MEDIATIZATION OF DIPLOMACY: A STUDY OF INDIA

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
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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled **"Mediatization of Diplomacy: A Study of India"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Chapter One

Introduction

The revolution in information and communications technology has amplified the role of media in various facets of our lives. This study aims to analyse the relationship between media and diplomacy focusing on India. Most of the studies on diplomacy have been conducted in the context of developed countries, specifically those analysing the influence of mediatization on diplomatic practices. Mediatization in this study is being referred to as the increasing role that the media has started playing in our day to day lives, pervading all personal, social and political organizations

Against this background, exploring and understanding the linkages between media and diplomacy in the Indian context would reveal not only the nature of the relationship but also the manner and extent to which Indian diplomacy has been mediatized. This has been done in this study using extended illustrations of four specific events from the relations between India and Pakistan. The print media in India has been used to analyse the nature of reportage for the specific illustrations chosen. The association between media and diplomacy has then been further explored by analysing the views of Indian diplomats. This study argues that first, the degree to which media can influence diplomacy and vice versa depends on the level of policy certainty/uncertainty. Second, mediatization has had a positive impact when it comes to processes of Indian public diplomacy as it enables the Indian government to engage more easily with the masses. The impact on traditional Indian diplomacy however can be said to be negative as it has resulted in the loss of autonomy of diplomats, with increasing centralization of decision making processes.

Background

The historical practice of diplomacy has been very different from its contemporary form. Like the evolution of all institutions, the institution of diplomacy has also evolved, triggered by various conditions and factors. If diplomacy is to be defined as a means of conducting negotiations between various political entities, then the changes it has undergone have ranged from the establishment of resident missions, the domain

of changing actors, the speed of communications, the level of transparency, the spread of multilateralism, use of summitry, and broadening of issues and processes.

These changes have their expanse both practically and on the discourse of diplomacy, that is, both its theory and practice. Theoretically, the understanding of the institution of diplomacy has considerably broadened, deepened and become more compartmentalised. Hence pedagogically too, diplomacy is taught under various separate headings like coercive diplomacy, summit diplomacy, public diplomacy, nuclear diplomacy and others.

These changes that have come about in the theory and practice of diplomacy have been triggered and pushed by various other changes in other institutions. One such important change is the evolution of the political entities from empires to the establishment of the nation state system post the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The entrenchment of this system around the globe brought about the entrenchment of a formal diplomatic process involving resident missions and practices like a formal exam to choose the diplomats to be sent to foreign lands as their countries representatives. Another important systemic evolution would be the transformation of majority of the countries into democracies. This led to the rise of concepts and practices of public diplomacy, where the government of a country tries to directly influence the public opinion of another country to create a favourable image of itself, in the hope that this public opinion will push their democratic governments to pursue an overall favourable foreign policy towards itself. Subsequently emerged practices like citizen diplomacy, and people to people diplomacy.

One of the most fundamental changes in the world is the revolution in information and communications technology (ICT). This has impacted the practice of diplomacy in innumerable ways. Apart from speed of communications, the nature of diplomacy has itself transformed. The easy availability of information from around the globe, the fast travel and connectivity by telecommunications, have led to concepts like digital diplomacy. The impact by the media on the theory and practice of diplomacy has to be understood in this context. The purpose of this study is to investigate the ways in which diplomacy is changing due to the influence by the media and how in turn Indian diplomacy has used media resources for its own objectives. This interdependence between the two will be analysed in this study. The analysis would

be focusing upon India as a case study with the realisation that the understandings that emerge with regard to media's impact on diplomacy would be context specific. This would however add to the discourse on diplomacy which can be said to be based more on the analysis of developed countries. A study of India is all the more important to make a shift from the hitherto Euro-Atlantic focus of diplomatic studies.

Definitions, Rationale and Scope of Study

The term 'mediatization' is relatively new to the discourse of both media studies and international politics. It has been defined as a "meta-process" which has been explained to refer to "a social change process in which media have become increasingly influential in and deeply integrated into different spheres of society" (Esser and Stromback 2014:4). They argue that the process of mediatization is related to "media influence" in a structural manner instead of "media effects" which is contextual (Esser and Stromback 2014:10). Another definition articulates it as "the essence of mediatization theory is that mediatization is a long term process of increasing media importance and direct and indirect media influence in various spheres in society. Corollary, "mediatization of politics" describes a process in which politics has increasingly "lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media."" (Esser and Stromback 2014:6).

In this context, 'mediatization of diplomacy', for this study, has been defined as the increasing influences of media on diplomacy thereby altering its actors and processes to suit the media logic. Media logic has been enumerated as being constitutive of three sub-concepts of "professionalism" (independence of journalism as an autonomous profession with its own standards deciding news worthiness), "commercialism" (with profit for the investors being one of the main motives) and "media technology" (use of media technology to suit the specific media format) (Esser and Stromback 2014:18). However, this study does not envisage mediatization of diplomacy to be a one way process. It equally factors in the elements of diplomatic institutions trying to influence the media and use various media platform to achieve its objectives.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of India was one of the first governmental ministries to adopt and utilize digital technology to achieve its diplomatic objective. They made a mark in the innovative use of social media to connect with the public both in India and abroad. The various twitter accounts run by the MEA, along with the account of the Spokesperson and the Minister of External Affairs has brought India's diplomacy to the public in the virtual world. The number of journalists attending the press briefings of the MEA, as part of the MEA beat has also significantly risen. These briefings are also being aired live on the MEA's youtube and facebook channels. One can say that the MEA's engagement with the media has broadened, leading to greater amount of information generation on diplomatic issues in the public domain.

On the other hand, the news media's reportage on foreign policy issues has come into sharp focus in the public sphere on a number of diplomatic events. It almost makes one feel as if the media is not only reporting the issue but is also a participant in the negotiations or conflict with its minute by minute reportage. Such a strong reportage might not be present for all the countries, but it is certainly present for India's relations with great powers and its neighbours. This statement is all the more true for the case of Pakistan. There are various reasons for the media's strong engagement with issues regarding India-Pakistan relations. This includes the continuous terrorism exported from there, historical baggage of partition, cultural linkages, mixture of religious dimension and others. Moreover, with both India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons powers, the bilateral relationship operates on nuclear deterrence. A serious military escalation carries the risk of deterrence breakdown. The relationship between India and Pakistan has seen equal number of highs and lows. According to our former Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, the problems that India and Pakistan face are certainly *sui generis* (Menon 2009:14). After the partition, both countries have fought four wars with each other, in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999 (Jayanta Kumar Ray 2011:114-196). For India, terrorism sponsored against India from the soil of Pakistan is the main issue, whereas Pakistan keeps emphasising that Kashmir is the main issue. There have been phases of co-operation where there is an exchange of prisoners, bus journeys and flights to Lahore, back channel diplomacy, trade, comprehensive dialogue and an equal number of phases of terrorism, taciturn, distance, acrimony and

antagonism.   Pratap Bhanu Mehta (2003:2014) has called this, the "cycles of oscillation between sentimental peace summits and new war." Hence this study focuses on the extended illustrations of four specific events from India-Pakistan relations for its analysis of media reportage.

As is mentioned above, four events in India-Pakistan relations have been taken up for purposes of analysis in this study. Two of them are in the domain of conflict and two of them are in the domain of negotiations summits. One can say that diplomacy is all about negotiation between war and peace. Although it is true that as an institution, diplomacy is so pervasive that it does not stop even in times of war. But it is also true that diplomacy is heightened and the media's coverage on this front becomes expansive either at the zenith of a peace summit or the nadir of a war. The purpose is to not only track the developments of these four events in the newspapers but more importantly to analyse the nature of the reportage. The objective is to highlight the manner in which media frames the issues of conflict and peace. In times of conflict, the enquiry will be into whether frames of peace mongering or war mongering were more prevalent. In times of the peace negotiations, the enquiry will be into whether the media framed the issue in terms of support for the peace process, or whether it used a critical frame. In both conflict and peace, the statements of the government and the opposition parties are analysed along with the editorials as a response to these statements. The editorials are then elaborated upon as they represent the newspaper's overall position and what kind of consensus they were trying to create and promote among their readers. Also, the space given to public opinion and views of different non-governmental bodies is analysed. A special emphasis is placed on the articles published by former diplomats. Articles on the role of the media itself at that point of time are also highlighted. Overall the purpose is to investigate the nature of the consensus or deviance that the newspaper was building during these four episodes.

The four episodes are first, the Kargil War (1999); second the corresponding Agra Summit (2001); third, the Sharm-el-Sheikh summit (2009) and lastly Surgical Strikes (2016) which followed the attacks at Uri in Jammu and Kashmir. The Kargil war and Surgical Strikes have been clubbed together under the category of war/conflict and the Agra Summit and the Sharm-el-Shiekh summit would be coming under the category

of peace/negotiation phases. Temporally, the Kargil war and Agra summit are older episodes than the Surgical Strikes and Sharm-el-Sheikh summit.

The print media has been chosen for analysis in this study. For every episode of conflict or peace, four newspapers have been analysed, two in the Hindi language and two in the English language. For purposes of uniformity, one English newspaper (*The Times of India*) and one Hindi newspaper (*Nav Bharat Times*) have been examined for all the events. The other corresponding Hindi and English newspaper are different for the four illustrations. This maintains both a uniformity and diversity in terms of newspapers chosen. The other Hindi newspapers are *Dainik Jagran*, *Rashtriya Sahara* and *Dainik Bhaskar* whereas the other English newspapers are *Hindustan Times* and *The Hindu*. Most of these papers have been tagged as the largest running dailies since their inception according to the Indian Readership Survey. Hence, in absolute numbers, they reach a large number of people in India.

With regard to print newspapers, the website of the Office of Registrar of Newspapers for India, Government of India, mentions that the total numbers of publications (registered) are, first: newspaper category -17,573 and second: periodicals category- 1,00,666 as of 31st March, 2018. This makes a total of 1,18,239 registered publications as of 31st March 2018. The largest numbers of publications are registered in the Hindi language and their number stands at 47.989. The largest circulated multi-edition Daily is the "Dainik Bhaskar" in Hindi (58 editions) whose number stands at 51,19,720. The second largest circulated multi-edition Daily is "The Times of India" in English (34 editions) whose number stands at 43,34,769. However the largest circulating daily (not multi edition) during 2016-17 was first, "Ananda Bazar Patrika" in the Bengali language and its number stands at 11,18,440 (Office of Registrar of Newspaper for India, Government of India 2018).

The contemporary global trend shows that newspaper circulation is decreasing in the developed countries (due to larger use of online news sources) and increasing in developing countries (Khandekar 2013:1; Tharoor 2017). One reason for this is the rising literacy levels in India (Tharoor Shashi 2017). According to the *Indian*

Readership Survey[1] 2017, 39% of the Indian population read newspapers (Media Research Users Council 2017). There is a 9% growth in newspaper readership over the last four years.

> Hindi readership stands at 17.6 crore in IRS 2017, up 45% from 12.1 crore in IRS 2014. The largest percentage growth has been in Oriya language readership which has grown by 83% to 1.1 crore as compared to 0.6 crore in IRS 2014. Bengali readership grew by 9% to 2.1 crore from 1.9 crore (Sarma 2018).

In 2017, among the data for Hindi newspapers, the top four newspapers in terms of readership were, first, Dainik Jagran; second, Hindustan; third, Amar Ujala and fourth, Dainik Bhaskar. Among the English dailies, the top four were, first, The Times of India; second, Hindustan Times; third, The Hindu and fourth, The Economic Times (Indian Readership Survey 2017).

Compared to print newspapers, there is no official data on the largest running electronic news channel. The data that is released by the Broadcast Audience Research Council (BARC) states the data for viewership of news channels on a weekly basis instead of an annual one (Khandekar 2013:70). That print news is understood to have more credibility than electronic news because the latter is fundamentally linked to TRPs (Television Rating Points) and hence highly profit oriented. This corporatisation of media makes the news channels more prone to sensationalism and paid news/propaganda. This phenomenon has increasingly been observed in the Indian electronic media. Hence most of the electronic news media in India cannot be counted as a credible reflector of the actual public opinion. In fact for a country like India, the coverage of news from rural India is greatly absent from electronic news media, coming second even to the coverage of international news (Bhaskara Rao 2017:65; P Sainath 2006). "Hardly 2 percent (2012) of "prime time" news bulletins' contents is about health, education, agriculture, development, welfare and environment. One-third or more of the news items of national channels continue

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[1] *Indian Readership Survey* is published by a non profit industrial body called *Media Research Users Council* (MRUC) (Media Research Users Council 2018). There was another survey published on the status of the media in India titled *National Readership Survey*. This was by a joint body consisting of ABC (Audit Bureau of Circulation), AAAI (Advertising Association of India) and INS (Indian Newspaper Society) (The Economic Times Jan 5, 2004). However both of these surveys were merged in 2011 and started getting published under the title of Indian Readership Survey, jointly published by a new body called Readership Studies Council of India (RSCI) and MRUC (Warsia 2011).

to focus on politicians and party politics" (Rao Bhaskara 2017:63). Hence, this study has been focused upon print news media rather than on electronic news media.

Most of the studies analysing the linkages between media and diplomacy have been done in the western context. After the invention of the internet and the World Wide Web, the western society has been pervaded by the use of wireless local area network (WLAN and WiFi) and hence can be said to be 'mediatized' virtually to a greater extent than developing countries like India. Nonetheless, the role of digital media in India is constantly increasing in all spheres from infotainment to areas of governance In the case of digital media, although it has the lowest penetration among the print, radio and electronic, it is one of the fastest growing sectors in India. According to the FICCI-EY (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry-Ernst and Young) report of 2018, titled "Re-imagining India's Media & Entertainment Sector", the segmental growth from 2016 to 2017 for digital media was 29 percent. It is estimated that the Government of India's programme "Digital India" will be taking this expansion even further (FICCI-EY 2018:105). In 2017, India has 481 million internet users out of which 295 million are from urban areas and 186 million are from rural areas. Based on the current trend of growth, this number is expected to 829 million by 2021 (FICCI-EY 2018: 107). Hence the Indian MEA's foray into social media for purposes of internal public diplomacy is definitely a step in the right direction. In the light of the above understanding, this study seeks to answer the following questions:-

Research Questions

1). What are the various ways in which Indian diplomacy has been mediatized?

2). Does the media play an autonomous role in influencing diplomacy?

3). How do the institutions of diplomacy influence and utilise the media for its own objectives?

4). Why has mediatization had a greater impact on public diplomacy than on traditional diplomacy?

5). Has mediatization decreased the functional autonomy of diplomats by increasing the centralization of decision making?

Hypotheses

1). The degree to which media can influence diplomacy and vice versa depends on the level of policy certainty/uncertainty.

2). Mediatization has had a positive impact on public diplomacy and a negative impact on traditional diplomacy.

Methodology

This study has adopted the use of both theory and practice to understand the interaction between media and diplomacy in India's case. The theoretical evolution of mediatization of diplomacy has been used to understand and analyse the nuances of mediatization in the context of Indian diplomacy. For this matter, content analysis has been undertaken of Hindi and English newspapers on four specific issues between India Pakistan, two of which are in the realm of conflict and two are in the realm of negotiation summits. Subsequently an examination of diplomatic writings has been done and interviews have been conducted based on the semi-structured format with former and present Indian diplomats to analyse their adaptation and way of functioning to the continuously changing media environment.

Overview of Chapters

Chapter One is the introductory chapter which lays down the definition, rationale and scope of the study while also outlining the research questions, hypotheses and methodology. Chapter Two is dedicated to first delineating the theoretical evolution of the mediatization and politics. This lays the background for the further exposition of the relationship between media and diplomacy. The discourse on the mediatization of politics has been divided into two large sections, where the first largely underscores the role of the media as a dependent variable (Manufacturing Consent Model) and the second highlights the role of the media as an independent variable (CNN Effect Model). One of the main questions that have been analysed is the correlation between policy certainty/policy uncertainly on particular issues and media influence/impact. The next section elaborates the "Politics Media Politics" Model, which becomes a focal point to explore the relationship between media and diplomacy. This model becomes important to understand the influence media has on diplomacy. The approaches adopted by the news media for reportage like agenda setting, priming and framing have been dealt with next. A background to media tools becomes an

imperative to understand the various ways in which media frames diplomatic issues and subjects.

Elaborating the discourse of media and politics at the global level, the chapter then focuses on the institution of diplomacy. The evolution of the theory and practice of diplomacy due to the revolution in information and communications technology and the associated phenomenon of mediatization has been delineated. Due to associated changes in society and politics, a watershed distinction that came about after the end of the First World War was regarding old secretive diplomacy and new transparent diplomacy. It would be axiomatic to state that the role of the media is more pronounced in the latter than in the former. The changes in the practice and theory of diplomacy have been analysed by providing the writings of various scholars of diplomacy who have assigned new terminologies and conceptual models. They have been elaborated under separate sub-headings like, club to network model; rapid reaction diplomacy; media diplomacy; media-brokered diplomacy; public diplomacy; digital diplomacy and mediatization of diplomacy.

The next chapter, Chapter Three deals with the print media narratives of India-Pakistan conflicts. The two illustrations that have been examined are the Kargil War of 1999 and the Surgical Strikes of 2016. For this purpose two Hindi newspapers and two English newspapers have been used in each case. For the Kargil War, the newspapers used are *The Times of India*, *Hindustan Times*, *Nav Bharat Times* and *Dainik Jagran*. For Surgical Strikes, the newspapers used are *The Times of India*, *The Hindu*, *Nav Bharat Times* and *Dainik Bhaskar*. Using the reports from these papers, the day to day developments of these two conflicts have been tracked. Most importantly, an effort has been made to analyse the frames that the media was using for reporting these conflicts. During a tense phase of conflict, were they using a war mongering frame or a peace mongering frame? For this, an in-depth analysis of the editorials and other articles has been undertaken. An exploration of the space given in the paper for opinions and views from different quarters has been done. These include not only the statements from the then government, but also the opposition parties, non-governmental civil society organisations and the general public. Articles on the role of the international community have also been covered. The articles written by

former diplomats, defence experts and critical articles on the role of the media itself have been highlighted.

Chapter Four deals with the print media narratives of the peace processes between India and Pakistan, specifically the Agra Summit of 2001 and the Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit of 2009. For this purpose, Hindi and English newspapers have been used for each. The English newspapers examined are *The Times of India, Hindustan Times* and *The Hindu*. The Hindi newspapers used are the *Nav Bharat Times* and the *Rashtriya Sahara*. Some of the questions that being explored in the chapter are: when a peace process is underway between two historically conflictual neighbouring countries, how do the media, especially print news behave? Do they overwhelmingly support the peace process or are they critical and sceptical of the initiatives. By their reportage what kind of consensus are they trying to from among their readers? Are they critical or supportive of the government? Are they trying to set an agenda of peace or an agenda of prolonged conflict? Analysing the reportage from these papers, an investigation has been made into the preparation for the talks and whether the newspaper was publishing hopeful or critical editorials and articles. The voice given to not only the government and the opposition parties but also various non-governmental organisations have been covered. The articles written by former diplomats have been focused upon along with articles on the role of the media itself.

Chapter Five sets forth to analysing the various ways in which diplomacy has been mediatized in India. Based upon the theoretical framework in the first chapter and the media's reportage in the extended illustrations of conflict and peace third and fourth chapter, it delineates the assessment of Indian diplomats on media's influence on diplomacy in a generic sense and with reference to India. Some of the questions that have been grappled with by the diplomats pertain to various changes that have been brought in the practice of diplomacy due to associated changes in the media field. For example, whether they felt forced to react to any situation due to media pressure, felt a loss of autonomy, came across any case where the media acted as either an impediment to diplomacy or an accelerator, whether media rhetoric influences their functioning in any way and in what manner they try to influence the media narrative. Providing a practitioners perspective, the chapter also elucidates how the Ministry of External Affairs India has been dealing with the media and its foray into new media.

This involves an elaboration of the evolution of the institution of the External Publicity Division of the MEA, India. Such an elaboration will be done in the context of the literature existing on media, public opinion and foreign policy in India. Chapter Six is the concluding chapter which takes a re-look at the research questions and hypotheses in the light of the delineation of the literature from secondary sources and primary sources in the various chapters. It goes on to give a summary of the findings and unite the various arguments given in the four separate chapters.

Chapter Two

Understanding Mediatization of Diplomacy: A Theoretical Evolution

In order to understand the relationship between media and diplomacy, it becomes an imperative to observe the studies that have already been conducted on the nature of linkages between media and politics in general. Since diplomacy is a part of politics and social sciences, such an overview would theoretically enrich the understanding of media and diplomacy. Hence, this chapter outlines the theoretical evolution of the discourse on media and politics. This has been divided into two large sections, where the first largely underscores the role of the media as a dependent variable (Manufacturing Consent Model) and the second highlights the role of the media as an independent variable (CNN Effect Model).

One of the main questions that have been analysed is the correlation between policy certainty/policy uncertainly on particular issues and media influence/impact. The next section elaborates the "Politics Media Politics" Model, which becomes a focal point to explore the relationship between media and diplomacy. This model becomes important to understand the influence media has on diplomacy or vice versa. The approaches adopted by the news media for reportage like agenda setting, priming and framing have been dealt with next. A background to media tools becomes an imperative to understand the various ways in which media frames diplomatic issues and subjects.

Elaborating the discourse of media and politics at the global level, the chapter then focuses on the institution of diplomacy. The evolution of the theory and practice of diplomacy due to the revolution in information and communications technology and the associated phenomenon of mediatization has been delineated. Due to associated changes in society and politics, a watershed distinction that came about after the end of the First World War was regarding old secretive diplomacy and new transparent diplomacy. It would be axiomatic to state that the role of the media is more pronounced in the latter than in the former. The changes in the practice and theory of diplomacy have been analysed by providing the writings of various scholars of diplomacy who have assigned new terminologies and conceptual models. They have

been elaborated under separate sub-headings like, club to network model; rapid reaction diplomacy; media diplomacy; media-brokered diplomacy; public diplomacy; digital diplomacy and mediatization of diplomacy.

Media and Society: The Independent and Dependent Variable

Denis Mc Quail (1983:42) has stated that the relationship between media and society can be categorised in the following four ways: first: "idealism", where media is the independent variable and society is the dependent variable. Another name of such an understanding is also "technological determinism" (Mc Quail 1983:42). Second: "interdependence", which envisages a constant interaction between media and society and identifies no single direction of causation (Mc Quail 1983:40). Third: "autonomy", which envisages an autonomous relationship between media mass communication and social change (Mc Quail 1983: 44). Finally the fourth approach is called the "materialist approach", where society is independent variable and media is the dependent variable (Mc Quail 1983:44). Under the final "materialist approach", he further goes on to identity four main variants, first, main sociological tradition; second, classical Marxism; third, political economic media theory and last, dependency theory of development (Mc Quail 1983)

It is important to understand in detail Mc Quail's fourth category of materialism/political economy model as it negates/undervalues the autonomous impact/influence of the media on society. It stands in complete opposition to what Mc Quail has identified as the idealist approach which gives more power to the media to impact/influence various aspects of society. The materialist/political economy model identifies that the powerful elements within the society mould/make/use the media for their own purposes and that the media cannot act autonomously. One of the most important variants of this approach is the well known "manufacturing consent" model of Edward S Herman and Noam Chomsky (2002).

In order to better understand the nuances of interdependent and dependent variable in the case of media and politics/society and vice versa, a flow chart has been given on the next page:-

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                    ┌──────────────────────────┐
                    │  Media and Politics/Society │
                    │        (Diplomacy)          │
                    └──────────────────────────┘
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Media ⟹ influences ⟹ Politics/Society (Independent) (Dependent)	Politics/Society ⟹ influences Media (Independent) (Dependent)
Vietnam War Syndrome & CNN Effect	Manufacturing Consent (E. Herman & N. Chomsky 2006)
Technological Determinism •Innis and Mc Luhan (1964) (*the medium is the message*) •Idealism- Denis Mc Quail (1983)	Materialist Approach (McQuail 1983) •Neo Marxist (Artz and Kamalipour 2006; Edwards and Cromwell 2006)

Source: Compiled by the author

The relationship between media and society/politics is ultimately that of a dynamic interplay and interdependence. In order to analyse this interplay with more clarity, the discourse has been structured around identifying the causal variables in specific situations and conditions. However, this has to be done within the backdrop of other factors/variables with the knowledge that ultimately in social sciences, most of the times it is usually a case of complex interdependence.

Manufacturing Consent Model

Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky have also titled this model as the "propaganda model". They write "It is our view that, among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them" (Herman and Chomsky 2002:X). They have specifically analysed the United States media institution in their book. Herman and Chomsky (2002: X) identify certain structural and functional factors that lead to the media acting as a tool of the powerful.

The structural factors are ownership patterns and sources of funding. These structural factors impact the functional level factors which then results in shaping the news in a

certain way. At the functional level, effort is made towards "selection of right thinking personnel and by the editors' and working journalists' internationalization of priorities and definition of news worthiness that conform to the institution's policy" (Herman and Chomsky 2002: X). Herman and Chomsky (2002) have analysed a number of case studies and provided evidences of the 'propaganda model' throughout the book. For example, they have looked at how the US media has toed the government line in reporting domestic elections taking place in other countries.

Depending on whether the US government favoured a particular political party or leader in that country and whether it was the winning or losing party, the reportage of the US mainstream media changed accordingly. Every time a party/leader that US had hostile relationship with, won the elections, the US media cried foul about the election procedure without any credible evidence for the rigging in the electoral procedure. But when a party/leader that the US government saw as promoting its interests, no amount of credible evidence of fraud in the election procedures made the US media cry a sham and delegitimize these elections (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XXV-XXVII). For example, in alignment with the views/aims/interests of the US government, the US media "found the Salvadoran election a "step toward democracy" and the Nicaraguan election a "sham," despite the fact that electoral conditions were far more compatible with an honest election in Nicaragua than in El Salvador" (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XXV).

Other examples of the US media functioning as a 'propaganda' machine of the US government in power relate to how they reported on conflict/war situations in other countries and the reportage of the US involvement in the Vietnam War. The media conveniently choose to categorise some situations as genocides and the others as not, despite having evidence on the contrary, depending on what the US government's position was (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XIX- XXIV). The media overplayed[2] the killing of forty Albanians at Racak (Kosovo) by Serbs in January 1999 as a "genocide" and "massacre" while underplaying the killing of nearly 200 East Timorese in Liquica (East Timor) by the Indonesian army which took place in April

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[2] According to Herman and Chomsky (2202:XXIV), this over emphasis and sensationalised reporting by the mainstream media "helped create the moral basis for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia" in March 1999.

in 1999. This is because the US government actively supported the then Indonesian Military. Herman and Chomsky (2002: XXIII) write, "The double standard reflected in the politicized use of "genocide" is applicable to the treatment of news events more broadly, with the media regularly focusing on the abuse of worthy victims and playing down or neglecting altogether the plight of unworthy victims." This biased categorisation went to the extent of making the United States the victim for its involvement in the Vietnam War when it was actually the aggressor[3] (Herman and Chomsky 2002:XXIX-XXXVI).

The 'propaganda model' of the media system stems to propagate a neo-liberal commercialist ideology in the society, relating to "lifestyle themes and goods and their acquisition" which makes community living and "civic life" take a backseat among individuals (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XIV). The direct impact of this is felt in the quality of the "public sphere"[4], which according to Herman and Chomsky (2002: XVIII) is

> The array of places and forums in which matters important to a democratic community are debated and information relevant to intelligent citizen participation is provided. The steady advance, and cultural power, of marketing and advertising has caused "the displacement of a political public sphere by a depoliticized consumer culture"" (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XVIII).

Most virtual spaces are structured for advertising, buying and selling consumer goods (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XVIII). The business class and their advertisements are antithetical to the development of a vibrant public sphere as it prevents a space for the fissures in the society to come to the fore by taking away public attention to consumer goods. The ideal environment for a consumerist culture to thrive is a status quoist capitalist environment with no major social movement or change taking place and

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[3] The US government and media turned itself into the victims during the Vietnam War from 1955 to 1975. This portrayal was equally helped by various works produced in popular culture during this period. Movies like "The Deer Hunter, Uncommon Valor,...and Missing in Action, in which Rambo-like heroes slaughter evil Vietnamese" to save American prisoners of war who were being tortured and tormented. This helped in demonising the Vietnamese and their actual plight and what the American intervention has done to them. (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XXXV).

[4] Public Sphere is a term that has been popularised by J Habermas, in his 1962 book titled "The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society". Public sphere is understood as a discursive space, separate from the realm of the state and the market, where there is a free critical discussion on various issues, which influences public opinion and thereby public action. The notion of the public sphere has been criticized for its exclusivity based on class, gender and others.

prevalence of public apathy for political issues. It yearns for a politics/conflict free society in which the entertainment acts as a red herring from pressing socio-economic issues (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XVIII).

There are however two caveats in this understanding which Herman and Chomsky highlight (2002: XII). First, these structural and functional conditions do not operate in a monolithic and tight fitted manner. "These structural factors that dominate media operations are not all-controlling and do not always produce simple and homogenous results" (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XII). Hence parts of the system do experience some level of autonomy which work towards highlighting some pieces of news and frames that do not fit the overall narrative. However, such voices of "dissent and inconvenient information are kept within bounds and at the margins, so that while their presence shows that the system is not monolithic, they are not large enough to interfere unduly with the domination of the official agenda" (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XII).

The second caveat is the difference highlighted between causes and effect of the 'propaganda model'. The causes that give rise to such a model are highlighted above as structural and functional factors. The mere existence of such a media model, however, does not mean that it will be always successful in its objectives. "The propaganda model describes forces that shape what the media does; it does not imply that any propaganda emanating from the media is always effective" (Herman and Chomsky 2002: XII).

The Vietnam War Syndrome and the CNN Effect Model
If Denis Mc Quail's (1983) categorisation inserts Herman and Chomsky's (2002) 'manufacturing consent' or 'propaganda model' under the 'materialist' category where society is the independent variable and media is the dependent variable; then the Vietnam War Syndrome and the CNN Effect/Model understanding of the media would come directly under the 'idealist' category of Mc Quail as it envisages media as the independent variable having an autonomous impact on society at large.

The term 'Vietnam war syndrome' got formulated during the end of the Vietnam War when it was stated that one of the main reasons why the United States pulled out of the war in Vietnam was due to the role of the media. The media covering the war took images of American soldiers dying in the battle abroad along with the images of the body bags of dead American soldiers being brought back to the US. According to the Vietnam War Syndrome, such horrid images played an important role in changing the opinion of the American public against America's involvement in the Vietnam War.

> The Vietnam War, the first 'television war' and also the first major US military defeat on foreign soil of the 20th century, secured mythic standing as the most uncensored war in history and also as the war in which the media sapped morale and the political resolve to continue –the so called 'Vietnam War syndrome'. (Cottle 2006:75).

The term 'Vietnam Syndrome' is a larger concept as it refers to not only the role of the media but the prevalence of general reluctance among the American public to involve the American army in conflicts abroad which does not pose a direct national threat to the American nation or bring about any direct benefit to it (Kalb 2013).

The CNN Effect has been defined as "the ability of real time communications technology, via the news media, to provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to both global and national events" (Robinson 2002:2). It became popular during 'Operation Provide Comfort/Safe Haven' after the first Gulf War in Iraq in 1991 and 'Operation Restore Hope' in Somalia in 1992. The claim was that the media had played a necessary role in causing both these humanitarian interventions. It was said that the "highly critical coverage of Kurdish refugees fleeing from Saddam Hussein's forces" and images/coverage coming out of Somalia had pressurised the various western governments to jointly undertake these two humanitarian missions (Robinson 1999:301). George Kennan and James Hoge had warned then of a "media dictated foreign policy" (Kennan George 1993; Hoge James 1994 in Robinson Piers 2002:302). James Hoge had gone to the extent of writing that "these capabilities of modern media to be immediate, sensational and pervasive are unsettling the conduct of foreign affairs" as politicians and diplomats are no longer allowed quiet time for deliberation during crisis times and were under the enormous pressure to react or lose face both among the domestic population and international public (Hoge 1994:136-137). Hoge was categorical in mentioning in his article in 1994 that in the absence of

a persuasive government policy/strategy on any issue, the media's role would be catalytic (Hoge 1994: 138).

Piers Robinson has analysed the role of the CNN effect in affecting a humanitarian response and has outlined a number of variables and caveats instead of establishing a simplistic direct causal relationship. He mentions two variables on the basis on which one can decide whether a CNN effect has occurred or not in a particular case of humanitarian intervention. First, the level of political certainty regarding the course of action to be followed in a particular case; second, the way the media frames the news/debate surrounding that case (Robinson 2002:25). In order to better understand the CNN Effect, one needs to look into these variables in greater detail.

Policy Certainty vis-a-vis the CNN Effect

Most scholars writing on the relationship between media and politics have agreed to the premise that the relationship between policy certainty and the role of the media in impacting policy is inversely proportional. Hence, higher the policy uncertainty or lack of consensus in the decision making apparatus regarding a particular issue, higher is the role that the media can play in impacting the final decision/policy on that issue. James Hoge (1994:138) had written about the impact of policy certainty/uncertainty even when the terminology 'CNN Effect' had not been popularised. He wrote, "The existence of policy that can command public support against emotional swings stirred up by television imagery is key" to avoid the harmful effects of media's pervasiveness (1994:138). Piers Robinson (1999:304-305) citing the works of Nik Gowing (1997), Larry Minear (1997) and Warren Strobel (1997) writes that though their research fails to decidedly clarify whether media reportage can pressurise the political class to undertake a humanitarian intervention, what they do clearly highlight is "the key role 'policy certainty' plays in determining media influence."

> When policy is unclear or ill defined the media can indeed have some influence on policy; on the other hand, 'the media effect on policy decreases as the clarity on strategic interest increases' (Robinson Piers 1999:305)

Since policy certainty/uncertainty has been cited as a major variable that impacts whether the media can influence policy or not, it becomes necessary to define it and

underline the ways in which one can find evidence of it. According to Piers Robinson (2002:26) if policy making is "an outcome of a complex bargaining process between a set of sub-systems in government," then policy certainty/uncertainty depends on the consensus or lack of consensus in this group. Robinson has written that in the United States, apart from the President and his/her key group of advisors, the other important sub-systems are the "Pentagon, State Department, National Security Council, the Joint Chief of Staff and the CIA" (Robinson 2002:27). Furthermore, a distinction has been made between levels of policy uncertainty as a state of first, 'undecided policy', 'no policy' and 'wavering policy' (George 1989 in Robinson 2002:27).

Media Framing vis-a-vis the CNN Effect

The way in which the media uses various frames to conduct its reportage on various issues shall be discussed in greater detail under a different sub-section. Here, the objective is to analyse the relationship between media framing and the CNN effect. According to Piers Robinson, apart from policy uncertainty, media framing impacts the success of the CNN Effect. It is to be noted again that Robinson's study restricts the impact of the CNN Effect to the realm of humanitarian missions. Piers Robinson (2002:28-30) talks about two types of pair framing approaches in the case of covering a conflict, "distance framing" or "support framing" and "empathy framing" or "critical framing".

In "distance" and "support" framing, the media undertakes an unimpassioned reportage whereby it creates an "emotional distance between the audience and the people suffering in a conflict" virtually supporting and reinforcing the non-interventionist status quoist stance of the government (Robinson 2002:28). On the other hand, "empathy" and "critical" framing by the media espouses empathy for the victims of the conflict. At the same time being critical of a non-interventionist policy by the government, it encourages a humanitarian intervention to save the suffering individuals (Robinson 2002:29).

Bringing these two variables of policy certainty and media framing together, Piers Robinson (2002:30-45) has formulated a "policy-media interaction model" by which one can find evidence for a CNN Effect having occurred or not in affecting a humanitarian intervention. In his words, "the policy-media interaction model is

designed to help identify instances when media coverage comes to play a significant role in persuading policy makers to pursue a particular policy" (Robinson 2002:37). It does this by focusing on the two variables of "policy certainty/uncertainty" and "media framing". Robinson (2002:37-42) outlines a number of different outcomes that can come about depending on the nature of these two variables in a given case.

These outcomes are a "strong CNN effect", "weak CNN effect" and "accelerant and impediment effects" (Robinson 2002:37-42). Hence a 'strong CNN effect' occurs when the "media coverage is a significant influence on the policy process and might operate as either a necessary or even a sufficient factor in producing a particular policy outcome" (Robinson 2002:37). According to his findings, such a scenario is most likely to take place when there is 'policy uncertainty' and the existence of 'empathetic and critical media' reportage for a given conflict. A 'weak CNN effect' occurs when there is 'policy uncertainty' but the reportage on the conflict is neither numerous in number nor consistent over a period of time and manages to influence only a few decision makers instead of creating a overall pressure by influencing not only decision makers but also the public at large (Robinson 2002:38).

The "accelerant and impediment" effects of the media differ from the 'CNN effect' in that they do not impact the decision regarding what policy to follow, but only serve to either speed up or slow down the decision that would have been already taken (Livingston 1997 in Robinson 2002:39). In the case of 'CNN effect' impacting the decision on whether or not to undertake a humanitarian intervention, the 'impediment effect' has also been called the "body bag effect" as images of dead soldiers in the conflict and being brought home act as a major cause to convince the public in favour of non-intervention unless it directly harms the national security of the state (Freedman 2000 in Robinson 2002:39).

Piers Robinson (2002) has analysed the presence/absence and impact/non-impact of the CNN Effect on the undertaking/non-undertaking of a humanitarian intervention in a particular conflict. One of his major research findings is that 'policy certainty' is a more important variable than 'media framing' in this issue.

> In cases of non-intervention we would expect to observe either policy
> certainty against intervention coupled with distance framing (which

implicitly supports a policy of no-intervention) or else critical and empathy framed coverage coming head to head with policy certainty against intervention. In this scenario, again, policy certainty prevents media influence on policy (Robinson Piers 2002:42).

Hence when there is 'policy certainty' among the decision making bodies regarding what policy/action to implement, then no amount of media framing with a motive to change this policy can be influential (Robinson 2002:42). According to Robinson (2002:45), the 'policy-media interaction model' "goes some way in reconciling the contrasting claims of the CNN effect and manufacturing consent theory and to contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of media-state relations." Hence it seeks to bring together the contrasting approaches that Mc Quail (1983) has mentioned: the 'idealist' approach which treats media as the independent variable under which the 'CNN effect' and 'Vietnam War Syndrome' would come and the 'materialist' approach which treats the media as the dependent variable, under which the 'manufacturing consent model' would be subsumed.

Politics-Media-Politics (PMP) Model

In order to better understand the nuances of the relationship between media and society and to problematize the direct causal relations established by Mc Quail (1983) between these variables under the 'idealist' and 'materialist' approach, it becomes necessary to look at the research of Daniel Hallin (1984) and Gadi Wolfsfeld (2004) who have worked towards establishing the "Politics-Media-Politics" (PMP) Model. The credit for this term, 'PMP Model' belongs specifically to Gadi Wolfsfeld (2002). This model better explains the nuances in the relationship between media and society.

According to the 'Vietnam War Syndrome', one of the necessary reasons why the United States pulled out of the war from Vietnam was because of the role of the media which carried images of dead American soldiers and the destruction of war in Vietnam itself. Such empathetic reportage sought to strengthen the anti-war rhetoric which impacted the public opinion at large and hence created a pressure on the political decision makers to pull out of war. Daniel Hallin (1984) problematizes this 'oppositional media' thesis. In fact Simon Cottle (2006:86) goes to the extent of writing that Hallin "rebuts the 'oppositional media' thesis head on in his detailed examination of media performance throughout the Vietnam War."

Daniel Hallin's (1984) main argument is that the media shifts from a status quoist reportage to a critical reportage on an issue only when there is existence of a change of opinion among a part of the political elite itself. As mentioned above, his research findings are on the basis of the United States involvement in the Vietnam War case study. Hence in a way, Hallin's hypothesis supports the claim of the 'manufacturing consent' model of Chomsky and Herman (2002) which espouses that the media acts as a tool which is manipulated by the elite.

Hallin (1984:6) writes that there was definitely a shift in the reportage of the United States mainstream media before and after the Tet Offensive, a military battle in 1968 during the Vietnam War where both the sides at war suffered huge military and civilian casualties. The reportage before the Tet Offensive was largely supportive of the US government military support for the South Vietnamese and uncritical of the war itself. However, after the Tet offensive, the reportage started turning critical of both the government's policy and of war itself (Hallin 1984:8). This shift in the reportage had been attributed to the media taking on an oppositional role *suo moto* which has been termed as the 'oppositional media thesis' by scholars like Michael J Robinson (1976) and Samuel J Huntington (1975). Hallin disagrees that the media can *suo moto* take on such an oppositional stance (Hallin 1984:6).

Robinson (1976) and Huntington (1975) write that there could be one main reason for this sudden shift in the reportage, of which Hallin disproves (Hallin 1984:9-11). The reason could be an actual change on the situation on the ground, in the actual war going on in Vietnamese land. Hence "it could be argued that the increase in negative news had nothing to do with any change in the media, but simply reflected the evident failure of U.S. policy and the growth of domestic opposition" (Hallin 1984:9). However, there was no major change on the ground and "it was clearly the selection of news-rather than South Vietnamese politics-which was changing" (Hallin 1984: 11). Hallin (1984: 13-14; 20) goes on to write that the main sources of information for the journalists during this time were government sources. This explains the support for the government policy and an uncritical stance towards the war before the Tet Offensive in 1968. "A form of journalism which aims to provide the public with a neutral record of events and which, at the same time, relies primarily on government

officials to describe and explain those events obviously has the potential to wind up as a mirror not of reality, but of the version of reality government officials would like to present to the public" (Hallin 1984:20). The main question that Hallin answers in his article is the reasons for a change in this reportage after the 1968 Tet Offensive.

Hallin's (1984:20-21) main contention is that, the change in the media reportage in the United States on the US involvement in the Vietnam War before and after the Tet Offensive in 1968 from being supportive of government policy to being critical and anti-war, was not because of some change in the nature of the media itself but because there emerged a substantial political opposition to the policy/war on the ground, in US politics. Hence, "the change seems best explained as a reflection of and a response to a collapse of consensus-especially of elite consensus-on foreign policy" (Hallin 1984:20). When, political opposition grew to the then governmental policy to the Vietnam war, it compelled the media to report it, as the political opposition in any democracy is as important as the ruling political party as sources of information and opinion making.

Hallin (1984:21) goes on to divide the world of journalist reportage into three spheres, first, the "sphere of consensus" (media plays a legitimising role); second, the "sphere of legitimate controversy" (balance is to be maintained, for example during election coverage) and third, the "sphere of deviance" (where media purposely neglects voices considered unworthy/unfitting to the current political ensemble). The media in the United States started reporting critically of the Vietnam War Policy only when this critical stance moved from the 'sphere of deviance' to the 'sphere of legitimate controversy'.

> New content may not mirror the facts, but the media, as institutions, do reflect the prevailing pattern of political debate: when consensus is strong, they tend to stay within the limits of political discussion it defines: when it begins to break down, coverage becomes increasingly critical and diverse in the viewpoints it represents, and increasingly difficult for officials to control (Gitlin 1980 in Hallin 1984:23).

Had a substantial aggregate opposition among the political elite not been built against the Vietnam war policy, the media would never have been able to report on it. Hence Hallin concludes that the media at best can be an intervening variable, but not an independent variable (Hallin 1984:23).

Another clear exposition of the nuances in the relationship between media and society can be found in the work of Gadi Wolfsfeld (2002) who has formulated the PMP (politics-media-politics) Model. The PMP Model can be defined as a process where "changes in the political environment...lead to changes in the media norms and routines...that then lead to further changes in the environment" (Wolfsfeld 2002:163). It is necessary to point out that even in this understanding, the media acts as an intermediate variable and dependent variable. But depending on where one begins to notice this loop of cause and effects creating further causes, one's immediate perception may be different. Wolfsfeld (2002) has analysed the media-politics relationship on the basis of two case studies, first, the Israeli Palestinian Conflict and specifically the 'Oslo Accords' of 1993 and second, the Northern Ireland Conflict, specifically the 'Good Friday Agreement' of 1998.

> There is a good reason to believe that the news media play a rather different role in Northern Ireland than they do in Israel. They [media in Northern Ireland] were much more supportive of the peace process and appear to have played an important role in mobilizing public support for the accords (Wolfsfeld 2002:180).

By analysing the role of the mainstream press in both these territories and their conflicts, Wolfsfeld has reached the conclusion that the press has played a negative (destructive) role in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict and has played a positive (constructive) role in the Northern Ireland conflict and hence impacting the final outcome of the two peace processes of 'Oslo Accords' and 'Good Friday Agreement' respectively (Wolfsfeld 2002: Preface).

Justifying the choice of his case study, Wolfsfeld (2002:158-159) outlines the similarities and differences between these two conflicts and the nature of the political and media environment. On the similarity, both conflicts "have a long and bloody history and that religious differences play an important part" with the two sides in the Israel Palestinians belonging to two different religious groups following Judaism and Islam and the two sides in the Northern Ireland belonging to different sects within Christianity, Catholics and Protestants. Second, terrorist attacks resulting in huge civilian casualties have been a major part of both these conflicts (Wolfsfeld 2002:158). Third, the peace processes (Oslo Accords and Good Friday Agreement) in both conflicts came about after a protracted armed war and temporally in the same

decade, the 1990s and hence the territories had no major differences in their media environments.

On the differences, "the conflict in Northern Ireland is more of an internal dispute between two communities living within the same community" where they share the same language and culture (Wolfsfeld 2002:159). The conflict in Israel and Palestinian is more polarised as people belong to different cultures, speak different languages and had "lived as completely separate communities until 1967" (Wolfsfeld 2002:159). Another important difference pertains to the media environment as the press in Northern Ireland was common and catered to both the groups in the conflict. The press in Israel Palestinian conflict however was separated. The Israeli press catered to the Jewish population in Hebrew language and the Arab Press catered to the Palestinian population. This led to the possibility of greater polarisation and chauvinism in the Israeli Palestinian conflict. In Northern Ireland, since the press was common, it became commercially sensible for the press to moderate its views and present both sides of the picture to maintain their viewership from both communities[5] (Wolfsfeld 2002:174).

Gadi Wolfsfeld has analysed in detail the nature of the reportage by the media before and after the two peace processes in both territories. In the case of Northern Ireland's two major newspapers,

> The final tally for the *Irish News* shows a remarkable 64 editorials in support of the peace process, 5 express a more ambivalent attitude, and only 1 that was opposed to the process. The distribution of opinion of the *Belfast Telegraph* is equally one sided: 62 editorials in favour, 18 ambivalent, and again only 1 expressing opposition to the process. This finding is especially surprising given that these editorials were written during a number of periods of violence, when the process appeared to be in danger (Gadi Wolfsfeld 2002: 164).

This positive coverage for the peace process did not alter even after terrorist attacks in the run up to signing the Good Friday Agreement. In fact, after one major terrorist

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[5] An important point highlighted by Gadi Wolfsfeld here is regarding the employment ratio of companies in Northern Ireland. It is mandated by law that all companies hire people from both the communities. Hence the country has people from both sides working in all firms including the media houses. The equality in employment is overseen by the 'Fair Employment Commission', which could be one of the most important reasons for a balanced reportage coming out of the Northern Ireland media (Wolfsfeld 2002: 175).

bombing at Omagh in 1998, two major newspapers, the *Irish News* and *Newsletter* "put forth an initiative asking members of both publics to sign a petition condemning the violence and supporting the peace process" (Wolfsfeld 2002: 166). One major distinction highlighted by Wolfsfeld (2002:172) after a terrorist attack, the press made a differentiation between the terrorist and the common people. The idea was that the community as a whole should not blamed for any terrorist attacks. After the agreement was signed, the *Belfast Telegraph* had a front page picture of two women praying in their respective churches, one Catholic and one Protestant and the headline was "UNITED IN PRAYER FOR PEACE" (Wolfsfeld 2002:168). This shows that optimism for the peace process ran high in the Northern Ireland press both before and after the Good Friday Agreement, remaining unchanged during periods of violence due to terrorist attacks.

The media behaved on a completely different rationale in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, before and after the signing of the Oslo Accords. First, unlike in the case of Northern Ireland, every time there was a terrorist attack in the run up to the Oslo Accords, there was a major clamouring in the Israeli press to halt the peace process on the basis that the Palestinians should never be trusted (Wolfsfeld 2002: 69). Moreover the Israeli press failed to make a differentiation between those committing the terrorist attacks and the Palestinian community at large, blaming and stereotyping the entire community as terrorists and suicide bombers (Wolfsfeld 2002:69-70). Wolfsfeld has analysed the data from two major newspapers in Israel, *Yediot Ahronot* and *Ha'aretz* "that appeared from August 27, 1993 and May 5, 1994. This period starts with the initial news of the breakthrough in Oslo and ends with the signing of an agreement in Cairo which came to be known as "Oslo A" or "Oslo 1"" (Wolfsfeld 2002:58-61). He has divided his findings into five temporal areas of, first the "peace festival" when there was a lot of hope and euphoria for the peace process; second, the "terrorism" where there were terrorist attacks taking place; third, "talks"; fourth, "Hebron" where another massacre took place; and last "Cairo" (Wolfsfeld 2002: 59).

During the first period of what has been titled as the "peace festival", "thirty seven percent of the stories published in the two newspapers dealt with positive aspects of the peace process...only 16 percent of the stories provided pessimistic view" (Wolfsfeld 2002:60). The rest was mixed news or neutral news. When the terrorist

attacks took place, "an extremely high 59 percent of all the news stories were negative during this period and only 16 percent were positive" (Wolfsfeld 2002: 60). "The gap narrowed somewhat during the third period but negative stories still outnumbered positive ones" (Wolfsfeld 2002:60). The coverage in the Israeli media after a terrorist attack during the peace period was vast different from the Northern Ireland media. If in Northern Ireland, a terrorist attack meant that the media would clamour for an acceleration of the peace process to negate the violence and show humanhood of both communities as victims of terror, the Israeli media behaved completely differently. Hence while in Northern Ireland, a terrorist attack meant that the peace process should be accelerated, "in the Israeli case the natural inclination was to halt the process" (Wolfsfeld 2002: 171).

Wolfsfeld (2002:47) has identified two main major frames in which the reportage of the Israeli media can be categorised which he terms as the "security frame" and the "peace frame" (Wolfsfeld 2002:47). The government in power headed by Yitzhak Rabin was promoting the "peace frame" in the media "which emphasized the need for compromise with the Palestinians in order to end the conflict" (Wolfsfeld 2002:47). The "security frame" was being promoted by the right wing opposition to the peace process who constantly emphasized that Israel's security as being antithetical to any peace with the untrustworthy and suicide bomber Palestinians (Wolfsfeld 2002:47). The Israeli media was overwhelmingly promoting the "security frame" expect for the initial time during the "peace festival" where there was an initial euphoria and hope for the peace process. This negative "security frame" was dominant after any terrorist attack and actively promoted those opposing the peace process. According to Gadi Wolfsfeld (2002:50) the Israeli media could not understand that peace takes time.

> Those who expect quick result from such negotiations are inevitably disappointed. The need to provide daily reports about the negotiations only serves to exacerbate this problem: the constant repetition about a lack of progress provides increasing evidence of deadlock (Gadi Wolfsfeld 2002:51).

In their tabloid format, their main objective was to get sensational items of news that would give them more rating points and usually acts of violence sell better than acts of peace (Wolfsfeld 2002:53-54). "It is extremely difficult to find newsworthy events that "prove" the peace process is working. It is much easier to find events that "prove"

that the process has failed" (Wolfsfeld 2002:52). Hence they were functioning on purely commercial lines (Wolfsfeld 2002:54). With the increasing melodrama and short-sightedness of the reportage, "Israelis found themselves riding an emotional roller coaster as they went from the grandeur and splendour of the peace ceremonies to the sickening sights of carnage and blown-up-buses" (Wolfsfeld 2002:56).

Wolfsfeld's (2002:163) main contention based on the PMP (Politics-Media-Politics) Model is that one of the main reasons for the media behaving very differently in both these conflicts and peace processes lies within the nature of politics itself. The government of the day in Northern Ireland was able to muster a larger consensus among the political groups in support of the peace process which the Israeli government was unable to do so. "Good Friday Agreement received more support across the political spectrum than any previous attempt" (Wolfsfeld 2002:160). All the major political parties supported it including the one who were associated with the paramilitary groups like the 'Progressive Unionist Part, 'Sinn Fein' and 'Ulster Democratic Party'. The only groups opposed to it were the 'United Kingdom Unionist Party' and 'Democratic Unionist Party' (Wolfsfeld 2002:160). On the other hand, in Israel's case, the Oslo Accords did not have support from across the political spectrum. "Many of the opponents of the Oslo peace process argued that the Rabin government had never been given a mandate to recognize the PLO and to give up territories" and that was not the mandate on which they had won the elections and hence did not have legitimacy to go ahead with such a deal with the Palestinians (Wolfsfeld 2002:160).

Since the overall political atmosphere is Israel, based upon the number of political parties supporting the process, was antithetical to the peace process, the media houses would have to go against the tide to publish reports in favour of the peace process.[6] Wolfsfeld (2002:72) has quoted one journalists summing this up as "The journalists, including those in the middle politically, are influenced by the atmosphere....they reflect the general political mood, they can't detach themselves from it." This was not

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[6] In fact after one of the terrorist attacks, the President of Israel at that time, Mr. Ezer Weizman gave out a statement saying "maybe Arafat is not the right partner" (Wolfsfeld 2002:68). This shows the poor degree of political consensus that the Rabin government was able to whip up in form of support for the peace process. This also shows that the government of the day had no control over the political rhetoric doing the rounds, which were picked up by the media regarding the peace process.

the case in Northern Ireland, as proponents of the peace process outnumbered the opponents.

> In the past journalists in Northern Ireland were much more cautious, because any implicit support for the peace process would bring charges of bias or even disloyalty. The more polarized a society, the more likely journalists are to come under attack. When all of the major political forces are pointing in the same general direction, it makes it easier for journalists to frame news stories accordingly (Gadi Wolfsfeld 2002: 162).

Hence the journalist in Northern Ireland did not have to go against the tide to the current political dispensation.[7] This was also the conclusion that Daniel Hallin (1984) had reached to regarding the main reason why the reportage in the mainstream United States media changed after the Tet Offensive of 1968 during the Vietnam War. According to Hallin (1984) the reportage changed as the political opposition against the war became stronger among the other political parties/organisations and hence the media felt at ease in reporting the oppositions stance. Hence as the political environment changes towards peace, journalists also feel comfortable using pro-peace frames to report the events. Wolfsfeld stretches this argument further by saying that once the political environment impacts the frames of the media, this is in turn impacts politics plus the political process and a loop is formed (Wolfsfeld 2002: 163). Hence the terminology 'politics-media-politics' model is apt.

Media Impact: Agenda Setting, Priming and Framing

When one is talking about the role of media in society, it becomes necessary to be equipped with the terminologies that define the ways in the media can have its impact on public opinion, political process and the society in general. The most repeated terms are, agenda setting, priming and framing. Before defining them, one needs to understand two theories that studied the impact of mass media on the public. First is the *hypodermic needle theory*, also known as the *magic bullet theory* belonging to the 1920s and 1930s, which proposed that the impact of mass media on people worked in

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[7] Gadi Wolfsfeld (2002:161) has, based on certain parameters calculated the percentage of "elite and public consensus surrounding the peace processes in Israel and Northern Ireland." First, based on the "percentage of legislative members supporting agreements" Israel has 51-55% and Northern Ireland has 75%. Second, based on the percentage of support for Agreement among Public (calculated on the basis of referendum results conducted in Northern Ireland and monthly seventeen monthly polls conducted in the case of Israel by Tel Aviv University) , Israel got a 32-44 % and Northern Ireland got a 56-73% (Gadi Wolfsfeld 2002:161).

a uni-dimensional manner with the passive audience receiving the message in toto, thereby influencing their lenses of viewing the world. There was an overhauling of this theory by the *users and gratification theory* in the 1950s which did not treat the audience as passive but as active members who played a role in choosing what media to use and what to reject according to their preferences and pre-disposed biases (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007:10). The main argument was that media effect were complicated in nature and dependent on "people's homogenous networks and their selective informational diets, which reinforced existing attitudes[8] rather than change them" (Scheufele and Tewkbury 2007:10). Following this, the discourse on media effects saw the rise of agenda setting during the 1970s which was followed by the research on priming and framing during the 1980s and 1990s.

The agenda setting model to understand media effects is based on the research by McCombs and Shaw published in 1972 on the media's role in the 1968 United States presidential elections (McCombs and Reynolds 2008:2). Agenda setting basically tries to establish a relation between issues that the mass media emphasises and highlights and the amount of importance the public attaches to these events. The relationship is deemed to be directly proportional. Hence the "ability to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda has come to be called the agenda setting role of the news media" (McCombs and Reynolds 2008:1). According to Bernard Cohen (1963), this was the media's influence in directing people minds what to think about, thereby acting as an initiator of public debate in certain issues and wilfully neglecting others issues (McCombs and Reynolds 2008:1). Walter Lippman has been considered as the father of agenda setting model, though he himself never used the terminology. In a book titled "Public Opinion" published in 1922, he wrote,

> The news media, our windows to the vast world beyond our direct experience, determine our cognitive maps of the world. Public Opinion, argued Lippmann, responds not to the environment, but to the pseudoenvironment constructed by the news media (Lippmann 1922 as given in McCombs and Reynolds 2008:2).

Priming is an extension of agenda setting. Priming has been defined as "the link between agenda-setting effects and the subsequent expression of opinion about public

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[8] This phenomenon of individuals being more receptive to information which suit their cultural and ideological preferences and become averse to diverse information is termed as "echo chambers" in contemporary discourse for online media. Another similar term would be "confirmation bias".

figures or other objects" (McCombs and Reynolds 2008:14). Iyengar and Kinder (1987:63 as given in Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007:11) have defined priming as "changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations". Basically, priming means setting certain standards for public figures to conduct their professional services, and once those standards are set, then to analyse to what extent have public figures/governments/bodies matched up to those standards. "Priming occurs when news content suggests to news audiences that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for evaluating the performance of leaders and governments" (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007:11). By focusing on certain issues and negating others, news media influence the considerations of the public on what standards they should judge their political candidates or other issues.

Framing has been characterised as second level effects by McCombs and Reynolds (2008). It refers to the linkage between "how an issue is characterized in news reports" and "how it is understood by audiences" influencing their perception of the news event (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007:11). If agenda setting and priming influence the audience in terms of what issue to think about, framing influences the audience in terms of how to think about that issue (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007:14). Agenda setting and priming bring to salience certain news items in front of the audience, there making it more accessible and bringing more public attention to it. Framing on the other hand has a role in play in how that particular news item was presented to the audience which made them perceive it in a certain manner. Hence according to Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007:15) it is a difference between accessibility and applicability effects.

Framing may seem give a negative notion of journalism as it tampers with the objective and fair reporting standards. However, framing is, most of the times an important tool for journalists to present complicated/complex issues in a way that makes it simple for the audience to understand. Hence, journalists do not always behave like spin doctors who intentionally want to give only one side of the picture and deceive the public (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007:12). But more often or not, for journalists who function under the rationale of commercial sale of news and TRPs (television rating points), framing is used most of the times to sensationalise the issue in order to increase the viewership. Most of the times, the news is presented in

binaries, with a clear villain and a hero, thereby making the rhetoric more hateful, especially in conflict situation. The matters get worse with stereotyping of certain ethnicities, racial groups, gender groups, religious groups and others where the culture and previous discourse presents a clear enemy/outsider/other.

What is mediatization?

The available literature as mentioned above on the models of media and politics leads to the introduction of a new concept into the discourse termed as 'mediatization'. The term "mediatization" is a relatively new term that has been added to this discourse on the role of the media on the society. It has been defined as a "meta-process" which has been explained to refer to "a social change process in which media have become increasingly influential in and deeply integrated into different spheres of society" (Asp, 1986; Stromback, 2008 as given in Esser and Stromback 2014:4). They argue that the process of mediatization is related to "media influence" in a structural manner instead of "media effects" which is contextual (Esser and Stromback 2014:10). Hence media effect theories like agenda setting, framing and priming for example, must be differentiated from the "larger form of media influence that mediatization involves" (Esser and Stromback 2014:10). In other words mediatization is a meta-process at a structural level of influence that includes media effects (Schulz 2004 in Esser and Stromback 2014:11).

Esser and Stromback (2014: 6) have defined "mediatization of politics" as "a long term process through which the importance of the media and their spill-over effects on political processes, institutions, organization and actors have increased". They have identified four important dimensions of this process which are first, "media constitute the most important source of information about politics and society"; second, "media have become independent from other political and social institutions"; third, "degree to which the media content and the coverage on politics and current affairs is guided by media logic or political logic"[9]; and last, "the extent to which

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[9] The differentiation between "media logic" and "political logic" is important as they highlight the degree of mediatization. The fundamental idea is that "media and politics constitute two different institutional systems that serve different purposes and that each has its own set of actors, issues and processes, as well as needs and interests" (Esser and Stromback 2014:14). Hence both have their separate standards of behaviour and functioning. Political logic is shaped by three dimensions of

political institutions, organizations and actors are guided by media logic or political logic". Esser and Stromback (2014:7) point out that the degree of mediatization along the various dimensions might vary depending upon the context. They also point out in the context of "mediatization of politics", the most important media under consideration would be "news media" (Esser and Stromback 2014:11).Thus, one can say that the term mediatization refers to a structural phenomenon by being all pervasive in human life. It has increasingly assumed the dimension of processes like socialization and politicization.

The mediatization of diplomacy can only be deliberated about in the context of modern diplomacy[10]. Since the institution of diplomacy is as old as civilization, its evolution has been an ever growing process. Diplomacy has evolved with evolving changes in the socio-eco-political-technological dimensions. One of the major changes in the practice and theory of diplomacy came in the form of the differentiation between old/secretive and new/transparent diplomacy. A call for this form of "Old Diplomacy' to change towards a progressive form of 'New Diplomacy' was famously made by President Wilson after the end of the First World War. He declared "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view" (Library of Congress website). This call was made because there was a view that one of the major reasons for the First World War had been identified as 'old diplomacy' based upon the principle of military alliances and the principle of 'balance of power' (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 95; Gilbert 2004: 255).

"polity" (institutional structure and rules guiding the political processes), "policy" (definition of problems and formulation of solutions on the basis of a collective deliberative process) and "politics" (relates to the act of garnering support for one's candidate or political party/ideology) (Esser and Stromback 2014:15). Media logic on the other hand is constitutive of three sub-concepts of "professionalism" (independence of journalism as an autonomous profession with its own standards deciding news worthiness), "commercialism" (with profit for the investors being one of the main motives) and "media technology" (use of media technology to suit the specific media format) (Esser and Stromback 2014:18).

[10] Modern diplomacy can be said to have begun by the end of the 17th century. With the diplomatic practices of Italian city-states gradually spread in an uneven way to the rest of the European continent, by the end of the seventeenth century, it became possible to speak of a European complete diplomatic system (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995:35).

With Wilson's call towards news diplomacy, the revolution in information and communications technology along with forces of globalisation further accelerated certain changes in the actors, issues and processes of diplomacy. These changes have been analysed by scholars of diplomacy in a multitude of ways, some of which are:-

Club to Network Model

One of the myriad conceptual tools in which this change in diplomacy has been explained has been the shift from "Club Model" to "Network Model" (Jorge Heine 2013:54). According to Heine (2013:55) this change in the way diplomacy is practiced has been brought about by the processes of globalisation, of which the revolution in information and communications technology is a huge part. The forces of globalisation has placed the institution of the state under increasing pressure from factors both at the international level (intergovernmental institutions, international organisations) and from domestic level (sub-state level institutions and civil society activism). With this challenge to the state's sovereignty, diplomacy has been forced to move from the realm of a "club model" to a "network model" (Heine 2013:67).

The "Club Model" of diplomacy refers to traditional/classical or cabinet approach where diplomats restrict themselves to other diplomats or government officials. Where "diplomats meet only with government officials, among themselves, and with the odd businessman or woman, and give an interview or speech here and there" (Heine 2013: 60). The main diplomatic actor in this case is the State. With the increasing pressure on the state both from above and below, this mode of diplomacy had to evolve to a "network model" which is "based on a much more extensive set of contacts at home and abroad, built around critical 'issue areas' pertinent to the mission." (Heine 2013:67). Hence the negotiation and representation moves from an exclusive club to a broader range of actors focusing on a broader range of issues. Such an inclusive, non-hierarchical "network model" is a much required change for the community of diplomats to remain relevant in the twenty first century. This is because, "a traditional diplomatic perspective is insufficient in a world that is becoming increasingly networked" (Cooper, Heine and Thakur 2013:24). Such a networked approach makes public diplomacy a foundational element of diplomacy itself, instead of treating it as an adjunct to the main traditional form of diplomacy.

Rapid Reaction Diplomacy

Not only have the number of actors and issues increased in diplomacy with its change from club to network model, but with the increase in the speed of communications, the pace of diplomacy has also become faster. Diplomatic communication is no longer dependent on the diplomatic bag/pouch. With the communications and news information being altered by the likes of telegraph, radio, television, internet and now twitter, what has fundamentally been altered is the speed with which diplomacy is conducted (Seib Philip 2012:2). Though governments have their own sources and ways of gathering information, most often they do get news from all these non-official sources much faster. Hence it would not be politically feasible if the government did not calibrate a quick response to important events taking place at home and abroad (Seib 2012:3). The thrust to act fast because of the news media and the varied sources of information in the public domain on various important issues may make the government take a wrong policy decision. The choice is between the devil and the deep blue sea, when responding quickly may lead to a wrong policy choice and responding slowly may mean risking an image that the government is not in control or a weak government (Gilboa 2007: 14; Grant Richard 2004:9). This is why James F. Hoge Jr (1994:136) has written that "these capabilities of modern media to be immediate, sensational and pervasive are unsettling the conduct of foreign affairs".

One of the first examples of radio influencing public opinion on a foreign policy issue came about with Edward R Murrow's reportage for the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). Murrow, through his radio broadcasts from London changed the way the American Public thought about the Second World War, thereby galvanising the public's support for American intervention in the war (Seib 2012:5). Broadcasting live from the streets of London during the war, he made the war come alive in American homes with the sound of explosions and sirens playing at the background of his voice. Seib (2012:77) writes that Prime Minister Churchill had personally approved of Murrow's request to broadcast live as he was hoping that his dramatic reporting would play a role in helping break down America's isolationist policy. The Gallup survey taken in May 1941 showed that 77 percent of the people supported that America should help Britain in the war even if that would mean being drawn into the conflict itself (Seib Philip 2012:78). Hence when the Pearl Harbour happened, the American public was fully ready for the intervention, shedding years of isolationist

attitude.[11] From the Second World War, the Vietnam War to the Iraq War, the role of the media seems to have magnified.

Media Diplomacy and Media-Brokered Diplomacy

For purposes of promoting systematic study regarding the role of the media in the domain of international negotiations, Eytan Gilboa as identified three conceptual models. These are, first, public diplomacy; second, media diplomacy and last, media-broker diplomacy (Gilboa 2007:4). Public Diplomacy has been defined as when actors make use of the media to influence the public in countries abroad. Media Diplomacy takes place when "officials use the media to communicate with actors and to promote conflict resolution"; and Media Brokered diplomacy refers to negotiations "where journalists temporarily assume the role of diplomats and serve as mediators in international negotiations." (Gilboa 2007: 4). Gilboa's main contribution lies in the third model of media-brokered diplomacy.

Some examples of media-diplomacy were the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Known as the Operation Desert Storm (1991) which was to prevent the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq by a coalition of countries led by the United States was televised live by the Cable News Network (CNN). As America's first 24/7 news channel, it played an important role of a messenger during the war, when all official communicating systems broke down (Gilboa 2007: 11; Seib Philip 2012:83). According to Philip Seib (2012: 84), this was the primary reason why Saddam Hussein allowed the CNN to stay back in Iraq as he knew that the fastest way to reach George Bush was through CNN. Moreover the final ultimatum to Saddam Hussein by the United States was given through the CNN instead of an official channel (Gilboa 2007:11). The press also played an important role of a messenger during the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979, when the United States government communicated with the terrorists only through the press (Gilboa 2007:11). According to Gilboa (2007:12) Henry Kissinger was "the inventor of modern media diplomacy" as he made excellent use of his relations with the media to influence the outcome of his shuttle diplomacy between the Israeli's and Arabs after the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973. Onboard with him on the plane during

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[11] Corollarily the first academic centre on public diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University, United States of America) is named after Murrow as "The Edward R Murrow Centre for Public Diplomacy" Which has now been changed to the "The Edward R Murrow Centre for a Digital World" (https://sites.tufts.edu/murrowcenter/about/).

the many travels required of shuttle diplomacy were the top journalists of like "Marvin Kalb of CBS, Ted Koppel of ABC and Richard Valeriani of NBC" of the United States. "He gave them back background reports, information and leaks in an effort to affect the negotiations and his mediation effort" (Gilboa 2007:12)[12].

The concept of Media-Brokered Diplomacy, where media personnel play an important role as the main negotiators, has been explicitly categorized separately by Gilboa (2007:16). This deems to have taken place when journalists act independently to broker an agreement between two or more parties. "It is possible and useful to view journalists acting independently as 'third parties', pursuing 'track two diplomacy' particularly in 'pre-negotiation stages'" (Gilboa 2007:16). Examples include, first, the arrangement of the visit of the first Arab leader to Israel in 1977 with Anwar Sadat visiting Israel. This arrangement was initiated by the famous journalists of CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) News, Walter Cronkite (Gilboa 2007:16). Second, Ted Koppel, anchoring the show titled *Nightline* on ABC (American Broadcasting Company) News also played an instrumental role in bringing together on stage for the first time, historically antagonistic parties, like representatives of the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1988 (Gilboa 2007:18). Third, during the Cuban Missile Crisis between the United States and the USSR (United of Soviet Socialist Republics) in 1962, John Scali, the then reporter from ABC News played an important role as an intermediary (Gilboa 2007: 20). These three journalists taken together played an important role in the conflicts that they were reporting either consciously or being taken in as a mediator by either of the parties. "The consequences of these various mediation efforts were significant and were viewed by both the participants and observers as a major contribution to the beginning of official negotiations" (Gilboa 2007:21).

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[12] It needs to be underlined that Gilboa's category of "media diplomacy" can be understood in two different manners. One variant is the open media diplomacy where the media is being used by the officials in a transparent manner in order to propagate its narrative. Gilboa seems to only hint at such an open variant of media diplomacy, especially when he writes "media diplomacy includes various uses of the media by officials and mediators to promote negotiation and conflict resolution" (Gilboa 2007: 15). However, there is another strand of secret media diplomacy which Gilboa does not explicitly mention or categorize in this manner. This comes about when he mentions how Henry Kissinger influenced the media to suit his conflict resolution objectives (Gilboa 2007:12). The author argues the latter variant of Gilboa's media diplomacy is more akin to the Manufacturing Consent Model where media is being used to influence issues in a surreptitious manner.

Public Diplomacy

The rise of the importance of the theory and practice of public diplomacy in international relations is linked to the rise of three inter-related concepts/practices in international politics (Gilboa Etyan 2008:56). These are, first, revolution in "politics" where increasing number of countries started becoming democratic countries, especially in Asia and Africa, with the phase of decolonisation during the 1960s. This meant that people could now influence their governments to change their foreign policies towards certain countries. Public opinion became a factor to be considered in foreign affairs. Second, the revolution in the overarching discourse on "international relations" where there was a rise in non-realist dimensions of power, like soft power. Finally, the revolution in "mass communications" making the world a 'global village' with increasing linkages among the individuals situated in all corners of the world, through the power of the digital world (Gilboa 2008:56).

Public Diplomacy has to be understood in the context of traditional diplomacy or government to government diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy is understood as the relations between various levels of government of one country with that of the government of another country. In this context, public diplomacy is the conscious effort made by the government of a country to establish communication directly with the public of a foreign country (Tuch 1990:3; Gilboa 2007:58). Traditional diplomacy is more prone to being conducted behind closed doors whereas public diplomacy, by virtue of involving the reach to the largest audience has to be conducted openly. This entails the maximum use of mass media and communications technology.

There are three caveats to this understanding of public diplomacy. First, is the nature of the actor. Can non-state actors conduct public diplomacy? Many scholars, especially operating out of the developed western countries support the idea that non-state actors can and do conduct public diplomacy. For example, Bennon Signitzer and Timothy Coombs (1992: 138) brought in the role of the private institutions, individuals and groups in public diplomacy. This role of non-state actors has been referred to as P2P (Public to public), in contrast to G2P (Government to Public) by Nancy Snow (2009:6). However, there is more credence to establishing the role of the state as a fundamental one for all diplomacy, including public diplomacy. The state

might delegate its public diplomacy tasks to non-state actors, but such initiatives by non-state actors without the backing of the state cannot be called public diplomacy.

The second caveat is the dimension of what is known as, internal public diplomacy. Although by definition, the 'public' in public diplomacy is supposed to be foreign public. But states make an effort to also focus on the internal domestic public for purposes of PD. This is because, it times of the information and communications revolution, it was understood that every citizen of the country is a citizen ambassador on her/his own and represents the country. "It is commonly known that information directed at a domestic audience often reaches foreign public, or the other way round..." (Mellisen 2005: 13). This phenomenon of internal public diplomacy was termed as 'public affairs' in the context of the United States during the era of Cold War. Hence public diplomacy is a two faced Janus, facing both inwards and outwards.

The third caveat is the difference between 'old' and 'new public diplomacy'. New Public Diplomacy (NPD) has been defined as the practice of PD processes using the tools provided by new media/digital media, which are basically the online resources. New Public Diplomacy has also been interpreted to mean "the increased priority of public diplomacy in the national diplomatic hierarchy" (Fitzpatrick 2007:194). NPD is PD suited to a changed context of the ICT revolution (Mellisen 2005:8). One of the most important features of NPD is its dynamic nature that allows for an interactive relationship between the receiver and supplier of various PD initiatives. This marks a fundamental shift in PD processes as before the use of new media, PD functioned in the form of a monologue[13]. The use of digital media allows space for a dialogue among the participants (Fitzpatrick 2007:194; Mellisen 2005:8).

One of the most important objectives of undertaking Public Diplomacy activities for any country is to increase its soft power potential. In fact the rise of the concept of

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[13] G. Cowan and A. Arsenault (2008:10) have identified there processes of public diplomacy, which are, monologue, dialogue and collaboration. Monologue refers to one way communication like press releases, speeches, movies and others; Dialogue refers to a two- way communication like conferences, formal summits, interactive web sites and others; Collaboration refers to a joint venture with cross national participation like producing a play after a joint theatre workshop (Cowan and Arsenault 2008:10-21). In terms of building long term relationships, collaborative ventures have the maximum impact. They are the epitome of people to people (P2P) public diplomacy building strong bonds among individual and groups across countries.

public diplomacy is linked to the rise of the concept of soft power in the theory and practice of international relations (Mellisen 2005:6). The concept of soft power was propounded by Joseph Nye during the 1990s and it became popular through his book "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics" published in 2004. If power is defined as the ability of 'x' to make 'y' do what it wants. Then soft power is defined by Nye as the ability of 'x' to make 'y' do what it wants through persuasion and attraction (Nye 2008:94). This type of power neither uses sticks (military tactics/economic sanctions) nor carrots (inducements) in order to achieve to success (Nye 2008: 94). It does so by attracting the people of a foreign land towards its own countries 'cultures', 'values' and 'norms', which are considered as resources of public diplomacy (Nye 2008:96). "Soft power is a form of power that has its source in ideas rather than material bases" (J. B. Mattern 2005: 590).

Propagating a positive image of one's country and building a positive perception among the people of the world started being considered as an important dimension of power in international politics. This was a shift in the discourse of international relations which has been majorly dominated by the realist and neo-realist paradigms focusing only on hard power, consisting of military capability and economic might (Gallarotti 2011: 9). An opposition to merely naked show of hard power was symbolising a move from *realpolitik* to *noopolitik* (Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 2009: 355).

Digital Diplomacy

In contemporary times the cyberspace is replete with an information overload and it is said that the story with the most convincing narrative takes precedence over others in the public's mind (Copeland Daryl 2013:453). Governments no longer hold a primary position on the nature and reach of information. Hence, diplomats who were the primary sources of information from foreign countries are increasingly losing their fundamental advantage in this sphere. "While intelligence gathering and diplomacy may enjoy advantaged positions from time to time, the relative difference between the capabilities of open-source information-such as real time news gathering-on the one hand, and those of intelligence and diplomatic channels on the other is diminishing" (Livingston Steven 2002:111). "The mass media, global television in particular, have become a central source of information about world affairs" (Gilboa 2007: 2). What in

turn gets affected is the government's control over the narrative on certain important foreign policy issues (Livingston Steven 2002:111). "Eban has argued that 'nothing has done more to revolutionize the diplomatic craft than the current vogue of persistent media attention...[and] there is no way of putting the clock back to an era in which negotiations were sheltered from domestic constituencies'" (Abba Evan 1983 as given in Gilboa 2007:2).

Richard Grant (2004), a diplomat from New Zealand has written that the information and communications (ICT) revolution is bringing about a "democratisation of diplomacy" which is a part of his report title for the Oxford Internet Institute. His main argument is that the internet is becoming the main source of expansive reach of information making people not only aware of various foreign issues but encouraging them to have their own judgements (Grant Richard 2004:8).

> Foreign policy advisors, who have been used to being more reticent in the conduct of their business, are being forced more and more into the public domain. [This] increases the amount of scrutiny to which the diplomat is subject. That scrutiny comes now from more quarters: the media; the public; the non-government organisation; and, of course from other governments and societies as well (Grant Richard 2004:12).

Hence the "internet can provide a vehicle of policy debate", thereby breaking the exclusivity of the government on diplomatic issues (Grant 2004:8-11).

Though on absolute terms, the government of the day can block access to digital news for the public by shutting down en masse access to the internet. This has been followed by autocratic regimes in order to quell pro-democratic protests movements, like in Iran, China and countries in West Asia/Middle East. These are extreme cases, but in normal times, scholars have argued that global media and communications have implicated a shift in power in terms of data and information from the government to the people (Livingston 2002:112). "The press briefing, the typical venue for official control of news content, is less important in an environment dominated by the priority of love pictures" (Livingston 2002:114). Ironically, this very information overload would "produce an effect similar to no information at all" (Livingston 2002:121). Plus, "the speed of delivery is not matched by the reliability of content" (Seib Philip

2012:67) and "plenty of information, arriving very quickly, does not itself guarantee authenticity" (Grant Richard 2004:14). In such a situation, the role of diplomats may become more relevant than irrelevant. This is because, they would go on to play the crucial role of not only highlighting fact from fiction, but also presenting an informed and credible analysis from the tumultuous amount of data at disposal (Potter Evan H 2002:12). "Judgement of the relevance and the accuracy of what we see and what we hear is a quality that diplomacy needs even more today than in the past" (Grant Richard 2004:14).

With foreign affairs departments of many countries adapting to the cyberspace form of new diplomacy by building up their virtual online communities through official social media accounts and online campaigns, "twiplomacy" seems to have become an epitome of this movement (Copeland Daryl 2013:457). Canada was one of the first countries to use the tools provided by new media to advance its foreign policy objectives with the setting up of the *Canadian International Information Strategy* (CIIS) in 1996 (Potter Evan H 2002:193). Its objective would be to present a favourable view of Canada abroad thereby attracting tourists, students and business (Potter Evan H 2002:194). The practice of using virtual diplomacy for purposes of nation branding spread from the developed countries to the developing countries. Presently the foreign ministries of most of the countries, including India have a vibrant online presence with not only the various Indian embassies having their own online accounts but the current foreign minister, Sushma Swaraj herself reaching out actively to people/groups personally through her twitter account. The current President of the United States, Donald Trump has also been an active user and known to send out tweets regarding his official visits with the other heads of the states and even announce important updates regarding ongoing negotiations. For example, during the negotiations between Trump and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un in 2018, Trump tweeted, "North Korea has announced that they will dismantle Nuclear Test Site this month, ahead of the big Summit Meeting on June 12th. Thank you, a very smart and gracious gesture!" on 13th May, 2018 (Trump 2018). Many leaders have an active online presence in contemporary times which is used to connect on foreign policy issues with both other leaders and the people directly. In fact, there are even non-profit organisations that help smaller countries with marketing their online

presence. One of these organisations is named the DiploFoundation[14], which is based in Malta, also having offices in Belgrade and Geneva. It recently received a consultative status with UNESCO (United Nations Economic and Social Council).

The digitisation of international communications and negotiations has brought relatively greater transparency by opening up of the black box of foreign policy for the public. However, the digitisation also threatens the cahoots of traditional secret diplomacy which governments involve in and do not want to make it public. One of the biggest examples of such breach of privacy came about with WikiLeaks, a non-profit organisation established in 2006 by Julian Assange.[15] The WikiLeaks published "hundreds and thousands of US-origin diplomatic cables between November 2010 and September 2011" (Copeland Daryl 2013:461). These cables were formed by 274 United States diplomatic missions abroad in between December 1966 and February 2010 (Copeland Daryl 2013:461). These leaks commonly known as "Cablegate" brought forward stories ranging from trivial issues to very serious classified documents. Such a grand scale revelation threatened the sanctity and privacy of the diplomats' relations with her/his sources and other official communications. Hence resulting in "rebounding secrecy" where more actions will be taken to maintain secrecy like going off paper, sharing less information and others. This would in turn "diminish transparency, diminish accountability, and impoverish the historical record" (Copeland Daryl 2013:462). However, the positive feature of such a grand scale diplomatic communications leakage has been to force governments to be "more honest, consistent, and transparent" (Copeland Daryl 2013:462). It also served to raise the value of the diplomatic profession in the eyes of the American public. After the leaks, many politicians, journalists and scholars commented that they were proud of the work that American diplomats were conducting on the ground all over the world (Hunt Edward 2019:72).

Mediatization of Diplomacy

Following from the four dimensions of "mediatization of politics" as provided by Esser and Stromback (2014:7), James Pamment in an article titled "The Mediatization of Diplomacy" has looked at how 'mediatization' has played a role in "shifting the

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[14] https://www.diplomacy.edu/
[15] https://wikileaks.org/

ontological and epistemological conditions for conducting diplomacy". (Pamment 2014: 257).He defines 'mediatization' as "the ways in which communication technologies have become so integrated into everyday activities that our knowledge and experience of the world is significantly altered, often in ways that appear banal and taken for granted." (Pamment 2014: 253).

Pamment locates the impact of 'mediatization' on diplomatic identities at three levels, first, "...the mass media in a particular setting constitute the most important source of information and channel of communication between the citizenry and political institutions and actor" ["proliferating of mediating channels" (Pamment 2014: 262)]; second, "the semiotic-linguistic function explores the interpretive rules governing media channels" ["the proliferation of codes and norms" (Pamment 2014: 267) based on the logic of the media] and last, "media as a political-environment, in which its institutions constitute and pervade social relations." (Pamment 2014: 261).

The underlying assumption of the first dimension of 'mediatization of diplomacy' that Pamment (2014) has enumerated is that mass media has become a very important source of information and there is a creation of intensely mediated environment with numerous communicating passages leading to more number of interested individuals in a particular issue. This does not signify the replacement of older forms of communication and attaining information, but a state in which all parallel systems co-exist. Hence "diplomatic actors draw upon the range if channels available to them in order to expand their reach, learn about others, and maintain relations with increasingly broad and diffuse networks" (Pamment 2014:263). This also has its impact on "diplomatic policy environments [which] are increasingly subjected to the intervention of all kinds of actors" (Pamment 2014:257) where "policy positions and critiques may be produced and reproduced by anybody with an interest" (Pamment 2014:264). This leads to the formation of a "diplomatic public sphere in which intensified diplomatic and pseudo-diplomatic representation entangles a tenuously structured public opinion with the debates conducted among the more influential and legitimate players" (Pamment 2014:265). In such an environment, the diplomacy's role in terms of setting the terms of the debate (agenda setting) becomes important. "The role of the diplomat as a 'stabilizer' of identities, bringing order and coherence to policy frameworks, is perhaps more urgent in the light of mediatization than at any previous time" (Pamment 2014:267).

The second dimension refers to the proliferation of codes and norms. This refers to how based upon the changed mediatized environment, diplomats have to structure their messages according to not only the audience but also the nature of the mediating channel (Pamment 2014:267-270). For example, diplomats in contemporary times not only have to keep themselves abreast with traditional diplomatic channels but also socialize themselves with electronic and social media standards of behaviour, or what is known as 'netiquette'. The same message has to be given not only in print but also in an audio-visual manner and through a twitter account. Hence based upon the medium, positioned in McLuhan's famous adage "the medium is the message", the diplomatic actors have to tweak their messages accordingly. "Perhaps most importantly, this involves the skill of managing 'intertextuality' in order to pursue the same issue through multiple communication methods (Pamment 2014:268).

The third dimension relates to the overall political-economic environment being mediatized. Hence "diplomatic actors are increasingly forced to adapt to, internalize and reproduce a variety of mediated codes and norms, simply because they have come to appear normal or commonsense." (Pamment 2014:274). More importantly, the diplomatic community is pushed towards making "strategic interventions in the public sphere" in support of their objectives and interests (Pamment 2014:274). Such kinds of diplomatic practices blur the strict separation between diplomacy and public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, instead of being treated as a supplementary aspect of diplomacy, upgrades itself to being an important component of diplomacy per say. "We can no longer accept the view that public diplomacy is simply all of the external communicative activities that are attached to the diplomatic world, since these are-in an age of mediatization-necessarily part of diplomacy proper." (Pamment 2014:278-279).

Pamment (2014:276) having elaborated how mediatization has changed the ontological and epistemological conditions of diplomacy paradoxically states that

> Participation in a diplomatic public sphere implies monitoring, coalition-building and agenda-building in relatively transparent ways that may be conducive to allowing parties to reach agreements, but it cannot replace those functions. At best, this article would argue that such a platform can provide an enabling environment for work that is conducted behind closed doors. (Pamment 2014:276).

What also needs to be stated is that Pamment is writing the article in the context of the developed countries. His examples spans the use of instances from mainly Sweden, France, Russia, United States, Israel, Germany and other developed countries. What corollarily follows from this is the fact that these states have a higher degree of mediatization in terms of digital sphere. There is higher degree of internet penetration among the masses, with a higher degree of literacy levels. Hence, it seems highly likely that the mediatization that Pamment focuses on is relegated to the digital dimension depending upon the use of internet. It would be axiomatic to state that the same cannot be applied to developing countries with lower levels of literacy and digital penetration. Hence the 'diplomatic public sphere' is bound to be of a distorted version in the case of a developing country where various inequalities are at play among the masses. Here, in the domain of foreign policy, the media can become a potential tool for propaganda by various non-state interested bodies like corporations. As an illustration, the scientific and rational inputs of diplomatic community on the matters of trade, war and immigration can be checkmated by these bodies through the media by using emotive and reactionary narratives, which can become an effective political subject for securing domestic electoral gains.

Whether a developing country or a developed country, what is true is that with the ongoing revolution in the communications systems, brining about the revolution news media, the practice and theory of diplomacy has undergone various changes. New practices have not completely replaced old practices and there is a potpourri of old and new practices. Various other scholars have analysed the various ways in which diplomacy has undergone changes.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined the theoretical dimensions of the existing discourse on the relationship between media and society. Such an exposition was an imperative to explicate where the institution of diplomacy can be placed in this domain. It went on to bring a focus to the various conceptual models/terminologies that have been used by scholars of diplomacy to highlight the various changes that the institution is undergoing due to associated changes of revolution in information and communications technology, globalisation and mediatization. Most importantly, it delineates the meaning of mediatization as an all encompassing category and also the

dynamics of mediatization of diplomacy. This chapter has been written from discourse that has been produced mainly from the developed world perspective. Unfortunately, this is true for most of the path breaking theoretical work in the discipline of International Relations. The various conceptual models and theories here have been propounded from a particular perspective of mostly the western world. The next two chapters focus specifically on the Indian context. The task is to analyse whether these particularistic theories can be equally applicable to the unique Indian context of Indian media and Indian diplomacy.

Chapter Three

Media Narratives in India-Pakistan Conflict: An Analysis of Kargil War and Surgical Strikes

This chapter deals with the print media narratives of India-Pakistan conflicts. The two illustrations that have been examined are the Kargil War of 1999 and the Surgical Strikes of 2016. For this purpose two Hindi newspapers and two English newspapers have been used in each case. For the Kargil War, the newspapers used are *The Times of India*, *Hindustan Times*, *Nav Bharat Times* and *Dainik Jagran*. For Surgical Strikes, the newspapers used are *The Times of India*, *The Hindu*, *Nav Bharat Times* and *Dainik Bhaskar*. Using the reports from these papers, the day to day developments of these two conflicts have been tracked. Most importantly, an effort has been made to analyse the frames that the media was using for reporting these conflicts. During a tense phase of conflict, were they using a war mongering frame or a peace mongering frame? For this, an in-depth analysis of the editorials and other articles has been undertaken. An exploration of the space given in the paper for opinions and views from different quarters has been done. These include not only the statements from the then government, but also the opposition parties, non-governmental civil society organisations and the general public. Articles on the role of the international community have also been covered. The articles written by former diplomats, defence experts and critical articles on the role of the media itself have been highlighted.

The Kargil War

Before the basic details of the Kargil War are stated, it is necessary to briefly outline the domestic political situation during the late 1990s and early 2000s as it captured the majority of the attention and space in the media and the public discourse, both influencing each other. The period from 1996 to 1999 was a very tumultuous period for India's democracy as no political party could gain a majority in the general elections from April/May 1996 till the general elections of September/October 1999. From 1996 to 1998, India saw a change of three Prime Ministers, H D Deve Gowda, I K Gujral and A B Vajpayee. After the general election held in February/March 1998, a government was formed by the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) under A B Vajpayee

which lasted for 13 months until AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazahgam) pulled out its support from the coalition. The then President invited the Congress Party under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi to form the government but she refused. This led to another general election in the month of September/October 1999. Hence the Kargil War was initiated by Pakistan at a very tumultuous time for Indian democracy when there was no stable government at the Centre and A. B. Vajpayee acted as the Caretaker Prime Minister.

The Kargil war lasted from May 1999 to July 1999 at Kargil in Jammu and Kashmir Line of Control (LOC) (Ray 2011:181). What the India government initially thought was infiltration by intruders turned out to be the members of the Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan and some recruits from religious military organisations (Navlakha Gautam 1999:1747; Raghavan Srinath 2010:29). The Indian Army launched 'Operation Vijay' successfully re-taking the recently occupied territories. By July, all captured areas were free from Pakistani clutches (Ray 2011:182).

Reportage in Dainik Jagran and *Nav Bharat Times*

The first report on the firing across the Line of Control at Kargil was published in the *Dainik Jagran* on May 10, 1999. It is titled "पाक गोलीबारी में भारतीय सेना का आयुद भंडार नष्ट". This reports states that firing from the Pakistani side across the border has led to the destruction of Indian Army's Ordnance Factory. Explosions were also taking place inside this factory. The constant firing and the explosions has led to the residents of Kargil town to vacate their area and move to safer areas. It also states that the firing has not led to any casualties. One of the spokespersons of the Defence Ministry stated that in response to the Pakistani firing, the Indian Army too has fired but to what effect is not known. Although the firing has stopped, but in the meantime, in Jammu and Kashmir, from last night to now 22 individuals have died due to terror attacks. This included 13 terrorists and 5 security personnel. There were also attempts to blow up a Police Thana by terrorists which was foiled, thereby arresting 7 insurgents. Also, two other terrorists surrendered. There were also other problems in Old Srinagar where a police constable named Sabzaar Ahmed was shot dead and in different incidents in the Poonch-Rajouri sector, four security personnel

and equal number of terrorists were killed. At the same time, there were reports of five terrorists being killed in Jammu (Dainik Jagran 1999a).

One can see that the report highlights many incidents of firing across the LOC and the violence caused by the terrorists inside Jammu and Kashmir in various sectors. All these stray incidents of violence have been categorised under one report on the first page of the newspaper. At this moment, neither the Indian government nor the media seems to have a clue regarding Pakistan's war intentions and actions. The tone of the report is very factual and it does not involve any kind of sensationalism in reporting the various incidents. On the same day (May 10) the paper has also reported how the Pakistani government have rejected the proposal for Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.

On May 14, the report is titled "सेना ने कारगिल में हेलीकाप्टर से घुसपेटियों को मार भगाया" and it is on the top right hand side of the first page. The subtitle to this report states "200 आतंकी व पाक सैनिक घरियो के भेष में आये थे".

Picture 1: "सेना ने कारगिल में हेलीकाप्टर से घुसपेटियों को मार भगाया", *Dainik Jagran*, 14 May, 1999

This report clearly outlines the role of the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI and the role of the Pakistani Army ("कारगिल की और में पाकिस्तानी खुफिया एजेंसी आई एस

आई द्वारा कश्मीर में बड़े पैमाने पर आतंक फ़ैलाने के लिए घरियो के भेष में भेजे गए करीब 200 विदेशी व पाकिस्तानी सैनिकों के घुसपैठ के प्रयास को सेना के हेलीकाप्टर ने विफल कर दिया"). It states that the firing by the Pakistani side on the LOC was to give a covering to these infiltrators and that this message has been verified by the informers of the secret services of the Army. It also states that the attempt by these agencies to spread terror in Kashmir by donning the appearance of shepherds was foiled by the Indian army using helicopters and Para Commandos. The numbers of infiltrators are cited to be around 200. The then Defence Minister George Fernandes has said that the Indian Army is ready for any kind of battle/war ("हर किसी मुकाबले के लिए पूरी तरह तैयार हैं") More importantly this report also states that as a result of the Indian action, the number of terrorists/infiltrators having got injured or run away has not been clearly known (Harbans Nagoke 1999a). Hence the title of this report, written by, Harbans Nagoke, is ambiguous as it portrays as if the Indian Army has been successful in pushing out/nullifying all the 200 infiltrators. Whereas when one reads the report, it states that the number of infiltrators nullified is not known. There is a level of uncertainty in the reportage which could be due to a lack of sources and confusion even in the official quarters as to the nature of events taking place.

There is no report on the infiltration on May 15 and 16, 1999 in the "Dainik Jagran". Most of the front page articles in the month of April and May have been taken up by the citizenship row of Sonia Gandhi and whether that made her eligible to take a post of Prime Minister of India. A lot of space has also been given to the reportage on the Cricket World Cup and the Jessica Lal murder case. On May 17, there is one article on the first page by Harbans Nagoke. It is titled "कारगिल के पहाड़ों में 350 घुसपेटियों की सेना ने घेराबंदी की". It states that 350 infiltrators have been put under siege and surrounded by the Indian Army foiling the attempt by Pakistani ISI to spread terror in Jammu and Kashmir. Hence in their frustration of failure, the Pakistani Army has continued its heavy firing across the border for the eighth day. It also states that according to military intelligence, these infiltrators under siege are facing a lack of resources being surrounded in such high altitude in the snow. According to Indian

Army Signal Corps, some of them are speaking in the Pashto language. The continuation of this report on page 12 also states that Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaz Aziz has given a statement that it condemns India's firing at Kargil without any provocation and that this could be called an incitement. Aziz also stated that such steps by the Indian Army are a clear move away from the principles of the Lahore Declaration[16] (Harbans Nagoke 1999b).

One can see that all the reports till now have stated that the Indian Army has been successful in chasing away, putting under siege these infiltrators. It is only on the report on May 19, that a report states that amidst the heavy Pak firing at the LOC, the Indian Army is continuing with its efforts to oust the valley of these infiltrators ("इस बीच भारतीय सेना पाक घुसपेटियों को मार भगाने के प्रयास में आज भी जुटी रही") (Dainik Jagran 1999b). On May 19 itself, on the first page the report is titled "सीमा पर तनाव बड़ा, पाक सेना को भारतीय हमले का मुंहतोड़ जवाब देने का निर्देश" meaning that tensions have been rising at the LOC and the Pakistani Army have been giving the orders to tackle the firing from the Indian side with whatever means appropriate. It seems like the newspaper reporting has finally awakened to and accepted the idea that a war, however limited that might be, is currently taking place at the borders between India and Pakistan (Dainik Jagran 1999e).

In the *Nav Bharat Times* there are multiple reports in the month of May and June that highlight the domestic political situation in Pakistan. Most of these articles emphasize the lack of democracy under the Nawaz Sharif regime and the increasing curb on civil and political rights and freedom of speech. One of such articles published on May 28

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[16] Signed on February 1999, the Lahore Declaration was one of the first treaties signed between India and Pakistan after both of them had tested their nuclear weapons in May 1998 thereby openly declaring that they were nuclear armed countries. It is a treaty that pledges peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes thereby upholding the Shimla Agreement and a shared vision of peace and prosperity for the region. It is a mutual nuclear control treaty where both agree to nuclear non-aggression and affirm principles of non-proliferation and universal nuclear disarmament. It was a historic treaty that played a major role in calming down tensions and animosity after both countries became nuclear (Ministry of External Affairs India, Lahore Declaration February, 1999) (https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999)

is titled "पाकिस्तान में अघोषित तानाशाही" (There is an undeclared dictatorship rule in Pakistan) written by Kuldeep Talwar (1999).

Picture 2: "पाकिस्तान में अघोषित तानाशाही", *Dainik Jagran*, 28 May 1999

Although Nawaz Sharif had promised that if voted to power, he would strengthen democracy but evidence suggests otherwise. First the Chief Justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court- Sajjad Ali Shah and then the Chief of the Army Staff- Jehnagir Karamat were removed from their posts. The article states that Sharif also ordered for the shutting down of thousands of non-governmental and social service organisations and increased restrictions on print media, thereby repressing these organisations. Moreover, freedom of speech and expression has always been an issue in Pakistan and the opposition parties are also subdued. The author goes on to argue that these are signs that a dictatorship regime is hiding behind the veil of a democracy (Talwar 1999).

The newspaper reports have been consistent in praising the Army and criticising any action on part of the government/opposition/public that hint at lowering the morale of the Indian Army. An article on May 24 on the ninth page is titled "थार की मारभूमि में पाक सैनिकों पर भारी पड़ रही हैं भारतीय सेना" (Dainik Jagran 1999f). It states that Indian Army is famous all around the world for its discipline, duty, heroism and willingness to serve the nation. This attitude of our Army does not change whether

they are serving at forty degrees celsius at the Thar Desert or at minus sixty degree celsius at the Siachen glacier. However the same cannot be stated for the Pakistani army, who are usually sleeping in their bunkers because of the heat at the Thar Desert (Dainik Jagran 1999f). The title of the editorial on the May 31 is "भारतीय सेना का शौर्य" (Bravery of the Indian Armed Forces) (Dainik Jagran 1999t).

Picture 3: "भारतीय सेना का शौर्य", *Dainik Jagran*, 31 May, 1999.

It states that we have to congratulate the Indian forces on how bravely they have been able to move towards accomplishing their task in the border. Our forces have sacrificed themselves for the country. Their sacrifice should not go in vain. The government should bear in mind that we should not start any dialogue with Pakistan until and unless each and every infiltrator has been ousted from our territory. Due to international pressure or diplomatic etiquette, we might have agreed to talk to the Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaz Aziz but this does not mean that we stop our forces from moving forward at the border. It also states that the Pakistani forces that have come under the garb of infiltrators should not be protected under any kind of internal law and they should not be allowed to return alive. Fifty years of history has shown us that trusting Pakistan is like hitting the axe on your own leg. Hence India should show no moderation and softness with them and our forces should be given a free hand at the border (Dainik Jagran 1999t).

There are continuous reports regarding the military developments in the Kargil sector and the overall security inside Jammu and Kashmir. On May 19, in an article titled "कारगिल में मात खाने के बाद जम्मू में खून-खराबा की ISI की मंशा", where it is stated that having failed to infiltrate the Ladakh sector, Pakistani ISI is trying to infiltrate the Jammu sector with an intention of bloodshed. After being heavily cornered in the border areas, the ISI led forces have now made Jammu sector their target. The Indian forces are well prepared to tackle this. According to some sources, our security forces have killed around 450 intruders in the Rajouri and Poonch sectors (Nagoke 1999c). On May 24, on the first page there is an article titled "उपग्रह से करगिल में 300 घुसपेटियों की मौजूदगी का पता चला". This article reports that in the midst of heavy firing at the border, the Indian forces are continuously trying to oust the infiltrators. However, based on satellite images it is known that there are more than 300 infiltrators are still present (Dainik Jagran 1999g). May 25 has an article titled "कारगिल में पाक गोलीबारी से युद्ध जैसे हालात" (It is like a war situation in Kargil) on the first page. The first line of this article by Harbans Nagoke states that the Indian Army is moving towards ousting the terrorists and Pak Army from the Kargil heights. The civilians have been shifted to safer locations (Nagoke 1999d).

On the May 27, on the first page, there are reports of the first air strikes in Kargil which has led to the death of 300 infiltrators. It states that many of those killed are Pakistanis. According to the Defence Ministry, only 160 infiltrators have been killed. The Navy and Air Force have been instructed to be fully prepared for any eventualities. Due to the air strikes by India, Pakistan has now demanded intervention by the United Nations ("पाकिस्तान की भारतीय हमले पर संयुक्त राष्ट्र से हस्तक्षेप की अपील"). Pakistan External Affairs Spokesperson has declared that India's fighter jets and helicopters dropped bombs not only attacking the infiltrators but also inside Pakistani territory (Dainik Jagran 1999j). On May 28, the headlines on the first page are "पाक ने मिग-27 मार गिराया, भारतीय वायुसेना उचित जवाब देगी". It states that due to the downing of Indian fighter plane by Pakistani missiles, tension has increased on the border. India has given out a statement that says that Pakistan will be

responsible for the deteriorating situation at the border. Also, due to engine failure, another of India's planes crashed leading to the death of one pilot while the other one was captured by Pakistan. Pakistan has claimed that the debris of the plane landed on its side (Harbans Nagoke 1999e).

On May 28, there is also a report which states that PM Vajpayee had a meeting with the then President K.R. Narayanan ("अटल ने राष्ट्रपति से मुलाक़ात की- 'ऑपरेशन विजय' और तेज होगी"). The PM met the President along with the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force to make him aware of the state of the matter. After the downing of the Indian fighter jet by Pakistan, India is fastening up the implementation of 'Operation Vijay' (Dainik Jagran 1999l). On the other hand, Pakistan gave a statement that the captured Indian pilot (Kambampati Nachiketa Rao) will be kept as a prisoner of war. The body of the other dead pilot (Ajay Ahuja) would be returned to India.

Picture 4: "पाक ने बंधक पायलट नचिकेता को टेलीविज़न पर दिखाया", *Dainik Jagran*, 29 May 1999.

Major General Anis Bajwa of Pakistan has declared that though both countries have not declared a war, but Indian fighter planes crossing the border is a call for war. ("पकडे गए पायलट को बतौर युद्ध बंदी रखा जायेगा: पाक") (Dainik Jagran 1999m).

On May 29, on the first page it is reported that Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif has said that the infiltrators are actually Kashmiri freedom fighters. He also said that India's

barbaric action against them is testing the patience of Pakistan ("नवाज़ से घुसपेटियों को 'कश्मीरी स्वतंत्रता सैनानी' बताया") (Dainik Jagran 1999n).

On June 4, the headlines states that "घुसपेटियों की सुरक्षित वापसी का सवाल ही नहीं उठता: केंद्र". In response to George Fernandes' statement that the infiltrators will be given a safe passage, the Spokesperson of the MEA clarified that there is absolutely no question of allowing a safe passage to the infiltrators. Fernandes himself had to make a clarification regarding the same. He also had to state that he has not given the ISI a clean chit in the Kargil fiasco (Dainik Jagran 1999y). The reports on the same day also state that India had achieved a diplomatic victory with Pakistan agreeing to release Flight Lieutenant Kambampati Nachiketa under international pressure. Also Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sartaz Aziz has made a proposition of visiting India on the 7th of June, though the MEA clarified that it has not received any formal intimation regarding this visit. The article also states that according to diplomatic sources, Aziz also accepted that some Islamic fundamentalists have entered Indian territory and that India has every right to take necessary action ("पाक का बदलता रुख बड़ी कूटनीतिक सफलता") (Dainik Jagran 1999aa).

The statements of the PM and other members of the executive have been continuously reported upon. One can see that the then Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani made the most stern remarks regarding the conflict and in condemning Pakistani action. There was immense controversy about the comments made by the then Defence Minister George Fernandes. On May 25, Advani was quoted as saying, "घुसपेटियों ने अपने खात्मे को न्योता दिया: अडवाणी". Advani has said that by crossing the border, the Pak infiltrators have invited their own fatality. The government is going to clean them out. There can be absolutely no compromises on the territorial integrity of India. We know only one way of dealing with those who violate our good spirit. The infiltrators will be dealt with in such a way, that they would not be even able to run away (Dainik Jagran 1999h). On May 26, on the first page, the report is titled "घुसपैठ रोकने के

लिए हवाई हमले भी संभव: अटल". It states that our PM, A.B. Vajpayee has a phone call with Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif, where he made it clear that India will not tolerate any intrusions inside its borders. He also explicitly stated that these terrorist infiltrations at the borders had the support of the Pakistani army which is a serious violation of the Lahore Declaration. The objective was to occupy Indian territories. When he was asked in the press conference, whether air strikes would be done in order to remove these infiltrators, Vajpayee responded that India is willing to take all actions (Upadhyaya 1999).

On May 28, there are two reports which quote two important leaders in the government. First is the statement of the then Minister for Human Resource Development, Murli Manohar Joshi, who is quoted to have said that if a war does take place, then India will give fitting reply to Pakistan and that India is very much capable of making Pakistan bow down. Second, the then Party President of BJP, Rajnath Singh as having stated that Congress Party has played a negative role in the state's historical effort to oust the infiltrators in Kargil. In matters of national security it was necessary that the entire country put up a united front, which the Congress has failed to do. On June 3, the then Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani gave a statement that Nawaz Sharif was responsible for the Kargil fiasco as he is the PM of the country ("करगिल घटनाक्रम के लिए शरीफ जिम्मेदार: अडवाणी"). Advani is also quoted to have said that this infiltration is neither a failure of the intelligence services nor a failure of the government. It is a matter of an armed infiltration which has taken the form of an aggression. He said that many of the infiltrators are speaking the Pashto language and hence they are from Afghanistan (Dainik Jagran 1999x).

On June 4, there is a report that states that the government has decided only a few ministers will be able to give statements on the status of Kargil ("अब कुछ चुनिंदा मंत्री ही कारगिल पर बयान दे सकेंगे").

Picture 5: "अब कुछ चुनिंदा मंत्री ही कारगिल पर बयान दे सकेंगे", *Dainik Jagran*, 4 June 1999

Due to the various controversies that have arisen due to contradictory statements given by some ministers, the government has taken the stern decision that apart from the official spokesperson, only a few other ministries will be allowed to make statements on Kargil. In the meeting that this decision was taken, it was discussed how the media has been portraying news in a twisted manner, especially the comments of George Fernandes on the issue of providing safe passage to the infiltrators. Hence all party members have been cautioned regarding the same (Dainik Jagran 1999z).

The statements of the then Defence Minister George Fernandes caused a lot of furore among the opposition parties and the media. He was believed to have given a clean chit to the civilian government in Pakistan while blaming the entire infiltration bid only on the Pakistani Army. The opposition parties showed displeasure at what was said were careless remarks by the Defence Minister and worked to lessen the morale of our forces fighting at the border ("जॉर्ज के बयान से सैनिकों का मनोबल गिरेगा") (Jha 1999b). On this issue, India's former Chief of the Army General Shankar Roy Chowdhury has stated in the month of May itself that the Nawaz Sharif government was fully aware of the plans of infiltration and that this planning was taking place even during PM Vajpayee's trip to Lahore. Such an action cannot at all be undertaken without the civilian government being aware of it ("शरीफ सरकार को कारगिल में घुसपैठ की पूरी जानकारी थी: जनरल चौधरी" (Dainik Jagran 1999s).

Criticising the comments of Fernandes, in an editorial June 1, Rajeev Sachan ("लाहौर बस यात्रा के जवाब में") writes that India's objective should not be to oust the infiltrators from our territory but to finish them. India should take such tough action against Pakistan that it does not dare to take such action again in the future. He also states that the Defence Minister's statements are questionable. If the public assumes that the civilian government was totally unaware of the infiltration bid, then it does not make sense to talk to such a civilian government that does not hold de facto power in the state. If George Fernandes truly believes that the civilian government was not involved, then he should also realise that it is of no use to talk the foreign minister of such a powerless government (Sachan 1999). There was also reaction against Fernandes' statement that safe passage of return might be given to the infiltrators. The opposition parties said that such statements were lowering the morale of our Armed Forces ("जॉर्ज के बयान से सैनिकों का मनोबल गिरेगा: कांग्रेस"). Prem Shankar Jha in an editorial on June 7 was also very critical of Fernandes' statements and called for his resignation (1999b).

Apart from Fernandes, both these newspapers have also highlighted the controversy surrounding the patriotism of actor Dileep Kumar. In an article titled "निशान पर हैं दिलीप कुमार की देशभक्ति" in the *Nav Bharat Times* published on July 10, the article reports that members of the political party Shiv Sena stone pelted the actors house asking him to return an award (Nishan-e-Imtiaz) that he had received from the Pakistani government. The purpose of such an incident is to put a question mark on the patriotism of Dileep Kumar.

Picture 6: "निशान पर हैं दिलीप कुमार की देशभक्ति", *Nav Bharat Times*, July 10, 1999

It is reported that the actor has already had a meeting with PM Vajpayee regarding this issue. Mr. Kumar had said in the meeting to Vajpayee that if his returning the award serves national interests, then he is ever willing to return it. He had also expressed his sadness that people are trying to give this a communal colour for their own political interests when the Vajpayee government itself had allowed him to receive the award in the first place (Nav Bharat Times 1999d).

There were continuous reports on the status of Negotiations/Diplomacy taking place side by side the conflict at Kargil. On May 18, in a report titled "गोलीबारी के बावजूद पाक से वार्ता जारी रहेगी" where the then Defence Minister George Fernandes is quoted to have stated that one should never run away from dialogue. America and the Communists continued their talks even at the height of the Cold War. We can also solve our problem only by interaction (Dainik Jagran 1999c). Throughout the conflict, both India and Pakistan gave statements where they declared that they were rightfully upholding the Lahore Declaration and the Shimla Agreement and accused the other of violating it at various stages. On May 19, in an article titled "लाहौर घोषणापत्र के प्रति पाकिस्तान गंभीर, भारत के चुनावी नतीजे से रुख नहीं बदलेगा" where the Minister of State for External Affairs of Pakistan, Mohammed Siddiq Khan Kanju is quoted to have said that Pakistan is serious about upholding the tenets of the Lahore Declaration by continuing dialogue with India. This insistence on dialogue will not be affected by which party comes into power in the upcoming elections in India (Dainik Jagran 1999d).

The *Dainik Jagran* did produce a number of editorials that were critical of the government action and questioned the government on a number of fronts. On the May 25, there is an editorial titled "कश्मीर में गंभीर चुनौती". It basically raises a question about the efficacy of our secret intelligence services. The fact that so many infiltrators could attempt to cross India's borders at such heights and India was not prepared for it shows that our services were not doing its duty to its optimum level. The editorial argues that the matter should be taken seriously as these infiltrators have not come to do mere bloodshed in the Kargil and Dras sectors but their intension was to occupy

Indian territories. It is mentioned in the editorial that National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra has said that these infiltrators must have been trained for at least four months by the Pakistanis in order to make them capable of fighting at such heights. This means that out intelligence forces was unaware of all this planning which was taking place during our PM's visit to Lahore. India needs to correct its mistakes on this front (Dainik Jagran 1999i). On the June 4, in the editorial titled "घुसपेटियों से निपटने की नीति", it is argued that the Defence Minister's statement and controversy surrounding the issue of giving a safe passage to the infiltrators shows a bankruptcy of our tactical strategy. It has acted to demoralize our Armed Forces. It is mentioned that the infiltrators should be shot and if some of them are caught alive, then they should be sent to rot in our jails. This does not violate any international law and all other countries like Israel, United States and Russia follow such actions in such matters (Dainik Jagran 1999ab).

There were strong editorials that fully supported the government action. On the May 28, the editorial titled "कारगिल में साहसिक कार्रवाई" fully supports the air strikes in the Kargil sector. It unequivocally condemns Pakistan's statement that this is invasion of Pakistan by India. India has full right to defend its borders and states that Pakistani actions to support the infiltrators deserve the toughest actions from India's side. Pakistani designs and conspiracy to support these terrorists are now known. India's air strikes at Kargil are neither threatening world peace not does it threaten Pakistan's sovereignty and integrity. In fact the truth is that Pakistan's action to infiltrate trained terrorists from across the border is a move to violate India's sovereignty (Dainik Jagran 1999o). In the *Nav Bharat Times*, on May 31, there is an editorial titled "कारगिल में दोहरी सफलता". It starts by arguing that in Kargil it is not only necessary to fight a military battle but it is also important to equally show/publicise that we are fighting a battle. The Indian government having authorised 'Operation Vijay' on the battle front, had also led forward a diplomatic battle amongst the international community which has given India good results. The article states that due to such measures by India, Pakistan is not only suffering on the battlefield but also getting isolated diplomatically by the international community. India has received support from Russia, America and Britain whereas Pakistan's all weather

friend China has not been able to say a word of support for Pakistan. The editorial states "इससे साबित हो रहा हैं की कूटनीति भी अंततः सच का साथ देती हैं और नवाज़ शरीफ चाहे संयुक्त राष्ट्रसंघ को लाख चिट्ठियाह भेज दे, दुनिया उनके विलाप को गंभीरता से नहीं लेंगी" which means this shows that there ultimately truth prevails even in the diplomatic world and no matter how many letters Sharif writes to the United Nations, it is not going to take him seriously (Nav Bharat Times 1999a).

Picture 8: "कारगिल में दोहरी सफलता", *Nav Bharat Times*, 31 May, 1999

The *Dainik Jagran* has given ample space to what the opposition parties in the country have to say about the Kargil issue. On the May 27, on page number seven, there is an article titled "कांग्रेस ने कारगिल में घुसपैठ के मामले में सरकार से स्पष्टीकरण मांगा". Stating that the infiltration was a failure of the government, the Congress had demanded an explanation from the Prime Minister and the Defence Ministry. The Congress including all chief opposition parties while extending support to the Indian Army has questioned the government's negligence on the issue. Congress leader, Natwar Singh was quoted to have said that not only should the Prime Minister and Defence Minister resign but also drown in themselves in water for such negligence. The infiltration shows the failure of the well publicised Lahore diplomacy of the PM. However, while criticising the role of the government, he made it clear that on the issue of the territorial integrity of India, the whole country is one and united. But the public also has a right to know what caused such infiltration. The government should make sure that this fiasco does not extend further (Dainik Jagran 1999k).

On June 2, a report is titled "कांग्रेस ने करगिल मामले में सरकार पर आपराधिक लापरवाही का आरोप लगाया". The party also raised an objection to the presence of Indian Army officers in a working meeting of the party executive of the BJP. The Congress was also consistently critical of the statements given by the Defence Minister George Fernandes (Dainik Jagran 1999ac). Interestingly there were also editorials that were critical of how the opposition was behaving during the entire conflict. On June 4, the editorial is titled "कारगिल पर कांग्रेस का रवैया" and is written by Dinanath Mishra. It argues that the Congress party is politicising the Kargil Conflict for electoral benefit in the upcoming elections. Mr. Mishra writes that despite out soldiers dying at the border, on the one hand Congress is saying that it supports the Armed Forces and on the other hand is asking for the investigation into the failure of our intelligence services. Their demands of investigation into such failures at this point of time will demoralise our forces fighting on the border. It also states that a Congress party supporting TV channel has shown the pictures of a demolished aircraft continuously for five days. Are they doing this to demoralise the common people at this point of time? The editorial also questions the Congress use of an upside down bus with balloons attached to it with the writing "Delhi-Lahore-Kargil" on it stationed in front of the party headquarters in Delhi.

Picture 9: "An inflated replica of the Delhi to Lahore bus", *Hindustan Times*, 2 June 1999

The article states that such a demonstration was a unique way of protesting but does this mean that PM Vajpayee should have never tried to make relations better between

the two countries? Is this the reason why there is infiltration in Kargil? This article is critical of the behaviour of the opposition parties and is fully supportive of the government actions (Mishra 1999).

The newspaper carried articles where various defence experts were quoted. On May 29, on the first page is a report titled "कारगिल पर आणविक युद्ध की आशंका क्षीण: रक्षा विशेषज्ञ". There is consensus among defence experts that India's use of air strikes in the Kargil sector is justified (Dainik Jagran 1999q). On the Mar 31, there is an article titled "कारगिल में इजराइल जैसी 'सर्जिकल' कार्रवाई जरूरी: विशेषज्ञ". According to well known defence experts, in response to Pakistan downing two of Indian fighter planes, India should conduct Israel type 'surgical' actions inside Pakistan. However, they were other defence experts from the defence studies and analysis institution, like the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, that were of the opinion that India cannot behave like Israel and that such actions goes against our laws (Dainik Jagran 1999u).

The *Nav Bharat Times* also published article from former Prime Minsiter I.K. Gujral, retired Commodore Uday Bhaskar and former Indian civil servant and strategic analysts K. Subrahmanyam. An article on the June 20 by K. Subrahmanyam is titled "सूचनाये तो हमें सरकार से ही मिलेंगी".

Picture 10: "सूचनाये तो हमें सरकार से ही मिलेंगी", *Nav Bharat Times,* 20 June 1999

He argues that solutions to problems between India and Pakistan should not be dealt with according to people's emotions and mere intellectual feedback. He also writes that in situations of war, even intellectuals, journalists and the public are heavily dependent on the government for information. Hence what matters most is how the government itself is dealing with this responsibility. He argues that the government should itself come forward with regard to handling any kind of misinformation during such crisis periods. India should publicise internationally that the real risk lies with Pakistan who in a case of defeat with India can use a nuclear weapon. Since India is stronger than Pakistan both in terms of conventional warfare and economic strength. If the international community becomes aware of this, then it is more likely to pull more control strings on Pakistan. Subrahmanyam writes that India needs to realise the importance of media and providing more articulate information to establish its narrative internationally. The media has a huge role to play in terms of either calming the public or antagonising them during a war. Hence if public opinion is being made by private news outlets, then this can get very risky. He ends the article by writing that in such circumstances, it is apt that the government holds the reins on the narrative through its own information services which needs to be modernised (Subrahmanyam 1999b).

The response of the international community and the Permanent Five countries of the Security Council were also continuously focused upon. On May 27, on the first page, a report states that India has taken diplomatic initiatives to explain its stance on the use of air strikes in the Kargil conflict to military officials from 39 countries from around the world. "39 दूतावासो के सैन्य प्रतिनिधि को वायु हमले के औचित्य की जानकारी दी गई". The briefing was done in South Block in New Delhi. The report also states that American ambassador to India, Richard Frank Celeste has stated that his country is worried about the status of events in Kargil. However, he declared that the United States does not intend to interfere in any way. The American and British ambassadors to India were specially briefed about the situation by the Ministry of External Affairs. They were given enough evidence to prove Pakistan's misgivings in giving birth to this conflict (Dainik Jagran 1999r).

On May 28 ("अमेरिका ने बम गिराने के पाक दावे को खारिज किया- रूस ने घुसपेटियों के खिलाफ भारतीय कार्रवाई का समर्थन किया"), it is reported that the United States has dismissed Pakistani claims that Indian bombs used against the infiltrators had also been dropped on Pakistani territory. The US also asked India and Pakistan to maintain restraint. It is reported that Russia giving out its support to Indian actions to oust the infiltrators in Kargil, has condemned the actions by Pakistani supported infiltrators. Russia unequivocally declared that India has a right to action for its security. China and other European countries have also asked both the countries to maintain restraint in their actions (Dainik Jagran 1999p).

The newspaper of May 31 has the headlines "अटल ने दूत भेजने का अन्नान का प्रस्ताव ठुकराया - ज़रूरी हो तो दुता पाकिस्तान भेजा जाये". The report states that Prime Minister Vajpayee has rejected United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's proposal that of sending a Special Rapporteur to India. Vajpayee also commented that if Mr. Annan wanted to send a rapporteur, then he should him/her to Pakistan instead of India. It also states that in the past two days, Mr. Annan has spoken to PM Vajpayee twice regarding the Kargil conflict. PM Vajpayee reiterated that Pakistan has violated India's territorial integrity and therefore Operation Vijay will not stop until all the infiltrators have been ousted from Indian Territory (Dainik Jagran 1999v).

The reportage also highlighted how the civil society and the common people in India was responding to this conflict situation. There is a very interesting article on May 31 which is titled "आम भारतीयों को कारगिल की चिंता नहीं, उनपर विश्व कप का भूत सवार". The article goes on to say that the whole world is worried about Kargil, but the Indian public is worried only about the Cricket World Cup. It states that common people are of the opinion that cricket world cup takes place once in four years but tensions between India and Pakistan are common. They were also of the opinion that tensions in Kargil would not lead to an all out war between the two countries. Many people were of the view that this is political theatre by power hungry Bharatiya Janata Party. The BJP intends to deflect attention from other political challenges. The Indian

public have faced this situation many a times before elections. That is why the public is not serious about such a situation anymore (Dainik Jagran 1999w).

The *Nav Bharat Times* (1999) has presented the people's perspective in an interesting manner with the name and picture of the person given along with the comments. Most of these comments from people are critical of the government and the intelligence forces during the Kargil War. The title of this article consisting these comments is "कारगिल में घुसपैठ: सूचनातंत्र ज़िम्मेदार" (Nav Bharat Times 1999c).

Picture 11: "कारगिल में घुसपैठ: सूचनातंत्र ज़िम्मेदार", *Nav Bharat Times*, 9 June 1999

The various comments are, first, Sunil Kumar writes that both the government and the intelligence forces are responsible for the Kargil fiasco. Lalita Sharma is very critical of the political class and deems them responsible. Rajesh Dilwariya asks the important question of where the military intelligence was when the infiltration was taking place in Kargil. Indira Sharma writes that she cannot put the entire blame on the intelligence forces as overall the government is responsible. Kishorilal is also of the opinion that the government is responsible for failing to stop the infiltration bid in Kargil (Nav Bharat Times 1999c).

Another facet of civil society that has been highlighted is the anger shown by the Muslim communities in India against Pakistan's bid for infiltration and also support shown for the Indian Armed Forces in Kargil. For example an article in *Nav Bharat*

Times on June 19 is titled "पाक के नापाक हरकतों से नाराज मुस्लिम समुदाय". This article by Om Prakash Tapas states that many people are revengeful regarding Pakistan's infiltration bid in Kargil but the one community that is most angry and vengeful is the Shia community in India. Tapas (1999) writes "मौलाना तालिब हुसैन का कहना हैं कि जुम्मे के दिन सभी प्रमुख **मस्जिदों** में लोगो ने पाकिस्तान के नेताओं को सबक देने के लिए अल्लाह से दुआ की" (Maulana Talib Husssain said that in the Friday prayers, heads of all mosques have prayed to Allah to teach Pakistani leaders a lesson).

Picture 12: "पाक के नापाक हरकतों से नाराज मुस्लिम समुदाय", *Nav Bharat Times*, 19 June, 1999

The Nav Bharat Times even published a picture of muslim citizens burning the effigy of Nawaz Sharif at Jama Masjid to display their anger regarding Pakistan's bid for infiltration. The report also states that other muslim people have also stated that Pakistan policies have led to the destruction of Kashmir where no development can take place. The same feelings have been displayed by the All India Iman Organisation. Other muslim organisations not only want to make donations to help Indian forces but need be also go to the border to fight the Pakistani infiltrators (Tapas 1999).

At the height of the conflict, very importantly the newspaper did publish some peace mongering articles. On June 7 an editorial by Zafar Aaga is titled "युद्ध से बचने में ही भलाई". The possibility of the Kargil conflict turning into an all out entire war

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between India and Pakistan should worry us all as both countries are now nuclear weapons enabled. It is the responsibility of the leaders of both countries to not allow this dangerous situation to go out of hand. Nawaz Sharif should make sure that the army of his country is in control. For this reason, it is advisable that talks should continue between both countries. After the partition, the fundamentalists on both sides want enmity from both sides to grow and this is in their selfish interest. War is not play and the lives of the common people are in the hands of the leaders. Both leaders have maintained restraint till now and the hope is that they will not allow this conflict to become an all-out war and the infiltrators are ousted from Indian Territory (Agha 1999).

Lastly, the newspaper also had reports that analysed the role of the media itself during the conflict. On May 31, there is an important editorial titled "भारत का मौन" written by Prem Shankar Jha which focuses on the negative coverage of the Kargil fiasco by the international media. It asks the important question as to why the internal media became very active on this entire issue when the Indian air strikes started and not when there were news that infiltration had taken place in Kargil seriously violating our sovereignty. Jha asks certain questions in the article: why is the international media talking in convoluted terms regarding the linkages between the infiltrators and the ISI and Pakistani army? Why are they reluctant to accept that are the infiltrators have come five/ten kilometres inside Indian territory? Prem Shankar Jha further writes that like it has happened many times before, the Indian government have made rubbish out of media management. This is a direct question the work done by the External Publicity division of the MEA. The fact that the international media was portraying a one-sided image shows that the XP Division failed to reach out and convince the international media with our narrative (Jha 1999a).

The *Nav Bharat Times* has also published an editorial on June 4 that is critical of the Pakistani media and supports the Indian Government's decision to ban it during the war. It is titled "उचित प्रतिबंद" which means a suitable/reasonable/apt ban. The editorial states that based on the reportage of the Pakistani news channels on the war in Kargil, the Indian government was left with no option but to ban it. These news channels were spreading false news couched in a jingoistic propaganda. They were

calling the Pakistani infiltrators as mujahideen or freedom fighters. They are falsely showing humongous losses on the Indian side whereas the truth is vastly different. The author writes that modern war is not only a military battle but equally a battle for information/winning the narrative also. Hence the media becomes very important. The editorial, making a comparison between the media in India and Pakistan, goes on to write "भारत में प्रेस को पूरी आज़ादी हैं और तमाम तरह के सूचना सूत्रों से लोगो को कारगिल की घटनाओं का सही और सच्चा चित्र मिल रहा, लेकिन पाकिस्तान में रेडियो और टेलीविज़न तो क्या, वहाँ के तमाम अखबार भी सरकारी सुर में सुर मिला कर ही बोल रहे हैं और भारत को एक खलनायकके रूप में पेश कर रहे हैं" (The press in India has full freedom and is presenting the facts of Kargil in a truthful manner but the media in Pakistan, including all the newspapers are completely towing the government line and showcasing a villainous image of India). The editorial ends by writing that although in times of information and communications revolution, all information coming from Pakistan cannot be stopped, but as far as possible India should stop such poisonous news from coming into India (Nav Bharat Times 1999b).

The Times of India **and** *Hindustan Times*

There are comparatively few articles in the month of May on the Kargil infiltration and ensuing Kargil war. Most of the articles in Hindustan Times and *Times of India* during the initial period of the Kargil fiasco in May were on other domestic issues like Sonia Gandhi's citizenship row. One of the first articles in the *Hindustan Times*reporting the infiltration is published on May 20 and is titled "Pak Amy had crossed LoC" (Shishir Gupta, 1999). The report clearly highlights that this is a "calculated" and "well rehearsed" plan by the Pakistan Army. It also states that although the Defence Minister George Fernandes had stated that the Indian Army was in control of the situation, it might take some time to evict them these intruders. Throughout this period, there are a number of articles in *The Times of India* and *Hindustan Times* on this issue which are direct, informative, detailed and which ask a number of crucial questions.

A lot of coverage is for the statements of the then government on the crisis situation. What is clearly stated in all articles is the fact that Pakistan apart from physically

attacking across the border was also raising the Kashmir issue simultaneously in all international forums to bring the world's attention on Kashmir. On 12 June, *The Times of India* has reported the data from the news conference held by Prime Minister Vajpayee on the Kargil issue. Through this press conference the PM assuaged the perception in the media and among the public that the government was not in control of the situation or had failed in terms of intelligence and militarily pre-empting the infiltration. The same message of leadership is given on 18 June via the article titled "Vajpayee takes initiative on Kargil issue" by Bhaskar Roy (Roy 1999).

The then Home Minister of India, L.K Advani held a number of press conferences which seemed to serve two purposes: first, make a decisive statement that India is looking at the present conflict as a limited war but that does not mean that it not ready for an extreme situation where there might be an all out war and second, to assuage public fear and build unity thereby shoring up the morale of the members and families of the armed forces. This message has been reported by *The Times of India* in various articles, for example, "India wants to treat conflict with Pak as limited war, says Advani" published on 20th June (The Times of India 1999c); "Pak will pay a heavy price of it escalates conflict: Advani-Nation must be ready for any eventuality" published on 24th June (The Times of India 1999d); "BJP won't exploit Kargil crisis" published on 29th June (The Times of India 1999g).

The statements from the opposition are also majorly covered in both these newspapers. The reportage in *The Times of India* in June starts with an article titled "Congress may seek special session of RS Kargil issue" where the report highlights the Congress assailing the government for the contradictory statements made by it on the issue. While the Prime Minister had said that the country faced a war-like situation in Kashmir, on the other hand, the Pakistani Foreign Minister was on his way to meet the Indian counterparts. It quotes K Natwar Singh, one of the leaders of the then opposition party as saying that the contradictory statements of the government showed that its attitude is "immature, naive and unprofessional". The comments of K Natwar Singh critical of the government have been equally highlighted in *The Hindustan Times*. A report on June 1, states that the opposition has criticised the government for politicising the Army. This criticism comes amidst the

news that senior military officials had been asked to brief the National Executive meeting of the Bharatiya Janata Party on the Kargil issue.

An article published on June 18 titled as "Don't escalate Kargil to All-Out War" written by Siddharth Varadarajan (Varadarajan 1999). There was also an article by Amitab Mattoo (The Times of India 1999) titled "Winning the Other War-Window of Opportunity in the Valley" published on June 22 which talked about how this conflict provided the ideal time for the central government in New Delhi to act on an "imaginative policy initiative towards the state of Jammu and Kashmir" and win the hearts and minds of its people and steer it towards real inclusivity in terms of co-operative federalism, development and prosperity. At the same time, there were also articles in The Times of India that asked for stern action to be taken against Pakistan (Mattoo 1999). For example, on June 4, *The Times of India* published an article by a retired major general named Afsir Karim who argued for a stronger action to be taken towards Pakistan in an article titled "For a Proactive Policy, Put Pakistan firmly in its Place" (Karim 1999).

On May 30, there is article in the TOI titled "Where the buck stops?" by Dinesh Kumar, which asks the important question as to who is responsible for the state these state of affairs in Kashmir. Is it the failure of the Brigade stationed there or is it is the failure of the military intelligence? (Kumar 1999). This shows that the print media was willing to allow the asking important questions instead of rising on a tide of nationalistic impulse and hooting in favour of a war. Another article also asks the question of the various ways in which the political parties would be using this for the then upcoming general elections. Hence the *The Times of India* was willing to analyse the myriad causes and consequences of the Kargil war in its varied reportages in the month of May.

Similarly *Hindustan Times* has highlighted the concerns of the opposition. For example, an article is published on May 27, titled "Cong hits out at Govt for fiasco in Kargil" (Hindustan Times1999a). It reports that the Congress Party had alleged that the caretaker government has failed to protect the territorial integrity of India. Another article critical of the government has been published by *Hindustan Times* on May 29 by Brahma Chellaney, titled "India got taken in by own rhetoric". Chellaney

argues that India misjudged Pakistan's intentions and got swayed away with the Lahore Bus diplomacy. He writes "While the Lahore initiative made diplomatic sense, it made no sense for New Delhi to overplay the success of the bus diplomacy or to start believing its own rhetoric that a major breakthrough had been achieved in Indo-Pak relations." Chellaney also calls out the government for not being able to grasp the magnitude of the Kargil fiasco and indeed downplaying it. However, he does end the article by stating that what is required is national unity and support for the government in fighting this menace (Chellaney 1999).

Another critical editorial is written by Ajit Bhattacharjea on June 4 is titled as "High Level Incompetence" (Bhattacharjea 1999). It argues that though Lahore bus diplomacy is being blamed for this fiasco, the actual blame lies with both the military and the intelligence agencies. "Diplomatic efforts to improve relations with Pakistan cannot excuse incompetence in defending a strategically crucial area contested for 50 years" (Bhattacarjea 1999). On June 5, another article critical of the government decision not to convene a session of the Lok Sabha is published under the title "Ducking a Debate" (Hindustan Times1999d).

Picture 13: "Ducking a Debate", *Hindustan Times*, 5 June, 1999.

The editorial argues that it required that a Rajya Sabha session have been convened at that crisis moment, since the Lok Sabha was dissolved. Contrary to the claims that this would portray a divided India at that hour, it would show India's unity. The editorial mentions that the Lok Sabha was in session during the 1962 war with China and "speeches made in the House helped to convey the country's firm determination

to face the challenge". PM Vajpayee contention that this was not the right time to convene a session makes a mockery of democracy (Hindustan Times1999d).

The editorial in *The Times of India* wrote about the government not talking in one voice especially in the initial days of the war, and hence losing a battle in the information war in an article titled "The Info War" on June 7. The article mentioned,

> In contrast, we in India seemed destined to put up with a cacophony of opinions on Kargil. Forget the media and the Opposition, spokesperson for the government revel in of varying opinions, Defence Minister George Fernandes especially showing a predilection for this (The Times of India 1999a).

This editorial also point out that such a confusing rhetoric in the media in India is compared with Pakistan putting out a single rhetoric about the war and hence presenting a united picture in front of the world, especially the emerging netizens in the rapidly spreading online world. The editorial however, also ends by stating that such a united stance would not be suitable for a thriving democratic genius like India (The Times of India 1999a).

Space was given to the views of leaders of opposition parties in India especially in the interview format. Mulayam Singh Yadav's interview with Mahendra Ved (The Times of India 1999) was published on July 29 and he took on a very critical stance on the government's role in the war. He was of the view that the government was caught unaware by the Pakistani action and had our Army not been one of the best in the world and saved the day, India would have faced a terrible loss. Not only was the government to be blamed for failure of intelligence but also naive diplomacy in terms of putting all its eggs in one basket during the Lahore bus event. An interview was published with Sitaram Yechury on July 17 where he praised the commendable job done by the Indian Army and at the same time being critical of governmental lapses that let such a serious situation arise in the first place. At the end of July, there were a number of editorials analysing the whole fiasco and steps to be taken by India to prevent something of a similar nature in the future. This included the stalwart of Indian security affairs K Subrahmanyam whose article published on July 26 was titled "Kargil Balance Sheet-Security as a Full Time Job" (Subrahmanyam 1999a).

There were also articles on how the Indian economy was not suffering as a result of the war. For example, "Kargil fails to dampen bull spirit" by Kedar Kamat published on June 22 (Kamat 1999b). What is noteworthy is that in times of crisis, the newspaper highlighted some voices arguing for nuclear restraint and nuclear disarmament, like that of Praful Bidwai ("From Pokhran to Kargil, the nuclear danger is no fantasy" (Bidwai 1999a) on the June 2; "Kosovo, Kargil, Kashmir-Towards South Asia's Denuclearisation" (Bidwai 1999b) on June 19, 1999. It also published a radical article by Professor Nivedita Menon on July 6 titled "Plastic Patriotism in Times of War" which criticised war in totality and the overall loss of lives on the basis of man-made borders. She wrote "we simply don't see the logic of borders which must be defended to the last citizen. For ours is the doubtless quirky belief that people are the nation, not borders, not big dams, not nuclear might.(Menon 1999)" Another article which can be clubbed under that of being critical of governmental rationality prevailing those times was by Madhu Dandavate , being titled "Democratic Expression-Rajya Sabha Should debate Kargil" published on July 3. It contested the argument that there should be no discussion on the war in the Rajya Sabha as that went against democratic values and also that all other previous wars India was involved in had received its fair share of discussion in the Parliament without being tagged as anti-unity and anti-soldier solidarity (Dandavate 1999).

What is also given space is the international equations surrounding the war and the successes of Indian diplomacy in making western countries condemn Pakistani hand in the infiltrateion. On May 31, it is reported in *Hindustan Times* first page that "Infiltrators pushed back; India rejects UN offer" (Hindustan Times 1999c). It states that PM Vajpayee had rejected the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's proposal to send an envoy to India Pakistan.

Picture 14: "Infiltrators pushed back; India rejects UN offer", *Hindustan Times*, 31 May, 1999

There is also an editorial in *Hindustan Times* on the June 1 titled "Gains for India". It states that the international community has recognized that Pakistan is the main culprit in the Kargil fiasco. The editorial also raises doubts on the proposal of the visit of Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaz Aziz to India while supporting India's rejection of the Kofi Annan's proposal to send a United Nations envoy (Hindustan Times 1999b). For example an article titled "Raghunath's visit to Paris may strengthen India's stand on Kargil" published on June 28 (The Times of India 1999f). An article on 27th June titled "Kargil Crusade" stated

> With the international community firmly behind it, India scored over Pakistan in the diplomacy war on Kargil, and going from army reports, on the battlefield as well. India regained ground on Tiger Hill and Point 5203. The United States endorsed India's military action to push back infiltrators from its territories and bluntly blamed Pakistan for the crisis (The Times of India 1999e).

On June 5, the headlines of *Hindustan Times* are "Respect LoC, Clinton advises Nawaz Sharif". Adding more support to India on the Kargil issue, the report states that President Bill Clinton had written to Sharif calling him to take concrete steps to "defuse the crisis and respect the Line of Control" (Hindustan Times 1999e). Along with India's diplomatic successes, focus was also given to Pakistan's diplomatic engagements especially with China.

The then Defence Minister George Fernandes statements during this time created a lot of controversies which have been covered by both *The Times of India* and *The Hindustan Times*. Even the Congress Party had termed Fernandes' offer as "unwarranted" and "indefensible". There is another very critical editorial about the conduct of Fernandes, titled "The Controversial Mr. Fernandes" by A. N. Dar published on the June 14 (Dar 1999).

Throughout the three months of the Kargil fiasco, the *Times of India* not only published articles on an analysis of the Indian media reportage on Kargil, but also ran some articles on how the Pakistani media were reporting the war. A very interesting article on how the Pakistani media was covering the war was also published on the June 27 by Sanghamitra Chakraborty titled "Our war, their war" (1999). It also published excerpts and even full articles published in Pakistani newspapers under the larger title, "THE OTHER SIDE" which contained short excerpts of Pakistani

newspapers like *Dawn, The Nation, The Frontier Post, The News* and others (July 29 "The Other Side"; July 12 "The Other Side"). One of the articles published under "THE OTHER SIDE" was an article published in the Pakistani newspaper *The News* on July 11, tiled "Hate Campaign" focused on the reportage on the war in the Indian Media. It said that the print and electronic media in India had made every effort to fuel war hysteria and rouse patriotism among the public. An article has been published in *Hindustan Times* on how the Kargil War was being covered by the media in the United States. It is published on June 15, written by Francois Gautier and titled "Losing the PR battle". Gautier argues that though Pakistan is clearly the aggressor, India is losing the publicity battle in the international media. He quotes the BBC, "In spite of Pakistan's peace overtures (the proposal to send Aziz and the release of the airman), India is proceeding with its military offensive". Such a line from a BBC correspondent clearly shows that India has been unable to convince its narrative and "western public opinion is still not on its side" (Gautier 1999).

On the various ways in which our own media covered the war, there were interesting articles on how especially the commercial/non-governmental electronic media covered the war. On June 17, an article criticised the nature of reportage of Doordarshan on Kargil by Kedar Kamat (Kamat 1999a) titled as "Doordarshan lags behind private channels in Kargil coverage". The article states that "Not only is the time allocated to show the latest developments in the area very little (except during the evening news and after 10pm), but the coverage given is also poor. Compared to Doordarshan, private channels like Zee and Star in particular are way ahead of Doordarshan". The article also mentions that since Doordarshan is viewed even by an international audience, it should be doing a better job at presenting the war from India's perspective (Kamat 1999a)

The Times of India also made it a point to cover the news that that various Muslim bodies were out protesting against the Pakistani intrusion on June 17 in an article titled "Muslim Bodies Protest against Pak intrusion" (The Times of India 1999b). Regarding the pieces of political stalwarts, I K Gujral, the former Prime Minister of India from 1997 to 1998 wrote an introspective piece for *Hindustan Times* on the June 13 titled "Was Lahore a mirage or a charade?" In the article he outlines the principles of the Shimla Agreement (1972), almost as a reminder to the Pakistanis. He questions

the rhetoric of Pakistan which raised doubts on the validity of the LoC and urges them to have a re-look at the Shimla Agreement. Quoting the Agreement, he writes that Article 4 states that for durable peace in the region,

> In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations...and refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line (Gujral 1999).

He asks what made a sober PM of Pakistan even overlook the Lahore Declaration that recently had been signed between the two countries. With such clearly spelt out principles in both agreements, he writes "where is the scope of misinterpretation?" This article reads like a very rationally articulated argument to the Pakistanis to honour their agreements.

Overall the reportage of the *Times of India* and *Hindustan Times* during the entire episode was noteworthy. It represented a large section of views across the political spectrum giving space to not only leaders of the opposition but also radical opinions of the academia questioning the notion of borders itself at the height of a war. It also presented the Pakistani side of the picture by not only giving space to statements of Pakistani leader but also the reportage in the Pakistani media. There were an ample amount of editorials that were critical of governmental action/inaction and failure. At the same time a large section was also devoted to representing the rhetoric that the government wanted to promote, the statements of the then PM Vajpayee and Home Minister L. K Advani which portrayed the necessary sense of unity and that the government was in control of the situation. This included the statements of the then finance minister Yashwant Sinha who stated that the war was not adversely affecting the Indian economy. The most interesting articles were on how the Indian media itself were reporting the war and an analysis of it.

Surgical Strikes

India conducted surgical strikes against Pakistan on the 29th of September, 2016 in response to the Uri Attacks on 18th September 2016. The Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence held a joint Media Briefing on the same day. The briefing

was done by the then Official Spokesperson of the MEA, Vikas Swarup and the Director General Military Operations, Lt. General Ranbir Singh. General Singh made it clear that

> Based on very credible specific information which we received yesterday that some terrorist teams had positioned themselves at launch pads along the Line of Control with an aim to carry out infiltration and terrorist strikes in Jammu & Kashmir and in various other metros in our country, the Indian army conducted surgical strikes last night at these launch pads (MEA, 2016).

He also stated that "significant casualties have been caused to the terrorists and those who are trying to support them. The operations aimed at neutralizing the terrorists have since ceased." Initially during the briefing Pakistan's continuous support for supporting infiltration and terrorist activities against India has been mentioned. Despite India having provided consular access to the captured terrorists, Pakistan has failed to act on any evidence or confessions. He also clarifies that he has spoken with the Director General of Military Operations of Pakistan and informed him about these strikes and its objective.

Reportage in *Dainik Bhaskar* and the *Nav Bharat Times*

The headlines of *Dainik Bhaskar* on the first page on the September 30 is "देश ने चाहा, सेना ने कर दिखाया; पाकिस्तान के घर में घुसकर मारा" (The Country desired it, the Army implemented it; we beat Pakistan inside their own homes) (Dainik Bhaskar 2016a) and the headlines in the Nav Bharat Times is "मुहतोड़ जवाब" (Fitting Reply).

The details of the operation are similarly provided in both the paper with the *Nav Bharat Times* providing a prominent portrait of the Prime Minister along with the report. The *Dainik Bhaskar* has provided an editorial on the first page itself, written by Kalpesh Yagnik and titled as "भारतीय ताकत की गर्वभरी झलक" (A glimpse of Indian Strength). Mr. Yagnik writes that though India has conducted such strikes across the border before, it is for the first time that the political class has owned it, which has in turn made the whole country proud. He argues that the tradition of exchanging dossiers with Pakistan after every terrorist strike had to stop some day as it not lead to any outcome for India as desired. Yagnik states that India launched a multi-pronged strategy to attack Pakistan after the Uri attacks. First, rethinking on the

Indus Water Treaty with the PM commenting that blood and water cannot flow together; second, steps to internationally publicise Pakistan's linkages with terror by Sushma Swaraj; third, boycott of SAARC meeting due to be held Islamabad; fourth, convincing other SAARC countries to do the same and fifth, military action in the form of surgical strikes. . Pakistan was isolated on all fronts of strategy, diplomacy and military. He ends the article by writing that "देशवासियों के मन में जो चल रहा था, उसका राजनीती ने सम्मान किया" meaning to say that political decisions have responded to people's wishes and such a response was extremely important (Yagnik 2016).

Importantly views from the not only the families of the soldiers who were killed in the Uri attacks but also the people who were being relocated from the border areas after the surgical strikes for precautionary measures in case Pakistan responds. There is a report titled "10 किमी दायरे में गांव खाली कराये, लोगो ने कहा - हम भी पाक से लड़ना चाहते", where people being relocated say that they want to stay back and also fight Pakistan for the country (Choudhary 2016). These reports not only how the families of the Uri attacks martyrs were feeling avenged after these strikes but a rising sense of patriotism among the public. Similar reaction was covered by the Nav Bharat Times with an article titled "उरी शहीदो के विधवाएं बोलीं कलेजे में पहुंची ठंडक" (Mishra 2016). The other public reaction that has been captured is the support of strikes shown by the Muslim bodies in India. For example, an article "भारत को रक्षा का पूरा अधिकार: जमात-ऐ-इस्लामी" states that one of the foremost Islamic bodies in the country, Jamaat-e-Islami has extended full support to these strikes by stating that terrorist activities should not be tolerated and India as a sovereign nation has full rights to defend itself. The leader also said that war is not a solution for any problem and it can hamper our developmental progress (Nav Bharat Times 2016ad). The reaction of the domestic leaders from other political parties, the international news outlets like *BBC* and *The New York Times* and news outlets from Pakistan like the *Dawn* and *The Nation* on social media has also been covered on the same page in *Dainik Bhaskar*.

Dainik Bhaskar has published quite a provocative article by Muzzaffar Hussain on September 30 titled as "अब अगला कदम बलूचिस्तान की आज़ादी हो" where he argues that only by freeing Balochistan and creating another Israel next to Pakistan can it be controlled in a proper manner by India. Balochistan has been tortured by Pakistan and wants India to help in its independence but India does not want to interfere. Since Pakistan does not stop interfering in India, India should now help the people of Balochistan and thereafter, both can deal with Pakistan jointly to establish peace in the region. Pakistan has also deeply hurt India's interest by handing over the control of Gilgit Baltistan to China which has resulted in the Chinese Pakistan Economic Corridor. He writes that time has come for India to show its place to Pakistan where not only will it not be broken into two halves but vanish away from the map of the world (Hussain 2016).

It has been noticed that although the report titles on the other pages for both *Dainik Bhaskar* and the *Nav Bharat Times* are aggressive and emotive, most of the editorials in both papers argue for peace and level headed thinking in such crucial times of conflict. Such a phenomenon was not only observed after the Surgical Strikes but also the Uri attacks. The page focusing on the attacks in *Nav Bharat Times* had the title "कब तक सहेंगे?" with the title of the main article on the page being "मुहतोड़ जवाब दो नापाक दुश्मनो को".

Picture 15: "मुहतोड़ जवाब दो नापाक दुश्मनो को", *Nav Bharat Times*, 30 September, 2016

Being quite emotive, these titles mean "Till when we will tolerate?" and "Give a fitting reply to the wicked enemies" respectively (Nav Bharat Times 2016ab). On the other hand, the editorial on September 20 is titled "शांति और सय्यम ज़रूरी" (Nav Bharat Times 2016aa). This editorial states that it is natural that there is angst among the Indian public against Pakistan's nefarious actions, but it would not be in India's interest to take a reactionary action that fuels instability. It argues that not only should India's intelligence and security apparatus be strengthened but India needs to take people in Kashmir into confidence to fight against cross border terrorism from Pakistan. Our diplomatic onslaught also needs to continue as more and more countries are getting aware of the true nature of Pakistan (Nav Bharat Times 2016aa).

On the same day, another article is titled "कृपया देश में जंग का माहौल न बनाएं" meaning a request to not make an atmosphere of war in the country. In this article Urmilesh Singh criticises both the political establishment and the media for war mongering. He writes that certain news channels are giving statements like "अब तक जिसका खून न खौला, वह खून नहीं पानी हैं" meaning that whoever's blood has not boiled against Pakistan even after the Uri attacks, they do not have blood flowing in their veins but water. Condemning usage of such strong intonation by the news media he writes "ये कैसे पत्रकारिता हैं, ये कैसे विचारक हैं, ये कैसे विशेषयज्ञ हैं, जो सिर्फ युद्धोन्मान का धंदा करते दिखते हैं" (Who are these journalists and specialists who only focus on the business of war?) (Singh 2016).

On September 30, the title of one of the editorials is "नेतृत्व के समझदारी पर निर्भर है आगे का रास्ता" (Dainik Bhaskar 2016b). It states that the course of the future action will depend on the leadership. It argues that it is worrisome that both countries are embroiled in such a conflict and it would be better if both limited the conflict to this as extending it further could risk a nuclear war. Such discretion is in the interest of both the nations (Dainik Bhaskar 2016b). On the same day, the title of the editorial in *Nav Bharat Times* is "आतंकवाद पर हमला" which states that by these strikes India

has give a strong message to Pakistan. It reiterates that Pakistan has been supporting terrorist groups against India and that this policy has not changed despite India's appeals and international pressure. Hence India was left with no option other than undertaking surgical strikes. India's action should not be taken or portrayed as an act of aggression and Pakistan should take this as a lesson. India also has to take care that this atmosphere that has been created is not misused by anyone (Nav Bharat Times 2016ac).

The papers have also aggressively focused on the controversy surrounding Pakistani actors working in Bollywood. An article is titled "वर्ल्ड टूर, स्टेज शो और 75% कम हो जाएगी पाक एक्टर्स की कमाई" meaning that with this boycott by India, Pakistani actors will not only lose the opportunity of world tours and stage shows but their net income will reduce by 75%. The article goes on to highlight the huge difference in the payment that Pakistani actors receive in India and Paksitan. For a movie in Pakistan, they get merely 25 lakh rupees but in India, for one movie they get almost in between one crore to one and a half crores. These actors will be at a huge loss with this boycott but Bollywood will not be affected by their absence (Arora 2016). Since most of the editorials are less emotive and appeals to reason, the *Nav Bharat Times* has an editorial titled "लड़ाई आतंक से हैं" on October 3. The author argues that in such times, it is understandable that anger also gets directed towards toward Pakistani actors, but we need to remind ourselves that we are a modern and progressive nation state. The editorial also states that though India and Pakistan have fought many wars, but despite it, we have been continuously having cultural exchanges. It states "ये बात हम सबको समझनी ही होगी कि एक दूसरे के खिलाफ नफरत बराकर हम इस दुनिया से आतंकवाद को मिटा नहीं सकेंगे" (we cannot solve terrorism by spreading hatred against each other) and that "संगीत, साहित्य और कला- जो हमें अधिक मानवीय बनाती हैं, आतंकवाद के खिलाफ इस लम्बी लड़ाई में हतियार हैं.... इनपर किसी भी तरह की बंदिश हमें इस लड़ाई में कमजोर ही करेगी" meaning to say that art and cultural exchanges which makes us more humane is one weapon to fight

terrorism, stopping of which will only make our fight against terrorism weaker (Nav Bharat Times 2016af).

The international reaction, especially from the United States, Russia and Britain was covered in detail to show how India received ample support. Some of the statements used were "सर्जिकल स्ट्राइक्स पर पाकिस्तान को नहीं मिला विदेशी सहयोग" (Pakistan did not receive any support from the international community on the issue of surgical strikes); "भारत पर परमाणु हमले की पाक धमकी से अमेरिका नाराज" (America is angry with Pakistan's action to threaten India with nuclear weapons). The article reports that in response to the Pakistani defence minister's statements of using nuclear weapons, American State Department had said that the leaders of such nuclear weapon states should speak with a lot of restraint. It also reports that India had received support on surgical strikes from many countries. With regard to China, the newspapers amply reported the support that it gave to Pakistan. One article stated "पाक के फेवर में दिखे चीन के तेवर" meaning that China is showing signs of supporting Pakistan.

Picture 15: "पाक के फेवर में दिखे चीन के तेवर", *Nav Bharat Times*, 2 October, 2016

This article stated that China has stopped the flow of one of the tributaries to the Brahmaputra in Tibet. This action was taken by China after India had declared a

rethink of the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan. China has also vetoed the banning of Masood Azhar in the United Nations (Nav Bharat Times 2016ae).

The comments of the leaders of Pakistan have also been amply covered. Apart from other important war of words between India and Pakistan during the entire process, on October 8, it is also reported that Nawaz Sharif, due to the international pressure that India had created, had told the Pakistani army that it should stop shielding the terrorist (“पाक घिरा तो नवाज बोले- आतंकिया को बचाने छोड़ सेना उन पर कार्रवाई करे”). It is reported that he (Nawaz Sharif) had said that the army should investigate Masood Azhar, Hafiz Saeed, Jaish-e-Muhammed, Lashkar-e-toiba, and Haqqani network (Dainik Bhaskar 2016c). A related highlighting of the domestic politics of Pakistan is the publication of an article which quotes a leader in Pakistan asking why Pakistan was shielding Hafiz Saeed. The report is titled “’हाफिज हमारे लिए कौन से अंडे दे रहा है’” (Nav Bharat Times 2016ah). The article states that members of Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) –PML (N) had questioned their own government in the Pakistan National Assembly on the issue of shielding Hafiz Saeed. Legislator M.M.A Rana Mohammed had asked as to what help was Hafiz Saaed providing with regard to the Kashmir issue that the government is shielding him from international boycott (Nav Bharat Times 2016ah). Another report on October 9 sought to highlight how the ISI Chief post was in danger after India’s surgical strikes (“ISI चीफ की कुर्सी खतरे में”) (Nav Bharat Times 2016ai). These articles serve the purpose of bringing awareness to the domestic fissures inside regarding its support to terrorist.

Comments given by the Congress President, Rahul Gandhi and the government’s response to it has also received it fair share in both the papers. Rahul Gandhi had stated that the BJP is trying to take political benefit from these strikes and that Modi is doing a brokering of soldiers blood (“PoK के बाद अब दलो में सियासी सर्जिकल हमले”) (Nav Bharat Times 2016ag). The exact phrase that was used was “मोदी कर रहे हैं शहीदों के खून की दलाली: राहुल” (Dainik Bhaskar 2016d). A war of words between the two political parties had emerged after this statement with the BJP President

stating that when the entire country was excited by the strikes, the Congress is sad because in its regime, it had helped these terrorists "राहुल के मूल में ही खोट हैं" (Dainik Bhaskar 2016e)., and "कांग्रेस पाकिस्तान के साथ दिख रहा हैं" (Dainik Bhaskar 2016f). The editorial on the October 8 warns Rahul Gandhi against riding against this tide of nationalism as it was not in his political interests ("राष्ट्रवाद के इस उबाल में संभल के उतरे राहुल गांधी") (Dainik Bhaskar 2016g). There is an article that criticises the immaturity of the Indian political class for their statements on this issue. Ved Pratap Vaidik (2016) writes that although the controversy regarding these statements should have been over soon, but it is not because from an international issue, this has turned into a domestic issue ("यह गर्मिया जाता रहेगा, क्योंकि यह अब जितना भारत पाक के बीच हैं, उससे कही ज़्यादा यह दोनों देशों की आतंरिक राजनीति का अहम मुद्दा बन गया हैं"). He argues that the political parties are hyping this matter in both India and Pakistan for their own domestic purposes. In Pakistan, the army chief is about to retire and Nawaz Sharif is getting increasingly embroiled in the Panama Papers scandal, whereas in India, after two years the Modi government is looking weak with the BJP having lost state elections Delhi and Bihar (Ved Pratap Vaidik 2016). Being an introspective yet realistic piece, this article serves to offer advice to both the ruling party as well as the opposition.

The Times of India **and** *The Hindu*

Reports for the Surgical Strikes appear on the 30th of September in both the papers. The headlines on the first page of *The Times of India* are "Pak Crossed The line, India Crosses LOC" and "PAYBACK FOR URI: In 'Surgical Strikes', Army Hits 7 Terror Launchpads in PoK On A Dim-Moon Night, Kills 40-55". The subtitle to the article written by Rajat Pandit is "First Open Breach of Threshold Since 1971". It states that as a reprisal for the Uri terror attacks, India conducted Surgical Strikes across the LOC in PoK managing to break its self imposed restraint which it had kept intact for decades. The details of the operation are outlined in a separate box right in the middle of the page. The soldiers had gone from 1.5 kilometres to 6.5 kilometres across the LOC from between 12.30 am to 4:30am and had come back home before sunrise after

completing the operation (Pandit 2016). The headlines on the first page of *The Hindu* are "Target terror: India strikes along LoC". The report of by Suhasini Haidar and Kallol Bhattacherjee and gives all the details including that the attacks were launhed on the Hot Springs, Kel, Lipa and Bhimber Sectors across the LoC (Haidar and Bhattacherjee 2016).

The first page on the September 30 in *The Times of India* specifically focused on the role of PM Modi in giving a green signal for the strikes right after the Uri Attacks. It reports that "PM set ball rolling at Sept 19 CCS meet" where it is stated that PM Modi "abandoning the posture of strategic restraint" had authorised the army to look for feasible military responses for an "effective response". The first page also has a report which states that the Indian Armed Forces and intelligence are bracing up for any kind of retaliation from the other side. Page number 10 has detailed report on the mission. An article titled, "Modi's okay prompt, Army given time to plot the mission" states that Modi had given a go ahead for a military response in the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) held one day Uri attacks, which allowed the Army to prepare for ten days for the strike. It is clearly mentioned in the article that the principle of "strategic restraint" that was followed under the UPA government for fear of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan was abandoned by PM Modi (The Times of India 2016r). There is another article titled "Modi dares to go where Atal didn't" where admiring PM Modi's skilful handling of the issue, it stated that this action puts PM Modi is the "league of India's notable PMs". The article also stated that this action would help the BJP in the Vidhan Sabha elections bound to take place in UP at that point of time (The Times of India 2016s).

What has been continuously hauled as a progressive development and a new benchmark is regarding the fact that by these strikes India choose not to be blackmailed by the threat of Pakistan's nuclear response. As the article reports,

> This marked the abandonment of "strategic restraint": the doctrine which eschewed use of military reprisals for fear of a nuclear conflict and its replacement by a posture of effective military retribution and, more crucially, of pre-emption. It was a stark announcement that the fear of a nuclear showdown has ceased to be a deterrent for India (Times of India 2016s)

Picture 16: "Storm Brews on Western Front", *The Times of India*, 30 September

It is important to note that the Indian Director General of Military Operations had stated that they had credible evidence that terrorists were hauled up at a launch pad at LOC ready to infiltrate inside India and carry out terrorist strikes in Jammu and Kashmir and other metropolitan cities inside India. The then BJP Chief, Amit Shah had stated that the strikes "signal the rise of a new India where the government doesn't get cowed down by nefarious designs of terrorists" in a report titled "Strike signals rise of new India: Amit Shah" (The Times of India 2016t). On October 2, it is reported that India's then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had stated that "Pakistan is in a state of coma just like an anaesthetised patient after surgery. Even two days after the surgical strikes, Pakistan had no idea what has happened". Giving full credit for initiation to the PM, he is quoted to have said, "On the orders of Modiji, the Army did a great job" The article on the first page of 3rd of October has big headlines titled "In 1st speech after POK raid, PM refrains from rubbing it in". It states that PM Modi in a speech at New Delhi had said that India has never attacked any other country nor has desire to take over anybody else's territory. On the other hand Indian soldiers had laid down their lives for others during the two world wars (The Times of India 2016al). Hence according to the article, PM Modi was clearly avoiding

chest thumping on the Surgical Strikes and hinting at India's peaceful intentions. With regard to any kind of negotiations taking place after the Strikes, on the October 4, it is reported that the National Security Advisors (NSA) of the countries had spoken to each other with the purpose of de-escalating the situation. The details of the conversation have not been divulged, it stated that, "First guns spoke, now NSAs talk" (The Times of India 2016an).

With regard to the response from the Pakistani side, on the first page of September 30, it is reported that Pakistan had given out a statement that it was "just a border skirmish" in which "two Pakistani soldiers were killed and nine injured". The then Pakistani Defence Minister Khwaja Asif was also quoted to have stated that "India is trying to present a skirmish as a surgical strike" The tenth page has a report titled "Sharif & Sharif need time to plan a response" referring to the then Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif (The Times of India 2016v). Nawaz Sharif was also quoted as stating that Pakistani restraint and intention of maintaining peace should not be seen as weakness. In many of the reports in *The Time of India* it was also highlighted that Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammed Asif had threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons on India if their safety is threatened. This comment was made just a day before India had carried out the Surgical Strikes.

On October 1, an article states that "Sharif vows to protect Pak sovereignty". Nawaz Sharif had said that India had indulged in unprovoked firing at the border while rejecting all claims of surgical strikes (The Times of India 2016ad). There is also an article on the Pakistani Army chief on the same day titled as "Retiring Raheel may seek bloody hurrah". It accounts that due to the fact that Raheel Sharif is retiring in November, he might want to seek revenge against the surgical strikes in order to regain his legacy which has been dampened by India's strikes.

The Times of India has continuously carried articles and statements of former Indian diplomats. On September 30 itself, there is an article by Ambassador G Parthasarathy titled "India well aware of Pak's nuke threshold". Directly answering the concerns of whether Pakistan would react with using its tactical nuclear weapons in answer to India's military response, Amb Parthasarathy writes

New Delhi is aware of Pakistan's nuclear threshold, enunciated by the former head of its nuclear command authority, Lt General Khalid Kidwai. General Kidwai acknowledged that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons only if its populated centres are threatened, or its army is facing defeat (Parthasarathy 2016).

Hence the main thrust of his argument was that since India was not undertaking either of the two actions, its action was within the bounds of Pakistan's nuclear threshold. This argument serves as a counter-argument to those who fear that Pakistan will be provoked to use its nuclear weapons with any kind of military response by India, thereby supporting India's action of Surgical Strikes. Amb Parthasarathy also clearly enunciates the diplomatic steps taken by India on the bilateral and international front in order to isolate Pakistan. He writes that PM Modi personally led a "high voltage diplomatic offensive" in conclaves like the G20 and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). This made sure that India received support from major powers and also countries from West Asian Region like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and UAE. Moreover, Amb Parthasarathy underlines that Pakistan had already been sidelined in the South Asian region when Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan had joined India in boycotting the SAARC Summit that was to be held in November 2016 in Islamabad because of Pakistan supporting terrorism on its soil (Parthasarathy 2016).

The response from the opposition parties of India was also extensively covered by *The Times of India*. On the 30th of September, in an article titled "Cong backs govt, pats armed forces" it is outlined that the Congress party had said that the Surgical Strikes had sent a strong message to Pakistan and the party stands united with the government in matters of India's national security. It is also mentioned that the Congress Party had run a scathing campaign against PM Modi after the Uri attacks, criticising him for inaction. Sushma Swaraj had also briefed Sonia Gandhi about the matter. The then Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti vociferously called for restraint on both sides as "confrontation would lead to disaster of epic proportions". The support for the action by the government also poured in from CPM (Communist Party of India-Marxist), LJP (Lok Janshakti Party) and others (The Times of India 2016u). The opposition initial response has been covered by *The Hindu* under an article titled "Plaudits from across the political spectrum" (Gupta 2016).

A lot of statements of the Delhi government have been reported in *The Times of India*. On the 30th itself, there is an article on the second page titled as "Kejriwal Lauds military action". It states that Kejriwal showing his support for the Surgical Strikes had tweeted "Bharat Mata ki Jai. The entire country is standing with the Indian Army." Most Aam Aadmi Party workers had expressed their support for the strikes in twitter with Kapil Mishra tweeting "...Dear Pakistani terrotists, you don't need to cross LOC for getting killed Army has started home delivery...Special festive season offer". The Delhi Vidhan Sabha had even passed a unanimous resolution condemning Uri attacks where Delhi Chief Minister Kejriwal had assured that the entire country stands united in supporting the Surgical Strikes (The Times of India 2016w).

Various defence experts including former military officials' pieces on the issue was published by *The Times of India*. On the September 30, there is an article by retired Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain titled "India must now remain a step ahead of Pak". He argued that this military response by India for the Uri attacks was the best possible one as it is within the red lines of breaking Pak's nuclear threshold. Congratulating PM Modi of the deft handling of this response, he also explains the meaning of a Surgical Strike by stating that it is an operation in which "trained troops rapidly move into enemy territory and head for a selected objective to target it and are not diverted by any other opportunities that may arise until the identified objective is neutralised". He also warns that though Pakistan has denied any strikes, it might be readying itself for a counter-response at a time and place of their choosing. Hence India needs to be ahead of Pakistan in all fronts including the information loop and decision making has been emphasized by General Hasnain (Hasnain 2016).

Articles on various strands of public opinion in India have been published. The public here includes families of the martyrs, normal citizens and other organisations from the civil society. On the 30th of September, an article expressive of the views of the families of the Uri attacks martyrs titled as "'Want strikes to continue till 1,000 terrorists are killed'" has been reported. Most of the family members welcomed the news of the strikes and felt that this action had avenged the death of their loved ones in a cowardly terrorist attack. The pregnant widow of one of the martyrs, Lance Naik said that though this news did not lessen her pain but it provides her a sense of

satisfaction. Many were of the opinion that this was necessary to teach Pakistan a lesson so that it does not dare to take such a step in the future (The Times of India 2016x). There is another article on page sixteen which reports that the Indian largest film producers, the Indian Motion Pictures Producers' Association (IMPPA) has decided to boycott all artists from Pakistan. The report also states that such a decision was taken after Pakistani singer, Rahat Fateh Ali Khan and Pakistani actor, Fawad Khan refused to pay a tribute to Uri soldiers and condemn these terrorist attacks. The Joint Secretary of the film body was quoted as saying "if they don't bother about the country that has given them so much, why should we bring them here and glorify them?" (Oldest, largest film producers' body bans Pak artistes"). As a reaction to this, it is reported that Pakistan banned the broadcast of Indian films and TV channels (The Times of India 2016y).

On October 1, on the first page, an article is titled "Salman: Pak artistes aren't terrorists" where it is reported that Bollywood actor Salman Khan had said that Pakistani artists are not terrorists and if they are coming to perform in India, the Government of India gives them visas for it. The report also states that Salman Khan had received flak from the regional parties of Maharashtra, the Shiv Sena and the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) (The Times of India 2016af).

Picture 16: "After Films, Indian TV channels banned in Pak", *The Times of India*, 1 October

On the same day, there is an editorial titled "Sallu is Right- Our fierce patriots need to get that Mahira Khan isn't a terrorist". It argues that despite PM Modi making a differentiation between Pakistani people and their government by making a direct appeal to the Pakistani public for a pitch to fight against poverty, the Indian public had failed to make the same differentiation. It argues that it is in India's best interests if it treats the Pakistani people as different from the Pakistani state and terrorists. If people to people contacts grow, that would eventually lead to positive results for India. The editorial ends with the thought that the Indian public should "take a leaf out of the how the west won the Cold War with the Soviet bloc-while containing their governments, the West didn't demonise their peoples" (The Times of India 2016aj). On October 3 it is reported that actor Om Puri and director Nagesh Kukunoor had said that Pakistani artistes are not terrorists and that art and politics should be treated on different levels.

The 30th of September also has a report titled "Muslims back action against Pak at govt-hosted panchayat". It states that the Minority Affairs Minister Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi in a meeting in Mewat, Haryana had asked the crowd to show their support for the strike and for PM Modi, which they had done by raising their hands and cheering (The Times of India 2016z). On October 1, an article states that "Darul backs Centre, lauds Army action". It states that Ashraf Usmani, the spokesperson of Darul Uloom Deoband had said that in matters of national security, they stand shoulder to shoulder with the government (The Times of India 2016ag).

The response from the international community has been mentioned in various articles throughout the entire process. The first neighbouring country to come out in support of India was Bangladesh which is mentioned in an article titled "India has every right to hit out at Pak: Bangladesh" (The Times of India 2016aa). The most immediate international neighbourhood response was seen in the official announcement of the boycott of the SAARC Summit to be held in Islamabad in November. October 1 had a front page report about this with the title "Isolation complete, Pakistan forced to put off Saarc meet- Lanka Was Fifth Nation to Pull Out". This report also states that what was most humiliating for Pakistan was that all of these countries (Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Sri Lanka) had mentioned Pakistan's role of supporting terrorism in their statement which they gave as a reason

for pulling out of the summit (The Times of India 2016ah). On October 2, it is reported that Maldives had joined this boycott of the summit along with condemning international terrorism. Finally on October 3, it is reported that Nepal "rounds of move to isolate Pak" by formally postponing the summit as the current chair. Nepal in its statement to postpone the summit had also condemned state sponsored terrorism including the attacks at Uri.

It is reported that representatives from within the United States government have been worried by Pakistani behaviour, especially Nawaz Sharif support for slain terrorist Burhan Wani. These representatives include Republican Ted Poe and Senators Mark Warner and John Cornyn. The report states that the two Senators had written to PM Modi stating that they were extremely worried about Pakistan's use of terrorism as a pillar of foreign policy towards India and Afghanistan (Sharif's praise for Wani may haunt him") (The Times of India 2016ab). Another article on the 30th by Chidanand Rajghatta affirms that "Ahead of strike, India got backing from US". Its further states that the National Security Advisor of the United States Susan Rice had spoken to India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval before the strike and had not only offered condolences to the families of the victims of Uri attack but also expressed support on the issue of terrorism. The article also mentions that Rice was unequivocal in reiterating that Pakistan needs to take effective action against the United Nations designated terrorist individuals and organisations. Also that Rice did not mention India's boycott of the SAARC summit in Islamabad, hence endorsing it and not repeating it's often counsel on the need for dialogue. The South Korean President Park Geun-hye had also given a statement supporting the surgical strikes and was quoted as saying "Indian Army action should be a lesson for other nations facing terror threats". Supporting India, the German Ambassador to India had also stated "When it comes to counter-terrorism, Germany stands side by side with its strategic partner" (Rajghatta 2016a).

China, on the other hand has asked both countries to show restraint. In an article titled "India, Pak calm down: China & Russia" on October 1, the spokesperson of the Chinese foreign ministry is quoted to have stated that "We call on relevant parties to exercise restraint and refrain from actions that would escalate tension." The article also states mentions how China has been blocking the banning of Masood Azhar by

the United Nations 1267 Committee on sanctions on terrorist individuals and organisations. Russia too had called for restraint. The article mentions that "Russia would normally have been one of the first to stand by India, but its statement appeared to take a more even-handed approach" (The Times of India 2016ai). On October 2, it is reported that China had again put a hold on the banning of Masood Azhar under the UN sanctions list. This article is titled "Pak's friend China again shields Azhar at UN", which is clearly hinting at the fact that China by supporting Pakistan has supported its terror proxies.

Picture 17: "Pak's friend China again shields Azhar at UN", *The Times of India*, 2 October 2016

The official news agency of China, Xinhua had also reported that China had blocked a tributary of the Brahmaputra in order to make progress on one of its hydro-electric projects. The paper writes that this is a reaction to India's plan to review the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan (The Times of India 2016ak).

The editorial pages in *The Times of India* have a mixture of opinions. On the 30th, there are three pieces in reference to the Surgical Strikes, one of which lays out the facts, the other shows support and third reminds the public of Gandhi's ideal of non-violence. The first is titled "Across the Thin Line-Cross LoC strikes have occurred before, owning it this time was a political call" is by Jyoti Malhotra. Quoting India's former Army Chief General Bikram Singh, J. Malhotra outlines that such strikes have taken place even under the UPA regime specifically after the beheading of two Indian soldiers in 2013. However, the government had chosen not to announce it to the public in 2013. She also writes that Pakistan is not going to stop sending terrorists across the borders, so the Indian Army should always stay alert, specifically in the

upcoming days. J. Malhotra writes that a military response must be complemented by not only political will but also backed by popular will, specifically among the population of Jammu and Kashmir. Hence the government should make extra efforts for the reconciliation here (Malhotra 2016). The second editorial on the 30th is titled "Avenging Uri-Modi has sent a message of resolve but India must be on high alert". It reiterates that due to Pakistan support of terrorism India has consistently suffered from Gurdaspur to Pathankot to Uri in previous year itself. Despite India having provided credible evidence of terrorism in its soil, the Pakistani establishment instead of routing out the terrorists, placates and supports them. The editorial ends by giving a message to Pakistan which is that it would be best for it to avoid a confrontation and "if it can forswear terror, it will find New Delhi more than willing to talk to it on any issue it wants" (The Times of India 2016ac). The third article on this page, within the section of "Speaking Tree" is written by Sumit Paul and titled as "Why We Need to Revisit Rumi and Gandhiji". It basically states in times of high tension between the two neighbours, one should remember the non-violence and pacifism of Rumi and Gandhi (Paul 2016). The editorial in *The Hindu* on September 30 outlines the facts and states that with these strikes India is in "uncharted terrain" and also asks that "the Centre will need to articulate what it regards as the new normal- and indeed, how it hopes, or plans, to dissuade Pakistan from escalating the situation in turn" (The Hindu 2016).

There are two editorials in *The Times of India* on October 1 regarding the Surgical Strikes and India's relations with Pakistan. The first is by author Chetan Bhagat and it is titled "Pakistan: Islamic State Ver 2" where he writes that India should make every diplomatic and cultural effort to designate Pakistan as the second Islamic State. Once the international community is aware that Pakistan is a failed state, then it would be easier to deal with various other issues emanating from that country. He also argues that India should cut off all diplomatic ties with Pakistan and remove its consulate from New Delhi. He explains that if we should any kind of "bhai chaara" with Pakistan, then we would not be able to convince the world that it is a failed state. He ends the article with the lines "Equality and brotherhood is a luxury we enjoy in peaceful times. Not when our people are being killed" (Bhagat 2016). The second editorial is by Indrani Bagchi and it is titled "Terrorism no longer a low-cost option for Pakistan, Indian counter-strikes have broken a psychological barrier". She argues

that with these strikes, India has shown that it can also "impose costs" on Pakistan for its actions. Bagchi also lauds that the media briefing after the strikes was done by both the Defence and External Affairs Ministries. This ensured that the narrative was better managed than the time India had conducted such strikes inside Myanmar in 2015. She argues that even if India and Pakistan get back to the talk for talks after these strikes, New Delhi should uphold all the threats that it has given till now which includes boycott of SAARC Summit and a re-look at the Indus Water treaty (Bagchi 2016).

The Hindu has an editorial by India's former diplomat, Ambassador Rakesh Sood on October 1 titled as "Uri as inflection point". Clearly explicating the nature of the relations between India and Pakistan since the Kargil War, he is of the opinion that these strikes was a new inflection point in the relationship and that now PM Modi could give a paradigm shift to base India's policy in realpolitik with Pakistan. He writes "Mr. Modi is using his communication skills, a controlled rhetoric and a limited cross-border operation to show that he can take risks while dominating the escalation ladder" (Sood 2016). Gopalkrishna Gandhi, former Governor of West Bengal wrote a peace mongering article for The Hindu on the October 3. Clearly hinting towards the overall futility of wars, he asks what India and Pakistan have "won" or "lost" in the last four wars of 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999. With no clear winner or loser the success or failure of such wars to achieve their objective cannot be delineated. Gandhi writes,

> Remembering that 'War and peace' are one single entry in the Union List, we-you and I-must fight another war. And this is the war against war-mongering, a war against the psychology that glorifies war, that makes nuclear warheads of our minds (Gandhi 2016).

The editorials on October 2 are all critical of the surgical strikes. The first one is by Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar and is titled "Surgical strikes are good theatre, but stop there". He argues that the recent Surgical Strikes were nothing but political theatre to please an enraged domestic population. He even writes that the terminology that has been used to describe these strikes had been misleading in order to "paint a picture of victory". He explains, "Launch pads are used by missiles, not guerrillas, who are very mobile and infiltrate wherever opportunity beckons...They are not stationery targets (like missile launch pads) that can be destroyed by bombing". However, by the end of the article, he writes that such kind of strikes are our best

possible option as they satisfy the domestic public's thirst for revenge while at the same time not risking escalation from the other side (Aiyar 2016). The second article is by Aakar Patel who goes into the meaning of surgical strikes in a satirical article titled "My wife doesn't get why India gave up strategic restraint" (Patel 2016). The third article is by Swapan Dasgupta and is titled "War is a bad idea for a nation prepping to take off". The main thrust of his argument is that India under is doing economically well under the Modi government and hence all the focus on surgical strikes and diplomatic offensive are nothing but "unnecessary distraction". For Dasgupta, the Indian economy is taking good strides forward and hence "India would be loath to be forced into a war" at this time (Dasguta 2016).

In continuation with the critical stance in *The Times of India*, on October 3, Santosh Desai, has published an article titled "The New Imperatives of Strength". He begins the piece by stating that the narrative of the government on the Surgical Strikes has been "consistent" and "sure-footed". However his main argument is that being calm and composed is symbolic of strength instead of being bombastic and flaunting ones capabilities. The institution that is failing India horribly on this front is the media. It is deliberately whipping up a hysterical nationalism for commercial purposes which he argues can grow into a dark phenomenon. Desai writes that "to be pushed to taking military action against a nuclear neighbour because of public sentiment is a frightening prospect". He is also critical of some of the statements given by members of the Cabinet like Manohar Parrikar who had said that Pakistan is in a state of coma after India's strikes. This could lead to the creation of dangerous prospects for India and hence the narrative needs to be more "tightly controlled". To quote Desai, when one is in actuality strong, "restraint then becomes a choice one makes rather than being seen as an excuse for one's perceived inability to act with strength" (Desai 2016).

Another editorial that is anti-war for economic reasons is by Chidanand Rajghatta and is titled "Pakistan's road to Perdition", published on the October 5. The main argument is that India with its prospering economy has much to lose in a war with Pakistan. Whereas Pakistan has nothing to lose in a war because not only is its economy in a bad shape but its societal and political indicators are also poor. With its economy running on rental money from the US and its support of extremist Islamic

groups and terrorist groups, it has lost the plot in the eyes of the international community. Rajghatta further argues that the world already recognises that India produces CEOs of companies like Google, Microsoft and others, whereas Pakistan hosts leaders of Al-Oaida, Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and others. Hence India needs to run a campaign against Pakistan on the diplomatic front instead of firing actual bullets because that country is already on the road to perdition because of its own policies (Rajghatta 2016b).

The first reports about the release of videos for the Surgical Strikes is on October 3, where it is stated that on being prodded by reporters for the evidence of strikes as Pakistan had raised doubts, the then Home Minister Rajnath Singh had said "Just wait and watch" (Just Wait & Watch', says govt as Pak asks for proof") (The Times of India 2016am). In a report on the 4th of October, it is stated that the Congress Party had asked the government to expose Pakistan's denial of the Surgical Strikes. At the same time, the Congress had affirmed that it absolutely had no doubt on the announcement of the Army ("Expose Pak's denial of surgical strikes, Congress tell govt") (The Times of India 2016ao). The first page headlines on the 5th of October are titled "Political battle erupts over evidence of surgical strikes" (The Times of India 2016ap). Arvind Kejriwal is quoted to have stated "Pakistan is spreading false propaganda...that no surgical strikes took place. The PM should give Pakistan a befitting reply". To such statements from the Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party, the government had responded by stating that they are backing and "seconding Pakistan's propaganda by demanding proof of the attacks-a position that was tantamount to doubting the Indian Army"

It is reported that Delhi Chief Minister Kejriwal had responded by stating that he fully believed in the Indian Army and the government that the Surgical Strikes had taken place. However, because Pakistan was widely spreading false propaganda in the international media regarding its actuality, he was only asking that India give a fitting reply to this in order counter this propaganda in the international media. On October 6, on the first page, it is reported that "Govt may not release proof of 'surgical strikes' in POK". The government had stated that releasing the video would be imprudent as it would "compromise operational details, tactics, techniques and equipments used in the attacks to take out the Lashkar-e-taiba launch pads". The government also held

that any decision to show it to a selective audience for a specific purpose will be taken at the highest level (The Times of India 2016aq). Continuing the political battle, on the 7th it is reported that Rahul Gandhi had accused PM Modi of "khoon ki dalali" over the strikes. He had said that PM Modi was taking political mileage from these strikes that the brave Indian soldiers had undertaken

On the October 6, on the first page, there is a report which states that PM Modi had asked the ministers to avoid chest thumping at a Cabinet meeting. It is reported that the government had decided that only authorised spokesperson would speak on the issue.

Picture 18: "Avoid chest-thumping on surgical strikes, says PM", *The Hindu*, 6 October, 2016

Quoting the report, "the view in the government is that public sentiment has strongly has strongly hailed the raids and it was unnecessary to indulge in credit seeking-the political message of a decisive government did not need elaboration". It is also mentioned that immediately after the strikes, it was suggested that the party members do not give flamboyant and jingoistic remarks. This was followed by the PM himself when right after the strikes, he without referring to it, only highlighted how India was not interested in aggression The editorial on the 6th also called for a stop to such political "tu tu main main" and asked the political class to stay united as villagers close to the border had been asked to evacuate due to increase on cross border firing ("Stand United- Strikes palaver shows political class in incapable of mature strategic conversation") (The Times of India 2016ar).

Conclusion

Based on the theories of media and politics laid out in Chapter Two, one can analyse the nature of reportage in this chapter. The analysis can be centered on the following issues, first, the kind of 'framing' predominantly used in issues of war by the print media in Hindi and English. The nature of media framing would highlight whether the media was in the "sphere of consensus", "sphere of legitimate controversy" or "sphere of deviance" according to the typology set out by Daniel Hallin (1984). Second, whether there was certainty or uncertainty in the government policies regarding the conflict. Third, the nature of media 'priming' which plays a major role in setting standards of behaviour for the political class and the public.

Since the Kargil war lasted for approximately two and a half months, the reportage also saw changes in its nature in this time period. In *Dainik Jagran* and *Nav Bharat Times*, the predominant frame that was being used throughout was one of security. This security frame involved focusing on the aspects of the war with catchy headlines that praised the Indian Army and revealed a total victory for their efforts on the field even when the war was only in the initial stages. For example, all the articles written by Harbans Nagoke for the *Dainik Jagran* belong to this category. The 'security frame' also includes articles written on praising the bravery of the Indian Army in juxtaposition to the laziness and fear of the Pakistani side. The Pakistani state was definitely framed in unfavourable terms by articles that listed their dubious nature and evil intentions. There were also article on the extreme jingoistic side which called for a wiping out of the infiltrators by openly disregarding any adherence to International Humanitarian Laws of War.

With regard to level of policy certainty, it is observed that in the initial days after the infiltration bid was exposed, there was a level of policy uncertainty. However, by the end of the month of May, the statements given out by the government showed a resolve of policy certainty. The increasing policy certainty also led to India's active diplomacy on the international front and rejection of United Nations Secretary General's Kofi Annan's proposal to send a mediator. There were multiple statements from various leaders like Vajpayee and Advani that showed India's strong resolve which portrayed that the government was fully in control of the situation. The literature by scholars like Piers Robinson (2002) and others on policy certainty and

media frames argues that with the rise of policy certainty, the role of the media framing and influence decreases in policy formulation. As can be observed, with the government giving clear statements on the front, the narrative building at the domestic front increasingly tilted towards showing support towards the government and its rhetoric.

Hence the 'security frame' in this context slowly evolved to become a 'unity frame' where any counter-narrative that was alleged to problematize this unity was derided by the Hindi print media. This included, what has been termed as 'priming' in the literature on media and politics. Priming has been explained in chapter two as setting of certain standards of behaviour for public figures to conduct their professional lives by the media. In the Kargil context, any deviance to the 'unity frame' resulted in criticism. This included a number of critical articles written about the then Defence Minister George Fernandes on his comments of giving the Pakistani civilian government a clean chit and proposing a safe passage of return for the infiltrators. There were also articles criticising the public itself, where one article argued that the Indian public was more interested in the cricket world cup than the Kargil conflict. Although both *Dainik Jagran* and the *Nav Bharat Times* provided ample space to the critical statements of the opposition, there were also critical editorials written on the role of the opposition. These highlighted the unfortunate role of the opposition which called for disunity among the public when the country required total unity. Though the papers did publish articles critical of the government's role with special regard to the failure of the intelligence agencies in foiling the infiltration bid, these were few in number and did not become a part of the larger narrative. The government's control on the narrative was sought to be strengthened by the decision of the executive to allow only a few ministers to speak to the press on the conflict and the banning of the Pakistani television in India. The larger narrative being built under the 'unity frame' also included multiple reports on the support for the government and anger shown towards the Pakistani state by various civil society and religious organisation, with a special focus on the Muslim organisations.

With regard to the reportage in *The Times of India* and the *Hindustan Times*, it is observed that the predominant media frame that was being used was one of 'peace' instead of 'security'. There were a number of articles in the English press which

called for a peaceful and calm approach by the government that would not lead to as escalation of this conflict into an all-out war between the two countries. Along with such peace mongering articles, there were quite radical articles from the academia and activists which called into question the concept of border and nationalism itself and argued for complete nuclear disarmament. There was a call for isolation of the Pakistani state by the use of diplomatic negotiations and not a military backlash which could further escalate tensions. This included articles by Siddhart Varadarajan, Praful Bidwai, Achin Vanaik, Nivedita Menon and others. Instead of totally demonising the Pakistani state, the English press actively published articles published in Pakistani newspapers under the tagline of "The Other Side". Apart from the 'peace frame', what was also dominant was the 'critical frame'. There were multiple articles and headlines that not only focus on the failure of the government in preventing the infiltration but also highlight the critical stance of the opposition parties. This includes editorials written by Dinesh Kumar (1999), Brahma Chellaney (1999), Ajit Bhattacharjea and others. Interviews with opposition leaders like Mulayam Singh Yadav and Sitaram Yechury on the conflict was also published.

As outlined in Chapter Two, based on Daniel Hallin's (1984) typology for journalistic reportage into three spheres, first, 'sphere of consensus' where the media plays a legitimising role; second, 'sphere of legitimate controversy' where a balance is maintained for and against a particular policy; and third the 'sphere of deviance' where the media purposely rejects voices considered to be unworthy of any attention (non-news worthiness). This suggests that both 'sphere of consensus' and 'sphere of deviance' can function in the same realm by focusing on certain news events in a certain manner and completely neglecting others as unworthy. They are backed by certain given assumptions about certain standards and criteria of society. Moving away from such fixed standards and questioning these common standards of news worthiness is the 'sphere of legitimate controversy' where objectivity and a balance is maintained, for example during an election coverage in a vibrant democracy. Hence, it is observed that during the Kargil war, the Hindi print news media analysed here largely functioned within the 'sphere of consensus' while the English news print functioned within the sphere of 'legitimate controversy'.

With regard to the Surgical Strikes, it is observed that there is a high level of policy certainty right from the beginning. On September 29 itself, when the strikes had taken place the previous night, a joint press conference was held by the Director General of Military Operations along with the Spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs. The government was firm on its narrative and there was a strong degree of policy certainty regarding the same. Due to the different nature of the overall context, this kind of policy certainty was not found in the Kargil war, especially from the initial days till mid-conflict conflict period.

Immediately from the next day, that is September 30, there were articles in strong support of these strikes in both the Hindi and English print newspapers that have been analysed. The *Nav Bharat Times*, *Dainik Bhaskar* and *The Times of India* specifically highlighted the role of Prime Minister Modi in giving the green signal for these strikes. The headlines that were used were full of satisfaction at being avenged by these strikes having taken proper revenge from the enemy state for the Uri attacks. For the Hindi newspaper, these included articles by Kalpesh Yagnik, H.S. Choudhary, Dinesh Mishra, Muzzaffar Hussain and other editorials. There were reports to show that public opinion was high in support of these strikes along with pictures of the families of those martyred at the Uri attacks. *The Times of India* highlighted the rise of a new India which gave up the policy of 'strategic restraint'. There were multiple articles that were published by former diplomats and defence officials to explain how this did not violate Pakistan's nuclear threshold while at the same time, supporting India's new policy of not following 'strategic restraint'. This included articles by Ambassador G Parthasarathy, General Ata Hasnain, Chetan Bhagat, Indrani Bagchi and other editorials. There were also articles highlighting the strong success of India's diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakistan by convincing all the neighbours to boycott the SAARC summit due to take place at Islamabad in November 2016.

The reportage in *The Hindu* was comparatively more nuanced with more focus on stating of facts. There were articles that were peace mongering calling for lowering of the tensions by using diplomacy instead of military might with the logic that a war would not befit a rising economy like India. These included articles by Gopal Krishna Gandhi, Swaminathan S. A. Aiyar, Swapan Dasgupta and Chidanand Rajghatta. In the Hindi newspapers, such articles were written by Urmilesh Singh, Ved Pratap Vaidik

and editorials, specifically in the *Nav Bharat Times*. However these articles were an exception to the main narrative. Due to the high level of government certainty on its policy, these deviant articles could not generate a counter narrative. The predominant frame that was being used by the media was one of 'support' to the government and 'nationalistic framing'. Engulfed within this 'nationalistic frame' were also articles to show support by the civil society and religious organisations especially by the Muslim community in India. In this context, 'priming' has taken place for those who did not show an all out nationalistic support for the government action. This includes the leaders of the opposition that went ahead to ask for the proof of these strikes and Bollywood actors that did not support a boycott of the Pakistani actors. Hence it can be said that the print media was largely functioning in the 'sphere of consensus' as there is a larger uniformity with regard to the support to these strikes and there is hardly any deviance from the larger nationalistic narrative.

Chapter Four

Media Reports in India-Pakistan Peace Processes: Examining Agra Summit and Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit

When a peace process is underway between two historically conflictual neighbouring countries, how do the media, especially print news behave? Do they overwhelmingly support the peace process or are they critical and sceptical of the initiatives. By their reportage what kind of consensus are they trying to from among their readers? Are they critical or supportive of the government? Are they trying to set an agenda of peace or an agenda of prolonged conflict? These are some of the questions that this chapter will be exploring. This chapter deals with the print media narratives of the peace processes between India and Pakistan, specifically the Agra Summit of 2001 and the Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit of 2009. For this purpose, Hindi and English newspapers have been used for each. The English newspapers examined are *The Times of India, Hindustan Times* and *The Hindu*. The Hindi newspapers used are the *Nav Bharat Times* and the *Rashtriya Sahara*. Analysing their reportage, an investigation has been made into the preparation for the talks and whether the newspaper was publishing hopeful or critical editorials and articles. The voice given to not only the government and the opposition parties but also various non-governmental organisations have been covered. The articles written by former diplomats have been focused upon along with articles on the role of the media itself.

The Agra Summit

The Agra Summit took place on the 14-16th July in 2001 between India and Pakistan. After the breakdown of relations during the Kargil War and India's stance that it would not deal with a military power that had come to power in Pakistan using unconstitutional means, the initiative to invite Pakistan for this dialogue was made by India. Vajpayee put forward the invitation to General Pervez Musharraf to come to India for a summit meeting (Dixit 2001:136). "Vajpayee's invitation of May 24th was accepted by Musharraf on May 27th. Dates for the Agra Summit was tentatively scheduled for mid-July, and took place between July 14 to 16th" (Dixit 2001:138). According to J N Dixit (2001:135-138), there were several reasons why India made this initiative. The Hurriyat faction in Kashmir had put a condition, that it would come

to a dialogue table with India only after it had spoken to Pakistan and by inviting Pakistan directly for a summit meeting, India wanted to build pressure on the Hurriyat (Dixit 2001:138). The other is that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir was relatively less violent but showed no chances of stabilising and the government was of the opinion that to change the situation positively, a bold step had to be taken (Dixit 2001:137). Lastly, India by making the first move also wanted to project a certain responsible image and will to the international community regarding peace between two nuclear neighbours (Dixit 2001:138).

Due to various reasons, the Summit ended up in a deadlock with no joint statement at the end. Pervez Musharraf left India without visiting the Dargah at Ajmer on the night of 16th of July (Dixit 2001: 138). The Annual Report of the MEA 2001-2002 states that the initiative for the Agra Summit by PM Vajpayee was built on the foundation of the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, "which commits both countries to pursue good neighbourly relations through dialogue and reconciliation" (MEA India 2001-2002: 8). The Indian PM stressed that in order to create an atmosphere of trust all issues should come up for discussion including Jammu and Kashmir. These issues included the issue of 54 POWs in Pakistani jails, extradition of terrorists, the treatment of pilgrims visiting Pakistan, trade and economic issues. However "President Musharraf focused almost exclusively on Jammu and Kashmir and re-stated well known Pakistani positions on Jammu and Kashmir" (MEA India 1999-2000: 8). Though India attempted to bridge this vast difference but had to abandon the effort in lieu of Pakistan's insistence on settling the Jammu and Kashmir issue as a precondition (MEA India 1999-2000: 8).Though there are many underlying and immediate reasons why this summit ended up in a deadlock, scholars and former diplomats have noted the "meddlesome" role of the media. J N Dixit writes,

> India and Pakistan particularly, instead of controlling and tempering the media's intrusive enthusiasm, consciously utilised the media as an instrument of high policy instead of focusing on the negotiations. Senior Ministers and Heads of Government do no hold press conferences while being engaged in the middle of important and sensitive negotiations, on the very subjects on which negotiations are taking place (Dixit 2001: 141).

Despite a lack of joint statement and Musharraf's abrupt departure from India, both governments publicly acknowledged separately that this should be seen not as a complete failure but as a beginning of resumption of engagement. The press conference held by Jaswant Singh and Abdul Sattar on the 17th of July deemed this to be a process towards normalisation of relations (Dixit 2001:142).

The Agra Summit in *Rashtriya Sahara* and *Nav Bharat Times*

Reportage from the Hindi Newspapers *Rashtriya Sahara* and the *Nav Bharat Times* have been analysed. July 11 saw a whole lot of articles relating to the meeting between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf. The first page had seven reports that informed the public about the preparation for the talks. For example, how PM Vajpayee had conducted a high profile meeting of the Cabinet Minsters to decide the agenda of the talks ("वाजपेयी ने बैठक की") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001a) and that there were 19 members in Musharraf's delegation ("मुशर्रफ के साथ 19 सदस्यीय दल आएंगे") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001b). The interesting article on the first page was about the fact that for the first time, visa had been given to around 90 Pakistani journalists who were travelling to India for covering the summit meeting, which was titled as "पत्रकारों की फ़ौज" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001c). There was a report on how Pakistan, especially, its then Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar were trying to derail the talks ("शिखर वार्ता[17] की राह में विवादों के कांटे बिछा रहे हैं सत्तर") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001d).

Picture 19: ("शिखर वार्ता की राह में विवादों के कांटे बिछा रहे हैं सत्तर"), *Rashtriya Sahara*, 11 July, 2001

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[17] Shikhar vaarta can be translated as meaning Summit Meeting.

However, the mood of the majority of the articles was upbeat with showcasing how various groups of people were preparing in their own ways for the meeting ("भारत पाक के शायर देंगे शांति भाईचारे का सन्देश" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001e).; शिखर वार्ता की सफलता के लिए दुआ की" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001f); लजीज चाट और जलेबी पेश किये जायेंगे मुशर्रफ़ को" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001g). Consistently there were articles on the status of the Prisoners of War and how the resolving of their status should be an important agenda in this meeting ("भारतीय युद्धबंधीयूं पर भी बात हो") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001h). This consistency of articles was also there for the issue regarding the invitation given to the leaders of The Hurriyat by Musharraf for a meeting on this trip ("भेट की उम्मीद, मुशर्रफ से मिलने देगी सरकार?" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001i); कश्मीरियों का प्रतिनिधित्व नहीं करता हुरियत") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001j).

An important article regarding the views of the then Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Farooq Abdullla was published with the title "शिखर वार्ता में जम्मू कश्मीर के किसी दल की भूमिका नहीं: फ़ारूक़" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001k). He argued that there should be absolutely no role for the Hurriyat in these talks. If given a role, this would be many steps away from peace. Since high hopes have been attached by many quarters, nothing should be allowed to derail these talks. Our PM should focus on cross border terrorism emanating from inside Pakistan.

The editorial page has three articles on this which were titled as "आखिर क्या हैं एजेंडा?" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001l); "एक दरगाह डेरा गाजी खां में" and "एक महत्वपूर्ण फैसला" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001m). The last article argues that though Musharraf is changing his statements daily, India is still making an effort to build a positive atmosphere before the talks by announcing policy changes relating to economy, trade and educational exchanges with Pakistan. If the Pakistani state responds with equal policies, then it can be said that the talks have been successful even before they began formally. There needs to be citizen to citizen relationships. Unfortunately Pakistan has

not been responding accordingly and moreover by inviting the Hurriyat has created an atmosphere of suspicion. Pakistan sponsored terrorism and peace process does not have any meaning. Also Pakistan should not except that we will treat Kashmir as a disputed main issue. It is an important part of Indian territory and has to be accepted as such by Pakistan (Rashtriya Sahara 2001m).

The important part of the reports on July 11, two days before the summit meeting not only shows a lot of hope but also presents a variety of perspectives of different groups/organisations. The various stakeholders that are given a voice are the State Government, the leaders of the Hurriyat, those groups opposing the Hurriyat, the Kashmiri Pandits, social scientists/academicians, statements by Musharraf's mother, various non-governmental organisations who are fighting for issues like human rights and the prisoners of war. What has been consistently covered is also the role that the media, both print and electronic in this summit. An interesting article titled "मीडिया प्रबंधन का दायित्व पत्र सूचना कार्यालय संभालेंगे", which means that the responsibility of media representation for the summit has been given to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting due to the insistence of its then Minister, Sushma Swaraj.

Picture 20: "मीडिया प्रबंधन का दायित्व पत्र सूचना कार्यालय संभालेंगे", *Rashtriya Sahara*, 11 July 2001.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Publicity Department will also be in touch with the Press Information Bureau (PIB). The broadcasting rights of the visit have been given to Doordarshan and Pakistan TV. Other channels would have to get their feedback from here. PIB would give coverage rights to around 800 journalists for this event. This is despite the fact that usually the MEA has its own broadcasting unit called the External Publicity (XP) Division[18] (Rashtriya Sahara 2001o).

On July 12, the majority of the articles quote the statements of the government which doubt the entire outcome of the talks. On the first page itself, the three articles are titled as "अटल को भी मुशर्रफ की मंशा पर शक" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001p); "एक ही बैठक में कश्मीर के हल की उम्मीद नहीं" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001q); "मुशर्रफ से कहेंगे, कश्मीर को पाकिस्तान में मिला ले" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001r). The first of these quotes Vajpayee in the NDA meeting as saying that Musharraf is not visiting India with an open mind. Vajpayee stated that Musharraf might want to talk only about Kashmir, but we shall talk about all other seven issues that we want to focus on including cross border terrorism. This article also states that in the tea party with the Hurriyat neither Jaswant Singh as the Foreign Minister, nor Chokila Iyer as the Foreign Secretary would be attendees. The government would be represented by another official from the MEA (Rashtriya Sahara 2001p). The second article quotes Musharraf from an interview given to Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV). He is quoted as having told the Pakistani National Security Council that he would make Kashmir the central agenda of the talks and that no solution to the problem can be brought about without the Kashmiris (Rashtriya Sahara 2001q). The second page on the 12th also has a quote from former Defence Minister of India, George Fernandes as saying that high hopes should be not attached to this meeting ("बहुत उम्मीद न लगाया जाये वार्ता से: फर्नांडेस") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001s).

The editorial on the 12th titled as "कश्मीर की रट" articulates a position where Pakistan's insistence on the centrality of the Kashmir agenda sidelining all other agenda's put forward by the Indian side including, business, educational, cultural and trade areas is problematic. By Pakistan's insistence, it is clear that it does not want to

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[18] This XP division nature and role will be dealt with in more detail in the fourth chapter.

improve relations but rather its aim is to seek international attention on the Kashmir issue. If it was serious about the success of the meeting, then it should have responded to India's favourable announcements in the same manner, but it ended up meeting the separatists of Kashmir. Overall this is an article which is very critical of the Pakistani behaviour at this stage

The most important article on July 12 is the one based on the then Spokesperson of the MEA, Nirupama Rao's press briefings on the issue. Her stance plays an important role of balancing out the extreme positions being taken by all perspectives. Despite Pakistan trying to make Kashmir the central issue, India looks at this meeting as important step towards building peace and friendship in a comprehensive and detailed way ("पाक के साथ व्यापक व विस्तृत बातचीत का इच्छुक हैं भारत"). India does not want to override the Kashmir issue but for the betterment and stability of future relations, what is required is a comprehensive dialogue. Such a comprehensive dialogue requires that we discuss trade and economic issues include the Most Favoured Nation status (Rashtriya Sahara 2001t). The other two important articles are regarding the media coverage for Musharraf's entire trip. They are titled as "शिखर वार्ता के मद्देनजर दूरसंचार विभाग भी तैयार" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001u), and "दिल्ली में कवरेज से वंचित रहेंगे मीडिया वाले (Rashtriya Sahara 2001v)".

Picture 21: "दिल्ली में कवरेज से वंचित रहेंगे मीडिया वाले", *Rashtriya Sahaa*, 12 Juy 2001

It states that the journalists from the print media have not been allowed passes for the coverage and that they would have to rely on news agencies for their information. The PIB and MEA have given passes only to journalists from electronic media, mostly Doordarshan and PTV (Rashtriya Sahara 2001v).

On the July 13, one day before the start of the summit meeting, the headlines on the first page states that the foreign minister Jaswant Singh has said that Kashmir is not an issue but India's heart and hence there can be no negotiation on it ("कश्मीर भारत का दिल, इस पर कोई सौदेबाजी नहीं"). Absolutely dismissing the talks of referendum, he said that cross border terrorism, the status of minorities inside Pakistan and prisoners of war would be discussed. It was also clearly stated that the invitation given to the Hurriyat by the Pakistani High Commissioner has been a major disappointment to India (Rashtriya Sahara 2001w). If this was the statement from India's side, one day before the conference, there was also a strong statement from the Pakistani side in the media. This article, given on the first page itself is titled "कश्मीर मसले के हल में देरी खतरनाक: मुशर्रफ". Musharraf had given a statement in the Pakistani media that India's lackadaisical attitude towards the solving of the Kashmir issue can be dangerous. He also stated that he expected that each and every aspect of the Kashmir issue would be discussed in an elaborate manner in the ensuing summit meeting and he believes that Vajpayee would also keep similar attitude. Also the Pakistani Defence Spokesperson Major General Rashid Qureshi has stated that he is curious as to why meeting with the Hurriyat is being made such a big issue when the Pakistani High Commissioner has been inviting with them on other important occasions (Rashtriya Sahara 2001x). As is evident, one day before the meeting, both sides have upped the ante by declaring and reiterating their main agendas which are diverging, hence moving towards a deterministic limbo. There is also one article which quotes a regional leader of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) as saying that Musharraf should ask for forgiveness for the Kargil conspiracy before the summit meeting ("मुशर्रफ कारगिल षडयन्त्र के लिए माफ़ी मांगे") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001y) .

On the 13th itself, ("दिल्ली में पत्रकार को संबोधित करेंगे मुशर्रफ") it is reported that Musharraf would be addressing the Indian press in Delhi. It quotes a Pakistani diplomat as saying that a consensus has not been reached regarding a joint press conference between Vajpayee and Musharraf. But regardless of whether a joint conference is held, Musharraf would be meeting the Indian Press. The media was informed that India had requested that Musharraf meet the media only after going back, which was denied. The Pakistani diplomat also said that a joint statement would be released at the end of the talks. Also that during the meeting, Musharraf would offer an invitation to Vajpayee to visit Pakistan (Rashtriya Sahara 2001z).

Another important article on the July 13 on is regarding the suggestions given by former Foreign Ministers of India regarding the summit meeting "पूर्व विदेश सचिव का सुझाव, बातचीत कश्मीर पर हो".

Picture 22: "पूर्व विदेश सचिव का सुझाव, बातचीत कश्मीर पर हो", *Rashtriya Sahara*, 13 July, 2001

Former Indian High Commissioners to Pakistan and former Foreign Secretaries have suggested that the main agenda between PM Vajpayee and President Musharraf should be Kashmir. This is because Kashmir has been a roadblock to relations between the two countries and we have even had two wars on this issue. This suggestion was given in response to the Central Governments seeking suggestions from our former diplomats. The diplomats also criticized the invitation given out to Musharraf without any preparations from the Indian side, especially without undertaking any comprehensive discussion with foreign affairs subject specialists,

other political parties and former foreign ministers. The diplomats who gave this suggestion were Ambassador Maharaj Krishna Rasgotra, Romesh Bhandari, S.K. Singh, Muchkund Dubey, J.N. Dixit, S. P Venkateshwara, Jagat Mehta, S. K Lamba, G Parthasarathy among others (Rashtriya Sahara 2001aa).

On the 14th of July, which is the day of Musharraf's arrival to India, the first page of the newspaper is full of welcome quotes from famous personalities in India like Lata Mangeshkar, Bismillah Khan, Amitabh Bachchan, Dev Anand, Johnny Walker, Shyam Benegal, Sourav Ganguly and others. By representing the quotes of non-official famous people on the first page, the paper was acting as medium of public diplomacy. The centre of the page has a long welcome address titled "सहारा इंडिया परिवार का पैगाम" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001ab). It starts with a four lines poem which says, "पहनाएँगे ईनको ताज, जब अटल मुशर्रफ आज देंगे मोहब्बत का पैगाम" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001ac). The newspaper is clearly showing a welcoming and positive attitude with this welcome address, in fact bordering on the level of idealism regarding the relations between the two countries.

Picture 23: "सहारा इंडिया परिवार का पैगाम", *Rashtriya Sahara*, 14 July, 2001

It states that all the people of India and Pakistan are hoping for the summit's success. There should never been a division line in between India and Pakistan in the first place but which has happened and unfortunately created a distasteful and negative mental division between the people. People of both sides do not want war and in reality they are imposed on us. Hence both countries should sign a kind of treaty of non-aggression. When leaders will meet in love, the antagonism between the people will also die down leading to a lessening of terrorist activities. There should even be a joint Hind-Pak cricket and hockey team the article suggested.

However, after such an idealistic welcome and pictures of various groups of people praying for the peace, one can see that the statements given by the leaders to the media showing hardened stances of both the sides, especially regarding the main agenda. On the third page, the MEA India is quoted as saying that Kashmir is not the main agenda and India is going to raise all other relevant issues. But MEA's spokesperson is also quoted as stating that a beginning has been made after the Kargil fiasco ("इंतज़ार की घड़ियां खत्म, मुशर्रफ आज आएंगे") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001ad).

There is also an article ("शिमला समझौता व लाहौर घोषणा कारगर नहीं") where Musharraf is saying that the Shimla Agreement of 1972 and the Lahore Declaration of 1999 are not effective. He also went to say that if India shows the sensitivity to solving the Kashmir issue, then he can extend his stay in India by another 48 hours (Rashtriya Sahara 2001ae). On the other hand PM Vajpayee ("पुराने झगड़े मिटाकर खुले मन से आये") is quoted as saying that though we have not forgotten Kargil, but in hope for a better future, we are ready to bury our differences. (Rashtriya Sahara 2001af). Hence both sides are firm on their narratives. There were some articles on the 14th also representing the perspective of some groups who take a more hard line approach to India's initiative with Pakistan. For example, "बाल ठाकरे की चेतावनी, मुशर्रफ के सामने घुटने मत टेकना" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001ag); "मुशर्रफ के खिलाफ संसद मार्ग पर प्रदर्शन" (Rashtriya Sahara 2001ah), where the former article reports Bal Thackeray's warning to Vajpayee not to bend in the negotiations and the latter

article reports the protest demonstrations against Musharraf's visit by members of the Hindu Mahasabha at in front of the Parliament in New Delhi.

On the July 14, the *Nav Bharat Times* published an article by former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral titled "गुफ़्तगू बंद न हो, बात से बात चलें" (Conversations should not stop; talks should lead to more talks). He starts off by asking whether Musharraf has landed in India after reading the lecture of the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin which was given in 1996 in Pakistan Senate. Jiang Zemin had visited Pakistan after he had visited India in 1996. Jiang Zemin in the lecture had stated that "..हलाकि चीन और भारत के बीच बॉर्डर का विवाद सुलझा नहीं, लेकिन फिर भी दोनों देशों ने तय किया हैं की बॉर्डर पे शांति बनाए रखेंगे और आसान मुद्दो को पहले सुलजाते हुवे धीरे धीरे मुश्किल मुद्दों की ओर बढ़ेंगे" (though the border conflict between India and China is not resolved, both the countries have decided that maintaining peace at the border, they will solve easier issues first and slowly move towards solving difficult issues). By quoting this statement from Jiang Zemin, I. K. Gujral was directly trying to convey to Pakistan that it is better to move to other areas on discussion, rather than to keep harping on Kashmir, which is a difficult issue. I. K. Gujral further argues that though some of the statements of President Musharraf and the scheduled meeting with the Hurriyat have become major irritants, he is not hopeless with regard to the outcome of this summit. The fact that both countries could move on from the Kargil conflict is a big positive development in itself. Warning the Indian public not to attach high hopes with these talks being swayed by the media rhetoric, he writes that difficult issues will take time to resolve. He writes "शांति किसी घटना का नहीं, प्रक्रिया का नाम होता हैं" (peace is not the name of an event, rather it is the name of a process) (Gujral 2001).

The 15th of July mostly has articles that focus on the positive aspects of the meeting. The topmost report quotes Musharraf's statement that using soldiers is not the solution to solving the Kashmir issue ("मुशर्फ ने कहा कि कश्मीर मसले का सैनिक हल नहीं"). He is quoted to have said that in the new century, we have to forget the

past and think about our future generations and move on to a new level of relationships (Rashtriya 2001ai). Other two articles report that by giving a tribute to the Mahatma Gandhi's remains, Musharraf has created history ("बापू को श्रद्धांजलि देकर, मुशर्रफ ने इतिहास बनाया") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001aj), and that the Pakistani national tune was played at our Presidential house for the first time ("राष्ट्र भवन में पहली बार बजी पाक राष्ट्रीय धुन") (Rashtriya Sahara 2001ak).

However there is on the first page another article that reports how Musharraf was cornered by the then Home Minster of India, Mr. L.K. Advani in their 20 minute talk. It is titled, "अडवाणी ने मुशर्रफ से कहा सीमा पार से आतंकवाद पर लगाम लगाइये". He also raised the issue of extradition of underworld don Dawood Ibrahim and those accused of the Kandahar plane hijack in December 1999. He said that, one of the released terrorists, Masood Azhar was in Pakistan and had opened an organisation called the Jaish-e-Mohammed to conduct terror activities inside India. Advani is also reported to have raised the issue of cross border terrorism by presenting credible evidence and asked Musharraf to control it. It is written that Musharraf seemed to have given a positive response to Advani's statements regarding the extradition of terrorists but he bluntly refused Dawood Ibrahim or any other mafia gangster being there inside Pakistan (Rashtriya Sahara 2001al).

The *Nav Bharat Times* has published a lot of people's opinion on the summit on the July 15. The article is titled "क्या कामयाब हो पायेगी आज की ये कोशिश" (Will today's effort lead to a success).

Picture 24: "क्या कामयाब हो पायेगी आज की ये कोशिश", *Nav Bharat Times*, 15 July 2001

It quotes the views of both ordinary people and great personalities in the country like lyricist Gulzar, singer Naushad Ali, historian Bipin Chandra, former Indian Police Service officer K.P.S. Gill, fashion designer Jatin Kochhar and script writer Kamleshwar. Their opinions are diverse, with some having hope from these talks to some being hopeless. Gulzar sees positivity in the meeting as it is symbolic that at least both the countries have moved on from the deadlock to talking. Naushad Ali attaches hope and displays his delight at the meeting of the two leaders. Bipin Chandra is of the view that no matter what the outcome, conversations between the two countries should keep taking place. Gill's comments were critical of meeting and even called it a mere media event. Kochhar being critical of the political class stated that it is best that both countries should move forward. Kamleshwar gives a reasoned argument by stating that the best possible outcome of the meeting would be that the two countries keep talking (Nav Bharat Times 2001e). The comments of the ordinary public are also given along with the photographs. With most of the comments being hopeful about the talks, the title given to this amalgamation is "आम आदमी को बड़ी उम्मीद इस वार्ता से" (Nav Bharat Times 2001f).

The editorial of the Nav Bharat Times (2001) on July 16 is titled "सकारात्मक संकेत" meaning positive signs. The editorial states that though there were some irritants during the summit process, Musharraf's statement that there can be no military solution to Kashmir in the dinner hosted by President K.R. Narayan seems to light a new hope for the summit. Also when PM Vajpayee's meeting with Musharraf, which was supposed to be only for fifteen minutes went on for nearly one and a half hours, then this sent a signal that both sides are genuinely trying their best for its success. The editorial also states that "दोनों देशों को अपने अपने कब्जे या हिस्से वाले कश्मीर से संतोष करना होगा और वहा के लोगो को वो सभी नागरिक अधिकार और अज़ादिया देनी होगी, जो देश के सेष लोगो को मिली हुई हैं" (Both countries should be satisfied with their part of Kashmir and move on to giving citizenship rights and freedom to the people of both sides). The editorial further states that a country does not only mean geography and history but people and people of the same country cannot be treated differently in different regions (Nav Bharat Times 2001g).

With Musharraf leaving the country on the of 16th July, the title of the headlines on the July 17 were "शिखर पर पहुँचने से पहले ही विफल हो गयी आगरा वार्ता- परवेज़ मुशर्रफ कश्मीर के मसले पर अड़े रहे, वाजपेयी ने आतंकवाद का मुद्दा उठाया" (The Agra Summit failed before reaching the summit- Musharraf stuck to the Kashmir issue whereas Vajpayee raise the issue of terrorism) (Nav Bharat Times 2001i). On the first page itself, there is another article titled "सुषमा के बयान से भड़का पाकिस्तानी पक्ष" where it is stated that in the statement that was given by her on the July 15 in the then capacity as Minister on Information and Broadcasting, it was said that Vajpayee and Musharraf had a conversation on four issues and Kashmir was not included in this list of four.

Picture 25: "सुषमा के बयान से भड़का पाकिस्तानी पक्ष" *Nav Bharat Times*, 15 July 2001

Hence according to observers, this angered the Pakistan delegation as it made it would make it seem to their home audience, that they could not defend their interest in the talks with India (Nav Bharat Times 2001j). The editorial on the July 17 which is titled "आगरा में असंयम" criticises this uncontrolled statements and is of the view that such to and fro statements between both the sides have led to the failure of diplomacy (Nav Bharat Times 2001k). .

After the lapse of the talks, there were a lot of editorials debating the reason for its failure and suggesting the future course of action. The Congress Party as the opposition also said that the talks failed because there were no proper preparations for it. In fact Natwar Singh had given a statement that "वार्ता तो नहीं, सरकार जरूर असफल हुई" (talks did not fail but the government surely failed). Natwar Singh had

also said that Musharraf was better prepared than India not only in terms of strategy but also influencing the media. His breakfast with the Indian journalists made sure that he collected more brownie point which became akin to submitting us to a media war (Singh 2001). However, providing a balanced outlook to the purported result of the talks, the Foreign Ministers of both countries held press conferences and deemed that the talks did not end in complete failure and has to be seen as a resumption of engagement. The headlines on the July 18 hence states "भारत पाक ने कहा, बात अधूरी रही पर नाकाम नहीं" (Nav Bharat Times 2001h).

Agra Summit in *Times of India* and *Hindustan Times*

The reportage in the *Times of India* and *Hindustan Times* before the Agra Summit was balanced in terms of levels of positivity and negativity. Some articles were critical of the agenda of the summit and very sceptical about the outcomes considering the nature of the Pakistani state and the past precedent. Some heralded it as a step in the correct direction. The space was fairly divided into encouragement and moving ahead with caution on the one hand and inhibition on the other hand.

The titles of some of the discouraging and cautioning reports were "Agra Summit is a futile effort, says Altaf Hussain" (Ahmed 2001); "Agra summit may not provide all the answers" (Guha 2001); "Agra summit has 'made in U.S.' tag attached to it" (Joshi 2001); "Pakistan must vacate Kargil peaks before the Agra summit" (The Times of India 2001). The article by Rashmee Z. Ahmed on July 2 in *The Times of India* (Ahmed 2001) quoted a leader of a Pakistani political party MQM (Muttahadi Quami Movement) delegitimizing the summit as General Musharraf was not an elected representative of the Pakistani people and any deal signed hence might be rejected by the next democratic head of the government. The article also quoted him as saying that dialogue was the only way to move ahead on India Pakistan relations (Ahmed 2001). On July 12, *Hindustan Times* on the front page published an article titled "Kashmir fixation vs composite dialogue" by Udayan Namboodiri. This article clearly laid out the different agendas of the two countries for the meeting. He writes that both have resorted to "diplomatic brinkmanship" in repeating their main agendas. "While Pakistan maintains it (Kashmir) is the core issue, India steadfastly replies that Kashmir is just one of the issues bedevilling bilateral ties" (Namboodiri 2001). Due to

Pakistan's sole focus on Kashmir, Musharraf's delegation did not include the Trade Minister or the Finance Minister. India had included these ministers in the delegation for the meeting (Namboodiri 2001). Hence there is a sense of pessimism regarding the outcome of the meeting.

The article on July 12 titled "Pakistan must vacate Kargil peaks before the Agra summit" by Rashmee Z. Ahmed (Ahmed 2001b) outlined the demands made by the leader of one of the political parties in India, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), R.K. Anand. He was quoted as saying that contrary to popular perceptions, Pakistan still occupied some points in Kargil despite India having claimed that it won the Kargil War. He demanded that these points needed to be vacated before any dialogue could start. He also questioned the government on the status of LOC and POK and asked it to clarify its stance. The article by Manoj Joshi) titled "Agra summit has 'made in U.S.' tag attached to it" (Joshi 2001) in *The Times of India* probed the angle of the intervention of United States in making this summit take place. Moreover, *Hindustan Times*published the statements of India's former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral on July 12. Gujral had criticised the demeanour and diplomatic approach of Musharraf and stated that it seemed as if Musharraf was virtually holding a pistol to our head to talk on the agenda of Kashmir. He was also quoted to have said that the guests should respect the sensitivities of the host nation, which Pakistan had failed to do by inviting the Hurriyat Conference for the reception of Musharraf . Overall these articles were sceptical of the outcome of the summit and cautioned the government.

In *The Hindustan Times*, J. N. Dixit, India' former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, published an article on July 12 titled "No euphoria please". Ambassador Dixit clearly delineates the different objectives of this meeting for both India and Pakistan. For India, it is an amalgamation of not only stopping cross border terrorism but also starting conversations on other issue areas of socio-economic sphere for mutual benefit. For Pakistan, on the other hand, the main agenda is the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Though for both the common agenda is that of bringing back on rails and stabilising the relationship after the Kargil fiasco, their separate agendas are very different. Importantly, Gujral also underlines the domestic contradictions within Pakistan. He writes "political parties in Pakistan, which have been marginalised by Musharraf, are opposed to the summit....because he is not an

elected leader. Jehadi groups have announced that they will continue the violence regardless of the summit and its decisions". Ambassador Dixit hence warns the public against any kind of euphoria with regard to the outcome of the summit (Dixit 2001).

Some articles/reporters heralded it as a step in the right direction, while at the same time, adding on what more could be done to remedy the conflict prone relationship between the two nuclear armed neighbours. In a historically detailed argument in *The Times of India*, Manoj Joshi (2001) argued that more steps should be taken towards nuclear confidence building measures as the risk was too high for not having mutually defined understandings of nuclear issues and structures. He wrote, "Given the hostile nature of Indo-Pak relations, practical and verifiable agreements to reduce the risk of war are perhaps more important than grand declarations of intentions, that seldom amount to much" (Joshi 2001). Hindustan Timeseven published an article on the July 10 by a Professor at Peshawar University, Qadim Mossarat, titled "Open your heart". He argues that both countries should educate the masses on the need of co-operation.

> The media should be used to promote positive gestures. Once public opinion is moulded in favour of co-operation, the political leaders will be less frightened of taking a step forward (Mossarat 2001).

He also outlines other steps that both countries need to take in order to progress. Some of the suggestions include "designing a scenario of interacting steps"; "apologising for mistakes"; "mobilising resources of communication"; "delinking of disputes and opportunities" and mostly importantly, "deal with misperceptions and underlying fears" (Mossarat 2001).

Siddhart Varadarajan (2001), in an article titled "Not Just Pakistan-India Too Needs Success at Agra" on July 12 in *The Times of India*, outlined how both countries had set the wrong motivations for coming together and wrongly perceived that a failure of the summit would hurt the other party more than itself domestically. Sincere efforts towards dialogue needed to be made by both sides and New Delhi should most importantly make an effort to win the hearts and minds of the Kashmiris as years of violence due to militancy had alienated the people (Varadarajan 2001a). *The Times of India* carried forward the tradition of publishing articles from Pakistani newspapers, similar to the practice it had adopted during the Kargil War ("Agra is not Shimla or Lahore" by Najam Sethi in *The Friday Times;* Ardeshir Cowasji's column in the

Dawn) Though this time, it was not under a separate section called "the other side" like it was during the Kargil War reportage. *Hindustan Times* also similarly published articles from Pakistani newspapers under the section "View from the Other Side" which most of the times included articles by Khalid Mahmud, former editor of the Pakistani newspaper, *The Nation*.

Interestingly, there was a report on how the electronic media were already preparing for the reportage titled "Summit of Peace causes channels to go to War" by Nupur Mahajan and Smita Deshmukh (2001) published on July 7 in *The Times of India*. On July 15, Hindustan Timespublished a very critical article about the role of the television news channels by Poonam Saxena titled "Musharraf, and nothing else". Regarding the obsession of the new channels with Musharraf, Saxena writes sarcastically, "short of informing us about the brand of toothpaste General Musharraf will use while he's in India, satellite new channels...are continuing to tell everything else." (Saxena 2001).

The reports when the summit was ongoing were optimistic. The headlines on the front page of *Hindustan Times*on the 16th of July stated "SO FAR, SO GOOD. The editorial states that both sides seemed optimistic after the first one-to-one meeting between PM Vajpayee and President Musharraf (Hindustan Times 2001f). The editorial of *The Times of India* on the 16th of July stated "The indications from Agra, as we go by the press, are happily positive". It went to state that after the Kargil War, that this summit could be held in the first place, was an achievement in itself (The Times of India 2001h). The fact that articles have cited Pakistani journalists as sources of information clearly showed that not only were Indian journalists were in touch with their Pakistani counterparts but also that Pervez Musharraf maintained close links with his media at home and was using them as a medium of communication writes Varadarajan (2001) in an article titled "Agra Summit may kickstart Indo-Pak dialogue" (Varadarajan 2001b). On the 16th itself, another article ("The chemistry is right now, for peace formula") stated that the fact that both parties were consulting each other on what to tell the press showed signs of progress and the upbeat mood. It also mentioned that as of now, both parties had decided not to speak to the media at all in order to prevent unnecessary speculation (The Times of India 2001i).

The reportage on July 17 (General Musharraf had hastily left India on the previous night before a joint statement) was sombre but not nihilistic regarding the action for dialogue taken. The article on 17th titled "Agra Summit yo-yos, trips on terms of disagreement" reported how the two leaders met one-on-one on many occasions in order, but in the end could not come to an agreement. Despite this failure, both governments had agreed to continue the dialogue process hence initiated (The Times of India 2001j). The headline of *Hindustan Times* is "Summit comes to dead end" with the sub-headlines "But at least it was a beginning, says India" (Hindustan Times 2001g). The same line was pursued by the press conference on the 17th by the two foreign ministers, India's Jaswant Singh and Pakistan's Abdul Sattar as written by Seema Guha in "Foreign ministers dub summit a 'start', not a failure" in *The Times of India* (Guha 2001). Editorials were published thereafter on the possible best explanations of whether the summit was to be considered a failure or a success, and if it failed, then what could have been the causes, and the steps to be taken forthwith. For example in *The Times of India*, the following articles were published, "Agra Flawed from Start-Pakistan is the Real Core Issue" (Joshi 2001b); "Message from Agra-Let's Resolve Kashmir Internally" (Ram 2001) and "India, Pak focus on gains in Agra balance sheet" (Padgaonkar 2001). The editorial of Hindustan Times on the July 18 titled as "Neither success nor failure" aimed to make the public look forward towards solutions instead of getting into a blame game mode. It states that the one purpose that the summit served was to show how the common people on both sides desired peace. (Hindustan Times 2001h).

HINDUSTAN TIMES

Neither success nor failure

ASHKENT, SIMLA, Lahore and now Agra. The city of Taj Mahal has joined the other three to become yet another landmark in the turbulent history of India-Pakistan relations. Unlike what happened in the first three, no agreements were signed in Agra. But that shouldn't cause too much disappointment because the earlier pacts haven't made much of a difference to mutual ties, which have remained fraught with tension and mistrust. Instead of moaning over what did not happen in Agra, therefore, it might be better to regard it as neither a success nor a failure. After the initial unhappiness has subsided and the blame game is played out, it will be more to the point to pick up the threads and start all over again.

In fact, the references to a re-engagement made by both the sides point to the intention of continuing the dialogue. Some of the framework is apparently already in place, such as the number of times the high dignitaries of the two countries can meet and the subjects which they can discuss, which include terrorism. For a start, it is more than likely that the two heads of government will meet in a few months' time while attending the UN General Assembly session in New York. President Pervez Musharraf's invitation to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to visit Pakistan, and his acceptance, still stand. Only a time convenient for both remains to be fixed. The two of them seem to get on well together. General Musharraf has acknowledged that he respects and honours Mr Vajpayee. So, it is not the end of the road for either country if only because both seem to realise not only the urgency of a reconciliation but also the deep desire for peace among the common people. Indeed, if the Agra summit has served a purpose, it is to emphasise how the average person in the two countries looks forward to a settlement.

In contrast, the only people who will be pleased at the latest turn of events are the hawks, especially in Pakistan who have been issuing warnings against "trusting" India and pledging to carry on their *jehad*. There may well be an upsurge of violence in the Valley and elsewhere. But no one will know better than the political establishment in Islamabad how such a revival of the *jehadi* enterprise will undermine Pakistan's present strenuous efforts to portray itself as a moderate Islamic country. India, too, has its own share of loonies, but their numbers and influence are minuscule. At the moment, there is hardly any dissenting voice among the major political parties in India on the initiative taken by Mr Vajpayee to reach out to Pakistan. In fact, Pakistanis, too, seem to admire him for his gestures, including the use of the word *"insaniyat"* (humanity) to settle disputes. There is reason to believe, therefore, that the efforts for a rapprochement have not reached a dead end.

Picture 26: "Neither Success nor failure", *Hindustan Times*, 18 July 2001.

The electronic media in India and Pakistan was very active during the Agra Summit. Hence the nature of its reportage was also covered by the print. Especially post the summit, a number of articles have commented on the role of the electronic media. The most scathing attack on its role has been made by Shastri Ramachandaran in an article titled "Indian Soap Trick-Summit as Entertainment" published on July 20 in *The Times of India*. Ramachandaran, shows how the media turned Musharraf into an object of fascination by commenting on his dress, mannerisms, the emotional meeting with his childhood nanny and others completing neglecting the fact that this was the same person India had accused of being behind the Kargil War (Ramchandran 2001).

This completely changed the nature of the discourse from focusing on the goals and objectives of the summit to being held hostage to Musharraf's "charm offensive". This article by Ramachandaran (2001) is not only critical of the electronic media but also of the government's response to it. Hinting at such a hyperactive reportage, Jaswant Singh had made a statement after the summit that "When it comes to bilateral or international issues, we do not and cannot negotiate through the media" (Ramachandaran 2001). This response is critiqued by Ramachandaran (2001) in this article that in a democracy, the public has a right to know about vital international interactions. He wrote,

> While negotiations cannot be conducted through the media, to deny the public information that is vital for a sense of security based on peace on or borders amounts to repudiating the involvement of large sections in the process towards reconciliation....Instead of harping about General Musharraf's media overkill and breach of confidentiality, the best way out, and the most credible step forward, would be for GOI to keep giving its side of the story (Ramachandran 2001).

Many other articles commented on the role of electronic media during the summit. Siddhart Varadarajan (2001) wrote about how Musharraf's breakfast meeting with Indian editors and the fact that it was televised ended up irking the Indian Cabinet in an article titled "How the Agra Summit lost its way" (varadarajan 2001c). The editorial of *Hindustan Times* on July 17 clearly stated that the Agra Summit failed "because of the hardline stand he (Musharraf) took during his breakfast meeting with media personnel" with regard to discussing only Kashmir. Roger Pereira (2001), in an article titled "Did India lose the PR war to a tele-savvy Musharraf at the Agra

Summit", argued how this episode should serve as a learning experience for the Indian bureaucracy that in times of the information and communications revolution, transparency and ample information became an imperative on the part of the government (Pereira 2001). In response to the criticisms of the government's mishandling of the media, PM Vajpayee was quoted by a report on July 25 ("PM sticks to his guns on Agra Summit") as saying "We are not looking for propaganda advantage or seeking to score debating points. We will engage in quiet, serious diplomacy" (The Times of India 2001k).

Sharm el-Sheikh Summit between India and Pakistan in the Print Media

The heads of governments of India and Pakistan talked for the first time after the Mumbai terror attacks on 26th November 2008 on the sidelines of the NAM (Non Aligned Movement) Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt on the 16th of July 2009. This was seen as a thawing of relations between the two nuclear armed neighbours. However, the Indian government faced a backlash in the Indian media for the decision taken during the summit. The Joint Statement released following the summit stated that Dr. Manmohan Singh and Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani had a constructive meeting were the entire range of relations was discussed (MEA 2009). It also stated that since terrorism is a threat to both countries, both leaders affirmed to co-operate with each other to fight this menace. Pakistan reiterated that it had provided an updated dossier on the investigations of the Mumbai Terror attacks to which India said that the review was under process (MEA 2009). The statement put forward the principle that dialogue was the only way forward and that "action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues" (MEA, 2009). The move to delink dialogue and action on terrorism was pointed to in both print and electronic media as a major step down by the Indian leadership. Such a backlash may have led to a delay in the rapprochement that was initiated by the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit meeting.

Reports in *Nav Bharat Times*

Reports from the 10th of July to 20th of July have been analysed in the Nav Bharat Times. On the 10th of July, there is an article titled "नाम के बैठक में पाकिस्तान से

पूछेगा भारत- 26/11 के कसूरवार पर क्या कार्रवाई की?". The article states that the Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani needs to answer in this meeting at Egypt, what all steps has been taken with regard to not only the stopping of terror activities emanating from Pakistani soil but also what concrete steps have been taken with regard to the perpetrators of the heinous 26/11 attacks in India. The main agenda of the meeting between PM Manmohan Singh and PM Gilani on the sidelines of the NAM Summit on the 15th and 16th of July will be the steps taken by Pakistan against terrorism. PM Singh had stated that in his meeting in Russia a month before with President Zardari, he had taken a promise that before this meeting in Egypt, he would have to tell what steps had been taken by Pakistan with regards to terrorism (Nav Bharat Times 2009l). A related article is titled "पाक के कबूलनामे हैं जरदारी का बयान" (Zardari's statement is symbolic of Pakistan's acceptance to its faults). Zardari had stated that the Pakistani state had been responsible for encouraging the terrorists. This statement has been accepted by India and now expects that this policy would be changing (Nav Bharat Times 2009m).

Nav Bharat Times has a tradition of analysing the reports from the Pakistani print media, mainly the reports from *Daily Times*, Pakistan. These articles are usually printed on the editorial page under the generic titles of "Across the Border". *Daily Times*, a Pakistani paper owned by Salmaan Taseer is known to have secular and liberal ideology. Salmaan Taseer, a businessman turned politician and Governor of Punjab, was assassinated by his own bodyguard for speaking against the blasphemy law in Pakistan in 2011. On the 10th of July, it has an article titled "नयी तालिबनी नीति". It states that the *Daily Times* has reported that the security structure is changing in Pakistan. Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari in a recent meeting with the bureaucratic community stated that Pakistan's previous policy towards terrorism was wrong (Nav Bharat Times 2009n). Hence the *Nav Bharat Times* has published an article from the *Daily Times* which quotes President Zardari as accepting their wrong policy towards the extremists and terrorists.

On the 11th of July, there is an article on how Ajmal Kasab had received his training from the Pakistani marines. There are reports of Ajmal Kasab's trail both before and after the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit. On the same day, in the editorial section "Across the Border" there is an article which has quoted a Pakistani newspaper called *The News International*. This article talks about the domestic problems being faced by the people of Pakistan due to rise in petrol and other consumer/food items. On the 12th of July, on the first page itself, there is a statement given by PM Manmohan Singh, where he is saying that he had had a conversation with President Zardari last month in Russia. On the basis of this conversation, the High Commissioners have spoken and conversations have also taken place with the ISI Chief and the Foreign Department The same day, on the international page there is a report which iterates the statement of Pakistani Internal Affairs Minister Rehman Malik. He has said that the hearing of those accused for the Mumbai Terror attacks will soon take place. However, India also needs to be blamed for the delay in the investigations as it did not submit enough proof sooner. India has totally denied such allegations and demanded that Pakistan give clear reasons for the release of Hafiz Saeed

One day before the beginning of the NAM Summit, on the 14th of July, an article titled "आतंकवाद पर भारत व पाक में होगी बातचीत". It is clearly mentioned here that the two foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan are meeting one day before the meeting of the Prime Ministers, in order to assess what progress Pakistan has made with regard to punishing the perpetrators of the 26/11 attacks. The main agenda of the talks between India's Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and his counterpart, Salman Bashir would be terrorism and Pakistan's actions against it. The report also reiterates PM Manmohan Singh's meeting with President Zardari in Yekaterinburg (Russia) on the sidelines of the SCO (Shanghai Co-operation Organisation Summit) a month before. It is written that in that meeting, Singh had clearly stated in front of the media to Zardari that he take strict action against those perpetrating terror from his soil (Nav Bharat Times 2009o). In the editorial on this day, under the section on "Across the Border", the report is titled "जुर्म कबूल". The subtitle of this section states "मैत्री भाव सीमा के आर पार". The report states that the Pakistani government has accepted the blame for the 26/11 attacks for the first time. It quotes from the Pakistani

paper *Daily Times* as having reported that the information given by the Interior Affairs Minister, Rehman Malik on Sunday was new for the Pakistani public. Pakistan has completed the investigation in 76 days and has come to the conclusion that the main group behind the 26/11 attacks is Lashkar-e-taiba. Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhavi had hatched and implemented it with other people like Hammad Amin, Mazarh Iqbal, Abdul Wajeed and Shahid Jameel. This revelation by the authorities shows that Pakistan is serious with regard to action on terrorism to India and plus it will change public opinion of the Pakistani public (Nav Bharat Times 2009p). The media in both India and Pakistan, as of the moment are trying to create an atmosphere favourable to the upcoming meeting between PM Singh and PM Gillani at Egypt.

However on the 15th of July, there are new facts that come up that change the narrative and the editorial pieces become sceptical of the upcoming meeting between PM Singh and PM Zardari on the 16th of July. A report on the first page on this day is titled "साईद के खिलाफ अपील वापस लेने का फैसला".

Picture 27: "साईद के खिलाफ अपील वापस लेने का फैसला", *Nav Bharat Times*, 15 July 2009

It states that the provincial government of Punjab in Pakistan had decided to take the back the petition against the release of Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) chief, Hafiz Saaed, due to lack of evidence. Despite being the main accused in the Mumbai terror attacks, the Lahore High Court had given a judgement to release him on the 2nd of June. The Pakistani government had appealed against this judgement and the hearing was to take place on the 16th of July. The Punjab government had said in the court that it wants to

take this appeal back due to lack of enough evidence as the Central Government of Pakistan had not provided all the evidence to the State Government. This action by the Punjab Government was taken a few hours before the meeting between the meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan (Nav Bharat Times 2009q). This created a domestic backlash in India regarding the intentions of the Pakistani government. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) cautioned the government that before going ahead with talks with Pakistan, they should seek a clarification regarding the status of Hafiz Saaed ("साईद पर पाक से सफाई मांगे सरकार: बीजेपी"). India's then Foreign Minister, S. M. Krishna also stated that Pakistan should do some visible investigation and action on Hafiz Saaed (Nav Bharat Times 2009r).

On the day of the meeting, the 16th of July, the international page states that PM Manmohan Singh declared in the NAM Summit that countries should not give shelter to terrorists. Although not taking Pakistan's name directly, this was a strong statement made one day before the meeting with PM Gillani. The editorial on this day raises strong doubts on the intentions of the Pakistani government ("अपील वापस"). The fact that the Punjab provincial government taking back the appeal against the release of Hafiz Saaed on the basis of lack of evidence shows the dubious nature of its diplomacy. The editorial states that the different stances taken in Pakistan by the Central (led by Pakistan People's Party: PPP) and Punjab provincial government (led by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz: PML-N) seems to be a corrugation. But one should not see Pakistan's domestic politics with such simplicity as the Army and religious fundamentalists have more of a say in politics matters there. The State does not make an effort to change its own political structure that values such extremism. In such a situation one cannot hope for official genuine talks to begin between the two countries. This editorial, by pointing out the domestic convoluted political structure in Pakistan points to the fact that talks might not be favourable in such a situation (Nav Bharat Times 2009s).

Concurrently with what took place on the 16th meeting, on the 17th of July, the first page of the newspaper states "डायलाग अभी नहीं". It states that India has given up on the condition that it will not have official talks with Pakistan until punishment is given

to the 26/11 perpetrators. This however did not mean that this was the resumption of the Composite Dialogue Process. This stance taken by India, to disengage the connection between talks and action on terror can be seen as being soft on Pakistan. In the three hour meeting between PM Singh and PM Gillani, our PM took a promise from Gillani that Pakistan would take every action possible to punish the attackers of 26/11. In the joint statement released thereafter, both agreed that terrorism is the biggest threat to both countries and hence both have to fight it together. The report clearly outlines the fact that there is confusion regarding the joint statement issued ("उलझने तोह अभी कायम हैं"). The fact that India has de-linked talks and action on terror is difficult to digest (Nav Bharat Times 2009t).

Picture 28: "पाकिस्तान को आश्वासन पर मनमोहन ने दी सफाई", *Nav Bharat Times*, 18 July, 2009

PM Singh's clarification issued after this joint statement has muddied the waters even more. In the clarification, he had stated that any meaningful talks with Pakistan in the future will depend on the future events ("भविस्य के घटनाक्रम पर निर्भर करेगा पाक से सार्थक बातचीत का स्वरुप"). For the time being, it had been decided that talks would be held between the two Foreign Secretaries and the report would be submitted to the Foreign Ministers. This clarification was provided by the PM in the Indian Parliament after the opposition party, BJP had staged a walkout on the issue. The BJP alleged that the government made a u-turn on the issue of not going ahead with the composite dialogue with Pakistan until it took action against terrorism, "पाकिस्तान

को आश्वासन पर मनमोहन ने दी सफाई” (Nav Bharat Times 2009u); “पाक के आगे किया सरेंडर: बीजेपी” (Nav Bharat Times 2009v).

The title of the editorial on the 18th is “बयान से क्या डरना- सजा बयान की नरमी, कूटनीति का तकाजा” is supportive the Joint Statement. It says that the friendly wording of the joint statement, which is being looked upon as a sell out to Pakistan is actually a result of diplomatic necessity. The anxiety regarding the de-linking of talks and action on terror is valid but it is not considered to right to be so emotional in matters of international relations. PM Singh has made it clear thereafter that without Pakistan taking concrete action against the perpetrators of 26/11 we cannot get back to having normal dialogue. Hence one cannot say that India has completed deviated from her earlier stance. PM Singh was quite harsh when he had earlier met President Zardari in Russia. This time, the objective of the government was to show that India's intention is not to corner Pakistan forever but to compel it take action against terrorism while at the same time establishing good neighbourly relations with it (Nav Bharat Times 2009w).

However, there is also an editorial on the 20th of July that was very critical of the Joint Statement. It is titled “कूटनीति भूल सुधार का साहस- गनीमत यह हुई कि शर्म अल -शेख में सांझा बयान जारी किया गया, अन्यथा लेने के देने पड़ जाते”.

Picture 29: “कूटनीति भूल सुधार का साहस- गनीमत यह हुई कि शर्म अल -शेख में सांझा बयान जारी किया गया, अन्यथा लेने के देने पड़ जाते”, *Nav Bharat Times*, 20 July 2009

This article starts by stating that in the past 62 years, India and Pakistan have signed on a number of documents but such negligence was never shown before. The joint statement of Sharm el-Sheikh is an extreme tragedy for India by making her bow before Pakistan. The condition was that India would only talk to Pakistan if it took strong action against the perpetrators of 26/11. Pakistan has not done anything at this front in the last seven months. Despite its non-action, India has changed its stance. Balochistan has been mentioned without the mentioning of Kashmir. The editorial in a scathing attack asks what magic spell did Gillani use on Manmohan Singh that captivated him and catapulted India backwards. It has been a diplomatic victory for Pakistan (Nav Bharat Times 2009x).

Reports in the *The Times of India* and *The Hindu*

The meeting took place on the 16th of July, but the reportage in *The Times of India* even in the month of June showed signs of disapproval against any compromise with Pakistan until it took strong actions against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks. A report on the 17th of June, 2009 titled "India, Pak foreign secys to talk terror" stated that though the 'composite dialogue' between India and Pakistan initiated since 2006 was dead, there would be a new kind of engagement where the foreign secretaries would first meet to discuss Pakistan's step against terrorism. This would be followed by a meeting between the two heads of state in Sharm-el-Sheikh. Immediately after outlining these details, there are quotes given from various important personalities who have shown disapproval to this step by India (The Times of India 2009l). Kanwal Sibal, former foreign secretary has been quoted as saying

> It would have been acceptable if our side had insisted on Pakistan meeting our minimum demands on Mumbai and terror at this meeting. But to agree to foreign secretary talks amounts to resuming a dialogue, no matter what gloss is given. Discussions on terror never worked with Pakistan (Sibal 2009).

The article goes on to state that Pakistan has unfairly benefited from such a move by India and that public opinion in India is against resumption of normal business with Pakistan (Sibal 2009). On the 26th of June, there is an article titled "Peace can't be one-way Traffic- Talks only if Pak acts against anti-terror outfits: Antony". Here the Defence Minister of India is quoted as saying that India could move forward only if

Pakistan takes strong actions against the terrorist havens operating from inside its territory against India (The Times of India 2009m).

The reportage in *The Hindu* is not as pessimistic as The Times of India before the Summit took place. It has highlighted the government's rhetoric on the summit. For example, on the 12th, the headlines on the first page state "Pakistan should take credible action against terrorists: Manmohan" (Ravi 2009). The report focused on the fact that PM Singh also prioritised action on terror and had stated that if Pakistan takes action on the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks, then India was "willing to walk more than half the distance" to improve relations (Ravi 2009). It also states that PM Singh had said that one can choose one's friends but not one's neighbours and hence India had to be the force for peace in South Asia if it intended to be a great power (Ravi 2009). On the same day, there is another report which clarifies that Pakistan has been acting on the Mumbai attacks investigation. It is titled "Trial of Mumbai terror attacks may begin next week: Pakistan" (Subramanian 2009a). The report outlines the steps that Pakistan has taken with regard to the investigation. On the question of delay in the same, Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik is stated to have said that Pakistan has done its job professionally and efficiently and any delay that has been caused was because of India's failure to share material as and when required (Subramanian 2009). *The Hindu*'s editorial titled as "Bold Admission" on the July 13 also argues that "Still for India,...Mr. Zardari's words are a timely reminder that it must engage positively with the elected government of Pakistan" (The Hindu 2009a). The editorial is referring to President Zardari's remarks about accepting that militants have been purposely nurtured by the Pakistani state for tactical benefits. Such an acceptance is read as a positive signal and symbolic of the good intentions of the civilian government in Pakistan (The Hindu 2009a).

An article right before the conference on the 14th of July in *The Times of India* is factual and displays all the preparations that have been made for the meeting so far. It states some senior officials as saying that foreign secretary Shiv Shankar Menon's meeting with Pakistani foreign secretary Basheer is also important as it was in this meeting that Pakistan will outline what actions it has specifically taken to tackle the terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks. "Whatever action Pakistan has taken against anti-India terrorism will be reviewed during this meeting. India will take stock of the

situation only after that" (The Times of India 2009). Sensing the antagonism of the people to any resumption of dialogue, with such statements, the government may have been trying to pre-empt the opposition to the dialogue. However the opposition with regard to any kind of reconciliation with Pakistan grew louder with new developments on the Pakistani front related to the detention of Hafiz Saeed, the leader of the Jamaat ud Dawah (JuD), the political arm of the banned Lashkar-e-taiba (LeT). In an article in *The Hindu* titled "Rethink on appeals against Saeed's release" on the first page, Nirupama Subramanian, informs that the federal government and the Punjab provincial government of Pakistan are rethinking their appeals against the Pakistani Supreme Courts orders for the release of Hafiz Saaed. This rethinking was taking place on the same day that the two foreign secretaries were due to meet at Sharm-el-Sheikh (Subramanian 2009b). Such a move acted to dampen the mood and doubt Pakistan's intentions on acting against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack. Or as Varadarajan wrote, it serves to be "casting a malevolent shadow over [these] crucial talks" (Varadarajan 2009d).

On the 16th of July, the title of the first page of The Hindu says "India, Pakistan positive on talks- But looking only for modest gains". Here, Varadarajan (2009) outlines what transpired in the meeting between the two foreign secretaries, Shiv Shankar Menon from India and Salman Bashir from Pakistan. Bashir handed over the dossier to India on the investigation of the Mumbai terror attacks. Varadarajan writes that though foreign secretaries termed the meeting as "good, detailed and lengthy", Menon was unwilling to predict the outcome of the Prime Minister's meeting the next day. Varadarajan writes "As of now, it appears the Indian side is looking only for modest gains from Sharem-el-Sheikh and that there is considerable internal resistance to the resumption of the composite dialogue" (Varadarajan 2009e). The headlines on the 17th of July of The Hindu on the front page states "India and Pakistan to 'delink' action on terror from dialogue- But no resumption of composite dialogue yet; Foreign Secretaries to meet again" (Varadarajan 2009f). Varadarajan writes that both sides wanted to exploit the ambiguity in the Joint Statement on delinking talks and terror. India interpreted it to mean that "Pakistan should not wait for the resumption of the composite dialogue to take action against terrorism" whereas Pakistan interpreted it to mean that the dialogue process should not be held hostage to India's perception that

Pakistan had not done enough with regard to action of the perpetrators of 26/11 attacks (Varadarajan 2009).

The reportage on the 18th of July shows that the government clearly lost its rhetoric in the media. An article in *The Times of India* on the 18th is titled "Advantage Pakistan-Gilani Claims Victory as PM Delinks Terror From Talks".

Picture 30: "Advantage Pakistan- Gilani Claims Victory as PM Delinks Terror From Talks", *The Times of India*, 18 July 2009

As is evident by the title of the article, it is deeply critical of the government's step towards a dialogue with Pakistan. It clearly states that India suffered a diplomatic loss to Pakistan on three grounds: first, delinking terror and talks which was a step down from India's initial stance that there would be no dialogue until and unless the perpetrators of the 26/11 attacks were punished. Second, there is no mention of the 2004 Pakistan commitment to dismantling all anti-India terror infrastructures in its territory which could be read as a signal to Pakistan that it is freed from this commitment. Finally, the greatest loss was the mention of Balochistan in the Joint Statement. "It's a big gain for Pakistan because it legitimises Islamabad's contention that the Balochistan unrest was being fomented by India" (The Times of India 2009n).

Apart from clearly mentioning these three diplomatic losses, the article also provides a table with two sections, one stating "what we lost" and the other giving "what we got". Although the gains are mentioned in a separate category, but immediately, the

next sentence following the gain problematizes this gain. For example, under "what we got" the first point says "there is no mention of Kashmir in the statement. Does it prevent Islamabad from raising the issue later?" The second point says, "Pak has promised to share intel information---a similar promise was made in Havana but never kept". Moreover, the title of the photograph attached to the article states "Giving Pak the Upper Hand: Manmohan Singh (right) goes the extra mile to offer his hand to Pak PM Gilani during their meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh". On the 18th of July itself, the headlines of the first page of *The Hindu* are "No dilution of our stand: Manmohan-'Engagement only way to create stable South Asia'". It puts forward PM Manmohan Singh's clarification on the issue of giving Pakistan and upper hand and advantage in the Joint Statement. PM Singh has stated in the Parliament that the Joint Statement was not a dilution of India's stand and that when and how to engage with Pakistan was India's prerogative depending on future developments (The Hindu 2009b).

The editorial in The Hindu on the July 18 is titled "There must be no backsliding" is completely supporting the PM Manmohan Singh's stand on the issue. It states

> The Prime Minister struck the right note in Parliament by clarifying what India expects Pakistan to do but emphasising that the only way forward in the coming months is engagement. This newspaper could not agree with him more-and expects him to old firm on the course worked out (The Hindu 2009c).

It also argues that the government is going to "come under pressure to backslide and disown the small steps taken at Sharm-el-Shiekh" which it should not do. The only way in which India can make Pakistan take action against terrorism is by continuous engagement. This is not mean resumption of the composite dialogue immediately but continuous talk at the Foreign Secretary levels (The Hindu 2009c). On the other hand, throughout the rest of July, there is a continuous publication of articles deeply critical of the Joint Statement in *The Times of India*. For example, "A major diplomatic surrender-Advani: PM Gave Unprecedented Leeway to Pak on Balochistan" by Mohua Chatterjee on 20th July, 2009 highlighted the statement of the then Leader of the Opposition, L K Advani. The mention of Balochistan in the joint sentence was the biggest diplomatic error. He was quoted as saying that until India receives credible proof of Pakistan actions against Mumbai terror attacks, instead of only a dossier, it should suspend all official talks with Pakistan (Chatterjee 2009).

The Times of India carries on with the tradition of analysing the reportage in the Pakistani media. An article states that an editorial in the *Dawn* newspaper of Pakistan lauded the joint statement and India's change from its hard line stance by recognising that militancy and terror should not come in the way of improving relations. It also disapproves India's stance till now on the erroneous thinking that the Pakistani state would have sponsored the Mumbai attacks ("'Much needed breakthrough achieved'"[19]) (The Times of India 2009o). A scathing article was published by former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal on the 31st of July titled "Peace at Any Price?" in *The Times of India*. He attacked the government's diplomatic strategy at various levels and stated that this would lead to India having less manoeuvrability in any future negotiations. He even suggests two ways in which the joint statement could have been drafted to India's benefit and end the article with "The road to Sharm el-Shiekh was paved with egregious mistakes; the road ahead is likely to be marked with potholes of more inept handling of Pakistan" (Sibal 2009). It is observed that the media rhetoric in *The Times of India* after the joint statement was released was very critical with almost negligible voices for dialogue being represented or being given some space. The reportage in *The Hindu,* being more hopeful before the meeting and made it a point to highlight the government's clarifications on the issue after the hullabaloo on the Joint Statement released after the meeting.

Conclusion

Based on the theories of media and politics laid out in Chapter Two, one can analyse the nature of reportage in this chapter as has been done in Chapter Three. The analysis can be centered on the following issues, first, the kind of 'framing' predominantly used in issues of war by the print media in Hindi and English. The nature of media framing would highlight whether the media was in the "sphere of consensus", "sphere of legitimate controversy" or "sphere of deviance" according to the typology set out by Daniel Hallin (1984)[20]. Second, whether there was certainty or uncertainty in the

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[19] This title is in quotes in the *Times of India*, as it is the title of the editorial published in the *Dawn* in Pakistan.

[20] As outlined in Chapter Two, based on Daniel Hallin's (1984) typology for journalistic reportage into three spheres, first, 'sphere of consensus' where the media plays a legitimising role; second, 'sphere of legitimate controversy' where a balance is maintained for and against a particular policy; and third the 'sphere of deviance' where the media purposely rejects voices considered to be unworthy of any attention (non-news worthiness). This suggests that both 'sphere of consensus' and 'sphere of

government policies regarding the conflict. It is stated in the work of Piers Robinson (2002) that the level of policy certainty is indirectly proportional to the extent of influence of media frames on that issue.

With regard to the reportage for the Agra Summit, it can be stated that the English print media that has been analysed was framing the entire episode both before and after the summit in a 'critical frame'. Before the summit began, the number of articles that cautioned the government against Pakistan's intentions and the public from being euphoric were in a majority, than the articles that were hopeful and more optimistic about the outcome of the summit. The pieces in the former category include articles by Rashmee Z. Ahmed, Seema Guha, Manoj Joshi, Udayan Namboodiri, I.K. Gujral, J.N. Dixit and other editorials. The pieces in the latter category include articles by Siddhart Varadarajan and articles published from the Pakistani print media, especially of Khalid Mahmud. After the end of the summit, there were also quite a few articles that critiqued the role of the electronic media.

 The level of policy certainty during the Agra Summit can be gauged from the statements coming from the government before the summit. These statements clearly state that the agenda of the Indian government was not only to start dialogue again but to most importantly focus on other issue areas of trade and economy. Hence there was a level of policy certainty from the Indian side as to what was the desired outcome of the negotiations were. However, this policy certainty could not match with the policy certainty of the Pakistani government whose sole focus was raising the Kashmir issue. Hence both the countries were trying to influence the media narrative to suit their respective agendas which ended up hardening their stances both before and during the peace summit. The epitome of this bid to influence the media came from both sides. From the Indian side, it came with Sushma Swaraj's press briefing on July 15 and from the Pakistani side, it was Musharraf's breakfast meeting with Indian journalists on July 16. Since the media was being addressed by both the sides, this led to the 'sphere of legitimate controversy' in the words of Daniel Hallin (1984) which has

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deviance' can function in the same realm by focusing on certain news events in a certain manner and completely neglecting others as unworthy. They are backed by certain given assumptions about certain standards and criteria of society. Moving away from such fixed standards and questioning these common standards of news worthiness is the 'sphere of legitimate controversy' where objectivity and a balance is maintained, for example during an election coverage in a vibrant democracy.

been explained in Chapter Two. In terms of policy certainty and actual preparation for the talks, there is an article in *Rashtriya Sahara* (2001) that quotes nine former Indian diplomats as having stated that the government did not seek any expertise of the former foreign ministers, subject experts and leaders of other political parties.

It has been observed is that the media was not optimally briefed, in terms of properly setting the agenda according to the Indian side. First, it was stated that only the electronic media would be given the permission to cover the various summit venues. Hence a large section of the media, in the form of print media was left out and had to depend on the electronic media for the update. Second, the interaction with the media for this summit was being handled by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting instead of the External Publicity Division of the Ministry of External Affairs.

With regard to the Hindi print media analysed, it is observed that after the initial cautious articles regarding Pakistan's insistence on Kashmir as the main agenda, the rhetoric becomes more optimistic as the day of the summit approaches. This is specifically true for *Rashtriya Sahara* whose coverage was extremely optimistic and went several steps towards establishing links between the public of both the countries by their friendly narrative and representation. In fact, on the day of the arrival of Musharraf, the paper published several welcome remarks by famous Indian celebrities on their first page along with a message of peace and co-operation from the newspaper itself. Quite contrary to the 'critical frame' being used by the English print news, Rashtriya Sahara applies a 'support frame' where majority of its articles promote dialogue, peace and public to public relations between the two neighbours. It has been observed that the nature of the reportage in the Rashtriya Sahara for the Agra Summit is similar to the reportage of the press in the conflict in Northern Ireland, which took on the 'peace frame' and 'support frame' for the peace process despite many hurdles in the form of terrorist attacks. The press in Northern Ireland has been analysed by Gadi Wolfsfeld (2002) as outlined in Chapter Two. The reportage is comparatively less dense in the *Nav Bharat Times* while being more optimistic than the English print. Overall it can be states that the English print, in this case functioned in the realm of the 'sphere of legitimate controversy' whereas the Hindi print functioned in the 'sphere of consensus'.

With regard to the reportage on the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, both the Hindi and the English print media that has been analysed function in the 'sphere of legitimate controversy'. There are a host of articles that are critical of the government initiative to start a dialogue with Pakistan without it having taken any concrete action against the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Hence the media frame being used is the 'critical frame'. An exception to this 'critical frame' is the reportage of *The Hindu*, whose editorials clearly supported the beginning of dialogue with Pakistan but with an expectation of only modest gains. However, the larger media narrative among the other Hindi and English newspapers is unfavourable and disapproving of the government's initiative. This negative coverage becomes even more denigrating firstly with the news that the Punjab government in Pakistan was taking back its appeal against the release of Hafiz Saeed and secondly with the release of the joint statement between India and Pakistan on July 17 2009. The newspapers amply highlighted India's loss in this summit in various article across the spectrum. Since members from within the Congress Party did not come out in full fledged support of the summit, it seems there was a level of policy uncertainty where the political executive had failed to build a consensus for the initiative within the government and the opposition party members. Hence this became a case of less level of policy certainty coupled with the media using the 'critical frame' as its dominant narrative. This led to the government completely losing the media narrative at the domestic front. The counter- narrative of the opposition parties was picked up and highlighted by the print resulting in the Prime Minister having to give a clarification remark on the floor of the House in the Parliament.

Chapter Five

Actuality and Potentiality of Media's Interface with Diplomacy: Perspectives of the Indian Diplomatic Community

This chapter sets forth to analysing the various ways in which diplomacy has been mediatized in India. Based upon the theoretical framework in the first chapter and the media's reportage in the extended illustrations of conflict and peace second and third chapter, it delineates the assessment of Indian diplomats on media's influence on diplomacy in a generic sense and with reference to India. Some of the questions that have been grappled with by the diplomats pertain to various changes that have been brought in the practice of diplomacy due to associated changes in the media field. For example, whether they felt forced to react to any situation due to media pressure, felt a loss of autonomy, came across any case where the media acted as either an impediment to diplomacy or an accelerator, whether media rhetoric influences their functioning in any way and in what manner they try to influence the media narrative. Providing a practitioners perspective, the chapter also elucidates how the Ministry of External Affairs India has been dealing with the media and its foray into new digital media. This involves an elaboration of the evolution of the institution of the External Publicity Division of the MEA, India. Such an elaboration will be done in the context of the literature existing on media, public opinion and foreign policy in India.

Media, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in India

There are multiple issues that need to be focused upon while analysing the role of media and public opinion. First, is the role of public opinion being looked at in terms of its influence on any specific foreign policy of the country or in terms of the diplomatic negotiations regarding any policy? Second, what is the link between media and public opinion? Finally, how much is the media focusing on foreign policy and diplomatic issues in terms of its coverage in comparison to other domestic and entertainment issues?

Media's influence on Foreign Policy

Regarding the role of public opinion in foreign policy, in a democratic country, there is a lot more chance for public opinion on a given issue to be taken seriously given the virtue of electoral politics. This stands true for issues of foreign policy and diplomacy. Consequently in a democracy, it should also be rightly assumed that the media would be likely to play a largely independent role in influencing various issues, including foreign policy choices of the government. According to Sanjaya Baru, "the media has an obvious and independent role in shaping public opinion on foreign policy issues in a democracy" (Baru 2009:278). However this role of the media in influencing foreign policy depends on two factors: "the extent of domestic political disagreement or consensus on foreign policy issues; and second, the relationship between the Government of the day and the media" (Baru 2009: 278).

With regard to the extent of political consensus on foreign policy, the initial decades after independence, saw a great deal of consensus under the towering personality of Jawaharlal Nehru as the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (Baru 2009:278; Kapur 2015:376). These initial decades saw India imbibing and promoting principles like anti-imperialism, anti-racism, non-alignment and others. Due to the dominance of the Congress Party on the entire political spectrum, the oppositional voices were negligible. Hence the media too played a marginal role in foreign policy issues during this time (Baru 2009:278). In fact the media was constantly courted by the government in a "cozy relationship" through which the government sought to project its views on the public domestically (Baru 2009:278). The External Publicity Division of the Ministry of External Affairs focuses more on the domestic media, almost seeming like it is "more engaged in seeking internal publicity for external policy rather than external publicity for internal policy" (Baru 2009: 279). Regarding the "cozy relationship" between the government and media, Rajdeep Sardesai (2006:166-171) has written that the MEA, India seeks to manipulate the media on foreign policy issues. If journalists are travelling with the MEA for a summit, then it is expected that the journalists would toe the line of the government while reporting on the summit. "They ply you with the choicest whisky on the flight and caviar on the flight and in turn it is expected that you will follow, hook, line and sinker what the ministry is saying" (Sardesai 2006: 166-171).

Both these factors, the political consensuses on foreign policy issues and the media's equations with the government have undergone a change since the beginning of the new millennium (Baru 2009: 279). As the overarching dominance of the Congress Party has ended, the political consensus on foreign policy issues have also been eroded (Kapur 2015:377). This has made the media do the job of arbitrating on foreign policy issues. Such a role in heightened by the fact of the beginning of 24X7 television news channels (Baru 2009:279). Since these television channels are owned by corporate houses, their main objective to increase the viewer attention, hence they not only try to make news more entertaining but also tend to present the news item in "for and against" debates, which go on to foster more dissensions rather than consensus on foreign policy issues (Baru 2009:279).

If the assumption is that media's influence on foreign policy issues has increased, because of erosion of political consensus and rise of television channels, then the important linking between the two is the role of the public. Media's influence on both the decision makers/political leadership directly and on the public, through which further pressure can be exerted on the political class in a democracy. Hence the role and nature of the public and public opinion and its link with the media in foreign policy issues need to be delineated.

Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues

With regard to foreign policy issues, "who is the 'public' in public opinion?" (Kapur Devesh (2015:374) is an important question, as mostly it is observed and cited that most foreign policy issues interests only a minority of the public, who usually belong to the upper class and caste of the Indian society. It was till now being assumed that the masses are too entangled by domestic politics and everyday lives to bother about India's foreign relations. The recent literature on this field alludes to a change in this scenario where due to the role of the mass media, foreign policy issues is no longer the domain of just the elite class in India (Kapur 2015:374, Baru 2009). As to which strata of the society is showing is an interest in foreign policy issues, Devesh Kapur conducted a survey of more than 200,000 households in the year 2009 (Kapur 2009:378). Attempting to be largely representative of the diverse population in India, the survey consisted of "nine specific socio-economic groups" in both urban and rural

areas. The respondents' educational levels and their occupation were also mentioned (Kapur 2009:378).

The findings of the survey by Devesh Kapur (2009:378-382) state that firstly, there existed a direct relationship between the respondents socio-economic status and her/his interests or "ability to respond to questions of foreign policy". It showed that the population in rural India was still not as bothered or did not know about foreign policy issues as the economically better off population in urban India (Kapur 2009:379). Secondly, the respondents in all socio-economic groups had positive feelings regarding United States of America, followed by Japan. This was corresponded by negative feelings for Pakistan, followed by China (Kapur 2009:379). Third, the elite group favoured the United States (US) because of a variety of factors linked to personal and professional linkages. But the lower economic strata also preferred the US to other countries (Kapur 2009:379).

Fourth, these "warm sentiments" towards the US was irrespective of the respondent's region, education, occupation, gender and other diversity. This was true for regions with a strong left ideology in power at the state level and the regions with a majority Muslim population (Kapur 2015: 380). Fifthly, "broad public opinion on foreign policy indicates that the Indian public is not naive and indeed demonstrates a streak of pragmatism". Hence despite the likeness for USA, the respondents were of the view that India should pursue a tougher negotiating diplomacy with the USA (Kapur 2015:380). Lastly, the internal variance among the elite group was least among socio-economic groups on foreign policy issues. Most of them had intense warmer feelings towards the US and China coupled with intense colder feelings towards Bangladesh and Pakistan (Kapur 2015:380-381).

Relationship between media and public opinion

The question to be asked is how this public opinion is formed? What are the influences that play a role in influencing opinion on a particular issue? Equally what needs to be asked is what influence/impact this public opinion has on other institutions of our socio-eco-political existence? Where does the media fit in all this? Is it an influencer of public opinion or are the journalists operating within the media

being influenced by the prevailing public opinion? The relationship between media and public opinion seems to resemble the chicken and egg conundrum.

With regard to media's influence on public opinion and in that process on foreign policy,

> It is probably still the case that the news media influences public opinion and thereby foreign policy, rather than sculpting or determining policy. The news media pushes a government towards action, forcing it to speed up the decision making process, with negative coverage being especially potent in this regard. It is more likely to influence symbolic, highly visible agendas with intense emotional characteristics, rather than substantive agendas (Kapur 2015: 382).

Hence, according to Devesh Kapur (2015), firstly, the media influences instead of determining foreign policy. Secondly, the media is likely to influence only emotional and symbolic issues instead of substantive issues. Sanjaya Baru (2009:281) is also of the same view when he states that perceptions on foreign policy and the media's role vary with regard to the local political and social factors. For example the Indo-Sri Lankan relations have more of takers in Tamil Nadu and the Tamil press instead of the national press located in New Delhi (Baru 2009: 281). Hence the media is likely to cover areas which are closely associated with a particular group, whether that be an ethic group or a religious group, which then makes matters emotional and sensational.

However, Baru (2009:280) does state two examples where the national media has been an influence on foreign policy. These are firstly, the signing/not signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by India in 1996 and the role of the *Times of India* newspaper and secondly, the Indo-US Nuclear Deal in 2005 (Baru 2009:180-181). Regarding India's signature on CTBT, there was ambiguity as India had first been a proponent of the ban, but when the CTBT got linked to NPT, there was more policy uncertainty. A major debate took place on the pages of *Times of India* and the editorial called for India's rejection of the CTBT. This went on to become the official position of the Indian government (Baru 2009:280).

With regard to the Indo-US nuclear deal, it is purported that the government received overwhelming support from the media to defend the deal against the opposition of the left parties and right leaning parties. There were only two national newspapers that

did not support the deal, The Hindu under the editorship of N. Ram who is pro Communist Party of India and The Asian Age under the editorship of M J Akbar (Baru 2009: 280). Hence although affected more by emotional issues, with the increasing diversity of political stances among political parties on foreign policy issues, increasingly the corporate media can take an independent stance (Baru 2009).

Response from the Indian Diplomatic Community

As is written above, there seems to be a general consensus that media does influence certain matters of foreign policy and diplomacy through influencing public opinion either for or against certain policies. This section deals with how the Indian diplomatic community perceives this role of the media. There is a range of opinions where the media's role is viewed as important/non-important and positive/ negative. Some practitioners of diplomacy believe that the media's role is very restricted and does not hamper the autonomy of diplomatic expertise. On the contrary, some believe that the growing influences of the media are inevitable and diplomats must imbibe this medium and take it into their stride. The actual and potential role of media in diplomacy has thus been viewed very differently by various diplomats.

Diplomats themselves have written and spoken about the role of the media in diplomacy. Ambassador Kishan S. Rana (2011:11) in his book titled "21st Century Diplomacy" opines that this century has brought about a paradigmatic change in the manner in which diplomacy is conducted. Since globalisation has become omnipotent in our day to day lives, a lot of work that diplomacy does these days is to manage its effects. As Rana (2011:11) has quoted Daryl Copeland (2009:1) as writing that today "world affairs is about managing the colossal forces of globalisation." Hence according to Rana, it has brought about, what can be termed as "Globalized Diplomacy" (2011:11).

There are several reasons what these various changes have brought about to the structure of diplomacy. "Overall, diplomacy has become multifaceted, pluri-directional, volatile, and intensive" (Rana 2011: 14). This means that, firstly, the number of actors in diplomacy has increased. It is no longer restricted to only inter-state relations as envisaged by the principles of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (Rana 2011:13). Since the 1970s, commerce and promoting trade

and economic relations became a pre-dominant part of diplomatic activity. During the 1990s, what also started getting emphasized upon was the cultural aspect with a host of associated matters like science and technology, education and consular priorities (Rana 2011: 14). Hence diplomatic negotiations started requiring specialized knowledge. This led to the involvement of other departments of the government like the Commerce Department, Science and Technology Department having direct negotiations with their counterparts from other countries. Basically, "the MFA is no longer the monopolist of foreign affairs" (Rana 2011: 16). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a nodal point that collaborated among these various bodies (Rana 2011: 14). Amb Rana suggests that the MFA also needs to train their diplomats in such a way that they cultivate certain specialities apart from their generalist knowledge. "Professional diplomats need to be both generalists and experts in some specific fields; collectively, they are the MFA's pool of expertise" (Rana 2011: 17).

Loss of Autonomy of the Diplomatic Community

Before the revolution in information and communications technology and the 24/7 news media, diplomats posted abroad were one of the main sources of information about the host country for the home government (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995; Sasson Sofer 2013). This is not the case anymore as almost everybody gets their information about various quarters of the world from the media. Hence it is assumed that one of the most important functions of the diplomats have been taken away from them, hence reducing their importance. The argument is stretched further to say that due to the revolution in communications technology, diplomats have also lost their autonomy (Sasson Sofer 2013). Previously when communications took months to reach from one place to another, diplomats had more autonomy to take decisions in their host countries. This has changed as in present times, as they have to revert even the smallest matters to their political/bureaucratic bosses at home before taking any decision, leading to a loss of their autonomy.

With regard to the media becoming the main sources of information for the government and public, Amb Rana[21] (2011: 199) has written this is absolutely true.

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[21] Ambassador Kishan S. Rana joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1965 and served as a diplomat in various posts till 1995. He was India's Ambassador and High Commissioner for Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Kenya, Mauritius, and Germany; and consul general in San Francisco. He has

All government leaders are get real time updates about various issues from news media. However the news media only provides the news whereas the analysis of how a particular issue or event in a foreign land may affect the country can come only from a diplomat. The diplomat being well versed in the language, political context and language of that country will be able to appropriately summarise the various effects it might on the home country. "The resident embassy remains the MFA's prime source for sharp analysis and policy advice. But hard news now comes from elsewhere" (Rana 2011: 199). According to Ambassador T.C. A. Raghavan[22], it was true that people now have other sources of information but that does not reduce the role of the diplomatic mission. A hundred years earlier, an ambassador when posted abroad, s/he had real plenipotentiary power because s/he had no way of communicating with her/his government. A letter would take three months to be sent and another three months to receive a reply. Now heads of governments, foreign ministers, foreign secretaries can speak directly to each other on the phone. But still the role of the diplomat is not taken away by all this (Raghavan 2018).

Although diplomats are no longer the main sources of information, it does not mean that they are being sidelined (Katju 2018)[23]. It is one thing to study a country, to analyse a country, to even report on a country, to be able to read about it and form opinions, but is another thing to represent your government, live there and then give an assessment of what is happening and recommendations on what is to be done (Raghavan 2018). So while news media have a huge impact in terms of reaching out and telling people what is happening, it would be wrong for a government to rely on

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authored several articles and books on Indian diplomacy and is also Professor Emeritus at the DiploFoundation (Malta and Geneva). He has been instrumental in opening up of the bureaucracy at the MEA India for many students and scholars of diplomacy by his prolific writing on the subject matter. He is also attached to many think tanks in India and abroad.

[22] Ambassador TCA Raghavan joined the service in 1982. He has served as a Joint Secretary of the PAI Division in the MEA. Most importantly, he was India's High Commissioner to Pakistan from June 2013 to December 2015. Hence he was the point person when PM Nawaz Sharif travelled to India for Prime Minister Narendra Modi's swearing in ceremony. He was also there during the India-Pakistan meeting on the sidelines of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) Summit in Ufa in Russia in 2015.

[23] Ambassador Vivek Katju retired from the services in 2011, having joined the service as a 1975 batch officer. He served as the Joint Secretary of the PAI (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) Division of the MEA. He played an instrumental role during the Kandahar hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 on route to India from Nepal in December 1999. Ambassador Katju headed the PAI desk at the MEA at that point of time and hence was one of the chief negotiators. He was also there for the Agra Summit between India and Pakistan in 2001. The media's reportage was heightened during both these events.

that to make its assessments. In the end, the government needs its own people to inform on what is taking place on the ground and recommend on what is to be done as everything else is not protecting the countries interests (Raghavan 2018). The media is reporting, assessing, analysing, for all kinds of other reasons. They might be good reasons but those reasons are not the same as the government's reasons. Hence, because of all this, the role of diplomacy has not been reduced (Raghavan 2018).

Diplomats in the old days used to be the main sources of information as there were no newspapers etc. The main information used to be on the despatches of the diplomats. Now there are different sources with the mass media. Diplomats themselves get information from the mass media. But to all this varied information, the diplomats provide a perspective which the mass media will not (Katju 2018). The Ambassador of the country is supposed to knit everything together. This is the view that the government is supposed to rely upon. This is how the nature of things has changed and the Ambassador provides a perspective which no one else can give (Katju 2018). The role of the diplomat had certainly changed but the importance of that role has not decreased/downgraded (Katju 2018). According to Shiv Shankar Menon (2018) diplomats are no longer in the business of collecting information and are in the business of analysing the readily available information, which is a positive change.

With regard to loss of autonomy, Ambassador Rana (2011) writes about a movement of diplomats from "high diplomacy" to "low diplomacy" which can be said to be a loss of autonomy. Amb. Rana writes that this change that has come about is with regard to the functions performed by the Ministry of External Affairs all over the world. Ambassador Rana (2011: 17) argues that diplomats have moved from implementing "high diplomacy" to "low diplomacy". High Diplomacy consists of important issues like security and significant interstate records whereas low diplomacy involves consular services and public diplomacy activities (Rana 2011: 17). High Diplomacy is today's times is mostly handled by the political bosses themselves (Rana 2011:17). This is symbolic of the centralisation of foreign policy decision making by the Executive organ of the government the world over, whether it is a presidential system or a parliamentary system. This shows a tendency towards the increasing dismissive attitude towards the knowledge and experience of the diplomatic class in important matters of international politics.

The other important shift that Amb. Rana (2011: 18-19) brings our attention to is regarding the matter of politicisation of the diplomats themselves. He writes,

> Also altered is the old distinction between national policy, as determined by the political leaders, and its execution by an apolitical diplomatic system. The mutual roles are now permeable, and the boundary is less clear-cut. Professional diplomats are no longer insulated from home politics (Rana 2011: 19).

It was said that the diplomatic bureaucracy provided continuity to the foreign policy of a country despite the change in the government because of their apolitical nature. However, this is changing as Amb Rana (2011:19) argues. The United States has a system where high level diplomatic positions are filled with political appointees. The same is followed in many African and Latin American countries (Rana 2011:19). This can hamper with the continuity of the fundamental principles of a country's foreign policy.

Diplomats React instead of Respond to Crisis Situations due to Media Pressure

It is argued that the 24/7 media glare forces diplomats to react to crisis situations, giving them less time to deliberate on the crisis issue and make an informed policy (James Hoge 1994). Due to this pressure, diplomats end up taking hasty decisions, which they would not have taken had the media pressure not been there. The diplomatic view in this regard is contrary to this assumption. They were of the view that working under the media glare had become a fact of life for every profession. The speed of communications has changed for everyone and people have accommodated to it.

Syed Akbaruddin[24], spokesperson of the MEA from January 2012 to April 2015, was of the view that it is valid that the media has its own requirements and at times one has to meet those requirements. Hence it would be valid to say that there could be times where a diplomat is under pressure (Akbaruddin 2018). There could also be times that under pressure, one could perhaps make statements without having 100 percent information. But with 50 percent information, the diplomat is most likely to

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[24] Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin joined the service in 1985. He is presently serving as India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He served as the Office of the Spokesperson of the MEA from 2012 to 2015. He has played a major role in bringing about many changes to this office and has been instrumental in bringing this office to the public through the media.

have more knowledge of the situation than anyone else (Akbaruddin 2018). This 50 percent information that a diplomat gives to a media person, will be most likely, a little more information than the journalists already knows, which then gets published (Akbaruddin 2018). Maybe sometimes while doing this, a diplomat is pressurised for time, but time pressure is for everybody. It has not led to a foreign policy posture, which in retrospect one thinks of as a wrong posture (Akbaruddin 2018). Hence the media pressure may sometimes lead to statement which may be a bit sharper response or a cooler response, but one needs to understand that all initial statements of diplomats during crisis are more of a holding statement, till you one gets more information and diplomats are trained to handle this (Akbaruddin 2018).

TCA Raghavan (2018) also agreed that one is under more pressure and that one might have to react to the urgent rather than to the important. However, this does not mean that one cannot discharge one's core responsibility as a diplomat (Raghavan 2018). It's a fact of life and it's not as if one is so caught up dealing with the tangential, urgent, emergent issues that one has no time for anything else (Raghavan 2018). The core responsibilities of a diplomat very much remain. At the same time, addressing public opinion, attending to the so called emergent issues, that is also important (Raghavan 2018). There is no point in an Ambassador saying that s/he won't address a major issue confronting an Indian who is in distress or whose human rights are being violated because s/he has to do something important and policy oriented. That would not possible and both have to go hand in hand (Raghavan 2018).

Media acting as an Impediment to Diplomacy
On the jingoistic media acting as an impediment to diplomacy, Ambassador Vivek Katju was of the view that this was the problem of the TV media all over the world and not just in India (Katju 2018). Mainstream media today, because of the way it is structured, cannot nuance the issue (Katju 2018). TCA Raghavan was of the view that media has always been negative and this negative reportage is not a new phenomenon (Raghavan 2018). Role of the media has always been negative, whether it was the 50s, 60s, 70s or now. Except that technology has changed and apart from the newspapers, you have electronic, digital and various other platforms (Raghavan 2018).

According to Syed Akbaruddin (2018), one should not overemphasize the role of macho media, either in the formulation of public opinion or in that public opinion in then influencing policy making. To some extent it does, but it is not such a big one (Akbaruddin 2018). Syed Akbaruddin also stressed more on the power of images rather the rhetoric that the television channels employed. He said that during the Kargil, what had a strong influence on public opinion were the pictures of soldiers bodies (Akbaruddin 2018). The images of soldiers' bodies coming from Kargil impacted people; it was not the jingoistic fervour of the reportage. Hence one should not over-emphasize debates and under emphasize the impact of actual situations taking place (Akbaruddin 2018).

One of the immediate irritants in the Agra Summit between India and Pakistan in 2001 was the event where Pakistani President Musharraf addressed the Indian media in an interactive session and kept harping on the issue of Kashmir. There were a number of editorials which cited this as one of the reasons which led to the final deadlock in the talks (H.Y. Sharada Prasad 2001). However, according to Shiv Shankar Menon[25] the real reason it went into a deadlock was because both the parties were not clear what they wanted. If both sides had clarity with regard to the goals then diplomacy could have been used to achieve them. Once the talks failed, then people blamed the media as an excuse for the failure (Menon 2018). If both sides had achieved their objectives with regard to the talks, then Musharraf talking to the media would not have become an issue (Menon 2018).

With regard to the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, Shiv Shankar Menon was of the opinion that the media was a follower and raised the issue picked up by the opposition. The first dissension came from within the Congress Party itself, which was picked up by the opposition and then by the media. The issue here was not with the media but with politics and politics is there, whether it is an open system, closed, democracy or not, whether it is with or without the media (Menon 2018). First, every government in India, whether it was under Vajpayee, P.V. Narasimha or Modi has been talking while

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[25] Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1972. He was Foreign Secretary during the Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit between India and Pakistan that took place on the sidelines of the NAM Summit in 2009. He also served as the National Security Advisor from 2010 to 2014 and was India's High Commissioner to China and Pakistan from 2000 to 2003 and 2003 to 2006 respectively.

terrorism is going on. Second, with regard to the raising of Balochistan, Manmohan Singh was ready to deal with their internal issue. The problem was created because of domestic politics. The media here was a follower and it did not determine the event and the government clearly failed to influence the media narrative (Menon 2018).

Whenever the government is negotiating anything or making and implementing any policy which has a huge impact on public opinion, the government is conscious of it (Raghavan 2018). It is not as if the government is dealing with a theoretical, abstract, academic issue. Anything which it does will have an impact on public opinion, so it is that much more sensitive to the situation (Raghavan 2018). The media has certain influence, but one should not exaggerate that influence (Raghavan 2018). On the substantive elements, the impact has been limited, at best perhaps even peripheral (Akbaruddin 2018). In the end if the government and political leadership decide on a course of action, the media does not stop them from doing it (Raghavan 2018). The media is a factor, it is a factor to be kept in mind, to be handled, to be managed, to be taken into account, but it does not stop the political leadership from implementing a policy that it is certain about. To say that a hostile media and a hostile public opinion can prevent any political action is not correct. It is a factor, but it is no more than that (Raghavan 2018).

With regard to government to government diplomacy, the media itself was interested in few countries, maximum five to six countries (Akbaruddin 2018). For example, the media is not interested in India's ties with Nigeria. They are interested only in United State of America (USA), China, Pakistan and a few more. There would be individuals and serious people certainly interested in these other countries, but it hardly causes uproar in the media, except in exceptional circumstances (Akbaruddin 2018). If the government is certain about a course of action, the government can withstand the impeding negative opinion (Raghavan 2018). There are many examples. The present government, despite the perception of it being hawkish, invited the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif for the swearing in of our new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi (Raghavan 2018).

Mr. Modi even dropped into Lahore to meet Nawaz Sharif in December 2015 on his way back from Afghanistan. It is not that India did not extend the hand of friendship

despite the over arching negative public opinion and media rhetoric (Raghavan 2018). There are many other examples, with BJP, with Congress, with other governments. The media does not stop political initiative (Raghavan 2018). Anyone who says that public opinion or the media is the main factor in deciding policy is wrong. It is one factor amongst many others (Raghavan 2018). The political class, on many occasions, takes this factor into account but on most occasions, they take political actions in spite of it (Raghavan 2018).

In a democracy, the media itself will also not be united and rightfully so (Gonsalves[26] 2018). There exist internal fractures in the media, which is how it is supposed to be in a democracy, the media will not be united, will have a generalised sense of national interests and at the same time be critical of the government. The governments do not like that and hence there is a constant battle to subvert the media, to buy the media. The media also tries to constantly to make the politicians do what they want (Gonsalves 2018). If this works properly and the country has a healthy media overall (the outliers, the cranks will always be there in any setting, the extreme right and the extreme left), then there will be certain healthy interactions which tell politicians that they cannot go beyond a certain limit (Gonsalves 2018). All that can be conclusively said is that this interplay is a moving process and the whole enterprise keeps evolving (Gonsalves 2018).

Media on Democratizing Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Making

Ambassador Rao[27] (2017) in one her articles titled "Crowdsourcing Foreign Policy: Engaging in the virtual Public Square" has argued that the online world can become a "virtual public sphere" where there can be an exchange of innovative ideas regarding foreign policy issues. Although she contends that the virtual space is not free of its vitriol, predisposed biases/narratives and hyper-nationalism, but that makes the job of the diplomat more challenging. The objective would be to "introduce civilization into

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[26] Ambassador Eric Gonsalves joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1950. He served as India's Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and Tokyo.

[27] Ambassador Nirupama Rao joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1973. She served as India's first woman Spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs. She was also India's Ambassador to China and the United States and High Commissioner to Sri Lanka and served as the Foreign Secretary from 2009-2011. Being very active on social media, her twitter handle is @NMenonRao. She also heads a Trust called The South Asian Symphony Foundation which is committed to pushing peace and understanding in the South Asian region though music.

this virtual world" by demonstrating a willingness to engage with all varied kinds of opinion.

> We must fight ghetto mentalities, the narrow, myopic confines of imagined histories, seek a cross pollination of minds, the freedom of democratic debate, the jousting of ideas-never to forget the connectivity that ties us with the rest of the human race (Rao 2017).

However, she does give a clarification that engagement and transparency in the conduct of diplomacy does not mean 'open covenants of peace openly arrived at'. Intractable problems have a far greater chance of getting solved amicably if negotiations are conducted in secrecy (Rao 2017). However, what is required is the articulation and publication of the goals and fundamental principles of the policy course being undertaken in a manner in which the public can appreciate it. This is to prevent misrepresentation of the policy objectives by parties with opposite/vested interests (Rao 2017). The ability to direct the message in such a way that it reaches the target audience is a key to check misinformation and convince the public. It is also "crucial that civil society engagement is embraced as a vital segment of a diplomat's daily duty" (Rao 2017). Like all disciplines, diplomacy has evolved and can no longer be seen "as the exclusive preserve of diplomats alone" in the 21st century (Rao 2017).

According to Syed Akbaruddin (2018) there cannot be any surety to whether media's influence could be called democratization but he was certain that it had brought about greater responsiveness of the Ministry of External Affairs to human interest stories (Akbaruddin 2018). This responsive had taken place at levels, among those involved in publicity, to those in the missions and seeped up to even the level of the Minister with Sushma Swaraj's excellent twitter initiatives (Akbaruddin 2018). Such a change had been taking place since 2012/2013 (Akbaruddin 2018).

The most substantive implication of this media-MEA interaction or the biggest influence has been on Consular issues (Akbaruddin 2018). One can call this as human interest. For example, when human interest stories had been emphasized and blown out of proportion by the media, which then influenced the government to take quick action. One particular example was from Togo 2013, where a ship with an Indian crew was caught. This ship had been hijacked and the petroleum was sucked out of

the ship sending it back to the dock. The authorities in Togo had arrested the Indian crew on the allegation that they had conspired with the pirates that had hijacked the ship. India did not have its own embassy in Togo. Akbaruddin (2018) said that ordinarily, this would have been a small story. But the media took up this story after the captain's wife refused to do the last rites of their child, who had suddenly passed away during this entire event. The media fanned this entire story, bringing the focus to action taken by the MEA and that pressurized the government to act instantly (Akbaruddin 2018).

Another such instance was with when a Norwegian child of an Indian origin couple settled was taken away by the government authorities on the basis of allegation of mistreatment of the child. All these are not policy issues, but they are human interest issues, related to individuals and this is where the substantive influence of the media on the functioning of diplomacy is seen (Akbaruddin 2018). It should be noted that the media interest in such stories is not initiated by these big television channels but by ordinary individuals who first highlight it and then it is picked up by the television channels. Hence, the greatest influence that the media has had on Indian Foreign Policy issues is the need to be more responsive to such concerns (Akbaruddin 2018).

According to TCA Raghavan (2018), the public opinion fanned by the mainstream media on other countries, especially our neighbouring countries is on the whole negative, but there is a small section of it of the population which is positively influenced by changes in technology. So while television channels on the whole have a negative effect, there is nevertheless a small section which now finds that it can access opinions on the digital space not just in India but also Pakistan and vice versa (Raghavan 2018). Twenty years ago the full spectrum of public opinion could only form their views based on what appeared in Indian newspapers or on Indian television channels. Now with the internet, it means that for those who want to, they can also access Pakistani news. The same thing happens in Pakistan, where they can read Indian newspapers, so they get an idea of the Indian position too (Raghavan 2018). No doubt this affects only a small section, because there are not many people who are going to be accessing different sources of information as most people rely on the television channel they watch. But nevertheless there is a small section now which has access to far more variety of information than they did before. To this extent,

technology has brought about a positive change in opening up the other country for people who want to know more about the other country, bypassing the negative portrayal in the mainstream media (Raghavan 2018).

Whether media is democratising foreign policy making, Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon (2018) was not convinced with this proposition. He was of the view that though increasingly people are more vocal about foreign policy issue on various platforms, but the core considerations while making policy is always economic, security, military and political reasons. The issues in this domain are not guided by what is published in the papers; it might be driven by interest groups like FICCI (Federation of Indian Commerce & Industry), CII (Confederation of Indian Industries) and other interest groups in a polity (Menon 2018). This is normal in a democracy and a democracy is all about all interest groups having a say and negotiating an outcome. The media cannot be an interest group, because it is a medium and a channel rather an advocacy group. There was a time when the media spoke for the public, but that is less true today mainly because of the corporatisation of media (Menon 2018).

Traditional/Quiet Diplomacy versus New/Transparent Diplomacy

Former Ambassador Surendra Kumar[28] has written jostled with the question of comparing traditional diplomacy and new diplomacy in an article titled "Are the Days of Quiet Diplomacy Numbered?" He argues that no matter how much technological progress we make in terms of information and communications revolution, quiet diplomacy will always remain important. He gives a number of examples of the success of quiet diplomacy. His examples range from global level diplomacy to the times he has personally used it to India's advantage in his various postings. The direct question that he is answering in the article is:

> Many believe that internet instant connectivity, search engines, video conferencing, smartphones, Skype, micro blogs and Twitter are making

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[28] Ambassador S Kumar is a 1972 batch officer and retired in 2008 as MEA/Dean of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) in New Delhi. He served as the Press, Information and Cultural Secretary in India's High Commission in London. He also served as Ambassador to many African countries like Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Mozambique. He was Consul General in Chicago and Indian High Commissioner to Kenya, Malta, Swaziland. Apart from being author to several newspaper articles and book, he is very active on Twitter with twitter handle @ambksurendra

diplomats redundant. Is that so?...When Presidents and PMs can talk to their counterparts directly almost instantly, media buzzes with twenty-four hours and diplomats can interact with influential opinion makers and people at large through Twitter round the clock, is there a future for quiet diplomacy? (Kumar Surendra 2015:419).

Globally, he states that it was quiet diplomacy that actually ended the Vietnam War. When a technologically and militarily superior American force had failed to defeat the Vietnamese forces, it was quiet diplomacy that stepped in that ultimately led to the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement between North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the United States in 1973. For this, the then National Security Advisor of the US, Henry Kissinger and the then Vietnamese Politburo member Le Du Tha were also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (Kumar Surendra 2015:418).

Quiet Diplomacy has led to the thawing of three other conflictual relationships between historic enemies. First, the signing of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1997 came about after gruelling negotiations between the two both before and after the Camp David Accords in 1978 (Surendra Kumar 2015:420). Second, between the Cold War ideologues, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) in 1987 was a result of quiet negotiations since the Reagan-Gorbachev meetings since 1986 (Kumar Surendra 2015:420). Third, Henry Kissinger's quiet diplomacy with the Chinese led to the meeting between US President Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong in 1972 after a gap of relationship of two decades between the two countries (Kumar Surendra 2015:420). With regard to the success of India's quiet diplomacy, Ambassador Kumar mentions that after India tested the nuclear weapons in 1998 and the United States has placed sanctions on us, then it was the quiet diplomacy between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott that helped in a gradual removal of those sanctions. Jaswant Singh, the then India's External Affairs Minister and Strobe Talbott, the then US Deputy Secretary of State held meetings fourteen times over a period of 1998-2002 for this thawing of relations to finally come to fruition leading to the easing of sanctions (Kumar Surendra 2015:422). Ambassador Kumar also writes that the phenomenon of lobbying influential opinion makers in countries where one is posted is also a part and parcel of what counts as quiet diplomacy to serve your national interests.

Amb Surendra Kumar goes on to argue that the nature and conduct of quiet diplomacy changes depending upon the country one is placed in, taking into account the type of government. Open lobbying of opinion makers can be allowed in western democracies like Canada and US and in Europe, but they cannot be done openly in countries like China, Russia and Iran which are not as democratic and transparent in their functioning. It is also not possible in countries in African countries which had/have autocratic regimes like Libya, Egypt, Syria and the Gulf States. Hence, "the quiet diplomacy turns quieter in such countries (Kumar Surendra 2015:425). Emphasising on the ingredients and basic principles of quiet diplomacy, Amb Kumar writes that firstly,

> It can't be practiced through primetime TV cacophony passed on as debate or town hall meetings or lectures as think tanks. It involves painstaking efforts in identifying key decision-makers and those who influence such decision makers (Kumar Surendra 2015:427).

Secondly, one needs to not only become their friends whom they can trust but also make them believe that it is in their own national interest to be friends with you. This requires patient persuasion pursued with the power of clear articulation of mutual interests or goals (Kumar Surendra 2015: 427). Thirdly, "one can't arrive at an agreement which can't be sold to one's people" (Kumar Surendra 2015:427). Hence the negotiators should be acutely aware of where to draw the line in terms of give and take during the process, so that a positive narrative is already in store for the people at home. Amb Kumar, ends his article by writing that "quiet diplomacy can prepare the ground, do the spade work, smoothen rough edges and facilitate communication and dialogue but can't substitute other prerequisites: internal political stability, economic progress, social cohesiveness and harmony, and above all, military muscle" (Kumar Surendra 2015:428). This is underlining the fact that diplomats are as strong as their countries are comprehensively in the international sphere.

The External Publicity Division of MEA, India

Ambassador Kishan S. Rana has written on the relationship between media and diplomacy in a chapter titled "The Media-Ally or Adversary" (Rana 2006:374-393). He has given a detailed critical analysis of the structure of MEA's External Publicity Division. With regard to the MEA's relationship with the press and publicity, he writes that, "in 1950, soon after the inception of the Foreign Service, a separate

Information Service of India was created, consisting of journalists and others directly recruited from the profession" (Rana 2006:376). However, this practice was dismissed soon after as the new recruits from the journalistic field did not fit well with the diplomats. Also the Pillai Committee Report (1996) on Indian Foreign Service had recommended that the work regarding information dissemination should be done by the IFS officers themselves (Rana 2006:376). Hence this mantle was shifted to the External Publicity Division, which is commonly known as the XP Division of the MEA. According to Rana (2006:377), the XP Division has been headed by the most talented and outstanding personalities, many of whom have gone on to become Foreign Secretary.

The website of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) India states that the External Publicity and Public Diplomacy (XPD) Division is the "interface between the Ministry and Media mandated with publicity of India's foreign policy through briefings, press interactions and other media events" (MEA, India). This includes updating the official website and other media platforms, facilitation of the foreign journalists working out of India, liaising with the MEA beat journalists and any other work related to publicity material that helps us project our soft power (MEA, India). There is a different section on the External Publicity Division of the MEA in all the Annual Reports. The Annual Report 1999-2000 quotes the XP Division as being "an instrument of foreign policy management" which implements several functions (MEA India 1999-2000: 106). The key functions are related to promoting a favourable image of India to the world. It does so by articulating India's foreign policy and its stand on various issues through dissemination of information and acting as a conduit between journalists (foreign and domestic) and the government. It is also responsible for publication of *India Perspectives*, a monthly issue for purposes of distribution abroad in various languages (MEA India 1999-2000: 106).

One of the most important functions of the XP Division is the assistance provided to journalists from abroad who visit India. The Division fixes their appointments with various ministries and their officers, industry and business class, academicians and others. This is to done in order to promote a balanced coverage of India in the foreign media. During 1999-2000, it is stated that about 100 journalists came to India in this process from various countries like Bangladesh, Australia, China, Israel, Russia and

others (MEA India 1999-2000: 107). During summit meetings or when the leaders of the Indian government travel abroad, the Division also facilitates and provides logistical support to the media (MEA India 1999-2000: 108). The report states that "over 200 journalists, both Indian and foreign, covered Prime Minister's historic visit to Lahore in February 1999" (MEA India 1999-2000: 107).

The Annual Report of 1999-2000 is also important because right in the first paragraph of the section on External Publicity, it mentions that:

> A special responsibility was places on the XP Division in the summer of 1999 to organise and anchor the inter-ministerial daily briefings to the national and international media on political and military developments following Pakistan's aggression against India in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir. These briefings helped galvanise international public opinion in support of India's message that aggression against India would have to be reversed by Pakistan and that the sanctity and inviolability of the Line of Control in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir must be respected (MEA India 1999-2000: 106)

Ambassador Kishan S. Rana has also written on MEA's induction into the briefings during the Kargil War which was for the initial period being handled by the Ministry of Defence. The Defence Officials "found themselves in deep waters on the nuances of words in relation to issues that went beyond the military operations being undertaken" (Rana 2006: 379). It was only the seventh day of the incursion that officials from the MEA joined the briefings which brought about a better media management in such a crisis situation (Rana 2006: 379).

Rana (2006:378-381) has chartered out these specific functions of the MEA in his chapter, along with how the implementation of these processes can be improved. With regard to the facilitation of the media from abroad, he states that their reportage needs to be focused upon as they impact India's images abroad in a major way. He writes that sometimes, it does happen that some foreign correspondents lose their impartiality for various reasons (Rana 2006: 377). In such cases, resorting to gestures like visa restrictions for those journalists with biased reportage will do more harm than good. The solution is more effective communication (Rana 2006:378) "Problems from unbalanced reportage can be countered only by positive actions, not restrictions" (Rana 2006: 380). He also writes that "Indian regulations concerning visits by TV and

documentary film teams are archaic, and have become increasingly irrelevant" (Rana 2006:379).

The Annual Report 2003-2004 states that with PM Vajpayee extending a "hand of friendship" towards Pakistan in April 2003, the Spokesperson's Office kept pace with the various media interactions and updating of India's stances. This was the beginning of the Composite Dialogue process where India and Pakistan agreed to have negotiations under eight subjects (MEA India 2003-2004: 8) "Around 210 press releases and statements were issued and more than 150 press briefings and media interactions were held during the period" (MEA India 2003-2004: 133). The MEA website is also updated by the XP Division on a real time basis "with latest press releases, briefings, statements, documents, reports, question answer in the Parliament, interviews and relevant articles and op-ed pieces from India and international media" (MEA India 2004-2005: 148). A Hindi version of the website was launched in 2006 (MEA India 2005-2006: 151).

The Annual Report of 2006-2007 announces the establishment of the Public Diplomacy Division in May 2006 (MEA India 2006-2007: 151). It states that "its mandate includes, inter-alia, outreach activities inside and outside India, and audio visual and print publicity" (MEA India 2006-2007: 151). The projection of a better understanding of India's foreign policy for publics both abroad and at home is the top objective of the of the PD Division. Importantly the report mentions the need for discussion and domestic consensus building as a top priority. "Such a understanding requires that issues of international politics, including those related to strategic issues, the reformation of global institutions so that they reflect contemporary realities, and the emerging global order are discussed and debated in our universities, think tanks and by the general public to evolve a national and consensual approach towards them" (MEA India 2006-2007: 152). Hence one of the main objectives of the PD Division was the inclusion of the voices of the domestic public into the shaping of foreign policy.

A separate division for Public Diplomacy was established in the Ministry of External Affairs in the year 2006. However after having established a new division, this new division was again merged with the External Publicity Division (XP Division) in the

2013. The reason for this has not been clear in the literature available on India's Public Diplomacy. Hence the reason for this merger was put forward to the interviewees. The separation was done with the idea of having more focus on Public Diplomacy issues in terms of the other creative enterprises. In that bargain one did not see this entire effort in a continuum. Hence both the PD Division and the XP Division started functioning in silos. The media part was in one silo, the social media part was in another silo, the books-prints-lectures was in another silo. To function in silo is not the best approach (Akbaruddin 2018).

Hence, the two divisions were integrated back. But this was done keeping in mind the fact that the ability of the professionals should be strengthened at all levels of functioning. An effort was made to install the best directors with the Spokesperson keeping an overall eye on everything (Akbaruddin 2018). In the earlier system, nobody had a complete view/oversight/picture of the entire system as the Spokesperson was doing his/her part, the Joint Secretary of the PD division was doing his/her part. Inevitably as it happens in bureaucracy, the spokesperson was the more lucrative job. And the person, who would be the second choice for the Office of the Spokesperson, would be made the Joint Secretary of the PD Division. Such a system was hence leading to unnecessary intra-bureaucratic rivalries (Akbaruddin 2018). Hence the two divisions were merged in 2013 in order to facilitate integration in processes of working and a holistic approach instead of working in silos which led to duplication of work and lack of oversight (Akbaruddin 2018). One can still argue that there can be a separate Public Diplomacy Division, but this prevents a holistic approach to the entire process hence impeding the objectives. Working in silos does not lead to success in the contemporary time (Akbaruddin 2018).

Indian Public Diplomacy and New Public Diplomacy
With the global focus shifting towards public diplomacy, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in India started a new division within the Ministry for purposes of Public Diplomacy (PD) in 2006. Till then the media relations of the MEA were being handled by the External Publicity Division (XP Division). However the PD and XP were again integrated in the year 2013. Historically, it can be argued that all countries, including India have practiced some form of public diplomacy, without this terminology being attached to it. Influencing the important people in a foreign land

has always been a part of diplomatic strategy. In periods of crisis, India too managed to "effectively influence foreign publics and through them, their governments" (Rana 2007: 66). During the 1971 war with Pakistan that led to the liberation of Bangladesh, the Indian government publicised its side of the story to the outside world through radio broadcasts (Rana 2007:66). One can recall the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi's interview to the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) where she effectively tackled all questions in the most dignified manner on India's stance on West Pakistan's actions on East Pakistan, equating it to what Hitler had done to the Jews and the resulting inflow of refugees into India. A variety of influencers, which included non-state actors like CII (Confederation of Indian Industries) and FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Indian Industries) were used by India to change the international rhetoric against India after its nuclear tests in 1998, especially in the United States (Rana 2007:66). These can be public diplomacy campaigns but without the terminology being attached to it.

The Ministry of External Affairs in India is the main actor for planning and implementing PD initiatives. With regard to this, it does maintain linkages with a variety of actors, both state and non-state actors. These are national organisations like the ICCR (Indian Council of Cultural Relations), ICWA (Indian Council of World Affairs) and various domestic and international think tanks like Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) and many others. The Annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs also mention the work of ICCR and ICWA in separate categories. Ian Hall (2012: 1099) has regarded the work of the ICCR, ICWA, and External broadcasting by the All India Radio (AIR) as being part of India's "traditional public diplomacy". All the three organizations have played an important role historically to popularise India's cultural heritage and civilization in the world abroad.

Established in 1950, ICCR has been responsible for India's cultural diplomacy. "ICCR acts in parallel and sometimes in competition, with the Department of Culture, as the eternal promotional agency, responsible for inbound and outbound visits of performing artists, lectures, plus a dozen odd overseas cultural centres" (Rana 2007: 64). With 35 cultural centers and 14 regional offices within India, these centers

perform different functions depending on their location (ICCR 2017). Some centers serve expatriate Indians or people of Indian heritage, while others-those located in major capitals such as London and Moscow-have broader roles. The larger centers, such as that in Suva, Fiji, which has been operating since 1972, provide Hindi language lessons and maintain contacts with NGOs in the local Indian community (Hall 2012: 1099-1100). "From the outset ICCR was given a novel adjunct task- to reach out to foreign students in India; every university with a sizeable concentration of foreign students has a part time adviser, paid by ICCR, helping in their welfare" (Rana 2007: 64). Hence it has been one of the main actors for India's cultural diplomacy and cultural diplomacy is a fundamental part and parcel of India's public diplomacy.

It is in this global outreach programme that ICWA has been playing a major role for India's public diplomacy endeavour.

> Founded in 1943 as an independent think tank, it has recently assumed a semi official role and was recognized by an Act of Parliament in 2001 as an 'institution of national importance'. The ICWA's main function is producing and disseminating research on foreign affairs, holding seminars, publishing briefing papers and a major journal (*Indian Quarterly*), but it also plays a significant and growing role in outreach. (Hall 2012: 1100)

"Since 2001 the Council has signed memoranda of understanding [MOUs] with 19 other institutions, three within India and 16 beyond it, from Russia and China to Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates" (Hall 2012: 1100). With such MOUs with foreign and domestic institutions, ICWA is expanding India's outreach in the field of educational and academic exchanges. Such academic exchanges foster greater understanding among scholars from diverse cross national backgrounds about various bilateral, multilateral and global issues. They can not only lessen frictions in bilateral relations through Track II dialogues but also act as a stepping stone towards greater engagement among groups, ultimately reaching to the point of implementing joint programmes and ventures which further strengthens the bonds of relationships already established.

Apart from these activities delegated to these bodies, the External Publicity (XP) Division of the MEA also maintains the linkages with the media at home and abroad. Here, both the internal and external services of the All India Radio (AIR) have been playing an important role. The objectives of AIR, as stated its website is to inform, educate and entertain the masses since its inception, truly living up to its motto – "Bahujan Hitaya : Bahujan Sukhaya". It is one of the largest broadcasting organisations in the world in terms of the number of languages of broadcast, the spectrum of socio-economic and cultural diversity it serves. "AIR's home service comprises 420 stations today located across the country, reaching nearly 92% of the country's area and 99.19 % of the total population. AIR originates programming in 23 languages and 179 dialects" (All India Radio 2017)

With regard to the external services of AIR,

> Today, the External Services Division (ESD) of All India Radio broadcasts daily in 57 transmissions with almost 72 hours covering over 108 countries in 27 languages, out of which 15 are foreign and 12 Indian. The foreign languages are Arabic, Baluchi, Burmese, Chinese, Dari, French, Indonesian, Persian, Pushtu, Russian, Sinhala, Swahili, Thai, Tibetan and English (General Overseas Service). The Indian languages are Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Malayalam, Nepali, Punjabi, Saraiki, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu (All India Radio 2017).

Both the internal and external services of AIR would mainly come under the category of 'monologue', as given by Cowan and Arsenault (2008: 10). Historically, before the advance of the World Wide Web and smart phones, AIR news broadcast and other shows on Indian culture and festivals, formed an integral part of the PD processes domestically and internationally.

As the political, economic, social and communications context changed rapidly both at the national and international levels, the Indian government realised that the actors, issues and processes of diplomacy in general and public diplomacy needed to both broaden and deepen. "Since 2000, India has looked beyond these well established traditional instruments of public diplomacy and employed a number of new initiatives..." (Hall 2012: 1102). He also goes on to identify five important developments in this context, firstly, "India's effort to reach out to overseas Indians", secondly, "its attempts to build connections with foreign business interest", thirdly, "its nascent foreign aid and development program", fourthly, "its use of major events

to showcase and 'nation-brand' India", and lastly "its use of new social media to reach out to younger, tech-savvy audiences." All these new processes initiated by the government went on to eventually establish the PDD division in the MEA for their better co-ordination and linkages.

The processes under 'new public diplomacy' would include the following: developing a positive narrative; the projection of soft power; hosting visitors; digital diplomacy; image and branding; broadcasting; the domestic front and coordination and strategic communications (Suri 2011: 298). Suri (2011: 298-300), who headed the PD Division in the MEA in 2009 has explained briefly what specific activities were undertaken within each of these larger processes, firstly, developing a positive narrative focused on the "'need to share approach of the positive work that India does through its development partnership in Africa, South East Asia, Latin America, Caribbean, South Asia". Secondly, the projection of soft power was done by "promoting brand India through campaigns such as 'Incredible India', organizing film festivals by foreign missions, commissioning documentary films on various diverse facets of India, publication of magazine 'India Perspectives' that reaches out to 75,000 readers around the world in 17 languages". Thirdly, hosting visitors included "an eclectic audience ranging from parliamentary delegations from UK, Cambodia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Australia to film critics and journalists" (Suri 2011:298-300).

Fourthly, digital diplomacy is running with "a 'Indiandiplomacy' twitter account, a facebook page, and a YouTube channel". Fifthly, image and branding include "initiatives such as 'India Inclusive @Davos' at the World Economic Forum in 2011 and 'India Future of Change'". Sixthly, under broadcasting, India has been making an "attempt to make Doordarshan cater not only to the diaspora public in the 67 countries where it is aired but also the general foreign public in those countries". Seventhly, on the domestic front, things started rolling with "the institutionalization of 'Distinguished Lecture Series' having taken place in more than 20 universities in several cities, the organization of seminars, workshops and conferences in places like Varanasi, Patna, Kolkata, Shillong and Kochi". Lastly, coordination and strategic communications "attempts to integrate the various departments of the government needed for an active and credible public diplomacy." (Suri 2011: 300-302).

These specific activities and processes can be put under all the three categories of 'monologue, dialogue and collaboration'. Branding, developing a positive narrative through films, magazine circulation, documentaries and broadcasting would come under the category of a monologue. Whereas, hosting visitors and holding conference both at home and abroad would come under 'dialogic' category. When holding academic conferences is institutionalized and regularized, with added measures of joint research and joint publications, then it would be included in the category of collaboration. India's recent foray into, what has been termed by Suri (2011: 300) as "digital diplomacy" can be said to be part of the processes under a 'monologue'. This is despite the fact that such a platform provides and is supposed to be inter-active and dialogic. The failure of India's digital diplomacy to become inter-active and dialogue based can be attributed to whole lot of reasons. What is commendable though is the fact that, though India began comparatively very late with these new technologies, it has picked up pace very quickly with the number of facebook 'likes' increasing on the MEA facebook page and instagram accounts.

Specifically with regard to the online presence, the Ministry of External Affairs, India has been one of the first ministries in the Government of India to use social media officially. The MEA has a Facebook page, a YouTube channel, a Twitter account, an Instagram account and an app for phones. Along with the main public diplomacy pages, the various missions of India abroad have their own separate account and pages online. The Annual Report 2010-2011 (MEA India 2010-2011: 163) has a new sub-section under the section of Public Diplomacy which is titled "Digital Diplomacy". It states that the PD Division aims to harness the opportunities provided by the online medium in order to connect with the younger generation. The intension is to "utilise the powerful, low cost, communication channels offered by Twitter, Youtube, Facebook, Blogspot, and the like...for receiving feedback and for creating interactive platforms that improves our interface with the citizens" (MEA India 2010-2011: 163). The MEA's reach on social media is increasing every moment since they started. The official twitter handle of the MEA India for Public Diplomacy is titled "Indian Diplomacy" with the handle name as @IndianDiplomacy. This handle has 1.4 million.

The handle of the current Official Spokesperson the MEA, Mr. Raveesh Kumar is titled @MEAIndia and has 1.95 million followers. The previous Foreign Minister from 2014-2019, Sushma Swaraj's twitter handle with 12.8 million followers was positively hailed as she personally reached out to people in distress with regard to passport, visa issues and any other emergent issues falling within the domain of foreign policy.[29] With the BJP coming into power with a bigger mandate in 2019, the new Foreign Minister is India's former diplomat, having served as India's Foreign Secretary from 2015 to 2018 is S. Jaishankar. He also served as India's Ambassador to the United States and was India's longest serving envoy to China. With the twitter handle of @DrSJaishankar, he presently has 212 thousand followers. His first tweet as India's External Affairs Minister on the 1st of June read as "My first tweet, Thank you all for the best wishes! Honoured to be given this responsibility. Proud to follow on the footsteps of @SushmaSwaraj ji". India's current Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Syed Akbaruddin, with the twitter handle name @AkbaruddinIndia has 99.6 thousand followers. India's various missions abroad have their own twitter, facebook and youtube accounts to reach out to the internet savvy host countries public. In 2010, the PD Division "won recognition through the India e-governance 2.0 Awards...for the most innovative use of the social media in Government" (MEA, India 2010-2011: 163).

Their foray into the online world has been impressive and commendable. However, although social media allows space for an interactive exchange between individuals and groups, all these pages of the MEA have not been interactive at all levels. The interaction is limited to Consular issues. Commenting on this, Syed Akbaruddin (2018) stated that interaction had to be limited only to Consular issues and it would not be viable to have discussions related to policy matters on social media. The MEA does not have the manpower to engage in such online discussions on policy matters. It would be impossible for the Joint Secretary to get involved in such matters (Akbaruddin 2018). Such an initiative would mean taking a full-fledged approach where engagement has to be done on a daily basis and Foreign Policy by its definition may not be amenable to this sort of a thing (Akbaruddin 2018). It would be possible to send out a reply but to get into a serious foreign policy debate on social media

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[29] The number of followers for various twitter handles mentioned was last updated in the month of June, 2019.

would not be a good strategy. One of the reasons for this is also that social media has increasingly become polarised. There are people who will not be convinced no matter what rationale argument may be put forward (Akbaruddin 2018). On platforms like twitter, it also becomes difficult to make nuanced positions in limited words. If the diplomatic issue is a big public concern and requires an interaction on the public platform, then the MEA could do a live facebook interview. But more than that cannot be expected in this domain (Akbaruddin 2018).

However, Ambassador Nirupama Rao positively states that no matter what the challenges, diplomats need to rise up to this challenge of social media "disruptiveness" and "intrusiveness". Referring to the difference between old/secret diplomacy and modern/transparent diplomacy, she writes that,

> Nostalgia for the old days of privacy and distance from public spaces may result, but it is no antidote to what awaits. The era of Open Situation Rooms (tried with some success in Germany) involving consultation between senior officials and a wider public of entrepreneurs, physicians, social activists and a wider circle of digitally-networked experts and scholars is more than possible. (Rao 2017a)

In fact she argues that in this world of information overload, the need to inform and to maintain transparency becomes all the more important. Diplomacy should be bringing together of diverse actors ranging from the fields of business and scientists to various other governmental department. This would act to broaden the scope of issues and also increase the credibility and trust of diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy will continue but new diplomacy can be ignored only at our own peril (Rao 2017a). Encouraging diplomats to be more technologically savvy and handy with their social media, she writes "We need tweeting Talleyrands, not control freaks" (Rao 2017a).

She further argues that, "Public Diplomacy is a buzz word that has been around for decades, but today it is well ensconced with a significant other, which is social media" (2017a). She argues that diplomacy in this contemporary age of social media has to be up to speed with a demanding environment.

> The demands of openness and transparency in policy deployment and articulation, real-time communication, countering fake news and

alternative facts in a post-truth world, clarity and conciseness, are all upon diplomacy (Rao, Nirupama 2017a).

This is making diplomacy focus on people more compared to being cocooned in its own silos and black boxes. There is a call for a more interactive diplomatic apparatus. She also enumerates the challenges to this interactivity on social media. She writes "hate speech, vitriol, ethnic, racial or sexual abuse can inundate embassy social media profiles" (Rao 2017a). The question being asked is how can diplomats and diplomacy deal with such intolerant and preconceived views expressed on social media regarding certain foreign policy issues (Rao 2017a). Nonetheless a beginning has been made with regard to the use of social media by Indian diplomacy and this need to be broadened and deepened. She writes that Sushma Swaraj presented an excellent example of how a foreign minister can connect directly to the citizens especially those in need of urgent consular service (Rao 2017a).

Syed Akbaruddin (2018) approaches this issue of new media and diplomacy with a cautionary and balanced approach. He is of the view that the MEA does have a social media team but the professionals there are not specialists in responding to policy specialist issues because they are trained in Public Diplomacy. One cannot expect them to become experts in Indo-US or Indo-Russia and other domains of Indian Foreign Policy. That sort of expertise will perhaps be available only in a mission. And the MEA staff is already stressed out in terms of its personal capacity (Akbaruddin 2018). The objective should be to first try and fill gaps where there are needed; social diplomacy requiring serious engagement on substantive issues on social media is not one of these urgent gaps. The MEA is already engaging in Counsellor related issues. This is taking place not only through Sushma Swaraj's account but is being implemented at an institutional level for a long time (Akbaruddin 2018). For a huge diverse country like ours, such a dialogue on substantive issues on social media is a difficult task (Akbaruddin 2018).

Ambassador Rana unequivocally declares that "Communication with publics is transformed....Public diplomacy as it takes place now could not be conducted without the ICT Revolution" (Rana 2011: 199). The websites and social media profiles of Foreign Service people have a huge following and are regularly used by people for

updating themselves on the key elements of foreign policy developments and consular services. The manner in which the MFA's have also started dealing with the media has considerably evolved. Some foreign ministries even carry out their media briefings on certain days of the week via the internet. Examples of such countries would be France and Japan (Rana 2011: 200). This results in getting a broader range of journalists from such parts of the country which are far away from the capital city and even journalists from abroad (Rana 2011: 200). It can be said that with all these associated changes in the world of communication, "few members of the Foreign Ministry can afford the luxury of treating their jobs as a nine-to-five employment...running the MFA is now a 24x7 affair" (Rana 2011: 201). The response time for all diplomats especially in crisis situations has been reduced as the pace of incoming information has been fastened. This requires diplomats to adopt in such a way that they can not only think quickly but also in a manner that can satisfy the frenetic media. "Every single diplomat needs a modicum of media skills and needs to be trained" (Rana 2011: 201). The Annual Report of the MEA 1999-2000, under the section of "Administration and Organisation" states that officers on probation are taught "Special Diplomatic Skills" which includes negotiating/ communicating skills and representational and media skills (MEA India 1999-2000: 122).

The Office of the Spokesperson of MEA

The MEA maintains linkages with the media but through these means of Press Briefings and Press Releases, various statements and responses to a query (MEA 2019). Through such interactions, the MEA articulate and provides information to the media, spells out its policies. The most important link between the MEA and the media is the Office of the Spokesperson of the MEA. The Joint Secretary of the XP Division is the Official Spokesperson of the MEA. "The office of the Official Spokesperson and Joint Secretary (External Publicity) is the interface of the Ministry of External Affairs with the media." (MEA, India 2019). This is a very important post in the MEA and the person who heads this Division becomes the face of the MEA after the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Secretary. The people who have been the Official Spokesperson since independence are as follows: V.R Bhatt (1949-1954); R. Ramamirtham (1954-1955); P.N Haksar (1955-1958); R. Goburdhan (1958-1959); P.N. Menon (1959-1962); M.A. Rahman (1962-1964); I.J. Bhadur Singh (1964-1967); R. Jaipal (1967-1968); A.B Bhadkamkar (1968-1969); S.K. Singh (1969-

1973); A.N.D. Haksar (1973-1976); S.V. Purushottam (1976-1979); J.N. Dixit (1979-1982); Mani Shankar Aiyar (1982-1983); Salman Haidar (1983-1985); G. Parthasarthy (1985-1988); Aftab Seth (1988-1992); S.S. Mukherjee (1992-1994); Arif Khan (1994-1997); Talmiz Ahmed (1997-1997); Pavan K. Varma (1997-1998); K. C. Singh (1998-1999); R.S. Jassal (1999-2001); Nirupama Rao (2001-2002); Navtej Sarna (2002-2008); Vishnu Prakash (2008-2012); Syed Akbaruddin (2012-2015); Vikas Swarup (2015-2017); Gopal Baglay (2017-2017) and Raveesh Kumar (2017-till present) (MEA, India 2019).

According to Ambassador Kishan S. Rana (2006: 381) "there is surely no other active or large foreign ministry where the normally full-time job of Official Spokesman on foreign affairs is combined with the equally full-time occupation of handling the complete set of operational external publicity activities". He opines that since both require a lot of effort and attention, the MEA should divide these two tasks between two people. This division is all the more required for crisis situations where the media is baying for a sound bite and the first statement from the government sets the narrative rolling (Rana 2006: 382). The XP division is responsible for analysing the trends in the foreign media regarding its reportage on India and its issues (Rana 2006: 382). The MEA website also has a link to important articles regarding news about India in important foreign newspapers on specific topics. This is under the column titled "Media Centre" under which there are two sections, one titled "Article in the Indian Media" and the other titled "Articles in the Foreign Media" (MEA, India 2018). Rana (2006:382) goes on to write, there is also "under-utilization of potential" because the XP Division does not monitor Television reportage in a thorough manner. "All India Radio runs a broadcast monitoring service, but it is not known if Doordarshan has begun to systematically track trends in TV reportage around the world, at least on developments that are of direct concern to India" (Rana 2006: 382).

According to Vivek Katju (2018) till the 1990s, the Spokesperson of the MEA was never identified in the media. It was a faceless entity and in all newspapers, it was mainly cited as 'the Office of the Spokesperson'. It is only recently that this institution of the MEA has been highlighted among the public through the media (Katju 2018). The Press Briefings too were not institutionalised and regularised. It used to take place on a case to case basis, as and when required. It was only

regularised from 2012 on a weekly basis (Akbaruddin 2018). Before that briefings were not structured and used to take place on an individual level and on the occasion when the Spokesperson wanted to say something on any specific issue/event (Akbaruddin 2018). It was also decided in 2012, that along with the weekly press briefings, there would be background briefings by the Spokesperson as well as the Joint Secretary of the Division concerned on a specific issue (Akbaruddin 2018). For example, background briefings were to be held on different geographical divisions so that when the journalists could write about it in the near future, they would do with keeping the larger context in perspective having been given the background information (Akbaruddin 2018). Hence briefings would be held on the Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh, or fishermen's issue with Sri Lanka, or workers issues in the Gulf, broad issues in which journalists would be interested and did not have access to the material that the MEA would provide them in these specific briefings (Akbaruddin 2018).

Another important change with regard to the Press Briefings that was implemented in 2012 was regarding the nature and structures of these briefings itself. This related to the broadening of the nature of journalists attending these briefings. According to Akbaruddin (2018), External Publicity Division realised that not only the English press but also the regional media press were interested in specific foreign policy issues. For example, the Tamil Press had huge stakes in the fisherman issue with Sri Lanka and they needed information regularly on it. Similarly the Bengali press was mostly interested on India's foreign policy issues with Bangladesh. Hence the interest in foreign policy issues was broader that the English media and academic and intellectuals operating most from New Delhi (Akbaruddin 2018). The increasing interest in foreign policy issues in the regional language media was because, firstly, they had more space than English media and secondly, they are catering to small towns and less than big cities where people are in contemporary India, going out for various things (Akbaruddin 2018). For example, a lot of youngsters from all over the country are going for higher education abroad; professionals from Kerala going to the Gulf for purposes of, and others. Hence the media in these states have to cater to their audience, whose children and relatives are abroad for various purposes (Akbaruddin 2018). Each language media have their own interests and specificities. But the larger point was that there was an increasing appetite for foreign policy related issues

throughout the country (Akbaruddin 2018). Hence in 2012 the MEA decided to open up and broaden the segment of journalists who would have more access to cover the MEA (Akbaruddin 2018). Certain decisions were taken through which it was ensured that all the journalists, whether English and Hindi or regional language saw themselves on a common footing.

In the weekly Press Briefings that hence began, all journalists were allowed to ask one question each. Previously the nature of these briefings was such that all the questions would be asked by a few journalists (Akbaruddin 2018). According to Akbaruddin (2018), previously the regional language journalists and many newcomers were sidelined and felt that they were not getting enough opportunities and their questions were being asked by somebody else and other such problems (Akbaruddin 2018). This was how the MEA's reach to the media, especially regional language media was broadened (Akbaruddin 2018). This started in bringing more number of journalists to the regular briefings of the MEA generating more interest in diplomatic issues. The number of journalists attending these briefings before 2012 was approximate 20-25 and after these changes were brought about in 2012, the number increased to 75-80 attending on a regular basis. This number increase took place over a year (Akbaruddin 2018).

Another important decision that was implemented was that these Press Briefings started getting video graphed, the clips of which could be used by the television media. Hence, the reach was extended further (Akbaruddin 2018). Prior to 2012, these briefings largely catered only to the print media and were sporadic in nature. Once it got regularised and on camera briefings started, the electronic media also got its sound bite on foreign policy issues (Akbaruddin 2018). This did disappoint some people in the media as their privileged access was taken away, but overall the decision was for the betterment of the entire media fraternity (Akbaruddin). What also began was that the Press Releases started being published in some regional languages apart from English and Hindi. There were not Press Releases in Malayalam, Tamil, Bengali and other some regional languages (Akbaruddin 2018). The rule that was followed was that if the External Publicity division got a request from at least five people for a release in a particular language, the MEA would provide for it (Akbaruddin 2018). A series of these measures allowed the MEA to broaden its appeal and it was found that

the fastest growing media was the regional media other than English (Akbaruddin 2018). The difference between the regional language media and english/Hindi media is that the regional media is much more in tune with what their audience wants (Akbaruddin 2018). Hence it can be said that the regional media press was much more people centric (Akbaruddin 2018). When the nature of these questions changed, that led to a change in the outlook and focus area of the MEA itself with issues of individual and human interest started becoming important (Akbaruddin 2018). Before that issues of human interests were not the MEA's forte. It was only about bigger broader country to country ties (Akbaruddin 2018).

MEA, India influencing the media narrative

In the sphere of news management regarding foreign affairs, the ICT revolution has brought in magnanimous changes. Communicating one's narrative with the public at home and abroad is as old as politics itself. Kishan S. Rana writes that,

> Much as the media abhor being "managed," all governments try to influence publics via the media, placing positive spin on their own actions and eroding the stance taken by adversaries, as during key negotiations (Rana 2011: 86).

However in a time when news emerging from anywhere becomes global news, it becomes impossible for governments to tailor the news with regard to the target audience in mind. Hence the governments cannot have one news for domestic audience and different news for foreign audience. Both spill over to publics in both domains in contemporary times. "Yet politicians address domestic audiences with themes that will resonate with them, as during elections; foreign audiences are expected to treat such rhetoric with indulgence" (Rana 2011: 87). Even diplomats will try their level best to spin the news narrative in their favour.

> Astute spokesmen and background briefers slant news, to spin the story. Control over language and the use of the "right" key phrases shapes the immediate perception. But over the medium term, news management does not work, for the same reason that publics cannot be manipulated all the time (Rana 2011:87).

The level of success of news management by the government is dependent on a host of other issues. Politicians with a good grasp of media skills are more successful in spinning the narrative than others. Amb Rana goes on to write that, with the

increasing importance of domestic publics, the "foreign ministry spokesman now focus mainly on the home reactions to foreign affairs issues, to the point of reduced attention to projecting home policy to the foreign media" (Rana 2011: 87). This should not be the case ideally and Amb Rana (2011:87) argues that both the domestic public and the foreign public should be given equal importance. With the overall role of the media in the decision making process of foreign policy, Amb Rana writes that "the media are especially effective in blocking new initiative through premature publicity. They also influence the direction and shape of policy" (Rana 2011: 161).

On this issue, Vivek Katju (2018) is of the opinion that in a democracy, the government seeks to project its internal policies and it also seeks to project its external policies. Through this process it seeks to influence the media by giving arguments, by giving information, by giving perspective to establish that their policies and approaches are correct. And through the media it seeks to impact the public opinion. That is part of the democratic process, nobody can object to it (Katju 2018). No government can ignore the kind of influence that the media is making on public opinion. On the other hand, the media tries to either influence the government or if it is neutral, then it seeks to put a spotlight on the policies and approaches of the government to make it more intelligible to the people. There is interplay in the process here (Katju 2018).

If the argument is that foreign policy successes are highlighted by governments for their own benefits, then there is nothing new in such an activity (Akbaruddin 2018) All governments use every area to enhance their profile. So it is not unusual for governments to do it. Governments have always done it and they will always do it (Akbaruddin 2018). Not only governments but also individuals, or individual members of the central and state legislature seek to enhance their profiles by citing their foreign visits and exchanges (Akbaruddin 2018). The media, not just in India but anywhere in the world, especially in democratic countries cannot be controlled. So people will have the opinion they want and they will also broadcast those opinions which sells their product (TCA Raghavan 2018). All governments seek to influence the media's rhetoric especially on sensitive foreign policy issues through public press

briefings and informal background briefings, sometimes this influence is successful and sometimes it is not.

On many sensitive issues, the MEA tries to influence the media rhetoric especially when there is a crisis (Akbaruddin 2018). For example, when the nurses were caught in Iran or the problems Indians were facing when the ISIS moved into Iraq. In such cases the MEA did tell the media not to be sensationalist in its reportage as they were far away from the actual reality and actually were not aware of what was transpiring on the ground. Hence it was an imperative on them to be balanced in their reportage (Akbaruddin 2018). On Pakistan and China, despite the MEA's attempted influence, the media mostly resists the influence. Each journalist comes with an agenda and makes it a point to ask particular questions to get a sound bite and then plays it according to the media's original agenda (Akbaruddin 2018). Sometimes television news agencies come with a fixed mindset, which then cannot be changed by rational argument (Akbaruddin 2018). Moreover, on a day to day basis the MEA cannot guide journalists on the nature of their reportage. That would be an impossible task (Akbaruddin 2018). But in situations where the issue is sensitive and urgent, as war on border related with China and it is related to an ongoing event, the MEA does have discussions and sometimes such discussions works and sometimes it does not work (Akbaruddin 2018). There are so many in the media fraternity who think that they do not have an obligation towards the government (Akbaruddin 2018)

The frequency of MEA-media discussions is also higher during such crisis situations. In some situations the meeting takes place on a daily basis for a few months until the crisis lasts (Akbaruddin 2018). Daily briefings were held because it was realised that if no information is provided at all, then the nature of the reportage decreases further in quality with rise of emotions/jingoism and lack of rationality (Akbaruddin 2018). If no information is provided by the MEA, then journalists, since they have a job at hand and have to produce something and hence start writing on nonsensical issues. But even if some rudimentary information is provided, part of this is picked up and reported on (Akbaruddin 2018). This strategy helped change the rhetoric of the media during crisis situations rather them asking them to purposely report in a certain manner. Information, even if rudimentary, on a daily basis helped (Akbaruddin 2018).To engage with the press during the crisis also helped the MEA to perceive the

situation better. The more the engagement takes place during a crisis, the better it is for both the MEA and the media (Akbaruddin 2018).

According to Vivek Katju (2018), the difference in the rhetoric of the media had little to do with the press briefings and background briefings that the MEA had with the press. He explained this by an example from the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It is not a question of allowing. The *New York Times(NYT)* had got hold of the story or part of the story and they were about to break it. Kennedy had to call the publisher of NYT and had to request them to hold on as national security was at stake. So sometimes government appeal, sometimes governments send out signals to the media indirectly. The media responds favourable sometimes and sometimes it does not (Katju 2018). Influencing the rhetoric through the background briefings is not successful in the Pakistani case because there are two important angles which are not present in the case of China, which are the angles of religion and terrorism. This makes public opinion in India more emotional and vociferous towards Pakistan. These inherent emotions among the people are hence represented in the media discourse. This problem of public discourse/opinion influencing the reportage of the media or the media's reportage influencing the public opinion/discourse can be viewed as a chicken and egg problem.

With regard to the linkages between the Indian Embassies and the media in the host countries, Ambassador Katju (2018) was of the view that the Indian Embassies abroad maintain linkages with the media of the host country for mainly two reasons, first, to give them an indication of your our own policies and approaches and second, to learn from them as they are the repository of enormous amounts of information (Katju 2018). There are many and very strong informal linkages with the media in the host country (Raghavan 2018). Recounting his experience when he was India's High Commissioner to Pakistan, TCA Raghavan said that anything to do with India use to make news in Islamabad. With the opening up of the Pakistani media in the last 15 years, the number of newspapers and television has increased. Most of them keenly follow the Indian High Commission (Raghavan 2018). The Indian High Commission there knows all the journalists and these journalists are always available. If the High Commission holds a press conference, most of them make it a point to attend. The

same goes for any kind of informal interactions. Hence the linkages are very strong (Raghavan 2018).

The nature of the media abroad depends on country to country (Katju 2018). Vivek Katju (2018) explained this with an example. Being was posted in Myanmar when the 9/11 attacks took place in America. The press in Myanmar during that time, that is 2001, was tightly controlled by the military leadership. One of the well known english daily in Myanmar during that time was called *The New Light of Myanmar.* Katju (2018) said that if any future historian at a future of 1000 to 2000 years from today had only two sources to write the history of the year 2001, the *New York Times* and *The New Light of Myanmar*, s/he would not be able to figure out the world. When the *New York Times* was covered with photos and reports on the 9/11 attacks, *The New Light of Myanmar* devoted this news a small column on the front page. The main news item in *The New Light of Myanmar* for almost a week after the attacks involved the story of a young white elephant that was found in Myanmar (Katju 2018).
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According to TCA Raghavan (2018), there both similarities and difference between the media at home and abroad. Commenting on the similarities between the media in India and Pakistan, he said that both have very adverse operating environments in terms of survival and making money. The balance sheet in terms of making enough money is a factor in both countries. There is immense competition between television channels and between newspapers (Raghavan 2018). But the big difference is that the English media, both electronic and print has a much more important role in India than in Pakistan. In Pakistan, 90 percent of the media is primarily the Urdu media while in India, this is not the case. It may be the case quantitatively but in terms of impact, the English language media has a far greater impact in India than it has in Pakistan. This itself leads to other differences, because the level of knowledge in the English language media in both countries is definitely superior to those of the non-english speaking media (Raghavan 2018).

General Interface between Media and Indian diplomacy
Ambassador Vivek Katju (2018) was of the view that Indian Diplomacy had mediatized enormously as media's role was a fact of life and a reality in contemporary times. For diplomacy, in some cases this role is useful and in some cases it is an

obstacle (Katju 2018). According to Raghavan (2018) mediatization has led to the government being more conscious of the likely public impact of its decision than it would have been otherwise. But this effect is more subtle. It does not see change everything. It is there as a factor, but it is not as if something new has happened (Raghavan 2018). If one defines the media in a larger sense, not just news media, but if one takes into account the larger interests in India, the larger community which is developed around foreign policy, then that has a more significant impact (Raghavan 2018). The increasing number of think tanks, doing as much more policy analysis has certainly brought about one important change which is that diplomacy is no longer the specialisation of the Ministry of External Affairs. It is a much wider fraternity (Raghavan 2018). For Syed Akbaruddin (2018) mediatization has had limited impact on policy centric government to government aspects of diplomacy and more of an impact on human/individual consular issues.

According to Eric Gonsalves (2018), this was a difficult and long term subject as the media has been effective in many ways at least for the last 200 years in the making of relationships or diplomacy. Even in the 19th century, war correspondents that went to wars in Europe, South Africa and China did have an effect. What was interesting was that the nature of the media has itself changed (Gonsalves 2018). From 1950 onwards the media has become more recognisable. There is a whole new domain of social media which is capable of a political role as they have access to data which is used by politicians to project themselves in a certain way (Gonsalves 2018). Narrowing it down to Indian diplomacy and the media at home and abroad, it is seen that whether it is Non Alignment and India's relations with the US, or nuclear weapons and relations with the rest of the world, the media weapon has been a powerful weapon which has been used against India and India also have been able to use it occasionally. Gonsalves was of the view that 1971 was one of the highlights when India did this, but it does not happen very often (Gonsalves 2018).

For Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon (2018) diplomacy has not mediatized in any manner. Since diplomacy is the art of getting what you want in a negotiation, through a peaceful process of persuasion, it is best done secretly. If it is done in public view then there is a possibility that in the give and take of negotiations, either or both sides will get embarrassed as it is hard to make concessions in public. Since it also involves

a level of manipulativeness, diplomacy works best when done privately (Menon 2018). Media does affect the overall environment and the manner in which international negotiations will be covered by the domestic media and influence the public opinion, but it does not change the actual practice of diplomacy (Menon 2018).

Conclusion

There are multiple shades of opinion in the Indian diplomatic community with regard to mediatization of diplomacy. Some view it as positively and some give less importance to it. As pointed out by Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin, the invaluable change that has been brought about by mediatization is the interest and response to "human interest" concerns of the people at home and abroad by the diplomatic community. Also, the growth of the MEA Beat to include journalists from the regional news media shows that there is a growing interest in certain foreign states where the diaspora of that particular provincial state is in a larger number. Ambassador Raghavan is of the opinion that mediatization has led to a certain section of the public being exposed to the media, customs and people of the other countries leading to people-to-people exchanges. According to Ambassador Rao, diplomats need to become tweeting "Talleyrands" referring to Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, who served as France's ambassador to the United Kingdom during the Napolean Era. Ambassador Rao seems very hopeful regarding the use of new media for purposes of diplomacy. In fact, she argues that diplomats should actively use this medium not only for providing information but for bringing a diverse range of actors and issues together.

Some of the diplomats are weary of mediatization and the calls for transparent new diplomacy. This includes Ambassador Surendra Kumar who has written on the virtues and successes of old secretive diplomacy and Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon who does not give the media any important role in diplomacy and strongly hold the opinion that successful diplomacy is best done secretly. All the diplomats were in unison in stating that if a government had high level of policy certainty regarding a policy issue, then it would go ahead with its implementation despite an unfavourable media narrative. Hence the media played almost no role in high politics substantive issues of diplomacy and more of a role in non-substantive low politics issues. All the diplomats were averse to the idea that media intrusion led to a loss of the autonomy

and that the media pressure negatively impacted their functioning. They were of the opinion that mediatization has become a fact of life for all professions and the diplomatic community has evolved like everyone else.

The reinvention and evolution of the External Publicity Division (XP Division) of the Ministry of External Affairs India is symbolic of the fact that the inter-linkages between diplomacy and media is ever increasing. The rise in the number of press briefing and the effort put in by the XP division to reach out to the media shows that the state sees the media as an invaluable tool of pursuing its diplomacy. This is also used to update the domestic audience with diplomatic issues and seek a favourable opinion on the same. Hence one can say that media is being constantly being used by the diplomatic and political class to manage the public narrative on foreign policy issues both at home and abroad.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

This study started out by seeking to understand the relationship between media and diplomacy in the Indian context. The focal point used was mediatization of diplomacy which has been defined as the increasing influences of media on diplomacy, thereby altering its actors and processes to suit the media logic. Mediatization is not a one way process where only media influences diplomacy; it also includes how the diplomatic institutions influence and utilise the media and its narrative to achieve their own objectives. The research began with the following hypotheses: first, the degree to which media can influence diplomacy and vice versa depends on the level of policy certainty/uncertainty. Second, mediatization has had a positive impact on public diplomacy and a negative impact on traditional diplomacy. In order to verify these hypotheses, first, an analysis was undertaken of the print media in India on specific diplomatic issues between India and Pakistan. Second, the perspectives of Indian diplomats on the role of the media in diplomacy was analysed through the writings produced by diplomats and the data collected from interviews undertaken with former and serving Indian diplomats.

The examination of media narratives was done in the Hindi and English languages for four events between India and Pakistan: two of these events being in the realm of conflict and the other two being in the realm of negotiations/peace. The analysis drew from the theoretical background of mediatization of diplomacy written in Chapter Two. Three main criteria were used for the analysis: first, the kind of 'framing' predominantly used in issues of war and peace by the media. The nature of media framing would highlight whether the media was in the "sphere of consensus", "sphere of legitimate controversy" or "sphere of deviance", according to the typology designed by Daniel Hallin (1984). Second, whether there was certainty or uncertainty in the government policies regarding the conflict. Third, the nature of media 'priming' which plays a major role in setting standards of behaviour for the political class and for the public.

The relationship between India and Pakistan is cyclical in nature, ranging from bitter war/conflict to emotional peace summits. Hence the events chosen for this study belong to these two extreme realms. The war/conflict events selected for this study were Kargil War (1999) and Surgical Strikes (2016) and the peace summit chosen were the Agra Summit (2001) and the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit (2009). Based on the detailed examination of the media narratives, it is observed that there is a difference in the media frames used by the Hindi and English print newspapers for some of these events. However, even though the nature of framing was different, one can observe a predominant narrative that forms an overarching milieu in the media. It was revealed that during the Kargil War, the Hindi newspapers broadly used the 'security frame' and 'unity frame' while the English newspapers primarily used the 'peace frame' and 'critical frame'. Hence it can be stated that the former was operating within the 'sphere of consensus' while the latter was working within the dimension of the 'sphere of legitimate controversy'. It is also observed that there was a high level of policy uncertainty during the initial days of the war, which slowly evolved towards policy certainty in the mid-conflict period and lasted till the end of the war. With regard to the Surgical Strikes, it is observed that both the Hindi and the English media majorly operated under the 'nationalistic and security frame'. The level of policy certainty was high and the media narrative was overwhelmingly in the 'sphere of consensus'.

In the context of the peace summits, during the Agra Summit, the English newspapers predominantly used the 'critical frame' before and after the summit, in unison with the 'support frame' just before the summit. The Hindi newspapers used the 'support frame'. In fact, one of the Hindi newspapers overwhelmingly framed the summit in terms of peace ('peace frame'), whose appeal was made at the level of public to public relations, which went much beyond the rhetoric of the government. Hence, one can argue that the English media was operating from the 'sphere of legitimate controversy' while the Hindi media was operating in the 'sphere of consensus'. Although the talks ended up in a deadlock for various reasons, from the Indian side, there was policy certainty with regard to the objectives of the summit for India. With regard to the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, both the Hindi and English newsprint functioned within the 'critical frame' and hence were operating from the 'sphere of legitimate controversy'. This was coupled with a low level of policy certainty within

the government and the political parties for the peace initiative undertaken with Pakistan.

These media chronicles underlined the different ways in which the media covered these events of war and peace. One of the research questions that this thesis addressed was whether the media can play an autonomous role in influencing diplomacy. The hypothesis had stated that the role of the media in influencing diplomacy depends on the level of policy certainty/uncertainty. Hence higher the level of policy certainty, lower is the degree to which media can attempt to influence diplomacy by using the critical frame. This is amply observed with regard to the Kargil war and Surgical Strikes. In both these contexts, the majority of the print media predominantly functioned under the 'sphere of consensus' as the 'critical frame' was seldom used, specifically during the Surgical Strikes. One of the reasons for this would be the high level of policy certainty. As for the peace summits, the Agra summit operated from the framework of policy certainty whereas Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit did not. The media narrative was very critical of the initiative of peace undertaken at Sharm-el-Sheikh both before and after the summit. With regard to Agra, though there was policy certainty, only the Hindi media overwhelmingly supported the peace process whereas the English media applied a cautionary and critical approach.

In this context, it becomes important to state that this analysis is limited to examining whether the media can attempt to influence diplomacy by generating a counter narrative in times of both policy certainty and uncertainty. Since the conduct and success of a diplomatic venture/initiative depends on a host of other factors/variables, the extent of the success of the media narrative in actually impacting diplomacy cannot be gauged in isolation and autonomously. Hence, due to the extensive and emotive media coverage of India-Pakistan relations, it may appear like the talks are being cancelled/initiated and conflict is being escalated/de-escalated due to the media coverage, but this is not true. Although from the four events it has been observed that some newspapers like *The Hindu* and *Rashtriya Sahara* have attempted to create a different narrative from the dominant narrative but these have not been successful. Consequently, the CNN Effect and Vietnam War Syndrome Model where the media acting autonomously as the independent variable have had its own moments in the

narrative, but they do not last long enough to become the main narrative in India Pakistan relations.

The first hypothesis not only contemplates media's influence on diplomacy but also diplomacy's influence and utilization of media, depending on the level of policy certainty/uncertainty. In all four cases, it was observed that when policy certainty is high, the government manages to significantly influence the media rhetoric to suit the government rhetoric. This is observed in both Surgical Strikes and the latter part of the Kargil War. This phenomenon can be understood within the domain of the 'manufacturing consent' model. However, with policy uncertainty in Sharm-el-Sheikh, the government could not influence the media narrative to suit its objectives. With the Agra Summit, though there was policy certainty, it is observed that the government could not manage to influence the media, especially the English media. This could be because both parties to the negotiation were attempting to influence the media narrative and the Indian government clearly failed to give enough information and press briefings to influence the media.

To answer the question of the various ways in which Indian diplomacy has been mediatized, one can state that the growing inter linkages of the diplomatic world with the world of the media shows that diplomacy intends to use media for its own objectives. If mediatization is seen as a meta-process where various political and diplomatic institutions are forced to alter their actors and processes to suit the media logic, then the various dimensions of mediatization are clearly observed in the context of Indian diplomacy. Mediatization can be located first, at the level of the External Publicity Division of the Ministry of External Affairs with its increasing linkages with all forms of media. The rise in the number of media briefings and the effort put in by the XP division to reach out to the media is indicative of the state seeing media as an invaluable tool of pursuing its diplomacy. Second, the MEA's foray into new media with its various social media accounts especially that of the Minster of External Affairs (EAM), the Foreign Secretary and Official Spokesperson shows that diplomacy is using the media to reach out to its target audience both at home and abroad.

This is related to the second hypothesis of the study, which states that mediatization has had a positive impact on public diplomacy and a negative impact on traditional diplomacy. The positive impact on public diplomacy is obvious as media becomes one of the most important mediums for the government to reach out to the public domestically and globally. As pointed out by Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin, the invaluable change that has been brought about by mediatization is seen in the interest and response to 'human interest' concerns of the people at home and abroad by the diplomatic community. Hence, it can be argued that the media plays more of a role in non-substantive low politics issues and almost no role in high politics substantive issues of diplomacy. With regard to the negative impact on traditional diplomacy, the assumption was that increasing mediatization had decreased the functional autonomy of diplomats on the field by increasing the centralization of decision making. However, most of the diplomats in the interviews and their writings have rejected the idea that mediatization had led to a decrease in their autonomy or importance. In fact they argue that due to the information overload, in a post truth world, there is a greater need for diplomatic expertise. Most of the diplomats were of the opinion that mediatization has become a fact of life for all professions and the diplomatic community has evolved like everyone else.

Based on the examination of the media narratives in the third and fourth chapters and the diplomatic perspectives in the fifth chapter, it can be stated that the media cannot function as an independent variable in matters of diplomacy. At best it works as an intermediate variable. Hence this is a verification of the Politics Media Politics (PMP) Model of Gadi Wolfsfeld which has been delineated in Chapter Two. Wolfsfeld has defined the PMP model as a process where "changes in the political environment...lead to changes in the media norms and routines...that then lead to further changes in the environment" (Wolfsfeld 2002:163). As has been observed in the case of Indian diplomacy, mediatization has taken place more in the realm of the government using the media as a tool of diplomacy. Although the media extensively covers events in the India Pakistan relations, there is no concrete evidence to show that it has acted as an autonomous variable to generate a counter narrative to impact policy. Whenever a counter narrative to the government rhetoric has been generated, it has been due to a lack of consensus within the government itself or a vociferous campaign by the opposition parties. As pointed out in Chapter Five, Indian diplomats

have affirmed to the fact that if the government is certain about undertaking any policy action, negative rhetoric in the media cannot inhibit the government from implementing it. On the whole, there is a constant interplay between the forces of diplomacy and the forces of the media. This is an ever increasing interaction in a vibrant democracy like India which is itself symbolic of the mediatization of India diplomacy.

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