Contested Politics of 'Self' and 'Other': The Case of Kashmiri Nationalism, 1989-2016

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled **"Contested Politics of 'Self' and 'Other': The Case of Kashmiri Nationalism, 1989-2016"**, submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

Arshi Javaid

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Acknowledgments

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAC:	Awami Action Committee
APHC:	All Parties Hurriyat Conference
AJK:	Azad Jammu Kashmir
CFL:	Ceasefire line
HM:	Hizbul Mujahideen
ISI:	**I**nter Services Intelligence
ISL:	Islamic Students League
JI:	Jammat-e-Islami
JKLF:	Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
LOC:	Line of Control
OGW:	Overground worker
MC:	Muslim Conference
MKA:	Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
MUF:	Muslim United Front
MJF:	Muslim Janbaaz Force
NC:	National Conference
NLF:	National Liberation Front
P.a.K:	Pakistan adminstered Kashmir
P.C:	Peoples Conference
PDP:	Peoples Democratic Party
P.F:	Plebiscite Front
PSA:	Public Safety Act
UGW:	Underground worker
UKLF:	United Kashmir Liberation Front
UNCIP:	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
YMMA:	Young Mens Muslim Association

Introduction

This study examines Kashmiri nationalism and the contestations to it. The thesis explores the theoretically different forms of Kashmiri nationalism-ethnic and civic. The classical dichotomy between the civic and the ethnic has been a recurrent feature in the Kashmiri nationalism. The nature and interplay of the two forms will be explored in the thesis, by placing them against a set of political and social variables. It looks at Kashmiri nationalism as a political expression, as a latent subjectivity which defines the connection between the individual and the collective.

The thesis seeks to understand Kashmiri nationalism as a daily practice, through a series of socio-political developments and adjustments. The Kashmir conflict has largely been understood through a securitized approach that defines the relationship between India and Pakistan. Internal political dynamics and other causalities are given little importance. This, in part, is because they disappear before analytical lenses that are focused on formal institutions, geopolitical security, and the nation-building project. This understanding presents Kashmiri nationalism as a homogenised monolith.

However, there are differences based on social, political and economic parameters. This study focuses on the internal and external factors that have influenced Kashmiri nationalism and further uncovers if Kashmiri nationalism is synonymous with Islamic nationalism or exists as a separate entity. Varshney (1991:999) has influentially demonstrated that Kashmir is a result of three forces: religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism epitomised by India, and ethnic nationalism embodied in what Kashmiris called Kashmiriyat (being a Kashmiri).

Kashmiri Nationalism: An Overview

The growth of Kashmiri nationalism can be broken down into a few critical themes-the construction of 'self' versus the 'other', the centrality of religious identity, the desire for political autonomy, and contested nature of Kashmiri nationalism. As the Kashmiri identity cannot be seen as a homogenized monolith, its transformation into contestation does not happen without the intervention of exogenous factors.

Like in other identities, the constitution of Kashmir identity happens in relation to difference. Identity formation happens through self-realization of an individual, of how others perceive the individual. Mead (1934:225) argues that "an individual becomes self by taking attitudes of individuals towards himself/ herself within a social environment." The collective formation of identity and the sense of self-reflexive action formulate the distinctions between the self and the other. The Kashmiri identity gets negotiated between the 'self' and the 'other' through how it imagines itself; and how the identity of the other constructs an identity for self. This thesis looks at the self and the other through ways in which self/other binary is reproduced and arranged. The underlying argument remains that the relations of difference are distorted into othering only when certain other factors play in. And in essence, those transformative processes form the constitutive basis of the self/other interaction. Many a time, the interaction between the self and the other could only be for securing one's identity. However, the difference gets characterized into othering by factors like nature of identity, social distance, etc. This thesis draws an understanding that contestations between the self and the other are produced where identities are invoked overtly and made the basis for conflict. The social and political reproduction of conflict transforms the incompatibility of interests into an active battle between the self and the other.

The formation of Kashmiri identity in response to the 'other' needs to be understood in the context of the centuries of foreign rule Kashmir has witnessed – Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs, and Dogras. The identity has to be located in the series of dynamic interactions that have taken place over the years. Khan (2012) observes that the anxiety for the preservation of the Kashmiri identity can be traced to two important junctures-1586 and 1846 when Kashmir came under the control of the Mughals and the Dogras respectively. The sense of national and religious belonging also changed owing to the different ruling regimes. The establishment of British Residency and the centralisation of the Dogra state under the British at the turn of the 20th century provided a context for an emphasis on 'community' which later became a reference point for identity.

A key element of the political discourse of the 19th and 20th centuries in Kashmir is the repeated regional assertion against anything from 'outside' (Nebar). While the narrative

on Kashmiri regional and religious identities was no doubt transformed in the social and political context of indirect colonialism, the historical discourse, literary forms, religious idioms and symbols from the pre-colonial period were easily identifiable in the 19th and 20th century Kashmiri public discourse. For instance, the growth of conservative Islam in the valley caused discomfort among the Sufi practitioners of Islam. Similarly, the Kashmiri Pandit community became quite apprehensive of the designs of co-religionists who had migrated to Awadh and had begun attacking the regionally specific religious customs. The contending contentions of 'insider' and 'outsider' are witnessed on numerous occasions.

In this context, the protests of 1931 are an important landmark as it was the first time that Kashmiri Muslims erupted against the Dogra rule. It was in the 1930s that the sense of belonging to a religious collectivity informed the discourse on rights and freedom. In other words, the new Muslim leadership that emerged in wake of the events of 1931 linked religious affiliation with political demands by claiming rights for Kashmiri Muslims based on the concept of a just Islamic society. Furthermore, since this leadership ultimately sought to replace the autocratic rule of Dogras with Kashmiri self-rule, the articulation of national ideology was imperative to its project. The energies unleashed by this phase of mobilisation resulted in the formation of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The period forms the fulcrum as how the emerging sense of political and religious belonging hinged towards two directions gradually –a civic territorial idea of Kashmiri nationalism and an ethnic idea of Kashmiri nationalism. The rechristening of Muslim Conference into National Conference indicates how the nature of emerging consciousness ranged from exclusivist to inclusive liberal democratic. The sense of belonging was split over the organic historical experience linked through lingual, religious and folk traditions versus a unified voluntary nature of the state. Therefore the focus of the two is different, the idea of how people imagined and envisoned a community and the idea of belonging to the same. By the time of the partition, Kashmiri nationalism was emerging in a civil form. Emergence of a civil society within a demarcated geographic territory, legal equality to the members, a government that respects the law rather than exists above the law, respect for liberal democracy were the demands nationalist were espousing. As the partition approached, the question of

Kashmiri nationhood came to be tied with the fate of princely states in the eventuality of a British withdrawal. As a Muslim majority kingdom with a Hindu ruler, Jammu and Kashmir's status was unique in its complexity. The Kashmir war of 1947 led to Maharaja of Kashmir acceding to India on 26 October 1947. Lord Mountbatten accepted the accession with a clause that a referendum would be conducted in the region as soon as possible. The people would be provided an option for either validating or negating the accession.

This provision for referendum or plebiscite became one of the main rallying points and demands by the Kashmiri nationalist movement. The much-promised plebiscite never happened and the Pakistanis and nationalist sections in the Valley claimed that it was an act of sabotage.

 To account for the complexity of Jammu and Kashmir and accommodate nationalist claims in the state, it was given a special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, became the first Prime Minister of the state. As Prime Minister, Sheikh Abdullah combined this secular, civic nationalism with socialist policies to create a constituency for his rule and this shaped the ideology of the National Conference. Besides bringing an end to the hereditary monarchy, one of his major achievements was the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act which ushered in land reforms and abolished the feudal system in Kashmir.

In the post-Independence era and particularly under Sheikh Abdullah, a central concern in the Kashmiri nationalist sphere was the desire to maintain the state's autonomy vis-a-vis the centre. Despite the assurance of Article 370, the central government continued to pressurise the state government to accept more provisions of the Indian Constitution and after hard bargaining by both sides, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah entered into what became known as the Delhi Agreement in July 1952. However, there were contesting narratives to this as well. While the Muslim Conference continued to advocate accession to Pakistan, Jammu's Dogra Hindus formed the Praja Parishad in the early 1950s demanding the final and irrevocable accession to accession to

India. The removal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 proved to be a major point of rupture between Kashmir and the Indian state. Through measures like land reform and debtor relief, Abdullah had managed to create a support base for the National Conference. By winning over their loyalty, he had managed to secure their tacit support for the accession to India as well. His arrest harmed the credibility of the state government. It also turned the balance of power decisively in favor of the Centre. A symbolic manifestation of this was the change in nomenclature of the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir to Chief Minister under the state's new constitution adopted in 1957.

The structural breakdown enforced by the state led to the creation of alternate spheres of political mobilization. The non-state alternatives emerged in circumstances where the participation and representation was dominated by the state. The state promoted nationalism was fundamentally majoritarian in character and restricted autonomous political agency. The political process was based on centralization and hegemonic control, curtailing on the sphere of legitimate representation. Thus the strategy of hegemony and de-legitimation was emerging at doctrinal as well as political level. The interests of the state were taking priority over all the other commitments made at the time of accession. The state-nationalism espoused a parochial character and made itself a carrier of limited loyalties, ignoring or deliberately wiping out any local or cultural characteristics. This situation led to the crisis of legitimacy and longevity to the local nationalism. The internal crisis of the state, the search for community and identity made way for a confrontation between the forces of Kashmiri nationalism and the state nationalism.

Abdullah's arrest in 1953 strengthened the autonomous nationalist forces. The heightened political turmoil led to the formation of J&K Plebiscite Front in 1955. Its doctrine was "ensuring self-determination through a plebiscite under UN auspices, withdrawal of the armed forces of both nations from Kashmir and restoration of civil liberties and free elections." These demands continue to be a central part of the program of the nationalist outfits in Kashmir.

The majoritarian character of the state promoted nationalism was coming out at a doctrinal as well at a political level, restricting collective rights. The interests of the central state were being prioritised over all other promises made at the time of accession. The state-led nationalism espoused an exclusionary character and made itself a carrier of limited loyalties. This situation led to the crisis of legitimacy and provided longevity to the local nationalism. It also led to the emergence of youth-led organizations creating alternate avenues of mobilization, channelizing alternate narratives towards sustained collective action.

The youth-led organizations mainly emerged for launching an indigenous struggle for highlighting the Kashmir issue internationally by giving it an indigenous shade without the involvement of Pakistan. These political formations became a very important part of everyday life in Kashmir and shaped the Kashmiri nationalism. Sheikh Abdullah's growth as a figure of Kashmiri resistance was cut short with the Indira-Abdullah accord of 1975. The years from 1950-1970 were a time of intensive political mobilization that constantly invoked the shared memories of denial and dispossession. The narratives produced during this period came to configure the political events within a context and created conditions for shaping the collective conscience.

Shiekh passed away in 1982 and was succeeded by his son Farooq Abdullah. However, the Centre dismissed Farooq Abdullah's government and imposed President's Rule in the state, in a repeat of what had happened in several other states in India under Indira Gandhi. The periodic dismissal of elected governments and interference by the Centre prevented even pro-accession leaders like Sheikh Abdullah and Farooq Abdullah from building a stable political base. This created a vacuum that was later exploited by separatist outfits. President's Rule administered by Governor Jagmohan Malhotra following the sacking of Farooq's government was accompanied by a crackdown on protests and arrest of political leaders.

The events of the 1980s created perfect conditions for the growth of militant nationalism. Non-fulfillment of political aspirations of the people, undemocratic functioning of different institutions of the state, mal-administration in running the affairs of the state

made ground for violent expression and militant assertion of Kashmiri identity. The breaking point was the electoral rigging of 1987 where Congress and Farooq Abdullah's National Conference contested in alliance and were opposed by a coalition of non-mainstream, anti-establishment groups known as Muslim United Front (MUF). MUF represented a new face of Kashmir politics. By most accounts, the elections are said to have been rigged and reports reveal that candidates of the MUF were beaten up. Pakistan, on its part, tried to capitalise on the resentment in the Valley and provided patronage to the MUF members militant groups reinforcing its irredentist claims over Kashmir through the militant groups. While the JKLF stood for complete independence and reinforced civic nationalism, the Hizbul Mujahideen, which was the militant wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, stood for the merger with Pakistan.

Kashmiri nationalism adopted a variety of structural combinations to pursue its goals. The political nationalism directed an effective mobilization for nationalism, tried utilising electoral strategy as a vehicle to expand the base of popular struggle. It sought to establish formal access to the state for translating movement aspirations into policy and ultimately created new state institutions. While as militant nationalism undermined the legitimacy of the state through mass agitation on social, economic and political issues. It sought to erode the ruling governments claim to authority in the eyes of constituents and also tried to convince the international community of state's legitimacy. In a way, the militant transition was directed towards securing the political rather than the military overthrow of the state. Thus one can say that the military and political struggles were not waged by distinctly but in alliance with each other. The outbreak of militant nationalism was not sudden as most accounts on Kashmir propose; rather a gradual culmination of demands which expressed in political form earlier. The absence of democracy, deep political mobilization and the growth of modern education and press further channelized the grievances into a vocabulary of nationalism.

One can largely assume that over the years these central themes pointed out earlier constantly reinforce itself in Kashmiri nationalism – fear of the other, religious identity and loss of autonomy. The study uses 1989 as an entry point to delineates the nature and emerging aspects of Kashmiri nationalism.

Conceptual Definitions

Nationalism and its typology

Nationalism is widely referred to as a political belief that people who represent a natural community should live under one political system. The underlying question is what classifies a natural community, is the natural community invented or there is a pre-existence of nations. Also, what is the relation of nations and nationalism to modernity? The position taken by the perennialisits and primordialists reflects whether natural or not, nations have been there for long. The features of a nation whether symbolic or mythical, pre-date the living memory of its members. The second position by modernists is that nations have emerged within a modern context and are created cosmetically. Schleiermacher (2004), Fichte(1808) are the major theorists who based their arguments on the primordial/perennial grounds where nations are an ancient and natural phenomenon. As the nation is immemorial, national forms may change and particular nations may dissolve, but the identity of a nation remains the same. Fichte (1808) advocated for the earthly fatherland and based his claim on ethnic-genealogical and cultural-linguistic elements.

The second set of understanding is the rational liberal understanding which got shaped prominently by the ideas of Hans Kohn (1961), Elie Kedourie(1966) and Isiah Berlin (1979). Their main argument rests on the premise that nationalism developed in response to the intellectual and political crisis during the enlightenment. In this sense, nationalism is not only a unit bound together, but it is the group looking forward to the highest organized activity which is the formation of a sovereign state. As the process of attaining sovereignty might take time, it satisfies itself with some form of autonomy or pre-state organisation but eventually would rest on sovereignty. However, this sovereignty operates on a dual principle of empathy towards the fellow members of the nationality but marked with indifference and distrust/hate for member and outlook within the nations and is marked by the crystallisation of will. This aspect generated a kind of dialectic and subsequently set a precedent for Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, and Ernst Gellner.

The modernists perceived nations as modern social constructs which emerged with the increased communication and to the growth of modern social and political processes like capitalism, industrialism, state bureaucratization, secularism, and urbanisation. So nations became the territorial political communities constituting the chief political bond and overtook over other formative allegiances. Gellner (1983) intervened in the debate by understanding nationalism as a peculiarly contemporary phenomenon with dual structural connections-modern society and the modern capitalist economy. He envisioned nationalism as the imposition of a high culture on society replacing local low culture. Anderson (2006) maintains that the nation is an imagined political community because the members of the nation will never know of their fellow members, meet them or hear of them, yet all of them share a sense of communion and a feeling of horizontal comradeship. It also has a finite character because beyond a nation are other nations. Hobsbawm (1990) sees nations as a result of the recent historic process. Hobsbawm agrees with Gellner in the invented notion of nations and writes nations are inventions both in their culture and form. A creative process of selection and composition of the past is designed and then the symbols take a different significance through modern rituals and institutional forms that arise with industrialisation. As a Marxist, Hobsbawm links the political invention of the nation to the needs of capitalism and the rising bourgeoise seeking hegemony on coming into competition with old established groups and religious beliefs.

Another discourse that exists around the study of nationalism is the marked differences between the rise of nationalism in the western and the non-western world. This idea of difference was given by Meinecke (1907) who differentiated between the Staatsnation and Kulturnation. The former was based on some sense of cultural similarity while the latter was based on the unifying force of common political history and constitution. Kohn (1961) reworked on the idea of two types of nationalism –civic and ethnic. He details how nationalism in west emerged as a predominantly political occurrence, while as in the non-western societies it grew as a protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern-primarily to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with the ethnographic demands and found expression in the cultural field. Western nationalism originated with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism, in the eastern/central

Europe and the Asian contexts it pitched on the natural fact of the community and sentiments, held together not by will but by traditional ties.

There also exists an understanding that the nature of nationalism in developing countries is different from western countries. One approach to study nationalism can be in terms of viewing the concept in the background of colonial rule. Nationalism can be a product of a reaction of colonised people against their colonial masters. Chatterjee (1986) and Nandy (1994) both agree that nationalism essentially is a western construct. However, there is a lot of variation when the concept travels to non-western societies. Chatterjee (1986) explains that nationalism in Africa and Asia emerged to escape European domination, yet could not be distant from it. However anti-colonial nationalism creates its sphere of influence well before it begins its contestation with the other. It divides the society into two categories-material and spiritual. The material involves science, technology, economy while as spiritual is the inner sanctum of culture.Nandy (1994) argues that colonialism cannot be express itself with only economic and political variables. Its impact on the sphere of psychology is more lasting.

The study of ethnic nationalism in South Asia has taken two prominent trajectories - the state-centered nationalist project and the ethnic-nationalist project. Brass (1991) explains that one of the shortcomings of the theory of ethnic groups is that it reifies the classes or the ethnic groups. He proposes state is an institution where elites are engaged in a conflict for access to greater power. The groups compete to establish their rule for attaining their control over resources and legitimacy. Since the state itself is a resource and distributor of resources, it can provide a political formula for differing claims. On the other hand, the ethnic-nationalist claim is the outcome of the shortcomings or failure of the state-centered project. Oommen (1997) elucidates that heightened ethnic consciousness of an ethnic group combined with territorial and language dimension forms the cornerstone of the separate state formation.

Political Dimensions of Kashmiri Nationalism

Rai (2004) and Zutshi (2004) locate the Kashmiri political and national identity before 1947. Rai's account links the colonial history to the present and dissects the role of

religion and secularism in the Kashmir conflict. Her primary concern remains dissecting how the Dogra Maharajas used the Hindu religion for staking claim to authority and ensuring legitimacy. Adding a new dimension to the study of Kashmir conflict, her work documents the arbitrary rule of Dogra princes, and how the formerly utilised services of Kashmiri Pandits and Punjabi Hindus as their allies. On the other hand, Zutshi notes that Kashmir could have been politically dormant, had the Indian and Pakistani states accommodated Kashmir's regional aspirations. Instead, Kashmir was transformed into a confrontative emblem between their competing nationalist imaginations

Bose (2003) argues that the Kashmir crisis might have originated in partition, but other factors combined for the continuation of the conflict. The non-existence of democracy, the militant movement became the factors other than the complex regional, linguistic and religious causalities. Ganguly (1996) and Behera (2000) explore how existing political institutions have shaped the Kashmir conflict. Ganguly (1996) explains that the 1989 insurgency was a result of the profoundly paradoxical exercise engaged by the Indian nation-state since 1989. The effort was on one side to entice the Muslims of Kashmir into fuller integration into the Indian Union by providing them every effort for political education and mobilisation but on the other hand perceiving the separatist threats, muffling down the institutions that engendered popular political participation in Kashmir. The obvious result was institutional decay that left no other way than political violence to show their discontent. He argues that social mobilisation and consequently increased the level of political participation, unless accompanied by robust political institutions, becomes a reason for political instability. Behera (2000) aptly asserts that the logic of the modern nation-state which recognizes the demographically compact form of a nation is problematic for pluralistic societies like India. She contends that the self-assertion of a formerly non-dominant identity becomes inherently a site for violence. She reminds us how the balance between competing nationalisms was maintained legally and constitutionally by Delhi agreement Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. But the breakdown of this framework occurred when the Indian state-imposed itself on the Kashmiri people through legal integrationist measures by abrogating the legal and political space. Over the years, the claims for autonomy grew into claims for Azadi.

Varshney (1991:999) writes that at the core, the Kashmir problem is the result of three forces – religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism represented by India and ethnic nationalism (Kashmiriyat) embodied by Kashmiris. He chooses to pit the contesting nationalisms in Kashmir in different phases. Phase one covers the period, 1947-1953 suggests ambiguity; the second phase marks shrinking religious nationalism in favor of secular nationalism during 1953-1983. Phase three characterises diminishing secular nationalism, the resurgence of Islam return of Kashmiri nationalism from 1983 to 1991. Aggarwal(2008:227) remarks that

> nearly all political actors evoke Kashmiriyat. Kashmiriyat is an abstract noun that signifies "origin or affiliation" to Kashmir, literally referring to the ethos of being Kashmiri. However, little agreement exists over the precision of the term". Kashmiriyat refers to the class of terms known as empty signifiers which have been prevalent in Indian politics for at least a century.

Militant Dimensions of Kashmiri Nationalism

Sikand (2007) notes that during the last decade, the appearance of the radical Islamist groups added a new dimension to the ongoing conflict in the region. It made India, Pakistan and Kashmiri's equal stakeholders to the conflict. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) initiated an uprising against Indian rule in 1989. However, by 1990s JKLF had been pulled off by Pakistan-based Islamist groups.

Puri (1995) argues the initial mishandling of the situation by Indian forces with their ruthless and tactless repression led to a mass uprising, including by sections of government employees and the police force. Firing at the funeral procession of a political leader, Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq, can be seen as one such instance. A political leadership, which for some years was waiting for such an opportunity, seized it. The most organised militant outfit was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) headed by Amanullah Khan in Pakistan controlled Kashmir. Yasin Malik was its leader on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Gradually every separatist political leader formed a separate militant outfit, which could bank on armed support from across the LoC. Finally, Hizbul Mujahideen, an outfit sponsored by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence emerged as the strongest of all. The various separatist organisations formed a loose political alliance under the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). It became a kind of

conglomerate of all separatist parties. The mass insurgency could not be maintained for too long. The expectations raised by it proved illusory. As pro-Azadi militants were replaced and in some cases, eliminated by pro-Pakistan militants, the Kashmiri nationalists were alienated. Yet, as alienation with India was greater, the militancy survived with massive popular support. The militant phase in Kashmir, without the active involvement of the people, continued through various ups and downs till it reached a point where it became no longer dependent on local political backing.

Schoffield (2003) writes by 1989, several militant groups had begun to function in the valley. They were spread around major towns of Srinagar, Anantnag, Baramulla and Sopore and the objective remained either complete independence or unification with Pakistan. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, led within the Valley was the most prominent and its objective was fighting for an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of the political parties who had been part of the Muslim United Front had formed their militant wings.

Definition, Rationale, and Scope of the Study

Since most of the literature on Kashmir is security-centric, which understands Kashmir in context of the rivalry between India and Pakistan or looks at conflict resolution; there is a gap in terms of understanding the changes and continuities in Kashmiri nationalism.

Nationalism in civic or ethnic form is invoked by the political elite as a political assertion of group identity. The political elite makes use of nationalism for replacing some previously dominant cultural group and creating a new one. Theoretically, the route towards nationalism takes two ways either by pursuing national identity through the formation of the nation-state or exercising national identity through invoking the shared commonality of religion, language, race, etc. This thesis does not seek to reject these routes to nationalism rather tries to show that nationalism does not emerge without the intervention of the other variables. Core elements of both forms are used interchangeably to fulfill the goals of nationalism. For example, civic nationalism uses shares shared values and myths and symbols, particularly if there is no principal territorial or population base from which they can establish a political community. Similarly, ethnic

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nationalism imagines itself within a state. The idea of a demarcated territory for an ethnic base takes a lot from civic nationalism. Therefore the categorizations have borrowed from each other. The resurgence of ethnic nationalism is forged by mobilization of the ethnies. Re-defining and re-educating the ethnie, intellectuals politicise culture and are constantly involved in the production of the 'other' and the 'outsider' within. One also needs to understand that the possibility of the emergence of multiple narratives from margins. The counter-narratives that emerge from the margins continuously evoke and erase the nation's boundaries and also stimulate the ideological support through which the demand for the nation is essentialised.

Kashmir becomes an interesting ground to understand the juxtaposition of various forces. Since the formation of the Kashmiri nationalism precedes the formation of the nation-state or the accession, this study focuses on the changing meanings, interpretations, and perceptions related to the Kashmiri nationalism. Also, to bridge theoretical and practical perspectives, this study unpacks Kashmiri nationalism and its central dilemma of not being equated with or within any global movement of terrorism.

The rationale of the study understands the essence Kashmiri nationalism, the forms it assumes. Moreover, there have been minimal comprehensive studies on Kashmiri nationalism, exploring the dimensions, actors, trends, successes, limitations, failures, etc. The research agenda remains exciting as it would inform and expand our knowledge about the moderate and militant dimensions of Kashmiri nationalism.

The scope of the study is not only limited to Kashmir only, but it also informs and expands the theoretical base to nationalism studies, locating its structural fault lines. The study covers the period from the beginning of militancy in 1989 to 2016. However, the study provides a historical overview as Kashmiri nationalism cannot be studied without examining the creation of Kashmiri identity through centuries. This study ends in 2016, when a unique political formulation between the PDP-and BJP alliance government has come to power in Jammu and Kashmir after the BJP won an unprecedented 25 seats in the state assembly elections.

The main objectives that the study covers are understanding the internal contestations within Kashmiri nationalism. It analysed the changes in the form, meaning, and conceptualisation of the idea of Kashmiri nationalism. It tried to understand the growth of Hindu nationalism in Jammu and its impact on Kashmiri nationalism.

The major questions this research looks at how self does/other contestation play a role in the conception and sustenance of Kashmiri nationalism? How do religious symbols provide a moral vocabulary for Kashmir nationalism and how is the goal of nationalism recalled, recognised, localised and reconstructed through commemorative practices? How is collective memory used to foreground a counter-memory, and how does performity of nationalism provide visions of nationhood and possible strategies of cohesion and resistance? How do symbols and concepts become a powerful source of inspiration and legitimate the struggle for political identity?

Hypotheses and Methodology

The research questions are answered by testing the following hypotheses.

- The first one is Kashmiri nationalism is essentially a contestation of 'self' and 'other'.
- The second one is weakness of democratic institutions has created social categories for the distribution of patronage, resulting in chasms on the basis of ethnicity, religion, and region.

This work utilises primary as well as secondary sources for testing the hypotheses. Data was collected from existing literature like books, research articles, news articles from different magazines and internet sites. Primary sources were also used extensively-from the published material of various Kashmiri political organizations, personal diaries, observer accounts, posters, unpublished documents, and memoirs. The researcher's knowledge of Urdu and Kashmiri languages enabled the use of books and newspapers from these languages.

The thesis was compiled after conducting elaborate fieldwork in Kashmir, from April 2017 to July 2017. Field trip to Jammu was taken on December 2017. Other than using the available material in local libraries, interviews were conducted with various political

actors, analysts, journalists, and scholars. The interviews were largely narrative-based, without utilizing a specific questionnaire allowing the interviewee to speak without inhibitions. The interviewees were chosen through snowball sampling where the interviewees introduced me to their acquaintances and the circle went on growing.

Chapterisation

The study is divided into five main chapters. This first chapter develops an analytical framework for examining the form, meaning, and conceptualisation of nationalism. The section explores the development of the concept of nationalism through the theoretical debates. It further looks at other exclusion and the desire for accessing greater power results in the formation of other nationalisms. It looks at the sources of the other nationalisms, what instrumental factors combine in the formation of the other nationalism. It further tries to find out the goals and objectives of other nationalisms.

The second chapter locates the origin of the Kashmiri nationalism by locating the historical, political and social factors for the development of the same. It sketches out how Kashmir and Kashmiri nationalism is understood in the popular imagination. It also looks at whether Kashmiri nationalism is geographically exclusive to a certain territory or it extends to the length and breadth of the state. Additionally, it traces how religious and ethnic complexities of the Kashmiri society have interacted with the Kashmiri nationalism. The role of different political formulations in defining and promoting Kashmiri nationalism is also to be examined. The chapter argues that to garner a better picture of Kashmiri nationalism one needs to evaluate its interaction with forces of modernity. A deeply rooted sense of regional identity that existed in Kashmir got channelized when education offered access for understanding the nature of the Kashmiri nationalism. The development of education, social communications, and growth of print enabled masses to think of themselves in profound ways.

The third chapter explains the transition of Kashmir nationalism from the political to militant terrain. It traces the assertions and objectives of different political actors. The chapter examines how civic Kashmiri nationalism remains a corner-stone in mainstream and separatist projects alike, and how and where the differences are marked. Further, it

examines how the militant transition also brings ethnic Kashmiri nationalism to fore which otherwise had been latent. It looks at how the contestations within the militant groups are a contestation of ethnic and civic variants of nationalism. The chapter explains the essential transition of political nationalism into militant nationalism through important political developments that spanned from 1950-1980 and how these episodes provided a temporal map for the transition. Parallel to the political developments, counter histories were providing newer meanings and form to the political nationalism. The sense of political betrayal and humiliation added to the urgency for the transition. The chapter in detail looks at the political groups and organizations which existed beyond the visible political zone and mobilized opinion for civic-nationalism. Thus, deflating the myth that 1989 was the starting point for Kashmiri nationalism.

The fourth chapter examined how external factors have impacted Kashmiri nationalism. The chapter looks at the external factors that influence Kashmiri nationalism. It tries to examine intervention of various political actors through civic and ethnic nationalism respectively. It tries to locate whether the political actors have changed their positions with the changing geopolitical situations. The chapter looks at the relationship between the Kashmiri diaspora and the Kashmiri nationalism and looks at how Pakistan functions as a factor in Kashmiri Nationalism and how through deploying centralizing tendencies it has tried to contain Kashmiri nationalism.

The fifth chapter looks at the contestations to Kashmiri nationalism. It looked at how polarising tendencies within Jammu division emerge as a challenge to Kashmiri nationalism. It further examined the contestations within the nationalist camp. In this context, changes in the form, meaning, and conceptualisation of Kashmiri nationalism were explored.

Chapter 1

Nationalism: A conceptual Framework

Introduction

The study of nationalism was taken by historians before anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists shifted their attention towards the subject. After the World War II, a vast body of literature has emerged on the subject but alongside also came a sense of terminological and historical chaos. Calhoun(1997) writes that nationalism is too diverse to be explained by a single theory. Various combinations of cultural traditions and leadership roles determine the orientation of nationalisms .Calhoun's skepticism was shared by Hall (1999:1) who believed that theory of nationalism cannot be binded universally. As the historical record is diverse, so too must be our concepts.

As such, there cannot be any periodic demarcations for understanding the exact time frame for the emergence of nationalism. Scholars though have tried to mark the important historical events that are essential to understand the emergence of nationalism. Hutchinson and Smith (1994) marked the partition of Poland in 1775 as an important date; installation of American Declaration of Independence in 1776; the commencement of second phase of French Revolution in 1792 and when Johann Gottlieb Fichte addressed the German nation about the higher meaning of the love of Fatherland in 1807.It is essential to point out that imagining a theory of nation and of nationalism is not the same thing. The institutional dimension of nations is state oriented, hence the idea of nation-state. Whereas nationalism operates as an ideology, promoting ones superior identity over the other and seeks control of the nation. Therefore the fundamentals of nationalism are embedded in identity politics.

This chapter tries to map out important theoretical debates on nationalism. It looks at the scholarship around nationalism and finds out that the idea of exclusion emerges complimentarily to the idea to nationalism. The chapter makes an attempt to understand how exclusion converts itself into the derivative discourse of ethnic nationalism in a heterogeneous society. It identifies the basis, strategies and principles of ethno-

nationalists and also throws light on how ethno-nationalism is constructed through socio-political grievances.

The study of nationalism during the early years

Emergence of nationalism is commonly associated with the French Revolution where the rights of man came be recognised as the rights of the citizen and hence the nation emerged as the source of political authority. Junaid(2008) writes conceptually the origin of nation can be traced to the Hebrew Bible, where after the deluge and dispersion of Noah's sons, the connection between land, language and kinship was established.

This section looks at the major influences to the study of nationalism in three phases from 18th century to early 20th century, from 1944 to 1980 and the third from 1980 to present. The first intellectual traditions for understanding the nation are through primordialism and perennialism. Primordialism recognises nations as organic givens and natural divisions of humanity. They regard nations as fixed and permanent entities of the world and trace the nature of national ties to the primordial attachments. Smith(1999) recognises that the power of such social groups in rootedness of kinship and genetic bases of human existence. Subsequently they survived later processes and developments.

Schleiermacher (2004) and Fichte(1808) were the major theorists who based their arguments on the primordial/perennial grounds where nations are ancient and natural phenomenon. As the nation appears timeless, national forms evolve and particular nations cease to exist. Fichte(1808) in his 'Address to the German nation' advocated for the earthly fatherland.The natural impulse of a man, which should be abandoned only in the case of the real necessity, is to find heaven on earth and to endow his daily work on earth with permanence and eternity; to plant and to cultivate the eternal in the temporal-not merely in the incomprehensible fashion or in a connection with the eternal that seems to mortal eye an impenetrable gulf, but in a fashion visible to the mortal eye itself[1](Jones and Turnbull: 1992, 136-138)

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[1] Fichte advocated that men fundamentally had a tendency to live and perfect their lives, but also to preserve these qualities for the souls of those he leaves behind, so that in turn they may hand it over to their successors. The tendency acquires a national character gradually.

Fichte conceived nation as something organic and believed that love for the fatherland can be consolidated only through its eternal character. He simplified it through individualising the context that an individual may imagine having a fatherland in afterlife but not in this life he has no fatherland. Jones and Turnbull (1992:143-145) bring out the Fichte's translations and describe education having the capacity to imbibe devotion for fatherland. Drawing heavily from Herder and Hegel, Fichte regarded subordination of state to the nation, while state involved governance of human life but it is means to a higher organic purpose. Fichte's nation was based on ethnic-genealogical and cultural linguistic elements which inspired proto-jingoistic conservatism over the years.

Herder again belongs to the organic tradition of nation visualising nations as divine and focuses on the education of the mankind. Education makes an individual a man and the whole species lives as a chain of individuals. To his understanding, a common language in a common territory marks a nation, and its spirit is vitally nourished by inherited myths and traditions. Herder (1800) sees education as performing the function of imparting social traditions. Following this tradition, he progressed to say that the natural state of man is society and the first forms of government arose out of these natural social relationships.[2] Mutual assistance and protection are the principal ends of all human associations. For a polity, too, the natural order is ensures that each of its members becomes what nature wanted him to become. Crouter(1988) in his reading of Schleiermacher, points out towards the defence of the fatherland, whether by the armies that are already in motion, or whether, according to their own inclination. A common aim is organised into a noble whole and personal ambition is not allowed to weaken the true effectiveness of this courage.

There are three varieties of primordialism: popular, socio-biological and cultural. Popular primordialism sees nations as close to natural organisms and closer to natural laws. Thus national identities are seen as an organic part of human beings and the nationality predetermined by nature. Hutchinson (1994) recognises that the common claim of popular primordialists propagates nations as primordial formations that were recognisable,

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[2] Herder's historicist character of the nation is quite contrary to the purpose of political government, It is prohibitive of the wild mixing of various races and nationalities under one scepter and valorises natural order.

through their distinctive way of life, their affiliation to a territorial homeland and a deep desire for political autonomy. On the other hand, socio-biological primordialists stress on social and biological intersection in ethnicity and nationhood. Its leading proponent, Van den Berghe, tried using the principles of socio-biology in animal grouping and cooperation to explain ethnic ties. Socio-biological primordialism suggests that the ethnic groups can be traced to the genetic reproductive drives of individuals and the desire to maximise their gene pool. Berghe(1978) explains socio-biological primordialism is dictated by three elements: kin selection, reciprocity and coercion.The entire process of socio-biological primordialism works on the persistence and strength of social cohesion in ethnic groups or nations by shared biological heritage of group members.

On the other hand, perennialists do not specify a specific date of birth for nationalism but see modern nations as lineal descendents of their medieval counterparts. For perennialists, nation is an ethno-cultural community which is politicised and makes a claim to political recognition on account of its common ancestry, rootedness in certain geography at a certain point in time. Smith(1988) identifies two types of perennialism: continuous and recurrent. While continuous perennialism advocates that certain nations have existed for centuries and their history is therefore traceable and continuous.He believes that some nations like the Egypt and Greece are immemorial while some other nations in Asia and Africa can be more recent. Recurrent perennialism, on the other hand believes that nations appear and disappear, emerge and dissolve in different in different places and times, but nation in general as a human association is perennial and ubiquitous.

However, writing in 1882, Renan challenged the primordial understanding of nation in subtle yet powerful ways. What makes his contribution worthwhile is unlike the over importance to the idea of 'remembrance' in the nationalist studies, Renan introduces the idea of forgetting to the discipline. "Forgetting,I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation", Renan (1882)lectured in his classic statement, "*Quest-ce-qu'une*,What is a Nation"? Renan reminds his readers that the essence of the nation is in the belief that the individuals have many things in common, and also have forgotten many things. Likewise a nation represents an earlier conquest,

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one which would have displaced and massacred individuals to set up a certain dynastic realm.[3]

His argument also challenges the German scholarship which lays undue importance to race in the formation of nations. While race becomes a primordial right he holds supremacy of rich legacy of memories and the present day consent as the soul of the nation. He uses a meticulous metaphor, 'a daily plebiscite' which forms the consent to continue a common life.

> Man is a slave neither of his race nor his language, nor of his religion, nor of the course of rivers nor of the direction taken by the mountain chains. A large aggregate of men, healthy in mind and warm of heart creates the kind of moral conscience which we call a nation. So long as this moral consciousness gives proof of its strength by the sacrifices which demand the abdication of the individual to the advantage of the community, it is legitimate and has the right to exist. Incase of disputes the populations would be consulted for decisions. (Rundell,1992:11)

Clearly enough Renan's emphasis is on the radically subjective analysis of nationhood and he gives analytical primacy to the contemporary,against the romanticism of the nations that was the order of the day.Nation for him is a spiritual principle and the most crucial aspect emerges from the consensual principle of how nations act and itsperformativity against the divisive politics of race, language, geography and religion. This aspect of Renan's thinkingmade contemporary theorists resurrect him in the 1990s.

Renan's importance also lies in putting forward the subjective identification of the factors that influence nationalism over the objective ones. Weber(1963:172), in his"The nation" wrote that "it is based on sentiments of prestige,which often extends deep down to the petty bourgeois masses of political structures rich in the historical attainment of power-positions". Since the fervour of nationalism does not have an economic origin and runs deep down to the prestige principle, making itself indispensable in the sphere of values. And those who zealously shoulder the idea have access to certain cultural capital. He establishes the idea of vital importance of intellectuals to the nationalist consciousness by establishing how the particularistic interest transformed into the national mission.

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[3] Renan discusses the idea of forgetting along with the massacre of Saint Bartholomev in which many thousands of Huegonots were killed. This event had momentous repercussions in the history of France

Weberian analysis introduced a vital idea which was later developed by Clifford Geertz, Carleton Hayes, Edward Shills and Elie Kedourie.

The study of nationalism,1944-1980

During the second phase, from 1944-1980, the study of nationalism acquired a contemporary rational liberal outlook. The rational liberal understanding got shaped prominently by the ideas of Hans Kohn (1961), Elie Kedourie(1966) and Isiah Berlin (1979).Their main argument rests on the premise that nationalism developed in response to the intellectual and political crisis during enlightenment. In this sense, nationalism is not only a unit bound together, but it is the group looking forward to highest organized activity which is the formation of a sovereign state. As the process of attaining sovereignty might take time, it satisfies itself with autonomy or a similar arrangement. However, this sovereignty operates on a dual principle of empathy towards the fellow members of the nationality but marked with indifference and distrust/hate for member and outlook within the nations and is marked by the crystallisation of will.

There are also marked differences between the rise of nationalism in the western and the non-western world. Kohn (1961) details how nationalism in the non western world it emerged in protest to existing state pattern primarily for redrawing the political boundaries in compliance with the ethnographic demands and found expression in the cultural field. Western nationalism originated with the concepts of individual liberty and rationality, in the eastern/central Europe and the Asian contexts. It pitched on the natural fact of the community and sentiments, held together by traditional ties.The second major contribution of the rational-liberal thought is the historical soundness of the critique of nationalism. This aspect generated a kind of dialectic and subsequently set a precedent for Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith and Ernst Gellner.

The liberal rationalists draw their influences from the Whig historiography modern forms of liberal democracy as having progressed from constitutional monarchy. The supremacy of reason can be gauged from Kedourie's(1974) path breaking intervention where he recognizes self-determination as the only acceptable way to deal with nationalism. Kedourie(1974) regards, "National self-determination as the final culmination in the

determination of the will: and nationalism is a method of teaching the right determination of the will".

However, while defining loyalty to a certain institution, for example an 'A' institution, a nationalist would have to define the 'A' institution in terms of language, race or religion and merge their will in the will of the community. The rationalist liberals went to the extent of classifying nationalism as a 'new tribalism', criticising ideological politics capable of espousing hate on grounds of race, tradition and religion.The destruction of traditional hierarchies deprived people of social and emotional bonds of security leading to phenomenon of alienation. A new innovative strategy was required for cultural, political or religious bonds from the older order. Majorly the chasm was filled by old traditional bonds of language, memories or self-conception as a community. This sentiment was exploited for ulterior purposes and gradually acquired an independent force of its own.

Berlin(1979) pitched the doctrine of nationalism as revolt against reason and identified euro-centrism in the study of nationalism. The European perceptions were used to analyse Asia and Africa and the inhabitants were seen either as beneficiaries or victims of Europe but seldom as people with histories or cultures of their own. Their nationalisms were perceived solely against the European domination and so the nationalisms emerging from the non-western contexts were seen as explosion of anti-imperialism.

The study of nationalism since 1980

Nationalism in this time period emerged in reaction to primordials and perennialists, rejecting thenaturalism and immemorialism of nations as a myth.For modernists, nations are modern social constructs which emerged with the increased communication and to the growth of modern social and political processes like capitalism, industrialism, state bureaucratization, secularism and urbanisation. So nations became the territorial political communities constituting the chief political bond and over took over other formative allegiances. Modernism could be approached through three categories in terms of economic modernism, socio-cultural modernism and political modernism.

Like Berlin(1979) who set the tone for establishing relationship between primordial ties and modernity within the rational liberal framework,Gellner (1983)meticulously intervened in the debate by understanding nationalism as a peculiarly contemporary phenomenon with dual structural connections-modern society and the modern capitalist economy. Gellner(1983)envisioned nationalism as the imposition of a high culture on society replacing local low culture. He gave immense importance to the cultural affinity as the underlying principle for the development of politically organized systems and secondly on the Weberian State[4].Gellner (1983) thoroughly defended that nations are a product of modernity's efforts for imposing higher cultures. In his work, he saw modernity translating the structure and culture of state and the nation.

Since the society was vertically bound before industrialization, there was watertight segregation between communities as well as between classes which led to non-commonality of language, memories, religion or ancestry. However, in the industrial society the barriers between communities faded away due to mass education which had a standard character allowing for socio-economic mobility. Additionally, if the scale of industrialisation is uneven, the communities which are at a disadvantage end up not assimilating. This gap might increase if the ruler of the state is not from the same ethnic majority. In this case, nationalism will erupt because members of the 'nation' would not like to be governed by any other ethnic element. Subsequently, standardised education becomes the connector between culture and the political will of belonging to a nation. This way, the identification between culture and politics is not given but result of a social process. The industrial society is one in constant growth and accompanied with absolute mobility. Inherited roles disappear as constant movement requires equality for social functioning. As members must be able to communicate to each other, there emerges an urgency of a common language. The category of 'cultural' assumes a modern and cultural homogenization acquires a cultural imperialistic form.

Another important element of the Gellner's work is the strain generated by nationalism around entropy-resistant groups. The groups that resist entropy become problematic for

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[4] Weberian state is a modern system of administration based on centralization and coercion. It is a symbol of collective action which means whatever the state performs is always for the community and not particular interests. Territoriality, violence and legitimacy are the essential elements of the weberian state.

industrial societies. The reasons for the resistance could be genetic or cultural. Gradually because of being exposed to discrimination, these groups will be openly resistant to entropy generated within industrial societies leading to the creation of nationalism in industrial societies. He thus makes a claim that nations are produced by nationalism created through series of social processes. For him, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should be in congruence with political boundaries.

Other essential theorisation that emerged in this period is Benedict Anderson's (1983) phenomenal work on nationalism. His primary concern has been to understand nationalism as an occurrence in its own right and not as a shadow of any other variable. Though Anderson's work is considered prophetic in the nationalism studies one can segregate it between his theoretical arguments and the second is the historic account about the rise of nationalism in Europe and elsewhere.

The starting point of (Smith1983:6) theoretical claim is that , " nation is an imagined community because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of the fellow members, meet them or even hear of them". He contends nations like religions are cultural artefacts of a particular kind which emerged towards the end of 18th century. Discussing the formation and rise of nationalism within Europe against a certain background with the collapse of earlier religious and cultural certainties, (Smith1983:4) visualizes nationalism as "modular form capable of being transplanted with varying degrees of self-consciousness to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and to be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological factors".

The second theoretical assertion Anderson makes is that the nation is not only imagined but also a limited and sovereign political community. It is limited because the boundaries are clearly demarcated and it is sovereign because within the demarcated boundaries, most nations imagine themselves as free. He makes a connection of sovereignty to the religious plurality where legitimacy of divinely ordained realm is challenged vehemently. The final theoretical assertion Anderson makes that nation through deep comradeship becomes imaginable as a community.

Anderson phenomenal work also explains the historicity behind the rise of nationalism. Talking about the European experience, Anderson discusses the role of religious community particularly Christianity to understand the rise of nationalism. The sacral cultures were imagined largely through the medium of sacred language and written script which catered to a tiny literate population hierarchically on the apex. However, the importance of religiously imagined communities could not survive beyond the middle ages. One of the predominant reasons for this development was the discovery of non-European world from the beginning of 13th century. The second reason was the gradual demotion of the sacred languages. The status of Latin waned and the traditional communities got fragmented. The form of the dynastic realm also changed from being the only conceivable political unit to one in which monarchy organised all the essential functions.

The third important idea Anderson floats is the idea that nationalism has to be situated along with the idea of time.He explains another reality was dawning which was equally instrumental in replacing religious communities and dynastic realms. Anderson links the idea of time with the role of print capitalism. This transformation marks an important juncture in the birth of an imagined community. Book publishing became the earliest form of capitalist enterprise and in the capitalism's restless search for markets, nationalism became a saleable commodity.

By the mid-seventeenth century, the printing press owners faced shortage of money. As a rescue measure, printing press owners decided to print literature in the vernacular languages. The advent of vernacularisation coincided with reformation. (Anderson 1983:40)notes

> The coalition between Protestantism and print capitalism, exploiting cheap popular editions quickly created large reading publics, not least among merchants who typically knew little or no Latin and simultaneously mobilized for politico-religious purposes. Third was the slow geographically uneven spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralization by certain well positioned would be absolutist monarchs.

With time, print languages influenced the national consciousness by creating unified fields of exchange and communication. He contends nationalism arose in Americas

before arising in Europe. The formation of creole states was enabled by population sharing common origin and language. Creole states shared lingual commonality with the metropoles, it inevitably led to quick transmission of the new doctrines generated in Western Europe. Creoles used their sense of exclusion along with the opportunities created by the print capitalism as an opportunity to generate a Creole identity and subsequently Creole nationalism.The pilgrim creole functionaries and print men played an equally decisive role towards the spirit of Creole nationalism. However, despite the striking similarity with the metropole, nationalism in creoles was not able to convert itself into a Pan Americas phenomenon. Anderson makes an interesting observation that by middle of 20th century, the educational journey gained a predominant stature gifted by the mobility generated by railways.

The modernist theorisations denote a shift in the framework of analysis from culture to capitalism. They contributed to the debate by swapping ahistorical and essentialist notions of cultural and power by forces of modernity. However structurally heterogeneous imperatives within all modern states give rise to one or the other form of nationalism. This assessment was done by historicist-lexographical rebuilding of the nation, imparting importance to subjective act of imagining vis –a- vis the material conditions.

The role of educational journey and the role of intellectuals for creating a civil society has an amorphous relation with the nation. Shill (1995) opines that civil society is an important indicator for sustaining the nation. Civil society is one of the institutional manifestations of the nation and is formed by a sense of mutual awareness. In this way participating in the collective and not recognising those who are outside the ambit becomes political act resulting in the classificatory process of the 'Self' and the 'Other'. Hastings (1997) corroborates the classificatory consciousness and places nationalism as a strong exposition of a particularistic identity. In fact, the nation-state arose from a conviction that one's own ethnic or national tradition is valuable and has to be defended.

On the other hand, economic modernism explained nationalist resurgence through the dynamics of particular stages of capitalism. The economic modernists co-related the roots

of nationalism with the world economy and wanted to find an explanatory framework for deriving nationalism. Nairn(1981) notes that the roots of nationalism are to be sought beyond internal dynamics of societies and therefore determined by certain features of the world political economy. The capitalist development process created a vast gap between the core and the periphery. Given the situation, mass mobilisation was only possible in terms of national identity outside the forces of domination. This was followed by emergence of nationalism in peripheral countries as a response to uneven development.

In the same period, ethno-symbolism driven by tireless efforts of such scholars as Anthony Smith (1999), John Armstrong (1982) and John Hutchinson (1987) emerged. Ethno-symbolists asserted that nationalism has stronger roots in pre-modern ethnicity and their objective is to retain the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities. Armstrong (1982) writes that ethnic precursors are essential for our proper assessment of the emergence of the present nations. The formation of nations should be explored within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity. In particular, ethno-symbolists are critical of the modernist failure to grasp the recurring nature of ethno-symbolic ties. Smith(1999) expresses that understanding of modern nations, involves understanding the myths, memories, traditions and symbols associated with it. He acknowledges that nations cannot be perceived as natural but located in ancient histories and filtered through ethnic consciousness. Ethno-modernists make a difference between nationalism as an ideology and nationalism as a movement. Though nationalism appeared around the later eighteenth century, the ethnic origins of nations are older. Smith writes myths, symbols, memories and values are carried forward by artefacts. As these artefacts and activities change very slowly, the formation of an ethnie also sustains over a long time. Smith(1986) explains therefore the origins of modern nationalism therefore lie in the successful bureaucratization of aristocratic ethnie, ethnic communities with their myths and symbols. Collective memory plays an important role for the formation of ethnic and then national identity. Smith(1986:109) notes that in the modern arena, ethnic communities are compelled to become political and "in order to survive, *ethnie* must take on some of the attributes of nationhood, and adopt a civic model". On the other hand, nations, rooted in ethnicity, are long-term processes. According to Smith, modern nations and

nationalism have intensified the meaning and scope of older ethnic concepts and structures.

Exclusion and desire for power: A distinctive characteristic of nationalism

An important idea that emerges regularly in theoretical understanding of nationalism is the 'idea of exclusion'. Perennials and primordials believe that in the natural order of the world for ensuring exclusion of those who don't belong to that particular order, while cultural modernists understand that the change in the mode of economy ensures exclusion. As primordialists point out that if the natural order of the world is a division of humanity, made by culturally fixed groups, then the groups would tend to exclude others. Such order is bound to create hostility between nations and ethnic groups. While it is difficult to prove that the genetic pool of smaller social units as family and clan is extendable to larger groups. It is also pertinent to note that boundaries of ethnic identity are fluid, and are continuously redefined and reconstructed via individual choice and according to changing conditions. So the primordial and perennial claim that ethnic and national ties are ineffable is clearly problematic. The organic nationalism theory also neglects changes affecting nations as migration and colonization, and fails to explain the reasons for loss and rebirth of nations. Mere knowledge of ethnic ties is not sufficient in predicting the dynamics of ethnic groups as the use of ethnic attachments for political and nationalist ends can transform their very meanings. In this way, primordial sentiments are ineffable, overpowering and coercive.

Primordial identities are essentially a question of emotion and affective ties and explain the power of cultural givens of human existence such as blood, kinship, language, custom, religion, and territory. In this way, cultural primordialists build on the anthropological conception of culture, which defines it as a total way of life having a unique historical group past. However, imagination of unique people-hood, distinct culture, encoding distinct historical experience into a set of symbolic patterns remains a fundamentally divisive and exclusivist doctrine. Isaji(1992) situates primordial attachments alongside modern secular civil ties which impede and dissolve civil ties of the modern state.

Other than impeding the functions of the modern state, another marked gap in primordialism is its given-ness and the unquestionable reverence to the fixed social position. In a way organic understanding of nationalism imposes retrospective nationalism on communities and groups, whereas the identities and consciousness could have been local, regional or religious.

In contrast the socio-cultural modernists are historically more grounded and address the issue of nation-building. Modernity created situations for the cultural homogenization and the emergence of a new national conscience. The modernist processes like printing and communication helped in the formation of the community for imparting a sense of nationhood but fell short of explaining nationhood as an ideology. The centralised uniform state proposed by the socio-cultural modernists provided members a sense of belonging towards one's own identity against the other. The cultural homogenisation was ensured through an education-dependent high culture protected by the state. It was cultural homogenization enabled through socio-economic modernisation. Socio-cultural modernism places nationalism as rooted in past.

However, over a period of time, theory of homogenised mass culture could not hold ground in varying socio-economic terrains. Deutsch (1953) notes that modernization enables social mobilization and social communication. If the social communication outraces assimilation, then competition among the various groups is inevitable In a way the forces of modernization have a different impact in the consolidation of states where people share lingual or cultural similarity. But it can be different for states with mixed populations. Secondly, modernization is also accompanied by the growth of new economic and political orders. Traditional values and authority misplace their meaning in the changing societies. As the old structures fade, societal equations of status and power are reworked too. This reworking of values and new forms of relationships are reflected through contesting power claims and thus the idea of exclusion,that can emerge with the modernity. As there is a tussle for having control of the economy, objective class differences emerge between formerly classless groups. Competition during modernization is essentially competition between large-scale groups for privilege. It

brings different ethnic groups who held different values, spoke different languages in confrontation with each other.

Thus a vital accompaniment to the process of modernity has been multiplication of the claims for greater access to power and resources. However, the success of any such claim depends on the infrastructure of social communications and comprehensive institutionalization of values, roles and expectations. Melson and Wolpe (1970) remarked that the social groups grew faster reinforce ethnic differences, creating a stark ethnic confrontation. As there is a tussle for controllingthe economy, objective class differences emerge between formerly classless groups. Thus different ethnic groups who held different values, spoke different languages were pitched against each other.As tribal and kinship networks failed to provide support, individuals sought to create a broader formation such as an ethnic nation**.** This way the ethnic boundaries got broadened and loyalty towards immediate tribe were replaced by loyalty towards an identity.As modernization also politicizes ethnicity for seeking greater values in the political process, the ethnicity is mobilised through ethnic clientale. The politicisation of ethnicity transmits the message to the masses.

Rogowski(1985) notes that elites believe in ethnic nationalism only when they expect that the future autonomous nation will have a favourable supply-demand ratio for their particular skills. For gaining greater economic and political participation, ethnic mobilization can be carried on cultural lines rather than economic lines. Ethno-symbolism here is used as a smokescreen for underlying demands of economic and political values. So the demands are carved in terms of invoking pre-modern ethnic identities and contextualization of ethnic demands through the larger phenomenon on ethnicity. Reverence for the past of the nation is invoked thereby providing new meanings and functions to myths, memories, symbols and values.

Modernisation actually correlates with institutionalism whereby institutions work as political actors and provide opportunities. They function as recurring patterns of behaviour and are embedded in particular contexts which is shaped by the forces of modernization.Institutions are understood as models or scripts for behaviour and include

the structure of governance, the inclusion or exclusion of different actors. As explained there can be no grand theory of ethnic nationalism, only partial theories concentrating on specific aspects. Various dimensions of modern social, cultural and political change serve to make both nationhood and ethnicity salient. Ethnicity and nationhood are not just social problems but a political resource, which is often used in a variety of political strategies. Hence,it is reasonable to take cue from differing theories to make sense of our case study.

EthnicNationalism:A derivative discourse of the contestation between the self and the other

In post-colonial states nationalism has evolved as a replica of what it once stood against. Chatterjee (1986:42) perceives this problematic as a derivative discourse. The post-colonial nationalismended up adopting a repressive structure, shaped by western capitalism and rationalism. Chatterjee's colonial state model presents an excellent framework for understanding contestation of self and other in the context of the nation. The west has asserted its superiority through its access toscience and technology, while the east, pitches its superiority in the spiritual domain often done by glorifying thegolden past.(Chatterjee 1986:121) notes that "nationalist thought accepts and adopts the same essentialist conception based on the distinction between 'the East' and 'the West', the same typology created by atranscendent studying subject, and hence the same objectifying procedures of knowledgeconstructed in the post-Enlightenment age of Western science".

Plemenatz(1973) and Greenfeld(1992) also have suggested ways about how the other gets imitated. Plemenatz(1973:30) has made a clear distinction between the western nationalism and the oriental type, where the domination of the west undermined the very structure of the eastern society. He writes that

> Drawn gradually, as a result of the diffusion among them of western ideas and practices, into a civilization alien to them, they have had to re-equip themselves culturally, to transform themselves. In their efforts to assert themselves as equals in a civilization not of their own making, they have had to, as it were, to make themselves anew, to create national identities for themselves.

Thus Plamenatz suggests a conclusive way for thinking about the sub-nationalisms that emerges in response to the control of others, often from the West. This serves dual purpose of rejecting the control of the other and also traditional ways that are perceived as hindrances towards progress. A key factor emerges here called *ressentiment*[5] which results from suppressed hatred and not having a vent for expressing hatred. Sub-nationalism thus emerges on multiple levels, as a political doctrine and also as a movement led by elites against the social control. This tussle also reflects the adaptive processes groups indulge in for raising their prestige .For example in India, the pre-colonial contestation between the self and the other occurred through the nationalist stigmatisationand imitation of the British colonialist. The reformist rather than rejecting the British onslaught on private sphere began to diffuse the western claims by situating them in the ancient global age. In other ways, 'self' began to interpret itself through the cultural understanding of the other.(Foucault, 1984:125) notes that, "resistance as a phenomenon is situated within the power which provokes it, and not outside this power: '[…] I believe that resistance is an aspect of this strategic relationship that involves power."

The building of a sub-nationalistic ideology thus creates a new mechanism for coping with the threats of the other. Geertz(1973) explains that sub-nationalist retaliation is a reaction to socio-cultural and psychological strain. In away, Geertz supports the point made by Plemanatz regarding the pre-requisite of cultural re-alignment through socio-psychological factors. This re-alignment through political, moral and economic variables determines the growth of sub-nationalism. Thus,sub-nationalism at one level imagines glorious past for itself and also transforms its culture vis-à-vis the outsider. Also, lot of attention is given to construction of ideology through socio-economic and political factors. Civil society often plays a significant role for this and social groups carry out the message of transmitting the values of sub-nationalism.

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[5]*Ressentiment* is a notion that Greenfeld borrows from Max Scheler who had himself taken it from Nietzsche. It can bedefined as a 'psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred existential envy and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings. For more see (Liah 2012:90)

Sources of Ethnic nationalism

Ethnic nationalism derives itself from subjective as well as objective sources to manifest itself as a socio-political value. Cultural attributes and symbolic ethnic markers, such as language, territory and religion form the objective dimension while the subjective dimension includes group loyalty, identity etc. The objective and subjective values determine the lines of ethnic identity and membership, along the questions of group inclusion and exclusion. The objective factors do have centrality in the discourse on ethnic-nationalism but sometimes the role may be exaggerated. Fenton (2003) places ethnicity as construction of descent and culture and ethnic nationalism as the social mobilization of the same. The mobilization depends on the level of self-consciousness in an ethnic group and awareness of difference with other groups.

De Vos(1995) points out that subjective application of the cultural references or their emblematic use for differentiating themselves from other groups defines the ethnic nationalism. Thus, the cultural references become a marker for group affiliation, identification of strangeness and unfamiliarity. The awareness of difference plays a vital role in the mobilisation. When a group has no consciousness or the desire to organise in terms of ethnic consciousness, ethnic nationalism does not evolve.

Subjective references thus perform the function of social organization of cultural difference, and a demarcation of 'us' and 'them'. Thus, subjective references perform the essential function of generating social labels. A peculiar character of subjective references is that they are formed through mutual contact rather than in isolation. Burgess(1981)explains that symbolic markers explain the quality of the subjective aspects of ethnic nationalism. The subjective aspect of ethnic nationalism by and large plays a more crucial role than objective qualities, as group formation is a subjective experience undertaken by group members themselves. The differences that set the group apart from other are usually drawn along real or putative shared culture. So the differences are crucial for not only the members of the group but also for members of other groups.

Smith(1999) and Hutchinson (1996) particularly emphasize the importance of myths, symbols and memories as primary elements of ethnically defined groups. (Smith1999:50), for example, defines it as "a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of common culture, including an association with a homeland and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites".

It is interesting to note that the description seeks a compromise between objective attributes, namely common history and culture, and subjective qualities of ethnicity such as myths and memories. The combination of subjective and objective variable makes ethnic nationalism viable and potent in social structures.

Construction of ethnic nationalism

Ethnic nationalism is a process of construction of an identity negotiated through social practices. Through engaging social processes, actors come to identify with and commit themselves to a certain vision of nationhood. Smith (1991) identifies the some fundamental elements for constructing ethnic nationalism a historic homeland, myths and memories and amass public culture. Ancestry and historical memories play a crucial role in transmitting the values of nationalism and forming identity. It is through customs, rituals and preconceptions that elements of common culture shape the content of culture, broadcast it, and formulate the behavioral patterns. Popular myths, art, music and literature provide a bridge with the homeland. A sense of solidarity is manifested through political and popular community institutions or organizations. Yinger (1994) introduces another interesting characteristic of ethnic groups, other than segmentality and that is of participation. According to him, ethnic nationalists take part in common activities for valorization of their culture. So ethnic membership involves not only a possession or a belief in possession of common origin and culture but also requires participating in shared activities, which in turn sustain the very belief in common ancestry.

Ethnic nationalism operates in a larger social reservoir, and ensures interaction with other groups for enhancement of pseudo kinship ties. The group then acts, or participates, in shared cultural activities that not only symbolize ethnic bondage but also sustain the

putative belief. As part of strategy, compulsory institutions like kinship and religion are promoted for ensuring easy communication. Institutions are given an instrumental nature, which are responsible for ideological transformation of the cultural values to political and economic ends.

Ethnic nationalism makes it a point to solidify social-psychological ethnic boundaries. These boundaries define lines of ethnic identity and membership, as well as involve questions of group inclusion and exclusion. While the contents and membership of ethnic group change, its boundary remains. Boundaries can be of two kinds: internal, within the ethnic group, and external, outside the group. In the internal boundaries, self-inclusion in the group takes place, sympathy and loyalty is set towards co-members, and the process of self-identity overlaps. In the external borders, membership exclusion is outlined and demarcation lines are laid for outsiders.

While assessing ethnic nationalism, Isajiw(1992) suggests distinguishing its external and internal aspects. External aspects of ethnic nationalism refer to social and cultural observable behaviour, participating in ethnic institutional organizations, contributing to ethnic associations, etc. The internal aspects of ethnic identity comprise of visual images, ideas,etc. In this way, ethnic nationalism is constructed as a facade for political aspirations through cognitive, moral and affective ways.

Resource Competition and Ethnic Nationalism

Ethnic identity is mobilised in multi-ethnic societies as ethnic elites compete with each other for scarce resources and rewards. Such resource competition could lead to ethnic political movements if the acquired resources of a group are threatened or an under privileged group realises the structural inequalities a group faces. Gurr (1993) writes that an ethnic group may come to develop a perception of deserving more value than its getting. (Phadnis 1989:39) observes that the process of relative deprivation leading to ethnic political movement may occur in four stages. The first stage is the stage of recognition whereby a group recognises deprivation. In the second stage a group should recognise that the experience is not shared by other groups. Second ethnic groups also have to recognise that wretched condition is not experienced by other groups. In the third

stage ethnic group has to develop the feelings that the situation of deprivation in which they find themselves is inequitable and unfair. Finally, ethnic groups must recognise that political action could change the situation in their favour, which leads to a stage of mass political revolt. Thus, the realisation that a group is receiving less than it deserves becomes the motivating force for ethnic political movements. Two key elements that combine for research competition are elite interaction and politicisation of ethnicity. Brass(1991) shows that elite competition, resource scarcity and centralising tendencies of states have combined to produce ethnic competition. However, quite sometimes resource competition becomes a smokescreen for elites to use the issue for their own ends.

Articulation of interests as ethnic nationalism

Given the scenario of the resource competition, the ethnic nationalism could emerge as a point towards mobization. The grievances are expressed over the absence of socioeconomic or political values but aiming towards redistribution of the existing scheme of things. Glazer and Moynihan(1975) realized that modernization places groups differentially resulting in ethnic groups mobilising towards group or individual interests. Thus, the ethnic grievances become a ready means of demanding group rights or providing defense against other groups. Horowitz(1985) utilizes the same perspective for explaining how groups symbolically counterfeit hurt sentiments. For example, a group's dignity may be jolted by lack of respect for its language and could become the cause for violent group conflict.

Goals and Objectives of Ethnic Nationalist Movements

The goals and objectives of ethnic political movements fluctuate according to the socio-political conditions. As a group collectively suffers from discrimination in a state and mobilises for promotion of self-defined interests, historical specificity and the political conditions determine the nature of goals and the change of goals in ethnic nationalist movements.Gurr(1993) uses two terms for politicised groups-national and minority people. National people are the regional groups who retain their cultural and linguistic characteristics in event of threats from expansionist states. Their desire is to retain some degree of political autonomy. On the other hand, minority people have a definitive

position within a society and are focussed about protecting or improving their status. Therefore, the basic difference between the two lies in the goal seeking behaviour.

National people can be further sub-divided into two typeseither ethno-nationalist who are regionally concentrated people with a historical precedent of political autonomy or indigenous movements. Or, indigenous people, who are mostly peripheral groups and have distinction from centres of state authority and concerned mainly about issues of group autonomy. The minority people also have a classification of ethno-classes, militant sects or politically active religious minorities, linguistic or geographic distinct groups aiming for greater share of power. If the minority people face or suspect discrimination, they have the capacity for transforming them into ethno-nationalists.

To borrow two terms and ideas from Gurr(1993), inter group differentials and outright discrimination precisely determine the objectives of ethno-nationalist movement. He uses differentials as traits that set each group apart in the larger society and are classified as cultural, political and economic differentials.[6]On the other hand, outright discrimination is measured through systematic exclusion from desirable economic and political goods that are available to others in society. Existence of economic inequality is amplified through social and political conditions responsible for creating and maintaining these inequalities. Political discrimination could be seen in under-representation in political participation and a prolonged exclusion from political positions. Additionally, demographic and ecological stress also determines the goals for ethno-nationalists.

Strategies of Ethnic Nationalism

For an ethnic nationalism movement to be durable and visible despite the repression by the state, ethno-nationalists adopt number of strategies for which a number of variables need to be taken care of. The first critical variable is to exist as a group and as a strong political movement.The movement should have the external support in the form of bases,training,finances,weapons,soldiers,intelligence,etc.Additionally,   ethno-nationalists

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[6]Cultural differentials determine whether the groups differed from other groups in an important manner through ethnicity, language, religion, customs, urban-ness or rural-ness. Political differentials are focused on how communal groups varied in access to positions of power and to political associations. Economic differentials are grounded in economic inequalities, access to higher education etc. For more see (Gurr 1993:200)

should have visibility in order to draw solidarity. Modelski(1954) explains that a movement derives visibility and audibility by attracting external politico-diplomatic support as well as the attention of the international media. Several ways like international diplomatic activity for gaining sympathisers could be taken for making the movement long lasting. Diplomatic support can fetch recognition, acknowledgement, territory for exiles and diaspora activity. It can also fetch material support such as financial support and military backing in terms of training and procuring weapons.

Ethnic nationalists have to be extremely careful and practical in accepting aid from the external actors. This may involve adopting flexibility in its professed ideology, and at the same time holding to its core constituency too. Choosing an ally also is an important step as the political image of the ally would impact the image of ethno-nationalism too. Another important factor is the efficient articulation of their case. This would involve writing booklets, pamphlets, articles in newspapers and media. This would demarcate the allies and the opposition clearly. (Phadnis1989:30) writes that ability to effectively use positive inducements like rewards for services and support, as well as negative sanctions against non-compliance to ethnic nationalist demands may prove pivotal in attracting support from external parties.

Subsequently, lobbying is conducted at individual, group,state and systemic level.At the individual level, the targets of lobbying usually are influential personalities, intellectuals, artists, religious figures etc. The purpose is to use their influence for legitimising ethno-nationalism.

At the group level, the targets of lobbying are neighbouring nation-states who are eager to provide military and material support,base facilities as well as international publicity. Those states which in the past have supported the ethnic nationalist movements elsewhere are approached for support.Ethnic nationalist movements elsewhere are routinely utilised for solidarity and support. Ethnic diaspora is also utilised for lobbying especially if they are economically and politically powerful.

International bodies which comprise of former colonial powers and major powers are another category of states that could be approached for assistance,for recognition or for

negotiating the conflict.International government organisations are other bodies that could be called to mediate the conflict and for lending legitimacy to the movement,boosting the morale of members and have the wider international opinion in their favor.

The appeal for support to ethnic nationalists opens up possibility of external partisan intervention for affective or instrumental motives. Affective motives include reasons for justice,humanitarian considerations,ethnic,religious affinity, personal ties between the leadership. While the instrumental motives are rooted in real-politik and usually include short or long term military strategic considerations.

Conclusion

This chapter tried to develop an analytical framework for understanding nationalism and how the derivative discourse of ethnic nationalism comes into existence. Nationalism emerged as a political force against the colonial rule, having a strong support base within the political elites. The genesis of nationalism in post-colonial states was entirely different than its evolution in Europe where a geographical, political, social and religious unity existed. European model of nationalism held the cultural boundaries of the nation in congruence to the political boundaries. In South Asia, the nationalist imagination emerged mainly for claiming the independent nation-state. Nationalism required congruence of language, faith and culture in most cases. In cases where it did not exist, bonds of nationalism were forged.

However, the forged bonds of nationalism were challenged soon after by the underlying divisive tendencies. Some of these tendencies were new, while some were historically entrenched. Consequently, different ethnic groups found little in common with other ethnic groups. Many of these groups had to deal with subordinate treatment from the majoritarian groups because such groups felt badly treated and hence saw these cultural groups as new colonizers. The ethnic grievances went hand in hand with the growing assertion by the majority ethnic communities for the promotion and restoration of their political, economic and socio-cultural privileges. This was accompanied by the minority ethnic groups calling for special rights or secession. The social fragmentation, civil and

institutional discord, regime instability became other reasons that bolstered multiple claims of ethnicnationalism.

Absence of a strong nationalist spirit and commitment to common political goals led to a culture of non-accommodation and fundamental discord amongst varied social interests. Given the divergent political and ethnic backgrounds, post-colonial states required to develop inclusivity,consociational structures based on accommodation and negotiation. While as the states mostly relied on centralist and exclusivist patterns of rule, which resulted in long term exclusion and blockage of any cross-segmentary ties. This resentment when supported by sufficient social support gradually evolved towards ethno-political territorial goals.

In a way,ethno-nationalistic assertion in post-colonial states was determined by varying factors- the most important being the colonial legacy of the ethno-regional policy preferences, state response, and the nature of social basis for support for ethnic nationalism. The traditional belief system, locally based sources of authority and kinship ties reinforced the social basis for support. Some postcolonial states redrew their internal boundaries in part to reduce the perception of exclusion and facilitated a more balanced allocation of benefits to long ignored regions. However, such examples are quite limited given the vastness of growing ethnic/sub-nationalistic demands. Success of ethnic nationalism also depended on the infrastructure of social communication and comprehensive institutionalisation of values, roles and expectations. Modernisation created social mobilization, leading to a greater involvement in mass politics. As social communication outraced assimilation, ethnic competition becomes the inevitable result of increased group interaction. Thus forces of modernisation have a different impact on consolidation of states with heterogeneous or homogenous populations.

Chapter 2

The Origin and Nature of Kashmiri Nationalism: A Historical background

Rishta Abul Watan, Az Dile Burid

Raft Digar Barkas, Roshan Nadid [7]

(If the sentiment of love for the homeland rises from the heart, it will not prove a burden of the individual)

Introduction

This chapter tries to locate origin and nature of the Kashmiri nationalism. Through delving into politico-historical, sociological, educational and psychological factors, the chapter tries to find out how these factors corresponded in the formation of Kashmiri nationalism. The chapter tries to map both the emotional and political nature of nationalism, bringing out the role played by major political actors. Also, it tries to initiate a theoretical engagement as to how beneath the actual historical process, other factors intensified the consciousness of identity and the nation-state.

As with other nationalisms, Kashmiri nationalism evolved concretely as a consequence of changes which were economic, political and social in nature. These changes had a peculiar psychological impact that eventually made the geographical unit more compact and a sense of commonality strengthened. A sense of difference was maintained by having a belief in common historical past. The historical memories were gradually interpreted and diffused verbally over the generations. Thus, the imagination of common social and genetic descent was consciously developed and propagated through intelligentsia and was diffused throughout the social strata. This mobilization was not hindered by the social and cultural differentiation rather a distinct intense and exclusive culture erupted which had its own social boundaries. This was followed by continued dichotomization between the members and the outsiders, making the entire phenomenon continuous.

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[7] A critical edition of Shakristan of Mullah Hamidullah Shahabadi Kashmiri with necessary annotations(1783-1848)

The chapter also looks at how various socio-political processes created identification of the self, and dichotomization of the other as a stranger. The chapter broadly tries to understand how the boundaries of the Kashmiri nationalism were set in.

Politico-Economical Factors

Class formation in Kashmir and the corresponding politico-economic changes are very instrumental for understanding the nature of nationalism in Kashmir. The political discourses emerged with the change in economic character for both rural peasantry and urban artisans.

The state came together as a single geographical entity through the Treaty of Amritsar signed between Maharaja Gulab Singh and the British signed on 16 March 1846 for a meager amount of Rs 75 lakh[8]. Since Gulab Singh sought to earn back the huge amount quickly, he enlarged the existing taxation system from the pre-Dogra period. The trade in the valley was monopolised and there was a tax on every trade and profession. This monopoly also led to pervasive hoarding and black marketing.

Kashmir's rural landscape presented a picture of extreme despondency where the cultivator was at the bottom of the social ladder and a number of social groups lived off their labour. In the case of Kashmir, the office holders were primarily Kashmiri Pandits and the Pirs (the preachers from Central Asia settled in Kashmir) who exercised the revenue functions and these classes were exempted from regular revenue assessment and other taxes the state levied. Zutshi(2003) and Rai(2004) explicate how the exploitative revenue system discriminated against the Kashmiri Muslim cultivator.The Kashmiri Muslim cultivator not only had to feed the Darbar but an entire contingent of middlemen between himself and the state.

As large tracts of land were concentrated in very few hands, the intermediate class perpetuated all sorts of miseries on the cultivator; the state took away not less than 3/5[th]of

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[8] After the Anglo-Sikh war of 1845, the British demanded 1.5 crore from the Lahore Durbar against the cost of war and breaching the friendship treaty with British. They also realised how controlling the complete Sikh territory, would require greater military and financial costs. More so a mountainous territory like Kashmir was difficult to defend and closer to the Russian frontier. The inability of Lahore Durbar to pay the war indemnity, paved the way for the sale of the territory eastward of the River Indus and westward of the river Ravi to the Dogra rulers.(Zutshi 2004).

the gross produce from cultivator besides other shares 3 percent for Patwari and Qanungo, 2 percent for village servant and other charges too. Lawrence (1895) records that in the early Hindu period the state collected one-sixth of their produce from the cultivator. During the Sultans, cultivator paid off one-half of their produce.Under Mughals, the taxation intensified and the cultivating class was asked to dispense off with grain for three months. Ever since then, the state's share was fixed as three quarters of the produce of the land.

The nature of the huge scale exploitation could also be understood from the fact that ownership of land rested with the state. The land was demarcated into two categories-Khalsa and the Chakdar, Jagir and Imam grant. In the first category, land was given directly to the peasants who would work on the land and the intermediate class would collect the revenue on the states behalf. The second category was Chakdars, Jagir land and Imam grant. This category also did not own the land but held the ownership in lieu of services provided to the state. During the Sikh period, the rulers were firm on retaining the proprietorship rights, resulting in Jagirdars holding Jagirs but without proprietorship.

The condition of Muslim cultivator could also be gauged by the system of *begaar* or forced labour. Since labour was scarce and a valuable commodity, the Dogras made up ways for obtaining it for free. Here again, Pandits became the intermediaries to collect the human resources. To make easy money they would exaggerate the number of persons required instead of the actual requirement. Those who could grease the palm of Pandit intermediaries would be saved of the ordeal of *begaar*. Ahmad(2017) narrates how *begaar* was the worst manifestation of the Dogra regime with an unspecified number of able-bodied Muslims serving as beasts of burden and being devoured by an inhospitable terrain. The forced labor took a more perilous turn as administration herded them to take supplies for the armies engaged in military expeditions in far off Gilgit, Leh, Chilas, Askardu and Hazara. The fellow villagers would tearfully bid good-bye to the male folk that were taken away for *begaar* as most of them would die en-route to these far flung areas. Doubtlessly rural Kashmiri peasantry was at the bottom of the economic ladder since the ownership rights rested with the Maharaja. In order to make the ends meet,

many of these peasants migrated to Punjab in search of labor during the winter months and returned to Kashmir in early spring.

There has not been a specific peasant insurgency in Kashmir to identify any ideological variant of peasant consciousness. But certainly, the existing relational opposition of power meant that the dominated possessed certain subjectivity, where they were autonomous and un-dominated. The historical material available describing the resistance to practices like '*Begaar*' becomes a methodological procedure by which one can obtain access to the peasant consciousness. Since the dominated by virtue of their power had no means of recording their knowledge, Ranajit Guha (1985) in his exemplary work recognized six elementary aspects of insurgent peasant consciousness-negation, modality, solidarity, ambiguity, transmission and territoriality.

In the case of Kashmir, Lawrence (2005) records the revenue administration from highest to lowest was based on loot and corruption. The loot was based on intelligent calculation and the administration was vested practically in the hands of the Kashmir Pandits. Lawrence (2005:19) writes, "It has been pointed out that the revenue administrator keeps three additions of the statement of holding, one for himself, which was supposed to near the truth, one for tehsildars and another for villagers, the two latter being prepared with a view to convincing each side of the excellent bargain he had secured."

This way peasant consciousness was shaped as an essentially negative consciousness, in a sense that it expressed itself solely through an opposition to the difference and antagonism towards its dominators. In the case of Kashmir, the dubious official morality and other signs of domination such as the imposition of taxes or rent or the power to punish, became the targets of resistance. Lawrence (2005:20) writes, "The Kashmiri in spite of his abject condition is very obstinate and determined person, and in cases where he considered the assessment was too high he has steadily declined to pay the excess".

The forms of resistance by peasantry involved a higher degree of ambiguity. There was an assurance of self- definition belonging to a certain collectivity which was separate from the oppressor. However, the idea of self-definition comes to fore through the aspect of solidarity. Solidarity ensured the message was transmitted with ease and the single

unifying idea that gives peasant resistance its fundamental character was the notion of community, where respective rights and duties are established and contested.

If forceful taxation and *begaar* was exterminating rural peasantry, the urban artists and shawl weavers were not in a better position. The royal court controlled the shawl trade through the reinstating of powerful institutions like *Dagh* Shawl which levied a heavy duty on shawls, at various stages of their production and distribution. From purchasing of yarn, dyeing of threads, creation of motifs to the actual completion, there were series of taxation milestones a shawl would go through. There were separate tax brackets for differential embroidery patterns. Then the shawl would be taken to *Dagh* Shawl where a tax of 25 percent would be levied. The shawl makers lived in the worst kind of penury and were not allowed to relinquish the trade or choose other vocations.

Ali (2017:35) notes that in 1847, about 4000 shawl *bafs* managed to flee the valley for Punjab to escape the horror of forcible taxation and compulsory weaving. The mass migration by the shawl weavers would mean excessive loss to the tax regimes. To shirk the situation, Maharaja introduced *Rehdari* System ordering his troops to plug all the escape routes and passes. The hapless shawl weavers stranded in a whirlpool of oppression, began chopping off their thumbs, to evade weaving.

Despite several delegations sent to the British government to deal with the grievances, things only worsened. Ali (2017) writes about the agitation of 1865 when the shawl workers agitated against the Maharaja's atrocities. It was perhaps one of the first organised demand day in the history of class struggle in erstwhile in the subcontinent. Workers from all parts of the city marched towards *Zaldagar* and raised slogans against the Dogra administration. The protestors were dealt with severity and many lost their lives after getting drowned into a marshy canal nearby. The dead bodies were buried secretly and punitive fines were put on those who survived.

The international situation also impacted the politico-economic conditions in Kashmir. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 had deteriorated the condition of shawl trade and weavers as France, which had emerged as a major market for Kashmiri shawls had ceased to exist as a markIt is pertinent to understand that the decline of the shawl

merchants had implications for social and political landscape of Kashmir of late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Shawl merchants were an influential class in the valley and had developed contacts with the outside world and contributed immensely to the revenue. After losing the principal sources of income to the decline of the shawl trade, a good number of merchants cognized the political and economic condition of the Muslim community paving way for internal and external contestation.

Sociological Factors

The position of Kashmiri Pandits as an entrophy-resistant group can be understood by Gellner's concept of social entrophy. Gellner (1983:65) explains his exposition in hypothetical terms, "supposing a society contains certain number of individuals who are by heredity, pigmentionally blue. After a number of generations have passed, the blues persist in occupying places either at top or at bottom of the society in question. In other words, the blues tend to capture either too many or too few of the privileges and the services available in the society". This would make blueness a 'social entrophy resistant trait'.

A cursory look at the history of Kashmir reveals that the Pandit community has wielded enormous influence on the affairs of the state .Its members would hold power irrespective of the fact who was ruling. The prime reason was the education within the community and the ability to quickly learn and master the languages of the rulers. However, both education and learning languages of the rulers are not innate endowments, they flow with state privilege and other social factors. Gellner (1983) puts it down that the traits for social entrophy might be invented as natural notions and the group might re-invent notions whenever it finds itself in a challenging state. The ideological and sometimes punitive mechanisms are employed to confirm to the expectations and sometimes internalize them thoroughly. In the case of Kashmir to this day, the legend flows that Kashmiri Pandits are naturally intelligent. A prominent Kashmiri Pandit writer, (Kilam 1955:90) describes the community as a fountain of deep thought having deep insight on human nature and poetics. He quotes from Ain-i-Akbari (2003:204),

> The most respectable class in this country(Kashmir) is that of Pandits,who
> notwithstanding their need for freedom from the bonds of tradition and custom are

the true worshipers of God. They do not loosen their tongue of calumny against those not of their faith nor beg nor importune. They employ themselves in planting fruit trees and are generally a sourceof benefit to the people.

The recurring attestations of being unique and gifted explain the community's selfperception.Smith(1986) situates myths and symbols as important dimensions for communication as mobilisation. Nurtured by collective experiences the myths,epics and ballads form the cognitive maps of community's history.

The myth-symbol complex functioned impressively in the case of the Kashmiri Pandit community. The segregation worked both on genealogical and ideological grounds, genealogical in terms of the difference in caste which led to conversion to Islam and ideological in terms of the difference in religion.While education inevitably gave Kashmiri Pandits a mobility which their Muslim counterparts could not even dream off. The advent of Mughals rapidly improved this mobility as members of the community started trickling out of the valley. Mughals saw allies in Pandits in comparison to the Muslim majority that had resisted the forceful Mughal takeover of Kashmir[9]. This trust earned them important positions in the power corridors of Delhi and Agra.In order to accommodate themselves in the Mughal dispensation Kashmiri Pandits quickly took to learning Persian.

(Kilam1955:96) notes establishment of the Mughal rule in Kashmir opened a new vista for Pandits. After one of his visits to Kashmir, Akbar left along with a number of Pandits. He distributed rent rent-free lands to Pandits and the community enjoyed fruits of power while the Muslims lived a life of complete political disempowerment as a matter of State policy. In another incident, Akbar participated in the religious fesivals of Pandits, as a mark of recognising their distinct social existence.The Kashmiri Muslims were ousted from all channels of administrations as the Mughals didn't want to repose administrative trust in Kashmiri Muslims. Moreover, their entry was closed in the army.The powerful Muslim families who once ruled over the lands were pulled off from higher positions.

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[9]Kashmir lost its sovereignity to Mughal emperor Akbar on October 6,1586. The mighty Mughal army was defeated two times by Kashmir Army. Finally,Akbar resorted to treachery and offered friendship to the Kashmiri King Yousuf Shah Chak.Chak visited Delhi to meet Akbar where he was arrested and sent off to a prison in Bihar where the former died(Fauq 1993).

Ahmed(2017)writes that in order to kill the urge of Kashmiris to regain freedom, Akbar utilised the Kashmiri Pandits as informants of the Mughal court and they willingly obliged. The royal patronage Pandits enjoyed was not only restricted to Akbar's reign only but continued throughout the Mughal era. To maintain their separate identity, the term Kashmiri Pandits was coined by Emperor Mohammad Shah to distinguish them from the Brahmans from other parts of India.

The Mughal decline made way for Afghan rule over Kashmir which is seen as one of the worst periods of penury and persecution. During this period too, the Pandits were deeply entrenched with administration and connived at aborting any chances of rebellion against the Afghans. Similarly, during the Sikh and Dogra reigns, Pandits enjoyed power and patronage of the Lahore Durbar while naked economic, political and religious aggression was meted out on the Muslim subjects.

During the Dogra era, a series of natural calamities took a heavy toll of lives forcing a considerable portion of the population to move to neighboring Punjab. Against this scenario, Kashmiri Pandits did not feel any pressure to migrate. Lawrence (1895) validates that since Kashmiri Pandits were a powerful group,so were able to avail grains during natural calamities. The enormity of the Muslim migration to Punjab can be realised from the Punjab Census Report (1891) which listed around 111,775 Muslims from Kashmir settling in Punjab.

The differential access to political and economic centre created fissures, rather veritable chasms in the Kashmiri society. Since Muslims had limited to no access to education, the community was likely to remain at bottom of social and political hierarchy. And, hence, it was not be able to correct and compensate the disadvantages which had haunted them. The Kashmiri Pandits were comfortably placed and continued to work as an arm of repression.

However, Gellner's (1985) argument also suggests that within the differentiated population there will be many who are much abler,much more fit in terms of whatever criteria of performance may currently be relevant and applied. The condition of this

section will be painful and fraught with tension. And the sociological obstacles won't be easily removed by goodwill or legislation.

Historical Factors

The year 1931 is extremely important to understand the emergence of civil society and its role vis-a-vis the growth of Kashmiri nationalism. The events of 1931 satisfy all the qualifications which a nationalist narrative demands-a unified movement, a mature civil society and arrival of Muslim leadership on scene. The scope of the uprising was not limited as it made religious collectivity and rights an inseparable discourse. Kanth (2008) narrates how 1931 made *Hakuk*(rights) and *Baidari* (awakening), part of the Muslim self-consciousness. It is in the face of the events that unfolded in 1931, the rights discourse evolved.

The incidents of 1931 began in Jammu on April 29, when a *maulvi* was asked to stop the Eid *khutba*(sermon). Following this, protest meetings were organised and the government was requested to punish the offenders. However, in another few days, an incident of similar nature reoccurred where a Hindu constable allegedly desecrated the Quran .An organisation called Young Mens Muslim Association of Jammu[10] which had earlier reached out to the government over the *khutba* controversy, sprung in action again and issued notices for calling protest meetings throughout the state. The sacrilege was yet again prompted by discovery of few torn pages of Quran in a Srinagar drain.

By this time, in Kashmir Valley the reading room party formed by the Muslim graduates was emerging as a locus of Muslim civil society.[11] The protest programme given by the

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[10] Muslim civil society in Jammu emerged in response to the network of civil society reform among Hindus and Sikhs of the region. Given the geographical proximity, these reforms were led by mostly Punjab based organisations, and run by one or the other Hindu sects. Hence, the Muslims were excluded .Towards the end of 19th century, AryaSamaj was firmly established in Jammu. Soon,Shri Ramakrishna Sewa Ashram also followed .The vast influence of Arya prompted the entry of Sikh organisations like Guru Singh Sabha, Khalsa Youngman Association. This social reform based on identity, inevitably led to formation of socio-political organisations by Muslims too. Muslims indigenously formed Anjuman-e-Islamia Jammu for social and educational upliftment of their community. However, in the coming years the Anujuman-e –Islamia made a political foray under the name of Young Men's Muslim Association(YMMA) of Jammu. In view of the curbs on political activities, YMMA worked as an underground political organisation for Muslim awakening.(Choudhary,2015)

[11] The educated young Muslims from valley formed an informal party as freedom of association was strictly proscribed. These young men formed a reading room party where the greivances of the Muslim community

Young Man's Muslim Association was enthusiastically followed in Kashmir as against the trampling of Muslim rights. Big gatherings were held where the policies of the Dogra government were criticised.

A huge gathering of Muslims assembled in the courtyard of Khanqah-i-Maula shrine of Srinagar on 21 June 1931 for protesting. A person named Abdul Qadeer, who was in the services of a European visitor, made a speech which was considered seditious and for which he was promptly arrested. The date of his trial was set for July 13, 1931 inside the central jail premises. On July 13, restive crowds and police clashed resulting in the death of 22 unarmed Muslims. Some accounts foreground a picture of communal rioting where Muslims men destroyed the shops and homes of Pandits after the civilian killings.

However, there remains a remarkable difference over how the two communities remember the event and also how local and official histories narrate the event. The state's narrative contributes in constructing a particular image of the Muslim public. The Srinagar Riot Enquiry Committee report appointed by Maharaja to enquire into the disturbances of 1931 publicized that the movement erupted as Kashmiri masses had been duped by their leadership by blurring the boundaries between their religious and economic grievances, thereby communalizing the 1931 movement. The commission read the uprising in Kashmir as primarily inspired by 'outsiders'. Bazaz (1954) notes that as the external influences were cited for provoking of Muslim masses that were dumb-driven cattle, it denied any agency to the locals. This assertion also dismissed agitating masses of having any rationality or any historic reason for mass eruption.

The commission also attempted to define the agitation as a communal event between the Pandits and Muslims. Conversely, it is more important to understand 1931 as outcome of years of oppression. Because the demands of Kashmiri Muslims were couched in religious terms, it did not mean that the demands were essentially communal.Zutshi(2003)corroborates that despite the communitarian rhetoric in the aftermath of 1930,the tensions were far from motivated by religion. The tussle between the Muslims and the Pandits in and after 1931 was more about political and economic

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were expressed and articulated. Subsequently,room party went on to perform extremely instrumental role vis-a- vis growth of nationalism in Kashmir.

representation than religious antagonism.

Significantly, the events of 1931 mark the advent of Muslims into the political scene, which coincided with the emergence of Muslim provincial leadership in British India. It also gave a common platform to the Muslims of Jammu division and Kashmir division for articulation of their rights. Given the geographical and political proximity of Jammu with Punjab, it also meant an intervention from Punjabi Muslim organisations in Kashmir. Prominent among them was the All India Kashmir Committee, Anujuman-i-Himayat-i-Islami, and Anjuman -i-KashmiriMusalman. The prevailing situation of Kashmir equally appealed to the Ahrar and Ahmediya leadership in Punjab and both the parties plunged into Kashmir for boosting their political image.[12]Jalal(2008)writes Majlis-i-Ahrardecided to send its volunteers for liberating thirty two lakh Muslims of Kashmir valley. This position of Ahrar's was challenged by the creation of All India Kashmir Committee by Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad who was a prominent Ahmediya.[13] Looking at the situation, the Government of India feared that the uprising in Kashmir would spill to the neighboring province of Punjab and as a measure of political expediency, it advised the Durbar to enquire into the disturbances. Eventually the Maharaja's government announced the appointment of B.G.Glancy to hold an independent commission to look into the grievances.

Secondly, events of the 1931 transformed the political vocabulary where the Muslims employed moral discourses to demand their rights, while as Pandits took recourse to past by continuously reiterating their position in the past. For example, in one of the representations by Sanatan Dharma Youngmen's Association Srinagar, the group blames the durbar for step-motherly treatment, despite the historical importance of the Kashmiri Pandits which entitled them to special protection.

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[12] In Punjab,the British patronised landed rural intermediaries who could be counted for becoming allies of the Government. Gradually oppositional voices in the form of Ahrar party rose up, which was critical of the British and the landowner alliance. The Ahrar party was reformatory in nature and primarily composed of urban lower and middle classes.For more see (Jalal 2002:342)

[13]Ahmediya is an Islamic revival movement founded in Punjab in 1889.The originated with the life and teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who claimed he embodied the metamorphic second coming of Jesus of Nazareth and the divine guide, which was foretold by the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. The orthodox Muslims consider the message of Ahmad heretical, as they believe Muhamamad was the final prophet of Islam.

These grievances establish the biased nature of the state in creating a public sphere which gave differential patronage to individuals based on their membership of particular religious communities. As the communities became pitted against each other, it led to the newer forms of 'Self' and the 'Other'. The new subjectivity challenged the rationality which once Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims had held, when they raised the slogan of Kashmir for Kashmiris. The events bought into play the fear of numbers, whereby the Pandits were scared of losing ground in the state to Muslim majority. This gave impetus to the idea of a threatened Hindu minority. The events also catapulted a number of new actors on the political stage of Kashmir, which was different than the older elite leadership.

The new leadership was determined to gain full mileage out of 1931 by drawing attention to the origins of the disturbance. The economic and political disabilities suffered by the people and which could only be corrected through a widespread reformation of the structures of the state which implied representation through legislation. Bazaz(1978)writes that the memorials presented detailed description of the proposed constitution for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which would guarantee the fundamental rights of religion,press,platform,assembly and equality of treatment of all state subjects and the formation of executive and legislative bodies to carry out the will of the people. Significantly, the memorial demanded proportionate religious representation for the elected representatives.

As the events of 1931 catapulted the growth of civil society in Kashmir,one of its major contributions has also been the formation of Muslim Conference which later got converted into National Conference.The inaugural session was held in October 1932 where the constitution was drafted and a party flag was also adopted. The unique feature of this association was that it extended beyond the territorial divisions and representatives from all parts of the undivided Jammu and Kashmir became a part of it. However, to make the Muslim Conference inclusive,the party was converted into National Conference in 1939.Abdullah(1986) writes that the policy of admitting non-Muslims was neither tactical nor diplomatic. It was a sincere voice, therefore, led to opening the doors for all minorites to join the fight against autocracy.This political strategy of transforming the

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politics of grievances into a successful nationalistic movement draws an analogy in Gellner(1983), who considers the assimilative functions could be performed either through successful nationalism or through education.Prem Nath Bazaz, who was Shiekh's companion in this effort, wrote a letter to Mahatama Gandhi, explaining to him the direction of Kashmir Politics. Bazaz(1944) wrote that only nationalism could save his country and community because neither the Hindus nor the Muslims can wipe out one or the other from the country. Since Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims did not live in segregated localities, communalism would endanger their lives. It is only nationalism that would save such families. Consequently, members who aligned with the Punjab-based Muslim politics did not become a part of the rechristened National Conference and re-launched Muslim Conference. This splitting of ranks had many ramifications for the politics of the state in the years to come as their vision was more closely aligned to the idea of Pakistan and pro-Pakistan politics in the coming years

Educational Factors

In the context of Kashmir, education was intermeshed with the structures and functions of the established hierarchies. The early Dogra state did not intervene in the indigenous educational system, as it was very busy consolidating its dominions. The notion largely was education was prerogative of ruling class and hence Kashmiri Muslims would be kept away from education. The census of India (1911) notes that in the year 1910,there were only 15 educated Muslim males as compared to 453 Hindu males per thousand of population, The number grew to 19 for Muslims and 508 for Hindus in the 1921 in Census of India.

As the state shirked from providing mass education,the public discourses perpetuated by the absence of education were shaping the contours of nationalism. Particularly, the relegation of Kashmiri language in the background in all educational and administrative matters was becoming an issue of concern in these discourses. These concerns also became prominent as Punjab based Muslim organisations had taken to highlight the

educational deprivation of Kashmiri Muslims.[14]Some organisations contributed by providing scholarships to talented Kashmiri Muslim who, towards the end of 1930s assumed leadership roles for enhancing the status of Muslims.

One of the first organisation to be set up for educational and moral reform was *Madrasa AnjumanNusrat-ul-Islam,* estblished in 1889.Within a few years of establishment of this madrasa,institutes of similar nature started cropping up. The purpose of these institutions was to ensure religious as well as scientific education for Muslims who were educationally deprived and to create social awakening among the Kashmiri Muslims. This development continuously harked on the glorious Muslim past, during the reign of Kashmiri Sultans and the only way to reclaim the same position was through education.

Bazaz(1954)observes that Muslims had begun to feel their backwardness. They were approaching the government for intervening in the sphere of education. These requests were not heeded in the beginning, but as the demands grew louder, Kashmir Durbar sought services of an educational commissioner from British India.

Conversely, the most important aspect was by the late 1920s the demands of Kashmiri Muslim elite had gone beyond the provision of just ensuring educational opportunities for Kashmiri Muslims. The platform of education became a platform to make the state acknowledge the distinct demand of Kashmiri population. Though educational reforms were introduced in 1926 where primary education was made free and compulsory in the municipal limits of Srinagar, the discourse on education was deeply linked with the more argumentative discourse on political, economic and social rights.

In retrospect, a major drawback of these reform organisations working towards education was ignoring Kashmiri in favour of English and Urdu. The language and education guideline reflected biases of Kashmiri Muslim elite,which clearly was looking at segmental interests working in their favor.This predicament takes us to Gellner's(1985) thesis of linking notion of education to the viable modern high culture. Gellner sees education amalgamation of skill sets which ensures reformulation of skills. It is a

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[14] All India Kashmiri Muslim conference one of the main Kashmiri expatriate organisations in Punjab made avery strong appeal for improvement of Muslim education in the state by employing Muslim teachers in the state schools as well as providing religious education.(Taseer:1969)

perceptive skill developed for non-rigid adaptable state of mind rather than a single itemed list. If a state ensures mass-education to all its citizens, it inevitably allows for economic, social mobility and also homogeneity. However, in cases where a state has a biased approach towards the dissemination of education, may be with intent of monopolising the access of power-privilege. This monopolisation debars the filtration of education as it could be a counter-entropic trait

The advent of education also meant contestations between the high and low definitions of religion. The evolving matrix of social and political realities was providing spur to the emergence of a politicized religious identity, leading to intense focus on original definitions of Islam and the perceived advances of the 'other' within the community. It was perhaps the first time that the sacrality of religious sites, beliefs and practices came to be questioned. The position of shrines came into question, which was otherwise unthinkable in the Kashmiri socio-cultural milieu.[15] Questioning the shrine also meant attacking the position of the Sayeds/Pirs who had migrated from various parts of central Asia for preaching Islam. Shrines functioned as key sites for rural-urban political and economic exchange, so were also a repository of landed wealth and social capital. The management of shrines would be under a caretaker Pir family or a couple of families, and the same would provide these functions for generations together. Contrary to the principles of Islam, the class of Pirs/Syeds emerged as a power group who resorted to social stratification based on one's origin to chance of birth in a certain family. Though the practices of pollution and purity were not observed strictly, there was a visible prejudice towards patronage or matrimonial alliances.

Since their formation, Anjuman-e-Nusratul Islam and the associated madrassas were engrained in Hanafi philosophy[16], they launched a tirade against the Shrine worship. The shrine supporters accused them of Wahhabism[17] while they would in turn call them

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[15] Shrines were a central component of Kashmiri society and Kashmiri Islam in particular. It had an extremely important role in spiritual and temporal life of Kashmiris. For more see (Gauhar.:2002).

[16] Hanafism is one of the four Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence. It is named after the scholar Abu Hanifah and has the largest number of followers in Sunni Muslim thought. The sources from where Hanafism derives Islamic law are the Quran and the hadiths of Prophet Muhammad.

[17] Wahabbism is an Islamic movement founded by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab, advocating veneration of practices like veneration of saints, visiting tombs etc. The movement is considered as ultra-conservative and puritanical.

Mushriks(saint –worshipers) who associated partners with Allah. The debates around the sacrility assumed the form of petitions requesting the Darbar to restrict each other's activity. Likewise Anujuman-e-Ahl-i-Hadith joined the chorus against shrine worship and made alliances with the local *ulema*that had similar ideological leanings.Khan(1999) informs about how Anjuman-e-Ahl-e-Hadis was not liked by the Mullahs and issued fatwas against debarring its members from attending the mosques. Along these lines,education served as a channel for religious modernisation, for holding textual interpretation supreme against the pronouncements of Pirs and also as a crystalliser of dissent against the Dogra state.

Contact with Punjab and the spread of education encouraged an expansion of the publication market, particularly in Srinagar.The circulation figures for newspapers had risen noticeably in the 1920s and circulation of books in English,Urdu and Kashmiri was also growing. Most of these books and pamphlets were being published in Lahore and Amritsar,further cementing the relationship between Punjabi and Kashmiri politics. The progress in print industry quickly created reading publics and simultaneously mobilised them for socio-political purposes.Therole of print becomes extremely important in age when production of knowledge andthe skill set to read was so limited. Growth of publishing madethe horizontal circulation of ideas and nationalistic imagination possible.

The boom in publishing also solidified the rival interpretations of history and sharpened the role of the reactionary forces who would try to suppress any dissent.Munshi Muhammad Din Fauq tried to set up a newspaper in 1904, he was not granted permission by the Dogra state. In 1932, when famous Kashmiri activist PremNathBazaz established the first newspaper,Vitasta, it could not last for more than a year owing to the hostility of Pandits.Earlier Mulk Raj Saraf had tried to establish a newspaper;however, it ended up becoming an official mouth-piece of the ruling Dogra regime.

Ahmed (2017)records that owing to the absence of local press in 1931, the newspapers from Punjab were also divided into two camps −Hindu Press and Muslim Press −on the basis of the religion practised by their owners and their policies vis-a visKashmir.Newspapers like *Zamindar,Inqilab,Siyasat,Alfaaz* and Lahore Chronicle

formed the Muslim Press and the cause of Kashmiri masses.On the other hand, there were newspapers like *Tribune,Prataap,GuruGanthaal* that comprised the Hindu Press and took side of the Hindu Maharaja.

Psychological Factors

The history of Kashmir is rife with events which at the outset appear driven by the religion, but underneath it is matrix of forces at work. The contestations essentially are a conflict between the perception of 'self' and the 'other'.The presence of 'other' reflects transference of power,a radical break and comes to assume the privileged position once acquired by the 'self'.The self if not destroyed by the transcendental other gets completely subsumed into it, so much that it loses its entire agency.The ancient Kashmiri history confirms alliances between ruling elite and Brahmans which in turn provided the ideological support for consolidation of their polity. However, the social heterodoxy perpetrated by this Brahmans was inimical to the lower classes that had considerably risen economically and politically by virtue of performing merchantile functions in the society.This led to a new alliance between Kshatriyas and other lower classes against the Brahminical heterodoxy.So when the Buddhist doctrines reached Kashmir during the Mauryan reign, the society was ready for the conversion to Buddhism.Bazaz(1954) explicates that the Mauryan conquest of Kashmir provided a blessing in disguise for Kashmir. Many inhabitants readily accepted the tenets of Buddhism. The mass conversion to Buddhism produced changes in the politico-social and cultural sphere for Kashmir.It awakened a spirit of defiance towards social justice.

However, with the end of Kushan rule,Buddhism received a setback in Kashmir as the corrupt practices had crept in. The Buddhist and the Brahminical forces kept on engaging in a long drawn struggle. However, what looked like a religious battlewas actually a manifestation of status anxiety. Kashmir came under the Muslim Sultans around 1339 A.C. The conditions under which Muslim rule came to be established were very different from rest of the subcontinent. In Kashmir, a runaway Buddhist prince from Ladakh,Rinchana came to exert considerable influence in the politics of Kashmir and acceded to the throne. His wide popularity can be gauged by the fact that Jonraja(2000)calls him a lion among men. After his accession to the throne, Rinchana

expresses his desire for becoming a Shaivite, but was refused entry into the fold by orthodox Brahmins .Around the same time, Islam was making inroads across Kashmir by peaceful proselytization of Sufis from Central Asia. Stein (1900) notes that Islam made its way into Kashmir not by gradual conversions and not conquest. Though Islam became the court religion the administration was in the hands of Brahmans.However the social position of Sayeds was threatning the Brahmans now.

The bitterness between the Sayeds and the Brahmans was taking form of class struggle where two elite groups were involved with the struggle for power, whereas the common masses remained unaware of the persisting situation.In the twentieth century, there were struggles between the interests of businessmen who had migrated from neighboring provinces of Punjab and Delhi and the Kashmiri commercial classes. The status anxiety arises since the self could not move outside itself to embrace the otherness fully,it understandsthe other as always mediated by its own experiences. The self here tried to identify on religious terms, however,more than religion, the prestige interests and the status mark characterised the situation. Yet again, otherness comes from a difference which leave self and the other forever open to change for good or for bad.

Later examples like Kashmir for Kashmiris and Roti Agitation[18] are manifestations of the same anxiety.However the 'self' regularly transmutes with the change in the overall situation. In the Kashmir for Kashmiris movement, the threat emanated from the bureaucrats from the neighbouring Punjab as the language of administration was replaced to Persian from Urdu. Bazaz(1954) putsit that as armies of outsiders followed the officers from the plains with the intention of exploitation, and leaving behind a line of successors for further drain of resources.

In this way, first Punjabis and then DograRajputs began exerting power which was very threatening to the aboriginal upper classes. For six years, from 1925-1931, educated young Pandits rallied around for demanding a due share in the administration of the state at the highest level. During this movement Kashmiri Pandits worked in unison with

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[18] Glancy Commission recommended series of reforms such as reforms of administrative structure and education,the representation of Muslims in services and minimum freedom for the press and public expression. Maharaja accepted these recommendations, which led to Pandit Yuvak Sabha agitating against these recommendations.(Bose,2003)

Kashmir Muslims, although the stakes were not as high for the Muslims. Yet the bonhomie was short-lived as the Roti Agitation of 1932 was started by the Pandits after Maharaja conceded in opening the door of the Government services for Muslims.

Intellectual Factors

Understanding Kashmir through the bracketed ethos of 'Kashmiryat' has been the fancied methodological paradigm for most the scholarship on the subject.The valley is imagined as a space where differential communities always lived with unity and harmony till militancy erupted in 1989.The fancied imagination not only presents an ahistorical picture, but also denies any cultural and political specificity to the Kashmiri political space. Subsequently differential aspects of identity in Kashmir are washed down.Whitehead (2007) notes that the composite and accommodating culture of Kashmir, known as Kashmiryat, is often overstated as to evoke a political paradise before a biblical fall and the embroiling of the valley in the rival nationalisms of India and Pakistan.

Kashmiryat has functionedmore like a conduit to different political actors who try to wade through Kashmir, providing enough space for modification as per one's requirements. Given the concept itself is not based on any historical premise, there are little concerns for political correctness orvalidation. Gandhi symbolically invoked 'Kashmiryat' to create a picture of harmony in the valley that amounted to any spiteful conflict existed between the various communities in Kashmir.[19]Infact, the towering leader of Kashmir, Shiekh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru became ambassadors of Kashmiryat many a times at public platforms. One such moment etched in the public memory and deeply reflective of Kashmiryat in public discourse happened on 2nd November 1947, whenShiekh Abdullah quoted Amir Khusro's Persian sufi verse to and for Pandit Nehru,

> "*Mun Tu Shudam, TuMunShudi,Man Tan Shudam,TujaanShudi,Takasnagoyad bod azeem,MunDeegram,TuDeggaree.*" (I am You and You are me; I am your

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[19]'Only Kashmir is a ray of hope in the time when the subcontinent is in darkness' were the words of MK Gandhi during the partition at the time when communal frenzy had taken all over, but did not touch Kashmir. (Zutshi,1986)

body, You are my soul; So none should hereafter say, I am someone and You someone else)."[20]

Aggrawal.N(2008) makes an attempt to read Kashmiryat through linguistics and semiotics to arrive at an argument that Kashmiryat belongs to a class of terms called 'empty signifiers'. It was a sort of the new categorical order imposed an order on the social collective of Jammu and Kashmir, without resolving the legal issues.In a way the usage of term Kashmiryat is indicative to understand Kashmir's changing relations with New Delhi over the years.On one hand, there was the tightening noose of New Delhi on the various autonomous provisions and on the other Shiekh Abdullah's favorite slogan of '*Izzat-oo-Aabrookamuqaam*' (A position of dignity) was becoming redundant. So there was need for re-phrasing the demands and aspirations in a different vocabulary. Consequently, Jammu and Kashmir Academy of Art, Culture and Languages bolstered up the claim of National Conference leadership to debate and define the concept in a specific historical and cultural context.

(Ahad 2008:8) writes, "to lend an intellectual content and meaning to the much publicized but vaguely worded idea/slogan:*izzatooabrooka muqam*and make it thus an effective and viable alternative and alimony for the Kashmiri aspirations, the phrase/expression was to our dismay hijacked and eventually used as an elixir for both the lords and their loyal subjects to make them feel much comfortable and stronger in their behavior and attitude towards Kashmir and Kashmiris.[21]

In recent times, Kashmiryat has found two more qualifiers: *Insaniyat*(humanity) and *Jhamooriyat*(democracy).Originally used by AtalBihari Vajpayee, in 2003, to break the thaw for initiating talks, this trinitywas picked up in 2016 by the Modi government.It

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[20] The timing and the usage of couplet are quite fascinating. It had only been a week since Kashmir's conditional accession to India and invoking Amir Khusro,who was an iconic Sufi musician and poet from medieval India who united Persian and Hindivi forms. Perceived as a very important figure in the Ganga-Jamuni tehzeeb,Khusru invocation here refers to Shiekh's adoration of a particular culture and politics.
[21] Abdul Ahad claims that Kashmiryat was supposed to be change of attitudes that the people were the real masters of their desires; a panacea for political, social and economic misfortunes to force out inner Kashmiri urges, skills and energies and promote indigenous arts and crafts, agriculture, horticulture and floriculture for marketing a self-sufficient brand, a strategy to protect environmental degradation, urban vandalism and many other things. A former bureaucrat during the National Conference government his claim substantiates how National Conference officially tried to construct a discourse around Kashmiryat which obviously did not exist on ground before. For more see (Ahad:2008)

pitched for takingahead the growth story of Kashmir. The usage of trinity reflects contradictions and inanity of avoidance.[22]

There have been constant attempts to locate Kashmiryat vis its political usage, earlier as an antidote for invalidating the two-nation theory and setting the tone for the religious and political plurality that the newly created post-colonial state espoused and now as a ploy to sustain rigidity regarding the status-quo.

Subsequently,scholarship has tried to look at Kashmiryat through two approaches. First is to look through the relationship between religious identities, community definitions and the state-building over the course of the later half and the first half of the two decades of the twentieth century. These interventions examine the various forms of belonging and challenge the primordial understanding of the identity in Kashmir. This discourse also clarifies how pre-colonial Kashmir was home to prototypical power struggles among elites to protect themselves from the existing state order. Zutshi(2003) and Rai (2004) argue that Kashmiryat continues to be a series of dynamic identities that have emerged in interaction with and at times been overshadowed by other forms of belonging. There has always existed a tacit balance of region and religion that encompasses the Kashmiri sense of 'self'.The public discourse exhibited strong strands of religious universality as well as regional specificity.

Instead of whatKashmiryat would like one to believe, the political culture of the pre-colonial Kashmir was laced with variety of factors of difference-political, economic or social.Though the difference was substantial as suggested by the literary forms,poetic narratives and other symbols, it allowed for accommodation and not erasure of religious difference.However, parallel to this one also finds an expression of Kashmir as a homeland and how it had to be saved from 'outsiders'.

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[22] In Vajpayee's context the trinity is still somewhat usable .None of the word is explained vis-a vis the present context. Kashmiryat does not specify the inclusions and exclusions and how the differing political demands can be negotiated under the gamut of Kashmiryat. Same holds true about Jamhooriyat as to what are the terms of democracy given the constant erosion of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and Insaniyat has always become hostage to gross human right violations.

It is also important to mention that the narrative of belonging−be it religious or regional −was carved in tandem with various inter and intra− politico-economical interactions and changes that were happening in Kashmir. Zutshi(2003) explains at length how in the late pre-colonial era ,the changing economic and political relationships created arenas for individuals to lay claims to leadership roles and definitions of community,whether religious, political or regional.

Since Kashmiryat is corroborated with the presence of syncretic religious cultures which are tolerant, the second approach navigates through its metaphysical understanding and how Kashmiryat cannot be understood without understanding the role of Reshis in promoting Islam against the backdrop of socio-cultural context of Kashmir and not only the *Tawhidic*(one-ness of God)universalism. The tradition was equally antithetical to the Brahmanic supremacy prevalent in the Kashmri society.

Explaining the Kashmir's transition to Islam and the role of Rishis,Khan(2011) meticulously shows how Rishis became a framework for associational life within a common social, normative and ritual order at the time when the Ulama from Central Asia grounded mostly in Sharia were propagating Islam in the valley.Though not an organised tradition, itsgradual assimilation and absorption of local ascetic practices in the wider system of Islam gave this movement enormous authority and social importance.

The Rishi tradition like other mystic traditions borrowed and innovated from other existing traditions.The Rishi concept of 'peace with all' was borrowed from Mahayana Buddhism. Secondly, this tradition also imbibed a very strong sense of resilience which eventually later became a strong character of Kashmiri Nationalism. The tradition questioned the caste and class orders that came with established religion. It flourished in the localpopular dialects making it accessible for everyone−from artisans, peasants, tradesman and also the downtrodden castes. This inclusiveness reflects the popular social character of the tradition. Following the Hindu ascetics it retained essential elements of ancient popular religious culture like meditating in the caves,vegetarianism,maintaining celibacy, etc. While accommodating local Hindu-Buddhist practices to the Islamic framework, the Rishis gradually assimilated the people in the Islamic identity. What is

however unique about this identity is not merely the assimilation of the Kashmiris in Islam over a period of six centuries but alos importantly, their urge to live with their Pandit compatriots in symbolic rather than synergetic relationship. The vitality of the movement that separates as well as unites for a deep metaphysical identity can be reflected from the verses of ShiekhNoorud din Wali, the pioneer of Rishi tradition.

> *"Among the brothers of the same parents*
> *Why did you create a barrier*
> *Muslims and Hindus are one*
> *When will God be kind to His servants"*
> *(Kulliyat,II,1981:33-34)*

Khan (2011) and Shah(2011)explicate that Kashmiryat has been defined to serve the ideological interests of the Indian state. Neither can Kashmiryat be explained as Kashmiri nationalism. The conception of nationalism is foreign to the metaphysically oriented civilizations. The mystical, metaphysical grounding of any culture implies that modern political appropriations are prone to suspicion.

The crisis of identity is a modern phenomenon and attempting to graft it onto traditional cultures is not admissible. Kashmir's self or spirit of individuality cannot be located without in-depth analysis of its religions, mythologies and most importantlymetaphysics.Comprehensive conception of Kashmiryat requires understanding the metaphysical tradition which is underlying with diverse religious and philosophical expressions.

Conclusion

Like elsewhere, the act of imagining the nation arose when education offered privileged access for understanding the oppression that spanned over centuries. The development of social communication and the growth of print linked the ideas of community and power and time. This also for the first time made it possible for people to think about themselves in newer ways

A deep rooted sense of regional identity has existed in Kashmiri for long,which only hardened with the subsequent years of oppression.The Mughal and the subsequent ruling realms could not address this regional identity, rather widened the existing chasms with providing patronage to a particular community. The religious migration impelled mass conversions to Islam, but the migrants got placed above the new converts given their access to sacred word and script. The new religion made the community imaginable but remained centripetal and hierarchal rather than dispersing horizontally. The majority was doubly discriminated and various border-guards and symbols functioned to preserve the binary of 'us' and 'them'. There was a visible similarity-dissimilarity pattern, where members shared similarity and dissimilarity both with the non –members. With one section of population i.e. the Kashmiri Pandits, the Muslims shared the language and culture, but somehow the power dynamics were not balanced. With the non members of the Kashmiri society, the Muslim majority shared the religion but not the culture and language.

The educational reform movements in British India filtered down some welfare emoluments to Kashmir and some of the Kashmiri Muslims were able to make educational journeys into British India. These journeys also facilitated the rapid and easy transmission of political ideas that were rife in British India. Political ideaswere transported to various geographies, where they would emerge with correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological terrains.

The arrival of education distinctively baptised this differentiated class into a collective where they began to assert their demands through the rights discourse. Since this anxiety was shared by a majority, it garnered a populist character very soon. These developments led to re-interpretation of the historical realities, which led to the formation of rival histories and subsequently to dual association and dual recognition with a single piece of territory. By the 1930s, a new Kashmiri leadership educated in British India came to replace the religious leadership and the discourse on economic, political and social rights became an extremely important part of Kashmir's political culture. This narrative shaped up the articulation of coherent nationalism that accommodated the diverse local, religious and sectarian interests.

After 1947, Kashmir has always been imagined through a Hindu subjectivity that has obstructed any attempt to grant full citizenship rights to Kashmiris, while, at the same time it does not accept its distinct existence.The right to a distinct nationalism was obfuscated under the united nationalism.The new system did not redeem its pledge of conducting a referendum to concede to the demands of the wishes of the Kashmiri people. To safeguard its position, New Delhi supported unrepresentative governments and pumped monetary emoluments to strengthen their limited patronage network. In a way, replicating the structure it had inherited from the Dogra government.The demand for rights was met with political and economic coercion, which further solidified the assertion of rights in a religious language.

Chapter 3

Political and Militant Dimensions of Kashmiri nationalism

Introduction

The chapter looks at the political and militant dimensions of Kashmiri nationalism. The chapter establishes that Kashmiri nationalism has defied a neat organizational characterization and reflects the intersection of three distinct forms of political action: firstly through participation in democratic institutional political process, in terms of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah's role in the pre-1953 politics; secondly through participation in extra-institutional forms of non-violent direct action that may have been illegal and thoroughly reflected in the resistance politics till 1989. And, finally, through the involvement in direct violent action. In a way, Kashmiri nationalism has charted its course through violent and non-violent ways of expression and through parliamentary politics too. The movement of 1989 only served as the immediate catalyst for transition of political into militant.

Employing various strategies of collective action through violence, disruption and convention, Kashmir nationalism in a way has sustained itself through its ability to combine a variety of forms of collective action. Most of the prominent enquiries into the outbreak of militant movement have suggested that militant nationalism was a result of a breakdown of centre-state relations as well as a consequence of alienation of the Kashmir youth from the rest of India. Such analyses in a way miss out the political aspects of the Kashmiri nationalism, which sustained itself from 1947 to 1989. Cockell (2004) notes that this assertion denies Kashmiris any political agency outside of that state definitions for militant assertion. This chapter tries to look at how armed militancy was neither sudden, nor purely motivated by religion. The events were guided by political continuity that had arisen from the structural weakness of state-institutions and the constant development autonomous nationalistic consciousness.

This chapter essentially tries to explain the transition of Kashmiri nationalism to militant terrain. It looks at the assertions of the differing political and militant organizations in

terms of ideology and the larger aims they are looking at. Further it looks at the strategies and the struggle for power within militant groups. The chapter also evaluates the strategies, strengths, and limitations of Kashmiri nationalism.

Political Nationalism and the Politics of Plebiscite

The section tries to understand how a collective sense of history, memory, myths and symbols combined and culminated in political nationalism. These trigger points could be understood as events or series of events that created a stronger identity, a sense of being subjected to injustice and a perception of agency. This marked a shift from a popular sympathy to participation in political nationalism. The other important variables for mobilization are the changing political, economic and structural context of the society which includes emerging middle class, changes in social structures of both rural and urban geographies and effects of religious movements tapped into a rich vein of potent political nationalism.

Kashmiri political nationalism emerges as part of the complex normative world, that includes myths, a collective sense of agency and a language of grievances articulation. These variables establish paradigm of behavior of Kashmiri nationalism and also build the relation between the normative and the material universe, between the constraints of reality and demands of an ideal model of political nationalism. In a way, Kashmiri political nationalism tries to bridge the concept of reality to an imagined alternative, working as a connective between two states of affairs, one prevailing and other imagined. At the same time, it is important to understand the diverse and divergent narrative traditions within the national discourse.

Language, memories and symbols cannot escape their location in a normative political nationalism, nor can the application of a coercive legality embodied in a political negotiation escape its consequences. Inevitably, a political negotiation is held together by the force of interpretive commitments, and the functionality of these commitments determines the path a certain political nationalism can take. Thus, political negotiation is viewed as a system of overcoming the tensions and bridging the diverse tendencies, but can also invoke the fissiparous tendencies if the interpretative commitments tail off.

A very important event in terms of failing interpretative commitments is ousting and detention of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah in 1953, which accelerated the constitutional integration between the state and the centre. Qasim (1992) remembers that Shiekh Abdullah's arrest in 1953 had been preceded by a whole lot of contributory events. They included a triangular correspondence between him, Prime Minister Nehru and the Praja Parishad leader and founder of Jana Sangh, Dr Shyama Prakash Mukherjee. There was also an agitation and strong press campaign against his policies. Abdullah, opposition within the party hierarchy and the erosion of his popularity in Kashmir because of some of his policies.Besieged by these developments, Shiekh Abdullah became more defiant, he suspected his colleagues of plotting against him and openly criticized the central government.

It was in the backdrop of Praja Parishad movement that things had taken a volatile turn. Praja Parishad was founded by Balraj Madhok by building upon the existing organizational network of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and its ideology of Hindu nationalism. The party was rancorous against the 1951 Big Landed Estates Act [23]because it had abolished the big land holdings without compensation and affected the economic power of the Dogra landlords. Behera(2002) notes that Praja Parishad accused Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah of Islamizing the administration. However, this was only an outward reason. The underlying reason was slipping of the political power and initiative from the hands of Dogras towards Kashmiri Muslims.

In 1952, the Praja Parishad launched an agitation in collaboration with the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram Rajya Parishad, Punjab Arya Samaj and a few Akali leaders. The demands of the agitation were full integration of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union; full application of India's Constitution; doing away with the difference between `state-subjects' and Indian citizens; bringing the state under the complete jurisdiction of

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[23]The land reforms in Kashmir were among the most radical reforms of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah. It placed a ceiling on land ownership at 186 kanals (about 22 acres). The rest of the land of a landlord was redistributed among share-croppers and landless labourers, without any compensation to the landlord. Transferring land without compensation was possible since the provisions of the Indian constitution did not yet apply in the state. The land reforms were so popular in Kashmir that they continued to be pushed for the next quarter-century. The ceiling was gradually decreased until the last of the reform Acts in 1975.

the Supreme Court; removal of customs barriers between the state and India; fresh elections to the state's Constituent Assembly; and setting up an impartial tribunal to probe the cases of alleged corruption in the state.

The popular slogans of Praja Parishad were, "*Ek desh main do vidhan, do nishan ,do pradhan, nain chalenge,nahin chalenge*" (In one country, two Constitutions,two flags and two chiefs will not work,will not be tolerated), "*Abdullah Hakumat Khatam Karo"*(end Abdullah's rule) and "*Jammu Alag Karo"*(separate Jammu).[24]Provoked by the developments within the state, Shiekh Abdullah gave a powerful speech at Ranbirsinghpora in Jammu on April 10, 1952

> *So long as communalism exists in India, the accession of Kashmir with it will be strictly limited. We want to accede to India without any condition. But how can we do it, unless we are assured and convinced that communalism has been buried in India. We are prepared to apply the whole constitution of India to Kashmir and will welcome it. But in this regard we are not fully satisfied. We have acceded to India in respect of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communication. Other matters are separate from the Agreement. This we have done because we are interested in having a sort of internal autonomy.*(The Daily Telegraph, 135 Fleet Street London, E.C 4 March 13, 1957)

This defiance was expressed repeatedly in the wake of systematic erosion of the state's autonomy.The divergence between the centres's state-sponsored and the Shiekh's political nationalism created visible chasms through the different spheres of representation. Subsequently,the above quoted speech laid the basis of sharp difference between the Shiekh Abdullah and the central government. Speaking before a huge gathering at Ziarat-e-Naqshband Sahib Srinagar on 13 July, which is a symbolic date in the annals of Kashmir historyShiekh Abdullahsaid,

> *The basic thing is that we have not given any sacrifices in Kashmir to pawn ourselves either to India or to Pakistan but to achieve freedom for the people of Jammu And Kashmir State. The message which the martyrs have left for us is that they have performed their duty and now it is the Nation (Quom) which has to perform its duties. This duty is not to join either Pakistan or India but to secure freedom for all the people of the State. We will adopt the path in which we find that our freedom, honour and the future is safe.*(The Daily Telegraph, 135 Fleet Sreeet London, E.C 4March 15,1957)

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[24] All Jammu wa Kashmir Mahaz Raishumari Ka Aaien,Mazdoor Press Srinagar,published by Kh Ali Mohammad Naik ,General Secretary,All Jammu and Kashmir Plebscite Front,pp 2-3.

Subsequently, Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah was arrested in 1953 and the existing National Conference was replaced by a local unit of Congress party. The Centre's policy led to the shrinking of the avenues for democratic political participation and weakening of local politics. In response to this, several youth groups were formed to bring the right to self-determination as the primary objective of the political struggle in Kashmir. In the backdrop of such developments, the All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front or *Mahaaz-i-Rai-Shumari* was founded by Mirza Afzal Beg on August 9, 1955.Led by colleagues and sympathisers of Shiekh Abdullah, the group contested the finality of the accession of Kashmir to India and demanded for the right to self-determination.

Detailing the events of 1950s, Shiekh Abdullah later wrote in the weekly Awami Daur,

> *It was due to my basic differences with Government of India that I was detained on August, 1953.The differences between me and the Government of India had started sometime earlier. The Government of India wanted to back out of all those promises and agreements, which she had made and concluded with me and the people of Kashmir.*[25]

Strategies adopted by the Plebiscite Front for garnering public support

The Plebiscite Front managed to penetrate to the grassroots levels by operating on the plank of plebiscite. Gradually the front launched educative campaigns for magnifying its presence. *Mahaaz-e-rai-Shumari*, as it was popularly known, acquired a mass character as its politics was presented as some kind of service and sacrifice and not as politics of power. The rise and growth of Plebiscite Front represented an ideological shift as it was asserted that Kashmiri cultural identity was incompatible with the mainstream culture and could only be maintained through the operationalization of certain autonomous zones. Secondly, intervening role of the state for the repeated distribution of patronage also created absolute chasms for political nationalism to thrive. The state's weakening of autonomous provisions through legal and constitutional measures was equivalent to sponsoring a formal nationalism.

In the process of political formation of identity, the state was using certain historical references and symbols for cultural homogeneity. The state's espousal of Praja Parshad

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[25] Shiekh Mohammad Abdullah, "*Sarguzasht-i-Nau* August 1953",p.175 October 2,1978,Weekly Awami Daur,Jammu

politics and the subsequent incarceration of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah were working towards the creation of inaudible spheres of representation. These inaudible spheres were never formally accommodated and a strong policy of stifling of political opposition and pursuance of patronage politics was encouraged. As Connor(1994) notes that assertions of the rights of nationhood are problematic, as unwillingness on the part of the national government to give into mini-nationalism often disrupts the political order. Mini nationalisms have moral legitimacy attached to it and can become the source of complexity instead of generating homogeneity and cohesion.

The dilemma for the state arises as to how to satisfy the differing political claims. However, as Connor (1994) points out that the universal tendency of the states is non-compromisable position vis-a -vis the political integrity of the sovereign territory. The underlying premise of course remains that state is given and must not be compromised.

The non-addressal of grievances for political and cultural autonomy also leads to a sense of self-awareness and also creates an awareness of the other group, a referent 'them' vs 'us'. Levin(1993) suggests that subtle shifts in identity correspond to historical and demonstrable construct and thus emerge as mental constructs contrary to histographical facts. This works for the reinterpretation of the history of grieved people through complex interplay of self-awareness and the awareness of the 'other'.

In the case of Kashmir, self-awareness happened through the formation of wide network committees at various levels−the basic committee at the mohalla or gram level,halqa committee at town or municipal level, followed by tehsil committee, two provincial committees, general council and the central Committee. These committees worked democratically under the supervision and the discipline of the central committees bounded by the programmes and policies of the *Mahaaz Rai Shumari*. Gradually other political groupings like the Mirwaiz group, Jamaat –e-Islami and Political Conference also allied with the Plebiscite Front.

The activism of Plebiscite Front was targeted soon after, when the state government arrested its founder president Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg along with a number of office bearers and prominent members under the Preventive Detention Act. However, this only

strengthened the position of the Plebiscite Front .The rival group made every move to see the Plebiscite Front defeated politically. The defection of Plebiscite Front workers towards the rival group was celebrated with enthusiasm. Accordingly, the government framed number of programmes at the administrative level such as massive subsidies on rations, providing loans to farmers, establishing cooperative societies, opening up government contracts to divert the attention of the people from the policies of the Plebiscite Front. Thus, there were attempts to contain Plebiscite Front at different levels – local, national and international. The repression of legitimate democratic opposition and pursuance of patronage politics was widely used to checkmate the growing popularity of Plebiscite Front. The situation could find a resonance in Sangpam's(1992) characterization of third world as an overtly politicized state where the major pre-occupation of the state actors is accumulation for the purpose of survival. The strategies used by power-holders to legitimize their rule often falls under political violence and corruption. Kashmir was becoming an over politicized state without appropriate mediating institutions such as legitimate political parties and ineffective leadership.

A common allegation of the Plebiscite Front against the new government structure was suppression and torture of its workers. The organization was successful in presenting memorandums to certain world leaders for the immediate free, fair and impartial plebiscite and support Kashmiri's right of self-determination.[26]Other than this, the organization managed to do publicity work .It came up with five weeklies, which propagated their party's ideologies. The Urdu weeklies were *Johaar*,*PayamNau*,*NawaiMuslim*,*Awaam* and *Naya Payaam*. A fortnightly named Free Thinker was also published around the same time.[27]

Tremblay(1996) explains in Kashmir that it was precisely the absence of a competitive party system of the population,combined with the unfortunate decisions of the leadership to pursue patronage politics at the expense of an appropriate economic strategy for development, generated the crisis of governability in the valley. This crisis quickly

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[26] Memorandums were presented to Earl Atlee-UN Secretary general, Mr Dag Hammerskgoeld- Chinese Prime Minister,Bulganin-Premier of Soviet Union, Khrushev-Premier of Soviet Union, Mr Macmilliam-the Prime Minister of England, Dr Sukarno, Queen Elizabeth. The Times of India, January 2,1957.
[27]The *Dawn*, Karachi,July 24,1958.

degenerated into challenges to the political viability of Kashmir's association with India, revolving around the issue of Kashmir's distinctness and consequent past political claims of self-determination.

Under mounting pressure from various quarters Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah was released in 1958.The shrines of Kashmir again became powerful spaces for propagation of Shiekh's political doctrines.[28]The Hazratbal Shrine,the Khanqah Shrine, Jenab Sahib Soura provided opportunity for Shiekh Abdullah to propagate his political ideas. However the war of words between Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah and political leaders in New Delhi resulted in a confrontation, which ultimately landed Shiekh in jail once again.

By 1972, the Plebiscite Front leadership was arriving at the conclusion that they should settle the issue within the Indian constitutional framework. On the other hand, the Awami Action Committee, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Kashmir Political conferences were emerging as a new force on the old narrative of plebiscite. These forces allied for mobilizing the situation in their favour. Mirwaiz Farooq's Awami Action Committee and the Jamaat-e-Islami constituted a new party called All Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation League seeking the solution of Kashmir through plebiscite.[29]

According to Gochkhami (2011), the movement for Plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir ran into two phases. The first phase can be delimited as between 1953 and 1966 and the second from 1966 to 1975.The first phase was a genuine movement for the achievement of plebiscite. The second phase spread over from 1966 to 1975 was more related to the politics of state autonomy, power politics and politics of reconciliation. However, two fundamental changes, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, had a bearing on the people of state and Plebiscite Front, which compelled them to rethink on the political issues facing the state. Thus, these years were a process of rapport building for the Plebiscite leadership, who sought to create alternate avenues for political mobilization.

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[28] Shrines in Kashmir were and continue to be far more than simply spiritual retreats. It was in shrines where literature and politics intersected.Shrines provided legitimacy to the rulers and the agents respectively. For more on the role of shrines see *Languages of belonging* by Chitralekha Zutshi and Hindu Rulers Muslims Subjects by Mridu Rai.

[29] The *Patriot*, Srinagar,March 17,1974.

The Kashmir Accord between Indira Gandhi and Shiekh Abdullah signed in 1975 also added to the resentment. The provisions of the accord ensured that Shiekh Abdullah would be released and re-appointed as chief minister of the state. Additionally the Plebiscite Front would be disbanded with immediate effect. This was bargained against integration of Kashmir into central constitutional structures and any further devolution of autonomy. This was a turning point in many ways as the culture of systematic political mobilization was replaced by sporadic mobilizations led by various youth groups.

Contribution of Plebiscite Front Movement to Kashmiri Nationalism

The Plebiscite Front movement converted Kashmiris into a group possessing common and distinctive cultural elements, where a strong sentiment had arisen out of common experiences. This historical point of time ensured a political awareness of the self, and differentiated itself from other political collectivities. The entire process, which spanned over several years acquainted people with sense of rights and responsibilities, which essentially was missing from the existing dispensation. A noteworthy aspect of the movement was congruence between the elites and the masses, and a sense of owning up of institutions. The breakdown of autonomous provisions incarceration of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah became symbols of political mobilization for Kashmiri nationalism.

The Plebiscite Front movement utilized the myths and memories from the past in order to reconstruct and transform the community into the modern phenomenon of nationalism, through a process of re-discovery and re-affirmation. By creating political, social, cultural process of legitimacy, the movement ascertained the ownership of resources and infrastructure launching disruptive actions against the authority. Participation in a movement like *Rai Shumari* was motivated by three key factors—firstly by a prevailing sense of injustice and moral acknowledgement that collective grievances existed and were provoked by the centralizing moves of the government. The perceived injustice was at a collective level, rather than an individual one. This collective identity was on the basis of shared beliefs and sensibilities, be it cultural or religious. The second important factor that contributed to this movement was presence of an aspect of agency, a belief that one can participate in sustained collective action for altering political conditions.

These conditions certainly emerged in retaliation to the various contextual factors and were cultivated by the Kashmiri nationalism.

The door-to-door contact campaigns, reading material circulated by the publicity division of Plebiscite Front ensured development of a shared perception of injustice, reinforcement of a collective identity and the amalgamation of a sense of agency occurring at different levels of society. The activities conducted by the Front dramatically changed the perceptions and persuaded people from different contexts to be a part of the movement. The common experience of state enforced coercion influenced the people to come together in the form of the Mahaaz, converting the threshold of sympathy into participation. Political coercion not only formed the core of the collective grievances but also developed a response and led to maximization of the goals of political nationalism. This experience also channelized the further adaptation of strategies and tactics for Kashmiri nationalism.

The Plebiscite Front utilized the myth-symbol complex and the mythomoteur through creating similarity in the events of 1931 and 1953, and preserved it for all future events. The political leadership and intelligentsia were thus trying to transform a collectivity into a political nation .This also helped in gaining recognition for cultural and political claims of a community. The Plebiscite Front reinforced collective identity by persuading those who perceived a sense of injustice being perpetrated on the ethnie and tried to convince them that a national movement is the only way to address this injustice.

Proliferation of Youth Groups:Al-Fatah and other organizations

In response to the restrictions of the local parties and the shrinking of legitimate avenues for the democratic political participation, number of youth groups emerged to call for the exercise of self-determination. Other than Plebiscite Front, number of other smaller organizations had also actively taken to advocacy for the right to self-determination. Organizations like Jammu and Kashmir Youth League which was formed in 1964 provided the first avenue of political activism for self-determination.

The failure of Operation Gibraltar [30]also led to change in strategy of how the resistance activities would be channelized. Jagmohan (2006) writes that there were about eighty underground cells and active in the Valley of Kashmir between 1965 and 1971,and the ISI did succeed in winning over some of these cells during the late 1960's.

Correspondingly a network of youth organizations had cropped up across the Cease Fire line (CFL)in the Pakistan controlled Kashmir. An organisation called Jammu and Kashmir Independence Committee was formed in 1963 by Aman-ullah Khan, Mir Abdul Aziz, G.M Lone, Mir Manan and Mir Qayoom to channelize the resistance movement towards the independence option. Other organizations like Jammu Kashmir Liberation League, Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front and Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front, Jammu Kashmir National Students Federation were also formed espousing broadly the same cause[31].This proliferation paved way for the formation of Al-Fatah in 1966, an embryonic indigenous armed movement that was neutralized in the early stage during the 1970s.

In December 1966, a political project called Al-Fatah was launched. Posters showing a map of India with Jammu and Kashmir depicted as a separate entity marked in red ink were sent out to government officials, politicians and influential private individuals. The red ink posters created a stir as the general elections to Jammu and Kashmir assembly were to be held soon after. An article published in *India Today* in1984 notes that Al-Fatah was the biggest of all the subversive and espionage groups in Jammu and Kashmir.[32]It was a guerrilla outfit comprising over 200 people, which began operating around the middle of 1970.

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[30]Operation Gibraltar, a covert Pakistan-backed guerrilla attack that aimed to draw on anti-Indian sentiment and foment a rebellion against the Indian government in Kashmir, was launched in August 1965.Though the operation failed, but it further fuelled the conflict. Religious and nationalist tensions in the Kashmir Valley had a role in prompting Operation Gibralatar.In December 1963, the Moi-e-Muqaddas, a strand of the Prophet Muhammad's beard considered to be the holiest Islamic relic in Kashmir, was stolen from the Hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar. Mc Leod (2002) and Schofield(2010) discuss how the theft led to an outpouring of Islamic sentiment in the Valley, causing riots and demonstrations of a decidedly anti-Indian flavour .

[31]*Kanoon-i-Azaadi Hind aur Maslamai Kashmir*,Published by Information Wing of Mahaaz-e-Rai Shumari,Mirpur,AJK.

[32]http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/al-fatah-is-biggest-espionage-groups-unearthed-in-jammu-kashmir/1/360540.html [Accessed 10 February 2017]

The group was essentially formulated to launch an indigenous armed struggle just like Al-Fatah in Palestine. With support from the organizations that were espousing similar politics from across the ceasefire line, the movement was ready to launch its guerrilla operations. However, there was clarity that the organization would run in a totally autonomous pattern. The group was essentially formed to highlight Kashmir issue internationally by giving it an indigenous shade without the involvement of Pakistan. To maintain its individuality, it made its own preamble and maintained independent finances. By September 1967, Al Fatah had recovered enough confidence to initiate militant operations. Some of the members crossed over the ceasefire line and started recruitments too. Ali(2012) writes towards the end of 1968,unarmed resistance group just like Al Fatah of Palestine, totally indigenous in character emerged under the commandership of Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer (GRZ).Zehgeer operated under number of assumed names like Rehman, Maqbool,and Gaznavi. The headquarters were located at Barsoo, Awantipotra in South Kashmir.

Excerpt from the preamble of Al-Fatah reads, "The freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir is having peculiar character, embedded with religious, cultural, geographical and nationalist maxims to upkeep our prestige and honor as Algerians, Palestinians and others have done. The preamble draws an analogy between the battle between India and Kashmir as like between elephant and a mosquito. The minute nature of mosquito does not dither it from engaging the elephant. In case of guerrilla warfare, main objective of guerrilla is to engage the enemy and secure political motives, which may include political ideology, re-establishment of lost nationhood or fight against oppression and exploitation. The guerrilla tries to win his political motives by operating and acting on three fronts-political, military and economic".[33]

Al-Fatah imagined the guerilla warfare in Kashmir as a four-staged process. The first stage was imagined as an extremely important stage where processes like recruitment, training, collection of information and setting up of organizational structure were involved. The triumph or loss of guerrilla warfare could be historically realized by the complete realization of this stage. This stage would also involve civil disobedience, non-

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[33] For more see Al-Fatah Constitution 1971.

payment of taxes and a campaign of economic breakdown like targeting airports, railway lines and the industrial states. Simultaneously to pressurize New Delhi based forces, there would be a formation of political party.[34]

The second stage was to create panic among armed forces in Kashmir in terms of laying light ambushes and throwing hand grenades occasionally but without causing any civilian damage. [35]Swami(2014) writes that Al Fatah urged the cadres to know alternate roadways from a militaristic point of view and said that targeting these could structurally paralyze the enemy at any point of time.In the third stage, blueprint of raids were to be prepared. In the fourth and final stage, attacks were to be made to target military convoys, depots and armed garrisons.[36]

The training pattern of Al Fatah was quite unique in nature, sometimes the new recruits were taken to watch Hindi films like *aankhein* and *shaheed*. This was part of the training to inculcate nationalism among Kashmiri youth .The recruits were also asked to read books like *Jehad- e- Islam* written by *Khalil Hamidi*.[37]

As part of the planning infrastructure, recruits were asked to collect or drop material at specific places, which at times was done to check the integrity of the recruits. A specific organizational order was followed and every recruit in the organization was codified ,and these codes were read in reverse sequence A as Z,B as Y,C as X, D as W,E as V,F as U,G as T,H as S,I as R,J as Q and so on. The recruitment was done only after a thorough check of personal background and preference was given to recruits, who had other male siblings. This was done to ensure financial stability of the family in case the recruit was arrested. Among the strategies one was to write with lemon water so that the words could only be read under the illuminated tube lights.[38]

Though some writers like Jamal (2009) establish that Al Fatah was the first organization to establish formal links with ISI, nevertheless not directly. ISI provided weapons,

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[34]Interview with Zahid Ghulam Ahmed,senior political columnist,dated 30 June 2017.
[35] Ibid
[36] Interview with Bashir Ahmed Bhat, former Kashmir University student's union president (1973-1975) dated 30 April 2017.
[37] Interview with Fazal ul Haq Qureshi,former student leader, dated 15 April 2017.
[38] Interview with Muhammad Ashraf, trade unionist dated 15 April 2017.

trainings and sanctuaries to the fighters but had no direct control over its militant actions. Though they did not financially back up Fatah. The funds were raised its funds by looting Government departments and banks.[39]

However Al-Fatah got exposed much before it emerged as a full-grown organization when the members of the latter got identified while committing a bank robbery for generating revenue for the organization. Sahni (1999) records that the Al-Fatah militants looted around 70,000 rupees from the sub-divisional education office in Pulwama and 100,000 rupees from a local bank .The police arrested a handful of Al-Fatah fighters, which led to a crackdown on its entire membership. It was in 1977 that the cases against Al-Fatah were withdrawn. Thirty members of the organization were charged with sabotage, subversion and dacoity.

Other than Al-Fatah, number of other organizations espousing the same cause also cropped up. *Awami Inqelabi Mahaaz, Jammu Kashmir Mahaaz-e-Azaadi* were other votaries of independent Kashmir. Later, a military wing of *Mahaaz-e-Azaadi* called "Operation Balakote" was formed to pursue the same demands in a more militaristic way.

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was also formed around the same agenda in 1977.In one of the official brochures[40], the organization traces the independent status of Kashmir to 1586, when Mughals forcefully annexed Kashmir. Contrary to the popular belief that complete independence arose as an option in 1989, JKLF holds a contrary view. JKLF claimed in one of the initial proceedings of Muslim Conference held on 19 July 1947 that the option of independence was completely acknowledged by the Muslim Conference. However, the very next day the decision was rolled back[41].In a way autonomous sentiment of Kashmiri nationalism that always existed, found manifestation in one way or the other on both sides of Line of Control.

In the year 1962, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto held several rounds of talks with Swaran Singh, the Indian foreign minister, where India proposed giving away 1500 sq. miles to Kashmir

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[39] Ibid

[40]*Baba-e-Kashmir Aman-u-ullah Khan,Ek Ahd Saaz aur Tareeq Saza Shakisiyat*,Information and Communication Wing Jklf, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

[41] Ibid

valley. Unfortunately the talks failed due to Pakistan's provisional agreement with China. Aman ullah Khan, who later emerged as one of the main faces of Jammu Kashmir Liberation used his *Voice of Kashmir* journal for generating a consensus around the same. Consequently, a meeting was called at Rawalpindi on 12 May 1963,which was attended by G.M.Lone,Qazi Khurshid Alam,Abdul Khaliq Ansari,Abdul Majeed Malik,Mir Abdul Aziz,Majid Ahmad Bhat,Ghulam Nabi Gilkar,Mir Abdul Qayoom,Mir Abdul Farooq,Syed Shah Nazki,Ghulam Ahmad Jarah,Ali Muhammad Malika and Mir Abdul Rashid to form a committee called Kashmir Independence Committee.The committee resisted the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks and the dissection plans of the valley.[42]

In his book *Jehd-e-Musalsal*, Aman-ullah Khan (1992) writes that as soon as the organization was formed, the members boarded buses and travelled to an unguarded India-Pakistan boundary at Suchetgarh, twenty kilometers from the city of Jammu. One of them crossed the no man's land and bought back soil from across the working boundary. With the soil from other side of Kashmir in their hands, the members took an oath to extensively work for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir. Abdul Khaliq Ansari was made the President, Aman-ullah Khan the secretary general and Maqbool Bhat was made the publicity secretary.

Aman-ullah Khan had already started thinking on the lines of guerrilla warfare, which was not well received by many other members of the party. The younger lot of the party agreed with the principles of guerrilla warfare while the elders categorically rejected the formulation leading in the split of the ranks.[43]The younger crowd favoring the guerrilla warfare ended up forming National Liberation Front(NLF) in 1965.Guerilla warfare was considered as the only way forward as it was the only way to establish the point of Kashmiris, which otherwise got buried under the ideological structure of India and Pakistan both. The single point program of NLF was to create conditions in which people of Jammu and Kashmir could determine the future of their motherland. All the members

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[42]*Maslae Kashmir ka Behtareen Hai* ,Jklf,Rawalpindi,Pakistan.
[43] Interview with Ghulam Mustafa Alvi, octgenerian political worker and member of NLF,dated 30 May 2017

were required to sign an oath in blood that they would not hesitate to sacrifice their lives to achieve the NLF objectives.[44]

National Liberation Front decided to step into Kashmir valley for introducing guerrilla ideas. This way two groups, one headed by Maqbool Bhat and another by Major Amanullah entered the valley to create various hideouts and provide military training. The two groups were successful in setting up in Srinagar, Sopore, Baramulla, Bandipora and vulnerability, NLF workers pre-emptively kidnapped and subsequently murdered a police inspector. Soon Bhat was arrested and sentenced to death for murder of Inspector Amarchand and inciting the people against the state of India. However Bhat escaped the jail[45] and the organization began looking for ways to escalate their work towards a dramatic act that would draw the world attention to the Kashmir issue.[46]

Subsequently, hijacking of Ganga flyer was planned by Hashim Qureshi and Ashraf Qureshi to bring the Kashmir issue to the forefront. The hijackers demanded release of 36 political prisoners and claimed allegiance to an organization called Kashmir National Liberation Front. The high voltage drama ended with hijackers setting the aircraft on fire after taking out the passengers. In May 1976, Maqbool Bhat re-entered the valley to impart military training to new recruits. To manage the shortage of funds, Bhat robbed a bank. The employees resisted and in a shootout that followed, [47]the bank manager was killed.It soon led to Bhat's arrest and was subsequently sentenced to death.

From the time of Bhat's arrest in 1976, National Liberation Front changed its strategy towards advocacy and lobbying as effective techniques for bringing Kashmir to forefront. In this way JKLF was formed in London and a journal called *Voice of Kashmir International* was started. The lobbying mechanisms included booking visitors' gallery of United Nations General Assembly and raising slogans against the stalemate over Plebiscite and for endorsing the independent claim to Kashmir. Amanullah Khan on

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[44] Interview with Muhammad Altaf Hussain, political worker dated 3 April 2017.
[45]*Srinagar Jail say Faraar ki Kahaani*,Muhaammad Maqbool Bhat(2006)
[46] In September 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked four jets bound for New York and successfully landed two of them at Dawson Field in Jordan .The operation was successful, attracting international media attention with the detonation of three jets at Dawson's Filed.
[47]*Main Kaun Hun*, Muhammad Maqbool Bhat

behalf of JKLF started giving press conferences discussing the historicity of Kashmir and the about the complete independence as an option. The lobbying continued from 1979-1984 and there was lot of press and media publicity around this time. While the total number of people working for JKLF was not more than a few dozen, the organization would quickly become the largest and most important group working for Kashmiri independence. Soon branches were set up in New York, Holland, West Germany, Denmark, France, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Understanding the impact of youth groups on Kashmiri nationalism

The Plebiscite Front movement and the proliferation of youth groups became a part and parcel of everyday life in Kashmir. These everyday experiences and events were all along shaping the Kashmiri nationalist narrative. Faheem (2018) notes that the Azadi movement of the 1990s provided a context through the broken promises connected with other narratives, producing a collective narrative and thereby giving birth to a sustained collective action.

The activities of Plebiscite Front and the corresponding network of indigenous organizations led to what (Anderson 2006:8) calls as 'spontaneous distillation of complex tossing of historical forces'. Once surfaced these historical forces had Janus faced capability of acquiring newer meanings. As these historical forces were transported through various social terrains, they acquired varying degrees of self-consciousness. Thus, merging with a correspondingly wider network of political and ideological constellations.

Before 1947 the National Conference headed by Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah was the major political force behind the political mobilization. His leadership charisma and appeal had made it the major catalyst for the political mobilization. Folk songs, stories of this time are full with narratives of Shiekh's popularity. However by 1953, he was arrested and a new Prime Minister was installed. This event marks the curtailment and erosion of the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir. As the National Conference was banned and Shiekh Abdullah imprisoned, many members, supporters and sympathizers of National Conference galvanized themselves into a new party called

Plebiscite Front. The massive publicity done through the Plebiscite Front became the primary carrier for the Kashmiri political nationalism in these years. This was corresponded by a remarkable increase in the number of underground youth led organizations.

The personality cult of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah had grown regardless of the institutionally defined position and superseded the established institutional authority. After the Indira-Abdullah accord of 1975,the personality cult diminished but by then the historical forces had taken self-directed trajectory. This was corresponded by the creation of large reading publics created through educational reforms. Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah made several radical reforms, which also included access to free standardized education. Education ensured that people would think about themselves and relate in newer ways. The land to tiller reforms had successfully created a middle class, which prioritized education over everything else. Razdan (1999) informs that in 1941 only 1.6 percent of the Kashmiri Muslim were able to read and write. However, two decades later the literacy rate for state rose to 11.03 percent and then 36.29 percent.From the early 1950s Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir also increased its involvement in the field of education. Sikand (2006) records how through its growing network of schools, Jamaat made tremendous contribution in the field of education. Jamaat schools were planned as safeguards against the onslaught in the cultural sphere. The self –consciousness brought through the education had taken different forms−Islamic, secular, socialistic,etc. and leading towards political baptism across the class and sectarian lines. The partition of the sub-continent had already created a political atmosphere charged with newer doctrines, which were further transmitted through the surge in education.

Another major factor that sustained the political nationalism was the rapid development of print. To borrow a line from (Anderson1991:90), "The readership had expanded beyond the tiny literate reefs on the top of the vast illiterate ocean". The readers were connected through print forming a visible invisibility, emblematic of the nationally imagined community. Ganguly(1996) cites that in 1965 some 46 newspapers were published in Kashmir, while the figure in 1991 was 254.The advent of education, print, power packed politics of Plebiscite Front and the subsequent birth of indigenous

organizations on one hand and the religious revivalist organizations like Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-e-Islami converged for setting the stage for Kashmiri political nationalism.

Prior to the Indira −Abdullah accord, the demand for plebiscite had been the major demand of the Plebiscite Front for twenty-two years. These years were essential in the formation of the political nationalism and this memory laid the foundation for the militant nationalism. In the public memory, the mobilization followed a continuity of sorts, which had started in 1931.In this context, the youth organizations particularly the JKLF extensively used influences from the past events, forging bonds between events of past and present. The underground organisations were in a way weaving a parallel narrative during the 1953-1987, where perceived political betrayals were openly discussed. Underground literature in forms of books,pamphlets, and newsletters were being shared in the realm that was not under the state control. Faheem(2018) regards that instead of being a phase of relative calm, this phase was collective effervescence whereby shared narratives, jokes, rumor and gossip embedded in the larger political reality of the time, were emerging as the powerful vehicles for political mobilization in Kashmir. The slogans acted as snapshots of memory, waiting to be discovered from generation to generation.

The cadre of the newly formed organizations revived and accelerated the political mobilization through collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction of political events and how these events mediate between the political opportunities and action. The youth led organizations and their intervention created a collective perception of the Indira-Abdullah Accord and they developed a new language of political nationalism. Equally the political nationalism, be it Arab nationalism or Afghan nationalism were providing motivations and helping the imagination of locating oneself in a global matrix.

Run-Up to the Elections of 1987

The closure of legitimate avenues of democratic political participation had made way for number of youth protest groups. The 1975 Indira -Abdullah accord corroded the legitimacy of the National Conference as a representative of Kashmiri Nationalism.

Punjabi(1989) characterizes the 1980s as the result of non-fulfillment of urges and aspirations of the people, the result of undemocratic functioning of different institutions of the state, the result of mal-administration in running the affairs of the state and violent expression and militant assertion of a sub-national identity. As the process of participation of people in decision making, power sharing and restructuring of the institutions did not take the normal course in the state in general and Kashmir valley in particular, the policy of appeasement was used to win over the estranged majority of the population. Appeasement included generous central government aid, gearing up a highly subsidized economy, arbitrary and discretionary sanctions of permits of licenses and permit. The bureaucracy assumed the role of according legitimacy to the successive undemocratic government. Thus the cumulative effect of all these processes was the emergence of new middle class in Kashmiri society. The services and privileges of the state remained confined to this very class.

During 1953-1975, the disenchantment and discontentment of the people was drained off through emotional slogans and sharpening the dual identity –religious and regional. In other words, Shiekh Abdullah had the capacity to restrain the Kashmiri identity coming in direct confrontation with the national identity. With the exit of Shiekh Abdullah from the socio-political scene, his successors could not maintain a balance between the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. Puri(1989) states that during 1975-1984,the politics of the state was divided between two secular and nationalist parties. Those who were dissatisfied with the policies of the state government voted and supported the Congress (or the Janata for a while), while those dissatisfied with the policies of the Union Government opted for the National Conference. There was little space for the secessionist forces during this time.

The dismissal of the duly elected Government in 1984 by Governor Jagmohan under the direction of central Congress leadership was a major blow to the centre state-relations. It outraged sentiments of local population, who saw Farooq as being wronged by New Delhi. But what outraged the sentiments even more was Farooq's accord with Congress and decision of joining hands with centre. Noorani(1989) argues that the honorable course for Farooq would have been to stay in the opposition, build up his party National

Conference and articulate protest through a committed political party. Instead he discredited himself, so did the Congress. Added to this, Farooq Abdullah constantly blamed his father for what he inherited "rusted administration" from him, which exhausted him of any left overgood will which he otherwise enjoyed. During this time, Maqbool Bhat an influential JKLF leader was hanged in connection with a case of the killing of an Indian diplomat in United Kingdom. The hanging marked a significant shift in the landscape of Kashmir and paved the way for transformation of nationalism from political to militant terrain.

Kashmir observers unanimously assert that the militant nationalism could not rear its head if March 1987 elections were not rigged. Many of the political groups formed in the mid 1970s against the Indira-Abdullah accord, came under a coalition called Muslim United Front(MUF) to contest elections unitedly. In a way, politics of Muslim United Front represented the expression of the non-elites who were contesting against the dominance of the centralized institutional control. It was widely expected that MUF might emerge as major contender after the elections. However, allegedly the elections were massively rigged in favor of the National Conference-Congress alliance. The election results met with massive outbursts with mass protests against the subversion of the democratic process.

MUF was a manifestation of moderate old guard leadership ready for working within the confines of the Indian constitution. The political mobilization was reflected in broader as well as underground formations, some of which were blanket banned by the National Conference. The other underground groups devised radical measures to mobilize against the state. Splinter groups regularly spoke in favor of armed struggle as an only logical tool for resolution of the conflict.

The last blow to the edifice of democracy was rigging in favor of National Conference. As a veteran leader, Abdul Ghani Lone said in one of his interviews, "The sad part is that moderate leadership is now being finished. Our youth now prefers to listen to the sound of the gun rather than even to my voice."[48]It is also argued that had there not been rigging

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[48]The Srinagar Times,dated 29 September 1990

of elections, the MUF would not have bagged more than 15 seats at most in the House of 76.The National Conference-Congress coalition would have sailed through with ease.[49] The result declared National Conference as the winner of 40seats, Congress of 26,MUF had secured only 4 seats and the Bharatiya Janta Party and the Independent candidates secured 2.

The results were declared after an unprecedented five-day delay and there was complete curfew during the counting. What was worse that MUF counting agents were thrown out by police from the counting stations. And as soon as the results were declared, MUF candidates were arrested, detained under Public Security Act and shifted to various jails. Cash award of Rs 25000 were placed on MUF polling agents-Abdul Hamid Shiekh, Ashfaq Majid Wani,Muhammad Yasin Malik and Javed Ahmed Mir each.

One particular group called Islamic Students League[50]had emerged powerfully with a considerable member base. This group had actively campaigned for MUF and as a result of the rigged elections, a number of its cadres defected towards armed militancy. A senior member of Islamic Students League in an interview held in 2017 stated, "Islamic Students League(ISL) had become the street power in 1980s. Every political actor wanted to utilize this street power for their gains." Muslim United Front which was a coalition of various small groups against the elite politics of National Conference also sought to utilize the resources of Islamic Students League for the purpose of campaign in elections. However, ISL differed from MUF fundamentally vis-a-vis its approach to electoral politics. Ahmed(2017) remembers that though it agreed to campaign but essentially ISL was trying to change the character of the struggle. It was trying to replace the political nationalism with more radical options. As time again political nationalism was manipulated in favor of electoral gains.

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[49] Ibid

[50] On October13, 1983 the West Indian cricket team was playing against the Indian team at the Polo Ground Srinagar. The spectators involved many Islamic Students League members and they openly cheered for West Indian team. Some people from the crowd dug the pitch in anger as how India could host a cricket match in a disputed region. The event became quite a sensation and brought Kashmir into international focus quickly.

Many of the MUF candidates and ISL members ended up crossing over the line of control for acquiring armed training. Another senior activist (2017) preferring anonymity in an interview recalls, "1989 elections were not an answer to those who had any hopes from the state, it was a reality check for those who were thinking in terms of Indian constitutional framework." This remark asserts that political mobilization had taken a paradigm change with the advent of organized acts of anti-government violence. Armed militancy was initiated formally by HAJY group which returned from receiving armed training in Pakistan.

Understanding the drift from Political nationalism to Militant nationalism

Militant ethnic nationalism emerged to challenge the state by denying it symbols of authority and legitimacy. The militant form also blocked the monopoly of coercive violence. The political ethnic nationalism had operated to undermine the state through mass agitation on social, economic and political issues. However, militant nationalism in a way was perceived for eroding the ruling governments claim to authority. This was done by establishing its own legitimacy of numbers. Thus the militant movement was a strategy of sustained political violence to challenge the state. Guell(1989) notes that the strategy of armed struggle may be viewed from two distinct perspectives. From one perspective, armed struggle represents the first phase in the strategy of political violence. It gradually advances from armed struggle to guerilla warfare and then to people's war to general insurrection and weaken the state. From the other perspective, armed struggle represents an autonomous strategy sufficient in itself to achieve the desired goals.

The idea of transition of political nationalism into militant nationalism can force the state to negotiate the demands made by the militants. However, this could be facilitated only by successful coordination of two different forms of struggle, reconciling the conflicting demands of strategy of armed struggle and political outreach and mobilization too.

The Kashmiri nationalist movement adopted variety of structural combinations. For example, the political wing created and directed an effective mobilization setting up small semi- military organizations and directed subordinate wings to carry out the work

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of disseminating propaganda and mobilizing local support for the nationalism. It successfully dispersed itself through military, political, trade union and cultural forums. The military and political struggles were not waged by distinct but allied organizations. Kashmiri nationalism also took to electoralist strategy, using elections as a vehicle to expand the popular struggle and to expose the shortcomings of governments in power. The elected representatives were seeking to establish formal access to the state for translating movement aspirations into policy and ultimately create new institutions. However, many of those who opposed an electoral strategy regarded participation in elections as providing legitimacy to the incumbent regime and the institutions. However with time differing ways to seek the goals proved to be a source of disagreement and disintegration than of the success in Kashmiri militant nationalism. In particular, internal debate often resulted in organizational splits and recurrent warfare within.

Rise of Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front was one of many organizations formed as an offshoot of politics of Plebiscite Front in mid-1960. For more than two decades, JKLF had a negligible presence on Indian side of Line of Control as the pro-independence space was strongly captured by the National Conference and the Plebiscite Front. Ideologically it was very close to the NC's version of Kashmiri Nationalism, but at the same time disassociated from the Shiekh Abdullah's political heritage. Bose (1997) records that in the backdrop of the alleged rigging of the elections of 1987, JKLF resurfaced after remaining dormant for twenty years. The core HAJY group that emerged immediately after the election rigging had its allegiance to JKLF. Largely, it found spiritual inspiration in the Islamic traditions rooted in mystical piety of Kashmiri Sufi saints. Kashmiri identity could never merge with a religious identity. Explaining the spiritual aspects of Jameel(2017) ,a professor at the university of Kashmir said, "Major religions modified when they came to Kashmir. The local texture was retained to uphold the nationalistic identity that existed here. Hinduism did not exist here in a way how it existed elsewhere; Buddhism also underwent major changes to accommodate the local practices. So did Islam emerge in a way which has no parallels elsewhere". He added, "In Kashmir beneath the realm of political, there always has been spiritual. Say for example, Syed Ali

Hamdani gifted Kashmiris a beautiful treatise on spirituality-*Aurad-e-Fatiha* because he understood and valued the spiritual mysticism that was practiced here."

The interview reminds me Renan's (1882) famous essay, "What is a Nation", where he drew a parallel between nation and the soul. The things that constitute this soul or the spiritual principle are past and the present. The first one being the legacy of memories and the second one- the desire to live together. The vision of Kashmiri nationalism shared by the JKLF definitely rested on the glorified vision of the shared past, but how the idea of consent was emulated remains a matter of debate. Malik(1995) notes that JKLF has based itself largely on geo-political and historical grounds, with a underlying focus on territorial and geographical identity. The activists of the organization put forward the idea of a supra−religious Kashmiriat. The term was both an ideological and strategic attempt to not alienate Buddhists of Ladakh and Hindus of Jammu from the predominant Muslim population of the valley.

JKLF advanced as a frontline group which crossed over the border for the arms training in 1988.On December 7,1988 it took the entire state machinery by surprise with a high profile kidnapping of the Rubaiya Sayed, daughter of the then Union Home Minister, Mufti Muhammed Sayed. This marked the arrival of JKLF on the political scene as well as explained total breakdown of the state apparatus. The kidnapping was surprising for the state machinery, traditional leadership and the Pakistani stakeholders equally. The helplessness of the state machinery could be evaluated by then Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah's insistence on the act as 'un-islamic' and then chief secretary Moonis Raza calling out to the kidnappers as 'brothers do not hold sisters hostage'[51]

The case of Rubaiaya's kidnapping presents a crisis of weak mediating structures and how the state was totally held captive by militant nationalists. Constant appeals from the representative organs of the state express breakdown of trust and also complete take over of the traditional pro-resistance leadership by the JKLF. The traditional pro-resistance camp largely espoused political nationalism. The fact that Pakistani leadership also appealed to JKLF for releasing Rubaiya is indicative that the kidnapping was not induced

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[51]*The Kashmir Times,*December 11,1989

by the external actors and JKLF was posing a threat to them as well. Prominent Pakistani leaders like Maulana Kausar Niazi and Dr Sher Ali Khan expressed astonishment at this act.[52]

This act of kidnapping also took the traditional leadership by disbelief. Awami Action Committee chairman, Mirwaiz Maulana Farooq requested the JKLF to release the hostage as it was against the principles of religion.[53]Subsequently, there was no other way than giving in to demands of kidnappers, to resolve the crisis as police and intelligence could not locate the kidnappers. The militants had put a condition that Rubaiya would be freed only if five of their colleagues were released by the government. The militants had also put a condition that Rubaiya's release would come only after 48 hours of the release of the five militants. [54]

As Rubaiya was released in exchange of the arrested militants, the society expressed widespread jubilation. Women turned out in large numbers with garlands, traditional sugar candies (*shirini*) and traditional folk songs to welcome the militants. Immediately after the release of the five militants, JKLF flags were hoisted all over Srinagar and celebratory gunshots were also fired.[55]In the words of a senior journalist Bukhari(2017), "The Rubaiya kidnapping case was a psychological victory for Kashmiri nation. It was for the first time that a common Kashmiris had brought the government to its knees."

For some time, JKLF was articulating a vision of an independent state and giving a strong expression to the autonomous political agenda. Earlier there had been attempts at channelizing the political consciousness outside of the state defined institutions; however those attempts could not manage to grab the attention the way JKLF did. The JKLF politics found a parallel in insurgent peasant consciousness that Guha(1983) explains, occupying autonomous space derived from the historical and social aspect of identity.

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[52]*The Kashmir Times*,December 12,1989
[53]*The Kashmir Times,* December10,1989
[54] Meraj,Zaffar(1989),"Government vacillation delayed Rubaiya's case by 3 days" *The Kashmir Times*, Jammu and Kashmir ,December 15,1989
[55]*Kashmir Times*, December 13,1989

There was also a gradual increase in organized violence, An editorial of *Kashmir Times* titled, Insidious tactics [56] discussed how call for *bandhs* surprisingly evoked total response despite the large scale pre-emptive arrests having made to prevent any coercion and intimidation. The futility of all these preventive measures were highlighted. It showed how the ruling parties had lost their influence and secondly, how the popular support had drifted towards JKLF. The massive demonstration in the form of protest marches strikes was churning out a new narrative, which was threatening Pakistan and India .The complete support for strike calls, political marches reflected the solidarity for the Kashmiri nationalism.

On 18th June 1990, when the guerrilla movement was at its peak Amanullah formed the interim independent government which created whirlwind in the media both national and international. The independent government attempted at crossing over the ceasefire line at *Chakoti* in Pakistan controlled Kashmir on February 11, 1992. Marchers were stopped short at the ceasefire line and 12 of them were killed and many arrested. This exposed Pakistan's reprehensible position on Kashmir completely.[57]

The act of kidnapping Rubaiya Sayeed and the act of forming the interim independent government constituted an experience where the 'self' and the 'other' encountered and confronted one another.There was considerable strain between the ISI and the JKLF during the latter half of 1989.The ISI even forced the JKLF to change its central plank from sovereignty to self-determination. Jamal(2002)writes the ISI also demanded that its representative be allowed to sit in JKLF central committee meetings as an observer. Amanullah Khan rejected both the ideas, saying that he would allow ISI participate in the central committee meetings if he was allowed to sit for meetings of Pakistan army. By early 1990, the ISI had cut all funds to the JKLF. Amanullah tried seeking help from Benazir Bhutto but the communications channels were completely blocked[58]

JKLF was repeatedly attacked for its secular character by the ISI. As it was the first militant organization to cross over the border for militant training, its cadres were

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[56]*Kashmir Times*, January 27,1989
[57]https://kashmirlife.net/the-gilgit-rebel-issue-07-vol-08-104096/ [Online:web]Accessed 3 January 2019.
[58] The Daily *Alsafa*,dated 31 March1991.

attacked for fighting for a cause distant from Islam. But beneath the smokescreen of secularism, it was JKLF's vision for independent statehood that was a challenge for the Pakistani state and the ISI. The Pakistan supported groups adopted an area domination programme where the geographical territories were marked either as green or red. Green represented areas where pro-Pakistan groups were dominating and red where JKLF was in control. The JKLF cadre was attacked repeatedly for taking secular positions and pressurized for defection. Those who did not agree were killed mercilessly.

Constitution and Strategy of JKLF

In the proposed constitution, JKLF envisioned a federal, parliamentary political system. This system comprised five federal units namely Kashmir valley, Jammu province, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan. These units would be autonomous with elected provincial governments and they would further be sub-divided into districts, which would have their own administrative structure. At the centre, it put forward bicameral houses of legislature, with proportional representation. Lower house of the parliament would have proportionate representation vis a vis the population. The upper house would have an equal representation from all units.[59]

The envisioned constitution provided equality interms of social, economic and political rights to the religious and ethnic minorities and neutrality towards both Pakistan and India. The proposed neutrality was such that the proposed republic of Jammu and Kashmir would develop economic cooperation and trade links with both India and Pakistan. As far as socio-economic programme, JKLF strongly recommended by the Naya Kashmir manifesto adopted by National Conference in the early 1940s premised on egalitarianism and social justice.[60]

The JKLF constitution promotes non-homogenization of identity in many ways. The idea of autonomous federating units can provide greater recognition an establish legitimacy in many ways.Based on the interviews with activists from JKLF and reviewing newspaper articles, the strategies aim at active dissemination of Kashmiri nationalism. JKLF utilized

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[59] JKLF Constitution(2003)
[60] Ibid

negation, ambiguity, collective experience, solidarity, transmission and territoriality to solidify expressions of ethnic Kashmiri nationalism. One could understand the strategies through four phases: establishing an organizational base, devising military strategy, pursuit of international support and mobilizing popular support.

The most active years of JKLF (1989-1993) were characterized by massive political mobilization and subsequent mass protests on the streets. Starting with the boycott of 1989 elections, the popular slogans from this time like *Hai Haqq Humara Aazadi*(Azaadi is our right)*Jab tak na hogi rai shumari jung hamarai aazadi*(we will fight, till the world recognises our right to plebiscite) [61]suggest a meaningful framework for the articulation of ethnic demands. The presence of JKLF flags at every nook and corner of the valley, complete strikes on symbolic days suggested a state seeking behavior and creating legitimacy for a new power structure.

JKLF ensured that the government installations and offices considered as symbols of authority were routinely targeted. Huge rallies were organized with people from different walks of life joining in, even some of them who were active part of the state machinery before 1989. Taseer (1990) writes how the collective oath taken by the JKLF leadership by Chrar-e Sharief, absolved the previous attachments and awakened new impulses. In the absence of alternate channels of collective action and protest, mosques emerged as focal point of mobilization and resistance. So it can be said that during the initial stages of protests, JKLF intensified and directed the tension and discontent of people. Garner (2013) explains that JKLF capitalized on the benefits of political Islam. The leadership of JKLF prided itself on the secular understanding of Kashmiri nationalism but that did not stop them from utilizing Islamic themes in the mobilization and public discourse in response to the violence. The motivational literature used symbols and metaphors from the Islamic history.[62]

JKLF also mobilized international support for Kashmir's right to self-determination by focusing repeatedly on human right violations. To maintain distance from Pakistan's position on Kashmir and as a total repudiation of two-nation theory, fund raising was

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[61] The Srinagar Times, dated 1 March 1990.
[62] Jklf pamphlets from 1990-1993 were seen to analyse this trend.

done in the Middle East, the United Kingdom, Europe and the USA. The Kashmir diaspora in the United Kingdom was particularly active for mobilizing international support.

With the intensification of militancy, strategies evolved into a more dissident and subversive model. Works of Mao and Che Guevara were translated in Urdu and the tanzeem(organization)frequently learnt underground and guerrilla warfare tactics from them. Zahid(2018) informed in a personal interview that a hyper revolutionary atmosphere was created and it was strictly urged on the fighters of JKLF(*mujahids*) to show impeccable moral conduct and strict self-control, so that the local population would spontaneously become sympathetic to militancy.

A particular impetus to the militant nationalism during this phase was the death of Ashfaq Majid Wani, one of the founders of HAJY group. His death inspired thousands of other young Kashmiri men to take up the arms, making it very difficult for the state to control the militancy from this time forth. [63]Defying curfew orders some 500,000 mourners participated in the funeral of Ashfaq which easily surpassed other historical gatherings, let alone burials.[64]

To get people together and to create a sense of commonality, JKLF made number of symbolic gestures like visiting the families of militants after their death, setting up schools and urging for adoption of the children of dead militants. JKLF activists would regularly visit the families of the killed militants, who they referred as martyrs, honoring them immediately and also on periodic basis. Martyr cemeteries were laid in every area specifically for militants. The valorization of fighters was incorporated and manifested at the community level. The organization tried to project slain militants as 'martyrs'.They explained how wives and children of martyrs need to be supported. These were the performative aspects of the commemoration of the nationhood. Multivalence of martyrdom was enacted through funerals, commemorative murals and the naming of places after martyrs. Tributes paid to the mothers of martyrs became archetypal events for recalling the goal of nationalism.

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[63] The Kashmir Times,30 March 1990
[64] The Kashmir Times,1 April 1990

As more militants began getting killed, the memorial stones with the name, date of birth and date of their killing started propping up at every nook and corner of valley. The day on which the militants were killed were observed as 'martyr days'. Commemorative meetings were held on such days and these days became events in their own way as the goal of nationalism was recalled, recognized, localized and reconstructed through these meetings. To use Anderson's(1983:9) important argument of how arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist in cenotaphs and tombs of unknown soldiers. Whether the tombs/graves are filled with anybody cannot be ascertained but become active sites for nationalistic imaginings. Thus news of any militant's death evoked strong sentiments reminding of reliving and reinforcing the sacrifices made by Kashmiris. These acts were foregrounding a counter memory and producing strategies of cohesion and resistance. The martyrdom of a militant had a religious underpinning and gave meanings to the larger cultural systems that surrounded it.

Faheem (2006) notes that the community dinners were organized by common people during infamous nocturnal crackdowns and search operations by para-military fostered a solidarity and friction with the adversary. The crack-downs, combing operations incited fear but also made individuals come together and share one another's experiences, unconsciously importing and assimilating into themselves the gestures, attitudes of one another. Tabassum(1991),a JKLF supporter writes in her unpublished memoir that how Eid in 1990 was entirely different from other Eid's she had ever seen. On Eid that year, early morning the males from her mohalla were called out for an identification parade, but soon were hurdled into buses and taken to some undisclosed location. Soon after in some other buses, males from a village far away from hers were paraded in the common community ground. As it was Eid, she urged the other women to march out with the food they had made and share it with men from the distant village.

Challenges for nationalism proposed by JKLF

Faheem(2006) notes that the strategic vision of JKLF was straightforward. It hoped to generate enough popular resistance that it would force India to withdraw from Kashmir and JKLF would be able to form an independent state. However the strategy proved to be full of miscalculations given the actual social resources and institutional capacities. JKLF

produced an agitational model of militant nationalism utilizing restlessness and impulsive behavior of the people. However, itcould not be transformed into something concrete due to the state action from both India and Pakistan.

In the initial stage JKLF was able to intensify and channelize the grievances of common Kashmiri towards collective action. While the initial interest helped to recruit members, it had shortcomings in terms of giving a long-term political direction. One reason for it could be the extermination of the main leadership of JKLF in the initial years itself. In the early years of the militant movement, despite having a limited cadre, the central processes were handled by the four original organizers of the HAJY group. As the first tier leadership got arrested or killed, there was no second tier leadership to take control of the situation. Neither was an institutionalized structure in place, that could deal with a situation like this.

Secondly, JKLF had a considerably weak social penetration in rural areas as compared to urban areas. There was deficient social infrastructure that could mobilize masses for a longer period of time. Weak vertical ties meant that the recruitment and expansion of the organization was going to be difficult in the long run. Since the organization had no patronage from a caste, class or a religious network, it meant dangerous consequences for the organization. The urban rural gap visibly worked in terms of training and control within the organization.

Equally a stringent crackdown was placed by security agencies which led to JKLF recruiting a number of individuals and local subgroups with which it did not share its ideological and organizational commitment. This had serious ramifications as it created risks of revolts from below and also decapitation of the organizational hierarchy. These new fighters often tried to control resources they got after the armed training. There were also instances when these groups retained important information for individual good. Moreover, there wasn't a strong policy to deal with the splinter groups, paving way for chaos. Stanilard (2016) also writes how JKLF was unable to build a durable organization particularly at the local level. It could not convert mass mobilizations into resilient institutions, able to handle expansion and shocks of conflict. In a way, JKLF had an idea,

not a base. The problems were equally propounded by the weak horizontal ties that existed between JKLF on Indian side and the JKLF on Pakistani side, which later became evident by multiple splits within the JKLF.

Evans(1999) writes that as the cadre strength of JKLF was decimated by constant killings and arrests from 1992 to 1993 from both Indian security forces and pro-Pakistan gunmen, there was a complete takeover of the movement by Pakistan and its intelligence agencies. Thus JKLF lost its ascendency to the radical groups, which resulted in unilateral ceasefire called by Yasin Malik in 1994.

One can evaluate that JKLF utilized all the elements mentioned above in section for the awakening of subaltern consciousness. JKLF was catering to the class historically on the defensive and helped them achieve self –awareness. JKLF's taking over of the traditional leadership introduced a new set of class polarities and formed a class of new political actors. These actors had a redefined position to Kashmiri nationalism, also posited a vertical conflict between the new and the old actors. In a way, the arrival of JKLF on political scene introduced a new set of individual and group dynamics in the Kashmiri society. JKLF mobilized ethnicity in defence of culture and also for establishing political boundaries.

Rise of Hizbul Mujahideen

The rise of JKLF was becoming an anathema for the Pakistani state, which always deterred any attempts at a creation of the separate state in Kashmir. During the 1980s, the Pakistani state headed by Zia-ul-Haq tried making intervention in Kashmir through using Jamaat-e-Islami as its client. In a couple of meetings with a foundingleader of Jamaat-i-Islami-Maulana Abdul Bari, Zia had already set things in motion. Jamat-i-Islami was to gather international support for the Kashmiri cause, from international movements Subsequently, Bari travelled to Indian administered Kashmir and had meetings with politicians and activists. However, the Jamaat-e-Islami(Kashmir wing)was not keen on making Pakistani army as their benefactor. Subsequent meetings were arranged between General Zia and activists of Jamaat-e-Islami in Saudi Arabia.

JKLF was also a threat for small Islamist militant groups as it was a nationalist secular party with no allegiance to Pakistan. Consequently, a new militant organization was envisioned and it would be sponsored by Jamaat-e-Islami. The new origination would replace JKLF and also lead the militancy in Pakistan's interests.

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)in Jammu and Kashmir was formed in the 1940s and ever since played a crucial role in the politics of Kashmir. The JI in Jammu and Kashmir shares the common ideological framework with Jamaat elsewhere, based on the writings of Maulana Sayed Ala Maududi. Till the onset of militancy the core support base for JI was middle class, propagating adherence to Islamic law (sharia).For JI, Islam functions as a complete code of life covering all the aspects of a collective as well as individual existence of a Muslims life. And, for establishment of Islam in entirely, according to JI,creation of a Muslim state guided by sharia is mandatory. Accordingly, Jamaat sees democracy as going against the sharia, and for the same reason the separation of religion and politics is condemned. Sikand(2002)notes that JI in Kashmir urged men and women both to playing an important role in the establishment of the status based on din. And for this purpose, a strong representative party is required which JI is. The membership is open to any group irrespective of the affiliation of class, caste, tribe who agrees to follow the guidelines of Jamaat.

Consequently, Jamaat –i-Islami surveyed the political landscape and decided a decisive action was needed to control the situation in their favor. Subsequently, informal relationships with smaller Jehadi groups were strengthened, with many Jamaat-i-Islami leaders taking direct roles in the activities of underground mujahideen. The smaller groups like Zia Tigers and Al Hamza shared its pan-Islamist vision with Jamaat. The most important group, the largest and the effectively organized, was Ansarul Islam. To broaden its appeal and to pull the movement out of JKLF's hands, Ansarul Islam was renamed as Hizbul Mujahideen−the party of holy warriors on June 11,1989.

The ambiguity over two Hizbul Mujahideens was resolved with the merging of the two with Ahsan Dar as its commander in October 1989.Aconstitution was finalized on June 10,1990 after secret meetings between all stake holders−Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu

Kashmir, Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan controlled Kashmir and the ISI. The constitution created the offices of the patron, Amir,chief commander who together made up the executive leadership. It also established a central *Majlis-i-Shoura* while the chief commander would be nominated. The power to appoint the patron nearly meant total control over then organization. However, ISI wanted to run the show pushing its major client Jamaat in the limelight subordinating smaller factions. Senior people were regularly demoted and smaller organizations like Allah Tigers,Al Badr,Tehreek-i-Jehd-Islami were merged as part of this power struggle. Jamal(2009) records that to combat the influence of JKLF,ISI supported and funded a wide variety of militant organizations. By 1990,the ISI had over 100 militant organizations on its payroll. But with JKLF removed from the scene, the ISI moved to cease its support of the smaller factions, becoming more selective in its support of Kashmiri militants. Subsequently a joint front was envisioned for pro-Pakistani groups,meaning the merger of Hizbul Mujahideen*,* Muslim Janbaz Force, Tehreek Jehad Islami, Hizbullah and Al -Umar to form Mutahidda Jihad Council.

However in 1993, as the United States of America began pressing Pakistan to close its militant operations in Kashmir, the ISI decided to continue funding jihadi organizations only if they could gain sponsorship by a client political party. Thus Awami Action Committee became the sponsor of al-Umar Mujahideen, the Muslim Conference was directed to sponsor Jamiatul Mujahideen, the Peoples Conference was to sponsor al-Barq,the Peoples League was to sponsor Muslim Janbaaz Force (MJF),Ittehadul Muslimeen was to sponsor the Karwaan-i-Mujahideen. Hizbul Mujahideenbecame critical of this move as it would de-centralize the entire unified structure which it had bought together and it would also dilute the chain of hierarchy and dilute the command structure.

Haqqani (2005) writes that the Hizbul Mujahideen carried series of campaigns to disarm other militant groups.It also marked a consistent smear campaign against the JKLF. Pamphlets were distributed calling JKLF a secular, atheist party with limited vision. Some pamphlets went to explain how JKLF was working for a small territory while as Hizbul Mujahideen was working for larger Islamic cause. The famous slogans of "*Hum Kya Chahtay, Aazadi*"was added with a qualifier-"*Aazadi ka matlab kia-La ilahaha*

Illallah" (What does freedom mean?There is no God but Allah), *"Yahaan Kya Chalega,Nizam e Mustafa"* (Which System will be allowed to function here, only the system of Prophet Muhammad) *"Pakistan say rishta kya,La ilaha Illah"* (What is our relationship with Pakistan, there is no God but Allah).

This new campaign was more ruthless as the political rivals, mainly from the JKLF, were completely eliminated. According to JKLF figures, Hizbul Mujahideen eliminated more members than the state military apparatus. Civil society efforts at negotiation between the two also failed to yield any results. Stanilard(2016) writes that the Hizbul Mujahideen marginalized the JKLF by executing and threatening its members. Street battles in Srinagar, assassinations of JKLF fighters, and public denouncement of militant nationalism were indicators of the fragile social infrastructure Hizbul Mujahideen was building.

Disappointed with the target assassinations and political differences, Hizbul Mujahideen's founding commander Ahsan Dar resigned from the organization. Given his popularity, the resignation caused widespread resentment in the organization and was followed by massive defections towards the new organization called Muslim Mujahideen. Fair(2014) notes that in the entire history of Hizbul Mujahideen, one can clearly observe political differences within the organization, to the level that target assassinations of fellow commanders were also done.

Strategies of Hizbul Mujahideen

Hizbul Mujahideen was strongly owned by Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan controlled Kashmir and Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan. Since the Jamaat-e-Islami of Kashmir was under tight scrutiny of security agencies, the party could not publically endorse the politics of Hizbul Mujahideen. They ended up playing both sides, disavowing a connection publically but clandestinely supporting it.

The most important reason for Hizbul Mujahideen to emerge as a robust organization was its access to the networks of Jamaat-e-Islami. The central processes were built around the

horizontal ties Jamaat had cultivated over the years. Ahsan Dar, the first chief commander of the organization pronounced the organization as the "sword arm of the Jamaat".[65]The administrative control was built around Jamaat's shura control and the pre-existing social ties were used to form a militancy grid.

The first strategic goal that Hizbul Mujahideen followed was to cleanse its membership of affiliates who did not subscribe to Jamaat ideology. To accomplish the task, constitutional changes were made. The offices of secretary general and patron were annulled for creating the position of chief patron. A permanent *Majlis-i-Shura* was also established in the form of twelve-member command council.The command council was to be elected by the *Majlis-i-Numaindgaan*(council of representatives) which would consist two senior commanders from each district in Jammu and Kashmir.

At the top of the ladder would be supreme commander, followed by deputy supreme commander (one or more than one person could be put at this post), followed by field operation commander who would be in control of three officiating chief operation commanders: the first one being field spokesperson, logistics and military advisor and the financial chief. The field operation commander would be followed by divisional commander, district commander, battalion commander, company commander and finally section commander. This was followed by a strong network of overground workers (OGWs) and underground workers (UGWs).[66] The over ground workers were mostly the members of the Jamaat and would be the main contact links between the militants.

The organization had a clear process of decision-making and internal security that provided direction and controlled the group in sharp contrast to JKLF. There was a clear demarcation of military and administrative functions with administrative wing being the decision-maker.

Likewise, geographically the valley was divided into units−Srinagar, Budgam, Ganderbal, Kangan being the first one, Baramullah,Kupwara,Bandipore the second one,

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[65]http://www.risingkashmir.com/news/pak-backed-jklf-hm-my-creation [Accessed 5 September 2018]
[66] Interview with Abbas Masoodi,political analyst, dated 10 June 2017.

Anantnag, Kangan,Shopian,Pulwama the third one, Poonch, Rajori the fourth one, Udhampur, Doda, Kishtawar, Bhaderwah the fifth one.[67]

Hizbul Mujahideen could mobilize Jamaat linked social networks in parts of Doda and Bhaderwah too. Prominent Jamaatis would identify young men,some of them having been educated at Jamaat run Falah ul Aam schools.Using the moral and religious authority and the already established social linkages, they would persuade youngmen to join the ranks. This set- up also ensured control finances and weapons too.   The Jamaat members and the sympathizers were the crucial connections that linked local mobilization with the overall structure of the organization.   Behera (2007)writes the organizational network of the Hizbul Mujahideen spanned over the divisional and district levels in the valley.The Hizbul Mujahideen cadre was recruited by the Jamaat-i-Islami.In totality, the social resources of Jamaat clearly contributed to the decisive ascendency of Hizbul Mujahideen as a dominant militant group. In addition the Hizbul Mujahideen cadre was trained initially mostly at the Hizb-e-Islami camps who had clearly better combat strategies. So the cadre was better equipped militarily and strategically too in comparison to JKLF and other fringe organizations. It had access to wireless technology which was unthinkable for any other militant organization at that point of time.

With the closure of the Afghan war, the Hizbul Mujahideen also started to get fighters who participated in the Afghan war and this gave a boost to their position. However with time the presence of foreign militants led to socio-institutional compromises.[68]The foremost compromise was with the political intentionality and the politics of control. Often the foreign militants had wrong notions of the political context and ended up creating a landscape of their own beyond any politics of control. And so there was no longer any control at the outcomes too. With this argument, political intentionality becomes impossible because it is unable to separate the domestic causes from the global one, resulting in the disintegration of causality.

The cadre was encouraged to read about Islamic theology and Islamic history, particularly books written by Abu Ala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-i-Islami. The

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[67] Ibid
[68] Interview with Gayoor Dar, columnist,dated 25 December 2016.

value of martyrdom in Islam was repeatedly espoused. "We had a problem with JKLF's perspective. We were not ready to die in the name of secularism", informed a former recruit.[69]

One of the major challenges that Hizbul Mujahideen faced was in maintaining effective communication networks. Foremost challenge was finding a reliable way to communicate between the fighters on two sides of line of control. Usually couriers were used to communicate but with the security crackdown, the couriers were arrested much before they could communicate the news. In the 1990's,ISI moved to assist the militant cadre for using the communication system .It intended for the trainees to handle a wide range of information which included sending the trainees to Al-Jehad University of Technology in Peshawar to learn telegraphic and radio communication methods for streamlining its operational functions.[70]

In the aftermath of 9/11 the space for militant activities constricted immensely and strategically there was a major shift in terms of how the militant organizations functioned. In the new course of action, militants were told to strictly avoid media attention and refrain from making any inflammatory statements. Most of the militant offices were moved from city centres to the remotely located areas. The signboards from removed from the offices and fighters were strictly asked to abstain from wearing military fatigues and stop adopting Kunyat-the Arabic style of nickname. Words like *lashkar,jaish,sipah* were to avoided at all levels of conversation.Miller and Gelleny(2010) note that in terms of militant tactics also there were major changes.The fighters were now sent in smaller groups.The militant organizations like *Al –Jehad,Al Umer* and *Lashkar-e-Toiba* were asked to work as one group.Another strategy was to create new fronts like Freedom Fighters for Kashmir,Kashmir Resistance Force for camouflaging Pakistani fighters behind Kashmiri organizations.[71]

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[69] Anonymous interviewee, dated 10 June 2017.
[70] Ibid
[71] Interview with Tariq Rahman, village level social worker,dated 3 June 2017.

Conclusion

Since the consciousness of political and cultural difference from 'others' constantly needs a referent "them' vs 'us', the events of 1989 provided significant context to the complex interplay of clashing valuational identities. Firstly, it laid bare state's role at sponsoring formal nationalism and simultaneously intervening through legal and constitutional structures to suppress the presence of local nationalism. By intervention through legal and constitutional institutions, the processes of individual and collective identity formation accelerated. The historical references and symbols used by the state over a period of time clearly created a divergence between the state-national and ethno-national identities. Despite states overarching presence in the larger socio-political environment, the underlying sentiments of independent existence on social, political, cultural and economic lines existed.

Throughout the political history of the state of Jammu and Kashmir post 1947, an extensive system of political patronage has been maintained.The result of this institutionalization of patronage politics and constant stifling of democratic opposition was the strengthening of alternate spheres of representation which were not completely invisible in the political domain. The alternate mobilization was pursued through a number of political processes .The purpose here is to recognize what Guha (1983) calls, statist discourses of nationalism which include autonomous subjectivity of the collective identity. Nationalist movements are often denied recognition as often subjects of history by the statist discourses while the nationalist movements pursue their political designs.

Largely the post-colonial states imposed control through pronounced focus on centralization and hegemonic control and the entire engagement is restricted through official processes. Any alternate mobilization was confronted with coercion and placed outside the confines of legality. Thus an institutional-specific definition of nationalism was churned out and implemented by using the political elite. Since the demotic affiliations of self-legitimating political agency were underpinned, it led to the complete disavowal of the state created institutions. In a way, there were two mutually incompatible vocabularies –institutional and valuational, operating in absence of a viable dialogue. As the state resorted to coercion as the only way out, the autonomous political

agency often establishes non-state channels of communication, making militancy with popular support an inevitable phenomenon .The advent of militant nationalism altered the development of nationalist ideology in many ways, with the strength of a particular militant group enforcing the domination of a particular group ideology.

Chapter 4.

External Factors in Kashmiri Nationalism

Introduction

The chapter looks at the external factors that influence Kashmiri nationalism. It tries to examine intervention of various political actors through the theoretical structure of civic and ethnic nationalism .It tries to locate whether the political actors have changed their positions with the changing geo-political situations. The first section looks at the relationship between the Kashmiri diaspora and the Kashmiri nationalism; as how other than maintaining remittances this group performs the function of imagining Kashmir outside the geographical confines of India and Pakistan. The second section looks at how Pakistan functions as a factor in Kashmiri nationalism and how through deploying centralizing tendencies it has tried to contain Kashmiri nationalism within Pakistan controlled Kashmir (Pck). The next section maps how Pakistan uses irredentism as a policy position to counter the narrative of Kashmiri nationalism.

The Diaspora and Kashmiri nationalism

The section looks at the diaspora as an object of analysis, for considering the relationship between global and local in the context of Kashmiri nationalism. The diaspora is the transnational community that contests the power of the state and also performs essential functions for continuity of political movements. (Bhaba 1990:11) argues that in a global field dominated by a geopolitical paradigm of the nation-state, the imperfectly assimilated or unassimilated inhabitants of the margins of the nation-state constitute a subversive subjectivity, contesting nation states claim to legitimacy. Diasporic populations entail the plurality of polities within, creating a new alignment of self to the other. Alongside the process of de-territorialisation, the political subjectivity of an individual gets reconstituted with an imaginary coherence. (Hall 1990:53) understand that displaced people cluster around remembered or imagined homeland or places or communities in a world that seems increasingly to deny firm territorialized anchors in their actuality. In this sense, diasporic subjects at once reflect the bi-focality of engagement with struggles in both the homeland and the new geography.

In the context of Kashmir, the continuing dispute resulted in large scale displacements of the Kashmiri population. The migration movements from the valley date several centuries with push factors being environmental and economic. Consequently, there has been a regular Kashmiri presence outside Kashmir. In the modern historical context, the first migration accompanied the partition and the bifurcation of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The political situation of 1947 resulted in a massive migration from Jammu province. Subsequently, during the wars of 1965 and 1971, substantial migration occurred again from the Jammu province. Rollier (2011:85) elaborates that, "those displaced in 1947–1949, mainly from the Jammu province, constitute the majority of this population. For the most part, these migrants were allocated property in the main cities of northern Punjab and eastern Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa. Those displaced in the wars of 1965 and 1971 were also resettled in Punjab, even though many of this generation and their descendants have now moved to Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi". Since the onset of armed militancy in 1989, more Kashmiris, mainly from Srinagar this time, have crossed over to Pakistan controlled Kashmir (PcK) and Pakistan. While most of them fled as entire families or villages after the state's violent counterinsurgency practices, others crossed the LOC in search of militant training. Most of them were accommodated in refugee camps across PcK.

However, the largest group which channelized the discontent and displacement towards a strong diasporic formulation has been Mirpuris. Though culturally and geographically they are more close to Punjab, but allegiance to the erstwhile territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the subsequent displacement by the Pakistani state fostered a sense of unique Kashmiri identity in them. The source of displacement has not been direct military intervention, but the construction of a dam in the 1950s and 1960s. The dam project started in the 1950s,aiming at confining waters of rivers Jhelum and Poonch for increasing the irrigation water for Punjab and generate electricity for the area. Initially, around 13000 inhabitants were relocated but over the period of time, bulk of population was relocated. Sayyid(2000) notes that the reason for the major displacement of Kashmiris to the United Kingdom was the dam project which intended to confine the waters that flowed through parts of PcK.

The dam project resulted in mass displacement of the inhabitants who joined the labour force in northern Britain, given the shortcomings in terms of education and social capital. Gradually this diaspora became important as it sent back remittances and also because they become repositories of the political act of imagining the homeland outside the confines of India and Pakistan. In this new space, the experience of the shared past, constant displacements mobilized this disenfranchised population around the wide range of identity issues and subsequently resulted in a redefinition of the Kashmiri identity. This memory of this migration was seen as a reminder of many such political migrations ad high-handedness of the two countries vis a vis Kashmir.

Gradually over the years, this diaspora in the United Kingdom emerged like a significant entity.Ballard (1991) through his analysis of emigration from Punjab and Pck, approximated that most of the Pakistanis in UK are in fact from Pak Controlled Kashmir. The reasons of displacement range from militarised to non-militarised .The Mangla dam displacement initially relocated around 13000 inhabitants, but over a period of time, most of the population was eventually relocated.

The process of displacement, though came along with of misery, but started a process of articulation of Kashmiri identity. Ali(1996) writes that Kashmiri identity in Britain engages at two levels− the individual and the collective level. The identification is not with the current territory but with the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The emotional value for homeland is further augmented by the familial ties across the ceasefire line. Though there is no linguistic affinity between the Kashmir valley and the parts of Pakistan controlled Kashmir, it does not impede the inhabitants of this territory to identify with Kashmir. The entire process ensures preservation of memories and reliving the memories of the homeland through the collective efforts. The Mirpuri community developed a rather idealized account of their place of origin and disseminated if allowed to return to homeland the community could overcome the sense of subjugation. This strong sense of returning to the homeland is substantiated that there has not been a nationalistic closure in the case of Kashmir.

Though the Mirpuris are economic migrants but the community sees itself as a 'nation in exile' which is done by the relative positioning. Of what the diaspora defines itself against like the assimilationist policies of nation-states of India and Pakistan. Like other diasporas, Kashmiri diaspora also shares a incongruous connection with nationalism. The diaspora requires a strong sense of self as a nation for providing a coherent unified sense of collective identity in relation to territorial dispersal. So the evocation of shared history and culture in relation to, myths and memories become all the more important. Several of my interviewees used the phrase 'Nation in exile' to describe the Kashmiri diaspora in the United Kingdom. On being asked further they replied, "that Kashmiri diaspora de-territorializes the notion of Kashmir and therefore projected an idea of Kashmir not founded on the bounded territory". Several explanations are placed to justify the presence of Kashmiri diaspora. The first classifies Kashmiris as national people and also a distinct ethnie which has a right to exercise self-determination. The second presents Kashmiri diaspora as victims of political oppression and unified by the experience of being part of the liberation struggle. Evans(2005) writes that after the commencement of militancy, many in the diaspora found it more likeable to identify as Kashmiris as opposed to as Mirpuris. The latter often got stereotyped by urban Pakistanis and Kashmiris.

The Kashmiri diaspora in Britain has tried to articulate Kashmiri identity as being a nation by ethnic identification as Kashmiris and not Pakistanis. Ballard(1991) notes that the change in ethnic self- ascription is also a political move as it enables an articulation of the deep resentment felt by the people in Pakistan controlled Kashmir towards the treatment given by the Pakistani government. For the 2001 census in the United Kingdom, Kashmiri diasporic organizations came together to ensure that Kashmiris are counted as Kashmiris and not as Pakistanis or Indians. From door to door campaigning to bringing out printed pamphlets, it was ensured that the Kashmiri population marks itself as 'other' and writes 'Kashmiri' in the given box. Ali(2002) writes that Kashmiris in Britain have only recently appeared as a separate ethnic group. Previously, Kashmiris mostly got subsumed under a Pakistan or a generic Asian identity, or alternatively, under a regional category. As a consequence, this led to exclusion in terms of resources, opportunities, and services in comparison to other ethnic identities. The fundamental argument that my interviewees share was, "We were given a rough deal in Pakistan.

However, if we don't assert our separate identity we would never be able to have our own homeland." [72]This de-territorializes the notion of Kashmir beyond the geographical boundaries and re-theorizes the national imaginary. Given the Indian and Pakistani nation-states' hostility towards Kashmiri nationalism, the Kashmiri diaspora became a major theater for the performity of Kashmiri nationalism. This brings us to the questions of how solidarity works towards achieving a homeland and how through Kashmiri nationalism of the diaspora is decontextualized and spread across the world.

Following the efforts of the organizations like Kashmiri National Identity Campaign(KNIC), local councils in the United Kingdom like Bradford Metropolitan Council, Rochdale Metropolitan Council, Kirklees Metropolitan Council, Luton Borough Metropolitan Council, Oldham Metropolitan Council, Pendle Borough Council and Leeds City Metropolitan Council in the United Kingdom have recognized Kashmiris as a distinct ethnic community. A systematic program was launched for recognizing Pahari as a separate language instead of as a dialect of Punjabi. The growth of Pahari can be gauged by Pahari television channels being aired on satellite\\e television.

The discourse of Kashmiri nationalism operates in various spaces and levels. It may be expressed through oral narratives at an individual level and in the form of shop names, community organizations and special events at the community level. In cities like Birmingham, Bradford and Luton, Kashmir is a very popular name for retail outlets, restaurants, convenience stores, travel agents, etc. In common parlance, Birmingham is often referred to as Chota Kashmir or little Kashmir. To evoke memories of the homeland, it is common to send Eid cards bearing pictures of Kashmiris who died during militancy, Kashmiri leaders, freedom slogans and Kashmiri flags. Eid festivals and Muslims holidays are routinely celebrated by waving the Kashmiri flag. The cards often have political messages like 'Freedom Now' and' Day of Independence will be Eid for Kashmiris'. This way children born and schooled in faraway lands are initiated to the historical past whose reconstruction becomes the basis for nationalist aspiration. Ali(1996)writes that for the younger generation human rights violations become a reason for

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[72]Telephonic interview with Shams Rehman, renowned Kashmiri diaspora activist dated 16 May 2016.

mobilization, whereas for the older generation emotional location becomes significant. Close contacts are maintained through biraderi(rural) based lifestyle.

The displacement of Mirpuris coincided with the relocation of individuals involved with the liberation politics in Pakistan controlled Kashmir to Britain. The political coercion in Pck had made it necessary for many of them to move to Britain where political organizations like JKLF were formed. Based in Luton, which was home to many Mirpuris the organizationutilized the human capital and remittances to flourish. Availability of free media also worked in their favor. The creation of Bangladesh in 1972 had made it evident that Pakistan could not be a possible ally against India.

Other than the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, the other political organization called the United Kashmir Liberation Front(UKLF) had leftist and internationalist in nature. It was formed by a small yet committed circle that were influenced by the Palestinian resistance and agitations against the Vietnam War. There activism was largely anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist in nature. Hutnyk(2006) reminds us how rise of leftist politics in the British South Asians and also contributed to Kashmiri activism. UKLF cooperated with leftist organizations like Indian workers association and Pakistani workers association. Gradually,it developed strong connections with the trade unions and anti-racism initiatives.

The Kashmiri diaspora based in the United Kingdom tried engaging in local elections to have a political presence and influence on Britain's foreign policy. Earlier majority of the voters would consider the labor party as their natural political representative. Sokefeld(2016) elucidates on how Kashmiris began demanding labor tickets for contesting elections themselves. One of the first Kashmiri Councillor Muhammad Ajeeb won from Bradford and became the first mayor of Kashmiri origin. Another significant outcome of the political presence was the formation of the All-Party Kashmiri parliamentary group. There are four all-party Parliamentary Groups in the UK with an interest in Kashmir. Before this, a Kashmir Human Rights Committee was formed in the House of Commons chaired by a Labour Party MP from Bradford.

Political activity among Kashmiris in the United Kingdom was a mixture of reactions to the events in Kashmir like Hazratbal Siege AND burning of Chrar-i-Sharief shrine. Protests were held at the Indian High Commission, Hyde Park, Trafalgar Square, and other important places. Utilizing the lobby of British MPs, demonstrations and rallies were not only confined to London but took place in provincial centers like Bradford, Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow. Demonstrations were regularly held on symbolic days like International Human Rights Day. Charity Eid dinners were held for Bosnia and Kashmir in Bradford regularly every year. Two satellite channels-Apna channel and Kashmir Broadcasting cooperation were set up to voice the feelings of Kashmiri diaspora. Ali(2002) rightly points out THAT Kashmiri ethnicity has been fairly successful in asserting itself through hegemonic agents like political parties, welfare organizations and intellectuals.

In totality, Kashmiri diaspora in Britain was not simply created by migration. It happened through the discursive creation of a particular vision of Kashmir and the mobilization of political actors towards this imagination. Political activists, academics and ordinary people have shaped and articulated the idea of community through a variety of factors such as relative freedom, political mobilization, and frames of imagination. This imagination got enhanced with the growth of satellite television and social media. Ellis and Khan (1998) found that there was universal support for the reunification of Kashmir in all sections of society, but with a majority favoring independence for the re-united state. Most believed that this should be decided through a referendum among Kashmiris on both sides of the divide and in the diaspora. The assumption of the majority was that such a vote would be in favour of reunification and independence. The diaspora has played a key role in promoting the debate on Kashmir in the international arena, be it by physical actions or by attending meetings in Britain to advance aspirations for the unification of Kashmir within the near future. Kashmiri diaspora has utilized trauma and the memories (images, myths and practices) associated with Kashmiri nationalism to alter the political imagination. The trauma is remembered repeatedly through the symbols, cultural practices, and public memory. Thus, diaspora refigured itself as a social form, as a type of consciousness and also as a mode of cultural production.

Diasporic Contribution

The diaspora and its contribution to Kashmiri nationalism foster an understanding based on self-determination, political legitimacy, and social integration on civil and religious grounds. It has espoused voluntaristic, organic, universalistic nationalism and denounced illiberal, ascriptive and particularistic forms of nationalism. The diaspora has constantly used the language of civic nationalism to present their status, especially to an international audience. Organizations representing Kashmiri diaspora have in particular adopted universalistic and rationalist understanding of nationhood. The nation is always imagined as a voluntary association of culturally differentiated individuals. Kashmiri national membership is prioritized over the Pakistani or the British. An analysis of organizational patterns reflects the importance of individual assent based on common values as well as the influence of social interactions. Through the remembrance of the events of 1947 and the subsequent post-dam displacement trauma, a novel sense of community evolved which maintained a constant yearning for an obtainable homeland. This sense of community was transcending the frontiers and promoting the return of a movement. The troubled relationship with both the Pakistanis and the British added to the urgency of return. This sense of attachment and connection to the land from where exile was forced, operates as a powerful metaphor. It is useful to abstract the idea of force as motivation and thus in potential creation of diaspora.

Within the diasporic circles, the discourse on Kashmiri nationalism emerges at multifarious levels. The repetitive appeal of the return ensures the presence of Kashmiri nationalism on the global scene. There has been a growing conviction within the diaspora to make their case through civic nationalism, using contextualized and historical details to expand its appeal. Despite the continuous status-quo on the ground, the very idea of returning to the homeland is used to concretize the idea of Kashmiri nationalism. This is amplified through requesting the global civil society for building a narrative around the political and deteriorating human right record in Kashmir.

Punjabis' disdainful views of Kashmiris as being backward and uneducated has also complicated the issue of Kashmiri identity. The Kashmiri identity was seen as a class identity in Pakistan and hence the remittances sent back by diaspora were a way of

accentuating the Kashmiri position. Ali(2002) in her research on Kashmiris living in United Kingdom try to bring out how the Kashmiri identity there was expressed on cultural and territorial lines. The residents bring about historical continuity of their ancestry and distinctness of their homeland. Though there is religious identification with Pakistan, there is a greater identification with the territorial idea of Kashmir.

The constant geographical movement of the diaspora has enabled a situation where people have moved multiple times. This continuous movement has enabled connections in faraway lands through multiple frameworks, in terms of understanding the politics of Kashmiri nationalism, the evolution of nationalism through the changing economic character of the diaspora. In particular, remittances contributed towards the evolution of communication and technology allows for the creation of virtual Kashmiri identity and enabled the displaced groups to maintain proximity and contactwith each other. This way the diasporic experience sharpened a certain narrative and forged continuity between the Kashmiris who stayed back and those who went away.Sayyid(2000) notes that the terms of home and home away become insignificant as the concept of diaspora is no longer just an empirical category but also an increasingly metaphorical one. Diaspora exemplifies a condition of political and social homelessness, more than a physical displacement from an imagined homeland and an eagerness to return.

Over time, the diaspora has maintained institutional practices to it nurture Kashmiri nationalism. Through the biradari networks, political activity is encouraged. The literature on Kashmir conflict is shared to keep the settlers informed. Community welfare organizations also contribute to maintaining the social side of the Kashmiri nationalism, for example, Eid celebrations, the celebration of Kashmir day, etc. The goal of return to the homeland is reified through clothing, performity of Kashmiri nationalism at socio-cultural gatherings

In totality, diaspora asserts Kashmiri nationalism through civic variables, articulating how to be Kashmiri outside the historic and geographic idea of Kashmir. The identity of diaspora evolves through its identification with the homeland. While the displacement

changes the context, Kashmiri nationalism is defined and redefined according to the contexts where settlers find themselves.

In addition, Kashmiri refugees in PcK have played an active part in politicizing the space and maintaining a continuity in the narrative of Kashmiri nationalism. (Khan and Ellis). Since 1947, the cross border flight has been in one direction only, from Indian administered Kashmir into Pakistan controlled Kashmir. Subsequent migrations in 1947,1965 and 1971 produced a constituency of refugees who were relatively absorbed in society. However, those who fled after the 1990s have not been absorbed into the local population as the groups that arrived before and live in a series of tented refugee camps. The government in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has classified them as refugees. There are a series of tented refugee camps in which people have beenmade to live, for many years in some cases. Sneeden(2012) writes that the refugees have chosen to live in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir over any other Pakistani city makes a major political statement. Even while being displaced, it is important for many to remain within Kashmir and not enter Pakistan. The presence of the refugee Kashmiris in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir acts as a reminder that their plight is due to the unresolved nature of the Kashmir conflict. The insistence of refugees to stay in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir also brings in the citizenship question. Jammu and Kashmir citizenship, as defined in the Dogra Maharaja's promulgation in 1858, applies to all those living in Kashmir at that time and up to two generations of those living outside at that time. The ruling stands still as it was never revoked and Kashmiris who fall in this category are legally entitled to being citizens of Kashmir. This provides a basis for a sense of Kashmiri nationalism for those who have been displaced.

For those refugees who hold a Pakistani passport, an additional undertaking is attached describing them as a native of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir. This is included in the production of Pushtani Basindha document confirming a person's origin from Kashmir. This way Kashmiriness is reinforced within the citizenship narrative and also through the controlling mechanisms of modern state.

Refugees from 1947, 1965 and 1971 have established themselves at all various levels within the society. Several senior bureaucrats are from refugee families who have exerted their position for community gain at multiple levels. The other way that refugees have adopted is active participation in the liberation politics, alongside participating in the domestic politics of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir. The second way for refugees has been through a refugee-specific structure. The Legislative assembly in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has 48 seats in all, out of which 12 have been reserved for Kashmiri refugees. The 12 refugee seats are very influential in determining the composition and nature of civil administration.These 12 refugee seats have largely served as an ideological benchmark for Kashmiri nationalism. Thus, Kashmiri refugees impact the boundaries of citizenship and political community

Pakistan as an external factor in Kashmiri Nationalism

Pakistan's position on Kashmiri nationalism can be determined through its relation to the Pakistan Controlled Kashmir. Lamb (1991) records that the first Indo -Pak war over the princely the state of Jammu and Kashmir culminated in the division of state into two entities with the bulk of valley of Kashmir and Jammu, Ladakh and a portion of Poonch coming under the Indian administration; and the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) and Pakistan controlled kashmir falling under Pakistani administration.

Though Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has been projected as an independent state, however in effect the government remains largely administered by Pakistani officials. Theoretically, this part never joined the country, but the lack of recognition internationally, regionally as well as within Pakistan subsumed its status. Till 1948 the government of Azad Kashmir was appealing international bodies like the United Nation Commission in India and Pakistan for de-facto recognition of Pak as an independent state. However, it could not get recognition regionally or internationally, resulting in the further degradation of the local government to that of the local authority. Korbel (1954) notes that despite Pakistan's insistence that de-facto recognition is given to Azad Kashmir, UNCIP explicitly stated that the government there was like a local authority with responsibility for the area assigned to it under the ceasefire agreement.

The Karachi agreement of 1949 concluded between Government of Pakistan and provisional Muslim conference of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir , allotted control of defence, foreign policy, negotiations with UNCIP and the affairs of Northern Areas to the former, while local administration was handed to the latter. This was indicative of the broad canvas within which the state of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir could exercise its autonomy in managing affairs. The United Nations also dealt restrictively with the Pakistan government on all Jammu and Kashmir matters. This allowed Karachi to take binding decisions on Pakistan-Controlled Kashmir, have an indefinite authority in regulating the Kashmiri nationalism without having to consult the respective government.

Pakistan routinely used its local surrogates and its Ministry of Kashmir Affairs(MKA), its trusted agent to assert itself. The MKA was also created to help the United Nations in its involvement in Kashmir dispute including the conduction of plebiscite. Jalal(1990) writes that the first head of the ministry was Mushtaq Ahmed Gurnami, an ardent Muslim League ledaer and ubiquitous civil servant and a redoubtable Punjabi.Gurnami's appointment was again pitching the Punjabi identity over the regional Kashmiri Pahari identity. The MKA ensured complete instability in the region as it is evident from the appointment of seven presidents from 1950 to 1959.Saraf(1977) records MKA's manipulation meant that no President of Pakistan controlled Kashmir could think of keeping himself in power when the government of Pakistan wanted him to quit. By the end of the 1950s, Pakistan's interference in political, economic and administrative affairs of PaK began to be seen as some sort of internal colonialism.

Snedden (2012) notes that the veteran Kashmiri leaders like Chowdhary Ghulam Abbas complained to President Liaqat Ali that MKA gave scant regard to regions aspirations and often made decisions without consulting the local government. In effect, the joint secretary holding the MKA claimed to be the real head of the Pak government. Though there existed a clear delineation of powers, regional aspirations were completely ignored. At the time of the creation of the state of PaK, there existed a tacit understanding that the state shall facilitate a pro-Kashmir vision which encompassed both the parts of Kashmir, ensure an immediate plebiscite and the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.Snedden(2011) writes that in addition, the dissolution of the local army contingent called Azad Army and

merger into the Pakistan army stifled any effort of opposing the benefactor country. Secondly,with no nation to turn to, people were totally dependent on Pakistan for their survival. It was also combined with the fact that there was no open hostility against Pakistan. In totality, one can say that Pakistan military is the most important political actor in the politics and administration of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir, a consequence mainly of its dominance in Pakistani politics.

More so the region lacked sustained resources to wage the war against Pakistan. It had greater manpower, resources, strategic depth to sustain. Puri (2012) notes that the lent officers from Pakistan controlled the administrative affairs of Pck which had no legal approval. These officers were mostly Punjabi, leading to acrimony between already rancorous Punjabi identity and the local identity. Discouraged by this approach, the veterans of the Kashmiri nationalism like Sardar Abdul Qayoom choose an independent way in 1951 to resume the war for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir.

The situation was equally exploited by pro-Pakistan political groups like the Muslim Conference. The Muslim conference had an irrendialist Pakistani position over Kashmir and had refuted Kashmiri nationalism on all grounds. Bazaz(1954) writes immediately after the ceasefire Muslim conference maintained its monopolistic control of Azad Kashmir government and secured exclusivity in the region. It was the only political organization that Pakistan recognized. While it ensured the party's longevity, it also meant Karachi controlling any left-over power.

The Muslim Conference had a dictatorial majority in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir and the expectation of plebiscite taking place soon blocked very possibility to establish a participatory political system. Divisive factionalism was fanned by the presence of Muslim conference. I. Khan (1990) informs that the two main factions centered on Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas whose political career gave him power and prestige and Ibrahim whose position arose from his liberation credentials in southern Poonch. While Abbas had the support of people from eastern areas of Jammu, Ibrahim had Poonchis and Mirpuris rallying behind him. Apart from these, there was a third faction that comprised of ethnic Kashmiri led by Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah and later K.H.Khurshid. Within the

Poonchis popularity of Sardar Qayum was also growing. Saraf (1977) writes that for MKA and Gurmani, this situation was a boon. The factions could be played off and entire liberation movement would be divided. Pakistan did not seek to discourage these tendencies as no faction was ideologically opposed to Pakistan or the possibility of merging with Pakistan in case plebiscite took place.

From 1948 to the late 1960s, the Muslim Conference dominated the entire political landscape of PcK and acted as a facilitator for Pakistan Muslim League. Asif (2007) notes that Muslim conference also played an important role in bringing Pakistan's man to the office of the president. Though there was the presence of other pro- Pakistan parties , nonetheless pro-independence parties were practically barred from political processes.

During the time of General Ayub Khan, poor treatment of Kashmiris slightly improved as K.H.Khurshid reasonably influenced the position of Kashmiris but soon fell out with the Ministry of Kashmir affairs. Askari (1991) in his book writes the reason for this disruption as difficult and uncooperative behavior of K.H.Khurshid while the actual reason was displeasure with Kashmiri's direct contact with General Ayub Khan. By 1965, the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs had again successfully subordinated Pakistan Controlled Kashmir. The Government Acts of 1964 and 1968 further repudiated the position of the government there to a municipal committee.

During General Yahya's time, the agitated leadership of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir – Sardar Qayoom, K.H.Khurshid and Sardar Ibrahim signed a joint declaration for reconstituting government as a full sovereign and a successor state to the Government of Maharaja Hari Singh. Thus a rudimentary Constitution−the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Act, 1970 was granted which was a major victory for leadership. It provided a presidential system of government, a legislative assembly and considerable autonomy. However foreign affairs, defence, and currency still remained under the purview of Pakistan. The act of 1970 also acknowledged that Pck should not be seen as a part of Pakistan but should be brought into the mainstream of general administration. However, the contradictions did not cease to exist. Like the interim constitution shows, all Kashmiris in the territory and all of their political parties have no choice but to be pro-

Pakistan. The constitution of Azad Kashmir reads, "No person or political party in Azad Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against, or take part in the activities prejudicial or detrimental to the state's accession to Pakistan." These legal requirements obstructed the space of leaders who favored an independent Kashmir and consequently shrunk spaces for Kashmiri nationalism. Qayoom(1992) records that this deception of independence negated people's sacrifices to unite Azad Kashmir with Pakistan and diminished the concept of united Muslim community joining Pakistan.

Bhutto introduced a new constitution that gave Pakistan a parliamentary system of government and influenced the leadership in Pck for a similar system. So the interim constitution of 1974 was promulgated. This opened up ways for Pakistan's People Party to operate in Azad Kashmir and could have also paved the way in case the region had to be provincialized. Like its predecessor Act of 1970, this one was also legally contradicting with sections related to Pakistan having a superior position. The emergency powers in times of war, external aggression or internal disturbances rested with Pakistan.

During Zias time, six amendments were made to the Interim constitution which further lowered the position of Pck. Thus, in times of military dictatorships in Pakistan, martial law would be imposed in Pck. And in times of civilian governments, Pakistan's elected leaders influenced the Pck politics through their membership of the Azad Kashmir council. This was done by manipulating Azad Kashmir legislative assembly elections via constituencies for Jammu and Kashmir refugees located in Pakistan. The 1990 elections fully restored the Pck's prime ministerial system which continued during Musharraf's time too.

In totality, Pakistan has progressively subsumed the region through its Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. Pakistan failed to empower the people of Ajk as it could have stimulated the growth of Kashmiri nationalism which was antithetical, to the 'two-nation' theory. In addition to these formal mechanisms of control, Pakistan appoints federally civil servants on top administrative positions in PcK.

Over the years the pattern of domination has not evolved much and politics of Pck is managed through acquiring and consolidating political space through material assistance.

The local leadership has frequently expressed desperation with the lack of political freedoms and the restrictions on political freedom. However, the huge military and economic dependence constrain possibilities to a different engagement. Moreover, no news about the Pakistan Controlled Kashmir could go out as no printing press existed in the region. A dozen newspapers run by Kashmiris or refugees from Jammu and Kashmir had offices located in the border districts of Punjab that is within Punjab. This made timely news collection impossible. Bhat(1956) records how strict censorship was enforced on newspapers and how the non-conformists were tactically punished.

Puri(2009) writes that even today, candidates desirous of contesting elections are required to sign a declaration reaffirming their commitment to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. A report of amnesty international records that , thirty two JKLF leaders were barred from contesting the polls for refusing to sign the declaration and were arrested while holding a protest rally.Economic and political underdevelopment, weak political institutions and legal restrictions on freedom of association have undermined the development of civil society The sensitive geography of the state is often used to limit the state for democratic reforms of contention. The maintenance of public order ordinance which prohibits activities prejudicial to public safety is often invoked to deter and suppress opposition.

Asif (2007) argues that Islamabad's relationship with Muzaffarabad is based on control rather than autonomy, with negative consequences for political and economic development. Although the patron-client nature of the relationship has structured political competition, so as to encourage and reward political compliance from local political actors, the relations between Islamabad and Muzaffarabad are far from frictionless.

Pakistan and Kashmiri Nationalism

The Pakistani position on Kashmiri nationalism is exceedingly determined by the ethnic nationalism, determined through a rigorous religious commonality and filtered through socio-cultural traditions of the past and the present. The mainstream Pakistani position takes heavily from the common origin of the group;connections formed by blood ties and rely heavily on the sense of uniqueness. This is done by valorizing particular Islamic cultural attachments for captivating the social base of the group, in this case Kashmiris.

Religion thus is used to reinforce the notion of congruence of commonality of statehood and nation.

In the case of Pakistani nationalism, the national consciousness developed outside the rational, political units of modernity. The resulting national conscience was all-encompassing religiously On the other hand, Kashmiri nationalism was evolving more as a fluid apolitical consciousness where national consciousness arose first, only to be enclosed in the politico-territorial form later. There is a marked difference of expression with Pakistani nationalism hugely relying on mutually exclusive forms of cultural homogeneity.

In civic Kashmiri nationalism, cultural standardization was achieved through a particular level of communication and education. But the Pakistani state here ensured that cultural standardization was not achieved through education-oriented high culture.So the political elite developed a populist language driven by a seduction of myths and memory curating a shared memory and a shared destiny. More the repression against the high culture, more it compensated with an overzealous insistence on popular culture. Hence the cultural standardization was achieved through overtly religious ethnie for ensuring homogeneity.

The dynamics of control are thus manifested and prolonged through the cultural values, in this case through religion. Thus ethnicity influences the nationalism and also determines the nature and character of particular nationalism. The commonality of religion lends a popular appeal to nationalism and appealing the elements unique to the group gives the entire situation an emotional nature. The Pakistani state was created through a pre-existing territory and nationality was embodied in the territory. However, the provision of creation of a new territory doesn't exist. Nationality is completely embodied in the individual who cannot move in and out of the pre-existing national space.

To legitimize its presence in PaK, Pakistani position has strategically imposed that the relationship between the two units is bounded by genealogical descent. Thus national identity is defined as a perennial feature within the theory of Pakistani nationalism and is a reflection of the populist nature of ethnic nationalism. Like other ethnic nationalisms,

the Kashmiri population was kept out of the high culture. It is only the Punjabi elite who could participate in manipulating the masses for mobilization. As such mobilization could only take place with the tools available or via methods that would compensate for the tools unavailable such as the necessary economic and political institutions. The use of compensatory tools often meant the use of the uniqueness of the people themselves −characteristics that they regarded as distinguishing themselves from others. The peripheral elites had no option but to try and satisfy such demands by taking things into their own hands. Elite manipulation then served to crystallize mass discontent.

At every step, the relationship of Pakistani nationalism to Kashmiri nationalism is that of repressed existential envy and negativity. As it is, nationalisms born out of reaction are marked by profound ambiguity and ambivalence. This forced relation also meant that the elite group had to fit their social character in a desired social form so that their involvement appears natural and legitimate. This required mobilizing the masses not just in response to their demands, but to meet their demands by issuing a narrative to them. Just as they needed a shortcut towards a high culture they also needed a short-cut to a history which would lend the necessary legitimacy to this nationalism. Forcing this process of development and creating a high culture and history due to necessity suggests that the role of the elite in more ethnic-oriented nationalisms was more conscious and manipulatory. This further suggests a requirement to rise above the law, which is why ethnic nationalism is seen to sometimes act as a bulwark to liberal democracy and lend itself more easily to authoritarian rule.

Pakistan's irredential claim and Kashmiri Nationalism

This section focuses on how Pakistan's Kashmir policy works as an external factor for Kashmiri nationalism. The policy is largely embedded in the context of negative imagery. The basis of Pakistani nationalism was never territorial; rather it emerged on community separatism and religiously derived nationality. The proponents of Pakistan neither occupied the land they demanded nor had ever lived together in the past. At the time of the formation of the Pakistani state, the state power was retained by the one dominant ethnic group –Punjabis. Khan(2001) notes that the issue became a source of trouble as

the control of the state apparatus and institutions was in the hands of a single ethnic group. This ethnic group used the institutions for their own political leverage.

 In a way, national identity was imposed from above and it did not emerge as a horizontal comradeship that could cut across boundaries and social groups and penetrate with varying degrees of consciousness. Thus, national identity is super-imposed by the religious identity and makes way for Islam to project its relationship to the state. Akhtar (2007) notes that the chaos of partition and the larger need to protect the territorial integrity of the state , Islam came to occupy centrality in the Pakistani state. The ideological orientation of the new state was challenged constantly over the accession of territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which had not followed the logic of partition.The centrality of this contentious relationship is maintained through forging an idea of a nation through a web of emotional, familial and political ties. Thus all the political actors from conservatives to liberals have placed a claim and strategy to claim Kashmir.

The conservative Islamists have opted for a combative approach for staking their claim to Kashmir while the liberals have largely followed a managerial position. Yasmeen (2003) notes that the Pakistani government has balanced various constituencies on Kashmir. Operating in an international environment that identifies terrorism as a major global threat led to a changed policy position in Kashmir. The Pakistan governments curb the activities of Islamists in Kashmir.

The changed Kashmir policy marked a paramount change in Pakistan's position on Kashmir. The state had tried to alter the status quo during the cold war era. Traditionally, three positions determined Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir—the orthodox, the Islamists and the moderate. The moderate positions have largely been for prevailing the balance of power.In a way, urging for a change in the foreign policy,through a political rather than a military solution. .Yasmeen (1995) is of the opinion that the Kashmir issue is rooted in the negative context. The military control over the Kashmir policy resulted in the predominance of the efficacy of Jihad and policy of encouraging and actively using Jihad in anti-India militancy. These groups had acquired some experience in the Afghan war. This resulted in the triangulation of Jihad policy with making Jehadis stake-holder in

the Kashmir policy. Gul (2002) writes that some of madrassas in Pakistan with close links to the Taliban became the supplier of the Jehadis. As the cross border movement drew criticism, the Pakistani state constantly denied these accusations by reinforcing that it was only providing political, diplomatic and moral support to Kashmir. Yasmeen.S(2003) points out that the Pakistan foreign office maintained that it was helping the Kashmiris to make a demand for a plebiscite by urging the international community to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The democratic leadership was not a mute spectator to the Kashmir policy pre-dominantly formulated by the military and exploited Kashmir for their own interests. They also repeatedly used the Kashmir issue to divert away the domestic policy issues.

The support for militancy as a way of altering the status quo came under the global scrutiny in the second half of the 1990s.The perception of the Indian state about the Pakistan being a a weak state,also impacted the Kashmir policy. The ousting of Benazir Bhutto as the prime minister of Pakistan and the coming back of Nawaz Sharif opened the space for the implementation of the moderate agenda. The moderates figured out that the Kashmir policy needs a change, and there should be a reduction in the tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. However, the nuclear tests followed by Kargil derailed the process. Hence military administration opted for invariably managing Kashmir In 2000, Pakistan pushed for a unilateral ceasefire, expressing a strong will to engage on Kashmir. The change of positions was evident in government actions and pronouncements on the Kashmir. For example on the Kashmir solidarity on 5th February 2002, Musharraf repeated Pakistan's resolve to assist, Kashmir in diplomatic and political ways.[73] It was asserted that Pakistan's willingness to negotiate should not be seen as a sign of weakness. Farooq (2001), Malhotra (2001)elucidates that Pakistani foreign policy urged for a political process that sought to resolve freedom struggle by political means . This change of policy was visible in the changed Pakistani approach s during the Agra summit, where Pakistan's gave up its rigid insistence on Kashmir dispute.

After 9/11 the context for Pakistan's Kashmir policy. As Islamabad opted for joining the United States led war on terror agreeing on intelligence sharing with America. The

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[73]17. 'Vajpayee must show courage: Musharraf', The News, 6 February 2001.

changed political milieu impacted Pakistan's Kashmir policy also. Pakistan's support for Kashmiris could be perceived as a confirmation of its credentials as a state supporting terrorism. This made the Pakistani government more watchful of its Kashmir policy, thus replacing the military solution with political solution. In an address to the nation in 2002,Musharraf categorically maintained that the support to Kashmir won't be severed - political and diplomatic support shall flow towards . [74]He made an appeal for involving the international community for resolution of Kashmir and also announced measures to restraining the Jihadis and banned organizations like Laskhar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. However the groups like Harkat-ul-Ansar,Hizbul Mujahideen and Al-Badr were not disbanded as these groups were indigenous Kashmiri groups. The speech indicated a major transfer of the Pakistani position on Kashmir. The Pakistani state was intelligently modified its strategy but not directly forsaking its claim on Kashmir. Officially clear cut distinction was made between genuine freedom struggle and acts of terrorism. Akhtar (2011) reproduces that in a UN session, Musharraf stated that just struggles of the people for self –determination a cannot be banned law in the name of terrorism. The leadership in Pakistan realised that it was important to bring out some discernible change in its Kashmir policy so that Pakistan's stance on Kashmir remains unchanged and also the international pressures are deflated.

In the context of Kashmir, General Musharraf repeatedly requested the international community for intervening and pressurising India to settle the Kashmir issue. In the aftermath of parliamentary attacks in 2002 the pressures increased dramatically and Pakistan had to reduce its involvement for providing diplomatic, political and moral support. The crackdown after the 9/11 had substantially expunged the foreign militants and drastically reduced the finances too. Pattnaik (2008) notes that the efforts towards re-a towards re-approachment with India have saved Pakistan to save its reputation from further fall.

As a part of the changed strategy, militant organizations were made subservient to the political organizations. To evade the international scrutiny it was extremely important to engage through the political medium and pro-Pakistan militant organizations were

http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=684[Accessed on 15 July 2019]

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effectively utilized for this purpose. As part of the changed strategy, Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen went on to support the formation of the political party called the People's Democratic Party. A new political formation would challenge the primary political party National Conference. N.C as a political party had embodied Kashmiri nationalism, even though it took a volte face position in 1975. Nonetheless it had tried to retain some commitment to the Kashmiri nationalism. On the other hand, Peoples Democratic Party was again using ethnic religious motifs instead of civic ones. It can be observed that the ethnic religious lobby within the state which earlier espoused a pro-Pakistan religious approach moved strategically towards a political party which was based on ethnic contours.

The new political formation was carved in a way that it did not appear distant from the Kashmiriseparatist position,at least theoretically. Borrowing heavily from the separatist stance, it blurred the boundaries between the separatist and the mainstream discourse.Chaudhry and Rao(2004) write that the formation of Peoples Democratic Party has to be located in the larger political context. The political context was to encourage an articulation of political grievances through a non-separatist channel. It was a step towards democratization and also towards curtailing the relevance of the National Conference.

Another reason for Jamaat-e-Islami's support to People's Democratic Party was the patronage National Conference provided to pro-government militia called Ikhwan. Ikhwan in particular targeted the Jamaat cadre and the over ground workers of Hizbul Mujahideen.It was paid and supported by the mainstream security agencies. Ikhwan became quite instrumental in suppressing militancy, but also became infamous for targeting of Jamaat-e-Islami ruthlessly.[75] So it was necessary to form a party who could deal with Ikhwan politically. The new formed party was Peoples Democratic Party. Wani (2004) opines that there was viable political viod which Mufti Muhammad Sayed decided to fill up. Hence he formed the People's Democratic Party. It should also be pointed out that the formation of the PDP, coincided with a changed central policy over Kashmir.

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[75]Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen targeted the cadre of other militant organization brutally during the 1990s over the slightest political difference. Many of the militants were killed through this rivalry. To safeguard ones interest many defected towards Ikhwan after its formation in 1995.

The election manifesto of the People's Democratic Party(2001) centered on three main issues, namely, safe-guarding the life and property of the people from the Ikhwan, restoring peace by persuading the central government to initiate a dialogue process with Pakistan and the militants, for which opening the roads between two parts of Kashmir would act as a prelude, providing fillip to the economy and providing a source of assured livelihood to each family. Maqbool (2016) notes that the party was to mobilize public opinion for bridging various strains of opinion in the state and the country. It aimed at engaging with all stakeholders and resolving the grievances of the people through constitutional means. Like the restoration and protection of human rights. Thus the formation of Peoples Democratic Party made the militant structures subservient and also provided an option of opposition in Kashmir.

Another major strategic policy shift in the aftermath of 9/11 gets visible in Musharraf's out of the box solution for ending the dispute.The idea involved partial stepping back of all parties-Pakistan, India and Kashmiris to an extent. Musharraf (2008:89) envisaged , "that identifying the geographic regions of Kashmir that need resolution. Second, demilitarizing the identified region or regions and curb all militant aspects of the struggle for freedom. Third, introducing self-governance or self-rule in the identified region or regions. Fourth, and most important, having ajoint management mechanism with a membership consisting of Pakistanis, Indians, and Kashmiris overseeing self-governance and dealing with residual subjects common to all identified regions and those subjects that are beyond the scope of self-governance".

However as other Pakistani policy positions on Kashmir, this position was also subtly targeting Kashmiri civic nationalism. It surrendered the right of self-determination for Kashmiris and divided the state on regional, lingual and racial basis. The people-to-people contact, softening of borders and easing of travel formalities was a diplomatic way of converting the line of control into permanent border, and separating the two parts of Kashmir completely. The move was rejected by Kashmiri nationalist. Secondly the plan Musharraf proposed was not done in consultation with any stakeholder. The formula envisaged that the area should be de-militarized and there should be movement from one part of Kashmir to another.But at the same time also says borders cannot be withdrawn

which is akin to making the line of control into an international border. Secondly, self – government here clashed with self-determination. If self has the right to govern, how the notion of self-determination could be negated. The joint management system would only give endless powers to the external rulers.

Conclusion

The external factors contribute in both negative and positive ways to the Kashmiri nationalism. Kashmiri diaspora as an external factor represents the pursuit towards attaining a culturally diverse political territory. Attainment of a state functions is a starting point for the civic nationalism; so the diaspora intervenes in interesting ways in imagining and reinforcing the idea of a state. The Kashmiri diaspora promotes the ideals of territoriality, citizenship, civic rights and legal codes and through its interaction with modernity eliminates cultural cleavages for the formation of a unified culture. It endorses a welfarist culture that emerges nourished our factors such as advanced communication and education. In a way, it negates all the primordial affinities and claiming commonality on non-genealogical variables.

The intervention of Pakistani state as an external factor has negative consequences as it bases its claim on irredentism. This irredentism is played through a metaphoric body of an Islamic nation-state and ummah. In this sense a geographic, spiritual, religious and emotional continuity is imagined between Pakistan and Kashmir. Kashmir is linked through biological expressions such as *shah-rag*(jugular vein) and through varying configurations Pakistan places itself at representative position to take up the case of Kashmir. The projection happens through exaggerated news, rumors, and dramatized accounts to reinforce a strict ethnic essence to Kashmiri nationalism.

This claim of common genealogical descent towards attaining a common national identity gets fostered through myths and memories.Common religious ties between Pakistan and Kashmirare used to enforce commonality between different people eliminating any sense of difference. Pakistani nationalism emerged out of reaction and is marked by vagueness and ambivalence. This necessitated a need of invention for creating a history that makes the aspirations for a nation look legitimate and natural. Thus the ethnic irrendential intervention in Kashmiri nationalism by Pakistan is an essential part of issuing a history.

Chapter 5

Contesting Kashmiri Nationalism

The chapter seeks to analyse the changing dimensions of Kashmiri nationalism, in terms of its relationship with the competing nationalistic tendencies within the Jammu division of the state. It tries to locate the position of Jammu in the Kashmiri nationalism and how the internal dimensions of the competing nationalisms operate. It is imperative to understand Jammu pre and post-partition and its attitude towards Kashmiri nationalism to get a clear picture. Given the fact that religious or national belongings weren't of the same nature over the whole geographical territory called the erstwhile as the valley of Kashmir and Jammu were separate entities till 1846 when the Dogra king Gulab Singh brought these regions together to form what came to be known as the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The post-partition dynamics, coupled with religious resurgence solidified factors of otherness and subsequently respective nationalisms.

Historical Background

The present area of Jammu is bound by river Ravi on one side and the Pir Panchal range on the other side. Historically, the boundaries of the current Jammu region have undergone many changes with its numerous principalities having their own alignments with the neighbouring kingdoms. Sufi (1948) writes during the time of the Shah Jahan, the hill chieftain of Jammu settled down quietly to the position of a feudatory and carried out the orders of the Delhi court. They were, however, able to retain their autonomy and Mughals did not interfere in their internal affairs. Except for brief periods, Jammu is said to be ruled by external forces. It was ruled by Mughals from 1733 to 1745, while as was part of Sikh empire from 1808-1820. The Mughals, Afghans and Sikhs could never really get a foothold in the Jammu region. At this time, Jammu did not exist as a well-defined region or territory as it exists today. It was instead a composition of a large number of small kingdoms by Dogra king Ranjit Dev who got control over many lesser kingdoms and principalities. However, his successors soon began fighting against each other, leaving space for many warring Sikh Misls (confederacies) from Punjab to intervene and

[76]gain control of the kingdoms. During the later period, however, a resistance movement led by the legendary hero Mian Deedo continued against the Punjabi rule till Gulab Singh was installed as Raja of Jammu by Ranjit Singh in 1820 under his overall lordship which ended in 1846. Thus the state of Jammu and Kashmir as it is understood today, came into being as a single political entity in 1846 after Gulab signed what is called Treaty of Amritsar with the British. The treaty was concluded on 16 May 1846 and transferred the mountaineous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of river Indus an westward of river Ravi into the independent possession of Maharaja Gulab Singh and his male heirs. In return for this transfer, Gulab Singh paid the British government the sum of seventy five nanakshahi rupees and an annual tribute of one horse, twelve shawl bearing sheep and three pairs of Kashmiri shawls.Jammu always displayed a closer affinity to the political culture of Punjab than with that of the Valley of Kashmir. During the late nineteenth century, though the Jammu province did not have a cohesive political outlook in whatever form politics was pursued, it was greatly influenced by the neighbouring Punjab province. Both Hindus and Muslims of Jammu closely watched the political developments in Punjab. Subsequently, the popular socio-political organizations in the Punjab province got a strong foothold in the Jammu region as well. The Hindu reformist movement Arya Samaj which founded by Dayanand Saraswati was the first movement that arrived in the Jammu region in 1875, gaining a massive presence. Within the next few years, Arya Samaj had a substantial following and branches throughout the Jammu region. Sharma(1988) notes two years after it was established in Jammu, Maharaja Ranbir Singh met with Swami Dayanand Sarawati in Delhi. In some years, branches of Arya Samaj came up in different parts of Jammu region like Mirpur, Kotli,Bhimber, Rajauri,Nowshehra, Reasi, Ramban, Bhaderwah and Kishatawar.

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[76] The Treaty of Amritsar, signed on 16 March 1846, formalised the arrangements in the Treaty of Lahore between the British East India Company and Gulab Singh Dogra after the First Anglo-Sikh War. By Article 1 of the treaty, Gulab Singh acquired "all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State according to the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.Under Article 3, Gulab Singh was to pay 75 lakhs (7.5 million) of Nanak Shahi rupees (the ruling currency of the Sikh Empire) to the British Government, along with other annual tributes.

The Arya Samaj had faced stiff resistance in other parts of British India for challenging the upper-class brahminical hierarchy. In contrast, Jammu embraced the organization and was given universal acceptability across all sections of the Hindu society and the rulers alike. The numeric strength of Muslims in the region and the desire of people to identify on religious lines were strong, and it reflected in the ever-growing membership of the Arya Samaj. Chaudry(2015) writes that from 70 members in 1890, the group grew by around 23,000 new members every year, till it reached 940,000 in 1931. The immense popularity of Arya Samaj and its growing influence alarmed the other religious organizations in Punjab, who started making their forays into Jammu. This proliferation was an indication of competing tendencies of the socio-reform movement in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. By 1890, a Sikh organization called Guru Singh Sabha had formally made inroads in Jammu. Sharma(2002) records by 1906, Guru Singh Sabha, had its organizational and infrastructural presence in Mirpur and Muzaffarabad. As communitarian consciousness provided the context for identification on the line of religious collectivity, the Muslim responses to these political influences were also rapid. The Anjum-e-Islamia Jammu was established in 1893 and was the first socio-political organization looking towards Muslim reform. However, it did not conduct many activities in the coming years.[77] Soon after efforts were made to set up an organization on the secular lines. The first socio-political organization that was set up on secular grounds was the Dogra Committee in 1904 founded together by Lala Hansraj Mahajan and Sahibzada Hazrat Aftab Shah. However, this organisation could not retain its secular character for long. In the coming years, Khalsa Youngman Association and Sri Ramakrishna Sewa Ashram too forayed in Jammu. As petitioning was the dominant mode of representation, both the organisations were petitioning the Maharajas court to offer special scholarships to students from their religious communities, respectively. The demand was conceded immediately, and a specific amount was set in the exchequer for scholarships of students from Hindu and Sikh community.

In the backdrop of these developments, Muslim leaders tried reviving the dormant Anjum-e-Islamia Jammu in 1910. However, unlike the other organisations, Anjum-e-

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[77]Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Political Development File No 312/7-C,List of Sabhas and Societies.

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Islamia was an indigenous Jammu-based organisation and was not politically controlled from elsewhere. Among other reform activities, Anujuman-e-Islamia started a couple of schools around Jammu. However, the formation of the organization called Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA) in 1928 was pivotal in the development of politics of Jammu in the coming years. The committee had been formed to work against the discriminatory nature of the Maharajas administration in general and in terms of educational scholarships in particular. Because of the severe curbs on the political activities, YMMA mostly worked as an underground political organization to escape arrests but started taking political stands against the Maharaja's dispensation. It soon started issuing the occasional pamphlet aimed at Muslim awakening, bringing forth the discrepant nature of Maharaja's administration with credible statistical evidence. Young Men's Muslim Association was also the first organization that made the first political contact with the Kashmiris and came up with the common platform with the state-wide appeal during the crisis of 1931. The common platform came to be known as the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference and it had its inaugural session in October 1932.The incident of 13 July 1931 became a prominent political agenda in Punjab and other parts of British India

However, in the coming years, cracks developed between the Jammu based leaders and the Kashmir based leaders of the nascent organization. The primary reason for this chasm was Shiekh Abdullah's insistence on making the Muslim Conference more inclusive by exploring possibilities of alliances with the Hindus, which Jammu based leaders vehemently opposed. This eventually led to the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. Over the years, Muslim Conference aligned itself with the Muslim League.As the Kashmir Committee based in Punjab focused all of its political energies on the developments in Kashmir valley, Majlis-e-Ahrar, a party of conservative Sunni Muslims rallied in support of Muslims in Jammu. The situation in Kashmir created a proxy warfare situation where

Kashmir Committee and Majlis-e-Ahrar were working to counter each other's influence.[78]

The long term goal of Majlis –e-Ahrar was the creation of Pakistan. Gradually the Muslim consciousness in the Jammu province was moving towards the idea of Pakistan. The large-scale discontent, along with its particular political outlook, had put Jammu in a precarious situation. Bands of Ahrar volunteers had started arriving in the city, making the security situation volatile. Though the borders were sealed, the clashes had transferred even to the interior areas like Reasi, Rajauri, Mirpur and Kotli.

In the year 1932, groups of Muslims clashed with Dogra forces at Behrote, leading to the killing of 25 people.[79] Similarly civil disobedience movements were simmering at Poonch and Mendhar too. Maini(2012) records that the Raja of Poonch succeeded in putting down the revolt against the Dogra ruler. The post-1931 uprising became such a strong movement in Jammu province that at some places state had to withdraw its troops. The strategically important fort of Mangla being one of them.

Meanwhile, the Maharaja approached the British resident for help. Saraf(1977) discusses at length how the British forces had taken possible measures to stop infiltration of Ahrar volunteers into the Jammu province, including bombarding the agitating protestors. As intense political activities were taking place across the state, the members of YMMA of Jammu and Reading Room Party of Srinagar unified towards creating a common platform with a statewide appeal, resulting in the creation of Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah insisted on building the party on secular lines, but Jammu leaders had a very different approach vis-a-vis the outlook of the party. Gradually the party was re-christened as Jammu Kashmir National Conference. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah's close rapport with the Indian National Congress was another obstacle towards the smooth functioning of Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference. Bazaz(1954) informs the growing proximity of the congress, and Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah ultimately led to the resignation of Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas from National Conference and the restoration of Muslim Conference in 1942. Whatever influence

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[78]Siasat,31 October 1931
[79]National Archives of India, Political/Home Department, File 5/54,1931.

National Conference could have had in Jammu province was pre-empted by the resurrection of the Muslim Conference. The political-ideological battle lines were drawn between the two provinces with National Conference working in close coordination - with Indian National Congress having its primary concentration in the valley but claiming presence across both the regions. The Muslim Conference had its primary concentration in the Jammu province and allegiance with All India Muslim League. The autocratic Dogra rule came to an end in 1948, and Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah took over the reins, first as the emergency administrator and then as Prime Minister. This marked a watershed in the history of Kashmir as the 101-year-long Dogra rule came to an end, and the seat of power shifted to the Valley.

The Moment of Partition

Partition put Jammu in a precarious position as the region witnessed the worst kind of communal frenzy, where the state administration was equally complicit in the perpetration of the violence. By the time the dust settled, the region had lost a major portion of its territory. As much as 75.07 per cent of the entire population and 51.29 per cent of the area of the Pakistan controlled Kashmir was drawn from the Jammu province. Conservative estimates record that over a million Muslims of the region were uprooted and 250000-300000 massacred in the Jammu region alone in August-October 1947. With the Muslim leadership of Jammu jailed around this time, the National conference too couldn't deliver to the dismay of Jammu Muslims .Thus the Jammu factor in Kashmir politics appeared, a or factor which complicated issues in the times to come.

While Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were all affected by the violence in 1947, written and oral evidence indicate that Muslims bore the brunt of the violence. Violence against Muslims in Jammu pre-dates the princely state's accession to India. Muslims comprised 61% of the population in the Jammu province of the Dogra state. However, in the Hindu majority districts of Jammu, Udhampur, Reasi and Kathua, they only made up 38% and had become increasingly vulnerable in the build-up to Partition. Ian Stephens(1955) notes that the violence in Jammu began in August 1947 and continued for about eleven weeks. Stephens claims that five lakh people were killed and two lakh went missing, with many women being abducted. The exact death toll varies across sources. Christopher Snedden's

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(2012)controversial book, Kashmir: The Unwritten History, suggests that no less than two lakh Muslim men, women and children were killed, while the number of women abducted is estimated to be 27,000. Choudhary (2015) in his book uses documents from the International Committee of the Red Cross to narrate how 256 Muslim women were abducted from Ustad Mohalla in Jammu, before eventually being sent to their male kin in Pakistan. The number of abductions is said to be much higher, but many cases went unreported because of the conservative social setup.More than a thousand women could not be traced despite many efforts to locate them. Prominent Muslim Conference leader, Choudhary Ghulam Abbas's daughter, was also allegedly abducted by Hindu right-wingers in 1947. The large scale displacement of Muslims caused significant demographic changes in the Jammu region. The community went from a majority of 61% to a minority of 30%. The censuses conducted after 1947 reveal the existence of "uninhabited villages" – villages whose residents left or were killed in 1947. The Jammu violence was also accompanied by the systematic erasure of evidence and denials that followed the violence, and the state's alleged complicity. Perhaps the main reason for attempts to erase any proof of the Jammu violence is that it questions the narrative

The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was necessitated by the invasion of Pakhtoon tribes in 1947. While it is indisputable that Pakhtoons invaded Jammu and Kashmir on October 1947, it was not how the conflict started. Jawaharlal Nehru's biographer, Sarvepalli Gopal, acknowledges that the Jammu violence wasthe starting point of trouble in the princely state. Indian governmnt has consistently claimed that all the violence started on October 22, 1947. However, there are several press reports, some dated as early as September of the year 1947 which speak about the violence in Jammu. This clearly shows that the Jammu violence preceded the tribal invasion. [PI8. According to a New York Times report mentioned by Snedden ,Jawaharlal Nehru informed the home minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel about the events in Jammu and also sent a 19-point report prepared by Nehru's close aide Dwarkanath Kachru. The most important elements of the report were that the National Conference had decided to accede to the Indian Union and how Sheikh Abdullah deemed the "killings in the state" as "un-Islamic and un-Hindu". Since there was no violence in the Valley till then, it is clear that the National Conference leader was referring to the massacre in Jammu. The report further

stated that Maharaja Hari Singh had lost control over the administrative and governmental machinery. So this means that three weeks before the Pakhtoons arrived in Kashmir, the government of India had reliable information that the Maharaja had little control over his princely domain. The Pakhtoon invasion narrative serves two purposes – legitimising Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India, and demolishing the premise for any indigenous mobilisation in the state. It completely ignores the uprising of Muslims in Poonch in September 1947, as well as the violence in Jammu. These events have been glossed over in all accounts of the Kashmir dispute. The Pakhtoon invasion narrative highlights the external threat while completely denying the indigenous revolt against the authority of the Maharaja. Another reason for the erasure of the Jammu massacres from public memory is the evidence of state complicity in the events. While the arrival of a large number of Sikhs and Hindus from West Punjab led to a communal frenzy in Jammu, the Maharaja's administration played a key role in the massacres. Various sources refer to the Maharaja's growing proximity to the Hindu right-wing. In an interview with Khalid Bashir Ahmad, who has conducted extensive research on the 1947 Jammu violence, prominent human rights activist Balraj Puri, a witness to the violence, testifies to the close relations between Maharaja Hai Singh and the Hindu Right. MG Golwalkar is said to have been a private guest of the Maharaja. Rajguru Sant Dev, a key functionary of the Maharaja's regime, is said to have been the main link between the Maharaja and Hindu right-wing outfits. This was also the period when Rajguru had come to occupy enormous influence in the administration, sidelining the secular elements. Furthermore, Muslims soldiers in Jammu, Mirpur and Poonch were disarmed, something which was not done with their colleagues of other religions. Ian Stephens claims that Maharaja Hari Singh not only encouraged the violence but also opened fire on a group of Gujjar Muslims. However, this also explains the failure of Kashmiri Muslim leadership – both separatist and mainstream – to accommodate survivors of the Jammu violence. Far from accommodating them, the leadership hasn't even acknowledged the events that took place. Sheikh Abdullah understood the complicity of the state, but he chose to remain silent. No proper inquiry was ordered on the role of Maharaja Hari Singh and his Prime Minister, Mehr Chand Mahajan. Abdullah maintained that the survivors wanted to go to Pakistan, and the only justice that could be done to them was providing safe passage. A

leader of Shiekh Abdullah's stature set a precedent, and no civil society or future government took to the cause of survivors of the 1947 massacres. As Ahmad(2014) writes, "The victims of the Jammu carnage still wait, some in body and the rest in soul, for justice which has alluded them all these decades".

Jammu Province and National Conference

The secular fringe movement in Jammu for political democratization, a responsible government,fundamental rights and land to tiller had predated the birth of the National Conference. SardarBudh Singh formed the Kissan Party in 1925 for political democratization. Puri(1981) writes that Singh tried to give Kissan Party a forceful outlook against the Dogra outlook. During his tenure as the elected president of Dogra Sabha, the first secular organization of the state, he tried vigorously to politicize the political organisation. It enabled himto extend the movement to all sections of the society in the state too. Eventually, when the National Conference was formed,Budh Singh was the only person other than Abdullah and only non-Kashmiri and non-Muslim to be elected the president twice. The accession to India and retreat of Dogra rulers made Shiekh Abdullah's position unassailable. However, the very reasons that made National Conference a formidable force in the valley proved to be major roadblocks towards the non-establishment of National Conference in other parts of the valley, particularly in Jammu. As the National Conference led Quit Kashmir movement was directed against the Dogra Raj, the Kashmir leaders could not endear themselves and their movement to the Dogras-the main community of the region. Secondly, the conversion of the Muslim Conference into National Conference inhibited any chances of growth of National Conference, which was an epitome of Kashmiri nationalism. Many prominent Hindu,Sikh and Muslim leaders and young intellectuals joined the National Conference when it was formed in 1939,but could not acquire emotional,regional and religious appeal in Jammu. Moreover, Jammu also lacked a homogenised regional personality like the Kashmir valley, which was symbolically united culturally as well as emotionally. Jammu's various communities, castes and cultural sub-groups could not emerge unanimously in the face of the common danger. Given the situation, the reaction against Kashmir oriented character of the National Conference was expressed in a communal

vocabulary, which further divided its people. The absence of a secular party to voice angst over the Kashmir centric vision of National Conference always worked in rightwing's favour. At the time of the partition, this sentiment was captured by Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha respectively. Post-partition this sentiment was entirely subsumed by the right-wing.The base of the communal movement initially was the urban middle-class intelligentsia, the traditional aristocracy, landlords,jagirdars because they were the ones who suffered most by the transfer of power.In comparison to Jammu, National Conference was better situated in other areas of Jammu Province. However, the geographical divisions at the time of the partition didn't work well for National Conference. The amalgamation of Poonch Jagir with the state had considerably hurt the local sentiments and attracted its people to the state-wide movement against the autocratic regime of the Maharaja. In Chenaini Jagir, National Conference aligned itself with the revolt against the excesses of the local Raja, protected by the ruler of the state. In Mirpur region of the state, National Conference again made inroads aligning with the local struggles of the region.[80]

A group of Dogra patriots formed All Jammu National Youth Conference in 1948 asserting institution of monarchy was the biggest stumbling block towards the satisfaction of the popular aspirations of the Jammu region. The organisation specifically proclaimed that the political power had to be transferred from the autocratic ruler to the people of Jammu. It also alleged that a section of Kashmiri leadership did not allow the people of Jammu to stand on its own and had imposed reactionary elements and government puppets in the Jammu National Conference.[81]

The *mohalla* committees operating under All Jammu National Youth Conference attacked the National Conference on the pretext of attacking the personality of the ruler rather the institution of monarchy. A convention of Jammu District National Conference workers was held at Parmandal in March 1949 which not only demanded the abdication of the Maharaja by also amendment of the party manifesto Naya Kashmir to delete

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[80]Interview with Mustafa Kemal,senior politician National Confrence. Interviewed In June 2017
[81] Poster published by Ram Nath Mengi, General Secretary,All Jammu and Kashmir National Youth Conference

provision for a constitutional ruler of the state.[82] However no constitutional, institutional or political arrangements were devised to uphold inter-regional and inter-communal harmony. The impact of political vacuum in Jammu was precipitated again by the inexplicable expulsion of senior leaders like Om Nath Saraf and Amarnath from the primary membership of the National Conference, by the party president Shiekh Abdullah,a day before they had proposed to celebrate Maharajas proposed abdication as a deliverance day under the auspices of Jammu district National Conference committee.[83] Instead of allowing this leadership to flourish, Kashmir leadership of the National Conference preferred to project Karan Singh, the new regent of the state to get the support of the people of Jammu. The Jammu leadership felt betrayed that National Conference negotiated with the Dogra royal house to retain power. Bhasin (2016) notes that the transfer of power from Jammu based ruler to the Kashmir based National Conference had reversed the regional power and psychological vacuum in Jammu. After the removal of the sponsors of the abdication move from the leadership of Jammu National Conference, no other regional leadership could stabilize itself owing to repeated and arbitrary changes in the local functionaries of the party.The debate on the future of the Maharaja and the institution of the monarchy could not thus be confined to what could be called the radical and conservative wings of Jammu politics. It inevitably became a Kashmir versus Jammu issue, aggravating the tensions. The abdication of Maharaja was followed by an irregular share of Jammu in the political power of the state. With numerical confusion over the numbers, the Jammu leadership always felt a lopsided power-sharing arrangement was at work. In order to raise the level of Jammu leadership and harmonise it with Kashmir, Balraj Puri made the following suggestion in 1950, "If Shiekh Abdullah is unwilling to permit the evolution of local leadership in Jammu democratically as he does not trust his people, let him nominate a leader from Jammu. This leader should be consulted for all Jammu affairs and should have as high a status as any other Kashmiri leader. We should try to rally around such a leader. This might not be a democratic way. But in the present undemocratic system, if Shiekh Abdullah's

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[82] Interview with historian Om Prakash Saraf, dated January 2017
[83]*Ranbir*,1948

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leadership is indispensable and the integrity of the State is to be maintained, this is the most feasible way to defend the self-respect and honour of Jammu.[84]

Jammu and the Pandit Migration

In the late 1980 and early 1990,the Kashmiri Hindus known as Kashmiri fled from the valley towards the southern part of the state and rest of the cities in India .The Pandit migration coincided with the resurgence of Hindu right in India. Thus Kashmiri migrant Hindu community emerged as an important factor in 1990's as Bharatiya Janta Party and its affiliate members increasingly used the issue of Kashmiri Pandits as political mobilization tool and quickly associated it with the Hindu nationalist project. After the Pandit migration, Hindu-right wing leadership constantly raised the issues of Kashmiri Pandits in their speeches. The then BJP president L K Advani,in response to the Pandit migration said, "None raised the voice when 40 odd temples were desecrated in Kashmir. Why these double standards"? According to Nandudar (2006), the BJP's Hindutva politics worked on the perception of 'Muslim threat' to Hindu majority, which given the exodus of Pandits from a Muslim majority state served their ideology. In one of their publications, the Hindu right-wing political group RSS, documenting the 'genocide' of Kashmiri Pandits claims that 600 Pandits were murdered and 36 temples desecrated."[85] The Sangh Parivar situated itself in hostility against the secular nationalist position as it said had ensured minority appeasement at the cost of majority.Thus Hindu nationalism was becoming a reservoir for middle class anxieties. While as in the case of Kashmir the fleeing minority became the plank for communalism and xenophobia. The Kashmiri Pandit issue was invoked in political manifestos, speeches and slogans repeatedly arguing that congress leaders had implemented minority appeasement policies for decades but could not provide adequate protection for the Pandit community which was a minority in Kashmir. Duschinski(2008) writes that, "Hindu nationalist rhetoric presented the anxieties of the Kashmiri Hindu migrant community as a miror of anxieties of the Indian middle classe themselves, who felt themselves vulnerable to   increasing mobilisation among minority and impoversished classes.This position also enabled Hindi nationalist

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[84] Desh Sewak,Jammu,23 March 1950
[85]Speeches by senior Bjp leadership as recorded in Anand Patwardan's documentary Final Solution made in 2012

political parties to strengthen their claim as onadefenders of national boundaries and national interests in India." Thus the Hindu right positioned themselves within this framework vis a vis the Kashmiri Pandit discourse. With the eruption of militancy in 1989 ,Kashmiri Pandits felt vulnerable and the feeling of insecurity was aggravated by the targeted killings of important members of the community of the community. The state narrative believes that the target killings were mainly responsible for the exodus but the killings were not entirely based on religion but more so on political affiliations .The argument is supported by Madan(1993) and Bose(2003) ,who argue the targeting was not based on religion, infact the number of targeted Muslims surpassed umber of targeted Hindus. Allegedly some local newspapers also carried direct threats ordering the Pandit minority to leave the valley or be prepared to be killed. The threats issued were issued by the Hizbul Mujahideen. Evans(2002 makes a claim by the valley using census data that not more than 155,000-170,000 Pandits left the valley at the onset of 1989 violence. Most of the Kashmiri Pandits moved towards Jammu. However, the state outrageously had no adequate requirements for relief and rehabilitation of the migrants. As the state stumbled to offer succour, socio-cultural organisations many of them who had loose affiliations with Hindu right came forward to help. Duschinki (2008) notes the community found support in Kashmiri Hindu families who had moved to Delhi over the years. The others source of support were the political parties who had their own vested interests.   Panun Kashmir, a prominent Kashmiri Pandit organisation claims, that the Pandits were thrown out of their homeland after a sustained campaign of intimidation and harassment by the secessionists. It was done to create a Hindu free Kashmir where the goal of 'Islamisation' could be easily achieved". Behera(2000) records though the Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits shared the ethno-nationalist identity with each other, but with the increasing momentum of the self determination movement,the community began feeling a sense of vulnerability and insecurity. The other narrative sharply blames Governor Jagmohan for hatching a conspiracy to comb out militancy,but after shifting Kashmiri Pandits outside the valley for an interim period.` Akbar (1991) reinforces that Jagmohan encouraged the scared Kashmiri Pandits to create legitimacy for his harsh tactics .Some prominent citizen did make efforts to stop the Pandits from fleeing, however it could not yield any results.80 Traditionally Kashmiri Pandits sided with National conference on local level

and Congress party at the national level .Even the Praja Parishad, the vanguard party of the Jana Sangh had no popularity among the Pandits. However, the situation began changing with 1990 as the relationship between Kashmiri Muslims and the Kashmiri Hindus came under a double threat. One was from fundamentalist militant groups like Hizbul and the another from the Hindu nationalistic organisations like Sangh Parivar. The Hindu nationalist organisations offered support to the Kashmiri Pandit cause for reinforcing other causes like full integration of Kashmir into India.

Panun Kashmir was formed in 1991 to articulate a vison for Kashmiri Pandits and work towards the cultural revival of the community. They demanded a homeland for Kashmiri Pandits for formation of separate homeland which would comprise of eastern and northern basin of the river Jhelum. The demarcated territory would have the status of union territory and governed by the constitution of India. The homeland would have a provision of resettlement of all those Hindus who left the valley. Though some community organisations responded harshly to such demands ,and saw the demands as part of the political maneuvering. In 2007,Kashmiri Pandits formed their own political party ,The Jammu Kashmir National United Front with an aim of non dependence The reason for the formation was non-dependence on mainstream parties like the Bharatiya Janta Party and the Congress

Jammu and the Amarnath Land Agitation

Amarnath pilgrimage is conducted for about 40 days between July and August in southern part of Kashmir for paying reverence to the naturally forming ice stalagmite,which is pereceived as incarnation of Lord Shiva. The cave is located at the elevation of 13,500 feet and can be reached from two routes, the traditional route from Pahalgam and shorter non-traditional route from Baltal. In the earlier years, yatra was undertaken over a span of 15 days primarily by Sadhus and few civilians.The number of pilgrims would not exceed few thousand people. With the advent of 1990's,the demographics of yatra changed andlakhs of yatris began participating from many regions of India. In the year 1996 a freak-weather natural disaster resulted in large number of fatalities, creating momentum for the creation of a Shrine board to for effective and smooth running of yatra. Jagmohan, the former governor had conceived the idea of

forming shrine board for Amarnath, similar to what was achieved for Vaishno Devi shrine in Jammu region. report, Amarnath- A militarized pilgrimage(2017), throws light at how the move was conceived during the President's rule and. The blueprint envisaged formation of a statutory body called SASB ShriAmarnathji Shrine Board(SASB).It was clearly mentioned in the blueprint that Governor would chair the board. However, the shrine board could not be formed in 1986 as governors rule terminated before it could be established. In the coming years, the yatra was organised by state government with assistance from local people for logistics. The Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board(SASB) was put in place in 1996, by an act passedby Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly. According to the Act(2000)[86], "the governor of the state of Jammu and Kashmir would be the e-officio chairman of the board if the governor was a Hindu. And if not a Hindu, he could nominate a person who is a Hindu. The security functions were controlled by Army and Central Reserve Police Force. Between 2005 and2008,several attempts were made for constructing the infrastructure for the Yatra. In 2008,the state cabinet approved the transfer of land for construction of infrastructure. This resulted in wide spread protests in Kashmir from June 23rd 2008 to August 2008. This land transfer in the fragile ecological belt was seen as a long term conspiracy to engineer change in the demography of Kashmir valley .[87]The chief executive of the SASB, Arun Kumar responded to the raging agitation as a disinformation campaign provoked by certain sections of media and communal propaganda launched by separatist groups. SASB kept on insisting that they had every legal right to raise the pre- fabricated structures and the land transfer was permanent[88] The problem with the Amarnath Land controversy was not only the rigid and chauvinistic attitude of the outgoing Governor, but also the sinister designs to communalise the situation and hamper the ecological balance of the place. There were also concerns of de-involvement of locals and their right to traditional jobs during the pilgrimage and the threat to ecological balance that was being created by the extension of the yatra. The controversy triggered massive polarization with the political mainstream and separatists echoing the same narrative. Barring the Congress, all other mainstream parties and groups including the National Conference, Peoples Democratic Party and the

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[86]The Jammu and Kashmir Amarnath Ji Shrine Act 2000
[87] The Kashmir Times,dated June 10,2008
[88] The Kashmir Times,June 17,2008

Left came out against the land transfer deal. Given the volatile attitude of the administration, the state got actively involved in a religious affair. The land agitation eventually caused the fall of the coalition government, where PDP took a tough stance when its patron demanded cancellation of the land diversion order. On the other hand,appeasing PDP was not an option for Congress as it could have proved counter-productive with its Hindu vote bank in Jammu.[89] Kashmiris saw the land transfer and establishment of permanent structure as a cultural and political threat for the region intended for dispossessing residents of their land and natural resources. A sustained movement took up against the land transfer   Massive violent protests erupted across the valley against the land transfer, resulting in complete collapse of authority. The order about land transfer was eventually revoked on 30 June 2008 and the Action Committee against Land Transfer (ACALT) announced the end of the strike in Kashmir valley. The right wing organisations equally resisted the cancellation of land transfer order.The resistance was clubbed in the formation of Shri Amarnath Yatra Sangharsh Samiti(SAYSS).The hindu right wing organisations, Kashmiri Pandit groupings and other social and cultural groups deemed the cancellation of the transfer order as unconstitutional. [90]The condition went out of hand and the curfew had to clamped down in the province be and army had to be called out. As a form of protest, bandhs, suspension of traffic movement and an economic blockade was enforced in Jammu to suffocate Kashmir. As a result the Chief Minister had to resign and Governors rule was imposed in the state..Bidwai (2008) writes the fall of the Congress-PDP coalition government, the first of its kind in J&K was a set back to the cause of moderation and political reconciliation in the long-troubled and restive state.This is one of the many casualties extracted by the transfer of forest land to SASB and the subsequent violent process.The crisis has taken even greater toll in the form of the collapse of the political normalization process and revival of intolerance and assertion of regional or communal based identity. The first economic blockade which clogged-up the National Highway, was started on June 23rd .The second blockade was started on July 22nd Angry protestors burnt vehicles and in couple of instances attacked Kashmiri drivers. One of them was

[89] Kashmir Times,June 22,2008
[90]https://www.hindustantimes.com/topic/shri-amarnath-yatra-sangharsh-samiti.Accessed Februray 2018

brutally burnt alive.Horticulture too was adversely affected as the agitation came at the time offruit, thus resulting in heavy losses for Kashmiri traders. Furious over the blockade of Srinagar-Jammu highway in the peak fruit season, apex body of the Kashmir Fruit Growers Association decided to cross the Line of Control through the Srinagar – Muzzafarabad road with their trucks carrying the fruit.88 In retaliation, 'Quit Jammu' call was given by BJP and it's cohortsagainst KashmiriMuslims who resided in Jammu. On August 11, traders in the valley protested against the blockade and called for a March to Muzaffarabad,the first town across Line of Control. During the march, a senior Hurriyat leader Shiekh Abdul Aziz was shot as he tried to lead the march. On his funeral, more than 300,000 joined and the procession was again met with state violence.However, the yatra continued in full swing and not even single yatri was attacked by Kashmiris. The agitation had huge impact on the assembly elections in the state.with the BharatiyaJanta Party using the agitation as a plank to widen its base in Jammu. The polarization could be gauged by the national leadership of BhartiyaJanta Party jumping in the fray.The then BJP president Rajnath Singh announced the agitation over Amarnath shrine would be extended to the entire country and the senior leader of the party, Lal KishanAdvani said that the issue would figure in the Lok Sabha election too. Eventually an agreement was reached between SAYSS and the government. The aftermath of the controversy left irreversible consequences on the relations between Jammu and Kashmir and implanted a sense of vulnerability in the Kashmir valley.

After the traditional routes that worked along the River Jhelum had been closed in the aftermath of 1947, the only road access that the valley had to the rest of the world went through Jammu. The difficulty of accessing the markets abroad became more prominent for a Kashmiri trader. The Jammu traders also realized the shortcomings of doing business at the cost of politics..Jammu traders alone suffered a loss of Rupees 500 crores.89 In an interview with a senior member of Jammu traders association, it was revealed that they were invited to be part of the SAYSS. "We did not know initially, how politically motivated the movement was, but as soon as we realized it we did not want our business to be at stake .We tried convincing the SAYSS that a blockade like this, will result in closure of our only market that is Kashmir. SAYSS did not yield,so we withdrew our participation. The polarization also shook the Muslims based in Jammu as how the

Hindu right-wing organisations like VHP, RSS, Bajrang Dal had prepared the ground in the Jammu province. The educated class found space for asserting themselves in rallies where the trishuls were carried openly. The symbols of protest at the SAYSS's rallies were reminiscent of militant Hindu symbolism, making the Muslim population insecure. The fissures created by the blockade could not be filled even after almost ten years. It is not simply a question of economics but also the social fabric of the state which has been severely damaged by the protests taking a communal form[91]. Interestingly Kashmiri Pandit bodies like Kashmiri Pandit Sabha argue the issue was not how the constructions at Baltal could have eased the yartris. Rather it was about making the outsiders stakeholdersIn fact, the insecurity of service providers who saw the complete takeover of services industry by outsiders could have been resolved if Kashmiri Pandits were dealing with these issues, said K.K Khosa,member Kashmiri Pandit Sabha. The Amarnath Land transfer revealed sinister designs with graver implications. The problem was not only the rigid and chauvinistic attitude of the Governor Lt General Sinha, who polarized the situation on communal and religious grounds. Additionally the administration clearly locked horns by straying into the political domain with sweeping generalization of seeing any criticism to the move as communal. This was indicative of the unabashed sectarian behaviour coupled with irrepressible tendency to usurp the administrative authority of the political executive. Moreover, there have been constant attempts by the Hindu socio-religious originations to prolong the duration of the Amarnathyatra, which goes against the recommendations of Sengupta report[92]. In 1996, Public Interest Litigation was filed by Swami Sachidanand against the state government of Jammu and Kashmir demanding the Baltal route to be kept open throughout the lines of Vaishno Devi Yatra. However, logically it is not achievable given the weather and the time specificity of the pilgrimage. To increase the duration of the yatra would mean tampering with the fragile ecology of the region. However, since SASB has always been more accessible to the Hindu socio-religious organizations who have constantly demanded the increase the duration of yatra

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[91]Interview with Shakeel Qalandar,President Kashmir Chamber for Commerce and Industry,dated 3 June 2017.

[92]Enquiry Report on Amar nath Yatra Tragedy(1996),Department of Jammu and Kashmir Affairs, Government of India by Nitish Sengupta called for regulating the number of pilgrims as well as the period of the yatra. He also elucidated that the carrying capacity of the pathways that led to holy cave shrine in extremely limited so the influx of yatris has to be controlled

and rejected any attempt at putting a restrictive cap on the number of pilgrims visiting each year.

BJP/PDP coalition and its impact on Jammu

In a dramatic turn of events, Bharatiya Janta Party managed to secure 25 seats in the Jammu Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections (2014) making the claim of contesting nationalisms visible to any observer. It is pertinent to mention that all the 25 seats were secured in Jammu division alone. This also brings into focus the debates around Article 370 and the plan of trifurcation of the state. It is also important to understand that the Dalit assertion in otherwise upper-caste Hindu dominated area of Jammu is minimal because the caste concerns have been relegated to the background because of the threat from the Muslim other. Chowdary (2014) writes that assembly elections of Jammu and Kashmir surprised everybody for the massive participation and the performance of BJP. The election changed the dynamics of the internal politics of the state.

The political baggage of the BJP ran counter to the ideological soft-separatism of PDP. In the BJP's nationalist cosmology removal of Article 370 of the constitution is very fundamental idea. On the other hand, the political imagination of a party like Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) is entirely enshrined in the principles of soft separatism.PDP couched its agenda in quasi-separatist language advocating change of New Delhi's relation with Kashmir. Even the concept of self-rulewas first coined in 2005 by the then President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf. The PDP adopted it in January 2006 in a different form and context. The party aimed towards constitutional restructing, rescinding of central laws that curtailed Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy, reclaiming of the titles of Prime Minister and President respectively .These proposals being nothing less than an anathema to the BJP. Chaudhary.R (2015) explains that, "the PDP is a product of a political situation developed in Kashmir in the last two decades, and it reflects an inappropriateness that persists in the region between the need for democratic governance and separatist sentiments."

The PDP on one hand was close to separatist organisations, interms of its agenda on self rule, demilitarization, softening of borders and free movement across Line of control.

Through the support of Jamaat-e-Islami, and Hizbul Mujhaideen, the party managed to build a strong constituency for itself. The party got unconditional support from others also who were critical of the politics of National Conference.

Thus Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party was launched on a soft separatist plank in 1999. It styled itself self-consciously on the memory of Muslim United Front borrowing its flag and also drew for its ideological content. Even the PDP symbol- a pen and inkpot, was the very same logo used by the HizbulMujahideen's supreme commander, Muhammad Yousuf (now known as Syed Salahudeen) when he contested the 1987 Assembly elections. A major feature of the formation of PDP was the unspoken tactical alliance between the elements of Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizbul Mujahideen and PDP.. Ahead of the elections in April 2002, Mehbooba displayed her party's Islamic colours by waving a green handkerchief to the audience at a rally.In the recently published memoir, Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years, former chief of the research and Analysis Wing, A S Dulat, describes Mehbooba Mufti as having links with the Jamaat-e-Islami, the ideological edge of armed militancy in Kashmir. Dulat recounts how prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee suspected Mehbooba of having links with militants. Narrating an episode from Vajpayee's visit to Srinagar in 2003, he writes "When Vajpayee went to Srinagar in April 2003 and famously extended his hand towards Pakistan, a stage was erected high up for the public meeting. Sitting up on the stage were Vajpayee and Mufti (Mohammad Sayeed). Mehbooba wanted to join them, but she was politely told there was no place for her on that stage". He goes on to add, "Vajpayee did not want her up there...There were grave doubts about Mehbooba in Delhi, about her links with the HizbulMujahideen and the help it provided her party during the 2002 elections". Wallace and Ramashray (2009) write that the party (PDP) took to using religious motifs for appealing the voters. In 2008,this kind of propaganda was used by PDP for getting support from Jamaat-e-Islamis cadre. With multi-cornered contests in many constituencies the 2014 assembly elect ions led to a fractured mandate. The outgoing National Conference managed to capture 15 seats, its coalition partner the Indian National Conference got along with 12 seats, Peoples Conference managed two seats and independents, and all other parties walked away with five seats.PDP had come out of elections as the largest party of the statein terms of its share of seats, the BJP in terms of

its share of votes. After hectic negotiations,the two parties entered into a Governanc Alliance based on a contract for seeking national reconciliation on Jammu and Kashmir. PDP's patron Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, who became the chief minister in the new government, mentioned that the "alliance as coming together of the North Pole and the South Pole-hoping the alliance would cover the gap between the two."The alliance was to form a coalition government which would help in settlement and confidence building within and across the Line of Control. Alongside providing a stable and representative government. Given the wide ranging difference between the socio-political aspirations and complaints of the different people in the state, economic amelioration cannot lead to peace and prosperity. It was envisaged that a pure political process without any visible material and economic goals, could not ensure peace .Due to the different positions and perceptions of thee two parties, the two parties have had on the constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir, the alliance said it would maintain the status quo on all constitutional provisions including the special status Jammu and Kashmir enjoys constitutionally.

Conclusion

After 1947 the leadership vacuum in Jammu proved to be too big, and the efforts of the National Conference were too small to bridge it up. The National Conference failed to extend its base to Jammu because of its Kashmir centric vision and lack of coordination and contact with its workers in Jammu. Further, an uneasy coalition between a democratic leader like Shiekh Abdullah and a constitutional leader who was the erstwhile Maharaja turned out to be untenable on many grounds. The constitutional leader could not give public expression to the aspirations of Jammu.

As a repository of feudal interests, he could furthermore not provide any justice to the democratic aspirations of Jammu's population. The reluctance of national parties to extend their activities in the state, in particular, the secular parties enlarged the sense of prevailing vacuum. No other secular party could counter Sheikh Abdullah's charisma as a secular leader. For instance, All India Congress Committee disbanded its Jammu unit after National Conference took over the administration. Praja Parishad articulated Jammu's discontent in the emotive vocabulary of complete accession of the state and

abrogation of Article 370, that guarantees a special status to Jammu to the state. Gradually with time Jammu's regional discontent branched off into a demand for local autonomy. This was portrayed repeatedly through statistics of lopsided developmental outlays. Much of the regional identity politics was appropriated by the Hindu rightist parties and was asserted through the demands made in the elite interests, with marginal interests being relocated to the peripheries.

Most of the agitations spearheaded in the name of regional discrimination of Jammu focused on the interests of the educated middle class and did not represent the backward areas and sections of the society.As Hindu rightwing organisations raised the issues of regional discrimination, the discourse inevitably became the dominant Hindu perspective. Copious amount of the communal discourse also evolved during the 1952 agitation led by the Praja Parishad. Gradually with time Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Jana Singh and other variants of Hindu right-wing like VHP,Shiv Sena,Bajrang Dal etc. also made inroads. However, the hold of these parties and organisations remains limitedto Hindu belt of Jammu, the internal contradictions between the two regions have only deepened. The failure of democratic institutions to take root in Kashmir by overt intervention of the central government prevented the development of healthy competition amongst the political parties of the state.

Over the years, the polarising tendencies in different divisions were never checked, and institutional structures became weaker and vulnerable. When in a dramatic turn of events the Bharatiya Janta Party, which did not have a significant electoral presence in the state managed to secure 25 seats in the 2014 state legislative assembly elections it made the claim of contesting nationalisms visible to any observer. It is pertinent to mention that all the 25 seats were secured in Jammu division alone. This also brings into focus the debates around Article 370 and the plan of trifurcation of the state. It is also important to understand that the Dalit assertion in otherwise upper-caste Hindu dominated area of Jammu is minimal because the caste concerns have been relegated to the background because of the conflict-centred political discourse. The upward graph of religious tourism in the last thirty years also corroborated in the solidification of the religion-based identity in Jammu.

The Pandit migration from the valley turned out to be a bonus for the Hindu right-wing organisations as they could make inroads within the Pandit community and communalise the society on religious lines.The eruption of land agitation in the state also led to long-term implications changing the very nature and the course of the politics in the region. The most significant fallout from the land row was the fracturing of the relationship between the two major regions of the state. The discordant politics went beyond the grievances of regional discrimination towards the idea of trifurcating the state into three parts.

The electoral triumph of BJP in 2014 put PDP into a more passive mode towards in junior partner in the coalition, which was almost equivalent to disrespecting the popular mandate.The demands of self-rule, end to human rights violations and revocation of the AFSPA could not get any response beyond the election manifesto of PDP. The common minimum programme too did not gain any traction. The only take away from the coalition was polarization on communal grounds and greater demands for trifurcation of the state.

Conclusion

Kashmiri nationalism has acted as a definitive mode of political participation and existed antecedent to the violent militancy. Before the partition, it acted as a kind of political mobilisation in response to centuries of foreign domination. After the partition, the same mobilisation began to challenge the structural stagnation of the post-colonial state. It was also a way to address the majoritarian bias of the state-enforced nationalism.

The majoritarian character of the state nationalism was coming out at a doctrinal as well at a political level, restricting collective rights. The interests of the centralised nationalism were taking priority over all other commitments made at the time of accession, reflecting a clash of interests. The conditions created were fragmentary and particularist, creating a form of 'particularist politicization'[93]in the words of (Mary Kaldor1999:22). The state-nationalism espoused a parochial character and made itself a carrier of limited loyalties, ignoring or deliberately wiping out any local and cultural characteristics. This situation led to the crisis of legitimacy and longevity to the local nationalism. The internal crisis of the state, the search for community and identity made way for a confrontation between the forces of Kashmiri nationalism and the state nationalism. Delanty and O'Mahony (2002:146) classify that situations like this generate "a strong presence of fundamental assumptions about group membership and hence a high degree of exclusion; the identity of the self—'the people'—is predicated on the negation of the other; and there is an absolute subordination of the individual to the collectivity." Thus the thesis tries to understand how Kashmiri nationalism exercises itself through distinctly self-defined social, political and cultural processes.

The growth of education and print from the 1940s to the 1970s in particular created conducive conditions for the development of Kashmiri nationalism. This was happening in parallel with a growing sense of discrimination and the consciousness of political difference with others.

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[93]Mary Kaldor, see "Cosmopolitanism vs. Nationalism: The New Divide?" also Old and New Wars (1999) Cambridge: Polity Press.

This study tried to look at the Kashmiri nationalism in terms of its origin and growth as well as brings out contestations around it. It also assessed the strategies and objectives of Kashmiri nationalism, in terms of its relation with competing nationalistic tendencies within the Jammu division of the state. In Kashmir, various political processes led to the nationalist mobilisation and this lasted over a considerable period of time. These processes preceded the militant nationalism. The presence of alternate political processes which were widely popular indicates that Kashmiri nationalism enacted itself in the political form before it took a militant form. The transition can be placed as the change of strategy in the Kashmiri nationalism.

A cursory look at the last seven decades of Kashmir's political history shows underlying tensions between the state-nationalism propounded by the state and the political elite versus the valuational Kashmiri identity. The purpose here is to recognize that beyond the state nationalism exists a realm of nationalistic assertions which challenged the former. As Guha (1983) remarks the mainstream narrative of national identity does not recognise the subdued nationalist movements as they hinder their political projects. The recognition of the underlying valuational identity gives communities a sense of affective and collective satisfaction. In the case of Kashmir, a sense of historical wrongdoings and sociological imperative augmented the nationalistic imagination. Additionally, the development of education and press contributed to the nationalist imagination. Symbols and myths of the past were regularly used as strategies to appeal the mass sentiment and marked a socio-cultural particularism and historical discontinuity with the state.

Hypotheses One

The weakness of democratic institutions resulted in the creation of social categories for distribution of patronage.

The patronage was disbursed according to the convenience of the state on ethnic, religious and regional lines. The constant tensions between the centralized nationalism and the indigenous nationalism resulted in the imposition of formal nationalism through juridical and legal structures. The officially constituted legitimate sphere of politics was the only channel to express the grievances and only groups that were ready to engage

with the official political processes were given leverage. The other assertions were confronted with violence and coercion to impose a monological definition of the nationalism. The refusal to acknowledge such claims is based on a specific understanding of non-legitimacy to any opposition to formal nationalism and non-acknowledgment of value specific identity. This lead to a situation where the indigenous nationalism also did not recognise the controlling institutions. The outcome of the clash between the two forces of nationalism was that no mutually acceptable framework emerged for a dialogue. In short, the state nationalism and the Kashmiri nationalism reflected irreconcilable political discourse, one having institutional characteristics and the other based on values of autonomy. The absence of the reconciliation between the two leads to status-quo, where coercion became the only way for the ruling elite. The adoption of coercion accelerated the Kashmiri nationalistic mobilization. The autonomous nationalist agency also became a reserve for local trust, given its political positioning and subjectivity. As the Kashmiri nationalist agency was confronted with state coercion, the possibility for violent militancy grew with support. The mode of political mobilization also altered, introducing differing agendas of the various groups who took up to militancy. The dominant militant began to enforce the ascendancy of their respective political agendas within the nationalist movement.

Among other things, what comes out is that roots of Kashmiri nationalism are more complex than the simple thesis of institutional decay and lack of economic structures. Kashmiri nationalism exerted itself through subaltern processes creating autonomous ways of political participation and opposing the mainstream ways of participation. The alternative forms of political participation and mobilization can be observed in politics of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference from the 1930s to 1953, the Plebiscite Front and the 1987 Muslim United Front.

One could also understand that the support for Kashmiri nationalism majorly evolved through the collective awareness of the community and a deep urge to exercise their political agency. The repetitive failure of non-violent political mobilization paved a way for the eventual rise of militancy. In other words, the militant nationalism introduced new ideas which were not always sharing their objectives with Kashmiri nationalism and

actually undermined Kashmiri nationalism over time. This thesis tried to understand how the structural inconsistencies within the state nationalism paved the way for further augmentation of Kashmiri nationalism. It thus justified the hypotheses that weakness of democratic institutions has created social categories for the distribution of patronage, resulting in chasms on the basis of ethnicity, religion, and region.

Hypotheses 2: Kashmiri nationalism is essentially a contestation of self and the other.

The second hypotheses of the study stated that Kashmiri nationalism is essentially a contestation of self and the other. 'Self' and the 'Other' here is used to denote identity and difference with regard to specific political actors. Rumaelili (2007:22) notes that the same time self and the other also emerged to be perspectival and interchangeable concepts, where the self and the other changed constantly. The collective identities were constituted in relation to the difference; hence the formation of collective identity entailed difference with those outside of the collectivity. This resulted in the relationship of constitutive difference between the collective self and others.

Nationalism forms identities when the process of socialization enables individuals to see themselves as to how others perceive them. Thus individuals become self by encompassing the attitudes of other individuals as Mead(1934:88) calls them 'generalized other'. Similarly, individuals refer to nationalism from the perspective of a generalized other. In this way, Kashmiri nationalism comes to see itself and its relation to the other through oppositional structuring, construing a meaningful identity in opposition to the other nationalisms. Therefore, the discourse revolves around morally superior nationalism juxtaposed with the less superior nationalism. The performance of nationalism entails a representational character and politicization of differences furthers the sense of self and otherness.

The contestation of self and other in the Kashmiri nationalism, if analysed carefully, is contestation between civic forces of nationalism and the ethnic forces of nationalism. It is a recurring tussle between a set of contradictory values of inclusive liberal universality versus the illiberal, ascriptive, exclusive particularism. In its current form, Kashmiri

nationalism emerged against the highhandedness of the ruling Dogra house in the 1930s. The fundamental idea that emerged from this was a territorial idea of inclusive Kashmiri homeland with a common citizenship. A cursory glance at the important pre-colonial junctures brings out civic dynamics of Kashmiri nationalism clearly. For instance, the movement against Begaar (bonded labour) was actually a movement for exclusive citizenship rights along with the right to work and right to equal opportunity. Even the tirade against the Dogras was directed against the exclusion of common Kashmiris, oppression, and lack of opportunity, etc. The resistance of Kashmiris to share administrative positions with non-Kashmiri officers led to the enactment of state subject law in 1927. This movement saw coming together of Kashmiri's irrespective of religion against opening the jobs for non-Kashmiris. However, on another instance the Roti agitation was launched in 1932, by Kashmiri Pandits after the Maharaja's government opened the gates for Kashmiri Muslims. The incident hints towards the shortcoming in the construction of the narrative of the Kashmiri nationalism. The formation of the Muslim Conference in 1931 and its conversion to National Conference in 1938 is determinative of the fact that Kashmiri nationalism was constantly evolving with visible tensions between ethnic and civic nationalism.

Without getting into the micro political details of the politics of the accession signed in 1947 ensured by the National Conference was in many ways, a vote against the ethnic irredentist nationalism espoused by the Pakistani state. In the 1940s the popularity of the organization had gone down after it moved away from Islamic principles towards vague ideas of secularism and nationalism. Kashmiri nationalism had taken a bold position against the illiberal premise of the religious commonality. However, Jalal (1998) notes that Indian nationalism represented by the Indian National Congress excluded those seeking to accommodate religious difference within the framework of the Indian constitution. The resultant creation of the binary opposition between the secular nationalities and the religious communalism denigrated the affinities to religion and not with the nation. Like the Indian nationalism, the Kashmiri nationalism was also becoming resistant to any other alternate vision of Kashmiri nationalism

Kashmiri nationalism expressed itself repeatedly against the exclusionary nature of the religious nationalism. It debunked Islamic revivalism in its inception, made distance with Muslim league, which stood for ideals of Muslim Conference, which was in favor of ultimate accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. The political outlook throughout the 1940s was far more ambiguous with the presence of multiple actors displaying a diversity of interests. However, the pertinent theme that comes up is the dialogue between religious and communitarian identities and deep longing for rational democratic governing structures. Though in practice, the main appendage of the Kashmiri nationalism, the National Conference faltered in successfully incorporating dissent and difference. Nonetheless, the shortcoming should be ascribed to the National Conference and not to the Kashmiri Nationalism as such. In some ways, one can assert that the disjunction between the politics of National Conference and the Kashmiri nationalism placed a precedent for primacy of state nationalism to other valuational variables. The thesis tries to question and transcend the polemical and teleological interpretations of Kashmiri nationalism. In the process it brings out that Kashmiri nationalism could not be delinked from the ideas of major nationalisms and their shortcomings elsewhere in South Asia. In a way, the civic and ethnic nationalism is not set against one another, but are two affiliated parts of the modern nationalism.

After 1947 the contestations within the Kashmiri nationalism did not cease to exist. In fact, differences got enhanced with the rising political consciousness, education development of press and media. A kind of vibrant civil society developed in Kashmir and the idea of Kashmiri nationalism based on civic lines gained further momentum. Kashmiri nationalism was forming a narrative where people and territory were to belong together and possess a singular political will. A sense of belonging to the same community and urge for self-governance was fostered. In fact, civic nationalism developed more like a social movement having democratic characteristics. The ethnic nationalism was propounded by the political actors who imagined a commonality of Kashmiri nationalism with Pakistani nationalism. The binary articulated itself in both the political as well as militant form of Kashmiri nationalism and exhibited constitutive difference. However, the relationship between the self and the other is constituted along multiple dimensions, which allow for a wider range of possible interactions and

contradictions. The interactions and contradictions emerge around the nature of difference, the social difference between the self and other and response of the other.

Scope for further research

This research opens up a possibility for engaging further with emerging aspects of Kashmiri nationalism through a dual structure of civic and ethnic nationalism. Further research could be conducted on how the stimulation of religious nationalism in both India and Pakistan impact the civic and ethnic idea of Kashmiri nationalism. And what form of nationalism gets encouraged through the resurgence of religion. It would also be particularly interesting to analyse how transnational political actors perceive Kashmiri nationalism. And how Kashmiris perceive their sentiments for ethnic and civic nationalism and if the understanding is fluid or overlapping. The research can initiate a study of variables like ethnicity and territory in terms of a Kashmiri ontology

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