ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING AFTER OSLO

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the Ph. D., thesis entitled *Israel's National Security Policy Making after Oslo* submitted by me for the award of the degree of Ph. D., of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated to the Indian Armed Forces

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMAN	Agaf Modi'in/ Directorate of Military Intelligence
APG	All Palestine Government
ATM	Anti-tank Guided Missile
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CPPR	Centre for Political Planning and Research
CPR	Centre for Political Research
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
D/CIA	Director of Central Intelligence Agency
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DMI	Director of Military Intelligence
DoP	Declaration of Principles
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FRC	Fatah Revolutionary Council
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Production General Command
GHQ	General Headquarter
GSS	General Security Service
Hamas	*Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya*
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAF	Israel Air Force
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
ISA	Israeli Security Agency
KGB	*Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*
LAKAM	*LishkaLe'Kishrei Mada*/ Bureau of Scientific Liaison

MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MI	Military Intelligence
MIG	Mikoyan and Gurevich fighter aircraft
MK	Member of the Knesset
MOSSAD	*HaMossadle Modiʿinule Tafkidim Meyuḥadim* / The Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
PDFLP	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PNC	Palestinian National Council
PNF	Palestine National Front
PNSF	Palestine National Salvation Front
POW	Prisoner of War
RPG	Rocket-Propelled Grenade
SA 2	Surface-to-air Guided Missile
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SHABAK	*Sheruth Bitahon Klali*/ General Security Service
SHAI	*Sheruth Yedioth*/Information Service
SLA	South Lebanese Army
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile

TIPH	Temporary International Presence in Hebron
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Chapter One

Introduction

Security forms a key component of social systems. The concept of security bears varied significances in the wake of human existence and with existent social practices and activities. The lack of security can be described as a situation where certain undesirable elements stand a chance at hampering peace and stability in the society. According to Joseph Nye (1991), the notion of security should be understood as a process, helping in ensuring the basic functions of the society. It is a precondition necessary for the discharge of basic activities of the society. Any social system inclines to organize its space in such a manner that the actors within the system (people) can operate "interdependently and that they are structured in such a way as to comply with the need for security in society at large" (Grizold 1994:37-53).

In this context, the security structure of a particular social system/society is aimed at deliberating security, in its broadest sense, to every member of the society. Therefore, the fundamental concept of national security system is derived from the structural connects between security and human needs. The abstraction of providing security through a security system has historically existed throughout human history, and its manifestation can be observed in the contemporary societies as well. In the current global order, nations guarantee security to its citizens through the effectiveness of the national security apparatus. The competence of this apparatus does not only reflect in the ability of the nations to guard their "basic social values against an internal or external threat but also their ability to ensure social development as well as the well-being of their population" (Grizold 1994:41).

The notion of national security encircles around the realist idea of security which sees international politics as an unvarying tussle among nations in the pursuit of expanding their powers and national interests under the state of anarchy. The concept deals with safeguarding a nation's existence and defending its vital interests; which can be traced back to the *Peace of Westphalia* (1648), where the concept of a sovereign state became the cornerstone of a new international order of nation-states system. However, the way the term has been used contemporarily has a rather recent origin. Its constituents could be seen in the works of Madison and more recently in Walter Lippman's work "US Foreign Policy" published in

1943 (Lippman 1943). The term national security acquired its place in strategic thinking as a concept during the Second World War.

The conception of national security of a country is based on various internal and external factors including geography, historical experiences, threat perceptions, natural resources, manpower changes in domestic, regional and international politics. National security as a concept is described as a focused act which is strictly connected with interests of the nation and its internal order (Buzan 1983). According to Mario Nobilo (1988) the concept of national security acts as a complex interface between economic, political, ideological, military, social, legal and other "social factors through which individual states attempt to ensure acceptable provisions to maintain their sovereignty, territorial integrity, the physical survival of its population, political independence and possibilities a balanced and rapid social development on an equal footing" (Nobilo 1988:74).

On the other hand, Amin Hewedy, defined national security as "an activity of nation-states with which the states, within the range of their social capacities at present and in future, considering global changes and development, protect their identity, existence and interests" (Hewedy 1989:16).6 This activity involves specific measures, such as trade, economy, etc, defence against any kind of threat from the environment; long term and short term security measures of the society; and all these must be adjusted with the capability of the society and accustomed to global and regional changes (Ibid.). Studies by various researchers and scholars alike limited the notion of national security to basic military aspects (Morgenthau 1948; Lippmann 1943; Berkowitz and Bock 1965; Kissinger 1957) while Amos Jordon and William Taylor (1981) and Charles D. Freilich (2012) expanded the explanation to all of the components of state, including national identity, economy, technological advancement, societal cohesion, and foreign relations. Initially national security focused on military power, but gradually came to encompass economic security, energy security and environmental security. Despite its prolonged usage, there is no consensus regarding the concept of national security.

The national security concept of Israel generally indistinct but reflects some defined objectives. However, it does not have an official national security doctrine in the form a document (Harkabi 1990; Tira 2009). It does, however, have some guiding principles which Israeli leaders underline in their public statements and acts from time to time (Bar-Joseph 2005; Dror 2009). These principles have dominated the Israeli national security strategies

from Ben-Gurion to Netanyahu. However, over a period of time, these principles have also registered little alterations.

The Israeli concept of national security is profoundly influenced by the atrocious memories of the Holocaust (Freilich 2018; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Shabtai 2010). The massacre which took place in different phases and named by the Nazis as "final solution to the Jewish question", led to a profound effect on Israel and its national security policy (Nili 2011:3). The influence of the Holocaust, which took lives of more than six million and affected many more, has found profound significance in security planning throughout the history of modern Israel (Sheffer and Barak 2013: 23; Nili 2011:3).

Since the declaration of independence in 1948, the security of its citizens forms the primary concern for Israeli political and military leadership. The Israeli understanding of national security starts from its struggle for survival (Horowitz 1993; Freilich 2018; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Shabtai 2010). Since the day of formation, Israel has shared antagonistic relations with its Arab neighbours and continues to face threat to existence. It has been portrayed as 'a nation in arms' (Cohen and Cohen 2012:1). Surviving hostile conditions necessitates the maintenance of military supremacy in the pursuit of preserving its position as the strongest regional power in West Asia (Horowitz 1993). As a result of this hostility with its surroundings, the issues related to national security encroach on the almost every aspect of Israeli life, private as well as public.

Security of its citizens and land is the principal goal of Israel and towards this end, its security strategy is based on three main pillars, namely. deterrence, intelligence warning and battle decision (See diagram 1.1). Its strategy begins with the maintenance of a reliable deterrent posture, which includes its willingness to carry out pre-emptive strikes when necessary considering possibility. The deterrence posture of Israel is constructed to ensure the Arab countries that militarily they would not be able to achieve their objective (Freilich 2018). To prevent a perceived deterioration in its deterrence Israel opted for wars in years; 1956, 1967 and 1973 respectively, launched many reprisals during the 1950s and 1960s and fought with PLO in 1982 at Lebanon. Deterrence was to be achieved through both full-scale war and limited military operations, such as special military operations and retaliations raids (Ibid.). According to Freilich (2018), Israeli deterrence posture was initially based on denial, rather than punishment, such as, thwarting Arab military efforts, destroying the attacking forces, and conquering the territory, not targeting the uninvolved bystander and economic

infrastructure. However, a few occasions such as; retaliation raids in the 1950s and deep penetration raids in Egypt during the War of Attrition can be mentioned as some of the exceptions.

However, since 1973 the prospect of a traditional full scale intra-state war has declined significantly. However, prospects of low-intensity wars led by the potent non-state actors, namely, Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have emerged as a major challenge for Israeli security forces. In a rapidly changing strategic scenario, countries such as Iran and Syria have transferred their focus to secret support to these groups, considering them as a cost-effective and low-risk instrument to continue to fight against Israel (Jones 2019). To deal with these threats, the importance of deterrence has significantly increased for Israeli security experts. It is mainly to prevent asymmetric actors from initiating attacks that would require a large-scale IDF response. An assessment of IDF deterrence ability "in the wake of military campaigns against Hamas and Hezbollah reveals a mixed record where tactical successes have not translated into strategic victories" (Vira 2018). When deterrence fails, Israel would seek to prevent escalation and to determine the outcome of war quickly and decisively. Since it lacks strategic depth, it must prevent the enemy from entering its territory and must try to quickly transfer the battle to the enemy territory.

The early warning system (intelligence warning) is the successive pillar of Israel's security doctrine. Early warning or strategic warning system has proven to be indispensable to make effective mobilization and deployment of reserve forces when Israel becomes defenceless in the absence of strategic depth, as was the case before 1967 (Vira 2018; Freilich 2018). Over the years, Israel has tried to clearly define a clear set the indicators that ascertain on possibility of early warnings of hostility which allows it to undertake preventive and pre-emptive actions (Freilich 2018).

The next pillar of Israeli national security strategy is known as the first strike strategy which has been developed after 1948. It can be divided into two parts: preventive wars and pre-emptive wars. A preventive war is rooted in the belief "that the enemy plans to attack Israel sometime in the future. Therefore, preventive war can be launched without the existence of an immediate threat to the political or territorial status quo. The pre-emptive strike, on the other hand, is launched by relying on signs and assessment of information, with an aim to avert imminent threat" (Civcik 2004: 95).

This security strategy worked properly till the 1967 war and it was useful only when the IDF was dealing with the conventional military. However, this proved inadequate in fighting non-conventional warfare. Unlike the conventional conflict natures between state actors, in the Post-Camp David period, most of the threats that Israel received came from the unconventional military and non-state actors. In the 1980s and 1990s, this strategy proved inadequate in addressing the security concerns of Israel. It was mainly in the light of missile attacks on Israeli territories during the first Gulf War in 1991 and during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. In this situation, IDF slowly developed 'home front' as the forth pillar of its national security strategy. As a result in the Meridor Committee on Israel's Defence Doctrine in 2007, the concept of home front was informally accepted as the fourth defensive pillar (Meridor cited in Finkel, Friedman and Preisler-Swery 2015). Furthermore, the Operations Pillar of Defence in 2012 and Protective Edge in 2014 shone a light on the concept of the centrality of defence in Israeli security consideration.

The Israeli concept of national security is rooted in its perennial engagement in a struggle for survival. It has been subjected to regional hostility, the constant threat of war, international politico-economic isolation and the cycle of violence and terrorism. In the absence of peace with most of its immediate and distant neighbours, Israel military plays a key role in combating and protecting its frontiers. Its primary security concerns are existential and in the post-Second World war era, no other state has been more concerned about its national security than Israel.

Many of the security issues Israel faces contemporarily present themselves with limited response options and requires prompt decision-making capabilities in the highly uncertain strategic atmosphere (Shlaim and Yaniv 1980:242). Under such a situation, its security-related decisions depend upon the unfolding of the security situation at a certain point of time. According to one former minister, "long term planning is impossible. No one else plans and neither do you. In your subconscious, you do not prepare long term plans and if you do, nothing comes of it … All of the issues requiring long term planning are in a state of crisis." (Bilski 1980: 115; Peri 2006:49). In this context, the role of defence establishment in framing Israel's national security policy is paramount.

Regarding National security policy making, the IDF is the most influential bureaucratic player in Israel and the defence establishment exerts overarching influence on the security policies. According to Zion's Dilemma, "the IDF's sources of influence lie in a deep

commitment to its mission and not to unwarranted belief in its ability to handle most issues far more effectively than other government organs; the IDF has fought for control over a broad spectrum of national security issues" (Freilich 2013:71). On the other hand, agencies such as, Ministry of Foreign Affairs barely engage in bureaucratic politics, the supremacy of the IDF is well documented in the bureaucratic politics in Israel.

Despite IDF's influence on many occasions, several important decisions have been taken over its objections or even without its knowledge. For example, Menachem Begin, known for his proximity with the IDF, started working on the peace talks with Egypt without informing it. Similarly, Yitzhak Rabin placed the decision of the Oslo Peace process without informing IDF (Freilich 2013, 2018). Begin took the decision of targeting the Iraqi reactor in 1981 despite objections from Aman. Ehud Barak's decision of withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 was also drawn without the consent of the IDF. Similarly, "Arial Sharon decided to withdraw from Gaza without discussing with the IDF, as did Olmert regarding the West Bank Consolidation Plan" (Ibid.:71).

Diagram 1.1: Basic Pillars of Israeli Security Policy

Deterrence

Battle Decision

Early Warning

Home Front

(Gradually became a important pillar in Israeli security thinking after 1991)

(Source: Inspired by Available literature)

In the last few years, the Shin bet's influence regarding Palestinian Issues has significantly increased. Its suggestions have been given importance in contrast to the IDF's on several occasions (Yadlin and Yatom cited in Freilich 2013). According to Freilich (2013), therefore, the IDF is not invincible, nor must it be so to substantiate its primacy in the security planning; "IDF primacy is based not on "winning" every issue but merely on being the most important player in most" (Freilich 2013:71-72).

The supremacy of IDF as a sole institution to make security related policies is mainly because of the absence of an institution which can compete with the IDF's intelligence systems and planning abilities in generating rapid and comprehensive policy planning (Peri 2005; Freilich 2013, 2018). Thus, the IDF continues to be the sole entity capable of generating high-quality analyses and policy advices. Information which is gathered by various intelligence agencies, namely, Aman, Mossad and Shin Bet, provide the pedestal for security policy making (Peri 2005; Freilich 2013, 2018). The cabinet generally does not play an active role security policymaking; while the IDF decides the appropriate strategies pertaining to security. In the framework of drawing lessons from security challenges in the 1999 government under Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, established the National Security Council to analyse, monitor and coordinate policies regarding national security. Despite this effort, a decade and a half later, it is found to be unable to compete with IDF's research units (Peri 2005; Freilich 2013, 2018).

Major parties such as Likud and Labour give equal importance to security, however, their political stands can be described as hawkish and dovish respectively. All major political blocs profess the argument that in any final-status agreement with the Palestinians, the city of Jerusalem must remain united under Israeli sovereignty and openly advocate the need for a demilitarized Palestinian State along with Israel maintaining 'defensible' borders. Moreover, on the question of weapons of mass destruction, the views of most parties coincide. The Labour Party has traditionally emphasized on a more flexible position vis-à-vis the occupied territories to facilitate peace agreements between Israel and Arab states than Likud and religious parties.

Although Israel has emerged victorious in the 1948 war and acquired considerably more territory than originally allotted under the 1947 United Nations Partition plan, Israel achieved strategic depth in the wake of June 1967 war. The victory in the war was a milestone in the history of Arab-Israel conflict, when Israel captured the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula in

the south, Golan Heights in the North and West Bank, including East Jerusalem in the east. From the perspective of national security, the military victory and the acquisition of vast amount of territories was important, because it contributed to the idea of 'defensible' borders.

From the Israeli perspective the traumatic experience of the 1973 Arab-Israel War significantly influenced its strategic thinking. The initial success of the Arab armies brought Israeli security system into jeopardy. This can be understood as a fault in military planning after the 1967 victory. Moshe Dayan, the defence minister of Israel remarked at the time, "The 1967 war was the last of wars… after which there is nothing left for the Arabs but to plead for mercy" (Badri and Zohdy, 1978: 203). The subsequent scenario of defeat however did undo the prevalent belief.

In the Initial few hours, IDF defence arrangement along the Suez Canal (Bar-Lev line) and Golan Heights were broken by Arab armies. On 7 October 1973, the second day of the war, the Southern Command of the IDF was routed and became incapable of preventing the Egyptian army from encroaching into the Sinai Peninsula (Bar-Joseph 2001). The only option for resistance available was the Israeli air force. However, two of Israel's major air attacks against the Egyptian and Syrian air defence systems that controlled the airspace over the battleground failed (Bar-Joseph 2001; Herzog 1998). Driven by desperation, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan expressed concerns about the fate of the 'Third Temple'.[1] While the final outcome of the war was very different, the war is still recognized and remembered in Israel, for the surprise attack in the early stages of the conflict and its setback (Bar-Joseph 2001; Herzog 1998).

Once the war was over, Israel found itself politically isolated and largely reliant on the US for economic, military and diplomatic support. Furthermore, the end of war enhanced the differences between Israel and the US, regarding their visions of the West Asian region (Bar-Joseph 2001; Inbar 2008). Though influence of America in the West Asian Region has significantly amplified after the 1973 War, it became more vulnerable to Arab pressure (Inbar 2008). In addition, America attached more importance to oil-rich Arab countries and tried to protect Egypt's pro-Western shift. It even expected to attract Iraq or Syria under this shift.

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[1] In the light of the destruction of the First and Second Temples, Israel is at time referred as the Third Temple of the Jewish people.

In the post-1973 period, Israel was under-confident and significantly susceptible to the American pressure. This pressure pushed Israel to sign agreements with Syria and Egypt in 1974 and 1975 respectively (Bar-Joseph 2001; Inbar 2008). Popular belief loomed regarding the agreements for being unable to reduce Arab hostility or the requirement of modern weaponry by Israel. Furthermore, after agreements both the countries continued to compete in an expensive arms race, "which further increased Israel's dependence on the US" (Inbar 2008:24-25). According to Efraim Inbar (2008), after 1973, Israel considered making territorial compromises to secure American consideration of its needs. Even, the key reason behind Israel's support to the American vision of West Asia, was to get American weaponry.

The importance of receiving the weapons was broadly highlighted by Shimon Peres, in 1974. In an interview, he expressed to the US policymakers that Israel would only "enter into the next phase of negotiations before receiving weapons they were promised" (Inbar 2008:24). It was also reflected in the famous Memorandum of Understanding between Israel and US that comprised "important pledges as to the magnitude of the American military supplies and their quality" (Ibid.).

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war emerged as the cornerstone for peace between Israel and Egypt. While Israel was surprised by the limited war initiated by Egypt and Syria combined with the Arabs states. Egypt recognized that the territories lost in the 1967 war could not be retrieved using the military. Thus, the 1973 Arab-Israel War paved the way for a change of perception between both the countries in accordance with the Camp David agreement (1979) between Egypt and Israel. It was the first major change in the Arabs policy towards Israel (US Department of State 2019; Inbar 2008). The Camp David talks discussed a number of issues, comprising the future of Israeli settlements and airbases in the Sinai Peninsula, issue of Gaza Strip and the West Bank. During the talks, delegations had differences in opinions "over the applicability of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 to a long-term agreement in the territories, as well as the status of Israel's settlements during projected negotiations on Palestinian autonomy that would follow a peace treaty" (US Department of State 2019).

The agreements called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula and establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. For its partly, Egypt agreed to allow Israeli ships to use the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran (*CNN* 2013). According to the treaty, Israel had fall back to the 1949 armistice line and pull out all its military and civilian presence from the Sinai Peninsula. It included the evacuation of several

Israeli settlements established since 1967, particularly in Ofira (Sharm el-Sheikh) and Yamit (near El-Arish) (Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty 1979). It was noted that the pull-out was to be completed by June 1982. On the other hand, Egypt agreed to the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, with the exception of limited police presence and monitoring by Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) formed in 1981. Furthermore, trade and diplomatic ties were formalized between the two nations (Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty 1979). It was also decided that the US would provide both countries billions of dollars in annual subsidies, including military aid. Under the agreement, Israel received US$3 billion, while Egypt received US$1.3 billion annually in military aid (Ibid.).

The peace treaty significantly reduced the possibility of Israel simultaneously having to face wars on two fronts. The Camp David agreement brought a new security environment in return for its territorial withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, Israel secured political recognition and relations with Egypt (Inbar 2008). Even though the bilateral relations did not blossom beyond cold peace, Egypt ceased to be a part of the larger Arab military coalition against Israel (Hoffman 2016). According to Daniela Huber (2018), the peace treaty neither resolved "the local (Israeli-Palestinian) nor the broader regional dimension of the conflict. Instead, it was the first step toward gradually weaving Arab states into a single unit gravitating around the US-Israeli/US-Saudi alliances" (Huber (2018). While the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was Israel's last war with the Arab states, its security dilemma was not resolved as the major threats to Israel's security in the post-Camp David period came from non-state actors.

The Egypt-Israel peace treaty normalised the relationship between both the countries, which largely was the fruit of tough negotiations. Similarly, in the case of Jordan, diplomacy played an important role in solving Israel's disputes and working out of differences between the two. Because of their formal peace, these two countries also tried to mediate and minimise the Israeli-Palestine conflict through various diplomatic and peace-making efforts. The absence of similar peace or political arrangements resulted in Israel continue to seek military means to manage and mitigate security challenges it faces vis-à-vis Syria and Hezbollah.

The significant developments that occurred in the 1990s, brought drastic changes in the international system. The disintegration of the USSR and the end of the ideological bloc politics brought about major changes in international politics. The reduction of nuclear weapons and drawdown in the defence budget of western powers; were some of the major

changes in the security environment. The end of the cold war brought with it many security challenges and changes in the new international world order and the nature of the conflicts also shifted. It altered from inter-state to intra-state level. The end of cold war rivalry between the United State and USSR was a major shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The end of the ideological divide also provided a congenial climate for peace.

In March 1991, the victory of the US in Gulf War created new favourable conditions for America to play a constructive role in peace-making efforts (Blair 2016). On the one hand, successful American armed operation against Iraq made the Bush administration very popular at the domestic level. On the other hand, it emphasized America's emerging to an influential role in West Asia in the post-cold war period (Goodwin 2004). During this period even USSR had not effectively contested the US intrusion in Arab countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and earlier Soviet client Syria, joined the alliance against Iraq (Beaver, Beaver and Wilsey 1999). This change pushed the US administration to give a reward to Arab partners for their valuable endeavour by creating situations to deal with the Palestinian issue.

Since the PLO was supporting Iraq in the Gulf war, it lost the support of many Arab and Gulf countries such as Syria, Egypt and the Gulf countries. It lost its support base in the Palestinian territories as well. Thus, it provided President Bush an opening at a diplomatic process with the Palestinians, under conditions which Israel agreed (United States Department of State 1991). Under such a situation, US took the responsibility of addressing the issue of the Arab-Israeli dispute at the international platform.

To revive the Israel-Palestine peace "process through negotiations on 30 October to 1 November 1991, a conference was hosted in Spain broadly known as Madrid conference" (Shlaim 2005: 241). The conference was cosponsored by both major powers, the US and the Soviet Union. During this conference, the US followed a fair and impartial attitude with a vow to reach an agreement that would give justice to Palestinians and security to Israel (Ibid.). According to experts, once the Gulf war was over Bush gave a speech in the Congress often cited as the key policy of Bush administration on the new order in West Asia (Knott 2018). This culminated in the Oslo process which brought about a new climate of security for Israel.

The Oslo agreements were a major shift in Arab-Israel relations as Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed to recognize each other. As underlined by the

Declaration of Principles (DoP), "Israel agreed on the land-for-peace principle to recognize Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, by beginning to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho" (Declaration of Principle 1993). According to the DoP, Israel would retain authority for overall security issues, although the IDF would pull back from Palestine population centres and continue to supervise all border crossings. The negotiations sought to achieve a permanent solution based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It was also decided in the DoP that "Palestinians would police the territories they controlled, cooperate with Israel in the fight against terrorism" (Ibid.). By late 1995, Israel withdrew from "Palestinian population centres in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. In January 1996 an elected Palestinian Authority took over governance of the territories from which Israel withdrew" (Ibid.).

The Palestinian recognition of Israel strengthened the possibility of the latter being accepted by the countries in the first circle through a peace agreement. Such an agreement was important, in the view of new threats posed by the states of the external circle, especially Iran and Iraq which were at loggerheads with Israel. These conditions highlighted that a political settlement is not only possible between Arab countries and Israel, but also with non-state actors.

The Oslo accords demanded significant demands vis-à-vis Israel, namely, acknowledgment "of the political rights of the Palestinians", withdrawal from occupied territories and political accommodation over issues such as Jerusalem, refugees and border. In return, the DoP also offered certain gains such as Arab recognition and normalization of relations with Israel, and Israel's acceptance by major international powers China and India. At the same time, the DoP and subsequent Israeli-Palestinian agreements such as withdrawal from the six major cities in the West Bank and transfer of control of Hebron to the Palestinian Authority posed certain security challenges to Israel.

The subsequent events proved that the Oslo process was an agreement between Israel and a section of the Palestinian national movement and not between Israel and the Palestinians. Israeli security policymakers hoped that Oslo agreements would provide security to the state and its citizens but this turned into as a nightmare. Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and other Palestinian areas proved to catastrophic for maintaining security as terrorism and instances of suicide attacks within the Green line increased and hence the accords faced severe criticisms from the military. The Oslo agreements restricted the scope of the IDF's security measures to

defend Israel. In the post-Oslo period, a cycle of violence started, and a rapid increase in the number of terrorist strikes was recorded from Palestinian territories on Israeli populated areas.

Substantial military withdrawal from Gaza and West Bank made it easy for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to launch a guerrilla war on Israeli territories. Between September 1993 and 2001, Israel witnessed 67 suicide attacks resulting in the deaths of 900 people (Including soldiers) and maiming of 979 civilians (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001). These forced the policymakers to redeploy military in the areas of West Bank and Gaza and reoccupy areas from which IDF was withdrawn by late 1995. In 2000, the outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada and the spiral of suicide attacks turned the Israeli public sentiment against Oslo accords highlighting the security dilemma faced by the Israeli security establishment. Its withdrawal from significant portions of the occupied territories did not ensure peace for Israel. The spiral of violence also prevented Israel from evolving a security-based policy over contentious issues such as settlements, borders and Jerusalem surfaced.

The unilateral decision of development of the security barrier disregarding the Green-line was a partial response to terror attacks without addressing the question of 'secured and recognised borders as demanded by the UN Resolution 242. The faltering peace process deprived Israel of the politico-diplomatic gains that looked promising in 1993. Furthermore, the security challenges accompanied by Oslo accords coincided with a number of other problems. Israel's presence in south Lebanon following the 1982 invasion resulted in the emergence of Hezbollah and the periodic occurrences of violence along its northern borders. The Oslo accords also did not resolve Israel's emerging competitions and confrontations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its support for various militant groups.

Survey of the Literature

The literature on the subject of the proposed research has been divided into three themes. The first theme titled as *National Security Policy* deals with the concept of national security, various definition of national security, Israeli concept of national security and the role of defence establishment in security policymaking. The second theme *Post-Cold War Security Environment* deals with the literature which covers the changes in the international security paradigm in the 1990s. The third theme titled as *the Oslo Accords and the National Security*

Policy Making, will contain the literature related to the impact of the peace making on the national security policy of Israel.

National Security Policy

The concept of national security developed generally after the Second World War. Although certain features of the contemporary concept of national security can be traced in the writings of James Madison and covered more recently in the works of Hans Morgenthau (Madison 1788; Morgenthau 1948). Walter Lippmann (1943) defined national security by underlining "that a nation feels secure when it is not pressurised to accept legitimate interests in order to avoid war, and when it is able to protect these interests through war, if challenged" (Lippmann 1943).

Hans Morgenthau (1948), Walter Lippmann (1943), Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock (1965) and Henry Kissinger (1957) limited the concept of national security to vital martial aspects while Amos Jordon and William Taylor (1981) and Charles D. Freilich (2012) expand it to all components of state, including national identity, economy, technological advancement, societal cohesion, and foreign relations. Amos Jordon and William Taylor (1981) noted that "the concept of national security has more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm and also implies protection through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interest, the loss which could be threaten fundamental values and the validity of states" (Cited in Romm 1993: 6). According to Charles D. Freilich (2012) national security policy refers to foreign and defence affairs, as well as to those aspects of socioeconomic policy of relevance to national power. Barry Buzan (1991) did not limit the concept of national security only to military but broadened it to environmental, social, political and economic aspects also. Mohammed Ayoob (1995) noted that the concept of national security does not include the non-military aspects, until unless they do not affect the national existence of a state. Mario Nobilo underlined national security as "an intricate interaction between political, economic, military, ideological, legal, social and other internal and external social factors through which individual states attempt to ensure acceptable provisions to maintain their sovereignty, territorial integrity, the physical survival of its population, political independence and possibilities for a balanced and rapid social development on an equal footing" (cited in Grizold 1994: 4).

Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock (1965) noted that "national security can be most fruitfully defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threat" (Berkowitz and Bock 1965: 10). Similarly, Ira S. Cohen and Andrew C. Tuttel defined "national security as protective condition which statesmen either try to acquire, or preserve, in order to guard various components of their polities from either external or internal threats" (Cohen and Tuttel 1972:1). According to Stephen J. Cimbala (1984), "national security decision is those values that are most important for national survival, cohesion, and character" (Cimbala 1984: 1). He further noted that these "policies are strategic in the sense that the term 'strategy' implies conscious skilful handling of the environment for pre-decided ends" (Cimbala, 1984). These definitions show the variety of understanding of the concept of national security.

Vojin Dimitrijevic (1973) identified "five features which he considered to be the basic elements of national security first, ensuring the existence of the state as a political community, existence of the nation (which is not identical with the existence of a particular state) and the physical survival of its population; second, protecting territorial integrity as the basic right of the state; third, maintaining political independence as an attribute of internationally recognized national status of the state; four, ensuring quality of life; and five, embedding of the vital interest of the state in the national security policy" (Dimitrijevic 1973:34).

The national security doctrine of Israel is not designed in an official document form (Tira 2009b; Levita 1988; Passig 2008). However, it is guided by the several principles which Israeli leaders underlined in their public statements and acts (Bar-Joseph 2005; Levita 1988; Dror 2009; Passig 2008). Among these several principles, existentialist threat to Israel is the most dominating one. The unfriendly neighbouring countries of Israel, such as, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestinian people, aimed to destroy it in the past (Bar-Joseph 2005; Passig 2008; Dror 2009; Freilich 2018; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Shabtai 2010). The problems between Israel and its enemies cannot be resolved by military power and Israel cannot expect others powers to protect its existence (Bar-Joseph 2005; Passig 2008; Levita 1988; Dror 2009; Freilich 2018; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Shabtai 2010).

The experience has underlined that Israel needs an appropriate security concept (Civcik 2004). There is consensus among the scholars that its security policy has been significantly influenced by its geographical condition (Inbar 1999; Muhareb 2011; Rodman 2001; Freilich

2018; Howoritz 1993). According to Charles D. Freilich (2018) the security policy makers in Israel saw the country as a "state under siege till 1967 and its geography as a nightmare" (Freilich 2018:17).

The Israeli understanding of the national security begins from the fact that it found itself always busy in a struggle for survival (Horowitz 1993; Dayan 2014; Rodman 2001). It has been subjected to a hostile atmosphere of war, international isolation, domestic sabotage, and terrorism. The Israeli concept of "national security emerged out of the political-military leadership's interpretation of the strategic environment in which Israel found itself in the in the late 1940s and early 1950s" (Rodman 2001). These circumstances depicted a posture of military deterrence, it had a defensive strategic purpose, but on the other hand operational content was offensive (Heller 2000). David Rodman (2001) says that the past experiences compelled Israeli defence policy makers "to develop a set of basic security concepts. Development of these concepts has been Israel's reaction to the geographic, diplomatic, and resource conditions in which it has had to survive. Making of these concepts have also been shaped by Israel's experiences both during wartime and peace time" (Rodman 2001: 23).

About Israel, there is a range of definitions available over the concept of national security, a few limiting it to neo-realist school of thought and others expanding it to hard core realist school. For example, Israel Tal explained national security as "the guarantor for the nation's existence and the defence of its interests" (citied in Muhareb 2011: 3). On the other hand, for General Yehoshavat Harkabi (1990) the concept of national security comprises "the security of the nation's existence, independence, and regional integration". He also comprised the security of almost every important units of state in his definition of national security, which includes its citizens' lives, political system, domestic security, security on the borders, ideology, and demographic equilibrium (cited in Muhareb 2011: 3). According to Muhareb (2011) for numerous reasons Israel's concept is different and important than other part of the world. It is mainly because of its constant military engagement in the conflicts with the Arab countries. Since it declared independence in 1948 and it has modified, expanded, and changed its geographical borders. The Arab countries has not seen Israel as a common state like any other country in the world (Rodman 2001; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Freilich 2012).

There is consensus in Israel that there is a need to cope with threats to its existence and that can be only achieved by its own military power (Allon 2013; Horowitz 1993; Inbar 2005). According to Dan Horowitz (1993) in the war time this objective was well covered into the

operational goal of the destroying enemy forces in order to not to allow them an offensive capability (Horowitz 1993). During the initial days of the state formation, Israel's security policy was basically defensive. This policy was basically come out from writings of David Ben-Gurion (Freilich 2018:14). However, the lessons of the 1948 Arab-Israel War and the changing regional realities which existed thereafter, led a significant change on the Israeli security policy (Perlmutter 1985: 142). According to Dimitrios Machairas (2017), the territorial gain in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was a double-edged sword for Israel. One hand it, decreased short-term security threats, on the other, it increased security dangers in the long run (Machairas 2017).

Regarding Israeli national security strategy variety of classification available which cover a sphere from security to economic security, to environmental security. For example, General Israel Tal explained the concept as "the guarantor for the nation's existence and the defence of its interests" (citied in Muhareb 2011: 3). Other side, for General Yehoshavat Harkabi (1990) the concept of national security comprises "the security of the nation's existence, independence, and regional integration" (cited in Muhareb, 2011: 3). He also comprised the security of almost every important units of state in his definition of national security, which includes its citizens' lives, political system, domestic security, security on the borders, ideology and demographic equilibrium (Ibid.).

According to Yigal Allon (2013) national security concept of Israel "refers to a system of values and principles that have shaped Israel's national security institutions. It also highlights the manner in which the state has uses its capabilities and strength in the fields of security and foreign affairs in order to protect its existence and security" (Allon 2013:1). Brigadier-General, Avraham Ayalon defined national security as "the total of reciprocal ties between the means at the state's disposal and its readiness to employ them- and its immediate and distant environment. It reflects state's ability to guarantee its preferred interests and promote its national objectives under varying conditions of uncertainty" (Quoted in Horowitz 1993: 56). Ayalon summarized his definition by saying that one may talk about a national security equation based on both 'capability factor' and 'intent factor'. According to Stephanie G. Neuman "national security policy articulates both the general national interests and objectives of the state and the means (Military, Economic, and Political) it [the state] will use to further and protect them" (Quoted in Horowitz 1993: 56).

According to Charles D Freilich (2006), since 1948, Israel has confronted an unfriendly hostile neighbourhood and unsuccessful attempts of "peace processes with the Palestinians and Syrians, and even the cold peace with Egypt and Jordan have reinforced this image. As a result, national security has been at the forefront of Israeli political life for six decades" (Freilich 2006: 635). To deal with this critical situation, Israel has followed two strategies, namely, firstly it developed a disproportionate defence capability to prevent the coercion to its security and secondly by creating a "hunkering down" national security policy making style geared to a "garrison democracy" (Ibid.). According to him, "National security decision making in Israel takes place within the context of a uniquely harsh external environment, a proportional representation (PR) electoral system in which the entire country comprises one national constituency, and the structure of the national security establishment" (Freilich 2012:14).

According to many experts, national security policy making in Israel is monopolized by the security officials, mainly by the IDF officers, who marginalized other actors, especially civilian leaders (Sheffer and Barak 2013; Sela 2007; Freilich 2012, 2006). It is mainly due to the security condition and military threats from its neighbours and low-intensity warfare (Sela 2007; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Mc Laurin et.al 1977; Freilich 2012, 2006). In this regard, IDF is most powerful bureaucratic actor in Israel and "the defence establishment as a whole wields inordinate influence" (Freilich 2012:70). The key sources of influence for IDF are numerous, "but it has also been the least reticent of the various agencies in adopting an aggressive approach to bureaucratic politics. Motivated by a deep commitment to its mission and a not unwarranted belief in its ability to handle most issues far more effectively than other governmental organs, the IDF has fought for control over a broad spectrum of national security issues. Although the other agencies, the MFA especially, are hardly innocent of engaging in bureaucratic politics, the primacy of the IDF is the story of bureaucratic politics in Israel" (Freilich 2012:70). On the other hand, according to Avraham Sela, the civil-military relationships in Israel symbiotic in nature where political leaders are unable to subordinate defence officials in the decision-making (Sela 2007; Mc Laurin et. al 1977).

R.D. Mc Laurin, Mohammed Mughisuddin, and Abraham R. Wagner (1977 noted that the role of IDF in the foreign and security policy making have been a matter of huge concern in Israel. They underlined that the basic principle of state is that the military be an instrument of foreign, strategic and security policy making, not its maker and in Israel the situation is

complicated because foreign affairs are associated with defence and settlement policy and hence the IDF has emerged as a dominant player in security and foreign policy making (Mc Laurin et.al 1977: 179). Another reason for IDF's influence on security policy is that the political leadership heavily depended on the IDF for critical assessment, vital intelligence, and policy implementation (Mc Laurin et. al 1977; Klieman and Pedatzur 1991).

In Israel there is absence of an alternative organization which is capable of countering the IDF in terms of analyses and policy recommendations as the IDF has the monopoly on tactical and strategic intelligence and planning. As a result, the political system is entirely dependent on the professional opinion of the military leadership (Laurin et.al 1977; Klieman and Pedatzur 1991; Peri 2002; Sela 2007; Inbar 1999). The IDF pose encroaches upon the political decision-makers in shaping security policies in a time of war and peace and makes "public discourse of security in theory and practice" (Peri 2002: 22; Lissak and Horowitz 2012: 214-215).

The IDF became the most important instrument "in defending the country, creating new settlements along its borders, or developing strategic dialogues with various countries, convincing the Arab world that the best course was to reach a compromise with Israel and sign peace agreements with it" (Schiff 1999). According to Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer Israeli government consult with IDF before its security strategy (Barak and Sheffer 2013). It should be noted that the IDF was not only security agency that acquired a predominant position in the policy making, policies related to Palestinians is dominated by Shin Bet, which was the main source for information about Palestinians (Cohen 2010).

Post-Cold War Security Environment

The notion of security has undergone significant changes in the post-Cold war era (Nayak 2012). The end of cold war rivalry between the United State and USSR was a major turning point in Israel- Palestinian conflict (Peri 2005; Inbar 2005; Baldwin 1995; Mahler 2011). The end of cold war escorted many positive outcomes, such as "the unification of Germany, the drawdown of nuclear weapon and end of the bi-polarity and a drastic downfall in the defence budget of the western countries" (Inbar 1996: 33).

On the other hand, John Mearsheimer (2001) rejected that there has been any change in the post-cold war security environment and asserted that in the Post-Cold war era also states will have to worry as much about military security as they did during the Cold War (Mearsheimer

2001). According to Mats Berdal in the international system with the end of the Cold War violence had shifted in the more evidently to the intra-state level. According to him the major reason for this had been the collapse of multi-ethnic federal state structures (USSR) and the disintegration of fragile political orders in parts of Africa (Berdal 1999). The outcomes Intifada forced George Shultz to propose an international gathering that would offer a platform to open straight interaction between Israel, Palestinians and Jordan over the issue of interim self-government for Palestinian areas, accompanied with negotiations over the permanent status agreement (Berry and Philo 2006:89).

The departure of the USSR had mixed results on the West Asian players (Bergman 2014; Inbar 1996). In the absence of the Soviet Union, super power protection of Arab countries vanished; it sanctioned an efficient America led coalition to fight against Iraqi aggression against Kuwait (Inbar 1996). Les Aspin (1993) noted that Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait signalled a new class of regional dangers for America "by rogue leaders set on regional domination through military aggression while simultaneously pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities. The world's response to Saddam's invasion also demonstrated the potential in this new era for broad-based, collective military action to stop such dictator" (Aspin 1993). During the 1991 Gulf War Yasser Arafat declared his support for Saddam Hussein, Gulf States responded it by cutting "off funds to PLO and tens of thousands of Palestinians were forced out of the Gulf States" (Mahler 2011).

Another indirect outcome of 1991 Gulf war was the shift in Arab policy towards PLO, now Saudis and Iranians began to provide funds to Hamas and the Islamic Jihad which they used to develop their base in the occupied territory (Byman 2011; Dadwal 1995). The 1991 Gulf war greatly diminished the chances of building a radical coalition against Israel (Dadwal 1995). For Syria disintegration of the Soviet Union was matter accepting certain realities with fear that in the comparison of economy and military power Syria was nowhere in front of Israel. In addition, Israel was a nuclear power whose security was guaranteed by the US. According to Efraim Inbar (2005), Avraham Sela (1998) Gabrial Sheffer and Oren Barak (2013), Shebonti Ray Dadwal (1995) under this situation Palestinians felt that the peace process was an opportunity which should not be missed.

Aharon Levran (2014) underlined that the necessity of an updated security policy for Israel realized when during the 1991 Gulf war Iraq fired 39 missiles on Israeli territories. This event revealed that Israeli civilian population was under the direct threat of attack from a country

that does not even share borders with Israel, at the same time even distant enemies could hit centres of the civilian population (Aharon 2014; Schiff 1999). According to Aharon Levran (2014) on the one hand, Israel recognizes that it must meet the new security threat through long-range missiles or by launching military satellites; while on the other hand, it is clear that none of these measures can provide real security, and that the most effective way to neutralize these distant threats (Iran and Iraq) is by completing peace treaties with the countries that share borders with Israel (Levran 2014; Schiff 1999). Some noted that during this period Israel realised that making peace with Syria and PLO would set the foundation of lasting peace in the entire region, which would generate tremendous economic opportunities for Israel. Israel was also aware of the fact that making peace with Syria would also bring peace with Lebanon (Dadwal 1995).

According to Efraim Inbar (1999), in the post-1990 period the US supremacy was seen beneficial in fighting nuclear proliferation and limiting the spread of long range missile technology as well. The establishment of the US inspired "the United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM) inspection regime on Iraq", actually strengthened Israel's security posture (Inbar 1999:129). This was the time when Yitzhak Rabin was more relied on American diplomatic efforts, rather than Israel's own diplomacy, for large numbers of security challenges, from UNSCOM to avert the sale of long-range North Korean missiles to Iran (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129). In addition, in the mid-1990 to derail the deal of sensitive technology[2] transfer from Russia to Iran, Israel looked towards the US and the latter played an important role in the bringing Israel into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in October 1991 (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129). In the 1990s Israeli security policy makers stressed over two vital perspectives, an inner and an outer circle, while strategy formation for the security challenges originating from its neighbouring countries surrounding (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129).

The US's victory over Iraq in 1991 led positive security results for Israel. It achieved its security objectives without even participating in the war, "all the havoc inflicted on Iraq and its forces occurred without IDF participation" (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129). As an outcome of these new unfolding situations, in the post-cold war period

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[2] Technologies related to missile and nuclear weapons.

'outer circle' "countries, such as Mauritania, Qatar, Tunisia, Oman and Morocco established official diplomatic ties with Israel" (Ibid.).

However, the 1991 Gulf war was also reminding the changing the West Asian politics, limited Israeli power and increasing Israeli vulnerability to long-range missile attacks. Though the Iraqi missile attacks caused very minimal casualties, but it led a considerably high economic implication in Inbar's word "the country was paralyzed for several weeks" (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58). By the end of the 1990s as well, Iraq's aggressive behaviour did not change, it still had a large conventional army, a frightening stock of weapons and victorious in confronting the UNSCOM regime (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129). The Iraqi stock of arsenal included biological agents, chemical weapons, components for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles (Inbar 2002). Iran was another outer ring country which had the capability to hurt Israel.

The Iranian theological opposition threatened the existence of Israel by backing radical groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. In the late 1990s, Iran acquired the capabilities to threaten Israel by reaching in the advanced stage of research regarding Sheha-3 missile (Inbar 1999:129). The second stage of the missile was tested in July 1998 that was technologically similar to North Korean Nodong missile (Ibid.). The long range of 1,300 Km directly brought Israel under the striking capability of Iran. The enhanced striking capability of Iran made its nuclear programme, even more, endangering (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129).

One significant constructive development in the outer circle during this period was the upgradation of Israel-Turkey relations (Nachmani 1988; Lochery 1995; Inbar 2001, 2002). The up-gradation in the relations brought the two strongest allies of the West in West Asia on the same platform. According to Inbar from Israeli perspective this most favourable "regional development since President Anwar Sadat visit to Jerusalem in 1977, thereby changing the parameters of the Arab–Israeli conflict" (Inbar 2002:6). In the Inner Circle the US brought Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians to the negotiation table at Madrid in 1991, principally on Israeli terms. The agreements with a section of Palestinian movement (1993) and Jordan (1994) considerably reduced the possibilities of a large-scale war with the countries situated in the 'first ring' (Nachmani 1988; Lochery 1995; Inbar 2001, 2002). According to Inbar (2002) in the inner circle countries, only Syria had remained a threat to Israel, but it was also gradually losing the offensive capabilities. According to Efraim Karsh (1991), the Syrian

objective of 'strategic parity' with the Israeli army in the 1990s became even more elusive than 1980s.

Oslo and Israel's National Security

There is a consensus among the scholars that peace initiatives with Arab countries highly impacted on the Israeli national security in a positive and negative way (Inbar 1991, 1999; Karsh 1996; Dror 2011; Peri 2006). According to Sven Behrendt (2007), the Arab support to the US during the Kuwait crisis reduced the strategic importance of Israel. Domestically, the impact of the Intifada on the Israeli public was significant. At the same time, if Hamas "gained the support of a wide spectrum of Palestinian society, the security situation would worsen even more" (Behrendt 2007:111). The peace agreement with less radical Fatah-led Palestinian leadership than with Hamas was out come these new situations (Karsh 1996; Behrendt 2007).

Efraim Karsh noted that (1996) peace-making with Arab neighbours rapidly reduced the threats to Israeli national security. Yitzhak Rabin recognised the importance of Israel's future borders for national security. According to Efraim Inbar, Yitzhak Rabin knew it very well that peace agreement was not enough for security; Israel had to maintain strong IDF and defensible border that would provide Israel a good defence line and strategic depth (Inbar 1999). Yoram Peri (2006) highlighted that the main goal of peace initiative was not achieve peace as supreme objective but primarily as a means to achieve security (Inbar 1995; Peri 2006; Sheffer and Barak 2013).

Ze'ev Schiff (1999) noted that Oslo created a new security situation in the territory under dispute between the Palestinian people and Israel. He further underlined that the failure of negotiation would deteriorate Israel's security situation and the dispute would be brought back to the bloody conflict in Israel (Schiff 1999). Alon Ben-Meir (2013) noted that "neither military might nor the annexation of any Palestinian land in the West Bank will guarantee Israel's national security, short of a comprehensive peace. Territorial depth can no longer guarantee Israel's security. In the age of rockets and precision missile technology, controlling a wider area east of the 1967 borders will make little or no difference" (Ben-Meir 2013:2).

According to Efraim Inbar (1996), "the peace process enhanced Israel's security by significantly reducing the military threat from Arab states" (Inbar 1996:41). In Inbar's words, the "peace process reduced the chances of war in the near future but entailed a price for Israel

in the term of strategic assets such as territories, which weakened Israel's defensive posture in the long run" (Ibid.). In the light of IDF's withdrawal from the West bank, its posture to defend strategically important Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa significantly weakened (Dayan 2012; Inbar 1996; Shlaim 2005).

Avi Shlaim (2005) underlined that while negotiating with Palestinians the IDF took a tough line, the IDF officers were unhappy it was mainly because, policy makers completely ignored their expertise and did not consult the possible effect of the withdrawal of Israeli security strategy. The Chief of staff Ehud Barak felt that "in their haste to secure their place in history, the politicians had conceded too much to the PLO and that when the time came to implement the agreement, it would be the responsibility of the army to tackle the security problems" (Cited in Shlaim 2005; 251). Aharon Ze'ev Farkash (2014) noted that the PLO was not able to avert the violent groups from smuggling weapons in areas under Palestinian rule. Moreover, the PLO and Fatah helped terrorist organizations in manufacturing and smuggling the weapons which were prohibited in the agreements from Iran through Egypt and Gaza (Frakash 2014: 70). According to him, in the Oslo agreements, it was decided that the Palestinians would be responsible for the internal security with the help of Police, but would not have the Army. However, Arafat and his patrons started creating a security apparatus which was more like an army (Ibid.).

Daniel Byman (2011) noted that Israel hoped that Oslo would transform Palestinian security organizations into an arm of Israeli police and intelligence services. It was expected that Palestinians would do a better job in the comparison of Israeli because they knew their community better than Israeli Security Services but, it became a nightmare following a spate of terror attacks (Amidror 2004; Byman 2011). The PA officials also participated actively in such terror strikes and this was clear in the 1997 Hasmonean Tunnel riots and in the large-scale violence started after Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 (Amidror 2004; Byman 2011). For this reason, Israel reserve the right to act own with its military and intelligence forces. From counterintelligence perspective withdrawal of troops from the Palestinian areas had devastated for Israeli Intelligence gathering capabilities (Byman 2011: 83).

Amnon Lipkin-Shahak (Chief of Army Staff) stated in January 1995 that Israeli defence forces were unable to deal with suicide bombers due to lack of intelligence (Cited in Byman 2011: 83). Yaakov Amidror, (the head of Aman research division) was even more straightforward in saying that "Israel's Intelligence capacity in the Gaza Strip has dropped to

zero" (Cited in Byman 2011: 83). The self- rule to Palestinians had fundamentally altered Israel's security posture. Yair Hirschfeld noted that in the Oslo process civil society actors in Israel made the first attempt to de-securitise Israel by engaging in secret talks with Palestinians who were connected to the PLO (Hirschfeld 2000). Aharon Ze'ev Farkash (2014) noted that the attacks which were carried out by "the PA beginning in the of 2000 underscored Israel's demand- and PLO's failure to comply signed agreements- to prevent military and terrorist capabilities from developing in Palestinian controlled areas" (Frakash 2014). Efraim Inbar (1996) noted that the chances for a full military engagement had been reduced in the post-Oslo period but the rising capabilities of violent groups and uncertain superpower position, highlighted a necessity of caution and continues investment security technologies (Inbar 1996).

According to Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela (2000) "the more real this threat seemed- as a result of the progress in the diplomacy between Israel and the PA- the more willing Hamas was to resort to armed struggle despite the risk to its dialogue with the PA" (Mishal and Sela 2000: 72). According to Avraham Sela, "Oslo was a major blow to Hamas" (Quoted in Bayman 2011:100). Mishal described Oslo as "the funeral of the Palestinian cause," because he felt that it was a surrender of the Palestinian patrimony. Hamas was unable to digest these developments because its leadership feared of losing ground because its political influence was not effective as it adopted terror attacks as a tool to disrupt the peace process. For this reason, it enrolled with other fundamentalist groups to establish rejectionist forces which called for the prolongation of jihad against Israel (Baconi 2015:5). According to Bayman (2011) during the peace process Hamas positioned itself as "an anti-peace opposition party". Its success also was completely dependent future of the process, therefore, it used violence as a tool to derail the peace talks (Bayman 2011:100). Therefore, under the leadership of Yehya Ayyash, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade started a chain of suicide bombing attacks against Israel which continued for many years. These attacks were termed by Hamas as 'trademark' or 'signature' operation and were actually aimed at hampering the peace talks and push the Palestinians towards Jihadi terrorism (Ibid: 5)

Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

There is a lack of a single universally accepted definition of national security some reduce the concept to military issues and some include political, economic and environmental security in national security. National security is the most important concern for all the states of the

world. Since the establishment of Israel, has fought six full-scale wars with its neighbouring Arab countries and still faces threat to its survival. In the post-1973 period, it faced new threats from non-state actors. There is the continuous looming threat of terrorism and nuclear and biological warfare which still persists. Due to these peculiar security concerns, it becomes important for Israel to dependent on the defence establishment for the survival of the state. Towards mitigating these challenges, from state and non-state actors and from conventional and non-conventional threats, Israel has been resorting to preventive and pre-emptive operations.

The reviewed literature discussed the various dimensions of the national security and highlighted the role of defence establishment of Israel in national security policy making. It also throws light on the post-cold war security environment and the Oslo accords but still, there are significant limitations in the existing literature. The security implications of the Oslo accords and its impact on national security policy are not broadly covered in the available literature. The security dilemma which Israeli security experts faced during this period is untouched in the existing literature. This research has tried to fill these gaps and seeks to enhance the value addition on the existing literature related to Israeli national security.

The primary objective of the proposed research would be to study the impact the 1993 Oslo Accords on the national security policy of Israel. The proposed research work will seek to enhance the value addition in the existing literature related to Israeli national security policy. The main focus of the study will be to understand national security policy making of Israel.

Research Questions

1. How is national security policy shaped in Israel?
2. What is the role of the political and military elites in the making of the national security policy of Israel?
3. What is the security challenges facing Israel?
4. How did Israel respond to post-Oslo security challenges?
5. How Oslo Accords influenced Israel's national security policy?
6. Has Israel managed to meet its security challenges through diplomacy?
7. How do new threats challenge Israel's national security?
8. Is there any change or continuity in Israel's national security policy?

Hypothesis

1. The Oslo peace process did not change the security environment of the region because of the emergence of new threats from non-conventional sources and non-state actors.
2. The failure of peace efforts results in Israel seeking national security through military means.

Methodology

The research is deductive while trying to build up a relationship between the concepts of national security and the impacts of Oslo Accords on national security policy making in Israel. The research is based on available primary resources in English and Hebrew as well as secondary sources. Primary source like the IDF reports and autobiographies by Israeli leaders especially Prime Ministers are used. Secondary sources included books, research journal articles, newspapers and articles published in edited volumes. Internet sources will also be used.

Chapterization

The thesis is divided into seven chapters including an introduction and conclusion. The second chapter, **Evolution of Israel's National Security Policy**, examines the role of various Institutions such as defence ministry, IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet and National Security Council and role of individuals in the national security policy making in Israel. It broadly deals with the gradual evolution of the national security policy of Israel. The chapter starts with the defining basic pillars of Israeli security strategy, explaining basic security triangle namely, deterrence, Intelligence warning and War decision. It briefly examines the evolution of national security policy in the various phases and highlights the changes and continuity in the security strategy.

Chapter three, **Changing Security Environment** examines the alterations in the regional security environment in the Cold war and post-cold war security dilemma. It begins with highlighting the departure of Britain and France, the major powers and emergence of USSR and the US as new superpowers. The rise and fall of Arab nationalism and Arab cold war significantly affected the region as well as the security calculations of Israel. Furthermore, military coups in Egypt and Syria significantly increased the security concerns of Israel. On the other hand, the French arms embargo in 1967 started the brainstorming in the Israeli

policy makers for the development of indigenous military and aerospace industry. At the same time, the massive victory in the June 1967 war phenomenally changed the US policy towards Israel. The military victory instantly turned Israel into a strategic asset for the US, as an important Cold War ally. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 completely changed the relations between Israel and Iran. The rise of Hezbollah and Hamas also posed a significant challenge for security policy makers. To deal with the above mention changes Israel timely introduced various alterations in its security strategy.

Chapter four, **the Oslo Agreements and Security concerns** give a detailed overview of the Oslo peace process by covering all the agreements signed during the Oslo process. The chapter begins with a background of the 1987 Intifada and Madrid conference. It underlines the impact of both of these events on the Oslo process. The chaotic security situation which was an outcome of the agreements was also captured in the chapter. A detailed overview of large-scale suicide attacks which Israel witnessed in the post-Oslo period is captured in this chapter. It broadly discusses the Israeli security concern in the light of potential withdrawal from the territories of Gaza, West Bank and domestic security concerns of Israel. The diplomatic, political and security implications of the Oslo accords and the deteriorating security situation after 1993 and the difficulties Israeli policymakers faced in dealing with this situation captured in the chapter.

Chapter Five, **New Challenges to Israel's National Security**, discuss the emerging threats of non-conventional warfare and challenges posed by non-states actors in maintaining security safe and peaceful order. To give a full overview of security challenges, Efraim Inbar (2008) and Yoram Peri's (2006) tier one (inner circle) and tier two (outer circle) categorization is used to explain the emerging threats from the Arab countries (Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan) and the countries that are on the exterior such as Iran and Iraq. It also comprises the tier thee category which talks about new emerging danger, such as, the threat of terrorism, tunnel terrorism, construction of security wall and rise of rocket attacks, Cyber Security and BDS movement and it impacted Israeli security strategy.

The Oslo process significantly affected various stake holders of the peace process. Chapter six, **Impact**, broadly examines the effect of Oslo on Israel and Palestinians. In the context of Palestinians, the process honed the split in the Palestinian commune. It politically divided the Palestinian politics into the two major camps, one which was in favour of the PA style of accommodative politics and second one rejectionist trend through violence such as, Hamas

and Islamic Jihad. For Israel it significantly increased the security concerns, however it reduced the conventional threats but the non-conventional danger remained constant.

The concluding chapter tests the hypotheses and summarises the findings of the research.

Chapter Two

Evolution of Israel's National Security Policy

Astate's national security policy encompasses the entirety of military, diplomatic, economic, and social policies that are intended to protect and promote the state's vital interests (Mastapeter 2008). The national security conception of a country is based on various internal and external factors, such as historical experiences, geography, threat perceptions, natural resources, human resources changes in domestic and regional and international politics. National security as a concept is described as a focused act which is strictly connected with the interests of the nation and its internal order (Buzan 1983).

The Israeli concept of security is vague but with some defined objectives. The national security doctrine is not designed in the form of an official document (Harkabi 1990; Tira 2009) but is guided by the several principles which its leaders underlined in their public statements and acts (Bar-Joseph 2005; Dror 2009). These principles have guided its security strategy from David Ben-Gurion to Benjamin Netanyahu. However, over a period, these principles have also seen transformation.

Among these several principles, the existentialist threat is the most dominating one. The hostile neighbours such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestinian people, aimed to destroy it in the past (Bar-Joseph 2005; Dror 2009; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Shabtai 2010). The problems between Israel and its enemies cannot be resolved by military power alone. Furthermore, it cannot expect major powers to protect its existence (Bar-Joseph 2005; Dror 2009; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Shabtai 2010). Therefore, it must transform the battle from its territory to the enemy lands, as it lacks geographical depth. It's a defensive strategy which focuses on preserving the status-quo rather than shaping up the realities (Freilich 2018; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Shabtai 2010). The experience of the last three decades, especially since 1980, has underlined that Israel needs an appropriate security concept (Civcik 2004).

This chapter analyses the evolution of the national security policy in Israel from 1948 to 1982. The post-1982 developments have been underlined in the chapter three and it broadly underlines the transformation of threats from state to non-state actors and from conventional to non-conventional warfare. The chapter briefly discusses the role of various institutions and

examines the basic security doctrine, broadly covering the changes and continuity in its calculations and objectives.

Evolution of Security Policy

Israel's national security policy is dominated by the experiences of the Holocaust and the suffering of Jewish people in both the world wars (Inbar 2005; Horowitz 1993; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Shabtai 2010). The discrimination and genocide that took place in various stages and termed by the Nazis as "final solution to the Jewish question", had a deep impact on Israel (Nili 2011:3). The influence of the Holocaust on its collective consciousness, and specifically in its security doctrine, has been prevalent throughout the history (Ibid.). It took lives of more than six million Jews and had marked a brutal history of suffering and torture (Sheffer and Barak 2013: 23).

Since the declaration of Independence in 1948, the security of its citizens has been the primary concern for Israel's political and military leadership. Its understanding of the national security starts from the struggle for survival (Horowitz 1993; Sheffer and Barak 2013; Shabtai 2010). It is not seen as a normal country like any other by its Arab neighbours. It constantly faces a threat to its existence. It has been portrayed as 'a nation in arms' (Cohen and Cohen 2012:1). To survive in such a hostile condition, it's important for Israel to maintain supremacy in the military domain over the Arab countries and to remain the strongest regional power in West Asia (Horowitz 1993). As a result of this complex hostile surrounding, the issues related to national security encroach on the almost every aspect of Israeli life, private as well as public.

In such a condition, its expenditure in the security domain has increased since its establishment (Horowitz 1993). In addition to economic resources, the Israeli citizens dedicate a significant portion of their life for the security of the country which is almost unmatched by citizens of any other country. The Jewish men and women are expected to perform mandatory military service upon reaching the age of 18 (Muhareb 2011). According to the Israel Defence Forces Service Law (Section 2), the age conscription is 18–29 years for men and 18–26 for women, according to the Hebrew calendar. However, recruitment may begin at age 17 if the parents or guardians of the recruit allow it (Defence Service Law 1986).

In the absence of peace with most of its Arab neighbours, it faces the military challenge for survival (Horowitz 1993). In the post-Second World War period, no other state has been

more apprehensive of its survival than Israel (Ibid.). In the first three decades of its existence, its principal security challenges were focused on the threats of all-out war from a coalition of an enemy force of *tier one* countries supported by *tier two* enemy countries[3] (Allon 2013; Horowitz 1993). **.** There is a consensus in Israel that there is a need to cope with threats to its existence that can be only achieved by its own military power (Allon 2013; Horowitz 1993; Inbar 2005).

According to Dan Horowitz (1993) in the wartime, this objective was well covered by the operational goal of destroying the enemy forces and not allowing them an offensive capability (Horowitz 1993). During the initial days of the state formation, its security policy was defensive. However, the lessons of the 1948 War and the changing regional realities, thereafter, led to a significant change in its security policy (Perlmutter 1985: 142). The 1948 war made it clear that the Arab states would not accept Israel as a country, even if, the United Nations (UN) took the decision to that effect.

The chief architect of the pillars of Israeli security strategy was the first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. He designed the concept in the early years of the state which has been modified over the years. However, it has never documented officially national security objectives (Reut Institute 2013:1). The basic tenant of its security policy was highlighted in the writings of Ben-Gurion (Shapira 1997: 646; Freilich 2018:14).

Ben-Gurion's writings formulated a security strategy that contained the following five principles:

1. A qualitative advantage in traditional warfare.

2. Nuclear deterrence.

3. At least support form one superpower.

4. Technological superiority and financial self-dependence.

5. National resilience based in part on Jewish immigration and the connection with the Jewish people in the Diaspora (Ben-Gurion 1970).

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[3] The category of tier one countries comprises those Arab countries, share border with Israel, such as, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. While the tier two category comprises the countries do not share borders with Israel but pose a grave threat to its existence.

These principles led a significant impact on Israeli military circle, which reflected in two core strategies of the Israeli military: "first, mandatory national service and reserve duty and second security triangle, composed of deterrence, early warning and battle decision" (Horowitz 1993). In many ways, the Sinai Campaign in 1956 and the June War of 1967 were the successful realizations of these principles (Horowitz 1993). For numerous reasons, the concept of security is different and important for Israel than many other countries of the world, as, since the day of its establishment, it has been continuously engaged in more military conflicts than any other state in the world. Muhareb (2011) noted that the military components of conflicts with the neighbouring Arab countries hegemonize its notion of national security (Muhareb 2011).

Regarding the Israeli concept of national security, many definitions are available, some restricting the concept only until security and others capturing a wider area such as economic and environmental security. For instance, General Israel Tal explained the concept as "the guarantor for the nation's existence and the defence of its interests" (cited in Muhareb 2011: 3). On the other hand, for General Yehoshavat Harkabi (1990), the concept of national security comprises "the security of the nation's existence, independence and regional integration" (cited in Muhareb, 2011: 3). He also comprised the security of almost every important units of state in his definition of national security, which includes its citizens' lives, political system, domestic security, security on the borders, ideology and demographic equilibrium (Ibid.).

According to Yigal Allon (2013) national security concept "refers to a system of values and principles that have shaped Israel's national security institutions. It also highlights how the state has used its capabilities and strength in the fields of security and foreign affairs to protect its existence and security" (Allon 2013:1). Brigadier-General, Avraham Ayalon defined national security as "the total of reciprocal ties between the means at the state's disposal and its readiness to employ them- and its immediate and distant environment. It reflects the state's ability to guarantee its preferred interests and promote its national objectives under varying conditions of uncertainty" (Quoted in Horowitz 1993: 56). Ayalon summarized his definition by saying that one may talk about a national security equation based on both 'capability factor' and 'intent factor'. According to Stephanie G. Neuman "national security policy articulates both the general national interests and objectives of the

state and the means (military, economic, and political) it [the state] will use to further and protect them" (Quoted in Horowitz 1993: 56).

The Primary Elements

The Israeli thinking of national security is a combination of various important security issues. The foundation of its national security concept rest upon following essential issues:

Geography: Israel's security policy has been significantly influenced by its geographical condition (Inbar 1999; Muhareb 2011; Rodman 2001; Howoritz 1993). As seen in the map 2.1, it is a small size country, covering an area of 20,770 square kilometres (pre-1967 border) and is surrounded by Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria (Ibid.). Its boundaries from north to south measures around 482.8 kilometres. It was surrounded by enemies from three sides. The security policymakers saw the country as a "state under siege till 1967 and its geography as a nightmare" (Freilich 2018:17).

It defeated the enemies in the 1948 War and captured more lands in comparison to the area that was allotted under the United Nations Partition Resolution 181 (Rodman 2001: 72). Furthermore, Israel did not have strategic depth and its major population centres, strategically important areas and industrial assets were within the range of Arab militaries (Rodman 2001; Freilich 2018).

The problem of strategic depth has two sides:

1. First, it is a problem of the restricted area available for the operative movement for IDF during the war. According to Dan Howoritz (1993) "this limitation is born of the proximity of Israel's vital centres to the pre-1967 borders and severely affects its ability to initially withstand enemy strike and only afterward move onto a counterattack. Any tactical retreat is liable to develop into a strategic threat" (Howoritz 1993: 57).

2. Second, the issue of strategic depth is related to the solution to the quantitative imbalance in forces. As such, the problem of space becomes a problem of time. The preparedness for the war depends on the military reserves, and the narrow pre-1967 borders meant that a surprise attack before the reserves could mobilize would ensure an enemy military victory (Ibid.).

These paved the way for the development of the strategy to bring the battle to the enemy lands. This policy has significant influence over IDF's operational and tactical thinking (Peres 2011).

The operative significance of this solution was the assumption of an offensive posture in any military confrontation with enemy forces (Horowitz 1993:40). But the fundamental question related to this concept was that how such an offensive strategy would be carried out. The solution to this problem was the intelligence warning of the enemy's intention (Ibid.). Later with the increased tendency to apply offensive action to the opening stages of the war, these answers proved inadequate. Yigal Allon called the extensions of the offensive posture to the actual outbreak of fighting a 'pre-emptive strike' (Ibid.). The IDF adopted the doctrine of the pre-emptive strike in the mid-1950s, during Moshe Dayan's tenure as chief of staff, and it continued to guide its military planners through the June 1967 War (Ibid.).

The June 1967 War fundamentally changed the territorial status quo between Israel and its adversaries. The outcome of the war was uneasy for the Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, as captured considerable portions of Jordanian, Syrian and Egyptian lands (Rodman 2001: 72). It captured the Golan Heights from Syria, West Bank including East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. This new geographical change provided considerable strategic depth to Israel. As a result, its industrial assets, military facilities and major population areas were out of the reach of its enemies. At the same time, the new territorial gains provided defensible borders, but "the post-1967 War territorial status quo did not have a great impact on the IDF's operational and tactical principles, it nevertheless did affect Israel's military doctrine" (Ibid.: 73). The significant victory in the 1967 war also generated some major security challenges which were well understood during the October 1973 war.

According to Dimitrios Machairas, the territorial gains in the June War were a double-edged sword for Israel. On the one hand, it decreased short-term security threats and on the other, its increased security dangers in the long run (Machairas 2017). It was reflected in the statement of Moshe Dayan when he noted on 29 June 1967:

> We are … less than 100 km from Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Beirut. We have no aggressive intentions. But our presence along these borders … is more than just a challenge to the countries around us—it virtually imperils their foundations" (Quoted in Gera 1992: 234).

The two-year-long War of Attrition, which ended on 7 August 1970, was the initial sign of series of reactions which highlighted that Egypt would not allow Israel to consolidate its gains and gradually prepared itself to fight against it (Khalidi 1973: 61). In the post-1967 period, Egypt quickly rearmed itself with Soviet weapons. With the new territorial gain, Israel was close to the Suez Canal and was in the easy reach of Egyptian commando raids, artillery shelling and eventually large-scale air operations (Ibid.).

Human Resources: Israel's total population is just over 9.02 million (April 2019), which is very small in comparison to its hostile Arab neighbours (Centre bureau of Statistics 2019). In 1948, it had approximately 600,000-650,000 Jewish population residing within its territories (Rodman 2001). Currently, Israel has a Jewish population of 6.6 million which is 74.2 percent of the total population (Centre Bureau of Statistics 2019). On the other hand, the Arab countries had a huge population and massive military power. This demographic disparity made it clear that even if it registers a large-scale Jewish immigration, it would not be able to deal with this imbalance. This meant Arab countries could sustain a sizeable professional army (Ibid: 73). However, Israel neither at that time nor today can afford a sizeable professional army as the latter would adversely impact its economy.

To overcome this obstacle, the founding leaders of Israel opted to develop the IDF into an army that functions like militia (Ibid). Furthermore, this "army would consist of a small number of professional well-trained soldiers and supplemented by a big number of conscripts" (Ibid.:73). In the Israeli case, the comparatively "small standing military is accountable for ongoing security and first response in emergencies, while a widespread and swiftly mobilized reserve system is expected to win the war" (Rodman 2001). The concept of reserve army system was an answer "to the quantitative gap faced by Israel in comparison to Arab armies" (The Jerusalem Centre 2001).

According to David Rodman (2013) during the time of peace IDF have had two basic functions. Primarily, to take care of country's day-to-day domestic security and this includes dealing border skirmishing with an Arab army, counter-insurgency operations and mob insurrection (Ibid.). The IDF needs to be ready for a full-scale war in limited time. To this end, a well-established and well-organized mobilization arrangement has been crucial for IDF. It has demanded the IDF give additional responsibility of training conscripts and reserve forces, upholding equipment in the functional situation and be ready with updated operational and tactical strategies (Rodman 2013).

Qualitative and Quantitative Superiority: Israel could not compete with its Arab neighbours in terms of population, military size and economic resources. To deal with this quantitative inadequacy, Israeli policymakers have worked continuously in attaining a qualitative advantage in both, soldiers and military technologies (Rodman 2001; Freilich 2018). To achieve this goal, the IDF has adopted various initiatives.

Firstly, the IDF has adopted a rigorous and realistic training style, particularly in combat training. Secondly, it extensively focused on the vigilant selection process (Rodman 2001; Horowitz 1993). The strictness in the selection and difficult training of soldiers surpasses any military in the world (Rodman 2001; Horowitz 1993). Third, the IDF aimed at capitalizing its human resources at the tactical and operational level of warfare (Ibid). On the other side, technological pre-eminence in weapons is a relatively new phenomenon. However, sophisticated weapons which Israeli army is equipped today veils the fact that in the pre-1967 period Israeli weaponry was inferior to the Arab armies (Rodman 2001; Horowitz 1993).

On the one hand, before the 1967 Israel had to face the enemy with its second-hand Western weapons while the Arabs were well equipped with up-to-date Soviet arms. Only IDF's tank and intelligence units were able to match the Arab states in qualitative terms (Rodman 2001; Freilich 2018; Horowitz 1993).

The IDF only attained technological air superiority after the 1967 War, "when the United States began to supply the IAF with America's frontline combat aircraft" (Rodman 2001). Similarly, the IDF acquired technical pre-eminence on the water after 1967, when the Israeli Navy integrated "the then novel fast missile boat, equipped with an indigenously developed ship-to-ship missile, into its order of battle. In the wake of infantry warfare, technological superiority was only achieved in the wake of the 1973 War, largely through local production of arms" (Horowitz 1993).

Relations with Major Power: The friendship with a major power such as the US is a significant factor in the Israeli security thinking. Its fundamental sense of "insecurity and isolation pushed Israel to secure at least one patron from among the major power" (Horowitz 1993). It is considered that this alliance would further improve its strategic posture and extended deterrence (Horowitz 1993). Such an alliance was also essential to guarantee diplomatic, military and economic support. Territorially, being a tiny country with inadequate resources, encircled by enemy neighbouring states, it became necessary for Israel to have

constant and robust support from major powers (Civcik 2004). It was important for getting arms and for legal recognition especially in the first few decades after the establishment of the state (Podeh and Winckler 1999).

Israel is quantitatively inferior to its Arab neighbours, its total military manpower is 6,15,000 (est.) which includes 1,70,000 active personals and 4,45,000 reserve soldiers in comparison to Arabs these numbers are very small. Egypt contains an army of 9, 20,000 (est.) with 4,40,000 active personnel and 480,000 reserve personnel (Global Firepower 2019). Before 2011, Syria had an army (SAA) of about 325,000 men, of which 220,000 were ground forces (est.) (Khlebnikov 2018). On the other hand, Lebanon has a combating manpower of 2,135,026 soldiers (Global Fire Power 2019a). To compensate this and to be able to influence events in West Asia, it was important for Israel to join the "community of Western states" (Alon 2013:15). The highly hostile surrounding makes it essential to have a powerful ally. However, the policy of receiving the support of at least one major power created an ambiguity with the fundamental Zionist principle of 'self-reliance' (Weinberg 1988). The need for major power support and the policy of being self-reliant created a dilemma (Asher 1989). This contradiction was also visible in the Zionist ideology, which supported the self-reliance principle. However, "the Zionist leaders such as Theodor Herzl and Chaim Weizmann noted that the survival of the Jewish state would be guaranteed by the protection and help of a patron" (Roberts 1973).

In the initial day of state formation, the USSR has supported Israel. In 1947, the Soviet representative to UN Andrie Gromyko spoke in its favour and supported the UN partition plan (Centre for Israel Education 2015). Moscow also approved It**s** membership of the UN (Aharonson 2018). Furthermore, on 17 May 1948, three days after of the declaration of independence, the Soviet Union recognized Israel. Furthermore, it also received the shipments of weapons which were sent through Czechoslovakia (Aharonson 2018). The ties between the two were halted after the grenade attack at the Czech embassy in the Tel Aviv and an attack on the Soviet embassy in Israel on 9 February 1953 which was planted by the *Tzrifin* underground (Pedahzur 2009). The attacks broke the diplomatic ties between the two. This was also the time when Israeli-French relations were taking a new dimension.

In the early 1950s, France and Israel maintained warm military and political relations. Until the French withdrawal from Algeria1962, France was its key arms provider (Ziv 2010). The defence relations between the two were at their peak during 1954–1959. During the period,

France sold a huge number of high-quality arms to Israel and vividly shifted the strategic balance of the region in its favour (Ibid.). Furthermore, in the late 1950s, France secretly helped Israel in building the Negev Nuclear Research Centre (Pinkus and Tlamim 2002). Its military victory in the 1967 attracted the US and since then the US emerged as its major patron (Freilich 2018).

For Israel, It was important to have good relations with the US. The close ties with Washington significantly increased its deterrence power and drastically reduced the prospect of Soviet intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Civcik 2004:117). Therefore, despite the doubts of Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan over superpowers' intentions, the patronage of Washington was accepted as a fundamental pillar in defence strategy (Ibid.). The reluctance for not being dependent upon the superpower was never implemented in the Israeli policymaking. The main reason behind it was that the policymakers were aware of the political, military and economic limitations (Kobar cited in Bar-Joseph 2001: 191).

However, there were several occasions when the US abandoned Israel in critical times. It was evident in the US posture against Israel during the 1956 Suez War and its late response in the October 1973 War (Levite 1989). In addition, during the Gulf War over Kuwait (1990-91), Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was under severe pressure from Bush administration for not retaliating against the Scud attacks from Iraq due to fears of possible collapse of the anti-coalition Iraqi (Levite 1989; Civcik 2004; Tal 2004). At the same time, on several occasions, the US interventions were in favour of Israel, except the 1956.

However, the alliance with major powers has been useful for national and security interests. According to Civcik a major power patron should not be ignored at the cost of self-reliance (Civcik 2004:44). It does not mean that Israel would only look for support from major powers and stop considering the principle self-reliance. Rather, it should focus on balancing both the principle to overcome the dilemma (Levite 1989; Civcik 2004; Tal 2004). In this context, Ben Gurion's noted that:

> I do not say that no material aid will come from outside, but if there is any hope for such a help – and this hope does exist – then to the degree that we demonstrate to the world that we are not dependent solely on outside help, to that degree such help may be forthcoming. Even God himself helps only those who help themselves (Quoted in Levite 1989: 30).

Public Opinion and National Security: Israel is the only democratic state in the West Asian region. It has a vibrant democratic culture, high numbers of informed civil population and extremely active independent media (Dershowitz 2011). All the governments since 1948 have been coalition governments. Therefore, the politics and decision of any Israeli government on the key national security issues were largely affected by the public (Ben-Meir and Shaked 2007). Therefore, it's any military campaign needs the popular support and divided public opinion makes it difficult for the government to go for war or for military action the enemy (Ibid.). In this context, the 1982 Lebanon War can be identified as a perfect example.

According to I. Rabinovich, the Lebanon War was "Israel's most controversial and divisive war" (Rabinovich 1985:170). The public opinion during the War went against the government's security calculations vis-à-vis Lebanon. During the military campaign, the membership of anti-war groups registered a rapid rise and these groups included *Mothers against Silence* and *Yush Gvul* (There's a Limit). In addition, the *Peace Now* movement organized huge protests in Tel Aviv that mobilized around 400,000 participants (Tessler 2009:583). It was the first time when an Israeli government did not have support during a war and public trust and support for the military decreased considerably (Smith 2012). The political situation during the war forced Israeli Prime Minister Begin to resign and led to the removal of Defence Minister and the escalation of a political division between the Likud and Labour party (Ibid.).

The Doctrine of Iron Wall: The doctrine aims to foil the ambition of the Arab nations regarding the devastation of Israel. The doctrine talks about a significant military superiority, which can be understood with the following points. (Shlaim 2014; Jabotinsky 1923)

1. Deterring enemy military capability that allows Israel to attain decisive success in the War;
2. Shorter military campaign;
3. Transferring the confrontation to the enemies' lands and keeping the battlefield away from the home front;
4. Attaining qualitative superiority by well-trained human resources and technology; and
5. Comprehensive use intelligence system to provide early warning to take pre-emptive and preventative action if required (Feldschreiber 2011; Shlaim 2014; Jabotinsky 1923).

According to Jabotinsky, the Arab countries would never accept a Jewish majority within Israel. Therefore, the only possible way for Jewish people to survive would be to have a strong military and strategic capability (Jabotinsky 1923). Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's security policy was partially influenced by the Iron Wall essay of Revisionist Zionist Ze'ev Jabotinsky which was published in Russian in 1923. In the words of Ben-Gurion,

> Israel must deal a severe knockout blow through a series of rounds against Arab enemies, as quantitatively it could never achieve one cumulative victory. We have a unique military problem — we are few while our enemies are many — and the numbers … are a major military factor. So what has helped us to survive until now and what will help us in the future. Only our qualitative advantage (cited in Feldschreiber 2011).

Ben-Gurion further noted that the country needs to maximize the skills of its people and an emphasis on the qualitative edge (Ibid.). He also understood the perilous strategic environment in which it had to survive and hence, emphasised on developing a military capability, which would be more like a "knockout punch" in boxing (John 1959). The Iron Wall strategy asserts that it is impossible to affect hostility towards Israel in the region, and therefore it only aims to frustrate hostile actions. This concept leads to constant military activity towards preserving the status quo.

Peripheral Doctrine: The security concerns after the establishment of Israel in 1948, led Israeli policy makers to follow an overarching foreign policy known as the "periphery doctrine" (Alpher 2015:16). This strategy aimed at establishing relations with non-Arab, non-Muslim and minorities in West Asia, as means to strengthen Israel's posture against Arab countries. The key architect of this strategy was the first prime minister of Israel Ben-Gurion (Wojnarowicz 2017). The strategy was a "temporary strategy that needed to be sustained as long as the Arab nations refused to recognize Israel and make peace with it" (Alpher 2015:16). According to Leon Hadar (2010), the strategy proved cost-effective in the short-term span (Hadar 2010). However, the development in 1979, such as peace agreement with Egypt and Iranian revolution in Iran significantly reduced the importance of strategy. This importance was further decreased during the Oslo peace process period when Israel signed agreement with the PLO (1993) and Jordan (194). However, "it has begun to resurface as the rise of political Islam in Egypt, Turkey, Gaza, southern Lebanon and possibly Syria, coupled with the Islamic regime in Iran, has generated concern in Israel that it is again being surrounded by a ring of hostile states—in this case, Islamists rather than Arab nationalists" (Alpher 2015:1).

Ethnicity and Religiosity: The Israeli attitude towards national security continues to be impacted by the religiosity and to a lesser extent ethnicity (Pew Research Centre 2016). According to scholars, the Israeli society from very beginning follows unique, predictable voting patterns; the secular and the upper classes largely composed of Ashkenazi origins and tend to be more centrist or leftist in their views whereas the lower classes and those with Mizrahi origins are more supportive of the right (Tessler 1986; *Freilich 2018*). Some argue that the ethnic and socioeconomic status has lost its impact on politics. According to this league of scholars, the Soviet immigrants (largely Ashkenazi) tend to vote for right-wing (*Freilich 2018*). However, in the ultra-right, the pattern is still unchanged.

Haredi or ultra-orthodox Jews: In 2015, the Haredi population in Israel was between 893,000 and 910,500; 11 percent of the entire population or approximately 14 percent of the Jew population (Freilich 2018). According to Charles D. Freilich (2018) the Haredi population growth is extraordinarily high, about 5 percent a year, which means it doubles every 14 years. The current statics suggests that the Haredi population would comprise over 24 percent of the Jewish population in 2029 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2017).

Table 2.1 provides the anticipated growth rate among the Haredi and non-Haredi populations and Israeli Arabs, between 2014 and 2059 (Ibid.). The low rate of Haredi participation in the workforces although increasing growth means that their rising number will have profound ramification for economy. Only 36 percent of Haredi men worked in 2002, and this number grew drastically to 48 percent in 2011 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2017).

Since 1948, the Haredi population has enjoyed preferential treatment in the country. The government in the earliest years, under Ben-Gurion, exempted a 400 hundred religious students from military services each year. *It was* an effort to re-establish the tradition of yeshiva scholarship, which had been nearly destroyed during the

Holocaust (Kershner 2017). Since then this problem has become serious issue, as the number of religious community students have significantly increased. In 2012, only 6 percent of Haredi people served in the military and two-third out of them received a psychological discharge (Freilich 2018).

Israeli Arabs: Israel has a sizeable number of the Arab population that identifies as Palestinian and is commonly known as Israeli Arabs (Bligh 2004). According to Central

Bureau of Statistics (2019) data, 1.890 million Arabs are residing[4] in Israel in 2019, comprising 21 percent of the country's populace. In 2016, their number has grown by 36,000 people (Central Bureau of Statistics cited in the Times of Israel 2017*).*

The Haredi and Arab community have a substantial impact on the national security policymaking. Both the communities put an additional burden upon the IDF to maintain the balance against the enemy countries. It's mainly because of exemption given to Haredi community and decision of not keeping Arab population out of conscription. To deal with the highly hostile strategic situation, universal conscription exists for all citizens over the age of 18 (Freilich 2018; Horowitz 1993). However, universal conscription was never universal; the Haredi and Israeli Arabs have been exempted from military service since the day of establishment of the state.

Table: 2.1 Demographic Trends in Israel (Millions)

	2015	**2025**	**2050**	**2060**
Non-Haredi Jew and other	5.56	6.09	7.34	7.85
Haredim	0.91	1.32	3.07	4.15
Israeli Arabs	1.71	2.10	3.16	3.60
Non-Haredi Jews and others out of Jewish population (Percent)	86	82	70	65
Non-Haredi Jews and others out of total population (Percent)	68	64	54	50

(Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statists 2017)

The Haredi population constituted approximately 11 percent of overall population in 2016, while the Israeli Arabs constituted 21 percent share in the population (Central Bureau of Statistics 2017). This means 32 percent of the population is exempted from the military service.

Basic Security Strategy

An analysis of the Israeli concept of national security underlines that a single defeat in the battlefield is not affordable (Rodman 2001; Horowitz 1993). It is necessary for Israel to keep

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[4] Arabs: Muslims (including Circassians), Arab Christians (including Armenians) and Druze.

belligerent armies out from its heartland (Horowitz 1993). Therefore, its security policy starts with the upholding a consistent and powerful deterrent posture, which comprises its readiness to launch preventive and pre-emptive military strikes (Rodman 2001; Horowitz 1993).

The objective of deterrence is to the prevention of war (Tal 2000). According to Israel Tal (1980), the deterrence strategy focuses on averting a combined or individual military campaign against the state by its Arab adversaries. Zeynep Civcik (2004) underlined deterrence "as one of the basic pillars of military doctrine and is principally non-offensive" (Civcik 2004:84).The importance of deterrence for Israel has not only enhanced by victory in the full-scale war but by the operations that are part of its defensive strategy (Tal 2000). To avert a supposed weakening of its deterrence strategy, it went for war in 1956, launched various counter strikes during 1950s and 1960s and fought wars in 1967 and 1973 (Freilich 2018).

According to Freilich (2018), the Israel deterrence posture was designed to convince the Arab countries that their efforts to destroy it were pointless and that they would always face defeat if they try to achieve their objective militarily (Freilich 2018:23). According to him, primarily, the strategy of deterrence was based on the denial rather than punishment (Ibid.). It means ruining the Arabian military adventure against Israel and destroying the attacking forces but not attacking the civilian population or economic infrastructure. However, there are some exceptions such as Israeli reprisal in the 1950s and attack on Syrian energy production capabilities during the 1973 war (Ibid.). If the strategy of deterrence fails, Israel would have to aim to dominate the enemy decisively. Since it is a very small country, it is necessary to stop the enemy from infiltrating into its territory and swiftly relocated the fight to the adversary's lands (Horowitz 1993).

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had the solution to the problem of strategic depth. According to him the problem of strategic depth could be addressed by "transfer of war into the enemy territories" (Ibid.:20). His operational answer to this problem was based on an offensive position in any military confrontation with Arab states (Horowitz 1993). This policy had some influence of the Iron Wall doctrine, which talks about frustrating the ambition of Arab countries regarding the physical destruction of Israel (Feldschreiber 2011). Because its population were very near to the borders, transfer of battle to enemy's lands was an excellent answer against the likely devastation at the home front (Horowitz 1993).

The early warning is the next pillar of Israeli security doctrine. Since 1948, it has established a powerful and effective intelligence system to deliver an advance warning to thwart any attacks or to enable it better prepared for an impending war (Rodman 2001; Horowitz 1993). Early warning is crucial for timely mobilization and deployment of troops in the critical time, especially during a surprise attack as Israel does not have strategic depth, primarily before 1967 (Cohen 1983).

First strike principle was not constructed in 1948, unlike the deterrence and transfer of the war to enemy territory. It developed over the years with changing politico-strategic circumstances (Horowitz 1993). It was Moshe Dayan who implemented the strategy of the first strike in Israeli strategic thinking. The first strike can be divided into two parts: preventive wars and pre-emptive wars (Horowitz 1993). A preventive war is based on the belief that the opponent would plan to strike Israel soon. As a result, the preventive war focuses on averting an intermediate or long-term military confrontation (Freilich 2018; Horowitz 1993). However, the pre-emptive strike focuses on eliminating an imminent threat and based on vital information, against an adversary who is about to start an attack (Howoritz 1993).

In the words of Yigal Allon the pre-emptive strike is "an operational initiative … against concentrations of enemy forces and the capture of vital strategic targets on enemy territories at a time that such enemy is preparing to attack you, before he has succeeded in actually launching such an attack" (quoted in Civcik 2004: 44). Geoffrey Lee Williams and Alan Lee Williams described pre-emptive strike as "an attack provoked by an imminent and certain attack" (Williams and Williams 1974: 139). The strategies of bringing the war into the enemy territory and the pre-emptive strikes are aimed at the "destruction of enemy forces and material resources, conquering of the enemy territories and achieving a quick victory" (Civcik 2004:34).

The pre-emptive strike is largely based on the intelligence information about the enemy's plan. To achieve early warning Israel needed an efficient intelligence system. Therefore, after the creation of the state, the leadership has invested considerable human and material resources to develop a well-structured intelligence system as mentioned above (Horowitz 1993).

All these offensive components of IDF strategy were prepared to deal with the problem of strategic depth, limited human resources and its dependence on reserve forces (Freilich 2018; Horowitz 1993; Civcik 2004). These elements led defence policymakers to take a swift decision to go for war and to complete the military campaign as soon and as effectively as possible.

Role of Various Institutions in National Security Policy Making

The national security strategy making in Israel is a collective effort made by various security agencies. The chief responsibility for national security remains under the control of the government's institutions, which holds the information and capability to formulate security strategy and to execute it. There are following institutions that play an important role in the shaping of national security policy.

Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs: The Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs, also known as Security cabinet, is a short form of 'Inner Cabinet' within the Cabinet. The head of the inner cabinet is the prime minister with the purpose of outlining a foreign and defence policy and implementing it (Peri 2006). The Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs is authorized to coordinate the diplomatic negotiations and in the time of crisis, it is responsible for formulating quick and effective decision (Government of Israel 2016). Its members include the Prime Minister, Vice Prime minister (if one), and the ministers of defence, foreign affairs, and finance and the prime minister is authorized to appoint additional ministers up to a limit of half the size of the full cabinet. In practice, the Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs has become far too large a forum for quick and tactful decision making (Ibid.). In the initial days state formation, the committee saw marginalisation as well, for example, except few times, in 1955 Ben-Gurion abstained from attending its meetings (Ben-Meir cited in Muhareb 2011). Even couple of times Israeli prime minister did not even form the committee, for example, after the victory in the 1981 election for good six months Prime Minister Menachem Begin did not form a ministers committee for security affairs and not a single meeting of the committee was held during the Lebanon War in 1982 (Muhareb 2011).

According to Freilich (2006), the cabinet and ministerial committee are non-working bodies. The crucial decision related to security made by the prime minister in unofficial forum containing the defence minister, chief of staff (CoS) and other important defence officials. It

shows that Israel lacks an effective legislative body that can play a vital role in security decision-making (Freilich 2006: 637).Over a period, the importance of the committee has significantly increased among the coalition partners in Israel. During the coalition formation small parties demand to be a part of the ministerial committee on national security. For example, in the 20th Knesset Shas, Kulanu and Jewish Home Party secured membership of the committee.

Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee: The Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee is a permanent committee of Knesset to oversee the critical security and foreign policy related issues (Government of Israel 2016). The essential responsibilities include the drafting of legislation, supervision over other ministries and approval of their budget (Sheffer and Barak 2013). The large part of the committee's activity is done by its sub-committees, whereas the full committee serves as a media platform for the top security policymakers. It approves legislation in the area of defence, emergency preparedness, urgent recruitment of human resources, special operations of Shin Bet, distribution of emergency equipment, and other important intelligence and security task. The chair of this committee is considered one of the most sought-after position in Knesset. The committee's plenary meetings are secret and the meetings of some of its subcommittees are top secret. Therefore, its modus operandi remains largely unpublished (Freilich 2006; Sheffer and Barak 2013).

It seems that the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee has given excessive power but in reality, the members of the committee are "preoccupied with their personal political activities, which are the primary basis of their political advancement, and have little time, and even less incentive, to undertake the politically mixed task of trying to exercise serious parliamentary oversight of the national security establishment" (Freilich 2006:26). Furthermore, the committee does not have its own staff, as it is dependent on the national security institution for information and assessments.

According to Alon Ben-Meir (1986), because of Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee's dysfunctional nature and its composition inherently reflects the coalition majority, its impact on policy has been minimal (Ben-Meir 1986:50). There is consensus that the there is a huge gap between its picture as the Knesset's most esteemed committee and its actual influence (Pedatzur 2013; Ben-Meir 1986).

Charles D. Freilich (2006) observed the committee has a restricted role on foreign and defence policies or the size or make-up of IDF budget, and it is not involved in any of the important decisions concerning the army, despite the committee being officially responsible for "supervising the state's foreign policy; its armed forces and security" (Freilich 2006: 637). The committee members receive limited information from the defence ministry, without even trying to supervise or inspect the army actions. Some committee members acknowledge it openly, while others whisper the truth in secret (Ibid.).

Avshalom Vilan, a former Knesset member, was interviewed on the matter years ago: "This is a very strange committee. When I joined, I was sure, I was entering the most holy sanctuary, that this was the committee that determined the priorities of the defence apparatus. I soon discovered I was wrong. Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz dictated everything; we had absolutely no influence" (Cited in Pedatzur 2013). According to Vilan, the committee does not even attempt to influence the defence budget and "we have Members of Knesset lose their tongues and have no idea what is going on when presented with these slides… the debate was like at a Byzantine court … there is no true parliamentary supervision of the budget. It is all a show, causing an impossible situation. We're not doing our jobs" (Ibid.).

On the other hand, according to Charles D. Freilich (2012) committee's role has grown over the years. Now it interacts with the prime minister, defence and foreign ministers, chief of army staff, and chiefs of the other security institutions. In the last few years more information is presented by the committee in comparison to the past and some meaningful debate have taken place, especially in the closed subcommittees where confidentiality is usually observed. According Freilich periodic attempts "have been made in recent decades to conduct more substantive policy work, including landmark reviews of Israel's defence doctrine and of intelligence's role prior to the 2003 war in Iraq" (Freilich 2012: 27).

Prime Minister's Office (PMO): Prime Minister's Office is very much like the executive of the US, namely, Office of the President; it has assigned responsibility for assisting the prime minister in carrying out domestic and national security responsibilities and for inter-ministerial coordination (Ibid.). In Israel, all the important securities agencies, such as Mossad (external intelligence), Shin Bet (internal intelligence), and Atomic Energy Commission are directly under the supervision of the prime minister and are part of the PMO (Ibid.).

Ministry of Defence (MoD): The Defence Minister is a bridge between the military and civil society. Until now the post has always been held by men. He formally represents the government, as he is selected by the government to supervise the defence ministry and Chief of Staff of the IDF is officially subordinate to him (Muhareb 2011). The MoD is responsible for weapons acquisition, defence exports and defence budget (Freilich 2012:28). However, regarding the performance of the defence minister, there are lots of questions which remain unanswered. Although, the defence minister is selected by the government, but it is unclear on what decisions does he require the authorization of full cabinet and what can be decided without consultation with the cabinet (Muhareb 2011). Practically, defence minister has no staff of his own except for a few assistants and had only restricted internal estimation and planning capabilities. It makes the ministry entirely dependent on IDF for security policymaking.

To overcome this structural weakness while fulfilling the supervision role, a new politico-military branch was established in within the MoD in 2003 (Freilich 2012:28). Practically, the size of the branch is small, and its influence on the national security policymaking has been mixed. To help the defence minister in policy making and to provide him greater policy planning capabilities, two more supplementary divisions, namely, defence-economic and social affairs, were also instituted in 2003 (Freilich 2012:28; Ben-Horin and Posen 1981).

Israel Defence Force (IDF): IDF is the key player in the security establishment. It reports directly to the defence minister, not to the MoD, which is neither sanctioned nor structured to supervise it (Kahana and Sharfman 2014). The IDF has the overall authority over matters related to the size and structure of forces, operations, intelligence, strategic planning, training, logistics, doctrine, personnel and procurement plans (Ben-Meir 1995: 88-90; Freilich 2012; 29).

Freilich (2012) noted that in the IDF, "the General Staff is a unified military structure under the direct command of the chief of staff (CoS), who has clear and final authority in all areas" (Freilich 2012; 29). The General Staff includes the commanders of the staff divisions (Intelligence, Operations and Planning), Army, Air Force, Navy, functional commands (Home Front and Training), three joint MoD-IDF branches (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, R&D, Financial Adviser), regional commands (Northern, Central, and Southern), and the legal adviser to the CoS (Ben-Meir 1995: 88-90; Freilich 2012; 29). Between 1948 and until 2019, Israel had 22 CoS (See table 2.2).

According to Freilich (2012):

> The MoD director-general, military secretaries to the prime minister and defence minister, and MoD comptroller are permanent participants in General Staff meetings. The roles of most of these officials are relatively self-explanatory; a few warrant special attention. The Planning Branch is responsible for military and politico-military planning, including the IDF force structure, defence budget, foreign military relations, and strategic affairs. It has been extensively involved in the peace processes with Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, and Syria, both through preparation of background and policy papers and active participation in the talks and has produced numerous proposals for diplomatic initiatives over the years, whether of its own accord or at the request of the defence minister or premier. Other significant areas of activity have included relations with the United States and issues of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Interestingly, the Planning Branch has a standing order to develop an 'exit strategy,' that is, the politico-military criteria for ending hostilities, as soon as a significant military confrontation begins (Freilich 2012; 29).

The Planning Branch was established as the de facto National Security Council in the aftermath of the October 1973 War, as one of the lessons derived from the initial setback in the war. It was established before the National Security Council; the planning branch remains the most capable and influential strategic policy planning body (Ibid.).

According to Freilich (2012) even though the planning branch has gone beyond on issues mandated for military bodies in a democracy, its nature as a military organization restricts its command over several issues and at times undoubtedly adjusts its approach towards them. The branch suffers from persistent overwork due to enormous demands from the defence minister, the prime minister and the General Staff.

Table 2.2: Chief of Army Staff in Israel

S. No	Name of Chief of the General Staff	Years of Service
1	Yaakov Dori	1947-1949
2	Yigael Yadin	1949-1952
3	Mordechai Maklef	1952-1953
4	Moshe Dayan	1953-1958
5	Chaim Laskov	1958-1961
6	Tzvi Tzur	1961-1964
7	Yitzhak Rabin	1964-1968
8	Haim Bar-Lev	1968-1972
9	David Elazar	1972-1974
10	Mordechai Gur	1974-1978
11	Rafael Eitan	1978-1983
12	Moshe Levi	1983-1987
13	Dan Shomron	1987-1991
14	Ehud Barak	1991-1995
15	Amnon Lipkin-Shahak	1995-1998
16	Shaul Mofaz	1998-2002
17	Moshe Ya'alon	2002-2005
18	Dan Haulutz	2005-2007
19	Gabi Ashkenazi	2002-2011
20	Benny Gantz	2011-2015
21	Gadi Eizenkot	2015-2019
22	Aviv Kochavi	2019

(Source: Israel Defence Forces 2019)

Intelligence Community: Being the primary arm of the intelligence community, Aman (Military Intelligence) is the only singular agency with the capability of integrative assessment in all the vital spheres of political, military, and socioeconomic nature, apart from collecting intelligence (Freilich 2012). It is Aman who has assigned the responsibility for the annual intelligence estimation and for providing early warnings regarding possible outbreaks of hostilities. It also supplements extensive intelligence support to the political leaders and negotiators involved in the peace process (Maoz 2006; Peri 2006; Ben-Meir 1995). Though the Aman focuses primarily on Arab and Islamic countries, it has also diversified its role by providing assessments regarding economic issues such as oil prices as well as the international community at large. Apart from producing daily assessments of ongoing developments, Aman's Research Division also provides for periodic in-depth reports (Maoz 2006; Peri 2006; Ben-Meir 1995).

As an IDF officer, the head of Aman reports to the prime minister and cabinet through a chain of command in which he falls below the CoS, and the Defence Minister in the order of precedence and this structure makes their approval necessary (Peri 2006). The Prime Minister and cabinet are presented with regular weekly and special assessments in all areas by the head of Aman. Simultaneously, conventional practice has portrayed multiple instances where the head of Aman has taken charge as the policy adviser apart from being the senior intelligence adviser to the prime minister and cabinet (Peri 2006; Ben-Meir 1995). Even in the presence of potentially conflicting lines of authority, which could have been problematic otherwise, the head of Aman has enjoyed seamless access and analytical freedom except for a few instances such as the 1982 invasion of Lebanon (Peri 2006; Ben-Meir 1995). It was evident in the 1973 October war. The October 1973 war started when Egypt and Syria initiated a joint incursion on Israeli sites on the terrains Israel had captured during June 1967 war. This attacked, unforeseen by the IDF, began on 6 October 1973, on the holiest day in Jewish calendar. The main reason behind the failure of the IDF about the war was the misinterpretation of available intelligence information by the chief intelligence analysts, or more precisely, because the intelligence establishment did not present a clear picture to the cabinet about the Arab military plans and moves. It was mainly a failure of Aman in generating the final estimation as it had monopoly on the national intelligence estimation.

The Mossad (Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) runs on parallel lines like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US when it comes to cooperation with foreign

intelligence services and executing covert intelligence operations abroad (*The London Times* 1996). Intelligence collection is the primary agenda of Mossad, but its operations have also expanded to counterterrorism as well as restricting and upsetting the Arab arms programmes, especially nonconventional ones (Freilich 2012). The Israeli efforts to restraining the Iranian nuclear programme were led by this agency (*Time* 2010; Bergman 2018; Tartt 2013). Despite Aman remaining the primary player in this area, the Mossad established intelligence research divisions to end Aman's monopoly for promoting greater pluralism in intelligence assessment following the recommendations of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry after the October 1973 War (Freilich 2012; Maoz 2006).

Shabak (also known as Shin Bet) is accountable for the intelligence activities within Israel and in the occupied territories since 1967 and in the West Bank following 2005 Gaza withdrawal. Its activities include counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and monitoring domestic subversion. The responsibility to protect important public figures and facilities abroad, such as embassies, is also assigned to Shabak. In the wake of the first Intifada, counterterrorism has been the Shabak's prime focus. According to Freilich (2012), Shabak's research branch holds key responsibility to observe developments on the Palestinian side.

There is also a Committee of the Heads of Intelligence Services, known as VARASH. It is the senior most committee for inter-service coordination, chaired by the director of the Mossad along with MI and Shabak, the Prime Minister's military secretary, and on occasion the premier himself. The National Security Adviser is also included as a member of this committee (Kahana 2006).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the preparation and implementation of the foreign policy of the country. It represents Israel and its positions over the various domestic and international issues throughout the world. As of 2019, "Israel maintains diplomatic relations with 162 countries. It promotes relations with Diaspora communities and safeguards the rights of Israeli citizens abroad" (Government of Israel 2019).

There is also an intelligence body operating within the MFA known as the Centre for Political Research. This organization was re-established in the wake of the recommendation of the Agranat Commission to facilitate pluralism of intelligence assessment (Agranat Commission 1974). At the time of establishment, it was named as the Centre for Political

Planning and Research (CPPR). But the foreign minister Moshe Dayan did not want to involve this intelligence organization very much in the decision-making process and hence, the word 'planning' was dropped in 1977, and it was renamed as the Centre for Political Research (CPR). The main task of this organization is to the analysis of information obtained worldwide from the diplomats (Kahana 2006).

The MFA structure follows a duality while considering geographical and functional aspects. The former includes, inter alia, the Middle Eastern, North American, European, and East Asian divisions, responsible for relations with countries in these regions (Kahana 2006). The latter include the economic, media, legal, diaspora, research, planning, and strategic affairs divisions, which deal with several issues of cross-cutting nature as well as those issues related to domains such as non-proliferation, which demand particular expertise. Just after the few years its establishment, the importance of the Centre in the policymaking had weakened, though it is formally affiliated with the intelligence community (Ibid.).

The sharing of sensitive information with the Centre for Political Research was terminated by intelligence agencies due to apprehensions of leaks. It discontinued participating in the VARASH, and most of its work lay focus on short-term updates on current affairs, chiefly for internal ministry consumption (Freilich 2012). Though an attempt has been made to advance its capabilities and improvisation has been observed in recent years, the Centre for Political Research's potential remains untapped due to limited capabilities to conduct high quality and in-depth research because of the absence of appropriate research personnel, organizational clout, and disinterest on the part of senior ministry management (Kahana 2006; Freilich 2012).

The Policy Planning Division, which was originally responsible for both the intelligence research as well as policy planning, was segregated from the Centre for Political Research (Freilich 2012). However, others have expressed reluctance out of concerns that it might suggest recommendations at variance, which are not in line with their preferences. On similar lines and reasons Centre for Political Research and Planning Division remain less relevance in the MFA at the cabinet level as well as amongst other policy planning bodies (Ibid.).

The MFA established the Strategic Affairs Division in the early 2000s, with three component departments namely the Arms Control, Terrorism, and Strategic Affairs following the growing importance of politico-military affairs, especially WMD proliferation and terrorism.

Though the MFA suffers from problems of professional expertise and organizational clout, the new division enhanced the MFA's effective role in these areas, enabling it to thwart their complete takeover by the other agencies (Ibid.). However, MFA has very limited influence over the foreign policy. It is mainly because it "lacks the personnel and organizational processes needed for systematic policy formulation and focuses on the day to day management of Israel's foreign relations" (Ibid.). Its Policy Planning Division is organizationally weak and its outputs are totally reliant on the very few individuals composing it. Therefore, MoD becomes only influential body along with PMO which has professional capabilities to influence the foreign policy.

National Security Council: National Security Council (NSC) in Israel is new but effective institution, which plays a vital role in national security policymaking. The responsibilities of NSC are to "The council was instituted in 1999 by Prime Minister Netanyahu following the cabinet resolution 4889, which was unanimously adopted 7 March 1999, as a response to the lessons taking from IDF's failure in the October 1973 war (Government of Israel 2016).

The responsibilities of NSC are to serve as a coordinating, integrative, deliberative, and supervisory body on matters of national security and to operate as an arm of the Prime Minister's Office (Kahana 2006:198). It works with the various ministries such as the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Public Security, Industry and Trade, Justice and others. Furthermore, NSC also works with the security agencies, as well as with experts and academicians on the variety of subject within and outside the country (National Security Council 2016). The topmost post in the National Security Council is the chairman who directly reports to the prime minister and functions as National Security Adviser to the prime minister.

The NSC operates in accordance with orders given by the prime minister and obtains its powers from the government. It collects data from all institutions and ministries dealing with or responsible for with national security and converts this information into assessments of anticipated trends to Knesset committees on these issues, with the prime minister's directions. It is authorized to formulate recommendations to the government over the national security-related policies and to perform long-range planning" with the assistance of existing planning bodies in various ministries (Ibid.).

However, due to domestic politics and IDF's non-willingness to share its supremacy in annual intelligence estimation it took so many years to establish NSC in Israel (Mizroch 2007; Oren 2009). Internal differences within the coalition partner proved a biggest obstacle even at the time of its establishment.

In 1996, when Binyamin Netanyahu was elected as a prime minister of Israel, he decided to establish a NSC to advise the government on security policy. According to Amir Mizroch (2007), Netanyahu asked, Uzi Arad (Head of intelligence at Mossad), "to advice him in this matter. Arad suggested the name of David Ivri to start the project. However, within a month the project ended abruptly, when then-defence minister Yitzhak Mordechai decided to stop the project" (Oren 2009). According to Arad, Mordechai "stopped working on the project because he didn't see the need for a defence advisory body" (Arad Cited in Oren 2009). The discussions to establish NSC resurfaced "following the establishment of the Ciechanover Commission of Inquiry into the assassination attempt on Hamas chief Khaled Mashaal in Jordan in 1997" (Mizroch 2007; Oren 2009: 43). Many top-level officials argued with Netanyahu that now objection would come against the NSC because such a council was of the extreme necessity. However, Mordechai was not convinced and again refused to allow the formation of NSC (Mizroch 2007; Oren 2009). In 1999, Netanyahu sacked Mordechai due to political disagreements, once more discussion over establishment of national Security Council started. It was mainly because of Moshe Arns' appointment as defence minister; he was educated in America and had knowledge of importance of a powerful NSC in US (Mizroch 2007; Oren 2009). The election in 1999 was another obstacle in establishment of NSC. The election in 1999 was another obstacle in establishment of NSC (Oren 2009). Arad was sceptical about Ehud Barak, he thought that Barak might terminate the NSC. Therefore, diplomatically he confirmed it, which was presented in this way:

> If we establish a NSC and Barak gets elected, will he dissolve it or let it continue to exist? The answer came back: Barak would not scrap the NSC. Arad told Netanyahu that they were on "firm democratic grounds" and work on the NSC continued (Quoted in Mizroch 2007).

After that the project was presented in front of cabinet for authorization and officially NSC was formed. Though, Barak did not break his promise but "brought in former Mossad Chief Danny Yatom as his strategic advisor which created a parallel system as a result" the NSC was overshadowed by Yatom's team (Mizroch 2007). National security advisor in Israel faced trust deficit with the changes in the government (Ibid.). In 2001, when Ariel Sharon became

prime minster, he didn't trust Uzi Dayan, who was appointed by Ehud Barak. He thought Dayan was a political appointment and believed that he leaked information to the press. Similarly, Sharon's advisor, Dov Weisglass outflanked NSA Ephraim Halevy (see table 2.3 for more details). Furthermore, Giora Eiland attempted to boost the power of the body but he failed and left in frustration.

According to Ephraim Kahana (2006) "the National Security Council was created by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to politically sting Defence Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, who opposed its establishment. It seems that Netanyahu only wanted a body with a flashy American name, nothing more" (Ibid:199). Once the council was established, Prime Minister Netanyahu immediately ordered to the council to "address nonconventional weapons and ballistic missile threats to Israel as its top priority" (Mizroch 2007).

Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak (2013) underlined that the NSC never became a major player in national security policymaking in Israel. Aman, Shabak, and Mossad have maintained their dominance as consultants to the government in general and the prime minister on security matters (Freilich 2006: 641). The place where the NSC was situated initially also says lots of things. The council's headquarters were initially located in Ramat Hasharon, a suburb of Tel Aviv, while other important institutions were located Jerusalem. It was relocated to Jerusalem only in 2008 when a law instructed that it should operate there (National Security Council 2016).

It was also reflected in the account of Halevy, he noted that once Prime Minister Sharon asked him responsibility for preparing the first discussion on questions related to Israeli Arabs. Prior offering his recommendations, He discussed it with Mr. Sharon and noted :

> … Mr. Prime Minister, … there are four possible ways of approaching this topic. Are we relating to the Arab minority in Israel as a national minority? Are we relating to the Arab minority in Israel as a religious minority? Are we relating to the Arab minority in Israel as a cultural minority? Or are we relating to the Arab minority in Israel as individuals? Because each one of the alternatives has implications, and I want to hear from you whether you have a particular vision for your strategy as prime minister." Prime Minister Sharon listened to me attentively, as always, and then he smiled broadly and said: "Efraim, my friend: I want you to make a recommendation to me about building a soccer field in Sakhnin. That's what I'm asking you to do. All the rest – leave it to me (Eiland, Halevy and Ivry 2011: 43)

In his report for August 2005-April 2006, the state comptroller said that the NSC was unable to fulfil its responsibilities. The report highlighted that the prime ministers were not engaged

in the decision-making over the crucial security issues, such as the defence budgets, Gaza disengagement, decision of retreat from Lebanon, and large defence projects (Even 2009: 88).

The Winograd Commission, which was established in wake of the Second Lebanon War of 2006 underlined that the government's decision making during and before War was lacking *inter alia* cooperation. The commission summed up "that the primary responsibility for the failure rests with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the outgoing Chief of Staff" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). The commission observed that if anyone from these three had acted better the outcome of the War would have been significantly better (Ibid.). The Winograd commission recommended strengthening of the NSC so that it can support for the government and the prime minister to make sound decisions. As a response to the Winograd commission's findings, National Security Staff law was passed by the Knesset in 2008. The idea behind this decision was to make the National Security Council powerful.

National Security Policy in Different Phases

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, which was adopted on 29 November 1947 proposed the division of Palestine into independent Jewish and Arab states. The resolution underlined that the important religious areas around Jerusalem to be administered by the UN and would be under international control (The US Department of State 2016a). However, the Arabs were not in favour of partition of Palestine and according to them this arrangement was unreasonable because it left many Arab inhabitants in Jewish territory (Shlaim 2014). The UN resolution 181 ignited clashes between Arab and Jewish communities within Palestine. The conflict started with assaults by Palestinian militia associated with Arab Liberation army, comprising of volunteers from the neighbouring Arab countries (The US Department of State 2016a).

The fighting intensified after the Israeli declaration of independence on 14 May 1948. The conflict converted into a full-fledged war on 15 May 1948 when the regular armies of the then Transjordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria attacked Israel. It was the time when the Jewish army was smaller than the Arab armies. The Haganah's intelligence report of March 1948 noted that the situation in the initial days of the war was critical and the Arab armies had a clear advantage (Isseroff 2005). There is a consensus among the scholars that in April

1948 the face of battle was changed and turned in favour of the Jewish forces (Shlaim 2014; Isseroff 2005; Herzog and Gazit 2005).

Table 2.3 : List of National Security Advisors of Israel

S.No	Name	Year
1	David Ivri	March 1999– January 2000
2	Uzi Dayan	September 2000– August 2002
3	Ephraim Halevi	September 2002– September 2003
4	Giora Eiland	January 2004– June 2006
5	Ilan Mizrahi	June 2006– December2007
6	Dani Arditi	December 2007– April 2009
7	Uzi Arad	April 2009– March 2011
8	Yaakov Amidror	March 2011– November 2013
9	Yossi Cohen	November 2013–December 2016
10	Yaakov Nagel	(Acting National Security Advisor)
11	Eytan Ben-David	(Acting National Security Advisor)

(Source: National Security Council Israel 2009)

Regarding the numbers Jewish and Arab troops, experts have offered figures. Chaim Herzog and Shalmo Gazit (2005) noted that in 1947 the numbers of Haganah troops was around 45,000 and most of these troops were useful for the defensive role while only 15,000 could be deployed as combating force. In regards to arms, the Jewish forces had "700 light machine guns, 900 rifles and 200 medium machine guns (MMG) with inadequate ammunition" (Herzog and Gazit 2005). In regards to the Air force, it "had 11 single-engine light civilian aircraft and around 40 pilots" (Ibid.). Though Lehi and Irgun paramilitary associated with the right had around 2,000 and 4,000 troops respectively, but they lacked fighting experience and ammunition (Ibid.). In February 1948, "Haganah had six brigades of varying sizes ranging from about 800 to 3,000 troops; Carmeli in Western Galilee, Golani in Eastern Galilee, Alexandroni in the Sharon area, Givati in the southern coast and lowlands, Qiryati in Tel Aviv and Etzioni in Jerusalem" (Ibid). By the end of April 1948, Haganah had around 20,000

rifles, counting Israeli manufactured Sten guns. However, it did not have tanks and artillery support (Ibid.:18-20).

According to Avi Shlaim (2000), many scholars projected the war, as a struggle of few against many but the IDF changed the balance of power at each stage of the war against the Arab armies. In May 1948, the total operational military strength of Arab troops in Palestine was under 25,000, while the numbers of the IDF troops were around 35,000. According to Shlaim by mid-July, the IDF mobilized had 65,000 men under arms and by December it reached to 96,441. Though the Arab states reinforced their human resources, they were unable to match the Israeli rate of increase. Therefore, the ultimate result of the war was not a miracle but a reflection of the changing Arab-Israel military balance (Shlaim 2000: 35).

In the 1948 War, IDF was fighting on the internal lines and under unified command structure. By contrast, its Arab enemies were scattered and divided among themselves to coordinate operations (Bregman 2000:28). The testimonies of Arab troops also highlighted the lack of coordination among the invading Arab forces. Mohsein Abdel Khalek, a captain in the Egyptian army and later a Prime Minister of Egypt, recollected that "the Jews were attacking us from the flank that the Iraqis were supposed to be protecting. We discovered that the Iraqi army had withdrawn, without even telling us. We had to shorten our lines, else the Egyptian army would have been destroyed. It was the turning point in the war" (Quoted in Bregman 2000:28).

Moreover, as the War was reaching its end, it became clear that the IDF was the best led and best equipped of all the contestants (Cohen and Cohen 2012: 51). However, the loss of life and property in this war had a profound and longstanding impact on the psychology of the Israeli people.

According to Ahron Bregman

> In the 1948 war 5,682 Israeli people died, 20 percent of them were civilians and about 8 percent women. This amounts to about 1 per cent of the total Jewish population in Palestine-Israel, and is indeed a the 1947–49 war 35 high ratio if compared to the number of casualties in the First World War, where France lost 34 percent thousand, Germany 30 percent thousand, Austro-Hungary 10 per thousand, Britain and Italy 16 percent thousand, and Russia 11 percent thousand. Taking into consideration that the First World War was nearly three and a half times as long as the 1948 war –51 months compared with fifteen – then it can be said that the ratio of Israeli dead compared with the population was more than Germany's and closer to France's. There were 1,260 women widowed, 2,290 children orphaned and 3,000 soldiers

wounded, of whom as many as 360 became mentally ill, which is as high as Britain during the First World War (Bregman 2000:36).

Despite Israel's significant victory in the 1948 War, it did not achieve peace with its neighbours. Furthermore, defeat in the War initiated coups in Egypt (1952) and Syria (1966) and brought both the countries close to the Soviet Union (Yaniv 1993: 5).

Israeli National Security, 1949 to 1967

In 1949, Israel signed armistice agreements with Egypt (24 February 1949), Lebanon (23 March 1949), Transjordan (3 April 1949) and Syria (20 July 1949) to formally end the fighting between all the parties (Ibid.). The agreement instituted an armistice line, known as Green line, between IDF and Jordanian forces (Steinberg 2011). The 1949 borders significantly improved strategic situation by expanding the areas allotted to Israel according to the partition plan, providing it control of areas of Jerusalem, strategically vital Negev (Steinberg 2011; Friedman 2011). However, the armistice line did not change the major security threats. After the armistice agreement, the Arab strategy shifted from conventional warfare to fedayeen "raids from Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, Jordanian-occupied West Bank and Syria" (Gimlin 1969; O'Neill 1978).

These strikes from Gaza, West Bank, and Syria killed many Israeli civilians. To deal with this situation, Ben-Gurion ordered the IDF to launch a retaliatory attack and operations (Steinberg 2011). Therefore, elite units, "such as Unit 101 led by Ariel Sharon, were created but it led to internal controversy, particularly after the Kibya incident of October 1953 with some critics arguing" that Israeli reprisal attacks had increased Arab motivation to use terror (Shimshoni 1988:20). The 1949 Armistice agreement allowed Jordan's military to encircle the Israel-held western Jerusalem from three sides and endangered the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem corridor. With this new change, the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem corridor was within the easy reach of Jordanian artillery. Therefore, IDF needed to prevent any military campaign by Jordan toward the Mediterranean at the border because there was no space for IDF to counter-attack (Friedman 2011; Steinberg 2011).

During this time the main security threat for Israel was not coming from Jordan. The Jordanian forces were limited, and tensions with Egypt and Syria created a de facto alliance between Israel and Jordan (Friedman 2011; Steinberg 2011). Furthermore, Jordan's major security concern was coming from the Palestinians (Steinberg 2011). Thus, the danger to

Israel was eased by the limited military power of Jordan and domestic politics of Palestinian (Ibid.). However, its ability to defeat Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in coordinated attack especially from Jordan river valley side, was uncertain (Ibid.). According to Steinberg (2011), this kind of military campaign would have left Israel with insufficient forces to hold.

George Friedman (2011) noted that the 1949 borders provided many strategic advantages. According to him, the Arab forces were combating on peripheral lines, which mean their forces could not move swiftly between Syria and Egypt (Friedman 2011). On the other hand, "fought from interior lines, and in relatively compact terrain. They could carry out a centrifugal offense, beginning with Egypt, shifting to Jordan, and finishing with Syria, moving forces from one front to another in a matter of days" (Ibid.). The pre-1967 borders permitted Israel to launch well-coordinated, timely, planned and intensive operations within its reach. Though it did not have "strategic depth, it made up for it with compact space and interior lines. It would have to manage the time, place and tempo of engagements, it could defeat numerically superior forces" (Ibid.).

Israel required two objects to utilize this benefit. The first requirement was an exceptional intelligence system to decipher the moves of the massing enemy forces. The second, important prerequisite was an association with a big power. It was based on advanced technology and powerful intelligence organization (Friedman 2011; Tal 2000).

The most challenging obstacle in Israel's strategic power since its "independence had been that its security requirements exceed its financial and industrial realities. It could not domestically develop and produce all of the weapons it needed to fight a war" (Tal 2000). In terms of security, the 1948 War brought some lessons for its strategic thinking. According to Israel Tal, the 1948 War taught a pivotal lesson to in terms of the realization of the significance of offensive strategy, dependency on attacking capabilities, pre-emptive strike and taking the battle to enemy land (Ibid: 121–122).

The defeat of Arabs in the 1948 War intensified many internal problems in the Arab countries as well. It brought the fore the extreme elements and created an atmosphere of unrest and revolution (Friedman 2011; Tal 2000). In July 1951, King Abdullah of Jordan, who covertly initiated a peace with Israel, was murdered on the steps of the Al Aqsa Mosque by the agents of the Mufti of Jerusalem (Herzog 2005:111). In Egypt, the Prime Minster Nokrashi Pasha was assassinated on 28 December 1948. Furthermore, in Syria government was deposed by

General Husni el Zaim in 1949 and he was also overthrown in 1951. In Egypt, a group of Free Offices led by Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser took over the government on 23 July 1952 and banished the King Farouk (Ibid.). In short, these changes in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan drastically increased Israel's security concerns. The regime changes in Egypt and Syria established a kind of government which was visibly hostile towards Israel.

Formation of Israel's Strategic Doctrine, 1953

On 12 October 1953, Israel formed its strategic doctrine. This strategic doctrine was a response to its core security concerns. The emergence of Nasser in 1952 in Egypt, who was known for his anti-Israel position, intensified the fear of a multi-front war. In the 1950s, Israeli leaders understood that the state would be always inferior in comparison Arab countries in terms of quantity. Under such situation Ben-Gurion sought to find out ways to counterweight it by encouraging immigration. He also encouraged the high birth rate and tried closing the gap with qualitative know how. He also took initiatives to develop upper hand in science and technology He believed that IDF must be equipped with fall innovative scientific and technological conquest for defence of Israel. Ben-Gurion realised that along with these modifications the territories of Israel would not be protected, therefore, having knockout punch was important. In this regard, having ''the bomb'' would adequately assure the state's strategic deterrence against a full-scale war from Arab countries (Beres 2015: 89-104). His national security strategies were like a model of Carl Von Clausewitz. It focused on capturing, disarming and 'breaking the will' of its enemy (Cohen 2010). To deter any conventional attack from Arab countries, Ben-Gurion adopted a policy of massive retaliation.

According to Ben-Gurion, the ultimate guarantee for survival in a hostile environment was the nuclear option (Ben-Gurion 1970). He realised that in the absence of an external guarantee for "Israel's existence, its future could be assured only through the fruits of Jewish mind-science and technology- and that vow 'never again' meant that it must acquire nuclear option" (Cohen 2010: xxii). By 1955, soon after Ben-Gurion came to power for the second time, this commitment was translated from a vision for the future into a series of concrete action. He understood well that Israel could not rely on the assurance of the world's big powers for its territorial integrity (Ibid.).

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According to many scholars, the Israeli nuclear programme was the outcome of this policy (Cohen 2010; Beres 2015; Inbar 2006). According to Avner Cohen (2010) its desire to become nuclear power initiated with a doomsday situation which the policy makers realised in 1950. The Dimona nuclear programme was shaped "to offset its quantitative disadvantage in conventional forces and to convey the message that if it was faced with the possibility of destruction, the Arab countries would suffer the same fate" (Maoz 2003:44).With the support of France, it established the Dimona Nuclear Reactor facility in southern Israel. According to Zeev Maoz (2003), the nuclear strategy has achieved three primary security aims. First, since the June War, it has significantly deterred a possibility all-out attack from Arab countries. Second, it successfully altered military objectives of its s enemies, pushing them to transfer the "operational planning to limited war scenarios" (Maoz 2003:44). Third, it made it easy to bring Arab countries to the negotiation table and paved a way to conclude various peace agreements (Maoz 2003:44).

Moshe Sharett and Security Policy

On 26 January 1954, Moshe Sharett came into power as prime minister and the change and Ben-Gurion's replacement with moderate Sharett was a sign that the leadership was not interested in going for war soon (Rokach 1980). The first year of Sharett as a prime minister was not easy on security and political domains (Shlaim 2004). . The main reason behind it was deterioration in the US-Israel relations because of the former's decision to supply arms to Arab states (Shlaim 2000: Rokach 1980). Britain's decision to depart from the Suez Canal also raised its concerns. On the other hand, along with Israeli borders with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan "the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization was unable to prevent incidents of infiltration, theft, murder, and sabotage" (Shlaim 2000:7).

Under such situation, Sharett tried to achieve the national security objectives through diplomacy. He actively tried to stop American military aid to the Arabs and procure arms to

ensure security (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). But, within government Sharett was facing much bigger problems (Ibid.). This situation turned worse when Pinhas Lavon refused to accept Sharett authority in defence matters and did not regularly report to the prime minister on IDF's operations. He used to share only partial, misleading information with the prime minister. Sharett was seen by "Ben-Gurion as being too moderate in retaliation against incursions and attacks on Israeli civilians, while Sharett considered it important to maintain his policy of moderation and de-escalation of the Arab-Israel conflict" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).

In February 1954, General Mohamed Naguib was challenged by Nassar in Egypt and Adib Shishakli was removed from power by a military coup in Syria. Ben-Gurion was invited to a meeting organized by Sharett, with Pinhas Lavon and Moshe Dayan to decide what should be the Israeli response for these developments (Shlaim 2000). Lavon proposed that it should take a military action in the south to detach the Gaza Strip from Egypt and to invade the demilitarized zone in the north with Syria. On the other hand, Ben-Gurion proposed that the country should help Christen-Maronite to create a Manorite Christen state in Lebanon (Ibid.).

According to Avi Shlaim (2000), Sharett was against both plans and Sharett observed that both plans would unite the western powers and the UN Security Council against Israel. He was constantly under pressure to approve the reprisal attacks suggested by Lavon and Dayan. He also received many reports that the army was becoming more militant and was heading towards war. According to Shlaim, Sharett exposed the danger of war in a Mapai's Political Committee meeting held on 12 May 1954 and pointed out that "it's not enough to say that we want peace, but the IDF would have to act accordingly as well" (Quoted in Shlaim 2000:107). The scope of large-scale reprisals against Jordan was reduced because of Sharett's restraining influence (Ibid.)

In 1955, the problems between Sharett and Ben-Gurion became visible despite their close relations since the 1920s. Sharett initiated negotiations on arms purchases with the US, which gave positive result after he had left the premiership. However, the deep-seated rift between Sharett and Ben-Gurion finally resulted in the former's resignation in 3 November 1955 (Maoz 2016). Following the 1955 Knesset elections, Ben-Gurion became prime minister and Sharett served as Foreign Minister until June 1956.

By later 1955, the threat of another war led by Egypt, increased. With the support of Egypt, Palestinian fedayeen had been attacking Israeli territories from their bases in the Gaza Strip. The IDF was responding with strong reprisal attacks (The United Nation 2016). After the military coup in Egypt, "Nasser moved swiftly to modernize Egypt's armed forces, signed an agreement for Soviet weapons, including modern aircraft and tanks, which supposed to be supplied via Czechoslovakia" (Bennett 1985: 747). The first shipment of the Soviet supply reached as aid package to Egypt which was announced in 1955 and known as Czech arms deal (Golani 1995; Bennett 1985). According to Alexander J. Bennett (1985), this agreement valued around US$90-200 million and payment was to be made in the form cotton and rice over a period of 12 years by Egypt. Though, this was also a fact that the equipment transfer was largely surplus and outdated but had broader implications (Bennett 1985).

Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in July 1956 proved to be provocative for Britain and France. It also directly challenged Israeli freedom of shipping in the Red Sea. As a result, a covert deal was concluded among France, Britain and Israel against Egypt leading to the Suez War (Quand 1992). The Israeli "alliance with France, which lasted until the eve of the June 1967 War, enabled it to acquire French weapons and technology, including advanced combat jets and provided the political foundations for the construction of the Dimona nuclear reactor" (Pinkus and Tlamim 2002).

During the 1956 the Suez War, the IDF successfully followed its security doctrine by making quick advances in the Sinai Peninsula and defeating the Egyptian army. The Israeli aims in the war were to stop the terror strike "from Gaza and degrade the broader threat from Egypt before its military had an opportunity to assimilate the new Soviet weapons" (Steinberg 2011). As the conflict intensified, the US and USSR intervened and forced Britain, France, and Israel to accept a ceasefire agreement (Ibid.). Egypt saw this military defeat as a political victory and under the threat of sanctions from the Eisenhower administration, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula as well as the Gaza Strip in return of an American assurance to stop Egypt from again restricting movement of Israeli shipments "through the Red Sea to the port of Eilat" (Ibid.).

Security Policy under Levi Eshkol

Levi Eshkol became the third Prime Minister of Israel after the resignation of Ben-Gurion in 1963. Like Ben-Gurion, Eshkol also held the Ministry of Defence but never claimed expertise

in security-related areas. Hence, his security policy was largely a continuation of Ben-Gurion's. During the major security policy-making meetings Eshkol used to consult with his colleagues (Brecher 1972:210; Naor 2006).

Eshkol's achievements were remarkable. Though he had never commanded any military campaign, he had a clear picture of the dangers encircling Israel and the resources it needed to overcome them (Brecher 1972:210; Naor 2006). He emphasised on the military modernization and modernized the armoured brigade with powerful weapons and transformed it into a quickly deployable force (Oren 2003). At a time when France was changing its West Asia policy, Eshkol decreased reliance on French arms though the purchase of Sky hawk fighters and Patton tanks from the US (Brecher 1972:210; Naor 2006). On the other hand, he improved Intelligence apparatus and transformed structure of IDF and under his guidance, "some of the IDF's most capable generals were retained and promoted, among them Yitzhak Rabin, whom Eshkol appointed to a three-year term as chief of staff in January 1964, and whose tenure he extended in late 1966 for an additional year" (Oren 2003).

Under Eshkol's leadership, IDF was closely monitoring Arab countries acquiring heavy bombers, chemical weapons, and long-range missiles. In 1966, he was told by intelligence officials that the Arab countries were incapable and divided to wage war against Israel before 1970 (Oren 2003). Eshkol had ordered the doubling of armoured corps ammunition reserves whose stocks at that time could cover only three days of fighting (Oren 2003; Brecher 1972; Naor 2006). Keeping deterrence power in mind, Eshkol followed a strategy of limited retaliation against Arab belligerency.

According to Michael B. Oren (2003), this strategy was useful in 1964, "when the Syrians tried to undermine the national water carrier project by diverting the Jordan River at its source within Syrian territory and began firing on Israeli farmers attempting to cultivate demilitarized zones along the northern border" (Ibid.). In 1965, when Syria encouraged Fatah to launched terror strikes against Israel, Eshkol allowed the Air force to target Syria's installations in the Golan Heights. He also ordered the army to give an appropriate reply to Fatah in the areas of the West Bank (Oren 2003; Brecher 1972; Naor 2006). However, he abstained from commanding a full-scale war against Syria. The main reason for this decision was his fear that such an offensive could start a large-scale war in the region in which the Soviet Union would get involved openly. As the US was engaged in Vietnam, it would be difficult for the US to come for Israel's defence (Cohen and Cohen 2011).

Eshkol was aware of the strategic realities of the West Asian region and like Ben-Gurion, he gave special consideration to nuclear deterrence. Between 1963 and 1966, around 90 tons of yellowcake was covertly sent from Argentina (Burr 2013). The Israeli reprocessing plant was ready by 1965 and could convert the reactor's fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium (Hersh 1991). In 1967, it was reported that Israel had built two nuclear bombs and Eshkol ordered IDF to be on the nuclear alert during the June War (Cordesman 2000).

Security Policy from 1967 to 1973

Israel's national security policymaking during the 1967-1973 period had registered a mixed outcome. On the one hand, it was successful in achieving a decisive military victory over the enemy in 1967 by using its basic security strategy (Pinkus and Tlamim 2002). On the other hand, in the 1973, it completely failed to follow the security doctrine. Before discussing the national security strategy during 1967-1973, it is important to understand its basic security doctrine (Merom 1999).

As it has mentioned earlier, Israel lacks strategic depth and is quantitatively inferior and hence cannot afford long wars. To deal with this problem, it developed a security policy which includes the following four points:

1. Deterrence seeks to deter enemies from attacking;

2. Early warning or strategic warning is essential to make timely mobilization (Cohen 1983);

3. First strike principle that can be divided into pre-emptive and preventive wars (Howoritz 1993);

4. Israel does not have strategic depth, it needs to prevent Arab armies to infiltrate in its territory and rapidly shift the fighting to the enemy land.

The June 1967 War was a watershed event in its national security policymaking. It changed the strategic realities of Israel and its neighbours (Sousa 2014). The 1967 War radically changed the face of the West Asian region and transformed the political landscape of the region as Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip and West Bank including East Jerusalem (Sousa 2014). The massive military victory made it territorially tiny but militarily a powerful country in West Asia.

The war started on 5 June 1967, when the Israeli Air Force opened cautiously coordinated pre-emptive air attacks on the major military bases and airports in Egypt, Syria and western Iraq (Horowitz 1993). This aerial offensive was quickly followed by a major ground offensive attack into the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Following the by military doctrine framed by Ben-Gurion, Israel successfully transformed the battle to the enemy lands. The Intelligence services were also successful in gathering as much as possible information about enemies' plans (Ibid.). Although its policy of deterrence failed before the war, the circumstances forced Israel to implement its pre-emptive strike successfully which in turn enabled it to gain a strategic depth. The 1967 War was not just a military victory over the enemy but was also a success for its military doctrine which converted the war into a decisive defeat for the enemy (Horowitz 1993; Civcik 2004).

The Israeli victory in 1967 over the Arab forces carried a drastic change in its geographic and military situation (Civcik 2004; Horowitz 1993). Until the 1967 the Arab countries maintained a practically monolithic commitment to the destruction of Israel (Freilich 2018:24). However, the magnitude of the Arab defeat in the war changed all these conceptions. This rude Arab awakening started a process of growing Arab acceptance of the reality of Israel's existence.

However, unexpectedly it brought no alterations in fundamental principles of its military strategy (Dror 1999: 47; Herzog 2004:189). The 1967 War provided Israel a strategic depth with the occupation of the West Bank including East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip (Dror 1999:47). This territorial gain or strategic depth assured the "policymakers that the 1967 borders which were vulnerable to surprise Arab attack were replaced by new borders which gave topographical and territorial advantages to Israel" (Civcik 2004:94). This meant that the pre-war strategy needed a major alteration; for example, the concept of pre-emptive strike was no longer important in the post-war period. However, these important modifications were ignored in the post-war period due to the euphoria of victory.

According to Dan Horowitz, the 1949 Armistice lines were 'indefensible borders,' the 1967 ceasefire lines developed a new concept of 'secure borders' (Horowitz 1993:23). Chaim Herzog noted that "the Israeli control of the West Bank down to the river Jordan moved potentially hostile forces from the coastal strip and narrow 'waistline' of Israel and the area

surrounding to the city of Jerusalem, and created an additional buffer for its defence" (Herzog 2004; 189).

However, the strategic depth that Israel achieved in 1967 was unable to save it from a surprise attack from the enemy in 1973, and it failed to follow its security strategy. According to Efraim Inbar, the 1973 War was a major setback for its security strategy as the surprise Arab attack devastated its self-confidence. Moreover, the fundamental pillars of security strategy began to be questioned after the war. The self-confidence that Israel acquired from the defensible post-1967 borders were as altered after the 1973 War (Inbar 1982). David T. Buckwalter noted that the national security strategy of 'total deterrence' threatening heavy reprisal for any military adventure from the enemy side did not work (Buckwalter 2001: Herzog 1975). The Israeli defence strategy was relied on three extremely important elements; first, strongly structured defensive strategy which would allow a tiny professional army to respond any initial attack; second, quick mobilization; and third, early warning (minimum 24 to 48 hours) to deploy the regular forces on the borders. All these three pillars of strategy failed during the 1973 War and the most critical failure was the lack of strategic or early warning (Herzog 1975).

After the October War the Agranat commission was established to investigate the reasons for a strategic surprise in the initial days of the war. The high-level investigation commission said that the main reason for failure was the Aman's firm belief in *Ha Konzeptzia* (the conception). According to this estimation of the intelligence, especially Aman, the Arabs neither had the intent nor the capability to initiate an attack against Israel in the short and medium term. This conception was based on three main suppositions:

1. Egypt would not go for war as long as it does not have sufficient air power;

2. The significant victory over Arabs in 1967 provided vital strategic depth and provided the crucial military advantage; and

3. Syria would only go for the war if Egypt is firstly initiating a conflict against Israel (Shlaim 1976; Agranat Commission 1975; Sousa 2014).

Herzog noted that the doctrine of deterrent had failed during the 1973 war. The Arab forces analysed the deterrent characteristics of the Israeli security doctrine and found out an incredible solution for that, "the important one being to give strategic and operational

surprise" (Herzog 1975: 277). Accordingly, the Arab armed forces employed the method of international diplomacy as a tool to take benefit of any condition that would develop in their favour (Ibid.). They were even successful in accomplishing this objective. The Arab armies planned their offensives in such a manner as to ensure that the IDF would be inadequate to destroy their attack before the deployment of international political forces (Ibid.). Because of economic restriction, it was impossible for Israel to maintain the IDF fully mobilized along the front line. Hence, the IDF strategy was grounded on sufficient early warning, which would permit to political leaders to mobilize the reserves in time but in October 1973 Israeli intelligence failed to provide an early warning (Ibid.).

Egypt learned a significant lesson from the 1967 war that any military superiority over Israel would be possible if they were able to neutralize its tanks and air force (Horowitz 1993; Herzog 1975). At the same time to slow down the mobilization of Israel reserves, the Arabs answer to this problem was missile umbrella, a cluster of anti-tank weapons and strategic surprise which would force the IDF to react slowly (Horowitz 1993; Herzog 1975). However, Israel did not develop their forces accordingly; it ignored the enemy's preparation, following a fixed concept which was based on their previous experience. Moreover, for years it was suffering from superiority in fighting and Arab countries kept in mind and exploited all modern technological advancement in this area (Horowitz 1993; Herzog 1975).

Again, as the Israeli armed forces put too much emphasis on the air force, the artillery arms were neglected. Once it is realised the crucial support was not available from the air force, increased reliance on artillery becomes self-evident (Herzog 1975). It was only on third- and fourth-days artillery reached southern borders (Ibid.: 271).

During the War, Arabs planned their supply line carefully and amidst the campaign, major Soviet airlifts[5] reached Damascus and Cairo with short intervals. According to Herzog "the Soviet ships loaded with thousands of ton equipment passed through the Bosporus Straits and reached Latakia and Alexandria" (Ibid.). During the war the use of ammo was incredibly excessive by Israel, loss to fighter jets was heavy, and the flow of resupply was very weak. According to Herzog "some weeks later General Moshe Dayan was to make an ill-advised public admission that the Israeli forces had run out of certain items of ammunition that but American supplies to the country would have been in a very serious situation" (Ibid. :277).

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[5] The Soviet made Antonov 22 Cargo Carriers landed in Damascus and Cairo during the war.

As the situation became difficult, the MFA started shuttling between the White House and Pentagon. Ammunition was urgent needed, primarily for artillery and tank units (Ibid.).

Indeed, since 1948, Israel tried to balance quantitative split between Arab forces and IDF through a qualitative approach, but the October War highlighted the significance of quantity. After the war, extensive resources were spent so that IDF could compete with the quantitative might of the Arab armed forces (Horowitz 1993). There was a significant increase in military expenditure of Israel in 1975, which was 30.5 percent of GDP (See table 2.4) (SIPIRI 2019).

Table 2.4: Military Expenditure of Israel as Percentage of Gross domestic Product

Year	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Military expenditure (Percent)	23.4	22.8	20.4	27.9	27.7	30.5

(Source: SIPRI 2019)

Sam Katz analysed and underlined the reasons for failure. According to him between the 1967 and the 1973 wars, Israel was fighting a defensive war of attrition. This resulted in the IDF introducing technological and tactical improvements to improve the fighting capabilities, which were essential for the next war. In the process, it underestimated the threat of surface-to-air missiles and the significance of improvement in the anti-tank capability of its opponents (Katz 2002). The IDF had used a 'pure tank', 'pure infantry' and 'aerial artillery' strategy which proved useless in the October War (Katz 2002: 6).

A significant shift in the strategic thinking after the October war was the determination to establish a powerful quantitative military, as soon as possible. Inbar highlighted several rationales for this alteration; Israel was determined to establish a more powerful military strength with substantial firepower to avert failure if enemy surprised again; because of modest strategic depth, it is necessary to stop the enemy from entering its territories. A close look of the 1973 War shows that its damaged "deterrence increased the prospects of an Arab military initiative" (Inbar 2008).

Security Policy, 1973-1982

In the post-1973 period, national security policymaking saw a major shift. This shift was dictated by the IDF's failure in the initial days of the 1973 War. Similarly, the continued defeat of Arabs in conventional wars, eroded the ability to pursue any possible strategy to destroy Israel (Horowitz 1993). After the War, It was severely dependent on the US and became vulnerable to American pressure. It was under this situation Israel signed disengagement agreements with Syria and Egypt in 1974 (Beauchamp 2014).

However, within the country, these were not seen as an agreement which would significantly reduce Arab-Israel hostility or decrease Israel's necessity high-tech weapons (Inbar 2008: 4). As a result, both sides continued their extravagant arms race and this increased the Israeli dependency upon the US. According to Inbar peace treaty with Egypt "in the short run has weakened Israel's military and political situation but has not changed its strategic dilemma" (Ibid.: 4). The collective armies of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq were weak in comparison to Egypt in regard of all types of weaponry, but these unfriendly armies were immediate to strategically vital Israeli areas. Therefore, its threat perception has not changed, even after the 1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt. The need to modernize the "IDF was underlined by the enormous Arab military build-up in both qualitative and quantitative terms since 1973" (Ibid.: 4).

The peace agreement with Egypt altered the balance between political and military considerations in the Israeli national security doctrine (Cohen and Azar 1981; Aronson 2013). Since 1948, Egypt had been the most important component in the anti-Israel alliance. The normalization of the relationship with Egypt accorded Israel a recognized player status in West Asia (Inbar 2008). According to Dan Horowitz, earlier, the state was indirectly involved in interstate relations in West Asia. But these relations were secret, such as relations with Jordan and Morocco, and other countries outside the region (Horowitz 1993:31). Its relations with non-Arab countries such as Iran and Turkey were the exception but the peace agreement with Egypt changed all this.

It significantly increased the relative value of diplomacy at the expense of the military factor in West Asia. According to Horowitz, the fresh diplomatic process did not change the Israeli definition of national security and "the country' very existence was at stake in the conflict and the no political arrangement could replace the necessity for Israeli self-sufficiency in its

defence" (Ibid: 32). On the contrary, the peace with Egypt was a product of Israeli military capability which defeated all Arab attempts to solve conflict militarily (Sabet 1998). The peace agreement extensively reduced the possibility that it would have to a face war on the two fronts-Egyptian and Syrian-simultaneously.

According to many scholars, the importance of the 1973 war was far greater than victory. Before the war, Israeli security policy had stressed on the idea of self-reliance (Mikaelian 1994:120). On the other hand, after the war, it found itself militarily and politically largely dependent on the US (Inbar 1996; Lewis 1999). Despite this dependence, decision makers were careful regarding the state's growing dependence on the US. (Yaniv 1993:40).

From a national security point of view, the post-1973 period had seen the decline of the idea of an existential threat (Merom 1999; Mikaelian 1994:120). One of the important lessons of the 1973 War was the troublesome nature of the concept of strategic depth that Israel acquired in the war. The territorial gains along with small numbers of troop pressurized its forces' operational manoeuvrability and flexibility. According to Shoghig Mikaelian (1999) "these negative aspects of territorial conquest and maintenance of occupation, the idea that occupied territory could be used as a bargaining chip for normalization of ties and neutralization of threats by diplomatic means – namely the 'land for peace' concept – retained its centrality in Israeli strategy" (Mikaelian 1999: 180).

The key shift in Israeli strategic thinking in the post-1973 war period was the determination to establish a larger army, as quick as possible. Efraim Inbar noted that this change was an outcome of various reasons; Israel desired for a generously proportioned army with a substantial military capability to avert any collapse if enemy surprised again. A small state with little strategic depth, it has credible security concerns regarding strategic surprise and has to stop the enemy outside its borders. Hence, what matters is not military potential, but instantly accessible military power. A close look of the October war shows that its weakened deterrence expanded the probability of an Arab military initiative and "the operational implication of the reduced deterrence was the need to have greater forces to hold the border lines, as well as the need to have more units on alert. This required a larger army" (Inbar 2008: 10).

According to Yoram Peri, following the 1973 War, the defence policymaker understood that a saturated battlefield and use of a mass army in the future wars of assault and friction would

create unbearable attrition. The solution for this problem was to enhance the IDF's ability to hit the enemy target without direct human contact on the battlefield and this was a major shift in its defence doctrine. Therefore, Israel took steps to provide the IDF land forces with technological superiority over the Arab armies that it did not have earlier (Peri 2006). The peace agreement with Egypt allowed it to divert huge resources to embark on a project "small smart army" which brought many innovation and revolutions in the IDF. The change in defence doctrine also included another element related to the definition of war goals. Whereas earlier there were two fundamental goals of IDF, namely, destruction of the enemy force and the taking of territories but in the post-1973 period first became more important than second (Ibid.:38).

The 1973 War brought an alteration in the Israeli nature towards occupied territories. According to Mikaelian (1999), even before the War these territories were observed from 'strategic-security perspective,' but after the War they received an additional 'ideological and religious-point of view' (Mikaelian 1999). After the war on a large-scale settlement drive started and gained more impetus with the rise of the right and selection of Menachem Begin as prime minister in 1977 (Noar 1999; Mikaelian 1999). The first major shifts in the national security policy after the 1973 War, were made when Sharon was the Minister of Defence with Israel's invasion of Lebanon (Noar 1999; Mikaelian 1999). The decision to go for war was taken with the objective of eliminating the Palestinian armed groups and the Syrian Army, which IDF saw as a threat to its security. The invasion of Lebanon was neither prevention nor deterrence, but rather sought to achieve political aims (Mikaelian 1999).

In June 1982, the IDF invaded Lebanon with the military objective of eliminating the Palestinian military threat. Nevertheless, "it soon turned out that Israel's military operation had three broader aims: to remove the Syrian Army from Lebanon, to assist its major local ally, Bashir Gemayel, leader of Lebanese Forces militia, in becoming Lebanon's next president and signing a peace agreement with Israel, and to crush the PLO, and the Palestinian national movement in general, politically and militarily, thus facilitating Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian Territories" (Sheffer and Barak 2013:119).

The strategic conception in 'Operation Peace for the Galilee' was a practical use of the Clausewitzian policy of "war as a continuation of diplomacy by other means" (Horowitz 1993:41). The strategic doctrine of employment of force to rearrange the political order of West Asia was articulated by the three central political figures during the war in Lebanon:

Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Rafael Eitan (Inbar 2008). According to Horowitz, on many occasions the chief of staff stated that IDF's strength was indented to be used and it should not be restricted until deterrence was established (Horowitz 1993:41).

Ariel Sharon noted that objectives in Operation Peace for Galilee were not limited to fundamental defensive existential aims (Horowitz 1993:41) but listed many "subsidiary objectives" that had been formulated long before the start of the conflict. Among these was the expulsion of the Syrian military forces from Lebanon and the establishment of a pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon (Ibid.). On the other hand, Prime Minister Menachem Begin tried to defend the war in Lebanon, saying that Israel should start a war "not just when there is no choice" (Ibid.: 41). It generated a contradiction between "war of no choice" and "war of choice" (Ibid.: 41). There was a clear difference of opinion within Israel over the reasons to invade Lebanon and this difference was based "on the notion of 'wars of choice' rather than 'wars of necessity' as" mentioned by Shoghig Mikaelian (Mikaelian 1999). According to Prime Minister Begin, the Lebanon war was waged "to avoid a costlier, more terrible war in the future" (Johnson 2011).

Another important objective in Lebanon war was to deal with the non-state actors (Mikaelian 1999) which presented an elusive security threat but not an existential danger (Naor 1999: 151). Though these actors had limited military capabilities they proved more difficult to deal with for the security forces and on the other hand, especially when there was no progress on the peace front (Mikaelian 1999). Thus, "Israel found itself in a dilemma: where one side, it was unwilling to compromise; on the other hand, it was unwilling to accept the security challenges associated with such political blockage" (Ibid.).

With the appointment of Moshe Arens as Minister of Defence in 1983 the security policy registered a return to the traditional concept of security according to which Israel would only go for war for preventive purposes when war was essential for security (Horowitz 1993:31). The return to the traditional approach became visible with the formation of the national unity government in 1984 when Yitzhak Rabin became the Minister of Defence. This change "paved the way for the substantial IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, except for a narrow security zone alongside the Israeli-Lebanese northern border" (Ibid.).

According to Mikaelian (1999), primary objective of the Lebanese invasion was to either eliminate or at least disrupt Syrian capabilities in the areas of Golan, to protect its crucial strategic and political interests. The second important objective was to set up a friendly regime in Lebanon that would sign a peace agreement with it as manifested by the ill-fated 17 May 1983 agreement[6] (Mikaelian 1999). It would bring about economic profits and probably a water sharing agreement, which also a major component in Israel's security and an essential strategic interest. It can significantly impact Israel's survival in the long run and its policy towards water rich Shebaa Farms and the West Bank highlights the importance of water in strategic thinking (Ibid.).

Conclusions

An assessment of Israeli national security policymaking highlights that from the very beginning the existentialist threat from the hostile neighbouring countries dominated the its concept of national security. However, over a period, the nature of this existentialist threat has changed. During the initial years of statehood, it was directly coming from the 'tier one' neighbouring Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan but with the time it shifted to tier two countries such as Iraq and Iran. Since the day of establishment, Israel has seen a variety of changes in its security policy, but some core components had not been changed even in 2010s. The IDF remains committed to the concept of qualitative superiority in human resources and arms, air superiority and offensive battle strategies dominates its national security policy even today.

In the context of national security policymaking, it is highly dominated by IDF and other security agencies (Such as Mossad and Shin Bet). Though there are many other institutions in Israel, which participate in national security policymaking, they are not able to dictate the policy-making process. The institutions, such as the Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs, Knesset Foreign and Defence Affairs Committee and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have given excessive power but, they are not influential in security policymaking in comparison to the IDF.

After the 1973 War the Agranat Commission underlined the urgent need of an institution that can help prime minister in security policy making and recommended the establishment of the National Security Council but it was not established until 1999. Even after the establishment

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[6] This agreement is also known as 'May 17 agreements'.

of the National Security Council, its role in the policymaking was limited. It was reflected in the Winograd Commission's finding of the 2006 Lebanon war, which made a recommendation to strengthen the NSC so that it can assist the government and the prime minister in making sound decisions related to security.

An assessment of the Israeli national security policy making also highlights that it has seen rapid shifts over the period. These shifts were its response to new emerging dangers. Before the 1948 War, it was facing serious security problems, and its very existence was on stake. But its strategic realities were comparatively simple and required security policy was clear. The Jewish forces had to prevent a military defeat at the lowest cost possible, hoping to convince the enemy through a chain of wars when the Arabs did not accept Israel as a permanent entity in West Asia. According to this strategy, if IDF ever conducted any full-scale war in future, it must do so in an offensive manner, compensating for Israel's inherent demographic disadvantages and lack of strategic depth by converting the face of battle to enemy's land and be characterised by a combination of surprise, speed, and tactical manoeuvre.

In the 1950s, it included the policy of pre-emptive strike to keep away enemy from its territory. This policy was a response to the problem of strategic depth. To maintain the balance against the Arab forces other strategies were also developed such as the development of Dimona nuclear reactor, peripheral policy of strategic cooperation with actors in West Asian region and close relations with at least one major power.

The watershed victory in the 1967 War and the initial setback in the October 1973 War had a profound impact upon its security policy. The failure of basic security doctrine (Deterrence, early warning, and battle decision) raised many questions over the issue defensible borders and highlighted the limitation of the new borders. On the one hand, painful initial setback paved the way for heavy military build-up in Israel and on the other hand, in the post-war period it tried to achieve security through diplomacy. The Egypt-Israel peace agreement not only secured the borders connecting the Sinai Peninsula but also ended the possibility of a collective military campaign against Israel.

Before 1980s, the main concern of the IDF and policy makers was the danger of cross boarder invasion by the conventional armies of its immediate neighbours who carried out war against in 1948 and 1973 and threatened it in 1967. In the post-1980s period, this threat

shifted to threats from non-states actors and danger of missile attack from tier two countries. The most significant shift in the security policy came when Sharon was the Minister of Defence, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The decision to go for war was taken with the objective of eliminating the Palestinian armed groups and the Syrian Army, which it saw as a threat to its security. The invasion of Lebanon was neither prevention nor deterrence, but rather sought to achieve controversial political aims and hence proved to be domestically unpopular. In the Post- 1982 period Israeli security concern were largely focuses on the threat of terrorism and dangers of rocket attacks. The emergence of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah not only challenged Israeli security concerns but also proved an obstacle in the progress of Oslo peace process.

Chapter Three

Changing Security Environment

Since the end of the Second World War, the regional strategic environment of the West Asian region had changed significantly and has impacted on the Israeli national security in many ways. During and after the war, Britain, France and the Soviet Union had departed from several areas of West Asia, which significantly changed the geographic map of the region. It gave birth to seven independent countries, namely, Lebanon (22 November 1943), Syria (1 January 1944), Jordan (22 May 1946), Iraq (British forces left in 1947), Egypt (British forces withdrew from the Suez Canal in 1947), Israel (14 May1948) and Cyprus (16 August 1960).

The departure of colonial powers marked a modern West Asian region where Israel as a Jewish and democratic state became a reality and along with this emerged the Arab-Israel conflict. The UN partition plan of 1947 was accepted by the Jewish leaders but rejected by the Arabs and initiated a full-fledged Arab-Israeli war after the British departure from the mandate Palestine (Wallace 2012). The 1948 War changed the geographical map of the West Asian region, which registered more alterations in the 1967 and 1973 wars.

On the other hand, the rapidly rising importance of the oil industry after the world war attracted the superpowers, especially the US to the region. The Arabic speaking population of the region also underwent a significant change with the rise of pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism. A combination of factors such as the emergence of Saudi-Wahhabism and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 encouraged the ever-increasing augmentation of Islamism. Furthermore, the emergence of Hezbollah and Hamas led a significant impact over the countries of the region, such as Israel, Lebanon and Palestinian people. In 1991, the disintegration of the Soviet Union fetched another global security shift from the Cold War to US hegemony and to War on Terror. This chapter broadly focuses on these important developments in the region and their impact on Israel's security policy.

Background

West Asia has been as a gateway between Asia and Europe. Its strategic and economic value converted it into an area of power contest among Britain, France, the US and Russia (Baldwin 1957). This strategic significance was further augmented by the opening of the

Suez Canal in 1869 and the discovery of oil in the 20th century. However, after the First World War, Britain and France became the guardian of the region and kept most of the countries in semi-colonial dependence. Throughout the 19th century, Britain restricted the Soviet Union from expanding into the eastern Mediterranean and Gulf (Soraby 2001). It dominated the region and kept it out of any hostile great power. The Soviet revolution of 1917, which changed the political order in Russia, did not alter the basic patterns of the rivalry between Britain and Russia (Gel'man 2009).

On the other hand, some scholars noted that the Soviet Union intentionally kept itself outside West Asia, during this period (Soraby 2001). According to Johnson (2017), it tried its best to penetrate in the region by using military, economic, diplomatic and ideological weapons to remove Britain and France but failed (Johnson 2017).

The post-Second World War period registered a decline of the previous major powers, such as Britain and France and the saw the emergence of new superpowers, the US and the USSR (Johnson 2017: Soraby 2001). This period witnessed the breakdown of the old international political order and radical changes in international politics. The British and French influence in the region drastically declined after 1945 and the range of events eventually brought about a rivalry between the US and USSR (Soraby 2001). Surprisingly, the friends of the Second World War became contenders and an era of cold war started. The declining power of France and Britain paved the way for the US to step in to prevent the expansion of communism in the region (Kumar 2015).

After the end of the war, the world transferred into bi-polar order. Though the main battleground of the US and Soviet rivalry was Europe, it affected international politics deeply. The cold war divided the world into two blocs, namely, the US-led Western bloc and the Soviet-led Eastern bloc (Ibid.). It was a period that registered an intense nuclear arms race between the superpowers. According to many security experts, possession of nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence played an important role in restricting this war into the "Hot war" (Kumar 2015; Soraby 2001; Forman 1980). During this period, a group of countries, namely non-aligned bloc and they were not interested in the participating in the cold war rivalry between the US and Soviet Union (Kumar 2015).

In the initial days, this rivalry was mainly restricted to Europe, but gradually West Asia also became its playground. The Soviet penetration in the region did not begin actively until 1953.

However, the Soviet Union harboured territorial aspirations in the region, especially during the 1945-1947 (The War Time Journal 2016; Ulrike 2010). During the Second World War, its forces entered the northern areas of Iran in 1941 to secure vital supply routes for the US land lease material. The deployment of Soviet troops presented a severe threat to Iran (The War Time Journal 2016; Ulrike 2010). When the war ended, the Soviet Union presented a series of demands to Iran, which included oil concession in the northern areas of Iran (The War Time Journal 2016; Ulrike 2010). In 1946, the allied forces agreed-upon withdrawal of their troops from Iran within six months after the cessation of hostilities. However, the Soviets did not leave Iran and remained there. Almost around the same time, Kurdish and Azerbaijani forces, with the Soviet support, started hostilities with Iranian troops. Under diplomatic pressure from the US and negotiations with Prime Minster of Iran, Ahmad Qavam, forced the Soviet Union to withdraw and dissolution of the separatist Azeri and Kurdish states (Sebestyen 2014).

At the same time, other countries of the region such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq were undergoing significant changes. In Syria, the nationalist old guard came to power through a military coup in 1949 (Ellis 2006). On the other hand, the chaotic economic and political situation in Egypt paved the way for military coup staged by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser-led Free Officers Union (Thornhill 2004). In Iraq, a coup by "free officers" dismantled the monarchy in 1958 and formed a popular republic. In Jordan King Abdullah was assassinated in 1951 over his close but clandestine relations with Israel. On the whole, the west Asian region was changing (Lesch 2004). These rapid changes in the region, directly and indirectly, affected not only the emergence of Israel but also its strategic thinking.

Changing Strategic Equations in the Region

Egypt: After the end of the Second World War, socialism as political ideology received the widespread appeal in the Third World countries. In Egypt, the nationalists of all persuasions were quick to adopt socialist slogans and according to Roy R. Anderson, Robert F. Seibert and Jon G. Wagner (1982), the most socialist beliefs were not based on Marxism or other intellectual systems, but they were more a reaction against the western private enterprise system and commercial domination. The socialist programmes in Egypt called for an end to the gross income disparities in society (Ellis 2006). The distress of the mass was visible and the reason for their misery was attributed to the selfishness of the local elites, who were allies of the imperialists. The situation was further complicated by the desperate economic

conditions and the failure of the Egyptian Army to prevent the formation of State of Israel, which according to many Egyptians was an outpost for Western Imperialism (Seibert and Wagner 1982).

During the Second World War, Egypt helped Britain in its military endeavour under the treaty of 1936 (Deeb 2007: Warburg 2006). In 1940, Britain pressurised Egyptian King Farouk to appoint a British friendly government and dismiss nationalist Prime Minister Ali Mahir. In 1942, when the German forces threatened Egypt, the British government again intervened in Egyptian affairs and this incident is generally named as 4 February Incident[7] and forced King Farouk to acknowledge al-Naḥḥās as prime minister of Egypt (Warburg 2006). In March 1942, the Wafd party won the general election and liaised with Britain. However, Britain's cooperation with Egypt had ravage consequences and impacted king Farouk-Britain relations and made it hostile towards each other.

On the other hand, al-Naḥḥās ruined the Wafd' party's image, which was earlier seen as the standard-bearer of nationalism (Warburg 2006). The internal politics and corruption charges weakened the Wafd party (Britannica 2017). In October 1944 King dismissed Al-Nahhas and named Ahmad Mahir as prime minister. However, he was assassinated in February 1945 and this brought al-Nuqrashi to the power (Reid 1982).

Egypt was in an unbalanced situation at the end of the war (Deeb 2007). It was the time when the influence of the Wafd declined and its political rival took up the nationalist call for an amendment to the 1936 treaty of "in particular for the complete evacuation of British troops from Egypt and the ending of British control in the Sudan" (Britannica 2017: Deeb 2007). On the other hand, there was a noticeable shift in Egyptian politics, which was going in the radical's hands (Britannica 2017: Deeb 2007). The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 paved the way for a popular Islamic reformist moment into a rebellious organization (Britannica 2017). Slowly, protests in Cairo started becoming more regular and vicious. These developments pressurized the Egyptian government and policymakers to stay away from two vital external issues, the Palestinian issue and revision of Egyptian-British 1936 treaty (Warburg 2006).

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[7] Fourth February incident was a military confrontation that occurred at the Abdeen Palace, Cairo on 4 February 1942 and almost ended in the forceful resignation of King Farouk I. this incident is regarded as a landmark in the history of Egypt.

During the interwar period, neither Egyptian policymakers nor civilians had shown any interest in larger Arab issues. Furthermore, nationalism in Egypt emerged as a natural response to domestic conditions (Kourgiotis, 2015). However, in the post-1936 period, Egypt did take part in the Palestinian issue. It played a significant role in the creation of the Arab League during 1943-44, which was not in favour of a Jewish State in Palestine (Ibid.).

After 1945, Egypt was a leading country in the Palestine question (Deeb 2007). It was whole heartily committed to the Arab cause in Palestine but its thrashing defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war[8], resulted in its disappointment and political instability (Warburg 2006: El Beblawi 2008: Deeb 2007). It gave space to the Muslim Brotherhood to establish its violent activities. On the other hand, Prime Minister Al-Nuqrāshī tried to curtail the organization's activities and was assassinated in December 1948, two months after his assassination the leader of Muslim Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Bannā was also assassinated (Warburg 2006).

In 1950, al-Nahhas again came into power as the Wafd Party won the general election but was unsuccessful in reaching an agreement with Britain (Ginat 2003: El-Amin 1989). As a result, in 1951, the government revoked the Condominium Agreement of 1899 and the 1936 treaty. It also sparked anti-British protests, accompanied by guerrilla attacks, against British barracks in the Canal Zone (Ginat 2003: El-Amin 1989). The British retaliation of these violent protests led to the unprecedented violence in Cairo on 26 January 1952. As a blowback of this situation, Al-Naḥḥās was removed from power and in the six months, four prime ministers were changed (Warburg 2006).

The chaotic situation in Egypt paved the way for military coup staged by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser's Free Officers. While highlighting the causes of the military coup, in statement broadcasted on Cairo Radio, Army noted that "... revolt was not merely a movement against the former-king, but it has also been, still is and always will be a force directed against corruption in all its forms" (BBC 2005).

According to S. Munir (1952), there were three main reasons for the military coup in Egypt:

1. The poor financial conditions which heightened social anxieties;
2. The Deterioration in British-Egypt ties; and
3. The uproar in the military, which was the most important column of the regime.

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[8] The war was launched by Syria, Iraq and Jordan in response to the declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948.

Economic Situation

The military coup in Egypt was also a response to severe economic crises. This economic crisis was an outcome of a bad situation of cotton in the international market (Munir 1952: Warburg 2006 Deeb 2007). The share of cotton in Egyptian export accounts around more than 80 percent and the raw cotton price significantly affect the Egyptian economy (Privatization Coordination Support Unit 2002). If the price of cotton was low and demand was also limited and it would be difficult for Egypt to pay for its primary imports.

According to Munir (1952) during this time, the international market registered a drastic shift in the price of cotton, which fell by more than 25 percent. It impacted Egyptian cotton export, which was dropped by 50 percent. Concurrently, the textile industry in Egypt, was also suffering from a severe crisis. Its market was constrained because of the extremely depleted buying power of the people. Due to this economic development, the whole "social equilibrium" had been brutally shaken in Egypt. As a result, of this situation, the policymakers were geared up to support any power which could re-establish this symmetry. In the six months, Egypt registered failure of different governments; it forced Egyptian folks to accept the military dictatorship of General Naguib with no confrontation (Ibid.).

Egypt-Britain Ties

The political order in Egypt was becoming unstable with the emergence of the extraordinary anti-imperialist in 1951 (Kodsy 2015). The stronghold areas of the British in Egypt, such as the Canal Zone, witnessed violent protests. These protests were suppressed by Britain militarily, which generated a feeling of discontent in the people. In such a situation, the Wadf party won the election but failed to reach any significant agreement on "both the 1936 treaty and the Condominium Agreement of 1899" (Munir 1952). As an outcome of this situation, Pasha Nahas was expelled and was replaced by Ali Maher. He tried to restart the negotiations with Britain but when he failed Hilali captured the power and evaporated any possibility of agreement, as the domestic situation was not favourable to reach an agreement. It was evident that agreement with Britain was useless without the WAFD's support (Ibid). However, Naguib guaranteed to bring Egypt out of this deadlock by reaching an agreement with countries of the west under the pressure of his military dictatorship (Ibid).

Military: Since 1948, there was visible discontent in the young Egyptian officers. The reason behind this displeasure was the Egyptian defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war (Margolick 2008:

Deeb 2007). The young officers observed that the corrupt ruling class war moderately guilty for poor military planning and weak frontline that resulted in the defeat (Podeh and Winckler 2009). In December 1951, Mohamed Naguib came into power as an elected president of the Cairo officers' club defeating the candidates supported by King Farouk, who wanted to offer the designation to corrupt but old high-rank officers. Under such condition, the officers' club was shut down (Marr 1999).

It was evident that the army had bitterness towards the aristocracy which was also registered during Cairo troubles of 26 January 1952. The event of the appointment of the Ministry of War, widen this gap between the army and monarchy (Hazell and Morris 2016). Naguib wanted him to be appointed as a minister of war, but king vetoed it. In addition, Hilali gave this position to Ismail Sherin, who was the brother-in-law of the king (Munir 1952; Deeb 2007). It made Young Officers realise that if the corrupt ruling class in Egypt was not capable of governing the country without their support, why not the army itself should take power in its hands. This line of thinking of the Egyptian Army became the main reason for the 23 July 1952 coup (Munir 1952).

In June 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser became the President of Egypt. His popularity in Egypt and the Arab world reached new heights after he declared the nationalization of the Suez Canal and political victory following the Suez crises (Aburish 2013). In the 1960s, he became a leader of the Arab nationalist movement targeted at uniting the Arab nations along cultural rather than religious lines. It helped in the formation of the United Arab Republic with Syria. The key objective of this movement was to stand up against Israel and the US and to terminate the cultural, political and economic domination of West in the region (Harik 2004). Egypt under Nasser becoming a powerful country simultaneously and received support from a major power, the USSR in the form of military aid and assistance (Ibid.). During 1952 - 1967, Egypt received financial help from the US under various forms such as the food for peace programme, economic support fund and development assistance (Sharp 2017:31).

It can be observed through table 3.1 that how much aid Egypt obtained from the US during 1955- 1967. Though Egypt received assistance from the US, it did not allow the US to influence Nasser's policies towards the West or the countries of West Asia.

While holding the designation of the president, Nasser also invested a huge amount of money for the improvement of military power. In 1958 budget, Egypt invested US$211 million defence modification; it was further increased to US$506.9 million in 1968. Egypt's military spending during this time was more than any other country in the region (Dawisha 1976).

Table 3.1: American Financial Aid to Egypt during 1952-1967

(In US$ million)

Year	Direct Assistance Loan	Direct Assistance Grant	Economic Support Fund	P.L. 480 Loan	P.L. 480 Grant	Total Aid
1952	0	0.4	0	0	0.8	1.2
1953	0	12.93	0	0		12.9
1954	0	3.3	0	0	0.7	4
1955	7.5	35.3	0	0	23.5	66.3
1956	0	2.6	0	13..2	17.5	33.3
1957	0	0.7	0	0	0.3	1
1958	0	0	0	0	0.6	0.6
1959	0	2	0	33.9	8.9	44.8
1960	15.4	5.7	0	36.6	8.2	65.9
1961	0	2.3	0	48.6	22.6	73.5
1962	20	2.2	20	114	44.3	200.5
1963	36.3	2.3	10	78.5	19.6	146.7
1964	0	1.4	0	85.2	8.9	95.5
1965	0	2.3	0	84.9	10.4	97.6
1966	0	1.5	0	16.4	9.7	27.6
1967	0	0.8	0	0	11.8	12.6

PL 480 I = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace)

(Source: Sharp 2017:31)

In January 1964, Nasser organized an international gathering known as the Arab League summit in Cairo. The main agenda was to institute a collective Arab response in opposition to "Israel's to divert the Jordan River's waters for economic purposes, which Syria and Jordan deemed an act of war" (Dawisha 2009). According to Said K. Aburish, (2004), Nasser charged Arabs for this disastrous situation. He prevented Palestinians and Syria from inflaming the Israelis, yielding that was not interested in war with Israel (Aburish 2004). In addition, Nasser established friendly ties with King Hussein of Jordan and relations with the monarch of Saudi Arabia, Syria and Morocco were also restored (Ibid.).

Arab Nationalism

The Arab nationalism was an ideological movement that emerged after the First World War and reached eminence after the Second World War. It started as a secular ideological movement in the early 20th century under the Ottoman Empire (Dawisha 2003: Ismail 2017). It initially began as appraising of the Ottoman Empire, not as a response to Western values and rule. During the First World War, it proved influential enough to motivate an Arab rebellion against the Ottomans and later, paved the way for the independence of the Arab countries from colonial powers (Dawisha 2003: Ismail 2017).

The attractiveness of this movement grew during the interwar period and many Arab territories became independent after the Second World War" (Ismail 2017). The strategic thinkers have referred Arab Nationalism with different terminology; some has called it Arabism and some pan-Arabism. There is no consensus among the scholars on the terminology part (Dawisha 2003: Hourani 199; Khalidi1991).

According to Martin Kramer (1993) since the early sixteenth century, the contact of Arabism broadened over the Arabic-speaking folks. For nearly four hundred years, these folks had been completely devoted to their role in the Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, with the gradual decline in Ottoman power, the fundamentals of this symbiosis started to deteriorate and "the great Ottoman carpet was being rolled up at both ends: by Europe's Great Powers, locked in imperial rivalry and by the discontented Christian subjects of Ottoman rule in Europe, whose struggles for independence took a nationalist form" (Kramer 1993:171-206).

Though the champion of the Arab nationalism in Egypt and West Asia was Nasser, it is essential to understand that the existence of Arab Nationalism was already there in the Egyptian society before Nasser came to power (Danielson 2007:23). In the 1920s and 1930s,

Egyptian society had the principles and customs that created the ideas of Arab nationalism. Ralph Coury (1982) "underlined that there was a growing interest in various forms of Arab unity and cooperation among the different branches of the Egyptian ruling class and this was reflected in the political and socioeconomic developments within the country. Much of the ruling class felt that Egypt was far ahead, in these aspects, of other Middle Eastern countries and could use this to their advantage to spread the ideals of pan-Arabism" (cited in Danielson 2007:24).

According to Adeed Dawisha (2003), Arab nationalism was political concords between the countries of West Asia among those were united with the Arab culture (Dawisha 2003). According to him, there are links and similarities between all West Asian Arabs, both culturally and politically, According to Albert Hourani (1991), the roots of Arab nationalism can be traced after the end of the First World War when the Ottoman Empire lost its control over the Arab provinces and restricted to Anatolia. It also changed the political structure in which Arab people survived for four centuries. This had a significant impact on the political consciousness of Arabs and paved the way for them to define their identity. The traumatic event of the First World War sprouted an aspiration among the Arab people to alter their political status. It led to the rise of a search for an identity, which was a response to the hegemony of France and England in the post-war period (Hourani 1991).

The Arab nationalism was a search for religious, cultural, political and historical unanimity among the people of Arab nations. Some have an agreement that the Arab nationalism's core objective was to attain autonomy from the Western influence (Coury 1982). Ira M. Lapidus (1988) observed that Arab nationalism was taking birth even before the World War-I with the resurgence of the Arabic language, the anti-Turkish political aspiration of Arab intellectuals and with the recognition of Islamic glories of past.

In the pre-war period, Arab nationalism registered a transformation from an Islamic to nationalist thinking which was a "struggle to win autonomy within the Ottoman Empire and then in the effort to create an independent Arab state. Arabism rather than Islam became the dominant discourse, displacing the traditional vocabulary of political affiliation and political action" (Lapidus 1988). According to Rashid Khalidi, (1991) the Arab Nationalism was an outcome intellectual condition of the nineteenth century and stood for expression of identity. He noted that the ethnic and cultural characteristic of pan-Arabism made it so tempting to Arabs in West Asia. According to him, on the one hand, it presented the renewal of old

traditions and loyalties and on the other hand, it created new myths based on these traditions (Khalidi 1991).

After the Second World War Arab nationalism took a new shape, as most of the new Islamic countries got independence. According to Ira M. Lapidus (1988), it became the shared ideology of intellectual opposition and political elites. Based on shared desire, these ideologies united themselves for independence. It integrated "non-Muslim minorities into the political system and the awareness of the need for a modern national form of political identity corresponding to the actual state structures" (Lapidus 1988). In the post-Second World War period, Arab identity turned out to be the cornerstone for political goals of the countries of the West Asian region, such as the fight against Israel, anti-imperialism and the formation of political regimes (Aburish 2004). The 1948 Arab Israeli War in this context provided the flourishing ground the Arab nationalism.

After the war, though the Arab countries engaged themselves in the armistice negotiations with Israel but intellectuals and military officers were unhappy with this change. They were critical of the political leadership. The officers blamed the political leadership and high-level officers for stabbing them in the back (Ibid.).

Consequently, the Arab countries experienced an era of the coup (Zurayk 1956). For example, in Syria, the nationalist old guard came into power by a military coup in 1949. It was followed by two more coups in the same year (Brown, 1984). In 1952, the monarchy was overthrown in Egypt by the Free Officers, for its failure in the 1948 Arab Israeli War (Osman 2011; Deeb 2007). In 1954, among these officers, Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as an unquestionable leader. In Iraq also a coup by "free officers" dismantled the monarchy in 1958 and formed a popular republic. And King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated in 1951 for his relations with Israel.

According to Martin Kramer (1993), in the post-1920 period, the Arab nationalism became a response to imperialism, which again took a shift in the post-1948 and became a revolutionary movement. This change was mainly because of the major defeat of Arabs in the Arab Israeli war. The war highlighted that despite independence the Arabs were still "militarily fragile, politically scattered and economically poor" (Kramer 1993: 184). The new Arab generation of young military officers, "now promised a social revolution that would overcome these weaknesses and propel the Arab world to unity, power and prosperity. They

usually defined this revolution as Arab socialism, lest it is alleged that the changes were not authentically Arab in inspiration (Ibid.). According to Avraham Sela (2002), the Palestinian issue and resistance to Zionism turned out to be a meeting point for Arabism for both religious as well as military points of view (Sela 2002:151-155).

The emergence of Nasser as the leader of Egypt played an important role in the rise of Arab nationalism (Sela 2002:151-155). Its fame reached to another height at the hands in 1958 when Syria and Egypt united to form the United Arab Republic (Ismail 2017).

In the mid-1950s, Egypt was becoming a battleground for a cold war. The control of Suez Canal was the main reason behind it; the Egyptian refusal for the British control of the Suez Canal Zone pushed Nasser to sign a collective Arab Security Pact under the framework of Arab League (Hero 1996:24-25). The fundamental reason behind it was the urgency of financial aid which would not be dependent on the compromise of peace with Israel or construction of the US or British military bases within Arab countries military (Sela 2002:151-155). By nationalizing the Suez Canal, Nasser confronted western hegemony in the region. Simultaneously he unlocked Egypt fertile ground for cold War by accepting military from the USSR. However, because of Egypt's importance in the cold war, the US provided a handsome amount of aid to Egypt. The main reason behind giving aid to Egypt was the strategic value of Arab nationalism, which could be a barrier to communism (Sela 2002:151-155; Hero 1996:24-25).

Arab Cold War

The 1950s and 1960s registered a unique contestation among the Arab countries which was known as the Arab cold war (Malcolm Kerr 1981). The term 'Arab Cold War' was firstly used by Malcolm H. Kerr, an American political scientist. The Arab cold war was not related to a typical cold war fight between capitalism and communism, but it was a fight between the two sides of the Arab world; on the one hand, new republics led by Egypt and on the other, more traditionalist monarchies under the leadership of Saudi Arabia. During this period, the tension between these countries encircled around the problem of unique connections connecting the Arabs, "more specifically whether the notion of an Arab nation constituted by a common language, history and culture also entailed an aspiration for some sort of political unity" (Morten Valbjørn and André Bank 2007:7).

The pro-Western conservative Arab monarchies such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and for a while Iraq[9] replied to this contestation in the negative sense. These Arab nations decided to challenge Egypt, Syria and Iraq[10], known as socialist Arab republics. The Arab Cold War divided the world into the two groups; on the one hand there was revolutionary regimes supported by the Soviet Union which challenged traditional monarchies favoured by the US and Great Britain.

The Arab cold war registered complex interplay between regional and domestic politics; it was strange to see that during this time "hard power" was less dangerous than the "soft power" in the monopolizing definition of the Arab interest. According to Morten Valbjørn and André Bank (2007) to gain public support, the regimes frequently presented themselves as fighting for the higher Arab cause. The well-known speech of President Gamal Abdel Nasser on radio, namely, *Voice of the Arabs* was a significant example of the soft power in this regional cold war. This speech allowed Nasser to present himself as the leader of the Arab world and it directly influenced the Arab population. However, this cold war revelry was slowly turning into a hot war. Within the two decades since the Nasser came to power, the Arab world registered many revolts and coup attempts (Ibid.).

In 1962, a military coup in Yemen turned the Arab Cold War into a hot war. The military officers succeeded in overthrowing the Imamate (Orkaby 2014).[11] Although Egypt was geographically far from Yemen, it decided to provide aid to the revolutionaries. In response to Egyptian decision, Saudi Arabia feared that the revolution would prove contagious and swore to help Yemen to restore the Imam (Valbjørn and Bank 2007). As a result, both the countries engaged in a bloody conflict to control the outcomes of the civil war. The struggle proved a costly affair for Egypt; initially, it deployed only few hundred commandos in Yemen in October 1962, which was increased to about 70,000 troops by mid-1965 (Orkaby 2014; Valbjørn and Bank 2007).

The Egyptian deployment of troops increased the security concerns of Saudi Arabia and the UK because Britain had its naval presence at Aden and created a platform for Saudi-British rapprochement (Orkaby 2014; Valbjørn and Bank 2007). This struggle led to an adverse impact on Egypt-US relations as Saudi Arabia and Britain were American allies. The

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[9] In the pre-1958 period.
[10] In the post-1958 period.
[11] Imamate is a dynastic institution of religious rulers belonging to the Zaydi branch of Shiite Islam.

termination of the US aid to Egypt in 1966 intensified the economic burden of Egypt and drove it into a deeper soviet dept (Valbjørn and Bank 2007).

In 1967, another setback came to Egypt in the form of pre-emptive Israel strike and defeat in the June war. The main reason for this defeat was the Yemen crisis, which weakened Egypt politically, economically and militarily (Ibid.). The defeat of Egypt was a defeat of an entire political model and ideology which was based on the socialism. According to Amr Al Shobaky (2009), along the various explanations of defeat such as, Marxist and liberalist, people also thought that "defeat came as a result of the Arabs' deviation from the religious path of Islam" (Quoted in *Al-Jazeera* 2009). Under such situation, the Saudis took the lead in launching the Organisation of Islamic Conference in 1969. It led rise of political Islam the dominant discourse in the West Asia.

Israel- France Relation and Arms Embargo

The saga of France-Israel ties started in the mid-1950s when Israel turned out to be a major customer of the French-made arms. The relations between two were not restricted to commerce but were strategic as well. At that time, France wanted to crush the rebellion in Algeria and therefore shared the strategic goal with Israel in dealing with Arab nationalism (Crosbie 1974:55; Kyle 2011). On the other hand, Israel desperately needed a country which can help in the advancement of its military capabilities. The strategic interest of both the countries vis-à-vis West Asia brought them closer (Heimann 2010: 243; Crosbie 1974:55).

The decision of deepening ties with France was an outcome of Israel's precarious security situation. By the early 1950s, its policymakers were searching for a country which could help Israel in strengthening its security posture (Crosbie 1974:55; Kyle 2011). On 17 February 1955, when David Ben-Gurion returned to the defence ministry, he realised that Israel desperately needed armour and aerial equipment (Crosbie 1974:55). To fend off any motorized attack on its narrow neck between the Gaza Strip and West Bank Israel needed counter-offensive capabilities accompanied by mobile armoured columns (Crosbie 1974:55; Kyle 2011). For quick infantry advancement and plan pre-emptive strikes, the air superiority was needed. To deter any enemy aggression, the development of the nuclear option was also considered. Under such a situation, Ben-Gurion decided to expand the cooperation with France (Crosbie 1974:55; Kyle 2011; Heimann 2010).

In 1956, both countries, joined by Britain, fought together against Egypt in the Suez War (Varble 2008). The next two year after the Suez War was important from deepening the Israel-France relations (Crosbie 1974). At this time, the closeness was mainly because of common objective regarding Egypt over the issue of assistance to the Algerian radicals and nationalisation of the Suez Canal. According to Gadi Heimann (2010), "the last government of the Fourth Republic 'spoiled' Israel in a way that was very rare in international relations" (Heimann 2010: 243). It was clear in France's eagerness to deliver Israel a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction plant for defence use (Ibid.). France also provided Israel with many arms, some of which was almost free of cost (Ibid.). French support was not only limited to the military sphere, but despite its meagre resources at that time, helped Israel economically during this period. According to Gadi Heimann (2010), the main objective behind this support was French strategic interests in the region and the testimonies of the French political leaders "for example, Foreign Minister Christopher Pineau Defence Minister, Prime Minister, Maurice Bourges-Maunoury and Prime Minister Guy Mollet" highlighted that the driving force of this relations was a robust ideological and emotional aspect (Ibid.). According to him, from 1958 to 1967, France and Israel had a conventional "patron-client relationship," which ended on the eve of the June 1967 War (Heimann 2010).

The Israel-French alliance deepened in the early 1960s under deputy defence minister of Israel, Shimon Peres (Heimann 2010; Bass 2010). He enhanced military relations in the cultural sphere as well. As a result, France helped Israel in developing nuclear capabilities and provided advanced combat aircraft, which strengthened Israeli Air force (Bass 2010). But things started changing with the end of the Algerian war in 1962 and Gaulle began to establish a relationship with the Arab world. However, for some time, France tried to balance its relations with Israel as he still considered Israel as a friend (Bass 2010; Crosbie 1974).

The changing realities in domestic politics also contributed to the decline of ties between Israel and France. Since 1963, domestic politics of Israel saw new changes. In 1963, Levi Eshkol became prime minister after the resignation of Ben-Gurion (Crosbie 1974). According to many Israeli politicians, Eshkol had relatively little understanding of Europe in general and France in particular. In late 1964, Moshe Dayan and Ben-Gurion left their offices due to a struggle to control the Mapai Executive Committee. In May 1965, Peres also left his post as Deputy Minister of Defence (Crosbie 1974: Bergman 1969). The change from Ben-Gurion to Eshkol was disastrous for Israel-France relations and many Frenchmen felt that Eshkol was

less of a statesman than Ben-Gurion (Crosbie 1974). Baron Edmond de Rothschild criticized Eshkol's neglect of Africa and his misunderstanding regarding the relations with France (Rothschild cited in Crosbie 1974).

However, France continued warmness towards Israel; for example, it was evident from the negotiation with the European Common Market. Israel was seeking an agreement with the EEC since 1959 and by 1960- 61 one-third of its exports went to the Common Market countries (Ibid.). In September 1962, it was the unofficial push of France that initiated talks regarding Israel joining EEC. Although, the negotiations were failed, on 26 November 1962 it provided tariff and quota concessions on forty goods and duty-free entry for goods manufactured from raw material imported in Israel from Common Market countries (Ibid.). It was because of France that Israel was accepted as a first non-OECD member for the application of the International standards fruit and Vegetable (Ibid.). However, there was another side of reality, which highlighted that there were evident frictions between the two countries.

In 1965, a French minister told a western counterpart that the Elysee had lost confidence in Israel's future (Ibid.). In return, Moshe Dayan also admitted that:

> Israel's position today …is established by various international organizations, such as the NATO and the Common Market and not by the Suez-Sinai Alliance, which is now seen as no more than a passing episode (Dayan in Calvocoressi et al. 1967:57).

It was clear by now that the changing role of France increasingly weakened the Israel-French alliance. It was evident in the many events; in 1962 annual staff-level meeting between the two was discontinued and exchanges on intelligence on Africa and the Arab world lasted until 1966 (Crosbie 1974). According to Sylvia K. Crosbie (1974), France preferred discretion during this period regarding its relations with Israel. This was mainly because of its foreign policy objectives (Ibid.). According to the Central Intelligence Agency, in May 1959 France and UAR representatives secretly negotiated in Geneva a finical and commercial agreement aimed at restoring the pre-Suez relations between their countries (Middle East Institute 1959). The CIA also noted that France wanted to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt and reduce relation with Israel and in return Egypt would reduce its support to the Algerian rebels (Papastamkou 2015).

By the mid-1960s, it was clear that the relations between Israel and France were crumbling even in the defence sphere, the most stable area of cooperation. As the event moved forward

towards another Arab-Israeli hostility, (Safran 1969), on 24 May 1967, Foreign Minister Abba Eban met General De Gaulle and explained the danger to Israel created by the concentration of the Arab troops along the borders, increased acts of terrorism and sabotage supported by Arabs and threat posed by Egypt in the form of closing the Gulf of Aqaba for Israel. He also reminded French commitment to view any attempt to close Strait of Tiran as a *causes belli* (Crosbie 1974).

However, De Gaulle discarded Eban's contention and made it clear that France would not help Israel in opening the Gulf of Aqaba. It was mainly because of his fear that this conflict had the potential to start a large-scale military confrontation between the major countries of the world (Ibid.). He even warned Israel against starting a War and in response, Eban said that war had already begun and Egypt had fired first shot by closing Straight of Tiran (Hammond 2010). As crises entered in the final phase, France suspended deliveries of important logistics, firstly unofficially on 3 June and officially on 5 June. On 3 January 1969, a complete ban was imposed on all military supplies to Israel. Furthermore, France refused to deliver fifty Mirage V, which was ordered in 1966 and were not delivered even after Israel making full payment (Crosbie 1974).

France joined the Arab countries, imposed an arms embargo on the West Asian region, and threatened Israel to keep away from hostilities (Crosbie 1974; Bass 2010). Even, Israel's decision to launch a pre-emptive strike on 5 June was condemned and after some time, De Gaulle told media that France had "freed itself ... from the very special and very close ties with Israel", unpleasantly, adding that Jews were "an elite people, sure of itself and dominating" (cited in Bass 2010). De Gaulle's decision of separating itself from Israel was not an emotional decision, but it was a strategic move to expand its status in the Arab world, "which in 1967 meant largely abandoning Israel. France proceeded to make the arms embargo on Israel permanent, sought oil deals with the Arab states and adopted increasingly anti-Israel rhetoric" (Ibid.).

According to George Friedman (2015) after the June war, the US noticed that Egypt was becoming a base for the Soviet Union[12], besides Syria. This new shift endangered strategic interests of the US in the eastern Mediterranean and posed a threat to its Sixth Fleet. The main concern of the US was regarding Turkey since the Soviet influence over the strategically important Bosporus, would allow Soviet's to challenge the US in the

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[12] Mainly, Naval and Air force Base.

Mediterranean and South Europe (Friedman 2015). It not only posed a threat to Turkey from the northern side but also from the southern side by Syria and Iraq (Ibid.).

The deterioration of relation with France after the arms embargo in 1967 fundamentally altered Israeli security strategy of keeping close ties at least one major power. In the post-1967 war period the US replaced France as its strategic partner. A vital push forward in the direction of indigenous aerospace and weapon industries came with the deterioration of Israel-French- ties in "the early to mid-1960s and finally the French weapons embargo in 1967 and 1968" (De Carle 1991:95). However, the embargo came at a time when Israel had already achieved basic development capabilities which could be carried forward. In response, to French decision of not delivering 50 Mirage fighter aircraft, it decided to develop and produce the Kfir combat aircraft (Pfeffer 2014; De Carle 1991; Bonen 1994). Similarly, due to non-delivery five already-paid-for Sa'ar missile boats, it decides to build the Reshef class fast attack crafts Sa'ar 4 and 4.5. Prior to 1967, its defence industry was primarily focused on modest undertakings such as repair, upgrades, maintenance, licensed production, and modifications (De Carle 1991; Bonen 1994). But after 1967, basic knowledge which was gained in these domains initiated the indigenous design of major weapons (De Carle 1991; Bonen 1994). In the post-1973 war period, the Israeli weapon industry continued to expand production and became a profitable arms exporter. It became major supplier of military electronics, sophisticated missile technology and communication equipments (De Carle 1991).

The extraordinary lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, resulted in Israel realising the growing importance of sophisticated weapon systems (De Carle 1991; Bonen 1994; Pfeffer 2014;). However, the high cost, complexity, and swift rate of technological change it became difficult to develop and produce all systems locally (De Carle 1991). Under such situation, the cooperation with the US in these areas was formalised and a "significant defence production MOA was signed in 1979 which allowed Israeli firms to participate in the US government contract bidding without the hindrance of Buy American legislation; this MOA also provided for cooperation in military R&D" (Ibid.:96). The relations also slowed downed the Israeli nuclear programme as it was largely based on the French co-operation. However, by the time relations between Israel and France worsened, it already became nuclear power. According to A. Cohen (1998), Israel had full access to French nuclear test explosion data in the 1960s (Cohen 1998: 82- 83) and when France commenced nuclear test in 1960 it made

two nuclear powers, namely, France and Israel (Weissman and Krosney 1981). The evolution of Israel's nuclear posture was completed after 1967 war. Under the leadership of Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir "Israel moved from nuclear ambiguity to nuclear opacity" (Cohen 1998: 279).

The Emergence of the US

Since the day of independence in 1948, the US and Israel developed strong relations based on shared democratic values and security interests (Migdalovitz 2006). Though, the US recognized Israel within minutes after the Declaration of Independence, relations were cold until after the June War. In 1956, when Israel, along with Britain and France, attacked Egypt, the US ordered Israel to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza and Israel complied (Friedman 2015: Lieber 1998). However, the US was not an adversary for Israel, nor did it consider its relations with Israel as special. This equation transformed only before the 1967 War when pro-Soviet Ba'athist regimes occupied the power in Syria and Iraq through a coup. In response, the US built a security barrier of surface-to-air missiles starting from Saudi Arabia to Jordan and Israel in 1965 (Friedman 2015; Lieber 1998; CRS Report 2017). It was only in 1965 when Israel received first military aid aimed at restricting the Soviet influence in West Asia. As underlined in the last section, until 1967 France was primary weapons provider to Israel (Friedman 2015; Lieber 1998).

According to Steven Spiegel, the relationship between the US and Israel has gone through two phases, namely before and after the June War:

Phase 1 (1948-1967): In this period, the state of Israel was considered a burden on the US.

Phase 2 (1967-1992): After the June war, the US understanding about Israel changed entirely and it started seeing Israel as an attractive ally. The war had a profound impact on American thinking and it expressed that Israel was the dominating regional military power. It provided a fresh side to the Israeli viewpoint as a possible benefit to American interests.

The 1967 Arab-Israel War miraculously transformed the US position on Israel. The military victory instantly turned Israel into a strategic asset for the US, as an important Cold War ally (Friedman 2015; Ben-Zvi 1998). The US started seeing Israel as a barrier against the Soviet expansion in West Asia and as a result it provided military support to Israel. The 1967 Arab-Israel War miraculously transformed the US position on Israel. The military victory instantly

turned Israel into a strategic asset for the US, as an important Cold War ally (Friedman 2015; Ben-Zvi 1998). In 1968, Johnson Administration allowed the supply of the Phantom aircraft to Israel with the strong backing of the US Congress (Friedman 2015; CRS Report 2017).

According to Abraham Ben-Zvi (1998), this clever and thoughtful change in the US foreign policy toward Israel not started in 1962 but in 1966, during the second Eisenhower administration. This was an outcome of the American strategic calculations (Ibid.). In 1962, the decision of arms sale with Israel was driven by domestic politics. This understanding was based on the premises that "Democratic administrations, starting with Truman and especially under Kennedy and Johnson, were" focused firmed to protected "the Jewish vote in certain key states, among them, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Florida and California and that these partisan electoral considerations outweighed more hard-headed and long-standing calculations of America's strategic interests in West Asia" (Ibid.). On the other hand, Ben-Zvi underlined that

> The policy shift began under the Eisenhower administration, as a gradual recognition of changes in the region and especially after the July 1958 crises in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. During that time, the pro-Western government of Iraq was overthrown. The Hashemite monarchy of King Hussein in Jordan seemed endangered and the political situation in Lebanon appeared to be so unstable that the Eisenhower administration dispatched U.S. Marines to Beirut for several months (Ibid: 125).

This shift became more evident during 1966-1970, when the US military loans to Israel reached to around 47 percent of the total military aid budge of the US, while average aid per year reached approximately US$102 million and (CRS Report 2017). In 1971, the US military loan was increased from to US$545 million from US$30 million a year earlier. In 1974, Israel turned out to be the leading beneficiary of U.S. foreign assistance. Since 1976 it has been the foremost recipient of the U.S. foreign aid (See Table 3.1).

Since 1971, the US economic aid to Israel has averaged over US$2.6 billion per year, two-thirds of which has been military assistance. Congressional researchers have disclosed that between 1974 and 1989, US$16.4 billion in military loans were converted to grants and that this was the understanding from the beginning (Ibid.). According to The Marker, "the US has provided Israel with $233.7 billion in aid since the state was formed in 1948 through the end of 2012" (Cited in Coren and Feldman 2013).

According to Congressional Research Service Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter were favourable to Israel and they committed to finding out peace between Arabs and Israel

(Congressional Research Service Report 2017:1). But the relationship between the two was not always as smooth as projected. Over the issue of territorial concessions, Presidents Ford and Carter threatened to refuse to give aid to Israel. The US president George H.W. Bush pressurized Israel over the issue of resettles the Russian immigrants in the areas of West Bank and refused loan guarantee to Israel (Friedman 2015; Evans 2018). In 1981, Israel was criticised by Ronald Reagan for its military operation on Iraqi nuclear reactor and the blockade of Beirut in 1982 (Congressional Research Service Report 2017:1).

On the other hand, Israel was unhappy with the US over the issue of sophisticated arms transfer to Saudi Arabia (Friedman 2015). The US opposition regarding Israeli arms sells to China since the end of the Cold War also frustrated Israel (Ibid.). The more interesting fact was that until 2018, the US did not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital until President Donald Trump who recognized Jerusalem as the Israeli capital on 6 December 2017 and the US embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusleam on 14 May 2018 (The US Government 2017).

The 1979 Iranian Revolution

After the independence, Iran has seen an important player in Israeli foreign policy. From 1948 until the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979 both the countries maintained a close and cordial relation (Karsh 2012). Iran became the second Muslim majority country after Turkey to recognise Israel in March 1950 (Karsh 2013: 284; Kumaraswamy 2012:11). However, Iran was reluctant to establish formal diplomatic relations due to the Arab attitude towards Israel. The lack of formal ties opened secret ways for close military and economic ties between the two (Karsh 2004; Shawcross 1989). It was also significant that in the back 1949, Iran gave passage to Iraqi Jews to reach Israel through its territories (Karsh 2004; Shawcross 1989; Morad and Shasha 2008).

Table 3.2: U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Year	Military	Economic	Refugee Resettlement	ASHA	All Other	Total
1970	30.0			12.5	51.1	$93.6
1971	545.0			2.5	86.8	$634.3
1972	300.0	50.0		5.6	125.3	$480.9
1973	307.5	50.0	50.0	4.4	80.9	$492.8
1974	2,482.7	50.0	36.5	3.3	73.8	$2,646.3
1975	300.0	344.5	40.0	2.5	116.0	$803.0
1976	1,500.0	700.0	15.0	3.6	144.5	$2,363.1
1977	200.0	735.0	15.0	4.6	32.9	$987.5
1978	1,000.0	785.0	20.0	5.4	12.4	$1,822.8
1979	1,000.0	785.0	25.0	4.2	98.8	$1,913.0
1980	4,000.0	785.0	25.0	4.1	331.9	$5,146.0
1981	1,000.0	764.0	25.0	2.0	222.4	$2,013.4
1982	1,400.0	806.0	12.5	3.0	29.0	$2,250.5
1983	1,400.0	785.0	12.5	3.1	5.0	$2,205.6
1984	1,700.0	910.0	12.5	4.1	5.0	$2,631.6
1985	1,700.0	1,950.0	15.0	4.7	7.0	$3,676.7
1986	1,722.6	1,898.4	12.0	5.5	25.0	$3,663.5
1987	1,800.0	1,200.0	25.0	5.2	10.0	$3,040.2
1988	1,800.0	1,200.0	25.0	4.9	13.5	$3,043.4
1989	1,800.0	1,200.0	28.0	6.9	10.7	$3,045.6
1990	1,792.3	1,194.8	29.9	3.5	414.4	$3,434.9
1991	1,800.0	1,850.0	45.0	2.6	14.7	$3,712.3
1992	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	3.5	16.5	$3,100.0
1993	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	2.5	20.9	$3,103.4
1994	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	2.7	14.5	$3,097.2
1995	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	2.9	19.5	$3,102.4
1996	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	3.3	64.0	$3,147.3
1997	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	2.1	50.0	$3,132.1
1998	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0			$3,080.0
1999	1,860.0	1,080.0	70.0			$3,010.0
2000	3,120.0	949.1	60.0	2.8		$4,132.0
2001	1,975.6	838.2	60.0	2.3		$2,876.1
2002	2,040.0	720.0	60.0	2.7	28.0	$2,850.7
TOTAL (1948-2017)	**$79,823.4**	**$30,897.0**	**$1,708.2**	**$171.027**	**$14,991.9**	**$129,808.527**

(The table does not include assistance for some other projects those were not considered foreign aid to the CRS, for example, $180 million funding for the Arrow missile (R&D).

(Reproduced from Sharp 2016)

From the prism of David Ben-Gurion's 'peripheral diplomacy,' (Samaan 2017; Patten 2013) Iran was vital for Israel as it regarded Iran as a non-Arab natural ally on the edge of the Arab world (Marantz 2012). Iran was among the group of countries selected to establish the United Nation Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to find out a solution of the Palestinian problem and it opposed the partition plan along with India and Yugoslavia (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1947). According to Iran the partition would have led to an unstoppable struggle between Israel and Arabs (Simon 2010). With Initial ups-downs, the two countries successfully sealed warm relations rooted on shared interests and the emerging threat from the Soviet Union and Arab nationalism (Ibid.).

According to Miinsour Farlu (1989), the establishment of relations with Iran was the strategic goal of Israel. Iran was important because it was a non-Arab country and was willing to provide a route Iraqi Jews to immigrate Israel (Farlu 1989:86). In 1950, Reza Safinia, Iranian minister plenipotentiary visited Israel to represent and hosted an official reception in Jerusalem, which marked "the first such function to be held by a foreign diplomat in Jerusalem since it was proclaimed Israel's capital" (Jewish Telegraphic Agency 1950). In this function, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion registered his presence along with other ministers of the cabinet. The then both chief rabbis of Israel also attended the event (Ibid.).

For three decades, both the countries enjoyed flourishing military and trade relations (Karsh 2013). After the 1967 war, Iran also helped Israel in dealing with energy supplies. On the other hand, Israel helped Iran in town planning and agriculture (Gilboa 2002; Bialer 1985).

According to Aryeh Levin[13] "After the Suez campaign, from 1956 onward, we began working in Iran, attempting, eventually succeeding, to purchase oil, which was denied to us by the Arabs and the West," (Quoted in Ahren 2013). While talking with *The Times of Israel,* Aryeh Levin mentioned that Israel's help especially, after the tragic 1962 earthquake in the Qazvin area, it planned and remade their agriculture, village construction and communal organization. He further noted that "In agriculture, we had a number of talented and experienced experts who helped and guided the Iranians, excellent agriculturists themselves, toward modern methods of production and husbandry" (Quoted in Ahren 2013)**.** Though both, Iranian and Israeli military kept their relations covert, they were supposed to have been across-the-board, for example, included the joint military project "Project Flower" (1977–79), an Iranian-Israeli attempt to develop a new missile (Ellsworth 2014). On the one hand,

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[13]Aryeh Levin was an influential official in Israel's diplomatic mission in Tehran from 1973 to 1977.

Shah had good relations with Israel and on the other Ayatollah Khomeini was strongly against Mohammad Reza Shah and constantly charged the US and Israel for the corruption and backwardness in Iran (Parsi 2007).

On 3 June 1963, Khomeini delivered a provocative speech largely against Shah, where he said that the regime was dependent upon the US and Israel. Two days after this incident, he was arrested, this sparked anti-Shah demonstrations in Qom and other cities of Iran (Parsi 2007; Bergman 2013). Almost everywhere in the country, the anti-US and Israel slogan "Death to the Shah, Death to America and Death to Israel" was raised (Bergman 2013; Parsi 2007).

The 1979 Iranian revolution altered the mutual interest of both countries. The Iranian theocracy started becoming the regional player by leaving Arabs States behind. According to Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader and Parisa Roshan (2011) the foreign policy Iran after the Islamic revolution was at first overenthusiastic and ideological. The objective of the revolution was not only to overthrow Shah but a primary step to liberate West Asia from the US domination. However, the Iranian move was mostly ineffective and counter-productive (Kaye et al. 2011:14). Under the fear of Iranian revolutions, Arab Gulf countries in 1981 formed the Gulf Cooperation Council and helped Iraq against Iran (Vakil 2018). The post-revolution Iran did not undermine the importance of Israel. In addition, The Iran-Iraq war brought the two countries on a platform to fight against Iraq. As a result, low level ties between Iran and Israel existed during this time and Israel helped the Iranian regime to avoid total isolation when it desperately needed Israeli (and U.S.) weapons (Kaye et al. 2011:14).

The destruction of Iraq in the war was in favour of Israel because it viewed Iraq under Saddam a vital threat to its security (Kaye et al. 2011:14; Farhang 1989; Parsi 2007; Bergman 2013). Under such situations, Iran was in desperate need of Israeli or American arms because the Iranian military was modernized by the US under Shah Regime. The Iraqi quest to develop nuclear capabilities and its powerful military force posed a more acute threat to Israel than Iran (Farhang 1989; Kaye et al. 2011). Therefore, Prime Minister Menachem Begin approved to provide Iran a shipment of Phantom fighter planes tires and weaponry to Iranian army to fight against Iraq (Kaye et al. 2011). However, it resulted in Israel violating the US policy of not supporting Iran in the war until the release of American hostages (Kaye et al. 2011:14; Farhang 1989:87-88).

The Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel (1979) diminished the danger of the war from the southern side and decreased the need for Israel's periphery strategy and pronounced ties with Iran (Allin and Simon 2011). The Iran-Iraq war also strengthened the strategic posture of Israel as it weakened both countries. Iran's efforts to incite revolution and damage secular Arab governments, except for Syria, diverted Israel's enemies (Simon 2010; Parsi 2007; Bergman 2013; Beit-Hallahmi 1988; Alpher - 2015). Despite hostile relations Iran clandestinely purchased Israeli weapons after Iraqi 1980 invasion. This covert purchase of arms ended in the mid-1980s without normalization of the relationship between the two (Parsi 2007; Bergman 2013; Beit-Hallahmi 1988; Alpher 2015). Furthermore, these relations more worsened as Iran adopted a frontline posture against Israel.

In 1982, responding to terrorist attacks by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Israel invaded Lebanon. Israel's objectives were to weaken Syrian influence and establish a cordial Christian regime in Lebanon (Simon 2010). In response, Iran positioned the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to demonstrate its support for Shias in the Eastern part of Lebanon (Ibid.). But Israel's prolonged occupation alienated the southern Shiites and opened the door for more significant Iranian intervention (Ibid.). Through a proxy, Iran projected a big-time security challenge for Israel across a common border. Its support to Hezbollah helped in its rise as a serious regional foe (Sorenson 2016).

The saga of Israel-Iran informal relations faded by the 1990s, though Iraq was still seen as a threat to Israel. In the 1990s, the Israeli policymakers became increasingly worried regarding the development of Iranian long-range missile and nuclear programmes (Parsi 2007; Bergman 2013; Beit-Hallahmi 1988; Alpher 2015). By the end of the 1990s, it started to re-examine the Iranian threat. In the initial phase, the rivalry became more visible and well established (Kaye et al. 2011:14; Farhang 1989:87-88).

In 2002, Israeli Navy detained a Palestinian Authority-owned ship, Karine A. This ship had been loaded with high quantity weapons, ammunition and explosives at Iran's Kish Island destined for the Gaza Strip (Kahana 2006; Simon 2010). Furthermore, Iran helped and trained Islamic Jihad (Bennett 2012; Marschall 2003), a designated terror outfit by Israel, which launched terror strikes within Israel territories in the 1990s (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002). It was accused of training Palestinians at the Dara Kazwin barracks outside Tehran. In 2006, Israel fought its longest war with Hezbollah. The Iranian covert arms aid to Hezbollah made Israel's northern border insecure (Simon 2010).

The 2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran. His anti-Israel posture and Holocaust renunciations worsened the fears of Israel (*The Guardian* 2005). The Iranian quest for nuclear weapon intensified security concerns. While addressing an anti-Israel gathering, he said that Israel "must be wiped off the map" (Fathi 2005). His statement in 2005, regarding Israel's destruction, added an apocalyptic dimension to Israeli security concern. Constant, threatening statement by Iranian leaders has projected nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat to Israel According to Simon (2010) Israel has seen Iran as the Amalekites, who tried to eliminate the Israelites according to the Bible. Though many Israelis do not think that Iran would use nuclear weapons against it they fear that a nuclear Iran can encourage taking a risky action which could lead to War (Simon 2010).

The 1982 Lebanon war and emergence of Hezbollah

The significant change in the Israeli security environment in the 1970s and 1980s was the emergence of militant groups in the region. These outfits followed a critical agenda, namely, destruction of Israel and among them, Hezbollah was more lethal and powerful. Hezbollah[14] emerged as a radial fundamentalist Shi'a movement under the shelter of IRG. Its central headquarter was Lebanon's Bekaa Valley near Syria. The main objective of this organization at that time was to expel Israel from southern Lebanon and the western military presence in the country (Worth 2011; Norton 2007).

Hezbollah emerged as an ideology tracing its roots to the 1979 Iranian revolution and following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, a group of Shi'as under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah seceded from Amal and formed Hezbollah (Bergman 2013; Alagha 2002). Similar to itself, Iran wanted to establish a Muslim spiritual rule in Lebanon that would symbolize the oppressed section of the society (Bergman 2013). Under the leadership of religious clerics, Hezbollah wanted to follow the Iranian principles to find an answer to Lebanese political melancholy. These principles widely justified the use of terrorism to attain political interests (Worth 2011).

To achieve this goal in 1982, Iran sent many combatants to help and train the radical Islamic movement in Lebanon who played a crucial role in its Jihadi war against Israel (Norton 2014; Alagha 2002; Worth 2011). These fighters brought Iranian-Islamic influence on Lebanon and

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[14] The meaning of Hezbollah is the Party of God.

set up a flourishing ground in Ba'albek in the northern Beqa'a valley. It instituted a core organizational infrastructure for Hezbollah in Lebanon (Bergman 2013; Alagha 2002).

Once the organizational infrastructure was prepared, this small core group started building up a widespread military web in the Ba'albek area (Clary 1988). The valley area also provided a safe haven for engaging activist and combatants among the Shi'ite populations of the area (Alagha 2002).

The Hezbollah received more public support after the 1982 Israeli war in Lebanon, this was mainly because it fought against the American peacekeepers and French those stayed in Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal from Beirut in September 1983. It was also the time when Hezbollah emerged as a new security challenge for Israel. Since 1983, it has launched a range of small and big scale strikes against Israel, mainly suicide attacks (Harik 2004).

Until the late 1980s, Hezbollah accumulated highly sensitive arms and mobilized many new recruits with the objective of expelling the Israeli soldiers out of Lebanon. Since its inception, the group posed a major security threat to Israel by constant rocket attacks which made Israeli home front venerable (Farquhar 2009: Johnson 2011). Hezbollah launched an asymmetric war employing suicide attacks against the Israeli civilian targets outside Lebanon (Pape 2005). On 18 July 1994, a Hezbollah suicide bomber detonated a car loaded with 275 kilograms of explosives in front of the Jewish Community Centre in of Buenos Aires and killed 85 people and wounded 300 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). After 18 years, on 18 July 2012, a Hezbollah suicide bomber blew himself targeting an Israeli tourist bus in Burgas, Bulgaria, killing six people and injuring 36 (Ibid.).

The fighting techniques of Hezbollah made it first the first Islamic resistance groups in West Asia to use the strategies of assassination, suicide bombing and hostage-taking of foreign soldiers (Farquhar 2009). In comparison to other groups, it had more weaponry, notably Katyusha rockets. Despite signing the Taif Agreement which ended the 15-year old Lebanese civil war, Syria permitted Hezbollah to keep its weapon store and control Shia areas along the border with Israel (Goldberg 2002). As a result, the US government added Hezbollah to its terror outfit list in October 1997 (Ibid.). Though Israel unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah did not stop its operation against Israel. Furthermore, Hezbollah justified its attacks as a response to Israeli occupation of Shaba'a Farms at the trijunction of Israel, Syria and Lebanon (Ibid.).

In 2006, Hezbollah militants launched a cross-border attack in which eight Israeli soldiers were killed and two others kidnapped, triggering a massive Israeli response (Khoury, Stern, Harel and Issacharoff 2006). The Israeli warplanes bombed Hezbollah strongholds in the South and Beirut's southern suburbs, while Hezbollah fired about 4,000 rockets at Israel. More than 1,125 Lebanese, most of them civilians, died during the 34-day conflict, as well as 119 Israeli soldiers and 45 civilians (*BBC* 2016).

The emergence of militant groups in the neighbouring areas of Israel was the major change for security and challenge for Israel. The constant growth in the military capabilities of Hezbollah and its significantly rising influence in war-torn Syria (Jones 2018) have emerged a vital security concern for Israeli security policymakers (Katz 2019).

The direct Iranian support to Hezbollah and its strong military capability makes it worse security threat for Israel (DeVore 2012). It was also reflected in two major wars which Israel had fought on this front in 1982 and 2006 and IDF campaigns in South Lebanon. The risks for Israel in Lebanon are far higher than in its periodic battles with Hamas in Gaza. Hezbollah is more powerful after the May 2018 Lebanese parliamentary elections and with additional seats, "its power grew at the expense of Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, the leader of Lebanon's Sunni Muslims. Hezbollah already had a de facto veto over government decisions and its strong election performance further strengthens it" (Brookings 2018). Though there is a presence of the UN peacekeepers between Israel and Lebanon, the UNIFIL has significantly failed to assure security to Israel. *Operation Northern Shield* which started on 4 December 2018 has exposed it again.

The operation by the IDF was aimed at locating and destroying Hezbollah tunnels across the Blue Line at the Lebanon-Israel Border. Until January 2019 three tunnels have been discovered by IDF. The tunnels being exposed have their origins in homes in Lebanese villages; Israel for years asked the UN to survey these sites (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019a) but was rebuffed because these are private courtyards and UNIFIL would need substantial evidence to check them (UN 2018). The construction of tunnels was a violation of ceasefire agreement (*Times of Israel* 2019) signed between the two parties during the 2006 Lebanon war and was a violation of the UN Resolution 1701 (*The Times of Israel* 2019: UN 2018). According to the resolution both the party would respect the blue line, in this context construction of wall was visible violation which was even rectified by the UNFIL (UN 2018).

Intifada and Emergence of Terrorism

On 9 December 1987, a motor vehicle accident which took lives of four Palestinian civilians of Gaza sparked a Palestinian Intifada and following this Palestinians of from Jabaliya refugee camps started throwing stones on Israeli Army (Said 1989). Within the day unrest spread to the other areas and turned violent. It lasted six years until it was waned in 1993 in the wake of the Oslo process (Berry and Philo: 82).

The Intifada gave the birth to Hamas (Harakat al-Muqwama al-Islamiyya), the militant Islamic opposition movement founded by Sheik Yassin in February 1987. Intifada provided a centre stage to Hamas operatives to come forward as an organization (Mishal and Sela 2006). Utilizing this available platform, Hamas[15] emerged as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. According to Donald Neff (2002), Hamas "came into existence in large part because of unintended consequences of Israel's actions" (Neff 2002:20-21). Since its inception in 1988, Hamas has continuously launched terror strikes against the Israeli civilians as well as the military personnel. It does not acknowledge the existence of Israel (Ibid.) and its goal is to set up an Islamic state on the whole land of Israel (Terror info 2017).

The leadership structure of Hamas is divided into two branches. The inner circle wheels the organization in Gaza Strip (See Diagram 3.3). It is also responsible for the day-to-day activities guiding the external leadership located outside its territories. The second part is the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade, (military wing) which has the responsibility to launch terrorist strikes against Israel, "including rocket, mortar and suicide bombing attacks" (Kimhi and Even 2004:815-840). The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade of Hamas has conducted many terror strikes against Israel, repetitively explaining them a retaliation of the acts of IDF, specifically in revenge for assassinations of the high ranks of headship (Ibid.).

Hamas issued its charter in August 1988 and a revised one in 2017. However, in the both the charters it argued that all the Palestine belongs to the Muslim nation as a religious endowment (Hamas Charter 1988, 2017). It is the duty of each Muslim to engage in Jihad to liberate Palestine (Hamas Charter 1988, 2017). With the emergence of Hamas, a new age of terrorism started in the Palestinian territories. This was also sponsored by the other countries of the region such as Iran (Rostami-Povey 2013), Qatar (Chehab 2007) and Turkey (Zuhur 2014; Mishal and Sela 2006). Since its establishment, Hamas has been dedicated to killing

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[15] Hamas is a designated terror outfit by the European Union and the United States

Jewish people and destroying the Israeli State. The emergence of Hezbollah and Hamas brought the concept of suicide terrorism to Palestinian and Israeli territories (Berry and Philo: 82).

In 1989, Hamas plotted its first terror strike by kidnapping and murdering two IDF soldiers (Office of Department of National Intelligence 2018). In response, IDF instantly arrested Sheik Yassin and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In 1989, Israel also deported around 400 Hamas operatives to south Lebanon (including Mahmoud Zahar) as a response to terror strike (Higgins 2009). This was the time when Hamas covertly established links with Hezbollah (Holtmann 2009). In the 1990s Qassam Brigades carried out several attacks against Israel (*Frontline* 2006; *The Guardian* 2006; Yassin 2006). These attacks were not only limited to military personnel but targeted the civilian population as well (*Frontline* 2006).

In the initial six years of Intifada, Hamas targeted Israeli collaborators and civilians and later the IDF. With the establishment of al-Qassam Brigades, the suicide terror attack in the West Bank took a new direction (Laqueur 1994). The first wave of these attacks started on 16 April 1993, when an operative of al-Qassam Brigade detonated an explosive-loaded car, which was parked next to two buses[16], in Mehola, killing one Palestinian national and injuring 8 IDF soldiers (Associated Press 1993). After the Hebron massacre in 1994 by a Jewish settler, Hamas started launching suicide attacks deep inside Israel (Holtman 2009).

The suicide bombing at Afula on 16 April 1994 was the beginning of killing civilians (Burke 2017). However, the most deadly suicide bombing was a Netanya hotel attack on 7 March 2002 in which took the life of 30 people and injured another 140 (Baconi 2015; Burke 2017). In 1994, a wave of suicide attacks launched by Hamas and Islamic Jihad killed 37 people (one foreigner) (See Table 4.3) (Baconi 2015:5). It was ironic that when Israel opted the way of diplomacy to achieve security, the numbers of causalities went up rapidly. From September 1993 to December 1996 (as motioned earlier) 202 Israelis lost their lives in lethal suicide strikes in comparison to 164 from December 1987 until 1993. Together, "Hamas and Islamic Jihad took responsibility for correspondingly 80 fatalities and 395 injured and 48 killed and 243 injured" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a).

[16] One military and one civilian passenger loaded bus.

In the period before the Oslo Accords, the average numbers of Israelis in the terrorist deaths were 27 people per year. It radically altered after Oslo, when an average of 66 people per year–almost two and half times higher in comparisons pre-Oslo period—were killed (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a). The important aspects of these attacks were that Hamas justified these strikes as a lawful part of its asymmetric warfare against Israel (Ibid.). In a 2002 report, Human Rights Watch underlined that Hamas members "should be held accountable" for "war crimes and crimes against humanity" done by the al-Qassam Brigades (Human Rights Watch 2002, 2007a, 2007b).

Since the inception of Hamas, guerrilla strategies were its favourite technique to target IDF soldiers and civilians in the Gaza Strip (*Ynetnews* 2006). These techniques proved significantly successful for Hamas after Intifada. Following guerrilla strategies, Hamas has used anti-tank rockets, RPG, homemade rockets, such as al-Batar, al-Bana and al-Yasin and IEDs to target Israeli military and civilians (Hroub 2009). The deadliest part of this strategy was the use of Palestinian children, under the age of 18, as a tool to achieve their brutal crimes (Ibid.). It is evident in various, videos available on *Youtube* by Palestinian news channels that highlights that Hamas trained these child warriors and its operatives send the children "on missions from which they would not risk their own lives" (*Ynetnews* 2006). It was claimed by Israel that the Palestinian kids are employed as spotters for transporting the arms and explosives (Israel Defence Forces 2008). They are even asked to play in areas where IDF plans to launch operations and are sent without knowing that they are carrying explosives in their schoolbags to blow up in the surrounding area of Jewish people (Ibid.). It is interesting to know that the use of children for military targets considered as a war crime but Hamas and other terror groups functional in the Palestinian territories have regularly used it as a tool to reach their goals (Human Rights Watch 2002, 2007a, 2007b).

Changing Security Dynamics in the 1990s

The 1990s were characterized by radical changes in the international system and significant regional developments. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, things drastically changed in Europe. The countries opened borders to one another and the influence of the communist regime drastically reduced in Eastern Europe (The United State Department of State 1989; European Union 2017). In 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen countries and in a speedy way, the Cold War came to an end. The disintegration of the USSR and the end of the ideological bloc politics brought about major changes in international politics (Dadwal 1995; The United State Department of State 1989). The reduction of nuclear weapons and drawdown in the defence budget of western powers were some of the significant changes in the security environment (Dadwal 1995).

Diagram 3.3: Structure of Hamas

(Source: Reproduced from the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre 2011)

The end of the cold war brought many security challenges and changes in the new international world order and the nature of the conflicts also changed. It shifted to intra-state level from inter-state level. The US lost its main enemy and Americans believed that there were no grounds for US involvement in the affairs of the former Soviet Union (Haran 1995). The collapse of the socialist Soviet Union provided a severe and lethal blow to the communist ideology. In the post-cold world, almost all the states have accepted and adopted liberalisation, liberalism, democracy, decentralisation and market economy (Kothari 1997). The superpower umbrella, which was protecting some Arab countries, vanished after the disintegration of the USSR and they found themselves in an isolated situation. It was reflected in the Saddam Hussein's speech to other Arab leaders in Jordan where he highlighted that "the decades of the cold war had assured the Arabs regarding Soviet support against the US and Israel" (cited in Quandt 1991:50). As mentioned earlier, this arrangement was changed in the post-cold war era. Drawing the attention to a weakened Russia, he warned that the US would be in the strong position for the next five years (Quandt 1991:50).

In March 1991 the victory of the US in the Gulf War created favourable conditions for America to play a constructive role in peace-making efforts (Dadwal 1995; Quandt 1991; the New York Times 1991). On the one hand, successful the American military operation against Iraq made the Bush administration very popular domestically. On the other hand, it emphasized America's increasingly influential role in West Asia. During this period, even USSR had not powerfully contested the US intrusion and Arab countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and earlier Soviet client Syria, joined the alliance against Iraq over Kuwait (Quandt 1991). This change pushed the US administration to give a gift to the Arab partners for their valuable endeavour by creating situations to deal with the Palestinian issue. Since the PLO was supporting Iraq in the Gulf War (Ibid.), it lost the support of many Arab and Gulf Countries such as Egypt, Syria and the Gulf States. It lost its support base in the Palestinian areas as well. Thus, it provided the President Bush an opening to start a diplomatic process with the Palestinians under conditions which might Israel agreed on (Ibid.).

According to William B. Quandt (1991) Iraq's aggression, the Arab-Israeli peace process and the massive influx of the Soviet Jews to Israel were some other significant developments were defining issues for West Asia in the 1990s. The end of cold war rivalry between the US and USSR was a major turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the end of

ideological divide also provided a suitable climate for peace. These culminated in the Oslo process, which brought about a new security climate for Israel (Quandt 1991).

Israel and the Changing Security Environment

Since the end of the Second World War, Israel was the only West Asian country, which was progressively excluded from regional political, military and economic alliances and groupings (Sorby 2001). In the initial days, this problem posed a higher danger for Israeli security. With the end of the Second World War, Britain tried to maintain its influence in the West Asian region by helping the Arabs. The British support to Arab Legion against Israel[17] in 1948 broadly captured it (Bradshaw 2010; Shlaim 1998). Almost all the major powers during this period maintained a sizeable distance from Israel. Though, the US President Harry S. Truman voted in favour of Resolution 181 in the Security Council but refrained from open support to Israel in 1948 war (United Nation 1948).

The main reason was the US's closeness with Britain and Saudi Arabia. This was the time when the US also had to protect "its oil interests and had to counter emerging Soviet sway in the region. Therefore, the US could not permit arms to be rightfully supplied to Israel (Bradshaw 2010; Shlaim 1998). In such condition, the Soviet Union arranged arms supply for Israel through Czechoslovakia (Bradshaw 2010). This arms supply proved critical for Israel's survival during the 1948 War (Krajőir 2013). However, after signing 1949 armistice agreement, Israel was firmly devoted to western bloc and opposed any alliance with the Soviet Union (Ibid.). As a result of the 1950s, Soviet support to Israel was entirely overturned (Bradshaw 2010; Shlaim 1998).

According to Avi Shlaim (2004), though, the Soviet Union was Israel's chief arms supplier during the 1948 War, but it expected help from the Western bloc as well. At this time, the US was the most popular source of economic assistance (Shlaim 2004: 657-673). Though Israel initially received support from both the superpowers, its international position was paradoxical in many ways. Firstly, it was far away from the countries which recognized and established diplomatic ties with it. Its immediate neighbour did not recognize it. Secondly, it was situated in Asia, but culturally, it was close to western countries (Ibid.). In such a situation, Israel adopted a policy of non-identification (policy of i-hizdahut). According to

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[17] The elite military force in Trans-Jordan under the command of the British Major-General Glubb.

Michael Camay[18], "at the birth of the State, there were two godfathers - the United States and the Soviet Union. To try to retain the support of both, we adopted a posture of non-identification, of keeping out of the Cold War" (Quoted in Shlaim 2004:668)

The military coup in Egypt in 1952 and emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954 "established a government based on principles of socialism and pan-Arab nationalism" (Danielson 2007:56). Almost at a similar time, the Ba'ath party in Syria, promoting parallel values, got power (Sassoon 2012; Ziadeh 2012). Though, both the countries were against communism but under the Soviet Union support to deal with Western influence was always critical for both (Patten 2013). A significant aspect of this developing relationship was the Soviet help to the countries that were against Israel, namely, Syria and Egypt.

In 1955, following the Khrushchev's strategy, the Soviet Union broke the Western arms monopoly and established the Soviet Union as the leading outside power in Egypt, the strongest and most influential of the Arab states. Similarly, by providing arms to significantly unstable Syria, the Soviet Union enhanced its sphere of influence (Campbell 1972). According to John C. Campbell (1972), the Soviet influence gained additional ground among Arab states through the Syrian crisis of 1957 and the Iraqi revolution of 1958 (Campbell 1972:128).

To deter these developments, the western countries came out with the Baghdad Pact (1955)[19] which comprised Turkey, Iran, Britain and Pakistan (Central Treaty Organization 1959). The significant aspect of this change was the absence of American support to Israel. In the highly hostile West Asia, Israel did not have any stable major power to support. As a result, Israel moved closer to France, which emerged as its major arms supplier (Patten 2013).

This changing environment of the region pushed Israeli policymaker to develop relations with the states situated geographically on the periphery of West Asia (Alpher and Alpher 2015; Neuberger 2009). These were the countries concerned about the Nasserist expansionism, Arab nationalism and Soviet penetration (Patten 2013). David Ben-Gurion was concerned about a communist insurrection in Iran, a threat to Ethiopian independence by Eretria and

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[18] Michael Camay is a former senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel.
[19] The Baghdad Pact was established in 1955 by Great Britain, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey and Iran. It was said that the organization was a defensive organization to encouraging shared military, political and economic values. Similar, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and NATO, the critical objective of the Pact was to avert communist invasion in West Asia. It was renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, in 1959 after Iraq pulled out of the Pact.

Nasser's moves in Africa (Ibid.). Ben-Gurion considered these countries potential allies and paid effort to forge relations with these countries. Israel also sought to develop ties with the non-Arab ethnic minorities within Arab countries (Ibid.).

> We have begun to strengthen our ties with the neighbouring countries on the outer circle of the West Asia: Iran, Ethiopia and Turkey, to create a powerful dam against the Nasserist-Soviet torrent. We have established friendly relations and attitude of mutual trust with the government of Iran and the emperor of Ethiopia. Recently, our ties with the Turkish government have become more intimate, above and beyond our normal diplomatic relations. Our purpose is the creation of a group of State not necessarily an official and public pact which … will be capable of standing firm against the Soviet expansionism with Nasser as its middleman and which may be able to save the independence of Lebanon, perhaps with time, that of Syria as well. This group will include two non-Arab Muslim countries (Iran and Turkey), one Christian country (Ethiopia) and the State of Israel (Ben-Gurion Quoted in Patten 2013:1).

This policy was known as the policy of the periphery (Hadar 2010). The policy was the brainchild of Reuven Shiloah, the first director of Mossad. According to Patten (2013), Ben-Gurion thought that the "dynamic created by cultivating pockets of allies around West Asia could convince the majority of the Arab states to temper their position towards Israel" (Patten 2013:2). Ben-Gurion noted that

> West Asia is not an exclusive Arab area; on the contrary, the majority of its inhabitants are not Arabs. The Turks, the Persian and the Jews-without taking into account the Kurds and the other non-Arab minorities in the Arab states- are more numerous than the Arab in the West Asia and its possible that through contacts with the peoples of the outer zone of the area we shall archive friendship with the peoples of the inner zone, who are immediate neighbours (Ben-Gurion Quoted in Patten 2013:3).

The Korean War in June 1950 provoked Israeli policymakers to abandon the policy of non-identification (Ibid.). During this time Israeli foreign policy registers a significant change but this transformation was not accomplished with a single stroke (She 2015). According to Gangzheng She (2015) apart from left parties, "the majority of Israel's government and Knesset had initially agreed to support the UN resolutions, as Israel hoped the UN would maintain its role as safeguard of world peace and, if possible, protect Israel from the next incident of Arab aggression" (She 2015:6). The Soviet support to North Korea made it easy for Israel to take makes this departure. According to Shlaim (2004) with the outbreak of the Korean War, "Israel moved towards de facto alignment with the West." According to Michael Brecher, "that shift was catalysed by the need for arms and economic aid, rationalised by the perception of renewed Soviet hostility and eased by the indifference of the

Third World. The last merits attention, particularly because it is rarely noted in analyses of Israeli foreign policy, by practitioners and scholars alike" (Brecher Quoted in Shlaim 2004:3).

According to Shlaim, three main factors pushed Ben-Gurion to shift from East to West.

1. An increasing number of immigrants from Europe to Israel;

2. Ben-Gurion's greed to win the support of whole American Jewry; and

3. He wanted to get reparations from the Federal Republic of Germany for the crimes that Nazi Germany had committed against the Jewish people.

The changing security environment in the region and the emergence of the hostile regimes, especially in Egypt, Syria and Iraq forced Israel to think about the nuclear option. According to Ben-Gurion, the ultimate guarantee for survival in a hostile environment was a nuclear option (Ben-Gurion 1970). On 12 October 1953, Israel formed its strategic doctrine, which was a response to the core security concerns. The chief architect of this security doctrine was Ben Gurion. His strategies were like a model of Carl Von Clausewitz (Ibid**.**). It focused on disarming, occupying and perhaps most importantly, 'breaking the will' of its enemy (Cohen 2010). Ben-Gurion realised that in the absence of an external guarantee of "Israel's existence, its future could be assured only through the fruits of Jewish mind-science and technology- and that vow 'never again' meant that Israel must acquire nuclear option" (Cohen 2010: XXII).

To deter any conventional attack from Arab countries, Ben-Gurion adopted a policy of massive retaliation (Ibid**.**). To assertively follow this policy, Israel needed a strong deterrence capability and decided to pursue the nuclear option. According to Avner Cohen (2010), Israel's urge for nuclear weapons capability originated with a doomsday scenario first put forward in 1950. In 1955, soon after Ben-Gurion becoming the prime minister of Israel for the second time, the government started working on this objective. He understood that Israel could not rely on the assurance of the world's big powers for Israeli territorial integrity (Ibid.). As a result, with French support, Israel established the Dimona Nuclear Reactor Facility in the South. According to Zeev Maoz (2003), "Israel's nuclear policy has accomplished three fundamental security objectives. First, the policy has deterred an all-out Arab attack since the June 1967 War. Second, it has been instrumental in modifying the

military objectives of Israel's adversaries, forcing them to shift their operational planning to limited war scenarios. Third, by helping to bring Arab states to the negotiating table, it has provided impetus to the conclusion of several peace treaties" (Maoz 2003:44).

In the 1960s France emerged as a key player in Israel's security requirement. On the one hand, French technical assistance helped Israel developing nuclear capabilities**,** on the other; advanced military aircraft provided by France strengthened Israeli Air Force (Bass 2010). However, Israel-France relations faced a hard time during the 1967 War when France supported the Arab countries and hostile moves of Egypt (Crosbie 1974; Bass 2010). Furthermore, it imposed an arms embargo and threatened Israel to keep away from hostilities. The French embargo was a critical security challenge for Israel (Crosbie 1974; Bass 2010). The victory of Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war drastically changed the US policy towards Israel. In the post-1967 period the US emerged vital arms supplier to Israel but oil embargo during the October 1973 War and delayed in the American support, forced Israel to take a relook on its security policies.

Learning a lesson from this critical situation, Israel introduced significant change at the domestic level. It introduced drastic changes in the IDF and Israeli intelligence communities. These changes eventually guided its policymakers towards the Arab-Israeli peace process (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013b). Since 1973, Israel paid considerable attention (Ibid.) in the regaining the confidence which it lost during the October war through large scale military build-up (Ibid.). After the war, special attention given to develop a self-sufficient defence industry (Broude, Deger and Sen 2013; Rubin 2017). The main reason behind it was the increasing dependence on the US (Deger and Sen 2013). At the same, this heavy military build-up was introduced under the unfavourable economic circumstances (Broude, Deger and Sen 2013; Rubin 2017). At the same time, the October 1973 war significantly improved Israel's strategic interests and developed a way for the Egyptian-Israeli peace and enabled Arab countries to initiate peace talks with Israel (Krasna 2017).

Though Israel was surprised by the limited war initiated by the Egyptian-Syrian forces in 1973 the outcome of their limited campaign forced Egypt recognized that the territories it lost in the June war could not be retrieved using military (Kumaraswamy 2000; Krasna 2017). Thus, the October War paved the way for a change of perception in both the countries and the Camp David agreement (1979) between Egypt and Israel was the first major change in the Arabs policy towards Israel. Indeed, and the 1973 Arab Israel War ironically provided "Egypt

(and others), a much needed 'ladder' to climb down from their refusal to accept and recognize the presence of the Jewish State in the Middle East" (Kumaraswamy 2000: 9).

The peace treaty significantly reduced the possibility that Israel would have to simultaneously fight on the two fronts. The Camp David agreement brought a new security environment and in return for its territorial withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, Israel secured political recognition and relations with Egypt (Telhami 2009; Krasna 2017). Even though the bilateral ties did not blossom beyond cold peace, Egypt ceased to be a part of the larger Arab military coalition against Israel (Inbar 2002). While 1973 was Israel's last war with the Arab states, its security dilemma was not resolved as the major threats to its security in the post-Camp David period came from non-state actors (Ibid.). The peace treaty with Egypt normalised the relationship between both countries. However, the deficiency of parallel peace or political arrangements with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah resulted in Israel continue to seek military means to manage and mitigate security challenges.

On the other hand, the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 changed the Iranian regime with a fundamentalist government. The new Iranian government, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, became hostile to the US. The regime change in Iran was a setback for Iran-Israel relations. However, the informal low-level ties between Israel and Iran benefited the Iranian regime to avoid total isolation during the Iran-Iraq war (Kaye et al. 2011:14).

The 1990s were significant for Israeli security. For several decades Israel was outside the regional politics and was unaccepted in the region. In the 1990s, the international system and West Asia region registered significant developments, "which were of great importance in terms of Israeli national security" (Inbar 2002: 21). During this time, Israel also acquired a much better international status. The end of bipolarity and the cold war was extremely constructive to Israel. Since the end of the 1960s, Israel's relations with the US were a crucial pillar in Israeli deterrence power in the region. For decades, it was a vital objective of the Arab countries to break this alliance. According to Inbar (2002, "the overall robustness of Jerusalem-Washington relations and particularly the increased strategic cooperation between the two sides since the 1980s made the Arab goal of putting a wedge between the two unrealistic. The campaign to isolate Israel from the international community failed too" (Ibid.).

The new era did not affect Israel's strategic ties with the US. In the post-Cold War period, Israel enjoyed an increased amount of American military aid (Ibid.). It continued to receive financial support for "the development of high-tech weapon systems, such as the anti-ballistic missile Arrow, the anti-ballistic interception missile at the boost phase, Moab and the laser weapon against Katyushas, Nautilus. The US also agreed to shorten the warning time of incoming missile attacks provided by its satellites to the Israeli early warning system. The US has remained committed to maintaining the Israel Defence Forces' (IDF) qualitative edge over its Arab opponents" (Ibid.). According to Inbar (2002), throughout the 1990s, the weapon procurement of the IDF enjoyed rather free access to the American conventional arms arsenal. Its primary constraint was insufficient financial resources rather than politically inspired restrictions (Ibid.).

Practically, in the post-1990 period, the US supremacy was been beneficial in the sphere of nuclear proliferation and limiting the spread of long-range missile technology as well. The establishment of the US-inspired the United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM) inspection regime on Iraq, strengthened Israel's security posture (Inbar 1999). This was the time when Rabin was more relied on American diplomatic efforts, for large numbers of security challenges, from UNSCOM to avert the sale of long-range North Korean missiles to Iran (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129). In addition, in the mid-1990 to derail sensitive technology[20] transfer from Russia to Iran, Israel looked towards the US. Washington also played an important role in bringing Israel in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in October 1991 (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129). On the American request, Israel agreed upon banning the export of anti-personnel mines.

In the 1990s Israeli security policymakers stressed over two vital perspectives, an inner and an outer circle, while for formulation of strategy for challenges originating from its neighbouring countries (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129). The first circle, "inner circle" comprised the group of countries that shared borders with Israel. On the other hand, 'the outer circle' comprised the distant enemy nations in West Asia. In the post-cold war world, the Israeli security challenges drastically reduced from "inner circle" but a significant growth was seen in the emanating danger from the countries situated on the outer circle.

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[20] Technologies related to missile and nuclear weapons.

In April 1990, Iraq threatened Israel 'to burn half of Israel' with chemical weapons. It was followed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, an attempt by Saddam Hussein to gain regional supremacy but the US victory over Iraq in 1991 led positive security results for Israel. It achieved its security objectives without even participating in the war, "all the havoc inflicted on Iraq and its forces occurred without IDF participation" (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129). As an outcome of these new unfolding situations, in the post-cold war period 'outer circle' countries, such as Qatar (1996, Trade relations), Tunisia (1996, Interest office), Oman (1996, Trade representative offices), Morocco (Liaison office, 1994) and Mauritania (1999, Full diplomatic relations), established initial level ties with Israel.

However, the 1991 Gulf war was also a reminder of the changing the West Asian politics, limited Israeli power and increasing Israeli vulnerability to long-range missile attacks. Though the Iraqi missile attacks caused very minimal casualties, it led a considerably economic implications and "the country was paralyzed for several weeks" (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58). By the end of the 1990s, Iraq's aggressive behaviour did not change and still had a large conventional army, a frightening stock of weapons and victorious in confronting the UNSCOM regime (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129). The Iraqi stock of arsenal included biological agents, chemical weapons, components for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles (Inbar 2002). Iran was another outer ring country which could hurt Israel.

The Iranian theological opposition threatened the existence of Israel by supporting militant outfits such as Hamas and Hezbollah. In the late 1990s, Iran acquired the capabilities to threaten Israel by reaching in the advanced stage of research regarding Sheha-3 missile (Inbar 1999:129). The second stage of the missile was tested in July 1998 that was technologically similar to North Korean Nodong missile. The long range of 1,300 Km directly brought Israel under the striking capability of Iran. The enhanced striking capability of Iran made its nuclear programme, even more, endangering (Inbar and Sandler 1993-94: 330–58; Inbar 1999:129).

One significant constructive development in the outer circle during this period was the upgradation of Israel-Turkey relations (Nachmani 1988; Lochery 1995; Inbar 2001, 2002). The bilateral relations were the most significant international development for Israel as it brought the two strongest allies of the West in West Asia on the same platform. According to Inbar from the Israeli perspective this most favourable regional development since President

Anwar Sadat visit to Jerusalem in 1977, "thereby changing the parameters of the Arab–Israeli conflict" (Inbar 2002:6).

While in the inner circle brought Syria, Palestinians and the Jordan on the negotiation table at Madrid in 1991, principally on Israeli terms. The agreements with a section of Palestinian movement (1993) and Jordan (1994) considerably reduced the possibilities of a large-scale war with the countries situated in the 'first ring.' Though in the mid-1990s, Egypt emerged as a source concern, it was not marked by the IDF as a major threat. According to Inbar (2002) in the inner circle countries, only Syria has remained a threat to Israel, but it was also gradually losing the offensive capabilities. According to Efraim Karsh (1991), the Syrian objective of 'strategic parity' with the Israeli army in the 1990s became even more elusive than 1980s.

Conclusions

Since the end of the Second World War, the security environment of the West Asian region had significantly changed. On the one hand, the region registered the decline of old European colonial powers Britain and France and the emergence of the US and USSR as new powers in the region. The Cold war allowed the US and USSR to play an important role in regional politics. This significant strategic change in many ways impacted on the security policy calculations of Israel. The decade's long Cold war divided the whole West Asian region into the two camps. This period also registered the political changes in the many countries of the region, for example, the Egyptian revolution in 1952, the emergence of Nasser, military coup in Iraq and Syria. Though military coup changed the monarchy in Iraq, it took the side of Arab nationalists against Israel and made large arms deals with the Soviet Union. In 1957, the tensions began in Syria due to provocative institutional change made by Shukri al-Quwatli, which led to a confrontation between the US and USSR. At this time, Arab Nationalism was at its peak and emerged as a security challenge for Israel.

The nationalism was not at the same stage in all countries. West Asia in the post-second world war period also registered a unique kind of contestation among the Arab countries, known as the Arab Cold war. During this period, the main cause of contestation was the problem of unique connections connecting the Arabs.

Though, in 1979 peace treaty with Egypt diminished the danger of the war from the southern side and the importance of periphery strategy. The Iran-Iraq war further strengthened the

strategic posture of Israel as it weakened both countries. Iran's efforts to incite revolution and damage secular Arab governments, except for Syria, diverted Israel's enemies. The Iranian revolution in 1979, the emergence of Hezbollah and Hamas and disintegration of USSR were some other major changes that affected Israeli security positively and negatively.

Chapter Four

The Oslo Agreements and Security Concerns

T he Oslo accords were a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict and it changed the political equation between Israel and a section of the Palestinian liberation moment, namely the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The agreements were an outcome of new international political realities which allegedly heralded the beginning of "new world order" under the supremacy of the United States (US) (Sela 2009). The weakened PLO and the radical Arab actors, such as Syria and Iraq; the supremacy of the US; Israel's vulnerability to Iraq's medium-range missiles and growing economic pressure it faced; and the Gulf War over Kuwait created a perfect condition for the historic breakthrough in the long-deadlocked Arab-Israeli peace process.

On 13 September 1993, both sides delineated a five-year process to arrive at an agreement on future relations and arrangements (Benvenisti 1993). Indeed, the first two years after signing the accords registered unique international optimism and emerging temptation to see a new West Asian region, characterized by development projects, joint economic ventures, and social cooperation at regional and the Israeli-Palestinian levels (Sela 2009).

The agreements also posed severe security concerns for Israel. In the post-Oslo years, Israeli cities witnessed large-scale suicide attacks. The expectation of peace registered a slow death marked by missed deadlines, broken political promises and declining good faith between both parties (Mahle 2005). The horrendous terror attacks during 1995-1996 that culminated with the Dizengoff Centre bomb blast on 4 March 1996 threatened a premature death to the land-for-peace agreement negotiated at Oslo. This chapter covers the diplomatic, political and security implications of the Oslo accords and broadly examine the deteriorating security situation after 1993 and the difficulties Israeli policymakers faced in dealing with this situation.

An overview of Pre-Oslo Situation

In the late 1980s, the Israeli leadership and the PLO realised that they were besieged. It was mainly because of the strategic situations of at that time. In Israel, leadership was paying the price for its invasion of Lebanon or the Operation Peace for Galilee of 1982 (Van Dijk

2008:681 2018). It took lives about 2,000 people, mostly military (Ross 1982). At the same time, the PLO was forced to retreat from Lebanon from where it was functioning since the Black September Massacre of 1970 and went into exile in Tunisia (*Middle East Eye* 2018).

In Tunis, the PLO faced severe internal challenges from leaders and political movements in the occupied territories (Raj 1983). Since the second half of 1983, growing tensions with the Fatah and between PLO leadership forced the Palestinian sections towards larger cooperation so that they can secure their political influence (Leopardi 2013). The problem started around 11 May 1983 "when a number of senior Fatah military officers and disaffected political figures circulated a statement in the Bekaa Valley" criticising the policies and decisions of Arafat, specifically, demanding the termination of several military appointments made by the Palestinian leader (Raj 1983:306). This opposition came over the appointment of discredited Col Hajj Ismail and Col Abu Hajem to command posts in the east and north Lebanon respectively (Raj 1983:306).

Furthermore, at the end of June the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) proclaimed the formation of a "political and military Joint Command" which was now "responsible for the political affairs and moves of the two fronts and for their armed forces, within the framework of strengthening the relations between them and unifying their ranks" (Leopardi 2013). Within the Fatah, Arafat's deputy Abu Iyyad (Salah Khalaf) publicly criticized the PLO leader for failing to consult the movement's committees before taking major decisions (Raj 1983:306).

The outbreak of Intifada was a response to all these divides and emerged as a challenge for both the PLO and Israel. For PLO, the challenge was the "Unified National Leadership of the Intifada, which was formed without Tunis's backing and was only later controlled by it" (Leopardi 2013:1). The UNLI was increasingly influenced by the newly emerging Hamas, which took an even more active role as uprising progressed and became a threat the PLO's stature. Therefore, "a series of conflicts between the PLO 'outsiders' in Tunis and Palestinians 'insiders' within the territories" emerged (Selby 2003:135). This inside-outside tussle turned into another form during the Madrid Peace talks in 1991, when the PLO was denied officials representation in the negotiations but had to attend as part of the joint delegation with Jordan (Ibid.).

For Israel, a significant reason for going the Madrid peace negotiations was its growing security concerns for occupied territories. The experiences of Intifada underlined that the Gaza Strip and some of the West Bank areas were uncontrollable and these areas turned more violent during the early 1990s and use of weapon replaced stone throwing (Selby 2003: 135; Bregman 2014). It created a threatening situation for the Israeli settlers in the occupied territories. In March 1993, the tensions in the occupied territories were reaching newer heights, when a group of Palestinian activities killed fifteen Israelis (Bregman 2014). In the response, the IDF reacted forcefully by dissecting the Palestinian occupied territories into four areas, namely, East Jerusalem, North and South West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Later, the IDF sealed off the area and closure went on for weeks, causing a devastating blow on all aspects of the Palestinian life. The most affected were the medical services and the Al Maqassed Hospital in East Jerusalem (Ibid.).

This forced foremost Israeli figures such as Ze'ev Schiff to "advocate 'security for peace' plans for the territories, with the Palestinians being granted functional autonomy with their own 'large police force' linked in confederation with Jordan" (Selby 2003: 135). All these pushed, Yitzhak Rabin, who was known as a 'security hawk', to start advocating that indirect control was better for Israeli security interest than a direct occupation. As a result, he started a negotiation with PLO to reach security concerns without compromising Israeli economic and territorial aims (Honig-Parnass 1993). According to Jan Selby (2004), the Intifada underlined the depth of the Palestinian nationalism and forced the Israeli policymakers to rethink their harsh measures against the Palestinians.

From Intifada to Madrid

On 6 December 1987, an Israeli was stabbed to death while shopping in the Gaza Strip. The next day, a traffic accident took the lives of four residents of the Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza Strip (Lesch 1990). After the incident, some people circulated a false rumour that it was a deliberate attack by the Israelis. The funeral of the people who were killed in this accident sparked widespread violent protests in the Gaza Strip and unarmed Palestinian men, women and children started attacking Israeli soldiers (Aly et. al. 2013: 231). According to Benny Morris, the Intifada was a massive, unrelenting struggle of civil resistance, with commercial shutdowns and strikes along with aggressive manifestations against occupying power, rather than just being a violent conflict (Morris 1992:561). The Intifada also gave birth of Hamas,

the Islamic resistance movement formed by the Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in the February 1988 (Tamimi 2009; Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010).

Hamas aimed to work as a local arm of the Muslim Brotherhood and presented itself as an alternative to the secular Palestinian leadership represented by the PLO. The Brotherhood was active in the Gaza Strip since the 1950s and expanded its influence through a chain of mosques, charitable trusts and social organizations (Hroub 2006:6; Webman 1994; Sela 2006). Under the name of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted an extra-nationalist line and pursued a comparatively more violent stand during and after the Intifada.

The Intifada pushed the US Secretary of State George Shultz to organize an international gathering that would offer a platform to open straight intercessions between Israel, Palestinians and Jordan over the issue of interim self-government for the Palestinian areas, accompanied by negotiations over a permanent status agreement (Berry and Philo 2006:89). By doing so, he wanted to address the Palestinian grievances and end the violence. This plan failed to achieve its objective as Israel rejected Shultz's proposals because it was not aimed at stopping the Intifada, which was its precondition for negotiations. However, King Hussein of Jordan gave up Jordanian claims over the West Bank in July 1988 which rendered the Shultz Plan impracticable (The US Department of State 1991b).

According to the State Department after the failure of the Shultz Plan, the US peace-making efforts during 1989-1990, were circled around a proposal drafted by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir which focused on electing the Palestinian representatives from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank who would "negotiate interim arrangements for self-governance with Israel, followed by a permanent status agreement" (Ibid.). The intense contestation over the issue of how to implement Shamir's proposal brought down Israel's national unity government in March 1990.

The Gulf Crisis, 1990-91

On 2 August 1990, the Gulf War started when the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait. In response to the Iraqi aggression, the US-led coalition launched two important operations, namely, Operation Desert Shield to stop Iraq from attacking Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Storm to free Kuwait from the Iraqi forces. These operations were financially supported by Japan and Germany, which later came to be known as 'check-book diplomacy' (Tucker-Jones 2014).

During the war, Iraq threatened to attack Israel and to destroy a substantial area of the country (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013e). On 17 January 1991, the US-led forces attacked Iraq and in retaliation, Iraq targeted Israel and 38 Scud missiles were launched between January and February 1991. The missiles largely targeted the Tel Aviv and Haifa regions but southern West Bank and Dimona in the Negev were also attacked (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013e). It was the first time in the history of Israel when the whole country faced the danger of devastation through non-conventional weapons.

The victory of the US in the Gulf War created new and favourable conditions for Washington to play a constructive role in peace-making efforts (Blair 2016). On the one hand, the successful American military operation against Iraq made the Bush administration very popular domestically. On the other hand, it emphasized America's emergence as an influential player in West Asia in the post-cold war period (Goodwin 2004). During this period even the USSR, which was on the verge of disintegration, had not contested the US intrusion while Arab countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the former Soviet client Syria, joined the alliance against Iraq (Beaver, Beaver and Wilsey 1999).

This change pushed the US administration to reciprocate its Arab allies during the Kuwait crisis by dealing with the Palestinian issue. Since the PLO leadership was supporting Iraq in the Gulf War it lost the support of many Arab and Gulf Countries such as Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf States, especially, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Mattar 1994). Thus, the geostrategic reality provided President Bush with an opening to initiate a diplomatic process with the Palestinians under conditions which were almost entirely dictated by Israel (the US Department of State 1991e). The US took responsibility to address the Arab-Israeli dispute at the international level.

To revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process through the negotiations, including Israel and the other Arab countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, on 30 October 1991 a conference was hosted in Spain broadly known as Madrid Conference (Shlaim 2005: 241). Both the major powers, the US and the Soviet Union, were the cosponsors. During this conference, the US followed a fair and impartial attitude and vowed to reach an agreement that would give justice to Palestinian and security to Israel (Ibid.). According to experts, with the end of the Gulf War, President Bush gave a speech in the US Congress on 7 March 1991, often cited as the key policy of the administration on the new order in the West Asia (Knott 2018).

In this speech President Bush said:

> All of us know the depth of bitterness that has made the dispute between Israel and its neighbours so painful and intractable. Yet, in the conflict just concluded, Israel and many of the Arab states have for the first time found themselves confronting the same aggressor. By now, it should be plain to all parties that peace-making in the Middle East requires compromise. At the same time, peace brings real benefits to everyone. We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states and between Israelis and Palestinians. The tactics of terror lead absolutely nowhere; there can be no substitute for diplomacy. A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin tests of fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict (Bush 1991).

The centrepiece of his initiative was to reach a peace agreement between Arabs and Israel, based on the principle of 'land-for-peace' and the accomplishment of Palestinian rights (Shlaim 2005: 241).

The US thought that there was a window of opportunity to utilize the political influence achieved through its victory over Kuwait to re-energize the Arab-Israeli peace process (Ibid.). The focus of this peace initiative was to convene a multi-party international conference which would be later divided into individual, bilateral and multilateral negotiation tracks (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013e).

To make this event possible and convince to other Arab countries, the US Secretary of State James Baker undertook twenty visits to the region between March and May 1991 (US Department of State 1991a). After a lot of brainstorming a framework of objectives were formulated (Ibid.). On 24 October, the U.S and the Soviet Union extended a letter of invitation to Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians for the Madrid Conference which was inaugurated on 30 October (Shlaim 2005: 241).

The invitation broadly stated the following:

1. The US and USSR believe that there is a historic opening available to advance the chances of peace in the region. The far-reaching consultation with the Arab countries, Palestinian and Israel highlighted it.

2. Based on the UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 the US and the Soviet Union were ready to support the involved parties to accomplish a permanent solution in the form of a long-lasting peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

3. According to the invitation the direct bilateral negotiations had to start four days after the beginning of the conference.

4. The parties who wanted to take part in the multilateral negotiations would assemble after the two weeks of the beginning of the conference.

5. The countries those were invited for the talks included Syria, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon. The Palestinians joined the conference as part of a joint delegation with Jordan. However, Egypt was invited as a participant in the conference. The list of other participants included the European countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council (as an observer), and GCC member states (for multilateral issues). The United Nations would be invited to send an observer, representing the Secretary-General.

6. The invitation clearly stated that "the conference will have no power to impose solutions on the parties."

7. Regarding bilateral talks between Israel and Palestinians, it was decided that the negotiations would be carried out in phases, starting with the talks on interim self-government agreement.

8. The objective of these talks would be to reach an agreement within one year.

9. Once concluded the interim self-government arrangements would last for five years and negotiation for the permanent status would only start at the starting of the third year.

10. The co-sponsors were committed to making this process successful as it was their responsibility to organize the conference and negotiate with all those parties who were ready to participate in the conference (The Madrid Peace Conference 1991).

The Madrid Conference created an international platform for all involved parties to hold one-to-one negotiations (Ziv 2014).

The conference started on 30 October and ended on 4 November and the long-term impact of the conference was limited than what the US had expected (The US Department of State 1991a). However, it allowed the representatives of Israel, Jordan and Palestine to meet at continued intervals for the bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In the Madrid conference the parties stuck to their conventional positions and did not participate in the negotiations sincerely, but they decided not to leave dialogue (Shlaim 2005).

Since the conference began, one-to-one talks were, by and large, considered more important than the multilateral track. However, it was frustrating for Israelis to deal with the Palestinian delegation due to its incapability to move forward without Arafat's approval or clearance (US Department of State 1991a). As a result, Israel decided to talk directly with the PLO which resulted in the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) on 13 September 1993.

Similarly, Jordan also decided to negotiate independently to reach an agreement with Israel. The Madrid conference no doubt paved the way for Oslo Accords (Ibid.).

The Oslo Accords

Before starting any discussion over its impact on Israeli security, it is necessary to understand the Oslo process comprehensively in structural terms. The Oslo negotiations started in April 1992 over lunch when the then director of Fafo Institute based in Oslo, Terje Rod-Larsen, met with Israeli Labour Party lawmaker Yossi Beilin (Cohen-Almagor 2018; Beilin 2013). It was the first positive step to switch intense rounds of talks between Israel and the Palestinians from the US to Norway. Larsen established a clandestine route through the Fafo Institute and between prominent Palestinian leader in Jerusalem Faisal Husseini and Beilin (Beilin 2013).

Beilin noted, "nobody knew that a single lunch would become the most significant channel ever for Israel-Palestine peace negotiations" (Beilin 2013:1). After the lunch with Larsen, who was excited to solve the conflict, Beilin introduced Larsen to one of his friend Yair Hirschfeld, who for a long time was assisting Beilin "in meeting Palestinians in the occupied territories and in the attempt to hold indirect talks in the Netherlands with one of the most prominent members of the PLO" (Savir 1998:1). On 23 June 1992 the day Israel was having the Knesset elections, Larsen, Husseini, Hirschfeld and Beilin "met at the American Colony Hotel in East Jerusalem and agreed that, following the elections, we would establish a secret negotiation channel in Oslo" (Ibid.).

In June 1992, the Labour Party won the elections and Rabin became prime minister. During his elections, campaign peace with Palestinian was a cornerstone and the Labour Party's slogan was the "Peace with the Palestinians within six-to-nine months" (Gasiorowski and Yom 2017:57). This was the perfect time to start the covert peace negotiations, but the political contest between Rabin and Shimon forced a delay (Ibid.). Finally, after lots of discussions between Larsen, Beilin, Uri Savir and Jan Eaeland, it was decided that Hirschfeld would represent Beilin in the meetings. Hirschfeld was participating as a middleman in the talks and Ahmed Qurei, the PLO negotiator, was brought to the negotiation table (Beilin 2005).

The whole process was kept secret because even a little media exposure could halt the negotiations. According to Uri Savir (1998), there was a time when everyone was so tensed because of a report in AFP noted that Israeli and PLO officials were holding secret talks in

Norway. After hearing this everyone was shaken but thankfully the Israeli-Palestinian writers were holding a conclave in Oslo that weekend and the resourceful Norwegians managed to deflect the media attention to the seminar that was exploring the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Savir 1998:30).

It was also a great opportunity for the PLO. In the post-Kuwait period, the Palestinian umbrella organization was diplomatically isolated and politically at its all-time low (Rose 2001). Its support to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein created uneasiness in its relations with the Gulf countries (Lesch 1991) and it was no longer receiving funding from Saudi Arabia (Mattar 1994)

Furthermore, with the outbreak of Intifada in the Gaza Strip in 1987, Hamas started receiving popularity among the Palestinians. According to Charles D. Smith, "Hamas, similar to Islamic Jihad, posed an alternative to PLO's political guidelines" (Smith 2013; 413). In 1988, when its charter was first published the group's formation represented a serious divide in the nine-month-old Palestinian uprising. Since the beginning, Hamas was critical of the PLO. The difference between Hamas, Islamic Jihad and PLO divided the Palestinian population. While the both Hamas and Islamic Jihad agreed on PLO's goal of creating the Palestinian state and the weakening of Israeli military power through disobedience but had a disagreement on the nature of future Palestinian state and the process that would lead to it (O'Neill 1991:58). Hamas and Islamic Jihad were in favour of a Sharia-based Islamic Palestinian state, while PLO was in favour of a secular state. It not only generated a threat to the secular PLO leadership "but also complicated the efforts of several West Bank leaders to press Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership abroad to capitalize on their political gains by offering to come to terms with Israel" (Hammond 2010). The beginning of 1990 witnessed Fatah losing influence in the territories. However, the Intifada continued but the Palestinian resentence took the form of armed violence. Hamas established a military wing Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade. It was clear that Fatah was losing its influence and the groups in the Gaza Strip were more interested to establish a religious state rather than a secular one (O'Neill 1991:58; Smith 2013: 413). Fatah loyalists were losing ground fast in the Gaza Strip to the Islamic militants gathered under the banner of Hamas.

The Hamas ideology influenced a broad section of the Palestinians. As its popularity rose, Hamas pressured women to dress modestly and attacked stores selling liquor. It became blunter in its attempts to delegitimize Fatah. In January 1989, a leaflet published jointly by

Hamas and the PFLP called for an alternative to the PLO leadership of the UNLU (Kurz and Tal 1997). Boaz Ganor noted that in "the rivalry between the two organizations was marked by violence-using live weapons at times-mainly in Nablus in May-June 1991" (Ganor 1992:7). Along with this, due to its support to Iraq during the Gulf War of 1991, the Palestinian leadership was facing international isolation, even from the countries of West Asia. Its economic condition was worsening day by day. Under such situations, Arafat required a dramatic move to bring the PLO back into the picture. A possible agreement with the new Israeli government might open the doors of the US and Western countries for the PLO (Beilin 2005).

The Declaration of Principles

The Declaration of Principal (DoP) (See Table 4:3) on Interim Self-Government Arrangements was a framework or blueprint for provisional arrangements. It presented a certain set of structure to administer the Palestinian territories until both the parties reached the final status agreement (Declaration of Principle 1993). The DoP was signed on 13 September 1993 by the then Foreign Minister of Israel Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas, the representative for Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at the White House in the presence of Rabin, Arafat and US President Bill Clinton and was based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (Declaration of Principle 1993; US Department of States 2017). While signing the agreement both the parties recognized each other and agreed that a Palestinian Authority (PA) would be established and take governing responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for five years. After that period, permanent status talks over the issues of refugees, Jerusalem and borders would take place. The PLO also agreed on abandoning terrorism (Oslo Accord 1993).

The Oslo agreements were neither a peace treaty nor a final settlement of the issue. It was a chain of agreement with "interim arrangements" for the Gaza Strip and West Bank and until the time final status of agreement not reached (Raja 2000). According to Galia Golan (2007), these highlighted that both sides were not yet ready for a peace agreement, and that was why they needed an interim period during which mutual trust could be developed (Golan 2007). The declaration was extraordinary for three reasons; rather than calling them "Judea, Samaria and Gaza", Israel preferred to call occupied territories as "West Bank and Gaza". This was a significant shift from Israel's point of view (Kumaraswamy 1994:219). Furthermore, it accepted the sensitive issue of Jerusalem is to be settled during the final phase (Ibid.).

According to Avi Shlaim (2005), the DoP was a tightly timetabled plan for negotiations rather than a complete agreement. The phase one demanded an IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho. The phase two asked for slow removal of Israel from the West Bank cities, coinciding with the first Palestinian presidential and parliamentary elections. The final phase was supposed to deal with a permanent solution which would have to start after the third year for permanent status. The focus of these negotiations would be to resolve all the core issues such as borders, refugees and the status of Jerusalem, settlements, and security arrangements. The agreement was coupled with a momentous mutual recognition agreement between Israel and the PLO (Savir 2008: 45).

According to the agreement, within the two months of the signing the agreement, IDF withdrawal has to be made and within four months it must be completed (Shlaim 2005). A Palestine security force comprising mainly combatants had to be deployed to safeguard inner security matters in Jericho and Gaza Strip, the responsibility of external security and foreign affairs would rest in Israeli hands (Madhoun 2006). Furthermore, according to the agreement, the Palestinians were supposed to hold elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip within nine months and it would be responsible for the major functions of the government apart from foreign affairs and defence. It was decided that at the end of five years the permanent settlement was to enforce (Shlaim 2005; Savir 2008).

In short, the DoP promised a systematic process to reach a final settlement of the Israel-Palestine issue (Shlaim 2005). While, the critical issues such as borders, refugees and status of Jerusalem were left for the second stage of negotiations (Kumaraswamy 2011), the DoP identified seven issues that would be discussed during the permanent status negotiations, namely, "Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours and other issues of common interests" (Kumaraswamy 2019).

There is a consensus among the scholars that the DoP was quite on crucial subjects such as the question of Jerusalem, the right of return, borders, and the future of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Singer and Eichewald 1997; Shlaim 2005; Kumaraswamy 2019). The reason behind keeping these issues for the later stage of negotiation was that if these critical issues would have been discussed, the chances to reach accords would have been very low (Kumaraswamy 2011, 2019; Singer and Eichewald 1997; Shlaim 2005) According to P R Kumaraswamy, the basic logic of the DoP was that "these are core

issues and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be resolved without addressing them. At the same time, given the historical nature of the problem, both sides sought to settle for the Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) model and deferred the core issues for better times when both had developed mutual trust and confidence to handle the delicate issues. That opportune time never came, and the interim period saw mutual acrimony and distrust culminating in the al-Aqsa intifada" (Kumaraswamy 2019:2).

Moreover, there were some clear differences over these critical issues among the Palestinians and Israelis. According to Shlaim (2005), Rabin had strongly opposed the idea of an autonomous Palestinian state but he was in favour of a "Jordanian-Palestinian confederation". On the other hand, "Yasser Arafat was strongly committed to an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, but he did not rule out the idea of a confederation with Jordan" (Shlaim 2005). In spite of all its limitations and ambiguity, the DoP marked a significant breakthrough in the decades-old quarrel among Jews, Arabs and Palestinians (Singer and Eichewald 1997; Shlaim 2005).

The Oslo agreements comprised two parts. The first was the letters of mutual recognition which were the most important part of the Oslo peace process. It was a series of executive letters which were exchanged between the top officials of Israel and PLO dated 9 February 1993 addressed by Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat and Johan Jørgen Holst (See Table 4:1) (Dajani 1994). In the first letter, Arafat stated:

> …I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments: The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO commits itself...to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations...the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators...the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid (Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition Letters 1993; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993).

Arafat also accepted the UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 and agreed upon abandoning the use of violence and acts of terrorism against Israel (Government of Israel 1993). In response to the Palestinian effort, Israel acknowledged "the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinian

people" (Government of Israel 2017). Unlike Arafat, Rabin made no promises in the letter outside recognition.

Secondly, since its beginning, the Arab-Israel conflict had been a fight between Jewish and Palestinian nationalism. Both rebuffed each other's right to have autonomy in Palestine (Ram 1998). Until the DoP was signed in 1993 both sides mutually denied and rejected each other's claims but after signing the Oslo accords, this mutual denial converted into cordial acceptance (Shlaim 2005). By signing the agreement, Israel just not acknowledged the political rights of the Palestinians but also officially accepted the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people (Middle East Eye 2018). The historic handshake between Arafat and Rabin, while signing the agreement, was a sign of the significant reconciliation between both the parties. The major advancement in reconciliation was an outcome of significant compromise which was "acceptance of the principle of the partition of Palestine" (Shlaim 2005: 248).

By signing the accords both the parties accepted territorial compromise and gave up the ideological clashes over the rightful ownership of Palestine territories and agreed upon finding a practical solution to the problem (Kelman 2004 2007; Alkidwa 2019). The biggest accomplishment in the agreement was the separation of the short-term settlement from the permanent settlement because in the past Palestinian leadership had constantly rejected to the suggestion of provisional accord until unless the final resolution was not decided (Shlaim 2005).

On another side, Israel was in favour of an arrangement where five-year transition period would start in the absence of a prior agreement regarding the nature of the permanent settlement (Maoz, Ward, Katz and Ross 2002; Shlaim 2005). In the Oslo accords, the PLO finally endorsed the Israeli proposal and "agreed to a five-year transition period without clear commitments by Israel as to the nature of the permanent settlement" (Belin cited in Shlaim 2005:248). The Palestinians wanted maximum control within the autonomous areas. Furthermore, during the negotiations at a certain point, they demanded full authority over them, while Israel asserted to retain some powers that could affect the shape of the permanent solutions, such as, the control of water resources (Corradin 2016; Djerejian et. al 2018).

However, for Israel security was more important than anything else and its problem was "how to unburden itself of the occupation while continuing to protect its citizens-including

the tens of thousands living in the settlements in the territories" (Savir 1998:39). For this reason, Rabin insisted that Israel retaining the responsibility of security to citizens of Israel, as well as for the external security for the future self-governing areas, which would allow Israel to maximise leverage on a security arrangement for present and future (Ibid.). According to Uri Savir (1998), both sides had realised that the best way for reshaping their future relations was to progress in stages.

In the initial phase, both parties tried to secure the advantage, focusing over the permanent settlement. The PLO wanted Israel to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people and implement UNSC resolution 242 (Ibid.). This resolution asked for a pull-out of Israeli troops from the areas captured in the 1967 War in return for lasting peace (Christison 1999). According to Savir (1998), the PLO's demands in this stage can be divided into the following points:

1. Establishment, an Autonomy Council, to have an executive and a legislative branch;

2. Status in East Jerusalem (right to stand in the election for Palestinian);

3. Creation of a mechanism for repatriate refugees from the 1967 war and share in the control of the Allenby Bridge to connect the Jordan river as the eastern border of a future Palestinian state; and

4. The presence of outside arbitration and international presence in the territories.

However, for Israel, these demands were difficult and mostly unacceptable. Nevertheless, a joint strategic approach had positively started to develop and looked like a partnership which was based on mutual legitimating, security and economic prosperity. Savir had rightly mentioned that "Oslo fixed the basic tactical approach for the two sides to follow, beginning with a feeler stage in which we were to explore our joint interest" (Savir 1998:40).

After the signing the agreement in Washington, Prime Minister Rabin took a stopover in Morocco, where he received a warm welcome by King Hassan II. A new development was also seen in the Jordanian front when first it permitted Israeli News channel to report live from Amman (Parks 1993). On the other hand, Arab states such as Tunisia[21] (Jewish Telegraph Agency 1994) and Saudi Arabia started thinking positively about having ties with

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[21] In 1993, Yossi Beilin, then Israel's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, paid a visit of Tunisia and direct telephone links were established in July 1993.

Israel (Savir 1998). Even the Arab League started thinking about the withdrawing the economic boycott from Israel (Ibid.:40). With this development, the rules of the game in West Asia drastically changed.

According to Shlaim (2005), the Oslo agreement had a wider implication for the interstate components of the conflict between Israel and the Arab world. Since 1948, the key responsibility for Arab countries led by the Arab League was to assist the Palestinian in their fight for Palestine. After 1948, the Arab League turned into a forum that assisted military policies and waged a political, ideological and economic war against Israel. In 1974, the PLO was recognised by the Arab League as the rightful representative of the people of Palestine. With the formal recognition of the PLO of Israel, there was not any gripping reason for the Arab countries to continue the policy of refusal or rejection of Israel (Shlaim 1993).

Shlaim noted that (2005), "the PLO recognition of Israel was an important landmark along the road to Arab recognition of Israel and the normalizing of relations with Israel" (Shlaim 2005:248). According to him, Israeli policy before and after 1948 was based on the supposition that the agreement on the partition of the land of Palestine would be easily accomplished with the head of states of the neighbouring Arab states in comparison with the Palestinian Arabs. It was proved in the negotiation where Israel courted by almost all conservative leaders. According to Shlaim "Israel's courting of conservative Arab leaders, like King Hussein of Jordan, was an attempt to bypass the local Arabs, and avoid having to address the core issue of the conflict" (Ibid.).

The PLO's decision to recognize Israel was expected to broaden the way for acknowledgement by the Arab countries from the Persian Gulf to North Africa. It was also observed in the Rabin's letter to Arafat where he motioned that "I believe … that there is a great opportunity of changing not only the relations between the Palestinians and Israel but to expand it to the solution of the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries and other Arab peoples" (*Herald Tribune* 1993). According to the Beilin, this was an extraordinary moment, which was not utilized to reach a permanent agreement. Rabin selected to pursue the idea of a five-year interim agreement which was recommended during the Camp David talks in 1978 by Menachem Begin (Beilin 2005).

Domestically, the agreement between Rabin and Arafat faced a powerful and loud resistance from the hard-liners. The opposition accused both the leaders for betraying their

constituencies. Likud and other political parties confronted Rabin for his abrupt change in the policy of his refusal to negotiate with the PLO. The leaders of opposition blamed him for disowning the 120,000 settlers who were leaving in the occupied territories and making them an easy target for terror groups (Shlaim 2005:242).

Implementing the DoP

The implementation of the agreement proved to be a challenge for Israel. One side, the peace process was progressing gradually but systematically and on the other, it was also passing through the constant act of violence and terror (Savir 2008). To have a discussion on the execution of the declaration which was signed in Washington two committees were formed. The first committee was chaired by Mahmoud Abbas and Shimon Peres. According to the agreement, this committee was supposed to meet up after every two-three weeks in Cairo (Shlaim 2005). The experts of the second committee supposed to meet each other for two-three times in a week at the Egyptian resort of Taba on the Red Sea. This delegation was headed by Maj. Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and Nabil Sha'ath.

According to Savir, both the sides managed to "hammer out an agenda and formed two groups of experts, one to deal with military affairs, the other with the transfer of authority" (Shlaim 2005:242). In these negotiations, the officers from IDF followed a solid and difficult position in the negotiations (Peri 2002). According to Yoram Peri (2002), the IDF officers were not involved in the secret negotiation. It impacted on them adversely as they felt bad about the things that they were completely ignored during the secret negotiations (Ibid.). While Ehud Barak noted that the Israeli policymakers were in a hurry to register them in history and hence, they gave PLO too much; but when the time of implementation of agreement came, it was for the IDF to deal with the security problems (Cited in Shlaim 2005).

During the Taba negotiations in 1995-, there was a deep rift between the Israeli and Palestinian representatives (Lehrs 2013; Shlaim 1995). The Israeli delegation was in favour of the steady and strict limited transfer of powers, keeping the complete responsibility of security in the occupied territories in their hands. On the other hand, the representatives of the PLO wanted a quick and extensive transfer of power, which would allow them to set a base for the independent state (Savir 2008).

After four months of intense struggle, an outcome was reached in the form of two documents; the first one was on general principle, and the second was on the border crossings. These two documents were originally put forth by Arafat and Peres on 9 February 1994 in Egypt (Cairo). This agreement was also known as the Cairo Agreement. It was an Oslo I follow-up which broadly underlined the details of Palestinian autonomy. The agreement granted the restricted self-rule in Gaza Strip and West Bank within five years (Shlaim 2005).

In Cairo Agreement, Israel pledged to withdraw partially from the territories of Jericho (West Bank) and the Gaza Strip within the three weeks from the day signing the agreement. It also established the Palestinian Authority (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994) and "Yasser Arafat became the first president on 5 July 1994 upon the formal inauguration of the PA" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). This agreement allowed the Israeli military to have full control over three settlement blocs of Gaza Strip, to connect all these areas with the Green line and four lateral roads were also allowed (*Frontline* 2014).

However, the significant elements of the agreement were to permit the IDF to have a presence of armed forces in and around areas which were allocated for Palestinian self-government; hold accountability for exterior security; and authority to rule the territorial passage to Egypt and the Jordan (Shlaim 2005). This agreement was the first move to regulate the Israeli withdrawal of the civil Administration and intelligence organizations from the territories of the Jericho and Gaza Strip. In another round of discussion, the negotiation converted this into a final agreement was signed by Rabin and Arafat (Europa World Yearbook 2004).

According to Shlaim (2005), the Cairo agreement paved the way for the Gaza-Jericho negotiations and created the base for the expansion of Palestinian self-government to the other parts of the West Bank. It was decided that it would happen in three stages:

1. In the first stage, accountability for culture, education, tourism, social welfare, health and direct taxation was to be handed over to the PLO;

2. The redeployment of Israeli armed force would happen in the areas that were away from 'Palestinian population centres'; and

3. Thirdly, the election would happen all over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for a fresh authority.

In February 1994, a small unit of the Palestinian (comprising 30 Palestinian soldiers) armed forces entered in the Gaza Strip from Egypt to take control of internal security after signing the agreement (Ibid.). On 29 August 1994, Israel and the PLO signed an agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities. Under this, the powers in five specified fields, namely, education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism were transferred to Palestinians (Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 1994).

Protocol on Economic Relations (Paris Protocol, 1994)

The protocol on economic relations was signed between Israel and PLO on 29 April 1994. The key objective behind signing the protocol was enhancing the cooperation in the economic domain. The protocol provided a platform "for strengthening the economic base of the Palestinian side and for exercising its right of economic decision making in accordance with its own development plan and priorities. According to Hanah Hasan (2018), the protocol followed a model known as "custom union" and its basic characteristic was the absence of "economic borders between members of the union" (Hasan 2018:1). Both the parties "recognised each other's economic ties with other markets and the need to create a better economic environment for their peoples and individuals" (Protocol on Economic Relations 1994: 1). The protocol also provided the PA various powers related to economic policy, "such as the authority to impose direct and indirect taxes, set industrial policy, establish a monetary authority to regulate financial mediation, and employ persons in the public sector" (B'tselem 2011). Furthermore, it started a gradual process of cancellation of export constraints on agricultural produce exported from the Palestinian territories to Israel that had been in effect until then and protected Israeli farmers from competition (Ibid.). The protocol noted that trade relations of the Palestinians would be handled through Israeli Airports and sea or through border crossings between the PA and Jordan and Egypt, which are also controlled by Israel (Protocol on Economic Relations 1994: 1). The protocol on economic relations remains the base of the economic framework for relations between the two, even after Al- Aqsa Intifada (Began in 2000) and Israeli disengagement from the Gaza strip in 2005. However, in July 2012, both the parties inked "a new agreement to facilitate components of the Paris Protocol" (Hasan 2018:1).

Taba Accord (Oslo II)

On one side, Israel was negotiating with the Palestinian and on the other negotiations were also moving forward on the Syrian track. Rabin's strategy was to keep the Syrian track separate from the Jordanian, Palestinian, and Lebanese tracks (Hajjar 1999). Rabin controlled the velocity of negotiations with Syria and kept it away from the other parallel negotiations. The critical issue for Syria was the full withdrawal of Israel from the Golan Heights and this meant that Syria wanted Israel to go back to the armistice lines (Shlaim 2005). In the second half of 1993, Rabin was ready to accept the Syrian conditions if Damascus was ready to meet Rabin's demand of "four legs of the table" (Ibid.). These were withdrawal, a timetable for implementation, normalisation and security arrangements but the response of Syria was unacceptable to Rabin. Though, both the countries narrowed down their differences and made considerable progress they failed to reach a final agreement (*Frontline* 2014; Shlaim 2005).

On the other side, the Israel-PLO accord led a significant impact on Jordan in comparison to other countries (Reich and Powers 2001:21). The main reason was Jordan's close connection with West Bank. A huge portion of its population was of Palestinian origin. It can also be said that the agreement between Israel and PLO started giving regional benefits to Israel. In October and November 1994, the wider West Asia was opened for Israel (Shlaim 2005)

In a significant development, just a day after the Israel-PLO accord was presented to the world, the representatives of Israel and Jordan countries signed a common agenda for negotiations (Shlaim 1994). It was inked in a ceremony was organized by the US State Department and was aimed at reaching a comprehensive peace treaty. The key components of this agenda were borders, territorial matters, water, security, Jerusalem, and refugees. On 24 October 1994, Israel and Jordan signed an official peace treaty (See Table 4:1) and this was a result of months of secret negotiations (Shlaim 2005). It was the second peace treaty, after Camp David accord (1979), between Israel and an Arab country in fifteen years. In comparison to an agreement with Egypt, the treaty with Jordan was important because it initially offered warm peace to Israel, while the agreement with Egypt offered only cold peace (*Frontline* 2014).

On 28 September 1995, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat signed the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in Washington. The event registered the presence of high-level dignitaries, such as Bill Clinton, King Hussein of Jordan and Hosni Mubarak. It was widely known as Oslo II agreement. The Interim Agreement (also Known as Taba accord) was a comprehensive agreement in its scope, containing 300 pages. The

agreement allowed Palestinian Council to have elections, legislative authority, the withdrawal of IDF from Palestinian territories (centre of the population) and divided the Palestinian territories in three-parts, namely, Area A, Area B and Area C as follow:

1. Palestinian would control Area-A and in this area, the Palestinian Authority would control full civil and security issues. The area-A contains eight cities and their surrounding areas namely, Jenin, Jericho, Nablus, Qalqilya, Tukaram, Ramallah and Bethlehem, and a huge portion of Hebron.

2. Area B contained around 23 percent of the occupied territories (consisting around 440 villages and their surrounding areas). In this area, the Palestinians would be responsible for civil functions, while Israel would take care of security issues. It was also agreed that to maintain the internal security Israel and Palestinian would petrol jointly.

3. Area C, comprising around 74 percent of the territory, would be exclusive control of Israel, comprising 145 settlements and the new Jewish neighbourhoods in and around East Jerusalem (Taba Agreement 1995: 1).

On 5 October 1995, Rabin addressed to the Knesset and presented a comprehensive survey of Taba accords. It was interesting to know that while addressing the house, he was repeatedly disrupted by the ministers of opposition. Furthermore, he was shown a black umbrella by two Likud Knesset members. During the address, Rabin highlighted the issue of the permanent settlement, which can be understood under the following points:

Figure 4.1: Division of Area A, B and C

(Source: Bickerton 2008)

1. The Jordan Valley would not be annexed but there will be the presence of Israeli military;

2. Israeli control over the huge chunk of settlements close to the 1967 border;

3. Keeping in mind the rights of other religions, Jerusalem (United) would be preserved; and

4. Palestinian territories would be demilitarized, having a status of less than a state (Shlaim 2005).

The Oslo II had approved by the Knesset with majority support but it sparked massive protests in Israel. In a huge number of demonstrators assembled in Jerusalem at Zion Square (Katz 2016; Golan 2014; Shlaim 2005; Rubenberg 2003). The Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu charged Prime Mister Rabin of "causing national humiliation by accepting the dictates of the terrorist Arafat" and named Oslo II a surrender agreement for Israel (Golan 2014; Shlaim 2005; Rubenberg 2003). On 4 November 1995, a fanatic religious nationalist Yigal Amir killed Rabin to derail the peace process. The sad demise of Rabin led a serious setback for the peace process. After the assassination of Rabin, Shimon Peres took charge of the peace process (Aronoff 2009; Bowen 2015).

On 8 December, Peres and Arafat met to restate their commitments to the Oslo agreements. As a result of this meeting Israel released 1,000 Palestinian prisoners and withdrew its troops from an additional five key Palestinian cities (*Frontline* 2014). Within Israeli security circle and the opposition, this decision was a strategic mistake which had potential to jeopardy security of Israel (Ibid.). Netanyahu's victory in May 1996 election completely changed the political realities of Israel-Palestine conflict.

According to Melissa Boyle Mahle (2004), the assassination of Rabin and Netanyahu's electoral victory in 1996 created a fresh political reality which adversely affected the peace process. The opinion polls highlighted that people of Israel were considering that the peace process was "like a train out of control" (Mahle 2004). The periodic suicide attacks by Hamas and "the assassination of Rabin by an extremist Israeli citizen opposed to the peace process made the public question whether the Interim Agreement would bring them security" (Mahle 2004:3). In response to these apprehensions, the security became the catchphrase for the Netanyahu government and decelerated the peace process.

Hebron Protocol

On 16 January 1997, in his address to the Knesset over the Hebron Protocol, Netanyahu highlighted his strategy for dealing with the PA. He said that that the government would hold direct negotiations with "the time, the ability, and the freedom for political manoeuvre" (Cited in Mahle 2004:3). The government would continue with the Palestinians, "insisting on reciprocity and security" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997). It was evident in Netanyahu's speech that any peace agreement with the Palestinian would be based on the security of the Jewish people. Next day, the Hebron protocol was signed on 17 January 1997 with the presence of US Secretary of State Warren Minor Christopher between Netanyahu and Arafat (The Hebron Protocol 1997) (See Table 4:3).

The Hebron protocol was an outcome of efforts made by the US to rescue the Oslo accords. After the assassination of Rabin, a phase of difficult time threatened the whole peace process (Andoni 1997). Netanyahu's decision of opening the Hasmonean tunnel in the old city in Jerusalem sparked violent protests in the occupied territories and further intensified into violent quarrels between IDF and Palestinian police (Hirschberg 1998; Andoni 1997). All these incidents brought the peace process closer to a total failure. The opening of the Hasmonean tunnel in the old city and construction of new settlements in Jerusalem was an attempt to delegitimize Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem (Mahle 2004:3).

The militants in the Palestinian territories quickly took advantage of this situation and mass protests started in Jerusalem (Kimmerling 2009). It was the first time when the Palestinian police directly took arms against the IDF and took lives of 59 Palestinians and 16 Israelis and hundreds of more got injured (*Frontline* 2014). To stop violence and resume negotiations, the US President Bill Clinton invited Arafat and Netanyahu to Washington. King Hussein of Jordan was also asked to join the talks. By the end of the talks, both the parties agreed to resume the implementation of the Oslo agreements (Mahle 2004:3).

The protocol said that both parties had approved the redeployment in Hebron and noted that the redeployment of IDF would take place in accordance with the Interim Agreement and Hebron protocol (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997). This redeployment would be carried out within the ten days from the signing of this Protocol. The protocol divided the security responsibility between the two parties; the Palestinians would control the Area H-1 (about 80 percent) while Israel would manage Area H-2. The redeployment of the forces

began on 16 January 1997. The protocol started the third partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the peopled territories of the West Bank (Ibid.).

The protocol allowed special security arrangements in the areas under the Palestinian control. According to the protocol:

> 1. With a view to ensuring mutual security and stability in the City of Hebron, special security arrangements will apply adjacent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel, in Area H-1 (See image 4.2); in the area between the Palestinian Police checkpoints delineated on the map attached to this Protocol and the areas under the security responsibility of Israel.
>
> 2. The purpose of the above-mentioned checkpoints will be to enable the Palestinian Police, exercising their responsibilities under the Interim Agreement, to prevent the entry of armed persons and demonstrators or other people threatening security and public order, into the abovementioned area (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997: US Department of State 1997).

It was agreed that the Palestinian police positions would be "manned by up to 400 policemen equipped with 20 vehicles and armed with 200 pistols, and 100 rifles for the protection of the police stations" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997). Both parties also agreed to a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). The Hebron protocol was not a new agreement but rather the steps required to implement an agreement which was already settled over a year earlier (Andoni 1997).

Wye River Memorandum (1998)

To keep Oslo Process alive, the US President Clinton organized the Wye River Summit during 15-23 October 1998 (See Table 4:3). The objective of the memorandum concluded at the end was to continue the implementation of the Oslo II accords on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (The Wye River Memorandum 1998). Memorandum underlined that Israel would withdraw from the areas of the West Bank in return of Palestinian security arrangement.

It also mentioned that "the PA will have shared responsibility for 40 percent of the West Bank, of which it will have complete control of 18.2 percent" (Wye River Memorandum 1998). Palestinians have ensured the systematic combating of terrorist organizations and their infrastructure. According to *The Time* (1998) "the Wye talks aimed to craft agreements on issues ranging from anti-terror measures to be taken by the PA and land transfers by Israel to ensure that the process remained on track" (*The Time* 1998).

Image: 4.2 H1 and H2 Areas in Hebron

Note: This map is not authoritative regarding the Hebron Protocol but is intended for illustration only.

(Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997)

According to memorandum Israel agreed to withdraw its troops from a further 13 percent of territory West Bank (1 percent from Area A and 12 percent from Area B), in three stages, within a period three months, in return for an assurance by the PNA to curb terror and abolish weapons stock and act against anti-Israel agitation. Both the parties also agreed on the release of Palestinian prisoners (Ibid.).

On the one hand, both the parties were discussing various issues related to security, redeployment, and territorial transfer. For its part, the US assured that the PA would take measures regarding the provisions in the PLO charter regarding the destruction of Israel and terrorism. Wye River Memorandum was a combination of Israel's old security concerns and the Palestinian economic problems and was a repetition of old agendas (Thrall 2017).

Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum 1999

The Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum was signed on 4 September 1999 (See Table 4:1) between Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Arafat (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). It was another attempt by both the parties (Israel and PA) under the supervision of the US, to save the Oslo process. The key agenda of the memorandum was to situate a schedule for the implementation of commitments agreed by both sides under the Oslo Accords, as well as the continuation of permanent status negotiations (The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre 2009).

The memorandum aimed at the production of two agreements, namely, a Framework Agreement on all Permanent Status Issues (FAPS) and the Comprehensive agreement on all Permanent Status Issues (CAPS) (Economic Cooperation Foundation 1999). It pushed both parties to act instantly and effectively against any acts of terrorism, violence or incitement and arrangements for cooperation. In this regard, it "also sets out a series of specific security obligations of the Palestinian side under the Wye Memorandum, including the collection of illegal weapons, the apprehension of terrorist suspects and the forwarding of a list of Palestinian policemen to the Israeli side for review by the Monitoring and Steering Committee" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999).

Particularly, it aimed at further redeployments of the IDF and the release of about 200 Palestinian prisoners and to resume negotiations to reach a permanent settlement within a year. Supplementary clauses in the memorandum concerned with "the operation of the Safe

Passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, coming into operation via another protocol the following month; construction of the Gaza Sea Port; and issues relating to Hebron and security matters" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). An early round of meetings, however, accomplished nothing, and by December the Palestinians suspended talks over settlement activities in the occupied territories. Barak's priority was to conduct negotiations with Syria and hence slowed down the new timelines of IDF redeployments and finally, Israel implemented another phase of 13 percent redeployment guaranteed in the Wye River Memorandum (Iqbal 2014).

Hamas and Oslo Process

Hamas was an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and as a Sunni Muslim militant Palestinian organization which was established in 1987 by members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza Strip (briefly discussed in chapter 3). It is designated as a terror outfit by the US and the European Union (The U.S. State Department 1997; Dearden 2017). The terror strikes launched against the civilians as well as the military personnel made Hamas a critical security threat for Israel. It does not recognize Israel's right to exist and its goal is to set up an Islamic state on the whole of historical Palestine (Terrorinfo 2017).

The leadership structure of Hamas is divided into two branches; the first is the inner circle, which runs the organization in Gaza Strip and is responsible for the day-to-day activities guiding the external leadership located outside its territories (Satloff 2006). The second part is the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade the military wing that has the responsibility to launch terror attacks against Israel, "including rocket, mortar and suicide bombing attacks" (Kimhi and Even 2004:815-840). The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade of Hamas has conducted many terror strikes against Israel, repetitively explaining them a retaliation of the acts against the IDF, specifically in revenge for assassinations of the high ranks of headship (Ibid.).

Table 4.3: The List of Agreements Known as the Oslo Accords

SN	Agreements	Date
1	Israel- PLO Mutual Recognition	9- 10 September 1993
2	Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government	13 September 1993
4	Protocol on Economic Relations (Paris)	29 April 1994
5	Cairo Agreement (Gaza and Jericho Agreement)	4 May 1994
6	Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities	29 August 1994
7	Oslo II, Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip	28 September 1995
8	Protocol Regarding the Redeployment in Hebron	15 January 1996
9	Wye River Memorandum	23 October 1998
10	Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum	4 September 1999

(Source: Adapted from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

To attack the Israeli civilians and soldiers, it has adopted various strategies such as stabbing, suicide bombing, rocket attacks, ramming attacks through vehicle and shooting (Halevy 2014). Its rocket storage largely consisting of homemade short-range Qassam rocket (Range 48 Km) and long-range weaponry acquired from neighbouring countries such as Iran and former Soviet Union (Dehghan 2012). Its shorter-range arsenal includes Grad, heavy mortars, and Qassam rockets with ranges of up to 17 to 48 km (30 miles) (Startfor 2014). This range is enough to threaten the Israeli southern towns and cities, such as Sderot, Ashkelon and Beersheba and the port of Ashdod. It also has the longer range Fajr-5 missile which can target up to 75 km. It can easily target Israeli major population centres like Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (Marcus 2014: Dayan 2008). In the 2014 conflict, the IDF uncovered that Hamas has even longer-range systems as well. This longer-range system thought to be a Syrian built-missile-Khaibar-1, which has a range 160 km and can easily target Israel's northern coastal city of Haifa from the Gaza Strip (Dayan 2008; Marcus 2014).

Since its inception, Hamas was against the Oslo accords because these agreements were a strategic threat to its very existence (Mishal and Sela 2000). Its reaction to the DoP was complete denial and rejection and it made clear that it would use arms to destroy the agreements (Usher 1995). Beverly Milton-Edwards (2005) noted that Hamas was against the Oslo Accords in the same manner as it was against the Madrid conference of 1991. For Hamas peace negotiations were a west-motivated plan which benefited only Israel. It quarrelled that Oslo was signed by unpredictable Palestinian leaders and was not even successful in protecting the fundamental Palestinian rights (Baconi 2015:5). Hamas said that it "was the most dangerous agreement on the Palestinian cause and the rights of our people" (*Ha'aretz* 2011).

According to Hamas

> [T]he Oslo Accords have transformed the Palestinian struggle from one in which the people seek liberation from occupation to one limited to the rights of minorities within the Zionist entity. It has transformed the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from a liberation movement into a tool which can be used to repress the Palestinian people and protect the occupying Zionist entity (Cited in Baconi 2015:5).

The Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO radically altered the strategic realities for Hamas.According to Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela (2000) "the more real this threat seemed- as a result of the progress in the diplomacy between Israel and the PA- the more willing Hamas was to resort to armed struggle despite the risk to its dialogue with the PA"

(Mishal and Sela 2000: 72). According to Avraham Sela, 'Oslo was a major blow to Hamas' (Quoted in Bayman 2011:100). Mishal described Oslo as "the funeral of the Palestinian cause," because he felt that it was a surrender of the Palestinian patrimony. Hamas was unable to digest these developments because its leadership feared of losing ground because its political influence was not effective as it adopted terror attacks as a tool to disrupt the peace process.

For this reason, the Hamas enrolled with other fundamentalist groups to establish a rejectionist force which called for the prolongation of jihad against Israel (Baconi 2015:5). Hamas positioned itself as the anti-peace opposition party and its strength was dependent on the rise and fall of the peace process, and it used terrorism to help make the negotiations fail (Bayman 2011:100). Therefore, under the leadership of Yahya Ayyash, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade started a chain of suicide bombing attacks against Israel which continued for many years. These attacks were termed by Hamas as 'trademark' or 'signature' operations and were aimed at derailing the Palestinians from the diplomatic route and push them towards active resistance or Jihadi terrorism (Ibid: 5).

On 6 April and 13 April 1994, just before signing the Cairo agreement on the formation of a self-governing Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, the military wing of Hamas launched two suicide terror attacks in Afula and Hedera. Hamas portrayed them as revenge attacks for the massacre of Muslim pilgrims in Hebron on 25 February by Jewish religious extremist Baruch Goldstein. According to Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela (2000), these operations were intended to boost Hamas's negotiating power "regarding the anticipated PLO-based PA, by pressuring Arafat to reckon with Hamas and seek political coexistence with it" (Ibid.).

On 5 September 1995, Hamas came out with a leaflet where it denounced the Oslo accords and urged the Palestinians not to be misled by the Palestinian leadership and noted that leadership under Arafat would do its best to prove that the DOP an excellent opportunity. The leaflet added:

> … We will, therefore, insist on ruining this agreement and continue the resistance struggle and our Jihad against the occupation power. We reject any action which will lead to a Palestinian civil war, not least because the consequence would only benefit our Zionist enemy. The leadership of Arafat carries the responsibility for 37 destroying the Palestinian society and for sowing the seeds of discord and division among the Palestinians (Jensen 2002:45).

Hamas saw the Israel-PA peace process as an obstacle to its ambition as a mass movement. According to Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela (2000) in Israel voices were asking for its proscription because Israel recognizes it as a terror group triggered Hamas and the Islamic Jihad to use extreme brutality in opposition to Israel. They urged their followers to launch a "wave of suicide terror attacks in Tel-Aviv (by Hamas) and Ha-Sharon Junction (by the Islamic Jihad) in October 1994, and January 1995" (Mishal and Sela 2000: 72-73).

On the other hand, there was a lack of transparency and consistency in Arafat's policy towards Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In public, he used to condemn the militant operations of the Islamic opposition but was covertly making concessions to them. Arafat allowed Hamas to publish the official al *Risala* (weekly) and to organize rallies (Ibid.). According to Melissa Boyle Mahle (2004), Arafat allotted a Hamas leader to be a minister of youth and sports in his cabinet. Arafat's attempts to deal with terrorism were contradictory. The PA used to coordinate with Israel's arrest campaigns but used to release those people who were arrest quietly, many of these people were from military cells and military-wing of terror groups (Mahle 2004).

According to a data provided by the Israeli government, between September 1993 and December 1996 "a total of 202 Israeli people lost their lives in terrorist attacks compared to 164 during the period from December 1987 up until the signing (of DoP). Suicide bombs alone killed 128 and injured 638. Together, Hamas and Islamic Jihad took responsibility for correspondingly 80 fatalities and 395 injured and 48 killed and 243 injured. From this, we can infer that perpetrating attacks against Israel came to represents an important aspect of the resistance to Oslo" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).

In 1994, the wave of suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad killed 65 people (including one foreigner) (See Table 4.5). In the first half of 1995, Hamas launched two suicide bombing campaign in Ramat Gan and Jerusalem, which coincide with the final phase of the Israeli-PA negotiations over withdrawal from all primary Palestinian towns in the West Bank, and the general elections for the PA's Council afterward. On the one hand, in the second half of the 1990s, Hamas was persistently engaged in the *fedayeen* attacks against Israel and on the other, it was constantly working on socio-economic aspects of its existence inside the Palestinian areas and to stay alive form the Israeli-PA security crack-down (Baconi 2015:5).

The PA also helped Hamas to expand its hands at various places. As Uri Savir (1998) noted in the initial weeks of the Palestinian self-rule in Gaza Strip, it was clear that Arafat and his

men were not using their new power base to destroy Hamas and other violent players. By the end of the 1990s, Hamas had completely established itself as a military and political entity, one which was involved in various terror attacks on Israeli civilians. Furthermore, from 2000 to 2004, Hamas killed nearly 400 Israelis and wounding more than 2,000 in 425 attacks. From 2001 through May 2008, it launched more than 3,000 Qassam rockets and 2,500 mortar attacks on Israel, mainly from the Gaza Strip (Cited in Fox News 2008).

Palestine Islamic Jihad

Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was another challenge for the progress in the peace process. PIJ was inspired by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and its founders were disaffected members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They realised that the Brotherhood's gradualist approach was ineffective to achieve Muslim goals (Mannes 2004). The PIJ believed that violence was a necessary step towards defeating Israel and creating an Islamic Palestinian state (Bayman 2011). According to PIJ, The destruction of Israel is the necessary first step towards greater Jihad and ultimate Islamic governance.

The PJI is one of the few Sunni Muslim movements inspired by Shiite Iran (Mannes 2004). Unlike Hamas, its focus was not largely centred on grassroots social changes and made only a token effort to run hospitals, schools, and social welfare organizations (Bayman 2011; Mannes 2004). Although it was a very small organization, it led to significant pressure on Hamas as well as on the peace process (Mannes 2004). The leaders of this moment, Fathi Abd al-Aziz Shiqaqi, Abd al-Aziz and Bashir Musa were primarily inspired by the 1979 Islamist Revolution and felt this modal was more suitable to adopt in the Palestinian territories (Bayman 2011; Mannes 2004). The organization was heavily depended on its founder and long-time leader, Fathi al-Shiqaqi. He was the core of the organization-the recruiter, the fundraiser, and the planner (Bayman 2011).

Since the early 1990s, PIJ's military wing, the Al Quds Brigades, has been responsible for dozens of suicide bombings against Israeli targets. One of its most serious operations was in 1995 when its members targeted IDF soldiers in Netanya (January 1995), killing eighteen soldiers and one civilian (Fletcher 2008) and, in a second attack, the emergency services' personnel who responded, thereby killing 22 Israelis (Bayman 2011; Wilson Centre 2018). The same year, Shiqaqi was assassinated in Malta, reportedly by Mossad. He was replaced by one of his deputies, Ramadan Shalah and in October 1997, the US designated PIJ as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (Wilson Centre2018).

Table 4.4: Suicide Bombings against Israel during 1993-2002

S.N	Year	Numbers of Bombings
1	1993	2
2	1994	5
3	1995	4
4	1996	4
5	1997	3
6	1998	2
7	1999	2
8	2000	5
9	2001	40
10	2002	47
11	2003	23
12	2004	17
13	2005	9
14	2006	3
15	2007	1
16	2008	2
17	2009- 2014	0
18	2015	1
19	2016	1

(Source: Developed from available literature from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019)

According to Bayman (2011), Shiqaqi spent most of his time hiding out in Damascus, and Israel did not target him there for fear of jeopardizing ongoing negotiations with Syria. On 26 October 1995, the assassination of Shiqaqi devastated the group, leaving it leaderless for several years. The former Mossad head Shabtai Shavit contends, "Shiqaqi was Islamic Jihad and Islamic Jihad was Shiqaqi". After Shiqaqi, Ramadan Shalah led the group but the difference between Shalah and Shiqaqi was "night and day" (Bayman 2011). Shalah had less support within Hamas and did not have the same skill at operations, making PIJ far less effective. After Shiqaqi's death, the PA and Israeli crackdown on PIJ operatives and the continued popular hope that negotiations would succeed resulted in decreasing support for PIJ (Ibid.).

The group maintained close ties with the other extremist groups functional in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran because of its emphasis on pan-Islamic ideology. Since 1981, PIJ has been able to develop its bases in the Gaza Strip and successfully influenced intellectuals and students. The group started cooperating with Hamas after 1993 when it switched to suicide attacks against Israeli civilians (Gupta and Mundra 2007). The PIJ believes that the conflict between Arab and Israeli nationalism is an ideological conflict not territorial and violence is the only way to 'remove' Israel from West Asia (Abū 'Amr 1994). It rejects the two-state settlement in which Israel and Palestine would coexist and does not want political representation within the PA (Young and Kent 2013).

The outcome of the Oslo process was favourable for the PLO. During the process, the popularity of PLO significantly increased among the Palestinians and it became the sole representative of the Palestinian people (Kepel 2006). This development threatened its ideological rivals, Hamas and PIJ and in response, they started a vicious battle against Israel and the peace process.

According to Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra (2005) in particular, these groups "discovered the power of suicide attacks. These attacks succeeded in inflicting deep damage not only on Israeli politics but also, for the first time, the cruel equation of relative losses turned against the Israelis" (Ibid.:578). Responding to these suicide attacks, Israel adopted aggressive measures of collective punishment, which alienated a big section of the Palestinian population "to whom any peaceful coexistence with the Jewish state lost its appeal" (Ibid.).

Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra (2005) noted:

> Ehud Barak's defeat and the election of Ariel Sharon saw the formal end of the process of a negotiated peace. Seeing the prospect of losing the global recognition of being the sole representative of the Palestinian people as well as losing political clout among its constituents, a number of factions within the PLO umbrella organization (e.g., the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, the Fatah-Tanzim, and the PFLP) started following the path of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and decided to carry out the most successful of the violent strategies, suicide bombings (Ibid.:578).

Oslo and Its Impact on the Israeli Security

The Oslo process was premised on Israel's security concerns. The key agenda for the policymakers during the peace process was to achieve security through diplomacy. The approach during the process was largely dominated by the 'security first approach' (Khan 2005). It broadly covered a range of security conditions which Israel insisted during the 'interim period' before the establishment of a Palestinian political entity. It means a partial, phased and conditional Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories when the final borders are not yet defined (Khan 2005). Furthermore, "Palestinians would have to follow a strict code of non-aggression against Israel and Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. On the other hand, Israel may continue to carry out security operations, necessary for its survival" (Khan 2005:65).

According to Dan Diker (2008) in 1993 Israel changed its traditional "security-based diplomacy" approach to foreign relations. This approach had dominated Israel's defence doctrine from 1967 until 1993. Instead, a doctrine of "diplomacy-based security" came to existence and subjected the diplomatic thinking of Israel. According to this new strategy, the peace agreements were thought to be the assurance of security and safety of Israel (Diker 2008:129). The success of this new strategy was based on the cooperation from PA which said that it would dismantle all the terror threats within Palestinian territories that posed security threats to Israel (Ibid.).

Following the Oslo agreements, Israel withdrew gradually from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to allow PA to take control over these areas. Besides, it allowed PA to enforce its rule and authority via a police force which was armed with the weapons provided by Israel. The assumption was that weapons would be used to retain public order and to fight terrorism (Karsh 2016).

Rabin thought that the PA would tackle terrorism more efficiently than Israelis could ever do because it would operate without constraints imposed by "human rights groups and the Israeli Supreme Court" (Rabin Quoted in Hellman 2018). According to Hellman (2018), for the Israeli policymakers, the Oslo agreement was an anti-terrorism alliance between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Hellman 2018). In other words, under the Oslo arrangements, Israel wanted Palestinians to deal with Israeli security issues. It entirely relied on the Palestinians for its security concerns but forgot that Israel itself failed to address these security issues effectively.

On the other hand, the Palestinian agreed on renouncing the violence. The PLO assured that it would not allow citizens to possess or use the weapons. It would help in arresting the terrorists and combat their infrastructure and would not have heavy weapons such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, mortars and any other lethal weapons those were not needed to fight against terrorism or to maintain civil order (Israeli 2003:240).

However, in a very short period, it was clear that Arafat was unable to stop terrorism against Israel (Bayman 2011). The details of Arafat's return to Gaza Strip were a blowback to counterterrorism effort. In his first visit to Gaza Strip, he smuggled people those were most-wanted in Israel along with weapons. He smuggled Jihad Amarin, who allegedly had planned the 1974 attack on a school in Ma'alot that killed twenty-two, Israeli students. He "had a few Kalashnikov rifles and night-vision equipment in the car" (Quoted in Bayman 2011). According to Denial Bayman (2011), "it was Arafat's way of showing his people that even though he made concessions at the negotiating table, he was not Israel's stooge" (Ibid.:90).

Following the Oslo, the number of Israeli casualties from terrorist attacks turned out to be several-fold higher than the toll from the pre-Oslo period (Savir 1998; Israel 2003; Amidror 2004; Levin 2004). According to Uri Savir (1998), in the initial weeks of the Palestinian self-rule in Gaza Strip, it was clear that Arafat and his men were not using their new power base to destroy Hamas and other violent groups. On 24 August 2017, Rabin met with Arafat and asked him to do his job properly (Savir 1998). According to Savir, Rabin told him "it's your takes a strong decision (Ibid.). During the first six months of the PA rule, 15 Israeli people were killed and 8 of them were killed in areas surrounded with Gaza Strip. During the meeting, Robin told Arafat that he had to deal with the fundamentalist extremism (Ibid.). To teach a lesson Arafat he even, sealed off the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1994. If the PLO

was unable to prevent terrorism and IDF was not allowed to fight it in the areas under Palestinian control, then all Palestinian had to deny access to Israel for their jobs (Ibid.).

In October 1994 things became more serious when a 19 years old Israeli soldier, Corporal Nachshon Watchsman was kidnapped at a hitchhiking post (Erlanger 2006; Savir 1998). The Israeli policymakers and military elite tried for his safe return and there were talks about releasing Sheikh Yasin (Founder and the Head of Hamas) from the Israeli prison (Savir 1998). At a time when Arab members of Knesset were mediating between Arafat and Islamic movement in Gaza Strip, Israeli security forces discovered that Watchsman was being held by Hamas not in the autonomous Gaza Strip but in Bir Naballah in the West Bank which was under Israel's control (Erlanger 2006; Savir 1998; Bayman 2011). Many rounds negotiations took place but once it became clear that that mediation had failed Rabin decided to take military rescue option (Savir 1998). Unfortunately, the Israeli army was unable to rescue Watchsman. Five days after Watchsman was shot by his captors, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a bus near Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv, which killed 22 people (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994).

In 1994, the wave of suicide attacks carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad killed 37 people (one foreigner) (See Table 4.6) (Baconi 2015:5). It was ironic that when Israel opted for diplomacy to achieve security, the numbers of causalities went up rapidly. From September 1993 to December 1996, 202 Israelis lost their lives in terrorist attacks compared to 164 during the period from December 1987 up until the signing. Together, Hamas and Islamic Jihad took responsibility for correspondingly 80 fatalities and 395 injured and 48 killed and 243 injured (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a).

According to Yaakov Amidror (2004), security arrangements were the heart of the Oslo accords but the rapid emergence of violence after the signing stunned the policymakers. According to many experts, the Accords created favourable situations for radical Palestinians to prepare for terror attacks against Israel and limited Israel's options to act against them (Amidror 2004; Inbar 2013; Karsh 2016). Kenneth Levin (2004) noted that after signing the Oslo Accords, the acts of terror persistently continued. From September 1993 to 1 July 1994 when Arafat entered the territory, 50 Israeli people were killed in the terrorist attacks, including 13 in the two bus bombings in April 1994. Correspondingly terror attacks by Palestinian groups had taken 400 lives in 26 years from the 1967 war until the inception of Oslo (Karsh 2016).

According to Dan Schueftan (2019), the impact of Oslo on Israeli security was considerable but its impact on national security was much deeper. It was mainly due to thinking that whether it was legitimate and fruitful to engage with the radical enemy, expecting that they would provide security to Israel. According to him, it was the impact of Oslo that the Labour Party was seen very weak because people felt that they were cheated by the left parties. The hopes of peace in the Oslo accords proved unrealistic. The objective in the Oslo accords was unrealistic and policy makers were seen to be irresponsibly gambling with the life of Israelis (Schueftan 2019).

According to Evelyn Gordon (2017), the casualties of civilians during the peace process underlined that the Palestinians had deliberately violated the promise that it made in both the "Oslo Accord and every subsequent accord–an end to Palestinian terror". Though Israel made various substantial concessions to the PLO on the ground, Palestinians were not able to return "one quid pro quo" that was promised to the Israeli leadership, namely, an end to terrorism (Gordon 2017; Karsh 2016). Israel handed over full Gaza strip and 40 percent of the West Bank by 1996. It released around 15,000 Palestinian prisoners (Gordon 2017; Karsh 2016). According to Gordon (2017), peace not only failed to thwart terrorism but provided a flourishing ground to train and organize attacks with impunity. As a result, terror in the West Bank raised significantly "in the first decade after Oslo but began falling again after the Israel Defence Forces reasserted security control over the area in 2002" (Gordon 2017:2).

According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013), since 1948, terror attacks have taken the lives of more than 3,100 Israelis. From 1949 to 1992, in 44 years terrorists killed 1,176 Israeli citizens. But in the post-Oslo period (1994), 1,538 people lost their lives in the terror attacks. It was the considerably larger figure in a shorter period. Before Oslo, the average numbers of Israelis killed in terrorist attacks were 27 people per year. It radically altered in the post-Oslo period, where an average of 66 people per year, almost two and half times higher in comparison to the pre-Oslo period (See Table 4.4) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). While harshly criticising the Palestinian for creating a national security nightmare for Israel, Evelyn Gordon (2017) noted that in the post-Oslo period causality figures highlighted that the "Palestinians blatantly violated the promise they made Israel in both the original Oslo Accord and every subsequent accord–an end to Palestinian terror" (Gordon 2017).

Table 4.5: Deaths Toll In Terror Attacks: A Comparison between the 1980s And 1990s

In the 1980s	Deaths
1980	16
1981	14
1982	6
1983	21
1984	9
1985	27
1986	14
1987	11
1988	16
1989	40
1980s total = 174	
In the 1990s	**Deaths**
1990	33
1991	21
1992	34
1993	45
1994	65
1995	29
1996	56
1997	41
1998	16
1999	8
1990s total = 348	

(Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a)

The numbers of casualties since Arafat's arrival in the Gaza Strip in 1994 included 87 Israelis and three tourists Israel. Out of the 64 dead, three non-Israeli Jews were killed in the bombings (Levin 2004: 346) and19 of this killing occurred in Gaza Strip and were perpetrated by residents of the areas under the control of the PA. In addition, many of the other attacks, including the bombing, were the work of groups whose infrastructures and training facilities existed in Gaza Strip or were carried out by people recruited in the Gaza Strip. It was apparent that Arafat was unable to disarm Hamas and Islamic Jihad or dismantle their infrastructures. While he occasionally made arrests of the people who were involved in the terror activities but they were often released after some time (Ibid.).

According to Amidror (2004), it was dreadful that the most of negotiators were from the military background- experienced, professional and war veterans but they failed to calculate that the Oslo accords would provide a platform for a section of Palestinians to establish 'terror factory'. Before 2000, Israeli security experts who were in the policymaking thought about two types of security.

1. A conventional military threat from the eastern front.

2. A terrorist threat from the section of the Palestinian who was against the accords (Rejectionist Group) secular and religious, within the Palestinian territories (Amidror 2004).

Regarding conventional threat, the policy was that security arrangements should not restrain the IDF from protecting itself against a threat which emanates from the eastern border. It meant two things:

1. During the time of peace, the IDF deployment in the territories would be limited with may be two or three early warning in indicators

2. During the time of emergency, Israel would be allowed to install forces in specified territories of the West Bank which were identified critical for Israel's defence. This installation of forces would take place only after Israel proved to the US that there was compelling real and imminent needs to act (Ibid.).

Regarding the terrorist threats, the security experts believed that Israeli-Palestinian collaboration and Palestinian self-interest would offer a sufficient response. Practically this meant:

1. The primary responsibility for the fight against terrorism in the Palestinian-controlled areas was handed over to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its security organizations;

2. Israel agreed to act together with PA security apparatuses by providing intelligence without breaching quasi-sovereignty of the Palestinians;

3. Israel would be having a limited role at international transit points, such as seaports and airports and this would be an invisible presence so that Israel would not infringe on the quasi-sovereignty Palestinians; and

4. The responsibility for protecting external borders with Egypt and Jordan would be rested in the hands of Palestinians, with some assistance from international forces (Amidror 2004)

Daniel Byman (2011) noted that Israel hoped that Oslo would transform the Palestinian security organizations into an arm of Israeli police and intelligence services. It was expected that Palestinians would do a better job in the comparison to the Israelis because they knew their community better than Israeli Security Services. However, it became a nightmare following a spate of terror attacks (Amidror 2004; Byman 2011). According to Efraim Inbar (1996), the peace process enhanced Israel's security by significantly reducing the military threat from Arab states. It reduced the possibility of war in the short-term future but demanded a price from "Israel in the term of strategic assets such as territories, which weakened Israel's defensive posture over the long run" (Inbar 1996:41). The Israeli withdrawal from areas of the West Bank reduced Israel's ability to defend the vital areas, such as, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa, in the event of an attack from the East (Dayan 2012; Inbar 1996; Shlaim 2005).

It was clearly visible that the Israeli security strategy in the West Bank was largely dependent on the PLO led PA's actions against the Israeli security concerns. However, the PLO's economic situation was the biggest obstacle in fulfilling these security concerns. At the time signing the agreement organization's economic situation was terrible (Rynhold 2008). This

was mainly because of its response to the Kuwait crisis and corruption within the organization (*Al-Jazeera* 2009). Apart from financial constraints, Arafat used the security establishment to implement his strategy of divide-to-rule. In the Palestinian ruled territories, he developed a system where the top officials of the security forces accountable only to him (Lutz 2017). These top officials often were involved in the internal rivalry in their operations, ending as bloody clashes. Furthermore, there was a clear lack of inter-agency cooperation between the Palestinian agencies. It led to a visible waste of resources and insufficient outcome during the operation (Ibid.).

As noted earlier the corruption was widespread at the political level. It divided the PA leadership internally as well externally (Lia 2007). It was mainly because of the large numbers of Fatah people in the Army. This divide led to "the Black Friday in Gaza in November 1994, when Palestinian police fired live ammunition at civilian demonstrators killing 13 and wounding another 200, or the arresting and torturing of the opposition" (Frisch 2008). Under such a condition it was difficult for the PA to deliver all the security concerns of Israel (Lutz 2017; Rynhold 2008). It was an unrealistic expectation on the part of the Israeli policymakers that the PLO despite having serious economic, logistical and leadership shortcoming, would fulfil its security concerns (Schueftan 2018).

Impact of Handing over Territorial Control on Israeli Security

Territorial control is a crucial pillar in fighting against terrorism. It has significant importance in gathering information against the threats. For any country in the world, in the absence of territorial control, it is difficult to monitor and arrest terror suspects, take measure to understand the techniques of terror groups and to make it difficult for them to reach their objectives (Indor cited in Miskin 2013).

In the absence of control of territory which generates possible terror threats, security forces are in physical danger. It gives the opportunity to terror outfits to recover easily from counter-terror operations (Amidror 2004). At a time, when Israel was maintaining territorial control of populated areas of Gaza Strip and West Bank, its defence against the terrorists were the cities and towns, where the terrorists were operational. In the absence of such control, the line of defence for Israel was its towns and cities and this gave the terror groups a kind of surety in their operations because they generally target civilian areas (Karsh 2016; Amidror 2004).

According to many Israeli scholars, the Oslo agreements surrendered the Israeli control over Palestinian populated areas (Tolan 2015; Amidror 2004; Karsh 2016). This concession allowed section Palestinians to launch a guerrilla war against Israel which cost around 900 Israeli lives in the first three years of signing the agreements (Amidror 2004). It is important to understand that most of the people, who were killed in these terror attacks, were civilians. It forced Israel to reassert the control of these territories of West Bank and Gaza Strip but by the time this was done it had already consumed many innocent lives (Karsh 2016; Amidror 2004). If comparing it with Israel's military deployment in Lebanon for final seventeen months during the 1982 War, Israel just lost 21 soldiers, which was far smaller than the people who were killed in single terror attacks in the post- Oslo period (Amidror 2004).

Another setback for Israeli security was the absence of territorial control which provided space for violent Palestinians (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) an opportunity to enhance their capability for military strikes against Israel. During the First Intifada, the control of whole West Bank and Gaza Strip was in the hands of IDF (Amidror 2004). Despite military challenges, IDF could manage the conflict with light weapons such as gun and nightsticks, without using tanks, armed personnel carrier, helicopter, or F 16s. But the moment, PA took responsibility for the security of these areas, it started building an installation for starting the long-range assault on Israel. This strategy also increased the Israeli causalities (Barnea 2008; Amidror 2004).

According to Amidror (2004) during the 69 months of the Intifada, Israeli casualties were 160 (killed), but in the first 36 months of the post-Camp David period, around 900 people were killed (Ibid 2004:35). This difference was an outcome of the Oslo security concept that divested Israel's ability to fight against terror actively. On the other hand, it gave the opportunity to violent groups that were functional in the Palestinian territories to reunite and operate against Israel (Amidror 2004).

From the security viewpoint, the Palestinian-controlled areas turned into a safe haven for violent groups during 1993-2002 and challenged the Israeli national security planning (Amidror 2004; Savir 2004; Karsh 2016; Bayman 2011). It forced the IDF to retake control of the territories from where it had withdrawn following the Oslo accords. From a national security point of view, the 1993-2000 period highlighted an important lesson from joint patrolling (Amidror 2004). In the six years of shared joint patrol and combined headquarters added nothing to a mutual understanding of both the parties. The joint patrol did not provide

any barrier to terrorists (See table 4.4 which highlights the rapid escalation of suicide attacks in the post-Oslo period) (Ibid.).

Under the provisions of Oslo agreements, both parties agreed that Israel would strengthen the Palestinian security and intelligence organizations. It was expected that it would help the PA to fight against terrorism (Amidror 2004; Savir 2004; Karsh 2016). Unfortunately, this did not happen in the post-Oslo period; even in some cases, the PA itself was involved in terror purveyor. It actively participated in the Hasmonean Tunnel riots in 1997 and in initiating violent situation in the post-Camp David period leading to Al-Aqsa Intifada (Amidror 2004). According to Amidror, Israel should have restricted the Palestinian security forces to the weak and small force competent to provide only basic police functions. This kind of force would have contributed to stability and peace in Palestine as well as Israel.

According to Efraim Karsh (2016) the Oslo 'peace process' significantly deteriorated, the postures of Israel and Palestine "made the prospects for peace and reconciliation ever more" difficult. It led to the formation of an ineradicable terror entity in front of Israel. The Israeli policymakers were confident that the DoP would end three decades of PLO violence and alter the organization immediately "from one of the world's most murderous terror groups into a political actor and state builder" (Karsh 2016:3). This proved naïve and ill-informed. On the other hand, the Oslo intensified Israel's internal divisions, political system and weakened its international standing (Karsh 2016). According to Karsh, it had been "a disaster for West Bank and Gaza Palestinians too. It has brought about subjugation to corrupt and repressive PLO and Hamas regimes" (Ibid; 1).

Karsh blamed the Palestinian leadership's perception for the failure of the process as a pathway, not for a two-state solution but to the subversion of the state of Israel. According to him the Palestinian did not view Oslo as a way to achieve "nation-building and state creation, but to the formation of a brutal terror entity that perpetuates conflict with Israel, while keeping its hapless constituents in constant and bewildered awe as Palestinian leaders lines their pockets from the proceeds of this misery" (Ibid.). While highlighting the impact of Oslo on Israeli national security, he underlined key respects.

1. On the security levels, it permitted the PLO to reach its strategic objective to transform the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into a base for terrorists which would interrupt Israel day to day life;

2. On the diplomatic and political levels, it transformed the PLO and, to a lesser extent Hamas, as an accepted political actor at international level and continued its policy of destruction of Israel, "edging towards fully-fledged statehood outside the Oslo framework, and steadily undermining Israel's international standing" (Ibid.).

3. On the domestic level, agreement radicalized the Arab minority living within the territories of Israel.

According to Meir Indor, head of the Almagor Group for Victims of Terrorism, the Oslo process brought terrorism to Israel and noted "the first issue was transferring control over security, including counter-terror operations, to the hands of the Palestinian Authority. While there was a precedent of sorts – Israel had transferred much of the responsibility for security in southern Lebanon to the South Lebanon Army – the situation with the PA was different because it gave the PA far more autonomy than the SLA had" (Indor cited in Miskin 2013).

The handing over the security control to the PA did not slow down the terror activities in the PA-controlled areas but had an opposite effect and resulted in the killing of many Israeli civilians after the Oslo Accords. It was even three times more than the casualties witnessed during the First Intifada when the IDF still patrolled the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Ibid.). Indor highlighted the three causes that led to terrorism:

1. Transfer of the territory stopped the IDF to arrest terrorists and collect information;

2. The Israeli decision of providing weapons to Palestinians led to at least ten percent going to terrorism; and

3. The absence of the fear of legal penalty – the officers of IDF called the absence of legal penalty with outrage, saying, 'how can it be that after we caught the terrorists, they bring in new terrorists? … According to these officers, terrorists knew that the PA would pay no attention to them, "and if they were caught, at worst, they would be tried and the 'revolving door' would go into effect". (Indor cited in Miskin 2013).

According to him one example of a direct link between Oslo and terrorism was the IDF withdrawal from Bethlehem, which led to a daily shootout in the nearby Jerusalem neighbourhood of Gilo (Indor cited in Miskin 2013). Since the signing of the DoP and until 1998, 279 civilians and soldiers were killed in terrorist attacks while during a period starting

from 1987 to 1993, 172 people killed in Israel (for brief detail see table 4.6) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998). The number of people killed by Palestinian terrorists since Oslo (279) was more than 50 percent greater than the number killed during the six years of the first intifada (172).

Despite the progress following the Hebron and Wye agreements, the security situation remained the same. According to Bayman (2011), as part of the Wye Accords Netanyahu obtained guarantees that the Israeli withdrawal and other steps were contingent on several specific Palestinian security promises (Bayman 2011:90). As Bayman (2011) noted:

> In Wye's aftermath [Netanyahu] cited a lack of effort on the part of Palestinian security cooperation, and Israel did not implement a second redeployment out of territories promised to Palestinians: they did not construct the safe route reconnecting the West Bank and Gaza Strip, they did not fulfil an agreement that would free Palestinian prisoners, they did not return confiscated lands used as settlements, and they otherwise thwarted attempts to move forward on talks (Ibid.).

Martin Indyk, the former U.S. ambassador to Israel, concludes, "both sides observed Oslo in the breach" (Indyk 2009:90). There was a clear lack of trust between the two parties. Though the violence reduced in the mid-1990s but the support for violence did not (Bayman 2011:90).

Table 4.6: Israeli Casualties in the Suicide Bombing: (1993-2002)

Date of Attack	Israeli Casualties in the Suicide Bombing: (1993-2002)
6 April 1994	A car bomb blast killed eight people at the centre of Afula (Hamas).
13 April 1994	A suicide bombing attack (SBA) killed five people in a bus at the central bus station Hedera (Hamas).
19 October 1994	Twenty one Israelis and one Dutch national killed, in an SBA on the No. 5 bus on Dizengoff Street in Tel-Aviv.
11 November 1994	Three soldiers killed at the Netzarim junction, a Palestinian riding a bicycle detonated explosive strapped to his body (The Islamic Jihad).
22 January 1995	Twenty soldiers and one civilian killed in 2 bombs exploded at the Beit Lid junction near Netanya (The Islamic Jihad).
9 April 1995	Seven Israelis and 1 American killed; an explosives-laden van hit a bus near Kfar Darom in the Gaza Strip (The Islamic Jihad).
24 July 1995	Six Civilians killed in an SBA on a bus in Ramat Gan.
21 July 1995	Three Israelis and 1 American killed in an SBA of a Jerusalem bus.
25 February 1996	Twenty six people killed (17 civilians and nine soldiers) in an SBA near the Central Bus Station in Jerusalem, (Hamas)
25 February 1996	One Israeli killed in an explosion by an SBA at a hitchhiking post (Ashkelon). (Hamas)
3 March 1996	Ninteen were killed (16 civilians and three soldiers) in an SBA in a bus, Jaffa Road in Jerusalem,
4 March 1996	Thirteen killed (12 civilians and one soldier), SBA at Dizengoff Centre in Tel-Aviv.
21 March 1997	Three people killed and 48 wounded, an SB detonated a bomb on the terrace of a Tel Aviv cafe.
30 July 1997	Sixteen killed and 178 wounded, two SBA in the Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem.
4 September 1997	Five killed and 181 wounded, in 3 SBA on the Ben-Yehuda pedestrian mall in Jerusalem.
29 September 1998	One soldier was killed, a terrorist drove an explosives-laden car into an Israeli army jeep escorting a bus with 40 elementary school students from the settlement of Kfar Darom in the Gaza Strip.
2 November 2000	Two killed and ten injured in a car bomb explosion near the Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem. Ten people were injured. (The Islamic Jihad)
20 November 2000	Two killed and five injured, a bomb exploded alongside a bus carrying children from Kfar Darom to school in Gush
22 November 2000	Four killed and 60 wounded, a Car bomb detonated by Terrorist
22 December 2000	Three injured SBA at the Mehola Junction
In the years 2001 terror groups launched 40 SBA attacks on Israel which killed 85	

	people and injured 474. In this table, only major suicide attacks have been mentioned.
1 June 2001	Twenty-one killed and 120 wounded in an SBA outside a disco near Tel Aviv's Dolphinarium.
9 August 2001	Fifteen people were killed, including seven children, and about 130 injured in an SB at the Sbarro pizzeria,(Hamas and the Islamic Jihad).
9 September 2001	Three killed and 90 injured in an SBA near the Nahariya train station in northern Israel (Hamas).
29 November 2001	Three killed and nine wounded in an SB on an Egged 823 bus en route from Nazareth to Tel Aviv near the city of Hedera (The Islamic Jihad and Fatah).
1 December 2001	Eleven killed and about 180 injured in an SBA on Ben Yehuda Street, the pedestrian mall (Hamas)
2 December 2001	Fifteen killed and 40 injured, in an SB on an Egged bus No. 16 in Haifa (Hamas).
	In the years 2002 terror groups launched 47 SBA attacks on Israel which killed 235 people and injured 114. In this table, only major suicide attacks have been mentioned.
2 March 2002	Eleven killed and over 50 injured four critically, in an SB in the ultra-Orthodox Beit Yisrael neighbourhood in the centre of Jerusalem (The Fatah Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade).
9 March 2002	Eleven killed and 54 injured 10, when a suicide bomber exploded at in the crowded Moment café (Hamas).
20 March 2002	Seven killed and 0 wounded, SB of an Egged bus No. 823, Afula. (The Islamic Jihad)
27 March 2002	Thirty killed and 140 injured - 20 seriously - in an SB in the Park Hotel in the coastal city of Netanya (Hamas).
31 March 2002	Fifteen killed and over 40 injured in an SB in Haifa, in the Matza restaurant (Hamas)
7 May 2002	Sixteen killed and 55 wounded in an SBA in a club in Rishon Lezion, southeast of Tel-Aviv (Hamas).
18 June 2002	Nineteen killed and 74 injured - six seriously - in an SB at the Patt junction (Hamas).
21 October 2002	Fourteen killed and some 50 wounded when a car bomb containing about 100 kilograms of explosives was detonated next to a No. 841 Egged bus from Kiryat Shmona to Tel-Aviv (The Islamic Jihad).
21 November 2002	Eleven killed and some 50 wounded in an SB on a No. 20 Egged bus on Mexico Street, Jerusalem (Hamas).

*Suicide Bombing Attack (SBA)

*Suicide Bombing (SB)

*Suicide bomber (SB)

(Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013: Johnstonsarchive.net 2017)

Conclusions

The Oslo accords were a result of changing international and domestic situations. For the PLO, it was an opportunity to compete with the local rivals. As mentioned earlier, it realised the strategic situations of the late 1980s. The PLO was thrown out of Lebanon from where it was functioning for more than a decade and went into exile in Tunisia. In Tunis it faced severe internal challenges from leaders and political movements from the occupied territories. In Israel, there was an uproar over the catastrophic foray in Lebanon. The outbreak of Intifada represented a reply to all these divides and emerged as a challenge for both the PLO and Israel. For Israel, a significant reason for going the peace negotiations was its growing security concerns for the occupied territories.

In March 1993, the tensions in the occupied territories were reaching other heights, when a group of Palestinian activities killed fifteen Israelis. The change in the international strategic environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s were also a major factor for the changed Palestinian attitude towards Israel. The disintegration of the Soviet Union left the US as the only major power in the world. The victory of the US in the Gulf War (1991) created favourable conditions for Washington to play a constructive role in peace-making efforts. In this regard, the Madrid Conference created a platform for all involved parties to hold one-to-one negotiations, which later paved the way for Oslo agreements.

There is a consensus among the scholars that Oslo accords were an attempt to address Israel's security concerns. It was evident that accords changed the realities between the Israeli-Palestinians. It convinced a section of the Palestinian population to change their perception about the existence of Israel. The mutual recognition of each other was an example of this change.

However, it had a significant impact on the Israeli national security thinking at two levels, domestic and international. Internationally, the Palestinian recognition of the Israeli right to live in the peace and security fundamentally altered the policies of the Arab countries regarding the existence of Israel. The Arab countries were fighting on behalf of Palestinians had to change their perception about Israel. The Oslo accords strengthen Israel security posture from the tier one countries, especially Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

On the other hand, the Oslo accords deteriorated Israel's national security posture at the domestic level. There is the consensus among the security experts that the accords brought

terrorism to the Israeli territories. The rapid increase in the suicide terror attacks, stabbing incidents and shooting were living example of deteriorated domestic security during 1993 to 2002 period.

Apart from making the prospects of peace and conflict resolution ever more isolated as the Oslo process significantly aggravated Israel's security posture. It was even reflected in all the agreements and memorandums signed by both the parties. If the Israeli security concerns were repeated in every agreement, it also highlighted that Palestinians were unable to fulfil Israeli security requirements.

Chapter Five

New Security Challenges to Israeli Security

T he 1990s was significantly important for the national security policymaking of Israel. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 considerably altered the strategic balance in the West Asian region. In the absence of the USSR, Syria and other Arab countries lost their vital military support to confront Israel (Freilich 2018). In many ways, the changes in international politics were fruitful for Israeli security policymakers. After the denial of many decades, it finally received acceptance in the region. The major transformations in international politics and vital regional changes in some respects strengthened Israel's strategic posture (Ibid.).

However, it generated many security challenges as well for national security policymakers. At a time when dynamics of the international system were changing, Israel remained an ally of the US. This relationship helped Israel in sustaining as a respectful international player in during the changing global order (Inbar 2008). It also allowed its policymakers to go forward in the peace process. According to Efraim Inbar (2008), from a national security perspective, while possibilities of a full-scale conventional war were lesser than before the existential threat was still persistent. It was mainly originating from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the West Asian region. Furthermore, the possibilities of low-intensity warfare between Israel and other Arab countries of the region were also persistent (Freilich 2018).

The Oslo agreements solved the problem with some of tier one countries, namely Jordan, Egypt and Turkey, but the relations with these countries were also not free from frictions. Egypt, Jordan and Turkey were committed to Oslo process but did not have stable diplomatic relations with Israel and most of the time their ambassadors were re-called due to various tensions (Inbar 2008). On the other hand, hostility from Lebanon and Syria still existed. At the same time, Israel was constantly facing large scale terror strikes from the Palestinian groups. During and after the Al-Aqsa Intifada these insecurities reached to newer heights (Ibid.). Furthermore, many new challenges, such as, tunnel terrorism, rocket attacks, cyber-terrorism, and the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign challenged the strategic thinking. These were the emanating dangers that were not altered by the Oslo agreement and are still posing a significant existentialist threat to Israel. To understand all these security

challenges, chapter uses Efraim Inbar (2008) and Yoram Peri's (2006) "Inner Ring or Tier One and Outer Ring or Tier Two" categorization of the Arab countries. The categorization is mainly to understand the security risks and challenges emanating from surroundings. The 'first ring' included the neighbouring countries that share a border with Israel. The 'Outer Ring' (also termed as the 'second ring') talks about the countries such as, Iran and Iraq, situated far from Israel in the region but still pose significant security threat to it. To understand the new emerging dangers another category "Tier Three" is mentioned in the chapter which refers to security challenges in the form of terrorism, rocket attacks, tunnels, and cyber threat. By covering a broad spectrum of security threats in the post-Oslo period, chapter offers a detailed overview of new security challenges facing Israel.

Security Threat within the Region

The security experts, such as Efraim Inbar (2008) and Yoram Peri (2006) explained growing security challenges from the regional countries in the 1990s by categorizing them as inner and an outer ring, also known as tier one and tier two countries (Inbar 2008; Peri 2006; Mansfeld 1994). Tier one contains the nations that shared borders with Israel, such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. While the tier two categories include the countries situated far from Israel or may be called distant countries on West Asia. In the 1990s threats from first ring's countries significantly reduced but did not end. During this period, the major security threat was posed by the outer ring countries, such as Iran and Iraq.

Tier One Countries and Israeli Security

Tier one or inner circle is also known as a traditional circle among the Israeli security experts. The tier one category contains countries that shared borders with Israel, such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (Bar-Joseph 2014; Inbar 2008). The security threat from tier one countries significantly reduced in 1991. It was mainly because the US brought all these countries to the negotiation table mainly on Israel's terms. The absence of the Soviet umbrella pushed Syria to go to the negotiation table (Inbar 2008). The Syrian decision of taking part in the Madrid peace process was an outcome of new international strategic reality (Hinnebusch cited in Inbar 1999). Likewise, the PLO also accepted agenda of peace and dropped the complicated matters to be discussed in the second round of negotiations. The important part of this agreement was that Israel did not make any advance concessions in these matters (Rubin 1994).

The signing of historical Oslo agreements with PLO in 1993 and 1995 and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 was significant from Israel's national security point of view. The growing peace process led to vital agreements that made Israel a more acceptable actor in the region and reduced the chances for an additional large-scale Arab–Israeli war (Inbar 2008). The lower of threats emerging from the inner circle countries is discussed in the following sections.

Jordan

Since the signing of the Israel–Jordan peace treaty on 26 October 1994[22], both the countries enjoy a good strategic relationship (Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 1994). The treaty was aimed at achieving "just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbours" (Israel Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994). Both the countries said that they are committed to ending the "generations of hostility, blood and tears" and to stop "bloodshed and sorrow" for a long-lasting peace (Bar-Joseph 2001.) The peace agreement with Jordan was vital for Israeli national security because it shares a long a border with Jordan and it was close to the strategic heartland. This strategic heartland is known as the Jerusalem–Tel Aviv–Haifa triangle, where around 70 per cent of its population is concentrated and has a vital for role in economic stability as the most of the business, security and political offices are situated in this triangle (Inbar 2008).

The peace treaty with Jordan also solved the problem of the eastern front, that is, a possibility of a collective attack by Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian-Saudi Arabian army from the eastern side (Inbar 2008; Luft 2004). It was also expected that the relations with Israel would embrace the economy of Jordan and undo the cold peace with Egypt (Luft 2004). The agreement opened the way for the greater cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries. Furthermore, Jordan was even interested in the deployment of the Israel-developed Arrow missile system in its territory as part of a regional ballistic missile defence system (Inbar 2008). However, the sad demise of "King Hussein in February 1999 was an important test of the strength of the Hashemite regime and the resilience of the peace treaty. The smooth transition of power to his son, Abdullah, and the continuity in foreign policy orientation were accepted with relief in Israel as in many other capitals of the world" (Ibid:157).

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[22] The Jordan-Israel Peace treaty was signed between Israel and Jordan on 26 October 1994, at the southern border crossing of Wadi 'Araba. To create a firm base for future negotiations treaty outlined a number of areas, such as trade, transportation, tourism, communications, energy, culture, science, navigation, the environment, health and agriculture, as well as co-operatory agreements for the Jordan Valley and the Aqaba-Eilat region.

Though the peace agreement with Jordan proved vital from a security point of view, ups and downs in the relations created a broader security challenge for Israel. The peace agreement normalized the relations between the two but warmness in the relations was missing, since 1994. The Israel-Palestinian relations, which is so sensitive to Jordan, put relations the Israeli-Jordanian relations to test. Rabin's assassination in 1995, suicide campaign by Hamas in early 1996, the election of Netanyahu in 1996 and deterioration of relations between Netanyahu government and Arafat (Sarraj 2018), slowed progress of peace process on the Palestinian track. This in turn, contributed to growing feeling of concern and unhappiness among the people of Jordan against its government's peace with Israel (Eisenberg and Caplan 2003). The King Hussein's frustration regarding peace efforts, under Netanyahu, was revealed in a letter dated 9 March 1997, in which Hussein sharply berated Netanyahu for pursuing actions which provoked Palestinian anger, such as Har Homa settlement in East Jerusalem (Ibid.).

On 25 September 1997, with the permission of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, security cabinet allowed two Mossad agents to target Hamas leader Khaled Masha'al in a failed assassination attempt. The operation was a response to the Mahane Yehuda Market Bombings in Jerusalem on 30 July 1997 which took the life of 16 Israeli citizens and injured 178 (*Al-Jazeera* 2013). The incident turned out a critical diplomatic crisis in the bilateral relations. Immediately after the event, King Hussein demanded antidote for the poison and even threatened to cancel the historic 1994 peace agreement if Masha'al dies (Hilalah 2013). The rapidly deteriorating relations pushed the US President Bill Clinton to pressurise Netanyahu to give the antidote to the poison. Though Masha'al was saved, the event breached the trust between the countries (Scham and Lucas 2001).

Initially, the Israeli government kept the negotiations with the Jordanian government secret and did not inform the media. Later, Netanyahu government and Mossad came under harsh media fire for a double humiliation, failing to kill the Hamas leader without being caught and of being forced to release the spiritual leader of Hamas Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from jail in a prisoner exchange deal (Al-Jazeera 2013). The al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 brought many the Palestinian protesters to the street of Amman, which again brought the relations between Israel and Jordan on brink (Eisenberg and Caplan 2003).

In 2010, Jordan asked for permission from the international community to generate nuclear fuel for use in Jordanian power plants, which was objected by Israel. Considering the Israeli

opposition of demand, the authorization to generate nuclear fuel was denied by the US (Bar'el 2010). The Israeli position on Jerusalem has been a major issue for the friction in Israel-Jordan relation. In July 1980, the Knesset passed "Jerusalem law" which declared the 'united Jerusalem' as Israeli capital (Eisenberg and Caplan 2003). Rabin also underlined in his Knesset address on 5 October 1995 that united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel when he was talking about the ratification of the interim agreement. In his speech he said

> …first and foremost, united Jerusalem, which will include both Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev- as the capital of Israel, under Israeli sovereignty, while preserving the rights of the members of the other faiths, Christianity and Islam, to freedom of access and freedom of worship in their holy places, according to the customs of their faiths (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995a).

On the other hand, Jordan considers east Jerusalem as a capital of future independent Palestinian state capital (Al-Khalidi 2017). The issue of Jerusalem has often become a critical issue in diplomatic relations between the two (Harms and Ferry 2008). In 2017, when Netanyahu provisionally closed the al-Aqsa Mosque in response to Palestinian protests and installed metal detectors in the mosque, it triggered "widespread protests among Palestinians in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza and inflamed Jordanian public opinion" (Al-Khalidi 2017). The US President Donald Trump's announcement about recognising Jerusalem as the Israeli capital on 6 December 2017 became an issue of soreness in the Israel-Jordan relation (US Presidential Documents 2017). On 14 May 2018, the US embassy was officially opened in Jerusalem. The issue was a vital concern for Jordan because King Abdullah retains the title of custodian of the al-Haram al-Sharif. Following the announcement, hundreds of people gathered outside the US embassy in Jordan. Because Jordan has a large population of Palestinian it cannot disregard the Jerusalem issue (Aftandilian 2018). In July 2019, the killing of two Jordanians by the Israeli Embassy Guard further deteriorated the relations between the two. The diplomatic relations between the two were reinstalled when the new Ambassador Amir Weisberg joined his office at Amman (Ahren 2018). He replaced Ambassador Einat Shlain, who left Jordan after the shooting incident in which an embassy security guard shot and killed two Jordanians after being stabbed in his apartment with a screwdriver. Later, Jordan was angry because the guard received a "hero's welcome" from Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel (Ynet 2018). In Jordan, the new Ambassador was welcomed with the protest by Members of Parliament and around 25 members of Jordan's 130-seat parliament signed a petition rejecting the scheduled return of the Israeli ambassador to Amman.

Another major issue for the soreness of Israel- Jordan relations has been the constantly increasing Israeli settlements, specifically beyond Green Line. Since 1967, Israel has developed settlements south and east of the Green Line. It has been strongly criticised by the many countries including Jordan. On 5 October 1995, Rabin noted in his speech on Oslo II accords that he wanted to keep settlements beyond the Green Line[23] including Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev in East Jerusalem. In June 1997, Netanyahu unpacked his "Allon Plus Plan". According to the plan, Israel would retain around 60 percent of the West Bank, including the "Greater Jerusalem" area with the settlements Gush Etzion and Ma'aleh Adumim,

According to the 1993 Israel-Palestinian Oslo peace agreement, the issue of settlements deferred until final status talks - a reason why Israel objects to pre-conditions and UN resolutions on the matter (Oslo Agreement 1995). However, during the interim period, Israel continued to build new settlements in the Palestinians territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It resulted in the number of settlers increasing from 110,000 in 1993 to 185,000 in 2000, when the negotiations over a final status were under process (Wilf 2018). It reached to 430,000 in the year 2018 (Ibid.). This increase in settlements significantly undermined the notion that Israel has the willingness to establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and created friction in the relations between the two (Ibid.).

In January 2018, Jordan denounced Israel's decision to build nearly 1,122 new settlement units in the occupied West Bank (*The Jordan Times* 2018). Commenting over the issue of settlement, the Jordanian State Minister for Media Affairs Mohammad Momani said that "the decision is a breach of the international law and constitutes a unilateral political act that undermines the two-state solution and the entire peace process" (*The Jordan Times* 2018).

Syria

The history of Israeli-Syrian quarrel goes back to the 1948 war when Syrian forces went down to Golan Heights and capture small amount to land of mandate Palestine (Slater 2002; Cordesman et al. 2008). The land was allocated to Israel under "the UN partition plan, advancing to the Jordan River or just beyond as well as to the northeast shore of the Sea of Galilee" (Slater 2002:82). The Syrian strike on Israel was unprovoked acts and since then,

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[23] The Green Line is the demarcation line created in the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. During a period from 1948 to 1967, it also served as de facto borders of Israel.

Syria has not changed its policy towards Israel (Cordesman et al. 2008). It was a party of conflict since the establishment of Israel and participated in all the wars against it, as well as provided Hezbollah a platform to attack Israel (Ibid.).

In the post-1973 period, President Hafez al-*Assad* discarded the use of force in favour of diplomacy and in 1974 announced the acceptance of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, which talked about the political settlement of conflict under the land-for-peace formula (United Nation 1991; Golan 2009). According to formula, if Syria would guarantee peace and in return, Israel would return the Golan Heights captured in June 1967. According to Jerome Slater (2002), during the 1970s, while meeting with the US officials such as Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Jimmy Carter, Assad reassured to end the armed conflict with Israel and was slowly heading towards normalization of relations (Drysdale and Hinnebusch 1992). Assad even agreed to "a general demilitarization of the Golan Heights in an effort to reassure Israel about its security" (Ibid.). In 1974, both countries signed a disengagement agreement.

In the regard, the first high-level negotiations between the two started at Madrid Conference of 1991 (1992). The negotiations were aimed at reaching a permanent solution between the two parties. In September 1992, Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara proclaimed that Syria was ready to reach a "total peace" with Israel in return for Arab lands occupied in 1967. The Syrian officials made it clear that total peace means not only non-belligerency agreement but also formal economic and diplomatic ties with Israel (Maoz 1995). Though, Syria showed the world that it made the strategic move to established peace with Israel but proved unable to cash in on the available opportunity (Inbar 2008). The Syrian president refused to exchange Golan Heights for a peace agreement, "which would require of him to open up Syria's closed society to outside influence" (Ibid.). It was also reflected in his views that Syria missed a significant opportunity to reach a constructive deal with Israel (Pipes 1999).

Syria again received similar kind of opportunity during the premiership of Shimon Peres in January 1996 and again under Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 1999. Furthermore, Netanyahu also offered a similar kind of deal in 1998, but Assad continuously refused to make peace with Israel. At the end of talks on the 8 January 2000, Syria acknowledged that the 4 June 1967 line was not a border and agreed to the appointment of a border demarcation committee but insisted that withdrawal from Golan Heights should extend to both military and civilians. According to Inbar 2008 "The unprecedented territorial generosity of Prime Minister Ehud

Barak (May 1999) was also not sufficient to induce Assad into an agreement" (Inbar 2008:158). On the other hand, Bente Scheller (2013) noted that adamant Israeli position on the civilian settlement was a key reason for the failure of the talks (Scheller 2013).

In the post-Oslo era, Syria has remained the only constant military threat for Israel within the tier one circle. Syria's objective of 'strategic parity' with the IDF became more elusive in the 1990s than in the 1980s (Karsh 1995). During Madrid to Oslo period (1991–93), Syria obtained with the help of Iranian funding "North Korean technology to produce Scud-C missiles," which had a range of 500 kilometres and could cover the whole Israel (Inbar 2008:108). In mid-1996, it even test fired its first home-made Scud-C missile.

It has steadily toughened its missile silos and took supplementary measures to defend them from possible Israeli attacks. In 1999, security agencies of Israel noted that technological help from Russia and Iran in development of Scud-C missile had possibly increased the range Syrian warhead and according to them Syria was expected to be complete this within 6–12 months. This technological advancement would allow installing the missiles deeper inside Syrian territories and away from the borders with Israel (Cited in Inbar 2008). Syria has also allowed Hezbollah to obtain aid from Iran to start a guerrilla war against the IDF's presence in Southern Lebanon. Often this conflict was accompanied by strikes of Katyusha missile on Israeli civilian population residing in towns and villages adjacent to the border. Israel lost annually 17 soldiers in this low-intensity war with Hezbollah, which slowly turned into a political problem and produced growing public pressure on IDF for a unilateral withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May 2000 (Freilich 2012:44).

In the post-2000 period, Syria persistently refused to reach a deal with Israel. Syria' involvement in the death of Rafik Hariri on 14 February 2005, forced out Syria from Lebanon. However, Syrian support to Hezbollah was constant even after this incident. Syria and Iran, both militarily contributed to Hezbollah (Ali 2019; Jones 2018). The weapon loaded Iranian flights regularly off-loaded arms at Syrian airports and the latter used its own trucks for shipping these weapons to Hezbollah (Cordesman et al. 2008). The Israel-Lebanon war 2006 raised a possibility of Syrian engagement to put significant military pressure on Israel (Ibid.).

Since 2011, Syria is suffering from a costly Civil War which ended the three-decade of peace at the Syria-Israel border. Though, Assad-led government ruled the country with an iron hand

it principally maintained a de facto ceasefire with Israel (Zilber 2018). However, the outbreak of civil war turned a relatively quiet border into a war zone. Under such a situation, the Iranian support and presence in Syria aggravated the gravity of the situation for Israel (*Vox* 2018).

The presence of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria has also increased its security concerns. Though IS has not attacked Israel directly but it has presence in northern eastern borders with Syria (Knell 2016). In regard to IS threat from northern and eastern borders with Syria, Israel pursues a policy of deterrence, containment and even quiet liaison (Ignatius 2016). This strategy is mainly to avoid being drawn deeper into the chaotic Syrian war. However, the group Ansar Bait al-Maqdis which pledged allegiance to the IS targeted Israeli in the southern borders with Egypt (Al-Arabia 2016).

Egypt

The 1979 peace treaty with Egypt significantly strengthened the national security posture of Israel and separated the other neighbouring countries from Egypt in a situation of collaborated attack (Gerdes 2015). It also lowered the possibilities of two-front warfare. However, the peace treaty did not change the insecurities of Israel. Since 1979, there had been a nonstop trend of enmity and strategic tensions between the two countries and as a result, their ties did not go beyond "cold peace" (Dowek, 2001:176).

In the post-1979 period, Egypt did not stop itself from developing a huge modern army equipped with the US arms. However, it persistently saw Israel as a potential military rival and carried out massive military exercises (Gerges 1995). It was only in the mid-1990s when Egypt has slowly turned into a cause of concern. In the post-1993 period, Israeli intelligence has paid immense attention to Egypt's arms procurement, for its air force (Sagie cited in Inbar 2008).

Egypt's demand for deploying an international force to monitor the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula has created problems for Israel (Gold 2012). Its concerns registered a significant rise due to Egypt's efforts to bring Israel under NPT and its problematic role in the peace negotiations with Palestinians. This was the critical reason for the collapse of ACRS negotiations in 1996 (Jentleson and Kaye 1998). Its imports of long-range North Korean Scud C missiles in 1984- had further increased Israeli concerns (Bermudez 1999; Inbar 2008). According to Arash Beidollah Khani (2013), since 1979, the relations with Egypt have seen

ups and downs (Khani 2013). The incident of Egyptian Air Force UAVs flying over the nuclear research facilities at Nahal Sorek and Palmachim Airbase in 2003 heightened Israel's security concerns (Toukan 2009). Although Egypt's Military Supreme Council on 12 February 2011 declared that Egypt was committed to its international obligations, including the peace treaty Israel was seriously concerned about the internal and future political events in Egypt (Khani 2013).

The fall of the Hosni Mubarak regime in 2011 was another setback from a security point of view. Initially, post-Mubarak Egypt was unfriendly towards Israel, mainly the short-term Islamist rule under President Mohamed Morsi (Soliman 2016), more so when even during the Mubarak regime the complete normalization of the relation between the two countries did not happen. According to Dina Ezzat (2017), the Israeli diplomats who served in Cairo during the Mubarak rule frequently informed to their counterparts "about their sense of 'isolation" and complained that there was no breakthrough on the political or any other front, whether cultural, scientific or in tourism (Ezzat 2017).

It was reflected in the opinions of the Egyptian people. While commenting on Israel-Egypt relations a doctor said that "this is very true; I would not at all engage in a one-on-one chat with an Israeli doctor when we meet in any medical conference in any country, be it in the Middle East or Europe. If one tries to talk to me on the sideline of the conference, I would politely excuse myself, as such a chat could qualify as a normalisation of relations" (Quoted in Ezzat 2017). Similarly, a 40-year old tour guide underlined, "no one I know would agree to take assignments with Israeli tourists. I am not saying that nobody does it at all, but most would decline such an assignment, either because they do not like it or they think they would be criticised for it" (Ibid.). Shortly after the 2011 revolution, a former trade minister under Mubarak noted that "it was never seen as a good thing to propose any kind of enhanced cooperation with Israel. It was always a very sensitive matter, and when we proposed it, we had to be ready with a clear plan on how this would be presented to the public" (Ibid.).

Though, the two countries established full diplomatic ties on 26 January 1980, Egypt's ambassador "to Israel was recalled between 1982 and 1988, and again between 2001 and 2005 during the 2001 Intifada" (*China Daily* 2005). The embassy was reopened only in September 2015; four years after an angry mob stormed it during the chaos of the Arab Spring (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). However, Israel pulled the staff from the

embassy again at the end of 2016 because of safety reasons and this was the worst diplomatic crises between the two countries in 30 years (Keinon 2017).

Lebanon and threats from Hezbollah

The success of the US in the Gulf war of 1991 generated a window opportunity for peace in the region. Under the leadership of the US and Russia, almost all major countries of West Asia participated in the Madrid peace process. Subsequently, Israel signed agreements with Palestinians (1993) (PA) and Jordanians (1994). In this chain, in March 1996, Israel and Syria hosted another round of talks in Washington but the Lebanese track did not take off and left Israel's northern borders with Lebanon tense and hostile. The tension on the borders with Lebanon was largely an outcome of Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 1982 which created a space for emergence of Hezbollah in the early 1980s. It was basically a response to Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon following the Israeli invasion and siege of Beirut (Khashan 2006). The invasion was costly to Israel as it lost more than 1,550 soldiers and paved the way for the formation of Hezbollah which proved to be a serious security concern (Neff 2002). Though, Israel withdrew from the areas it captured during the campaign between 1983 and 1985, but continued to control an area near border known as South Lebanon Security Belt. However, the threat from Hezbollah mainly dominated the threat perception from Lebanon.

The absence of a peace agreement with Lebanon and constant attacks by Hezbollah pushed IDF to be aggressive. As a result, in 1993 Rabin started "Operation Accountability," to cut down Hezbollah's supply routes and destroy its installations (Locker 1999: 162). Similarly, in 1996, IDF launched "Operation Grapes of Wrath" in retaliation for Hezbollah's strikes on Israeli military installations in south Lebanon (O'Ballance 1998: 207-221).

On 24 May 2000, the government of Israel carried out unilateral military withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Bekaa valley, ending the 22 years of military occupation of in Lebanon (Calvert 2002). The withdrawal was in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 425. Though, after the Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah lost the image of a vital threat to Israeli security, but it still had been on the top of security concerns. It allowed Hezbollah to successfully keep the low-scale conflict alive in Shab'a Farms (Calvert 2002; Feldman 2003).

In 2002, it opened a second front by launching enormous Katyusha missile and mortar in the Shab'a Farms area and the Golan Heights (Feldman 2003). In May 2002, Hezbollah leader

Nasrallah warned that Hezbollah could attack Israeli territories "whenever necessary" (Sobelman 2002).

According to Dalia Dassa Kaye (2003), the IDF was predominantly against to a unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon because in their estimation withdrawal was useful for targeting the areas of security zone (Kaye 2003). The IDF experts noted that unilateral withdrawal would allow Hezbollah to fire Katyushas rockets from a more effective range of six to eight miles (Luft 2000: Kaye 2003). It was a result of the buffer zone that when Hezbollah "fired more than 4,000 Katyushas rockets into the Galilee between 1985 and 2000, only seven civilians were killed" (Kaye 2003).

According to an anonymous Israeli security expert, southern Lebanon was a "playground" to play their interest there and restricted the conflict from escalating. In the absence of this playground, the danger of escalation would reach new heights (IDF officer cited in Kaye 2003). Israeli military Chief of Staff, Mofaz, frequently flagged the danger of escalation due to improved Hezbollah strike capabilities considering unilateral withdrawal (Collins and O'Sullivan 1999). The Israeli security planers saw unilateral withdrawal as the slightest favourable option for its security.

It was also realised by the senior officials under Barak's government who expressed their concern regarding the risks of pulling out IDF troops. They even warned that Hezbollah might rapidly fill the vacuum in the security zone area (Rodan 2000). Furthermore, its intelligence agencies concluded that withdrawal could result in a confrontation between Israel and Syria because the latter would not allow the border area to be peaceful (Limor cited in Kaye 2003). There were consensuses among the scholars and security experts that withdrawal would again renounce north part of Israel exposed to attack (Kaye 2003; Rodan 2000; Luft 2000).

Former Defence Minister Arens and former General Amos Malka had argued that withdrawal could harm the security of people residing in the northern part (Malka and Arens quoted in Kaye 2003). Malka further noted that "the war would continue much closer to our border than is now the case and any Katyusha rocket (See image 5.1) attacks could threaten areas of Israel currently spared" (Malka quoted in Kaye 2003). According to Gal Luft (2000), "the two large-scale military operations—the 1993 Operation Accountability and the 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath-confirmed how difficult it is to hunt down well-hidden rocket

launchers in Lebanon's mountainous terrain. The pull-out proponents argued that since the security zone failed to eliminate the threat of Katyushas, there was no point in maintaining the military presence there" (Luft 2000).

According to some, the decision of withdrawal was an outcome of domestic pressure initially created by citizen groups, such as the Four Mothers movement. The way Four Mother Movement got popularity and pressurized the policy makers to think about withdrawal (Kaye 2002). The rising Israeli casualties led its citizens to question the logic of the military presence in southern Lebanon. This shift largely started after the incident of the Helicopter crash in 1997 that took lives of 73 military personnel and brought the issue of the security zone to the public's attention (Waxman 2001).

The discussions over the idea of withdrawal also took place in the tenure of Netanyahu. Sharon, the then Likud cabinet minister, was in the favour of a gradual withdrawal option and to see the enemy's response (Ron Ben-Yeshai citied in Kaye 2002). However, the issue of withdrawal became a key issue in the 1999 election. During and before the election Barak's used the issue of withdrawal as a key agenda, with his election pledge to "bring the boys home" (Ze'ev Schiff cited in Kaye 2002). The question for Barak was not whether but "how withdrawal would happen" (Ibid.). In other words, it became a compulsion for Barak to withdraw from Lebanon and he projected the issue in such a "ways that made withdrawal seem a legitimate, secure, and preferable option to maintaining the security zone" (Ibid.). He assured people, especially those residing in the north that withdrawal would improve their security (Ibid.).

Following the withdrawal, the problem between Israel and Hezbollah reduced considerably, but the latter frequently developed new issues of conflict which justified continuation of violent struggle, "including the kidnapping of Israelis in order to release Lebanese prisoners, the demand for the return of Shab'a Farms, and the claim to Lebanese sovereignty over seven destroyed Shiite villages in the Galilee" (Even 2009:31). According to Shmuel Even, unilateral withdrawal strategy allowed Israel to retaliate forcefully against any provocation. However, Israel's response to Hezbollah's acts was relatively gentle which allowed the other to dominate the rules of the game.

This strategy changed in 2006 after the kidnapping of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev which sparked another war with Lebanon in 2006. Israel responded in an excessive way in

terms of destruction and Nasrallah admitted that he anticipated this kind of response, Hezbollah would not have kidnapped the soldiers (Ibid.) The Lebanon war reopened the debates regarding the concept of home front which already existed in the security circle since 1982 and reappeared in the Gulf War when Iraq fired 39 Scud ballistic missiles on its territories. As a result, the home front command was established in 1992 as part of the lessons learned during the Gulf War. According to Meir Elran, the attacks did not cause much damage to Israel, but it led a significant psychological effect (Elran 2016).

During the 2006 Second Lebanon war, Hezbollah launched around 4,000 rockets and missiles on the Israeli territory leading to the deaths of 45 civilians (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). It also threatened that "it had more than 30,000 rockets in its inventory" (Riedel 20012: Even 2009:31: Inbar 2008). The Israeli air command was not adequate to prevent the rain of missiles over northern territories. According to Uzi Rubin:

1. From 13 July 2006 to 13 August 2016, police reported 4,228 rocket impacts inside Israel from rockets fired by Hezbollah.

2. A large portion of these rockets were transferred to Hezbollah by Syria rather than from Iran. Most of the time the rocket warhead was made of steel balls, anti-personnel munitions and mixed explosives.

3. During the initial days, 100 rockets per day fired by Hezbollah on Israel and one-third of those rockets landed in the Israeli territories.

4. In the first half of August 2006, these attacks were doubled by Hezbollah, an average 200 rocket attacks per day.

5. The rocket attacks caused 53 fatalities and 250 critically injured. It also lightly injured 2,000 people.

6. It forced the government to evacuate around 250,000 civilians (Rubin 2006).

These rockets targeted the many Israeli towns such as Tiberius, Nazareth, Hadera, Haifa, Safed, Nahariya, Afula, Shaghur, Kiryat Shmona, Karmiel, Beit She'an, and Ma'alot-Tarshiha. This rocket rain forced Defence Minister Amir Peretz to order IDF top leadership to set up civil defence plans and the development of the Iron Dome anti-missile system.[24]

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[24] The Iron Dome Weapon System, developed by Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, works to detect, assess and intercept incoming rockets, artillery and mortars. Israel deployed the system first in the south in April 2011 to intercept rockets from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli-developed system uses cameras and radar to track incoming rockets and is supposed to shoot them down within seconds of their launch. It's the world's most used missile defence system, intercepting more than 1,500 targets with a greater than 90 percent success rate since being fielded in 2011.

According to Inbar, before the war, the IDF's attitude showed that Israel was not assuming any land war on its borders. Maj. Gen. Udi Adam argued that the Lebanese front was hardly discussed in the top military forum before the war. Moreover, the IDF failed in its military build-up before the war. Furthermore, Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz (November 2002 to March 2006) decided to reduce the duration of military service for conscripts by four to eight months, a decision that came into effect in March 2007 (Cited in Inbar 2008:242). All these events reflected the IDF's carelessness and unpreparedness regarding the possible threat. It also underestimated the Lebanon Katyusha stock.

Once the war was over, the Israeli government established an Inquiry Commission to investigate "the preparation and conduct of the political and the security levels concerning all the dimensions of the Northern Campaign which started on 12 July 2006" (The Winograd Commission Report 2007). The former Justice Eliyahu Winograd headed the commission (Ibid.). "campaign and criticised the then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defence Minister Peretz for their war decision with improper preparations. The commission noted that the IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action, and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required" (Ibid.). The commission also stated that "a document should be drafted which will accompany Israel's military and political strategy for the future generation" (Glove et al. 2010).

Even after the war threat perception had not changed. It was reflected in the policies of the government on Lebanon. In 2009, the Lebanese cabinet issued a policy statement recognizing Hezbollah's "right to use arms against Israel," despite the objections of some ministers who insisted that Hezbollah's "substantial arsenal ... undermines the authority of the state" (Maroun 2016). Later in 2014, the government claimed that "Lebanese citizens have the right to resist occupation and repel any Israeli attack" (Maroun 2016).

In the post-Oslo period, Lebanon has been a constant security challenge for Israeli national security policymaker. To deal with the situation of rocket and missile attacks, the Israeli army has installed state-of-the-art technology comprising new radar on its border with Lebanon, as well as by improving fortifications and transportation. It has deployed the anti-rocket system, the Iron Dome, to deal with the short-range rockets and to deal with the threat of medium and long-range rockets was planning to deploy David's Sling (Kurtzer 2017).

Image 5.1: IDF Soldiers Examining Katyusha Rocket

(Source: Reproduced from Rubin 2006)

Tier Two Countries and Israeli Security

Iraq:

Since 1948, Israel is facing a constant threat from Iraq. It participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war along with the Arab forces against Israel (Alpher 1989). In 1948, it wrote a letter to the UN stating that it would accept the outcome of the armistice agreement. The positions Iraqi forces were holding were covered by the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan, therefore, no separate agreement was signed agreement with Iraq (Armistice Agreement 1949:310). Since then both the countries are remaining hostile towards each other.

In 1981, under the fear of an attack from Iraq, Israeli Air forces demolished the under construction nuclear reactor at Al-Tuwaitha, describing it a national security threat (Bar-Joseph, Handel and Perlmutter 2005). This was the first time in the modern history when a successful pre-emptive strike was launched on a nuclear installation and was also first ever attempt to prevent the possible proliferation of nuclear weapon by force (Ibid.). Prior to June 1981, policy makers used political and diplomatic pressure to pre-empt construction of the Iraqi reactor. The asked many countries, mainly France and Italy, to avoid supplying Iraq with the "Osiris-type reactor and the fuel to run it (Claire 2005: Ford 2005). The strikes completely demolished the site, "comprising a French-built Osiris-type Materials Testing Reactor (MTR), as well as a smaller adjacent reactor" (Kirschenbaum 2010:50). The strike on the Iraqi reactor was the last option available to derail the nuclear programme.

In the 1991 Kuwait crisis, the hostility between the two again reflected when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein threatened to wipe out half of Israel with chemical weapons if it ever attempted to attack any targets in Iraq. He noted "we don't need an atomic bomb because we have advanced chemical weapons" while addressing in an army ceremony to decorate senior Iraqi officers in 1990 (Centre for the Preservation of Modern History 1995:69; Friedman 1993). In this speech, he further noted that "Iraq's chemical weapons' capability is matched only by the United States and the Soviet Union ... I swear to God, we will let our fire eat half of Israel if it tries anything against Iraq. As for anyone who threatens us with an atomic bomb ... we will destroy them with chemical weapons. The Iraqi people know that (chemical) weapons were available to us at the end of the (eight-year) Iran-Iraq war" (UPI 1990). In Israel, IDF officials swiftly condemned Saddam's threat but expressed confidence in their

ability to repulse any attack. While responding to Saddam's statement, Israeli Foreign Ministry spoke person, Yossi Amihud, said that "it is high time for the civilized world to act in unity and see to it that Saddam Hussein will not have the possibility to pursue his irresponsible and criminal designs" (Ibid.). The Gulf-based Western diplomats authenticated the statement and said that speech, broadcasted live on state-run Iraqi television and radio, appeared to be designed to improve Saddam's image as a pan-Arab nationalist both at home and in the Arab world (cited in UPI 1990).

The Gulf War (1990-91) raised the tension between the two when Iraq fired 39 Scud ballistic missiles on the Israeli territories. However, under the US pressure, Israel did not retaliate (Shlaim 1994: Miller 2012). To fight against Iraqi aggression of attacking Kuwait, under the leadership of the US President George H. W. Bush a coalition forces was formed (Bose and Perotti 2002:452). The Iraqi army was the world's fifth largest army at that time and the coalition forces destroyed a large part of their army. According to Efraim Inbar, the destruction of a large part of Iraqi Army was in the favour of Israel and the defeat, Iraq, "became an international subjected to UN inspections. The UN demolished a large part of Scud-3 missiles and WMD arsenal and infrastructure" (Inbar 2008). The victory of the US-led coalition had constructive security outcomes for Israel, as the US-led forces significantly weakened the Iraqi army without any participation of the IDF (Parsi 2007).

In the light of missile attacks during the Gulf war, Israel revived the concept of home front which was introduced in the wake of its Lebanese invasion of 1982. In the post-Kuwait war period, Israel's concerns vis-à-vis long-range missile remained unchanged. Though the missile attacks during in 1991 resulted very minimal causalities, but financial and economic damage was significant and missile strikes paralyzed Israel for many weeks (Inbar 2008, 1998, 1992).

The missile attacks in early 1991 also underlined Israel's limits regarding freedom of action. The attacks came at a time when Israel was ruled by the most right-wing government, but still, it could not attack as there was severe pressure from the US (Ibid). On the other hands, the refusal to take any responsive action by the then Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defence Minister Moshe Arens was a weakness for the Arab countries (Welch 1992).

With the end of Cold War and defeat of Iraq, the strategic environment changed drastically. In 1991, under this changed strategic environment again a process to establish peace in West

Asia began with the Madrid Conference which began in October 1991 (Cohen 2000). As an outcome of this changed security environment many Outer Ring countries namely, Morocco (1994), Oman (1996), Tunisia (1996), Qatar (1996) and Mauritania (2000), formed formal counsellor ties with Israel (Migdalovitz 2006). However, Israel's threat perception vis-à-vis Iraq did not change. Saddam Hussein's strong anti-Israel stand posed him as a danger for Israel. Although, Iraq was a party to the Geneva Protocol (8 September 1930), Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (29 October 1969) and signed Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 but it did not sign the Chemical Weapons Convention. Its use of Chemical Weapons during Iran-Iraq war and against its Kurdish citizens in 1988 raised the concerns in Israel regarding the possible use of chemical weapons. At the end of the decade, Iraq managed to resist the UNSCOM regime and had a huge pile of weapons, which was enough capable for terrorize its neighbouring countries and Israel (Butler 2000: Ritter 1999). By this time, it was having long-range missiles and speculated having biological agents, chemical weapons, and gears to develop nuclear weapons (Butler 2000: Ritter 1999).

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre intensified the Bush Administration's concern about Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction programs (Copson 2003). As a result, on 20 March 2003 the coalition forces of the US, UK, Poland and Australia attacked Iraq. According to President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, the objective of the campaign was "to disarm Iraq of WMD, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people" (Bush 2003:1). The US invasion of Iraq significantly eliminated a potential national security threat to Israel. However, there were still concerns in Israel regarding the effect of Iraq war on the terrorism in the neighbouring countries. The outcome of the war significantly increased the threat from Iran and possibility instability in Jordan (Frederic et. al 2010). The chaotic situation in Iraq in the post-2003 period created a flourishing ground for the terror groups such as IS and Al-Qaeda. Though, IS has been unable to attack Israel but it has raised the security concerns. The ideology of IS had potential to influence the Muslim population of Israel, as these trends were visible though the globe.

Iran

Iran was a key player in the Israeli foreign policy during the initial years of the state formation. From 1948 to fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979 both the countries maintained a close, cordial relation (Meddeb and Stora 2013). Iran became the second Muslim majority country after Turkey which recognized Israel in March 1950 (Danilovich 2018). From the

prism of David Ben-Gurion's 'peripheral diplomacy,' Iran was vital for Israel and was regarded as a non-Arab natural ally on the edge of the Arab world (Parsi 2007; Alpher 2015; Freedman 2009). According to Miinsour Farlu (1989), the establishment of close but clandestine ties with Iran was the strategic goal for Israel. Iran was important because it was a non-Arab country and it was willing to provide a route to the Iraqi Jews to immigrate to Israel (Farlu 1989:86).

For three decades, various types of military, diplomatic and trade relations developed between the two countries. It was the time when Iran was a vital source of Israeli energy demand. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Iran provided a significant portion of its oil to Israel. The Iranian oil was further transported to European markets via the joint Israeli-Iranian Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline (Bialer 2007).

Before the 1979 revolution, a vast majority of Israeli population, mostly businesspeople and diplomats, discovered several business opportunities in Iran. There used to be El Al flights daily, connecting Tehran with Tel Aviv (Flight International 1979; Ahren 2013). Furthermore, there was a Jewish school in Tehran and from the folk's point of view, "some Israelis made so much money in Iran in a few years that upon their return they could afford to buy large houses in fancy Tel Aviv suburbs without mortgages" (Ibid.). Israel played a significant role in the development of Iran, especially in town planning and agriculture.

Iraq was another connecting point for Iran and Israel as both viewed Iraq as a common threat. Both saw Kurdish fight against the Iraqi government a vital to their interest. Therefore, the Mossad (Israel) and the SAVAK (Iran) together started aiding the Kurds in their struggle against the central Iraqi government (Melman and Javedanfar 2007). In 1958, Mossad also formed a formal trilateral intelligence coalition (codenamed Trident) with Iran and Turkey to exchange intelligence and launch joint counterintelligence operations (Shlaim cited in Kaye et al. 2011: 3). In 1977, both the countries started a joint military project "Project Flower" to develop an advance missile system (Ibid.). According to Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader and Parisa Roshan (2011) the ties between the two were "driven by Ben-Gurion and the Shah, solidified by early 1959, and continue to expand until the Islamic revolution" (Kaye et al. 2011: 3).

The sudden shift in Iranian politics after 1979 revolution made it another 'second ring' country with a potential to harm Israel. Its support to Hamas (Rostami-Povey 2010) and

Hezbollah (Levitt (2013) created a unique national security challenge which was difficult to deal. After the Islamic revolution, the Iranian theological opposition to the existence of Israel was a grave concern for security policymakers (Parsi 2007; Alpher 2015; Freedman 2009). This threat was   taken over by long-range missiles and nuclear programme of Iran in the 1990s.

By the mid-1990s, security experts in Israel started focusing on Iran as a serious threat when it began developing long-range missiles beyond which could reach beyond Iraq (See image 5.3). According to one, the Iranian advancement for these capabilities was a challenge for Israeli security experts, especially intelligence organization (cited in Kaye, Nader and Roshan 2011). At the end of 1999, Iran was close to developing the surface to surface Shehab-3 Missile. The two staged missiles were very similar to Nodong missile of North Korea and the Russian up-gradation provided it a long 1,300 Kilometres attack range. It can capture the whole of Israel within its range (Kaye, Nader and Roshan 2011: Inbar 2008). The long targeting range of missile posed a greater danger in case of a nuclear attack.

In the post-Madrid period, Iranian threat was not limited to terror threats through Hamas and Hezbollah but turned into a strategic danger which had potential to disrupt the peace process. In 1995, Rabin observed that Israel had sufficient time and capabilities to deal with Iran and he was confident that Iran would not be able to acquire a nuclear bomb for 10–15 years (anonymous sources cited in Kaye, Nader and Roshan 2011:19). However, people had "a few renegade voices in the Israeli intelligence community trying to elevate the Iranian ranking [nuclear file]," but Iranian threat was considered a "relatively low risk" (Melman, Yossi, and Meir Javedanfar 2007:152). Though, Iran was actively involved in strengthening itself with the long-range missiles, nuclear capabilities did raise concern for some of the security experts but not emerged as a severe security concerns among political leadership and public (Ibid.).

In 1997, the IDF reviewed the policy regarding Iran as a part of an effort to upgrade of its defence doctrine but concluded that Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria were more threatening in comparison with Iran (Anonymous sources cited in Kaye, Nader and Roshan 2011:19). Though, the security experts realised that Iranian ideology was hostile towards Israel, they believed that Iran's hostility towards the common enemy Iraq would ease the relations between the two (Ibid.). However, things changed after the 2003 Iraq war that overthrown Saddam Hussein from power and common threat for Israel and Iran was over. The defeat of Iraq brought Iran on to top security agenda of Israel.

Image 5.2: Iran's Ballistic Missile Range

(Source: Reproduced Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2017)

Table 5.3: List of Iranian Missiles

S. No	Missile	Class	Range	Status
1	Khorramshahr	MRBM	2,000 kilometres	In Development
2	Ghadr 1 (Shahab-3 Variant)	MRBM	1,950 kilometres	In Development
3	Shahab-3	MRBM	1,300 kilometres	Operational
4	Emad (Shahab-3 Variant)	MRBM	1,700 kilometres	In Development
5	Sejjil	MRBM	2,000 kilometres	Operational
6	Qiam-1	SRBM	700-800 kilometres	Operational
7	Zolfaghar	SRBM	700 kilometres	Operational
8	Fateh-110	SRBM	200-300 kilometres	Operational
9	Tondar 69	SRBM	150 kilometres	Operational
10	Shahab 2 (Scud C-Variant)	SRBM	500 kilometres	Operational
11	Shahab-1	SRBM	285-330 kilometres	Operational
12	Soumar	Cruise Missile	2,000-3,000 kilometres	Operational (presumed)
13	Ra'ad	Cruise Missile	150 kilometres	Operational
14	Simorgh	SLV	500 kilometres altitude	In Development
15	Safir	SLV	350 kilometres altitude	Operational
16	Koksan M1978	Artillery	40-60 kilometres	Operational

(Source: Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2018)

On the other hand, the revelations about the Natanz nuclear base in 2002 generated more serious concerns for security policymakers and the political leadership of Israel. The gravity of situation could be understood by the decision of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon who appointed Meir Dagan to direct the Mossad to allow him to derail the Iranian nuclear program (Melman, Yossi, and Meir Javedanfar 2007:152).

Furthermore, it disproved the hypothesis of Rabin and Shimon Peres that blooming peace process would help Israel to be in the better position in dealing with Iran (Ibid.). The widespread violence in the light of Al-Aqsa Intifada not only made the Israeli civilian population sceptical about the peace process but also pushed security policymakers to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the IDF realised that Iranian military and political backing to Syria and Hamas and Hezbollah had increased significantly. According Yossi Melman and Meir Javedanfar (2007), all these developments reversed the erstwhile Rabin's theory regarding Iran and the peace process. The Israeli military and political leadership thought that it would be difficult to achieve peace with the Palestinians without dealing with Iran.

As a result, in Prime Minister Netanyahu argued, "What has been preventing peace? Iran with Hezbollah, Iran with Hamas, Iran that succeeds in dominating and intimidating moderates everywhere ... But if there will be a change in Iran, this... would give peace a tremendous opening…" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). According Yossi Melman and Meir Javedanfar (2007), many scholars argued that Israel under Netanyahu was hiding the issue of settlement behind Iranian security concerns. However, there is consensus among the scholars that Iran has become a key national security challenge and a dangerous actor in areas bordering Israel, particularly the Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq (Rostami-Povey 2010; Parsi 2007; Alpher 2015; Freedman 2009).

Iran's Military Deployment in Syria and Support for Hezbollah

Since 1979, Iran has launched a constant proxy war against Israel, which left the IDF in frequent face off with Iran's proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip, and in the West Bank (Orion and Yadlin 2018). The Iranian regime has been strengthening its military capabilities around Israel. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, Iran has increased its support to Hezbollah, particularly regarding quality weapons transfers. According to Assaf Orion and Amos Yadlin (2018), Iran has also tried to start a new terror front in the Golan

Heights. As soon as civil war in Syria reaching to its end, Iran has moved to collect its war dividends, seeking its forward military deployment in Syria (Ibid.).

According to Israeli Security experts, the Iranian strategy in Syria includes use of "Hezbollah model," which means using Syrian forces with external massive support of Shiite militias (Inbar 2018: Orion and Yadlin 2018). The Iranian military deployment in Syria directly poses a threat to Israel, especially with aircraft, precision ballistic missiles and air defence systems. Though, Israel had attempted to oppose these developments through US and Russia, it's their inability or disinterest has forced Israel to get involved in Syria militarily. It had made clear that presence of Iran in Syria would be a direct threat and that it would prevent Iran from entrenching itself in Syria (Heller 2018).

According to an anonymous security expert, on 10 February 2018 breach of Israeli sovereignty by an Iranian Drone marked a minor transformation from Iran's mould of roundabout action to straight action (Barbara 2018). The constant developments from Iranian side pushed the Israeli national security planners to switch to next level of retaliation, "which included striking directly at Iranian forces and capabilities in Syria, not limiting Israeli action to proxies alone, as well as striking not only at weapons transfers to Hezbollah, but also at factories, facilities, and assets central to Iran's growing threat to Israel" (Orion and Yadlin 2018). Furthermore, the clashes on 9-10 May 2018 were direct outcome of Iran's heavy military presence in Syria.

Iranian Nuclear Ambitions and Israel

The Iranian nuclear programme was initiated during Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlavi's time in the 1950s with assistance from the US and establishment of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974 (Fayazmanesh 2008). The programme was terminated in 1979 after the Iranian revolution, when Ayatollah Khomeini declared it 'un-Islamic'. However, in 1984, Iran restarted the programme and started building the Bushehr reactors (Afkhami 2009).

The nuclear capabilities of Iran have been an issue of global concern, since 2003. In the 2000s, the revelation of its covert uranium enrichment activities increased concerns that Iran might develop capabilities for non-nuclear uses. In 2003, an investigation by IAEA underlined that Iran was involved in the undeclared nuclear activities (IAEA 2003). Due to Iran's non-compliance with NPT obligations, UNSC resolution 1696 on 31 July 2006 asked it to stop its enrichment activities (UNSC 2006). However, Iran refused to suspend the

activities therefore on 23 December 2006, UNSC resolution 1737 imposed sanctions against Iran (UNSC 2006a).

In November 2011, IAEA noted that it has credible evidence that Iran was conducting experiments to achieve nuclear weapon capabilities until 2003 (Cordesman 2015). However, on 1 May 2018 it refuted its old report by saying Iran was not involved in the nuclear activity after 2009. Though, the Iranian leaders consistently maintained that their country was not developing nuclear weapons, "its enrichment of uranium and history of deception created deep mistrust" (Tirone 2018:1). On 14 July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 (France, China, Russia, Germany, UK, and the US) signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which was backed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted on 20 July 2015 (JCPOA 2015). Since its beginning, the JCPOA was criticised by the Israel which named it as "bad deal" and "historic mistake" (Kershner 2015).

Israel has been constantly confronting Iran's quest to become nuclear power in the region. To derail the nuclear programme, it allegedly assassinated many Iranian scientists. According to Mehdi Hasan (2012), during 2010-2012 four nuclear scientists -Masoud Alimohammadi, Darioush Rezaeinejad, Majid Shahriari and Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan - were killed by unknown attackers (Hasan 2012). However, neither Israel confirmed nor refuted its involvement. It was assumed that these assassinations were stopped in 2013 due to American pressure (Yaalon 2015). Israel has also launched various cyber attacks to slow down the Iranian nuclear programme. In 2010, it launched a computer virus known as "Stuxnet" to damage the nuclear programme and virus reportedly caused substantial damage to Iran's nuclear programme (Nakashima and Warrick 2012). It was expected that the attacked was launched by the US and Israel but neither countries took the responsibility for the attack (Nakashima and Warrick 2012).

The Israeli security concerns regarding Iranian Nuclear Program was adequately capture by Yossi Melman and Meir Javedanfar (2007) and according to them there are four major concerns for Israel:

1. Nuclear weapons would allow Iran and its friendly countries to adopt a more hostile stance towards Israel. It was many times reflected in the acts of Hezbollah. Currently, if Hezbollah is not assertively acting against Israel the main reason for that, it fears massive IDF retaliation on Lebanon. On the other hand, if Iran is nuclear armed, IDF's ability to

act freely against Lebanon would end and its ability to deal with Hezbollah would be affected.

2. It may also align whole Arab world with Iran.

3. Third, the nuclear-armed Iran may reduce the US' regional influence. In Iran point of view success of nuclear program would bring global implications, it would end the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime simultaneously US global influence.

4. Lastly, nuclear-armed Iran would activate more nuclear proliferation in the region.

The statements and speeches of Iranian leadership also projected the country as a potential existentialist threat to Israel. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on 27 October 2005 that Israel must be "wiped off the map" (Fathi 2005). On 3 February 2012, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khomeini said that the Islamic Republic would help any nation or group that confronts the Jewish State and noted that "we have intervened in anti-Israel matters, and it brought victory in the 33-day war by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006, and in the 22-day war" between Hamas and Israel in Gaza" (*The Associated Press quoted in* Benari 2012). On 20 April 2018 in threatening speech, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hussein Salami, warned Israel by saying that "hands are on the trigger and missiles are ready'; US and UK won't save Israel" (*Times of Israel* 2018).

Turkey

Turkey was among the group of first nations which recognized Israel in 1949. It follow a careful foreign policy regarding relations with Israel and mostly kept its ties secretive (Bengio 2004). This policy was evident in 1956 when Turkey downgraded its relations with Israel due to the Suez war (Efron 2019; Ulutas 2010). In 1958, Turkish Prime Minister of Adnan Menderes had a covert meeting with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to establish base for the future partnership and agreed on the 'peripheral pact'. This pact comprised intelligence cooperation and support to respective armies (Efron 2019).

In 1979, Arafat's visit to Ankara which allowed PLO to open an office in Turkey brought friction in the relation (Ibid.). In 1980, it kept very minimal relations citing the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem which was considered by most of the UN states as occupied territory. It was only after the Madrid peace processes in 1991 both the countries engaged

with each other (Ulutas 2010). The ties between two countries significantly improved in the 1990s, utilizing the post-cold war developments, specifically defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War and the Oslo peace process (Çelikkol 2016). The signing of Israel-Turkey agreement on defence co-operation in 1996 was a new change in Israeli security calculation.

The upgrading of relations was a positive development for Israel in the outer circle from a national security point of view (Kibaroğlu 2002: Kogan 2005). With the formal ties, two strange but strong allies of the US came together on the one platform. The Turkish decision of paying attention in the West Asian affairs was a result of a threat perception originating from its radical neighbours, Iran, Syria and Iraq. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey became an active player in the West Asian politics (Peri 2006).

Israel and Turkey found some convergence in the national interests and for both unremitting presence of the US in the region was seen favourable. It was mainly because of the conception that it would bring stability in the West Asian region. The objective of both countries was to restrict the Iranian brand of Islamic radicalization to flourish in the region. It also called for the destruction of Israel and threatened the secular political practices of Turkey (Inbar 2008). The grave danger coming from the radical Islamist countries of the region-Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia- to knock off-balance pro-Western Arab regimes was also a common security challenge for both. The two countries were facing a similar kind of threat-over water and territory- from Syria that was hostile towards both the country (Ibid.).

For a very long period (October 1998), Syria was helping the Kurdish anti-Turkish PKK terror outfit and until October 1998. It hosted Abdullah Ocalan, the leader and one of the founding members of PKK. It was also hosting Hamas and Palestinian Popular Fronts, those were committed to derailing the Peace process. Syria also played an important role in waging war against Israel through Hezbollah in South Lebanon (Peri 2006; Inbar 2008).

According to Inbar (2008), the minimization of the proliferation of WMD and the long-range missiles of Iran, Iraq and Syria was another common interest in the Israel-Turkey ties (Byman et al 2001). On the one hand, Turkey shares borders with all the three countries and on the other, Israel had experienced the missile attacks from Iraq and Syria and were convinced that Iran might attack it. Both the nations had a fear that this danger would not be addressed by the western countries (Inbar 2008).

Under such fears, in 1996 both the country signed a military agreement. The cooperation between the two was largely captured the security domain to enhance the military capabilities of each side. Inbar (2008) noted that under this changed equation,

> Access to Turkish airspace allowed the Israel Air Force to train better, as well as to provide new routes to enemy territory and to enhance efforts to collect valuable intelligence allowed by Turkey's proximity to the radical states. In turn, Jerusalem assists Ankara in upgrading its military forces with its technological and operational know-how. Israel is already retrofitting Turkish fighter jets (F-4s and F-5s) and is ready to transfer other military technologies to the Turkish defence industries. Israel also markets a variety of military equipment and the Turks expressed interest even in the antiballistic missile Arrow system (Inbar 2008:107).

In January 1998, both countries did a naval exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean along with the US and Jordan took part as an observer. In 1999 and 2001, similar kinds of exercises were held again.

In the initial years, the strategic cooperation between the two proved significantly useful for both as it developed unique balance of power in West Asia. However, the sweet and sour relation with Turkey also posed a low-level security threat. In the first half of the 2000s, Turkey started following a new vision for West Asia region which targeted political stability and economic integration of West Asia and overtly started confronting Israeli vision of the region (Ulutaş 2010). The confronting regional views of Israel and Turkey placed both countries in a situation where face to face confrontation was inevitable.

On 31 May 2010, the IDF soldiers raided "a passenger ship, the Mavi Marmara, the largest boat of a flotilla of six boats which were carrying 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid to besieged Gaza, in international high waters" (Seta Foundation 2010). The military operation by the IDF soldiers killed 9 Turkish citizens and injured more than 30 people on board. In the flotilla, the citizens of thirty-two other countries were travelling which included "European legislators, a Swedish best-selling author, Henning Mankell, and Nobel peace laureate Mairead Corrigan-Maguire" (Ibid.). The flotilla was owned by Foundation for Human Rights and Freedom and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) and was carrying around 600 passengers and most was Turkish citizens. After the operation on the Mavi Marmara, the flotilla was docked at Ashdod port and the activists on board were detained. The government of Israel in an announcement made it clear that the activist on the board would be either arrested or deported (Abu-Hajiar 2014).

The Israeli response quickly received worldwide protests and condemnation. While reporting the incident, *the Guardian* noted,

> Israel's relationship with its closest Muslim ally, Turkey, has been pronounced fatally wounded. A succession of European leaders, including David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, has lined up to pronounce Israel's long-term embargo of Hamas-run Gaza as unsustainable and indefensible. Most serious of all for Netanyahu, Israel's closest and most assiduous ally, the United States, has also endorsed that view, going out of its way to reveal that it had warned Jerusalem to show restraint when dealing with the six-ship convoy (*The Guardian* 2010).

The incident happened in the international high waters and Turkey took the matter to the UN, NATO, and the OIC. It condemned Israel by using harsh words calling it "state terrorism" and "an act which must be duly punished" (Ulutaş 2010; Abu-Hajiar 2014). Turkey asked for quick discharge of its civilian and an official apology from Israel and an international investigation into the incident (Abu-Hajiar 2014).

On the other hand, Israel claimed that the activists on the "Mavi Marmara attacked the IDF Naval commandos with light weaponry, such as knives and clubs, and the Israeli commandos were forced to react in an act of self-defence" (Ulutaş 2010). It also claimed that the flotilla's owner, IHH, was directly helped by the current Justice and Development Party (JDP) government in Turkey. According to Israel, the incident of the flotilla was a purposeful provocation and Al-Qaeda and Hamas were also had a role to play (Ibid.). The incident was the first time when Turkish citizens faced a violent response from IDF. It started a new trend for Turkish-Israeli relations. Israel's response to the event brought sourness in the relations between the two. In August 2010, Ban Ki-moon, then UN Secretary General announced a four-member probe led by Geoffrey Palmer. The panel noted that navel blocked of Gaza was legal and there were "serious questions about the conduct, true nature and objectives of the flotilla organizers, particularly IHH. The actions of the flotilla needlessly carried the potential for escalation" (Palmer Report 2010:4). The report also noted that the scale of force Israeli navy used against the Flotilla was "excessive and unreasonable" and the way the people on flotilla were treated was a violation of international Human Right law (Palmer Report 2010:4). In March 2013, a settlement was made between the two country according to which Israel paid $20 million in compensation to Turkey and a deal was signed in June to restore ties after a six-year rift. Along with this an apology and an easing of the blockade on the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip was also accepted (*The Times of Israel* 2016).

Though the settlement solved the flotilla issue but ups and down in the relations were constant, since then. This was reflected in the statements and speeches of the leaders of the two countries. On 30 March 2018 Erdogan again said that Israel was "a terror state" and that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was "a terrorist." He further noted that "I do not need to tell the world how cruel the Israeli army is. We can see what this terror state is doing by looking at the situation in Gaza and Jerusalem" (Haaretz 2018).

Tier Three

The Threat of Terrorism: A Shift from Suicide Terror to Tunnel Terror

For a long time, Israel has been facing the unvarying threat of terrorism. According to Irwin J. Mansdorf (2017), in the Israeli case the phrase "living with terror" defines its equation accurately with terrorism, where civilian deals with the terror threat every day (Mansdorf 2017). For many years, especially if the conventional military threat from Arab armies loomed over its survival, it referred to terror as a lesser menace and used the euphemistic term "current security threat" to conceptualize it (Kuperwasser 2017).

It was always affected with some or other form of terrorism, but it posed a more acute danger in the post-1973 period (Dicter and Byman 2006) when it posed a unique kind of psychological challenge. Israel has given a push to develop a unique kind of strategies and technologies to deal with the challenges posed by the terrorism to the society (Freilich 2018). The rise of anti-Israel terrorism was an outcome of back-to-back defeat of Arab armies in the conventional wars since 1948. Its neighbouring countries understood that it was difficult to defeat Israel through conventional War and this led to a rapid rise in terror activities and attacks against Israel.

In this context, the emergence of Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the 1980s played a significant role in making the threat of terror, particularly suicide terror, more acute. According to former chief of the IDF Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, the Israeli military encountered first suicide terror attack only in 1983 in Lebanon (Lipkin-Shahak 2001: 6). This came as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which was followed by the establishment of Hezbollah. From the very beginning, the focus of its suicide attacks was on both the Israeli and non-Israeli targets.

To maximize the Israeli causalities in the 1990s, the group adopted various strategies such as stabbing; suicide bombing, rocket attacks, ramming attacks through vehicle and shooting but the suicide terror attacks were the most effective one. As suicide terror threat emerged as a nightmare for the Israeli security policy maker (Marcus 2014: Dayan 2008). Initially, these attacks were not sophisticated, but later, they became a grave security challenge. The use of suicide terrorists was a significant shift in the tactics of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and it resulted in heavy Israeli casualties in the wake of the Oslo accords (Lipkin-Shahak 2001: 6). In 1994, the wave of suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad killed 37 people (See Table 5.4). In the first half of 1995, Hamas launched two suicide bombings in Ramat Gan and Jerusalem, which coincided with the final phase of the Israeli-PA negotiations over Israel's withdrawal from all primary Palestinian towns in the West Bank, and the general elections for the PA's Council to be held afterward. Furthermore, from 1993 to 2001 suicide attacks became the severe challenge for the IDF and they turned bad to worse between 2001 and 2003 (See Table 5.4).

It was evident in the comparative studies, wherein the period of 1993-2001, it faced 67 suicide attacks, on the other hand, this number reached to 87 in 2002- 2005 or in three years. During 2001-2003, Israel registered 85 suicide bombings inside the Green Line (the 1967 border). In the following years, the suicide bombing rates fluctuated and saw a decline. In the first half of 2001 it registered eight suicide bombings, on the other in March 2002 alone it reached to 13 suicide attacks, yet only 17 such bombings in the whole of 2003. In the first half of 2004 there were three bombings (Figure 5.1) (Kaplan 2005). Furthermore, from 2000 to 2004, Hamas killed nearly 400 Israelis and wounding more than 2,000 in 425 attacks. From 2001 through May 2008, Hamas launched more than 3,000 Qassam rockets and 2,500 mortar attacks into Israel (Cited in Fox News 2008).

In the post- 2004 period, the use of suicide attacks among these groups radically decreased. The international revulsion against the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 was the main reason for this decline. On 20 June 2002, Yasser Arafat requested to all Palestinians to stop attacking Israeli civilians, in a note prepared after the second suicide attack in Jerusalem which took lives of seven civilians (*The Guardian* 2002). He noted that the suicide attacks "have given the Israeli government the excuse to reoccupy our land" (Ibid.).

On the other hand, Hamas refused to give up suicide bombings and in 2002 Ismail Abu Shanab, a Hamas spokesman in the Gaza Strip said "If we have an effective weapon in our hands and the whole world is trying to take it off us, this kind of reaction shows it to be the

most effective way," (Quoted in *The Guardian* 2002). Even, Islamic Jihad promised to continue its armed struggle (Ibid.). On 11 June 2003, Arafat described suicide bombing as a "terrorist attack," after a suicide attack on a bus. It was the first time when Arafat condemned the attack and called it "a terrorist attack" since the first intifada (*Ha'aretz* 2003). On the one hand, as Arafat declared suicide attacks as a terror act, these groups discovered a new way to challenge peace, and security in Israel, namely use of tunnel to attack Israel (See Table 5. 4).

Tunnel Terrorism

Since the mid-1990s, Hamas has been using tunnels to launch attacks on the Israeli targets and for smuggling. It has successfully developed a sophisticated system of underground tunnels in the Gaza Strip. In 2001, when Israel was engaged in the dealing with suicide attacks, Hamas started a systematic use these tunnels to plant explosives at IDF installations. This system of tunnel passes through several cities and towns of the Gaza Strip, such as Jabalia, Shati and Khan Yunis refugee camp (Ben 2014). Some of these tunnels are more than 10 Kilometres long and used for the several functions, including hiding arsenal, ease modes of communication, permitting ammunition stocks and for concealing militants and making detection from the air difficult (Ibid.).

Eado Hecht highlighted that there are three kinds of tunnels exist inside Gaza:
1. Tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, mainly smuggling tunnels.
2. Defensive tunnels used for weapons storage and command centres.
3. Offensive tunnels mainly used in attacks IDF installations and capture Israeli soldiers (Cited in Nicholas 2012).

The first major blow from these tunnels came in 2006 when Hamas attacked a tank unit near Kerem Shalom on the Israel-Gaza border and kidnapped Corporal Gilad Shalit. To achieve their objectives terrorist infiltrated in Israel near Kibbutz Kerem Shalom by using a tunnel (Butcher 2006). The incident of kidnapping of Shalit was the first it's kind of incident by Palestinians since 1994 and Shalit was kept for five years and two of his fellow soldiers were killed. The negotiations between Hamas and IDF took lots of time and proved costly for Israel. To secure the safe return of Gilad Shalit, in 2011 the IDF arranged a prisoner exchange and 1027 prisoners were released (*Ha'aretz* 2011).

The constant threats from these tunnels were also reflected during the Operation Cast Lead in 2009, when Israel launched a sustained military campaign against the Hamas in the Gaza Strip. After 2009 period, the use of tunnels to attack Israeli installation became a clear threat. The gravity of terror threat posed by these tunnels was echoed during Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012.

Table 5.4: Suicide Attacks in Israel

Year	Dead	Injured	Total	Suicide attacks
1989	16	NA	16	1
1993	2	39	41	2
1994	38	13	51	5
1995	39	NA	39	4
1996	59	NA	59	4
1997	24	NA	24	3
1998	3	NA	3	2
1999	0	NA	NA	2
2000	6	4	10	5
2001	85	476	561	40
2002	238	114	352	47
2003	145	83	228	23
2004	98	33	131	17
2005	33	60	93	9
2006	15	99	114	3
2007	3	NA	NA	1
2008	1	22	23	1
2015	0	1	1	1
2016	0	20	20	1
Total	**805**	**964**	**1.769**	**171**

(Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002)

During the operation "the IDF targeted the tunnels as much as it did Hamas' rocket capabilities" (Feferman 2016). In 2013, IDF discovered two long tunnels leading to an Israeli town and destroyed around 32 terror tunnels until 8 August 2014 (Yaakov, Sharon and Ben-David 2014).

According to the IDF, each tunnel was constructed with the estimated 350 truckloads of building material, costing up to US$3 million to create (Cited in *Fox News* 2014). At the same time, around 3,360 short and medium-range rockets had been fired at Israeli territories. According to experts, "Hamas' arsenal- estimates highlighted, it still retains a significant number of missiles - includes home-made crude Qassam rockets, as well as longer-range more sophisticated weapons such as the Iranian Grad and Fajr5, and Syrian-made M302's. Hamas had scores of rocket launching sites, many placed in or close to schools, mosques, and hospitals - including missiles hidden in UNRWA schools on three separate occasions" (*Fox News 2014*). The tunnel infrastructure has proven a military asset for Hamas and a significant danger to Israel's security in the post-Oslo period and Israel was not ready to face the terror threat posed by the tunnel attacks (Feferman 2016). A state inquiry carried out in highlighted that the Prime Minister Netanyahu and the IDF were unprepared to deal with the strategic threat of tunnels used by Hamas militants during the 2014 Gaza war. The State Comptroller, Yossef Shapira, noted the political establishment, the military establishment and the intelligence bodies were aware of the tunnel threat and even defined it as strategic. And yet the actions taken to deal with the threat did not match this definition" (Shapira quoted *in The Guardian* 2017). The report said Netanyahu and Moshe Yaalon, then the Defence Minister did not fully share information they had on the tunnels with other members of the security cabinet and but spoke in "sparse and general" terms (Ibid.).

According to the 2014 report, these tunnels served various operational purposes, such as, allowing Hamas militants to appear suddenly from below the ground and ambush or kidnap IDF soldiers; connecting command and control centres and bunkers for militants to hide in; and facilitated storage, transport, and launch of weapons (Government of Israel 2015:41). The tunnel network also helped Hamas to convert civilian areas into combat zones. The combat tunnel created by Hamas "creates a 360-degree, multidimensional threat- making it difficult and sometimes impossible, to ensure that areas of operation are clear of enemy presence" (Ibid: 41-44).

Following the Gaza Operation 2012, Hamas prioritised developing cross-border assault tunnel infrastructure. These tunnels often began from "urban neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the Gaza Strip and extended underground the heavily guarded border between the Gaza Strip and Israel, in violation of Israeli sovereignty" (Ibid: 42).

Security Wall and Rocket Attacks

On 28 September 2000, Prime Likud leader Ariel Sharon, along with over 1,000 Israeli police officers, walked on Harem al-Sharif/Temple Mount area in the Old city of Jerusalem. The incident was a provocative step by the Palestinians and became the cornerstone of violent protests in Jerusalem and quickly spread to other part of Palestinian territories. The protests were known as the al-Aqsa Intifada and brought the suicide attacks inside Israel or within the green line (Kumaraswamy 2004). The constant terror attacks pushed the Israeli government to construct a "Security Wall" (Acharya 2014: 65). The decision of construction of security wall was justified as an indispensable requirement to stop the wave of suicide terrors attack deep inside its territory (Ibid.).

According to the Israeli government, the security wall has been proved effective in this regard (Uzi Dayan mentioned in Nusseibeh 2002) as the number of suicide bombings from the West Bank registered a significant decline during 2000-July 2003 and fell from 73 to 12. Though the threat of suicide attacks diminished significantly with the construction of Wall, since 2001 the rocket attacks from the Palestinian areas became a serious security challenge (Government of Israel 2000).

According to the official claims, since 2001 armed groups have fired thousands of rockets inside into Israel (Government of Israel 2018). Human rights group *B'Tselem* estimated that from September 2000 to March 2013, the Palestinian armed groups fired around 8,749 rockets and 5,047 mortar shells on Israel (*B'Tselem* 2014). On the other hand, *Jewish Virtue Library* noted that during 2012- 2016 more than 2,604 rockets and mortars were launched on the civilian areas (Jewish Virtue Library 2017). The responsibility of these attacks was claimed by various Palestinian armed groups**,** such as Hamas, Al-Quds Brigades, Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Brigades, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Salah al-Din Brigades.

According to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Palestinian groups launched "more than 15,200 rockets and mortars towards Israel between 2001-2014 and it forced IDF to conduct

conducted various operation in the Gaza strip, such as Operation Rainbow in 2004, Operation Days of Penitence in 2004, Operation Summer Rains in 2006, Operation Autumn Clouds in 2006, Operation Hot Winter in 2008, Operation Cast Lead in 2009, Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012 and in 2014 Operation Protective Edge (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). According to a rocket and missile attacks tracking website *Israel Has been Rocket Free For* (2018), since 2001, 29900 rockets have been fired into Israel (Israel Has been Rocket Free For 2018).

Over the period, the range of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip has increased (See Table 5.5). According to Amnesty International, between 2001 and 2004, the range of mortar and home-made Qassam rockets was up to 10 kilometres and subsequently, these groups acquired longer-range Qassam rockets that could easily target to 17 kilometres. Later, armed groups in the Gaza Strip developed and smuggled "thousands of BM-21 Grad rockets of different types, with ranges varying from 20 kilometres to 48 kilometres" (Amnesty International 2015). These groups also contain "the Iranian Fajr 5 and locally produced M-75 (both with a range of 75 kilometres), and the locally produced J-80 rockets with a range of 80kilometres" (Ibid.).

Table 5.5: The Palestinian Missile Stockpile

S.NO	Name of Group	Name of Rocket
1.	Popular Resistance Committees	Al Nasser 3, 4
2.	Islamic Jihad	Al Quds 101 Al Quds 102
3.	Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Fatah	Arafat 1, Arafat 2 Aqsa-3
4.	Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,	Bahaa- Named after Saed Bahaa.
5.	Fatah	Jenin-1, Kafah
6.	Hamas	M-75, Fajr-5, Katushya, Qassam 1, Qassam 2, Qassam 3, Qassam 4, M-302
7.	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Sumoud rocket

(Source: Weiss 2008; Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre 2007)

In March 2014 Israel reported that M302 rockets[25] were fund on a merchant ship from Iran by "the Israeli navy in the Red Sea, were bound for Gaza via Sudan and Egypt" (Ibid.). In 2014, the al-Qassam Brigade maintained that it fired R-160 rockets to Israel. It was important to know that R-160 rockets are a local version of the M-302 long-range rockets and capable of targeting much longer distance (Al-Qassam 2014).

Since 2011, the use of long-range projectiles has significantly increased the number of fatalities because now it can target a larger area of the Israeli territories. According to Amnesty International (2014), "during periods when rocket and mortar fire from Gaza is intense, major Israeli cities including Ashkelon, Be'er Sheva, Ashdod, Holon, B'nei B'rak, Bat Yam, Rishon LeZion, Petah Tikva, Netanya, Rehovot, and even Haifa, are now affected". Almost all the rockets used by the Palestinian groups, whether it's Fajr 5, M-75, J-80, R-160, or M-302 – lacked the accuracy and were unguided. A security expert consulted by Amnesty International noted that "the M-75, Fajr 5 and J-80 rockets could land as far as 3kilometres away from a purported target, and that the M-302 and R-160 rockets could land 6kilometres or more from any purported target" (Ibid.). According to UN data, violent armed groups of the Gaza Strip launched around "4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars towards Israel between 8 July and 26 August 2014" (UNDSS cited in OCHA 2014); out of all these rockets, 243 rockets were "intercepted by Israel's Iron Dome missile defence system, while at least 31 fell short and landed within the Gaza Strip" (Cited in Amnesty International 2014).

Gaza Disengagement, 2005

On 15 August 2005, under the leadership of Prime Minister Sharon Israel carried out a unilateral plan of disengagement from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the West Bank (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). The key objective of the plan was to enhance Israel's security and status in international politics in the absence of peace negotiations with the Palestinians (Ibid.). Under the plan, Israeli evicted 9000 Jewish settlers from the 25 settlements in the Gaza Strip and four from the West Bank. At the same time, the military installations and IDF forces were removed from the Gaza Strip. The expulsion of the four settlements in the West Bank and withdrawal from the whole Gaza Strip to the Green Line was completed 22 September 2005 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). In June 2007 Hamas took control of whole Gaza Strip from the PA. Since then, thousands of rockets and

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[25] M302 rockets have a target range of approximately 160kilometres.

mortar shells have been launched from Gaza Strip against Israel, particularly targeting the southern towns and villages (Byman 2010).

According to Dore Gold , the decision of unilateral withdrawal from Gaza Strip led a "far-reaching military developments that have come to serve as a warning of what could happen in the West Bank if appropriate security arrangements and defensible borders are not in place" (Gold 2008:19). According to him many experts "argued that the Gaza pull-out could not serve as an example for a withdrawal from the West Bank, since the Gaza withdrawal was strictly unilateral, while any future withdrawal from West Bank territory would be the result of an agreement in which Palestinian security responsibilities would be spelled out" (Ibid.).

Many security experts in Israel assumed that the Gaza disengagement would reduce the rockets fired by the armed Palestinian groups in the Gaza strip. This line of thinking was obvious because "by pulling out its civilian settlement presence as well as its army positions, Israel was removing one of the principal grievances raised by Palestinian spokesmen" (Ibid.). However, the attacks on Israel by short-range Kassam rocket in 2001 should have end to these speculations. As noted in the previous section (threat of rocket), since 2001 the numbers of rocket attack had registered a quick rise. In 2005, the year of the Gaza disengagement, it faced 179 rocket attacks and after that, it went up drastically and in 2006 over 900 rockets were fired at Israel (The Meir Amit Intelligence and -Terrorism Information Centre 2011).

The disengagement agreement also allowed the Palestinians to improve the quality of projectiles, especially regarding missile range. Before 2005, the militant groups were using domestically produced rockets which had a range of 7 kilometres. However, after the withdrawal, they started attacking a much wider area and on 28 March 2006 first time it struck town of Ashkelon. Similarly, in November 2012, Palestinians fired "1,506 rockets, nearly reaching Tel Aviv and Jerusalem" (Ibid: 20). Furthermore, the up gradation in Palestinian arsenals had threatened a wider area as they are upgraded with 120 mm Grad rocket which has a targeting range of 20-40 kilometres. The Iranian supply of Fajr-5 rocket to Palestinians (attack range 75 kilometres) also enhanced the Palestinian striking capability. There are speculations that weapons of many other countries have been smuggled the weapons into Gaza Strip. One of them was 'Konkurs' the Russian armour-piercing missile. In 2011, the use of 'Kornet,' laser-guided anti-tank missile on an Israeli school bus in the southern area confirmed it, because of its Russian manufacture. The smuggling of SA-7

shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles made by Russia has brought the Israeli aircraft into their range (Ibid.).

There was one more problem associated with the disengagement agreement. Under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement between Israel and the PLO (1994), a thin strip along the border, this was under the IDF's control, known as "Philadelphia Route." According to Gold (2014), this route was important for Israel and when Palestinian started constructing tunnels underneath the Philadelphia route[26], IDF was able to counter that with little difficulty. However, after the 2005 Gaza engagement, that option was also closed for the IDF (Gold 2014). As a result, the numbers of tunnels increased rapidly in the Gaza Strip. Under such a condition, national security policymakers were left with one option which was to launch military operations such as "Operation Cast Lead (2008- 2009), Operation Pillar of Defence (2012) and Protective Edge" (Ibid: 20).

Cyber Security

In the contemporary technological world, the cyber security has emerged as major national security concerns. The Israeli expertise in the cyber sphere is world known (Steckman and Andrews 2017), but there is a growing concern that its adversaries would be able to match or at least narrow down the technological gap to challenge its current superiority (Freilich 2018). In the last decade, Israel has neutralized many attempts by its adversary to infiltrate its cyberspace. In 2013, an Anonymous group of hackers attacked Israel and its prime targets were a website for an NGO that assists children with cancer (Ronen 2013). The group announced that it had hacked around 19,000 Israeli Facebook accounts, besides the personal details of students from Haifa University (Ibid.).

The cyber-attack damaged several dozens of sites belonging to NGOs which also included the website of Larger than Life and NGO for children with cancer. While updating about the attack, Larger than Life wrote on its Facebook page that "the website of Larger than Life has been under attack from pro-Palestinian hackers for a week ... and every day they take down our site and plant different content-flags, a skull, symbols and all sorts of hate-related things" (Ibid.). These attacks were appreciated by Hamas and its spokesperson Ihab al-Ghussain wrote: "May God protect the spirit and mission of the soldiers of this electronic war" (Yaron 2018).

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[26] Refers to a narrow strip of land (14 km long), situated along the border between Gaza Strip and Egypt.

Since 2013, these cyber-attacks have become an annual coordinated event, known as OpIsrael. On 3 April 2017, OpIsrael targeted governments, religious, and corporate websites, later, the group threatened that next operation to take place on 7 April (Israel National Cyber Directorate 2017). In 2017, the CERT-IL obtained several indications regarding a malware named "End of Israel" which acts to damage computer files while displaying pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli messages (Israel National Cyber Directorate 2017). According to a report published in *The Jerusalem Post*, in August 2018, Iranian hackers "Leafminer" targeted Israel and other Gulf Countries. The reports of attacks were also published by US cyber security firm Symantec (Grewal 2018).

The Israeli industrial plants have been constantly under attacks. In the case of factories dealing with hazardous materials, such an attack could have dangerous environmental and security consequences (*Xinhua* 2018). Israel has not yet reported a successful attack directed at its industrial infrastructures, but there are fears of such attacks, mainly by hostile elements, including enemy states. According to a former division commander of Shin Bet, the organization "is facing more significant challenges, today" and these challenges are identified as emanating from China and Russia (Ibid.). In recent years, these world powers countries have been trying to attack Israel in a variety of ways, like those carried out against other Western countries.

The Israeli cyber-security firm ClearSky noted several cases in which Iranian hackers imitated genuine websites. In February 2018, "for instance, it revealed an operation it called Ayatollah BBC – a series of Iranian-run websites impersonating foreign or even Iranian media outlets" (Yaron 2018). In January, the company revealed that a hacker group, *Charming Kitten*, which successful in infiltrating in earlier attacks, was still functional (Ibid.). It also underlined that the group is working with the Iranian government and project a severe threat and it comprises of sophisticated hackers. The Charming Kitten group even impersonated ClearSky itself by creating a website almost identical to that of the Israeli firm, with a slightly different address; the imposter site ended in ".net" rather than ".com" (Ibid).

The hackers also managed to insert a malicious page into the website of a Los Angeles Jewish community paper, *The Jewish Journal*. The page invited users to a webinar and included a link that activated a programme called BeEF, which stands for Browser Exploitation Framework. The BeEF was created for security researchers who look for

security breaches, particularly in browsers, to improve their defences. However, it has proven a double-edged sword that attackers can use for less benevolent ends (Ibid.).

In response to such a situation, Israel has developed offensive as well as defensive capability by encouraging educational and technological bases in the cyber realm (Siboni and Assaf 2016). On offensive level, it developed capability and ability to use cyberspace as a weapon to confront its adversaries (Ibid.). However, in the public domain, there is very little information available about it.

In 2015, the IDF noted that cyber defence is equally vital in normal and emergency and hence would conduct cyber operations for defensive, offensive, and intelligence collection purposes. Though there is very little information available about the offensive capabilities, there are illustrative examples. In 2010, the US-Israel together targeted the Iranian nuclear programme with the Stuxnet virus, which was designed to acquire supervisory access and data about the uranium enrichment centrifuges (Freilich 2018: Garuman 2012).

According to Freilich, the Stuxnet was useful because the virus collected strictly classified information which was hidden from the international community. The US and Israel had suspected these Iranian installations but did not have firm information about them. Stuxnet was also economical because if the US and Israel had gone for a military option, it would have created several challenges, operational and diplomatic. Therefore, the virus achieved a vital military objective with minimal risk (Parmenter 2013: Freilich 2018). The impact of cyber-attack was significant but short-lived. The attack derailed the Iranian nuclear programme for some time but was unable to destroy it completely. However, the significance of the Stuxnet lies in the fact that it was first of its kind of attack which was launched to inflict major damage a strategic installation, the Iranian Nuclear programme (Parmenter 2013: Freilich 2018).

Israel also reportedly worked with the US to attack the Iranian nuclear programme with the Flame virus. Flame allowed Israel to record audio conversations, take screenshots, view network traffic and prone to extract information from infected computer. It has also been reportedly developing malware for the offensive purpose, such as targeting enemy's critical strategic infrastructure (Katz 2012: Freilich 2018). With a similar kind of malware, Israel infiltrated in Lebanon's cellular telephone network to get intelligence (Egozi 2011: Freilich 2018). It was also reported that Israel used cyber tool to support combat operations, such as

its air strike on the Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007 (Parmenter 2013). During the attack it hacked Syrian radars and reprogrammed them, projecting Syrians that everything was fine while strikes were underway (Ibid.).

On defensive level, Israel has constantly been upgrading its know-how in the cyber sphere and the IDF has developed and constantly upgrading its weapons and communication system that might be hacked by its adversaries (Egozi 2011: Freilich 2018). Currently, the general staff's C4I branch is primarily responsible for defending IDF's communication and system but the IDF is planning to develop an independent Cyber Command (Katz 2012). The defence ministry has a cyber defence body to protect Israel's defence industry and Mossad has developed similar cyber defence capability (Katz 2012: Freilich 2018).

On the other hand, responsibility for protecting civil ministries and agencies is in the National Cyber Bureau (NCB) which directly reports to prime minister. The NCB is further assigned the responsibility of protecting critical infrastructure against cyber strikes and for suggesting strategy concerning cyberspace, comprising the development of cyberspace doctrine (151). It also has a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) cyber-attack on aviation, transportation, finance, health and energy sector (Freilich 2018).

Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS)

The Arab countries have tried to delegitimize Israel from the early days of the state and according to Charles D. Freilich (2018), this de-legitimization campaign based on the long-lasting refusal of the rights of Jewish people to have land in their own nations. For Kuperwasser, for Arab countries, the issue was not the size of state or borders but its existence (Kuperwasser in Freilich 2018:99). The milestone for the current de-legitimization campaign was the UN Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban in August 2001 (Freilich 2018). The Durban strategy set the tone for launching the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement formally established by the Palestinian activists in 2005.

The BDS movement is a collective campaign against Israel which was started on 9 July 2005 by around 170 Palestinian civil-society organizations academics, intellectuals and trade unions (BDS 2005). The campaign called upon the international community "in the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency, and resistance to injustice and oppression" to

implement it by recognising the Palestinian right of Self-determination (BDS 2005). It talks about three vital components:

1. To end the Israeli occupation of Arab land and destruction of the security wall;
2. To recognize the rights of Palestinian Arabs; and
3. Protection of rights of Palestinian Refugees and return of their lands to them under the UN resolution 194 (BDS 2005).

The stated objective of the movement is to force Israel by using nonviolent means to accept the right of self-determination of Palestinian people (Freilich 2018:99). The BDS seeks to damage Israel's economic, technological and cultural ties with the other parts of the world by promoting a campaign of boycotts, divestments and sanctions, including academic boycott. In the initial stage, this movement was only popular in Europe and Britain, but gradually it expanded to other parts of the world. In 2013, the Association for Asian American Studies and the American Studies Association passed resolutions endorsing an academic boycott of Israel (Ibid.).

According to Dany Bahar and Natan Sachs "BDS is a loose amalgam of groups and individuals with varying political aims, who call for economic and cultural pressure on Israel in solidarity with the Palestinians" (Bahar and Sachs 2018). For some of its supporters, the objective is merely to stand against Israel or to Israeli policy and its military rule over the Palestinian people (Ananth 2013). There is also a league of supporters to whom the BDS is a concrete tactic to attain political goals, namely, "either an end to the occupation of Palestinians in the West Bank and the achievement of a two-state solution, or, conversely, the dissolution of Israel altogether and its replacement with a different state that includes the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (Bahar and Sachs 2018).

The BDS has made a vibrant presence in various Christian denominations, comprising Quakers groups in both the US and England. The Church of Sweden has endorsed boycotts sanctions against companies and products from Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Cohen and Freilich 2018). The United Church of Canada adopted a similar campaign to mobilize people for boycotting Israeli goods (Freilich 2018). Besides the United Methodist Church[27], voted in favour of boycotting products from Israeli settlements (Goodsteinmay 2012).

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[27] The United Methodist Church is a part of the second largest Protestant denomination in the United States. Its worldwide connection includes more than 12.6 million members.

Economic Boycott and Divestment

The economic impact of BDS is questionable; some says it has impacted Israel severely while others say there is no significant impact of BDS (Bahar and Sachs 2018). However, under the influence of the campaign, some of the major international companies have withdrawn from the Israeli market. In 2015, a French international company Veolia left Israel "after a global campaign targeting its links to occupation and settlements, while the following year, Irish construction giant CRH withdrew from the Israeli market" (White 2017). In 2016, amid of extreme BDS campaigning in France and Egypt, multinational Orange declined its Israel affiliate. According to Ben White (2017) "a number of significant investors have also divested from companies targeted by the BDS movement for their complicity in Israeli violations of international law and human rights, including pension funds in the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand and Luxembourg" (Ibid.). In 2017, Danish pension fund Sampension barred four companies for links with the Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory. In November 2018, Airbnb submitted to BDS movement by deciding to drop Jewish homes in the West Bank from its services (*Arutz Sheva* 2018).

There are no clear estimates regarding the impact of BDS on Israel, though reports in 2017 claimed that farmers of Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley region were losing NIS 100 million a year due to boycotts (White 2017). There also no estimates regarding the firms decided not to do business with Israel or numbers of consumers who opted not to buy Israeli goods. It may also happen that in these both categories numbers are very small but is growing (Freilich 2018). According to Finance Ministry report, the country's economy could lose up to US$10.5 billion per year, and thousands of people could lose their jobs if the country is subject to a full international boycott (*The Times of Israel* 2015). According to Rand Corporation, the BDS has potential to cost Israel at least US$47 billion over ten years (North 2015).

Academic boycott

The BDS campaign has hit the international academic sphere significantly. In North Africa, more than 50 student councils and associations have come in support the movement. In 2015, the British National Union of Students (NUS) voted to support BDS, mandating the confederation of some 600 student unions to support the boycott campaign in various ways (White 2017). In 2016, students of New York University gave their support to BDS. In the

same year, Britain's biggest – the University of Manchester – voted to support BDS. The University of Leeds in the UK has joined many other campuses around the world in divesting from Israel (Baroud 2018).

According to Ben White (2017), academic institutes in Ireland, Canada, South Africa, Qatar, and the UK have shown their support to BDS; "in the US, the Association for Asian American Studies, the American Studies Association, the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association, and National Women's Studies Association, have all endorsed a boycott of Israeli academic institutions, while in the UK, hundreds of academics have publicly declared their backing for the academic boycott" (Ibid.).

This boycott is not limited to academics only but goes into the cultural domain as well. In recent years, many artists and cultural figures from different part of the world have followed the call of BDS. This list includes Henning Mankell, Alice Walker, Roger Waters, Ken Loach, Judith Butler, Mira Nair and Elvis Costello. In February 2015, almost a thousand UK artists signed a pledge in support of the cultural boycott of Israel (*The Guardian* 2015). It was made public in the form of a letter which noted:

> Along with more than 600 other fellow artists, we are announcing today that we will not engage in business-as-usual cultural relations with Israel. We will accept neither professional invitations to Israel nor funding, from any institutions linked to its government. Since the summer war on Gaza, Palestinians have enjoyed no respite from Israel's unrelenting attack on their land, their livelihood, their right to political existence. "2014," says the Israeli human rights organisation B'Tselem, was "one of the cruellest and deadliest in the history of the occupation." The Palestinian catastrophe goes on. Israel's wars are fought on the cultural front too. Its army targets Palestinian cultural institutions for attack and prevents the free movement of cultural workers. Its own theatre companies perform to settler audiences on the West Bank – and those same companies tour the globe as cultural diplomats, in support of "Brand Israel." During South African apartheid, musicians announced they weren't going to "play Sun City." Now we are saying, in Tel Aviv, Netanya, Ashkelon or Ariel, we won't play music, accept awards, attend exhibitions, festivals or conferences, run master classes or workshops until Israel respects international law and ends its colonial oppression of the Palestinians (*Ha'aretz* 2015).

In February 2017, football star Michael Bennett declined to take part in a goodwill tour organised by the Israeli government (*The Guardian* 2017). The BDS movement has not left even sports untouched and in 2018, under severe political pressure Argentina cancelled its final World Cup warm-up match against Israel and striker Gonzalo Higuaín said that it was mainly because of political pressure grew before scheduled fixture of a match in Jerusalem (*The Guardian* 2018; *Haaretz* 2015).

The BDS has a well-defined objective behind its de-legitimization campaign. It attempts to create a situation in which Israeli use of force, even defensive, is considered illegitimate (Freilich 2018:99; White 2017). For example, amid of huge terror strikes during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel started the construction of security wall in the West Bank so that it can control the massive wave of terror strikes. The BDS campaign portrayed it as "Apartheid wall," the one like those existing along with the borders of Gaza Strip and Lebanon (Freilich 2018:99). While the Palestinians challenged the legality of the fence in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), it issued a non-binding advisory opinion in 2004 which noted that very construction of security fence was not a violation, but the construction of the wall in some areas of West Bank was a violation (Rabkin 2006). However, the advisory opinion received significant attention and proved a diplomatic blow for Israel (Freilich 2018:99). Furthermore, the UN General Assembly gave significant value to the ICJ ruling and led to sanctions and boycott against Israel (Lynk 2005:55).

In response to the BDS campaign, the Israeli government mobilised US$33 million for anti-BDS initiatives (White 2017). It also adopted legislation as anti-BDS offensive, which includes a prohibition on the "entry to international visitors who support BDS, as well as a law that makes Israelis who support BDS vulnerable to civil lawsuits" (White 2017). In March 2017, the Israeli Knesset passed the Anti-BDS Travel Ban which became law in November 2018. The law would prevent foreign nationals who have publicly called for a "boycott of the Jewish state or work on behalf of an organization that advocates these measures from entering Israel" (*The Times of Israel* 2018). The Member of Knesset, Roy Folkman of Kulanu party, who sponsored the law, noted that the legislation was required to protect Israel's "name and honour" (*The Times of Israel* 2018). Since the ban went into effect, many BDS supporters have been detained, deported, and barred from entering the country (Ibid.).

Changes in the Military Doctrine

In the post-Oslo period, it was difficult for the national security policymakers to pursue Israel's traditional security strategies which were developed keeping conventional threats in mind (Rynhold 2008; Civcik 2004). The Israeli acceptance by most of tier one countries and long-lasting enemies needed modification in the key pillars of military deterrence and the use of force. Before the peace agreement, it applied the strategy of use force and deterrence

according to regional hostility, but the Oslo process curtailed its freedom of action (Inbar 2008: Civcik 2004:99).

The restrained on the use of force negatively affected the deterrence position of Israel. The main reason behind this adverse impact was that its deterrence strategy was "based on capability and willingness to use of force which dissuades the Arabs from attacking" (Civcik 2004:99). Many scholars noted that the "limited freedom of action for the use of force" would decrease the usefulness of deterrence policy of Israel (Dayan 2008, Rubin 2006, Inbar 2008).

The changing security environment restricted the use of pre-emptive and preventive strike principles of offensive strategy due to political constraints. Though, the offensive principles were not given up after the operations in Lebanon, the principle of traditional self-reliance also changed during this period. Israel started looking for new friends in the region (Sherman 1999). It was interested in forming ties with countries that have common threats such as, Jordan and Turkey.

Though Israel was facing constant threats of rocket and missile attack since 1982, the home front command was not strengthened properly. Indeed, protection of the home front was not part of the IDF's strategic planning until 2006 and "was not even mentioned in the document on strategic goals submitted to the government at the beginning of the hostilities" (Inbar: 2008:233). After the war Home Front command became a vital part of Israeli security policy and as a result in 2011, it deployed the Iron Dome in the south to deal with the missile threat from Gaza.

Similarly, the establishment of the National Cyber Bureau (NCB) underlines that the cyber security has emerged as a significant area in national security strategy. Israeli policymaker has utilised the cyber-attacks to achieve its national security objective, particularly against Iran.

Demography: Silent Existentialist Threat

Demography has become an important part of primary Israeli national security consideration since 1990. It plays a significant role in shaping up national security strategy (Tal 2016). At present IDF no longer wants to triumph over territory in the conflict. It is mainly because IDF does not want to add more hostile population under its control and create a demographic imbalance (Freilich 2018). The Former head of the Mossad, Tamir Pardo at a conference

organized in Netanya in memory of Meir Dagan in March 2017, warned that the demographic threat poses the greatest risk to the state. He noted that the Jewish and Palestinian populations in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are nearly equal, and Israel must ready to deal with this situation. He further noted:

> It's the time bomb that's been ticking all the time for a while. In an exceptional way, we've decided to bury our heads deep in the sand, to preoccupy ourselves with alternative facts and flee from reality while creating other various external threats" (*Times of Israel* 2017).

He noted that Israel is swiftly "approaching the point of no return, at which point a bi-national state will be the only solution...The clock is ticking, we must weigh the facts and not the alternative facts and reach a decision. The time has come to choose a direction" (*The Times of Israel* 2017).

Numerous leaders belonging to centre-right-wing parties such as Dan Meridor, Tzipi Livni, Ehud Olmert, Roni Milo and Ariel Sharon had underlined the security threat posed by the demographic imbalance (Freilich 2018:109). While underlining the gravity of the problem of demographic imbalance and justifying the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Sharon noted that "demographic reality that has been created on the ground" and there was the need to ensure the future of Israel as Jewish and democratic state (Sharon quoted in Freilich 2018:109). Its total population is 9 million including a 6.6. million Jews (74 percent) and 1.9 million Arabs (21 percent) (Centre Bureau of Statics 2019). Shortly, this equation would be drastically altered by the Israeli Arabs (Ibid.). The population of Gaza is expected to grow from 1.71-1.85 to 3.05- 4.79 million in 2050 and of the West Bank from 2.64- 2.89 million to 4.21-4.72 million in 2050 (Freilich 2018:109). According to Charles D. Freilich (2018), the numbers are troublesome because of their impact on the future character of Israel as a Jewish state.

Table: 5.6 Demographic projections, Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (Millions)

	Projection	2015	2025	2030	2050	2060
Israel Total	High	8.30	10.02	10.99	16.36	20.38
	Medium	8.18	9.52	10.23	13.58	15.60
	Low	8.06	9.04	9.50	11.07	11.61
Jews and other	High	6.57	7.82	8.52	12.63	15.84
	Medium	6.47	7.42	7.92	10.42	12.00
	Low	6.37	7.04	7.34	8.43	8.82
Arab Israelis (Including East **Jerusalem**)	High	1.73	2.20	2.47	3.73	4.54
	Medium	1.71	2.10	2.31	3.16	3.60
	Low	1.69	2.00	2.16	2.64	2.79
Jews (Total Percentage)	High	79	78	77	77	77
	Medium	79	77	77	76	76
	Low	79	77	77	76	76
West Bank Including **Jerusalem**	High	2.89	3.52	3.76	4.72	--
	Low	2.64	3.15	---	4.21	--
East **Jerusalem**		0.26	0.31	0.33	0.42	--
Gaza	High	1.85	2.65	3.13	4.79	---
	Low	1.71	2.12	--	3.05	---

(Source: Reproduced from Freilich 2018:109)

Table 5.7:

The Demographic projections, Jewish Population as a Percentage of Total

	Projection	2015	2025	2050
Percentage of total Israel and West Bank	High	60	59	61
	Low	61	59	56
Percentage of total Israel, West Bank and Gaza	High	51	49	49
	Low	52	50	47

(Source: Reproduced From Freilich 2018:112)

According to high population projection, in 2050, the Jewish population of Israel and the West Bank would be 61 percent which is not much different from 2015 (See table 5.7).

On the other hand, if the low projection is more accurate than the proportion of Jewish population declines from 61 percent to 56 percent. The point to remember is that despite projection, around 40 percent population of Israel and the West Bank is not Jewish at present and will not be in 2050. Furthermore, if the Gaza Strip comes into the picture, the Jewish population in 2050 would be somewhere around 47-49 percent (See Table 5.7).

Conclusions

The Oslo process partially removed the security danger emanating from some of the tier one countries. It also weakened the possibility of the potential threat of conventional attack from its neighbouring countries. However, it failed to provide total security to Israel because it did not change the security environment of the region. During the process, it was unable to reach an agreement with Syria and Lebanon. The influence of Syria in Lebanon and its support to Hezbollah resulted in a hostile northern front. In short, existentialist threats were not eliminated by the peace process but on the contrary, its positive developments might induce fundamentalists to enhance further their endeavours of undermining the peace.

On the other hand, Iraq, Iran and upgraded Palestinian terrorism emerged as a new security challenge. However, developments in the post-2000 period were crucial from an Israeli point of view, with the outbreak of al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 a new age of terrorism started. However, the terror attack on the world trade centre on 11 September 2001 paved the way for combating terrorism with full US support. The defeat of Iraq in 2003 eliminated another national security challenge for Israel. The US hegemony created a less threatening regional order in the region for Israel. However, Palestinian terrorism emerging from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other groups challenged the security arrangements of Israel, but the serious threat to its existence came from the Iranian Nuclear Programme. Iran's presence in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza has further raised the Israeli security concerns. These security challenges also accompanied by new threats such as cyber terrorism and BDS movement that has impacted adversely affected Israeli economic and security apparatus.

Chapter Six

Impact

T he Oslo process led to significant positive and negative impacts on the Palestinians and Israelis. On the one side, it opened the doors for discussion and debate over a future Palestinian state and on the other, it significantly impacted the political, economic and security calculations of both the parties. For Palestinian, the process highlighted a split within the national movement and the divided the politics into the two major camps; one which was in favour of the PA style of politics of compromise and negotiations and the other which opted violent means to achieve their goals of achieving Palestinian statehood in the whole of mandate Palestine such as, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

From a security point of view by signing the agreements Israel expected that the Palestinian leadership would take care of terror activities in PA-controlled territories and neutralizes them on its own. This proved to be difficult for PA because it neither had the willingness nor the capabilities. For Israel, the key objectives of agreements were starting a peace initiative that would strengthen its security posture towards the rising terror threats from Palestinian territories. However, as it turned out the Oslo accords adversely impacted the Israel's security calculations.

Under the agreements, Israeli experts were searching solutions for two possible critical security challenges. Firstly, a conventional military threat from the eastern front and second, terrorist threats from radical groups, both religious and secular, within the Palestinian territories. As far as the conventional threat was a concern, Israel's strategy was to reach a security arrangement whereby it was able to defend itself against a threat from the East through Jordan and this was reasonably successful. The Oslo agreements brought significant alterations and accommodations in the policies of Arab countries towards Israel because the PA accepted the existence of Israel and therefore, these countries, especially, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and some of the gulf countries (Oman and Qatar), had to modify their policy towards Israel.

However, Israel failed to find a solution for the emerging threat of suicide terrorism. Since 1993, a rapid escalation in terror activities from the PA-controlled territories which easily targeted Israeli cities and emerged as new security challenge. Under such situation, IDF was

pushed to changes its defence strategy in the Palestinian territories, in the light of territorial withdrawal. This chapter attempts to broadly understand the significant impact of the Oslo process on the various shareholders in the process such as Israel and the Palestine Authority.

Impact on Palestine Authority

Political Impact

The Oslo process led to a significant impact on the Palestinian people. The process sharpened the polarization within the broader Palestinian community. Politically, it divided the Palestinian politics into the two major camps, one which was in favour of PA style of accommodative politics and second one rejectionist trend through violence such as, Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Rubin 1998; Pradhan 2008). Under the leadership of Arafat, PLO was more in favour of negotiations and gradual development of political aspirations of the Palestinian. For Arafat, among the others, one of reasons for signing the accords with Israel was the growing popularity of Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Arafat was not in favour of a rise in power of its Palestinian adversary (Pradhan 2008: 295-339). He thought that the peace agreement with Israel would project him as an influential actor and a hero who could realise the Palestinian hopes of an independent Palestinian state (Ibid).

The establishment of PA as an indigenous political front forced Hamas to participate in Palestinian politics as a violent and armed opposition party (Baconi 2015). Most of the time, Hamas was critical to the leadership of Arafat and the PA over its accommodation with Israel and its style of the governance and its attempts to guide the Palestinian struggle towards the agreement (Ibid.). This understanding was reflected in an interview with Abd al Aziz al Rantissi when noted that "the PA's actions: political arrests, suppression of freedom and the undermining of human rights are the catastrophic outcomes of self-governance" (Cited in Baconi 2015). Accommodative politics, according to Hamas did not serve the objectives of "Palestinian people and their national struggle, but rather the Zionist enemy, who cannot hide his joy and blessings of these actions" (Ibid.). By adopting this posture, Hamas emerged as an assertive opposition that offered Palestinian people an alternative through violent options (Turner 2006).

As a result, the peace agreement pursued by Arafat did not have unanimous support from the Palestinian. According to many experts, the challenges for Arafat were at four levels, namely, secular leftist, secular nationalist, anti-peace and anti-PLO groups, and radical

groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas (DiGeorio-Lutz: 137-39: ; Pradhan 2008: 295-339). From the very beginning, people and groups who were not in favour of the agreements noted that the peace agreement was signed by two asymmetrical partners and Israel was in the dominating position in the agreements (Gallo and Marzano 2009).

According to these scholars, Israel was not in favour of the establishment of a Palestinian state but wanted to give the Palestinians only municipal rights and not complete sovereignty (Pradhan 2008). The powers which Arafat got after signing the agreement also made him an autocratic leader in Palestinian politics (Pradhan 2008). There was "unprecedented concentration of powers" in Arafat's hands within a year of his return to the Palestinian controlled territories in 1994 (Rubenberg 2003:224). He took over around the sixty major functions which comprised not only the chief executive but total concentration of power in the hands of the head of the state. This autocratic style of functioning led to an adverse impact on the evolution and thriving the democratic institutions and practices in the PA-hold areas (Pradhan 2008). The autocratic practices of Arafat proved as an obstacle for the nation-building process.

According to Pradhan, the monopolization of power by the executive subordinated the legislature and judiciary. The best example of this executive takeover was the adoption of the Basic law which was ratified by the PLC in 1997 which had to serve as the interim constitution. However, Arafat declined to sign it until 2002 when he came under severe pressure from the outside (Ibid.). Furthermore, most of his decision violated financial regulations as outlined in the interim constitution (Nofal 2006: 33).

Arafat was also accused of permitting large-scale corruption by senior Palestinian officials and this was reflected in the extravagant living standard of the new elite. According to Pradhan, Arafat's style of ruling Palestine was "neo-patrimonial" which established "a system of governance that sought to combine informal social structures and networks with the formal and legal ones" (Pradhan 2008). He used to follow formal rules and procedures when these were fortifying his authority but did not think twice to bypass them when it used to confront his authority (Ibid.). According to Jonathan Schanzer (2013), the creation of the Palestinian Security Forces was a relatively easy task but the difficult one was the establishment of the other key institutions of a Palestinian state while Israel still in control of vast swaths of territories. According to Aaron David Miller "the real challenge, was to end the [Israeli] occupation through negotiation but at the same time building institutions of

governments within limits defined by the agreements" (Quoted in Jonathan Schanzer 2013). However, the autocratic nature of Arafat failed to establish a democratic structure.

On the other hand, "Hamas perceived the Oslo accord and the 1994 Cairo agreement as a strategic threat to its very existence" (Mishal and Sela 2000:72). There were several reasons for this opposition and primarily, the peace agreement largely ended the first intifada which began in December 1987. Secondly, it made it difficult for Hamas to exploit jihad as a military strategy to achieve its objective of a Palestine State in the whole of Mandate Palestine. Furthermore, it created PA and initiated a competition between PLO and Hamas (Ibid: 67). All these developments were a threat by Hamas for its existence. The group's rejection of Oslo made it evident that it was not only ideologically against the idea of peace with Israel but also was against the way Oslo presented to the world, as a movement subordinating Islam (Baconi 2015:4). Hamas was in favour of 'Islamic peace,' which maintains the superiority of Islam over other religions, and institutes and an Islamic order on Palestine (Milton-Edwards 2006: 220-222).

Though the PA enjoyed popular international attention and public support of the Palestinian people, Hamas was critical to the PA and its leadership. The post-Oslo period intensified the debate within ranks of Hamas regarding its approach to the peace process. Several of its moderate leaders such as Amad Al-Faluji, Mahmoud al-Zahar and Ghazi Hamad of Gaza and Jamil Hamani of Jerusalem criticised Hamas for its approach for peace process (Klein 2009:881). Among these people, Al-Faluji joined PA and became the Cabinet Minister in 1996. Moreover, in August 1993, before signing the first Oslo Al-Faluji advocated that Hamas should establish a political party that would participate in a local and national election (Ibid.). He advocated that Hamas should participate in utilising the current reality rather than side-lining itself (Ibid.: 883).

This differed from the viewpoint of its top leadership. Al-Faluji strongly said that the Hamas could not prevent the new reality which was emerging because of the peace agreements between Israel and the PLO, except at a price of civil war. This rebellious voice within Hamas became more powerful with the signing the Oslo II accord in September 1995 between Israel and PLO. This development intensified debate within Hamas (Ibid). The several leaders from the Hamas' moderate wing refused to accept the hard-line official position.

Another rebellious Hamas leader from the Gaza Strip Mohmoud al-Zahar came out with a new proposal for Hamas programme and noted that the text of the charter was no longer sufficient and perhaps even irrelevant (Ibid.). During the Oslo period, on the one hand, Hamas adopted an aggressive position to challenge and to derail the peace process by targeting Israeli people. On the other hand, it moved forward gradually to become a political player. It was reflected in 1995 when Hamas members commenced forming an Islamic National Salvation Party (Hizb al-Khalsa al- Watani al-Islami) but this not permitted by the Arafat until 1996 (Ibid.: 887).

On the other hand, the Palestinian leader tried to convince the leadership of Hamas to take part in the 1996 legislative council elections. It requested Israel to allow Hamas's internal leadership to attend Khartoum meeting in 1995 and to discuss the possibilities of joining the PA (Baconi 2015:509). The meeting underlined that Hamas was uncomfortable with the secular nature of on the PA. Though Hamas boycotted the 1996 PLC election, it established itself as a social, political and military entity (Baconi 2015:509). In 1999, the five years deadline for the final status of negotiations under the Oslo process expired and peace process technically collapsed. In 2000, Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak under the leadership of Clinton administration tried to restart the peace process. It was known as the Camp David talks which was unsuccessful due to considerable differences between the two sides (Thrall 2013). However, the controversial visit of Ariel Sharon to Temple Mount on 27 September 2000 sparked a violent protest in the Palestinian territories and erupted as Al-Aqsa intifada which ended all possibility of peace and changed the equation between PLO and Israel (Klein 2009; Kippenberg 2011).

The unfortunate collapse of the Camp David summit effectively dispersed the hopes regarding the potential success of the peace process. During the violent period of the intifada, Hamas's legitimacy significantly increased among the Palestinian people as decade-old popular support for the Fatah led PA significantly declined. According to Khaled Hroub, during these four years, "Hamas enjoyed three main strategic boosts: the resistance project' gained ground over the 'national agenda', regional Arab and Muslim support increased, and popular support for the movement gathered force on the ground" (Hroub 2004:1). The death of the peace process allowed Hamas to become a major player in Palestinian politics.

In the Initial period of the al-Aqsa intifada, it followed a strategy of "Balance of Horror" (Ibid.). It focused on using the same amount of force the IDF was using against the

Palestinians and was aimed at pushing the Israeli soldiers to leave the Palestinian territories (Bar-On 2008). The final objective of this strategy was to liberate the land from Israel. As discussed in Chapter Four, in 2001-2002, Hamas used a high rate of suicide strikes against the IDF in the occupied territories. However, even after using the massive destructive strikes against the IDF in the first half of the Intifada, it eventually failed in achieving the goal (Esposito 2005). Its strategy received significant blowback from the IDF and instead of forcing Israel to leave the territories it increased the ferocity of IDF's assault against the Palestinians in general, and Hamas in particular and resulted in the IDF re-occupying some of the territories from where it had withdrawn in late 1995 (Ibid.).

According to Michele K. Esposito (2005), during the 2001-2002, the IDF resorted to assassinations or targeted killings. In 2000, out of a total of 22 operations, six were targeted Hamas members; wherein 2002 it reached to 56. These only include known targeted assassinations that succeeded in killing the targets and do not include attempted targeted assassinations, perceived or otherwise (Luft 2003). Some of the prominent Hamas figures who fell victims to this strategy include Fathi Shiqaqi, Nur Barakeh, and Yahya 'Ayyash (Luft 2003; *BBC* 2018). Furthermore, it significantly increased the pressure on PA to take a concentrated effort on the violent activities of Hamas and the other militant factions (Esposito 2005).

On 11 November 2004, the PA President Arafat passed away and elections were held on 1 January 2005 to elect a successor and this was boycotted by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Dyrud and Hollekim 2004). The election saw the victory of Mohamed Abbas as elected president for a four-year term. On the other hand, on 16 February 2005, the Israeli parliament endorsed the Gaza disengagement agreement in the Knesset and drastically changed the Palestinian view about Israel (Dyrud and Hollekim 2004; *Ma'an News Agency* 2007). All these developments pushed Hamas to think about its role in the Palestinian struggle differently.

On March 2005, an agreement known as the Palestinian Cairo Declaration[28] accepted by various Palestinian factions namely, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Fatah, PFLP and DFLP, paved the way for the legislative election with a mixed voting system (*Ma'an News Agency* 2007). On

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[28] The Palestinian Cairo Declaration was signed on 19 March 2005 by 13 Palestinian factions at Cairo. Some of the groups those signed the declaration were, Hamas, Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Islamic Jihad, and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)

25 January 2006, ten years after the first elections, the Palestinian went to the polls to elect Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in which Hamas became victorious. Hamas won 74 out 132 seats while Fatah got just 45 seats in the election. Hamas received, 44.45 percent of the vote in comparison to Fatah which gained 41.43 percent (Dyrud and Hollekim 2004; *Ma'an News Agency* 2007).

After the election, on 29 March 2006 Ismail Haniya, leader of Hamas formed a new government which largely comprised members of Hamas members. However, Hamas turned a political player in the 2006 election, but it did not recognize Israel and Oslo Process (Dyrud and Hollekim 2004; *Ma'an News Agency* 2007).

In the election Hamas' performance was extremely well, "with its Change and Reform Bloc winning 74 of the 132 available seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)" (Berti 2015:12).

The success of Hamas was the result of various factors namely,

1. The Palestinian population penalized Fatah for internal division, corruption, and ineffective administration.

2. The failed peace process also played a significant role in proving incapability of Fatah.

3. The Al-Aqsa intifada played a significant role in the harnessing the popularity of Hamas.

4. It also used positively the move the Gaza disengagement by Israel in 2005 (Ibid.).

Though the results were in the favour of Hamas (Queri 2015) but Fatah was hesitant to surrender the power to its rival (Berti 2015). It was mainly because of its disagreement with Hamas over a number of issues ranging from security arrangements to political issues (Ibid.). The victory of Hamas created two opposing centres in the Palestinian politics, namely, one led by Abbas and Fatah and the other Hamas-led government (Ibid.). This divide was geographically visible as well; Fatah largely staying in the West Bank and Hamas leadership operating from the Gaza Strip.

Fatah's decision of boycott of parliament in March 2006 further increased the tensions between the two (Rubin and Rubin 2003). The key reason of boycott was the attempt of Hamas' elected representatives to abrogate the law which enhances the power of Presidency

(*Al-Jazeera* 2006). The key issue in contestation was "the reform of the security sector and the push to bring it under the control of the cabinet and the Hamas-affiliated minister of interior, Sa'id Siyam" (Berti 2015). Under such situation, Hamas eventually resolved the stalemate by creating its security force: the executive force. After February 2007, Mecca agreement,[29] the problem between Hamas and Fatah became worrisome due to Abbas's nomination of Fatah leader Muhammad Dahlan to head the National Security Council (Haaretz 2007). This became a major conflict in June 2007, when Hamas-Fatah clashes developed into a full military confrontation. In the fight, Hamas defeated Fatah and took control of the Gaza Strip (Youngs and Smith 2007; Berti 2015). The seizure of the Gaza Strip left the Palestinian Territories divided between Hamas controlled of Gaza and Fatah controlled the West Bank. In response, Abbas condemned the act of Hamas and declared the formation of an Emergency Government (Youngs and Smith 2007:15; Berti 2015).

Hamas' capture of the Gaza Strip was a serious security issue for Israel, as it unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005 (Migdalovitz 2010). The takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas also pushed Israel and Egypt to impose a land, sea and aerial siege. This was mainly on security grounds, as Fatah already had fled the city and was not able to provide security in the Palestinian side (Kershner 2007). According to Israel, the blockade was vital for the protection of its citizens from rocket attacks and terrorism. It was also important for the restriction of dual-use goods from entering Gaza (Benhorin 2007). However, amid of constant rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip on 27 December 2008, Israel started Operation Cast Lead. The operation ended on 18 January 2009 in a unilateral ceasefire resulting death of around 1,300 Palestinian and 13 Israeli (Benhorin 2007; Nidal 2009).

Since 2007, the efforts have been made to bring both the Palestinian faction together to form the unity Government, but all the efforts have badly failed. The revolution in Egypt in 2011 intensified the tensions between the two rivals (Toameh 2013). In 2008, both the groups signed the Sanaa declaration that asked for the return of the Gaza Strip to pre 2007 situation (Sana'a Declaration 2008). However, due to disagreement over hand over of the Gaza Strip and Unity government, it could not reach a final decision. Similarly, the two had various rounds of negotiations (Cairo Agreement 2009, 2010 and 2011), Doha Agreement 2012) and the Fatah–Hamas Agreement (2017) but like previous results talks were unable to reach any

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[29] By signing Mecca agreement on 8 February 2007 both the parties agreed upon the establishment of Unity Government in the Palestinian area.

solutions. Twelve years after the seizer of power in the Gaza Strip, there is no sign of rapprochement between Hamas and Fatah.

The Security Aspect of the Palestinian Factor

Security is a fundamental concern in all peace agreements between Israel and Palestine. From the security point of view, Oslo agreements led a significant impact on Palestinian people. The agreements restricted the freedom of terror attacks for Fatah (Pearlman 2008) and left the only political option for Arafat to deal with Israel. This did not apply to other terror groups in the Palestinian areas, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad which were resorting to terrorism against Israel. The agreements transferred the control of the major Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, namely Fatah to PA under an interim structure to supervise administration and security in those areas (Aljazeera 2013: Weiner 1999). It was expected that limited Palestinian self-government and Israeli departure from Palestinian territories would boost the mutual trust that would encourage both the parties to negotiate the final-status agreements on the trickiest issues – such as settlement, refugee, orders, Jerusalem and security (Weiner 1999; Aljazeera 2013).

To understand the extent of the impact of Oslo on Palestine, it's important to realize that what Palestinians and Israelis expected from each other. Mainly, from a national security point of view, Israel hoped that the PA would ensure Israeli security and take responsibilities for ensuring peace in the area evacuated by IDF. This commitment was underlined in the Yasser Arafat's letter to Prime Minister Rabin sent on 9 September 1993 and Declaration of principles' article five and six (DoP 1993; Arafat 1993). The DoP noted that once the Israeli troops withdrew from Gaza Strip and Jericho area, the authority in the following spheres would be transferred to the Palestinians, namely, education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. It was underlined that the Palestinian side would start building a police force (DoP 1993). Furthermore, under article eight of DoP, it was decided that internal security would be in the Palestinian hands while Israel would be responsible for deafening from external threats and security of Israeli nationals (DoP 1993; Arafat 1993). The Israeli security concerns were quite visible in the DoP.

The similar security concerns were also reflected in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement signed on 28 September 1995 in Taba. The agreement allowed Palestinian Council to have elections, legislative authority, withdrawal of IDF from Palestinian centres of population and

divided the Palestinian territories into three categories, namely, Area A, Area B and Area C, as follows:

> 1. Area-A, in this area, the Palestinian Authority would have full control over civil and security issues. The area-A contains eight cities and their surrounding areas (Jenin, Jericho, Nablus, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, Ramallah and Bethlehem, and a large portion of Hebron).

> 2. Area B contained around 23 percent of the territory, consisting of around 440 villages and surrounding areas. In this area, the Palestinians would be responsible for civil functions, while Israel would take care of security issues. It was also agreed that to maintain the internal security Israel and Palestinian would petrol jointly.

> 3. Area C, comprising around 74 percent of the territory would be the exclusive control of Israel, "comprising 145 settlements and the new Jewish neighbourhoods in and around East Jerusalem" (Taba Agreement 1995: 1).

The peace agreements were thought to be the assurance of security and safety for Israel (Shavir 2008; Diker 2008). However, their success was dependent on the cooperation from PA, which said that it would dismantle all the terror threats within Palestinian territories those posed security threats to Israel (Diker 2008:129).

In the initial stage of the process, Israel was seen in a hurry to "unburden itself of the occupation while continuing to protect its citizens-including the tens of thousands living in the settlements in the territories" (Savir 1998:39). It was decided that Israel would withdraw gradually from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to allow PA to take control over the evacuated land. The PA would enforce its authority and rule through a police force which would be armed with the weapons provided by Israel. The assumption was that these weapons would be used to retain public order and to fight against terrorism (Karsh 2016).

Regarding terrorist threats to the Israel civilians, security experts believed that Israeli-Palestinian collaboration would offer an adequate amount of security. It means,

1. The main responsibility for fighting terrorism in the Palestinian controlled areas was in the hands of the PA;

2. Israel would provide the PA security apparatuses by assisting them by providing intelligence without breaching quasi-sovereignty of the Palestinians;

3. Israel would hold a limited role at international transit points, such as seaports and airports; and

4. The responsibility for protecting external borders with Egypt and Jordan would be rested in the hands of Palestinians, with some assistance from international forces (Karsh 2016).

In other words, the Israeli security experts expected that the Oslo accords would transform the Palestinian security organizations into an arm of Israeli police and intelligence services (Byman 2011). They expected that Palestinians would do a better job than Israel because they knew their community better than Israeli Security Services (Amidror 2004; Byman 2011).

It was also reflected in Rabin's security calculations when he noted that the PA would confront terrorism more effectively than Israel could ever do because it would operate without constraints imposed by "human rights groups and the Israeli Supreme Court" (Rabin Quoted in Hellman 2018). Through that statement, he was expressing the hope that many Israelis would rally behind the agreement as an anti-terrorism alliance between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Hellman 2018). In other words, under the Oslo arrangements, Israel wanted Palestinians to deal with Israeli security issues and almost entirely relied on the Palestinians for its security concerns. However, it forgot that Israel itself failed to address these security issues adequately and that Palestinian also had compulsions that prevented the PA as Israel's collaborator in the occupied territories (Kumaraswamy 2018).

Impact on Israel

The Oslo accords led a significant impact on Israeli security strategy. According to many experts, the main purpose of accords was to strengthen Israeli security posture towards the emerging conventional and terror threats from the Palestinian territories (Kelman 2007; Arian 1998; Peri 2005). According to Asher Arian (1998) accords somewhat solved some of these problems and was reflected in public opinions conducted during the peace process. According to a survey, during 1993-1998 Israel enjoyed a higher level of national security against conventional attacks than it had at any other point in the previous fifty years. However, at a personal level, the Israeli people felt less secure (Arian 1998).

At the same time, the Israeli security policy makers and senior military officers came across a range of security problems which were far more complex and difficult than the previous leaders faced (Peri 2005; Arian 1998). The constant attacks on the civilian population within the Green line raised the security concerns for the policymakers. Before the accords were signed, the security officials at least knew that who and what they were up against. According to Asher Arian (1998), the peace process changed the situation and proved to be a mixed

blessing. It introduced new deadly threats, "while at the same time fostering higher expectations among Israeli citizens of what peace and security should signify" (Ibid.). Many experts asserted that the post-accord situation underlined that accords were failed to address Israel's security concerns (Inbar 2004; *Schueftan 2018;* Amidror 2004). As stated earlier, the human cost of the Oslo agreements was greater for Israel in comparison to the war of attrition during 1968-1970. In a decade starting from September 1993 to 2000, "Israel suffered 1,080 casualties; 256 from the signing of the DOP in September 1993 to September 2000, and 824 from September 2000 until 1 June 2003" (Fishman 2003:1).

Though in the post-Oslo period, the conventional threats were weakened significantly but the danger remained constant (Peri 2005; Arian 1998). During this period, the key security challenges were coming from the adversary, who does not share borders with Israel, "but that appears bent on acquiring a capability to strike Israel directly" such as ballistic missiles loaded with biological, nuclear, or chemical warheads (Arian 1998). The easy availability of missile technology to the states that were unfriendly to Israel such as Iran and Iraq posed a serious security danger (Peri 2005; Arian 1998; Inbar 2001). On the other hand, the "low-end" security challenges were emerging from Hamas's terror attacks, the al-Aqsa Intifada, and the protracted struggle with Hezbollah in the "security zone" in Southern Lebanon (Arian 1998).

It was evident that the conventional military doctrine was unable to address these security challenges and Israel had to adopt a different security strategy. The acceptance of Israel by some of its immediate neighbours forced to alter its deterrence strategy and use of force doctrine (Inbar and Sandler 1995). After 1948, Israel followed the strategy of deterrence and use of force to deal with its security concerns largely emanating from the hostile Arab neighbours. In this context, the peace process limited Israel's freedom of action in following its four-decade-old basic security doctrine (Civcik 2008; Inbar and Sandler 1995). In other words, the limited freedom of action reduced the effectiveness of the Israeli deterrence (Cohen 1998). It was mainly because Israel's deterrence strategy was based on its capability and willingness to use force which would stop enemies from preventing attacking Israel and with a quasi-friendly atmosphere, the use of force became diplomatically costly and, in some cases, politically unfeasible.

The peace process also limited the use of pre-emptive and preventive strike principles of the security doctrine. The political development which started with the peace process was the

biggest restraint in this regard (Cohen 1998). The post-Oslo developments impacted on the traditional principle of self-reliance. Under the new situations, Israel's started looking for the new alliances in the region. However, the superpower support coming from the US was still a main element in the security doctrine. It was very important for gaining access to new weaponry, technology and economic support (Cohen 1998; Civcik 2008). At the same time, Israel was keen to establish ties with the nations that have common security danger like Turkey and Jordan without jeopardizing its relations with the US (Inbar and Sandler 1995). Its emerging new ties with Turkey pointed towards a change in the conventional military doctrine of Israel. According to Zeynep Civcik (2008), "It was hard to claim that the self-reliance policy was completely abandoned, but it was more flexible for sure" (Civcik 2008:111).

However, despite cultivating new ties in the region Israel took the risky decision of targeting Khaled Mishal on 25 September 1997 in Jordan (Harms and Ferry 2008) and Hassan Lakkis, commander of Hezbollah in Cyprus on 4 December 2013 (*Cyprus Mail* 2010). On both occasions, the decision turned into critical diplomatic crises and adversely affected Israel's new relations with Jordan and Turkey. Its response to the Turkish ship MV Mavi Marmara in 2010 severely damaged Israel-Turkey relations (The *New York Times* 2011).

Another major change in the defence doctrine was structural and was related to the 'nation in arms' concept. In the 1990s the upper limit of the reserve duty period was reduced to age 45 in fighting units "and to age 51 in rear echelons and continued with the reduction in female conscript terms in 1993" (Stuart 1995: 238). The most important change during this period was the military services losing its significance. According to Stuart A. Cohen (1997), the enthusiasm for the armed service deteriorated significantly among the youth coming from a "secular and middle-class background from 82 percent to 68 percent over the period 1986-95" (Cohen 1997:107). A decline of 5 percent was also seen in the motivations of "national-religious young people towards the conscription, during the same period (Civcik 2008).

All these were a result of the changed strategic setting of Israel in the 1990s. However, it was also evident that the right-wing and centre-left parties had a different position regarding security issues. According to Civcik (2008) centre-left parties' strategy of territorial compromise and progress on peace accords were fairly diverse from Likud's policy which totally instituted on the "Jewish history, persecution and redemption and the protection of the mission to settle the whole of Israel and the occupied territories" (Civcik 2008: 111; Barnett

1999: 17). The difference in strategy had an ideological and religious background as well. In comparison to Likud, the Labour has been without ideological and religious underpinnings. On the other hand, Likud's vision was expansionist and religiously orthodox (Barnett 1999: 17).

The most important component of the accords was the territorial compromises, which significantly impacted on the Israeli security calculation. The accords demanded significant territorial compromises from Israel (Israeli 2014: Amidror 2004). In the absence of territorial control, it was difficult for the IDF to keep track of the developments and monitor and anticipate possible threats emanating from Palestinian territories (Amidror 2004; Karsh 2016). To fight against terrorism, the control of land was critical and even vital for acquiring intelligence about terror groups, to monitor suspects and terror sites, recruit agents and sources, to take the measures by which counterterrorist experts learn the terrorists' modus operandi, to question and arrest terror suspects and prevent terrorists from getting close to their target (Amidror 2004). In the absence of territorial control counter-terrorism measure becomes risky both militarily and politically (Amidror 2004; Karsh 2016).

Furthermore, as noted in chapter four, when Israel was maintaining territorial control of populated areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, its defence against the terrorists were the cities and towns, where the terrorists were operating. In the absence of such control, the line of defence for Israel was the Palestinian towns and cities. This situation gave the terror groups a greater scope to target Israeli civilian in these areas and their success was almost assured (Karsh 2016; Amidror 2004). On the other hand, the absence of Israel's territorial control provided space for a section of Palestinians, who were committed to violence and allowed them to improve their striking capability. It allowed a section Palestinians, largely led by Hamas, to carry out a guerrilla war campaign which cost around 900 Israeli lives in the first three years of signing the agreements (Amidror 2004).

The significance of territorial control was reflected during Israel's military strategy during the first Intifada. It was a serious security challenge, but the IDF could deal with the situation by light weapons, namely, gun and nightsticks but the Oslo arrangements completely changed it (Amidror 2004; Barnea 2008). In the absence of territorial control, Israel had to manage these threats from the PA-held areas with fighter jets and additional security arrangement (Amidror 2004). In other words, the territorial compromise led to an increase in its financial investment in the security technologies to deal with this new development (See table 6.1). This was

clearly reflected in Israeli military expenditure which reached to US$ 16,275 million in 1996 from US$ 13,789 million in 1993. During Al- Aqsa Intifada period Israeli military expenditure registered a constant rise (SIPRI 2019).

The PA control on the areas from where the IDF troops withdrew, allowed radical groups to build an installation for starting the long-range assault on Israel, which resulted in high causalities (Barnea 2008; Amidror 2004). This situation forced Israeli security policy makers to think about retaking control of the some of these territories from where the Israeli troops were withdrawn. This peculiar security situation was also reflected during the IDF's operation in Jenin which took place during 1–11 April 2002. Since the outbreak of al-Aqsa Intifada Jenin served as a principal centre for the terrorist organizations operating in the West Bank (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002b). The IDF's Operation in Jenin was difficult in many ways, from a logistical point of view problem in fighting in a densely populated urban battlefield was tiring. On the other hand, IDF had to distinguish fighters from civilians. The Jenin operation cost the lives of 23 IDF soldiers which was "far more than in all the other battles of Operation Defensive Shield combined" (Henkin 2003:21). To neutralize the threat, Israeli required the use of tanks, helicopter gunships and armoured personnel carriers. At certain times it also required the use of fighter aircrafts loaded with precision-guided missiles (Ibid.).

The nightmare security situation in the post-Oslo period made Israeli security experts to understand that fighting terrorism in the surrounding areas of Israel was solely its responsibility and fight and it needs to retain the right and capability to fight terror independently (Amidror 2004). For various reasons, starting from an inability to fight against terrorism to PA sympathy to radical groups, it certainly it was unable to battle against radical terrorism (Savir 1998; Karsh 2016; Amidror 2004). The most terrorism experts in Israel and outside were familiar that the PA was unable to deal with the terrorism and its attempts were inadequate. According to Amidror (2004) "it was a nave and costly belief the Palestinians would fight terror more readily than Israel because they lack an interventionist judiciary" (Amidror 2004).

Table 6.1: Military Expenditure during the Oslo Process Period

S.N	Year	Military expenditure US$ Million
1	1992	13,789
2	1993	15,164
3	1994	14,397
4	1995	13,377
5	1996	13,628
6	1997	13,642
7	1998	13,448
8	1999	13,164
9	2000	13,952
10	2001	14,537
11	2002	16,275
12	2003	16,666
13	2004	16,926
14	2005	16,413
15	2006	16,895

(Source: SIPRI 2019)

The inadequacy of the PA in dealing with the radical groups was basically an outcome of its incapability. The PA neither had resources nor professional expertise to handle the security situations in the West Bank and Gaza (Byman 2011; Savir 1998). There was also fear that if PA would act against Hamas and Islamic Jihad it could lose the support and even legitimacy of the Palestinians (Pradhan 2008). Some of these difficulties were underlined by Peres during meeting with Arafat at Spanish town Granada in 1993 when he said, "Mr. Chairman ...Rabin and I aware of your difficulties and we are interested in seeing you succeed ... we are concerned about the smuggling of weapons ... this is absolutely vital to our security" (Karsh 2007:5). On the other hand, in comparison to PA security forces, Hamas was better trained and motivated fighters. This difference was clearly visible during the 2007 Hamas-Fatah clashes when Hamas easily seized the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, Israel itself failed to deal with these security challenges posed by radical groups which it expected PA to deal with.

The experience of territorial compromise underlined that the cooperation with Palestinian was important but Israel must retain its ability to gather intelligence within the Palestinian area to defend itself. According to Amidror (2004) "this means insisting that in any permanent status accord, the Palestinians must accept continued collection by Israel of human intelligence as well as an agreed set of aerial reconnaissance flights" (Ibid.). Over time, Israel also demanded that Palestinians recognize its right to detain, arrest, and interrogate terrorist suspects if the PA failed to act against such suspects themselves. Moreover, mechanisms must be created by which the Palestinians share all terrorism-related information with Israel; full transparency is essential" (Ibid.).

The 1993-2000 experience highlighted other key lessons of the Oslo security arrangements, namely, the benefits of security collaboration. The reality was that the "six years long Israeli-Palestinian joint patrols and combined headquarters contributed virtually nothing to a mutual understanding on both sides" (Ibid.). Practically, the cooperation in the sphere of security created no barrier to fight against terrorism (Ibid.). This was basically because the PA and Israel had different worldview regarding terrorism. For Israel, the constant suicide attacks from the Palestinian territories were a serious security concern. On the other hand, PA's slow response to terror activities underlined its unwillingness to act against the radical groups. This unwillingness was the outcome of few important factors, first, as said earlier, the PA did not have the capability to deal with this groups and second it had a fear that if it takes action against Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Palestinian people might react it adversely.

On 24 August 1994, Rabin met with Arafat and asked him to do his job properly (Savir 1998) and to deal with the extremism (Ibid.). To teach a lesson to Arafat he even, sealed off the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1994. He further noted that if the PA was unable to prevent terrorism and IDF was not allowed to fight it in the areas under Palestinian control, then all Palestinian would be denied job access in Israel (Ibid.). After the DoP, the PLO officials were extremely reluctant to condemn terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. The head of PLO's internal security apparatus and a close aide of Arafat, Hakam Balawi told to an Israeli interviewer when he was asked about the spate of suicide strikes by Hamas on the day of signing the DoP that "I do not condemn them. No, I do not," (Karsh 2013:130).

When asked to condemn a Hamas terror attack in October 1993, in which around thirty civilians were injured, Arafat noted "Have I asked Rabin to uproot the opposition on his side? If he respects their opposition to him, I also respect the opposition on my side" (Ibid.). According to Karsh (2003), Arafat and the PLO leadership never considered the Oslo accords as an end of the violent struggle against Israel. It was reflected in the statement of Hani Hasan, a member of Fatah's central committee "the armed struggle plants the seeds while the political struggle reaps the harvest" (Karsh 2003:131).

The PA's many times violated the agreements over the security cooperation (Savir 1998; Karsh 2003; Netanyahu 1997). In July 1994, Arafat returned to Palestinian territories with Mamduh Nawfal, the mastermind of 1974 Maalot atrocity, which took the life of 29 children and injured 67 (Netanyahu 1997; Savir 1998; Karsh 2003). During Arafat's visit to Hebron following the withdrawal of Israeli Army in January 1997, hidden ammunition boxes were found in his personal helicopter. Furthermore, his bodyguards were carrying the improved versions of AK 47 rifles smuggled from Egypt in violation of the Oslo agreements (Savir 1998; Karsh 2003). These events created a perception that PA was not serious in dealing with the issue of terrorism.

As mentioned earlier, the territorial compromise allowed a section of the Palestinian group to target Israeli cities and town. It eventually forced Israeli policymaker to create separation wall that can effectively reduce the suicide terror attacks from Palestinian territories (Karsh 2016; Amidror 2004). The construction of the security wall started on during the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. It was constructed as a defensive measure in order to protect Israel's civilians from terrorist attacks. However, the proposal creating a physical security barrier separating Israel from Palestinian population was first proposed by Prime Minister Rabin in

the 1993 (Kahana 2006). In 1995, amid of constant suicide attacks from the Palestinian areas deep inside Israel, the Shahal commission was established to discuss the ways to implement a security barrier (Catignani 2013). In 2000, then Prime Minister Ehud Barak approved funding of a 74 km fence between Wadi Ara and Latrun areas (Kahana 2006). The Sharon government on 23 June 2002 fully approved the plan in principal and started the construction work of security barrier (Shlay and Rosen 2015).

The security fence is a mix of concrete walls in urban areas and barbed wire fences in rural areas. The concrete walls are eight meters tall and makeup roughly 5 percent of the total length. The rest wall comprises "of complex of barbed wire stacked in pyramids, smoothed dirt to capture footprints, patrol roads, and a high-tech intrusion-detection fence" (Jones et al.2016; 1).

A large portion of the route goes parallel to the Green Line[30], but it mostly runs on the West Bank side of the line (Khamaisi 2008). According to David Newman (2010), the wall designates the land between the Wall and the Green Line as "the seam zone," which can be only accessed with special permission (Newman 2010). In October 2003, UNSC voted a resolution to declare the barrier illegal at places where it departed from the Green line and noted that it should be demolished at those sections. In 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) said that the wall was "contrary to International law" (ICJ 2004) and its legality was challenged in Israel's High Court (Lynk 2005) and it remains in place with few minor changes to the route (Jones et al.2016; 1).

There is a consensus among the experts that the security fence had only one objective, to keep the terrorists away and thereby save the lives of Israel's citizens (Karsh 2016; Amidror 2004). Since 1993, many innocent people had lost their lives in the terror attacks, mostly suicide terror attacks from Palestinians. According to the Israeli government, in almost all cases, the terrorists infiltrated from the West Bank. The Palestinian leadership has done nothing to stop them and has even encouraged them (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). There was an agreement among security experts and political leaders from right wing parties to left that "security fence" was a solution to the spate of terrorism. In October 1994, following constant violence including a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, Rabin noted that "we have to decide on separation as a philosophy. There has to be a clear border. Without demarcating the lines, whoever wants to swallow 1.8 million Arabs will just bring greater

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[30] The pre-1967 armistice line between Israel and Jordan,

support for Hamas" (Rabin Quoted in Makovsky 2004:52). On 25 January 1995, Peres said that some form of a security barrier "definitely appeals to me" but noted that the government must discuss the issue in detail (*The Los Angeles Times* 1995:1). In 1999, the concept of separation was also reflected in Barak's 1999 campaign slogan "we are here and they are there". He promised before the Camp David summit in 2000 to build "a physical separation" between the two sides. Barak said, such a barrier would be "essential to the Palestinian nation in order to foster its national identity and independence, without being dependent on the State of Israel" (Barak quoted in Makovsky 2004:52). The fence was seen an answer for those who see no hope for diplomacy, at least in the foreseeable future (Amidror 2004).

The impact of this security situation was so dominating that during the permanent status negotiations which began in 1996, security policymakers were searching solutions for only two possible critical challenges (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996c). Firstly, a traditional security danger from the eastern side and second, a non-traditional terror threat from radical groups, "both religious and secular, within the Palestinian territories themselves" (Amidror 2004). As far as the traditional threat was concerned, Israel's strategy was to reach a security arrangement whereby it could defend itself against a threat through Jordan (Kelman 2007; Amidror 2004).

According to Yaakov Amidror (2004), it practically means that:

1. Israeli military deployment in the territories would be minimum, restricted to two or three early warning arrangement during the time of peace and low visible threat; and

2. During the critical situation, the IDF would be permitted to deploy troops in strategically important areas in the West Bank, crucial for security. It would be done only after Israel convincing the US for the compelling, real, and imminent need to act (Amidror 2004).

3. With regards to the threat of terrorism, security experts assumed that the Israeli-Palestinian cooperation would provide an adequate response, which practically meant that

4. The PA would be responsible for fighting terrorism within the areas that are under its control;

5. Israel would cooperate with PA in helping them create a security apparatus by helping them with intelligence and without violating the Palestinians' quasi-sovereignty;

6. Israel would limit its role "at international transit points, such as airports and seaports, to an invisible presence so as not to appear to violate Palestinian quasi-sovereignty" (Amidror 2004); and

7. The PA would be responsible for protecting external borders with Jordan and Egypt (Ibid.).

All these principles dominated Israel's strategy at Camp David negotiations in July 2000, over security arrangements. These alterations were vital in the light of the security challenge which Israel encountered during the Oslo period.

Israeli Security Strategies

Since 1993, the PA-Israel security cooperation was at the heart of Israeli security strategy in the West Bank and Gaza. The security cooperation between the two was established under the 1993 Oslo agreements and focused on bringing stability to both sides. However, "the elements of the agreement were very much focused on creating a structure which would primarily ensure the security of Israel" (Purkiss and Naf 2010).

The cooperation between the two comprised of sharing of intelligence. By signing the agreements, the PA assured that it would help Israel in dealing with its security concerns and on the other hand, Israel pledged help in PA fighting the emanating security dangers (Karsh 2016; Inbar 2001).Article 15 of Oslo Agreement (1995) said that

> Both sides shall take all measures necessary to prevent acts of Terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and against their property and shall take legal measures against offenders (Oslo Accords 1995: Article 15).

According to the agreement the PA was expected to form a "strong police force" to take care of internal security and public order in the areas that were under its control (Lutz 2017; Lisiecka 2017; Oslo Agreement 1995). On the other hand, the responsibility for all security of Jewish settlers and external threat rested with Israel. It was clearly mentioned in article 12 of Oslo Accord (1995), which said:

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council shall establish a strong police force as set out in Article XIV Below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian borders and defence against external threat from the sea and the air, as well as responsibility for overall security of Israelis and settlements for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all the powers take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility (Oslo Accords 1995: Article 12).

According to the agreement the IDF was tasked to protect the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as it was also assigned to deafened external threats emerging from air and sea routes. Article XII of the agreement also allowed Israel to protect Jewish settlements and had "all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility" (Oslo Agreement 1995; Article 12). Along with maintaining internal order within the PA hold areas, the Palestinian security forces were also responsible for "the prevention of terrorism and violence" (Oslo Agreement 1995: Annex I, Article II). The article broadly underlined that

Both sides will act to ensure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end, they will cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence (Oslo Agreement 1995: Annex I, Article II).

Similarly, in the civil affairs also the cooperation between the PA and Israel was the backbone of agreement. This was reflected in article 1 of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement-Annex III, which broadly underline the matters and duties for liaison and coordination in civil affairs. According to Article 1:

A. A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter the CAC) is hereby established.

B. The CAC will function with regard to policy matters under the direction of the Joint Liaison Committee, with ongoing coordination being provided by the Monitoring and Steering Committee.

C. The CAC will deal with the following matters:

1. Civil affairs, including issues concerning the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council.

2. Matters arising with regard to infrastructures, such as roads, water and sewage systems, power lines and telecommunication infrastructure, which require coordination according to this Agreement.

3. Questions regarding passage to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including crossing points and international crossings.

4. The relations between the two sides in civil matters, in issues such as granting of permits.

5. Matters dealt with by the various professional subcommittees established in accordance with this Annex, which require further discussion or overall coordination (The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement-Annex III 1995: Article 1).

It was evident from these articles that the Israeli security strategy in the West Bank was largely dependent on the PLO-led PA's actions against the Israeli security concerns. However, the PLO's economic situation was the biggest obstacle in fulfilling these security concerns. The organization was in a precarious shape at the time of signing the Oslo agreements (Rynhold 2008). The PLO's political stand during the Kuwait crisis has further weakened its financial situation (*Aljazeera* 2009). In the months following the war, some 400,000 Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait (Haram and Ferry 2008). According to Philip Mattar (1994), it reduced per capita income by 15-20 percent, down to $800 annually, or half of what it was in 1987. The embargo after the war led a significant impact on "trade with Iraq and the end of the trade with Saudi Arabia, badly affected the Jordanian economy. Its cost amounted to the Jordanian-Palestinians 1.6 million in 1990 and $2.5 billion in 1991" (Abed 1991:37). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia's decision of withdrawal of financial assistance to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip further deteriorated this situation (Haram and Ferry 2008).

Apart from financial constraints, Arafat used the security establishment to implement his strategy of divide-to-rule. In the Palestinian ruled territories, he developed a system where the top officials of the security forces only accountable to Arafat (Lutz 2017). These senior officials many times involved in the internal rivalry in their operations, ending as bloody clashes. For example, in October 2006, the clashes between the Palestinian police aligned with Fatah and the Interior Ministry troops close to Hamas erupted during a protest for non-payment of wages (*The Hindustan Times* cited in Pradhan 2008:326). Furthermore, there was a clear lack of inter-agency cooperation among the Palestinian agencies, such as the General Intelligence Service, the Preventive Security Force, the Presidential Guard and the Special Security Force (Usher 1996). According to Al-Haq, the Palestinian affiliate of the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists, there were other smaller forces as well, such as

the PA's Military Police, Navy Police, and Disciplinary Police (Al-Haq cited in Usher 1996: 24).

These divided the PA leadership internally as well externally (Lia 2007). There was a visible divide among the Palestinian people vis-à-vis Palestinian security forces as well and they viewed them through a binary prism of "our and their" in the Gaza and West Bank (Lutz 2017). It was mainly because of the large numbers of Fatah people in security agencies. This divide led to "the Black Friday in Gaza in November 1994, when Palestinian police fired live ammunition at civilian demonstrators killing 13 and wounding another 200, or the arresting and torturing of the opposition" (Frisch 2008). Under such a condition it was difficult for the PA to deliver all the security demands of Israel (Lutz 2017; Rynhold 2008).

Despite initial problems, both IDF and the PA cooperated in the joint petrol and information sharing. Nevertheless, a clear violation of the peace treaty was made by Palestinian when they started building "quasi-military structures" such as separate intelligence units (Lutz 2017). There was a clear violation of Oslo Agreement (1995, annex I, Article IV) which said that Palestinian security force would not be exceeded 30,000 troops (Oslo Accords 1995). However, by the end of the 1990s, the Palestinian security forces reached to 45,000 to 60,000 soldiers (Lutz 2017). Furthermore, these troops were equipped mainly with smuggled and locally produced weapons (Ibid.). In January 1997, during the Arafat's visit to Hebron, his bodyguards were seen carrying an advance version of AK 47 rifles those were smuggled from Egypt via Gaza which was a clear violation of the agreements (Karsh 2003).

The Israeli strategy to deal with the violence within Palestinian and Israeli territories was largely focused on the cooperation with the PA. However, many times the PA forces failed to help IDF to act against violent group (Bayman 2011:104). Furthermore, there was clear negligence in dealing the radical groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In addition, the PA-controlled areas became a safe haven for radical groups. Hamas and Islamic Jihad were free to carry out training with virtual impunity. According to Steven Emerson "in citrus groves only a few kilometres from the border with Israel, Hamas set up makeshift training camps where its Izz ad-Din al-Qassam squads practiced with live fire and hand grenades" (Emerson 1996:4). Due to the casual attitude of the PA forces toward terrorism, there were no limits on "arms control, and in some cases even facilitated their acquisition, tens of thousands of smuggled automatic weapons, grenades, land mines, and even rocket-propelled grenades suddenly flowed into Gaza" (Ibid.). Furthermore, high tech explosives and extremely potent

plastic and synthetic TNT was available to the radicals easily. The failure of security cooperation pushed Israel to follow a policy of massive use of force. This policy was mainly focused on breaking the will of Palestinian radical groups to attack Israel (*Pressman 2003*). According to this strategy, the Israeli security measures were largely concentrated on surgical military operations, intelligence gathering, installation of CCTV cameras, wiretapping, use of *mistaarivim* and biometric identification cards (Najjar and Tahhan 2017). As said earlier, the high-tech security fence was also part of this strategy which significantly reduced the terror strike on civilians (Almog 2004).

The assassinations of militant leaders and fighters arrests largely dominated Israeli military strategy in the Gaza. During a period starting from 29 September 2000 to 25 April 2001, the IDF carried out at least 13 assassination attempts against the Palestinian terrorist in Area A, resulting in the killing of 22 Palestinians (Ibid.).

To fight and eliminate the terrorists the IDF adopted the following means:

1. Eliminating the target's car by combat helicopters;
2. Eliminating the target by using snipers from a short distance, mainly at military checkpoints;
3. Placing the bombs in the targeted person's car and detonated through a remote-control device; and
4. Planting bombs in public phone cabins that are detonated by remote control (The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights 2001).

In the light of Oslo agreements, Israel constructed an electronic fence around the Gaza Strip in the wake of a military redeployment mandated by the Oslo Accords. The agreements allowed PA to enjoy control over much of the Gaza Strip "including a one-kilometre-wide security perimeter established near the fence" (Almog 2004). The IDF never strictly monitored this perimeter, but the al-Aqsa intifada led a significant impact over the Gaza fence, the Palestinian activists demolished security fence in 2000 and was a critical security challenge. The destruction of the security fence was a vital danger for Israeli security. Soon after that, IDF Southern Command investigated the reasons behind the barrier's operational failure (Ibid.). The various round of brainstorming guided IDF to reconstruct the Gaza fence in 2001 and helped it accomplish extraordinary containment of terrorist infiltration from Gaza (Ibid).

Impact of Peace Process

Security policy under Rabin-Peres Government

Yitzhak Rabin became the Prime Minister of Israel in June 1992. In the 1990s, he developed a new diagnosis for Israel's strategic predicament. This was mainly a result of the changed strategic situation in the 1990s, which drastically altered his old strategy regarding the region and Palestinians. After 1973, Rabin understood that the international attitude towards Israel was changing which increased his fears about Israeli security (Inbar 1999). He recognized that the Eastern European countries that were under the Soviet umbrella renewed the diplomatic relations with Israel that were broken off in the wake of the June War. Similarly, following the Madrid conference many countries, including India and China, established full diplomatic relations with Israel. In 1992, Rabin underlined these changes in a speech by saying that in its diplomatic history "Israel is no longer 'a people that dwell alone'" (Quoted in Lerman 2018).

At the regional level, Rabin regarded the defeat of Iraq by the US-led forces in 1991 conducive to Israeli security. Iraq was a bitter adversary of Israel and it had strong military potential and its convincing military defeat was in Israel's interest (Cohen, Eisenstadt and Bacevich 1998:17). In 1992, he noted that due to changed international strategic situations, Israel had a special opportunity and estimated that the Palestinians could be brought into a meaningful political discussion (Lerman 2018). Israel under the leadership of Rabin signed Declaration of Principle and later two additional agreements on the interim agreements, namely, agreement on the preparatory transfer of power and responsibility between Israel and PLO and protocol concerning the further transfer of power and responsibility.

According to Inbar (1999), Rabin was a clear-headed analyst and did not bother about the utopian deliberations regarding West Asia, as his colleague Shimon Peres. Though he was determined to move forward on the peace process, Rabin had no illusions that it could be achieved overnight and in November 1993 he observed: , "one hand will reach out for peace, the other we will keep on trigger … the has not passed … in time of need we will pull that trigger" (Rabin quoted in Inbar 1999:137). Similarly, in 1994 during an address to the Knesset, he said that "peace is not blinding us. We are keeping our eyes open and closely monitoring what is the happening around us…we have not for a moment stopped training and increasing the IDF's capability in various spheres" (Rabin quoted in Inbar 1999:137).

Even after signing the peace agreement in 1993, Rabin believed that Israel still faced a serious military threat. However, the nature and source of the threat changed in his thinking. For him, the peace process reduced the threat from an immediate neighbour but Israeli security was facing a major security challenge from the countries those are not situated close to Israel, such as Iran and Iraq (Inbar 1999: 128; Karsh 1996:40; Inbar 1991). According to Inbar (1999), militarily, Rabin followed a defensive strategy and refrained itself from taking a pre-emptive and preventive strike. The key pillar of his policy was the strategy of deterrence. Israel under Rabin was more concerned about the threat coming from "Tier Two" countries; therefore, he gave significant importance to the development of long-range military capabilities (Inbar 1991, 1999).

During the Rabin's premiership, the decision of use of force was tied in the complex matrix of cost and benefit (Rabin and Peri 1996). It was mainly to convince the Arab elements to encourage living in coexistence; for example, Israel refrained from attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon it was mainly because of not to escalate the conflict which can adversely impact peace negotiations with Syria (Inbar 1999:141). The self-imposed restrictions on the freedom of action adversely impacted on the deterrence posture of Israel.

For example, the IDF's decision of refraining from attacking resulted in increasing toll of attacks in the bordering areas with Lebanon. In 1994, when Israel responded to these attacks by targeting the Beka'a Valley, it led retaliation against the embassy of Israel and other Jewish targets in Argentina (Malka 2008; Kirchofer 2017). This response significantly affected IDF's assessments of how and whom to act, because any response from IDF would have received retaliation against Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. Though in 1996, IDF launched Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996, Lebanon) but it was also a limited attempt of restoring Israel's deterrence toward Hezbollah and Syria (Malka 2008).

Under Rabin's premiership, Israel underestimated threats emerging from militant Palestinian groups. In the past, he considered terrorism as a military nuisance but in 1993 he demeaned the threat from the Palestinian terror groups, even those were equipped with threatening capabilities, such as Hezbollah and Hamas (Ibid.). He said, "the PLO and other terrorist groups are not the existentialist threat for Israel and it would be insulting to the IDF were I consider the Hamas and Hezbollah a serious military threat to Israel" (Rabin quoted in Inbar 1999: 142). This understanding only changed in 1995, following a host of suicide attacks

inside Israel which caused heavy casualties. It made him realise that terrorism was causing serious harm to Israel (Ibid).

According to Rabinovich (2017), since joining the office in June 1992, Rabin started working on the prospect of a peace agreement with the Palestinians (Rabin Centre 2018). Rabin followed a positive approach to establish peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians and to address the critical security-related issues (Rabinovich 2017). For the Labour-led government, decreasing the extent of existentialist threat was more important than the terror threats emerging from a section of Palestinians (Ibid.). It was assumed that terror threat could be dealt with but not the existentialist threat but gradually the terror threats became the biggest challenge for the Rabin government (Inbar 1999). The suicide bombings in 1994 forced Rabin to identify the activities by Hamas and Islamic Jihad as "a form of terrorism...different from what we once knew from the PLO terrorist organizations" and he noted that only way to deal with this threat was "a combination of a political and military action" (Ibid.:40).

Rabin brought economic factor into the picture to deal with the security problem emanating from Palestinians (Murden 2000). According to Robin, military power alone could not guarantee Israel's future security, "but cooperative political and economic relationships would contribute to the Israeli security since they would strengthen the Arab states which would make them be able and eager to control Islamic radicalism" (Civcik 2008:117). Under the leadership of Rabin, Israel was even ready to withdraw from Golan Heights and hand over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to Palestinians (Inbar 1999). The Israeli decision of withdrawal from the occupied territories was a significant change in the traditional security strategy of Israel (Karsh 2004; Civick 2008). According to the Labour party government with the end of the Gulf war, the strategic importance of territory had declined (Ibid.). It was mainly because of a change in the notion of defensible borders after the missile attack during the Gulf war against Israel (Shlaim 1994).

As a result of this new phenomenon, Israel decided to pull out from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and was even ready to discuss the territorial compromise over Golan Heights (Inbar 1999; Civick 2008). In return, Israel asked Syria to avert a war of attrition from South Lebanon "since the terror attacks of Hezbollah put both the peace process and the public support for Rabin into danger as they threatened the Israeli civilian security" (Civick 2008).

With regards to Lebanon, the Labour government tried to follow a strategy that kept Lebanon and peace process on one parallel track (Karsh 2004; Civick 2008). However, despite its peace-oriented security strategy, "the Labour government decided to launch two intensive air and artillery campaigns in Lebanon; Operation Accountability in July 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996" (Civick 2008). The operations largely focused on putting an end to Katyusha rocket attacks from Hezbollah on Israeli civilians and reduction of Hezbollah's armaments. However, the operations were not compatible with the security understanding of the peace process. Peres highlighted the nuances about the operation when he said:

> (Grapes of Wrath did not represent) any deviation from the path of peace. On the contrary, it is necessary precisely to save peace. This is not an operation of choice, but rather one of no alternative; it is the fulfilment of the national duty of clear self-defence, on the other hand, and overcoming the attempt to eliminate the peace process on the other (Peres quoted in Murden 2000).

On 4 November 1994 in the wake of Rabin's assassination, Shimon Peres became the prime minister. He was in the office only for seven months, until he lost the May 1996 Knesset election. During his tenure, he struggled to uphold the "momentum in the peace process, despite a wave of terrorist attacks by Palestinian suicide bombers against Israeli civilians" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).

Benjamin Netanyahu, 1996-99

In 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu became the prime minister, registering a victory with a narrow margin. He came to power against the backdrop of the assassination Rabin who was killed by a fanatic right-wing extremist Yigal Amir. In comparison to Labour, the Netanyahu government had a different point of view about the security issues and peace process. He noted in his election agenda that, "Israel opposes any kind of return rights of Arabians over the Israeli land on the West Bank of the Jordan River" (Yin 1999: 174-175). Netanyahu promised a different approach, which he said: "provide better security for Israel" (Ibid.). In taking a tougher line with Palestinians, he noted that he would not honour the Israeli commitment (Netanyahu 2009) to discuss the future of Jerusalem. He also favoured a halt to the IDF withdrawals from occupied territories and a renewed drive to settle Jews in the West Bank (Ibid.).

According to Daniel J. Elazar and M. Ben Mollov, Netanyahu wanted to "restructure the peace process in such a way that the Palestinians would be forced to reduce their expectations, as Israel began to assert a much harder line both in substantive positions and in interpersonal negotiating behaviour and tone" (Elazar and Mollov 2001). On the domestic front, a fragile coalition comprising 66-seats was another obstacle to carry forward sustained peace initiatives. It was reflected during the Way river agreement of 1998 which was approved by a vote of 75-19 on 2 November 1998 and only 29 members of Netanyahu's coalition voted for the accord (Ibid.).

According to some, Netanyahu tried to convince right-wing supporters that the government was trying to minimize damage to Israeli interests within the framework of the Oslo process. However, after signing the Wye agreement, settler council leaders announced that Netanyahu to be "no longer the leader of the national camp" (Ibid.). In such a situation, Netanyahu was compelled by the situation to halt a political process that was vehemently opposed by his government.

Under Netanyahu, the national security policy went back to its roots. His government had serious objections to the idea of the land-for-peace which meant the refusal to any territorial compromise with the Palestinians in return for peace (Yin 1999: 174-175). He accused the previous Labour government for initiating territorial compromise that "could have led to a domino effect and could not have been stopped at the Green Line" (Civick 2008; 120). This difference over the issue of territorial concession highlighted the understanding of both governments. The Likud government's concern was not only territory but also settlements on those territories which had a vital importance for security policymakers as well as political support for the right-wing government (Mor 1997; Netanyahu 2009).

The Netanyahu government's policy on Golan Heights was also significantly different and uncompromising. It temporarily shifted to the 1981-1991 situations "when Israel was formally committed to peace while seeking to retain the Golan Heights" (Kumaraswamy 1999:1156). This was also reflected in an interview with Ari Shavit on 22 Nov 1996, Netanyahu made his position clear regarding Golan Heights, he noted that

> I am not prepared to negotiate under threats. When we do begin negotiations, we will do so with demands that are identical to those of the Syrians. If they demand the entire Golan Heights, we will do the same. I see no reason we should restrict our demands. Just as I do not try to tell Assad what to demand at the beginning of the

negotiations, neither do I expect him to try to tell me what to demand (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996b).

The government noted that the Golan Heights as essential to the Israeli security and for its water resources and hence, retaining control over the Golan Heights would be the bottom line for any agreement with Syria. The government made it clear that a complete return of Golan Height to Syria was something difficult. It was reflected in Netanyahu's interview on 16 November 1996 in which he said that "...when we enter this negotiation, we will enter it with a demand identical to that of the Syrians. If they demand all the Golan Heights, so will we. I don't see any reason why we should diminish our demands..." (Netanyahu quoted in Mor 1997:189).

Netanyahu maintained a similar position during his interview with *Ha'aretz* on 22 November 1996 when he noted:

> The problem in the case of the Golan Heights is essentially one of security. While we do have strong links to the Golan as you can see, I have here an aerial photograph of Gamla and despite the warm emotional ties that exist that is not the main point. The main point is the security question. People say to me, look you gave all of Sinai to the Egyptians. This is true, of course. But along the Egyptian border, we have strategic depth of 200 kilometres. I imagine that if we had strategic depth of 200 kilometres on the Golan Heights, we could easily reach a similar arrangement with the Syrians. In reality, though, we do not. Here the strategic value is not in depth, but in height which we will lose if we abandon the Golan Heights and the crest of Mt. Hermon.

> People tell me that in the modern world there are missiles, so territory is no longer important. Missiles are certainly a problem, but so are tanks, particularly tanks moving down towards you from higher ground. In some respects, territory has become more important in the age of missiles, since the other side ground forces now also enjoy the support of surface-to-surface missiles which can disrupt our reserve system and make it harder to defend our borders. So it should be clear that ground defence requirements do not disappear in an age of missiles but actually, become even more important. And for intelligence purposes, high ground assumes a special importance. All this goes to explain why the problem on the Golan is mainly one of security (Foreign Ministry of Israel 1996a).

Regarding the negotiations with the PA, the Netanyahu government was intending to reach a permanent solution on the condition that the PA would fulfil its commitment (Ibid.). However, it also noted in the guidelines that "the government will oppose the establishment of a Palestinian State on the west of the Jordan River and will also oppose "the right of return" of Arab population any part of Israel on the West of the Jordan River" (Ibid.).

According to the government's security calculation, the establishment of a Palestinian state was the biggest security concern. This fear was further strengthened by the Palestinian terror attacks which strengthened the Likud's understanding of putting security before peace (Civick 2008). On 24 September 1996, the Western Wall Tunnel riots erupted and absence of trust became mutual which brought peace process in danger. However, the possibility of peace did not die with the tunnel riots and "continued with the 1997 Hebron Protocol and the 1998 Wye memorandum, following these agreements Likud-led government accepted the principle of partition" (Heller 2000-1: 24). However, apart from these two agreements no real actions towards the realisation of Palestinian political rights, especially statehood were initiated by the Netanyahu government (Civick 2008).

Furthermore, Netanyahu increased the defence expenditures to develop a missile force and anti-missile defence system. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2018), the defence expenditure increased from US$ 13628 million in 1996 to US$ 13642 million in 1997[31] (SIPRI 2018). It highlighted that "the peace agreements were not substituted for military power. This understanding reflected that how Netanyahu still found the peace process insecure, did not trust peace and prepared for war" (Civick 2008: 107). On Lebanon, Netanyahu had different security policies than Rabin. He understood that use of force would not work in Lebanon and adopting diplomatic channel would be difficult at a time when Israel was facing international criticism based on UNSC resolution 425 (Ibid.). The resolution was adopted on 29 March 1978 after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and called for Israeli withdrawal and establishment United Nation Interim Force for Lebanon (UNIFIL). The constant rocket attacks from Lebanon and growing public pressure on the government after an IDF helicopter crash[32] on 4 February 1997 in Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon pushed the government to think about the withdrawal from security zone (Kaye 2002).

According Civick (2008) a portion of Likud members of Knesset favoured the withdrawal from Lebanon because they believed that if the IDF did not withdraw, a long-lasting low-intensity war in Lebanon would lead to creating more pressure on the government to sign an accord with Syria which might lead to pulling out from the Golan Heights (Civick 2008). However, the policy shift brought significance to the Syrian front but questioned "the effectiveness and the necessity of the security zone in the north led to significant

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[31] The value is estimated by SIPRI and there may be difference in the Israeli government's values.
[32] The helicopter crash took the lives of 73 IDF soldiers.

modifications" in the security doctrine (Civick 2008:119). For example, Ariel Sharon, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Netanyahu was in favour of increasing the security zone, considerably altered his thinking and acknowledged it as a 'liability' and presented a slow pull of troops from Lebanon (Murden 2000:40; Bell 2014).

Defence Minister Mordechai also suggested a withdrawal proposal based on UNSC resolution 425 whereby Israel should focus on the disarmament of Hezbollah. However, neither Syria accepted it nor did Lebanon (Civick 2008:119). The ineffectiveness of the security zone pushed even Netanyahu to support a unilateral withdrawal (Murden 2000:40) and was reflected in his comments on inner cabinet decision on Lebanon on 1 January 1999:

> Rocket attacks cannot be prevented by territorial occupation, because Katyushas can have a longer range ... The only thing we can do to prevent missile attacks on our territory until suitable technology is developed ... is to deter ... (Netanyahu quoted in Kaye 2002: 40).

It broadly highlighted his policy towards Lebanon and desire to withdraw troops from Lebanon.

Ehud Barak, 1999-2001

On 6 July 1999, Ehud Barak became the tenth prime minister of Israel. He brought Israel out from prolonged recession to an economic boom, "with 5.9 percent annual growth, record foreign investments, near-zero inflation, a halved deficit, and substantially decreased external debt" (Belfer Centre 2017). Barak raised hopes that Israel and the Palestinians would resume the road to peace, but the experience of previous governments indicated that it was not going to be easy for him. According to Rachelle Marshall (1999), Barak was unlikely to break ranks of the previous leaders. However, there were major differences between Barak's government and the Netanyahu government. It was due to the composition of the parties in the coalition. It comprised "the ultra-Orthodox but pro-peace Shas and United Torah Judaism parties, with their combined 22 seats, rather than the hard-line Likud" (Marshall 1999). A small Centre Party, largely comprising former Likud members and Meretz were also part of the government. Though, Arabs overwhelmingly supported Barak in the election however not a single Arab was named to a cabinet post. The victory of Barak was an outcome of dissatisfaction of Israeli people with Netanyahu, internal cleavages and worsening International and regional environment (Elazar and Mollov 1999).

The fundamental focus of the Barak government was on the peace process (Belfer Center 2017: Murden 2000). In May 2000, he unilaterally withdrew the IDF from South Lebanon and put an end to the 18 years of Israeli occupation of Lebanon. He took initiatives to reach agreements with Syria and the Palestinian Authority (Belfer Centre 2017). Unfortunately, all these negotiations were unable to conclude (Belfer Centre 2017; Murden 2000).

While highlighting the decision to withdraw from Lebanon, Gal Luft (2000) noted that it was an obligation for Barak, because he promised during his election campaign that he would 'bring the boys [soldiers] home', therefore, the moment he became the prime minister he started a discussion on this issue. There was also constant pressure on the policymaker from the civilians regarding bringing their kids back (Ibid.). The incident sparked Four Mothers Movement, a protest, movement which was aimed at pushing the policy makers to withdraw from south Lebanon (Kumaraswamy 2015; Luft 2000). On 5 February 1997, four women whose sons were serving in the IDF units deployed in the south Lebanon held a demonstration at the Machaniyan Junction in north Israel. They held similar protests in the various part of the country and gradually developed in a protest movement. The movement received widespread support from men, women and former IDF soldiers (Kumaraswamy 2015).On the other hand, day-to-day public criticism was reaching another level due to the rising toll of Israeli casualties. Barak realised that the situation inside the security zone was deteriorating the Israeli security arrangements rather than enhancing them. It was mainly because of constant rocket attacks and growing Israeli causalities. As a result, the government decided on withdrawal from Lebanon (Luft 2000; Kumaraswamy 2015; Civick 2004). It was thought that the decision of withdrawal would also result in peace with Syria but the failure of the Israel-Syria talks in January 2000 had left Barak only with the unilateral option which was completed on 24 May 2000 (Luft 2000; Civick 2004). According to Barak, the withdrawal would be the setback for Hezbollah, because it would deprive them of the anti-occupation rationale for firing Katyusha rocket deep into the town and settlements in the north and would allow Israel to strike them harder if needed (Barak 2018).

Amid of constant violence, on 7 October 2000, Barak made his strategy clear for Palestinians and noted that he would "exercise restraint - not to act, but to react" (Barak 2000). If the Palestinians change their patterns of violence, Israel would continue negotiations and otherwise peace negotiations with Arafat would be halted. According to Simon Murden (2000), Barak initiated a "Rabin-like peace-prone policy," but at the same time, he made it

clear that Israel was competent enough to defeat any unwarranted threat regarding its security (Murden 2000). Barak's intention towards peace process was clear with he withdrew from Lebanon (Ibid.). However, the decision of withdrawal was based on Israel's security calculations. According to Civick (2004), Lebanon was one of the most serious security problems that had to be solved when Barak was in power. This problem was directly connected with the agreement with Syria and therefore, previous governments were unable to solve (Civick 2004).

The Barak government's decision of unilateral withdrawal was severely criticized (Luft 2000), mainly due to two basic reasons. Firstly, the decision would not address the security danger emanating from Hezbollah (Ibid.). It would make it easy for the militant group to target Israeli civilians in the northern part of Israel. The second criticism was about the impact of withdrawal over other terrorist outfits which started to believe that back-to-back terror strikes can push Israel for giving greater concessions (Ben-Israel 2002). Furthermore, the Palestinian groups viewed the withdrawal as a model for their struggle. This was clearly reflected in Marwan Barghouti's (Fatah) interview in March 2001, in which he said,

> To be candid, I must say that Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon was indeed one contributing factor to the [al-Aqsa] Intifada. I won't say that it was the single reason, but the Palestinians looked on carefully as the army pulled out of Lebanon. They asked how it could be that Israel was able to withdraw from an entanglement of nearly 20 years— all in one night. Not one soldier remained behind. So, I say that if that was accomplished literally overnight in Lebanon, the retreat from Ramallah to Tel-Aviv should require no more than three nights at most (Quoted in Rabasa et al. 2006:6).

In reality this claim was not groundless because it actually weakened Israel's deterrence posture and allowed the Palestinian radical groups "to think that the Israeli public was quite vulnerable to casualties which could lead to strong public pressure to the government to give more concessions" (Civick 2004:110).

The Barak government's threat perception was like the Likud party, but it preferred to overcome these security challenges through peaceful negotiations:

> Israel is galloping toward disaster ... If we do not reach a solution and the window of opportunity closes, we will find ourselves in a very sharp deterioration. Setting a timetable is impossible. It is impossible to know exactly what the trigger will be. Large-scale terrorist attacks ... or a fundamentalist wave of operations against us – which the Americans and the rest of the world will be wary of dealing with for fear of their interests – and with simple nuclear instruments and means of launching in Arab

states in the background ... Therefore, I understand that we have an interest of a very high order in trying to reach agreements now (Slater 2001:180).

To solve the complex conflict between Israel and the Palestinians from 11 to 24 July 2000 a summit was held at Camp David between United States president Bill Clinton, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat (The US Department of State 2003: Kumaraswamy 2006, 2015). During the talks, final status issues were discussed such as Jerusalem, the right of the refugees to return, borders, withdrawal, security, settlements, and water (Pressman 2003; Kumaraswamy 2006, 2015).

The Barak government offered the biggest concessions during the Camp David summit of July 2000 and these include sovereign Palestinian state comprising "the Gaza Strip, 92 percent of the West Bank, and some parts of Arab East Jerusalem" (Pressman 2003:7).[33] In return, it proposed the annexation of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem[34]. Israel also asked for several security measures, including early warning stations in the West Bank and an Israeli presence at Palestinian border crossings (Ibid.). In addition, the Palestinians would receive "custodianship," not sovereignty, on the Temple Mount, while Israel keeping control over the Western Wall (Sher 2006). It was also proposed that the administrative authority not the sovereignty of the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the Old City, with the Jewish and Armenian Quarters remaining in Israeli hands (Sher 2006: Pressman 2003). In regards to security measures, Israel would have "early warning stations in the West Bank and an Israeli presence at Palestinian border crossings" (Pressman 2003: 6). It would be allowed to install radar stations in the Palestinian state and to use its airspace. To deal with an emergency situation, Israel also wanted to have the right to deploy troops in the Palestinian areas during an emergency (Sher 2006: Pressman 2003).

According to P.R. Kumaraswamy (2005), though the Camp David summit negotiations were intended to resolve some of the core issues, there was no trust between the two parties. Therefore, in spite of "their best efforts, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat could not resolve sensitive issues such as borders, refugees, and the Jerusalem question" (Kumaraswamy 2005:60). The talks at Camp David, however, failed to make advance

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[33] Israel offered the Palestinians 91 percent of the West Bank plus the equivalent of 1 percent of the West Bank in land from pre-1967 Israel.
[34] Including settlements those were beyond the Green Line, such as Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'ev, and Gush Etzion.

especially on Jerusalem and the refugee question. Following the talks, Clinton blamed Arafat for the failure (Ibid.). Their failure led to the end of the Oslo peace process.

The end of the Camp David talks put an end to the history of the Israeli-Palestinian peace endeavours. Many experts noted that at the Camp David Palestinians lost the opportunity to reach a final solution (Sher 2006: Pressman 2003; Kumaraswamy 2006, 2015). As a result, Arafat was severely criticized by the International community, especially by US President Bill Clinton (Sher 2006: Pressman 2003; Kumaraswamy 2006, 2015) for halting the peace process (Karsh 2004; Inbar 2005). On the other hand, Stephen Zunes (2002) charged the US and Israel equally responsible for the failure of the talks. According to him, throughout the negotiations, the US seemed to manage the pace and agenda of the talks with Israel, while disregarding Palestinian apprehensions (Zunes 2002:1). The decision of initiating final status negotiations without prior confidence-building measures, such as Israeli troop withdrawal or freezing the settlements, forced Palestinians to rethink sincerity of the US and Israel. Even the claim that Barak offered 95 Percent of West Bank was misleading. According to Stephen Zunes (2002), "this figure did not comprise greater East Jerusalem, which includes Palestinian villages and rural areas to the north and east of the city unilaterally annexed by Israel" (Ibid.). Similarly, Robert Malley and Hussein Agha (2001) noted, proposals during the negotiations were quiet over the inadequately discussed the question of refugees, the land exchange and much of Arab East Jerusalem. To accept these proposals in the hope that Barak would then move further risked diluting the Palestinian position in a fundamental way (Malley and Agha 2001).

Ariel Sharon, 2001

On 7 March 2001, Arial Sharon became prime minister of Israel. During his military career, he took part in all the major wars and fought against the Arab countries. In October 1973, he led a small Israeli contingent that crossed the Suez Canal and broke the will of Egyptian forces. Sharon always had a different take over the security issues. Once when he was asked about the solution of the first intifada, he said: "round up the terrorists and expel them" (Aronoff 2010). Since its beginning, Sharon was against the Oslo Accords and was one of the leaders who were against Israel's participation in the Madrid peace conference. Though he was ready to talk with PLO in the 1970s, it was also only over the solution of Jordan being a Palestinian State (Rabin in Aronoff 2010: 149-172). He noted that the Palestinian state would only become a terror harbouring ground. Furthermore, he voted in opposition to his own

government's decision of withdrawal from Hebron. On the Gaza Strip, he believed that evacuation from the settlements in Gaza would only "bring the terrorism centres closer to [Israel's] population centres" (Cowell 2006).

According to Yoram Peri (2006), unlike his predecessor Barak, Sharon did not instruct the military to contain political violence but ordered them to put a complete stop. Though, "he saw the PA as an adversary but not as an enemy" (Peri 2006). He rejected Barak's position and refused to have negotiations at a time when violent confrontations were going on. Keeping in the mind violence started after Oslo, he avoided any direct or personal contact with Arafat. According to Sharon the use force massive force could only control to Palestinian insurgency (Amidror 2008).

Sharon also criticised the IDF officers for their lack of professionalism and resourcefulness and said, "the military is not creative enough" and its operations are cumbersome" (Quoted in Peri 2006:111). He fearlessly criticised even the most senior IDF officers such as Maj. Gen. Itziki Eitan, head of the central command and Maj. Gen. Doron Almog, head of the southern command. His criticism also received a response from IDF officers, they said: "what is considered cumbersome is our effort to prevent the casualties" (Ibid: 110).

IDF officers also responded to Sharon's criticism this was mainly for two reasons:

1. According to them, he did not understand the complexity of the conflict. He wanted to reach a strategic outcome by tactical weapon, according to Sharon massive use force would bring Palestinians on their knees.

2. They were also critical to the restriction put on them particularly for entering the PA territories (Harel and Isacharoff citied in Peri 2006:111).

Sharon was subjected to own political constraints. The government under his leadership was under severe pressure from the US which raised various objections over the military operations of IDF. It was guiding the type of weapons security forces would during the military operations. Equally, constraining was the effect of the international media. Sharon, like his predecessors, tussled between restraint and violent retaliation (Peri 2006:111). This dilemma was mainly created by the peace process that demanded various compromises from Israel, most importantly the territorial withdrawal.

However, there were people within the defence establishment who believed that it was not right to blame Arafat for the situations during 2001 because it was not under his control to stop the violence (Ibid:112). Therefore, he could be a partner in future negotiations. It was also reflected in Benjamin Ben-Eliezer's opinion when he was responding to Director of Military Intelligence, Malka, who noted that Israel should "focus on the best possible management of the continuing confrontation with the PA" (Ibid). Benjamin Ben-Eliezer disagreed with this opinion and said that "the question is not just how to manage the conflict, but how to get out of it. If we present the Palestinians with a serious option, we might get a partner on the other hand" (Ibid.).

A similar understanding was also shared by the few ministers of Sharon government, particularly from the Labour party, who believed that at a certain point there would be needed to continue to conduct negotiations with Arafat. However, military officials such as Chief of General Staff, Mofaz and Deputy Moshe Ya'alon had a different take and conducted a military campaign in 2001 to discredit Arafat and expel him from the Palestinian territories (Ibid.).

Sharon's victory speech on 7 February 2001, he said "I know peace require difficult compromises on both sides. I am calling on our Palestinian neighbours to leave violence behind and come back to a way of negotiations and solving arguments between us in methods of peace" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001; Finkelstein 2005:89). In the first few months in the office, he waited to observe the results of the US-led negotiations. However, unfortunately, the terror strikes on Israel continued even during that period continued and hence he rejected the plea of the US administration (Ibid.) to accept the ceasefire agreement and stop building and expanding the settlements in the West Bank. He noted that "the settlements were a vital national enterprise" (Ibid.). However, regarding the negotiations, he said that Israel would only begin negotiating with the Palestinians after seven days period in which there were no attacks on Israeli civilians (Ibid.).

A few days after the September 11 Attacks, Arafat reaffirmed his commitment to another ceasefire and ordered the Palestinians not to attack Israeli forces and civilians. In return, Sharon ordered a gradual military withdrawal from Palestinian territory and this resulted in IDF pull-out out from Bethlehem and Beit Jala which they have occupied in the 1967 war- (Peri 2006:111). Both the parties agreed that negotiation would continue if Israeli civilians were not targeted. However, the agreement was over immediately with a terror attack in

Hebron which took the lives of two people and injured fourteen on 2 October 2001 (*CNN* 2001;Finkelstein 2005:90). On 4 December 2001, in the backdrop of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli tanks surrounded and targeted Arafat's headquarters in Ramallah. A few days later Sharon declared that the Palestinian leader was "irrelevant" to the political process (Kumaraswamy 2005). On 29 March 2001, IDF started a large scale military operation known as "Operation Defensive Shield" to stop terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians. The operation was primarily a response to a series of suicide attacks in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Netanya on 27 March 2001 at the Park hotel which took lives of 30 people (Harms and Ferry 2008:173). Though the operation ended on 21 April 2001 but the terror strikes were again resumed.

Sharon warned Arafat that the violent groups of the PLO had escalated the unofficial war against Israel, even President George W Bush also asked Arafat to do more efforts to stop the violence (Finkelstein 2005:90). On 6 June 2002, after a suicide car bomb blast in Megiddo which killed 17 people, including at least 13 Israeli soldiers (*Washington Post* 2002). To make his position on violence clear just few hours after the attack Sharon ordered the bombing of Arafat's office in the Gaza (6 June 2002). Furthermore, constant terror strikes from the Palestinian violent groups and Arafat's 'incompetency' in dealing with terrorism pushed Sharon to maintain that Arafat should have been "eliminated" 20 years ago during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Sharon's interview with (Whitaker 2002).

The relations between Israel and Palestinians severely deteriorated under Sharon's leadership. It seemed that his policy to deal with violence was largely inspired by the experience of the Oslo period and Al- Aqsa intifada (Civick 2004). The rising terror threat significantly influenced the security policy of Sharon because he was aware that the people elected him to stop the terror threat and provide security. Therefore, he was determined to use massive force to deal with this situation (Civick 2004; Peri 2006).

In this context, Sharon's security policy was focused on forcefully fighting terrorist attacks, restricting Hezbollah to escalate strikes and defending the Jewish nature of Israeli state by denying the right to return to the Palestinian refugees in negotiations (Civick 2004; Peri 2006). There was a visible deviation from the peace-seeking policy and under him the IDF adopted a ruthless policy to crush violent Palestinian security threat. As mentioned earlier, Sharon adopted a policy of massive use of force to deal with the Palestinian violence and it comprised of shelling of residential areas; deployment of tanks, helicopter gunships; missiles

against demonstrators; demolishing buildings and assassinations (Journal of Palestine Studies 2009: 124). Sharon retaliated the first suicide bombing by deploying F-16 and helicopter gunship to destroy the military bases of terror groups and assassinated many Hamas, PIJ and Fatah leaders such as Mohammed 'Attwa 'Abdel-'Aal, Iyad Mohammed Hardan (PIJ), Osama Fatih al-Jawabra, Abu Ali Mustafa (PFLP), Yusif Suragji (Hamas) (Civick 2004).

Sharon's policy of excessive use of force was also aimed at achieving the deterrence power, which was constantly failed in the previous years considering intensive terror attacks (Ibid.). Another reason behind using excessive force against the Palestinians was in trying to find a moderate political solution through negotiations to protect Israeli citizens he was not committing the same mistake that Barak did and endangered the Israeli security by negotiating with the Palestinians while Israel was constantly facing terror strikes (Ibid.). Sharon's strategy was influenced by the changing strategic equation in West Asia. The US decision to invade Iraq after the September 11 attacks paved the way for Sharon to use excessive force against terrorists Civcik 2004).

According to Gregory Harms and Todd M. Ferry (2008), "the trends of suicide bombings, which began at the end of Barak's term dramatically increased under Sharon's term. Both religious (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) and secular groups (Tanzim and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade) engaged in acts of harming and killing Israeli civilians" (Harms and Ferry 2008:173). During this period, Israel faced widespread suicide attacks which targeted schools, buses shopping malls, restaurants and kinder gardens Between November 2000 and mid July 2003, the number of Israeli civilians killed by the Palestinians inside Israel was 317 (Ibid.).

Suicide bombing became a part prevocational-reprisal pattern characterizing the Al-Aqsa Intifada (Ibid.). Under such situation the typical response by the IDF was targeted killing or assassination of various leaders and members of groups those were involved in attacking Israeli civilian, some of them were, Abu Nidal, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, Saleh Shehadeh and Mohammed Khalil (Harms and Ferry 2008; Kumaraswamy 2005). In an attempt to prevent suicide attacks, in June 2002 Israel decided to construct a physical barrier that would detach Israel from the West Bank. As mentioned earlier, the idea of construction of wall was not

new, Sharon observed that the security fence was an effective counterterrorism measure (Harms and Ferry 2008; Kumaraswamy 2005).

Impact of the Al-Aqsa Intifada

On 28 September 2000, the Palestinian territories, the West Bank and Gaza witnessed a widespread violence with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006:570; Frisch 2003:62). Intifada started after the two months after the breakdown of the Camp David talks when Ariel Sharon, the leader of Likud, visited the Temple Mount. In comparison to first Intifada (1987-93), which was characterized as a popular uprising, the Al-Aqsa Intifada characterized by armed attacks and terrorism, perpetrated by Hamas, Jihad, and the PA" (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006:570).

The outbreak of Intifada destroyed whatever was left between Israeli and Palestinian leaders after the failure of the Camp David talks (Karsh 2004; Inbar 2005). In the completely changed the security situation and Arafat was seen more as a danger rather than a peace partner (Abrams 2013).

As mentioned earlier, Intifada intensified the suicide attacks against Israeli civilians and military personnel. Though, the terror strikes were not new for Israel, "but it had never been that massive and caused lots of casualties in a short period of time" (Civick 2004). During the Intifada, Fatah and Tanzim forces also targeted Israeli settlers and military personnel in the occupied territories (Harms and Ferry 2008), and inside Israel, Hamas and Islamic Jihad became a major security challenge. These groups exploited the failure of the Camp David talks and massive uses of force by the IDF against the Palestinians, which rapidly increased the popularity of these groups (Schulze 2001:220).

To deal with the situation, the IDF adopted a policy of massive use of forces which was not expected by the Palestinian. IDF's strategy was to realise the Palestinians fighters that they would have to pay a heavy price if they decide to go for another round of violence (Ibid: 220). However, the Israeli estimation failed regarding calculating the aspiration of Palestinians. It was a security challenge rather than a political uprising against its policy of occupation (Usher 2003:2).

The uprising ended the security partnership between IDF and the PA and their fight against terrorism. It was a big shift for the Israeli security policy because it lost a partner who could

make the fight against terrorism easy (Barari 2004; Usher 2003). Though the PA's efforts were not so successful in fighting against terrorism, but in many instances, it helped IDF and created trust among the Palestinians counterparts (Barari 2004). The intifada also deteriorated Israel's budding relations with the Arab countries (Ibid.). Though, the Arab response during the Arab League Summit in October 2000 was not new, it gave space to other countries to stand against Israel. The Secretary-General of the League Amr Musa underlined this when he noted:

> The peace process, as we have known it during recent years, is finished … Nobody among the Arabs, and especially among the Palestinians, will agree to return to the negotiating table based on the old criteria and standards. Right now, the resolute stance was taken by the Palestinian people, and its resistance to Israel's conquest is the top priority (Schulze 2001:220). 16

Six weeks after the Arab League Summit, Egypt called back its Ambassador from Israel, while Iraq and Yemen even favoured military action against Israel. Throughout Intifada, Israel followed an "ad hoc" military strategy and reprisal method of initiating a series of military actions (Maye 2006:47). However, the massive use of force was in the core of the strategy. The main reason behind it was to show Israeli civilians that Sharon was not repeating Barak's mistake of endangering the Israeli security by negotiating with the Palestinians under fire (Ibid.). The second and most probably the most important reason for his unrestrained, aggressive policy was the changes in the West Asian region, specifically the US-led invasion of Iraq after September 11 attacks.

As noted earlier, to deal with the terror attacks the IDF followed a policy of targeted assassination and eliminated many suspected terrorists as well as political leaders associated with Hamas, the PIJ, Fatah, and the PFLP (Esposito 2005:104). *Journal of Palestine Studies* noted that, in the first four years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, IDF assassinated total 273 people involved in the terror activities and eliminated 170 bystanders during the assassination operation (Cited in Maye 2006:39). This assassination included 119 Hamas members, 96 members of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade or al-Fatah, 35 members of PIJ and 23 from either the PFLP, PA intelligence or another affiliation (Esposito 2005:121).

Along with assassinations, the IDF used Apache helicopters to target PFLP members. In August 2001, it targeted PFLP leader Abu Ali Mustafa in Apache strike (Ibid.). The strikes were a direct outcome of the attack on an IDF soldier in Gaza and PFLP's constant car bombings against Israel. These reprisal attacks were continued until 2003 and eliminated

numerous low-level members of Palestinian terror groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as Fatah.

Furthermore, in September 2003, Israeli Air Force "dropped a quarter-ton bomb in the Gaza Strip, trying to target Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin" (Cited in Maye 2006:39). It was in response to an attack planned by Hamas on an Israeli ship near Ashdod. In March 2004, Israeli helicopter launched Hellfire missiles on al-Sabra town in Gaza that killed Yassin and seven others (*Al-Jazeera* 2004). In September, Hamas political official Izz al-Din al-Sheikh Khalil "was killed in a bomb blast in his car in Damascus" (*Bahrain Tribune Daily News* 2004). Apart from assassination, the IDF also used a strategy of collective punishment. Under this strategy, IDF demolished many houses in the Palestinian land, limited the movements of Palestinians in troublesome areas and build new Israeli settlements or expanded old ones (Harms and Ferry 2008). This was operated under "Operation Bronze" which was launched in March 2003. Israeli forces also conducted 13 major operations from February 2002 to October 2004 (Mayle 2006). The key objective of these military endeavours was to bulldoze terrorist infrastructures in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During the operations, the IDF destroyed hundreds of homes, businesses, agricultural lands and roads.

According to Camille Mansour, Israeli policy towards the Palestinians comprised collective punishment and harassment measures. He noted that:

> … encirclement of Palestinian towns in areas A; quasi-permanent controls along the roadway and around the villages in areas B; ban on travel between the West Bank and Gaza; separation of East Jerusalem from its hinterland around Bethlehem and Ramallah; the virtual impossibility of travelling between West Bank Towns…disruption of economic, social, family and educational life for the majority of the population...the destruction of hundreds of homes…preplanned assassinations that kill not only the targeted individuals; disproportionate use of war equipment...the bombing, including F-16 fighter planes, of building belonging to the Palestinian Authority (Mansour 2011).

The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories reported that "from October 2001 through January 2005 Israel demolished 668 homes in the Occupied Territories as punishment" (UN Human Rights Watch 2006). The series of suicide attacks during this period forced the Israeli government also to take a call on border management. As a result, in 2002, the government decided to construct a wall between Israel and the West Bank. As noted earlier, the security wall mostly consists of an electronic fence equipped with electronic sensors with dirt paths, barbed wire, and trenches on both sides, with an average

width of 60 meters (200 feet). In some areas, a wall 6–8 meters (20–25 feet) high has been erected in place of the barrier system (Kumaraswamy 2005; Harms and Ferry 2008).

It was also designed to help the Israelis find a way to "keep a Jewish majority within its borders" (Makovsky 2004:50). The IDF was well aware that to deal with terrorism, it was important to deal with the terror finance. Terror financing typically comes from charitable donations or state sponsors. To create pressure on the PA "in 2002, Sharon began restricting the amount of tax revenue they received back from the Israeli government" (Mayle 2006:37). The government also enhanced the surveillance on all the Palestinian organizations.

Conclusions

The impact of Oslo was significant for Israel and Palestinians. The process sharpened the split within the wider Palestinian community. It divided the Palestinian politics into the two major camps, the first one was in favour of PA style of politics and others in favour of use violent terrorism to accomplish their objectives. From a security point of view, agreements expected that the PA would take care of rising terror activities in Palestinian territories and neutralize them on its own which was something difficult for PA because neither it had ability to do it nor willingness. For Israelis, the Oslo process was an initiative that would strengthen its security posture towards the rising terror threats from Palestinian territories. However, it failed to achieve this goal. During the peace process, Israeli policymaker expected that the cooperation from a section of the Palestinian people would help them to deal with terrorism. However, they forgot that neither the Palestinians could fulfil this expectation nor they had the willingness.

The Oslo peace process also gave some positive results to Israel and strengthened its security posture for the conventional threat through Jordan. It brought significant alterations in the policies of Arab countries because the PA accepted the existence of Israel and these countries had to change their policy towards Israel. The agreements also pushed IDF to changes its defence strategy in the Palestinian territories in the light of territorial withdrawal. It made clear that territorial withdrawal was not a solution for Israeli security concerns. The withdrawal of troops the West Bank, Hebron and the Gaza Strip, did not avert the peace process to from failing. The back to back terror attack from the territories withdrawn by IDF became a flourishing ground for terror groups. Furthermore, it made Israeli operations in the

Palestinian territories costly affairs, because now IDF needed more sophisticated technologies and heavy deployment to deal with the situation as it lacked territorial control.

Chapter Seven

Conclusions

T he national security policy of a country outlines the core interests of a nation and sets the principles for addressing current and future security challenges. As a concept, it's has been described as a focused act which is strictly connected with the interests of the nation and its internal order. For any country, it's essential to have a proper overview of the security situation internally and externally to generate a set of policy to deal with the security challenges posed by various internal and external actors. Israel is no exception to this understanding. However, it does not have an officially documented national security doctrine but there are some guiding principles, namely, deterrence, intelligence warning, battle decision, pre-emptive and preventive strikes, short wars, bring the battle to enemies land and military superiority, which were reflected in public statements and acts of Israeli leaders. However, these principles have seen some alterations over time but still guided the security strategy of Israel from David Ben-Gurion to Benjamin Netanyahu.

The Israeli national security strategy is an outcome of some given realities of the country, namely, geographical limitation, small population, qualitative superiority, limited economic resources and demographic imbalance. Due to the small territorial area, it did not have strategic depth and its vital populace centres, strategically important areas and industrial assets were within the range of Arab militaries before 1967. It created to major problems; the first one was the problem of the restricted area available for the operative maneuver of IDF and second, the problem of limited space also became a problem of time. The closeness of pre-1967 borders meant that a surprise attack before the reserves could be mobilized result in a possible enemy military victory. It paved the way to follow the strategy of taking the battle to the enemy lands. The problem of limited human resources pushed Israel to an army that functions like a militia. This means the army would comprise a small amount of skilled and well-trained troops and supported by a larger number of conscripts.

Similarly, to deal with the quantitative scantiness, Israel has worked persistently in attaining a qualitative advantage in terms of soldiers and military technologies. To deal with a combine mammoth size army of the Arab states, it also needed support from at least one great power.

These are some critical issues which significantly influenced the national security policy of Israel.

An assessment of national security conception of Israel underlines the centrality of existentialist threat from the surrounding Arab nations and the experience of the Holocaust. However, the nature of the existentialist threat has been altered over a period of time. During the initial years of statehood, it was directly coming from the Arab countries of the region such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt but over a period of time, it shifted to the countries situated on the exteriors such as Iraq and Iran. The basic security strategy which is also known as security triangle (deterrence, intelligence warning and battle decision) has seen the transformation from triangle to square with the inclusion of the concept of Home Front in the light of threats from missile and rocket attacks. Similarly, the emergence of guerrilla warfare and terrorism introduced operational change in the security strategies, such as target killings and assassination of people responsible for the killing of Israeli citizens. However, some core components had not been changed even today. For example, the centrality of the concept of qualitative superiority in human resources and weapons, air superiority and offensive battle strategies still dominate its national security policy.

In regards to security policymaking, it is highly dominated by IDF and other security agencies (such as Mossad and Shin Bet). Although, there are other institutions which participate in national security policymaking they are not able to dominate the policymaking process. The institutions, such as Knesset Foreign and Defence Affairs Committee, Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs, National Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Security Council have given powers, but, the IDF still bypasses all these institutions in shaping and dictating the security strategy.

After the 1973 War, the Agranat Commission underlined the urgent need of an institution that can help prime minister in security policymaking and recommended the establishment of the National Security Council, but it was not established until 1999. Due to domestic politics and IDF's non-willingness to share its supremacy in intelligence estimation, it took many years to establish the NSC. Even, after the establishment of the NSC, its role in the policymaking was limited. This was highlighted in the findings of the Winograd Commission after the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and recommended to strengthen the NSC so that it can assist the government and the prime minister in making sound decisions related to security.

Since the formation of Israel on 14 May 1948, its security strategy was significantly influenced by the changing security environment of the region. On the one hand, the region registered the decline of old European colonial powers, Britain and France, and the emergence of the US and USSR as new powers. The Cold war allowed the US and USSR to play an important role in regional politics. This significant strategic change in many ways impacted on the security policy calculations of Israel. The decades of Cold war divided the whole West Asian region into the two camps. This period also registered the political changes in the many countries of the region, for example, the Egyptian revolution in 1952, the emergence of Nasser, military coups in Iraq and Syria. Though military coup changed the monarchy in Iraq, it took the side of Arab nationalists against Israel and made large arms deals with the Soviet Union.

The Israel-Egypt peace treaty (1979) drastically diminished the danger of the war from the southern border. The Iran-Iraq war further strengthened the strategic posture of Israel, as it weakened both countries. Iran's attempts to inflame revolution and destabilize the Arab nations, excluding Syria, diverted Israel's enemies. The Iranian revolution in 1979, the emergence of Hezbollah and Hamas and disintegration of USSR were some other major changes that affected Israeli security positively and negatively. In the backdrop of all these developments, Israeli national security policy also registered timely alterations to counter the emerging security challenges. These alterations were a response to new rising security threats.

At the time of the 1948 War, Israel was facing serious security challenge to its existence. But, its strategic realities were comparatively simple and required security policy was clear. The Jewish forces had to prevent a military defeat at the lowest cost possible, hoping to convince the enemy through a chain of wars to force the Arab states to come to terms with its existence in West Asia. According to this strategy, if IDF ever conducted any full-scale war in future, it must do so in an offensive manner, compensating for its inherent demographic disadvantages and lack of strategic depth by converting pushing the battle to the enemy lands and was characterised by a combination of surprise, speed, and tactical manoeuvre.

In the 1950s, it included the policy of pre-emptive strike to keep enemy away from its territory. This policy was a response to the problem of strategic depth. To maintain the balance against the Arab forces, other strategies were also developed such as the development

of Dimona nuclear reactor, the peripheral policy of strategic cooperation with actors in West Asian region and close relations with at least one major power.

The initial setback in the October 1973 War led a profound impact upon its security policy. The failure of basic security doctrine (deterrence, early warning, and battle decision) raised many questions over the issue defensible borders and highlighted the limitation of the new borders. On the one hand, painful initial setback paved the way for a heavy military build-up in Israel and on the other hand, in the post-war period it tried to achieve security through diplomacy. The Egypt-Israel peace agreement not only secured the borders connecting the Sinai Peninsula but also ended the possibility of a collective Arab military campaign against Israel.

Before the 1980s, the primary concern of the IDF and policymakers was the danger of cross border invasion by the conventional armies of its immediate neighbours who carried out a war against in 1948 and 1973 and threatened it in 1967. In the post-1980s period, this threat shifted to threats from non-states actors and danger of missile attack from tier two countries. The most significant shift in the security policy came when Sharon was the Minister of Defence, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The decision to go for war was taken to eliminate the Palestinian armed groups and the Syrian Army, which it saw as a threat to its security. The invasion of Lebanon was neither prevention nor deterrence, but instead sought to achieve controversial political aims and hence proved to be domestically unpopular. In the post-Lebanese invasion period Israeli security concern largely focused on the threat of terrorism and dangers of rocket attacks. The emergence of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah not only raised Israel's security concerns but also proved an obstruction in the progress of the Oslo peace process.

On 13 September 1993, Israel and PLO signed the Oslo agreement. It was followed by the signing of the Oslo II on 24 September 1995. The Oslo accords were also an attempt to address the security concerns. Israeli decision to accept the PLO as a peace partner was a remarkable change in policy because for years the PLO was categorized as a terror group. It was evident that accords changed the realities between the Israelis and Palestinians. It convinced a section of the Palestinian population to change their perception about the existence of Israel. The mutual recognition of each other was an example of this change.

However, the Oslo accords had significantly impacted the national security strategy of Israel at two levels, domestic and international. Internationally, the Palestinian acceptance of Israel's right to live in the peace and security fundamentally altered the policies of the Arab countries regarding the existence of Israel. The Arab countries who were fighting on behalf of Palestinians had to change their perception about Israel. The Oslo accords strengthen Israel security posture from the tier one countries, especially Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. On the other hand, the territorial withdrawal deteriorated Israel's security situation at the national level and brought terrorism to its own territories.

The decision of pulling out the troops from areas of the West Bank significantly reduced IDF's capability to secure the vital areas, such as Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa, from enemy attacks in future from the eastern front and exposed them to terror attacks. Under such situation, IDF's withdrawal from the Palestinian towns in the West Bank led to the absence of territorial control. This led to an increase in its financial investment in the security technologies to deal with a spate of terror attacks from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To deal with the security situation, it had to deploy helicopter gunships, tanks, surveillance cameras and heavy arms. Furthermore, it made Israeli operations in the Palestinian territories costly affairs, because now IDF needed more sophisticated technologies and heavy deployment to deal with the situation as it lacked territorial control. The rapid increase in the suicide terror attacks, stabbing incidents and shooting highlighted deteriorating domestic security situation from 1993 to 2002.

It pushed the security policymakers to use massive force to deal with the violent Palestinians, which was reflected in Ariel Sharon's tenure as prime minister. The outcomes of withdrawal of troops made clear that territorial withdrawal was not a solution for Israeli security concerns. Furthermore, the withdrawal of troops from the towns in the West Bank and the unilateral pull-out from the Gaza Strip, did not avert the peace process to from failing.

The Oslo process, to some extent, removed the security danger emanating from some of the tier one countries, such as Jordan and Egypt. It also weakened the possibility of the potential threat of conventional attack from its neighbouring countries. However, it failed to provide total security to Israel because it did not change the security environment of the region. During the process, Israel was unable to ink a treaty with Lebanon and Syria. The influence of Syria in Lebanon and its support to Hezbollah resulted in a hostile northern front. In short, existentialist threats were not eliminated by the peace process, but it also induced radicals to

improve their activities of damaged the peace process. Furthermore, Iraq, Iran and terrorism emerged as a new security challenge. It validates the first hypothesis of this research that *the Oslo peace process did not change the security environment of the region because of the emergence of new threats from non-conventional sources and non-state actors.*

The Israel-PLO agreements during the peace process were unable to deal with the rapidly rising threats and acts of terrorism. The Palestine Authority (PA) assured that it would tackle the terror threat emanating from the radical Palestinians and would neutralize them. In reality, the PA was not able to control it. This was mainly because, it neither had the ability to do it nor the willingness. The Israeli security policymakers expected that the Oslo process would strengthen and combat rising terror threats from Palestinian territories. However, the high-intensity violence in 2000 with the eruption of Al-Aqsa Intifada faded all these expectations and proved that the Oslo agreements were unable to achieve its objectives. As highlighted in chapter five, sharp rise in the suicide terrorism pushed Israeli policymakers to find out other possible ways to with the situation. In response, Israel decided to construct a defensive security wall to protect its civilians from terrorist strikes.

The outbreak of Intifada destroyed whatever was left between Israeli and Palestinian leaders and the collapse of the Camp David talks ended all possibilities of peace at least in the near future. In the changed security situations and Yasser Arafat was seen more as a danger rather than a peace partner. The widespread violence since 2000 destroyed all the possibility of peace between Israel and Palestinians. The large scale violence ended the security partnership between IDF and the PA and their fight against terrorism. Under such situation, IDF used massive force to neutralize the threats. It used Apache helicopters, tanks and heavy artillery to target the radicals and eliminated numerous low-level members of the Palestinian groups, such as Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

Because the Oslo agreements were aimed at addressing core security concerns of Israel, the failure of agreements resulted is a massive use of force to deal with security challenges. Moreover, the agreement with the Palestinians also witnessed other forms of threats from tire two countries and this validates the second hypothesis namely, *the failure of peace efforts result in Israel's seeking national security through military means.*

In the post-2000 period, terror strikes became more frequen**t.** However, the terror strikes in the US on 11 September 2001 paved the way for combating terrorism with full American

support. The defeat of Iraq in 2003 eliminated another national security challenge for Israel. However, Palestinian terrorism emerging from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other groups challenged the security arrangements of Israel. Along with this, the emergence of the Iranian nuclear programme posed a severe threat to its existence. Iran's presence in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza has further raised the Israeli security concerns. These security challenges also accompanied by new threats such as cyber terrorism and BDS movement that has adversely affected Israeli economic and security apparatus.

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Apendix 1: The National Security Council Law, 2008

1. The cabinet and premier will have a National Security Staff, operated and directed by the premier.

2. The National Security Staff's roles will be the following:

   a. Coordination of national security staff work for the cabinet, MCoD, and any other ministerial forum.

   b. Recommending to the premier topics for meetings of the MCoD and other ministerial committees, as well as the participants and their hierarchical level.

   c. Preparation of cabinet and subcabinet meetings and—in addition to this being done by the respective ministries—presentation of policy options, their ramifications, and detailed recommendations.

   d. Responsibility on behalf of the premier for interagency national security staff work, presentation of options, their ramifications, and policy recommendations to the premier and, at his discretion, to the cabinet.

   e. Follow-up on implementation of decisions by the cabinet and its subcommittees and apprising the premier of this.

   f. Operation of a new National Centre for Crisis Management.

   g. The law further enumerated four specific areas of responsibility:

   ▪ Submission of annual and multiyear politico-military assessments to the MCoD and preparation of situational assessments on related matters.

   ▪ Similar assessments are to be presented to the premier by the various agencies at least once a year and to be discussed by the MCoD.

   ▪ Preparation of staff work for the premier on the defence, foreign affairs, and other national security-related budgets, including options based on a broad perspective of national priorities. Analysis of the national security strategy and recommended changes.

2. Examination of defence projects with important politico-military ramifications and presentation of findings to the premier, MCoD, or any other forum the premier wishes, including options based on a broad assessment of national priorities.

3. The NSA is authorized to require the participation of representatives of the different agencies and ministries in meetings, at the level the NSA determines.

4. All information regarding foreign and defence affairs sent to the premier by the various agencies will be sent to the NSA as well.

5. The NSA will be a permanent participant in meetings of the cabinet, MCoD, and other cabinet forums. The NSA will also be a permanent member of the Committee of (Intelligence) Service Heads.

6. The premier will establish procedures regarding the INSC's operation within the PMB, including the mutual relations between the NSA and other senior officials.

(**Source**: Government of Israel (2008), "National Security Staff Law enacted by the Knesset on 29 July 2008", Jerusalem: Published in Reshumot.)

Appendix 2: Recommendations of the Winograd Commission and the Shahak Committee, 30 January 2008

Recommendation: The INSC must be restructured in order to enable a fundamental change in its status. To this end:

1. The roles of the INSC must be defined clearly and include, inter alia, preparation of long-term, integrative staff work on politico-military affairs, and the presentation to the premier and cabinet committees of positions on all relevant issues under consideration by them. To this, the Shahak Committee added:

a. The importance of the INSC presenting decision makers with options, an analysis of their ramifications, and a recommendation.

b. The need to clearly define the INSC's relationship with the other officials in the PMB and with the various national security agencies.

c. The INSC should be the premier and cabinet's only national security staff. The NSA should be directly subordinate to the premier and should serve as the premier's senior national security adviser.

d. The name of the INSC should be changed to the Israel National Security Staff, which is more appropriate to its role.

2. The INSC should be charged with preparation and coordination of meetings of the MCoD. Materials and recommendations for the MCoD will be prepared both by the various national security bodies and the INSC.

3. The INSC should be charged with preparing cabinet discussions on the defense budget, including a comparison of defense and other needs.

4. The INSC staff should be strengthened radically, both qualitatively and quantitatively, through development of a multidisciplinary and highly experienced team and use of outside expertise.

5. The NSA must be a personal appointee of the premier's, with the approval of the cabinet and Knesset Foreign and Defense Affairs Committee. A senior deputy to the NSA shall be appointed by the premier, with the approval of the cabinet, in order to ensure continuity over time. The senior deputy will serve for a period of six years, with a possible four-year extension. The Shahak Committee took exception to the role accorded the Knesset committee, which it found to be a violation of the separation of powers.

6. A National Assessment Team shall be established within the INSC, in order to integrate the intelligence information and assessments of the different intelligence agencies and provide both periodic and special National Security Assessments. Though part of the INSC, the National Assessment Team will enjoy full professional independence. Upon its establishment, the intelligence unit subordinate to the premier's military secretary will be abolished.

   A. The Shahak Committee supported the need for a small intelligence unit within the INSC to present the daily intelligence briefing to the premier and for its own internal needs, but recommended that the issue of a National Assessment Team be studied further in terms of its structure, personnel, and relations with the intelligence agencies.

7. Legislation should be enacted to establish the INSC's roles and authority, as well as the means of appointing its senior officials (as was done in July 2008, with the passage of the INSC Law).

8. To the general description of the INSC's duties above, the Shahak Committee added the following specifics:

   a. Coordination of national security staff work for the premier and formulation of assessments and policy recommendations for him.

   b. Recommendation to the premier of the MCoD agenda, preparation of its meetings, and follow-up on implementation of decisions.

   c. Coordination of national security staff work for the cabinet and cabinet committees, preparation of their meetings, and follow-up on implementation of decisions.

   d. Briefing the premier daily regarding the intelligence and defense picture, including its ramifications and the meetings required as a result.

   e. Coordination of a senior forum composed of the directors-general and deputy heads of the different ministries and agencies.

   f. Chairing interministerial and interagency forums, established by the premier.

   g. Maintaining reciprocal relationships with counterparts abroad.

   h. Involvement in preparation of the premier's visits abroad and in his diplomatic activities.

   i. The Committee singled out the following duties for particular attention:

• Preparation of annual and multiyear national security assessments for the premier and MCoD.

• Preparation of staff work for the premier and cabinet prior to discussion of the defense budget and the budgets of the security agencies subordinate to the PMO.

• Coordination of staff work for the premier in the area of counterterrorism.j. In order to enable the INSC to perform its responsibilities, the NSA should participate in the following forums:

• The Committee of the Heads of the (intelligence) Services (VARASH).

• The premier's meetings with foreign representatives and diplomats.

• Cabinet, MCoD, or other ministerial committees dealing with national security issues.

9. The Shahak Committee stressed that one of the reasons for the INSC's lack of influence was the ambiguity regarding its relations with the other officials in the PMB. While emphasizing the premier's prerogative to work with advisers as he or she sees fit, the Committee recommended the following procedures in regard to each of the primary functionaries in the PMB:

a. Cabinet secretary. The NSA and cabinet secretary must coordinate the preparation of cabinet and cabinet-committee meetings, circulation of materials to the ministers, and follow-up on implementation of decisions.

b. Chief of staff/bureau chief. Although the nature of this position is at the premier's discretion, the NSA should be directly subordinate to the premier.

c. Military secretary. The Committee sidestepped this issue, apparently seeking to avoid confrontation with the IDF, and merely recommended that the military secretary coordinate with the NSA. The Committee found that the role of the military secretary has grown over the years, beyond his basic role as the premier's liaison with the defense establishment, and that some had even come to see him as the premier's adviser on defense affairs. It stressed, however, that he does not in fact bear responsibility for politico-military staff work in the PMB and does not have the organizational capacity to do so. The Committee thus concluded that if the military secretary's responsibilities were limited to his intended functions, there was no need for him to bear the rank of general.

*d. Foreign policy adviser. Here, too, the Committee sought to avoid conflict, this time with the Foreign Ministry, though it took a clearer stand than in the case of the military secretary. The Committee stressed that there was considerable overlap between the roles of the foreign affairs adviser and the NSA and determined that most should be carried out by the latter. It stated that if the premier wished to appoint a foreign affairs adviser, the latter's role should be of a more technical nature, such as coordination of prime-ministerial visits abroad, meetings with foreign officials, and preparation of speeches. In any event, the foreign affairs adviser should coordinate closely with the NSA.

Recommendation: Urgent establishment of a National Emergency Management Center, within the PMO, for both defense and civil crises, with a situation room connected to all existing crisis management centers, such as those in the IDF and Foreign Ministry. The Shahak Committee further added that the Center should:

1. Be established within the INSC and staffed by it, with representatives from the various agencies to expand it in times of crisis.

2. Provide an integrative and dynamic picture to the premier, cabinet, and MCoD and serve as a means of conveying reports and updates between the premier and various government agencies.

3. Not be a command body or a means of communicating directions to the defense forces and other agencies and not come between them, the premier, and ministers.

4. Produce, in noncrisis times, an integrative daily report covering the primary developments in Israel and the world, including defense issues, diplomacy, domestic issues, the media picture, expected developments and their ramifications, and issues of importance for further consideration.

Recommendation: Procedures should be adopted for the presentation of issues and recommendations to the cabinet and its subcommittees, particularly for the premier, minister of defense, and foreign minister. When cabinet decisions are based on the recommendations of one body, such as the IDF, a "second opinion" must be presented by another. The Shahak Committee further recommended that:

1. A differentiation should be made between three different types of cabinet-level meetings: strategy and policy meetings, designed to formulate long-term objectives, strategies, and

policies; noncrisis meetings, designed to adopt specific decisions, on the basis of the different options proposed for achieving the above strategy and policy; and urgent situations requiring operational decisions, where time does not permit an integrative preparatory process.

2. The following procedures should be adopted for cabinet-level meetings on politico-military issues:

a. The NSA should open the meeting and present the issues to be discussed, the framework for discussion, and primary options. Each of the agencies should then present their viewpoints and recommendations, followed again by the NSA, who would provide an integrative perspective and identify dilemmas and primary issues to be resolved. The NSA would be responsible for preparing the meeting.

b. Aides, spokespersons, and advisers should not be permitted to participate in cabinet-level meetings. The most senior officials (e.g., chief of staff and directors-general of government ministries) would be permitted to participate during the pre sentation stage alone, during which the relevant minister would also be able to add additional officials as required. Only the premier may authorize additional participants.

Recommendation: The Foreign Ministry must be fully integrated in those defense issues that have diplomatic dimensions, including meetings of the premier, especially when military objectives are to be achieved through diplomatic means. Procedures should be adopted for the Foreign Ministry to hold consultations on matters of national security, with the participation of the PMO and defense establishment. To this the Shahak Committee added:

1. The foreign minister and director-general of the Foreign Ministry should hold periodic meetings on diplomatic aspects of national security issues, with the participation of senior representatives from the PMO and defense establishment.

2. The director-general of the Foreign Ministry should be a permanent participant in the minister of defense's weekly assessment meeting.

3. The Foreign Ministry should participate in preparatory interagency meetings for cabinet and subcabinet discussions of national security issues, especially those chaired by the premier or NSA.

4. The Foreign Ministry should participate in those interagency defense forums headed by the premier that include diplomatic considerations, including military operations (except for covert operations).

5. A plan should be developed by the Foreign Ministry for the strengthening of its Center for Political Research and Policy Planning Branch.

Recommendation: The number of nonministerial participants in classified meetings should be reduced significantly, and clear legal sanctions should be adopted and enforced against leakers. The Shahak Committee found the existing legislation and regulations sufficient and made only a few recommendations, focusing on increased awareness of the severity of the problem.

Source: Government of Israel (2007), "Winograd Commission: Interim Report", [Online web] Accessed 6 April 2018, URL:https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Winograd+Inquiry+Commission+submits+Interim+Report+30-Apr-2007.htm

Appendix 3: Conclusion of the Partial Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the October War, 2 April 1974

Conclusion:

In concluding this partial report, the Commission considers itself bound to reiterate that, despite the fact that it has not yet concluded the hearing of testimony on every matter relating to the conduct of the war up to conclusion of the containment stage, it is already in possession of much evidence clearly attesting that in the Yom Kippur War, the IDF was con- fronted by one of the most difficult challenges which could possibly confront any army - and emerged victorious. Despite the difficult initial position from which the IDF started out in the war, and despite the errors committed at this stage - partly detailed above, and partly to be detailed in the reasoning on this report - not only did it succeed in mobilizing the reserves at unprecedented speed, with all their complex formations, but at the same time it also blocked the massive invasion of enemy armies which had planned and trained for this onslaught over many years and, in the opening stages, had enjoyed the benefit of surprise. The IDF's success was secured at the cost of heavy and irreplaceable casualties, and thanks to the supreme heroism of all ranks, the endless powers of improvisation of its commanders, and the stability and strength of its basic organizational structure. These facts reinforce the Commission in its opinion that not only does the IDF possess the capacity to absorb criticism and draw the painful conclusions implied, but that it will thereby increase and enhance its strength.

Source: Agranat Commission Report (1974), "The Partial Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the October War", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 3 (4):189-207