U. S. STRATEGIC PERCEPTION OF PAKISTAN, 1971-1979

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Preface

Pak-U.S. relations have been one of the most important determinants of Indian foreign policy. When during the height of the cold war Pakistan was inducted into American alliance, Indian leaders had warned about the dangers of bringing the Super Power rivalry into an otherwise unaffected region.

From the very beginning of the alliance itself, India has been wary of the fall out, this security relation could produce on the subcontinent. True to its fears, the Pak-U.S. security relations had a very decisive role to play in the emboldening of Pakistan foreign policy and a prominent share in the enhancement of its defense capabilities that resulted in two major wars in South Asia. Hence Pak-U.S. strategic links have been a matter of intense interest to India.

In the 1950's Pak-U.S. relations were fortified by three different security links. Pakistan was then considered to be an important "link" in U.S. encirclement strategies. But with the dawning of the 1960's Pakistan's importance for the United States declined. It continued to further decline for the next two decades until the late 1970's when the United States "perceived" that its virtual dominance in the oil-rich region of the Persian Gulf was being threatened by a growing Soviet influence.

The present study covers the years 1971-1979, a period of fluctuating American perception of Pakistan. During the early 1970's the United States had apparently envisaged no strategic role for Pakistan although Washington worked to preserve its security ties with its ally in South Asia. For , the United States considered Pakistan to be a nation of potential usefulness. The feeling that the time has come to renew American strategic links with Pakistan emerged after 1975 when the Soviet Union began to further its foreign policy objectives with unprecedented boldness. However, Carter who was elected to the White House in 1976 did not share this growing opinion about Pakistan's usefulness and until almost the last year of his incumbency, Pak-U.S. relations were bedevilled primarily by the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. Nevertheless, outside the Administration, Pakistan's usefulness for the United States was being highlighted.

It finally led to the second phase in U.S.-Pak strategic co-operation which most starkly began after the 27 December 1979 Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. This crisis only precipitated the emerging trend and lent credibility to the voices that underlined the need to enlist Pakistani cooperation in any future American strategy towards West Asia. The longer range implications of the formation of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the intensification of opposition to the Shah in Iran as

also the increasing naval capabilities of the Soviet Union had triggered a revival of interest in Washington in new modalities for responding to a variety of possible threats.

The present study, however, ends with this development that has had and might continue to have far-reaching consequences on South Asian nations. Therefore, this work deals primarily with the low and transitory phases of American perception of Pakistan. Because of the period of the study, one of the difficulties faced during the course of the present work was the scarcity of primary source material. Especially when a work deals with strategic aspects and more so when the perception is low or shifting, details are not easily forthcoming. Most of the behind-the-scenes goings on are "classified" and hence access is virtually nil at this time. The bits and pieces that emerged in various statements and documents had to be sewed together. Therefore this work will inevitably suffer from that inadequacy. It should also be mentioned that the present study deals primarily with American strategic interests of Pakistan. Its impact on India, except in the last part of the conclusion, is dealt with only inasmuch as it is necessary to understand the Pak-U.S. strategic relations.

Before concluding my preface, I would like to avail of this opportunity to acknowledge that it was a matter of privilege to have worked under Professor M.S. Venkataramani.

I will consider myself fortunate to have been afforded the opportunity to work under Professor Venkateramani who unremittingly encourages his students to attain high standards of research, independent and critical interpretation and literary craftsmanship.

Among friends, I owe my thanks to my good friend Al Pachino who was a source of great inspiration and assistence. My thanks are also due to D.R. Subodh and Ashok Raj who untiringly listened to my arguments. Last but not least, I must thank my parents for virtually everything. Without their understanding I would not have been able to undertake this work.



Thomas Mathew

Chapter I

PAKISTAN IN THE UNITED STATES' ALLIANCE SYSTEM

The Cold War

It was the morning of 5 August 1945 in Hiroshima Japan. At 8.15 plus 17 seconds an American air force bomber, Enola Gay, performed a very unique mission; the dazed co-pilot of the bomber, Captain A. Lewis, exclaimed: "My God, what have we done."[1] It was his reaction to the flash of the first atomic bomb to be dropped over any nation. The teeming industrial city of Nagasaki was the second target of the attack. A war-weary world initially viewed with relief the swift end of a horrendous and prolonged war. But the onset of the age of the atom bomb was soon to have sombre implications. Out of the debris of the Second World War soon emerged a new war, the cold war. The allied powers who fought to destroy a common enemy found themselves beset by growing rivalry and animosity. The war-time honeymoon was shattered and the Soviet Union and the United States began viewing each other as adversaries. The two huge and mighty nations geared themselves for a determined effort to preserve and promote the gains of the war to extend their influence wherever possible in the deadly game of racing towards hegemony. In

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1. Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II, "The Ultimate Weapon", in Readers Digest: Illustrated Story of World War II (New York, 1969), p. 513.

the very early phase the erstwhile allies snarled at each other as they sought to maintain assured control of the areas in Europe and the Far East that each had occupied. During this phase, other areas like the Indian subcontinent which had not figured as active combat theatres during the war did not figure as issues of conflict and rivalry between the two antagonists who were later to become known as the Super Powers.

Even before the war had concluded tensions had developed between the United States and the Soviet Union on a variety of issues. Among American policy makers there was growing opinion that the era of cooperation with the Soviet Union could not last for long and was likely to be followed by an era of confrontation. It was recognised that an antagonistic Soviet Union, given its geographical location, size, population and resources would be a more formidable adversary than had been confronted by the United States in all its history. In view of its own geographical location, the United States felt it necessary to launch a strong effort, firstly for closer association with the countries of Western Europe and subsequently with as many other countries as possible elsewhere, especially those close to the borders of the Soviet Union. Against the ideology of what American leaders depicted as "international communism" they introduced the concept of the "free world" with themselves as the leaders thereof.

The United States leading the "free world" shed its historical rejection of alliances. In this new found role in real politik, the U.S. in successive phases evolved the alliance system which led to a phase of bipolarization in world politics. Out of the American perception of Soviet military potential, of the Communist ideology and of Stalin as a "kind of Byzantine Hitler pursuing hegemony with more circumspection but no less determination than the Nazis"[2] there emerged an American policy ostensibly directed at stemming the "International Communist Conspiracy" directed from Moscow and also at the same time, safeguarding the position of military and economic pre-eminence that the United States had attained at the end of the war. Increasing realisation that the Chinese under the leadership of Mao Zedong were likely to emerge victorious in the civil war in that country aggravated American anxieties. The geopolitical implications of a Soviet dominated communist empire stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic Sea to the Himalayas was viewed as serious enough to call for energetic measures that came to be characterized as the "containment" policy. Ensuring the security of Western Europe and of Japan and safeguarding access to the vital oil resources of West Asia were regarded as the highest priority objectives of American planners. In view of the decisive edge the United

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2. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Maryland, 1967), p. 34.

States had in naval and airpower and more especially in view of monopolistic possession of the atomic bomb, American planners in the early post-war period were confident that the Soviet Union was unlikely to involve itself in direct military confrontation. The backing down of the Soviet Union in the face of American demands concerning the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran and Soviet claims on Turkey concerning the Dardenelles illustrated the disparity on overall military power between the two adversaries during that period. However, the recognition that the Soviet Union was bound to acquire a nuclear capability of its own in time prompted the United States to initiate a rapid programme of reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan and the administration of a clear warning to the Soviet Union in the form of the so called "Truman Doctrine".

The Truman Doctrine's immediate emphasis was on Greece and Turkey. Through an infusion of economic and military aid under the supervision of American civilians and military advisers the United States responded to the crises in these two nations and indicated American willingness to assist other "free peoples" who might face a threat of Soviet aggression or Communist-inspired "internal subversion".

It was not Greece or Turkey but the erstwhile major powers of Western Europe that the United States deemed to be of critical importance in its confrontation with the USSR.

The prevention of Soviet expansion in West Europe, that is, the maintenance of a predominant U.S. influence in the vital region was a task of highest priority.

Though Europe was devastated, it still was the second most powerful industrial bastion in the world and a repository of trained personnel and resources. With Western Europe as its associate, the United States would have an even greater edge over the Soviet Union. Military strategists underlined the indispensability of Europe for the security of the United States as they viewed that the area could be used for "forward defence" and for the exploitation of its superiority in air-atomic power.

In February 1948 a Communist coup took Prague straight into the Soviet orbit. And within four months of the coup in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin in an attempt to wrest the control of that city from the Western nations. To the United States these developments were enough proof that economic reconstruction alone would not suffice to immunise the war-torn nations of Europe from the Soviet Union. If European nations were to economically recover as viable entities, them firstly security had to be guaranteed. The solution came in the form of a collective security organisation named the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949. Although this was not the first U.S.-sponsored security treaty

to be concluded after the Second World War, it was the first to be engineered strictly in the context of the rivalry between the two most powerful nations with the specific objective of deterring the other.[3] Because of the perceived Soviet threat in Western Europe, deterrent alliances "lost their stigma in American eyes and gained the aura of an instrument of international order".[4]

Western Europe was obviously United States' number one priority area and with the conclusion of NATO in 1949, a strategy combining both economic and military prescriptions was well under way. In comparison there was no similar strategy evolved on an urgent basis to protect perceived American interests in other areas. Nevertheless, the United States considered it important to guard Japan and the nations of West Asia against Soviet influence.

On the other hand, South Asia was perceived to be one of the least important areas for the United States, while Africa was even lower in the order of priorities. Neither was there any Communist threat nor any predominant American economic or military interests in the South Asian region. It was considered to be safely tucked away from the areas of

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3. The Rio Pact and the Bogota Charter of the OAS concluded in 1947 were the first two treaties signed by the U.S. after the Second World War.

4. Osgood, n. 2, p. 34.

contention between the Soviet Union and the United States. Although just about the same time Chiang-Kai-shek faced imminent defeat in the neighbourhood of South Asia, U.S. planners felt that they could cope with the situation.

Both India and Pakistan, the two largest nations of South Asia, after their independence from Britain, adopted democratic forms of governments under the broad framework of the British Commonwealth. The two nations of South Asia were totally dependent on Britain for matters of defence and economic support. More assuring was the fact that British legacy in South Asia appeared to have provided an inbuilt resistance against the spread of Communism in these nations. For instance, the first Indian Home Minister was considered to be an avowed "anti-Communist". Moreover, India's economy was integrated into the Sterling bloc. British influence was the most glaring in case of the elites of South Asia. This class preferred "British schooling for its children, and English for its dinner conversation".[5]

Another factor responsible for Washington's assignment to South Asia a low importance was the Soviet perception of the region. The Soviet Union deemed that their influence in this area mattered little in its confrontation with the U.S. and hence was unworthy of much attention. Thus, Washington already burdened by its commitments in Europe and faced with the

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5. Wayne Wilcox, "American Policy Towards South Asia", Asian Affairs (London), vol. 60, no. 2, June 1973, p. 128.

necessity of re-orienting its policy in China, neither found any immediate urgency to evolve a strategy nor any need to increase its influence in the area. It regarded the area as falling under the responsibility of Great Britain---the reliable junior partner of the United States on the world scene.

The Changing American Perception

Beginning in 1949, this low American perception of South Asia changed alongside a change in the general perception of Asia. The victory of the revolutionary Communist forces led by Mao Zedong in China in 1949, Communist China's proclaimed alignment with Moscow, the North Korean invasion of South Korea and the subsequent involvement of China in the conflict became important developments that were to influence change in the American thinking. The fall of Chiang-Kai-Shek in China gave birth to a new Communist nation in Asia. As a result, the U.S. realised that it would have to now checkmate the strength of China in Asia and the Soviet Union in Europe; China adding to the Soviet strength, its enormous size, the backing of its mammoth population, resources, and above all the influence that a revolutionary regime inebriated by victory could bring to bear upon Soviet foreign policy.

The United States had unflinchingly supported Chiang-Kai-Shek through the course of the civil war making Mao Zedong, the father of the revolution, a more militant anti-U.S.

leader.[6] Despite the common ideological outlook existing between China and the Soviet Union, the United States entertained the hope that the two giants might not challenge the United States as one force. Conflicting national interests and territorial issues, some senior American planners contended, would ultimately lead to a clash between the Communist nations. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, "predicted that Russia's appetite for a sphere of influence in northern China would alienate Chinese nationalism" and make Mao a "potential Tito".[8] Preparations were even afoot in Washington to review the American support for Chiang-Kai-Shek's forces which had fled to Formosa and to recognise the People's Republic of China. Such steps were considered necessary if the United States had to avoid a further hardening of Mao's anti-American posture. The United States believed that if it toned down its support for Mao's enemies, the United States would be successful in diverting the expected awakening of Chinese nationalism to historic memories of loss of territory to Russia. If the United States did not stop Mao's forces from pursuing Chiang's forces into Formosa (which it was sure to do unless stopped by the U.S.) and underwrite Formosa's security then it was deemed that the U.S. stood good chances of improving its

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6. John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, 1965), p. 85.

7. The U.S. perceived that Soviet Union was inclined to detach areas from the northern province of China and attach it to Soviet Union. Outer Mongolia was already in Soviet hands. Secretary of State Acheson, specially, believed that Soviet Union had such intentions in Manchuria, inner Mongolia and Sinkiang as well. Spanier, n. 6, p. 84.

8. Ibid., p. 85.

relations with the People's Republic of China. As a consequence, though the birth of the People's Republic of China increased American anxiety abroad and further hardened the American anti-Communist posture, it did not, however, bring about any dramatic change in the nature of the containment policy or the re-arrangement of priorities, much less the designation of other regions like South Asia as priority areas.

Similarly, with the hope that Washington could establish good relations with People's Republic of China the U.S. strongly resisted British, Australian and the Nationalist Chinese attempts to enlist American support and backing for bilateral treaties in South East Asia against Mao's forces.[9]

But the Korean War was the last nail in the coffin of such assumptions. All hopes of reconciling its relations with the People's Republic of China were shattered. China in the American eyes became a nation more dangerous than Soviet Union when China sent its 'volunteers' to fight alongside North Korean troops. The new threat was seen as a powerful aggressive communist nation in Asia.

The withdrawal of American troops from Korea after the Second World War under the belief that the Soviet Union

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9. Osgood, n. 2, p. 76.

threatened Korea or any other nation in Asia, then the superior American Air Force and Navy would be the answer was now seen as a cardinal mistake. To the military strategists especially, this war was mainly attributable to the omission of Korea from the officially declared perimeter running from Japan through the Philippines to Australia and other vital interests such as the NATO area and Latin America. For the United States this war also meant that China should be contained in Asia as the Soviet Union in Europe. And as a logical extension of this thought, the Korean War underscored for the U.S., the necessity of making known the American resolve to stop "communist expansionism" whether in Asia or in Europe, or in any other part of the world, whether pushed by Soviet Union or by China. After the Korean War, a collective security organization similar in lines to the one concluded in Europe was seen as the best solution. The underlying objective was to make known to any potential agressor in "advance that, if he does not exercise self-control, he may face a hard fight, perhaps a losing fight."[10] Thus, the object of immediate priority for the U.S. after the Korean War was the conclusion of a series of defence agreements in Asia, bringing the cold war hitherto considered a European phenomenon into the Asian continent.

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10. Dulles quoted in Ibid., p. 76.

By the time the Korean War ended, the American public showed signs of war weariness. Public opinion indicated that public backing would be hard to enlist if the United States went about fighting local wars. A way had to be found to use American troops only as the last resort. If the Communist nations could be deterred then it was thought that the question of using American forces would never arise. Alliances, the U.S. conceived, would create "local situations of strength". But this alone was considered inadequate to prevent the Communist powers from starting wars. The answer they sought was located in the potential use of U.S. nuclear weapons in wars both big and small. Thus the Eisenhower-Dulles Administration which was then in power, announced as an adjunct to the formation of alliances, the adoption of the nuclear strategy of "Massive Retaliation".[11] Taken together, the alliance system and the strategy of massive retalliation were designed to serve as a measure to foreclose another American intervention in Asia.

Coming shortly after the Korean War, the French defeat injected a sense of urgency to the American search for a new anti-Communist strategy in Asia. The United States had done

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11. Speaking before the Council on Foreign Affairs in New York on 12 January 1954, Dulles enunciated the doctrine of Massive Retaliation. This strategic doctrine was meant to act as a deterrent by implying that the U.S. would counter Communist expansion by unleashing its nuclear might.

everything short of direct intervention to save the French from defeat in Vietnam. The United States had in the last days of the French defeat in Vietnam, absorbed seventy five per cent of the cost of the war, sent military transport planes to fly men and supplies to the embattled French garrisons and even went to the extent of warning China through thinly veiled threats that the United States would not idly stand by while the French were being defeated. Now that the Korean War was over, China ignored the American warnings and continued to support the Vietminh forces with military supplies. The result was that France faced an ignominous defeat and staged a hasty withdrawal from Indo-China following the Geneva Conference which brought the colonial war to an end. Faced with this new reality, U.S. initiative, backing and support in the area was considered to be the only feasible means of preventing "Communist forces" from having a free hand in the perceived vacuum created by the French withdrawal.

Unlike in Europe where the emphasis on security was only in as much as it was necessary to facilitate a peaceful economic reconstruction of European nations, in Asia, the emphasis on security was so intense that economic development was relegated to secondary importance. The focus was on the creation of "local defence forces ... with U.S. forces held in reserve."[12]

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12. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (London, 1972), pp. 89-90.

Alongside the changing American perception of Asia, India and Pakistan which had been considered as safe as they were unimportant, were now being thought of as nations which could aid the U.S. in this new scheme. The modest emphasis on economic and humanitarian aid which had characterised the American concern for South Asia after the Second World War now appeared to be inadequate. An increased economic and military aid with a protective "nuclear umbrella" was offered to India and Pakistan.[13] In brief, the Korean War and the defeat of the French in Indo-China had the effect of the hardening of American attitude into "undifferentiated and militaristic anti-communism."[14]

Pakistan's Earnestness and India's Unwillingness

Historically, Pakistan appeared to be pursuing a policy of benign aloofness in the growing distrust and animosity between the two Super Powers during the initial years of the cold war. However, in a forthcoming work[15] on "The American Role in Pakistan", Professor M.S. Venkataramani of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, reveals on the basis of his examination of top level internal documents of the various

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13. Wayne, n. 5, p. 128.

14. Robert G. Wesson, Foreign Policy for a New Age (Boston, 1977), p. 22.

15. M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan: 1947-1958 (New Delhi, 1982). (The book is expected to be released in May 1982).

government agencies of the United States, that the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, even before the creation of that nation had initiated moves designed to obtain large quantities of military and economic aid once Pakistan was created.

In this effort, Jinnah, two weeks after the creation of Pakistan, made secret contacts through his emissaries with the Truman Administration. It is also revealed in the same work, that Jinnah was prepared to convert Pakistan into virtually a vassal state if the United States acceded to Pakistan's aid requests. Pakistan made its willingness known that it was ready to make sacrifices in the American efforts to contain "Communism". At this juncture, however, the Pakistani efforts met with a humiliating negative response from the U.S. Washington had a low perception of Pakistan as it deemed that the new nation would not be of any use in its global containment strategies. The United States under these circumstances evaluated that it would serve no purpose to undertake arms and economic aid to Pakistan and in that process alienate India.

Having failed in the efforts to enlist American help, Pakistan conceived that a new and economically weak nation in an area of unimportance for both the great powers would not be viewed as being one of any importance for either of the Super Powers and therefore did not stand to gain from the

confrontation. Apart from its evaluation of the outcome of the great power rivalry, it had neither any special affinity, historical or otherwise, nor any disdain for either of the great powers. Pakistan's foreign policy determinants were clearly found in its historical and geographical moorings, both of which primarily contributed to Pakistan's dread of India. Thus, when the Communist forces overthrew Chiang-Kai-Shek, Pakistan thought it expedient to quickly recognise Mao's regime, lest it should imply any Pakistani disapproval of the new regime in its neighbourhood. By the same token it refused to brand China as an aggressor in the Korean War although it had initially lent its support to the resolution in the United Nations branding North Korea so.

Since the United States was unwilling to extend Pakistan any large scale aid, the new Muslim nation outwardly showed that it had no intentions of taking sides in the Super Power rivalry. Consequently, Pakistan made it appear that it was adopting a foreign policy posture that was almost akin to India's non-alignment. It was only Pakistan's criticism of the Western scheme of the division of Palestine that was more critical than India's.[16] Such appeared to be the Pakistani stance. But India was given more attention than Pakistan by the U.S. press. Its slightly more moralistic

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16. Barnds, n. 12, p. 91.

end outspoken criticism received more coverage in the U.S. This besides eliciting the American ire had the branch effect of attracting support for Pakistan in the U.S.

Initially, the United States viewed India as a potential ally in the region. India's size, natural resources and its population were all considered to be the best available consortium of strength-imparting factors that could be marshalled against China in the East. From the appointment of envoys[17] to the extension of invitation[18] to heads of governments, the U.S. initially accorded India significantly more importance than Pakistan. India's leadership found special favour in the United States. The American admiration for Jawaharlal Nehru was clearly demonstrated during his visit to the United States in October 1949. The Indian leader was likened to America's George Washington and the Washington Post called Nehru "the world's most popular individual."[19] On the whole, the treatment meted out to him was the kind that was normally reserved for statesman from close allies

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17. While Charle W. Lewis the Consul General in Karachi was raised to the status of Consul and Charge d' Affairs ad interim pending the appointment of an Ambassador, a senior diplomat, Henry F. Grady was appointed as U.S. Ambassador to India.

18. The Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was the first head of government from South Asia to be invited to the United States. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, on the other hand, was only extended an invitation after Moscow had already invited him.

19. Cited in S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London, 1973), p. 120.

of the U.S. And as for India it was "visualised ... as the counterpart of America in the East."[20]

These American overtures to India came at a time when Pakistan was desperately attempting to formulate a policy which could best secure if not assure a continuous supply of weapons to safeguard its security. And for her security meant and still means its military might vis-a-vis India. Pakistan fully believed that India had not reconciled itself to the partition that created it and that India's aim was to either absorb or convert it into a satellite state. There is no doubt that certain remarks[21] of some Indian leaders had further fuelled the Pakistani suspicion that had initially emerged because of Indian leaders' earlier opposition to the creation of Pakistan. But Pakistan was never prepared to accept the Indian government's stand that India had no territorial ambitions in Pakistan. Therefore its security concerns became a matter of psychosis with Pakistan's leaders.

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20. Ibid.

21. For instance, Acharya Kriplani who was the President of the Indian National Congress, declared in 1947 that "neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a united India", Amrit Bazar Patrika, 18 August 1947 cited in Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London, 1967), p. 115. Similarly, India's first Home Minister, Sardar V.B. Patel, is reported to have said "sooner than later, we shall be united in common allegiance to our country", cited in Ibid., pp. 115-6.

Initially, Pakistan sought security within the Commonwealth hoping that a Republican India would not qualify for Commonwealth membership and hence it would stand a good chance of obtaining enough arms and equipment from Britain. Another strategy adopted by Pakistan was designed to gain the confidence and support of the Muslim nations and the erstwhile colonies. Pakistan's condemnation of the Western scheme for the creation of Israel should be seen in this light. But this policy of Pakistan did not make much headway as the Arab nations were quite distrustful of Pakistan's true motives.[22] Compounding the problem of its security was the Pushtunistan dispute and a belligerent Afghanistan. Under these circumstances Pakistan perceived that its security would have to be ensured with outside support. For this it was prepared to pay a price.

Given the Pakistani obsession with security, the American attempt to woo India was the cause of considerable consternation in Pakistan. She feared that any American effort to strengthen India would be a grave threat to its security. Receiving no concrete assurances from the Arabs and disappointed by India's membership in the Commonwealth, Pakistan viewed India's spurning of the U.S. overtures seeking a special relationship with India, as an opportunity too good

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22. Barnds, n. 12, p. 77.

to be ignored. Pakistan realised that if it could have itself inducted into American alliances, it would benefit from large scale arms and economic aid as other nations aligned with the U.S. were the beneficiaries thereof. Moreover, the prospects of being the world's most powerful nation's ally was considered a factor that could be of great importance for Pakistan's virtually non-existent international status.

With this objective in view, Pakistani leaders tailored their official statements alluding to the alleged global Communist threat to establish identity of views with the Western powers on this count. Simultaneously, Pakistan also started extending its support for the various moves that were being taken by the U.S. to subvert the alleged Communist intentions. On the other hand, the Indian leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru through his pronouncements angered many Americans. According to Justice Douglas, President Truman himself laboured under the notion that Jawaharlal Nehru was a "Communist".[23] The Indian leader condemned the bipolarisation of the world and the creation of military blocs and declared that the greatest threat to the third world nations came from "imperialism".

Nevertheless, India's initial support in joining the West in declaring that North Korea was the aggressor generated

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23. Parade Magazine, St. Paul Sunday Pioneer Press, 6 August 1967. Cited in Burke, n. 19, p. 151.

considerable support for India in the United States. This was, however, short-lived. India's refusal to condemn China for its role in the Korean War spread a pall among India's friends in the United States. While on the other hand, although Pakistan did not condemn China for its role in the Korean War, it nevertheless was the only Asian nation to hold that the UN troops should not have stopped at the 38th Parallel but crossed over to the northern part as well. Writing about the Indian stance the New York Times echoed:

> One can feel certain that history will condemn the Nehru policy as well intentioned but timid, short-sighted and irresponsible.[24]

In the same vein, the same paper called Jawaharlal Nehru the "lost leader" and referred to Pakistan as America's "one sure friend in South Asia."[25]

To the United States it was unimaginable how a democracy like India could be blind to the implications of the Chinese involvement in the Korean War. The United States on its part began to contemplate ways to make Japan secure. It quickly convened a conference in San Francisco to conclude the Japanese Peace Treaty along with a "security agreement"

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24. New York Times, 12 October 1950. Cited in R.C. Gupta, U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan (Delhi, 1977), p. 6.

25. New York Times, 15 September 1951. Cited in Burke, n. 19, p. 135.

with Japan. While Pakistan attended the Japanese Treaty Conference, India's refusal to attend it and above all the criticism of the Western move was the proverbial last straw in the view of the Truman Administration.

The growing disenchantment with the Indian attitude toward Communist powers and the Indian criticism of the various U.S. moves transformed Indo-U.S. relations. The election to the White House of the former American General with a "military mentality", Dwight David Eisenhower, and the appointment of John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State, quickened the pace of the emerging American perception of India and Pakistan. For, the Republican Administration came to power with a promise that the Far East would no more be ignored. During his inaugural address, Eisenhower made it clear that the "proven friends of Freedom"—meaning nations which shared with Washington its abhorrence for the Communist system—would find special favour in Washington.[26]

The Secretary of State "saw the struggle against Communism as a moral crusade".[27] He appeared to believe that a nation could either be pro-Soviet or pro-U.S. and India because it did not support America's cold war schemes, became pro-Communist in effect. As a consequence of this

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26. Burke, n. 19, p. 159.

27. Ibid., p. 157.

simplistic deduction, Nehru's appreciation of the merits of the Soviet system was seen as Indian support for the Soviet Union, when Nehru himself did not favour such a model for India. The American leaders were so tinted in their perception that they equated the Indian Prime Minister's proclivity for Socialism with endorsement of the Soviet variety. Ironically, Nehru favoured "Fabian Socialism", an ideology which was the brain child of the Liberals of the United Kingdom, the closet ally of the United States. Likewise, India's policy of maintaining good neighbourly relations with China was taken amiss by Washington. The Indian effort at bettering relations with China, notwithstanding the Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1950 and the conclusion in 1954 of the Sino-Indian treaty was misunderstood in the United States. The numerous cultural exchanges and professions of lasting good relations between India and China which followed the treaty further fuelled American suspicions of India's true intentions. But the fact was that India refused to be drawn into the vortex of American containment policies. This did not however indicate a conflict of interest between the two nations, but only a difference in perception as to the sources of potential threats. But seen through the prism of the cold war, Indian policies appeared inclined towards Communist powers and antagonist to the U.S.

In contrast to the Indian position to what U.S. considered important for its security, Pakistan's purported

identity of views with the U.S. and support for its various moves were too striking to have no impact in the United States. Pakistan presented itself as the only hope in South Asia. It was not that U.S. deliberately chose to align with Pakistan and ignored India, but India deliberately chose not to align with the U.S. The reality was that "if India was relatively unimportant to the American global strategy of the 1950's, Pakistan was absolutely insignificant unless it was an ally."[28]

The Induction of Pakistan

By 1951, the U.S. viewed Pakistan as the only nation in South Asia that was willing to join the Western nations to challenge the "Communist threat". The Pakistani support for American policies had by now generated considerable support for Pakistan among many Congressmen and officials of the government of the U.S. The Pentagon in December 1951 received approval to negotiate with Pakistan a limited arms assistance agreement. Beginning then, the U.S. Air Force evinced interest in sites for potential bases in Pakistan. The U.S. did not, however, intend to create any alliances immediately. But with the election of the Republican President in early 1953 such a creation became a distinct possibility.

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28. Wayne, n. 5, p. 77.

The coming to power of Mohammed Ali of Bogra, the former Pakistani Ambassador in Washington and a staunch advocate of closer relations with United States as the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the appointment of John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State in the new Republican Administration in Washington provided an ideal setting in the form of the meeting of minds. Dulles believed that all nations which opposed Communism should have a privileged place in American policies and Mohammed Ali saw in closer relations with U.S., a short cut to international prestige and military power.

The United States clearly viewed the Korean War as an evidence of the Soviet Union and China's aggressive intentions. Therefore, when in 1954 the Soviet Union suddenly exploded a thermonuclear device breaking the U.S. monopoly, it sent waves of intense fear into the minds of the American public. For the first time the U.S. was faced with an "aggressive" enemy in possession of a weapon of dreadful potential. Fearing that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to use this weapon against the West, the U.S. evolved in view of this possibility, a new strategy to counter the new Soviet threat. The fact that in case of a Soviet nuclear attack the U.S. stood to lose[29] more than the Soviet Union,

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29. The reason was that 75 per cent of American industry and 50 per cent of its population were concentrated in 190 metropolitan cities.

added a sense of urgency to the search for ways to neutralise the potential of this mighty weapon in the hands of its enemy. "To most Americans the issue at stake was nothing less than national survival."[30]

To counter this new threat, military strategists argued that the United States should establish a string of bases around the Soviet Union and China. This new strategy which came to be known as the encirclement strategy, they conceived, would make it almost impossible for the Soviet Union to destroy the American retaliatory capacity by making it difficult to destroy all the bases simultaneously. To achieve this capability, the United States emphasised the importance of bases with close proximity to the Soviet Union and of Pakistan because of its geographical positioning. Some American officials and particularly certain Air Force officers regarded military bases in Pakistan as both "desirable and obtainable". The American Air Force contended that the U.S. had no air bases between Turkey and the Philippines and therefore "bases in Pakistan (or even the right to land on air strips in war time) would extend America's power to strike at the USSR thereby adding to the Soviet air defence problems".[31] In the face

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30. M.S. Venkataramani and Harish Chandra Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership", International Studies (Bombay), vol. 8, nos. 1-27, July-October 1966, p. 102.

31. Barnds, n. 12, p. 101.

of these strategic demands, the U.S. looked appreciatively at Pakistan which purportedly shared the American fear and was prepared to align with them in their effort to counter the Soviet threat.

Pakistan in the meanwhile had left no stone unturned in the effort to get closer to the U.S. In April 1954, it signed a treaty of Political Consultation and Cooperation with Turkey. Although this treaty was not a defence treaty it provided for mutual defence consultations, and it brought Pakistan closer to Turkey which was the linchpin of American defence in the Middle East. This in turn brought Pakistan within the general scheme of security parameters designed to take the containment policy into the Middle East. Pakistan certainly was not of primary importance to American security calculations in the Middle East and Asia. It was her strong battle-hardened army of over 250,000 men that was conceived by the U.S. to be of special military value. Just as Britain had depended on the subcontinent for troops for its security interests in the Middle East, the U.S. also viewed that the Pakistan army could be used in West Asia and elsewhere specially now (after the Korean war) that the U.S. had become reluctent to use her troops to fight local wars.

It was further viewed that the Pakistani army would best strengthen and compensate the poorly trained skeletal

military force in West Asia. According to Professor N.S. Venkataramani, Pakistan's usefulness for these purposes came to be determined by the Pentagon and the State Department in the context of the non-availability of the vital Suez base facility following the Egyptian revolution and the erosion of the Western position in Iran consequent on accession to power of Dr. Mossadegh. It was concluded that achieving a cooperative attitude on the part of Pak leaders called for offering the Pakistani army modern and sophisticated military equipment. In pursuance of this objective, the U.S. signed with Pakistan a Mutual Defence Agreement on 19 May 1954 to supply Pakistan with "such equipment, material services or other assistance" as it deemed necessary to strengthen Pakistan. Moreover the mood in Washington was to strengthen from within the nations in West Asia and the willing nations of the adjoining areas.

The United States shaken by the Korean war had already made an effort in 1951 to conclude in the Middle East a defence organisation. Egypt was to be made the bedrock of such a scheme. Its influence and large Suez base under British control was deemed to be necessary for the defence of the area. But the U.S. proposal could not have come at a more inappropriate time. For, at that time, Arab nationalism was at fever pitch and had clearly turned against the Western

powers, specially Britain, because its role in the division of Palestine for the creation of Israel. With Egypt unwilling to join hands with the Western nations, other countries of the Middle East also expressed their reluctance to go along with the American proposal. Therefore, strengthening a willing nation like Pakistan appeared to be the best U.S. could do at least for the time being.

In the meantime, the defeat of the French in Indo-China came as a big blow for the Western interests in South East Asia. The vacuum which was feared would follow the imminent French withdrawal prompted the military strategists to advocate the rallying of as many nations as possible under American leadership. The predominent line of thinking was that

> the U.S. should take all affirmative and practical steps, with or without its European allies to provide tangible evidence of Western strength and determination to defeat communism; ... and to secure the affirmative association of South East Asian states with these purposes.[32]

The anxiety of the Western powers was so dominating that within months of the French defeat a collective defence organisation (SEATO) was created on the eighth of December 1954. Not only did Pakistan, bordering on South East Asia

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32. Excerpts from Part II of the Special Committee Report on South East Asia, 6 April 1954, The Pentagon Papers (London, 1971), p. 337.

as the Middle East seemed to be a logical member. it was also plausible that Pakistan's membership was considered to be a potential link between the SEATO and any similar pact Washington intended to create in the Middle East just as Turkey would be the link between the NATO and the Middle East defence organisation. However, according to Professor Ramani's findings, in the initial stages when American planners envisaged the setting of a South East Asian regional organisation, Pakistan did not figure at all as a prospective member. Within the top echelons of the Pakistan government and in the military forces too, there was hardly any enthusiasm for their countries involvement with the South East Asian military alliance which was clearly directed against China. However, there came a point where the United States came around to regarding Pakistan's membership as serving a useful purpose in terms of Asian support for the American venture. With only Thailand and the Philippines eager to join the organisation it was believed that "Pakistan would augment its Asian component".[33] Further, the Indian decision not to participate in American containment schemes made Pakistan's membership essential to the U.S. policy of encoureging inter-regional cooperation. The National Security Council issuing a policy statement on the "U.S. Objectives and the Courses of Action with Respect to South East Asia,

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33. Barnds, n. 12, p. 98.

held that the U.S. should

> ... continue to encourage closer cooperation among the countries of South East Asia, and between those countries and the United States, Great Britain, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Asia and Japan.[34]

Since Pakistan was the only South Asian country willing to join the United States, it became America's natural choice.

After having apparently "secured" the South East Asian region through SEATO, the United States turned its attention to West Asia to fill the gap in the deterrence between SEATO and NATO.

The U.S. was however, not new to the area. Shaken by Soviet attempts to create client states in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in 1946, the United States had concluded bilateral arms sales agreements with Saudi Arabia and Iran. The U.S. in 1949 had also established a small naval presence in the area and later a Strategic Air Command recovery base at Dhahran.

With the cold war hotting up, the United States concluded that its token force would be inadequate to counter major Communist threat in the region. The gravity

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34. Statement of policy by the National Security Council made in early 1952, on the "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to South East Asia", The Pentagon Papers, n. 32, p. 30.

of the American concern was evidenced by the visit of Secretary Dulles to eleven nations of West Asia and South Asia, in the first ever visit by an American Secretary of State, barely six months after his assumption of office in 1953. Dulles realised that cooperation of Arab nations would be hard to obtain. The conclusion of any collective defence organisation seemed as difficult as it was in 1951 when Arab nations had largely spurned the American move to conclude such an organisation. The new Administration in Washington was, however, of the opinion that the need for the establishment of such an organisation was more compelling now than in 1951.

South East Asia atleast looked secure after the conclusion of the SEATO. But West Asia appeared to the U.S. planners as the weakest link in the encirclement chain that was under implementation. Under these circumstances the United States felt that it should at least conclude a defence organisation comprising of the willing nations of West Asia. Iraq seemed the best placed nation in this new security scheme. Although Mossadegh was deposed in 1953, Iran, was busy trying to resolve its differences with the West and hence did not at this point favour joining any American defence pact. Moreover, Turkey was the most powerful nation in the area who was willing to join Iraq in the formation of a defence treaty to protect the Middle East. Added importance was attached to Turkey because of

its existing membership in the NATO and its 1954 treaty with Pakistan. Therefore, given the militant Arab nationalism and the extant Egyptian opposition, Pakistan's chances of being included in any Middle East defence scheme brightened.

By 1955 Pakistan had largely succeeded in improving its relations with fellow Muslim nations. Pakistan's eagerness to join the United States in the establishment of any defence organisation despite the anti-Western fervour propagated by countries like Egypt came as relief to the U.S. The aim was to link West Asia to NATO through Turkey and to SEATO through Pakistan. Giving expression to this plan, a Turkish-Iraqi Pact was signed in February 1955 with an anxious Britain joining in April 1955 to be followed by Pakistan in September. Thus was born yet another collective "security" organisation called the Baghdad Pact (later named CENTO after Iraq withdrew in 1958).

Although the U.S. was not a signatory of the pact, it was wholly an American creation. Nonetheless, anxious about its formal non-membership in the treaty, the U.S. Congress through a resolution in 1958 demonstrated the importance it attached to the area and the member nations. Paragraph four of this resolution authorized the United States government to enter into seperate agreements with the members of the CENTO in accordance with "existing Congressional authorization", for their security and defence. Drawing legitimacy from this resolution, the United States concluded bilateral agreements

with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. These agreements became effective in 1959. The operational clause of the agreement signed with Pakistan, read:

> The government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon and is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request.[35]

However, while naive Pakistanis might have regarded this agreement as a commitment by the United States to safeguard its territory and integrity by commiting American troops for the purpose, they failed to comprehend that "the existing Congressional authorization" was restricted to the use of U.S. forces only in the event of a "Communist aggression" and not in a conflict with a non-Communist neighbour, for instance.

Dulles was to a large extent responsible for assigning Pakistan the "link" function in the U.S. alliances and thereby increasing its importance for the United States. He was of the strong conviction that overlapping membership would help cooperation and consultations among the treaty members while

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35. Cited in Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York, 1965), p. 285.

strengthening the very purpose of these alliances. Besides helping to forge links between alliances, Pakistan was viewed as a Muslim nation well placed to help form a "belt of Muslim nations as a barrier against international communism and its design on West Asian oil".[36] Further influencing the American importance of Pakistan were the writings of British statesmen[37], especially those of Lord William Barton and Olaf Caroe, a former Governor of the North West Frontier Province. The former specifically underlined the perceived indispensable geographical and religious factors that qualified Pakistan to be the bedrock of any American security strategies to safeguard West Asia.

The Dual Perception and the Effect of U.S.-Pak Alliance

By 1959 Pakistan was well ensconced in U.S. containment devices. As described earlier, there existed in U.S.-Pak alliance a dual perception. From the very outset it was evident that Pakistan did not share the U.S. phobia for Communism and U.S. Pakistan's fearful distrust of its big neighbour, India. The two because of their obsessive concern for security sought the cooperation of the other not to

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36. Venkataramani and Arya, n. 29, p. 84.

37. Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the United States: Case History of a Mistake", Part I New Republic (Washington, D.C.), 10 August 1959, pp. 10-17.

achieve a common objective, but as a means to find a solution for the different causes of their insecurity. For U.S., Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India was of no concern and in fact Eisenhower had assured India that he would take immediate action if Pakistan used U.S. supplied arms in aggression against India. Its only intention was to strengthen Pakistan so that it could play an effective role in the American containment policy. On the other hand, Pakistan was not concerned where and how the Soviet Union succeeded in frustrating the American encirclement strategy. Thus the interests of both the nations converged in the desire to align with each other and then diverged as the objectives they sought to achieve through the alliance were not the same. In this lack of identity in their ultimate goals lay the cause for the flickerings in the strength of the Pak-U.S. alliance. Indeed, the security alliance contained the seeds of its own destruction.

It was not that the United States was not aware of the dual perception and Pakistan's motives in aligning with the U.S. But where the United States failed was in its exaggerated perception of the Pakistani fear of Communism and its under-estimation of Pakistan's itch to take on India at some appropriate time. American policy makers believed that although Pakistan was obsessed with the perceived Indian threat, it was no less fearful of the Communist powers.

Even Pakistan's stubborn insistence[38] to alter the wording of the SEATO treaty to make it applicable to all aggressions did not significantly alter American thinking.

Nevertheless, the alliance was beneficial to both U.S. and Pakistan. Pakistan obtained large quantities of arms and other forms of assistance which would have otherwise been difficult to come by. According to the de-classified defence records the United States revealed that it had given Pakistan eight times as much arms aid as it had in the case of India, ($ 671.6 million Vs. $ 82.9 million) during the period 1950-65.[39] This served Pakistan well for it "was perfectly willing to exchange base rights, treaty commitments, and her U.N. vote for a reliable flow of weapons and political support against India".[40] Once Pakistan became the beneficiary of a continued arms supply, American diplomatic support also followed as a corollary. Any other stand would have undermined Pakistan's resolve to play a constructive role in American security arrangements while threatening the efficacy, unity and cohesion of the U.S. alliances of which

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38. Because of Pakistan's relentless pressure, the text of the SEATO treaty was enlarged in scope to include within its ambit all aggressions. The U.S., however, ultimately succeeded in attaching an undertaking which meant that only Communist aggressions would automatically be deemed as a threat to its own security.

39. Asian Recorder (Delhi), vol.18, June 17-23, 1972, p. 10835

40. Cohen P. Stephen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", Strategic Digest (Delhi), vol. 7, no. 3, March 1977, p. 18.

it was a member. However, Professor Venkataramani argues in his study that such U.S. diplomatic support was more impressive in form than in substance in so far as the advancement of Pakistan's objectives were concerned. His assessment is that there is no evidence to be found in the internal records of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations to indicate any U.S. intention to support Pakistan in any adventurist course against India aimed even at the limited objective of getting for itself "Indian-held" Kashmir. Although initially the U.S. posture on Kashmir was not distinctly anti-Indian, the Soviet support of the Indian position in Kashmir slowly hardened their posture in terms of UN votes not because of any enmity towards India or because of any belief in the legitimacy of the Pakistani claim, but because of the Soviet support for India and the need to demonstrate to Pakistan and other small allies that the United States would not remain silent when their opponents receive Soviet support in the UN.

In return for U.S. weapons and support, Pakistan provided U.S. with two bases in Peshawar. One was the Bada Ber Air Force surveillance base and the other a monitoring base. Surveillance of the Soviet Union was considered militarily important especially in view of the fact that the U.S. had no other effective means to keep abreast of Soviet Union's growing military capabilities. This base served as the

staging area for the high flying U-2 reconnaissance aircrafts whose photography missions over Soviet Union and China were considered strategically indispensable. "The U-2 proved to be a source of intelligence on Russian industrial and military developments of inestimable value to the United States."[41] Further, an espionage and monitoring base was deemed strategically important to monitor Soviet and Chinese military movements and other military related activities. Diplomatically too, Pakistan reciprocated the American diplomatic support. Its pro-Western stand during the Suez Crisis of 1956 stood in stark contrast to its earlier stand on the division of Palestine for the creation of Israel. Even in regard to China, Pakistan exhibited a sudden change in policy. It reversed its earlier stand in the United Nations and identified with the U.S., voting for its "two China's" resolutions. Thus the United States was able to stem the Pakistani drift towards China. It may be opined that had not been for the American alliance, U.S. would not have been able to even temporarily stop Pakistan from moving closer to China and this could have probably had far reaching consequences during the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The U.S. used its leverage in Karachi to dissuade Pakistan from amassing troops in Kashmir or opening a diversionary front during the conflict. This

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41. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., The U.S. Intelligence Community (New York, 1978), p. 10.

ironically meant that the U.S.-Pak alliance which was largely detrimental to India, during the 1962 war, turned to India's benefit.

But the United States because of its alliance with Pakistan became slowly involved in a region characterised by acrimony between an ally and its larger neighbour with whom too the U.S. desired to maintain good relations. The consequence of this involvement was that America's prestige and reputation as a dependable ally was tied to a local conflict, the outcome of which was of little or no consequence[42] to the U.S. Further the U.S. alliance with Pakistan, its arms supply and diplomatic support had the inevitable effect of alienating India. India which had tried in vain to stop the induction of Pakistan into U.S. alliances, now alienated, had to look elsewhere for diplomatic and military support, prompting it to seek better relations with both U.S.S.R. and China. For instance, India renounced its rights in Tibet and recognised the Chinese claim to Tibet in its earnestness to remove any irritant that could possibly become an impediment in the improvement of their bilateral ties. The effect on India of U.S. support for Pakistan was predictable. The Indians knowing the purpose of Pakistan's re-armament as well as

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42. It is interesting to note that on the eve of President Ayub Khan's visit to the United States in December 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson likened the 1965 Indo-Pak war to the American civil war, Dawn (Karachi), 3 December 1965.

any one else, could only view the American motives at least misguided and at worst maleovolant.[43]

The Soviet Union which had under Stalin refused to evince much interest in the newly independent nations reversed its policy under Khrushchev venturing into the area to break the ring the U.S. had cast around her. Thus, although the U.S. had initially believed that the Indian discontent would be manageable, Washington found that its support for Pakistan had the effect of spawning exactly what the West sought to preclude — increased Soviet and Chinese influence in the region. India's response to the induction of Pakistan into U.S. alliances gave the Soviet's a bigger and stronger ally in South Asia. The Indian reaction to the Soviet involvement in Hungary in 1956 holds testimony to this fact.[44] Moreover, it brought the region closer to extra regional developments making India less receptive to anti-Soviet postures. On the other hand, the American course spawned a distrust for the United States in India, which to many critics of the U.S. policies, was the result of what they called the costliest American blunder in the region. In Pakistan too, discontent

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43. Stephen, n. 40, p. 19.

44. India was the only non-aligned nation to vote against the resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the holding of election there under the aegis of the UN.

grew with the realisation that membership of the Pacts was unlikely to ensure early solution of the Kashmir and the Pakhtunistan issues on the lines fervently desired by Pakistan.

Chapter II

SHIFTING U.S. PRIORITIES IN ASIA

Implications for Pakisten of Washington's Changing Posture

The 1960s on the whole can be considered a watershed in international relations. This decade witnessed the abatement of the brinkmanship policies of the cold war. Although the 1960s was a period of transition from the politics of cold war, the 1970s was a decade of "compulsive negotiations" or detente. No single factor can be pinpointed as the cause for this change in thinking. Factors even beyond the control of both the Super Powers were responsible for the realisation that the old policies were ill-suited to the changed circumstances.

Inevitably, along with the change in the perception of the Super Powers, a re-alignment of forces and a review of the cost and benefits of the reliance on military alliances was only natural. The strategy of fostering alliances and militarily strengthening the non-Communist nations in non-priority areas chiefly for the military contributions they could make, lost credibility. The perceived threat which accompanied the cold war thinking became less convincing and the equally strong conviction that the People's Republic of China would destabilise every non-Communist state in Asia unless militarily prevented, slowly ebbed.

The decisive factor contributing to such a perception on the part of the United States and its Western allies was the increasing evidence of the split between the Soviet Union and China. The growing rupture between the two Communist giants increasingly made it evident that they were unlikely to act together in an anti-American venture outside their borders in Asia and equally unlikely to act seperately. Taking advantage of the situation, the United States set about responding to Soviet approaches for a relaxation of tensions with the objective of bringing about some Soviet concession in respect of European issues.

Not all the allies were regarded as of continuing importance in the changing context. The importance of America's allies in the critical area of Western Europe remained largely unaffected. On the other hand, allies in regions of only peripheral interest lost their importance for the United States. Pakistan was one such nation. This was primarily because the United States had no significant economic or military interests in Pakistan or in South Asia for that matter. United States' trade[1] with Pakistan was almost negligible and neither did it have any large economic investments in this South Asian nation nor was Pakistan the source of any strategic minerals. Even during the height of the cold war, South Asia's importance was only "derivative". Policy makers assessed it in terms of the extent to which

1. For instance, in 1970, U.S. trade with Pakistan amounted to only about .484 per cent of its total trade, or $405 million. Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 1971 (Washington, D.C., 1971), pp. 768-70.

U.S. policies in the region could affect other areas of greater American interest such as West and South East Asia. South Asia being an area of only marginal importance, Pakistan was not important for the United States except for a brief interlude when it had some reconnaissance and monitoring bases in Pakistan. Thus, when it appeared that the Communist powers would not be in a position to pursue "expansionist" policies, especially in Asia, there appeared to be no meaning in continuing Washington's military strengthening of these nations whose importance was only in as much as they could contribute to the encirclement policy. The "tense jockeying for tactical advantage around the globe" which characterised the cold war days was now replaced by subtler strategies.[2]

The Soviet Union had under Stalin relied heavily on military power to back up Soviet policies. But after his death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev who succeeded Stalin as the First Secretary of the Communist Party and later in 1957 replaced Marshal Bulganin as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, announced a programme of "peaceful competition" with the West. Because of this shift to non-confrontationist tactics to promote its goals and the minuscule force of Communist parties in the nations of South Asia that prevented

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2. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 3 May 1973, in Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 68, 4 June 1973, p. 718.

any capture of power in these countries, "the declaratory policy rhetoric of American containment doctrine became less credible"[3] as regards South Asia.

Further, both the Super Powers had accumulated enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other many times over. It was reckoned that a nuclear confrontation would leave no victors and it dawned on the Super Powers that if the cold war policies were allowed to continue, direct confrontation between them was a probability. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 specially drove home this point.

Alongside these developments, the decade after the Cuban crisis, witnessed an unprecedented growth in Soviet military might which eroded the American military superiority. Faced with the approach of parity, the Super Powers recognised that peace between them would rest on the tenuous concept of "Mutual Assured Destruction". As a result, "intense anti-Communism in the United States and anti-Capitalism in the Soviet Union became identified with total war and hence with self destruction."[4] Under such circumstances when the cold war enmities were sought to be tempered down and there appeared to be no direct Communist threat, Pakistan, whose

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3. Wayne Wilcox, "American Policy Towards South Asia", Asian Affairs (London), vol. 60, June 1973, p. 131.

4. John P. Cooper, "Asia and a New International System", Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol. 5, no. 3, April 1974, p. 394.

utility rested on the contribution it could make to the containment policy in an area of relative unimportance, was relegated by American planners to the status of a vestige. Another important factor that further contributed to the low American perception of Pakistan was the fact that, especially after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Soviet-U.S. rivalry had become irrelevant as far as South Asia was concerned as both the Super Powers were by then interested in containing China.[5]

In addition to the change in the Soviet strategy, the fact that after the Korean war there was no direct threat from either China or the Soviet Union for over one and a half decades, changed the American public opinion which had hitherto largely supported a hardline military policy. Thus, while in 1954 over 75 per cent of the American people considered the Soviet Union as a "highly unfavourable nation", by the year 1973 the percentage of people who viewed Moscow with distrust was only 30.[6] In the same vein, while the fear of the Soviet Union and the threat of war was the predominant concern of the public in the 1950s and early 1960s, by 1973, only 3 out of every 100 persons considered the same threat relevant.

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5. Wilcox, n. 3, p. 132.

6. U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Choices for the Seventies and Eighties (Washington, D.C., 1976), p.6.

The process of detente with the Soviet Union proceeded despite the prolonged involvement of the United States in the Vietnam war. It was in the context of Sino-Soviet hostility that the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations planned and executed the Vietnam adventure. The expectation was that with direct Soviet or Chinese intervention precluded, the United States would be able by the application of military force to "snatch" victory and thereby reap domestic political dividends as also a strengthened role in Asia. The U.S. committed over half a million troops, sustained a loss of over 55,000 dead and fought in Vietnam the longest war in American history and yet could not find a military solution to the Vietnam problem. This defeat shattered the perceived invincibility of the U.S. armed forces and spawned the feeling that "there are limits on American power".[7] The lessons of the war were clear. The United States could no longer proceed on the assumption that it could bring about the changes it desired in a distant country merely by the application of superior military fire power and economic might, even if it confronted no direct challenge in that country from the Soviet Union or China. The impact on the American public of the failure and the human cost of the intervention was profound. Whereas an early and decisive military victory might well have buttressed support for interventionist policies

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7. Time (Tokyo), 19 May 1975.

among American people, the ignominious failure of the military effort created grievous doubts about the wisdom of the policy makers. This severely eroded the credibility of these men and even major American institutions among the American people.

Indeed, the Vietnamese conflict psychologically devastated the American public and spawned adverse financial and social results. It also became a "catalyst for a severe disenchantment with all aspects of foreign policy".[8] It made the public tired and wary of sacrificing men and material in conflicts, which they felt, they had no compelling reasons to be involved in. The wide spread opposition to the war had even partly transformed into a militant call for an "anti-interventionist" policy, generating some support also for the extremists who stood for a "neo-isolationism". As a result, what appeared to be Communist threats far beyond their frontiers ceased to beget the kind of support that was easily forthcoming in the heydays of the cold war. Evidently, "the bipartisan consensus that once existed for a vigorous American intervention was ... now torn apart".[9]

The Vietnam war had also given rise to wide ranging debates in the United States whether any really vital interests

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8. Mike Mansfield, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Pacific and Asia", Pacific Community, vol. 5, no. 4, July 1974, p. 481.

9. Nixon, Department of State Bulletin, n. 2, pp. 719-20.

involving the long range security imperatives of the United States were at all involved in Vietnam, as leading policy makers had claimed for long. This inevitably raised similar questions in regard to other countries like Pakistan with which the United States had military agreements. Strong opposition to commitments that might result in future military involvement was voiced by important Senators in the course of extensive hearings held in late 1969 and early 1970s by the Subcommittee on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments abroad.[10] None of these developments could furnish any encouragement to Pakistan, that in the event of any serious difficulty with India, American public or Congressional support would be forthcoming in the form of any significant assistance to it as an ally. In the prevailing mood of the times, even a friendly person in the White House as Richard Nixon would clearly have confronted serious difficulties and criticism if he were to run against the tide.

Alongside the growing disenchantment with U.S. foreign policy, the American public also became more concerned with domestic problems. Unemployment was increasing and the inflation was threatening the American life style. The United

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10. U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad (Washington, D.C., 1971), 2 vols.

States faced stiffer competition from its own allies and partners and was caught in a web of trade deficits. The consequence was that the U.S. had to concentrate more on economic problems than it had done at any point of time after the Second World War. Economic relations were posing a "greater challenge" to the American "diplomatic ingenuity".[11] Because of the far reaching changes that were being brought about in the American foreign policy tactics and the changing dimensions of international relations, Pakistan was peeled away from the reckoning of the American policy makers just as any superficial layer is affected in times of change. On the other hand the "core" allies of the United States remained largely unaffected.

Nixon Doctrine and Pakistan

The official recognition and the first important move to adjust the American foreign policy to the new international situation and domestic compulsions came in the form of the Nixon Doctrine or the Guam Doctrine announced in 1969.

The war in Vietnam and the domestic impact thereof as dealt with earlier, had engendered a change in U.S. thinking in regard to its entanglements in local wars. Not only was a change in foreign policy approach considered a strategic

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11. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, cited in Department of State Bulletin, vol. 67, 23 October 1972, p. 472.

necessity, but also a political necessity for President Nixon specially because of his desire to seek election in 1972. In the wake of the wide ranging reactions wrought by the Vietnam war, Nixon sought to reassure the troubled American public that they would not be involved in distant conflicts where the burden would be borne almost exclusively by the United States. The declared new emphasis of the Nixon Doctrine was therefore to meet the so called Communist challenge in Asia without the United States directly partaking in conflicts.

The Nixon Doctrine did not indicate that the U.S. was unconditionally abdicating its interest in the areas of importance. Quite contrarily, the Doctrine was a device to protect U.S. interests through a change in tactics. The Doctrine was in fact a broad set of principles evolved to encourage the important nations in Asia to assume the burden of their security with appropriate military and economic aid from the United States. The emphasis was supposedly on "self-help" aimed at assuring the American public that the Nixon Administration was determined to minimise the direct role of the United States while safeguarding its security interests. But, although the Nixon Doctrine's focus was to strengthen the nations of Asia through an "elaborate" aid policy with the United States ready to fulfill "its commitments while looking to friends and allies to play a greater

role in providing for their own defence"[12], the United States had no intentions of extending such assistance to Pakistan.

On the other hand, some nations besides being identified as powers whose security was considered important for the United States, were also seen as nations which could play an additional role of safeguarding American interests. Iran occupied the prima donna position in this scheme. The United States was not only prepared to sell Iran advanced military hardware for security but also for strengthening Tehran to protect American strategic as well as economic interests. In this effort the United States even sold Iran some new and advanced items in the American inventory of which even the United States forces had limited quantities.

In stark contrast, the United States did not deem it expedient to sell Pakistan weapons necessary to shoulder its perceived "security burdens", much less assign Pakistan any role as a guardian of American interests. Given this perspective, Nixon while identifying nations that were to be given the "elaborate" aid under the Guam Doctrine, ignored Pakistan. In contrast, nations like South Korea,

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12. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 9 February 1972, in Department of State Bulletin, vol. 66, 13 March 1972, p. 397.

Greece, Republic of China, Iran and Saudi Arabia among other nations, figured prominently.[13] Evidently, the United States was now only willing[14] to supply Pakistan "non-lethal" arms and "spare parts". The arms embargo imposed in 1965 remained operative. In fact, the U.S. had begun restricting its arms sales to Pakistan even before Nixon was elected to the White House in 1968. Assistance on grant basis had been terminated in 1967 and in the same year, the U.S. Military Supply Mission and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Pakistan was withdrawn. Even when the embargo was slightly modified in 1966, it was only to the extent that Pakistan could receive "spare parts" for previously supplied "non-lethal" equipment on strictly cash basis and "non-lethal" equipment on a "case-by-case basis" on credit or cash. However, a de-classified U.S. Defence Department record revealed on April 20 that although Pakistan purchased arms worth $ 60.1 million and India $ 11.8 million, from 1965 to June 1971, India received $ 10.9 million in aid while the amount in regard to Pakistan was only 0.6 million.[15] The extension of more aid

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13. Nixon, Department of State Bulletin, n. 2, p. 813.

14. In contrast, when the United States had assigned Pakistan security roles in its schemes of the 1950's, Washington supplied the Pakistani army with modern M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks. The air force was equipped with F-86 Sabre jets, F-104 supersonic fighters (which incidentally was also the frontline NATO fighter) and B-57 light attack jet bombers. Besides these, advanced engineering, communication and transportation equipment were liberally supplied to Pakistan.

15. Asian Recorder (Delhi), vol. 18, 17-27 June 1972, p. 10835.

to India even as the United States faced strong Indian criticism for its role in the Vietnam crisis and during the first two and a half years of the pro-Pakistani President, Nixon's incumbency, indicated the absence of any special need to assign Pakistan more importance than India. Conversely, it also revealed that the U.S. was equating India with Pakistan.

The 1965 arms embargo was further slightly modified in 1967, allowing for the purchase on a cash basis of "spare parts for previously supplied lethal equipment" on a "case-by-case basis".[16] Besides the professed aim of contributing to the "reduction of military expenditures" and to a "reasonable military stability"[17] in South Asia, the U.S. also sought to maintain some leverage on Pakistan through sales of spare parts for lethal equipment, and perhaps, through these and other such sales to India some influence in Delhi as well. But Pakistan's requests for large scale arms deliveries were turned down by President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Having failed to move the Johnson Administration, Pakistan renewed its efforts after Nixon was elected to the White

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16. U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, United States Interests in and Policies Towards South Asia (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 86.

17. Ibid.

House in 1968. After intense lobbying the U.S. once again lifted the embargo in 1970 for a "one-time exception". This time perhaps the Pakistani leaders found the American President more receptive to their pleas for more arms. It appears that during Nixon's visit to Pakistan in 1969, he had promised to "do something for Pakistan".[18] Under the "one-time exception", Pakistan was offered the opportunity to purchase a number of M-113 armoured personnel carriers and a limited number of combat aircraft for hard-cash. But the U.S. declined to enter into negotiations to sell M-48 tanks which was one of the most sought items by Pakistan. The aircraft allowed to be purchased were only interceptors and not the sophisticated F-104's which Pakistan had requested. Even at that, the replacements were limited to those lost by attrition and accident and not in combat.[19] By and large, Washington refused to sell Pakistan any offensive weapons. Even this sale can be attributed to Nixon's desire to send a signal to China that the U.S. was willing to help a mutual friend and also in appreciation for the intermediatory role that Pakistan was playing in Sino-U.S. parleys. The fact that Nixon had always inclined towards Pakistan should also not be ignored.

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18. Stephen P. Cohen, South Asia and U.S. Military Policy in Lloyd I. Rudolph, Sussanne Hoeber Rudolph and Others, The Regional Imperative: The Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards South Asian States Under Presidents Johnson and Nixon (New Delhi, 1980), p. 114.

19. Ibid., p. 116.

It was also Nixon who as Vice President, after a visit to Pakistan in 1953 December, underlined the need for the United States to undertake arms aid to Pakistan irrespective of the reaction such assistance may evoke in India. It has also been revealed that it was Nixon's arguments before the National Security Council that finally settled the matter of arms sales in favour of Pakistan.[20] Despite the fact that Pakistan found a friendly Republican President in the White House, the Nixon Administration as soon as the war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1971, due to intense public and Congressional criticism of the Yahya Khan regime for its military action in East Pakistan, once again imposed an embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan.

That Pakistan was no more of any significant strategic importance for the United States and hence did not qualify for any preferential treatment, vis-a-vis India, was continuously manifested through its arms sales policy. Thus, even after the defeat of its ally in the 1971 war, when Washington announced on 14 March 1973 that it would allow Pakistan to take delivery of spare parts, parachutes and reconditioned aircraft engines worth $ 1.2 million allowed under the "one-time exception" and 300 armoured personnel carriers worth $ 1.3 million, India was also given similar

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20. Ralph de Toledano, Nixon (New York, 1956), p. 163.

treatment and allowed to purchase some $ 91 million worth of communication gear.[21]

In a further demonstration of the American unwillingness to supply Pakistan arms, the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on initiative of Senator Frank Church (Democrat), recommended the barring of all military aid, training assistance programmes and commercial sales of weapons to Pakistan. However, the Senate watered down the original recommendation and voted 44-4 to prohibit the extension of military grants and the American financing of arms sales to Pakistan and certain other states of South Asia.[22]

In view of the widespread opposition to the arming of South Asian nations in the U.S. official circles, Pakistan's intense lobbying for arms did not bear any positive result. Bhutto who undertook a visit to Washington in September 1973 to apparently capitalize on Nixon's special regard for Pakistan and to convince Washington to "replenish the equipment lost during its war with India", had to be contented with offers of more flood relief (rains were playing havoc in Pakistan at that time), instead of military hard ware.[23] Although President Nixon sounded the familiar theme of the

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21. Facts on File (New York), vol. 33, 11-17 March 1973, p. 203.

22. Asian Recorder, 29 July-4 August 1972, p. 10907.

23. New York Times, 20 September 1973.

American interest in Pakistan's territorial integrity declaring that it was a "guiding principle" of U.S. foreign policy, a White House statement issued on 19 September clearly stated that the arms embargo on Pakistan would continue.[24]

It was clear by 1973 that Pakistan would not be able to move the United States to accord it any privileged position in South Asia. The only U.S. assistance that was forthcoming was in the form of "humanitarian" and economic aid rather than military grants or atleast substantial sales of weapons which were of the topmost priority for Islamabad. South Asia's strategic importance for the U.S. had evidently declined and therefore, Washington was conducting its relations with Pakistan largely through "silence and neglect, as if South Asia hardly mattered".[25]

American View of Sino-Pak Relations

Even before the backlash of the Vietnam war changed U.S. policies abroad, Pakistan's importance for the United States was progressively decreasing. The dual perception that characterised Pak-U.S. alliance came to the fore during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. It was quite evident that Pakistan's membership in American security schemes was

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24. Facts on File, vol. 33, 16-22 September 1973, p. 792.

25. Norman D. Palmer, "The Changing Scene in South Asia: Internal and External Dimensions", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 19, no. 3, Fall 1975, p. 902.

primarily sought to contain the alleged Chinese "expansionism". At the same time it was equally clear that Pakistan's decision to enroll itself in American cold war alliances was motivated almost totally by its desire to strengthen itself against its big neighbour India.

Washington had not been unaware that Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO had not been prompted by any resolve to be fully associated with anti-Chinese moves that Washington might sponsor. The logic of circumstances revealed that Pakistan would try very hard to avoid adding Chinese hostility towards it.

Therefore, when the United States began to seek closer ties with Pakistan and Islamabad joining American alliances which were ostensibly aimed against China in particular, Pakistani leaders moved to ally Chinese fears of any Pak-U.S. collaboration that may be directed against Beijing. In 1955 at Bandung, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali of Bogra, assured the Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai that Pakistan would not participate in actions directed against China.[26]

Regional factors were of much more importance for Pakistan than any contribution it could make to the American containment policy. Pakistan feared that a strong anti-

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26. Anwar Syed, "Sino-Pak Relations-An Overview", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol. 22, no. 2, Second Quarter 1969, p. 108.

Chinese policy would spur its big neighbour China to seek better ties with India. Pakistan specially feared that the 1955 Panchsheel Agreement between India and China would open a chapter of cordial relations between its two big neighbours. The official line of thinking was that Pakistan should not ignore China because it could be used "as a counterpoise to India".[27] But before it could forge better relations with China, it believed that it would be propitious to indicate its willingness to settle all outstanding problems. Pakistan did envisage that India might have some problems with China in regard to its border problems with India.

Predictably, the Pakistani moves to better its relations with China gained added urgency and momentum with the Sino-Indian war of 1962. It was clear that the United States would not be able to remain a silent and impassioned onlooker when the world's largest democracy battled the power which for the United States was the more aggressive of the two big Communist powers. Washington concluded, that if it turned down India's desperate call for arms in the face of military setbacks in its war with China, then India "would with genuine reluctance approach the Soviet Union, which was now as anxious as the United States to hold China in check".[28]

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27. Ibid., p. 118.

28. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep : My Years in Public Life (Delhi, 1972), p. 477.

The United States therefore undertook an emergency assistance programme during the course of war and agreed to supply India arms for twelve mountain divisions and a radar network at an estimated annual cost of $ 75 million for a five year period.[29]

To Pakistan, the American assistance to India appeared to be a betrayal of a loyal ally of the United States. Islamabad could not overlook, much less countenance the American military assistance programme to its most feared and hated enemy. Assurance to Pakistan that the arms supplied to India would not be used against Pakistan did not ally Islamabad's trepidations. The assistance caused considerable consternation and prompted a reappraisal of its close relationship with the United States.

Islamabad believed that the Chinese objective during the war was only limited and therefore, the rushing of American arms to India on the scale undertaken "seemed totally unjustified by the requirements of the situation".[30] None of the assurances from the United States appeared convincing to Pakistan, and it could not ignore what it believed was an attempt to militarily strengthen its enemy without giving adequate consideration to Pakistan's own security needs.

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29. Bowles, n. 28, p. 475.

30. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography (London, 1967), p. 133.

On the other hand, Pakistan had hoped that the United States would use their new found leverage in Delhi to pressurize India into an accommodation with Pakistan on Kashmir.[31] The United States did exert some pressure, but it was not ostensibly willing to compell India to Pakistan's satisfaction. Nor did Islamabad find Washington receptive to Pakistan's appeal for an iron-clad guarantee to come to Pakistan's assistance in case of an attack from India. Pakistan therefore convinced itself that the United States was "most unlikely" to genuinely aid Pakistan in its own problems.[32] Disillusioned with the American military assistance to India, Ayub Khan therefore embarked on a new policy of "bilateralism" which he knew would be like "walking on a triangular tight rope".[33] Apparently, this policy initiative was directed to the improvement of its relations with all the big powers and India while at the same time retaining its close ties with the United States. Washington was Pakistan's major source of arms and Islamabad did not desire the adoption of any policy that could dry that source. But obviously, the purpose of the new policy was to reduce Pakistan's exclusive dependence on the United States. Given

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31. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London, 1973), p. 279.

32. Khan, n. 30, p. 153.

33. Mohammad Ayub Khan cited in S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of India and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis, 1974), p.

this objective, in view of Pakistan's already improving relations with China, the emphasis was laid on the improvement of its ties with the more powerful of its neighbours.

Pakistan did make some efforts to improve its relations with Moscow too, but in view of the hardening Sino-Soviet schism, Pakistan's efforts turned out to be a difficult-to-tread "tight rope". The extra zeal to forge closer ties with China was understandable; China was its "enemy's enemy". Predictably therefore, alongside the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Pak relations improved "almost in direct relation to the deterioration in Sino-Indian and U.S.-Pakistani relations".[34]

In March 1963 a border agreement was signed between Pakistan and China, and the former in its earnestness to improve its relations with India's enemy, ceeded large chunks of disputed land to it. This border agreement was quickly followed by an air agreement between the two nations. Though the air agreement in itself did not signify much, it was politically significant in as much as Pakistan was the first non-Communist nation to be accorded landing rights in China.

The close relationship that was being established between China and the U.S. could not but spawn adverse reac-

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34. Burke, n. 31, p. 290.

tions in the U.S. After the air agreement was signed with China, the U.S. suspended a promised loan of $ 4.3 million to Pakistan for the construction of an international airport at Dacca and threatened further action if U.S. supplied spare parts were used by Pakistan International Airlines at Chinese airports.[35] Further, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Philips Talbot, expressed dismay at the probable political benefits that China would reap as a result of the growing Sino-Pak ties.[36] Bhutto wrote that Pakistan's increasing contacts with China even resulted in the "cancellation in April 1965 of an invitation to Ayub Khan to visit the United States, the postponement in July 1965 of Aid-to-Pakistan consortium meeting, the American embargo of arms during the 1965 war" and a U.S. warning to China on 16 September 1965, .. not to help Pakistan in the war.[37]

Despite the initial American displeasure, Pakistan in keeping with its new policy took "precipitate turn"[38] towards China and steered the country away from exclusive ties with Washington. This was clearly prompted by the thinking in Pakistan that military relationship with the U.S. involved it "in dangerous commitments serving the ends of other

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35. Ibid., p. 312.

36. Ibid.

37. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, New Directions (London, 1980), p. 49.

countries than its own "without providing any extra protection against India."[39] China also very deftly calculated that Pakistan especially after the American decision to supply arms to India after the Sino-Indian border war would be more than willing to improve its relations with Beijing on a priority basis. Even the announcement of the 1963 border agreement with Pakistan was so timed that it came barely ten days prior to the opening of the fourth round of Indo-Pak talks being conducted under Anglo-American auspicies. There is little doubt that the announcement of the agreement was so timed that it could strengthen Pakistan's bargaining position.

The Sino-Pakistan relations were to further in the coming years. With the United States not making any substantial moves to iron out the rather serious differences caused by the American arms assistance to India, Pakistan felt no need to go slow on its relations with China. On the other hand, Sino-Pak relations began to steadily strengthen in the aftermath of the war. Pakistani leaders now believed that the days of intense Super Power rivalry were over and as a consequence Washington would not be receptive to Pakistans perceived defence requirements. The only pragmatic solution that appeared to the Pakistani

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39. Norman D. Palmer, "South Asia and the Great Powers", Strategic Digest (Delhi), vol. 4, no. 7, July 1974, p. 12.

leaders to make up for the lack of support from the United States was through Ayub Khan's "bilateral arrangements".[40]

Coming soon after the Sino-Indian border war, the 1965 Indo-Pak war presented itself as the cementing media for Sino-Pak relations. As soon as the war broke out, the United States imposed an arms embargo in the region. The lack of U.S. support for Pakistan and above all the arms embargo that was clamped was a "bitter experience" for Islamabad. Writing about the American response to the war, the former Pakistani Ambassador to U.S., U.K. and Minister for Industries, M.A.H. Ispahani, echoed: "The taste in our mouth (of the 1965 experience) will linger for a long time".[41] In contrast, China openly supported Pakistan and held India solely responsible for the conflict and accused Delhi of harbouring grand designs of "aggressive expansion".

China flooded Delhi with protests and accused India of crossing the border; erecting structures, firing on and kidnapping Chinese citizens. Thus, with China openly voicing its support for Pakistan and the United States taking a neutralist stance, Pakistan moved with added vigour to forge closer ties with China. The private assurances given by

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40. Drew Middleton, America's Stake in Asia (Philadelphia, 1973), p. 152.

41. M.A.H. Ispahani, "Pakistan and New Regional Arrangements", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 32, no. 3, Third Quarter 1969, p. 203.

Chinese leaders of the willingness to come to Pakistan's assistance if called upon[42] to do so in the 1965 war, created a profound impact on the Pakistani leadership even though they did not have the will to put China's offer to the test by continuing the war.

On the other hand, the American posture during the 1965 war only confirmed the thinking of the Pakistani leaders regarding Washington's indifference to Pakistan's security needs. Angered by the imposition of arms embargo when it was waging a war, Pakistan started moving with increased resolve on the road to what it called was a "tryst with realism" — a euphemism for improved relations with Beijing. It viewed, and rightly so, that any exclusive ties with any of the major powers as being "necessarily circumscribed by the limits of the endurance of the remaining two".[43]

With Ayub Khan still at the helm, Pakistan sought to intensify its policy of "bilateralism". While moving closer to China, Pakistan also attempted to dilute the Soviet support for India and if possible, obtain arms from that nation. With these intentions Pakistan began courting the Soviet Union. After Tashkent agreement, Pakistan even succeeded in securing a promise for the supply of arms worth $ 30 million from the Soviet Union. Although nothing much materialised of this courtship, what is significant is that it exposed Pakistan's growing sentiment to reduce the risks of dependence on the United

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42. When Bhutto was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the Ayub Cabinet, he has been cited as saying that China would be Pakistan's "ally in its war with India". Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and Security of Asia (New York, 1968), p.137.

43. Syed, n. 26, pp. 118-19.

States and mitigating Soviet suspicions against Pakistan. It also signalled a strong and dominating desire on the part of the Pakistani leaders to seek support from whichever quarters it was forthcoming.

After the 1965 war Pakistan progressively sought to differentiate its position from America's anti-Communist strategies. While not giving up its American connection, Pakistan recognized China as its only dependable ally. In the words of Ispahani, "we had powerful and big friends ... . In time of crisis and need, no one, I repeat no one, except China with whom we had no security pact, came to our aid".[44]

At the same time, there was a paradox in the implications of the Sino-Pak relations. Since the U.S. subsequently began talks with Chinese representatives in Warsaw, and given the overriding American interest in exploiting opportunities in promoting a split between two Communist giants, the strengthening of Sino-Pak relations was probably not unwelcome to the top policy makers in Washington. They might well have regarded the evolving Sino-Pakistan contacts as of potential usefulness.

U.S. Response to the Bangladesh Crisis

The major point that is sought to be made in this part of the work is that, despite all the hullabaloo raised in

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44. Ispahani, n. 41, p. 203.

Washington during the crisis, the United States was not prepared, and if prepared, was unable by circumstances to do anything substantial to help Pakistan during its hour of trial. The American response was at best determined by considerations less to do with the defence of Pakistan than with the effect the American response could have on its allies.

The Bangladesh crisis came at a time when the United States was still pre-occupied with the task of re-orienting its strategies and extricating itself from the Vietnam quagmire. Despite the fact that both Nixon and Kissinger were favourably disposed towards Pakistan, and distrustful of India, the timing of the civil uprising in East Pakistan, the subsequent Pakistani military crackdown and the Indo-Pak which followed it, made Washington unable to come to the aid of its one-time linchpin which had proclaimed itself as the only nation that would "stand by" the United States in the event of "real trouble".[45]

The Pakistani outrage in its Eastern wing which began late March 1971 generated considerable adverse public opinion in the United States. It was felt that the Pakistanis were crudely attempting to find a military solution to an essen-

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45. President Mohammad Ayub Khan's address to the U.S. Congress in 1961, cited in Bhutto, n. 37, p. 110.

tially political problem. On the other hand, the Nixon Administration acted nonchalantly to the crackdown. Clearly, as Henry Kissinger admits, the United States was not prepared to criticise or pressurise Pakistan to change its tactics.[46] However, the public opinion and criticism from the Congressional members compelled the rather reluctant Administration to cancel all licences for the purchase of weapons by Pakistan and order a "hold" on the delivery of military hardware allowed under the "one-time exception" of 1970.

In the meantime, tension mounted in the subcontinent as refugees in millions fled East Pakistan to escape the brutality of the military forces. Apparently, all that the United States was prepared to do was to make half-hearted and infructuous calls for restraint on the part of both India and Pakistan, while the refugee problem was proving to be an excessive burden on India politically, economically and socially. But there appeared to be no indication that Pakistan's military leaders would allow a let up in their military crackdown on the "Bengalis".

When finally the war broke out on 3 December, President Nixon accused India of being the "aggressor" and believed that the conflict was the result of a "ruthless powerplay" by a nation "aligned" to the Soviet Union despite its official

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46. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (New Delhi, 1979), pp. 853-4.

declaration of neutralism.[47] Washington's response was nevertheless limited to diplomatic efforts to end the war while the Indian forces were making steady gains in East Pakistan. In fact, by Kissinger's own admission, the Nixon Administration was sure that India would "liberate" Pakistan's Eastern wing. He told the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), that India would end up winning in East Pakistan.[48] Nixon not only acquiesced in Pakistan's defeat in its Eastern wing, but also exerted pressure on Islamabad to expedite its own dismemberment by promising complete support to Pakistan if it "no longer" made efforts to "defend East Pakistan".[49]

This was a clear indication that the American President was hardly concerned about saving for Pakistan its Eastern wing, although he himself had assured Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan, in 1969, that "nobody has occupied the White House who is friendlier to Pakistan".[50]

At this juncture, the Nixon Administration was contented with the suspension of military sales to India and the diplomatic efforts it was making to stop the war despite the fact

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47. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London, 1980), p. 525.

48. Kissinger, n. 46, p. 898.

49. Nixon, n. 47, p. 528.

50. G.W. Choudhury, "Reflections on Sino-Pakistan Relations", Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol. 7, no. 2, January 1976, p. 226.

that the President himself was supposedly giving Henry Kissinger "unshirted hell" to effect a clear "tilt" towards Pakistan.[51] In the United Nations the United States supported the 4 December resolution calling for a halt to the war and the withdrawal of the Indian forces. George Bush, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations labelled India as the "aggressor".

Ironically a day after the announcement of the suspension of licences to India, all economic aid to Pakistan was suspended — a rather incongruous move towards a nation on whose side the United States was supposedly tilting. On 6 December Nixon wrote to Brezhnev obliquely warning him that in the event of unacceptable Soviet behaviour in respect of the Indo-Pak war, the United States would consider the cancellation of the summit meet that was planned for the next year. He wrote: "I am convinced that the spirit in which we agreed that the time had come for us to meet in Moscow next May requires from both of us the utmost restraint and most urgent action to end the conflict".[52] On the same day, the State Department also announced that it was cutting off $ 87.6 million in development loans to India, but loans for long-term projects were not affected and nor were the goods already committed to India.[53]

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51. Kissinger, n. 46, p. 897.

52. Nixon, n. 47, p. 572.

53. New York Times, 7 December 1971.

But all these were at best token moves and it was clearly evident that they would have no significant impact on India. Equally evident was the fact that the United States had easily reconciled to a Pakistan with only one wing.

American moves designed to demonstrate its support for Pakistan only gained momentum after the Administration claimed that the American intelligence sources had revealed that "at a meeting of the Indian Cabinet Mrs. Gandhi had led a discussion of plans to expand the war on the western front and to invade West Pakistan".[54] This suspicion was perhaps, further fuelled by the Indian Ambassador to the United States, L.K. Jha's refusal to give any assurance to the U.S. Under Secretary of State, John Irwin, that India would not undertake military action to seize Azad Kashmir.[55]

However, a day after the receipt of the alleged intelligence information, according to Kissinger, Nixon asked him to consider the cancellation of the summit meeting, if Moscow did not put pressure on India to stop the war.[56] But, in the same breath, Kissinger also points out that Nixon was rather non-serious about the suspension of the summit.[57]

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54. Nixon, n. 47, pp. 527-8.

55. Kissinger, n. 46, pp. 903-4.

56. Ibid., p. 903.

57. Ibid.

Kissinger also claims that Nixon was furious about India's alleged intentions in West Pakistan. In his anger it appeared that President Nixon invited the Soviet Minister for Agriculture, Valdimir Matskewich, who happened to be in Washington at that time and warned him that "if India moved forces against West Pakistan, the United States would not stand by".[58]

It is further stated that on 10 December, President Nixon wrote a second letter to Brezhnev underscoring the increasing American concern at the Soviet Union's "failure" to compel India to accept a ceasefire. While delivering the letter to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, Yuli Vorontsov, Kissinger claims that he warned that the United States would "honor" the "pledge" given in 1962 during the Sino-Indian war, that in case of Indian "aggression" against Pakistan, Washington would give Pakistan "U.S. assistance".[59] On the same day, a task force of the Seventh Fleet consisting of eight ships including the nuclear-powered Aircraft Carrier Enterprise, was ordered to sail to the Straits of Malacca from where it was to proceed on a twenty-four hours notice to the Bay of Bengal.

Henry Kissinger also met with the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations in an apparent effort to coordinate U.S.

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58. Ibid., p.904.

59. Ibid., p. 905.

response with China. The National Security Adviser also makes a rather incredible claim that President Nixon was even prepared to risk a war in the "triangular Soviet-Chinese-American relationship"[60] if the Soviet Union took any military action against any Chinese move that it may have taken in support of Pakistan.

While these diplomatic moves were being taken in Washington, the Indian armed forces were racing towards victory in East Pakistan. On 15 December the Pakistani Commander in East Pakistan surrendered and a day later, India offered an unconditional ceasefire on all fronts. And when it all ended after Pakistan accepted the ceasefire the next day, Pakistan had lost its Eastern wing while its ally the United States was satisfied with the token gestures of support it had taken but never failing to claim that it was Washington's resolute moves that saved West Pakistan from alleged Indian designs.

In actuality, however, the United States had done nothing to help its ally during the war. The United States was hardly concerned about Pakistan's defeat in the east. The United States was perhaps a little anxious about Pakistan's western wing. But even this objective did not emanate from the intrinsic aim to stand by an ally in times of crisis. Washington's desire to secure the territorial integrity of

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60. Ibid., pp. 908-9.

West Pakistan was because of the "geopolitical perspective" of the White House. The United States was wary about the lessons its allies may draw from the disintegration of an ally of the United States. Even the apparent American pressure it claimed to have exerted on Moscow to compel India to accept a ceasefire should be seen in this light. The hectic diplomatic moves that were taking place in Washington were principally intended for the "record", notwithstanding the tone of grave solemnity with which Nixon and Kissinger describe them. The United States claimed that it had acted on the belief that any attack on West Pakistan would have serious repercussions on the Middle East and further embolden the Soviet Union to undertake similar adventures.[61] But how credible is the theory that India planned to attack? The only "evidence" that Nixon provides is the information provided by the unidentified and possibly imaginary American agent who got it from a "meeting of the Indian Cabinet".

Kissinger writes that he had advised Nixon on the necessity to make some moves for fear that if any American ally goes down, then "the Soviet Union won't respect" the U.S., "the Chinese will depoise" Washington and "other countries would draw their own conclusions".[62] He goes on to write that the Soviet aim during the war "was to humiliate Peking and to demonstrate the futility of reliance on either

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61. Ibid., p. 898.

62. Ibid.

China or the United States as an ally."[63] This clearly explains the underlying motive for the moves the United States made during the war. It also makes equally clear the fact that the American actions were less related to Pakistan's security than to America's prestige and standing among its allies. Kissinger concedes that the American response to the 1971 war was prompted by a desire to prevent a further aggravation of the adverse image of the U.S. due to its failure in Vietnam and its inability to honour the pledges it had given to its South Vietnamese partner. Kissinger argued that "a reputation for unreliability was not something" the United States "could afford".[64]

Another strong reason was that the United States feared that if Pakistan was defeated, China would become reluctant to pursue co-operation[65] with the United States. Additionally, the American planners considered Pakistan as an invaluable channel to China and that the process of Sino-U.S. detente would be damaged if this intermediary was lost. Therefore, when an American ally was being dismembered, the United States was busy trying to safeguard its reputation as a big

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63. Ibid., p. 876.

64. Ibid., p. 895.

65. William P. Bundy, "International Security Today", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), vol. 53, no. 1, October 1979, p. 38.

and dependable friend and an ally evincing little concern for the security interests of the affected nation, Pakistan.

On close examination, the American claim that if it was not for the United States, Pakistan would have been completely destroyed appears to lack substance. For, there are no indications to show that India was, as claimed by Washington, waiting to wind up its operations in the Eastern front to find a military solution to "Azad Kashmir" and destabilise Pakistan to make it in Kissinger's words, "a vassal state". All available records go to show that India harboured no ambitions in regard to West Pakistan.

India's military objectives were limited. It had to find a solution to the difficult situation created by the continuing influx of the millions of refugees that were fleeing East Pakistan. The refugee problem was causing tremendous strain on India and there appeared to be no answer to the refugee problem in the light of the Pakistani leadership's hard line tactics and refusal to accept a solution based on negotiations accommodating the results of a democratic election. Kissinger naively admits that the incessant flow of the refugees could have grave consequences[66] for the Indian society but never failed to term India as the "aggressor".

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66. Ibid., p. 856.

Indian officials are on record[67] as having said that India had no intentions of destroying West Pakistan. It is true that India did not give any assurance to either Pakistan or the United States on Azad Kashmir. But this cannot be interpreted as revealing any Indian design to find a military solution to the Kashmir problem. When India was fighting a war on two fronts, it would have been a poor military strategy to announce in advance its precise military aims. Obviously, an assurance by India that it would not take military action in Kashmir would only have encouraged the Pakistani military planners to reduce the force level in the Western wing and reinforce that in the East.

India was probably less worried by U.S. moves than by developments in the United Nations. The overwhelming support for the 7 December General Assembly resolution calling for a cessation on hostilities, a resolution supported by all the non-aligned countries except India and Bhutan, could not but have some impact on Indian policy-makers. On the other hand, what is clear is that the United States was not prepared to take any meaningful action on behalf of its ally. In spite

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67. For instance, the Indian Ambassador to the United States, L.K. Jha, had assured the U.S. that India had no military aims in West Pakistan. Similarly, when asked by the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., George Bush, to issue a "dissavowal" that India had no designs in West Pakistan, the Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, categorically assured the world forum that India had no ambitions on India's western borders with Pakistan, Facts on File, vol. 31, 9-15 December 1971, p. 962.

of all the sabre-rattlings it is beyond doubt that the United States was only making threats that it had no intention of implementing. The United States all through the war, did not lift the embargo clamped on Pakistan; not even after it claimed that India was determined to move its forces into West Pakistan -- a starkly incongruous lapse in the light of the Administration's claimed "tilt" towards Pakistan.

The task force despatched could too have done nothing to change the course of the war even if Nixon would have dared to intervene, which any way was most unlikely. A task force of this magnitude could have conducted selective strikes against India, but it could not have turned the tide of India's victory in East Pakistan. Above all, the task force steamed into the Bay of Bengal only on the eve of the fall of Dacca. Further, it is rather ironical that when Nixon had expressed his anxiety about the fate of West Pakistan, the task force was ordered to sail to Bay of Bengal rather than the Arabian Sea. Nonetheless, a study sponsored by the Brookings Institution has authoritatively concluded that the task force had no appreciable impact[68] on the Indian conduct of the war.

It is manifest that no military intervention short of large scale deployment of U.S. combat forces or naval-air

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68. Barry H. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington, 1978), p. 200.

power might have altered the course of events. Even if Nixon had entertained thoughts of intervening, given the mood in the Congress and the backlash of the Vietnam war, neither the Congress nor the public opinion would have countenanced any American direct involvement. Indeed, the Congress was actually in the process of circumscribing[69] the "imperial Presidency" in many areas especially those that might lead to any American military involvements abroad without adequate prior consultations with the Congress.

Therefore, in this light, Nixon's claim that it was American moves that saved Pakistan in 1971 from the "imminent threat of Indian aggression and domination"[70] is not borne by facts. The evidence show that the United States preferred to be concerned about Pakistan's Western wing. While the United States easily acquiesced in the liberation of East Pakistan, it felt that a destruction of West Pakistan, because of its proximity to the oil rich Persian Gulf area, would undermine the confidence of the countries of West Asia in the United States and adversely affect U.S. strategic objectives. Even at that, the tilt remained essentially at the mental level — which, in fact, is the decisive circumstantial evidence that the Nixon Administration did not really

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69. For details, see: Richard B. Stebbines and Elaine P. Adam, ed., American Foreign Relations 1971: A Documentary Record (New York, 1976), pp. 28-30.

70. Nixon, n. 47, p. 530.

believe in its own story of the danger of an Indian attack on West Pakistan.

The U.S. had, of course, to take note of the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship that had been concluded before the hostilities began. While the treaty might not have been the decisive factor in the policies that the U.S. followed, in view of the other factors that have been already outlined, it was probably evident that Washington would inhibit any involvement other than rhetorical by China in the war Pakistan had involved itself into. Such small scale military assistance that the Chinese could extend to Pakistan could not alter the outcome as far as an Indian military effort in East Pakistan was concerned. Thus, a nation that had a military alliance with the U.S. suffered what it regarded as dismemberment while little concrete assistance was forthcoming to it from Washington in an evident exemplification of the low strategic interest Pakistan was for the United States. The point that is sought to be made is that the United States was hardly stirred when its ally suffered defeat and dismemberment even as Washington claimed that it was prepared to go for war for the sake of its ally while limiting such a course only to an imaginary contingency. The meaning of this development should not escape the small military powers while conducting its relations with Super Powers.

Sino-U.S. Detente and U.S. Objectives in South Asia

The Nixon Doctrine itself was an unmistakable signal to China that "Washington had downgraded the possibility of Chinese military aggression or military expansion in Asia".[71] Soon similar other moves indicating a playing down of Sino-U.S. enmity followed.

The American motive behind the easing of its anti-Chinese postures at a time when the monolith Communist bloc had cracked revealing Soviet Union's and China's profound mutual distrust was to gain new manoeuverability in dealing with the Soviet Union. The Sino-U.S. detente was undoubtedly a move directed to curb "Soviet expansionism". When the United States itself was hemmed in by limitations arising out of its involvement in Vietnam, its parleys with China had the obvious objective of seeking China's collaboration in Asia and more particularly in South East Asia, against the Soviet Union. Indeed, the very essence of Sino-U.S. detente was that the two former enemies would co-operate in "areas of mutual interest".[72]

South Asia was no exception to this evolving joint strategy. Just as the United States and China desired to

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71. Henry Owen, The Next Phase in Foreign Policy (Washington, 1973), p. 147.

72. Budget Message of Richard Nixon. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 68, 19 February 1973, p. 207.

preclude Soviet influence elsewhere, in South Asia too, the objective was no different. In this effort however, a role for Pakistan was only natural in view of the close relationship that was extant between Islamabad and Beijing. Therefore, at the end of the Bangladesh crisis, what was in the offing was a Sino-Pak-U.S. axis.

The secret trip which the then American National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, undertook using Pakistan as a stopover and the "invaluable" role that was being played by Pakistani statesmen only went on to assure a berth for Pakistan in the evolving Sino-U.S. strategies. Kissinger himself concedes that the Pakistani channel was almost irreplaceable in the Sino-U.S. detente.[73]

Chinese leaders on their part found it befitting to remind the American policy makers that Pakistan should not be ignored in the days to come and that the United States should also bear in mind the interests of Pakistan while formulating its policies toward South Asia. Given the Chinese support for Pakistani interests, it is not surprising that during one of Kissinger's visits to Peking, the Chinese Premier, Zho En-lai exhorted: "do not forget the bridge that you have crossed in coming here".[74] The import of the

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73. Kissinger, n. 46, p. 854.

74. Bhutto, n. 37, p. 50.

statement quite obviously was that Pakistan should also be a part of the emerging Sino-U.S. schemes and also be a beneficiary thereof.

This perhaps explains in part Kissinger's meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations during the Bangladesh crisis to co-ordinate their response to the crisis. Kissinger himself writes that the sailing of the task force during the 1971 war was partly made to demonstrate the American support for any move that China might have taken on Pakistan's side.[75] Commenting on the Sino-U.S. response to the Bangladesh crisis, the New York Times wrote that the "U.S.A. and China recently found themselves virtually co-belligerents when they backed Pakistan".[76] And when the war ended, China moved in to make up in part for the Pakistani losses suffered with Zhou En-lai assuring Pakistan that it would "firmly support it in its struggle" against what he called "foreign aggression".[77] The New York Times reported that after the war ended, China delivered to Pakistan a substantial quantity of weapons under a military and economic aid agreement worth over $ 300 million signed during the Pakistani President,

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75. Kissinger, n. 46, p. 910.

76. New York Times, 2 February 1972.

77. Asian Recorder, vol. 18, 29 January-4 February 1972, p. 10591.

Bhutto's visit to China in February 1972. The delivery was reported to include 60 Mig jet fighter bombers, 100 tanks (T-54 and T-59 models) and an unspecified number of small arms and 6 coastal patrol boats.[78] Further, it was reported that China had stepped up the deliveries of medium-range TU-16 bombers to Pakistan. Although the precise number of the aircraft involved was not available, it was reckoned that Chinese military aid to Pakistan after the 1965 war was the largest it undertook to any nation outside the Communist bloc.[79]

In the aftermath of the war, however, the United States adopted a different strategy to gain new manoeuverability in South Asia. It apparently ceased identifying with Pakistan's security concerns. The only interest shown was in regard to Pakistan's "stability" which the U.S. knew would partly be ensured. Because of the new found friendship with Beijing, the United States' partial withdrawal from Asia, and the "Vietnam induced fear" that made the public and the Congress intolerable to U.S. involvement in areas of only peripheral interest[80], Washington found it only natural to "leave to China the security of Pakistan".[81] Thus, although

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78. New York Times, 2 June 1972.

79. Asian Recorder, vol. 21, 21-27 May 1975, p. 12597.

80. Kissinger, n. 46, p. 875.

81. Walter F. Hahn, "The Nixon Doctrine: Design and Dilemmas", Strategic Digest, vol. 11, no. 12, December 1972, p. 18.

no formal military relationship existed between China and the U.S., there was a "security relationship ... implicitly, as it must between any two powers whose interest and policies intersect".[82] That the United States and China were collaborating in regard to Pakistan was clearly evident from the joint communique issued at the end of Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972 declaring their support for self determination in the disputed territory of Kashmir.[83]

The major thrust of the American policy towards South Asia after the 1971 war was to reduce the enhanced influence Moscow gained in the subcontinent as a result of its backing for India. Some American defence planners took the view[84] that the Soviet Union's primary aim was to capitalise on its standing in India to acquire a naval base in Vishakhapatnam. Anxieties concerning such developments might have added a sense of urgency to American moves calculated to repair its relations with India. Washington embarked on a course apparently designed to convey to India that it was ready to improve its relations with India. President Nixon offered

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82. Doak A. Barnett, "Military-Security Relations Between China and the United States", Foreign Affairs, vol. 55, no. 3, April 1977.

83. Robert Jackson, "The Great Powers and the Indian Subcontinent", Strategic Digest, vol. 3, no. 5, June 1973, p. 10.

84. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., The Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973, vol. 4, Far East (New York, 1973), p. 787.

to hold a "serious dialogue" with India to mend the fences damaged during the 1971 crisis. In 1972, President Nixon despatched John B. Connoly Jr., as his emissary to India in what was considered the first major attempt to salvage Indo-U.S. relations from the effect of the 1971 war. In a similar vein, the new American Ambassador to India, Patrick Moynihan, indicated that the United States would henceforth conduct its relations with India on the basis of a "new realism".[85] To assuage India's fear of American involvement in the region, Nixon declared that the "United States has no economic or strategic interests in a privileged position, nor in forming ties directed against any country inside the region or outside the region, nor in altering the basic political framework on the subcontinent."[86] On 15 March, it was also announced that the U.S. was releasing the $ 83 million which had been earmarked for India but held up because of the 1971 war. He further went on to assure India that American interests in South Asia were only "humanitarian" and related to the "development" of the nations of the region. His primary objective was to convey to India that the United States was only interested in making South Asia an "example to the world of peaceful progress".[87]

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85. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 68, 2 April 1973, p. 405.

86. Nixon, Department of State Bulletin, n. 1, p. 719.

87. Ibid., p. 789.

The underlying objective of Washington's professed benign intentions in South Asia was, however, calculated to decrease India's dependence on Moscow by also conveying to India that the United States would not lean backwards to support Pakistan or involve it in any of its strategic schemes. To demonstrate its apparent resolve, President Nixon made it clear that the U.S. would not assume the role of a major arms supplier to Pakistan. But in reality, Nixon was quite aware that Pakistan would make up in part from China for the non-supply of U.S. arms.

In a further bid to tone down the effect of Nixon's "tilt" policy, Washington recognised the new nation of Bangladesh and became the largest aid donor for the new nation.[88] This move, as also Nixon's announcement of Washington's desire to better relations with India, came at a very painful time for Pakistan. Islamabad was at that point struggling to reconcile to the loss of its bigger half and was making desperate attempts to limit the number of nations recognising Bangladesh to pressurise India and Bangladesh to secure the release of its 90,000 and odd prisoners of war and to regain the territory lost in the Western sector during the war. But clearly, Washington ignored the Pakistani sentiments as the United States policy was not aimed

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88. Ibid., p.791.

as much to support Pakistan in these efforts as to prevent any further increase if not decrease of the Soviet influence in the region by not identifying itself with Pakistan's interests. The United States apparently feared that any increase in tension in the subcontinent would lead to an increased level of Soviet influence in the region. To use Nixon's words: "unresolved enemeties [in South Asia], could make the area vulnerable to an undesirable level of foreign influence".[89] It is only in this context that Nixon's call to South Asian leaders to turn the "relationship between India and Pakistan from hostility to co-operation"[90] should be understood.

But at the same time, the United States made it clear that although it had no intention of assigning Pakistan any special importance, it would nonetheless tolerate no destabilisation of Pakistan. In the aftermath of the war, Nixon declared: "our concern for the well being and security of the people of Pakistan does not end with the end of a crisis".[91] In a somewhat similar vein, the National Security Adviser turned Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, repeated

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89. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 25 February 1971, in Department of State Bulletin, vol. 64, 22 March 1971, p. 385.

90. Ibid.

91. Nixon, Department of State Bulletin, n. 12, p. 387.

the familiar Nixon theme that "the independence and integrity of Pakistan are a central concern of American foreign policy".[92]

The frequent reiterations of American concern for Pakistan's territorial integrity was designed primarily to warn India that although it wanted to improve relations with it, India's evolving relations with Moscow should not assume an anti-U.S. or anti-Pakistani mould. Nixon announced: "India's policy toward its neighbours on the subcontinent and other countries in nearby parts of Asia is now an important determinant of regional stability, which is of interest to us".[93] Referring to the Soviet influence, he warned that, "no outside power has a claim to a predominant influence"[94] in the region.

The Nixon Administration's policies towards South Asia were followed by the Ford Administration. The continuation of Henry Kissinger as the Secretary of State in the Ford Administration ensured the continuance. Just as the Nixon Administration had declared, Alfred L. Atherton Jr., the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs also harangued that the sovereignty and territorial

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92. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 70, 10 June 1974, p. 639.

93. Nixon quoted in John W. Mellor, ed., India: A Rising Power (Colarado, 1979), p. 160.

94. Nixon, Department of State Bulletin, n. 12, p. 386.

integrity of Pakistan remains an "important concern" of American foreign policy.[95] To improve America's image in the subcontinent, Henry Kissinger undertook a visit to India in October 1974 declaring that the United States recognised the fact that the "size and position of India give it a special leadership in South Asian and world affairs".[96] But he was also quick to add that India had a "special responsibility for accommodation and restraint"[97] — a subtle yet unmistakable reminder that India should do nothing to undermine Pakistan's stability.

Nevertheless, it was to further Indo-U.S. relations that the Secretary of State visited India in 1974. Talking to press reporters, the Secretary maintained that the primary objective of his trip was to "establish the basis for a new and mature relationship"[98] with India. His concern at the growing Indo-Soviet relations was uncovered while answering a question about the prospect of the United States resuming aid to India. He clearly drove home his idea when he opined that the resumption of aid was not a matter of according India "special favour", but that, the whole question was

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95. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 71, 14 October 1974, p. 52.

96. Ibid., vol. 71, 25 November 1974, p. 741.

97. Ibid.

98. Asian Recorder, vol. 20, 26 February-4 March 1974, p. 11871.

a case of defining "joint objectives".[99] This clearly implied that India should tone down its ties with the Soviet Union and make an effort to establish areas of mutual interest with the United States. In pursuance of this aim, an Indo-U.S. Joint Commission was formed on 27 October and it was hailed by the Indian External Affairs Minister, Y.B. Chavan, as a "landmark in Indo-American relations".[100]

The United States had been making a series of efforts to improve its relations with India. It had earlier in February transferred to India a sum of Rs. 1,664 crores which represented the lions share of the accumulated U.S. held P.L. 480 rupee payment made by India. Close on the heels of Kissinger's departure, it was also announced in Washington on 30 November, that the U.S. had decided to allocate 300,000 tonnes of wheat to India on favourable credit terms repayable over a period of 20 years. These moves were probably depicted to Pakistan by Kissinger as to promote "restraint" on India's part and, consequently, not adverse to U.S. commitments to Pakistan's integrity.

But despite his noble professions regarding South Asia, Kissinger left open the most delicate and important question of American arms sales to Pakistan that had been the single most important issue responsible for the frequent

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99. Ibid., vol. 20, 19-25 November 1974, p. 12301.

100. Ibid.

embitterment of Indo-U.S. relations. While the Secretary privately assured Indian leaders that Washington was also of the opinion that there should be no arms induction into the subcontinent, the joint communique[101] issued at the end of his visit conspiciously omitted any reference to this ticklish question. As was to be evidenced a few months later, when the United States once again resumed arms sales to Pakistan, Washington was not prepared to tie down its arms sales policy to Pakistan by any commitment given to Pakistan's arch enemy.

At the same time, despite both Nixon and Ford Administrations concern for Pakistan's territorial integrity, they were not prepared to undertake any significant economic or military aid to Pakistan. The U.S. continued to largely adhere to its arms embargo, treating Pakistan, its ally, on par with India, the non-aligned nation that was hardly restrained in its criticism of the various U.S. policies.

As the U.S. interest was only to maintain the stability of Pakistan and check Soviet influence in the region, the moderately sophisticated arms that were being supplied by China to Pakistan could be hardly inimical to U.S. interests in South Asia. Since the Chinese weapons were comparatively unsophisticated in comparison to the arms supplied to India

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101. Ibid., p. 12301.

by the Soviet Union, Pakistan could not embolden itself to challenge India and spawn tensions while the United States was underlining quiet in the region in the effort to deny the Soviet Union with an opportunity to increase its influence in India. At the same time, the American refusal to supply Pakistan with the military hardware it requested meant that the United States was able to avoid Indian criticism when it was trying to improve its relations with Delhi.

Therefore, if Washington's interest in South Asia was only "derivative" upto the mid-1960s, then after that it appeared to have become, at least for the time being, "continental". The United States professed that its interests in South Asia rested on its desire to "contribute to a stable balance of power" in Asia as a whole, or in other words, prevent the Soviet Union from attaining an unacceptable level of influence in South Asia. China too claimed to have the same objectives.

Attenuation of Pakistan's Military Importance

During the height of the cold war, Pakistan was important because of the military contribution it could make to the American containment policy. The thermonuclear explosion by Russia made the United States look interestingly at Pakistan's close proximity to the Soviet Union. Until 1960, its bases at Peshawar served the U.S. well. Peshawar had until then been the staging ground for many an operation

against the Soviet Union. U-2 aircrafts flew constant reconnaissance sorties over Soviet Union and the monitoring base constantly fed the Pentagon with valuable information about Soviet military activities. But specially after the shooting down of one of the spy planes over Soviet Union in 1960, the utility of the base at Peshawar began to decline.

Sophistication in military and allied fields had reached such proportions that planes were being replaced by big satellites which could, unlike the U-2 aircraft, fly with virtual impunity over the enemy territory. The satellites being unmanned and in sky all through their life time, could be placed in orbit for reconnaissance missions over any area on earth. Therefore the U-2 flights became largely obsolete as regards the Soviet Union. Even the monitoring base in Gilgit was closed down in 1965. Sophistication in military technology made such a base superfluous. Even the conduct of nuclear blasts could be recorded and transmitted back by the satellites. In effect, all the military tasks performed with Peshawar as the base could be transferred to the satellites.

Besides the decline in the direct contribution which Pakistan could make to the American cold war efforts, by 1970, there was also a definite vitiation in Pakistan's importance in SEATO and CENTO.

All the multilateral alliances which the U.S. had concluded in Asia had during the 1970s lost their military value. SEATO and CENTO were of greatly reduced value as military alliances. Indeed, from the very inception itself, these two military alliances appeared to be an uncommitted congregation of states roped in by the United States to form alliances. As a result, with few exceptions, American "alliances with Asian states had no solid foundation" with no "mutuality of benefits and liabilities" and therefore incapable of responding to "American interests in the area".[102]

These alliances were set up during the days when Washington perceived that conventional mode of warfare posed the most serious danger to U.S. interests. But with the advancement in technology and sophistication and the accumulation of nuclear weapons, large scale invasion became less probable. Alliances which had in fact sought the bringing together of the armed forces of as many nations as possible lost their deterrent power. Moreover, the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear states injected a new factor into alliances as "nuclear and non-nuclear powers cannot be real allies in the old sense, since they do not share in the ultimate power".[103]

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102. Robert E. Osgood and Others, America and the World From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam (Baltimore, 1970), p. 45.

103. Robert G. Wilson, Foreign Policy for a New Age (Boston, 1977), p. 90.

SEATO which was the largest multilateral defence organisation, considered by Dulles as a symbol of an "Asian Monroe Doctrine" lost its relevance by the second half of the 1960s.

The Vietnam war was largely responsible for exposing the inherent weaknesses of SEATO. All American efforts at shoring up South Vietnam had come to a naught. Even at the height of the Vietnam war, unity among member nations were hard to come by. SEATO which was formed to be an answer to Communist moves in South East Asia had by the 1970s failed in its purpose. Only Thailand, Philippines and Australia had offered anything more than token military support. The lack of cohesion in SEATO had become evident as early as the 1960s. For instance, when Northern Thailand was threatened by Pathet Lao forces, the United States had to introduce a proctocol to the Manila Treaty in 1962 declaring that it would take unilateral action irrespective of the attitude of other SEATO members. "In effect, SEATO in the final years became an alliance between the United States and the remaining Asian members".[104]

More than anything else, this ... spawned the feeling in the United States that primary emphasis on alliances to prevent perceived Communist threats was an ineffective stra-

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104. John Sterling, "ASEAN: The Anti-Domino Factor", Asian Affairs, vol. 7, no. 5, May-June 1980, p. 276.

tegy. The Vietnam war had also churned up adverse Congressional and domestic reactions to alliances that necessitated the downplaying of the old pacts. Now the new emphasis was on a gradual evolution of new concepts and strategies that could both be "sold" to the American public and have the potential of future evolution to meet new requirements.

The Chinese threat, the ostensible primary reason why the United States concluded the SEATO became irrelevant with the Sino-U.S. detente. The new fear propounded was of "internal unrest and guerrilla activities in the member nations".[105] While the Kennedy Administration began talking about the "national liberation movements" being exploited by the Soviet Union for its purposes and began evolving "counter-insurgency strategies", the expectation in third world countries was for increased economic aid for developmental purposes and not for the complications posed by military alliance. An unnamed Malaysian official has been quoted as saying that "we don't expect or want another SEATO military alliance, a major American presence, because we do not expect an invasion". He went on to say:

> Our struggles are small ones, internal ones. What is needed to fight this is to build our economies, develop our countries. That's what we need help for. Our insurgencies we

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105. Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.), 29 June 1977.

> can handle with co-operative arrangements among ourselves.[106]

Though Malaysia was not a member of the military alliance system, the statement cited above indicates a trend towards evolving indigenous organisations to meet common problems. Therefore, it was not only the changing U.S. perception about military alliances in Asia that contributed a change in strategy; the growing discontentment among the member nations were equally responsible. As a consequence, the new trend was to encourage self reliance and stability in South East Asian nations so that the perceived communist threat could be warded off.

The U.S. took note of these trends and the possibilities that they could open in the future. In the meantime it observed without any protest the expressions or disenchantment over the military pacts that were voiced not only in Pakistan but in Thailand and Philippines also. Thus, even while pro-Chinese elements threatened Thailand's North Eastern border, its Prime Minister found it expedient to phase out SEATO. He joined Thailand's President Marcos "in a public suggestion that SEATO "had served its purpose commendably" and that the organisation should be phased out to make it accord with the "new realities in the region".[107] Therefore, the members of the SEATO itself, during the

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106. St. Louis Post - Despatch (St. Louis, Mo.), 8 July 1977.

107. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), 15-21 September 1975, pp. 27335.

organisation's 1973 annual council meeting decided to reduce the traditional military role of the pact and emphasised the need to support national programmes of the two regional members, the Philippines and Thailand. In a move clearly revealing the shift in emphasis, the council decided to integrate the military staff into the civilian staff at the SEATO Headquarters at Bangkok to make it "more relevant to the situation in the treaty area".[108]

In the light of these developments and new demands, the role envisaged for Pakistan in American containment schemes was reappraised. Pakistan's "link" function which Secretary of State Dulles thought was of crucial importance in Asian alliances no more portrayed the American thinking. CENTO was already struggling to extend its life while by 1973, SEATO faced imminent dissolution. Under these circumstances, American policy makers believed that no constructive role could be played by Pakistan. Moreover, when Pakistan embarked on a course to establish close relations with China after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, it amounted to a virtual "defection from SEATO".[109] In addition, ever since the United States imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan in 1965, its commitment to both these organisations becomes half hearted,

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108. Press statement issued at the conclusion of the 18th annual meeting of the SEATO Council held at New York on 18 September 1973. Richard B. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam, American Foreign Relations 1973: A Documentary Record (New York, 1976), p. 377.

109. Robert E. Osgood, Alliance and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, 1968), p. 68.

if not simply token. Disillusioned and highly critical of SEATO for its failure to come to the aid of a member nation during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, Pakistan, the only South Asian nation in the South East Asian alliance, withdrew from the pact on 8 November 1972.

Now Pakistan came to see even its remaining security links with U.S. as connections that constituted a burden limiting its foreign policy options. It was contended that they affixed on it the stigma of an aligned nation without bringing the corresponding benefits. Hence the new focus was on disassociating from American alliances in the effort to remove all the legacies "of the past which has outgrown its usefulness".[110] Barely twenty four hours before Pakistan served notice to SEATO, it recognized the Communist government of North Vietnam and after it recognized North Korea in an effort what the Pakistani spokesmen said was an interrelated effort reflecting Pakistan's independent foreign policy.[111]

Pakistan was also considering withdrawing from CENTO. Bhutto even included it in his election manifesto. But later he went back on his promise, indeed, for reasons hardly intended to please the U.S. A major restraining factor was its close relations with the Iran and Turkey which had helped

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110. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "Pakistan Builds Anew", Strategic Digest, vol. 3, no. 9, September 1973, p. 10.

111. Asian Recorder, vol. 18, 29 July-4 August 1972, p. 10847.

Pakistan during the 1971 war. Further, Pakistan was linked to these two nations through the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD), established in 1964. Besides the fear of displeasing its Arab friends whom he called "dependable allies"[112], Pakistan was also concerned about Beijing's stand. China had after its detente with the U.S. voiced support for American presence in both South and West Asia. Under these circumstances, they viewed that any Pakistani effort to withdraw from CENTO would displease China and probably give Moscow the wrong signal.

Nevertheless, Pakistan would have withdrawn from CENTO had it not been for the American support toward Pakistan during the 1971 war with India, which he thought was responsible for securing the Western part of Pakistan.[113] But even if Pakistan continued to entertain any thought of withdrawing from CENTO after the war, by 1974 it discarded all such

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112. Pakistan was rendered both moral and material support by Islamic states during the 1971 war. When tensions were rising in June 1971, the twenty-two nation Charter Committee of the Islamic Conference which met at Jeddah unanimously expressed "full support and backing to sisterly Pakistan" in the effort to fight what it called "foreign interference in Pakistan's internal affairs". Asian Recorder, vol. 17, 6-12 August 1971, p. 10298. Further, Saudi Arabia "loaned" Pakistan 75 military aircraft, Libya sent a "number" of Northrap F-5 jets, Jordan "some" F-104's and Iran alleviated shortages of ammunition, oil and aircraft. Ibid., 19-25 November 1971, p. 10473.

113. Bhutto is quoted as saying that if the United States had not given a "firm warning that hostilities must cease", then a greater tragedy would have befallen Pakistan. Burke, n. 33, p. 212.

thoughts when India exploded a nuclear device. Pakistan began once again looking towards the U.S. for weapons and its heightened security concern prompted it to view America as its only hope.

However, Pakistan's utility in American alliances were of no crucial importance to the United States any more. The emphasis had clearly shifted from military aspects to economical cooperation among member nations. Iran which had slowly become the most important CENTO nation in West Asia, and the United States, recognised the fact that the military organisation had outlived its utility and that it does not any more "contribute a great deal in security terms".[114]

Nevertheless, it is amply evident that the U.S. did not favour a dissolution of CENTO. It felt that despite the decline in its military utility, the alliance should not be wound up atleast for the reason that "it does not hurt much to have a treaty continue".[115] The United States perceived that it would act as a channel through which co-operation between friendly Arab nations could be achieved and that it could play "a valuable role in promoting the economic and social well being of the peoples in the area".[116]

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114. U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 135.

115. Statement of Alvin J. Cortell, Director of Research, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, George Town University, in ibid.

116. Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph Sisco, at the CENTO Council Meeting at London, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 67, 3 July 1972, p. 25.

Additionally, it was viewed that the continuation of CENTO would be of some help in case some contigency arose. Even for the stability of the area it was recognised that the United States should not call for the dissolution of CENTO, but only encourage a shift in its emphasis. The conclusion was that although military alliances did not carry the same appeal it had in the 1950s, "regional military alliance have not lost their reason d' etre" and that it could contribute "to peace and stability and developmental efforts in the CENTO area".[117] Washington viewed that CENTO would foster unity among the signatory nations. Detente thus did not mean that the United States was totally and unilaterally withdrawing its support for all its cold war devices.

In this light, Pakistan's attempt to improve its relations with Muslim nations and place it on a sounder footing contributed indirectly to American prescription of "regional co-operation". Therefore, with the dissolution of SEATO in 1973 and the de-emphasis of CENTO's security role, American strategic view of Pakistan was to the extent Pakistan could contribute to increased consultations and co-operation among the pro-American nations of West Asia. But even at that,

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117. Statement of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Near Eastern, Africa's and South Asia Affairs in Hearings, New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf, n. 114, p. 43.

Pakistan's continued membership in CENTO had little to do with American pressure or persuasion. Pakistan remained in the alliance until its dissolution for reasons little connected with its relations with the United States.

Another important factor that affected the American view of Pakistan was the Egyptian break from the Soviet Union. The United States had tried in vain to enlist Egyptian support in the American containment scheme of the 1950s in the Middle East. This was one of the factors that had significantly contributed to the American decision to induct Pakistan in U.S. alliances.

Egypt under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser was steered closer to the Soviet Union. But after his death, Anwar Sadat who came to the helm, in a dramatic change reversed the policy of his predecessor. In 1972, he expelled the 20,000 Soviet advisers and military technicians who were stationed in Egypt to strengthen its armed forces and signalled a clear break from its old benefactor. This provided the United States with a definite opportunity to capitalize on the vulnerability of Egypt resulting from the severance of its intimate connections with the Soviet Union and deliver a coup de grace to the relations that had caused considerable anxiety to it. Therefore Pakistan was now faced with the possibility of a further reduction in

its utility for the United States and as a result, a further scaling down in the American need to strengthen Pakistan militarily.

Chapter III

SHADOW OVER PAKISTAN

U.S. Focus on West Asia

In the 1970's the United States began to accord West Asia more attention than it had at any time earlier. The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the subsequent oil embargo imposed on the United States by Arab oil producing states forced Washington to evolve new strategies to prevent the occurence of anything that would disrupt the oil flow to the United States, its Western allies and Japan. The strength of the economies of the West and Japan clearly hinged on a continuous supply of oil from West Asia.[1] Although United States' dependence on West Asian oil was much less, the fate of its economy was tied to those of Japan and its allies in Western Europe. Therefore, the importance of safeguarding the oil flow from the Gulf region was paramount for the United States.

For the United States, the difficulties engendered by the emerging oil crisis were also compounded by the 1971 British withdrawal from "East of Suez" which left the area

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1. In 1973 Western Europe's dependence on Arab oil was estimated to be about 73 per cent, that of the United States' about 9 per cent and of Japan about 42 per cent of their respective total consumption. U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Subcommittee on The Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Impact of the October Middle East War (Washington D.C., 1973), p. 159.

without any major Western presence. The immense requirements of the Vietnam war had already sharply reduced the military resources that Washington could spare for the West Asian region. In the post-Vietnam Watergate context, Washington was in no position to put forth any fresh programmes signifying a deeper involvement in the region. The courses of action that the United States embarked upon under the circumstances were to have implications for Pakistan. Given the enfeeblement of Pakistan after its military defeat in 1971, it was in no condition to play any useful role in support of American objectives. The American quest therefore, was to locate other countries that could serve a supplementary role during the years immediately ahead. If those countries were also in a position to pay for American military hardware, it would be a far more attractive proposition than a grant or sales programme or concessional credits to a country like Pakistan.

The American choice logically fell on Iran and Saudi Arabia. It was deemed that these two nations could be enlisted to undertake a major programme of rearmament to safeguard the oil rich region from domestic instability or Soviet influence that could pose a threat to the oil supplies to the U.S. or its allies. This policy, known also as the American "twin piller policy", was designed to maintain a regional balance within the global balance, to enable the United States to play a less active or visible role of providing guidance and

military hardware necessary for the task.[2] In order to strengthen the two nations and enable them to play more active roles, the United States undertook an arms delivery programme that by the end of the 1970's surpassed in quantum, the arms delivered to any North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member, including Germany.[3] Iran specially, had clearly become the American "gendarme" and the "Nixon Doctrine ideal" in West Asia...a role that the Shah took upon with great enthusiasm and a somewhat inflated estimation of his and Iran's potential. Saudi Arabia did not project military airs but proceeded with huge outlays on sophisticated military hardware. Pakistan was hardly in the same league as those two much smaller but much richer Islamic neighbours.

The American goal was to equip Iran and Saudi Arabia so that they could look after the security of the friendly pro-American states of the Persian Gulf and insulate them from Soviet influence. With this objective in mind, Washington encouraged the Shah's ambitions of turning Iran into the most powerful regional power. Iran was to assume the responsibility

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2. Glen M. Johnson, "Interest Structures: Decision-Making Processes and United States Foreign Policy", International Studies (Bombay), vol. 18, no. 4, October-December 1979, p. 98.

3. During the 1970's, Iran and Saudi Arabia received the largest amount of U.S. arms. The United States delivered Iran $ 9,740,337,000 worth of arms and for the same period, Saudi Arabia received arms worth $ 8,639,575,000. In contrast, Germany which was the largest recipient of arms among the NATO members, received only 6,046,653,000 worth of arms. Foreign Sales and Military Assistance Facts (DATA Management Division, Defense Security Assistance Agency. December 1979), pp. 4,5 and 6.

of keeping the region secure from any destabilising elements or unfriendly influences. The Shah of Iran was stated to be the guardian of what he called the "jugular vein" or the oil routes of the Gulf. Just as the British were winding up their naval presence, Iranian forces occupied the strategically located islands of Abu Musa and Tumbs overlooking the Strait of Homruz and began constructing a naval base at Chah Bahar in the Baluchistan part of Iran to "guard the entrance to the Straits of Homruz."[4] Further, when the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Persian Gulf (PFLOAG) threatened Dhofar, the Southern most province of the Sultanate of Oman, in 1973, Iran sent its crack troops to quell the insurgency. There was a time in the 1950's when Washington believed that an allied Pakistan might provide the muscle to deal with problems in West Asia, including Iran. But the situation had changed so completely, that Iran played such a role and was soon to assume the posture of underwriting the territorial integrity of Pakistan itself.

The Shahanshah not only aimed at keeping the Persian Gulf from Russian influence, but also to limit Soviet influence in the adjoining areas of South Asia as well. He deemed it imperative to reduce the Russian influence in the subcontinent if Iran were to achieve the status of a dominant

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4. Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York, N.Y., 1980), p. 83.

power, for, Russian influence would have automatically constituted an impediment to Iran's aim of becoming the most influential power in the region.

Iran was constantly suspecting Moscow of aiming for a warm water port in the Indian ocean, and to achieve this, Tehran believed that Moscow would destabilise Pakistan. The 1971 Bangladesh crisis was seen as a Soviet-inspired creation to achieve this objective. The Shah therefore, embarked on a policy of reducing the role of the Soviet Union as the most influential power in the region. In pursuing this ambitious objective, the Shah turned his attention not only to Pakistan but to India as well. Tehran's primary aim in South Asia was to safeguard Pakistan's territorial integrity and to prevent a further "disintegration of what remains of Pakistan".[5] Iran offered large scale economic and military aid to Islamabad. Under an agreement signed on 12 June 1974 and another on 18 April 1976, Iran pledged[6] loans amounting to $ 750 million to Pakistan. Iran also went on to finance several joint industries and technical projects. In fact, the only other nation to receive larger credits from Iran

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5. Shahanshah of Iran's Washington Conference (Text of the Proceedings of the Press Conference of His Imperial Majesty, The Shahanshah Aryamehr of Iran at Blair House, Washington, on 25 July 1973), Strategic Digest (Delhi), vol. 3, no. 9, September 1973, p. 35.

6. The Muslim (Islamabad), 11 August 1979.

was Egypt.[7]

Clearly the Shah's role was in accord with American interests. Not only was the Shah doing for Pakistan what the United States was in no position to do at that time, but he also went ahead to diminish the possible danger to Pakistan's security from its two long term adversaries - Afghanistan and India. What the United States had long sought to promote was at this point carried forward by the Shah with the use of its newly acquired money power.

After the 1973 revolution which overthrew King Mohammad Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, the Shah became specially concerned with Pak-Afghan relations. Afghanistan had been calling for an independent territory for the Pakhtun minority in Pakistan. The close contacts forged by the new government of Prime Minister Mohammad Daud with the Soviet Union was the cause of great concern for Iran. To prevent the Soviet Union from gaining unacceptable influence in Kabul, and to induce Afghanistan, a land-locked country, to move in the direction of accommodation with Pakistan, the Shah promised Kabul access to Bandar Abbas and Chah Bhar ports in the Persian Gulf which were very important for Afghan trade. In addition, the Shah assumed the task of playing the role of a mediator in the Pak-Afghan dispute and offered Afghanistan $ 2 billion in

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7. Safia S. Mohammadally, "Pakistan-Iran Relations (1947-1979) Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol. 32, Fourth Quarter 1979, p. 58.

aid[8] in 1974-75, provided it settles its dispute with Pakistan. Iran's underlying objective was to reduce Soviet influence in Afghanistan so that it would not be used by Moscow to sow instability in Pakistan or threaten Iran. To demonstrate to the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and India, his deep commitment to the preservation of Pakistan's territorial integrity, the Shah gave large economic aid and loaned Pakistan 10 helicopter gunships to fight Baluch forces and ordered Iranian military to take direct action against the forces when they sought refuge in Iran.[9]

With the twin objectives of displaying his own enhanced role and moderating potential hostility towards Pakistan on the part of India, the Shah offered India substantial aid for its agriculture and economic development. For instance, in 1974-75, Tehran extended to India £ 133 million in loans for joint ventures and some £ 750 million went to India in 1974 in the form of deferred oil payments, with 20 per cent of oil imports moving at the pre-embargo (1973) prices.[10] The gradual reduction of Soviet influence in India also

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8. Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Princeton, New Jersey, 1980), p. 174.

9. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), vol. 17, 17-23 March 1971, pp. 27016-8.

10. Howard Wriggins, "Changing Power Relations Between the Middle East and South Asia", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 20, no. 2, Fall 1976, p. 796.

figured in the Shah's calculations. Iran also began to encourage increased contacts between India and Pakistan so that peace could be established between the two nations. The Shah went to the extent of suggesting that the countries around the Indian Ocean (India, Ceylon, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand) should "combine to guarantee their collective security".[11] Tehran even toyed with the idea of a "regional common market" to make South Asia less vulnerable to Soviet influence. Since in the ultimate analysis, the Shah himself was known to regard the U.S. as the ultimate guarantor of his regime and dynasty, his grandiose plans were not viewed with any anxiety in Washington. On the other hand, given the basic anti-Soviet thrust of the Shah's course, his actions were viewed as being in consonance with U.S. interests that Washington itself found very difficult to further in the aftermath of the Vietnam war.

This dependence on Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard American interests when the United States itself was hemmed in by domestic constraints, diminished the already declining value of Pakistan for the United States. Thus, while in the 1950's the United States had sought Pakistan's help to strengthen the "northern-tier"--the nations of West Asia--

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11. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The Shah's Story (London, 1980), pp. 135-36.

in the 1970's the United States was only interested in seeing that Saudi Arabia and Iran commit their influence and some of their resources to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining much influence in Pakistan. Further, since the Shah of Iran had resolved after the 1971 war to safeguard the territorial integrity of Pakistan, the United States found it unnecessary to give much attention to any programme of direct assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan's territorial integrity was seen by Iran not only as a necessary adjunct to promote the Shah's regional ambitions but also because of its conviction that if Pakistan "were threatened and some separatist movement started, this would create an absolutely intolerable situation" for its "eastern frontiers".[12]

Therefore, when reliance was placed on "regional influentials", Washington found it perfectly logical to reduce to a trickle, its military supplies to Pakistan, Iran and other friendly nations were any how transferring[13] small

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12. The Shah of Iran quoted in Saikal, n. 8, p. 234.

13. For instance, it was reported that Iran had offered to supply Pakistan at least 50 F-5 aircraft in 1975. Turkey was to supply about 100 M-48 tanks after reconditioning and refitting according to Pakistani specifications. Indian Express (New Delhi), 8 March 1975. Further, during the visit of the President of Turkey, Fahri Koruturk, in the same year, it was announced by the British Broadcasting Corporation that Turkey and Pakistan had decided to establish joint defence industries. The Shah of Iran also promised assistance in the setting up of a similar industry in Pakistan with the ostensible purpose of reducing their dependance on Western arms. Asian Recorder (Delhi), vol. 22, 15-21 January 1976, p. 12977.

quantities of arms to Islamabad and helping it establish defence related industries.

Washington was also quite aware of the implications of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of 1971 and the close relationship which Moscow had forged with India. Washington feared that any large scale American arms sales to Pakistan would only send India closer to the Soviet Union and heighten tensions in the subcontinent when the United States was attempting to "urge restraint to contain or dampen intra-regional hostilities".[14]

Alongside the growing American strengthening of Iran, the United States was succeeding in its attempt to bring within its fold the largest Arab nation, Egypt. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, with references to Henry Kissinger as "my good friend" and a reversal of "pan-Arabism", the policy of his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser, demonstrated that his country was for improving relations with Washington and continuing the policy initiated in 1972 to reduce the Soviet influence in Egypt.

Henry Kissinger who was largely responsible for bringing Egypt and Israel together through his "shuttle diplomacy"

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14. Statement made by Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, on 6 March 1974, before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 70, 8 April 1974, p. 372.

and the "step-by-step" approach, brought the two nations to an agreement that was signed in Geneva in 1975. And under the agreement, Israel agreed to withdrew from a strip in Sinai and broke the ice that existed in the relations between the two nations since the very creation of Israel. This symbolized the course Egypt-Israeli relations were to take in the coming years.

Ever since the Soviet advisers and military technicians were expelled from Egypt in 1972, the American aim in the Middle East was to capitalize on Egypt's distrust of Moscow to neutralise the strength of Israel's most powerful enemy in the Middle East. The primary objective was to dampen the Egypt-Israeli enemity. American planners calculated that if Israel and Egypt could be made to establish peace between themselves it would weaken Arab strength and seriously affect their strength and resolve to fight Israel. Such a development, it was reckoned, would reduce the possibility of yet another Middle East War that was sure to damage American standing, jeopardize its economic interests and increase Soviet influence in the Middle East.

By bringing Egypt and Israel together the United States hoped to increase its influence in Egypt and subsequently enlist its support in the American Middle East strategies. It was clear that Pakistan's usefulness for the

United States would be further reduced if the United States succeeded in making Egypt a supporter of its policies. The other important nation of the Middle East, namely, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel were already in strong league with the United States. Therefore, with the United States in the threshold of a break through in its position in Egypt, Pakistan whose role in the American containment scheme was to a large extent considered important because of Egypt's refusal to support the U.S. policies in the 1950's (as elaborated in Chapter I), was now as a result of the impending reversal of Egypt's stance faced with the prospect of a further decrease in the American interest in Pakistan.

American Apathy towards Pakistan's Arms Quest

After 1961, the United States undertook no major arms sales to Pakistan. Pakistan had to increasingly rely on other sources for its military requirements. China became the largest supplier of arms, taking over from the United States after the latter imposed its embargo in 1965. But Chinese arms failed to meet the Pakistani requirements of sophistication, and as a result, Pakistan had to purchase weapons from the United Kingdom and France and a few others with whom Pakistan had no defence or any other strategic links. All purchases from Western Europe were made on

commercial basis with financial help from Islamabad's Arab friends, while its ally, the United States cold shouldered Pakistan's repeated arms requests. Elaborating on the United States' arms sales policy towards Pakistan, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Marshall Wright, told the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia in 1974, that international relations had changed since 1959 and that the change had made it unnecessary for Washington to accede to Pakistan's arms requests despite American defence links with Pakistan.[15] Nevertheless, while the United States provided Pakistan with only insignificant quantities of arms even after the dismemberment of its one time linchpin in South Asia, Islamabad continued its efforts to impress upon Washington the need to modify its arms sales policy.

Pakistan was convinced that it would not be the beneficiary of any large scale American arms sales. Although the American stance on arms supply stirred considerable anxiety in Islamabad, Pakistan still looked towards the United States as a potential source and was not prepared to make any drastic changes in its policies that could hamper future Pak-U.S. ties.

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15. This policy statement came in reply to a query by Lee H. Hamilton, the Chairman of the Subcommittee, whether Pakistan could depend on its defence agreements with the United States to gain access to military hardware. Asian Recorder, vol. 20, 24 January-4 February 1974, p. 11826.

However, Pakistan began to look elsewhere for ways to safeguard its perceived security interests. Pakistan's new emphasis was designed to increase its ties with the Arab States and China which were seen as dependable sources of help in comparison to Washington whose course was too often conditioned by domestic factors and its reluctance to endanger its relationship with India. Therefore, as soon as the Bangladesh crisis was over, the new leader of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, undertook a visit to Muslim nations calling it a "journey among brothers"[16]. Traumatized by the dismemberment of its eastern wing and virtually ignored by the United States, Pakistan's new priority was to "build anew" by intensifying its contacts with Arab nations. At the same time, fostering even closerrelations with China and depicting China as Pakistan's most reliable friend was a key element in Bhutto's foreign policy approach.

But ironically, this very emphasis on forging closer relationship with Arab countries and China further contributed to the low American perception of Pakistan, for, it suited the United States well. Perhaps if Islamabad had sought to increaseits contacts with the Soviet Union significantly it would have prompted the United States to review its arms sales policy towards Pakistan. Thus, although President Nixon

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16. S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis, 1979), p. 229.

persisted in his mental "tilt" in favour of Pakistan, the troubles that enmeshed him domestically and the course of international developments meant that he was unable and unwilling to recommend concrete measures of help to Pakistan. In the State Department and the Pentagon, no influential personages showed any disposition to stress the necessity of selling to Islamabad the arms it requested.

Nevertheless, a relentless Bhutto did not give up hope, and when Gerald Ford became President, he undertook a visit to Washington in 1975 to persuade him to solve what he called the most "delicate problem" - the resumption of arms sales to Pakistan.[17] Obviously, the explosion of a nuclear device by India in 1974 had shaken Pakistan and added a sense of desperation to its search for arms to ward off what Bhutto called the danger of "nuclear blackmail". Bhutto's shopping list included radars with "look-down capability" to enhance detection of low flying aircraft, "helicopter-borne surveillance radars and radars installed in Lockheed C-130 transports, and replacements for the ageing Rockwell F-86 fighters."[18]

President Ford was receptive to Bhutto's plea for the removal of the arms embargo. However, he apparently made

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17. New York Times, 22 January 1975.

18. Aviation Week and Space Technology (Hightown, New Jersey), 21 April 1975, p. 25.

clear to Bhutto that the action should not be deemed as representing the prospect of a large scale provision of arms to Pakistan. Nevertheless, under the arrangement that Washington was willing to accept, Pakistan was permitted to buy such "lethal" weapons as might be approved by Washington. However, this was the first time since 1965 that Pakistan was accorded the permission to buy "lethal weapons". But, the State Department took pains to make it evident that the arrangement should not be deemed as a major step indicating a renewed American strategic interest in Pakistan. Alfred L. Roy Atherton, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, made it clear that the U.S. was not going to resume its policy of arming Pakistan to maintain "parity" with India or going to engage in an "open-ended" policy of granting all that Pakistan requested.[19]

The case for allowing potentially lucrative arms sales was being strongly pressed by U.S. defence contractors and their supporters in Congress. That one of the items under consideration, the A-7 bomber, was being manufactured by the LTV Corporation in Fort Worth, Texas, the constituency of the Democratic "heavy weight", James C. Wright, was a factor favouring Pakistan. Although the planes were not any more required by the Pentagon, the Congressman who was also the deputy whip of his party was managing to include the aircraft in the Defence Department purchase orders. Washington was

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19. Asian Recorder, vol. 21, 9-15 April 1975, p. 12533.

also beginning to be concerned about its diminishing influence in Islamabad that its arms embargo was causing. Moreover, the efficacy of the American embargo was being undermined by the liberal British and French arms sales policies. Additionally, Washington took note of Pakistan's complaint that while it was being denied U.S. arms India was acquiring large quantities[20] of weapons from the Soviet Union and other nations. Therefore, Washington decided to undertake arms delivery to Pakistan to correct what Under Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco, said was "a rather anomalous situation".

Washington also perceived that Pakistan needed arms to quell the "separatist strife in North-West Frontier province and Baluchistan"[21] and to diffuse threats that appeared to cause instability in Pakistan. In a somewhat similar vein, The Richmond Times Despatch wrote that the "friendly government" of Prime Minister Bhutto needed the weapons "not to embark upon any foreign military adventure, but to keep the country in one piece".[22] American defence analysts were also of the view that political instability was one of the main factors that induced the Soviet Union to increase its presence in the

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20. In a working paper attached to the State Department's announcement the 1975 arms sales to Pakistan, it was noted that India had received $ 1,697,000,000 in outside arms while Pakistan had received arms worth only $ 851 million. Asian Recorder, vol. 21, 9-15 April 1975, p. 12533.

21. Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.), 25 February 1975.

22. The Richmond Times Despatch, 27 February 1975.

Indian Ocean.[23] And more importantly, the American arms sales of 1975 could also have been influenced by Prime Minister Bhutto's assurance that if Pakistan was supplied with adequate conventional weapons, it would dampen Islamabad's search for nuclear weapons. In fact, senior officials of the State Department admitted in 1976 that the arms sales would be used as a level to block Pakistan's nuclear programme.[24]

It is thus discernible that the 1975 arms sales agreement with Pakistan can be attributed more to the American aim of retaining some influence in Islamabad and preventing any further instability in Pakistan, than to any effort designed to strengthen the American South Asian ally to once again play any important role in U.S. defence strategies. Therefore, keeping with this limited arms supply to Pakistan, the Ford Administration did not find any need to rush the key item in the proposed sale, the A-7 aircraft.

Nevertheless, reports that the U.S. was considering the sale of military hardware to Pakistan, evoked predictable Indian criticism. India contended that the sales would spark off an arms race in the subcontinent. The Indian External Affairs Minister, Y.B. Chavan, put off his scheduled visit to the United States to attend the Indo-U.S. Joint Commission meeting that was to be held in mid-March in the same year. Further, the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, declared that the announcement of arms sales to Pakistan had "queered" India's "pitch" and that it would

23. New York Times, 22 April 1979.
24. Asian Recorder, vol. 22, 23-29 September 1976, p. 13369.

hamper the normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan.[25] The sharp Indian criticism to the lifting of the arms embargo coupled with the absence of any strong reasons for the U.S. to immediately strengthen Pakistan militarily, prompted the Ford Administration to leave the final decision of the sale of the "hot" A-7 bombers to the incoming President, Jimmy Earl Carter.

During his race for the presidency, Jimmy Carter had indicated his concern over indiscriminate arms sales and the undesirability of unnecessary American involvement in other countries that process may bring about. The prospect of the victory of a Democratic nominee was understandably a source of some anxiety to Islamabad which had always found Republican Administrations some what more receptive to its pleas. Predictably, after the new Administration took office, Carter enumerated a series of restrictions on the sales of military hardware to all countries except the NATO members, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.[26] Therefore, when even nations like South Korea and the Republic of China were to be allowed only reduced purchases, Pakistan, a nation far less important for the U.S. stood virtually no chance of obtaining permission to purchase American arms. That Carter really intended to

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25. Ibid., vol. 21, 18-24 June 1975, p. 12637.

26. Elaine P. Adam, ed., American Foreign Relations 1977: A Documentary Record (New York, 1979), p. 188.

clamp restrictions on the sales of American military hardware was clearly demonstrated when he cancelled the proposed sale of the 110 Corsairs to Pakistan.

The new Administration also indicated that its arms sales policy would be selectively and vigorously tied to the global priorities in U.S. security requirements. One of the nations that were to be the most adversely affected because of this new policy, was Pakistan. Especially since Pakistan was not considered important for U.S. security interests, Carter was able to apply vigorously his concern for Democracy, human rights and non-proliferation.

Washington's New Priorities

On 18 May 1974, India exploded her first nuclear device with the professed aim of developing nuclear programme for peaceful purposes. But, besides the peaceful purposes to which nuclear energy could be employed, the explosion also constituted an announcement to the world that India could manufacture nuclear weapons if it chose to do so. Predictably, the implications of the explosion were not lost on Pakistan. The reaction from Islamabad was swift. Prime Minister Bhutto accused India of "brandishing the sword of nuclear blackmail".[27] Pakistan now felt that it would have to face its traditional

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27. Facts on File (New York), vol. 34, 25 May 1974, p. 409.

enemy with a new weapon that could be used as "a means of pressure or coercion against non-nuclear countries."[28]

Despite India's assurance that the nuclear test was meant for peaceful purposes, Pakistan refused to accept the Indian contention. It believed that now since India had successfully exploded a nuclear device and attained the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, Pakistan would be in a position of distinct military inferiority vis-a-vis India. To overcome this perceived debility caused by the lack of a nuclear capacity, Pakistan embarked[29] on an ambitious programme to acquire nuclear reprocessing capacity of its own, claiming that its nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes. But later developments and statements of Pakistani leaders laid threadbare the actual intention of Pakistan. It is starkly clear from the notes and a dairy purported to have been written by Z.A. Bhutto from his prison cell while awaiting execution that Pakistan was determined to produce nuclear weapons. Alarmed by India's 1974 nuclear

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28. Ibid.

29. There is however, conclusive evidence indicating that even before the Indian explosion, Pakistan was contemplating means to acquire a nuclear capacity. The point that is sought to be made here is that, it was only after India exploded its nuclear device did Pakistan's efforts become frantic. Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear device programme began to have an impact on its bilateral relations with the United States only after the Indian explosion.

explosion, Bhutto wrote that "Pakistan had no reason to lag behind" in the nuclear field.[30] According to Bhutto, Pakistan was even prepared to "eat grass" to match India's nuclear capability.

To the United States, the nuclear explosion by India came as a blow to its non-proliferation goals. By the 1970's, nuclear proliferation had become an important issue with far-reaching consequences for the Super Powers. Proliferation of the nuclear weapons, it was believed, "would complicate regional confrontation, pose political problems to the U.S., create risks of the Super Powers being drawn into conflicts which could involve nuclear weapons."[31] Besides this professed reason, there was also the fear that proliferation of nuclear weapons would erode the political clout of the great powers.

But when it came to Pakistan's regional rivalry, it relegated to the background American goals as it had always done. Despite intense American pressure, Pakistan concluded with France an agreement on 18 March 1976, for the construction of a nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan.

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30. B.L. Kak, Z.A. Bhutto: Notes from the death Cell (New Delhi, 1979), p. 43.

31. U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organisations and Security Agreements, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nonproliferation Issues (Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 203.

The United States feared that if Pakistan was allowed to set up the nuclear reprocessing plant, a new arms race involving nuclear weapons might erupt in the subcontinent as reprocessing capability would allow usable fuel obtained from spent nuclear fuel to be used to manufacture weapons-grade fissionable material. Therefore, despite his known sympathy for Pakistan in its difficulties with India, the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was very strongly opposed to Pakistan's nuclear venture. In the course of a visit to Pakistan, just two months after the Pak-French nuclear agreement, Kissinger reportedly strongly warned Pakistan to abjure its nuclear quest.[32] There was a threat implied in Kissinger's warning to the effect that if Pakistan in disregard of U.S. non-proliferation goals went ahead with the French agreement, it might well face the suspension of all future American aid, That was Kissinger's stick, while the carrot that he dangled was the prospect of increased aid if Pakistan showed itself receptive to the U.S. position on the nuclear issue. Simultaneously, it exerted intense pressure on France to cancel its nuclear agreement with Pakistan. What is remarkable is that the American pressure continued in spite of the fact that the French Premier Jacques Chirac in no uncertain terms criticised the U.S. Administration for trying to "intervene

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32. New York Times, 9 August 1976.

in what concerns two sovereign States"[33] and the French press termed the American move as a "blackmail". In its determined effort to prevent Islamabad from acquiring a nuclear reprocessing facility, the United States is reported to have proposed an alternate plan to France. Under the plan proposed by Kissinger, the plant was to be set up in France itself rather than in Pakistan. While Pakistan was to own the reprocessing establishment, France was to have effective control over it.[34] Henry Kissinger's extraordinary zeal to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear can be explained in the context of the traditional Indo-Pak enmity that had already erupted into two major wars. The United States clearly believed that "proliferation of nuclear weapons technology could add a more ominous dimension to a world in which regional political conflicts persist".[35] In addition, the United States quite strongly believed that any nuclear bomb produced by Pakistan would fall into the hands of Arab radicals. And in the event of such a development it was reckoned, that emboldened Arab nations may use the weapon against Israel.

If the Ford Administration had pushed hard to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear, the effort was renewed with added vigour after Jimmy Carter was elected to the White

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33. Asian Recorder, vol. 22, 23-29 September 1976, p. 13369.

34. Chicago Daily News, 11 August 1976.

35. U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Foreign Policy Choices for the Seventies and Eighties (Washington, D.C.), 1976), vol. 2, p. 467.

House in 1976. Under the Carter Administration, "the need to halt nuclear proliferation" came to be seen as "one of mankind's most pressing challenges".[36] Carter made the nuclear issue the touchstone of Pak-U.S. relations. The intense pressure brought to bear on Islamabad in regard to a very sensitive issue for Pakistan sparked off a series of crises casting a pall over their bilateral relations. Unfortunately for the Bhutto Administration, the American pressure came at a time when it was struggling to bring under control the domestic unrest sweeping Pakistan. The American criticism of Bhutto at this juncture tended to further weaken the Pakistani government. There were widespread demands for provincial autonomy and movements calling for the ouster of Bhutto. But when it came to American nuclear non-proliferation goals, the Carter Administration continued to exert pressure on Bhutto unmindful of the implications such pressure could have on the strength of the Bhutto government. Therefore, coming at a very difficult time for Pakistan, the American cri de coeur appeared to Pakistan as being "antagonistic" and "irresponsible", and a danger to the security of Pakistan.[37]

Bhutto accused the Carter Administration of funding his opponents and planning to overthrow him. And in a related move, though disclaimed by the American State Department, the U.S. President withdrew the nomination of

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36. Adem, n. 26, p. 185.

37. Mohammed Ashen Chaudhry, "Pakistan and Regional Security: A Pakistani View", India Quarterly (Delhi), vol. 36, no. 2, April-June 1980, p. 184.

G.S. Vest as the American ambassador to Pakistan.[38] Further, the United States imposed embargo on all aid to Pakistan in 1977 as a response to Pakistan's insistence on proceeding with the purchase of the French reprocessing plant. Thus, because of the relentless American pressure on Pakistan and the adverse effect it had spawned on other facets of Pak-U.S. relations, their relations touched rock bottom in 1977.

In fact, the single most important factor that charted the course of U.S.-Pak relations during the Carter regime, was the issue of nuclear proliferation. Factors like the growing civil disturbances in Iran and the "Saur" revolution in Afghanistan certainly had some effect on the U.S. perception of Pakistan. But, the translation of this changing perception into concrete measures of assistance to Pakistan was being stalled by the nuclear issue.

Meanwhile, American pressure reinforced by certain other West European nations forced France to reappraise its position on the sale of the reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Against Pakistani gratitude and goodwill, the French had to yield to the opposition and displeasure principally of the U.S. and the time came when France decided that its own interests required cancelling its offer to Pakistan. Therefore, although the United States may have desired to resume its aid to Pakistan because of the disturbances in Iran and Afghanistan, Washington was unwilling to

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38. New York Times, 3 April 1977.

do so because of Pakistani nuclear ambitions. This was clear from the fact that as soon as it was announced in Islamabad on 24 August 1978, that the French-Pak nuclear deal had fallen through, the United States lifted the embargo on aid that was imposed as a response to Pakistan's pertinacious attitude regarding its nuclear deal with France. The circumstances under which the embargo was imposed and subsequently lifted were intended by Washington to serve as a clear warning to Pakistan against any fresh efforts to seek outside assistance to set up a reprocessing facility.

The cancellation of the French-Pak nuclear agreement did not however mean that Pakistan had given up its plan for a nuclear reprocessing plant or that Pakistan had deferred its search for nuclear weapons. Pakistan was indeed pushing ahead with what Bhutto had said was the effort "to show the world" that "they also knew how to explode a nuclear bomb".[39] After France cancelled the nuclear agreement, Pakistan embarked on a clandestine plan to acquire a nuclear reprocessing plant by buying the various components of the plant from Western Europe, mainly West Germany, Britain, Netherlands and Switzerland with financial support from Libya. The United States after having demonstrated its strong stance on the issue in respect of Pakistan, pushed ahead with its non-

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39. Kak, n. 30, p. 51.

proliferation policy demanding that those nations who had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 should do so without delay. In 1978, the United States Congress passed a new act called the Non-Proliferation Act prohibiting American nuclear assistance to any nation which had not accepted the so-called "full scope safeguards". Further, in 1979, a new law in the form of the Symington amendment was made to section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1976, barring economic and military assistance to nations that obtain equipment for nuclear enrichment without placing it under international safeguards. Pakistan had all the while resisted American efforts to convince it to accept the full scope safeguards on the ground that India had similarly refused to comply with such limitations. With the passage of the Symington amendment, however, Pakistan once again confronted the danger of all American assistance being cut if the Pakistani clandestine nuclear plans were brought to light. Thus, when American intelligence agencies confirmed[40] European reports that Pakistan was surreptitiously acquiring nuclear reprocessing capacity, the Carter Administration reacted strongly and sternly announcing that most of the $ 40 million that had been approved by the Congress for Pakistan for fiscal 1979 and all the $ 45 million in assistance proposed for 1980 would

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40. New York Times, 7 April 1979.

be withheld. This was followed by a decision to wind up the Aid Missions in Lahore, Peshawar and Karachi.

As irony would have it, the second American aid embargo on Pakistan in as many years, and the consequent strain in U.S.-Pak bilateral relations came at a time when developments of far reaching future significance for perceived U.S. security interests in West Asia were evolving. (These developments in Afghanistan and Iran and their bearing on subsequent U.S. policy will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter). What is sought to be explained here is the ramifications the Carter line on non-proliferation had on Pakistan. The non-proliferation issue had gained so much of momentum and topical interest in the United States, especially in the Congress, that it came to be accepted as one of the most important priorities for Washington, making it virtually impossible for the United States to ignore Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear arms development programme. In the effort to dampen Pakistan's nuclear quest, Carter had even offered to sell Pakistan upto fifty Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighter planes and to assist Pakistan's nuclear power programme and also to lend diplomatic support for the Pakistani proposal calling for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia.

The United States was clearly faced with the dilemma of promoting its non-proliferation goals and at the same time,

responding to the brewing crisis in the important area of West Asia enlisting Pakistan's support. It was reported by the New York Times[41] that the Administration had approached Pakistan with new inducements of advanced conventional arms and threats of harsh economic sanctions. The newspaper indicated that the Administration even contemplated covert action against Pakistani nuclear facilities to prevent Pakistan from going ahead with its nuclear weapons programme. It was not long before the troublesome developments in Iran and Afghanistan were to force some rethinking within the Administration even as their media began drawing attention to the negative aspects of Washington's attitude towards Pakistan. The Christian Science Monitor, for instance, wrote that the United States had "every strategic interest in bolstering rather than ruffing U.S.-Pak ties."[42]

Another development which hampered Pak-U.S. relations was the Carter Administration's professed concern for human rights. In 1970, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 had been made tying U.S. aid to the incidence of political prisoners to potential recipient nations. By 1976, two more crucial amendments were made and one such amendment of section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act barred economic

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41. New York Times, 12 August 1979.

42. Christian Science Monitor, 10 April 1979.

assistance to nations violating human rights. When Carter assumed office, he attached more importance to human rights than any other previous Administration. Carter commented that "the government of the United States will continue, throughout the world, to enhance human rights" and that "no force on earth can separate us from that commitment".[43] With the backing of the new Administration, the concern for human rights gained much currency.

The public posture of the Administration was a complicated factor for American allies like Iran and Pakistan whose record on human rights left them open to criticism in Congress and elsewhere. The Administration was conscious of the human rights course and in practice applied it rather "selectively". Countries that were of great importance from the point of view of U.S. security, like China, were treated gently while Chile and Uruguay for instance, were subjected to vigorous treatment. In regard to two important nations, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Administration's posture was one of gentle exhortation but in regard to Pakistan it was somewhat stronger.

The Amnesty International reported that there were over 2,000 political prisoners in Pakistan and that they were being

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43. Carter quoted in Editorial Research Reports, U.S. Foreign Policy: Future Directions (Washington D.C., 1979), p. 4.

tortured to extract confessions.[44] In the same vein, Leonard Garment, a U.S. member of the U.N. Human Rights Commission criticised the Bhutto government for large scale arrests of political opponents of the government in Islamabad.[45] But there is no evidence to show that Pak violations of human rights substantially affected Washington's policy making towards that country. The reason was that the American opposition to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions eclipsed all other issues which the United States considered important in South Asia. But at the same time, the Pak violations of human rights, in a limited way, further contributed to the low American perception of Pakistan. The large scale imprisonment of political prisoners around the mid 1970's by Prime Minister Bhutto to stifle his opposition caused some trepidation in the United States. Further, the overthrow of the elected government of Bhutto in July 1977 and its replacement by the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq was widely interpreted in the United States as a serious reversal of Pakistan's experimentation with democracy. Thus, when the nuclear controversy was stretching the Pak-U.S. relations, the deteriorating position of human rights and the overthrow

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44. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 33, 23 September 1977, p. 28569.

45. New York Times, 2 April 1976.

46. Statement by David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, on 18 October 1978, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 78, December 1978, p. 54.

of Bhutto made it easier for the Carter Administration to exert more pressure on Pakistan. The true situation was that the United States found it propitious to exert pressure on Pakistan to further the American non-proliferation goals, human rights concepts and democratic ideals which became important concerns in South Asia when Pakistan's cooperation was not deemed important for the promotion of American strategic objectives.

Appraisal of India as the Dominant Regional Power

A major factor that had begun to influence American policy toward Pakistan even earlier than the advent of the Carter Administration was Washington's perception that India should be dealt with as clearly the dominant power in South Asia. The defeat of Pakistan in 1971 was contributed decisively to such an appraisal.

In the United States there was widespread criticism of the Nixon Administration's "tilt" towards Pakistan during the Bangladesh war. The Democratic Party platform, for instance, in 1972 criticised strongly the Nixon Administration's pro-Pakistani policies that according to it had "seriously damaged the status of the U.S. in Asia."[47] Because of the virulent criticism of Nixon's policies toward South Asia and the Administration's desire to improve relations with India,

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47. Facts on File, vol. 32, 23-29 July 1972, p. 577.

Nixon in spite of his known dislike for India and Mrs. Gandhi in particular[48], deemed it necessary to call for a "serious dialogue" with Delhi. The United States came to be well aware of the fact that "as long as India faces Chinese hostility and American indifference, New Delhi will have little option but to rely upon the Soviet Union and Moscow will endeavour to exploit the state of affairs."[49] But nothing concrete was done by either the Nixon Administration or the Ford Administration to better Indo-U.S. relations. But it was clear that there was an implicit recognition in Washington of India's new dominance in the region.

There was a further boost in the Indian status when it exploded its first nuclear device in 1974. In a report submitted to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Relations, it was concluded that India was central to the future of South Asia and that India not only possessed a technical pool of competent scientists but was also capable of developing "nuclear explosives" by very original techniques and processes."[50] The report also alluded to the fact that the

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48. Henry Kissinger writes that Richard Nixon was favourably disposed toward Pakistan. According to him Mrs. Gandhi's "moody silences brought out all of Nixon's latent insecurities", and that the two leaders were "not intended by fate to be personally congenial". Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (New Delhi, 1979), p. 848.

49. William J. Barnds, "Moscow and South Asia", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vol. 21, May-June 1972, p. 36.

50. Asian Recorder, vol. 22, 20-26 May 1976, p. 13167.

dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 had left India in a dominent position in South Asia. But this did not mean that the United States had begun to assign India the importance it had assigned Pakistan in the early days of their alliance. The difference in the new approach was that India gained more attention because Pakistan became less important. India's size, its mammoth population, its geographical location and the Indian democracy began to weigh more in the absence of any present or immediate threats to U.S. strategic interests in South Asia.

Washington was aware that there was little prospect of inducing India to offer help in the American strategic schemes. Though Pakistan had a record of co-operation, the absence of even any perceived short range threats in the region inevitably meant that Washington saw no special need to woo Pakistan.

Of all the U.S. Presidents, the reality in the sub-continent was most clearly recognised by Jimmy Carter who was elected to the White House in 1976. His Administration sought to convey that while it was deeply interested in what remained of Pakistan, it also desired to improve working relations with India on the basis of acknowledging India's non-aligned policy as a realistic course reflecting Indian interests and its own position as the most important country in the region.

Such a course was viewed as clearly necessary, both to counter further rise in Soviet influence in India and to mitigate Indian anxieties concerning the evolving U.S. moves in the direction of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China.

The cancellation of the sale of the A-7 bombers was a clear manifestation of the growing realisation of the need to consider Indian positions when the U.S. made policies towards South Asia. Carter's decision was taken on the ground that the sale of the aircraft would be viewed by India as a disruption of the balance of power in the sub-continent and that the sale would significantly enhance Pakistan's defence capability vis-a-vis India.[51] By the same token, the Senate acting on the recommendations of the Carter Administration approved in 1977 a $ 1.6 billion foreign aid bill that contained the first significant amount of U.S. aid for India after the 1971 war. The imposition of emergency in India in 1975 and the adverse reaction it evoked in the United States, had provided for the first time, some relief to Pakistan in not being unfavourably compared to India in terms of internal democracy. However, the period of respite was short lived. The defeat of Mrs. Gandhi in the 1977 general elections brought forth such wide-

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51. Ibid., vol. 23, 9-15 July 1977, p. 13827.

spread resurgence in the U.S. of the appreciation of the vitality of the democratic spirit in India, that Pakistan was once again placed in a disadvantageous position. And to make things worse for Islamabad, just about the same time Mrs. Gandhi was defeated, Pakistan's stint with democracy met with an ignoble end.

Carter himself with sentimental references to his mother's stint in the Peace Corps in India gave the impression of attaching importance to rebuilding and strengthening U.S. relations with India than with Pakistan. Carter claimed to have a special regard for the new Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, with whom he saw so much in common. To the United States the Indian Prime Minister was an "anti communist"[52] who cared for the territorial integrity of Pakistan as much as the United States did. More importantly, the United States viewed the policies of the Janata government as designed to correct the pro-Soviet incline that allegedly characterised Indian policies under Mrs. Gandhi. Washington was specially heartened by what it believed to be the new government's concept of genuine "non-alignment" or what had been termed as the effort to be "completely neutral".[53]

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52. Pragh David Van, "Pakistan's New Buffer Role Against the Soviet's", Business Week (New York, N.Y), 21 August 1978, p. 48.

53. Elaine P. Adam and Richard Stebbins, ed., American Foreign Relations 1978: A Documentary Record (New York, 1979), p. 100.

Further, to the United States it appeared that the Janata Government in India was viewing less critically the growing American presence in the Indian Ocean and adjoining areas. Washington was inclined to believe that India was attributing the growth of the U.S. presence to a "realpolitik" approach to foreign policy, rather than a development for which the U.S. was primarily to blame as was held by the previous government in India.[54]

It is also not insignificant that Carter was the first American President to visit India without stopping in Pakistan. Carter had clearly placed India before Pakistan. In his speech to the Indian Parliament during his visit to India in 1978, Carter explicitly recognised India's increasingly important role in world affairs and acknowledged that India had become a nation of global importance.[55] These developments were understandably viewed with concern in Islamabad even though Carter and his senior associates had been careful enough not to make any statements derogatory to Pakistan or indicating a lack of concern for maintaining good relations with that country. One important issue that was of decisive importance for Pakistan was the attitude the Carter Administration displayed on the controversial issue of shipment of

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54. Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities, and Foreign Policy", Asian Survey (Berkeley, California), vol. 18, no. 7, July 1978, p.7-27.

55. Stephen P. Cohen and Richard L. Park, India: Emergent Power? (New York, 1978), p. xix.

enriched uranium to India. That the President was willing to overrule the recommendation of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and authorise the shipment to India of enriched uranium was a move that had a profound impact on Pakistan's own nuclear quest. The President was seen as treating India on a different basis from Pakistan, adopting a rather anomalous posture, though the positions of both the countries in not signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty and not accepting the "full scope safeguards" were identical. That Pakistan was being discriminated against even after the U.S. had concluded that India had diverted U.S. supplied heavy water for its nuclear explosion, was to Pakistan an unmistakable indication that Washington was assigning more importance to its relations with India than with Islamabad. Pakistani complaint was that the Carter Administration even while taking a hardline toward Pakistan had chosen to supply enriched uranium in support of its traditional opponent even after it had exploded a nuclear device — a development regarded by Pakistan as having serious implications for its future security.

It is perhaps during the Carter Administration that Indo-U.S. relations reached its apex. Indeed, Indo-U.S. relations, in the words of the Presidential National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brezezinski, "have never been

better".[56] No previous Administration had ever placed India before Pakistan say during a very brief period that India was more important than Pakistan and that "the most crucial factor of the subcontinent ... is the central dominating position of India".[57] In contrast, under the Carter Administration, the American perception of Pakistan and their relations reached the lowest nadir. Indeed, the Carter Administration mostly viewed and treated Pakistan according it the status of only a small and unstable military ruled third world nation trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Therefore, for the first time since the Second World War, there appeared to be an incumbent of the White House, who was willing to recognise India's predominant position in the subcontinent. It was not until the Afghanistan crisis of December 1979, that the U.S. once again found that its perceived security interests demanded a reversal of its policy towards India and Pakistan.

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56. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 79, February 1979, p. 19.

57. Cohen and Park, n. 55, p. 10.

Chapter IV

PAKISTAN BACK IN AMERICAN SECURITY FOLD

Strains in Detente

By 1975, the comparative quiet which had characterised U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations began to exhibit signs of strain. American hardliners kept on warning that the spectacular growth in the Soviet military capability was bound to be reflected in the Soviet foreign policy. Nuclear inferiority had circumscribed the limits to which Soviet political aims could be pursued. Attainment of strategic parity would make the Soviet Union more willing to take risks[1], they argued.

During the period of inferiority, there may have been innumerable political or geo-strategic objectives which Moscow would have pursued if it were not for the overwhelming American military superiority. The Soviet decision not to pull out of Iran until President Truman warned that American military might would be used at a time when only the United States had atomic weapons is a case in point. But once the Soviet Union achieved parity or near parity with the United States, the rules of the game were bound to change.

Soviet military muscle came to be closely aligned with its political objectives. With the backing of the military,

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1. Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1966), p. 181.

political aims came to be advanced more actively. As a result, Soviet power began to catalyze change in areas far away from the Soviet borders. U.S. intelligence sources estimated that the Soviet ability to bring to bear its power in trans-border regions increased eightfold in ten years.[2]

The first indication came in the form of the Soviet involvement by proxy in the Angolan civil war in 1975. The Soviet role in the civil war once again threatened to involve the big powers in "tense jockeying" for tactical advantage around the globe. Since the Second World War, this was the first bold attempt by the Soviet Union to involve itself so closely with leftist forces outside Eastern Europe. This foray which Kissinger pointed to accusingly while justifying U.S. covert operation in Angola became the first step towards the dismantling of the carefully and painstakingly nurtured detente. At the same time the Angolan crisis served as a convenient development to the U.S. hardliners to warn of the degrees of Vietnam-induced American slumber. For, the thousands of Cuban troops ferried by Moscow to Angola at a critical stage of the fight turned the tide of the war in the favour of the Soviet backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.). While

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2. Sol W. Sanders, "US Policy is adrift in the Indian Ocean", Business Week (New York, N.Y.), 20 November 1978, p. 58.

on the other hand, the Western backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola (F.N.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.) had to be contented with the token help the Vietnam scared United States could extend. Even in such appraisals, there was hardly any emphasis placed by American planners on a new or enhanced role for Pakistan. Nonetheless, certain developments that were to follow in terms of what were perceived to be Soviet efforts to project its power far beyond its borders were to alert Washington to the vulnerability of West Asia and to the usefulness of Pakistan in dealing with problems in the region.

No sooner did the Popular Front establish itself in Angola, then Angola's relations with neighbouring Zaire, a pro-Western nation, soured. Katangan forces led by Angola-based Cuban forces and logistically supported by Angola, invaded Zaire in March 1978. French military instructors and Moroccan troops had to be flown to Zaire to help drive away the invading forces from the copper-rich province of Shaba in Northern Zaire. After the Angolan war, Moscow with the help of Cuban troops established itself in the horn of Africa which is a vital western trade route. Soon, Soviet influence came to be seen in Mozambique, South Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. Cuba became the Russian surrogate and to release the Cuban air force personnel for missions

abroad, Soviet airmen were flown to Havana to take over Cuban defence missions.[3]

Such Soviet moves set about strong reactions in the United States. Hardliners in Washington began to step up warnings about the perceived consequences the growing Soviet influence in Africa and West Asia could have on U.S. interests. Democratic Senator, Henry Jackson, declared that Moscow's burgeoning military strength would result in an "increasingly aggressive Soviet international policy".[4] In the same vein, referring to the overt Soviet involvement in Africa and the Middle East, the Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown, opined that the Soviet Union had become "more adventurous in their behaviour".[5]

Growing anxieties concerning the stability of the Shah's regime in Iran as also the regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms were reflected in various high level discussions on what the response of the United States should be if the threat materialised through either Soviet moves or internal insurgencies. The broad principle was accepted that the safeguarding of access to oil was so vitally important for the security of the "free world", that the United States had no other alternative except to gear itself for a military response to such threats.

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3. Time (Tokyo), 13 August 1979.

4. Ibid., 24 October 1979.

5. Ibid.

Congress started becoming hawkish when it came to dealings with the Soviet Union. The SALT II Treaty which was awaiting Senatorial approval ran into increasingly strong opposition and its passage became doubtful. Carter, who had in his election campaign promised to cut the defence budget was compelled in 1979 to request the Congress for a five per cent increase in the defence budget after adjusting for inflation. To overcome the perceived weakness of the American military, a new force called the Rapid Deployment Force (R.D.F.) began to take shape. Under this plan a force of 100,000 troops, including 40,000 combat soldiers was to be established to safeguard American interests in the Middle East and other areas.[6]

Carter was responding not merely to the military threat as was depicted to him but also to the political threat to his own position as domestic opponents including some in his own party pressed vigorously the charge that he had neglected American defences and allowed the Soviet Union to forge ahead not merely in the nuclear field but also in its "conventional weapon" capabilities to project its power. The American President declared that the United States "must understand that not every instance of the firm application of power is potential Vietnam"[7] and signalled

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6. New York Times, 20 April 1979.

7. Time, 24 December 1979.

"clearly enough, that the era of the Vietnam complex in American foreign policy had come to an end."[8]

This did not however mean that the American strategic perspective of Pakistan was radically affected. The new cold war had not yet emerged from the thin veil of detente. Detente was still dangling on tenuous strings. The Vietnam war syndrome was certainly wearing off, but its hangover still lingered on. But the indications were clear. The United States if confronted by an increasingly aggressive Soviet Policy would discard its fear of intervention, and seek more allies abroad in a way reminiscent of the cold war years. Thus, alongside the increasingly assertive Soviet foreign policy and the turmoil in Iran, Pakistan by 1978 began to gain more attention than it had in the 1960's and larger part of the 1970's. In fact with each alleged Soviet role in Africa and the Middle East, there was a revival of American interest in Pakistan.

Militarization of the Indian Ocean

Adverse developments for the United States that took place in Africa, West Asia, particularly in Iran and the growing appraisals of expanded Soviet Naval capabilities were to lead to a process of increased United States Naval

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8. Ibid.

presence in an area that had not previously received significant attention, namely, the Indian Ocean. The growing importance evinced in that part of the ocean adjoining the Persian Gulf was bound to lead American planners to take a fresh look at the possibilities of again seeking Pakistan's cooperation. However, since the end of the Second World War, the United States had been maintaining a skeletal presence in West Asia. In 1949, the United States had rented from the British a naval facility in Bahrain and set up a small naval presence in the Middle East, called MIDEASTFOR, rotating two destroyers from the Atlantic fleet.[9] Further, in 1951, a Strategic Air Command (SAC) recovery base was established in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia).

The growth of the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean began in the mid 1960's when the United States' strategic superiority was eroded by the steady growth in the Soviet nuclear power. Before that time, the United States had clear cut military superiority over the Soviet Union. But as the Soviet nuclear weapons began to increase both in terms of number and sophistication, the threat to the American landbased missiles (then the back bone of U.S. nuclear strength) increased. Therefore, to reduce the vulnerability

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9. Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 70, 8 April 1974, p. 372.

of the U.S. nuclear force, reliance came to be placed on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). To increase the strike capability of these missiles and to get a new "angle"[10] on Soviet and Chinese targets, the United States started deploying its nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. In this effort, the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) consisting of the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar, Desroches and the Chagos Archipelago in South West Indian Ocean set up in 1965 and the new bases acquired from Seychelles and Mauritius came as convenient locations which could be utilised for the expansion of the American Naval presence.

Washington and London joined hands in an effort to increase their joint naval presence to safeguard their perceived interests in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. During this period, however, Pakistan's help was not sought in any substantial way. British and American interests ran parallel in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, and as a result, the United States reckoned that British help, besides being far more beneficial in the strategic sense, would also be forthcoming without politico-military costs that any induction of Pakistan would have entailed. Thus, in 1966, the United States entered into a secret pact with

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10. U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 63, no. 9, 28 August 1967, pp. 32-33.

Great Britain to reduce the cost (£ 14 million in research costs) of Polaris missiles to London in exchange for permission to establish military facilities in the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia.[11]

To provide various support and other necessary infrastructure for an increasing presence, the United States set up naval communication facilities in North West Cape Alice Springs and Woomera (Australia), Asmara (N. Ethiopia) and Mahre (Seychelles Islands) and tracking and telemetry facilities and a naval radio station in Vacoas in Mauritius in 1967.[12]

But the Anglo-American co-operation in West Asia did not prove durable. Due to its loss of colonies and declining economic strength, Great Britain announced in January 1968 that it was withdrawing from the Middle East and "East of Suez" by 1971. The United States made it appear[13] that the

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11. New York Times, 17 October 1975.

12. T.T. Poulose, "Indian Ocean: Prospects of a Nuclear Free, Peace Zone", Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol. 5, no. 2, January 1974, p. 320.

13. In the ultimate analysis, the reasons for the growing U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean is linked to the American aim of extending power and to acquire a strong military interventionist capability in order to be able to exert pressure on nations in the region. U.S. Military officials themselves admit that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean had little concrete influence on the U.S. decision to increase its naval presence. For the statement of J. Owen Zurhellen Jr., Deputy Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

withdrawal of the traditional presence of the Britannia would leave a "vacuum" — a convenient theory propounded by the U.S. to strengthen its naval deployment in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, with the professed intention of precluding the Soviet Union from attaining an upper hand in the region, the United States moved to augment its Naval presence. To monitor Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean the United States established an intelligence listening post in Diego Garica in 1971. But, even after the withdrawal of the British Navy from the area and the United States decided to substantially increase its presence in the Indian Ocean, Washington did not seek Pakistan's co-operation or assistance. The Vietnam war was being wound down, and in view of the backlash engendered by the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, any American attempt to seek the help of Pakistan would have confronted stiff opposition in the United States besides being politically dangerous for the American President.

With the onset of the oil crisis in 1973, American presence in the Indian Ocean and the mouth of the Persian

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Footnote 13 cont'd...

agency, see: U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, Ist Session, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 5. For a similar opinion voiced by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr., Chief Naval Operations, See: U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Briefings on Diego Garcia (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 7.

Gulf began to substantially increase. Strongly spurring the quickened pace was the opening of the Suez Canal. Military experts in the United States argued that the Soviet Black Sea fleet deployed in the Mediterranean would be able to now maintain a squadron in the Indian Ocean. Previous to the opening of the canal, the Soviet Union had to detach ships from its Pacific fleet based at Vladivostock to operate in the Indian Ocean. But now, with the Canal opened, the distance between the Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol and the Persian Gulf was reduced by 2,500 miles.[14] Further with the opening of the Suez Canal, the distance of 10,400 miles which the Soviet ships had to travel to reach the Persian Gulf through the Cape of Good Hope, was reduced to 3,300 miles.[15] As a result, the American policy makers came to believe that if a growing Soviet Naval presence went unchecked in the Indian Ocean, then the sea routes to Iran and the Persian Gulf States, the Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb and the oil rich countries would slip away from virtual American control. Opinions came to be expressed accusing Moscow of harbouring grand designs to move into the Persian Gulf and take control of South Africa's

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14. New York Times, 25 May 1974.

15. Ibid., 19 November 1974.

mineral wealth.[16]

Similarly, the fact that there were limitations on the class of ships that could navigate through the Suez Canal because of the large size of the American ships had an important influence in the proposed increase in the American presence in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, and more importantly, the growing "show of the flag" by the Soviet Navy, the direct consequence of the attainment of a blue water capability, had its own effect on the American military strategists especially because of the so called Gorshkov Doctrine which implied that a powerful navy for Moscow was as important for the Soviet Union as it was for the British in the past.[17] Underlying this anxiety was the fear that Soviet Union would use "military assistance and shows of force to influence events where their major interests are at stake",[18] and thereby reduce the virtual American control in the area.

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16. Statement of Dr. Igor Glagolev, former Senior Research member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Science and a former Adviser to the Central Committee. A somewhat similar opinion was voiced by Dr. T.B. Millar of the Australian National University. Anthony Harrington, "The Indian Ocean and U.S. Security", Vital Speeches (Southold, N.Y.), vol. 46, no. 22, 1 September 1978, p. 674.

17. New York Times, 25 January 1974.

18. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 70, 8 April 1974, p. 372.

Referring to the sharp increase in the Soviet deployment in the Indian Ocean, Seymour Weiss, the Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, testified before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign affairs that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean rose from 1000 ship days in 1968 to 6,500 in 1973, while that of the United States registered only a "moderate" increase from 1,150 in 1968 to just over 2,000 in 1973.[19] Having convinced themselves that the primary motive of the Soviet Navy was to supplement Soviet political activity in Asia as well as Africa, the United States established a full fledged communication base in Diego Garcia in 1973 and increased the American naval presence in the Indian Ocean to counter the allegedly growing Soviet influence.

Because of the fact that the American Navy had to sail its ships from the Pacific fleet, plans were also afoot to convert Diego Garcia into a full fledged base. The American Navy sought bunkering and aircraft landing facilities in Diego Garcia to enlarge the American presence in the area[20] and to counter what U.S. military experts considered was the alarming magnitude of the Soviet build up. Testifying

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19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 374.

before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the need to expand the American base in Diego Garcia, the Defence Secretary James Schlesinger revealed that the Soviet Union was substantially improving its base facilities in Somalia and even introducing Soviet missiles there.[21] Apparently, Washington felt the need to expand its base facilities in the Indian Ocean both to relieve the excessive burden of the Navy because of the lack of support facilities in the Indian Ocean and to counter more effectively, the alleged Soviet build up. This was considered imperative both to reassure America's friends in the region about U.S. military power and to serve as a warning that Washington would not tolerate any erosion of American influence in the Persian Gulf that could jeopardise American interests.

But even during the period of increasing military activity in the Indian Ocean, the United States did not find it expedient to involve Pakistan to augment pro-Western presence in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan, however, partook in CENTO exercises. For instance, in 1974, Pakistan hosted the largest CENTO exercise called "Midlink" which was supposedly directed to demonstrate the resolve of the U.S. and friendly nations to protect the oil lanes from any Soviet threat. But CENTO exercises were few and far between and no large scale exercises were conducted after the Midlink

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21. New York Times, 15 June 1975.

exercises.

In the meantime, however, the Western presence was steadily increasing in the Indian Ocean and the United States began establishing and looking for new bases in the periphery of the Indian Ocean and feverishly upgrading its Diego Garcia base. Surprisingly, even under these circumstances, the United States did not find it beneficial to accept the Pakistani offer of an air and naval base at Gwadar on the shore of the Arabian Sea close to the Iranian frontier. The offer was originally made by the Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to President Nixon in 1973 and renewed thereafter to the Ford Administration in 1975.

Strategically, a base at Gwadar would have served the United States well because of its closer proximity to the Persian Gulf region by about 2,000 miles. But it was perhaps reckoned in Washington that the advantages of such a base would be outweighed by the political costs Washington would have to pay for the close relations the United States would have to forge with Pakistan for the base. Washington was also aware of the fact that any close relations with Pakistan would heighten intra-regional rivalry in the subcontinent. Moreover, Pakistan was beset by instability and there was no surety that any United States base, if set up in Pakistan, would survive the upheavals.

Pakistan, on its part, was all the while advocating an increased American and Western presence in the Indian Ocean, declaring that it was in the interests of the Western nations to counter the increasing Soviet presence in an area close to the oil rich regions. The Pakistani Prime Minister said in an interview that the Indian Ocean had become a "critical area" where the Soviet Union was attempting to establish "hegemony".[22] But there was little doubt that Pakistan was encouraging the Western presence to counter the steady growth of the Indian Navy which Pakistan saw as a threat to its own security. Evidently, Pakistan hoped that the establishment of an American naval and air base at Gwadar would once again bring the United States closer to Pakistan and stem the indifference that had come to characterise American policy toward Pakistan. The setting up of a base in Pakistan would have invariably brought Islamabad military and economic aid besides diplomatic support in its historical rivalry with India. Further, any Pakistani participation in the patrolling of the Indian Ocean would have automatically meant access to American facilities in the Indian Ocean to the disadvantage of India.

It was manifest that the United States did not envisage any role for Pakistan in its increasing presence in the Indian

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22. Ted Szulc, "Confrontation in the Indian Ocean", New Republic (Washington, D.C.), 13 March 1976, p. 22.

Ocean. Pakistan was both economically and militarily a weak nation. Its Navy had neither the ships capable of patrolling the Indian Ocean and supplementing the U.S. presence, nor the finances to acquire them. The Pakistani naval strength was such that if the U.S. would have had to give Pakistan new sea going vessels and incur additional expenditure to subsidise or finance such sales to Pakistan it had to prepare Pakistan for any military role in the Indian Ocean.

On the other hand, Iran under the Shah and with its oil billions looked as the ideal nation that could be encouraged to play an active role in the Indian Ocean. The Shah believed that his country was already on the way to becoming a regional power by virtue of its oil wealth and the strong American backing. Vigorously encouraging the Shah was Henry Kissinger who remarked that Iran was playing a "constructive" role in the Indian Ocean and that it had the "support" of the United States.[23] In pursuance of its regional ambitions Iran sought some pretext or the other to extend naval patrolling to the Indian Ocean. The Iranian Ambassador to Kuwait, Dr. Reza Ghassimi, for instance, announced in 1977 that Tehran had called for a collective security effort to protect oil lanes, asserting that "there was a link between the security of the area and the security of the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean".[24]

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23. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 71, 25 November 1974, p. 727.

24. Summary of World Broadcasts (London), vol. 64, The Middle East and Africa, Second Series, ME/5501, 2 May 1977, p. 4.

It is noteworthy that the United States in its effusive references to the Iranian potential for playing the role of the dominant regional power used language of the kind that it had hardly used in the case of India in the earlier years. This leads to the inference that while Iran's playing such a role was in accord with American desires, such had not been the case in respect to India. Likewise, no important American planner had referred to Pakistan, a more populous and developed nation compared to Iran, as of being in possession of the prerequisites to be a regional power. The import of the omission was that the United States did not look to Pakistan as a nation that could play a substantial role in American defence schemes.

Without having to bear any expenditure on its own and with the prospect of obtaining huge amounts from Iran in military sales, the United States worked to prepare a more than eager Iran for military roles to augment pro-Western presence in the Indian Ocean. In accordance with this objective, the U.S. sold the Iranian Navy three Tang class deep diving fast submarines in 1975 and further offered to sell a so-called "sea control ship" capable of supporting "convoys and amphibious operations".[25]

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25. New York Times, 10 January 1975.

Instability in South West Asia

On 22 April 1978, the Communist Party of Afghanistan backed by a segment of the Afghan armed forces overthrew President Muhammad Daud Khan who had come to power in 1973. The Soviet Union became the first nation to recognise the leftist regime in Kabul and in a short time concluded with the new government over thirty aid agreements.[26]

In the United States Moscow's increasing ties with Kabul came to be seen as a development that had far reaching implications for the West. It was believed that Moscow aimed at securing access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, and that to achieve this it would move through Afghanistan and exploit Pakistan's trouble with Baluch rebels. Further, because of the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist government in Afghanistan and the intimate relations that were being forged between the two countries there was an increasing tendency in the United States to consider Afghanistan as being in the process of becoming an extension of Soviet territory. After the 1978 coup, Soviet power was seen as bordering Pakistan in the Khyber pass. Afghanistan which had for long served as the traditional buffer that kept the Soviet Union away from its historical ambition of

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26. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan Under the Khalq", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vol. 28, July-August 1979, p. 34.

reaching the Indian Ocean, was seen as having been replaced by Pakistan.[27] Given the perceived immense American stake in preventing the Soviet Union from gaining any access to the Indian Ocean, Pakistan's importance for the United States took an upward swing.

The Soviet Union had already established itself in Addis Ababa. In 1977, Moscow had dropped Somalia for a bigger bargain, Ethiopia. In the very next year, about 7,000 Soviet "advisers" and Cuban troops were flown in to consolidate the Soviet position there by enabling Ethiopia to repel a Somalian attack in the Ogaden region. Washington spoke of mounting Soviet threats in the crucial area of the "horn of Africa".

By 1977, the State Department estimated that Cuba had military advisers and troops numbering 10,000-15,000 in Angola, 1,000 in the People's Republic of Congo and smaller numbers in Guinea, Somalia and Mozambique.[28] Predictably, the increasing Communist influence was causing considerable rethinking of U.S. policies. Referring to the increase in Soviet arms, advisers and Cuban personnel in Africa, the American Vice-President, Walter Mondale, remarked that "we

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27. David Van Praagh, "Pakistan's New Buffer Role Against the Soviets", Business Week, 21 August 1978, p. 48.

28. New York Times, 26 May 1977.

cannot ignore this increase and we oppose it".[29] U.S. policy makers began to increasingly believe that the "Russians were embarked on some nefarious African 'grand design' -- perhaps an attempt to develop a chain of positions along the Western oil routes".[30] Zbigniew Brezezinski, the National Security Adviser to President Carter, argued that the Middle East, Africa, Iran and Afghanistan constituted an "arc of crisis" that had to be guarded from alleged Soviet machinations.

At the same time, by mid-1978, the American position and influence in South West Asia was also weakening. It threatened to take a "precarious" turn if the Soviet Union managed to secure more sway in the region. The Shah of Iran was fighting for his survival and the hope that Washington's handpicked nominee for "regional leadership" would survive to continue playing that role dimmed. In the midst of these developments, Pakistan which was located in the corridor to the Persian Gulf and came within the purview of the "arc of crisis", was seen as a nation whose stability was of increasing importance for the U.S.

The status of Baluch and Pakhtun minorities in Pakistan have been a factor that had a direct bearing on the stability of Pakistan. It was also the status of these

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29. Ibid., 27 May 1977.

30. Elaine P. Adam, ed., American Foreign Relations 1977: A Documentary Record (New York, 1979), p. 65.

minorities that had long embittered Pak-Afghan relations. After Daud came to power in 1973, the differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the minorities had almost come to a head. But under the bidding of the Shah of Iran, Kabul and Islamabad entered into an agreement on the issue in 1977. Under the agreement Afghanistan agreed that it would neither aid nor give refuge to Baluch and Pakhtun rebels.[31]

The United States had tried to help solve the minority problem and preclude it from affecting Pakistan's territorial integrity. When the Baluch and Pakhtun issues appeared to assume a serious turn in 1974, Henry Kissinger, during his visit to Kabul in December 1974 reportedly tried to persuade Afghanistan into reaching some modus vivendi with Pakistan.[32]

But now the government in Afghanistan under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki had apparently no intentions of making good the promises of his predecessor. Within months of the coup, the new government declared that the Baluch and Pakhtun problems "should be resolved in the light of the historic facts of this region"[33] -- a warning that Afghanistan would not promise not to aid these forces.

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31. Pakistan Economist (Karachi), 4 November 1978.

32. Indian Express, 16 December 1974.

33. Dawn (Karachi), 21 November 1978.

With the new government in Afghanistan indicating that peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan would be hard to come by unless the Baluch and Pakhtun sentiments are accommodated by Pakistan, the integrity of Pakistan which had been considered "vital" by successive U.S. Administrations became a cause of worry for Washington. The Under Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, aired that anxiety when he declared that the Carter Administration was concerned about the possibility of "Pakistan's internal problems" lending "themselves to exploitation by foreign sources".[34] A Pakistani daily, Nawai Waqt, in a London datelined report also revealed that, according to a secret assessment of the U.S. Defence Department made in May 1979, Pakistan would be destabilised by the Soviet Union in the effort to reach the Indian Ocean.[35]

With civil strife in Iran and a Soviet foothold in Afghanistan, it was beginning to be argued that Washington should not any more conduct its relations with Pakistan with indifference. The nuclear issue was nevertheless hampering any significant policy change toward Pakistan. Further, the United States came to be concerned over the

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34. New York Times, 11 May 1979.

35. Public Opinion Trend: Pakistan Series (New Delhi), vol. 7, part 246, December 1979, p. 1246.

fact that a 20 Year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation had been signed between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union in November 1978. That the nuclear issue was straining Pak-U.S. relations, was evident from the fact that as soon as Zia-Ul-Haq announced that the Pak-French nuclear deal had fallen through, Washington announced the resumption of aid making it clear that the Afghan drift toward Moscow and the turmoil in Iran had influenced the decision to resume aid.[36]

In addition to the threat to American influence in the Persian Gulf states, the tension brewing in South and North Yemen may be said to have enhanced Pakistan's importance for the U.S. Both the nations are strategically important because they can exercise control over the access to the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, through which 60 per cent of the oil consumed by Western Europe and Israel passes.[37] Within 48 hours of the assassination of the North Yemeni President in July 1978, Abdel Fatah Ismaili, a fanatically pro-Soviet member of the Presidential Council in neighbouring South Yemen overthrew the South Yemeni President who was working towards better relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia. A Soviet hand in the coup was suspected. The Wall Street Journal wrote that the Soviet pilots who were

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36. Facts on File (New York), vol. 38, 3 November 1978, p. 840.

37. Time, 10 July 1978.

in South Yemen at the time of the coup helped in the overthrow of the President.[38]

The United States had long suspected South Yemen as being a Russian surrogate. Washington believed that since South Yemen had now a stauncher pro-Soviet leader as its President, Saudi Arabian security may be threatened. South Yemen was seen as having made provocative moves. For instance, in 1971-72, Soviet supplied Mig-21's flown by Cuban pilots had attacked border villages of Saudi Arabia.[39]

Meanwhile, despite Taraki's claim that Afghanistan would follow its policy of non-alignment, the strong ties that were being forged with Moscow appeared to the U.S. as indicating actual direction his government was taking. Within months of the revolution, 3,000 to 4,000 Soviet military "advisers" flew into Kabul to help strengthen the Taraki government. It was perhaps also not considered a mere coincidence that the new Afghan leader's first foreign tour abroad in December 1978, took him to Moscow and during that very first trip itself, the now familiar 20 Year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed with Moscow. Pakistan which had already been wary of the Afghan support for the

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38. Wall Street Journal, 8 September 1978.

39. Shafqaat Ali Shah, "The United States and the Crescent of Crisis: A View from the Region", Strategic Digest (Delhi), vol. 10, no. 3, March 1980, p. 103.

Pakhtun rebels saw in the fast increasing contacts of the new Taraki regime with Moscow, a clear danger to its security. The Soviet support for the Afghan stance on the Pakhtun issue since 1973 was already seen in Pakistan as a "Soviet brow beating to induce Pakistan" to join the 1969 Asian Security Plan floated by Brezhnev.[40] Therefore the new pace with which Afghanistan was establishing newer lines of contacts with Moscow could not but increase Pakistan's concern about the probability of a strengthened and more active Soviet support for Kabul on the Pakhtun issue.

The close relations being forged with Moscow and the 1978 treaty between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union could not but heighten U.S. concerns about the Soviet intentions in the region. For, the new treaty came close on the heels of a similar treaty that was signed between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia referred to earlier. In the words of the National Security Adviser to the American President, Zbigniew Brezezinski, the Soviet moves in "Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Yemen ... cumulatively" presented a "serious problem for the stability of the region and for the West's secure dependence on oil".[41] Thus, because of the growing Soviet influence in the region, Washington was forced to ignore the strains in

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40. G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers (New York, 1974), p. 227.

41. Newsweek (New York), 18 December 1978.

Pak-U.S. relations and undertake in 1978, the largest arms delivery to Pakistan in over two decades.[42]

But although the Carter Administration had slowly begun to have second thoughts about its policies towards Pakistan, and the developments in Afghanistan had made its due contribution to that change, Washington continued its aid and assistance to Afghanistan pursuing a policy of "watchful waiting". But one incident that took place on 14 February 1979 prompted and accelerated change in regard to the American policy toward Afghanistan.

On that day, the American ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was killed in a Soviet-directed operation to rescue him from the hands of four extremists who had held him hostage. The United States drastically reduced its economic assistance programmes, withdrew peace corps volunteers and terminated military training programmes. To the United States, the Afghan handing of the rescue operation portrayed "a fundamental shift away from Afghanistan's traditional non-alignment policy".[43] As a result, the Afghan-U.S. relations touched a new low. From this point,

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42. United States Delivered Pakistan arms worth $ 46,662,000. For details see: Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Facts (Data Management Division, Comptroller, DSAA, December 1979).

43. Testimony of Jack C. Milor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 15 May 1979 in Department of State Bulletin, vol. 79, April 1979, p. 54.

as the Soviet Union charged, the United States began making some military supplies available to rebel forces fighting the Taraki government. It was further alleged that Egypt, China and Pakistan were also involved in the provision of assistance to the rebels in consonance with U.S. moves.[44] However modest may have been the Pak-U.S. aims or actions in Afghanistan at this point, it was the first time in years that the U.S. and Pakistan became close partners in a concerted move against an irritant threatening the stability of Pakistan. This suggested a heightened American concern for the territorial integrity of Pakistan as well as the use of Pakistan in moves directed against a hostile regime in Afghanistan.

The fall of the "Gendarme"

The regime of the Shahanshah of Iran had by 1978 begun to shake in the face of mounting domestic disturbances. It was initially held in Washington that Iran would be able to tide over the domestic eruption threatening his autocratic regime. But as events unfolded in quick succession the Shah's fall became imminent. In fact the United States had not seriously expected the Shah to have an early exit. Therefore when the Shah was forced to leave Iran in February 1979, the United States was caught with little or no viable options in West Asia.

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44. Pravda (Moscow), cited in Dupree, n. 26, pp. 47-8.

Not only was the "loss" of Iran a severe blow to the United States, the fall out of the revolution also threatened to adversely affect American interests in the entire Persian Gulf. To the United States it "meant that she could no longer rely on the local states to ensure stability on their own" implying that the U.S. would have to become "more directly involved" to maintain "security in the region".[45] In addition to the removal from Iran of the "protege" of the United States, the new government in Iran was also bound to be strongly influenced by the almost unconditional support Washington had extended to Shah.

The new fear was that the Soviet Union stood to gain by this revolution. The euphoria generated by the Islamic revolution in Iran seemed to be acquiring distinct anti-American overtones. All doubts were removed when militant Islamic students stormed the American Embassy in November 1979 and held fifty American hostages threatening to kill them unless Washington agreed to certain Iranian demands. As for the region, the American impotence at having failed to come to the aid of its unquestionably loyal protege's regime, sent tremors of doubt and fear regarding the wisdom of aligning closely with the United

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45. Strategic Survey (London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 42.

States. Washington's prestige and dependability as an ally was seriously compromised by the Carter Administration's inability to come to the Shah's rescue during the turmoil in Iran.

On the other hand, Moscow began to slowly lend its support to the new regime after the Shah departed in February 1979. Although the Soviet Union "made no direct criticisms of Iran until his departure ... she nonetheless posed as the protector of the revolution" and alluded to a warning that Brezhnev had given in 1978, that "any interference" in Iran would "affect Soviet security interests, as having deterred U.S. military intervention."[46]

Thus, with the fall of the Shah of Iran, the United States past policies in the Persian Gulf were an impediment to even a partial retrieval of its position. Washington looked as if it could benefit by the support of as many nations as it could muster to strengthen its weakened position as the importance of West Asia was only increasing for the United States. Besides being the source of two-thirds of the "free worlds" petroleum reserves, it also had become an international finance centre and a vast market for Western industrial and military goods.[47] Not surprisingly, under these circumstances,

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46. Ibid.

47. Harry M. Joiner, American Foreign Policy: The Kissinger Era (Huntsville, Alabama, 1977), p. 110.

the American perspective of Pakistan began to be rekindled. Deputy Warren Christopher, the United States/Secretary of State, after a visit to India and Pakistan in 1979, told the House Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee on March 7 that the United States perception of South Asia was changing. He further maintained that Washington could not make the "South Asia policy in a vacuum" and that the U.S. would have to consider the import of events in "other areas as well" while framing its policy toward Pakistan.[48] The statement was an unmistakable indication that the United States was rethinking its policy toward Pakistan.

Nonetheless, there was no immediate major change in American policy toward Pakistan. The only perceptible change in the American stance was that Washington became more concerned with the instability in Afghanistan and its possible repercussion for Pakistan. Therefore, reconciliation between India and Pakistan became more important for the United States.

Warren Christopher went on to announce that the United States was prepared to sell arms both to India and Pakistan according to their "genuine security needs" and that the "reconciliation between Pakistan is of central importance" to the United States.[49] But at the same time the United

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48. Public Opinion Trend: Pakistan Series, vol. 7, part 59, 12 March 1979, p. 463.

49. Ibid.

States announced that it would be cautious in its arms sales policy lest it should cause intra-regional rivalries to flare up. Predictably, with the loss of Iran and faced with an increasingly strengthening Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the United States feared that any Indo-Pak war would only heighten tension in the region, further complicating the situation. Thus, even under a difficult situation, the Carter Administration was taking into consideration Indian concerns.

But there seemed to be a growing opinion in the United States and among its allies that the West should face the perceived threat in and the adjoining regions with more vigour and move towards repairing its relations with Pakistan and assign more importance to Islamabad than it was doing at that time. John Biggs Davison who led a British Parliamentary delegation to Pakistan in 1979 is reported[50] to have opined in an interview to the Urdu Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on 29 September, that Pakistan's importance for the West had been enhanced in view of the leftist take over in Afghanistan. Pakistan Times[51] revealed that Davis had also called on the Western powers to assist Pakistan militarily so that it would be in a position to thwart the alleged designs of the Communist government in Kabul. William

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50. Ibid.

51. Public Opinion Trend: Pakistan Series, vol. 7, pt. 210, 3 October, p. 1862.

Safire wrote in the New York Times of 3 December 1979, that the Soviet action in Afghanistan, South Yemen and Pakistan was a concerted move to wrest control of the supply of the world's oil reserves and criticised the Carter Administration for not comprehending the Soviet threat. In the same vein, the Los Angeles Times wrote that American pressure against the Pakistani nuclear programme would "result in a further erosion of the American position in the area".[52] Influential American Senators were also beginning to express their anxieties over the possibility of outside powers attempting to destabilise Pakistan. Senator John Glenn (Democrat) of the Senate Foreign relations committee, clearly reflected this growing concern among Congressmen. In an interview with the Pakistani press, the Senator in an obvious attempt to warn the Soviet Union and Afghanistan against exploiting Pakistan's internal difficulties, assured Pakistan that the U.S. would "be inclined to take a lot more interest and a lot more action" if its territorial integrity were threatened.[53] As indicated on several occassions in the present work, expressions by important American leaders of their deep interest in Pakistan's integrity always covered an equally fervent interest in the possible use of Pakistan for the promotion of American interests.

That Glenn, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services and Committee on Government Affairs and one of the chief promoters of U.S. non-proliferation goals should view Pakistan as a nation whose strategic importance was increasing for the United States

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52. Los Angeles Times, 10 April 1979.

53. Public Opinion Trend: Pakistan Series, vol. 7, part 168, 6 August 1979, p. 1425.

was a clear indication that Washington would not let Pakistan's nuclear programme hinder the implementation of any scheme that may seek Pakistan's support to counter alleged Soviet "grand schemes" in South West Asia. These motives were reflected in the American decision to increase its sale of arms to Pakistan. Despite all the furore raised in Washington regarding Pakistan's nuclear quest, Washington's arms deliveries to Pakistan in 1979 showed more than a 25 per cent increase over the quantity supplied in 1978.[54] Similarly, in 1978 and 1979, the United States "Military Education and Training programme including Military Assistance Funding" touched an all time high for the '70's in regard to Pakistan.[55]

Apparently, when the United States was hard put to strategic difficulties because of the exit of the Shah of Iran and the links the government of Taraki in Afghanistan was forging with Moscow, it could no more ignore Pakistan, a Muslim nation that was clearly eager to improve its relations with the United States and get arms in the bargain. Moreover, the United States could no more overlook the fact that Pakistan was located at a point where the Gulf of Oman meets the Arabian Sea occupying a strategic position near the Persian Gulf oil

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54. In 1978 U.S. delivered Pakistan arms worth $ 6,662,000 and in 1979, the arms delivery amounted to $ 61,256,000. Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, n. 42, p. 4.

55. In 1978, the amount under the head was $ 5,47,000 while in 1979 the amount was $ 4,68,000. Ibid., p. 25.

fields.

Thus, with instability threatening to engulf the entire region, Washington could not but derive comfort from Pakistan's "Islamic ties" which had made "it to some degree a factor in the Middle East".[56] Especially after the 1971 Bangladesh war, Pakistan under Bhutto had embarked on a new course designed to forge closer relations with fellow muslim nations. During the Yom Kippur war, Pakistan had sent mobile medical units to help the Arabs. The hosting of the 1974 Muslim countries Summit conference in Lahore on 22 February was a clear indication that Pakistan was gaining prominence among Muslim nations. The increasing trade links between Pakistan and the Arab countries was also a barometer revealing Pakistan's fast developing relations in the Middle East. While in 1971 Pakistan's export to the Arab countries was only 12 per cent of its total exports, it registered a substantial rise to 33 per cent in 1975.[57] A significant development in this direction was the progress that Pakistan was able to make in inducing some Arab countries to receive the services of Pakistan military personnel — a connection with longer range potential of being financially and militarily helpful to Pakistan if Islamabad were to confront a problem from its immediate neighbours. This link also

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56. Philips Talbot, "The American Posture Towards India and Pakistan", The Annals (Philadelphia), vol. 340, July 1979, p. 89.

57. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "The Foreign Policy of 'New' Pakistan", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 20, no. 3, Fall 1976, p. 754.

created a web of unconspicious transnational links between Islamabad and various Arab nations supplementing "the country's more formal alliance connections with the Northern Tier States of the Middle East and the United States".[58] Understandably, this Pakistani scheme which was designed to bolster Pakistan's role among the Islamic nations and to earn badly needed finances went largely unnoticed or was deemed of no important consequence by the United States before the fall of the Shah. But as soon as the Shah fell the role Pakistani forces were playing in these nations was viewed as a positive factor by the United States.

According to the New York Times[59], Pakistan had military missions in over 22 countries, the largest being in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In Abu Dhabi and many of the other countries Pakistan's military representatives were basically accredited to the airforce while in Saudi Arabia, besides strengthening its air force, they were playing an invaluable role of providing training to Saudi armed forces and accredited as advisers. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had signed an agreement on military co-operation and exchange in 1967. Especially in view of the fact that Saudi Arabia's regular army consists of only 25,000 personnel, Pakistan's role in strengthening the

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58. Howard Wriggins, "Changing Power Relations between the Middle East and South Asia", Orbis, vol. 20, no. 3, Fall 1976, p. 790.

59. New York Times, 6 February 1981.

armed forces could not have escaped appreciation in Washington. The ouster of the Shah and the establishment of a militant regime with an aggressive foreign policy in Iran that was bent on promoting "pan-Shi'ism" threatened to sow instability in the pro-Western monarchies of the Persian Gulf. There was a distinct possibility that the popular religious sentiment that now formed the base of the Iranian regime could become a source of inspiration for the masses in other nations. Coupled with this probability, the determination of the new revolutionary regime in Tehran to export its brand of revolution threatened to incite overlapping religious minorities of the various Monarchies and create instability in an area critically important for the United States. For instance, within months (in September and October) of the establishment of the revolutionary regime in Iran, Shia-inspired disturbances erupted in Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrein and notably in Saudi Arabia's Eastern (Hasa) province in November and December.[60] Although these threats were sternly and quickly stamped out, the possibility of larger threats of this kind still existed. The capture of the Mecca Grand Mosque in November 1979 by religious zealots close on the heels of the Iranian revolution sent tremors through the royal family of Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that there was no evidence that the capture was Shia-

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60. Strategic Survey, n. 45, p. 47.

inspired, it nevertheless revealed the vulnerability of the Saudi regime and the possibility of religious fanatics spearheading political uprisings to change the mode of leadership. Therefore, the security role being played by the Pakistani military component became one of critical importance.

Clearly, any direct American presence in any Arab country would have drawn the ire of the Arab nationalists and radicals who made no bones about their abhorrence for the United States and its policies because of the latter's support for Israel. Further, any nation which might have invited or allowed American presence would have faced isolation in the Arab world. For instance, because of the despatch of a Squadron of F-15s to Saudi Arabia by the United States during the brief Yemeni conflict in 1979, the Saudi regime became the target of radical Arab criticism, and for the fear of opposition from other Arab nations, Saudi Arabia turned down[61] an American offer to station U.S. troops there. In fact, anti-American sentiments were sweeping Islamic capitals. Mob attacks on American embassies had become a common feature. For instance, the American embassy was burned down in Islamabad itself; and in Libya, a rioting crowd attacked the U.S. embassy. Because of the anathema to U.S. presence in Arab soil, the United States was compelled in 1979 to withdraw all

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61. New York Times, 20 August 1981.

all non-essential dependants of the American Embassies from Iran, Pakistan and eleven other Muslim countries.[62] In such a situation, the presence of the military elements of a friendly Pakistan to strengthen the pro-Western conservative regimes of the Persian Gulf region could not but contribute to a more favourable American appraisal of that nation.

What further underlined the importance of the crack Pakistani "advisors" in various Arab nations was the impotence of the America's Second pillar in the Persian Gulf — Saudi Arabia. Unlike the Iranian forces under the Shah, the Saudi Arabian forces were incapable of substantially helping neighbouring countries in times of crisis. This clearly came to the surface during the two week Yemeni War in March 1979. Saudi Arabia was unable to do anything substantial to help North Yemen. The United States had to rush 75 military advisers and emergency aid. The gravity of the situation was such that Carter had to invoke the emergency provision of the Arms Export Control Act to bypass Congress to rush aid to North Yemen. In fact, during 1979, North Yemen received $540 million worth of U.S. military aid, making it the largest recepient of U.S. arms after Israel and Saudi Arabia.[63] In addition, the Carter Administration became

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62. The other eleven countries were : Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Qatar, Oman, N. Yemen, Kuwait, Iraq, Bangladesh, Libya and Bahrain. New York Times 27 November 1979.

63. Ibid., 7 March 1979.

wary of the repercussions the conflict could have on its close ally, Saudi Arabia. The President ordered the despatch of a task force into the Arabia Sea to warn Moscow of the risk of supporting North Yemen and to demonstrate U.S. support for Saudi Arabia.[64] And further, the United States had to seek the help of over 70 Taiwanese pilots to help fly the aircraft supplied by the U.S.[65] This would perhaps have been only a small part of the help that Tehran may have extended to South Yemen if the Shah had not fallen.

At the same time, by the end of 1979, there was no military alliance that could effectively prevent any military action against America's friends in the Persian Gulf. The long moribund CENTO was dismantled after Iran and Pakistan withdrew from it in mid-1979. Pakistan withdrew from the alliance because it found that even after the fall of Kabul to leftist forces, no large scale American aid was forthcoming. Therefore, when the Shah fell and Tehran became overtly anti-U.S. and withdrew from the CENTO, Pakistan, as one Pakistani diplomat put it, felt that it "might as well not suffer the disadvantages" of continuing its alliance with the U.S. without receiving commensurate benefits.[66] The lukewarm American response to the developments in Afghanistan appeared

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64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., 30 May 1979.

66. New York Times, 10 April 1979.

only to confirm the growing opinion in Pakistan that the continuation of its alliance with the United States would only adversely affect its standing among third world nations. Pakistan had already applied for membership in the non-aligned group and it found that the effete alliance with the U.S. was impeding its full membership.[67] In fact, CENTO was created for the protection of friendly regimes in moments of crisis such instability as at present could spawn. Ironically, it was dismantled exactly when an alliance like CENTO would have been beneficial.

Faced with this adverse situation and increasing Soviet influence, the United States to counter alleged Soviet moves, embarked on a scheme to increase its direct presence in the Indian Ocean and West Asia. Washington suddenly found it propitious to accept the Somalian offer of a base at Berbera which the Soviets had vacated in 1977. The offer was first made by Somalian government in 1977 but then the U.S. had declined to accept the offer. But now because of the changed circumstances, a Defence and State Department team visiting the region to find bases from where to "project force" found the offer worth accepting.[68] Further, the United States began expanding the Diego Garcia base. As part of the same

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67. Naveed Ahmad, "The Non-Aligned Movement and Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 32, Fourth Quarter 1979, p. 79.

68. New York Times, 23 December 1979.

strategy, Pakistan was depicted as a moderate state that would "contribute stability in the region".[69]

American spokesman propogated the view that the growing Soviet influence in the vital region was evident in the Soviet Union's treaty links[70] with several nations of Africa, Middle East and East and South Asia. As a consequence, support grew in the United States for protecting the American interests through a military build up and a more direct and heightened role in the security of friendly nations including Pakistan. As a matter of fact, after the fall of the Shah and the growing Communist influence in the region, the Indian Ocean witnessed the largest American build up since the Second World War. Two aircraft carrier battle groups led by the Kitty Hawk and Midway were detached from the Seventh fleet in the Pacific, and by the end of 1979, the U.S. had over 21 ships including the two aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean. The perceived urgency of the U.S. naval deployment was such that to find ships for the spiraling U.S. presence, the strength of the Pacific Fleet was severely compromised.

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69. Testimony of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Jack C. Miller. Department of State Bulletin, n. 43, p. 50.

70. During the period 1971-79, the Soviet Union concluded the treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with ten countries. Although strains developed in relations with some of the nations with which the treaty was signed making the treaties meaningless, the treaty links nevertheless revealed the growth of Soviet influence. Besides India, the other nations with whom Moscow signed the treaty are: Egypt (1971), Iraq (1972), Somalia (1974) Angola (1976), Mozambique (1978), South Yemen (1978), Ethiopia (1978), Afghanistan (1978) and Vietnam (1978).

The United States was no doubt making significant progress in its efforts to enlist Egyptian support for the United States in the Middle East. The idea of establishing peace between Israel and Egypt that Kissinger had succeeded in selling to Cairo and Jerusalem had a salutary impact on the American standing in Egypt that had for over two and a half decades opposed American policies. In 1977, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt in a "sacred mission" became the first Arab leader to place foot on Israeli soil.

After a series of complicated moves, the Carter Administration succeeded in bringing together Egypt and Israel to an agreement at Camp David in March 1979 that, for the first time since the creation of Israel included the renunciation of the use of force by any Arab nation against Israel. Through this agreement and the role of the "honest broker" that the United States played in bringing the two nations together, Washington was assured of Egypt's co-operation in its moves against the Soviet Union. President Sadat himself became a popular figure with the Congress and the American public by frequent affirmations of his readiness to collaborate with the United States and denunciations of the Soviet Union threat. Thus, the early post World War II aspiration of American planners to enlist Egyptian co-operation for the promotion of U.S. strategic plans especially in the Eastern Mediterranean and West Asian regions appeared to be

near realization. With such a promising development at the Western approaches to the Middle East, it was certain that Washington would manoeuvre to create a similarly favourable situation at the Eastern end where its old ally Pakistan was located. And to cement the new found relationship with Egypt, the U.S. agreed to sell Cairo arms worth $ 1.6335 billion[71] during the period 1976-1979, and financed military sales to the tune of $ 1.5 billion[72] in 1979 to Egypt.

Though the activities and level of Soviet influence in the West Asian region were kept under continuing and critical scrutiny and Washington tended to view Soviet activities as a growing menace to its interests, no immediate change in the American strategy in the region was on the cards. It was not until the exit of the Shah that the United States felt the urgency to assign new role to its allies. The fall of its protege besides making Washington grope for a new strategy, also prompted it to pay more attention to Pakistan. Nevertheless, no clear cut American plan to involve Pakistan in its strategic plans was announced. Perhaps, it can be concluded that if it was not for Pakistan's tenacious efforts to build a nuclear bomb, there would have been a more evident change in the American policies toward Pakistan. The United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Jack Millor's testimony that "Pakistan's current nuclear activities ... restrict our ability to assist

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71. Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Facts, n. 42, p. 1.

72. Ibid., p. 8.

it in meeting its considerable security and economic requirements",[73] illustrating the point. This does not, however, mean that Pakistan's importance for the United States had become crucial. It certainly did become important and Pakistan's nuclear efforts had become an impediment in any change U.S. may have intended to make. But certainly, Pakistan's usefulness had not become compelling enough to warrant a waiver of the Symington amendment. It cannot be doubted that, had Pakistan's importance become crucial, then the United States would have found a way to circumvent the amendment as it has been done now. It will also be pertinent to note that while the Symington amendment was applied to Pakistan, Israel, a nation significantly more strategically important for the U.S., but closer to developing nuclear weapons was unaffected by the amendment. Therefore, although Pakistan had become important, its usefulness was not considered compelling enough to set aside American non-proliferation goals.

At the same time, it was clear that the nuclear issue had constituted a stumbling block in the improvement of Pak-U.S. relations. Carter had attached great importance to nuclear non-proliferation. It may also be that if ever there was any thought to ease the pressure on Pakistan, the Indian

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73. Department of State Bulletin, n. 43, p. 50.

Prime Minister's ultimatum that India would keep its nuclear options open if Pakistan produced nuclear weapons removed all such thoughts and injected a sense of urgency and fortified Carter's determination to prevent Pakistan from producing nuclear weapons. Perhaps, it was not even a matter of simple coincidence that no sooner had Charan Singh sounded the warning than some talk of some undefined U.S. covert actions against Pak nuclear facilities came to the fore.[74]

It appears to the present writer that despite the complications posed by Pakistan's nuclear programme and the Carter Administration's strong posture on the non-proliferation issue, consultations probably proceeded apace between the two governments on the modalities of future cooperation and possible trade offs by one to the other.

One publicly inhibiting factor, however, was the burning down of the American Embassy in Islamabad after it was reported that the United States had a hand in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Other crowds burned U.S. cultural centres in Lahore and Rawalpindi. Almost 137 Americans waited for over six hours narrowly escaping death in a vault

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74. In July 1979, the caretaker Prime Minister of India, Charan Singh warned that India would not hesitate to produce nuclear weapons if Pakistan did so. New York Times, 28 July 1979. And the New York Times of 12 August of the same year, reported that the Carter Administration was even contemplating covert operations against Pakistani nuclear facilities to prevent Pakistan from producing nuclear bombs.

in the Embassy while Pakistani security forces took unusually long to respond to the calls for help. When it all ended, two Americans were dead. Although Zia apologised and offered to pay compensation, the adverse public reaction which the burning of the Embassy evoked in the U.S. there was a temporary setback to the establishment of the kind of co-operation that both the governments had by this time come to desire.

In the ultimate analysis, as events unfolded, there were growing indications that the U.S. would not be able to delay the revision of its policy towards Pakistan. But evidently, a dramatic change in the American perception had to wait for the Soviet Union's direct intervention by "invitation" of the Afghanistan government in December 1979. More precisely, it had to wait for the replacement of Jimmy Earl Carter, by the 40th American President, who promised to give the U.S. a newer and sharper clout discarding the worn out old.

CONCLUSION

> "We have no eternal allies - nor perpetual friends. We do have interests, both eternal and perpetual. And these it is our duty to follow."

This statement of Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister of England (1855-1865), is in the modern history of American foreign relations best exemplified in Washington's conduct of its relations with Pakistan. It has been a case of big power exploiting a small power's intra-regional difficulties to further its global interests that meant little if not, was inimical to the interest of this small South Asian Muslim nation.

When the cold war was born out of the clash of interests of the two Super Powers, it turned out to be a development which left none of the powers, both big and small, unaffected. During the foggiest years of the cold war, Pakistan was roped in by the United States to assist it in thwarting alleged Soviet expansionism, which in reality, meant little more than prevent-ing the Soviet Union from eroding the power and influence with which the U.S. emerged from the Second World War.

But after the 1950's the Soviet Union made rapid progress in the military field. The gap in the American and Soviet military capabilities slowly narrowed. As a result the Soviet

Union furthered its interest with more confidence. Along with the shifting military equation the two Super Powers adopted different tactics to safeguard their perceived interests. Inevitably, the American reliance on military alliances to protect its interests was toned down and Pakistan became less important for the U.S. It was dropped off like an unwanted attachment and left to fend for itself and face the consequences brought on by its American connection.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union, the other Super Power, as a result of Pakistan's American links became more inclined to friendship with India which still is Pakistan's bitterest enemy. And when the United States scaled down the importance of its strategic connections with Islamabad, India was on the way to registering a clear cut military superiority over Pakistan. Ironically, if it was not for the American connection, the Soviet Union would have found the need to be more receptive to Indian interests less attractive. The consequence of Pak-U.S. military ties, was that Pakistan deluded itself as being strong enough to militarily confront India.

Domestically too, Pakistan's American links had their own impact. The American preference for dealing with the military damaged the prestige and standing of the civilian government. The unfortunate result was that democracy never took roots in Pakistan. The civil authorities found themselves being dominated by the military which vowed that only armed

forces could best safeguard Pakistan's interests.

By aiding Pakistan militarily, the United States kindled and then fanned the hope in Pakistan that military solutions could be found for its historical problems. As a result economic development always found a secondary place in Pakistan's priorities. "Democracy" and the peoples "liberty" which the United States claimed it sought to protect from "totalitarianism" through American alliances begot the opposite. The attempt to make the world "safe for democracy" made Pakistan not only undemocratic but even unsafe for democratic protagonists. Ever since 1958 when General Ayub Khan came to the helm after a coup, Pakistan has come under the rule of military generals except for the period December 1971-July 1977. And today, perhaps more than ever before, the prospects for the re-emergence of democracy in Pakistan appears bleaker.

The United States, on the other hand, virtually insensitive to what its alliance had done to the small nation, reduced significantly its assistance when Pakistan was considered no more important to the U.S. Not only did the United States cease to accord Pakistan any privileged position in South Asia, it also evinced little interest in Pakistan's developmental programmes. It was deemed unnecessary to undertake any substantial economic aid to Pakistan. Beginning in the early 1960's, the United States followed such a policy until the fag end of 1979.

No significant aid to Pakistan was forthcoming except when the U.S. needed Pakistan's military co-operation. Thus,

before the United States had brought Pakistan within its security folds, U.S. aid to Pakistan in the form of U.S. government grants and credits was only $178 million for the period 1945-1955.[1] As soon as Pakistan joined U.S. alliances, the quantum of aid skyrocketed. During the period 1956-65, which were the heydays of the American alliance with Pakistan, U.S. aid under the above head reached $2,416 million. It is also noteworthy that during the decade immediately after Pakistan's birth, the United States aid to Pakistan constituted only 0.32 per cent of the total aid disbursed by the U.S. and during 1956-65, the amount jumped to 5.101 per cent.

Similarly, when the United States ceased to consider Pakistan as an ally whose military contribution was important for the U.S., its aid to Pakistan significantly decreased. During the period 1966-75, the U.S. aid in the form of grants and credits was reduced to $2,040 million. Although the quantum of aid during this period was only $376 million less than the previous decade, it constituted only 3.203 per cent of the total aid given by the U.S.

During the latter period, the American interest in the military contribution Pakistan could make towards the success

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1. All aid figures that appear in the conclusion have been computed from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States (Washington, D.C.) 1971-80.

of U.S. policies became transformed into a rather passive interest in Pakistan's "territorial integrity". Predictably, at this juncture, the United States was unwilling to supply Pakistan substantial military hardware as there was no apparent role expected of Pakistan in American defence plans. Pakistan's military utility for the United States in the Middle East which was considered important in the 1950's was now deemed dispensable. When the oil crisis in 1973 made the United States view West Asia as an area of increasingly crucial importance, Iran and Saudi Arabia were initially seen as prospective "pillars" on which U.S. interests in the area could safely rest. Moreover, after 1972, the prospects of Egypt co-operating with the United States, were also bright.

Not only did Iran take over the task which the United States expected of Pakistan in the 1950's, the assumption of the "guardian" role by Iran made the CENTO superfluous and Pakistan's membership in it inessential. Moreover, the United States found that its supply of military hardware to Pakistan was the cause of increased tension in the Indian subcontinent that damaged Indo-U.S. relations. In addition the U.S. found that its alliance with Pakistan had spurred India to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, when Pakistan was seen as a nation which could not contribute to U.S. military objectives, the United States found no urgent need or strategic compulsion to continue militarily strengthen-

ing Pakistan.

Nevertheless, during this period the United States did not find it propitious to sever all its security ties with Pakistan. As dealt with earlier, the constant reiterations of the American "vital" interest in Pakistan's "territorial integrity" only revealed the potential usefulness of Pakistan for the United States. Thus, although Pakistan withdrew from the SEATO in 1973 and it continued to be a member of the CENTO until 1979 for reasons more related to its ties with Turkey, Iran and China than with Washington, neither the United States nor Pakistan, found it pragmatic to repudiate the 1959 Pak-U.S. bilateral Agreement of Co-operation. The American objective was to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining an unacceptable level of influence in Pakistan and any Indo-Pak conflict that could further weaken Pakistan as the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war had done.

With the Sino-U.S. detente the United States was presented with an ideal opportunity to detach itself from South Asia while not having to worry about the stability of Pakistan. Besides Iran which found the territorial integrity of Pakistan essential both for its security and regional ambitions, China was also partly taking care of Pakistan's military needs and evincing considerable interest in the stability of its close South Asian ally. Therefore the United States besides being

relieved of the need to supply significant quantities of weapons to Pakistan, was also guaranteed that however much its one-time linchpin in South Asia may have been dissatisfied or frustrated with the quantum of U.S. assistance, Pakistan would remain under American influence.

Though this was the situation in the 1970's, the United States found it necessary to preserve its leverage in Pakistan. For, even during this period, the American objective was to "moth ball" Pakistan. In view of Pakistan's potential usefulness, it was authoritatively held in Washington that the U.S. should retain some of its influence in Islamabad. The 1966, 1967, 1970 and 1975 relaxation of the arms embargo had this primary motive to serve. Thus, even though the United States had ceased to be the largest arms supplier to Pakistan, it was cautious not to stretch too taut the apron strings that tied Pakistan to the United States. The connection at the other end was kept intact through an assistance programme which amounted to a trickle that was just enough for that purpose and through assurances of America's "genuine" interest in Pakistan's "stability". Military alms were given so that the connection could be reactivated when and if a contingency arose.

What kept Pakistan alive in U.S. strategic calculations was its connection with the oil rich Muslim nations, its geo-

graphical proximity to the Persian Gulf and the American vital stake in the continuous supply of oil to itself and its allies. Pakistan, for this reason, was seen as a nation whose potential usefulness could not be disregarded. Paradoxically, Pakistan's move to strengthen its links with the Arab world and Iran in the wake of decreased U.S. assistance, enhanced further the potential usefulness of Pakistan for the United States. At the same time, although Pakistan's ability to play an increased role in American schemes became stronger, its contacts with the pro-U.S. Muslim nations contributed to a lull in the perceived American need to identify more closely with Pakistan's interests. Pakistan's dependence on Muslim nations for a variety of needs, most notably financial, guaranteed that it would remain within the American ambit.

The Nixon-Kissinger team considered Pakistan's potential usefulness important, and was therefore careful not to fall out of favour with Pakistan. If ever Nixon desired to assist Pakistan more than he did during his incumbency, it was preempted by the adverse reactions whipped up by his "tilt" policy during the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Even after Nixon's exit, there was no substantial policy change effected in regard to Pakistan. The Ford Administration equally worked towards the retention of American influence in Pakistan.

But with the election of Jimmy Carter as the President, the United States' policy towards the subcontinent started

revealing signs of change. For the first time, a U.S. President was prepared to acknowledge and treat India as the dominant power in the region.

To Pakistan's chagrin, the new Administration found India's "resilent" democracy and the respect its system accorded to human rights more attractive than Pakistan's unstable military dictatorship which evinced scant respect for human rights and democracy. The Carter Administration also found Pakistan's inextinguishable urge for nuclear weapons too dangerous to be overlooked. It resorted to a number of strong measures to prevent Pakistan from obtaining the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, all the while showing little concern for the repercussions it could have on Pak-U.S. relations.

Therefore in the absence of any security role Pakistan could perform for the United States, the latter became more inclined to exert pressure on Pakistan to promote U.S. non-security goals. Like other less strategically important nations, Pakistan was subject to "selective" pressure to promote these objectives. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, human rights and democracy (for whose failure in Pakistan the U.S. bore some responsibility) soon became important concerns for the United States as regards Pakistan. Carter's arms sales policy that sought to prevent the United States from being the "first supplier" to introduce into a region "newly developed weapons" and impose substantial

restrictions on weapon sales to all nations other than NATO members, New Zealand, Japan and Australia, along with a "tighter control" on arms transfers, hit Pakistan hard. U.S. government economic grants and credits too were substantially reduced, partially to pressurise Pakistan to conform to the Carter Administration's new priorities. As a consequence, credits and grants extended to Pakistan at an average annual rate of $183 million during the Nixon and Ford Administrations (1966-76), plummetted to $48.66 million during the first three years (1977-79) of the Carter presidency.

But it was evident that any adverse developments that might take place in the Persian Gulf/Middle East region, would once again make the United States look towards Pakistan for strategic support. By 1975 such a possibility seemed to be emerging with the crisis in the horn of Africa (Angola). As dealt with earlier, a chain of events involving the growth of Soviet influence in Africa slowly began to increase American interest in Pakistan.

Although the growing Soviet role in West Asia was perhaps making the Carter Administration rethink its policies regarding Pakistan, its policies did not quite manifest it. In the meantime opinion in the United States regarding the need to enlist Pakistani support for the U.S. policies in West Asia gained momentum. The departure of the Shah of Iran in February 1978 and the "Saur" revolution in the same year, were the two

most important factors that contributed to this growing opinion. The Yemeni war (1978), the liberal use of Cuban troops to play "proxy" to the Soviet Union to strengthen and further Soviet influence in Africa and in Yemen too had their own impact.

The instances of growing Soviet influence and the use of Cuban troops were quickly grasped by the Carter Administration as a convenient handle to gain Congressional and public backing for a more militaristic foreign policy. Such a shift was also reviewed as politically necessary for Carter's re-election prospects.

The last straw held by the "doves" was swept away on 27 December 1979 when the Soviet Union directly intervened in Afghanistan in the first ever foray outside the corridors of Eastern Europe. The hardliners in the United States Congress and the Pentagon who constantly warned about the dangers involved in detente suddenly gained credibility and the hardening of U.S. foreign policy accelerated with lightning speed.

Pakistan was once again rocketed into American strategic calculations and U.S. reactions to the Soviet intervention, bordered unbridled frenzy. The U.S. defence allocation jumped all original estimates, SALT II was discarded if not condemned to scrap heap, the Persian Gulf region became the focus of desperate base hunting, the Rapid Deployment Force became a

reality, the 1980 Olympics in Moscow were boycotted, grain sales to the Soviet Union suspended, moves to remove the fetters on the CIA gained currency and Carter drew a line in South West Asia, further to which it was declared, if the Soviet Union moved it would confront the U.S. military might — a statement of policy which has since, become known as the Carter Doctrine.

As regards Pakistan, Jimmy Carter's famous concern for human rights was scuttled, Pakistan's nuclear ambitions which had become a cause celebre ignored, and aid to Pakistan which was barred by the Symington amendment ceased to be a major impediment. Within two weeks of the Afghan crisis the Carter Administration rushed to offer Pakistan an aid package of $400 million. The President himself requested the Congress to lift the ban on aid to Pakistan. Zbigniew Brzezinski reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the territorial integrity and the 1959 Pak-U.S. bilateral Agreement of Co-operation which allowed the U.S. to use direct force to "protect" it from "Communist aggression".

In the American view, it was an ideal setting for the induction of Pakistan in U.S. defence strategies. The situation was depicted as one which made Pakistan's support more compelling than in the 1950's. Then the major trouble spot was deemed to be Western Europe, but now, the Persian Gulf region — the

region with close nexus and strong links with Pakistan. Former high officials as well as academic and military strategists called for U.S. arming of Pakistan, Henry Kissinger, for instance, opined that the United States should set up a naval and air force base in Pakistan to deter the alleged Soviet conspiracy.

Similarly the Pentagon argued that the Afghan crisis had brought the Soviet Union to a distance of only 300 miles away from the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and from achieving the aim the Soviet Union has been accused of harbouring since the time of the Czar.

The much publicised American fear is that once the Soviets are able to entrench themselves in Afghanistan, either politically or militarily, then the disintegration of Pakistan might loom as a possibility. Pakistan's territorial integrity, they contend, would be vulnerable to external manipulation, with the Pushtun and Baluch movements forming the Achilles heel. It is also alleged that the Soviet Union is lying couched to destabilise Pakistan.

But to Carter's disappointment, Pakistan refused to bite the skimpy $400 million bait. The one-time peanut farmer, Carter's offer of $400 million in economic and military aid was dismissed by Zia as "peanuts" that Pakistan did not quite savour. In retrospect however, it appears that Carter, while

offering aid to Pakistan, considered the impact it could have on U.S. relations with India.

Although Carter in his 1980 State of the Union Message declared that Pakistan's security was "vital" for the United States and warned that it would even use force to "protect" Pakistan from the Soviet Union, he showed moderation when it came to military aid to Pakistan. Thus, even while the Carter Administration was prepared to sell sophisticated weapons to Pakistan, it sought to reassure India that it was also concerned about India's security after the Afghan crisis. Carter made it manifest that though his Administration was prepared to sell Pakistan the sophisticated Vought A-7 attack aircraft equipped with Forward Looking Infra Red Poddel (FLIR) which give the plane advanced night flying capability, the range of the plane would be reduced to allay India's fears. Likewise, he was not prepared to substantially increase his aid offer to Pakistan for fear of alienating India.

However, with the defeat of Jimmy Carter in the 1980 Presidential election, India ceased to be a restraining factor in the proposed military strengthening of Pakistan. The new Administration of the conservative hard-liner, Ronald Reagan, viewed Pakistan as a "frontline" state whose co-operation had to be bought unmindful of the repercussions it may have on South Asia or more precisely, India. The new offer from the

United States was eight times higher than that made by Jimmy Carter, and high level consultations began, to assess the requirements of Pakistan so that it could face the alleged threat from Afghanistan and safeguard U.S. strategic interests once again.

Misguided Solutions to Complex Problems

The Reagan Administration's decision to substantially arm Pakistan is at best misguided. The decision to extend Pakistan $3.2 billion in aid consisting mostly of military hardware and defence related economic assistance, would not, to say the least, achieve for Washington what it seeks. The aid package is a hastily drawn up programme based on simplistic view of the hard realities of the subcontinent. The consequence of the aid package would be that the United States would again find itself embroiled in intra-regional rivalries that can only pave way for greater domestic discord in Pakistan and an increased Soviet influence in the third most economic and second most military power of Asia.

The Afghanistan crisis, the United States military strategists argue, has made Pakistan a "frontline" state in the American effort to prevent the Soviet Union from pursuing the alleged objective of dominating the entire southern Asian and African regions. Their strategy is to make Pakistan a strong link in the Administration's "Middle East-Persian Gulf Strategic Consensus".

But in reality, while the United States has been over enthusiastic in its efforts to highlight the perceived positive factors that lie in the induction of Pakistan in its new security chain, it has conveniently chosen to disregard the negative strains in such a plan. Precisely in this failure to weigh the pros and cons of the military strengthening of Pakistan, lies the danger.

The military aiding of Pakistan in the scale that is being undertaken might, paradoxically, jeopardize Pakistan's own territorial integrity.

The United States has been particularly favouring Punjabi-dominated dictatorships that have always sought to perpetuate their domination over the Sindhis, Baluchs and Pushtuns who constitute forty two per cent of the population and inhabit seventy two per cent of Pakistan's land area. The Reagan Administration's decision to strengthen Pakistan militarily would only fortify the resolve of the military government in Pakistan to find a military solution to its domestic problems, and damage further the chances of the re-emergence of a democratic system in Pakistan. By strengthening the military dictator's hands, the political opponents of the present regime would virtually react unfavourably to U.S. identification with the dictatorship. During the height of the Baluch attack in the mid '70's it was the American supplied jets that strafed the Baluch rebels. The "Bengalis" had also accusingly pointed their fingers at

the U.S. for having supplied weapons that were used against them.

At the same time, by identifying closely with the Pakistani regime, the United States could prompt the Soviet Union to provide aid to the Baluch forces, especially if anti-Soviet Afghan elements are supported with U.S. arms supplied through Pakistan. In the absence of such a close identification Moscow may well have entertained the hope of softening Pakistan's attitude towards the Afghan crisis through diplomatic means. And if the Soviet Union decides to provide covert aid to the divisive forces, Pakistan would be bogged down in a costly venture to protect its own territorial integrity.

Most importantly, the United States' decision to supply Pakistan highly sophisticated weapons has alienated India and fanned anti-American sentiments there.

The supply of the F-16s, a highly sophisticated plane whose capabilities were demonstrated in the recent Israeli strike on the Iraqi nuclear plant, has sparked off an arms race in the subcontinent. India has, as a response to the induction of this "new generation" planes into the subcontinent, been forced to find the best match it can to the F-16s. Although India has diversified its sources, there is no doubt that it has been compelled to request the Soviet Union for advanced MiG varients, the 25s, 27s and even the 29s. The political

price India would have to pay for the supply might well be a more vocal support for Soviet policies and of course, the toning down of its ambivalent position on the Afghan crisis.

The Congressional waiving of the Symington amendment while approving the aid package to Pakistan, has added yet another dangerous dimension to the arms race. The Congressional legislation has chosen to ignore Pakistan's nuclear ambition. The extension of the aid despite Pakistan's indefatigable efforts to produce nuclear weapons has given it new room to manoeuvre. Pakistan is today not under pressure from any influential power to abandon its nuclear programme. As a result, one can only expect Pakistan to push ahead with its aim of producing nuclear weapons. Predicting such a course by Pakistan, powerful voices advocating a reconsideration of India's position on the production of nuclear weapons have already emerged.

The Reagan Administration has proclaimed that all aid to Pakistan would be affected if Pakistan explodes a nuclear device even if it were ostensibly for "peaceful purposes". But what the Administration would do if such an explosion actually takes place, especially if it does outside Pakistan's territory in a location friendly to Pakistan is not clear.

The myopic decision to arm Pakistan stems from America's faulty perception that India is a "Soviet ally". It will be

interesting to note that Alexander Haig, during his confirmations Hearings, equated by implication, India to the position of a Soviet East European ally. It is true that India has almost exclusively been militarily strengthened by the Soviet Union. But it should also not be ignored that it was only after the United States refused to supply India weapons, that military hardware was sought from the Soviet Union.

It is also not difficult to understand that the liberal arming of Pakistan on the belief that India is a Soviet ally can only constitute a danger to Pakistan's own territorial integrity. To repeat what has been said so often: whenever the United States has supplied Pakistan weapons in large quantities, war has broken out in the subcontinent, always to the disadvantage of Pakistan and ultimately to the U.S.

There cannot be any denying of the fact that beneath the recent Pakistani overtures of peace, there is that dangerous "hurt pride". It is a fact that despite Islamabad's constant reminders that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is a grave threat to its security, the bulk of its armed forces is not poised along the Khyber Pass but on its border with India. Surely, when the danger is supposedly from Afghanistan, the stationing of its troops along the Indian Indian border cannot be a military strategy. Perhaps, it would also be pertinent to point out that the Economist has

in a recent article reported that a good number of the Pakistani ex-POW's of the 1971 war are waiting for an opportunity to seek "revenge". To make things worse, not that it makes any great difference, the United States government has this time simply refused, to give any assurance to India that the weapons it supplies Pakistan would not be used against India. Conversely, it implies that the United States has not this time even placed any apparent limitation on the use of the weapons that it is supplying Pakistan. (President Eisenhower had assured India in 1953 that the U.S. would take appropriate action of Pakistan used U.S.-supplied weapons against India).

In addition, the induction of high level technology weapons has damaged the process of reconciliation between India and Pakistan that had started in 1972 when the latter's strength more accurately portrayed the "natural balance" in the subcontinent. The present strengthening of Pakistan beyond its "genuine" security needs has hardened the Pakistani position and made peace elusive in South Asia. A military strengthening of Pakistan can hardly be expected to be a factor that could be conducive to the realization in Pakistan of the larger stakes involved in any conflict with India.

Likewise, it need not be emphasised that a tottering military dictatorship in Pakistan may be tempted to divert its domestic attention by "crying wolf", or even acting as

if one is marching to devour it. And if Pakistan's military government seeks such a diversion, it takes little thought to conclude that Pakistan would emerge badly burned if not charred. And an instability ridden or weakened Pakistan according to America's own logic, would please the Soviet Union the most.

Even if Pakistan does not seek such a diversion immediately, as it may jeopardise the flow of the weapons in the pipeline, the strengthening of the Pakistani armed forces would keep live that option. By the time the present American aid programme is wound up[2] the United States will have made Pakistan strong enough to tempt it to find military solutions to its problems.

The next question that automatically follows is in regard to Pakistan's need for "new generation" weapons. The United States apparently believes that by extending military aid to Pakistan it would be able to ensure that this South Asian nation would be a conduit for weapons to the Afghan rebels while at the same time strengthening Islamabad to face any external military threat. The truth, however, is that Pakistan would remain a channel for weapons even if the United States does not undertake military aid in the

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2. The present authorization by the Congress which empowers the President to disregard Pakistan's nuclear activities, except a nuclear explosion by it, has limited the period during which he can waive Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act, to 30 September 1987.

magnitude it is now doing. Pakistan had been viewing Afghanistan as a nation that could pose a danger to its territorial integrity. And it would make sense to conclude that Pakistan would be prepared to be a link in the supply line of military hardware more because it suits her interests than for reasons concerning American strategic aims. In fact, Pakistan has been serving as a conduit long before United States announced its aid package. Ever since the ouster of Mohammad Daud in 1978, it has been reported that Pakistan has been funnelling arms to Afghanistan rebels.

Even if the United States intends to strengthen Pakistan militarily against internal disturbances incited by outside forces, there is apparently no rationale for undertaking the sale of such arms as are being delivered. If the United States truly aims at enhancing Pakistan's defence capabilities as claimed by it, the range, sophistication and type of weapons earmarked for Islamabad belies that. The F-16 aircraft which the United States, for instance, is supplying Pakistan, cannot be classified as defensive weapons. The F-16s are very sophisticated attack aircraft for offensive purposes. The Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) and Electronic Counter Counter Measure (ECCM) devices that the planes carry make them mostly suited for attack purposes and less than impressive for defensive roles. Senior American Air Force officers have testified that the

F-16s are comparable to the ultramodern high performance F-15s which are the pride of the American forces. Surprisingly, when the United States has repeated that its aim is to only strengthen Pakistan's defence capabilities, the F-16s can carry a weapon load of 10,000 pounds for a greater range than the F-15s, and its radars can pick up ground targets with greater accuracy than even the F-15s[3], and with reduced internal fuel, the load can be increased to 15,200 pounds.[4] Surely, the United States canbe expected to be aware of the fact that, however hard it may try, and whatever it may give Pakistan, this small nation will not be able to ward off any Soviet attack from Afghanistan, much less directly trouble the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan. If the emphasis was on providing weapons to Pakistan to strengthen its armed forces so that it can defend itself, then the Northrop F-5Es or the F-5Fs aircraft with proven defence capabilities would have been a logical choice.[5]

In regard to other categories of weapons also, the United States should, if it means what it says, limit its supply to those that are basically defensive. Although no

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3. U.S. Defense Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Commitments, Congressional Quarterly (Washington, D.C.), April 1978, p. 87.

4. Janes: All the Worlds Aircraft: 1979-80 (London, 1979), p. 344.

5. These planes have more combat radius than the F-16s but lesser ferry range and speed. The F-5Es, F-5Fs have weapon systems more suited to defence . For details, see, ibid., pp. 342-44 and 398-9.

detailed account of the list of the weapons involved in the deal is available, the preliminary indications are that the Reagan Administration had not been influenced by such considerations.

In a recent RAND Corporation study by Francis Fukuyama, Pakistan's usefulness for the United States has been highlighted. That Fukuyuma is also a member of the State Department's policy planning staff, needs to be borne in mind. He holds that Pakistan can be used as an "entrepot" for the American Rapid Deployment Force. He further maintains that the Pakistani militia which is already in many West Asian countries, most prominently in Saudi Arabia, where it is estimated to be about 20,000, can be used a "proxy forces" by the United States.

Though logically these ideas sound plausible, it would be naive to conclude that Pakistan would be available for such roles. Pakistan has been maintaining excellent relations with Muslim nations, both radical as well as moderate. To Pakistan these Muslim nations have been "dependable allies". Unlike the United States whose conduct is determined by factors hardly related to Pakistan's security interests, these nations have been sources of considerable assistance to it. If and when the United States stages a military operation, it would be almost absurd to conclude that Pakistan would give primary to United States objectives

rather than to those of its own good friends, who are, to quote Bhutto, "brothers". Any aid Pakistan would render of a kind not acceptable to one or more of its "brothers" would only alienate it totally from them — something a finance hungry Pakistan would not be in a position to do. The unwillingness of even the United States closest allies to permit the U.S. Air Force a refuelling stop during the 1973 American airlift to Israel for fear of Arab retaliation is an educating point.

Admiral Thomas Moorer is one of those who have highlighted the importance of Pakistan. He contends that an American naval base at Gawadar would be an excellent military facility. He further stresses the potential benefit of a surveillance base at Peshawar. However, as it stands today, Pakistan has been reluctant to accord any base facilities to the United States. But, if the United States manages to establish bases in Pakistan, there would be a clear danger of the Soviet Union coming down hard on Pakistan. The establishment of American bases in Pakistan might well encourage the Soviet Union to take more interest in the rebels who are fighting the Pakistani government.[6] In addition, it would also tie the prestige and reputation of

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6. It would be pertinent to point out that Khrushchev had in the aftermath of the U-2 crisis warned Pakistan that Peshawar would be blasted if it were to be further used as a base to conduct anti-Soviet activities.

the United States to an intra-regional conflict. Besides this, the direct presence of American forces in the Pakistani soil might serve to increase Pakistan's bellicosity towards India. This would only send India closer to the Soviet Union.

The current United States course is a resurrection of the Olaf Caroe thesis of Pakistan serving as a linchpin for protecting U.S. and western sources of oil, -- the "wells of power". Olaf Caroe is dead, and it is not easy for many Pakistanis to contemplate with equanimity to breathe new life into Caroe's thesis which may only spur more troubles for the future of their country.

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