ISRAEL'S LABOUR PARTY AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, 1967-1993

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Declaration

I declare that the thesis entitled **"Israel's Labour Party and the Palestinian Question, 1967-1993"** Submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The THESIS has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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
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Dedicated to My Elder Sister

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Acknowledgements

Abbreviation

ALA	Arab Liberation Army
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
DOP	Declaration of Principles
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DMC	Democratic Movement for Change
EU	European Union
FPTP	First-Past-the-Post Method
GS	Gaza Strips
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMFA	Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
JNF	Jewish National Fund
MK	Member of Knesset
NUG	National Unity Government
OT	Occupied Territories
OETA	Occupied Enemy Territory Administration
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestine National Authority
PNC	Palestine National Charter
PLA	Palestinian Liberation Army

PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PISGA	Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority
PM	Prime Minister
PR	The Proportional Representation
TAMI	A Movement for the Tradition of the People of Israel
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOP	United Nation Special Committee on Palestine
UNPP	United Nation Partition Plan
US	United States
WB	West Bank
WCS	The Workmen's Cooperative Society
WZO	World Zionist Organisation

Glossary

Ashkenazi: _____A Jewish community belong from European and Western.

Democratic Movement for Change (DMC):____A centrist political party, known in Hebrew as Dash, established in 1976 and disappeared from Israeli politics by 1981.

Eretz Yisrael_____The Land of Israel.

Gahal_____It was basically a political alliance formed between Herut and the Liberal Party before the 1965 general election.

General Zionist_____Known as the Liberal Party joined the Progressives between 1961 and 1965.

Greater Israel_____Notion of a Jewish state on both sides of the River Jordan.

Gush Emunim_____The Block of Faithful, the messianic movement of the settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Halacha_____It was the Jewish law.

Haganah_____It was the defence force in the Yishuv.

Herut_____A political party and forerunner to the Likud Party.

Haredi_____Ultra-orthodox non-Zionist or anti-Zionist Jewish.

Hasbara_____It was effort by Likud Party to convince American public about party's settlement policies.

Independent Liberals_____Progressive Party and since 1984 part of the Alignment.

Irgun_____A military organisation (Revisionists) prior establishment of Israel.

Jewish Agency_____Working for Israel's development by using World Jewry money and from 1971 worked with the World Zionist Organisation.

Kach_____Extreme nationalist party which called for the forceful transfer of Arabs formed by Rabbi Meir Kahane.

Mamlachtiut_____A Hebrew term meaning statism..

Moledet_____A Homeland party led by Rehavam Ze'evi which calls for the voluntary transfer of Arabs from Israel.

Moshav_____A co-operative settlement.

Peace Now_____A movement (1973) came during the Lebanon war organised mass demonstrations against Israel's participation and conduct of the war.

Progressive List for Peace (PLP) _____A joint Arab-Jewish advocated the Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Rakah_____Acronym for the New Communist Party which appeals to Arab nationalist feelings.

Sephardim_____Jews belong to Asia and Africa.

Shiniu (Change) _____Centre party which was part of Dash in 1977 became part of Meretz party.

Tehiya_____It is extreme right-wing party opposed the Camp David Accords (1977) even not pass the electoral threshold in the 1992 Kmesset elections.

Tsomet_____A right wing party formed (1988) by ex-Chief of Staff Eitan.

Yahad_____Founded (1984) by Weizman and merged with the Labour Party (1988).

Yishuv_____The Jewish community in Palestine prior State of Israel.

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Chapter One:
Introduction

Israel's Labour party can be seen in its various facets and has been remained in the centre of the evolution of Israel before and since the formation of Israel (1948). In 1948 the state of Israel did not start with its establishment. Although without sovereignty, the organised the Yishuv enjoyed authority. As a "state within a state" it solved most of its problems through voluntary or civic organisations (Shimshoui, 1982). To prepare itself for eventual independence, the Jewish community under the British mandate set up a semi-autonomous political authority that was formally recognised by the Mandate power in 1927. This political authority was composed of two bodies such as the elected assembly and the national council.

They together came to be known as "national institutions". Since these institutions lacked sovereign authority, they had to base their power and authority on voluntary recognition by the political bodies and the community at large. They tried to achieve the widest possible consensus by forming a coalition set up that committed various parties to the national institutions. Thus, the political leadership consolidated its power by sharing it with the widest possible array of organised bodies. By the time the Mandate ended and the state of Israel was proclaimed, the national institutions had developed sufficiently, to set up a full-fledged government within a short time.

The national institutions succeeded to coordinate the political, social and economic affairs of the pre-state Israel and different streams of ideology came to dominate political thinking. Right from the beginning, the political spectrum of the Yishuv was differentiated along left-right and religiously observant-non-observant groups. Accordingly, three political sectors developed: the left-of-centre (the Labour Movement), centre-right, and the religious groups. The moderate left included Hapoel Hatzair and Poalei Zion and, later, Achdut Ha'avodah, Hashomer Hatzair and Mapai. Mapai, the predecessor of the Labour Party played a crucial role in the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and was largely responsible in state-building and nation-building process in the formative years. The left-of-the-centre party has been dominating the Israeli politics. The extreme left included the communist and the moderate centre-right included the General Zionists and the Progressives. The right wing included the

Revisionists. The moderate religious sector included Hamizrachi and Hapoel Hamizrachi. The extreme religious sector included Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel.

Among these three sectors, the left-of-centre one (the Labour Movement) came to be the most powerful and the most influential one. The ascendancy of Labour Movement came about by various stages of organisational development. The Labour Movement was the first to organise on a relatively large scale. In 1906 the first two Labour parties were founded-Hapoel Hatzair and Poalei Zion. Hapoel Hatzair was composed mainly of agricultural labourers while Poalei Zion initially consisted of urban proletariat but later came to be dominated by agricultural labours. In 1919 the Achdut Ha'avoda organisation was founded. The main objective of this organisation was to help absorb the immigrants of the Third Aliya (immigration).

They established agricultural settlements, trade unions, an office for public works to alleviate unemployment, as well as various welfare projects. But initially most labourers refused to join the new political body, which was organised as the local branch of the World Poalei Zion Party. The leaders of Achdut Ha'avoda, to overcome the problem of integration among the different groups of workers, tried to organise all new immigrants and the old time labourers in a common framework and founded the Histadrut in 1920. This was a countrywide general federation of labor unions comprising all occupations. It did not confine itself to trade union activities rather it assumed many of the economic functions previously fulfilled by Achdut Ha'avoda.

In 1930, Achdut Ha'avoda joined with Hapoel Hatzair to form Mapai (Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel). Thereafter, Mapai received 75 per cent of the votes in the Histadrut elections, thus enabling it to control that organisation's executive bodies. The economic power that the party had come to possess enabled it to set itself up as the dominant force not only in the Histadrut, but also in the Yishuv as a whole. The establishment of Mapai as a unified, powerful party marked the beginning of the political hegemony of the workers' groups in the Yishuv.

The moderate centre-right "citizens" groups, despite their major contribution to economic development, accepted the Labour Movement's dominance. In contrast, the Revisionist party challenged the supremacy of Labour in national leadership. Consequently, it seceded from the institutional framework of the organised Yishuv in 1935. This did not undermine the Labour

Movement's dominant position and perhaps even facilitated its control over key political positions.

The major parties that composed the political spectrum of independent Israel were basically the same that co-existed in the Yishuv era, although many have undergone various splits, mergers and alignments. After establishment of the state of Israel, the left-of-centre Labour Movement was still headed by Mapai and merged with some others smaller parties to form the Israel Labour Party and aligned itself with yet another party (Mapam) to form the Alignment. Merger and splitting nature in the political system generally is called Factionalism. Factionalism is an essential characteristic of Israeli politics due to periodic splits, merger and emergence of new political parties. In the 1950s and 1960s more than 30 parties contested the Knesset elections and the number has come down due to political reforms and increase in the threshold margins, which has been occasionally changed in Israel.

Labour Party was one of the oldest and a largest political party in the country as it came into the existence was the union of three prominent socialist parties, namely, Mapai, Achdut Ha'avodah and Rafi. The Party is based upon the values of the Labour Movement during the Yishuv and is commitment to maintaining a democratic form of government, to enhance the social and economic well-being of all Israeli citizens and to secure comprehensive peace with the neighbours. The Labour Party was the major partner of the ruling coalition until it lost its monopoly to the right-of-the-centre Likud opposition in the 1977 Knesset elections. It briefly shared power with the Likud Party during 1984-1990 as part of the National Unity Government.

Following the 1992 Knesset elections, the Labour Party returned to power under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and pursued effective peace efforts with the Palestinians leading to the signing of the Oslo Accords. Therefore, the third chapter of this thesis unfold the domestic struggle of Labour Party as in power and Gahal/Likud, the party without power until 1977. National consensus over the policies is also important factor in the Israeli politics. It became issue due to the intra-party differences, distinction in the opinions among the major leaders and sometime are fights among the personalities for political power. These trends are more visible in the Labour party and had huge bearings on the party positions on the peace. The chapter three of the thesis also discusses the actions and the motivations of the Likud governments and how Likud Party influenced the internal dynamics

of the Labour Party across the political spectrum. It also discusses the challenges which became problems for Labour Party when it was in opposition.

Since its acceptance of the United Nations General Assembly resolution to partition Palestine, the Labour Party generally supported an accommodative position and endorsed peace efforts by the Likud Party such as the Camp David Accords (it can be seen in the Appendix-2) and Israel's participation in the Madrid Conference (1991). It supported the "land-for-peace" principle which is the part of Resolution 242 that established a framework for peace-making.

The Palestinian question is the central to the Arab-Israel conflict. As highlighted by the UNSCOP (United Nation Special Committee on Palestine) it is primarily due to intense competition between two rival nationalisms over the same piece of territory. The non-realisation of the Palestinian state as recommended by the UN partition plan led to the Palestinian statelessness and refugee problem. Until 1967 when the West Bank and Gaza Strip were not under Israel's occupation and control, the Arab states stated did not work for the Palestinian statehood. Israel occupied these territories in the aftermath of the June 1967 War. Since then the Palestinian question encompasses, issues of statehood, political rights, occupation, borders, settlements, refugees and Jerusalem. The Security Council resolution 242 adopted after the June War described the Palestinian question basically as a refugee problem and in the 1970s the political rights of the Palestinians took the centre stage.

In the aftermath of their decisive military defeat, eight Arab heads of state met in Khartoum 29th August 1st September, 1967 and adopted "Three NOs" policy of no recognition, no negotiation and no peace with Israel. Declaration of the Khartoum Summit made many political leaders convince that there were no credible peace partners. In that ambiguous atmosphere, Labour Party was seen unable to decide on any clear vision for the Occupied Territories' (OT) future. Hence, chapter four also examines political consequences and repercussion of June War on Israel-Palestine relationship.

Meanwhile, to channel Arab support and to divert his critics, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser paved the way for the formation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The Arab defeat in June 1967, exhibited the limitations of the Arab states in pursuing and delivering the Palestinian demands. Fatah led by Yasser Arafat joined the organisation in 1967 and soon took the effect control of the PLO. Both the PLO Charters of 1964 and 1968,

especially Articles 18, 21 and 28, sought to undo all the consequences of the Balfour Declaration, including the partition of Palestine and the formation of Israel. The PLO sought a Palestinian state within the boundaries of Mandate Palestine and in lieu of Israel. According to Article 9 of the PLO charter states that "armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it." Moreover, chapter four also demonstrates the PLO and its relationship with Israel, what kind of attitude, the Labour Party pursued towards the PLO?

The repercussions of October War (1973) traumatised the faith of populations, especially youth, upon the Labour Party's leadership. The policy of deterrence and wariness was said to be outdated, and the results of June War in terms of OT were said to be the true cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Navon, 2004). David Ben-Gurion's pragmatic realism and those who supported him were challenged. Peace for the conflict became major concern of Israel's populations concern. In the aftermath of October War, moderates and optimists from left/right ideologies emerged with the hope of peace. The increasement of settlements in the West Bank intensified Israel's diplomatic isolation and alienated it from traditional European friends in the global politics. These trends led to traumatise the demographic and social capability of Israel. On other hand, in 1974, a 'phased strategy' of the PLO explicitly stated the formation of a Palestinian state and destruction of the State of Israel.

Moreover, the October War and the emergence of oil as an important political instrument resulted in the PLO being acknowledged as the 'sole and legitimate' representative of the Palestinian people by the Arab states. This was done despite Jordanian claims to represent the Palestinians. Reflecting the prevailing understanding, the UN recognised and granted the observer status to the PLO (November 1974). Since the 1978 Camp David Accords, four basic territorial policies have dominated Israel's policies regarding to the Occupied Palestinian Territories namely, total withdrawal, partition, autonomy, or partial annexation.

The doves (Labour Party) in Israel have advocated a total withdrawal to the 1967 boarders and this has usually been accompanied by a demand for the dismantling of all Jewish settlements and the self-determination leading to a Palestinian state. For the advocates of this

policy, primarily represented by Yigal Allon, Ehud Barak, Shimon Peres and other Labourite, the return of entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and the withdrawal of all Jewish settlers set a precedent and model for a future solution vis-à-vis Palestinian territories.

The idea of partition of territory commonly known as "territorial compromise" was based on Allon Plan (named after the Labour leader Yigal Allon) that was finally incorporated into Labour Party platform in 1977. According to this Plan Israel should keep its control over areas of strategic importance west of the Jordan River. It should not burden itself demographically with the annexation of areas that was populated by Palestinians. Under this plan mountains South and North of Jerusalem should be demilitarised.

This Plan also advocates a policy of selective settlement in the areas that would be retained while the rest would be ruled by Arabs, Jordan. Several occasions, many plans were made but never made it to the government and were never accepted. For instance, the Allon Plan, which is sometime defined as the outline upon which Labour Party's territorial policy and positions contrary, to it was never approved. However, some of the decisions regarding Occupied Territories were derived from the Allon Plan, but Plan was never applied as a whole.

The autonomy concept represents the "Functional Compromise" approach and was espoused by Moshe Dayan, then a Labourite. This view emphasis on the strategic importance of West Bank central mountains forms the underlying rationale of this approach. Since full sovereignty over the mountain area would entail Israeli rule over areas populated by Palestinians, those formulated autonomy plan have proposed a functional division of responsibilities. Under Dayan's influence this shared rule approach was incorporated into the Camp David Accords (1979), which suggested an unspecified autonomy in Israel-ruled territories as an interim agreement. It left the final settlement to future negotiations. Many in Israel regard the functional compromise as a good one for the indefinite future and Likud has gradually become identified with this prescription.

Negotiated autonomy is a balance with which neither Labour nor Likud have problem. However, there were doubts and suspicions. For doves (the Labour Party) it has the advantage of detaching Israel and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) from responsibilities for administering the lives of millions of Palestinian. In autonomy, hawks (Likud Party)

recognise the possibility of avoiding transfer of sovereignty over any part of the Occupied Territories, while retaining all or most of the settlements.

Annexation was the least favourable option in Israel. Annexation of the Occupied Territories would necessitate either the expulsion of the Palestinian population or granting them full Israeli citizenship. Neither of them is a feasible proposition. Hence, the Labour and other centre-left parties have opposed annexation and favoured a territorial compromise. Thus, the extreme positions of the left-right continuum in Israel are annexation at one pole, and total withdrawal at the other pole. In between this hawkishness, and the territorial compromise position closer to dovishness.

Towards reaching a political settlement, there were differences over the potential interlocutor. For long, the Labour Party joined others in rejecting any role for the PLO. Mainstream parties had misgivings vis-à-vis the PLO and viewed it merely as a terrorist organisation, primarily due to the anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli clauses of the PLO Charter. Opposing Palestinians right to national self-determination they looked for easier and less pliable alternatives; it was Jordan for the Labour Party and non-PLO leadership for the Likud. For long, the 'Jordanian Option' became the hallmark of the Labour Party and unsuccessfully pursued it through the London Agreement of 1987. The chapter of the thesis examines the Labour Party's perspective towards the PLO, the policies and approaches adopted for the Occupied Territories and demonstrates the differences among the parties and within Labour party over the policies.

The outbreak of Palestinian Intifada in December 1987 and Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank in following July ended the prospects of a 'Jordanian Option' which the Labour Party adopted. In the wake of Intifada that is extensively popular by its Arabic name as intifada (shaking off), this incident significantly became a crucial point that indeed crystallised dissimilarities between the core leading political parties (Labour and Likud). The prominence of the incident stems from the fact that it had enhanced the evolution of a Palestinian orientation in the Labour party's policy. This development is examined as a breakthrough and prerequisite for the signing of Oslo agreement. Hence, therefore, chapter four of this thesis examines the factors which culminated to Intifada and Israeli government response to the Intifada and its impact on the Israeli policies in general and Labour party's policies towards the Occupied Territories in particular.

The Intifada explicitly resulted that existing status-quo was no longer relevant. The uprising changed the Palestinians political initiative from the PLO leadership in Tunis to the Occupied Territories. The activists and peace supporters demanded that the PLO should adopt decisive and clear political programme. As a response, the Palestine National Council adopted the Algiers Declaration that recognised the United Nation Partition Plan (UNPP), the State of Israel, declared the State of Palestine and relinquished terrorism. Passive response was given to the Algiers Declaration by the Labour Party. Party urged that nothing has changed, would not negotiate with the PLO which was seen as a terrorist organisation. The PLO's act was recognised by the United State (US) which believed that its policies have changed but did little to encourage Israel to abandon its inflexible stand. Chapter four also explains the Labour party's perspective towards PLO and what and how the Labour Party began to view PLO as negotiator partner.

The end of the Cold War, Kuwait crisis and the Madrid Conference brought about a fundamental shift in international order. The Kuwait crisis paved the way the success of the US and enhanced the influence in the region. This was an encouraging factor for Israeli position in the region, because Saddam Hussein's influence and future target were disturbing for its security interests. This power changeover provided Israel a legal and more powerful entity in the West Asia. In that regards, Israel's attitude towards the Palestine in general and the PLO would be more troubling. The war made US a leading power and the other regional countries became weak at the same time, Israel was most benefited country from the Gulf War. The American forces presence in the region had minimised all Arab countries' influence. The result of Gulf War and demise of Cold War provided new unipolar world order, which created different opportunities as well as challenges in the Palestine-Israel peace process.

The support of the other Arab nations towards Palestine was also seemed lesser. The Palestinian resistance were not effective enough to check Israel's advancement and the Soviet Union voted with the majority in the UN and was in favour to the US led coalition against Saddam Hussein. Though it, did not send troops to the Gulf but continued to advocate a negotiated settlement. Israelis was expecting that the American-Arab alliance would enable the U.S. to press the Arab countries to minimise their antagonism towards Israel and wanted pressure taken off them, especially in terms of Palestinians and asserted that the main issue in the region was Arab recognition and acceptance of the Jewish state. For their part, the Arab

states supposed that their cooperation and partnership with the US would be rewarded by the latter making pressure on Israel to return land for peace and to accept self-determination for the Palestinians (Ashrawi, 1995).

Before the Gulf War, the terms between the Bush administration and Israel's right-wing leadership were not good enough and had been at low ebb. Direct communication between them had been rare and Secretary of State Baker had put pressure on Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to step forward in response to PLO peace initiatives. Chapter five of this thesis explores and analyses these changing dynamics in the region, particularly, in the aftermath of the end of Cold War and Kuwait crisis.

Meanwhile, the PLO was diplomatically isolated due its perceived support for President Saddam Hussein following his invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait. Under Israeli insistence, the PLO was formally excluded from the Madrid Conference and took part as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The fear of radicalism following the emergence of Hamas and stalemate in the Washington talks brought the Rabin government to re-examine and reverse the longstanding Israeli refusal to negotiate with the PLO. The back-channel Oslo talks indicated a Palestinian willingness to compromise and co-exist with Israel. Consequently, Israel initiated secret negotiations directly with PLO representatives and these talks resulted in the Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed between Israel and the PLO in Washington on 13 September (it can be seen in the Appendix-7). Four days prior to this they agreed for mutual recognition.

The Oslo agreement (1993), the most significant step towards peace would not be possible overnight; rather it had evolved gradually and through prolonged and consistent dialogue. Moreover, it had come after decades of confrontation. But what made Israel and Palestine to reach the Oslo agreement? The answer to this fundamental question is focus chapter five of this thesis which explores and analyses these changing dynamics in the region after demise of Cold War and Gulf War, as well as the political manoeuvring within PLO and Israel, moreover their impact on the peace process.

The changes between two arch-rivals namely Israel and PLO had occurred in the form of Oslo Accord 1993. Behind the shift, several reasons were responsible. There are various precedents on the global politics when extreme rivals changed their positions to each other and shook hands. These changes provided a major shift in their foreign policy. Charles de

Gaulle (French military leaders became President of Fifth Republic and changed his prolong and longstanding French nature of attitude towards the Algerians in 1962, especially on granting independence. In terms of American relationship, a significant breakthrough happened when American President Richard Nixon's visited to China in 1972, which marked the important turnaround in their relationship. Before the agreement between Israel and PLO, the most important incident occurred when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977 and met with Israel Prime Minister Menachem Begin. His visit occurred four years after Egypt attacked Israel (1973) and the visit culminated in Egypt-Israel peace accord (1979). Moreover, in South Africa, Nelson Mandela wrote to a letter opposing violence in 1989 to President P.W. Botha. The cooperation of both created the stage for the country's transition from apartheid to democracy. It was during the mid and late 1980s the US President Ronald Regan and USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev sought a rapprochement between them and this policy later transformed the relations between the two.

Literature Review:-

The literature on the proposed research has been divided into three broad themes. The first theme is; 'Labour Party and its Policy' explains historical background of Labour Party as well as emergence and ideology of Labour Party. The second theme is; 'June War and its consequences' that deals with the literature on the June War and changes that took place in Israel's politics vis-à-vis the Labour policy towards the occupied territories and (PLO) after the June War. The third theme is 'Peace Process' that examines literature that focuses on evolution of Labour Party towards peace process on the Palestinian issue and focus on several stages through which Labour Party sought peace and the changes, which influenced Labour Party and PLO.

Labour Party and its Policy

The available literature on Labour Party is divided into three segments namely one part of the literature which deals the Party's evolution in institutions and organisation prior formation of Israel. Second segment of the literature examines the Israeli politics and foreign policy and last deals the changes, developments and efforts that had been initiated to bring peace. In the first segment, there are three very profound works was done that examines the various phases of development of the party. Yonathan Shapiro one of the prominent political scientists has done tremendous works on Labour Party. His book "*The Formative Years of the Labour*

Party: The Organisation of Power, 1919-1930" which demonstrates how Labour Party evolved in the form of Mapai Party in the Yishuv and came to occupy a dominant position in the Yishuv and early development of the state.

Peter Y. Medding is well known scholar had worked on Israel's democracy and Israel's Labour Party. His one of the books "*Mapai in Israel: Political Organisation and Government in a New Society*" demonstrates the structure and organisation of the Labour Party in particular and its relationship with Israeli society in general and the book ends with the creation of Labour Party (1968). Myron J. Aronoff's work "*Power and Ritual in the Israel Labour Party*" deals with the decline in the influence of Party's ideology within the Party where it was replaced by power-oriented politics. Subsequently, these trends in the Party have increased the party's distancing from elements of Israeli society. The book also covers the 1977 general election defeat of Labour Party. Leon T. Hadar's article *"The Israeli Labor Party: Peacemaker or Likud II?"* discussed the lack of change in the Labour Party's attitude in terms of peace. Jonathan Mendilow's article *"Israel's Labour Alignment in the 1984 Election: Catch All Tactics in a Divided Society"* deals the weakness in the Labour Party's electoral strategy.

Moreover, after the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that was seen as a British guarantee for a Jewish homeland, Third Aliya occurred that brought around 35,000 immigrants to Palestine. After the end of the First World War there were three major centre-left groups in the Yishuv namely, Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion) Party; Achdut Ha'avodah (Unity of Labour) Party and Hapoel Hatzair. Poalei Zion while talking about class struggle attempted to balance itself between socialist internationalism and Zionist nationalism and envisioned a socialist state in a Jewish majority society. Poalei Zion in 1919 joined hands with unaffiliated group of workers leading to the formation of Achdut Ha'avodah (Perlmann, 2006). The new party, Achdut Ha'avodah that was established by David Ben-Gurion and Berl Katznelson retained the principle of class struggle but stressed more on workers unity. Achdut Ha'avodah eventually dominated the political landscape and despite variety of parties, it has dominated the Yishuv and later Israel (Shapiro, 1976).

After the 1927 global economic crisis, private companies went bankrupt and Histadrut too suffered loss. Achdut Ha'avodah came to rescue of Histadrut and took over its economic and administrative structure and became a dominant force in Jewish political discourse. It became stronger after it joined hands with Hapoel Hatzair to form Mifleget Poaelei Eretz Israel (Land

of Israel Workers' Party, widely known as Mapai in 1930. In the short duration of time, Mapai Party gained popularity and became the dominant discourse in pre-Israel trade union, social and political structure (Shapiro, 1976; Medding 1972).

On 29 November 1947 the United Nation adopted resolution 181 that called for the formation of independent Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. On the eve of the British withdrawal on 14 May 1948 the state of Israel was proclaimed under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion of Mapai Party. The first election for the 120-member Knesset was held on 25 January 1949 in which Mapai emerged as the leading party with 46 seats. Mapam Party was formed in 1948 and its popularity in the first election was seen as a threat by Mapai under Ben-Gurion (Schindler, 2008).

Gershon R. Kieval (1983) has explained that there are both structural and political characteristics to Israel's political system. The political cause is rooted in the proportional representation system which prevents any one party securing an overall majority. The structural cause is the root of factionalism, that is, two major groupings the Labour Alignment and the Likud, both offshoots of mergers of several predecessor parties. After long ideological caucus in the left, Labour Party founded with mingled of parties. Laswell defined of faction as "any constituent group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons of policies" (Nicholas, 1965, and Pocock, 1957:15). Labour Party is example of above definition. Party is subdivided into major factions and these factions can be further broken down to analyse their political networks (Barnes, 1969, and Mitchell, 1969).

Anita Shapira (1994) wrote that most of the Labour history before the foundation of the state of Israel as well as after centres on narrating the institutional history of the trade union federation which has monopolized the representation of Israeli Labour since 1920. Peretz Merhav (1980) has described historical roots and stages in the ideological development of the Israeli Labour Movement its multiple directions and factions. Yonathan Shapiro (1976) has elaborated that history of formative years when Labour Movement began in mandate Palestine.

Michael Shalev (1996) explained the Labour Movement and its relations with Labour Party. Histadrut, Israel's "peak association" of labour, is a formidable Hydra which is without peer in the world and also operates two of the country's most important social service provider, namely, "Sick Fund" and a group of pension funds-that provide primary health care and

superannuation, respectively, to the majority of Israeli households". This welfare attempt was possible because of Labour's long period of uncontested dominance, from the mid-1930s to the late 1970s.

Ronald Ranta (2009) has described that the history of Israel's Labour Party has been a fractious and fragmented one and is better understood as a movement which supported diverse groups who occasionally split and/or joined forces. Peretz Merhav (1980) described history of left politics in Israel and the ideological differences among left parties. This process of splitting and forming new parties under the banner of the Labour Movement has been endemic to politics in Israel. The diverse views expressed within the party's factions regarding the Arabs, territorial compromise, socialism, questions of security and foreign policy and the nature of the Israeli State has been a feature of the party from its inception (Beilin, 1985).

Mayron Aronoff (1993) has pointed out three main debates within the Labour Movement. First was the power of the elites to dictate the agenda, suppress issues and dominate the nomination and patronage system. Even though this behaviour served them well in the past, it came to represent a growing gap between the Labour elites and the public. Second was the role that Socialism should play within the state. Third was deciding on the nature of the Israeli state, its attitude towards the Arab world, and its future borders. Latter-day Labour factions correspond, to a certain degree, to earlier splits along these debating lines (Aronoff, 1993). Yoav Gelber (2011) has explained that the issues and problems that shaped the Labour Party, namely the Partition Plan and the Lavon Affair. In both cases, reaching a consensus within the party meant sacrificing party unity because at that moment Mapam and Mapai represented the two competing approaches. David Ben-Gurion, the leading figure of Mapai, accepted the Partition Plan out of necessity and as a diplomatic compromise. His counterpart in Achdut Ha'avodah, Yitzhak Tabenkin, was unwilling to accept the plan.

Initially, Achdut Ha'avodah was a faction within Mapai known as Siya Bet. The debate between Mapai and Achdut Ha'avodah concerned the nature of the party and the state. According to Gershom Gorenberg (2006) "the avoidance of policy was a ploy that served the purpose of maintaining unity within the Labour Party and the Coalition: 'It was easier to avoid decisions or keep them vague" (Gorenberg, 2006:21). According to Peter Medding, (1972) Ben-Gurion advocated a policy of Statism and a movement away from the social policies advocated by Achdut Ha'avodah and Mapam. Statism represented a policy shift that

occurred within Mapai as it changed from being a narrowly focused entity into a party associated with the state and considered to be more representative of the nation. Avi Shlaim (2000) has pointed out that the points to the Galili document to argue that they are basically policies of creeping annexation. Samuel J. Roberts (1990) adds that the creation of settlements was part of Israel's new security understanding.

The genesis of Labour Party goes to Labour Zionism and as a political movement, Zionism sought to establish a Jewish national home. It strove to achieve Jewish national and social redemption by fusing Zionism with socialism and hence Labour Zionism is the forerunner in creation of Jewish presence during the pre-state period. After the establishment of Israel in 1948, the twelve parties participated in the first election. Mapai as party with socialist background emerged as the leading political force. Even its political opponent, Mapam believed that Labour Zionism must incorporate the founding principles of socialism, settlement and undivided homeland. Mapai under leadership of David Ben-Gurion who became the first Prime Minister of Israel formed a coalition government (Schindler 2008).

During its reign that lasted until 1977, Mapai pursued a two-track policy-at the economic and social level it followed socialist path while in dealing to Palestine problem it approached it with pragmatism. This pragmatic approach was the outcome of experience such as Arab-riots, violence, and resistance to Jewish people etc. in the Mandate period (1921-48) (Ruedy, 1980). In the defence sphere, Mapam preferred a People's Army which was rejected by the Mapai government. Mapam also tried to persuade Mapai government to support a Big Five Pact, armament reduction and support the UN efforts to solve Arab-Israeli conflict (Beinin and Hajjar, 2014).

In the post-1967 period, Labour Party encouraged building of settlements in the Occupied Territories partly to cater to the increasing influx of Jewish immigrants and continued to ascertain its primacy of security which led to regression of the Palestinian cause (Shaoul, 2001). In political sphere Labour Party lost political monopoly in 1977 which brought its internal crisis to the fore. Although emphasis on security remained a constant tenet of the party over the Palestinian issue, there is a difference in approach vis-à-vis its main political rival, Likud. While Labour was willing to accept territorial compromise, Likud was insistent on achieving greater Israel (Yehuda Agid-Ben and Auerbach, 1991).

After Palestinian Intifada, end of Cold-War and the Kuwait crisis, the Madrid conference brought changes in international political order. Labour Party has abandoned its intransigent posture and re-examined its policy towards Palestinian and for its part the PLO showed its willingness to co-exist with Israel. Both have signed on mutual recognition; the PLO acknowledged the State of Israel and pledged to reject violence and in return, Israel recognised the PLO. This led to the Oslo Accords and the formation of the Palestinian self-government in Gaza Strip and Jericho (Navon, 2004). Although there are diverging opinions over Palestinian Question within the Labour party, it is largely seen domestically and internationally to be more accommodating towards the Palestinian cause. Hence, it is perceived to be more dovish on the Palestinians. However, there is greater need to assess the internal policy dimensions within Labour Party which would explain the overall policy decisions and changes for the state since the formative years until the present.

June war and its Consequences

The war brought about numerous changes, one of which saw Israel occupying territories and the transformation also took place on other areas such as political, diplomatic and ideological. Politically, the war had increased Moshe Dayan to the status of a national hero, which created great tension with Eshkol (Ranta, 2009). Furthermore, it had brought to the fore a territorial question. Beyond the Labour Party, the Israeli state went through a transitional phase, which included demographic, political and cultural changes. These changes resulted in a shift in the views and the political power to the right, which contributed to a deeper fragmentation of Israel's polity (Brecher, 1973 Sharkansky, 1999). Medding suggests that the history of Israel should be divided into two periods, that is, before and after 1967 (Medding, 1990). Michael B. Oren has explained (2002) that the manner of the Israeli victory in the June War had a detrimental effect on the state.

The war had left the country with a National Unity Government, which incorporated a 'wall-to-wall' coalition of the right, left and the Religious parties. Thus, the task of maintaining unity within the coalition was made very difficult by the controversial and polarising issues on the agenda. On the diplomatic front, the war had provided Israeli decision makers, for the first time, with the necessary bargaining chips to achieve a long-lasting peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, the war instigated a change in the involvement of the superpowers in the region, the increasing Israeli dependency, diplomatically and militarily, on the US (Seliktar, 1986).

For many members of the religious community in Israel, the outcome of the 1967 war was a divinely ordained opportunity to re-establish Jewish control over the sacred city of Jerusalem and all of the land of Israel, and to observe the religious commandments that pertained to this land. Settlement in these areas became the primary objective for religious nationalists, but not, at the time, for the ultra-orthodox communities. The results of the 1967 war also changed Israeli democracy in a fundamental manner and altered the approach of the religious sectors of society with respect to issues of security, territory, and borders. Immediately after the 1967 war ended, movements were organised with the goal of building Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories including Sinai, Golan, West Bank and Gaza Strip. Their political power was enhanced by the stalemate between the two secular political blocs (Labour/centre-left and Likud/right). The religious parties and the NRP (National Religious Party) in particular, used this power to lobby for incentives for the settlements, and consistently worked to expand and strengthen Jewish sovereignty and control in these areas (Steinberg, 1992).

Tom Segev (2005) defined that the Occupied Territories were referred to as the liberated ones and this 'Liberation' of biblical Israel assumed messianic and prophetic proportions. An increase in immigration and investment followed a wave of nationalistic and religious fervour, signalling the revival of a new form of Zionism, that is religious Zionism or neo-Zionism. The period between the 15 of May and the 5 of June 1967 was known in Israel as the 'Hamtana' (Waiting Period). During this period the leadership of Eshkol was publicly challenged by members of his own party, as well as by members of the coalition, the opposition, IDF, press, and the wider public.

The various committees and scholars analysed the situation-either at the order of the government, ministers or the IDF's Intelligence unit (AMAN) and reached several but similar conclusions. Two of these were that Israel must formulate a long-term policy in dealing with the territories and that any delay in finding a long-lasting solution would undermine national security and put Israel in a difficult position vis-à-vis the international community (Ranta, 2005). Ofira Seliktar (1986) viewed that the occupation brought to the fore a territorial discussion that was not touched upon since the partition era. This discussion revealed a 'growing dissonance' between the Labour Party's foreign policy and the public perception of the Occupied Territories.

Dan Bavly (2002) argues that, during the 1967-1973 periods, Israel operated within a limited perspective and relied on the wrong axioms. Prominent officials and politicians within the administration described the decision-making process during the period as 'non-existent', 'lacking definitions and targets' and 'unprofessional' (quoted in Ranta, 2007). Abba Eban (1978) described it as 'amateurish' and being 'based on improvisation'. Shabtai Teveth (1970) stated that in 1967-1973 Israel pursued a 'wait and see policy' because the division within the government and the state froze all new ideas. Myron Aronoff (1993) states that before the June War the public accepted Mapai's national agenda but in the aftermath of the War, the gap between the party and the public grew, and the party elites were no longer seen as representing the state.

Reuven Pedatzur (1996) contends that the decision-making process was held captive by a small group of politicians, who failed to deal with the Palestinian question. This group sowed the seeds of future conflicts by being unable to detach themselves from the concepts and understandings they acquired in the aftermath of the June War; he refers to this phenomenon as the 'triumph of embarrassment'. Yael Yishai (1987) admits that what goes on in Israeli politics 'only partly shapes Israeli perceptions of the territorial issue.' Gershon Kieval, (1983) Kieval focuses on structural problems associated with Israel's political fragmentation. W.W Harris' (1980) book "Taking Root: Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip 1967-1980" deals with political and environmental actualities and the social and spatial implications of the settlement policy. He also argues that Israel's settlement policy was mainly reliant on the 'shifting balance of personalities and attitudes within the domestic political system'.

Peter Robert Demant's (1980) work on "Ploughshares into Swords: Israeli Settlement Policy in the Occupied Territories, 1967-1977" explores that settlement policies made by a small group of policy makers namely Eshkol, Golda Meir, Galili, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon and Shimon Peres. These policy makers had not put forward a 'grand plan', but instead, several 'competing blueprints with mutual overlaps and big hiatuses in between them'. However, he explains that, despite the elusiveness of this settlement policy, many policy makers were 'pleased with the results'. He points out the lack of cohesive settlement policy to the controversial nature of the issue: 'Domestically, the whole problem was so fiery that any unambiguous decision would probably have led to break down the government.'

In the academic sphere, bulk of literature are available which deals Israel's terms with US and Arab countries, including the peace talk over the Occupied Territories. The next theme of the research literature is based on the 'Peace Process'.

Peace Process

In terms of Peace process, there are several prominent political analysts who have analysed comprehensively Israel, Palestine and the peace process. These are the following, Efraim Inbar (1991)*"War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labour Party Position on National Security"* David Makovsky (1995) *"Making Peace with the PLO"* Yossi Beilin (1999) *"Touching Peace*: *From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement"* Avi Shlaim, (2000) *"The Iron Wall"* Yehuda Lukacs, (1997) *"Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process"* etc. Moshe Sasson, however, states that the lack of an Israeli peace initiative and any significant negotiations, in the period leading to the October War was due to the absence of trustworthy and credible partners; 'there was no one to talk to' (quoted in Ranta, 2007: 20). Jean Rael Isaac explores that "Israel had pursued two policies: one it had accepted, but unable to implement, and another it was partially implementing, without fully agreeing upon. He states that Israel agreed to the land-for-peace concept, but the lack of Arab reciprocity and popular backing meant the state 'had a map and could not say so" (Isaac, 1976: 105).

The Arab-Israel conflict go back to the end of the nineteenth century when the Zionist Movement conceived the idea of building a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This project met with bitter opposition on the part of the Arab population and since the early 1940s Palestine question has first and foremost been a national question. The Palestinian Arabs claims to the land are based on their continuous residence in the country for hundreds of years and the fact that they represented the demographic majority until 1948 (Morris, 2009). On 14 May 1948 hours before the departure of the British from Palestine, the Zionist leaders proclaimed the State of Israel. Neighbouring Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq) then invaded Israel, claiming that they sought to "save" Palestine from the Zionists. For long the Palestinian question remained primarily as a refugee problem and the refusal of the Palestinian leadership to recognise and accept the UN partition plan remained a major issue. Following the October war and oil crisis, the international community began to recognise the political rights of the Palestinians and recognised the PLO as 'sole and legitimate' representative of the Palestinian people. However, the responding the outbreak of the First Intifada through the Algiers Declaration, on 15 November 1988 the PNC accepted the UN

Resolution 181, thereby signalling its willingness to co-exist with Israel. Thus, the Palestinian question transformed into being a refugee problem into a political rights and coexistence (United Nation, 2008).

The armistice lines created after the 1948 war fixed the territorial boundaries of Israel, and the question of settlement outside these lines was moot (Melman and Raviv, 1989). For long, peace process was remote, as it became clear that the Arab states were unwilling to go beyond the armistice agreements towards formal treaties, and acceptance of the legitimacy of Israel. This situation changed radically following the 1967 War (Steinberg, 1992). Peace process between Israel and the Palestinians has become a prolong phase of negotiation as in the wake of the June War, Israelis increasingly came to believe that they and the Palestinians would have to reach a modus vivendi. As a result, the ideological debate over the future of the territories became a major part of the political discourse (Rynhold and Steinberg, 2007). There was no deliberate strategy to focus on peace process because the Palestinian issue has been predominant issue in Israeli politics during the past generation (Shamir and Arian, 1999). Reuven Y. Hazan (2000) defined that The Labour Party's victory in the June 1992 election and installation of Rabin as Prime Minister were responsible for the dramatic decisions that heralded a new era in the peace process. That has started at the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991.

Robert Putnam (1988) suggested that bargaining between two entities that is shown reaching a peace agreement may develop a second level of bargaining inside the domestic political arena. The debate over whether to support the agreement was the need to build a coalition to ratify agreement. The first six months of the Labour government showed little progress on the peace. At the Madrid Peace Conference, the US took the lead in trying to address the Arab-Israeli conflict following the Kuwait crisis. At the conference the US adopted an even-handed approach and pledged to promote a settlement that would provide security for Israel and justice to the Palestinian. On this issue Labour was a pragmatic party committed to a territorial compromise, whereas Likud remained an ideological party committed to maintaining to the West Bank as part of the ancestral Land of Israel. The peace process had a strong impact on internal cohesion of the party and internal partisan division influenced the peace process (Shlaim, 2005).

Michael Brecher (1973) explained that about negotiations with the Arab states, Israeli elites were willing in principle to exchange land for peace but, in practice, their reliance on

delaying negotiations and arguing over methods led to diplomatic stagnation. Nadav Safran (1978) states that Israel did not define formally and specifically it's endgame but was willing to negotiate for a permanent peace and described that one of the most important contributing factors to Israel's policies towards the Occupied Territories was the role played by the US administration. Michael Barnett (1996) has discussed the forces which led to embrace of the Oslo Accords and defined the feature of Rabin's practices and policies and cultural space in Israeli politics in which a withdrawal from the territories become desirable and legitimate.

Louise Fischer (2014) discussed changes in Israeli foreign policy after the October War and the step-by-step diplomacy of Henry Kissinger. Rabin's narrative presented discursive space for Israelis to imagine that they shared a storyline with other political communities and states thus provided a conceptual space for peace with its Arab states and the Palestinian. On the other side Yitzhak Shamir's ultra-nationalist narrative on of unbroken persecution from non-Jews that held out no possibilities of change, thus virtually precluding any cognitive space for a secure boarder with Israel's neighbour. This process has been taken place during and because of specific events. That understood as the 'structuring of social action in time'.

The US was 'anxious about the consequences' of instability and increased USSR involvement in the West Asia. The fact that Israel was 'partly unwilling, partly unable' to define its end-game increased instability and forced the US involvement. There is no doubt that successive Israeli governments accepted the notion of territorial concessions and land for peace, but it was 'American pressure, rewards and incentives that made peace seem acceptable and the inevitable price worth paying' (Sella and Yishai, 1986). Rabin framed the settlement and possibilities in a way that aggregated various domestic groups that had diverse, sometimes even divergent interests. Economic and political elites, Russian immigrants and a critical percentage of Sephardim and lower-class Israeli Jews joined the traditional pro-Labour Ashkenazi constituency in voting for Rabin and then given him a modest support base to pursue Oslo (Barnett, 1996).

The above reviewed literature discussed the various dimensions of the Labour Party and the Palestinian issue. It provides useful and essential insights into the understanding of Israeli politics. Aftermath of June 1967 War, there are various aspects have been discussed, social, economic, military, security, political. There are significant limitations in the existing literature. The Labour Party's politics and policies towards the Palestinian question, from the June War 1967 till the 1993 are not widely covered in the available literature, specially its

position regarding PLO as the negotiating partner. A shift in this position resulted in the Oslo accord. The proposed research will try to fill this vacuum.

This study seeks to utilise the internal politics over Labour Party's policies about the Occupied Territories and the shift within Israel from non-recognition to recognition. In that perspective, this research at least would be a part of the contribution to academic domain. The significance of this research is the fact that offers a new explanation for the Labour Party's policies towards the Occupied Territories and suggests that domestic politics, personality, and the dynamics of intra-party politics are the key to comprehending Israel's peace efforts from 1967 to 1993.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

The Labour Party is often cited as an example of holding a dominant force in Israeli political system, decades before Israel was founded and dominated until 1977. Historically, the Party had been the proponent of humane and liberal Zionism, political moderation, reconciliation and compromise. The objective of this research is to examine the Party's policy on the Palestinian question. The Palestinian question as an issue is very crucial not only in Israel's polity but also in entire international politics. The June War gave a new shape to the Palestinian issue. One of the consequences was that the war brought all the territories of Mandate Palestine under Israeli control and heralded a new era in Israeli politics.

The purpose of research is to examine the shift in Labour Party's position towards the newly occupied territories and its policies towards the Palestinian question. There are several disagreements concerning the Palestinian issue between Likud Party and Labour Party, especially in the realm of ideology and in the realm of practical policy. If the rise to power of the Likud in 1977 constituted a sharp break in Israeli policy, the year 1993 marked the changing period because the transition in the posture of both Israel and the PLO. Both entities were inimical to one-another and had intransigent attitude prior to the Oslo accord. This was ended when Yitzhak Rabin leader of the Labour government entered secret negotiations with Yasser Arafat Chairman of the PLO. Both have signed on mutual recognition later and the PLO acknowledged the state of Israel and pledged to reject violence, Israel recognised the PLO. The negotiation has led to Declaration of Principles (DoP) on Palestinian self-government in Gaza Strip and Jericho. This negotiation has marked a major watershed in

Israel's relations with the Palestinians despite all its limitations, defects and ambiguities. This was the most important event of the Labour Party's period.

The research proposal will first attempt to look at the Labour Party's posture towards the occupied territories-Gaza Strip and West Bank. The problem of defining such an approach was further complicated by the need to reach a consensus within the confines of the National Unity Government (NUG) especially between the Labour Party (dovish) and the Likud Party (hawkish) and examine the causes that led to the rapprochement between Israel and the PLO to reach peace process.

The Palestinian question has various components such as Palestinian political rights, statehood, refugees, Jerusalem etc.; the most critical issue was the Israeli recognition of the PLO and its acceptance of the latter as the negotiating partner. Since its founding in 1964 the PLO has gradually secured Arab and international recognition as the 'sole and legitimate' representative of the Palestinian people. Despite this Israel was not in favour of seeking the PLO as a negotiating partner. For long, the Labour Party, the dominant political force in Israel sought to bypass the recognized the Palestinian leadership and sought a solution through Jordan. Only when this approach ended was the Oslo process became feasible and hence the proposed research seeks to examine the changes in the Labour Party's position about pursuing negotiations with the PLO.

Research Questions:

1. What is the position of the Labour Party towards the Palestinian question and Occupied Territories?

2. How did the Labour Party evolve its positions regarding the PLO being the negotiating partner?

3. What were the significance changes in the Labour Party's position towards the Palestinian question?

4. What are the domestic political compulsions faced by the Labour Party with rise of the Likud?

Hypotheses

1. Labour Party's position on Occupied Territories became inflexible because of the domestic partisan contest with Likud.

2. The Labour Party's recognition of PLO as the negotiating partner was the critical shift that facilitated the Oslo process.

Research Methodology

The research used analytical method. The proposed research based on available primary resources such as autobiographies, original documents of various plans, policies that have been proposed by Labour Party towards the Occupied Territories and the Knesset minister's interviews and government's official policy statements including those of Presidents and other Ministers. The proposed research provides a detailed historical analysis-based on the archival material-of Israel's relationship with the Occupied Territories, between the years 1967 and 1993. Proposed research is based on secondary sources such as books, articles published in edited volumes, research journals and newspapers. Internet sources are also used wherever necessary. For collection of materials, libraries in New Delhi like JNU, IDSA, JMI, ICWA and others is used. Field trip to Israel is not done due to some reasons.

The second chapter on *Historical Evolution of Israel's Labour Party* elaborates provided the background. It traced the roots of the Labour Party, which begun by examining the Jewish Diaspora its problems such anti-Semitism, Theodore Herzl's Zionist Movement, Aliyahs, Labour Movement, Histradut and its various works (welfare policies), and the political Parties (Poalei Zion, Achdut Ha'avodah, Mapai etc.) which emerged during the evolution of state of Israel. It also discusses the ideology of the Party and examines very briefly various political segment of Labour Party in Israel.

Chapter three on *Domestic Struggle within the Labour Party 1948-1977* analyses the salient features of the Labour Party as the dominant member of the ruling coalition. Basically, this chaptered explained the Israel's political system, Labour Party's role in it and major leaders of the party. The second segment of the chapter covered the Party's dominant era (Mapaivot) and how the Party was able to maintain its dominance for nearly three decades. Moreover, chapter dealt the problems party faced during the governance and the factors, which contributed the defeat of the party in 1977 general elections and the result of the elections.

This fourth chapter on The *Labour Party's Perspective on the PLO before the First Intifada* discussed Israel and the Palestine dispute since the June War, which had changed the contour of the conflict in the political context. It explained reflection and effect of June War in Israel's politics in general and Labour perspective towards PLO. Moreover, this chapter mentioned the PLO shortly and explored the posture of Labour Party on the Palestinian question (PLO) before resistance (First Intifada). It also discussed the Plans and approaches that have been taken for solving the territories questions. Particularly, the Allon Plan, the Functional solution, and Jordanian Option etc. examined to understand the Labour Party's territorial approach.

The fifth chapter on *From Non-Recognition to Oslo* elaborates Labour Party's attitude towards the PLO particularly the reasons for its prolonged refusal to recognise PLO and seek alternative options (Jordan). It also examined the compulsion that resulted in a reversal of this policy thereby enabling the Oslo process. The reversal of the policy was not brought suddenly rather several major incident occurred in external and internal levels, namely the First Intifada, end of the Cold War, impact of Kuwait crisis , the hegemonic status of the US in the global politics and of course Israel's 1992 general election that led to a dovish government in Israel. Additionally, chapter examines the circumstances and rationale behind the shifts in Labour Party's policy towards the PLO and its role in the evolution of the Oslo process.

The chapter six summarises the findings of the study putting to test the proposed hypotheses.

Chapter Two:
Historical Evolution of Israel's Labour Party

Israel is a state, which is being considered an immigrant and democratic state. Political parties are a primary component of any democratic state as they tend to channel the official machinery effectively. Israel's political system is widely known as the 'overdeveloped multiparty system' (Akzin, 1955). The parties before the declaration of the State of Israel in the Jewish community (the Yishuv) in Mandate Palestine revolved around ideologies, class, and community-based interests which permeated into party formations in Israel.

Yonathan Shapiro (1976) considers the existence of Jews community in Palestine as Old and New Yishuv. Old were representing the religious Jews and the nationalists Jews who had immigrated to Palestine later are categorised as New Yishuv. The emergence of political groupings with different segment of thoughts and opinions influenced the political trends of the Yishuv. The rise and evolution of parties in the Yishuv broadly characterise in three political spectra including Left, Right and Religious. The emergence of Mapai (predecessor of Labour Party) and the Revisionists (Predecessor of Likud Party) emerged in the Yishuv. Another party, the Aguda Party came during Yishuv period with the goal to fulfilling the religious interest of the Jewish community in the Yishuv. In the aftermath establishment of state of Israel, several other political parties emerged including Shas, Shinui and Yash Atid and many more. In the twenty-first century, Kadima, Ha'Tnuah parties were formed.

In the Israel's political history, various political parties have emerged and disappeared from time to time. A famous political scientist Giovanni Sartori's analysis is recognised in academic sphere by the name of Sartorian analysis. He explained that Israel's political system before the 1970s was one-party dominance system but in the 1970s it became multi-party coalition system. For Geovanni Sartori (1976) "the Israeli parties had always been 'baffling' in view of complexities of society and polity, the first two decades of the party system followed the 'one-party dominance system".

In the 1970s, Mapai was the dominant party, which was also dominant party prior the formation of Israel especially in the Histradut trade union. Mapai Party acquired a pivotal status in the Israel's political history, this narrative is characterised as Mapaivot era in Israel.

Mapai can be equated with an umbrella organisation. The voters after the establishment of Israel have given major responsibilities to Mapai by bringing it to the helm of governance. It can be said that it was a dominant party without power after 1981 also (Nochery, 1996). Those used to be the symbol of socialist intellectual and ideals in the society and politics later had lost their political dominance in the 1980s. Gradually, Mapai/Labour Party was replaced with the Revisionist ideology (Likud Party) which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Mapai, as a dominant party, has carried its tag even before the formation of Israel. The formation of the State of Israel started towards the end of the 19th century. It can be traced its history with the starting of Zionism (as a national movement) in 1897. Theodore Herzl steered the movement, later movement spread all over the world. Gradually, various parties played significant role in carrying forward Herzl's dream.

The journey of the Zionist Movement had begun before First Aliyah (the large numbers of the Jewish immigration to Palestine since the late 19th century). Israel has its long history to claim its historic rights in Palestine. This chapter will not focus on its history in details but will pay brief attention to the evolution of the State. When scholars trace the history of the land, they have found that the land of it was, for many centuries, ruled or occupied by foreign emperors. They came, colonised, ruled and disappeared (Shapiro, 1976). It can be seen from 1517 until 1917 it was part of the Ottoman Empire. Even prior Ottoman Turkish Empire, it was ruled by many other foreign emperors including Babylonians, Persian, and Roman, etc. The last foreign ruler was British which conquered it in 1917. Subsequently, in 1924, it became a British mandate. At the end of British rule, state of Israel (November 1947) was established under the UN Partition (Plan 181) Resolution which was accepted by the majority members of the UN but was not accepted by the Arabs states (Marver, 1957).

The end of the British Mandate was approved by the United Nations on 29 November 1947, when the General Assembly resolved to partition Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State.[1] Five months later with the departure of the British and the Israeli Declaration of Independence, Palestine had become a battlefield.[2] Ironically, the British, who had restored security and order in Palestine after the Turkish retreat, left Palestinian insecure and

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[1] Palestine was divided into three segments especially 55 per cent land reserved for Jewish people, 45 per cent land was given for the Palestinian state. Jerusalem and its surrounding part were described as an international zone.

[2] Both the sides were not happy with the plan. The Palestinian and Arabs thought injustice was done with them. However, Irgun (Jewish militant group) had accepted the plan whereas the Jewish Agency (de facto government of the Yishuv) had given it support to the plan.

disorderly in 1948. The liquidation of the British administration in Palestine subsequently had produced maximum chaos. The country's official administrative machinery was destroyed and security of life and property was undermined (Shlaim, 1988).

That time, however, the Jewish community was far better prepared than they were after World War I. The institutions of Jewish self-government, which had developed under Mandatory administration since 1920, had already assumed the tasks of governance. Under Turkish rule, the Jews had become accustomed to exercising wide discretion in local matters. And under the Mandate, the Jews realised that they would be able to maintain acceptable standards of Jewish community life and social services only under their efforts (Bernstein, 1957).

The establishment of Israel was laid on widespread struggle and contribution of several leaders of the Zionist Movement, the Labour Movement and Jewish people who had migrated to Palestine. Therefore, this chapter deals the history of the Zionist Movement and then the period from First Aliyah (1882) until the declaration of the state of Israel (1948). During that period, the history of the Labour Movement had been evolved. Since 1930 Mapai (the forerunner to the Labour Party) had played an important role in the Labour Movement. The evolution of the Labour Party had succeeded during the arrival of the various Jewish waves of immigration to Palestine.

The political history of the Jewish community in Palestine emerged during various such waves of immigration. Each wave is known in Hebrew as an Aliyah. Aliyahs were inspired by strong nationalist sentiment and each wave was seen a different set of experience which affected the behaviour of immigrants in a new place. Especially the Second and Third Aliyah (1904-1914), was a landmark in the development of the Labour Movement. Meanwhile, various organisations and a union formed around them and later, some leadership (Revisionist) who rejected ideology and actively work against established authority before the establishment of Israel also emerged during this phase. In between, the root of the Labour Party was nurtured in the form of the Labour Movement. They have a unified the Jewish people, to provide social security, nationalism and their foundation for political life in Palestine (Shalev, 1996).

At that period, the Labour Movement had played an important and decisive role in implementing the goal of Zionism in Palestine, while Labour Movement's socialist parties

(particularly Achdut Ha'avodah and Mapai) were dominating the Yishuv and Israel until 1977. Hence, this study will not explain the history of each aspect, which developed the prior formation of the state of Israel. Rather, the chapter will focus on immigration (Aliyah), roots and emergence of Zionism/Zionist Movement and will elaborate on how Labour Parties grew up during immigration and under the discourse of Zionism, especially socialist parties, which formed the Labour Party (1968) later.

Before examining the Aliyah phase, the chapter will draw little focus on the Zionist Movement and its philosophy which has emerged before the Jewish immigration to Palestine.

The Zionist Movement

The core of Jews diaspora was in Russia and Europe, where in the late 19th century, Jewish community were persecuted, especially under the rule of Alexander III (1881-94) and Nicholas II (1894-1917). Under their rule, hatred and persecution activities against Jews have intensified and were encouraged (Cleveland L. & Bunton, 2009). Due to persecution and continuing oppression, East European Jews had begun immigrating to the different places expecting a new and fresh life. For some Zionism was alternative hope to get rid of from the anti-Semitism and persecution. It was the Zionist Movement which inspired as much by nationalism as by religious faith and had taken responsibility to Jew's emancipation from the agony and sufferings (Ibid.). They had core beliefs that all Jews would establish 'one nation' which could be the only solution.

The Zionists were influenced by not only one ideology but were inspired by many ideologies over period of time, such as nationalism, Marxism, socialism, and Labour Zionism (Atmaca, 2012). Despite having differences among the Jewish people, their collective endeavour was to establish a nation/state for the Jewish people. That collective effort of establishing a state for Jewish community is called Zionism or Zionist Movement (Gorni, 1977).

The word 'Zion'[3] is a Hebrew Biblical name, meaning Jerusalem. The word 'Zionism' was coined by Nathan Birnbaum[4] in 1893 (Ettinger, 1976). The emergence of Zionism was a significant event in the struggle of Jewish history. It was the national movement for the Jewish community to form a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The Jewish national movement

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[3]Basically, Zion is characterised a hill, which presence was seen in Jerusalem. It can be seen three major identities (King David's palace, Soloman and the Jerusalem) located on the crest of Mount Zion. The word of Zionism basically originated from Mount Zion.

[4]. He was known firstly as a writer, journalist, additionally Jewish thinker and nationalist.

has advocated and mobilised the Jewish community to emigrate to Eretz Israel/Palestine. It has attempted to establish a nation at a time of nationalism, revolution and anti-Semitism in Europe. The ambition for political freedom and a highly historical consciousness of peoplehood had led them to materialise their nationalist goals (Adelman, 2008). During the evolution of Zionism, many political parties sprang and later developed completely and secured their place in the Israeli polity (Lewis, 1992). Some scholars considered that Zionism was a genuine national liberation movement that had come into picture as a legitimate reaction to anti-Semitism and to resolve the Jewish problem, one of physical security, economic survival and collective identity (Shafir, 1989).

In the thoughts of Zionists, especially among the Orthodox Jews, anti-Semitism was an unavoidable consequence of Jewish presence in the Diaspora. Poalei Zion delegation to Dutch-Scandinavian committee, urged that "the source of all the misfortunes of the Jewish people is the loss of its historic country and its dispersion in all countries" (quoted in Leon, 1950:206). Before shifting to Palestine, the Jewish community was going under extreme agony and struggle. According to Zemlinskaya (2008), "Zionists at that moment of time wished to achieve two goals; first to legitimise the idea of establishment of a Jewish state in the land and to call all the Jews, in the entire globe, must be united. Concerning actualising these two aims, the Zionist Movement desired immigrants to come to Israel" (quoted in Flapan, 1979:56). It has been conceived that emancipation of the Jewish community was possible only with the creation of a state to which the community could claim ultimately as their nation.

The modern Jewish nationalism started with the ethnic group (Jewish community) being scattered in various countries around the world (Shlaim, 2000). Their lifestyle, including costumes, language, diet and religion was inassimilable; subsequently, the Russian nationalists among the Jews believed that their way of life was like capitalism and was not Russian. The Czar has described the Jews as 'a nation within a nation' (Cohen, 1987). The Bible describes the Jews as a community with a strong sense of peoplehood. Jewish people claimed that their Biblical past is authentic and scientific (Hobsbawm, 2007).

The Zionist Movement has emerged during the 19th century, while the philosophies of the Zionist Movement were present for hundreds of years. The European Jewish community wanted to establish a structure in which the whole Jewish community could seek liberation

and enlightenment could preserve its own identity while taking participate in modern civilisation (R. Taylor, 1974).

Modern Zionism found its roots among the Russian Jewish people. A Modernist Movement called '*haskalah*[5]' arose in the 1850s among the Russian Jews whose members were influenced by Western European literary models and stood for legal equality with non-Jews (Smith, 2004). The assimilationist hope of '*haskalah*' has been encouraged by the relatively tolerant regime of Czar Alexander-II. But the pogroms erupted in 1881 as a result of the assassination of Alexander-II shattered the hopes for legal emancipation. The malaise of anti-Semitism soon spread to East Europe, the Balkan countries and Germany. The result was the beginning of a huge immigration movement, especially from Russia. A vast majority of them moved to bountiful America and a few young zealots directed their attention to Palestine (Brunhes, 2012). At the time of immigration to Palestine, in particular and in other parts of the globe in general, various thinkers and philosophers came out in the support of Jewish community namely Leon Pinsker, Ahad Ha'Am, Moses Hess and more importantly Theodor Herzl who were not only advocating state for Jewish community but actualised the Zionist dream for the state of Israel (Gelber, 2011).

Leon Pinsker (1821-91) a Russian Jew born in Poland, has been considered as the founder of the Modern Zionist Movement in its preliminary pre-political phase. He undertook a trip to Europe in 1882, visited various capitals and tried unsuccessfully to popularise the idea that Jewish people need to set up a nation of their own to solve the question of Jewish homeland. He returned to Odessa and published a pamphlet '*selbstemanzipaito*' ('Auto-Emancipation'*)* (1882) in German. In his book, he analysed the roots of anti-Semitism and declared that Jews would never be the legal and social equals of gentiles if they did not have a state of their own. Pinsker strongly believed that "Like the Negroes, like Women, and unlike all free peoples, the Jews must be emancipated and the only solution to Jews problem was to acquire a Jews homeland somewhere on the globe" (Kaplan, 1983:46). He became the leader of Lovers of Zion (called in Hebrew "Hovevei Zion" also known as "Hibbat Zion") to materialise his dreams. He was instrumental in the original founding committee of the local Hibbat Zion movement in Odessa, which held a founding convention in Kattowitz (a German name for the city in Poland) in November 1884. He was the chairman of this convention and continued as the leader of the Hibbat Zion until his death in 1891(Brooker, 2006).

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[5] Hebrew word meaning 'Enlightenment' basically had started as a movement, in Europe in 18th century, which brought European enlightenment in Jewish world (Brunhes, 2012).

Pinsker had pointed out in his 'Auto-Emancipation' that the Jewish people were being persecuted due to Judophobia[6] and for that reason, they had to have their own country (Ettinger, 1976). His pamphlet and activities mainly inspired the evolution of Zionist ideology and the Movement. Once Herzl read 'Auto-Emancipation' just after the publication of his own "*Der Judenstaat*" he commented that surprisingly there was critical consensus and significant similarity in the constructive part. "Pity that I didn't read the pamphlet before the printing of my own. And yet it is a good thing that I didn't know it. I would perhaps have refrained from writing my work" (Herzl, 1959:59).

The first valid criticism of Pinsker's movement The Lovers of Zion was made by Ahad Ha'Am (1856-1927), the famous Jewish writer and perhaps the most acute Zionist theorist. He published his essay "*This is not the way*" in 1889 (Abraham, 1950). In that essay, he argued the settlement activities of Lovers of Zion was bound to fail so long as they appealed to self-interest and the desire for personal emancipation rather than to the inspiring vision of national regeneration with its cultural potentiality (Lucas, 1974). He embraced the notion of Jewish cultural renewal based on the fundamental spirit of Judaism and called on the Jews to be true to the Jewish tradition, embodying ethical values in its highest form. He dedicated his entire life for the cause of Judaism and combined the biblical spirit of courage, dignity and aesthetic creativity with modern Zionism. His approach was 'Cultural' rather than political (Chowers, 1998) and was rightfully regarded as the father of 'Spiritual' or 'Cultural Zionism (Ibid.). The opposite philosophy, Zionism with communism, was derived by Moses Hess.

Moses Hess (1812-75), a German Jew, advocated a Jewish state in Palestine in his book "*Rome and Jerusalem: The Last National Question*", published in 1862 (Avineri, 1985). The book reconfirmed the idea of Zionist, loaded with a social pathos which was entrenched in the belief of the prophets in a better world and tranquillity of the universe. He was known as 'Red Rabbi' and 'the first Trotskyist' as he combined Zionism with communism. He influenced Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in formulating the communist ideology, before meeting Hess both were Young Hegelians, not communists. Hess joined the International Working Men's Association or the Communist International in 1867 and sided with Marx in his dispute with Russian revolutionary anarchist Mikhail Bakunin (Ibid.). He originated the expression "*Religion is the opium of the people*", the phrase used in the Communist Manifesto; inspired the Kibbutz and Histadrut Movement (will be discussed later); and

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[6]According to Hertzberg that "the Auto-Emancipation is the first great statement of the torment of the Jew driven to assert his own nationalism because the wider world had rejected him" (Hertzberg, 1959:181).

preached social ownership of the economy. He was the founder of Israeli National Socialism and set the ideological base for Labour Zionism (Ibid.) and came to be regarded as the father of Labour Zionism.

Hess, in his early stage of intellectual activity, was so critical to Judaism and urged in his essay "*On the Essence of Money*" that Judaism with the cult of money and emphasised on the significant role of Jews people in the world Finance. The opinion of Hess profoundly influenced Marx and he equated Judaism with capitalism in his book "*The Holy Family*" published in 1845 (S. Wistrich, 1976). Marx had an anti-Semitic myth about the Judaised essence of bourgeois society and according to Marx "the Money is the jealous God of Israel … in the last analysis the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism" (quoted in S. Wistrich, 1976:26).

For ahead, Hess vetoed the assimilation and demanding back to Judaism and stood for the formation of a Jewish socialist state in Palestine. He urged that the Jews to be a race and a nation and considered that "the Jewish race is one of the primary races of mankind that have retained its integrity, in spite of the continual change of its climatic environment, and the Jewish type has conserved its purity through the centuries" (Waxman, 1949:54).

The thought of 'Jewish race' seems to be baseless because religion is the primary identification of being Jewish and in the Biblical sense, Jews are only a 'nation,' not a race. The restoration of Jewish nationality in Palestine was conceived as the only solution for Jewish question. Hess was so specific about Palestine and was in full agreement with the declaration composed by the representatives of the progressive Jews at their meeting in Frankfort, which stated "We acknowledge as our fatherland only the land where we are born and to which we are inseparably united by the bonds of citizenship …Judaea would be allowed to expand its boundaries from Suez to the harbour of Smyrna, plus the whole area of the Western Lebanon rage" (quoted in Ibid. pp.135 and 136). His "*Rome and Jerusalem*" was the first document which proposed socialist state in Palestine and argued that only it could help to create healthier Jewish society where they can have more productive and fruitful occupations as against a non-productive and wasteful job.

However, during the 1890s, Zionism was uncoordinated movement, in terms of development and seemed vague in its direction. Theodore Herzl took the movement in the proper direction,

his energy and determination forged the present elements of the ideology into an understandable and coherent international movement.

Theodore Herzl and Political Zionism

Theodore Herzl conceived the doctrine of political Zionism and was pursued by his successors and supporters. He was born in Budapest in a middle-class family and worked as a journalist in '*Viennese newspaper'* (Hertzherg, 1960). His understanding and experiences in various Western European part mainly in Paris (1891-1895), made him conscious of anti-Semitism a profound and deep-seated preconception in the French society that was most tolerant and progressive at that time. He conceived that any legislation could not ever abolish anti-Semitism. This perception and Dreyfus affairs (1894) drove Herzl to write "*Der Judenstaat"* (The Jewish State*),* in 1896, which marked the ideological basis for political Zionism (Waxman, 1949). According to Herzl, the Jewish persecution and oppression could only be solved with establishment of Jews their own state (quoted in, Laqueur & Rubin, 2001). His "*The Jewish State'* was a kind of treatise on nationalism.

The Dreyfus Affair[7] split France between the Dreyfusards (those supporting Dreyfus) and anti-Dreyfusards (those who were against). The quarrel was especially violent and invoked anti-Semitic epithet. The responsibility to report the trial had given to Theodor Herzl by his newspaper and for its aftermath, the unfairness and discrimination found in the trial (Bein, 1970). The anti-Jewish passions aroused during the trial forced Herzl to consider the implications of anti-Semitism. Herzl was seriously preoccupied with anti-Jewish prejudice and discrimination long before he encountered the insane Jew-baiting of the anti-Dreyfausards in Paris (Ibid.). He was obsessed with the consequences of Jewish '*material'* powerlessness. As a solution for the bitter anti-Semitism he encountered everywhere in Europe he came up with the idea of a Jewish homeland.

Herzl presented his plan for a Jewish state to the celebrated Jewish publicist, Max Nordau and encouraged by the latter's support, he prepared a remarkable pamphlet, titled "*Der Judenstaat"* (The Jewish State which published in 1896 with a sub-title *'versuch einer modernen loesung der Judenfrage'* meaning (An attempt at a modem solution of the Jewish question). Originally it was a 65-page pamphlet 'Address to the Rothschilds', outlining a

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[7]The result of the Dreyfus issue shocked Jewish community and demonstrated the extremism of French anti-Semitism. In the verdict of the Affair (1894), Alfred was convicted and shattered the Jewish community's emotion.

state where the Jewish people could live at least as freemen on their soil (Nachman, 1935). The Maccabaean Society of London encouraged Herzl and his views were published in an article in the 'Jewish Chronicle.' In England, this paper was first published in a condensed form. The material later appeared as the 'Judenstaat'. A month later, a revised version of the pamphlet under the title *"Der Judenstaat"* was published in Vienna (Ibid.).

Herzl evaluated modern-day anti-Semitisms and discussed that would not be a reversal of the tide enmity. All analysis summed up in the classic Berlin Phrase "Judenraus'-"out with the Jews" and of Israel expressed the formation of state (Herzl, 1946). His evaluation was nothing new to that of Pinsker baring the hopes that the European authorities would support the formation of state of Israel and pledge its sovereignty.

Two factors, Jewish nationality and their sovereign state contributed such an alien feeling on the planet where they were oppressed and persecuted by majority. Herzl's solution for the sufferings was to achieve political sovereignty in the form of a state of their own that can only bring them out of perpetual oppression and subordination. The Jewish question was raised by the Herzl in the comprehensive framework of issues related all oppressed peoples of the world. For him, the Jewish problem presence was appeared wherever the Jewish people dwell in noticeable figures and "it was a national question, which can only be solved by making it a political world question to be discussed and settled by the civilised nations of the world in council" (Ibid.:2).

Herzl understood that oppression and persecution could be prevented only when the Jewish community came together. They retain all necessary material resources for human being for realising the dream of a model state. Herzl had core belief that forming a state neither an abstract thought nor was it impossible. "Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves" (Ibid.:18).

Herzl was not committed to Palestine like the Lovers of Zion and wrote, "Shall we choose Palestine or Argentina? We shall take what is given us and what is selected by Jewish public opinion" (Ibid.:29). At the same time, Herzl never discredited the primacy of Palestine and viewed immigration to it as the ideal solution and felt, "Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvellous potency" (Ibid.p.29). To form the Israel, Herzl was roaming around the world,

requesting Turkish Sultan and European powers to grant the Palestinian land for the Jewish community in the return he would favour them if a sovereign state is formed for Jewish community in Palestine (Kedourie & Haim, 1982).

Herzl's move reached the ears of the Turkish Sultan had made his discussion with the Sultan (Abdul Hamid) in May 1901 for obtaining Sultan permission for Jewish people settlement in Palestine. It was the unfortunate moment for Jewish community because his effort had not been successful. In the response, Sultan had not granted permission for huge Jewish immigration into Palestine but could develop scattered Jewish settlements Syria and Iraq (Patai, 1971). In the aftermath not getting success in his diplomacy from the German Kaiser and Sultan, Herzl had approached the British in 1902 because "England the great, England the free, England with her eyes fixed on the seven seas, will understand us" (Tuchman, 1956:292).

Holding an interview with Joseph Chamberlain October 1902 (Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs in Britain), Herzl received help from Lord Nathan Rothschild. The Sinai Peninsula in the al-Arish was mentioned the proposal, which might be a feasible area for the Jewish community settlement (Friedman, 2004). In the aftermath the conducting three meeting with Chamberlain, he was ready on the proposal (settlement in the Sinai) but asked Herzl to take permission from the Egyptian authorities. Herzl had visited to Cairo but unfortunately, owing to specific Egyptian provisions and Turkish intrigue, the negotiations was not been successful (Taylor, 1974). The mounting force of Egyptian nationalism created strong opposition to land alienations.

After failing these attempts, Chamberlain urged to figure out some other options. In the coming year, Chamberlain put an offer of territory, internal autonomy in East Africa (Sokolow, 1919). This territorial alternative is known as 'Uganda Plan' in the history of state building. Under this alternative, offered territory was a part of Kenya. Thus, the first country was England which was officially negotiating with Jewish community as a political unit and the first to make them a territorial offer for Zionism (Tuchman, 1956).

The territorial offer was provisional solution and accepted by the Herzl considered a short-term strategy. Herzl was hoping that his interest in East Africa offer might persuade the wavering Sultan to re-think on Palestine proposal. He restarted to make effort on a Turkish Charter, perhaps in Mesopotamia, anywhere in West Asia with major focus kept on Palestine.

Simultaneously, Herzl was trying to convince the Sixth Zionist Congress (1903), held in Basel to accept the 'Uganda Plan' (Heymann, 1977). To discuss the Uganda Plan, several national delegations debated separately. In these meeting, the option was categorically rejected by the national delegation. Particularly, Russian delegation most were strongly recommended Palestine land rejected the Uganda proposal. Despite rejecting the 'Uganda Plan', the Zionist Congress was unable to propose any concrete plan other than sending off an investigating Committee to East Africa. In that context, the voting method was conducted on the proposal to decide the matter. Subsequently, 295 votes were in the favour to the proposal and 178 against the proposal. Moreover, the delegates from Eastern Europe walked out of the auditorium en bloc (Tuchman, 1956).

The 'Uganda Plan/Proposal' created rift within the Zionist Movement into fractions. These dissenters who were from Russian Zionist conducted their separate conference at Kharkov[8] (November 1903) and declared that their exclusive preference to Palestine remained unchanged. They called themselves 'Zion Zionists'. Another section preferring East Africa, torn apart under the leadership of Israel Zangwill to establish a faction called the 'Territorialists'. The group, which urging for an immediate solution to the Jewish problem by settling down in Palestine or elsewhere with an international sanction, came to be known as the 'Politicals' and was favouring Herzl's claim (Herzl 1946). Those who were opposing Herzl's claim called the Palestinophiles or 'Practicals.' At the time of Seventh Zionist Congress (1905), a resolution was made in the favour of Palestine. The 'Practical' dominated the conference and rejected the 'Uganda Plan' out rightly. The British 'Territorialists' under Israel Zangwill withdrew from the Congress (Alroey, 2016).

Herzl was an active leader and worked persistently and tirelessly to actualise the Zionist aspirations. His diplomatic endeavour to obtain a charter from Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), for an autonomous Jewish settlement in Palestine was not successful. Moreover, his efforts to ensure the support of the European powers (Germany, Britain and Russia) to pursue the Zionist agenda also did not become successful. It was his charismatic personality and dynamic leadership that laid down the ideological and material bases of the future state of Israel. A massive heart attack on 3 July 1904 made him rest forever at the age of 44. With the premature death of Herzl, the control of the World Zionist Movement passed mainly to the 'Practical' Zionists.

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[8] It was the city in Russia, where conference was held.

From the death of Herzl in 1904 until 1911, disputes arrayed the followers of Herzl, who advocated deferment of settlement in Palestine until political guarantees were secured, against the 'Practicals' led by Nahum Sokolow, Chaim Weizmann, and Menahem Ussishkin, who urged immediate colonisation (Atmaca, 2012). David Wolffsohn had become the President of the Zionist Movement. He was a Lithuanian Jew settled in Cologne, Germany, his diplomacy and leadership brought about an 'official' fusion of 'Practical' and 'Political' Zionism at the 1907 Congress (Parkes, 1962). Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952) was elected the President of the Zionist organisation. He was born in Motel, Russia, in 1874 and raised in an atmosphere of poverty, piety, and learning, studied chemistry in German universities and joined Zionist groups as a student. In 1904 he accepted a position at the University of Manchester and became an ardent admirer of the British.

In 1911, the 'Practicals' won control; however, the outbreak of First World War effectively foreclosed immediate settlement plans, and Weizmann became the principal exponent 'Synthetic Zionism' (focused actively on the ground level through both the means 'Practical and Political' to achieve the Zionist aim) or 'Organic Zionism (Weizmann's three point programme, organisation, recognition, and colonisation)', to stress the relation between these two diverse attitudes (Ibid.). Weizmann was associated with Ahad Ha'am[9] so that his doctrine of 'Synthetic Zionism' also encompassed the elementary canons of 'Cultural Zionism' (response to the personal identity and Jewish cultural renaissance). The Labour Zionists very efficiently encompassed the aim of 'Political,' 'Practical' 'Cultural' and Marxism Zionism and was appeared as the major ideological assets leading constructive Zionist efforts in Palestine.

Weizmann, a Zionist spokesman in London, carried a small Zionist Commission in April 1918 and reached in Palestine charged with establishing a liaison with British administration (which was called as Occupied Enemy Territory Administration [OETA]). This commission was helping the Jewish community in Palestine for maintaining friendly relations with Arabs (Lepkin, 1986). Persistently, Weizmann had been active in the Zionist cause established links with leading personalities among British political establishment. He had been active in raising the cause of Zionism before the British government and in establishing good terms

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[9]One of the first clashes developed early in 1901 between Herzl and Ahad Ha'am (Asher Ginsberg). Herzl wanted to defer colonising work in Palestine until the requisite political guarantees of Jewish settlement had been obtained. Ahad Ha'am, who regarded political self-government in Palestine as unnecessary, wanted to give far more attention to Jewish culture and to proceed with Jewish settlement quickly. His Zionism failed to attract many adherents because it offered no solution of the economic and political problems of Jewish community.

with well-placed personalities and officials. Subsequently, he was significantly assisted in his mission by the British cabinet. British backing for Zionism had the potential to serve British imperial proposes in West Asia (Cleveland L. & Bunton, 2009).

To sum up, according to Herzl, the fundamental purpose the Zionist Movement was to acquire a legal charter for the Jewish settlement sanctioned by the European authority under the international law. That was possible and could be actualised by merely practical diplomacy buttressed and helped by the prosperous and distinguished world Jewry. In the formation of Israeli foreign policy was influenced and had affected by the Zionist diplomatic style and geo-strategic perspectives (Lucas, 1974). The Zionist diplomacy transmogrified the abstract and spiritual inspirations into a viable policy (Sofer, 1998). Theodore Herzl was emphasising that a territory should be granted to the Jewish people by the legal process not it should be done by infiltration, occupation or the back-door channel.

According to Noah Lucas (1974), "Herzl's view was dubbed 'political' Zionism in contradiction to 'practical' Zionism. Herzl argued that the 'practical Zionist' strategy of immigration and 'gradual infiltration' was 'pointless unless it is based on our guaranteed sovereignty" (Lucas, 1974:45). He complained that "the practical Zionists sent 'settlers for show,' and "want to start going to Eretz Israel ever before it belongs to us. The political Zionists ... say: First, it has to belong to us and then we will go there" (Ibid.).

To provide the political Zionist Movement with a mass base and to gain the support of the leading Jewish people of the West, Herzl summoned a World Zionist Congress on 29 August 1897 in the Swiss city of Basel (Youssef, 2012) where 197 delegates assembled from all over the world. In this conference, overwhelming participants had arrived from the Russian Jewry, around 66 delegates (Lucas, 1974). Herzl was elected unanimously elected president. He presented an intelligible program for the re-establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, openly recognised and legally secured. The delegates, belonging to all schools of thought in Judaism, sensed the political realism of Herzl's programme and voted overwhelmingly in favour of it. The word 'homeland' was substituted for 'state' and 'public law' for 'international law' to avoid Ottoman objection (Alon, 1975). The programme adopted at the first Zionist Congress is known as 'The Basel Program,' which declared that Zionism aimed to create a homeland for the Jewish people ('Heimstatte'-homestead) in Palestine secured by public law. The Basel Conference established the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) with Herzl as its first president.

In the writings of Moses Hess, Leon Pinsker, and Theodor Herzl, the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine became the historic mission of the Jewish people. The idea of a Jewish state was powerfully inspired by a dream of social justice where the Jewish community can escape from the anti-Semitism of the Gentile world and create more optimistic demand for an outlet for the artistic energy and strengthen of Jewish people. The political Zionists who followed Herzl to the first Zionist Congress in Basel were driven not by only spiritual and charitable purposes but also by the motives of social justice in a place where the Jewish community would not have the only liberation from oppression but also a full opportunity for expression and achievement. Political Zionism appealed especially to Russian Jews, as for them, Zionism was a blend of nationalism and socialism whose goal was the creation of a community of working people dedicated to a life of freedom and dignity (Shapiro, 1989).

The European founders of the Zionist Movement were fully committed to a parliamentary form of organisation. As an amalgam of Jewish people from scores of countries, the movement developed in several political directions represented by a great many political parties. The first Zionist Congress included orthodox and reformist Jews, early Palestinian settlers and new converts into Zionism, socialists and businesspeople. The proceedings had to be translated from German to Russian, Yiddish, English, and French. At the outset, the leadership of the Zionist organisation associated with the party of Zionism. The Zionism had continued to produce the core leadership for many years. Various political parties had begun coming into the picture as early as 1901, including Mizrachi Party (1902) which was established by the orthodox Jews. Moreover, between 1903 and 1906, some of the socialist parties, including Poalei Zion, Achdut Ha'avodah and Mapai, were formed (Sternhell, 2009).

A Jewish flag and national anthem, "Hatikvah (meaning 'hope')," were adopted. The organisation was pyramidal in structure. Power tended towards the centre and could indeed be characterised as an 'elective aristocracy,' or as a form of democratic elitism (Cohen, 1987). The first Zionist Congress elected an 'Action Committee,' also known as 'General Council' to run affairs between Congresses. Its members represented various countries. An Executive Committee of five was selected with Herzl at its head. Vienna being made the initial headquarter for the convenience of Herzl. A Zionist newspaper '*Die Welt*' also was launched. The Zionist Congress was convened annually up to 1901 and after that biannually. The Congress inspired the formation of new Zionist groups throughout Eastern Europe,

Russia and even in the Western Europe. The old Lovers of Zion branches were incorporated to the Zionist Congress. At the 4th Congress held during 1900 in London, Russian Zionists were represented by more than 200 delegates (Kochan, 1978). They were inspired by Zionist Congress, the first all-Russian Zionist Congress met in 1902 at Minsk (Ibid.).

The Second Zionist Congress conducted at Basle, Switzerland in 1898 formed a 'Jewish Colonial Trust' under the leadership of David Wolfson and Jacobus Kann to finance settlement work in Palestine to fund the movement registered in London. In 1903, its first branch in Palestine was established and started providing credit for all types of enterprises (Syrkin, 1960). The 5th Congress (1901) established a Jewish National Fund for land acquisition in Palestine. To assist, promote and coordinate the settlement activity a 'Palestine department' was set up within the Executive in 1907 and a 'Palestine office' was opened (1908) at Jaffa (Ibid.).

The Palestine office established the 'Palestine Land Development Company' for land amelioration preparatory to settlement. Palestine office was instrumental in founding the city of Tel Aviv, on the initiative of its first director Arthur Ruppin (1876-1943) (Lucas, 1974). Ruppin, a German sociologist assumed the leadership in purchasing land in the Emek Jezreel and Jordan Valley for new colonies and villages. Together with Menachem Ussishkin, Ruppin was instrumental in acquiring land on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem, where the Hebrew University was inaugurated in 1925 (Ibid.).

In Palestine, the formation of the Zionist Movement which has especially been characterised as Yishuv was built upon the Aliyah in a continuous process of absorption and expansion (Eisenstadt, 1967). The next theme will examine the role of Aliyah.

Aliyah

Aliyah, as an important component in the Zionist Movement, had inspired Jewish people to immigrate to Palestine (Atmaca, 2012). The first Jewish wave to present-day Palestine happened in the 13th century, long before the Zionist period (Dubnow, 1918) when the Babylonian Jews and the Karaite Jews immigrated to Palestine. The immigration of diasporic Jews to the land of Israel was spurred by religious persecution and spiritual yearning. The underlying meaning of Aliyah is '*ascent*.' It has come into the picture to refer to the waves of immigration of Jewish people to Palestine (Shapiro, 1976).

The idea behind the word has an ideological reference in terms of both religious and Zionist Jewish context (Rolef, 1987). This has happened through periodic immigration. Aliyah can be differently characterised regarding geographical origins, reasons and ideologies. Most of Aliyah came from Eastern Europe and Russia whose society underwent rapid and radical changes. First two waves have occurred before the First World War and the following two have taken place after the Russian Revolution. Until 1933, the wave of immigration noticeably decelerated particularly after Fourth Aliyah and fifth started because of Hitler/the Nazi Party came to power in Germany and prompted economic depressions in the Europe. Subsequently, this was triggered in the immense number of Jewish people, from Germany and central Europe to Palestine (Shapiro, 1976).

According to Benedict Anderson (1991) that "Constructivism as social science theory emphasises that before the formation of a state; the nation is built as an imagined community-imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (quoted in Atmaca, 2012:169). Accordingly, nation-states spreading from these imagined communities recognise themselves as distributing certain attributes and state-building policies are formed around and consolidating the feeling of statehood (Ibid.).

The reason behind quoting Anderson is to indicate the Jewish people's goal and spirit when they had immigrated to Palestine. They had an intention to establish their homeland or a sovereign state. As mentioned earlier, the Jewish people are a community which was scattered in a different part of the world prior to the establishment of state. They went through several suffering including pogroms, anti-Semitism[10] and the holocaust (Marver, 1957). Immigration generally had begun due to these incidents. The Zionist Movement has emerged during the series of assault against and suffering of the Jewish people. The Jewish populations had immigrated to the land of Palestine with the determination to establish their homeland. From the late 19th to the early 20th centuries, immigration was hugely assisted and instructed by the Zionist Movement as World Zionist Organisation established by Herzl in 1897. He widely supported in facilitating Aliyah at this time as part of Zionism. After him, Chaim Weizmann, who carried his attempt forwards and executed the Aliyah in Palestine.

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[10]Anti-Semitism is hate, the animosity which has been persisting in the world against the Jewish people. Initially, the philosophy of Adolph Hitler was the most extreme form (Hitler's Nationalism) of anti-Semitism. The term was coined first in 1860 by the Jews philosopher Moritz Steinscneider in the form of anti-Semitic prejudices' (antiisemitischenvorurtheile). He had used this phrase to indicate Emest Renan's thought about how 'Semitic races' were considered inferior to the 'Aryan race.' Anti-Jewish prejudice, the feeling of suspicion, contempt and hatred towards Jews are the important components of Anti-Semitism

According to Yonathan Shapiro (1997), "A small Jewish community has always resided in Palestine. It was composed of groups of Orthodox Jews concentrated in the four holy cities-Jerusalem, Tiberias, Safed and Hebron". During the 18th and 19th centuries, the large numbers of Jewish people had immigrated to Palestine. In 1882, Jewish immigration to Palestine on a large scale began and was called as a First Aliyah (Ibid.). The first group of 14 landed at Jaffa on 6 July 1882. On their arrival to a sparse, barren land, these settlers were faced with the dual task of becoming workers as well as competing for their jobs with the cheap Arab labourers in the job market (Halevi, 1957).

There were around 24,000-30,000 Jewish people arrived in First Aliyah (1882-1093) (Shapiro, 1976). They had shared the land with Arab residents whose population was around one million. That's the reason that land was hugely and sparsely inhabited and their source was only subsistence agriculture (Ibid.). Agricultural communities were established by some of the immigrants, even though half of these members left Palestine due to financial difficulties (Tessler, 1994). In the beginning, these immigrants were primarily inspired by religious discourse rather than by the Zionist ideology. In immigrating to Palestine, many Jewish people had religious orientation because they thought redemption could happen through the coming of the Messiah. Religious orientation had been superseded by national endeavour (Morgenstem, 2006). The Jewish immigration had continued even after the establishment of the State of Israel as the result of anti-Semitism. Many of them were recruited from among the first organised nationalist Jewish groups, known as Hovevei Zion (lovers of Zion) (Shapiro, 1976).

During the 1880s a small number of nationalist zealots organised Zionist groups in the cities of Palestine revived interest in the Holy Land. The organisation emerged (1881-82), as mentioned above, which later known as 'Hibbat Zion' (The Love of Zion) conducted courses in the Hebrew language, Jewish history and tried to reconstruct the Jewish identity around Palestine. The members of 'Hibbat Zion' called themselves 'Hovevei Zion' or 'Lovers of Zion.' They organised gymnastic and self-defence organisations called Maccabee clubs, which were the pioneer militant groups in the history of the modern Zionist Movement. The distinguishing feature of the Lovers of Zion was its members were quite particular about the need to return to Palestine.

There was a subsidiary movement within it known as the BILU, an acronym for 'Beit Ya'akov' lehu Venelha ('O House of Jacob, come, let us go'). This association was founded

by Young Jews in Kharkov, Russia and its members advocated the revival of the Hebrew language and decided to settle in Palestine as farmers or labourers. It combined Jewish nationalist fervour with Marxism (Sternhell, 2009). They brought a pamphlet which demonstrates the expectation that the 'interest of our glorious nation will rouse our national spirit in rich and powerful men, and that everyone, rich and poor, will give his best labourers to the holy 'cause" being committed to socialist ideals, the BILU combined the passionate nationalism with a very un-Marxian religiosity and added, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one, and our land, Zion, is our only hope"(Dowty, 2008:123).

The mass emigration of Jews from Russia after 1881 was unquestionably motivated by the pogroms and the propaganda of Hibbat Zion. They were motivated on nationalist and socialist ideas and established a new settlement forms called the New Yishuv[11] (Jewish Community in Palestine) where the key political, social and economic institutions emerged. The aim of Hibbat Zion was to create a virile new agricultural society in Palestine. The young Zealots of Hibbat Zion were emotionally charged but lacked practical considerations. After reaching to Palestine, many of them drifted aimlessly into the cities of Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Hebron instead of penetrating rural Palestine and established the agricultural settlements (Reich, 2008). Only a few acquired lands and developed citrus plantations and vineyards. The majority settled in the cities, especially in Jerusalem. By the end of first immigration, the total Jewish rural population in Palestine was only 5,210, operating some 7,000 farming units distributed among twenty-five new villages (Braslavsky, 1962). The Lovers of Zion Movement expanded greatly by 1895, they had approximately 10,000 members in Russia (D. Smith, 2001).

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1967) argues that those who came from Russia to administer financial aid effectively controlled the settlements, preventing their self-determination. The settlers established some of the agricultural communities where cheap labours were employed and others had settled in towns. According to Yonathn Shapiro (1976), First Aliyah, which belongs to Hovevei Zion, wished to build new agricultural communities and become farmers. They were influenced by their Russian liberal colleagues' idolisation of the healthy rural life of the peasants and their conviction that the farmers were the salt of the earth.

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[11]The community which was governed along with nationalist lines at the start of the First Aliyah, this kind of society was referred to call New Yishuv.

The settler farmers found it difficult to realise their dreams. Palestine was a barren country and the settlers were inexperienced farmers. Baron Edmond de Rothschild came to their rescue (Shapiro, 1976) and bought land and brought his agricultural experts from France to organise and control the new communities. After a series of disagreements between settlers and the foreign controllers, Baron decided to transfer land to the settlers and recalled his officials from the agricultural settlements. By then, the economic conditions of the settlements had improved considerably (Ibid.)

Baron de Rothschild's contribution to the early settlement of Jews in Palestine was critical and as late as 1914, 58 per cent of the land owned by the Jews in Palestine was originally purchased by him (Laquer, 2003). In comparison the World Zionist Organisation purchased only four per cent land owned by Jews (Ibid.). By 1904, a new wave of immigration begun from Russia to the Ottoman Empire (Amit, 2000) and this was the beginning of the Second Aliyah.

The immigration during the period 1904-1914 marked the Second Aliyah, where around 35,000-45,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine from Russia and Poland. It was a result of pogroms (1905) in the Russian Revolution (Frenkel, Shenhav & Herzog, 1997). However, unlike the First Aliyah, immigrants of Second Aliyah came with socialist ideas, primarily influenced by the thoughts of Ber Borochov and Aaron David Gordon,[12] Martin Buber etc. They had become the basis of an ideological framework for most of the symbols and institutions created in the State of Israel.

Some of the famous and prominent political names including Lavee of Plonsk, Berl Katznelson of Bobruisk, Issac Ben Zvi of Poltava, David Remez of Mogilev, Joseph Baratz and David Green from Plonsk (he changed his name to David Ben-Gurion in 1906) belong to the Second Aliyah (Gorni, 1977). They had founded political and administrative institutions. For example, First Kibbutz (also known as Degania), self-defence organisation (Hashomer, [the Watchman]) was formed in 1909 by them.

The city of Tel Aviv and its neighbourhoods like Jaffa and Ahuzat Bayit were established during the Second Aliyah. Second Aliyah also marked the newer important developments including the formation of political parties, Labour organisations, educational improvement

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[12] One of the founder of Degania in the Jordan valley, whose spiritual qualities imbued a pioneer group with a dedication to return to the soil, productive labour, and a society based on work and social justice.

in primary and intermediate levels, higher education, art, literature and journalism (Neuman, 1999). However, a vast number of these immigrants went back after a short stay in Palestine (Flapan, 1987). One source has it that out of the 35,000 immigrants of the Second Aliyah, only 6,000 remained by 1918 (Shapiro, 1976). The outbreak of the First World War marked the end of the Second Aliyah. The end of the Ottoman Empire resulting in its occupation by the British began Third Aliyah.

During the Third Aliyah (1919-1923), 37,000 Jewish people had come to Palestine due to the series of international events like the First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Civil War, massive pogroms in Eastern Europe and the Balfour Declaration (Schoenman, 1988). The Balfour Declaration gave legitimacy for the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine (Marver, 1957). The desire of creating a socialist society resulted in the number of Russian Jews blooming during this time (Ben-Yehuda, 1995). This phase also witnessed the establishment of most Zionist representative institutions like Asefat Nivcharim (Assembly of Representatives), along with other national institutions such as Histadrut and the Haganah which had played an extremely significant role in the Labour Movement. However, the largest waves of immigration of the pre-state period were the Fourth and Fifth Aliyahs (Glazer, 2001).

The Fourth and Fifth Aliyah, during 1924-1928 and 1929-1939 respectively witnessed around 82,000 and 217,000 immigrants respectively, belonging mostly from Poland and Germany belonging to professional classes, coming to Palestine to escape from the onset of the Second World War (Stein, 2003). Immigrants of this phase preferred to settle in urban areas, which, in the 1930s, paved the way for the development of cities at the heart of the country, as well completion of the Port of Haifa and oil refineries (Morris, 1999). In 1924, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Technion (Israel Institute of Technology) were founded (Ibid.). These economic developments transformed the country's agricultural structure (Atmaca, 2012).

Overall during these waves, socialism had influenced most of the immigrants of Second and Third Aliyah. In that context, they realised a society that could be formed only based on the idea of equality. The objective of liberation of Jewish community from sufferings and agony could be done with the help of socialist principal. The idea of socialist Jews state was one of the most significance motivations (Sternhell, 2009). During this period, political and organisational structures of the Jewish people in Palestine were dominated by the Labour

Zionism, which was put the foundation of the state formation. They separated Jewish from Arab economy, established institutions, political parties and became the main component of the founding ideology of State of Israel (Ibid.).

The following themes will examine these developments which had happened mainly in the Second and Third Aliyah, where social, economic, political institution and prominent leaders had emerged. The Labour Zionist Movement could be seen in terms of its leadership skill, absorbing the new immigrants successfully as well as acting as the umbrella organisation committed to accommodating divergent sections of society. Its organisation included members of agricultural settlements Kibbutzim and Moshavim (Agricultural Settlement), urban workers, professionals, artisans, women, youth, ethnic groups and the religiously observant groups.

In examining the critical role of the Labour Movement in the Yishuv, the role of the Kibbutz Movement cannot be overlooked. One of the important developments of the Labour Zionism under the control of Yishuv was the formation and promotion of Kibbutzim and Moshavim.

Kibbutz (Degania)

It was kind of settlement where ownership of land and many forms of social life were collective. The management for collective society and cooperative consumption on Kibbutz was laid on the responsibility of the Kibbutz to meet the full range of individual need, including attention to the particular needs of particular individual (Leon, 1969). Explaining about Hakommuna Haromanit[13], Harry Viteles (1967) observed that ten young refugees from Ukraine, who met on the boat to Palestine, decided to share a household (founded by earlier Jewish settlers) in Petach Tiqwa, a small town near the present city Tel Aviv. This group of refugees roamed around the country together while moving to share their housework their wages from manual labour. Similarly, in other areas, other groups also were following the same method. Viteles pointed out that staying and sharing bring closeness between people of the groups. This way of lifestyle culminated an idea for forming a social system. With the help of Jewish National Fund, which provided land to Hakommuna Haromanit near the Sea of Galilee where they had settled in 1910 (Achouch & Morvan, 2012).

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[13] It was a small Romani town, was called 'Romani Commune' in Ukraine from where a group of people had come to Palestine (Bowes M., 1977).

This settlement came to be described as Degania which was the first Kibbutz in Palestine. In the beginning, the Kibbutz Movement contained just a bunch of young group of people functioning together and living together on common land. It can be said Kibbutz means 'group' and early in its existence was Hashomer Hatzair (Rosenthal & Eiges, 2014). It developed at the moment of immigration and consolidation of Jewish community in Palestine. In 1927, the Kibbutz established Artzi Hashomer Hatzair, a mutual aid federation (Laqueur, 2003).

After the Balfour Declaration of 1917, one of the most critical events in the history of Zionism, Hashomer Hatzair moved to Palestine, organised itself in Kibbutzim (Shapiro, 1976). Over there, the Movement started to articulate clear philosophy, focussing Borocho's position of Jewish people and spreading socialist Zionism as the solution (Bowes M. 1977). Cohen (1966) explained about the ideology of Kibbutz "a heterogeneous system, composed of elements stemming from Socialism, Zionism, humanistic ethics and sometimes religion, which are integrated only in a most strenuous way" (Cohen, 1966:3-4). Thus, development and changes were accelerated in the Kibbutz Movement since the beginning of the late 19th century (Bowes M. 1977). David Ben-Gurion had expressed that the Kibbutz Movement was one of the most efficient apparatus became an effective mean to guarantee the Jewish labour (Sternhell, 1998).

Kibbutz meant basically gathering and collective living of the members relying on the principles of equality, sharing property and imbibing fraternity and predominantly working in the agricultural sector. Moshavim emerged as the 'cooperative agricultural community' of the Labour Movement. With time, Kibbutzim started producing leaders for parties and other political organisations. Realising the significance of the grassroots entities, other schools of Zionism also started setting up their respective Kibbutzim and Moshavim. Kibbutzim as an ideological base were approved by in the first meeting of the federation of Kibbutz in 1925. Along this line, the concept of pioneering Labour Movement was emerged in Hashomer Hatzair (Gitai, 2011).

The Labour Movement

The evolution of the Labour Movement can be separated in three far-reaching segments, namely, up to the forming of the Histadrut, until the formation of the State of Israel and the post-1948 phase. The Labour Movement is considered a significant component behind the

efforts to establish the State of Israel and remained most influence ideology in the politics and the organisational structure of the Yishuv. The Movement had started with the beginning of most of the First, particularly Second and Third Aliyahs. Immigration was influenced by the philosophy of socialism, which had the primary purpose of forming the society on the principle of equality. The thought 'liberation of Jewish people' with the inspiration of the Jewish socialist state was one of the most significant motivations for the independent state (Schinder, 1976).

The most succeeded stage of the movement came in 1904, especially after the beginning of the Second Aliyah, when Russian socialist Jewish steeped in the Zionist Movement (Halevi, 1957). The immigrants' first steeped into agriculture, in which, work corps, labour exchange activities were dominant. Besides, collective settlements were established to overcome the crises of finding work. Mutual aid organisations were formed namely the Sick Fund, to provide more comfortable convenience public services for Jewish people facing difficulties. The members of the Second Aliyah were provincial in their outlook regarding health services but were more progressive when the Yishuv encountered with the crisis of severe magnitude (Atmaca, 2012).

After the First World War a vast number of workers in the Yishuv were observed to be living at a low level of subsistence (Morris, 1999). The economic conditions of them were severe and labourers in lower Galilee determined that something must be done to support the workers whose economic position was most terrible (Schindler, 1976). In terms of assisting them, welfare services were adopted by Histadrut in the 1930s. These welfare services included assisting workers in various level including disabled, unemployed, a fund for orphans, widow (Schindler, 1981).

During this period, the most significant role played by Kupat Holim (health services) in the Labour Movement. It was developed, at the time of Second Aliyah and later reached out to the 70 per cent of the Yishuv population (Janowsky, 1959). It was also revolutionary philosophy of mutual aid which brought about workers cooperative (The Mashbir). Features of social welfare and social security were included in several associations and funds of the Labour Movement. Kupat Holim was the worker's health in the insurance institution and worker's sick fund was formed in 1911, especially four years after the formation of the Workmen's Cooperative Society (WCS) to help the workers. This effort of the Labour

Movement had immensely benefited to the Yishuv to mechanise these social services (Schindler, 1976).

Prior to the Labour Movement, these services were functioned and executed by political parties then unions such as Poalei Zion, Hapoel Hatzair (Young Worker). The Labour Movement has differentiated itself from the political Zionism in the 1930s, particularly with the influence of the prominent socialist personalities belonging to the Second Aliyah. As mentioned above political Zionism underscored the Jewish nation would be established through the endeavour of the international community (Albright et al. 1947). In contrast, the forerunners of the Labour Zionism adopted the notion that only the Jewish working class in the Land of Israel could form a Jewish statehood with rural Kibbutzim and Moshavim and an urban Jewish proletariat (Syrkin, 1935). However, these notions were not built on class conflict; instead, Labour Zionists shielded egalitarianism with no private ownership (L. Gelvin, 2005).

The Labour Movement has left its influence not only on the philosophy and policies of the founding father of the State of Israel but also upon the central institutions of the state. For instance, Hashomer (the forerunner of Haganah), was the forerunner of the IDF and was founded by the Labour Movement. There were some prominent figures including Moses Hess, Dov Ber Borochov, Aaron David Gordon, David Ben-Gurion, Nachman Syrkin, Golda Meir and Berl Katznelson who were considered as the Labour Movement's ideological and political funders. In the words of one scholar, "Without the first four Aliyah (1880-1930), and the dominant Socialist Zionist democratic leadership, the State of Israel would never have existed" (Frank, 2009:2).

It should be underlined that during the Second Aliyah as a response to the First Aliyah's settlement, which was organised on capitalist terms, the Labour Zionism had played a significant role. During this period, the objective of the Labour Zionism was socialism; Hebrew became the language of communication, security and self-defence and the employment of Arab labour (Adler, 2008:13).

Institutional achievements that helped to implement the ideology of the Labour Movement began with the initiative of the World Zionist Organisation, whose office was present in Palestine. Firstly, the Labour Zionism had established the HeChalutz (1905) (The organisation of socialist-Zionist Pioneers) movement and then Gdud Ha'avodah, (Labour

Brigade) in 1920, which appeared as an autonomous ideological and organisational institution. Its objective was to create a real socialist community in the future state (Lockman, 1996). These attempts of the Labour Movement established large Kibbutzim, such as Ein Charod or Tel Yosef, which could bring together hundreds of members staying according to communal principles (Cohen, 1992).

During this time, agricultural schools and Kibbutzim were created to settle Jewish labour on the land. An economic cooperative was founded in Sejera. Another socialist institution was the Histadrut (General Federation of Labourers in the Land of Israel). Less than five thousand Jewish workers called for a meeting in December 1920, to sort out the regular difficulties. Subsequently, the Histadrut emerged from the meeting to focus on the goal accepted by the entire labour community (Ibid.).

Under the Yishuv several political parties emerged; Achdut Ha'avodah was one of the left dominated parties. The left ideology to be defined as the Labour or Socialist Zionism was represented by Achdut Ha'avodah (1919). It was the first organised political group which was defined as a formal political party by providing welfare organisations, health services and loan funds for its members. Yonathan Shapiro (1976) defined that the party became the actual 'role model' for other parties. The left political trends in the Yishuv came to be characterised by the Labour Movement because the founders of the movement had been brought up in the Russian socialist political culture. Prior to the formation of Histadrut, Yishuv witnessed conflicts between the Old Guards and Young Turks or between the veterans and the newcomers. Shapiro (1980) defined as "conflicts between the generational units". However, the party leaders created a non-partisan organisation of the Jewish labourers, which came to be known as Histadrut for carrying out all the economic and financial tasks of the party. Before examining the significance of Histadrut, the next theme will examine the political parties which played an important role in the Yishuv.

Evolution of Political Parties

Before the 1920s, the predominant effect in the Zionism Movement was middle-class and urban Jewish people. After World War First, it had changed particularly in the commencement of large-scale immigration to Palestine. Subsequently, the Labour Zionism had converted from being a minority force into being the dominant influence in the building up of land (Teller, 1954). The Labour Parties' ideological roots could be traced from Central

and East European socialism. Israel's Labour Parties' socialism was nurtured under the rule of the Czarist state, which recognised in the oppression of nationalities (Tartakovar, 1954).

The political and ideological struggle extended hugely especially during the turbulent formative years of 1925-35 and subsequently strengthened Labour's hegemony and removal of the Revisionists in 1935 from the Zionist Movement. Later, the Revisionists promoters formed the rival New Zionist Organisation (Goldstein, 2001). In 1930, Mapai formed as core rival party to the Revisionists ideology (Perlmann, 2006). The founder of Revisionist Zionism, Ze'ev Jabotinsky who set up the Revisionist Party in 1925 had emphasised on middle-class values while criticising socialist policies (Goldstein, 2001). Having failed to gain control over the Zionist organisation, Jabotinsky and his followers moved out of the movement in 1935, sowed the seeds of political and ideological differences (Morris, 2007).

The significance of Jabotinsky lies in the fact that today's right-wing Likud Party draws its ideology from him and emerged as the main rival to the Labour Party. Jabotinsky was a chief rival of Weizmann who proclaimed liberal and socialist principal. Two years following the withdrawal of Jabotinsky, Irgun which followed Jabotinsky's ideology, had become a rival of Hagana. The non-acceptance of the Zionist Movement's authority or the leadership of the Yishuv has made Jabotinsky and Irgun as a 'dissents' (Goldstein, 2001).

The Revisionist Party was founded by Jabotinsky in 1925, founder of the Jewish Legion in World War I (Cohen, 1984). The party accepted the name "Revisionist" because its members felt that a revision was needed in the restrained policies of the Zionist Organisation under Weizmann's leadership towards Great Britain as well as they wanted a change in the pace of Zionist colonisation in Palestine (Ibid.). At Sixth Zionist Congress, which was held at Basle in 1903, there were two new parties had appeared namely the Poalei Zion and Mizrachi (religious party). These parties developed their ideological positions and practical programmes of Zionist action (Bareli, 2009). Religious and ideological partisanship in the Zionist Movement led to and was reinforced by the Zionist electoral system, featuring proportional representation, party lists, and a single national constituency (Aronoff, 1989). Both parties were destined to become very important and to influence Zionist policies after 1948.

The most important socialist parties during the Yishuv was Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion), Hapoel Hatzair (Young Workers), merged with Achdut Ha'avodah (Unity of Labour) in 1930

and formed Mapai. Berl Katznelson, David Ben Gurion, Yitzhak Ben Zvi, Moshe Shertok (Sharett) and others were leading leaders of these parties. In early 1930, following on the establishment of Mapai (Party of Eretz Israel Workers), all the prominent personalities have become the main figures in the Labour Movement as well as in the Jewish community (Shapiro, 1976). Some of them contributed by holding significant posts for instance, from their ranks came two presidents (Ben Zvi and Zalman Shazar (Rubashov) and three premiers (Ben-Gurion, Sharett and Golda Meir) and leaders of clandestine military organisation (Haganah). Moreover, Eliyahu Golomb and Yitzhak Tabenk had served as the leader of the largest faction of the Kibbutz Movement (Gorni, 1977).

Poalei Zion (Zionist Socialist Party)

Under the impact of anti-Semitism, the Jewish community was discovering the means that could provide freedom and equality to the Jewish people. In the hope of freedom, equality and statehood they joined the Zionist Movement (Kerstein, 1961). In the beginning, they failed to see any noteworthy logical affinity between their Zionism and their class affiliation. The Jewish worker had two independent roles; one was to protect his economic and political interests and the second to cooperate in the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine (Neuman, 1999). However, despite the opposition and dissatisfaction, some socialists who remained loyal to the interests of their people ultimately formed a Socialist faction, the Poalei Zion (the Zionist Socialist Party) under the Zionist Movement (Johnston, 1965).

Poalei Zion Party was founded in 1901 and it presented its programme in 1907 at the Eighth World Zionist Congress held in Hague where it received official recognition as a party in the Zionist Organisation. At the outset, the faction was faced with great difficulties of reconciling Marxian Socialism with the nationalist Zionist aspirations (Marver, 1957). Its programme was based on a socialist plan of society, to work for a new order of public ownership to participate as socialists in every movement that would lead to the emancipation of the proletariat; and to organise the Jewish proletariat based on national and class consciousness (Shalev, 1996). The Poalei Zionists gained an advantage in Palestine. Palestine was a land in which capitalism was not yet entrenched, and it would, therefore, be much easier to develop a socialist state there.

Besides the Poalei Zion another party was Hapoel Hatzair in the Zionist Movement with socialist tendencies.

Hapoel Hatzair (Young Worker)

Hapoel Hatzair Party believed in the ideal of social justice for labour no less than the Poalei-Zion and was more attached to Hebrew culture and Jewish cultural traditions (Cohen, 1984). In Palestine, the party was organised in 1905 and its goal was to transform the Jewish youth into workers and peasants to introduce socialism wherever possible by voluntary efforts (Aronoff, 2004). Its most eminent representative was A.D. Gordon, who took up agricultural work and preached the doctrine of "religion of labour" and the dignity of toil. He utterly rejected both socialism and class struggle in its usual sense (Lockman, 1976). Gordon felt that socialism would have to merge with nationalism to be genuinely workable (Ibid.). The idea of nationalism seemed to him to be the highest expression of human thinking and feeling. Socialism rests entirely upon technique and action, while nationalism rests upon life and creation (Gordon, 1938).

Before the First World War, the Zionist-socialist groups had been small and less influential and the leaders of WZO maintained an indifferent attitude towards these young enthusiasts (Youssef, 2012). This soon changed when the Zionist leaders realised that most of the new immigrants were joining the labourers and their organisation. Hapoel Hatzair objected to the enlistment of the labourers in the British army. This resulted in many debates among the labourers. Many Hapoel Hatzair members who had enlisted in the army later left Hapoel Hatzair and joined the newly formed Achdut Ha'avodah (Sternhell, 2009).

Achdut Ha'avodah Party

The arrival of the second wave of immigrants came in great numbers. The veterans of the second wave feared that the newcomers' politicians would organise members of the Third Aliyah and "push into the corner the Second Aliyah including their projects, problems, organisation and leaders. The most pressing problem was a bad relationship with the Zionist Commission" (Perlmann, 2006:43). The Commission did not view the *kvutzot* (kind of Kibbutz) as primary importance and was not willing to provide them with enough funds (Shapiro, 1976). The Commission also demanded control over the funds it was giving to a Labour organisation and accused the labourers of inefficient economic practices. This

insulted and angered the labourers. They thought that financial losses were inevitable and were not willing to accept outside control. The Zionist Commission demanded that all economic enterprises oversee experts under the supervision of the organisation, which was raising funds (Sternhell, 2009).

The politicians decided to organise labourers, and then use this organisation to put pressure on the WZO. They could not hope to lead non-labour elements in society, but they felt they could meet the most urgent needs of the workers. Based on their fight for jobs and decent salaries, they wished to be accepted as labour leaders and to be followed by all labours (Shalev, 1996). Thus, the new organisation was designed to attract city workers as well. But, first organisers convened agricultural labours and their current followers to satisfy all groups. It was decided to base the election of delegates on proportional representation; every organised group would be represented in the convention in proportion to its electoral strength among agricultural labourers (Neuman, 1999).

In this election, 1,500 labours took part and elected 58 delegates from among three groups. The non-party heads of agricultural organisations won 28 delegates; Poalei Zion, 19; and Hapoel Hatzair, 11. When Hapoel Hatzair refused to unite with the other two groups, the second convention was organised within a few weeks. This time 1,871 votes participated, including several city workers. Of the 81 delegates chosen, 47 were agricultural labours, 19 represented soldiers still in barracks and city workers elected 15. This second convention established the new organisation, which is become to be known as the Achdut Ha'avodah Party (Unity of Labour) in 1919 (Shapiro, 1976).

A committee of six veterans organised both the convention; the same six veterans headed new Party throughout its existence. All had left Eastern Europe between 1905 and 1910 and had already been active in various socialist-Zionist groups before their departure. Four of them-Berl Katznelso, Yitshak Tabenkin, David Remes and Shamuel Yavnieli- were heads of the organisations of agricultural labours; David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi-were head of Poalei Zion. Four of them were, at various periods, members of agricultural collectives; only one, Ben-Zvi never worked on a farm (Kerstein, 1961). The inner circle of the Achdut Ha'avodah leadership also included Shlomo Kaplanski, David Bloch, Nata Harpaz and Eliahu Golomb. Kaplanski had come to Palestine in 1924 as head of the department of colonisation of the Zionist executives. While in Europe, he maintained his ties with the group and was the representative in Poalei Zion abroad, and various Zionist bodies (Amit, 2000).

David Bloch had come to Palestine in 1912 as head of the Kapai, Palestine fund of the World Federation of Poalei Zion. Nata Harpaz was another active leader of the Second Aliyah and a member of Poalei Zion. These people all belonged to one generation. They had been active Zionists and socialist and had already been active as labour organisers in Palestine during the Second Aliyah (Neumann, 1999). The younger man was Eliahu Golomb. He had graduated from the first Hebrew high school in Tel Aviv in 1913. He immediately joined a *kvutzah* and was soon drawn into political work (Kerstein, 1961).

The organisers were disappointed when Hapoel Hatzair refused to join their organisation of labourers. They feared that without uniting all labourers into one organisation of labourers their efforts would be futile. Katznelson tried to persuade the recalcitrant heads of Hapoel Hatzair to join the organisation. He then went on to give examples from the short history of the Jewish community-explaining that, since the community lacked political power, 'any opposition is strong enough.' Katznelson was concerned that an organisation without sufficient power over its members would not be able to persuade them to be active in building the country (Sternhell, 2009).

Ben-Gurion said at the same convention that a new organisation would not be a political party since its major activity was to be in the economic sphere (Sternhell, 2009). Tabenkin explained, the aim was not just to lead a class but to lead a nation, "and not just to lead the nation but to be the whole nation, to create a working Hebrew nation" the whole idea of uniting all labourers was to get rid of all sectarian and theoretical distinction. The new organisation was built in such a way that it assured the dominance of politicians and the political goal over the economic affairs. This remained the fundamental organisation principal of Achdut Ha'avodah throughout its existence (Perlmann, 2006). The basic units of Achdut Ha'avodah were economic, such as trade union and *kvutzot*.

The heads of Achdut Ha'avodah organised different units to control other organisation in the community. Members were urged to join and be active in other organisations. In the case of a military organisation whose task was to defend Jewish settlement against Arab assault and such an organisation was already in existence, as mentioned above namely 'Hashomer' (the Watchman) (J. Aronoff, 1977). Many members of Hashomer joined Achdut Ha'avodah but insisted that the military unit must be autonomous unit executed by members who would devote all their time and effort to military problems (Shapiro, 1976).

In short, Hapoel Hatzair which was completely Palestinian non-Marxist labour parties influenced by Gordan's philosophy of the "the religion of labour" and the Russian Social Revolutionary Party. Poelei Zion was founded as the Palestinian branch of European Party and orthodox Marxist Party which stressed on a platform uniting socialism and Zionism. These two parties published a journal and established institutions aimed to provide the economic and cultural need of their members. Together they founded the Agricultural Workers Union (1912). In 1919 most of Poelei Zion, except for its extreme left wing, united with non-partisan workers to form Achdut Ha'avoda. Later in the process of solving the differences among these parties with Hapoel Hatzair created General Federation of Jewish Labour is called Histadrut (1920) which took over all economic and part of cultural work of two parties. Through the wide service of their voluntary activities and developments, these main political and economic institutions of under the Yishuv gained popularity and established its positions immense importance and power.

In 1930 Hapoel Hatzair and Achdut Ha'avoda merged to form Mapai which dominated all the major political institutions of Yishuv (Ibid.). Before Mapai became dominant political party during the Yishuv and controlled the Histadrut. Histadrut expanded its work and influence in a different corner and carried out all the economic and financial activities of the party.

Next theme will examine the significance of Histadrut within the Labour Movement.

Histadrut

The Labour Federation was a significant contribution of the Labour Movement to the Yishuv and to the state. The core objective of the organisation was to look after the economic absorption of a new wave of immigration in 1920. Besides this, it established different units under its watch such as financial and industrial (agricultural communes and cooperatives), Bureau of Public Works, Workers Bank, Trade Unions and other welfare groups. The funding was provided by primarily WZO which was a national organisation with no class identity, in which wealthy individuals and religious leaders, as well as workers' parties, were well represented (Amit, 2000). Peter Medding (1972) defined Histadrut as "a microcosm of the future independent Jewish state; it was the state on the way". Others described Histadrut as "quasi-state" based on the self-rule for the working class. Shapiro (1976) characterised Histadrut as "class democracy" as it catered to the needs of all labourers and peasants regardless of political affiliations and beliefs.

As mentioned above, various Zionist workers parties emerged in Eastern Europe, with a distinct attitude later steeped into Palestine. By the end of First World War, in Poalei Zion, the synthesis of Marxism and Zionism had required squaring the circle of proletarian internationalism and Jewish nationalism. This feat was typically accomplished by claiming that some form of normal class relations had to be achieved by Jewish people before they could be enlisted for the formation of a socialist society (Perlman, 2006). The Achdut Ha'avodah was formed with a group of unaffiliated workers of Poale Zion Party which merged with it in 1919. The core party members of Poaelei Zion were Ben-Gurion and Berl Katznelson. Ben-Gurion, at the time of the merger with Achdut Ha'avodah, had firmed with the principle of class struggle as core stand for the new formed Party Achdut Ha'avodah (Ibid.). But Katznelson and others left their effect on him to give away that insistence in the name of unity, most of Poelei Zion in Palestine followed new formed Party's leadership. Several members of the Achdut Ha'avodah must have belief in some form of class struggle, however, Achdut Ha'avodah's platform no longer stated in the name of unity (Ibid.)

Despite the differences, Ben-Gurion and his fellows succeeded to manage a different sort of agreement with Hapoel Hatzair at the start of the 20th century to form a Labour federation where both the political entity could function together for the goodwill of Jewish community and workers (Plunkett, 1958). This Federation was the Histadrut (General Worker's Federation) formed in 1920. These two parties (one more overtly socialist than the other) yet both parties cooperated to each other under the notion of Histadrut in Palestine (Youssef, 2012).

It came out with principal to advance Jewish trade unionism, during the interwar period extensively interacted with entrepreneurial functioning (Cleveland L. & Bunton, 2009). The organisation had been grown rapidly, initiated new social and economic works. As immigration numbers added urban centres increased, Jewish urban proletariat developed and deepened the Histadrut's union functions. In the 1920s and 1930s, on a broad level, recognition was Histadrut was recognised a union granted.

The Israeli labour, for the most part, was organised in the General Federation of Jewish labour, commonly referred to the first word in its Hebrew title-the Histadrut (Halevi, 1957). The organisation was a general union in the broadened context; generality was seen in its membership and works. In terms of its membership, it holds workers, their families especially agricultural, manual labourers, industrial workers, intellectuals, wage earners, self-employed

and part of the cooperatives (Ibid.). It worked under the three categories including trade union activities; Mutual aid and social works.

The Histadrut was a distinctive occurrence in the Jewish history and an independent political, social and economic association of the Labour Movement functioned anywhere else freely. It was accessed full independence where the colonial government did not obstruct or nor become a hindrance in the Histadrut activities (Sternhell, 2009). The World Zionist Organisation and all the collective agriculture settlement were controlled with authorised power by the Histadrut. The Histradut was not only an apparent formation of the Labour Movement but was created in idyllic circumstances (Glazer, 2001). The function of Histradut, the kind of bonding that persisted within it, the tenets by which it functioned was and its order of priorities reflected the purpose of the movement (Sternhell, 2009).

On Histadrut's inauguration convention, huge numbers of people, estimated to be than four thousand people had participated in the election of delegates. The outcome of the election of delegates was like this; 1,864 votes won Achdut Ha'avodah, 1,324 votes gained Hapoel Hatzair, the new immigrants' list under the leadership of Menachem Elkind, a magnetic forerunner who was soon to convert into a head of the Achdud Ha'avodah, obtained 824; and the leftist gained 303 (Ibid.). Additional 100 votes were categorised as various. With the establishment of the Histradut, all institutions including economic formed by Achdut Ha'avodah facilitated workers, most of whom were struggling bachelors, with basic and important services and were transported to the organisation (Perlmann, 2006). These essentials services were including a labour exchange, workers' kitchens, and an enterprise for building and construction, Bureau of public Works-which in 1923 became Solel Boneh, which was a stock company controlled by Histradut (Shapiro, 1976).

Since its formation, the Histadrut had expanded widely and had achieved tremendous success. The reach of the organisation was reported by the Executive Committee, in 1923, that 8,394 members were associated with the organisation and were dispersed in the 5,435 in cities and Moshavot (private agriculture), and 1,621 in collective settlement (Sternhell, 2009). In the following years, the numbers were 22,538 members in 1927; of whom 15,325 stayed in cities, 4,250 in Moshavot, and 2,968 in a collective settlement. Since the inception of Histadrut, which was the only organised, structured, collective and planned force, most workers in the country were connected via collective settlement and the Bureau of public works. At the time of forming Mapai, particularly at the end of the1930 and early 1931,

around more than 30,000 members were associated with Histadrut and of them 18,781 were living in the cities (Ibid.).

At the occasion of the formation of Israel, Histadrut had control on 25 per cent of the national economy through the Hevrat Haovdim (1922) (Society of Workers). The impact of Histadrut on the development of the Yishuv was widespread through its control of Haganah, an organisation sponsored and backed by Histradrut (Glazer, 2001). The Arab riots had sparked in 1920, in response to that Haganah formed in the same year; the Jewish forces were provided training by centralised military arms by Haganah. It progressively developed into a stable covert reserve army with a command structure that was entirely combined into the political institutions of the Jewish community as a total. However, Haganah was objected and disapproved by the British authorities but no intensive effort done to disband it (Sternhell, 2009). Later, particularly after the formation of Israel, Haganah had turned into the Israel Defence Force (IDF).

The functional premise of the Histadrut was an exceptional phenomenon in term of its scope of activities and institutions. It comprised of various kinds of groups and organisations, some of which were not Zionist and a larger proportion of which were not socialist. That is why it was called a general and non-partisan Histradut (Perlmann, 2006).

According to Zeev Sternhell (2009), the success of Histadrut was not dependent on purely sociologist ideology, but it was one of its essential sources of strength. Ben-Gurion being as a head of Histadrut opposed any aspiration on the part of the majority to turn the "General Histradut into Zionist-Socialist Histradut," which would destroy organisational unity. He started to regulate the organisation with the hope to form State (Rosemarin, 2013). In August 1925 in fourteenth Zionist Congress, Ben-Gurion stated that formation of Jewish State firstly and primarily necessitates majority of Jewish populations. The Jewish workers were the only peoples in Palestine who could take them into the majority (Sternhell, 2009). Ben-Gurion headed Histradut from its inception until 1935 and Remez controlled Solel Boneh and Tabenkin oversaw collective settlement (Sternhell, 2009).

In addition to its control over traditional trade union activities, Histadrut had interlocking ties with the Kibbutz workers in the agricultural sector (Bowes, 1977). Together, Histadrut and the Kibbutz Movement represented the ideal of Jewish rejuvenation through the dignity of labour and working on the land (Perlmann, 2006). This was an important impulse within the

Yishuv and imparted to community a socialist economic orientation and a glorification of the new Jewish self-image in which the passive and oppressed ghetto dwellers of Europe gave way to the self-confident, physically active workers, farmers, and soldiers of Palestine capable of determining their own destinies (Cleveland, 2000:237).

Many Histadrut members were living in communes where all earnings were distributed equally among its members, and heads of Histadrut were hoping that all members would eventually live in such communes and work in Histadrut's economic enterprises. But most laborers refused to live in communes, especially the city labourers. Moreover, during the Third and Fourth Aliyah, the private capital had increased somewhat (Ibid.). During 1927, severe economic crises had happened where two land companies, including American 'Zion commonwealth' and the Polish' Meshek, went bankrupt, and their property had to be rescued by the WZO. The Histadrut's economic enterprise also suffered during the economic crises in 1927. Solel Boneh also went bankrupt. Most laborers moved to the private sector and became hired laborers in private enterprises and as a result, the authority of the leaders over Histadrut members was weakening (Ibid.).

The crises of leadership were overcome by the Achdut Ha'avodah's party apparatus which took over control of the remaining Histadrut economic organisations and the administration of the trade unions. With the aid of this economic power, party apparatus became strong and effective. The apparatus, in turn, used its power to persuade Jewish community-Histadrut members as well as non-Histadrut members-that only the Achdut Ha'avodah and its leaders could lead them to political independence (Shapiro, 1976).

According to Joel Perlmann (2006) ultimately, in 1929, after a long time near a decade distrust conditions among parties in Histadrut, the two core parties of the twenties including Achdut Ha'avodah and Hapoel Hatzair decided to amalgamate and formed the Mapai. Mapai later fully dominated Histadrut. The body that dominated the political life of the Yishuv was Mapai. Considering the opinion that the welfares and interest of labour and Zionism were identical, Mapai Party was representatives of the socialist egalitarian model that was extremely essential in determining the outlook of the Yishuv at the time of its formative years (Cleveland L. & Bunton, 2009).

The most prominent leader in Mapai Party was David Ben-Gurion who carried and maintained political power. His deep understanding of politics gained through experiences

and attitudes were typical of his generation of the Zionist leaders in Palestine (Keren, 2000)). Ben-Gurion was one of among them who came from Poland in 1906, worked in the Kibbutz and later was involved in the Labour Zionism (Cleveland L. & Bunton, 2009). Most importantly he was part of the group that formed the Histadrut, in which he was serving as executive secretary for several years prior became the elected head of the Jewish Agency in 1935. Moreover, Ben-Gurion was energetic and active in the formation of the Mapai Party. Shortly he had taken the responsibility as the leader of Party, as being the head of Party and chairman of the Jewish Agency. As both head and chairman, he was recognised as the leader of the Yishuv at the time of formation of Israel became popular demands as first Prime Minister of Israel (Rosemarin, 2014).

After independence, Histadrut emerged as one of the most powerful organisations, which started controlling the state and the government. It acted as the 'quasi-state' and came to be defined as the 'state within the state' (Choudhary, 2017 & Shapiro, 1989). The leadership of Mapai established its strong nexus with the Histadrut. As a result, the party leadership succeeded in controlling the management of Histadrut both in the Yishuv and in new State. Because of the salience of Mapai and significance of the Histadrut, the post-independence Jewish society witnessed the transfer and implementation of the political process and democratic structure of the two organisations of the Yishuv under new state formation.

Mapai Party (Mifleget Poale Eretz Yisrael)

During the creation of Mapai Party, it contained 80 per cent of all Jewish workers and their backing in Palestine. Moreover, in terms of political contour, Mapai oriented towards moderate Socialist Party called as centre-left Party (Dowty, 1997). By 1931, Mapai had gained its hegemony on both in the Yishuv and the Labour Movement through the support with its allies throughout the Jewish community in the world (Sternhell, 2009). The more importantly, Party's ideology and policies attained broad collaboration of both labourers and the middle classes, and was handled by a group of prominent and talented leaders aforementioned such as Ben-Gurion, Itzack Ben Zvi (the second president of Israel), and Beri Katznelson (Labour ideologist and practical organiser) (Goldstein, 2001). They were the leading figures among the people of the Second Aliyah and they started to construct a new social order and collective agricultural pioneering with a systematic ideology and a concern for labour unity in the towns and countryside (Aronoff, 1993).

The principles set forth in the programme of the Mapai party were:

> Devotion to the construction of the Jewish people in Israel as a free working people rooted in ... agricultural and industrial economy and developing its own Hebrew culture... Membership in the world movement of the working class and cooperation in the struggle to abolish class subjection and social injustice in any form... nationalisation of natural resources and means of production, and building a commonwealth of labour, equality and freedom (Ben-Gurion, 1955:56).

The essence of this programme was a combination of Zionism and Socialism. Mapai's programme was not concerned only with the needs and interests of people of Israel. It carries a promise to dispersed Jewish people everywhere upon their return to Israel and ensured individual freedom and economic security (Laqueur, 1972). Efforts were made prior to statehood to retain the terminology of class movement and class struggle in Palestine , while at the same time, stressing the fundamental differences between labour and other classes of the population in so far as national interests were concerned (Ibid.). The other classes remain faithful to the needs of the nation only if they are compatible with their special class interest; whereas the interests of the Labour Movement were always identical with the interests of the nation. That's class struggle led, therefore, toward the abolition of class antagonism and the achievement of unity in the nation (Hertzberg, 1997). Therefore, Mapai Party called in its programme for equal rights and obligations for all inhabitants of state without distinction of sex, class, religion, or origin. It was dedicated to the democratic principles of free assembly, free speech, and a free press (Ben-Gurion, 1955).

Ben-Gurion (1955) stated that "The struggle of the worker in Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) has not been and will not be a struggle of class interests alone; he derived his power not only from his class organisation and his social vision but from his national mission with which he identified himself willingly and deliberately" (Ibid.:61). Thus, Mapai from its foundation set out to reach the goal of becoming the government, with power to make labour's voice dominant in the Jewish commonwealth. Since the beginning it won the confidence of the Yishuv and continued to hold it throughout the British mandatory period. It linked its destiny with Histadrut and gradually made the Labour Federation the most powerful single force (Shapiro, 1976).

Since it was committed to the principle of a socialist state, Mapai adopted a slogan of "Socialism in our day" coined by Golda Meir in the early 1950s (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989). To the leaders of Mapai, socialism is constructive revolutionism, which finds its expression

not only in the establishment of labour settlements and various economic institutions but also in the struggle for new forms of life and culture and a new Jewish nationalism (Kerstein, 1961). The real aim of socialism was not to put the proletariat above other classes but to abolish classes altogether, to make the entire nation, a nation of workers. Mapai, while considering itself part and parcel of the socialist movement throughout the world, recognised that its fundamental duty was to establish a Jewish nation in Palestine as a free nation of working people, well rooted in all branches of agriculture and industry and to develop its own Hebrew culture (Aronoff, 1993).

However, when Mapai called, in its election platform of 1955, for "equal treatment of both the private and the cooperative sectors of the domestic economy, for investment in productive undertakings, for the establishment of new industries, for the development and enlargement of existing industry ...", (Ibid.:112) it became apparent that the Party had adjusted its social and economic principles to the unique realities of Israel. The Marxian principle of class struggle and "socialism in our day" has been toned down (quoted in Kerstein, 1961:52). In its broader policy, it has come, at least in theory, to recognise the mutuality of interest between labour and capital, in line with Nachman Syrkin's theory (1935) that "the class struggle, important as it cannot be considered as the sole basis of development in social life" (Ibid.). This and the following policy deviations indicate that under the new conditions of statehood not much remained of the imposing structure of Marxian-Borochovism (Ibid.).

Further ideological deviation had taken place. The Secretariat of Mapai decided to open the party ranks to the middle-class element and artisans, small storekeepers and other self-employed individuals were able to become full-fledged members of the Labour Parties. The Mapai might even be favourably disposed towards greater private initiative in certain economic fields (Hattis-Rolef, 1994). In the case of Israel, Mapai was forced to modify its socialist ideology, to attract the vote of the new immigrants. The majority of whom, although not being able to distinguish one party platform from another, was nevertheless opposed to socialism (Shimoni, 1995). The East European immigrants who had survived the Nazi holocaust and were later trapped in the Soviet bloc countries rejected socialism on an emotional rather than ideological basis. As for immigrants from the Arab countries, they lived in poverty in backward feudal societies in which property was cherished and who looked with suspicion at any new ideas, particularly one which was intended to revolutionise

their whole mode of patriarchal family existence. Most of them have never even heard about the existence of such an ideology (Merhav, 1980).

Another modification was forced upon Mapai, by the necessity to attract foreign investments for the upbuilding of Israel's industry and strengthening of its economy. Consequently, the Party developed a more national point of view, to the extent of disclaiming, unofficially though, the existence of a nationalisation policy. The government enters only into such business where pioneering was essential and where a private enterprise would be reluctant to invest because of the small prospects for immediate returns (Shapiro, 1989). Even Histadrut's position was becoming less rigid in its quest for national ownership or monopolistic, cooperative enterprises. Thus, it can be said that Mapai which was by far the strongest party in Israel, carrying the major responsibility for governmental decisions and programmes, pursued an internal policy of opportunistic compromise. Its international attitude was officially neutral, one which would "foster friendly relations and mutual aid with all states which wanted peace, freedom, justice, consolidate her security and well-being, regardless of the internal regime" (quoted in Kerstein, 1961:55).

However, Mapai's foreign policy was pro-western, "an orientation strengthens or was liable to strengthen Israel was the right one... under the present condition, the best orientation for Israel could be based only on the non-Communist world" (Aronoff, 1993:56). But as Mapai's socialist programme has been whittled down, it has lost the support of certain groups who charge Mapai with a willingness to compromise the position of labour to remain in office. These dissident groups eventually left Mapai.

Conclusions

The beginning of Jewish immigrations in large number to Palestine between 1882 and prior the 1948 had left their immense effects on the Labour politics under the Yishuv prior and after the formation of the state of Israel. These Aliyahs came to Palestine were ideologically committed to the Zionist Movement and had received formal training from Eastern European based Zionist groups. They formed several agricultural colonies (Moshavot) where the land was privately owned. They were educated people from urban backgrounds but lacked agricultural skills and the work itself was mainly carried out by hired Arab labours. This Aliyah was largely saved by philanthropic capital. Between these periods, various organisations, parties, ideologies and personalities emerged and the most important were

Kibbutz and Histadrut under the guidance of the Labour Movement. Throughout its history, the Labour Movement has experienced a series of mergers and splits, in which various groups have been incorporated into the Parties or have broken off, due to ideological differences, generational challenges. Some of these divided groups have established independent parties, others have merged with additional parties, and many of them re-joined the Labour Parties later.

In ideological terms, Poalei Zion was committed to the establishment of a Socialist Jewish state by means of class warfare. In 1919 it, together with other non-partisan groups, set up Achdut Ha'avodah, and in 1920, the Party split into two factions, left and right. Achdut Ha'avodah (Unity of Labour) rejected the previously held ideology of Marxist class war in favour of social democracy and hence the split in Poalei Zion in 1919 with a splinter group forming Maki, the Israel Communist Party. This split was critical because it led to the birth of the two ideological streams of the Labour Movement, namely social democracy and Marxism. This ideological division became the central divisive issue in the historical development of the Labour Movement.

Its leadership included Berl Katznelson and Yitzhak Ben Zvi, both of whom were influential in the formation of Mapai Party in 1930. The other major element of the Labour Movement was Hapoel Hatzair, which like Poalei Zion was established in 1906 by Second Aliyah Eastern Europeans, but which unlike Poalei Zion saw Jewish labour in Palestine as a unique movement. It, therefore, rejected most of the Socialist doctrines established in Europe and used by Poalei Zion. It did not, for example, celebrate May Day or have connections with the international workers' movements. However, under the leadership of Chaim Weizmann, its position gradually changed in the 1920s, as it became closer to both the International and (within Palestine) to Achdut Ha'avodah, eventually merging with the latter in 1930 to form Mapai Party. Among the leaders of Hapoel Hatzair were Levi Eshkol, A. D. Gordon and Yosef Sprinzak.

However, the Israel Labour Party (1968) was created as a result of the amalgamation of three socialist parties including Mapai Party, Rafi Party and Achdut Ha'avodah Party. The next Chapter will explain Israel's political system, and Labour Party's salient features both as part of the ruling coalition and as the principle opposition.

Chapter Three:
Domestic Struggles of the Labour Party, 1948-1977

As mentioned in the first chapter the national institutions successfully worked to coordinate the political, social and economic affairs of the pre-state of Israel. Meanwhile, there were different kinds of ideology that dominated political activities and thinking among different interest groups. Since the beginning, political spectrum of the Yishuv was differentiated between left-right group and religiously observant/non-observant groups (Halevy & Shapiro, 1971). In that context, three kinds of political spectrum emerged including the left-of-centre the Labour Movement, centre-right and the religious groups (Medding, 1972).

The moderate left included Hapoel Hatzair and Poalei Zion (the extreme left included the communists) later, Achdut Ha'avodah formed Mapai and Hashomer Hatzair. The moderate centre-right included the General Zionists and the Progressives. The extreme right wing included the Revisionists (later Likud). The moderate religious faction included Hamizrachi and Hapoel Hamizrachi. The extreme or ultra-orthodox religious groups included Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel (Halevy & Shapiro, 1971).

Among these three sectors, the centre-left one or the Labour Movement became the most powerful and influential one. The ascendancy of the Labour Movement came about through various stages of organisational development. The Labour Movement was the first to organise on a relatively large scale. In 1906, two Labour parties were established including Hapoel Hatzair and Poalei Zion (Ibid.). Hapoel Hatzair was formed mainly by agricultural labourers. In the beginning, Poalei Zion composed of urban proletariat but later came to be dominated by agricultural labourers (Gidron, 1997). The Achdut Ha'avodah came into existence in 1909. Its main objective was to assist the immigrants of the Third Aliyah. The Party successfully created agricultural settlements, trade unions, an office for public works to mitigate unemployment and various welfare projects. But in the early days, most labourers had refused to become a part of the new political body, which was organised as the local branch of the World Poalei Zion Party.

The leaders of Achdut Ha'avodah encountered with the problem of ensuring the support of different groups of workers and thrived to integrate all new immigrants and the old-time

labourers in a collective and joint agenda and subsequently created Histadrut in 1920 (Halevi, 1957). This was a countrywide general federation of Labour union composing all occupations. It was not only limited to trade union activities but also assumed many economic functions previously fulfilled by Achdut Ha'avodah. Within a few years the Histadrut became successful in unifying most Jewish labourers (Halevi & Shapiro, 1971).

In the initial phase, the Histadrut formed itself not only as an economic body, but as a political body as well. It regarded itself as a microcosm of the future Jewish state. Hence, no sphere of activity was outside its domain. It included in its framework various Labour parties. In 1920, Histadrut election, Achdut Ha'avodah won over 50 per cent of the votes and thus gained control of the Histadrut's executive bodies.

In 1930, Mapai formation happened particularly when Achdut Ha'avodah associated with Hapoel Hatzair. Gradually, the Mapai gained momentum in Histadrut elections in which it got 75 per cent of the votes. This popularity led it to control Histadrut's executive bodies. The economic power that the party had come to possess enabled it to become a dominant force not only in Histadrut, but also in the Yishuv. The establishment of Mapai as a unified and powerful party marked the beginning of the political hegemony of the workers' groups in the Yishuv (Johnston, 1965).

Mapai's hegemony continued after the establishment of state of Israel. The major parties that composed the political spectrum of independent Israel were basically the same that coexisted in the Yishuv era, although they underwent various divisions, mergers and alignments. The left-of-centre the Labour Movement was still (after 1948) headed by Mapai which merged with some smaller parties to form the Israel Labour Party and aligned itself with yet another party (Mapam) to form the Alignment in 1969.

The process of evolution of the Labour Party does not end with the establishment of Israel but continued thereafter. Hence, this chapter will examine its post-1948 evolutions and its prolonged hold on power. Fundamentally, 1977 marked a second essential focal point or change which occurred in Israeli politics, where the shift of power happened after the Knesset elections when for the first time the Likud Party came into the power. The right-wing politician Menachem Begin who represented Likud Party had replaced David Ben-Gurion's Mapai Party and its successor the Labour Party. Thus, for the first time a dominant political force (Labour Party) lost in the 1977 elections and Likud Party came into power.

It can be seen in Table 3.1, since the formation of Israel, the Labour members (in particular Mapai) were the winners. Its leaders enjoyed both ideological and electoral support within the population. Despite being the largest party in the Knesset, Mapai never won an overall majority. The party always occupied the governing position and no coalition was formed without its leadership. Since the inception of the state until 1977, every government in Israel was headed by Mapai (the predecessor of the Labour Party). From 1977 election onwards, the Labour Party had witnessed considerable downfall due to internal and external challenges (will discuss in further themes).

The 1977 Knesset elections brought the Likud to power which led to a tectonic shift in politics. The Likud remained in power until 1992, partly by exerting influence over the Labour-Likud National Unity Governments during 1984-1990. In 1992, the Labour Party returned to power under Yitzhak Rabin.

Table 3.1: Governments 1948-1977

Knesset/120/Govt.	Entry Date	Prime Minister	Parties
Provisional	14/05/48	David Ben-Gurion	
1:1	10/03/49	David Ben-Gurion	Mapai+Arab list (48), Religious bloc (16), Progressive (5), Sephardim (4)=73
1:2	01/11/50	David Ben-Gurion	Mapai (48), Religious bloc (16), Progressive (5), Sephardim (4)=73
2:3	08/10/51	David Ben-Gurion	Mapai (50), Hap. Mizrachi (8), Mizrachi (2), Aguda, Poa Aguda (5)=65
2:4	24/12/52	David Ben-Gurion	Mapai (50), NRP (10), General Zionist (23), Progressive (4)=87
2:5	26/01/54	Moshe Sharett	Mapai (50), NRP (10), General Zionist (23), Progressive (4)=87
2:6	29/06/55	Moshe Sharett	Mapai (52), NRP (10), Progressive (4)=66
3:7	03/11/55	David Ben-Gurion	Mapai (45), NRP (11), Achdut Ha'avodah (10), Mapam (9), Progressive (5)=80
3:8	07/01/58	David Ben-Gurion	Mapai (45), NRP (11), Achdut Ha'avodah (10), Mapam (9), Progressive (5)=80
4:9	17/12/59	David Ben-Gurion	Mapai (52), NRP (12), Achdut Ha'avodah (7), Mapam (9), Progressive (6)=86
5:10	02/11/61	David Ben-Gurion	Mapai (46), NRP (12), Achdut

			Ha'avodah (8), Poalei Aguda(2)=68
5:11	26/06/63	Levi Eshkol	Mapai (46), NRP (12), Achdut Ha'avodah (8), Poalei Aguda(2)=68
5:12	22/12/64	Levi Eshkol	Mapai (45), NRP (12), Achdut Ha'avodah (8), Poalei Aguda(2)=67
6:13	12/01/66	Levi Eshkol	Labour Alignment (49), NRP (11), Mapam (8), Ind. Liberals (5)=73
6:14	17/03/69	Golda Meir	Labour Alignment (49), NRP (11), Mapam (8), Ind. Liberals (5), Rafi (9), Gahal (22)=104
7:15	15/12/69	Golda Meir	Labour Alignment (60), NRP (12), Ind. Liberals(4),Gahal (26)=102
8:16	10/03/74	Golda Meir	Labour Alignment (54), NRP (10), Ind. Liberals(4)=68
8:17	03/06/74	Yitzhak Rabin	Labour Alignment (54), CRM (3), Ind. Liberals(4)=61
9:18	20/06/77	Menachem Begin	Likud

Knesset (2009): Governments of Israel.

*h*ttp://knesset.gov.il/govt/eng/GovtByNumber_eng.asp

Early Developments after Formation of Israel

Since its formation in May 1948, Israel has been at loggerheads with Arab countries to survive as an independent and sovereign state. After having replaced the British Mandate, Israel made its first effort towards a democratic structure by conducting a national election. Eight months after the Declaration of Independence, on 25 January 1949, elections were held for the Constituent Assembly which replaced the provisional government. Any discussion about the political developments in Israel after its formation is not possible without understanding its political system which has a significant bearing on its foreign policy. Therefore, the next theme will focus its political system.

Israel's Political System

The introduction of Israel's political system lies in its uniqueness and distinctiveness in comparison to its neighbouring countries. Section four of Israel's Basic Law (passed in February 1958 by the 3rd Knesset) illustrates that "the Knesset is the house of representatives of the state of Israel, that its seat is in Jerusalem and that upon election it should include 120 members. The law then deals with the electoral system, the right to vote and be elected, the Knesset's term of office, the principles relating to the Knesset election, the service of the Knesset members, the parliamentary immunity of the Knesset members and the Knesset building, the work of the Knesset and its committees etc. Article 4 of the law, articulates that the Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct, secret and proportional elections, can be amended by a majority of 61 Knesset members. Article 44, "prevents the amendment of the law by means of the Emergency Regulation, can only be amended by a majority of 80 Knesset members and only if special condition exit that prevent holdings the elections at their proper time" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019:1-2). Israel is a multi-party parliamentary system and the nature of its political system is reflected in the structure of three organs, namely, executive, legislature and judiciary[14]. Although, the Prime Minister and the President hold the executive power, however, the President is mere nominal and ceremonial whose powers are weaker than that of the Indian President (Bernstein, 1957). The President

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[14] Israel does not have a written constitution. During the creation of State of Israel, at that time Ben-Gurion stated that due to in the large number of immigration and because of religious faction in the polity, anticipated prospect with the possibility of attacks from Arab nations writing a constitution was not seen possible. In 1950, it was decided to indefinitely postpone the implementation of a formal written constitution and chosen for its gradual creation (Bernstien, 1957).

of Israel is elected by the parliament (Knesset) of the state for the duration of seven years and cannot be re-elected more than one term.

The parliamentary system gives real powers to the Prime Minister and his cabinet administrators (Peretz, 1997). The Prime Minister holds significant position on the early choice of cabinet colleagues. Cabinet is responsible to the Knesset, which remains in the office if it holds support and enjoy the confidence of the Knesset which has tenure of four years (Arian, Nachmias & Amir, 2002). The legislative power is assigned to a 120- member Knesset which is the supreme authority. The power of the PM and cabinet is limited by the Knesset. Neither the PM, nor the President or any authority is authorised to dissolve the parliament. The Knesset can only dissolve itself when government of the country fails and that too only after the Knesset passes a resolution fixing the date and time of the next election (Peretz, 1997).

Under the proportional representation electoral system, Israel has multiples parties, one of the most extreme versions of the proportional representation list system, where the entire country is deemed as a single constituency. All Israeli citizens over the age of eighteen may vote in Knesset elections without regard to sex, religion, or other factors, unless deprived of that right by a court of law (Reich, 2008). The people vote for the party lists not to individual candidates and parties elect, select or nominate the candidates to its list to be eligible to become Member of the Knesset (MK). Each party may present the voter with a list of up to 120 names. The number of seats received by each party would be proportional to the percentage votes received by it (Arian, 1977). A party obtained representation through one or more of the 120 available Knesset seats if it surpasses the threshold. Initially it was one per cent of the valid votes and then rose to 1.5 in 1988, to 2 per cent in 2003 and to 3.25 per cent in 2014.[15] The president then asks Leader of the largest party to form a government (Chazan, 2005).

Several parties contest the election and the creation of a new list is a comparatively simple affair. According to reforms, in 1984 a new list required the written consent of 25,000 votes and a deposit of NIS500,000 (then worth about US$2,000), which would be forfeited if the list did not secure at least one per cent of the valid votes cast in the election. The party lists usually are prepared by its leadership acting informally or through organised committee. The

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[15] Electoral System in Israel http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections16/eng/about/electoral_system_eng.htm

top name in the list usually represents the leader of the party who could become the Prime Minister, should the party lead the coalition (Cohen, 1992).

Moreover, the multi-party system helps one to understand the origin of coalition-based and compromise-laden model of Israeli government. In the case of Palestinian issue, it is important to look at the coalition government in the multi-party system, because coalition governments have been becoming an obstruction in the making cohesive policy over the Palestinian question in the Israeli politics (Kieval, 1983, Shlaim & Yaniv, 1980).

According to Jonathan Mendilow (2003), "due to the multiplication of diverse parties, strong ideological tensions had to be appeased to form government coalitions, this in return created a system where none ever enjoyed the ability to govern alone" (Mendilow, 2003:03). This indicates the importance of the smaller parties which play a crucial role in the formation of coalition government in Israel. The government formation mostly is completed and Prime Minister-elect must submit his/her cabinet to the Knesset within the 45 days after the election to receive the mandatory vote of confidence and confirm the majority support for the elected government (Diskin, 1991).The Knesset elections are scheduled every four years and Prime Minister is expected to serve full premiership; however, most often the Israeli governments serve shorter terms and the Knesset has the power to call for early elections as well. Additionally, only the Knesset can suspend itself and call for new elections at any time during the four-year term (Mahler, 2004).

This political system has resulted in multiplicity of parties, called lists, joining the election campaigns, with better-than even chances of success. Even though party mergers and splits have frequently happened, the overall level of fragmentation has remained rather stable (Medding, 1990). The electoral system accounted not only for repeated attempts by new lists to capture seats in the legislature but also for a large variance in party sizes (Diskin, 1984). The Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system in Israel has created a situation that can be characterised by a single dominant party facing a host of much smaller parties, in a system that displayed a high degree of ideological fragmentation, with a bilateral opposition (Peretz, 1997).

The fragmentation of the Israeli Party system during pre-1973 era can be seen in table no. 3.2.

Table 3.2: Elections Results and Parliamentary Seats

PARTY/YEAR	1949	1951	1955	1959	1961	1965	1969	1973
LEFT-OF CENTRE								
Communist	4	5	6	3	5	4	4	5
Mapam	19	15	9	9	9	8	-	-
Achdut Ha'avoda	-	-	10	7	8	-	-	-
Mapai	46	45	40	47	42	45	56	51
Rafi	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-
State-List	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
RIGHT-OF CENTRE								
Free centre	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Herut	14	8	15	17	17	26	26	39
Gen. Zion	7	20	13	8	17	-	-	-
Progress	5	4	5	6	-	5	4	4
RELIGIOS PARTY								
NRP	16	10	11	12	12	11	12	10
Aguda	-	5	6	6	6	6	6	5
Other	9	8	5	5	4	5	6	3

Source: - American Jews Yearbooks

http://ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1978_12_IsraelArab.pdf

During 1948-1973, three characteristics of the party system emerge from the table no. 3.2; the numerical balance between the different groupings has remained basically stable; electoral volatility and party mergers and splits have chiefly occurred within, not across, political blocs; and the median position of the Mapai Party has stayed within the left-of-centre Labour bloc (Korn, 1992:24). This defined the coalition game and the bargaining structure. In short,

the dominant party determined who might join in the coalition and who would be left out. This kind of power is usually associated with parties which enjoy an electoral, or at least a parliamentary majority (Korn, 1992).

Labour Party and Israel's Political System

The Labour Party's position in the Israeli political system is also important to describe the effect of the electoral system on the party. As mentioned above, Israel has the clear form of proportional representation or the list system. The section four of Israel's Basic Law stipulates that the elections should be general, national, direct and equal, by secret ballot and proportional (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019:1-2). An absolute majority of 80 Member of the Knesset and not a simple majority of 61 is required to make amendment in any aspect of the electoral system. This was inserted due to the fears that Ben-Gurion would attempt to change the system to bring in a first-past-the-post method (FPTP) or the simple majority system (Y. Hazan, 2000). Vernon Bogdanor (1993) considers that "this would have transformed the political system with Mapai becoming not only the dominant party, but one with an absolute majority of seats in the Knesset and therefore enjoying a total monopoly of power" (Bogdanor, 1993:84).

The decision to use the party list system was adopted without making much thought. The pre-state elections in the Yishuv were conducted under proportional representation so that that all parties and streams involved are represented and consequently this system was carried over into the state. At the time of making the decision on the electoral system, the country was involved in the war with the Arabs, therefore, the leadership decided to continue with the old system (Neill, 1996). Ben-Gurion was in favour of using the British first-past-the post system but accepted at the time of undefined borders of infant state, it was impossible to draw up the constituencies needed for this system (Ibid.).

In order to understand the high importance of the Labour Party in its political system it is important to deal with various approaches to the party's position within the system. The party list system had huge conditioning effects on the internal organisation of Mapai. Ferdinand A. Hermens (1968), in his classic study of proportional representation, explains that "the democratic nature of parties is destroyed by the system, in that the individual deputy is no longer independent as he lacks the support of his constituents, once the leadership has control over the appointments committee, this leads to total domination of the elite over the party"

(Hermens, 1968:69). The leader, or leadership, can destroy and make political careers with the stroke of a pen and the only compensation for a rebellious candidate is to form another list or run as an independent. However, the cost of campaigning prevents most candidates from attempting to do so. Mapai dearly contained many of the above characteristics, with its highly centralised, oligarchic party machine and the control of the leadership over appointments to the Knesset list (Medding, 1990). This situation was compounded by the fact that Mapai was a dominant party, winning the largest number of seats in Knesset elections, thus helping to reinforce the power of the leadership (Garfinkle, 2015).

On the other hand, Peter Y. Medding (1972) disagrees with the notion of the leaders using the appointments committees to destroy political careers. He argues that the temporary nature of the appointment committees prevented them from influencing or dictating the candidate's parliamentary behaviour. He stressed that:

> There is no evidence to suggest that Mapai parliamentarians were dropped because they offended members of the appointment committees; most were dropped for reasons of age or unsatisfactory parliamentary performance or because groups recognised as having a right to nominate candidates for safe zone decided to alternate between their leading members (Medding, 1972:3).

The electoral system is inclined to reinforce the importance of intra-party politics over inter-party politics in the Mapai. With the party serving as the central reference point for the candidates, as opposed to the electorate in a first-past-the-post system which was favoured by Ben-Gurion intra-party conflict has increased as candidates struggled to gain a realistic place on the party list. Various factions in the party, whether interest groups or party factions (post-1968 merger), fought for intensification of their representation on the list (Lochery, 1996). Leaders attempted to gain their clients placed in a realistic position on the list to enhance their own position within the elite. This became more important as the divisions within the leadership enhanced and the old factions came to be replaced by simple personality and power politics (Aronoff, 1977).

The strength of a leader, therefore, came to be measured by how many of his/her supporters could receive realistic positions on the Knesset list of the party. The intensification of the intra-party struggle, with the Lavon Affair (1954)[16] and the emergence of the first serious

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The Lavon Affair was basically related to the security-political and the military issue, which sparked in the form of domestic and political crises in Israel. The Lavon Affair occurred in 1954, failed Israeli intelligence operation launched against Egypt, begun with launching attack on the Alexandria post office, within a week, six others building were targeted in Alexandria ad Cairo. In that covert operation, Egyptian Jews were to bomb western

divisions within the elite, confirmed that Ben-Gurion was keen to ensure that his young guard were given a realistic number of places on the party list so as to bolster his intra-party position, in the conflict with Lavon and subsequently with the Gush Emunim itself (Arian, 1971).

The dominance of intra-party politics were compounded by the long Mapai later on the Labour Party rule in Israel, in which a generation of functionaries came to rely on the party for their career, thus making them more concerned about their own position within the party structure, rather than any inter-party conflict or concerns (Korn, 1992). The inter-party conflict, prior to 1977, was based around which parties would join the coalition with the Mapai and not on any real threat of the party losing its essential lead role in the coalition negotiations. Hence, its importance was not as significant as it would have been in a competitive party system. However, even with the emergence of a competitive party system in 1977, intra-party conflict continued to dominate inter-party conflict, particularly among the leadership within the Labour Party (Lochery, 1997)

Leadership in the Labour Party

In this theme would draw light on the Labour Party leadership's role and importance in Israel's political system. The government is not a single pillar rather it has various branches organ that plays important role in the functions within the domestic and international political context. The Labour Party's charismatic leadership, which in pre-independence time, implemented an agenda of rapid development of the Jewish community in Palestine, was publicly identified with the realisation of the independent State of Israel. This was made possible by Mapai efforts because party had control over all the major institutions of the state (Arian, Barnes & Samuel, 1976).

Whenever, country's nation security on peril, in that case, country's major leadership plays important role. In that dangerous environment, country's leader has to decide about war and peace. The importance of the leadership is most crucial factor of any country. Israeli state suited more to prove the statement, which surrounded by the enemies could attack anytime. Although democratic states are not any less war-prone than non-democratic ones, they wish

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and Egyptian institutions with certain objective. Subsequently, these Jews were arrested due to Egyptian government was apparently informed about next target (Weiss, 2013). That issue created the split into the Mapai marked its endpoint in 1965, as brought about by its leader of many years, the state founder David Ben-Gurion (Amar-Dahl, 2016).

not to go to war against one another. But if a democratic state faces an imminent war, the leader has to strongly consider resolving the crisis peacefully, or else risk high human, economic and ecological casualties, which, besides imminent catastrophe, would legitimately fear of losing his/her reputation and chances for re-election (Mor, 1997). How a leader acts in a conflict depends largely on the context of the political system because they are part of that system. In fact, David Ben-Gurion's charismatic personality overshadowed the leaders of all other parties; Golda Meir had a strong personality and , Menachem Begin, the leader of Herut who became Prime Minister in 1977, proved to be an effective and charismatic figure only after Ben-Gurion had left the scene (Beinin, 1992). Moreover, Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of Likud Party consecutively formed the governments and emerged as one of the most charismatic leaders in Israel's politics.

The nature of leadership sometimes finds difficult or vulnerable over some issue; for instance, over the Palestinian issue, the power of the Prime Minister is rather weak and gives him/her less freedom to spearhead the pursuit of a peace initiative, because of the Israel's multi-party parliamentary system that leads to coalition government formed with support of smaller parties with distinct political agenda. As mentioned earlier, in Israel, no one party has ever achieved an electoral majority in the Knesset. Hence, forming coalitions with other parties is important for the victorious party, in order to get a coalition majority in the Knesset (Capitanchik, 1988).

Due to this, sometimes the Prime Minister becomes vulnerable during his/her tenure in office, especially if the coalition government's composition is influenced by differently motivated parties. The increasing number of the parties in the coalition can be seen the greater risk for the PM (Mahler, 2004). A coalition government with several parties, with different ideology, inevitably diminishes opportunities for unilateral legislative moves over the policies towards the Palestinian issue. In other words, the largest parliamentary parties must negotiate formal agreements with smaller coalition partners and must need their agreements over the issues (Korn, 1992).

In these cases, the leadership of the governing party must make some compromises that are likely to weaken his/her and the party's own ideological stands. In the following chapter highlights various moments where the Labour Party failed to evolve cohesive policy towards the Palestinian question due to coalition compulsions. In the case of approval of a peace initiative, the Prime Minister had faced stark opposition from most of his coalition. In that

case, Prime Minister had to abstain from any unilateral move. Exceptionally, in the case of a single-handed move by the executive might be possible if the Prime Minister has strong public support. If that is not the case, any controversial, unilateral move by the Prime Minister threatens his/her office as he can quickly fall "out of favour" with one (or more) of his/her coalition partners (Kenig, 2008). This circumstance, Mahler (2004) points out, "leaves the executive vulnerable to 'blackmail' and to be ousted at any time by a vote of no confidence. In the ten-year period between 1989 and 1999, Israelis voted five times, instead of the designated two times" (Mahler, 2004:161-162).

There are list of chairmanship of the Labour Party and prominent leaders, who had played significant role in the party in particular and in Israel's political discourse in general. There are following:

- **David Ben-Gurion (**1886-1973**):** He was the first Prime Minister (PM) of Israel and as a PM served for 13 years (1948-1953 and 1955-63), primary national founder of the state of Israel. He was a founding member of Mapai Party and recognised as founding father of modern Israel. He served head of Jewish Agency and Zionist Executive (1935-1948) and also as Defence Minister (1948-53 and 1955-63) (Rosemari, 2014 & Bar-Zohar, 1977).

- **Moshe Sharett** (1894-1965)**:** He served as Foreign Minister of Israel (1948-56) and had been second Prime Minister of Israel in the Mapai government (1953-55) (Sheffer, 1996).

- **Levi Eshkol** (1895-1969)**:** He served as the third Prime Minister (1963-1969) and a founding member of the Labour Party. He served various senior portfolios including Defence Minister (1963-67) and Finance Minister (1952-63). He was Chairman of the Labour Party from (1968-69) (Avner, 2010).

- **Gold Meir** (1898-1978)**:** She was leader of Alignment, fourth and first woman Prime Minister of Israel. She served numerous senior roles including Minister of the Labour (1949-1956) and Foreign Minister (1956-1966) and the Chairman of the Labour Party (1969-74) (Medzini, 2008).

- **Yitzhak Rabin** (1922-1995)**:** He was known as the man of security or "Mr Security". Rabin was Israeli politician, statesman and general. He was the fifth Prime Minister of

Israel and held the office twice during 1974-77 and 1992-95 until his assassination in November 1995. In between served various portfolios including as IDF Chief of Staff (1964), Defence Minister of Israel (1984-90), Israel's Ambassador to the United States (1968-1973) and Chairman of the Labour Party (1974-77 and 1992-1995) (Rabinovich, 2017).

- **Shimon Peres** (1923-2016)**:** He was 9th President of Israel (2007-14), served two terms as Israel's Prime Minister (1984-86) and the interim Prime Minister (1995-96). Peres served various prominent posts in Israel. He was Chairman of the Labour Party (1977-92, 1995-97 and 2003). He was also Nobel laureate (Golan, 1989 & Bar-Zohar, 2007).

- **Ehud Barak** (1942-till now)**:** He was Chairman of the Labour Party (1997-2001) and the tenth Prime Minister (1999-2001). He served the posts of Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister (2009-2013) (Dowty, 2019).

- **Binyamin Ben-Eliezer** (1936-2016)**:** He was the member of Knesset (1984-2014) and held prominent portfolios in government including Minister of Industry, Trade, Labour and Defence Minister. He was also Deputy prime minister and was Chairman of Labour Party during 2001-12 (Joffe, 2016).

- **Amram Mitzna** (1945-till the date): He was former general in the IDF and the Chairman of Labour Party during (2002-3) (Reich, 2008).

- **Amir Peretz (**1952-till the date**):** He was former Chairman of the Histadrut (1995), had become Defence Minister and was Chairman of Labour Party from (2005-11) (Phelan, 2012).

- **Shelly Yachimovich** (1960-till the date): She was the Chairman of Labour Party from 2011-2013 (Kumaraswamy, 2015).

- **Isaac Herzog** (1960): He was the Chairman of Labour Party from 2013-2017 and in 2018 was elected Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel (Hoffman, Cashman, 2018).

- **Avi Gabbay** (1967-till the date): He is the Chairman of Labour Party since 2017. He was former leader of Zionist Union and the Minister of Environmental Protection in 2015-16. He was also the CEO of the telecommunications company Bezeq.

In addition, there were some of the prominent leaders in the Labour Party, who were not the heads of the party but had made greater contribution. They are the following:

- **Moshe Dayan** (1915-1981): He was made Defence Minister (1967-1973) on the eve of the June War (Bar-On, 2012).

- **Abba Eban** (1915-2002): He was Foreign Minister and as a member of Mapai, served as Minister of Education and Culture during 1966-74 (Siniver, 2015).

- **Chaim Herzog** (1918-97): He served as President of Israel twice. His son, Isaac, was the Chairman of the Labour Party mentioned above (Kumaraswamy, 2015).

- **Efraim Katzir** (1916-2009): He was the President of Israel during 1973-78 and was a prominent member of the Labour Party in the 1970s (Bard & Schwartz, 2005).

- **Yitzhak Navon** (1921-2015): He was 5th President of Israel (1978-1983) and prior to that he was the political secretary to David Ben-Gurion and later his bureau chief (1951). He was also served as Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and Chairman of the Knesset Committee on Foreign and Defence Affairs (1965-1978) (Lentz, 2014).

- **Zalman Shazar** (1889-1974): He was 3rd President of Israel (1963-1973) and was first elected in 1949 as a member of the Mapai Party. He was served as Minister of Education in Ben-Gurion's first government (1949) (Ibid.).

- **Yossi Beilin** (1948-till the date): He served in various portfolios in Israeli government as a leading member of the Labour Party. He had played significant role in the Israel-Palestine peace process especially in Oslo Peace Accord 1993 (Bard & Schwartz, 2005).

Additionally, the early years of the state saw the transfer of state control of the Yishuv institutions such as the military Palmach and Haganah. After declaration of independence, the power of these institutions had increased including their legitimacy and authority. These were enhanced with the formal sovereignty and power (Shlaim, 2000). Mapai was enjoying a similar power having controlled these institutions. In short, the direct control of these institutions by the Mapai Party was replaced by a form of indirect rule which was formally responsible to the parliament and the electorate system (Medding, 1990). The activities of these institutions, which were founded by the Labour members, had increased in the early years of the state. It was due to the degree of dependence of the population, especially the newly arriving immigrants, on these institutions had increased.

The main point of the programme of institutionalisation was the shift in the balance of the ideology of the elite in Mapai marked the gap from socialism and shifted towards nationalism that was later known as Ben-Gurion's version of '*statism*' (derived from the Hebrew

mamlacha *[mamlachtiut]* (kingdom) (Koppel, 2000). The meaning of *mamlachtiut,* is "the state as existing free from the Labour Movement or political parties but focused the close relationship between the Labour Movement's influence and legitimacy of the government" (Rolef Hattis, 1993:208).

There were short term benefits for the Mapai Party in holding a *mamlachtiut* policy. For instance, Party marked up potential and actual constituency of the party through appealing to the groups other than its traditional constituency of the workers. However, in the long period of time, relinquishing of socialist principles led to internal party problems and preferred material inducements rather than ideology to gain political support. Consequently, Party had to face negative consequences in the 1977 elections. However, the crises started much before and the emergence of a new generation of potential leaders came to a head with the Lavon Affair (Niell, 1996).

Aforementioned that the Lavon Affair came into light in 1954 with the arrest of an Israeli spying ring in Cairo and the subsequent trial and conviction of the group members. It was claimed that Prime Minister Moshe Sharett was not informed about the 'Operation Susannah' (1954) by Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon who had acted without taking permission from the government. Lavon always defended his innocence. In 1960 a special cabinet committee found that he was innocent and had not given the order for the operation. David Ben-Gurion did not accept the Committee's verdict and the affair took a different shape. It became central divisive issue in the government vis-à-vis within the party for nearly 10 years, threatening a permanent split in the Party (M. Sachar, 1979).

The Lavon Affair is important because it marked a wider power struggle within the party, as Lavon was one of the leaders who were trying to preserve his positions within the party while Ben-Gurion and the young guard were trying to challenge him. Primarily, the main point of conflict was the debate between *mamlachtiut*[17] favoured by Ben-Gurion or kind of his 'statism' and the Tseirim (youth section) and *chalutztiut* (pioneering) (Shlaim, 2000). *Tseirim* (young intellectual, opted for a vehement and unequivocal denial of the rabbinic tradition and the history of suffering in exile) was not based on the Histadrut apparatus rather their position in the state (especially the military) which provided them an independent status and foundation from which to champion *mamlachtiut* against the ossified conventional socialism

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[17] It is defined that the state as existing free from the Labour Movement or political parties yet stressed the close relationship between the Labour Movement's influence and the legitimacy of the government.

of the Mapai veterans. In a security conscious country, the youthful activists (Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres) were known with the defence establishment. The Old guard who, in the public mind, were best identified as for their socio-economic achievements. The Old guard sensed that the prospects of the Mapai and its character were made less important by the young statists (Cohen, 1992).

This should be noted that these differences did not mark major ideological rift but rather reflected the more modernised and technocratic style of the youth section and Ben-Gurion against the more conservative tendencies of the party's character (Aronoff, 1977). Subsequently, the Lavon Affair culminated into a situation where Ben-Gurion had to leave the Mapai and formed a separate new party 'Rafi Party (1965), along with two leaders of the *tzeirim* namely, Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres. Later Rafi re-joined the Mapai in 1968 as part of the Israel Labour Party. In contrast, Ben-Gurion and some others had refused to join new party, indicating continued intense bitterness among the key figures of the party and their followers (Inbar, 1991). In the result, the factionalism and threats of party splits had increased.

Labour Party and Politics of Factionalism

According to Myron J. Aronoff (1977) the Israeli political system has been defined throughout its history by a process of fission and fusion or splitting and remerging of its political parties. He identified three basic characteristics which gained the widest acceptance; first, sub-units competing within a larger corporate political unity; second, they are not themselves corporate units; and third, they pursue particularistic interests generally viewed as selfish or against the common good and other is leader oriented, temporary conflict groups. For example, the Labour Party, which was divided into three major factions, had joined to Mapam Party in an electoral Alignment which competed with other parties on a joint electoral list. It had joint consultative institutions and was bound by joint coalition discipline.

The cultural and institutional factors were also responsible for factional politics in Israel. The major historical splits merges on wide level within the Labour parties happened during 1968-1977. There is old story narrated by Jewish people in the Diaspora and about the Jewish community. Every two Jews have at least three political points of views (Bard & Schwartz, 2005). It means they do not have similarity in their political thinking. The tendency of Jewish

people to divide among themselves into competing political camps is clearly visible throughout their history (Aronoff, 1977).

The most important institutional factor which influenced factionalism in the electoral system is the proportional representation within a single electoral district. Israel's politics have frequently commented on the intense ideological nature of politics which is obviously related to factional politics (Issac, 1981). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Zionist parties were a product of the developments of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and many of them emerged in Eastern Europe and were influenced by many progressive and radical ideologies popular at the time. For example, debates in the Elected Assembly of the Yishuv between the leaders of the socialist parties and Jabotinsky's Revisionist Movement led to the outbreak of the fist fights between their supporters in the assembly (Peretz, 1997).

Regarding the disagreement among the political parties in general and leaders, many issues such as the German arms sales and German war reparations caused volatile public debates and violent demonstrations between the parties and among the public (Aronoff, 1977). Likewise, Kastner affair[18] and the Lavon affairs have embroiled top party leaders and public leading to major confrontations which have had far ranging political ramifications (Ibid.).

These issues led to the fragmentation within the Labour Party and formed new party, like Rafi Party was the most significant example. Between 1967 and 1973, the two most embarking events happened namely June War subsequent occupation of lands and the formation of the Labour Party in 1968 (Schnall, 1979). These events were inter-related with June War proving to be one of the major reasons why the various Labour factions opted to work together. The Labour Party received huge support because of backdrop of major economic recession which led to large scale unemployment, especially among the middle classes and a high rate of immigration to Israel. These factors had led to a decline in the popularity of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and the government as a whole (Yishai, 1985).

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[18] Kastner Affair was one of the popular court cases at the time of early development of Israel. The event begun with the name of Rudolf Kastner was a Hungarian origin Jew. He was working at the Ministry of Trade and Industry in the capacity of a clerk. He was a candidate on behalf of Mapai in the second Israeli Knesset election. Kastner Affair was exposed in Israel when (1952) a pamphlet came out with the accusation, by Malchiel Gruenwald, Kastner and others of collaborating with Nazi official in Germany (Budapest) during the weeks in which the great number of Hungarian Jews were sent to death in Auschwitz (Gur-Are & Greenberg, 2013). The court verdict vilified Kastner as an abettor of the Nazis (Ibid.).

Therefore, the merger between Achdut Ha'avodah and the Mapai appeared perfectly natural and get more closely, in the preceding years, with each other later submitted joint lists to the Knesset. Their respective elites had worked together in the cabinets. Even before any formal arrangement, Achdut Ha'avodah had been the natural coalition partner of Mapai Party. Achdut Ha'avodah, had in fact tried to reach agreement with Mapai in the past, leaving out Rafi Party, which they viewed as being dangerously anti-socialist. Much of the motivation, from Achdut Ha'avodah's argument, for the merger was to try and dilute the growing influence of Rafi Party in the Labour Movement among the younger generation of the Mapai members (Yishai, 1981).

Rafi was a much more difficult fusion. This was caused by the great deal of personal hostility between the Rafi leader Moshe Dayan and the Mapai elite, which can be traced back to the Lavon Affair. In real, Rafi had very little option but to join the new party (Aronoff, 1993). It had performed badly in the 1965 Knesset elections winning only 10 seats and had failed to develop the local party structures needed to increase its support in the short term. Despite these reasons, the vote to re-join Mapai and many of the latter joined Ben-Gurion in forming the New State List (Shalev, 1990).

The formation of the new Israel Labour Party took place at the start of the race to succeed Prime Minister Eshkol, with each of the factions having their preferred candidates. Dayan was keen to persuade his Rafi colleagues to join the new party to pursue his succession claim and to prevent Eshkol remaining as Prime Minister or his political enemy Pinhas Sapir, becoming the Prime Minister. Sapir although officially was Finance Minister oversaw the Gush Emunim and ran the party both financially and organisationally (Medding, 1972). Achdut Ha'avodah had their own candidate, Yigal Allen, who at the time of the merger was the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education. The Mapai's own candidate was clearly Sapir, whose power in the newly formed party continued from his pivotal role in the Mapai. The importance of this succession battle cannot be overstressed in determining the action of the key members of the elite during this period. After Eshkol's sudden death in February 1969, Golda Meir took over as a Prime Minister without any challenge. In the preceding period, Sapir had become the Secretary General of the party and had put together a centre party majority based around the Mapai which was so strong that Dayan did not challenge it (Roberts, 1990).

The fundamental problem of the merger was it did nothing to address the problems which Mapai and the others of the left had been experiencing. It led to further decline in the importance of ideology in the party due to competition, between leaders among the various factions, for Cabinet positions, representation in party institutions and Knesset lists. The increased size of the party made it easier for the party machine to control it, due to the decline in the efficiency of the party institutions (Merhav, 1980). The shortcomings of the party were illustrated by the growing feeling of alienation even among many of its supporters and were drastically highlighted by the failure of the party prior, during and after the October War (1973).

The merger also failed to achieve one of the central aims of the Mapai faction which was to secure a parliamentary majority and make it less reliant on coalition partners (Medding, 1972). In addition to the merger in 1969, Mapam formed an electoral pact with the Labour Party to create the Alignment. This preserved the independent status of the Mapam Party and led to a degree of close co-operation between the two parties from 1969 until the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG2) in 1984 (Beilin, 1985). The Mapam's ideology was more dovish than that of the component parties of the Israel Labour Party and its socio-economic programme was more socialist than the Labour Party's. From the beginning there were many in Mapam who opposed the Alignment, but these at this time were in the minority. The ideological differences between the two eventually led to a split in 1984 (Mendilow, 1988).

Labour Party and the Coalition Governments

The coalition governments have been a peculiar characteristic of Israeli politics. The existence of multiplicity of parties and the proportional representation of electoral system were responsible for this phenomenon. No single party in Israel could win a majority in the Knesset in any of the twelve elections between 1949 and 1988. All the governments in Israel were coalitions, prior formation of National Unity Government (1984), there were only two occasions when coalitions were truly broad based. The first instance was at the time of formation of Israel when a provisional government was set up incorporating all important existing parties and the other occasion was during the national emergency leading to the June War of 1967 (Peretz, 1979).

They were unusual in their nature and were established at times of national stress. The 1984 National Unity Government was unique. Earlier all coalitions were forged out of likeminded parties but in 1984 two largest opposing parties with divergent views almost on every policy had to co-exist and direct the government (Stellman, 1985). The formation of coalition government was an arduous and complex task. It involved tough bargaining among numerous factions and individuals, for political power and prestige. The coalition partners being aware of their importance in the forming a government, often tried to extract high political advantages for their participation.

As mentioned above, the Labour Party or its predecessors never won an overall majority in any elections. It can be seen above given table 3.1 that after each Knesset election the coalition governments were formed with other parties. The place of coalition and the coalitions-forming played important role in Israel's politics and had consequences for the Mapai both in terms of ideology and organisation. The Mapai got the important role in the coalition process, in that until 1977 no government could be formed without its support and leadership role. Consequently, after each election it was the Mapai who became the main movers in coalition negotiations. Since 1948 the Labour Party formed a series of coalition governments without any break during the first eight Knesset elections, can be seen table no 3.1, sometime coalition partners were changed. The 13th coalition (1966) became a national unity government at the time of June War, when it was joined by Rafi and Gahal. During the 15th coalition (1969), Gahal left in August 1970, when the government decided to accept an American peace initiative (The Rogers Plan {1969}) (Torgovnik, 1980). The 17th coalition (1974) was formed without the NRP, which joined later only and withdrawn again in December 1976 from the Labour-led government.

There were three kinds of strategies which the Labour Party adopted in the coalition politics. These strategies helped Party to form series of coalition government. First those parties (right wing and extreme left) alienated a priori from participation in the government. This case has been applied to the Israel's Communist Party. The Communists never participated in any coalitions, not even in national coalition of 1967 and other one was the Herut Party (Choudhary, 2017). The Labour Party and Herut (predecessor of the Likud Party) shared traditional hostility since pre-independence times and have not had much in common in terms of policy. Appearing Herut as its most dangerous rival, Mapai has gone to a lot of trouble to ascertain that no political power come its way (Levite & Tarrow, 1983). It can be noted that,

Mapai was so keen to add as many parties as can be possible in the coalition except Herut and Communist parties. The decision of not including the extreme parties from potential participation in the coalition government has been a brilliant coalition strategy which served to strengthen the Labour Party's political dominance (Korn, 1992).

The second category was inclusion of occasional partners. In that case, parties that have had coalition potential, yet participated in the government mainly when needs of the dominant party required it. The ultra-orthodox Adugat Israel Party had cooperated with the Mapai for only three years in three decades. An on-going partnership between the two parties was quite difficult, due to the vast gap separating them on the religious-secular point (Shamir, 1986). The Liberals (formerly the General Zionist party), Poalei Adugat Israel and the Mapam, belonging to a different political category and have alternated between government and opposition. In general, whenever these parties gained an electoral support or whenever their policy positions became popular, Mapai tended to include them in the coalition (Seliktar, 1982).

The third category was the parties which constituted regular partners in the coalition governments from 1948 up to 1977. The first was Achdut Ha'avodah, which has participated in coalition with the Mapai for more than two decades, until the two parties formalised their alliance and finally had merged. Moreover, there were two smaller parties which were each belonging to a different political ideology, were also included in this category, National Religious Party (NRP) and the Independent Liberal Party (ILP) (formerly the Progressive party). Both the NRP and the ILP have actively taken part in the Mapai-led coalitions for two decades (Seliktar, 1975).

Since the first Knesset election in 1949 Mapai included at least one excess party in the coalition and mostly three or more excess parties in a coalition (Medding, 1990). Large coalitions had two advantages for the Mapai; first, they contained many diverse elements which increased Mapai's freedom of action and second, the coalition could survive the resignation or departure of one of the participating parties. Mapai, for these reasons, preferred all the smaller parties in a coalition (Issac, 1981). The smaller parties participated in the coalition governments for several reasons; the religious parties to ensure the maintenance of religious *status quo* and their share in the distribution of religious funds, while sometimes others did not join mainly because of the electoral damage that membership in a previous coalition had brought. The General Zionists, for example, were convinced that their poor

performance in the 1955 Knesset elections had been caused by their participation in the previous government (Ibid.). According to Amitai Etzioni (1959), the Mapai used the coalition-forming process to adapt to changes in voting patterns and in particular, the strength of its rival parties. Mapai had done this to diffuse voter dissatisfaction with aspects of its polices by attempting to introduce into the coalition, a party or parties that had significantly increased its share of the vote in the previous Knesset election. And other hand, Rael Issac (1981) argued that Etzioni's theory is not acceptable, in that all the evidence was based on the 1951 and 1955 Knesset elections and that he ignores the efforts of the Mapai to include other parties in the coalition such as the Mapam Party in 1955.

The fundamental principle of all coalition process was the collective responsibility of the government and this was brought together with the in-built the Mapai majority in the government. Moreover, the Mapai always held the most important portfolios and this meant that it was practically able to translate a coalition government into a close approximation of government by a single party (Medding, 1972). There is, therefore, a clear relationship between the electoral system which always led to coalition government and the decline in the importance of ideology, or lack of an ideological challenge to the Mapai Party from the parties positioned to the left of it (Zuckerman, Shamir & Herzog, 1992).

On the other hand, it can be noted that the Revisionists (Gahal) did not share the same Zionist ideology as the Labour Movement and were not included in any government coalition from 1948 up to the NUG in 1967 (Issac, 1981). Mapai's refusal to accept Herut as a constructive party and the hostile relationship between Menachem Begin and David Ben-Gurion created bitterness between two parties and their successors. Ben-Gurion and the other Mapai leaders considered Revisionists ideology as a threat to the state and consequently tried to de-legitimise them among the voter's mind by not allowing them to take participation in the coalition government. Almost this view was supported by the other parties of the left and the NRP up to mid-1960s (Nachmias, 1974). The Labour Party remained dominant political party until 1977, during this period intra-party politics had an impact on the coalition bargaining process also.

Labour Party's Dominance 1948-77

With regard to democratic regimes three types of dimensions in terms of party system are found including (1) a two party system, in which the two major parties compete for the

power; (2) a multi-party system, in which different parties contest for power; and (3) dominant party system, in which a single party has domination in the system. Since the formation of Israel and even before that and up to 1977 country's political system was dominated by the Labour Party even though multi-party elections were in vogue. Highly involved in the interaction between socio-economic groups, the party won electoral pluralities in election after another. However, it never received more than 50 per cent of the votes in any election (Peretz, 1997). According to Don Korn (1992) the longevity and enduring stability of Mapai/Labour's dominance were because of, to a large extent, the outcome of successful strategies, alliances and coalition politics.

Theoretically, there are several classic definitions about dominant party. The definitions were provided by several authors and Maurice Duverger can be cited as one of them. The definition of the dominant party is used or developed by most scholars to describe the status of the Labour Party in Israel prior to 1977. Duverger (1960) stressed that "a dominant party need not win of the majority of the votes, but over a period of span it gains more votes than any of the other parties, consequently creating a system in which there is one party which dominates the whole system. He argues that the reason for this dominance is that the party is identified with an epoch and is therefore able to appeal to broad strata of society, with a mutual identification of political ideology, philosophy and style. Dominance is also related to belief. A party can be dominant when the public believes it to be" (quoted in Lochery, 1996:29).

On the contrary, Yonathan Shapiro (1980) described that "Duverger's definition thus includes notion of inferiority of the opposition parties, caused by the dominance of one party affecting their conduct and actions. The spiritual advantage accounts for the possibility of a dominant party ruling without an electoral majority, thus achieving legitimacy by a lack of viable alternatives. The other parties may be in a coalition which is built around the dominant party, but they do not play a significant role in the government. In short, any party that could convert such a spiritual advantage into the electoral success is likely to remain in the power for a considerable of time" (Shapiro, 1980:43).

Some of political scientists disagree with Duverger, claiming that there is no difference between a multi-party system and a dominant party system and therefore the presence of a dominant party system does not affect the party system. Giovanni Satori (1976) argued that "a party's electoral dominance is directly related to its ability to attract more resources than

other parties and this is only a temporary advantage" (Satori, 1976:21). Samuel P. Huntington (1968) explained that "the presence of a dominant party leads to a special set of inter-party relationships, claiming that the electoral dominance of a party is achieved by its ideological flexibility, which attracts support from wide-ranging strata in society. When the electorate disagrees with the party, they cast their votes for a second or contender party. Consequently, the dominant party takes note of the feelings of the public and adapts its policies to the changing consensus in order to attract voters" (Huntington, 1968:42). Huntington, therefore, said that "the key to the party's dominance is this ideological flexibility which allows it to modify itself when the need arises" (Ibid.).

From the above, differences of various definitions about dominant party can be noticed. In terms of Israel political system, most Israeli academicians follow the Duverger's definition of a dominant party and the effect it has on the political system in explaining the fortunes the Mapai and its successor the Labour Party (Arian, 1985). Peter Medding does not agree with much of Duverger's theory and was sceptical about the extent to which the Mapai's dominance can be identified with an epoch, which he feels was more identified with the state rather than the party (Medding, 1972). He accepts, as previously discussed, that the two were closely related, but argues that they were not the same. He also sees difficulties the differences between a dominant party and dominant party systems. The Mapai had occupied the pivotal position in the system, in that no coalition could be formed without it. This constitutes, therefore, merely an elaboration of Satori's theory (Ibid.).

Israel has been for several decades a classic example of a dominant-party system, with one party, the Mapai ever acting as the central pillar of the political system. It was also deeply involved in the interaction between socio-economic groups, elections and state power, party won electoral pluralities in one election after another for almost half a century, from 1930 until 1977. This predominance enhanced the Labour Party's a sense of moral superiority, which was reflected by its opponents' attitudes of almost less confident towards election victory (Arian & Bernes, 1974).

However, there were several factors which led the Labour Party's political dominance to the and two of which proved central to coalition politics, namely, size and ideological centrality, which together determine a party's essentials position in the system. Strong leadership was certainly a main component in the Mapai's dominance. Yet another contributing factor was

Mapai's control of important political sub-systems, the powerful trade union movement, the Jewish Agency and many local authorities (Krasno & LaPides, 2015).

Naturally, a dominant party demonstrates real strength at the grassroots level and it proves an ability to mobilise again and again a significant number of socio-economic groups. Despite great social, economic, demographic and cultural changes which took place during the 1948-1977, vastly affecting the electorate, the Labour Party has enjoyed large and relatively steady support from various sectors of the public (Medding, 1990). At the grassroots level, the strength of the Labour Party was manifest by its ability to secure one-third or more of the popular votes in all the eight general elections between 1949 and 1973, ranging from the low of 32.2 per cent in 1955 to the high of 46.2 per cent in 1969 (Korn, 1991).

The size of the Labour's share of the votes has guaranteed its control over sizeable public resources, which were then distributed according to the party's especial method (Galnor, 1995). This method bases the distribution of resources upon the existing power relations that in turn affected future power relations. In addition to making this kind of use of public resources, the party also developed an elaborated patronage system, thus making itself, for many social and cultural groups, their own party (Shapiro, 1980). Integrative in nature, the Labour Party has maintained its on-going activity on a high level which has enabled it to mobilise large cadres for the real test-election time.

Generally, in a parliamentary system, a dominant party must win the largest number of seats to become the number one party, while its main rivals should qualify merely as also runs. The Labour Party's dominance in the Knesset has always been clear-cut. Not only was the party the largest Knesset's group, it has always been bigger than a combination of any other two parties. Party's vast margin of plurality is clearly shown in below Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: The Domination of Mapai in the Elections Result

Party/Year	1949	1951	1955	1959	1961	1965	1969	1973
Mapai	46	45	40	47	42	45	56	51
Mapam	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
General Zionist		20	-	-	-	-	-	-
Herut	-	-	15	17	17	26	26	39

Source-Israel Government Yearbooks (1990)

It can be noted here, in 1965, the Mapai and the Achdut Ha'avodah formed the Labour Alignment; in 1969 and 1973, the Israel Labour Party (Mapai, Achdut Ha'avodah and Rafi) was merged with Mapam. Herut and Liberals joined in the Gahal bloc in 1965 and 1969 and in 1973 they created along with several smaller groups, the Likud bloc. The wide gap between dominant and the second largest party has had a strong impact on coalition politics and essentially, political bargaining structure in Israel has been defined by a single pole, the dominant party (Tarrow, 1990).

The Labour being by far the largest parliamentary party and its leader has always become the formateur, the person appointed by the President to head and form the next government. The party has thus been the main to any executive coalition and dominated the bargaining structure. In all the governments, it has had a majority in both cabinet portfolios and parliamentary support. It can be seen above Table Mapai Party consecutively had won the largest number of seats in the Knesset. Being in fact a minority party yet enjoying a majority within the majority situation, the Labour Party initial decades achieved unchallenged political powers within the political system (Herman & Pope, 1973).

In the left-of-centre bloc, the centripetal processes started in the 1960s, following the retirement of party's leader Ben-Gurion and the struggle over his political heritage. In 1965 the party created an Alignment with Achdut Ha'avodah and in 1968 Mapai, Achdut Ha'avodah and Rafi formed the Labour Party. In 1969 the Labour Party set up an Alignment with the Mapam. At the same time, centripetal moves began within the religious bloc, where most constituent parties were nearing the inner circle through participation in the coalition governments. To an extent, even the right-wing Herut Party was constrained to cooperate with the Mapai (Issac, 1981).

The logic behind such moves was to capture bargaining positions in preparation for possible coalition. For example, the defection of Rafi Party in 1965 was a move out of the inner circle, wanted at creating new coalition possibilities[19] (Johnston, 1967).The ultra-orthodox parties also withdrew from coalition participation and waited for new opportunities. With the creation of the Likud Party in 1973, in which some of the elements previously associated to the left-of-centre bloc also joined. In the 1973 elections, for the first time in decades, the

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[19] Rafi's schism split the nucleus of the dominant party system-Mapai's top leadership-and caused an irreparable damage. All the attempts to restore a new core within the framework of the Labour party were only partially successful.

dominance of the Labour Party was seen weaker (Korn, 1991). The number of votes gained by the Labour Party in 1973, 621,183, was only one-third higher than the Likud's votes, 473,309. Moreover, the number of votes gained by the two largest parties has increased for the first time to about 70 per cent. These changes were indicating different prospect in Israel's next elections (Arian, 1975).

In a multi-party system, forming the next government has always been a struggle and crucial task for political party. The ability to capture ruling position is rarely contingent upon the sentiments of most of the electorate and more often, it is at least partially a product of the rules of electoral game (Remy, 1975). A specific party may find itself in an important position, on the left-right scale, if the parties to its right and the parties to its left do not possess a parliamentary majority or if their combined majority does not have enough numbers to form the coalition government (Laver & Schofield, 1990). The operational distinction between left and right was the impossibility of forming any coalition government between parties to the left of Mapai (the Labour Party) and to its right, because of ideological difference, even though they have had chance to convert minority status into majority through the mutual consensus.

The Labour Party's important position has based not only on its size but also on its location at the centre of ideological spectrum (Shamir, 1986). The bloc of parties to right of the Labour Party was larger but had little chance of forming coalition government, even with the support of the religious parties and could get majority in the Knesset. The Labour Party was a party early 1977 as proto-coalition, because it was impossible to form a coalition without it (Peretz, 1997).

The party has retained its core position in each of the eight general elections. In 1961, its dominance was tested for the first time. Deeply divided from within and very strongly attacked because of Lavon Affair (Yanai, 1981), the Mapai had to cope up with a merger between the General Zionist and the Progressive parties to form the centre-right Liberal Party (centre-right) that challenged to its hegemony. As it happened, the Mapai Party lost five seats in the Knesset, the Liberal Parties gained three, but the overall picture did not change. Its position seemed weak, despite that, the Mapai retained its hold in the Knesset. In the next elections, the Liberal Party led the Club of Four (which constituted both sides parties from right and left), which tried to face the Mapai altogether in the coalition negotiations (Diskin, 1988). Levi Eshkol held the negotiations and eventually succeeded in dismantling this

alliance and formed a left-of-centre coalition government. The failure of the Club of Four proved that a coalition of left and right parties without the Mapai Party was not a politically viable alternative (Korn, 1992).

The 1965 election was first critical election when the prospects of party looked more promising and the composition of next coalition appeared to be in doubt. At that moment, for a strong right-wing political bloc 'Gahal' (merger of the General Zionist and Herut Parties), was formed to fight with the Mapai Party (Mahler, 2004). The attempt by the secessionist Rafi Party to capture pivotal position for itself was not successful. Following elections result showed once again that parties that fought the Mapai including Gahal, Rafi and the religious parties could not achieve a parliamentary majority. Rafi Party learned lesson and re-merged with the Mapai to form the Labour Party (Korn, 1992). The 1969 parliamentary election was pivotal due to existence of National Unity Government formed because of June War (1967). However, a very serious challenge for the Labour Party (LP) came in 1973, due to the traumatic events of the 1973 War.

The October War had a traumatic effect on both the Labour Party and Israel as a whole, leading to crisis in confidence in the leadership and party. It was clear failure of leadership particularly, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, in declining to act on intelligence warning about an imminent Arab attack (Bar-Joseph, 2006). It illustrated the sense of arrogance and lack of clear direction. This was compounded by lack of strong leadership during the first days of the war, when Israel sustaining heavy losses, which shocked to the society that had trusted on the party to provide such defences.

Asher Arian (1979) figured out that "1973 War broke the emotional dependence of the Israeli society on the labour elite, whose ability to defend Israel had never previously been questioned". This dependence had been reinforced by the party's performance during the June War, in which it was generally viewed as having shown great tactical skill in the conduct of war. The resignation of Meir less than a year after the October War ended the period of domination of the Labour elite by the Jews of the Second and Third Aliyahs. In the end Meir had little choice, although the party still won delayed in the delayed 1973 elections but with a reduced majority.

Finally, the 1977 elections marked the major changes in Israel's political history. The electoral fight between the Labour and its arch-rival from the right parties particularly Likud

led to the right-of-centre bloc gaining strength that could scrap the Labour Party's dominant position (Medding, 1972). Additionally, in 1973, State List, which originated in the Labour Party joined Likud Party. These political developments provided a political contour which was purely different and against the Labour Party (Roberts, 1990).

Ultimately, in the 1977 parliamentary election, the Labour Party lost both its status as the largest party and its position as the dominant party. Prior to the election, it was believed that the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), a new centre party, might capture middle status in the system (Akzin, 1980). As it happened, the shift to the right was very strong that a coalition of the right-wing and the religious parties, without the centrist DMC, was indeed possible. In the past, centre parties, such as the Liberal Party in 1961 or Rafi in 1965, failed to secure a major place (kind of pivot) both the parties and the right-wing and religious parties, had not have parliamentary majority. In 1977, right-wing and religious parties were not dependent any more on the centre to form a government. The DMC was cordially offered and grudgingly accepted, an invitation to join the right-of-centre coalition, but it had no real bargaining power. In a matter of a few years, the DMC has virtually vanished from the political scene (Rubinstein, 1982).

In conclusion, the Labour Party's political dominance from 1948 to 1977 was not an accidental or a matter of a few sporadic successes on election days. The party has been the strong and important actor in the political system, due to its numerical strength and moderate ideological posture. Its electoral and parliamentary minority has achieved a majority status at the governmental level because of its several strategies with 'coalition politics' being one of them and acted as a fully established majority party in the system. A political attack from the right-wing parties has been the Mapai's nightmare. It was tempting to speculate on the possible outcome of a move by the Mapai in the early 1960s, to cop-up with both constituents of the Liberal Party, the Progressives and the General Zionists, rather than with the left-wing parties (Korn, 1992).

This might have put the entire party system on a different course and a better one for the Mapai. Later, they had formed Gahal in 1965 and the Likud in 1973 and created an environment to stop the Labour Party's political dominance in 1977 parliamentary election. By 1977, methods or mechanism used by the Labour Party to maintain power over a dynamic and developing society of Israel, were slowly getting bankrupt (Shapiro, 1980). Subsequently, the Labour Party lost the 1977 elections.

Labour Party and 1977 Knesset Elections

The 1977 Knesset election was were held on 17 to constitute 9th Knesset election and the total number of ballets cast was 1,771,726 or 79.2 per cent of the turnout.

Table 3.4: Labour, Likud Seat Difference in the 1977 Knesset Elections

Labour led Party and Seats	Likud led Party and Seats
Alignment (32)	Likud (43)
Sheli (2)	NRP (12)
Ratz (1)	Agudat Israel (4)
Hadash (5)	Shlmzion (2)
United Arab List (1)	-
Total= 41/120	Total=62/120

Source: - (Neill, 1996).

Above figure illustrated limited number of parties and its seats. There were some other parties that received remaining eighteen seats, of which the most significant point was that Dash Party which got 15 seats. The Independent Liberals, Flatto-Sharon and Poalei-Agudah won only one seat each. Both the elections 1973 and 1977, difference in the vote percentage between the Likud Party and the Labour Party was noticeable, which marked obvious change in Israel's election history. Consequently, Menachem Begin became Prime Minister and went on to form the coalition government that completed full four-year term together with the other parties such as NRP as illustrated in Table 3.4.

The first and foremost outcome was the Labour Party (Alignment) had lost its major position in the coalition building process and second, Likud emerged with the capability to put together a winning coalition (62 seats) without the support of centrist Dash Party (Mintz, 1989). The founders of Dash Party had not expected such a situation and were preparing themselves for coalition negotiations with the Alignment after the election. However, their success in the elections became the single most significant statistical factor in the defeat of the Labour Party and its subsequent inability to form a coalition. Eventually Dash Party joined the coalition of the Likud Party on 24th October 1977, after being offered four cabinet portfolios (Horowitz, 1990). Many political scientists, especially, Myron J. Aronoff and

Yonathan Shapira referred the 1977 election as 'an earthquake' in Israel's politics where it marked the end of the Labour legacy in Israel's political history, ascendance to power of the Likud Party and replacement with a competitive party system.

There were several factors which were responsible to defeat of the Labour Party in elections. In the period leading up to the campaign and to an extent during the campaign itself, the leadership of the Labour Party made a series of organisational errors and misjudgements which contributed to the party's poor result in the polls (Bard & Schwartz, 2005). These can be categorised as personalities and internal organisational mistakes. One of Yitzhak Rabin's final decisions, before resigning as Prime Minister, was to appoint Chaim Bar-Lev as campaign manager for the Knesset elections (Caspi, Diskin & Gutmann, 1984). Such move was clear illustration of one of Rabin's failure in his first premiership. Bar-Lev, like Rabin, was an ex-general in the IDF with minimal experience of party politics and therefore lacked organisational skills required during an election campaign (Lochery, 1996). In many places the Labour Party appeared arrogant and failed to respond to the concerns of the electorate about the performance of the Labour leadership, manifest since the October War (Brichta, 1977).

In organisational terms, the party made two strategic blunders in the period leading up to the elections. First, unlike previous elections, the elections for the Labour organisation Histadrut were held after the Knesset elections instead of before and therefore not give the electorate an option for protest voting that did not affect the Knesset (Cornelius & Henriksen, 2009). The elections for the Municipal Councils were separated from the Knesset elections and compounded the problem of lacking party unity.

Historically the presence of municipal elections was an important factor in motivating the local party workers in the branches to campaign vigorously and to ensure that Labour Party supporters turned out to vote. The removal of this linkage took away the strong sense of personal motivation to ensure such a turnout (Neill, 1996). The central ideology of Likud Party, the Revisionist vision of a Greater Israel (that is, a Jewish state on both sides of the River Jordan) was no longer the cornerstone of Likud's campaign which instead concentrated on the corruption and failings of the Labour Party. The performance of Likud Party in election, has seen, its number of seats increased from 39 in 1973 to 43 in 1977 (Penniman, 1979 & Arian, 1977).

There were also several significant factors which brought the Likud Party's victory in 1977 election. The most importance factor behind the Likud's success in elections was the religious parties moving away from the Labour Party. After what Simon Peres's supporters termed as the 'smart exercise' of 1976[20] towards the Likud nationalist camp. In truth, this trend had started well before the 1976 split with the radicalisation of especially the NRP. One of the major reasons for this change in the NRP was the growing influence of settlement movements such as Gush Emunim from the 1967 war onwards (Shapiro, 1980). The change in the NRP was both ideological and generational, with the younger generation proving more militant and messianic supporters of the Greater Israel, as well as the settlement drive in these areas (Azmon, 1981). Consequently, they moved into the Likud camp along with the other religious parties, thus, providing the Likud with an in-built blocking the majority in 1977 election. In 1977, the strength of the religious parties increased to 17 seats, thus compounding the difficulties for the Labour Party (Aronoff, 1979).

Nevertheless, the election clearly marked a change away from the Labour Zionism towards a more nationalistic brand of Zionism led by the Likud and the religious parties. Importantly, it represented the ascendance of bloc politics over simple party politics with smaller parties lining up behind one of the two major parties (Labour and Likud) and to form potential coalition partners (Medding, 1990). The fact that Begin had a choice as to whether he wanted Dash Party in the coalition or not and this was a clear indication that the Likud-led-bloc had become the stronger of two.

This was compounded by the addition of Dayan to the Likud list and his presence in the government as Foreign Minister gave the Likud an additional seat in the Knesset while reducing the Alignment to 31 seats (Horowitz, 1990). The Alignment experienced its single largest loss of seats in any election, losing support on two fronts, first to Dash, in traditional Labour middle class strongholds and second, to the Likud Party, among the key interrelated groups of low-income groups, ethnic groups and the young. In the low-income areas of the major cities, the Likud Party had received nearly three times more votes of the Alignment and also performed much better than previously in the wealthy areas against the Alignment (Peretz, 1997). Part of this marked the Likud Party's improvement in the wealthy areas,

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[20] The moving away Religious party from the Labour party was historical moment in the history of Israel's Labour party. This smart exercise was being cited also, by the Peres' supporters, helped Likud to hold central power in Israel (Lochery, 1996).

which was caused by Dash Party was taking away some traditional Labour Party supporters (Caspi, Diskin & Gutmann, 1984)

Political Discourse and Palestine Issue Prior June War (1967)

Opinion in Israel was more-or less divided in 1948 over five major issues, namely, basic socio-economic doctrine, the place of religion in the state, communal problems, national and territorial claims of Zionism and the mode of relations that was to be maintained with the Arab population within and outside the state (Cohn-Sherbok & El-alami, 2003). The first issue that created division among different parties was the issue of the basic socio-economic doctrine to be adopted in free the state. It differentiated leftist parties from rightist parties. Within each group of parties, there were important differences of doctrine and practice on socio-economic issue. The Mapam followed dogmatic Marxism while the Mapai adhered to the pragmatic socialism. Herut was inclined to national managerialism while the progressives believed in free enterprise (Isaac, 1976).

The place of religion in the independent state of Israel was the second issue at debate. Religious motivation for the Zionism played only a marginal role in political Zionism. But the attachment to the land of Zion among the Jews was purely based on religion (Harakabi, 1988). All the major parties, except religious parties, were opposed to the establishment of a theocratic state while the religious parties vowed to strive towards making the state a theocratic one (Schocken, 1984).

The third issue that created division among political parties was related to communal problem. Even before the formation of the state, Sephardi, Yemenite and Central European Jews had set up separate political groups to advance their interests in the face of the ruling Ashkenazi and Eastern European Jews (Etzioni & Shapiro, 1977). Another issue that created political division in Israel was the definition of the national and territorial claims of Zionism. The Revisionist party and its underground military wing-Irgun claimed the whole of the Palestine and the West and East of Jordan as part of Israeli territory (Flapan, 1987). It was prepared to fight for their goal alone and outside the framework of the Zionist institution. This separatist stand was expected to create a civil war. Hence Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister in the provisional government, decided to order the shooting and sinking of the Irgun arms ship Altalena, a few weeks after the State came into existence (Barzohar, 1978).

The establishment of the state compelled the communists, Hashomer Hatzair and Herut to adapt themselves to the new facts. But they had their reservation on the definition of the national and territorial claims of the new state. The Communists for example, while accepting the fact of Israel's existence, continued to reject the underlying Zionist doctrine (Nahas, 1976). The party even ventured to advocate independence for Israel's Arabs but after a few years it shifted its emphasis to autonomy within Israel (M. Sachar, 1977). Mapam even before independence advocated a bi-national state. Although it failed, it was not ready to abandon the Arab population and became the guardian of the rights of the Arab minority and pressed for the easing of restrictions imposed on it on grounds of security. Herut always clamoured for a "Greater Israel" but limited its rhetoric after the creation of the state and submitted its armed forces to the authority of the state. However, it pressed for greater militancy in the country's relations with its neighbours.

The fifth issue of dispute among the major parties was the mode of relations that was to be maintained with the Arab population within and outside state (Khalidi, 2014). Mapam called for peaceful cooperation among Jews and Arabs within the Jewish state and in the region. It advocated the acceptance of an independent Palestinian state as set out in the UN Partition Resolution and was most sensitive to the problems of Jewish-Arab relations (Flapan, 1987). Herut, on the other hand, considered the strife between the Jews and the Arabs as a Darwinian struggle for survival between two ethnic groups which could only end in the complete triumph of one and the submission of the other. The party stood firmly for the struggle for the conquest of the whole of Palestine (Silver, 1984). Between these two extremes, Mapai occupied a middle ground and held the view that the Arab masses are to benefit from cooperation with the Jews. It believed that only strength and diplomacy would convince the Arabs to accept and make room for the Jews by their side (Etzioni, 1977).

Except for Mapam, the other Zionist parties showed only little interest in the Arab minority. Mapai as the ruling party and dominant political force had to cope with the reality of Arabs citizens of the Jewish state (M. Sachar, 1977). The other Zionist parties looked upon the Arab population merely as a ground for vote catching. Some Zionist parties like the General Zionists and the National Religious Party tried to create Arab lists following the example of Mapai. Even Menachem Begin's Herut movement did not refrain from trying to gain a foothold among the Arabs (Scholch, 1983).

During the pre-state period the existence of a separate Palestinian nationality was denounced by Ben-Gurion. He repeatedly stressed the notion that the legitimate national aspirations of the Arabs are taken care of outside Palestine. He stated "Eretz Israel belongs to the Hebrew nation and the Arabs living in it" (Wiemer, 1983, p, 18). After the establishment of the state of Israel, Mapai under Ben-Gurion changed its attitude towards the Arab population. The various commissions which toured Palestine in 1946 and 1947 were assured by Mapai leaders that the Arabs would be treated with equality in Israel. Ben-Gurion, the leader of Mapai stated that the Jews would have to treat the non-Jewish neighbours based on absolute equality, as if they were Jews. Moshe Sharett declared before the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry in 1946, "No privileges, no superiority of status and no special rights for the Jews of Palestine or for the Jewish religion or for any Jewish institution" (Ibid.18).

On 24 January 1952, the matters of the Arabs were discussed for the first time in Political Committee of Mapai. The approach of Mapai leadership towards the Arab minority showed two trends. The first trend sought to get rid of the Arabs in Israel one way or another. The second trend understood more clearly that the Arabs who had remained in Israel were there to stay and that their numbers could not be reduced (Kafkafi, 1998). The three years later the Suez Crises 1956 was an important and formative period in the evolution of Israel's policy towards the Arab world. For all the outward manifestation of unity in the face of the external threat, Israel's leaders were deeply divided among themselves on how best to safeguard the country's security. The nature of Israeli politics over the conflict was result of the Israel's internal struggle between the hawks and doves. The former was led by Ben-Gurion and the latter by Moshe Sharett.

Ben-Gurion maintained that Arabs were a cruel people fanatically bent on the destruction of the national aspirations of the Jews. He held the view that it was beyond the capacity of the Jews to overcome by peaceful means this inherent Arab hostility. He concluded that repeated and strong force could exhibit Israel's power and its invincibility would force the Arab countries to recognise her existence and sovereignty (Shlaim, 1980). Moshe Sharett, on the other hand, considered Arabs as a proud and sensitive people and not just as enemies. His attitude to them was characterised by empathy and firmness without rigidity. Since peace with the Arabs was possible, he advocated restraint in the use of military force. He attached considerable value to patient and imaginative diplomacy (Ibid.). Thus, Ben-Gurionism

expressed firmness and activism while Sharettism symbolised accommodation and negotiation (Flappan, 1987).

A clash developed between Ben-Gurion and Sharett over war against Egypt in collusion with France. This forced Ben-Gurion either to resign himself as the head of the government or to secure the resignation of Foreign Minister Sharett. It became evidently clear that they could not co-exist in the same government (Ram, 2005). By mid-June 1956 Sharett was forced to resign. Sharett's departure marked the final collapse of the moderate school of thought. It remained a matter of debate whether the conciliatory approach by Israel might have succeeded in breaking the chain of Arab-Israeli conflicts. But for sure, such a possibility was sealed by Sharett's departure (Lucas, 1945).

Between 1958 and 1967 period, Mapai Party adopted a more liberal approach to the Arab problem. On 5 August, 1959 Ben-Gurion announced that his government decided to ease some of the travel restrictions in the areas under military government. This declaration marked the beginning of a process which culminated in the abolition of the military government by Prime Minister Eshkol in November 1966. Mapai Secretariat discussed the overall policy towards the Arab minority again in 1960 following its earlier debates in 1952-53. In those discussions, the idea of driving the Arabs out of the country was not mentioned (Lewis, 2002). The existence of Arabs in the Jewish state was accepted as an accomplished fact. However, Ben-Gurion made it clear that the Arabs did not and would not enjoy equal rights in Israe1 (Wuemer, 1983).

In short, the government of Israel led by Mapai consciously or unconsciously tried to isolate the Arab population within the Israeli society. At no time had the government succeeded in defining any clear, long-term policy towards the Arab minority (Sachar, 1977). After the June War of 1967, Israel was in control of a massive and hostile Arab population. Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians underwent a great change after the War. Then onwards three factors decisively influenced the governmental policies and these were the idea of "the Greater Israel", "demographic dangers" and settlement and colonisation in the Occupied Territories (Shimshoni, 1982). The next chapter will examine the political outcome of June War, policies that were discussed by the Labour Party towards the Occupied Territories and how Party did deal with PLO?

Conclusions

This chapter dealt with the early developments of Israel, including political system, the Labour Party's role in system and its leaderships. Additionally, the Labour Party's strategies (strong leaderships, coalitions politics etc.), which helped party to hold political power for several decades and how Palestinian issue was being considered by the party and the defeat of the Labour Party in 1977 election also dealt. Overall the 1977 elections marked a decline of the Labour Party's dominance in Israeli politics. Reasons which led to the defeat of the Labour Party in the election, can be traced the 1960s as the start of the reversal of fortunes for the Party. Even the significance of the political consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and June and October War cannot be overlooked. The next chapter will discuss these issues.

The Labour Party saw its political fortunes temporarily from its conduct of the 1967 War, while its role in the 1973 War is generally observed as a sign of the end of the party's dominance. In some respects, it can be noted that the electoral system protected the Labour Party from an earlier decline, with its party list system and subsequent reliance on coalition government. Even in 1977, if the religious parties had decided to stay within the Labour-led-bloc there would have been the possibility of it forming a coalition with them and Dash Party. This could have happened even though it was no longer the largest list (Lochery, 1996).

Moreover, the Likud, with its 1965 merger of Herut and the Liberals, provided the electorate with an alternative party to the Labour, capable in the long run of building a winning coalition to govern the country. Although, the Likud's major electoral gains were made in the 1973 Knesset elections, the decision of the Labour Party to include it in the 1967 NUG, contributed to the Likud with a sense of political legitimacy, which previously had been denied to the party many times. The rapprochement between the previously bitter enemies, Ben-Gurion and Begin, provided this newfound status of the Likud Party, as did the conquest of the territories in 1967, bringing with it, a realistic chance of building Greater Israel that was the central notion of the Likud ideology.

Additionally, corruptions and the Lavon Affair marked the start of this destruction as the previously relative homogenous nature of the Labour leadership was shattered. The political consequences of the Affair were one of the single most important factors in determining the inter-elite relations and the relationship between the party and its co-founder Ben-Gurion and

his followers up to its electoral defeat in 1977. Finally, the leadership had to understand their previous mistakes and that the party had suffered a major defeat in 1977 as the result of a process of long-term systematic decline.

Chapter Four:
Labour Party's perspective on the PLO before the first Intifada

T he previous chapter dealt with the Labour Party's domestic dimensions and domination in the political system and its evolution. There are two dimensions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: first, the international dimension which involved Israel as the nations in the region and external powers second, the domestic dimension which involves Israel, the PLO and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (OT). This chapter will examine the Labour Party's attitude and perspective vis-à-vis the PLO, how internal political dynamics had influenced the policy formulation towards the Occupied Territories from 1967 until the First Intifada. The chapter will briefly discuss the historical background of Israel's politics and Arab-Israeli conflict before 1967 and influence on the political environment in the aftermath of the June War. It also deals with the Labour Party's positions while in opposition and its role in the National Unity Government (NUG).

Israel's internal dynamics have played a very crucial role in the evolution of its foreign policy. It had a huge political debate regarding the Palestine issue. Even before the June War, many had observed the Palestine issue and the refugee problem were used primarily as propaganda tool by the Arab states in their struggles against Israel as well as with one another (Bar-On, 1996). For their part, the Palestinian issue was fight between those supporting the Hashemite regime and Nasserist Pan-Arab nationalism. In most international forums, the Palestine issue was debated more as a humanitarian issue of a refugee rather than as a political question involving their national rights and many Palestinian groups were often viewed more as pawns in the intra-Arab cold war (Elmamuwaldi, 2008). It can be said that before the 1967 War, the confrontation was just merely an Arab-Israeli conflict.

Moreover, the core confronting issue from 1967 and until the Oslo process was the Occupied Territories, moving away from its previously dealt issues of refugee and border. After the June War, "land" became the most significant issue not only in Israel's Knesset but also beyond the region. While sometimes, it has been the historical contestations of their religion, in other cases, the strategic significance and establishment of peace have been fundamental concern with the Palestine question (United Nation, 2007).

Peace was the fundamental goal to be achieved by policymakers but they faced multiple security problems. There were domestic political wavering, confronted approaches, clash of interest and political fight between the personalities within successive government and the domestic partisan contestation with Likud Party. It can be argued that because of this, the Labour Party's position on the Occupied Territories became inflexible and was nor succeeded adopting cohesive and long-term policy of Occupied Territories. In bringing a solution with neighbours, various schools of thought had been discussed within the Israeli polity, namely 'Jordanian Option', 'Allon Plan' 'Functional approach, and many more. Issue of survival and security have been as the key point in the Israeli policymaking. Security discourse is not part of the research and hence survival issue has been dominant since 1948. The next theme will discuss some of the political trends regarding the conflict after the formation of Israel.

Israel-Palestine Conflict before June War of 1967

The Zionist Movement culminated in the establishment of State of Israel and set the Arabs as adversaries of Israel. Subsequently, the military confrontation had erupted between two adversaries that are to be known as the Arab-Israeli conflict. There were several Arab-Israeli wars, which took place since the formation of Israel (1948 War, 1956 War, 1967 War and 1973 War). The Oslo agreement (1993) between Israel and the PLO was a significant breakthrough in the series of wars. In the aftermath Oslo agreement, Israel had fought to Hezbollah (2006) and Hamas (2006, 2008, 2014) occasionally (Kumaraswamy, 2015).

Between 29 November 1947, when the partition plan was approved by the United Nations and until 14 May 1948, series of armed clashes between Palestinians and Jewish forces occurred. However, the Palestinians demographically enjoyed an advantage with a population of 1.3 million while 650,000 Jews yet they were in an inferior position in terms of the military (Morris, 1999). The Jewish forces were well-equipped and the Palestinian forces were less organised and suffered with lack of unity. As a result, the Palestinians were defeated and had to leave their homes. In the huge numbers, Palestinians became refugees and more than hundreds Palestinian homes were demolished. This environment created tension, unrest and increased the public pressure in the Arab countries, which culminated in War between Israel and Arab nations.

In 1948 War, due to the imbalance of military forces between the two sides, Israel defeated the Arab allies (Shlaim, 2001). The victory was attributed to Israel's ability to deploy more

troops and procure weapons during the war as opposed to the Arab inability to acquire more weapons, fragmentation, lack of coordination and rivalry among their leaders (Ibid.). However, the Arab Legion or the Jordanian army was able to acquire most of the territories allocated to the Arabs according to the UN Partition Plan (L. Rogan & Shlaim, 2001). These territories were annexed by Jordan and were later known as the West Bank of Jordan.

The 1948 War formally ended after the signing of the Armistice agreements in 1949, which was mediated by the United Nations. Around 6,000 Jews were killed during the war and twice the number were injured (Morris, 1993). These figures were significant because the total number of Israelis at that time was about 650,000 Jewish citizens. Hence, those killed represented almost one per cent of the Jewish population. Israel benefited from the war and expanded its territory beyond the parameters were allocated to it under the Partition Plan. It occupied 2,500 square miles of more lands which, according to the Partition Plan, should have been part of the Arab states (Bar-On, 1996).

In the aftermath the war, Israel neither agreed to give the territories back to the Arab countries nor was willing to allow refugees to come back to their homes (ibid). The Arabs states continued to stick to these two demands in exchange for peace. As a result of these differing views, the conflict has taken the form of one what might term as a zero-sum struggle. It should be noted that after 1948 until the June War 1967, Israel's foreign policy vis-a-vis its neighbours were affected by several issues that were enduring primarily the refugee problem, borders and statehood.

Since the formation of the state of Israel, the reactive behaviour of its foreign policy was based on struggle for survival. Israel is a small country surrounded by implacable adversaries who wanted its complete demise. The reactive character of its foreign policy was not just its choice but rather the result of the hostile regional circumstances (Shlaim & Yaniv, 1980). Among these Wars, the June War (1967) was a watershed event in the history of conflict. The War had fundamentally altered the political landscape for the Israelis, Palestinians and others. The outcome of the June War was left huge territory under the Israeli control. Since then, the problem of Occupied Territories had always been at the centre point not just in Israel's political discourse but also the fundamental discussing issue for the Palestinian political leadership.

These three core issues, namely border, Jerusalem and the refugee problem remained the primary source of friction and provoked military clashes between Israel and its neighbours before the June War (Morris, 1993). However, at this point of time, neither Palestine nor the PLO was at the centre of Israel's policy-making debate. Jordan, on behalf of Palestine, was the only country that the Israeli leaders viewed as a potential partner for peace. Hence, some attention on Jordan in the following section would help a better understanding of the Labour Party's attitudes towards the Palestine question and the peace process. Peace is the central requirement in Arab-Israeli conflict in general and Palestine in particular; for instance, land, refugees, statehood, settlements or talks with the PLO are the issues which have been debating internally and externally on the question "how" to solve the problem and bring peace.

It is a never-ending affirmation of the Israelis side that tranquillity in the region has been a central aim of Zionism. Israel indeed was trying to seek peace with its neighbours since 1948. However, the peace did not appear absolute form in this sketch of history. The reason is quite simple, namely, the Arabs were not bringing moderation in their intransigent position towards Israel and vice versa and Israel was not ready to compromise with its security (Slater, 1991). Scholars termed New Historians, mainly comprising of Benny Morris, Ilan Pappe, Avi Shlaim, and Simha Flapan (Shlaim, 2015 & Ottman, 2008) challenged the official account of the 1948 War. Drawing on Israeli archives, these scholars challenged and contested the standard Zionist narrative of the 1948 War and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees. For instance Israeli leaders in the 1950s, especially Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, were not keen to establish peace because this would put an end to the conflict with the Arab states and a solution that would mean that Israel could not increase its lands in the perspective (Shlaim, 1988).

According to the New Historians, Israel was seeking security through expansion. Avi Shlaim reinforces his argument by presenting the example of Israel's rejection of peace with the Arabs and pointed out that in 1949, Syria's Husni Za'im (a military man and politician) proposed the settlement of 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, especially in exchange for a peace treaty with Israel but this offer was rejected by Ben-Gurion (Shlaim, 1986). Za'im even proposed a meeting with Ben-Gurion to discuss a solution, but the latter's response was negative. This response, according to Shlaim, showed the Ben-Gurion's characteristic that he had a general preference for force over diplomacy as a means of sorting out confrontation

between Israel and the Arabs. Unlike him, former Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett (1948-56), believed that peace was vital and that Israel would lose if the conflict were to remain unsettled (Ibid.69).

However, Ben-Gurion was a central figure in the Mapai Party during the first two decades of Israel's establishment. The internal politics and personality politics have been playing a significant role in the formation of the Israeli policy toward the neighbouring Arab states. Israel's behaviour in this period, in many ways, was the result of internal debates and disputes between two alternative approaches within Mapai Party. Two schools of thought were visible within Mapai Party. "Activist", this was the first school of thought that means (*bit'honistim*, the security-minded one) and the second was the "Moderate". The main supporters of the first approach within Mapai Party were Ben-Gurion, Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan[21] (Kuperman, 2001).

As far as 'Activist' stand was concerned they considered that the Arabs were predominantly keen or willing in the principle of Israel's destruction. Therefore, it was believed that Israel was destined to live in such an endangered environment where neighbouring countries posed a permanent hostility. This left little choice to remain passive but to rely highly on raw military power for its survival. Ben-Gurion summarised this position when he said shortly after the 1948 War:

> If I were an Arab leader, I would never accept the existence of Israel. This is only natural. We took their land. True, God promised it to us, but what does it matter to them? There was anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was it their fault? They only see one thing: we came and took their land. They may forget in a generation or two, but for the time being there is no choice (Quoted in Mark Heller, 2000, p.10).

Moreover, the Activist approach believed that the Arabs could not understand the language of co-existence and hence the language of force became more viable for Israel's survival and it had to show the ability to deploy force effectively (Morris, 1993). According to Benny Morris (1993) "proponents of this school believed that solution could come only when the Arabs clearly understood that militarily Israel could not be defeated" (quoted in Al-Barari, 2004:10).

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[21]Moshe Dayan was a close ally to Ben-Gurion and a chief of staff from 1953-57. He was known for his hawkish stance. He assumed the defence portfolio during the period between 1967 and 1974 and became the Foreign Minister from 1977 until 1980.

The second position was the 'Moderate', and this was associated with Sharett who was the Prime Minister during 1954-55 and served for a short time under Ben-Gurion's as Foreign Minister during 1955-56. His resignation from the government on 18 June 1956 came as a result of the incompatibility of his moderate views and policies with that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. He stated, during his tenure in the capacity of both as a Foreign Minister and Prime Minister in the 1950s, that 'moderation' was better or more critical attitude than retaliation. He emphasised that Israel should control its military responses because the retaliation would neither bring peace nor solve its security problems (Shlaim, 1996). It should be noted that security was not just an issue of territory, but also there was, to the Israeli mind, a problem of infiltration. These consisted Arab actions, such as returning to their villages to retrieve possessions left behind at the time of expulsion (1947-48) and the acts of revenge could be the reason (Morris, 1993). These actions were indeed carried out by Palestinian refugees and made by non-state actors although this was perhaps a low-level threat to the Israeli security, but yes, it constituted yet another threat to the Israeli State.

The narrative of 'Moderates' approach, in fact, were not indeed against using force against neighbouring states instead favoured a more selective and controlled policy (using force assuming its political implications). They were seen conceivably more sensitive to the world opinions and the Arab feelings. The proponents of the moderate approach argued that to create a climate conducive for reconciliation, Israel should not rely on the use of force only. The military act increased the Arab hatred and their frustration, which would destroy any prospect of rapprochement between them (Shlaim, 2000).

However, distinctions between two schools of thoughts were tactical and not strategic. The fundamental reason for contention between these two narratives was over, in terms of, how solve the problem of infiltration. It is probably worth noting that all the Israelis had difference over the two types of security. The first one was called basic security, which threatened the very existence of the state. The second one was the day-to-day security, which was also called personal security of Israelis (Khalidi, 1992). Day-to-day security had not indeed appeared to pose a deliberate threat to the existence of the state of Israel but increasing provocations and border incursions with aim to destabilise the society (Morris, 1999). The Labour Party's 'Activist' school of thought, due to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's dominant and decisive personality, was effective during the first two decades of Israel's history. Indeed, his narrative was so substantial, which had provided the core of the Israeli national security

concept. His narrative about security comprehensively dominated the political scene even after his resignation in 1963. It produced what has been called 'the Ben-Gurion complex' and attempts which were made other leaders based on their speculations about what the 'old man' (Ben-Gurion) would say or pursue (Heller, 2000).

It should be noted that if one makes an overall conclusion of Israel's attitudes towards its neighbours in general, and Palestine particular before the June War, it can be viewed that from the very inception of the state it was as a zero-sum game. It was driven by its quest not just for security but also for expansion. Israel's unwillingness to concede land and repatriate the refugees coupled with its dissatisfaction with its eastern border with Jordan characterised its approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestine issue was not as significant as it was after the June War (Kuperman, 2001).

However, the June War changed Israel's strategic environment and more importantly gave primacy to the domestic variables. As it would be examining below, the defeat of neighbouring countries led to two important outcomes that significantly increased the domestic input in its foreign policy. First, it created internal challenges to the Ben-Gurion's thought or conception of national security. Secondly, and more importantly, Ben-Gurion's notion of *mamlachtiut* a term that focuses on Ben-Gurion's emphasis on the importance of the state over other possible bases of identities, which were challenged (Cohen, 1992).

The territories which have been occupied by Israel in the June War, namely Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights and Gaza Strip and the West Bank including east Jerusalem, caused the prospering of an ethnonationalism that is, forces that did not consider territories as a mode to accomplish security but as an end in itself. Therefore, they constituted an ideological difficulty or challenge to the conventional concept of security (Heller, 2000). A decade later, the Labour Party lost the 1977 Knesset election because of the ideological challenge. The Zionist right wingers believe that Israel has a claim on the West Bank based on history and religion rather than on the state-based concept of security, where land is merely a significant component of security (Shibly, 1996).

Therefore, it can be said that the June War granted a degree of ideological legitimacy to the Revisionist (the Likud Party) especially in the form of 'Greater Israel' for their agenda. The Labour Party, unlike the Likud, was deeply divided over the status of the Occupied

Territories, with no coherent degree of unity formed among the party over the issue. This, however, is not the case with the Israeli Right.

June War (1967) and its Implications

Due to national survival, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack on the Arab allies in June 1967. There were several regional factors, which led to the Israeli decision to go for war. The perpetuated border skirmishes with Syria, clashes with Jordan over water rights, and the geographical proximity of Israeli cities to Arab heavy weaponry were the major factors. These factors contributed to immense pressure on the Israeli leadership to act or do something before the Arabs could unify their military power and 'move the Israelis into the sea' (Sela, 1999). On 5 June 1967, Israel air strikes launched and war with Syria, Egypt and later with Jordan began.

Israel achieved success in every stages of the war, from the preliminary air strikes to the campaigns in the West Bank, Sinai, and Syria, All the stages, Israel was seen succeeding in the war that even astonished the Israelis (Smith, 2004). On 10 June, Israel captured three times its own size, namely control of the Gaza Strip, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Syria's Golan Heights. Consequently, it can be said that the outcome of the June War radically changed the Armistice Map of 1949. Israel had to govern more than one million Arab Palestinians, who came under its control. The ascendancy in the holy city of Jerusalem, strategic grounds of the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and all the Sinai Peninsula up to the eastern banks of the Suez Canal (Sela, 1999).

The outcome of the war became a propellant for future conflicts and reshaped the political contours of the entire West Asia. The War brought not only enormous changes in Israel's politics but also sparked political change in the Palestinian politics.

One of the most significant outcomes of the war, especially in terms of the present research, was its contribution to the disruption of Palestinian faith and dependency on their Arab neighbours. In the aftermath, it became an active catalyst in the triggering off distinct Palestinian Nationalism and weaken the Palestinian believes in the Arab leadership (Lenczowski, 1985). Not only were the Arab states unsuccessful in liberating the Palestinian people and in establishing the Palestinian state as they pledged, but they also lost additional territories to Israel (Cleveland, 2004). There was the Palestinian opinion that the Zionists not

only adopted illegal measures when Israel was established but made the situation worse with the additional occupation of Arab lands following the June War (Tessler, 1994).

This provided a favourable moment for the Palestinian leadership, who did not feel beholden to abide by the timelines and strategic aim of the Arab states while wanted to play a more notable role in the Palestinian affairs (Aron D., 1988). They remained no longer obliged to the Arab states. The Palestinians could now emphasise on their struggle against Israel by themselves with lesser involvement of the Arab states. The June War had created the weaknesses in the Arab-Palestinian relationship and had undergone various changes. Importantly, the war escalated tensions between the Palestinian national movement and the Arab states (Lenczowski, 1985). It showed the rudimentary division between the Arabs who were showing enthusiasm to negotiate with Israel over the Palestine issue and bring peace between them and the other side those who were not inclined to negotiate the Israel. They were emphasising that the Palestinians would form their own independent homeland (Elmamuwaldi, 2008). These differences among Arabs over the same issue provided a platform to the local Palestinian group. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was the major party and a viable national political entity (Cleveland, 2004).

Israel celebrated the victory of June War many of the Israeli considered that the victory of Israel's Western allies over the Arab states had supported Communist regime. It had built the line of profound strengthening of American-Israeli relationship and consolidated Israel's bonding with the West. Israel had become desirable strategic friend/partner of US in the West Asia. Later, Israel received various kind of support from the US namely militarily, economic aid and support in the international forum.

The June War had created a kind of environment that had changed the contour of Israel-Palestine dispute and provided fuel for future dispute and reshaped the conflict which is still not solved (Smith, 2004). The War had pushed Israel to create new set of rules, which to deal with the Palestinian particularly Occupied Territories and the residual national security concern (Olmert, 1983). It also provided an opportunity to them willing to expand the land of Palestine and build settlements complete the Revisionist dream 'Greater Israel' (Sela, 1999). Before the June War, the Likud Party was not as significant as after the War in the Israeli political history. It was performed very poorly in the all the Knesset election before the 1967 War.

In the aftermath of war, the right-wing ideology roused up from the ashes and was a significant political force in the policy making concerning the Occupied Territories (Peleg, 1998). Increasing crises over the post-war situation brought right wing into the national spotlight and series of political manoeuvres were served by the Menachem Begin to enhance the Herut's influence (Ibid.). The right wingers had an inflexible and unwavering faith in the destiny of Israel to Eretz Israel. They believed in Israel's territorial integrity and left no room for compromise with Arab countries over the Occupied Territories. These stark differences in Israel's politics can be seen with Labour Party advocated to bargain land for security as seen in the Allon Plan 'land for peace'. Subsequently, regarding the return of Occupied Territories, the internal polarisation of the Israeli society had started. It was gradually becoming the existential threat to Israel's security. Moreover, it facilitated the re-emergence of underlying political division (Bregmam, 2010). These competing thought processing in Israel's political nature shaped the debate on the Occupied Territories. Following theme in the chapter will draw focus on the debate on Occupied Territories.

Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)

In 1964, the PLO was formed as an attempt to channelize the Palestinian nationalism while shaping to champion their cause. Its 1964 charter considered 'partition of Palestine' and 'creation' of Israel was illegal and not accepted (Livingstone & Halevy, 1990 and Dowty, 2008). The PLO and its militant wing, the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) have been violently opposing the Israeli existence and occupation. After the June War, the PLO's position became rigid and uncompromising regarding recognition of Israel and towards the demands made by the international community. Hence, uncompromising and rigid attitude of the PLO led the peace brokers' decision not to include the PLO in any negotiations process in the West Asia until the Oslo agreement. The PLO was kept out from key negotiations especially the Camp David Accord (1978) (Lenczowski, 1999).

In the immediate aftermath of the June War, various Palestinian guerrilla organisations were become more active against the Israeli occupation and settlement policy. Al-Fatah was the most leading and successful organisation led by Yasser Arafat (Cleveland, 2004). Arafat's rise from the head of al-Fatah organisation to the leadership of the PLO can be attributed to the war. He achieved importance as a Palestinian leader when Israel strived to direct strikes on an al-Fatah training camp in Karama at Jordan on 21 March 1968. IDF suffered heavy losses from Arafat's forces in the clash (Elmamuwaldi, 2008 and Siklawi, 2017).

The rise of the PLO as a political and militant organisation was because of the defeat and failure of the Arab states in the 1967 June War (Tessler, 2004). One of those lasting influences was Arafat took over the leadership of the PLO, an individual who for the next four decades chartered the course of the PLO, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the larger Palestinians (Sela, 1999). Another was the confrontation that took place between Israel and its Arab neighbours attributed to the activities of Palestinian guerrilla organisations who were determined to bring political change through violence (Miller, 1988). The lack of a strong governing body in the Occupied Territories favoured the PLO in acquiring the characteristics of a Palestinian government. The PLO assumed various governmental onuses such as social services including the management of schools and hospitals in the Occupied Territories (Cleveland, 2004).

At the time of the Lebanese Civil War which begun in 1975, the PLO became a major party to the conflict. In the following years, especially in 1982, Israel launched attack on Lebanon. The purpose of the attack was to remove the PLO base from the Lebanon. Subsequently, Israel succeeded to throw out the PLO leadership base from the Lebanon. Later, PLO had resettled its headquarter to Tunisia. It is significant to note that the PLO leadership remained in exile until 1993 and emphasised on enhancing Palestinian goals, especially from the outside through international diplomatic and military activities. However, the PLO was advancing its goal by the local Palestinians who were residing in the Occupied Territories. They had often faced rather different issues with the Occupied Territories. In the development the Palestinian society continued to grow up as political and governing institutions in the 1980s (Sela, 1999). However, the Palestinian's internal political growth was gradually progressing despite surviving under the restrictions placed by the Israeli government.

Even, the disillusionment about the status quo within Israel was viable and created an unrest and frustration among the Palestinians (Tessler, 2004). Later, the illusion about the 'status quo', Palestinian frustration and unrest culminated to the first spontaneous uprising against Israeli occupation. That is called the First Palestinian Intifada. During the Intifada, although most Palestinians people from 'inside' had always been the supporters of the PLO, came out in the street and protested for certain independence from the PLO leadership in Tunis.

Since the establishment of the PLO and until the Oslo accords, the Labour Party's attitude towards it was 'not to negotiate with the PLO'. The party claimed that it was nothing but a

terrorist organisation and focused more on dealing only with Jordan or other Arab states. Party was even not in favour of the establishment of a Palestinian state, stressing that Palestinians should be incorporated with existing Arab states. The abandonment of this intransigence attitude led to the Israeli representatives entering secret negotiations with the PLO, which later led to the Oslo process. The following theme will examine the attitudes of some of the Labour Party leaders, namely Yigal Allon, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin towards the PLO. Each of these leaderships held one or more of the three important portfolios in the country, namely, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Defence Minister of Israel.

The Labour Party and the PLO

Allon, Peres and Rabin have made yeoman contribution and had played a significant role in Israel's politics while serving as Labour Party's leaders and shaped the party's approach towards the Palestine question. The period from 1974 to 1977 was a unique one for the Labour Party when they had worked together holding powerful portfolios and was the leading trio in the political system. Allon held the portfolio of Deputy Prime Minister (1967-74) and held various ministerial roles, including Foreign Affairs, Education, and Absorption Minister. He was also a chairman of some important cabinet committees as well namely, Settlement Policy, Knesset subcommittee for South Lebanese Affairs and Jerusalem Affairs (Yehuda Agid-Ben & Auerbach, 1991). Peres was Defence Minister from 1974 to 1977 and more interestingly, he was a professed follower of Ben-Gurion and was a member of Knesset until 1969 especially when the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories came under his direct authority (Ben-Yehuda, 1991).

As far as Rabin was concerned, throughout his political and military career, he had strenuously endeavoured defining and protecting Israeli security as well as with constructing and implementing his foreign and defence policies. He was leading the IDF during June War and its exploits. On 1 January 1968, Rabin took retirement from the army and moved to the US as Israel's Ambassador, where he spent next five years. After that he held various portfolios in Israel's political system in general and the Labour Party in particular, including Minister of Labour, Member of the Knesset, Minister of Defence and (twice) Prime Minister (twice) (Freedman, 1995).

For more than a decade, these leaders particularly Allon and Peres set forth and defined the guidelines of the Labour Party government's nature towards the Palestine question. Hemda

Agid-Ben Yehuda and Yehudit Auerbach (1991) have written some of the points about both the leaders had adopted towards Palestine issue in their article.

These consisted of the following:

1. Informal adoption of the Allon plan that was brought before Israel's government as early as July 1967, when most Israelis were still overwhelmed by the stunning 1967 June War victory. The plan called for a political settlement of the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, based on the following themes: Israel would not return to the 4 June 1967 borders; the Jordan River would be Israel's defence border; Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, would remain united; and a solution to the Palestinian problem would be found as part of a peace agreement with Jordan. This plan was never officially adopted by Israel's government, although it has never been rejected either. Moreover, it shaped, to a great extent, Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the years from 1967 to 1977 (Yehuda & Aurebech, 1991:521).

2. Acceptance of UN Security Resolution 242 as applying to all three fronts that are, to Israel's borders with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. This resolution, accepted by the major participants in the conflict, was presented by the Labour government as the basis of diplomatic processes aimed at peace in the Middle East.

3. Establishment of de facto peace with Jordan. Throughout the period under inquiry, the Hashemite regime was actively involved in West Bank developments, cooperated with Israel's 'Open Bridges' policy, and played an active role in the commercial-agricultural interaction among the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel, and Jordan.

4. "Implementing an administration of the territories which minimized Israeli involvement in the internal affairs of the Palestinians, while maintaining security in the area (Ibid.).

More specifically, Allon symbolised the merits of the Kibbutz Movement (Hakibbutz Hameuchad), political activism (Achdut Ha'avodah) and non-traditionalist attitudes towards the military and security issues of the Palmach.[22] These values have become visible as the underpinning themes that escorted his political attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and outlined his views vis-a-vis the Palestinian question in particular. On the other hand, Peres advocated the Labour Party's plan for a territorial compromise. He, along with Dayan, upheld a different proposal, namely, functional compromise in either a federal or confederal framework (Rynhold, 2001).

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[22] Palmach (Plugot Mahatz) was unit of the Haganah, especially the elite one, established in 1941 shortly it was disintegrated in 1949 when it amalgamated into the Israeli Defense Force.

Allon regarded the Palestinian question as part of the on-going tussle between Israel and the Arab states rather than between Israel and the Palestinians. He acknowledged the Palestinians' national identity in the territories but has recognised them as an integral part of the Jordanian-Palestinian nation (Allon, 1976). The state of Jordan presented a satisfactory solution to most of the problems, leaving the remaining of the problem, as he often termed it, to be sorted out between Israel and Jordan only in the context of a peace process (Lukacs, 1997). He observed the connection between Jordan and the Palestinian people as complex and politically meaningful and this affiliation, according to him, should only produce the foundation for any solution to the Palestinian question (Allon, 1976).

Peres's concern towards the Palestinian question was that he had recognised it as a significant issue, which required a different approach. It should not be based on the military one. He viewed confrontation to Palestine was as an inter-state conflict. The separate identity of the Palestinian population has been observed by Peres in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and he recognised them as a specific section with ethnic and national aspects. He went as far as acknowledging the legitimacy of their national objective and ambitions (Freedman, 2009). However, this approach contributed distinction between territorial sovereignty and national self-expression. The self-determination is a rudimentary right to which any national group should be granted, but that should not inevitably relate to an independent state. The people are first and foremost human communities that should and could learn to live with harmony, peacefully and together. Their problems could be solved by civilised and peaceful method. Moreover, according to Peres, no contradiction persisted between the historical relationships of the Jews with Israel and the Palestinian relation to the territories and Jordan. The solution to the problems should be outlined on coexistence within a federal plan (Yehuda & Aurebech, 1991:526).

Peres considered the PLO as a militant organisation pursuing antagonistic and destructive goals. Peres thought that the PLO was willing to accomplish these goals through violent measures. It was not an authentic national liberation organisation. According to him neither it was a genuine, sincere and truthful organisation, nor could be the real representative of the people of the Palestinians (Ziv, 2007). The thoughts of Allon and Peres were quite similar, concerning the PLO. Both the personalities disagreed over the PLO's legitimacy. Allon considered that the PLO should not be a legitimate party in the dispute solving process, and

Peres also denied the PLO's claim to be an authentic National Liberation Movement (Weinberger, 2007).

Both the leaders showed their attitude which focused on the PLO's hostility, not authentic and genuine, while paying little attention to the hope of the Palestinian population. However, clear differentiation was made by both leaders between the former and the latter. The PLO was recognised as a cruel adversary who sought to dismantle the state of Israel and kill its people. The PLO's terrorist and devastating activities were recognised by Allon to the murderous character of its leadership, making decisions on the murder of innocent people as political tools (Rolef, 1997). In the same manner, Peres considered the killing nature of the PLO, which wanted to hold arguments with Katyusha shells, to destroy its opponents (Quoted in Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991).

Both leaders dismissed any positive sign of change regarding the PLO because as Peres observed, "it's Nazi specialities are inherent to its nature, not only to its behaviour" (Ibid.). Overall, both Allon and Peres portrayed the PLO as a venomous adversary whose purpose was to malign and remain aggressive towards Israel.

The notion of peace with the intentions of compromise affects the attitude and scheme of both political leaders. There are six ideological principals which were articulated by both the leaders. These principals are written by Agid-Ben Yehuda and Auerbach Hemda:

(1) "There is no possibility of negotiations between Israel and the PLO"

(2) "Independent Palestinian State cannot be possible"

(3) "United Jerusalem cannot be the part of any other country and would remain the capital Israel"

(4) "Israeli settlements would take place only in security regions"

(5) "Defensible borders are a prerequisite for withdrawal".

(6) "Safeguarding of the Jewish Democratic character of Israel" (Yehuda, 1995: 535).

These basic tenets were adopted and favoured by both the leaders, though not with the same enthusiasm or dedication (Flamhaft, 1996).

Allon's thought was relevance to the period prior to Oslo because its influence was visible in the behaviour of many members of Labour Party, most notably, Yitzhak Rabin. As aforementioned that he held a very prominent position in Israeli politics in general and Labour Party in particular. Regarding Rabin's attitude towards the PLO, there are seven prepositions were written by Hemda Ben-Yehuda (1997). She pointed out as: particularly the affective, cognitive and behavioural components anticipated in the conflict as spelling out decision makers tends to:

> Deny the adversary's claim to national identity. Deny the relationship between the adversary and the contested territory. Evaluate the adversary as strong in the short run but bound to lose over the long term. View the adversary as hostile, harbouring political and even genocide aspirations, and make no distinction between the adversary's aspirations and goals. Express hostility towards the adversary, and associate negative traits with it. Forward a self-centred ideology predominated by fundamental principles. Formulate a policy involving a zero-sum mode of conflict resolution and advocating the exclusive use of military means (Ben-Yehuda, 1997:203).

From June War to the Intifada Rabin supported and followed all above seven propositions vis-à-vis the PLO. So far, his approach towards the Palestinian population is concerned it was found to have moderated slightly. In the aftermath of the Intifada, changes gradually developed into the leaders' attitude regarding the PLO, which culminated to the Oslo Accord (chapter five will examine the changes that led to the non-recognition to the recognition attitudes).

Israeli Political Debate over the Occupied Territories

In the aftermath of the June War, Israel found itself in a profoundly different strategic environment. The consequences of the War changed the contour of conflict from a zero-sum to a mixed-motive one. After the war, the Occupied Territories have become the focus in the Arab-Israel-Palestine conflict in general and Israel's domestic politics, in particular (Abdulmuhdi, 2000). A divisive debate had brought in Israel over the disposition of Occupied Territories. Particularly the public debate revolved around the attainability of peace and the future borders of Israel in case of peace and centred on the political future of the Occupied Territories. After June War, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol declared that Israel would not return any of the Arab territories occupied until the Arabs were ready to negotiate directly with Israel a formal peace treaty incorporating secure and recognised boundaries. This stand which

was adopted as the basis for the Israeli diplomacy for the next six years simply stated Israel's maximalist demands for perfect peace and perfect security (Shlaim & Yaniv, 1980).

Some political scientists described the impacts of the June War in various manners. The new geopolitical and strategic situations created by the war led to what Harbert C. Kelman (2007) called 'Palestinisation' of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Once again, the Palestinian question returned to the centre of the political agenda. During 1949-67, the Palestine question was mostly in the hands of the Arab states. After the war, new attitude gradually evolved in both the leaderships regarding the necessity and possibility of negotiation based on mutual recognition which eventually formed the building stones of the 1993 Oslo Accord.

Brecher, Sharkansky and Arian have argued that not only the Labour Party but the Israeli state had gone through a changing phase, covering the political, cultural and demographic changes. This transitional phase aggregated in a shift in the opinions and the political power to the Right, which resulted in a more profound fragmentation of the polity (quoted in B. Oren, 2000: 145). Peter Medding (1990) stated that the history of Israel should be divided into two periods, that is, before and after the June War. Yonathan Shapiro (1977) refers to the period after the June War as the changing phase from the founding generation to the 1948 generation. All the observations mentioned above, which were summed up by various political scientists, have shown the profundity of the War that comprehensively left its influence in several manners.

The manner of the Arabs defeat in the June War had a detrimental influence on the State of Israel. Some of the Israeli public and parties, especially religious ones, carried a perception that the Occupied Territories were the liberated ones and this 'Liberation' of biblical Israel was considered messianic and prophetic proportions. The immigration and investment became larger and followed a huge level of nationalistic and religious fervour that spread throughout the state giving signs of the revival of a new form of Zionism, namely, Religious Zionism or New Zionism (Segev, 2008).

The victory of June War, especially the occupation, triggered to the fore a territorial discourse in the discussion not visible since the partition era. This territorial discourse revealed a growing disagreement between the public perceptions about the Occupied Territories and the Labour Party's foreign policy (Seliktar, 1986). Ian Lustick (1993) stresses these disagreements as the collapse of the Green Line as a Hegemonic Conception. The public was

immensely backing the thought of retaining most, if not all, of the territories (Sella & Yishai, 1986). The change in the public views and the incapability of the Labour Party to respond meant that interest groups took it upon themselves to influence the foreign policy. Several definitions have been portrayed which showed the deep implication of the June War on Israel. The formation of the policy towards the Occupied Territories and making peace with the neighbours especially were driven by Israel's domestic political dynamics and came as a result of the clashing perspectives and competition between personalities within successive governments (Aronoff, 2014).

As mentioned earlier, the importance of Ben-Gurion and the impact of the internal input in Israel's foreign policy became acute during and following the June War. A few days before the outbreak of the war, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol responded to intense public, as well as army demands, with the appointment of Moshe Dayan as Defence Minister and formed a National Unity Government (NUG) (Brecher, 1974). As expected, Dayan who was the leader of the Rafi Party got the defence portfolio. Menachem Begin, the leader of Gahal Party, a man particularly known for his hawkish stance concerning the Occupied Territories, was appointed as a minister without portfolio. The formation of the NUG, although completed under excessive domestic pressure, was meant to provide Israel with effective leadership at a time of crisis. As a result, there was no bargaining or agreement among the coalition members over domestic or foreign policies (Kieval, 1983).

After the June War, the main motive of Eshkol and indeed Golda Meir, who succeeded him as Prime Minister in February 1969, was to retain the national unity strong. This goal made it impossible for the government to officially and publicly offer Jordan as plan for a territorial compromise. This Israeli deadlock was a result of several factors, not the least of which was the ideological affinity that some factions of the government, the Gahal bloc especially, had and still maintained towards the West Bank of Jordan (Medding, 1973).

Thus, the Prime Minister's responsibility was to maintain the balance between the confronting opinions and personalities within the government. In maintaining the national unity government, the Labour Party was not in the position to adopt a clear policy towards the newly captured territories. Successive Labour Party-led governments favoured the status quo rather than adopting for coherent and decisive policy. It happened because of it might lead to the decline of the government, the fear about the fragmentation of the Labour Party, and the losing its dominance in the Israeli politics (Medzini, 2008). It indeed is essential to

examine how the territorial issue proved to be the most divisive in Israeli politics after the June War.

The territory that comes under its occupation put Israel in a strong bargaining position as the Arab states and Palestinian issue was not the main consideration. The newly conquered territories had given Israel the potential to offer the land back to the Arab countries in exchange for peace especially it was 'land for peace' for doves. Hence, on 19 June 1967, the Israel government had adopted a dramatic decision when it called for the return of Sinai to Egypt with a special arrangement of Sharm al-Sheikh, and the return of the Golan Heights to Syria, in exchange for peace (Shlaim, 1980). This decision did not, however, include Jordan, the West Bank or even Gaza Strip. The decision became irrelevant when the Arab leaders, who met in Khartoum Summit in September 1967, took the stand of "Three-Nos" namely, 'no to negotiations', 'no to recognition', and 'no peace with Israel'. The Khartoum Resolutions had a tremendous impact on "the delicate balance of forces in the (Israeli) government and public opinion" (Sella & Yishai, 1986:45).

It can be pointed out that before the "Three Nos" the government of Israel showed a more accommodating behaviour. On 19 June the cabinet agreed on a decision that was addressed in great secrecy to the US State Department for transmission to Arab governments, indicating Israel's willingness to sign peace treaties with Egypt and Syria based on the former international boundaries. But in August the cabinet revered its position and annulled the decision (Rabin, 1977). Thereafter, the Cabinet had no agreed position on the terms of a peace settlement. Dayan, who was Defence Minister at the time and one of the leading opponents of Israel taking the initiative in opening a peace dialogue, frankly admitted in October that the reason for the government's reluctance to state its position on peace proposals was that it had no policy in this regard (Reich, 1977).

Doves within the Israeli government, such as Foreign Minister Abba Eban, were disappointed because the Khartoum decision implied that the Arab leaders were not yet ready for direct negotiations with Israel. It signalled that, the dynamics of Israeli politics, the rejection might mean that the doves would be losing ground. The "Three Nos" decision did indeed weaken the dovish trend within the Israeli government and simultaneously strengthened the hawkish one, which argued for the retention of all the territories on security, historical, and religious basis. The latter referred to the claims by the Jews that Palestine is promised land and

therefore they have a fundamental right to establish their state overall of Palestine (Pappe, 1988).

The ascendance of religious parties, which saw Israel's victory in the 1967 War as the beginning of the redemption and the advent of the Messiah has been one of the factors that hindered the peace process and created obstacles for the Labour Party to adopt a coherent, decisive and long-term policy of Occupied Territories (Gerald, 1992). In the religious circles, the West Bank is the heart of the biblical lands and hence no government is authorised to concede it. Religion should not be underestimated as a factor in these territorial disputes (ibid.).

Because of this specific reason, most of the Israeli leaders were adamantly opposed to the withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, especially in the West Bank. For instance, the eastern border with Jordan was the main source of security concerns to various governments. Overall, the leaders believed that the eastern front of the border between Israel and Jordan— was by far the most dangerous to security. For Israel, the pre-1967 borders lacked a strategic or tactical depth and needed to assure its security. The complete width between the coastal areas and the green line, Israel's pre-1967 borders with Jordan, varies to less than ten to fifteen miles (Allon, 1976). Its size, according to Israeli governments, rendered it strategically vulnerable to a surprise attack from the east.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which was to become the basis for future peace-making efforts in West Asia, asked among other things that Israel to withdraw to secured and recognised borders (Ehud, 1993). This resolution came after the United States and the Soviet Union co-operated in the Security Council to pave the way for peace in the region. It is worth noting here that such external intervention was to increasingly become more significant after the June War for the Israel-Palestine conflict. Unlike the Arab states, which interpreted Resolution 242 to consider a total Israeli withdrawal from all Occupied Territories, Israeli governments interpreted it differently to mean withdrawal from some territories, not all territories (Hisham, 1970).

When in the spring of 1969, the Four Powers began informal negotiations to elaborate proposals for an Arab-Israeli settlements, the government of Golda Meir vehemently opposed such an exercise and explicitly stated that it would not even consider their recommendations (Brecher, 1974). Following the breakdown of the Four Power talks, the American

government brought the Rogers Plan in December 1969 and this ran into immediate and categorical Israeli opposition. The second Rogers Plan of June 1970, which, unlike the first, did not spell out the terms of a settlement, but merely proposed a ceasefire and the reactivation of the Jarring Mission (1969-70), nevertheless precipitated a major governmental crisis which was only resolved when the Gahal bloc led by Menachem Begin left the national unity government in protest against the cautious affirmative reply favoured by the majority (Ibid.). Later, however, when Egypt violated the standstill agreement, Israel responded by suspending its participation in the Jarring talks. To break the deadlock, Jarring sent a questionnaire asking Egypt for a declaration of readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel and asking Israel for a commitment to withdraw from Sinai in exchange. Set against the background of a generation-old refusal to recognise Israel's legitimacy, Egypt's positive response represented an important breakthrough in the conflict. Israel, however, charged Gunnar Jarring with exceeding the terms of his mission and stated bluntly that it would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines (United Nation Document, 1974). This negative reply sealed the fate of Jarring's mission.

Accordingly, successive Israeli cabinets understood that changes were to be introduced to the 1949 armistice lines to make the borders defensible. A strategic consensus developed in the wake of the June War that connected security and topography. For Israeli strategists, the territory was the crucial component of security (Ibid.). Allon argued that Israel should pull out to defensible borders to correct its strategic weakness. These are the following words which were advocated by Allon: "the purpose of defensible borders is, thus, to correct this [strategic] weakness, to provide Israel with the requisite minimal strategic depth, as well as lines which have strategic topographical significance. The successive Labour-led cabinet was not monolithic in their views especially concern to the scope of the expected withdrawal" (Allon, 1976:42).

In the wake of October War (1973) and the emergence of oil as an important political instrument, the Arab states recognised the PLO as the "sole and legitimate" representative of the Palestinian people. This was done despite the Jordanian claims to represent the Palestinians. Reflecting the prevailing understanding, the UN recognised and granted the observer status to the PLO in November 1974. The Security Council resolution 242 adopted after the June War described the Palestinian question basically as a 'refugee' problem but in the early 1970s, the political rights of the Palestinians took the centre stage (Inbar, 1991).

Before 1977, the Labour government was unable to adopt a clear policy about the future of the Occupied Territories. Apart from the Allon Plan—proposed in July 1967 by Yigal Allon concerning the Occupied Territories—no other plan was proposed, suggested or accepted by doves. The Allon Plan visualised establishing Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley, retaining a strategically vital strip along the River Jordan especially for security considerations, and conceding densely populated areas of the West Bank to Jordan in return for a peace treaty (Barian, 1977). It mentioned nothing about the occupied area of East Jerusalem, which had been captured and annexed after the June War. The rationale behind the Allon Plan was to control and annex territories without necessarily incorporating almost 600,000 Palestinians into Israel. Annexing all the West Bank and incorporating its population would have affected the very Jewishness of the State of Israel, as more Palestinians in Israel would have made it a bi-national state instead of a Jewish one. Though tacitly accepted by most of the Labour, the Allon Plan was never adopted formally by the government for fear of breaking up the National Unity Government (Touval, 1982).

However, the plan did act as a guideline for the settlement policy of the Labour governments before 1977. The plan envisaged co-operation with Jordan to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip through relinquishing parts of the West Bank, which would be incorporated into Jordan (A. Bill & Springborg, 1994). That was the essence of the 'Jordanian Option', which it envisioned would solve the Palestinian problem by partitioning the West Bank between Israel and Jordan. The 'Jordanian Option' later became the Labour Party's preferred policy to the Palestinian problem. Though on the whole the Labour Party preferred dealing with Jordan over the future of the West Bank, there were different views within it that prevented the advancement of this 'Jordanian Option'. The different views in the context of the debate within the Labour Party and indeed in Israel over the political future of the Occupied Territories had led to the emergence of dark line of doves and hawks that cut across party lines and this, in turn, caused the inability of successive Labour-led governments to build a workable consensus with regard to peace and policies towards Occupied Territories (Shlaim, 1980).

It can be described as the Labour Party's inability and unwillingness to take a clear and unequivocal stand on the issue of the Occupied Territories. The confronting thoughts, personal clashes among top leaders, and competition for assuming power within governments

made it complex to form clear policies towards Occupied Territories and thus caused a degree of what might be described as immobilism in the making of the Israeli policy (Ranta, 2015).

After June War, Prime Minister Eshkol was adamant that Israel would not abandon the land until the Arabs counterpart accepted the Israeli pre-conditions, namely that direct negotiations to arrive at a peace treaty that recognised Israel's secure borders (Shlaim, 1980). Eshkol realised that there was no need to take a decision and run the risk of splitting the party when there was no partner who was ready to accept Israel's conditions. Yossi Beilin (1985) stated that the Labour Party's inability to put forward a clear long-term policy was the price of unity. Avi Shlaim (1980) rightly argues that this formula, which served as the basis for the Israeli diplomacy from 1967 to 1973, simply stated Israel's maximalist demands for perfect peace and perfect security. It did not, however, represent a realistic strategy for initiating dialogue with its adversaries.

The governments' incapability to take decisions was also influenced by the battle over who would take Eshkol's position after his death as the leader of the Labour Party and Prime Minister. This was a disruptive battle between two prominent Labour members and Cabinet Ministers, namely Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon (Lukacs, 1997). Consequently, the '*status quo*' (a term used here to refer to Israeli indecision about the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) was a function of these factors.

Thus, to examine Israel's policy towards the Occupied Territories, one should examine the interplay of four main positions or school of thoughts which had been formulated by different parties and factions, which was represented within successive Israeli governments. These proposals were such as 'Reconciliationist', 'Functionalist', Territorialist, and Annexationist (Ranta, 2007 & Lukacs, 1997 & Al. Barari, 2004). Particularly the first three positions were represented by the three factions within the Labour Party (these factions were discussed in the previous chapter) and dominated the Israeli way of thinking on the West Bank, without any gaining ascendance among decision makers.

The 'Reconciliationist' school of thought advocated by Mapam Party constituted the return of the West Bank to Jordan with some small border alteration, which was the dovish one clustered around Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir and Foreign Minister Abba Eban. Hence, both the political leaders were from Mapai Party. This group argued that the retention of the populated Arab lands would be a catastrophe for Israel (J. Roberts, 1990). Advocates of this

approach were more concerned about the nature of the Jewish State. They employed both demographic and ethical arguments. They assumed that the long-term retention of the Occupied Territories would result in the flooding of the Israeli market by cheap Arab labours which in turn, would result to the evolution of the Jewish State into a colonial state or worse, the superior Arab birth-rate would eventually transform into an Arab majority (Ranta, 2007). Israel, according to this reasoning, would become a de facto bi-national state. In either case, Israel would cease to be a Jewish State. In sum up, the 'Reconciliationist' school of thought believes that giving up the Occupied Territories would be in Israel's best interest (Lukacs, 1997).

The second position was the 'Functionalist Approach'. This group was the most hawkish one within the Labour Party. It was expressed by Dayan, Peres and Rafi Party along with the members of Achdut Ha'avodah. They advocated for an Israeli military control over the West Bank with a joint Israeli-Jordanian administrative control. Dayan was highly pessimistic about the prospect of peace with the Palestinian and a solution for Occupied Territories (Ranta, 2007). Because of this, he stated for a 'Functionalist Approach' to the territories under occupation. This group downplayed the importance of the demographic argument by arguing that any such problem could be sorted out through enhancement of Jewish immigration or by the arrangements of Jordanian citizenship to the populations of the West Bank (J. Roberts, 1990).

This group promoted the idea of the integration of the West Bank into the Israeli economy. The point here was to raise living standards and to make the occupation more acceptable. Dayan, in his capacity as Defence Minister, announced the "Open Bridges" policy vis-à-vis the Occupied Territories, which was calibrated to serve as a "pressure release valve" by enabling the Palestinians in the West Bank to be in touch with their brethren in Jordan (Lukacs, 1997). The Rafi Party and Gahal parties had supported Dayan's policies on the West Bank in the Cabinet discussions. This approach was opposed by them who were holding the 'Reconcilationst Approach' particularly the Minister of Finance Sapir, who described Dayan's policies as "creeping annexation" (Aran, 2014).

The third position, which came between both the positions is called 'Territorialist' one expressed by the prominent spokesman Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, member of Achdut Ha'avodah Party. His thoughts tried to balance security needs and the requirement to keep the Jewish character of Israel (R. Kieval, 1983). The majority within Achdut Ha'avodah

supported Yigal Allon. Advocates of this school of thought contended that territory is a crucial component of security. They sketched out which land should be retained and which should be given to Jordan within the context of a peace settlement. The Allon Plan, which was never actually adopted as a party policy when the Labour Party was in power, was incorporated into the party platform in 1977. This Plan which envisioned a Jordanian role in the settlement of the Palestinian problem, however, became redundant in 1992 when the Labour Party won the general election and adopted a more 'Reconciliationist' view that stressed the centrality of the Palestinian option (Greenberg, 2000).

The fourth position was the 'Annexationist Approach'. It was as advocated by Menachem Begin, the leader of Gahal/Likud Party. This was anti-Jordan. Begin rejected the idea of negotiating with Jordan because, according to him, there was nothing to negotiate (Lukacs, 1997). Likud Party advocated the annexation of the West Bank into Israel with some form of a transitional period in which its residents' civil rights would be assessed and after which they might be able to acquire citizenship (Ranta, 2015). This party was driven by a revisionist Zionist ideology that deemed the West Bank of Jordan as an integral part of the biblical land. Begin supported Dayan's policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip because they did not preclude the option of annexing the territories later. Indeed, Begin's participation in the NUG was designed to prevent any concession to Jordan regarding the West Bank. A more extreme version of this school of thought adopted by Ariel Sharon, who was extremely anti-Jordan and believed that establishing a Palestinian state in Jordan, was the optimum solution to the Palestinian problem (Al-Barari, 2004).

Moshe Dayan and the other hard-liners were a minority within the Labour Party but they did hold disproportionate power vis-a-vis the majority moderates. Theoretically, Dayan and his supporters could withdraw from the government and join the opposition. This could have led to the fall of the government and might have provided a chance for Dayan to lead a Rafi-Gahal bloc. Had Dayan decided to leave the Labour Party, he with his brilliant military record coupled with his popularity among the Israeli public, could have greatly diminished the chances of Labour Party's electoral victory. The moderates had no potential partner to left and had feared losing power if Dayan decided to defect from the Party (R. Kieval, 1983). Indeed, what prevented Dayan from seceding from the Labour Party was his ambition to be a Labour Party's leader and Prime Minister of Israel (Al-Barari, 2000).

The Labour-led governments were vulnerable to Dayan's implicit threat to withdraw if his demands were not met. Two examples are sufficient in this regard. Before the 1969 Knesset election, the Labour Party adopted the 'Oral Law', which reflected Dayan's position over the future of the Occupied Territories. The 'Oral Law' was a statement on territorial aims. These aims were such as Jordan River as Israel's security border in the control of Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and Sharm al-Sheikh (R. Kieval, 1983).

During the 1973 election, the Labour Party was forced to adopt the 'Galili Document' in its electoral platform, which reflected Dayan's demands. It called for the development of the economy and infrastructures of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories; the growth of economic ties between the Palestinians in the territories and Israel; the encouragement of Jewish settlement and the development of rural and urban settlement in the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley, and the continuation of the open "Bridge Policy". These two instances illustrate that the idea of majority and minority within the Labour Party was, to some extent, irrelevant for decision-making. A hawkish minority was able to force a course of action against the wishes of the moderate majority within the Labour Party (Al-Barari, 2004).

Moreover, the situation was far more complicated than mere internal differences within the Labour Party. To account fully for Israel's policy preferences for the territorial '*status quo*' in the West Bank, one needs to understand the transformation of the historical partnership between the Labour Party and the National Religious Party (NRP, also known in Hebrew as Mafdal). First, the NRP had taken part in all Labour-led governments since the establishment of the state up to 1977. Before the June War, the NRP had focused on religious issues and had followed Mapai Party in all national security and foreign policy matters. Therefore, their partnership was maintained without serious trouble.

However, the occupation of the West Bank triggered a change within the NRP (Yishai, 1981). The NRP became more hawkish and increasingly sought to influence foreign policymaking. These new changes had jeopardised the sustainability of the historical partnership between the NRP and the Labour Party. The change in NRP's traditional position could be attributed to changes in the internal balance of forces (Arian, 1972).

The Youth[23] (younger generation with more hawkish inclinations) in the NRP, who were more concerned with the retention of the West Bank, became more influential. The veterans of the NRP feared that the Youth would take over if their party did not act to prevent any future Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank (Aronoff, 1989). Therefore, the leadership of the NRP, responding to pressures exerted by the Youth, linked their participation in the government to the retention of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This position coincided with the establishment of Gush Emunim in February 1974, initially as a pressure group within the NRP.[24] Suffice to indicate that Gush Emunim derived its ideology from the teachings to the late Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook who emphasised that the primary purpose of the Jewish people was to attain both the spiritual and the physical redemption by dwelling in and building up the land of Israel (Shahaka & Mezvinsky, 1999). That was the reason why this extra-parliamentary movement, Gush Emunim, focused on the issue of settlements (Avishai, 1990).

The Labour Party's leaders could not take the support of the NRP for granted if they decided to negotiate the peace settlement with Jordan. In 1974, for example the Central Committee of the NRP adopted a resolution that the party would oppose in both the cabinet and the Knesset if any withdrawal occurred from the West Bank (J. Roberts, 1990). It happened so, in the 1973 Knesset election, which came after the 1973 War, the NRP placed its participation in the government on conditional basis. NRP would take Prime Minister Meir's undertaking that her government would not enter negotiations over the West Bank. Meir, recognising the indispensability of the NRP in coalition formation, gave in (Al-Barari, 2004). Rabin had to provide the same pledge in 1974 when he became Prime Minister (Aronoff, 2009).

Therefore, Rabin was severely constrained by domestic political considerations. When he assumed the premiership, he faced several internal problems that prevented him from negotiating an interim agreement with Jordan. The opposition from Likud, NRP, and hawks within the Labour Party was very effective and strong over the concessions regarding the West Bank. Any concession to Jordan regarding the Palestinians could have alienated the NRP. Given the indispensability of the NRP to the government, Rabin dismissed any settlement with Jordan. In the aftermath of the 1973 War, despite Henry Kissinger's appeals that Israel should recognise Jericho for disengagement and reach an agreement with Jordan (Rabinovitch, 2017).

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[23] Many of the youth were studying, were taught by Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda
[24] Gush Emunim severed its links with the NRP several months after its establishment.

In addition, the Israeli negotiating team for an agreement with Jordan was made up of Prime Minister (Rabin) Foreign Minister (Yigal Allon) and Defence Minister (Shimon Peres), all of whom held different views on the negotiations. Peres, who represented the 'Functionalist Approach', argued that there was no urgency to conclude an agreement because Jordan and Israel had come to a tacit understanding to manage the West Bank affairs. He instead advocated the continuation of the status quo and claimed that Jordan and Israel could arrive at a peace treaty if the '*status quo*' seems untenable (Lukacs, 1997:130). Allon was the most dovish among them and represented the 'Territorialist Approach', which favoured an agreement with Jordan as mentioned above. To him, such an agreement would aid to prevent the Arab forces from amassing troops on the two sides of the River of Jordan and thus would prevent the possibility of war between Israel and its adversary (Ibid.). Rabin, who advocated an agreement with Egypt, ruled out to disengagement from the West Bank and wanted an Israeli military presence and offered Jordan only a civil administration in the West Bank. Rabin feared any concession to Jordan would strengthen the position of his arch-rival Peres (Al- Barari, 2004). As a result of these conflicting views and personal competition, the talks with Jordan ultimately failed.

In conclusion, it could be argued that Israel's policy especially the Labour Party was determined largely by internal political dynamics. Intra-party differences, personal rivalry within successive governments, and inter-parties conflicting dispositions were responsible for the immobilism in the making of a policy concerning the Palestinian question. Hence successive Labour-led governments were not able to take up clear decisions regarding the political future of the Occupied Territories. Such a course would have unsettled the internal balance within the Labour Party or even worse would have led to a split in the party. This would, in turn, have exacerbated the position of the Labour Party and reduce its chances to stay in the power. What made matters worse for successive Prime Ministers was the fact that the NRP (due to internal developments) changed its political agenda and threatened to withdraw from the government, should the latter agree to concede any part from the West Bank. Israeli decision-makers, constrained by domestic considerations, preferred the territorial status quo vis-à-vis the Occupied Territories (Aronson, 1990).

Those domestic forces on the right of the political spectrum that opposed any territorial compromise in the West Bank defeated the Labour Party in the 1977 Knesset Election. This event, in turn, had left a profound impact on Israel's policy towards the Palestine question.

The next section explores how domestic political changes after the 1977, impacted on its policy towards the Palestinian questions and the peace process.

Political Phase from 1977-84

As discussed in the previous chapter that the Knesset election held on 17 May 1977, which brought significant changes in the Israeli politics. For the first time in the history of the State, the Likud had won a national election. Menachem Begin, the leader of the Likud, became the Prime Minister and formed a right-of-centre government. Those familiar with the new premier's 'Revisionist ideology', argued that it was obvious that the prospects of peace were slim. Some even expected war, because the party's radical nationalist party which holds the ideology of 'Greater Israel' (Siman-Tov, 1994).

Begin was renowned for his revisionist Zionist ideology. Historically, Zionism has two main strands; the Labour Movement which adopted a decision to accept the UN partition plan of 1947 and the Revisionist Movement which rejected the plan. Ze'ev Jabotinsky called for the immediate establishment of Israel. Unlike the Labour Movement which still sought to establish Israel in gradualism and compromise. On another hand, the Revisionist movement believed that confrontation with Arabs was inevitable and ruled out a compromise with them. It even considered Occupied Territories to be an integral part of Eretz Yisrael (N. Goldstein, 2001).

Begin, a great believer in Jabotinsky's teachings, had a strong determination to the notion of Jewish historical right in Eretz Yisrael. According to him, the West Bank was "Judea and Samaria", which has been the heart of the biblical Land of Israel. Given that logic and force, it was not unnatural for him to reject both the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and the armistice agreement with Jordan concluded after the 1948 War (Peleg, 1988).

So far as Likud is concerned, it is crucial to outline its perception over the Occupied Territories. The party advocated policies that would consolidate Israel's grip over the Occupied Territories. Its participation in the NUG during 1967-70 was meant only to influence policy and to forestall any settlement with Jordan. Some circles in the Likud Party advocated the idea that "Jordan is Palestine". Among those who later became prominent figures in politics that advocated this idea, were Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Shamir, and Benjamin Netanyahu did not officially embrace it (Usher, 2005 & Bookmiller, 1997 & Shlaim, 1995).

In September 1970, during the Black September events in Jordan, one of them was a general in the army, namely Sharon, who advocated for the dethronement of the Hashemite reign and the setting up of a Palestinian state in Jordan itself. This, he envisaged, would change the dispute from one on the legitimate existence of Israel to one regarding borders (Sharon, 1989).

Yehuda Lukacs (1997) argues that "one of Sharon's unstated aims during his war against Lebanon in 1982 was to cause a mass exodus of Palestinians refugees into Jordan and thereby to put an end to the Hashemite regime" (Lukacs, 1997:158). Sharon's insistence that "Jordan is Palestine" was meant to justify Israel's annexation of the West Bank. Shamir made a similar point when he argued that: "The state known today as the Kingdom of Jordan is an integral part of what once was known as Palestine (77 per cent of the territory); its inhabitants, therefore, are Palestinian not different in their language, culture, or religious and demographic composition from other Palestinians ... It is merely an accident of history that this state is called the Kingdom of Jordan and not the Kingdom of Palestine" (Shamir, 1987: 23).

Indeed, the Revisionist ideology affected Likud's conception of security and peace, and this put Likud Party in stark contrast to the Labour Party. Both Likud and Labour gave preference to security and state survival over peace. They had different conceptions of security matters and herein lay the fundamental difference between their foreign policy outlooks. Whereas Likud was committed to an ideology that placed territory over any other value such as peace, Labour was a pragmatic party placed security over other values such as territory (Shlaim, 1995). Hence, for the Labour Party, security, which does not necessarily mean territory, is regarded as sacred whereas for Likud land is sacred.

Though, the national security was the dominant theme in the public debate on the future of the Occupied Territories. It was also a second major element in the debate concerned settling anywhere in the West Bank. The debate over what the state's boundaries should be? And what sort of society Israel should become? was the basis of deep debates within Zionism. Shlomo Avineri (1986) argues that there are two schools of thought concerning this point. The first school of thought was "sociological or societal" and is identified with the Labour Movement. The second school of thought was the "territorial school" and is identified with the Likud Party and its allies. This school was different from the 'Territorialist Approach' one advocated by Allon within Labour Party as aforementioned.

The Likud Party, which represented the territorial school, was now in power. It was driven by an ideology that led to an aggressive settlement policy towards the West Bank. This policy meant, among other things, to establish political facts that is settlements that would prevent future Labour-led governments from exchanging 'land-for-peace' with Jordan (Yorke, 1988). On the whole, Israelis believed that settlements were irreversible facts. This conviction is inherited from the pre-state period when the Yishuv's leaders thought that the settlements would shape the extent of the state's borders (Al-Barari, 2004).

Unlike the Labour governments, this built settlements in areas which were deemed necessary for the security of Israel. They believed that these settlements would be annexed. The Likud governments built settlements in every possible part in the West Bank to perpetuate the Israeli control (Efrat, 1988). During Likud's first term in office (1977-1981), forty-four new settlements were established. Thus, increasing the number of settlers in the West Bank from 5,000 to more than 16,000 (Yorke, 1988). During its second term in power, from 1981-1984, Likud accelerated the pace of settlements. By 1984, the total number of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was 114 and the number of settlers was around 30,000 (Yorke, 1988).

Therefore, 1977 was a turning point of Israel's policy. The triumph of the territorial school over the societal school at this time led to the internal shift in the Israeli society particularly towards the right. Subsequently, it made impossible for any attempt to construct a successful peace. As mentioned above, some argued that it was evident that the prospects of peace were slim. Some even expected war.

In contrast, before 1977 the major discussion within Israeli society and politics had been predominantly on socio-economic issues, but after 1977 it was largely on the issue of peace regarding Occupied Territories. The Camp David Accords (17 September 1978) and the subsequent signing of a formal peace treaty with Egypt transformed the political party landscape of Israel in several ways. The repercussion led to the creation of the radical right which included many ex-Likud members who did not accept the Camp David Accords, especially the evacuation of the Sinai settlements. Moreover, it threatened to split the Labour Party into those who were willing to return all of Sinai (including the air bases) and those who were unwilling of the same. Consequently, the Camp David Accords came to be the single most important divisive issue of the time for both the major political parties.

However, Israel under Likud did conclude a formal peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. It was signed between President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin. It was most unaccepted move. The peace with Egypt meant that Israel no longer faced the possibility of a two-front war, as had occurred during the 1973 War. The security of Israel was thus enhanced to an unprecedented level. With his decision to evacuate Sinai for peace with Egypt, Prime Minister Begin accepted UNSC Resolution 242 which he did not do upon Likud's victory in 1977. However, this acceptance to Resolution 242 came with a different interpretation. He argued that by evacuating Sinai, Israel fully implemented the resolution and he did not accept that Resolution 242 could apply on all fronts, namely, Syrian and Jordanian fronts (B. Quandt, 1988).

The Camp David Accord and the Labour Party

The Camp David talks were one of the many factors which subverted the performance of the Labour Party during this moment. Before the Camp David peace process, the Labour Party had launched strong personal attacks on the Begin government accusing him of slowing down the peace process rather than focusing on the economic condition where he failed to manage the economy. Inflation in November 1978 was running at an annual rate of 50 per cent. On 16 November, the Labour Party tabled an unsuccessful motion of no-confidence in the Knesset on this issue (T. Abed, 1986). There was widespread economic agitation resulted in a series of one-day strikes being organised by the Labour-controlled Histadrut Movement.

Additionally, the government suffered from a series of issues which involved public disputes and internal divisions. Even many in the Likud Party was observing the failures of the government at the time as the result of Begin's huge devotion to the peace process which took up most of his energies (Arian, 1985). Consequently, he permitted ministers to get on with their jobs and did not engage much central management of the government. The ministers were given too much freedom over the traditions of Cabinet collective responsibility (Lochery, 1997).

However, there was an important change of tactics by the Labour Party between the Camp David talks up to the signing of the treaty and its subsequent approval in the Knesset. The core cause for this was the Israeli tradition of uniting behind a government in times of crisis

or external pressure on security issues (Arian, 1993). Thus, the Labour Party was trying to hold itself from attacking the Likud during the Camp David negotiations to not weaken Begin's negotiating position. The restraint of the party at this time was confirmed by Moshe Shahal, the Head of the Labour Party faction in the Knesset, who agreed not to reconvene the Knesset during the summer recess to not weaken the Cabinet's position in the talks (Peleg, 1987).

A main tactical problem for the Labour Party at the moment was the unpredicted adaptability of Begin in the negotiations with Egypt following a period of inflexibility from the government (Beilin, 1985). This was compounded by the fact that Begin eventually delivered a significant peace treaty with Israel's potentially most dangerous Arab neighbour. The Labour Party's response to the Camp David Accords elucidated the problems the leadership experienced in opposition.

The central point was that the Labour leadership' helplessness to pacify criticism of the treaty with their self-perceived role as the dominant party. In short, the Labour Party's past meant that it could not oppose a peace treaty with Egypt, despite its strong reservations regarding Begin's conduct of the peace process and the decision to return all the Sinai. The Labour Party visibly felt that an Accord could have been reached at a much lower cost to Israel that is, without giving up the Sinai Airfields (Lochery, 1997). Many in the Likud believed that Sadat's price for peace was, in fact, lower than a complete return of all the Sinai (Roberts, 1990).

An additional challenge for the Labour leadership was the fact that it soon became specific that Begin was supposed to rely on its support to endorse the Accords in the Knesset. Moreover, Begin had successfully enlisted the support of Sharon in agreeing to dismantle of the settlements in the Sinai. During the subsequent discussion in the parliament, Peres articulated the challenges facing the Labour Party. He began by welcoming the Accords:

> I unhesitatingly congratulate the Government and the Israeli Prime Minister on the difficult and awesome, but vital decision they have made to march towards peace in return for a price that seemed impossible for the present Government, to free themselves from their commitments, conventions and ideology, and progress towards a new direction in the history of the Middle East (quoted in Lochery, 1996: 97).

However, Peres moved on to catalogue what the Labour Party observed as a completely insufficient presentation of the government during the negotiations and its inability to retain some Israeli control of the Sinai:

> We have paid a heavy price for these mistakes. Chairman, this Cabinet conceded all of the Sinai on one clear Jerusalem evening. Afterwards, it held negotiations, characterised by regrets, but it did not help. In conceding the Sinai, the Cabinet shattered Israel's credibility. We stood on a defensible border with settlements and airfields ... We have returned to 1967 borders and have given up this defensible border (Ibid.97).

Peres's explained that the party was responsible towards the people and argued that had the Likud been in opposition, their response would not have been so.

The major intra-party issue for the Labour Party came out over the Camp David accords. It reopened old wounds in the party between the two thoughts, hawks and doves, especially over the issues of the dismantling of the Sinai airfields and the evacuation of the settlements. On 27 September 1978, the Accords were eventually approved in the Knesset by a vote of 84 in favour to 19 against; those who against included namely, Moshe Arens from Likud, Shlomo Hillel from Labour and those abstained included Yitzhak Shamir from Likud and Yigal Allon from Labour.

One of the leading dissenters in the Labour Party was Hillel who urged that the Labour Party should encourage the peace treaty, but that the issue of the settlements had to be resolved independently. In addition to this, he supported retaining around 25 per cent of the Sinai for security reasons (Rynhold, 1997). Subsequently, he called for two votes: one on the peace treaty and the other on the settlement problem. Begin refused to permit such a vote and after discussions the Labour leadership eventually agreed with Begin. Consequently, it was Labour leadership, despite strong reservations about the Accords, got Begin out of trouble and presented him with the single biggest achievement of his tenure. Had Begin been forced to hold two separate votes on the Accords, it was generally viewed that he would have won the first on the overall Accord but lost the second on the question of the Sinai settlements (Shlomo, 1986).

In many ways Camp David Accord, while representing Begin's single most significant accomplishment, became problematic for his government. On the one hand, some hawkish members, especially Geula Cohen, left the party and founded Tehiya. On the other hand, towards the end of the first Likud government in 1981, Begin's two senior ministers Dayan

and Ezer Weizman resigned in October 1979 and May 1980 respectively, mainly over differences about the conduct and overall lack of progress in the peace process, especially due to differences with Begin over the autonomy talks.

Dayan and Weizmann, the most moderate ministers within the cabinet, believed that Begin was not serious about the autonomy plan. The Camp David agreements, which provided a framework for the solution of the Palestinian problem, gave the Palestinians autonomy (Peleg, 1998). The autonomy plan for the West Bank and Gaza Strip referred to a five-year transition period after which full autonomy would be given to the inhabitants of the territories. It left the issue of sovereignty over the West Bank open for future negotiations (Elazar, 1982). Begin's intention of the autonomy plan was to prepare the international community for the final absorption of the West Bank into Israel (Peleg, 1998).

Begin meant autonomy for population and not for land. To achieve this goal, Begin appointed Y. Burg, the hard-line leader of the NRP, to head the autonomy talks. In so doing so Begin guaranteed the failure of the talks as he did not want the autonomy talks on the West Bank to succeed. After the resignations of Dayan and Weizmann, Begin appointed Ariel Sharon as Defence Minister and Yitzhak Shamir as Foreign Minister. Begin's advisors, namely, Shamir, Sharon, and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan were known for their hawkish position and dominated the foreign policy process (Garfinkle, 1992).

Additionally, to make things worse, the centrist party Dash had collapsed because of bitter intra-party conflict over the party's future continuation in the coalitions. The unpopularity of the government was clear in opinion polls published at the time which anticipated that the Labour Party might win an overall majority for the first time in the Knesset elections in 1981 (Lochery, 1997). The Labour Party had overtaken Likud in the opinion polls from the summer of 1979 onwards and in the absence of Weizmann and Dayan, the Cabinet contained no moderate members (Aronoff, 1984).

The period from 1981-84 can be marked as the Labour Party's second consecutive election defeat. Likud Party, between these periods, tried to dismantle the remaining sector or areas of its dominance and attempted to replace it with their Revisionist brand of dominance. Basically, during this time Likud was been seen to become the dominant party in Israel (Aronoff, 1984). After the Camp David Accord notably after the resignation of Dayan and Weizman, the popularity of Likud Party went down. The opinion polls anticipated that the

Labour Party would come into the power. Notwithstanding, things were just opposite and Likud came into the power in 1981, and the Labour Party was defeated again (Aronoff, 1989).

In brief, the reasons behind Likud's victory can be attributed to three points. The first one was the re-appearance of Begin especially in terms of in good health now serving also as Defence Minister particularly after the resignation Weizman. The second was exercising control over the Cabinet; the blatant election-centric economic package of the new Likud Finance Minister Yoram—known at that time as "Aridor Sales"—included the restoration of government subsidies on some basic commodities and oil products. Third, the renewed intra-party struggle within the Labour Party, it was due to the allocation of Finance portfolio in a future Labour-led government (Arian, 1981).

Additionally, the determination of Begin to secure a second term in office led to the application of his settlement plans in Occupied Territories. The purpose of the latter was to create demographic realities in these areas and thus prevent any future Labour-led government from returning them to Arab sovereignty. As a result, Begin's aim and the emphasis Likud placed on the settlement programme meant that the party was highly motivated to win the elections. The settlement programme represented the most significant but not the only part of the Begin's motivations for winning the election (Lochery, 1996).

The elections were held on 30 June 1981 and witnessed a 78.5 per cent turnout, with 15,312 votes required to win a single seat in the Knesset (Table 4.1) (Diskin & Gutmann, 1984).

Table 4.1: Seat Share between Labour and Likud Block, In 1981 Elections

Labour Party's Block	Seats	Likud Party's Block	Seats
Labour Party	47	Likud	48
Hadash[25]	4	NRP	6
Shinui	2	Agudat	4
Ratz	1	Tehiya	3
………………	…………..	Tami	3
Total=	54		64

Source: (Arian, 1981)

[25] Hadash was the Hebrew acronym for "the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality" left wing part was formed March 1977.

In adding one more party, Telem won two seats but was not being placed in above figure because it was neither associated with Labour block nor Likud bloc and its leader Dayan, served as minister under both the parties. Even though the Labour Party increased its seats from 32 in 1977 to 47 in 1981 elections, it was unable to form a coalition government. On the other hand, Likud's number of seats increased from 43 in 1977 to 48 in 1981 elections and was able to form a coalition government even without taking support of any central parties.

Since the 1981 election, Labour Party no longer remained the dominant power in Israel, rather it continued to be tormented by its past which restricted its responses on many of the key issues. These were the settlements issue, the annexation of the Golan Heights (1981) and the Lebanon War. These restrictions, when taken together with the continuing intra-party conflict among the elite and the factional divisions within the party, made the conduct of effective opposition during this period highly difficult (Arian & Shamir, 1983).

Thus, the second Likud government was the most hawkish one until that point. The government was made up of like-minded persons who believed in Israel's exclusive right to determine the future of the West Bank. The two most powerful positions of Foreign Affairs and Defence were occupied by Shamir and Sharon respectively who were hawks. In addition to this, the Chief of Staff of this period was Eitan, well known for his belief that a military solution to the Palestinian problem was possible. Predictably, with such figures in prominent positions, the government adopted an extremely active and aggressive foreign and security policy facilitating in the Lebanon War of June 1982 (Barnett, 1990).

Moreover, the government derived a huge amount of resources and energies into enhancing Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There were a total number of 43 new settlements constructed during this period, by far the most significant number under any Israeli government (Alpher, 1994). In short, the second Likud government had a more radical agenda and was set upon establishing its Revisionist ideology, thus changing the character of the state which was extensively dominated by the Labour Party's institutions. In addition to building new settlements at an unprecedented rate, the government ordered the IDF to carry out an attack against Iraq's nuclear reactor in July 1981 and ordered the IDF to invade Lebanon in June 1982 (Aronson & Yanai, 1984).

Israel's invasion of Lebanon should be understood within the broader context of Begin's ideological and strategic positions towards the West Bank vis-a-vis the Labour Party's stand.

The Lebanon War came to dominate all aspects of Israeli political life during this period. First, Begin's centre of foreign policy was the goal of annexing the West Bank. Begin and Sharon believed that by invading Lebanon and destroying the PLO's political and military infrastructures, the inhabitants of the territories would accept the terms of Begin's autonomy plan (Arian, 1985). The PLO, at the end of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s, was gaining international recognition. Begin feared that if the PLO's ascendance went on unchecked, Israel would be forced to negotiate with it. Thus, destroying the PLO, it was hoped, would facilitate the annexation of the West Bank (Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991).

After the Lebanon War, Israel remained opposed to any peace attempt. Begin rejected the Reagan Plan out of hand. The Plan, as was announced by President Ronald Reagan in September 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, called for a solution to the Palestinian problem by relinquishing parts of the West Bank to Jordan. It also called on Israel to freeze settlements in the West Bank (Ben-Zvi, 1997). Begin's answer came with the announcement of the building of eight new settlements in the West Bank. The domestic consequences of the war led to the resignation of Begin in 1983 succeeded by Shamir, one of the hawks within the party and forced Sharon to leave the Defence Ministry over Sabra and Satilla massacre. With a new leadership, the Likud did not change and remained loyal to its longstanding ideology that placed the West Bank as its top priority (Arian, 1985).

On the other hand, the Labour Party's stand was regarding the Lebanon War was dominated by the four significant stages of the war, namely, the limited aims of the 40 km advance, push to further north to surround Beirut, evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon and the massacre at Shatila and Sabra refugee camps in September 1982. The leadership accepted the first stage but felt that the second and third stages were over-ambitious and dangerous while the fourth was a tragic consequence of the overall war (Lochery, 1996).

To conclude, with the Likud government phase, the 'Jordanian Option' entertained by the Labour Party was substituted by the autonomy plan. One fact remained unchanged though, Likud's goal of the annexation of the West Bank. The Likud-led government refused to contemplate any territorial concession in the West Bank, and the rejection of the Reagan Plan should be seen within this context. The Labour Party's responses and actions during this period were motivated by its desire to return to power. The next major shift in Israel's politics was the formation of the National Unity Government that lasted from 1984 until 1988.

Labour Party and NUG, 1984-1988

The formation of the NUG which preceded by the Knesset election of 1984. The party's participation in the NUG (1984-88) indicated a power-sharing operation in a competitive party system. The timespan between 1984 and 1988 also was seen a maturing of the Israeli competitive party system. Both main parties were appeared to accept the relative state of near parity between them and functioned in a more normal manner for such a system. In short, there was no attempt by either the Likud or the Labour Party to portray itself as a dominant party operating within a dominant party system (Aronoff, 1989).

During these elections, the two more confronting issues of the day remained unchanged, the Lebanon war and the economic crisis. In response to these issues, the Labour Party produced an election manifesto which contained no big changes from the 1981 version. A paragraph was inserted about the Lebanon War calling for the need for security arrangements and speedy withdrawal (Makovsky & White, 2006). On economic issues, the party decided that the electorate was not ready for the kind of shock therapy that economists argued was necessary to successfully deal with the crisis. On the settlements issue, the party, careful about the need to court the generally hawkish Sephardim constituency, inserted a clause stating that no Jewish Settlement would be uprooted (Barkai, 1987).

The overall tone of the programme was in part set by this perceived need of the leadership to appeal to the Sephardim Jews. Hence the party still said an explicit no to negotiations with the PLO. In addition, with regards to its economic programme, it was unwilling to solve the crisis in a way which would in the short term reduce the standards of living of the population, and particularly the lower income groups which are mainly Sephardim. Party adopted a hawkish approach to the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to attract votes from the Sephardim constituency (Aronson & Yanai, 1984). The Labour Party enjoyed a healthy lead in opinion polls at the start of the campaign which peaked at the point of the television debate between Peres and Shamir and which, despite Shamir's surprise call for a NUG Peres, was perceived to have won (Lochery, 1997).

The elections were held on 23 July 1984 and produced the following results (Table 4.2)

Table 4.2: Seat Share between Labour and Likud Block, In 1984 Elections

Labour Party and its block	Seats	Likud and its block	Seats
Labour Party	44	Likud	41
Ratz	3	Tehiya	5
Shinui	3	NRP	4
Hadash	4	Shas	4
PLP	2	Agudat	2
…………….	…………….	Morasha	2
		Tami	1
Total=	56		59

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics

https://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res11.htm

In addition to the above figure, Yahad led by Ezer Weizman won four seats and Kach the extreme nationalist party won one seat.

In this election around 2,091,402 votes were cast (turnout was 78.8 per cent) with each party needing to win a minimum of 16,786 votes to win a seat. No party emerged as a clear winner in the elections as the election in 1984 ended inconclusively. It was a more complicated situation for forming a coalition for either Likud or the Labour Party. At inter-block level, Likud at first appeared to be in a strong position, but the decision of Weizman and Yahad to join the Labour block effectively meant that both the blocks were tied at 60:60. Therefore, neither Likud nor Labour could form a government without taking the support of the others (Bogdanor, 1993).

In addition, Shamir made it clear that he would not form a government which relied on the support of the extreme Kach Party and its leader Meir Kahan. The increase in support for the smaller parties was an illustration of the growing polarisation of Israeli society, notably in the wake of the Lebanon War that led more voters to seek radical solutions to the issues of the day from the alternative parties than the major two (Bradley, 1985). The increased influence

of these smaller parties (with the 60:60) became an additional reason in the formation of a NUG as both Peres and Shamir were reluctant to pay the high price the religious parties were demanding (Beilin, 1994).

After the election, at some extent, after the complex negotiation had occurred between the Labour Party and Likud Party ended by a power sharing. Peres, the Leader of the Labour Party, and Shamir, the leader of Likud Party, agreed to form a national unity government. It was rotation agreement for the position of Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister for the entire four-year period of the government as well as an equal division of the remaining 24 portfolios between the Likud bloc and the Labour block. In addition to this, an Inner-Cabinet was created consisting of 10 ministers, five from each party (Horowitz, 1990).

The agreement which formed the basis of the NUG, as well as reflecting the immediate priorities of withdrawal from Lebanon and the need for and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-type solution to the economic crisis, contained a series of compromises on other aspects of policy, especially the settlement issue. Peres eventually presented the NUG to the Knesset on 13th September 1984 and won a vote of confidence by 98 votes in favour of 18 against (Korn, 1997). The consequences for the Israeli left became clear almost immediately with the decision of Mapam to leave the Alignment (September 1984) and return to opposition. This period also marked the start of attempts to forge a new party of the left by uniting Mapam, Ratz and parts of the peace movement which culminated in the formation of Meretz in 1992 (Aronoff, 1989).

The leaders of Mapam accused the Labour Party of putting the peace process back by ten years with its participation in the NUG and argued that the Labour should have either attempted to form a narrow-based left-of-centre government or returned to the opposition. By 1988, Mapam had accepted the principle of direct negotiations with the PLO provided the latter accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and thus made it the first Zionist party which is willing to talk to the PLO (Barnett, 1990). In addition, Mapam, under certain conditions, accepted the notion of an independent Palestinian state, something that the Labour Party was still had not publicly. Consequently, Mapam's 1988 manifesto was a radical departure from that of the Labour Party. It is important to stress that this distancing the elite from the Labour Party's MKs did not transform the party overnight, but rather created the conditions for some of the changes which took place from 1988 onwards (Aronoff, 1993).

There were two pressing problems that faced the NUG, namely, the Israeli militarily presence in Lebanon and an inflation rate which crossed in the higher per cent. The government led by Peres served from 1984-86 and second one led by Shamir which was in office from 1986-88. Under the Labour Party's leadership, namely Peres, Israel was able to solve the inflation problem and managed to re-deploy the IDF into a "security zone" in southern Lebanon. However, the two parties had different foreign policy orientations and, in its platform, the NUG only made vague call on Palestine question to start negotiations without preconditions (Korn, 1992). The basic divide between the two major parties on the peace process revolved around international peace conference. The proposed conference was to be cosponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union and has provided a forum for direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours (Ziv, 2014).

When Shimon Peres first assumed the premiership, the peace process was almost dead. Israel, under Likud (1977-84), had made no serious efforts to solve the Palestinian problem. On the contrary, it complicated the process by establishing more settlements, by refusing to proceed with the autonomy negotiations, and indeed by initiating the Lebanon War in June 1982. Unlike his predecessors Begin and Shamir, who marred Israel's image by initiating the war in Lebanon and by displaying intransigence regarding peace with Jordan, Peres sought to rebuild Israel's reputation in the international arena (Shlaim, 2000). He tried to revive the peace process and settle the Palestinian problem with Jordan.

Of course, Peres explored the prospects for a separate peace settlement on the 'Jordanian Option'. On this issue, he agreed with Defence Minister Rabin (Ibid.). Their desire to make peace with Jordan was paralleled by some positive development on the Arab side. King Hussein and the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat signed the Amman agreement on 11 February 1985. According to this agreement, a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would participate in an international conference to negotiate a settlement to the conflict that would be based on 'land-for-peace' formula (Madfai, 1993).

Prime Minister Peres praised this agreement but was still hindered by his coalition with Likud which was not ready to endorse it. The US, whose involvement was desired by both Peres and the King, refused to talk to the proposed joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation unless the PLO lived up to the American conditions (Cassese, 1993). These conditions were the PLO's acceptance of Resolution 242, recognising Israel's right to exist, and renouncing terrorism. The US position about the PLO went back to 1975 when Kissinger committed his country not

to talk to the PLO until it met these conditions (Makovsky, 1996). Arafat, due to intra-PLO differences, failed to meet these conditions and subsequently, the Amman agreement became redundant. Another reason for the American lack of enthusiasm for the idea of the international conference was the fear that such a conference would bring the Soviet Union, after being excluded successfully from peace-making, back in the region (Yehuda, 2000).

However, the underlying problem in Israel's strategy for peace was the fact that the government spoke in two different voices. Peres genuinely sought to explore the prospects for a peace settlement with Jordan based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 383. He believed that the obstacle in holding direct negotiations with Jordan was a procedural one. The Jordanians insisted on an international conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council. It was, however, understood that Hussein wanted an international conference to legitimise his participation in the negotiations with the Israelis (Yorke, 1988). It was then a matter for the Israeli government to overcome this problem. Though Peres displayed an appreciation of Jordan's constraints, he would not have been able to proceed with this idea without the breakdown of the NUG (Golan, 1989). Shamir, who represented the second voice in the government, adamantly opposed the international conference, thus making Peres weaker.

Therefore, there was little progress under the NUG. Shamir was able to stop Peres from agreeing to the idea of international conference partly due to his fear, which stemmed from his perception of the whole world against Jews and that Arabs would be able to manipulate an anti-Israeli stand and thus perhaps impose a solution on Israel. Another reason for Shamir's rejection of the idea of an international conference was his intra-party position. Shamir's leadership of Likud was not taken for granted. Three prominent members, Ariel Sharon, David Levy and Yitzhak Modai who opposed the idea of the international conference challenged Shamir's leadership of Likud (Al-Barari, 2004).

Yossi Beilin, one of the most articulate young doves of the Labour Party, was the most enthusiastic within the NUG for the international conference because he felt the conference to be a token event after which parties would break up into bilateral tracks. He managed to sign a document with King Hussein on 11 April 1987 with Peres secretly negotiated it and was came to be known as the London Document or London Agreement (Flamhaft, 1996). London document comprised an agenda for procedural agreement on direct Israel-Jordan negotiations

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under the umbrella of an international conference. The conference was to be held with the participation of all the parties to the dispute, including Palestinian representatives.

The document admitted that the engagement of the five permanent members of the Security Council would not force any pressure on the parties or to veto any agreement reached between them through the bilateral negotiations (Beilin, 1992). Believing that the US could play a constructive role in advancing the peace process, Peres sought to elicit American approval for the document. Beilin met the US Secretary of State George Shultz in Helsinki and informed him about the breakthrough and asked him to adopt it as an American initiative (Shlaim, 2000). Shultz telephoned Prime Minister Shamir, to find out whether he was ready to proceed with the London Agreement. Shamir's response came shortly and was made through his aide, Elyakim Rubinstein, who informed Shultz that Shamir was not interested in the idea and that he would not welcome a visit by Shultz (Christion, 1989). On 24 April 1987, Shamir sent Moshe Arens without the knowledge of his Foreign Minister Peres, to inform Shultz that the idea of an international conference was not acceptable and that if Shultz presented the London Agreement, this would be tantamount to interference in Israeli domestic politics. Shamir's rejection of this framework proved that a two-headed government was a prescription for immobilism in foreign policy (Shlaim, 1997).

Shamir finally blocked the London Agreement or International Conference and Likud in the inner cabinet leading to the eventual withdrawal of King Hussein form the dialogue and the ending of Jordan's commitment to the West Bank. There were differences within the Labour Party and particularly from Peres about the refusal of the cabinet to support the agreement. Peres saw the agreement as important as the Camp David Accords. Significantly from this point on, the NUG was over but continued to function to serve the intra-party needs of both Shamir and Rabin. The Labour Party's problems with the peace process were compounded by the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in the Occupied Territories. It was the intransigence of Shamir and the Likud in the peace process which led to the outbreak of the unrest.

Conclusions

Therefore, the ideological and political differences, clashes of interests, and conflicting perspectives among key members within the coalition government regarding the Palestinian issue were the main cause for the stalemate in the peace process. These factors were, indeed,

aggravated by the outcomes of the 1984 general election. Likud obtained veto power over the making and conduct of foreign policy, and, therefore, it was not possible for Prime Minister Shimon Peres, to explore the possibility of implementing his preferred solution, namely, the 'Jordanian Option'.

This chapter has also identified the relative historical significance of the dynamic of domestic politics in Israel and its impact upon the formulation of policy with respect to the Palestinian issue and peace process. The evolution of certain configurations of domestic power (which developed autonomously from external factors) contributed largely to the immobilism in the peace process whereby Israel failed to respond positively to the changes in its strategic environment brought about by the June War.

The June War had transformed the Arab-Israeli conflict from what might be considered a zero-sum game to mixed-motive one. This means that, in theory, the territorial conquest provided Israel with a mechanism by which it could exchange land for peace. More importantly, the war had led to the breakdown of the Israeli consensus on national security issues. The stunning victory accompanied by territorial gains led to the crystallisation of dissonance inherent within Zionism on both the physical borders of the state and the nature of the society. It has been demonstrated throughout this chapter that a lack of peace stemmed from Israel's failure to formulate a clear position or take decisions concerning peace with either Jordan or Palestine.

At the heart of the problem with Jordan was the continuation of the occupation. Israel's policy towards the Occupied Territories was the function of the interaction of four factional positions: the ''Reconciliationist, 'Territorialist', 'Functionalist', and the 'Annexationist'. The emergence of the four positions could be attributed to differences within Israel over how peace should be attained, the borders of Israel, the future of the West Bank, and the clash of personalities. The outcome of the different positions, which were adopted by key decision-makers, has created the continuation of status quo.

It is against this background that the Palestinian Intifada erupted in December 1987. The Intifada demonstrated that the '*status quo*' in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was no longer an option. The next chapter focuses on the impact of the Intifada on the Labour Party's attitude and examines the factors which brought changes in the Labour Party's attitudes towards PLO and examines the transitional causes and external factors which provided road or platform to the Oslo 1993 peace process.

Chapter-Five
From Non-Recognition to Oslo

T his chapter will discuss and analyse the compulsions that resulted in a reversal of the Labour Party's non-recognition policy towards the PLO into recognition. The latter enabled the Oslo process. Additionally, the chapter will examine the circumstances and rationale behind the shifts in the Labour Party's policy and its role in the evolution of the Oslo process as well as changes within the PLO.

Introduction

The previous chapter dealt with ideological and political differences and clashes of interests between two main political parties namely, Labour and Likud parties in general and key ministers within the coalition government, regarding the policies towards the Occupied Territories and the PLO. These were the main cause for the stalemate in the peace process. The findings of the previous chapter indicated that the Labour Party extensively paid attention to the crucial issues including defensible borders and settlement policy. A notable exception to this reluctance was the emphatic principle of 'No Palestinian State'. This refusal served as a common denominator between its inclination to look for functional solutions to the Palestinian question and its formal stance which favoured a territorial compromise.

Yigal Allon, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin were the prominent personalities in the Labour Party and set forth the Party's guidelines and policies regarding the Palestinian problem and the PLO. After the June War, the Labour Party's policies towards Occupied Territories resulted primary from the interaction of four bureaucratic plans, dealt in the previous chapter, which directly affected the actions and behaviour of the Labour Party. The basic argument is that the Labour Party, in the contest for power with Likud, had been remained inflexible regarding the Occupied Territories.

The Labour Party and its leaders preferred to consider Jordan as a partner for peace. Regarding the PLO, they harboured intense hostility towards it and viewed it as a terrorist organisation. At the same time, they had shown optimistic dispositions concerning the Palestinian population. The nature of not talking to the PLO often dictated the thoughts of three leaders' approach (Ben-Yehuda, 1997). Thus, the policies of the Israeli government in general and the Labour Party led the status quo. It was against this background and unrest and

frustration of the Palestinian population which subsequently culminated into the Intifada or popular resistance in December 1987.

Further discussion will deal with the question of changes within the Labour Party and its leader's non-recognition position towards the PLO in favour of recognition. The Intifada demonstrated that the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was no longer an option. The Intifada has effectively challenged many schools of thoughts that in the past were taken for granted, not only by most Israelis but also by many Palestinian as well (O. Freedman, 1991). This chapter will also focus on the impact of the Intifada on Israel's politics, the Labour Party's policies and changes within the PLO as well. It will also examine the external transitional causes including Gulf War over Kuwait, the demise of the Cold War and the Madrid Conference. The external players, especially the American hegemony which played a significant role in the road to the Oslo peace process in 1993 will also be analysed. It is true that genuine peace will not come in overnight and need an incremental policy to sort out the issues. The only breakthrough was the Oslo Accord, which came after a long period of non-recognition converted into recognition, to end the bloody dispute which has endured for over a century. Post-Oslo, the line of dispute between Israel and Palestine had darkened and increased instead of bringing tranquillity and normalisation of the relationship between both. However, the analysis of the changes in their attitude and politics vis-à-vis one-another in the aftermath of the Oslo accords is beyond the scope of this study.

After the Labour Party's policies towards the Occupied Territories and its harsh and uncompromising nature concerning with the PLO cultivated such an environment in which peace with Palestinian was challenging and even impossible. Notwithstanding, not only peace was established, albeit temporarily, but both entities—the Labour Party leadership and PLO—shook hands abandoning their 'not-to-talk' policy and attitude. Now a significant question is raised about what kind of political situation emerged in the world in general and in the West Asian region in particular? What were the changes occurred in the domestic and regional politics, which brought the reconciliatory attitudes in both the leaderships resulted in the Oslo Accord.

The first major incident, in the road to peace, was the Intifada which influenced the politics of Israel comprehensively in general and the Labour Party in particular. Before looking to the impact of the Intifada, a short discussion of the Intifada would be useful. The purpose is to portray the backdrop where the Labour Party especially Yitzhak Rabin adopted harsh

measures to quell the Intifada towards brining tranquillity but his policies failed to do so. This was the moment where the Labour Party in general and Rabin recognised the need to adopt a different measure to bring about tranquillity.

First Intifada, 1987

The day 8 December 1987 marked the First Intifada and the incident which sparked off the conflict was a traffic accident in the Gaza Strip, which resulted in the death of four Palestinians and injuries to many more (Sayigh, 1997). As ordinary Palestinians believed that the accident had been the result of a deliberate action taken by an IDF vehicle transporting tanks, demonstrations by Palestinians followed. These demonstrations and riots spread rapidly throughout the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and turned into an uprising or the First Intifada (Resistance). The Israelis, in general, were surprised by the outbreak popular protests (Massalha, 1994). Before its eruption, many Israelis, in particular those who had rightist approach, had claimed that the Palestinians' standard of living was reasonable under the Israeli occupation and that the Palestinians were by and large content, and that the territorial and political status quo would continue without any real cost to Israel (Tessler, 1990).

However, the Intifada had proved them wrong. There was a set of factors that had contributed to the creation of the conditions leading up to the Intifada. The overall objectives and strategies of the Intifada and the Unified National Leadership (UNL) in Palestine, was to persuade and force Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories and bring world attention and opinion on the Palestinian question (Rubin, 1994).

In terms of the factors which led to the Intifada, several reasons have been identified by various scholars namely David McDowall (1989), Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (1989), Don Peretz (1990), Geoffery Aronson (1990), Robert O. Freedman (1991), Walid Khalidi (1992) Uzi Amith-Kohn (1993), Barry Rubin (1994), and Mark Tessler (1994) etc. and hence will not be dealt with here. As mentioned above due to the inflexibility of the Labour Party in term of the territorial issue (Occupied Territories). In this regards, Ruth Margolies (1995) argues that Israel's policies in the Occupied Territories, which were aimed at pacifying the population, had been successful but only in the short term. She contends that the Israeli leaders failed to recognise the broader impact of their measures and thus, created the conditions for the Intifada to explode. Uzi Amit-Kobn (1993) dealt with many reasons for the Intifada and two political reasons are suited best for this chapter. The first reason can be seen

from the Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories. This policy produced a feeling of absence of rule among the young Palestinians. The laxity on the part of the Israeli military instilled the Palestinians with the belief that Israel would not be prepared or interested in maintaining its rule over the area at all costs. This belief fostered the protest by the Palestinian youths. The second cause for the Uprising can be found in the nationalist sentiments of the residents of the Occupied Territories, coupled with their profound dissatisfaction with the PLO and its lack of progress in advancing the Palestinian status in the political and social realms.

From 1982 when Arafat and the PLO were forced to leave Beirut for Tunis and until 1987, a decline in the influence of the PLO in the international arena can be noted. This failure is exemplified by the PLO's inability to have the Palestinian issue addressed in the Amman Summit Conference of the Arab League in November 1987 in which the Iran-Iraq War had entirely eclipsed the Palestinian cause. King Hussein, the host, had given the PLO a cold shoulder. Young Palestinians in the Occupied Territories realised that achievement of their nationalist aim would not come from abroad and concluded that it was incumbent upon them to take matters into their own hands (Ibid.).

The Intifada became the source for those Palestinians who wanted to preserve their own identity and through the Intifada they could reassert the existence of the Palestinian nation. From the Israeli point of view, there are two schools of thought about the Intifada. One argues that the Intifada occurred because of the government policies in the Occupied Territories. The other says that it was due to the emergence of a fundamentalist Islamic fervour. The first school of thought focuses on the fact that the Palestinians do not want Israel to rule over them, and they did not want to live with Israelis and were trying to destroy the Jews for good. Rabin, at the beginning of the Intifada, explained, "There are three major reasons for the Intifada. The fundamentalists and they are few, the local and the outside media (Arab and international and the outside Palestinian organisations)" (Hussein, 1991:140). Rabin said later when the Intifada was progressing, The reason for the Intifada is because of the religious, political, and ideological differences between the Palestinians and the Jews (Ibid.).

The ideological and political differences between Israel and Palestinian leaderships and in the forming the policies towards the Occupied Territories within the Labour Party and of the coalition government created inflexibility in the Labour Party in sorting out the territorial issue. These were the main cause for the stalemate in the peace process and contributed to

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immense frustration and unrest among the Palestinians that erupted in the form of Intifada. The point is that after the eruption of Intifada 'the thought of political solution' did not come into the picture immediately. The immediate thought of Israel's government was how to stop the Intifada. In that context, Israel's government adopted several measures to quell it. The next theme of the chapter will very shortly deal with the Israeli government's response to Intifada.

Israel Government's Response

The Intifada had erupted some eleven months before the Israeli Knesset election of November 1988 (Tessler, 1990). The intensity and the scope of the Intifada triggered an unprecedented debate among the Israelis on how to respond to the aggravated situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Once the Intifada erupted, the government had to respond to this new and unexpected situation (Ibid.). This government was resting upon an uneasy coalition of national unity government under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and the Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Such a government could work only by consensus and with an understanding of most of the Knesset Members (MKs). The relationship between Shamir and Labour leader Shimon Peres was, as Shamir described, 'unfriendly' (quoted in A. Barari, 2004:100). The Intifada and how to react to it had deepened the mistrust and difference that had already existed between them. On different occasions, during the election campaign, Peres argued that had Shamir not blocked his agreement with King Hussein (the so-called London agreement), the Intifada would not have erupted in the first place. This was a conspicuous attempt on the part of Peres to hold Likud and its intransigent leader responsible for the outbreak of the Intifada (Ibid.). It was very unconventional eruption; the government was needed to tackle to it unanimously but this was not the case.

Even though, the immediate concern of the Israeli government was to end the Intifada and restore calm, the differences among the coalition partners alarmed the government and the public alike. The Chief of Staff Dan Shomron argued that the Intifada was a genuine popular resistance movement, not a simple case of rioting. In January 1989, Shomron, in a series of interviews, compared it to the Algerian revolution (1954-62), in which the native Algerians had rebelled against French colonisation (Tessler, 1994). Because of these unpleasant assessments, the Israeli government resorted to the use of the IDF to quell the Intifada rather than relying solely on the less powerful but less provocative police forces (A. Barrari, 2004).

For Israel, it was had to confront the Palestinians civilians who were determined to achieve independence or at least freedom from the Israeli occupation. This was unlike a conventional war between two states, and perhaps more critically, it was a type of mission for which the IDF was not designed. At one time, Defence Minister Rabin admitted 'you cannot saddle the IDF with a mission that was outside its proper function' (The Jerusalem Post, 1988). Rabin understood this limitation perfectly and his criticisms of right-wing politicians who believed in the utility of using force to solve the problem, which was widely known among both Israeli scholars and politicians. His inclination towards containing the Intifada rather than crushing it was primarily derived from his belief that relying only on military force alone would not be sufficient to provide a solution to the conflict (Ibid.).

Irrespective of Rabin's views in the short-to-medium term, it was a critical priority for the Israeli government to restore calm. To realise this objective, the IDF moved through several phases, adopting a '*trial and error approach*' which included different methods. Rabin's '*iron fist policy*' policy, however, was criticised universally and widely condemned even by the Israeli radical left (Fielding, 2003). When the '*iron fist policy*' failed to end the Intifada, Rabin ordered a second strategy; '*the policy of beating*'. The beating policy was intended to minimise the number of Palestinians being killed. The aim was to abate criticism by the international community for the '*iron fist policy.*' When the '*beating policy*' failed to end the tactic of mass demonstrations, Rabin devised a politico-military strategy. This new strategy, initiated in March 1988, was designed as one of attrition directed against the Palestinians through military and administrative measures. However, these measures proved ineffective as the Intifada persisted for nearly five years (Al-Barari, 2004).

During the Intifada, the most dramatic incidence was the mission by an Israeli special unit which flew to Tunisia in April 1988 and assassinated Abu-Jihad, second in command to the PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. He was widely believed to be the main organiser and architect of the daily activities of the Intifada. Israelis, especially those in the army and Mossad, concluded that killing Abu-Jihad would be a severe blow to the morale of the Intifada and would bring it to a rapid close. Peres and Ezer Weizmann had opposed such an act on the grounds that it would jeopardise the prospects for peace but were overruled in the inner cabinet (Peretz & Samooha, 1989).

This decision reflected the differences within the NUG over the correct response. While all Likud members believed that the Intifada could be put down militarily, the Labour Party was

divided on the issue, with the hawkish camp led by Rabin, approving of the assassination of Abu Jihad. Yet these measures failed to stop the Intifada. Using force against the Palestinians eventually proved counterproductive. Force had made the Palestinians even more resentful of Israeli rule (Fielding, 2003). Thus, the reasons for portraying all the government's measure is to justify that 'the thought of political solution' had not come into the picture immediately at the beginning of Intifada. While the series of policies were pursued to stop the Intifada but they failed. At this moment Israel in general and the Labour Party realised that the only solution would have to be political.

Significance of the Intifada

Thus, the Intifada was one of the very significant events of the 20th century Palestine. Its reach went far beyond the changes in political and economic dynamics between the parties involved. The west Asian region was affected and the superpowers had also been drawn towards the Palestine question after the intifada. The Intifada had broken the illusion of the Jordanian option being feasible (Pedatzur, 1995). The Intifada played a remarkable role in pushing Israel towards political accommodation with the Palestinians despite Israel's resistance to negotiations (Kaufman, Abded & Rothstein, 1993). Subsequently, after failing to stop Intifada, Israel appears to have become more 'realistic'. It is not only the Labour Party and its leadership that had changed its attitude, but entire Israel was affected by it. The Israeli public also wanted peace and prosperity and led to the unprecedented dialogue over the Occupied Territories' strategic importance for Israel.

It is essential to sum up the assessment over the impact and repercussions of the Intifada by various prominent and renowned political thinkers such as Edward W. Said. He expressed that "The Intifada … accomplished a number of unprecedented things. In my opinion, the future of the West Asia as a whole is going to be influenced by them, and Palestine and Israel will never be the same again because of them" (Quoted in Lockman & Beinin, 1989:20). The Intifada had the same impact because it shook some of the implicit assumptions about the nature of the Palestinian political will, the Palestinian entity, and possible relations between Israel and the Palestinians. The Intifada had a significant effect, the culmination of which, has led to the opening up of the areas of security, international relations, and military relations, to intense political debate, the life of which has not been known in the State of Israel since its establishment (Maoz, 1994).

The Intifada forced the Israeli public and political leadership to think about the future of the occupied territories more concretely and realistically than they had in the past. In a survey conducted in the weeks before the November 1988 Knesset election (and about ten months after the outbreak of the Intifada), 55 per cent admitted that their opinions regarding security and politics had changed as a result of the Intifada. Moreover, Israel appears to have become more realistic (Freedman, 1991).

The Intifada was a topic of great concern, at least according to the discussions in the media and many debates in the Knesset and within the Israeli government. Moreover, it was a concrete event that took place daily, not many kilometres from Tel Aviv University and had affected considerably not only the public mind but also the political leadership (Gordon, 1995). In that, the most important feature of the Intifada was to put the future and the fate of the Occupied Territories back on the agenda of the government and the political parties. The events in the Occupied Territories required Israel to make decision that were ignored in the past. According to one, "If the land is part of the land of Israel, let us annex it and if it is dangerous to the Jewish State and its Jewish makeup, let us start the procedures to get rid of it or its inhabitants (transfer), the most important thing is to do something" (Ahranot, 1988:32).

Moreover, one group of senior officers believed that the Occupied Territories were the most important strategic defence factor for Israel in future wars and should be kept under its control even if this prevents peace. According to them, peace with the Arab world was not on the agenda and Israel should adopt Henry Kissinger's notion that no-war arrangements were better for Israel than peace agreement (Lockman & Beinin, 1989).

At the same time, compared to the Palestinians and their unity, the Israeli public was divided in its response to the Intifada. At one end of the spectrum were the left-wingers, who believed that the Palestinians deserve to have their own state and that peace was the best solution for both Israelis and Palestinians. At the other end of the spectrum were the Orthodox Jews who were both religious and nationalistic, and who believed that the land of Israel was promised to the Jews by God and that all means would be justified to protect and retain it. Right wingers share the Orthodox Jew's nationalistic conviction but were less religious. Israeli Arabs or the Palestinian citizens of Israel saw the Intifada as a just struggle and took pride in it (Pines, 1994).

Yehoshafat Harkabi, a retired general and the former head of the Israeli military intelligence, spoke out and warned:

> We will have to negotiate with the Palestinians, the majority of whom, in any referendum, would vote for the PLO as their representative, not out of love, but as the unparalleled symbol of the idea that the Palestinians are a human public worthy of political expression. The U.S. does not determine the composition of the Soviet delegation to negotiations, and Israel's presumption in trying to determine the composition of Arab delegations is an absurdity (Rantisi & K. Beebe, 1990: 121).

The most important ration for above point is to portray the essence of the Intifada which had influenced Israel and the PLO in several aspects and compelled them to change their attitude and rethink about the future of Occupied Territories in terms of bringing peace.

Next theme of the chapter will focus on the Israeli political discourse; how it begun to evolve from non-recognition to recognition. The Intifada was the real breakthrough in the transformation of non-recognition to recognition.

Various suggestions and questions have been come up about the Intifada; did it constitute the significant turning juncture in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute? With regard to the PLO, scholars recognised the important change from an armed confrontation to a political struggle when a declaration was issued by the 12th PNC meeting in 1974 that specified the will of PLO to find a Palestinian national authority on any liberated land (Sayigh, 1988). This juncture has been construed as an implicit acknowledgment of a two-state solution, even without abandoning the armed struggle (Hassassian, 1997).

Another significant turning point was the consequence of the Lebanon war 1982 and this forced the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon to Tunis and made the political and diplomatic option more strengthen in terms of the failures of the armed struggle (Sayigh, 1997). For Israel's part, many researchers regarded that the October War of 1973 as a significant turning point. This forced Israel to realise the limitations of its military power in maintaining its interests in the region (Rubin, 1994). Without disproving the essence of these significant events, there is a wider unanimity among scholars that the Intifada was the most significant development in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute (Aronoff, 1998). The Intifada opened up the internal dimensions of the dispute, whereas previously the Israeli-Palestinian issue had been subsumed by the interstate dispute.

Intifada and Israel's Political Discourse

For the first time the June war of 1967, the Israeli forces lost control of the population in the Occupied Territories (Kimmerling & Migdal, 1993). The single event that led to the realisation of the need for compromise with the Palestinians was the Intifada. Furthermore, the Israeli policymakers became aware that this time they were faced with a national struggle whose solution could only be found by politically. Indeed, the Intifada had left the Labour Party in a state of ideological and political disarray. Its chairman, Shimon Peres, understood that there was no hope of reaching an understanding with the Palestinians without the involvement of the PLO (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1989). During the Intifada, Rabin had changed his thinking on three critical issues. First, he realised that King Hussein of Jordan would not bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table but rather the monarch would follow the Israeli leadership on the Palestinian question. Two, Rabin realised that Israel must negotiate directly with the local Palestinians, not just treat them as mailmen bearing messages to Jordan and the PLO. And three, he appreciated the benefit of holding elections in the Occupied Territories a prospect he had earlier refused to consider (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1989).

Rabin conceded that since "the start of the Intifada, Israel has concluded that it will be impossible to end the conflict without reaching accommodation with the PLO. Any other settlement will be only a partial one and thus liable to collapse" (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1989: 333). Army commanders stood with Defence Minister Rabin's argument that Israel would have to be found a political solution rather than a military one. After a prolong hesitations, the military leadership openly agreed that there was no military solution to what Israel was facing. In March 1989, an Israeli intelligence assessment stressed that the uprising could not be ended in the near future and that a political solution could be found only if the government entered dialogue with the PLO. The report also maintained that there was no serious leadership in the Occupied Territories besides the PLO and that the latter had moved towards moderation (quoted in Peretz, 1990).

As mentioned earlier, Rabin had pursued a series of policies to quell the Intifada, which led to the disagreements and domestic criticism was levelled against the government and in particular against the Defence Minister. Both the Left and the Right were not happy with the measures taken by the IDF (Rubin, 1994). According to Avraham Burg—a Labour 'dove'—criticised Rabin's measures publicly as 'too harsh'. He said that "I remember me (sic) in 1988

calling Yitzhak Rabin the 'minister of war'. In Israel, we use a minister of defence, a slightly more humane expression. And I said to him: you are the first minister of war in the history of Israel because of the Intifada and because we have to break bones etc" (Quoted in A. Barari, 2004: 97).

Yossi Sarid, a leftist Knesset member from Ratz[26] expressed his opposition to Rabin's harsh repressive policies. He told the Knesset Committee of Defence and Foreign Affairs that the extreme use of force had become the norm rather than the exception and as such was unacceptable (BBC World Summary, 1988). Many Israelis, leftists, in particular, were concerned about the democratic foundations of the state and felt that Israel's security aims could be achieved by negotiating a peace agreement with the Palestinians. In their view, the Intifada had affected the social norms, political cohesion and could ultimately undermine the foundation of democracy in the country which Israeli public considered their fundamental strengthen (Khalidi, 1992).

The Israeli public was divided over the Intifada. In the immediate and short-term, the Intifada had made the public even more hawkish than before, thus giving Likud a slight edge over Labour in the 1988 election. However, in the long run, it led to a growing number of Israelis to adopt an increasingly more dovish position. Reuven Hazen, a political scientist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, argues that this change towards a dovish attitude was not automatic. In his words: "It takes time for this [change] just like the 1973 War, it took 1977 to see the reaction [that is, voting against Labour] and here we had to wait up to 1992 to get the reaction" (Hazen, 1998:75). A possible explanation for such change was that the population was slowly concluding that the Intifada could not be suppressed.

As Reuven Hazen (2000) argues, "After 20 years of occupation, the Israeli society realised that this land had previous inhabitants, that these inhabitants are a strategic liability, and that to deal with them was not an option to military force. As a consequence, the status quo died with the Intifada. An opinion poll conducted in 1986 prior to the outbreak of the Intifada showed that 47.1% favoured the status quo, 30.2% favoured giving up territories for peace, and 22.8% favoured annexing the territories" (Quoted in Giora, 1991:135). In that (changing

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[26] Ratz, is the Civil Rights Movement; a radical social-liberal party established in 1973 by Shulamit Aloni. It calls for electoral reform, the introduction of a Basic Law protecting human rights, the recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination, the separation between religion and state, and equal rights for women. It joined Mapam and Shinui in 1992 to form the Meretz party after the electoral law increased the electoral threshold to 1.5 percent.

mindset due to Intifada's influence) the popular feelings of Israeli people toward the Intifada was being described by former Israeli Supreme Court Justice Haim- Cohen (2004) that "Israelis are very upset by the Intifada. From August 1988, when we first asked, to November 1990, 60 per cent of Jewish reported feeling insecure as a result of the Intifada. They also added that in 1988 (February, June, August) 23 per cent of Israeli Jews felt "the way we behave towards the Arabs in the territories is not good enough," compared with only 1-2 percent who thought so in the early 1970s. In another place, Cohen had written that "the uprising of the Palestinians in the areas occupied by Israel has, no doubt, had significant influences on Israelis as individuals and on the Israeli society as a whole. While this conclusion might have been reached by logic alone, the present empirical findings led to empirical support" (quoted in Khader, 2011: 123). Changing mind of the Israeli people towards the Occupied Territories after the Intifada, created pressure on Israeli government to bring peace and prosperity in Israel.

This contrasted with another opinion poll conducted in May 1990, where the hawkish position received a meagre approval of only by 2.4% (Ibid.). Israelis had discovered the link between the deterioration in their personal security and the maintenance of the status quo. Despite this, one should be careful not to interpret that an overwhelming majority of Israelis would automatically accept a territorial compromise to end the Intifada (Arian & Shamir at., 1992).

As mentioned above that it was crucial that the Intifada occurred when Israel was governed by a NUG. Because of this, no decision could be taken without both Labour and Likud ministers agreeing on any particular course of action. The advent of the Intifada was the crucial variable that led many politicians to change positions with respect to advocating a political rather than a military solution to the Palestinian question. This became increasingly obvious within Labour where 'doves' pressed the leadership of the party to adopt a more conciliatory position vis-a-vis the Palestinians.

According to Nathan Yanai (1991), there were divisions among the political parties over major three issues, namely, the legitimacy of the Intifada, the strategy in dealing with it, and the peace process. The first position was adopted by the radical anti-Zionist and the Zionist political left. This front had won five Knesset seats in 1988 and comprised of Communist party, Arab Democratic List, and the Progressive List for Peace. Ahmed Tibi, an Israeli Arab member of the Knesset, held that the Intifada was a legitimate means for the Palestinian

Palestinians to press the Israeli government to negotiate with the PLO and to assert their right to self-determination (Yani, 1991).

They also criticised Rabin's harsh policies in suppressing the Intifada. Abdel Wahab Daraw, an Arab Knesset member, resigned from the Labour Party in protest against the official policy and started the first political party in Israel's history, namely Arab Democratic Party (J. Aronoff, 1993). This meant that many Israeli Arabs, who had traditionally voted for Zionist parties, especially the Labour and its predecessor Mapai, would no longer support Labour as long as the latter supported suppressing the Palestinian national struggle. The change in the politics of the Israeli Arabs would later make its impact when Rabin needed their support in the Knesset to proceed with the Oslo Accord

The second position was adopted by the radical Zionist left which comprised of Shinui, Mapam, and Ratz and it had won 10 seats in the 1988 election. They argued that the Intifada was a legitimate means of achieving Palestinian self-determination Although they felt that a limited use of force against the Intifada was legitimate, they advocated negotiations with Palestinians or with the PLO towards an independent Palestinian state (Yani, 1991). The intensity and persistence of the Intifada gave some credibility to their view on the matter. For example, Deputy Speaker of the fifteenth Knesset and a leader academic Naomi Chazen, argued that "the Intifada did strengthen our [Meretz] argument that the status quo was impossible and that we should put an end to the occupation" (Quoted in Al. Barari, 2004:37). This position was also closer to the one adopted by the Labour 'doves' including Minister Ezer Weizmann, Yossi Beilin, Uzi Baram, Nawaf Massalha, and Haim Ramon (Ibid.).

The radical right adopted the third position. This front was comprised of Tehiya, Moledet, and Tzomet and together they had seven seats in the Knesset. Moledet had campaigned on one issue; the idea of 'transfer', according to which the 'solution' to the Intifada was to peacefully expel Palestinians from the Occupied Territories. Some of Likud's leaders as well, such as Ariel Sharon, David Levy, and Yitzhak Modai were very close to this group on matters pertaining to the Intifada. According to this school of argument the Intifada was illegitimate and was an attempt by the Palestinian to put an end to the State of Israel and hence, they advocated tougher measures against the residents of the occupied territories (Yani, 1991).

The position of the religious parties, which had increased their representation to 18 seats in the 1988 Knesset, was not monolithic. The NRP (5 seats) was close to Likud, but a minority within the NRP was closer to the radical right Shas (6 seats), while closer to Labour concerning negotiations, advocated tougher military measures to put an end to the Intifada. Agudat Yisrael (5 seats) and Degel Hatorah (2 seats) were closer to Labour on the three above-mentioned issues, namely legitimacy, strategy and the peace process (Mahler, 2004).

The Labour mainstream position was different from Likud's in the sense that it was less ideological and hence, was more flexible. It recognised the Palestinian aspiration for self-determination but simultaneously contended that Israel must be involved in determining the scope of Palestinian aspirations statehood The Intifada was viewed as illegitimate and a threat to Israel's security, and as a consequence, a strategy of containment was advocated (Arian, 1995). Labour leaders, whether doves or hawks, acknowledged that the Intifada and the Palestinian problem could not be solved by military means. The growing violence increased a sense of urgency for a political solution. In the early days of the Intifada Shimon Peres stated that "we should strive for a political effort regardless of any end to the ferment in the territories ... If we wait until the riots die down and only then resume our political efforts, the riots will not stop. The situation in the field must be calmed by political peace activities as well" (BBC, 1988:2).

The persistence of the Intifada changed even the view of many within the Labour party who were sceptical about the utility of peace and recognition of PLO Ranan Cohen (2000) argued that the Intifada changed many people, like him, who thought that peace with the Palestinians would not help Israel. The Intifada strengthened the dovish view within the party that Israel should negotiate with the Palestinians and did not exclude the possibility of adopting a 'Palestinian option' and a 'PLO option' rather than pursuing the 'Jordanian option.' Nawaf Massalha—one of the Labour doves—regarded it as the main driving force compelling Israel to start negotiations with the Palestinians and that Israel would not have no alternative but to initiate talks with the PLO (Makovsky, 1996).

Furthermore, many within the Labour party, especially the doves, were concerned that the prolonged occupation would corrupt the Israeli society. The frequent use of force might, they believed, become a matter of routine. This normative concern became prominent after the First Lebanese War of 1982 and increased during the Intifada Ora Namir argued that "the recurrent use of force would lead to intolerance and would create an Israeli generation that

believes in the power of naked force as an alternative to dialogue, and as the only way to resolve disagreements" (Ibid.56). Hawks and Yonetzim (those caught between 'hawks' and 'doves') expressed their concerns over the impact of the use of force as well. Mordechai Gur—a former Chief of Staff and Labour member—expressed fears that the continued occupation would lay the ground for racism and Kahanism (a term, which refers to the racist, anti-Arab ideology that Rabbi Meir Kahane preached during the 1980s until his assassination in November 1990). Kahane believed that the expulsion of the Palestinians from their homes was the only solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Alpher, 1995).

At the same time, the Likud position regarding negotiating a peace settlement remained unchanged. The mainstream within Likud regarded the Intifada as illegitimate and viewed it as a Palestinian fight for the destruction of the State of Israel The Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir told the United Jewish Appeal during a visit to the US that the Intifada was "A war against Israel, against the existence of the State of Israel. I am astonished of some people's short memory. Did we have peace when we did not have those territories" (quoted in Neff, 1988:3). During the duration of the Intifada Shamir and the Likud maintained called on the Arab states and the Palestinians to start direct negotiations to implement the plan for Autonomy Plan.

On 16 December 1977, 'Autonomy Plan' was presented by former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the 39th US President Jimmy Carter in Washington D.C. and on 25 December 1977, presented to the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Ismailia, Egypt, and then presented before the Knesset on 28 December 1977 (Singer, 2019). The 'Autonomy Plan' (self-rule plan) for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was first initiated by Menechem Begin in the exchange of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem that began on 19 November 1977 (Quandt, 2011). In the Israeli Knesset, during his visit, Sadat had given a speech in that offered Israel complete peace in return for full Israeli withdrawal from the Israeli-occupied Sinai as well as demanded Israel recognise the right of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip populations to self-determination, including right to establish their own state (Weizman, 1981).

Subsequently, autonomy plans have been drafted by former ministers including Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon and Transport Minister Haim Landau. The Plan consisted several points regarding 1.1 Million Palestinians were living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Claiborne, 1979). The plan was a 26-point document that was

known as 'Autonomy Plan' or Self- rule for Palestinian Arabs and the residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was intended to bring a permanent solution to the Palestinian question by maintaining self-rule arrangements for the Palestinians (Singer, 2019).

The plan concise self-rule to administrative functioning only and was stressing self-governing administrative council in the occupied territories but not legislative functions. The authority was mentioned in the draft were driving solely from the Israel government (Claiborne, 1979). That means basically, the administrative council could be dissolved by Israel if it found unable to adhere to the principles laid down in its charter.

The Plan stated that an elected people, including a chairman, an 11-member administrative council elected by residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would operate social and educational services (Fahmy, 1983). Security and public order in the territories would remain the responsibility of the Israeli Army. Administrative included following departments such as autonomy was given to agriculture department, health department, religious affairs, welfare and labour department, industry and commerce department, finance, communications, culture and education department, internal and judicial administration and Police department(Quandt, 2011). According to the Israeli model, these responsibilities will be transferred from the Military Government to the Palestinian council, as soon as it is elected in free elections (Claiborne, 1979). The Israeli occupation army would withdraw from its headquarters in the centres of major towns to new emplacements, presumably in strategic rural positions and in the vicinity of Jewish civilian settlements. But the military administration would remain as an overseer of Palestinian autonomy (Journal of Palestine Studies, 1980).

The Plan also underlined the responsibilities in detail for instance Internal Affairs department includes four sub-departments: local councils, housing and construction, tourism, and local police. According to Israel's conception of autonomy "there shall be no borders between the autonomous region and Israel. Israel would retain the right to acquire land and build new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and would control more than a million acres of 'state land' in the West Bank that was Jordanian public property before Israel conquered the territory in the 1967 June War" (Singer, 2019:04). The plan also claims to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, an issue which under the peace treaty is left open for five years.

The team of Israeli legal experts who prepared the autonomy document wanted to make sure that the autonomy's institutions will never try to express any national independence in any way. In order to remove the temptation to such national expression, Israel does not give the autonomy the right to print stamps nor to mint coins. With this prohibition Israel guarantees to itself that it will not one day be surprised to find that the autonomy has printed a stamp with the picture of Arafat, for example. Israel also maintains its responsibility for all media and information. An independent radio station in the autonomy could turn into an instrument of incitement, and in order to avoid having to operate against it, the authors of the document decided to leave the radio in the hands of Israel (Journal of Palestine Studies, 1980).

Water was a very delicate matter since the water sources for the West Bank and Israel are the same. Therefore, Israel wanted to hold sole responsibility for allocating resources. But on this subject the document proposed joint cooperation with the autonomy. Other joint responsibilities were to be: inhabitants' registration, inspection of those entering and leaving by the Jordan bridges, responsibility for the religious places and abandoned property (Quandt, 2011). Plan also talked that Israel will continue to have the sole responsibility over Jewish settlers and settlements in the territories. According to the plan, all the Israeli settlements shall be beyond the authority of the autonomy (Anziska, 2018). This paragraph came to strengthen the principle that the autonomy Israel proposes was for people, not for land. All the responsibility for security will continue to be in the hands of Israel. On this subject the document makes no compromises and offers no framework for joint responsibility (Tessler, 1994).

The 'Autonomy Plan' has not specified it, but it was clear that Israel had wanted to keep the option of being responsible for fighting terrorism that often used to occur from the territories. It was proposal for an autonomy model not the final position (Quandt, 2011). Needless to say, Israel had no intention of giving the autonomy any authority to maintain foreign relations that might give the West Bank and Gaza Strip a sovereign status. Israel had done all it could prevent the autonomy from developing into a sovereign entity that could lead soon to sovereign Palestinian state (Singer, 2019).

The negative Egyptian reaction to the 'Autonomy Plan' before entering negotiations on its contents promised a heated debate over autonomy. Five months before the destined date the way leading to autonomy seems very long. Plan doubtlessly intended to maintain full Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was therefore unsurprising that Egypt rejected

it out of hand. The plan was the basis for Israel's negotiating nature when autonomy talk start later apparently seemed the extreme bargaining posture along expected by American and Egyptian diplomats (Fahmy, 1983). Egypt rejected the Israeli autonomy plan and said the proposal would obstruct peace efforts in the West Asia (quoted in Journal of Palestine Studies, 1980). Later, a modified version of Begin's 'Autonomy Plan' became the basis for the Camp David negotiations regarding the Palestinian prong of the accords.

The Intifada's only impact on the Likud and its leaders was to force them to present a semblance policy. Shamir was not serious even about autonomy but the notion served the purpose of propaganda (Yanai, 1991). He never endorsed a peace plan, opposed even the Camp David Accords with Egypt, which also included Menachem Begin's plan for Palestinian autonomy. It can be said that Shamir was reluctant because of internal competitions within the Likud Party over making peace with the Arabs and Palestinian Reich & Kieval, 1991).

The Intifada were used to strengthen the Labour's argument as the party pressed Likud for a solution. Prime Minister Shamir, was under pressure from outside, especially the US and he reluctantly responded by declaring what became known as the Shamir Plan and by May 1989, it became Shamir-Rabin Plan Shamir-Rabin plan had come into the picture at the time of two important events namely First Intifada and the election of President Bush in the US (The Knesset, 1989). These two developments had profound impact on Rabin and Shamir. Rabin had sensed that military is not the right mechanism to end the Intifada rather needed to be a negotiated solution from within the framework of the NUG (Ben-Yehuda, 1997). The plan was put before the NUG on 14 May 1989 by both the Yitzhak and brought before the US President Bush by Shamir (Tessler, 1994).

The Plan comprised four points including the peace should be established between Israel and Egypt on the basis of Camp David Accords, second strengthening the establishment of peace between Israel and the Arab states, third the question of Arab refugees should be resolved and the last insisted on the election in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the Palestinian leadership because Israel was no ready to negotiate with PLO (Shlaim, 2000). The fifth issue 'weapon control in the West Asia' was scraped from the plan on the request of Rabin. Moreover, in the response to Rabin-Shamir Plan (it can be seen in the Appendix-4), Egypt President Hosni Mubarak brought 'Ten Points Plan' September 1989 that was rejected by Likud. Subsequently American Secretary of State James Baker presented his 'Five Points Plan' in

December 1989 (Tessler, 1994). The differences and the details of all three plan is examined in the following the themes.

This model emphasised the need to come to terms with the Palestinians and suggested a method of bringing the Palestinians into the negotiating process (Maoz, 1994). Rabin declared early in 1988 that "I've learned something over the past two and one-half months. You cannot rule by force over one-and-a-million Palestinians." A week later, Rabin further observed, "You cannot saddle the IDF with a mission that is outside its proper function. The unrest in the areas reflects a problem that can only have a political solution" (Quoted in Sucharow, 2005: 125). Thus, the significance of Intifada was that the Labour Party's 'non-recognition' policy vis-à-vis the PLO showed signs of change.

Subsequently, the first unanimous step of the NUG the Shamir-Rabin Plan, which came as an Israeli response to the Intifada, will be discussed. Before moving on Shamir-Rabin plan, the impact of Intifada upon the Palestinian politics cannot be overlooked.

The Intifada was a signified shift in the centre of gravity of the Palestinian politics as it moved the theatre of action from the Palestinian diaspora communities in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan to the territories occupied by Israel in the June 1967 War It is also significant because it involved not only the West Bank and Gaza Strip but for the first time witnessed the full participation of Israeli Arab citizens in Galilee and elsewhere Intifada sets the tone for the formulation of Palestinian politics outside the immediate vicinity of the Palestinian territories (Lockman & Beinin, 1989).

Another significant result was a far-reaching shift in the political nature of the national movement which sought to hold on to the option of a military struggle and for liberating all of historic Palestine The national movement began focusing its commitment to political negotiations as the only way of accomplishing the aim of a Palestinian state within a narrow territorial arena of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Erika, 1994).

It also furthered the political prospects of the Palestinian struggle. It did so primarily by focusing international consideration for contesting the Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was happening at a time when many Israelis and members of the world community were demonstrating a growing tendency to accept and recognise the political-territorial status quo. A direct consequence of the heightened global attention to the Palestinian issue was a greater emphasis on the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian inter-

communal conflict and not merely the Israeli-Arab interstate-conflict in reaching of possible formulas for a West Asia peace (Ibid.).

In this regard, Maoz wrote that "On the Palestinian side, the Intifada created the need to achieve practical political results on grounds that were attainable only by means of negotiations with Israel and thus induced the Palestinian leadership to adopt a more flexible attitude and seek-like the government of Israel-an acceptable formula that would enable the beginning of the peace negotiations" (Maoz, 1994:104). F. Robert Hunter, in his work, *"The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means"* (1991) postulated that the Intifada had great impact upon the PLO. Not only did the Intifada rescue the PLO from the relative importantly, it resolved the long-standing political struggle within it between those who clung to the old idea of replacing Israel by a secular democratic state, and those who supported the negotiation tactics been developed by Arafat since the mid-1970s (Hunter, 1991: 165). It was the Intifada, however, that brought Arafat's strategy to its fruition. Without the impetus provided by the popular uprising, the Palestinian leadership could not have moved so fast or so far towards a political settlement with Israel (Ibid.:153).

The Intifada by itself was insufficient to stop the Israeli control over the occupied territories and to establish a Palestinian sovereign state. This was possible only through a diplomatic and political agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Since the Intifada, Palestine did not have a structured, independent leadership or the power to compel Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories Therefore, it became the task of Arafat and the PLO to work towards and reach a negotiated solution. If Arafat was not capable, then there was space for local activists in the occupied territories who might look elsewhere for leadership(Brynen, 1993).

Along with broadening the role of the PLO, the Intifada brought the Palestinian question back on the agenda of the international community and received huge and substantial international consideration and sympathy. It gave strength to the PLO hand vis-a-vis Jordan, polarised Israeli opinion, and isolated Israel even among its western allies and friends (Rubin, 1994).

For its part, the PLO was able to take advantage of the Intifada to place the Palestinian problem on the international agenda and keep it 'hot' (Shalev, 1991). By the end of 1989, the Intifada had stabilised and became more organised. Politically, its main achievement during the second year was to urge the need for direct talks between Israel and the PLO, which had become established de facto. As one PLO leader called, the Intifada was "the real mother of

the peace process" (Rubin, 1994: 42). The Intifada provided, the PLO and the Palestinian people both, strength and independence as a party in the conflict.

In sum up, the Intifada influenced very broadly on the Israeli political discourse. It proved to be resilient and effective and had a direct impact on the intra-party and inter-party politics in Israel. It influenced the internal dynamics of the ruling National Unity Government in Israel. It compelled the Israeli leadership to look for a non-military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its influence on intra-party politics was more salient in Labour and this saw the accelerated the ascendance of the dovish wing of the Party.

The Intifada strengthened the dovish position within the Labour party as it pushed for changes in the party's platform. It also affected the hawks within the party and Rabin who viewed the conflict only as an inter-state one. He was forced to change positions and acknowledge that the Intifada could not be dealt with through the military force alone. This change was of significant as Rabin, who was widely respected within the country for his credibility and his credentials as 'Mr. Security', started to lean towards a Palestinian option (Navon, 2004). He was compelled to enter into talks with local Palestinian leaders to advance a political solution. His political moves were of great importance because they put Shamir and the Likud in a position whereby if they did not adopt or approve a political initiative, Shamir's position as prime minister could be undermined. However, the short-term impact of the Intifada was that of strengthening the hawkish trend to the extent that helped Shamir to narrowly win the 1988 Knesset election (Arian, 1995).

Consequently, the Labour Party, under the leadership of Shimon Peres, lost the election for the fourth time successively since 1977. This defeat was a severe blow to peace because it was inconceivable that Israel could accept a 'land-for-peace' formula under a Likud-led government. For peace to come, Israel had to be governed by the more pragmatic Labour Party (Mahler, 2004). The Intifada, which had forced King Hussein to sever administrative and legal ties with the West Bank in July 1988 indirectly led to Peres' embarrassment when the Labour Party's favoured 'Jordanian option' was lost for ever. It forced the Party to look to the only possible alternative, namely, the Palestinian option.

The Intifada, which continued, albeit with lesser intensity, until the Oslo accords in 1993, affected the Israel domestic politics by enhancing the dovish trend within the Labour party but this was not sufficient to break the logjam (Mendilow, 2003).The Intifada alone could not

explain why the Israeli leaders changed their mind and became more 'prone to peace.' It was an important factor that led to the change but one still needs to understand other factors that also contributed to the Labour Party's shift from non-recognition stand and resulted in the Oslo Accord.

Before addressing these factors, it is essential to briefly highlight some of the peace initiatives which were adopted by internal and external forces to stop the Intifada and to bring peace.

Shultz Peace Plan

The Intifada occurred when Israel was governed by the NUG. The military option failed to stop the Intifada and there was huge criticism from within Israel and internationally as well. Therefore, the Israeli government needed to bring the best solution of this predicament but due to differences the government appeared more paralysed and unable to speak in one voice. Due to internal disagreement concerning the establishment of peace, US Secretary of State George Shultz introduced a plan in March 1988 and subsequently, the US played a significant role to establish tranquillity between Israel and Palestine.

The persistence of the Intifada and Israel's harsh measures against the Palestinians forced international media-led by television news and brought the violence to hundreds of millions homes worldwide. The Intifada helped to motivate the Reagan administration to undertake a new diplomatic effort to foster West Asia peace (Tessler, 1994). The US, committed to Israel's existence and security, developed a peace plan to convince the leaders in the West Asia (Melman & Raviv, 1989). The US tried to mediate a peace agreement through what became known as the Shultz Plan of March 1988, and later through Secretary of State James Baker's 'five points' to end the Intifada and start negotiations between the Israel and Palestine.

The US made its efforts to get the PLO into a diplomatic process, directly or through Jordan. At the same time it was upset and fed up with the PLO's refusal to renounce terrorism and abandon its position that called for the destruction of Israel. US Secretary of State George Shultz stated in October 1987, that "the Palestinians must be involved in the peace process if it is to mean anything. There isn't any question about that. [But] it's also true there isn't a role in the peace process for people whose tactics are violent and refuse to renounce violence,

who refuse to recognise that Israel is there as a state[. Instead, they must be] ready to talk and try to make peace".[27] In March 1988 he said that "The ingredients for a peace process are present. There is an unacceptable and untenable status quo. There are competing parties willing to shed illusions and temper dreams to the underlying realities. And there are realistic and achievable ideas on the table ... This is the moment for a historic breakthrough, and this is the plan" (Washington Report on West Asia Affairs, 1988:1).[28]

The first feature of the Shultz plan was; five permanent UN Security Council members will host Menahem Begin's negotiations that should be attended by all the parties and will accept Resolution 242 and 338 and renounce violence and terrorism. Second, the Palestinian questions would be represented by a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation and negotiate for three-year transitional period for the territories. Transitional period would start three months after the completion of the negotiation (that is, 1 February 1989). Third, the separate bi-lateral negotiations for final settlement would be facilitated by the international meeting but have no veto or enforcement power (Hunter, 1993 & Christison, 1989).

The plan talked about the 'the final talk would begin shortly after an autonomy agreement regardless of whether it was fully implemented. Other feature of the Plan included that the participation of local Palestinians not the PLO, in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, role for the US as an active partner in the negotiation (including even drafting its own autonomy. Last, the bilateral negotiation under the umbrella of an international conference that could not impose its will on the parties themselves.

The Plan primarily calls for an international conference that would function as an umbrella for the direct negotiations between Israel, Jordan, and local Palestinians on interim autonomy for the occupied territories, followed by a dialogue on a permanent status agreement (Tessler, 1990).

In March 1988, he set out his vision and the primary component of his proposal called for Begin accepting the presence of the five permanent UN Security Council members, including participated all parties, UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and relinquishing violence and terrorism. The Palestinians were to be represented by a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation that would negotiate the terms of a three-year transitional period for the territories. The

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[27] This statement is taken from Palestine facts http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_shultz_plan/
[28] https://www.wrmea.org/1988-april/editorial-is-the-shultz-plan-serious.html

international conference would facilitate separate bilateral negotiations for a final settlement but would not have veto or enforcement powers (Marcus, 1988).

The NUG which was in power at that time had ideological differences. It was obvious that neither Likud nor Labour could impose any course of action, partly because each had veto power over the other in the coalition. Moreover, neither of them could form a government without the participation of the other (Aronoff, 1996). This reality revealed itself Peres, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, reached the London Agreement with King Hussein on 11 April 1987 (Al. Barari 2004). This initiative was blocked because of the ideological stand of Shamir and was rejected by him. Shamir believed that through the initiative Israel would be forced to make territorial concessions and would, in turn, undermine Israel's long-term claims to sovereignty over the Occupied Territories. It is against this background, one has to analyse the Israeli politics over Shultz Plan. What were the stands of both parties?

The disagreement between the two parties peaked following Shamir's reluctant stand of the Shultz plan. The international conference proposed by Shultz would not have the power to impose an agreement or to veto any agreement reached among the parties (*The Jordan Times*, 1988). The Palestinian issue would, it envisaged, be discussed in the negotiations between the Israeli and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegations and this was one of the packages of the initiative. Shultz suggested six months for negotiating a transitional arrangement starting from 1 May 1988 and would lead to an implementation nine months later. Negotiations on the final status, it envisaged, could be concluded within a year.

Above all, the plan did not mention the PLO and thus was consistent with stand of both Labour and Likud. The PLO had not got space in the plan and this led to its rejection by the Palestinian. As far as Israel's stand is concerned it was passive and it has neither accepted nor rejected the US initiative (Flamhaft, 1996). At the same time, the plan was the subject of bitter debate, especially because the Labour leaders were in favour of it. Defence Minister Rabin stated, in one of his lectures in March 1988, that Israel must respond positively to the Shultz initiative (Ibid.).

Rabin argued that Israel should strive to reach an agreement with Jordan through which Israel would relinquish parts of the Occupied Territories and agree to Jordanian sovereignty over the territories evacuated by the IDF. The Labour ministers, Rabin, who were traditionally more sensitive than Likud to the opinion of the US were also concerned about the

implications of not responding positively to the Shultz peace initiative (Navon, 2004). In an exchange between Shamir and Peres, the latter responded: "If the deadlock persists and we don't take part in the peace process, if we don't adopt a diplomatic option with Jordan, we will be left with the PLO" (Kidron, 1988:7). It is essential to remember that at that time both Likud and Labour were opposed to the PLO.

Shimon Peres was the most enthusiastic among his cabinet colleagues to the idea of having Jordan as a partner. He believed that this would undermine what he perceived as the high international standing of the PLO and would convince Jordan to co-operate with Israel. Appreciating Jordan's inter-Arab calculations and constraints, Peres was convinced that the best way to involve Amman was through an international conference that would lead to direct negotiations with Jordan and to exchange 'land-for-peace' (Makovsky, 1996)).

Thus, Likud's rejection of the Shultz plan in April 1988" (Shindler, 1995 & Sherbok, el-alami, 2003) stemmed from its dislike and suspicion of the idea of the international conference and its view of the nature of this conference. This rejection of the idea of an international conference was tantamount to the rejection of negotiating a peaceful settlement based on the land-for-peace formula. This position of Shamir made it impossible for Jordan to even contemplate direct negotiations with Israel but without the backing of the PLO (Rynhold, 1997). King Hussein's options were limited to two: to engage in direct negotiations with Israel if there was a commitment for an Israeli withdrawal from all the Occupied Territories including East Jerusalem and this was the only way he could bypass the PLO or break off with the Arab consensus; alternatively to negotiate under the umbrella of international conference and in this case territorial concession would be possible(Aggestam, 1999).

Shamir was ready to start negotiations with Jordan without preconditions but he was not prepared to deviate from the Camp David Accords which only promised social and economic not political and territorial autonomy to the Palestinians. However, he and his close ally, Minister Moshe Arens, did not vote in favour of the Camp David Accords when they were brought before the Knesset on-27 September 1978 (Quandt, 2011).

The Labour on the other hand and its leader Peres believed that a political solution to the Palestinian problem might be attained through Jordan. In a meeting of the Labour party in

April 1988, he insisted that Jordan was still ready to embark on negotiations in accordance with the London Agreement (Yorke, 1988).

Shimon Peres was in favour of the Shultz initiative, and repeatedly argued that if Israel could hold on to the status quo, then it would open the possibility of the PLO stepping at the expense of Jordan. His sense of urgency, like that of all doves, was intense. He argued that if there would be no start of the peace process, it would be highly possible that war would erupt between the Arabs and Israel. Hence, it would be in Israel's interest to avert war by embarking on negotiations with them (Roberts, 1990)).

Shamir was remained unmoved over the Shultz Plan. In between, in a significant move King Hussain decided to withdraw from Palestinian issue by disengaging from the West Bank and this became a turning point in the peace process (Golan, 2015). In a speech to the nation on 22 February 1986, Hussein expressed his disappointment with Arafat in terms of his reneging on his promise to recognise 242 Resolution. Finally, in July 1988 the King declared that Jordan was not interested any further to speak for the Palestinians and the PLO would the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians (BBC, 1988). It was a clear message to the Israelis that the Jordanian option was not feasible and that the former should talk to the PLO if they were interested in finding a solution. The king's decision was a turning point in the history of the peace process and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Asher Susser, former director of the Moshe Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, observed that for the first time in history, the King of Jordan was admitting that the Palestinians were not just a partner but an equal partner. The Disengagement decision sealed the fate of the Jordanian option. Hussein's decision was primarily an outcome of the Intifada (Navon, 2004). In an interview given to Professor Avi Shlaim in London on 3 December 1996, the King asserted: "… it was the Intifada that really caused our decision on disengagement from the West Bank ... I simply tried to help them [the Palestinians] by that decision" (Shlaim, 2000:12).

Hussein's decision embarrassed the Labour leadership and came days before the 1988 Knesset election. The party's platform for the election mentioned Jordan as a partner for the envisioned international conference. The Labour Party, therefore, went to the election without any real option. It was opposed to talks with the PLO, and Hussein made it clear that Jordan would not bypass the PLO. This means that the Jordanian option was truly over.

At that time, on 13 September 1988, Arafat had given a very vague speech at the European Parliament and little later on 13 December 1988 at the UN General Assembly regarding his recognition of UN Security Council Resolution 242. This paved the way for the Reagan administration to 'enter into a substantive dialogue with PLO representative' (Ben-Yehuda, 1997).

The above developments left the Israeli government with three options, namely, to begin the negotiation process with an elected Palestinian delegation from the West Bank, to negotiate with the PLO or to maintain the status quo (Navon, 2004). Yossi Beilin favoured negotiation with the PLO, whereas Rabin and Arens were inclined towards elected Palestinian delegation from the West Bank. For his part, Shamir advocated the last option to maintain the status quo. Arens advocated Israel to figure out for new discussers on the ground, especially for people who have a constituency and for the people who represent the Palestinian population in the area. That means talking with the Palestinians who 'accepted' negotiations which the PLO 'rejected.' Having carried out this thought, Arens and Rabin eventually persuaded Shamir to come up with a peace plan that would facilitate direct negotiations between Israel and the elected local Palestinian leadership (Ibid.).

Hence, negotiating with the PLO was not acceptable; the basic idea was to talk to Palestinians but not with the PLO. Despite their differences at this juncture both the both parties were adamantly opposed to talking to the PLO. As the pressure from the Intifada and Labour ministers mounted, Shamir decided to take the diplomatic initiative to alleviate pressure. Thus, the Israeli government endorsed a peace plan in May 1989 which called on the Palestinians to elect their representatives to negotiate with Israel for an interim agreement and this is known as Shamir-Peres Peace Plan.

Shamir-Rabin Peace Plan (1989)

The four-point plan was put forward amid two key events; the worsening of the Palestinian uprising and the election of President George W Bush in the US. Both had a profound effect on Defence Minister Rabin and Prime Minister Shamir. The former become aware that force was not the sole weapon needed for ending the Intifada and that there was a need for a negotiated political solution within the framework of the NUG. This position was different from his stand the previous year; when interviewed on the Israeli television he had stated that "They (the Palestinians) are leading it (the Intifada) in an incorrect manner, in a manner of

violence, but we will suppress this violence ... We prefer to establish an order using a minimum of force, but one thing is clear; we shall prove to them that nothing can be achieved through violence. It is preferable indeed that the period of violence be shortened since those who will mainly suffer from this are the residents of the territories" (quoted in Lochery, 1996:188). However, by the following January, the emphasis in Rabin's public pronouncements moved towards a dialogue and he observed: "I am telling them (the residents of the territories) that I want you to know that we are ready to talk to you. You are the partners to negotiations. The time for you has come to want more than to throw stones and abandon that path and sit down and negotiate with us" (Ibid. 189).

Moreover, Shamir was extremely concerned about Israel's deteriorating image abroad, particularly in the US. After eight years of warm relations between the Reagan administration and Israel, there were concerns whether President Bush would prove to be a strong supporter of Israel (Navon, 2004). Shamir's staff had monitored Bush's statements during his time as Vice President and during the American Presidential campaign. They foresaw more problems in dealing with him than with President Reagan (Lochery, 1996). Shamir, therefore, felt the need to improve Israel's image abroad and to please the new American administration (Rynhold, 1997). The existence of a peace plan approved by the NUG cabinet prevented the Labour Party from leaving the government (Ibid.).

Additionally, in January 1989, with public opinion moving in favour of peace, four Knesset members joined the PLO officials in Paris for discussion on the West Asian Peace and both sides characterised this as a step towards formal and high-level dialogue (Brynen, 1993). Contributing to the Israeli willingness to come to the negotiation table was the weakening of the economy with an estimated loss in 1988 of at least US$1.5 billion because of the Intifada. Minister of Finance Shimon Perez confirmed in June 1989 that "the Intifada had cost Israel, directly and indirectly, between 1.5 and 2 billion dollars per year" (quoted in Shalve, 1991:154).

Since the outbreak of the Intifada, the doves within Labour had pressed for a political initiative to end the conflict with the Palestinians. A Labour Member of the Knesset Haim Ramon argued that the "Intifada erupted because the Likud destroyed the chance for negotiations with Jordan … the military solution is not possible. The only solution is to talk with anyone who is ready to recognise the existence of Israel and its right to live in security

and peace" (A. Barrari, 2004:47). His use of the word 'anyone' is indicative because the PLO met these conditions in Amman Summit[29] and therefore came to qualify as a partner.

Therefore, Rabin who was gradually moving towards advocating a Palestinian option and some type of self-determination, declared his peace plan in January 1988 and later this plan subsumed the earlier Shamir plan. The Intifada had had a sobering effect on Rabin. Although he had committed to the Labour Party leaving the NUG if necessary, he did believe in the necessity of maintaining it if possible and pressed Shamir to adopt a peace initiative (Beilin, 1999). He suggested a peace plan based on elections in the Occupied Territories so that the Palestinians could choose their representatives to negotiate an interim agreement with Israel. Rabin demanded a Palestinians pledge for a six-month moratorium on the Intifada to prepare for the election (Bookmiller, 1997).

Shamir was unable to put an end to the Intifada, was under pressure from the Labour Party and was subjected to increasing American pressure (Sherbok & El-alami, 2003). These forced him to agree Rabin's election proposal. Shamir announced his plan for elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the government endorsed it on 14 May 1989 (Caplan, 1998). Shamir proposed holding free and democratic elections in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in an atmosphere devoid of violence and terror.

These elections were aimed at choosing Palestinian representatives from the Occupied Territories who would negotiate an interim agreement with the Israeli government to establish a self-governing authority (Ibid.). This five-year transitional period would be a test for coexistence and co-operation. During the interim period, matters of security, foreign affairs, and anything that was relevant to Israeli citizens in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were to be in Israeli hands. The Palestinians would be accorded self-rule during the transitional period. Shamir stipulated that the end of the Intifada would have to come before implementing his election plan. Above all, this plan ruled out any negotiations with the PLO

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[29] In 1987, Jordan's King Hussein and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres initiated a peace process in a secret London meeting, after prolong intense communication effort between both leaders and trusted aides. Subsequently, "The London Document (can be seen in the Appendix-3)" prepared on 11 April 1987. Regarding "The London Ducument" Hussain made his effort to build a partnership with PLO, with himself as the senior partner, wanted to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute and regaining the West Bank. The PLO's collapse in the Israel's attack on Lebanon and the increasing Israel's settlement in the West Bank drove Hussein to ponder that Yassir Arafat might be weak and willing enough to accompany him to the negotiating table as his junior partner and political cover. Therefore, Hussaein and Arafat signed an agreement, on 11 February 1985, Amman which is known an Amman agreement (Eisenberg & Caplan, 1998).

and opposed the formation of a Palestinian state between Jordan and Israel in the immediate term (Ibid.).

The plan which called for elections in the Occupied Territories leading to Palestinian autonomy was approved by the NUG Cabinet on 14 May 1989 with three Likud Ministers voting against (Ariel Sharon, David Levy and Yitzhak Moda'i) who insisted that the plan went too far. Two Labour Ministers (Ezer Weizman and Rafi Edri) also voted against claiming that the plan did not go far enough (Franklin, 1989).

However, it was from the Likud that the most vigorous opposition emerged. The three Ministers who opposed the plan claimed that it would lead to a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories. Such assertions were based not only on the plan itself but also due to calls from some elements of the Labour Party to open a dialogue with the PLO (Ibid.). The group of Likud Ministers dubbed as the "constraints faction" or "Shackle Ministers" demanded four constraints or amendments to the plan: No participation of East Jerusalem Arabs in the elections; An end to the Intifada before negotiations take place; No to talking with the PLO and no to a Palestinian state; and continuation of the Jewish settlement programme in the West Bank (Navon, 2004).

As Shamir said in his speech to the Knesset on 17 May 1989: "our proposals (are) not directed at them (PLO). We know that they do not have an interest in peace, our call is directed to our neighbours and the citizens of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip" (quoted in Al. Barari, 2004:126).

Shamir's proposal was not an attractive one for the Palestinians or the Arabs. First, it did not visualise any role for the PLO and as a consequence would never be blessed by Arafat (Aronoff, 1990). The plan was only an Israeli favour aimed at putting an end to the Intifada and at disguising Shamir's intransigence. For its part, the PLO had made revolutionary decisions in November 1988. For the first time, it had accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242, recognised Israel's right to exist, and renounced terrorism in all its forms (Caplan, 1998).

On the Israeli side, many politicians, including some Labour ministers, were not convinced of the feasibility of their government's plan. The Science and Technology Minister, Ezer Weizmann (Labour), for example, did not approve of the initiative. His rejection of the

initiative stemmed from his belief that only the PLO could deliver. He maintained that negotiations with the PLO and Arafat must be conducted soon (Rolef, 2003).

The emergence of this loose alliance of Ministers was a major threat to Shamir. Had he ignored these intra-party considerations and pressed ahead with the plan he would have faced increasing opposition from within his own party. It was also clear that the views of the "Shackle Ministers" reflected a vast majority of Likud members. Consequently, Shamir was faced with a difficult choice between the position of NUG and his own intra-party considerations. At a crucial meeting of the Likud Central Committee held on 5 July 1989 Shamir was forced by the "Shackle Ministers" for a series of tactical votes led by Sharon the Chairman of the Central Committee (Rynhold, 1997).

The Labour Party's response to these events was swift. Peres rejected Likud's position and stated that NUG was bound by the original vote of the cabinet. However, Shamir's decision marked the beginning of the end of the NUG with relations between him and Rabin deteriorating. From then on, the NUG was dominated by the two key personalities who for ideological and personal reasons wished to see the demise of the government namely, Peres and Sharon (Nochery, 1997).

Baker's Peace Initiatives (December 1989) and the Collapse of the NUG (March 1990)

The emergence of two external peace initiatives put forward by the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (4 September 1989) and the US Secretary of State Baker (14 October 1989; Baker initiative bridged the gap between Mubarak and Shamir plan), further destabilised the government. The plan "Baker's Five Point Plan" (details can be seen in the Appendix-5) aimed at holding a dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli delegations in Cairo.

The addition of these two plans divided the NUG into three groupings: the Labour Party who supported the NUG plan as well as the foreign proposals; Shamir who was against both the foreign initiatives but in favour of the NUG plan and finally the "Shackle Ministers" in the Likud who rejected all three (Nochery, 1997).

Shamir's acceptance of the NUG reflected the growing concern within the Likud over the Bush Administration and its views on the peace process. Baker, while addressing a meeting of the AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) in May 1989 urged Israel to forget

about 'Greater Israel.' In clear and direct terms, he observed: "For Israel now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel. Israeli interests in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, security and otherwise, can be accommodated in a settlement based on Resolution 242. Forswear annexation and stop settlement activity" (quoted in, Ibid.:192).

The Likud was suspicious that the US was trying to move the NUG too far from its agreed position. However, the significant achievement of both external plans was that remained unsuccessful (Arian, 1993). The NUG eventually collapsed in March 1990 when Shamir accepted the views of the "Shackle Ministers" that no Palestinian representatives from East Jerusalem or deportees be allowed to take part in the meeting in Cairo to discuss the Palestinian elections (Navon, 2004). Rabin sought a compromise whereby the Palestinian could take part but not vote but this was rejected by Shamir. It became clear to Rabin that there was no point in continuing with the government. Shamir was unwilling to alter his position even after Foreign Minister Moshe Arens had privately come to an arrangement with Secretary of State Baker (Sherbok & El-alami, 2003). They agreed that Israel should consider the Palestinian participants on a name-to-name basis and accepting the criteria that the list would include people who had an additional address in Jerusalem or had been expelled at one time. The rejection of this plan by Likud and subsequently by the Cabinet proved to be the final nail in the coffin of the NUG (Lochery, 1996).

It was Rabin's decision to leave the government which proved vital to the Labour Party's withdrawal. In his speech to the Central Committee of the party held on 12 May 1990 he stated that that "despite my desire to continue the peace process within the NUG, without a peace process, a fact resulting from the objection to providing a positive reply to Baker's question, I see no point in the continued existence of a unity government that blocks the process instead of promoting it. This is the question we are faced with. This is the question that the Likud members should ask themselves today and tomorrow, as it is impossible to carry on. There is nothing over which to drag things out" (quoted in Nochery, 1996:194). Subsequently, the Labour Party Bureau and the party Knesset members were given a green light to vote against the NUG at the time of no confidence motion.

Moreover, the new Bush US administration, which took office in January 1989, was different from its predecessor. While Reagan had pursued a West Asia policy which was based on a strategic understanding with Israel, Bush and Baker sought to pursue a more even-handed

policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict (Mor, 1997). On different occasions, they spelled out their rejection of Shamir's settlement policies and both understood that territorial compromise was the key to a solution. Hence, Baker maintained that pressure when he put forward his five-point plan in December 1989 and thought that "there was a way to bridge the distance between Shamir's four points and Mubarak's ten points" (Tessler, 2000:45). The Plan was also described that Israeli delegation only be in the meeting after the convincing list of Palestinian delegation has been finalised. Moreover, Plan was also mentioned that Israel would speak based on Shamir's Plan (Baker, 1995). The main disturbing point was who would the representative from Palestine. Shamir was not ready to accept anyone from East Jerusalem and from the outside Occupied Territories. Despite its clear pro-Israeli position and its granting of veto power for Israel over who would represent the Palestinians, the PLO agreed with the Baker's plan whereas Shamir rejected the idea (Nochery, 1997).

Baker unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Israeli government that his five-point initiative was good for Israel and had the potential to lead to peace. Shamir remained unconvinced. The main point of contention was over who would represent the Palestinians. Shamir refused to have any Palestinian from East Jerusalem and from outside the Occupied Territories—even deportees who were legally from the West Bank and Gaza Strip—as participants in the negotiations (Zartman, 2001). Baker and Bush concluded that as long as Shamir was head of the Israeli government, there would be no chance for negotiations to get started. The relationship between Israel and the Bush administration had become tense and reached its peak after the Labour Party left the NUG in March 1990, and with the formation of a right-wing Israeli government in June (Rynhold, 1996).

In an unprecedented move, Baker blamed Shamir publicly and announced that he would not interfere unless he is sure that the other party is serious and added: "... everybody over there should know the telephone number is XXXXXX. When you are serious about peace with Palestinian, call us"(Navon, 2004:13). The Gulf War over Kuwait temporarily averted a confrontation between Israel and the Bush administration, but the result of the war affected Israel's strategic stance.

The rejection of Baker's five-points was the last nail in the coffin of the NUG. The Labour Party, who had conditioned its participation in the NUG on the progress in the peace process, concluded that Shamir would never budge and was only playing for time. Peres lived up to his pledge, and in March 1990 gave Shamir an ultimatum that if the latter did not accept the

five-point Baker Plan, the Labour Party would withdraw from the coalition. Shamir responded by sacking Peres and this forced the resignation of all Labour ministers. In the subsequent motion of no-confidence held on 15 March 1990, all Labour members voted against the government and contributed to its fall (Shlaim, 1995).

However, Shimon Peres who was asked by the President Chaim Herzog in 18 March 1990 to form a government failed to put together a working coalition with the help of religious parties (Sherlok & El-alami, 2003). As a result, Shamir was again given the opportunity to form a government, and he succeeded in forming a right-of-centre government on 11 June 1990. It was clear that with such a government, the prospect for peace was nil (Ibid.). Despite this, the under intense American pressure the Shamir government was forced to go to the Madrid Peace Conference. Shamir's government had redefined the political agenda. Despite being the most radical government in Israel's history, the Likud-led government in effect legitimised the Labour Party's peace agenda with the decision of the Shamir to attend the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991 (Beilin, 1992). In addition to this, the responses of the Likud-led government to the Kuwait crisis, the government's complicated relationship with the American administration and the arrival of the Soviet Aliyah, resulted in shifting the 'political goalposts' in Israel (Navon, 2004).

Moreover, the end of Cold War and the American emergence as ana hegemonic power set out the prerequisite for Oslo. Consequently, it is necessary to understand the significance of these changes.

Impacts of the Kuwait War and the End of the Cold War

This segment of the chapter will focus on a different but interrelated dimension of the peace process and led to the Labour Party forming its recognition policy vis-à-vis the PLO. The collapsed of the Cold War led to the US becoming the hegemonic power in the world, especially in West Asia.

Indeed, these developments changed the regional and global environments for Israel as well as the PLO. Certainly, it may be argued that changes in the external environment and specifically the end of the Cold War engendered a positive environment for the conduct of a peace process. The external factors provided the necessary preconditions for what may be termed the initiation of conflict resolution in the West Asia. This section examines to what

extent regional and global changes influenced Israeli strategic thinking in general and Labour Party in particular vis-a-vis the PLO.

After the Second World War, the global strategic battle commenced between the Soviet Union and the United States. That era was called Cold War period. This global strategic rivalry between the superpowers reached out to the entire world and the West Asian region was one of them. The war had immensely dominated the West Asian's conflict structure, and had a profound impact on it (Garfinkle, 1996). Thus, during the Cold War, the efforts to establish peace between Israel and Palestine were struck due to the Cold War (Avineri, 1993). The prolonged impasse was resolved after dissolution of the cold war conflict. Between 1986 and 1989, domestic, political and economic pandemonium, forced to the Soviet Union gradually to withdraw from the West Asian region (Bruner 1990).

Subsequently, there was no longer a superpower rival against the US and the American domination had grown up considerably in the West Asian region (Fermann, 1994). In the beginning of 1990s, the leadership from USSR made a start to focus on advancing peace and stability in the West Asian region (Kimche, 1996). In this initiative, the Soviet was performing closer and stood with the US peace plan. Moscow wished to retrieve some its presence and influence in the region by performing an interlocutor role in terms of establishing a reconciliation deal between Jews and Arabs (Bruner, 1990). This closeness and togetherness initiative were vindicated especially during the time that Mikhail Gorbachev— the last leader of USSR—came to endorse the ideas of US President Bush. He had demonstrated his complete rejection of and critical attitude towards Iraq following the latter's invasion of Kuwait. On 9 September 1990 through the Helsinki communiqué Gorbachev outlined the Soviet policy towards the region (Tibi, 1993).

Influence of the Kuwait War on Israel

Since the collapsed of the Ottoman Empire, the Kuwait war was a significant occurrence in the West Asian region (Tibi, 1993). No regimes had been collapsed. No changes had occurred in the borders. The prolonged conflict between Palestine and Israel endured unsolved. The regional tranquillity and stability were also not established (Butenschon, 1992). The war had begun in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August and its subsequent annexation of the State of Kuwait. It was a war waged by an UN-authorised coalition force of 34 countries led by the US against Iraq (Makovsky, 1996). Subsequently,

the War had huge ramifications in the West Asia region in general and the Israel-Palestine peace process in particular. After the invasion, Iraq replaced the Palestinian question as the central concern that preoccupied the Arab world as a whole (Ibid.).

The Gulf War's influence reached out to the Israeli public when the latter had taken their inclination towards the Likud government. At that time, the government's action was justified by the public, in the form of advancing sanctions on the Palestinians. The sanctions came into effect with a result of two conditions. First, the PLO and the moderate Palestinian political leaders were unwilling to criticise the Iraqi invasion. Secondly, the launching of Iraqi Scuds missiles against Israel was celebrated by Palestinian with the images of Palestinians cheering the missiles (Peretz, 1991).[30] Subsequently, the Palestinian workers from the occupied territories were not allowed to enter Israel. The borders between Israel-proper and the occupied territories were closed by the Israeli military (Ibid.). As a result, the economic condition of Palestinian had deteriorated considerably.

At that time, due to immigration from Russia between 1989 and 1991, the Israeli population had been increased by nearly half a million. This led to a reduction in the Israeli GDP and a deterioration of the economic activity (ibid.). This development proved to be curse for the Palestinians and worsened their economic situation and resulted in a boomerang-effect for Israel. It strengthened the line of conflict with the Palestinians.

The Israeli society, at the psychological level, was also influenced by the War. Subsequently, it brought changes in the thoughts of a few policymakers. There were two syndromes, namely syndrome of Qadhafi-Saddam and missile Scud syndrome, identified by Ehud Sprinzak that grow up in Israel as a result of the Kuwait war (quoted in Flamhaft, 1996:82). The Qadhafi-Saddam syndrome created a kind of fear in the feelings of people that an Arab leader could launch an attack somewhere to wipe out the Jews state. These syndromes had developed a peril and vulnerability feeling due some Arab countries possessing of such weapons which can launched from a long distance. Thus, it become evident for Israeli politicians the need for future safety especially the security of Israeli public. In that regards, the Israeli politicians had to rethink on other options and methods (Fermann, 1994). In that changing scenario, Peres observed it and said that the political scene was seen changing in the West Asia. Having seen that, the Israeli policy also should be changed, especially his vision of a 'New Middle East'

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[30] As mentioned above Amoz supported land for peace formula, at this moment right-wing government decision in the form of sanction on Palestine was supported by Amoz and Yael Dayanlike (Flamhaft, 1996).

constituted economic cooperation, accommodation, and the negotiation should be the substitute for military deterrence (Peres, 1993). The transformation and the changes of the Israeli strategic thinking were visible in the 1992 Knesset elections.[31]

Influence of the Gulf War on the PLO

In August 1990, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War fundamentally altered the political landscape of West Asia and made peace a possibility. Iraq was defeated by the US-led coalition comprising of European and Arabs countries During the late 1980s, Iraq was considered a close friend of PLO. It had happened due to the Palestinian relationship with Egypt and Syria were not healthy and were weaker. This made Iraq to get closer to the PLO (Muslih, 1992). It, therefore, was said that the Iraqi attack on Kuwait was not condemned and opposed by the Palestinian leadership. It was being said that this was not an accurate interpretation that the PLO had directly supported the Iraqi invasion (Niblock, 1994). True or not this factor contributed a considerable loss for the PLO. It had eroded the position, image, and support the PLO had gained in the international political arena in the 1980s.

In addition, the PLO also lost the political and economic backing of some Gulf countries including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Andoni, 1991). The Palestinian workers, in huge numbers, were employed in Kuwait but were declared non grata after the war. Around 330,000 were employed in Kuwait but became unemployed and had to abandon the country (Hassassian, 1997). These expelled Palestinian workers' remittances sustained the economy of the Occupied Territories. Some of the Palestinian workers had gone to Jordan; rest moved to Palestine and brought about an increase of the Palestinian population to 82 per cent (Peretz, 1991 & Wilson, 1994).

This conflicting development had exacerbated political and economic conditions in Palestine (Joffe, 1993). This event left a huge loss for the Palestinians and was estimated at US$10

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[31]. The election in the summer of 1992 was undoubtedly the most important in the history of Israel. For the first time since its electoral defeat in 1977, the Labour Party was able to emerge as a clear winner on a definitive peace platform. Not only did Labour win more seats than Likud, but more importantly Labour had a blocking majority. Labour and parties to its left obtained 61 seats, with Labour alone obtaining 44 seats. As a consequence Likud had no chance whatsoever to form a government with the support of the right-wing and religious partiesInterestingly, the election came only a few months after the Likud-led government, under intense American pressure, agreed to attend the Madrid Peace Conference, which eventually commenced in October 1991 (Nochery, 1996).

billion (Muslih, 1992). In addition, the Palestinians workers were unable to work in Israel due to closure of the borders with the occupied territories. These had contributed enormously to the economic setbacks of the residents of Palestine. Subsequently, the living standard of Palestinians had fallen considerably fallen. It had created difficulties for the PLO to get out of this miserable condition (Peretz, 1996).

As a result, the PLO almost was appeared financially bankrupt (Rolef, 1997). The national unity was threatened due to polarisation within the Palestinian camp. Arafat was criticised by the Palestinian opposition and the Arab states. Those radical and Islamists groups affiliated with PLO had opposed and criticised to the pragmatic leadership in the moderate centre (Brobak, 1998). Therefore, the PLO leadership had to find out ways to maintain its power among the Palestinian population rather considering national liberation strategies. During that moment, the survival of PLO rested on Arafat's credibility and efficiency in reclaiming the lost assets including international credibility and support. He had to maintain terms with Israeli concessions so that he could revive the economy improve the conditions of population of the Occupied Territories (Freedman & Karsh, 1993).

These combined internal and external conditions had created pressure on Arafat. It had derived him from reconsidering PLO's strategy, and the goal had to be flexible and he succumbed to the conditions of Israel and the US ruing the run-up to the Madrid conference (Abi-Ezzi, 1996). The US was working for the limited inclusion of the PLO and Palestinian on the political scene, during the preparatory session for Madrid negotiation.

At that juncture, especially in the post-Gulf War period, the manoeuvring-space of the PLO had been shrunk considerably. The Palestinian leadership was under substantial political pressure. It was exhausted and was left with no option except to accede to the demands and preconditions of Israel and the US to remain in relevant and to overcome the complete political exclusion and to bring about an economical solution for Palestinian populations. On the other hand, especially after the War, Israel had too lost little manoeuvring space due the US pressures.

These political changes brought changes in the PLO's attitude. First, to get into an open-ended negotiation with Israel was accepted by the PLO. Secondly, the previous demands, especially its recognition as an equal peace partner, had departed (Muslih, 1992). The significance of this point is those earlier peace initiatives often stuck due to the question of

Palestinian representative (Butenschon, 1994). The PLO's claim of establishing Palestinian state had no space in the 1991 PNC statement had significantly continued to the Madrid conference (Muslih, 1992). The pressure from international community and from within Palestinians resulted in the PLO accepting the Israeli and American demands (Ibid.).

The Demise of the Cold War and its Impact upon Israel

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent Soviet departure from the West Asian proved to be a loss for the erstwhile Arab clients. The end of the Cold War also meant the collapse of communism. There was not a Soviet Union to bankroll radical Arab states who were receiving the Soviet weapons, paramilitary training, and financial support. Moscow also provided the PLO with political diplomatic and moral support and backing (Owen, 1993). The Soviets were encouraging and cheering the Arab countries to fight and pose a severe threat to Israel (George, 1993). The first sign of the significant of the post-Cold War change was observed in the West Asia during Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad's tour to USSR in 1987. When Gorbachev urged that Assad had to abandon the principle of 'strategic parity' with Israel and instead look up to resolve the conflict peacefully (Makovsky, 1995). The Arabs states, therefore, were not able to compensate for the loss of the Soviet Union with their own military force.

Syria was influenced by this development and its intention to threaten Israel in the long run decreased considerably due it abandoning the goal of military parity with Israel (Murphy, 1994). This also harmed the radical factions within the PLO who were forced to come up with the moderate views, concerning the need to negotiate with Israel. The Soviet Union had also been taken new image towards Israel especially during the Gorbachev years. It came with the Soviet decision to reopen its embassy in Tel Aviv. Moreover, after 1989, the Soviet Union also allowed the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel without interruption (Avineri, 1993).

Even though, after the Gulf War, the US emerged stronger, after the Soviet disintegration, the former was enjoying the leverage of being the sole Superpower. It was acting and had been appeared as the hegemonic power in world politics and intervened in West Asia to protect its vital interests. At that time, a 'New World Order' was announced by George Bush (Hadar, 1996) in his address to the US Congress on 6 March 1991. He observed that he was dedicated to peace and projected four international policies, namely, to design kind of shared security in

the West Asian region; to establish a mechanism to keep hold of weapons of mass destruction; to avail fresh opportunity to establish peace and stability in the region; and to encourage and promote economic progress in term of peace and stability (quoted in Flamhaft, 1996).

The US President's endeavour in the form of Madrid conference had been concluded in the wake of the Gulf War. He had gone as planned to get all the parties involved. During the runup to the Madrid process, a prolonged debate emerged between the US and Israel to bring Israel to the Conference. The conference would not have been possible if the US had not put the massive political pressure on Israel. The Shamir government was forced by the American administration to go to the Madrid conference. His approval of the international conference was a marked departure from his previous position. Having made the Madrid conference possible, the US and Israel relationship also witnessed tension (Roadman, 1997).

In 1991, the difference between the Shamir government and Bush administration reached an extreme level. Shamir had requested a US$10 billion loan guarantees from the US to help absorb the waves of Soviet immigrants (Flamhaft, 1996). In that response, President Bush frequently stressed that any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be based on trading territory for peace and respecting legitimate Palestinian rights. Bush and Baker considered that settlements issue is become main an obstacle for peace. That issue also became the bone of contention between Shamir and Bush. Moreover, it was done so because a joint Arab-Palestinian delegation demanded a halt in the Israeli settlement activity a part of the Madrid conference understanding. The Madrid initiative and negotiation terms were accepted by the Israel government especially Shamir. The outcome was that Shamir lost the battle with Bush administration. As a result, he halted settlement progress and agreed to go to Madrid (Navon, 2004).

At the time, the Soviet Union abandoned the West Asia region. It could be argued that Israel's political manoeuvring-space increased because the Soviet client states, especially anti-Israeli Arabs sections including the PLO were appeared weaker, and the special relationship between the US and Israel became little more comfortable (Niblock, 1994). More interestingly, at that moment Soviet Union had appeared working simultaneously along with the US concerning supporting the principle of land-for-peace and sought a solution based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, but, manoeuvring space for Israel had declined

(Avineri, 1993). It was vindicated when the Shamir government was under pressure with the Bush administration agreed with the Madrid principal.

The pressure seemed to have outweighed the freedom to act. Israel experienced this when the power of the anti-Israel Arabs group had weakened. Realistically, the number of rational strategies escalated pressure upon Israel to change the status quo (Keddie, 1992). The risk to security by attending the peace conference became less because of the decrease in the capability of the anti-Israel bloc. Then, Israel could go for negotiations from a position of safety and strength and enabled Shamir to explore a strategy of negotiation instead of a military approach (Shlaim, 1994).

End of Cold War: It's Impact on PLO

The demise of the Cold War meant that the PLO was deprived of taking advantage of the Soviet-American rivalry to its benefit. It had significantly decreased the military and economic power of the organisation and led to a revision in its liberation strategies (Murphy, 1994). After the end of Cold War, Arafat and other leaders were pressurised by the Soviet Union to bringing Palestinians to the negotiations with Israel. However, it neither side with Israel nor did it wish to remain to continue its aid for the Palestinian struggle, especially its confrontation and violent methods (Keddie, 1992). As a result, the political manoeuvring space of the PLO reduced tremendously.

Regarding PLO's strategy of survival, it had to approach to the US. That time, America was the only hegemonic power. It could bring change in Israel's attitude towards PLO through political force and economic sanctions. In these situations, the PLO was in a do or die situation. It had no option except to subtract its political and territorial demands. The intentions of PLO to recognise of Israel, to renounce terrorist activities lessened the American disbelief towards PLO and softened the Israeli attitude as well. It can be argued that it was the prerequisite for the reconciliation and recognition from non-recognition attitude between Israel and PLO (Niblock, 1994).

Arafat's attitude towards Israel had increased the possibility to exclude Hamas, thereby enhancing PLO's power basis among the Palestinian. The demise of the Cold War and influence of Gulf War decreased the PLO's support from Soviet and Arabs states. The PLO had no option except to agree with Israel's demands regarding negotiations. Martin Indyk

argued that in the aftermath of the Cold War "PLO setback may combine with the impact of the Intifada to shift decisively the balance of power in the Palestinian national movement from the headquarters in Tunis to the local leadership in the territories that would be more responsive to the local populations. The decision of the local leadership to meet Secretary of State James Baker in April 1991 and the break their own boycott on contacts with US officials is the first manifestation of this potential. But if it is to be successfully developed, it will require the full cooperation of the Arab states. Those in the Gulf seem prepared to lend their support to the process, and Egypt and Syria are also willing to give the local leadership their backing for the moment" (Indyk, 1991:33). The PLO's changing attitude towards Israel could stabilise its strength and power within the Palestinian camp and towards consolidating its effort in the contest for self-rule. Moreover, PLO was trying to present its good image for the American administration as well.

Madrid Conference, 1991

As the Gulf War came to an end in February 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker made eight trips to the West Asian region which culminated in the Madrid Conference. On the 30 October, in the Salon de las Columas at the Royal Palace in Madrid, US President George H.W. Bush stood before a gathering of delegates from West Asia. In an unprecedented meeting that many hoped would help resolve a conflict that had been in existence since 1948. Bush, in his opening remarks stated the "objective must be clear and straightforward. It is not simply to end the state of war in the West Asia and replace it with a state of non-belligerency. This is not enough. This would not last. Rather, we seek peace, real peace. And by real peace, I mean treaties, security, [and] diplomatic relations" (quoted in Rodriguez, 2011:01).

These words marked the beginning of a new policy of open dialogue between Israel and its Arab neighbours, which had been elusive since the creation of Israel in 1948. It was welcomed as a breakthrough in the West Asia peace process. The purpose of the conference to be a two-track approach of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States and Israel and the Palestinians based upon UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which was approved unanimously on 22 November 1967, focused the inadmissibility a country to acquire territory by war. It was required to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area, including Israel, could live in peace and security. The resolution also demanded the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories it occupied in the June war (United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1967).

The UN Security Council Resolution 338 was adopted 22 October 1973, to correspond with the outbreak of the October War. The resolution called for the immediate implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 242 after a cease-fire is established in October (United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1973).

This conference was convened jointly by the US and the USSR and attended by Israel, and many Arab States including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The conference was a breakthrough in which Israel and its immediate neighbours had initiated a face-to-face negotiation for the first time (Bar-On, 1998). Subsequently, several rounds of talks were hosted by the US, aimed at a peace agreement between Israel and its neighbours.

Despite periodic efforts over the years to resolve the political dispute, various attempts were being made by the US administration. The Oslo accord marks the first comprehensive Israeli-Palestine peace agreement in an almost 100-year old conflict barring 1981 ceasefire in Lebanon between Israel and the PLO (Makovsky, 1996). In the aftermath of June War, November 1967, the UN Security Council Passed Resolution 242, which enshrined the notion of Israel's relinquishing, captured Arab lands in exchange for peace and agreements on secured recognised borders. Unfortunately, Khartoum Summit had made proclamation that there would be neither recognition nor negotiation with Israel. In the meantime, US Secretary of State William Rogers tried to mediate peace between Egypt and Israel based on 242 Resolution, which became unsuccessful. In the aftermath surprise attack in October 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made effort to make peace between Israel-Egypt laying the ground work for the Camp David Accord later that decade.

The US and the Soviet Union came closer, later the Washington advanced the peace process. This effort led to the West Asia Peace Conference in Geneva December 1973. In this conference, Palestinian was represented by the Jordan. The result was of the effort was fruitful (Ibid.). In March 1977, US President Jimmy Carter offered American support for the Palestinian homeland but not mentioned the PLO's name. Sadat's visit to Israel made the environment for peace process and set the stage for the Camp David Accord. Sadat responded the criticism that he sold the Palestine reaching with separately. In that respond, he wanted to show some progress on the Palestinian track (Ibid.). In December 1977, recognised the idea of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank, later US developed Begin's idea of autonomy.

The idea was incorporated into the Israel and Egypt peace treaty signed on the White House lawn in March 1979 (Ibid.).

US made a series of special envoys to the West Asia over the next three years. They visited with wish to advance the principal of autonomy. This effort ended with Israel's attack on Lebanon. At the end of the Lebanon war, US offered a new vision of Palestinian autonomy known as the Reagan Plan but rejected by Israel, Palestine and Arabs alike. At the time of December 1987 uprising (the Intifada), citing the deteriorating situation, US Secretary of State George Shultz proposed a modified version of Camp David plan, which is known as Shultz Initiative (Maoz, 1994). After the Gulf War (August 1990), the political upheaval started, seeing these condition, US had an opportunity to advance the peace process. US launched a diplomatic initiative in cooperation with Moscow that resulted in the Madrid Conference October 1991.

The Madrid Conference adjourned immediately at the ceremonial opening in Madrid. After that, separate bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria, Lebanese and the joint Jordan-Palestinian bogged down on each front (Dowty, 1997). The negotiations were filled with prejudices and larger than life personalities. It was the most difficult for Baker to get Israeli agreement to attend the conference. The Government led by Shamir took part in negotiations on the conditions that the PLO would not be invited. The only Palestinians present were the representatives from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the effort for bringing peace became unsuccessful because of Palestinian's insistence on the right to recognition of sovereignty (Grange, 2000). The Madrid Peace Conference, however, did not make any changes in the parties' stand. There was little keenness for the negotiations process that had started. The bilateral negotiations afflicted from the point that direct contact between Israel and PLO was still impossible (Reich & Goldberg, 2000).

The PLO's representatives had to take part as members of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Secondly, the negotiations in Washington were being held in public. This meant that they tended to end up in open controversy. The media was present and the Israeli and Palestinian public were within earshot. It proved impossible to have a genuinely constructive dialogue (Ibid.).

In the meantime, the Likud-led government announced a new wave of settlement construction designed to double the settler population in the Occupied Territories in four

years (Jewish populations growth and settlements in the Occupied Territories by the Israeli government in power from 1977 to 1992, such as Likud government (1977-81), twenty settlements and four per cent of population growth, Likud government (1981-84), thirty five settlements and nine per cent of population growth, NUG (1984-88), twenty seven settlements and 38 per cent of population growth, NUG (1988-90), five settlements and 11 per cent population growth, Likud government (1990-92), twenty four per cent population growth and seven settlements (Lochery, 1996). Little progress was made in the negotiations, either in Madrid or in the five rounds of bilateral talks that took place in Washington. The Likud pledged to continue the peace process while retaining all the Occupied Territories and expanding settlement activities (Hadar, 1992).

The Labour vowed to conclude a deal on Palestinian autonomy and to allow the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem to take part in negotiations. It wanted to freeze the construction of the 'political settlements' deep in the occupied territory. Thus, the US linkage between the loan guarantees and a freeze on settlements in the Occupied Territories pressured Israel to the conference (Ibid.). While the PLO was not officially invited to Madrid in October 1991, the Palestinian delegation to the talks was coordinating and regularly consulting with the PLO leadership in Tunis (Schoenbaum, 1993). Arafat's supporters in the Gaza Strip organised a peace demonstration, shook hands with the occupiers, and tied balloons to the soldiers' jeeps. When the delegates to the Madrid Conference returned to the territories, they were given a hero's welcome (Bar-On, 1998). While on the Israeli side there was little public euphoria, but polls showed substantial support for the peace initiative. In public opinion poll conducted in November 1991 by Middle East Contemporary Review 92 per cent supported Shamir's decision to go to Madrid, although only 56 per cent expected that the conference would result in peace (quoted in Bar-On, 1996). The question of territorial compromise in exchange for peace still divided the nation into roughly equal halves.

The Labour Party won the 1992 Knesset election under Yitzhak Rabin and ended 15 years of Likud rule. Finally, a change in the Israeli government in June brought into power a new leadership under Rabin who was more supportive of the peace process. With victory in the election the Labour declared its intention to pursue peace and to work for a political breakthrough as its primary goal, and a majority of the Israeli public approved (Nochery, 1997). In other words, although Israeli society had authorised Rabin to go ahead with the bilateral and unilateral talks within the Madrid framework, they also expected him to

safeguard the country's security (Hermann, 2006). Soon the absence of progress in the formal Track I negotiations in Washington was attributed to the parties still being locked in their long-time attitudes of mutual hostility.

It was then that Track II negotiations among scholars acted as a legitimating forum in which both sides could meet, thereby avoiding officially sanctioned restrictions. The guise of academic conferences protected the participants and even drew considerable official observation by both the PLO and the Israeli government. The next theme of the chapter will deal with the secret or back-channel process that culminated in the handshake between the Labour Party and PLO, that is, the Oslo Accords. In the history of Israeli-Palestine dispute, various peace efforts had been made and failed, but the Oslo agreement became a historic breakthrough in the West Asia history. Thus, the above-mentioned causes and incidents facilitated the change in Israel's politics in general and the Labour Party towards the PLO and there were changes in PLO too. These developments had made successful the back-channel efforts in the form of the peace process (Oslo Accord).

Oslo Accord

In 1993, the leadership from PLO and Israel had signed the Oslo Accords, with the aim of ending the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That was marked the first overarching deal where the official level handshake happened between the leaders of Israel and PLO. According to Theodore Friedgut "the signing of the Declaration of Principles for peace negotiations between Palestine Liberation Organisation and the government of Israel in September 1993 was one of those rare moments in world politics when all the necessary and sufficient conditions fell into place, and a historic turning point was reached" (quoted in, Freedman, 1998:65).

Representatives from both sides had reached out to the peace process over the prospect of the Occupied Territories. The latter of recognition (it can be seen in the Appendix-6) was exchanged, before the signing in Washington, between Rabin and Arafat. The 1988 PNC statement (PLO) accepted resolution 242, recognised Israel's right to exist, and renounced terrorism in all its form (al-Madfai, 2007). This was reiterated in the Arafat's letter addressed to the UN General Assembly. He recognised Israel's existence within the pre-1967 line (Ashton, 2007). In mutual recognition, PLO was recognised by Israel as the legitimate

representative of the Palestinian people and in 19 January 1993 Israel also scraped the law that prohibited contacts with the members of the PLO.

Positive developments in term of peace process indicated a wish to end the confrontational rivalry by establishing peace, subsequently dispute transformed from battleground to the negotiations table (Harkabi, 1994). Such progress in Palestine-Israel peace process exhibited the will to bring to an end prolonged conflict. In addition, this was a sign that the Palestine-Israel conflict was shifting from the battlefield where military means was frequently used to the negotiation table where peace talks were held (Ahrari, 1996).

Rabin had not departed from his realist worldview especially when he was elected prime minister in July 1992. After taking charge, his primary concern was the security of Israel, which, he thought, could be assured and guarantee only by negotiating the Allon Plan of with an elected Palestinian body and remained kept away from the PLO. With Moshe Arens, Rabin had framed together the 1989 Israeli peace initiative as discussed before and planned to apply this initiative when he became Prime Minister. On 13 July 1992, when Rabin formed his government, he made it clear that he did not intend to pay any price for peace, indeed not a price that would endanger Israel's security (Navon, 2004). He confirmed Israel's assurance to the strengthening of strategic settlements in the West Bank..

The Government continued to increase and strengthen Jewish settlement along the lines of hostility, due to their significance for security, and in Greater Jerusalem, to preclude any negotiation that would compel Israel to compromise over Jerusalem. The Government was strong too in its resolve that Jerusalem would not be open to negotiation and warned that Israel would support its security over the search for peace. Basically, security had taken preference even over peace and guaranteed that Israel would not retreat from the Golan Heights (Israel's Foreign Relations, 1992).

Rabin claimed that Israel's interests and security would prevail over the aspirations and consciousness of the Palestinians: "Instead of learning from their mistakes over generations, instead of accepting what has been offered to them or at least discuss [it] seriously-the Palestinians are still adhering to 'all-or-nothing.' If it will be this way, if they are not willing to change their positions, they will ultimately remain with nothing. Again, I appeal to them to return to the negotiating table, to the land of reality, before they miss the current opportunity perhaps the last one, for many years" (Ibid.1 & Slater, 2015:418).

The question therefore is that how did Rabin come forward to recognise the PLO and sign a Declaration of Principles (DoP) that encompassed Jerusalem and the refugees and over the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the negotiations? The answer is that Yossi Beilin—junior Foreign Affairs Minister and key architect of the Oslo agreement—presented a fait accompli to Rabin.

Beilin had secretly initiated a negotiation deal with the PLO in Norway while the Israeli government was holding negotiation with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in Washington. Beilin had commenced making contacts with the PLO in the early 1980s, with the assistance of Haifa University Professor Yair Hirschfeld (himself a friend of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who had welcomed Arafat as a head of state in Vienna in July 1979) (Makovsky, 1995). Beilin intensely disagreed with the passing of the 1986 law that forbidding contacts between Israeli citizens and PLO representatives, a law which he once called as "one of the most reactionary and shameful" (Navon, 2004) in Israel's history. He was one of the few politicians who appreciated the initiative of the Reagan administration to initiate a dialogue with the PLO in November 1988. He had done everything he could to torpedo the efforts of Rabin and Arens to organise elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1989 (Navon, 2004).

In March 1989 Peres himself overruled the proposal of Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stuhl to set up a secret negotiation channel with the PLO in Holland. Three months later Beilin flew to The Hague to negotiate a declaration of principles with the PLO representative in Holland Hafif Safieh. Subsequently, Beilin had approved on 'general principles' for future negotiations between Israel and the PLO in August 1990. Even though the PLO claimed and praised the failed terrorist attack on an Israeli beach on 30 May 1990 and Arafat fervently supported Saddam during the Gulf War, Beilin maintained that Israel should negotiate with the PLO, a position that was criticised even by Yossi Sarid, a prominent figure in the Israeli Left.

Four days before the June 1992 election, Beilin agreed with Faisal Husseini—a prominent Palestinian in East Jerusalem—to establish a secret negotiation track between Israel and the PLO (Makovsky, 1995). After the elections, Rabin reluctantly admitted to authorising the nomination of Beilin as deputy foreign minister. One of Beilin's first acts was to lobby for the repealing of the 1986 law that forbade formal contacts between Israelis and the PLO (Ibid.).

Prime Minister Rabin had not been part in the vote in January 1993 when the Knesset nullified the 1986 law. Beilin himself relates that Rabin was against this act because the latter was attached to the differentiation between the PLO and the residents of West Bank and the Gaza Strip. When he had held the responsibility as prime minister, Rabin ruled out to any dialogue with the PLO, as illustrated by his unwillingness to repeal the 1986 law (Rolf, 2003). Beilin did not report to Peres and Rabin that secret negotiations had initiated in Oslo in December 1992 between Hirschfeld, his colleague Ron Pundak, and PLO official Abu Ala. Beilin felt that "Rabin would have ruled out the process before it begun" (Navon, 2004). When in February 1993, Hirschfeld, Pundak and Abu Ala agreed on the basic principles for future negotiations between Israel and the PLO, Beilin had informed about the secret channel to Peres, and then Peres briefed to Rabin (Shlaim, 1994).

Peres himself was in shock and called Hirschfeld and Pundack as 'crazy' (Ibid.). When he was conveyed of the secret Oslo channel, Rabin first believed it might help jumpstart the Washington negotiations (between Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation) (Morris, 1999). Rabin had not taken Oslo seriously and "was cynical about the Oslo talks; sometimes he completely disbelieved in them. When asked later why he did not share the secret with any of his close aides, he replied frankly that he doubted anything would come out of Oslo" (Peres, 1995).

But Oslo confronted Rabin with a dilemma: on the one hand, he was condemning to negotiating with the PLO; on the other, he realised that his electoral commitment to reach out an agreement with the Palestinians by March 1993 was not realistic. At the same time, Hirschfeld and Pundak were only waiting for his endorsement to reach an agreement with Abu Ala. In May 1993, two months after the March 'deadline', Rabin finally decided to send the director-general of the Foreign Ministry Uri Savir to Oslo (Kimmerling, 2003).

However, an angry letter was sent to Peres by Rabin especially few days after giving his acceptance. He was condemning the Oslo track and expressing his unhappiness and upset mood that the secret negotiations had been established without his concerned and without consulting the IDF. He also was condemning the PLO of manipulating Israel in Oslo to thwart the Washington talks (Makovsky, 1996). Beilin was struck by 'Rabin's turnaround,' (Beilin, 1999) for which he had no explanation. In early June 1993, Rabin opted to allow the negotiations in Oslo to begin again, and this time chose to involve himself directly in the talks.

Beilin relates that until the historical signature, Rabin was torn between his reluctance to recognise the PLO and his willingness to reach an agreement with the Palestinians. Between the recognition of the PLO and his tragic death, Rabin made many contradictory and confusing statements on his perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Navon, 2004).

Peres, by contrast, made the bold move of explaining his turnaround in "*The New Middle East*", a book was published after the signing of the Oslo accords according to him, "Rabin had never actually changed but rather 'realised' that he was living in a 'New World,' which is why he himself became a new man: 'It was not I who shifted course . . . Rather, the world has changed'. Shimon Peres claims that human history has entered, at an unspecified date, a 'New World' which is radically different from the 'Old World.' What was true in the 'Old World' is no longer true in the 'New World' and vice versa. The 'New World,' Peres maintains, 'has moved beyond having an ideological confrontation,' and economic rivalries 'have begun to take the place of military confrontation" (Peres, 1993:33). Peres stressed that peace in the "*New Middle East*" will result from a virtuous circle: "prosperity will lead to democracy, and democracy will lead to peace: 'Democratisation will put an end to the danger to regional and world peace . . . The higher the standard of living rises, the lower the level of violence will fall' (Ibid.).

Even though, Rabin had not shared Peres's "*New Middle East*" narrative. Rabin had a very realistic and pragmatic worldview. Some argued it was because he was a son of the nationalistic Ha-kibbutz Ha-meuhad movement and a pragmatic general.. Notwithstanding, having many hesitations, reluctantly or intentionally, he had given his nod to the Oslo track. But from a realistic point of view, he did not campaign and share the ideological discourse of Peres and Beilin that the Arabs and the West Asia had taken into the changing shape (Navon, 2004).

> Despite his ideological attachment to the Land of Israel (the Ha-kibbutz Ha-meuhad movement had opposed the partition of Palestine), he realised that Israel's presence in the West Bank was untenable in the long run, demographically, economically and ethically. He assessed that with the implosion of the Soviet Union, the military defeat of Iraq, the improvement of Israel's diplomatic stance, the massive immigration of Soviet Jews, and the diplomatic and financial bankruptcy of the PLO, Arafat would realise that time was playing against him. It was his pragmatic calculation and a calculated risk-not an ideological conversion (Ibid.:234)

In sum up, it was difficult but not impossible ultimately political recognition between two the Labour Party and the PLO had been reached at the Oslo. This was done by beginning

significant upheaval in the regional and international politics had widely influenced the political manoeuvring space for the both Israeli, and the PLO leadership had sought both the parties to the long debating question of future of Occupied Territories with the same conclusion. The time had changed, and parties had to leave the trenches aside and come forward to negotiate peace.

Conclusions

The turning point was Intifada came as a surprise and shock to the Israeli politicians. Intifada especially came "against the continued Israeli occupation of both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This incident compelled the Labour Party to admit that the status quo was no longer viable. This incident underlined in the matter of the Israel-Palestine peace process. It significantly put pressure on the international community and an increased number of Israeli to be found a solution to the Palestinian question.

Though the Palestinian Uprising was not in itself able to defeat the Israeli militarily, it had a critical impact on the thinking of those in power. Most notable here was the impact upon Yitzhak Rabin, who realised that the only legitimate partner for peace negotiations was the Palestinians. Therefore, by adopting a Palestinian option, Rabin and indeed the Labour Party took the first step in the direction.

Indeed, as demonstrated above, the end of the Cold War and the demise of Iraq's military power created a more favourable strategic environment for Israel. This indeed impacted on the perception of decision-makers about the nature and level of threat. Moreover, the US emerged as a single powerful actor in the region and the bi-polar system converted into a unipolar system. The role of the US in Israel's peace strategy was, of course, a considerable one. Israel's need for the American support has increased with time, creating a dependency relationship. However, as was demonstrated, Israel, under Shamir refused to budge and to give into the American demands regarding peace and a freeze on settlement expansion.

The end of the Cold War is a historical event in the world political history in general and in West Asia in particular. Significant changes influencing the political discourse in West Asia begun much before and can be traced from the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the Soviet disintegration. The combined impacts of these led to structural transformations at the various level including the local level (the Intifada and the growth of Hamas), regional level (end of

the Cold War, the Gulf War, and US emergence as hegemonic power in the world politics) and opened the window of peace process and brought political leadership to move away from non-recognition to negotiated peace.

After breaking the NUG, Israel was defensive and suspicious of every peace proposal that was put forth. On the other hand, The PLO, which prior the Gulf War had expectations of becoming a partner in the peace process, deteriorated and preoccupied with its political and economic survival. Moreover, the local Palestinian leaders found themselves in the awkward position of being pressured into participating in a peace process, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while frequently reaffirming that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Thus, these internal and external changes created a backdrop which led changes in the both leadership (PLO and the Labour Party) that subsequently facilitated the Oslo peace process. In this breakthrough, the Labour Party was seen having recognised PLO, here it can be said that 'the non-recognition position of the Labour Party had taken into recognition mood. It was the more requiring time for both the PLO and Rabin, because the PLO was in grave financial crunch in the wake of Gulf War, due to its pro-Iraqi attitude and Rabin because he promised to forge an autonomy agreement with the Palestinian within six to nine months after assuming office. Thus, by 1993 it was time for both sides to reach a compromise.

Chapter-Six:
Conclusions

T his research primarily sought to address four objectives/questions namely, to find the position of the Labour Party towards the Palestinian question and Occupied Territories; the evolution of the Labour Party's positions regarding the PLO being the negotiating partner; to examine the significance changes in the Party's position vis-à-vis the Palestinian question; and the domestic political compulsions the Labour Party faced with rise of the Likud? The research examined and validated two core arguments in the form of hypothesis, namely, *The Labour Party's position on Occupied Territories became inflexible because of the domestic partisan contest with Likud,* and *The Labour Party's recognition of PLO as the negotiating partner was the critical shift that facilitated the Oslo process.*

The Labour Party in the Israeli has its roots in the pre-state period. The political system, characterised by proportional representation and coalition governments, is the direct outcome of the pre-state political process. Political parties differed in their approaches to almost every issue and the history of its political life in the pre-state period was organised by institutions like the Elected Assembly and the National Council. Before the formation of the State of Israel, Jewish populations immigrated to Mandate Palestine from different parts of the world with different cultural backgrounds and ideologies. Before immigrating to Palestine, the Jews community were scattered since the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 AD and dwelling in different parts of the world. This scattered Jews community is defined as the Jewish Diaspora, without its own state.

The Jewish Diaspora has gone through various problems. In this context, the major problem was the anti-Semitism, kind of prejudice and perceptions about Jews people around the world; this stereotyping included Jews being not trusty, selfish, cruel, etc. The Dreyfus Affairs occurred in 1894, which was a significant incident in the history of state formation. The event had left a profound impact on Theodor Herzl, seen as the Father of Political Zionist Movement who lost his belief in the premise of Jews emancipation. The incident provoked Herzl to write a pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* (*The Jewish State*) in 1896, which marked the ideological basis for political Zionism. According to Herzl, the Jewish persecution and oppression could only be solved with the Jews establishing a state of own. Meanwhile, to get redemption from the agony, humiliation, suppression and anti-Semitism, Jews immigration (it

is called Aliyah) started to Palestine. They claimed their religious connection to the Holy Land, especially to the city of Jerusalem, where the two ancient Jewish Temples once stood.

Jews in large number started migrating to Palestine since 1882 and had left their profound influence on the Labour politics in the Yishuv, the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine. The First Aliyah (1882-1903) ideologically committed to the Zionist Movement, while the Second Aliyah (1904-1914) was the result of Russian Revolution (1905) most of them, Russian. Major Parties and leaders belonged to this Aliyah. In the Third Aliyah (1919-1923) majority of them were male, single and hailed from Poland and Russia. The Fourth Aliyah (1924-1930) and Fifth Aliyah (1932-1948) were ideologically committed to the Zionist Movement and had received formal training from Eastern Europe based Zionist groups. Meanwhile, at the end of the First World War, British forces captured Palestine and it was transformed into British Mandate by the newly formed League of Nations.

The various agricultural colonies (Moshavim/Kibbutz) were formed during these Aliyahs, where the land was collectively owned and educated people with urban backgrounds without any agricultural skills began tilling the land. Under the concept of Hebrew Labour, they gradually took over the toiling of land which until then was carried out by hired Arab labour. Between these periods of continuous immigration, various organisations, parties, ideologies and personalities emerged. The most important organisation was Workers Federation Histadrut (1920), a kind of umbrella organisation that covered health, home and welfare service under the guidance of the Labour Movement. Throughout its history, the Labour Movement experienced a series of mergers and splits, in which various groups had emerged, merged and amalgamated. Some of these separated groups have transformed into established independent parties, others have merged with additional parties, and many of them re-joined the parties.

During the Yishuv various parties emerged under the Zionist Movement including and the most prominent was Poalei Zion with future Prime Minister David-Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Tabenkin as founding members. It was committed to the establishment of a Socialist Jewish state by means of class struggle. Another major party was Hapoel Hatzair, which like Poalei Zion, was established in 1906 by Second Aliyah and was different from Poalei Zion. It rejected most of the prevailing socialist doctrines in Europe adopted by Po'alei Zion. In 1919, Party, together with other non-partisan groups, had formed Achdut Ha'avodah Party (Unity of Labour). Achdut Ha'avodah rejected the previously held ideology of Marxist class struggle in

favour of social democracy. In 1919, Poalei Zion forming Maki Party (the Israel Communist Party). This separation was a critical moment because it led to the birth of the two ideological streams of the Labour Movement, namely social democracy and Marxism.

This ideological division became the central divisive issue in the historical development of the Labour Movement. Poalei Zion under the leadership of Chaim Weizmann, gradually its position changed in the 1920s, as it became closer to Achdut Ha'avodah and formed Mapai Party (1930). Berl Katznelson and Yitzhak Ben Zvi both had a contribution to the formation of Mapai.

Based on ideological differences, the political parties of Israel may be categorised under three distinct groups, the center-left parties, center-right and the religious groups. Prime position in the centre-left block is the Mapai (1930) (the predecessor of the Labour Party formed in 1968 with the merger of Mapai, Achdut Ha'avodah and Rafi Party).

Mapai Party had played a major and dominant role in the Labour Movement, which actualised the Zionist dream with the formation of Israel. This influence was compounded by the fact that Israel is an immigrant society where many of the newly arriving immigrants were extremely dependent on the Labour-controlled institutions for their initial basic requirements. Party was the major pillar of Labour Movement before and after the establishment of Israel (1948) and until 1977 it dominated the political discourse in Israel and hence was largely responsible for formulating a policy towards the Palestinians question.

Following its establishment, Israel had faced several challenges as a new state. The early developments of Israel were a political system, the Labour Party's role and its leaderships in the system. The Labour Party's strategies (strong leaderships, coalitions politics, etc.), which helped Party to hold political power for several decades and how the Party shaped Palestinian issue until its electoral defeat in 1977 which marked the political decline of the Labour Party in Israeli politics. Reasons which led to the defeat of the Labour Party in the election can be traced the 1960s as the start of the reversal of fortunes for Party.

The Labour Party saw its political fortunes temporarily enhanced from its conduct of the 1967 War, while its role in the 1973 War is signalled an end of its political hegemony. In some respects, it can be noted that the electoral system protected the Labour Party from an earlier decline, with its party-list system and subsequent reliance on a coalition government. Even in 1977, if the religious parties had decided to stay within the Labour-led-bloc, there

would have been the possibility of the Labour Party staying in power and forming a coalition with the religious Party and the newly formed centrist Dash Party.

The decision of the Labour Party to include Gahal (later Likud) in the national unity government before the June 1967 war, contributed Likud with a sense of political legitimacy, which previously had been denied to the Party many times. The rapprochement between the previously bitter enemies, Ben-Gurion and Begin, provided this newfound status of Gahal/Likud, as did the capture of the Arab territories in 1967, bringing with it, a realistic chance of building Greater Israel that was the central feature of right-wing ideology.

The internal discards marked the start of the Labour Party's decline as the previously relative homogenous nature of its leadership was shattered. The political consequences of the Lavon Affair over the role of Defence Minister were one of the single most important factors in determining the inter-elite relations and the relationship between the Party and its co-founder Ben-Gurion and his followers up to its electoral defeat in 1977. Finally, the leadership had to understand their previous mistakes and that it had suffered a major defeat as the result of a process of long-term systematic decline. Two initial chapters, Chapter two and Chapter three of the thesis dealt the historical background of the Labour Party since the Yishuv and until 1977.

The most important and immediate development after the formation of Israel was a collective attack by the Arab armies on Israel. Since then, it has constantly been engaged in the armed confrontations with the Arab States and there have been four wars between Israel and its neighbouring states (1948 War), (Suez War or 1956 War), (June War of 1967) and (October War of 1973). In addition, Israel faced a series of low-intensity conflict in terms of terrorism and violence by non-state actors. At times these threatened to develop into a wider regional conflict involving the then Superpowers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union.

The 1967 War has drawn a darker line in the Israel-Arabs dispute. It has not only changed the contour of the dispute but also provided huge land, namely, the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip controlled by Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem which were annexed by Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria and these were captured by Israel in June. Therefore, the title of the research opted for the time period from 1967.

Israel's tremendous territorial gains in the June war brought several challenges for its government, namely state's security, demographic problem and economic concern but these

are not the major concern of the thesis as the newly gained territories became the major discourse for the Israeli policymakers. More importantly, the June War had led to the breakdown of the Israeli consensus on national security issues. Religious and Right-Wing Parties considered that newly acquired land as an explanation that the whole historical land of Israel or Eretz Israel promised by God to the Jewish community was finally 'liberated' and became determined than ever to realise their dream of Greater Israel. In contrast, the Labour Party saw the occupied territories as potential bargaining chips for a peace agreement and begun to territorial compromise based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 Resolution adopted after the June War (it can be seen in the Appendix-1) under which the Party was prepared for a "Land for Peace" policy. Subsequently, this distinction over the result of the June War, an event of monumental importance, created the hawk-dove divides in Israeli politics.

The policymakers adopted various approaches and solutions to solve the problems over territories, especially the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and these include the Allon Plan, Functional Solution, Territorialist, and the Annexationist Approach. The emergence of the four positions could be attributed to differences within Israel over how peace should be attained, borders of Israel and the future of the Occupied Territories. The harsh reality of the Allon Plan was that it widely received the support and promoted by the cabinet but never became the official policy of Labour Party. It was implemented in conjunction with other plan that was the "Functional Solution."

Did successive Israeli governments under the leadership of the Labour Party, had made any decisive and long-term policy of Occupied Territories? The answer, however, is negative. The ideological and political differences, clashes of interests and conflicting perspectives among key members within the Labour Party and coalition government regarding the Palestinian issue were the main cause for the stalemate to bring peace process successfully. These factors were, indeed, aggravated by the outcomes of the 1984 general election where neither Labour nor Likud managed to form a working coalition. Likud obtained veto power over the making and conduct of foreign policy, and, therefore, it was not possible for the Labour Prime Minister Shimon Peres, to explore the possibility of implementing his preferred solution, namely, the "Jordanian Option."

The "Jordon Option" was the only alternative by which the Israeli government under the Labour Party leadership sought to solve the Palestinian problem. Labour Party followed this

option due to the absence of reliable Palestinian negotiator partner. In the aftermath of the June War defeat, Arab leaders met in Khartoum 29th August 1st September 1967 and adopted "Three NOs" policy of no recognition, no negotiation and no peace with Israel. In this environment, the Israeli policymakers could not even think of talking to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) established in 1964 as the Palestinian negotiator partner. Fatah led by Yasser Arafat joined the organisation in 1968 and soon took the effective control of the PLO.

Some of the articles of the PLO charter (1964), particularly Article 9, insist that "armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and destruction of the state of Israel." The idea of armed struggle has been a key principle in Palestinian ideology and strategy of the PLO. Since its origin, the PLO committed several guerrilla attacks, hijacking and militant acts to force Israel ceding territory or to make a shift in the political balance. Fortunately, or unfortunately, it has never been an effective weapon against Israel. Instead, these acts resulted in the PLO being labelled as a terrorist organisation by the US in the 1970s.

The Israeli policymakers in general and the Labour Party's leaders especially Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Yigal Allon the trio who hold powerful portfolios and set forth and defined the guidelines of the Labour Party's nature towards the Palestinian question, in particular, had a similar attitude. They considered PLO as a terrorist organisation which was pursuing antagonistic and destructive goals through violent measures. They were not in favour of the Palestinian state or the division of Jerusalem while paying attention to the daily apolitical needs of the Palestinian population under the Autonomy Plan. This non-recognition position of the Labour Party towards the PLO had left the "Jordan or Jordanian option" as the only alternative by which Israel could solve the Palestinian issue.

The evolution of certain configurations of domestic power contributed largely to the immobilism in the Labour Party's policies of Occupied Territories whereby Israel failed to respond positively to the changes in its strategic environment brought about by the June War. The outcome of the different positions adopted by key decision-makers has created the continuation of the status quo. It is against this background that the Palestinian Intifada erupted in December 1987. The Intifada demonstrated that the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was no longer an option.

The differences and inter-factional based politics of the Labour Party and competition for power and influence, lack of suitable peace partners, fragmentation of the decision-making process, and the nature of Israel's political system, resulted in major differences between the parties especially Labour and Likud regarding the territorial issue. Successive Labour Party governments had failed to produce a substantive, decisive and long-term territorial policy. Hence, thereby, the chapter fourth proved the first hypothesis, namely, *The Labour Party's position on Occupied Territories became inflexible because of the domestic partisan contest with Likud*.

The external factors created the necessary preconditions to provide the right international and regional environment to which Israel and Palestinian internal politics could respond positively. The external changing dynamics are considered essential in the initiation of rapprochement between Israel and PLO. In the process of rapprochement, the First Intifada was turning point came as a surprise and shock to the Israeli politicians. Intifada began against the continued Israeli occupation and compelled the Labour Party to admit that the status quo was no longer viable and underlined in the centrality of the Palestine question in the wider regional peace and stability.

The Intifada significantly put pressure on the international community and the public opinion increased pressure on the Israeli government to find a solution to the Palestinian question. Though, the Intifada was by itself was unable to defeat the Israeli militarily, it had a critical impact on the thinking of those in power. Most notable Rabin, who adopted harsh policies to quell the Intifada realised that military response was not a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over land. The need for a political solution became obvious, including an end occupation and the realisation of the Palestinian right to self-determination. For a while, they felt that the only legitimate partner for peace negotiations was the Palestinian leaders elected from the territories and the Tunis-based PLO which could end the Intifada.

In response to the Intifada, many proposals were brought to stop the violence such as Shultz Plan 1988, Mubarak Ten Points 1989, and the Baker Plan 1989. The refusal of the Likud Party to the Baker Plans proved the uncompromising attitude of right-wingers, which created the crises within the National Unity Government. Consequently, Shamir responded by sacking Peres and this forced the resignation of all Labour ministers and this led to the collapse of the unity government in March 1990. This stubbornness led Labour Party's victory in the 1992 Knesset elections, which provided the most dovish government in Israel's

history. The Rabin government (1992) was also one of the significant factors, which proved successful in proceeding with the PLO.

Indeed, the end of the Cold War and the demise of Iraq's military power created a more favourable strategic environment for Israel and impacted the perceptions of the decision-makers. Moreover, the US emerged as a single powerful actor in the region and the bi-polar system converted into a near unipolar system. The role of the US in Israel's peace strategy has been considerable and Israel's need for American support has increased with time. However, as was demonstrated, Israel, under Shamir, refused to budge and to give in to the American demands regarding peace and a freeze on settlement expansion. The differences emerged between Rabin and Shamir when Rabin was ready to consider territorial concession and co-ordinate with the American administration to actualise peace, while Shamir was not prepared.

The combined impacts of at the various levels including the local level (the Intifada and the growth of Hamas), regional level (the Gulf War) and global level (end of the Cold War and American hegemony in the world politics) led to structural transformations in the both leadership (PLO and Labour Party) and opened the window of peace process and brought political leadership to move away from non-recognition to recognition.

Hence, these internal and external changes created a backdrop which subsequently facilitated the Oslo Agreement (1993). In this breakthrough, resulted in the Labour-led Israeli government recognised the PLO and the latter recognised Israel as a sovereign state. It was the more appropriate time for both PLO and Rabin; the PLO was in a grave financial crunch in the wake of Gulf War, due to its pro-Iraqi attitude and Rabin won the elections on the pledge of forging an agreement with the Palestinian within six to nine months after assuming office. Thus, by 1993 it was time for both sides to reach a compromise and hence the research validates the second hypothesis, namely, *The Labour Party's recognition of PLO as the negotiating partner was the critical shift that facilitated the Oslo process*.

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Appendix-1: U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 November, 22, 1967

The Security Council

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East. Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security.

Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with article
2 of the charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle east which should include the application of both the following principles:

    I.   Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

    II. Terminations of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

    a. For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

    b. For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

    c. For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures, including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the state concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement *in* accordance with the provision and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Source: United Nation (1968), "Resolution and Decisions of the Security Council 1967", [Online: Web] Accessed on 1 July 1919, URL: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/7d35e1f7 29df491c85256ee700686136/$FILE/French%20Text.pdf

Appendix-2: The Camp David Accords

The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following: The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts... To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by co-operation in the promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.

Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighbourly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbours which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows.

A. **West Bank and Gaza**

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

a. Egypt and Israel agreement in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

b. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate and agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring international and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the managing of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

c. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbours and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These

negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbours, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through.

1. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
2. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
3. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
4. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordan, and Egyptian officers.

During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of

admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. **Egypt-Israel**

1. Egypt-Israel undertaking not to resort to thereat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. **Associated Principles**

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbours-Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationship normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

a. full recognition;

b. abolishing economy boycotts;

c. Guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context to final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, co-operation and friendship, which is their common goal.

Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertaking contained in the Framework.

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt: of Israel:
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat Menanchem Begin
Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel
Signed at White House on September, 17 1978

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the using of this framework a peace treaty between them:

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:
a. The full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine ;
b. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai; The use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Rasen-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;
c. The right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations;
d. the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and over flight;
e. The construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan;
f. The stationing of military forces listed below.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the

Arab Republic of Egypt: of Israel:

Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter,

President of the United States of America

Source: The Middle East (1990), 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: *Congressional Quarterly, Inc.*

Appendix-3: The London Agreement, 11th April 1987 by Peres and King Hussein

A three part understanding between Jordan and Israel

1. Invitation by UN Secretary General.
2. Resolutions of the International Conference.
3. The modalities agreed upon by Jordan-Israel.

1: The Secretary General will issue invitations to the five members of the Security Council and the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to negotiate a peaceful settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338, with the objects of bringing a comprehensive peace to the area, security to its states, and to respond to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

2: The participants in the conference agree that the purpose of the negotiations is the peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Resolutions 242 and 338 and a peaceful solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The conference invites the parties to form geographical bilateral committees to negotiate mutual issues.

3: Jordan and Israel have agreed that:

I. The International Conference will not impose any solution or veto any agreement arrived at between the parties.
II. The negotiations will be conducted in bilateral committees directly.
III. The Palestinian issue will be dealt with within the committee of the Jordanian-Palestinian Committee and Israeli delegations.
IV. The Palestinians representatives will be included in the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.
V. Participation in the conference will be based on the parties acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and the renunciation of violence and terrorism.
VI. Each committee will negotiate independently.
VII. Other issues will be decided by mutual agreement between Jordan and Israel.

The above understanding is subject to the approval of the respective governments of Israel and Jordan.

Source: The Israel-Palestine Conflict an Intractive Data Base, *Peres-Hussain London Agreement*, [Online-Web] Accessed on 3 July, 2019, URL:https://ecf.org.il/media_items/556

Appendix-4: Peace Initiative by the Government of Israel, 14th May 1989/The Rabin-Shamir Plan

General

1. This document presents the principles of a political initiative of the Government of Israel which deals with the continuation of the peace process; the termination of the state of war with the Arab states; a solution for the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district; peace with Jordan; and a resolution of the problem of the residents of the refugee camps in West Bank and the Gaza Strip district.

2. The document includes:

a) The principles upon which the initiative is based.

b) Details of the processes of its implementation.

c) Reference to the subject of elections under consideration. Further details relating to the elections as well as other subjects *of* the initiative will be dealt with separately.

Basic Premises

3. The initiative is founded upon the assumption that there is a national consensus for it on the basis of the basic guidelines of the Government of Israel, including the following points: ·

a) Israel yearns for peace and the continuation of the political process by means of direct negotiation based of the principles of the Camp David Accords.

b) Israel opposes the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip district and in the area between Jordan and Israel.

c) Israel will not conduct negotiations with the PLO.

d) There will be no change in the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the Government.

Subjects to be dealt with in the Peace Process

4. a) Israel views as important that the peace process between Israel and Egypt based on the Camp David Accords, will serve as the cornerstone for enlarging the circle of peace in the region, and calls for a common endeavour for the strengthening of the peace and its extension, through continued consultation.

b) Israel calls for the establishment of peaceful relations between it and those Arab states which still maintain a state of war with it for the purpose of promoting a comprehensive

settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, including recognition, direct negotiations, ending the boycott, diplomatic relations, cessation of hostile activity in international institutions or forums and regional and bilateral co-operation.

c) Israel calls for an international endeavour to resolve the problem of the residents of the Arab refugee camps in Judea, Samaria and Gaza in order to improve their living conditions and to rehabilitate them. Israel is prepared to be a partner in this endeavour.

d) In order to advance the political negotiation process leading to peace, Israel proposes free and democratic elections among the Palestinian inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District in an atmosphere devoid of violence, threats and terror. In these elections a representation will be chosen to conduct negotiations for a transitional period of self-rule. This period will constitute a test for coexistence and co-operation. At a later stage, negotiations will be conducted for a permanent solution during which all the proposed options for an agreed settlement will be examined, and the peace between Israel and Jordan will be achieved.

e) All the above mentioned steps should be dealt with simultaneously.

f) The details of what has been mentioned in d) will be given below.

The Principles Constituting the Initiative Stages

5. The initiative is based on two stages;

a) Stage A - A transitional period for and interim agreement.

b) Stage B- Permanent Solution.

6. The interlock between the stages is a timetable on which the plan is built; the peace process delineated by the initiative is based on Resolutions 242 and 338 upon which the Camp David Accords are founded.

Timetable.

7. The transitional period will continue for 5 years.

8. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations for achieving a permanent solution will begin.

Parties Participating in the Negotiations in Both Stages

9. The parties participating in the negotiations for the first stage (the interim agreement) shall include Israel and the elected representation of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea,

Samaria and Gaza District. Jordan and Egypt will be invited to participate in the negotiations if they so desire.

10. The parties participating in the negotiations for the second stage (permanent solution) shall include Israel and the elected representation of the Palestinian Arabs inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, as well as Jordan; furthermore, Egypt may participate in these negotiations. In negotiations between Israel and Jordan, in which the elected representation of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will participate, the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan will be concluded.

Substance of Transitional Period

11. During the transitional period the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will be accorded self-rule by means of which they will, themselves, conduct their affairs of daily life. Israel will continue to be responsible for security, foreign affairs and all matters concerning Israeli citizens in Judea, Samaria and Gaza district. Topics involving the implementation of the plan for self-rule will be considered and decided within the framework of the negotiations for an interim agreement.

Substance of Permanent Solution

12. In the negotiations for a permanent solution every party shall be entitled to present for discussion all the subjects it may wish to raise.

13. The aim of the negotiations should be:

a) The achievement of a, permanent solution acceptable to the negotiating parties.

b) The arrangements for peace and borders between Israel and Jordan.

Details of the Process for Implementation of the Initiative

14. First and foremost dialogue and basic agreement by the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as well as Egypt and Jordan if they wish to take part, as above mentioned, in the negotiations, on the principles constituting the initiative.

15. a) Immediately afterwards will follow the stage of preparations and implementation of the election process in which a representation of Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will be elected.

This representation:

I) Shall be a partner to the conduct of negotiations for the transitional period.

II) Shall constitute the self-governing authority in the course of the transitional period.

Ill) Shall be the central Palestinian component, subject to agreement after three years, in the negotiations for a permanent solution. In the period of preparation and implementation there shall be a calming of the violence in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

16. As to the substance of the elections, it is recommended that a proposal of regional elections be adopted, the details of which shall be determined in future discussions.

17. Every Palestinian Arab residing in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, who shall be elected by the inhabitants to represent them, after having submitted his candidacy in accordance with the detailed document which shall determine the subject of the elections, may be a legitimate participant in the conduct of negotiations with Israel.

18. The elections shall be free, democratic and secret.

19. Immediately after the election of the Palestinian representation negotiations shall be conducted with it on an interim agreement for a transitional period which shall continue for 5 years, as mentioned above. In these negotiations the parties shall determine all the subjects relating to the substance of self-rule and the arrangements necessary for its implementation.

20. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the establishment of the self-rule, negotiations for a permanent solution shall begin. During the whole period of these negotiations until the signing of the agreement for a permanent solution, the self-rule shall continue in effect as determined in the negotiations for an interim agreement.

Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1989), Israel-Palestine Initiative-May 1989, [Online: Web] Accessed on 5 July 2019, URL:https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel s%20peace%20initiative%20-%20may%2014-%201989.aspx

Appendix-5: Baker's Five Point Proposal, 14th October 1989

1. The United States understands that because Egypt and Israel have been working hard on the peace process, there is agreement that an Israeli delegation should conduct a dialogue with a Palestinian delegation in Cairo.

2. The United States understands that Egypt cannot substitute itself for the Palestinians and Egypt will consult with the Palestinians on all aspects of that dialogue. Egypt will also consult with Israel and the United States.

3. The United States understands that Israel will attend the dialogue only after a satisfactory list of Palestinians has been worked out.

4. The United States understands that the Government of Israel will come to the dialogue on the basis of the Israeli Governments 14th May initiative. The United States further understands that the Palestinians will come to the dialogue prepared to discuss elections and the negotiating process in accordance with Israel's initiative. The United States understands, therefore, that the Palestinians would be free to raise issues that relate to their opinions on how to make elections and the negotiating process succeed.

5. In order to facilitate this process, the US proposes that the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Egypt, and the US meet in Washington within two weeks.

Appendix 6: Letters of Exchange

Letter From Yasser Arafat To Prime Minister Rabin

Yitzhak Rabin   September 9, 1993

Prime Minister of Israel

Mr. Prime Minster,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following PLO Commitments:

The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.

The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.

In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,

Yasser Arafat

Chairman

The Palestine Liberation Organization

Letter From Prime Minister Rabin To Yasser Arafat

September 9, 1993

Yasser Arafat

Chairman

The Palestinian Liberation Organization

Mr. Chairman,

In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.

Yitzhak Rabin

Prime Minister of Israel

Source: Makovsky, David (1996), *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to Peace*, USA and UK: Westview Press, Inc.

Appendix-7: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian- Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the, two sides agree to the following principles:

ARTICLE I
AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

ARTICLE II
FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

ARTICLE III
ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the

elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

ARTICLE IV
JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

ARTICLE V
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest.

4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or pre-empted by agreements reached for the interim period.

ARTICLE VI
PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII
INTERIM AGREEMENT

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement")

2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.

4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

ARTICLE VIII
PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

ARTICLE IX
LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

ARTICLE X
JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

ARTICLE XI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

ARTICLE XII

LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

ARTICLE XIII
REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

ARTICLE XIV
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

ARTICLE XV
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

ARTICLE XVI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan", the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

ARTICLE XVII
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel

For the P.L.O.

Witnessed By:
The United States of America
The Russian Federation

ANNEX I

PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.

2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:

a. the system of elections;

b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and

c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

ANNEX II

PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

3. The above agreement will include, among other things:

a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.

b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.

c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.

d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.

e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.

f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

a. Gaza - Egypt; and

b. Jericho - Jordan.

5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

ANNEX III

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility

study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli- Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

ANNEX IV
PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION
CONCERNING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:

a. an Economic Development Program for the 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

b. a Regional Economic Development Program.

A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza strip will consist of the following elements:

1. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.

2. A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.

3. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.)

4. A Human Resources Plan.

5. Other programs.

B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:

1. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.

2. The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

3.   The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal.

4. Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.

5. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.

6. Interconnection of electricity grids.

7. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

8. A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.

9.   Regional cooperation in other spheres.

3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage intercessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Article IV

It is understood that:

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.

2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI (2)

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.

2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.

3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII (2)

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5)

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee.

It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint
Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

Annex II

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel

For the PLO

Witnessed By:
The United States of America
The Russian Federation

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