

India's Strategic Response to Insurgency in Kashmir

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**India’s Strategic Response to Insurgency in Kashmir**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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Ashish Sharma

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
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Map 1 The erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir with are under Indian administration



Taken and edited from <http://www.news Bharati.com/Encyc/2016/8/19/The-Kashmir-imbroglio-and-Art-370>

List of Abbreviations

AFSPA	Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AGUL	Ansar-Ghazwat-ul Hind
AIIMS	All India Institute of Medical Sciences
APHC	All Party Hurriyat Conference
BJP	Bhartiya Janata Party
BSF	Border Security Force
CID	Crime Investigation Department
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CPI (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force
DGP	Deputy General of Police
DSCO	Doctrine of Sub conventional Operations
HUM	Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
IB	Intelligence Bureau
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGP	Inspector General of Police
ISJK	Islamic state of Jammu and Kashmir
ISI	Inter Service Intelligence
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
ITBP	Indo Tibetan Border Police
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammad
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
LeT	Lashkar-e-Toiba
LOC	Line of Control
MUF	Muslim United Front
NC	National Conference
NDA	National Democratic Alliance

NIA	National Investigation agency
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PAVA	Pelargonic Acid Vanillyl Amide
PDP	People's Democratic Party
POTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
PSA	Public Safety Act
R&AW	Research and Analysing Wing
RR	Rastriya Rifles
SASB	Sri Amarnath Shrine Board
SASS	Sri Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti
SHO	Station House Officer
SP	Superintendent of Police
TADA	Terrorist Activities Disruption Act
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
WHAM	Winning Hearts and Minds

Chapter 1

Introduction

The Kashmir valley abodes the true beauty of nature. Sitting gracefully between Pir Panjal range in west and South and Zaskar range in the east, Kashmir is drained by river Jhelum. Abound with numerous lakes, gardens and beautiful apple orchards, Kashmir is the sanctuary of Amarnath shrine, a haven for nature lovers and a retreat for the tired souls. But the beautiful valley is now covered with blood.

“Srinagar hunches like a wild cat: lonely sentries, wretched in bunkers at the city’s bridges, far from their homes in the plains, licensed to kill . . . while the Jhelum flows under them, sometimes with a dismembered body. On Zero Bridge the jeeps rush by. The candles go out as travellers, unable to light up the velvet Void....” – Agha Shahid Ali, The country without a post office (Ali 1997: 3).

Since 1988 to July 2018, 4,46,94 lives have been lost in Jammu and Kashmir which includes 14,836 civilians, 6400 security personnel and 23,459 terrorists¹. As this dissertation is being written, more lives are being lost. The valley which was once called as ‘paradise on earth’ has converted into the largest militarized zone of the world where lives are lost every day.

Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil society estimates the presence of the forces to be between 656,638 and 750,981 in Indian Administered Kashmir. Ajai Shukla disputes the exaggerated figures provided in their report². Shukla provides us with the details of troop deployment in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, but here we will list the deployment in the Kashmir valley. The first deployment is of Indian army which mans the Line of Control and counter-infiltration grid. Two infantry divisions are present in Kashmir namely 19 Division in Baramula and 28 Division in Kupwara. Each division consists of 25,000 army personnel. The second army that operates in the rural area of Kashmir is Rashtriya Rifles which is armed with light weapons and is a specialized counterinsurgency force. Rashtriya Rifles has two divisions in Kashmir namely Kilo

¹ Data taken from South Asian Terrorism Web Portal website which can be accessed at

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm

² Report can be accessed from <https://jkccs.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/structures-of-violence-e28093-main-report.pdf>

force and Victor forces each comprising of 15,000 soldiers each. The total presence of army amounts to 80,000 soldiers in Kashmir. Alongside army, 60,000 personnel of Central Reserved Police Force and Border Security Forces are present. Jammu and Kashmir police comprises of 70,000 personnel including special police force which puts the total count of forces deployed in Kashmir to be 2, 10,000 with almost 29 (28.5) soldiers present per 1000 locals in the valley and total of 4,70,000 personnel in entire state of Jammu and Kashmir bordering Pakistan and China (Shukla 2018). Despite the armed force density of 28.5 per 1000 civilians, Kashmir remains the biggest militarized zone in the world.

Why did this happen?

The bomb blast at central telegraph officer at Srinagar in July 1988 initiated the valley into the spiral of violence. This research tries to analyse the strategic response of Indian state towards the insurgency that has entered into its 30th year. Indian response has been multipronged but is there a coherent framework to analyse India's strategy?

Debates in the realm of Indian strategic thought began with a question- 'Does India think strategically'? This question generated a series of works which analysed India's perception of threat and its strategic responses towards the pursuit of security in the bipolar world order. In their analysis of India's strategic responses during the era of cold war, scholars were divided into two camps. Scholars from the first camp termed Indian strategic responses as *ad hoc inchoate and reflection of the absence of Indian Strategic culture*³ while scholars from the second camp characterized them as a part of Indian Grand strategy.⁴ The scholars from the second camp provided their dissidence to the scholars in the first group by producing works on outward oriented Grand Strategy.

The same question can be raised in the context of counterinsurgency in Kashmir- Does India think strategically in Kashmir? And the dissidence can be raised in the domestic realm also by exploring a 'possible Indian Grand Strategy in Kashmir'.

1.1 What is the crisis in Kashmir?

We all know that there is a crisis in Kashmir but what should we call it? Is it a proxy war, an insurgency or a full blown radical terrorism? Vivek Chadha provides us the

³ Scholars like George K Tanham come under this camp

⁴ Bajpai, Basit, & Krishnappa and others who contributed in the volume of India Grand Strategy: History Theory Cases, 2014

headway when he explores the dynamics of insurgency and terrorism. He argues that terrorism deploys the tools of sensationalism and higher visibility of violence to terrorise people and institutions to force the state to concede to a set of demands (Chadha 2003: 403). Insurgency on the other differs from terrorism as it originates due to popular discontentment within people. Terrorists attack the civilians and the innocents while the insurgent's targets 'legal governing authority'. Therefore, it is tricky to classify Kashmir crisis as it began as an insurgency and soon degraded into terrorism while re-emerging as an insurgency in 2016⁵. When the Kashmir insurgency degenerated into terrorism, there were some traits of insurgency present which were evident from protests by local population against security forces and similarly when insurgency re-emerged in 2016, the terrorist activities too accompanied it prime example is assassination of prominent Srinagar based journalist and editor of Rising Kashmir Syed Sujaat Bukhari and his two PSOs on 14 June 2018 and kidnapping and subsequent killing of soldier of 44 Rashtriya Rifles on the same day.

We must know the ailment before we proceed with our diagnosis. Indian counterinsurgency strategy will depend upon what kind of low-intensity conflict are we dealing with in Kashmir. Chadha (2003) also raises this question as he argues that if India classifies the crisis as full-blown terrorism then it would use brute force to quell the violence down. If the Indian state classifies the crisis as an insurgency then it would deploy force with caution and will seek political negotiations. It would frame policies to counter administrative inefficiencies and design programme to win the heart and minds of people. If India classifies the crisis as a proxy war then it will confront Pakistan and threaten it of escalation. Unfortunately, the crisis in Kashmir has shown symptoms of all of the three, which has proven to be a challenge for Indian counterinsurgency strategy.

To define the problem in Kashmir merely as a site of Low-intensity conflict between India and Pakistan would do injustice to any analysis on Kashmir. Since this research is limited to understanding the Kashmir problem from the Indian perspective, our primary focus will be on domestic factors that sustains the conflict. From 1988 onwards,

⁵ Or 'second intifada' as Prem Shankar Jha would call it in his essay -The Rise of Kashmir's Second 'Intifada' published by The Wire on 23 August 2016. It can be accessed from <https://thewire.in/politics/kashmir-uprising>

the majority of militants were locals from the valley who demanded independence. In 2018 also, the majority of militants operating in Kashmir along with stone pelters are local Kashmiris. Since Indian state is seen as their prime adversary, it will be safe to characterise Kashmir conflict as 'insurgency'. But is it merely an insurgency?

Rajagopalan defines insurgency as "armed rebellion that seeks to replace existing political authority" which goes through stages of political preparation; guerrilla warfare and finally conventional warfare (Rajagopalan cited in Gates and Roy 2014: 14). Lt General SK Sinha (retired as Vice Chief of Army Staff in 1983) conceptualized as "armed rebellion against the legally constituted government with support of local population obtained voluntarily or with coercion.." he adds on by stating that there is not merely military aspect but modern insurgencies go beyond armed struggle with their economic, political and social aspects (Sinha cited in Gates and Roy 2014: 14). The modern insurgency that aspires for secession and separate statehood also solicits international support by harping on human rights violation of the state and selling the visuals and tales of oppression at global platforms. The Modern insurgency also solicits economic and political support from other in the name of religion and morality to undermine the state externally along with waging an insurgency internally. Kashmir also fits the bill and crisis in Kashmir is a Modern form of insurgency.

Terrorism in a 'tactic' in modern insurgency. The tactic of terrorism is used to threaten those group of people who do not toe in line with the ideology of insurgents. The targets are the minority and dissenters are perceived as informers and agents of the state. An interesting aspect of this form of terrorism is subtle and tacit approval of the majority community. When religious and unfair treatment of a community is rallied as the reason of demands of secession, we can witness the fissure in the social harmony of the disturbed area.

Gallagher argues that the definition of Low-intensity conflict originated from the US defense department and has been defined as "limited politico-military struggle to achieve social, political, psychological or economic objectives. They are protracted and involves economic, political and psychological pressure through insurgency and terrorist acts" within a geographical area (Gallagher 1991: 3 cited in Chadha 2003: 24). Chadha expands upon this definition by adding that low-intensity conflict can also involve non-violence and could be between two regions of different states (Chadha

2003:25). The low intensity conflict characterized as modern insurgency with multi-dimensional Kashmir nature requires a comprehensive strategy.

1.2 Review of Literature

This section is divided into two themes. The first theme deals with the literature that provides us insights on the Kashmir crisis along with India's response in the armed, political and diplomatic sphere. The second theme deals with the literature that provides us insights on Indian counterinsurgency strategy and the concept of Grand Strategy.

1.2.1 Theme I -Kashmir insurgency and Indian responses

The important works on the issue of Kashmir have merely treated Kashmir insurgency as merely an episode of the wider dispute.⁶ They place the episode in the wider narrative that explains the causes and implication of the insurgency while providing minimal space for a structured analysis of Indian state's multipronged responses.. This research plans to delve deeper into the analysis of insurgency and provide analysis of India's responses.

One of the most authoritative account on Kashmir insurgency comes from the former Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, Jagmohan Malhotra through his book *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir*. This book provides a snapshot of Jagmohan's controversial second tenure as a Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. After getting appointed for the second time as the Governor, Jagmohan effectively portrays the challenges and the prevailing conditions under which he had to operate. Jagmohan points out the grim picture of Kashmir of late 1980's as a region which was witnessing reign of terror evident from bomb blasts and assassinations being carried out on regular intervals. Jagmohan inherited the Kashmir from where the writ of elected government had vanished and decree of militants had become the law of the land. As the state government was rendered ineffective and control over minds of people by militants was completed, the azaadi was perceived as just round the corner. Jagmohan in his book tells us that he took it as his nationalistic duty to wrest Kashmir out from the terrorist's grasp and put it back in the hands of India. Managing the situation from the eye of the storm, Jagmohan provides the tale of administrative subversions from government

⁶ (Schofield 2003); (Behera 2006)

employees, political subversion from the mainstream political parties and disinformation campaign from the local press, all of which was launched at the behest of Pakistan. Jagmohan berates the petty local leadership represented by Farooq Abdullah and his clique who pursued their political interests while endangering the security of India. The corrupt political leadership, the maleficent administration, rampant poverty, unemployment, Islamic fundamentalism and Article 370 were the reasons identified by Jagmohan for the imbroglio in Kashmir. This autobiographical account of Jagmohan reveals to us the gravity of the situation that was prevailing in the valley as the sovereignty of India was being challenged, Kashmiri Pandits were being eliminated and loss of life and property was becoming a regular occurrence. He is vastly critical of the central government which did not heed to his warning as Kashmir situation deteriorated. Jagmohan himself emerges as the protagonist of the thriller and initiates a series of steps which curtailed these subversions. He addressed the slanderous campaign initiated by Farooq Abdullah against him and also addressed the criticisms launched against him for his 'excesses' as he argued that they were necessary to at least build a semblance of law and order. Jagmohan regards the conflict as an offshoot of corrupt bureaucracy and political class and can be solved by providing economic opportunities to the youth and accountable administration to the people. Jagmohan provides the starting point to our investigation by painting a picture of Kashmir of 1980's.

The target of Indian strategy was the insurgency so first we must also understand the complexity and dynamics of the Kashmir insurgency. We find such details in the work of M.H. Syed. M.H. Syed in his book *Islamic Terrorism: Myth or Reality* explores the contours of Islamic fundamentalism in the world but his chapters on Kashmir insurgency are of concern to us. Syed calls out the nefarious designs of Pakistan whose objective is to launch full blown insurgency in Kashmir but he also highlights India's political misadventures which fuelled the discontentment in the people which led to believe that only in the independent Kashmir, the political aspirations of Kashmiris would be realized. Syed divides the Kashmir insurgency into five phases with each phase carrying a unique mix of demand of secession and popular aspiration, Islamic radicalism and criminal terrorism. His work provides the overview of militant organizations that cropped up after the widespread call for violence and subversion of state authority was called by Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. He analyses their

strategy and goals to provide us with the details of the adversary that Indian state had to deal with. The details of incidents provided in his book exposes the utter helplessness of state law enforcement agencies and Indian policy to the sudden and violent developments in Kashmir. As the violence continued unabated, muscular knee jerk reaction to the mass upsurge reinforced alienation within people. By analysing various rituals of making a Mujahideen, Syed demonstrates how the society sanctioned violence through tales of injustice, indoctrination of children and fundamentalism. Aggressive response of security forces and policy paralysis at New Delhi allowed Pakistan to call the shots in the insurgency. Syed analysis shows us the ways in which ISI came to dictate the content of the insurgency and marginalized its progenitor JKLF by floating Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and other factions. As the Islamic element began to dominate the content of insurgency, the mass participation diminished and the insurgency degenerated into criminalization. As Indian counterinsurgency forces began gaining ground and successfully reclaimed the political initiative in 1996, Syed analyses reasons for 'failure' of Kashmir insurgency. The work of Syed provides us with important details about the nature of insurgency, its dynamics, the important players and their strategy, internal complexity and its continual transformation. Since Syed's work is limited to 2002, This research takes the analysis forward from 2002 to 2018 infusing it with more details and analysis.

What could have been the causes of insurgency? Various set of literatures gives various interpretations which we will analyse in the second chapter. But we can analyse Indian military responses. The central question which Simon Jones tries to answer through his article *India Pakistan and Counterinsurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir* is what India has done to restore peace in the insurgency-infested region of Kashmir and how successful they have been? To provide holistic perspective he delves into other topics which require attention starting with thorough examination of shortcoming of historiography. He divides structure of responses into two phases: an early phase lasting from 1989-1998 which depicts the learning process of Indian security establishment and the second phase lasting from 1999-2008 depicting how those lessons have been put into practice. By locating the lacunae in research he identifies preponderance of English material vastly produced by India and the nationalist tinge in writings of authors of India and Pakistan in which the blames of causes of violence are put forth on each other. Among the other moderate voices, Jones highlights works of Ganguly where he

puts forth the ‘political skulduggery’ of Indira Gandhi and factional hostility as major causes of Insurgency. The works of LN Subramanian provides insights into deficiencies in Indian COIN operations and lays the blame on Pakistan for funding and supporting the insurgents. Victoria Schofield work reveals the aspect of breakdown of political legitimacy in Kashmir and how myopic policies of political elite escalated the conflict. Jones notes the role of international actors like US in pressurizing Pakistan government to act against terror producing factories. Jones concludes with challenges that bedevils Indian military that is lack of modern instruments, frustration among soldiers. YS Jafa in his article *Defeating terrorism: Strategy of operational strategy and tactics of Police forces in Jammu and Kashmir*, brings in forth the argument that mere armed response to the insurgency would not yield the necessary solution rather readdressal of political and economic grievance, efficient use of intelligence, the rule of law and reduction in police excesses can reduce the intensity of alienation among the Kashmiri population. Jafa analyses the nature of counterinsurgency policing to establish the argument that police forces too can hinder the growth of insurgency through winning over the masses and modifying their strategy and tactics.

Vivek Chadha in his book *Low-Intensity Conflict in India* attempts to provide a brief military history of low-intensity conflicts in India. He admits that although his work lacks subjective analysis, his objective is narration of India’s experience with low-intensity conflict, post-independence. His work assisted me in bringing out understanding of Kashmir conflict from the lens of a military personnel. While analyzing the Low-intensity conflicts, he pivots the causes around language, religion tribalism. Chadha through his work tries to bring to light the academic relevance of studying low-intensity conflicts within military history. His brief case studies of various low-intensity conflicts in India provides a good entry point for the more rigorous study of sub-conventional warfare. This directs us to a more specific account of Indian response.

AC Soneja in his book *Militancy in Kashmir: Untold Saga of Counterinsurgency operations* provides a military history of counterinsurgency operations taken by the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles also called BODYGUARD from April 1992 to April 1995. Soneja narrates the exploits of the battalion in various deployments across the valley to bring into light various tactics and strategies. Indian army uses to neutralize the militants. Although being factual, this work sheds light on the experiences of a

battalion, local challenges, and motivations of the army men. This work provides us with insights into the modus operandi of the Indian army in an insurgency infested environment. Written from a perspective of army personnel, it provides logical explanations for Cordon and Search operations (CASO), night raids and role of local intelligence by winning trust of people but it sheds no light on the impact of such actions on locals and angers it produces in them. Taking no cue of psychological impact of army actions on locals, the book mechanically provides a narrative of strategy and logic behind that. The tales of victories and failures is measured in number of weapons procured/missed or number of terrorists captured, killed/missed not in number of villages alienated or collateral damages.

Rekha Chowdhary in her article *Understanding Political Alienation in Kashmir* analysis two concepts of political space namely systemic political space which provides articulation of political rights in the peaceful and democratic way and extra-systemic space from where the legitimacy itself is contested not only of political institutions but also of Indian sovereignty over Kashmir. She argues that political alienation can invariably be linked with the formation political identity of Kashmiris which developed under ethnocultural identity represented through a Kashmiriyat – a syncretic mix of Shaivism, Islam, and Sufism, and collective political consciousness which evolved through the long historical experience of outside rule and political movement of 1930's against Dogra rule. These two components formed the basis of political identity that demanded popular participation in decision making and respect for the dignity of Kashmiris. The crisis of 1989 demonstrated cumulative discontentment over denial of political space. This political deprivation has led to the erosion of legitimacy which has expanded the extra-systemic space. Chowdhary identifies four causes for it – the over-intrusive role of the Indian state in local politics, issue and process of constitutional integration, failure of the democratic institution of address political grievances and finally decline of socially purposive politics. The political alienation prevalent she concludes is the result of unaccountable political elites, corrupt administration, inability to address economic grievances, and no channel of articulating political destiny. Bereft of dignity, Kashmiris moved to extra-systemic space and supported the insurgency. Her article is important in the sense it provides us with the reference to which Indian Political strategy must be addressed.

Rekha Chowdhary and V Nagendra Rao in their article *Jammu and Kashmir: Electoral politics in separatist context* deal with the separatist context of Jammu and Kashmir politics and its impact on electoral politics. In their view, the 2004 parliamentary elections pushed the separatist under the democratic area to contest the legitimacy of elections. They go on to analyze internal dissension within the groups in separatist politics for example fragmentation of APHC into Hurriyat (Ansari), Hurriyat (Geelani) and the existence of other groups like JKLF of Yasin Malik. They highlight how separatist politics itself deployed the vocabulary of democracy while maintaining boycott of elections as a democratic right. Through their empirical analysis of voting percentages comparison and provides analysis of survey conducted by Centre for Study of Developing Society (CSDS) to derive home statistical conclusions depicting people's rise in trust in electoral practices while also projecting an important ground-level response of people asserting that elections are not the answer to the political problem of Kashmir. Chowdhary and Rao conclude by stating that although people in their responses to the survey provided a preference for peace but emphasized that durable peace would only be peace with dignity which can be attained after political resolution of Kashmir issue.

Rekha Chowdhary in her article *Electioneering in Kashmir: Overlap between separatist and mainstream political space* begins with comparing the parliamentary elections of 1989 when the political legitimacy of democratic processes was eroded in Kashmir and only 6% voting. The electoral processes were restored in 1996 but they weren't fully fair due to coercive voting and proxy candidates but 2002 elections were a turning point in the tale of political processes in Kashmir since 1987. Elections of 2002 were held in international glare and were the first elections where ruling party was ousted by a popular mandate. The large voter turnout, the emergence of PDP and competitive electioneering were the key component of the revival of democratic space but most importantly it was an overlap of separatist agenda with the mainstream agenda which provided back the legitimacy which was lost after 1987 elections. Issues raised by separatists like withdrawal of AFSPA, autonomy and others were raised by mainstream political parties which made these elections closer to people and less superficial. Chowdhary highlights the implication of mainstreaming of separatist issues which created favourable political space in Kashmir. Although the separatist space was left intact, borrowing their issues has certainly put separatists on unease but it has also

provided them with an opportunity to challenge the political mobilization for voting with their own political mobilization for boycotting. The implication of free and fair elections in Kashmir is the issue she is addressing while keeping in mind that fact that people vote for local issues and the voting turnout doesn't reflect 'resolution' of Kashmir issue.

While the set of articles by Rekha Chowdhary presents identifies both the problem and success of Indian political strategy but intervention from Paul Staniland brings to light the limits of Political strategy. Paul Staniland in his article *Kashmir since 2003: Counterinsurgency and paradox of normalcy* argues that political space of Kashmir suffers from a 'paradox'. Although violence has declined in Kashmir which has allowed India to pursue its goal of normalcy in Kashmir, India has not been able to install stable political order due to its perception that Kashmir political autonomy and India's security are mutually incompatible. The ideas and tools that Indian constitution and democracy professes like non-violent protest, rule of law and others in abstract meet stiff resistance when they are incorporated into practice which by masses makes Indian political strategy appear hollow and hypocritical to the masses. Taking Kashmir as a case study, Staniland builds his model of 'paradox of normalcy' in which states promise 'normalcy' by extending tools of peaceful mobilization, rule of law and freedom of speech but punishes citizens when they use these tools. This model has a potential to study states political strategy in their insurgency infested areas and how they reintroduce the political normalcy in these areas. The analysis of Staniland provides a direct critique of what we can extrapolate from Chowdhary as reintroduction of free and fair election as the major trait of Indian political strategy.

Amarjit Singh Dulat (with Aditya Sinha) in *Kashmir the Vajpayee Years* provides an autobiographical account of his stints as head of Kashmir group from IB division and later on as head of R&AW during Vajpayee's tenure. The central thrust of his work is 'dialogue' as he demonstrates different cases where he met Kashmiris. More than his approach of conducting a dialogue with them, he demonstrated their willingness to engage in a dialogue to get Kashmir out of the spiral of violence. Pakistani disillusionment and willingness to restore calm in Kashmir were the major motivations of the leaders and militants with whom Dulat conducted his dialogue. Dulat provides the contrasting account of handling of Kashmir issue by two Prime Ministers- Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh. Vajpayee approach was proactive and his magnanimity and love

for Kashmiris made him popular in Kashmir whereas Manmohan Singh's tenure missed the most opportune moment in history of resolution of Kashmir conflict. Dulat's work provides first-hand insights that would not be available in any other literature. His work shows how his idealism thawed the ice between a representative of a state and separatists and militants to bring out in them, a Kashmiri that only desired peace.

Sajad Padder in his article *The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan: Structure, Process, and Agency* traces the genesis of Indian Pakistan bilateral composite dialogue. He situates Male Summit of 1997 as the reference point while illustrating highs and lows of subsequent India-Pakistan bilateral dialogue. The idea of composite dialogue in his opinion involved a form of dialogue which was comprehensive and accommodative. He provides an analysis of how the dialogue between India and Pakistan picked up momentum only to be sabotaged by incidents which led to the derailment of entire progress. The composite dialogue also unveils the complexity between India and Pakistan worldview which is demonstrated by 'Kashmir centrality' from Pakistan in any form of dialogue and its haste for a concrete solution on Kashmir. India, on the other hand, has preferred to address other issues with more urgency. The diverging worldviews and the absence of trust makes the process more prone to derailment. Assad Durrani and A.S Dulat (Former head of ISI and R&AW respectively) present a joint paper on *Kashmir: Confrontation to Cooperation* to demonstrate the optimism that countries with polar worldviews can come together to discuss on issues on intractable issues, given they have trust and the willingness to dialogue. Their work projects the prospects of composite dialogue and how such dialogue can force partnership between these two nations to act together. These two set of work on composite dialogue brings into light the fact that India Pakistan dialogue is not similar or comparable to any other bi-lateral dialogue. Both the countries operate under a tremendous pressure from the domestic constituency and powerful groups while discussing together on the table which explains their escapist nature and higher willingness to exit from the process under the light of any catastrophic incident. Despite these two flaws, the resumption of talks after such incidents explains the durability of such an idea.

1.2.2 Theme II -Grand Strategy and Counterinsurgency

In the realm of strategy making, Peter Layton's article '*The idea of Grand Strategy*' holds a critical importance. Layton argues that Grand Strategy as a concept emerged in twentieth century during the tumultuous eras of wars and goes on to trace the theoretical evolution of the concept. Layton notes an important intervention through the work of naval historian sir Julian Corbett who in his work 'Strategic terms and definitions used in lectures on naval history' published in 1906 provided the initial intervention which was followed by JFC Fuller in 1923 in his book -*The reformation of war* when he inserted moral dimension to the existing definition. In 1929 BL Hart in his book *Decisive Wars of History* further expanded it when he shifted the objective of Grand Strategy from winning the War to establishment (and sustenance) of subsequent peace. Layton argues that Strategy is mere application of means to achieve an end (security) whereas Grand Strategy is concerned with qualitative and quantitative development of these means through capital or research and technological procedures; secondly, Grand Strategy not merely deals with the material means but also focuses on development of legitimacy and soft power of the state; finally Grand Strategy seeks to establish preferred order of the future. Layton also provides alternatives to Grand Strategy in the form of policy measures namely Opportunism and Risk Management. Although Layton doesn't talk about synthesis between these alternatives and Grand Strategy, I would explore such possibility. The focus of Layton's work was on statecraft and Foreign policy. My focus would be on domestic policy and Statecraft.

The quest of Nina Silove in her article '*Beyond the Buzzword: The Three meanings of Grand Strategy*' is to identify the object that the concept of Grand Strategy addresses. She makes her own contribution to the debate over questions like what is Grand Strategy and does it actually exist by proposing three ideas of the concept of Grand Strategy in the form of 'grand plans', 'grand principles' and 'grand behaviour' each of which offers a different set of tools and framework to the study of Grand Strategy (Silove 2017). Her objective is to develop the concept of Grand Strategy itself and contribute to the research methodology through this piece where she invokes the qualitative method of theory building and application of concepts (Silove 2017: 3). Her analysis widens the scope of Grand Strategy and brings together a different group of scholars who argue about absence and presence of Grand Strategy to work with new concepts of Grand Strategy which can broaden their understanding. This broad

understanding provides a voice to literature which was earlier omitted from the study of Grand Strategy.

Frank O'Donnell and Harsh Pant in their article *Managing Indian Defence Policy: The Missing Grand Strategy connection* link the defence reforms with the Grand Strategy. They argue that Grand Strategy requires an astute political leadership that can set objectives for securing and advancing the interests of the polity and secondly, it requires a policy oriented infrastructure that integrates and applies resources to meet those interests. Unfortunately, India's defence management's shoddy performance reflects poor functioning of Grand Strategy. O'Donnell and Pant argues that India should look at historical resources like Arthasastra and practice of Mughal Empire to evolve Grand Strategic principles that would have practical relevance. Theoretical development in the realm of Grand Strategy can revitalize Indian Defence programme. Through this article, O'Donnell and Pant brings out the relevance of Grand Strategy formulation from academic to the domain of practice.

Krishnappa Venkatshamy in his article *-The problem of Grand Strategy* expands upon the proposition that absence of a coherent Grand Strategy leads to incoherence in practice (in the realm of defence, foreign policy etc.) However, he notes that there are barriers to the formulation of Grand Strategy namely lack of conceptual clarity over the term; the possibility of unfavourable outcomes; the political contestations and lack of consensus over the goal and finally the institutional incapacities to meet the goal. Venkatshamy proceeds to highlight the benefits of formulation of Grand Strategy but simultaneously mentions the risk accompanied by that benefit. After analysing eight areas of agreements among various proponents of Grand Strategy, Venkatshamy firmly mentions that absence of deliberative Grand Strategy doesn't signify lack of strategic practice as state as its various 'micro actions' can manage its security. Venkatshamy concludes his essay by mentioning five elements of formulation of Grand Strategy namely the identification of purpose of Grand Strategy; identification of field of actions and strategic environment; bringing knowledge into the practice; construction of appropriate methods and plans to reach the goal and finally installing a feedback loop that bestows flexibility and adaptability to the Grand Strategy. Venkatshamy article is holistic in the sense that it raises relevant questions to our understanding of Grand Strategy and the problems associated with its formulation.

Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler in their book *India and Counterinsurgency, Lessons learned*, brings to the fore the counterinsurgency experience of India in the form of case studies to draw out the Indian way of performing counterinsurgency. The purpose of their work is to make available the lessons from Indian counterinsurgency operations which are not thoroughly analyzed outside India. The ambition of their work is to 'cross-fertilize' reflections from India along with western and American reflection in counterinsurgency having policy based implication. The major implication of their work is to show how as a robust democracy in the developing world, Indian counterinsurgency experience can serve as lessons for developing democracies ailed with the task of state building. The collection of essays in this volume sheds light on Indian COIN doctrine and counterinsurgency challenges.

Bhibhu Prasad Routray in his article *India: fleeting attachment to the counterinsurgency Grand Strategy* provides a commentary on India's experiences in counterinsurgency and laments the lack of a proper COIN doctrine which could provide more efficiency to the COIN operations and reduce the intractability of conflicts. The lack of such a doctrine presents India with perpetual confusion over what set of response would be adequate to a particular form of insurgency. Routray, however, extrapolates four pillars of Indian COIN operation and calls them Indian COIN grand strategy. These four pillars have provided India with a set of directions which inform policy that is implemented in different theatres of the insurgency. The central question raised by Routray is what explains the protracted nature of insurgency in India? The answer to this is lack of coherent COIN doctrine and secondly deviance from the rules of engagement that were derived from successful Indian counterinsurgency experience in Assam, Tripura, Punjab, Mizoram and Andhra Pradesh which explains the intractability of conflict in other theatres. Through these experiences, Routray concludes that India has a COIN grand strategy which is ad-hoc due to the lackadaisical attitude of political class and is unlikely to develop a COIN doctrine. The major loophole of his work is he doesn't define grand strategy and reduces its conceptualization to just two elements: military and political. This research will invoke this concept in full 'grandness' in the analysis of Kashmir insurgency.

Rajesh Rajagopalan in his paper- *Force and Compromise: India's Counter insurgency Grand Strategy* argues that India has always seen insurgency as a political problem more than a military one and ensured that this idea get reflected in modus operandi of

Indian army. After giving theoretical overview of Insurgency and Counter Insurgency, Rajagopalan presents case-studies of two insurgencies namely Mizo and Naga. After tracing out their historical origins and Indian responses, Rajagopalan locates two similarities between them which he presents it in his conclusion. Firstly he argued that although military force is needed to counter insurgency, the scope of force was limited in such a way that political compromises can be reached in future. Secondly, patience and long term perspective has been key elements of India's negotiation strategy. If any task of formulating a counterinsurgency Grand Strategy has to be taken, political compromise and the limited use of force would be their key elements. In this essay, although Rajagopalan deals with the theories of Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies, he doesn't deal with a theory of Grand Strategy at all leaving the reader wondering in what way Rajagopalan is conceptualising Grand Strategy and how these two assertion fits into it. Secondly Rajagopalan does not engages with the role of special counter insurgency forces and goes on to conflate Indian army with Counter insurgency forces deployed in North Eastern region. Rajagopalan's essay provides a good starting point for my research. Since he hints at a presence of a counter insurgency Grand Strategy, it provides a necessary boost to my pursuit in this direction. This research would address these short comings.

The reports by Institute of Kashmir studies on Sopore incident 1993, Lal Chowk fire in April 1993, three volumes on Catch and kill strategy of security forces sheds light on excesses of security forces in Kashmir and the regime of impunity under which they operate. Institute of Kashmir studies fact finding report on 1996 elections points towards the primacy of coercion that became the hallmark of that election. The report of catch and kill tactic of India, brings out the staggering number of custodial killings of not merely alleged militants but also their alleged accomplices. Through a report on counterinsurgency in Kashmir, Institute of Kashmir Studies provide an empirical account to demonstrate how Indian counterinsurgency was nothing but a euphemism of state terrorism. The reports prepared by IKS is exhaustive and empirically sound as they have attached numerous interviews and surveys to supplement their claims. The reports have also attached list of citizens killed by security personnel along with their addresses to provide credibility to their claims and highlight darker side of Indian counterinsurgency in Kashmir. Despite being replete with empirical data on Indian human rights violations, these reports have stayed mum on human rights violations by

militants and completely denied any involvement of Pakistan in the ‘freedom movement’ of Kashmir. These reports promote a singular opinion that Kashmir wants freedom without taking into account the divergent pro-Indian voices from Kashmir. I have kept a tab of this shortcoming while deploying these reports to criticise Indian armed action in Kashmir.

1.3 Rationale of research

AS the insurgency in Kashmir moves on to its 30th year, it becomes imperative to analyse how the insurgency transformed through the ages and how well India has managed to control the crisis in Kashmir. The prominent literature have just covered the insurgency as merely a chapter of larger project of crisis of Kashmir. This research provides the desired and detailed coverage to the crisis in Kashmir. Since earlier research on Kashmir insurgency are dated/ has not covered the latest phase of insurgency, this project seeks to extend their analysis to include the latest phase and provide more extensive coverage of Kashmir insurgency and India’s strategic response.

Secondly, this research plans to structure the Indian strategic response through the concept of Grand Strategy. The study of Grand Strategy has been limited to addressing the external threat to the security of the Indian state. The proposed research aims carry forward this investigation into the domestic realm of India. In this proposed research, I would investigate the Indian strategy to counter insurgency in Kashmir for the purpose of its security in order to explore and unearth “A Possible domestic Grand Strategy”. By unearthing a domestic Grand Strategy, the research seeks to make a distinct contribution to the corpus of Indian strategic thinking which is an important component of Indian Political thought. This research is an act of negotiation and exploration. I have negotiated with the concept of Grand Strategy which is outward oriented (foreign policy oriented) to make it a viable tool for the analysis of the internal security predicament. Since the concept of the Grand Strategy caters to the element of security and security which also has an inward dimension, it would be interesting to shift the lens inwards and deploy these concepts to explore whether India has a Grand Strategy to respond to its ‘internal’ security threats or not. The objective of a Grand Strategy is to resolve conflict and sustain peace. This research takes these two elements to ground the exploration.

1.4 Scope of the research

This research analyses only the insurgency that is plaguing the Kashmir valley and not the other regions of erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.⁷ The primary focus of this research is to analyse ‘the crisis in Kashmir’ not the ‘crisis of Kashmir’ hence it will refrain from discussing the issues of legality of Kashmir accession to India and conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The role of Pakistan will be analysed with relation to its support (official and proxy) to the Kashmir insurgency. The Grand Strategy shall be explored by keeping security and peace in Kashmir as its goal not the resolution of Kashmir issue. Although very little reference will be made of the Kashmir dispute, its role in keeping alive the discontentment within local Kashmiris is acknowledged in this research.

1.5 Research Methodology

This research relies on the method of textual analysis for the coverage of insurgency in different literature and newspapers. By analysing details of incidents, this research tries to derive a pattern out of them to explore the nature of the insurgency, its transformation and its implication on the polity. This research uses same tool of textual analysis to derive a pattern of Indian strategic response in the domain of military, political, economic and diplomacy.

By taking Kashmir as a case study, this research also uses inductive reasoning to excavate Grand Strategic designs of India in Kashmir. Simultaneously this research plans to domesticate the outward looking lens of Grand Strategy to provide a structured analysis of Indian strategy in Kashmir.

This research is primarily based on secondary sources. Apart from the literature on the Kashmir conflict, This research has widely consulted coverage of Kashmir insurgency in magazines like Frontline, India today and the outlook and has also incorporated opinions and mainland newspapers like The Times of India, Hindustan Times, The Indian Express, Deccan Herald, The New Indian Express, Asian age and others and also consulted Jammu and Srinagar based newspapers like The Greater Kashmir, Kashmir Reader, Rising Kashmir, Free Press Kashmir, Kashmir Times, Kashmir Life and others. This research has incorporated few inputs from the opinions pieces published in online websites like the wire, Caravan, and dailyO. This research has also

⁷ Jammu, Ladakh, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan.

relied on analysis of videos of speeches and opinions taken from the YouTube. This reports produced by the state government and the Institute of Kashmir studies is taken as the primary source.

1.6 Central research question

Question 1. What has been India's strategic response to Kashmir insurgency?

Question 2. Do these responses point towards a 'possible Grand Strategy' of India in Kashmir?

1.7 Outline of the research

This research is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter provides the research design of the project.

The second chapter provides the exhaustive coverage of the crisis in Kashmir from 1988-2018. It begins by laying out the causes of the insurgency explained by different scholars. The chapter progresses to analyse strategies and organizations of militant organizations along with the study of Pakistan's role in fomenting the insurgency against the Indian state. The chapter progresses to analyse what led to the insurgency and then divides the Kashmir insurgency into six phases to trace its dynamics and transformation. This chapter reaffirms the nature of Kashmir Conflict as a case of Modern insurgency which is multidimensional and uses terror tactics with the popular backing and also highlights reasons for the present discontentment.

The third chapter deals with the military response of the Indian state to the Kashmir insurgency. This chapter maps the lessons that Indian army and the security forces have learnt through their experience in Kashmir. After disaggregating the military responses, this chapter goes on to highlight the limitation of these responses to show that overtly muscular policies are counterproductive in the insurgency infected area and any act of excessive force not only etches into the collective memory of oppression of Kashmiri but also alienates an entirely new generation, forcing them to pick up arms thereby making the insurgency, protracted and vicious.

The fourth chapter deals with the political strategy of Indian state in Kashmir which is form of organization of successful elections in the state to pursue the goal of normalcy. The political strategy gets coupled with economic strategy which takes the form of economic aid; surrender and rehabilitation policy to call back the militants into the

mainstream, and amnesty policy which provides second chance to the protestors so that they can articulate their views in the political sphere. This chapter progresses to highlight the limitation of Indian political strategy which prefers Indian security over the well-being and democratic rights of Kashmiris. India's political strategy is thus shown as hypocritical due to its misplaced conception that Kashmir security and democratic rights of the Kashmiri people are mutually incompatible.

The fifth chapter deals with India's dialogical strategy in which it has involved various stakeholders in Kashmir issue namely Hurriyat Conference, Civil society groups, militants, political parties and Pakistan. This chapter demonstrates India's disingenuous practice of appointing groups and interlocutors only to refute their recommendations when they present one. This chapter also exposes the hypocrisy and insincerity of Hurriyat conference and Pakistan in their higher willingness to abandon the peace process whenever they get an opportunity. Due to commitment phobia of all three actors (India, Pakistan and separatists), this chapter highlights the permanent impasse of the Indian dialogical strategy.

The sixth chapter demystifies the concept of Grand Strategy and explores how the concept of Grand Strategy can give us more coherence to the analysis of India's strategic response to insurgency in Kashmir.

The last chapter recapitulates the arguments made in this research to structure them in a way that brings into light a possible Grand Strategy of India in Kashmir.

Chapter 2

Crisis in Kashmir (1988-2018).

A Coverage of Insurgency in Kashmir

What makes a study of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Kashmir interesting?

Without discounting the geo-strategic importance of Kashmir as a site of perennial rivers and its implication on India's security, the region of Kashmir has boasted of syncretic and liberal ideas of Kashmiriyat which defined the Kashmiri identity. The idea of Kashmiriyat crystallized in the atmosphere which was isolated from the mainstream Indian subcontinent. The syncretic idea of Kashmiriyat witnessed its decline from 1989 onwards. Let's study some explanations.

2.1 Overview of explanations

Vivek Chadha notes investigates why the secular ideals of Kashmiriyat were eaten away by Islamic fundamentalism which revealed its fangs in 1988. Chadha identifies many reasons which could collectively explain what led to the alienation of general masses in the valley and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Chadha argues that communities in the state of Jammu and Kashmir have lived with insecurity post-partition as the shadow of partition riots and communal divide lingers between Muslim majority valley and the Hindu dominated Jammu region. The Muslims in the valley got threatened by the Hindu dominated mainland India, and the potential and possibility of Hindus denying dignity to Muslims. Hindus in the state were wary of the political clout of valley based leaders and feared getting side-lined from the critical administrative posts (Chadha 2005: 111). Chadha also blames the partisan politics of leaders like Sheikh Abdullah who exaggerated the fear of Hindu majority in the mainland and to secure maximum autonomy for the region and raised veiled and sometimes explicit threats of Kashmiri independence to the Indian state. Chadha argues that this bogey of autonomy shifted the attention from the core issues like economic development, the invigoration of political institutions and menace of corruption to the special status of Kashmir (Chadha 2005: 112). This hindrance prevented the complete integration of Kashmir into India as Kashmiris under the Sheikh Abdullah leadership believed that

Kashmir should enjoy special status till the end of the time provided by Article 370 which according to Jagmohan created a psychological and emotional divide between Kashmir and rest of India (1992: 230).

Partisan politics also fomented nepotism, corruption, and decay of political institution (Chadha 2005: 112) marked by the absence of political opposition and rigged elections to place proxy governments. Chadha notes that only a few influential families held significant contracts and infrastructural work was riddled with corruption hence the state never witnessed proper communication and connectivity through rail and road network, proper electricity network and industrialization which not merely condemned people into economic misery but also led to radicalization as youth were not getting any employment opportunity and were full of resentment due to lack of economic development.

Chadha hints that the radicalization was a gradual phenomenon which was also seeped into the psyche of Kashmiri youth by organizations like Jamaat-e-Islami, Al Fateh, and others which established madrassas to spread fundamentalist brand of Islam in the valley. Due to lack of schools and poverty, Chadha notes that people were forced to send their kids to these subsidized madrassas which were mainly funded by Islamic west Asian countries and Pakistan (Chadha 2005: 114). The rise in literacy level in Kashmir made youth aware of social and political conditions. In the meanwhile, All India Radio was commissioned in Srinagar in 1975, and later Doordarshan was introduced. It was complemented by a rise in circulation of local vernacular newspapers due to rise in literacy levels causing what Chadha calls a 'Media boom' in the valley (Chadha 2005: 116). This media boom helped in the coalescing of political opinion in the valley. Separatist organizations have also propagated their secessionist ideas through newspapers. A model of madrasa educated religious youth who achieved political awareness through local newspapers was created, and hence local foot soldiers for insurgency were built over a period.

Syed also notes various other causes of insurgency like lack of socialization between valley Muslims and mainland Muslims as Muslim leadership in mainland India was not able to appease valley Muslim insurgent group. The communalization was heightened in the valley which culminated into the distressed migration of Kashmiri Pandits from the valley; another step towards Islamization of Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir

Liberation Front attacks on Kashmiri Pandits which led to their exodus received no international condemnation which created resentment and Islamophobia within Hindu community in the state. Finally, Syed notes the role of All Parties Hurriyat conference that has acted as a conduit of Pakistan's nefarious designs in Kashmir. The basic strategy of All Parties Hurriyat Conference is organizing strikes, *Bandhs* and protest while appealing to the religious passions of the Kashmiris as their leaders have no political base. They are financed by Saudi Arabia and other West Asian countries along with Inter-Service Intelligence of Pakistan. They are tasked with providing leadership, direction, and funds to anti- Indian opinion in the valley and have emerged as the face of the rage of Kashmiris or what Syed calls the front of 'disruptive activities in Kashmir' (Syed 2002: 242-245). The discussion over the role of Hurriyat Conference ranges from their role in promoting radicalization and violence in the valley on behest of Pakistan to their calls for peace and permanent solution of Kashmir issue.

Reeta Chowdhary Trembley lists the reason of transformation of demand for autonomy to that of azaadi. She notes loss of people's confidence after National Conference-Congress alliance, massive rigging of 1987 elections, suspension of democratic processes with long span of Governor's rule, decline in administrative capability to govern, enjoyment of greater legitimacy and popular support by leaders like Abdul Ghani Lone, Maulavi Farooq, Shabir Shah, and others (Trembley 1997: 472). In the global arena, many nationalities were gaining separate statehood, and the demand of Kashmir independence too had been raised at the time when ethnonationalism became the basis of demand for separate statehood. Invoking the ideas of Walker Connor, Trembley brings into light the intra social violence that nationalism brings when the nation-state is unwilling to give in to "mini-nationalism" in its regions. She invokes the idea of Arthur Waldron to bring out the complexity of these mini nationalisms. She argues that nation-state would not entertain the demand of right to self-determination of its fragments and would muzzle that demand using political violence, coercion and extra-democratic methods which can explain why a democratic state like India uses coercion in Kashmir (Trembley 1997: 474). Trembley traces the crisis of governability in Kashmir due to its "overpoliticization."⁸ Kashmir is also an example of an

⁸ Overpoliticization is S.N Sangmpam term to refer to Third world states where the political leaders seek dual goal of establishment of legitimacy and economic development. It results in set of leaders seeking power by resorting to corruption; creating problem of governability (Trembley 1997).

overpoliticized state where political leaders sought to continue their rule at the expense of addressing economic and social problems of the region which led to the problem of governability and question over political viability of association with India (Trembley 1997: 478). The economic causes for seeking this separation remain secondary and get expressed after mixing with primary political issues. India encouraged patronage politics in Kashmir which Trembley argues, reached its “saturation point” in 1987. The inability to deliver at economic point led Kashmiris to question that political viability which led to the demand of azaadi through insurgency (Trembley 1997: 478-479). The other accompanying reasons were the absence of industrial class in Kashmir due to state subject law, exposure to the radio frequency of both India and Pakistan along with competing ideas from across the border, geographical isolation of the valley in winters due to inadequate infrastructure facilities, the influence of radical Islamism and global Jihad (ibid.). Widmalm argues that per capita income of people rose steadily till 1986 and economy started suffering then after which implies that economy suffered immensely due to persistent curfews during GM Shah rule. He argues that if socioeconomic inequality becomes the basis of violent insurgency and separatism, then India would not have survived as a state since 1947 (Widmalm 1997: 1024-1025).

Widmalm conducts a wide range of interviews with prominent leaders like A.G Lone, Amanullah Khan and others to provide a first-hand account of what was happening in Kashmir after 1987 elections and what was the mood of the Kashmiris when the insurgency began. The immediate motivation was the rigging of the 1987 election and disenchantment from Indian democratic processes coupled with the historical denial of political space for self-governance (Widmalm 1997). The causes of the conflict he highlights lie in stunted institutions like bureaucracy and political parties. The traits of nepotism and dynasty politics were prominent, and it was a struggle to keep parties functional due to their poor organization. Widmalm traces the development of conflict which can be explained as “Political elite behaviour led to deinstitutionalization, which in turn led to populism and communalism which concluded in political violence” (Widmalm 1997: 1029). He argues that political elites preferred short-term “political expediency” over the development of democracy which led to a rise in the populism and polarization on the regional and religious basis (ibid.).

Balraj Puri argues that denial of demands of democracy and autonomy promised by Nehru and the detention of Sheikh Abdullah and installation of proxy government

ruptured the emotional ties that Kashmir had with India. Kashmiris witnessed fall of federalism and democracy which led to weakening of legitimacy of India which provided a fresh ground for insurgency to thrive (Puri 2008: viii). Puri focuses on the strength of emotional ties Kashmiris had with India and demonstrates how this bond evolved within the people who suffered from centuries of alien rule and how Nehru's warmth and Gandhi's moral appeal won the hearts of Kashmiris. The slogan of *azaadi* changed from 1948 when *azaadi* meant desire of identity as they resisted Pakistan sponsored tribal invaders to late 1989 when they broke the emotional ties with India under the spell of alienation (Puri 2008: 14).

Sumit Ganguly also deals with the issue to stunted institutional development as he states that as the economy grows and modernizes, the literacy level rises and the subsequent awareness about their reality provided by mass communication and promises of democracy heightens the political demands. If the institutions are not able to address these political demands and all the institutions which could provide a forum to express these dissent are decayed, then the society is susceptible to political violence. The violence has more propensity to exacerbate in the poly-ethnic societies (Ganguly 1996: 77). Ganguly traces the explanation of causes of insurgency listed by various commentators which primarily included continual electoral fraud, the rise in discontentment in youth and demand of jobs, Pakistan's sponsorship, degradation of Kashmiriyat, competing visions of nationalism and others. He asserts that some of these reasons explain the origin of the insurgency, and some of them explain the timing, but none of them explains both origin and timing (Ganguly 1996: 78). Ganguly argues that 'Political mobilization' and 'Institutional decay' explains both the timing and origin of insurgency (ibid.).

Ganguly notes that In 1965, the condition was ripe for the level of the insurgency as there were strong anti-India riots taking place in Kashmir after the holy relic (which was the hair strand of Prophet Mohammad) was stolen from Hazratbal Mosque in Srinagar. However, Kashmiris still they did not support Pakistani infiltration by rising in rebellion (Ganguly 1996: 82) This was due to lack of political awareness, low levels of literacy and charisma of Sheikh Abdullah. As the literacy grew along with continual political participation, it got coupled with lack of institution building in Kashmir which resulted in "extreme disinstitutionalization and accelerating political mobilization" (Ganguly 1996: 84). Ganguly counters Varshney's analysis of the origin of Kashmir

crisis manifested due to competing for the vision of nationalism by asserting that had this been a viable explanation, the insurgency would have broken out in the 1950s when Sheikh Abdullah was arrested under the pressure of Hindu nationalist organizations. Similarly, Ganguly notes that Prem Shankar Jha's assertion that Kashmir insurgency broke out due to "middle-class frustrations" falls short of reasonable explanation as it would not explain why a specific section of youth wanted to join Pakistan despite its abysmal record in infrastructural development in Pakistan held Kashmir (Ganguly 1996: 90-91).

From these explanations, we can conclude that multiple variables operate together both in the physical realm (economic indicators, rise of media and literacy, deinstitutionalization, Pakistan's support, etc.) and ideational realm (Awareness about denial of political rights, continual sense of injustice and humiliation, alienation, Islamic radicalization, etc.) that can explain the causes of insurgency.

There are primarily three major actors operating in Kashmir: Guns (Local militants, guest militants, Indian security forces, Indian Army and State Police force) Political groups (Political parties, Hurriyat Conference, Governor) and People of Kashmir. In this chapter, we will discuss the organization of strategies of militant organizations that initiated the insurgency. We would also note the role of Pakistan. After tracing the evolution of insurgency from 1988-2018, we will try to understand the reasons it didn't succeed. We will also try to point out the reasons for current discontentment in the valley. After evaluating the initial counter insurgency actions of India and Governor Jagmohan till 1990, we will carry our pursuit of tracing Indian counter-insurgency actions in Kashmir further in upcoming chapters.

2.2 Organization and Strategies of the militant organization

2.2.1 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

JKLF as a militant organization started a series of violent acts against civilians and state institution which evolved into a full-blown insurgency. Their political objective is the reunification of territories of Jammu and Kashmir from both Indian and Pakistan side to form a separate nation. JKLF challenged the legality of the instrument of accession as it was signed by the king who was fleeing from the revolt of its subjects. JKLF pushed forward for the demand of plebiscite which was to be conducted under the aegis of United Nations. Syed argues that It borrowed from secular credentials of National

Conference, but it denounced Sheikh Abdullah for giving up the demand for a plebiscite (Syed 2002: 255). The prominent leaders were Ashfaq Majid Wani, Hamid Sheikh, Yasin Malik, Javed Mir and Amanullah Khan.

Syed divides JKLF strategy into four components- establishing a local base and devising strategy; soliciting international support to the cause of Kashmir; mobilizing local support and inflicting violence on state institution to increase costs of Kashmir for India. Amanullah Khan headed the chief policy-making body which was a central committee at Muzaffarabad (Syed 2002: 256). Three subcommittees oversaw the diplomatic, military and political affairs. Their activity was divided into three zones, J&K wing, Azad Kashmir wing and overseas wing. The joint revolutionary council is tasked to oversee three wings. Each zone had a chief commander assisted by zonal, district and tehsil commander (ibid.). JKLF aspired for a separate nation based on Swiss model of the federal parliamentary democratic system in which provinces of Jammu, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Valley, Gilgit, and Baltistan would have regional autonomy and would send representatives whose number will be proportional to the population of each province to the lower house. The upper house will have equal members from all provinces. There would be protection for minorities, and the new nation-state would have good relations with both India and Pakistan (Syed 2002: 255).

To realize this idea, JKLF deployed many tactics. Azad Kashmir acted as a conduit for supply of arms and training of militants. They confined their activities to mostly Urban areas as the visibility was higher in the urban region. Their tactic was to shoot security or army force personnel to provoke and induce a retaliatory fire by coaxing them into firing which caused civilian casualty (Syed 2002: 256). The civilian casualty alienated the people of that particular area who then resorted to shielding militants and helping them escape. The vengeful security forces then resorted to torture and detention which in turn motivated more youth to join the organization and thus a vicious cycle of militancy was created.

The Indian wing of JKLF headed by Mohammad Yasin Malik announced a permanent ceasefire in 1994.

2.2.2 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is the militant wing of Jammata-i-Islami with Syed Salahuddin as its head. Syed argues that organization set up of Hizb is deep down to division and

district level in Jammu and Kashmir. Each wing of the organization has division heads of the military, weapons supplies, funds and ideological training. All position together act as a nucleus of central command of an organization called *Majis-i-Shoora* (Syed 2002: 263). The cadre of HUM was better trained and disciplined due to considerable experience of fighting in Afghanistan. Syed notes that HUM and Jammat had front organizations like Jamiat-ul-Tulba which is the student wing and Dukhtaran-e-Millat that translates into Daughters of the faith led by Aasiya Andarabi who also ran Islamic blood bank and Islamic relief committee (Syed 2002: 264). The DeM was tasked to impart ideological training to women to become powerful aids to the Muslim brothers waging Jihad. It had roughly around 10,000 members in mid-1990s (Syed 2002: 265).

Syed notes that Jamaat-i-Islami recruited HUM cadre through Madrassas which propagated Sunni Islamic culture and teachings of Quran and Hadiths. They ranged about 2500-3000 and were funded generously by West Asian countries and Pakistan. The Field unit of ISI was tasked to provide support to HUM. It also set up Markaz-ud-Dawa-Wal-Irshad⁹ as a coordination centre for worldwide Jihadi activity (Syed 2002: 265). The pattern involved motivating the cadre in the name of Islam using motifs, fables, and symbols extensively. The instances from Islamic literature and history were nitpicked to project instances of holy war for Islamic causes likening it with the cause of Kashmir (Syed 2002: 265). Syed cites an example of how 'Badr' which was a victory of Prophet over Arab Pagans was used to depict heroic expeditions of Islamic warriors. (ibid.). HUM called these warriors to emulate Prophet Mohammad to defeat the pagan Indian army and liberate Kashmir through a holy war (Jihad).

HUM goal was to increase the political, diplomatic, military and economic cost of retaining Kashmir for India. It sought to make Kashmir not feasible for the Indian army, and also it aspired to increase its domain of operation from Kashmir to other parts of India (Syed 2002: 264). They operated from rural areas and rugged terrains of Kathua, Doda, Udhampur, Rajouri, and Anantnag. They used modern and sophisticated weapons provided by ISI. Their favorite tactic was hit and run and ambushing military convoys (ibid.).

⁹ Founded by Hafeez Saeed and Abdullah Azzam, Zafar Iqbal and others in 1987. The militant organization Lashkar-e-Toiba is considered offshoot of it. It was renamed Jamaat-Ud-Dawa.

JKLF and HUM dominated that militancy in the valley from 1989-late 1990s when the mantle was taken over by Harkat -ul-Ansar¹⁰, Lashkar-e-Toiba, and other relatively minor militant organizations. Harkat-ul-Ansar enjoys the patronage of Talibagh Jamaat of Pakistan and Jamaat-ul-Ulemah-e-Islam (JUUI). It was formed after the merger of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen in 1993. It belongs to Sunni-Deobandi school of thought, and its members vow to protect Muslims in danger anywhere in the world (K.Santhanam, et al. 2003: 100-101). During the recent protests, many flags of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) were spotted. The political leaders and police officers dismissed the visuals by asserting that youth have raised these flags to prove Indian state and there are no footprints of ISIS on the ground. This perception changed after ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack on policeman Farooq Ahmad in Saura district of Srinagar on 26 February 2018 (Deccan Chronicle 2018). On March 11, J&K Police forces killed three ISIS militants which included Eisa Fazili and Syed Owais of Srinagar and Anantnag respectively (Jameel 2018). In June 2018, a combined operation of the army, security forces, and J&K Police eliminated four militants of Islamic State of Jammu and Kashmir including its head Dawood Ahmad Sofi (The New Indian Express 2018). Al- Qaida is also trying to establish their foothold in Kashmir through their local branch called Ansar-Ghazwat-ul Hind headed by Zakir Musa. Zakir Musa left Hizb-ul-Mujahideen proclaiming that Kashmir is a religious issue and any move to call it political would entail consequences. Al-Qaida demonstrated this mood through the assassination of Mohammad Yusuf Rather on 13 February 2018.

Swami classifies dominant terrorist groups by their allegiance, cadre, and ideology.

Table 1 List of prominent militant organizations in Kashmir

Terrorist group	Formation	ideology	Headquarters	Cadre base
Lashkar-e-Toiba	1990	Islamist	Mudrikre (Punjab Pakistan)	Pakistan and Afghan Jihadis along with local recruits

¹⁰ Later known as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen

Jaish-e-Mohammad	January 31 2000	Islamist	Bahawalpur (Punjab Pakistan)	Pakistani recruits
Al Badr	June 1998	Islamist	Mansehra (KP Province, Pakistan)	Foreign leadership
Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen	1990	Islamist	Kashmir	Kashmiri

Swami (2003) demonstrates that these militant organizations had contradictions within themselves which is evident through the JKLF attack on Kashmiri Pandits forcing their exodus despite their self-proclaimed secular ideology of Kashmiriyat. Similarly HUM which had Islamic orientations killed Al-Badr cadre for imposing Burkha on women (2003: 44). The distinctions between these groups on bases of ideology thus can be problematic (ibid.). HUM is trying to portray Kashmir insurgency as an indigenous struggle for freedom while ISJK and AGUL are trying to transform the insurgency into complete religious war. Various militant groups operating with a variety of ideologies and motivation provides a challenge to the formulation of a counter-insurgency strategy.

2.3 Pakistan's support to Kashmir insurgency

Kashmir insurgency began as a homegrown initiative to realize the goal of political self-determination before getting infected by religious fervour and Pakistani influence. Pakistan calls Kashmir an 'unresolved issue of partition' and aspires to capture it. Jagmohan notes that at the end of 1989 itself, 11 party alliance known as Tehrik-e-Huriyat-e-Kashmir under the leadership of Mian Quoyum was formed in Azad Kashmir and Kashmiri cell of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad was set up to lend the political support to the cause of Kashmir Azadi (Malhotra 1991: 401). As the insurgency was at a peak, the clandestine support for Kashmir insurgency converted into full-fledged official support as Foreign minister of Pakistan Sahabzada Yakub Khan and Minister of religious affair Khan Bahadur Khan openly announced their support for Kashmir's liberation. On February 4, 1990, the opposition parties of Pakistan Parliament unanimously expressed their support for Kashmir's liberation and following that leaders of Pakistan led by

Benazir Bhutto openly invoked the Kashmir card in public rallies. She stated that Pakistanis have blood relations with Kashmiri along with geographical and historical affinities which called for such natural solidarity with Kashmir and Kashmiri cause (Malhotra 1991: 403).

The much-fabled plan of Operation Topac must also be seen in the light of acts of subversions caused by HUM militants supported by Pakistan. As originally conceived by General Zia ul Haq, Operation Topac was to be carried out in three phases. In the first phase, infiltration of political structures was to be carried out. The police, communication network, the financial institutions must be infiltrated by pro-Pakistan Kashmiris, but the subversion would be low key at this stage so that Governor rule is not imposed. The terrorist organizations would then be tasked to radicalize students and peasants on the religious ground who would later be trained and armed to deal with the security forces of India. The focus from Kashmir would be shifted away by Sikh extremists working with the aid of Field intelligence unit of ISI and Pakistan sponsored terrorist organizations would capture areas where the army is not yet deployed. In this phase discrediting of India will be the major task.

In the second phase the focus of Indian army would be diverted to the region of Siachen and Kargil; away from the Kashmir valley and base depots, airfields and army headquarters would be destroyed by Mujahideens and Banihal pass, and Kargil Leh highway would be blocked. As Indian army would be kept busy on other fronts by Pakistan's army, Pro Pakistani elements would subvert local police force as there would be no resistance by Indian state against this insurgency. In the third phase when internal subversion is completed, and Kashmir is cut off from rest of India, Pakistani force would launch coup de grace to complete the accession of Kashmir.

Although Operation Topac is considered as a fable concocted by R&AW or any other Indian organization, Jagmohan argues that it was only vigilance of Indian army which prevented attacks on the army base and road networks. He notes that first phase which called for causing subversion within Indian institution was successful as we can see through Jagmohan's account. The valley was radicalized beyond the expectation of Pakistan and infiltration became a challenge for India (Malhotra 1991: 410).

Wedmalm notes that the first article on operation Topac appeared in 1989 in Indian Defence Review and the article itself acknowledged that the analysis might be "part

fact and part fiction” (Widmalm 1997: 1024). He interviewed Lieutenant General Asad Durrani, former head of ISI in 1996 in which Durrani denied the existence of any such plan. He countered the assertions by stating that “Pakistan will lose more than it can gain from such a plan” as the conventional superiority of India is much higher than that of Pakistan also the insurgency was started by indigenous factors and Pakistan’s support came much later (Widmalm 1997: 1027).

Pakistan has openly provided support to the insurgency in Kashmir by providing financial assistance through hawala transaction to fund the stone pelting in the valley (India today Stings); political support by garnering sympathy from Pakistani population towards cause of Kashmir; diplomatic support by projecting Indian human rights violations in Kashmir at United Nations and various other international platforms; logistical support by supplying weapons and safe havens for training to aspiring Jihadis and moral support by inspiring youth in valley via invoking calls of Jihad and rhetoric of Islam in danger. Chadha notes that Pakistan has been in the forefront in recruiting Islamic fighters from Afghanistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, sponsoring them and brainwashing them into providing leadership in Kashmir Jihad. These foreign mercenaries were also tasked to recruit local Kashmiri boys into the holy war for the liberation of Kashmir which would culminate into Kashmir merger with Pakistan (Chadha 2005: 117).

Chadha cites former foreign secretary J.N. Dixit to bring to light Pakistan’s three-pronged approach for Kashmir. Firstly Pakistan hoped to conduct a proxy war to secure Kashmir secession from Indian to impress the domestic audience that defeat in 1971 war and dismemberment of West Pakistan in 1971 has been avenged. Pakistan also hoped to mobilize Islamic countries against India riding on the bogey of Islam in danger and lastly increase the visibility of Kashmir and draw international attention towards this region on the issues of human rights abuses, right to self -determination and as nuclear flashpoint (Chadha 2005: 137).

In the current scenario, Pakistan itself is plagued by terrorism and has shifted its focus to economic development by taking part in One Belt One Road initiative of China in the form of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

2.4 How did it all start?

The proxy rule of New Delhi in the form of Chief Ministers that were loyal to New Delhi than to the locals had frustrated the people and led them to question the democratic credentials of the Indian state. The frustration in the political scenario was over a game of Congress which sought to control the politics in the state. As Farooq Abdullah did not toe the line of Congress ruling at the centre, it orchestrated no confidence against Farooq's government as 26 congress MLA withdrew support and later on withdrew support for Shah Government as well in 1986 leading to a 246-day spell of Governor's rule. These manipulative practices led people to believe that New Delhi controls politics of Kashmir to suit its security needs rather than allowing people to express their political will. Farooq Abdullah who was set to take up the role of a leader that his father Sheikh Abdullah left for him but was vastly discredited after reaching to a somewhat pragmatic political accord with Rajiv Gandhi called Farooq – Rajiv accord in November 1986. Farooq Abdullah considered it as a pragmatic move as one would require central government assistance to implement his vision.

“The Congress commands the centre. In a state like Kashmir, if I want to implement programmes to fight poverty and disease and run a government, I have to stay on the right side of the centre. That is a hard political reality that I have come to accept.” (Donthi 2016)

Farooq Abdullah won 1983 election as people trusted him to represent the political will of Kashmiris but after the accord when Farooq Abdullah accepted a partnership with a party that denied Kashmiri voice in the previous elections, alienated the National Conference from people. Widmalm argues that this alliance had large implications. Congress (I) and NC alliance wasn't tactical as they didn't come together to defeat a common or larger enemy, but they came together to form an “election cartel” and create a “political monopoly” in the political space of Jammu and Kashmir (Widmalm 1997: 1018).

2.5 The turning point of 1987 elections

Bose notes that what came into fruition during 1987 elections had been a premonition of Sheikh Abdullah delivered in his speech on India's Republic day 26 January 1968

“The fact is that Indian democracy stops short at Pathankot. Between Pathankot and Banihal you may have some measure of democracy, but beyond Banihal there is none. What we have in Kashmir bears some of the worst characteristics of colonial rule” (Bose 2003: 46).

This speech became prophetic after the results of 1987 elections were announced.

Despite the 'cartel,' Widmalm argues that there was some semblance of opposition present and there was still a chance for democracy to function because the other small parties channelized their discontent via political means only, i.e., by participating in the election (Widmalm 1997: 1019). Bose argues that after the accord, there was broad dissatisfaction in the people in Kashmir. The politically aware groups and various parties came together to form an umbrella coalition known as Muslim United Front (MUF). MUF came with a promise of 'constitution bound alternative' to NC-Congress alliance. The local disenchantment from NC and Congress was evident from the outpour of booth volunteers for MUF (Bose 2003: 48).

However, the 1987 elections were far from free and fair. Bose lists down eyewitness reports that testified patterns of "massive rigging, booth capturing, forcible stamping for NC, instances of people not being allowed to vote, cases of booth officials stopping the count after non NC-Congress candidate takes the lead and refusal by civic authorities to listen to any complaints" (Bose 2003: 49). Bose points out the case of the Amirakadal constituency where Jamaat-i-Islami candidate Yusuf Shah was contesting and was expected to win by a landslide margin. However, GM Shah was declared the winner. Public protests ensued, and Police arrested both Yusuf Shah and his campaign manager Yasin Malik without any charge or trial from March till the end of 1987 (ibid.). The election witnessed 75% voting with NC getting 40 seats, Congress (I) securing 26 seats, BJP securing two seats and remaining eight seats went to independents with 4 out of them belonging to MUF (Widmalm 1997: 1019). Yusuf Shah emerged as Syed Salahuddin and became the chief of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen after this traumatic experience and disillusionment from Indian democratic processes and Yasin Malik crossed the border and emerged in 1989 as a militant who later on would become Indian head of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Bose 2003: 50). A similar incident happened with Abdul Ghani Lone who was initially declared a winner, but the result was changed in favour of NC candidate (Bose 2003: 51). Lone, later on, would become one of the founding fathers of All Party Hurriyat Conference who would take up the political struggle for Kashmir's right to self-determination without recognizing constitution of India.

The 1987 elections had much promise around them. After suffering long spans of curfews, economic stagnation, and institutional decay, 1987 election offered a promise of legitimate opposition and fair elections. After these episodes, Bose notes that disenfranchisement was complete and the trust from Indian democracy eroded not merely in the minds of regional political elites but also in Kashmiris (Bose 2003: 95). In 1989 parliamentary election, the voter's turnout was merely 4% which signified the intensity of political alienation in Kashmir. The political processes in Kashmir tell us the sad tale of how mere opposition dissenters like Jamaat-e-Islami who contested 1972,1977,1983 and 1987 election under the banner of MUF was forced to transform into "disloyal" organization that rejected the Indian democracy and Indian sovereignty over Kashmir (Bose 2003: 99). Dulat notes that Jamaat was not inclined to join militancy as it would only result in Kashmiris shedding blood of Kashmiris but in 1990, they approved of militancy and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen became their militant outfit (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 99).

It was not merely the degeneration of Kashmiri institution but Indian institutions as well as Widmalm notes that watchdogs of electoral processes like Election Commission and the High Court were more silent and unresponsive to petitions by MUF leaders, and instead 8 MUF members were charged with cases of instigating people on religious lines and chanting anti-national slogans and were arrested under draconian Terrorist, and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act famously known as TADA (Widmalm 1997: 1021). Bose argues that Indian state made Kashmir "an enclave of authoritarian politics and repressive central controls within an institutional framework on robust multi-party politics and federalism" (Bose 2003: 101). Trembley terms these strategies as strategies of 'Overpoliticized state' where political actors engage in such practices for their political survival and these strategies invite political violence in the form of guerrilla war, coups and insurgencies (Trembley 1997: 494). Lone calls the 1987 election rigging as the "flashpoint" as the condition became ripe for abandoning of democratic processes to launch an armed struggle (Widmalm 1997: 1022).

Syed argues that Farooq Abdullah was no longer seen as the protector of interests of Kashmiri hence the youth took the initiative upon themselves. Since the ballot has failed them, they resorted to bullet as the way of deliverance of Kashmir's destiny. Syed argues that a new generation of militants was born inside the prisons and police control rooms, after witnessing police brutality and hollowness of democratic promises of

Indian constitution. The crossing of LOC became a holy journey undertaken for a pious task as the first batch of youth crossed the border in 1987-88 for weapon training (Syed 2002: 249). Evans provides an interesting insight into the insurgency. He notes that just before the 1965 war, Pakistan tried to foment insurgency in Kashmir by causing infiltration and expected support from Kashmiris after it launched an offensive against India. However, not only did Kashmiris refused to pick up arms against India but also not welcomed Pakistan's attack on India (Evans 1999: 23). However, after the 1987 elections, the vast political mobilization by Islamist leaders and people's discontentment with India's democracy indicated that political violence is around the corner (ibid.).

2.6 Phases of Kashmir insurgency (1987-2018)

I have divided Kashmir insurgency into phases to paint the evolving nature of the insurgency in Kashmir. These divisions are not watertight as traits described in different phases are not exclusive to that phase only. The division is done for methodological simplicity and general understanding.

2.6.1 Phase 1 - Strike of Militancy and Popular Backlash for Azaadi

Jagmohan notes that insurgency in Kashmir was not an unorganized outbreak of people's rebellion against India but a result of well-knit conspiracy supported by various forces, propagated by well-oiled propaganda machinery and was aimed at infiltrating government institutions, creating subversions and driving out Indian state from the political and social life of Kashmiris. He notes that Kashmir got wounded by terrorism and violent activities like a bomb blast Central Telegraph office in July 1988, blast in Maruti van on October 27, 1988, and at Lal Chowk where 11 people were injured. JKLF Terrorists attacked CRPF bus on July 13, 1989, in which two CRPF personnel and four civilians died, and ten were grievously injured (Malhotra 1991). Jagmohan notes that terrorists used modern tactics comprising of the element of surprise, ambush, planning and disappearing in crowds. These were terrorist activities as they were conducted not merely to challenge the state authority but also to overawe the public and attract media attention (Malhotra 1991: 319). After the blast in ladies toilet in Khayan cinema on July 20, it was ascertained that female Jihadis are now also part of the terrorism. The speck of fundamentalism was also beginning to grow as a model of Independent Kashmir as the ideal Islamic state was germinating into the ideas.

The example of this is an acid attack on young Muslim ladies without burqa to send a message of fear across (Malhotra 1991: 320).

Terrorists also targeted politicians as on August 21 Mohammad Yusuf Halwani; National Conference politician was shot dead in Srinagar. On September 14, Tikka Lal Taploo, a Kashmiri Pandit advocate of High court and BJP vice president of J&K Unit was shot dead in Srinagar. JKLF released a statement after this assassination that the organization would kill anyone who would proclaim that J&K accession to India is irrevocable. Jagmohan also notes that it was a signal to the Kashmiri Pandit community to change their stance as the majority of them were Indian loyalists (Malhotra 1991: 322). As the martyrdom day of Ajaz Dar was celebrated by terrorists through prayer, poems, posters, and closure of markets, colleges and schools, the state administration or the state government did not do anything to counter the propaganda (like removing posters, forcing market open) hence the celebration filled euphoria among separatists. The violence on that day included attacks on Police Patrol car and J&K Bank in which around 50 people were injured. Jagmohan notes that absence of sound strategy by state gave terrorists a free hand to carry out their propaganda which granted them a psychological advantage and terrorism started to gain a stronghold in Kashmir (Malhotra 1991: 323).

The administration laxity was further demonstrated when the administration did not try to break the strikes and protests after the arrest of Shabir Shah on September 27 furthermore DCP Srinagar, and DCP Anantnag refused to sign the warrant of arrest of Shabir Shah. The Advocate General, Additional Advocate General, declined to appear as government counsel against Shabir Shah, entrenching the roots of subversion and boosting the confidence of Shabir Shah's supporters (Malhotra 1991: 324). October and November of 1989 were marked by over 50 bomb blasts with scores of people injured. The terrorists brutally killed the family of Shabir Ahmad, Sub-inspector including his ten-year-old daughter and also assassinated retired sessions Judge N.K. Gunjoo who pronounced the death sentence to Maqbool Butt to instill fear in the minds of judges (Malhotra 1991: 325). The subversion became easy because not merely there was infighting within parties, but there were interparty conflicts (Malhotra 1991: 327) which resulted in the absence of collective political voice to condemn the violent activities of the terrorists. The most prominent was a squabble between Congress (I) and National Conference as Jagmohan points out an incidence where Mohammad Shafi Qureshi of

Congress (I) continually criticised Farooq Abdullah via fiery speeches, blaming him for doing nothing to curb unabated violence and complained about ‘step-motherly’ treatment being accorded to Congress (I). National Conference legislators rebuked Qureshi for sabotaging Farooq-Rajiv Accord (Malhotra 1991: 328).

Syed groups the insurgency into five phases (which I will use to denote subphases as his analysis does not go beyond 2000) although the dominant traits were not the only trait and the phases were not neatly sequential but can guide us towards an evolving pattern of insurgency and its dynamics.¹¹ Praveen Swami also notes the changing character of terrorism in the valley through empirical data. He notes that although the militancy started after the blast in Telegraph office, the militants were not very keen for an armed confrontation with Indian state as the bulk of violence comprised of random bomb blasts and just one attack claimed fatality on security forces out of six attacks launched at them. In 1990, the situation changed as an attack on security forces increased 20 times with ten times more civilian and security personnel casualty (Swami 2003: 45). Indian state’s response also reflects the intensification of the insurgency as Indian security forces killed 552 terrorists in 1990 after killing none in 1989 (ibid.).

The first subphase is divided into two parts: Underground militant activity and mass political movement. As part of the underground militant activity, the militants unleashed series of violent actions on police, CRPF, and intelligence agencies. Militants targeted police stations and pro- Indian police officers. Pro- Indian officers deaths were not mourned by pro-militant police forces and were not accorded state honour. These activities led to demoralization of police forces (Syed 2002: 251), but it also pointed towards deep levels of subversions within state institutions.

2.6.1.1 Subversions in the valley

Jagmohan states that by 1990, 44 terrorist organizations have cropped up in Kashmir with around 39 training centres in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. Jagmohan gives an illustration of how terrorists infected the institutions. Firstly the Police which was tasked to counter the terrorists had much personnel working for the terrorist organizations or were sympathizing with the terrorist agenda of secession. Jagmohan notes that police force did not stick a photograph of terrorists on the wanted boards,

¹¹ Bose also divides the Kashmir insurgency into three phases, Firstly Intifada phase from 1989-1995; Demoralization phase from 1996-1998 and Fidayeen phase from 1999-2002 (Bose 2003: 107).

they were disinterested in investigating major terrorists as they wrote shoddy FIRs and took no action. Case in point is the kidnapping of Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed in which only one line investigation report was written which read “ Accused are not known and no witness forthcoming” (Malhotra 1991: 375).

Jagmohan argues that turned police officers had a huge role in the elimination of Intelligence Bureau officers from the valley which resulted in drying up of intelligence (Malhotra 1991: 376). Many middle-ranking officers like head constables, constables were working with terrorists and were promised substantial monetary rewards.¹² (ibid.). While those working as double agents were caught, police officers who just collaborated with terrorists¹³ were a lot harder to catch. Jagmohan ponders over the possibility of official complicity when he comes across how Farooq Abdullah government released over 70 terrorists from July to December 1989. These terrorists included many of those who were experienced subversives and had an experience of border crossing, weapons training, facilitating infiltration and executing bomb blasts (Malhotra 1991: 379). Jagmohan recounts the horrible consequences of their release as they were absorbed into militant organization networks as heads of various divisions and were tasked by the important role of smuggling weapons and recruiting militants¹⁴ (Malhotra 1991: 380).

Jagmohan argues that subversives had also infiltrated General Services as he came across instances where an Inspector in the State electricity Department on the payroll of State government worked as Area Commander of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and used department facilities like vehicles and telephones for terrorist activities. A similar instance was of Irshad Hussain who was Junior Engineer on the state payroll who worked as weapons handler of major terrorist groups and was indicted in several bomb blast cases including Srinagar Zero Bridge and Kashmir Club. The Hospitality and Protocol department was also compromised. Jagmohan notes that these subversives were supported by political bosses and were not accountable to their seniors and carried out terrorist activities with impunity (Malhotra 1991: 381).

¹² A Head Constable working in Joint interrogation centre leaked information to terrorists like Abdullah Bangaroo.

¹³ Supplied them with curfew passes, leaking information in lieu of money etc.

¹⁴ Mohammad Daud Khan became deputy commander in Chief of Al- Bakr is an important illustration to prove this point

The infiltration of subversive element resulted in the fleeing of 12 detenus from Srinagar Central Jail where Jagmohan notices the infiltration and collusion at multiple levels. He also highlights that influential doctors of significant hospitals in Srinagar colluded with terrorists as they provided them with facilities to hide and store/hide their weapons. The conspiracy hatched within the hospital was revealed when doctors at SMS hospital arranged the escape of Hameed Sheikh and Yasin Malik who were indicted in kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed. Dr. A.A Guru (who was later revealed as an ideologue of JKLF and was killed by HUM) controlled subversive activities as he and his caucus had a say in appointments, fund allocation and other decisions of the hospital (Malhotra 1991: 385). Jagmohan notes that the subversion also got spread to the courts. Two judges subverted the rules in High court as they formed a division bench on their own instead of what legally is mandated to be constituted by the Chief Justice. The judgments passed by courts comprised majorly of restricting curfew times, granting anticipatory bails under Public Safety Act (Malhotra 1991: 386).

The most vicious subversion was subversion of Press as Jagmohan notes that vernacular press literally became the mouthpiece of the terrorist and their principal methodology was to give publicity to events, press releases, and declaration given by terrorists with much glorification to their deeds and more tooth to their threats by intimidatory language (Malhotra 1991: 388). The newspaper became more hostile from 1989 onwards, and some of them became mouthpieces of Hizb-ul- Mujahideen as they went on to publish and disseminate threats issued by the HUM to induce fear of violence against non -Muslims in the valley. These newspapers also carried on the task of inciting people to defy curfew and revolt against the state (Malhotra 1991: 389). Another strategy of these newspapers was biased reporting and exaggeration of facts to influence the minds of the readers. The rumour mongering was done to demoralize the army and tarnish India's image in the mind of Kashmiris (Malhotra 1991: 392) As Indian army men were not Kashmiri and Muslim, the naïve Kashmiri Muslims started believing in these rumours.

The dangerous of all subversions were political subversions in which Jagmohan regarded National Conference as the main culprit. As an example of National conference duplicity, Jagmohan highlights call by Ali Mohammad Sagar on Maqbool Bhatt day for withdrawal of security forces ironically asked by National conference itself (Malhotra 1991: 368). National Conference MLA, Abdul Rashid Dar urged fellow

party members to join the freedom movement and assist JKLF (ibid.). It showed the duplicitous nature of National Conference as they became anti-India when they went out of power and shifted their loyalty to terrorists. Jagmohan blames the escalation of the insurgency to the subversive political activities of leaders like Farooq Abdullah who gave speeches against Indian state to keep alive his relevancy. Jagmohan argues that his approach to keeping the ‘pot burning’ hindered a fight against terrorism in the valley (Malhotra 1991:370).

Syed notes that BSF and CRPF were often drawn into ambushes which caused heavy casualties which led to frustration and human rights violations by them. The militants selectively targeted intelligence agents of Intelligence Bureau on behest of ISI which led to problems in intelligence gathering (Syed 2002: 250).

2.6.1.2 Challenge to Indian sovereignty and a series of assassinations

Militants next resorted to targeting symbols of Indian sovereignty over Kashmir by organizing strikes and civil curfew on Indian Independence Day and Indian Republic Day, burning Indian flags and removing the title of ‘Indian’ from institutions like State bank of India, Air India, Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum, and others. Jagmohan notes that terrorists sent warning letters to parents warning them of dire consequences if they allow their ward to participate in Indian Independence Day celebrations (Malhotra 1991: 320). Their aim was to paralyze and delegitimize state institutions and emerge as the sole political and social voice of Kashmir (Syed 2002: 250). Militant organizations replaced official calendars with their calendars to undermine state’s legitimacy in which 20 October was celebrated as ‘day of occupation’ as Indian forces landed on Kashmir to liberate it from Pak sponsored tribal invaders. Nehru birthday on 14th November was celebrated as ‘black day’ and Sheikh Abdullah death anniversary was celebrated as *Yomi-i-nijat* (day of deliverance). Fearing or accepting the writ of the militant organization, the public offices like banks and secretariat started observing Friday as a holiday instead of Sunday (ibid.). By 1990, Terrorist organizations writs became the law of the valley- they ordered residents to surrender their Indian passports, ordered shopkeepers to colour their shops green and to observe strikes and closedowns whenever a call for a strike is given (Malhotra 1991: 374). Jagmohan notes that terrorists instructed the general public not to pay taxes to the state and the incapable state administration could not even collect excise duty and entertainment taxes (ibid.).

After subverting state institutions, militants sought to dominate the electoral space of Kashmir through violence. Syed notes that Militants started killing pro Indian National Conference politicians and declared an ultimatum to other leaders to resign from the party. Jagmohan notes that this move of militants was inspired by series of resignations by top leaders of National conference. The fear of militants also reigned supreme which was demonstrated through special column *Izhar-e-Latalugee* (Declaration of disassociation) in Kashmir daily *Aftab* (Syed 2002: 251)(Trembley 1997: 491) while Jagmohan notes that many of them were paid advertisements by leaders disillusioned by the inability of Farooq Abdullah (Malhotra 1991: 329). Jagmohan, however, doesn't discount the threat of violence as on August 12 there was an explosion near the house of Kashmir president of National Conference Abdul Salam Deva; On August 13, the explosion was near the house of Ghulam Ahmad Mir; Sheikh Rashid who was cousin of Farooq Abdullah resigned after there was an explosion on the compound of his house (Malhotra 1991: 329), He resigned due to his differences with Farooq Abdullah as he alleged that the National Conference has abandoned its core principles and partially due to fear of militants which explains the timing of his resignation.

The extent of militant control over electoral control can be gauged by the fact that during 1989 Parliamentary elections, nearly 5,000 booths stopped functioning, government schools which served as polling station were set on fire, and the administration was too scared and reluctant to control the spate of violence. The average voting in Anantnag and Baramulla were 5.11% and 5.47 % respectively, and according to some media outlets only 2% votes were cast (Syed 2002: 251). What is noteworthy here is that lack of voting should not wholly be ascribed to fear of militants or violence but also to their political alienation and disenfranchisement from the façade of electoral democracy after 1987 elections. Syed notes that locals supported militants as they considered them one of their own who were willing to die for their land and people of Kashmir (Syed 2002: 252).

Militants also engaged in arson and kidnapping of political leaders; the most famous of all them was the kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed, Daughter of Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed on 8 December 1989 for the release of 5 militants. The VP Singh government buckled to the demands and released five militants¹⁵. As the kidnapping

¹⁵ Hamid Sheikh, Mohammad Kalwal, Javed Ahmad Zarger, Sher Khan and Mohammad Altaf Butt were released.

yielded a favourable result for JKLF, even the skeptics assumed that azaadi is just around the corner. The violent activities increased many folds as on December 20; United Bank was looted. On December 27, Prem Nath Butt who was a noted journalist from Anantnag was shot. In following days, J&K Police personnel were explicitly targeted as on December 20, two police officers including a DSP were shot in which the police constable died; an ex-serviceman was killed on the same day in Kupwara. On December 27, a DSP was shot near Kashmir University (Malhotra 1991: 335). The total of 1600 violent incidents which included 351 bomb blasts had already wounded the valley in 1989 (Malhotra 1991: 342).

The new -year (1990) brought new tales of bloodshed as the valley was rattled by shooting of Intelligence Bureau Inspector R.N.P. Singh on January 3, 1990. As the confidence rose among the militant cadre, their acts of violence became more provocative and ghastly as they hanged a police officer from a tree in Hyderpura on January 8 after brutally torturing him (Malhotra 1991: 335) Lassa Kaul, Station Director of Doordarshan and IB officer Bhan were murdered on February 13 and 12 respectively in gruesome manner (Malhotra 1991: 363). Even Muslim dissidents were punished with death evident from Professor Mushir-ul-Haq murder. Indian newspapers widely criticized administrative apathy which allowed militants free hand to call the shots in the valley. Sanjeev Mighali of The Statesman wrote that no one from the centre came to assess the situation and the administrative machinery has collapsed completely (Malhotra 1991: 336). Jagmohan shows that the credibility of the ruling dispensation was eroded, frequent bomb blasts and militant attacks questioned state's monopoly over legitimate violence.

Syed highlights the movement became the mass movement when the Kashmiris devised new social norms and religious sanctions to justify political violence. He notes that having Mujahideen in the family became a status symbol as women would put mehandi on their son's hands going to cross the border and daughters would give them hero's welcome on their return after training. Young kids were brainwashed by the narrative that Indian forces are there to take away their freedom and were seen moving with placards reading 'Indian dogs go back.' The narrative was furthered with new political vocabulary that termed Mujahideen as freedom fighters and Indian forces as 'occupational forces.' Curfews were termed as Martial law, and Mujahideen graveyard acquired a holy significance (Syed 2002: 258). Jagmohan highlights the propaganda

blitz that came to dominate the society in the valley apart from frequent bomb blasts. There were calls of Hartals given by militant organizations on their whims, and political parties could not bring themselves to counter these calls by issuing calls of its own. The propaganda blitz was in the form of pamphlets, papers and other materials and this blitz were aimed to control the mind of Kashmiris and assist in the legitimation of discourse of violent struggle for independence. Again, the state administration did nothing to counter this propaganda (Malhotra 1991: 330). The propaganda blitz was supported by three major mouthpieces of subversive organizations. *Sada-i-Huriyat*, *Sada-i-Haq*, and *Sada-i-Kashmir* were three mouthpieces which adopted the strategy of Islamic blackmail on the naïve population threatening them with the curse of Allah if they do not contribute to the cause of freedom of Kashmir. Jagmohan argues that propaganda war included Islamic obligation and fear of divine wrath, poetic passion, the glory of martyrdom, religious fervour, portraits of Indian occupation of Kashmir and exaggerated tales of Indian cruelty which was tasked to mold the mind of Kashmiris (Malhotra 1991: 400).

The series of government crackdown also assisted in converting this underground insurgency into a mass movement. As the attacks of state institutions became rampant, Indian security forces organized cordon and search and started violently curtailing protests which led to a large number of civilian death. Indian state crackdown adopted a form of prolonged curfews which restricted civilian movement along with custodial torture and enforced disappearances which we will discuss in the next chapter. Kashmiri rose against the injustice and the state's ruthless actions against its population. Since the mass movement has to operate on some motivational force that could bind people together towards a common cause and sustain the movement for a more extended period.

Syed argues that the rationale of violence and support to Militants was purely contemporary as Kashmiri heritage influenced by 'Rishi order' which was pacifying and non-violent did not offer any justifications of violence furthermore Kashmir's history did not have any heroic tales of conquest and valour. Syed argues that this is why the unrest in 1930 against monarchy and political movement in the 1960s by Plebiscite front was fought non-violently. Syed notes since the ancient culture and accounts of past struggles did not motivate violent struggle, Islam provided the rationale for the fight for justice (Syed 2002: 259). The ideas encapsulated in the politico-

religious concept of Jihad. Syed notes that after the political movement got coloured with Islamic colours, the mosques became the new power centres and the struggle translated into establishing '*Nizam- e- Mustafa*' or Islamic democracy based on ideals of Quran and Sunnah (ibid.). Jagmohan pointed out that Islam and its ideas were deployed to rouse political consciousness in the minds of people (Malhotra 1991: 398).

In the first phase we witnessed

1. Dual character of insurgency as an underground movement and a popular struggle.
2. In this phase, the challenge to Indian sovereignty was launched as political process like elections were rejected by people. The writs and threats of militant organizations operated in the valley.
3. There was a considerable lack of political courage to challenge the militancy
4. The administration found itself completely helpless in the light of sudden outburst of violence

2.6.2. Phase 2- Radical Islamic capture of Popular Movement

As the struggle for 'azaadi' got covered in Islamic tinge, the radical militant organizations sought to expunge non-Islamic influences from the valley, and the victims were pro- India Kashmiri Pandits. Syed notes that selective killings of Kashmiri Pandits were carried by JKLF. The violence against Kashmiri Pandits reached critical high in 1989 as militants carried planned campaign is asking Kashmiri Pandits to evacuate the valley through use of Mosques which warned the community of dire consequences through loudspeakers if they stayed.

2.6.2.2. Exodus of Kashmiri Pandits

Tej K Tikoo notes that night of January 19, 1990 was ominous as he recounts the incidents of sirens from mosques inciting Muslims in the valley to eliminate *Kafirs* (Tikoo 2013: 371). *Ralive (convert) Tsalive (abandon the place) ya Galive (perish)* were the choices given to Kashmiri Pandits. Hizb in its press release in Urdu daily's Aftab on April 1, 1990, asked Kashmiri Pandits to leave the valley within two days as they are responsible for the duress on Kashmiri Muslims (Tikoo 2013: 372). The state administration provided them with no respite, and they were forced to seek refuge in tattered and unhygienic refugee camps at Jammu and Delhi. Tikoo notes that minister

of Rehabilitation in the state government, Raman Bhalla announced that 219 Kashmiri Pandits were killed in 1990 but survey conducted by Centre for Minority Studies, Jammu, and Kashmir, stated that 316 Kashmiri Pandits were killed from July 1989- October 1990 in which 311 were killed in 1990 alone (Tikoo 2013: 398). Panun Kashmir Movement submitted its report to National Human Rights Commission in which it mentioned that till October 1990, 319 Kashmiri Pandits were killed (Tikoo 2013: 401). B.N. Nissar who was the editor of *Kashyap Vani* compiled the names of 765 Kashmiri Pandits that were massacred from 1989- October 1990 (ibid.).

These massacres led to the exodus of Kashmiri Pandit community from Kashmir. Tikoo argues that most of Kashmiri Pandits fled between January and May 1990 leaving their property behind. Under the shadow of violence, around 60,000 families left the valley and registered themselves at various places (Tikoo 2013: 411)¹⁶

The newspapers carried special columns dedicated to warning Kashmiri Pandits to evacuate the valley. Although the Kashmiri Pandit community started migrating reeling under the threats from 1988 onwards, On 19 January 1990, the wide-scale exodus of Kashmiri Pandit community took place as the state administration laid helpless in its efforts to placate the community and instill security in their mind so that exodus can be prevented. After the exodus, the administration did nothing to rehabilitate Pandits back into the valley in the coming months. The security situation worsened in the valley and the will to return faded over time. Syed notes that Kashmiri identity bifurcated into Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits (Syed 2002: 259).

The insurgency in its second phase witnessed JKLF lose its leadership role partly due to better preparedness of security forces (Syed 2002: 262) but also due to withdrawal of Pakistan' support as the 'independence sentiment' espoused by JKLF was not in the interest of Pakistan and it needed terrorist outfits that could assist in merger of Kashmir into Pakistan. Syed cites Wirsing to bring home the concern that Pakistan faced. As the cry of Azaadi grew louder, Pakistan was worried that these cries could jeopardize Pakistan claim in Northern areas and from Jammu and Kashmir in total (ibid.). As we have witnessed, as the Islamic fundamentalism grew, the mantle of leading the

¹⁶ Based on report on the impact of Migration on Socio-economic conditions of Kashmiri displaced people conducted by Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies.

insurgency was passed on to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen which waged Islamic righteous war (Jihad) against the Indian state, Kashmiri Pandits and moderate and secular JKLF. Their purpose was to make Kashmir, merge with Pakistan as they discarded the secular nationalist version of nationalism of JKLF. HUM's nationalism was linked to Islam. They were opposed to the idea of an independent Kashmir and were in constant loggerheads with JKLF. Both ideological adversaries engaged in warfare as both organizations either conducted ambushes on each other or leaked information to Indian security forces about each other's hideouts. Syed notes that firing by Pakistan on unarmed JKLF members to stop them from crossing LOC signaled divorce in the relationship between JKLF and Pakistan (Syed 2002: 266) and the resurgence of Hizb ul-Mujahideen as a favoured pawn of Pakistan. However, Pakistan never favoured anyone militant group in its strategy of sustaining insurgency in Kashmir.¹⁷ Syed notes that the reason was two-fold. Firstly, Pakistan did not want any organization to centralize the movement hence it resorted to the tactic of 'counterbalancing one organization against other and secondly, it wanted to prevent any group from becoming influential enough to go to the negotiation table with India (Syed 2002: 268).

Syed points out that Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was not embraced as wholeheartedly as JKLF was embraced because people preferred 'azaadi' over communion with any other nation in South Asia. Syed notes that strict directives of adherence to tenets of Islam given by Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and their directives to Kashmiris to cease worship of *Pir Mazars* and decreed *Sufi* tradition as blasphemous drew the ire of Kashmiris who believed in syncretic ideals of "Kashmiriyat" (Syed 2002: 266.). Hizb-ul-Mujahideen warned Pandits not to return to the valley if they do not support the movement (Syed 2002: 267). This phase was marked by the waning of people's spirit as 'Azaadi' was not appearing close. The army entered the valley and was neutralizing militants; there was also infighting between various militant outfits with their separate agendas and the motivation in many cases shifted to glamour than a genuine desire for 'Azaadi' (Syed 2002: 269). Militants started a parallel economy where they resorted to activities like kidnapping, smuggling timber to fund themselves. They carried out extortion in the form of donation. Syed argues that rallies for 'azaadi' decreased. The criminal activities

¹⁷ Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Al-Badr, Allah Tigers and others.

of militants led to the degeneration of movement where feared reigned; of militants and security forces (ibid.).

2.6.3. Phase 3- Degeneration of Militancy and entry of guest militants

The degeneration of insurgency continued in this phase of insurgency which was marked by the Hazratbal crisis (1993) in which militant occupied Hazratbal mosque; an act which was seen with disdain by the local Kashmiris. The disillusionment with the crusaders grew strong, so Pakistan modified its strategy. Earlier Pakistan used to fund and support local militants with sometimes sending Pakistani Jihadis to provide leadership, training, and coordination with the ISI. However, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan started sending Afghan veterans to fight against Indian state which was projected as a secular and anti-Muslim entity by Pakistan. Pakistan fiddled around with the idea of Pan Islamism and convinced these foreign mercenaries that Islam is under threat and by liberating Kashmir, ideas of establishing *Dar-ul-Islam* (land of Islam) and Islamic Millat or a grand Islamic state can be realized (Syed 2002: 270).

Through Pakistan's mediation, there was an influx of organizations like Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-i-Toiba, and Harkat-ul-Jehad Islami which were of Wahhabi orientations and whose aim was to establish Caliphate with no regional or racial importance. Syed argues that Jamiat ul-Mujahideen in its ideological pronouncement emphasized on Islamic identity of Kashmiri movement and asserted that reducing the present movement to a mere democratic one would be a distortion of Islamic teachings as Kashmiriyat and territorial nationalism is not compatible with Islamic ideals (Syed 2002: 271). The field of insurgency came to be dominated by so-called 'guest militants' who negated the Kashmiri-will for self-determination and syncretic culture and tried to replace it with an Islamic caliphate.

As Indian army started eliminating key commanders and inflicting significant damages on militant organizations in 1993-1994, Indian state assumed that the time was ripe to regain the political initiative in Kashmir as we will be seen in subsequent chapters but this phase was not only an ideal time for Indian state to cull the militancy but also for the heads of militant organizations to look out for political avenues to solve the bloodshed or what was commonly referred as 'gun culture'. Centre government released Syed Ali Shah Geelani, of Jamaat-i-Islami, Abdul Ghani Lone of People

conference and Maulana Abdul Ansari, Qazi Nissar and Abdul Ghani Bhatt of Muslim United Front. Later on, Indian government released Yasin Malik of JKLF and Shabir Shah of People's league in 1994 to kick-start the political dialogue. Malik and Shah along with other leaders like Javed Mir and Ghulam Nabi Butt started off by criticising the gun culture prevalent in the valley and asserted that their demands for independence could be won through negotiations. In this phase in the insurgency, struggle sought to explore the political options (Syed 2002: 276).

This phase witnessed the birth of All Party Hurriyat Conference, a conglomeration of 30 political and militant groups with an executive council of seven parties. The young Mirwaiz, Umar Farooq chaired the conglomeration. The goal of Hurriyat was to push for a political solution of Kashmir problem through a plebiscite under the aegis of United Nations so that Kashmiris can express their will for self-determination. Hurriyat conference had pro-Pakistan and Islamic overtones and much to the chagrin of Indian state, the Hurriyat conference ruled out negotiations within the framework of Indian constitution. With its broad base, APHC aspired to become the sole mouthpiece of the political movement of Kashmir.

Syed argues that the critical feature of this phase was initiatives by Kashmir leaders to wrest away the leadership from 'guest militants' and re-instill Kashmiri ethos into the movement. Yasin Malik and Shah were in the forefront of secularizing the movement by projecting it as a war between oppressed and oppressor across the border, not the war between religions. Mirwaiz Omar Farooq also denied to give the movement Islamic colour rather he projected it as the movement of Kashmiri people. Shabir and Malik tried to bridge the gap between Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims asking them to return to the valley (Syed 2002: 277). Syed argues that their efforts were scuttled by Pakistani controlled Harkat-ul-Ansar and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen who prohibited all attempts to secularize the insurgency. Both these leaders enjoyed popular support, and even people started rejecting diktats of these militant organizations. Syed cites an incident of 1994 where people foiled militant's attempt to kidnap the daughter of National Conference leader Ali Mohammad Sagar and also how Muslims in Srinagar made militants attacking a Hindu shopkeeper, flee. People resisted warnings from militants against the celebration of *Urs* (birth or death of rishi) of Batmoal Rishi in Batamaloo and Zainuddin Rishi in Aish Mugham. There were massive protests against Pakistan and Jamaat-i-Islami due to their role in the assassination of Qazi Nissar, a

leader with pro-independence orientations. People raised slogans like “*Jo Mangega Pakistan usko milega Kabristan*” (Syed 2002: 278). The scorn against Pakistan further deepened after the crisis at Charar-i-Sharif which revealed the Islamic orientation of Afghan mercenaries who captured the shrine. Local Kashmiris held the shrine of Sheikh Noorudin in high respect, and when the guest militant with no respect to the local culture occupied the shrine and the walls were desecrated with slogans like *Kashmir Banega Pakistan*, the people were incensed (Syed 2002: 279). The prospect of joining Pakistan was utterly unacceptable to the majority of the population.

2.6.3. Indian forces gains the ground.

The next sub-phase of insurgency (1995-97) is marked by heavy losses to the militant organizations as Syed notes that Indian army and security forces killed more than 4,000 militants in 1995 alone. Many militants surrendered but they were strategically deployed as Ikhwans, (renegades) and were utilized by Indian army and Rashtriya Rifles to counter militants in the valley especially Hizb- ul-Mujahideen. Syed argues that these pro- India militants harnessed people’s anger against Hizb and other militant organizations, but they were criticized for extortion and corruption activities they carried out with impunity under the shield of security forces (Syed 2002: 280) Furthermore Indian state now wanted to conduct polls and its strategy was to utilize these renegades to kick-start the negotiation process through entering into political sphere. The Hurriyat conference came under mounting criticism for failing to have carried forward the political talks and focusing on mere *bandhs*, strikes, and *Chalo* calls to corner the state which yielded no concrete result. India was unwilling to accede to demands of Hurriyat conference to involve Pakistan in the dispute and recognize Pakistan as a party to the dispute. Few prominent militants were willing to enter into unconditional dialogue with India- Babar Badr (Chief of Muslim Janbaaz force), Bilal Lodhi (erstwhile deputy of Abdul Ghani Lone), Imran Rahi (deputy chief of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen) (Syed 2002: 281). Syed argues that these militants did not ask for Pakistan’s involvement in dialogue marking a significant departure from another militant political line. They came together as a ‘Forum for peaceful resolution of J&K’ and central government reciprocated by releasing political prisoners, disarming few renegades and observing ceasefire against these militants groups. After witnessing these developments, former leaders of HUM Ahsan Dar and Azim Inqalabi were invited

to the table by India. All these negotiations finally culminated into elections of 1996 (Syed 2002: 282).

2.6.4. Phase 4- End of the insurgency, intensification of Radical Islamic terrorism and Indian Counterattack

From 1997 onwards, the Kashmiris started feeling the fatigue of entrenched warfare against the unrelenting state. Indian state was resolute enough not to let Kashmir slip from its hands. Pakistan's strategy was to tire India through continued pressure, but Pakistan too started suffering from increasing costs of providing resources to the militants. As the counterinsurgency operations intensified in the valley, Militants set up their base in the challenging terrain of Doda and Kishtwar in Jammu and started spreading their wings by targeting nearby hill areas. In April 1998, Militants killed 26 Hindu villagers in Prankote and Dakikote, located in the Udhampur district of the Jammu region (Ahmad 1998). HUM commander Abdul Hamid Gada orchestrated the killing of 23 Kashmiri Pandits in Wandhama in January 1998 (Swami 2003). Another terror act in Doda witnessed the massacre of 25 people on June 19. Terrorists massacred 35 villagers in Chamba on August 3, 1998 (BBC News 2001).

Mehraj, Narula, and Abbas write that after India and Pakistan became nuclear in May 1998, the cross-border firing became intense as Kashmir was now to be projected as the nuclear flashpoint. Pakistan's supported groups intensified their terrorist activities after gaining motivation from two successful nuclear tests by Pakistan. Muchkund Dubey, the Indian foreign secretary also commented that it was in the interest of Islamabad to derail all peace process (Mehraj, Narula and Abbas 1998). L.K Advani, the home minister of NDA government, adopted the 'proactive' hard-line approach against militants which signaled intensified counterinsurgency operation. After testing the nuclear weapons, Pakistan assumed that India would not react to any LOC adventurism. However, Pakistan's pursuit to change the status quo resulted in the Kargil War in 1999 which fortunately remained confined to a conventional war. Dulat notes that after Clinton forced Nawaz Sharif to take back the troops from Kargil, pro-Pakistan Kashmiris realized that Pakistan cannot liberate Kashmir even if it wanted to hence Pakistan's approach revolved around Plebiscite demand (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 102)

The Kargil War had deep logistic impact upon Indian LOC protection system. Evans notes the implication of Kargil war on the militancy in Kashmir as, after the war, India

had to renovate the security grid arrangement, and while this renovation was going on, terrorists infiltrated from LOC. Evans also notes that the terrorist attacks became more specified as security forces bases were targeted. The plausible explanation Evans provides is that the erstwhile pro-India terrorist started working for anti-India organizations and provided details of location and organization of security forces bases in Kashmir (Evans 2000: 76). As security forces maintained a thorough record of surrendered militants, this hypothesis would suggest gross laxity on the part of security forces. Indian aircraft IC 814 carrying 176 passengers and 15 crew members was hijacked on 24 December 1999 by terrorists of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and was landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan from where terrorists demanded the release of Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh and Maulana Masood Azhar (Iqbal 2015). A.S Dulat, former R&AW chief criticized the Crisis Management group in Delhi for mishandling the situation which resulted in yet another negotiation failure by India (ibid.). Like the Rubaiya Sayeed case, the release of three terrorists had a lasting implication on Indian security.

After his release, Maulana Masood Azhar founded Jaish-e-Mohammad with the intention of taking charge of militancy operations (Jihad) in Kashmir. Since such coordination was not possible due to sectarian differences between militant organizations operating from Pakistan, Azhar organized a rebellion in rank and file of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Azhar became its chief and got control of launching pads¹⁸ and training centres which were under the control of Mohammad Khalil (Outlook 2000). JEM took up the mantle of terrorism by conducting a first suicide attack in the valley on April 19, 2000, outside Army Corp 15 headquarters in Badami Bagh, killing one and injuring seven. Another major attack was in the form of a car bomb blast outside State Legislative Assembly in Srinagar and subsequent shooting with Indian security forces which killed over 31 people on October 1, 2001 (Stanford University 2015). Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) also vied for becoming the dominant terrorist organization in the valley as it carried murderous assault on March 2000 at Chittisinghpura in which 35 Sikhs were massacred (Press Trust of India 2000).

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen announced its ceasefire on July 25, 2000, but other militant organizations ensured that violence does not subside in the valley. The month of August

¹⁸ Launching pads are referred to the sites where militants assemble to cross the Line of Control or India Pakistan Border.

in the year 2000 started with the biggest bloodbath of the insurgency which has been replaced by terrorism as August 1 and 2 witnessed death of 91 people including 26 labourers due to series of multiple terrorist attacks in the valley. Firstly, there was shooting at Pahalgam camp of Amarnath Yatra in which 32 people died. After 5 hours there was the merciless murder of 19 labourers from a different part of India at Katran village in Qazigund area of South Kashmir. After an hour, militants killed seven brick kiln labourers at Sandhu village near Achabal. On the same day, 23 villagers were killed in two separate incidents at Danmata and Kunda villages in Doda district and Dachan region in the same district. Five other civilians were shot near Banihal in Doda district. Terrorists also gunned down the family of five of surrendered militant Mumtaz Ganai (Bukhari 2000).

LeT killed 17 Hindus in Ludar hamlet of Paddar area in Kishtwar in Doda District on August 3, 2001 (Kak 2001). LeT along with JeM attacked Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 in which 14 people were killed. It led India to conduct its largest army mobilization at LOC known as Operation Parakram. Under pressure from the US and the international community, Pervez Musharraf was compelled to ban JeM and LeT in January 2002 (Reuters 2009). On 14 May 2002, LeT militants attacked army and army family lines after stopping Jammu bound bus from Pathankot at Kaluchak, killing 31 people including three army personnel, 18 family members of army personnel and ten civilians (Ministry of External Affairs 2002). LeT was involved in yet another terrorist attack in Qaim Nagar on July 13, 2002, in which 32 people were killed. Unidentified terrorists assassinated Abdul Ghani Lone on May 21, 2002. He was one of the founders of All Party Hurriyat Conference, and it was suspected that ISI assassinated him due to his opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and Jihadi fighters in the valley and his desire to have talks with the centre for resolution of Kashmir conflict (The Hindu 2002). Islamic terrorists were hell-bent on muzzling the voice of all those who opposed Islamization of valley and Kashmir's merger into Pakistan.

The attack on Kashmiri Pandit minority continued in 2003 when 24 Kashmiri Pandits were gunned down in Nadimarg in Shopian district on March 23, 2003, by LeT terrorists. The 15 surviving families of Kashmiri Pandits fled the area after two days of Massacre (Dar 2003). Doda district yet again became the hunting ground for militants as 22 people were killed in two villages of Doda district on May 1, 2006, and 13 more people were killed in Udhampur district (Haleem 2006). Dar (2003) notes that Muslims

in Nadimarg tried preventing Pandit migration as they were living peacefully with them for decades but the fear of terrorists was strong. This shows that terrorist organization in Kashmir did not have the approval of local Kashmiri Muslims and regions of Jammu and valley started suffering Islamic fundamentalism. This phase was marked by the continued and targeted elimination of minorities like Kashmiri Pandits.

2.6.5. Phase 5- From lull to Civil disobedience

From 2004- 2008, Kashmir valley was relatively peaceful and Indian state assumed that normalcy has returned to the valley after the successful 2008 Assembly elections which witnessed a high voter turnout. The tourism sector also witnessed growth. However, with the communalization of society, the old familiar calls of Azaadi were back into public space. The next phase witnessed the return of Kashmiris into the public space with their demands of justice and Azaadi after the Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in 2008.

During this crisis, India witnessed the apparent fight between Muslim separatist leadership of Srinagar represented by Yasin Malik, Syed Geelani, and Mirwaiz Omar Farooq as they opposed the land transfer and Hindu leaders (belonging to Hindu right) of Jammu region as they threatened of creating economic blockades. Greater Kashmir reports that on June 28, PDP pulled out of coalition government leading to falling of PDP-Congress coalition government. On June 29, Sri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) surrendered the land allotted to them. This ensued protests and blockade of Jammu-Lakhanpur Highway on 30 June in Jammu which was organized by Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dal, and Bhartiya Janata Party. It also led to the formation of Sri Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti (SASS). Leaders from Jammu like BJP state president Ashok Khajuria called a boycott of Kashmiri Politicians, and VHP leader Pravin Togadria called for a boycott of all Kashmiri products. The governor rule was imposed on July 10 after assembly was dissolved. On August 11, as the blockage began to hurt the fruits and handicrafts traders economically, The PDP, Hurriyat and Trader group gave a call for “Muzzafarabad Chalo’ where they would attempt to cross the LOC as a sign of protest. As the situation got volatile, eight people were killed which included Hurriyat leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz. On August 12, the violence intensified as 21 people were killed in Kashmir valley and region of Kishtwar by the Police and the security forces (Greater Kashmir 2008). Talks were organized on 31 August between 4 member

panel appointed by the state government and SASS in which SASB agreed to temporarily use the land during Amarnath Yatra (Press Trust of India 2008).

Why did the lull fade away? Naqvi (2008) writes that opposition to Indian security forces for their increasing operations against the civilians in the valley led people to support LeT and raise slogans of Azadi yet again in the valley. Kashmir valley witnessed development and growth in the tourism sector in last few years but despite that Naqvi notes that an existential crisis was created in the minds of people about their status in Kashmir and the little choice they have. She pointed out that even in Kashmir although Youths were shouting Azaadi, there is an economic constituency that still required Indian markets (Naqvi 2008). The shouts of Azaadi were reactionary and didn't have the support of all sections of Kashmir society hence we should avoid terming it as a revival of the insurgency. However, this civil disobedience took a turn for the worse in 2010 when the anger against Indian state became more intense.

On 27 April 2010, Indian army lured three labourers from Nadihal village in Baramulla through a promise of work for Rs 2,000 a day. The labourers met a counterinsurgent named Bashir Ahmad Lone and Abbas Hussain Shah who took them to an Army Major posted in Kupwara who offered them a deal to cross the LOC and spy for Indian army. They were taken to Sona Pindi in Kupwara region near LOC on 29-30 April and were killed by few officers of 4 Rashtriya Rifles after they were dubbed as militants infiltrating the LOC. The Police investigation revealed that this staged encounter was done for monetary reward (Yasir 2017). The bodies of labourers were exhumed on May 28 as the magisterial inquiry was ordered into the killing. On May 29, Kashmir witnessed massive protests. On June 11, 17-year-old Tufail Ahmad Matto was killed by a tear gas shell. The ensuing protests led to 11 deaths and crores of damage to public property as government buildings and vehicles were torched. On July 7, the Police response to the protests during a funeral procession led to two deaths (The Economist 2010).

A few months later the valley again descended into protests over reports of Quran burning on the anniversary of 11/9 terrorist attacks on the United States twin Towers. Around 15 people were killed in these protests with five people killed in an altercation with forces in the village of Tangmarg, and four people were killed in Budgam when Police fired upon Stone pelters (Al Jazeera 2010). Saba Naqvi told Al Jazeera that after

months of violence and harsh reaction from Indian state, the trust deficit has developed between Kashmiri and Indian state as now Kashmiris have started demanding more autonomy, dilution and removal of Armed Forces Special Powers Act and punishment to officers who fired upon crowds (ibid.). From May to September 21, Kashmir witnessed large-scale violence which resulted in the death of around 110 people, and 534 were injured. Around 1,274 CRPF men and 2,747 Police personnel were injured from the stone pelting and riots. Police surveyed 1000 people arrested for stone pelting and stated in their result that 72% had broken families and most of them were drug addicts (Hussain 2011). Although State Police wanted to project stone pelters as drug addicts and depressed youth, why did other 28% of arrested respondents' pelted stones? The problem in Indian approach to understanding the Kashmir reality seems to be a denial of what is explicit.

2.6.5.1 Tactic of stone pelting

The unique feature of this phase was the emergence of Stone pelting as a major form of opposition to Indian forces. Protestors hurled stones and bricks at security forces which caused injuries to Police and security personnel which led them to fire rubber bullets, tear gas and a new weapon of crowd control- Pellet Guns. The separatist leadership was not allowed on roads as they were kept under constant house arrests. This phase brought into the light, the Indian ineffectiveness in crowd control. The central government of India also was in denial about the ground realities as they blamed these violent acts on Pakistan's supported infiltrators. The Economist (2010) makes a pertinent point by stating that unlike the previous phases of insurgency where civilian deaths were the result of terrorist activities or crossfire between militants and security forces, in this phase, most civilian deaths were caused by security forces firing on the protestors. The authorities were viewing these protests as a continuation of 1989 insurgency but were ignorant of actions by Indian state that led people to out in this form of civil disobedience.

Saba Naqvi and Showkat Motta in their analysis list the causes of anger in Kashmiris as overwhelming footfall of Indian soldiers who treat Kashmiris without a shred of dignity. The Kashmiris also rue about hollow talks of development as the job opportunities in the valley had sunk drastically. As people were coming out on the

streets to demand their rights, Indian forces were not exercising restraints and were firing upon protestors killing even the innocent bystanders. After the Indian state perpetrates such killing and other human rights violations, no action was taken against them, and no steps were taken to curb human rights violation. Naqvi and Motta recount the tales of humiliations that Kashmiris face which compels them to pick up stones and come out on the street chanting Azaadi. Apart from the humiliations that fuel the anger in Kashmiris, Dr. Arshad Hussain who is a psychiatrist in a mental health facility in state tells Naqvi and Motta that 17% of Kashmiri people suffer from Post- Traumatic stress disorder which has also led to a rise in suicides among Kashmiri youth. He links it to the socio-political environment in the valley (Naqvi and Motta 2010).

Yasir notes that in 2013, Kashmir witnessed frequent attacks on security forces. Militants targeted security forces camps, and bunkers and security forces suffered an almost same number of fatalities as militants. Yasir notes that this was due to the return of *fidayeen* tactic of militants on security forces. Prominent terrorist incidents were *fidayeen* attack on CRPF camp near Police Public School, Bemina on March 13, attack on Police Party in Sopore which killed 4 Police personnel on 26 April, terrorist attack on 24 June which killed 8 soldiers and terrorist attack on Army camp in Samba in Jammu and attack on Police station in Hiranagar on September 26 in which 8 security forces personnel and two civilians were killed. The number of violent incidents declined and came down to lowest in 23 years, and merely 63 militants were killed in comparison to 119 in 2012, but the noteworthy aspect is the death of 61 armed personnel as compared to 47 in 2011 and 2012. However, militants attacks were more spatial and precise which made them deadlier than before (Yasir 2013). India and Pakistan also started engaging in cross-border firings¹⁹ across LOC in subsequent years, and the focus from Kashmir was shifted. The Kashmir once again came into prominence in 2016 after the encounter of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen commander, Burhan Wani.

2.6.6. Phase 6- Revival of the insurgency

Before the infamous encounter of Burhan Wani, there were frequent terror attacks on military camps and Police stations.²⁰ The police station in Kathua was attacked in

¹⁹ Also Known as ceasefire violations

²⁰ Even after Burhan Wani's death, JeM targeted 12 Infantry Brigade headquarters in Uri on 18 September 2016 killing 18 soldiers. JeM also targeted Sunjuwan Army camp on 10 February 2018 killing 6 army men and a civilian (Various news agencies).

March 2015 in which three people died. LeT attacked Police station at Gurdaspur on 27 July 2015 killing seven people including three civilians. On January 2, 2016, Pathankot air base was attacked by Pakistan based militants who killed seven people (Outlook 2016). On July 8, 2016, Burhan Wani was killed, and the widespread protests ensued. Motta argues that these protests were different from 2008 and 2010 protests because in 2016 protests, people not merely broke curfew but also attacked public properties, CRPF posts, army bunkers, BJP offices and various police stations across the regions of South Kashmir. Omar Abdullah in his interview with Bula Devi of Outlook commented that 2016 uprising has a life of its own and is not based on the demand of justice like the 2010 uprisings (Abdullah 2016). The anti- Indian protests increased after Indian security forces and J&K Police fired pellet guns on protestors in which even bystanders and children were blinded. The disproportionate use of force and little regard for casualties led to a rise in people's anger against India. Burhan Wani funeral witnessed the presence of around two lakh people who attended four funerals of Burhan Wani in Tral, South Kashmir. The outpour of such huge crowds in funeral processions of slain militants led Motta to use the phrase 'Streetside- Plebiscite.' The public with their footfall demonstrated the mood of the Kashmiri population (Motta 2016). The glamour quotient Burhan brought to the militancy by being active on social groups and circulation of tales of his miraculous escape enchanted the Youth of Kashmir (Abdullah 2016).

However, the leaderless crowd grew more angry and radical as the Indian army, and the Police force started eliminating militant commanders one after another in operation All out (discussed in next chapter). Girls who were not seen in the public spaces opposing Indian forces were now seen pelting stones as part of disgruntled youth. Girls in headscarves, in school uniform, pelting stones as armed vehicles became the image of resistance against India. One of the most promising female footballer of Kashmir, Afshan Ashiq indulged in stone pelting after Police misbehaved with her and 15 other girls accompanying her after the clashes near Pulwama's Government Degree College on April 13 which left around 50 students injured (India Today 2017).

2.6.6.1. Criminal Stone pelting

This phase of the insurgency is also characterized by crowd criminalization, unlike the militant criminalization which was common in earlier phases. The crowd not merely

torched the public property but also got involved in the lynching of Ayub Pandit near Jamia Masjid, Nowhatta on 22 June 2017. The stone pelting has got more fierce and intense, and it is now being used to protect militants during encounters. Crowds have started breaking cordons and coming as close as 300-200 meters from the crossfire. During security forces and militant standoffs, crowd resort to stone pelting. Tariq Bhat notes that till June 2017, stone pelters had hindered government's operation on 13 occasions causing around 27 militants to escape since February 16 when Army General Bipin Rawat announced that all those who would be hindering military operation would be treated as 'Overground Workers of Militants' and will be dealt with strictly. Bhat notes that in 6 cases, forces did not initiate the operation at all primarily to prevent civilian casualty (Bhat 2017).

India did put huge pressure on militants through 'operation all out' in 2017 in which around 213 militants were eliminated, but the violence did invite local recruitment as 124 locals joined the militancy in 2017 (Yasir 2018). Yasir notes that in 2018 also, the offensive continued. On 1st April 2018, Indian security forces eliminated 13 militants of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen from Shopian district. Noteworthy aspect was four civilians died, and over 100 civilians were injured in their bid to help militants escape (ibid.). Stone pelters targeted a school bus carrying around 50 children in Zavoora village in Shopian injuring two school children (Deccan Herald 2018). Stone pelters are even targeting tourist vehicles causing grievous injuries to tourists. A 22-year-old tourist R.Thirumani was killed when stone pelters attacked the cab on May 7, 2018, in Narbali on Srinagar-Gulmarg Highway (Pandit 2018). Indian reaction in dealing with the stone pelters have been heavy handed which is explicit when an Army unit (10 Garhwal Rifles) shot stone pelters who attacked their convoy which resulted in the death of 3 stone pelters. The army in their narrative stated that they came under attack at Ganowpore area of Shopian by around 200 stone pelters who damaged the vehicle and injured seven personnel and they had to shoot at them in self-defence and to save the JCO from lynching. The natives allege that army officers tried to remove black flag outside the slain militant Firdous Ahmad Lone's home. Furthermore, the issue gets complicated when natives complain that why were stone pelters shot in the head and not on the leg? (Ganai 2018), (Press Trust of India 2018a). Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti stated in the legislative council that from 2015-2018, in 4,736 stone pelting

incidents, around 11,566 security personnel's were injured which included 9,670 police officers and 1,896 security forces personnel (Press Trust of India 2018b).

As the time progressed and incidents increased, Kashmir witnessed precision stone pelting aimed at injuring (and sometimes killing) the police or security personnel which had led to rise in injuries during such protests. Indian security forces and J&K Police has been equally vicious in giving back through the generous use of Pellet guns and higher willingness to use bullets on the crowd which starts to appear threatening. A vicious cycle of violence ensues wherein more people get motivated by the heavy-handed reaction, and a new crop of stone pelters is created. Similarly, as the intensity of stone pelting increases and becomes vicious, army, security forces and Police are compelled to use fatal measures.

2.6.6.2 Rising militant recruitment

Kashmir Life Bureau presents a synopsis of a report prepared by J&K CID titled "Radicalisation and Terrorism in J&K — A Study." It traces down the motivation of 156 youth who joined the insurgency from 2010 to 2015. This synopsis sheds light on the profile of the 'New Militant.' According to the report, the majority of new militants are not madrasa educated, radicalized poor and unemployed youth. It notes that 74% of new militants never completed full education in Madrasas and only 7% of the total recruits were uneducated. This reports also discredits the "revenge theory" proponents as only 20% of the recorded cases reported any altercation and harassment by security and Police forces (Kashmir Life 2018).

The report also traces the life span of a new militant. The new militant goes through following life stages


1. While in his teens, he tries to make sense of the world and discontentment grows within him due to various reason (mentioned in the next section). The Kashmir political and social space doesn't provide space for articulation, and this discontentment grows into a rage.
2. In the second stage, he ponders over the possibilities to change status quo and gets either attracted towards religion, views, and speeches of separatists or gets enticed by the glamour associated with the martyrdom in the Kashmir valley.

3. The new militant is more likely to be enticed by the glamour of militants and the legends associated with them than by religion or speeches of separatists. In his pursuit to change the status quo, he joins the militancy.
4. Due to the better preparedness of Indian security forces, the new militant is eliminated quickly after joining militant ranks. The funeral of the slain militants attracts thousands of people. The other disillusioned youth allured by adoration bestowed on the martyr, decides to follow the same path. The new recruits are also killed, and the vicious cycle continues (Kashmir Life 2018).

Muzamil Jaleel presents the synopsis of a report prepared by security agencies on Militancy and Recruitment in Kashmir which contains insights on how counterinsurgency operation sets in motion a recruitment drive. One of the key findings of the report is that after the elimination of Burhan Wani on July 8, 2016, 47% of recruits came from localities situated 10 Km from slain militant's residence and these recruitments were completed within 40 days of the encounter. Jaleel notes that report analysed 43 operations from November 5, 2016, to April 26, 2018, and found that 77 militants were killed but 104 joined, and this recruitment depended on whether militant was killed in their area as it would have created the aura for resistance and glamour associated with martyrdom or slain Militant belonged to their area which implies that militant could be a friend, acquaintance or even a relative (Jaleel 2018). The report also demonstrated that South Kashmir remains the hotbed of recruitment as out of 461 youth who joined militancy since 2010, South Kashmir supplied 331 out of them. The report noted that the death of protestors in funeral processions combined with the emotionally charged environment acts as a perfect catalyst for recruitment. Jaleel points out from the report that during funeral processions, pledges are taken by friends and relatives to carry on the cause for which the militant laid down his life²¹. The report notes the impact of Burhan Wani encounter with that of militancy recruitment as the Jaleel notes that the report highlights that from January 2016 to July 2016 killing to recruitment was in ratio 4:7 but after elimination of Burhan Wani, 35 youth joined militancy in next three months out of which 32 came from South Kashmir from where (Tral), Burhan Wani hailed (ibid.).

²¹ Friends of Jahangir Khandey killed in Bamnoo encounter in Rajpora Pulwama, joined militancy on the spot (Jaleel 2018).

Figure 1 Graph representing a spike in militant recruitment



Taken from- <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-and-kashmir-encounters-fuel-militant-hiring-says-official-report-ramzan-ceasefire-burhan-wani-5196477/>

Conducting counterinsurgency operation in the valley has become a ‘Zero-sum game’ due to the rising rate of recruitment per operation (Jaleel 2018). In this phase, Kashmir insurgency witnessed massive local recruitment which signaled the need for a more comprehensive strategy for ensuring normalcy in Kashmir. The challenge India faces is to counter the legitimacy of the insurgency which it has not been able to challenge successfully.

Jagmohan calls Kashmir insurgency- a distinct alloy of terrorism as Kashmir terrorism is primarily supported by Pakistan which got stimulated by latest development and success registered by Afghan mercenaries against USSR. Pakistan created a narrative of Islamic Jihad and lured them into the cause of liberating Kashmir from secular India and transform the valley into an Islamic state (Malhotra 1991: 410). The techniques deployed by insurgents were taken from Mao Tse Tung’s advance retreat formulation and Che Guevara’s teaching population guerrilla warfare by being friending them, extensive use of Mosques and clergy sermons from Iranian revolution and some inspiration from the continual struggle of Palestine liberation movement was also taken (Malhotra 1991: 411) thereby making it a mix of various techniques, and strands.

The Kashmir insurgency has been dynamic as different elements took charge of the movement to lead it to different directions. The JKLF wanted to lead this insurgency

towards the goal of Independent Kashmir but why was the same level of intensity not shown in Gilgit and Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir region by JKLF deserves justification. As Pakistan and Radical Islamic elements highjacked the movement, it lost its moral conviction and popular support. However, the popular support has flowed back into the movement after almost 23 years in 2016, and it is up to India to either allay the anger in Kashmiris by engaging them with dialogue, not bullets. Central government should take proactive steps to address immediate causes of anger namely draconian laws, huge military deployment, actions against army and security forces officers who adopted illegal ways to torture and kill Kashmiris.

2.7 Why has the Kashmir insurgency not succeeded?

Syed notes that due to three reasons Kashmiri failed to achieve their objective of 'Azaadi.' Firstly, they had a very limited social base as they articulated the interests of valley Muslims within their political articulations hence Kashmiri Pandits and Buddhists of Ladakh were alienated. Syed argues that fundamentalist views of Jamaat and Hizb did not resonate with the syncretic ethos of Kashmir furthermore pan Islamic agenda of the global jihadist was seen imposed from outside, and the Kashmiri demand for self-determination could not be subsumed under desire for an Islamic caliphate (Syed 2002: 284).

The second reason was inadequate international support for the Kashmiri issue. Syed notes that although Indian mainland Muslims sympathized with Indian atrocities against valley Muslims, they did not support the right to secede. Syed notes that although International human rights were supportive of Kashmiri people and highlighted Indian atrocities, the international support was limited to OIC countries. After the movement was coloured in a tinge of Islamic fundamentalism, International community evaded questions on Kashmir as their stance could jeopardize their relationship with the emerging economy of India (Syed 2002: 285). Syed notes that China and Iran asked Pakistan to not to raise Kashmir issue in UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in 1993 and even OIC dropped a resolution on Kashmir due to lack of support of other members (ibid.).

The third and final reason was miscalculated strategies and internal contradiction among major actors in the movement which led to its fizzling out. The JKLF had widespread support, but as Pakistan understood that JKLF sought independence rather

than a merger with Pakistan, it ceased its funds and weapon supply, and eventually, JKLF could not face Indian security forces with its depleted strength. Pakistan shifted its support to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, but it lacked popular backing. As Lashkar-e-Toiba and Harkat-ul-Ansar entered the scene to dominate the insurgency, people felt alienated as they did not resonate with the agenda of guest militants. The Hurriyat conference which was the political front of the movement couldn't formulate a proper political agenda and often ran away from centre's effort for political negotiations. Its calls for *Chalo* and Strikes were fruitless and internal dissension within the conglomeration complicated the matter and dented its relevance. The degeneration of militancy into criminalization also pushed people away from its grip (Syed 2002: 285-287).

On 30 March 1996, Indian security forces eliminated 33 militants of JKLF (Amanullah) group eliminating JKLF out of militancy scene in Kashmir (Chadha 2005: 138). Exploiting shortcomings of Hurriyat and counting on military successes, India was able to push forth elections and regained the political initiative.

These reasons would explain why Kashmir insurgency did not succeed till 2001 but why it has not succeeded 17 years since. The primary reason is better preparedness of Indian security forces as they can eliminate militants with far more efficiency and are not lured into ambushes that easily. Indian army and security forces have successfully prevented infiltrations from Pakistan through its advanced grid system hence the flow of weapons and funds has now reduced from Pakistan. The aspiring militants have to go through hands-on training and snatch guns from security forces which is not easy anymore. These untrained militants are not able to come up with astute strategies to counter Indian security forces and are eliminated easily.

As we have noted that crowd resorted to criminal stone pelting when led to injuries and death of security forces. In one case, death of a tourist too in the valley. Due to these actions, pro-Kashmiri intellectuals, human rights activists, and Muslim mainstream politicians of India are no longer willing to support the cause of Kashmir. After the sensational sting operation of Hurriyat Conference leaders by India Today (which we will discuss in subsequent chapters) which recorded the admission of funding and support by Pakistan, local Kashmiri is disillusioned by Hurriyat leadership. Rohit Revo (2016) argues that no leader has been able to provide leadership to people's rage as Hurriyat leaders have been pushed to the margin in political space. There has been no

leader of the stature of Sheikh Abdullah since 1982. I would add that the political parties are busy in demanding piecemeal autonomy and doesn't want to upset the central government as we can see from the unholy alliance between PDP and BJP in Jammu and Kashmir. No leader led the protest that ensued after Burhan Wani's death which proves that there is no more coherence left in Kashmir movement.

Revo argues that India has managed to mute the International response on Kashmir insurgency through its Soft Power, but I would like to argue International community silence is more a result of daft diplomacy of Pakistan more than the clout of India's Soft Power. Pakistan failed to convince the International community that Kashmir issue requires their immediate attention whereas India has managed to project Kashmir agenda successfully as a bilateral issue.

It would be imprudent for India to say that everything is normal in Kashmir. The large turnouts in the funeral of militants signify the disillusionment of Kashmiri youth. The economic depravity is not the reason for youth to join militancy as now educated, well to do people are joining militancy²². India has not managed to subdue the call of azaadi as yet, and it could be a matter of time when the current crisis takes similar form the one took in 1988.

²² Naseem notes that educated well to do Zahid Manzoor Wani joined militancy after he was detained and tortured by security forces. He had Bachelors in Sciences. Manan Wani who joined HUM had PhD in Geology from Aligarh Muslim University. Many commanders of HUM like Masood Ahmad Tantray were highly educated (Naseem 2018). Mohammad Rafi Bhat, assistant professor of sociology at Kashmir University joined the militant ranks too and was eliminated 36 hours later.

2.8 Why the discontentment stays on?

The Kashmiris are no longer afraid of Indian security forces as they indulge in regular stone pelting and turn up in huge numbers at the funerals of slain militants and crossfire victims. They have also indulged in orchestrating successful escape of trapped militants. What explains this absence of fear and higher willingness to die in Kashmir?

Arfa Khanam Sherwani in her video analysis traces the contours of Narendra Modi's government policy in Kashmir to answer why Srinagar remains the valley of discontentment (Sherwani 2018). She raises three important questions which are relevant to understanding the dimension of present discontentment. She asks why the space between picking up a stone and picking up gun has been diminishing since July 2016. Why people are turning up in huge numbers for militant's funeral and finally why has the recruitment of militants increased in the ratio of militants killed by security forces? (2018: 2.06). She notes that after the Kathua rape case, the divergence between Jammu and Srinagar has increased (2018: 3.09). There is also a prevailing anti-Muslim narrative prevailing in rest of India which is espoused by Gau-Rakshaks and Hindutva groups, the Kashmiri Muslim too feels alienated (2018: 3.27-3.48). Indian media houses have left no stone unturned to project Kashmiris as enemies and anti-nationals to build a new narrative of nationalism. Their failure to mark the distinction between militants and citizens has enraged the Kashmiris. The news media has created a huge divide between sentiments of rest of India and Kashmiris (2018: 4.05-5.02). Indian politicians and media houses have also started believing that Kashmir is now a religious issue, a part of global radical Islamist Agenda (2018: 5.10-5.58). The Indian government has not shown sincerity towards embracing Kashmiris the way Vajpayee government did (2018: 5.30-6.40).

The BJP and PDP came together with their agenda of alliance which included some important points of agreement. The agreement was forged on gradual removal of Armed Forces (J&K) Special Powers Act (AFSPA), talks with Pakistan and Separatist and reduction in troops stationed in Kashmir. Although both parties principally agreed to implement these policies, from last four years, no progress has been made to implement these agendas (2018: 7.22- 8.20). The Kashmir policy of Narendra Modi has failed to a large extent (2018: 9.30- 10.00). If the youth of Srinagar does not receive the same level of freedom as compared to Youth in Delhi or Mumbai, the trust would undoubtedly diminish (2018: 10.42-11.00).

We should also note that the problem also lies in Indian perception of present protest which is demonstrated by the inability to read writings on the wall and interpreting responses to suit one's narrative. People who come out in protests and throw stones at Indian security forces and Indian army are dubbed as brainwashed Pakistani supporters/terrorist sympathizers who should be neutralized. The agency that a citizen carries within a democracy is robbed by the Indian state from Kashmiris. Subduing every protest with disproportionate force implies that the area is occupied and India will behave like a colonial power to muzzle any opposition.

Indian politicians have been all rhetoric and no action about the resolution of Kashmir issue. Yosuf Tarigami of CPI (M) highlighted that even after announcing from Red Fort that Kashmiris need hugs, not bullets, Modi government has only sent security forces to the valley, not Psychiatrists, Physicians and eye specialists to tender to the Kashmiris suffering from pellet guns injuries and post-traumatic stress disorders (Outlook 2016). The high rate of suicide, susceptibility to drugs, and turn towards fundamentalism demonstrates declining mental health of Kashmiri Youth. The central government is not even willing to recognize these deep-seated issues of Kashmir society. It shows that priority will always be given to regional security over Human security and Kashmiri physical and mental well-being.

The rage within Kashmiris is fuelled by hyper-visibility of security forces that indicates that the region is under siege. It appears to be occupied by entities who would execute any writ of New Delhi with impunity. Kashmiris in their everyday life watch bunkers on the side of roads, Army personnel keeping an eye on them and checking their identity card whenever they wished. This leads to an identity crisis as in Kashmir identities of native and foreign is inverted. The security force personnel acting as a native demanding identity card and explanation for carrying out 'normal' activities in their locality and the Kashmiri acting as the foreign, produces identity card whenever he/she is asked. Kashmiri goes through two dislocations as he/she resides in the valley. First is dislocation from the birthplace through a treatment that democracies exercise on aliens or non-citizen and second displacement is of identity viz. India as they are labelled not as Kashmiris in an absolute sense but either loyal Indians or anti-national militants.

2.9 Baby steps towards counterinsurgency

Jagmohan recounts that problems were mainly administrative when he took the reins of the state under Governor's rule. The salaries of government employees were not disbursed, and there was unfair recruitment in subordinate services hence he went on to establish Statutory Subordinate Service Selection Board and instituted inquiry over financial sanctions, irregularity and other cases of nepotism and corruption (Malhotra 1991: 354).

Taking primarily an economical approach to the resolution of the problem, the grievances of youth in his perception was to be cured through employment opportunities. Jagmohan announced that government would employ youth by raising five battalions of BSF comprising entirely of 5,000 Kashmiri youth in constabulary and 2,000 in ancillary jobs which would be trained in Srinagar. Through Statutory Subordinate Service Selection Board, a plan of hiring around 3,000 teachers were drafted (Malhotra 1991: 355).

The measures of wresting the initiative from the subversives began with sending a firm message to subversive agents undermining Indian authority like local newspaper publishing incendiary reports and propaganda or dismissing any public servant found aiding the subversives (Malhotra 1991: 519). Jagmohan credits himself with setting up of three special commissaries in Kupwara; Anantnag and Pulwama and Rajouri, Poonch, and Doda (Malhotra 1991: 521). He created State security board for better coordination between civil and military authorities with Governor as its head and also setting up of Special Initiation Squad, a small team of specialist personnel who would strike terrorists when they would least expect (Malhotra 1991: 523). This team was set up to take an element of surprise away from the terrorists. Jagmohan banned dangerous organizations like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jamaat-i-Islami, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and others to undermine their active operations (Malhotra 1991: 524). As these organizations were fuelling the insurgency, banning them resulted in the freezing of their bank accounts (of Jamaat-i-Islami) and disruption in the spread of their propaganda material and they were not able to incite people from Mosques as their leaders were fleeing or were under arrest (Malhotra 1991: 525). As Madrassas and school funded and run by Jamaat-i-Islami and Farah-i-Aam trust sowed the seeds of radicalism and anti- Indian sentiment into young minds, Jagmohan decided to ban

Farah-i-Aam trust and instituted closure of 157 schools run by it (ibid.). Around 15,000 students were swiftly relocated in the state-run schools (ibid.).

Jagmohan carried his version of a surgical strike on public officials who were found linked to subversion. 121 officers were dismissed by Jagmohan using his power under Article 126 of J&K Constitution, and 101 Police officials were dismissed by the Director General of Police (Malhotra 1991: 526).

Another challenge Jagmohan mentions in his work is shifting of the secretariat from Jammu to Srinagar in April, the procedure most popularly known as ‘Darbar Move.’ With the volatility prevailing in the valley, the Darbar move was considered impossible and was opposed by Hindu and Bakarwal officials (Malhotra 1991: 543). Jagmohan regarded any deviation from normal practice as an act which could have severe effects on the national psyche. It can boost the morale of the terrorists and can send a message to the people that state has restricted its administrative institution to Jammu only and Kashmir has been vacated. His administrative wing executes this exercise perfectly. His idea of what’s wrong with Kashmir is based on Article 370 and economic condition of the valley as he states

“We must not forget that our real fight is against the forces of poverty, backwardness and economic and administrative injustices. We must redress public grievance speedily” (Malhotra 1991: 545).

Jagmohan also advocated for the implementation of certain laws in letter and spirit in Kashmir which were controversial and their utility has been challenged and debated ever since.

2.9.1 Draconian laws of the State

The hard-line approach had to be supplemented with some amount of legality hence certain coercive laws were applied. While laws rule citizens, subjects are governed by violence. Hingorani notes that draconian laws by their virtue of being draconian are not respected by people, and they become causes of discontentment in people (Hingorani 2017: 447). Hingorani notes that fundamental rights of democratic Indian constitution are denied to people of Jammu and Kashmir through the insertion of clause c) in Article 35 through Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954. It was inserted into Indian constitution via Article 370 of the Indian constitution (Hingorani 2017: 448). This subclause grants immunity to “preventive laws made by state

legislature for a period of five years” and it was extended via Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1959 for 10 years and Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1964 for 15 years and even Supreme Court upheld the extension (ibid.). Hingorani notes that full bench of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Mohamad Subhan case commented that India could “omit” the “application” of Fundamental Rights of Indian constitution to the citizens of the state (ibid.). This shows even the pillars of Justice in Indian state have sanctioned third class citizenship on Kashmiri population. The state of Jammu and Kashmir hence cannot enjoy the fruits of democratic citizenship.

Jammu and Kashmir also have a set of draconian laws. Hingorani highlights section 8 of Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act which allows officials to arrest a person by simply citing “public interest” as the reason of their detention as they are not liable by law to disclose actual reason of detention. Hingorani notes that this section is even in contravention of Article 22(5) of Indian Constitution which instructs authorities to communicate grounds of detention to the detenu (Hingorani 2017: 448-449). Another law which allows non- disclosure of arrest and is widely misused, Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Area Act 1992 also empowered Police officials to fire at any person “who was indulging in the act which may result in serious breach of public order, or who was acting in contravention of a law and order prohibiting assembly of 5 or more persons or the carrying of weapons, firearms, ammunition and explosive substances” (Hingorani 2017: 449)²³.

Indian Parliament has its own set of draconian coercive laws for the state and the most notorious among them is Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act which was imposed on the state in 1990. The law bestows tremendous powers to Army and Security forces operating in ‘disturbed areas.’ Rafiq notes that while in 1990 only six districts of Kashmir and Rajouri and Poonch of Jammu region were declared disturbed, in 2001, all of Jammu and Kashmir except Leh and Kargil came under the tag of the disturbed area (Rafiq 2015). The controversial aspect of this act includes total immunity to security forces against prosecution, power to arrest without warrant, power to enter and search any premises relying on suspicion and most importantly power to

²³ Additional General Secretary of Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Council submitted to the floor on March 2015 that Disturbed Area act is no more in force in the State (Rafiq 2015).

fire causing death after a warning to anyone disturbing public order or is likely to disturb public order (Hingorani 2017: 450).

Terrorism and Disruptive (Prevention) Act (TADA) 1987 and later the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 (POTA) were also controversial acts. Hingorani notes arrest was permitted against an ambiguous charge of “disruptive activities” which could have included any act or speech intended to challenge the sovereignty of India directly or indirectly (ibid.). Furthermore, the burden of proof was shifted to the accused implying a complete reversal of the legal principle of criminal jurisprudence. Under TADA, a person can be arrested without a charge for 180 days which could be extended to one year (Hingorani 2017: 451).

Hingorani notes that these laws are introduced to strengthen the armed response to the militancy by endowing them with legal immunity so that they can inflict maximum possible damage to militancy. These legal endowments reflect the perception that militancy in Kashmir is a “law and order problem” which can be resolved by stricter and extra-ordinary laws (Hingorani 2017: 476). He suggests that India should directly address the root of the problem as terrorists would not care for any strict laws as they are bound to break them. The speech of Nehru can provide an insight into what can be a better approach. Nehru in the Indian Parliament on 7 August 1952 stated that the strongest bonds would not be bonds of the army or even constitution but of something more stronger; bonds of love and affection will keep India and people of Kashmir together (Hingorani 2017: 477).

2.9.2 Limits of Jagmohan’s counter-insurgency tactics

Jagmohan was appointed Governor on 19 January 1990 for the second time which elicited a hostile reaction from National Conference. Just after his appointment, he adopted the hard-line approach and ordered intense cordon and search operations in the valley which alienated the people (Evans 1999: 25). Jagmohan also managed to alienate the Police force as he did not trust them because most of them were Kashmiris. Evans notes that by removing state police from counterinsurgency duties, Jagmohan burned the bridge between the Kashmiri population and the state (ibid.). Puri argues that reappointment of Jagmohan worsened the crisis in Kashmir. The heavy handed crackdown on 20 January in Srinagar in which many complaints about the inhuman treatment of civilians, misbehaviour with women, arson on the property was reported.

People came out on streets against the crackdown in protest, and amateur security forces fired at them at GawKadal killing 35 people. Puri argues that rising human toll converted Kashmir militancy into “total insurgency of the entire population” (Puri 2008: 66). Jagmohan was blamed for this transformation as he imposed a total gag on freedom of the press, couldn’t stop cross border infiltration of militants after training and weapon procurement (Puri 2008: 70). Puri notes that even though militants committed atrocities, continued excesses committed by Indian forces managed to overshadow them thus redirecting rage back to themselves (Puri 2008: 80).

Syed argues that Governor Jagmohan after dismissing the Farooq Abdullah government on 17 February 1990, centralized all the administrative powers and sought to reverse the subversion by banishing media which were following pro-militant lines which included censoring few programmes of Doordarshan TV (Syed 2002:260). The application of draconian laws also alienated people and led them to doubt the democratic credentials of Indian constitution.

He notes that the Indian government came on the back foot as there was a huge communication gap between not only the security forces and the local police force but also between central government and Governor. Jagmohan complained to Rajiv Gandhi and demanded the seriousness in action; he was not reciprocated with that level of severity. Syed notes that Indian policy-making apparatus in Kashmir was not merely paralyzed domestically with inter-departmental and intergovernmental strife but also they were cornered by International human rights organization for human rights violations by security forces and Kashmiri youth were instigated by fiery speeches of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan (Syed 2002: 261). Jagmohan was replaced by Girish Saxena on 26 May 1990.

2.10 Kashmir crisis: A Tale of transformation

The crisis in Kashmir has witnessed many phases. Beginning as a popular movement, it degenerated in Islamic fundamentalism and further into terrorism. This degeneration assisted security forces as they started getting local support from Kashmiris who had grown tired of violence and found Islamic radicalism unacceptable in their syncretic way of life. AS Indian armed forces gained ground, the political initiative was recovered, and the valley began to sail towards normalcy. However, the normalcy was disrupted by 2008 and 2010 protests in which Indian armed forces used

disproportionate force which reinstalled the rage among Kashmiris. After laying dormant for 6 years, the rage reappeared through massive protests after the death of Burhan Wani in 2016. The element of popular support was regained, and all the gains on the ground were left undone.

In subsequent chapters, we will see in what ways Indian state tried to bring normalcy in the valley.

Chapter 3

Indian military responses and their limitations

The insurgency in Kashmir that broke out in 1988-89 was not the first insurgency that India has faced since its independence in 1947. India has managed to reduce the spate of violence in Mizoram and Nagaland by breaking the back of insurgency through force and initiating series of negotiations that culminated into political accords. The Kashmir insurgency was perceived to be another case of a region gone rogue hence the first step was the tried and tested method of breaking the back of the insurgency through a sheer force.

3.1 Operational Scenario

Bringing forth his 'practitioner perspective,' VG Patankar traces the genealogy of the Kashmir insurgency from its origin as a local support based insurgency to a proxy war and terrorism. He highlights how the transformation of the insurgency itself calls out for transformation in the tactics. (Patankar 2009). It began as classical insurgency derived from frustration from political, economic issues and corruption translated into a proxy war through Pakistan's intervention by which they introduced seasoned jihadi veterans from Afghanistan into Kashmir. Beguiling Al Qaida to instigate religious war (Jihad) against India, ISI started a recruitment drive which attracted locals to join various foreign Islamic militant organization like Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Jihad, Lashkar-e-Toiba, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. This low-intensity warfare along with the strategy of thousand cuts can be explained through the casualty percentage of foreign militants which went from 0.2% in 1991 to 82.5% in 2004 (Marks 2004: 125 cited in Patankar 2009:69). This sort of warfare also sheds light on global jihadist agenda which has been aptly exploited by Pakistan (Patankar 2009: 78). Jones also agrees to the Pakistan's logic of supporting insurgency as he makes clear that after its defeat in two wars against India and development of nuclear power, Pakistan could not pursue the Kashmir agenda by force (Jones 2008: 5). The Pakistani tactic of fomenting insurgency seems the ideal way to keep alive the Kashmir agenda. Jones argues that the turmoil of Kashmir has worsened after the rise of *Madrasahs* which also compelled Pakistani youth and Kashmir Youth to wage holy war against

India signaling a rise of radicalization. Rise in political consciousness after rising in levels of literacy in the state and corrupt and unpopular policies taken by both state and central governments also contributed to alienation and radicalization (Jones 2008: 6). Jones also notes how Islamization of Pakistan's society and the army under Zia's rule rejuvenated the religious tinge to the Kashmir agenda (Jones 2008: 8). Jones noted that with US support to ISI to facilitate Afghanistan insurgency, ISI gathered vast experiences in conducting guerrilla warfare against the Soviet forces hence were now more equipped to handle, organize, train and recruits radicalized men for insurgency (Jones 2008: 9). Fomenting insurgency and wage a guerrilla war against India by giving it a religious colour was hence in the best interest of Pakistan in its Kashmir agenda.

Fortunately for Pakistan, there was a deep-seated alienation against India due to the rigging of elections. Kashmiri leaders raked up issues of autonomy, a historical betrayal which accounted for the political reasons for the radicalization of youth. From 1987 onwards, India faced a religious-proxy war under the garb of an insurgency led by seasoned Jihadi militants and waged by radicalized and alienated local youth. The voice of separatism was mired with the Jihad narrative leading to complex nature of Kashmir insurgency.

3.2 Initial responses

Pointing towards the flawed assumption of Kashmir insurgency as merely a law and order problem, Sumit Ganguly calls the initial response to the insurgency 'ham-fisted and clumsy' relying upon the means of rough cordon and search measure. Indian army dealt with insurgencies in positional warfare by deploying a large number of soldiers. Since Indian counterinsurgency responses would invariably depend upon the tactics and ploy of the insurgents, Jones identifies Indian counterinsurgency responses as uncoordinated exemplified by the way government dealt with Strikes, riots and assassination and kidnapping. Example of this was an episode of the kidnapping of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed (then home minister's) daughter Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed when India released dreaded terrorists as a ransom for her release (Jones 2008: 10). Various laws like Disturbed areas act, and TADA act added to the indisciplinary conduct of BSF and CRPF and through human rights violation, played into the hands of insurgents. (Jones 2008: 11) The haphazard pattern of operation can be linked to the absence of a credible network of intelligence as Jones argues that the religious nature of the insurgency prevented the gathering of any credible intelligence by Intelligence Bureau.

Indian army hence developed an innovative idea of using former captured insurgents as the counterinsurgency force following the idea of General Frank Kitson (Jones 2008: 14). After briefly laying down the causes of insurgency and the tactics deployed by the insurgents to fulfill their goal, Jafa reiterates the same description of armed tactics like area domination, preventive raids, etc. He argues that armed tactics were merely operational and their focus was on the decimation of militants to prevent further attacks (Jafa 2007: 154).

3.3 Police / Security Forces

Subramanian argues that after the breakout of insurgency and breakdown of law and order in the valley, the only security force deployed in the valley was the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) which was raised in 1909 and consisted of soldiers from all parts of the country. Subramanian highlights the various operative challenge that CRPF faced as it was not ready to challenge insurgents trained by ISI and battled hardened Afghan veterans having an experience of launching a Jihad in Afghanistan. CRPF was only trained as a riot police, having basic experience of countering what Subramanian calls 'Urban insurgency.' CRPF was staffed with mostly officers from Indian Police services who were devoid of any training in long range patrols, high altitude assaults and other aspects of counterinsurgency. (Subramanian 2000). The composition of CRPF and BSF was the same in a way as each battalion of police had its tactical and company/platoon headquarters. The federal police (CRPF and BSF) carried out both defensive and offensive role. CRPF guarded vital installations like a major power plant, Jawahar Tunnel, Governor's and Chief Minister Residence and was also deployed in VVIP security duties. They are currently deployed for area domination to encourage civilian activity and secure roads through the deployment of Road opening parties for VIP and military convoy movement. Their offensive actions comprise counteraction in case of attack, cordon and search operation, detainment of suspects and their interrogation (Jafa 2007: 155).

The modus operandi of CRPF was similar to that of state police except with their reliance on primary two features; Naka (bunker) and cordon and search operation. The bunkers were damp and amounted to the defensive stance which was constantly under threat. The second method was Cordon and search which were reactionary in nature, conducted after the assault on the unit or after generation of intelligence from sources. The CRPF reactionary response was predictable, and as a result, they were easily duped

by the militants which ensued casualties. They also alienated the population following a vengeful cordon and search. Subramanian argued that Indian state did not learn from their counterinsurgency experience in Punjab where they quelled insurgency by building up the state police force (Subramanian 2000). Although Subramanian provides few prerequisites like weeding out undesirables, instituting cash reward, etc. to increase their reliability, state police were formed out of local population whose mood was anti-state. Hence there was a logical reason for the distrust. The lack of experience and professionalism was evident from its limited success.

CRPF resumed its duty to guard vital installation as Border Security force (BSF) another paramilitary organization took its place. The BSF was raised in 1965 and was mandated to guard international borders in the peacetime and to guard important installation during war-time. The introduction of BSF into the fray was tremulous as even under the leadership of Inspector General Ashok Patel, BSF suffered heavy casualties from the insurgency. Subramanian also argues that BSF too indulged in similar tactics of bunkers and cordon and search, but the intelligence 'G' wing of BSF was more enhanced whose major strategy was to collect intelligence through interrogation and letting off small insurgents to catch hold of important militants (Subramanian 2000). BSF was first to introduce the tactic of small group operation based on sneak attacks on the suspects. Since it has been noted that Pakistan began supplying advanced weaponry to insurgents, BSF too armed itself with Carl Gustav 84 mm RCL's and automatic grenade launchers. The vital mission BSF achieved according to Subramanian was penetration into militant strongholds like Sopore, Anantnag, Bijbehera, Bandipur, and Baramulla. BSF penetration into these strongholds against the growing intensity of Pakistan supported the insurgency in Kashmir helped India to establish its presence. This presence gave the notice to the insurgents that Kashmir has not been seized from India (Subramanian 2000). However, this positive aspect resulted in another wave of alienation as BSF ran roughshod on all human rights and due to lack of professionalism carried out many encounters which alienated the Kashmiri population and created a new generation of home-grown insurgents.

Jafa furthers this argument by stating that subsequent generations of insurgents join the insurgency due to unprofessional conduct of the local and federal police. It is because of the attitude within the federal police establishment in which Muslims in the valley are seen as perpetrators of violence rather than victims of it. He observes that

demoralization and frustration creep within the ranks of battalion due to rising casualties during initial action against foreign-trained insurgents which called for more tactical innovation in maintaining caution, e.g., putting camouflage nets on bunkers, parking vehicles away from crowded areas to avoid grenade attack, etc. The Police forces unlike army, often rushed into cordon and search operation without any planning after an attack and get ambushed losing a considerable number of soldiers as they did not think the way a terrorist does. Jafa highlights that the weaponry provided to police forces were mainly automatic and semi-automatic weapons which were inadequate to deal with the unruly and unarmed protestors. Due to lack of professionalism, under panic, police forces fires upon unruly mob rather than containing them which resulted in civilian deaths. Jafa too notes that Police forces are critiqued as the occupation forces by separatists and citizens who have turned hostile against India due to police excesses. They can win minds and hearts of people by doing public service like establishing medical centres wherein BSF doctors can provide medical facility to injured civilians (Jafa 2007: 157-161) Skill development centres can also be opened wherein BSF can assist in enhancing the employability of the Kashmiri Youth.

3.4 Operation Rakshak: Indian Army enters the Valley

As Pakistan's involvement grew intense in Kashmir region, the army was called in through the operation Rakshak. Indian army stepped in Kashmir valley from its usual role of frontiers in 1990. It devised a three-tier border protection strategy to stop the infiltration. The first tier focused on guarding the border itself. The second tier focused on security of the region of 5km from the border with night curfew and shoot on sight orders. The third tier was to cordon and search villages behind the 5km region. This strategy resulted in the elimination of over 400 militants in two years. During the initial deployment of BSF and CRPF, militants indulged with paramilitary police in town taking civilians as shields which resulted in crossfire casualties and comfortable escape for insurgents. Taking a cue from this aspect Indian army decided to use 'Psych ops' to conduct operation 'Sahayak' which focused on avoiding confrontation with militants inside the towns. Under this operation, The BSF will dominate the high positions from all directions leading to the village or town; then the army would conduct loudspeaker warnings against the threat of militants. This will get followed by a lull giving a false illusion that army has retreated from the village or a town resulting in luring out of militants. After the lull, pre-dawn cordon and search operations are carried out to flush

out militants who are still hiding. After securing the village, BSF would build a network of bunkers to dominate the town (Subramanian 2000). Through this operation, crossfire casualties were to be reduced. However, its success has been limited as throughout the years, many civilians did die in the crossfire.

AC Soneja in his book *Militancy in Kashmir: Untold Saga of Counterinsurgency operations* provides a military history of counterinsurgency operations taken by the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles also called BODYGUARD from April 1992 to April 1995. Soneja narrates the exploits of the battalion in various deployments across the valley to bring into light various tactics and strategies. Indian army uses to neutralize the militants (Soneja 2015).

The battalion that gets deployed in the valley goes through an intensive pre-induction training before being launched into specific operations. They also go through an extensive training programme which is aimed at chiselling their battling drills and formulation of tactics. From the operations carried out from 18 April 1992, the apprehended militants were found with AK 56 Rifles from Al-Jihad organization (Soneja 2015: 2). From the details of the operation at Batmaloo on 25th January 1992 and interrogation of the militant apprehended in cordon and search operation, Soneja mentions that interrogation with the militant revealed a location of an AK 47 rifle that had eluded the army for almost two months (Soneja 2015: 5). This reveals that the important task of the army was to keep a tab on the inflow of weapons or to seize them. The capture of weapons was as monumental as the apprehension of the militant. The recovery of the weapon also symbolizes as an act of restoration of law and order. It is essential to know the type of weapons that militants usually possessed. Their weapons ranged from Chinese pistols to AK 47, AK 56, Universal Machine Guns and Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers (Soneja 2015: 22).²⁴ Militants are also trained to build and use IED devices.²⁵ It is interesting to point towards the role of ISI who was willing to invest heavily in training and supplying arms to the motivated youth

The cordon and search operations are not random instead are planned keeping in mind whether any army patrol has been ambushed in the nearby region or there is credible

²⁴ They were recovered from the operation conducted by 2J&K Rifles battalion from 10 march till 24 April 1993.

²⁵ IED devices were recovered from militants in the Khudwani village in Kulgam Tehsil of Anantnag on 20 June 1994

intelligence that a militant or group of militants are hiding in an area. Following the accounts of various counterinsurgency operation mentioned by Soneja, the chief strategy of the army has widely focused on capturing the militant alive. Soneja has noted that the chief commanders and rank holders do not submit so easily to the army and indulge in the fight to the death. It implies that the leadership of militants is highly radicalized.

Indian army also keeps tracks of the militant organization who carry out ambushes to the military vehicles and perpetrate terrorist attacks. Through its intelligence networks, it manages to gather intel on the names and movements of the terrorists responsible for orchestrating the attack or the ambush. This aspect is revealed on 20th June 1994 cordon and search operation in Khudwani village of Kulgam tehsil of Anantnag district where one army vehicle came under IED explosion. On 26 June, the alpha company of this battalion eliminated company commander of Hizb ul-Mujahideen Paley Khan who orchestrated the ambush in Hargram of Kulgam Tehsil (Soneja 2015: 56). Following the same policy for years, Indian army also eliminated the militants who carried out attacks on Amarnath tourists in 2017.

For the tenure of their deployment of the battalion from April 1992 to April 1995 what he terms as operation Rakshak, Soneja mentions few lessons that their battalion learned which in fact have become major characteristics of military counterinsurgency operations. These lessons tell us about the modus operandi of the Indian army in Kashmir. The first element is leading by example. This is ensured by the commanding officer of the battalion as he has to look after the needs of the troops concerning their food, rest, sanitation motivation and rewards. The orders passed by the commanding officer should reflect his experience, sanguinity, and viability. The commanding officer must 'not only be fair but also appear to be so' to maintain trust and motivation of troops he commands. The commanding officer is also entrusted with the task of ensuring the professional competence of the soldiers by ensuring regular hours of training, tactic formation wherein brainstorming takes place, and lessons from the past mistakes are incorporated. Before a counterinsurgency unit moves for operation, the commanding officer or the Joint commanding officer ensures that details regarding some militants, their equipment, their organizations and the plan to eliminate them. The professional troop is aware of the legal restrictions associated with carrying such operations and avoids any human rights violation (Soneja 2015: 116-117).

The second element is adhering to the basic tactic. Some of the basic tactics like securing the patrol area before going for patrol, maintaining silence during patrols, maintaining appropriate distance while marching. Soneja argues that counterinsurgency operation rarely demands high-level planning as it is based on operational freedom with greater emphasis on surprise which calls for 'field-craft at all levels' (Soneja 2015: 118). The small teams are accompanied by the support team at the gap of half-hour; Patrol has a different route in and different route out, routes must be secured after any operation, and set routine must be avoided. Indian army has been following different routines by frequently changing the timing of their operations and the mode of transport by relying more on local taxis and trucks²⁶ to avoid ambushes.

In the insurgency-infested areas, the command structure is not so solid as unlike international border areas, battalions here are allowed to choose their objectives and outputs of even low ranked soldiers are given due importance (Soneja 2015: 118-120). Some junior officers who are well versed with the local area and know the topography are allowed to plan operations which get approved from the commanding officer after which he issues necessary orders (Soneja 2015: 122).

The third element is the collation of intelligence. Soneja notes that if the army maintains friendly relations with the public, they themselves become the informers. Soneja also notes the role of taxi drivers as the excellent source of information (Soneja 2015: 120). In the present time, Intelligence Bureau has established a well-knit network of intelligence, but the local and trusted source of information being directly collated at company and battalion level is majorly preferred by the army. The army maintains details of militants of each village alongside detail of family members which enables them to track these militants when they visit their home. Military intelligence through electronic surveillance, radio interception and movement of terrorists also gets translated into actionable intelligence which is then promptly put into action by the military to achieve desired results. Such swift actions on actionable intelligence wielded results in Operation Waltuyang on 5 May 1993, Turkpura in July 1993 in and also in operation Alpine Noose.

Dynamism in operation is another element of Indian army counterinsurgency operations. This aspect is influenced by beating militants in their own game. Sometimes

²⁶ Widely used in Operation Kaitson 14 July 1993

villages deploy specific tactics²⁷ to warn militants about the presence of the armed forces, seeing through these tactics allowed Indian army certain operational successes. Changing the routine for cordon and search operations allowed the army to capture militants unawares either resting, bathing, wandering, etc.²⁸In operation Waltiyang on 5 May 1993, the battalion raided 2500m mountain operating away from their area of responsibility in broad daylight thereby catching militants, off-guard, eliminating 3 of them (Soneja 2015: 75-77).

Another element of Indian military counterinsurgency action in Kashmir is keeping alive the motivation of the soldiers working in an inhospitable environment amongst the hostile population. This is ensured through commendations by the Chief of Army staff and other senior officers. Cash incentives are provided for excellent performance of companies. Individual citations are awarded for gallantry at *Sainik Sammelan* (Soneja 2015: 125). Teamwork, discipline and trust among the soldiers is another aspect that maintains helps to maintain cohesion within a company as proper teamwork transforms into operational successes where innovations are required.

Soneja argues that the military counterinsurgency responses are an act of restoration of law and order, not political action. Patankar and Ganguly (2009) however disagree as they state that military action is there to establish civilian government exemplified by the iron fist with a velvet glove. The ideals of minimum force, respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights are values that perforce action of the army. Another aspect that deals with shielding of security/armed forces from civil or criminal prosecution to avoid demoralization of force is also a political move (Patankar 2009: 76).

The final and most controversial element is good relations with the civilian population. Soldiers during cordon and search operations would treat elders with respect and care. Soldiers would also provide first aid to people injured and assist them during winter months when roads are closed due to rain and snow (Soneja 2015: 130). During the operation Hazratbal which lasted for a month, the Indian army took special concern of the people, and there were no complaints about harassment against any soldier (Soneja 2015: 98). The troops of 31 Sub Area went on to successfully tire out militants as 60

²⁷ For example when the army approached a village, someone would fire a shot in the air to warn the militants. Army officers then fired their shot first to apprehend any movement in the villages. In Prisal village, such tactic allowed Army to seize 2 AK rifles and six magazines with 180 rounds of AK ammunition (pg122)

²⁸ These change in routine assisted them in Yaripura 3 July 1993 and Prisal 8 July 1993.

militants surrendered on 16 November 1993. During operation in Bolus also known as Balsoo carried out on 31st December 1993, the battalion tried to negotiate with the terrorists by asking their parents to turn them in. This yielded no result, and hence both militants were neutralized. Soneja argues that when army displays transparency on the operation and doesn't carry out harassment to civilians, civilians usually do not retaliate. Another example is operation Sadbhavna.

The Jammu and Kashmir Rifles carried out 581 operations out of which 192 were successful. It led to the recovery of 241 weapons. This battalion killed 168 militants in 58 armed operations and apprehended 190 militants (Soneja 2015: 68).

Subramanian argues that by 1993 Indian army established a grid system that consisted of 49 sectors and every armed unit was expected to dominate the area. Each grid would also have Quick Reaction Team (QRT) to counter an ambush. Another aspect was the strengthening of intelligence network and the introduction of Special Forces who could deliver a quick response to credible intelligence. Indian army has also created village defence committees that are armed with primitive weapons and basic other radio sets. Indian army also raised a counterinsurgency force of former militants called 'ikhwans' or renegades. As an organizational innovation, Indian army introduced the Rashtriya Rifles as specialized counter-insurgency force (Subramanian 2000). Apart from the COIN grids, at the central government level, Kashmir Monitoring Group comprising of senior members of security agencies and intelligence organization coordinated with Prime Minister, Chief Minister of J&K and other representatives from the state in the matters of policy and Strategy. Second Coordinating Mechanism was the formation of Unified headquarters to coordinate political and military efforts of central and state governments. The Chief Minister of the state chaired this Unified Headquarters at the Jammu city and Srinagar with the local corps commander acting as the security advisor of the Chief Minister. In this way, political and military coordination was envisaged. Patankar, however, argues that Kashmir Monitor Group wasn't so successful due to its dependence on personalities who were often unable to reach common ground (Patankar 2009: 72).

Patankar argues that successful military intervention allowed the tourism industry to thrive after the election of 2002. To counter the anti- Indian propaganda, Indian state introduced *Sangam*, *Maitree* and *Ujala* projects. *Sangam* which means confluence gave

the opportunity to Kashmiri students to visit a different part of India and instilling the aspect of integration within them. *Maitree* means friendship under which different students from other parts of India were asked to visit Kashmir and *Ujala* project which means Light catered to setting up a school in a different part of Kashmir valley. Alongside India also set up the task to change the narrative of ‘azaadi’ by establishing the fact that India is best guardian of the ‘azaadi’ of Kashmir and Pakistan’s support to the insurgency is instrumental for its own selfish gain not for the syncretic idea of Kashmiriyat (Patankar 2009: 74). It brings into light the changing pattern of elimination to integration strategy by the Indian state. Ganguly also mentions five tactical lessons that Indian Army derived and deployed. Firstly, installation of counterinsurgency grid. Secondly, deployment of road opening parties to comb out IED devices and prevent an ambush. Thirdly, the covert apprehension technique to catch hold of terrorist sympathizers. Fourthly, use of Ikhwan or local militias for intelligence gathering and assaulting pro Pakistan militant organizations and finally, the creation of special counter-insurgency force called Rashtriya Rifles (Ganguly 2009: 83-84). Jones argues that COIN doctrine of Indian security forces began to stabilize due to trained security forces, superior force, and coherent doctrine. The shift from small unit warfare and less brutality has been the hallmark of such a shift (Jones 2008: 15)

3.5 Operation Sadbhavana: Winning hearts and minds

Colonel Harjeet Singh has suggested ‘10 Commandments’ to prevent alienation of local population and win hearts and minds of people. Gates and Roy note that these commandments show the influence of ‘Dharma’ which is integral moral force of Indian civilization. Singh lists them as – no torture resulting in death, no rape, no sexual assault or molestation, respect for human rights, using media as ‘force multiplier’, no interfering in civilian authority, assisting in civic works, no surrender of arms and personnel, professional conduct during operations and fear of god (Singh cited in Gates and Roy: 20). Indian army and security forces have obviously not followed any of them in their letter and spirit, but they initiated Operation Sadbhavana to Win Hearts and Mind of people.

Operation Sadbhavana is a military operation which lies at the intersection of military action and governance as the military actions blurred the boundaries between the traditional military role of defence and governance.

Operation Sadbhavana entails military, civic action programme to win the hearts and minds of the people. It was launched in 1998 to counter the propaganda of the separatists and bring Kashmiris into the mainstream politics. Veerendra Singh APRO Army writes that Operation Sadbhavana was launched in 1998 in the rural areas of Jammu and Kashmir in the wake of the huge infrastructural damage done by militants. There was widespread destruction of schools, bridges, electric grids and other government property. To counter the alienation thus caused and to alleviate people from the poverty resulting from long spans of the insurgency, Indian army initiated a series of welfare and development projects. These projects ranged from Education, capacity building, vocational training, infrastructural development, medical care, women and youth empowerment, recreation and Educational tours programmes (Singh 2013). Singh notes that till 2013, Army spent 450 crores by setting up 53 English medium goodwill schools and also provided assistance to over 2700 state schools in the restoration of their infrastructure, renovation. There has been a renewed focus on computer education with army assisting in building computer labs and provide vocation training in computers. The major focus of this operation has been in infrastructural restoration mainly bridges, roads, primary health centres and rural mini-hydroelectric plants. BSF and the Army have opened up many primary care facilities. To thwart recruitment of youth into the militant organizations, Indian Army has opened up vocational centres and installed Youth Guidance Employment nodes (YGEN) along with many skill centres. The army under the banner of operation Sadbhavana has been organizing education tours for students to make them appreciate the cultural diversity of India, integrate them within the nation's fabric and counter the anti-India propaganda. Furthermore, the skill development projects have helped locals to revive the local economy which died down during the peak of insurgency. Indian army has been instrumental in setting up stadiums and conducting sports tournaments to identify talents from various parts of the valley (Singh 2013). It is a good move in the direction of channelizing the energy of youth which can be misused for anti- India activities.

The aim of this mission was first to integrate the population into the national mainstream by alleviating social and economic life of people and secondly reduce the alienation by providing the healing touch. Operation Sadbhavana, however, was meant to improve the image of the army and place army as the facilitator of people and civic administration, but instead, it has established the unusual system of militarized

governance where the local civic administration enjoys no power. Unlike civic projects, army projects do not have that level of transparency and accountability hence there is a rising call for public auditing.

Operation Sadbhavana is an example of political action by the armed forces, but it is not a political action towards resolution of conflict. Through this operation, Indian armed forces aspired to undo the infrastructural and economic damages done by the militants and repair the psychological damages perpetrated by the Indian army in the initial phases of the insurgency. This operation reveals that it is only the political leadership that can aspire to reach the political solution. All actions of armed forces can only lead to conflict management and not conflict resolution.

3.6 Operation All out: Renewal of the offensive

In 2017, Indian offensive against the militancy that gained prominence after the death of Burhan Wani, intensified when India announced ‘Operation All out’ which intended to comb out terrorists from the valley by the end of the year. Operation All out is a combined operation of armed forces, police forces, and the local police. It relied on the intensive use of intelligence as it entailed a district wise survey to locate militants hideouts followed by listing out of 258 militants (130 local and 128 foreign). The hit list involved militants from Lashkar-e-Toiba (136) followed by 95 from Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and 23 from Jaish-e-Mohammad (J. B. Singh 2017). Director General of Police S.P Vaid in his media interaction on 31st December expanded the purview of operation all out when he announced that apart from neutralizing militants, Operation All out’s another major aim is to “bring back youth from clutches of militants.” Through counseling and other efforts, Forces have recovered 74 youth from the trap of militancy. Police forces have also asked parents of the newest recruits to call their kids back, and Vaid notes that seven children have returned to their parents. In the year 2017, Vaid announced that Indian armed forces and the Police forces have eliminated 206 militants (85 local and 121 foreign) including 18 most wanted militants²⁹. IGP Munir Khan, however, noted that 24 civilians died in the crossfire due to radicalized resistance from

²⁹ Abu Dujana, (Jaish Chief) Khalid Bhai, Sabzar Bhat, Bashir Lashkari, Junaid Matoo, Qayoom Najar, Noor Tral, Umar Khatab, Muzafar Ahmed Naiko alias Muza Molvi of Sopore, Abu Surag of Pakistan, Adil Ahmad Reshi of Bijbehara, Abid Ahmad Sheikh of Saktipora and Masood Ahmad Shah of Bewoora village, Abu Musaib, Qari Anas Abu Ali, Azaharuddin alias Ghazi Umar, Sajad Ahmed alias Babar, Mudasir Ahmad Tantray alias Asim, Wakeel Ahmad Thokar, Farooq Ahmad Bhat, Younus Lone, Mushtaq Ahmed, Muhammad Shafi Sherguri and Jahangir Ahmed Ganaie.(NewsDesk 2017)

the villages. Vaid stated that the Operation All Out which is focused on the elimination of the militant leadership and chief militant recruiters would continue until there are no more militant left in the valley (Khalid 2018). However, the question remains that what has been done apart from the neutralization of militants and invoking parental appeals to control the militancy. The first post reports that over 200 locals have joined militancy from 2015-2017 with 124 locals joining the militancy in 2017 alone along with heavy casualty suffered by Indian forces (Yasir 2017). Indian armed and Police forces have also suffered heavy casualties as at least 93 personnel from the Army (52), CRPF (05), BSF (02), SSB (01) and Jammu and Kashmir Police (33) died in counterinsurgency operations (Newsdesk 2017).

The table shows a rise in violence after the elimination of Burhan Wani.

Table 2 Data of casualties in terrorist violence

Year	Civilians Killed	Security force personnel killed	Terrorists killed	Total
2015	20	41	113	174
2016	14	88	165	267
2017	57	83	218	358
2018 (Till July)	41	43	108	192

Taken from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/datathe_sheets/annual_casualties.htm

It would be dangerous to ascertain success on the basis of numbers alone as higher kill count also represents higher recruitment.

3.7 Organizational innovations in armed counter insurgency responses

3.7.1 Rastriya Rifles

Rajesh Rajagopalan in his article *Innovation in counter insurgency: the Indian Army's Rastriya Rifles* provides the rationale behind the formation of Rastriya Rifles as solely being an organizational innovation rather than a doctrinal one. Rajagopalan highlights the growing reluctance of army with their increasing counterinsurgency commitments in the interiors of the country (Rajagopalan 2004). The solution demanded the bolstering of paramilitary force to ease the burden from the army. Administratively managed by the ministry of Home affairs, central paramilitary forces carried 'police ethos' not an 'army ethos' (Rajagopalan 2004: 27). These forces were trained for high

intensive police duties like riot control, securing borders and vital installation not professionally trained for dynamics of counterinsurgency warfare which was explicit from their not so successful performance in Kashmir region (Rajagopalan 2004: 27). Rajagopalan argues that the Army found a lack of 'army ethos' in paramilitary forces which made them 'culturally incapable' of fighting insurgency (Rajagopalan 2004: 28). As a director former Chief of Army Staff, B.C. Joshi conceptualized Rastriya rifles, a new force to meet counter insurgency commitments of the army. According to his plans, RR would consist of ex-servicemen from paramilitary forces and paramilitary soldiers in deputation along with 25% of soldiers as a deputation from the regular army. RR would then be under the army's operational command granting it the so called 'army ethos.' However there was a problem of lack of recruits from paramilitary forces, and secondly, the army didn't want to raise or rename any of their units as it would not answer the original problem of a burden on the army (Rajagopalan 2004: 29). The solution proposed was the creation of a mixed battalion but that solution too was a victim of 'bureaucratic headaches' in the realm of finance, salary, leave, etc. It was argued that there would be an element of a lack of cohesion among mixed battalion units which can determine combat performance. The mixed battalion would lack the culture, and traditional belongingness to a regiment hence would not go beyond for their comrades (Rajagopalan 2004: 30). This problem was resolved by changing the recruitment pattern of RR under which 4 out of 6 companies that form a single RR battalion would come from a single regiment, and other two companies would be from support groups such as artillery, supply groups, etc. Being on deputation, RR imposed strict qualitative restriction such as adequate fitness, combative experience and clean disciplinary record for the last two years (Rajagopalan 2004: 31). The formation of RR has relieved army from its ad hoc counter insurgency duties. RR with a specific mandate focuses on the element of counterinsurgency. RR battalions are permanently deployed in the areas of their operation while other troops move in and out of a unit. Rajagopalan argues that it gives an operational advantage to RR over the army as they carry on with familiarity and necessary knowledge about the area of their deployment (Rajagopalan 2004: 32).

Even with the creation of RR, Indian army is yet not fully relieved from counterinsurgency duties as the present strength of 65 RR battalions are way lesser than needed 150 battalions, and furthermore non availability of non-army officers for RR

was made it an extension of Army in the department of counterinsurgency. Rajagopalan argues that Rastriya Rifles symbolizes the working compromise between the theoretical ideal of a specialized force and working ideal of army ethos (Rajagopalan 2004: 35).

3.7.2 Ikhwans (renegade)

Another organizational innovation was the setting up of a local militia called Ikhwans or renegades formed out of militants who have surrendered but now are armed by the army to assist it in counterinsurgency operations. The study by Institute of Kashmir study on counterinsurgency practices of India, reveals that various organizations of Ikhwans emerged in which Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon, Jammu and Kashmir Ikhwan, Al Ikhwan, Muslim Mujahideen of Ghulam Nabi Azad and Khaja group were prominent who set up camps under the patronage of Rastriya Rifles (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1996: 24). They were tasked not merely for neutralizing pro Pakistan militants but also were deployed to eliminate political opponents (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1996: 60). In 1994, Mohammad Yusuf Parrey a.k.a Kukka Parrey, the leader of Ikhwan-Ul-Musalimeen, started cooperating with the army which led the way to the tradition of maintaining this militia.

Ikhwans are ethnic Kashmiri people who are either hostile to Islamists or were marginalised by the Inter service Intelligence of Pakistan. They target pro Pakistan militant organization such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Jamaat-e-Islami and were considered instrumental in paving the way for the organization of 1996 Assembly elections by removing reign of terror of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen from the South Kashmir (Swami 2003). Even though they provide assistance to the BSF, Indian Army and Rastriya Rifles, these renegades are known for their criminal activities that are carried out with impunity. Since their stipend is low and fluctuating, they resort to indiscriminate tax collection from villagers, auto-rickshaw drivers, truck owners and some time, some criminal Ikhwans indulge in killing, appropriation of property, loot and extortion from members of Jamaat-e-Islami along with timber smuggling and drug trafficking (Swami 1999). However, all is not too well for Ikhwans. Swami through interviews with many Ikhwans brings into light their over dependence on Rastriya Rifles for supplementing their basic needs. They also suffer from non- payment of their dues along with the merciless backlash from the political parties. Many militants become Ikhwan in the hope for a stable job in Indian paramilitary forces. Apart from

political hostility and bureaucratic hurdles in payment of their dues, Ikhwan and their families are most targeted by the terrorist groups. Maintenance of such militia not only runs contrary to the ethos of Indian democracy, but it has also further alienated the local Kashmiri citizens who now no longer can distinguish between foreign militants, Indigenous militants and the pro-Indian militants.

It is difficult and very subjective to make an assessment about the success of Indian military actions, but we can assess it by putting forth the goals of armed actions. Indian armed actions have succeeded not only in drastically reducing a total number of militants operating in the valley but have also succeeded in reducing their lifespan. Rahul Singh (2018) notes that Burhan wani operated for 6 years before being killed by security forces along with his his HUM compatriots. Waseem Malla, Naseer Pandit and Saddam Hussain Paddar were killed within 4 years of joining the HUM cadre but in recent trends, the Career span has come down considerably³⁰. The most high profile case is that of Kashmir University Sociology assistant Professor Mohammad Rafi who was killed within 36 hours of joining militancy with HUM. The reason for this decreased career expectancy Lieutaenant General BS Jaswal (R) states is galvanized intelligence network, better preparedness of security forces along with terrain awareness. He states that now that Indian state has curbed border infiltration, the home grown terrorists are not that well prepared against the forces who have done multiple stints in the region (R.Singh 2018). The flipside of these ‘success’ is regular casualties of youth that have joined militancy evoke a more sustained reaction that grows in intensity as more incidents of casualties are reported. This factor is crucial as we examine the limits of Indian armed actions in Kashmir.

3.8 Limits of Indian Counterinsurgency actions

In this section, we will look into specific case studies to highlight why Indian approach to dealing with counterinsurgency in Kashmir has fallen short of its goal. Nabi and Ye point out Indian military and security forces adopted methods like mass arrests, cordon and search operations, frisking and identity card checks, detention without trials, encounters of militants and their ‘alleged’ accomplices and use of Ikhwan and other sets of measures which alienated the local population (Nabi and Ye 2015: 59). There

³⁰ Sameer Lone who joined HUM in February 2018 along with Rayees Ah Thokar in June 2017, Aediman Malik in November 2017 and Ishfaq malik in January 2018 have been eliminated quickly after they joined HUM ranks.

are few incidents which moulded the perception of the people and were so indelibly etched into the minds of the inhabitants that their historical feeling of alienation and anguish developed from these incidents got passed in successive generations as bedtime stories. These tales and visuals act as reminders of traumatic past and reaffirmation of a bleak future.

3.8.1 The cases of excesses

The Sopore incident (or Sopore Massacre) remains the most traumatic incident for the inhabitants of Sopore town. On the ill-fated morning of 6 January 1993 (according to the eyewitnesses as report on Institute on Kashmir Studies), two militants lifted a machine gun lying nearby a BSF official on Patrol and ensued firing on two BSF officials in which one of them succumbed to his wounds (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 31). According to IKS reports, the official accounts say that 94th Battalion of BSF initiated cross firing in which 45 civilians were killed and attack on militant's ammunition dump charred over 300 houses in five localities.

However, the extensive study conducted by Institute of Kashmir Studies revealed a different picture. The report notes that as a retaliatory measure, BSF started indiscriminately firing on all civilians that came in their way and blazed all the buildings. Eyewitnesses note that the civilians who tried to escape the rampage by hiding inside the shops or the houses were shot at point blank. After killing the civilians, the buildings too were set ablaze where these bullet-ridden bodies, cindered and other civilians who survived gunshot were burnt alive. (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 1). Eye Witnesses also report that some BSF men also fired upon State Road Transportation Bus JKY 1901 bound to Bandipora from Sopore. It is reported that 15 people were killed while 4 were seriously injured in this ruthless rampage. It was confirmed by the testimony of survivors. One of them was Mr. Assaaddin Lone (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 35)

“The bus was parked in the main Chowk Sopore near main bazar area. On hearing the Gunshots, the passengers of the bus laid flat in the bus. At 11:25 am, Two BSF officials entered in the bus and started indiscriminate firings on the passengers. This process continued for 10 minutes till they were satisfied that they have killed all the passengers of the bus....I found my wife who had succumbed to the injuries due to 9 bullets. I got hit by three bullets in my arm, leg, and abdomen” (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 1).

Another claim that the report nullifies is that fire broke out from the ammunition dump. As per IKS report, 99% of the eyewitnesses testified that the area was lit at 6 different places simultaneously (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 7). The BSF personnel was explicitly seen carrying kerosene to ignite the area. The report also recounts evidence of Fire breaking out on both sides of the road of the main Chowk which also refuted the official account. The critical study carried out by IKS supplemented by eyewitness account nullifies the official account that people were killed in cross firing, and the building was set ablaze due to ammunition dump of militants rather this was an act of revenge carried out to liquidate the area and punish the locals for supporting the militancy (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 5).

The study also brings into the light the friction between armed forces and the civil administration that persisted in the 90s. Then SSP Baramulla range SM Sahai confirmed that BSF ran amok in the area, going on a killing spree while torching the buildings. B. S Bedi (DG Police J &K) also commented that *“The security forces have lost their control which resulted in this unpleasant happening.”* Hakeem Manzoor (District Commissioner Baramulla District where Sopore falls) commented that *“Disturbed areas and TADA act has bestowed the forces with utmost power and Sopore incident is the outcome of such power.”* It was also ascertained in the report that the fact that armed forces outnumber local civil administration implies that the domain of law and order remains unofficially under the control of the security forces (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 6).

The Sopore incident threatened the credibility of so-called peace-brokering measures initiated by the Indian state as depicted by the duality between ‘operation goodwill’ and the state terrorism. Kashmir times in its article ‘Murderers in Khaki’ published on January 9, 1993, demolished the ‘demoralization of army’ argument by comparing how Pakistan punished its soldiers for having murdered some villagers with one getting death sentences while several others were given life terms (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 19). Furthermore, it brought to the light a need to trial BSF officials in open court to restore some faith in Kashmiris to show that Indian state is serious towards addressing crimes by aberrant soldiers. The Economic Times on January 8, 1993, paper presented a more disturbing image. The civic administration agreed to the allegation that BSF charred more than 300 structures in five localities of Armpora, Peer, Kralteng, Shallagund, and Shahabad in the township by spraying gun powder and kerosene

(Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 22). Over 45 people were killed, and over 300 were injured. (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 21). The Tribune reported that doctors, fire-fighters were reluctantly allowed by BSF to carry out their duties. AM Ganai, Divisional fire officer, Sopore noted in his diary that serious firefighting operations were not allowed by the BSF despite the plea of additional SP of Police Sopore until an hour was lost and wasted (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 69). People got the traumatic confirmation that BSF was hell bound in reducing a town to rubble.

The resolution passed by the public at Sopore on 15 January 1993 under Syed Geelani raised a pertinent question that even if the official accounts were considered true, why were five localities torched, over 100 of people shot and 45 people killed by the disciplined forces? (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 73).

The fire at Lal Chowk came across as another famous incident of arson and indiscriminate killings by the Indian forces. The BSF from 11 pm onwards started vacating Sanatan Dharam building on 9 April 1993 without any notice to the local administration. 9th and 10th April were the days of Hartals in Srinagar called by Hizbul Mujahideen to mourn the loss of their divisional commander Maqbool Illahi hence the atmosphere of the valley was volatile. Various eyewitnesses testified to researchers from IKS that some protestors entered the building at around 8:30 am and ignited it (Institute of Kashmir studies 1993b: 4).

According to the official records the BSF was adjusting its deployment and was moving from the top floor to the ground floor of the building when the militants entered the buildings and set it on fire (pg. 11 ref Hindustan times 11.4.93) which led to spread of conflagration across various localities near Lal Chowk in which at least 50 houses and 250 Shops were cindered. The paramilitary forces were called in to confront the militant in an intense gunfire. However, these 'official' records have been contradicted by the testimony of the S.H.O of Maisuma Police station Mushtaq Ahmad. Mushtaq Ahmad testified that the local police were caught unawares regarding the fact that 114 battalions has vacated the Sanatan Dharam building and hence were not prepared to protect the building from the violent protesters. He also records that commandant of 114 BSF Mr. B.R. Sharma didn't heed to his request for assistance in controlling the violent mob at the Lal Chowk which led to an escalation of violence and property damage. When BSF arrived at the scene, it started discriminatory firing at all sides endangering the police

officers themselves who were out there to control the mob (Institute of Kashmir studies 1993b: 90). Many separatist leaders interpreted the vacating of SD building as a premeditated move to provoke protestors who were bound to be present at the Lal Chowk and use the excuse of their violence as a pretext of shooting at Kashmiri population and cindering shops and houses. IKS in their survey notes that nearly 100% of the eyewitnesses surveyed answered that it was BSF who set the buildings on fire. IKS notes the death toll be to be around 12 people and the Director of Fire services J&K government M.S Dar noted the tentative property damage of Rs 63 crore (Institute of Kashmir studies 1993b: 92)

The Year 1993 became monumental as another massacre happened at Brijbehera on October 23, 1993. The 74th battalion of BSF fired upon people who were protesting against seize of Hazratbal shrine by the military. Human Rights Watch reports that 37 people were killed in that firing. What is most impactful about this incident was that since in the local graveyard, there was no space to bury the dead, the same public park became the burial ground of the young boys killed in the massacre where they used to play. 14 BSF officers were charged, but all of them were acquitted. The public park became the site of a historic reminder of oppression. Similarly, the bridge of Gaw Kadal which witnessed the death of 51 protestors from the bullets of CRPF also remembers the blood that was spilled on the Gaw Kadal Bridge on January 21, 1990 (Asia Watch 1993). The operations and misadventures of the security forces created many monuments of oppression which keeps on inspiring youth to join militancy.

These incidents created a historic continuity of oppression signaling towards the bleak future and demonstrating what possibly the true intentions of the Indian State are. Indian state commits a folly of ignoring the fact that security forces and the army acts as the representatives of the state, and their acts reflect not merely the acts of an institution but of the entire state. Any act of punishing the perpetrators would have led towards fading of traumatic memory, but it got etched through continuity and rage of injustice.

Apart from the operations, certain policies and strategies of the Indian army, J&K Police and security forces alienated the locals. These policies included illegal detentions, custodial tortures which often resulted in death, fake encounters of militant

sympathizers but it was the notorious catch and kill policy which dented the image of India internationally and alienated the local population.

3.8.2 Catch and Kill tactic

The Catch and Kill tactic is adopted by the Indian state for the ruthless liquidation of the militants and their alleged supporters. It is a policy adopted by various security agencies across the world and is considered as one of the most viable action for the elimination of national security threats. The indiscriminate application of this policy in Kashmir, however, has produced contrary results. The arbitrary arrests of youth and other locals of the valley and the tales of torture and custodial killings have widely discredited Indian army and the security forces. Ironically, the security forces in the valley of Kashmir emerged as the greatest security threat for the locals of the valley mainly due to this policy. The Indian state has also been condemned by the Human rights organizations like Asia Watch and Amnesty International for such blatant human rights abuses. Schofield writes that under the tenure of Girish Saxena who succeeded Jagmohan, Indian forces deployed the tactic of 'turning' militants who could not withstand interrogation and then were used as CATS (Concealed Apprehension Tactics) to identify other militants. Through a series of operations codenamed 'Tiger,' 'Cobra' and 'Eagle,' the catch and kill technique was deployed to eliminate militants (Schofield 2003:168).

Prof Y.A Neemani in Volume two of a report on extrajudicial Execution in Kashmir prepared by Human rights division of the Institute of Kashmir Studies, notes that the Catch and Kill plan of extra-judicial killing, custodial killing, and fake encounters were put to place in the month of August 1992. From August 1992 to October 1994 over 882 reported custodial killings have taken place (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1994: 27). The method of custodial killing is also very brutal which ranges from cutting off the limbs, cutting off the private parts, brutally torturing to death and then riddling the body with bullets. While actual circumstances might not be explained but the official accounts depict that these people were killed while attempting to flee or were killed in the crossfire (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1994: 27). Both militants and their alleged accomplices were subjected to these brutalities while the right to a fair trial was being denied to them. While some families of the victims of the custodial killing were able to

procure the bodies of the deceased, there are many cases of ‘disappearance’ from the custody have also been registered.

Catch and Kill policy derives its fuel from the draconian legislations that are extended in the Kashmir region like Public safety Act and Armed forces (Special Powers) Act. The visuals of a boy whom one has seen growing up in the neighbourhood getting arrested and subsequently declared disappeared or found killed add on to the memory of oppression. In this case, the rage is supplemented with fear which keeps the memory alive. The family members of a disappeared person have to suffer a life- long trauma while their spouses are condemned to live as ‘half widows.’

3.9 ‘Durbhavna’ in operation Sadbhavana

Operation sadbhavna as noted was the development-centric approach to winning hearts and minds of the people in Kashmir (Nabi and Ye 2015). Nabi and Ye provide three elements of ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach alongside with the overview of debates on their relevancy. The first approach is good governance as counterinsurgency. Through this approach, military and security forces take charge of the developmental works with the aim of alienating the local population from the insurgents. However, the contentions are raised over the rationale of a military takeover of civic actions. The second element is the use of information and communication to make masses aware about the developmental tasks that are undertaken by the army and destruction caused by the militants and third is minimum use of force (Nabi and Ye 2015: 59). Nabi and Ye invoke the question raised in the work of A. Anant; why did rural people participate in the protests if the operation was a success? (ibid.) Through a field study in the various village of district Kupwara and Bandipore, Nabi and Ye exposes the ‘durbhavna’³¹ within Operation Sadbhavna.

Operation Sadbhavana included measures like women empowerment programmes which Nabi and Ye report were not very well attended by women as they feared sexual harassment from the military officials (Nabi and Ye 2015: 61). The healthcare facilities operated in lieu of the absence of government hospitals made locals dependent on the healthcare services provided by the army to enhance their image (ibid.). Nabi and Ye identify various reasons for why infrastructural development projects in Kashmir didn’t succeed. Firstly, they argued that operation Sadbhavna was an external driven

³¹ Translates as Malice in english

developmental project which had no popular sanction from the population. The main concern of the army is to build legitimacy, but Nabi and Ye invoke the argument of Fitzsimmons to assert that people preferred a bad government which was their own over something external (ibid). Secondly, they argue that the military lacks the expertise to implement developmental projects which are evident from the 300 defunct micro hydroelectricity plants in Kupwara and also defunct vocation centers and schools. Thirdly, they argue that development initiatives by the army in the valley were not need-based and undermined the civilian authority thereby creating a rift between the two. The fourth problem is operation Sadbhavna has forced the military to do extra work as there are no dedicated cadres in military formations for this task. Nabi and Ye argue that this has bred corruption in the army wherein major army officials have accumulated wealth (Nabi and Ye 2015: 62). Nabi and Ye invoke Noorani to put forth an argument that military officers have acted as middlemen in supplying 'secret funds' to politicians favoured by the center to ensure that only those politicians win the election who support army's agenda and justify a military presence in the valley. Nabi and Ye use what Paglen calls 'secret state' for Kashmir to state that the main objective behind operation sadbhavna was not to earn the goodwill of the people but to gain legitimacy and control, accumulate wealth via corruption and reinforce power asymmetry (ibid.).

Worst of them all is the objective of land grab that underlies the Operation Sadbhavna. Nabi and Ye cite state government figures which state that the Indian army has grabbed over 53,353 hectares of state land. Nabi and Ye contest this figure by arguing that this record is merely a tip of the iceberg as the department of forestry has claimed that Indian army has 49,000 hectares of forest land under its grab itself (Nabi and Ye 2015: 62). Land grabs by the army results in loss of livelihood to the peasants. Nabi and Ye also note that not only army makes the forests inaccessible to the local people, but they also engage in criminal activities like smuggling timber (ibid.). Not only did the army grabbed agricultural, forest and barren lands but it also grabbed tourist lands in Toasmaidan, Gulmarg, Pahalgam and Bagus valley which has impacted the livelihood of people dependent on tourism. Under the guise of operation Sadbhavna, the Indian army has indulged not merely in corruption but also dented the agricultural sector of the local economy as well as tourism sector whose development ironically was the objective of Operation Sadbhavna. As army occupies the agricultural lands and forest lands, the perception of the army as a colonizer gets reaffirmed. Nabi and Ye conclude

that development works cannot go hand in hand with measures that take away the dignity of Kashmiris like regular frisking, identity checks, fake encounters, curfews, and torturing. The political will and the right to live with dignity cannot be replaced by building schools and healthcare centres (ibid.).

3.10 Havoc of Pellet Guns

In the year 2016, Kashmir reeled into a massive wave of protests after killing of Burhan Wani by the security forces in an encounter in South Kashmir's Anantnag district on 8th July. Burhan Wani was a top commander of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and was revered by the people of south Kashmir. Under the huge wave of protests covering the entirety of the valley, Indian security forces and J&K Police deployed popular crowd control measure of pumping pellets which was introduced in 2010 as 'non-lethal technique of riot management.' What became an issue was the lethality of Pellet guns. Pellets were fired on the protesters arbitrarily without warning which resulted in blinding of Youth and in some cases, even multi-organ failures. The situation in the valley became very tense for upcoming months as from July 15 onwards, J&K Police announced a curfew in the Kashmir Valley which went on for almost 100 days. The valley went on fire once again on September 17 when the pellet-ridden body of an 11-year-old boy was recovered near a stream at Dachigam National Park. The images of young children blinded in the apparent crossfire created a serious issue of serious Human rights violation issues (News18 2017) . The Chairman of the National Front Naeem Khan informed in an interview to the Greater Kashmir that 77 people died and 1200 got injured in 2016 within two months from the military crackdown following the encounter of Burhan Wani (Greater Kashmir 2016).

As per the report of Indian Express, the figures submitted by the deputy commissioners of eight districts in Jammu and Kashmir to the State Human rights commission revealed that at least 2,524 people were injured by the use of pellet guns in the wake of protests following the death of Burhan Wani. The state government according to the Indian express report also identified the nature of injuries of 1700 victims which included 59 women (Indian Express 2017). From July 2016 until February 2017, 9,042 people were injured in the Kashmir valley which the government specified in the written reply to the legislative assembly. Out of 9,042, 368 were bullet injuries, and 6,221 were permanent injuries, 4 people were injured by PAVA shells, and 2,449 people were injured for other reasons. The government data noted that 782 people had eye injuries

with 15 people, permanently blinded and 39 people partially blinded (Kashmir Reader 2018).

AG Noorani notes that India violated the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials whose basic principles if summarily put are advocacy of non-violent methods before violent ones, proportionate damage and minimization of damage and injury. He notes how the doctors at Shri Maharaja Hari Singh Hospital observed that almost all Pellet victims had wounds above their chest. Noorani reports that According to Dr. Qaisar Ahmed, Dean of Medical Services, Government of Jammu & Kashmir, 60 pellet victims (Till July 24, 2016) including a three-year-old girl and a four-year-old boy, lost their eyesight completely. This raises a question on why Pellet Guns remain a popular crowd control non-lethal weapon in the valley (Noorani 2016).

The state government justified the use of pellet in the J&K High court. The government's reply, signed by the director general of police (DGP), reads as follows

“The pellet gun is a modern method to deal with crowd, particularly agitating mobs, who resort to heavy stone pelting, rioting, arson, at the instigation of militants and separatists with the intention of causing loss to life of police personnel and those of security forces, besides the public and private property,” (Saha 2016).

Javaid Gilani, Inspector General of Police, in an interview to a Srinagar-based newspaper has justified the pellet gun blinding by asking,

“How can a deterrent be set then? How are stone-throwers to be stopped?” Such callousness amounts to adding wounds to a wounded body, an attitude that can push Kashmir back to the brink.” (Saha 2016).

It will be impudent to note that these statements merely reflect the use of Pellet Guns as the first preference as aggressive stone pelting might compel them to use it and being untrained in its operation; they draw flak. Aggressive stone pelting causes a serious threat to life to security forces and Police and pellet guns have started to injure the innocents hence the central government decided to explore alternatives that can resolve both problems.

3.10.1 Alternatives to Pellet Guns

Rajnath Singh announced in front of the Parliament about the constitution of the committee which came into being on July 26, 2016, as a seven-member expert committee under the chairmanship of Joint Secretary Home affairs T V S N Prasad (The

Hindu 2016). The expert committee zeroed in on PAVA shells as a less lethal alternative to the Pellet Guns. PAVA stands for Pelargonic Acid Vanillyl Amide, also called Nonivamide, and is an organic compound found in natural chilli pepper. It has the ability to stun and immobilize bodies due to irritation it causes to human. The second option was ‘dye marker grenade with irritant’ that leaves a dye mark which can aid security forces to identify the rioter. The third option was ‘Tear smoke shell with a soft nose’ that doesn’t injure protestor while being fired at close range and its plastic starts melting after being launched hence the protestors can’t throw the shell back at forces. Forth option was “Stun Grenade’ along with some other products made by Ordnance Factory Boards (OFBs) which were also in the consideration (PTI 2016) . In the meanwhile, CRPF sent 21,000 rounds of DRDO made rubber bullets in the valley under the launching criticisms of the pellet guns (Asian Age 2017). However, it is interesting to note that while discussing non- lethal alternatives to pellet guns, we don’t discuss what could be the political alternatives to prevent crowd controls. India myopic policy of containment problem (not of resolution) provides for such kind of alternatives only as political alternatives would require a political will and lasting patience.

As we were growing optimistic about the government quest for alternatives, we came across the report by the Greater Kashmir newspaper. As reported by the Greater Kashmir on 2nd September 2016, J&K Police already ordered a fresh consignment of 1 lac Pellet cartridge each containing 635 Pellets with the total amounting to 6.35 crore pellet. A senior officer from J&K Home department informed the newspaper. *“A portion of this delivery has already been distributed to different districts as per the requisition made by the concerned heads of police.”* This makes up question the rhetoric of Indian government and the huge gap between promises to the Kashmiri people and the actual practices of Kashmiri people (ALI and YUSUF 2016). Furthermore, this answers the question that we raised a while ago. Indeed Pellet guns remain the preferred option of crowd control by Police and security forces

Despite evolving other crowd-controlling measures, Indian security forces prefer the use of pellet guns over other alternatives. In the Shopian encounters of April 2018, 12 militants were killed but also on the other hand 4 civilians were dead in the crossfire while 50 people suffered bullet wounds while around 100 people suffered pellet injuries. Instead of replacement of pellet guns, we have witnessed the more aggressive use of the pellets (Kashmir Reader 2018).

Sujaat Bukhari in his cover story in Frontline notes that Kashmir problem is not merely problem of economic alienation, unemployment or lack of opportunities rather it is for their right to live with dignity. Bukhari (2016) notes that over 2 lac people who attended Burhan Wani's funeral were not unemployed. Most of the injured protestors admitted at Sri Hari Singh Hospital were educated and employed with a firm resolve to resist Indian state by all means and all forms. Disillusionment with BJP-PDP regime and the rise of Hindutva politics has fomented radicalization. I would like to add a fundamental observation that visual of large footprints of forces and experience of perpetual fear of getting encountered or harassed the visual images of pellet-ridden bodies and blind children supplements the existing memory of trauma with a more immediate sense.

3.11 The Human shield Affair

Amidst the rising toll of injuries due to pellets, Indian security forces added yet another incident to their legend of misadventures. International media and the major human rights organizations vociferously condemned the Indian security forces after a video of a man being used as a human shield got viral on the social media. Under the huge domestic and international pressure, Rashtriya Rifles decided to clear this blot from their image by conducting an unprecedented press briefing, explaining their side of the story.

On 23 May 2017, Major Nitin Leetul Gogoi conducted a press briefing in which he explained his position and the circumstances which led to this apparent violation of Human rights. On 9 April at 10:30 am, Major Gogoi of 53 Rashtriya Rifles received a distress call from the ITBP officers conducting polling at Utligam polling station where the mob of 1200 people has gathered and are trying to burn down the polling booth with petrol bombs. Despite making repeated announcements with a megaphone stating that they have come only to rescue the polling staff, the crowd refused to budge. In the meanwhile, the officers accompanying Major Gogoi identified the ringleader; a short man who was standing 30 meters away from their vehicle. He tried to escape on the motorcycle, but the security forces got hold of him. He was later identified as Farooq Ahmad Dar who came from Chil to Ultigam to instigate the crowd. The security forces were successfully able to rescue 12 people in which 4 were polling staff, 7 were ITBP officers, and the final one was a J&K Police constable. They prepared to move away from the area, but their Mine protected vehicle got stuck in the muddy area. The crowd

outside the booth started stone pelting which got intensified after the announcement from a nearby mosque. Major Gogoi requested the crowd to allow a safe passage through his megaphone, but his request went unheeded. Sensing imminent death, his subordinates advised him to open fire, but major Gogoi came up with an idea of tying Farooq Ahmad Dar to Mine Protected Vehicle. As they tied Dar to the Mine Protected Vehicle, the stone pelting stopped, and Major Gogoi was successfully able to rescue 12 people along with his subordinates from Utligam without any casualties. He was applauded by Indian media and the army for his presence of mind and was awarded Chief of Army Staff commendation card (Major Gogoi in a Press Conference 2017)³².

However, the detailed investigation of Hindustan Times, various eyewitness accounts and the testimony of Farooq Ahmad Dar presented a completely different picture altogether. After voting in Srinagar bypolls (his serial number on the voter roll was 612) at a polling booth (number 90), he and a friend were passing through Utligam on a motorcycle to a relative's house to condole a death in Gampora village when he was picked up by the security forces. Dar recounts:

"They damaged my bike, thrashed me severely with gun butts and wooden sticks and in an almost unconscious state tied me to the front of the jeep and paraded me through 10 to 20 villages," Dar told the wire. *"There was no stone pelting going on in the area when the army men picked me up and neither did any stone pelting take place on the [army] vehicles when I was being paraded,"* (Ahmad 2017).

The 26-year-old Shawl Weaver laments ignoring the call for a boycott of Indian elections and participating in the election which witnessed a mere 7% turnout. Interestingly the other side of the story revealed that Major Leetul Gogoi tied Farooq Ahmad Dar on the bonnet of his jeep as a "Human shield" and unlike the official account of when Dar was released after being paraded as a human shield for merely for 100 meters, The special report of Hindustan Times traces the journey of Farooq Ahmad Dar as the human shield which lasted for 5 hours as the security forces drove him through the excruciating tract of 28 km from Utligam to Hardpanzoo crossing 17 villages in between. The detailed story by the Hindustan times incorporates the accounts of the eyewitnesses from the different villages who witnessed the gruesome sight of the apparent torture of the Indian army. Dar's brother with the Sarpanch and deputy-Sarpanch of his Chil village reached the CRPF camp in Hardpanzoo where he was

³² Can be accessed from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzc3b2bkyRY>

eventually taken to. They witnessed Dar being kept tied to a tree inside the camp. Finally, at about 7 pm, he was released. When Dar was captured from the village of Chil, he tried to reason with the army by showing the indelible ink to the army men, but he was beaten and was tied up (Rashid and Saha 2017). This version was also reaffirmed by The Caravan interview (Maqbool 2017).

The report submitted by the senior superintendent of police Budgam to J&K Director General of Police SP Vaid in August revealed that Farooq Ahmad Dar did cast his vote at the polling booth in his native village Chil (T. Rashid 2017). The security forces used Dar not as the last minute resort to save their lives but to send a message to the Kashmiri populace of the fate that awaits a stone pelted. Security forces tied a placard on his neck which read “I am a stone pelted” and paraded him 17 villages, creating an example out of him. Taking cognizance of the incident, the State Human rights Commission admitted that Dar was subjected to humiliation and wrongful confinement and directed the state government to pay Rs 10 Lac to Dar’s family as compensation. Amnesty International too in its press statement has condemned the accolade of COAS commendation card for Major Gogoi by stating that this act of awarding the human rights violator valorises the act of cruelty and torture and reflects India’s “disdain for human rights” (The Times of India 2017)

3.12 Indian army leadership: From doves to hawks

As the violence broke out in Kashmir after the death of Burhan Wani, the Indian army was under pressure to curb the violence in the valley. Indian army adopted dovish line and promoted more citizen friendly approach. Lt General DS Hooda, Northern Army Commander, emphasized the security of communication lines so that the supply of an essential commodity is not disrupted in the valley (Kumar 2016). He along with Lt General Satish Dua briefed Indian army General Dalbir Singh in August 2016 who also urged the Indian army to exercise restraint while dealing with the protestors along with focusing on synergizing efforts with the other stakeholders. Dalbir Singh emphasized upon the efforts to constructively engage with the people so that peace can be restored in the valley (Ehsan and Sagnik 2016). The approach changed drastically after the appointment of Bipin Rawat as the General of Indian army in 2017.

Under General Rawat, Indian army adopted the most hawkish line on the Kashmir issue. Not merely the army rejected failure of its policies to normalize the situation in

Kashmir; it placed the blame on the locals for waging a dirty war against on behest of Pakistan. General of Indian army Bipin Rawat defended the actions of Major Leetul Gogoi by stating:

“This is a proxy war, and proxy war is a dirty war. It is played in a dirty way. The rules of engagements are there when the adversary comes face-to-face and fights with you. It is a dirty war... That is where innovation comes in.”

“We are a friendly army, but when we are called to restore law and order, people have to be afraid of us” (India Today 2017).

Bipin Rawat had specified his stance on February 16 when he commented while paying tribute to the brave hearts of the Handwara and Bandipora encounters (ANI 2017)

-“People who have picked up arms, the local boys, if they want to continue with such acts of terrorism and display flags of ISIS and Pakistan, then we will treat them as anti-national elements and go helter-skelter for them. Our relentless operations will continue,”

Bipin Rawat clarified the current temperament of Indian armed forces in Kashmir issues. He regards such acts as ‘innovative acts’ which have the potential to further destabilize the Kashmir issue by escalating feeling of alienation. By parading Dar through 17 villages, the immediate image of trauma was reinforced not only on the victim but also on the onlookers who have a potential to become dissenters or rebels. Since Bipin Rawat was not reprimanded by the central government, it reveals the present ruling government has no regard for human rights of Kashmiri locals as in their view, human rights of locals run contrary to the Indian security.

3.13 Incarceration of dissent

The Indian state has generously deployed the tactic of incarcerating dissenting political leaders. After the 1987 elections, it incarcerated leaders from MUF. The separatist leaders are either arrested under PSA for long durations or are kept under constant house arrest. The hopes and guarantees of Indian constitution hold little value also for the locals as those who dissented even by non-violent ways were punished by the state through its extraordinary laws. Former Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti stated in the legislative assembly that 726 people were booked in PSA in 2016 and 2017 out of which those 525 booked under PSA in 2016 were already released under programme of Amnesty to first time offenders but according to the claims by High court lawyers, 2016-2017 witnessed highest numbers of PSA detention orders with 738 people booked under PSA in 2016 alone and 371 in 2017 till November 25, 2017 (Khalid 2018). This

signifies incarceration of dissent which not merely dents Indian legitimacy in Kashmir but also breeds a new class of militants and motivates a generation.

3.14 Making of a militant

In chapter 1, we discussed how in the present phase of the insurgency, we are witnessing a rise in recruitment of militants.

Table 3 Year wise militant recruitment

Year	Recruitment
2010	54
2011	21
2012	23
2013	6
2014	53
2015	66
2016	88
2017	126
2018 (Till May)	81

The figure is compiled from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/local-recruitment-in-militant-groups-rises-alarmpingly-in-kashmir/articleshow/64436108.cms>

Mohammad Yasin Malik argues that the Indian state metes out disproportionate punishment to even the non-violent dissenters. The face of new militancy- Burhan Wani and other boys earlier participated in non-violent protests in 2008 and 2010 but turned to violent militancy after torture and humiliation. The family of Burhan Wani was consistently harassed by security forces in search of Burhan's older brother- Khaled Wani. After an incident when Khalid and Burhan were stopped by the army on their way home from Dadsara where they went to purchase groceries. They were taken into forced labour and were beaten. As the anger reached its brim, Burhan joined Hizb and became the poster boy of militancy in Kashmir.

Another is the case of Mufti Hilal who was an Islamic scholar and jurist and participated in peaceful demonstrations in 2010. Malik notes that in his speeches too, he advocated non-violence, but as he was arrested, he was tortured immensely and was humiliated by the Police force. He was continuously slapped with PSA so that he is kept

incarcerated. He too picked up the gun and was killed. Another tragic story is of Zubair Ahmad Turray who was first arrested under PSA when he was 5 and was kept under incarceration for 4 years by charging him 8 times with PSA (Malik 2018). From the interviews conducted by the Indian Express with the parents of militant Zubair Ahmad Turray, The parents told the reporters that it was Indian Police which left them with no option as they booked his son Zubair Ahmad under Public Safety Act and when that was quashed by the High court, the police again illegally extended the detention by booking him in a new PSA case. Turray after getting frustrated, joined Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Ehsan and Masood 2018) giving India a unique case study of how even a democracy creates militants. Malik argues that when the discourse of non-violence was prevalent in Kashmir, Indian civil society and political class announced that normalcy has returned to the valley and the demands were conveniently ignored. As the youth in the valley was left with no other option, it started picking up stones and graduated to guns (Malik 2018).

What implication would this new militancy have on the story of the insurgency? Malik argues that now the new militants are locals who rose among the same group of oppressed people. Unlike the old militants, they have not crossed the Line of Control, are not radicalized by Pakistan against India or received special training from Pakistan rather they are home grown; grown out of Indian armed strategy in Kashmir (Malik 2018)

3.15 Observations

The first observation linking these case studies together is that historic memory of oppression persists through generations if that memory gets reawakened through new acts of oppression. Those historic memories become a firm part of the narrative as they are relived albeit through new acts evoking the same feelings. These memories generate the rage with the collectivity with the same memories that can transform into a violent rebellion.

While the official narratives, (except the statement given by Major Leetul Gogoi), appears abstract, inconsistent and ambiguous while the counter-narrative repudiating the official narratives are backed by empirical data, photographic and testimonial evidence, eyewitness accounts and logical explanations of the incident. While analyzing both sets of accounts, the counter-narratives appear more credible. Their

credibility is reaffirmed by the subsequent reactions of the people (locals who have witnessed such incidents) in the form of angry (often violent) protests.

Indian army and the Indian government have only tried to address the factor of militancy, and the undeterred focus has been to eliminate the phenomena without eliminating the cause. Alienation of the Kashmiri population might not be the biggest cause of the emergence of the insurgency, but it certainly is the biggest cause of local support to the insurgency. Indian state's brute force demonstrated in these incidents has aggravated alienation among the local Kashmiris which in turn transformed them either into militants or supporters of militancy. The discriminatory application of PSA has transformed innocents into militants. The attitude of Indian army leadership has been a cause of rage among the Kashmiris. Nilofer Masood, an advocate at the Baramulla District Court while commenting on awarding Major Gogoi, told the Scroll-

"The "wave of alienation is only going to spread deeper with the lack of support from the government and an insincere Army. Whatever sense of belonging there was, will not remain." While adding- "A fair investigation was not done. The effect of such atrocities will show in the long run. It is only going to add to the unrest, which still has not subsided. The award will mean that people will continue the unrest." (Naqash 2017).

The priority of Indian State and the top officials of the Indian Army and other security forces is to keep the morale of soldiers high at the cost of demoralization of the local population.

All these incidents reflect towards a total collapse of the rule of law in the Kashmir region. All the evidence presented by a various human rights organizations point at the regime of impunity wherein inquiries have been set up by the security agencies and the army and barring a very few cases, no punishment has been given. In case of the Sopore incidents, the eyewitnesses seem to be aware of the regime of impunity persisting in the Kashmir region wherein Indian state loses its trust from the masses when it fails to punish the perpetrators. Till Jan 1993, the Indian government initiated 87 enquiries but only in two cases, the action against the culprits were taken. (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1993: 8) The state has directed police stations to not take any FIRs against Army, BSF, and CRPF which gives out the impression of responsiveness of Indian State towards grievances of Kashmir's and legitimizing the acts of state terrorism (ibid.). Indian express reports that 50 FIR's were sent to Defence Ministry by the local

police between 2001-2016 and the government reported in the parliament that permission to persecute was denied in 47 cases by the Ministry of Defence and 3 cases were awaiting decision (Indian Express 2018). In the Machil fake encounter case, the court ruled suspension of imprisonment term to the 5 convicts who were completing life sentences (Hindustan Times 2017). As the 5 convicts were granted bail, the message was sent loud and clear that army officials will never be persecuted within the legal system of India and Kashmir is the only region where the value of justice enshrined in the constitution might never materialize.

Apart from the fact and evidence, even in the popular perception, there has been a total collapse of the rule of law. Locals have witnessed civic administration being powerless in front of the army and security forces. Many youths have either disappeared or have been found dead near the coast of the rivers or nallahs (Institute of Kashmir studies 1997: 10). These daily occurrences add on to the atmosphere of distrust prevailing in the Kashmir valley. It is interesting to note that Indian state has always wanted to conduct dialogues and negotiations with the separatists under the framework of Indian constitution but has practiced incarceration of dissent with many Hurriyat leaders and their supporters being constantly kept in jail or under house arrest. While on a daily basis the separatist leaders and the local population witnesses total collapse of the rule of law, they will certainly maintain sincere doubts over commitments of the Indian State.

The episode of use of Pellet guns gives out a major revelation about the psyche of Indian forces and why pellet remains the favourite weapon for the State police and the security forces. As from the other episodes we have witnessed, the non-lethal bore pump gun showering steel pellets on the protestors cause great bodily harm but are generally non-lethal. In the current scenario, the security forces embody vast hatred for people who challenge them and the Indian state and pellet gun provides them with sadistic satisfaction of subduing an infantile population along with the creation of example out of blinded uneconomical bodies. While blinding of many small children troubles the conscience of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and International human rights organization, for Indian state it's a message delivered to the parents in Kashmir region to keep their children inside their home and away from protests. Pellet guns while being

non-lethal technically but causing right amount of harm to have 'lethal' impact on the psyche of the Kashmiri population.

Putting forward another perspective, Pellet Gun being used as the last resort of crowd control can also be representative of panic and inexperience of the security forces and the Police in crowd control. Since many people deployed in the security forces are from different regions of the country, they are not trained to counter mobs of such intensity without resorting to pumping of pellets on them. As long as security forces and J&K Police is not adequately trained in crowd controlling tactics, use of pellet guns would always be justified. The Jammu and Kashmir High court along with Amnesty has argued for discontinuation of pellet Guns as a weapon of crowd control however we need to look at the intention of the wielder than the weapon itself. Pellet Guns are not a problem, but their malafide usage (firing at close range, targeting vital body organs above the chest, etc.) is the biggest problem here. As we witness Pellet injuries in 2018, we can comfortably ascertain how unserious the government is to resolve the issue of blinding of Youth.

The Statements of Bipin Rawat demonstrates that Indian army plays the duality of us vs. them in the region of Kashmir. This symbolizes that India's focus merely on its own security rather than well-being of the population. We have also identified the malice in the operation good will. The question should be raised- Whose hearts and minds are Indian army trying to win when it characterizes protestors as over ground worker of militants furthermore, Operation Sadbhavana which is considered as a jewel in Indian COIN approach is merely a cover for oppression and corruption.

In the tactics of management of insurgency in the Kashmir valley has also implied that basic citizenship rights are not available to Kashmiri people and doctrines of 'limited force' 'right to protest,' 'freedom of speech,' 'freedom of movement' etc. are not provided to the Kashmiris. Secondly, episodes of custodial killings, encounters, and use of force to the effect of death imply that Article 21 and 22 are not applicable to the region. Thirdly, prevalence of Public Safety Act and AFSPA act implies that 'freedom' in general would not be enjoyed by Kashmiris. All the aspects imply that Indian constitution has blind to the problems of Kashmiris and all the negotiations conducted under the aegis of Indian constitution would not address basic issues of the Kashmiris. Kashmir is India's case of the permanent state of exception.

As the valley of Kashmir remains the permanent state of exception of the democratic India, Indian military responses can be characterised as abusive, statistically efficient, morally blind and overall self-defeating.

Chapter 4

Indian Political Strategy in Kashmir

After the outbreak of insurgency in the Kashmir valley, the initial response focused on recovering the areas dominated by rebels and Pakistan sponsored militants. However, as a democratic nation, the resolution of the Kashmir problem needed a multidimensional approach which not merely neutralizes the anti-India elements but also aids in the recovery of trust of the population who supported them. The real challenge in front of India was to establish its legitimacy which was challenged through hopes of 'azaadi' provided by the militants as well as India's iron fisted approach which alienated the population. The alienation in the valley wasn't the direct outcome of anger arousing from human rights violation but also from the political, economic and social realities operating in the valley.

In this section, I would analyse India's approach to reinstating the political initiative in the Kashmir and healing the wounds through promises of development and employment. The promises of Indian state carried with them a ray of optimism for the people trapped in the society of violence, but unfortunately, Indian state found itself trapped in its own imagery of contradictory relations between Kashmir's political autonomy and India's security.³³

4.1 Rationalizing the Military response

Indian security forces operations in the valley were riddled with many misadventures which not only increased the local scorn for security forces in the valley but also dented India's image as a peaceful democracy in the world. After the initial heavy handed military response which was spilling to involve more and more civilians into the casualty list, Indian government realized that it was time to dilute the military response in Kashmir and rationalize it by humanizing it. Dulat notes that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao wished to revive democracy and preferred negotiation with separatists and militants over Abdullah family. Rao set up the Department of Kashmir Affairs which he himself handled and gave the opportunity to young Rajesh Pilot who was willing to take initiatives in Kashmir (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 145). Rajesh Pilot was

³³ What Staniland calls 'a paradox of normalcy'

appointed Home Minister (state) in January 1994 with the assignment and responsibility to quell the insurgency in Kashmir. Rajesh pilot launched what Wirsing calls “Pilot initiatives.” They took shape mainly in the form of 1) administrative shakeups under which Rajesh Pilot appointed more “conciliatory faces of civil governments” like KV Krishna Rao who replaced Girish Saxena as a governor of the state. There was a reshuffling of governor’s small advisory staff in which liberals like IAS officer Ashok Jaitley and retired Lieutenant General M. A Zaki were appointed as political and military advisors (Wirsing 1994: 174). As a military officer with vast experience of dealing with insurgencies in North East India along with sound practical knowledge of ground realities of an insurgency infested area, KV Rao evolved four part plan of attack which included military as well political ingredients.

The first part comprised of a relentless military pursuit of militants with a slight innovation in technique so that the public doesn’t get alienated further than it already did due to reckless hardlined approach. This strategy included meeting with people, punishing the offenders who deployed unreasonable force and establishing better coordination between security forces and the police. The second part focused on making the administration more responsible and transparent by weeding out corrupt practices and their practitioners from the administrative setup. The third part was the restoration of democracy through free and fair elections and finally winning people towards the Indian side. The governor stated that this would be achieved by limiting cordon and search operations to flush out militants, not harassing the innocent villagers and asking people to expel militants from the villages or report them to security forces or police. The challenge was working with the fresh faces against the stubborn bureaucracy of the state (Wirsing 1994: 176).

Pilot’s second initiative was the formation of the unified command in May 1993 to establish formal coordination among security forces and the army. M.A Zaki as the military advisor was instituted as the chairman of Unified command and has to report developments to the Ministry of Home affairs and take their directives. The unified command came under widespread criticism as Wirsing through multiple interviews with his informants revealed that there was a widespread lack of trust prevailing between the army and the security forces followed by lack of desire to share intelligence information with each other. A senior bureaucrat in his interview with Wirsing

informed him that Zaki wasn't trusted by security forces and hence wasn't able to bend them to his wills. (Wirsing 1994: 177).

Rajesh Pilot in his third initiative rolled out a package of preventive procedural rules which were designed to curb excesses by the police and security forces in their counterinsurgency operations. The package comprised of training of security forces and police in Human rights and special circumstances of the insurgency to enhance the troop discipline. It included assignment of local magistrates as observers with BSF or army column to prevent abuses and to provide a local language and condition assistance. It required a mechanism of prompt notification to the family of the detained along with the reason of detention. The mechanism of monthly screening of detainees by a committee chaired by DGP was established to expedite the release of innocents and finally, the package included the establishment of speaking orders explaining the reasons for custodial deaths to the Ministry of Home Affairs (ibid.).

The Indian state realized that it could not install normalcy on the basis of the military crackdown alone. It needed to counter the most fundamental alienation that grappled Kashmir society: Political alienation.

4.2 Responding to the Political alienation in Kashmir: Restoration of electoral democracy

Rekha Chowdhary argues that the political alienation in Kashmir is a result of the suppression of constant desire of Kashmiri population to realize the 'independent political space' to fulfil their political aspiration (Chowdhary 2001). She argues that the promise of Article 370 has been taken away by a series of laws that were extended to the state. Chowdhary identifies elements like the over the intrusive role of state when it systematically eroded the spirit of Article 370, the ideology of integrationist politics, the failure of the evolution of dialogical tradition and interactive politics and decline in radical ideology as four factors which desisted formation of this political space.

Chowdhary argues that with lack of a systemic space for political expression, the political community in the state started shifting to what she calls 'extra systemic political space' (Chowdhary 2001: 159). The alienation was not sudden or abrupt but was a result of a long chain of events orchestrated by the Indian state in Kashmir with certain episodes acting as a trigger. She argues that three episodes exacerbated the political alienation. First was the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah government in 1984 by

Congress who orchestrated mass defection which was done to give a message that no state government can function in the state unless it is supported by the ruling party at the centre. The second event was Farooq- Rajiv Accord by which Abdullah formed a coalition government with the congress and dented the image of National conference and finally, the third episode was massive rigging of 1987 elections which gave the perception that democratic political processes in the state are sham (Chowdhary 2001: 160). The extra systemic space of militancy was now more preferable to the masses, and in this space, the idea of ‘azaadi’ was nurtured.

Puri comments that after free and fair elections of 1977 and 1983 were conducted, the secessionists were marginalized, but the grave folly was committed when Abdullah was dismissed in 1984 (Puri 2008: 36). The politics became monolithic, and democracy took the back seat for Nationalism. The dismissal of elected government became the first milestone for alienation. The second milestone was Rajiv Farooq accord which defeated the federal democracy. The third milestone was rigged elections of 1987. Puri argues that India has constantly denied democracy to Jammu and Kashmir through electoral manipulation, proxy government, stifling the growth of opposition parties and others (Puri 2008: 57). This refusal of the Indian state to let democracy function in Kashmir has prevented political and emotional integration of Kashmir valley from India (Puri 2008: 58).

What was so unique about the political alienation in Kashmir? Chowdhary argues that Kashmiris are a distinct group with their unique ethno-cultural identity defined by language, customs, and traditions alongside a philosophical way of life known as *Kashmiriyat* which has been mediated by Buddhism, Shaivism, and Islam thereby giving it a syncretic and eclectic basis (Chowdhary 2001: 162). Another aspect is the geographical insularity of the valley which provided the space for this identity to crystallize over a long period of time. Chowdhary analyses works of Stein’s *Kalhan Rajatarangani* to put forth a major argument that Kashmiri identity has integrated facets from other cultures but has always resisted subservience to a wider identity be it political or religious (ibid.). This explains why ontological priority is being given to Kashmiri identity over the Indian or Islamic identity. Chowdhary argues as the political consciousness grew in the region, people were made aware of ill effects of Dogra rule on the economy and well -being of Kashmiris but most importantly to the dignity of the locals. Taking the historical cue, they have developed an aversion to outside

interference in their local affairs (Chowdhary 2001: 163). Chowdhary asserts that Kashmiri population was more impressed with the secular democratic credentials of India as opposed to feudal and Islamic credentials of Pakistan thus the ideological and emotional bond was forged with India which was based on Nehru and Gandhi's commitment to autonomous political space for Kashmir and the promise of Indian constitution especially Article 370 (Chowdhary 2001: 164) (Puri 2008).

Over the decades as the promise of article 370 was eroded, the weak state structures created a legitimacy crisis. Post 1953, Chowdhary argues that politics in Jammu and Kashmir was superimposed from above as political leadership in Kashmir was dependent on the centre for its functioning and the 'highly politically mobilized community of Kashmiris were mute spectators of the political events in the state' (Chowdhary 2001: 165). The emotional basis was eroded as the federal character got replaced by a national unitary character with regard to Kashmir. The political space was homogenised with one set of views that focused on India's security rather than addressing the grievances of the Kashmiri population which led to stifling of dialogical tradition in Kashmir politics (Chowdhary 2001: 168) as the Centre systematically destroyed opposition parties, the trait which got exemplified in 1987 elections. Chowdhary notes that lack of political space had direct implication on the economy as well as the economy if the state was made dependent on the subsidies and aid from the centre which was appropriated by a section of society and also led to undeveloped economic infrastructure which could not sustain local economy but also ensure unemployment (Chowdhary 2001: 172). The section of society who suffered most due to lack of economic infrastructure was educated youth who later turned towards Islamic radicalization. The grievances were now echoed in the 'extra systemic spaces' which nurtured anti India secessionist politics (ibid.).

India's response too underwent change as it supported liberal political process in place of ruling through a proxy leader in the state, it sought to supplement counterinsurgency actions with developmental initiatives like operation Sadbhavana by the to win the hearts and minds of people however instead of working in tandem, democratic initiatives have run in conflict with counterinsurgency objectives as India sought to prioritize the prevalence of status quo in Kashmir (Staniland 2013: 942).

4.2.1 Confidence building measures

As a vibrant democracy that India professes to be, the resumption of the political process had to be the next move towards ‘normalization.’ Rekha Chowdhary argues that after military entered into the valley to put law and order into place, the next step had to focus on peace building in the more sustained way. She asserts that long term peace can only be ensured once the confidence of people has been restored (Chowdhary 2014: 8). That confidence could partly be restored by enforcing accountability on security forces for their human rights violations. To address the human rights issue, the central government introduced the Protection of human rights bill in 1993 which led to the formation of the National Human rights Commission in 1993 (Chowdhary 2014: 12).

As a confidence building measure, Narasimha Rao government released political prisoners including Shabir Shah, Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Abdul Ghani Lone. The chain of command was modified in unified command as now after the political process (elections) the Unified command would be chaired by the chief minister of the state. (Chowdhary 2014: 18). Chowdhary asserts that while noting the limitations of the political processes in the valley, it was decided by the central government that some amount of ‘political symbolism’ is needed to be offered to the political class in the state. That symbolism was projected in the approach which shifted the discourse from ‘azaadi to autonomy’ with Narasimha Rao promise of “sky is the limit” for autonomy. Along with such persuasion to local parties’ especially National conference and incentives to renegades (surrendered militants) who formed their own parties and when elections were announced; nominated their candidates. Most notable of them were parties formed by Kukka Parrey named Awami league and Awami congress which was formed by Hilal Haider (Chowdhary 2014: 24). Institute of Kashmir studies fact finding report notes that the promotion of plank of autonomy was in a fashion, not the demand of azaadi. The central government was so willing to start the political process that VP Singh and United Front assured before elections that autonomy of the state would be between the dignity of the Kashmiris and sovereignty of India (Institute of Kashmir Studies 1996: 8).

4.3 Elections are back in the valley

After the polling for the May 1996 parliamentary elections was conducted under heavy military presence, the state general elections were announced in Jammu and Kashmir in 1996. The National conference raised the demand for autonomy and restoration of pre 1953 status while Awami league opposed any concessions to autonomy. Although Hurriyat and other separatist leadership decided to boycott the elections, there was 53% voting in 1996 elections. National Conference won the majority by securing 57 seats out of 81 seats which it contested along with garnering 34.8% of vote share (Democracy and discontent in J&K since 1996 n.d. : 3). Hurriyat conference boycotted May 1996 and 1998 Parliamentary elections as well. Abdul Ghani Bhat explained the stance by arguing that elections were merely a ploy to divide people of Kashmir in their pursuit of freedom (Democracy and discontent in J&K since 1996 n.d. : 121) while Syed Ali Shah Geelani argued that Kashmir issue should be resolved through tripartite dialogue and implementation of UNSC resolutions (Dawn 2002) without the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, elections become a sham, and an eye wash to project a fake picture of restoration of normalcy.

Ajith Pillai (1996) writes in Outlook that the larger voter turnout was the result of various forms of ‘persuasion’ by Rastriya Rifles as they visited house to house ‘asking’ people to vote. Rastriya Rifles asked the mullah of the local mosque in many constituencies to announce that people should go to vote. Not only Rastriya Rifles and J&K Police force were pressuring people to come to vote, but in some constituencies (Anantnag and Baramulla especially), renegade militant political parties like Awami League of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon, Muslim Mujahideen also pulled people out to polling booths. In this pursuit, few minors were also forced to vote. Saifuddin Soz pointed out that even 15% votes would have sufficed to show that democracy is returning to the valley, but the overzealousness of the force has led to squandering of trust India was regaining after degeneration of insurgency (Pillai 1996). Despite these criticisms and shortcoming of Indian approach towards reclaiming the initiative, successful organization of elections after 9 years boosted the morale of India. Indian state got a clear direction that proper democratic procedures can restore the confidence of the people and people are only willing to support elections unless they are conducted fairly. The elections are the way forward.

After the victory in 1996 elections, Farooq Abdullah declared that accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Indian Union is complete and irrevocable and joined the united front government at the centre possibly to streamline implementation of central government plans and policies into Kashmir. Farooq Abdullah constituted State Autonomy Committee to pacify the discontentment among the Kashmiri masses. Abdullah assumed that maximum autonomy to Kashmiris could help resolve the issue of Kashmiri discontentment. The State Autonomy committee recommended restoration of pre 1953 status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and withdrawal of all parliamentary acts and laws and Union institution extended to Kashmir after August 9, 1953. The report was placed on the floor of the assembly on April 16, 1999, and was adopted by state legislative assembly on June 26, 2000, and the very next day, the Legislative council also adopted it. On July 4, 2000, the central government rejected the autonomy proposal by stating that it would “reverse the natural process of harmonizing the aspiration of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and the integrity of the nation” (Democracy and discontent in J&K since 1996 n.d. : 125).

State assembly elections due in 2002 were conducted for 87 seats in four phases and witnessed 43.7% voting. Marred by deaths of around 459 people which included 150 security personnel 261 civilians and probable candidates, party workers, the 2002 elections are regarded as amongst the fairest elections conducted in the valley as despite the violence, people came out to vote (Democracy and discontent in J&K since 1996 n.d. : 129). Although National conference acquired maximum seats (28), People Democratic Party (PDP) formed government in coalition with Indian National Congress (I) after both parties agreed to a ‘common minimum programme’ under which abrogation of controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), rotating chief ministership, disbanding of J&K Police Special operation groups, release of prisoner charged with militarily related offences, probe into cases of custodial deaths, facilitating return of Kashmiri Hindus and Pandits and resumption of dialogue with Pakistan on the issue of cross border militancy were the major points of agreement (Democracy and discontent in J&K since 1996 n.d. : 132).

As per the arrangement of rotating chief ministership, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed was sworn in as Chief Minister for first three years and he focused on the ‘healing touch’ while his successor in the arrangement, Ghulam Nabi Azad of Congress party focused on development agenda which he proposed development centric programme of

‘Khushhaal Kashmir’ which encompassed set of legislations against defection, corruption and illegal procurement of land by government officials or army personnel. Furthermore, the programme comprised of setting up of accountability commission, disaster management committees and a strict directive to state agencies for a formal, transparent process of recruitment. Special focus was given to infrastructural development mainly construction and modernization of roads and health centres (Nabi 2015: 159-160). Azad was also instrumental in facilitating the round table conferences with various stakeholders (Nabi 2015: 162). However, after the controversy of Amarnath Shrine land transfer, PDP withdrew its support from congress, and fresh elections were called in November 2008.

Next assembly Elections in Jammu and Kashmir were conducted in seven phases in November 2008. Out of 87 seats, National Conference secured 28 seats and formed a coalition government with Indian National Congress which acquired 17 seats. Omar Abdullah, Son of Farooq Abdullah from the National Conference, was sworn in as Chief Minister. Again amidst the call for a boycott by Hurriyat conference, the turnout was 60.5% (Democracy and discontent in J&K since 1996 n.d. : 138). The revival of democratic processes was beneficial for the mainstream political parties as in their rallies they delinked issues of separation and issue of governance. Major political parties like the National Conference and PDP didn’t challenge the sovereignty of India, yet they also ensured that they didn’t alienate separatists. PDP proposed ‘shared sovereignty’ while National Conference furthered their demand for autonomy with Farooq Abdullah proposing for ‘Autonomy plus’ through dialogue with all stakeholders in the conflict. BJP forwarded the proposal of Abrogation of Article 370, rights for Hindu refugees from Pakistan and complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir with rest of India while congress stuck to the agendas of development (Democracy and discontent in J&K since 1996 n.d. : 141). With such a diversity of opinions operating simultaneously, the political space of Kashmir became a genuine site of contestation.

Following the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, assembly elections were announced in J&K which witnessed the voter turnout of 66% in the state which is the highest in last 25 years. Apart from December 5 attack which killed 21 people including 8 army personnel, the elections were relatively peaceful. The fifth phase of elections registered more than 76% voting with 11 out of 20 constituencies in Jammu, Kathua and Rajouri regions registering more than 80% of the voting (FirstPost Correspondent 2014).

The PDP scored the highest number of seats 28 which was followed by BJP which gained tremendously by securing 25 seats followed by National Conference which secured 15 seats. Riding on the popularity of newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi, BJP secured the largest vote share in the state. With promises ranging polar opposite to each other, BJP and PDP decided to 'iron out' the differences and announced a 'common minimum programme.' Under the arrangement of the coalition, or common minimum programme, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed became the chief minister (He died during his tenure, so his daughter Mehbooba Mufti became the new chief minister) and Nirmal Kumar Singh of BJP became the deputy Chief Minister. Both parties agreed that the present special status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir would be kept intact and Article 370 of Indian constitution would not be abolished. Both parties also agreed to examine the process of De-notification of Kashmir as a disturbed area so that progress in the way of removing AFSPA can be made. The common minimum programme also highlighted on the need of evolving broad based dialogue with the stakeholders in the Kashmir issue including Hurriyat Conference furthermore the CMP included rehabilitation of refugees from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, setting up of accountability commission to promote the idea of smart governance by bringing transparency into governance and administration. This was aimed at reducing the levels of corruption in the state (IndiaToday Correspondent 2015).

The tale of these elections shows that India has managed to pull voters from the valley into the polling booth. The electoral process is not merely about the peaceful and successful conduct of election but also about how fair was the competition, how close was manifesto of the political parties to that of ground realities and how willing were parties to overcome their differences and form alliances instead of advocating for Governor's rule and going into re- election. However, the major point of debate is how to interpret the high voter outcome?

4.4 Making sense of the elections in Kashmir

Sujaat Bukhari (2014) in his coverage of 1996 assembly elections in Kashmir noted that assembly elections were conducted under huge military presence and election officers were imported from other states. He notes that as people were tired of continued military presence and fight between what he notes as "three guns in Kashmir: Military gun, Separatist gun and surrendered militants guns," people opted to turn up for the restoration of civilian government.

If voting was any criteria to gauge the political alienation in Kashmir, then Srinagar Lok Sabha bi polls present a unique picture. Srinagar Lok Sabha seat was vacated by Tariq Hameed Karra as he resigned from PDP and joined Indian National Congress. The election was announced on 9 April 2017 and re-polling was conducted on 38 polling booths on 13 April 2017 due to spates of violence on the polling booth. Farooq Abdullah won the Srinagar seat by 10,700 votes (Iqbal 2017). As the Lok Sabha elections were announced in Srinagar, violence engulfed the valley in which 8 people were killed including 15 year school boy in the police firing, and over 300 people were injured including over 100 police and security personnel and polling booth staff. Jammu and Kashmir chief electoral officer Shantmanu stated that there were over 200 instances of violence were recorded (Hindustan Times 2017) which forced polling booth staff to flee. The voter turnout was merely 7.14% on 9 April, and when re-polling was announced for 38 polling booths in Srinagar on 13th, only 2% of eligible voters turned up bringing down the total voter turnout to 7.13% (Press Trust of India 2017). Voting on the Lok Sabha seat of Srinagar has varied from 18.57 in 2004 to 25.87 in 2014 (Wikipedia 2018) but voter turnout of 7.13% can be called as a signal of rising alienation. Although there were also various other factors for less turnout namely violence.

Rekha Chowdhary notes that when the space of mainstream politics was overtaken by separatists and militants, it was a challenge for Indian state to reintroduce elections which it successfully did in 1996. However, those elections were controversial due to incidents of coerced voting, proxy candidates and a large force deployment (Chowdhary 2008: 22). The things changed in 2002 assembly elections when voter's turnout increased, and various other parties joined the mainstream election process. For the first time, the National Conference was ousted from power, and there was a revival of mainstream political space. Chowdhary notes that for PDP to ouster NC, it needed agendas that were closer to people hence it borrowed issues like a dialogue with militants and Pakistan, Kashmir as a political problem, revocation of AFSPA, etc. from the separatist spaces and brought them into the mainstream. NC followed suit and brought the issue of human rights, truth and reconciliation commission into manifesto (Chowdhary 2008: 23). Chowdhary notes the important implications of this move was that the mainstream political space gathered more legitimacy as parties were now addressing the local issues and acknowledging ground realities. This increase in

credibility and legitimacy is demonstrated by the high voting turnout (ibid). Another component of Kashmir politics is separatist politics of boycott which operates parallel to the mainstream politics of electoral competition. This overlap has resulted in the erosion of exclusive space of separatist politics in which they claimed to have represented the real and closer issues of Kashmiri people which cannot be resolved by mainstream political parties operating within a democracy. The reflection of this erosion is that now the Indian government has asked separatists to share the table with mainstream parties for dialogue (Chowdhary 2008: 24).

However, despite the erosion of the political space of separatists, the erosion of separatist sentiment is not there as there is also a large turnout of people at militant funerals (ibid). Chowdhary also highlights the disjuncture between separatist sentiments that people share when they come out on streets to oppose India's policy and human rights violation and also when they attend funerals of militants but in the elections, they reject the separatist politics of boycott which they see as non-progressive; which cannot resolve the Kashmir issue (Chowdhary 2009: 14). This distinction between separatist sentiments and separatist politics reaffirms the dichotomy between the right to vote and aspiration of freedom (ibid.). Chowdhary argues that post 2008 elections, despite the prevalence of separatist politics, the democratic space in the valley has deepened as the separatists argue for their right to boycott as a value which democracy provides furthermore people turnout has given legitimacy to elections as there is electoral competition with multiple parties. This competition ensures that local issues are addressed, and transparency is enforced. Chowdhary notes that democratization of politics would not address the 'separatist sentiments' that prevail within the valley. She argues that people participation in the election has shown their willingness to reach towards what she terms as 'honorable exit' from the conflict Kashmir which can only be reached after resolution of Kashmir dispute. She argues that the Democratization of politics is a positive trend, but it cannot be a substitute of continual dialogue for resolution of Kashmir dispute (Chowdhary 2009: 15). This analysis by Chowdhary reveals that not merely quantitatively (via higher voter turn-out) the political space is enhanced but also the quality of issues that parties raised which were close to people and didn't manage to alienate New Delhi. The separatist sentiment can be neutralized by a combination of political, economic and social measures.

Bukhari argues that Kashmiri people turned up for elections to demand accountability in regular day to day governance issues and to be part of the governance structure of the state which could improve their quality of life, give them education, employment, and healthcare facilities. Bukhari recounts that in 2008, 2009, 2010 people turned out in streets chanting pro freedom slogans. People have also been turning in for the funerals of the slain militants. Voting in elections merely throws light on people's concern over the local administrative issues, and they cannot be counted as a referendum over the political status of Kashmir. Moreover, in the election of the constituent assembly in 1951, 73 out of 75 members were elected unopposed with Muslim conference and Praja Parishad boycotting the election in Kashmir region and Jammu region respectively. India has wrongly associated outcome of elections as popular support for Indian accession of Kashmir (Bukhari 2014).

This gives us the clear indication that although the political space has improved both qualitatively and quantitatively. What is important to note that the large voter turnout doesn't resemble cementing of Indian legitimacy and rejection of militancy as people turnout for funerals and there has been a great increase in local induction into the militancy. Similarly, low voter turn -out doesn't resemble the rejection of India altogether as opposition to the election too happens in a systemic space of boycott politics and under the fear of violence. Indian approach of aiding rejuvenation of political space can lead to cementing of its legitimacy, but it doesn't do so by itself as an end in itself.

4.5 The economic strategy

As we have noted above that political alienation can also lead to economic alienation as basic economic issues of the region won't get a platform to get addressed. As there were limitations on capital investment in the valley due to Article 370 and stagnation of tourism industry due to the insurgency, there was also widespread unemployment and absence of basic infrastructure. As the political process suffered after the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah by the Governor Jagmohan, the opportunity to demand readdressal of these demands was lost. Under such a scenario, the onus was on the central government to provide financial aid.

Rajesh Pilot's fourth initiative was economic development of the region and divert Youths attention from militancy by providing them employment opportunities. In June

1994, Pilot rolled out various schemes involving expansion in higher education facilities, initiation of large scale public works projects, opening up of rehabilitation centres to integrate soft-core militants under detention back into the society, the opening of Srinagar Passport office and Srinagar station of All India Radio and Doordarshan. However, these initiatives failed to address real economic problems of a economic deficit alongside no response to state's public request for allocation of around 10,000 new slots in public services to soak up unemployed youth which reached to a staggering number of 80,000. In early July, Pilot announced the package of jobs for 10,000 youth in State Police department. Wirsing notes that the response to this package was demotivating. A group of 500 women met Pilot and asked him to shift his focus from employment issue to abuses by Indian security forces (Wirsing 1994: 180). This reveals the priority of Kashmiris is for the observance of their rights and justice before any economic measures.

On November 4, 1995, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao announced a plan for Jammu and Kashmir from Burkina Faso; plan famously known as Burkina Faso declaration. Rao announced set of economic packages for the state and assured the people of Jammu and Kashmir that the state wouldn't be bifurcated into three portions Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh, The special status to the Jammu and Kashmir provided by Article 370 would be left intact and Indira Sheikh accord of 1975 would be considered as benchmark for any future settlement as reverting back to pre-1953 arrangement is not feasible (Democracy and discontent in J&K since 1996 n.d. : 142) However Mushtaq (2014) notes that it was Dr. Manmohan Singh who reclaimed 'Naya Kashmir' slogan of Sheikh Abdullah which focused on infrastructural development and actually gave consideration to the idea of reducing deployment of army in the valley during winters if there were low accounts of infiltration in the valley. As he announced a huge package of Rs 24,000 crore from Prime Minister Reconstruction Fund (PMRF) and also reiterated the appeal to win hearts and minds of the valley population in his speech at Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences

"I have come to you to say that we can make that new beginning, with dignity and self-respect. Kashmir was safe in our hearts, our minds and our souls, and, therefore, the people of the State should feel safe in our secular, plural and democratic framework" (Mushtaq 2014).

Adopting the apologetic tone over spates of violence in the valley, Manmohan Singh appealed to the people to shed away their pessimism. Manmohan Singh's approach was

primarily economic as he sought economic rejuvenation of the violence tattered valley. He announced high level task force on April 04, 2005 whose task was to prepare long term plan for economic development of Jammu and Kashmir. Opening up of trade routes across Srinagar and Muzaffarabad was a move to rejuvenate the local economy. The key to peace was prosperity. As Manmohan Singh was not able to repeal Armed Forces Special Powers Act from places where army doesn't operate along with spates of violence after Machil encounter and the regimes of curfews. Mustaq notes as the tensions settled down, Manmohan Singh politics were back to development and jobs (Mushtaq 2014).

Narendra Modi also announced a package of 80,068 Crores in 2015. While invoking ideals of Vajpayee, he announced that he would follow the ideas of Kashmiriyat Jamhooriyat and Insaniyat in Kashmir as “mantras which are pillars of development of Kashmir.” He announced that these funds would be used to build new prosperous, modern and progressive state of Jammu and Kashmir. The package included funds for rehabilitation of flood victims, West Pakistan refugees, resettlement of Kashmiri Pandits, development of the tourism infrastructure, health and highway infrastructure and development of various power projects like the Baglihar project at Chanderkote. Out of 80,068, 44,800 were delegated to road construction and development of tourism in the state. 7,854 crores were earmarked for the flood relief, management, and reconstruction and also included restoration of livelihood and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and comprehensive flood management of Jhelum along with the development of the Jhelum-Tawi reconstruction project. The newspaper Hindu reports that 42,611 crores were earmarked for highway projects which included construction of the Zojila tunnel and upgradation of other Highways in the state. Sum of 2241 crore was marked for tourism projects like setting up of tourist villages. 11,708 crores were earmarked for development of renewable energy and power infrastructure, and 4900 crores were earmarked for improving healthcare facilities like the creation of AIIMS like institution in Jammu and Srinagar and upgradation of primary health centres (PTI 2015). Narendra Modi reiterated his position on Kashmir as he visited Srinagar in May 2018 and delivered a speech while e-inaugurating Kishanganga power project. He asserted

“Every issue, every conflict has only one solution – development, development and only development. We all should spend our energy on the development of the state.” (Wani 2018)

After the appointment of Dineshwar Singh as interlocutor, the developmental projects were given a significant push as Deccan herald reports that Under Prime Minister Development Package allocated 80068 crores for 63 developmental projects, 62,559 crores were been sanctioned and 22,042 crores were already released. The newspaper reports that home ministry has accorded special focus on the development of Border areas and protection of people living on the border areas (Deccan Chronicle 2017). However, the report presented by Parliamentary Standing committee on Home Affairs chaired by PC Chidambaram submitted its report in Rajya Sabha noting that “ little outcome was achieved” by the package. Free Kashmir Press website shows that the committee stated that out of 80,068 crores, only projects of 67,046 were sanctioned and 17,914 crores were released to the government. The report noted that projects dealing with the job creation, resettlement of 36,384 displaced migrants from the Kashmir and raising of Indian reserve battalion projects achieved the little outcome and while noting the poor outcome, the committee recommended that the Ministry of Home Affairs should speed up the implementation of the projects (Free Press Kashmir 2018).

Bula Devi and Meetu Jain point out that protest following Burhan Wani death brought in to light two hard hitting facts. Firstly winning elections and promising packages won't solve the ‘matter’ of Jammu and Kashmir, and secondly, security and development shouldn't be delinked, and alienation of people in all facets should be directly addressed (Devi and Jain 2016).

4.6 Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy

The first surrender and rehabilitation policy was launched in August 1995 wherein monetary incentives were provided to the surrendered militants for surrendering of weapon. Raghavan notes that incentives were provided to the surrendered militants who agreed to supply intelligence to the army (Raghavan 2013: 32). Although voluntary vocation training programmes were envisaged under the planned policy, Indian army decided to employ surrendered militants to create a new group of counterinsurgents in the form of Ikhwans or renegades who carried out counterinsurgency operations alongside the army and renegades with the police organised as Special Operation Group (SOG) conducted operations alongside J and K Police (Ibid.).

The government of Jammu and Kashmir in 2004 launched a rehabilitation policy aimed at those militants who have undergone a change of heart and have accepted the integrity of the Indian constitution. Aimed at the residents of Jammu and Kashmir who have joined militant ranks, the rehabilitation policy targets known militants who wished to surrender with weapons and the hard-core higher ranked militants who wished to surrender without weapons. The surrender policy would not include amnesty and withdrawal of cases of heinous crimes, and the rehabilitation benefits would be extended only after the judicial probe is completed, and the surrenderee is declared innocent. The policy provided for the authority and places for surrender and after the surrender, Additional DGP (CID) would be tasked to oversee rehabilitation programme of the surrenderee including the eligibility and release of the rehabilitation package. The rehabilitation package envisaged a monthly stipend of 2000 rupees and a grant of 1.50 lac as a fixed deposit to be redeemed after three years subjected to good conduct and clearance by state CID. The package also included monetary rewards for surrendering weapons which included 15,000 rupees for AK 47 to 25,000 to RPG or Sniper rifle (Home Department, Government of Jammu and Kashmir 2004)

In 2010, Omar Abdullah led government drafted the surrender and rehabilitation policy which was put into practice by the government of Jammu and Kashmir under which the parents or the close relatives of the militants who escaped to POK from 1989- 2009 or in exceptional cases, the militants themselves can initiate the formalities through a form available with Indian High commission in Islamabad. The relatives have to submit their application to the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the residing village of the militant. DSP after verification forwards it to state CID headquarters. After scrutinizing at their level, the application is forwarded to R&AW, IB, and army for their recommendations. After analysing the cases against the militant along with recommendations, State CID prepares a dossier taking into account the feedback from the intelligence agencies. The dossier is forwarded to the state Home department where the final decision is taken by a committee headed by financial commissioner (Home). The committee shall inform its decision to the DSP of the region. After the arrival of the returnee through the designated entry points, all the immigration formalities would be completed. Immigration authorities will ask J&K Police to move the returnee to counselling centres. These centres will facilitate procedures of the debriefing of the returnee by the state and centre intelligence agencies alongside take necessary steps for

successful reintegration of the returnee into the society. The returnee shall be provided with the option of skill development through skill development centres of the state government. After the counselling period, the discharge formalities would be completed, and the CID and State/ centre intelligence agencies shall keep an eye on the activities of returnee for the period of 2 years (Home Department, Government of Jammu and Kashmir 2010).

The surrender and rehabilitation policy was marked by such bureaucratic hassle that made the process onerous for the families of militants. Furthermore, the compensation and incentives are out of date forcing the need for formulation of new policy which unfortunately hasn't been evolved by the state or the central government. Tara Kartha (2018) notes that the access to political patronage determined the extent of help these families could get through this policy. Furthermore, militants who came through the Nepal route were denied benefits of this policy. The policy did not alleviate the economic status of surrendered militants as 28,000 of the registered former militants still lived in poverty. Kartha points out the way forward as she suggests that now initiatives. She argues that incentives should also be given to those who refuse to pick up the gun. Secondly, disbursement of funds and rehabilitation should be given to specialized Non-Governmental Organizations so that there is less bureaucratic involvement and finally this initiative should be provided with more legal clarity so that the state government's response would not be as lacklustre as it is at present (Kartha 2018).

4.7 Dispute over Article 370

In this section, we will discuss debate between A.G Noorani and Jagmohan Malhotra over the viability of article 370

4.7.1 Overview of Article 370

The basic understanding according to Noorani that Article 370 provides is the State of Jammu and Kashmir has acceded to India concerning defence, communication, and foreign affairs and it would be up to the constituent assembly when convened to determine other aspects to which the state can accede. (Noorani 2011: 5) It also embodies six special features namely The J&K would have its separate constitution; Secondly, the legislative power of Indian Parliament is restricted to the sphere of Foreign affairs, Defence and Communication as specified in accession. The President

of India can extend provisions related to these three matters with the consultation of the State government; Thirdly, if the president has to extend other provisions not specified by instrument shall only be applied after the concurrence of the state government; Fourthly, the ‘concurrence’ is provisional till it is ratified by the constituent assembly; The fifth feature is that the state government power of concurrence lasts until the constituent assembly has been set up which has decided what additional subjects are to be conferred to the Union. Once the constituent assembly decided upon the question, the presidential power of extending other constitutional provisions would end altogether; Sixthly, Article 370 cannot be amended under the procedure laid under Article 368. Although President can modify such a provision through an order under Article 370 then it has to have a concurrence of the State government and has to be ratified by the Constituent assembly (Noorani 2011: 6).

All these aspects are solidified by Ayyangar exposition in the constituent assembly on 17 October 1949 when he asserted that Presidential orders shall have no value when the constituent assembly has convened and dispersed, and all erstwhile orders will be examined by the assembly to decide their validity or invalidity. Once Constituent assembly was convened on 31st October 1951, it had the power to examine all Presidential orders and after its dispersal on 17th November 1957, the state government lost its power to grant concurrence with regard to extending more constitutional provisions to J&K and accept union institutions other than specified in the Instrument of accession (Noorani 2011: 9)

4.7.2 Abuse of Article 370

Noorani notes Till 1994, 94 out of 97 entries of the Union list were extended to J&K and 260 out of 395 Articles of Indian constitution were extended. The Presidential orders altered the basic structure of the J&K constitution by passing of the sixth amendment of the state constitution in violation of section 147 of the Indian constitution which is immune to any amendment. The Sadar - i- Riyasat who was elected by the State legislature was replaced by the centrally nominated governor. A Presidential order passed on 23rd July 1975 debarred the State legislature to amend the state constitution with respect to Governor, Election Commissioner and the composition of the Legislative council (Noorani 2011: 15).

AG Noorani considers article 370 to be a ‘constitutional wreckage’ which is to be redeemed through a review of constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and redrafting of the Article 370 under which amendments will be based in consonance with the stakeholders. Noorani identifies three components namely Political will, sincerity of purpose and spirit of compromise which can redeem the article 370 from its sorry state. (Noorani 2011: 1) The state of Jammu and Kashmir was the only erstwhile princely state that negotiated its terms of membership with the Indian Union which makes Article 370 a ‘Solemn compact’ which cannot be abrogated unilaterally by either J&K state assembly or the parliament of India except in accordance with the provisions made in the article (Noorani 2011: 2)

Jagmohan in the chapter titled Roots: 370 in his book ‘My frozen turbulence in Kashmir’, dubs Article 370 as the root of separatism and alienation which breeds separatist forces. Jagmohan however identifies the most vile thing about Article 370 is its misuse by the vested interests of politicians, richer class, business class and the bureaucracy to convert it into an instrument of exploitation of poor Kashmiri people (Jagmohan 1991: 231). By reciting the case of renewal of lease to Nedous Hotel and case of Santaur hotel at Karal Sangri, Jagmohan demonstrates how the business faction in collusion with the political elites usurped huge financial gains and ravaged ecology under the cover of Article 370 (Jagmohan 1991: 234-236). Jagmohan implies that If Article 370 is removed, commercial sites can be allotted on the basis of competitive tenders, the instances of damage to ecology of the state would be minimized and flow of black money would be curtailed. If the capital is allowed to come from outside the state, employment opportunities will grow and development of the region would accelerate. Article 370 is bad for the economy of the state and only after its abrogation, the pace of development will accelerate (Jagmohan 1991: 236)

Article 370 has fermented rampant corruption pioneered by bureaucracy and the political elites. Jagmohan recounts that in March 1988, he examined six cases of corruption in which two aspects were common. Firstly urban lands and bureaucratic elites and secondly cornering of valuable lands and speculating them to accrue unaccounted incomes. Article 370 prevents extension of Urban land (ceiling and regulation) act 1976 without the consent of those who are complicit in corrupt activities. Article 370 thus allows corrupt to amass money while the general population remains impoverished (Jagmohan 1991: 237). In other words, abrogation of article 370 can

bring in the provisions to transparency which would not be introduced by the corrupt political class of the state.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir enjoys 'exclusive jurisdiction' with regard to residuary powers, Article 352, Article 360 and Article 365. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has its own constitution, its own flag and its own emblem. The special status can be ascertained from the fact that no other state has its own constitution and are governed by a uniform structure laid down in part IV of Constitution of India. Jagmohan notes certain incongruities in the J&K constitution with regard to the right to property, right to settlement and right to citizenship which he finds highly problematic. He mentions the incongruity between citizenship right in J&K and Indian constitution. Indian constitution provides for single citizenship whereas J&K constitution provides for double citizenship for the permanent residents of the state. Furthermore he argues that provisions of the state constitution are anti-women as her permanent resident certificate is valid until marriage and if she marries someone who is not a resident of J&K, she loses her citizenship rights (Jagmohan 1991: 234). Jagmohan notes that the 18th amendment act of the constitution of J&K 1987 vested power of adjudication of disqualification via defection to the leader of the legislative party creating 'constitutional dictatorship of the party leader' and 'political oligarchy' (Jagmohan 1991: 237).

Article 370 is also discriminatory towards displaced people from West Pakistan. Jagmohan notes that Article 370 prohibits basic human rights to these unfortunate migrants who are living in the state for four generations. Children, grand-children and the great grand-children of these families cannot get admission into any state colleges, they cannot participate in the state or Panchayat election and cannot secure loans from the state government to start their business. Jagmohan brings into light the inhuman face of Article 370

The central government led by BJP has stated in its manifesto that it would remove article 370 from the Indian constitution to promote complete integration of the state of Jammu and Kashmir but it hasn't succeeded in this endeavour despite enjoying complete majority in the Indian Parliament and forming government in the state with PDP. The strategy has been limited to reducing the article 370 into an empty shell but the stand still us unclear whether India would abrogate it completely in the near future.

4.8 Recent Political initiatives

After the elimination of Burhan Wani, large scale violence broke out in the valley which led Kashmir into a new phase of violence. Indian army renewed the offensive, but political channels were not closed. The central government identified separatist leaders as major instigators of violence who have upgraded their role as practitioners of boycott politics to agents of Pakistan instigating youth to carry out militancy in the valley. New Delhi responded with a major crackdown on the separatist leaders after a sting operation came out. In the sensational sting operation titled “*Villains of the valley; the Hurriyat Tapes,*” India today revealed the nexus between Pakistan and the agenda of Hurriyat separatist leaders. India today sting operation caught many separatist leaders like Naeem Khan of Geelani faction, Farooq Ahmad Dar aka Bitta Karate of JKLF, etc. on tape admitting to receiving funds from Pakistan agencies to foment instability in the valley. This propelled National Investigation Agency into action (India Today Sting operation 2017).

The NIA registered the case on 30 May 2017 and made first arrests on 24 July 2017. After a preliminary investigation of the material that was recovered, NIA concluded that the separatist leaders indeed orchestrated the stone pelting, burning of schools and government property and instigated youth in the valley at the behest of Pakistani agencies to seek succession of Jammu and Kashmir from India. NIA in its press release also specified that separatist leaders formed strategies like ‘protest calendars’ which are published in newspapers, social media and APHC has formed cadres to incite youth to pelt stone, challenge the sovereignty of India and create law and Order crisis in the valley. Through the evidence collected by NIA, they were able to establish that APHC leaders received their funding from Pakistan through hawala transactions. NIA noted that APHC leaders floated fake companies and remitted money through them to finance terror activities against India. On 18 January 2018, NIA filed the charged sheet in NIA special court, Patiala house. In the charge sheet, NIA named 12 accused including Syed Salahuddin of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Hafiz Saeed of Lasher-e-Toiba (National Investigation Agency 2018). After the crackdown, the space of separatist sentiments was criminalized. Such hawala transactions are necessary to fund the militancy, and they are more likely to have increased after the valley erupted in violence. Dulat notes

that IB detected 20 and cases of Hawala transaction from 2001-2002 and Syed Ali Shah Geelani was the major perpetrator. The raid was conducted on Geelani house in 2002. After finding incriminating evidence against him, he was sent to Hazirabagh Jail in Jharkhand under Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act and fortunately public reaction was “muted” (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 185-186).

4.8.1 Amnesty to youth

The present BJP-PDP alliance government under the leadership of Mehbooba Mufti has decided to grant amnesty to the first time stone pelters who have been arrested from the year 2008-2017. While responding to the question by BJP MLA Sat Sharma in the Legislative Assembly, Mehbooba Mufti stated that from 2015-2017, 11,209 stone pelters were arrested under 3773 FIRs which were filed against them. The stone pelters were released on bail, and the state government has decided to grant them amnesty. The objective of this scheme is to “wean away youth from militancy” and to transform this act into a confidence building measure. To avail the scheme of amnesty (withdrawal of cases) the parents of the stone pelter has to sign an undertaking that their kid will not engage in such conducts. The act of amnesty has been coupled with other measures like surveillance of social media, an organization of cricket matches, establishing youth clubs at Police station level and organizing counselling of youth to keep them away from militancy. Amnesty with such other actions was envisaged to develop civic action programmes aimed at engaging with youth (PTI 2018). The scroll notes that 4,327 individuals would be beneficiary of this scheme (Naqash 2017). With the cases being withdrawal, the individuals are eligible for government jobs. The mainstreaming of locals. Avoiding heavy handed punishments of youth.

4.8.2 Calling the boys home

In 2016 during operation, Superintendent of Police Harmeet Singh Mehta was stuck with the idea that why shouldn't be the parents of the militant be asked to persuade the militant to surrender in Tujjar village in Sopore (Yasir 2017). However, the Police became serious about the initiative after the popular football player Majid Arshad Khan in the valley who had joined Lashkar e Toiba returned after the passionate plea of his mother which had gone viral on social media. Following his return, police encouraged parents of new militants to make a similar appeal. However in the alienated environment, there are numerous families in many villages whose sons have joined

militancy, and if one family beseeches their son to return, their family do not get any support from other families.

Mehbooba Mufti while responding to questions in Legislative council, mentioned that from 2015-2017, 12 militants had shunned militancy. However, there has been a sharp increase in the recruitment of local youth into militancy signified by 126 in 2017 from 88 in 2016, and 66 in 2015 (KR Web Desk 2018). The CRPF has launched Madadgar 24*7 toll free helpline (14411) to provide a way for the militants to surrender in case they or their family and friends are not able to approach official channels (Sandhu 2017)

To counter the recruitment by the militant organizations, that the civil administration and Indian army have started promoting their recruitment drives profusely. As Rising Kashmir reports on 26 February 2018, J&K Light Infantry Regimental Centre organized a passing out (Graduation) parade of 219 young new recruits in the Indian army out of which 115 were Kashmiris (Rising Kashmir 2018).

4.9 Limits of Political initiatives in Kashmir

Policy paralysis has been the perennial feature of Indian political approach in Kashmir. The personality clashes between Home Minister S.B. Chavan and Home Minister (State) Rajesh Pilot resulted in their disagreement on issues like appointment of advisors, dealing with insurgents, and future of TADA, and others. Chavan was not very optimistic about the prospect of elections in the valley and reinvigoration of the National Conference with Farooq Abdullah as its leader in the Kashmiri politics and was not keen on discussing the possibility of acceding to request of Farooq of providing autonomy before 1996 elections whereas Pilot was keen on bringing old discarded politicians back into the electoral space and also bring moderates from JKLF back to the table. These initiatives were not successful as these initiatives were hindered by disagreements between Chavan and Pilot at ministerial and bureaucratic levels. Furthermore, bringing JKLF to negotiating table did not mean that Hizb or any other militant organization will let the peace process move smoothly as Syed demonstrates how Dr. Abdul Ahmad Guru, a cardiologist, and JKLF ideologue was killed for breaking militant ranks (Syed 2002: 271). Apart from the crisis of decision making at the centre level, at the state level, Governor Krishna Rao wanted to coordinate with the centre directly but got only apathy in return. There was distrust between the Army and the Paramilitary forces as they withheld intelligence from one another (Syed 2002:

270). All these incidents were a classic case of policy paralysis both at centre and state level.

Evans notes that the ten years (1989-1999) displayed disappointment as despite such an intensity of political violence, New Delhi has not provided any concession to Kashmir instead responded with a heavy-handedness that has further alienated the population (Evan 1999: 32). Evans states that Kashmiri leaders have also beguiled the locals by exploiting them to stay in power as he points out that Kashmiri leaders perpetuated corruption in the valley and carried on their vile propaganda while blaming India for the present condition, divesting themselves from any accountability (ibid.). Evans points towards a graver problem as he states that even if the insurgency fizzles out, the problems like Kashmiri identity and dignity, political rights and issues of governance will not go away (Evans 1999: 34).

Staniland identifies the unique paradox that is ailing the political space of Kashmir. He argues that since the militancy went down in Kashmir region, India pursued the objective of “normalcy” which gets defined by the smooth operation of political processes like free speech, fair electoral competition. Despite projecting this normalcy as the goal, India adopts a hypocritical role and doesn’t allow the ideals it has agreed to in abstract to be put into practice (Staniland 2013: 932). This creates a paradox of normalcy in which India is forced to project ideals of the democratic political process but cannot allow them into practice due to its complicated relationship with Kashmir (ibid.). Staniland provides the contrast through examples of free, fair elections, but they are manipulated and controlled³⁴, India hails the rule of law but alongside implements PSA and AFSPA which runs contrary to the democratic norms of the constitution and examples of mass protests being met with heavy handedness by the security forces. This paradox has generated a mistrust within the minds of the population which has begun to see India as hypocritical which doesn’t practice in Kashmir what its constitution preaches (ibid.). This paradox has stifled the political and economic development of the valley. This paradox is driven by India’s desire to sustain status quo in the region hence it causes wounds through its military strategy in which civilians are

³⁴ Example is ‘secret fund’ that we came across in the previous chapter

killed as collateral damage and developmental work which ironically has alienated the masses³⁵.

Staniland identifies three areas where Indian state sought to maintain normalcy. The first area is electoral and local politics. As we have seen via Chowdhary analysis that multiparty competition, absorption of issues from separatist spaces into political spaces and large turnout of people signifies rejuvenation of political space in Kashmir however Staniland argues that Indian state has been involved in patronage politics which has direct impact on governance and the aspiration which drives people to vote never gets fulfilled (Staniland 2013: 944). Since chief ministers are dependent on funds from the centre to meet their governance needs, they should remain in the good books of leaders at the centre. Staniland argues that real normalcy would reflect the absence of patronage politics and resurgence of politics that reflects legitimate voices of Kashmiri not merely security interests of India (Staniland 2013: 948).

The second area pertains to mass mobilization. Staniland argues that Kashmiri politics in the decade of 2000 transformed from violent militancy to what he calls “contentious politics.” Which is reflected in protests in 2008 over land issue linking with Amarnath Shrine Board, in 2009 over rape of two women from Shopian and in 2010 over Machil fake encounters. Staniland argues that mobilization demonstrated in these protests is the shift from violent anti India action (Staniland 2013: 948). Staniland argues that mass politics was firstly aspired to garner world’s attention as it was the legitimate non-violent way of protest and sought world reaction which was akin to Arab spring and secondly, the mass protests were ‘acceptable brand of politics’ in other parts of the India and Indian state not just repressed it but also accommodated, sought compromises and arranged at favourable outcomes for both the parties case in point is the Gujjar Andolan (ibid.). Indian response in case of Kashmir mass mobilization movement was not merely heavy handed but also ruthless and disproportionate (Staniland 2013: 949). Pellet guns were more preferable weapons of crowd control in Kashmir than in rest of India. Staniland notes the paradox of how ‘normal politics’ of mass mobilizations and protests are considered ‘treacherous’ and antinational in Kashmir (ibid.). In 2010, protests over Machil fake encounter witnessed 120 civilian death. No- where India, these many civilian casualties are recorded in a protest. Staniland argues that if India

³⁵ See the section on ‘Durbhavana’ in Operation Sadbhavna

wants to pursue politics of normalcy, it cannot react discriminately to protests in Kashmir and should aspire to reach a political compromise (Staniland 2013: 950). However due to security consideration and the fact that recent stone pelting incidents are orchestrated to help terrorists escape, such politics of normalcy shall not be exercised.

The third trait of normalcy is the rule of law and freedom of expression. Staniland argues that liberal state provides freedom of expression which includes freedom of press albeit with some restriction. In Kashmir however, Indian state restricts even basic expressions of free speech on a regular basis as the politically active society, and press of India questions the status quo including the conditions of Kashmir accession to India in 1948. They criticize the government for human rights abuses, corruption, etc. hence India considers every critical opinion as a challenge to India's sovereignty over Kashmir which is why Kashmir witnesses frequent restrictions and monitoring of social media and press (Staniland 2013: 951). The rule of law is threatened by impunity provided to the security forces through extraordinary laws like AFSPA and PSA. The elected government by people in Jammu and Kashmir cannot take a decision on army presence in the valley (Staniland 2013: 952). The policies in Kashmir is dictated by the centre making elections a farcical exercise.

4.10 Observations

Kashmir region in the state of Jammu and Kashmir is plagued by many dimensions of alienation. To address them the Central government has evolved various strategies. To counter human rights alienation, the approach of the rationalization of military responses was made. However, a prominent Kashmiri politician in his interview to Wirsing observed that these well intentioned moves would not be implemented in letter and spirit because the people tasked with the implementation are not keen and motivated to observe them as these rules will question their actions and will cause hindrances in their objectives. Furthermore, the interviewee informed Wirsing about the corrupt network in which detainees secure their releases by bribing police officers. He argued that after the establishment of procedures introduced by Pilot, the only way to ensure swift release of their family member by families got blocked (Wirsing 1994: 179). As the nature of the political process is gauged from nature of competition, quality of participation and nature of outcome (Chowdhary 2008: 24), analysis of Staniland shows us that political process would never be fair in Kashmir. However no -where in

the world democracy operated in perfect, un- corrupted way. Chowdhary analysis which reveals qualitative enhancement of political space withstands Staniland's criticism.

Kashmir not only suffers from economic deprivation but also has to suffer the central government's inefficiency in implementing programmes and policies devised for the region. Ansari (2017) argues that Udaan scheme hasn't been implemented properly and the Ministry of Human Resource and Development hasn't released the scholarship money earmarked for Kashmiri students under PM special scholarship. We also noted that "little outcome was achieved" from the package announced by Narendra Modi.

The political strategy of India can be termed as myopic as it focuses primarily on attaining high voter count to demonstrate that popular mandate supports Indian administration of Kashmir. Secondly, it can be termed hypocritical as the tools of political mobilization are denied from Kashmiris. Staniland warned that paradox of normalcy would not produce the sustainable peace in the valley and true to the prediction, the mass politics has taken the militaristic turn as the crowd now helps militants escape via stone pelting. Indian strategy has certainly shown a way towards addressing the various dimensions of alienation in Kashmir but has lacked an endgame due to its imaginary contradiction between Kashmir's autonomy and National security.

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Chapter 5

Dialogue and Diplomacy in Kashmir

The story of Jammu and Kashmir holds a remarkable place in the Indian history of statecraft. As a case study, Jammu and Kashmir reveals the challenges that a newly formed state of India has to face while pursuing its task of nation building following the democratic principles. Faced with the challenges from Pakistan's persistence for Kashmir and burden of unfulfillable promises made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Indian state found itself in precarious position viz. its stance on Jammu and Kashmir in the decades to follow. The inhabitants of Kashmir as they became more politically aware of the promises, began to demand their stake. The youth in the valley eventually became disgruntled from the persistent alienation in all the spheres of political, social and economic life of which rigging of 1987 elections became the tipping point. As the security forces and army entered into the valley to counter what was termed as Pakistan sponsored proxy war, they also encountered a hostile population demanding the right to determine their future. After extensive army operations aimed at flushing out of terrorists from the valley, Indian state decided to open the dialogue with the stakeholders in Kashmir to subside the deeply rooted alienation.

The first moment of internal political dialogue arrived after the ceasefire announcement of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen on July 24, 2000. The military organization declared a unilateral ceasefire for three months under conditions that included tripartite dialogue with Kashmiri separatists as well as Pakistan. India responded by agreeing to talk with the militants and separatists but rejected the talks with Pakistan. Chowdhary argues that Indian political leadership didn't show the requisite flexibility to answer to the offer. By dismissing negotiations with Pakistan, India too didn't offer the political space for negotiation to Hizb (Chowdhary 2014: 35). Kshitij Prabha, however, questioned the credibility of the intent of the militant group as it ended the ceasefire on August 8, 2000, after bowing down to the pressure from Pakistan. Kshitij argues that bereft of any genuine desire for peace, the ceasefire was a tactical response to proactive counter insurgency operations launched by the Indian army as well as the pressure from the United States of America on Pakistan to initiate dialogue on Kashmir. However as soon

as Pakistan realised that it could not make India accede to tripartite dialogue, it forced Hizbul to withdraw it (Prabha 2002: 243-244). Vajpayee made his intent for dialogue manifest in the same year by announcing Non Initiation of Combat Operation (NICO) popularly known as Ramzan ceasefire as an initiative for dialogue with militants. Syed Salahudin who is the head of United Jihad Council rejected the call of ceasefire by asserting that Ramzan infact is “month of Jihad.” Syed Salahudin, however, stated that his organization is not averse to dialogue but will only initiate them once India agrees to the fact that Kashmir is a dispute. He asserted that dialogue could be initiated only after India agrees to revoke AFSPA and PSA, releases political prisoners and agrees to conduct a tripartite dialogue involving Pakistan (Hindustan Times 2011).

The policy of direct talks with the militants wasn't yielding any gains for India in the Kashmir issue, and there was a perception that the militants would eventually bid for Pakistan. Lack of credibility from militant's side and lack of favourable political gains for militants from the dialogue led to the breakdown of talks. It was against India's national interest to recognise Kashmir as a dispute, and by following the policy of denying Pakistan's stake in the Kashmir issue, Indian state resumed its offensive.

5.1 Interlocutors in the Valley

To regain the political initiative, India resorted to the method of appointing interlocutors who would conduct a dialogue with different stakeholders in the state and report directly to the central government. The role of interlocutors has been predominant in leading the political dialogue with the various sections of the society in Kashmir. However, the history of interlocutions has achieved similar results. Aarif Rather (2017) points out that it was Jawaharlal Nehru who was the first interlocutor from India to promise a referendum to the people of Jammu and Kashmir and took the issue of the Kashmir to the United Nations. As the time passed, the promises of Nehru and the role of United Nations faded away and thus begun the series of broken promises.

In May 2001 Vajpayee government announced the appointment of KC Pant as an interlocutor on Kashmir, mandated with authority to carry out talks with various groups in the Kashmir valley to establish peace in the valley. Interestingly there was no time frame provided to Pant to submit his report. About this query, Minister of State (Home) Vidhyasagar Rao submitted a written reply in the parliament emphasising upon the need to promote a 'vigorous movement to establish peace and tranquillity' in the valley

which would entail dialogue with all ‘peace loving sections of Jammu and Kashmir.’ Comparing establishment of peace akin to a movement, justification for no time frame was provided by Rao (Tripathi 2017). The announcement of KC Pant appointment as an interlocutor came as the signalling of new strategy that was rolled by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in November 2000 by declaring Ramzan ceasefire. However, Praveen Swami points towards the ‘not advertised discontinuities’ accompanying the peace talks which is explicitly mentioned in April 4 communiqué in which security forces were signalled to take action against those trying to victimise peace loving citizens of Jammu and Kashmir (Swami, *The Pant Mission* 2001). Even though Pant’s mandate was broad and included deliberations with APHC, APHC executive member Sheikh Abdul Aziz raised the stakes even higher in media interactions on April 18 at Islamabad by stating that discussion over Kashmir cannot be initiated without including Pakistan into the process. The political dialogue, however, did not mark the break in India’s military approach to insurgency as Praveen swami demonstrates that the Pant’s mission was ‘punctuated by violence’ as the armed conflict, and terrorist elimination operation regained vigour exemplified by wide area operations leading to elimination of eight terrorists in Poonch and Rajouri on August 17 and elimination of seven terrorists in Kathua on August 17 (Swami 2001). Among Pant’s recommendation, the primary ones were conferring of broad autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir, winning of hearts and minds of local people by exercising restraint during cordon and search operation. Pant’s report also emphasised the importance of respecting human rights in regaining the trust in the valley. In the organisational realm, Pant advocated for revamping up of security apparatus and more intelligence derived security operations in the valley (Tripathi 2017). The political dialogue suffered a setback after the attack on Indian Parliament in 2001.

As the relations between India and Pakistan began to normalize after the attack on parliament, the political dialogue in Kashmir also received a new kick-start. In 2002 Vajpayee government appointed a committee under the law minister Arun Jaitley to ‘explore the scope for greater exclusivity for Jammu and Kashmir’ (Tripathi 2017). In the same year, an unofficial Indian Kashmir committee under the leadership of Ram Jethmalani was formed which consisted of 8 members including Supreme Court advocate Ashok Bhan, former law minister Shanti Bhushan, journalists Dileep Padgaonkar, Jawed Laiq and MJ Akbar, retired Indian Foreign Service officer VK

Grover and eminent jurist Fali Nariman. The Indian Kashmir committee not only conducted several rounds of talks with the separatist leadership to persuade them to join the upcoming 2002 J&K assembly elections but also facilitated track two dialogue with Pakistan (Tripathy 2017). Jethmalani writes that Kashmir committee forged five point agreement with the Hurriyat conference in which both parties agreed that terrorism and violence are taboo, all contending parties should strive for a peaceful resolution which would be acceptable to all political elements and regions of the state. The parties agreed to shun the extremist position and finally, both parties agreed upon the proposal of rehabilitation and security of Kashmiri Pandits in the valley (Jethmalani 2011).

Indian Kashmir committee under the leadership of Jethmalani with MJ Akbar and Dileep Padgaonkar also visited Islamabad to facilitate dialogue, but due to its limited mandate, APHC expressed limited confidence in its efforts. Dawn reports Pakistan's government position which specified that the members of IKC are non- Kashmiri and hence they don't represent the will and aspirations of Kashmiris (Dawn 2003). Apart from the lack of confidence in the committee, it was also the unusual recommendation of the committee which prevented any breakthrough. Jethmalani committee asked the government to postpone the dates for elections so that separatists are given time to campaign alongside with a recommendation to conduct elections under the Governor's rule. These two recommendations were rejected by the central government. These committees also discussed the role of Pakistan in fomenting the insurgency by training and arming insurgents to carry out Jihad against India (Tripathi 2017). After receiving not so palatable recommendation from the India Kashmir Committee, NDA government appointed another interlocutor in 2003.

In 2003, N.N Vohra was appointed as the interlocutor and was entrusted to carry out dialogues with elected representatives of the state and various other organizations. The recommendations of NN Vohra were more readily accepted that resulted in adoption of three pronged strategies in Kashmir dealing; firstly, focusing on evolving better border management with carrying out more intense actions against terrorists; secondly, focusing on readdressal of economic grievances of the state and finally, pursuance of sustained dialogue with group of all shades to establish peace in the state. The central government conducted two rounds of talks with the Hurriyat conference moderate wing in the January 2004, and March 2004 notes Tripathi (2017), but the government change at the centre stifled the momentum.

In 2004 after the general elections, UPA under the Prime Ministership of Dr. Manmohan Singh formed government at the centre. UPA government's mistake, if it is to be called, would be not continuing with the momentum achieved by the previous NDA government as UPA 1 decided to give a fresh start to the dialogue process. Manmohan Singh government took some proactive steps initiating a series of sustained dialogues when he met a Hurriyat delegation led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq on 5th September 2005. There were some positive developments as the Hurriyat conference agreed to call off strikes and shunned violence to carry forward the dialogue. The sustained dialogue led to setting up of Joint Screening committee on October 3, 2005, whose task was to review cases of detention under Jammu and Kashmir Public safety Act. After review, the committee recommended the release of 44 prisoners. The delegation meeting was carried out with People's conference under Sajad Lone and Jammu and Kashmir liberation front under Yasin Malik on January 14 and February 17, 2006, respectively (Tripathi 2017). After achieving a good head start, Manmohan Singh government was not able to sustain such confidence among the separatists.

Md Sadiq (2006) states that to promote the widest base of dialogue on the Kashmir issue, Manmohan Singh invited Sajad Lone of People conference who met the Prime minister on 14th January 2006 to involve sections which were 'outside the electoral politics' into political dialogue with the government. Sadiq also records the series of 'parleys' that the Prime Minister Office held with Yasin Malik and sent invitations to even hard lined Hurriyat leaders like Syed Ali Shah Geelani for the round table conferences that were planned by UPA 1 government (Sadiq 2006).

5.2 The Round Table Conferences

Noorani notes that as a part of 'constructive approach,' Prime Minister Manmohan Singh organized three round table conferences to discuss the Kashmir issue whose aim was to explore and formulate common grounds on the issue of self -rule, autonomy, peace building, and regional aspirations. There were discussions on the complex ideas of National Conference demand for more autonomy within the constitution, PDP's demand for Elected Governor, CPI (M) demand for provincial elections within the three regions to represent ethnic and religious minorities in a proper manner, etc. (Swami 2006). In the first round table conference, Manmohan Singh in his speech emphasised upon the culture of "mutual tolerance, understanding, and accommodation" and argued that resolution of Kashmir dispute would entail celebration of diverse opinion thereby

setting up the theme for the conferences (Sadiq 2006). To make the dialogue more comprehensive, five working groups were set up at the second conference in Srinagar on 24th -25th May 2006. The first group was on good governance chaired by NC Saxena; C Rangarajan chaired the group on economic development; M.K Rasgotra chaired a group on solidifying relations across the Line of Control; Hamid Ansari chaired the working group on confidence building measures among different sections of society and finally the working group on Centre State relations was chaired by Justice Saghir Ahmad, a former Justice of Jammu and Kashmir high court. Noorani notes The Chairmen of the four working groups submitted their reports in the third round table conference on 24 April 2007 while Saghir Ahmad submitted his report on 18 December 2009. While noting that all the reports and recommendations were pigeonholed, Noorani commented that Saghir Ahmad report was a shoddy piece of work which evaded discussions on crucial issues most importantly on the constitutionality of Article 370 (Noorani 2010). Through the commentary of AG Noorani, we can note that the inadequacy of the government to work on the recommendations of the working groups made the whole exercise of these conferences redundant.

However, the round table conferences also suffered from various other limitations. Farooq Abdullah lamented the lack of ground work preceding the round table conferences but nevertheless sent Omar Abdullah as a representative from National Conference (Sadiq 2006). APHC also declined to participate in the round table conferences. Calling the conferences as ‘ fiasco’ Muhammad Yousuf Naqash then chairman of Human rights division of Hurriyat conference argued that inviting so many parties and leaders who have no stake in the Kashmir dispute adds to the confusion. India invited a lot of pro Indian parties to the conference which according to Hurriyat conference was not needed as India already represented them. What irked the Hurriyat conference was the absence of Azad Kashmir leadership and Pakistan (which are also parties to the dispute) from the conference. As the round table conferences eluded the fundamental issue of settlement of the dispute, Naqash argues that Hurriyat saw no relevance in participation (Naqash 2006).

Sadiq (2006) calls out the irony of the argument by stating that ‘less important’ issues self-governance and demilitarization were discussed by Hurriyat when they visited Pakistan so why would Hurriyat escape discussions on these issues at the conference? Praveen Swami argues that prior to the second round table conference, the APHC laid

down three preconditions; Firstly, only the major parties to the dispute be called; secondly, it should be preceded by a separate meeting with the Prime Minister, and finally, the government should deliver the formal invitations rather than sending government emissaries for the invitation. Swami notes that all three demands were met as only 27 participants were called at the round table, much lesser than originally decided 75. Swami argues that at a Seminar at Karachi, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq agreed to discussions on self- governance and self- rule but took a U turn with regards to round table conferences. Swami notes that openness shown at Karachi seminar got buckled from the pressure by Hizb-ul-Mujahideen who criticized the event as “pointless moderation” thereby forcing Mirwaiz to resume the conservative stance once again. Swami contends that Hurriyat conference seeks to establish itself as the sole arbitrator of Kashmiri voices and fears sharing tables with political competitors. Although Vajpayee would have tolerated this arrangement, Manmohan Singh government envisaged broad based dialogue which had to involve multiple parties and their views. Hurriyat was not comfortable with this arrangement (Swami, 2006). With the parties returning back to their uncompromising positions, the talk hit the dead end.

In 2010 there was massive unrest in the valley as over 110 civilians were killed after the massive protest against Machil fake encounter and the death of seventeen-year-old Tufail Ahmad Mattoo from the stray tear gas bullet. After the visit by an all-party delegation to the valley, Manmohan Singh government appointed a committee of three interlocutors - Dileep Padgaonkar, MM Ansari and Radha Kumar to carry out dialogue on a wide range of issues and prepare a roadmap to potential political solutions. The group of interlocutors submitted their report to the Home ministry in 2011. The major recommendations centred on the demand to set up a constitutional committee to examine in what ways application of central laws has eroded the autonomy of the state. It also recommended replacement of the word ‘temporary’ with ‘special’ to bring the status of Kashmir with that of North Eastern States of India. It advocated setting of regional councils with the set of devolved powers in Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh, it also advocated for a review of AFSPA 1990 and Public safety act 1978. The recommendations of the committee were too radical for the centre to consider (Tripathi 2017).

5.3 Negotiations with the separatists

Kashmiri began to think azaadi was round the corner as ISI assured them that if they create adequate instability, Pakistan will come to liberate them. Zia masterminded the insurgency, and the model was similar to Indian one in 1971. The intelligence played an important role when the military was deployed there as not only the key militants were neutralized and forced underground, the gains achieved by military compelled separatist like Shabir Shah and Firdous Syed to come to the table (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 65). There was a need to develop intelligence network on the ground, and thus the K group of IB was tasked to advise prime minister in 1990s (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 25), and Dulat took over Kashmir operation Group as for 8 years. Dulat argues that to solve Kashmir, India must win over separatists whom ISI will never want to lose (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 134). ISI's tactic is to establish relations with anyone wielding some clout in Kashmir. It included mainstream politicians, separatists and militants and R&AW and IB must neutralize it by establishing good relations with Pakistan so that it loosens its grip over separatists and secondly by providing a good political deal to them, India must bring them into mainstream politics.³⁶

AS Dulat notes that intelligence network developed during Rajiv Gandhi's tenure (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 61) and after the outbreak of insurgency, IB found itself on the back foot and its officers were targeted by ISI. Since they were mostly Kashmiri Pandits, there were eliminated conveniently. Dulat notes that Vajpayee even before his days as Prime Minister, he was an influential politician across India. It was Vajpayee who first told Shabir Shah in his meeting with him in 1995 that India must end the confrontation with Pakistan and Indians and Kashmiris should sit together to solve the Kashmir issue during his visit to New Delhi (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 14). The way of negotiations came to be known as the 'Vajpayee way' (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 16). The frustrations would come up as ISI would kill a person with whom R&AW tries to build

³⁶ Important caveat is that many separatists don't want to deal with India at all and want independence. The objective of negotiation should be providing them with a viable alternative to independence.

a relationship with, but Dulat states that R&AW approach in such cases was not tit for tat policy but “Selling peace through sustained dialogue” (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 130)

How could negotiations with separatists be started? Dulat points out that for a successful business deal, one must check out the other party. Any deal should deploy the vocabulary of doing business, only then the business will yield profitable negotiations. (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 32). Initial pattern was firstly army catches fellows, and after interrogation, if someone appeared interesting or had the willingness for peace, they would send him to intelligence officers. Subsequent negotiations should involve separatist leaders. The first step would be their release from prison.

Shabir Shah was in jail just like other separatist leadership along with Nayeem Khan. A businessman whom Dulat helped out of Jail suggested that Shabir would be the right person for initiating a dialogue as the idea of ‘peace with honour’ was raised by him (Dulat 2015 and Sinha: 69). As he was seen as oldest of separatists, Dulat called him ‘Headmaster of the boys who spearheaded the insurgency.’ Dulat discussed the possibility of arranging a settlement with him in which he could become chief Minister. As India began to release MUF leaders in 1993, including Yasin Malik in May 1994, Shabir too was released in October 1994. He got a good reception by people in his march from Poonch to Anantnag and in his in Baramulla in 1995 which indicated that he would bridge the gap between Kashmiris and Delhi. His meetings with Indian politicians suggested a possibility of positive dialogue. Dulat notes that as Narasimha Rao was keen in restoring political process in 1996, he was not very fond of Farooq Abdullah and interestingly was placing hopes on Shabir. In his famous Burkina Faso declaration, when he commented that “Sky is the limit,” Dulat argues that it was pointed at Shabir and his idea of peace with honour (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 72). Unfortunately, Shabir misconstrued it as acceptance of NC demand of maximum autonomy and hence took a step back. Farooq was also getting insecure about New Delhi’s attempt of striking a deal with separatist leaders, so he participated in 1996 elections, won and formed the government (ibid.), As Firdous and other militants who surrendered started taking with New Delhi, Shabir Shah became sceptical as assumed that “Delhi was double dealing with him” (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 72). The initiative failed and time watched him drifting away from mainstream politics.

As the commander in chief of Shabir Shah, Firdous Syed who formed Muslim Janbaanz force was caught in 1991 after the case of kidnapping of Swedish citizens but during his interrogation by Security forces, Dulat notes that Syed came across as reasonable and peace seeking man hence the army sent Firdous to IB (Dulat 2015: 76). Dialogue with Firdous was important on two counts. Dulat notes that it would be a tactical advantage if any militant is detached from the insurgency and secondly, only dialogue with militants will end the violence (ibid.). Firdous willingness to engage came after his tour of Pakistan where he realized selfish motivation of Pakistan towards keeping Kashmir on the boil. Firdous abandonment of Shabir led others like Bilal Lodi (Chief of Al-Baqr), Imran Rahi (Division commander of HUM) and Division Commander of Muslim Mujahideen- Ghulam Moinuddin to approach the political table (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 81). In February 1996, they had a press conference in Srinagar in which they expressed their willingness for dialogue. Although Dulat recommended Farooq to accommodate Firdous in NC, Firdous soon fell out of favour and became disinterested in fighting elections later on (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 86).

Dulat also recounts his dialogue with Hashim Quereshi, a part of 1971 plane Highjack who was disillusioned with Pakistan due to his harrowing experience in Pakistan jails and ISI sole agenda of making Kashmir part of Pakistan. For the benefit of Kashmiris, Hashim assumed that it would be better to deal with India (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 94). Hashim showed a willingness to come home in India and asked Dulat to facilitate his return, but he was arrested as he landed due to look out notice and the Indian authorities were not so interested in making him an Indian citizen rather decided to use him politically in Kashmir (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 95). These plans couldn't materialize, but Dulat notes that it paved the way for a dialogue with Abdul Majid Dar, former operational chief of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Dulat notes that although Yosuf Shah, later Salahudin was the head of HUM, Dar was guts and actual "brain trust" of HUM (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 100). Dar realized that Kashmir is not gaining anything with militancy, he was disillusioned from Pakistan and wanted the betterment of his family, so he found a way to come back. His plan involved informing ISI that he will go as their agent under the pretext of conducting a dialogue with India while secretly working for ISI (Dulat 2015: 101). He appeared in Srinagar through Dubai and announced a unilateral ceasefire on 24 July 2000 (Ibid.). Dulat notes that Dar himself was very keen on dialogue and he went around meeting leaders of all hues in Srinagar including Mirwaiz

Omar Farooq, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Yasin Malik, Shabir Shah and others to build a lobby for consensus on dialogue. (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 103). Dar found out that separatists were too much under the control of ISI. ISI lost the control over Dar and was shocked to see militant of Dar's stature turn towards India thus he was assassinated on 23 March 2003 in Sopore. Dulat also recounts the Salahuddin quest for getting his son admitted in Srinagar in medical college which was facilitated by K.M singh IB unit Srinagar and Farooq Abdullah, a gesture which warmed up Salahuddin. Failure to bring him to dialogue was a missed opportunity (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 108).

The meetings with Abdul Ghani Lone also revealed the disillusionment from Pakistan and sadness of continual violence grappling the Kashmir society. Lone's aspiration was to keep guest militants away from Kashmir. Lone told Dulat that he was willing to support the electoral process indirectly (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 119) and also tried to convince Hurriyat to contest elections as continued militancy was spilling too much blood in Kashmir but Hurriyat leaders did not deter as they were bound by dictates of ISI³⁷ (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 121). In his pursuit of peace, he too was eliminated by ISI (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 123). The Peace in Kashmir is not in the interest of ISI.

The absence of talk has been a problem as, during the worst days of cold war, the CIA and KGB would remain in interaction with each other. Dulat floated out the suggestion of open post was floated by him. Dulat also notes that money also plays an instrumental role. During NDA rule, money was used to buy ISI agents and to "win people over," and money and secrets were transferred at R&AW posts across the world (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 130). He notes that "money goes a long way" and in all probabilities, pro-Indian leaders in Kashmir were funded by India (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 133). The case in point of defection in 1983 which was orchestrated on money power.

Amidst all the political leaders with whom Dulat has worked with on Kashmir, Vajpayee was the trend setter. Vajpayee was the first leader after Nehru to receive affection from Kashmiris when he stated that "*insaniyat ke dairey mei baat*" implying humanity would prevail over everything else in India's pursuit of a political dialogue (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 201). Vajpayee continued persistence to have a dialogue with Pakistan despite two betrayals³⁸ which made Kashmiris jubilant (Dulat and Sinha 2015:

³⁷ ISI handled Kashmir through a political wing and military wing each headed by a Brigadier.

³⁸ Kargil War in 1999 and attack on Indian Parliament in 2001

202). Another masterstroke was acceptance of the invitation for SAARC summit in Islamabad in 2004. L.K Advani was asked to conduct a dialogue with Hurriyat. The first meeting held on 22 January 2004 then on March 27, but nothing substantial was achieved due to the tendency of Hurriyat to escape discussions on key issues (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 210). Dulat points out that Vajpayee and Brajesh Mishra (India's first National Security Advisor) grand plan was continual dialogue and the task of the team was preparing the grounds for it (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 18). Vajpayee's persistence came to a halt after a change in leadership post 2004 elections.

Dulat called UPA approach as 'Lost decade' because Manmohan Singh was not keen on showing patience. The advantage UPA had was that adequate groundwork was already constructed by NDA government. The round tables didn't provide any progress as Hurriyat decided to boycott them. The Mirwaiz was depressed with the pace things proceeded in Manmohan Singh's time hence he calls it a depressing time. The dialogue process went into the cold basket, and Manmohan Singh term was termed as 'missed opportunity' in Kashmir. With regard to Pakistan as in 2006, Musharraf four point formula implied Pakistan was willing to accept LOC, and this would have resolved "the unfinished business of partition" (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 219). The willingness of Musharraf to reach towards a deal in Kashmir made him ask Hurriyat to contest the election. It implied that ISI would loosen its grip on Hurriyat leaders. The moment was opportune, there was a willingness from Pakistan towards resolution of the crisis, but the opportunity slipped (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 220).

Dulat notes that we lack in our intention to "talk to anybody and everybody" and "listen to anybody and everybody" (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 247). Even though the credibility of Hurriyat is under question, India can mediate with Pakistan through Hurriyat. Dulat identifies four leaders in Kashmir who could be taken in confidence while initiating plans of normalcy in Kashmir- Omar Abdullah, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, Mehbooba Mufti and Sajad Lone (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 249). As the BJP won the decisive majority in 2014 elections, separatist leadership assumed that Modi would show the same resolve shown by Vajpayee in paving the ground for positive dialogue, but the strategy of New Delhi shifted from involving separatists to discrediting separatists.

5.4 Negotiations with Pakistan

Why does India need to talk to Pakistan? There are many reasons that support this requirement. Firstly, Pakistan administers a significant portion of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. It administers the regions of Gilgit, Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. Secondly, ever since the partition, Pakistan has raised its claim of Kashmir by questioning the legality of the instrument of accession. Thirdly, Pakistan is providing logistical, economic, political, diplomatic and moral support to the military groups in Kashmir thereby endangering the security and challenging the sovereignty of India in Kashmir and finally, since Pakistan has become a nuclear state, the coercive diplomacy cannot be practiced on Pakistan by India and finally, Durrani and Dulat state that war is not an option for India as it would unleash full support of Pakistan to insurgency which would worsen the situation and India would lose its 'threat card' for conventional escalation (Durrani and Dulat 2013: 3). For Pakistan, war with India would be very heavy on its fragile economy and its international image (ibid.). Dulat also mentions that talks with Pakistan are important as the only political hold that Pakistan has in Kashmir is Hurriyat. Hence if any Hurriyat member crosses the line, he gets eliminated. This explains why Hurriyat always advocates for a tripartite dialogue (Dulat 2015: 205). The dialogue is the way out.

Initiation of talks between India and Pakistan is not an easy task due to their contrarian position on Kashmir. Dulat and Durrani in their joint paper argue that striving for independence of Kashmir is considered as the national objective of Pakistan and any attempt in entering structured dialogue with India invites a backlash from radical Islamic organizations and domestic constituency as any soft stance Kashmir is not politically permitted in Pakistan whereas India considers entire erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, an integral part of India and it will not be willing to renegotiate its sovereign position in Kashmir (Durrani and Dulat 2013: 1). Stability in Kashmir depends heavily on India Pakistan relations. As India Pakistan relations improve, the hopes of Kashmiri improve. The eventful bus service from Delhi to Lahore was well received in both countries (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 30).

5.4.1 Composite dialogue

If we start out an investigation of talks between India and Pakistan after 1988, both of them had twelve rounds of talks before Lahore summit and Agra Summit, but they were

fruitless because of lack of commitment and inability to arrive at common consensus (Paddar 2012: 4). Paddar notes that the idea of composite dialogue was mooted in Male Summit in the Maldives in 1997 when I.K Gujral (Prime Minister of India) met Nawaz Sharif (Prime minister of Pakistan). This idea was based in the approach of compromise as India agreed to include Kashmir as an issue in the talks and Pakistan was willing to address the issue of cross border terrorism; the two issues that acted as a thorn in any bilateral cooperation between India and Pakistan. Durrani and Dulat pointed that Composite dialogue was meant to move in integrated manner as different issues would progress in tandem but due to complexity of Kashmir issue, progress in all other issues would have also suffered hence the idea of ‘integrated’ dialogue has to be dropped thereby no longer a composite dialogue but a “multiple track and multiple speed formula” (Durrani and Dulat 2013: 2).

Composite dialogue as a structured form of dialogue began in 1998 as the two meetings 16-18 October and 5-13 November without much headway, but the Kargil war in 1999 brought all efforts to nought (Paddar 2012: 2).

The failed Agra summit and attack on Indian Parliament pushed India-Pak relations to its lowest ebb. However, 11/9 attack on the United States managed to change dynamics of South Asia as the US began to empathize with India on the issue of terrorism and made Musharraf put sanction of JeM and LeT. Since Pakistan was a key ally in US war on Terror, an external push was provided by the US towards the restoration of ties. Relations between India and Pakistan began to improve in 2003. Vajpayee offered a 12 point confidence building measure, and Pakistan responded by announcing a LOC ceasefire in November 2003 (Durrani and Dulat 2013: 3). Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan in January 2004 which served as a major boost to revamping of relations and restoration of composite dialogue which comprised of four rounds of deliberations over eight issues³⁹ and continued till 26 November 2008 Mumbai terror attack in which role of Pakistan was ascertained (Paddar 2012: 2).

The composite dialogue resumed even after Kargil war, nuclear weapon testing and attack on Indian Parliament because of its flexible nature which was not demonstrated at Agra Summit. The composite dialogue was flexible enough to include core issues of

³⁹ They were Peace and security involving confidence building measure, Siachen glacier, Jammu and Kashmir, Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, Drug trafficking and Terrorism, economic cooperation and lastly friendly exchanges in other realms between two countries.

both nations and progressed on the premise that solutions that would be acceptable to both parties would be accepted (Durrani and Dulat 2013: 4). This aspect provided transparency to both the parties in the dialogue.

The role of personalities becomes instrumental in chartering future course of bilateral relations. Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf showed much desired willingness to engage even after the breakdown of Agra Summit. Padder highlights an important interview in which Pervez Musharraf presented his four step approach to BBC Urdu in November 2003. These four steps included commencement of official dialogue; acknowledgement of the centrality of Jammu and Kashmir dispute; Keeping aside all the proposals unacceptable to India and Pakistan and finally solutions will involve approval of India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris (Padder 2012: 4). This four step approach was polished and evolved into ‘four point formula’ which involved:

1. Softening of borders to promote more free movement of goods and people across the LOC.
2. Self-governance and autonomy without independence
3. Demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir
4. Joint supervision of Jammu and Kashmir

This potential proposal which could have resolved the crisis in Kashmir got derailed after the dismissal of Pervez Musharraf in 2007.

In 2014 elections, BJP emerged as the single largest party and Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of India. He invited heads of SAARC including Nawaz Sharif in his swearing in ceremony in May 2014. Narendra Modi also landed in Pakistan in his way from Afghanistan to meet Nawaz Sharif and bless his grand daughter’s wedding on 25 December 2015. The meeting was impromptu and was interpreted as a thaw in relations between two countries.

5.5 Unofficial portals of dialogue

5.5.1 Track two diplomacy

Another medium of dialogue that was adopted was track two diplomacy which started in 1992 at Neemrana Fort, Rajasthan. These were dialogues sponsored by University of Ottawa (Dulat and Sinha 2015: 226). These track two initiatives help to build connections and to understand the other side of the story and motivations of major

agencies of other nation in pursuing a policy. Chaophraya dialogue organized by Institute of Peace and Conflict studies from India and Jinnah institute of Pakistan and funded by British is another Track Two initiative.

5.5.2 Concerned Citizen Group Dialogue

After going through the history of failed events for political dialogue, we may as well look towards unofficial streams of political dialogue which was carried out by the concerned citizen group who unofficially visited the valley to take opinions from various sections of civil society in Jammu and Kashmir. The concerned citizen group led by Yashwant Sinha and comprising of former election commissioner Wajahat Habibullah, Retired Air vice Marshal Kapil Kak, Executive director of the centre for dialogue and reconciliation Sushobha Barve and Editor Catch news Mr. Bharat Bhushan visited the valley from 26th-28th October 2016. They conducted meeting with APHC members namely Syed Ali Geelani, Umar Farooq and Abdul Gani Bhat at their respective residences. On the same day, the group met Jammu and Kashmir Democratic freedom party (JKDFP) President Shabir Shah at Raj Bagh police station and finally met Farooq Abdullah, former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir at his residence. On 26th, the group met various representatives from Kashmir chamber of commerce and industry and trade and commerce union, academics, students and members of Kashmiri Pandit Sangarsh Samiti, High court bar association and finally with CM Mehbooba Mufti. On 27th the group met the governor NN Vohra. The group submitted its findings to the Home ministry.

From all sections, the only commonality they found was the demand for a political resolution of a political issue. The working group resounded the fact that the reason for the fifth generation of Kashmiris indulging in anti -Indian activities was linked to anger and alienation. The working group in its report listed down reasons for immediate anger and long term anger within the Kashmiris. The reasons for immediate anger were excessive use of violence by security forces mainly through notorious pellet guns which led to the blinding and partial blinding of innocent children and youth in the valley. The working group noted the argument by various political leaders from the valley which unequivocally stated that stone pelters are not paid rather they use stone pelting in anger to revolt against incidences of police and security forces brutality. Another cause for immediate anger is the vengeful cordon and search operations conducted at night in the

villages where security forces get pelted upon. In some villages, Kashmiri leaders complained, that Security forces allegedly destroyed electronic transformers to punish stone pelting. The working group notes misuse of Public Safety Act as another cause for immediate anger. The draconian PSA which doesn't allow the alleged convict to be presented before a magistrate and be charged for a year. The worst sufferers are minors. Due to the lack of juvenile homes, they are kept with criminals who can have an adverse impact on the mental development of minors. The working group also recorded the allegation that no easy access is provided to the relatives of the imprisoned. The reason for the anger is not merely these immediate issues, but the working group also identified the long term issues of anger. The working group notes that refusal to recognize Kashmir as a political issue and ignoring the sentimentality of the Kashmiri population is the major shortfall of the Indian approach to establishing peace in the valley. The working group notes that Kashmiri population takes offence at labelling all Kashmiri's as Pakistan's puppet.

The working group provided with some recommendation to state government and the Union government. To the state government, the working group recommended amnesty to first time offender school children arrested under PSA, compensation and rehabilitation package to those injured in the crossfire and blinded fully or partially by Pellet Guns. The working group recommended the state government to open schools for blind children and bear the burden of treating people blinded from the pellet. For the Union government, the working group recommended that Pellet guns should be withdrawn immediately. Furthermore, Indian national media channels should not designate Kashmiris as anti- nationals. The working group also recommended that facilities of migrants should be given to Kashmiri Pandits. The working group report in its conclusion echoed the need for a permanent process of dialogue with New Delhi (Concerned Citizen Group 2016).

The concerned citizen group in their second visit visited Budgam, Shopian, Anantnag and Baramullah towns and released the report on January 7, 2017. The group met with various members of the civil society along with exclusive meetings with civil and police officers, representatives of minority Shia and Sikh communities and GOC 15 Corps deployed in Kashmir. The group also met political leaders namely Engineer Rashid, Saifuddin Soz, Farooq Abdullah and various other politicians from the National Conference.

The report echoes Indian state's apathy towards Kashmiris and "crisis of acknowledgment" that Kashmir is the political problem which requires a final and conclusive political solution. The report notes the testimonies of the locals in the valley which univocally echoes the concern that Indian state sees Kashmir as instrumental for its national security without caring for the grievances of the local population. The hard line policies and incidents of discriminations against minorities in the other parts of the country have eroded the trust of the Muslim Kashmiris from the central government. The report records the anger against India from the interviewed locals which they base on Indian history of broken commitments (autonomy, self-determination, etc.) The Report notes that Kashmiris have become averse to words like unrest as the "Kashmir has never been at rest since 1947" and have become wary of even non-governmental initiatives as they might be "time buying exercises" or deviational issues to keep the focus away from the core issues of Kashmiris. Basically what the report notes that India is concerned about Kashmir but not about Kashmiris.

While various think tanks and intellectuals record the Kashmir problem in terms of economic alienation and anger against India, The report notes that Kashmiri issue is more of a political issue than an economic issue. There is widespread scepticism about BJP's tactics perceived as communal which places Kashmiri Muslim in double jeopardy for being a Muslim as well as a Kashmiri. The perceived nature of communal politics of BJP doesn't incite any hope in Kashmiri people. The report also notes the incidents of discrimination against Kashmiris in routine administration primarily being on the issuing of Passports perpetuates the distrust.

The most notable point of the report is its focus on issues of youth in the valley which are almost 68% of the population. The new generation of protestors is besotted by the glory of martyrdom and is less fearful of punitive retaliation of the state. After spending their entire childhood under curfew and shutdowns, the youth has radicalized and is now more prone to pick up stones and ultimately weapons. The report takes into account the suggestions of youngsters who basically stated that India should talk to the youth and give them a platform to express themselves. A step in this direction, the report notes, can be the formation of student unions and groups. The report also advocated for the release of youth from the jails who are charged with stone pelting so that their hatred can be curbed and it is ensured that jailed youngsters do not become hardened criminals. The report notes the youth cry about lack of employment opportunities in rural Kashmir

and inadequacies of Industrial Training Institutes which are unable to provide skills and are merely providing degrees. The youth also bemoans the lack of cinemas, stadiums, libraries, and upgraded school and college infrastructure which could at least provide a glimmer of normalcy. The report incorporated demands of youth alongside suggestions to provide exchange programmes for meritorious college students. Another important aspect the report notes is the prevalence of Post-traumatic stress disorder and lack of mental care facility in the Valley. Insurgency torn society can have a detrimental impact on the psyche of young children growing up. The report advocated for setting up disciplines in the hospitals as well as seminars to create awareness about the mental health and treat the mental disorders. The committee in the report notes that People are disillusioned with the state parties which have become inept in representing the voice of the people and most importantly lacks the power to resolve the political issue. The report notes that locals want consultation process to be started by involving all stakeholders to find the lasting solution to the Kashmir problem. In their discussions with minorities in the valley namely Sikh and Shias, the committee noted that they face insecurity and discrimination viz. the majority community with Sikh arguing about the non- application of 1992 National Minorities act and rueing over lack of government employment opportunities. Shia's rue over the ban of Moharram procession and issue of Aukaf land.

The committee recommended that the human rights situation should be improved by properly sensitizing the army and issuing human rights guidelines. Proper psychological counselling should be given to the youth. Confidence building measures should be undertaken by the police forces and armed forces. The report advocated for multidimensional dialogue with all the stakeholders including Hurriyat and Pakistan “contingent upon several other issues.” (Concerned Citizen Group 2017)

For the third time, the working group visited valley from 17 August 2017 to August 19. The delegation met representatives from various sections of civil society namely Jammu and Kashmir bar association, members of prominent political parties and students from various colleges in the valley. They interacted with people in the areas of Srinagar, Shopian, Anantnag, Pulwama, and Kupwara in Northern Kashmir as published in Kashmir Life. In the report published on Kashmir Life, the most concerning inference of the interaction with the people of different sections of Kashmir was rise in despondency and frustration in the people with the causes not merely limited

to lack of deliberations and talks but also towards plummeting down of tourism industry and shrinkage of economic opportunities in an area infested with insurgency. Along with economic distress, the strong rhetoric of centre against Article 370 and 35 A has provoked what report calls 'Judicial/Constitutional aggression' against the people of Kashmir. With the scare of change in demographic profile looming large within the mind-set of government, the suspicion has aggravated immensely. Dwelling upon the issue of National Investigation agency raids, the report noted that young sympathizers of Hurriyat conference are professionals from the legal field. NIA active investigation also made many pointed out the fact that Indian agencies too have funded Kashmiri leaders. The report notes that NIA proactive raids have induced fear within the Hurriyat sympathizers. The report notes that the majority of local militants are situated in South Kashmir while radicalized militants are limited to areas like Pulwama and Tral. The report also notes that while tourism suffered a severe blow, the local tourist industry representatives complained that Kashmir was not being sold as the major tourist destination in India and negative publicity of Indian media channels projecting the locals has anti nationals and India hating bunch has also perpetuated the negative perception that has dissuaded tourists. The report notes that all those workers from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar who used to migrate to the valley for low skilled work have now ceased alongside contractors from Andra Pradesh, Telangana and Maharashtra have also expressed their undesirability to apply for projects in Kashmir. This is also coupled with out-migration of educated and affluent youth from the valley in search of opportunities outside the valley. With depleting economic opportunities, the avenues of militancy appears favourable to uneducated and/or unemployed youth. The report also highlights the institutional decay and lack of credible leadership which can address their grievances. Lack of grievance readdressal mechanism makes the idea of azaadi more appealing. The report thereby emphatically highlights the fact that militancy is merely a symptom of a larger disease that is worsening due to less focus on administration and grievance redressal, not merely military counterinsurgency. Reflecting on the PM speech on Independence Day, the report states that strong military centric approach, provocative statements by the Army chief, intensified cordon and search operations, arrest of separatist leaders and disavowal of talks with Pakistan, the words of Prime Minister might come as another wave of rhetoric emptied of any significance (Concerned Citizen Group 2017b).

The major recommendations of Concerned Citizen Groups can broadly be summarized as

1. Kashmiris demand steps towards final resolution of the political issue of Kashmir.
2. Kashmiris are against excessive use of force and pellet guns and they demand its immediate withdrawal
3. Kashmiris want iteration of Human rights guidelines which can curb the excesses of the security forces
4. The report records the adverse psychological impact of insurgency on the youth in the valley and recommends the formulation of a policy that addresses the issue of mental health of youth in the war zone
5. Kashmiris demand withdrawal of draconian legislations like PSA and AFSPA
6. Kashmiris want Indian media to stop labelling all the Kashmiris as anti-nationals and cease the negative publicity of Kashmir.

Signalling a change in the muscular approach exemplified in operation All out, NDA government appointed Ex Intelligence bureau Chief Dineshwar Sharma as the interlocutor in Kashmir. After being bestowed with the same position as of cabinet secretary, Dineshwar Sharma is mandated to involve all stakeholders in the dialogue and submit observations and recommendations to the government. The appointment of interlocutor was seen as softening of the hard militaristic stance of Modi government. Dineshwar Sharma with his vast experience of policy formulation of national security matters like North East unrest, initiating dialogue with Assam based militant groups and curbing radicalization of Indian youth was seen as a perfect candidate for the role (Ashok 2017). We are yet to see the results after the appointment of Dineshwar Sharma, but various commentators have started viewing NDA approach with scepticism.

5.6 Limits of the dialogue

Hilal Mir ponders upon the question that what could be the purpose of Dineshwar Sharma's mission in the valley as it is not an ice breaker or a prelude to a larger discussion on the framework of resolution of the conflict. Although the previous initiatives were as facile and futile, the tone of those initiatives was conciliatory. Mir points towards the new mood reflected in the Doval doctrine and the statements of Bipin Rawat which is unyielding and uncompromising in nature. This mood is translated into

practice via strict warnings to citizens and the National Investigation Agency (NIA) actions against the separatist leaders. Mir recalls that earlier as a confidence building measure, India used to release political prisoners before the talk, but the appointment of Dineshwar Sharma has not been preceded by this move. Throughout his two trips to the valley, the cordon and search operations have continued undeterred. Mir further highlights the poor execution of initiating dialogue by the central government as he pointed out that Kashmiri mainstream politicians which are considered as Indian only assets in Jammu and Kashmir have been further marginalized as their demand to have their own power projects are being ignored. Although the purpose of Dineshwar Sharma's visit has been in Home minister term "to understand the legitimate aspirations of people of Jammu and Kashmir", Mir points out that it is New Delhi that defines and determines what the legitimate aspirations are, as the aspiration for having their own power plants are not deemed legitimate enough to be approved. When Prime Minister Modi advocated embrace in place of bullets but simultaneously condoned riddling bodies of youth with Pellets, India exposed the people of J&K to simultaneous fits of stimulation (softening) and frustration which Mir points what noted existential psychiatrist RD Laing terms as a recipe to drive someone crazy. The interlocutor's mission and the simultaneous iron fisted policies can only drive people mad. Hence interlocutor mission is mere a showpiece to improve the international image of India on the issue of Kashmir. Lacking any intent of positive rapprochement, the interlocutor's mission is bound to fail (Mir 2017). Aarif Muzaffar Rather too shares this despondency as he asserts that since the appointment of Balraj Puri in the 90's and rejection of report adopted by Jammu and Kashmir legislature, the centre has usurped more autonomy rather than divesting through the extension of central laws and application of draconian measures. While reports and recommendations of earlier panels went unheeded, it would be safe to doubt the viability of Dineshwar Sharma visit which came under more hardlined Modi led NDA government (Rather 2017).

MM Ansari who was part of a group of interlocutors who visited valley in 2011 too shared the pessimism in Dineshwar Sharma's appointment by pointing out the problem in Indian outlook towards Kashmir problem. The Indian government views Kashmir in the "prism of security." Ansari sees the Dineshwar Sharma appointment as an extension of muscular approach under the garb of "sustaining dialogue process." Ansari argues that Dineshwar Sharma has been tasked with plugging the loopholes in the collection

of intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. Ansari dismisses any aura of hope around Dineshwar Sharma as the latter is not mandated to “resolve” the issue and has no experience in dispute resolution. The appointment of Dineshwar Sharma can more practicably be linked with an assessment of national security and intelligence situation in the valley. Ansari too echoes the point that Dineshwar Sharma doesn't come equipped with confidence earning measures like the promise of partial or full revocation of AFSPA and PSA. Furthermore, the fundamental issue of persistent human rights violation would also not be addressed by his visit. By lacking the necessary ammunition, Ansari concludes by stating that the visit is unlikely to change the overall picture of the valley (Ansari 2017).

Praveen Swami points out that Ramzan ceasefire was not the prudent decision as he notes that far right Islamic fundamentalist, Pakistan based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and others would not be keen on mediation (Swami 2003: 52). Since their number outweighed Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the Ceasefire would not yield tangible results (ibid.). Similarly, the ceasefire called in Ramzan 2018, is preceded by operational successes in the valley and call for such ceasefire will allow regrouping of terrorist organizations. It would give them respite as well as the time to re-strategize, re-mobilize and re-organize. However, in the present phase of militancy, the largest challenge in the Valley is the menace of stone pelting. Since the operation would be ceased, there will be no rounds of violence, collateral damage, and civilian casualty. The Indian state has sought to provide respite to local civilians from the everyday experience of violence. The goal of this move is to ease the tensions and stop the alienation from deepening any further.

5.6.1 The Unruly neighbours

The story of India Pakistan relations stays the same. Whenever any significant breakthroughs are made in the peace process, they are bound to get derailed through incidents of terrorism supported by the other side. On January 2, 2016, Pathankot airbase was attacked by militants in which 5 security personnel were killed. It was followed by Uri attack on 18 September 2016 in which 19 security officials died. Indian suspected JeM to be behind both these attacks. At the diplomatic front, India cancelled its participation in 19th SAARC summit scheduled to be held in Islamabad citing cross border terrorism as the reason. On 1 May 2017, Pakistan initiated unprovoked mortar

shelling in Poonch district which provided cover to its Border Action Team as they launched a sneak attack on Indian patrol comprising of BSF and 22 Sikh regiment soldiers and killed two soldiers and mutilated their bodies. This incident was one amongst the series of incidents of sneak attack on Indian soldiers and mutilation of bodies (Hindustan Times 2017).

The frequent cross border firing and shelling (also known as ceasefire violation) fuels the hatred between both armies. Indian army has also focused on preventing cross border infiltration. From the table below we can see the rising number of terrorist casualties reflect more belligerence in Pakistan's attitude.

Table 4 Number of terrorist killed in cross border infiltration

Sl. No.	Year	Number of Terrorist killed
(i)	2015	108
(ii)	2016	150
(iii)	2017	213
(iv)	2018*(till February)	08

Taken from <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=176301>

Furthermore, this belligerence has led to a rise in fatalities in cross border shelling and ceasefire violations

Table 5 Casualties on Indian side due to cross border firing

Year	Army fatalities	BSF Fatalities	Civilian Fatalities	Total
2015	6	4	16	26
2016	8	5	13	26
2017	15	4	12	31
Total	29	13	41	83

<http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=176301>

Table 6 Ceasefire violations by India and Pakistan

Year	Ceasefire violations by India	Ceasefire violation by Pak
2015	152	248
2016	228	382
2017	860	1970
2018	1252 (192 till May 28)	1100 (till June 13)

⁴⁰Taken from <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=176301> and <https://indopakconflictmonitor.org>

5.7 Indian counterinsurgency through dialogue and diplomacy: A tale of the permanent impasse.

Prabha has argued that unconditional talks are a good starting point, but they have to be conducted with utmost honesty and genuineness towards reaching an understanding (Prabha 2002: 246). The genuineness and honesty can only be exhibited by the contending parties only when the contending parties trust each other. In the present context, the separatist leaders like Syed Ali Shah Geelani are being hounded by National investigation agency for indulging in Hawala transaction. Other separatist leaders like Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Yasin Malik are persistently kept under house arrests. The leaders of ruling parties have started raising calls for abrogation of Article 370 of Indian constitution and Article 35 A of Jammu and Kashmir Constitution which has created panic and suspicion within the minds of local leadership of the state and the local population. Under such circumstances, if any political dialogue is to be initiated, then certain enabling conditions are to be established. Establishment of certain enabling conditions does not warrant abandoning the iron fisted policy against militants. Under the NDA government led by Narendra Modi, no such enabling conditions are created which has perpetuated the environment of distrust and suspicious under which no political dialogue can thrive.

The second cause of impasse is the divide between committee's/ interlocutors recommendations and the government aspirations. The recommendations of working committees were not fully implemented, and the recommendations of a group of

⁴⁰ In case of conflicting data, figure from PIB was preferred.

interlocutors in 2011 were completely ignored. One can point out that the communication gap that has existed between the members of committee/ interlocutors and the central government. The central government before the constitution of any working group, committee or appointment of interlocutor must specify the ground rules and principles in whose consonance, the recommendation should be made. Furthermore, the members of the working group/ interlocutors should formulate such recommendations which are likely to be accepted and executed by the central government to prevent constitution of committees and appointment of interlocutors being reduced to façade.

Thirdly, various contending parties have engaged in carrying out propaganda against each other which has led to contempt and aversion to reconciliation. The most notable role is played by media. The media (Print and electronic) aggressively demonizes the other party to the conflict which makes political dialogue the least preferred option to resolve the situation.

The fourth cause of impasse is misjudgement by the contending parties about willingness to concede to opposite parties. Indian state wants the resolution of the problem within the framework of Indian constitution (despite the usual rhetoric made by Indian Politicians)⁴¹. The separatist under APHC demand Indian state to recognize that Kashmir is a dispute whereas India believes that Kashmir accession to India is complete and irrevocable. Indian state doesn't consider Pakistan to be the party in the Kashmir dispute whereas Hurriyat leadership recognizes Pakistan as one of the major stakeholders in Kashmir dispute. APHC considers itself as the major party in the Kashmir issue whereas India recognized voices from Kashmiri Pandits, Ladakh and Jammu as important as that of APHC; a position which is not acceptable to Hurriyat. As the contending parties hold such uncompromising positions and are unlikely to update their stance, the dialogue becomes almost impossible and the impasse; permanent.

The strategy of negotiation has been purposeless which is demonstrated by failure of all the diplomatic missions undertaken by various groups. Secondly, Indian strategy is high on rhetoric and low on practice which is evident from claims of Vajpayee but his

⁴¹ Narasimha Rao's –“ Sky is the limit” and Atal Bihari Vajpayee's- “ Kashmiriyat, Insaniyat, Jamooriyat”

summary rejection of autonomy proposal of the National Conference. The diplomatic strategy of both India and Pakistan is marked by 'commitment phobia' wherein parties seek avenues to escape

Chapter 6

Interrogation of Grand Strategy and the Kashmir Possibility

6.1 Introduction

From our analysis of India's strategic response to Kashmir insurgency, what brings us to the concept of Grand Strategy? How can a concept related to international security and foreign politics be relevant to a domestic crisis of a state? These are valid questions, and this chapter tries to provide an answer to these questions. It is important to note that all forms of strategy have an 'objective' to realize which sometimes cannot be realized through 'a predesigned path.' In our first chapter, we have noted the multidimensional nature of Kashmir insurgency which India seeks to counter through the amalgamation of different approaches. These approaches interact with each other to point towards a possible Grand Strategy of India in Kashmir.

In this chapter, I will try to demystify the concept of Grand Strategy by mapping its theoretical evolution, diverse definitions, conceptual extensions and barrier in implementation. We will move to the section on its relevance and how the concept of Grand Strategy has provided Indian scholars a tool to counter the assertion - 'India cannot think strategically.' To explore the Kashmir possibility, we will domesticate the concept by widening its scope. This chapter seeks to demonstrate how the concept of Grand Strategy provides us a better understanding of Indian strategic response to the insurgency in Kashmir.

6.2 Theoretical evolution of the concept of Grand Strategy

It is to be noted that the normative idea of Grand Strategy posed different questions in different eras, but its essence did not undergo a drastic change. Peter Layton in his article *'The idea of Grand Strategy'* asserts that the term Grand Strategy in the modern sense came into being in the twentieth century. During the tumultuous eras of wars, there arose a need to conceptualize strategy in a more precise way. Layton notes an important intervention in the work of naval historian Sir Julian Corbett. Corbett in his work *'Strategic terms and definitions used in lectures on naval history'* published in

1906 divided strategy into major strategy (also known as Grand Strategy) which dealt with deployment of ‘whole resources of the nation for war’ that included diplomatic, military as well as economic resources for war and Minor strategy which focused on operational plans. The task of this definition was to respond to the existential security crisis that different nations faced. This formulation shows us that the means of ensuring security were not merely military but also economic and diplomatic. This work, Peter Layton asserts paved the way for further resurrections of the concept (Layton 2012: 56).

Another known intervention in this field comes from the experiences of First World War (role of experiences of military leaders in the actual battlefield during the major warring period) by Colonel (Later Major General) J. F. C. Fuller in 1923 from his book ‘Reformation of war.’ In his analysis, Fuller broadened the ambit of Grand Strategy by including the moral aspect of the civil population along with the element of spirit. For Fuller, Grand Strategy implied the highest level coordination between material and social forces so that a country can be well prepared for the war (ibid.). Fuller too in his definition is responding to an existential security threat that nations faced during the First World War. How to survive a war? How to win a war? These were the major questions to which this concept responded. Unlike the complete realist definition of Corbett, this definition incorporated nonmaterial factors like morality. Fuller’s innovation was expanded upon by Basil Liddell Hart in 1929 in his work ‘Decisive wars of History.’

Prominent works following them on Grand Strategy were not focused on wartime but now got broadened to include national security and persistence of peace as their key objectives. How to maintain peace and ensure long-term security were the questions to which these new definitions responded. Under this changing context, Paul Kennedy in his book *Grand Strategies of War and Peace* (1991) sought refinement of the term by emphasizing the necessity of political judgement. He writes

“The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non- military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests. It is not a mathematical science in the Jominian tradition, but an art in the Clausewitzian sense—and a difficult art at that, since it operates at various levels, political, strategic, operational, tactical, all interacting with each other to advance (or retard) the primary aim.” (O’Donnell and Pant 2015: 202).

Pant identifies another perspective that seeks to equate Grand Strategy as an intrinsic part of statehood itself. One such proponent of this view of Edward Luttwark who in his book *Grand strategy of Byzantine Empire* argued

“All states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not. That is inevitable because the grand strategy is simply the level at which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern terms intelligence and diplomacy, interact with military strength to determine outcomes in a world with other states, with their own ‘grand strategies’” (ibid.)

This view as we would see can be contested on many grounds through the arguments of Layton who presents alternatives of Grand Strategies in the form of Opportunism and Risk management and Venkatshamy who lays down ‘micro-actions’ encompassing innovations as a form of securing security (Venkatshamy 2012: 126).

Peter Feaver in his article ‘What is Grand Strategy and why do we need it?’ explores (then) President Barack Obama’s Grand Strategy and its academic relevance. One of the examples is the Grand Strategy of ‘containment’ during the cold war. Cold war provided an ideal setup for this academic study to grow in the United States as scholars began theorizing about strategies to win the cold war on different (economic, diplomatic and military) fronts which was likely to stretch for decades. After the end of cold war, the studies shifted to understanding the US strategy to remain as a global hegemon or to eradicate terrorism across the World. Various courses were developed in US universities and defence colleges to study and work on Grand Strategy. Feaver (2009) provides us with a leader-centric understanding of Grand Strategy as he argues that study of Grand Strategy can make us understand the worldview of leaders and how they envision American National Security, economic prosperity, and international clout and its place in changing global scenario.

Feaver (2009) defines Grand Strategy as

“Collection of plan and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic and economic tools together to advance state’s national interest. Grand Strategy is the art of reconciling ends and means which involves purposive actions- what leaders think and want. Such strategy is constrained by resources, limitation in tools of statecraft and by word views of those formulating it”.

Finally, we move on to the definition of Barry Posen who defines Grand Strategy as a

“Political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself. Ideally, it includes an explanation of why the theory is expected to work. A grand strategy must identify likely threats to the state’s security, and it must devise political, economic, military, and other remedies for those threats. Priorities

must be established among both threats and remedies [. . .] Ideally, the grand strategy of a state should account for its effects on other states." (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 12).

Silove argues that Kennedy and Posen who gave the most authoritative definition of Grand Strategy, fall short on various grounds. Kennedy's definition does not adequately describe the phenomena to which he ascribes these characterizes and Posen while developing a theory of Grand Strategy does not define his idea of theory in his book about military doctrine. Both scholars fail to define the object of reference of Grand Strategy (Silove 2017:7). The quest of Nina Silove in her article *'Beyond the Buzzword: The Three meanings of Grand Strategy* to identify the object that the concept of Grand Strategy addresses. She makes her own contribution to the debate over questions like what is Grand Strategy and does it actually exist by proposing three ideas of the concept of Grand Strategy in the form of 'grand plans', 'grand principles' and 'grand behaviour' each of which offers a different set of tools and framework to the study of Grand Strategy (Silove 2017).

Silove notes the problem with defining the concept which may come across as slippery, jumbled and fuzzy and be riddled with some basic foundational questions like Does the grand strategy exist? Is it intentional? Is it the trait of only great powers? Is it flexible? And various others. Despite all these questions and contrarian viewpoints, Silove argues that Grand Strategy is not a hollow concept or a meaning term rather it comprises of detailed documents and plans made by individuals which, are known as grand plans; some guiding principles influenced by experience, culture, and values to make sense of the International politics which become grand principles and finally, a pattern in the behaviour of the state represents grand behaviour (Silove 2017: 3). Together grand plans, grand principles and grand behaviour provide diversity to the idea of grand strategy.

In this theoretical evolution under different contexts, we can note that the basic essence of the concept of Grand Strategy remained unchanged. Throughout the journey of this concept, the focus remained on security. During the wartime, the task of a Grand Strategy was to secure security, and during the peacetime, the task was to ensure and maintain security. In my project, I intend to work with the same end that all these definitions throughout different era sought, i.e., security. The contribution of my research would be an analysis of security predicament in the domestic realm of a nation.

6.3 What is Grand about Grand Strategy?

Intuitively we can assume that Grand Strategy formulation happens at the highest level of strategy/ policy making. Many authors like Hew Strachan, Colin Gray, and Terry Diebel, in one way or the other, have defined strategy as a plan to apply means to achieve a certain end (Layton 2012: 58). The concept of Grand strategy moves beyond this simplistic formulation.

Grand Strategy as Layton argues, is more than a mere application of means. Grand Strategy is concerned with the qualitative and quantitative development of these means through capital or research and technological procedures. Furthermore, Grand strategy does not merely deal with the sustenance, development, and application of material means towards a national security goal but also focuses on building and expanding legitimacy and soft power necessary for the implementation of formulated Grand Strategy (ibid.). Layton in this way differentiates it from strategy, statecraft, and foreign policy without giving any definitions of the latter two. Layton argues that in Grand Strategy, the means used are comprehensive, ranging from Political, ethical to diplomatic and industrial. Harold Lasswell, however, focuses on four policy instruments namely information, economics, military, and diplomacy. All these sets of policy instruments do not operate in isolation but are integrated into a cohesive formulation making Grand Strategy an integrative concept. In this integrative concept, elements are interdependent in a way that changes in one produces the change in the overall nature of Grand Strategy understood as a system of these elements. Layton asserts that Grand Strategy as a system can be understood as the complex whole of its parts, not as a set of disaggregated units (ibid.). Grand Strategy provides coherence and symbolic meaning to a policy.

Layton further adds to the scope of Grand Strategy by asserting that in the conceptual sense, Grand Strategy seeks to establish a preferred order of the future. As Stephen Mertz argues, Grand Strategy entails order extended in the time-space milieu and seeks to impose orderliness and stability. In this way, Layton asserts that Grand Strategy involves taking planned series of actions in the light of a preferred world order in future.

The approach of Peter Layton is clear when he seeks to demystify Grand Strategy. His approach is distinctively economic which aims to channelize this understanding to suggest Grand Strategy as policymaking approach that aims at optimal utilization to

declining resources for a particular objective to establish a preferred order of the future. In his article, he tried to project how the idea of Grand Strategy is ‘grander’ than what we perceive as Strategy.

6.4 Conceptual extension of Grand Strategy

Apart from the questions like what is Grand Strategy, why do we need it? We also need to investigate in what forms, the Grand Strategy operates or exists. These forms may also be termed as a conceptual extension of the Grand Strategy as they provide diversity to the idea.

6.4.1 Grand Strategy: Strategy or a Policy?

The question of whether Grand Strategy is a strategy or a policy comes from her discussion of Liddell Hart idea of Grand Strategy as a ‘higher form of strategy.’ However, this raises a question- Is Grand Strategy a strategy or a policy? Strategy is defined by Clausewitz as “use of engagement for the object (or the purpose) of war produced by individual agents like commanders” which is distinct from policy which defines these ‘objects of war’ which is ambiguously defined as state’s interests with no account of who defined it and how do they come into being (Silove 2017: 9). Liddell Hart deals with this question by broadening the definition of strategy and creating a link with strategy by defining Grand Strategy as “policy in execution.” He argues that Grand Strategy not merely deal with state’s interest rather it is a plan to win a war or to establish peace hence it is akin to strategy but only greater (as it moves beyond the mere military aspect). Greg Foster argues that Grand Strategy provides an overarching guide and framework where foreign and domestic policy can fit. He defines Grand Strategy as “mosaic into which specific pieces of policies fit. It provides the key ingredient of coherency, clarity, and consistency over time”. Presence of Grand Strategy ensures that goals and objectives of subordinate levels become narrow and precise (Foster cited in Layton 2012: 59).

6.4.2 Grand Strategy as a plan

Grand Strategy as a deliberate plan devised by leaders is one understanding of Grand Strategy (Silove 2017: 9). Scholars like Stephen Walt refer to Grand Strategy as

“A plan to make itself secure. Grand Strategy identifies the objectives that must be achieved to produce security and describes the political and military actions that are believed to lead to this goal” (Ibid.).

Stephen D Krasner also refers to it as a plan which designs the diplomatic, bureaucratic, ideational, economic and military resources to be allocated for specific policies. Grand Strategy here is conceptualized as a grand plan (Silove 2017: 12). Silove argues that grand plans reflect the effort of leaders to “translate state’s interests into goals, establish the idea of priority within these goals” and allocating means to achieve them (Silove 2017: 23).

6.4.3 Grand Strategy as a principle

The second idea of Grand Strategy is conceptualized as Grand Strategy as a grand principle(s). Silove argues that scholars who believe in this idea of Grand Strategy are against the idea of Grand Strategy as plans. The idea of Grand Strategy as a principle can include a framework, strategic culture, foreign policy doctrines, ideological worldview shared by leaders. The examples are the strategy of containment practiced by the USA against USSR during the Cold War (Silove 2017: 14). Scholars engaging with this understanding of Grand Strategy either investigate the Grand Strategy of leaders or present prescription over what should be the Grand Strategy (Silove 2017: 15-16). She defines grand principles as overarching ideas held by leaders or parties that determines the long-term goal and state priorities over resources to realize that goal (Silove 2017: 23). Venkatshamy also presents a similar understanding of Grand Strategy as a ‘vision’ which he calls “mental representation of strategy in the mind of leaders” (Venkatshamy 2012: 115). He argues that Grand Strategy as a vision allows bureaucratic flexibility to adjust to situations. The vision that provides better hope for future is different from a plan as unlike the plan which is factual and analytical; the vision may connect to people at an emotional level as charismatic leader acts as the glue that binds diverse interests and can incite painful sacrifices for the fulfillment of that ideal. An example in this regard would be Mao, Hitler, and Gandhi. This vision has to be supplemented by institutional competence and resources to be materialized into a Grand Strategy. The success of such Grand Strategy shall also depend upon the quality of the vision, resource management and institutional robustness (Venkatshamy 2012: 116).

6.4.4 Grand Strategy as behaviour

Scholars using the concept of Grand Strategy as grand behaviour studies the consistency of behaviour of a state. Silove argues that scholars working with this

concept considers the presence of plan or organizing principle irrelevant to the study of Grand strategy. They study and analyze a series of decisions taken by the state over a period which gets developed into a pattern (Silove 2017: 17). As the state does not prioritize resources to fulfill the objective through a deliberate plan or principle, it may exhibit certain pattern which shows what objectives receive relatively greater resource allocation than others. In this way, we can identify the objectives as well as Grand Strategy of a state (Silove 2017: 23).

6.4.5 Grand Strategy as a political project

Venkatshamy argues that the formulation of Grand Strategy is a political activity which involves negotiations with various stakeholders who would lobby for primacy for their interests. He argues that various stakeholders have competing goals, the varied perception of reality and they operate in the strategic environment where resources are finite hence the actual strategies will not be an outcome of rational decision making rather would emerge out from hard bargaining and negotiations (Venkatshamy 2012: 116).

6.5 Characteristics of Grand Strategy

Silove argues that despite the divergences in various concepts of Grand Strategy, there is a consensus over the presence of means and ends. She argues that each concept embodies a long-term scope which is explicit by Liddell Hart assertion that the Grand Strategy should extend from present war to future peace and also Kennedy's assertion that the policies evolved should operate for decades. Silove argues that through this way Grand Strategy which is determinate and specific differs from Foreign Policy which is "temporally indeterminate" (Silove 2017: 19-20).

The second characteristic is Grand Strategy is holistic in nature as it deploys "all resources" that includes political, military, economic, diplomatic, bureaucratic, ideational and moral elements for particular ends (ibid.). Venkatshamy argues that harmonization of means and ends is an essential characteristic of Grand Strategy. This harmonization would not always be based on rational calculations as a strategic culture; value preferences will also influence the content of the Grand Strategy and the pattern of resource allocation (Venkatshamy 2012: 118).

The third characteristic of Grand Strategy is concerned with making trade-offs to secure the most vital of state's interests- security and protection of sovereignty. Although Grand Strategy also deals with secondary interests like economic prosperity, acquisition of territories, global hegemony and others. It involves compromises with what the state perceives as lesser interests (Silove 2017: 20-21).

The fourth characteristic of Grand Strategy is "its inseparability of internal and external dimension" which makes it different from Foreign Policy (Venkatshamy 2012: 123).

The fifth characteristic is the involvement of content as well as the process in Grand Strategy. Venkatshamy argues that Grand Strategy not merely involves a plan, principle or behaviour but also the allocation of work, institutional responsibilities, and measures to realize the goal (ibid.)

The sixth characteristic is Grand Strategy involves analysis as well as synthesis. The analysis of the international realities aids us in the formulation, but it does not stop there. Formulation of Grand Strategy involves a synthesis between means and ends, internal and external, instruments and values and past and futures under a coherent framework. This syncretic nature makes Grand Strategy interdisciplinary (ibid.). Feaver (2009) argues that academic study of Grand Strategy is interdisciplinary in nature because it brings together military history (what did we do? What happened along with its causes), political science and International relations (Foreign policy understanding), Economics (how can we use resources judiciously to produce efficient policy outcomes) and others. The study of Grand strategy enhances the relevance of history, makes political science more concrete, provides a public policy with broader context to operate with and makes economics more security oriented. The study of Grand Strategy, Feaver argues, provides an opportunity to blend in together the theories in academics to the real world of policy and practice.

The seventh characteristic of Grand Strategy is its political nature. The formulation of Grand Strategy involves various political contestations from different stakeholders who have different views over resource allocation or mission fulfillment. The implementation and formulation of Grand Strategy involves co-optation of these interests (Venkatshamy 2012: 124)

Finally, Venkatshamy argues that the absence of grand strategy does not reflect in any way the absence of strategic thinking. Grand strategy, Venkatshamy argues is a mere

reflection of reality, not the reality itself and merely having a document on Grand Strategy does not warrant desirable results as shown in cases on Iraq War and Eisenhower's NSC-68 (Venkatshamy 2012: 124). Venkatshamy in this way appears to be responding to George K Tanham 1992 iconic conclusion that India cannot think strategically.

6.6 What not is Grand Strategy?

Silove argues that plan principle or behaviour that doesn't give us the idea of the long-term goal or the purposeful allocation of means to achieve a goal can be a non-grand plan, principle or behaviour. Furthermore, if the plan principle or behaviour does not comply with the principle of holism, then it would be classified as sectorial (Foreign, military, economic) policy (Silove 2017: 24).

Layton presents two alternative policy instruments which are examples of non- Grand Strategy policy formulation namely Risk Management and opportunism. Opportunism as a policy tool takes into cognizance the changing nature of the international system so that states can thus accordingly tweak their policies and measures. It is a situation based policy measure and unlike Grand strategy that evolves slowly; opportunistic strategy is instantaneous and reactive. Layton provides examples of post-Meiji Restoration Japan and Australia government of (1996-2007) (Layton 2012: 59). It is interesting to look at whether certain responses of the Indian State towards certain internal security crisis were reactive or were part of a comprehensive Grand Strategy. Second policy instrument is risk management that aims at absorbing the external stress that influences the capabilities of a state during a crisis and formulating measure to recover quickly to the original form. All of the other policy instrument are means oriented whereas Grand Strategy is end oriented (Layton 2012: 60). Layton in his article does not talk about the synthesis between these policy instruments.

6.7 The relevance of Grand Strategy

Venkatshamy notes that the demand for the articulation of Grand Strategy is based on many reasons. He argues that the Grand strategy would help many institutions and departments coordinate their short term and long term plan keeping in mind the grand Idea or a vision. Secondly, such articulation can provide a basis for the prioritisation of resources and promote focused research on issues identified as core interests of the nation; thirdly with an articulation of a common national intent, institutions and

departments will get a basis for sound coordination and goals that can be efficiently achieved; fourthly it helps citizens to evaluate whether their actions and views are in alignment with National interest; Finally Venkatshamy argues that articulation of Grand Strategy is useful in informing and educating the strategic leadership (Venkatshamy 2012: 113)

Edelstein and Krebs provide a critique of Grand Strategy through their understanding of Grand Strategy as a plan. They note that producing a National Security Strategy document has been 'a ritual' in the US followed from 1986. The production of such document is aimed at providing transparency to citizens, allies and other countries about the intention and goals of the United States and its proposed direction to achieve them. Edelstein and Kerbs argue that this document is assumed to play a role in reducing the uncertainty that looms round in International politics. Since the drafting of such document involves a search for insecurities and lack of democratic inclusion of meritorious views in the framing, The US is rather better off without any such 'strategizing.' The important reason for this is the fact that 'it is impossible to strategize' in the constantly changing global scenario and the United States lack complete knowledge of its threats and its interests too would not remain consistent over time. The cost-benefit analysis of strategies is difficult to wide subjectivity over subjectivity and conflicting understanding by analysts' from across the spectrum.

Edelstein and Krebs also shed light on the fact that charting out Grand Strategy involve post-ad-hoc rationalization as deviations are purposely ignored to map the 'strategy.' The National Security Strategy document maybe intended to ensure transparency about the intention of US to its allies and foes but authors make a valid point that in International politics, such plans and documents are not sufficient to win the trust. The political aspect of strategy comes across as a major limitation of this process as the dominant and influential voices go on to muzzle the meritorious opinions during the formulation of a strategy. The list of threats and strategy listed in these security documents is often so broad and vague that actual success and failure assessment becomes very difficult. Authors point out that this vagueness in the document demonstrates the unpredictability of world order which cannot be passed on as flexibility (Edelstein and Krebs 2015).

Edelstein and Krebs argue that strategizing is more dangerous than helpful as scrounging for threat increases their visibility turning possible threats into real ones. The safe and benign international environment is made to appear as full of possible but not probable threats, causing collective insecurity rather than providing a sense of security. They note that if aggressive steps are designed to curb these threats, fear of escalation will always linger in the system. Edelstein and Krebs, therefore, provide with assessment based on realist understanding of world order while also pointing out that hawkish realism will do more harm than good. In place of grand strategy, Edelstein and Krebs promote 'pragmatism' which will carry the element of pluralism for promoting multiple narratives over an issue, not a single hawkish traditional line that a country would have been following; the second element will be focusing on specific challenges and will explore experimental and creative out of the box policies for proper resolution of the issue which cannot be provided by a single narrative espoused by a policy document. Finally, for a robust democracy, the accountability should be expressed not through a 'ritual' of publication of a piece of document that hides more than it reveals but by a stronger press and more interaction between policymakers and citizens.

Hal Brands and Patrick Porter critiques the 'narrow reductionist view' of Grand Strategy which underestimates the value and ranges of strategy. Brands and Porter argue that the alternative provided by Edelstein and Krebs of 'pragmatism' is not only flawed but it is also an example of a Grand Strategy. Brands and Porter differ from Edelstein and Krebs conceptualization of Grand Strategy as formal planning process by presenting a broad idea of Grand Strategy as a 'guiding intellectual framework.' Although the authors realize that preparation of a Grand Strategy is an onerous task, it is still better than 'Grand strategy nihilism' (Brands and Porter 2015). The shortcoming of Edelstein and Krebs analysis is their understanding of just basic 'ritual' (drafting of National Security Strategy) or a process which leads to the conflation of their dislike to a particular ritual of strategy with a dislike of the concept of strategy. Brands and Porter promote their idea-centric notion of Grand Strategy by arguing that it is an 'ecological worldview' which gets influenced by experiences, ideology, culture, values- to create an ideal balance between resources and objectives. They argue that it not merely a 'detailed roadmap to desired destination' but 'set of core ideas' that lends coherence to the policy and provides practitioners with a set of values which can or cannot be compromised in the light of unfavourable international events. Brands and Porter

specify that Grand Strategy comprises of basic parameters which encompass efforts to react to shocks, contingency options and priorities in the time of crisis to ultimately fulfill the long-term objectives.

While Edelstein and Krebs promote pragmatism by advocating dealing crisis on their terms with creating an overall strategy, Brands and Porter argue that in such cases, it would be difficult as the pragmatism that is being advocated by Edelstein and Krebs doesn't help us in setting priorities and provides direction whether US response to particular crisis be more active or peripheral. The model of pragmatic restraint that Edelstein and Krebs espouse is another form of Grand Strategy (as the restraint is a part of a defensive Grand Strategy). Brands and Porter thereby assert that abandoning strategy is not prudent instead we should learn to strategize better by assumption testing, devising contingency plans, learning from experience and in other ways.

6.8 Barriers to the formulation of Grand Strategy

The formulation of Grand Strategy is not an easy task. The first barrier that Venkatshamy notes is the lack of conceptual clarity regarding Grand Strategy. As we have noticed in the earlier sections that since the majority of military leaders provided the intellectual resource to the concept of Grand Strategy, there is lack of universally accepted definition of Grand Strategy as every military official or analyst would bring in his/her own experiences into the articulation of the concept. However, this barrier can be overcome by carving out areas of agreements and contestations to make the concept not too broad. Silove has provided us with much-needed guidance by giving us three concepts of Grand Strategy which will give liberty to scholars to deploy these ideas to make sense of the Grand strategy

The second barrier Venkatshamy notes are the actual practical complications that might occur during the formulation of a Grand Strategy. For example in a certain strategic environment, the formulation of Grand Strategy would take into account diverse and often conflicting views of various stakeholders. There will be competing interests vying to influence the Grand Strategy in a way that it suits their interests and in countries like India, the differences between stakeholders would be enduring and persisting. Grand Strategy, in this case, would not be neat. It would be full of compromises which would substantially weaken the idea of preferred future that we identified in Layton's understanding (Venkatshamy 2012: 117). Although Venkatshamy sees it as a barrier, I

would consider it an advantage to have a compromise between conflicting ideas when we analyze the case of Kashmir. In the war-torn area of Kashmir, a Grand Strategy that ignores the views and aspirations of the stockholders would not yield desirable results. If we want a notion of lasting peace, Grand Strategy should emerge out of compromises.

The third barrier comes in the form of thinking that problematizes the task of formulating the Grand Strategy itself. It is similar to the argument presented by Layton and Edelstein and Krebs, but the approach of Venkatshamy is more critical than Layton. Instead of providing opportunism as an alternative as Layton does, Venkatshamy presents it as a critique. He argues that formulating a grand strategy as a pre-determined prescriptive modulus operandi would be counterproductive due to the changing nature of the International system. Venkatshamy argues that the understanding of Grand Strategy to reduce ambiguity and facilitate understanding of reality is risky, as the strategic action would require to counter specific crisis with innovation, reinterpretations of reality, deviation and completely novel responses (Venkatshamy 2012: 120). It might be interesting to note that if the Grand Strategy is not rigid, one would also incorporate innovation without deviating from the Grand Strategy itself.

6.9 Indian Grand Strategy

It would be ideal also to mention why India needs a study of Grand Strategy. The rationale of such a study is present in the book co-edited by Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit and V. Krishnappa titled *India Grand Strategy: History, Theory, cases*. In the introduction of the book, the authors presented five reasons- Firstly a research in the realm of strategic culture and Grand Strategy would aim at correction of the view that India has no strategic thinking which was the major conclusion of Tanham work titled 'Indian strategic thought'; Secondly India as a rising power is an object of curiosity for other nations and a possible roadmap for the third world; Thirdly Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa argue that through the analysis of Indian grand strategic thought and practice, we may be in a better position to understand what India did in the past and what it is doing presently and highlight continuity and divergence; Fourthly it would offer a comparative analysis of the relative merits of different grand strategies; and finally referring to its academic value, authors argued that the writings on grand strategy are not just interesting for their insights into the past, present, and future of Indian policy but also for what they reveal about Indian political thought thus pointing out an obvious

conclusion that India has a rich heritage to draw on in conceptualizing a Grand Strategy (Bajpai, S.Basit and V.Krishnappa 2014).

This book is path-breaking because it challenges the famous assertion of George K Tanham that India cannot think strategically. George Tanham (1992) in his essay *Indian Strategic thought* identifies four distinct elements which explain the lack of Indian Strategic culture in India. Indian Geography which assumes Indian subcontinent as 'Single strategic entity' therefore generates inward-looking perspective; Lack of political unity manifested in its view of history; Hindu culture which is riddled with fatalism and view of afterlife that stunts future planning and strategic thinking and finally British rule which brought its geopolitical concepts like naval security, buffer states and core-periphery within Indian subcontinent (Tanham 1992). Tanham's assertions are criticised by scholars like Waheguru Pal Singh, Varun Sahni, and Amitabh Mattoo on various methodological grounds in the different chapter of the book titled '*Securing India; Strategic thought and Practice*' co-edited by Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo in 1996. Bajpai, Basit and Krishnappa through their volume on Indian Grand Strategy bring together essays on Grand Strategic ideas and practices in Indian epics – Ramayana and Mahabharata through the work of Swarna Rajagopalan; Mughal India (Akbar) through historical investigation of Jayashree Vivekanandan ; and Modern India through analysis of liberal interventions in colonial military institution by Srinath Raghavan. The rest of the volume provides vital case studies to present a large array of diversity in Indian Strategic thinking and practices.

We use the term grand strategy to mean the combination of national resources and capabilities — military, diplomatic, political, economic, cultural and moral — that are deployed in the service of national security. National security has an external and an internal component. Our use of grand strategy refers therefore to both external and internal security. (Bajpai, S.Basit and V.Krishnappa 2014: 1)

Indian interventions in the field of Grand Strategy has been enriching for the discipline of Grand Strategy. With a potential for a large scope of academic research, their work deals with the external dimension of Grand Strategy. I intend to turn the lens inward and explore how this concept can explain Indian strategic response to the insurgency in Kashmir.

6.10 Turning the lens inwards. Existing views on Indian counterinsurgency strategy

The first question that demands an immediate inquiry Is turning the lens inwards even possible? I would answer in affirmative. Since the core concern of formulation of Grand Strategy is ensuring security among (among other reasons), securing India from internal threats is as important as securing India from external aggression.

The insurgency in Kashmir that broke out in 1988-89 was not the first insurgency that India has faced since its independence in 1947. Routray argues that the state's response to the armed rebellious has wrestled with the question that should India resort to the direct elimination of insurgents or should it try to bring them into the mainstream by proving them alluring political deals? Secondly, should India follow conflict management via development strategy or security concerns should be primary (Routray 2017: 58).

Rajesh Rajagopalan (2009) notes that in most cases the big states lose the fights in guerrilla warfare, India's record in maintaining normalcy and keeping the intensity down in insurgencies in India has been impressive. India has managed to end the Mizo insurgency and has managed to keep threshold of violence in Nagaland at a minimum. The reason that Indian experience is worthy of emulation is that India has managed to impose normalcy without resorting to "strategy of Barbarism" and sought political compromises after careful use of the military to bring rebellious groups to table. By putting forth the condition that secession is not an option, India has managed to reach some arrangement with them by proving autonomous councils, providing separate statehood and space for self -rule to rebellious leaders. While dealing with these insurgencies, India has tactically refrained from using heavy artillery and aerial bombing vastly used by the USA in Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Iraq, so that possibility of political settlements in the later period is not eroded.

Naga insurgency grew in intensity in the mid-1950s, Nehru refused the application of air strikes, and heavy artillery as the objective of Indian state was not to beat them into submission but reach towards political compromises. Naga Hills-Tuensang Area (NHTA) was carved out from Assam in December 1957 and in 1963, a separate state of Nagaland was created. The Indian state has tactfully kept alive the internal dissension within the rebelling group which kept Naga insurgency under control. Similarly, in

Mizoram, the air strikes were used once to recapture the villages taken over by Mizo National Front led by Laldenga in 1966. Despite the sole incident, any further use of air strike and heavy artillery was discouraged, and political compromises were given priority. Mizoram was given the status of Union territory in 1972, and it achieved complete statehood with its separate legislature in 1986 after Laldenga- Rajiv Accord (Rajagoplan 2009).

Following from Indian experiences, the Indian rules of engagement have demonstrated the following features. Firstly there is a clearly identifiable counterinsurgency force which is demonstrated by leadership of army in dealing with insurgency in Mizoram and proactive role of security forces and state Police in dealing with insurgencies in Tripura, Andra Pradesh, and Punjab; secondly Indian counterinsurgency forces adopted the WHAM approach in insurgency-ridden areas- Punjab to reduce terrorist legitimacy and village reorganization to limit the space of operation for militants; Thirdly apart from Mizoram, India has avoided the use of heavy artillery and finally, the counterinsurgency operations were executed keeping in mind the necessity of political resolution as the final solution of the issue. Routray argues that although insurgency supported by external forces were dealt with heavy-handedness, the option of negotiation was kept open (Routray 2017:68-69). He argues that these principles created the enabling condition of reducing violence in these different theatres and whether they form part of predetermined COIN doctrine is harder to guess (ibid.). However, India does have a grand strategy premised on these ‘rules of engagement’ (Routray 2017: 75).

Rajagopalan observes these cases and argues that Indian approach towards counterinsurgency reflects a larger “political grand strategy” where limited military force is utilized to curb the violence, and political concessions are made for a permanent resolution of the set of issues that led to the insurgency (Rajagopalan 2009).

6.11 Grand Strategy vs. grand strategy

The more comprehensive nature of Grand Strategy differentiates it with grand strategy⁴². Rajesh Rajagopalan in his article *Force and Compromise: Indian Counterinsurgency Grand Strategy* argues that If any task of formulating a counterinsurgency Grand Strategy has to be taken, political compromise and the limited

⁴² With smaller g


use of force would be their key elements (Rajagopalan 2007: 75). In this essay, although Rajagopalan deals with the theories of Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, he does not deal with the theory of Grand Strategy at all leaving the reader wondering in what way Rajagopalan is conceptualizing Grand Strategy and how these two assertions fit into it. From the observation of definitions of Grand Strategy presented in the first section, we may note that the characterization of Rajagopalan and Routray is limited to the analysis of political and military ingredients of Grand Strategy. I present the analysis on Kashmir by dealing with military and political in a more detailed manner along with adding some other dimensions that are present in the definitions we discussed above.

6.12 Indian Grand Strategy in Kashmir

Yes, India has a Grand Strategy in Kashmir because it fulfills all the necessary conditions. Firstly Indian strategy is future-oriented and as we have observed that Indian state deploys different gradients of military, political, economic, diplomatic and doctrinal dimensions collectively to reveal traits that we ascribe to the concept of Grand Strategy.

I would define Grand Strategy as a purposive and strategic ensemble of doctrinal, military, political, economic and diplomatic dimensions operating in an integrative way in a particular gradient envisaged by the political leadership, aimed at a definitive end. This end is the goal of sustained security and peace. This conceptualization does justice with the concept of Grand Strategy in all its grandness. In our previous chapters, we have analysed different strategies of India in Kashmir. Grand Strategy as a concept brings structure to these approaches by ascribing to them a future-oriented goal. The understanding of the concept of Grand Strategy also tells us that different dimensions of Indian strategic response interact with each other at all times. As the Grand Strategic formulation becomes more efficient and goal-specific, many other components like doctrinal, bureaucratic, etc. can emerge which can provide depth to the Grand Strategy.

Figure 2 Figurative representation of operation of a Grand Strategy



Chapter 7

Conclusion

In our previous chapters, we have ascertained the character of the crisis in Kashmir. The Kashmir is plagued by modern insurgency which deploys a wide range of tactics from terrorism to non-violence. The modern insurgency that aspires for secession and separate statehood also solicits international support by harping on human rights violation of the state and selling the visuals and tales of oppression at the global platforms. The Modern insurgency also solicits economic and political support from the other nations in the name of religion and morality to undermine the state externally along with waging an insurgency internally. We have analysed the multidimensional nature of Kashmir insurgency as well as Indian strategic response to Kashmir insurgency which reflects towards an incoherent Grand Strategy. Let's recapitulate our arguments to answer central research questions.

7.1 Military/Armed dimension

Through the chapter in Indian armed responses to the insurgency in Kashmir, we came to know that initial responses of Indian security forces (and later Indian army) have mostly been traditional. After the outbreak of insurgency in 1988, the security forces actions (CRPF and BSF) aimed at the penetration of militant strongholds like Sopore and Anantnag through the adoption of tactics like area clearance, area domination, and cordon and search operation to weed out militants. After securing the area, BSF would install bunkers and guard the area. The growing cross-border infiltration was recognized as the major reason for radicalization and rising violence hence Indian Army enforced formidable grid to curb infiltrations and security forces along with Police targeted the militancy within Kashmir. Although security forces and Police registered high numbers of militant eliminations, their stint essentially failed due to high officers and civilian casualties furthermore, they were easily and frequently outmaneuvered by the terrorist organizations which led to rising alienation among the people.

Indian army entered the valley with a fresh strategy. Indian army conducted 'psych-ops' to avoid casualties and counter the tactics of militants. Indian army developed

synergy with Police and security forces to ambush militants in less densely populated areas thereby reducing civilian casualties. Unlike the other security forces whose strategy was populating the area with a large footfall of soldiers, Indian army conducted its operations in a small team where strategy formulation happened at the lowest level without any rigid command structure. Indian army was forefront in pursuing WHAM approach to reduce resentment against India in Kashmir through assistance in civic works like snow clearance, bridge construction and initiation of a project known as 'Operation Sadbhavana' and worked to counter anti-India propaganda through project *Sangam, Ujala, and Maitree*. Indian army has demonstrated its uneasiness in fighting with its own people which led to the formation of counterinsurgency unit of Indian army known as Rashtriya Rifles. Indian army units have also taken offensive operations across Line of Control which were touted as 'surgical strikes' by Indian media and army.

In the current scenario, Rashtriya Rifles, security forces, and J&K Police have been proactive in combing out militants through operation All Out. The unique aspect of this operation is it is not merely muscular in nature but also persuasive as it appealed to militants to surrender and return to their families. The families of militants were asked to post heartfelt appeals to their sons to return. As the infiltrations are being curbed and militant's life career cycle being reduced considerably, Indian armed response is perceived as successful in policy circles, but the statistics and factual arguments do not provide the complete picture.

Limits: we have argued in the chapter on Indian military responses that incidents of enforced disappearances, custodial torture, and deaths, regular frisking, use of disproportionate force along with the blatant denial of justice has alienated the people. The historical memory of oppression instilled in the minds of locals through tales of massacre and rapes stays fresh when Indian forces remind them through a newer set of traumatic memories. As we witness the attendance of thousands of locals in the funerals of slain militants and rising numbers of militant recruitment, we should re-evaluate the success of Indian military response. Indian army and media presume protestors to be over ground workers of terrorists and a section of Kashmiris perceive Indian security forces as the occupying force. This bridge in perception is the major limitation of India's military strategy,

7.2 Political Dimension

Indian political strategy in Kashmir has been different than what was followed in case of Nagaland and Mizoram. Indian state agreed to provide them with autonomy while denying it in the case of Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir, as we know, is sought after by Pakistan hence by following the dictates of realism, Indian state established proxy government in Jammu and Kashmir for decades so that any regional leader does not now utilize anti-India vocabulary for his political gains; the one used by Sheikh Abdullah. Since Indian state was distrustful of regional leaders, it persistently engaged in electoral manipulations and weakening of opposition parties in the state. Due to the lack of political space to readdress the grievances and the hollowing out of institutions of the state, there was widespread political alienation in the state. After the elections of 1987, the insurgency broke out, and it was decided that stability in Kashmir cannot be established through military alone.

Central government at New Delhi devised ways to rationalize the armed response so that when the times of elections arrive, people should completely reject the democratic offer. To counter the rising alienation, various standard operating procedures were adopted in 1994 so that human rights violations are curbed; Secondly, India is releasing important leaders who were jailed after the protests against rigged elections and finally following the traditional counterinsurgency prescription, India managed to conduct elections in 1996.

Through our analysis, we can point out some important elements of Indian political strategy in Kashmir

1. The successful organization of free and fair elections in the state and ensuring a high percentage of voter turnout to depict the favourable mood of Jammu, Ladakh, and Kashmiris for India.
2. Refusal to recognize Kashmir issue as a political dispute along with the proposal of resolution of political problems within the ambit of Indian constitution.
3. Complementing the armed responses with initiatives like Surrender and Rehabilitation policy, monetary and employment incentives to create fissions in the militant organization and bring the boys (locals) back into the mainstream.

4. The strategic announcement of Non-Initiation of Combat Operation (NICO) popularly known as ceasefire to initiate dialogue.
5. The sequential dismantling of Article 370 through the extension of laws to Jammu and Kashmir. Although revocation of Article 370 has been objective of BJP, the non-BJP governments were responsible for tuning article 370 into an empty shell. It reflects the objective of Kashmir's complete and unchallenged integration with India. Although Jan Sangh (later BJP) and other right-wing parties have been vocal in raising this issue, Congress too has silently worked towards the same objective.

Indian political strategy also revolves around providing token confidence-building measures which have often come in the form of withdrawal of court cases (Amnesty to stone pelters in 2017), the release of separatists from jails on Islamic festivals and others. However, most of the time, separatists' leaders are put under house arrest or are arrested under PSA immediately after their release.

The political and military aspect is linked through operation of coercive laws in the state. The AF(J&K)SPA and PSA provide forces with special powers which allows them to carry out their missions with impunity and keep the disturbing elements into incarceration as long as the state wishes. Lt General (Retired) Syed Ata Hasnain defends the application of AFSPA because the extra powers bestowed on army are necessary to break the back of the insurgency. He argues that protection clause⁴³ in AFSPA is inserted because the other central protective laws are not applicable to J&K and since the protective clause has withstood the scrutiny of Supreme Court of India hence it cannot be termed as extra-constitutional. Furthermore, Indian army cadets are trained in human rights and religiously follows Do's and Don'ts issued by Supreme Court of India in its review of AFSPA in 1997 (Hasnain 2018). Since no charges have ever been proved against Indian army, no punishment has been given, and no injustice has been served. Hasnain makes all these claims while rubbishing away the UN report on Human rights violation in Kashmir published in June 2018.

Kashmir is also used as a mobilizing point in the parliamentary elections. As the Kashmir becomes a theatre where parties influence votes and the media broadcasts the

⁴³ This clause in Armed Forces Special Powers Act prevents soldiers from prosecution unless the prosecution is approved by the Central Government.

propaganda, it involves dehumanization of Kashmiris as their death and suffering are not considered worthy enough to be discussed in the prime time of Indian news channel. By projecting itself as a strong state by killing or blinding stone pelters working at the behest of Pakistan, BJP seeks to secure domestic support for winning elections. Since any initiative of dialogue will dub Indian state as weak and soft, such initiatives would not be well received by voters in India, and hence the choice to go soft is not available to BJP.

Limits: Indian political strategy is inflicted with a broad sense of insecurity in its political engagement with Kashmir. The Indian approach has been to deal with ordinary political issues in Kashmir with extraordinary measures. India has been averse to any discussions on providing autonomy to the region. India carried systematic dilution of article 370 of the Indian constitution which protected the special status of Kashmir. With no signs of withdrawal of AFSPA and PSA, Indian democracy takes an exception post-Banihal.

7.3 Doctrinal dimension.

7.3.1 Military doctrine

Routray notes that the academic work on the discussion on Indian COIN strategy has focused primarily on Indian experience in countering insurgency in North East India and Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka. Indian counterinsurgency doctrine in a document form is present in the form of 'Doctrine of sub-conventional Operation issued by Indian army in 2006. Routray asserts that since apart from Assam Rifles and Rashtriya Rifles which are wings of the Indian army, it is security forces (para-military) forces along with local Police forces who have been involved in the majority of counterinsurgency operations in India and there is no counterinsurgency doctrine issued by them (Routray 2017: 59). He traces three streams of thoughts over a discussion on COIN doctrine in India. The first stream is represented by authors like Rajesh Rajagopalan who argue that major counterinsurgency operations were devoid of any doctrine hence we should use the term 'political grand strategy' to trace India's consistency of actions dealing with insurgencies at home. The second stream of thought argues that India does have a COIN doctrine although in a vague form. Routray traces work of Harinder Singh to put forward his ideas on India's COIN doctrine. He argues that Indian COIN doctrine is Nehruvian as it believes in pacification and not in use of force; secondly, it is also

influenced by British counterinsurgency experience in Malay which leads another scholar Jafa to conclude that Indian doctrine shows conservative bias (ibid.). The third group of scholars argues that it is “neither possible nor desirable’ to form Counterinsurgency doctrine as it would limit innovation and create a standard of evaluation which would negatively affect the counterinsurgency campaign (Routray 2017: 60).

Dipankar Banerjee analyses the documents to deduce Indian COIN doctrine as he is satisfied that there is a doctrine present. Banerjee argues that the doctrines of Counterinsurgency warfare have been developed by India through its various experiences of countering insurgencies after independence. The doctrine in his interpretation is the ensemble of principles, guidelines, and ideas evolved to counterinsurgency (Banerjee 2009: 189). He argues that a doctrine facilitates combat readiness by establishing a standardized mode of objective completion and provides a reference for strategy development. He cites Indian military army definition of military doctrine as

“formal expression of military knowledge and thought that army accepts as relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of army for such conflicts and methods of engaging in them to achieve success” (Indian army 2004 cited in Banerjee 2009: 190).

The doctrine has a direct link to strategy as doctrine provides the guidelines for action which is fine-tuned for different strategic contexts through a strategy which makes strategy a contextual application of doctrine (ibid.). Banerjee states that Doctrine of Subconventional Operations (DSCO) provides limitation of use of force, establishes a relationship between civilian and military authority and guides military priorities about resource allocation in equipment procurement, special training (ibid.).

Alongside DSCO, the major pillars of the doctrine were inspired from various case studies of counterinsurgency across the world especially British tactic in Malaya insurgency and writings of Mao on guerrilla war. The first and the most fundamental pillar of Indian army counterinsurgency doctrine is realizing the political nature of the insurgency. The armed forces operate by keeping this principle in mind. The second pillar is the isolation of militants from the local population. The combing operations and cordon and search operations are an offshoot of this element. The third pillar is area domination which is exercised through covering the disturbed area with a large number

of troops. Rajagopalan argues that this is done to overawe the militants to showcase the magnitude of the strength of the state and the impossibility of their victory (Rajagopalan 2009).

Indian army's encounter with insurgency produced a set of ideas and principles which guided the counterinsurgency operations. Banerjee argues that COIN operations are fought on multiple fronts including social, military, economic, psychological. Military response would not suffice in subduing insurgency. A military response is undertaken to destroy the political organization that sustains the insurgency. Banerjee argues that unlike conventional war where the number of casualties determines the victory, in an insurgency the victory is determined by the extent to which minds and hearts are won of the local population. Only after winning the hearts and minds, any political initiative can take place (Banerjee 2009: 197). Avoidance of civilian casualty becomes the primary objective of any counterinsurgency operation.

Limits

In this section, I will argue how these principles are not being followed in Kashmir. Although Routray provides a general description of how nonadherence to these principles have led to protracted conflicts, I will add India's COIN experience in Kashmir to supplement his narrative and shed more light on the nature of Grand Strategy in Kashmir.

With Police force not being acting at the forefront, the Army operating simultaneously with security forces and State Police force creates challenges in coordination (Routray 2017: 71). We have noted in previous chapters that State intelligence and military intelligence vied for information and often counteracted each other. Although there is better coordination now between Rashtriya Rifles of Indian army and Police forces, the presence of single leading counterinsurgency force which should be in the form of local Police comprising of locals who could deal with the insurgency with more empathy and in a more culturally permissible way.

Secondly, the WHAM approach in the form of Operation Sadbhavana in Jammu and Kashmir has been launched where armed forces try to build a bond with the locals by providing them with amenities like skill development centres, medical facilities, and others. However, Routray points out that assignment of civic tasks to the army undermines the mandate and purpose of the civil authority. This tactic makes the army

as ‘real government of conflict-ridden areas’ (Routray 2017: 71). In case of Kashmir too, we have seen in the section on ‘Durbhavna in Operation Sadbhavana’ that how land is usurped of Kashmiris under the rhetoric of security and how a narrative and moral justification of permanent presence of the army in Kashmir is provided.

Thirdly, although the use of heavy artillery is avoided, the Indian state has been indulging in large-scale human rights violation. Indian army has also used Armed Forces Special Powers Act with impunity which has created deep dissatisfaction amongst the Kashmiris. Routray notes that is a shift from ‘population-centric’ measures to ‘enemy-centric measures’ in which some collateral damage and human rights violation is acceptable (Routray 2017: 73). In Kashmir, we have witnessed the wrath of pellet guns and disproportionate use of force against protestors. These measures can only undo the positive work done by state institutions.

Fourthly, Despite working with the mindset that all insurgencies should be resolved politically, the poor performance of the state and the central government in addressing the demands of people have made the iron fist approach the preferable one (Routray 2017:74). In case of Kashmir, we have witnessed that corrupt state administration with the undeliverable government has only reignited the anger within Kashmiris and as the Indian state witnesses the failure of its political initiatives, it resorts to violence instead of rearming itself with a better set of policies. The BJP has withdrawn from the alliance with an excuse that PDP is not allowing them to follow more masculine policy in Kashmir through Governor’s rule.

7.3.2 Political doctrine

At political doctrinal level, Indian approach has witnessed a shift from Dulat Doctrine to Doval Doctrine. ‘Dulat Doctrine’ is not present in any tangible form. They are a set of Ideas and principles, A.S. Dulat proposed for resolution of Kashmir conflict. These ideas and principles were derived from his experience of over 30 years of service as intelligence officer, R&AW chief and later, as a member of Vajpayee Prime Minister Office. Dulat Doctrine prescribes ‘Vajpayee way’ as the ideal way of reducing the discontentment in the valley. The Vajpayee way comprised of continual and positive dialogue with separatists and another party of the Kashmir dispute: Pakistan. Dulat argues for more flexibility in the approach of dealing with adversaries as he believes

sustained peace can be achieved only through dialogue. The important tenets of Dulat Doctrine are

1. Willingness to talk with anyone and everyone. Dulat believes that even hardliners can be won through dialogue and appropriate political deals. The objective should be leaders of all hues should be brought into the mainstream so that political space of Jammu and Kashmir becomes robust and vibrant.
2. Acknowledgment of the fact that Pakistan plays a major role in Kashmir insurgency hence coalitions are to be made with separatists disgruntled by Pakistan. Peace in Kashmir is not in the interests of Pakistan
3. However, Pakistan can be convinced to reduce its support for the violence through political dialogues and political deals. Any agreement with Pakistan is rejoiced by Kashmiris. Talks with Pakistan should multi-level. It should begin with a meeting of Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of both countries then it should progress by a meeting of ISI and R&AW Chiefs. Taking a step forward, Foreign Secretaries or National Security Advisors should meet which will ultimately pave way meeting by respective Prime ministers. This multi-level interaction could lead to solid proposals which can be translated into mutually beneficial agreements.

The critiques of Dulat doctrine argue that it is less muscular and promotes unnecessary optimism. These ideas underestimate the willingness of Islamic fundamentalist and separatist to keep valley on fire so that it can be merged with Pakistan.

As Ajit Doval took over the role of National Security Advisor of Modi government, his ideas came to influence Indian approach towards Kashmir insurgency. Ajit Doval shared these views in a seminar in 2010 and Modi government adopted this doctrine to reclaim streets of Kashmir from the “murderous stone pelters” (Aaron 2016) .

Doval argues that most of the problems in Kashmir emanate from Pakistan (4.55)⁴⁴. Kashmir is a point of convergence where both internal and external aspects of National security converge (3.33). The major problem in Kashmir is growth Islamic fundamentalism which is part of global pan Islamic movement (4.01). Doval identifies three actors of the Kashmir imbroglio- India, Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists (9.14-

⁴⁴ Video can be accessed from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUqlma5PshC>

9.20). It is India's ill fortune that Kashmiri Pandits are not recognized as a party to the dispute. There is a need of making Kashmiri Pandits stakeholders, an interest group which is the biggest victim of Kashmir insurgency as their demands are not being heard and violation of their human rights is not being addressed (9.33- 10.16). The solution will come when any one of three parties in India, Pakistan and Kashmiri separatist change their 'mindset' (11.45-11.50)⁴⁵. Doval argues that this mind set can be changed by using power.

Aaron provides us with a brief yet precise analysis of 'Doval Doctrine.' He identifies three elements of Doval's perception of Kashmir issue (famously touted as Doval Doctrine)

1. The first element is India's reluctance to embrace power.
2. Pakistan's strategy is not merely annexation of Kashmir but also balkanization of India;
3. Kashmiris are complicit in Pakistan's project. Any measure to appease the Kashmiri population is bound to be counter-effective.

The core of Doval Doctrine is the use of force to repulse the stone pelters to demonstrate the futility of violently engaging with the Indian security forces. Aaron notes that Doval doctrine prescribes that India must seek to 'reconfigure the conflict' by asserting that Kashmir should not be characterized as a political issue as the entire erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. India must note that people are on the street due to their different grievances for example lack of employment, poor infrastructure, corruption and others and India must discreetly address them and should not allow these disgruntled youth to converge on the issue of 'political settlement' of Kashmir issue.

Limits: Aaron argues that Doval policy is deeply flawed as it is riddled with contradictions. If Doval perceives the protests on the streets as an expression of disaggregated demands then why heavy-handed punishment is given to them as if they are demanding secession. Secondly labeling every stone-throwing incident as a Pakistan conspiracy is equivalent of ignoring the obvious writings on the wall. It is in common understanding that heavy presence army and security force personnel, denial

⁴⁵ Video can be accessed from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wyss5Ufb80>

of human rights and dignity and disproportionate punishment and impunity to army and security force personnel has ignited the anger within Kashmiris divested of any ideological orientations. Aaron argues that Doval doctrine virtually prescribes “Shock therapy” to discipline the valley but as we have seen in the section on limits of armed approaches as these heavy-handed responses get etched into the collective memory of a community and fuels anger that transcends generations.

Aaron (2017) argues that the present case of stone pelting is the result of youth disillusionment with the current system. The ‘model of managing’ Kashmir entails conducting successful elections to counter Pakistan’s propaganda against India. The state government formed by mainstream political parties would act as a buffer to absorb the local anger against the Indian state. The mainstream parties in the state would raise the demands that concern the local like demand for more autonomy so that they resonate with masses but will also benefit from the central funds to finance their patron-client relationship to win more elections. Kashmiri youth is now aware that although Chief Minister will raise a hue and cry about the repeal of AFSPA and withdrawal of Pellet guns, the Ministry of Defence would not budge. People of Kashmir have realized that mainstream parties would keep alive the atmosphere of hope whereas India would keep on conducting business as usual. Aaron points out the domestic reasons of why the central government followed such muscular policies. He argues that any domestic constituency prefers a strong state and media narratives of these (Muslim) stone pelters enrages the citizen in mainstream India. These narratives fit into the BJP’s agenda of core Hindutva, and communal polarization and the muscular approach against stone pelters provides the nationalistic gratification to citizens (Aaron 2017). Although this dimension is preferred by current ruling dispensation in India, they are not willing to acknowledge its shortcomings in the theatre of Kashmir.

7.4 Economic Strategy

Indian economic strategy is based on the Indian state’s fundamental premise that economic backwardness, lack of infrastructure, poverty, and unemployment drives the youth to either pick up weapons or throw stones at armed forces. Rampant poverty also becomes the breeding ground religious radicalization which attracts youth to wage holy war against India. Since Article 370 restricts the flow of capital investment by private

sector across India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the state is not able to provide employment opportunities.

Due to large-scale damage caused by militancy in the region, the central government has always earmarked a significant amount of monetary assistance for the state. It is worth investigating that whether the Indian state has promoted any initiatives to make the state self-sufficient. The approach of the Indian state in the economic realm is that of announcing packages to show India's concern for Kashmir. Starting from 1994 when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao announced financial packages, the trend followed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee when he announced two packages of the Rs 8,519.82 crore in May 2002, and 6,425 crores on April 2003 (Kashmir Life 2014). Manmohan Singh, the next Prime Minister, announced 24,000 Crore package and in 2015, Narendra Modi announced a package of 80,086 crores. This consistency is revealed by a report in Hindu which points out that from 2000-2016, Jammu and Kashmir has received 10% of central grant despite having 1% of country's population surpassing Uttar Pradesh which received 8.2% while housing 13% of country's population. Even among the special states, Jammu and Kashmir receives the highest central assistance due to its disturbed nature and an assumption that money will attract the state's loyalty to India (Raghavan 2016).

Limits: The main problem which has plagued the state is that the major share of funds have gone to Kashmir and infrastructure development in Jammu and Ladakh region has suffered. These funds were not translated into programmes of infrastructural rejuvenation, employment generations and other projects in the social sector. Major allocation for funds is also done to revamp security infrastructure as compared to upgradation of civilian infrastructure. The corruption in the bureaucracy and non-responsiveness of political parties prevents trickling down of benefits to the local population. Furthermore, mainstream political parties and APHC has constantly been commenting that the rage within Kashmiris is not due to poverty or unemployment, but they are against injustices meted out to Kashmiris by the Indian state. The rising number of cases where educated and affluent youth are joining militancy is alarming.

7.5 Diplomatic dimension

After the bitter experience of dealing with United Nations in the 1950s, India realized that any involvement of international organizations would not be in the interest of India.

However, as the insurgency broke out in Kashmir, India perceived it to be the handiwork of Pakistan. While Pakistan had been asking international organizations to look into human rights abuses in Kashmir, India demonstrated political unity. Narasimha Rao in 1994 sent a stellar team of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Salman Khurshid, Farooq Abdullah, Manmohan Singh, Hamid Ansari (India's permanent representative to UN) and Prakash Shah (ambassador in Japan) to Geneva to defend against Pakistan's allegations of gross human rights violations in Kashmir. With India's firm defence and diplomacy to turn China and Iran in its corner, it made Pakistan drop its resolution on Kashmir. In this way, India was able to ward off the arrival of the UN fact-finding mission into Kashmir (Gupta 1994). Shekhar Gupta argues that although India was victorious in this diplomatic battle, Pakistan was also successful in internationalizing the Kashmir intifada. This episode brought to light two important facts. Firstly Pakistan's objective to internationalize anything related to Kashmir and secondly India's need to expose Pakistan's act in Kashmir.

Since both India and Pakistan turned nuclear, India realized that coercive diplomacy would not work with Pakistan hence it resorted to the astute use of its soft power. India's growing clout as emerging economic power and presence as big market for western countries dissuaded European powers to comment on Kashmir and jeopardize its ties with India.

The attack on twin towers in the US on 11 September 2001 proved to be the watershed in India's mobilization process of diplomatically isolate Pakistan. The USA who was unwilling to acknowledge the terrorism peddling of Pakistan became more empathetic to India's concerns. After mending ties with the United States, India managed to enforce the international ban and economic sanctions on many important terrorist organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba and successfully lobbied to put their respective heads in the wanted lists of America. Through successful projection of soft power and creating solid cases against Pakistan, India managed to cut off terror funding that Pakistan has been providing to terrorist groups through the hawala route. After the rise of ISIS in western Asia, the European countries became wary of the Islamist agenda of global Jihad. As ISIS orchestrated terrorist attacks in France on November 14, 2015, killing 137 people; Belgium on 22 March 2016, Germany in December 2016 and London in September 15, 2017, India successfully projected Kashmir violence as part of this global Jihad which translated erstwhile muted reaction of Europe into public

support for Indian anti-terror operations. India has managed to insert support for anti-terrorism clause in various bilateral agreements and resolution at multilateral forums.

Indian strategy of dealing with separatists has been incoherent and fluctuating. India has been keeping separatist leaders under prolonged house arrests and has been randomly releasing them for talks without any confidence-building measure. Indian strategy of appointing interlocutors has turned disastrous due to its own insincerity in adopting their recommendations. We have noted the presence of permanent impasse between Hurriyat leaders and Indian state due to their persistent demand of tripartite talks on Kashmir which India will never accede to as it will call India's sovereignty over entire Kashmir into question.

Limits- India's Achilles heel is its dismal human rights record in Kashmir amidst these successful diplomatic endeavours. Although international superpowers like US, Russia, Japan and China have refused to condemn India, international human rights bodies like Amnesty International, Human rights watch and latest for the first time United Nations Human Rights Council have condemned Indian military response in Kashmir.⁴⁶ India's disproportional use of pellet guns and Human shield incident has evoked concern. Winning international support (votes) from countries requires strategic sacrifices. The more India falters in Kashmir, the more it had to sacrifice diplomatically.

7.6 Central research answers

To answer our first question, Indian strategic response to the Kashmir insurgency has been an ensemble of above mentioned approaches pursued for the goal of security and peace in the valley.

To answer our second question, Indian Grand Strategy in Kashmir is militarily abusive, statistically efficient, morally blind and overall self-defeating. India's political approach is myopic and hypocritical. India's economic strategy is security oriented not development or people oriented; India's diplomatic approach is characterized by high rhetoric and low substance, commitment phobia and insincerity to reach to agreements; Indian doctrinal approach is ambiguous and tilting and overall, India's Grand Strategy in Kashmir is incoherent, overtly muscular, non purposive and over all self defeating.

⁴⁶ UNHRC has first time published a report on Human Rights violation in Kashmir in June 2018

If India tries to solve the problem by deploying the concept of Grand Strategy, it might produce more strategic victories in Kashmir.

7.7 Kashmir possibility and future research avenues.

This research carried an investigation into India's strategic response to the insurgency in Kashmir from 1988-2018 and provided the application of the grandest concept of International security in the realm of internal security with its grandeur. The explanation presented above need not be the only explanation of Indian Grand Strategy in Kashmir. As more scholars engage with the concept, more ideas and diverse explanations can emerge. The conceptual extension of Grand Strategy can also give us an idea about Indian Grand Strategy in Kashmir.

Grand strategy formulation involves answering the question "why" do we need a Grand Strategy. The second step involves identifying the strategic context to tailor the strategy. Thirdly proper analysis is carried out to plan allocation of resources (harmonization of means and ends), and finally, it involves the creation of feedback mechanism to help states adapt to changing the strategic environment and improving the content of Grand Strategy under the light of new information (Venkatshamy 2012: 125-126).

Grand Strategy as a grand plan in Kashmir- This concept of Grand Strategy as a plan can be conceptualized as a vision document prepared by the central government which would not only list the confidence-building measures; the central government would take but also the measures it would take to resolve 'core' political problem of Kashmir. The vision document would take the shape of a ten-year strategy and can be published so that there is transparency in the intention of the government is demonstrated. It can help various actors like Hurriyat Conference and heads of terrorist organizations can come to the table with complete knowledge of Indian flexibility. However, this idea can be questioned as to how different will be the vision document of the central government to that of manifesto of the ruling party. We have witnessed how important agendas in the 'agenda of agreement' between BJP (which is ruling at the centre) and PDP were not implemented. Any vision document released by the central government would undermine the state government. By taking in account of the past experiences, the vision document might not be the perfect way to strategize on Kashmir.

Grand Strategy as a grand principle and leadership vision- We can unearth these grand principles through the approaches adopted by Indian Prime Ministers throughout the phase of volatility. Statements of Prime Ministers like Narasimha Rao's "sky is the limit" for demands of autonomy to Deputy Prime Minister Advani's rejection of Jammu and Kashmir autonomy proposal through "set the clock back and reverse the natural process of harmonising the aspirations of the Kashmiri people with the integrity of the nation" (BBC News 2000) to Vajpayee's "Insaniyat, Jamooriyat, Kashmiriyat" can either be interpreted as vague political rhetoric or as ambitious Grand Strategic designs. A.S Dulat has tried to bring together elements of Vajpayee's vision for Kashmir in his book, but he and other scholars have not dealt with the Grand Strategic implications of his ideas.

Grand Strategy as grand behaviour- My analysis of India's Grand Strategy in Kashmir aligns with this conceptual extension more than with other two. India's grand behaviour in Kashmir can be disaggregated further into bureaucratic, moral, socio-cultural and other dimensions to make the analysis more comprehensive and holistic.

Finally, this research is limited to the study of Indian strategy in Kashmir after the outbreak of insurgency in 1988. The more ambitious research can explore Indian Grand Strategy in Kashmir after 1947 by placing the objective of Grand Strategy as a final resolution of Kashmir dispute.

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