

Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir: The Pakistan factor, 1989-1999

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
for award of the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2019**



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Date: May 7, 2019.

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled 'Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir: The Pakistan Factor, 1989-1999' submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Acknowledgment

I convey deep gratitude to my Supervisor Dr. Saurabh whose support and help was invaluable in completion of this work. He went through the drafts of my thesis with utmost patience and offered valuable suggestions and critical comments. Moreover, he has always extended his support during tough times. Without his constant support and encouragement, this study would not have completed.

I am also deeply obliged to Professor Sanjay K. Bhardwaj and my former Supervisor late Professor Savita Pande and want to express my sincere thanks for their support and encouragement.

I express my deep gratitude to Professor Patricia Uberoi, Professor Alka Acharya, Professor Sanjay Kumar Pandey and Professor Phool Badan. I am beholden to them for their support.

I thank the office staff of the centre for South Asian Studies, JNU and the library staff of JNU for their courtesy and cooperation in providing me good research facilities and access to material sources relating to my research.

My thanks are also due to all my friends especially Sandip and Indrajeet who helped me directly or indirectly in completing this work.

Last but not least, I am indebted to my parents and sister for their constant support in fulfilling my endeavours all through.

Despite all this help, I sincerely take the responsibility for the mistakes that may have crept in this work.

Alok Ranjan

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In one of the deadliest terror attacks in the history of Jammu and Kashmir, 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel were killed in a suicide attack in Pulwama on 14 February 2019. The attacker was later identified as Adil Ahmad Dar, a resident of Pulwama district in South Kashmir and a member of Jaish-e-Mohammed (Government of India 2019; *Times of India* 2019). Earlier in an equally audacious attack on 18 September 2016, four Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists had targeted the Indian Army brigade headquarters in Uri in Jammu and Kashmir killing 17 army personnel (*BBC News* 2016; *Times of India* 2016). While for decades Jammu and Kashmir has been a victim of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, in recent years especially since 2013,¹ the state has witnessed gradual increase in terror incidents reaching to alarming proportions (See Table 1).

As could be seen from the data, after plummeting in 2012, casualties in terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir have spiked once again in last few years. Equally alarming is introduction of a new element by separatists i.e. stone pelting during street agitations which is often used by terrorists as a cover to attack security forces and escape. In 2015, 730 incidents of stone pelting were reported in Kashmir Valley which increased to 2808 in 2017 (Rajya Sabha 2018). The escalation in terrorist violence has surprised many observers as it came after a period of relative peace in Jammu and Kashmir between 2004 and 2012 during which the state not only witnessed a continuous decline in terrorist violence but also strengthening of the political process through successive assembly and local bodies election in 2008 and 2012. As Harinder Baweja writes ‘the ground reality in Kashmir is changing slowly but surely and it can be gauged even from plain statistics’ (Baweja 2016). The new development is being seen by many as a ‘new wave of terrorism’ which poses serious challenges to India’s counterstrategy strategy by introducing new methods and actors in an already volatile situation (Haider 2018; Mehta 2016; Mohanty 2018; Shah 2018).

¹ On 24 June 2013, terrorists had killed eight army soldiers in an ambush at Hyderpora in Srinagar. This was the first major terror strike on security forces in Jammu and Kashmir since 2008 when ten soldiers were killed in a blast at Narbal on Srinagar-Baramulla highway on 19 July 2008. For more details, see ‘Major Terrorist Attacks on Security Forces and other high security targets in the Post-Kargil Period in Jammu and Kashmir’. URL: https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/major_terrorist_attachs_sfe_kargil.htm

**Table 1:
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Jammu and Kashmir (2012-18)**

	Security Forces	Civilians	Terrorists	Total
2004	325	534	951	1810
2005	189	557	917	1663
2006	151	389	591	1131
2007	110	158	472	740
2008	75	91	339	505
2009	78	71	239	388
2010	69	47	232	348
2011	33	31	100	164
2012	15	15	72	102
2013	53	15	67	135
2014	47	28	110	185
2015	39	17	108	164
2016	82	15	150	247
2017	83	57	218	358
2018	95	86	270	451

(Government of India 2014; 2018)

Some analysts see this new wave of violence as a consequence of the failure of Indian Government to take genuine peace building measures in a post-conflict Kashmir (Baweja 2016; Haider 2018; Shah 2018). They argue that despite relative peace in the Valley for almost a decade, neither the political culture in Jammu and Kashmir changed qualitatively, nor the lives of the Kashmiri people improved. Coupled with a general disappointment that had set in after the collapse of India-Pakistan composite dialogue post 2008 and the lack of employment opportunities, it generated a propensity towards violent means, especially among youth. The frequent street protests since 2008 in Jammu and Kashmir were symptoms of growing disenchantment and frustration in Jammu and Kashmir to which the Indian government paid little attention (Stainland 2014).

Some others see it as a result of the growing Islamization of society in Jammu and Kashmir (Sareen 2017). They point out that the faces of the new generation of terrorists like Burhan Wani and Zakir Musa are fighting not for ‘Kashmiri nationalism’ which according to these terrorists, is forbidden in Islam. Instead, appropriating the slogan of Al-Qaeda, these terrorists declared that ‘the war in Kashmir is either for establishment of *Sharia* or for *Shahadat* (Safi 2017). The ultra-radical stance of these millennial terrorists caused a serious rift within the terrorist groups. In fact, when the All Party Hurriyat Conference (an alliance of Kashmiri separatist groups) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen distanced themselves from the controversial remarks of Zakir Musa, he threatened them and formed a new terrorist organization, *Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind*. Scholars like Praveen Swami and Navnita Chadha Behera however, reject this notion and argue that instead of any real rift, the radicalisation is a continuation of the Islamist project of 1990s. Although the jihadist elements were defeated in Jammu and Kashmir by 2002, they did not lose their appeal completely and the new terrorism is just an extension of the old agenda with new strategies. The opening salvo under this strategy was fired during the Amarnath land row in 2008 and since then it has been sharpened and aggrandized (Behera 2016:45-6; Swami 2009; 2010).

Still others attribute it to the external factors especially developments in the Af-Pak region. Noted scholar Ayesha Siddiqi says that in the years after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Pakistan was compelled to cut down its support to terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir under pressure from USA (quoted by Safi 2017). However, with the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, an emboldened Pakistan has decided to up the ante and rekindle its terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir (Narain 2016:15-20; Pant and Kaura 2018; Sareen 2018).

Based on various explanations, four essential traits of the ‘new wave of terror’ in Jammu and Kashmir are clearly discernible: the burgeoning gap between Government’s initiatives and people’s aspirations in Jammu and Kashmir; growing influence of the Islamist fringe in the state; terrorists’ use of street protests as a tactic to provoke and attack security forces and Pakistan’s attempt to revive the withering terror campaign. Incidentally, almost similar tactics were adopted by the terrorists in the initial stages of insurgency too. It is useful, therefore, to place current trajectories of terrorist incidences in Jammu and Kashmir within a historical context to get a clear understanding of this phenomenon since

the problem and the motive remains almost the same, only the tactics have been altered a bit.

On December 8, 1989, members of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) kidnapped Dr. Rubiya Sayeed, the daughter of the then Union Minister of Home Affairs, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. After intense negotiations, the Indian government agreed to meet the kidnappers' demands. Emboldened by the success, numerous terrorist groups emerged and created chaos throughout the Kashmir Valley in the days to follow. This incident is widely considered as the beginning of organized terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

In the initial phases, the spurt in terrorist violence was led by young Kashmiri Muslims born after 1947 and brought up in modern Jammu and Kashmir with access to modern and improved education. These young Kashmir Muslims advocated a 'free Kashmir'— independent of both India and Pakistan and demanded a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir under United Nation's supervision to ascertain the wishes of the people of the state. Influenced by the ethos of '*Kashmiriyat*' – a unique amalgam of local Muslim, Hindu and other traditions, the 'independent Kashmir' campaign was led primarily by the JKLF (Sikand 2001).

Later, Jammu and Kashmir also witnessed the emergence terrorist groups inspired by an Islamist ideology whose roots go back to the Ahi-i-Hadith, which was established in Jammu and Kashmir in 1925. The Ahi-i-Hadith believed in strict and rigorous observance of the teaching of the prophet and rejected Sufism, the dominant form of Islam in Kashmir as un-Islamic. Given the deep roots of the Sufi tradition in Jammu and Kashmir, the Ahi-i-Hadith failed to develop a mass base and remained largely an elitist phenomenon confined within a limited section of the urban middle class. But despite a very limited success, it prepared a fertile ground for the emergence of the other Islamist groups like the Jamat-i-Islami, which was established in 1941 by Syed Abul Ala Maududi (Sikand 2004:195). Initially formed as a religious movement, the Jamat became a political party in 1952. From 1952 to 1980's, the Jamat, despite contesting elections, failed to emerge as a significant political force in Jammu and Kashmir. For instance, in the Assembly elections, Jamat candidates managed to win only five seats in 1971, just one seat in 1977 and in the 1983 elections, it failed to even open its account (Widmalm 2002:57). But in the decades of

seventies and eighties, the Jamat support started increasing gradually because of various factors – both endogenous and exogenous. To start with, the agrarian reforms and massive expansion of educational facilities in Jammu and Kashmir after 1947 had given birth to a generation of Kashmiris who were politically more aware. Simultaneously, on the other hand, a gradual institutional decay and the stifling of democratic channels of expression resulted in growing political discontent especially among the youth (Ganguly 1999:73-77). Discontent of similar nature, in early 20th century, were expressed through the secular politics of the National Conference but now with the perceived surrender of National Conference leadership before the Central government, Islam became the rallying point and religious forces became the champion of political rights. In the meantime, Jamat had also expanded its social base through a vast network of *Madrasas*. Although Sheikh Abdullah tried to stop the activities of these *Madrasas* in 1975, they kept functioning with changed names and not only radicalised the masses, but also instilled an affinity towards Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims.

In the initial phase of terrorism, Jamat theorists were at odds with the ideology of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and decided first to ignore it, but finding the upsurge too strong, formed their own terrorist organization, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in 1990. Jamat started to project the insurgency spearheaded by JKLF as a ‘Jihad’ and the ‘nationalist’ struggle for *Kashmiriyat* was converted into a war between ‘believers’ and ‘non-believers’. Since Islam and nationalism were opposed to each other according to Jamat, it saw Kashmir as a part of Muslim Ummah instead of an independent nation and argued for Kashmir’s merger with a Muslim Pakistan (Sikand 2001:218). Over a period of time, the Jamat and its terrorist wing, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen gained strength assisted by three other factors as well: Pakistan’s deliberate policy to downsize JKLF and promote Hizb-ul-Mujahideen; a very serious shortage of man power suffered by JKLF as a result of Indian army’s counterinsurgency operations; and the internecine struggle with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and other pro-Pakistan terrorist groups that almost incapacitated the JKLF. Gradually, with the growing acceptance of Jamat in Jammu and Kashmir, instead of an independent Jammu and Kashmir based on the values of *Kashmiriyat*, Islam and accession to Pakistan became the catchword.

A third variant of the terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir is exemplified in the activities of many terrorist organizations originating and operating from Pakistan. With the beginning of Afghan war in 1979, Pakistan became one of the largest recipients of foreign aid for the terrorists engaged against Soviet Union in Afghanistan and a number of Islamist terror organizations cropped up in Pakistan as well. These developments also triggered a rapid radicalization of society and politics in Pakistan. The whole enterprise was supported by Zia-ul-Haq partly to legitimize his military coup and partly to create a class of jihadist proxies to fight Pakistan's sub-conventional war in Jammu and Kashmir. According to some reports Pakistani Army under General Zia-ul-Haq had hatched a multi phased plan, code named as the 'Operation TOPAC', for the occupation of Kashmir valley through political subversion, chaos and terror (Campose 2017; Indian Defence Review 1989; Raza 1996). The operation was a part of grand strategic design aimed at destabilizing India and the so-called 'liberation' of Kashmir valley from Indian 'occupation'. In this operation, there were schemes to snap communication lines within Jammu and Kashmir, to destroy Army depots, air-fields and radio stations located at various points. The entire operation was apparently intended to be carried out in the latter half of 1988 under the supervision of Inter Services Intelligence (Indian Defence Review 1989). By the end of 1980s, ISI directly took charge of the proxy war against India and export of terrorist to Jammu and Kashmir became a crucial part of this proxy and undeclared war.

In the early stages of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan had supported the JKLF but very soon, it became clear to Pakistan establishment that the JKLF's objective of an independent Kashmir would ultimately jeopardize Pakistan's own interests in Jammu and Kashmir. Hence, from the early 1990's, Pakistan began supporting pro-Pakistan groups like the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. However, after a couple of years, Pakistan made some more alterations in its policy as it was not satisfied with the performance of the local terrorist groups like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. The meek surrender by the terrorists in Hazaratbal in 1993 was perceived by Pakistan as a sign of incompetence of local Kashmiri terrorists and in order to provide a boost to the terror campaign, it decided to push more battle hardened foreign mercenaries into the Valley. The motivated cadre base of organisations like the Harkat-ul-Ansar and Lashkar-e-Taiba with their global linkages was used to achieve this goal.

The ideological orientation and ruthlessness of foreign mercenaries had a mixed effect on the terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir. On the one hand, it augmented the capabilities of terrorist groups and increased the lethality of terrorist attacks; on the other, it also created a feeling of marginalisation and alienation among those local Kashmiri groups that were against the Jammu and Kashmir's merger with Pakistan. The ultra-radical agenda of organisations like the Harkat-ul-Ansar and Lashkar-e-Taiba created a sense of unease among even a section of separatists. At another level, most of the mercenaries were religious zealots who had an utmost contempt for more tolerant version of Kashmiri Islam. Their disregard for local culture, ruthlessness and increasing criminalisation of terrorist groups did not go well with the local population and support for terrorist groups got reduced significantly.

In fact, by 1997-98, the balance in Jammu and Kashmir had tilted decisively in India's favour. Militarily, India's counter terrorism initiatives had started showing results on the ground and despite the influx of foreign mercenaries, terrorist groups had lost the fight. Politically, with successful Parliamentary and assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir in 1996, a representative political order was gradually being restored. As the covert war was dwindling down, Pakistan's military establishment was desperately in the need for some dramatic action in Jammu and Kashmir to keep the terrorist campaign alive. And that dramatic action came in the form of Kargil incursion in 1999. The manner in which the Kargil operation was carried out suggested its unmistakable link with the 'Zia Plan' or the 'Operation TOPAC' under which Pakistan had initiated the Jihad project in Kashmir. In a way, the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir after going through various phases had come to a full circle.

As is evident from the description, since December 1989, the terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir has seen many ups and downs. Ideologically too, it has seen many twists and turns. However, one variable remained constant throughout this period – a continuous external support to terrorist groups from across the border, both covert and overt.

Literature Survey:

The literature on conflict in Jammu and Kashmir can be divided into four broad categories:

Books written within an international relations framework that examine conflict in Kashmir in the context of India-Pakistan conflict in which the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is explained either as a proxy war only (if seen from an Indian lens) or simply as an indigenous freedom struggle to liberate their country ‘from the clutches of Indian occupation’ (if seen from a Pakistani prism). Ajit Bhattacharjea (1994) *Kashmir: The Wounded Valley*; Amar Cheema (2015) *The Crimson Chinar: The Kashmir Conflict*; Gurmeet Kanwal (1999) ‘Proxy war in Kashmir: Jihad or state-sponsored terrorism?’, *Strategic Analysis*, 23:1, 55-83; Maroof Raza (1996) *Wars and No Peace over Kashmir*, D.P. Kumar (1995) *Kashmir: Pakistan's Proxy War* Ved Marwah (2009) *India in Turmoil: Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeast and Left Extremism*, present the Indian point of view whereas the Pakistani official viewpoint is represented by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (1990) *Pakistan Defence Policy 1947-58*; Mushtaq-ur-Rehman (1996) *Divided Kashmir: Old problems for India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people*; Amin Tahir (1995) *Mass Resistance in Kashmir*; and Shaheen Akhter (1991) *Uprising in Indian Held Jammu and Kashmir*. Most of these books are ahistoric with a fixed narrative and attempt to justify a particular government’s point of view.

The explanation of Kashmiri insurgency by social scientists and journalists make up the second category of writings on Jammu and Kashmir. Important interventions in this regard include M. J. Akbar (2002) *Kashmir: Behind the Vale*; Balraj Puri (1993) *Kashmir towards Insurgency*; Victoria Schofield (2003) *Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War*; Robert, G. Wirsing (1994) *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute*; P.S. Verma (1994) *Jammu and Kashmir: at the Political Crossroads*; Tavleen Singh (1995) *Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors*; Manoj Joshi (1999) *The Lost Rebellion*; Praveen Swami (2007) *India, Pakistan and the secret jihad: the covert war in Kashmir, 1947–2004*; and Arif Jamal (2009) *Shadow War: The untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir*. Although these writings provide a useful insight, most of these lack a theoretical perspective.

The third category of books on Kashmir is written by people who were either directly or indirectly involved in the decision making or were important players in the insurgency. Jagmohan (1991) *My frozen turbulence in Kashmir*; Maj. Gen. Arjun Ray (1997) *Kashmir Diary: Psychology of Militancy*; Ved Marwah (1995) *Uncivil Wars: Pathology of Terrorism in India*; Mir Qasim (1995) *My Life, My Times*; Yasin Malik (1994) *Our Real*

Crime; Altaf Hussain (1994) *Shabir Shah: A Living Legend in Kashmir History*; Zahir-u-Din (2013) *Flash Back, Kashmir Story Since 1846*; Sanjay Kak (2011) *Until My Freedom has Come: The New Intifada in Kashmir*, and S A S Geelan (2011) *Vullar Kinare* etc. These detailed accounts, biographies and autobiographies are though informative but also partisan and give a one sided point of view.

In the Fourth category are the books written by academicians with proper theoretical explanations. These include: Sumantra Bose (2003) *Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*; Sumit Ganguly (1997) *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace*; A.G. Noorani (1992) *Pakistan's complicity in terrorism in J&K: The Evidence and the Law*; Navnita Chadha Behera (2000) 'State, Identity & Violence: Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh' Rekha Chowdhary (2015) 'Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of identity and separatism' and Iffat Malik,(2005) *Kashmir Ethnic Conflict International Dispute* etc.

Although these books are grounded in social/political theories, none of these use the theories related to terrorism research as the framework of analysis. For instance, Ganguly explains the insurgency by the linked process of 'Political mobilisation and Institutional decay'; Bose presents a causal connection between the Indian State's policy of denying democracy, systematic subversion of Jammu and Kashmir's federal autonomy and the Kashmiri uprising for the self determination; Noorani analyses Pakistan's involvement in Jammu and Kashmir within the framework of international law; Malik focuses on Kashmir's domestic and international aspects as two distinct issues – an international one between Pakistan and India, and a domestic one between Kashmiri Muslims and Indians; while Behera deals with different identities and their clashes along with the role of elites in shaping and moulding of identities within the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

None of them analyse the changing dynamics of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir within the framework of terrorism research.

Hypotheses/Arguments:

Tracking the socio-political and strategic trends at play in Jammu and Kashmir, this study makes following arguments:

First, initial public support to the terrorist organizations in Jammu and Kashmir was a consequence of an acute sense of alienation that was brewing in the Valley of Kashmir since a long time. Certain political developments, especially a gradual erosion of Jammu

and Kashmir's autonomy and the rigging of successive state elections were responsible for generating a deep discontent among the masses. Though the breakdown of political order came to the fore only after the 1987 Assembly election, the political discontent that led to this breakdown was a result of decades of misgovernance and arbitrary intervention in state's political process by the central government.

Second, since Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India in 1947, an Islamist fringe has always existed in the state that supported Kashmir's merger with Pakistan purely on religious grounds. The drift of Kashmiri separatism towards Pan-Islamism was a result of growing influence of Islamist fringe in Jammu and Kashmir's society and politics.

Third, Pakistan's involvement has fundamentally altered the contours of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. The vast range of Pakistani backing not only augmented the capabilities and of the terrorist groups but more importantly, it radically altered the nature of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir from a comparatively secular campaign – spearheaded by the local Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front – to a global jihadist campaign led by Islamist organisations like Lashkar-e-Tiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad.

Lastly, Pakistan involvement in Jammu and Kashmir also had some negative consequences for terrorist organisations in Jammu and Kashmir. To maintain an effective control over the terror campaign, Pakistan encouraged and supported various terrorist organisations simultaneously. The sheer number of actors led to severe infighting and the fragmentation of terrorist groups that ultimately weakened the terror campaign. In another deliberate move, Pakistan strengthened radical pan-Islamist terrorist organisations that advocated merger with Pakistan over local ones like the JKLF that sought Kashmir's independence. As a large section of Valley Muslims did not support the radical interpretation of Islam as propounded by organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba; the terror campaign lost its appeal and support base beyond recovery.

Rationale of the Study:

Since 1989, Jammu and Kashmir has been locked in a viscous cycle of terrorist violence, with Indian security forces combating pro-Pakistani and pro-secession Islamic terrorists. It is important to note that the contours of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir have transformed significantly over a period of time. For both India and Pakistan, the conflict over Kashmir is more about the competing visions of nationalism and nation-building

rather than the territorial control. Along with this ideological contest, involvement of foreign mercenaries, an alliance of religion and terrorism and linkages with the global jihadist terrorism, makes it all the more explosive.

The decade of 1989-1999 is extremely important in this context. The alleged rigging in assembly election in 1987, consequent arousal of public sentiments against the state government and manipulation of this opportunity by some separatist organizations to spread the anti-Indian sentiments, the strategy to 'liberate' the Kashmir valley from the so called Indian occupation by means of operation TOPAC manoeuvred by Zia-ul-Haq in 1988 and withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan paved the way for the emergence of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. By 1999, all the intrinsic trends of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, for instance, the contest between the pro-independence and pro-Pakistani groups, an alliance of religion and terrorism, involvement of foreign mercenaries and suicide attacks by terrorist on the army's bases and camps became explicitly manifested. Moreover, a thorough analysis of the decade of 1989-1999 assumes significance in order to comprehend the trajectory of current terrorist incidences in Jammu and Kashmir since the pattern of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir post 2008 remains almost the same, only the tactics have been altered relatively.

Considering the above mentioned factors, the proposed study in fact becomes very relevant in the present context.

Objectives:

The objective of this study is to analyze the factors attributing the emergence and growth of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. It attempts to explore the various socio-economic factors which gave birth to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The changing contours of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir and its various dimensions have been examined and an attempt has been made to find out how the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir got intertwined with the transnational Islamic terrorism. In this regard the nature and degree of Pakistan's involvement in Jammu and Kashmir has been scrutinized. Pakistan's aims, motives and changes in its policy towards Kashmir are the focus of this study. An analysis of the impact made by some fundamentalist organizations like Jamat and Markaz-ud-Dawa on terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has also been taken in to account. Finally, the changes in India's approach to manage the conflict in Kashmir, its evolution over a period of time

and impact on the changing dynamics of Jammu and Kashmir have been investigated thoroughly.

Organization/Framework of Study:

The first chapter primarily analyzes the various theoretical and conceptual aspects of terrorism. First, some key elements of the phenomenon have been identified to arrive at a reasonably inclusive working formulation derived from analysis of some of the key definitions of terrorism; along with some basic characteristics of terrorism. An attempt has also been made to explain various typologies of terrorism and distinction between terrorism and other related acts of violence to have clear and full understanding of the concept.

The second chapter focuses on the analysis of factors responsible for the emergence and growth of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Historical background of the Kashmir crisis and its politico-economic and socio-cultural dimensions has been taken into account for the above mentioned purpose. Three important factors namely, political mishandling and a gradual institutional decay; erosion of Kashmiriyat and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan's attempt to instigate violence have been dealt in detail.

In the third chapter, an attempt has been made to analyze the various dimensions of the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The terror campaign in Jammu and Kashmir has a torturous trajectory passing through several distinct phases. In this journey, especially between 1988 and 1999, five such phases could be identified; a period of political violence and underground militancy (1988-1989), the mass upsurge (1990-1991), Islamization of the terror campaign (1992-93), negation of the Kashmiri component (1994-1995) and association with the radical pan Islamism (1996-1999). In each phase, the key trends, ideological affiliations of various terrorist groups and organizations, their relationship with the transnational network of terrorism and Pakistan's role in their functioning has been examined.

The fourth chapter attempts to analyze Indian government's counterinsurgency policy in Jammu and Kashmir, both military and non-military and their outcome thereafter. Divided into five main sections, this chapter seeks to analyze the response of the Indian government during each phase. The first section deals with outlining some of the key components of India's counterinsurgency policy in general which impinge upon the

specifics of Government's response in Jammu and Kashmir. The second section analyzes the government's response during the initial phases of insurgency (1988-92) when it was challenged not only by the armed militancy but also a popular defiance. As the state was able to re-establish its writ by 1993, government began exploring other mechanisms as well to deal with the problem – this is the focus of the third section. The fourth section focuses on the introduction of the 'political processes' after 1995. The fifth section deals with the WHAM component of counterinsurgency policy along with engagement with Pakistan and government's approach towards internal dialogue until 1999.

The final chapter summarizes the findings and concluding observation.

Chapter 2

Terrorism: Meaning and Conceptualisation

Search for an appropriate definition of terrorism is one of the complex issues in the terrorism studies. Though there have been numerous attempts to define terrorism by scholars, yet the term has so many conceptual issues that a universally accepted definition still eludes us. The discourse on Terrorism carries intense emotional and ideological baggage as well. The group that supports terrorism perceives it as diametrically opposite to the perception of the group opposing it. Therefore, it is not surprising that there hundreds of definitions of terrorism in existence (Jackson 2010).

1. Definitional Dilemma: Issues and Clarifications

Some of the issues that thwart a universally accepted definition of terrorism could be summed up as:

- A lack of agreement on the content and nature of terrorism along with varying interpretation and interests of those who define the term affect the consensus on definition. As Smith notes, ‘scholars have defined, refined, and redefined terrorism to accommodate personal preferences regarding what should or should not be labelled terroristic’ (Smith 1994:5). While the law enforcement agencies focus on the ‘criminality’ of terror acts, the governments emphasize on the political aspect of terrorism that threatens the security of the nation.
- The socio-political contexts in which terrorism takes place make it difficult to reach a consensus on the definition of terrorism (Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005:88-89). A group could be the hero or terrorist for different societies depending on the interpretation of the act.
- Frequent changes in the meaning of terrorism and so it meant different things in different periods of the history (Hoffman 1998; Laqueur 1999).
- A loaded normative connotation that make the mere use of the term a statement of approval or disapproval of the activity. The normative implications and controversiality impede formulation of a clear definition of terrorism (Jenkins 1981:4-5, Crenshaw 1986:381).
- The inadequacy of data, a problem common to the field of security studies, and particularly so in the area of terrorism. It is argued that much government

information on terrorism is classified and security requirements seriously restrict the open research on terrorism (Crenshaw 1991:69-87).

It is after analyzing these complexities that Laqueur argues that ‘a comprehensive definition of terrorism does not exist, nor will it be found in the foreseen future’ (Laqueur 1977: 5). Keeping aforementioned issues in mind, this study aims to arrive at a working formulation derived from analysis of some of the key definitions of terrorism; along with some basic characteristics of terrorism. This study also attempts to explain various typologies of terrorism and distinction between terrorism and other related acts of violence to have clear and full understanding about the concept.

2. Defining Terrorism:

In this section a select sampling of definitions of terrorism will be studied and analyzed to get at the ‘analytic core’ of this particular form of violence. An attempt will also be made to arrive at some distinguishing characteristics of terrorism.

Various attempts at defining terrorism can be broadly classified in to two categories:

- i) Definitions given by academicians and experts, and
- ii) Definitions given by governments and law enforcement agencies.

2.1. An Academic Perspective:

Martha Crenshaw defines terrorism as ‘the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence to coerce changes in political behaviour that involves symbolic acts of violence, intended to communicate a political message to watching audiences’ (Crenshaw 1990:53).

Without being pejorative this definition gives us three important components of terrorism:

- i) A deliberate and systematic act
- ii) Symbolic use or threat of violence
- iii) A political act or behaviour.

In many ways similar to Crenshaw’s conceptualization, Richard Shultz defines terrorism as ‘calculated violence directed towards achieving some political objectives and affecting the views and behaviour of specific groups’ (Shultz 1990: 45). Essential components of terrorism according to this definition are:

- i) Calculated violence

- ii) Political objectives and
- iii) Attempt to influence behaviour

Using a minimalist approach, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sican Hirsch-Hoefler analysed 73 definitions of terrorism and proposed the following definition ‘Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role’ (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004: 786). Jessica Stern too provides a rather short definition: ‘Terrorism is an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing the audience’ (Stern 1999:11).

Common elements in both these definitions are:

- i) The threat or use of violence
- ii) Political motivation
- iii) Aimed at propaganda and publicity

Emphasizing on the divergent nature of terrorism, Laqueur argues that one definition will not fit all forms of terrorism ‘for the simple reason that there is not one but many different terrorisms’ (Laqueur 1999:46). Four defining features of terrorism identified by Laqueur may be summarised as:

- i) The use of violence
- ii) Political act
- iii) Targeted against the governments or civilians, and
- iv) Divergence in nature or diverse forms

Incorporating some more specific elements, Hoffman gives a rather elaborate definition of terrorism as

‘The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change’...all terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party or public opinion in general’ (Hoffman 2006:40-44).

The focus in Hoffman's definition of terrorism is on

- i) The deliberate exploitation of fear through violence or threat of violence
- ii) The pursuit of political change,
- iii) The psychological affects beyond immediate target groups,
- iv) The issues of power and publicity and
- v) The International dimension

In another detailed conceptualization, Alex Schmid defines terrorism as

'an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat-and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought' (Schmid and Jongman 1988: 28).

Here Schmid focuses on –

- Repeated violent action;
- The anxiety inspiring fear ;
- Intimidation, coercion or propaganda purposes;
- The distinction between direct targets or main targets and random or symbolic targets;
- Idiosyncratic, criminal or political purposes

This definition emphasizes terrorism's inherent political nature without ignoring the centrality of political violence in acts of terrorism.

2.2. Institutional Perspective:

Unlike academic definitions, governmental definitions are focused more on the legal aspects terrorism in general. For instance, the U.S. Department of State defines terrorism

as ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience’. The term ‘terrorist group’ means ‘any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism’. Further in the definition the term ‘non combatant’ includes civilians and military personnel who are unarmed or not on duty and who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting and the term ‘international terrorism’ refers to terrorism ‘involving citizens or the territory of more than one country’ (U.S. Department of State 2003: xii).

Government of France defines terrorism as ‘acts that are intentionally committed by an individual entity or by a collective entity in order to seriously disturb law and order by intimidation or by terror’. French law mentions specific acts of terrorism, like kidnapping, murder or assault, destruction of property, possession of explosives and/or biological and chemical weapons, hostage taking, hijacking and money laundering etc. if it comes under the legally defined acts of terrorism (Government of France 2011).

India defines terrorist act as ‘whoever, with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or does any act by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature, in such a manner as to cause or likely to cause death of or injuries to any person or persons or loss of or damage to or destruction of property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or causes damage or destruction of any property or equipment used or intended to be used for the defence of India, any State government or any of their agencies or detains any person or threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the government of India or any other person to do so or abstain from doing any act, commits a Terrorist act’ (Government of India 2004a).

Alex Schmid, after comparing various non-governmental and governmental definitions, found out that whereas in the 165 academic definitions, the focus was more on the political character (65%), terror (59%) and threat (42%), in 88 governmental definitions, illegal/criminal character (85%), terror (78%) and coercion of the government (53%) were emphasised more. Instead of the political character, the governments focus more on establishing the illegality of terrorist acts and making them punishable while in the

academia, more interest is paid to those aspects which are more descriptive and relatively contested (Schmid 2004:407).

3. Key Elements of Terrorism:

Sauter and Carafano after studying various definitions of terrorism found following common elements in such acts:

- a) Targeting of civilians;
- b) Attempt to create fear beyond the immediate target;
- c) Coercion of governments or populations;
- d) Aimed at getting publicity; motivated by political, ideological, or religious beliefs; and
- e) Political or Ideological motivations

(Sauter and Carafano 2005:66).

In a similar exercise, Gus Martin summarizes the common features of terrorism as

- 1. The use of illegal force,
- 2. Sub-national actors,
- 3. Political motives,
- 4. Attacks against soft civilian and passive military targets and
- 5. Acts aimed at purposefully affecting an audience

(Martin 2008:8).

According to Paul Wilkinson, terrorist violence has following major characteristics:

- 1. It aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror,
- 2. It is directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victim,
- 3. It involves attacks on random and symbolic targets, including civilians, and
- 4. It attempts to influence opponent's behaviour to force them into acceding the perpetrators' demands.

(Wilkinson 2000:1).

In order to get a more clear understanding of nature of definitions in various discourses, Schmid's quantitative analysis is very useful. After analysing 109 academic definitions, he presents a list of elements that appeared the most in these definitions:

1. Violence/Force:	83.5%
2. Political	65%
3. Fear	51%

4. Threat	47%
5. Psychological effects	41.5%
6. Victim-target differentiation	37.5%
7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32%
8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5%
9. Extra normality without humanitarian constraints	30%

10. Coercion 28%

(Schmid and Jongman 1988:5-6)

In another analysis of 165 definitions with a focus on different variables, he reached the following order:

1. Political character	68%
2. Terror	59%
3. Threat	42%
4. Coercion	38%
5. Civilians	36%
6. Tactic, Strategy	35%
7. Illegal, criminal	30%
8. Demonstrative use	28%
9. Communication	27%
10. Psychological warfare	12%

(Schmid 2004: 407)

On the basis of various surveys and analysis, it is possible to paint a definitional portrait of terrorism. Further, borrowing from these studies, some key elements defining terrorism which are pretty closely related to each other could be identified. These are:

3.1. Use or Threat of Violence/Force:

Violence is the most common element in almost every definition of terrorism. Terrorism is inseparable from violence and, in fact, the concepts of terrorism and violence seem to be almost interchangeable. Terrorism is said to be a ‘systematic threat or use of violence, with the intention of communicating a political message to a group larger than the

victim group by generating fear and so altering the behaviour of the larger group' (Claridge and Hoffman 1998:66). Some scholars say that only humans can be target of violence but others include destruction/damage of non human objects (buildings, infrastructure and even crops too) in terrorism as well (Gibbs 1989:330).

The use of violence in terrorist acts is qualitatively different from other forms of violence. Over the years, explanations for violence's centrality in the acts of terror have evolved substantially. Contemporary explanations see terrorism as a result of a complex interplay between various structural, strategic and rational factors. For instance, Structural theories propose that 'the causes of terrorism can be found in the environment and the political, cultural, social, and economic structure of societies' (Ross 1993: 317). Further, it is argued that acts of terrorism are not a result of impulsive thinking but are driven by an internal logic. Mark Juergensmeyer argues that in acts of terrorism, the violence is used to achieve a strategic goal while making a symbolic statement. As a part of strategy, the acts of violence fulfil certain political role and have a direct impact on public policy. Also, the strategy of violence is construed in such a manner that it creates an internal logic for perpetrating terrorists acts even beyond the immediate political goals (Martha Crenshaw quoted in Juergensmeyer 2003:125). Terrorists also try to rationalise the indiscriminate use of violence by claiming that these actions are a just response to the brutal oppression and the grave injustices. According to them, the violence is an 'indispensable necessity' to preserve their way of life, free from the constraints of oppression 'by every possible means' (Cohan 2006:904).

Followers of rational choice theory see terrorist violence as a strategy aimed at achieving certain goals. For example, Charles Tilly views terror as a political strategy that intends to 'send signals that the target is vulnerable, that the perpetrators exist, and that the perpetrators have the capacity to strike again'. The recipients of such signalling, according to Tilly, are: the targets, potential allies of terrorists, and neutral observers who might be either potential allies or enemies of terrorists in future. Apart from signalling, Tilly identifies four other objectives of terrorist violence: recognition, redress, autonomy and transfer of power. Thus, according to Tilly, terror is a strategy aimed at influencing target's behaviour, securing new allies, and greater cooperation with existing allies (Tilly 2004:9).

3.2. Political / Ideological Motivation:

Terrorism has been an integral part of politics for since the very beginning. There is a critical relationship between terrorism and politics/ideology. Without the political factor, terrorism would just be an ordinary crime and its perpetrators would be ordinary criminals (Quiggin 2010). The terrorists carry out attacks in the name of achieving some political objectives and attempt to attach a public purpose with the act.

Paul Wilkinson offers the following distinction between Crime and Terrorism:

'The majority of crimes are certainly not motivated by any social or political purpose, for the political terrorist, however, it is a sine qua non that the overriding objective and ultimate justification for terror is the furtherance of his political cause' (Wilkinson 1974:12-13).

A terrorist act is used to achieve certain goals that are political with an intention to secure political power. The motivation may vary from bringing political reforms to removing a seemingly illegitimate or oppressive regime. Terrorism may be also be used to demonstrate the weakness and vulnerability of the government or to instigate it to use repression which in turn could be used to mobilise terrorist's supporters. In situations where an ethnic or religious groups fear losing their identity, language or culture, terrorism may also be combined with cultural factors and used as an effective option. This is especially true where demands for political reform are ignored and where the regime resorts to collective punishment for what are seen as reasonable and justified demands (Sanders 2010). Political motivations can be further classified into three broad, but non-exclusive categories:

Separatism – In situation where the ruling group is seen to be unfair and unjust in its government administration, dissident groups fight to form a separate state;

Irredentism – The objective is to re-unite an ethno-political group that has been divided and separated by an arbitrary state border;

Nationalism – The aspiration of a national group (people related by ethnicity, religion, language or culture) to create a formal state for their nation (Sanders 2010).

3.3. Intimidation:

A major characteristic of terrorism is that it intends to intimidate and demoralize the government or a wider social audience. To achieve this purpose, a range of actions are used– from kidnappings, assassinations of public figures, individuals in positions of power

to the indiscriminate use of violence. It can also include targeting civilians who cooperate with the government or rival groups (Kydd and Walter 2006:67). However intimidation does not always include direct violence. Often, rather than direct violence, the threat of violence is used as a strategy to prevent some undesired behaviour by demonstrating that the terrorists have the power to punish and act with impunity (Brown 2010:110). Terrorists who wish to bring down a government convince the government's supporters that supporting government will be costly for them. To achieve this, terrorists demonstrate that they can hurt those who support the government and that the government can neither punish the terrorists nor protect its own supporters (Kydd and Walter 2006:66). Intimidation is also used to gain control over a population especially when a government refuses to accede to the demands of terrorist group and its efforts to change the state's policy fails. In such cases, terrorists use intimidation through selective violence and the threat of more attacks (Kydd and Walter 2006:66).

3.4. Coercion:

Developed by Thomas Schelling, Alexander George, William Simons and others during the cold War, the concept of Coercion in strategic thought is used to investigate how actual use of force or threat of force could be used to manipulate the politico-strategic choices of an opponent, thereby compelling them towards taking a desired political action. Explaining coercion, Thomas Schelling writes 'force is used coercively when it serves as a signal (tacit or explicit) of the actor's capacity and will to inflict further pain until the target grants her demands (Schelling 1960:21).

Terrorism is also defined as a 'form of coercion'. Kydd and Walter describe terrorism as a systematic coercion through which terrorists persuade opponents to accede to their demands by demonstrating their ability to impose costs' (Kydd and Walter 2006:50-51). Similarly, Abrahms also argues that organisations use terrorism to convey the costs of noncompliance and thus influence the behaviour of their opponents (Abrahms 2006:42-78.). As a strategy, terrorism is used as a tool of coercive bargaining to achieve desired policy objective where the target audience is coerced to change their policies and strategies by making the cost too high to sustain them (Dannenbaum 2006:312). The logic of this strategy is best explained by Robert Pepe who argues that terrorism attempts to cause such a pain that the adversaries either concede to the terrorist's demands or in case of a

population, they revolt against the government (Pepe 2003:346). But Pepe also distinguishes between military coercion and coercion by terrorists. According to him, in the case of military coercion, the coercer is the stronger state and the target is the weaker state, otherwise, the coercer would be simply unable to execute the threat (Pepe 2003:23). However, in terrorism, it is the weaker one that uses coercion against the stronger actor. Although, in some cases, terrorism is used as a tool in the larger guerrilla warfare, so far, no terrorist organization has been able to achieve its desired political goals by using either terrorism or guerrilla warfare or both (Pape 2003:346).

3.5. Demonstrative Use:

‘Terrorism is a theatre’ aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims (Jenkins 1975:4). Terrorism communicates a meaning that points beyond itself in the way of a *gesture*. Targets are often selected to have a demonstrative effect. By their demonstrative nature, they elicit feelings of revulsion and anger in those who witness them (Jurgensmeyer 2003:125)

The attacks on the Indian Parliament, World Trade Centre in America, the bombings of nightclubs in Bali; and the nerve gas attack in a Tokyo subway – all of these are not just incidents of violence but constructed events or as Jurgensmeyer puts it ‘*acts of performance violence*’. They are acts of violence executed or performed in a deliberately intense and vivid way through which, he explains, the terrorist thereby gestures, utters or issues a communication. Depending on the intentions of the terrorist, that act of violence can serve to perform various acts, such as issuing a warning, protest or condemnation, expressing outrage, or commanding attention. In this way, then, an act of terrorism is akin to a *performative* speech act. Terrorist acts thus, can be both *performance events*, in the sense that they make a symbolic statement, and *performative acts*, insofar as they try to change things (Jurgensmeyer 2003:125-28). In a way, terrorism is like the dramaturgy which works through symbolic expression. Often, terrorist attacks are carefully choreographed aimed at attracting the attention of audiences that go beyond the direct victims of the attack (Weimann 2015:2). In fact, terrorists do not act irrationally but carry out attacks after a well thought out plan based on their objectives. Karber also supports this view and argues that

‘as a symbolic act, terrorism can be analyzed much like other media of communication, consisting of four basic components:

Transmitter (the terrorist),

Intended recipient (target),

Message (bombing, ambush) and

Feedback (reaction of target audience)’

(Karber 1971: 527-33).

3.6. Psychological Warfare:

Psychological warfare is described as the planned use of propaganda and other psychological operations to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviour of opposition groups (RAND Corporation). Encyclopaedia Britannica explains psychological operation as ‘propaganda that is used to strengthen the resolve of allies or resistance fighters’. If judged on these parameters, terrorism is perhaps the most basic form of psychological warfare. Wilkinson states that ‘terrorism is essentially a psychological weapon aimed not only at its immediate victims, but also at a wider audience’ (Wilkinson 2000).

As noted previously, acts of terrorism are planned with an underlying purpose that goes beyond the act. It intends to deliver a message to a given audience and influence its political behaviour by creating fear, uncertainty and anxiety. The successful use of fear by terrorists depends on the degree to which the perception of an attack can be magnified beyond the possibility of actual physical attack. This fear can be divided into two broad categories; rational and irrational. *Rational fear* is an acknowledgment of the real threat that does exist. *Irrational fear* on the other hand, is the perception about the likelihood and subsequent anxiety of such an attack (Gaynor 2002 cited in Hanser n.d.). It is this irrational fear that is sought by the terrorist since it makes the target audience psychologically vulnerable and helps terrorists to induce behavioural changes in that audience (Hanser n.d.). It operates in two ways i) by positive reinforcements – where terrorists convey that the incidents of terrorism would be reduced if the audience start behaving in a manner desired by the terrorist group and ii) by negative reinforcement – the damage would be more severe manner if the public behaviour does not change (Hasner n.d.). As a psychological operation, terrorism operates on four fronts: a) it simply coerces or demoralizes enemy b) it

persuades the neutral or potentially allies to support the terrorist group and c) it boosts the morale of the members and sympathisers of the terrorist group and d) it attempts provide a moral justification of the actions taken by the terrorist group (Boyd 1994).

4. Explanations for Terrorist Violence:

So far, various attempts have been made to analyze the causes and life cycle/trajectory of terrorism. These can be divided into following broad categories:

4.1. Relative Deprivation/Frustration–Aggression Theories:

An explanation of terrorist violence could be found in the relative-deprivation hypothesis developed by Ted Robert Gurr. In his seminal work ‘Why Men Rebel’ (1970), Gurr explains it through the concept of relative deprivation – a gap between what people think they deserve and what they actually get. According to Gurr, the propensity for collective violence varies with the intensity of relative deprivation among members of a group (Gurr 1970:24). It is noteworthy that according to Gurr, instead of objective indicators of deprivation, the perceived deprivation acts as a trigger to collective political violence. Further he explains; just as frustration produces aggressive behaviour in an individual, relative deprivation triggers collective violence by social groups. Another proponent of this hypothesis, Joseph Margolin argues that much terrorist behaviour is a response to the frustration of various political, economic, and personal needs or objectives (Margolin 1977:273-4).

4.2. Structural Theories:

Supporters of this approach argue that the causes of terrorism lie in the socio-political and economic structure of societies (Ross 1993:317). Two diametrically opposite arguments under this approach revolve around the type of political regime. While one group of analysts argues that freedom available in a democratic polity helps terrorist organizations to operate freely and thrive (Hamilton and Hamilton 1989:39-54; Schmid 1992:14-25), others like Eyerman contend that democratic institutions like free and fair multi-party elections, rule of law and an independent judiciary ensures political participation, which subsequently helps in reducing terrorism (Eyerman 1998:151-70). A third line of argument articulates that both effects are possible; while democratic

institutions reduce terrorism, executive constraints may increase the propensity towards terrorism (Li 2005:278-97).

4.3. Rational Choice Theories:

In a way, rational choice theories suggest that terrorism as a strategy is selected by rational actors after a proper cost-benefit analysis. Proponents of these theories see terrorists as actors who operate in three ways. First, as rational actors, they are motivated by consistent political goals. Second, as a collective action, individuals or groups opt for terrorism when channels of political participation are blocked or stifled. Lastly, terrorism is chosen if its benefits outweigh the costs (Abrahms 2008:78-105; Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley 1983:36-54). A logical corollary of these theories also explains the selection of targets by terrorists is done after thorough analysis of risks and consequences involved. In practical terms, it argues that chances of terrorism occurring in democracies are higher (Eubank and Weinberg 1998:108-18). Similarly states with more lax security environments are also likely to be targeted more by terrorists (Enders and Sandler 2005:259-77).

4.4. Political Theories:

Analysts like Johnson (1978), Crenshaw (1981) and Jenkins (1979) argue that the root causes of terrorism can be found in environmental factors and preconditions that encourage use of terrorism as a collective political act. These preconditions can be divided into two categories: *permissive factors* which make it attractive to political dissidents (examples include urbanization, the transportation system, communications media, weapons availability, and the absence of security measures etc) and *direct situational factors*, which motivate terrorists. These include, the existence of concrete grievances (political economic or social); the lack of opportunity for political participation etc. If these pre-conditions are present, a social/political movement emerges and terrorism is then used by an extremist faction within the broader movement (Crenshaw cited in Hudson 1999:16).

5. Conceptual Lenses: Terrorism in Different Contexts

As mentioned earlier, terrorism as a strategy of collective action has evolved over a period of time during which it has interacted with some other forms of social/political phenomenon as well. Terrorism has also been situated and defined in various contexts such as crime, politics, insurgency, guerrilla warfare and religion etc. Schmid argues that if only

one framework is utilized to explain terrorism, certain aspects of terrorism get accentuated while others are ignored depending on the framework (Schmid 2004:213-14). To get a clear understanding of this process, six such conceptual lenses have been identified in this study as conceptual lenses to arrive at a broader working framework:

- A. Terrorism as/and Political Violence
- B. Terrorism as/and Insurgency
- C. Terrorism as/and Guerrilla Warfare
- D. State-Sponsored Terrorism: Terrorism as a Foreign Policy Tool
- E. Terrorism and Religion: Violence in the Name of the Faith
- F. International Terrorism: Global Spillovers of Terrorism

5.1. Terrorism and Political Violence:

Throughout human history, both terrorism and political violence have been used by insurgent groups as a means to wage the battle against governments. What makes this a form of violence as distinguished from say, criminal act or cases of organized crime, is that here the violence is used to achieve political objectives and carries a political meaning. Often, such acts of terrorism are portrayed as a result of perceived grievances against the regime, which is then successfully framed as such by a particular group seeking social change (Simpson 2014). The Irish Republican Army, the Hamas and the Naxalites, all have successfully interwoven political grievances around various ideologies like nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and Communism to seek regime change.

Although terrorism and acts of political violence are very closely related to each other, every act of political violence is *not* necessarily terrorism as Walter Laqueur states ‘Terrorism is violence, but not every form of violence is terrorism’ (Laqueur 1999:8). At the same time, distinguishing between the two forms of violence is also very difficult if not impossible. Many analysts have dealt with this aspect of terrorism and the key question: which kind of political violence is terrorist and which is not?

The main line of demarcation between the acts of political violence and acts of terrorism is that in the political violence, innocent civilians are not targeted, at least intentionally, while terrorists often attack non combatants or civilian targets. In terrorism, attacking civilians is justified on the basis of ‘indispensible necessity’ because it is

portrayed as a just response to the exploitation and oppression of the weak by the powerful (Cohan 2006:904).

According to Schmid and Jongman, terrorism can be defined on the basis of the acts it involves. Consequently, according to them, violent acts can be categorized as terrorism if they include physical violence against adversaries, symbolic objects, or non-related targets, with organized and systematic attempts to create fear and direct a change in the political order (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

The primary distinction between terrorism and political violence, according to Martha Crenshaw, is that terrorism is a strategy that aims at attaining specific political ends (motivation) through the *creation of fear, and not through the mere act of violence*. To achieve political influence, terrorism depends on its ability to create *psychological effects* not only in the target audiences but also in other groups who might be neutral, supportive, and/or antagonistic to the terrorist group (Crenshaw 1998:57-59).

The final yardstick for an act of violence to be considered as terrorism, writes Dipak Gupta, is that it must have a political aim. Highlighting the ‘public good aspect’ of political terrorism, Gupta explains political terrorism as ‘a shared action whereby a politically motivated act is undertaken in the name of an entire community. According to him, the public-good aspect of a terrorist organization’s motivation distinguishes terrorism from organized-crime syndicates or acts of violence for personal revenge (Gupta 2008).

Richardson’s description of ‘seven crucial characteristics’ of the term terrorism is also particularly helpful in making a distinction between terrorism and other forms of violence. These characteristics are:

First, terrorism is driven by political motivations. Without any political goal, it is simply a criminal behaviour.

Second, if there is no active or threatened violence, it is not terrorism.

Third, terrorism is the act of sub-state actors. Although states might use terrorism to achieve certain foreign policy goals by supporting terrorist groups, yet terrorism is essentially used by sub-state actors. This distinction is necessary to have an analytical clarity in understanding the behaviour of terrorist group. If states are considered as the major actors, the concept of terrorism as a weapon in the asymmetric warfare will simply collapse, according to her.

Fourth, the aim of terrorism is not to defeat the enemy but to send a message.

Fifth, the act of terror and the victims have a symbolic significance. The psychological effect usually is much greater than the actual physical act.

Sixth, the immediate victims of terrorism are a means of influencing a wider audience.

Seventh, and the most important criterion for Richardson, is the deliberate targeting of civilians. Terrorists rationalize the targeting of civilians by arguing that non-combatants provide legitimacy to oppressive regimes and hence they are also responsible for their government's actions (Richardson 2006:28-30; Zimmerman 2009:3).

A somewhat similar distinction has also been made by Paul Wilkinson. Wilkinson separates terrorism from other types of violence by the political context of the act and says that to have an accurate assessment of politically motivated terrorism, following features should be taken into account:

- it is integral to a revolutionary strategy
- it employs politically unacceptable violence in pursuit of its aims
- targets are selected for their symbolic values and lastly
- The perpetrators aspire to influence political behaviour of the target audience (quoted by Hutchinson 1972:385).

Wilkinson has divided political terrorism into three types:

Revolutionary terrorism: Here the violence is used to bring political revolution. Some distinct traits are: it is a collective phenomenon; the terror is incorporated within some sort of ideology; the organization has leaders who motivate the members to pursue a revolutionary ideology and; it develops alternative institutional structures (Wilkinson 1977: 56).

Wilkinson defines his second type, *sub-revolutionary terrorism*, as the violence employed 'for political motives other than revolution or governmental repression'. He differentiates revolutionary from sub-revolutionary terrorism by suggesting that while the former demands a complete systemic change, the latter aspires to achieve more limited or selected changes, for example, a change in government's certain policies (Wilkinson 1974: 38).

The third type, *repressive terrorism*, he defines as 'the systematic use of terroristic acts of violence for the purposes of suppressing certain groups or individuals by the

government or the dominant political group of that society'. Repressive terrorism is carried out through a secret police force or intelligence agencies on the behest by the oppressor (Wilkinson 1974:40).

5. 2. Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare:

Mao Tse-tung has defined guerrilla warfare as one in which small groups catch their enemy by surprise, quickly inflict maximum possible damage and retreat strategically (Mao 1973; Finn 2004). Many of these attributes are also shared by terrorists. In fact, terrorism and guerrilla warfare are generally used as the same phenomenon. However, terrorist groups differ from guerrilla organisations in significant ways also.

To start with, the word 'terrorism' is used pejoratively, whereas the term 'guerrilla warfare' carries comparatively neutral connotation. As David Rappaport says 'the traditional distinguishing characteristic of the terrorist was his explicit refusal to accept the conventional moral limits which defined military and guerrilla action' (Rappaport cited in Schmidt 2004b:205). Pointing out differences between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, Walter Laqueur writes that 'the essence of guerrilla warfare is *to establish liberated areas* where the guerrillas establish their own institutions, conduct propaganda and engage in other open political activities to fight against government' (Laqueur 1987:147). The *physical control of territory* as a key element in guerrilla strategy has also been highlighted by other analysts. Although this control is often partial, in some cases the guerrillas manage to completely dominate a sizable area for long periods of time which provides them a stable base for recruitment and maintaining an army. On the other hand, terrorism does not rely on physical control of territory rather it focuses primarily on gaining psychological dominance (Merari 1993:225).

The lack of physical control of a territory leads to another distinction between guerrillas and terrorists. Since terrorists have no territorial base, they usually merge themselves among the civilian population to avoid being an easy target. This is why unlike guerrillas; terrorists do not usually wear uniforms (Merari 1993:226).

Guerrilla warfare also differs from terrorist tactics in terms of target selection. While the prime targets of guerrillas are the armed forces and the government officials/installations, terrorist groups do not distinguish between armed forces and civilians or non-combatants. The targeting of non combatants is considered as the basic difference

between terrorism and guerrilla warfare by many analysts (Goodwin 2012:191; Stepanova 2003:6). Even when terrorists do make such a distinction, they broaden the definition of combatants so much that it becomes meaningless. It serves a very important purpose for terrorists. Labelling everyone who supports the enemy government or ethnic group as combatants helps terrorists to de-humanize the enemy and thus justifies extreme measures taken against them.

Distinguishing between guerrilla warfare and terrorism assumes significance in the context of international law (Stepanova 2003:6). According to Article 48 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, ‘the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives, and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives’ (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 1977). However, the international law regulating non-international armed conflict does not prohibit the use of force by rebels in the course of a ‘liberation struggle’ against a repressive regime although it could be a criminal act under national laws (Human Rights Watch 2001; Stepanova 2003:6). By broadening the ambit of combatants, terrorists exploit the existing ambiguities in the International laws.

Other differences between the Guerrillas and terrorists pertain to the size of unit and the nature of violence. Like Army units, guerrillas usually operate in a platoon or company size unit, sometimes even in battalions and brigades. On the other hand, terrorist groups are usually smaller in size which prevents them from holding territory (Khalil (2013)). Also, the violence by guerrillas in general is targeted and proportionate while terrorists do not hesitate to use extreme and often uncompromising violence (Merari 1993:225).

Despite these differences, this distinction between guerrillas and terrorists is getting blurred increasingly with guerrilla tactics adopted by various terrorist groups. As some scholars have opined that instead of making a clear distinction, the relationship should be seen as a sequence, beginning with the sporadic terrorist attacks which goes up to an organised guerrilla warfare’ (Harkabi 1983:28). Commenting on the ever evolving tactics of terrorist organizations, Robert Scales and Douglas Ollivant argue that nowadays many terrorist groups a combination of both traditional and modern terrorist tactics and very much like guerrilla organisations they now ‘manoeuvre in reasonably disciplined formation

and employ mortars and rockets in deadly barrages’ (Scales and Ollivant 2014). Their argument is also supported by many other analysts. Assaf Moghadam, in a study of terrorism in Middle East between 2002 and 2012, examined the growing nexus between terrorism and guerrilla warfare on the basis of two critical variables – the selection of targets and the methods used by the militant groups. The findings strongly suggest that terrorist groups indeed use a combination of both guerrilla and terrorist tactics (Moghadam 2015: 1-8). Terrorism expert Boaz Ganor argues that this trend is a result of the ambiguity in the international legal definition of both the terms. To escape the legal consequences of being declared as a terrorist organisation, many organisations use guerrilla warfare tactics. According to him, as long as there remains an ambiguity in distinguishing terrorism from guerrilla activity, militant organizations will keep using terrorist or in guerrilla strategies alternatively based on a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis (Ganor 2002:298).

As is evident, there exists a lot of ambiguity regarding terrorism and guerrilla warfare at operational level. It would be rather appropriate to assume that guerrilla war and terrorism are in a way part of a continuum and are often used interchangeably by groups who indulge in political violence.

5. 3. Terrorism and Insurgency

The US Department of Defence defines insurgency as ‘the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region’ (US Army 2008:113). In general usage, both Insurgency and Terrorism are used interchangeably because both have often similar goals i.e. to influence political system or challenge the existing government. However, if examined closely, several differences emerge between insurgency and terrorism. A key difference is that an insurgency is ‘a protracted political-military activity directed towards *controlling the country’s resources* through the irregular military forces and illegal political organization’ (Central Intelligence agency 2009:2). This makes it different from guerrilla warfare and terrorism, as they both do not focus much on controlling the resources.

Although insurgency and terrorism are both politically motivated violence, distinction between the two could be made on the basis of their objectives, the nature of violence, methods, strategic choices and organizational structures to demonstrate how different they are as political phenomena (Wheat 2011). Insurgents have twin objectives – political and

military. To achieve these goals, insurgents work on two fronts: weaken the enemy by constantly attacking them and simultaneously mobilize support from the local population. Furthermore, the insurgents try to establish parallel institutions in territory under their control and challenge the government's authority. Through these methods, insurgents intend to garner support and legitimacy for their movement both at the domestic and international level. On the other hand, terrorist group's focus more on having a psychological impact and attention that goes beyond the immediate victim (Hoffman 2006:40). Also, to coerce the government, terrorists use fear amongst the population rather than winning their support.

Another difference between insurgency and terrorism pertains to their activities and operations. The use of terror is not an *intrinsic* component of insurgency. Though some insurgents use terror at tactical level, many others have refused to do so altogether. Disagreement on the use of terror has often been responsible for internal divisions and emergence of splinter groups within insurgencies. The nature of violence is also a distinguishing factor between terrorism and insurgency. Though it is very difficult to draw a line, but for insurgents, violence often is a dispensable means to achieve their political aims while for terrorists, violence is an indispensable part of their strategy. Lt. Colonel Michael Morris argues that unlike insurgencies which use violence to complement their political goals, terrorist violence replaces rather than complimenting the political goals (Morris 2006:42). Many analysts also argue that the terrorist violence is often uncompromising or brutal. For instance, Schmid and Jongman contend that in terrorism, the use of violence is more indiscriminate and inhuman than insurgency (Schmid and Jongman 1988:17). On the other hand, insurgents usually attack only security or government officials (Berman 2009:158; Khalil 2013:422-24).

Insurgency and terrorism also differ in terms of their dependence on public support. While insurgencies rely heavily on support from local population, terror group does not require that and thrives on public impact. Martha Crenshaw argues that terrorists may operate as an isolated offshoot of the local movement even without an approval from the society (Crenshaw 2001:4). Similarly, Michael Boyle maintains that terrorists 'do not necessarily represent the will or even enjoy the support of the local population' (Boyle 2010:344). Besides the targets and objectives of an organization, the organizational

structure also differentiates terrorists and insurgents. Terrorists operate either as individuals or cells (Wheat 2011). In fact, of late, terrorist organizations have increasingly started operating like a leaderless networks relying more and more on multiple sleeper less very loosely connected with each other. The Al Qaeda employs this strategy very effectively with several cells without a well defined chain of command. In comparison, an insurgent organization copies a military unit and often has a clear military structure (O'Neill 2001).

Insurgents are also distinguished from terrorists through their ability to control territory. The need to dominate a territory is a key element in insurgent strategy. Although this control is often partial, like guerrillas, insurgents also manage to dominate a sizable area for long periods of time which provides them a stable base for recruitment and challenging the government (Merari 1993:225). On the other hand, terrorists do not need to control territory, as argued by Schmid and Jongman (Schmid and Jongman 1988:16). Bruce Hoffman also maintains that terrorists generally do not attempt to control territory because their influence goes beyond the geographical boundaries (Hoffman 2006:41).

Despite these differences, it is important to note that both terrorism and insurgency are not exclusive categories and considerable overlap exists between them (Hoffman 2006: 35). However, to distinguish between insurgency and terrorism is very difficult, if not impossible. In fact, terrorism is often only one tool used in the unconventional warfare. Most often, it is used to augment insurgency as the first step in an armed struggle. Once the group acquires the military capability, its strategy changes from irregular terror strikes to a full blown insurgency (Stewart 2014). Analyzing this strategy of militant organizations, Merrari notes that the selection of a particular type of method depends on the circumstances and often insurgents use variety of methods simultaneously. Terrorism is one of these methods (Merrari 1993).

Some scholars argue that terrorists and insurgents differ with each other not in terms of some intrinsic qualities but it has more to do with the practical requirements. For instance, Daniel Byman argues that many insurgent groups neither hold territory nor enjoy much of popular support due to numerical inferiority or lack of resources. Such groups use terrorism as a tactic and may be considered as *proto-insurgencies* (Byman 2007:3-6). Similarly, Steven Metz states that 'pure' terrorist movements are only those which are simply unable to use the complete spectrum of available insurgent strategies (Metz 2007:

38). In fact, scholars of terrorism studies increasingly recognize that terrorism is used together with other tactics, as part of a broader spectrum of political violence and irregular warfare (Moghadam 2014). Eitan Azani, for example, has developed useful model of ‘hybrid terrorist organizations’ that describe the way in which terrorist groups engage in terrorism and other methods simultaneously (Azani 2013:899-916). Recognizing the challenges and futility of distinguishing between terrorism, insurgency, and armed rebellion, scholars are also increasingly adopting alternative terms such as ‘violent non-state actors’ or ‘armed groups’ to describe the blurring of line between terrorism, insurgency and politics (Moghadam 2014).

5.4. State-Sponsored Terrorism: Terrorism as a Foreign Policy Tool

The link between states and terrorist groups has a long and complex history. Governments, all over the world, have used clandestine violence by terrorist groups to achieve certain objectives – both domestic and international. In general usage, State sponsored terrorism is understood as a state’s use or support of terrorism against another state, however in terrorism and conflict studies, the association between state and terrorist groups is more ambiguous and has been analyzed from two different angles:

i) *State terrorism as domestic policy* that refers to a state’s politically motivated use of illegal force by the state inside its own borders or against its own population to suppress perceived threats. Such acts are directed against perceived enemies that, according to the state, threaten its interests or security (Martin 2016:99-100). The terror campaign during the Stalinist Russia and the holocaust of Jews by Hitler are some of the examples of terrorism by the state agencies or state supported militias. A detailed analysis of this phenomenon is, however, beyond the scope of this study.

ii) *State sponsored terrorism as a tool of foreign policy*: It refers to a government’s covert or overt support to a separatist organisation or a proxy group that operates beyond its borders. Such a support is rendered to achieve some of state’s foreign policy goals. Daniel Byman defines it as ‘a government’s intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, to bolster its political activities, or sustain the organization’. It ranges from very clear lines of sponsorship to very murky and indefinable associations (Byman 2005:10). The existence of state-sponsored terrorism could be analyzed as a continuum ranging from active to passive support:

- a. The state actively helps the terrorist activities.
- b. The state encourages the activities of terrorist groups by providing financial or logistic support
- c. The state does not actively support the terrorist groups present within its own border, but it does make any effort to stop them either and thus enables them to carry on their activities.
- d. The state, simply due to inability to deal effectively with the terrorists, takes no action (Cohan 2002:90-91).

In one of the most comprehensive analysis of the state sponsorship of terrorism, Daniel Byman divides state-sponsored terrorism into two categories: *active* and *passive* sponsorship.

Active state sponsorship is when a state provides direct support to a terrorist group, either in the form of weapons, money or a safe haven. He further divides active support into three sub categories on the basis of three variables pertaining to the nature and extent of their involvement:

- i) Control: Some states directly control the terrorist groups they support and the group essentially acts a stooge of the state. Historically, many states have actively used terrorist groups as a tool of their foreign policy.
- ii) Co-ordination: When the sponsor coordinates the activities of terrorist groups to accomplish their interests. However, sometimes such groups develop their own interests and start working autonomously.
- iii) Contact: Sometimes despite limited level of coordination, states simply maintain contact with terrorist groups and keep channels open for possible future coordination (Byman 2008:3).

Passive state sponsorship, according to Byman, is when a host state deliberately ignores terrorist group's activities which help the group to operate freely. In recent times, the passive sponsorship has become much more important because of autonomous sources of funding and proliferation of small arms in international arms market. Byman divides passive sponsorship into three sub categories:

- i) **Knowing toleration:** When some governments decide not to interfere with a terrorist group's activities within its territory and allows them to flourish as the state's inaction is beneficial for both the host state and the terrorist group.
- ii) **Unconcern or ignorance:** When the host state neither assists a terrorist group's activities, nor bothers to stop it because it does not harm the state's interest.
- iii) **Incapacity:** Some states are either unable or too weak to rein in the activities of terrorist groups and their supporters (Byman 2008:4).

Analyzing terrorist group's relations with various actors or stakeholders within the patron state, Byman identifies three important actors who play an instrumental role:

- i) **The central government:** It refers to the people or institutions at the highest level of government. They may be elected or unelected but they are considered as part of the official government.
- ii) **Independent bureaucracies.** At times, individuals or institutions within the government may act without the knowledge or approval of the state. The state's ignorance also may be deliberate or it could simply be unable to control them. In the later case, they are also labelled as 'rouge elements'.
- iii) **Key social actors:** Some interest groups in a state especially religious organizations, or professional associations, may act in opposition to their government, even to the point of supporting terrorism (Byman 2005:32-37).

Why do some states support terrorist group to further their foreign policy goals and some others consider it an illegitimate instrument of statecraft? This question has been discussed by many analysts. Some of the goal states usually seek to achieve are – to destabilize the rival country, derail its economy, demoralize its people and perhaps most importantly, increase the vulnerability of the target state which otherwise may need a much costly full-fledged war (Ahmed 2012:10). Louise Richardson opines that relatively weak states support terrorist groups to strike against their more powerful enemies as it is often low cost-low risk, easy to deny and difficult to prove venture with a high pay-off that may serve to achieve a state's foreign policy objectives (Richardson 2006:51).

The motivations for states that support terrorism, according to Byman, can be divided into three categories: strategic, ideological, and domestic/political. For passive supporters,

the domestic/political considerations matter the most while for active supporters, the strategic concerns are the key drivers.

Strategically, a state sponsor may like to create problems or raise the cost for a rival state facing an insurgency by supporting terrorist groups and thus keeping the rival stuck in the conflict. State-sponsored terrorism is also used when a powerful state wants to coerce the weak neighbouring state to follow certain policies. In an asymmetric power dynamics, weak states resort to sponsor terror groups to strike back against a militarily superior rival or as a bargaining chip in conflict situation. As far as the terrorist organization's strategic motivation is concerned, the external support enables them to augment their capabilities (Ahmad 2012:10).

Ideological motivations, much like the strategic one, perform multiple functions and are often intertwined with the regional geopolitics. In the cold war period, the ideological struggle between Capitalism and Communism propelled various terrorist campaigns in different parts of the world. In the post cold war era, an ideology rooted in religious fundamentalism has gradually replaced the revolutionary ideology as a motivation of state-sponsored terrorism.

A third motivation for the state-sponsored terrorism is the domestic political concerns of the sponsoring state. These concerns may be to inculcate and perpetuate a particular kind of ideology or to secure domestic political legitimacy for the ruling elite (Ahmad 2012:10-11).

Often all the three motivations make a broad spectrum ranging from strategic on the one hand to the domestic on the other and the terrorist group performs multiple functions for its patron states simultaneously (Byman 2005:36-49).

The impact of state sponsorship of terrorism can be analysed from two angles:

i) *Gains and risks for the terrorist group*: Support from a patron state enhances the terrorist group's capabilities significantly. It provides protection against counterterrorism, helps them develop a robust logistics network, as well as recruitment and functioning without a fear of disruption. In addition, training and other forms of capacity building by the patron state enable the group to become more competent (Byman 2005:28).

However, such sponsorship often comes with considerable costs. Many sponsor states support multiple terror groups simultaneously to maintain their hold. It often results in

inter-group rivalry and clashes and ultimately weakens the terrorist groups. In addition, ties to foreign governments often undermine a group's legitimacy in the eyes of their supporters. State supported groups also risk losing their core ideological cause by becoming subservient to their patron's interest (Byman 2005:28-29).

Assessing the costs and benefits of state sponsorship of terrorism for the terrorist group, Carter argues that the sponsorship can be both a blessing and a curse for groups. While the resources provided by sponsors enhance a group's capability, it also increases the risk of a more forceful reaction from the rival state. He further argues that sometimes to avoid retaliatory action from the rival state, the sponsors can also provide information about the terrorist groups (Carter 2012:4-9).

ii) *Gains and risks for the sponsor state:* As has been mentioned earlier, the state sponsorship of terrorism brings various strategic, ideological and domestic advantages for the sponsor states. However much like the terrorist groups, the sponsoring state also faces various risks. The risk of political isolation, economic sanctions, and military retaliation has been identified by Byman as some of the likely consequences of such an endeavour. A more serious consequence for the sponsor state however, is the risk of spill over and radicalization of its own politics. There are numerous cases of terrorist groups turning against their own masters when the patron state decides to roll back its support to terrorist groups. Delegation of use of force to armed militias also weakens the patron state's monopoly on the use of force within its own boundaries and at times manifests in considerable governance deficit (Byman 2005:29).

Despite the risks, both for the terrorist groups and the sponsors, the state sponsorship of terrorism has emerged as a growing threat internationally. Terrorist organizations that were poorly funded and ill equipped are now better equipped and well organized, primarily because of support they get from various governments. States, to avoid retaliation from their rivals, often resort to provide covert or passive support to terrorist organisations rather than indulging in a direct conflict. This is particularly true for the terrorism driven by religious motivation which relies heavily on toleration or even complicity from several governments rather than any direct or overt sponsorship (Byman 2005). The combination of state support to religious fanatics has given birth to an alarming and lethal trend in recent

years where terrorist attacks have become more sophisticated, brazen and indiscriminate, and are far more difficult to predict and deter.

5.5. Religion and Terrorism: Violence in the Name of the Faith

The relationship between terrorism and religion is not new, though in recent decades, the frequency of terrorism driven by faith has increased considerably. On the other hand, terrorism motivated by the ideologies of ethno-nationalism and Marxist revolution has comparatively declined.² Similar to discussions on other forms of terrorism, the phenomenon of religious terrorism is also hotly contested and analysts differ on how it is different from other forms of terrorism? Is there something inherently violent about religion that motivates its followers to commit extreme violent acts? Or, is religion merely used by terrorists to achieve their non religious goals? Further, is religiously motivated terrorism really a unique and distinct category?

These questions have been investigated by many analysts.

The simplest description of terrorism driven by religious motivations has been given by Mark Juergensmeyer who states that 'religious terrorism consists of acts that are accompanied by a religious motivation, justification, organisation, or world view' (Juergensmeyer 2003:4-10). Differentiating religious terrorism from the secular one on the basis of justification and historical precedents, David C. Rapoport argues that the religious terrorism differ from traditional forms in the sense that religious terrorists use sacred texts and historic examples that are not present in secular terrorism (Rapoport 1990:103-30).

For some analysts like Bruce Hoffman, although religion is sometimes used with other factors, at times, it is also the primary motivation for some terrorist groups. He identifies three traits of religious terrorism:

- i) Use of religious scriptures to justify the act and motivate supporters
- ii) Leadership role is assumed by a religious/clerical figure, and

² For example, none of the 11 identifiable terrorist groups active in 1968 (the year credited with having marked the advent of modern international terrorism) were motivated by religious factors while in 1993, at least 20 percent of known terrorist groups active throughout the world have a dominant religious component (Hoffman 1993).

iii) A complete destruction of existing world is considered as a pre-requisite (Arquilla, Hoffman and Jenkins 1999:19-20; Hoffman 2006:90).

Putting religiously motivated terrorism within a politico-theological context, Gus Martin describes it as ‘a type of political violence motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned – and commanded – terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith. Acts committed in the name of the faith will be forgiven by the otherworldly power and perhaps rewarded in an afterlife. In essence, one’s religious faith legitimizes violence as long as such violence is an expression of the will of one’s deity’. (Martin 2007:130). Some scholars have argued that to understand the phenomenon of religious terrorism, a more nuanced approach is required. They divide the religious terrorism in two sub categories. First, the *Political-Religious terrorism* that aims for a political goal. In such cases, the discourse may be put in an apparently religious framework but the causes and motivations are largely non-religious. Second, *Milleniaristic terrorism* that strives for a higher abstract sacred objective and is least concerned about the material world (Odhiambo 2014:192; Wilkinson 1992). In such cases, the perpetrators are neither personally affected nor do they target any specific group or institution. It is this type of religious terrorism that is the most deadly because anybody can be a legitimate target if he does not agree with the terrorist group (Piazza 2008:469-88).

Some other analysts contend that the line between religious and non-religious terrorism is often blurred and instead of making a clear distinction between religious and non-religious terrorism, the phenomenon should be analyzed on the basis of its objectives especially in the context of *immediate* and *ultimate* objectives. They propose that while the ultimate goal of religiously motivated terrorism is determined by the religious belief, the immediate objectives are usually guided by purely political considerations (Sedgwick 2004: 795-814). However this distinction is also often very ambiguous according to some other analysts. For instance, Greggs contends that in some cases, certain groups may use religion as a tool of mobilisation to achieve completely non-religious objectives like toppling a government. However, sometimes both religious and political goals can be intertwined and inseparable from each other, for example installing a religious government by ousting a secular one, which according to the terrorist group, could be working against their religious faith. In such cases, the cause of the terrorist act is not entirely religious, but the objective is

purely religious (Greggs 2014:39). Further, she argues that an understanding of goals, means and the leadership of terrorist groups helps in comprehending this phenomenon. In this context, she identifies three goals (not exhaustive): creating a religious government, religious cleansing of a state and fomenting the apocalypse (Greggs 2014:36).

Several groups use terrorism with an aim to establish a religious government, an aspiration found in many religious traditions, for example, establishing a *Sharia* by Islamist groups or a state based on reconstruction theology by Christian Identity Movement in USA. Usually confined within a particular state, sometimes these groups can have transnational links with ideologically similar groups operating in other countries. In such cases, together they may aspire to create a transnational religious. For instance, Al-Qaeda by working together with other Islamist groups, wants to establish a *Caliphate*. However, often some disagreement arises among these groups about the true interpretation of religious text, the nature and role of religion in the functioning of the state etc which leads to internal fissure and conflict within the conglomerate (Greggs 2014:42). In some cases, in order to establish a religious state, terrorist groups attempt to coerce people to confirm to the faith of the terrorist group or eliminate the apostate within their own religion and the followers of other religions (Gregg 2014:42). This goal is in many ways similar to the ethnic cleansing carried out by ethno-national terrorist organisations except that instead of ethnicity, religion functions as the defining criteria in such cases. Some groups that are motivated by religion may have apocalyptic goals i.e. arrival of a messiah, destruction of the existing world and creation of a 'new world'. Apocalyptic terrorism is considered as the most dangerous form of religious terrorism because of the high emotional quotient involved with it which reduces the scope of any negotiation. In addition, the imagination of a post-apocalyptic world enhances the probability of using weapons of mass destruction and makes apocalyptic groups particularly dangerous (Greggs 2014:40).

The selection of targets also distinguishes religious terrorism from other forms of terrorism. The targets selected by religious terrorists may be divided into two categories: tactical targets and symbolic targets. Tactical targets usually pertain to specific, worldly goals like attacking a government institution or symbols of power and institutions related to foreign governments that targeted government etc. These targets can be either within that country or at times outside the targeted country as well. Tactical targets may also include

individuals and groups believed to be working against the faith and apostates within the faith. These targets are no different from their non religious counterparts except for the fact that they are means to achieve to greater religious goals (Greggs 2014:44).

Symbolic targets, on the other hand, serve specific religious goals and objectives. Cultural values and norms that differ from the values of the terrorist group are often targeted by religious terrorists to serve their purpose. Attacks on movie theatres, bars, and open cultural places etc are some of the examples of symbolic targets. Since the 'true culture' and the 'corrupting influences' both are impossible to define and identify, the cultural targets are also abstract and may include anything and everything (Greggs 2014: 44).

Although the link between religion and violence is not new, the radicalization of religious beliefs together with the sophisticated weaponry and modern means of communication technology has given birth to a new kind of terrorism that is qualitatively different in comparison to terrorism from previous historical periods. Today, the resurgence of 'religion factor' in public space poses the greatest challenge for counter terrorism policies.

5.6. International Terrorism: Global Spillovers of Terrorism

The nature of terrorism has changed significantly in last couple of decades. Assisted or supported by various states or private groups, today a majority of terrorist groups defy the boundaries of nation-states and are capable of carrying out attacks anywhere in the world. The internationalization of terrorist groups in terms of global networking with potential allies, arms suppliers, and other terrorist groups is seen by many analysts as qualitatively different from the traditional or old terrorism (Cronin 2003; Gunaratna n.d. Enders Sandler and Gaibullov 2011; Hough 2007; Marsden and Schmid 2011).

Like many other terms related to terrorism, the concept of international terrorism is also not very well defined and often used interchangeably with transnational terrorism. However, some analysts have attempted to make a distinction between the two. According to Reinares, an act of transnational terrorism is an act of international terrorism, but an act of international terrorism may not be an act of transnational terrorism (Reinares 2005:2). Reinares argues that the international terrorism is defined by two things: first, it is aimed at altering the power structure at regional and global level; second, the terrorists and their

victims are spread in a number of states and regions. Thus, whereas the aim of transnational terrorism is to bring regime change in a particular region, the aim of international terrorism is more encompassing (Reinares 2005:2). However, the distinction between transnational and international terrorism is largely for theoretical purpose and little difference exists on the ground. In fact many analysts argue that the definitional debate has become somewhat confused in recent years by the introduction of the term ‘transnational terrorism’ and that the term ‘international terrorism’ was adequate in explaining this phenomenon (Wilkinson 1977:174). In this study, the phrase international terrorism will be used to describe the phenomenon.

According to Enders, Sandler and Gaibullov, a terrorist incident is international if ‘its victims, targets, supporters, or perpetrators, are linked to more than one country’ (Enders, Sandler and Gaibullov 2011:321). Further, they point out following criterion for a terrorist activity to be an act of international terrorism:

- The nationality of the perpetrators and the victims is different.
- Terrorists cross an international border in order to carry out the attack.
- If the terror act begins in one country but ends in another.

(Enders, Sandler and Gaibullov 2011:322-23)

Thus, it could be argued that unlike the home grown terrorism, international terrorism is a phenomenon that is not confined to a specific country, maintains organizational structures and carries out attacks in more than one country. This new type of terrorism is considered to be started in the late 1970s which reached at its peak with the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001. Contemporary international terrorism is influenced by various factors like globalisation and technological developments in a rapidly changing world. To begin with, the unprecedented expansion of global communication networks enabled terrorist organizations to move around freely and establish cells around the world by removing traditional barriers of distance and geography. The increased porosity also enhanced the ability of non-state actors to operate like an international enterprise. Cumulatively, these developments provided terrorist groups to open new channels and to operate simultaneously in various countries (Cronin 2003:48). Furthermore, globalisation has helped in emergence of new radicals who are not linked to a specific state but who belong to religious and other transnational networks (Haynes 2001). The emergence of social

media platforms has also equipped terrorists with a powerful tool to connect with like-minded groups, set up support structures and recruit new members around the world (Wade and Maljevic 2004:133; Wilkinson 2000:29).

Terrorist organizations are also expanding their source of funding which now include not only state sponsors, but other illegal sources such as drug trafficking, piracy and donations from wealthy individuals as well (Spencer 2006:11). The funding from non-state actors has increased the use of extreme violence by terrorists as they do not fear a backlash or withdrawal of support from state sponsors. Often it is manifested in the form of *expressive violence* – violence that is ritualistic, symbolic, and communicative (Coker 2002:40). A crucial development in this regard is a growing convergence between religiously motivated terrorist groups and terrorist groups inspired by some local grievances as in many cases both are induced by a need to assert identity (Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones and Miller 2010: 50).

Another important aspect of international terrorism is involvement of amateurs who operate on a part time basis (Spencer 2006:11). Some scholars argue that the emergence of amateurs in terrorist networks is a manifestation of a new network structure which less hierarchical than the old terrorism. Each module within this network is rather autonomous but bound by a common cause and linked through advanced means of communication. They only come together to execute a particular terror act and then disband. Simon and Benjamin call it as the *'hub and spoke'* structure – where nodes communicate with the centre without even the knowledge of existence of other nodes in the structure (Simon and Benjamin 2000:70). Arguing on similar lines John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini describe this organizational structure as 'sometimes *acephalous* (headless) and at the other times *poly-cephalous* (Hydra-headed)' (Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini 1999:86). The looseness of structure and relative anonymity of actors makes it more flexible and adaptive to changing circumstances. At the same time, identification and penetration of such networks also becomes difficult for security agencies as each cell can remain functional even if the leader of the network is apprehended (Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini 1999:86; Simon and Benjamin 2000:70).

Many features of international terrorism described above were present earlier also but what makes the new terrorism different from the old one is the *centrality of trans-national*

linkages. With operational linkages under an overarching radical ideology, terrorist campaigns triggered by local factors in different regions of world have increasingly evolved into a global phenomenon. The use of terror groups as a tool for accomplishing foreign policy goals by some states like Pakistan, Iran and North Korean has further strengthened this development.

Introducing the framework

Although, there is enough literature available on terrorism, however, a definitive explanations for questions like – why terrorism occurs or how the trajectory of a terrorist campaign is determined etc are still elusive. Theoretically, this study presents only a limited set of ideas about the causes and trajectory of terrorism. At the core of the working theoretical framework used in this study is the recognition that terrorism is a multi causal phenomenon and it would be reductive and inaccurate to see it as an outcome of one single cause. Instead of delving deep into the theoretical details of causes of terrorism, this study attempts to understand the process by which it emerges out of a complex interplay between internal and external variables; passes through various stages and becomes part of a global international phenomenon. Six conceptual lenses – political violence, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, state sponsorship, religious motivations and transnational networks – that also loosely correspond to the trajectory of some of the recent cases of terrorist phenomena, have been used to analyse the life cycle of terror campaigns. As a case study, the terror campaign in Jammu and Kashmir has been used for illustration. Five variables emerge as particularly important in this regard.

First, *existence of political/ideological grievances* – real or perceived – acts as the initial trigger for political violence. These grievances get accentuated if channels to express political dissent are choked and the opportunity for political participation is either denied or reduced.

Second, *sponsorship from an external source* to terrorist organisations gradually transforms sporadic acts of political violence into a well organised terrorist warfare. The sponsorship could be in the form of financial contribution, training and weaponry or safe haven for members or supporters of the groups. In certain instances, the sponsoring state

may actually commission violence; in others, it may support terrorist activities that serve its interests.

Third, *the domestic politics of both the target and sponsor states* may also be an important factor in determining the trajectory of terrorism. The irredentist claims, support from various sections of society and quest for political legitimacy by supporting the terrorist organisation within the sponsor state could instigate the terrorist offensive. On the other hand, the lax security environment or counter-insurgency policies that are too coercive or too moderate may provoke terrorist organizations to operate against the target state.

Fourth, *presence of an internationalist ideology* can motivate or guide the terrorist group. An example of such motivation is the attempts of the global Islamists to create an Islamic state incorporating territory from various nation-states.

Finally, *international events and trends* may also be important contributing factors in the determining the life-cycle or trajectory of terrorism. While local factors may trigger the sporadic acts of terrorism, regional and global developments can effectuate consolidation of random terror attacks into a well organized campaign.

Chapter 3

The Genesis of Kashmir Crisis

On December 8, 1989, members of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) kidnapped Dr. Rubiya Sayeed, the daughter of the then Indian Minister of Home Affairs, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. After a lengthy negotiation, the Indian government agreed to meet the terrorists' demands. The incident is considered as a watershed moment in the history of Jammu and Kashmir which opened the floodgate of violence in the state. In the coming days, numerous terrorist groups emerged and created chaos throughout the Kashmir Valley.

The eruption of violence in Jammu and Kashmir came as a big surprise and shock for many observers because during the three wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, Kashmiris had not supported Pakistan. In fact, both in 1948-48 and 1965, they had helped India against Pakistan's attempt to capture the state of Jammu and Kashmir through infiltrations and sabotage. However, the terrorist offensive in Jammu and Kashmir that began in 1989 was not a sudden uprising rather it had its roots in the history. Various arguments have been put forward in this regard. For some, Militancy was in some ways a consequence of an acute sense of alienation that was brewing in the Valley of Kashmir since a long time (Akbar 2002; Puri 1993; Singh 1995). Arguing on the similar lines, some other analysts hold responsible specific political developments, especially a gradual erosion of Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy and the rigging of successive state elections, for generating a deep alienation among the masses. Though the breakdown of political order came to the fore only after the 1987 Assembly election, the political discontent that led to this breakdown was a result of decades of misgovernance and arbitrary intervention in state's political process by the central government, according to them (Chowdhary 2003:190; Bose 2003; Ganguly 1997).

There exists another prism through which the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has been analysed. Jammu and Kashmir shares a porous border with Pakistan that claims the entire territory and pursues both covert and overt warfare to snatch it from India. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir and every war began with the use of subversive tactics and infiltration from Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan's interference in Jammu and Kashmir has remained a constant challenge to India who insists that the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is a direct result of the Pakistan's policy of supporting terrorists from

across the Line of Control (Jagmohan 1991; Kanwal 1999:55-83; Meyerle 2012:4; Raza 1996).

Still another view blames the irretrievable loss of *Kashmiriyat* - a syncretic Kashmiri identity and rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Kashmir valley for the eruption of militancy and its subsequent drift towards Islamization (Chowdhary 2010; Khan 2012).

Although all the underlying themes of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir are governed by different sets of variables, a complex interaction between them can be seen on the ground. To fully comprehend the causes and dynamics of violence in the state, it is, therefore, necessary to analyse the politics of Jammu and Kashmir since the early fifties in general and particularly after the 1983 Assembly elections.

1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir

The state of Jammu and Kashmir is the Northern most state of India which consists of three relatively distinct cultural and geographical regions: Jammu, the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh. The state has two capitals: in winters, Jammu serves as the capital of the state while Srinagar is the summer capital. Except for the Union Territory of Lakshadweep, Jammu and Kashmir is the only state in India with a Muslim-majority population (Census of India 2011). The state is also known for its tolerant and syncretic cultural ethos – the *Kashmiriyat*. A perceived threat to this Kashmiri identity has always been an emotive issue in Jammu and Kashmir which was used as a tool to mobilize Kashmiri people during the early stages of militancy. The state is also subject of a territorial conflict between India and Pakistan. The Northern and Western parts of Jammu and Kashmir known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit-Baltistan respectively are occupied by Pakistan since 1947. The Eastern part of Jammu and Kashmir – the Aksai-Chin – is under Chinese control since 1962.

In 1947, the state of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India with certain conditions like it will have jurisdiction over all the matters except the there – defence, external affairs, and communication (Government of India 2008). At the time of accession, an assurance was also given to Kashmiri people by the then Indian Government to maintain their distinct culture identity (Constitution of India 1950:249-50; Government of Jammu and Kashmir 1952). But the socio-political contract that was agreed upon at the time of accession

gradually became contested due to some political development of 1950's and 1960's. The political process that was thought to initiate the process of greater integration with the rest of India, instead, created fault lines not only between Jammu and Kashmir and rest of India but also within the state of Jammu and Kashmir itself.

2. Years of Ambiguity: National Conference Administration (1948 – 1953)

After accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, an interim government was formed in Jammu and Kashmir in March 1948 (Constitution of India 1950: 249-50) and Sheikh Abdullah was appointed as the *Prime Minister* of the interim government.³ Soon after, Sheikh Abdullah announced the implementation of *Naya Kashmir* programme (Dabla 2012:24). Although the main focus of this programme was on land reforms, according to Widmalm, it also sowed the seeds of modern Kashmiri nationalism (Widmalm 2002:36). On the one hand, the land reforms programme, consolidated the peasants' ties with National Conference on the other, it also created schism between the Hindu landlords (mostly from Jammu region) and the Muslim peasantry (Akbar 1991; Behera 2002; Thorner 1963).

Meanwhile, elections for the Constituent Assembly were held in 1951. The very first elections in Jammu and Kashmir were mired in controversy with wide spread allegations of malpractices. The nominations of many candidates of opposition parties were rejected on technical grounds and in protest, the *Praja Parishad* boycotted the elections (Korbel 1954:220). The National Conference won all 75 seats and the party got an absolute majority in the Constituent Assembly. In fact, more than half of its candidates were elected unopposed (Korbel 1954:221-22).

Despite the formation of the Constituent Assembly, the issue of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India remained contested. Sheikh Abdullah's repeatedly changing tunes also added to the confusion and ambiguity. Although Abdullah kept emphasising his commitment to India, he never denounced the option of independent Kashmir in clear and

³ At the time of accession, the article 163 of the Indian constitution was not applicable to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the head of the state and the governments were called *Sadr-e-Riyasat* (President) and *Wazir-e-Azam* (Prime Minister) respectively. It continued till 1965, when the state Assembly passed the sixth constitutional amendment act and changed the title to 'Governor' and 'Chief Minister'. For further details, see 'Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir' by A. G. Noorani (2011).

unambiguous terms. In his opening address to the Constituent Assembly, he advocated Kashmir's accession to India but did not rule out the option of an independent Kashmir completely and said 'we have to consider the alternative of making ourselves an Eastern Switzerland, of keeping aloof from both States, but having friendly relations with them' (Abdullah 1951; Hassan 2009:6). Similarly, speaking about a solution for Kashmir in a meeting in New York, he said, 'only this, that Kashmir should be an independent state, free from both India and Pakistan. This should be a solution which should be acceptable to all, a face saving solution' (Quoted by Schofield 2003:78). The Indian Government started getting suspicious of Abdullah's ideological commitment to the accession especially after his meeting with the US Ambassador Loy Henderson in September 1950, who reported that

Abdullah was vigorous in restating his opinion that it should be independent; that the overwhelming majority population desired this independence; and that he had a reason to believe that some Azad Kashmir leaders desired independence and would be willing to co-operate with leaders of the National Conference if there were reasonable chances such co-operation would result in independence (Quoted by Varshney 1991:1005).

Abdullah gave many other speeches as well that were critical of the policy of the Indian government. Especially alarming for the Indian Government was his speech at Ranbisiringpura in 1952 in which he linked the accession of Kashmir to India with the alleged spread of communalism in India (Hassan 2009:7). Amidst all this, the Delhi Agreement was signed between Sheikh Abdullah and the Indian Government in July 1952. The agreement had twin purposes – to settle the ambiguity regarding the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India by setting out clear framework of centre's power in Jammu and Kashmir through article 370 and to give assurance to Kashmiri population to preserve their identity by granting a special status within the Indian Union (Government of India [GoI] 1952). However, despite signing the Delhi Agreement, Abdullah kept discussing independence of Jammu and Kashmir, especially with foreign visitors, which irked the policy makers in Delhi greatly. Sheikh Abdullah stance on accession also created rift within the National Conference and the party got divided into two camps: the faction led by Abdullah and Beg advocated maintaining a distance from India whereas Bakshi and Sadiq camp was in favour of greater integration with India (Hassan 2009:7).

The Delhi Agreement had also opened another front. Supported by the Jana Sangh, the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha, the Praja Parishad organised street protests throughout Jammu against the special status to Jammu and Kashmir (Puri 2001). The resentment against Abdullah government's land reforms programme and the Delhi Agreement gradually turned into demand for repealing the Article 370 and complete merger of Jammu and Kashmir with India (Hassan 2009:7). The Praja Parishad protest however failed to evolve into a mass movement due to its limited social base. The land reforms had benefitted peasantry in Jammu and Kashmir and farmers in Jammu region did not come out in support of Praja Parishad's demand. The demand to abrogate article 370 had also acquired a communal character which made the Jammu Muslims very uncomfortable. In addition, the Kashmiri Pandits and the Ladakhi Buddhist communities were also not with the Parishad despite their opposition to Sheikh Abdullah (Behera 2002; Tremblay 1992:160). The Abdullah Government dealt with the demonstrations strictly and many opposition leaders were arrested. Notable among them was Shayama Prasad Mukherjee who later died in jail.

All of these factors led to a point where Sheikh Abdullah was arrested in August 1953 and was replaced by Bakshi Gulam Mohammad as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.

3. Jammu and Kashmir: Between the Politics of Plebiscite and Greater Integration with India (1953- 1973)

After Sheikh Abdullah arrest in 1953, politics in Jammu and Kashmir entered into a new phase. Two diametrically opposite political processes were at play simultaneously during this period. First, many constitutional changes were introduced in Jammu and Kashmir that enhanced the process of integration of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union and second, the demand for a plebiscite by various secessionist groups also got intensified. The contest between these two processes put enormous strain on the body politic of Jammu and Kashmir. During this very period, corruption and nepotism in Jammu and Kashmir also got institutionalised.

In February 1954, the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee which included the finality of accession to India were accepted by the Assembly (Hassan 2009:8). In the same year, the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954 was

issued by the President of India that extended centre's jurisdiction to all subjects under the Union list and the residuary powers (Jagota 1960:530). Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Indian Constitution also became applicable to Jammu and Kashmir with some caveats (Hassan 2009:7). In 1958, the Union Public Service Commission was allowed to function in the State. In 1960, the state was brought under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the mandate of the Election Commission of India was also extended to the state. And in 1964, Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution were also made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir (Bamzai 2016a:7; Noorani 2011). Titles of *Sadar-i-Riyasat* and the *Wazir-e-Azam* were also changed to 'Governor' and the 'Chief Minister' respectively by the Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act 1965. Various other provisions and laws like the direct elections of the members of the Lok Sabha from the State were also introduced in Jammu and Kashmir by this act (Noorani 2011). In fact, as one analyst points out that after 1953 about 337 laws were extended to Jammu and Kashmir, including those related to Chartered Accountants Law, Coinage Act, Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggler Activities Law, Contempt of Courts Law, Customs law, Copy Right Act, Dangerous Drugs Act, and Delimitation (Bamzai 2016a:7).

Cumulatively, these changes had dual impact on the political dynamics of Jammu and Kashmir. On the one hand, they ensured greater administrative integration between the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the rest of India and on the other, these provisions also gave sweeping powers to the central government to dismiss state government and intervene in the affairs of the state at will (Anand 1980:133). Using these provisions, democratically elected leaders were dismissed repeatedly by the central government almost like a tradition. This tendency proved fatal in the sense that over a period of time, a section of Kashmiri population became suspicious about the Indian government's intentions and credibility of democratic institution in Jammu and Kashmir which ultimately sowed the seeds of alienation in the state. Ruling Kashmir through a 'trusted' man had another disastrous consequence. It made a section of local political elite indispensable and the central government was virtually forced to overlook the large scale corruption and nepotism. Especially under Bakshi Gulam Muhammad government, massive corruption almost got institutionalized. The corruption level under him was so rampant that his administration was called the BBC or the Bakshi Brother Corporation (Bhattacharjea 1994:205). As Sumit

Ganguly comments, ‘the national political leadership, from Jawaharlal Nehru onwards, adopted a singular peculiar stand on the internal politics of J&K. As long as the local political bosses avoided raising the secession bogey, the Government in New Delhi overlooked local political practices, corrupt or otherwise’ (Ganguly 1997:39).

The local ruling elite were not only indulged in massive corruption, they also subverted and manipulated the electoral process to serve their own interest. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad rule was highly centralised and quite autocratic. He also had raised a ‘Peace Brigade’ which was allegedly created to threaten and harass opposition parties and his political adversaries (Handoo 2014). The Indian Government’s policy of ignoring the misdeeds of local but ‘loyal’ politicians was most evident during the mass scale rigging in consecutive assembly elections in 1957 and 1962. Both the elections, it was alleged, were heavily rigged (Bazaz 1967:87). The electoral malpractices and election rigging were so blatant that when the National Conference won 70 out of 75 seats in the 1962 elections, Nehru expressed his displeasure and wrote to Bakshi, ‘*it would strengthen your position much more if you lost a few seats to bona fide opponents*’ (quoted in Akbar1991:159).

But the National conference paid little heed to such advice. It captured 68 out of 75 seats in the 1957 elections. Half of these were uncontested (DasGupta 1968:229-30). A similar story was repeated in 1962 assembly elections when the ruling party won 70 seats out of which 35 were uncontested (Bose 2003:77-78; DasGupta 1968:269-70; Election Commission of India 1962). In 1967, after G.M. Sadiq decision to merge the National Conference with Congress, the party won 61 seats. Twenty-two of these were uncontested (Election Commission of India 1967; Mayilvaganan 2002). Voting percentage in all these elections also remained very low and rarely went above 25%. In fact, as one commentator points out ‘until 1967, in many constituencies that later emerged as the hotbed of terrorism – Anantnag, Ganderbal, Kangan, Karnah, Lolab, Pulwama – the electorate didn’t get a chance to actually vote at all’ (Kak 2014). Such rigged elections not only created a class of corrupt and sycophant local political elites but it also alienated the local Kashmiri population as they saw it as a denial of their basic political rights.

Parallel to the process of constitutional and political integration of Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India, another process was unfolding – the demand for a plebiscite and the subsequent evolution of Kashmiri sub-nationalism. Though the slogan of right to

self determination had always found resonance in a small section of Kashmiri population, it remained dormant for some years after 1947 as Sheikh Abdullah, the most popular leader of the state supported Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India. With his arrest in 1953, the separatist sentiments in Kashmir valley started getting some traction. Two organizations mobilized and represented this sentiment – the Plebiscite Front (1955) and the Action Committee (1964). The period between 1953 and 1973 is perhaps the most crucial phase of Jammu and Kashmir's history in this regard, as it was during this period that Sheikh Abdullah, the main advocate of Kashmir's accession to India, became the champion of Kashmir's 'right to self determination' and launched the Plebiscite Front to oppose the accession. The principal objective of the Plebiscite Front was to raise the demand for holding a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition, it also demanded withdrawal of the Indian armed forces of from Jammu and Kashmir, restoration of civil liberties and free elections (Hassan 2009:9). Though the Plebiscite Front refused to participate in the assembly elections on the grounds that the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is not legitimate, however it participated in the municipal elections and managed to put a good showing (Jagmohan 1991:157). Despite the state government's attempt to suppress the Plebiscite Front's activities, the organization kept the heat on for the next two decades. Some analysts mention that the Front not only supported Pakistani infiltrators in 1965, it also used to receive financial help from Pakistan. According to Jagmohan, as per a report published in Pakistan in 1976, the front received an amount of Rs. 7.5 Crores between 1954 and 1978 (Jagmohan 1991:157).

The theft of Holy Relic and subsequent public protests in 1963 provided a big opportunity to the Plebiscite Front to increase its influence in Kashmir Politics. In December 1963, the Holy relic (*Mo-e-Muqaddas*) went missing from Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar. The news spread like wildfire and provoked massive street protests throughout the Kashmir Valley demanding recovery of the holy relic (Akbar 1991:160-62; Schofield 2003:103). The protests for restoration of the Holy Relic were spearheaded by the Holy Relic Committee, an umbrella organisation of Muslim clerics and separatist parties led by the Mirwaiz of Kashmir, Molvi Farooq. Later, the followers of the Plebiscite Front and the Political Conference (led by Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Karra) also joined the Holy Relic Committee and it was renamed as the Action Committee. The Action Committee soon

established its organisational setup throughout the Valley (Giyasu-ud-Din 1992:93). Exploiting the public unrest after the holy relic's disappearance, the Action Committee tried to turn and galvanize the public discontent into an anti-India sentiment and merge it with their demand for the right to self-determination (Giyasu-ud-Din 1992:36). This episode is considered as one of the most crucial phases in the growth of separatism in Jammu and Kashmir. It not only created a general sense of hostility towards the government which was exploited by the separatists, it also united the pro and anti-Abdullah factions of opposition leaders against the Government. In a rare show of unity, Sheikh Abdullah's son Farooq Abdullah and Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq led the protests together (Akbar 1991; Schofield 1996). Although soon serious differences emerged between the two and Moulvi Farooq formed a new political party, the Awami Action Committee (AAC), the increasing political discontent in the valley forced the Indian government to rethink its Kashmir policy (Lamb 1994:207).

Soon after the return of the holy relic, Shamsuddin was removed from the post of Prime Minister and Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq was appointed in his place. In April 1964, as part of the new and recalibrated Kashmir policy, the government also released Sheikh Abdullah along with Afzal Beg. He, however, once again went back to his anti India rhetoric, partly to keep all his options open and partly to counter the rising influence of Action Committee which had captured the political space during Holy Relic Movement. In May 1964, he went to Pakistan for talks with President Ayub Khan and in February 1965, met Chinese Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai in Algeria (Hassan 2009:10). This annoyed the Indian Government and Abdullah was again arrested after his return. He was released in 1968 but was prohibited from entering Jammu and Kashmir in 1970 after he made some speeches criticising the Indian Government policies. The Plebiscite Front was also banned before the general election (Widmalm 2002:52).

Elections for the fifth State Legislative Assembly were held in Jammu and Kashmir in March 1972 in which the Congress, led by Syed Mir Qasim, won a comfortable majority. The Party won 58 seats with 55.4 percent votes; the Bharatiya Janata Party won 3 seats with 9.8 percent votes and the Jamat-e-Islami won 5 seats with 7.2 percent votes (Election Commission of India 1972; Mayilvaganan 2002; Qasim 1992:133). Although the Plebiscite Front had performed exceedingly well in the 1969 *Panchayat* elections, it was banned by

the Indian government for its association with the militant group *Al-fatah* (Hassan 2009:10). The election once again was alleged to be rigged heavily. The charges were initially refuted by the Chief Minister Syed Mir Qasim, but later he himself confirmed these allegations in his autobiography:

If the elections were free and fair, the victory of the Plebiscite Front was a foregone conclusion....that in turn would lead to confrontation between the Centre and Jammu and Kashmir (Qasim 1992:132).

4. The Kashmir Accord: Kashmir from Plebiscite to Autonomy (1973-83)

While the contest between the politics of plebiscite and the push towards greater integration with India defined much of the politics in Jammu and Kashmir in the 1950s and 1960s, the Indo-Pak war of 1971 changed the political dynamics of Jammu and Kashmir significantly. For separatists in Jammu and Kashmir, the signals were loud and clear – that Pakistan does not have the strength to pose a serious challenge to India, and therefore, could not protect Kashmiri interests. It also meant that the separatist could no longer expect either politico-diplomatic or military-strategic support from Pakistan. Summing up the post 1971 situation, an ex-member of the Plebiscite Front said the ‘defeat of Pakistan broke the back of all pro-self-determination individuals and Sheikh Abdullah was no exception’ (Hassan 2009:11). Sheikh Abdullah after realising the diminishing utility of confrontational politics in the wake of changed regional scenario, shifted towards a more reconciliatory position. Accordingly, he began to explore the prospect of a settlement with the Indian Government which ultimately paved the way for his reinstatement as the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Government was also looking for a settlement with Sheikh Abdullah after years of exhaustive political experiments.

Softening of stance from both the parties initiated a new phase of dialogue. As part of the political confidence building measures, a number of restrictions imposed on the Plebiscite Front were relaxed. In April 1972, Sheikh Abdullah’s wife was allowed to return to Kashmir, which was followed by lifting of ban on Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg return (Hassan 2009:11). Reciprocating the gesture, Sheikh Abdullah also accepted that the plebiscite is no longer an issue in an interview to London Times on 8th March 1972 (Zargar 2012). For the dialogue, G Parthasarathi was chosen by the Indian Government as the

negotiator. Later on, D P Dhar and P N Haksar also assisted him. From Abdullah's side, Mirza beg played that role. The task assigned to the interlocutors was not easy. While the Indian government had to justify the settlement with Sheikh Abdullah – a person accused of inflaming secessionist sentiments, Sheikh Abdullah had to convince his supporters that instead of independence, autonomy is the best option for Jammu and Kashmir(Hassan 2009: 12). After much deliberation, finally an accord was signed by Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg and G. Parthasarathy on 13 November 1974 in New Delhi (Puri 2012). The agreement was presented before the Indian Parliament on 24 Feb 1975 as the 'Kashmir Accord' (Government of India 1975). The agreement virtually sealed the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Although Kashmir's special status was retained in principle, the state was termed 'constituent unit of the Union of India'. All the integrationist measures introduced after 1953 were also retained which, Abdullah's opponents claimed, had reduced Kashmir's autonomy (Schofield 1996:123).

The Kashmir Accord was an important milestone in Jammu and Kashmir politics with far reaching implications. It effectively ended the plebiscite phase in Jammu and Kashmir and the slogan of Kashmir's right to self determination was buried, at least for some years. Sheikh Abdullah had to accept the ratification of accession by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly. However, Abdullah claimed that the agreement was a success as it helped in reclaiming the lost autonomy. Abdullah justified this agreement later in his biography by saying

We only wanted Article 370 to be maintained in its original form... our readiness to come to the negotiating table did not imply a change in our objectives but a change in our strategy (Quoted in Behera 2006:289).

Abdullah's opponents accused him of betrayal and alleged that the accord was a sell-out of Kashmir cause. Mirwaiz Farooq accused Abdullah of sacrificing Kashmir's right to self-determination. In the Jammu region, the Jan Sangh criticised the Kashmir Accord for retaining Article 370, which according to them, was an obstacle in integration of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian Union (Hassan 2009:13). But the biggest criticism came from the masses. Sheikh Abdullah's prolonged plebiscite campaign had inflamed pro-secessionist sentiments in Jammu and Kashmir and with his sudden u turn, a large section of population felt cheated and accused Abdullah of surrendering before India for his

personal gains. Large demonstrations against the Kashmir accord were held throughout the valley and Sheikh Abdullah could never recover from the allegation of meek surrender (Para 2015:42). The accord had another far reaching impact. The perceived abandonment of 'Kashmir cause' by Sheikh Abdullah created a void in Jammu and Kashmir political space which was exploited fully by the more radical elements in coming days (Zargar 2012). In the nutshell, although the Kashmir Accord brought much needed political stability in the state, the trust deficit between the state and the union government remained as before because of differing interpretations of the agreement. In the coming days, the National Conference also moved away from the Kashmir Accord and its tussle with the centre surfaced once again.

In February 1975, as per the agreement, Sheikh Abdullah was sworn as the new chief minister. Indira Gandhi wanted him to join the Congress but Abdullah went ahead and revived the National Conference (Hassan 2009). However, with very few seats in the state Assembly, he was totally dependent on the support from the Congress. In such a situation, Abdullah, instead of democratising his governance, ruled through a small coterie mostly made up of his own family. It continued till March 1977 when the Congress withdrew its support from the Abdullah's government. Finally, the Assembly was dissolved and fresh elections were announced.

In the assembly elections in 1977, apart from all the regular political outfits, a new political player was also in the fray – the Janata Party. The number of seats in the assembly was increased from 75 to 76 after the new delimitation. The voter turnout was recorded at 67.7%. The revived National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah won 47 seats with 46.2% votes. The Congress secured 16.9% of votes and got 11 seats, the newly formed Janata party won 13 seats with 23.7 percent of votes while the Jan Sangh won 4 seats with 9.5% votes. The Jamat-e-Islami got 3.6 %votes and only one seat. Sheikh Abdullah formed the new government and extended the tenure of Legislative Assembly to six years through constitutional amendment (Election Commission of India 1977; Mayilvaganan 2002).

The election is considered to be the first free and fair elections in the history of Jammu Kashmir (Banerjee 1992:32-36; Ganguly 1997:71). Noted journalist Balaraj Puri called the 1977 elections as 'a quantum jump in the process of political and emotion re-integration of Kashmir' since it were 'universally acknowledged as the fairest and freest

election' in Kashmir's chequered political history (Puri 1981:189). The clear mandate to the National Conference proved Sheikh Abdullah's undisputed popularity and re-established his political stature in Jammu and Kashmir. Election results also indicated the support for Kashmir's autonomy as the Sheikh Abdullah had contested the election demanding the restoration of Kashmir's autonomy promised under the Kashmir Accord. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the 1977 Assembly election was marginalisation of separatist forces. The most prominent pro-Pakistani party, the Jamaat-e-Islami had barely managed to win just a single seat in the Legislative Assembly, four less than the 1972 elections (Widmalm 2002:57). However, the elections also provided some warning signals. First, it highlighted the growing antagonism between different regions of Jammu and Kashmir. Out of 47 seats won by the National Conference, 39 came from the valley alone. In contrast, all the seats won by Congress either came from Jammu or the Ladakh region and it failed to even open its account in the valley (Chowdhary and Rao 2003a:193). Second, the process of communalisation of state's politics and society gained significant momentum as many mainstream political parties, especially the National Conference, used explicit Islamic symbols to garner votes of separatists. For instance, Mirza Afzal Beg used Pakistani rock salt wrapped in a green handkerchief to indicate his party's support for Pakistan (Schofield 2003:125). Though, it helped the party to some extent, in the long run, it provided legitimacy to the Islamist forces in the valley. It also vitiated the political atmosphere considerably, widening the already present cleavages in the social fabric of Jammu and Kashmir.

Ideally, the mandate received by the National Conference should have heralded a new era in Jammu and Kashmir; instead, Abdullah used it for personal gains. Within months of coming to power, he introduced the Jammu Kashmir Public Safety Bill in 1978 ostensibly to tackle the Pakistan supported subversive activities. The real intention, as alleged by the opposition was to put severe restrictions on the media. Though, it gave some respite to Sheikh Abdullah from the media criticism, it fuelled the political discontent in the state by curbing the channels of political grievances. Many analysts argue that Sheikh Abdullah failed to appreciate the changing the political culture of the state. A new generation of educated and politically more aware Kashmiris had emerged while Abdullah was either in jail or in exile in the last two decades. They were more demanding both in terms of basic

amenities and political rights. The decades long plebiscite campaign and Abdullah's own political rhetoric had also raised their hopes and passage of such a draconian bill came as a rude shock to them. The consequences of this bill kept haunting the state for years to come (Ganguly 1997:73; Bazaz 1978:161).

Abdullah's dictatorial tendencies and his penchant for nepotism alienated his friends and colleagues also. His intentions to groom his son Farooq Abdullah and install him in his place did upset many close associates of Abdullah especially Mirza Afzal Beg who was with Abdullah for well over four decades. In an intra-party blame game, Beg was held responsible for the indiscipline and conspiracy against the chief Minister and eventually expelled from the National Conference. To suppress any further challenge to Abdullah's leadership from within the party, an anti defection act was passed in 1979 which made it mandatory for MLAs to vote along the party line. This act was seen by Abdullah's opponents as an attempt to create a one-party system in Jammu and Kashmir (India Today 1979; Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly Secretariat 2008:14; Karadia 1978).

Another step which created further turbulence in the state was the Resettlement Bill introduced in J&K assembly in 1980. The purpose, ostensibly, was to enable the pre-1947 residents of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to return to the state. The bill, as Sumit Ganguly writes, was at the best, a populist measure aimed at appeasing that section of Kashmiris who were critical of Abdullah for giving up Kashmir's right to self determination. However, it widened the regional and religious fault lines in Kashmir. The bill riled Hindus and Sikhs in the Jammu region as they were now settled on the property that had once belonged to the Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan in 1947. The Bill aroused fears in Delhi also. Abdullah's opponents alleged that it would enable Pakistani agents and sympathizers to freely cross the border and settle down in Kashmir and thus would be a threat to the security of the state (Khayal 2013; Ganguly 1997:78-79).

In 1981, when Sheikh Abdullah's health started deteriorating, he appointed his son Farooq Abdullah, as the President of the party. After some time, Farooq was also made a Cabinet Minister. A man, who had fought against the dynastic rule for all his life, ultimately ended up creating his own dynasty by appointing his son, a political novice, as his political heir. That was indeed ironic, though very much in line with the unique South Asian political tradition i.e. combining democratic and dynastic politics. Sheikh Abdullah

passed away on 8 September, 1982. Though at his funeral, 'people weptand mouthed melancholy slogans' (Singh 1995:24), fundamentally, he died as a defeated man (Bose 2003:90). Towards the end of his political career, his popularity had declined considerably. He was neither popular among pro-integration groups nor the separatist groups. His Kashmir Accord had failed to solve the issue of Jammu and Kashmir's relations with the Indian Union in any satisfactory manner. It was opposed by both, Hindus as well as Muslims in the state. He had also failed in creating a secular social democratic set up in the state. In fact, by early 1980's, the communal and regional divide in the state was visible more than ever.

All of these were going to be a heavy burden on inexperienced shoulders of his son Farooq Abdullah very soon.

5. Years of Alliances and Breakdown of Political Order (1983-87)

Farooq Abdullah was not even a member of the legislative Assembly when he was appointed as the Chief Minister. However, all senior ministers were forced to relinquish their claims to the post of Chief Minister in favour of Farooq Abdullah. As new Chief Minister, the first challenging task before him was to ensure the passage of Resettlement Bill which was sent back to the state Assembly by the Governor B.K. Nehru for some amendments (Akbar 1991:198). Farooq Abdullah, sensing the political gains of supporting this bill passed it in the state assembly through a voice vote on October 4, 1982. Ultimately, the bill was sent to the Supreme Court for its constitutional evaluation (Ganguly 1997:81).

Soon, elections for the state assembly were announced. The Congress was keen in forging an electoral alliance with the National Conference to get a foothold in the valley but Farooq was not interested because an alliance with the Congress was not favoured by his supporters and could have been detrimental to his political career. The prevailing mood in the National Conference was that 'if they agreed to such an alliance, the party would gradually be wiped out' (Abdullah 1985:21). Although, Farooq was praised by Kashmiris for not succumbing to the pressure, it antagonised Mrs. Gandhi greatly (Bose 2009:214).

Elections were held on June 5, 1983, the first elections after Sheikh Abdullah's death. For all practical purposes, it was a two party contest between the National Conference and the Congress, though other smaller parties were also in the fray. Total voter turnout was 73.2 percent. The National Conference secured almost 47% votes and won 46 seats. The

Congress got 30% votes and 26 seats, while the People's Conference, Panthers Party and two independent candidates managed to win one seat each (Election Commission of India 1983; Mayilvaganan 2002).

Though the main election plank was once again the Autonomy (represented by the National Conference) versus the Integration (championed by the Congress), the 1983 elections are remembered for communalisation of the state's politics (Behera 2000:150). Exploiting the anger of Jammu region against the resettlement Bill, the Congress ran an aggressive pro-Hindu campaign to appease the voters in Jammu region. The strategy was to fuel insecurity in Jammu residents and project Congress as the guarantor and saviour of their rights in a Muslim dominated polity (Behera 2000:150; Shourie 2013). On the other hand, though the National Conference's campaign was based on safeguarding the Kashmiri identity, the religious undertone was unmistakable. They also had an alliance with Mirwaiz Farooq's Awami Action Committee, a party with an explicit Islamic manifesto. But the most vitriolic poll campaign was run by the Jamat-i-Islami. Denouncing India as an occupation force, it called both the National Conference and the Congress as 'Indian Dogs' and with the slogan of *Hamara leader – Rasool Allah*, it urged people to vote for Islamic rule in Jammu and Kashmir (Behera 2000:151).

The society and politics of Kashmir couldn't remain unaffected by such a negative campaign. The election results were a clear reflection of growing divide and polarisation – both regional and communal. Out of 46 seats won by the National Conference, 38 were from the valley. More alarmingly, all except one were Muslim majority seats. Congress had managed to win just two seats from the valley and out of 26 seats won by the party, only 5 were Muslim majority seats. Its chief minister candidate Mufti Mohammed Sayeed lost both the seats he had contested in the valley (Behera 2000: 151; Ganguly1997: 83). Both Bhartiya Janata Party and the Jamat-i-Islami, representing the Hindu and Muslim right wing constituencies respectively, were wiped out as the National Conference and Congress had appropriated that space. This was in a way, mainstreaming of communal politics in Jammu and Kashmir, a trend with far reaching consequences.

Though the election results had established Dr. Farooq Abdullah as the inheritor of Sheikh Abdullah's legacy and the most popular leader in Jammu and Kashmir, the trouble was just about to begin. Indira Gandhi, known for her dictatorial and authoritarian nature,

had not forgiven Farooq Abdullah for refusing an alliance with the Congress. Her dislike for any regional political force capable of posing a challenge to her authority was already known. In her political career, she had resorted to a variety of dubious measures, including the dismissal of legitimately elected governments in other states of India that had eroded the federal character of Indian union considerably. The modus operandi was similar everywhere: increased use of central police and intelligence agencies, labelling opposition leaders as treasonous and manipulation of xenophobic and paranoiac nationalism (Brass 1994:321-22; Ganguly1997:84). The same methods were used in Jammu and Kashmir also and a systematic strategy to destabilize the National Conference government began. Initially, the allegations of electoral malpractices were made which was followed by creating local law and order problem through a series of carefully orchestrated public demonstration and protests. A vicious publicity campaign was launched against the Abdullah government and he was dubbed as 'anti national and pro Pakistan'. He was also accused of having relations with the Sikh separatists (Behera 2000:152; Singh 1995:38-39). Farooq Abdullah's decision to be a part of the larger opposition alliance against the Congress at the national level worsened the situation. In 1983-84, he had participated in four opposition conclaves in Vijayawada, New Delhi, Srinagar and Calcutta and like other opposition leaders, had vociferously criticised the arbitrary dismissal of various state governments by Indira Gandhi. For the then leadership of Congress, it was a sign of defiance that had to be suppressed at any cost. Unfortunately, for Abdullah, congress had also found a willing partner, his own brother-in-law G. M. Shah. So, with the help of G.M. Shah, defections were engineered within the National Conference to oust the Abdullah Government. When the Governor, B.K Nehru refused to comply and warned against the political repercussions of such a misadventure, a new Governor was sent to Srinagar with the specific instructions of carrying out Delhi's order (Behera 2000:152). His name was Jagmohan.

The Farooq Abdullah government was dismissed on July 2, 1984 when the Congress withdrew its support and G.M. Shah was appointed as the Chief Minister (Chawla 1984). The dismissal proved to be one of the most controversial decisions in political history of Jammu and Kashmir. Various interpretations and explanations of this episode have been given by the analysts. Jagmohan, presenting his case, has written in detail about the

circumstances and the charges against Abdullah. These charges can be summarised as follows: Abdullah had failed to control the deteriorating law and order situation in the state, he had allowed the Sikh extremists to organize camps in Jammu and Kashmir and above all, was fuelling separatist sentiments in Jammu and Kashmir by collaborating with pro-Pakistan forces like Mirwaiz Farooq and JKLF leaders, Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Butt (Behera2000: 153; Ganguly1997:87; Jagmohan 1991; Singh1995:39). However, these allegations have been questioned by most of the journalists, historians and political analysts. Behera notes that most of the allegations were either fabricated or politically motivated. For example, the Union Home Minister had told the parliament that the Sikh camps were not only religious in nature but similar camps were also organized in Punjab and Himachal Pradesh as well. Likewise, not only Abdullah but the Congress had also tried to woo leaders like Mirwaiz Farooq, Mohammad Shafi Qureshi, Maulana Iftikhar Ansari, Mohiuddin Salati and Abdullah's younger brother Tariq Abdullah. In fact, Tariq Abdullah, a Pakistani national till 1975, had even argued Pakistan's case at the UN in 1960s but he was welcomed as a true Indian nationalist the moment he joined hands with the Congress (Behera 2000:152-154).

Farooq's dismissal, as Mir Qasim writes, 'was another nail in the coffin of Kashmiri's faith in Indian democracy and law' (Qasim 1992: 163). Analysing the impact of this dismissal on Kashmir's psyche, Puri notes that 'while Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal had given the message that even if the Kashmiri people did not wish to remain within India, they would not be allowed to secede, whereas the dismissal of Farooq conveyed the message that even if they wished to remain within India, they would not be free to choose their own government (Puri 1993:34). It is important to note here that in 1983 elections, Kashmiris had opted for Kashmiri sub-nationalism within India Union over Jamaat-i-Islami's pro-Pakistan ideology by giving a clear mandate in favour of National Conference. In this backdrop, it was almost an insulting signal to Kashmiris that the yardstick to judge their loyalty towards India will be different than the citizens of other states and that they will have to prove their patriotism every day. As Tavleen Singh writes 'Kashmir was reminded that no matter how much it feels that it belongs to the mainstream of India, no matter how often its Chief Minister asserts that he is Indian, it will always be suspect' (Singh 1995:74).

The G.M.Shah government was unpopular from day one and lacked any moral authority to rule. In fact, Shah earned the name of '*Gul-e-Curfew*' as he could rule only by imposing curfew for 72 days out of the first 90 days of his government (Swami 2007:158). The widespread allegations of large-scale corruption made the matters worse for him. Shah's government made money like there was no tomorrow, writes Tavleen Singh (Singh 1995). To compensate the lack of moral legitimacy, the Shah Government made compromises with the pro separatist forces and took many controversial decisions that strengthened Islamist forces like the closure of bars and liquor stores and withdrawal of 'anti-Islamic' books from universities etc (Ganguly 1997:89). During his rule, the worsening economic situation of the state and rising unemployment also helped secessionist forces like Jamat-i-Islami and provided a fertile recruiting ground to them. Within a couple of years, Shah was sacked unceremoniously on 7 March 1986 and Jammu and Kashmir was placed under Governor's rule once again. The grounds of Shah's dismissal were all too familiar; corruption, inability to handle the growing political instability and being soft towards pro- Pakistan elements in the state (Bhattacharjea 1994: 248-50).

On November 6 1986, an accord was signed between the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah that facilitated his return as the chief minister. By that time, Congress's inability to establish itself as a significant political force in the Kashmir valley had convinced Rajiv Gandhi that only bringing back the National Conference could stabilise the deteriorating situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly Farooq Abdullah had also realised that without the central government approval, he can't return to power. In fact, he was convinced that even if he wins the majority in the state Assembly, his party will not be allowed to come to function. As Ganguly quotes Farooq Abdullah, 'In Kashmir, if I want to run a Government, I have to stay on the right side of the centre...this is the hard political reality that I have come to accept' (Ganguly 1997:96).

The alliance, though paved the way for Abdullah's return to power, was not welcomed by the people of Kashmir. For all these years, the National Conference had taken pride in establishing itself as a party who can stand up to the pressure and arm twisting from the central government and this accord was seen as giving it away for the comfort of power. The accord was labelled as an unholy alliance and Farooq Abdullah, from being a

symbol of Kashmiri identity and pride, became an agent of the central government. Tavleen Singh describes the public sentiment in these words ‘Overnight, Farooq was transformed from hero to traitor in the Kashmiri mind. The people could not understand how a man who had been treated the way he had been by Delhi and especially by the Gandhi family, could now be crawling to them for accords and alliances,’ (1995: 98). The accord was opposed within the the National conference as well. A senior cabinet minister was reported to have said to Farooq Abdullah ‘You will become the chief minister of the state but you will no longer be the leader of the people of the J&K (quoted by Behera 2000:156). Apart from the optics, the Congress-National Conference alliance proved to be harmful for the state’s secular politics also. Since the largest secular party of Jammu and Kashmir had formed an ‘opportunistic’ alliance with the congress, the opposition’s space was filled by religiously motivated groups which used the secular political void to further their agenda efficiently, gained substantial strength and later formed the Muslim United Front (Ganguly 1997:97).

It was in this backdrop that the elections for state assembly were held in March 1987, four months after the assumption of power by Dr. Farooq Abdullah. The assembly elections were a two way contest between the Congress-National Conference alliance and an umbrella coalition of various Islamic parties, the Muslim United Front (MUF). Initially Farooq Abdullah poll campaign was based on the promise of state’s economic development but soon it got transformed into a referendum for preserving Kashmir’s identity. Till now, the representative political formation for Kashmiri aspiration was the National Conference, but this time they had to face a tough contender in the form of MUF, an umbrella organization of many smaller groups formed by Maulvi Abbas Ansari, Syed Ali Geelani, Prof Gani Bhat and Qazi Nissar. Although the MUF’s stated objective was to safeguard the interests of Kashmiri Muslims, it fought the election on emotive issues like Kashmir’s identity, Muslim solidarity and establishment of *Nizam-e-Mustafa* (Rule of Islam) in Kashmir (Behera 2000:157). Accusing the National conference of capitulating before the Centre for the sake of power and compromising with the special identity of Kashmir, the MUF, for the first time in history of post independence Jammu and Kashmir, was successful in converging regional Kashmiri identity with the Islam explicitly. Though very much like other parts of India, an occasional communal overtone in politics was not new to Kashmir, this time it was unmistakably blunt and fierce. In some ways, the process of

Islamization of Kashmiri identity was now almost complete. The MUF election rallies started attracting large crowds gradually. Kashmiri youth formed the bulk of the supporters of MUF partly because the *Jamaat* had already a strong support base in educational institutions and partly because of lack of economic opportunities and aversion with the dynastic politics of Abdullah family (Bose 2003:48).

Alarmed by the growing popularity of the opposition, the ruling coalition rigged the elections heavily. Voters and political workers were intimidated and harassed on a large scale. A couple of weeks before the elections, nearly six hundred opposition workers were arrested (Badhwar 1987:40-42; Behera 2000:158-59; Ganguly1997:98). The elections witnessed the highest ever recorded voter turn-out in Jammu and Kashmir at 75% (Schofield 2003:137). The National Conference-Congress alliance swept the elections winning 66 out of 75 seats with 53 percent of votes. The MUF, who was hoping to win between 10-13 seats out of the 44 seats it had contested, managed to win only four seats with 32 percent of votes (Mayilvaganan 2002; Schofield 2003:137).

The 1987 elections and its impact on Kashmir's polity have been analyzed threadbare by the political commentators. Almost every neutral account of 1987 elections points to the blatant rigging and subversion of democratic process by the Congress-National Conference alliance (Behera 2000; Bose 2009; Swami 2007). It is argued that that the rigging was the 'straw that broke the camel's back' – the people become totally disillusioned with the electoral process and more so with India (Hassan 2009:16; Malik 2005). As Dr. Qazi Nisar, a MUF leader said, '...this kind of thing simply makes people lose faith in the constitution...we have to prove that we can do something concrete' (Behera 2000:159). Similarly, Abdul Gani Lone, the chairman of People's Conference, expressed his disappointment in these words 'If people are not allowed to vote, where will their venom go but into expression of anti-national sentiment' (Badhwar 1987:40-42). It was not as if the elections in Jammu and Kashmir were rigged for the first time. What made the difference was presence of a credible alternative riding on a popular wave. In popular perception, the Muslim United Front was posed to comfortably win the elections. The heavy defeat of MUF came as a rude shock and was perceived by Kashmiris as a grave violation of their political right to choose their government through free and fair election – the ultimate humiliation. As one separatist leader put it 'the thought was there, the

motivation was there, the urge was there and the opposition was there. Only a spark was needed now' (Abdul Gani Lone quoted in Widmalm 2002:80). The repressive tactics did not stop even after the elections were over. According to Lyngdoh, not only were the poll results manipulated, polling agents of the opposition candidates were arrested and beaten up. In fact, the political victimisation continued even after the polling had ended. Two days after the election, at least five MUF leaders were arrested for 'anti-national activities' (Badhwar 1987; Lyngdoh 2004:128).

Farooq Abdullah, thoroughly discredited in the valley by now, could never recover from the loss of credibility and ruled with little political legitimacy afterwards. The 1987 election were an important turning point in Jammu and Kashmir's political history. If the Congress-NC alliance in 1986 had provided space to Islamist forces in Jammu and Kashmir by creating a void in secular-nationalist political space, the blatant manipulation of electoral process and stifling democratic channels of political discontent in 1987 assembly elections led Kashmiris to believe that they would never be allowed to express their political choices under the current political dispensation (Behera 2000:159).

6. Transformation of Kashmir Identity: Erosion of Kashmiriyat and the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Jammu and Kashmir

Very much like other parts of India, religion has always been an integral component of politics in Jammu and Kashmir in some way or other. However, instead of the Muslim identity, politics in Jammu and Kashmir revolved around a more inclusive concept, the *Kashmiriyat*, in the years after independence. It was by the decade of seventies that Islam began emerging as a tool of political mobilization, though it still remained quite marginal. In a way, the Islamic identity of Jammu and Kashmir is closely linked to the politics of separatism (Chowdhary 1998:20).

The first noteworthy episode in this regard was the theft of Holy relic (*Mu-e-Muqaddas*) in 1963. The incident triggered massive political protest throughout the valley. The Action Committee to coordinate mass protests during this episode was headed by the *Mirwaiz* of Kashmir, Moulvi Farooq. It was during these protests that the institution of *Mirwaiz* became the pivot of political mobilization in Jammu and Kashmir. The fact that by that time, political credibility of the Pro-Integration political groups was lost significantly because of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest and centre's growing interference in Kashmir's

politics, proved very helpful in this process. Later, Moulvi Mohammed Farooq formed an independent organisation, the Awami Action Committee, which for the first time the history of post independence Jammu and Kashmir brought both Pro-Pakistani and pro-Islamic sections of Kashmiri society together. It gained popularity among youth, especially in old Srinagar area (Puri 1968:235). The emergence of Moulvi Mohammed Farooq as a popular political leader had significant implications for the politics of Kashmir because he was both a religious head and a political leader giving voice to the anti-secular section of Kashmiri Nationalism. This section, though marginalised by the popular appeal of Sheikh Abdullah, was quite strong in the decades of 1930s (Chowdhary 1998:22).

The process of Islamization got another boost in the decade of 1970s when a section of Kashmiri youth got attracted towards *Jamat-e-Islami* and its student wing, *Jamat-e-Tulba* (Chowdhary 1998:23). The roots of Jamat can be traced to the reformist efforts of the Ahi-i-Hadith which was established in Jammu and Kashmir in 1925. The Ahi-i-Hadith believed in strict and rigorous observance of the teaching of the prophet and rejected Sufism, the dominant form of Islam in Kashmir as un-Islamic. Given the deep roots of the Sufi tradition in Kashmir, the Ahi-i-Hadith failed to develop a mass base and remained largely an elitist phenomenon confined within a limited section of the urban middle class (Sikand 2004:195). But despite a very limited success, it prepared a fertile ground for the emergence of the other Islamist groups like the Jamat-i-Islami, which was established in 1941 by Syed Abul Ala Maududi. Initially formed as a religious movement, the Jamat became a political party in 1952 (Sikand 2001:219). From 1952 to 1980's, the Jamat, though, participated in elections, could not achieve much electoral success Jammu and Kashmir. For instance, In the Assembly elections, Jamat candidates managed to win only five seats in 1971, just one seat in 1977 and in the 1983 elections, it failed to even open its account (Widmalm 2002:57). But in the decades of seventies and eighties, the Jamat support started increasing gradually because of various factors – both endogenous and exogenous. To start with, the agrarian reforms and massive expansion of educational facilities in Jammu and Kashmir after 1947 had given birth to a generation of Kashmiris who were politically more aware. Simultaneously, on the other hand, a gradual institutional decay and the stifling of democratic channels of expression resulted in growing political discontent especially among the youth (Ganguly 1999:73-77). Discontent of similar nature,

were earlier expressed through the secular politics of the National Conference but now with the perceived surrender of National Conference leadership before the Central government, Islam became the rallying point and religious forces became the champion of political rights. In the meantime, Jamat had also expanded its social base through a vast network of *Madrasas*. Although Sheikh Abdullah officially banned them in 1975, they kept functioning with changed names. These *Madrasas* not only radicalised the masses, they also instilled an affinity towards Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims.

Another group that played an important role in radicalisation of Kashmiri society especially in 1980s was the Islamic Students League (ISL). A successor of the underground Tula Party, it became active in mid 1980s. The founding members included Aslam Wani, Yasin Malik, Javed Ahmed Mir and Sheikh Hammed (Jamal 2009:279). All of them played key role in militancy later. Despite having youth from varied ideological background, its ideology was establishment of *Islamic Nizam* in Jammu and Kashmir. The slogans it adopted were ‘Say with pride, we are Muslims’ and ‘Kashmir will become Pakistan’. Jihad was its declared goal and its flag carried the first Kalma ‘*La Ilaha Illallah Muhammadur Rasulallah*’ (There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah) with a pair of crossed Kalashnikov Rifles. Though the ISL could never become a big organisation, it introduced a culture of violence in Kashmiri youth (Jamal 2009:119).

Two significant international developments; the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan too provided a boost to the process of Islamization in Jammu and Kashmir. While the Islamic Revolution in Iran made an idea of pan-Islamic revolution believable for the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir, the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union led to the argument that if a super power like the Soviet Union could be challenged and defeated, why not India?. The Afghan war had another impact on Jammu and Kashmir. A significant amount of money that the USA was giving to Pakistan to fight in Afghanistan was diverted to fuel secessionism in Jammu and Kashmir (Verma 1994:74).

By the mid-1980s, a number of communal organisations had emerged in Jammu and Kashmir. These included the Kashmir Liberation Front, the People’s League, the Islamic Student Front and most importantly the Muslim United Front (Chowdhary 1998:23). The Islamization of Kashmiri society and the growing impact of fundamentalist politics had

also triggered ostensibly non political initiatives such as the ban on liquor shops and video parlours, insistence on wearing *hijab* etc. In Alstair Lamb's opinion, crowd's hostility towards the Indian cricket team and subsequent clashes between the supporters of the National Conference and Jamat-i-Islami during a cricket match in 1983 were also a manifestation of an increasing influence of Islamist forces in Jammu and Kashmir (Lamb 1994:329).

By the 1980s, a cumulative effect of all these factors had severely eroded the composite culture of Jammu and Kashmir and a general hostility towards the non-Muslim population of the valley was quite palpable (Chowdhary 1998). Together with the growing political discontent, breakdown of the political order and Pakistan's continued instigation finally led to a situation in Jammu and Kashmir that Alastair Lamb describes as 'the first phase of a general Islamic rebellion' (Lamb 1994:329).

7. Raising a Militia: Pakistan's Involvement in Jammu and Kashmir (1950-88)

Taking Jammu and Kashmir away from India has been an objective of Pakistan's policy ever since the state decided to join India instead of Pakistan. To achieve this goal, Pakistan has used both overt (formal wars) and covert (irregular warfare) means in Jammu and Kashmir. When the first war between India and Pakistan in 1947-48 failed to achieve the desired goals, a well thought out policy was launched in the 1950s based on irregular warfare. The broad contours of this policy could be found in the writings of Major General Akbar Khan, the architect of Pakistan's infiltrations in 1947-48. Shortly after the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir took effect, he wrote two papers titled '*What Next in Kashmir*' and '*Keep the pot boiling in Abdullah's Kashmir*' (Cheema 2014:387). He argued that in Kashmir, given the military asymmetry between Indian and Pakistan, the best option for Pakistan is to engage India in a proxy war. It could be done through providing military training to Kashmiris and raising a people's militia to revolt against India. Such an action will weaken India's hold on Kashmir and if India decides to retaliate, a crisis situation will ensue and the international community will be forced to intervene in the matter (Khan 1990:125-26). As per his estimates, not more than 500 men at a time would be required for this job. Avoiding a direct confrontation with the Indian security forces, the strategy would include fuelling communal tension in the valley, targeting bridges, communication & transport channels and other strategic locations etc. The money requested by him was

roughly 200000 US dollars. Although it is difficult to find a concrete proof of whether his plans were actually accepted or not, there is enough evidence to suggest that Pakistan implemented virtually the same strategy in Jammu and Kashmir in the 1950s (Jamal 2009: 71-73). Various low intensity attacks took place in Jammu and Kashmir throughout this period that include the bomb blast at Government Rest House on the Srinagar–Pahalgam road, the burning of the Kangan, Sagipora and Singhpora Bridges on roads leading out of Srinagar, the destruction of a Forest Department Building in Nagranag, the cutting of a military telephone line from Srinagar to Gulmarg and a bomb explosion in the Palladium Cinema Building in Srinagar etc. (Sahni 1999:19; Swami 2007:26).

In the 1960s, Pakistan intensified its activities in Jammu and Kashmir. In June 1964, it threw its weight behind a covert organisation formed by Mian Ghulam Sarwar, Bashir Ahmed Kichloo and Zafar-ul-Islam to create disturbances in the state, to help infiltrators coming from Pakistan and fuel communal divide in the state– the ‘Master Cell’ (Swami 2009:49-76). Though the organisational structure of the cell mirrored the revolutionary guerrilla organisations, its character was unmistakably Islamic in nature. The Master cell soon started its activities throughout the valley. Hayat Mir, one of its key operative, tried and executed a woman allegedly for promiscuity, the first instance of a jihadi court in Kashmir. In a typical example of social banditry but with a communal angle, a Hindu grocer was looted in Budgam and the goods were distributed in local poor Muslims (Sandhu 2011:84). The activities of Master Cell reached at its peak during the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. Multiple explosions were carried out in areas around Srinagar and propaganda material was distributed throughout the valley by the Master cell operatives.

In early 1964, a secret ‘Kashmir Cell’ was reportedly set up by Pakistan which consisted of the Chief of General Staff of the Army, the Director of Military Operation, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary to monitor and facilitate subversive activities within Jammu and Kashmir. Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed was made the chairperson of this Cell. The cell was assigned the task to prepare plans for providing support to potential recruits/militants and encouraging subversive activities within Jammu and Kashmir (Jamal 2009:76; Raza1996:43). The policy to escalate things further was driven by several changes in the regional geo-political environment in early 1960s. India had suffered a heavy loss in

a War with China in 1962; the China-Pakistan relations were improving and Pakistan had also acquired latest defence equipments courtesy its alliance with the United States by joining the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The disappearance of the holy relic and subsequent riots in Jammu and Kashmir had also created a volatile situation within Jammu and Kashmir. These developments had led to thinking in Pakistan's security establishment that not only a militarily and politically weakened India would be unable to defend its borders in case of sudden infiltration but Kashmir would also revolt against India if given enough support from outside.

In this backdrop, Pakistan prepared a plan to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir, the biggest after the 1947-48 war. It was codenamed as 'Operation Gibraltar'.⁴ Major General Akhtar Malik, General Officer Commanding (GOC), 12 Infantry Division, was given the authority to plan and execute the operation. The main objective was to challenge India's claim that situation in Jammu and Kashmir is under control and eventually to force India to come on negotiating table (Chakravorty and Kanwal 2015:36). The strategy to achieve these objectives included attacking civil and military institutions in different parts of the state to fuel unrest in the state, to paralyse the internal administration and to create a situation of internal revolt (Chakravorty and Kanwal 2015:36). It was assumed that Muslims in the Kashmir valley would rise against India after the Pakistani attack and fear of China will prevent India from crossing and opening battle-fronts on international border (Jamal 2009:77). In late 1964, according to sources, Malik started training a force of around five thousand personnel divided in ten units. In a well thought out attempt to give the whole operation a religious colour, the Operation Gibraltar was named after one of the most famous battles in the history of Islam, general Tariq ibn-Ziyad's invasion of Spain in AD 711. Similarly, to project the whole operation as a battle between Islam and unbelief, the units were also named after famous Muslim conquerors of medieval era (Swami 2007:61). According to the plan, the valley was divided in ten zones and each unit was allotted a particular zone to infiltrate as given below:

1. Force Tariq - Sonamarg, Dras and Kargil.

⁴ Though Pakistan never accepted the existence of such a plan, various accounts are available now. For details see Chakravorty and Kanwal 2015; Bajwa 2014; Prasad and Thapliyal 2011; and Pradhan 2013.

2. Force Qasim, - Kupwara, Gurez and Bandipur.
 3. Force Khalid, - Trehgam, Chowkibal, Nangaon and Tithwal.
 4. Force Salaudin, - Uri and Srinagar.
 5. Force Ghaznavi, - Mendhar, Rajouri and Naushera.
 6. Force Babur - Kalidhar Range and Chhamb.
 7. Force Mutaza, - Bandipur.
 8. Force Jacob, - Sonamarg.
 9. Force Nusrat- Tithwal and
 10. Force Sikandar – Not specified
- (Gull 2015; Jamal 2009:79).

Every unit was to be controlled by a Major and commanded by Captain rank officer. The personnel were a mix of *Razakaars* (civilian workers) from villages in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and soldiers from ‘Azad Kashmir Regiment’ of Pakistani Army. The training was given at kotli, Mongbajri near Rawalakot), Shinkiari and Ratu in Gilgit between March 1964 and July 1965 (Jamal 2009:79). The propaganda war was to be an important component of the operation and a mobile transmitter was set up to broadcast the ‘Voice of Kashmir’ radio programme by the Pakistan Army (Bhat 2013; Hiranandani 2000: 21).

The operation was formally launched on August 8, 1965 and soon it became clear to Pakistani authorities that most of their assumptions were simply wrong. Except a tiny section of the Plebiscite Front, local Kashmiris did not come out to support the invaders. In fact, the information of presence of Pakistani invaders to Indian authorities was given by Mohammad Din, a local Gujjar shepherd. Indian security forces retaliated and all the units except ‘Ghaznavi’ were overpowered by August 16, 1965 (Jamal 2009:83; Swami 2007: 62). Soon after the failure of operation Gibraltar, Operation Grand Slam was launched by the Pakistan Army and a full scale war broke out between India and Pakistan.

Despite the failure of operation Gibraltar, Pakistan continued its strategy of sending operatives covertly into Jammu and Kashmir to instigate local Kashmiris against the Indian Government. According to some estimates, there were around eighty underground groups/cells active in the Valley between 1965 and 1971. Most of these were supported by

the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan Army (Jagmohan 1991:159; Jamal 2009: 86). The most important of these groups was Al-Fatah.

Al-Fatah, founded by Ghulam Rasool Zahgir in 1965, was Kashmir's first guerrilla organization having explicit links with the Pakistan's ISI which provided training, weapons and sanctuaries to its members (Jamal 2009:86). By 1969, it had become a potent covert organization to carry out economic and militant subversive activities to challenge the Indian authority in Jammu and Kashmir. The prominent members of Al Fatah were Nazir Ahmad Wani, Fazl-ul-Haq Qureshi, Dr. Farooq Ahmad Bhatt, Mohammad Altaf Khan alias Azam Inquilabi and Mian Sarwar who had earlier set up an organization called Students Revolutionary Council (Jagmohan 1991:159-60). In the 1970s, some other organisations like the Kashmir Students Federation and Young Men's League also joined Al-Fatah. The organization had basically a two pronged strategy: to carry out subversive activities and to collect sensitive information through espionage. Attack on holy sites like *Maqdoom Saheb ki Ziarat* to incite communal violence was also attempted by the organisation (Jagmohan 1991:160-61). During the 1970s, Al-Fatah carried out three major acts of subversion: murder of BSF constable Charan Das in 1967, robbery at Tehsil Education Office, Pulwama in 1970 and Hazratbal bank robbery in 1971 (Ali 2015; Swami 2009:91-99). However, the organization was busted after the arrest of some of its members involved in the Hazratbal Bank dacoity which led to state-wide raids on Al Fatah's hideouts including its headquartering in Barsu (Jamal 2009:87). For helping the Al-Fatah, first secretary in the Pakistan High Commission was also expelled by the Indian Government (Sahni 1999:22 quoted in Jamal 2009).

Another important group supported by Pakistan to formant trouble in Jammu and Kashmir was the National Liberation Front (NLF). Part of the Plebiscite Front (for PoK and Pakistan), the group was formed in August 1965 in Peshawar by Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Butt. The objective of the NLF was to create enabling condition for people of Jammu and Kashmir to raise the demand of plebiscite (Khan 1992:98-99). The group was divided into four wings: the Military wing headed by Major Amanullah, the political wing by Amanullah Khan, the financial wing by Mir Abdul Qayyum and the Coordination wing led by Maqbool Butt. In 1965, the NLF sent Major Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Butt into Jammu and Kashmir to set up underground cells in various cities like Srinagar, Sopore,

Baramulla, Bandipore and Anantnag to carry out subversive activities (Jamal 2009:89). In 1966, the NLF kidnapped and killed a J&K police inspector, Amarchand. In a subsequent encounter with the Indian Army, some of the members of NLF were killed while Maqbool Butt along with Habibullah was arrested. Butt was sentenced to death by the Indian court but managed to escape after a jail break in December 1968 and went back to Pakistan occupied Kashmir (Cheema 2015:388; Swami 2007:104-105).

The whole episode brought infighting and intra-group rivalry within the Plebiscite Front and the NLF in the open. After much negotiation, all fractions within the Plebiscite Front decided to work together once again. By that time, Maqbool Butt had acquired almost a hero like status among separatist within Jammu and Kashmir and with the help of new recruits, the NLF managed to carry out a series of bomb explosion in the cities of Jammu and Poonch. Targets included public places like Railway and Bus stations as well as important military installations like the Transit Military Camp at Sarwari (Jammu), Army's divisional headquarter in Jammu and an ammunition depot in the Kamial Village in Poonch (Jamal 2009:91). These attacks were aimed at drawing international community's attention towards Jammu and Kashmir. When they failed to achieve the purpose, NLF soon began looking for other ways to escalate their activities. Inspired by the successful hijacking of four jets by the Popular Front in Palestine, the NLF too hijacked an India Airlines aircraft named *Ganga* on January 30, 1971. The act was carried out by two Kashmiris, Hashim Qureshi and his cousin Ashraf Qureshi (Dulat and Sinha 2015:77; Swami 2007:112-13). The plane was taken to Lahore where it was set on fire after the release of all on board passengers. Although Pakistan denied any involvement in the hijacking, the reception the hijackers got in Pakistan was nothing less than heroic. Thousands of people turned up at the airport to celebrate the incident including Z.A. Bhutto, leader of Pakistan biggest political party (Dulat and Sinha 2015:77). The NLF leaders led huge public processions and were showered with rose petals. Only after the intense international pressure, Pakistani authorities backed away from hijackers and arrested them (Jamal 2009:95-97). Later on, Pakistan also alleged that the hijacking was an Indian conspiracy to defame Pakistan and part of a larger strategy to ban over-flights between East and West Pakistan (Schofield 2003:116).

Activities of both the Al-Fatah and the National Liberation Front, in way, led the foundation of Pakistan's policy of using sub-conventional warfare in Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike the earlier covert organisations like the 'Master Cell' in early 1960s, these organisations were designed to wage a full-fledged war by themselves, if needed (Swami 2007:101). While the ISI kept providing logistical and material support to them, operations on the ground were carried out by the Al-Fatah and the National Liberation Front. It was also a template of upcoming Pakistan's policy of using indigenous Kashmiri elements to carryout subversive activities and providing them support from outside whenever needed; and most importantly, as Pakistan did in the case of activities of the NLF and Maqbool Butt, maintaining the plausible deniability when the situation becomes too hot to handle.

Pakistan's support to the covert war in Jammu and Kashmir got reduced considerably after the war of 1971. A defeated and weakened Pakistan was simply in no position to antagonize India any more. The pro-Pakistan element within Jammu and Kashmir also started to reconcile with the changing reality of Pakistan's inability to support them. However, a small section of secessionists kept harbouring the idea of waging a war against Indian rule. The theatre of activities, though, shifted to London now.

In 1976, Maqbool Butt came back to Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan and started recruiting new members for NLF (Widmalm 2014:59). In an effort to raise money for his operation, Butt decided to rob a bank during which he was caught and arrested by Indian authorities once again. He was later sentenced to death. After the Ganga Hijacking, a group of young Kashmiris had set up the united Kashmir liberation front to defend Maqbool Butt in 1971. The British wing of the Plebiscite Front joined this group in 1973 followed by Amanullah Khan in 1976. Amanullah Khan, with the help of Plebiscite Front president, Abdul Khaliq Ansari founded a new organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1977 (Naqas 2016). Very quickly, it became the largest and most important group of Kashmiri secessionists in Britain. In 1982, the JKLF decided to set up its branches in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir also. Initially, the organisation used mainly political means like demonstrations, writing letters to world leaders, distributing pamphlets etc to draw attention. Although, since its inception, the JKLF believed in waging the armed struggle, it kept waiting for an opportune moment as people

in Jammu and Kashmir were not ready for it as yet, according to their assessment (Jamal 2009:103). It was about to change very soon.

After a brief interlude, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir started heating up once again after Zia ul Haq's arrival on the political scene in Pakistan. According to several sources, General Zia met Maulana Abdul Bari of Jamat-e-Islami (PoK) in early 1980s (Puri 2012:103; Small 2015). By now, Pakistan had entered into Afghan War and Zia wanted to divert some of the funds received from America to wage the 'ultimate battle' in Jammu and Kashmir. Zia proposed that the Jamat-e-Islami begin preparations for Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir and promised that Pakistan would provide all necessary help in this regard (Riedel 2011:26). Abdul Bari was asked to get in touch with the secessionists in Jammu and Kashmir to gauge public mood towards the idea of a Pakistan sponsored war in Jammu and Kashmir. The most elaborate and deadly plan to bring militancy in Jammu and Kashmir was set in motion in that meeting. It later came to be known as 'Kashmir plan' or 'Zia Plan'.⁵

Taking the first step, Maulana Bari visited Jammu and Kashmir in early 1980s. Though the visit was through legal channels, the meetings he held also included the leaders of underground organisations. His most significant meeting was with Maulana Saidudin Taribali, Amir of Jamat-e-Islami (Jammu and Kashmir) (Jamal 2009:111). However, having been letdown by Pakistan in 1947 and 1965, many secessionist leaders of Jammu and Kashmir were not willing to trust Pakistan. There was also a lack of consensus among various groups regarding the future course of action. Many of those groups were not supportive of Kashmir's merger with Pakistan as the defining slogan of Kashmiri secessionism was *Azadi* from both India and Pakistan. To iron out these differences, a series of meeting took place between the ISI and the Kashmiri separatists over the next few years. Most of these meetings were held in Saudi Arabia. Some of the important separatist leaders also visited Pakistan via Saudi Arabia clandestinely. Finally, after a meeting between Maulana Saidudin and General Zia, the deal was made between the Jamat-i-Islami (J&K) and Pakistan. As per the deal, the Pakistan army should provide the military training

⁵ Though Pakistan still denies existence of such a plan, a host of writers, academicians, journalists and military analysts have written about it. See Cheema (2015), Schofeild (2003), and Karim (1996) for further detail.

and financial support while the Jamat would send local Kashmiris to Pakistan for military training. The actual operational strategy was to be decided later through mutual consultations (Jamal 2009:110-115).

Pakistan did not put all her egg in one basket and also reached out to other groups active in Jammu and Kashmir including the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. The JKLF, after years of dormancy, had come into limelight once again in 1984. On February 6, 1984, Ravindra Mhatre, the assistant High Commissioner of India in Birmingham was abducted and killed by the members of Kashmir Liberation Army (KLA), a group formed by the disgruntled members of JKLF (*Reuters* 1984). The act was apparently an attempt to secure Maqbool Butt release from prison. Though the KLA could not achieve the release of Maqbool Butt, the incident exhibited the potential of JKLF militants. Notwithstanding the lack of the financial and other material resources, it was the only militant organisation in Jammu and Kashmir with an organisational structure and a high public profile. The ISI, which was exploring the ways to widen its network in Jammu and Kashmir, approached the JKLF leadership very soon. General Akhtar Abdul Rehman held several meetings with the group in the later part of 1984 in Islamabad (Jamal 2009:123). At this stage, Amanullah Khan was not involved in the negotiations and the JKLF was represented by Dr. Farooq Haider, Raja Muzaffar and Sardar Rashid Hasrat (Joshi1999:18). Initially, an understanding between the ISI and the JKLF could not be reached because of considerable tension between the two organisations – each having differing conceptions of armed struggle and goals in Jammu and Kashmir. For JKLF, the *Azadi* meant freedom from both India and Pakistan while for the ISI it was Jammu and Kashmir's merger with Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan saw the conflict in Kashmir in religious terms while the JKLF had a comparatively secular manifesto. The shadow of these differences kept hovering throughout the period of terrorist insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and ultimately proved to be decisive in determining the trajectory of militancy in early 1990s. However, despite the differences, both the organisations needed each other as well to achieve their goals. Finally, a deal was struck after a meeting between Amanullah Khan and a Brigadier of ISI in 1986. It was decided that the ISI's role would be to provide arms and training while the JKLF would decide the operational strategy on the ground. In accordance with the deal, the ISI started smuggling propaganda material in large quantities especially two booklets written by

Amanullah Khan – ‘*the Ideology of Sovereign Kashmir*’ and ‘*Why Sovereign Kashmir?*’ (Jamal 2009:126). It also began persuading Afghan war veterans to join the ‘struggle in Kashmir’.

The JKLF, on the other hand, started setting up its branches in various cities and recruiting Kashmiri youth. Young recruits were sent to training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Rawalpindi where they received training by Pakistan army officials and Afghan war veterans. Then they returned to Jammu and Kashmir to set up underground sleeper cells. Amanullah Khan also formed the Jammu Kashmir Student Liberation Front (JKSLF) in 1987 to recruit people from Pakistan and Pakistan controlled Kashmir. By 1988, the JKLF had successfully established more than 300 underground cells not only in various cities of Kashmir Valley but also in Jammu and Ladakh region (Jamal 2009:127; Kapur and Ganguly 2012:126). However, these sleeper cells were asked to lie low and wait for the opportune time and signal to start the militant action.

Pakistan’s involvement in Jammu and Kashmir during these years, in a way, led the foundation of its policy of using sub-conventional warfare in Jammu and Kashmir after 1989. Lessons learnt during this period were implemented in future quite effectively. For instance, while indigenous Kashmiri elements were used to carry out subversive activities, ISI kept providing them material support from outside whenever needed. Pakistan also worked on having as many militant organisations as possible in Jammu and Kashmir. This policy was designed to serve many purposes. It created confusion in Indian security agencies and enhanced Pakistan’s capacity to play one organisation against another to keep the levers of covert operations under ISI’s firm control. It was also ensured that no single organisation become so powerful that it could determine the trajectory of covert operations on its own. And most importantly, as Pakistan did in the case of activities of the NFL and Maqbool Butt, it always maintained the plausible deniability when the situation became too hot to handle.

By the end 1988, Pakistan had been successful in raising a well trained militia in Jammu Kashmir. As General Zia said ‘I want to flex my muscles now because we have already sent a lot of arms and ammunition in Kashmir’ (JKLF leader Dr. Farooq Haider quoted in Jamal 2009: 129). The stage was now set for a cataclysmic shift in the course of history of post independent Jammu and Kashmir.

Chapter 4

Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir: Emergence, Growth and Changing Dynamics

On July 31, 1988, two explosions took place in Srinagar: one outside the Central Post and Telegraph Office and other near the Amar Singh Club. Two more bombs, outside the Congress Party Headquarters and near the Radio Kashmir Building failed to explode (Kashmir Life 2013). The responsibility of these explosions was taken by a little known group, working alongside the JKLF, the *Al-Hamza* (Cheema 2015:405). Though the war to ‘liberate’ Kashmir was not declared yet, unofficially it had begun. Jammu and Kashmir witnessed an extraordinary degree of political violence between 1988 and 1989. Years of misrule, blatant manipulation of the electoral process and erosion of Kashmiri identity had provided the sponsors of Jihad an opportunity to launch their operations in which the growing political discontent was easily manipulated into acts of political violence. Marked by three different conceptions of Kashmiri identity – the Secular, the Islamic, and the Pan-Islamic, with different political goals and mobilization strategies – these acts were also mere a prelude to a long period of terrorism, arguably the most violent chapter in the history of Jammu and Kashmir.

The terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has a torturous trajectory traversing through several distinct phases. In this journey, especially between 1988 and 1999, five such phases could be identified – a period of political violence and underground militancy (1988-1989), the mass upsurge (1990-1991), Islamization of the terror campaign (1992-93), negation of the Kashmiri component (1994-1995) and association with the radical pan Islamism (1996-1999). Each phase had some dominant trends, but that could not be misconstrued to mean the *only* voice, nor were those mutually exclusive or necessarily sequential.

1. Phase I: Kashmir on the Edge: Political Violence and Underground Terrorism (1988-89)

In 1988, Kashmir saw an unprecedented increase in violence. Throughout the year, riots, strikes and demonstrations crippled the civic life in Jammu and Kashmir. Though occasional incidents of violence were not a new phenomenon in Jammu and Kashmir, this time a qualitative change in both the extent and scope of violence could easily be noticed. The incidents were deliberate and well orchestrated, the targets were carefully chosen and the objective was way beyond the usual limited goal of destabilising the state government

(Ganguly 1997:102). On slightest of provocations, thousands of people protesting on the streets became a regular occurrence in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Year started with a huge violent protest in Srinagar against the alleged Indian hand in the Ojhiri Ammunition Depot blast in Pakistan on 10 April, 1988 (Kamm 1988). The depot was used to store weapons for Afghan terrorists and was an important centre for 'Kashmir Cell' of the ISI. In June 1988, public demonstrations in Srinagar against a steep hike in electricity rates turned violent in which five people were killed and nearly one hundred injured. Despite an assurance by the state Government that almost 93 percent population will remain unaffected by the hike, demonstrations led by the Islamic Students League (ISL) continued.

In September 1988, a young Srinagar man, Aijaz Dar, was shot dead in an attempt to assassinate the Deputy Inspector General A.M. Watali. He was Kashmir's first militant to be killed (Dulat and Sinha 2015). Strikes and 'black days' were observed throughout the Valley on India's Independence Day, India's Republic Day and Sheikh Abdullah's death anniversary which was termed '*Yome-i-Nijat*' (day of deliverance)(Behera 2000:165). The frequency and ferocity of attacks on government officials and political workers kept growing with each passing day. On July 13, 1989, a bus carrying CRPF personnel was attacked by the JKLF terrorists, in which two constables and four civilians were killed. In August 1989, Mohammad Yusuf Halwai, a senior member of the National Conference allegedly responsible for rigging election in 1987, was shot dead in broad daylight. Next Month, on September 14, 1989, the vice president of the Jammu and Kashmir BJP, Tika Lal Taploo, was killed by terrorists. In the same month, on the occasion of first death anniversary of Aijaz Dar, JKLF carried out two attacks on Police in Nawakadal, killing ten policemen and in November 1989, Nil Kanth Ganjoo, the judge who had given the death sentence to Maqbool Butt was killed in Sopore. In the last few months of 1989, in a typical pre-insurrectionary pattern, a spate of targeted killings took place in the Kashmir Valley, directed especially against security personnel and suspected informers of the Indian intelligence agencies. The most gruesome was killing of Saifulla Lone, the SHO of the Maisuma police station in Srinagar on December 1, 1989. His body lay on the road for several hours and nobody, not even the security forces, could dare touch it (Maheshwari 1993). In a similar fashion, the Deputy Superintendent of Police O.N. Wattal was killed

along with the Assistant Sub-Inspector Mustafa Qadri, Ali Mohammad Moghlu, Krishan Gopal and Hamidullah Butt in the same month. Like Saifulla Lone, their bodies were also kept hanging on trees for hours (Maheshwari 1993). By the end of 1989, 124 people had lost their lives in more than 2500 incidents of violence. The conflict in Kashmir was about to enter a new phase (See Table 2).

**Table 2:
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence (1988-1989)**

Year	Incidents	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
1988	390	29	1	1	31
1989	2154	79	13	0	92
Total	2544	108	14	1	123

(Marwah 1995:109; South Asia Terrorism Portal)

1.1. Goals and Strategy:

At first glance, these acts of violence appeared to be sporadic. In fact, the initial response of State Government was also indifferent and inadequate. But very soon, the government was overwhelmed by the extent and enormity of the violence. A closer scrutiny of incidents reveals a well planned strategy by terrorists aimed at both the immediate and long term goals.

First, the violence was used to de-legitimize the institutions of state authority and make them meaningless. In a targeted move, the drive to remove symbols and name of Indian Government from various institutions like the State Bank of India, Air India and Indian Oil was initiated. It was followed by an order to observe Friday as a holiday instead of Sunday. People were instructed to withdraw their money from Central Government's Banks and deposit them in the Jammu and Kashmir Bank. Through imposing civil curfews, the Government's authority and its ability to maintain law and order was challenged successfully. The civil curfews and blackouts were so effective that even the state-owned Srinagar Corporation complied (Behera 2000:165).

Terrorists' second goal was to undermine the political process and stop all mainstream political activities in the state. Important leaders of all political parties were attacked, especially those who were from pro-integration political organizations. People already had a negative perception about most of the politicians as corrupt and self-aggrandizing. Physical attacks and government's inability to provide security made them

utterly hapless and irrelevant in Jammu and Kashmir's public space. As former Chief Minister G.M. Shah remarked, '*We are not relevant at all. No one talks to us. No one listens to us. You are all up against an idea, which is supported by the gun and believed by the people*' (quoted in Gupta 1990). Especially targeted by the terrorists were the workers and supporters of National Conference. In August 1989, terrorists issued an open ultimatum to its cadre to publicly disassociate from the party. The compliance was so high that the Kashmir daily *Aftab* carried a special column *Izhar-e-lataluqee* (declaration of disassociation) for this purpose (Behera 2000:166).

As part of their strategy, terrorists also called for a boycott of *Loksabha* election in 1989. Polling officers were threatened, polling stations were set on fire and a civil curfew was ordered on the polling day. As a result, many polling officers declined to discharge their duties and average voting percentage came down heavily. Even official records put the figures at only around five percent. In many polling booths, not even a single vote was casted. By discrediting the electoral process, the terrorists successfully captured the political space in Jammu and Kashmir (Behera 2000:166).

The terrorists third and perhaps the most important goal was to paralyze state's internal security apparatus. In an effort to neutralize them, the police, paramilitary forces and intelligence organizations were targeted systematically. To instil a sense of fear, the killings were carried out in the most barbaric and horrific manner. These attacks left deep impact on the security institutions of Jammu and Kashmir which proved to be fatal in the longer run. As Behera notes, 'Stigmatized as 'traitors', ostracized by society, and neglected by senior officers', (Behera 2000:165) the state police lost the will to fight completely. As the state government failed to respond to the challenge posed by the terrorists, the state police became increasingly passive and ineffective. In fact, some policemen, for their safety, established links with the terrorists. The J&K Police, once the proud force, was neutralized gradually (Marwah 1995:53).

To create an ecosystem of radicalism in the state, an Islamization campaign among the Muslims was also initiated in the Valley. As part of this strategy, a strict social code was imposed by the terrorists. Veil or *Hijab* was made compulsory for women, Indian movies were banned and liquor shops and bars were targeted.

As the Government dithered, the terrorists started carrying out more daring and brazen attacks to send a clear message to the people of Jammu and Kashmir that it was *them and not the Government* that was in control. By the end of 1989, the political legitimacy of the state government was eroded considerably, the morale of the state Police was at its lowest and intelligence apparatus had virtually collapsed. In these circumstances, the kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed proved to be the last nail in coffin.

1.2. The Kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed:

On December 8, 1989, JKLF members led by Yasin Malik, Ashfaq Majid Wani and Ghulam Hassan, kidnapped Dr. Rubaiya Saeed, the daughter of Union Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. The group demanded the release of five militants: separatist leader Abdul Hamid Sheikh, three Kashmiri terrorists Noor Mohammad Kalwal, Altaf Ahemed, Javed Ahemed Jargar and a Pakistan based terrorist Sher Khan (Pachauri 1989). This was not an ordinary criminal act but the most serious challenge to the might of Indian state in Jammu and Kashmir so far. The Abdullah government, aware of the disastrous consequences of a tame surrender, initially opposed releasing even one terrorist (Joshi 1999:54; Marwah 1995:54). However, after hectic negotiations, the Indian Government decided to release all the five terrorists. The 122 hours of Rubaiya Saeed captivity and subsequent events are considered as watershed moment in Jammu and Kashmir's history. The mishandling of the whole affair and government's meek surrender before the terrorists gave an adrenaline shot to the so far underground militancy which turned into a mass upsurge quickly. The Government of India had not only acceded to the demands of abductors, it had also failed to demonstrate a coherent strategy to deal with the crisis. The state Government, already under severe pressure, simply crumbled after this fiasco. The government's abject surrender was seen as the fall of mighty India and inevitability of Kashmir's 'freedom'. Crowd chanting slogans of azadi had swamped the streets of Srinagar. Such was the mood on the streets of Srinagar, writes Ved Marwah, that the minister's convoy going to airport to return to Delhi was also forced to donate to the '*Azadi fund*' being collected by the young men at various check points (Marwah 1995:54). A full blown insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir had set in.

2. Phase II: From Guerrilla warfare to Insurgency – Mass Upsurge in Jammu and Kashmir (1990-91)

The Year of 1990 in Jammu and Kashmir began with an unprecedented surge in terrorist activities. Three key Intelligence Bureau (IB) officials were killed by terrorists in the first fortnight of the year: R.N.P.Singh in Ananthnag on 3rd January, Kishan Gopal in Badgam on 9th January and M.L.Bhan in Srinagar on 15th January 1990. Another IB official T.K Razdan was also killed by the terrorists some days later (Joshi 1999:37-38). Such was the fear of terrorists that his body was not claimed even by his relatives. By the end of January 1990, the IB had lost much of her on-field capabilities. It took quite some time to restore the normal functioning of IB.

For the Pakistani officers and planners, the situation was like a dream come true. While the earlier attempts to instigate a popular rebellion has failed miserably, this time, a large number of Kashmiris, especially the youth was eager to participate in their plan and thousands of people were marching on streets every day raising slogans of *Azadi* (Marwah 1995:55). There were frequent clashes between the Police and demonstrators causing in death of dozens of protesters. At least 15 people were reportedly killed and hundreds injured in the first fortnight of January 1990 in such clashes (Marwah 2009:58-59). Frequent police-protesters clashes inflamed the situation further. The increase in terrorist violence combined with the massive street protests had created a serious situation for the state government. In these circumstances, the Indian government decided to replace Governor K.V. Krishna Rao with Jagmohan against the wishes of Farooq Abdullah who resigned from his post in protest on January 18, 1990 (Dulat and Sinha 2015).

Jagmohan decided to control the deteriorating situation by using an iron handed strategy and a phase of tough measures that included cordon-and-search operations, prolonged periods of curfews, road block checks, and detention of violent protestors etc started in Jammu and Kashmir. However, his tenure started on an inauspicious note. On 20 January 1990, a large number of protestors were killed in firing by the CRPF during public demonstrations at Lal Bazar, Safa kadal, Hawal and Gawakadal (Ganguly 1997:106; Jagmohan 1991:18; Marwah 2009:57). It was followed by more demonstrations and it soon turned into a vicious cycle. Violent demonstrations were held regularly, security forces

fired on crowds, which further aroused the anger against the Government bringing more and more people on streets.

Though Jagmohan was able to bring back some sort of 'normalcy' in the state, the incidents of terrorism kept increasing. While the earlier terror attacks were amateurish, now they became more professional. On 24 January 1990, four Indian Air Force officers were killed (Hazarika 1990). The Srinagar station director of Doordarshan, Lassa Kaul was killed on 3 February 1990 (Rajya Sabha 1990). In April, the manager of the Hindustan Machine Tools, H.L Khera and the Vice Chancellor of the Kashmir University, Mushirul Haq were kidnapped and killed by terrorists (Baweja 1990). A major event during this period was Kashmiri Pandit's exodus from the Kashmir Valley. Though the selective killings of Kashmiri Pandits had started in late 1989 with the killing of T.L Taploo on September 14, 1989, it reached at its peak during the first quarter of 1990. Angry slogans of establishing Islamic rule in Jammu and Kashmir chanted during street protest together with selective killings of Kashmiri Pandits created an atmosphere of fear in the pandit community (Behera 2000:173). The state government's collapse and inability to provide security also aggravated the situations which ultimately led to mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley (Behera 2000:173; Marwah 2009:60; Rai 2004:286). The Kashmiri Pandits exodus left a deep impact on Kashmiri society both in terms of transforming the Kashmiri identity and Islamization of terrorist insurgency in years to come.

Terrorists also used public protests and target killings to provoke security agencies to use force which in turn resulted in further violence. A major incident that symbolizes the use of terrorist incident to incite police action on protesting mob was assassination of Maulvi Farroq, the Mirwaiz of Kashmir. He was shot by terrorists in his home on May 21, 1990. During the funeral procession, mob turned violent and in the firing by the Paramilitary forces, 47 people were killed (Ganguly 1997: 108; Joshi 1999:73). The local media blamed the highhandedness of Jagmohan's rule for this tragedy and amidst the growing resentment against Jagmohan and he was replaced by the former Research & Analysis Wing chief, G.C. Saxena. Such incidents continued for most part of 1990 and 1991. Between January 1990 and December 1991, almost 8000 incidents of terrorist violence had been reported in the state in which more than 2500 people had lost their lives, twenty times more compared to the period between 1988 and 1989 (See Table 3).

Table 3:
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence (1990-1991)

Year	Incidents	Civilians	Security Forces Personnel	Terrorists	Total
1990	4158	461	155	550	1166
1991	3765	382	173	844	1399
Total	7923	843	328	1394	2565

(Government of India 2002)

2.1. Key Trends:

All these events which occurred in the second phase of the insurgent terrorism highlight some significant trends that define the nature and trajectory of violence in Jammu and Kashmir.

The first is the ready availability of the Kashmiri population to rise up in protest against the government. Although separatist organizations assisted by Pakistan had been trying to instigate a revolt against India for long, on many occasions, Kashmiris had rejected their efforts. This time even separatists were surprised to find so much popular support in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, when the ISI had decided to formally start the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir in 1988, the local leadership of JKLF, despite the encouraging response from Kashmiri youth, was reluctant. As per their assessment, the time was still not ripe and more trained people were required to launch any operation. They agreed to announce the beginning of their ‘armed struggle’ on 1 August 1989 only after considerable pressure from the ISI. ISI was also overwhelmed by the number of Kashmiri youth crossing the line of control to receive military training every month during 1990 and 1991. Arif Jamal notes that they had planned and arranged logistics to train only few dozen men every month, but the number eventually swelled up to many thousands per month (Jamal 2009:154). According to one report, he adds, 2200 people once entered Pakistan controlled Kashmir to receive military training on a single day (Mohammad Abdul Hamid Karimi quoted in Jamal 2009:285).

Second, under a well planned strategy aimed at eliminating intelligence gathering apparatus and political workers, the target selection was also based on precise information. While only 14 security forces personnel were killed between 1988 and 1989, the number rose to 328 between 1990 and 1991. As far as political workers are concerned, Joshi notes

that almost one third of the persons killed in 1990 were political activists belonging to various mainstream political formations. This was, in his opinion, part of a grand design to eliminate all traces of older political order in the state (Joshi 1999:72).

Third, a moral justification for terrorist violence also started taking shape in this period. As an 'apt response to years of injustice', terrorist violence was presented as if it was owned and sanctioned by the entire community. Kalashnikovs replaced black flags of early days of underground militancy and 'boys' became '*Mujahidins*' overnight. Joining militant organizations became a status symbol, terrorists killed by security forces were treated as 'martyrs' and their graveyards became 'places of pilgrimage' (Behera 2000: 172). Since the Kashmiri society did not have a cultural tradition sanctioning violence, the sources of justification for violence were sought in conquests and valour of Muslim warriors of medieval period. Though 'Jihad' was not openly declared yet, sanction of violence against injustice in Quranic verses were used to defend the terrorist violence. Terrorists were depicted as 'freedom fighters' and the security personnel as 'occupation forces'. With increasing use of Islam as a tool of mass mobilization, mosques became centre of political/subversive activities and slogans like *Hum kya chahte hain – Nizam-i-Mustafa* 'Azadi ka matlab kya, La Illahilillah' started gaining currency. The shift from *Kashmiriyat* to Islam as the moral compass widened the rift between Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits which ultimately resulted in the forced mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley (Behera 2000:172-173).

The period also saw a battle between pro-Kashmiriyat/pro independence and pro-Pakistan Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. So far, the insurgency was led primarily by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation front, an advocate of complete independence of Jammu and Kashmir, from both India and Pakistan. Although it had a clear Islamic flavour in its constitution, *Kashmiriyat* was an integral part of its ideology (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2001). JKLF insistence on independence had always been a source of tension between the ISI and the JKLF. With the terror campaign gaining strength in the Valley, ISI started supporting pro-Pakistan group at the expense of the JKLF which sparked a violent struggle between various terrorist groups. Many prominent separatist leaders like Maulvi Farooq and Dr. A. A. Guru were targeted by the pro-Pakistani groups. The struggle for

supremacy continued for next couple of years and stopped only with an almost complete marginalization of the JKLF by the end of 1993.

2.2. Organizations, Strategies and Support Base:

Though various militant groups such as Allah Tigers, Peoples League and Hizb-i-Islamia were active in Jammu and Kashmir during this phase, the initial spurt in terrorist activities were led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The JKLF was founded in the United Kingdom in 1977 by Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Bhat. In the 1980s, it also opened branches in different towns in Jammu and Kashmir and set up many training camps in PoK with Pakistan's help and encouraged young Kashmiris to cross over and receive training at these camps. It also announced the formation of provisional government of the independent state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1990 (Sharma and Behera 2014:46).

2.2.1. Political Goals and Ideology:

As per information available on the official website of the JKLF, its political goal was 'liberation of Jammu & Kashmir state from India and re-unification of territories of the original *Dogra* State of Jammu & Kashmir' for an independent and sovereign Jammu and Kashmir. It demanded Kashmiris' right of self-determination and implementation of United Nations resolutions to hold a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. Though the group claimed to be a political organisation, it advocated using *all means including violent struggle* to achieve its goals (JKLF official Website).

Politically, the JKLF envisioned the proposed independent Jammu & Kashmir state as a neutral country like the Switzerland, with friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was conceptualized as a federation made up of five units: Kashmir Valley, Jammu province, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan, with a parliamentary and democratic political system. The constitution would provide equal social, economic and political rights to religious and ethnic minorities. Despite its claim to be secular, the JKLF's manifesto of the early 1990s, writes Behera, had a distinct Islamic tone. It wanted to establish a system of *Islamic democracy* and an economy of *Islamic socialism* (Behera 2000:170).

The JKLF's stance on Kashmiris' right to self determination brought it in direct confrontation with Pakistan which claims that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir belongs to it. The status of Gilghit-Baltistan caused additional friction in their relationship. While Pakistan's considers the region as separate from the state of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan as final, the JKLF considers Gilghit-Baltistan as a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2001). Despite these differences, the ISI helped the JKLF in the initial stages of insurgency because pro-Pakistan organisations lacked their own network in Jammu and Kashmir till then. Once the insurgency got the momentum, the ISI gradually stopped supporting the JKLF and turned towards pro-Pakistan outfits like the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. By the end of 1991, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, with ISI's help, had acquired more capabilities as compared to the JKLF and soon overshadowed it.

2.2.2. Network, Funding and Support Base:

Although, the JKLF had its cells in various parts of the state, it carried out terrorist activities mainly in Srinagar and some other urban pockets in different parts of Kashmir Valley. Young Kashmiri men such as Ashfaq Majid Wani, Hamid Sheikh, Yasin Malik and Jawed Mir led the JKLF in the Valley (Staniland 172). JKLF had a well developed organisational structure. The central executive committee (CEC), headed by Amanullah Khan was the chief decision-making body of the organisation. It also had a standing committee, a policy and planning committee and various other sub committees to oversee military, political and diplomatic affairs. The organization was divided into three wings: Jammu & Kashmir wing, Azad Kashmir wing, and the overseas wing. A joint revolutionary council coordinated the activities of all zones (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: 1994). The head office of JKLF was located at Maisuma in Srinagar. It also had an extensive network in almost all the districts of Pakistan occupied Kashmir as well as in three districts of Gilgit-Baltistan – Gilgit, Skardu and Diamer. Many of the terrorist training camps run by the JKLF were situated in major Pakistani cities like Lahore and Bahawalpur. As the organisation was set up initially in the United Kingdom, it easily expanded its organization in many European countries like France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden. The core support base of JKLF consisted of middle class Muslims of the Valley, especially intellectuals, students and government employees. It also enjoyed considerable support

among Mirpuri Kashmiris in PoK and the Kashmiri Diaspora in Europe and elsewhere, who were keen supporters of independent Kashmir, a slogan championed by the JKLF. The strong presence in Kashmiri Diaspora helped JKLF in generating funds for its activities in Jammu and Kashmir through its overseas branches. As it was the first militant organisation to lead the terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan initially supported it both financially and logistically (Raman 2008). However, with the rise in popularity of JKLF, Pakistani establishment got alarmed and gradually reduced its support to JKLF. It also received funds from Saudi Arabia. Didar Singh, who used to fund the World Sikh Organisation, was also suspected to have funded the JKLF (Sharma and Behera 2014:49).

2.2. 3. Operational Strategy

The JKLF worked on a three-pronged strategy.

First, armed struggle was launched through various subversive and terrorist activities throughout the state. As mentioned earlier, the JKLF carried out various terrorist activities in the valley to weaken the state authority in Jammu and Kashmir. A favourite tactic was to attack security forces in crowded areas so that innocent civilians are killed in cross-firing. Mass demonstrations were also used as a shield to target security personnel which often resulted in retaliatory firings by security personnel, more civilian casualties and more mobs, all feeding a vicious circle (Behera 2002:171). JKLF was also, in a way, the nodal agency to send young men across the border to receive military training. Pakistan occupied Kashmir was used as the base camp to supply weapons, running training camps and providing sanctuary to terrorists.

Second, highly sophisticated parallel media machinery was used to draw attention and expand the support base. Almost every newspaper in the Valley was pressurized to publish 'press statements' and 'advertisements' released by the terrorists. Video cassettes of protest marches were widely circulated by the media wing of terrorist organizations along with the stories of 'atrocities' by the security forces (Joshi 1999:91).

Third, to seek international support and internationalize the issue, with the help of Pakistan, the JKLF raised Kashmir at various international fora like the United Nations, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, and Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) etc. The overseas branches of JKLF proved to be of immense help in this regard and

made presentations before various international organizations, wrote letters to world leaders and managed to influence a section of international media. Terrorists' strategy in this phase of militancy proved to be highly effective and paid rich dividends for them.

Groping in the dark, Government was virtually at sea in early stages of the terror campaign. With the intelligence apparatus virtually wiped out, various agencies working at cross purposes, intense pressure because of serious allegations of human rights violations by international agencies and utter confusion and chaos in administrative and political machinery, the government was at its weakest footing. For the Masters sitting in Pakistan, time had come to fan the flames further and take complete control of events.

2.3. The Pakistan Factor:

Though on the surface, escalation of violence appeared to be spontaneous, a deeper scrutiny indicated a well planned strategy behind it. Pakistan's role in this context needs examination. In this phase of terror campaign, Pakistan's strategy was carried out through supporting JKLF. Although the outfit's relations with Pakistan were not very smooth, Pakistan placed its bet on JKLF as it was the only terrorist organisation having organisational presence throughout Jammu and Kashmir. When JKLF chief Amanullah Khan was deported to Pakistan England in 1986, the ISI revived its links with the JKLF. Various sources report that the ISI had contacted three other members of JKLF, Hashim Qureshi, Raja Muzaffar and Sardar Rashid Hasrat of JKLF through Dr. Farooq haider, a key associate of Amanullah Khan.⁶ The ISI wanted them to motivate Kashmiri youth for arms training and subversive activities. The Pakistan Army promised take care of these young recruits , give military training and send them back to Jammu and Kashmir to fight Indian security forces. However, there were still some issues to be resolved. The JKLF leaders were not comfortable with just being an intermediary and agent fetching machine for Pakistan and wanted a bigger role in the plan. Then, there was also the issue of ideological incompatibility between Pakistan and JKLF's goal of 'independence' for J&K. To bring the JKLF on board, the ISI did some arm twisting and kept pressurising them. The

⁶ These meeting have been reported by many analysts. In fact, Hashim Qureshi, a key member of JKLF himself, wrote about these meetings in weekly *Chattan* published from Srinagar. These accounts were later translated in English by O.N. Dhar and were published in Statesman. For more details, see Jamal 2009:124; Joshi 1999:18.

JKLF also didn't have much option and soon accepted the proposal. Under its terms, the JKLF agreed to provide young recruits while the ISI supplied the training facilities, funds and operational support. The ISI also gave an assurance of not interfering in the internal/organisational matters of JKLF. The arrival of Amanullah Khan in Pakistan marked the resurgence of JKLF activities and the collaboration between the JKLF and the ISI got under way. By then Pakistan had done its preparatory work for the Zia Plan/Operation TUPAC by using religion to incite anti-India sentiments in the Kashmir Valley through organisations like *Ansar-ul-Islam* (also known as *Shubbabul Islam*) and the *Islami Jamiat-i-Tulba* (later converted into *Mahaj-i-Azadi* in 1991). In 1986, the first batch of Kashmiri terrorists, affiliated to *Shubbabul Islam* had crossed the Line of Control which were then sent to Afghanistan to get training for subversive activities (Jamal 2009:121).

In 1987, the ISI asked the leaders of JKLF to start subversive activities in an organised manner. The JKLF began recruiting young men inside Kashmir for ISI training camps. The ISI also assisted JKLF in this job. It published two booklets written by Amanullah Khan in Urdu – *The Ideology of Sovereign Kashmir* and *Why Sovereign Kashmir* which were distributed throughout Kashmir. Some of the terrorists from *Ansar-ul-Islam* and *Islami Jamiat-i-Tulba* that were already trained by the ISI were also asked to join and assist JKLF. But most importantly, building on the successful model employed with the Afghan Mujahideen, ISI built several training camps in Pakistan (Sirrs 2016:158). In many cases, these camps were run by ISI men in JKLF. For example, Sardar Rashid Hasrat was in charge of six camps: Four (Lal Haveli, Sadar Bazar, Sadar Area Camp and Tench Bhatta) in Rawalpindi and Two (at Agriculture College, Muzaffarabad). Similarly, two camps in Muzaffarabad were managed by Raja Muzaffar. Other JKLF leaders like Dr. Farooq Haider, Rauf Kashmiri and Yasin Chowdhary were also running such camps not only in Pakistan occupied Kashmir but in many other cities of Pakistan as well. According to some reports, JKLF and ISI together were operating 18-20 terrorist camps in 1987-88 which was gradually increased up to 63 according (Kumar1995:213-217). To maintain the plausible deniability, the PoK government was used as a cover and two organisations 'Liberation Cell 202' and 'Refugee Management Cell' were set as nodal agencies to coordinate the plan, writes Joshi (Joshi 1999:20).

During this period, the recruits and trained terrorists were strictly forbidden to carry out any overt terrorist activities and were asked to wait for the final call. Till then, they were assigned the task of spreading anti-India sentiments and recruitment of as many youth as possible. The official date of 'armed struggle' was decided to be 31 July 1988 as revealed by Amanullah Khan in an interview to *Newsline*, a monthly magazine published from Karachi. In the same interview, he corroborated statements given by Hashim Qureshi. 'We actually started political planning in 1986 and continued till the end of 1987.....and it began in July 1988', he told Zahid Hussain of *Newsline* (Joshi 1999:19; Noorani 1992).

By the spring of 1988, more than 10000 men had received terrorist training and the Pakistani Government had started to pressurize the JKLF leadership to begin the campaign. After some reluctance, the JKLF agreed to it and with four explosions on July 31, the planned campaign was kicked off. From then till 1990, the JKLF was running the show and all other terrorist organisations, even the Jamat-e-Islami, were assigned a secondary role. However, soon cracks began appearing in the JKLF-ISI alliance over the future trajectory of terror campaign in Jammu and Kashmir. On June 18, 1990, Amanullah Khan announced formation of a 'Provincial Independent Government of Jammu and Kashmir' which made worse (Santhanam et.al.2003:168).

By now, JKLF had served its purpose for Pakistan and become useless for the ISI. Pakistan had got a toehold in Jammu and Kashmir and the pro-Pakistan Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was ready to replace JKLF. Pakistan was also alarmed by the growing popularity and strength of JKLF and as noted by Robert G. Wirsing, in a meeting in February 1990, attended by the Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the Army chief, Mirza Aslam Beg and the President of Azad Kashmir, to keep the uprising in Kashmir Valley in Pakistan's control, a policy decision was taken to stop all aid to the JKLF completely (Wirsing1994:150). From then onwards, Pakistan began marginalising the JKLF systematically. The funding and other support was stopped completely and to weaken it further, a three way split in JKLF was engineered with the help of Dr. Farooq Haider and Hafiz Anwar Samavi in 1991(Santhanam et.al 2003:168). A divided and weakened JKLF tried to run the terror campaign on its own but soon ran out of steam and was gradually replaced by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.

3. Phase III: Turn Towards Islamization: the Rise of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (1992-93)

By late 1991, after taking roots in the urban areas, terrorism had started expanding to the rural areas of Jammu and Kashmir. The character of terrorism also began to change gradually with more deadly attacks carried out by new pro Pakistan groups who were better equipped and trained.

The year 1992 witnessed a sharp rise in the level of violence. The year began with an attack on the *Ekta Yatra*, planned by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Beginning at Kanyakumari in Tamil Nadu, the march was planned to cover the entire length of the country and to culminate with hoisting of National Flag at *Lal chowk* in Srinagar on Republic Day, 26 January 1992. On 24 January, terrorists carried out an attack on the office of the Director General of Police in Srinagar, injuring him and 4 other senior police officers (Awasthi, Baweja and Bamzai 2013; Joshi 1999:100). The violence level escalated further in the latter half of 1992 when the news came that the Indian Government was considering holding elections in the State. Terrorists particularly targeted the properties belonging to Pundit community to spread fear among them and deny places of shelter to security forces.

The effort to internationalise the Kashmir issue and put pressure on India were also intensified. The Pakistan based JKLF decided to hold a 'Kashmir Conference' in Muzaffarabad on 1-3 July 1992, which ultimately could not take place because Pakistani authorities did not grant visa to participants. The JKLF also planned operations to cross the Line of Control (LoC) at Chikoti on 11-12 February and again on 30 March, which were aborted by Pakistani authorities. Similar attempts were made by terrorist groups in PoK to violate the LoC on 24 October 1992. Though these attempts failed because of strict administrative measures, they drew considerable international attention on Kashmir (BBC 2010).

Amidst the deteriorating situation in Kashmir, internal division within the the Government began surfacing, especially between the Governor G.C. Saxena and the Minister of state for internal security, Rajesh Pilot. On March 11, 1993, G.C. Saxena was replaced by General Krishna Rao. Two advisors to the Governor were also appointed, Lieutenant General (Retired) M.A. Zaki and a senior bureaucrat Ashok Jaitely (Behera 2000:186). Within a couple of month, the new government set up faced another big crisis,

the Police Revolt. The problem had started with the death of a police man on April 21, 1993, allegedly in Police custody. The Army claimed that he was killed in a cross firing between terrorists and armed forces. On 27 April, almost 1500 police men laid siege to the Police control room demanding action against the Superintendent of Police and Army men. Fearing the escalation, the army was called which forced the striking policemen to surrender. Although, the crisis was resolved without a single shot being fired, the resentment not only continued, it brought the divisions within various security agencies out in the open, especially between the local police and the army. The incident highlighted the dark reality of terrorist groups infiltrating and getting help from a section of local Police. The local police was for long been suspected of being sympathetic towards the terrorists. But so far their support was tacit and they had remained under the administrative command chain. This incident broke that chain and dealt a serious blow to the government's authority in the Valley (Baweja 1993a; Hazarika 1993). It also triggered a burst of secessionist activity pushing administration on the defensive. The rift and lack of coordination between various security agencies surfaced once again a couple of months later during the siege of Hazratbal shrine in mid October 1993. The crisis had begun on October 15, 1993 when the local administration received information that a group of terrorists have entered the shrine. Fearing a repeat of the theft of holy relic in 1963, authorities came into action. Two companies of the Border security Force were called and a siege was laid by the security forces blocking all the entry and exit points. After lengthy negotiations, terrorists agreed to lay their arms. However they insisted to surrender before the Jammu and Kashmir Police instead of the Army. In the meantime, as the stalemate continued, street protests were staged throughout the valley. In one such demonstration in Bijbehara, a large number of protestors were killed in police firing on 22 October 1993 (Bose 2003:115; Joshi 1999:262).

The Hazratbal crisis had two almost contradictory impacts on the developments within Jammu and Kashmir. For the government, the crisis and its aftermath was a serious setback to the Government's four year old Counterterrorism policy. For one, as mentioned earlier also, it exposed the cracks within the security agencies control and command structure once again. It also raised the anti-India tempo in the Valley at a time when government was trying to give a humane face to its Kashmir policy. Despite the surrender,

terrorists' morale also got a significant boost as less than 40 terrorists were able to hold the government to ransom for 15 days and had succeeded in drawing the attention of international community (Baweja 1993b). As far as the separatists are concerned, the crisis marked the beginning of people's losing faith in the ability of terrorists to take on the Indian Government. As Behera points out that they felt angry and humiliated for having undergone severe hardships for nothing and blamed terrorists for this loss of face (Behera 2000:183).

In the meantime, in an attempt to stop infighting between various terrorist groups and to give a political face to militancy, the *All Parties Hurriyat Conference* (APHC) was formed in 1993. It was an extension of an earlier organisation the Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir (THK)⁷ which had failed to take off. Made up of nearly thirty organizations, the real decision making power in APHC rested with a seven members executive council constituted of *Jamat-e-Islami*, Awami Action Committee, People's League, *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, Muslim Conference, JKLF, and People's Conference (Jaleel 2015). By establishing the Hurriyat as the political face of terror campaign, Pakistan not only intended to project terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir as an 'indigenous rebellion' rather than a proxy war, but also address international community's concern of use of violence by the non state actors.

By the end of 1993, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir had wrecked havoc in the state. Especially the last two years between 1991 and 1993, had witnessed an unprecedented scale of violence in the state with an increasing use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), landmines and ambushes by the terrorists that resulted in a large number of casualties among both the security forces and the civilians. While in the period between 1990 and 1991, a total of 2565 people were killed, 3897 people lost their life between 1992 and 1993, an increase of more than fifty percent (See Table 4 on Page 105).

3.1. Key Trends:

In this phase, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir began to expand both numerically and geographically and made its first inroads into Jammu region. Although, earlier some

⁷ Headed by Mian Abdul Qayoom, the Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir was formed in 1991. Originally conceived as a political face and a coordinating platform for the militant groups, it soon disintegrated because of ideological differences between its constituents and personal ambitions of its leaders.

random incidents were reported in Doda districts, so far the region had remained unaffected from the violence. In a first terror attack in Jammu region on 13th August 1993 terrorists killed 16 bus passengers at *Sarthal* area of Kishtwar (Swami 2001).

**Table 4:
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence (1992-1993)**

Year	Incidents	Civilians	Security Forces Personnel	Terrorists	Total
1992	4817	634	189	819	1642
1993	5247	747	198	1310	2255
Total	10064	1381	387	2129	3897

(Government of India 2004: 12)

The way Hindus were segregated and killed on communal lines was unprecedented till then even in Kashmir valley (Puri, *year unknown*). In another incident, terrorists killed the district President of BJP Santosh Thakur in the same year. The attacks were carried out by the *Harkat-ul-Ansar*, an organization having close links with Pakistan (Puri, *year unknown*). These incidents had a very negative impact on the inter-religious harmony in the state and fuelled communal tensions especially in the Jammu region. This phase of terrorism also saw increasing attacks on the press media and media. In early years of terrorism, a large section of Kashmiri media was sympathetic to the ‘liberation movement’ and Kashmir’s right to self determination. In fact, many newspapers based in Srinagar used to publish press statements and advertisements of the terrorists willingly. With the proliferation of terrorist groups, the ideological division within the media also came to the fore and terrorist groups started attacking journalists and media houses aligned with their rival groups. In March 1991, the *Jamat-ul-Mujahideen* threatened those newspapers who advocated a moderate line. Next month in April, the editor of *Al Safa* Mohammed Shaban Vakil was killed in his office for criticising the hardliner terrorists (Gull 2010). In May 1991, a ban was imposed on publishing statements of National Conference leaders. In August 1993, house of the editor of Urdu daily *Aftab*, Sanaullah Butt, was set on fire when he declined to follow dictats of Jamait-Ul- Mujahideen. Ultimately the publication was closed down in September 1993. In the same month, the terrorist organizations also banned

Greater Kashmir, for publishing an ‘anti- movement’ report. Both the newspapers were able to resume only after they agreed to toe the terrorists’ line (Kanwal 2001).

Most of these attacks were a result of infighting between various terrorist groups. The Kashmir Valley witnessed an exponential growth in number of terrorist groups between 1991 and 1993. In 1993, 177 militant outfits were functioning in Jammu and Kashmir as per Indian Army’s estimates. Most of them were small splinter groups with a very small area of operation (Behera 2000:182; Wirising 1994:132). It was now quite easy, as noted Sumantra Bose, for anyone to gather few boys from neighbourhood and float a militant organisation (Bose 2003:125). Along with personal ambition and greed, the proliferation was result of a well thought out policy of Pakistan that served both the tactical and ideological purposes. Tactically it ensured, as Behera argues, that no single terrorist organization could claim the leadership of the movement to negotiate a deal with the Indian government. It also helped Pakistan in maintaining an effective control over the trajectory of militancy by counterbalancing different groups through pitting them against each other when necessary (Behera 2000:182). Another, and perhaps more important, reason behind this move was related to the ideological trajectory of the terror campaign. The first two phases of terror campaign in Kashmir were led by the pro independence groups like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. The JKLF not only advocated an independent Jammu and Kashmir, it also claimed the Gilgit-Baltistan as part of greater Jammu and Kashmir State. Both these claims caused much unease within the Pakistani establishment but they were compelled to support JKLF initially as no other organisation had an extensive network and support base except the JKLF. With terrorism gaining strength in the Valley, Pakistan decided to stop supporting pro independence groups as they had served their purpose and their continuation was detrimental to Pakistan’s long term objective i.e. merger of Kashmir within Pakistan. Consequently, a conscious decision was taken by Pakistan to support pro-Pakistan terrorists groups like the Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HuM) that favoured the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan (Jamal 2009:137; Wirsing 1994:122-23). The ideological polarization between pro-independence groups like the JKLF and the pro-Pakistan Hizb-ul-Mujahideen divided the terrorists’ ranks sharply and set in motion a bloody infighting. Supported by Pakistan, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen killed their rivals with impunity, especially the JKLF. According to Amanullah Khan, more JKLF terrorists were killed by Hizb-ul-

Mujahideen than the Indian military. It is believed that *Hizb-ul Mujahideen* eliminated some 7000 political rivals which included JKLF ideologue Dr. Abdul Ahad Guru, *Al Barq* chief commander Professor Abdul Ahad Wailoo and HN Wanchoo etc. (Jamal 2009:155). Another outfit that faced the wrath of Hizb onslaught was the Jammu and Kashmir Student Liberation Front (JKSLF). Its leader Mohammad Yusuf Parray later claimed that between 1991 and 1993, almost 70% of JKSLF cadre was eliminated by the Hiza-ul-Mujahideen (Jamal 2009:156). In a retaliatory action, the JKLF supporters gutted the Srinagar office of Jamat in 1992 and in 1993, kidnapped Jamat-e-Islami leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani forcing Hizb to stop their killing spree, at least temporarily (Joshi 1999:105). However stakes against the JKLF were very high. Caught between the Hizb onslaught and an Indian military offensive, it suffered heavily. As the supply of funds and arms stopped from Pakistan, the JKLF lost its pre eminence and by the end of 1993, was completely overshadowed by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.

The emergence of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen as the leading terrorist organization set off another important trend in terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. To strengthen themselves against other terrorist organizations, the Hizb began to induct foreign terrorists into its fold. The first set of foreign terrorists came primarily from the Hizb-e-Islami of Afghanistan, an organization with which the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen already had strong linkages. It suited both the Hizb and their patron Pakistan. For Hizb, induction of battle hardened terrorists gave them an upper hand against both their rival groups as well as Indian security forces. For Pakistan, it not only tightened their grip on the terror campaign in Jammu and Kashmir, it also helped in augmenting the capabilities of local Kashmiri terrorists who had not proved as formidable as was hoped (Joshi 1999:104). The increasing influence of foreign terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir was evident by the sudden hike in the number of foreign terrorists killed in encounters with Indian security forces. While only three foreign terrorists were killed in previous two phases (1988-1991), 116 terrorists belonging to different nationalities were killed between 1992 and 1993 (See Table 5 on Page 108).

3.2. Organizations, Strategies and Support Base:

As mentioned earlier, this phase of terrorism saw a mushrooming of terrorist organizations in Jammu and Kashmir. At one point, more than hundred terrorist

organizations were active in Jammu and Kashmir.⁸ These included *Muslim Janbaz Force*, *Jihad Force*, *Al-jihad*, *Al-Barq*, *Al-Umar* and *Allah Tigers* etc. But the most important of them was the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.

**Table 5:
Foreign Terrorists Killed in Jammu and Kashmir (1988-93)**

Year	Number of Foreign Terrorists Killed
1988	0
1989	0
1990	0
1991	3
1992	19
1993	97

(Swami 2003a:61)

The Hizbul Mujahideen's ascendance and subsequent radicalisation of the terrorist landscape were, in a way, the hallmark of the third phase of the terror campaign. At the behest of Pakistan's ISI to counter and marginalise the JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen was established by Master Ahsan Dar in September 1989 as the militant wing of the Jamat-e-Islami. In 1991, Syed Salahuddin was appointed as the patron of Hizb. By now, some other major groups, such as the *Tehreek-e-Jihad Islami* led by Abdul Majid Dar, and *Allah Tigers* had merged with the new outfit (Swami 2000). The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen soon became one of the largest and one of the most dangerous terrorist outfits operating in Jammu and Kashmir with an estimated strength of 13,000-20,000 men. However, very soon serious differences between two factions of Hizbul Mujahideen emerged which ultimately resulted in a split in the organization. One faction chose Syed Salahuddin as its leader while Hilal Ahmed Mir became the leader of another faction (South Asia Terrorism Portal).

Organisationally, for better geographical operations, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was divided into five divisions. Three divisions – The Central, Northern and Southern division's operational areas were spread in the Kashmir Valley while the Chenab and the Pir Panjal divisions

⁸ While there is no definite number of terrorist organizations active during this period, varying estimates were given by agencies and policy makers. For instance, Indian security agencies put this figure at 177 JKLF Chairman Amanullah Khan claimed that around 70 groups were present, while Jagmohan claimed 40 terrorist organisations were active during this period. See Behera 2000:182 & Appendix VI; and Wirising 1994:132 for more details.

were assigned the Doda, Udhampur Rajouri and Poonch districts of Jammu regions as their areas of operations. Each division was headed by a commander which together formed the *Majlis-i-Shoora*, the central command of the Hizbul Mujahideen which was led by the *Amir* (chief) and commander-in-chief. The organizational networks of the Hizbul Mujahideen spread down to the divisional and district levels in the Valley (Behera 2000:178). The Hizbul Mujahideen also had a media wing based at Rawalpindi which was used to run a news agency, *the Kashmir Press International* and a research centre, *the Kashmir Information Centre* based in Muzaffarabad. It had also set up a women's wing, the *Binat-ul-Islam* which main task was to convince their family members to join jihad and take care of families of killed terrorists (Jaleel 2003). Internationally, it was supported by Ghulam Nabi Fai's Kashmir American Council and Ayub Thakur's World Kashmir Freedom Movement (Mir 2009:185). The Hizb had also established close links with Afghan Mujahideen groups especially the Hizb-e-Islami, which provided arms and military training to its cadre (GlobalSecurity.org). Although the headquarter of Hizb was in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, it enjoyed good support within the secessionist section of Muslims in Kashmir Valley as well as border areas of Jammu region, especially Doda, Rajouri and Poonch districts (*Times of India* 2003).

Training to the Hizb cadres was given mainly in the PoK region. Some camps and offices were also located in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan. Some of the main training camps of the Hizb were: *Kotli* training camp (Kotli district); the *Gujar Khan* Training Centre (in Rawalpindi); *Mangla Dam* camp (PoK); *Kot Jamial* camp (Bhimber district); *Samani camp* and the *Al Markaz* camp (Mirpur district) (Sharma and Behera 2014:43; Puri 2012). The *kotli* and the *Gujar khan* camps were managed directly by the ISI. The funding to Hizb was also provided mainly by the ISI though over a period of time, the organisation had also developed its own autonomous sources especially in Saudi Arabia. Charity during religious festivals and extortion were other sources of funding (Sharma and Behera 2014:44; *Times of India* 2012).

3.2.1. Ideology and Political Goals

Ideologically, Hizbul Mujahideen was against the notion of an independent Kashmir based on Kashmiri nationalism. Instead it fought for the integration of the Kashmir with Pakistan. Hizb was also not comfortable with the idea of a syncretic Kashmir and saw the

conflict in Kashmir in purely religious terms where a Muslim valley was waging an Islamic battle against the oppressive Hindu state in an order to accede to Islamic Pakistan (Sikand 2010:125-134). Interestingly, analysts point out that the Hizb never considered Muslims living in other parts of India as a part of this *Muslim Millat* and asked them to join the *Jihad* in Jammu and Kashmir (Behera 2000:177).

The core cadre base of Hizbul was made up of members from Jamaat-i-Islami which had a strong network of Madrasas and mosques throughout the Valley. The Jamat was spreading a Sunni Islamic culture based on strict interpretation of Quran and Hadith since long and by the end of 1980s, it had proselytized enough number of young Kashmiris who were ready to join the ‘struggle for an Islamic Kashmir’(Sikand 2002:705-51). A highly emotive terminology of jihad along with symbols and metaphors from early Islamic conquests were used to justify political violence and project the ongoing struggle in purely Islamic terms. Some popular slogans used by the Hizb during this phase were ‘*na guerrilla jang: na quami jang: al jihad, al jihad*’ (Behera 2000:179) and ‘Allah will be our guide, Quran is our constitution, jihad is our strategy and martyrdom is our aspiration’ (Jagmohan 1991: 396).

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen considered Kashmiri Pandits as an obstacle in their goal of Islamization of Kashmir valley and subsequently its merger with Pakistan. Although the *Pandit* exodus had started before the emergence of Hizb, it warned the Pandits against returning to the Valley unless they prove themselves to be a part and parcel of Kashmiri Struggle. Later, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen also attempted to stoke communal passion in other parts of Jammu and Kashmir by selectively targeting members of minority communities.

3.2.2. Operational Strategy:

Hizbul Mujahideen’s overall strategy had three important goals:

- i) To raise military and economic costs for India in Jammu and Kashmir;
- ii) To expand its area of influence especially in the Jammu region, and;
- iii) To establish Hizb as the most important and effective terrorist organisation in Jammu and Kashmir (Behera 2000:178).

As has been mentioned earlier, because of an increasing use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), landmines, booby traps and ambushes by better trained terrorists, the number of casualties among both the security forces and civilians increased rapidly during

this phase. Most of these attacks were highly effective that put enormous pressure on the security forces. In fact, according to some accounts, the Hizb was temporarily able to dominate even India Army in some areas of Anantnag, Baramula and old Srinagar city and had established liberated zones (Behera 2000: 178). The more focussed agenda of terrorists' military strategy can be gauged from the fact that the number of 'other acts of violence' i.e. acts of less significance, declined sharply in this phase. While a total of 1858 cases were reported in his category in the first three years of terrorism (1988-90), it came down to just 117 cases between 1992 and 1993. In the same period all other acts of violence like kidnapping, arson and robbery increased considerably (See Table 6).

**Table 6:
Pattern of Terrorist Violence (1988-93)**

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Incidents of Arson	118	334	646	391	564	662
Incidents of Kidnapping	0	2	57	100	124	176
Robbery and Extortion	0	0	23	11	39	50
Other acts of Violence	241	1190	427	0	5	112

(Swami 2003a)

As a part of their strategy to spread terrorism into other regions of Jammu and Kashmir, the Hizb initially penetrated the rural areas of Kashmir valley and later they moved to the Doda district of Jammu. Doda's mountainous terrain was ideal to wage a guerrilla war where a small number of terrorists could tie down disproportionately large numbers of security forces. Using favourable conditions to the maximum, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, gradually expanded its area of operation to Poonch, Rajouri and parts of Udhampur district by the end of 1992. The Police officials of Doda admitted in September 1992 that Doda has emerged as an important zone of activity for terrorists with almost 1,000 members of different militant organizations (Vinayak 1992). By 1993, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen had consolidated its presence in the area and was ready to penetrate even into the adjoining areas of Chamba District in Himachal Pradesh. Hizbul Mujahideen's operations in Doda also helped them in achieving another goal i.e. to create a communal polarization between the Hindu and Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir so that their concept of an Islamic *Jihad* could

be realised. In 1992, Hizb terrorists carried out many blasts in Hindu majority areas of Bhadarwah, Kishtwar and Doda, and stolen an idol from the *Sarthala Devi* temple in Kishtwar in an attempt to stoke communal tension and widen the chasm between Hindus and Muslims (Vinayak 1992).

To establish themselves as the leading organisation in Jammu and Kashmir, Hizb members, as has been mentioned earlier, attacked and killed the members of their rival groups and leaked information about them to the Indian Army. Though their main target was the JKLF, rivals from other outfits were also not spared. People like the *Mirwaiz* Maulvi Farooq were killed despite advocating Islamization of Jammu and Kashmir since he challenged Hizb methods and his interpretation of Islam was different from Jamaat-i-Islami's interpretation of a holy war in Jammu and Kashmir (Behera 2000:181). In this battle of supremacy, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen also suffered heavy losses, but ultimately was able to establish itself as the spearhead of terrorism between 1992 and 1993.

By the end of 1993, the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir had reached at a critical juncture. Though it had expanded both in terms of intensity and outreach, some disillusionment had also started setting in. The Kashmiri component of the campaign had been diluted significantly and though the Kashmiri Muslims had supported the Hizbul Mujahideen against the Indian Government, its diktats to follow Islamic practices literally had also alienated a large section of populace. In another development, while the government's counter-insurgency tactics had become more effective, terrorists, instead of fighting the Indian Government, had begun turning the guns on each other.

But the most negative development during this phase was the criminalisation of terrorist groups. The first generation of terrorists who were driven more by an idealistic 'cause' had been either killed or arrested. The middle class which used to be the core support base of militancy in its early years had drifted away largely and the new recruits were driven more by either the lust for power or were simply mercenaries. All these developments had resulted in an increasing number of cases of extortion, kidnapping, contract killings and most seriously, incidents of rapes and sexual harassment by the terrorists. The enthusiasm for *azadi* had weakened and the terrorists, unlike the early years, were now feared instead of being liked.

3.3. The Pakistan Factor:

In this phase of the terror campaign, after withdrawing the support from JKLF, the ISI decided to replace it with a new organisation that would not only lead the terror campaign but will also pursue Pakistan's interest unflinchingly. At that time, though many smaller organisations were working on the ground, the largest and the best organised group was the *Ansar-ul-Islam* which was active in valley since the mid 1980s. *Ansar-ul-Islam* had close ties with the *Jamat-i-Islami* and was also opposed to the idea of an independent Kashmir. The ISI, to push the '*Ansar-ul-Islam – Jamat-i-Islami*' combine at the front of proxy war and to chart the future course of action, called a *majlis-i-shoora* at Hadiderpura in Budgam district in June 1989 in which it was decided to pull the 'movement' out of the JKLF's hand (Jamal 2009:139). The *Ansar-ul-Islam* was renamed as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Hilal Ahmed Mir was appointed as its leader. However, around the same time another organisation was also floated with the same name by Masood Sarfaraz, a member of *Jamat-i-Islami* (PoK). For some time, both the organisation kept working separately but ISI finally managed to secure a merger and in October 1989, a unified Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was formed. The opposition within the *Jamat-i-Islami* regarding its relationship with Pakistan was also resolved after some arm twisting by the ISI. In June 1990, the district Amir of *Jamat*, Syed Salahuddin was appointed as the chief of Hizb and *Jamat* was virtually given the responsibility to manage Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Jamal 2009:140-41).

From here onwards, the Hizb-ul Mujahideen became the largest recipient of Pakistan's support, both moral and material. Proof of this shift and Pakistan's continued intervention in Jammu and Kashmir could be found in the reports published in Pakistani media itself. Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan's well known journalist and diplomat writing for the *Newsline* in May 1990, noted that the movement in Jammu and Kashmir is witnessing a process of fundamentalisation and that a new generation of terrorists using Islamic symbols have gradually replaced the secular symbols of struggle led by JKLF who used to be at the forefront of movement (Quoted in Noorani 1992). This new fundamentalist organisation was none other than the Hizbul Mujahideen. Though Pakistan as usual claimed that its support to Hizbul Mujahideen is limited to just moral, there are enough convincing facts to establish Pakistan complicity in the terror campaign in this phase. Hizb required intensive funding in its formative years and most of that monetary support came from Pakistan's ISI

(Roul 2014). *The Muslim*, on November 20, 1990 reported that the Azad Kashmir President has obtained a fatwa from religious leaders that the Zakat fund, could be used to wage jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. Earlier the deputy chief of Jamaar-e-Islami, Khurshid Ahmad had appealed for raising money and creating a fund for jihad in Jammu and Kashmir (Noorani 1992). This money was sent to Hizb through various charity organizations and NGOs like Jammu and Kashmir Affectees Relief Trust (JKART) and the Falah-e-Alam Trust. Established in the early 1990s, to ostensibly provide relief to Kashmiri families affected by the conflict, JKART was instead used for channelling money through hawala and human couriers to their conduits in Jammu and Kashmir to fund terror activities in the state (*Daily Excelsior* 2012; Roul 2014). In early 1991, Indian authorities managed to arrest two curriers for the Hizb. Letters and other documents seized from them provided enormous information about the funding being done to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Three letters recovered from them were written by Syed Salahuddin to Master Ahsan Dar and the fourth one was written by Ali Muhammad Mir, a Hizb commander to Ali Muhammad Dar, another Hizb Commander. All these letters had explicit details about money given by the ISI for subversive activities in Jammu and Kashmir (Joshi 1999:81-84).

Apart from financial support, the ISI also provided extensive training and logistic support to the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. In early 1991, the ISI facilitated a visit of Hizbul Mujahideen delegation to Afghanistan to arrange training facilities for its members. A deal was reportedly brokered between the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Gulbuddin Hikamatyar and thousands of Hizb terrorists were trained in Hizb-e-Islami training camps either in Afghanistan or the NWFP in Pakistan. Several other training camps were established in PoK and other cities of Pakistan as well which were managed and funded by the ISI and prominent Pakistani politicians like Shiekh Rasheed Ahmed of the PML (N); these included – Kot Jamial Camp (PoK's Bhimber district), Bhimber Camp (Bhimber), Samani Camp (Mirpur, PoK), the Kotli Camp (PoK), and Al Markaz Camp (Mirpur). In addition to its training and base camps, Hizb was also allowed to establish a media office on Rawalpindi's Murree Road (Puri 2012).

Many international newspapers also confirmed Pakistan's active involvement in training Hizb terrorists. For instance, Steve Coll writing for the International Herald Tribune on December 10, 1990, reported that terrorists fighting in Jammu and Kashmir are

not only receiving advice from Pakistan's ISI, but also a substantial aid in terms of arms, training and funds which has increased significantly over the years. Comparing it with the Pakistan's support to Khalistani terrorists in Punjab, he claimed that the support to terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir is considerably high (Federation of American Scientists [FAS] 1993). Various details of Hizb terrorists getting trained by Pakistan were also given by the Hizb leaders themselves. Talking to a Pakistani journalist Yusuf Jammel, Ahsan Dar of the Hizbul Mujahideen admitted that 'the Hizb was an armed wing of the Jamat-e-Islami' and claimed that he had 11,000 trained guerrillas ready to launch, a major offensive against the security forces from August 14, Pakistan's independence day'(FAS 1993). However, despite the enormous support from Pakistan, the Hizab-ul-Mujahideen led terror campaign was not yielding desired results for its masters and very soon a new strategy through a more fundamentalist terrorist organisation was put in place by Pakistan.

4. Phase IV: Negation of Kashmiri Component (1994-1995): Ascendance of Harkat-ul-Ansar

The Hazratbal siege in April 1993 is considered to be the beginning of a new phase of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Meek surrender by the terrorists in Hazratbal was perceived by Pakistan as a sign of fatigue setting in among the local Kashmiri terrorists, and in order to provide a boost to the terror campaign, it decided to push more battle hardened foreign mercenaries in Jammu and Kashmir. Some political analysts argue that the decision was also influenced by the need to divert Afghan terrorists from creating trouble within Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal (Behera 2000:183).

The results of Pakistan's move were soon visible on the ground with terrorist attacks getting more audacious and brazen. On January 16, 1994, the BSF was forced to ask for Army's help in an encounter lasting over 30 hours. In another incident, Major Bhupinder Singh of the Border Road Organisation was abducted and killed on January 20, 1994 (Sahni 1999). But the most daring attack carried out by terrorists was a blast on March 20, 1994, in Badami Bag cantonment in which Lt. General E.W. Frenandes was killed with 12 other army officers. Till date, he was the senior most Army officer to die in a terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir (Joshi 1999:284). In the same month, terrorists killed the former Speaker of J&K Legislative Assembly, Wali Mohammed Itoo in Jammu. Just months later, on 16 June 1994, seven people were killed in a bomb blast in Jammu city. In a similar

attack, 9 persons were killed in Jammu on 22 November, 1994. The year 1995 started on an equally inauspicious note. On 26th January 1995 three bombs went off in M.A. Stadium, Jammu when Governor K.V. Krishna Rao was delivering the Republic Day speech. Though he escaped unhurt, eight persons were killed (Vinayak 1995c). The audacity and success of terrorists targeting such a heavily guarded area on the occasion of Republic day shook the security establishment (Puri *Year unknown*: 35). On 20th July 1995, in another blast in Jammu's Purani Mandi area, 19 people were killed.

By this time, the situation on the line of control had become quite volatile with massive increase in terrorist infiltrations from Pakistan. It forced Indian Government to adopt a tougher approach towards Pakistan's interference in Jammu and Kashmir. In a manifestation of the Government's intent, on February 22, 1994, the Indian parliament passed a unanimous resolution on Jammu and Kashmir.⁹ Pakistan responded to it by beating war drums. The dreading escalatory scenario alarmed the international community

⁹ The full text of the resolution was as follows:

“This House note with deep concern Pakistan's role in imparting training to the terrorists in camps located in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, the supply of weapons and funds, assistance in infiltration of trained militants, including foreign mercenaries into Jammu and Kashmir with the avowed purpose of creating disorder, disharmony and subversion:

- reiterates that the militants trained in Pakistan are indulging in murder, loot and other heinous crimes against the people, taking them hostage and creating an atmosphere of terror;
- Condemns strongly the continued support and encouragement Pakistan is extending to subversive and terrorist activities in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir;
- Calls upon Pakistan to stop forthwith its support to terrorism, which is in violation of the Simla Agreement and the internationally accepted norms of inter-State conduct and is the root cause of tension between the two countries reiterates that the Indian political and democratic structures and the Constitution provide for firm guarantees for the promotion and protection of human rights of all its citizens;
- Regard Pakistan's anti-India campaign of calumny and falsehood as unacceptable and deplorable.
- notes with deep concern the highly provocative statements emanating from Pakistan urges Pakistan to refrain from making statements which vitiate the atmosphere and incite public opinion;
- expresses regret and concern at the pitiable conditions and violations of human rights and denial of democratic freedoms of the people in those areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which are under the illegal occupation of Pakistan;

On behalf of the People of India, Firmly declares that-

- (a) The State of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means;
- (b) India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity;

and demands that –

- (c) Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression; and resolves that –
- (d) All attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of India will be met resolutely.

greatly and a number of foreign delegations visited Jammu and Kashmir in an effort to bring some sort of ‘normalcy’ between India and Pakistan. The Government of India also facilitated these visits in a bid to counter the allegations of human rights violation by the security forces. In January 1994, envoys of Greece, Belgium, Germany and European community in New Delhi visited Jammu and Kashmir which was followed by the visit of Ambassadors of ten countries in March 1994 and Ambassadors of another group of eleven countries in April 1994. These visits continued throughout 1994 and 1995. Earlier, in an attempt to normalise bilateral relationships, the 7th round of secretary level talks between India and Pakistan were also held on 1-3 January 1994 (*Daily Excelsior* 2014).

By now, there was a growing realisation in India that along with the military response; effective political steps are also required to address the causes that are feeding the insurgency. The Indian Government, in an attempt to tackle terrorism through political means, opened channels of communication with the moderates among separatists. As part of its ‘healing touch’ policy, two important militant leaders were released from jail in 1994 – JKLF’s Yasin Malik and Peoples League leader Shabir Shah (Baweja 1994d). Next year, another important leader of JKLF, Javed Mir was also released from prison. All these leaders, especially Yasin Malik, expressed a willingness to hold talks with the Government, but threats from terrorists impeded any meaningful progress on the ground. Exploring the political opportunities further, the government started to float the possibility of holding an election in Jammu and Kashmir. In a significant development, the Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao, on November 4, 1995, declared that the government is open to the idea of granting greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 and in this regard only ‘*the sky is the limit*’¹⁰ – meaning that short of independence, anything and everything could be negotiated (Ahmad 2000).

However, by now, the terror campaign in Jammu and Kashmir was completely controlled by the foreign mercenaries and these measures had little impact on violence

¹⁰ Prime Minister Narsimha Rao had made this statement in a televised speech from Burkina Faso in which a framework of Government’s Kashmir Policy was outlined For further details see: ‘The Die Is Cast’ Zafar Meraj, Padmanand Jha, Outlook, 15 November,1995, <http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-die-is-cast/200203> & ‘A Chronicle of important events and dates in J&K's political History’ http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/basicfacts/politics/political_history.html

which continued as usual. On July 4, 1995, six western tourists were kidnapped from Pahalgam in Anantnag district by a previously unknown terrorist group the *Al-Faran* (Vinayak 1995d). The kidnapers demanded the release of Pakistani terrorist Maulana Masood Azhar and 20 other terrorists. Terrorists also targeted the famous *Amarnath Yatra* with two blasts in Jammu in July 1995 in which 17 people were killed, including one *Amarnath Yatra* pilgrim and more than 60 people were injured. Responsibility for both the attacks was claimed by the *Harkat-ul-Ansar* (dominated by foreign terrorists), which issued a statement that ‘the blast is a warning to the people and officials against associating themselves with the *yatra*’ (Vinayak 1995a). Demanding the removal of the security forces' cordon from Hazratbal shrine, the same outfit had imposed ban on the *Amarnath Yatra* in 1994 also in order to garner support within the hardliner Muslims in Kashmir Valley (Baweja 1994a).

However the more dramatic act of terror was carried out by terrorists earlier in May 1995 when one of the holiest shrines in Jammu and Kashmir, the *Charar-e-Sharif* was burnt down by a group of Afghan terrorists led by the self styled Major *Mast Gul*. The crisis was brewing for quite some time. In fact, the security agencies had received reports as early as February 1995 that Mast Gul, along with more than sixty terrorists has taken shelter in the shrine. The security forces moved quickly and cordoned off the town. Terrorists also fortified the shrine and the standoff continued for the next months. Fearing that the terrorists may blow up the shrine, a safe passage was offered to them by the Government which terrorists refused. After a prolonged stalemate, in an attempt to escape, terrorists first set fire to a number of houses adjoining the shrine which ultimately consumed the shrine. The burning of *Charar Sharif* sparked off protests throughout the Kashmir Valley. Though Abu Jindal, the leader of *Harkat-ul-Ansar* was captured and many other terrorists were killed in the army operation, Must Gul managed to escape and surfaced in Pakistan in July end (Ganguly 1997:124-27; Joshi 1999:352-68).

The entire episode was a big setback for the Government. Not only it exposed the lack of coordination between various security agencies and a clear cut policy to deal with such crises, Government's plan to hold an election also received a major setback (Baweja 1995; Vinayak 1995b). However, some analysts also regard it as a turning point in Kashmiri resistance against the effort to Islamize the Kashmiri society as many Kashmiris

and especially the people living in the vicinity of Charar-i-Sharif, were incensed at the total disrespect and contempt of Mast Gul and foreign mercenaries for the Kashmiri shrine (Behera 2000:188-90).

Statistically seen, the period between 1994 and 1995 was a continuation of the earlier trend of terrorist violence. While the number of terrorist incidents increased by from 10064 to 11797 in this phase, an increase of 17%,; 5216 people lost their life in terror related incidents , an increase of almost 33% compared to the previous phase (1992-93) (See Table 7).

**Table 7:
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence (1994-1995)**

Year	Incidents	Civilians	Security Forces Personnel	Terrorists	Total
1994	5829	820	200	1596	2616
1995	5938	1031	237	1332	2600
Total	11797	1851	437	2928	5216

(Government of India 2004: 12)

4.1. Key Trends:

This phase saw a continuation of many trends from previous years, albeit on a more heightened pace. For instance, the induction of foreign terrorist not only continued in this phase, both its number and outreach increased significantly. While in the previous phase, a total of 116 terrorists were killed in encounters with security forces, the number got more than doubled between 1994 and 1995 (See Table 8).

**Table 8:
Foreign Terrorists Killed in Jammu and Kashmir (1994-95)**

Year	Number of Foreign Terrorists Killed
1994	125
1995	119
Total	244

(Swami 2003a: 60)

Most of these terrorists were linked to three outfits in Pakistan: the *Jamaat-e-Islami*, the *Jamiat-ul-Ulemma-Islam* (Fazlur Rehman) and the *Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-hadis*.

The induction of foreign mercenaries into Kashmir radically changed the character of the terror campaign. Although, religion had always been an integral component in terrorists' strategy in Jammu and Kashmir, it was the Kashmiri identity that was used a unifying factor in the early years of terrorist campaign. Now, negating the Kashmiri component completely, the foreign terrorists attempted to frame the 'struggle' in Jammu and Kashmir as a component of a worldwide jihad aimed at establishing a grand Islamic Caliphate of medieval times that transcends the boundaries of modern nation states (Punjabi 1993: 2-42). It was defined as the first step towards converting the universe into *dar-ul-Islam* (land of Islam). Organisations like the *Harkat-ul-Ansar* believed in one supreme leader and justified armed interference in another country because Islam was under threat, according to them. Such fundamentalist organizations completely discarded the traditional Kashmiri values based on Sufi Islam, because for them, it was not only irrelevant but also against the core Islamic teachings. The *Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen* declared that the nationalist movement in Jammu and Kashmir is not only distorting the true struggle i.e. establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, but it is also an evil, since in Islam, only the Allah and his Prophet's law is supreme and everything including people's opinion is subservient to the will of Allah. (Behera 2007:158).

Noted analyst Riyaz Punjabi writes that the Harkat's pan-Islamic agenda was least concerned about the Kashmiris' demand of right of self-determination because Islam does not recognize territorial nationalism. The only real ideology was the ideology of the Islamic Caliphate transcending race, gender and territorial boundaries. The *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islam* reiterated that, *Islam and independence were two contradictory slogans* and declared 'establishment of Caliphate' as the ultimate goal of Kashmiris' struggle (Punjabi 1993:21).

Although the Hizbul Mujahideen and the Jamat-i-Islami had welcomed foreign terrorists, the abovementioned contradiction between the fundamentalist Islamic worldview of foreign terrorists and local Kashmiri Islam ultimately resulted in people's resentment against the foreign mercenaries which could be marked as a critical feature of this phase. Kashmiri people resisted the efforts to impose an Islamic ideology and defied the terrorists' dictates against traditional Kashmiri practices and festivals on several occasions. In one such incidence, defying Jamat prohibition, thousands of people gathered to celebrate the festival of lights at the Zain Shah Sahib near Gulmarg. In subsequent clashes many

civilians were killed by Hizb terrorists (Behera 2000:191). People also declined to follow terrorists' order of not celebrating the annual *Urs* (anniversary) of *Batmoal Rishi* in Batmaloo; while a similar dictate in 1995 resulted in a clash in *Aish Mugam* in South Kashmir when terrorists in an attempt to prevent the local villagers from celebrating the *Urs* of Baba Zainuddin Rishi fired at the annual *Urs* and killed two people. This created a lot of resentment against terrorists since paying homage to Sufi saints (both Hindu and Muslim), was traditionally considered sacred in Jammu and Kashmir and locals did not agree with the Hizb's radical interpretation of Islam¹¹ (Bhat 2014). Similarly, the killing of Qazi Nissar in July 1994, for his pro-independence stance invoked angry reactions from local Kashmiris. His funeral and demonstrations afterwards drew huge crowd where anti Pakistan slogans like '*Jo mangega Pakistan, Usko milega kabristan*' were raised (Behera 2000:191).

The people's resistance to fundamentalist organisations also induced local Kashmiri separatists to attempt to regain the control and wrest the initiative from pro-Pakistan elements and foreign mercenaries. Espousing a relatively secular stand, the Mirwaiz Umar Farooq described the movement as 'not an Islamic movement but a movement of Kashmiri people' (Behera 2000:191). Yasin Malik also refused to accept the fundamentalist interpretation of Kashmiri "struggle" and renounced the armed struggle in favour of a non-violent democratic movement (Malik 2016). The JKLF also announced a general strike against Harkat's ban on the *Amarnath Yatra* pilgrimage and started an indefinite fast against the Harkat-ul-Ansar's attempt to hijack the Hazratbal shrine. Malik even persuaded the Hurriyat to issue an appeal against the ban on Amarnath yatra. Yasin Malik along with Shabir Shah also tried building bridges between Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits. Stressing that *Kashmiris are incomplete without Kashmiri Pandits*, they visited refugee camps and appealed to the Pandits to return (Behera 2000:192).

These attempts, however, failed to yield desired results. The political face of terrorist organisations, the *Hurriyat Conference* which was virtually controlled by the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, thwarted all attempts to de-radicalize the campaign.

¹¹ Many analysts have written about the Islamists' dictates and people's resistance during this period. Such was the fear of radical terrorists that Hamza Dass, the famous Kashmiri singer was forced to stop singing because music was declared 'haram' by Islamic radicals. For more details, see 'Memories of Kashmir: Past, Present and Hope' (M Ashraf Bhat 2014).

The tussle between the local Kashmiri terrorist organisations and foreign mercenaries often resulted in violent clashes. The rivalry, as pointed out by many journalists, existed not just between the pro-Pakistan and pro-independence groups but among the pro-Pakistan groups also. According to official estimates, at least 200 terrorists were killed in internecine inter-group conflicts in 1994 alone. 29 terrorists were killed in battles between the *Muslim Mujahedin* and the *Hizbul Mujahedin* while as many as 55 terrorists were killed in clashes between the Hizb and the JKLF (Baweja 1994b).

The infighting and ruthlessness of foreign terrorists had another significant impact on the terrorist landscape in Jammu and Kashmir. A large number of terrorists, marginalised by the support given by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence to the Islamist groups, aligned themselves with the Indian security forces. The process was started in early 1994, when Jamshed Sheerazi alias Kukka Parrey, the leader of the *Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen*, started working with the security agencies. Later, Sajjad Ahmed Keno and Hilal Ahmed Beg also joined him. Almost simultaneously, the Jammu and Kashmir Police's Special Operations Group (SOG) initiated another effort of similar nature with the help of former National Conference MLC, Javed Ahmad Shah which was joined by many surrendered terrorists (Joshi 1999:426-432; Swami 2003b). All these initiatives finally led to the creation of 'renegades' which became an important counter insurgency tool for security forces.

4.2. Organizations, Strategies and Support Base:

Although many terrorist organizations were active in Jammu and Kashmir during this phase, the organization that led the terrorist activities was the Harkat-ul-Ansar, also known as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) or the the Jamait-ul-Ansar (JuA). The Harkat first came into limelight when it banned the Amamath Yatra in 1993 (Jaleel 2011). It intensified its activity soon afterwards and carried out activities like kidnapping of two British tourists in 1994, kidnapping of few Americans and British citizens in Delhi in the same year and kidnapping of some Europeans in Kashmir in 1995 for the release of Maulana Masood Azhar and Sajjad Afghani (Sharma and Behera 2014:180-82). After abductions of foreigners in Jammu and Kashmir by the Al Faran – a front organisation for Harkat-ul-Ansar, the United States of America designated it as a foreign terrorist organisation in 1997 and Harkat changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (US Department of State 2005:196-97).

The organisation was founded in 1993 after the merger of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HJI). The Harkat had a well-formed organisational structure. It was headed by an Amir assisted by Naib Amir (deputy chiefs), a secretary and a publicity chief. Some of the important leaders of the HuA were Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil (Chief), Maulana Mohammad Farooq Kashmiri (Deputy Chief), Maulana Abdul Jabbar (Chief of military affairs), Sajjad Afghani (chief commander in Kashmir Valley), Maulana Masood Azhar (General secretary) and Saeed Omar Sheikh (Sharma and Behera 2014:183-84). According to the US Department of State Report, the HuA had about 300-500 armed cadres which were mostly recruited from Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir but also included many Afghans and Arab nationals (US Department of State 2005:196-97). The recruitment was done through the extensive network of Madrasas and Tabligi Jamat in Pakistan while the main training to the HuA cadre was given in Afghanistan especially at Khalid Bin Walid camp and Liza camp (both in Khost); and Salman Farsi camp in Jawash (Raman 2011). Although the HuA was primarily based in Muzaffarabad (PoK), it maintained offices in various Pakistani cities like Lahore and Islamabad as well. In Jammu and Kashmir, it was most active in Baramulla, Budgam, and Pulwama in Kashmir Valley and Poonch and Rajouri in Jammu region. Apart from Jammu and Kashmir, it was also involved in terrorist activities in Myanmar, Philippines, Bosnia, Tajikistan, and the Middle East. Harkat leadership was also reportedly working with Osama Bin Laden. The main sources of funding to HuM were its supporters in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, Pakistanis and the Kashmiri Muslims settled in the UK and the US. Other major sources were donations from farmers at the time of harvest and hides of sacrificed animals (Sharma and Behera 2014:183-84).

As it has been already mentioned, the HuM had close ties with the ISI of Pakistan and with the Pakistan government. The HuA was also associated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) and Sipah-e-Sahaba, Pakistan, the Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden's International Islamic Front for Jihad and the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan (Raman 2011). It is believed that in 1998, many HuA members were killed during the American attack on Bin Laden's training camps inside Afghanistan (FAS 1997). According to some reports, the HuA also gave shelter to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi terrorists who had tried to assassinate Nawaz Sharif (Nasr 2002:99).

4.2.1. Ideology and Political Goal:

By and large, the Harkat-ul-Ansar was a Sunni organisation theologically close to the Deoband school of thought and drew its inspiration from Tabligi Jamat. It was part of an international network of fundamentalist Muslims who believed in a worldwide Muslim Ummah. The organization saw the Ummah as subjugated by the Jews, Ahmadiyahs and Hindus and bringing the past glory of Islam back was the main objective for the Harkat-ul-Ansar. It also vowed to liberate the suppressed Muslim Ummah in different parts of the world through creating awareness about jihad and for this purpose, it offered their services for jihad anywhere in the world (Sharma and Behera 2014:182-83). After the Soviet troops left Afghanistan, the HuA paid attention towards Jammu and Kashmir and worked for its merger with Pakistan (Stanford University 2016). However, unlike the other Kashmir-centric Islamic terrorist groups like the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the ‘liberation of Muslim Kashmir’ from the clutches of a ‘Hindu’ India was not its ultimate goal, but a mere stepping stone for the creation on a worldwide Islamic Caliphate. It also held the Sufi tradition of a tolerant Islam in contempt and treated democracy and gender equality as against the Islam (Raman 1999).

As many of the core beliefs of the Harkat-ul-Ansar were against the plural and syncretic Islamic traditions of Kashmir, Harkat’s ascendance created a rift not only between various groups within the separatist block, a majority of Kashmiri Muslim population also resisted the imposition of strict *Wahabi* code of conduct upon them. Observers point out two specific incidents in this regard that indicated Harkat’s increasing isolation in Jammu and Kashmir. First, the ban imposed by the HuA on *Amaranth Yatra* was not only ineffective; it was opposed by the Kashmiri Muslims also. Even the political face of terrorist organisations, the Hurriyat Conference was compelled to issue an appeal against it. Second, the Charar-i-Sharif tragedy, which, as Behera notes, infuriated many Kashmiris because of the burning of the holy shrine by the Harkat ul-Ansar whose members had occupied the shrine. The slogans of jihad written on the destroyed shrine of a saint who was revered for tolerance and compassion, incensed and alienated a large section of Kashmiri Muslims (Behera 2000:192).

By the end of fourth phase (1994-95), popular disillusionment with increasingly fragmented and criminalized militancy had become quite apparent. Growing instances of

people's resistance, and opposition to terrorists' misuse of the gun together with the government effective counter insurgency measures and exploration of political avenues had reversed the tide to a great extent. Though the intensity and ferocity of terrorist attacks had increased, the separatists were losing the battle, at least on the popular front.

4.3. The Pakistan Factor:

A key constituent of the United Jihad Council, the HuA, from the very beginning had close links not only with other global terrorist organisations but also the Pakistan Army. It is believed that Pakistani General Pervez Musharraf was instrumental in ensuring the primacy of HuA. He wanted to strengthen pro-Pakistan terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir and approached Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto with a detailed plan in this regard who gave her approval (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007). General Musharraf also closely worked with many radical Islamist groups to implement this plan. One such group was the Harkat-ul-Ansar. In the following months, the level of violence in Kashmir increased considerably as the militias begin sending their fighters there. Around the same time, Pakistan Army was also supporting the Taliban. Pakistan's support to both the HuA and Taliban was going on simultaneously as the Kashmiri terrorist groups got training in camps located in Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan and then fought against the Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. This link between Afghan and Kashmiri terrorists was facilitated by the ISI (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007:239-243).

Similar claims regarding ISI's association with the HuA were also made by Michael Meacher, a British Member of Parliament and former cabinet Minister. Writing for *The Guardian*, he claimed that many British Pakistanis were trained in Harkat ul-Ansar's terrorist camps in Pakistan and the whole operation was endeavoured by the ISI. These trained British-Pakistanis then went to fight in Bosnia alongside joined Harkat ul-Ansar terrorists (Meacher 2005). However the most convincing details about Pakistan's involvement in HuA's activities were revealed in some of the declassified documents of the US Government and CIA. Though these documents were primarily related to the US concern about Pakistan's support to Taliban, they shed enough light on Pakistan's dubious relations with the Harkat-ul-Ansar as well. For instance, in 1996, a secret CIA report mentioned that 'the Pakistani ISI is giving between 30,000–60000 US Dollars per month to the Harkat ul-Ansar' (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 1996:4). Similarly in a cable sent

from the US embassy (Islamabad) in March 1997, the HuA association with the Taliban and the training of HuA terrorists in training camps run by Taliban in Khost, near Afghanistan's border with Pakistan was described in detail. The Embassy staff also suspected of an understanding between Pakistan, Osama bin Laden and the Harkat ul-Ansar and told Washington that such an association 'could have very serious consequences' (Embassy of United States of America [Islamabad] 1997: Cable (Secret 1). In another cable, there was mention of Harkat-ul-Ansar terrorists being trained in several Taliban terrorist training camps in Paktia province near the Afghan-Pakistan border (Embassy of United States of America [Islamabad] 1996: Cable B6 [Confidential]).

Apart from the ISI, the HuA also had strong links with the wider jihad network active within Pakistan especially the Fazlur Rahman faction of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUIF), a Pakistani fundamentalist political party. Many of HuA terrorists were students of Madrasas run by the (JUIF) and the HuA core membership consisted of terrorists not only from Pakistan and Afghanistan but also Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries (Howenstein 2008:26).

The Pakistani support to Harkat-ul-Ansar, as has been mentioned, was part of a larger plan designed by Pakistani authorities through which they intended to ensure upping the ante in Jammu and Kashmir. By now, Pakistani authorities had started getting frustrated over the little progress made by the Kashmiri terrorists and were looking towards other means to keep the pot boiling in Jammu and Kashmir. The induction of battle hardened foreign terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir was aimed at intensifying the proxy war to advance Pakistan's interests in Jammu and Kashmir and the motivated cadre base of Harkat-ul-Ansar with its global linkages was used to achieve this goal.

5. Phase V: Pan Islamism and the Hegemony of Lashkar-e-Taiba (1996-1999)

On August 14, 1996, the Election Commission of India issued notifications for holding assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir. The elections were held in four phases between 7 and 30 September 1996 (Election Commission of India 1997). These were the first assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir after nine years and given the scale of violence, it was not a mean achievement. The political process, which had almost crumbled under pressures from terrorists, was at least coming back on track. In a way, it was also an indication of the fact that terrorists were on a losing track. Increasing inter-group clashes

and the public mood in favour of peace had created conducive atmosphere for the restoration of political process. Earlier, responding to the announcement made by the Prime Minister on November 4, 1995, four important militant leaders had formed the 'Forum for Permanent Resolution' (Behera 2000:200). The forum gave a call for an unconditional dialogue with the Government of India for a solution to the Kashmir problem and four important leaders of the forum namely; Firdos Ahmad Baba alias Babar Badar, Bilal Lodhi, Imran Rahi and Ghulam Mohiuddin Lone met the Union Home Minister on March 15, 1996 (Baweja 1996). Their efforts broke the stalemate by initiating a process of dialogue. To facilitate the peace process further, the Government also adopted 'the policy of transparency' in Jammu and Kashmir under which several important foreign dignitaries visited the state. These included M.H. Khusamadi (Councillor), from the Iranian Embassy in New Delhi, the US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner and US Senator Hank Brown. The concerted efforts to restore the political process gradually got translated into some concrete political initiatives on the ground. First, elections for six parliamentary seats in Jammu and Kashmir to the eleventh Lok Sabha were conducted successfully in May 1996 despite the Hurriyat conference's efforts to stall the elections. Earlier, the elections for Lok Sabha in 1991 were not held because of the insurgency. Although the National conference opted out of the elections claiming that the situation was not conducive for holding elections, people of Jammu and Kashmir welcomed the initiation of political process. The overall voter turnout reached a satisfactory 57.25%. Of the six Parliamentary seats, Congress won four seats while the BJP and the Janta Dal won each. Next and more significant step was holding the state assembly elections in which the National Conference also participated. The number of seats was increased from 76 to 87 after the delimitation in 1995 (Ahuja 2000:48). Unlike the 1987 elections, this time the elections were largely free and fair according to neutral observers. People's participation was also very encouraging with a voter turnout of more than 53%. The National Conference got 59 out of 87 seats. The BJP and the Congress won 8 seats each though the Congress vote share was much higher than the BJP (20% compared to BJP's 12%). Janata Dal and the Bahujan Samaj Party won 5 and 4 seats respectively while the Jammu and Kashmir Panthers Party and the Jammu and Kashmir Awami League managed to win one seat each. For the first time in the post-Independence politics of Jammu & Kashmir, the National Conference had got

mandate from all three regions of the state (Election Commission of India 1997; MayilVaganan 2002).

The government of India also initiated a peace process with Pakistan to normalise the bilateral relations and bring peace to Jammu and Kashmir. In June 1997, a composite dialogue was announced after the meeting of foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan in Islamabad (Chowdhary 2015:214). The eight issues identified for the dialogue were:

- i) Peace and Security including the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs);
- ii) Jammu and Kashmir;
- iii) Siachen Glacier;
- iv) Wullar Barrage/Tulbul navigation project;
- v) Sir Creek;
- vi) Terrorism and Drug Trafficking;
- vii) Economic and Commercial cooperation and
- viii) Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.

India's consent to include Jammu and Kashmir in the list of outstanding issues between both the countries and Pakistan willingness to discuss Kashmir with all the issues were a significant departure from their long held diplomatic positions (Mishra 2007:506).

However, it was just a beginning and a lot was still remained to be done. Though the political process has started, it has not reached an irreversible point. The terrorists were down but not lost the war yet. In fact, the next few years were to be some of the bloodiest in the history of Jammu and Kashmir.

Worried with the decline in intensity of terrorist campaign and efficiency of Kashmiri terror groups, the ISI launched a new terrorist outfit, Tehrik-e-Jehad (TeJ) in 1997. The goal was to send more foreign terrorists into Jammu and Kashmir to give a boost to the terror campaign. TeJ was made up of terrorists from various pro-Pakistan groups like the *Muslim Mujahideen*, *Al Barq*, *Hizbullah*, *Ansar-ul-Islam* and most importantly, the *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (LeT). Farooq Qureshi of *Al-Barq* was appointed as its chief. (Guidère 2012:344). According to some sources, many ex-servicemen of the Pakistan Army had also joined the TeJ. The new outfit was created to serve multiple purposes like stepping up terrorism through inducting foreign mercenaries, ensuring Pakistan's greater control over the terror campaign and countering the demand of an independent Kashmir. Pakistan also

decided to reduce Hizbul Mujahideen's role significantly. Instead of carrying out direct terrorist acts, its role was now restricted only to provide information and logistic support to non-Kashmiri terrorist groups like LeT and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.

Pakistan was also not happy with the performance of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). Growing dissension within the Hurriyat Conference and continuing discord between its leaders and their respective terrorist wings was viewed by Pakistan as having a negative impact on the secessionist movement. To bolster the political face of terrorism in J&K, Pakistan formed the Jammu & Kashmir Solidarity Forum (JKSF) as an umbrella organisation of over ground political wings of Kashmiri terrorist groups. The Hurriyat Conference was not very happy and saw it as a challenge to her role in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan, however, ignored the APHC's objection and provided enough support to the JKSF. Pakistan also intensified its efforts to project the Kashmir issue at international fora and was successful in getting a resolution passed in the 8th OIC Conference at Tehran in 1997 that condemned the human rights violation in Jammu and Kashmir. The OIC also reiterated its support for the 'right of self determination' and constituted a separate 'Contact Group' on the issue with Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Iran as its members (Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC] 1997). Within Jammu and Kashmir, the ISI made concerted attempts to step up the violence throughout the state. In fact, to fill up the void created by the lack of enthusiasm and motivation among the Kashmiri youth to join the militancy, the ISI started to recruit even criminals, smugglers and drug peddlers etc (Kanwal 1999:55-83).

The pro- Pakistan terrorist groups and mercenaries carried out numerous terrorist attacks in this phase especially on the Hindus with an aim to evoke a communal tension in the State. It started with the killing of 16 Hindu villagers in Barshalla in Doda district on January 5, 1996. Jammu and Kashmir witnessed many such incidents in coming years. The Barshalla massacre was followed by the Wundhama massacre in January 1997 in which 25 Kashmiri pandits were killed. Similar attacks were also carried out in Swari (Rajouri) on June 24, 1997 which claimed the lives eight Hindus and in Chapnari (Doda) on June 19, 1998 in which 25 Hindus lost their lives. In August 1998, 35 people were killed in Kalaban in August while 27 people got killed at Prankote in April 1998. Finally in July 1999, 15 persons were killed in an attack in (*Times of India* 2006a). In total, between 1996 and 1998,

215 people were killed in 17 communally targeted attacks by Terrorists (see Table 9a and 9b).

Table 9a:
Massacres in Kashmir Valley (1996-1999)

Date	Place	District	Causalities
May 6, 1996	Lasjan	Srinagar	8
July 7, 1996	Bakihakar	Kupwara	11
August 21, 1996	Ranbelpur	Anantnag	9
October 5, 1996	Sunderkut	Baramula	7
Innuary 2, 1997	Musmilpur	Baramula	7
March 27, 1997	Sangrampur	Badgam	7
January 26, 1998	Wandhama	Srinagar	23

(Kanwal 1999: 55-83)

Table 9b:
Massacres in Areas South of Pir Panjal Range (1996-1998)

Date	Place	District	Causalities
January 5, 1996	Barshala	Doda	5
April 18, 1996	Parankot	Rajouri	26
July 25, 1996	Hinjan Gali	Doda	13
May 6, 1998	Surankot	Punch	4
June 10, 1998	Phagla	Punch	4
June 19, 1998	Chapnari	Doda	25
July 27, 1998	Horna	Doda	16
August 3, 1998	Kalaban	Chamba- (Himachal Pradesh)	36
August 3, 1998	Chandi	Udhampur	5
August 8, 1998	Sailan	Punch	9

(Kanwal 1999: 55-83)

Most of these attacks were carried out by a new terrorist organisation – the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The selection of target by the terrorists was also done with definite motives. First,

they wanted to expand their bases outside the Valley. Second, the massacres were aimed at demonstrating the ability of the terrorists to hit whenever and wherever they want and finally, the most important motive was to transform Kashmir's insurgency into a Hindu-Muslim communal confrontation, with a pan-India political consequences (Swami 1998a).

By the end of 1999, almost ten thousand people had lost their life in the fifth phase of terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir. Though the average fatalities per year had reduced to some extent, worries for security forces had not ended (See Table 10).

**Table 10:
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence (1996-1999)**

Year	Incidents	Civilians	Security Forces Personnel	Terrorists	Total
1996	5014	1336	184	1209	2729
1997	3420	948	193	1075	2216
1998	2932	857	236	999	2092
1999	3071	821	355	1082	2258
Total	14437	3962	968	4365	9295

(Government of India 2004:12)

5.1. Key Trends:

The hallmark of fifth phase of terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir was a complete dominance of foreign mercenaries. The increasing dominance of foreign terrorists can be gauged from the fact that the number of terrorists of non-Kashmiri origin killed by the security forces got almost doubled in this phase (See Table 11).

**Table 11:
Foreign Terrorists Killed in Jammu and Kashmir (1996-1999)**

Year	Number of Foreign Terrorists Killed
1996	194
1997	258
1998	394
1999	348
Total	1194

(Swami 2003a: 61)

According to some estimate, by the end of 1999, almost 40% terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir were foreigners (Kanwal 1999:55-83).

As mentioned earlier, various factors had compelled Pakistan to induct more and more foreigners in Jammu and Kashmir which had far reaching consequences, both for the terrorists and the security forces. Since most of the foreign mercenaries were better trained and battle hardened terrorists with enough experience of terrorist warfare, the move resulted in an increased fatality rate for the security forces. While the Kill Ratio (the ratio of terrorists killed for every security person) was 5.91 between 1990 and 1995, it came down to a mere 3.17 between 1996 and 1999. In fact, in 1999, less than 3 terrorists were killed for every security person (See Table 12).

**Table 12:
Kill Ratio in Jammu and Kashmir**

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Ratio	4.18	5.49	5.60	7.33	7.70	5.20	3.49	3.61	3.28	2.30

(Swami 2003a: 61)

Along with the increase in lethality, the terror campaign also expanded in its territorial reach. Between 1996 and 1999, nine massacres were carried out by the terrorists in the Jammu region which became the core area of expansion for terrorists. All these massacres were carried out by foreign mercenaries and local Hizb-ul-Mujahideen's role was limited only to provide information and logistics. In fact, as some reports indicated, 'in the Jammu region, the local Kashmiri terrorist organizations were completely sidelined and the operation was now being run entirely by foreign mercenaries' (Kanwal1999: 66). The motive behind these attacks was twofold: first, to expose the limits of government's increasingly successful counterinsurgency operations and second, to create a communal divide between Hindus and Muslims and provoke mass migrations by like the Kashmiri Pundit exodus in 1990, if possible (Kanwal 1999:61).

This phase also witnessed some of the most gruesome massacres beyond the boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir. In August 1998, in the first-ever major terrorist incident in Himachal Pradesh, LeT terrorists killed 35 persons in Chamba district (*The Tribune* 1998). Similar to Jammu massacres, these attacks were also aimed at giving a

communal twist to the economic rivalry between the Gujjars and the Gaddis of Chamba in Himachal Pradesh. Communalising the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir and expanding it further to other parts of India, in fact, became the central motif of these pan Islamist terrorists throughout this phase. The new strategy was very much an execution of the ideology of *Markaz-Dawa-ul-Irshad*, the parent organisation of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. A confirmation of this policy soon came in the December 1998 when the LeT declared that these attacks are just the beginning and vowed to take its activities to other parts of India as well (Swami 1998b).

One of the significant trends of this phase was the introduction of *fidayeen* attacks. The first *fidayeen* attack occurred in November 1999, when a squad of LeT terrorists attacked the Badami Bagh cantonment in Srinagar and killed eight security personnel (Chandran 2000; Swami 1999). Again in December 1999, LeT terrorists attacked the Police SOG Headquarters in which 12 policemen were killed. In coming days, the LeT carried out many suicide attacks not only in Jammu and Kashmir but in other parts of India as well (South Asia Terrorism Portal).

This phase also saw emergence of some pro-government militias. Since the terrorist landscape was heavily dominated by ruthless foreign mercenaries who had very scant regard for the local culture and traditions, it caused great resentment among local terrorist groups which ultimately resulted in mushrooming of pro-government militias or *Ikhwanis*. Many of such *Ikhwanis* were made up of surrendered terrorists who had now switched their loyalty and fighting for what they called 'liberation of Kashmir from agents of Pakistan' (Baweja 1995b). Though this process had started earlier, it reached at its peak in this phase. The pro-government militant groups joined hands with the Indian security forces to fight against the pro-Pakistan terrorist groups. Many of them were recruited within the Special Operations Group of Jammu and Kashmir Police. These pro-Indian militias proved very useful for security forces and were particularly successful in some parts of Southern Kashmir because of the local level intelligence they possessed (Bose 2003:134; Human Rights Watch 1996).

5.2. Organizations, Strategies and Support Base:

Although many terrorist organisations that were active in previous phases kept operating in this phase also, the organisation that spearheaded the terrorist campaign in this

period was the Lashkar-e-Taiba. The organisation also known as the ‘Army of the Pure’ was founded in 1986 by two Pakistani engineering professors, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal as the military wing of Pakistani Islamist organization *Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irshad* (Fair 2014:8). The ISI was closely associated with the LeT since its inception; and according to Christine Fair, Osama bin Laden had also played a crucial role in the creation of Lashkar-e-Taiba (Fair 2014). Initially the LeT was active more in Afghanistan against the USSR but later changed its focus to Jammu and Kashmir in the mid 1990s. Though the first known LeT operation in India was the ambush of a small group of Indian Air Force personnel in 1990 (Stanford University 2016), until the mid 1990’s, it was not very active and carried out occasional attacks against Indian security forces. The organisation came into limelight in 1996 when it carried out a massacre killing 16 Hindus in Doda on January 5, 1996 (South Asian Terrorism Portal). In the phase between 1996 and 1999, the LeT emerged as the most lethal terrorist organisation in Jammu and Kashmir killing hundreds of innocent civilians in various terrorist attacks.

The outfit’s headquarters is located at Muridke near Lahore from where it also operates several seminaries, schools, blood banks and other charitable institutions across Pakistan (South Asia Terrorism Portal). According to a November 2005 report of Rediff, the top terrorists associated with the LeT were: Hafiz Mohammed Saeed; Zia-Ur-Rehman Lakhvi; Abdullah Shehzad alias Abu Anas alias Shamas and Kari Saif-Ul-Islam etc. The main decision making body of LeT was made up of its chief, deputy chief, Finance chief etc. Like an Army’s chain of command, the LeT also worked through a Chief Commander, Divisional Commander, District Commander, Battalion Commander and numerous Area Commanders who were given responsibility of operations in various zones and areas (Bhatt 2005).

Although no concrete figures are available on the size of LeT cadre base, the organisation definitely had a wide support base both within Pakistan and abroad. According to the US State Department estimates, LeT had thousands of members across Pakistan, Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir (US Department of State 2007). The South Asia Terrorism Portal estimates that LeT had more than 500 terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir in 1999 which was the largest group of foreign mercenaries in the

Kashmir valley. The *New York Times* in one of its report had put the figures at 150000 citing a source at the ISI (Jane and Salman 2009).

While the LeT started paying more attention towards Jammu and Kashmir after 1996, it still had very few Kashmiris members. Its recruits were mostly from Pakistan, Afghanistan and other Islamic countries like Sudan, Behrin, Uzbekistan and Libya. Mariam Abou Zahab, in one of the most extensive study of LeT composition, found out that most of the LeT terrorists were from small towns and villages of Central and Southern Punjab in Pakistan. In addition, according to Zahab, the majority of LeT terrorists belonged to the families which had migrated from the Indian state of Punjab (Zahab 2007:139-40). Another study notes that most of the LeT terrorists were between the age of 18 and 25 years with relatively better education than other terrorist groups. In fact many of them were better educated than an average Pakistani and had some sort of technical or college education (U.S. Department of State 2007).

The outfit reportedly had more than 3,000 offices across Pakistan to oversee recruitment, collection of finances and run training camps for terrorists. According to some reports, the LeT used to get regular grants from Pakistan government which was upto 50,000–60,000 US Dollars every month (Sharma and Behera 2014:172). Various other sources also confirmed substantial financial support to the LeT by Pakistan. While designating the LeT as a terrorist organisation, the US state department claimed that LeT receives regular financial support from Pakistan's military and its intelligence service (Roggio 2010). Similarly, Stephan Tankel and Abubakar Siddique wrote that Pakistani support to LeT increased considerably after 1995 (Tankel 2010:2-3) which enabled it to expand its area of operation in Jammu and Kashmir (Siddique 2008). Apart from the Government of Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Taiba probably also received Saudi money through various Islamic charitable organisations. Another source of financial assistance was Al-Qaeda, with which Lashkar-e-Taiba had close ties. Later on, the organization established a fund raising system among Muslim communities abroad, primarily Pakistani communities settled in Britain. In fact, donors from Britain were number two among LeT large donors (Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Centre 2008). The other key sources of LeT money were Islamic charities across the world, particularly those based in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (Sharma and Behera 2014:172). Since the Lashkar's

parent organisation Jamat-ud-Dawa espoused the radical strand of Wahabism, it received enormous amount of donations from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although, the donations were ostensibly meant for charity works, a large amount of it was used for terrorist activities.

Although the LeT was engaged in waging jihad in many countries, it had established five major terrorist training centres camps exclusively to train its members for jihad in Jammu and Kashmir: *Muaskar-e-Tayyiba*, *Muaskar-e-Aqsa*, *Um-al-Qura* and *Abdullah-bin-Masood* and *Muhammad bin Qasim*. All except one were located in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir while the *Muhammad bin Qasim* training camp was in the Sindh province of Pakistan (Zahab 2007:137). Many of these camps were closed down or shifted somewhere else when Pakistan came under international pressure for harbouring terrorist groups.

While the primary area of operations of the Lashkar-e-Taiba was Jammu and Kashmir, it was active in other cities of India also through sleeper cells. According to some reports, among terrorist organizations active in Jammu and Kashmir, the LeT was perhaps the only group with capabilities to strike any many other states of India as well. In its heydays, the organization used these cells to carry out attacks in other parts of India, including New Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Varanasi and Kolkata (South Asia Terrorism Portal). Although in later years, the LeT focused its energy largely in Jammu and Kashmir, it kept its ties with the global network of Islamist organizations intact. As far as other South Asian countries are concerned, LeT also had support structures in Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives which helped it in carrying out its activities in India (Roul 2010; Tankel 2011:144). But most significantly, the LeT was very closely linked to the al-Qaeda, the leading global Islamic terrorist organization. In fact, Abdullah Azzam, who was the founding member of Let parent organization *Markaz-ul-Dawa* was a close associate of Osama Bin Laden and had convinced laden to donate generously to the Markaz. LeT's ties with the al-Qaeda were more than just ideological affinity and they shared significant operational linkages with each other. While the LeT fought for Al-Qaeda in different parts of world, many Al-Qaeda operatives also helped LeT in its fight against Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. LeT had also provided training and shelter to Al-Qaeda terrorists like Ramzi Yusuf who had carried out the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing (Zahab and Roy 2004:42) and Zayn al-Abidin Mohammd Husayn, the mastermind of

multiple bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the USS Cole bombing in 2000 (McGirk 2002; United Nations Security Council 2010). Similarly, the brother of al-Qaeda's southeast Asia affiliate *Jemaah Islamiyah*'s operational commander, Riduan Isamudin was also captured from a LeT madrassa in September 2003 (RAND Corporation, 2006:81-90; Tankel 2011:155). The LeT had also established close ties with various jihadist groups in the Middle East, South East Asia, Bosnia and Chechnya through its Department of External Affairs, headed by Rehman Makki, the brother-in-law of Hafiz Saeed (Sharma and Behera 2014:172). It also worked closely with the The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and had supported the organization both financially and logistically (Roggio 2013). LeT was also closely associated with the *Al Akhtar* Trust and the *Al Rashid* Trust, created to fund global Islamist terrorist groups (South Asian Terrorism Portal; Stanford University 2012).

5.2.1. Ideology and Political Goal:

Ideologically, Lashkar-e-Taiba follows the Ahl-e-Hadith school, a puritan Islamic movement inspired by the Wahabism. Much like Wahabism, the followers of Ahl-e-Hadith believe that Muslims need to go back to the original sources of Islam i.e. the Qur'an and the Hadith and stop observing those local practices which have a corrupting influence on Muslims. They also advocate strict adherence to *Shariah* (Islamic Law) and reject not only the tolerant and syncretic Sufi traditions of Islam but also the Hanafi School of jurisprudence followed by the majority of Muslims in South Asia.

LeT aims to unite the Muslim community i.e. *ummah* scattered in different parts of the world to establish a *Caliphate* through *daawat* (invitation) and armed jihad (Sikand 2003:220). More importantly, as opposed to other Ahl-e-Hadith movements which do not view armed jihad as obligatory, it is considered as obligatory and *fard-e-ain* (an individual obligation) rather than *fard-e-kifaya* (collective duty) by the LeT (Siddique 2008:9). It also believes that the abandoning of jihad and other Quranic principles has led to the loss of power and subjugation of Muslims. For LeT, jihad must continue 'until Islam, as a way of life, dominates the whole world and until Allah's law is enforced everywhere in the world' (Sikand 2003:220). Husain Haqqani has mentioned that for the LeT, India, Israel, and the United States are existential enemies of Islam. Further, the organization cites following reasons for waging jihad:

- 1) To eliminate evil and facilitate the conversion to and practice of Islam;
- 2) To ensure the ascendancy of Islam;
- 3) To force non-Muslims to pay *jizya* ' (a tax paid by non-Muslims for protection from a Muslim ruler);
- 4) To assist the weak and powerless;
- 5) To avenge the blood of Muslims killed by non-believers;
- 6) To punish enemies for breaking promises and treaty obligations;
- 7) To defend a Muslim state; and
- 8) To liberate Muslim territories under non-Muslim occupation
(Haqqani 2005:24-25).

Unlike many other terrorist groups, LeT does not oppose modern education. Instead it believes in using the modern science and technology for furthering its goal of creating an Islamic Caliphate. Hafiz Saeed himself stated that when Muslims '*gave up Jihad, science and technology also went into the hands of others. This is natural; the one who possesses power also commands science, the economy and politics*' (Quoted in Saeed 2002:143). Adapting to modern technology for ideological and strategic goals has helped Lashkar evolve as a highly sophisticated terrorist group.

As far as the struggle in Kashmir is concerned, in Lashkar's discourse, 'the conflict in Kashmir is not as a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, but a holy war between two mutually opposed ideologies: Islam, on the one hand, and disbelief (*kufir*), on the other' (Sikand 2001:225). Further, the roots of the Kashmir problem, according to Lashkar, lies in its conquest by non Muslims which unleashed a long reign of terror on the Kashmiri Muslims, hence, it is the duty of Muslims to wage *jihad* against the 'Hindu oppressors' (Sikand 2001:225). Lashkar does not stop at Jihad in Kashmir only but wants to extend Muslim control beyond the borders of Kashmir over all of India as it was once conquered by Muslims, and, therefore, has to be brought back under Muslim control. Hence, as Sikand quotes, in November 1999, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed declared, 'today I announce the break-up of India... inshallah, we will not rest until the whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan' (Sikand 2004:211). In fact, for the Lashkar, even the Jihad against India is also only the first step in a wider struggle and after conquering the Indian subcontinent, the jihad would

continue further to unite the oppressed Muslim population scattered in different parts of the world and create a Caliphate (Haqqani 2005).

5.3. The Pakistan Factor:

From the very beginning, LeT received comprehensive support from the ISI which included weapons, training, funding and safe havens (Stanford University 2016). The ISI also helped LeT terrorists in cross LoC infiltration through logistical assistance and covering fire on India border patrol teams. Directorate S – ISI's wing responsible for the covert operations against India was in charge of this interaction (Tellis 2012: 9). Many observers have written about the nature and extent of Pakistani support to the LeT. Bill Roggio attests that LeT receives support from Pakistan's army and the ISI (Roggio 2010). Similarly, Stephan Tankel and Abubakar Siddique wrote that Pakistani support to LeT increased considerably after 1995 (Tankel 2010:2-3) which enabled it to expand its area of operation in Jammu and Kashmir quickly (Siddique 2008). Analysing the state sponsorship to the LeT, Jyoti Trehan claims that the ISI provides substantial financial support to LeT which also includes a huge amount of counterfeit currency to destabilize the Indian economy (Trehan 2002:201-11). The evidence from the ground also indicates a close nexus between the ISI and the LeT. A LeT member arrested by security agencies in India in 2006 told interrogators that the Pakistani army and ISI maintain regular contacts with the LeT operatives in Jammu and Kashmir to exchange sensitive information and operational strategy against Indian security forces (Adlakha 2010:37-39). American intelligence agencies have also mentioned close coordination between the LeT and Pakistani security establishment to discuss intelligence and operational details. In a *New York Times* report published in 2008, Zarrar Shah, a Lashkar commander, was identified as the chief liaison to the ISI. The same report quoted an American official saying that the cooperation between the LeT and ISI 'goes beyond information sharing to include some funding and training. What's going on is done in a fairly disciplined way' (Schmitt, Mazzetti, and Jane 2008).

Lashkar-e-Taiba emergence as Pakistan's favourite proxy terrorist organisation can be attributed to following reasons. First, its predominantly Punjabi cadre base was of the same ethnicity that dominates the Pakistani Army and the ISI. In fact, various studies have shown a remarkable convergence between the social base of Lashkar-e-Taiba and the rank and file of Pakistan Army (Fair 2014:273-74). Second, unlike many other terrorist groups,

who over a period of time developed their own political ambitions and started challenging Pakistan state, the Lashkar-e Taiba remained completely loyal to its master. So far, it has neither carried out any attacks inside Pakistan nor has defied Pakistan's strategy in Jammu and Kashmir. According to experts who track the LeT activities closely, the ISI supported LeT because first, it helped Pakistani military to replace incompetent local Kashmiri terrorists with the battle-hardened, ruthless terrorists loyal to Pakistan's objective in Jammu and Kashmir. And secondly, there was a growing belief within the Pakistani military that the theatre of proxy war must be expanded to other parts of India because it would be difficult to beat India if the conflict remains confined to Jammu and Kashmir only. By employing ideologically radical Islamist terrorists from outside the Jammu and Kashmir, the local struggle over Kashmir was expanded into a larger war aimed at destroying India itself (Tellis 2012:9). The induction of Harkat-ul-Ansar earlier was also part of this policy but two reasons compelled Pakistani authorities to rely more on LeT than the HuA. First, the HuA was banned by the United States in 1997 and second; unlike the LeT, a section of HuA had started participating in sectarian violence within Pakistan. The LeT enjoyed unbridled support from Pakistan Army, at least till the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre. The very fact that its headquarters in Murdike was barely few Kilometres away from the Headquarters of Pakistan Army's IV Corps demonstrate the freedom and immunity it enjoyed within Pakistan. As many analysts have noted that though the ISI's assistance to LeT became more clandestine after 2001, the outfit still receives enormous support from Pakistan despite being formally banned on January 12, 2002 (Tankel 2009:5-7; Tellis 2012:7).

The political philosophy, ideological orientation and ruthlessness of Lashkar-e-Taiba had a mixed effect on the terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir. On the one hand, it augmented the capabilities of terrorist groups and enhanced the lethality of terrorist attacks; on the other, it also created a feeling of marginalisation and alienation among those local Kashmiri groups that were against the Jammu and Kashmir's merger with Pakistan. The majority of Valley's Muslim population was also not supportive of LeT concept of global jihad which had created a sense of unease among a section of separatists. Most of the mercenaries associated with the LeT were religious zealots who had an utmost disregard for the more tolerant version of Kashmiri Islam. They also had a very contemptuous attitude

towards the local Kashmiri terrorists whom they mocked and called as ‘softies’. Foreign mercenaries’ disregard for local culture, their ruthlessness and increasing criminalisation of terrorist groups did not go well with the local population and support for terrorist groups got reduced significantly in this phase. As a senior army officer commanding counter-insurgency operation in northern Kashmir said, ‘No one now fights, except foreign mercenaries’ (quoted in Behera 2000:198). The alienation of local Kashmiri from the Wahabi project of Lashkar proved very helpful for the security forces that started getting actionable intelligence about the terrorists from local residents. According to some estimates, because of better intelligence, the Jammu and Kashmir Police’s Special Operations Group was able to eliminate and arrest more than 60 top terrorists in 1997-98 alone (Swami 2000:119).

As a result of all these factors, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir witnessed a significant decline in this phase. Though the number of casualties remained high, the popular support became almost negligible. In fact, by 1997-98, the tables had turned on Pakistan. Militarily, India’s counter terrorism initiatives had started showing results on the ground and despite the influx of foreign mercenaries, terrorist groups were on the back foot. Politically, after successful Parliamentary and Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir in 1996, the disrupted political order was gradually being restored. In addition, the successful elections had weakened Hurriyat Conference’s claim to be the sole spokesperson for *all* opinion in Jammu and Kashmir (Chowdhary 2003a; Swami 2007:185). As a result of this, a section in the Hurriyat had started exploring the possibilities of a dialogue with the Indian Government. Although nothing concrete was achieved so far, the very beginnings of these trends were unsettling for the Pakistan’s military establishment. It desperately needed some dramatic action in Jammu and Kashmir to keep the terrorist campaign alive. And that dramatic action came in the form of Kargil incursion in 1999.

5.3.1. The Kargil War

On 6 May 1999, Indian Army Patrols detected Pakistani intrusion in the Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir. Initially, it was thought that the infiltrators were jihadists, however, after detection of infiltration in other sectors too along the LoC, the Indian Government realised that it was part of a bigger well thought out plan executed by troops from the Northern Light Infantry and the Special Services Group (SSG) of Pakistan army

(India Today 1999). In the next few days, the crisis burgeoned into a full scale war between India and Pakistan. The Government of India responded with *Operation Vijay* on 26 May 1999. The Government also decided to use air power for the first time in 27 years at the LoC (Lambeth 2012).

Initially, Pakistan denied its involvement in Kargil intrusion but a phone conversation between the General Musharraf and a senior Army officer confirmed its full involvement where Parvez Musharraf was recorded saying: 'the scruff of the militant's necks is in our hands'¹² (India Today 1999; Rediff.com 1999). Later, Pakistan Army Chief Parvez Musharraf also accepted in his autobiography that the Kargil incursion was carried out by Pakistan Army's regulars (Musharraf 2006:94-95). Gallantry awards given by Pakistan Army also proved that the plan was designed and executed by the Pakistan army in which regular Army soldiers were involved.¹³

Kargil intrusions were almost unanimously condemned by the world community as an 'unprovoked, unjustified act of aggression, which had the dangerous potential of spinning out of control' (Chari 2003:18). When the crisis deepened, Pakistan requested the American Government to help in resolving the crisis. However, America refused to intervene until the withdrawal of all Pakistani forces from the Indian Territory. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the withdrawal of Pakistani troops unconditionally on 4 July 1999 (*The Guardian* 1999). By the end of July 1999, the Indian Army had recaptured all the territory which was under its control as per the Shimla Agreement (Chengappa and Hussain 1999). By the time the crisis ended on 26 July 1999, the Indian Army had lost 530 soldiers (Government of India 2012). Pakistan official figure for soldiers killed in Kargil was 453 but various other sources indicate that the actual number was much higher than official figures. In his memoirs '*Ghadaar Kaun?: Nawaz Sharif Ki Kahani, Unki Zubani*', Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif admitted that the

¹² The transcript of the conversations between General Parvez Musharraf and the Chief of General Staff Mohammed Aziz was released by India's then external Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh on June 11, 1999. The audio clip of entire conversation is available now. See: 'Transcripts of conversations between Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, Chief of General Staff and Gen Parvez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan'. *Dateline Kargil*, India Today; <https://web.archive.org/web/20080701220255/http://www.india-today.com/kargil/audio.html>

¹³ Pakistan awarded the *Nishan-E-Haider* (Pakistan's highest military honour) to two soldiers who had died in the Kargil conflict. Another 90 soldiers were also given gallantry awards, most of them posthumously. For more details, see: <http://www.shaheedfoundation.org/NishaneHaider.asp>

Pakistan Army lost 2,700 soldiers in Kargil, much more than the total casualties suffered in two wars of 1965 and 1971 (*Times of India* 2006).

Various arguments have been put forward to explain the motive behind Kargil intrusion. Some analysts do not link it directly with the Pakistan's proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and argue that it was primarily a localised operation of limited nature to avenge India's operation on Siachen Glacier in 1984 that continues to haunt Pakistan till date (Khan, Lavoy and Clary 2009:76; Musharraf 2006:87). However, a careful analysis reveals some other and rather more important strategic motives behind Kargil incursion. As mentioned earlier, the terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir had been losing its appeal rapidly and Pakistani authorities were desperate to up the ante. Through Kargil incursion, they aimed to rejuvenate the flagging terror campaign and internationalise the Kashmir issue. The Nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan earlier in 1998 had provided Pakistan a nuclear umbrella and Pakistan Army thought that India would not risk a full scale war against a nuclear Pakistan. Pakistan also wanted to highlight Kashmir dispute as a nuclear flash point to the international community. Moreover, the extent of preparation for Kargil incursion suggests that the operation was meticulously planned and methodically executed over a long period by the Pakistan Army (Malik 2009:2-3; Kanwal 1999b). In fact the manner in which the Kargil operation was carried out suggests its unmistakable link with the 'Zia Plan' or the 'Operation TOPAC' under which Pakistan had initiated the Jihad project in Jammu and Kashmir.

Whatever be the motive behind Kargil intrusion, it definitely brought a qualitative up gradation in the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan responded to the humiliation in Kargil by intensifying the terror campaign to new high. The figures of terror violence bear a testimony to this. Within a year of Kargil fiasco, the number of terror incidents increased from 1,390 in 1999 to 1,994 in 2001 (Swami 2016). Similarly, while 355 security personnel were killed in 1999, in 2001 this number increased to 536. The civilian casualty also saw an increase from 821 to 919 (Government of India 2004: 12). This is reflected by the weapons seized from terrorists over the years and the corresponding increase in casualties in the same period (See Table 13 on Page 144).

Within a couple of years another apocalyptic incident took place when the al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001. Together with the Kargil war, it

not only altered the regional security environment drastically but also brought dramatic changes in the dynamics of Kashmir conflict.

But one thing was pretty much clear – the shadow war had now come in the open.

Table 13:
Weapons Seized from Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir (1988-99)

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Anti Aircraft Missiles											1	3
Air Defence Gun									1	1	1	
Missiles							4	1	1	5	12	31
Mortars						12	5	4	5	14	22	74
RDX (Kgs)						2	5	9	152	709	1428	1161
Rocket Launchers			141	140	174	95	171	100	110	177	315	195
Other Explosives	107	86	1773	588	436	3725	1508	1689	3549	4168	4622	2805
AK series Rifles/ Carbines	34	46	1394	2602	3775	2424	2557	2348	2384	2509	1588	1365
Grenades	18	39	2937	2236	2818	4798	3207	3746	5392	7136	8136	6735
General Machineguns			96	161	168	157	137	79	107	74	72	33

(Government of India 2004b; Swami 2003: 55-88)

Chapter 5

State's Response and Implications

This chapter focuses on the Government of India's response to the terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir. Divided into five main sections, this chapter seeks to analyze the response of the Indian state during each phase.

The first section deals with outlining some of the key components of India's counterinsurgency policy in general. These components have framed the specifics of Government's response in Jammu and Kashmir. The second section analyzes the response during the initial phase of insurgency (1988-92) when the government was challenged not only by the armed militancy but also a popular defiance. During this period, the government responded to the problem primarily through military mechanisms. When the Indian government re-establishes its writ by 1993, it started exploring other strategies also – this is the focus of the third section. The fourth section focuses on the introduction of the 'political processes' after 1995. The fifth section deals with the Government's 'Wining Hearts and Minds (WHAM) approach towards internal dialogue along with engagement with Pakistan.

1: Key Components of India's Counterinsurgency Policy:

Since independence India has faced the challenge of integrating diverse ethnic and lingual groups into a unified national framework (Kalyanaraman 2003:83). In this process, it had to handle a number of insurgencies not only in Jammu and Kashmir but in other states as well. The experience gained during this process shape the broad contours of India's counterinsurgency (COIN) policy which, according to some analysts, is arguably the most successful counterinsurgency policy in the. In fact, India has very successfully managed to mainstream most of the secessionist movements up till now (Rajagopalan 2007:44).

Briefly put, a series of broad, guiding principles, such as the limitation on the use of military force, the primacy of political measures, adherence to democratic and legal procedures, the use of minimum force and respect for human rights etc form the basics of India's Counterinsurgency policies (Routray 2017).

1.1: Military Response:

Although India's counterinsurgency policy advocates a limited use of military power, historically; military response is the first step after the outbreak of an insurgency.

Analysing Government of India's COIN doctrine, Rajesh Rajagopalan has identified five essential components that make it so successful:

- Limited use of military means
- A distinction between insurgents and general population
- Area domination
- Sanitizing the conflict zones
- Emphasis on political solution of insurgency instead of a military one (Rajagopalan 2007).

Usually, the military response starts with the deployment of paramilitary forces in the affected area while the local Police force provides intelligence and other relevant inputs. The Army is deployed only if the situation worsens (Rammohan 2002). An Army operation usually consists of a number of 'grids' which is basically a network of outposts (Kalyanaraman 2003:88). An important component of India's counterinsurgency policy has been the concept of 'Area Dominance' i.e. concentration of troops in a particular area or grid to keep the pressure on insurgents on and gain physical and psychological superiority (Indian Army 2006:25; Rajagopalan 2007:51). To be successful, this multilayered arrangement requires coordination between various agencies due to complexities of the Indian political system (Banerjee 2009:203). In case of insurgents getting support from other countries, security forces focus on sealing or at least sanitizing the borders to stop or minimize cross border movement of insurgents, their supply lines and military lines of communications. Apart from isolating and neutralizing insurgents, sometimes the deployment of security forces is intended to achieve non military goals like sending signal of determination of the government or inducing support for government among the local population (Singh 2011).

1.2: Minimum Force and the Primacy of Political Resolution

From the very beginning, Indian COIN has been influenced by the thought that insurgents are fellow countrymen who at some stage, have to be won over. To give insurgents an opportunity to return to the national mainstream is the rationale behind using minimum force (Rajagopalan 2007:47-48). The focus of political mainstreaming in India's COIN go back to Jawahar lal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, who while negotiating

with the Naga rebels, declared that the government would consider any demand short of independence – devolution of powers, autonomy or creation of new states – to resolve the crisis.(Chaddha 2005:28; Gopal 1979:208; Rajagopalan 2009:226). The strategy of political settlement gradually became the cornerstone of India's COIN policy first after getting endorsement from the Army Chief in 1955 (Indian Army 2006:40; Rajgopalan 2007:47) followed up by successful resolution of insurgencies across North East India and Punjab.

1.3: The Centrality of Democratic Process:

A crucial aspect of political settlements of insurgencies is the centrality of democratic processes and institutions which include an open and tolerant political culture, inclusive polity to ensure participation of marginalised sections, effective governance to address the grievances that fuel political discontent and free and fair election to reinforce the legitimacy of Indian Union (Goswami 2009:70; Kalyanaraman 2003:91). This aspect of the COIN policy emerged gradually as the successful resolution of insurgencies in the North East India mitigated the threats of secession and opened space for political and democratic processes (Shekatkar 2009:24). Since then, restoration of democratic process through election invariably follows military operations as integral component of COIN model of India. However, sometimes it also results in undesirable outcomes such as politician-insurgent collusion, widespread corruption and violence that put a strain on an effective counterinsurgency policy.

The use of democratic means in India's COIN policy is not always uncontested and often faces challenges like repeated suspension of elected governments by imposing Central rule, the legal exemption provided to security forces that involves suppression of certain fundamental rights and the use of excessive force that lead to violation of human rights (Goswami 2012; Fair 2009:119; Shekatkar2009:23). However, policy makers and scholars argue that such measures are used only in extraordinary circumstances and are required to enable security forces to operated effectively in a conflict zone (Mann 2011; Shekatkar 2009:23). Despite these tensions, the COIN policy of India attempts to maintain a balance between the use of democratic means and legal requirements of security forces and a broad consensus exists in India that COIN should adhere to the principles of an open and tolerant democracy.

1.4: Winning Hearts and minds (WHAM):

In addition to the political process, winning the ‘hearts and minds (WHAM)’ of the population by providing developmental and economic assistance like building schools, hospitals and other infrastructure to local population is another crucial component of India’s COIN model. The WHAM was first used in India during the counterinsurgency operations in the North East Indian states. Examples of successful application of this approach are ‘Operation Good Samaritan’¹⁴ in the North-eastern states and Operation *Sadbhavana* in Jammu and Kashmir. The outline of Indian Army’s WHAM approach could be found in its doctrine of 2004 and Sub Conventional Doctrine (2006) in which winning the support of local population ‘through low profile and people-friendly operations’ is seen as the cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations (Chadha 2011; Indian Army 2004:27).

At the conceptual level, through the WHAM, Indian COIN model puts ‘people as the focal point’ and seeks to address the detachment of local population from the counterinsurgency efforts rather than suppressing it. The initiatives under WHAM can be put under two categories:

- i) Psychological or emotional steps to heal the emotional wounds and win the hearts of the population like showing respect to local culture and traditions and
- ii) Practical steps to address the inconvenience caused by the counterinsurgency operations like strictly implementing the rules of engagement to minimize collateral damage, changes in convoy timings which causes inconvenience to the people etc. (Chadha 2011:6).

It is argued that, over a period of time ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach has gradually been expanded in scope and quality as successive Indian governments realised their effectiveness, and now it has become a core, non-coercive element of the Indian model (Sinha 2007).

Based on these guiding principles, the Government’s kept modifying its counterinsurgency policy in Jammu and Kashmir with the changing ground situation and

¹⁴ Set in motion in June 1995, Operation Good Samaritan was a long-term plan for development works in Nagaland and in Manipur launched at the behest of the Chief of the Army Staff. A wide spectrum of projects was instituted under this operation such as the construction of community halls, toilet blocks, water services, imparting vocational training to the locals and so on. Initially the people were hesitant but soon they responded enthusiastically. The media extensively reported success stories of these ventures. For more details see Savitri Subramanian ‘Goodwill Operations and the Indian Army: Lessons for Society’ (2013). URL: <http://www.claws.in/1023/goodwill-operations-and-the-indian-army-lessons-for-society-drsavitri-subramanian.html#sthash.pdHeZAYW.dpuf>

nature of the terrorist campaign. Although both military and political measures were used in counterinsurgency, the political measures acquired salience increasingly as a coherent response evolved.

2. The Initial Phase: Groping in the Dark: Primacy of Military Mechanisms

Though the outbreak of armed insurgency in 1989 was a result of complex interplay of various factors, the Indian government initially saw it in a purely strategic context where the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India was attacked by terrorists. Accordingly, government's initial counter insurgency response was aimed singularly at controlling violence, which was seen as a 'proxy war' by Pakistan. Regular public protests were also treated as part of this proxy war that had to be responded with military means. Compounding the seriousness of the situation was an acute political vacuum and absence of any credible political force whatsoever in the state. Every mainstream political organization had lost its relevance and the political leadership had either surrendered before the terrorists or simply gone in hibernation (Chowdhary2014:9-10).

Keeping in mind the seriousness of the situation, policy makers in Indian Government decided to bring a tough administrator to deal with the problem with an iron hand. As part of this policy, Jagmohan, who had the reputation of a strict administrator, was appointed as the new Governor. Jagmohan had served as the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir earlier also and was disliked by the then Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah who resigned immediately protesting this decision.

For Jagmohan, the problem was created by Pakistan and in his opinion, a tough approach was required to deal with 'inner and outer forces of terrorism, which had conspired to subvert the Union and to seize the power' (Jagmohan quoted by Chowdhary 2014:11). However, in this process, he also completely ignored the local support to separatists.

Bringing Jagmohan as governor however proved to be a double edged sword and had a mixed effect on the ground. On the one hand, the rapid decline in the state's ability to enforce its writ was arrested and restored to some extent; one the other, whatever minimum political mechanisms in Jammu and Kashmir were left, also collapsed. Firm in the conviction that 'every component of the state's power structure had been taken over by the terrorists'; he centralized all political power in himself (Behera 2000:174). Some of his steps like restriction on local media and relying more on non-Kashmiri officers created

serious discontent in the state machinery as well as the local Press. His scepticism towards the local Police, that it has been infiltrated by the terrorists, however proved to be more detrimental. It created a sharp divide between the Jammu & Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces. As Behera writes quoting a senior police official ‘If you come from Delhi and tell a local officer that he is ‘mixed up’ with the militants, where is the morale for him to work for the state?’ The simmering tension in security forces between the ‘local’ and ‘outsider’ ultimately resulted in a police revolt on 22 January 1990 (Behera 2000:174). Jagmohan was also criticized for an excessive use of force as it turned the local population totally against the India. Also, the censorship on local media not only drew world’s attention to Jammu and Kashmir, it also gave an opportunity for the secessionists to spread rumours (Karim 1991:117). Later, the Legislative Assembly was also dissolved and Jammu and Kashmir was placed under the President Rule. According to some analysts, imposing President Rule in Jammu and Kashmir was a mistake that brought central government into direct confrontation with the Kashmiri separatists. It removed the buffer provided by the state government and thereafter the Kashmir problem acquired a new complexion – ‘India versus Kashmir’ (Puri 1993:60).

Although, Jagmohan’s policies have been criticised by many analyst (Behera 2000; Chowdhary 2014; Joshi 1999; Karim 1991) it would be unfair to put the entire blame on him alone. In fact, the seriousness of the situation had made a militaristic response inevitable. Also, numerous insurgencies fuelled by external support in different parts of India in 1970s and 1980s had created a clamour for a strong state to maintain the territorial integrity of India. In addition, while in some other states, the government had the option of exploring a political solution of the problem, an almost complete breakdown of political order in Jammu and Kashmir compelled the Government to respond militarily. As mentioned earlier, there existed a political vacuum in the state, thousands of people were coming out in mass demonstrations, ‘civil curfew’ and strikes imposed by terrorists had become a regular occurrence, the local government was totally ineffective and its authority was in shambles. In such dire circumstances, the Indian government was left with no option but to adopt a security centric approach handle the situation. The first step in this regard was the deployment paramilitary forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Initially, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was brought in to maintain the law & order and carry out

counterterrorism operations. After sometime, the Border Security Forces (BSF) also joined the CRPF. Gradually, the number of paramilitary forces in the state was increased substantially. By 1993, 300 companies of BSF and CRPF were deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. In 1989, this number was just 36 (Navlakha 1993). To enable the security forces, many laws were amended and extended to Jammu and Kashmir. These included: Public Safety Act in 1990, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1990), the Disturbed Area Act in 1997 respectively. Over the years some other laws like the National Security Act (1980) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2002) were also made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir.

Cumulatively, these steps helped in restoring the writ of the government. By the end of 1990, the level and intensity of violence also came down. However, the use of military means and government's highhandedness also caused inconvenience to local population. Cordoning off an entire locality and body search on numerous check posts specifically generated significant public anger among locals who were also caught in the crossfire between security forces and the terrorists often. Terrorists masterfully used these counterinsurgency methods to garner public sympathy and projected themselves as fighting against the atrocities of security forces. Two specific incidents are worth mentioning here which were used by the terrorists to fuel resentment against the government. First, the public demonstration against the firing by security forces in Gawkadal in January 1990 and second, the funeral of Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq in May 1990 (Chowdhary 2014: 14). This perception of the indiscriminate and excessive use of force by the government gained root partly because the paramilitary forces assigned the task of counterinsurgency were not really trained for handling a situation like Jammu and Kashmir. The local police was assigned a minimal role in operations conducted by the paramilitary forces and absence of a local element in the counterinsurgency set up was used by terrorists as the neglect of locals. The restoration of law and order also had its limitation as it was achieved through the coercive methods and the political element was missing. Not only the state was ruled directly through president's rule, the symbols of State's brute power were visible everywhere – bunkers and check post everywhere in cities and towns or large security camps in the hinterland. Even the local civil administration was also overshadowed by the presence of security personnel.

However, by the end of 1990, the situation had started improving at least in the urban areas of Jammu and Kashmir. The Intelligence apparatus that was almost wiped out due to the targeted killings was also revived to some extent. Security forces had secured strategic locations and were 'successful in establishing themselves as a dominant institution ensuring the daily functioning of the society' (Tremblay 2001:571).

3. Second Phase: From Establishing Physical Control to Exploring Political Possibilities

Initially, the Central Reserve Police Force was the only paramilitary force operating in Jammu and Kashmir. In 1990, the total number of CRPF personnel in Jammu and Kashmir was 15000 whose main task till then had been to provide security to VIPs and guard important installations (Joshi 1999:130). Established in 1939, it consisted of personnel from all parts of India and worked more like a centralized police force. The first task for the CRPF was to establish a physical presence everywhere and to indicate in clear terms that the organs of Indian State had not vanished. It adopted two methods for counter terrorism operations – the 'bunker system' and large scale 'cordon and search'. Bunker was narrow structure hedged by sandbags, tarpaulin and plastic sheets. The jawans in bunker were always vulnerable to attack from terrorists and the only protection from a grenade or sudden sniper attack was camouflage netting. Moreover, the pathetic living condition bunker with no electricity and toilet facilities put enormous physical and mental strain on jawans (Joshi 1999:131). Despite the problems, bunkers were quite effective as a symbol of the presence and might of the state. The second method was flushing out terrorists through the cordon and search operations. These operations however were often used by terrorists to attack security forces and then flee. The CRPF usually responded with the counter fire and many times innocent civilians or bystanders were caught in this crossfire. The collateral damage associated with it further alienated the population. Through these methods, though the CRPF tried its best to contain violence, because of lack of experience in dealing with terrorism, they were not particularly effective. Eventually the BSF replace the CRPF for counterinsurgency operations and the CRPF was assigned the task of guarding vital installations.

Established in 1965, the Border Security Force was created to guard the International Border and vital security installations. Very much like the CRPF, the BSF too had very

little experience in dealing with the terror campaign fuelled from across the border. To effectively deal with the prevailing situation it needed to learn things quickly. Since no credible information on any known militant groups was available, the BSF first set up dedicated teams for intelligence gathering, the G-teams. Initially it gathered information primarily from interrogation of captured terrorists and later developed its own sources at ground level (Joshi 1999:134). The communication network and the wireless interception capabilities of the BSF were also boosted up significantly. Once the flow of information from the ground started coming in, BSF changed the counter insurgency tactics also. Although the Bunker system was continued, the cordon and search operations were reduced to avoid the collateral casualties. Instead, based on precise intelligence, focussed operations by smaller teams were carried out successfully. In one such operation, in 1990, the BSF captured the JKLF chief Yasin Malik and his deputy Hamid Sheikh (Bose 2003:128; Rediff.com). Gradually, the changed tactics and better coordination started paying off and the BSF managed to secure at least all the main cities – Srinagar, Sopore, Anantnag, Bandipore and Baramula. Its strength was also increased from 5000 in February 1990 to almost 30000 by the end of 1992 (Joshi 1999:136). However, by that time, Pakistan had decided to up the ante. The newer lot of terrorists were better trained and equipped with lethal weapon. As a result, the security forces casualties also witnessed an increase. To outmanoeuvre terrorists, government also brought qualitative changes in its counter insurgency strategy and the Indian Army was called in.

Despite its presence across the valley, the Indian Army was not really involved in Counter Insurgency (CI) operations till 1991. It had focused its energy mainly on stopping infiltration from Pakistan and only occasionally assisted the BSF in flushing out the hiding terrorists. Moreover, there were some practical problems as well. For instance, so far most of the Army's deployment in Jammu and Kashmir was directed towards securing borders. The 19th Division, headquartered at Baramula, was looking after the LoC in Northern Kashmir while 25th Division was for the Western sector. Similarly, the 28th Mountain division was oriented towards the Chinese border. To conduct CI operations, a major shift in deployment pattern was needed. Very soon, changes were made accordingly. To start with, the 8th Mountain division was brought from Nagaland and was made the nuclei of CI operations. The 19th and 28th Divisions were assigned a subsidiary role and later on the 39th

Division along with the 6th mountain Division was also brought in. The Army focussed its energy on two fronts – checking infiltration along the LoC to cut the supply lines and launching a massive anti terrorism campaign in the Valley (Joshi 1999:137-39; Kashturi 2012). Along the Loc, the Army installed a simple three tiered system which is used even today. The first tier consisted of border patrol teams which laid ambushes to catch terrorists attempting to cross the LoC. The second tier consisted of a five km belt from the border in which the night curfew was enforced to monitor terrorist's movement. Behind this five km zone, lay the third tier where cordon and search methods were adopted. Depending on the area the size of these tiers varied. For example in some sectors like Kupwara, the second tier stretched to approximately 15 km or even more (Subramanian 2000). Another innovation of the Army, writes Manoj Joshi, was to allow the forward units to lay ambushes across the LoC in Pakistan held territory. This raised the ante for infiltrators since they could not be sure at which point they could be hit. Local commanders utilised this tactic to significantly raise the cost of infiltrations. In fact, according to some estimates, almost 70% of total captures were being made from what was technically on the Pakistani side of LoC (Joshi 1999:146).

As far as the Kashmir Valley is concerned, Army used a mixed approach. The BSF and CRPF had already cleared many urban centres and the Army focussed mainly on rural areas. The 8th Mountain Division launched a number of operations in 1991. The initial target regions were the Wullar lake area and the Srinagar-Leh road. The first operation was on the Western bank of Wullar Lake – ‘Operation Jeet’ between 11 and 17 September 1991 in which seven terrorists were killed and the Hizbul commander Shafi Shah was arrested. A month later, the ‘Operation Vikram’ was launched on the Eastern bank of Wullar Lake which was followed by a third operation – ‘Operation Deer Hunter’ in November 1991 (Joshi 1999:147-51). The striking feature of Army's strategy was the scale of all the operations which involved as many as three brigades at a time and lasted from three days to a week. As far as the tactics are concerned, along with traditional ‘Cordon and Search’ methods, carefully planned and coordinated roadblocks, ambushes and Road Opening Patrols (ROPs) and Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) were used regularly. By the end of 1991, the Army had managed to sanitize a large area, seized a number of lethal weapons like UMGs and Ak-47 Rifles and captured some big terrorists including Abdul Salam Rathar,

the chief of Muslim Janbaaz Force. More importantly, successful Army operations had re-established in the minds of terrorists, their sympathisers and local villagers that the Indian State was still around (Joshi 1999:152-57). When the dust settled, gradually the flow of information also improved resulting in more precise operations.

By 1993, the army had come up with a coherent low intensity conflict doctrine in Jammu and Kashmir. An important component of the doctrine was the establishment of a dedicated CI force for Jammu and Kashmir to fight entrenched insurgents. Keeping this objective in mind, the *Rashtriya Rifles* was formed with two permanent units in Jammu and Kashmir – Victor and Delta. By 1994, 5,000 *Rashtriya Rifles* personnel were deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. The *Rashtriya Rifles* proved to be a highly effective CI force in dealing with the situation and achieved remarkable success. Later on, two more RR units were raised; ‘Romeo’ for Rajouri and Poonch and ‘Kilo’ for Kupwara, Baramula and Srinagar (Chatterjee 2012).

In another significant development, a Unified Command was established in May 1993 to improve and institutionalize the coordination of counter-insurgency operations between the security forces and the civil administration (Kasturi 2012). Chaired by Lieutenant General M.A. Zaki, its mandate was to oversee the tactical and strategic aspect of CI operations while the overall charge of internal security remained with the Ministry of Home Affairs. Although, the Army was given the central role in government’s counterinsurgency strategy, the paramilitary forces also remained active and were assigned a supporting role.

The Army also used ‘Psy-Ops’ to flush the terrorists hiding in populated areas. The first effective use of Psy-Ops was carried out in Sopore in 1993. The operation – code named as ‘Operation Sahayak’ – was launched in October 1993. It was divided into four phases. The first phase started on 7th October; second began on 28th October; third on 26th and the last phase was launched on 20th December. Its aim was to clear the town from terrorists’ control without any collateral damage. Two Army brigades supported by BMP infantry combat vehicles¹⁵ and Mi-25 helicopters were used in this operation. The operation

¹⁵ BMP (*Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty*) was a Soviet amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicle which was first inducted in Indian Army in 1987. Currently more than 900 BMPs, now known as ‘Sarath’, are in active service manufactured at Ordnance Factory Medak. <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/weapons/346-BMP-2.html>

started with the BSF surrounding the entry and exit points to the town. The Army then used loudspeakers to air the message to local residents about possibility of some terrorists infected with the HIV. When terrorists, feeling the heat, attempted to flee, Army moved into the town and after small fire fights, killed 11 terrorists. Over the next two months, the whole town was secured (Joshi 1999:243-44; Subramanian 2000).

With the public order getting restored in Jammu and Kashmir, encouraged by the changing ground situation in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government also began exploring the political possibilities more seriously. The changed terror landscape also influenced Government's decision. The internecine struggle with the Hizb had almost incapacitated the JKLF and though the Hizb had emerged victorious in this struggle, it still had to consolidate its position. The inter group rivalry had not only affected the JKLF and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen but some other smaller groups like Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Muslim Janbaz Force and Al-Jihad were also hit very badly. In fact, almost every terrorist group was in in disarray and looking for a way out of this situation. In the meantime, a section of local Kashmiri's attitude towards the separatist had also beginning to change. Although they still had a soft corner for the slogan of 'azadi', the doubts regarding the methods adopted by terrorists had started creeping in. As Balraj Puri notes, 'The militants lost some of their original élan due to a number of reasons: a continuous proliferation of groups, confusion and division in their ranks regarding their ultimate objective, and Pakistan's changing policy towards different groups of militants' (Balraj Puri quoted in Schofield 2003:172). The changing character and composition of terrorists groups added to this discomfort. Elimination of a number of terrorists in successful military operation had forced terrorist organization to look for new recruits. However, the new recruits were ideologically not that committed and had joined terrorist groups simply because it was considered glamorous. In fact, unlike the previous generation of terrorists, many of them were hardcore criminals or lumpens who had joined the group to keep their criminal gangs running. Because of the criminalisation of terrorist groups, their aura and the bond with local population faded away gradually. The induction of foreign mercenaries and their complete disregard of local cultural sensibilities especially the attempt to restrict the freedom enjoyed by local women so far, further alienated the local population (Chowdhary 2014:18). But most importantly, the vicious cycle of endless violence had started taking its toll on the Kashmiri society. The

local trade was hit, tourists had stopped coming to Jammu and Kashmir, the daily life was disrupted completely and a whole generation had suffered psychologically. Cumulatively it affected almost every family in numerous ways and a sense of fatigue and disillusionment with the terrorist violence had set in.

Encouraged by these developments, the Indian Government began adding political means in its CI measures. The altered strategy had two main components: revival of the mainstream political parties at the grass root level and mainstreaming of the separatist outfits especially the moderate ones. On the Independence Day in 1994, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao announced a slew of political measures related to Jammu and Kashmir. As the first step in this direction, a cabinet committee was formed under the leadership of the Union Minister of State for Home to explore both the options. He constituted a new team of bureaucrats to assist Governor Krishna Rao, two senior IAS officers (Ashok Jaitley and Wajahat Habibullah) and Lieutenant General M.A. Zaki. To show the humane face of government, various steps were also taken. These included – stopping random search on check posts, strict implementation of rules during cordon and search operations, strengthening of grievance redressal mechanisms, rehabilitation centres for people experiencing psychological trauma etc. The government also announced an economic package for Jammu and Kashmir. On the political front; Rajesh Pilot cajoled Farooq Abdullah to come back into state's politics and released detained top separatist leaders like Shabir Shah, Syed Ali Shah Gilani, Abdul Gani Lone and Yasin Malik. The Government also took steps to address the allegations of human rights violations by introducing some legal measures like the Protection of Human Rights Bill (1993). Though international human rights organisations were still not allowed to visit the state, delegation of various embassies including USA, UK and Middle Eastern countries were appraised of the situation.

Most importantly, as one analyst noted, 'the components of human rights sensitization were introduced in the training of the army and paramilitary forces to make counterinsurgency operations more humane and people friendly'(Chowdhary 2014:18). However, despite many successes, Government's CI policy was still erratic and inconsistent and was plagued by many problems – from personality clashes and weak coordination to operational hiccups. In the Ministry of Home Affairs, the cabinet Minister S.B. Chavan and the state

Minister Rajesh Pilot were at odds with each other on almost every issue – be it the negotiations with separatists, the timing of assembly elections or to bring Farooq Abdullah back in Kashmir's politics (Behera 2000:187). However, the more serious differences were on the issue of granting more autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. Pilot wanted to announce it before assembly election as a confidence building measure while Chavan was not open to the idea of granting more autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir, especially before elections. Jammu and Kashmir Governor Krishna Rao's inaccessibility to the state administration and his differences with both S.B. Chavan were adding to this disarray. On the other hand, the Unified Command that was created to ensure better coordination between various security agencies and the politico-civil administration had become hostage of inter-services rivalry. Similarly, tensions had also emerged between the civil bureaucracy and security forces. In fact, as Behera notes, one wing of the government did not know what the other was doing, or worse, they were working at cross-purposes (Behera 2000:187).

Government's initiative of mainstreaming the moderates among separatists had also failed to yield desired results due to terrorists' strategy of thwarting every attempt to revive the political process. Assassination of Dr Abdul Ahad Guru, a JKLF ideologue, by Hizbul Mujahideen in 1993 had clearly sent message to every separatist outfit that anybody who disagreed would be punished severely. However, despite all the chaos and far from satisfactory outcome of political initiatives, the Government had finally set the ball rolling.

4. Third Phase: Towards a Full Fledged Political Process:

The hallmark of fourth phase was the primacy of political measures in Government's counter insurgency policy. By the mid 1990s, effective counter terrorism measures and internal contradictions within the terrorists' ranks had reduced the intensity of terror campaign. The initial euphoria of local public support had evaporated and fatigue had started setting in. The effectiveness of the counterinsurgency operations gave Indian government the confidence to explore possibility of holding elections in Jammu and Kashmir in 1996. However, despite the declining trend in terror campaign, holding elections was still quite a bold step in the given situation. For one, although the aversion towards violence had created a space for political action, it still did not have much room as yet for full fledged mainstream politics. Still suffering from the loss of credibility, the mainstream politicians were seen as betraying the 'cause' by the locals (Chowdhary and

Rao 2003:15-21). Also, the ascendance of a culture of violence had rendered irrelevant not only the mainstream political parties but even the separatist political forces. Political parties were also apprehensive of holding election at this point. They were not sure of how people will respond to elections – weather they will participate or boycott the election. There was also the threat from terrorists who were determined to thwart any initiative to restore the political order. Years of targeted killings of political workers had wrecked the cadre base of every political party in Jammu and Kashmir and a return to the political process and contesting elections was not that easy.

However, by now, policy makers had realised that to defeat separatist tendencies in Jammu and Kashmir, the root causes of alienation have to be addressed. Despite the enormity of challenges ahead, Indian government decided to proceed towards restoring political governance and took multiple steps in this regard. Signalling a qualitative shift in government's policy, the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao announced maximum autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir to the extent that 'only the sky is the limit' (Ahmed 2000). With this announcement, government intended to project 'maximum autonomy' as a substitute for '*azadi*' (Chowdhary 2014:24). Later, when the United Front Government came to power in 1996, the defence Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav visited Jammu and Kashmir to persuade Kashmiri political parties to contest elections; he further assured them that the aspirations of people of Jammu and Kashmir would be given the highest priority. In addition, the Government also successfully convinced a section of separatists especially the surrendered terrorists to participate in the electoral process. Many of these surrendered terrorists were quite strong in their areas of influence, especially in the Northern Kashmir. Two such political outfits were Kukka Parrey of the Awami League and Hilal Haider of Awami Conference (Chowdhary 2014:24).

In absolute terms, the 1996 Assembly elections were a success for the Indian government. Having a democratically elected government in state served many purposes and strengthened government's position considerably. First, it initiated the process of restoration of political forces in state's politics and helped in filling up the political vacuum. Second, by holding elections the government was able to bring about a change from administrative to 'political governance.' Third, although the Hurriyat conference had boycotted the elections, many separatist leaders had contested the assembly elections and

the fact that a mainstream, pro accession political party like the National conference was able to get majority significantly diluted Hurriyat's claim of being the sole representative of people's will in Jammu and Kashmir. Fourth, though the 1996 elections were marred by the violence; it was accepted as a relatively free and fair election by the international community and thus was a great relief for the government which was facing charges of human rights violations and rigged elections so far.

Along with the elections, steps like release of prisoners also generated positivity by signalling a departure in government's earlier policy of treating the entire separatist spectrum as homogenous and that the government is willing to distinguish between terrorists and separatists. As Chowdhary notes, it not only created a political space within the separatist camp controlled so far by terrorists but also helped in changing the local discourse vis-à-vis the terrorists and put public pressure on them to negotiate. Already facing heat from the security agencies, the popular support for negotiated settlement forced terrorists to retreat and alter their methods in order to avoid public displeasure (Chowdhary 2014:26).

After the formation of National Conference government in Jammu Kashmir, economic reconstruction was taken on a priority basis by the new government. Jammu and Kashmir was always dependent on generous aid and loans from central government and the destruction of infrastructure due to years of violence had increased it further (Planning Commission of India 2003). Especially the job creation and employment for youth required urgent steps because terrorists used to lure new recruits from this very section of society. Keeping this in mind, the newly formed state government announced a package of 26,000 jobs in 1997-98 (Planning Commission of India 2000: 113). Various other special packages for the youth were also announced by the central and state governments, for instance, Jammu and Kashmir Self-Employment Scheme, Swarna Jayanti Shahri Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY), and Swarna Jayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojna (SGSY). To give a boost to industries, the New Industrial Policy of 1998 was also announced (Government of India 2003; Yasmeen 2015; Chowdhary 2014:27).

Despite these successes, the government continued to face various challenge. For one, the heavy deployment of security forces during elections had led to the allegation of rigging and coercion. Also, though the terrorist campaign was contained to some extent, the

separatist tendencies were still prevailing and the mass sentiment had not changed qualitatively yet. On the military front, though the security forces had achieved considerable success against terrorist groups, the changing nature of terrorist campaign was posing new challenges for security forces. As the local terrorist groups became ineffective, Pakistan changed the gears and battle hardened foreign terrorist took the charge of terror campaign in Jammu and Kashmir. The theatre of their activities was also expanded beyond the Kashmir Valley and the area south of Pir Panjal has emerged as the new battle ground (Kanwal 1999).

The Government responded to these challenges accordingly through appropriate military measures. To counter terrorist challenge in Jammu region, the Army launched 'Operation Shatrugjeet' on 30 July 1996 in which seven militants were killed including the Hizbul commander Farooq Ahmed Lone. The operation was led by the second regiment of the Parachute Regiment (2 Para). In next seventeen months, the unit carried out as many as 93 operations based on precise intelligence inputs in which almost forty foreign terrorists were killed (Joshi 1999:408). In an innovative move, the Government also brought in Marine Commando (MARCO) units of Indian Navy in Jammu and Kashmir. Their expertise and assistance proved to be immensely effective in the riverine terrains of J&K (Hiranandani 2009:82). The Government also involved local residents to blunt the terror campaign in Jammu region. The villages of Doda and Udhampur had thousands of ex-service personnel who became the core of an innovative institution the Village defence Committees (VDC). As most of the districts of Jammu region had settlements scattered over vast mountainous terrain, providing security to them was extremely strenuous for the Army. Creating VDCs by arming villagers for self defence was considered as a more practical option. Conceived by the former Director General of Police Kuldeep Kumar Khoda, each committee was headed by an ex-serviceman who was given the rank of a Special Police Officer (SPO) and a monthly salary of Rs. 1500. The security forces provided military training to locals, and equipped them with weapons like the single shot Lee-Enfield Rifles to protect themselves and wireless sets to contact security forces in case of a terrorist attack (*Indian Express* 1998). The VDCs proved to be quite effective in countering terrorism in remote areas where there were no police or army pickets near villages. The VDC concept worked so effectively in Doda district that more than 600 such

committees were created very soon. Encouraged by the success in Doda, the VDCs were extended to Udhampur, Poonch and Rajouri districts as well (*Indian Express* 1998).

Another important component of Government's COIN operation in this phase was the use of surrendered terrorists (known as *Ikhwanis* or renegades) for CI operations. By the end of 1995, almost 5000 terrorists had surrendered before the security forces. In fact, some 800 terrorists had laid down their arms in 1995 alone (Joshi 1999: 426). With an increasing number of surrenders taking place, the Government began systematically to organize these militants into counterinsurgency teams to attack and wipe out terrorist infrastructure. Kukka Parrey became the symbol of this phenomenon (Behera 2000:199). A major reason for using *Ikhwanis* was also the need to protect surrendered terrorists from their former terrorist colleagues (Joshi 1999:426). The surrendered terrorists were mainly ethnic Kashmiris with an ideological commitment to an independent Kashmir. With the changing nature of terrorism, they were feeling isolated and disillusioned with the dominance of pro-Pakistan hardliners. Also, in the internal struggle for dominance, pro-Pakistan and Islamist Hizbul Mujahideen had killed scores of terrorists from pro-independence terrorist organisation like Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Al-Jehad. Most of the *Ikhwanis* belonged to these very groups who were at the receiving end of Hizb onslaught.

The initiative for rehabilitation of surrendered Kashmiri terrorists was launched in August 1995. The main plank of this initiative was to offer incentives to those who wanted to give up the gun. For each UMG/GPMG the Government offered Rs. 8000, for An AK-47, Rs 5000, for short wave radio set, Rs.2000, and Rs 1000 for smaller arms and explosive devices. Additional incentives were offered for providing actionable real-time intelligence against their former colleagues. Vocational training for future gainful employment was also offered (Sahukar 2015: 367). A number of surrendered terrorists were inducted into special units of Jammu and Kashmir Police and used in operations against pro-Pakistan terrorist groups. 'It was the logic of setting a thief to catch a thief that lay behind the Indian army's strategy of using the surrendered militants to fight the Pakistan-supported militant groups in the Valley. They knew who was who in the various militant groups and understood the mind of the militant far better than the armed forces did' wrote Sudha Ramachandran quoting a senior Army officer (Ramachandran 2003). *Ikhwanis* proved very useful in counter-insurgency operations especially in the Northern Kashmir where security forces

were able to put Hizbul Mujahideen on the back foot with the help of *Ikhwanis*. Later many of these groups also formed their own political parties and contested elections.

However, while the *Ikhwanis* proved useful in CI operations, there was also a downside of using the surrendered militants: their extra-legal power and lack of accountability that further muddied the already complex situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Working under the tutelage of security forces but without any institutional oversight and accountability, *Ikhwanis* soon began using their unbridled power to further their own agenda. Many such renegades were found involved in criminal activities like killing, extortion from local businessmen, running drug cartels and harassment of civilians population (Swami 1999). Numerous high-profile political killings were also attributed to them (Ramachandran 2003). As the Amnesty International reported quoting Gurbachan Jagat (DGP, JK Police), that ‘the utility of the renegades is over and their continued services was proving to be counter-productive in view of reports of excesses during the operations’ (Amnesty International 1999:6).

Another element of government’s evolving counter terrorism strategy was the revitalisation of the Jammu and Kashmir Police. For years, the J&K Police had bore the brunt of terrorist onslaught and was morally shattered. Ranks of local police were also either infiltrated by the separatists or had lost the will to fight back. There was a growing realisation among policy makers that to fight the terror campaign in Jammu and Kashmir, the local Police needs to be revitalised. The first step in this direction was setting up two battalion of Special Task Force (STF) in J&K Police in 1994. Special Operation Groups (SOG) under the state CID was set up in each district of the state to lead police operations. On the pattern of Punjab Police’s CI strategy, a system of cash rewards was also announced for important catches (Joshi 1999:428). The revitalised STF-SOG began to play an aggressive role ant- terror operation at local level. The SOG achieved a big success in October 1994 when three Al-Fateh terrorists were killed in a joint operation with the 26 Punjab Regiment at *Koil Muqam* and the Jihad Force's cheif, Bashir Ahmad was arrested (Swami 1998c). By the end of 1995, the J&K police had helped in killing more than 50 hard core terrorists and arrest of almost 500 terrorists (Joshi 1999:429).The SOG also played a vital role during the seize of Hazratbal shrine by terrorists in 1996 (Swami 1998c).

Among its more innovative tactics was the recruitment of key members of terrorist groups to act along with police formations in counter-terrorist operations (Bose 2016; Saini 2000).

However, scarcity of resources and personnel were a major constrain in expanding SOG activity. Its operation capabilities got a boost only after Gurbachan Jagat's appointment as the State's Director-General of Police in 1997. Around 12,000 Special Police Officers (SPOs) were hired on contracts basis at local level. Many of these SPOs were former terrorists and proved very effective in dealing with terrorism because of their knowledge of local terrain and terrorist network. The local intelligence witnessed a dramatic increase specifically and villagers started reporting to SPOs on the movement of terrorist groups. The SOG also helped in elimination of the Tehreek ul-Mujahideen as well as killing of Haji Arif and Riyaz Ahmad 'Karimullah' of Harkat-ul-Ansar (Swami 1998c). The SOG's proved to be equally effective in the Jammu region. Working with the Army and the BSF in joint operations in Poonch and Rajouri, the SOG units killed 130 terrorists in between 1995 and 1997 (Swami 1998c). Although the SOG proved very effective in counterinsurgency operations owing to its local intelligence network; like the renegades, it was also criticised for using excessive force and abuse of power.

The above criticism notwithstanding, Government's CI strategy during this phase proved effective not only in tackling the terror campaign but also in creating a situation where the political vacuum existing since the onset of terrorism could be filled. Restoration of political order through an elected government was an important step forward towards addressing the local alienation and though it was still contested by the separatists, the reclaimed political space had the potential of further expansion and democratization of state's polity (Chowdhary 2014:26).

5. Fourth Phase: Winning Hearts and Minds


As mentioned earlier, by 1995-96, the old Kashmiri terrorist groups were replaced by a new professional generation of hardcore foreign terrorists. However, despite terrorists' changing tactics, Indian security forces had out-manoeuvred and almost decimated them. Having dealt with the military aspect of terrorism successfully, the government now extended the ambit of the counterinsurgency policy and focussed its attention on human aspect of counter-terrorism.

Learning lessons from previous operations, which reinforced conviction about the importance of minimum use of force and ‘winning hearts and minds’, the government, from 1997 onwards started implementing the strategy of what a former Army chief General J.J.Singh termed the ‘iron fist in a velvet glove’ (Unnithan 2007). The strategy that was adopted had three crucial components:

- Civic action and development works,
- People-friendly Military operations, and
- Perception management.

Conceptually the idea of WHAM was not limited to people-friendly operations, civic actions or managing perceptions only but also involved the entire process of governance, the factor of alienation and its impact on Kashmiri society (Bhonsle 2009:14).

**Figure 1:
Three Pronged Approach to WHAM**



(Bhonsle 2009:15)

On the ground, this strategy was executed through the *Operation Sadbhavana*.

Operation Sadhbhavana: Launched with the tagline ‘*Jawan Aur Awam, Aman Hai Muqaam*’ in 1998 as a part of Government’s policy of WHAM, the operation Sadhbhavana was aimed at achieving two goals: first, to take the initiative back from the terrorists and second, integration of local Kashmiri population with the rest of India (Anant 2011:14;

Indian Army 2009). Additionally, it was expected that winning the trust of local population will also help in getting useful intelligence. These goals were to be achieved by restoring the destroyed infrastructure in the decade long terrorist violence and through human resource development in Jammu and Kashmir. At the core of WHAM was the belief that 'human security is the key element of national security, which can be achieved through human and infrastructure development' (Anant 2011:14).

The operation *Sadbhavana* was a logical culmination of operational learning and innovation in India's evolving counterinsurgency practices. For instance, the success of Indian Army's people-centric programmes under *Op Samaritan* in North East India strengthened the belief that counterinsurgency is primarily a political endeavour and that the Army's role should be supportive in nature. In addition, it also demonstrated that military success could be achieved with minimal use of force also and that winning hearts and minds of local population ensures better results politically. Secondly, it was also felt that the counterinsurgency operations should address the concerns of human rights groups which till then were severely critical of 'excessive use of force' in counterinsurgency operations (Anant 2011:11).

With these factors in mind, the Operation *Sadbhavana* was initially launched in rural areas of Jammu and Kashmir for capacity building through community/infrastructure development projects. The priority areas were: Education, Women & Youth Empowerment, Health care, Water Supply Schemes and Electrification in remote areas. The underlying theme, according to Indian Army, was 'to blunt Pakistan sponsored anti India propaganda and facilitate all around development based on a participative model involving the local people, Army and the civil administration' (Indian Army 2009).

The general principles guiding *Operation Sadbhavana* were:

- Instead of Top-Down a Bottom-Up approach for high impact
- Decentralised Planning and implementation of programmes
- Self empowerment of people;
- Sustainability;
- Integration of civic activities with state administration, and
- Respect of local religion, culture and tradition (Anant 2011:15).

Based on these guidelines, in the next few years, several kinds of projects were initiated under this project. These included building schools, Orphanages/Hostels, Women Empowerment Centres, Computer Training Centres, Community Development Centres, Model Villages, Educational Tour, Water Supply Project, Projects for Gujjar/Bakkerwal Community and Health Care Facilities. Initially the projects under *Operation Sadbhavna* were funded by the Ministry of Defence but later on funding for several projects was secured from the private sector also (Indian Army 2009). Some other supplementary programmes that complemented *Operation Sadbhavana* and were launched subsequently over the years were – *Operation Sangam*: sending Kashmiri children to visit other states of India; *Operation Maitree*: bringing children from different states of India to Jammu and Kashmir; *Operation Ujala*: rebuilding schools that were destroyed by terrorists and *Siraj-un-Nisa*: providing elementary computer and typing skills to women (Anant 2011:12).

Overall, Operation Sadbhavana played a limited but significant role in the transformation of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. As some later studies revealed that it not only helped in creating a comfort level between the security forces and local population in Jammu and Kashmir, it also dispelled the notion that the Army and locals were locked in an antagonistic relationship in Jammu and the Kashmir Valley (Anant 2011:34).

5.1: Improving Media Relations and Perception Management

In the initial phases of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, a section of local media was supportive of the separatism. Though increasing attacks on journalists and media houses by terrorists alienated the local press later, many of them were still very critical of government's alleged use of excessive force. Also, the allegations of human rights violation had done a great harm to the reputation of security forces. To effectively counter these charges and to improve security forces image (especially in the local media), a concerted effort was made in this phase of counter insurgency (Sahukar 2015).

After the Kargil war to counter false rumours and terrorist propaganda against the Indian government (especially security forces), Public Information Directorate was established at Army Headquarters in 1999. To begin with, several prominent local journalists were provided security protection against threats from terrorist organizations. Media persons from outside the state of Jammu and Kashmir (including the international

media) were also invited to Jammu and Kashmir to see the actual situation on the ground and evidences of Pakistani involvement in Jammu and Kashmir through seized weapons and documents from terrorists were given to them. Efforts were also made to use Internet in neutralizing jihadi websites and a website was launched to counter Islamist ideology and highlight the positive aspects of the Indian approach (Sahukar 2015:31). Government also established an Information Warfare Directorate to strengthen cyber security and took many steps to counter the Pakistani propaganda against India. A regional subsidiary channel of Doordarshan, 'DD *Kashir*' was also launched with a focus on highlighting syncretic Kashmiri culture and heritage.¹⁶

5.2: Peace Initiatives and Confidence Building Measures

So far, Government's response to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir was built around military and political measures. Once the war against terrorism was won militarily and the political order was restored, the ambit of counterinsurgency policy was also broadened and an effort was made to include diplomatic means to achieve durable peace in Jammu and Kashmir. In 1997, India took the initiative of engaging Pakistan and a composite dialogue was initiated with Islamabad. Moving away from their rigid positions both the countries agreed to discuss all outstanding issues – including Jammu and Kashmir (Lyon 2008; Noorani 2007). Though the peace process initiated during I.K. Gujral's tenure came to a halt after the nuclear tests by both the countries in 1998, a new opening was again made during Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Lahore in 1999. During this visit, both prime ministers signed the 'Lahore Declaration' and a commitment was made to resolve all the issues between India and Pakistan (Government of India 1999). However, while the Lahore Declaration was being signed, the Pakistan Army was busy planning an incursion in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir which eventually erupted in a war between India

¹⁶Although both the Information Warfare Directorate and the DD *Kashir* were launched in 2003, the proposal was initiated after the Kargil War. In fact, technically DD *Kashir* was launched on 15 August 2000 from the Delhi Doordarshan Kendra. It became a 24 hour channel in 2003 and was shifted to the Srinagar studio of Doordarshan.

For details about the Information Warfare Directorate, see Harsh V Pant (2016) 'Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines' page 180 and 'Army proposes information warfare directorate' <http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/apr/28josy.htm>

For DD *Kashir*, see (Rasool 2012: 183) and a news report 'DD *Kashir* to air 24/7 from 15 August' <http://www.indiantelevision.com/headlines/y2k3/apr/apr148.htm>

and Pakistan. After recapturing the Indian territory successfully, the Indian government once again made efforts to ease tensions between the two countries but an attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, carried out by Pakistan backed terrorists, scuttled the peace process once again (Chowdhary 2014:29; Ganguly and Kapur 2012:54).

Despite constant hostility from Pakistan, the Indian government kept exploring the ways to constructively engage with Pakistan. Although many security experts in India were quite critical of such efforts, government's efforts were driven by a number of reasons, both domestic and external. After the successful economic reforms introduced in 1991-92, India's economy was on an upward trajectory and to maintain its economic growth, a peaceful neighbourhood was a pre-requisite. India was also seeking a more assertive role in a rapidly evolving international order and did not want to remain bogged down in a protracted conflict with Pakistan. Domestically, there was an increasing realisation even within the Army that military means can help in resolving crisis in Jammu and Kashmir only to a certain point and that it would need a political solution ultimately. Enunciating Army's stance on this issue, successive Army Chiefs like General V.P. Malik and General Padmanabhan had categorically said that the Kashmir issue could not be resolved through military means only and had emphasised the need for political initiatives to address the root cause of alienation (Noorani 2000:3949-3958). At the same time, the changed political dynamics and public resentment against the vicious cycle of violence had forced separatist leaders also to be more flexible and open to the offer of dialogue from India Government. Many separatist leaders like Abdul Gani Lone, Shabir Shah and Yasin Malik were openly critical of Pakistan's attempt to hijack the Kashmir 'cause' and were willing to participate in the dialogue process for the resolution of Kashmir issue. Even the hardliners like the Hizbul Mujahideen had also offered a unilateral ceasefire. As far as the Pakistan is concerned, the increasing international pressure after the Kargil fiasco and multiple crises on domestic front were forcing it to recalibrate the policy of intervention in Jammu and Kashmir through non-state actors.

By the end of 1999, strong voices in favour of political resolution to the Kashmir issue had started emerging – both domestically and internationally. Taking cognizance of these voices, the Indian government offered to talk to the local terrorist organizations if they reject the violence (Chowdhary 2014:33). Although many steps that were initiated

during this phase came to fruition much later – like the ceasefire offer by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in July 2000 and a ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan in 2003 – a clear shift from singular track security-centric counterinsurgency approach to a much broader and nuanced politico-diplomatic response had already begun taking shape. Through all these measures, though the terrorist groups were tamed to a large extent, yet, a durable peace in Jammu and Kashmir remained elusive. Partly, it was due to inconsistency in the counterinsurgency policies and some internal contradictions. But the factor that kept the pot simmering in Jammu and Kashmir was a constant external intervention from across the border.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Since the outbreak of terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir in 1988-89, it has gone through various phases. Initial sporadic acts of political violence were followed by a well organised guerrilla war that soon blossomed into a full blown insurgency. When the insurgency lost its support base and appeal, it was replaced by a low intensity proxy war fought by religious zealots from across the border that soon got transformed into almost a full scale war between India and Pakistan in 1999. Ideologically too, it has seen many twists and turns. The comparatively non communal slogans of Azadi were replaced by the cries of Islamic jihad and '*Kashmir banega Pakistan*' and ultimately a localised conflict became part of the worldwide global jihad incorporation. However, one variable remained constant throughout the terror campaign – a continuous external support from across the border, both overt and covert.

Though the discreet Pakistani support to Kashmiri separatists had started in the mid 1980s, since 1988, along with diplomatic and political support, Pakistan has explicitly funded, armed and trained almost every terrorist organizations working against India. The extent of support has been so huge that despite not declaring Pakistan as a terrorist state, the US State Department's report on Patterns of Global Terrorism (2001) specifically identified Pakistan as the chief sponsor of terrorist groups fighting in Jammu and Kashmir (U.S. Department of State 2001:10-11).

1. The Nature of the Support: Pakistani assistance to Kashmiri terrorists has been wide ranging, from training, logistical, financial to doctrinal support.

1.1: Training and Logistics:

All the leading Kashmiri terrorist groups fighting in Jammu and Kashmir had bases in Pakistan. The JKLF was originally established in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), Hizb-ul-Mujahedin was based in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province; Lashkar-e-Taiba had its headquarter in Muridke and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin and Jaish-e-Mohammad were based in Muzaffarabad in PoK (Schofield 2003:153). To train these groups, Pakistan used the infrastructure it had set up in the 1980s to support the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan (Byman 2005). According to the Jane's Intelligence Review, in 2001, at least 91 terrorist training camps were operational in PoK alone, mostly in the districts of Kupwara, Baramulla, Poonch, Rajauri and Jammu (Chalk 2001). These camps were not

confined to PoK only and as reported by the *TIME* magazine, in fact, spread everywhere in Pakistan, from border areas in North-West Frontier Province to mainland Punjab, where all sorts of training was given to Kashmiri terrorists (Hasnain 2001). Describing the nature of training in detail, the *TIME* correspondent mentioned two types of training modules: basic courses focused on elementary weapons handling and training that were of 3-4 months of duration, and an advance course for more experienced terrorists that was more elaborate, longer and focused on specialised skills in sophisticated arms handling and sabotage (Hasnain 2001). He further wrote that these camps were often located near major military establishments and were managed and run primarily through two sub-divisions of the ISI's Operations Branch: Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) and Joint Intelligence North (JIN). In these camps, training was given not only by the Afghan war veterans and retired Pakistani army officers, but also by regular Pakistan military officers (Hasnain 2001). The ISI also helped terrorists cross the line of control from base camps in Pakistan by providing covering fire to distract Indian troops (Wirsing 1998:120). For better coordination and planning between various terrorist groups, a United Jihad Council was also formed by Pakistan. Not only Kashmiri terrorists but Pakistan also facilitated foreign mercenaries to fight in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan government worked with the Taliban and with international jihadist organizations such as Al-Qaida to send foreign terrorists to Kashmir (Rashid 2000:173). As per the Government of data, by 2001, over 60 percent of the terrorists fighting in Jammu and Kashmir were foreign mercenaries. In fact, after 1997, the number of foreign terrorists fighting in Jammu and Kashmir witnessed a drastic increase. Whereas between 1989 and 1997 the number of foreign terrorists killed was 673, between 1998 and 2000 1,102 foreign terrorists were killed in Jammu and Kashmir (Chalk 2001; Government of India 2004).¹⁷

1.2: Financing the Terrorists:

In addition to direct material support to terror groups, Pakistan helped them in getting financial support as well. Although, there is no authentic estimate about how much money Pakistan actually directly spent on Kashmiri terrorist groups, many analysts have given

¹⁷ The Annual Report of Ministry of Home Affairs mentions that almost 2500 foreign militants died in Kashmir between 1989 and 2001. Government of India, Annual Report, 2003–2004, p 12, Available at: http://mha.nic.in/hindi/sites/upload_files/mhahindi/files/pdf/ar0304-Eng.pdf

their estimates. The Janes Intelligence Review, in a report in 2001, claimed that the ISI used to spend between 125-250 million US dollars a year to cover salaries for terrorists and provide support to family members of killed terrorists (Chalk 2001). Likewise, Khitiz Prabha on the basis of personal interaction with terrorists and drug traffickers concluded that Pakistan spent approximately 20 to 30 Crores a month on payment to terrorists alone. Further, she wrote that almost Rs. 15-20 Lakhs were given to terrorist leaders per month, while for Afghan veterans new recruits, this amount was 3-5 lakhs and 15-20 thousands per month respectively (Prabha 2001:1885). Some other analysts mention that the ISI also helped to fund terrorist proxies through the circulation of counterfeit currency¹⁸ and by laundering profits gained from the narcotic trade (Hudson 2002:7-9; Prabha 2001:1886). Pakistan also helped terrorist organization in channelizing foreign donations through Pakistani banks. Most of these donations came from gulf countries in the name of religious or charitable trusts who despite being banned internationally, were allowed to function in Pakistan. For instance, the Hizb Chief, Syed Salahuddin, was found to be involved in using a charity organization called Jammu and Kashmir Affectees Relief Trust (JAKART) for funnelling more than Rs 100 Crores in J&K. While the funds were meant for relief, they were used for financing terrorism in the state (Chaddha 2015:41; Tripathi 2012). Many of these payments were channelized through notorious banks like the Habib Bank and the BCCI (Kerry and Brown 1992). Rahimyar Khan, a small town in southern Punjab where every year thousands of wealthy Arabs come for hunting, was also used as a hub for coordinating such activities (Chalk 2001).

1.3: Ideological Indoctrination

In addition to the military and financial assistance, the ideological indoctrination and guidance/directives to Kashmiri terrorists was also given by Pakistan. A vast network of Madrasas spread across the country was used for this purpose. Many of these Madrasas were affiliated to the conservative *Deobandi* or even more fundamentalist Ahl-i-Hadith

¹⁸Though initially, intelligence agencies could not find concrete proof of terror financing by Pakistan, gradually with strengthening of CT apparatus, many cases of counterfeit currency came to light. Indian agencies achieved a major breakthrough when they caught some members of Hizbul Mujahideen who were involved circulation of counterfeit currency which was received from Malda in West Bengal. For more details, see Chaddha (2015:49) and National Investigation Agency Chargesheet in this matter (RC/07/2011/NIA/DLI) dated July16, 2011.

Available at: http://nia.gov.in/writereaddata/press_16072011.pdf

school of thought in Pakistan which treat jihad as an obligation for Muslims. In these Madrasas, students were exhorted to fulfil their moral obligation by fighting for their Muslim brethren subjugated by a 'Hindu India'. Some of the most notorious Madrasas that were used as a base for proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir were the *Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania* at Akora Khattak; the *Markaz-ad-Da'awa-wal-Irshad* at Murdike; the *Dar-ul-Loom* at Pashtoonabad; the *Dar-ul-Iftah-ul-Irshad* at Nazimabad; and the *Ahle-Sunnat-wal-Jammat* at Rawalpindi (Chalk 2001). All of these Madrasas were part of a jihadist umbrella spanned across Pakistan and close operational links with terrorist organizations of all hue.

For instance, the *Markaz-ad-Da'awa-wal-Irshad* was the main recruiting centre for the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorists were trained at *Dar-ul-Iftah-ul-Irshad* and the *Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania* was a nursery for Taliban (Ganguly 2003:58; Siddiqua 2014). Commenting on this linkage, Pakistani journalist, Zahid Hussain, wrote that in 2003 he saw 'thousands of students in a seminary were chanting the slogans of jihad while a message from the Taliban chief Mullah Mohammad Omar was being read out' (Hussain 2016).

2. The Support Structure for Terrorist Groups:

To carry out the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan used various mechanisms. In many cases, the support structure that was created for Afghan Jihad was simply modified accordingly to achieve Pakistan's objectives in Jammu and Kashmir. Over a period of time, some of these mechanisms also acquired an autonomous/ independent existence.

The pivots to the support structure created by Pakistan Army were various Islamist groups that had emerged as a result of Pakistan Islamization project started during Zia's regime. Though, many scholars believe that the Islamization of Pakistan had started way before General Zia assumed power (Jamal 2009; Haqqani 2005), however, the prominence of Islamist groups in Pakistani society and politics increased exponentially during Zia ul Haq rule. Pakistan Government initially used these groups in its efforts to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and after the Soviet withdrawal, the same groups were directed towards Jammu and Kashmir. For instance, the *Jamiat-e-Islami* party, which had close ties with Gulbeddin Hikmatyar's *Hizb-e-Islami* and Burhanuddin Rabbani's *Jamiat-e-Islami* during Afghan war, also operated training camps for Kashmiri terrorists, particularly the *Hizb-ul-Mujahedin* (Haqqani 2005). The *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islami* (JUI), a Deobandi

organization that controls more than 60% of Madrasas in Pakistan had similar links with Taliban, especially the Haqqani network. The JUI started working closely with the Pakistan Army and in 1993, formed an alliance with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, an organisation made up of mainly foreign terrorists. Lashkar-e-Taiba is the militant wing of Markaz-ud-Dawa that was closely involved in Afghan war. The JUI and other religious groups run more than 40,000 Madrasas which, Jessica Stern terms as ‘schools of hate’ that supply the labour for jihad (Stern 2000).

According to some observers, the successive Pakistan Governments had created a support structure with a very effective division of labour for all the actors involved in this endeavour. The recruitment and basic training was assigned to domestic militant organizations while providing weapons and advanced training was provided by the Pakistani intelligence. The Pakistani Army then helped them to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir and provided targets and operational guidance along with other forms of assistance (Khan 2003:38-40; Fair 2007:107-134). These structures kept functioning despite constant changes in government as they enjoyed support from Pakistani government and various sections of society including traditional ruling elites, religious parties, and military officials. It also allowed the Pakistani regimes to maintain a plausible deniability about their support for cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Though Pakistani officials always denied their involvement in Jammu and Kashmir by saying that Pakistan’s support to separatists in Kashmir is only at the moral and diplomatic levels, most of the scholars question Pakistan’s claim. As Robert Wirsing notes after reviewing various Pakistani denials of assistance, ‘when all is said and done, however, there is very little likelihood that many infiltrators have made their way across the LoC (line of control) into Indian Kashmir without the knowledge and active cooperation of the Pakistan army, of the Afghanistan-seasoned ISI, and, indeed, of key elements in the civil bureaucracies of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir’ (Wirsing 1998:120).

3. Pakistan’s Motivations

Pakistan’s support to terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir can be attributed to a variety of strategic and domestic political objectives.

3.1. Strategic Motivations:

Strategically, Pakistan always aspired to secure Jammu and Kashmir's merger with Pakistan. For Pakistani leaders, Kashmir has remained an unfinished agenda of partition, as for Pakistan, Kashmir rightfully belonged to her due to its Muslim majority. Successive Pakistani regimes have described Kashmir as the jugular vein of Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistani leaders also believed that by winning Jammu and Kashmir, they would secure a 'strategic depth' in the broader conflict with India. Such depth is seen as particularly important in case of a two front conflict, with India on its eastern border and Afghanistan on its western border. International Crisis Group, in its report, suggests another rationale given by Pakistani leaders that getting hold of Jammu and Kashmir is also vital for protecting Punjab, Pakistan's most-populated province, in case of a conflict with India (International Crisis Group 2003:11). For some Pakistani analysts, the Kashmir's geo-strategic location is also significant. Jammu and Kashmir borders with China and is also geographically close to Central Asia. Pakistan's major rivers, the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab also flow through Jammu and Kashmir making it crucial for Pakistan's survival (Malik 2002:208).

Because of these reasons, Pakistan, since 1947, made various attempt to snatch Jammu and Kashmir from India and fought two wars with India, first in 1947-48 and then in 1965 when it used irregulars backed by army troops, across the Ceasefire Line to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir through the 'Operation Gibraltar'. The attempt, however, failed to persuade Kashmiris to revolt against India and as a report from International Crisis Group indicates, in fact, Kashmiris either supported India or remained neutral (International Crisis Group 2003:4). After Pakistan's comprehensive defeat in 1971, the balance of power got tilted in India's favour all the more and Pakistan's prospects of winning Jammu and Kashmir through a direct war simply vanished. Since then, Pakistan, instead of a direct all out war, began using non-state actors to achieve its objectives. In addition to secure Kashmir's merger with Pakistan, there are objectives as well that influence Pakistan's policy of proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir. One of these is 'bleeding India through a thousand cuts'. For many Pakistani military leaders, writes Daniel Byman, bogging India down in Jammu and Kashmir is a means to achieve strategic balance in an asymmetric equation that is tilted heavily in India's favour (Byman 2005:174). Sumit Ganguly also

supports this view and argues that in 1989 (the year when insurgency erupted in Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan saw an excellent opportunity to impose significant material and other costs on India without much repercussions for Pakistan (Ganguly 2013:92). By supporting terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan also aims to keep the relationship between Delhi and Srinagar complicated and shaky. Moreover, it also helps Pakistan in drawing the international attention to the Kashmir conflict.

However, to avoid retaliation from India, Pakistan always tries to keep the intensity of its proxy war below a certain threshold level. Pakistan's attempt at acquiring nuclear capability was precisely driven by this factor as a nuclear umbrella practically provides immunity to Pakistan from India's possible counter attack. This thinking has been articulated by many Pakistani leaders. For instance, retired Army chief of Pakistan, Mirza Aslam Beg wrote in the *News International*, 'India cannot dare attack Pakistan because of the fear of a nuclear strike which will render a vast proportion of its conventional army ineffective' (Beg 1999).

3.2. Domestic Politics:

In addition to the strategic variables, domestic factors in Pakistani politics also play a crucial role in shaping its policy of proxy war through non-state actors. The 'Kashmir cause' finds a lot of sympathy across the various sections of Pakistani society and most of the political parties support it regardless of their ideological differences. The terrorist groups active in Jammu and Kashmir are widely viewed as freedom fighters that are fighting for a 'Just Cause' as General Musharraf had once declared, 'Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir....' (Musharraf 2002).

Many civilian leaders also either enjoy a good relationship with jihadist or at least have worked with them in the past. For instance, Benazir Bhutto, when came to power in 1993, worked with Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the JUI, the mentor of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Nawaz Sharif is also known to have good relationship with organisations like Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamat and the Jamat-ud-Dawa. Over a period of time, these fundamentalist organisations have crafted a support base of their own and no political party could afford to ignore them.

These organisations have also been used by Pakistani army to suppress any dissent in Pakistani politics and put pressure on their civilian opponents. For instance, despite his

differences with fundamentalist organisations, Pakistan's first military ruler Ayub Khan had used them against Fatima Jinnah way back in 1965. Similarly, Zia-ul-Haq assisted the formation of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in 1977, of which the Jamat-e-Islami was a prominent member, to counter Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's popularity (Zaidi 2017).

Pakistani Army also uses the Islamic extremist to, in a way; avenge its repeated humiliating defeats in successive wars with India. Articulating Pakistani Army's perceptions of the utility of the terrorist groups, General Aslam Beg, who was Chief of Army Staff when the proxy war was launched in 1989, declared that a 'few hundred Kashmiri mujahidin humbled the military might of India' (Beg, 1999). Also, as noted by the International Crisis Group, the Kashmir conflict is used by the Pakistan Army to justify high defence expenditures, including Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons (International Crisis Group 2003). By depicting India as an existential threat that needs to be countered at any cost, the Pakistani military also justifies its regular interventions in domestic politics and demands a large share of Pakistan's budget.

4. The Impact of Pakistani Support

Pakistan support to terrorist groups has had a significant impact on the nature of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. To begin with, the extensive Pakistani backing enabled terrorist organisations to sustain a long terror campaign which otherwise could have ended very soon. Pakistan's support also changed the character of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. From initial slogans of an independent Kashmir, it soon was transformed into the struggle for Kashmir's merger with Pakistan owing to Pakistan's support to more radical Islamic terrorists over groups seeking independence. It also introduced a new dimension in the form of large numbers of foreign terrorists sent to Jammu and Kashmir. At one level, the supply of arms, training and finance considerably enhanced the capabilities and effectiveness of terrorist organizations on the ground. Pakistan involvement and assistance also helped Kashmiri terrorists sustaining the threshold of violence since 1990. This is reflected by the weapons seized from terrorists over the years and the corresponding increase in casualties in the same period (See Table 13). In 1990, 461 civilians and 155 security personnel were killed in terrorist incidents which kept increasing with each passing year and in 1999 the figure for civilians and security personnel killed had reached up to 873 and 397 respectively (Government of India 2004b:12). Pakistan's support to terrorists not

only increased the overall casualties, the lethality of terror acts also increased sharply once the organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba took the control of terror campaign in J&K. While the Kill Ratio (terrorists killed per security person) was 5.91 between 1990 and 1995, it came down to a mere 3.17 between 1996 and 1999. In fact, in 1999, less than 3 terrorists were killed for every security person. (*Calculation based on the data released by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India*).

However, Pakistan involvement in Jammu and Kashmir also had some negative impacts on the terror campaign as well. To maintain an effective control over the terrorist campaign, Pakistan encouraged and supported various terrorist organisations simultaneously. This was also done to ensure that no single terrorist organization could claim the sole leadership of terror campaign to negotiate a deal with the Indian government without Pakistan's approval. It also helped Pakistan in counterbalancing different groups through pitting them against each other when necessary (Behera 2000:182). The sheer number of actors involved in the terror campaign led to the fragmentation of terrorist landscape and severe infighting between various terrorist groups that ultimately weakened it considerably. In another deliberate move, Pakistan strengthened Islamist terrorist organisations that advocated merger with Pakistan over local ones like the JKLF that sought Kashmir's independence. This move altered the dimensions of the conflict in Kashmir fundamentally. The nature of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir got radically transformed from a comparatively secular campaign – spearheaded by the local Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front – to a global jihadist campaign expressed through pan-Islamic religious symbols and led by Islamist organisations like Lashkar-e-Tiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad (Chalk 2001). As a large section of Valley Muslims did not support the radical interpretation of Islam as propounded by organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba; the terror campaign lost its appeal and support base beyond recovery. The brutality of many Pakistan-backed groups and their contempt for local Kashmiri traditions further alienated Kashmiris, turning them against Pakistan.¹⁹

¹⁹ A poll conducted by the AC Nielson in September 2002 in Srinagar, Anantnag, Jammu and Udhampur revealed that while nobody in Srinagar, Anantnag or Udhampur was in favour of the Valley joining Pakistan; one per cent in Jammu wanted so. For more details, see 'Kashmiris don't want to join Pak: Survey' Times of India, September 27, 2002. Available at: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Kashmiris-dont-want-to-join-Pak-Survey/articleshow/23409600.cms>

For India, the Pakistan's involvement severely hampered its counterinsurgency campaign. Despite all the effort, the Indian Government could not completely dismantle the terrorists' support structures as they were always able to find a source of arms, funding, and other supplies from Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan constant intervention in Jammu and Kashmir hindered a decisive defeat of terrorist organisations. Consequently, the government was also not able to consolidate its control and forced to devote considerable resources in crushing the terror campaign. In addition, as the leadership of terrorist organisations was firmly controlled by Pakistan, all attempts to bring them to negotiating table failed thus limiting the success of political initiatives. As a result, despite defeating the terrorists militarily, the political resolution remained elusive and the government's efforts to bring Kashmiris back into the Indian mainstream could not materialize completely.

The biggest sufferers of Pakistan's support to terrorist organizations, however, are Kashmiris. The ascendance of Islamist terror groups has taken a heavy toll on the social fabric of Jammu and Kashmir. The state, once known for religious harmony, is plagued by communal tension. It also widened the regional disparity between Jammu, Ladakh and Kashmir Valley. While people in Kashmir Valley feel discriminated vis-à-vis other states of India, within Jammu and Kashmir, there exists resentment in Jammu and Ladakh over the Valley's dominance in Jammu and Kashmir Politics. However, the biggest scourge is that the state is now synonymous with violence. In addition to the vast number of casualties, the decades of violence has affected the state's society and economy very badly. Without any meaningful employment and disappointed with the political system, young people are either easily lured by terrorist organizations or turning to mindless street violence which many fear could ultimately lead to de-humanization of an entire generation.

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