


Civil-Military Relations in Israel: The Post-1993 DoP Phase

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial
fulfilment of the requirements
for award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **Civil-Military Relations in Israel: The Post-1993 DoP Phase** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


Vijay Kumar Gothwal

CERTIFICATE


We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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**Dedicated to My GURU One and Only
professor P.R. Kumaraswamy**

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Chapter One: Introduction

The civil-military relations mean the “relationship between the civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations established to protect the former precisely, it defines civilian authorities and their relations to military organisations” (Wogu 2014:48). Their history can be traced to the texts of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz and for a proper understanding of the civil-military relations in Israel, it is essential to look at the evolution of the State.

The declaration of Israel's statehood in May 1948 was the result of a long and difficult struggle by the Jewish people to create a homeland in the area of ancient biblical kingdoms, or the holy land. The main inspiration behind this enterprise came not from the small Jewish population that had lived there since the time of the Roman conquest in 63 B.C. (Shalem 1997:1) but rather from the European Jews who formed a major portion of the Diaspora since the Second Temple was destroyed in 70 A.D. (Padfield 2018:1). Although the Jews had never abandoned hope of returning to their land one day, their interest in Palestine remained largely religious until the emergence of the nationalist movement among the Eastern European Jewish community in the latter half of the 19th century.

The new comers were not the first Jews to return and Orthodox Jews had been coming for centuries to pray and die in the traditional religious centres of Jerusalem, Safed and Tiberius. Living on petty trade and charity collected in Europe, the Jews had slowly increased in numbers as communications with Europe improved. By the mid-nineteenth century, they already constituted a large population of Jerusalem. From the 1880s, the Zionists pioneers started arriving and unlike the orthodox Jews, they tried to create a living community and by the end of the century, they had established farming villages in Galilee. Different shades of socialist ideology were represented among them including Labour-Zionists, Marxists and non-Marxists, nationalists and internationalists, revolutionary and non-violent sections. They all believed in the need to combine the physical reclamation of Israel's land with the rehabilitation of its people.

At first, the Labour Zionists, the dominant political force in Mandate Palestine, ignored the potential for conflict with the Arabs and later they persuaded themselves that social progress and economic development would eradicate the causes of strife. They thought that in a socialist

Palestine, Arabs and Jews could live side by side in a secular and egalitarian society where proletarian solidarity would outweigh nationalist sentiments. When tensions turned into hostility, riots-communal strife in the 1930s and open war in the 1940s, the Labour Zionists came to believe that the restoration of Israel and the provision of shelter for persecuted Jews took precedence over Arab rights in Palestine.

Due to nationalism and anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and Russia, a number of Jews concluded that the security of the Jewish people could never be assured unless they attain a national home. The World Zionist Organization stepped up its support for immigration to Palestine and led to resistance from the Arabs, who feared losing their lands. This led to intermittent violence. The first of the acts of self-defence by Jews in Palestine was not against Arabs but, like the Arabs, they had to contend with the lawlessness of the Ottoman Empire in decadence. Robberies, land disputes, blood feuds and raids were common in Palestine. The Jewish farmers, like wealthier Arabs, hired Arab or Bedouin guards to protect their lives and property. But soon the Labour-Zionists insisted on self-reliance in defence as well as labour and in April 1909 they formed *Hashomer* ('The watchmen') whose members set out to protect Jewish villages. The development of self-defence system on wide scale started in the early 1920s and led to the formation of *Haganah* that which served as the foundation of the future Israel Defence Forces (IDF) established in 1948.

After independence, there was huge problem of security because its Arab neighbours could not come to terms with Israel's existence. Israel is a small nation with a small population therefore to protect itself it needed conscription which is unique. It is mandatory for all Jews over the age of 18 and has been optional for Druze, Bedouins or Circassian. The Arabs are not conscripted. Women are also included in conscription and because of the shortage of work force and they played an active role in the formation of the state. Due to this unique system, the Israeli army became strong and behind the civil-military relations was David Ben-Gurion, the first prime Minister as well as the defence minister of Israel.

Ben-Gurion's sought to dissolve and remove the extra political and ideological aspects inherited from the past. This ran into formidable opposition. He estimated the threat and assigned many of the functions, which had formerly been performed exclusively by the pioneers to the army. Thus it goes to the credit of Ben-Gurion, his chief of staff Moshe Dayan and a host of pioneers in *Haganah*, *Palmach* etc., to build a liberal democracy with stable civil-military relations. This was brought about by professionalization of the army, with emphasis on technical proficiency.

'Institutional inertia' in the army was also tackled. The young officers with their high turnover and the pioneer-egalitarian spirit made them a formidable force as was demonstrated in the subsequent wars. It was this unique 'Israeli Civil-military relations formula' which evolved through a long period—from the formative years of 1904 to 1948—and saved the society from becoming militaristic one.

Confronted with the security challenges, military service has become a virtue for public service and prerequisite for full citizenship. Despite being a military-dominated state, Israel has maintained a strong democracy. It is common that if a nation has dominance of military, it soon comes under dictatorship but in Israel despite the dominance of military there is democracy. There is different kind of military hegemony, which does not destroy the democratic norms, rather it protects freedom, equality fraternity, right etc. There is tremendous role of military, which sets a unique example of civil-military relations. Over the years, a number of senior military officials donned civilian responsibilities upon leaving the IDF.

History of modern Israel has been the history of a nation at war. Within hours of its declaration of independence it faced joint military attack by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. The name of this war within Israel was 'War of Independence'. This war was ended in 1949 with the Armistice Agreements. Since then wars and peace processes have been taking place continuously. In all the wars and peace treaties, there has been good collaboration between military and civilian government. The October War of 1973 and the Lebanese invasion of 1982 dented the venerated position enjoyed by the IDF in the Israeli society.

A breakdown in civil-military relations can be noticed after the Oslo Peace process in 1993 because Oslo tried to address the core problem of Arab-Israeli conflict. Though, Oslo accords brought mutual recognition of Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and created a platform for peace. It simultaneously weakened the cornerstone of civil-military relation. The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 proves that the Israeli civil-military relations were tense and that the civilian population was not entirely happy with the political and strategic situation in the wake of the Oslo process. The rapid rise of violence and frequent number of terrorist attacks created a trust deficit between the military and civil population.

Review of literature

The available literature on the proposed topic can be placed under three themes, namely, *Arab-Israeli conflict*, *Civil-military relations in Israel* and *Oslo peace process*.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

In the contemporary scenario the Arab Israel conflict started in the 1880s when the Jewish immigration to Palestine started due to the Zionist movement. Due to the *Aliya* the Jewish population increased in the Palestine. Then they started to acquire the land of *effendis* and established Jews agricultural settlement (Stein 2017). According to Justin McCarthy (1988) in 1882-83 “Palestinian population was about 468,000, consisting of 408,000 Muslims, 44,000 Christians and 15,000 Jews” (McCarthy 1988:10-19). A dramatically change came in the demography of Palestine, by the end of World War I.

This number of Israeli population had changed and on the eve of World War I there were 602,000 Muslims, 81,000 Christians and 39,000 Jews (McCarthy 1988:10-19). Roberto Bachi, who was the first Statistician General of Israel, gives the same date but suggests a lower number of Muslims (525,000) in 1914 (Bachi 1974:32). The Balfour Declaration of November 1917 pledged that British Government gave its support for establishment of a “Jewish national Home” in Palestine. This occurred anxiety among Arabs and Jews who emigrated there during Ottoman period (Sela 2002:58).

The Israel-Palestine conflict remains the epicentre of debate in contemporary world order. Even though Israel and Palestine seem to be two core players, in the conflict, the ambiance of neighbouring Arab nations, after the independence of Israel, expended the hostility and this Arab-Israeli conflict converted from bilateral issue to multilateral issue. Irrespective of the label, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s fight for existence or the Palestinian question, Israel is often defined as one of the wounded, battlefields in today’s world (Dowty 2012:2).

The Arab–Israeli conflict is not so old phenomenon but originated towards the end of the nineteenth century (Shafir 1996:196). However in 1948, with the origin of state of Israel, it became a major issue of contestation between Jewish and Arab population. After the independence of Israel, Israel faced five major wars, two intifadas and many small violence due to this religious and territorial conflict (Shang 2006:1).

The Palestinian people commemorate Nakba or catastrophe in the memory of migration of 750,000 Palestinians from their motherland in 1948 which is the epicentre of the whole conflict

(Hatuqa 2013:1). Adnan Abdel Razik who is an expert in land settlement and zoning, said (referring to the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine), “that 33.63 per cent of West Jerusalem’s land was owned by Arabs back in 1949 and plenty of famous parts of West Jerusalem including *Katamon*, the *Greek* and *German* colonies were owned by Palestinians” (Hatuqa 2013:1).

Some scholars say that religion is a main factor in this Arab Israel conflict. They argue that “it is infused with religious symbols and values” (Reiter 2010:229). West Asia has been the birthplace to the three Abrahamic religions, namely, Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Korany 2005:72). The city of Jerusalem due to its particular significance has been referred as to the “*Holy Land*” since the era Crusades (Reiter 2010:239). There is a widespread religious view between the people of both Israel and Palestine that Israel/Palestine is a holy land, ‘Promised Land’ for one and the *Waqf* for the other (Perry 2015:1). There are three reasons for the significance of religion; *first*, it provides an ideal framework to understand the world. *Second*, religion describes code of conduct and makes simple standard for understanding good and bad. And *third*, it gives an authority to the individuals and organisations seeking for religious objectives (Perry 2015:1). A more modern analysis of the conflict has expanded the scope of conflict from land to water. This water issue plays a very important role in Israeli territorial, the alienation of land has an impact on Palestinian access to water (Elmusa 1996:69).

For a country whose right to exist was being constantly questioned and challenged, the indispensability of military becomes understandable. In Israel this is very essential and comes through the existence of military which is known as Israel Defence Forces. Historically the origins of IDF are traced to the Yishuv. Mainly it began during the second wave of immigration. In 1907, *Bar-Giora* was the first paramilitary organisation which transformed into *Hashomer* in 1909. The main work of *Hashomar* was to protect the stealing of properties from the criminal gangs (Kaplan, 2015:1). This group was not enough after the 1920 riots and another underground paramilitary force was developed and its name was *Haganah*. It became a full scale defence force. During World War II *Yishuv* fought with the British following to creation of the Jewish Brigade. These incidents created a strong base for Israeli defence forces including manpower and doctrine (Kaplan 2015:1).

In the final, the Israeli interim government passed an order on 26 May 1948 which strictly banned the creation of any armed formation in the state. And other forces prior to creation of the state IZL, the *Lechi* and the *Palmach* got merged in the IDF. The IDF became the body far

from politics, strictly handling security issue and fully under federal control (Marina 2012:1). The military was tested many times after the independence of Israel. The Arab-Israeli conflict started on 15 May 1948 the day after Israel declared its independence. This war was a joint attack of Jordan, Egypt and Syria with Iraqi support. The war ended with Israel capturing territories, namely Lydda and Ramle area, Galile even the Negev, a vast strip beside the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem road, West Jerusalem. This was more than the territories allotted by UN General Assembly under the partition plan of 181 in November 1947 (Lustick 1980:135).

After this, Israel did attack on Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula in 1956 with help of Britain and France (Masalha 1996:56). This was the testing movement for the Israeli military. The six-day war in June 1967 was also another testing movement of Israel defence forces. In this war the result was surprising because Israel held full control over the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan and Golan Heights from Syrian state (Pappe 2017:1).

After the June war, Israel's prestige increase in the international politics and the area under Israeli control tripled. After this war the IDF officers were in over confidence because they won this war very easily. As a result of this over confidence, Israel could not get initial success in the October War of 1973 or the Yom Kippur War as it is called in Israel (Trueman 2015:1) Jonathan Kaplan say that "In addition to defending the nation against prolonged hostility and violence, the army carries out important social and economic functions. It serves as a symbol of Israeli strength, efficiency and effectiveness" (Kaplan 2015:1).

Civil-military relations

Yoram Peri states that the "military was actually the first bureaucratic structure to be successfully transformed from an autonomous pre-independence organisation into a truly national institution subordinate to the government. This was achieved by taking the army out of politics" (Mohler 2016:108). Moshe Dayan to explain his point "We are a generation of settlers; without a helmet or a gun we will be unable to plant a tree or build a house. Let us not fear to perceive the enmity which consumes the lives of hundreds of thousands of Arabs around us. Let us not avert our gaze, lest it weaken our hand. This is the destiny of our generation. The only choice we have is to be armed, strong and resolute, else the sword will fall from our hands and the thread of our lives will be severed" (Lissak 1984:13). According to Huntington, "A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures the legitimate authority within the state" (Huntington 1957: 84).

The Israeli army protects its people under any circumstances and so people always have a positive attitude about the military. They perceive their existence is made possible by the army and is also a cause of domination of the military in Israel. Israel has been characterised as a classic type of a 'nation in arms' or 'citizen's army' (Eliezer 1995: 264). The profession represents no ethnic or class groups but reflects the wider social system.

Israel spends a big amount in the defence establishment in the areas of production, marketing and consumption. It "spends about 5.8 per cent of the GDP on defence, compared to 3.3 per cent by the US, 1.9 per cent by UK and 1.5 by EU countries" (Wezeman 2017:1-7). Behind this strong military was the great role of Ben-Gurion who was the first Prime Minister and also the first defence minister (Perlmutter 1968: 617).

But in Israel there is another dimension to the civil-military relations. There is a great role of woman in military. They have taken part in Israeli military even before the founding of the state in 1948. Woman comprised over 20 per cent of Israeli force in 1948 and 33 per cent of all IDF soldiers and 51 per cent of its officer in 2011. They fulfil various roles in the army, navy or air forces (Cohen 2016:1). Despite all this, there are few women lieutenant general and major-general in the Israeli military.

Morris Janowitz (1964) echoes the same in his book *The Role of the Military in Political Development of New Nations*. The book has been a pioneer in the literature relating to the role of military in the developing nations. He views military intervention as a result of lack of institutions in the developing nations. But that argument seems weak in the context of Israel because lack of institutions is not a cause for the military intervention in Israel. Rather it has been due to the obsession with security, and it is widely believed that IDF intervenes for the people's security and not for its own personal interests. The civil-military coalition exists in Israel in a comprehensive manner and both work with each other in harmony (Sheffer 2007:1).

The greater part of the IDF force has been comprised of reserve units that were constantly reinforced by the young people who had completed their compulsory service. Most of the army's chiefs of staff have been in between the age of thirty and forty (Al-Qazzaz 1973:150). The assumption had been that most of the officers would be discharged by the age of forty, and after their retirement they would join politics (Al-Qazzaz 1973:150). Many senior officers have reached the cabinet or Knesset, but the route has always been through the civilian political system, at the invitation of the political parties (Al-Qazzaz 1973:151-152). Since 1948 three senior officers, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, became prime minister, and six

were appointed defence minister, namely, Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizman, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, and Yitzhak Mordechai.

Ze'ev Schiff says that “there is a large agreement inside Israel that one of the state's central achievements has been the creation of people's army. At an impressive professional level, it has protected the state and its citizens over the years and repelled all attacks against the Jewish state” (Schiff 1999: 434). It is doubtful whether the country could have survived without the Israel Defence Force, as the army has been called to serve since it was formed.

After the ending of the first round conflict in 1948, Jewish people had a properly organized semi-standing army. In the war of independence the casualty was heavy and near about one per cent of the Jewish people had died or was injured. But the IDF managed to overcome first the Arab forces, and then to stand up to the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, which had invaded the country (Schiff 1999: 435).

Israel has never been defeated by a regular army in any war till date perhaps because of the good support and cooperation of the civilian. Israel's civil-security relations have been characterised by a "partnership" between its civilian and military leaders in which the former had always been dominant (Peri 1981:303). Moreover, the recruitment, training, and placement of the IDF's officers, as well as their integration into the state's political, social, and economic spheres after their (relatively early) retirement, helped prevent emergence of a distinct military elite in Israel and ensured the continuity (Peri 1981:303).

Moshe Dayan modified his earlier views and played an important role in the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. Dayan was defence minister during the October War and as the highest-ranking official responsible for military planning, he bore a part of the responsibility for having missed the signs for the upcoming War (Dayan 1976: 80). Israel considered the Egyptian initial victory as a loss in October war and was scared for fate of its people. And its existence as a state (Hafny 2013:1) Lazarus quoted one of the Israeli newspapers' headlines one year after the October war as saying: “Something was broken at the Yum Kippur war last year. The state was saved but our faith is lost, our confidence is broken and our hearts are torn as we almost lost a full generation” (Hafny 2013:1).

He said that “this was the first war that did not strengthen Israel as it was a psychological disaster in so much that it destroyed the legend of the invincible army” (Hafny 2013:2). He said that “The biggest danger, was replacing this idea by the fear of being under threat at all times” (Hafny 2013:2). The people of Israel were thrashed by effect of Lebanon battle. Due to

the number of casualties the Israeli people were heavily divided on the necessity of the war. Many people's opinion was this that elective fighting is enough (*Yedioth Ahronoth* 2008:1). Thus, in 1985 the government of Israel decided to gradually withdraw from Lebanon. And by springtime most of the IDF's troops were out of Lebanon (Kaye 2002: 665-666). According to the Defence Ministry, "Israel suffered 1,217 fatalities in the war itself, which lasted between 1982 and 1985" (*Ynetnews* 2011: 1).

The IDF launched two major operations namely Operation Accountability (1993) and Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996) to stop continuous attacks by Hezbollah on Northern Israel. IDF was pulled out of the territory as a response to public cry over rising deaths in the buffer zone in southern Lebanon. In 1999, finally Prime Minister Ehud Barak agreed to vacate the Lebanese area and completed the withdrawal of the IDF in the summer of 2000 (Kaye 2002:568).

Israel had witnessed of sub-conventional challenges since 1948 hence the first intifada did not constitute IDF's first experience with low-intensity conflict (Cohen 1994: 7). For the control of the intifada, the command quality was improved at all levels, so much so that by June 1993 senior field positions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were being filled regularly by officers reported to be the most talented of the IDF's new generation of brigadiers (Cohen 1994: 9). Another work was that "At the top of the command structure, successive Chiefs of Staff appointed senior military" (Cohen 1994: 9). This improved the coordination between unit commanders and local representatives of the "Civil Administration" who have since 1981 possessed administrative responsibility for the government of the territories captured in 1967 (Cohen 1994: 9).

The IDF made efforts to restrain the intifada by physical force. Military groups were sent in to disturb areas for the attacks. They used their muscle power when attacked by big mobs (Cohen 1994:9). In 1988 *ALPHA* was established to design non-lethal means of dispersing demonstrations and after some time the IDF developed different kind of plastic bullets, gravel dischargers. They also used live ammunition to suppress public disturbances. According to some reports, there were "over 500 Palestinian deaths between 1987 and 1988 alone" (Cohen 1994: 10). Israel decided that the massive force will be used for the control of the Palestinian unrests. Major General Gabi Ofir, then outgoing commander of the West Bank Division, said that "If the Palestinians conduct battles like that (1996 tunnel riots), we will have to respond much more harshly and painfully" (Collins 1997: 2).

Oslo peace process

The Oslo peace process began with secret meetings between Israel and the PLO (Palestinian Liberal Organization). This meeting was conducted in early 1993. This process completed through the negotiations. There was a cycle of “negotiations, suspension, mediation, restart of negotiations and suspension again” (Goldfoot 2014:1). This process was become the history of agreements. In this process many agreements happen until the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000. This Summit was the landmark end to the Oslo process (Bender 2002:2), and contributed to the outbreak of the Second Intifada (Schweitzer 2010:39).

If one looks at the historical background of Oslo accord, Israel had always faced security challenge from its birth and it wanted to have peace with its neighbours (Chaulia 2018:1). Yehudith Auerbach say that “In 1992 Rabin won the election due to his military credentials and cautious approach to security. He was considered by large segments of the public, including many right-wing Likud voters, to be a leader who could make peace with the Palestinians without sacrificing Israel’s security”(Auerbach 2000:31:50) .

Top Israeli leaders including Rabin, Barak and military officials were anxious about impacts of socio-cultural changes or Israeli morals on the country's staying power in the face of continued low-intensity conflict (Cohen 2000:120). Rynhold (2003) says that the “increasingly bourgeois and individualistic nature of Israeli society was said to have led to war fatigue and a 'post-heroic' culture in which decreased motivation to serve in the military was coupled with decreased willingness to kill or be killed” (Rynhold 2003:12). Thus due to these causes Oslo accords become inevitable for the Israel and Oslo accords were signed in 1993.

The Oslo accords are a group of agreements, not a single agreement. That’s why it is called Oslo accords not Oslo accord. These accords include many agreements like “Declaration of Principles (1993), Cairo Agreement (1994), Paris Agreement (1994), Taba Agreement (1995), Wye Memorandum (1998), and Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum (1999)” (Kumaraswamy 2009:187). Declaration of Principles were the starting point of peace process and by the Oslo accords tried to establish the resolution 242 and 338 and “right of the Palestinian people to self-determination”(Bassiouni 1971:31-32).

The main promise of Oslo accords was the withdrawal of Israel defence forces from the territory of Palestine. The plan was that Israel will withdraw its military gradually and simultaneously, responsibilities would be transferred to the Palestinian authorities for maintaining security (IMFA 1995:1). Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to

specified military locations will commence after the inauguration of the Palestinian Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian Police (IMFA 1997:1).

The phase of deployment completed in the eighteen month. Authorities and liabilities would be given to Palestine in the area of West Bank and Gaza Strip (Taylor 2003:80). For the proper implementation of Oslo accords, the occupied area divided in the three parts which were “area A” (territories with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security), “area B” (territories with Palestinian civil jurisdiction but with joint Israeli–Palestinian security control) and “area C” (territories where Israel enjoys complete civil and security control). According to Oslo accords, area A and B would be hand over to Palestine Authority in the first phase and last one area C will be covered in coming phases. “Area C” refers West Bank’s which are not combined in A and B areas. (UN 1997:17).

Another thing about the Oslo accord that this process spearhead by the civilian player. In the beginning of the Oslo process the military was entirely excluded. All this process handled by the civilian leaders. It is difficult to digest that military which was major player of the Israel, was exclude from the Oslo accords process. The IDF was always in leading position mostly on the issue war and peace (Peri 2006:26). But military was not excluded for the much time and it became involved in the process gradually.

After the signing of the Oslo accords the negative result started to come for Israel. There were more and furious attacks by the Palestinian militant groups. In 1995, there were four bombings which led to the killing of 37 individuals. In the first half of 1996, there were four suicide bombings, killing 59 Israelis (IMFA 2013:1). In opinion polls, 85 per cent of Israelis expressed this fear in 1995, and 78 per cent in 1996 (Kennedy 2015:182). During the second intifada, the fear of terrorism was at the peak. In 2002, due to Palestinian suicides bombing 92 per cent of Israelis reported fear. At this time, almost every member of Israeli society feared for the safety of their family members and for themselves. So Oslo created more security challenges in the form of suicide attacks and this in turn affected public confidence. (Kennedy 2015:182).

Definition, Rationale and scope Of the Study

Military plays a significant role in Israel and there is good cooperation between military and society. Many ups and down came in the civil- military relations since the inception of Israel. The available literature on the proposed topic mainly focuses on the uniqueness, nature of the civil military relations and unique conscription system. The literature describes about the, why

there are cooperation between military and society and the absence of military coup possible. The focus of the research is the impact of the Oslo upon the civil-military relations, especially in the wake of the greater number of military personnel entering the political arena upon their retirement from the IDF.

Research questions

1. What is the nature of civil military relations in Israel?
2. How does the domination of military affect the democracy in Israel?
3. How did Oslo affect the civil military relations?

Hypothesis

1. The security challenges in the wake of the signing of the DoP have led to the civil-military tensions in Israel.

Research methodology

The research is analytical and is based on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources will include reports published by the Israel ministry of foreign affairs, Israel defence forces and documents published by UN and personal accounts of authors. The secondary source will include book, journals, new articles etc.

The second chapter on **IDF and the Society** deals with the Israeli defence force and the Israeli society. This chapter also deals with the nature of civil-military relations in Israel and the opinion of the different schools about the Israeli Civil-Military relations. It examines the responsible elements in the nature civil- military relations.

The third chapter on **Arab-Israeli Conflicts and Peace Treaties** deals in detail on the Arab-Israeli conflicts from the ancient period to the modern time. It looks at the responsible causes of this conflict. After this it offers a detailed discussion on various peace agreements and treaties of Israel after the independence. How far these treaties were succeed to reduce the Arab-Israel conflicts and how much Israeli civil- military relations affected by these treaties are examined.

Chapter four on **Impact of the Oslo Accords upon the Civil-military relations** deals with the Oslo accords peace process and why they become necessary. This chapter deals with the changing nature of civil-military relations and is divided into two major parts, before the Oslo accords and after the Oslo accords. It examines the causes of changing civil-military relations.

It discusses some definitions like professionalism, militarism, permeability, linkages, and nation-in-arms which are essential to understand the civil-military concept.

This last chapter summarise the findings of the research and tests the hypothesis.

Chapter Two: Israel Defence Force and Society

A person cannot survive without the society and society “means a group of people involved in persistent social interaction, or a large social group sharing the same geographical or social territory, typically subject to the same political authority and dominant cultural expectations. Societies are characterized by patterns of relationships (social relations) between individuals who share a distinctive culture and institutions; a given society may be described as the sum total of such relationships among its constituent of members. In the social sciences, a larger society often evinces stratification or dominance patterns in subgroups” (Lee 2016:170).

Human being is a social animal. The human body is made up of cells which is the basis and these cells makes tissue which in turn makes organ and organs in this process make the human body. The human society is also similar when the individual human coalesces they makes a group like family, community or tribes. When they work in concert the families make up a society. Because the society is composed of different and differing families and tribes disputes become inevitable. Where there are fewer disputes, cooperation within the society is always strong (Ronfeldt 2011:7-27).

When looking at the development of a society one could notice that “the development of the brain and the development of the human society occurred in relative parallel. While people were learning to live together cooperatively, they were also adapting to the new non-physical environment they found themselves in”. An individualist conception of society is also to believe that “society is a human artefact, constructed by individuals to serve their interests or purposes” (Smith 2004:1)

Thus, Herbert Spencer gave some new idea in his ethical and political writings about the development of the society. He observed that society is progressing toward an idea and the moral state. He said that “the fittest societies survive and that unfit societies should be permitted to die off” (Ritzer 2016:38). The outcome of this process is adaptive progression of the world as a whole. The idea of social evolution is given by Spencer is rich and complicated and in the

beginning his idea was liked and became popular. After some time, it was rejected and more recently it re-emerged with the neo-evolutionary sociological theories. George Herbert Mead uses the term society to mean that “on-going social process that precedes both the mind and the self” (Ritzer 2017:197). Mead gives importance to the society and says that it is the society which shapes mind and the self. At another level, for Mead, society signifies the organized set of responses that are taken over by the individual in the form of the “me.” Thus, in this logic persons carry society round with them, giving them the ability, through self-criticism, to control themselves (Mead 1934:175).

In his *The Descent of Man* (1871), Charles Darwin says about the evolution of humans and animals and observes,

I fully subscribe to the judgement of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lesser animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important ... the evolution of mutual assistance and the moral senses in humans and other animals are maintained by benefits shared by members of cooperative groups” (97).

This is closely related to the modern theories of social evolutions.

Darwin gives the example of many faunas living in groups and they work like a team and they collaborate with each other. He said that when one animal is facing any kind of threats all the other animals do come to its aid and attack their enemy. This example is equally applicable to the human being because they also live in groups and they do depend upon and cooperate with one another other. When they feel any kind of danger they fight collectively. Thus, one can say that mutual interests makes a group and anyone wanting to hurt the interest of that group will have be prepared to fight with the entire group or the majority of it.

After this comes the civil-society. German Philosopher Jürgen Habermas defined civil society as a “public space” (Sheffer 2010: 69). According to him,

The domain where a free, pluralist, and rational discourse is conducted for the common good through communicative action and mediation of civil interest groups. Despite differences of status, interests, and goals among these groups, a civil society has at its core a common agreement on the collective moral order and continuous process of constructing collective consensus on common goals and means, which in turn can affect the patterns of official policymaking and shape individual and collective identities(Chambers 2002:92-93).

The civil society is made by the independent groups and this often depends on the extent of liberalism pursued by the state.

The main work of the civil society is to limit the state actions and act as a kind of checks-and-balance mechanism. It tries to make or expend the public space through various mediums including civic discourses and practices and is less concerned by its legitimization by the government. So one can say that state-civil society relations are always in dichotomy. It seeks to influence if not control the government and raise the genuine issue of the society.

Every society, nation or states needs an army or some organized form of protection. From the ancient times, as an organized form of security the military has been working for the people and protected them from the threats from other societies, communities or states. Military means “a force authorised to use deadly force and arms to care the interests of the nation and some or all of its people” (Das 2018:447). The main function of the military is to protect the people and the state. At times, the military can also battle with the state it is supposed to protect when the rulers adopt policies which runs contrary to the interests of the society and the people and this often results in military takeover or coup.

Beside this, the military does additional work like promoting the political agenda, protecting the economic interest of the people, prevention of external interference and infiltration, emergency rescue missions and operations, preserving and maintaining social norms and protecting and securing areas of the country. In some post-colonial states, during the nation-building process, the military has been involved in building national infrastructure such as school, housing, health and medical facilities, food production and even financial management. Sometimes social work is carried out by the paramilitary force, which also shoulder the security responsibilities like the armed forces. Armed force is the synonym of the military force though there are differences between armed force and paramilitary force. In many societies, military backgrounds or accomplishments tended to be used for political power and electoral politics (for example Israel).

Military always works within the society and with the society because it non-militant components of the population dependent on the civilian communities for through its social engagements, welfare and employment, education and health and day-today-day existential issues. At the same time, the militarists say that the civilian population is depended on the military for the protection, preservation and perpetuation of the national history, culture and memory from threats from its neighbours (Leadershipngr 2017:1). Another thing is this about

the military that it is not limited to the state power and private companies have been hiring military, especially retired military personnel, for the protection their lives and key installations. Hiring the persons with military background is largely due to their professionalism but also due to the lesser skills of the conventional police force and the trust deficit with non-military agencies.

As historians highlight, military affairs had a major impact on the societies (Nolan 2004: 1). Most often the military history is also the history of the wars and the formation and disappearance of great empires. Along with the military doctrine, leadership, cultural foundation, strategy, technology, tactics have changed over time. Beside this in history of military there is exist the “just war theory” (Calhouna 2000:325) which highlights the moral dimensions of war and the need and necessity to limit the destructive capacity of wars towards establishing the doctrine of military ethics and emphasis on restrained arms establishing lasting peace and justice (Just War Theory 2011:1). The power of military has been used by different people or entities. Most often it is used by main person or the head of the society and in the contemporary world, one can say by the head of state. In the democratic countries, the political party in power use the military for public good or its interests.

At the same time, it is not easy to define the relationship between the military and the society. Where wars are frequent, if not perennial, the military has become important for the people or also has become an integral component of the daily live. Israel is the best example for this because of the constant threat that the society faces from and vis-à-vis its neighbours (Bar-Tal 2017:1). The relations between military and society has many problems, like the civilian control of the military and the presence or absence of the transparency. In extreme circumstances the lack of adequate control, supervision or accountability of the military results in dictatorship or military-takeover. According to Samuel Huntington, “subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state” (Huntington 1957:83).

On the basis of its nature, the Israeli civil-military relations can be divided into many parts. It is characterised as political-military relations, socio-military complex, and military-industrial complex (Mayer 2017:1). Then there are those who support the influence military in the political area and those who do not.

The military is very essential for the Israeli society both for its survival and protection. Israel war born in a war and from its inception there are many wars and conflicts which made it mandatory to establish a strong military for the protection of the Israeli people and society. Hence, Israel has become a society with strong militaristic characteristics. It believes in militarism (Kantor 2013:1). Militarism means the belief or desire of a government or people that a country should maintain a strong military capability and be prepared to use it to defend or promote national interests (Bacevich 2013:242). Militarist ideology is the society's social attitude of being best served or being guided by concepts embodied in the military culture, doctrine, system, or leaders. Militarism is sometimes contrasted with the concept of comprehensive national power, soft power and hard power (Militarism 2018:1). As a result of its history and evolution, Israel did not adopt the 'antimilitarism' (Helman 2009:6). The latter believe that war should not happen between the states and is a counter argument to the militarism (Liebknecht 1972:135).

Tracing the descent of the human being, Darwin observed that

... an eagle seizes a young Cercopithecus, which by clinging to a branch, was not at once carried off; it cried loudly for assistance, upon which the other members of the troop, with much uproar, rushed to the rescue, surrounded the eagle, and pulled out so many feathers, that he no longer thought of his prey, but only how to escape. This eagle as Brehm [the source of the story] remarks assuredly would never again attack a single monkey of a troop (Darwin 1871: 101, 102).

The Israeli society is akin to this description. When the state is in trouble all the people come together and fought collectively against the enemy and even the Jewish diaspora joins hands in defence of Israel (Wagner 2010:1).

Israel Defence Forces (IDF)

The military force is the main pillar of any nation. The Israel Defence Forces is the Army of Defence for Israel (Keller 2014:3). It is the military force and comprises of ground forces, navy, air force and special units. Initially it was called Israel Security Force but it was renamed as IDF by the Israeli cabinet on 26 May 1948. The military's main role was the defence the state and the Jewish people and hence 'defence' was selected (Kaplan 2015:1). As of early 2018, the strength of the IDF is as follows: the total military personnel are 615,000 and out this the active personnel were 170,000 and the rest were reserve personnel. Total aircrafts were 596, combat tanks 2760, armoured fighting vehicles 10,575; self-propelled artillery 650, towed artillery 300, rocket project 148 and total naval Assets were 65 (Military 2018:1).

The historical background of the IDF can be traced to the *Yishuv* (Jewish community in Mandate Palestine) especially with arrival of the second Aliyah (1904-1914) or Jewish immigration. Bar-Giora was the first organisation established in September 1907 for the defence of Jewish agricultural settlements against small time thefts and intruding (Hemmingby 2011:7-8). After the two years, in 1909 it transformed into *Hashomer* which operated in the *Yishuv* until 1920 when the British mandate which came into effect (ibid).

In 1919, the General Assembly of the *Hashomer* underlined the need to begin establishing widespread settlements close to the existing boundary lines of Mandate Palestine for the purpose of defending the *Yishuv* and laying the groundwork for revolutionary national education. On the basis of this, the Assembly has decided to found a string of special cooperative settlements in the spirit of the ideas and principles of the *Hashomer*, which will serve as guard-posts along the frontiers (Drory 2004:44).

Hashomer was elite with narrow scope and its main work was to protect the community from criminal gangs. The Jewish Legion and Zion Mule Corps also helped *Hashomer* in the sphere of protection. Zion Mule Corps and Zion Mule Corps took part in the World War I and both were part of the British military campaign against the Ottoman Empire. In this manner they acquired military experience and the manpower which in turn were used in the protection of the *Yishuv*.

The *Yishuv* realised the need for a national level underground defence organization after the 1920 riots against the Jewish community and *Haganah* was established in June that year. Meanwhile, during 1936-1939 the Arab revolt happen in Palestine in which the *Haganah* played a very important role, especially in organizing Jewish defence. That time there were three main units, namely, Field Corps, Guard Corps, and the *Palmach* and after the Arab revolt the *Haganah* became a full-scale defence force of the *Yishuv*.

When the World War-II was happenings, the *Yishuv* took part on the side of Britain and this was the base for the latter day Israel Defence Forces. Days after the establishment of the State of Israel and amidst the first round of conflict with the neighbouring Arab states, on 26 May 1948, the Israeli Prime Minister and Defence Minister David Ben-Gurion issued the mandate for the creation of the Israel defence force. Indeed, he passed this order without any legal authority but the order was legalized by the cabinet on 31 May (Ostfeld 1994:104-106). Under this order with the sole exception of *Haganah*, all the Jewish armed forces were disbanded.

After some initial standoff *Irgun* and *Lehi* Jewish underground groups which were affiliated with the right Herut movement also agreed to join the IDF. A standoff emerged between some *Irgun* members and the newly created IDF because of some thorny issues (Neff 2016:4). Amidst the 1948 war, twelve armoured and infantry brigades were formed, namely, *Golani*, *Carmeli*, *Alexandroni*, *Kiryati*, *Givati*, *Etzioni*, the 7th, and 8th armoured brigades, *Oded*, *Harel*, *Yiftach*, and *Negev* (Pa'il 1982:15) and after the second ceasefire in July, "some of the groups were changed into reserve units and others were scattered" (Strategic Information and Developments 2013:185).

The IDF maintained the structure of the *Haganah*. After the ceasefire came into force on 18 July 1948, Israel moved to phase of relative stability and the IDF fought a series of wars with the Arab neighbours in the following decades. In 1956 the Israel attacked and briefly captured Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip and this was the first serious test for the Israeli military, even though the IDF withdrew from both these territories under intense American pressures (Lahav 2015: 1304).

After the Suez crisis the June war happened in in 1967. Known in Israel as the six-day war, this was a great success for the IDF. In this war the Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This was also important in terms of balance of power in the region which changed in favour of Israel and showed of role and capability of the IDF. In October 1973 Israel faced the combined Egyptian-Syrian attack on the Day of Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. After some initial setback, the IDF repulsed the Arab attack but the war came to symbolise the initial 'surprise' inflicted by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Israeli unpreparedness (Linda 2013:7). In between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which was established in 1964 became a major politico-military challenge to Israel and after the October war of 1973, prime the national security threats moved away from state actors to non-state actors. Indeed, the 1973 war was the last inter-state war that Israel had fought. The entry of non-state actors, namely PLO and later on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine continue to challenge the IDF in protecting Israel and its interests.

There are three factors which make the IDF capable of performing the integrating functions. First, conscription or compulsory military service is universal for the Jewish males between the age of 18-29, and for about thirty three per cent (2011) of the Jewish women between the age group of 18-26 (Al-Qazzaz 1973:148). The military is the only institution in Israel that can

reach and socialize almost all young adults. Second, Israel's army has vast amounts of resources, which no other institution can boast and this enables the army to penetrate areas either neglected or impenetrable by the civilian authorities and other national institutions (Perlmutter, 1969: 70). And, finally, for army to perform and achieve its objectives of defending the country, it needs to have a good, dependable, loyal, committed, and a highly qualified pool of human resources to draw upon to perform the function. In other words, the military has a vested interest in raising the quality and the standards of the people at large (Paret 1989: 137).

Organization of IDF

In terms of organization, all division of the IDF are responsible to the General Staff. There is a Chief-of-General-Staff with the rank of the Lieutenant General who is known as *Rav Aluf*. The work of the CSG is to respond and report directly to the defence minister and indirectly to the prime minister and cabinet. There is a main role of the cabinet is to appoint the Chiefs of Staff on the recommendations of the defence minister. The Chief of the General Staff is appointed for a three-year period but government can extend the tenure by a year but in rare case the Chief of General Staff served for five years.

List of Chiefs of Staff since 1948

No.	Name	Time period
1	Yaakov Dori	1-6- 1947 to 9 -11- 1949
2	Yigael Yadin	9 -11- 1949 to 7 -12- 1952
3	Mordechai Maklef	7 -12- 1952 to 6 – 12 - 1953
4	Moshe Dayan	6 - 12- 1953 to 29 - 1 - 1958
5	Haim Laskov	29 – 1 - 1958 to 1 -1- 1961
6	Tzvi Tzur	1 -1- 1961 to 1 – 1 – 1964
7	Yitzhak Rabin	1 -1- 1964 to 1 – 1 -1968
8	Haim Bar-Lev	1 -1- 1968 to 1 - 1-1972
9	David Elazar	1 -1-1972 to 3 - 4- 1974
10	Yitzhak Hofi (acting)	3- 4-1974 to 16-4- 1974
11	Mordechai Gur	16 -4-1974 to 16-4- 1978
12	Rafael Eitan	16-4- 1978 to 19 -4- 1983
13	Moshe Levi	19 – 4 - 1983 to 19 – 4 - 1987
14	Dan Shomron	19 - 4 - 1987 to 1 - 4 - 1991
15	Ehud Barak	1 - 4 - 1991 to 1 – 1 - 1995
16	Amnon Lipkin-Shahak	1 - 1 - 1995 to 9 - 7 - 1998
17	Shaul Mofaz	9 - 7 - 1998 to 9 – 7 -2002
18	Moshe Ya'alon	9 – 7 -2002 to 1 – 7 - 2005
19	Dan Halutz	1 - 7 -2005 to 14 - 2 - 2007

20	Gabi Ashkenazi	14 – 2 - 2007 to 14 - 2- 2011
21	Benny Gantz	14 – 2 - 2011 to 16 - 2 - 2015

(Ginsburg 2014:1)

Mission: The prime mission of the IDF is to defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State of Israel. It is also responsible for the protection of the inhabitants of Israel, people under its administrative control and to combat all forms of terrorism and violence which threaten the daily life of the citizens, residents and inhabitants (IMFA 2013:1)

Main doctrine: *Cannot afford to lose a single war!* This is the main doctrine of the IDF because of Israel’s small territorial size. Even a single military defeat could be fatal and any defeat would mean the end of Israel (Wiemer 2005:85). At its narrowest width, only 15 kilometres or 9 miles separate the coastal Israeli town of Netanya and the Palestinian town of Tulkarm in the West Bank. Because of the size, Israel has been avoiding wars or fighting them on the enemy territory. This doctrine attributed to the then Gen. Yitzhak Rabin was successfully implemented in the June War. Initiating a pre-emptive strike, the IDF successfully neutralised the air forces of Egypt and Syria and captured vast swaths of territory from them as well as from Jordan (Oren 2011:1).

Fight the war quickly and decisively: Both because of the territorial issue and cost considerations—human and material—the IDF believes that if war happen it must be end very quickly and decisively. A long war would be costly, especially in economic terms as the IDF relies primarily on conscription and reserve soldiers who are called for active duty and hence they cannot be kept away from their non-military economic activities for long without creating massive economic crisis for the country (Sorabji 2006:124).

Combating terrorism: The low-level individual violence and crimes during the *Yishuv* days gradually transformed into political violence and terrorism, especially since the early 1970s. Hence, combating terrorism has become one of the major challenges facing the IDF for the past decades (Aran 2013: 358).

Composition:

The IDF is comprised of three services, namely, regular service, permanent service and the reserves.

Regular Service: In Israel the army service is obligatory for all the citizens over the age of eighteen. It is compulsory for the Jews, Druze and Bedouins (Berdichevsky 2015:1). But the Arab citizens are exempted from the compulsory military service but they could opt for it (Refworld 2008:1). There are exemption on the basis of religious observance for the Jews, physical conditions and psychological background. Jewish women can be exempted if they are married, have children or adhere to religious lifestyle (Lenoff 2015:5).

The exemption granted to the Jewish religious community has been controversial and has been opposed by the secular Jewish population (Pewforum 2016:2). While they are formally exempted from the compulsory military service the states grants them all the financial rights and social privileges granted to the Jews who are serving in the military. This provision however is not available to the Arab citizens of Israel who also do not serve in the military. According to the Tal Law introduced in 2002 the ultra-Orthodox Jews were given exemption from military service but this led to a lot of controversies (Staff 2017:2). In February 2012 the Supreme Court declared the Tal Law to be illegal and advised the state to come up with a more equitable option for the military service (Levush 2012:1)

Until July 2015, Jewish men served for three years in the IDF and after that it was reduced to two years and eight months or 32 months (Staff 2015:1). Israeli woman serve for two years. After the three years (often) training the conscripts opt for military as a career and participate in the several war and combat operations (Blum: 2016:1). During the training some people are selected to become members of the special units such as *Unit 101*, *Palsar*, *Gadsar* etc.

The regular army is the backbone of the IDF both in times of peace and war. It is comparatively small and is made up of professional officers, non-commissioned officers, and volunteer soldiers and conscripted soldiers. In the early years, they were originally members of different youth movements (Etzioni, 1959: 6-7). Officers of this group are selected from conscripts who pass through a rigorous elimination process based on written tests and evaluation of performance (Heymont, 1968: 15). Since they come from the rank and file, these officers do not represent a special class origin but come from all walks of life. Officers are contracted on a three-year basis, renewable at the option of the government and the individual officers. The size of this group in the 1960s was estimated around 80,000 and represented one-seventh of

the Jewish population. In 2018, the size of the regular army is 170,000 when the Jewish Israeli population was put at 6,380,822 (World 2018:1).

Permanent service: This service is for those people who had finished the regular service and opt for military as their career. This service can be for short time as well as long-time (Agaiazian 2018:1). This service often starts after the compulsory service period but it is not compulsory that one has to join permanent military service immediately after the mandatory service. Most also join after a short gap. When this service established there was a contract between the permanent position holder and the IDF which decides that how long the person can serve and soldier's service duration can be extended.

After the regular service soldier goes in the permanent service. When they exchange from regular service to permanent service they get military positions which require a long training period. After coming in the permanent service the soldiers get full wages. They also receive pension after retirement. In 2013 the finance ministry says that "IDF Soldiers' pensions more than double the civil-service average" (Levinson 2013:1). The permanent service is characterized by high flexibility and the ability to mobilize almost immediately. It is also characterized by a high degree of professionalism and specialization. It functions to train and lead soldiers and to supervise and plan both for general administration and military operations.

The second group is basically those individuals who have completed their required military service. This group was bigger than first group in numbers. The group is divided into two distinct lines. The first is comprised of those reservists whose ages range between 21 and 39; and the second contains those whose ages range from 39 to 44. In November of 1969, however, the upper age limit of the second defines line was extended to 55 years as a result of the pressure of the June 1967 war and its aftermath (Al-Qazzaz 1973:146) In general the reservists undergo continuous training throughout annual reserve period lasting for three weeks, in which they live under condition similar to those war. Often these individuals have participated in Israel raid and attacks on Jordan, Syria and Egypt (Al-Qazzaz 1973:146).

Reserve service:

The reserve service starts after the completion of the regular service or conscription. This is not mandatory for those who have joined the military as the career. People can be exempted from reserve service and under normal peaceful circumstances individuals can fix schedule. There is no difference between males or females reserve service and it is up to one month every year. The age limit of this service is 40 for the enlisted soldiers and officers can serve until they

reach forty five. After the age of forty (enlisted) or forty-five (officers), individuals can be the volunteers with the authorisation of the Manpower Directorate of the IDF. They give immediate duty in the battle time (Heymont 1967:42). For females, the reserve period is shorter and can they be called until they reach 34 or get married or have children, whichever is earlier (Al-Qazzaz 1973:149)

Almost all the Jewish Israelis under the age of forty have served in the IDF. Only those above the age of forty are exempted and these are normally immigrants who came to Israel at a later age. Those people have not attained the age of forty or more are eligible for the reserve service and this means all the people who served in the IDF are almost eligible for reserve service. Many people do active service together and they periodically meet in the reserve duty after their discharge. Therefore, due to the reserve duty people meet each other after a long time and this create a strong bond in the Israeli society.

Due to the changing nature of the war and the introduction of technology and cyber war, the need for a larger army is reducing and for example, in 2015 only 26 per cent of people are qualified for reserve duty (Gross 2016:1). Hence, the size of the reserve soldiers has been reduced by the IDF. This was also partly due to improving efficiency. Virtually no exceptions exist for reservist called up in a time of crisis but experience has shown that it is not necessary that all the units would be called up every year. Exceptions exist and the recent resent example is the Second Lebanon War of 2006 (Martegani 2017:28)

According to the 2008 legislation Israel changed the duration of service. The maximum service age of enlisted people was fixed at forty and for the officers at forty five (Canada 2013:1). For reservist soldiers the age threshold forty. Many reservists are listed and updated yearly by the Knesset and through the Occupations executive order it is fixed at 45 or 49, depending on their military occupation and position.

According to Ruach Tzahal, there are three core values and ten secondary values which are followed by the IDF solders (Tzahal 2015:1).

Core values

Protection of state and citizens: The IDF's aim is to protect and secure the State of Israel. It is also obligated to protect the freedom of the people and its residents. Since the independence Israeli army did protect the people during the 1948 war, Suez War of 1956, June War of 1967,

October War of 1973 war, the First Lebanon War of 1982, , first intifada (1987-1991) , second intifada of 2000 and the Second Lebanon War of 2006.

Loyalty and Love of the Homeland: IDF has much love about the land and would be loyal to the nation and believes that Israel must remain a democratic and independent state. It works for Israel being national home of the Jewish people. They always ready to do anything for the homeland. The extreme example of this love for homeland can be seen in the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 over the ceding of the occupied territories to the Palestine National Authority headed by Yasser Arafat.

Human Dignity: It is the obligation for the IDF to protect of the human dignity and every human being, irrespective of his or her birth, religious conviction, sex, status or origin.

Secondary values

Missions to Victory: The IDF soldiers fight and face all kinds of dangers and obstacles with the courage and persist in their tasks with determination and even to the point of risking their own lives. Although Israel won all the wars many times in its Israeli history army faced extreme difficulties. The October war is one of the best examples. In this war the Israeli Army stood on the verge of defeat. The prolonged first Lebanon war which continued from 1982 until 2000 proved costly in terms of human lives and popular support.

Accountability: All the IDF service personnel are responsible and they actively participate in the defence of the nation, its citizens and residents. They do their duty honestly and fulfil their duty with assiduousness, participation, inventiveness (IMFA 2013:1). They complete their duties under the authority of their commanders. The 1967 war is the best example of army's accountability.

Credibility: IDF have much credibility and on issues pertaining to planning performance and reporting, IDF soldiers present their things accurately, totally and exactly (Roislén 2010:99). The IDF commanders believe in the IDF and they all act in a good manner and perform their task with transparency. But this value had blurred during the Yom Kippur war when the IDF was underprepared. Due to this cause the *Agranat Commission* came to investigate the failure of Israel defence force (Shlaim 1976: 351-357).

Personal Example: All the IDF personnel have a very good behaviour among one-another. They behave with others like they want for themselves. They are the role model for the society

because they show their capability and responsibility not only in the military but also their civilian lives (IMFA 2013:1).

Human Life: Israel recognizes the supreme value of human life and IDF try to protect the human life. Since the Jewish population in the world is small, protecting human life assumes importance. When war happens, the IDF members also live in the theatre of the death but their purpose is to carry out the mission and protect the lives of the people. Although Israeli army protect human life as much as possible but in the Second Lebanon war and fighting unconventional war the army could not protect the people as much as it wanted.

Purity of Arms: The IDF uses the power and weapon only for the fulfilment of the target. Purity in arms means the IDF believes in humanity. IDF will not attack those people who are the unarmed and also will not bad behaviour (harming, exile from the property etc.) of those people who caught in the war. Although the value of purity in arms shows that the Israeli military believe in the Just War Theory but in the war of independence the army did not follow this value, that time, everything was fair in war.

Professionalism: Professional knowledge is essential in the IDF because without this the soldiers cannot perform their task in a better way. They believe that without professional knowledge they cannot achieve their targets (Jewish Virtual Library 2018:1)

Discipline: Discipline is the key weapon of the Israeli military and all members try to give their best. They do complete their work successfully under the command and do work with the spirit. They follow order meticulously. In this way they limit the probabilities of illegal orders. But another aspect is this in the Lebanon war the Israeli army was indisciplined. The percentage of casualties of military were twenty per cent which was very high; thirty four soldiers killed by own air attack in Bekka valley and police discovered that 4000 hand grenades, 300 Galil rifles, 200 M-16 rifles, seven bazookas, forty-five light mortars and two heavy machine guns had been stolen from the Israeli army stores in Lebanon, proves that there are instances of indiscipline (Fisk 2001:568-569)

Comradeship: This value says that all the member of the IDF will live in fraternity with their comrades or friends. Whenever anyone needs, other comrades will go to help that particular person and vice versa. Swapping of imprisoned Palestinians for the release of kidnapped soldiers or their body parts can be cited as an example for comradeship (Grassiani 2003:116)

Sense of Mission: Service in the IDF is the like a mission for its members. They are always ready to give everything for the protection of the state. This happens because all the members of the IDF are responsible and work within a framework and under recognized command (Troy 2018:361).

The Israeli army moral believes in fighting terrorism. In 2005 Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin wrote on “Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective”. The conclusion of both the writers was that the murder of terrorists and fanatics are acceptable even at the cost of hammering close citizens (Kasher: 2005: 3-32).

Command and control: For the command and control of the IDF a basic law came into force in 1976. This codified and formalized the practice since 1948. According to this law, the IDF functions under the authority of the government which gives the formal authority to the defence minister for the functioning of the IDF. Its supreme commanding officer would be appointed by the government in consultation with the Defence Minister.

In practice, since the formation of the state, the IDF has enjoyed a lot of freedom and leeway and the Chief of General Staff was often present in the cabinet and security Cabinet meetings. The *Agranat* Commission inquiry commission following the October War considerably limited the powers of the prime minister, defence minister and the Chief of General Staff (Ben-Meir 1995:39-41). At the same time, the army did not lose its primacy in terms of decision making and continue to enjoy unparalleled influence within in the government, often at the expense of the civilian authorities (ibid).

Budget: Israel spends a lot of money on the defence force. From the 1950 to 1966 it spent nine per cent of its GDP on defence. After the 1967 and 1973 wars the defence expenses dramatically increased (CBS 2016: 28). In the 1980 budget it was twenty four per cent of the GDP. After the peace with Egypt and later on with Jordan the defence budget significantly came down. In 2009 Defence IDF got NIS 1.5 billion extra defence budget to aid security challenges concerning Iran. The highest allocation for defence was given in 2009-10. The budget was at NIS 48.6 billion in 2009 and NIS 53.2 billion for 2010. In 2011 the Israeli government tried to significantly cut the defence budget in favour of social programmes and in 2012 the Israeli defence budget was US\$15.2 billion. Shmuel Even, Eran Yashiv says that, according to budget proposal (October 2016), the Israeli government would invest 70.7 billion NIS in 2017 and 70.5 billion NIS would invest in 2018, on the defence (Even 2016:1).

Israeli Society

The Israeli society is one of the most heterogeneous societies known to sociologists. It is a country with half its citizen being immigrants from seventy countries with diverse political, ideological and religious backgrounds and differences (Roth 2017:7-9). Many of these immigrants, particularly the Mizrahi Jews and those from the West Asia and North Africa, lack knowledge of the Hebrew language. They were not pioneering Zionists in the sense of nation building and most of them came after the establishment of the state and hence had to face the condescending attitude of the Ashkenazi Jews who came to Palestine since the late 19th century. It was primarily the European Jewry which conceived, struggled and eventually established the Jewish state and hence they considered the Sephardi Jews to be lacking political dedication, intellectual commitment, and organization genius that characterize the European Jew (Fruitman 2001:9-14)

In the larger sense, however, the establishment of the state of Israel was a historical turning point for the Jewish people. For the *Yishuv*, the Jewish community in Mandate Palestine, the creation of the State of Israel had a major impact as it ended the centuries of statelessness. The partition of Palestine and the fleeing of most of the Arabs from what become the State of Israel provided yet another chapter in the turbulent history of this small land and resulted in the demographic and geographic disturbance that marked out the boundaries of a new Israeli collective (Nasrallah 2008:72).

Though a melting part of diverse communities, a close study of the Israeli society and its organizations and institutions reveals the fact that Israel is also a 'garrison state' (Silverstein 2018:1). Both in theory and practice, military matters receive a very high priority in Israel. The military also performs many functions and is in charge of many activities which are normally carried out by civilian institutions in other countries (Kaplan 2015:1-2). One can say without exaggeration that the Israeli army is the Israeli society and the Israeli society is the Israeli army (Moskey 2012:292). From the very inception, Israel's geopolitical and strategic conditions underpinned the concept as a "nation in arms," in which the civil-military interface is marked by permeable and floating boundaries (Sheffer 2010:67). This interface enables not only the "civilianization" of the military but also the "militarization" of civil society (Sheffer 2010:68)

Though Jews are an ancient people, Israel is a new state in terms of its population and its institutions. The only common historical connection shared by members of the society in the cultural tradition has been the centuries-old notion of “people without a nation” (Hawaii 2002:5). This clearly set Israel apart from its most, if not all the new nations, that emerged after the World War-II. The Israeli society is not an old society but it is a new society of old people and the social structure of Israel is therefore not the culmination of historical progress. Stretching over a generation it is a product of ancient developments that were related mainly to the Zionist settlement endeavour that began in the late 19th century. Israel thus differs from most developing countries whose traditional structures served as a source of constraints on development.

The society of Israel is unique. There is a diversity of social and cultural traditions. The influencing behaviour and values were mostly imported with the immigrants from their countries of origin. Even the common core of Jewish religion observance and belief was overlaid with local or original variations in life style and behaviour (Horowitz 2012: 8). Many of the immigrants had previously not been exposed to the far-reaching influence of the secularization that accompanied industrialization and political modernization in Europe and much of Mizrahi Jews were not affected by secularization, industrialisation and nationalism until they came to Israel (ibid). The establishment of the state added a new dimension to the identity of Arab residents who in addition in being Arab and Palestinians also became Israeli citizens. Israel Declaration of Independence established the state as a Jewish state in the historical Land of Israel or Eretz Israel (Avnery 1998:2). It proclaimed full social equality and political rights to all its citizens irrespective of their religion, race or sex. However, for the ethno-national Arab minority were never fully integrated and this is also reflected in their position in the social structure (Avnery 1998:3).

Upon its establishment, the state adopted the anthem and the flag from the pre-state Zionist movement and adopted seven-branched candelabrum of Jewish religious tradition as its official symbol. These in turn expressed the historical link to between the Jewish people and the land and since 1948 have been used to integrate new migrants into an Israeli culture marked by a high level of mobilization and a strong claim for collectively (Sela-Sheffy 2006: 40).

In Israel the national resources come under the control of the state. Until the 1990s the economy was highly centralized and state controlled major sectors of the economy, including banking and industries. Some of the core sectors like health and trade union were formally linked to the

Labour Party which monopolised the Israeli polity until the 1970s (Maman 2012:7-8). The domination of the state was also due to security threats and military plays the important role in that. The security issues resulted in the basic collective social awareness and influence for national unity which once again strengthened the role of the military (Civik 2004:9).

Since the 1970s, especially after the October War of 1973, the Israeli society was going through a process of social and ideological division. This led to polarization and formation of separate interest groups which in turn changed the economic structure and started financial reforms towards open market and migration mostly from the USSR (Jewish Virtual Library 2018:3).

The 1990s was also a transformative period for the Israeli society from united under single orientation into social division and multiculturalism (Yonah 2006:96). For long, the Israeli society mainly overcame these restraints by “rallying around the flag,” particularly at times of disasters and conflicts. However, the national consensus over war was severely eroded in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 war (Sheffer 2010:71) and seeming inefficiency of the military-led “Civil Administration” in the Occupied Lands during the first Intifada (1987–1991) (ibid). Both have severely undermined the social cohesion that was the hallmark of Israel in the earlier years.

The Israeli society has relied on varied sources for its social harmony and but most of them came with Zionism (Bekerman 2009:134). In the late nineteenth century due to the Zionist movement many Jews came from the Eastern and Western Europe towards rebuilding the Jewish home. Before the Zionist movement a small number of people of the Jews were living there since the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans in A.D. 70. Since 1882 the Jewish people came in the Palestine to fulfil the idea of the Zionist movement.

The Zionist movement was very successful and since 1948 people came in large numbers and were absorbed and integrated into the society. The Hebrew language adopted by the Jewish people because it was the ancient biblical language. The Jewish culture also succeeded and Hebrew, the ancient biblical language was revived and became modern spoken and the written language (Peers 2016:9). The revitalisation of Hebrew was closely linked to the emergence of the new Jewish state and aided to unity of the society and transformed into a common *lingua franca* of immigrants coming from different parts of the world (Peers 2016: 50). Hebrew indeed plays a key role in the formation of the Israeli national identity and social cohesion (Peers 2016: 25).

Despite the fact that Israeli society is very cooperative and the people's understanding is very high, differences also exist. According to Israeli sociologist S.N. Eisenstaedt including "the Jewish re-entry into history" of the contemporary Israeli society is still affected by difficulties, some of them being profound (Marshall 2002:136). Amongst these are problems that originate in all industrial and economically distinguished social systems, counting stratification by socioeconomic class, differential prestige attached to various occupations or professions, barriers to social mobility, and different qualities of life in urban centres, towns, and rural localities (ibid). For example, there are significant differences in the quality of life in the so-called development towns in the periphery and the rural agricultural localities known as *kibbutzim* and *moshavim* respectively and the urban centres of population.

The new society has found that it cannot escape tension between traditions and modernity as traditionalist enclaves challenge and undermine cultural and political patterns that were dominated the society since the days of the *Yishuv* and had shaped the emergent institutions of the state of Israel (Horowitz 2012: 9). Even seven decades after its formation, most Jews of the world live outside of the state of Israel; as of 2018, The Jewish population stands at approximately 6.589 million which is 43 per cent of the total Jewish population in the world (Staff 2018:1)

In addition Israel also has a sizeable non-Jewish minority who in 2018 made up 25.5 per cent of its total of population. These create a problem of identity for the individuals and of defining boundaries for society (ibid). While the establishment of the state resolved the some of the issues of collective Jewish identities it retained some of the contradiction of bi-national and bi-communal nature of the Mandate Palestine (Ma'oz 2002:1).

Israel has many other social problems and the most basic one pertains to Judaism. Should the traditional Judaism play a main role in the modern state? This has dominated the political and social debates since 1948 (Metz 1990:93). Tension between the religious and secular identities has affected all aspect of Israeli society; for example, the religious interferences are considerable in education. It is argued that education should be based on the religious perspective and the secular ideology does not accept this argument (Cochran 2017:39-40) (MJL 2018:1). Because of coalition compulsions, the religious parties decide that how political debates should be conducted. In Israel there is no civil marriage which highlights the influence and interference of the religion upon the society (Sharon 2017:4).

Another problem is this that the Jewish people who came to Israel from the Europe and America known as Ashkenazim and others who came from the Africa and the Asia are known as Sephardim or of late Mizrahim. Due to the divisions there came extreme culture diversity among the migrants (Elhaik: 2012). There are also contradictions between people who are living Israel and those who coming from outside of the immigrants because they belong to different cultures (Shahin 2007:20).

Even within the Jewish Israeli society, there are many differences. They are identified as parts ultra-orthodox (*haredim*), modern orthodox (*dati-leumi*), traditional (*masorati*), and secular (*hiloni*). In 2018 Central Bureau of Statistics figures show 74.5 per cent out of 8.842 million population is Jewish (Staff 2018:1)

As discussed earlier there is conflict between the religious and secular Jews and in the words of one scholar, the secular Jews resent the control that the rabbinic establishment has over some aspects of their lives and at the same time, many ultra-Orthodox Jews believe the country's laws should reflect a greater affinity for Jewish tradition and law (MJL 2018:1).

There is also cultural disharmony between the Jews and the non-Jews of Israel (Marshall 2002:137). Most of the non-Jews are Arabs. The non-Jewish population is mostly Muslim but there are also Christians and Druze. According to the population figures, in 2016 the Arabs made up 25.3 per cent of the Israeli population; of whom 17.7 per cent are Muslims, 2.0 per cent Christians, 1.6 per cent Druze and 4.1 per cent are others (SAI 2017:1). There are serious tension and conflict between the Jews and the Arabs who reside within the pre-June 1967 boundaries of Israel (Marshall 2002:137) as well as with the Arabs who live in the occupied territories, namely, West Bank, the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip (until the Israeli withdrawal of 2005). Both Jews and Arabs are all are equal before law. All citizens have freedom of religion including the freedom to worship and practice their faiths. All the religious communities are governed by spiritual leaders in accordance with their traditions, customs and personal laws. Besides Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the state also recognizes Druze and Baha'i as distinct faiths and ensures and protects their practices and customs (IRFR 2016:4).

American political scientist Bernard Reich has observed that "Israel is perhaps unique among states in having hostile neighbours on all of its borders, with the exception, since 1979, of Egypt" (IBP 2013:91). He says that even before its origin of the state, army has controlled all features of Israel. People's protection was the main feature of social life especially after the Arab-Jewish violence in 1929. Since then, there was conflict between Jews and non-Jews,

religious and the secularists Jewish, between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states (ibid). The Israeli soldiers often complain of the constant stress while serving in the Occupied Territories especially in the wake of the popular Intifada in December 1987 which in turn caused dissent, disagreements and even occasional disobedience within the IDF (ibid).

The Israeli education system also reflects the religious and ethnic diversity. There are different schools systems. In the school the Israeli Arabs can use the Arabic medium and Ultra-orthodox uses the Yiddish for the education. In the ultra-orthodox school there are mandatory the use of Hebrew and religious education. The Jews studies in secular schools are cultural rather than religious studies. There is another system which is known as an alternative school system (MJL 2018:1). Basically this school creates a common ground between the secular and religious schools. There are also experimental schools which bring secular and religious Israeli Jews as well as Arabs and Jews together (MJL 2018:1).

Nature of Israeli Civil –Military Relations

In Israel there is a very strong bond between the civilians and military. It is a small country in terms of both population (8.842 million) and geographical area (22,072 kilometres square, excluding Golan Heights and East Jerusalem which were annexed in 1980). Therefore, contacts and engagements among army officers, soldiers, and the civilian population are rather easy, continuous and almost happen on a daily basis. Military personnel can see their spouses, parents, relatives, and friends on weekends and holidays (Al-Qazzaz 1973:158). These increase the familiarities between the military personnel and the civilians. It also decreases the chance of developing a closed, isolated, and segregated military class with a separate culture, life style, prestige symbols, and political ideology. The presence of a separate military class tends to breed political ambitions in the minds of officers, which in turn may upset the stability and continuity of the political structure (ibid).

Moreover, there is a habit in the civilian population that they always raise the morale of the army. This motivates the Israeli army for high performance in any circumstances. Long periods of separation from parents, friends, or loved ones tend to generate anxiety which can undermine the unity and cohesiveness of the armed forces leading to lower performance. Such anxieties and fears are characteristic of many army units of big countries (Etzioni, 1959: 6). In other words, constant contact between army and society is very important in keeping the battlefield and the home close together.

Army also do help in the light and heavy industry which produce goods and material for military and civilian. The Ministry of Defence owns and runs a sizable industrial and research complexes which produce many products such as small arms, light and medium weapons, spare parts, and ammunition for military equipment. The recent example is RAFAEL which was founded within the Ministry of defence (Epicos 2016:1). Because of the size of the domestic market and the cost of research and development, military deliberately cultivates an export market. In 2017 Israel's defence-related exports was US\$9.2 billion and the most important export market is the Asia and Pacific region (Kubovich 2018:1).

The hard currency resulting from export is used to buy strategic materials, for capital equipment, and for investment for research and development. The army also runs the best and largest research laboratories in which top scientists work for the development of electronic devices for military and civilian use. The Israeli institutes also developed high-tech computing technology, such as WAIZAC computer¹ which was built at the Weizmann institute during 1954-55. Today Israel has well established aircraft and electronics industries and some of the prominent Israeli defence companies include Rafael, Israel Military Industry, Israel Aircraft Industry (Zureik 2010:155).

The Israeli army is not only an important mechanism for domestic integration, but also for its foreign policy interests. The army plays a significant role in furthering not only Israel's security but also in establishing and strengthening ties and relationships with both advanced and underdeveloped countries. Its relation with the former is based on the need to import modern arms, train Israeli officers in the use of modern military equipment, and for updating military theory and concepts. Over the period 2009-2018, the Israel got US\$30 billion military aid from the United States and "the United States will give Israel US\$38 billion in military assistance over the next decade"(Baker 2016:1).

In 2017 the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel and visualized that "the two countries will become close partners in development, technology, innovation, entrepreneurship, defence and security" (*The Economic Times* 2017:1). Moreover, these nations cooperate with Israel to develop the military industry for mutual benefits. Israel's military related cooperation with the developing world covers the following fields: export of arms, sending experts to organize armies, and training their officers in Israel's military schools. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Israel is the 7th largest

¹WAIZAC (Weizmann Automatic Computer) was the first modern electronic computer.

exporter of weapon. From 2013 to 2017 Israel export 49 per cent weapon to India, 13 per cent to Azerbaijan and 6.3 per cent Vietnam (Hass 2018:1).

The Israeli army through its various organizations such as *Nahal* and *Gadna* penetrates the society of these countries (Kaplan 2015:2). It tries to convince the people of the value and significance of these organizations in training and preparing youth in different techniques for developing their countries socially and economically. The Israeli army, in cooperation with other governments, twelve hundred students from across the country are expected to experience the unique *Gadna* course inside an IDF combat training base in 2017. In 2016 this number was eight hundred (Zitun 2017:1).

During the initial phases of Israel, The basic aim of these sessions was to create and develop a group of leaders in these developing countries who sympathize with Israel's objectives and who can influence their people and governments (Al-Qazzaz 1973:162). Behind this act the Israeli hope was that governments will strengthen ties with Israel and vote favourably in the United Nations (ibid).

Relations between Soldiers and Officers

In Israel officers are well trained and are encouraged to lead their men and women. The general order in the battle is "*Follow me*" (*harai*) and not "*Forward march*" (*kadima*) (Al-Qazzaz 1973: 156) Leadership through exemplary behaviour is reinforced from the chief of staff through officers' training schools down to privates. There, the subordinates follow the order of military officers and maintain the loyalty which is expected by the military officers. The military officers also do not show the power of rank in front of the soldiers (Etzioni 1960: 12). He is expected to build a personal rapport with them which will highly motivate to follow his orders willingly (Etzioni 1960: 12). The June War demonstrated this point very clearly. Apart from the chief of staff, there were only two ranks that did not actually fight and rest of the officers, including colonels, were in the battle field. Among the 781 fatal casualties in the war as many as eight were high-ranking officers (Rolbant 1970: 175). Between 2000-2005 (Second Intifada) 218 IDF people died in the West Bank Gaza Strip and 83 IDF people killed inside Israel and those killed included both soldiers and officers (BBC 2005:1).

The tradition which requires the officers to be at the head of the troops can be explained by a combination of socio-historical factors. It is rooted in *Haganah* (underground pre-state defence force) days when the commander was deemed to be the principle actor not a stage manager (Al-Qazzaz 1973:156). He was expected to lead his group and be in the front lines. Second, the

modern day war demands that a leader be on the spot to direct and evaluate the operation and to make decisions that fit with the changing situations of the battle. Being present on the battlefield at the crucial moment enables the leader to make good use of the latest information and thereby turn the situation to his advantage (Al-Qazzaz 1973:157). On the other hand, directing the battle from behind not only leaves the leader out of touch with the ground reality but also makes it difficult to conduct the battle efficiently. If something went wrong, it would be very difficult to remedy the situation (ibid).

Third, there are no big difference in between soldiers and officers in terms education and age. This is true more for the reserves than the conscripts. Many reservists have college education and technical skills that resemble their commanding officers. In other words, the reservists are not illiterates or semi-literates, as is the case in many developing nations. These people are motivated more by what Etzioni calls ‘normative power’, which is sanctioned through exemplary behaviour and actual involvement, than by the categorization of the military rank (Azim 1975:681)

The civil-military relations in Israel have symbiotic nature under the condition of low intensity conflict and hence, “they maintain the status of partnership rather than being strictly subordinate to political leaders in the decision-making process” (Peri 2002: 11-12). Because of the monopoly of the IDF on the evolution of strategic intelligence and planning the entire political system is dependent on the military leadership. Another cause for this dependency is the absence of an important other skilled agency or body that would counter the IDF analyses and recommendations (Lissak and Horowitz 1989: 208). The Chief of Staff’s “access to the inner core of policymaking as the government’s military adviser renders him one of the three most powerful figures in the Israeli political system, and enables him to take part in ad hoc civil-military alignments with or against the Defence Minister (DM) or the Prime Minister” (Peri 1983:145-48).

Scholars on the civil-military relations agree that Israel cannot be considered a “praetorian” or “garrison state,” (Perlmutter1977: 267; Kimmerling 2001: 226). The highly visible and recognized role of the military in the state has endangered democracy and the participation of the civilian in the policymaking (Peri 1983: 8) but it is equally true that IDF has a greater role and influence in making the security policy. IDF acts as a serious restraint on the political system during the war and peace and “always tries to constructs public discourse of security in theory and practice” (Peri 2002: 22).

Besides national security, the IDF have many faces in the Israel. It is involved in the society, economy and politics and plays important role in the area of the education and settlement in the frontier area. There was a military government over the Arab population from the 1948 to 1966 and over the occupied territory from the 1967 (Bisharat 2013:1).

In the process, the IDF shaped the “cultural code of a civilian militarism” (Kimmerling 2001:209) with the strategic intelligence and planning. Another function of the IDF is “is to shape the public opinion through consistent off-the-record summits on security and Arab affairs delivered to the civil media, which allows the previous to disseminate its own interpretations and perceptions of events directly, as well as through the inputs of former senior military officers in civil think tanks” (Sela 2007:55).

It is not that the security policy of Israel is made only by the military but the civil society also participate and affect it. The civil society mainly raises the issue of the public sphere. After the October War the Israeli public were continuously facing threats individually and collectively from the non-state actors. Hence, Israel had to rejuvenate the public esteem towards the military leaders and to help the IDF because the latter is the ultimate guarantor of the sovereign Jewish survival and the national symbol of the most trustworthy state institution. In other words, “due to the decline of traditional constitutive social and political institutions since the early 1970s allowed senior military officers to become an integral part of the social and political elite” (Sheffer 2010:71). After the 1970s one can notice that senior officers such as Yitzhak Rabin, Ezer Weizman, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Barak reached key official positions in the legislature, and executive. Some were also successful in the also private economy, local government and the educational system (Barak and Gabriel 2006: 235-267)

In the sphere of the policy making or the policy implementation related to national security, there is partnership between the civilian and military elites. This is characterised as “political-military relations” because it happen between the military and civilian elites and is established in clearly defined spheres and this pattern prevailed in much of Israeli history. This has prevented the imposition of effective civilian control over the military in “pure” military matters (Owen1992:216).

The continuous involvement of political parties in running the IDF since 1948, most notably when the *MAPAI* was the dominant player (1948-77) began when David Ben-Gurion was the prime minister (1948-1954). After the June 1967 this gained momentum (Peri 1983: 8-9) and the IDF gained more importance and expended control within Israel as well as in the Occupied

Territories and as in the “security zone” in southern Lebanon until 2000. The IDF created and determined the larger discourse pertaining to the Israel-Palestine conflict and gave the shape among the Israel’s political elite (Schiff 1995:7).

In terms of the nature of the civil-military relations there are main approaches, namely, *Traditional approach, Critical approach and New-critical approach* (Sheffer 2010: 14).

Traditional approach: This approach says that there is a firm civilian control over the military in Israel and believes that the control was done by the state’s civilian institutions with the IDF playing its role. The IDF is ‘civilianised’ and this approach believes that IDF is a political actor and Israel is a “nation in arms” or “civilianized military in a partially militarized society” (Horowitz: 1982:77).

Critical approach: This approach says that the civilian control of the military is done through the dominant political party but says that during war or emergency, the control of the civilian or the dominant party is insufficient. During those times, the military takes almost all the decision. This approach also believes that IDF is a political actor. Furthermore, this approach says that there is “military democracy” in Israel (Peri 1983: 286).

In this approach some writers suggested that the militarisation of the society and politics it is not good because it will be end of the civilian control of the military. Other writer believes that this progression should be in fact allow for the state’s civilian institutions to found mechanisms for control of the military by making the IDF “dependent on the state’s resources” in return for legitimacy and prestige accorded to the civilian institutions (Levy 2010:104-106). They believe that there should be agreement and cooperation among the political elites, military and the citizens and through this way the military intervention can be reduced in the Israeli politics (Schiff 1995: 17-19).

The critical approach also characterise Israel as a “nation” in arms” and says that there is a partnership between the security establishment and the civilian population. It claimed that in the beginning the civil military relation was the “apparat control”² and the control exercised by *MAPAI* party headed by Ben-Gurion over the security sphere (Sheffer 2010: 24).

New critical approach: This approach believes that there is no civilian control of the military and this undermines the civil sector (Sheffer 2010:19). It believes that the civilian control is inherently very weak and in reality there is no civilian control of the military (Barak 2007:12).

² Apparat is tube administrative system of a left party(in Israel it uses for the centre- left party)

In addition, this approach says that earlier writers did try to end the stigma of the military by defining Israel as a nation in arms with a positive meaning. They did not show Israel as a “garrison state” or “praetorian society”, expressions which reflect the true nature of Israel (Sheffer 1996: 13-38). The new critical approach says that the military is a main arena for social exchange in terms of class, culture, ethnic, gender etc. and hence it is very difficult to assess the military’s place in the state and society. The new critical approach questioned Israel as a “praetorian state” that is imbued with a “militaristic” spirit (Barak 2007:9).

Some of the scholars such as Ben-Eliezer say that Israel is an incomplete process of state formation. It still faces an existential threat (to a large extent, propagated by the security sector) and hence due to these the civilian control of the military and other security agencies is indeed “pathetic and challenging” (Sheffer 2010:27). They do in the United States where the “post-modern army” imagined by some authors became mostly outshined following the events of September 11 terror attacks (Ben-Eliezer 2004: 55-56)

Oren Barak says that “due to necessity and especially because of the military’s significant role in the realm of national security, the boundaries between these two subsystems became somewhat fragmented. This fragmentation allowed interaction between the two subsystems, which mainly meant that the military has been able to engage in civilian tasks such as settlement, agriculture, and education, and could participate in policymaking in the area of national security but without undermining the civilian control”(Barak 2007:3).

Different thinkers have different opinions about the civil-military relations in Israel. Some of the scholars say that in Israel as being dominated by the “military-industrial complex” (Mintz 1985: 623-624). Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak suggest analysing Israel’s pattern of civil–military relations in terms of a “security network” (Barak and Gabriel 2006:235-61). Quite differently, Stuart Cohen proposes examining a phenomenon that he terms the “inverted turnabout,” which occurs in the relationship between the political and military levels (Cohen: 2006). Yoram Peri deals with the political–military partnership in Israel during the last two decades (Peri 2006). Moshe Lissak first introduced the term “security–political culture” in his discussion of the convergence between the IDF and Israeli society in the early 1990s (Lissak 1992:55-80)

According to Don M. Snider, the term “military culture refers to the structure of the military organization and is based on commonly accepted assumptions, norms, values, customs, and traditions that over time have collectively created common expectations among members of

the organization” (Heng 2013:6). The term political–security culture refers to the interaction between the political and military systems in shaping a state or a society’s security policy. This comprises security thinking, institutional and organizational development for policy implementation, working arrangements between the political and military elites and political supremacy patterns over the military (Bar-or 2010:262). The greater the number of contact points between the political and military cultures, the greater the need becomes for closer coordination and cooperation (ibid). The political–security culture is a dynamic environment that changes in conjunction with political, social, economic, security and technological developments and with the leadership’s influence on its operations (ibid).

Responsible elements

The civil-military relation is a cooperative and unbreakable bond between the military and society. Behind this are many elements which are responsible. One, hostile neighbours are the most responsible element for the Israeli civil-military relations. Due to the hostility of its neighbours, Israel faced many wars and it becomes mandatory to protect the nation from attacks and this work is done by the Israeli military. Hence, people believe that they exist because of the military. This results in them cooperating and helping the military as possible as (Lissak and Horowitz 1989: 32, 97). Second, Israel is a less populated country and because of this they interact each other and they have common concern. Three, in terms of territory Israel is small and this results in greater civil-military relations.

Four, the Israeli military is very loyal towards the people. According to various public opinion polls, the largest number of people believes in the military followed by Mossad, judiciary and the political parties in that order. And lastly due to continuous wars, the Israelis became cooperative and helpful towards the military. In the first two decades of independence the Israeli society was led by a relatively coherent ruling elite which utilized state instruments to assimilate the newcomers into an Israeli culture marked through high level of mobilizations and strong claims for collectively (Sela 2007:56).

Conclusion

Therefore, one can conclude from the above discussion of Israel defence force and society that it is a citizen army, in which almost every able Israeli adult is either in active service or on reserve. Unlike other armies, the Israeli army is an important vehicle for social integration, economic and social modernization and, above all, nation-building. The army is part of everything going on in Israel. It helps archaeologists, educates immigrants, aids agriculture,

promotes Hebrew and Jewish culture, supports religious life, teaches youth, and trains workers. And most important work of Israel defence force is to protect the people from the enemy nations. Due to these the Israeli people have so much belief in the military and help the IDF as much as possible in any conditions.

Chapter Three:

Arab-Israel Conflicts and Peace Treaties

According to Thomas Hobbes human behaviour is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short and on the basis of this argument one can say that wherever there are human beings, conflicts will always be present (Hobbes 1991: 88–89) Conflict is everywhere from the individual level to international level. There are three main causes for conflicts, namely, attitude, behaviour and contradictory goals (Galtung 1958:105).

Conflict means, competitive or opposing action of incompatibles; antagonistic state or action (such as divergent ideas, interests, or persons), a conflict of principles, mental struggle resulting from incompatible or opposing needs, drives, wishes, or external or internal demands (Smith 1966). Smith defines conflict as “a situation in which the conditions, practices or goals for the different participants are inherently incompatible” (Richard 2017:106). Other definition of conflict is a type of behaviour which occurs when two or more parties are in opposition or in battle as a result of perceived relations, relative deprivation from the activities or interacting with another person or group (Litterer 1966:180).

Litterer (1966) sees conflict as a type of behaviour, while Smith (1966) considers it as a situation. However, both of these scholars and Tedeschi et al. (1973) understand the term ‘conflict’ to denote the result of incompatible or oppositional goals, activities, or interactions among social entities (Akdeniz 2014:17). Boram (1990) after the reviewing a number of recent definition of conflict, concluded that although definition is not identical, the overlap with respect to the following respect-

1. Conflict includes opposing interest between individuals or groups in a zero-sum situation.
2. Such opposed interests must be recognised for conflict to exist.
3. Conflict involves beliefs by each sides that the other will thwart (or has already thwarted) its interests.
4. Conflict is a process and develops out of existing relationships between individuals or groups and reflects their past interactions and contexts in which these took place; and
5. Imply action by one or both sides that do in fact produce thwarting of other goals.

Conflict is defined as an interactive manifested in compatibility, disagreements or dissonance within or between social entities. (ibid).

There are many kinds of conflicts. Retributive conflict is one of them and here the conflict is characterised by a situation where the conflicting entities feel the need for a down-out conflict to punish the opponent. In other words, each party determines it gains, in part but also the incurring costs to the other party; the example for retributive conflicts is the Palestine Israel conflict (Satty 1990: 49).

Arab Israel conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict is always in the news. It is a hotspot and epicentre of the conflicts in the West Asia. It is always debated among the intellectuals, activists and in the media. After focusing on this conflict one finds that this conflict is mainly political, military and territorial conflict. A numbers of states and parties are involved in this conflict. The traditionally problem of this conflict is the Holy Land. Both Jews and the Arabs stakes claims over the holy land. It is the epicentre of this conflict (Spiro 2000:1). This conflict does not affect only the involved country but also affect bigger international community.

The starting point was the Arab Israel conflict in 1882 (Neal 1995:1). In 1882 the first Jews started to arrive in the Holy Land and this emigration of Jews is known as Aliya. They were coming from different parts of the world but mainly from the central Asia. They saw holy hand as their spiritual place. In 1917, through the Balfour declaration the Britain stamped its approval of the Jewish national home (William 2017:1) it has been sure that in Palestine there will be a Jewish national home.

The Arab Israeli conflict is a very wide issue. This issue cannot set in a narrow framework. For the proper understanding of the Arab Israel conflict one has to go 70 AD. In that year, the Second Temple of the Jews was destroyed by the Romans and Jews became an exiled community. For nearly two millennia, the Jewish people lived a life filled with “suffering, subjugation, destruction and death” (Kumaraswamy 2015:1). During that time the Jewish cultural and religious identities were totally different from the Christian and Muslims (BPS 2002:1). Christians and Muslims were in the majority. Jewish were in the minority and they were harassed by the majority people due to the cultural and religious differences. Although they lived in the group but they were still in the trouble. Another thing is during that time the Jewish unfriendliness from the majority population was often mutual. Neither could they

integrate themselves with the majority nor could the latter accept them as different but equal subjects. Quotes then

During that time in the Islamic world the life of Jews people was normally peaceful (Projetaladin 2009:1). As a *people of the book*, Islam recognised them as the owner of a revealed and sacred (though not final) text and hence their lives and properties were to be guaranteed and safeguarded. It was accepted that Islamic rulers would ensure the protection of Jewish properties and tolerate the Jewish people.

During that time the Jewish life was more miserable in Christian Europe rather than Islamic world. That time they were suffering from Anti-Semitic activities. Like they were facing organised violence, forced conversion, forceful expulsions, persecutions, ghetto, and pogroms. Seen in the larger context, the Nazi holocaust was the unlimited cruelty that visited the community under Christianity (Dalin 2007:1). At the same time, it is essential to recognise the positive contribution of the Renaissance and the French revolution, which brought about an overall improvement in the conditions of the Jews in Europe.

For centuries the doors of the educational opportunities and political participations in Europe were closed for the Jewish people due to religious differences (Malik 2007:1). But interesting this was this that the commercial activity were not closed because the Christians were thinking that the commercial activity will help in building of industrial Europe and the Jewish people would play a constructive role in that process.

In the 1890s, the passion of nationalism became stronger in Europe. Due to this passion a new trend of conflicts emerged. The emergence of nationalist thinking renewed Anti-Semitism around the globe. This was witnessed during the Dreyfus trial in France in the 1894 (Kovacs 2012:1). This kind of thinking of Christian people created a big aspiration among the Jews people for the nationalist consciousness.

That time the Jewish people started perceive themselves as a distinct nation in Europe but without a clearly defined boundary. The Jewish people have understood very well that the Jewish nationalist aspiration could be fulfilled only through the achievement of a national home. The cause of this thought was Anti-Semitism in Europe. It was the wish of the Jewish people and also a response to the Christians from whom they suffered a lot. The establishment of the national home was the solution for many problems like the problem of statelessness. The Jewish people also desired that should be a normal national life in an environment that should also be Jewish. They felt this could be fulfilled only with the national home (Simpson 1944: 1)

This is right that the Zionist movement was an extraordinary movement. It was not like other movement that were happening in other parts of the world. While other national liberation movement sought to liberate both people and land from colonialism, Zionism was different. It primary sought to free the Jews not from their immediate rulers in Europe but not liberate their historical suffering. "The diasporic life rather than any specific oppressor was its adversary" (Kumaraswamy 2006:16).

Second thing which is more interesting was that the intention of Zionism was never to liberate the lands where the Jews were living. In any liberation movement the demands is always to liberate the land where they are living. This thing did not apply for the Zionist movement. The aim of the Zionist movement was to liberate that land where Jewish people are very less but where the Jewish people will go there for own liberation. This is what was happening. When they proposed a homeland in Palestine, there were living in a very small number in that territory and most of the Jewish people were living in the diaspora. They came at their historic home land for their liberation.

The central plan of the Zionist leader was immigration of the Jewish people from the different parts of the world to their Holy Land and this immigration is known as Aliya (Reform Judaism 2018:1) .In the latter time Aliya become the basis for the Zionist movement.

It is often seen that when human migrate they face economic problems, religious forces, or social violence. This was true for the Zionist movement. It was a home to which a group of people would return and a place where the people would go so that a home could be establish. Its supports believed that not only was a people in search as a home but also a home was in search its people. In this sense, the Zionism is unique in annals of history (Kumaraswamy 2015:3). This kind of the thinking felt that they should go to Palestine in any circumstances. This was the situation when the first wave of Jewish immigration to the holy land stared in 1882 and between "1882 and 1947, 512,000 Jews came to Palestine for the purpose of constructing their homeland following the establishment of Israel in 1948, around 685000 more Jews immigrated to the new state" (Kumaraswamy 2015:3)

When bulks of people were migrating to their future homeland the Zionist leaders were thinking about the security. They felt security that can be achieved with the support of the great powers. The Zionist leader recognised that the support of major powers will stake in the Palestine. Lots of efforts were made by the Zionist for the support of the great powers. Finally

the Zionists got the support of the Great Britain. In the 1917 the Balfour declaration came and did support the formation of a national Jewish home in Palestine (Shlaim 2005:1)

During that time all the liberation movement were fighting against the colonial powers but this was not happening with the Zionist movement. This movement was supported by the Great Britain and the Zionism was getting benefits from the colonial powers (Makovsky 2007: 1). Second thing is the Arab nationalists were trying to tie with other nationalist movements but they cannot cooperate with the Zionist movement. While the rest of the movements were against the colonial powers the Zionist movement was not against the colonial power. The Arab nationalists had believed that Israel is a friend of imperial power and in the later years, during The Suez War of 1956 Britain and France fought with the side of Israel (Aljazeera 2008:1). This often led to Jewish nationalism and later on the State of Israel being seen as a colonial state.

The demands of the national home for Jews were logical and evitable. But the problem was that where the Jewish people were demanding a particular land that land was not an empty land. There was a living population of Arabs. They were living there for a long period. Only time when they were not the rulers was during the crusade period, that is, between 1099 and 1291 which was the brief period. The holy land was under continuous Islamic rule since the late seventeenth century. "The Palestinians considered themselves to be descended not only from Arab conquerors of the seventh century but also from indigenous peoples who had lived in the country since time immemorial."(Tabarani 2008:28) This statement also proves that there were root of the Arab population in the Holy Land or Palestine.

So picture was that the Jewish national home came in to the conflict with the rights of the Arabs inhabitants of Palestine. Thus, the exercise of the Jewish national home comes in to conflict with the rights of the Arabs inhabitants of Palestine. The realisation of the national aspiration of the Jews in Diaspora come in to inevitable and even irreconcilable conflict with the right of the native inhabitants. If the rise of nationalism in Europe spurred the emergence of Jewish nationalism, the birth of Zionism paved the way for the emergence of Palestinian nationalism. The Palestinian land has been changed into battleground for two nationalist movements. In other words, two competing nationalisms started combating over the same piece of land (Copeland 2002:1).

Since this conflict started, participant and outsider observers are giving suggestions about this conflict. Writing in the early 20th century, British author Israel Zangwill says that Zionism was

about “people without land going to land without people”(Kumaraswamy 2015:5).This statement shows that the attitude of the Zionist leadership towards the people of Palestine and their political rights.

The Balfour declaration also talks about the rights of non-Jews community. This was irony that during that time the non-Jewish population was over 90 per cent (Lynfield 2017:4). But they have no political rights. From the side of Palestinian nationalism they were not ready to recognise the historic links of the Jews to the land of their forefathers. They did not accept any claim of Jewish people over the Palestinian land. The Jewish people were demanding internal autonomy in Palestine but even this demand was not accepted by the Palestinian leadership. In 1947 the bi-national solution came into the discourse and a bi-national Palestine could have been the solution of this conflict. But this proposal also rejected by the Palestinian leaderships (Farsakh 2016:381).

The formation of Israel in 1948 increased the hostility with the Palestinians. In the later time, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964. The Palestine Liberation Organization’s aim was the destruction of Israel. The PLO believes that the Balfour Declaration and the immigration of Jews from the Diaspora were morally wrong and hence had to be reversed (Humphries 2006:121).

This kind of thinking was present until 1988 among the Palestinian leadership. In 1988, the PLO accepted the partition resolution of 1947 (Feldner 1998:1) and the idea that a Palestinian state would coexist with Israel. This feeling of coexistence was established in September 1993, when Israel and the PLO granted mutual recognition to each other, thereby ushering in the peace process in Oslo (Kelman 2007:287-288).

Partition of Palestine: During the World War I, through a series of letters, known as the Hussein McMahon Correspondence (July 1915–March 1916), Britain promised with the Sharif Hussein of Mecca that it would make the latter the ruler of a separate Arab kingdom if he would support the British war efforts against the Ottoman Empire (Friedman 1970: 86) Then, after sometime, Britain supported the Jewish national home through the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917. So it was clear that Palestine would not be the part of Arab kingdom that was promised to Hussein. Further the matter become more complicated. In 1916 the Sykes –picot agreement came. This agreement divided the Ottoman Empire. By this agreement Britain and France spoiled the Ottoman Empire (History 2018:1). Upon taking over the mandate of Palestine in 1922, Great Britain tried to resolve its contradictory commitments to the Arabs and the Jews.

There was a hope that the Arab consent could be secured for the wave of Jewish immigrations into Palestine and a homeland for them as visualised the Balfour Declaration (Gilbert 2011:1). But after some time Zionist people started to purchase lands in the Palestine. This act of the Jewish people was strongly opposed by the Arab inhabitants. This opposition often showed in protests, inter-communal tension and organized or unorganized violence. Finally all the disputes had led a violent conflict and the Arab revolt (1936-1939) started (Kimmerling 2003:1). In 1939 the Arab leader pressurised the British and told them to abandon their commitment to the Balfour Declaration. They were saying that here must be rules which would limit the Jewish immigrations to and land purchase in Palestine.

The ends of World War II crate the new challenges for all the parties. If one looks at it in the World War II the Zionist people were supporting the Britain in Europe but similarly they were opposing the mandate policy in the Palestine and they were continuously supporting the smuggling of illegal immigrants into Palestine. In the end of the war, the Britain has been lost its powers and its weaknesses were exposed. It was withdrawing from the colonies. In 1946 Britain took the decision to withdraw from the India and consequently the interest of Britain weakened in Palestine (Beckerman-Boys 2013:19). The onset of Anti-British violence from the Revisionist Zionists also stretched the British military.

After a long time, Britain recognized the conflicting nature of its promises to the Arabs and Jews and the failure of the mandate to prepare Palestine for self-governance. Finally in 1947 the United Nations came into the picture. In April 1947 the Britain handover the Palestine problem to the UN and requested the world body to find out a solution of this problem and determine the future of Palestine (Fincham 2015:1)

After some time, a UN committee was appointed. The name of this committee was United Nation Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). There were eleven members in this committee they were and Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The purpose of this committee was to determine the future of Palestine. The meetings of this committee were held in New York, Palestine, Beirut, and Geneva and on 1 September 1947 the UNSCOP submitted its report (Ben-Dror 2008:519-520).

The most of the committee members were agree on the issues of economic cooperation, protection of holy places land but the committee was divided on the issue of Palestine's future, which was the core issue. A seven-member majority supported the partition plan (Ben-Dror

2007:259-260). Under this Palestine would be partitioned into independent Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem and its neighbourhoods would be an international city. But India and two other members, Iran and Yugoslavia supported a federal plan (Kumaraswamy 2017:2). Basically they were supporting that the internal autonomy should be granted to the Jewish people within the federal Palestine. Australia absented from supporting either of the plans.

The Federal Plan was rejected by the both Zionist leadership and Arabs. The problem was this plan was giving religious and civil rights to the Jewish people but they were demanding political rights and sovereignty. The Arab people were also not accepting this plan because they were thinking that the people of Jewish who had immigrated to Palestine from outside were getting many concessions from this plan. The plan of partition was supported by the Zionist people. Although, there were doubts about the size and territorial limits, this plan gave hopes for ending the two millennia of Jewish statelessness. For the first time the Jewish people were getting the sovereignty over the land of their forefathers. Hence, the *Yishuv*, the Jewish community in Palestine, welcomed the partition plan.

After the lots of the difficulties and discussions the UN General Assembly approved the Partition Plan on 29 November 1947(Akasaka 2008:7). The final vote was thirty three nations in favour, thirteen nations were against and ten members abstained. The UN vote and the British decision to pull out of Palestine by 15 May 1948 intensified the Arab–Jewish tensions and violence in Palestine.

After the partition vote in the UN both side were doing preparations for military enmity. The neighbour of the Arab states, namely, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria wanted to stop the implementation of the partition resolution. They could not directly intervention because of the presence of the Britain. The violence forced the United Nations to convene a second special session of the General Assembly, where plans to “Freeze” the partition resolution were actively followed (UN 1995:3).

On 14 May 1948, hours before the British departure from the Palestine, the Zionist leaders met in Tel Aviv and declared the establishment of the State of Israel. After this declaration, the US recognised it within minutes and after this the allies of the US also recognised Israel (IMFA 2013:1). This was followed by attacks on the territory of Mandate Palestine by the Iraqi troops, Palestinian fighters and the armies of neighbouring Arab states. Thus, began the Arab–Israeli military conflict and hostilities.

Post-independence Phase: The formal conflicts between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries started on 15 May 1948, the partition plan had already revealed massive violence and sowed seeds of the 1948 war. The Jewish and Arab confrontations further enlarged as the British withdrawal approached and which led to brutal massacre of civilians, as in Deir Yassin carnage in April 1948 and the murders of score of Jewish doctors a few days later. The establishment of Israel and the following declaration of war by Arab countries transformed the Arab and Jewish conflict in Palestine into an interstate Arab-Israel conflict (Tolan 2008:1).

At the early years of the mandate, the Arab-Jewish conflict and violent incidents such as the Western Wall riots and the Hebron Encounter (both in 1929) opened doors for Zionist dominated *Yishuv* to organise into self-defence groups and forming organizations such as *Hashomer* and *Haganah*. These groups were established in 1920. Going with the change, Revisionist Zionist formed their own militant formations, such as Irgun and the Stern Gang. Upon the establishment of Israel, these formations were combined and a unified Israel Defence Forces was formed on 27 June 1948 (Jewish Virtual Library 1998:1).

The Arab side fared badly. By the summer of 1948, the official Palestine leadership, including of Hajj Amin Husseini (1893-1974), the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was residing out of the Palestine mandate, and hence the Arab states took the responsibility for liberating Palestine and preventing the birth of the Jewish State (Elpeleg 1989:1). The Arab forces including the armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, the erstwhile Transjordan, and Iraq were numerically larger than the fighters commanded by the embryonic Israeli State.

Transjordan, commanded the Arab Legion, the strongest and most organised force in the Middle East. It also had a strong territorial greed. Its ruler King Abdullah was secretly coveting those territories that were to be a part of the sovereign Arab state under the partition plan. At the end, internal divisions, lack of coordination, political differences and above all poor military planning proved to be too expensive for Arab states in desire to destroy Israel. Meanwhile the second United Nations mediated cease-fire came into force 18 July 1948. By then, Israel had achieved to secure its sovereignty and retained most of the regions allotted to it under the UN scheme and even made other territorial gains.

The Palestinian regions west of the River Jordan, that is, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, had gone to the Jordanian regime while Egypt took over the Gaza Strip. Jordan officially annexed the West River in April 1950, further creating domestic tensions with the

Arab ranks (Zahran 2012:1). Israel and its Arab neighbours signed a series of armistice agreements with UN mediated talks on the Greek islands of Rhodes in 1948.

They created an impermanent hold of conflicts, but the much awaited formal peace between Israel and its neighbours never happened. This region has been a witness to cross border infiltrations from both Gaza Strip and Jordan into Israel which resulted in the later carrying out retaliatory attacks against Jordan and Egypt. The emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and his growing popularity among Arab countries created tension in Israel. The much known Czech arms deal of 1955 added a security fears to the Israeli understandings of Nasser's designs (Skaggs 2015:37).

The Anglo-Egyptian agreement over British withdrawal from the Suez Canal area also contributed to the Israeli fears. Against this background, in July Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal and this caused the Suez War (History 2018:1). Joining hands with Great Britain and France, who owned the company that operated the Suez Canal, Israel launched a war against Egypt. This resulted in Israel capturing the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. However, under strong pressures from US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in early 1957 Israel was forced to vacate these territories. The end of hostilities also witnessed the formation of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). A decade-long peace came to an end in June 1967.

Media reported concentration of the Israeli forces along its border with Syria in May 1967. This made Nasser to demand the withdrawal of the UNEF deployed on the Egyptian side of its border with Israel. It was followed by him closing of the Gulf of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Soon Egypt entered into military alliances with Jordan and Syria who were Israel's immediate neighbours. These in turn created domestic fears and security concerns in Israel.

Israel responded unilaterally following the inability of international society comprising of the United Nations to lift the closure of the Gulf of Tiran, at the entrance to the Red Sea. On 5 June the Israeli air force launched a pre-emptive strike against the military bases of Syria, Egypt and Iraq and destroyed the bulk of the Arab air force, facilities and runways. It was the air force which made Israel superior to take full control of the military campaign. Israel captured the West bank including East Jerusalem following the entry of Jordan into the conflict (Hughes 1997:1). On 11 June when the battle ended, Israel had captured the whole Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights as well. The June war, also known as the Six-Day War gave

birth to some new terminologies to Arab-Israeli conflict such as Green line, occupied territories and settlements (ibid).

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 on 22 November 1967. It called for Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and demanded the right of all states in Middle East, including Israel, "to live in secured and recognized borders"(Britannica 2018:1). The response of Israel and its Arab opponents to war and the post-war scenario was different. The former looked to keep the newly occupied territories as leverage in securing its recognition by the Arab states and regional acceptance. This process did not stop the Israeli campaign of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories and articulating a desire to retain parts of West Bank and areas nearby River Jordan Valley for any future settlement with the Arab states.

For their part, the Arab States registered their opposition to Israel. The Arab League met in Khartoum in late August and early September and collectively declared no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it (Zieve: 2012:1). The military defeat decreased the secular image of Arab nationalism led by Nasser and increased the conservative religious forces headed by Saudi Arabia. However, even while refusing to recognize or negotiate with Israel, Egypt was not ready to let the Sinai Peninsula under the Israeli occupation. This led to low intensity conflict along the along with Suez Canal also known as the War of Attrition (1969-1970) (Kober 2006:801-802).

Nasser passed away in 1970 and Anwar Sadat became his successor. He brought about a new Egyptian calculation vis-à-vis Israel. Egypt did not have enough military power to defeat Israel but to recover the Sinai Sadat was keen to establish a military presence on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal by creating limited hostilities. This was the seeds of the October War of 1973.

With the help of Syria, Egypt started a military offensive against Israel on 6 October 1973. It was surprise attack for the Israel. In a little time, the Egyptian forces broke the Israeli defence and took control over the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. This war which began on Jewish day of Yom Kippur exposed the invincibility and Israeli dependence on US for any urgent military supplies (Wallsh 2017:1).

As an effort to support the Egyptian-Syrian war efforts, the oil-exporting Arab countries put a ban on oil supplies to Western countries that supported Israel. This resulted in a steep increase in oil prices and disrupted oil supplies. These efforts brought swift change in the policies of Europe and Japan towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. This war raised concerns over probability of use of undeclared nuclear weapons by Israel. Meanwhile a cease-fire came into place on 22

October. By then a small Israeli troop led by Maj .Gen. Ariel Sharon established a foothold on the western bank of the Suez Canal. This resulted in the encirclement of the Egyptian third army.

Israel also succeeded in keeping away Syrian efforts in the Golan Heights. But the war is continued to be recalled for the Egyptian strategic efforts against Israel. Even as Arab-Israeli confrontations sowed seeds for further advancements, the October War resulted in peace between the both. It was President Sadat's psychological win which enabled him to initiate a policy accommodation with Israel.

In wake of the 1977 the defeat of Labour party in the Knesset elections Menachem Begin became the prime minister of Israel. This proved favourable for peace. Egyptian President Sadat became the Arab leader to address Knesset on 19 November (Gross 2018:1). Less than a year later, Begin met with Sadat at Camp David in the US and in March in 1979, they met again on the peace agreement in the White House Lawns (ibid). The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979 paved way for Israel's withdrawal from Sinai Peninsula. This measure was completed by 25 April 1982.

This Peace Agreement led to the foundation for establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations and Egypt became the first Arab nation and third Islamic country after Iran (under the shah) and Turkey to have diplomatic relation with the Jewish state(Taylor 2015:1). In the same time, the Islamic revolution brought an end to the long standing and secret relations between Iran and the Jewish state. Sadat decided to break relations with Arab nations and make a separate peace agreement with Israel. However, but he did not get any regional support for the Camp David accords. Egypt was isolated and a number of Arab countries broke off diplomatic relations with it. Above all the headquarters of the Arab League was moved from Cairo to Tunis.

In between, the Palestinian forces got regional influence and attention followed by formation of an umbrella organisation, the PLO in 1964. In the starting years, it was an Egyptian organisation. But the Arab defeat in the June War and the entry of Fatah into its fold changed the whole scenario, status, and influence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Jewish Virtual Library 2018:1). Yasser Arafat took over as chairman of the PLO in 1969. After this the organisation gradually gained importance and became a major player. The PLO entered in the UN General Assembly in 1974 and gained the 'observer' status as it was recognized as the

“the sole and legitimate representative” of the Palestinians by the Arab League in 1974(Reut-institute 2006:1)

The 1970s showed a more radicalized face of Palestine movement. This intensified guerrilla attacks on Israel and began international terrorism and air piracy. Palestinian Fedayeen intruded Israel and spread terror, often targeted civilians. These attacks brought Palestine and its cause to internal attention and media headlines in the West. This in turn led a counter-terrorism campaign by Israel and the West and one of the most notable counter-terrorism actions was the Entebbe Operation of June 1976. Lebanon had become the focus of the Palestinian guerrilla warfare. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan cracked down against Palestinian militants in a near civil war in September 1970 and the PLO and its militants or Fedayeen were removed from Amman. Since the early 1970s the Palestinians carried out attacks against northern Israel with tacit Lebanese government protection (Chomsky 1993: 7).

Prime Minister Begin adopted a tougher stand against the PLO as an answer to attacks against Israel and to pacify the critics within his ruling coalition over the issue of withdrawal from Sinai .In June 1982, Israel invaded in Lebanon known as Operation *Peace in the Galilee*. This operation removed the PLO and Chairman Arafat from Lebanon but occupying the Lebanese capital was nothing but a disaster for Israel (Gawrych 2018: 6-7).

During the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and its capital Beirut, there were clashes between Palestinian forces and the armed members of the *Phalangist Party*,³ the Phalanges Liberalises, also known as *al-Kata'eb* was a militant right-wing group belonging to the Maronite Christians. The Christian militants entered Palestinian refugee camp in *Sabra* and *Shatila* on the outskirts of Beirut and killed civilian population. This was in revenge for the murder of president-Elect Bashir Gemayel on 16 September (Mommson 2011:262). The camp was in control of the IDF and Israel allowed gunmen to enter in refugee camps despite of tension raised by Gamayel’s murder. The killings in the Palestinian refugee camps brought Israel to the centre of criticisms from both the international community and its own citizens (Mohamad 2017:1).

By 1985 Israel had removed its military occupation from much of Lebanon but kept control over a narrow strip in the south called as the “security zone.” This was left under the control of pro-Israeli South Lebanese army which was trained and maintained by Israel itself (Eisenberg 2000:17). The Israeli aggression against Lebanon resulted in birth of Hezbollah and according

³ Christian right-wing political party in Lebanon

to the militant Lebanese Shia organization, “the services they provide are to relieve the burden of those who have suffered as a result of Israeli aggression” (Cua 2007: 24). This Shia militant group was actively conducting raids within security zone and against northern Israel from the mid-1980s. The increasing Israeli activities in Lebanon generated vast opposition inside the country over the presence of IDF in Southern Lebanon and the rationale behind the ‘security zone’. After long domestic debates and protests in May 2000 Israel unilaterally pulled itself out and returned to the international lines that marked the borders between Lebanon and mandate Palestine (Eisenberg 2000:23).

After the Lebanon war, the first intifada started on 9 December 1987(Lockman 1989:5). The immediate reason was the collision of IDF truck with the Palestinian civil car (Berman 2011:41). In this accident four Palestine people were killed. After this incident a protest movement arose. And Palestinian people started general strikes, boycotted the Israeli administration in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, refused to pay taxes, refused to work in the Israeli settlements etc. (Den Boer 2008:190). And after this they started throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails at the IDF and its infrastructure with the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the reaction the Israel deployed 80,000 soldiers and started firing. In this intifada, in first thirteen months, 332 Palestinian and 12 Israeli were killed (Afflerbach 2012:426).

The international focus shifted from the Palestine to the Gulf region after the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in August 1990. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein sought to link the occupation of Kuwait with the Israeli occupation of Arab lands. This got much support in the Palestinians in the occupied territories as well as in Jordan. The PLO leader Arafat said that “the plan would see the withdrawal of occupation forces from Kuwait, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strips) and the Golan Heights (Syria) which was occupied by Israel in 1967 War. Arab and UN forces would replace foreign armies” (Shodhganga: 2016:18)

This was a short-lived scenario. Iraq had to retreat against the US led international campaign to withdraw from Kuwait in February 1991. The Middle East peace initiative was introduced by the US to capitalize on the new international climate and end of the cold war. The Madrid Conference was inaugurated on 30 October 1991 by the US in collaboration with the USSR. Israel and its Arab neighbours agreed to look for political and negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The formal exclusion of Palestine Liberation Organization proved a major drawback to the efforts (Agrestam 1999: 147). The Palestinians took part in the Madrid conference as a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and not as an independent participant.

Yitzhak Rabin re-elected as prime minister of Israel in June 1992. This gave hope for peace talks as he agreed to forget the Madrid formulation that ignored the participation of the PLO. He was looking for a peace agreement directly with the recognized Palestinian leadership, the PLO, and this process is called Oslo Process. This concluded with the signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993 in the White House Lawns. Israel agreed to give withdraw from parts of the Gaza Strip and the town of Jericho in the West Bank to facilitate the formation of the Palestine National Authority (PNA). On 1 July 1994 Arafat came back to the Gaza Strip and took over PNA. Israel gradually had pulled out of almost all Arab towns in the West Bank except for Hebron.

The Oslo Process was anything but smooth. It was continuously interrupted by the militant Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad whose members carried out a wave of suicide attacks against Israel. The campaign was on the peak in 1996 when dozens of Israeli civilians were killed in suicide attacks. These attacks resulted in the Labour Party's electoral defeat in May and the victory of Likud led by Benjamin Netanyahu. He was also directly elected as prime minister under the new electoral system. He considerably stopped and reversed the progress made since 1993 and further complicated the Israeli withdrawal from the West bank and the Gaza Strip by increasing the settlement activities (Thrall 2017:1).

Ehud Barak who became prime minister in 1999, tried to make a comprehensive agreement with Palestinian leaders. US President Bill Clinton called upon Barak and Arafat with a hope to reach a peace accord. These efforts in Camp David in the summer of 2000 not only failed but also increased mutual disappointments. The visit of opposition leader Ariel Sharon, to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif on 27 September 2000 was a serious mistake and this sparked protests leading to Al-Aqsa intifada (Pressman 2003:1).

The Al-Aqsa intifada was different from earlier ones as popular participation was absent. Unlike the first intifada this was limited to suicidal attacks against Israeli civilians within the Green line or pre-June 1967 border of Israel. This rekindled Israel's old sense of insecurity. In this way Israel adopted a policy of assassinating known military and political leaders belonged to various militant groups. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual head of Hamas, was killed in the month of March 2004 and his successor Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi was killed in next month. Israel even threatened to kill Arafat. Adding to this, Israel wanted to recapture the Palestinian towns which had vacated in late 1995. It introduced some sorrows like detention, land

confiscation, general curfew, travel restriction between Palestinian areas and stopping Palestinians to work there in Israel (Cordesman 2002:96).

The Al-Aqsa intifada made Arafat weak and excluded him from the peace process. Since February 2001 Prime Minister Sharon not only stopped negotiating with the Palestinian leader but confined the latter to his office in Ramallah. He made serious threats to Palestinian leader's life. Arafat passed away on 11 November 2004 in a military hospital in Paris (Bennet 2004:1). His successor Mahmoud Abbas, could not maintain peace for a long period between different Palestinian groups as compared to Israel.

At sometimes this Israeli-Arab conflict also affected other Arab states. For example, the civilian strife in Jordan in 1970 or the Black September Massacre was closely to it. The throwing out of PLO Fedayeen from Jordan to Lebanon partly contributed to the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1989). Those leaders who looked for political settlements with Israel had to face brutal consequences. There are some examples for this like the assassination of King Abdullah-I of Jordan in July 1951, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt in October 1981, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 as they were accused to giving too much "concessions" to enemy.

Causes and issues of the conflict

The problem was made serious by some issues and contentions which tangled in the Arab-Israeli battle. These include Israel's right to exist, border question, refugee rights, Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and most importantly the status of Jerusalem. Even when recognition is a normal process for any state, community or an individual but it seems special in the case of Israel. The establishment of the state in 1948 was seen as a reply to sufferings of Jewish people. Being recognised by its Arab neighbours and international community has been a major goal of the Israeli foreign policy. This goal had hidden consequences for Palestinians and their unrest.

Existence of Israel

The main issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the boundaries but Israel's own existence itself. The Arab world opposed Israel's existence and even it had pledged not to give any recognition, negotiation or for making peace with Israel. The October War brought in a bigger sense of reality and ushered in recognition and resignation in the Arab world of Israel's existence (Kumaraswamy 2013:2). There was a kind inaction due to military weakness and Israel's

nuclear capability. This reality came in knowledge of Palestinian leaders and they came with terms to Israel's existence in their forefathers' land.

The Algiers Declaration of November 1988 proclaimed the Palestinian state and it also accepted UN Resolution 181 that advocated the partition of Palestine. Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization granted mutual recognition through the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 (Devroy 1993:1). Until then they were not formally ready to accept each other's existence. Both had the opinion to neglect each other's political and national rights. On the other hand, Hamas and other militant organizations never accepted Israel's legitimacy as a state. Similarly, the right wing groups within Israel argued against recognizing the Palestinians a specific and separate national group (Slater 2017:5).

Border's problem

It has been an important factor of the conflicts. Possibly, Israel is only nation with no recognised boundaries and this issue has been widely debated and some more terminologies are introduced like international borders, natural borders, Green line, armistice line, recognised borders, defensible borders, security fence, historic borders and biblical frontiers (Kumaraswamy 2002). It is not a simple boundary question for Israel. It is a consequence of struggle and conflicts of Jewish people and the state. The Zionist leadership never tried to identify the territorial limits of the Jewish homeland or the State of Israel. The size of the homeland was never clear. The Israeli leadership had accepted the United Nation Partition plan, but never committed to actual size proposed by the plan (Ein-Gil 2015:1).

It is essential to have a look at reservation of the Zionist towards the UN allotment of Negev to Arabs. The declaration of independence was never clear about the territorial jurisdictions. Israel signed an armistice agreement in 1949, as it acquired more territories than envisaged by the UN plan. The boundary issue was never resolved as the armistice agreement was not for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

The Green Line, emerged as the de facto border, came to the fore in June 1967 which separated Israel from its Arab neighbours (Newman 1995:2). The mitigating of situation came with some instances such as peace treaty with Egypt (1979), Jordan (1994) and Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon (2000) and formalized its boundaries with these nations. The solution to the border issue was never accepted due to absence of formal peace agreement with two other nations, namely, Syria and Palestine. The border resolution issue vis-à-vis the Palestinians would imply that Israel had defined its territorial limits. Some accuse Israel of

seeking lands on both sides of the Jordan River. A messianic spirit has emerged in Israel after it captured the West Bank. This gave opposes the release and return of the biblical land of Judea and Samaria, including Hebron, where the Patriarch/Ibrahim Mosque is located outside the Jewish control and sovereignty. Since then, *Eretz Yisrael* or Greater Israel remained an effective concept among religious Zionist circles (Friesel 2006:288).

The occupation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and the continuous increase in Jewish settlements in the occupied Arab territories placed Zionism as an ideology committed to territorial expansion. Zionism broadly defined its dimensions of territorial expansion but also did expand its extent and control over the Occupied Territories.

Capital City/Religious problem

The third factor affecting the conflicts is the capital city. Israel does not have an internationally recognized capital and it is the only its own kind of case in the world. The UN partition plan declared Jerusalem as an international city, keeping in mind the significance of city to all the three Semitic religions (Ranter 2017:1). Jerusalem is centrally important to Zionism and the Jewish people as it is known for their struggle for their homeland. Therefore, taking all these issues in notice and its foreign position, the Zionist leaders were conscious and prepared to announce its statehood (Lesch2018: 8-9).

At the end of the 1948 War, the city was divided. As Israel took over the Western part Jordan occupied the Eastern part, comprising of most holy places to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This division was given formal shape in an armistice agreement of 3 April 1949 signed between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Israel announced Jerusalem as its capital in December 1949, just after entering the UN (Ha'aretz 2010:1).Israel gained the Eastern part of Jerusalem following the victory in the June War when it captured the West Bank.

Israel's actions regarding Jerusalem were not recognised by the international community and its post-1967 unification of the city was condemned by the UN and international community. The UN, various regional and international organisations and forums condemned Israel's actions and adopted many resolutions against its policy on Jerusalem. All countries which have diplomatic relations with Israel consider Tel Aviv as its capital except few Latin American nations. In 1948, Guatemala became the first in Latin America to recognize Israel, setting off a domino effect in the region (Dolsten 2018:1).

Recently, in 2017 the US president Donald Trump officially recognised Jerusalem as Israel's capital. And announced that the American embassy will move from Tel Aviv to holy city. The

Trump called this step "a step to advance the peace process" between Israel and the Palestinians (Independent 2017:1). This announcement praised by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and told that this is a "Historical landmark" (ibid) and Hamas called for "day of rage" (ibid).

Both groups are showing interest in city of Jerusalem, especially the old city. This can only be done through an imaginative compromised solution. As per Oslo Accords Jerusalem was an issue that can be decided during the final status negotiations. Israel's claim for Jerusalem to be the united, undivided, and eternal capital is not final. Under the Oslo Israel and the PLO agreed to postpone negotiations on Jerusalem issue, until the second stage of the peace process.

Settlements

Many Israelis considered that West bank as an integral part of the Yisrael, usually known as Judea and Samaria. "Judea and Samaria is biblical name for west bank areas under Jordanian rule prior to 1967 six-day war and now under Israeli control and claimed by the settler as an integral part of Jewish Zionist homeland" (Selengut 2015:168-169). If this part comes under Israel then Israel has the full right to promote activities which help its citizen in settling in those areas. The issue of Green line that opposes occupation could become the boundary between Israel and future Palestine state has support across the whole Israel (Balmer 2012:1). despite its claims, Israel has never formally converted its claims over the occupied territories except for only East Jerusalem and Golan Heights (Auerbach 2017:1).

Earlier the two issues namely capital city and settlement are linked to Camp David accords and Prime Minister Begin had to face domestic outrage for agreeing to withdraw completely from the Sinai Peninsula. If Israel wants to officially annex the occupied territories it has to follow the example set by Jordan which gave full citizenship to all Palestinians when it annexed the West Bank. This would make Israel a bi-national state and it would cease to be a Jewish state (Anbar 2004:202). Another move is an apartheid model, whereby it could annex the territories without giving citizenship rights to the Palestinians or planning their expulsion (White 2017:1).

This attempt would drop Israel into a cycle of violence, international uproar, and complete isolation, which is irreversible and unfeasible. It will also cost its democratic credibility and moral arguments. Israel chose to go with the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip that completed in August 2005 which continued occupation proved to be a security threat as well as a demographic nightmare (Shindler 2017:1).

Settlements

Another dimension of the conflict is the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. The constructions work for settlement was done aggressively by both right wing and left wing governments in Israel. The focus was in Palestinian areas but these activities were also carried out in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. The Labour Party built settlements in areas of security significance, such as the Jordan Valley.

Opposed to this model, the Likud considered the settlement as a tool for territorial expansion in the West Bank and prevention of a future Palestinian State (CAMERA 2007:1). This resulted in encouraging settlements closer to the Palestinian populations. This strategy was strongly opposed by the Labour Party, as it was not possible to escape from its consequences. Israel had to withdraw from parts of the occupied territories in November in 1995 which showed its failure at policy making. The Palestinian had to go through barriers and checkpoints to go from one town to another. This indicated Israeli presence in the region. In reality Israeli settlement blocs were also a harsh at the Gaza Strip which meant vast Israeli control over the Palestinian areas until its unilateral withdrawal in 2005.

According to *Yesha Council*⁴, as of 30 June 2014, 382,031 Israeli people were living in the West Bank in 121 officially recognised settlements (Williams 2014:1). In addition, 20,000 Israeli citizens were living in the settlements in the Golan Heights and over 300,000 Israeli citizens (both Jewish citizens of Israel and Arab citizens of Israel) in the settlements in East Jerusalem (Sherwood 2012:1) in January 2015, “the Israeli Interior Ministry gave figures of 389,250 Israeli citizens living in the West Bank and a further 375,000 Israeli citizens living in East Jerusalem” (Balofsky 2015:1).

Peace Agreements after Israel’s Independence

A peace treaty is an agreement between two or more hostile parties. Usually countries or governments formally end a state of war through a formal agreement. It is different from an armistice, which is an agreement to stop hostilities, or a surrender, in which an army agrees to give up arms or truce in which the parties may agree to temporarily or permanently stop fighting. (REBUS 2014:8).

⁴ It is an umbrella organization of municipal councils of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Armistice Agreements (1949)

It was the first agreement after the 1948 Arab Israel war. The purpose was to end the military hostilities between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries. They were signed separately. Basically this was the set of agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. The process began on 12 January 1949 with the Egypt. (IMFA 2013:1) On 24 February, Egypt became the first Arab country to sign an armistice agreement. In this process Ralph J. Bunche (1904–1971), played an important role. He was the acting United Nations mediator. The negotiations took place palace in the Greek island of Rhodes. Then in 23 March 1949 Israel-Lebanon negotiation were held in the border Israeli town of Rosh Hanikra (ibid). Israel-Jordan talks took place at Rhodes on 3 April 1949. Israel and Syria began their negotiations at Gesher B'not Yaacov on the Jordan River on 20 July 1949. The Bunche got Nobel Peace prize in 1950 for the successful conclusion of armistice agreements (Sveen 2006:1).

This agreement was the first effort towards initiating peace negotiations between Israel and its neighbours. But the peace could not be established. In the latter time the Green Line which was the armistice line became Israel's de facto borders with neighbouring Arab states (Holmes 2011:1).

Resolution 242, 1967

After the June war of 1967 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242 on the draft proposed by Great Britain. It was unanimously accepted on 22 November 1967.

This resolution makes two interesting points.

1. There will not be acquisition of territory by war.
2. Every nation have in the region has the right that it will live in security and security
3. All the countries will live peacefully in the secure and recognised border.
4. There should be no threat to one another
5. There is the need for a just settlement of the refugee problem (Bailey 1985:151).

It also said that:

1. Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories captured during the June War of 1967.
2. It is obligatory for every state to recognise the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the region.

The UN Resolution also talked about some assurance like freedom of navigation through international waterways and political freedom of every State in the region. Finally this resolution says that there should demilitarized zones. This plan was accepted by the all major players of the June War, namely, Israel, Egypt (Hertz 2009: 6). But Syria did not accept the Resolution over Palestinian issue which was reduced to being a refugee issue (Bailey 1985:179).

In latter time when the resolution 338 came, all the parties were demanding the complete implementation of 242. There were however, some doubt from Syria and Palestine. Both the parties were trying to interpret this resolution according to own national interest. For the example Israel was saying that withdrawal would only mean sort parts of the occupied territory and not the whole of it (Erakat 2017:19).

Resolution's main theme the "inadmissibility of territorial conquest" was contested. This was not only For Israel but also applicable on the Jordan and Syria because Jordan occupied the West Bank in 1950 and Syrian encroachment on Palestinian territories beyond the 1948 Armistice lines (De Bel-Air 2012:5). The reference to "recognized" borders precludes the possibility of unilateral moves by any party, including Israel. The Arabs argue that by refusing to withdraw to the pre-June 1967 position, Israel has violated the resolution (Grief 2007: 6).

The important point of this resolution was that it provides a basis for future negotiations for peace. It was the base for the recognition of Palestinian political rights. In the latter time it is recommended by the many committees like Venice Declaration of 1980 and European Council that Palestinian problem is more than a refugee issue but concerns the absence of political rights of the Palestinians (Newman 2014:20).

Resolution 338, 1973

After the October 1973 war this resolution came into the picture. Basically this resolution calls for the implementation of the Resolution 242 and to accept and enforce an immediate cease-fire, which came into force on 24 October (IMFA 2013:1). The purpose of this resolution was:

1. to the military hostilities between Israel and Egypt and Syria
2. Immediately and concurrent with the ceasefire, the parties should start negotiations towards implementing UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 for establishing a 'just and durable peace in the Middle East' (ibid).

Resolution 242 was not acknowledged by the Syria and Lebanon but both accepted resolution 338. In this sense, it was the extension of the Resolution 242.

Due to this resolution the Israel Egypt and Syria came for a post-war military disengagement negotiation. On 21 December the Geneva Peace Conference began. The members were Israel, Egypt, Jordan with the United States and the Soviet Union acting as co-chairs. The Israeli opposition over the treatment of its prisoners of war prevented the participating of Syria (Reference PI) (IMFA 1973:1).

Camp David Accords, 1978

The Camp David Accords happened on 17 September 1978. These accords were signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin with the active participation of US President Jimmy Carter. The purpose of this accord was to establish peace in between Israel and Egypt. So after 13 days secret talk both the leader reached two framework agreements which formed the basis for continuing negotiations and they were:

- a) The Framework for Peace in the Middle East
- b) The Framework for Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel (IMFA 2013:1).

Initially both focused on the fate of Palestinians in the occupied territories that revolved around Israel's Autonomy Plan for Palestinians (Gerdes 2015:6). This accord accepted on 19 September by the Egyptian cabinet and the Israeli Knesset also welcomed it on 28 September. Some Likud leaders were not happy with this accord like Moshe Arens and Yitzhak Shamir (Shindler 2007: 105).

The background of this accord was 9 November 1977 when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat told in the parliament that he was even ready to go at Jerusalem and negotiate peace with Israel directly. This thing accepted by the Israel and on 19 November Sadat undertook the historical visit to Jerusalem. He addressed the Knesset and presented his peace plan. On 25 December both side started to talk. Both the parties were looking satisfy but they could not agree on the issue of Palestine and Israeli settlement in the Sinai Peninsula. These issues were hampering the progress. At this point US President Jimmy Carter invite both the parties for the talks in Camp David (IMFA 1978:1).

With the efforts of the US President a peace treaty was signed on 26 March 1979 at Washington. This treaty assured total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and gave guaranteed passage through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran for Israeli ships. In 1979, Sadat and Begin were jointly given the Nobel Peace Prize for the peace agreement.

The response of Arab League towards the Egyptian-Israeli peace was hostile. In 1978 all representatives of the Arab league met in Baghdad to isolate Sadat and in March 1979 the Egypt was expelled from the Arab league and League's headquarters were shifted to Tunis (Podeh 2002:1), despite Egypt being the founder member of the Arab League. Egypt was also excluded from the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The cause of this kind reaction was signing of the peace treaty by the Egypt. Reflecting this regional mood, on 29 November 1979, the United Nations General Assembly declared, "Camp David accords and other agreements have no validity insofar as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967." (Kumaraswamy 2015:134)

The result of this peace initiative was the damaging of Arab unity. Jordan and Saudi Arabia cast doubt over the Camp David Accords and Syria did not accept this plan. Egypt was readmitted into the Islamic forum in 1984. Interesting thing was that Israel continued its withdrawal process from the Sinai Peninsula after the assassination of Sadat. Finally Egypt got its lands on 25 April 1982.

Israel–Lebanon Agreement, 1984

This agreement came after the Lebanon war of 1982, known in Israel as *Operation Peace for Galilee*. It was a formal agreement in between Israel and Lebanon. The purpose of this agreement was to ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. It also provided a framework for the establishment of normal relations between the two countries. During the talk the some part of Lebanese territory was under control of the Israel and Syria (IMFA 2013:1).

On 11 October 1982, Israel initiated efforts towards a peace treaty with Lebanon after the controversies over the *Sabra and Shatila* Massacre. Israel accepted a working paper toward achieving a peace treaty. On 16 December 1982 the Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon revealed that the secret talks were going on with Lebanon which would lead to political gains for Israel. Thirty five meetings of negotiation were held at different places like Khalde in south Lebanon, Kiryat Shmona and Netanya in Israel between December 1982 and May 1983. Finally this agreement signed on 17 May 1983 (ibid).

Israel withdrew its troops from much of the Lebanese territory except for a specific security arrangement in southern Lebanon. In 1984 the confessionals government had collapsed due to the mounting civil war and so the Lebanon could not maintain this treaty. Finally 5 March 1984, Lebanon formally abrogated the agreement. Syria was against from the beginning of this agreement (Shaked 1986:690).

Brezhnev Plan

On 15 September 1982, Soviet Union drew a peace plan for the region. This plan came after the tension in between Israel and Syria. The cause of this conflict was the Syria deployed its surface-to-air missile batteries in the Beka'a Valley in Lebanon. Towards the establishment peace President Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union give this peace plan. Its salient features were:

1. Complete Israeli withdrawal to 4 June 1967 borders;
2. Unchallenged the right to self-determination of Palestinian people;
3. Working towards the establishment of an independent Palestinian state;
4. Security of all the states of the region; and
5. The establishment of peace in between Israel and Arab state to avoid war (Shazly 1986:83-84).

Brezhnev concluded his speech announcing this proposal by saying “such a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement can only be drawn up and implemented by collective effort with the participation of all parties concerned including, certainly, Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine (Shazly 1986:182-183). The single point of substance on which the Brezhnev plan was silent was the future of Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. However a subsequent statement by the Soviet government declared that it supported the Fez plan of 1982 (Karsh 1988:72). On this issue. In other words, it called for the dismantling of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

Madrid Conference

On 6 March 1991, American President George H. W. Bush told the US Congress, “The time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Philpott 2015:322). After the eight month of hectic diplomatic efforts by Secretary of State James Baker, the Madrid conference began on 30 October 1991. This was a peace conference, hosted by Spain with the United States and the Soviet Union acting as co-chairs. Basically it was an effort by the international community to establish peace between Israel and Palestinians.

This did try to establish peace process through negotiation, involving Israel, Palestinians, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It was the first time that all of the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict had gathered to hold direct negotiations and was a historically unprecedented event. All the

key members were satisfied with the format of this conference (USDS 1991:1). The international community also agreed to establish Arab demand and peace with the Israel.

All the parties agreed that UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 would be the basis for any peace settlement. Bilateral talks would be led independently and would be accepted by the members. The first ever direct talks between Israel and her immediate Arab neighbours opened in Madrid on November 3, 1991, on 9 December the contestants went to Washington, for the follow-up bilateral negotiations. They conducted over the dozen of bilateral talks but they could not produce any significant progress (Jewish Virtual Library 2018:1).

Meanwhile, on 28 January 1992 the multi-lateral talks started and five separate groups formed dealing with water, environment, arms control and regional security, refugees, and regional economic development. The conclusion of this confrere was that the progress was negligible (Yaffe 2001:10).

Oslo Accords, 1993-95

The Oslo accords are the group of agreements between Israel and the PLO. In these accords include “Declaration of Principles (1993), Cairo Agreement (1994), Paris Agreement (1994), Taba Agreement (1995), Wye Memorandum (1998), and Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum (1999)” (Kumaraswamy 2009: 187) . The aim was of these accord was to establish peace on the basis of resolution 242 and 338 and at accomplishing the "right of the Palestinian people to self-determination” (UN 1997:1).

In 1992 Israel and the PLO started secret bilateral talks in Norway. This talk based on the Madrid Conference peace process which previously excluded by the PLO (Blumenfeld 1993:1). In this accord Israel recognised the PLO as the representative of Palestinian people and the PLO recognised Israel as a state (Bazian 2018:1).

The root of Oslo accords are in the inception of Israel. From the inception the Israel was facing the invasion from the Arab states. Although Israel won all the wars in its history, it was living in the threat of aggression and invasion. The Lebanon war was very tough for Israel. In this war Israel was on the verge of defeat and just after some time in 1987 intifada started. So due to continuous attacks the Israeli military also faced fatigue. Rabin (Inbar 1999: 161-2), Barak and the Israeli military elites were concerned about the effects of wars upon social and cultural change and on the morale and on the country's staying power in the face of continued low-intensity conflict (Cohen 2000:1) All these things made the background for the Oslo Accords.

The important questions related to border, Israeli settlement, refugees and status of Jerusalem were to be negotiated and resolved during the final status negotiations. Additional agreements like “Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities between Israel and the PLO” (IMFA 1994:1), “Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities” (IMFA 1995:1) were implemented after the signing.

The declaration of principles also known as the Oslo I was an attempt to establish peace in between Israel and Palestine. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and the PLO Executive Committee member Mahmoud Abbas signed the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993 in the White House Lawns. Those witnessing the occasion were the US President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. A few days before on 9 September Israel and the PLO mutually recognized one another (Benvenisti 1993:542).

The key provisions of the Declaration of Principles included:

1. Acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338
2. Rejection of terrorism and violence by the PLO in resolving the disputes with Israel.
3. An interim Palestinian Self-Governing Authority would be established in the area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the five years and it would lead the negotiations in during the transitional period until the permanent settlement
4. The resolution of the core issues of the conflict—Jerusalem, refugees, borders, settlements, and security arrangements—would be postponed to Permanent Status negotiations (IMFA 2013:1).

The Declaration of Principles came into force on 13 October 1993 and Israel gradually started to withdraw their forces from the Arab towns. The PNA started to function in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The unique feature of the Declaration of Principles was the time frame. It was accepted by the both parties that the implementation of Declaration of Principles would follow within a certain time period (IMFA 2013:5). Although, most of the deadline were late. The permanent status agreement mentioned in the Declaration of Principles did not happen even two decades after Declaration of Principles came into force.

Taba Agreement, 1995

Also known as Oslo II its purpose was the establishment of a Palestinian interim self-government. This divided the West Bank into three, namely, parts A (territories with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security), B (territories with Palestinian civil jurisdiction but with joint Israeli–Palestinian security control) and C (territories where Israel enjoys complete civil and security control) (IMFA 1995:2). Some limited powers and responsibility was given to the Palestinian authority, especially in the area of A and B. It was also based on the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This Accord was formally signed on 28 September 1995 in Taba and was about the second stage of Palestinian autonomy and the gradual extension of Palestinian rule beyond the Gaza Strip and Jericho (Shlaim 2005:7).

This agreement concludes five main sections:

1. There would be elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and its powers and accountabilities.
2. Israeli army would be redeployed from six Palestinian towns of Bethlehem, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkaram in the West Bank.
3. Discussions would continue on the sensitive question of withdrawal from Hebron. The agreement provided for Israeli control of 15 per cent of the city, inhabited by 450 Jewish settlers.
4. It also providing for an extra three-stage phased Israeli redeployment to be finished within 18 months from the date of initiation of the PLC.

The aftermath was in November 1995 Israel did complete its withdrawals from the Arab population centres and in January 1996 the PLC election were held. Other provision of this agreement implemented later and the partial withdrawal from Hebron was not finished until the conclusion of the Hebron Protocol in January 1997.

Camp David Talks (2000)

The term "2000 Camp David Summit" denotes to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the US. This was sponsored by the President Bill Clinton and was attended by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Chairman Arafat. Both the leaders held intense negotiations at Camp David from 11–24 July 2000. The issues of discussion were refugees to return, borders, withdrawal, security, settlements, and water. Basically there was discussed a Permanent Status Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (Bender 2000:2-3). On the key issue of Jerusalem and the refugee question both the parties disagreed and talk had failed. Both Clinton and Barak blamed

Arafat. Palestinian disappointment over the unsuccessful Camp David talks was an important reason for the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 (Nusseibeh 2000:1).

Conclusions

If one looks at the Israeli peace treaties and agreements they affect the Israeli civil -military relation. The first was armistice agreements. During the armistice agreement the Israel was newly born country and it had lots of external threats and the civil -military bound was very tight. In 1967 Israel won the June War and this reduced the existential threat to Israel. The premise of the Resolution 242 lessened the bond of Israeli civil-military relations.

After the 1973 war the Israeli population has become less willing to bear the personal costs of an endless conflict. And military also want any solution of this conflict. Thus the Israeli military and civilians agreed on the peace issue. So one can say that the 338 resolution could not apply negative impact on Israeli civil military relations.

After the Camp David accords the conventional threats reduced so for the sometime it reduced the military hegemony over the civilian sphere and security policies.

The Oslo accord did create disputes in between Israeli civil-military relations. After the signing of this accord, terrorist attacks increased and this raised doubts over the return territories to the PLO. With this decision the larger people were dissatisfy. Rest of the treaties could not affect the Israeli civil- military relations.

Therefore, one can say that wherever there are human beings conflicts become inevitable. The level of the conflict may be different. Theoretically the main cause of the Arab Israel conflict is the behaviour of the both parties. Attitude and contradictory goals also cause but these are secondary causes.

Chapter Four:

Impact of the Oslo Accords upon the Civil-Military Relations

Historically, the Oslo accords were the turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since its founding, Israel was facing security threats. Seen in this context, the Oslo accords could be called as the genesis of peace-making between the two peoples. In regards to Arab- Israel conflict there are two schools (Peri 2002:14). The First school is called as the “war between states” which believes that the cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Arab refusal to recognise Israel’s existence (Peri 2006:35). Therefore, it affirms that if there is a change in the Arab policy, that is, to recognise Israel’s existence, only then peace can be possible. For this school, the solution to Palestinian problem is possible only in the path of peace, namely, to have peace with Jordan (Peri 2002:14). The Second school is called as “War between Nations” which says that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at the heart of the Israeli-Arab dispute and that Israel could achieve normalized relations with the Arab states only if the Palestinian problem is resolved (Peri 2006:34).

When he became Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin followed both David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir. He subscribed and followed the “War between the States School” (Peri 2002:14). This school was dominant in Israel before the first intifada (Peri 2006:34). The effect of intifada made Rabin realize and recognize that the Palestinians were independently and assertively fighting to form an independent state of their own (Peri 1996:380-399). In due process, he had argued and affirmed that Israel must recognise the Palestinians as an independent actor and an equal partner (Peri 1996:380-399).

In the beginning of the 1990s the security situation had changed. Before the 1973, all wars were conventional but after the October War unconventional war started wherein Israel was fighting non-state actors. The Lebanon war and intifada were the examples for unconventional wars. Israel paid a high price in both the wars; in the Lebanon war 657 Israeli soldiers were killed and 3,887 were wounded (Barzilai 1996:148). Israel also faced very much economic and military loss. After the Lebanon war the intifada started where Israel faced 277 casualties (Kober 2005:231). Rabin had stated “that Israel could no longer design a defence policy for

itself that would include an imposed peace settlement of its choice, on a routed or a defeated Arab country”⁵ (Rabin 1991 speech).

During the same time, changes occurred in Jordan, Syria and Palestine (Peri 2002:16), over their willingness to recognize Israel’s existence. This had set the premise that the countries of the first circle would follow the Egyptian model and would either accept or sign a peace agreement with Israel. The peace agreement was imperative as the second circle countries like Iran, Iraq and Libya (Peri 2006:37) threatened Israel with Scud missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Under Rabin the Labour Party had won the 1992 elections as he had the military credential and support (Sales 2015:1), for the promise that he will establish peace with Israel’s neighbours.

For his words and deeds, Rabin was accepted and considered a by large section of people including right-wing Likud voters, as the leader who would be the harbinger of peace with Palestinians without compromising Israel’s security. So, one can say that there was a large hopes and moral pressure of Israeli people on Rabin to establish peace.

On 13 September 1993, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Mahmoud Abbas signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, commonly referred to as the “Oslo Accord.” This agreement was signed in the White House Lawns. In any treaty or agreement, both parties come on to a common platform to accept and reject some key issues (Weiner 1996:667). In the Oslo Accord both Israel and the PLO agreed and disagreed on some of the key issues.

By signing the agreement Israel accepted the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. For its part, the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace. Both sides agreed that a Palestinian National Authority (PNA) would be established and assume governing responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a five-year period. Later, permanent status talks on the issues like borders, refugees and Jerusalem would be held (USDS 2000:1).

⁵ Rabin in a speech on June 10, 1991, “After the Gulf War: Israel’s Defence and Its Defence Policy,” which appeared in the collection Yitzhak Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Ramat Gan: BESA Center, Bar-Ilan University, 1996).

PREAMBLE

The Preamble of the Oslo accord falls within the larger ambit of the West Asian Peace Process that was initiated in October 1991 in Madrid. The following are the salient features of the preamble.

1. Both agreed to live peacefully by ending confrontation with peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security.
2. They would seek a long lasting settlement and historical reconciliation.
3. The peace established must be sustainable, continuous and irreversible and should be for the advancement of both parties.
4. The negotiations must aim at establishing a Palestinian Interim Self Government Authority and elect the president of the executive authority, for the people in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.
5. The Self Government would initiate permanent status negotiations by 1996
6. Both parties would adhere to the shared aspirations and commitments declared in the letters exchanged between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat on 9 September 1993 (Oslo Agreement 1995)

The emergence of Oslo process was a unique in comparison to other peace process in the international politics. It was an outcome of a personal initiative of the then Deputy Finance Minister Yossi Beilin (Burkart 2012:15). He had orchestrated a group of academic to secretly meet and engage with the representatives of PLO. Initially they were kept away from Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Rabin. This initiative had also violated the government policy that explicitly prohibited unauthorised contacts with the PLO (Peri 2002:26). With progress in the negotiations, the initiative was informed to the senior political leaders who had approved it and came on board. In May 1993, the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry Uri Savir had joined the initiative (Peri 1996:359). The Prime Minister-cum-Defence Minister Rabin had authorized the talks to continue at a more official level.

In the process Rabin left Israel Defence Force and did not even bother to inform the existence of the secret negotiations to Barak who was the then IDF Chief of General Staff. He assumed that there was no need to inform except to his close political aides and it would be better if only a few people were privy to the negotiations. Internal political considerations had played a major role in his decision. In the entire negotiating process, Rabin worried that the talks would fail, until the clandestine agreement on 19 August 1993. He preferred a process that would exempt him from responsibility for the initiative, so that it would then be identified with his partner

and political rival Shimon Peres, if it were to fail. Rabin also thought that Israel Defence Force officers would significantly decrease the pace of the talks if the existence was revealed. Premature disclosure he feared would have led to their cessation. It is possible that there was another factor that was influencing Rabin. He may have worried that military officers involved in the peace talks would have demanded detailed outlines of security arrangements and this would have precluded an agreement (Peri 2006:63-65).

Ultimately, the Israel Defence Force's exclusion from the talks led Chief of General Staff Barak to assume a critical stance towards their outcome. Barak sought permission from Defence Minister Rabin to present his personal viewpoint, during a cabinet meeting. Rabin allowed Barak to do so, despite the opposition from some ministers. Barak charged that the Oslo agreement was like Swiss cheese, arguing that the absence of military experts resulted in numerous security loopholes that could harm Israel in the future (Peri 2006:64).

However, there were other reasons for the military's criticism of the Oslo process. The Israel Defence Force opined that prior to the negotiations with the Palestinians, Israel should first negotiate with Syrians as it was the real threat to Israel's security, as it was heading the Arab "refusal front" that constituted the core of the eastern front (Peri 2002:26). On an additional note, the peace treaty with Syria would weaken the Palestinians and thereby enabling Israel to reach an agreement which would require far fewer concessions on its part. With regard to Oslo Accords, Barak's criticism regarding their content, significance, and the way in which they were achieved, would eventually lead him to take a step that seemed puzzling to many; he publicly confronted Rabin, his political patron who had brought him into the government (Peri 2006:64).

When the 1995 interim agreement, known as Oslo B, was submitted for government approval, Barak, then the Minister of Internal Affairs, voted against it (Rynhold 2003:17). He expressed concern that Israel would lose most of its territorial assets, which he thought should be retained for exchange in a final peace treaty (ibid).

Nevertheless, the military became a major player in the process, more than in the past. After the signing of the Oslo Accords on 13 September, 1993 Rabin constituted the staff that coordinated the negotiations on implementation and appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak to head it (Press 2012:1). In addition, two sub-committees were formed, both led by major generals: Uzi Dayan, head of the Planning and Policy Directorate, would lead the military team, and Daniel Rothschild, coordinator of activities in the territories (and

later his successors, Gady Zohar and Oren Shachor), would lead the team on civilian affairs (ibid). Even the working group's legal advice would be given by a retired officer who had served for many years as head of the IDF's international law division, Col. Joel Singer (Stern 2015:1).

The wide introductory work, occupying lots of specialists and clerks, including senior officers in the reserves, was completed at the Planning and Policy Directorate, which also recruited civilians for this purpose (Peri 2002:26). The Planning and Policy Directorate formulated position papers which were submitted to the Chief of General Staff for his approval, in turn, the then staff recommendations were presented to the political echelon. Every Friday, negotiating team met with Rabin in his office at the Defence Ministry, and he would determine their next assignments (ibid).

After some time there was a change at the top of the Israeli delegation, and the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry Uri Savir, and replaced Shahak who had been appointed Chief of General Staff, in the talks preceding the signing of Oslo B in September 1995. Though Foreign Ministry personnel played a role between the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and Oslo B in 1995, they certainly were not the only party involved in the Oslo process (Waage 2007:167). As Carmi Gillon, the future head of the Israel Securities Authority, stated, "with all due respect to the political work done by Uri Savir and Joel Singer [of the Foreign Ministry] on our side, and Ahmed Qurei (Abu Alaa) on the Palestinian side, who created the framework for the agreement, the content was filled in by the military and the Israel Securities Authority"(Peri 2002: 26-27). Truth appears more than the required and became quite evident in the later stages of the process, as this pattern continued until the last stage of the peace talks, at the end of the 1990s. (UN 2014:38).

In the Oslo accord process, politicians played a major role (Freedman 1999:144). The Israel Defence Force was excluded from the initial negotiations leading up to the signing of the 1993 agreement, despite being the major actor of Israeli politics. After the Oslo accords, Israel was regularly facing suicide attacks and killings. Israel was not prepared at all for the attacks (Grevle 2012: 4). The Israeli military officers were highly disappointed and were angry with the political leaders. The Military officers presumed that the Israeli society and its people came into troubles due to the bad decisions of the Oslo Peace Process (Rubner 1998:198). This paved way for the direct and indirect tension in the Israeli civil-military relations.

The following are a list of basic terms, which are necessary for understanding the foundation of *civil-military Relations*.

Military: Samuel Finer argued that “modern armies are cohesive and hierarchical. Armed forces are purposive instruments that tend to be far more rigidly organized than any other state-level entity. They are seldom the recipient of universal love or respect from civil populations, and their ability to focus on anything beyond operational environments or primitive governing (resulting from intervention or occupation) is limited” (Finer 2002: 6–13). In addition, while all security organizations view themselves as the protectors of national interests, they lack the legitimacy to rule unilaterally and may conceive or prioritize those interests differently from the rest of society. (Finer 2002: 14-37). Military is generally respected by the public, for the service it does to the nation. But, the public or the civilians do not want the army to rule the society. The national interests for the army, according to the civilians, are to safeguard and ensure the security of the state and the civilians. Army ruling the nation is not a national interest for the civilians (ibid).

Professionalism: This refers to a sociological as well as a logical concept applicable to the men in uniform. When it comes to civil-military relations, there are three basic dimensions which define civil-militant relations (Boene 2001: 52-53). These are as follows: Educational knowledge; a sentiment of service to the nation and responsibility towards the society are based on greater principles; and a sense of distinguished identity that creates the difference between military as well as civil institutions (Boene 2001: 52-53).

Two key theories that are propounded by Morris Janowitz and Samuel Huntington are linked with professionalism. Huntington argued that mostly during the beginning of the Cold War the officer corps was observed through the prism of potential total conflict. The objective was to ensure that the sphere of security remained comfortable in the civil-military relationship by eradicating any scope of the military getting into the politics (Owens 2009:1). Therefore, the proscribed mechanism was the clear demarcation of military from the civil society for the twin purposes of its martial skills maximization as well its subordination to the state (Boene 2001: 53-56). The military was seen as an institution that is apolitical in the domestic political affairs while ensuring security to the civilians. Military was also expected to be loyal to the state, that is, the executive and be its subordinate. However, the martial skills are expected to be maximized.

On the other hand, Janowitz argued that as the threat of mutual eradication got reduced, the military initiated to give up its corporate distinctiveness and started to re-connect with society. In due course, this led to the erosion of inter-domain gap (Boene 2001: 56-60). Therefore, discipline and professionalism paved the way for snowballing dynamism and management process. While Janowitz agrees about the civilian control and its hierarchy over the military, according to him close links between the military and society are positive signs because the control of the armed forces on civil authority is further strengthened if the dominant trends and attitudes of the society are further reflected in the military as well (Boene 2001: 56-60). The relations between the military and civilians improved with the reduction of mutual threat. The society's perception on the military has advanced with the strengthening of the ties (ibid).

Militarism: For Mira Sucharov, at the level of policy, militarism is actually the belief that “organized violence, or war, is the best remedy for any political problems” (Sucharov 2005: 190). Sucharov, while carrying the definition to the normative/societal level observes that militarism is subjugation of civil society to military values as well as the civilian control of the military for military control of the civilian (Sucharov 2005: 190). Being prepared in an organized manner for conflict is the policy of military. The civil society is made to observe or follow the military values and never question military values.

Boundaries: Lissak argues that the boundaries between military and civilian systems were never clearly demarcated and the two influenced each other (Lissak 1998:419). There is an interdependence between the military and civilians and their system of which military is also a part. Taking up very idea further, Huntington states that “dissemination of power between civilian and military groups ... differs with the compatibility between the dominating ideology of the society and the specialised military ethics ... Therefore the conceptualization of an objective civilian control varies upon the attainment of an adequate equilibrium between the ideology of society and the power of the army” (Huntington 1957: 94).

This culminated in theoretical classification of the three types of boundaries: integral, permeated, and fragmented. Integral is applicable to the states considered as ideal democracy where the exchange between persons holding roles at various levels of the military hierarchy and the environment are under strict vigil of those with responsibility for setting the operational goals of the armed forces that is the higher command (Huntington 1957: 94-96). Permeated is applicable to totalitarian regime, where there is total fusion both with respect of targets and of organization between the holders of the instruments of coercion and other social groups (ibid).

In the fragmented boundaries, the interactions of the possessors of military roles with those possessing civilian roles escapes the grip of the military elites in a manner that damages its freedom to cooperate with the political and social environment as one entity in a constant manner (Cohen 2006: 722).

Linkages: These are the meeting points between the military and civil spheres at both the institutional and individual level which leads to the occurrence of a distinguished pattern of interaction (Lissak 2001:239). The existence of such can be found at all the levels of penetration, but are more apparent in cases of permeated and fragmented connections. In the case of Israel, the linkages include social networks, political networks, economic networks, educational networks, and military service through reserve duties (Lissak 2001:239-242).

Nation-in-arms: This is portrayed as a model where the boundaries between the civil and military domains are fragmented. This was first observed in France's *Levee en masse* of 1793. This is a comprehensive system based upon the conscription of the state's entire, normally male, population. Gradually this was extended to include contributions made by civilians on the home front (Bartov 1994:27-33). Uri Ben-Eliezer argues that "the nation-in-arms model assigns a key place to the state in making or manipulating the nationalist sentiment" (Ben-Eliezer 1995: 268–269). It incorporates the armed forces and the society under a single objective and hence forms the belief that the military is a distant/alien and thereby reducing the scope for military intervention against the civil government (ibid).

In his exemplary work, *Soldier and the State*, Huntington assumed that civil-military relations are formed by three primary variables: the degree of outward threat (his functional imperative); the constitutional arrangement of the state (one of his societal imperatives) and the ideological configuration/perceptions of society (the other societal imperative) (Feaver 1997: 1–87). According to the Huntington, the civil-military relations are the key constituent of army safety policy of any state and the primary emphasis is the relation of the officer corps with that of the state (Huntington 1957:1-3).

The confrontation between societal pressures and functional pressure comes to the forefront and this leads to the dual premise that the domains of the civilian and military should be clearly demarcated and professionalization of the army can characteristically inspire a structural relegation to the civilian leadership (Finer 2002: 24). Huntington further continues to elaborate the unique patterns of the association, founded on the subsequent autonomous variables: degree

of army recognition in society (pro/anti); quantity/level of military political influence (low/high); and the level of military professionalism (low/high) (Huntington 1957:96-97).

These are fundamental rules for evaluating the interrelationship between the two domains and while valid to most states, they do not account for all possible examples. In his seminal work *Man on Horseback*, Samuel Finer takes stance contradictory to the Huntington's emphasis on the virtues of military professionalism. Since the militaries inherit professional virtues like hierarchy they are highly organized and goal oriented. By-default they pose a continuous threat to civil government if they are not kept under tight vigil (Finer 2002:6-13). Any government presumes that if it does any mistake army can stage a coup and hence it has checks and balances over issues with the army and its position (ibid).

Instead of assuring formal, long-term civilian control, Finer argues that professionalism can isolate the armed forces from the society and worsen its corporate consciousness, leading to a chance of military counterattack against civil leadership (ibid). Hence, he argues that substantive check against military intervention is the strict recognition of the civilian supremacy, not merely professionalism. The agenda of civilian control over military has no proper academic definition but is nurtured in customs, laws and traditions (ibid). Kobi Michael has defined this as a 'procedure' whose appropriateness is rests upon by appraising the contextual influence of civilians and military officers over state decisions (Michael 2007:28).

Finer, Huntington and Janowitz are all proponents urging clear demarcation of the military and civilian authority. They advocate a strong civilian control over the military. The continuation of the democracy requires the stern control of the military by the civil government. There is a necessity of the relative autonomy and political neutrality of the military elites (Etzioni 1996:402).

On the other hand, scholars like Horowitz, Ben-Eliezer, Peri, Lissak and Schiff argue that nearness of the military and civil domains furthers an environment of positivity. This in their view reduces the confrontation between the two and curbs the scope for military coups. Civilian control can theoretically be separated in two diverse consisting of subjective or objective mechanisms. The nearness makes a good atmosphere in the society (ibid, 402-403). For Huntington, the subjective civil control obtains its goals by civilianizing the army and converting it as a mirror of the state. On the other hand, the objective civilians control manages to get its goal by militarizing the military and making them as the instrument of the state (Huntington 1957:83). The military has, historically, attempted to increase the objective

control, where civilian governments have been more tilted towards seeking/maintaining the subjective control (Huntington 1957:83)

Prior to Oslo

It is noted that, there is unique characteristic of civil-military relationship in Israel. In the unique evolution of the civil-military relations there were the unique circumstances. There is inequality between military and civilians. The Israel Defence Force exercises unequal influence in the sphere of policy making (Freilich 2006: 635). Most of the time, Israeli politicians seem to be subordinate to Israel Defence Force, although, according to Israeli democracy the army officially remains subordinate to the elected government. Since the 1967 war, there is very blurred line between the civil-military relations (Barak 2007:4).

An overview of power sharing at micro level underlines that the power is under three key personality's hands. These three key position holders are the prime minister, defence minister and chief of General Staff (Bar-or-2006:365-366). The power fluctuates among these three only. At the macro-level, the security founding has obviously expected an extra confident role in the policy-making process due to politically-oriented factors (Peri 2005:335).

Udi Lebel says that the defence policy is always alive in most critical domain. It is considered in the most critical domain. Security is the most energetic public product. It is necessary to provide this product to the public (Lebel 2007:71). Security provided by the army has become like a tool in Israel that has almost become endowed with a religious status. Security obtains the lion's share of the state budget. And another factor is that defence policy always plays a very important role and it is the key component in deciding the way people vote (Lebel 2007:71).

There are different opinions on security "second careers", in the government. For senior Israel Defence Force leaders military role expansion or reduction has permanently changed the power relationship (Mintz 1985:626-627). They instilled Israel Defence Force as a default expert and arbiter of issues far beyond the issue of security. Some authors like Stuart Cohen say that in the last twenty years, the military's societal role has decreased. However, the overall influence definitely holds prominence in all measures (Cohen 2006:772).

When one talks about the Israeli civil-military relations the primary focus should be on the characteristics of main leadership position in the government like Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Chief of General Staff. Another factor is, in Israel there is no constitution so the relationship between military and civilian is very much unclear and left undefined (Shetreet

1984: 979). Although there is a series of Basic Laws which define exact responsibilities and the rights of various institutions, these are not enough to define civil-military domain, mainly security related matters. So it creates a contradiction in between Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Chief of General Staff (Ben-Meir 1995:37-40).

The role of the Israeli Prime Minister as a head of the government state and chief executive of the state was not formalised in the Israeli “Basic Law: The Government”, until 1968 (Ben-Meir 1995:37). But in 1948, David Ben-Gurion made a historical example, as the guiding principle of the state and proposed that the prime minister should be “first among equals” within the cabinet (Muhareb 2011:5).

During the earlier year there are no exact references between the Prime Minister and Defence, other than the prescribed role within the government. It is also seen that Israeli Prime Minister also played an additional as a Defence Minister during the combat time (Ben-Meir 1995:28-39). He worked on both state and defence policy, with the creation of a Ministerial Committee of National Security, the permanent and direct Security saw the light of the day (Ben-Meir 1995:28-39).

The role of the Defence Minister was always debatable in the civil-military community, due to the unclear definition and delineation of accountability. According to the 1948 ordinance the Defence Minister exists as a de facto in between the two spheres (Etzioni:2006:401). He works as government and cabinet representative to the Israel Defence Force. He is responsible for the budget. He is considered as an actor within the civilian bureaucracy (Etzioni: 2006:401). Research and developed works is also completed by him (Ibid). The operational and military matters are dispatched to senior military commanders in his name. The question remains whether the Defence Minister is in effect a “chief of war,” with the authority of a “Super CGS,” or merely the administrative link between the politicians and defence establishment (Ben-Meir 1995:39-41).

Chief of General Staff

According to military jurisdiction law, the Chief of General Staff is the head of the armed forces. His role is undefined and is akin to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. His boundary is blurred in terms of responsibilities which principally influence the functioning of custom and tradition, as the senior-ranking officer of the armed forces. Status of Chief of General Staff was not defined until 1976 (Bar-Or 2006:365-367). He was the like the quasi minister due to the nature of his responsibility to the government in terms of security matter.

His political military boundaries are blurred because he functions as a quasi-minister (Ben-Meir 1995: 43). This has clear and pertinent impact upon the dynamic relationship with the Defence Minister. The cabinet is the nominal superior of the Chief of General Staff. A smaller group of senior officers function in principle as collective commander-in-chief of the armed forces (ibid, 29-32).

It is notable that there is no formal or direct relationship between this body and the security establishment. The broadly interpreted nature of the “The Basic Law: Government” extends to the entire executive of the central government authority but not specified elsewhere (Bar-Or 2006:365-367). As the temporary regime established both the state and the military, in May 1948, after the independence, the elected government keep indirect links with the security apparatus via the Defence Minister (Ben-Meir 1995: 43). In some ways there was a direct control to oversee defence issues despite the notional subordination. Due to the lack of constitutional authority and haphazard incorporation the Ministerial Defence Committee has been constantly suffering (Ben-Meir 1995: 43).

When one looks about the control of or influence Knesset—the elected Israeli Legislative Assembly—over the military or security issues, finds that the direct control of the Knesset is less (Sternhell 2007:1). In the matter of security sphere there executive branch or the cabinet is more powerful rather than the Knesset (Sternhell 2007:1). For the distribution of power they have designed few checks and balances. Israeli legislature has control through the following the legislative ability, Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, and the budget control (Freilich 2006: 641). The Israeli history says that legislative ability and budget control are rarely used as a tool of national security. However, the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee has lot less specific effect outside of advisory channels (Freilich 2006: 641).

Civil-Military Relations from 1948 to 1967

Israel arose out of an incredible enmity between two nationalist groups, namely, the Zionists and Palestinians. They are fighting with each other since the inception of Israel. When Arab world rejected the partition of mandatory Palestine, the conventional and systematic threats were faced by Israel (Spoerl 2014:77). Israel’s perception was that it must unite and face this threat collectively. This perception rapidly developed and focused on defence and security.

Quantitatively inferior to its Arab neighbours, Israel’s civil and military leaderships were challenged with the twin dilemmas of how to mobilize rare manpower and resources most effectively and how to integrate the rapid influx of immigrants into a cohesive society

(Weinraub 2009:55). The outcome was an exclusive combination of state, society security apparatus and, changing potential weakness into a power multiplier (Weinraub 2009:55).

In the beginning of Israel Defence Force, the civil-military boundaries were blurred by trusting on a mass-based, civilianized structure to compensate for inherent numerical disadvantage (ibid). Mainly the Israeli armed forces came to be trusted during the time when there was tiredness of partition of labour and accountability split between a minor, professional constituent; a reserve army which could be speedily militarised in the occasion of a nation-wide emergency; and an active force included of new conscripts (ibid).

The aim of the active components (both professionals and conscripts) was to grip the opponent, until the much bigger reserve element could be transported to bear as a supplementing force (Ben-Eliezer 1997:362). This model was proved to be very fruitful in the beginning stage of Israel as battles were characteristically of tiny period and the Israel Defence Force kept an important qualitative benefit over bordering Arab enemies.

The role of the armed forces was not only in achieving the military objectives but it has also widely interference in the sphere of society. The role of the military was expanded more than to that of the earlier times (Cohen 2006). According to Uri Ben-Eliezer and Stuart Cohen, the IDF was seen as a de facto melting pot, “an instrument of modern Jewish ‘nation-building.’” (Ben-Eliezer 2001:138-141).

The Israeli armed force was accountable for such different tasks as: providing the education for the settlers and the disadvantaged Israeli; promote the civil culture via environment news and radio; providing medical care; and construction of critical infrastructure projects (Kaplan 2015:1).The most important thing of this system is that it is a universally accepted notion of civilian control over the army. While security necessities take superiority over external and internal strategy, Ben-Gurion was determined to remove all factionalism from the Israel Defence Force to mitigate its possible emergence as a political rival (Peri 1984:47).

The military’s subordination would continue resolutely under the Prime Minister’s control. It was therefore rigorously overseen by a framework of state-level institutions, and would continue resolutely under the Prime Minister’s (i.e., his) control (Schiff 1999:436). Uri Ben-Eliezer says that “a kind of trade-off took place between the political and military elites. The latter obeyed that the political leadership and discarded any possible threat to its rule, whereas the politicians gave the young people the freedom to operate according to their own lights.” (Ben-Eliezer 1997: 362)

Ben-Gurion always believed that the civil-military process must be highly dominated and there should be personal rules over the civil- military process (Smith 2007: 280). In Israel's beginning days, he firmly controlled the appointment of Israel Defence Force officers even down to levels below flag rank. This gave him a position to uphold support amongst party stalwarts and dependants. He believes that the due to this action the potential political threat from the military will also reduce (Smith 2007: 280).

Ben-Gurion has also believed that there should be limit of government to conduct security related policy. He included these things:

1. A separation of the Israel Defence Force from extraneous support functions, which were summarily transferred to the Ministry of Defence (Ben-Meir 1986: 100);
2. An informal decision making process whereby the Prime Minister had both extreme flexibility and few limitations (Ben-Meir 1995:48-49);
3. A severely curtailed role for the Knesset's Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, which was seen purely as an information provider (Ben-Meir 1986: 103); and
4. Controlling the functional authority of the Ministerial Defence Committee

Ben-Gurion's incorrectly trusted too much on his own individual control and did not create this structural interrelationship with a lawful standing. As a result, over time, the Israel Defence Force gradually encroached on areas of civilian functional responsibility to include procurement and arms exports (Ben-Meir 1995: 88).

When one looks at Ben-Gurion's policies and approaches, one finds that the policies of Ben-Gurion were realistic. Within the Israeli political range, he continued a moderate policy relative to the fringe positions (Heller 2000:22). Another factor is while elevating the Israel Defence Force on a pedestal as the key element within Israeli society, on the issues of policy primacy that Ben-Gurion was not scared to stand up to the military leadership (ibid).

First crack in the civil-military

In 1954, during the "Lavon Affair" the first crack came in the Israeli civil-military relations. Lavon Affair damaged relationship between the three main stakeholders, namely, Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Chief of General Staff and was subjected to personal and political rivalries (Shlaim 2001:105). In this case, newly risen Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon was started to use increased and direct operational control over the Israel Defence Force (Shlaim 2001:105). This led to contradictions between the Lavon (Defence Minister), secret Israeli detective ring operating in Egypt (unknown to the Defence Minister). Senior Israel

Defence Force leaders closed ranks in opposition to Lavon and laid the blame for the fiasco directly at his feet (Heper 2005:232).

Moshe Sharett convened an inquiry to ascertain blame regarding the operation's initiation but despite inconclusive findings, Lavon remained tainted by the affair and resigned. Then, in 1955, Ben-Gurion came back to the office as both Prime Minister and Defence Minister (Cohen 2010:173). He cleared that the concern is to absolve and protect the military from any blame worthiness from this disappointment.

Ben-Gurion had retired from political life in the mid-1960 and successor was Levi Eshkol (Steinberg 2010:1). Eshkol had aided his precursor in subjugating the military leadership (Shlaim 2001:218). He did maintain Ben-Gurion's practice. He did continue linking both the Prime Minister and Defence Minister portfolios. He did also continue the pleasant bond with the Chief of General Staff Rabin who was given big liberty and de facto independence. In limited words, one can say that there was a miser of constancy between the two spheres (Ben-Meir 1986:103-104). Unfortunately the attempt of Eshkol for the improvement in the civil - military system happened instantaneously with *MAPAI* party backbiting and division which presented him as feeble on defence issues (Ben-Meir 1986:103-104).

This was dangerous for Eshkol. This harmful effect did damage the relations with the military and created the problem between Israel and its neighbours. During a period known as the "General's Revolt," or the during the 1967 war the role of the Prime Minister was very indecisiveness, flopping on strategic policy and led to a severe backlash from Israel Defence Force leaders (Naor 2008:36-39).

Civil-Military Relations from 1967 to 1992

The civil-military relation became effective since the June 1967 war, where civilian leadership represented an immense counterbalance despite the growing Israel Defence Force's popularity and influence (Ze'ev 1999:438). As a result, it changed relationship dynamics between military and civil leadership. Prior to the war, the separation between Prime Minister and Defence Minister merely allowed policy and coordination in ambiguity on various issues. They are end of consensus on national security policy, corroding political stability and corroding strong civil-military relationship (Ze'ev 1999:438).

The agreement on new Prime Minister-Defence Minister was half hearted, more on personal relationship of Ben-Gurion and Dayan than on legal standing. It was the means to work as an aligning policy and to mitigate Israel Defence Force influence (Arian 2005:126). But the

effectiveness was hit by many examples like Rabin-Peres tension during the 1970s (Cohen 2016:1). The respective security system resulted in strengthening of strategic policy making (Arian 2005:126).

The 1967 victory ended the consensus on national security, inevitably emphasizing the strength of one another force (Naor 2006:41-46). For Arye Naor there were contradictions between sweeping tactical victory and eventually strategic failures that demonstrated failure of civilian planning. It disadvantaged the government's capability to resist Israel Defence Force (ibid). During Dayan's era, the conflict was expanded with their objective beyond their goal and served as an opportunity cost (Heller 2000:24). This divergence of 1967 war furthered and accelerated with 1973 and 1982 wars until present. This also resulted in the end of single party dominance, where *MAPAI/Labour* lost hegemonic control. It was merely depended on the appointees of state security that elevated Israel Defence Force with the increasing wartime success (ibid).

Though the shifting of former military men into government is not uncommon but Israel experienced a higher rate of accession (Mango 2002:116). This is inherent in civil-military relations. It blurred the distinction between the civilian leaders who has served minimum service obligation and experienced as senior officer. As a result, it monopolized the system (Mango 2002:116). On the boarder level, it defined roles and responsibility of civil authorities but neglected to delineate the roles and responsibilities of primary actors like Prime Minister, Defence Minister, and Chief of General Staff who continuously sustained their influential positions (Perlmutter 1968:606-643).

During the 1970s, the influence of military forces had risen, because of the October 1973 war (Lebel 2007:73). It was very troubling. The Israel Defence Force officers prolonged their role in the sphere of diplomacy. They were doing this work during disengagement and peace process (Lebel 2007:73) *Agranat* Commission noted that during the 1973-74 there was lack of civil-military delineation and superior-subordinate relationships (Ben-Meir 1986: 108).

In 1976, the *Basic Law: The Army* came and brought some reforms (Bar-Or 2006 365-367). It was the foundation for such reform and improvements in the civil-military relations. According to Amir Bar-Or the legislation "intended to define formally and explicitly Israel's political-military relations," and "firmly established constitutional principle of civilian control over the military" (Bar-Or 2006:365-366). Although the work was successful at the small level, many difficult issues were knowingly avoided. The issue of politics was avoided, "deliberately

formulated to allow a high degree of military involvement...without either endorsing or preventing it” (Peri 1981:311).

Prime Minister Menachem Begin was confronted with a defence establishment who initially saw security-related issues from a different perspective than his own (Inbar 1998:64-65). Begin staunchly symbolized the changes in the civil-military relation. Being in opposition with minimal military experience he was more concerned with the subject matter (Inbar 1998:64-65).

During the era of Ben-Gurion power politics, he opened up space for divergence of opinion. Begin, despite the lack of military experience, blunted the stand of Ben-Gurion on military and strategic issues and questioned the attempt to side-track the Camp David process (Peri 1983:50-51). Dayan and Ezer Weizman criticized his stand on policy and departed the administration to new Defence Minister under the leadership of Ariel Sharon. This transformation resulted in 1982 Israel’s failure in Lebanon (Beinin 1980:7).

Since 1980, the status of Israel Defence Force declined with growing hostility between military and society along with Defence Minister. This left an impression on the civil-military relations (Ze'ev 1999:440). Rather than maintaining national security, it focused on sustaining status quo stability, which was termed as a new generation of military action. Prime Minister Begin justified the military failure in Lebanon by stating that was “in order to avoid a costlier, more terrible war in the future” (Horowitz 1984:93-95).

The long standing relationship was dominated by military establishment. According to Horowitz, “the ‘partnership’ between the military and civilian systems was replaced with manipulation of the civilian system by the defence establishment, as the military gained professional authority to direct policies to the government” (Horowitz 1984:99). Following the Palestinian uprising, Israel Defence Force continued to direct support to civil policy maker, especially Defence Minister to eradicate the movement through the force (Cohen 1994:7-18). Later on, many senior leaders realized that it will entail the moral line and would violate the western norms. The Chief of General Staff publically broke civil policy established by Prime Minister and Defence Minister, while the government blamed the inability of the military to quash the movement (Horowitz 1984:99-100).

Post Oslo

With the end of cold war, a new geopolitical paradigm awakened which in turn influenced the civil-military relationship. The balance of judgment was impacted with the forty years’

experience of the Israel Defence Force, with regard to the peace deal with Arab neighbours (Maoz 2002:515-532). Israel's involvement in strategic position enabled it to strengthen its political and military sphere along with Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Chief of General Staff. They acted as a driving force for peace and normalization with the Palestine Liberation Organization (Kwartan 1996:18-20). As a result, Israel's military continue to influence its strategic policy (Heper 2005:234). The ability of civil-military relation has imbalanced the functionary, but power struggle is balanced through the elected government's hierarchical control over military. The acceptance of Israel Defence Force to influence government policy has concluded in Israel's acceptance of civil-military structure (Heper 2005:234). Another thing was that after the signing Oslo accord Israel got more terrorist attacks. The promise of withdrawal creates the power vacuums. So Israeli people were badly dissatisfied with this accord and hence this accord did affect badly civil -military relations. But it was not sustained for a long time.

Civil Military Relation during 1992–1996

The Israeli leadership changed with the 1987 intifada that concerted the doctrinal shift from “War between States” to “War between Nations” (Peri 2002:14-15). It shaped the functioning of armed forces in the civil administration and strong military control along with defined structure on the occupied territory. It paved ways to the changes of political and security reality of Israel Defence Force's position especially into the peace camp (Peri 2006:31).

The USSR's dissolution negatively impacted the Arab states, with regard to their material benefits and support. There was no source of interference from the former Soviet Union or Russia. This led Israel to shift from their traditional security (ibid 38-39). Alongside, it resulted in the loss of the values of bargaining chip and call of Israel Defence Force towards the direct restraint. With the defeat of Saddam Hussein of Iraq in the Kuwait crisis and the change of geopolitical position of Syria enabled, Israeli Defence forces were made to rethink their strategic depth. Yoram Peri argues that “these changes in Israel's circumstances opened the window of opportunity for a diplomatic accord,” and that “in order to enhance preparedness for a possible confrontation with ‘second circle’ states, Israel would need to reach a political accommodation with its ‘first circle’ neighbours, even at the cost of territorial assets” (Peri 2005:325). The ineffectiveness of Madrid Conference projected the secretive Oslo accord which was ultimately turned by Israel Defence Force's leadership (Cohen 2006:776).

Then Prime Minister and Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin held many functions, such as the leakage of information within Israeli bureaucracy, avoid bargaining position, and the fear of political failure (Freilich 2006:335-350). This was furthered by Chief of General Staff Barak, who opposed any sort of direct negotiation with the Palestinians. His concern was based on two criteria. Firstly, proposed agreement carried many security loopholes, and secondly; peace agreement and initiative with Syria offered more advantageous strategic position to Israel (Peri 2006:64-65). But Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel Defence Force were involved in various peace negotiations and planning agreements throughout the decade. The ability of government organization to conduct intelligence and strategic position was not within the government domain (ibid- 20-25).

Later Israel Defence Force accepted as a new geopolitical position where peace became a means to an end. The idea of granting Palestine more territorial leadership and political expectation was in return of the security for the Israelis. As a result, Oslo accord concluded with self-fulfilling and cyclical nature of Israel Defence Force perspectives and personalities (Peri 2005:380).

Civil -Military Relations during 1996–1999

The rise to power of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 had piloted to an unmatched crisis, for the Israel Defence Force. In opposition to the Israel Defence Force's super echelons that held the peace process, since the early 1990s, the new prime minister robustly opposed the Oslo Accords (Beauchamp 2015:1). However, the military opined that the Palestinian Authority as an interlocutor for an agreement and territorial compromise as a necessary condition for the peace process to continue. Netanyahu countered the compromise based on the land-for-peace principle. While approaching the elections he declared that as Prime Minister he would not shake Yasser Arafat's hand (Peri 2006:331). With Netanyahu as the Prime Minister, it marked, for the first time that the political leadership and Israel Defence Force super echelons were deeply divided over broad security requirements (ibid).

Besides Netanyahu, his ministers stood in opposition to the military's approach to the peace process. According to the reading of Netanyahu and his ministers, the Israel Defence Force's major point derived from its inefficiency to handle the challenges it had been ordered to perform and from its incapability to suppress the insurgent warfare against Israel's presence in the occupied territories and Southern Lebanon (Michael 2007: 430-435). They also firmly thought that the higher military echelons had subscribed to the political positions of the Labour party

and the military elites have close social relationship with it. Therefore the military's approach was lackadaisical in dealing the opposition. The criticisms by Netanyahu and his ministers were not restricted to themselves but were known to many quarters (Michael 2007: 430-435).

Alongside, Netanyahu criticised Israel Defence Force's support for peace process and active participation in the peace negotiations (Michael 2007:433). It may be negative and dangerous. He opined that the military officers must dedicate themselves and their time for military engagement with the enemy in the battlefield and that they must refrain and strictly restrict themselves from diplomatic agreements or negotiations (Michael 2007:433). Netanyahu was so strong that he aimed at dismantling the political influence of the Israel Defence Force officers. He had even endeavoured for a revolution in the government's functioning and its machinery at his first cabinet as Prime Minister (CNN 2018:1). As soon as the top officials of the General Staff expressed their opinions, he ordered them to leave the meetings so that it could be easier for politicians to discuss the subject and take decisions without them. But, this exercise did not sustain for long (Peri 2005:331).

The head of the Southern Command Major General Matan Vilnai had executed the Oslo agreement in the Gaza strip. On the eve of the agreement he had written in his diary that the intifada and quite popular uprising which had out layered with nationalist, social and economic pressures had displayed the shortcomings of Israel Defence Force's power (Peri 2006: 85-86). In addition, the diary noted that defeating terrorism militantly would be inadequate and the genesis of terrorism must be addressed so that the seeds of terrorism may not be sown by anyone and it shall not resurface (ibid).

Netanyahu's performance as Prime Minister was heavily disapproved by military. His leadership capabilities were undervalued by the senior officers of the Israel Defence Force (Lissak 1998:250). After the clashes between IDF and Netanyahu, the formers' assessment of the prime minister with regard to his leadership and professional abilities turned out to be negative. The IDF characterized that he was not balanced and he was functioning under political pressure (Lissak 1998:250-253). They did not consider him to be a trustworthy and reliable and did not take up responsibility while he was rapid in blaming others. The growing clashes between the military and political echelons outnumbered as Israel Defence Force's negative assessment of Netanyahu strengthened (Bar-Siman-Tov 2007:31-35).

The critique to Netanyahu's defence policy was displayed in the meetings of high ranking officers and bureaucrats. Deputy Chief of General Staff Vilnai after retiring from the IDF

expressed that “Netanyahu’s way was not his way. For him, Netanyahu was disappointing as Prime Minister. I was disturbed by his lack of understanding with regard to things he had to do; my main criticism of him is of his complementation of what was agreed to with Arafat” (Peri 2006:85). Indeed, the period from the end of 1997 to the beginning of 1998 was one of the low points of the military government relationship (ibid).

The second phase of the Oslo Accords proposed for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Hebron (Schmemmann 1997:1). The prime minister had appealed the newly appointed head of the Planning and Policy directorate Shlomo Yanai to draft an agreement for security cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian authority (Saban 2007:29). After the document was ready, Yanai made sure that the Prime Minister flies to London to present it to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Before presenting the agreement or the document, Yanai obtained feedback from a Central Intelligence Agency representative, and then it was presented to Netanyahu and received his support and approval (Peri 2006:85-86). After the return of Netanyahu and Yanai from Europe, the Israeli security cabinet debated the whole document. The militant group among the ministers heavily criticized the paper. The Prime Minister disapproved the document in the closed forum of the security cabinet meeting. He had secretly sent his comments to the media. He had called it a "sloppy working paper" prepared for him by the military, claiming he had completely rejected it. Netanyahu had withdrawn the agreement which he had signed with Albright at their London meeting but made the Israel Defence Force as a scapegoat (Peri 2006:85-86).

The information leaked to the media from the Chief of General Staff’s office, declaring its outrage at the criticisms levelled against the IDF. The outrage read as "The political echelon is cynically and evilly using the defence establishment. We weren't the ones who requested the 'security document it was designed all along for political purposes and approved by the political echelon" (Peri 2006:85) Later, a period of two days, these differences became clear as media issued an explanation regarding the deterioration in relations between Netanyahu and the defence establishment that had developed.

In November 1996, an Israeli paparazzi-style photo journalist caught Shachor, coordinator of Israel Defence Force operations in the occupied territories, walking into the house of opposition leader Shimon Peres late at night and leaving after an hour and a half (Peri 2006:85-86). It resulted that Shachor being accused of holding one-on-one meetings with Peres, Peres's senior aides, and MK Yossi Sand, the head of *Meretz* (another opposition party)(Beck 2015:1). These

were done without the knowledge and approval of the Chief of General Staff, the defence minister, or the prime minister. This was in clear violation of IDF regulations, which strictly avoids such meetings with political figures.

Conflict in between Prime Minister Chief of Staff

Prime Minister and Chief of General Staff used to meet once in a week and there were conflicts always between them. Shahak could not speak in front of Netanyahu as Netanyahu explained that Chief of General Staff was not responsible for providing political analysis. This observation of Netanyahu created chaos and made a huge headline in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, which is major newspaper in Israel on 15 January 1998.

Shahak leaked some of his letters addressed to Prime Minister Netanyahu accusing the latter of misleading the media and people as the Prime Minister's office had succeeded in popularising the incidents for its gain. After some time, *Yedioth Ahronoth* published a news item reading "New Low in the strained relations the Prime Minister and Chief of General Staff in the wake of the silencing. The Chief of General Staff accused the Prime Minister untrustworthy" (Peri 2006:88).

The conflict with Netanyahu forced Shahak to the political field. He expressed his desire to pursue his own line to continue Rabin's interrupted enterprise but Netanyahu had already realised Shahak's political ambitions more before the General had even thought of a political innings (Peri 2006:87-88). Netanyahu attacked Shahak's weak point as he knew the fact that Chief of General Staffs get their popularity and prestige from their independent and apolitical image (Reich 2016:333). Netanyahu never praised the Chief of General Staff but declared him to be a leftist which was a major drawback to Shahak's political beginning. Shahak had to work a lot to remove his 'leftist' label before making his political entry (Bar-or 2006: 368-373). For this reason, he had to reject Ehud Barak's invitation to join the Labour Party and take the number two position in the Labour Party list for the Knesset. Even he formed a new political formation with another retired chief of staff Yitzhak Mordecai and senior officials named the Centre Party (ibid).

Retired senior Israel Defence Force officials gathered against Netanyahu. This caused a drop in the Likud leader's electoral prospects but also he lost the confidence of right wing in his government and party (Bar-Or 2006:369). The media also criticised Netanyahu not for his policies but for his behaviour and character (Pfeffer 2018:1). The campaign got success as it

gained trust among retired army officers. The Israel Defence Force officials did not cover their support when Barak defeated Netanyahu in 1999 (Tibon 2016:15-18).

If one look on the Netanyahu era (1996-1999) one finds that with the assassination of Yitzchak Rabin, the peace process was hauled on 1996, projecting the inability and deteriorating security situation (California Press 1997:123-134). Netanyahu reacted with huge military influence in the political sphere with the killing of Oslo implementation. His critical approach towards Israel Defence Force reformed the political and policy making domain in the peace process (Lissak 1998: 250). He questioned the entire role of the IDF on quelling violence and lack of any operational results. He further focused on training the military for merely conflict purpose, without any military influence on political activity and policy making (Bar-or 2006 269-272).

Netanyahu shunned the military with an attempt to create more civilianised national security apparatus under his control. But the attempt exacerbated the tension between the civil-military relation and the failure of government capacity to produce staff and other administration along with the military establishment (Bar-or 2006 269-272). Finally the failure of Israel Defence Force for the implementation of poorly conceived policy led to the confrontation between prime Minister and Chief of General Staff (ibid). Thus, the pragmatic desire of Chief of General Staff, Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel Defence Force came into a direct confrontation with Netanyahu's revisionist policies (Ben-Porat 2005:225-245).

These internal unstable relationships were highly criticized by the Israeli media. The distrust of Shahak-Netanyahu led to potential fear for Chief of General Staff to challenge government career (Lebel 2013:33-45). The post-career of IDF senior officers questioned the credibility of their functionaries in the government domain (Lebel 2013:33-45).

The intense situation of military and government deteriorated with the 1999 election. While it became conventional for highly military official to join political parties, they had joined public domain only through political apprenticeship and political entrepreneurship (Peri 2006:82-83). For the first time in the history of Israel, groups were where no existing military officer can overtly displace the sitting prime minister. A collective desire to rid Israel of a perceived security threat (i.e., Netanyahu) mobilized a significant number of senior officials into the political arena (ibid).

Civil-Military relations from 1999 to2002

In 1999 Barak took charge of Prime Minister as well as Defence Minister following the tradition former prime ministers. It was not only his victory in election but also his deep will

to engage in military affairs, which led him to make that decision (CNN 1999:1). Barak explained the decision that he was anxious about opposition from military over his agreements with Syria and the Palestinian state and that he wanted to ensure military's support and its engagement in his peace policies and to make military a full partner (Weinraub 2009:80). He also expressed his nervousness for Chief of General Staff that it would have formed an alliance with defence minister, if he had not been there in the post of defence official (ibid).

With the formation of a left-wing government headed by Barak in July 1999, the number of retired officers in the government increased (Label 2003:30-35). Barak appointed a good number of retired major-generals and brigadier-generals. All-important administrative positions which were closely connected to the prime minister were given to the retired officials (Label 2003:30-35). He gave them the responsibility to run peace process with the Palestinian and the Syrians with objectives which he set for his government. He wanted to continue the Rabin's historic transformation in early 1990s (Beinin 2014:10).

As Barak accelerated the pace of peace process the higher officials in the IDF gave him full confidence to work. He worked with Chief of General Staff Shaul Mofaz, whose vision for peace was as similar to Barak's without the burden of defence ministers who might have become barrier that process (Kershner 2012:1). Even Mofaz referred himself as the Israel's first Peacetime Chief of General Staff (Peri 2007:82). The government's peace policies have been appealing just six months after Barak became the Prime Minister and this was not the case before.

With the arrival of Barak and Shaul Mofaz, the relation between civil and military was expected to improve along with long lasting peace with Palestinians. (Bar-Or 2006: 370). The dual role of Prime Minister and Defence minister, the Chief of General Staff was initially afforded wide latitude in his position as "commander of the army" (Bar-Or 2006: 370). The two came into an agreement where Mofaz would handle military without the interference of civilian and the Prime Minister would handle the state without military interference. This led to the de-facto functions of the agreement in vacuum (Bar-Or 2006: 371-375).

This season was short lived; the senior IDF officers expressed their frustration in determination of national security policy. It became apparent that political pressures were pushing the Israeli government in a particular direction, which presented grave concern to the military establishment (Bar-Or 2006: 371-375). The lack of military involvement led to the weakening of Israeli security position with the increase of violence against the state. Many discrepancies

were demonstrated through unilateral Israeli withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000, the unwillingness to negotiate from the Golan Heights and the increasing level of Palestinian violence against the Israeli civilians (Bar-Or 2006: 371).

Though Barak promised Lebanon withdrawal in his 1999 election campaign, the continuous Hezbollah attacks forced him to opt for a hastily and unilateral withdrawal. Mofaz was reluctant on the immediacy of the action and the potential effect of the Israeli security and deterrence. Many of the Israel Defence Force senior leaders were concerned over Syria and the Golan Heights (Harik 2005:145). The military saw the inherent notion of national security, function of fatally fragmented and paralyzed government process. With continuously increasing violence through suicide bombing, the peace leaning segment among the officers of Israel Defence Force shrunk (Clauzet 2010:7-45). With the failure of Camp David meeting in 2000 and the outbreak of second intifada, the positional shift of Israeli military and government was completed.

At the beginning of 1990s, military was willing to make concessionary settlement with the Palestinian. But with the outbreak of second intifada, the military shifted its position towards counter measures (Peri 2005:333-334). Mofaz along with Israel Defence Force suppressed insurgency in direct opposition to perceived policy waffling on the part of the prime minister and government. The period was marked as a “whole sale transfer of national Security” (Peri 2005:334). This resulted in abdication of policy control from civilian to military that questioned government’s ability to rein in an increasingly impetuous.

In 2001, Barak was defeated by right wing former general Ariel Sharon (Lis 2014:1). With the rise of Sharon, the drift between military and civilian was healed along with defunct of peace process and suppressing intifada related violence. However, Sharon distinguished himself with the identity of Defence Minister and rather focused on solving the differences that were exacerbating the tension in Israel. When the Israeli government accepted Chief of General Staff security policy recommendations cart Blanche, Mofaz understood his enormous influence and began to start his post-career in politics (Bar-or 2006:372-374). Though his primary level was the higher goal of Israeli people, it hampered Sharon’s policy like his predecessor, as his was made to sustain between US pressure to engage in peace negotiation and political autonomy of IDF leadership (Bar-or 2006:372-374).

Civil-Military relations from 2003 to present

Moshe Ya'alon, less politically inclined than his predecessor, a blunt critic of Arafat, assumed the position of Chief of General Staff in June 2002 (Peri 2006 137-153). He was vocal critic of his own government policies when needed, along with the aim of to get rid of Arafat. He believed that Chief of General Staff not only had the right but the authority to redesign national security accordingly. According to Yoram Peri, "Ya'alon behaved according to the perception...that the Chief of General Staff had not only the right, but also the authority to be a full partner in fashioning national security" (Peri:2006:138).

The election of 2003 created internal dynamics, when Mofaz made an entrance as Defence Minister. The relationship between Sharon and Mofaz had widened personality and professional differences (Bar-Or 2006:365-366). Mofaz wanted to have de facto control over IDF through his position on super Chief of General Staff (Bar-Or 2006:365-366). Until his position transition, Defence Minister lack of influence was glaring apparent to him.

The rift between Sharon and Ya'alon was so widened that led to the latter politically connect with the Prime Minister and accomplish his policy bidding. Sharon circumvented a politically weak Mofaz and bypassing several more senior officers he named Dan Halutz as the army chief (Preffer 2007:3). While taking new streamlining of the IDF, Chief of General Staff was willing to implement the Prime Minister policy of unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Despite of lacking military and political experience, Halutz was presented with a new administration (Preffer 2007:3-5).

The failure of the second Lebanon war in 2006 rested with the Chief of General Staff, where Halutz was criticized for not only for poor planning and strategy on the behalf of IDF but also for playing a proactive role on warning political leadership and counting the shortcoming of military training (Quetteville 2006:1). Within the period of one month, both Amir Peretz and Mofaz was replaced with highly regarded offices; Barak and Ashkenazi, respectively, who spend around two years in restoring the deterrent capability of IDF, establishing successful combating operation even while squabbling over the appointment of senior officers of the IDF (CNN 2006:1)

Conclusion

The Oslo accord was essential for the both parties. Israel was facing the continuous wars so it wanted peace especially after the first Lebanon war and first intifada. And from the side of Palestine, they were also exhausted by the conflict. At least they were getting a loosely defined

territory under this accord. Israel got more benefits from Oslo peace process because after the peace process the Israel was recognised by the Palestine. Israel's problem was that its people were not ready to give the occupied territory in any condition. The second thing was that after the Oslo accord the suicide attacks against Israel were not stopped by the Palestinian leadership. So this kind of situation gives a chance to military which was excluded from this process and it began to wield influence over the civilian authority. So the Oslo accord created tension in between military and civilian authority. Although the execution of Israel defence force was not for much time

Apart from this, before the Oslo many times tension came in the civil-military relation like after the June, October war when Israel faced existential threat and the Lebanon war and first intifada. They also affect the Israeli civil military relation. After the Oslo the most important phase was from 1996 to 1999. This was the phase of disharmony between Netanyahu and the IDF. This time there was not coordination between key players like Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Chief of general staff. In this phase Netanyahu reduced the role of the military officers. But after the winning the 1999 election Barak did lot of work in favour of military and role of military remerged which was not the case under Netanyahu.

Chapter five: Conclusion

The Israel is unique nation in terms of its history, geography, culture and society. Historically, it is situated on the place of the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judah. This place was the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity and Islam as well as it is birth place of Hebrew language. This area also holds some other holy faiths like Druze, Baha'i etc. In the land of Israel, various communities dominated and ruled various empires. In the seventh century this land captured by the Arab Muslim Empires and gradually become predominant in this area. Various Islamic empires ruled the holy land until British conquest in 1917.

In the late nineteenth century a twist came in the Jewish history when Zionist movement emerged due to anti-Semitism in Europe. After the First World War the Ottoman territories, including Palestine came under the Britain and France. Britain was given the mandate to rule Palestine by the League of Nations.

Meanwhile, due to continuous struggle and determination of Zionist leader the Belfour declaration was made in November 1917. This supported the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine. Towards the Jewish national home in Palestine many Jews immigrated from the different part of the world. This immigration was supported by the British mandate. This immigration was not acceptable to the Palestinian people and result was battle in between the Palestinians people and immigrant Jewish people. After the very much struggle and wars Jewish people succeed to make own Jewish national home with the formation of Israel in May 1948 as outlined by the UN partition plan of November 1947.

In the building of national Jewish home there was a great role by the military. In the all the riots and struggles the army was at the forefront. Before the independence of Israel the military was not in a united form. It was divided in the different groups, such as *Bar-Goira* (founded in 1907 it was the first paramilitary organisation), *Hashomer* (established in 1907 and was transformed from Bar-Goira), *Haganah* (established in 1920), *palmach*, *Irgun*, *Lehi* etc. These groups played a vital role to make Jewish national home. The common work of these groups was to protect the Jewish settlements. On 26 May 1948 Prime Minister-cum-Defence Minister David Ben-Gurion issued an order for formation of Israel Defence Force (IDF). Due to this order all the small and big groups were disbanded and came a new form which name was IDF.

Israel was born between wars. After its birth, it was not easy to survive in the hostile neighbourhood. During that situation strong army was mandatory for the Israel. For the strong military Israel started mandatory conscription system for all the Jewish people (Israeli Arabs are not conscripted). Somewhere it seems that Israel become a militaristic state due to its circumstances.

The Israeli civil-military relations are unique in the world. There is very much dominance of military. Military is decision-maker in politics and is very powerful in every field. The Israeli military is very powerful because of its functions. Like the unique conscription system where military service is mandatory all the Jewish people. Other than this the IDF is comprises of three services, namely, regular service, permanent service and the reserves. The organisation of IDF show that there are good cooperation among Chief of General Staff, Defence Minister and Prime Minister this gives strength to the IDF. The IDF's values missions to victory, accountability, credibility, discipline, comradeship, sense of mission, command and control and these values are power booster of the IDF.

The military powerful because of the Israeli society. In Israel there is exist various kinds of the civilians and several kinds of communities like Jews, Muslims, Christians, Druze and others. Within the Jewish community there are sub-divisions like orthodox Jews, secular Jews etc. Most of the Jews are immigrants from the several parts of the world. There exists also diversity of social and cultural traditions, influencing behaviour and values. The Jewish population is more than seventy five per cent of the population.

Despite all the fractions and division the society always stand with the military and moves side-by-side with soldiers. The some values of IDF such as protection of state and citizens, loyalty and love of the homeland and human dignity, prove that Israeli military is also accountable for the protection of the civilian in any circumstances. The military follows these values with honesty. These make engagements among the officers, soldiers and civilians easy. It increases familiarity in between military and civilians.

Other than this many social works are done by the Israeli military such education, health facilities, road, transportation and many others. Army also help light and heavy industry which produce goods and material for military and civilians. So these things also give the strength the military. More or less there was very tight bond between military and civilians. It seems that the Israeli army is the Israeli society and Israeli society is the Israeli army. There is not only

the “civilianization” of the military but also the “militarization” of civil society. These things shows that there is cooperation and harmony in between military and society.

On the basis of nature, the Israeli civil-military relations characterised as political-military relations, socio-military complex, and military-industrial complex by the different scholars. Regarding the nature of the civil-military relations there are three approaches; *Traditional Approach* which believe that there is a firm civilian control over the military in Israel and believes that the control was done by the state’s civilian institutions with the IDF playing its role. *Critical Approach* says that the civilian control of the military is done through the dominant political party but during war or emergency, the control of the civilian or the dominant party is insufficient. And *New Critical Approach* believes that there is no civilian control of the military which undermines the civil sector. It believes that the civilian control is inherently weak and in reality there is no civilian control of the military. Thus various approaches have own different thinking about the civil-military relations in Israel.

Behind the tight bond between military and society there were major cause was the Arab- Israel conflicts. After the independence the conflict intensified. Israel has been facing wars. During the 1950 to 1960 Israel did reprisal operations in response of guerrilla attacks from of Syria, Jordan and Egypt and fought the Suez war (1956), June War (1967) and October War (1973). The Lebanon war of 1982 and the First (1987) and Second Intifada (2000) tested its security. It also fought three major conflicts with Gaza strip since its unilateral withdrawal of 2005. These show that Israel is facing the continuous wars since its inception and this conflict is still in limelight in the international politics.

About the Arab Israel conflict various scholars have various opinions and attributed different causes. There are mainly four causes. One, *Existence of Israel* is the main issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict because the Palestinian people think that Israel’s existence is on their forefather’s land and hence Israel has no any right to exist. Second, is the *Border’s problem* because Israel is only nation with no recognised boundaries. So this boundary issue creates problem in between Arab and Israel. Three, *Capital City/Religious problem* is an issue in the conflict. Under the UN partition plan Jerusalem was recognised as an international city because both Muslims and Jews make sole claims. And four, *Settlements* is also an important issue because large people of Israel believe that West Bank is integral part of the historic Eretz Israel or Land of Israel.

Although Israel won all the wars and get more benefits rather than Arabs, peace was mandatory for the Israel and did make efforts. Almost after the every war Israel reached peace agreement or treaty. After the 1948 war it concluded Armistice Agreements (1949); the June war and October ended with the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 respectively. Then came the Camp David accords in 1978, Israel–Lebanon Agreement, (1984) Brezhnev Plan, Madrid Conference, Oslo Accords(1993-95), Taba Agreement (1995) and Camp David Talks (2000). These efforts could not establish a wider peace. Secondly, they could not affect the Israel-Palestine relations and could not stablish peace and this in turn affected the Israeli civil–military relations.

In the early years, the civil-military relations were good because most of the Israeli policy makers basically from the military. The latter took the same decision that the civilian wanted. Thus these peace efforts did not cause any fraction between civilian and military. In 1967 Israel won the June War and this reduced the existential threat. The premise of the Resolution 242 lessened the bond of Israeli civil-military relations. The resolution 338 came after the 1973 war and Israeli population have no desire to bear it.

Military also witnessed fatigue and both military and civilian wanted some solution. Both agreed with resolution 338 and there was fraction in civil-military relations, despite the initial military surprise. After the Camp David accords the conventional threats reduced and for some time this reduced the military hegemony over the civilian sphere and security policies.

However, the Oslo accords created disputes in the civil-military relations. After the signing of this accord, terrorist attacks increased and this raised doubts over the returning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian leadership. This move left a larger people with dissatisfactory and the impact of treaties was negligible.

The Oslo accords ware landmark in the history of Israel’s civil-military relations. Because Israel was facing attacks gradually, from the Arab neighbours, especially in the wake of the Lebanon war and first intifada, Oslo Accords became necessary. Israel was not able to bear cost of wars, both military and economic. So Israel needed peace. Second thing was during the 1992 election campaign, Yitzhak Rabin promised that he would find a solution and would establish peace in between Arabs and Israel. These things were major part of Oslo accords. After all the satisfactions, dissatisfactions and efforts, in September 1993 the Declaration of Principles, the Oslo Accord-I was signed.

After the signing the Oslo accords a big crack emerged in the Israeli civil-military relations because after this accord the intensity of the tension and violence increased due to the power vacuum. In the Oslo accord the main agreement was the withdrawal of IDF from the Gaza Strip and West Bank and this created a power vacuum. Militant terrorist groups like Hamas and also militant factions within Fatah started more attacks on Israel. A large group of Israeli civilians were thinking that these threats are coming due to the bad decision of Oslo accord and Rabin was accused. The assassination of Rabin prove that a large section of Israelis disagree and angry with him and the Oslo accords.

This is not the first time there were cracks in the civil-military relations. Before the Oslo accord many time cracks like the “Lavon Affair” which saw the first crack in the civil military relations. After this the period, from 1967 to 1992 was known as a period of change. In this period many changes came due to end of consensus on national security policy, single-party dominance. Thus, the civil military bond become weak and IDF become a vehicle for political mobility. After the Oslo accord the, mainly after Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister that the civil-military relations were not good.

From 1996 to 1999 this period was basically a disharmonious period. In this period there are a big trench between Prime Minister and Chief of General Staff over the peace process and the implementation of the Oslo accords. Netanyahu did try end the interference of military officers in the policy making and undermine the role of Chief of General Staff. In 1999 Barak won the election due to the engagement of military officers. In the period of Barak from 1999 to 2002, the military was again in the main role.

So ups and downs were witnessed since the inception of Israel. Many times the cracks came in the civil-military relations. But after the Oslo accords the trench in between civilian and military was much deep. And Oslo accord was become landmark in the history of Israeli civil military relations.

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