

**DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON FOREIGN POLICY:  
THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF RUSSIA'S NATIONAL  
SECURITY, 1991-2000**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirement  
for the award of the Degree of**

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**Khush-Hal Singh Lagdhyan**



**CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN, CENTRAL ASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

**NEW DELHI-110067**

**INDIA**

**2002**



# JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

NEW DELHI - 110067, INDIA

Tel. : 6107676, 6167557  
Extn. 2365  
Fax : (+91)-11-6165886  
(+91)-11-6198234  
Cable : JAYENU

Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies

July-22, 2002

## CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation titled, **Domestic Constraints on Foreign Policy: The Changing Concept of Russia's National Security, 1991-2000**, submitted by **Mr. Khush-Hal Singh Lagdhyan**, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. This is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


**Prof. Shashikant Jha**

(Chairperson)

**Dr. Anuradha M. Chenoy**

(Supervisor)

*To  
Dad, Jyoti and Médul*



## CONTENTS

<b>Preface</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter-1</b>	
<b>Foreign Policy and Factors Influencing Foreign Policy</b>	
<b>- A Historical Overview of Soviet Foreign Policy</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Chapter-2</b>	
<b>Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy Concept and Factors</b>	
<b>Influencing Russian Foreign Policy from 1991-2000</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Chapter-3</b>	
<b>Evolution of Russian National Security Concept and Factors</b>	
<b>Influencing Russian National Security from 1991-2000</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>Chapter-4</b>	
<b>Influence of Domestic Constraints on Foreign and National</b>	
<b>Security Concept - A Comparative Analysis</b>	<b>108</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>141</b>

## **PREFACE**

*The evolution of any nation's foreign policy is generally affected by several factors. It is dictated by national interests, domestic constraints, and at time punctuated by ideological implications. Russia as a regional superpower had its own historical constraints in formulating a uniform foreign policy for over a period from the tsarist era to the emergence of modern times. From the Russian revolution to present condition one may see a plethora of developments shaped by various internal and extraneous factors.*

*This study is an effort to access and evaluate, examine and explain the domestic factors that comes in the way of making a foreign and national security policy of a nation that has emerged with a new hope and ideology.*

*While focusing on the internal influences, this study tries to provide an outline about the challenges and responses in formulating a viable foreign and security policy to a nation, which has the power to determine the course of world politics.*

*Many people and institutions are involved in the completion of this dissertation and my studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. First and foremost, I am very grateful and deeply indebted to my supervisor Dr. Anuradha M. Chenoy, for her encouragement, advice, and supervision of this dissertation. Her teaching, guidance, support and mentoring, during my M Phil. course at the Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies and throughout the writing of this dissertation, were invaluable. I truly appreciate her patience and tolerance during my numerous mishaps.*

*I am greatly indebted to the faculty members of the Centre who provided me with a helpful insights and suggestions to formulate my arguments. At the same time I am grateful to the staff of the JNU Library, Teen Murthi Library, American Central Library, British Central Library and the IDSA Library for answering many urgent bibliographic requests.*

*I wish to express my sincerest thank to my friends Suji, Satya, Dharish Dravid, Prashant, Ramesh, and Madhusmita Bebra for their valuable and tireless support. They made this work a success.*

*I want to express my very deep gratitude to my family and brothers, Jyotender and Dhanesh for their support. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Vishal and Pooja Mehta, Vinit and Sakshi for their love and friendship.*

*I would like to dedicate this thesis to my father and my brother Jyotender, for their never-ending support and the sense of security they have given me when I wanted it most. I owe special thanks to Kamala, Jabin, Sudhir, Toppo, and Homen for their moral support.*

*I am also grateful to everybody else whose names may not be mentioned but have helped me along in their own ways.*

*K-HS Thakur*  
*Khush-Hat Singh Lagdhyan*

## *Introduction*

## INTRODUCTION

The emergence of nation state is of utmost importance in the political history of the world. To protect the nation state and its political boundaries, states had to maintain constant relation with other states either through peaceful diplomatic means or through war. In the past war and aggression dominated the relation between states. In those days the autocratic rulers on whom people had no control had drawn and redrawn the political boundaries of the states with ruthless conquest and consolidation. But with the emergence of modern nation states politically conscious people and democratic and responsible executive the people at the realm of political affairs had to shelve their greed for territories due to the fear of popular wrath.

Before the Russian revolution, when monarchy was the form of government the external relations of Russia were dominated by the desire to extend its boundaries to different directions. Behind the gigantic Russian Empire that stretched across two different continents, we can see the fruits of the political aggrandizement policies followed by Ivan III and Ivan IV, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Catherine II, Alexander I, and Nicholas II. Their political ambition extended over different nationalities, linguistic, racial, and religious groups and laid the political foundation of erstwhile Soviet Union. As a result of the ambitious foreign policy, the Soviet state became a highly plural society with diverse nationalities, religious, linguistic and ethnic groups.



With the emergence of Soviet Union and its avowed policy of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, the territorial expansion of Tsarist Russia came to an abrupt end. From there onwards the foreign policy Soviet Union was dominated the desire to protect the fruits of October revolution and if possible to bring other nations under the 'Red Umbrella'. The dwindling of parochial wars for political expansion in the last three quarters of 20th century and increasing acceptance of the dignity and sovereignty of nation states necessitated this policy.

Lenin who laid the foundation of Soviet State followed a policy withdrawing from international troubles in order to save the Soviet State from chaotic internal conditions. Stalin's policies were also the continuation of the core of Lenin's foreign policy of international peace with other countries for internal development. His efforts succeeded when the world was convinced about the might of Soviet power by defeating the powerful Germans in the Second World War. With the demise of Nazism and Fascism, the wall in Central Europe, which concealed the growth of Soviet Union, was lifted. From there onwards the western nations began to view Soviet Union with suspicion and as its main adversary. The last years of Stalin and the other leaders who followed him had to face the changed international environment. As a result, their foreign and security policies were dominated by the desire to protect and preserve Soviet Union and its allies from hostile capitalist countries. Throughout the Soviet regime fears of capitalism and expansion of an ideology had shaped its national security and foreign polices. The results were strategies promoting deterrence, military strength, interventionism and some time isolationism too.

Due to the fear from capitalism and military parity with West, the defence costs were crippling the national economy and the Soviet Union could not win an arm race with the United States. Soviet Union had to give prime importance to national security and defence, which siphoned away a good part of the nation's wealth. In a communist nation where state had the responsibility to produce and provide goods and services to its citizens this excessive importance and priority to defence and external security sapped away the vigour and vitality of a nation. In the midst of so many domestic constraints, excessive importance to defence and security helped Soviet Union to thwart a possible Capitalist invasion, but neglect of several internal problems culminated and became one of the important factors for the premature demise of the first communist experiment in the world.

From the fallen Soviet State, fifteen independent states emerged and Russia is the biggest one and one which inherited the legacy of Soviet Union. Russian inherited many of the international rights and responsibilities of the USSR, on January 1, 1992, the government of the Russian Federation faced an international system that was markedly different from the one confronted by its precursor. Russia inherited the Soviet seat in the UN Security Council and took control of the entire former Soviet embassies and property around the world, accepting responsibility for Soviet debt of approximately 60 billion dollars. Russia accounts for 60 per cent of GDP and occupies 76 per cent of the territory of former USSR.

The present day Russian Federation stretches from the Baltic Sea in the west, to the Pacific in the East, the Arctic Ocean in the North, to the boundaries of China, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus in the South having area of 6,592,850 square miles. From East to West, it spans more than 6,000 miles and eleven time zone; from North to South, it extends about 2,800 miles. Russia, a Eurasian country divided by the Ural mountains in to Asia and Europe occupies 43 per cent of the territory of Europe and 30 percent of the landmass of Asia. The Asian part constitute 76 percent of Russia's territory and 70 per cent of Russia borders are in Asia including a lengthy maritime border on the Arctic and Pacific oceans.

Such a geographical location historically gave Russia an advantage in dealing with both Europe and Asia. It made Russia a land bridge between the West and East and also gave her immense strategic depth in the advent of an attack either from the West or East. However, such a position is also handicap in a two- front war, which Russia through diplomatic skill and sheer luck, managed to around in modern time.

Demographically at the time of dissolution the Soviet Union's population was approximately 290 million, out of which nearly 147.4 million was the Russian population in 1989. The last official survey has estimated Russian population 146.5 million by October 1997. Out of the total population of Russia, ethnic Russian make up approximately 83 per cent and the rest is distributed among nearly 100 minorities.

New Russia differs radically from the USSR. Geographically it is smaller, what had been the Western and Southern provinces of the Soviet Union before 1992 are now independent countries. Soviet Union was a multi national empire, with half of its population non-Russian. The new Russia by contrast is a nation state nearly 83 per cent of whose are ethnic Russian.

The predecessor of Russia was committed to implement the precepts of an ambition, elaborate ideology where as in new Russia, Marxism-Leninism was not given any relevance. Soviet Union possessed a huge military industrial complex, which consumed nearly 1/3 of its economy. In new Russia the army and military industrial complex is smaller than that of its predecessor.

The end of the cold war has brought about significant changes in the political economic, social and culture structure of the international system. Policy makers find themselves increasingly in the middle of decision making processes that require them to devise strategies and policies for meeting shifting security needs, widening political demands, and accelerating social and technological changes that characterize an ever more complex global security environment.

Since its inception Russia has been undergoing complete transformation in its economic field also; replacing a single party order with a democratic state, command economy with a market economy, shattering the communist culture, and bringing free and private press in to the country. These promises of change at home have been fruitful

in easing the international relations with great improvements with western powers. Since 1991, Russia has been addressing the prominent issues as disarmament, nuclear proliferation, and territorial disputes from a 'democratic' platform. The major reform, which was of immediate concern after dissolution was of economic reforms. Yeltsin was anxious to reconstruct the economy in the shortest possible time and therefore, with Egor Gaidar he initiated a programme to accelerate price deregulation, marketisation and privatization under shock therapy model of economic change. The shock therapy was centered on a belief that injuries should be done all together, so that being less tasted, they will give less offense. Benefits should grant little by little, so that they may be better enjoyed.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, the shock therapists expected to counterbalance the up-front high political costs of the implementation of orthodox economic policies with what Albert Hirschman termed "asset of trust and hope". Where a special reserve of good will and trust was required from political liberties and human rights that (the new democracies) have restored or established.<sup>2</sup>

Third, the adaptation of shock therapy is justified by the belief that non-market economy polyarchy would be an unsustainable form of democracy; the direct control of the economy by the state would inevitably lead to the erosion of democratic rule.

---

<sup>1</sup> Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 35 cited in Minxin Pei, *From Reform to Revolution: the Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p.27.

<sup>2</sup> Albert Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Latin American Development: Seven exercises in retrospection", *Latin American Research Review*, Vol.22, No.3 1987, pp.228-29.

This economic panacea did not work. The frustration over two years of fruitless but painful shock therapy, Russia rejected the idea of reformist Choice party and gave birth to the strong performance of the ultra nationalists and communists in the Duma election of 1993.

In political perspective, Russia after the dissolution was a much-fragmented one, dotted with a multitude of weak organizations, political parties, and groups that shared little common ground and had no mass following. The political costs of disunity among progressive former could be high as was the case in the outcome of the parliamentary elections in Russia in December 1993, when the reformers were split into three competing parties – Russia's Choice, the Yavlinsky Bloc, and the Russian Unity and Accord party. Together, they plotted only about a quarter of the popular vote.

The economic reforms remained extremely unpopular for the general population and receive fierce opposition in the parliament. Yeltsin's primary goal now shifted from economic reforms to political stability to neutralize his parliamentary critics and replace the constitution of 1977, to lend him more powers. By 1993 the constitution was implemented which gave him more powers. In the aftermath of the adoption of new constitution, Yeltsin attempted to construct a new regime. The constitution is a strongly 'presidential' which assigns extra ordinary powers to the President and limits the role of the parliament. The parliament took the form of a bicameral system.

At the same time Yeltsin attempted to strengthen his control over local government, chiefly by personally appointing local governor's until the formal election

could be held. The new constitution was a slight majority in a national vote in December 1993 and immediately went into effect.

Although the new constitution greatly enhanced Yeltsin's presidential powers, it did not enable him to construct of supportive or even stable new order. That was immediately apparent in the parliamentary election of Election of December 1993, where pro-reform factions elicited little support. Far more successful were the nationalist parties which receive a sizeable share of vote. In the next parliamentary elections, 1995, the result had been still more dismaying, for the largest share of votes now went to the communist party of Russian federation.

On the security front, the new Russian State that rose from the ashes of Soviet Union in 1991 had to face a new reality. Its eagerness to shed its Communist legacy and its over anxiety to join the camp of the western nations ended in big setbacks. The West was not willing to blindly trust its erstwhile adversary. Even though Western European nations were much eager in their attempt to reconstruct Russia and to bring it on the path of capitalism and democracy, American position provided the main hurdle. It might be due to their eagerness to keep Europe divided and to perpetuates its position in Europe; but the biggest loser was Russia. Their frustrated ambition compelled it to review its foreign policy and its security policy; which led them to revive the historic old relations with many European and Asian countries. As a result of that the relations with China and India reached new highest. American attempts to provoke Russia and to undermine the European Unity created several sensitive situations like the stopping and checking of

Russian Ships and Oil tankers, Yugoslav Crisis and the expansion of NATO near to the doorstep of Russia. These factors compelled Russia to devote due attention to its defence and security policies; even though domestic constraints in the field of economy and nascent democratic system do not allow it.

With the signing of Russia-NATO co-operation pact month's back, a new episode was opened in the history of Russia. The earlier dream to get a respectable place among the western countries got a new impetus. At least for the time being Russia can look into its internal problems as the threat from one of the powerful military block was reduced.

Throughout history, even though man relied on peace and diplomacy the final settler of dispute is nothing other than war. So nation states of all the times gave much importance to security policies to prevent a possible onslaught into its sovereignty. Even though the nations of the world are eager to follow an ambitious defence and foreign policy to gain dominance over others there are so many strings which pull the nations from followings a policy of their liking. The main factor among them is the nations economic health. America, which is spending 40% of all the defence spending of the world, has a dominant position and their military might is a threat to all the nations. But for a country like Russia that has been undergoing several political and economic upheavals it has been impossible to spend a big amount to keep its superpower status. Even though in its inner heart Russia cherishes the dream to make itself a superpower to act as a balancing force in the international arena. The main factor that blocks the desire of Russia to follow an ambitious foreign and security policy is nothing other than



domestic constraints in economic and political field. The economic transition from socialism to capitalism and the political transition from totalitarian regime to democracy created so much stress and strain to Russia. So these realities in the economic and political field act as a stumbling block in the way Russian ambition.

Keeping this background, the proposed study analyses the main factors which mould the foreign and security policy of Russia. Here several factors act as the factors determining these factors; they are presence of external threat, the volume of money allocated to this sector play a dominant role. This study mainly focuses on the domestic constraints in shaping the foreign and security policy of Russia. The proposed study would begin with the economic, political, and geopolitical circumstances that prevailed since Yeltsin period. These developments had a direct relation with the Foreign Policy Document, and the National Security document of 2000, chalked out by the policy makers. In my study, I will analyse how far these domestic constraints influenced the new Foreign Policy Document and National Security document of 2000. The study is based on primary and secondary source materials available in English language.

*Chapter – 1*  
*Foreign Policy and Factors Influencing Foreign Policy*  
*- A Historical Overview of Soviet Foreign Policy*

## CHAPTER-1

### FOREIGN POLICY AND FACTORS INFLUENCING FOREIGN POLICY - A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy is the external vision and policy of a state through which a state negotiates its interests in the international system. After the establishment of United Nations and the emergence of new states, the interrelationship among states has assumed greater significance and the states started affecting the behaviour of other states in some form or other. Therefore, to minimise the adverse effect and to gain favourable actions of other state every state undertakes a set of purposive action. These actions for the adjustment of other state action in favour of one's own state are known as the foreign policy of the state. Foreign policy became quite diverse, as new voices enter the field and add their efforts to the continuing goal of understanding and explaining foreign policy.

#### DEFINING FOREIGN POLICY

In George Modelski words, "foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing behaviour of other states for adjusting their own activities to the international environment."<sup>1</sup> According to Padelford and Lincoln, "foreign policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interest into concrete courses of action to attain these objectives and preserve its interest."

---

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1997), p.39

In C. C. Rodee's words, "foreign policy involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behaviour pattern of a state while negotiating with other states to protect or further its vital interests."

George Modelski argues that the foremost task of foreign policy must be to throw light on the way in which a state attempts to change, and succeed in changing, the behaviour of other state. Padelford and Lincoln explain two aims of foreign policy. According to them, its first function is to attain its broadly conceived goals and second function is to preserve national interests. C. C. Rodee's definition includes not only the general principles but also those means necessary to implement them. With the changing environment, the system of international relation started focusing on the multiplicity of non-governmental actors – multinational corporations, ethnic, and special interest groups, the media and the general public etc.

The dictionary of international relation defines foreign policy as "a strategy of planned course of action developed by the decision makers of a state vis-à-vis other states of international entities aimed at achieving specific goals defined in terms of national interest".<sup>2</sup> Such multiplicity of foreign policy made it a highly interactive activity that involves continuous communication and comments. Scholars tried to bring more accuracy by incorporating "tune and change factors" in to it, which explains why foreign policy occurs in the particular ways.

---

<sup>2</sup> Jack C. Plano, Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary* (USA: ABC – Clio. Inc., 1988), p.6

James Rosenau advocates foreign policy as a 'bridging discipline' with 'limitless boundaries' that deals with "the continuing erosion of the distinction between domestic and foreign issues, between the socio-political and economic processes that unfold at home and those that transpire abroad".<sup>3</sup>

## ✓ DOMESTIC FACTORS INFLUENCING FOREIGN POLICY

The general principles like, safeguarding the territorial integrity, bargaining, and promotion of national interests and states own specific interest's etc. determine the foreign policy of any state. Kegley and Wittkopf categorise the 'specific interests' in to three basic levels- the external level, state level and individual level<sup>4</sup>. The external level incorporates the international features such as the prevalence of civil wars, the interdependence trades, which conditions the kind of choices a leader is likely to take. At the state level lies the internal or domestic influences such as the type of political system, the opinion of its citizens, which the leader is likely to take note of and at the individual level are the characteristics of the leaders, their personal beliefs, values, and personalities.

Padelford and Lincoln classify the 'specific interests' into two categories: subjective and situational. Under subjective interests, the states think of their own

---

<sup>3</sup> Cited in Laura Neack, et.al., *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1995), p.18

<sup>4</sup> Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.15.

national interests but while under situational interests the states take notice of the national environment, the activities of other states and their own capacities to meet international situations.

Roughly, 'specific interests' accommodate three categories of factors, which decide the course of a state's foreign policy. They are namely, *external* or *international* factors, *internal* or *domestic* factors and *policy-making* factors. *External* factors are those influences on foreign policy, which are executed by the activities occurring beyond a country's border. Such factors as the content of international law, the number of military alliances, deterioration of global environment and changing level of international trade profoundly affect the choices of foreign policy - decision makers. *Internal* or *domestic* influences on the other hand, are those existing at state level. These factors focus on variations in the state's attributes, such as military capabilities, level of economic development, geopolitics, historical and national values, public opinion, political institutions, etc. Finally, the policy-making factors play a decisive role in shaping the foreign policy. In the formulation of foreign policy, public officials, the assisting departments, and experts such as head of the government and foreign minister, legislature, foreign office and other services are of greater importance.

### ***Historical and National Values***

History of a nation shapes and conditions the foreign policy of a nation largely. From history, the nation inherits a style and culture, which in turn influences and decides

the course of action the nation follows in relation to other sovereign states. The American isolationist policy during both world wars, India's policy of non-alignments are the evidence of fact that how history is reflected in foreign policy.

Russian history, cultural traditions influenced the foreign and security policy of USSR. The absence of pluralist democracy, high degree of centralism, elitism, militarism, imperialism, autocracy, and influence of religion and ideology were the elements of Russian tradition. During the Soviet regime, the state always feared the negative influence of western values on society and cultures. This attitude limited the scope of co-operations between two different ideologies. The culture and personality theory elucidated the Russian fear towards the capitalist countries. The theory justifies that, "in the USSR the maternal practice of lightly swaddling the Russian infant produces a privation – gratification cycle".<sup>5</sup>

### *National Interests*

The major objective of foreign policy makers is to identify strategies that promote the national interests. The national interests act on behalf of a particular community or nation.<sup>6</sup> National interest is the essential concept in foreign policy. James Rosenau

---

<sup>5</sup> Hafeez Malik, "Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy: An Introduction" in Hafeez Malik (ed), *Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1990), pp.1-2.

<sup>6</sup> Cited in V. Spike Peterson, "The Politics of Identity and Gendered Nationalism" in Laura Neack et. al., (eds), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1995), p.175.

opines that, “the concept of national interest is used both in political analysis and political action. As an analytical tool, national interests describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation’s foreign policy instrument of political action; it serves a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies. They also share a tendency to confine the intended meaning to what is best for a nation in foreign affairs.”<sup>7</sup> According to Robert Johansens, “the concept of national interests is a highly acclaimed concept where national interests are not scientifically determined. The concept is a cluster of goals and strategies derived from values that are more fundamental. Traditionally foremost among those are the preservation of the security and prosperity of the government and its supporters. This includes maintaining sovereign control over a defined territory and population.”<sup>8</sup>

The Soviet Union based itself on the Marxist ideology of a class struggle against capitalist ideology, which equates the notion of national interests explicitly with class interests. The national interests of USSR were mainly the interests of working masses of the country, represented by the Politburo of the communist party. There was not much difference between the understanding and application of the “national interest” by pre-Revolutionary dynasty and its post revolutionary usage by leadership of CPSU. The only difference was that communists constantly emphasised their guardianship of national interest to enhance their legitimacy in clinging to power. Overall, when we speak of

---

<sup>7</sup> James N. Rosenau, “National Interests” in David I. Sills (ed), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (USA: McMillan Press, 1968) Vol. II, pp.34-40.

<sup>8</sup> Robert C. Johansen, *The National Interest and the Women Interest* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p.8.



Soviet Union's national interests this largely meant the state interests of the USSR as understood and formulated by the top Russian stratum of the CPSU.

### *Geopolitics*

The geographical characteristics of a state heavily condition the options of its policymaking in that political system. The country's frontiers, size, location, and neighbours remain relatively constant. If a state changes its borders in acquiring or ceding territory or the character of the neighbouring states change, the new geographical facts will apparently influence foreign policy decisions. The geopolitics school of 'realist' considers that the political geography in generality stresses the influence of geographic factors on state power and international conduct.<sup>9</sup> According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, the tsarist expansionism in early geopolitical thinking resulted due to the Russia's quest for national power through maintaining sea control. During those days states with extensive coastlines and ports used to enjoy a competitive advantage in the race for hegemony or global leadership. Therefore, to attain such goals the tsars of Russia corroborated the policy of expansionism in to their foreign policy realm. The geopoliticians, such as Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman stress that, not only location but also topography, size, climate, and the distance between states determine the foreign policies of individual countries.

---

<sup>9</sup> Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, Note. 1, p.43.

## *Military Capabilities*

Military strength, besides natural resource and industrial capacity, is another important factor, which influences the state's foreign policy as well as its status. The proposition that state's internal capability shapes their foreign policy priorities captures the demonstrable fact that state's preparations for war strongly influence their later use of force. However, the military factor is not a permanent factor like geopolitics and natural resources or the states internal capabilities but keeps on changing and fluctuating.<sup>10</sup>

Hence, military factor largely depends on the sound economic base of the country. Military capabilities increase the power to bargain in international affairs. All states may seek similar goals but their ability to realise them varies according to their military capabilities. According to Wittkopf and Kegley, military capabilities limit a state's range of prudent policy choices, and act as a mediating factor on the leaders national security decisions. In the words of Klaus Knorr, "historically, military power has tended to be superior to other form of power. Ever since the world became politically organized in terms of independent states and each claiming military sovereignty, force has been regarded as the ultimate arbiter in the settlement of conflicts".<sup>11</sup> Due to the dominance of military power, many scholars discuss other national characteristics such as a country's population, its political organization, its geographic position and topography, its endowment of natural resources, and the economic capacity solely in terms of how they contribute to the ability of a state to make a war. Many scholars argue that traditionally

---

<sup>10</sup> Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence" in Philip E. Tetlock, et. al., (eds.), *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.209-33.

<sup>11</sup> Cited in John M. Rothgeb Jr., "The Changing International Context for Foreign Policy" in Laura Neck, et. al., (eds), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1995), p.35.

the states have focused their foreign policy on the pursuit of military and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the advent of globalisation and inter-dependence dramatically shifted the role of military specifically and the international politics as a whole. Economic interdependence has gained much more importance in the foreign policy making process. Still military remains an essential instrument in the making of foreign policy, which provides security shield for international commerce as well as nation's safety.

### *Economic Development*

The economic and industrial development level of a state establishes its foreign policy goals to a greater degree. The growth and interdependence depends mainly on the sound domestic economy of the state systems. This relationship between interdependence and domestic economy brings economic relationship into the core issues of foreign policy. The end of cold war confrontation has magnified the state's economic responsibilities for promoting economic growth and development, in order to serve greater access to market to obtain investments to overcome epidemic, poverty, and other social stigmas. The intervention of the advanced countries in the 'troubled' developing regions indicates the degree to which some members of the western world react when they perceived that their important interests are at stake. Where as less developed, under developed and developing non-western countries, perceives themselves increasingly subjected to economic coercion.

## ***The Political System***

The political system of a state and its attributes, also affect its international behaviour. For a leader it is difficult to survive in any type of political environment without the support of organized domestic 'political interests'. In a democratic system these interests become politically potent and pressurise the government to pursue a foreign policy to achieve these political interests. In a democratic state public opinion, interest groups, and the mass media play a vital role in the policymaking process. In short, in a democracy, public opinion and preferences matters. However, who participate and how much they exercise their right to participate are critical determinants of foreign policy choices.<sup>12</sup>

## **HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

### **The Tsarist Legacy**

The Russian foreign policy began when Ivan III in pursuit of a strong central state attained hegemony over other princely families and started undermining Tatar power. He introduced the policy of "Collecting of Russian lands" by incorporating the policy of expansionism, which further continued under Ivan IV to strengthen autocracy. The "Oprichnina" symbolized the autocracy of Ivan IV regime, which had the features of a

---

<sup>12</sup> Cited in Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, Note. 1, p.46.


secret police force as well as parallel administration structure.<sup>13</sup> His expansionism policy invaded the non-Russian territories too.

However, the full flowering of Russian foreign policy took place under Peter I. Peter the Great transformed the Muscovite State into the Russian Empire. In the Treaty of Nystad, the power of Sweden declined heavily and Russia replaced Sweden as a great European power.<sup>14</sup> Peter through his outward expansion policies acquired coast and posts on Baltic Sea for military and commercial purposes and brought Russia into a European orbit. The next significant period of Russian foreign policy flourished under Catherine the Great. During her period, Russia participated in three wars and gained Black Sea Coast and Finnish City of Vyborg through the Treaty of Belgrade and Peace of Abo respectively.

Russia withdrew into neutrality after the accession of Catherine II. Soon she too started pursuing an active policy of expansionism by adding significant territories to Russian Empire. Another victory over Sweden and three portions of Poland exhibited Russian dominance in its immediate neighbourhood. Her expansion in the South added much of the northern Black Sea Coast line including Azov and Crimea, the Great Black Sea port of Odessa and nearly another 200,000 square miles to her realm.

<sup>13</sup> Julian Towster, 'The Geography and Historical Heritage of the USSR' in Randolph L. Braham (ed.), *Soviet Politics, and Government: A Reader* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1965), p.14.

<sup>14</sup> Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998) p.7.



From 1801 – 1825 Alexander I ruled Russian empire and his policy remained that of preserving 'status quo' and suppressing nationalism in a multi national empire. He incorporated Finland, Bess Arabia, Baku, and Georgia to the Empire. By this time, Russia began asserting its role as the 'gendarme of Europe', which became more apparent during Nicholas I. Autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationalism, functioned as pillars during his regime. Besides pursuing a defensive policy, he tried to expand Russia's realms southward to capture Constantinople and siege control of Dardanelles and Bosphorus.<sup>15</sup> The clash of Russian, British, and French interests in the near east led to a struggle for strategic advantages in the Ottoman Lands, which compelled the Turk to declare war on Russia, in association with France, and British.

The Treaty of Paris to end the Crimean war and neutralisation of Black Sea introduced a shift in Russian foreign policy. Due to Russia's humiliation of Crimean War Alexander II shifted his policies attention inward rather than outward. He shifted his expansion towards Asia, where resistance was weak. After the assassination of Alexander II, his son and heir Alexander continued the policy to ensure security of Russian Empire from aggression. To protect Russia against attack he made an alliance with Germany and Austria, signed a 'secret treaty in June 1881. He also signed a 'Reinsurance Treaty with Germany to observe neutrality if either side became involved in a war with third power. However, the lapse of these treaties ultimately drove the Russian into the arms of French. The Russia's 'association' with French in turn set a stage for the transformation of European system into a rigid bipolarity of opposing coalitions. Russia

---

<sup>15</sup> Peter Waldron, *The end of Imperial Russia, 1855-1917* (London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1997), p.122.

formalized a highly secret military convention with France in 1893. During the regime of Nicholas II China granted Russia a twenty-five year lease of the Liaotung Peninsula including Dairen and Port Arthur. However, Japan wanted to block Russian expansion and influence in Far East. Therefore, to achieve its goal Japan concluded an alliance with Britain in 1902 and in February 1904, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. The war exposed Nicholas II 's weaknesses and a revolution erupted in Russia, which opened a way to communist revolution.

The tsarist era had been an era of adventurism as well as defensive foreign policy. The scholars explain the reason behind Tsarist expansionist foreign policy as the Russia's push towards sea and ice free ports and efforts to fill the internal vacuums. Some analysts emphasise the Russia expansionism to an autocratic urge while other associates it with Russia's vulnerability to invasion and its search for security. The Tsarist expansionist policy could be explained by several facts of Russian Geopolitical situation, particular type of regime and Russia's aspiration towards the Baltic, Black Sea and warmer water of the Pacific Ocean. Sometimes such as in the regime of Ivan III and Ivan IV, Russian expansionism catered to internal despotism. With the passage of time Nicholas I turned Russian foreign policy inward due to its internal conditions, poor constitution, and absence of democracy and initiated a period of internal reform.

## The Leninist Period

The Russian suffering under the tsars, the autocracy of the regime and Russia's defeat in a war with Japan gave birth to a revolution, which finally took place in the form of Great October Socialistic Revolution in October 1917. Marxism, which inspired people for this revolution had very little to say that pertains to foreign policy. Marxism envisages that the motivating force in the development of industrial society was internal, and the 'classes' cause the conflict rather than nations. Karl Marx expressed this 'internationalism' in the closing words of the Communist Manifesto: "Working men of all countries Unite!" Marx's national sentiments belong to a superstructure, which he believed would entirely pass away with the demise of capitalism. For Marx, foreign policy relates to the nature and function of the state and use of state power. He believed that the state power would wither- away with the end of the class struggle and "when all people would live in harmony, nation-states and foreign policy would have no place".<sup>16</sup>

Due to the disappointment with German Social Democratic Party Lenin published his theory, 'Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism' based on John Hobson and Rudolf Hilferding ideas to which he added "certain realistic political conclusions" of his own.<sup>17</sup> He envisages the destruction of capitalism with the destruction of imperialist system. Therefore, he assigned the role of Bolsheviks to adjust prolong period of co-existence with capitalism while chipping away its imperialist foundations. The

---

<sup>16</sup> Cited in A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev (eds), *Soviet-Foreign Policy: 1917-1945, Vol. I* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), p.31

<sup>17</sup> Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Noguee, op.cit. p. 28.



'Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism, laid down the foundation of fundamental tasks of Soviet foreign policy that follows:

1. To secure, together with the other Socialist Countries, favourable condition of the building of socialism and communism;
2. To strengthen the unity and solidarity of the Social countries, their friendship and brotherhood;
3. To support the national-liberation movement and to effect all-round co-operation with the young developing countries; and
4. Consistently to uphold the principle of peaceful- coexistence of states, with different social systems, to offer decisive resistance to the aggressive force of imperialism, and to save humanity form a world war.<sup>18</sup>

Soviet foreign policy further in its evolution, corroborated two more formulation to it. The one emerges from Lenin's statement that, "the deepest roots of international and the external policy of our state, are determined by the economic interests of the ruling classes of our state and the policy pursued by the Soviet government abroad, is a reflection and an extension of its policy at home."<sup>19</sup>The second formulation came forth from the belief that "the danger of war including the danger of World War will continue

---

<sup>18</sup> Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-73: The Paradox of Super Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.2.

<sup>19</sup> V.I. Lenin, *Complete Collected Works, Vol. 36* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1962), p.327.

as long as imperialism exists so the peaceful coexistence is therefore a form of the Marxist class struggle.”<sup>20</sup>

Due to anti war feeling in Russia, Lenin focused his foreign policy priorities towards a struggle for peace and withdrawal from war. In second All-Russian Congress of Soviet, he adapted the ‘decree on Peace’ that marked the birth of a new foreign policy. In the document, he says that “it will be an uphill fight, international imperialism is mobilizing all its forces against us”.<sup>21</sup> Through this, Lenin informed the world about Soviet’s peace initiative. He offered a solution of peaceful coexistence by means of negotiations and tried to reconstruct Russian economy. While addressing the second Congress of Soviet Lenin said, “We reject all clauses on plunder the violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good-neighbouring relations and all economic agreements, we can not reject these”.<sup>22</sup>

The decree on peace defined peace as democratic and without annexations condemning the imperialist war. To end the war the policy of socialistic states also proposed the conclusion of an armistice for a period of not less than three month to permit all countries to prepare for peace negotiations. However, Lenin’s Decree on Peace failed to produce either peace or revolution as governments of allies rejected his plea. Lenin wanted immediate peace therefore foreign commissar Leon Trotsky declared armistice with Germany. On the issue of ‘peace with Germany’ at domestic front, a

---

<sup>20</sup> V.I. Lenin, *Complete Collected Works*, Vol. 2, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1962), p.485.

<sup>21</sup> Cited in A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev, op.cit. p.31.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p.32.

sharp divide among Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin and Joseph Stalin broke out. Stalin inclined toward immediate peace while Nikolai Bukharin emphasised to convert this struggle into a revolutionary war against imperialism and Trotsky adapted a middle path of 'no war and no peace'.

With the appeal of foreign commissar to Germany for a cease-fire, Russia opened itself to the Brest-Litovsk negotiation. Lenin wanted peace at any cost, so he agreed to German terms. Consequently, the line of Russian non-control shifted eastward, to include Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Ukraine. In return for peace, "Russia surrendered nearly 34 % of Russian population, 32% of country's agriculture land, 54 % of nation's industry, 89% nation's coalmine, all the Baltic and Finland in exchange for peace".<sup>23</sup> Further, the Poland- Russia war forced Russia to cede parts of Ukraine and Byelorussia to Poland in the Treaty of Riya.

By the time due to the policies of war communism, large parts of the country were experiencing famine and Russia desperately needed economic aid form the west in the form of loans, credits, grants, and technological assistance. The West ignored Russia's interests due to their reservation for Brest -litovsk treaty and was not happy with Russia and Russia ultimately turned to Germany.

---

<sup>23</sup> Peter Zwick, *Soviet Foreign Relations Process and Policy* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1990), p.15.

Through the 'New Economic Policy' Lenin tried to establish business like relations with outside world, to achieve business goals. Hence Foreign commissar Georgii Chicherin, formulated a policy of peaceful coexistence under which Russia renounced armed conflicts and tried to explore specific areas of "accommodation and establishment" of peaceful competition with the capitalistic world. Scholars also opine that with the establishment of third Communist International Lenin followed a dual policy. On the one hand, he initiated a revolution against capitalism, making Russia centre of revolution and Bolshevik, the ruling force in international communism. Where as on the other hand, through the policy of peaceful co-existence he tried to bring different social system together.<sup>24</sup>

Foreign policy during his period got further complicated due to the political struggle between Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin, over the possibility of building socialism in one country. Stalin viewed socialism as the Soviet state power, in addition, its electrification while Leon Trotsky wanted to add qualities for refinement and civilization.<sup>25</sup>

### **The Stalinist Era**

Stalin won the power struggle, ousted Trotsky from the communist party, and exiled him. Stalin found Lenin's compromise and adjustments improper for the world

---

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, pp.15-18.

<sup>25</sup> Robert H. Donaldson, and Joseph L. Noguee, op.cit.p.40

revolution. He identified the “world revolution” with the growth and expansion of Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup> Stalin’s first priority was to build up a strong socialistic base of communism in the Soviet Union over a short time period. He emphasized that if socialism failed, then the cause of the world revolution would be lost.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, to attain the “ideological goal” on diplomatic front he adopted a ‘dual policy.’ More open and conventional part of the dual policy was operational under foreign commissar Litvinov while a secretive, underground, and revolutionary part was functional under Comintern. According to analysts of foreign policy “these two conflicting policies were pursued one operating within the traditional rules of international relation and other was subversive of international rules”.<sup>28</sup>

Stalin concentrated nation’s energies on industrialization and collectivization during 1929-30. He continued the policy of retrenchment and presented Russia as the champion of collective security against aggression. The Soviet membership to the League of Nations, Litvinov policy of “peace through disarmament” supports the later statement. Litvinov advocated the renunciation of war as instrument of national policy, first in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and later with the bilateral non-aggression and neutrality pact with the neighbours.<sup>29</sup> Stalin and Litvinov were very eager to accommodate West in their policy. At Geneva Conference, Litvinov emphasized the fact that economic peace and general peace are inseparable and for economic peace, unrestricted foreign trade is

---

<sup>26</sup> Peter Zwick, op.cit. p.118.

<sup>27</sup> Jan F. Triska, David D, Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: The McMillan Company, 1968), pp.5-6.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p.5.

<sup>29</sup> Anatole G. Mazour, *Russia Tsarist and Communist* (Princeton: D.Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1962), pp.714-15.

must. During the period, Stalin initiated a Comintern policy of anti-fascist in support of 'Popular Front'.

Soon after the adoption of constitution in 1936, he started accommodating the West in to USSR's foreign policies due to the perceived threats from East and West. The rise of Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan made him suspicious about their moves. Moreover, he needed foreign currency to make five-year plan successful.

Soon the happenings like - Hitler's occupation of Rhineland, German support in Spanish War, unopposed German annexation of Austria and Munich agreement surrendering Czechoslovakia to Germany, made him suspicious about his accommodations. He found that Soviet Union could no more rely on French and British resistance to Germany. He also concluded that Western powers did not have political will to resist Hitler and he does not want to sacrifice Soviet Union for the policy of appeasement. Stalin consolidated power to achieve dictatorship and with his 'Great Purge' terminated domestic equivalent of Nazi's and Japanese imperialist in order to 'clean' the party and state apparatus. He followed a policy of total isolation for some time but soon he realized that Soviet Union was becoming the victim of hostile intention on the part of all powers in the world. Therefore, he decided to play the Western democracies and fascists against each other.

Stalin reversed Soviet foreign policy by signing Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact on 23 August 1939, and announced that hence forward Comintern would be no longer anti-Nazi. Stalin knew that the war with Germany is unavoidable and confronting Japan and Germany at the same time would be dangerous. Therefore, in April 1941 USSR negotiated with Japan and signed the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. On 21 June 1941, the Germans invaded Soviet Union. In Tehran Conference, Stalin foreign policy goal advocated security for Soviet Union. He wanted to extract major reparations from Germany and dismember her. He demanded for Soviet control over Poland, 'friendly' governments throughout Eastern Europe, recovery of the territories that Russia lost to Japan in 1905, in exchange for a declaration of war against Japan.

Churchill wanted to regain the waning British power in international sphere and so he in October 1944 participated in well known 'percentage agreement'.<sup>30</sup> Stalin cooperated Roosevelt and Churchill on every issues which were not of his central concern at Yalta conference in February 1945 but, he remained resolute on Russian interests such as t Lublin's government in Poland, recognition of Curzon line as Soviet - Polish borders, about Oder-Neisse line etc. Soviet troops in Eastern Europe were preparing to cross into Germany and estimate was that 18 months later Japan would be defeated in Manchuria. Therefore, Roosevelt and Churchill had no other choice, as the Soviet forces were essential for defeating Japan.

---

<sup>30</sup> Richard Sakwa, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union* (London: Routledge, Taylor a Francis Group, 1999), p.225.

Hence, Stalin incorporated the Balkans, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, and Germany in to Soviet sphere of influence. In the next allies, meeting at Potsdam the allies accepted the Oder-Niesse line, as Soviet control over Poland and Stalin agreed to declare a war on Japan. After the establishments of friendly governments in Eastern Europe, the cold war began as a struggle between two major powers. Churchill on 5<sup>th</sup> March 1946 delivered his “iron speech” in Fulton – Missouri, summarizing the western view of Eastern European developments. He said,

“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, and iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line in all the capitals of the ancient states of central and Eastern Europe, Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia all these famous cities and the population around them lie in the Soviet sphere. And all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow.”<sup>31</sup>

This speech was not openly hostile to the Soviet Union, and even less to call a war, but gave birth to the policy of containment. George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ formulated a containment policy attributing Soviet expansionist tendencies to Russia’s traditional backwardness and he believed that if contained properly Russia would break up.<sup>32</sup> The post war crisis started when Iran brought the issue of ‘wartime promise’ to the

---

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, pp.294-95.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, pp.293-94.



newly established United National Security Council. Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Iran under an implicit threat of force from US and Britain.

Further Stalin, in his 'Two Camps' speech, insisted that the world remained divided into two camps.<sup>33</sup> In 1947, the "Truman Doctrine" directly targeted the Soviet interference in Greece and Turkey. Truman said that, "that it must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities by outside pressure".<sup>34</sup> American government in June 1947 by European Recovery Program backed the Truman Doctrine. Stalin in response to the Kennan's Containment, Truman doctrine, and Marshall Plan established Cominform, with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, France, and Italy. Through the formation of Cominform Stalin wanted to solidify Moscow's hold over the states of Eastern Europe and shield them from the temptations of US aid and propaganda.

Stalin blocked the western access to Berlin when in spite of Soviet opposition they tried to bring currency reform in their respective zone. In direct response to Stalin's adventure on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1949, North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established. By this time, colonial empires in south and south East Asia were in the process of dismantling. Stalin remained busy with Europe securing Soviet Union borders, in search for security and did very less in Asia for the promotion of world revolution. In regards to third world countries like India; he held the opinion that Bourgeois governments in these countries deserve the support from communist states. Under George Melenkov, Soviet foreign

---

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp.290-293.

<sup>34</sup> Peter Zwick, op.cit. p.24.

policy took a shift assuming that the peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism is quite possible, under the mutual desire to cooperate.

Stalin foreign policy was a mixture of many components. Sometimes it fluctuated between rigidity and flexibility, and sometimes between aggressiveness and defensiveness. To conclude, the Soviet foreign policy during Stalin era incorporated the characteristics of expansionism and maintenance of status quo, astuteness and miscalculation, success and failure.

### **Khrushchev's Foreign Policy**

✓ Nikita S. Khrushchev laid the foundation of collective leadership in Soviet Union. He found it necessary to eliminate secret police, which had become very powerful in early 1950's, to consolidate party's power.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, new leadership arrested secret police leader Beria in a Presidium meeting and shot him later. In the field of foreign policy, Khrushchev introduced three major changes. ✓ He renewed the Stalin's peaceful coexistence putting emphasis between communist and non – communist countries with belief that Imperialism was as aggressive as war, but the socialistic commonwealth was enough strong to make war avoidable. Therefore, he introduced “different national path to socialism” with an idea that the transition to socialism could be carried out by peaceful means supported by his visits to US in 1959 (Spirit of Camp David) and non-summit in

---

<sup>35</sup> Analole G. Mazour, op.cit. pp.864,865.

Paris. For Stalin in his last years in power third world remained as a conflict zone between socialism and capitalism where as Khrushchev recognised third world as a 'neutral zone of peace'. His arm deals with non-communist countries and visits to the third world countries opened new vistas in Russian foreign policy. Richard Sakwa opines that Stalin "one-man dictatorship" went under transformation to "party's political dominance" after Khrushchev won over his rival.

Further Khrushchev brought a radical change in Soviet history when in his 'secret speech' he denounced some of Stalin's excesses. He said,

"Stalin's acted not thorough persuasion, explanation, and patient co-operation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his position, was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation."<sup>36</sup>

He criticised Stalin's failure to prepare Soviet defences for German attack in 1941; his 'lack of faith in 'Chinese comrades', 'unrealistic' assessment in Korea too. The Western powers took a sigh of relief and communist bloc feel betrayed. The speech followed dramatic changes in Eastern European where the longstanding antagonism towards Russia went more active. When western powers paid no attention to Soviet

---

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, pp. 316-17.

opposition regarding bringing Germany in to the NATO, Soviet Union organized its own military alliance the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The US, England and USSR remain divided on the issues of German reunification, European disarmament, and security at Geneva in summer 1955. The Soviet Union proposed at Potsdam summit for Mutual Disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw pact, withdrawal of American forces from Europe and conclusion of a European security Treaty but the conference failed to produce any agreement. Khrushchev brought Yugoslavia back into communist fold as a fact of his policy different national paths to socialism through peaceful means. He defined future relation with Yugoslavia on the bases of equal mutual respect. He dissolved Cominform thinking that Warsaw Treaty Organization and Council for Mutual Assistance (CMEA) will substitute the Cominform.

His diplomacy during Suez Canal crisis brought Middle East into back into Soviet grip. Russia took The British – French – Israeli invasion as a retreat of imperialism. The power vacuum, which had resulted after the departure of British and French in Middle East, made it easy for USSR to enter this area with a new dynamic force, staunch anti-colonist. Scholar's analysis that Khrushchev policies between 1957-62 shifted from 'peaceful co-existence' to 'offensive coexistence', towards missile deception and premature Soviet globalism.<sup>37</sup> He in 1958 declared that the Soviet government no longer recognizes its obligations under the Potsdam Agreement in particular affecting Berlin. Therefore, after successful launching of Sputnik in October 1957, through missile

---

<sup>37</sup> Richard F. Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969), p.309.

diplomacy he tried to bring a permanent resolution of the status of Germany and establish his unchallenged leadership in communist bloc in foreign affairs.

Both giant of communism took different pathway due to the differences on “Great Leap Forward” Chinese defence policy de-Stalinisation, Russian association with west, and the containment of China in communist bloc. By 1960, Khrushchev’s foreign policy projected that in “twenty years Soviet Union will not only enter into a new phase of communism but will also overtake the per-capita standard of living of any capitalist country and specifically reach 80% above the 1960 American standard of living”.

Secondly, he after the successful launching of sputnik projected that Soviet Union will achieve nuclear parity with the US. Khrushchev took a militant line, saying,

“Peace and peaceful coexistence is not quite the same thing. Peaceful coexistence does not merely imply absence of neither war nor a temporary unstable armistice between two wars but the coexistence of two opposed social systems based on mutual renunciation of war as a means of settling disputes between states.”<sup>38</sup>

His stern approach to erect Berlin Wall culminated in to “adventurism” and he installed nuclear weapons and launching pad in Cuba. Peter Zwick opined that Khrushchev’s missile diplomacy was a combination of hostile bluster and rational accommodation. After the Romanian Party Congress Khrushchev adopted a new

---

<sup>38</sup>Richard, Sakwa, op. cit.p.346.

approach towards third world countries, together with the members of the 'socialist camp' considering them as a 'peace zone'. He helped the disintegration of the western colonial empires and offered financial and military aids package to transform third world system into a socialistic regime or to extend influence by peaceful means. The estimation shows that by the Khrushchev fall "about 3 billion dollar worth arms Russia supplied to thirteen countries in the preceding decade, amounts nearly half the total of all Soviet economic aid to the underdeveloped countries in the same period".<sup>39</sup> However, after 'Congo crisis' Khrushchev became pessimistic about Soviet prospects in third world and he curtailed Soviet programmes and aids.

Khrushchev's period witnessed the Soviet transformation from a regional power to a global power. He successfully created bipolar relation in world affairs during his tenure. During his regime, Soviet Union continued to strive for superpower status, to seek guarantees of its national security vis-à-vis Germany and China. He maintained the Soviet influence through a coincidence of interests rather than brute force, created a commonwealth of socialist nation, through different roads to socialism and desalinisation. Through his foreign policy, he wanted to destroy the NATO alliance, to prevent the reunification of Germany and achieve nuclear parity with the West.

### **The Stagnation of the Brezhnev Period**

After Khrushchev's resignation, L. I. Brezhnev became the General Secretary of the CPSU. His period witnessed a period of stagnation- politically, economically as well

---

<sup>39</sup> Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-70* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 130.

as socially esp. after 1970. On the economic front GNP by 1970 had doubled, industrial production had more than quadrupled and agricultural production increased moderately. Furthermore, the real incomes of the ordinary citizens had more than doubled and wages paid to collective farmers had increased more than four times. However, due to the heavy industrialisation the consumer industry has not seen any improvements.<sup>40</sup> In political system, the 'stability of cadres' existed at each level of the party. Every office holders tended to remain in place until retirement or death, which marked increase in corruption and fragmentation of the party. Growing restlessness, alcoholism, and rise of dissent were the feature of the political system.<sup>41</sup> Socially, the contrast between egalitarian pretensions and actual conditions became more apparent. The society became more conservative. In the process of homogenisation, a class society with distinctions of rank and special privileges was emerging and the proletariat, peasantry, and different nationalities were drawing closer. Ideologically, there was a lack of interest in Marxism-Leninism as a new concept of 'developed socialism' emerged.

Military expansion resulted in deteriorating the economy of the country. Aleksei Kosygin tried to bring some structural changes but vested Soviet interest could not adjust with his changes and he abandoned them. Soviet Union military parity with USA opened a new phase in their relationship, which helped in establishing a reciprocal and regularized relationship under détente. Brezhnev incorporated a period of avoidance of war and relaxation of tensions in his foreign policy. He actively participated with the

---

<sup>40</sup> Joseph L. Noguee and Judson Mitchell. *Russian Politics: The Struggle for a New Order* (London: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), pp. 22-23.

<sup>41</sup> Stephen White, *Russia's New Politics: The Management of Post Communist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 1.

West in arms control, trade, crisis management, science, and technology. Where as in the words of foreign advisor Georgii Arbatov these relations, ... will never become relation of an alliance between two superpowers who have divided the world. Rather, no matter how successful the process of normalization and détente is, in the historical sense they will remain the relation of struggle.<sup>42</sup>

Germany had been the heart of concerns for Soviet Union since Russian empire. Therefore, under the détente the Big Four signed the final Quadripartite Protocol and removed Berlin as a source of East-West tension. Brezhnev initiated the Collective Security at Helsinki in July 1973 and later after intra-Europe détente and improvement in German relations, the President Richard Nixon visited Moscow to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty- I, which further culminated into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Helsinki in August 1975. The 'three Baskets' at Helsinki dealt with security, economic cooperation, and human rights. Helsinki first ratified Yalta and the transcended it.<sup>43</sup>

Détente produced a marked change in the security environment of Europe. Both super powers faced the risk of their dragging into conflict by their allies in third world. In XXV Party Congress Brezhnev emphasised to establish treaties with India, Burma, and Iraq. However, when Anwar Sadat unilaterally terminated Soviet-Egyptian treaty, Sudan and Somalia late followed the same path. The Security Council and General Assembly

---

<sup>42</sup> Cited in Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>43</sup> Richard Sakwa, *op. cit.*, p.354.



condemned the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan to help the Babrak Karmal. The third world also became uncomfortable with Moscow and a strong anti-Soviet reaction took place in the countries of third world. Although Brezhnev at XXVI Party Congress reaffirmed that to 'continue détente' remained Soviet priorities. Politically Soviet's Afghan venture was the death of détente.<sup>44</sup>

Brezhnev's foreign policy in its initial years was marked with continuity with the Khrushchev's policies. He intensified military force build up particularity of naval and nuclear forces to gain parity with the US. He overthrew governments by military intervention when they started reforms like those that of Czechoslovakia. Under détente, he achieved Arms negotiations, trade, science, and technological advancement successfully such as ABM treaty, SALT I, and framework of SALT II.

### **The Andropov Interregnum**

Iurii Andropov's major drive remained to wake up Soviet stagnant economy. He initiated an anticorruption campaign to overcome the inefficiency and corruption in the Soviet system. He resolutely tried to implemented anti-alcoholism and anti-absenteeism campaigns but due to resentment, withdrew them soon. He tried to decentralize economy but due to some reason or other he could not take radical changes in Soviet system and his decentralization plan for economy remained in embryo.

---

<sup>44</sup> Joseph L. Noguee, "Soviet Foreign Policy Since Brezhnev" in Joseph L. Noguee (ed), *Soviet Politics: Russia After Brezhnev* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 219.

On the front of foreign policy, some modest improvements with China and US took place after Soviet "isolation" from international relation. Scholars argue that the Soviet isolation from international affairs became acute after Brezhnev's Afghanistan venture. American President Ronald Reagan termed Soviet Union as an 'evil empire' after Afghanistan intervention. Sino-Soviet relations were of major concern for Kremlin. Andropov resumed negotiations with China to improve relations through many agreements. However, Chinese demands for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and reduction of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border resulted in a dead lock.

US-Soviet bilateral relation got further set back when the Soviets brought down the Korean civilian airlines 007. The Soviet new range of Missile SS 20 further added to the existing strains. Reagan's plans for Strategic Defence Initiative threaten Moscow and when US installed cruise missile in Britain and Germany, Soviet administration broke off from INF and START negotiations. Hence, under Andropov, Soviet – US arms negotiations served a setback. After his death, during the period of Konstantin Chernenko no break through was achieved in the field of foreign policy.

### **Gorbachev's Paradigm Shift**

A great change in foreign policy took place under the new General Secretary of CPSU, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. He defended two opposing systems and accused

capitalism to resorting to 'war and terror'. He initiated 'intensification' and 'acceleration' for upgrading productivity and intensive development of industry. For decades, Soviet military occupied first priority in their policies than everything else neglecting the consumer sector. Gorbachev with a broad vision of political change struggled to reinvigorate the Soviet system to make it efficient under his New Thinking. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze formulated the concept of New Political Thinking, a new philosophy of foreign affairs in the last years of bipolar world order. The new thinking recognized an interdependent and interconnected world where the importance of national interests and military threats was less dominating; instead, human values played a greater role. However, it was not possible without fine-tuning and adjustments with the present system. Therefore, instead of decentralization he started recentralization of the whole system. He reasoned that without reforms of the system it is hard to regain the USSR lost glory of 'great power'. Soon after assuming his office, he started amassing personal power. He carried out a quick power consolidation program, to get rid of Brezhnev's legacy of 'stability of cadre', which had resulted in aging elite's at all level. In order to have direct hand in foreign policy he removed Andrei Gromyko and handed Foreign Ministry office to Shevardnadze.

Gorbachev found the diffusion of power in international arena increasingly tied to purely economic factor. Both USA and USSR realised the fading nature of 'super power structure' and found hard to sustain under the burden of bipolar struggle. Japan, Germany, Middle East, South Korea, and Taiwan emerged as new power centre due to sound economic structures. Therefore, he laid emphasis on domestic priorities and better

relation with the socialistic community particularly China in his election speech of General Secretary in March 1985.<sup>45</sup> He opted for renewed dialogue and cooperation on nuclear threat on 'no winner' theme. He tried to resolve regional issues peacefully, fight against famine and discord, and protect the environment and global supply of energy and natural resources under the broad contours of New Thinking. He introduced a policy of openness under the term 'Glasnost'. To show the seriousness of glasnost he called Andrei Sakharov from exile – a human right activist. Glasnost received further impetus when the KGB chief condemned the illegal arrest of journalist in the Ukraine and fired his subordinate from office. The West realized the seriousness of Gorbachev's 'glasnost' policy and changed their concept of the 'evil empire' to that of 'Gorbymania'.

With the capitalistic world, he forged the relations of peaceful, mutual, and advantageous cooperation. He reduced the level of armed forces realizing that the lag of the Soviet economy vis-à-vis the west due to the excessive militarization of the economy. His cautious rapprochement with the West resulted in several weapons control agreements and in the end the acceptance of the German reunification and the independence of Eastern Europe by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. According to Shevardnadze, Eastern Europe satellites cost the USSR more than it gained from them and Moscow would be in better position it could get rid itself of the bloc.

He stressed that Soviet forces will be provided what they needed but not for confrontation between the USSR and its major capitalistic adversaries.<sup>46</sup> He launched the

---

<sup>45</sup>Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, op. cit.p.80

<sup>46</sup> Padma Desai, *Perestroika in Perspective: The Design and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform* (London: I.B.Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1989), p.48

de-ideologization of foreign policy. He emphasised on the interdependency of countries in environmental as well as military and economic terms to develop culture contacts and avoid ideological differences, in French Parliament on October 1985. Through the effective diplomacy, Gorbachev brought out USSR from the shell of isolation. In 1987 at Washington Summit, he accepted the 'zero option' elimination of modernized NATO missile in Western Europe in exchange for removal of SS 20 from Eastern Europe. He promised massive unilateral cuts in Soviet military and armaments on the European continents in a speech to the United Nations general assembly.

His New Thinking in foreign policy transformed the bipolar system by ending the cold war. Towards Europe, Gorbachev initiated a policy of "Europe our home" which indicates a community born by economic, cultural, and other interests extending from Atlantic to Urals. The President Regan, visited Moscow in 1988 and that was the end of cold war. Later in the year in December 1988, Gorbachev met Bush and Reagan followed by his United Nations speech where he unilaterally proposed massive reduction in arms.

He rescued USSR from the ongoing diffusion of power in the world, a game in which the USSR could overcome its disadvantages through effective diplomacy. He successfully attained his prime foreign policy goal by bringing out Soviet Union from the period of isolation.

*Chapter – 2*  
*Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy Concept and Factors*  
*Influencing Russian Foreign Policy from 1991-2000*

**CHAPTER-2**  
**EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT**  
**AND FACTORS INFLUENCING RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY**  
**FROM 1991-2000**

Russia began the process of transformations in political, economic, and social system when Boris Yeltsin replaced the hammer and sickle atop the Kremlin walls with tricolour flag and took possession of Gorbachev's office. For first month in power the domestic condition were very conducive to the liberalisation of Russian foreign policy because of the democratic euphoria, expectation of a better life and absence of conservative political elements.<sup>1</sup> The democrats under the Yeltsin and foreign minister Kozyrev followed a policy of "no enemy but all friends" to convince the West that Russia was more liberal, more market oriented and more European than Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Yeltsin and Kozyrev continued the Gorbachev's New Thinking.' In democratisation process, West had been the natural ally and President Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev perceived Russia's integration in to a 'civilised international community' mainly into Europe elemental. Soon nationalist pressure starts mounting and Russia's economic, political, and cultural westward course start facing domestic hurdles. This in turn confused Russia's priority of foreign and security policy in international affairs.

---

<sup>1</sup> Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, *Expanding the Zone of Peace: Democratization and International Security* (London: The MacMillian Press Ltd., 1998) p.45

## EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT

Basic Foreign Policy Principles of Russia, of April 23, 1993, underlines that Russia's foreign policy course must be pursued in keeping with its fundamental national interests. First of all the Russian governments task is to safeguard the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the state, by strengthening its security, in all dimension, promoting Russia's rebirth as a free and democratic country, ensuring favourable conditions for the formation of an effective market economy, and achieving the inclusion of Russia in the world community in a manner befitting its status as a great power. Further it to ensure the unity of domestic and foreign policy, safeguarding citizen's right, use of force within the premises of international law, and forming a belt of good-neighbours around Russia. It also has to ensure a strategic course aimed at partnership and allied relationship with Western countries, based on a commitment of shared democratic values.

It underlines the Russia's task to prevent Eastern Europe from becoming a kind of buffer zone that isolate Russia from the west.<sup>2</sup> This draft was based on the fundamental directives of the President, with the understanding that the foreign ministry is the transmitter of these directives and the main co-ordinator of the country's foreign policy

Since the adoption of the Basic Foreign Policy Principles of Russia, of April 23, 1993, the foreign policy concept of 2000 is the first comprehensive presentation on

---

<sup>2</sup> The Basic Provision of the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, <http://www.mid.ru/eng>.



international principles, directions, and priorities of Russia.<sup>3</sup> Firstly, circumstances in the world have changed, due to which the international milieu that has been created at the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century demands a revision of the global situation pertaining to the Russian Federation, the Russian foreign policy priorities and possibilities of ensuring it with the country's available resources.

Having taken charge of the Foreign Ministry in 1996, Primakov not only initiated a serious change in Russia's foreign policy course but also formulated a new foreign policy doctrine. His foreign policy concept features the general changes of global character that have taken place in recent international situation. The post socialist transitions have caused specific changes throughout world.<sup>4</sup>

The new foreign policy concept of Russia is an inseparable integral part of Putin's overall programs of recovery and development of the Russian federation. It was publicised only two weeks after his message to federal assembly and nation. A logical explanation for this "delay", according to analysts, is that President Putin and his advisers understood the Message not only as a regular and formalised annual statement to people's deputies of the two Assembly chambers but also as "a program speech of the new President, who openly aspired to change the political paradigm and the political era". In his message, President Putin summarised the starting point's substantive and basic

---

<sup>3</sup> Henry Trofimenko, *Russian national interests and the current crisis in Russia* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), p.22

<sup>4</sup> Sava Zivanon, "Russia Undergoing Changes: Revision and Reorientation of Foreign Policy", *World Affairs*, Vol.LI No.1096, August 2000, p.13.

positions of Russia's new foreign policy concept. Two days later, Foreign Minister Ivanov presented and further elaborated its meaning and important elements

The RF Foreign Policy Concept is related to the recently adopted documents that came into force in the first half of this year such as the RF Security Concept, RF Military Doctrine, and RF Maritime Doctrine. The RF Information Security Concept is another document, which Russia has adopted. All these documents make a logical unit and a well-conceptualised basis for the activity of state and other agencies of the Russian Federation in all of the mentioned fields.

The RF Foreign policy Concept has attracted a lot of attention both in Russia and beyond. Comments and initial analyses appeared shortly. Foreign policy actions initiated by president Putin are also viewed through the prism of its standpoints. At the regular annual assembly, held on February 26-27, 2000, the above-board social Council on Foreign and Defence Policy of the Russian Federation deliberated to adopted the framework of an important document entitled "Strategy for Russia: 2000 Agenda for the President". Chapter two of this strategy entitled "Russia's Foreign policy before the Challenges of 21<sup>st</sup> Century", raised the issues that became the focus of attention of the Assembly. This extensive document analysed the situation in the world at the turnover of the centuries and the big changes in Russia's foreign policy position, followed by an account of domestic and foreign factors affecting the country's foreign policy and ends with conclusions and recommendations.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation was approved by President V. Putin and was published on June 28, 2000. This document was published five months after the release of the National Security Concept. The foreign policy concept of Russian Federation consists of five parts, each explaining different factors in formulating the foreign policy of Russian Federation. General principles, of the document other than giving a brief introduction, define the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation and the legal basis, which supports the concept. The whole concept is based on the premise that the changing nature of international relations in the modern world, especially in the beginning of the twenty-first century has created both new priorities and possibilities and certain negative developments. Therefore, it argues there is a need for re-evaluation of the Russian foreign policy. The document details the nature of foreign policy of Russian Federation vis-à-vis the modern world. It lists out the significant global changes such as transformation of international relations, end of cold war, advancement of reforms and reduced threat of global nuclear conflict. The movement towards an uni-polar system and the weakening role of United Nations is perceived to be the challenges/threats to Russia's national security.

Given such a situation, the proposed foreign policy concept seeks to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations keeping in mind – mutual interests based on mechanisms of collective resolutions of key problems, on the priority of law & democratisation of international relations. The document also promises a foreign policy for Russia, which would be independent, constructive, transparent, and balanced

considering legitimate interests of the other states and making Russian Federation a reliable partner in international relations.

According to the proposed concept the New World order would be based on principles of justice, mutual respect and mutually advantageous cooperation, to ensure reliable security for each member of the world community in political, military, economic, humanitarian and other areas. United Nations must remain as the main center and to ensure this strict observance of the fundamental principles of the UN charter, a rational reform of the United Nations organizations and broader representation by enlarging the permanent members with veto powers is proposed. The document also makes a point for Russia's increased participation in G-8.

In order to strengthen the international security the document proposes means for enhancing strategic and regional stability and reducing the role of power factors in international relations. It promises to make Russia committed to further reduction of its nuclear potential through bilateral (START series with US) and multilateral treaties keeping intact the strategic stability in the nuclear sphere.

The concept commits itself for democratic values and human rights and sets the following goals: respect for norms of international law, protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens based on international law and operative bilateral agreements. The document lists out the regional priorities of the Russian Federation concerning economic security and political realm both at a bilateral basis with different states and with regional

organisations. Primary importance has been given to Commonwealth of Independent States wherein the priority task would be to strengthen the Union of Belarus and Russia followed by creation of a free trade zone, joint rational use of natural resources etc.

Concerning relation with Europe, the main aim of Russian foreign policy is the creation of a stable and democratic system of European Security and Co-operation followed by bilateral relationship with individual European Union countries. Co-operation with NATO is with the primary interest of maintaining security and stability in the continent. As far as the relationship with the United States is concerned, the document argues that Russian-American interaction is the necessary condition for the amelioration of the international situation and achievement of global strategic stability.

With regard to relationship with the Asian continent, the emphasis has been on the invigoration of Russia's participation in the main integration structures of Asia-Pacific region: ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Relation with China and India forms another crucial point of Russian foreign policy in the region. While with China, the emphasis is to bring the economic interaction on par with that of political Russia intends to strengthen its traditional partnership with India. The intention is to strengthen stability in the region through emphasis on creating nuclear weapons-free zones in Asia. With Japan, creation of an internationally recognized border between the two states will be given priority along with economic cooperation. Importance is also given to relationship with Afghanistan, Middle East and African states.

The fifth and final part of the document deals with the internal structures responsible for shaping and implementing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The President as the Head of State represents the Russian Federation, the Federation Council pursues legislative work to support the foreign policy course, and the Security Council performs the role of executing the decisions and laws along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, mention is made of the involvement of non-governmental organisations playing a role in the civil society contributing for effective implementation.

### **Complexity of National Interests**

Russian national interests have been at the centre of political discussion in post Soviet Russia since 1991. They have been resting entirely on Russian nature of politics and transition to market economy. Scholars find that still the national interests in Russia are not well defined. According to Henry Trofimenko in new Russia the national interests has been so maddening that “with every political turn and major measure the common question is -what are ‘Russian national interest in this field?’” He further argues that the national interest has been limited to political discussion and debate whereas the ordinary people were less concerned about foreign policy and national interests. Rather they were more concerned about the deteriorating living standard in Russia.

Foreign policy is an elite exercise in Russia too. The expectations that in new Russia foreign policy decision-making would become an open procedure have not yet taken place. Still the ruling class is largely composed of old party nomenclature of Soviet

Union and most of the Russian parties are becoming more nationalistic in the approach of foreign policy.<sup>5</sup>

Even in early mid nineties, it was not even clear that whose interests Russia is going to pursue. Whether new Russia should pursue the interests of its republics or of the central government in Moscow, was the question before the policy makers. Because the Federation, is a multinational entity, where nearly 85 per cent Russian are living in other republics of the federation. There are only four national republics, Chechnya, Chuvashia, North Ossetia and Tuva where indigenous ethnic group constitute more than 50 per cent of its population otherwise, in other republics ethnic Russians are the majority.<sup>6</sup> Due to the multinational identity policy -makers were in the position of confusion. The Russian media also points out the absence of a clear-cut understanding of the Russian national interests on the part of its leadership. According to Andrey Kortunov, "Russian national interests appear most of the time ambiguous and sometime electric".<sup>7</sup>

The volatile nature of Russian politics and conflicts between democrats and liberals was another major problem in clear-cut formation of national interests for the policy maker. The Supreme Soviet had been at loggerhead with President and his executive cabinet of ministers on most of the economic, foreign and arms control decisions President Yeltsin and Ruslan Khasbulatov, who was the leader of parliament

---

<sup>5</sup> Henry Trofimenko, *Russian National Interests and the Current Crisis in Russia* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), p.1.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen K. Batalden and Sandra L. Batalden, *The Newly Independent State of Eurasia: A Handbook of Former Soviet Republic*, Second Edition (Arizona: The Oryx Press, 1997), p.56

<sup>7</sup> Andrey Kortunov, "Russian National Interest: The State of Discussion in Kurt R. Spillmann and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *Russia Place in Europe: A Security Debate* (Bern) Peter Long AG, 1999), p.21.

confronted each other on many issues.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, the executive cabinet of ministers was pursuing one set of national interests, while Russian parliament on the other hand followed a dissimilar course. However, they shared a united stand on further disintegration of new Russia.

After the election of 1993, the differences between President and Legislative became more acute. The election resulted in bringing nationalistic forces in to the parliament. Due to the pressure, emerging from the majority of nationalistic forces in Federal Assembly, the President and the Council of Ministers adapted a nationalistic approach in their foreign policy. Yeltsin propagated some haphazard national interests after the adaptation of new constitution but they could not implement them properly.

Russia's role of dual characteristics between mature democracy and authoritarian state also made it impossible for policy makers to follow a pure "holistic" or "positivist" Foreign policy. Although the leaders like Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Alexander Lebed, Gennady Zyuganov, and Boris Yeltsin tried to impose an integrated national interest's concept but failed miserably. However, after the adaptation of new constitution in 1993, Yeltsin successfully created a supra-presidential system but still he failed to wipe away the nationalistic forces, which became more assertive after the Duma election of 1995 where democrats losing trend continued like 1993 election with more pace. Because of the election of 1995, Yeltsin took some firm stands on the national interests on the emancipating pressure from the parliament.

---

<sup>8</sup> Ruslan Khasbulatov, Richard Sakwa (ed.), *The Struggle for Russia: Power and Change in the Democratic Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1993), p.xvi.



During 1991-2000, Russia has come up with several official documents, pertaining to national interests of the new Russia. The first was entitled “Basic Provision of the Russian Federation foreign policy concept” which was approved by the Russian Security Council and confirmed by president Yeltsin. The second was the Kozyrev’s “The Basic Context of the Draft Conception for the Foreign Policy of Russian Federation”. The Third one was the Russian Foreign Ministry input “Conception for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation” adapted by the Security Council. In addition, there were two other laws of the Russia Federation – Law on security and Law on Defence, which read between the lines the Russian national interests.

In 1996, the President sent the Federal Assembly a message on national security of Russia, which touched upon some basic Russian national interests. The military doctrine of Russian federation, which appeared in 1993, also emphasised on national interests. The final draft in which national interests of Russian Federation were clearly defined during president Yeltsin regime was set out in the Presidential decree no. 1300 of December 1997, the “National Security Concept”. Further, again in 2000 under newly elected president V. Putin Russian Security Council adopted ‘New Military Doctrine’ and “Russian National Security concept” which talk at length about Russia’s national interests.

Scholars argue that, the people who were at the helm of political affairs did not care much about the interest of the state, its integrity and stability, instead they were more concerned with their own and their kin’s personal enrichment.

## **An Expensive Military**

The legacy of Soviet obligations, entanglements, and ambitions to the military of Russia faced several challenges from the very inception of new thinking to till date. Russia's military withdrawal from near abroad, reduction, and re-equipping it to modern standard are some challenges, which Russia starts facing soon after the dissolution of USSR. The Russian military and its future have been the heart of Russian foreign policy since the inception in determining the stability of Russian domestic politics and relation with other countries. The Russian military challenges had threatened Russia when it has been undergoing economic and political transformation.

Russia's declining economy has been very instrumental in wearing away the morale of the Russian military. In John Lipingwell's views "the regionalism, corruption, and declining morale were corroding military professionalism and had weaken the discipline with in the military".<sup>9</sup> There were nearly 250, 000, and 400,000 Russian troops, deployed outside Russia at the beginning of 1993 and Russia was facing problems to provide those bases.<sup>10</sup>

The Russian Defence Ministry had declared in advance that nearly 106,000 officers and their families were without proper housing and further withdrawal from Germany would increase these numbers substantially. The Soviet Union's agreement to pull the troops from Germany in September 1994 created another problem for the policy

---

<sup>9</sup> John Lipingwell, "The Russian Military in the 1990's: Disintegration or Renewal?" in Douglas W. Blum, *Russia's Future: Consolidation or Disintegration?* (Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), p.109.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

makers. There was a sizeable Russian military presence in the former republics of Soviet Union and Russia was thinking in terms of making it an unified or joint military structure. But Ukraine was pressurising to form its own military, which was of real concern for Moscow. Russian military forces from Baltic States were also facing withdrawal whereas the Russian ministry of Defence in particular appears to have recognised that the position of the forces in the Baltic States is increasingly weak.

In Caucasus the presence of Russian forces were seen as the guarantors of Armenian security. Azerbaijan was not happy with the presence of Russian forces in its territories and took a sigh of relief when they saw last Russian troops leaving Azerbaijani territory. Georgia was dependent on CIS especially Russian assistance because of their own problems with Abkhazia, hence Shevardnadze signed an agreement giving Russian force extensive right in Georgia, and leasing the naval base at Poti to Russia. Meantime the fourteenth Army in Dnestr Republic became a prominent political force, acting both as local militia and as army in East bank and West Bank respectively.

In the Central Asian republics, Russian military has mixed importance. The Russian military has been playing dual role in these republics. The military in these republics was consciously and explicitly considered the defender of Russian minority and a guarantor of stability in these new states.

The demolition of USSR allowed the armed forces and the defence industry of Russia a degree of independence. Liberalisation and globalisation has been also affecting

Russian military with unprecedented corruption leading to the formation of a military faction of bureaucratic capital. There have been many cases in Russian press of abuse of power, military property, technology, and even selling of weapon for illegal use.<sup>11</sup> The senior officers have been using military for personal luxury and self-enrichment. The illicit arms trade was high and more lucrative. This trade reached to its peaks when military property division and equipment and weaponry transfers between the CIS member was taking place.<sup>12</sup>

During the first half of the 1990's armed forces were followed a course of a relatively independent actor in foreign policy. Russia has pressing security concerns with new borders and advocated for a regional security system, preservation of old, and acquisition of new military bases and tracking stations. Russia's concerns gave military the privileges of operations as a somewhat independent actor. Beside this, Russia also lacked a considered strategy in military area. The trend of personal enrichment of army staff though illegal arms sale was very high. The explosions in military stores were picking up without any human causality that puts military under the cloud of planned strategy. Pavel Grachev's *Aviakonin* and later *Voyentekh* Company created suspicion in the minds of Russians.<sup>13</sup>

Putin, after assuming office, revised the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine, which form the basis of Russia's defence policy. The former Military

---

<sup>11</sup> Nodari Simonia, "Domestic Development in Russia" in Gennady Chufirin (ed.), *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.61.

<sup>12</sup> I. Anthony, "Illicit Arms Transfer" in I. Anthony (ed.), *Russia and the Arm Trade (SIPRI)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 217-32.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p.63.

Doctrine was adopted in November 1993, and the former National Security Concept in December 1997. The latest versions of these documents reflect changes that have occurred in the strategic environment surrounding Russia due to the changes in international situation since their adoption. The former documents were based on optimistic assumption that threats of direct invasion of Russia had vanished. Whereas, the recent, documents tend to fan a sense of external threat to Russia.

The increasing influence of NATO, its enlargement to the east, the adoption of a new "Alliance's Strategic Concept" has alerted the Putin administration to the threat from the west and the south.<sup>14</sup> New Security Concept presents the views of Putin administration on the present international situation and divides the world into two mutually excluding forces. The New Concept expresses a strong sense of wariness about the 'forces' which are weakening Russia's position in the political, economic, military, and other spheres in the world.

The Chechen conflict has brought to light a number of problems in the Russian military. The Russian armed forces disaster in Chechen has called the reform of the Russian armed forces into question. The Chechen conflict was a revelation that made Putin realise the weakened state of Russia's armed forces. Security Council at its meeting held on August 11, 2000, has taken a decision on the reform of the Russian armed forces. At this meeting, the Security Council decided to retain the strategic missile

---

<sup>14</sup> The National Institute for Defence Studies, Japan, "Russia", *East Asian Strategic Review*, 2001, (NIDS, Japan, Tokyo), p.245-46.

force as a service until 2006, to produce a larger number of *Topol MI* (SS-27), and phase out the intercontinental ballistic missiles as their service life expires.

Putin commented on the decision, that it was necessary to “make a balance decision, taking into account our economy’s real capabilities and the needs of Russia’s armed forces, for their further development”.<sup>15</sup> The morale and fighting capability of its armed forces has become more acute due to the declining living standard. Therefore, raising military salaries have become an important concern of the Putin administration. The living standards of military personnel have deteriorated during the past 10 years to such an extent that “in 1990, the ratio of military salaries to the subsistence income was three times for lieutenant colonels and those under them and 6.7 times for a four star general”.<sup>16</sup>

The Putin government has laid down the premises for the rebuilding of the Russian navy in “The Basis of Policy of the Russian Federation in Naval Activities during the Period until 2010”. The Navy Policy is based on the belief that the national interests of Russia are not confined to its coastal waters but extends to the world’s ocean. The sinking of the *Kursk* on August 12, 2000 did a serious damage to the credibility of the Russian Navy. The *Kursk* tragedy has made the nation aware of the necessity to rebuild the military.

---

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, pp.248-49

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p.149.

Putin had planned to reduce military personnel but could not put it into practice due to opposition from some of the top brass. On November 9, 2000, the Security Council in its meeting has proposed to cut its armed forces by approximately 600,000 troops over the next five years. Scholars are of the opinion that Putin's emphasis for a cut in the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), downsizing the Strategic Missile Force and Russia's dependence on Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), is likely to increase in near future. Moreover, Putin, in order to maintain a good relationship with the military for the stability of his administration, will have to approach cautiously the question of cutting troops.

### **An Economy in Transition**

The Russian economy was in turmoil when Yeltsin took the charge of new Russia. Since the inception of Russia Yeltsin had embarked upon ambitious reforms to establish a democratic political system and free-market economy. The economic condition of Russia has been considerably affecting the independent course of Russian foreign policy. Russia experienced an extraordinarily severe drop in economic activities after the dissolution of Soviet Union. According to the official estimate, the total decline in Russian GDP from 1991 to 1994 amounted to 38 per cent.<sup>17</sup> The skyrocketing crime rate and proliferation of mafia-type organisations have further intensified economic problems.

---

<sup>17</sup> Cited Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, *Expanding the Zone of Peace: Democratization and International Security* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994), p. 48.

Determined to restructure Russian economy Yeltsin launched the economic reforms. These reforms were based on the economic vision imported from the west. The major inputs of these reforms were taken from the ideas of Jeffery Sachs. Yeltsin hurriedly adapted “Jeffrey Sachs panacea” to reconstruct the Russian economy and on January 2, 1992, reforms begin under shock therapy. Juliet Johnson argues that the Russian economy had never functioned as market economy therefore to enter in to market economy it is the pre requisite that first the “old system should be destroyed then the foundation of the new market economic house could be built”.<sup>18</sup> However, nothing of this sort happened. Yeltsin wanted to change the system overnight and under shock therapy Russia introduced free price simultaneously forcing firms to sink or swim, without subsidies, at liberalised price.<sup>19</sup> In the words of Hungarian economist Laszlo Szamuely “these reform largely resembled Stalin’s famous slogan: let’s fulfil the five-year plan in four years”.

During 1992, the presence of industrial representatives in the government shifted balance of power decisively in favour of the Industrial lobby. The industrial lobby rose to a new height with the appointment of Vicktor Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister in December 1992. He made it clear that his top priority would be to revoke economic output by increasing industrial subsidies.

---

<sup>18</sup> Stefan Hedlund, ‘Path Dependence in Russian Policy Making: Constraints on Putin’s Economic Choice’, *Post-Communist Economics*, vol.12, No.4, 2000. p. 392.

<sup>19</sup> Michael Spagat, “The Disintegration of the Russian Economy” in Douglar W. Blum (ed), *Russia’s Future: Consolidation or Disintegration* (Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), pp.52-53.



Since 1992 onwards the country's transition favourably tilted towards market economy and a lot of legislative and administrative measures were adopted to remove control over currency movements as it was considered an integral part. On 15 November 1991 the president of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 213 on liberalisation of External Economic Activities, which allowed any company to export and import goods without special registration, and let any person carry currency in cash out of Russia. The exchange rate policy was further amended according to IMF charter's article VIII. According to which no multiple exchange rates will apply and single rate of the rubble will be maintained against foreign currencies.

In the spring of 1997, Russian trade unions attempted to call a massive national protest due to the problems of wage and pension, which were becoming acute and serious. During 1998, the economic crisis deepened when the escalating non-payment of wages provoked open protests from the coal -mines. On 12 May massive strikes began, which a few days later escalated into the blockades of several important point at Trans-Siberian railway. Evolution of Russia's economic policies from 1992 until the financial meltdown of 1998, the responsibility goes to Yeltsin and the men around him shaping the reform programmes.

Due to severe attack on rouble on 17 August 1998, the Russian government abandoned the peg to the US dollar and allowed the currency to float freely. The exchange rate depreciated from 6.2 rubbles per dollar in the first half of August to 20

rubbles per dollar in December. The crisis caused grave consequences for the country's economy.<sup>20</sup>

In 1998 inflation priced up to 84.4 per cent GDP and industrial production dropped by 5 per cent and 6 per cent, capital investment decreased by 10 per cent, house holds real monetary income fell by 17 per cent. The main stock exchange index RTS-I fell by 56 per cent in August and 33 percent in September and the banking system suffered great losses.<sup>21</sup>

According To International Monetary Fund, the fiscal problems were the man driving force behind the August crisis. The United Nations expert's stress that, "the Russian State inability to ratify its fiscal imbalance was indisputably at the heart of Russian crisis". Whereas Russian authorities consider budget difficulties as major factors behind the crisis, besides, weak structural and fiscal policies coupled with a large government debt and limited resources to effect due payments aggravated the situation.

A number of prominent Russian economists maintain the August crisis was purely a currency crisis like other countries, which had little connection with its fiscal record. Russian economists further acknowledged that in Russia the introduction of the peg from July 1995 was premature. It was officially admitted that the decisions of the government and central bank of Russia of 17 August 1998 were thoughtless and accelerated negative processes in economy. The failure of shock therapy and IMF model turned Russia away

---

<sup>20</sup> Sergei F. Grebenichenko, "Where Is Russia Going And Why?", *Social Science Review*, Vol.41, No.5, Sept.-Oct.2000, pp. 93-94.

<sup>21</sup> Olga Butorivia "Implication of the Russian Crisis", *Post-Communist Economics*, vol. 12, No. 4, 2000, p. 411.

from the West and allowed the economic reforms, which were purely based on western orientations.

Russia is now undergoing economic disarray, crime, terrorism, drugs, environmental damage, and deteriorating relations between the federal center and the regions, which in turn perpetuate the danger of internal conflicts. Therefore, Putin has called for progress on Russian membership in the World Trade Organization. He has decreased the restrictions of important Russian raw materials exports, and taken steps against Russian energy firms, which have not paid taxes. He has been initiating private ownership of land, an overhauling of the Russian tax system. He is seeking international integration and prosperity but neither at the price of territorial integrity and national sovereignty, nor the West's complete dominance in the Nuclear and conventional military spheres.

Present condition under Putin has signaled an economic recovery in Russia. The domestic investment levels are rising. The Russian economy grew by over 7 percent in 2000, the largest increase in decades. However, economic analysts believe that Gross domestic product growth may be due to rising oil prices and does not necessarily indicate an increase in the value of production

### **The Institutions of Foreign Policy Decision-Making**

A highly centralised and authoritarian state had controlled Russian foreign policy in its history. During the Tsarist era, the imperial court was responsible for the foreign

policy decision making and during the Soviet period, Politburo and Presidium functioned as the chief decision-making. The period of Stalin was an exception he exercised one-man rule, personally making all major decisions. From 1973 until 1990, the foreign policy apparatus was comprised of some voting and nonvoting members, including the Prime Minister and the ministers of foreign affairs and defence and the director of the KGB, as well as the most important functionaries of the party apparatus. Beside them there were subcommittees, the most important were the Defence council, the politburo, Department of Liaison with Communist and workers parties of the Socialist countries and the International Department that were given the foreign policy responsibility.

Prior to Glasnost extreme secrecy was the norm of the decision-making processes. Only selective high-ranking official with in the top leadership use to decide and discuss sensitive foreign policy issues. However, Gorbachev during his last years in power reduced the functions and authority of communist power and of its agencies. He invigorated the foreign policy role of the intuition of the government of the USSR.

With the creation of the executive presidency and Yeltsin's democratisation, the foreign policy debate became open. After the dissolution, the office of the President was instrumental in foreign policy decision-making. He was most of the time at loggerheads with the parliament and due to this political chaos, both 'parties' were pursuing their own type of foreign policy. Moreover, the institutions of foreign policy making were still naïve. Different foreign policies courses were followed during the initial years due to disorganised institutions of foreign policy. The base for different foreign policies

approach was the constitution of 1978. It gave Russian parliament the formal right to determine the main lines of foreign policy and approve ministerial appointments. The legislative tried to turn this formal power into reality, which Yeltsin resisted. In 1992, Yeltsin created a Security Council to bring the top foreign policy and national security official together to deliberate and prepare decisions for the president to implement by decree.<sup>22</sup> Yeltsin dominated over foreign policy after the adoption of new constitution. Because within the framework of the new constitutional Article, 80 and 86 the President, can exercise his leadership over the foreign policy.

Yeltsin had created a Security Council to look after the matters of security and foreign policy. However, after a narrow period in service, the Security Council started playing a dual role. Beside defence and foreign policy, the council involved itself in economic sphere on 'Black Tuesday'. In Marshal Evgenii's words, "the Security Council is no more than a part of the President's staff that is intended to organise conferences between the president and certain minister".<sup>23</sup> However, the Chechnya problem refocused the Security Council on more 'pressing' matters of internal security. During the second tenure of Yeltsin Alexander Lebed, the Security Council secretary began a highly public lobbying campaign to expand the role of Security Council. Yeltsin obliged to his demand and issued a decree that expand the powers of its Secretary and the Council particularly in redefining national security. He tried to create a military council under the Security Council's domain. Yeltsin created a Defence Council under his new decree and removed

---

<sup>22</sup> Stephen Kiseliiov, "Boris Yeltsin's Quiet Coup", *Moskovskie Novosti*, July 19, 1992, in *Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol, 44, No. 28, 1992, pp.2-4.

<sup>23</sup> Pavel Felgengauer, "Evgenii Shaposhnikov – Marshal-Destroyer?" *Segodnia*, June 18, 1993 in *Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, Vol, 45, No. 24, 1993, p.57.

Lebed. Yeltsin in order to have direct control over defence issues and foreign policy created a Russian defence ministry naming himself the acting minister, and he formed an independent Russian Army, with Grachev as minister for defence. With the formation of the Russian Ministry of Defence, he reintroduced a powerful rival to the foreign ministry.

The constitution of 1993 has been successful in creating a bicameral federal assembly, which granted most of the foreign policy making powers to the president. In the March 1997 CIS summit Yeltsin said, "I want to stress that Russia's foreign policy, including that with regard to the other CIS countries, is determined by the President." The overall parliamentary influence on Russian foreign policy has been quite limited. Scholars opine that Lebed tried to militarise the Security Council whereas his successor paid more heed towards economic, ecological, agriculture and industrial security.<sup>24</sup>

In 1997, Yeltsin issued another decree to redefine the organisational structure of the Security Council. Security Council has been assigned the task to-organise systematic and comprehensive studies of external threats and challenges to the Russian Federation, prepare conceptual documents on national security problems; develop scientifically authentic recommendations; consider decisions, and monitor their implementation.<sup>25</sup> The national security concept was drafted under Ivan Rybkin in which Russia has departed from the earlier approach regarding the use of nuclear weapons when confronted with armed aggression.

---

<sup>24</sup> Mikhail Karpov, "The Fifth Secretary of the Security Council Gets Down to Work", *Nezavisimia Gazeta*, October 22, 1996 in CDPSP, Vol. 48, No. 42, 1996, p. 7.

<sup>25</sup> Igor Korotchenko, 'Reorganisation of the Russian Security Council is Completed' *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, January 21, 1997, in Current Digest of Post Soviet Press, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1997, pp.15-16.

On one hand, Yeltsin was approving new co-ordinating council in the realm of foreign policy and defence policy whereas on the other hand, several times he made decrees that the ministry of foreign affairs should play the leading role in the co-ordination of Russian foreign policy. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze initiated many changes in foreign ministry structure and personnel during pre soviet days. Yeltsin and Kozyrev speeded up the process started by their counterparts. Soviet foreign ministry by the end of its tenure had employed 3700 persons and the Russian ministry, which had 240 in 1991 rose up to 3200 employees in the end of 1992. Initially it had thirteen departments but by mid-1995, there were twenty-seven departments.

In addition to trap internal democracy in the foreign ministry, Kozyrev also consulted various advisory groups about the direction of Russian foreign policies. The establishment of a Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relation established reporting link between the Foreign Minister and the President and reduced the role of prime minister and his government.

### **Centre-peripheral relations**

Regional separation has been haunting Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union and has been instrumental in influencing Russia's foreign policy and security policy largely. According to Helen Carrere D' Encausse, the policies of Perestroika and Glasnost have been responsible for igniting the separatist movements in every Soviet republic. He believes that the centre could not contain the earlier separatist movements,

which led to the fall of the “prison house of nations” to the ‘triumph of the nation’.<sup>26</sup> Due to the increasing powers of the regions and republics many Western and Russian observers have predicted further disintegration of Russia.<sup>27</sup> In a debate over the future disintegration of Russia, the “essentialist” perceive the ethnic identities as “primordial”. The “instrumentalist” distinguishes ethnic mobilisation as largely or wholly the work of self-interested political elite.<sup>28</sup> Since these ‘entities’ are the homelands of different non-Russian ethnic groups, so the threat of ethnic conflict is real.

Most of the autonomous republics have declared themselves sovereign by the end of 1991. In accordance with Yeltsin’s slogan, which he had put before the regions during his struggle against Gorbachev, “take as much sovereignty as you can eat”. The autonomies began to demand more and more sovereignty and more privileges.<sup>29</sup>

After assuming power, Yeltsin had been securing the loyalty of the autonomous republic by altering to sign a ‘federation treaty’ with them. According to the treaty, the republics were acknowledged sovereign republics within Russian Federation with property rights over land and natural resources on their territories.<sup>30</sup> Yeltsin signed three similar treaties in March 1992 one with autonomous republic, another with the lesser

---

<sup>26</sup> Helene Carrere D’Encausse, *The End of Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 98.

<sup>27</sup> ‘How close is Russia to Breaking Up?’ Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 25<sup>th</sup> March 1992, vol. 44, No. 8, p.1.

<sup>28</sup> Cited in Stephen E. Hanson, ‘Ideology, Interests, and Identity: Comparing the Soviet and Russian Secession Crises’ in Mikhail A. Alexsen (ed), *Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia: A Federation Imperialed* (Hampshire, London: MacMillian Press Ltd., 1999), p.17.

<sup>29</sup> Ingmar Oldberg, ‘The Emergence of a Regional Identity in the Kaliningrad Oblast’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 35, No.3, 2000, pp. 269-70.

<sup>30</sup> Cited in Steven Solnick “Will Russia Survive?: Center and Periphery in the Russian Federation” in Barnett R. Rubin, Jack Snyder, *Post-Soviet Political Order*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1998), p.64.



autonomous okrugs and the third one with non-ethnic oblasts and kraia. These treaties made 21 ethnic republics and 68 administrative territorial regions as the subjects of the Russian Federation.

Regions became very strong during 1993 over the struggle between Yeltsin and parliament. Further Yeltsin made them significantly stronger than republics to receive a support for the national referendum of 25 April 1993. In this referendum, “he failed to carry ten of the twenty republics participating in vote while out of sixty-eight regions, he failed only in sixteen of them”.<sup>31</sup> Regions became so powerful that between 1992 and 1993, up to maximum 30 many subjects of the federation withheld their contributions to the federal budget and demanded special tax regimes or new federal subsidies.<sup>32</sup> Even some provincial leader even attempted to seize power at the expense of both the president and parliament by establishing a short level council of the subjects of the federation. He, in the wake of the October 1993 presidential coup, ordered all provincial legislatures disbanded; he however, could not take any systemic action against governors who had failed to support him. During his military action against the parliament, although he got help from provincial leaders but majority had declared his move unconstitutional.

After the introduction of the federal treaty, the domestic scenario in Moscow went under great transformation. Yeltsin’s dual role in granting sovereignty and benefits to the subjects of the federation made some groups located wholly within the Russian Federation powerful to demand full autonomy like Bashkortostan or even outright

---

<sup>31</sup> Cited in Steven Solnick, *op.cit.*, p.65.

<sup>32</sup> D. Slider, “Privatization in Russia’s Regions”, *Post Soviet Affairs*, vol.10, No.4, 1994, pp.367-97.

independence like Chechnya. Chechnya and Tatarstan were not accepting the federation treaty and were insisting for a complete independence from Moscow. Therefore, Chechnya attempted for secession in the post- communist-Russia, which ultimately escalated into violent military threat.

The specially convened Constitutional Assembly in July 1993 was initially reluctant to preserve the republics sovereign states in the new draft of constitution, as the regions were also demanding the same. The draft ultimately approved by the assembly embodied the essential clauses of the federation treaty, including republican sovereignty. However, this draft received the support of representatives from just eight of these republics and ultimately failed to generate much political support among provincial leaders of either side.

Yeltsin made one final attempt in August 1993 to win the support of the provincial leaders for a draft constitution that could break his deadlock with the Russian parliament. He, in Petrozavodsk, proposed the creation of a federation council that staffed ex officio representatives of the 89 provincial governments, and would serve as the upper house of the New Russian parliament. However, the idea was backfired because the oblasts had objection to second-class status. After the parliament episode, Moscow seriously attempted to impose a universal and transparent set of fiscal rules. On 21 October 1993, Yeltsin signed a presidential decree ordering the Council of Ministers to impose harsh sanctions against any region or republic that delinquents in the payment of tax revenue to the centre. His victory led the republics to lose many of the privileges

accumulated in earlier agreement and strengthened the role of centre vis-à-vis provinces. On 12 December 1993, the new constitution was ratified which treated republics and regions essentially equal and dropped earlier references to republican sovereignty. It should be noted that Yeltsin continued to lean on the regions and gave them support with financial assistance and privileges in taxation export quotas on raw materials developed on their territories. Nodari Simonia states that “these privileges for the regions were registered officially, some time by secret decrees or through bilateral treaties between Russian federation and regions”.<sup>33</sup>

By 1994, Moscow was engaged in extensive selective bargaining with subjects of the federation and sharp distinction between the treatment of ethnic republics and non-ethnic regions. Moscow granted Bashkortostan additional control over its foreign trade and the republic of Sakha won the right to retain a significant share of its mining revenue. Due to these disparities, poor agricultural or industrial regions have begun to complain openly about the preferential treatment accorded to resource-rich republics.

Moscow was also partial about the distribution of subsidies. According to one analyst, only 10 per cent of subsidies of regional budgets from the centre went to territories facing severe environmental and climate hardships. The remaining 90 per cent went to republic like Sakha, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan whose per capita incomes were above the national average.

---

<sup>33</sup> Nodari Simonia, ‘Domestic Development’s in Russia’ in Gennady Chufrin (ed), *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 71-72.

It is further analysed that eight territories with per capita regional budgets above the national norms emerged as net recipient of federal subsidies while ten territories with per capita regional budgets below the national average emerge as net donor. Scholars are of the viewpoint that some of the republics had decided not to pay any taxes to the centre, and the centre, rather than use of force, decided to shift the tax burden to others, which has given rise to, said disparity.

In 1994, Yeltsin signed bilateral treaty with Tatarstan to grant few rights beyond those granted to republics in the new constitution. Thus, Yeltsin reopened the door for other subjects of the federation to demand special treatment. Moscow had signed similar treaties with Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan, North Ossetia, Yakutia, Buryatia, and Udmurtia by the end of 1995.

In 1996, Yeltsin began to offer similar bilateral treaties to the oblasts and Krai, concluding deals with Sverdlovsk, Orenburg, Kaliningrad, Krasnodar, and Khabarovsk as well as with the republic of Komi. During 1996 Presidential campaign, Yeltsin signed more treaties with republics and oblasts/krais.

Transcaucasia has been of Russian concerns due to the geopolitical position. The conflicts in this region had a potential to exacerbate tensions between Russia and former Soviet Republics. Scholarly presumption is that the ethnic conflicts on the borders of Iran a central Asian republic could lead to the unrest within Russia and in such a possibility Iran, Turkey or both could plausibly become involved. The independent

foreign policy of Chechnya, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan, all of which have close political and ethnic link with turkey, has raised the similar problem.

The North Ossetian separatism had restrained due to military hostilities with Ingushetia, which raised North Ossetia's need for Russian military aid. Russia has an interest in maintaining North Ossetian dependence vis-à-vis the conflict with Georgia over South Ossetia.

However, in 1995-96 under pressure from the regions, Yeltsin began to allow the election of governors, which by 1997 became universal practice. Aware of their new elective legitimacy, governors became more independent and they started asserting their powers in regards to distribution of budget money, the shares of their regions in tax revenue and so on. Consequently, the Council of the Federation changed form being the mainly decorative upper chamber of the federal assembly into a quite dependent centre of power and influence.

Finally, the country found itself in strange form of federation representing a mixture of elements of constitutional and conceptual federalism. The resentment in the regions, oblasts, and Krai was flaring up over the issue of granting privileges and benefits to one group of the federation. This resulted in 'sovereignisation' movements to put, pressure on the centre in order to extract additional benefits and concessions. After 1996, Yeltsin started to equalise the subjects with concluding bilateral treaties. However, neither the region demands for equality nor the centre has equal attitude towards every

one of them. On the distribution of subsidies, redistribution of resources, federal budgets, and the financial support from the special funds to the territories Moscow maintained secrecy. This in turn gave birth to the principal contradiction between centre and regions.

By the time, Putin came in to power Moscow had three parts. First, it is the centre of federal administration, which was trying to get as much as possible and give as little as it can to region. Second Moscow a federal city and subject of federation was using utmost like a capital to gain privileges and benefits. Third, Moscow was the economic centre of new Russian bureaucratic capitalism at the federal level. So far, Putin has been successful in consolidating his power in the region. He has appointed governors those who suit to his approaches and has been dealing vigilantly with the governors having 'independent' approaches.

## *Chapter – 3*

*Evolution of Russian National Security Concept and Factors  
Influencing Russian National Security from 1991-2000*

**CHAPTER-3**  
**EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT**  
**AND FACTORS INFLUENCING RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY**  
**FROM 1991-2000**

Security is a condition in which the states consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure, or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress. Security lies in all aspects of the state. The state bears increasingly heavy responsibilities as its functions increase irrespective of any particular ideology, such as functions of regulation, forward planning, projections, and system maintenance. Even the insecurity of the people shows the weaknesses and shortcomings of the state. Thus, the concept of security includes protection against all major threats to human survival and well being, not just military threats. Security addressed as national security, earlier meant only the maintenance of strong military defences against enemies invasions and attacks. But now includes ever widening concept of both external and internal security.

Modern nuclear and chemical weapons jeopardise the entire planet with the epidemiological and environmental hazards, and have introduced new forms of security and made military security less dominating. However, defence against military aggression remains a vital component of security but the severe environmental degradations, worldwide economic crisis, and massive human suffering remains imperative too.



The multiplicity of pressing world hazards integrates the concept of national security with world security. Up to now in the interests of national security, states often engaged themselves in a competitive struggle to enhance their own economic and military strength at the expenses of other nation's capabilities. Scholars argue that the "we versus them" zero-sum competition for security frequently entailed military and economic coercion. However, the quest for security is becoming "positive sum" process, whereby national well being is achieved jointly by all countries or not at all.<sup>1</sup> The scholars such as John Galtung, Bary Buzan, Raymond Aaron, Michael Shuman, and Sverre Lodgaard broadened the definition of security with the changing environment of international relations after the World War II.

There was a big debate on the issue of security between realist and idealist thinkers. Regarding the orientations of the debate Bary Buzan emphasises that "the realist have subsumed security under their preferred idea of power, idealist have subsumed it under peace, and in doing so both sides have seriously weakened their analysis".<sup>2</sup> He further says that 'an expanded and clarified concept of security can fill the ground between power position of the realists and the peace position of the idealists'.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, 'Security' used as an organising principal in international relations combines the entire gamut of realists with the concerns for global human interests of the idealists.

---

<sup>1</sup> Michael T. Klare, Daniel C. Thomas (eds), *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Chapital hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p.173.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 14.

The Stockholm Declaration in 1971 had fulfilled the long-standing demand of international community to include the right to liveable environment in to the charter of the U.N. Under its principle 1, "People have the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate condition of life, in an environment of quality that permits a life of dignity and well being."<sup>4</sup>

The inequalities between rich and poor countries have been the source of tension to create a greater international security order. Therefore, the Brandt Commission Report in 1980 and the South Commission Report in 1990 emphasised the need to reduce this economic gap between the countries. During 1982, the Palme Commission put forward the concept of 'common security', which emphasised that no nation can achieve true security through its own efforts alone, but only through some form of cooperation with its potential adversaries.<sup>5</sup> The international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development, convened by the United Nations General Assembly in New York from August 24<sup>th</sup> to September 11, 1987 adopted a definition of security, which states that:

The development process, by overcoming non-military threats to security and contributing to a more stable and sustainable international system, can enhance security and there by promote arms reduction and disarmament. Disarmament would enhance security both directly and indirectly. A process of disarmament that provides for

---

<sup>4</sup> United Nations, 1972, *Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment*, Document A/Conf.48/14/Rev.I, New York.

<sup>5</sup> Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order: Value and Power in International Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p.14.

undiminished security at progressive lower level of armaments could allow additional resources to be devoted to addressing non-military challenges to security, and thus result in enhanced overall security.

Recently non-military threats to security have moved to the forefront of global concerns. Underdevelopment and declining prospects for developments as well as mismanagement and wastage of resources constitute challenges to security. The degradation of the environment presents a threat to sustainable development. The world is no longer secure as there is polarisation of wealth and poverty at the national and international levels, gross and systematic violations of human rights retard genuine socio-economic development and creates tension which contribute to instability. Mass poverty, illiteracy, disease, squalor, and malnutrition afflicting a large proportion of the world's population often become the cause of social strain, tension, and strife.

The meeting of a group of experts on non-military aspects of security in Tashkent in May 1990 used the subsequent functioning explanation of security:

“Security does not merely mean protection from military attacks but from anything, that may threaten the continued existence of a state or the life, welfare, and freedom of its citizens. Security does not imply merely preservation of the status quo, but is a dynamic concept that includes human development and redressing of injustice as well as physical security.”<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Cited in Dietrich Fischer, *Non-Military Aspects of Security: A Systems Approach* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1993).p 9.

## NATIONAL SECURITY

National security, a sub-field of international relation means “the study of the security problems faced by nations, of the policies and programs by which these problems are addressed, and of the governmental processes through which the policies and programs are decided upon and carried out”.<sup>7</sup>

It differs from foreign policy in at least two respects: one, national security purposes are narrower, focussed primarily on safety and security of the nation. Two, national security is primarily concerned with actual and potential adversaries and their use of force. However, national security policy overlaps with foreign policy – indeed some time they are almost indistinguishable.

The issues of national security cannot be isolated form domestic policy. In addition to the relationship and linkage between foreign and security policy, there is also a domestic policy linkage that is important factor in establishing priorities and interests.

Some scholars view national security as ‘intermestic’ politics and policies.<sup>8</sup>In the anarchical international system states have vital, critical, and serious interests, which are the driving force of national security. The states rely on themselves for protection. National security helps the country to overcome ‘psychological’ fear of foreign attack. So in the policy making process, the policy makers typically assign national security the

---

<sup>7</sup> Richard Smoke, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. (New York: Random House Publication, 1987), p.301.

<sup>8</sup> Cited in Ibid. p.5.

most prominent place on their foreign policy agenda. Sam C. Sarkesian offered a preliminary statement:

“National Security is the confidence held by the great majority of the nation’s people that the nation has the military capability and effective policy to prevent its adversaries from effectively using force in preventing the nation’s pursuit of its national interests.”<sup>9</sup>

National security has two components, military or physical strength and psychological strength. National security policy concentrates on the actions and goals of government and its strategy to achieve the psychological and physical demands of nation’s security. Scholars of national security opine that national security means more than the capacity to conduct wars.

## **SOVIET PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL SECURITY**

The quest for security had been among the most basic and persistent Soviet concerns since the revolution. Soon after the revolution, the Bolshevik’s began to manifest a degree of concern about the survival of their ideology. They thought that state sovereignty would lose its meaning, and class solidarity would override national difference. The security problem would thus no longer present itself in its traditional

---

<sup>9</sup> Sam C. Sarkesian, *US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 1995) p.8

form. These early ideas constituted the most radical departure from the conservative conception of security, which had evolved historically in the system of states and nations. For Bolsheviks, security first meant the physical survival and further development of the regime.

Soon the USSR found herself confronting problems typical of those encountered by states functions within the system of states. The Bolsheviks continued to colour security conceptions that subsequently evolved. For Soviet leaders and the evolving elite, national security became synonymous with regime security. The nature of USSR's security perception remains either masked in secrecy or concealed by ritualistic and complicated terminology. The re-definition of security began in Lenin's lifetime. An important section of the revolutionary leadership remained persuaded that the Soviet-Union and her regime could no longer survive in a capitalistic world. They were dubious about the Lenin New Economic Policy and the Lenin's associations with capitalist powers. Stalin changed the security concept again to the conventional concept of security. Under his security plan, Soviet Union guarded her frontiers and territorial integrity with military force and warded off potential invaders.

“Russia utilised and even to an extent relied upon fragile, significant protection of the bourgeois international order and its legal norms. She looked out for alliances or other form of association, including economic ones with other members of the traditional state system and manipulated external balance of power.”<sup>10</sup> Basic principle of Soviet

---

<sup>10</sup> Helmut Sonnenfeldt, William G. Hyland, “Soviet Perspective on Security” in Jonathan Alford (ed.), *The Soviet Union: Security Policies and Constraints* (New York: St. Martin's press, 1985), pp.8-9.

security thinking was shaped during the pre-World War II period. Security in Soviet history was the protection of the country's "most progressive" socio-political and economic system, strengthening the power and capabilities of Soviet armed forces and the strengthening of the country's economic and industrial capacity.<sup>11</sup>

These principles of the Soviet national security remained in force throughout the post-war period too. At the same time, the new geopolitical position of the country, military technology, the increasing need for natural resources, economic and military expansion, necessitated the development of new approaches to the foreign policy and security policy. Scholars linked globalisation of Soviet foreign policy inextricably to the appearance of nuclear weapons and modernisation of the means of their delivery. The deployment of nuclear weapon drastically changed the strategic role and geopolitical situation of many regions

### **Changing Nature of Soviet Security**

Brezhnev assumed that Soviet State power, security, territorial integrity, and general scientific and technological progress required a substantial military-industrial complex and large armed forces. That was why the defence spending maintained a relatively high level during his tenure.

---

<sup>11</sup> Raphael Vartanov et. al., "Russian Security Policy 1945-96: The Role of The Arctic, The Environment and The NSR" in Willy Ostreng (ed.) *National Security And International Environment Cooperation in the Arctic-The Case of Northern Sea Route* (London : kluwer Academic publishers), p.55.

However, under the stagnation of overall system, there came a change in national security notions, which he signalled in his speeches such as in Tula in 1977 that Soviet national security was undergoing changes.<sup>12</sup> This idea of Brezhnev received impetus further when the Soviet leadership and intelligentsia realised the impracticality of competition with their adversaries in the then global conditions.

Declining economic growth, slow down of income per capita, labour productivity, technological lag, nationality problem, and Soviet Union's declining status in the World demanded for a rethinking of fundamental national security policy. The national defence sector remained as major problem. The armed forces and the defence sector employed some 60-70 percent of the nation's best scientific and technological talent, a national resource that Mikhail Gorbachev hoped to employ more effectively to solve the tasks of general economic modernisation and to execute a broad shift of resources towards civilian production. Gorbachev's national defence policy reforms began gradually; the first cuts in defence spending took place in 1989. However, in 1990 he began to press for the revisions in the Soviet defence establishment's position and role of defence in state priorities.

Mikhail Gorbachev also realised the Soviet Union incompetence to compete with the West, and introduced his 'New- thinking.' His 'radical' concept of change faced a lot of opposition therefore; he firstly recruited essential cadre to help him. He introduced Glasnost and Perestroika to put Soviet Union back on the path of progress and prosperity,

---

<sup>12</sup> George E. Hudson, "Conceptualizing Change in Soviet National Security" in George E. Hudson (ed), *National Security Policy Under Perestroika* (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1990), p.7.



which intensified the 'acceleration' and 'restructuring' programmes. By series of moves to arms control and military policy he called, an end to the arms builds up to defuse the tension of cold war. He developed Russian security mainly through political, diplomatic and arms control measure, and tried to create a friendly international environment.

Scholar's trace real transformation in national security to the period when Soviet Union agreed to eliminate intermediate- range nuclear missiles, agreed to arms control agreement, called back troops from Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, Mongolia etc. Soviet proposals at Reykjavik and their acceptance of 'double zero' option to eliminate nuclear missile in Europe and Gorbachev's unilateral initiative to reduce Soviet conventional forces were the major changes in its approach to national security.<sup>13</sup> The 'democrats' supported Gorbachev's new foreign policy, which promised both improved Soviet security and major reductions in defence allocations by concluding treaties with the West and China. In this political environment, it was extremely difficult for the national defence, constituency to conduct a reasonably objective debate about Gorbachev's foreign policy and new security doctrines. His critics gained a wide audience after the allied Communist regimes of Eastern Europe fell, the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, and the Soviet state began to lose control over its fifteen constituent republics.

---

<sup>13</sup> Philip D. Stewart and Margaret G. Hermann, "The Soviet Debate Over 'New Thinking 'and the Restructuring of US-Soviet Relation'" in George E. Hudson (ed.), *National Security Policy under Perestroika* (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1990), p. 14.

## Evolution of New Russia's Concept of National Security

Russian National Security evolution took place due to combination of several factors rather than some immediate threats. The first Russian concept of National Security emerged in 1992, which later became a law 'on security' which Russia adopted at the end of 1992. This 'Law on Security' was the departing sign of the former narrow interpretation of national security. The law interprets security as the protection of vital interests of individual, society, and the state against domestic and external threats. This law of security declares, "the goal of national security policy is to provide security of and for the personality, society, and state".<sup>14</sup> Scholars of national security considered this law on security premature and unrealistic because the country had yet to form her elite, interests, and identity.

The domestic situation in Russia diverted more attention towards economic and environmental security than to military security. From 1991 to early 1994, the Russian Federation's overall economic production declined by 35-40 percent and the rouble's value plummeted despite its major focus on economic security. Defence procurement spending crashed down by some 67 percent in 1992 compared with 1991. The foreign policy of Russia emphasizing partnership with the West and to become a member of the "civilized" Western international system reflected the view of very narrow elite around Yeltsin. With the competition that developed in Russia's domestic political and economic arena between the periods 1993-97, a multiple views on Russia's national

---

<sup>14</sup> Igorv Bestuzhev, *Risk for Russia's Security in the Next Decade: Repercussions on the Country's Domestic Foreign and Defense Policy* (A forecast and Scenarios miss paper Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies January 2000), (Stampa: Stabiliments Grofice Militare GAETA), p. 21.

security policy based upon diverse sets of political, economic and societal interests emerged.

Russia lacked an official national security policy up to 1997, but finally on 17 December 1997, the President signed the Concept of National Security, which was in the making for more than six years, a synthesis which emphasized cooperation and integration with West, but with a measure of 'Eurasianism.'<sup>15</sup>

## **FACTORS INFLUENCING RUSSIAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS**

### **Near Abroad: A Geopolitical Entity**

Russia has special interest in the other ex-Soviet republics based on historical background of these states, their proximity, and the presence of multimillion Russian in them. Andranik Migranian, a prominent political commentator argues, "the ex-Soviet republics are the sphere of... (Russia's) vital interests and they should not be allowed to form alliances either with each other or with third countries that have an anti-Russian orientation".<sup>16</sup>

Although there were, differences among the Yeltsin, Zhirinovskiy, Labed, Zyuganov on the Russian conduct beyond its boarder. However, they share some propositions commonly. Form 1992 onward a major realignment has been visible in

---

<sup>15</sup> Celeste A. Wallander , "The Russian National Security Concept: A Liberal-Statist Synthesis", *Ponars*. Memo No. 30, 1998, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/policy>, pp.1-4.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in Alexander J. Motyle, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) pp.122-23.

Russia foreign policy debate. The liberals who generally stood for disengagement from the ex-Soviet republics have shifted their stand, which matches with the present dominant centrist and moderate conservative group.

The near abroad has been historically and geopolitical importance to Russia. The military doctrine of Russian federation also stresses the role of Russia in these states. The doctrine confirms that Russia will not ignore the existing potential areas of local wars and armed conflicts, in close proximity to Russia's borders. Russia fears that these regions have the possibility of some weapon of mass destruction other than nuclear.

Being an only 'big power' around these states Russia has principal, geo- strategic interests in near abroad. The presence of ethnic Russian population in these territories has been Russia legitimate concerns. Russia is fearful from the tendencies for suppression of the minority rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in these countries. Therefore, in order to guard its principle interests Russia has been preventing near abroad from unfriendly alliances or coalitions and countering instabilities that could erode Russia's positions in the region.

According to Alexei Arbatov, the present centrist and moderate groups in Russia perceive Russia's special role in near abroad because of "its size, historic predominance and other advantages over the small republics of the territory of the former Soviet union as the principle goal of their version of Russian foreign policy".<sup>17</sup> Moreover, it is also

---

<sup>17</sup> Alexi Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Thinking in Transition" in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed), *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda* (New York: Oxford University Press (SIPRI), 1997), pp. 142-146.

psychologically difficult for Moscow to treat these countries as independent states. That is why the Russia's relationships with the former fifteen union republics are more of domestic policy than of foreign policy specifically with the eleven countries of CIS. Some scholars are of the viewpoint that the military and national security elites in Russia want to draw the ex-Soviet republics closer and create a coalition dominated by Russia. However, their economic counterparts are not prepared to spend a great deal of money to this end or to allow strategic aims, such as binding the Near Abroad to Russia, to hijack economic reform.

Eleven of the former Soviet republics constitute the core of the "near abroad" who have joined with Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States. After dissolution of the USSR Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Kozyrev were busy in accommodating the West in to their policies especially United States and the former republics of the Soviet Union were completely ignored. But when Russia realised its 'vital interests' in these republics it started pursuing an active policy especially in the mid nineties when Primakov said goodbye to Kozyrev's pro Western policy.

Since the inception, the CIS has been instrumental in Russian foreign policy. In the beginning, both Russia and CIS committed themselves to creating a "common military-strategic space" and a "common economic space". However, these commitments were abandoned within two years. Although Russia's setting up of a separate department has recognised that CIS is no more a part of domestic policy. CIS in its initial years acted as a loose organisation. With a shaky start, it became a forum for

exchange of views among its member countries for the division of military assets of former USSR. The major issue, which were discussed through this forum, were related to defence, security and economy. There had been some very complex issues on the transfer of nuclear arms control and ownership of naval fleets and assets. In February 1992, a joint command for regular forces was established but by mid-1993, all support for a unified CIS command had dissipated, and on June 15, Moscow, announced its abolition.

Yeltsin wanted to take possession of all nuclear weapons, which United States was also insisting. It was reached with difficulty and took a period of seven years to accomplish. The pro Western foreign policy of the Foreign Minister was discredited at home. Although he incorporated the near abroad in the foreign policy concept of 1993, but it was thought to be on the part of nationalistic forces. In the foreign policy concept of 1993, Kozyrev had emphasised Russia's "special interests" which required recognition by the international community. However, he took no concrete step. Even he did not visit the states of near abroad during his tenure as foreign minister. Under the "bilateralism", Russia developed bilateral security ties with some of the near abroad countries. Under these ties, Russia directly or indirectly involved itself in civil strife and ethnic tension in some of the countries, which weakened the sanity of CIS as a collective body. In economic field, CIS had been successful in creating a common rouble zone currency, arranged for repayment of Soviet era debt, agreement on joint tax, custom union and single monetary system.<sup>18</sup> Due to Russia's intervention in Central Asia,

---

<sup>18</sup> Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing System and Enduring Interests* (New York, London: M.E.Sharpe Inc., 1998), p.157.

Caucasus and NATO's eastward expansion, economic policies took back seat. After the end of Yeltsin's first tenure when Primakov became the foreign minister he made a balance between the East and West by bring the bilateralism back.

In the initial years, Russia was confronting the problem of the existing nuclear warhead in Ukraine and the denial of Ukraine for unified armed forces. Kiev was also not comfortable with the presence of nuclear weapons and indeed could not even afford the cost of maintaining them. Yeltsin met with Kravchuk at Massandra in the Crimea and negotiated an agreement to cancel a portion of Ukraine's huge debt to Russia in exchange for the transfer nuclear weapons. However, this offer collapsed. On the creation of a strong CIS, scholars argue that Leonid Kravchuk wanted no common law, no common citizenship, and no status for the CIS in international law and wanted to keep Ukraine away from the CIS.<sup>19</sup> Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Turkmenistan also opposed the creation of a strong co-ordinating structures and close co-operation with Russia.

Both countries had differences on the issue of Black Sea Fleet and the status of Crimea. To settle the controversies four separate agreements were signed between 1992-1994, but the issues were not resolved, although the differences were narrowed considerably. Later an accord was reached on the Black sea Fleet. For appropriate compensation, Russia was permitted to station its portion of the Black Sea Fleet at the port of Sevastopol for Twenty years.

---

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p.159.

Russia's had security interests in Byelorussia and wanted legal authorization to the stationed Russian troops on its territory. This goal was achieved in a treaty on cooperation and friendship, signed on April 12, 1994, which the Belarusian parliament ratified in April of the following year. But before Byelorussia guarantee this, Lukashenko demanded for closer economic integration, to bolster his own weak economy, and Moscow was hesitant on this issue.

The military suppression of a Georgian nationalist demonstration in Tbilisi in April 1989 shocked many in Moscow, which later spurred Georgian demands for independence but sparked nationalist emotions throughout the Caucasus. Since then the Caucasus has been prone to ethnic violence than other part of near abroad. Russia has been much concerned about its borders in the Caucasus, which are of geo-strategically important to her. These are the areas where the US has also expressed its economic and geo-strategic interests. The expansion of NATO in to these countries is threatening Russia's territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

The four conflicts broke there in the past- two Secessionist movements in Georgia, the war over Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and the independence struggle of the Trans-Dniester region in Moldova. Azerbaijan is the most important country on the Caspian littoral for Russia. It has been challenging Russian on many issues. It rejected the idea of joint management, and insisted on the legal validity of dividing the Caspian Sea into national jurisdictions. The Armenian majority of the Nagorno-Karabakhis within Azerbaijan wanted to break away from Azerbaijan. Despite repeated



denials from Armenia, there were evidences that the Armenian government provide financial and material aid to the Karabakh forces.

Nagorno and Karabakh were interested in merging with in themselves and in creating a greater Armenia. Therefore, Russia perceived its diplomatic role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict essential as a part of its effort to preserve its position in the south Caucasus. In January 1995 at Minsk, Moscow wants to retain a role in OSCE efforts so that decision taken by the organisation does not harm Russian interests in the south Caucasus. Nevertheless, despite its membership in the Minsk Group, Russia has been embarking on independent diplomacy on Nagorno-Karabakh since September 1991, with little co-ordination with the OCSE. Moscow wanted Russian or CIS troops to be the sole members of the peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Azerbaijan objected staunchly in the negotiations that preceded the 1994 cease-fire, and the United States and Turkey supported insistence on a multinational force. Nagorno-Karabakh war has enabled Russia to entrench itself in the south Caucasus.

When the Soviet Empire was on its last legs, a contest to control the state's economic and political direction began in Tajikistan. In May 1993, after prolonged mass protests involving demonstrators form both camps, Nabiev was forced to include the opposition in a coalition. Russia is now the key outside party in determining Tajikistan's political order. Tajikistan's dependence on Russia militarily and economically symbolised by the 1994 friendship treaty was essential to the regime's strategy. Although Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have also provided peacekeeping

troops but their numbers were small. The Tajik economy was in shambles. Always Central Asia's poorest country, Tajikistan's plight worsened because of the ravages and costs of war. To maintain its position there, Russia would have had to continue serving as primary benefactor. Nor was there any sign that Tajik government would one day be able to survive without Russian military support.

It was also well aware that the Russian military role in Tajikistan was unpopular at home. But precisely because of the shakiness of the Tajik regime and the ramifications for stability in Central Asia – especially in light of the situation in Afghanistan – it could not cut and run. Russia, therefore, adopted a strategy of supporting the Rakhmonov regime economically and militarily while nudging it to participate in peace talks with the opposition.

Russia relation with the Baltic States had often been contentious. Moscow was determined to keep the region within Russia's sphere of influence but the Baltic States were resisting to Russian hegemony. Lithuania faced a military problem with political implications for its involvement in the transit of Russian military equipment and personnel from the Kaliningrad oblast. Latvian and Estonian were not happy with Russia due to delay in withdrawal of Russian troop and the restriction on Russian citizenship rights were powerful sources of antagonism. Estonia has had the most contentious relations with Russia. Estonia simply ignored the Russian demands for citizenship to the ethnic Russian in the state. When the NATO initiated its "Partnership for Peace" program in early 1994 as a preliminary step toward possible full membership, the Baltic

States quickly joined the offer. Lithuania was the first to join on January 27, 1994 and Estonia and Latvia followed soon thereafter. Despite the sharp decline in its power, Russia has been far more successful and far less reticent in asserting its interests in the southern Near Abroad than is generally acknowledged. The continuing heavy economic and military dependence of these countries on Russia and the instabilities that have shaken some of them, together with Russian proximity and preponderant power, account for Russia's influence. Instead, a number of economic and geopolitical factors motivate Moscow. Of considerable is the question of Azerbaijan's co-operation in the exploitation of Caspian Sea oil and the pipelines to bring the oil to Western markets. Russia voiced reservations over the signing in September 1994 of the "deal of the century" to exploit the Caspian Sea oil fields.

The collapse of Soviet Union and the August coup confronted the Central Asians with unpopular choices. They were unprepared for independence, and they welcomed admissions to the CIS as founding members. In some of these states large Russian minorities have been living. Russia's interests in Central Asia are political and economic and both are vital for Russia. Moscow from the beginning was concerned about the outbreak of ethnic and national conflicts in the newly independent states bordering Russia for several reasons. The conflict in these newly independent states could spread to the Russian federation. The success of separatist groups outside of Russia might encourage separatism within Russia. Islamic fundamentalism might spread to Russia's southern neighbours and then to Russia itself. So far, Moscow has maintained a great degree of

influence over the entire region and these states largely rely on Moscow for economic dependence.

### **Chechen Separatism**

Since 1991, Russia remained busy fighting the war in Russian republic of Chechnya; civil war in Tajikistan; the festering conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

While a number of North Caucasian Republics have threatened to separate from the Russian Federation, Chechnya characterised by its aggressive nationalism, is distinguished as the only Republic to have actually proclaimed full independence. Since November 1991, when Dzhokhar Dudaev's government declared Chechnya to be a sovereign state, popular support for Chechen sovereignty has been very strong. General Dzhokhar Dudaev and his Chechen all National Congress seized power after the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow and was elected president on 9 November 1991. Yeltsin immediately contested the election, issued a warrant for Dudaev's arrest and sent troops to Grozny. However, Dudaev's National Guard blocked the Russian troops at the airport, and the Russian parliament, reversing Yeltsin's decision, recalled the troops. Russia did not recognise the legitimacy of Dudaev's election to the presidency. Chechnya was accused of assisting in the transportation of contraband, currency, weapons and narcotics to such centres as Moscow, London and the Far East.

Chechen nationalism and religious revival have created dangerous circumstances for Russians living in Chechnya. Chechnya was also jeopardising Russia's links with Dagestan. The Western press meanwhile gave much attention to Chechnyan oil industry and Russian desire to retain control on it. These factors led Russia to launch its invasion of Chechnya on December 11, 1994. The war however has been neither short nor successful. The peace accord signed in Khasavyust in August 1996 ended the fighting but did not resolve Chechen political status. The second war in Chechnya began with an invasion of Dagestan by Chechen militants on August 7, 1999. President Aslam Maskhadov was unable to bring the warlords under control. Russia was fearful that militants under the name of Islam could destabilise neighbouring region so it was unwilling to grant Chechnya independence. By October Russian forces seized the low land north of the Terek river, sealed off the northern border and ultimately captured Grozny on Feb 6. An agreement was signed to postpone the decision on Chechnya's political status until the year 2002.

#### **THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT OF 1997**

According to the national security concept of 1997, Russia does not intend to enter into a confrontation with any state or an alliance of states, and it does not nurture any hegemonic or expansionist aims. As an influential Eurasian power, it will sustain relations of partnership with all the interested countries of the world community.

Further, the concept asserts on the national security interests of Russia with in the country, as well as in the geopolitical space around it. Russia, under appropriate conditions wants to sustain its military presence in certain strategically important regions of the world. The concept says Russia retains the right to use all the forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case of an armed aggression against it. Russian national security concept ensures survival of Russia as a consolidated society.

It also underlines the commitments to strengthen national security through political, diplomatic, military, arms control measures and through restoring the health of the armed forces and improving their technical base. The concept upholds the leading role of Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and in consolidation of the CIS to the extent possible under the patronage of Russia.

The national security concept also purposes to create a peaceful international environment, and not to make enemies, to co-operate with everybody in the interests of peace and economic development of Russia, without any ideological or other prejudice, at the same time not allowing infringements of the basic interests of Russia.

Further the concept entrusts to improve relations with nearby countries and to continue friendly relations with the United States, developing them into a partnership, while resisting as far as possible any American encroachments into “purely Russian

matters". The concept further claims that Russia will not join US in its unilateral policies, which tend to overlook Russia's vital national interests.

The national security concept of 1997 defines Russia's interests in Europe by not permitting a new ideological, psychological economic and military borderline to be established between the two parts of Europe along the western and south-western borders of the Russian Federation.<sup>20</sup> Russia commits itself to take an active part in pan-European co-operation and integration. The concept further asserts that it will provide active support to strengthen and enhance the role of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Regarding Russia's role in East Europe, the concept says that Russia will try to restore some degree of economic and political influence in the former communist belt of East European states including the Baltic to continue active engagement with Germany and France.

In Asia, Russia's aims are those of strengthening friendly relations with China, to expand economic co-operation, while taking steps to prevent peaceful Chinese expansion into the Russian Far East. Russia is interested to improve relations with Japan. The concept asserts that Russia will participate with Japan in joint ventures and investments in the Far East and Siberia. The concept further assures that it will continue co-operation with the Republic of Korea, maintaining friendly relations with North Korea, sustain close relations with India, including military co-operation, and widen the constructive relations with the ASEAN countries.

---

<sup>20</sup> National Security Concept of Russian Federation, *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye*, 17 December 1997.

According to the concept, Russia's interests are to increase economic co-operation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific, and develop the relation with the regions, which are the arms markets for Russian military hardware. Russia, in the Middle East, is interested to regain traditional arms markets and to obtain some help for the ailing Russian economy.<sup>21</sup> It will also co-operate with the West to establish lasting peace in Middle East region. According to the document, Russia, in other countries of the world, will try to find new avenues for spreading influence, expand mutually beneficial commercial relations, open markets for military hardware, and utilise other yet unknown opportunities. Russia will participate actively, wherever possible, in international and regional organisations of states, devote greater attention to economical political and military co-operation, the protection of human rights, ecology etc. Russia will use its permanent membership in the UN Security Council as a means of promoting its national interests.

### **THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT OF 2000**

In the national security concept of 2000, substantial changes have been made from the December 1997 National Security Concept, with a significant shift from liberal elements of Yeltsin's political coalition. The reasons for the shift are internal, arising from Russia's own domestic political and economic developments after the August 1998 financial crisis. The changes are also due to the result of NATO's war in Kosovo and other difficulties in Russia's relations with the US. Aggression by NATO forces in Yugoslavia, the eastward expansion of NATO, and the international situation that

---

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.



developed because of the Kosovo and Chechnya conflict brought a change in the Russian National Security Policy. Moreover its deepening influence in Europe, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia and Asia Pacific region added up for more security concerns.

Russia's National Security Concept is not a binding document: it can be changed and modified. Yet the document is important for understanding Russian security policy, because it is a reflection of the priorities, assessments, compromises, and negotiations within the Russian political and security elite. It gives a brief of Russian understanding in the area of nuclear arms control, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, terrorism and WMD.

President Vladimir Putin approved new Russian National Security concept on January 10, 2000, with some important change and novel elements. This document this time was ideologically and politically more coherent and compact in comparison with the previous one. The Russian National Security Concept is a well structured, a lengthy document, which consists of Introduction and concluding observations with four part and corresponding heading.<sup>22</sup> The concept of national security and the law on security of 1992 were based on the assumption that Russia has neither enemies nor military opponents. Hence, the central task of the security was to protect the vital interests of multinational, ethnic people of the nation.<sup>23</sup>

The 'no enemy' approach of Kozyrev was opposed from the beginning and the vital interest were not well formed as the process of state formation was on. The

---

<sup>22</sup> National Security Concept, 2000. *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye* 14 Jan. 2000. p.3-4

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p.4

multiethnic people saw their interests sweeping away for the sake of other interest group. Yeltsin's tried to rebuild the Russian State into an effective military and political power capable of maintaining a Russian sphere of influence in Eurasia. Putin on July 8, 2000, in the Federation Assembly spelled out his view on the present state of domestic affairs. He expressed his apprehensions about the declining national power of Russia as symbolised by decreasing population. He is resolute about an early solution to domestic problems. He pointed out the problems such as law and order aggravation, underground economic activities, corruption, and stressed the validity of the steps he had taken to strengthen the legitimate function of the government in getting rid of crimes and corruption. He started out to prosecute oligarchs who had amassed a fortune during the Yeltsin administration such as Vladimir Gusinsky. Top priority of his domestic reforms is to strengthen the authority of the central government led by his Presidency. The receding of state Duma in 1999 is helping Putin to tighten his control over the leaders of the federal constituents.<sup>24</sup>

The document under "Russia in the World Community" has sought the world attention underlining that how Russia perceives the New World order and how Russia wants the world to perceive it. Under the heading, "National Interest of Russia" the national interests has been defined comprehensively, then explained segment by segment in various area of internal political life, in the social, spiritual, environmental and media fields. The "Threats to the National Security of the Russian Federation" has been most

---

<sup>24</sup> Henry Trofimenko, *Russian National Interests and the Current Crisis in Russia* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), p. 17.

relevant portion of the document. It has been mentioned that the tension in relation between Regions and the Central government poses a threat to the federal set up and socio-economic system of the Russian Federation. The concept finds the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, weakening of the CIS, and escalation of conflicts on CIS members' borders and the territorial claims against Russia as threats to Russian federation. The concept explains the types of external threats to Russian security, arising economic reforms, terrorism, societal discontent and disharmony, the uneven benefits of economic reform, the criminalization of Russian society, and the lack of a rule-based state to guarantee the safety and well-being of Russian citizens to a greater degree. Reform policy with even more substantial changes has been made in Russia's assessment of its external environment and external threats to Russian security are arising from the weakening of the OSCE and United nation.

The chapter of the document, which is entitled "Ensuring the National Security of Russian Federation", defines the role of individual bodies and organisations as well as mechanisms for assuring and achieving the national security. In the concept of 2000, a particular attention has been given to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation, which has been elaborated later in the military doctrine. The concept mentions the role which the President, the Government, Federal and Republic/Provincial authorities and Security Council will take to ensure the national security.

The Russian military doctrine admits that under the present conditions the immediate threat of outright aggression being unleashed against the Russian Federation has been considerably reduced. The main existing and potential sources of non-nuclear

military danger from the outside are the territorial claims of other states against the Russian Federation or its allies.

The concept also underlines the weakening Russian political, economic, and military influence in the world. The consolidation of military-political blocs and alliances, particularly further the eastward expansion of NATO and the possibility of foreign military bases or deployment of forces on Russian borders, are the threats, which Russia foresees in the near future.<sup>25</sup>

NATO's use of military forces outside its alliance territory without UN Security Council approval has been identified as major threat to world stability, and that these trends has created the potential for a new era of arms races among the world's great powers. This concept links the internal threat of terrorism and separatism to external threats. The concept argues that international terrorism involves efforts to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, with the possibility of direct military aggression.

The concept calls for a greater emphasis on traditional security instruments and Russia's security policy in the external realm. To deal with America's uni-lateralism, the Concept sets Russia's task of consolidating its position as one of the great powers and influential centers in the world. It is here that the concept drops Russia's earlier use of the term "partnership" with the West and replaces it with the more limited "cooperation".

---

<sup>25</sup> National Security Concept of Russian Federation 2000 op. cit. pp.6-7.

It proposes that Russia must keep its nuclear weapons as a guarantee against aggressors or coalitions of hostile states, and may resort to nuclear weapons to defend itself and its allies against nuclear-armed states or their allies.

The document says that Russia's national interests and security will be achieved primarily through international law and the "development of Russia's economy" in connection with its longer-term integration into the world economy. The concept also stresses on the support of scientific, technological, and defense industries to the Russian economy

There is wide perception that, the new concept of National Security and foundation of Military Doctrine of Russian federation are not sufficiently co-ordinated with each other. In fact, the latter document was the first to appear, while common sense would have suggested the other way round. The striking feature of these documents is that they departed from the earlier 'no enemy' philosophy. In these concepts of Russia, the emergence of opponents has been cited which as in general description is a 'coalition of state' toward another state pursuing a policy based upon military power to achieve political end.

*Chapter – 4*  
*Influence of Domestic Constraints on Foreign and National  
Security Concept - A Comparative Analysis*

## CHAPTER-4

### INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The societal experiment set in motion by the October revolution made Soviet Union a super power. The Soviet Union reached its zenith of power and influence in mid 1970's. Thereafter an astonishing collapse set in and finally the Union ceased to exist by the end of 1991. The world's largest country, encompassing one-sixth of the world land area, disintegrated in to fifteen sovereign and independent republics. It was not a demise of an ordinary empire or country rather it was the death of a state, which was devoted to an idea, the idea of the socialism. It was the collapse of a political entity and the abrupt end of fertile expression of Karl Marx's socialist dream, incorporating equality, justice and community. It was the end of a philosophy, which perceived capitalism as naked, shameless, direct and a manifestation of brutal exploitation that will undergo changes and bring a new world - world of socialism.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE ECONOMY

Karl Marx perceived the private property, growing inequalities, class conflicts, and competitive individualistic values, flourishing under market economy. He concluded that capitalism would sweep away in revolutionary upheaval. The revolution will set up a socialist society in which "the free development of each (person) is the condition for the free development of all".<sup>2</sup> This idea of socialism

---

<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Appleton – Century – Crofts, 1955) p.12.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p.32.

remained at the core of Soviet ideology from Lenin to Gorbachev, which spread widely. However, the absence of personal freedom and the economic stagnation in late 1970 has tarnished the idea of socialism. Moreover, Russian people's interaction with outside world had made it clear to them that; Soviet Union is not alone an advanced country in the world. They were retaining their belief of world and the changing character of socialism.

The Soviet Union could not accommodate these changing aspirations into the system and finally the state, which was set out to abolish state, failed to evolve a society capable of constructing an economy, which could satisfy the aspiration of its members thereby changing the political geography of the world.

The economic stagnation had been instrumental in breaking Soviet Union. Moreover, today the same economic factor has become a domestic constraint on Russia's foreign and national security policies. The primary reason for the destruction of the Marxist socialist dream had been Marx's inability to understand the fundamental importance of the market in generating secular growth. In Soviet Union, the market was a taboo. The bureaucratic markets replaced the markets in the Soviet system. The bureaucrats traded options among themselves and allocated resources according to their preferences.<sup>3</sup> Whereas, markets are so important that need to be found in all societies and cannot be legislated out of existence. Soviet Union avoided the markets and so could not stop the Union from breaking.

---

<sup>3</sup> Martin McCauley, *The Soviet Union 1917-1991*, second edition (London, New York: Longman 1993) p.18.



Moreover, the Soviet Union Central Planned Economy became very tedious and found difficulties in managing the system from the centre especially after the Stalin's industrial expansion. Lenin thought that when a factory could be run like a machine why not economy? With the introduction of War Communism, he abolished the market. When the War Communism failed Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy. Stalin abolished the New Economic Policy and adopted five-year plans. The Stalin's period had been successful in maintaining highest growth rate Soviet Union ever had. The Scholars believes that the growth under his 'industrial drive' was due to the proper and successful mobilisation of the resources of the state and society. The reason for such growth under Stalin was also the beginning from a low level of per capita out put. Another scholarly assumption for such growth had been the Stalin's lust for power and prestige, which he thought, would be increased along with the 'expansion' of the country. World War II proved the country's might where Soviet achieved an outstanding success. The victorious Stalinism flourished in the first flush of this success.

Since the beginning, aspirations of workers for a larger share of income, consumer's choice for higher quality and nationalities for more independence remained oppressed and represented a permanent, latent powder keg, although interim of a more egalitarian distribution of income the system achieve a success that contributed to its longevity.<sup>4</sup>

Stalin under the Central Planned Economy took away the property right from social classes and vested them with the state. He tried to establish a state monopoly

---

<sup>4</sup> Daniel Gros, and Alfred Steinherr, *Winds of Change: Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe* (London, New York: Longman Group UK Ltd.1995), p.34.

over the all forms of economic activities. He abolished the private ownership of productive assets. Stalin industrialisation drive had successfully turned Russia into a world's second largest economy but the scope for further extensive growth remained exhausted.

Khrushchev experimented with a variety of reforms but could not stop the Soviet Union from moving closer to stagnation. Moreover, Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's drive for the military parity with the West further aggravated the economic problems. With the inception of Brezhnev's period, growth rate slowly declined from 6.5 to 2 percent a year. With crisis in agriculture, transport and energy the economic crunch came in late 1970. Brezhnev launched some extensive programs in oil, gas, and atomic power with no economic sense, which further aggravated the problem. The Soviet economy had achieved zero growth in between 1980-85. By 1985, a growing sense of fiscal crisis was another problem that added up to the list of woes. By 1988, the government was running a budget deficit equal to 7.3% of GNP. Gorbachev realised the fact but he chose to begin with political reform rather than economic reforms. Scholars believe that he could have saved USSR from disintegration if he had started economic reforms first as the Chinese leadership did since 1978. Soon Gorbachev's political liberalization spiralled beyond his control, and his economic reforms never really materialized. He laid main thrust on decentralization of decision-making, introduced new forms of ownership, and opened the economy to international trade. He emphasized on planned or regulated market economy.

The economic transformation in new Russia has been slow and painful episode so far. The transition from a failed system to another system is much more painful and even worse when the transformation is from known to unknown. Socialism failed as a system in the defunct Soviet Union and to give a boost for failed system had been a complicated task for Yeltsin. He had been successful in destroying old structures of Centrally Planned Economy but failed in establishing the full set of market institutions. The new Russia was perplexed on the choice of economic model for market economy. There were options like Swedish model, German social market economy or South East Asian model of state managed corporatism but Russia settled for a Latin American Model. This model has narrow oligarchies run economies, and is characterized by sharp social division and much poverty. Yeltsin got a system and a state completely stagnant and ruined with in which he wanted to establish capitalism as soon as possible. Therefore, as a 'quick panacea' he brought models of shock therapy from Jeffery Sachs of Harvard, the same economic programme which was introduced by Poland in January 1990. On January 2, 1992, Gaidar government introduced the 'big bang' programme by liberalizing domestic price and foreign trade combined with tough fiscal and monetary policies.

For the first year Yeltsin's popularity was unchallenged and his associates wanted to move quickly to the market economy but before they could do so the Russian parliament under Ruslan Khasbulatov start blocking the major reforms. So, it proved further difficult to implement active policies such as raising taxes or privatisation of industry without the cooperation of other political actors. The 'anti reform' trend further intensifies with the coming of nationalists after the election of 1993 and 1995. In February 1992, Russian government submitted a memorandum to

IMF summarizing the shock therapy policies and IMF released \$ 3 billions as a financial support.

The major priority for Russian economic reformers was the convertibility of ruble for the monetary stability. However, because of domestic inflation the value of ruble was falling from 180 rubles to the dollar in 1992 January to 400 rubles by December 1993.<sup>5</sup> The ruble stabilized around 1200 rubles to the dollar in 1993 but the election soon crashed down the value of ruble against dollar. During 1994, the ruble lost 60% of its value against the dollar between January to July and on October 11; it plunged 27% in a single day, which was the 'Black Tuesday' in Russian economy.

The episode of Black Tuesday concentrated the government's attention on the need of monetary stabilization. In 1994, Russian government negotiated with IMF pledging to press ahead with liberalization of the economy, and to adhere to strict fiscal and monetary targets. Yeltsin's attention on the monetary stabilization got some success and in March 1995, IMF was pleased with Russia's progress in monetary policy and granted a \$6.5 billions stand by loan that brought the inflation down from 17.8 in January to 3.2 in December 1995. Scholars argue that after the failure of shock therapy Russian government decided to follow the same economic strategy, which the defunct Soviet government pursued nearly for 70 years.

Vladimir Tikhomirov is of the opinion that "in the greater parts of post- Soviet period the Russian population had on average significantly higher income than the

---

<sup>5</sup> Peter Rutland in "The Rocky Road from Plan to Market" in Stephen White, Alex Pravda, Zvi Gitelman *Developments in Russian Policies 4*. (Hampshire, London: McMillan Press Ltd. 1997) pp.158-59

country could afford to pay”.<sup>6</sup> This indicates that Russian workers worked less and were paid more. Russia maintained the above trend and went on a massive borrowing spree, which ended abruptly in August 1998. He further estimates that at the end of 1998 all major economic indicators were pointing towards a second collapse of this Soviet type economy in Russia, which certainly could leave greater social and political scars on the future of Russia than the first collapse of 1991-92. Thus in post – Soviet Russia, many inefficiencies and drawbacks of Soviet economic system were not only preserved but were also significantly magnified. By the end of 1999, external debt of Russia had grown from \$ 40 billion at the start of 1992 to \$147 billion.<sup>7</sup>

Scholars believe that due to the external funding Russian reformers never experienced the pain and difficulties in transformation of the system in real terms. The major reforms which, Yeltsin’s administration had achieved could be described as decentralization of the state through increasing powers of local and regional authorities and deprivation of the state from its property. However, scholars argue that in pure economic terms these two objectives failed to resolve the fundamental problems of the Soviet economy like its structural and systemic crisis, the unemployment, the declining productivity of labour and the widespread system of subsidies and donations. In fact, these features became even more prominent in the Russian economy in 1998 than in 1990, particularly following the privatisation and the consequent weakening of the power of the state.

Russia’s economic problem has become a major constraint on foreign and security policy. The foreign policy concept of 1993 underlines that Russia’s major

---

<sup>6</sup> Vladimir Tikhomirov “The Second Collapse of the Soviet Economy: Myths and Realities of the Russian Reform” *Europe – Asia studies*. Vol.52, No.2, 2000 p.230.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* p.232

thrust will be in strengthening the foreign policy on the economic aspect, with a view to mobilise international support for Russia's economic reforms, obtaining the inclusion of the country's economy in the world economics ties in competitive forms, easing the burden of military spending, solving the problem of foreign indebtedness, supporting Russian entrepreneurs and carrying out cooperation projects involving conversion problems. Further, the document emphasized that the foreign economic policy will be an organic part of Russia's overall course in the world arena. This requires an effective co-ordination of the policy within the framework of a single foreign policy line aimed at ensuring the country's national interests and priorities in international affair.<sup>8</sup>

The concept underlines that Russia will pursue a course of partnership and allied relation with the West in order to facilitate Russia's harmonious incorporation into the international economic ties and will ensure political, financial, technical and expert advice and support for the economic reforms in Russia.

Later in the foreign policy document of 2000 the economic constrain of Russia has been more prominent. The document contemplate that the "uppermost priority" of Russian foreign policy is to ensure "economic security of the country" to create a favourable external condition for steady development of Russia, and improving its economy.<sup>9</sup> The document underlines the creation of the uni-polar world order has been based on the economic might of United States. Russia has been the proponent of multi-polar world and "globalisation of world economy". The document further

---

<sup>8</sup> Kozyrev Offers Draft Foreign-policy Guidelines, *The Current Digest of Post-Soviet* Vol.XLIV no.48 (1992) p.15.

<sup>9</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2000 <http://www.mid.ru/eng/econcept.htm>

asserts that Russia's interest vest on the "intensification of the role of Group Eight", "the IMF" and the "World Bank" in present financial economic system.

The third part of Foreign Policy Concept, "Priorities of the Russian Federation in Resolving Global Problems" sub heading "International Economic Relation" talks at length about the priorities and commitments of Russia in economic sphere. The concept proposes that the main priority of Russia in the international economic relation is to promote the development of the national economy by integrating Russian economy with world economy. Russia ensures the appropriate environment and conditions for the market economy by reducing further risk for economic integration. Therefore, Russian Foreign Policy Concept calls for a fair international trade system, expansion of domestic export and rationalization of import into the country. Further the concept emphasizes that Russia shall work actively to attract foreign investment and shall form a comprehensive system based on Russian legislation and international legal and treaty basis in the economic sphere. To uphold the country's economic power the concept further stresses that Russia will utilise all available economic levers and resources.

Earlier to this concept of foreign policy the economic affairs of Russia has occupied a sizeable space in the National Security Concept of 1997, which was approved by then President Yeltsin. The concept emphasises that the most important threats to Russian security lay not in the international system but in Russia's internal conditions. The concept further proposes that Russia's internal threats arise from economic decline, and instability; and societal problems such as poor health and unemployment and they must be addressed through economic reforms.

After the National Security Concept of 1997, present Russian President Vladimir Putin has endorsed another National Security Concept in 2000. This document also envisages the role of economics ever increasing after the end of bipolar confrontation. According to the Concept, Russia continues to play “an important role in the global processes by virtue of its great economic, scientific, technological and military potential and its unique strategic location on the Eurasian Continent”.<sup>10</sup> Further, the Concept underlines that “there are prospects for the Russian Federation’s wider integration into the world economy and for comprehensive cooperation with international economic and financial institutions”.<sup>11</sup> Russia feels that there are forces, which are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia “economically politically, militarily and in other ways”.

The concept emphasises that Russia’s national interests in the economic sphere are of key importance and can be assured only on the basis of “sustainable economic development”. This document like the document of 1997 recognises that the national economy with other factors is creating extensive internal and external threats to the country’s security.

Russia perceives that the internal and external threats in economy are comprehensive in nature and are caused by substantial contraction in gross domestic product; reduced investment; diminished scientific and technological potential; stagnation in agriculture; a distorting banking system; growth in the states internal and

---

<sup>10</sup> Russian National Security Concept 2000, *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye* 14 Jan 2000, p.1

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* p. 1.



external debt; and domination of exports by fuel, raw materials and energy components of imports by food and consumer items, including consumer essentials.

The Concept also pronounces that the adverse trends in the Russian economy lie at the root of separatist aspiration of a number of constituent parts of Russian federation, which lead to political instability and weakening of Russia's unified economic domain and its important components such as its industrial production, transportation links, finance, banking, credit and tax system.

The Concept emphasises the need to improve the economy and follow an independent and socially oriented economic policy. Russia entrusts to take effective action in currency regulation, to pave the way for an end of payments in foreign currency on the domestic market and to end the uncontrolled export of capital. The main directions for ensuring the national security of Russian Federation in matters of the domestic economy are legal support for reforms, creation of an effective mechanism for monitoring the observance of Russian federation legislation towards strengthening state regulation in the economy and taking measures to improve the system for the well being of people. The priority of economic factors in the social sphere is fundamentally important for strengthening the state, ensuring real implementation of social safeguard based on state support, and developing mechanisms for collective responsibility, democratic decision making and social partnership.

From the above analysis of the documents with reference to the economic affairs of Russia, it is clear that Russian government and policy makers express a

higher level of concern about the deteriorating economic condition of the country and are trying hard to solve the economic problem of the country to bring Russia out of the 'sinking' economy. The economic reforms have been the prime task of the government since the inception of new Russia involving the policy makers and leadership most of the time. Therefore, it has become a constraint on foreign policy and national security. So far, due to economic benefits from the Western powers, Russian diplomacy has failed to recuperate power and prestige in international arena. These documents highlight the submissive character of Russia to the international pressures.

### **THE NEAR ABROAD**

The Near abroad has been another major component, which is instrumental in shaping the foreign policy and Russian National Security Policy. With the emergence of nationalistic forces in the Russian political sphere, Kozyrev shifted Russia's foreign policy priorities towards the space, which surrounds its periphery. There were number of reasons for this profound shift. The fundamental explanation was the deterioration of Russia's economic and social state, a growing dissatisfaction among the population with the result of economic reforms, first the shock therapy, and then the collapse of IMF model in August 1998. There was also a growing mood in favour of Russia's self-assertiveness, to find a clear-cut Russian national mission with in world politics and in defending it with all available instruments including military power as in Chechnya. There was also an increasing repugnance of the idea of a new World Order with universal values, international legal encroachments upon the action of Russia and other idealistic propositions as guideline of the policy. Greater

acceptance was given to anti- Western sentiments which started to appear more prominently in the public consciousness and with in the political debate.

The Russian relation with the near abroad came to the forefront of theoretical debate and practical policymaking, dwarfing other international concerns; the only exception had been to obtain foreign credits and economic assistance. The most important feature towards this shift according to scholars has been culminated in an expanding support for what was called Russian "Monroe doctrine". Yeltsin for the first time expressed the Russian interests in near abroad in an appeal to United Nations in early 1993 to entrust to Russia the mission of ensuring stability in the former Soviet Union geopolitical space.<sup>12</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shifted its policy that was overwhelmingly focused on the West to a much more assertive policy towards the near abroad. By late 1992, Russian foreign policy had started a shift from an 'outward- in' to an 'inward-out' focus on the countries of former Soviet Union as the first priority. The interaction of three factors; the struggle for political power in Moscow and the politicisation of the foreign policy; the influential alternative views proposed by different groups and policy-making bodies; and the development of events in the former Soviet Union encouraged this. These factors led the foundation of a centrist consensus on policy towards the near abroad.

During 1992, the near abroad remained a main source of threat for Russia. The Ministry of Defence attempted to protect Russian interests in these countries through bilateral agreements. The near abroad was recognized as a region of vital interests. Later in 1996, Primakov's foreign ministry tenure brought greater

---

<sup>12</sup> Alexei Arbatov "Russian Domestic Politics, Foreign Affairs and Geopolitical Considerations" in David Carlton and Paul Ingram, *The Search for Stability in Russia and the Former Soviet Bloc* (Aldershot, Sydney: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997) p.20.

consistency to the Russian foreign policy with respect to the near abroad. Dov Lynch is of the opinion that “since 1993, Russia has followed ‘Russia first’ integrationist policy towards the CIS, differentiated according to region and function and underpinned by bilateral relation.”<sup>13</sup> The near abroad especially the CIS member states has been explicitly drawn government attention. It has been another constraint on Russian foreign as well as on security policy for many reasons. Most of these countries have been the home of ethnic Russian. In addition, the influx of Russian refugees from these states would not only create more difficulties but also create political turmoil at home by providing important ammunition to the ultra nationalistic armoury. Russia has both defensive and offensive interests in these territories. It has to promote stability in this region and prevent conflicts from spilling into Russia itself. It has to prevent the emergence of a vacuum in the territories of these former Soviet republics. In the words of Kozyrev’s this vacuum can attract the “unfriendly forces” which will jeopardise the Russian security and territorial integrity. Consequently, Russia has been providing economic assistance to placate states where Russians feel insecure. These economic aids have created more problems to Russian economy, which is already burdened with foreign debt.

In the initial years of Russia’s transformation Russia provided 60 billion rubles as aids to Tajikistan, 75 billion rubles credit to Kyrgyzstan alone for the project, to encourage the Russians stay in these republics. Moreover, Russia psychologically cannot leave the habit of ‘Big Brother’ and has been trying to bring these countries under Russian sphere of influence. Most of these countries for last 10 decade has been the dormant partners of Russia so their dependence on Russia is not

---

<sup>13</sup> Dov Lynch, *Russian Peace Keeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan* (Hampshire, London: MacMillan Press Ltd. 2000) p.7.

surprising one. These countries of near abroad had no idea of 'independence' so they may take few years to come out of the historical legacy of Soviet Union.

Russia also has been providing military assistance to these countries beside economic assistance to have its say and grip over them. In the foreign policy concept of 1993 it has been mentioned that priority will be given to the relation with "nearby foreign countries", especially for those, which are of "geopolitical" importance to Russia, and have "a direct bearing on both the fate of international transformations in Russia and its position in the international arena".<sup>14</sup>

Russia with the countries of immediate geopolitical environment will pursue its "strategic goal" by forming a "belt" of good neighbourliness around it. It further says that in the long run the CIS will be an influential regional and international organization. The concept further proposes that Russia will actively participate and help the countries of near abroad in stabilizing their domestic situations, setting and preventing conflicts, defending their borders and provide military political cooperation, and organize mutually advantageous economic co-operations with states that pose significant financial and credit possibilities.

The national security concept of 1997 also proposes to create peaceful environment around Russia's periphery and uphold a leading role in the countries of near abroad. The national security concept of 2000 like the concept of 1997, foresees "the emergence of foreign military bases and major military presence in the immediate proximity of Russia" as a threat to its national security as well as a factor

---

<sup>14</sup> Kozyrev offers Draft Foreign Policy Guidelines, *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press* Vol. XLIV, No.48, (200) p.15.

to weaken Russia and the CIS's integration process.<sup>15</sup> According to the document, Russia's integrative associations with the members of CIS will not only incapacitate the escalation of conflict near the state boarder and external borders of CIS state but also create a single economic domain with them.<sup>16</sup> The concept purposes that Russia will also "expand mutually beneficial international collaboration in law and order with the states of CIS. A spiritual renewal of society is impossible without preserving the role of Russian language as a factor of spiritual unity and as the language of intercourse among CIS member states. The importance of near abroad has been also incorporated in the Foreign policy concept of the Russian federation of 2000.

Under the heading "Regional priorities" the document purposes that Russia is the largest Eurasian power with respect to its geopolitical position and its priority area is to ensure conformity of multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the states of CIS. The foreign policy document emphasised that the relation with CIS countries will be of "strategic partnership in nature".<sup>17</sup> Russia will determine the parameters and character of its interaction with CIS member states.

Russia's priority task is also to strengthen the Union of Belarus and Russia. The concept further proposes that Russia will take serious attempts towards setting conflicts in these states, to create a free trade zone, and implement programmes for the joint rational use of the natural resources. The concept underlines that "specifically, Russia will work for the elaboration of such a status, of the Caspian Sea as would enable the littoral states to launch mutually advantageous cooperation in using the region's resources on a fair basis and taking into account the legitimate

---

<sup>15</sup> National Security Concept, 2000. *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye* 14 Jan. 2000. p.3.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* p.4-5.

<sup>17</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, *op.cit.* p.1253.

interests of each other. The Russian Federation will make efforts to ensure and the fulfilments of mutual obligations on the preservation and augmentation of the joint cultural heritage in the CIS member states.

Putin, after coming to the power, has emphasised that the co-operation with the CIS will be of “absolute top priority”. He also took measures to strengthen the mechanism of CIS such as making consensus on common border defence, common currency, and combined nationality with President Lukashenko and Kuchma of Belarus and Ukraine respectively. He is also promoting collective security cooperation with the members of CIS. The joint military exercise with Central Asian state “CIS Southern Shield 2000” is an example where Putin discussed economic, military security opportunities with these countries. Scholars are of the opinion that CIS will be a powerful strategic backbone for stabilizing neighbourhood balance against NATO and rebuilding major power status.<sup>18</sup>

## **THE MILITARY**

Since the Soviet military withdrawal from Easter Europe and subsequent collapse of Warsaw pact. Russian military had undergone dramatic changes. And the process of changes has been continuing till today. Military that had been accustomed to have the highest priority for funding, staff, and material is adjusting itself with its diminishing status in the world of ‘conventional forces’. During military transition, the problems which military leadership is facing, has been the result of the reforms

---

<sup>18</sup> L’iu Guiling, “Russian Foreign Policy in Putin Presidency” *Strategic Digest*, September, 2000 p. 1258.

initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev.<sup>19</sup> Military has lost military equipment and infrastructures since 1985. Its work force system is disintegrating, the officers are disenchanting, and there is a sharp decline in equipment and combat readiness. The military condition of Russia is directly affected by Russian conditions of economy. The Military continues to suffer by the chronic shortage of funds. The armed forces have been decreased in size. When new Russia came into existence, the Russian armed forces numbered just under 3 million. As of January 1996, their authorized strength has been 1,469,900 less than half of the 1992 strength. Most of the Units are understaffed. In 1994 and 1995 alone, 600,000 positions were cut down.

The Russian government passed a law on Defence in September 1992, which introduced the concept of mixed staffing into the armed forces. The plan was to serve 100,000 contracts in 1993, to reach 30 percent of the total service man reduced by 1995 and 50 percent by 2000.<sup>20</sup> In February 1993, a Law on Military Services has been passed by the parliament, which temporarily reduces the service terms. According to the Defence Minister Sergeyev, the Law on Service further reduced the armed force intake to 130,000 in 1988. Ministry of Defence faced another problem after the dissolution- the problem of desertion, which undermines the Russian defence policy. According to Ministry of Defence figures issued in February 1993, 120 service men were deserting every week. There was an increasing outflow of officers especially junior officers taking place in Russian military. There was a sharp reduction in the defence expenditure due to Russia's economic decline, which continues till today. Estimates suggest that Russian defence budget which stood

---

<sup>19</sup> Cited in Douglas L. Clarke "Military: Another Year of Frustration and Humiliations" in Josephine Schmidt, *Building Democracy: The OMRI Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1996) p.239.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p.65



around 52.5 US \$ billion in 1985 has fallen to \$ 29 billions in 1993. There cuts in defence expenditure caused a sheltering loss to the officer corps. The salaries have fallen dramatically in comparison to civil educational and professional levels. Sizeable officers and their dependants remained without proper housing. The pay arrears problem has reached “catastrophic levels” by 1998.

Military was facing a severe problem in maintaining the equipments due to poor budget allocations. This maintenance problem became so severe that 40 percent of MIG – 24 strike helicopters has to be grounded by year 2000 according to a report. Some military personals even affirmed that the weapons in the ‘Strategic Missile Forces’ are almost wrecked. The drop in military procurement has decreased the combating effectiveness of Russian Military. The disastrous role of military in Chechnya has been analysed under said parameter. However, the value of weapon export is increasing in Russia. It nearly doubled in 1995 \$ 2.7 billions from \$ 1.5 billions in 1994.<sup>21</sup> Putin restarted building confidence in Russian Military. After the armed forces episode in Chechnya he initiated armed reforms and insisted on retaining Strategic Missile Forces. He has planned to create a small but fully professional army to tackle the declining standard and low morale in the armed forces. However, his plans to do so by cutting armed forces has been facing opposition from the top military brass and security council.

The foreign policy concept of 1993 underlines that Russia’s interests in military sphere by stating that “Russia’s interests are bringing military potential into line with the new structure of challenges and threats, based on the principle of

---

<sup>21</sup> Douglas L. Clarke op.cit. p.239-40.

defensive sufficiency”.<sup>22</sup> The document further laid the emphasis that concrete step will be taken in military reforms according to the country’s economic possibilities. The ‘military problems’ has been so acute that Russia brought so many documents, or concepts related to the military or armed forces. Researcher has dealt with them in the previous chapters such as Military doctrine of 1993, Law on Security, Military doctrine of 2000, National Security Policy Concept of 1997 and foreign policy concept of 2000, and National Security Concept of 2000. Most of the cited documents emphasised on military reforms and the mistakes made in initial stage of these reforms. The National Security concept of 2000, has underlined that Russia’s national interests can be ensured only by “restructuring and conversion of defence industry, which should proceed without detriment with the development of science and new technological opportunities and the modernisation of armament and the presence of Russian manufacturers on the world market”.<sup>23</sup> The Kursk episode further highlights the declining military competency of Russia and the problems of maintenance, which the country is facing to look after huge ‘military industrial complex’ inherited from Soviet Union. These problems have made military a constraint, which is ‘influencing Russia’s foreign and national security discourse. So it has been a major contributor to the ‘inputs’ of foreign and national security documents.

## SEPARATISM

Besides above discussed factors there are many other factors, which have become the constraints in pursuing foreign and national security policies. These

---

<sup>22</sup> Kozyrev Offers Draft – Foreign Policy Guidelines op.cit. p.15.

<sup>23</sup> National Security Concept of 2000, op.cit. pp.4-5.

'factors' falls outside the remit of this study. They occur 'inside' Russian Federation borders, hence lie within the realm of domestic policy. The vital of these factors are separatist tendency like Chechnya and Centre-peripheral relation where some regions are given more privileges and some are held back. Such discrimination has resulted in 'regionalist forces', which contributes a lot of threat to Russian Federation unity. These trends have been indirectly incorporated in to the Foreign Policy Concepts and National Security Concepts. Most of the documents report the "sovereignty and territorial integrity", "law and order", "civil peace", as essential components to establishing democracy in Russia. These documents emphasise that Russia is committed to fight "ethno- political issues" people or region pursuing separatist and "anti-constitutional" activity. Russia will make efforts to fight crime, and corruption, which are impeding the Russian consolidation.

The National Security Concept of 2000 underlines that, "it is very much in Russia's interests to uproot the economic and socio-political causes of these socially dangerous phenomenon and to draw up a comprehensive system for protecting individuals, society and the state against criminality."<sup>24</sup> Russia perceives the secession of Chechnya as a terrorist activity. Except for the Foreign policy concept of 1993, most of other documents emphasised to fight "terrorism" "drug trade" and smuggling with countermeasures to put an end to such activities. The drafting of legislation on crime was slower in Russia than anticipated. The absence of criminal code, law of organised crime and corruption for long period have hampered the fight against crime and corruption.

---

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

## SOCIAL PROBLEMS

In the social sector the government in order to stabilise macroeconomics and to control high inflation made cuts in its expenditure which resulted in the fall of the living standard of large number of state sector employees and people reliant upon pensions and other social benefits. A record 50 million people were living below the poverty line in February 1995.<sup>25</sup>

The unemployment has been on rampant. The unemployed workers registered with the federal employment services rose from 1.6 million at the end of 1994, to 2.3 million by the end of 1995. According to the International Labour organisation the number of jobless people increased from 5.3 to 6 million by the end of 1995.<sup>26</sup> The health care system has been collapsing and maintains a poor standard of hygiene. The incidents of diphtheria, tuberculosis, hepatitis, syphilis were increasing sharply. The higher sickness rate of pregnant women and children has been recorded. The economic decline has caused stress and people were consuming more alcohol, which played a high role in mortality rate.

These are some of the social problems, which have been covered in the documents. All above discussions make clear how the domestic factors have been affecting the Russia's Foreign and National Security discourse. These domestic factors not only are affecting the new Russia's political, economic transformation but have become domestic constraints and mould Russian political and economical

---

<sup>25</sup> Cited in Josephine Schemidt, *op.cit.* pp. 8-10.

<sup>26</sup> ITAR – TASS. 19 February, 1996.

transformation to a larger extent in their favour making certain compromises on independent foreign and security policy discourse.

*Conclusion*

## CONCLUSION

A comprehensive analysis of Russia's foreign policy and security policy has been undertaken. Historical review of the two policies shows continuity and change since the Soviet days. Roughly the break in the foreign policy and security policy formations can be broadly categorised into nine phases. The one notable characteristic in Russia is that like in other nation-states, the domestic or internal factors, which influence the foreign policy and security policy have in fact been found to have acted as constraints in Russia's foreign policy and security policy perspectives.

During the early years in the autocratic Soviet regime, Russia followed an expansionist and defensive foreign and security policy. Its drive was mainly catalyzed by the motive to control seaports for trade and economic reasons. As mentioned earlier the Tsarist expansionist policy could be explained by the peculiar Russian geopolitical setting, the particular regime type and Russia's aspiration towards the Baltic, Black Sea and warmer water of the Pacific Ocean. At time such an orientation catered to internal despotism as were is the case of Ivan III and Ivan IV. Peter the Great introduced a notable achievement during the Tsarist regime while he followed the expansionist policy with a different aim. He was more concerned to modernize and industrialize Russia towards building a capitalist development.

The shift in the foreign policy and security policy perception came with Nicholas I coming to the throne. This was the first break in Russia's foreign and security policy

conceptualisation. He introduced an inward looking policy. The domestic situation was a changed scenario especially after the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, which added a blow to the already declining economic health of the state. Then, the constitutional arrangement was weak hindering democratic development and there was deterioration in the social and other sphere of life. An immediate internal reform was a must, which Nicholas I sought to bring by concentrating his time and energy in the internal affairs of the state. The second drastic change to Russia's foreign and security policy evolved after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. The first aim of the Bolsheviks was to withdraw its army from ongoing World War I, because, 'peace', according to Lenin was needed to build up the country. As a strategy to built socialism Lenin followed war communism. During this period Russia pursued an isolationist foreign policy in accordance with war communism. Later when war communism failed, as evident by famine and economic and financial crisis, Lenin adopted New Economic Policy.

The overall changes in Lenin's developmental strategy comprised under New Economic Policy catapulted corollary changes in its foreign policy but did not affect the security policy. In the foreign policy front Lenin revised the earlier isolationist policy and moved towards 'competitive business like' relationship with the capitalistic world. While Lenin put forward the policy of accommodating the capitalist world, at the same time he propagated the idea of socialist revolution through Comintern in rest of the world. Peaceful coexistence with the Western world was highlighted to get Western aids and loans to rebuild the economy of the country, but on the other hand security policy remained the same. When the Bolsheviks came to power they displayed a degree of



concern about their survival. They believed that state sovereignty will lose its meaning and class solidarity would override national differences once socialism is established. The security problem would thus no longer present itself in its traditional form viz., aggression and war from other countries.

New Economic Policy continued up to 1929 but when there were no expected gains by pursuing this policy Stalin overhauled it and introduced five-year centralized planning, to speed up agricultural productions and rapid industrialisation. Side by side he abandoned the earlier idea of international communist revolution in theory and replaced it by the idea of socialism in one country which should be completed first in Soviet Union then spread out to rest of the world.

Thereby a shift occurred in the foreign and security policy formulations. A dual policy of diplomacy was followed. On the one hand Stalin continued the policy of retrenchment presenting Russia as the champion of collective security. This was the open part of the policy, which functioned under Litvinov. On the other side the previous policy of Comintern standing for socialist revolution was followed as a secret policy.

The visible gains were seen in the production sectors such as in agriculture and industry in mid 1930's through the initiation of centralised planning. In order to safeguard these gains Stalin promoted co-operation with the West. As a part of this plan and to get more financial and other gains from the West Stalin used the platform of Comintern to wage an ideological concrete war against Fascism and Nazism. Stalin's

statesmanship put Soviet Union at an advantageous position. As the World War II was about to begin Western democracies felt indispensable the support of Soviet Union for without her help the might of Germany and Japan could not be defeated. Once the war ended and the menace of German, Italy and Japan was put to an end (through alliance with the West), Stalin launched his attack towards West again, thereby, the bringing of cold war. In Tehran conference Soviet Union bargained to get back her lost territories from Germany, Japan etc. and exercised her influence in the East European countries.

The end of World War II produced two superpowers - Soviet Union and United States. The beginning of cold war and up to the last days of Stalin, Soviet Union's foreign policy and security policy could be characterised as a mixture of many components. One was Soviet Union's astute resolution to maintain her sway over the East European countries and protect them against the economic temptation given by United States and through Marshall plan. Secondly, her aggressive stand to meet the challenge of NATO by starting Cominform. And finally, Soviet Union's willingness to support the progressive section of the society fighting liberation and anti-colonial movements in the Asian, African and Latin American countries. At the same time, Soviet Union was willing to co-operate with western democracies. To conclude, Soviet foreign policy during the Stalin era incorporated the characteristics of expansionism and maintenance of status quo, astuteness and miscalculation, success and failure.

Khrushchev started his de-Stalinisation programme and introduced major changes in foreign policy. He renewed the concept of peaceful co-existence, which the Lenin

started. He was convinced that imperialism was as dangerous as before and resolved to defend socialism. His Cuban missile venture got a set back and he started again following the path of peaceful co-existence. On colonial question, he gave extensive help to the colonised countries considering them as a 'peace zone'. Not many changes occurred after Khrushchev. The military industrial complex achieved its height during Brezhnev period. The notable was that stagnation had started to show its sign in political, economic and social sphere during Brezhnev period. He introduced détente in order to keep Russia away from war and Western isolation. By mid 1970. The system was totally stagnant. He signaled that Russia could not maintain the parity with the West due to declining economic status of the country. So as to reduce the military expenditure he started demilitarization and put more emphasis on consumer industry. Gorbachev further continued this under his political philosophy of 'new thinking'.

Gorbachev reemphasized the interdependency and interconnectivity among the countries. He noted about military threat and also the importance of human values. His priorities were economic and political reconstruction. He too declared that Soviet Union was not on equal footing with the West in economic sphere.

In the security policy, demilitarisation and a unilateral policy was started. From this time onward radical changes were introduced under the programme of Glasnost and Perestroika to bring back Soviet Union on the path of progress. This very act resulted in the disintegration of Soviet Union. As a point of his new thinking troops were called

back from Afghanistan, relations and treaties were enhanced with China, United States etc., and demolition of Warsaw pact came into fore front.

The imminent result was the occurrence of “velvet revolution” in Eastern Europe and finally the break down of Soviet Union. The finding of this study is that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and with the democratisation of Russia into a liberal country, domestic factors started to act as constraints on the foreign policy which vis-à-vis affected the national security policy formulations.

Soon after disintegration the democratic president, Boris Yeltsin, moved closer to West for partnership. He started a policy of ignoring other important countries in order to have close ties with the Western powers and financial institutions. The nationalistic forces opposed this move and tried to capitalise on the opportunity by sliding Yeltsin regime when shock therapy of 1992 failed. The nationalistic forces with in the Parliament were pressuring the executive to follow the confrontational policy with the West and integration with the countries of near abroad, which were earlier overlooked.

In the beginning of new Russia the national interests were not well defined, the economy was in shambles and finally those military hoops which were called back started to act as a burden on the state economy. These factors could not possibly determine a well-defined course of foreign policy as how Russia should maintain its relation with the West and near abroad.

After, the 1993 election and before the adoption of the Russian constitution, the confrontational conflict between the executive and the parliament became sharper. The foreign policy during this time was unclear, the institutional mechanism of foreign policy execution was poorly and haphazardly developed, which could not be coordinated within its branches. The reason being the old Brezhnev constitution which was still functioning, whereas there was need of a new law to regulate the rules of the game. After the adoption of a constitution in 1993, the sphere of foreign policy solely belonged to the executive as act of balance was brought about. Theoretically, foreign policy moved closed with the near abroad, resisted against NATO's eastward expansion but simultaneously promoted peace with NATO.

After the parliamentary election of 1995, Primakov introduced new changes in the foreign policy framework particularly in Russia's relation with the West. Retracing from the earlier inception of partnership with the West, the new slogan was competitive partnership. Interestingly, after the presidential election of 1996 and with the reelection of Yeltsin, he declared NATO and the West as an external threat to Russia. He denounced the unilateral move of United States and declared that what the world needed was multi polar world. However, up to the smooth transfer of powers to Putin, he remained a sick President.

The constraints of the foreign and security policy formulations had their origin in Russia's domestic upheavals. Moscow's relation with the periphery is another important constraint on Russia's foreign and security policy. There had been complaints regarding

partial resource allocations and unequal treatment given to the republics, oblasts and regions. Moreover, in the sphere of center periphery relations the “subjects” of the Russian federation had complaints against the 1993 constitution, which did not contain many provision of the federation treaty of 1992. Over and above Moscow had to wage a war against Chechnya to save Russia from further spillover effect and involve its military in Tartarstan, Tajikistan and Georgia to safeguard its national interests. These problems hindered the formulation of precise national interest as well as foreign and security policy. Yeltsin accepted that security challenges to Russia were not form abroad but from within itself.

Vladimir Putin undertook the latest move to reorient Russia’s foreign and security policies after taking charge of Russian President. As mentioned in the previous chapters, two important documents on foreign and security policy came out in 2000. These documents reemphasized the internal problems that Russia is facing viz., economic, social unrest, drugs, terrorism and unemployment. In spite of these problems Putin promises to pursue a pragmatic and balanced foreign and security policy. Putin’s foreign policy is a part of his overall strategy of recovery and development of the Russian federation. His concept of foreign policy is based on the changing international situation at the turn of the century. The movement towards an uni-polar system and the weakening role of United Nations is seen as threat to Russia’s national security. Given this, Russia seeks to have multi polar world system, collective resolution on key problems and on the priority of law and democratisation of international relations. At the same time Russia promises to reduce its nuclear arsenal. Russia also promises to uphold human rights and

human value with a recurring emphasis to help the developing countries of the third world.

So far in the sphere of national security, after the inception of new Russia two concepts were brought first in 1997 and then in 2000. As per the 1997 declaration Russia does not intend to enter into confrontation with any country. The same is reported in the concept of 2000. Russia also does not intend to be a hegemonic European power. Russia does not intend to begin a new ideological or psychological war in Europe or elsewhere in the world. The only major shift, which Russia has taken, is that of its defensive security policy. It clearly departs from the Soviet promise of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons. Now Russia manifests that in case of any aggression it will use its nuclear arsenal thus making Russian approach defensive.

Russia remains committed to play a major role in Asia. Finally both the documents highlight the internal security problems which are troubling Russia. The National Security Concept of 2000 exposes the Russian fear of NATO expansion, which could threaten its peace. Finally we can conclude that Russia have followed different foreign policy and security policy contingent upon time and as demanded by developments within her own soil and from outside. Through out her history, which has taken different shapes – as a tsarist autocratic regime, the authoritarian communist regime, a transitional state or a liberal state her foreign policy and security policy have taken different paths. As of present, as mentioned, domestic factors work as a bulwark against her foreign and security policy. Internal problems ranging from economic to

terrorism are plenty. Yet, the inauguration of the Putin regime promises to have its share in international relations, to promote peace and development and safeguard humanitarian values- against all odds.



## *Bibliography*

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Sources

- “Kozyrev Offers Draft on Foreign Policy Guidelines”, Russian Foreign Ministry Press Release.
- “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation”, (17 December 1997), Russian Foreign Ministry Press Release
- “Basic Foreign Policy Principle of Russia”, (23 April, 1993), Russian National Security Council Release.
- “Russian Federation Military Doctrine”, (November 1993), Russian Defence Ministry Release.
- “National Security Concept of 2000”, (14 January 2000), Russian Foreign Ministry Press Release.
- “The Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation”, (28 June 2000), Russian Foreign Ministry Press Release.

### Secondary Sources

#### *Books*

- Aldred, Ken and Martin A Smith, *Super Powers in the Post Cold War Era* (Hampshire, London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1999).
- Alexseev, Mikhail A. (ed.), *Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia: A Federation Imperialed* (Hampshire, London: MacMillian Press Ltd., 1999)
- Allard, Sven, *Russia and Austrian State Treaty: A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970).

- Anthony, I, (ed.), *Russia and the Arm Trade (SIPRI)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- Aslund, Anders, *How Russia Became a Market Economy* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
- Baev, Pavel K., *The Russian Army in a Time of Trouble* (London, California, New Delhi: Sage Publications Ltd., 1996).
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Russia's Policies in the Caucasus* (London: Chameleon Press Ltd., 1997).
- Baranovsky, Vladimir (ed.), *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
- Barylski, Robert V., *The Soldier in Russian Politics: Duty, Dictatorship and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin* (New Jersey: Transaction Publisher, 1998).
- Batalden, Stephen K., and Sandra L. Batalden, *The Newly Independent State of Eurasia: A Handbook of Former Soviet Republic*, Second Edition (Arizona: The Oryx Press, 1997)
- Beloff, Max (ed.), *Beyond the Soviet Union: The Fragmentation of Power* (Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore Sydney: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1997).
- Bestuzhev, Igorv. *Risk for Russia's Security in the Next Decade: Repercussions on the Country's Domestic Foreign and Defense Policy* (A forecast and Scenarios miss paper Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies January 2000), (Stampa: Stabiliments Grofice Militare GAETA).
- Blum, Douglar W. (ed.), *Russia's Future: Consolidation or Disintegration* (Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1994)
- Bowker, Mike, *Russian Foreign Policy and End of Cold War* (England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1997).
- Braham, Randolph L. (ed.), *Soviet Politics, and Government: A Reader* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1965)

- Brown, Archie, Machael Kaser and Gerald S. Smith (eds.), *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Russia and the former Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944).
- Bubin, Barnett R., Jack Snyder, *Post-Soviet Political Order*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1998).
- Buzan, Barry and Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (London, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1998).
- \_\_\_\_\_, *People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Chaptal hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983).
- \_\_\_\_\_, *The National Security Problem: International Relation* (London: Harestor Press Ltd., 1983).
- Byrnes, Francis, Robert (ed.), *US Policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: Selected Essays 1956-1988* (Oxford. West New Press Inc., 1989).
- Carlton, David and Paul Ingram (eds.), *The Search for Stability in Russia and the Former Soviet Bloc* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publication Ltd., 1977).
- Chenoy, Anuradha M., *The Making of New Russia* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publication Pvt. Ltd., 2001).
- Chufrin, Gennady (ed.), *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)
- Clawson, Patrick L. (ed.), *Energy and National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Washington DC: National Defence University Paris, 1995).
- Cleary, Richards Laura. *Security System in Transition* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998).
- Cooper, Lee. *Soviet Reforms and Beyond* (Hampshire, London: McMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991).
- D'Encausse. Helene Carrere, *The End of Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
- Dawisha, Adeed, Karen Dawisha (eds.), *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1995).

- Desai, Padma, *Perestroika in Perspective: The Design and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform* (London: I.B.Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1989).
- Donaldson, Robert H. and Joseph L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing System and Enduring Interests* (New York, London: M.E.Sharpe Inc., 1998)
- Dunlop B. John, *Russia confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- Edmonds, Robin, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-73: The Paradox of Super Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975)
- Fischer, Dietrich, *Non-Military Aspects of Security: A Systems Approach* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1993).
- Gorodetsky, Gabriel (ed.), *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1991: A Retrospective* (England: Frank Case and Company Ltd., 1994).
- Gregory, Paul R., Robert C. Stewart, *Russia and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure 6<sup>th</sup> edition* (New York: Addison Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1998).
- Gromyko, A.A., and B.N. Ponomarev (eds.), *Soviet-Foreign Policy: 1917-1945, Vol. I* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981):
- Gros, Daniel. Alfred Steinherr, *Winds of Change: Economic Transition in Central and Easter Europe* (London: Longman Group UK Ltd., 1995).
- Gupta, Arvind. *Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy: Lenin to Gorbachev* (New Delhi: Venus Publishing House, 1993).
- Gustafson. Thane, *Capitalism: Russian Style* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- Halm, Gordon M., *Russia's Revolution from Above (1985-2000): Reform, Transition and Revolution in the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 2002).
- Harter, Stefanie and Gerald Easter (eds.), *Shaping The Economic Space in Russia: Decision Making Processes, Institutions and Adjustment to change in the El'tsin Era* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2000).

- Hocking, Brian (ed.), *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation* (London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1999).
- Honneland Geir and Blakkisrud (eds.), *Centre – Periphery Relations in Russia: The case of the Northwestern Regions* (Aldershot, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001).
- Hudson, George E. (ed.), *National Security Policy Under Perestroika* (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1990).
- Ian, Bremmer, and Ray Taras (eds.), *New States, New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- Imam, Zafar, *Foreign Policy of Russia 1991-2000* (New Delhi: New Horizon Publishers, 2001).
- Johansen, Robert C., *The National Interest and the Women Interest* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980)
- Jones, Christopher D., *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger Publication, 1981).
- Jonson, Lena and Clive Archer (eds.), *Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia* (Boulder, Colorado, Oxford: Western Press Inc., 1996).
- Judah, Tim, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000).
- Kegley Jr., Charles W., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1997).
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
- Klare, Michael T. and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.), *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).
- Klein, Lawrence R., and Marshall Pomer (eds.), *The New Russia: Transition Gone Away* (California: Stanford University Press, 2001).
- Koji, Watanabe (ed.), *Engaging Russia in Asia Pacific* (Tokyo: JCIE Inc., 1999).

- Kozhemiakin, Alexander V., *Expanding the Zone of Peace: Democratization and International Security* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998).
- Krickus, Richard J. *Showdown the Lithuanian Rebellion and the Break up of the Soviet Empire* (Washington: Brassey's Inc., 1997).
- Lapidus, Gail W. (ed.), *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation* (Oxford: Westview Press Inc., 1995).
- Lenin, V.I., *Complete Collected Works*, Vol. 2, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1962)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Complete Collected Works*, Vol. 36 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1962)
- Lieberman, Sanford R., et.al., (eds.), *The Soviet Empire Reconsidered: Essays in Honour of Adam B. Ulam* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press Inc., 1994).
- Lynch, Dov, *Russian Peace Keeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan* (Hampshire, London: MacMillan Press Ltd. 2000).
- Malik, Hafeez (ed.) *The Role of the United States, Russia and China in the New World Order* (Hampshire, London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1997).
- Malik, Hafeez (ed.), *Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1990).
- Marlin, Pierre, and Mark, R. Brawley (eds.), *Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied force or Forced Allies* (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
- Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engles, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Appleton – Century – Crofts, 1955)
- Mazour, Anatole G., *Russia Tsarist and Communist* (Princeton: D.Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1962).
- McCauley, Martin, *The Soviet Union 1917-1991, Second Edition* (London, New York: Longman, 1993).
- Medvedev, Roy, *Post Soviet Russia – A Journey through the Yeltsin Era* (Translated and edited by George Shriver) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

- Miller, Lynn H., *Global Order: Value and Power in International Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990)
- Morrison, Philip and Kosta Tsipis, *Reason Enough to Hope: American and the World of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press 1988).
- Motyle, Alexander J., *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993)
- Neck, Laura, et.al., (eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1995).
- Nerlich, Uwe and Thomson James A (eds.), *Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe* (Oxford Westview Press Inc., 1988).
- Nijman, Jan, *The Geopolitics of Power and Conflict: Superpower in the International System 1945-1992* (New York, London: Belhaven Press, 1993).
- Nizameddin, Talal, *Russia and the Middle East: Towards a new Foreign Policy* (London: Hvrst and company, 1999).
- Nogee, Joseph L., (ed.), *Soviet Politics: Russia After Brezhnev* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985)
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Judson Mitchell. *Russian Politics: The Struggle for a New Order* (London: Allyn and Bacon, 1997)
- Nolan, Peter. *China's Rise Russia's Fall: Politics, Economics and Planning in the Transition from Stalinism* (London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1995).
- Nye Jr., Joseph S., *Understanding International Conflicts: An introduction to theory and History* (New York: Addison Westey Longman Inc., 2000).
- Ostreng, Willy (ed.), *National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the Ascetic – The Case of Northern Sea Routs* (Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
- Pearson, Raymond, *The Rise and Fall of Soviet Empire* (London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1998)



- Pipe, Caroline Kennedy, *Russia and the World 1917-1991* (London, New York, Sydney: Arnold, a member of Hodder Headline Group, 1998)
- Plano, Jack C., and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary* (USA: ABC – Clio. Inc., 1988).
- Ra'anana, Uri (ed.), *The Soviet Empire: The Challenge of National and Democratic Movements* (Massachusetts, Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990).
- Read, Christopher, *The Making and Breaking of the Soviet System* (Hampshire New York: Palgrave, 2001).
- Rosenau, James N., "National Interests" in David I. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (USA: McMillan Press, 1968) Vol. II,
- Rosser, Richard F., *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969)
- Rozman Gilbert, Nosov Mikhail G. Watanabe Koji (eds.), *Russia and East Asia: The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Security Environment* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1999).
- Rubin, Barnett R., Snyder, Jack (eds.), *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building* (London: Routledge, 1988).
- Saadat, Dager, and West Hobert, *Defense Security and Development* (London: Francis Publications, 1987).
- Saikal, Amin, and William Maley (eds.), *Russia in Search of its Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- Sakwa, Richard, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union* (London: Routledge, Taylor a Francis Group, 1999).
- Sarin, General Oleg, Dvoretzky, Colonel Lev, *Alien Wars: The Soviet Union's Aggressions against the World: 1919 to 1989* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996).
- Sarkesian, Sam C., *US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition* (London: Lynne Riennes Publishers, 1995)

- Schmidt, Josephine, *Building Democracy: The OMRI Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1996).
- Shearman, Peter (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1995).
- Smoke, Richard, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition*. (New York: Random House Publication, 1987)
- Snow, Donald M., *National Security: Defence Policy in a Changed International Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1988).
- Spillmann, Kurt R., and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *Russia Place in Europe: A Security Debate* (Bern: Peter Long AG, 1999).
- Srivastva, Vinayak N., *The Separation of the Party and State Political Leadership in Soviet and Post-Soviet Phases* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999).
- Strayer, Robert, *Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse: Understanding Historical Change* (London, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1998).
- Taras, Ray (ed.), *Post-communist Presidents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- Tetlock, Philip E., et.al., (eds.), *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
- Triska, Jan F., and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: The McMillan Company, 1968).
- Trofimenko, Henry, *Russian National Interests and the Current Crisis in Russia* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999)
- Vickers, Miranda, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (London: C. Hurst & Company Ltd., 1998).
- Waldron, Peter, *The end of Imperial Russia, 1855-1917* (London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1997)

Walker, Martin, *The Walking Giant: Soviet Union Under Gorbachev* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1986).

Waller J. Michael, *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today* (Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1994).

White, Stephen, *Russia's New Politics: The Management of Post Communist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

\_\_\_\_\_, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman *Developments in Russian Policies 4.* (Hampshire, London: Mcmillan Press Ltd. 1997)

Wilson, Andrew, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Wolf Jr., Charter, *Linking Economic Policy and Foreign Policy* (London, Brunswick: Transaction Published, 1991).

Wolfe, Thomas W., *Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-70* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1970)

Zwick, Peter, *Soviet Foreign Relations Process and Policy* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1990)

### *Articles*

"The CIS Security Co-operation: Problems and Prospects", C-emis Paper, Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies N.4/2000. Institute for Strategic Studies "Studies and Analysis Moscow" (Stampa: Stabilimento Grafico Militare Gaeta).

Alexseev, Mikhail A., "Decentralisation Versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia's Endurance", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No.1, 2001, pp. 101-106.

Aslund, Anders, "Russia's Current Economic Dilemma: A Comment", *Post-Soviet Affairs*. Vol. 5, No. 1, 1990, pp.83-86.

- Betz, David, "No Place for a Civilian: Russian Defence Management from Yeltsin to Putin", <http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/bedo1>
- Brown, Archie, "The Russian Crisis: Beginning or End?", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1999, pp. 36-73.
- Butorina, Olga, "Implication of the Russian Crisis", *Post-Communist Economics*, Vol.12, No.4, 2000, pp. 409-424.
- Colton, Timothy J. and Michel McFaul, "Reinventing Russia's Party of Power: "Unity" and the 1999 Duma Election", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 16, No.3, 2000, pp.201-224.
- Glumicie, Dragan, "Foreign Policy Initiatives of the Russian Federation", *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. LI, No.1096, August 2000, pp. 18-21.
- Grebenichenko, Sergei, F.. "Where Is Russia Going And Why?", *Social Science Review* .Vol.41, No.5, Sept.-Oct.2000. pp. 85-103.
- Hedlund, Stepfan, "Path Dependence in Russian Policy Making: Constraints on Putin's Economic Choice", *Post-Communist Economics*, Vol.12, No.4, 2000, pp. 389-407.
- Herd, Graeme P., "Russia and the Politics of 'Putinism'", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol, 38, No. 1, 2001, pp.107-112.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Russia: Systemic Transformation or Federal Collapse?", *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 36, No. 3. 1999. pp. 259-269.
- Hoagland, Jim, "Russia's Restive Military". *Washington Post*, 29th June, 2000.
- Hoffman, David, "Primakov Accused of Inaction on Economic Front", *Washington Post*, 12th March 1999.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Putin Steps Towards Tighter Control", *Washington Post*, 1st July 2000.
- Kassianova, Alla, "Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.53, No.6, 2001, pp.821-839.

- Kincade, William H., and Cynthia M. Nolan, "Troubled Triangle: Russia, Ukraine and the United States", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March, 2001, pp. 104-142.
- Kontorovich, Valadimir, "Can Russia Resettle the Far East?", *Post-Communist Economics*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2000, pp. 365-385.
- Orttung, Robert, "Kremlin Has Many Tools to Keep Even Elected Governors in Line" *Russian Regional Report*, Vol. 5, No. 8, 1 March 2000, <http://iews.org/rrrabout.nsf>.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Resourceful Governors Able to Counter Kremlin" *Russian Regional Report*, Vol. 5, No. 10, 15<sup>th</sup> March 2000, <http://iews.org/rrrabout.nsf>.
- Peter, Rutland, "Putin Path to Power", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol.16, No.4, 2000, pp. 313-355.
- Rainone, Zebulon T., "Democracy Stalled: Evaluating the Russian Federation Today", *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXXII, No.2, June 1998, pp. 269-280.
- Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby, "Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society", *Millennium*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2001, pp. 285-309.
- Safranchuk Ivan, "Future of Nuclear Weapon", *Moskovskiye Novosti*, No. 2, January 18-24, 2000 p.5.
- Sapir, Jacques, "Russia's Crash of August, 1998: A Diagnosis and Prescription". *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 15, No.1, January-March, 1999, pp.1-36.
- Starr, Richard F., "Russia's National Security Concept", *ISCIP – Perspective*, Vol. 18, 1998, <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol.18/starr.html>.
- Stephen, Alfred, "Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2000, pp. 133-176.
- Wallander, Celeste A., "Russian National Security Policy in 2000" *Ponars*, Memo No. 102, 1999, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/policy>.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Russian National Security Concept: A Liberal-Statist Synthesis", *Ponars*, Memo No. 30, 1998, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/policy>

Wegren, Stephen K., "Socio-Economic Transformation in Russia: Where is the Rural Elite", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 52, No.2, 2000, pp.237-271.

White, Anne, "Social Change in Provincial Russia: The Intelligentsia in a Raion Centre", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2000, pp. 677-694.

Raevsky, Andrei, *Development of Russian National Security Policies: Military Reform*, UNIDIR /93/58 (New York: United Nations Publication, 1993) No.25.

Wohlforth, William C., " New Security Challenge or Old? Russia's Catch-22", <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/securityform/obnlinepublications/ws4/wohlforth.html>

Yorlov, Felix N., "Russian: Problems of Security in Post-Cold War World", *World Affairs*, Vol.4, No.2, April-June 2000, pp.42-56.

Zivanov, Sava "Russia Undergoing Changes: Revision and Reorientation of Foreign Policy", *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. LI, No. 1096, August 2000, pp.13-18.

#### *Newspapers and Journals*

Arms Control Today (Washington D.C)

Asian Age (New Delhi)

Contemporary International Relations (China)

Current History (Philadelphia)

Defence News Springfield (USA)

East Asian Strategic Review (Tokyo)

East European Quarterly (Colorado)

Europe-Asia Studies (Glasgow)

Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (Central Eurasia)

International Affairs (USA)

International Security (MIT Press, Cambridge)

International Studies (New Delhi)

International Studies Review (USA)

Journal of International Affairs (New York)  
New Times (Moscow)  
News from Russia (Russian Embassy, New Delhi)  
Post –Soviet Affairs (Columbia)  
Russian Social Science Review (New York)  
Strategic Analysis (New Delhi)  
Summary of World Broadcast (Moscow unit)  
The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press (Ohio)  
The Moscow News (Moscow)  
The World Today (London)  
Washington Post (Washington)  
World Affairs (Switzerland)

*Websites*

<http://IEWS.org>.

<http://www.bu.edu>

<http://www.bu.edu>

<http://www.ciaonet.org>

<http://www.fas.harvard.edu>

<http://www.isn.ethz.ch>