

North Korean Reunification Policy,1994-2016

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

Master of Philosophy

Submitted by

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2018



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DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation titled "North Korean Reunification Policy, 1994-2016" submitted by me in partial fulfillment for the award of the Degree of **Master of Philosophy** is my original work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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Acknowledgment

First and foremost, I express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Sandip Kr. Mishra for his invaluable guidance and the advice in the course of writing the dissertation which helped me a lot in setting the write perspective towards this academic endeavour. Without his critical comments, suggestions and constant support this work wouldn't have been possible.

I am thankful to the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and all the faculty members. I am also thankful to the staff members. I am eternally grateful to my family, specially my mother, for all the love, motivation and guidance they have continually and unconditionally given me. I am immensely indebted to them for the strong faith and belief they have bestowed upon me.

New Delhi.

Sunil Kumar

Dated:

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Dedicated to My Mother

Introduction

The division of Korean peninsula was decided by the outside powers in accordance to their security and other calculations. Temporary division of Korea got solidified when two different regimes- the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) were established in 1948, on the basis of different ideologies. Both the Koreas shared common history, culture and national identity for thousands of years but the coming of the Cold War on the peninsula divided Korean people in two states (Ryo Cho Sung 1995). From the very beginning South Korea under leadership of Syngman Rhee and North Korea under the leadership of Kim Il-sung claimed themselves to be the true representatives of all the Korean people. South Korea said that northern part of Korea was not independent until it's ruled by a Soviet stooge Kim Il-sung and similarly North Korea said that the southern part of Korea is ruled by the US imperial power (Hong Y 1999). Both the countries, thus wanted to reunify whole Korean peninsula and people in accordance to their plans, which included even use of force. North Korea made its first venture to reunify Korean peninsula in June 1950 by launching a military expedition which resulted in the Korean War. The course and consequences of the Korean War, which lasted for around three years, was very devastating and both the parties had to face huge human and physical losses. North Korea under the leadership of Kim Il Sung realised after the War that military means are not a viable option to reunify Korea and then began to work for the same goal by different other means. It was also a period, when both the Koreas were contesting for legitimacy as well as massive task of state re-building. The unification policy of Korea got influenced by these two important tasks.

The basis of Korean division has been the Cold War politics of the superpowers and the two different ideological models to organise politics and economics. Whereas, North Korean founding ideology was Marxist-Leninist (which later changed to Juche ideology), South Korea adopted ideals of liberal democracy and capitalism. While

formulating their reunification policies both the Koreas wanted to negate the other ideology and absorb the other Korea according to their own ideologies.

After the Korean War, North Korea took some time to articulate its policy towards the Korean reunification as use of force became unviable and North Korea was busy in rebuilding of its economy (Peterson Mark 2009). After a long hiatus, North Korean President Kim Il-sung first proposed to South Korea to discuss the issue of unification in 1960. He suggested establishment of confederal government in Korean peninsula without any change in their respective ideological system. But before that they wanted South Koreans to establish people's regime by ousting U.S. and its stooges. To gain dominance in Korean peninsula, North Korea sought some other means to realise unification. Firstly, it started focusing on its economic development, so that its economic capabilities could improve its place in the world view. Secondly, North Korea started to initiate normalisation policies with other powerful states, to gain political recognition.

In 1972, President Kim Il-sung of North Korea invited South Korean delegates to discuss the issue of unification through peaceful means. The North and South Korean governments made a joint announcement on July 4, 1972 that a representative of each government had secretly visited the capital city of the other side and that both sides had agreed to a North-South Joint Communiqué. This joint Communiqué was the first document to be agreed upon by both North Korea and South Korea following the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945. Through the Joint Communiqué, the two Koreas reached an agreement on the three principles for reunification i.e independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity (Jong Dae-Shin, 2012). The Communiqué provided thrust to the North-South dialogue to a new level, as both sides agreed to cease slandering each other, to setup a hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang, to begin various forms of exchanges, and to form a South-North Coordinating Committee to ease tensions and preventing armed clashes, and solving the issue of reunification. However, this development was unable to provide baseline to pursue reunification (Jonsson Gabriel 2006). Later with the decline in the economic development of North Korea in early 1980s and South Korea's economic boom and its

improved relations with Socialist Bloc in late 1980s and early 1990s, made North Korea cautious about the question of reunification. Since the latter half of the 1980s, in the wake of the German unification, the North Korean view of unification has been defensive, rather than offensive. In 1993, Kim Il Sung, with his defensive approach for reunification wrote ten point program for unification. The plan's original title was "10-point programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the reunification of the Country". It promotes the idea of reunification with South Korea under a loose federation, leaving the two systems and governments unchanged while opening the borders (Kwak Hwan Tae, Joo Ho Seung 2016). The program proposes to denounce outside forces from the Korean peninsula i.e. US, and proposes to cooperate on trade and foreign affairs as a reunified country. The North Korean foreign policy is still dominated by this original document, which had led to better relations with South Korea, beginning with Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine Policy, and in the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration.

The early 1990s heralded new developments in terms of North Korea's approach to reunification - moving away from the traditional offensive approach of aggression and revolution. North Korea abandoned its "One-Korea" policy and acknowledged South Korea as a political entity that has the nature and functions of a state. This is ingrained in the entry of both Koreas as member states of the United Nations and the adoption of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement. The inter-Korean agreement was between North and South Korea in 1991, according to which both the Korea's recognised each other as a independent state and promised to work in the direction of peaceful co-existence. North Korea also relaxed the preconditions of its federation unification formula, allowing for the diplomatic and military rights of regional governments, and, consequently, had proposed a new federation unification formula that accepts some form of confederation idea of South Korea's proposed model of unification.

Since the division of Korean peninsula, both North and South Korea sought to prove their political primacy on Korean peninsula. The prolonged competition and hostility for political primacy testifies many ups and downs in political history of both the Koreas. At the start of 1990s the posture that North Korea held for South Korea was

entirely different from what it had during Cold War. Taking into consideration the reunification issue, North Korea had changed its offensive stand, to reunify Korean peninsula under its banner of “our style socialism”, to defensive. This is because, North Korea’s understanding was that it is disadvantaged economically and militarily, to compete with its southern counterpart. Therefore, their long-standing belief that one day whole Korean peninsula would be under North Korean political system realising reunification, is under shadow. During late 1970s, when China normalized its relations with U.S and later the event of Soviet Union’s disintegration in 1990s, these political dynamics isolated North Korea and weakened its political legitimacy over Korean peninsula. These political shifts of the two North Korea’s closest allies i.e. China and USSR changed the security dynamics of the region and North Korea started looking forward for some other ways to support its regime's survival. On the other hand, South Korea's Nordpolitik (Park Johngseh 1991) provided fertile ground for further isolation of North Korea. As part of Nordpolitik, which was a signature policy of Roh Tae-Woo for reconciliation and rapprochement, 1988’s Olympiad games held in Seoul normalized South Korea’s relations with most of East Bloc or Socialist countries. South Korea, thus, got political recognition by its earlier adversaries, on international level. North Korea in late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed diplomatic defeat. All these unfavourable circumstances highly influenced North Korea’s policy on reunification, as it now sought to find ways for mere survival of its regime. As soon as North Korea found itself being cornered by its major allies, and major powers of North-East Asia as well, reunification became secondary while regime’s survival became primary objective of the North’s foreign policy. This shift from the nexus of trusted partners to an independent actor gave rise to many speculations among International Relations analysts. One of the most argumentative was North Korea's regime survival (Chung Ho Jae 2008).

Most of the Literature written about reunification dates back to Kim Il-sung era when North Korea’s position to pursue reunification on its own terms was strong. Later, after the demise of Kim Il-sung, the literature shifted to discuss the survival of North Korea which ultimately ended up concluding the absorption of North Korea by South Korea but nothing sort of this happened and North Korea still continues to survive. Earlier researchers have provided an overview of North Korea's stand on its

reunification policy change until 1990s but later development is limited. The huge political, cultural, socio-economical gap between two Koreas has deteriorated the prospects of reunification. North Korea is now incapable of coercing South Korea to reunify under its own terms. This situation poses a serious question of whether or not North Korea wants reunification at all. This paper deals with that question and also whether the recent provocations are part of its unification policy or just a tactic for its survival.

The study is an inductive approach to find out changes in North Korea's reunification policy. The study takes North Korea's survival issue as an independent variable and North Korean reunification policy as a dependent variable. In addition, some other variables such as the end of the Cold War, economic and security crises in North Korea, emergence of domestically weak leadership in North Korea, and issue of legitimacy would also be studied. By going through primary sources, the study conducts the analytical study of North Korean leaders' view on Korean reunification. The study would use qualitative method in general but it would also bring some quantitative elements by doing content analysis of North Korean leaders' comments or speeches made about reunification on different occasions. The paper will go through the inter-Korean dialogues concerned with reunification issues. The secondary source are also being used such as books, articles and news articles written in the post-Cold War era on North Korea's foreign policy change. The research will also be comparative in the sense that it would compare the reunification models proposed by North Korea during the Cold War era (Kim Il Sung) and the post-Cold War era (Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un).

In my thesis 'Korean reunification' refers to the potential future reunification of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (commonly known as North Korea), the Republic of Korea (commonly known as South Korea), and the Korean Demilitarized Zone under a single government. The fundamental reason for this for conducting this research is that, most of the literature that was written during 1990s, implicated the conjectures that North Korean regime would collapse within a decade or less. However, most of such literature was proven wrong as North Korea still continues to

survive. Some of the scholars even elicited that the North Korea would meet the same fate as East Germany i.e. absorption by South Korea, like West Germany did in case of German reunification. But contrary to that, unlike Ostpolitik's success, Nordpolitik, an engagement policy by South Korea, failed as it isolated North Korea in International political arena. Its successor engagement policy i.e. Sunshine policy also couldn't do much to improve inter-Korean relations. These failed attempts by South Korea to achieve reunification have initiated a new debate on how and when unification will be achieved. Since most of the literature written on reunification has South Korean perspective of achieving it (Savada Andrea Matles, Shaw William 1997). This study tries to examine a North Korean view on reunification and its timely changes of reunification policy to achieve it and its underlying considerations.

The research examines the impact of the Cold War on North Korean foreign policy regarding reunification and dynamics involved in it. The study will provide the overview of miscalculations and conjectures made about North Korea's prophesied regime collapse. The study will help contrast the North Korea's reunification perspective with South Korea's. The purpose of the study is to provide the readers with better understanding of resumption of reunification rhetoric at the time when North Korea is actually not capable of affording reunification of Korean peninsula on its own terms. To provide readers with North versus South Korean approach for reunification and the pre-requisites involved in it.

Chapter 1

North Korean Reunification Policy during the Cold War

1.0 Introduction

The emergence and the nature of the North Korean reunification policy during the Cold War can be divided into phases as North Korea kept changing its reunification policy according to its economic and South Korea's domestic political circumstances. North Korea opted for aggressive reunification policy whenever there was a political disturbance in South Korea and stepped back to its peaceful reunification rhetoric when South Korea had fairly stable political situation. For instance from 1950-53 North Korea had offensive reunification policy towards South Korea and North tried to forcefully annex South Korea with the help of its communist neighbours but failed tremendously. Later till 1960 North Korea propagated the idea of peaceful reunification and proposed to conduct general elections under the supervision of neutral states. In 1960, North Korea suggested to establish a confederal state, from 1961 onwards North Korea again resorted to its offensive reunification policy. However, again in 1980, North Korea's softening tone about Korean reunification could be witnessed in its idea to establish 'Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo'. However, the end of Cold War made North Korea to cease its offensive approach for reunification. This chapter tries to look into the North Korea's occasional reunification policy changes and try to establish the relation between North Korea's economic and domestic factors and its reunification policy.

1.1 North Korean reunification strategy during Korean War (1950-1953)

After the end of World War 2, 35 years old rule of Japan in Korea came to an end and it surrendered to allied forces which emerged as the winners of the World War 2. This political power vacuum in Korea brought about a rivalry between two major forces

that is communists in the north and conservatives in the south. This divide of political ideology left and right wings dates back to the independent struggle against the Japanese colonial rule. Left Wing freedom fighters were seeking China's help to oust imperialist Japan, while right wing freedom fighters were looking for westerner's support. In north, communist forces were struggling to proclaim whole Korea as a communist state and in South Korea conservatives were trying to establish a democratic state based on liberal values. Not realising any concrete mid-way solution and in the absence of mutual consent on forming a common state, Korea formally divided into two different states in 1948. More than internal divide in Korea in terms of ideology, the role of external players such as the US and Soviet Union was more important. They used internal divide in Korea and established two different states in Korea according to their own foreign policy interest (Eberstadt Nick, Eberstadt Nicholas 1999). Both the Koreas formed their respective governments, North Korea declared itself as a communist state named 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea', while South Korea declared itself as Republic of Korea. Both these governments were supported by then two superpowers, North Korea was supported by Soviet Union while South Korea was backed by United States. However, each of these newly formed governments claimed their legitimacy over whole of Korean peninsula. Both the Koreas formulated their plan to reunify Korea according to their ideological belief. North Korea wanted centrally controlled market system and to communize whole of Korean peninsula while South Korea supported democracy and liberal market system.

After the ROK was set up in 1948, the rebel troops seized and held major cities of South Korea within a week by a series of mutinies and major purges were carried out, during which number of South Korean officers were executed. Whereas, New South Korean army was frustrated and torn apart. In May 1949 one navy ship mutinied and two battalions of troops of South Korea with their officers crossed the 38th parallel and went to the DPRK. This was accompanied by a guerrilla movement specially in the mountain areas and Jeju island. To suppress these uprisings, Syngman Rhee campaigned against the guerrillas on Jeju island. According to Bruce Cumings, these campaigns were 'one of the most brutal, sustained, and intensive counterinsurgency

campaigns. According to some estimates about 100,000 people were killed in fighting and massacres inside South Korea before the Korean War even erupted.

After the establishment of Republic Of Korea, US was quick in eliminating the socialist forces in South Korea, and was backing, arming and participating in terrifying the socialist forces which ultimately broke the left-wing movement in much of the South. Imperialist forces drove socialist forces to either underground or into prison or into the North Korea. Kim Il Sung believed that if he didn't react on time then there is a possibility that imperialist forces would squelch socialist forces completely. To avoid such a situation, Kim Il Sung decided to start a war against the imperialist forces. North Korean supreme leader Kim Il Sung as part of its reunification strategy by force wanted to seize this opportunity of people's uprising in South Korea. Kim Il Sung thus visited his communist allies, Chinese Premier Mao Zedong and Soviets Union's Premier Joseph Stalin, and wanted support to attack South Korea and capture it. Kim Il Sung's aggressive policy of reunification was highly motivated by the guerrilla movements that were taking place at multiple places in South Korea. Jeju witnessed a farmer's uprising against the imperialist forces and were demanding the equitable land distribution, similarly as was being done in North Korea. North Korea was implementing land distribution system and was punishing the corrupt land lords and Japanese collaborators. People in South Korea also wanted the similar treatment of culprits. South Korea being an agrarian society even since the Japanese colonial period easily fell prey of the land distribution moves of the North Korea.

In his effort to reunify Korea, Synman Rhee, President of South Korea, initiated the “March North and Unify” campaign. Synman Rhee's ultimate purpose was reunification. Synman Rhee in a 1955 government publication stated: “Out of a long and tragic experience with communism, we of Korea believe there is no middle ground, no possibility of co-existence, no road of modus vivendi”. Synman Rhee wanted to use military means to reunify Korea and for this he had some discontent with United States as United States was trying to refrain from any sort of military expedition in Korean peninsula. This despotic behaviour of Synman Rhee to start a

war again was criticized in western media and in U.S. itself. “In his conduct of domestic affairs he is, without one question, a dictator, seldom reluctant to use police intimidation and force to suppress the political freedoms of whose theory he defends”(FrankGibney1954). Even in the British Embassy's publication, Synman Rhee was regarded as a“dangerousfascist, or lunatic” (Lone and McCormack 1993).Even though Synman Rhee was disliked by the Americans, his staunch anti-communist approach made him a viable leader to be supported by the U.S. However, Synman Rhee's, consistent demand for reunifying Korea by force was overruled by Americans. In the same vein, in North Korea, Kim Il Sung was planning to forcefully annex South Korea, with the help of communist China and Soviets.For this purpose, Kim Il Sung appealedover Radio Pyongyang: “We, the Korean people, must liquidate the unpatriotic fascist puppet regime of Synman Rhee which has been established in the southern part of Republic; We must liberate the southern part of our Motherland from the domination of the Syngman Rhee clique; and We must restore the People’s Committees- the real organs of power. Under the banner of the Korea People’s Republic, we must complete the unification of the motherland and create a single, independent, democratic state. The war which we are forced to wage is a just war for the unification and independence of the Motherland and for freedom and democracy...”(Pravda1950). Kim IISung, with the help of communist China and Soviets, tried to reunify Korea peninsula forcefully. On June 25th North Korean soldiers poured across the 38th parallel, which was designated as the divide line between North and South Korea, and Korean War broke out. Kim Il Sung believed that puppet regime of South Korea had kept its citizens captive and these people will help North Koreansoldiers if they expedite across South Korean borders.North Koreansoldiers took over South Korean capital Seoul,in a very short period of time and later reached Busan, acoastal city situated at the south-eastern side of the peninsula. Soon, United Nations forces under the commandof United States entered the war theatre and pushed them back to 38th parallel and later till Yalu River, a natural border between DPRK-PRC. China warned United States of retaliation if they didn’t retreat from river Yalu. China entered into the war on 25thofOctober 1950 by launching its first offensive attack on UN forces near Sino-Korean border (Jian Chen 1995). China's ground attack was later supported by the Soviets’ Air Force. North Korea with the help of Chinese and Soviet forces was able to push back UN forces to 38th parallel, where stalemate was maintained. Later, both the parties signed an

Armistice Treaty and the Korean War ended. No party could gain anything but lost everything. Since then, Kim Il Sung incorporated the strategy of peaceful reunification, which not only helped Kim Il Sung to consolidate his power but also to oust his political rivals like Park Hong Yong, then Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of North Korea, who was believed to be most popular leader after Kim Il Sung in North Korea. After the end of Korean War, Kim Il Sung changed his party line and started advocating peaceful unification and started antagonizing those who wanted to prolong the war and showed discontent for 'Ceasefire Agreement'. Park Hong Yong and his supporters spoke against the discontinuation of Korean War by any means. Kim Il Sung in his speech at the 6th assembly of the central committee of the Korean Workers Party stated that: "the unification of our Motherland must be achieved only by peaceful means without any intervention". Kim Il Sung in his major political purge, ordered the arrest of Park Hon Yong and his followers. Notably, Park Hon Yong, was the founder of the South Korean Workers Party and all its members were on the target list of Kim Il Sung. Park Hon Yong was also the organiser of the underground communist movement in Korea during the colonial rule of Japan. Most of the members of South Korean Workers Party were either sentenced to death or sent to jail for long period of time under the charge of 'treason against the state'. The underlying assumptions that Park Hon Yong had about ceasefire agreement was that; if ceasefire agreement was signed then his political career will come to an end because ceasefire meant cementing the Korean division. For Park Hon Yong, divided Korea meant no access to South Korean politics, where he had strong political base (Koh 1989). Additionally, Kim Il Sung, with the support of Communist China and Soviet Union, was able to accommodate power in North Korea. The increased political power that Kim Il Sung was fostering was actually pushing back Park Hon Yong in North Korean political arena. Kim Il Sung emerged as a successful leader of North Korea, after the end of Korean War and after the Ceasefire Agreement was signed. Kim Il Sung, propagated the idea that, 'Adventurist' are trying to oppose ceasefire agreement, who are actually the installed puppet of U.S. He stated in his speeches that further continuation of war would bring devastation to Korea and their dream to reunite Korean peninsula would go in vain. Therefore, by antagonizing those who, spoke against ceasefire agreement, Kim Il Sung got the popular support in North Korea. The decision to welcome ceasefire agreement by Kim Il Sung however was right in a sense that in 1953 both his major allies i.e. Soviet and China were not

mentally prepared to support further adventurism in Korean peninsula as Soviet faced a death of its leader Stalin in March 1953 and China was also experiencing internal problems to support North Korea (Zhang Shu Guang 1995). Unfavourable external political environment made North Korea to welcome ceasefire agreement and forced it to pursue peaceful reunification agenda. However, this new peaceful reunification was actually a facade, as implicitly North Korean was trying to sponsor anti-American sentiments in South Korea. At the same time, Kim Il Sung advocated that creating a strong socialist base in his own country is also important as it would help reunify Korea if any possibility occurs in future. According to Kim Il Sung, South Korean revolution couldn't be completed because they lacked a strong socialist base in their own country. Therefore, before fomenting a socialist revolution in South Korea, his own land should be communised first.

1.2 North Korean Reunification Policy after the end of the Korean War (1953-1960)

North Korean leader Kim Il sung realised after the War that Korean reunification wouldn't be possible before consolidating a strong socialist base in his own land and by achieving certain level of economic development. For the purpose of attaining a rapid economic development, North Korea formulated 5 year plan based economic planning. For almost a decade, Kim Il Sung, instead of discussing reunification with his southern counterpart, focused on improving its economy. In fact, Kim Il Sung refrained from discussing reunification which might be against the communists' interests. For this, he after the political purge of his opponents, drew his attention to economic development and initiated 5 year plan based economic policy. North Korea being the centre of industrial activities during the period of Japanese colonial rule experienced more loss as compared to South Korea as South Korean economy was mostly agrarian. Within 3 years of War, North Korea suffered loss of 3.5 billion dollars excluding the cost of reparation of more than 8 thousands factories. Around 60,000 houses, 1000 hospitals, 5000 schools were destroyed in Korean War. Industrial production reduced to 40% of pre-War level. Fishing and Metal Industry,

which was a major contributor of North Korea economy suffered heavy losses and were reduced to more than 60% of pre-War level. (Pak Chang Ok 1954) therefore, to improve its ailing economy and for economic reconstruction, it was necessary for Kim Il Sung to support ceasefire agreement. Kim Il Sung asserted that if reunification on the terms of communist interest is to be realised then North Korea needs to become economically powerful. He believed that North Korea's living standard might act as a leverage for South Koreans to force South Korea to continue reunification talks with North Korea.

To achieve its goals of economic development, Kim Il Sung introduced economic planning system with a targeted time period. As part of its first economic planning system, in 1954, North Korea introduced Three-Year plan which emphasized on development of heavy industries. However, North Korea's ambitious economic development merely would have been a dream if Soviet's technical know-how was not supplied to them. On the other hand, China supplied all the crucial raw materials which were required to reconstruct North Korean heavy industries. Soviet Union apart from technical know-how, also granted 1 billion Rubles to North Korea for reconstructing its war torn factories (Porter and Holland William 1955). Since, these developments were based on reconstruction of heavy industries, lighter industries suffered a lot and consumer goods were falling short which increased people's anger. Farming sector was also downgrading and grain production was very limited. Overall, the living conditions of general populace were poor. Kim Il Sung, who adamantly was in favour of rebuilding its heavy industries, faced opposition's discontent in Supreme People's Assembly. Opposition advocated the development of light industries and asserted that sacrifice of the Korean people during Korean War would go in vain if their basic needs were not taken into account. Even, after the discontent of his oppositions and his people's outrage, Kim Il Sung continued to support the idea of developing the heavy industries and narrated to the common populace that if Korean reunification is to be achieved any time sooner than developing heavy industries is necessary as it will increase leverage of North Korea over South Korea. Later, pursuing his revolutionary theme based economic reconstruction, Kim Il Sung, with the support of Soviet Union, implemented his 5 year plan which also focused on the development of heavy industries. However, this dictatorial step taken by Kim Il Sung

threw him in the pool of discontentment by opposition leaders and North Korean people(Cho Soon Sung 1967).Two of the most popular leaders of opposition, namely, vice premier Ch'oe Chang Ik and Par Chang Ok,during the KWP's Central Committee meeting and tried to seize the contemporary anti-Kim Il Sung sentiments to oust him. But, on the contrary, Kim IlSung, who had more number of supporters, denounced opposition as anti-social fringes, yet not fit for North Korea's will for creating a strong socialist base for reunification. For this Kim Il Sung, expelled his opponents from the party in March, 1958. These internal political disturbances, slowed the economic growth of North Korea for few years but regained the pace after Kim Il Sung was completely able to suppress his opponents. During this time, Kim Il sung, continuously reiterated in his speeches that North Korea still have not achievedthe required socialist base to foment revolutionary reunification in South Korea.

The theme of revolutionary reunification helped Kim Il Sung to legitimise his dictatorial steps taken to counter his rivals.As part of his drive to completely occupy Korean Workers' Party and administer North Korean domestic politics without any foreign influence, Kim Il Sung's new plan was to oust Chinese forces stationed in Korea. Chinese forces, both politically and economically, were a burden for North Korea to pursue its reunification program. Kim Il sung, thus, proposed to bilateral withdrawal of both Chinese and United States forces from Korean peninsula. Chinese forces left North Korea in 1958 and Kim Il Sung since then gained the total control of Korean Workers Party. In 1958, as part of his economic development policy and socialist base themed reunification policy, Kim Il Sung initiated the “Chûllima Undong” or “Flying Horse Movement”. This was actually initiated to complete the task of the five year plan. This movement helped complete the targets of 5 year plan before the actual time allotted for that.Considering all these economic successes, one can assert that North Korean economic development grew multi-fold after Kim Il Sung gained total control of North Korean administrative institutions. The economic growth that North Korea in 1960s not only improved the situation of domestic politics but also enhanced the North Korea's claim of legitimacy over the whole of Korea.By the start of 1960s, North Korea outpaced South Korea on economic front. North Korea now had the required socialist base to foment revolutionary reunification

movement in South Korea. Additionally, the domestic situations in South Korea were in favour of North Korea. In April 1960, South Korean students staged an anti-Park Chung Hee protest, demanding him to step down from the post of President. Ultimately, on April 26, 1960, under the American pressure, Syngman Rhee resigned and exiled to Hawaii, where he died after five years. During these protests, staged by students, North Korea supported the agitators through radio broadcasting and protests in North Korea. North Korea asserted that these protests are the results of frustrated North Koreans' against American imperialism. North Korea tried to seize this opportunity, by funding anti-Americanism in South Korea and tried to divert these events in its favour.

1.3 North Korea's Reunification Policy (1960-1972)

During this period, North Korea's reunification strategy fluctuated between offensive and defensive. North Korea based its reunification strategy during this period on the domestic political situations in South Korea. For instance, in 1960, when there was a students' uprising against Syngman Rhee's corrupt rule, North Korea used it as an opportunity to translate the uprising into anti-American revolution and tried to oust Syngman Rhee through socialist revolution in South Korea. North Korea demanded the installation of people's regime in South Korea. Immediately after the end of Students' uprising, North Korea presented a new reunification formula to South Korea on Aug 15, 1960. This formula called for the establishment of "confederal governments" in North and South Korea. However, North Korea's plan for confederal governments was a camouflage of its revolutionary reunification plan. North Korea through confederal governments wanted to induce cultural and human exchanges between South and North Korea. North Korea being a vibrant economy then, knew that the South Koreans would admire the success of communist system and would support it. Through this support, North Korea wanted to foment socialist revolution in South Korea. By the establishment of the confederal states, North Korea would have been able to form a political front in South Korea which would have supported North Korea's communist regime.

In 1960, with the increased membership of many neutral nations in United Nations, the position of North Korea on the issue of reunification somewhat improved as these newly admitted nations started questioning the rationale behind inviting only South Korean representatives for Korean reunification debate. By 1960, North Korea almost had developed its required socialist base for further continuation of its reunification rhetoric. On August, 1960, North Korea proposed a reunification model based on confederal governments system as a pre-requisite for future reunification. According to this method, a confederal government was to be established by combining the existing Korean governments. The establishment of Supreme National Committee was proposed, which was to be composed of equal number of representatives from both the sides. This Committee was then supposed to administer the common state functions like cultural exchanges, foreign relations, introduction of common currency, and one army etc. Each side, however, had 'Veto Power, that is if one side disagrees then other side would have to abide by that. This confederal system allowed both the Koreas to practice their ideologies on their respective sides, i.e without any change in their local political system. However, this new transitional method for reunification was the product of North Korea's new confidence which it achieved through economic development. A major change in this new reunification tactic was that, unlike before North Korea didn't mention about the elections for reunification of two Koreas under the supervision of neutral nations, instead propagated the idea of reunification by its own people, that is, without the interference of outside forces. This idea again, became a highly debated issue in South Korea and South Korean youths supported the idea of such national reunification. This new plan for reunification was motivated by the April 19 revolution staged by students to oust corrupt regime of Syngman Rhee, the President of South Korea. Soon after the Syngman Rhee resigned, North Korea proposed for the unified government of Korea on the basis of confederal type of political system. As part of its new aggressive reunification plan, North Korea extended its support to agitators during 'April Revolution', through Radio broadcasting and by mass rallies in Pyongyang (Hak Joon Kim 1976). Even though the April Revolution was against the corrupt rule of Syngman Rhee, North Korea tried its best to misinterpret it as an anti-imperialist in general and anti-American in particular, to South Koreans. However, these attempts to foster revolutionary reunification failed as South Korea refused to accept new North Korea model of unified government.

Later, new democratic leader, Chang Myon was assigned as the new Prime Minister of South Korea which adopted the Prime Ministerial form of government after a major constitutional change. Moreover, fall of Syngman Rhee's government set the trend of emergence anti-conservative political parties, like the National League of Progressives, the Korean Socialist Party, the Socialist Reformist Party, the Socialist Mass Party. Chang Myon like Syngman Rhee was also an ardent anti-communist. Chang Myon, however, differed from the idea of 'March to North' propagated by Syngman Rhee and believed in establishing the political stability in South Korea. Regarding Korean reunification, Chang Myon also remain stuck to the old rhetoric of conducting general elections under the supervision of United Nations, thus again inviting North Korean disapproval of his regime. During the short lived Chang Myon's government, North Korea applied thrust to its revolutionary reunification and propagated three themes to the South Korean public that is, the misery of the South Korean economic situation is caused by the division of the country and could only be solved by reuniting it; the stationing of American troops in South Korea was a major factor in blocking the realisation of unification; only by applying Communist principles and systems in South Korea could unification be achieved successfully (Benjamin Byung-Min 1967). The most ground breaking success of North Korean revolutionary reunification policy was the formation of 'Federation for National Unification' (FNU) in South Korea. This organisation was primarily founded by the students of political science of Seoul National University. FNU supported the idea of 'Neutrality' in Korean peninsula and inter-Korean exchanges in sports, cultural events and arts. The organisation even proposed to summon a conference of student leaders of two Koreas at Panmunjom on May 20, 1960. Chang Myon opposed this call of convening a conference at Panmunjom and stated such activities as North Korean propaganda. Chang Myon's government, however, couldn't survive more than anyear as a military coup, under the command of General Park Chung Hee, ousted him without any major opposition. The new military regime of Park Chung Hee, was also a staunch anti-communist. Park Chung Hee as his major goal focused on national security and thus antagonized all the sympathizers of communist ideology. The establishment of Military regime in South Korea was a big blow for the North Korean revolutionary reunification strategy. North Korea revolutionary reunification strategy was moving in the right direction until May 1960 or say before the military coup as North Korea was efficiently able to infuse pro-North Korean sentiments in atleast South Korean students.

The strong support that North Korea's proposal of 'National Reunification by its own people' got was magnificent. Apart from that South Korean populace also supported the North Korean idea of inter-Korean cultural exchanges. However, the establishment of military regime forced North Korea to adopt offensive reunification policy toward its southern peer.

Throughout the 1960s, North Korea resorted to terrorist activities as part of its offensive reunification policy. For example, in 1961, a South Korean guard post was attacked by North Korea soldiers which killed one and injured other four South Korean soldiers, in 1963 two American soldiers were ambushed and killed by an axe. In total, 750 infiltrations were sponsored by North Korea from 1967 to 1969. It was in 1971, that North Korea offered to conduct peaceful talks on the issue of reunification. In 1972, President Kim Il Sung of North Korea invited South Korean delegates to discuss the issue of unification through peaceful means. The North and South Korean governments on July 4, 1972 agreed to a North-South Joint Communiqué. This joint Communiqué was the first document to be agreed upon by both North Korea and South Korea following the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945. Through the Joint Communiqué, the two Koreas reached an agreement on the three principles for reunification i.e. independence, peaceful unification, and great national unity. The Communiqué provided thrust to the North-South dialogue, as both sides agreed to cease propaganda offensive to each other, to setup a hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang, to begin various forms of exchanges, and to form a South-North Coordinating Committee to ease tensions and preventing armed clashes, and solving the issue of reunification. However, this development was unable to provide baseline to pursue unification.

1.4 North Korean Reunification Policy (1972-1990).

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea engaged itself with the task of military build up. In early 1960s, North Korea's military had estimated 3 lakhs personnel which increased to 1 million in late 1970s. For a country of around 20 million (in 1980) people, having military of 1 million personnel was unmatched at the time. This military build up was part of the revolutionary reunification strategy of North Korea. North Korea wanted to seize the opportunity of reunification, whenever it comes. In

1975, Kim Il Sung even approached China to support him for a war against South Korea, China however declined the idea of attacking South Korea. This military build up was done considering the North Korea's calculations for the future war with South Korea. In 1970s, few of the events were encouraging North Korea of its revolutionary reunification strategy; the Vietnam War, the "Nixon Doctrine", the Carter administration's decision to withdraw troops from South Korea. North Korea perceived these developments as the end of U.S.-ROK relations. However, these events which favoured the hope for reunification of Korea on North Korean terms soon faded away as North Korea's relations with its closest allies i.e. PRC and USSR started to deteriorate. Deteriorating relations with its allies meant limited political and economic support. Until mid-1960s, 90% of North Korea's trade was with communist bloc, in 1970s North Korea took a sharp turn and improved its trade with neutral nations and later with, OECD countries. According to some estimates, by 1974, North Korea's imports from OECD countries surpassed its combined imports from China, USSR and Eastern Europe (Koh1986). But North Korea couldn't sustain this improved trade relations with western capitalists as North Korea failed to repay its debt taken from OECD countries. Even though the 1970s, events were in favour of North Korea's reunification strategy, it failed to realise it. Assassination of Park Chung Hee, the 2nd President of South Korea, proved against the North Korea's strategic calculations for revolutionary reunification. After the Park's assassination, Carter administration decided to cancel its decision to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea and again North Korea's hope to seize any opportunity for reunification failed.

In 1970s, North Korea's reunification strategy was highly influenced by the Chinese culturalrevolution(Bernd Schaefer, 2010). In late 1960s, China started to change its socio-economic system and abandoned its left adventurism. Kim Il Sung was reluctant to these news changes occurring in China. For this reason, DPRK-PRC relations between 1966-1969 were unfavourable, however, in 1970DPRK-PRC again restored their relations. Having China on its side was very important for North Korea from the perspective of security and its reunification strategy. For North Korea, having two enemies on its alternative sides was something to be refrained from. At the same time, China's importance for pursuing reunification strategy was also vital. North Korea

believed that only China could bring U.S. to negotiate its presence in South Korea. North Korea wanted China to play a role of a mediator to negotiate a peace treaty between DPRK-US. China's importance, as an actor, for reunification policy tool, emerged from the fact that in late 1970s PRC-US relations were improving and China had some leverage over US, mostly geo-political. This new period of reconciliation between hostile nations was one of its kind during the Cold War. Seeing this as an opportunity, North Korea also sought to initiate a peaceful form of negotiations. During this period of reconciliation, in 1970s, North Korea used its 'peace offensive' tactic as a tool to bargain reunification of Korean peninsula. North Korea brought forth 8-point declaration as a peaceful reunification formula on 12 April 1971. According to the declaration, North Korea demanded peace treaty between DPRK-US, withdrawal of US forces from Korea, regime change in South Korea, establishment of confederal local governments by conducting an election in both the Koreas, and finally a united central government on the basis of equal representation.

The July 4th Communiqué was the first instance when North Korea had shown somewhat softening tone as a part of its reunification strategy. The agreed basic principles of independence, peaceful reunification and national unity, on July 4th Communiqué could reach to any concrete solution. North Korea was worried about the unprecedented South Korea's rapid economic development under Park Chung Hee. North Korea was losing its upper hand in Korean peninsula in terms of economic leverage. North Korea planned the assassination of Park Chung Hee who was killed by the KCIA official in 1978. North Korea believed that the people of South Korea are frustrated by the dictatorial rule of Park Chung Hee and if he was assassinated then communist fringes in South Korea may rise in support of people's regime. But North Korea's plan failed as once again a military head, Chun Doo Hwan took over the control of South Korea. New reunification model proposed by North Korea in 1980, called as "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" and later in 1994, "Ten Point Program for Unification of Fatherland" by Kim Il Sung had defensive tone for its reunification strategy. North Korea by this time knew that its reunification strategy through the federal form of reunification formula wouldn't be possible as it now lacked both political and economic leverage over South Korea.

North Korea's new Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo as a reunification formula was more like a system maintenance formula. In DCRK, North Korea proposed a 'one nation, one state, two system, two government' formula for reunification and it was, unlike before, was permanent in nature.

North Korea saw its peace offensive tactic as an urgent move since, by 1970s, South Korean economy was already able to match North Korean economy, thus the economic leverage that North Korea had over South Korea was diminishing. The per capita GNP of South Korea was less than North Korea's until the mid 1970s (CIA 1978). However, in late 1970s, North Korea's economy weakened by its unnecessary expenditures on military expansion, North Korea used 15% to 20% of its GNP on its military advancement and expansion. Around 12% of North Korea's working age male were serving in Military, while in South Korea only 6% of its working male were serving in the military (CIA 1978). The economic policies implemented by Park Chung Hee were very effective. Moreover, in 1972 Park Chung Hee executed 'October Revitalizing Reforms' aimed at prolonging Park Chung Hee's rule for infinite terms. For North Korea, Reform of 1972 was a greatest threat to North Korea's revolutionary reunification strategy. North Korea, now as a part of its offensive reunification policy started its military build up at a faster pace, spending more than 30% of its total GDP. This new arms race between North and South Korea declined North's economy, while South continued to enjoy economic development. Park Chung Hee related the economic development of South Korea to its national security. South Korean economy under Park Chung Hee rule was so magnificent that it assured North Korea that fomenting people's revolution in South Korea would now be impossible. Moreover, Park Chung Hee had a very tight control over its citizens and suppressed Human Rights. In 1979, Park Chung Hee was assassinated by Kim Jae Kyu, Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and his 18 years of rule came to an end. North Korea expected that the assassination would install the progressive's government in South Korea, which would support North Korean idea of unified government but nothing sort of this happened, instead, new military regime took over and Major General Chun Doo Hwan became the President of South Korea. Again in 1980, Kim Il Sung scaled down from the goal of reunification to confederation and from offensive reunification policy to defensive policy and proposed to establish

'Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo'. Gradually, with ailing economy, North Korea became cautious to the question of reunification as it now knew that Korean reunification on its terms is not feasible. North Korea, falling behind on both economical and political front, instead of reunification, started looking forward to support its regime survival.

By the start of 1980s, North Korea lost its upper hand that it had over South Korea. South Korea appeared vulnerable for North Korea's revolutionary reunification strategy. Economically, DPRK was overtaken by the South Korea by the beginning of the 1980s. In 1987, democratically held presidential elections in South Korea, the success of the South Korea's Nordpolitik, and the Reagan administration's anti-Communist foreign policy back-paddled North Korea's effort to reunifying Korean peninsula on its own terms. North Korea avoided diplomatic dialogues with South Korea throughout the 1980s. This period witnessed North Korea's military build-up at full swing. In mid-1980s, around 1.25 million men joined the North Korean Army. North Korea thus had become the world's fourth-largest military force—after China, the Soviet Union, and the United States (Yoo Chan Yu 1999). However, the cost for the expansion of military power was too great for the North Korea's small economy to bear. By the late 1980s, the North Korean economy deteriorated drastically and experienced downward spiral. Year by Year, the economic balance in the Korean peninsula was shifting in favour of South Korea. In contrast North Korean economy was exacerbated by the burden of its military commitments.

By the end of Cold War, North Korea's confidence for its reunification strategy was totally shattered. North Korea now was looking forward for its regime survival as it was cornered off politically by the Nordpolitik, a foreign policy of reconciliation and rapprochement devised by South Korea. Nordpolitik, improved South Korea's relations with socialist bloc countries, which were the prime guarantor of the North Korea's security and trade. North Korea, therefore, like South Korea, tried to improve its relations with its earlier adversaries but failed tremendously. North Korea as part of its regime survival looked its security in achieving Nuclear Weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea, covertly had pursued its nuclear development plan. For

North Korea acquiring a nuclear weapon became a part of its national security. North Korea conducted Six nuclear tests till now and is a nuclear power now. North Korea, however, has remained consistent on reunification prerequisite that is realisation of peace treaty with US. For North Korea, realisation of peace treaty is one of the three main goals of reunification policy. The other two are to achieve nuclear weapon and realisation of reunification under communist system or never.

Chapter 2

North Korea's Reunification Policy shift during Post Cold War Era

2.0 Introduction

Since the end of the Korean War, the immediate issue that surrounded Korean politics was reunification of Korea peninsula and the debate for Korean reunification erupted both in North and South Korea. North Korea's defeat in Korean War made it realise that reunification by force was not feasible and it had to look for some other means for discussing the issue of reunification (Cho Soon Sung 1967). North Korea started to talk about peaceful reunification of Korea, however, it was more a propaganda than a realistic policy of reunification. North Korea's demands for reunification were unrealistic and unacceptable for South Korea. North Korea demanded that U.S. forces must leave Korean peninsula, and a peace treaty must be realised before any talk of reunification. These two pre requisites were not acceptable by South Korea as it was North Korea which started the Korean War and this could be repeated following the absence of U.S. forces and realisation of peace treaty would raise a question on U.S. forces' presence in Korean peninsula. According to North Korea the biggest obstacle in Korean reunification was the presence of imperialist forces in Korean peninsula and at the same time presence of U.S forces in Korean peninsula is a threat for North Korean regime. Apart from external threats that Kim Il sung, the leader of North Korea, had to deal with, there also occurred some internal threats to its regime in the form of its own party members i.e. in Korea Workers Party. Kim Il sung, in a major quest to consolidate his power, ordered the arrest of its rivals and who later were sentenced to death. Kim IISung's major rival Pak Hong Yong who had a strong communist base in South Korea and was a founder of South Korean Workers Party, was also sentenced to death in Dec 1955. Pak Hong Yong was more famous than Kim Il Sung and he had more support as compared to Kim Il Sung. However, Soviets were in favour of Kim Il Sung and wanted him to be a leader of North Korea. Kim Il Sung's support base constituted of mainly repatriates who returned to Korea from Russia and Manchuria. One of the major reasons why Pak Hong Yong and his followers were

sentenced to death was that they disagreed with the 'Ceasefire Agreement' to end Korea War, which both Soviets and China supported. For Pak Hong Yong, realisation of ceasefire agreement means death of his political carrier as Pak Hong Yong and his hidden army of communists, which he erected after years of working in South Korea, was exposed during the Korean War and thus was vulnerable to punishment to death. Pak Hong Yong's support base in South Korea thus was either dying or becoming limited. On the other hand, number of supporters for Park Hong Yong were limited in North Korea, while Kim Il Sung had a large number of supporters. This disproportion made Pak Hong Yong to protest against 'Ceasefire Agreement'. Contrary to that, realisation of Ceasefire Agreement helped Kim Il Sung to consolidate his power. Kim Il Sung throughout the 1950s, after the end of Korean War, advocated about the peaceful reunification of Korean peninsula but merely as a propaganda. After consolidating his power, Kim Il Sung focused on economic reconstruction, claiming that this would strengthen North's Socialist base, which is a pre requisite for fomenting a Socialist Revolution in South Korea, ultimately culminating into a Korean reunification. However, with the achievement of its required socialist base and economic reconstruction, North Korea changed its course of reunification rhetoric. This change was accompanied by the rising tensions in South Korean politics. With the start of 1960s, South Korea faced a number of political protests to oust its corrupt leader Syngman Rhee. In April, 1960, number of protests staged by students finally toppled down Syngman Rhee's government and a new republic was reinstalled with Chang Myon as its premier. This newly elected government couldn't survive for long since Democratic Party experienced a factional strife. Chang Myon administration faced dozens of demonstrations staged by students, most of them supporting progressive parties. Progressive's view on national reunification was split but they all agreed to North-South dialogue and social and cultural exchanges to realise reunification, which North Korea proposed. For North Korea it was a right time to foment people's revolution in South Korea. But in 1961, something unexpected happened, General Park Chung Hee suppressed the leftist movements and look control of the administration. Thereafter, South Korea's economy prospered under the regime of Park Chung Hee, South Korea achieved high rate of economic development, later known as 'Miracle of Han River'. From 1960s to 1970s, with thriving economic development, North Korea had limited diplomatic relations with outside powers or restricted to Socialist Bloc. As a satellite state of Soviet Union,

North Korea progressed under its supervision (Joon Kim Hak 1976). North Korea, whose existence was as new as the start of Cold-War, claimed to be a sole legitimate state of whole of Korean peninsula. North Korea's Southern peer i.e. Republic of Korea or South Korea, also claimed the same. However, it was impossible for outside observers to assert any possible outcomes of their respective claims of legitimacy, as both the countries were doing good in their socio-economic and political sphere. However, this situation changed soon, when, 1990s witnessed a major change in international political system, with rivalry between major powers deteriorating day by day, this change threw Democratic People's Republic of Korea or North Korea into a pool of many uncertainties. The reason for the deterioration of rivalry was their increased economic interests and normalisation of political relations. These rapprochement and reconciliation between two blocs ended the Cold-War and resultantly disintegrated Socialist Bloc and USSR. Under these circumstances, North Korea started reshaping its Cold War tactics to tackle new emerging challenges. By the end of Cold-War, People's Republic of China and Russia normalized their relations with United States, which emerged as the sole super power after the disintegration of USSR (DPRK's major ally). North Korea not relying on Russia and China, sought many other ways to support its regime. North Korea's weakening position was seen in its behaviour as it adopted lenient foreign policy and sought conciliation and rapprochement with its enemies. To support its regime survival, North Korea resorted to the development of nuclear weapons, normalisation with US and Japan as an alternative of its earlier allies, realisation of peace treaty and proposed re-unification model which was a facade to its real motive of revolutionary reunification. For this leniency in their revolutionary reunification policy, few of the events that occurred during and after the Cold War which changed North Korea's strategy to realise reunification could be analysed. The realisation of these events were to played a crucial role deciding the fate of North Korea. The strengthening ties between US and PRC and normalisation with Russia made North Koreaskeptical about the future course of action in the Korean peninsula. In 1994, when North Korea's Supreme leader passed away situation worsened even more and its leader's death caused many to think whether Kim regime would continue to survive or not. Kim Il sung until the end of Cold-War had a firm grip on its domestic political structure and his death bring forth the question of regime's successor. Even though Kim Il sung officially announced that Kim Jong il as his successor, his mettle as a

regime's successor was due to be proved. Apart from political crisis that North Korea faced post-Cold War, it also witnessed severe economical drawbacks. In mid 1990s, North Korea faced a major food shortage and the world witnessed a major famine in the form of North Korea. All these crisis forced North Korea to implement major steps to support its regime survival. This distracted North Korea from its major goal of reunifying the Korean peninsula. However, reunification still finds a place in North Korea's official documents but the intensity of it has got diluted (Nolan Marcus, Haggard Stephan 2010). North Korea which had opted offensive reunification policy during Cold War shifted to defensive reunification policy. This Chapter discusses, North Korea's shift in its revolutionary reunification policy and underlying considerations and also discusses the events which back paddled North Korea in international political system.

2.1 Democratic People's Republic Of Korea in Transition.(From Offensive to Defensive).

The commencement of the Korean War in 1950 is the greatest testimony of North Korea's offensive policies to reunify Korean peninsula. The imminent military action that President Kim Il Sung took to reunify Korea shook whole of peninsula, with more than 2 lakh people dead and many more injured. The Korean war supported by the then superpowers though indirectly. North Korea was backed by USSR, while South Korea was backed by U.S. The Korean War in fact was the first Hot War of the Cold War. The Korean War ended with the signing of 'Ceasefire Agreement' and Korean Peninsula's division cemented at 38th parallel or DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). The failed attempt to reunify Korean peninsula and their utmost desire to achieve reunification still finds a place in the charter of the country's communist party, which states:

Ensuring the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the accomplishment of the revolutionary goals of national liberation and the people's democracy on the entire area of the country, with the ultimate goal of the indoctrination of the entire society with Juche philosophy and the establishment of a communist society . . . [and] opposing imperialism and

hegemonism at the vanguard of which stands the U.S., and struggling to win the victory of the collective feats of peace, democracy, ethnic independence, and socialism.

After the Korean war ended in 1953, North Korea decided to shift its reunification tactics, as war left North Korea with very less resources to carry on its reunification rhetoric, as per Oct 1950, in the first four months of Korean War 70% of Chemical industry, 70% of textile industry, 40% of agricultural machinery were already destroyed. Additionally, as per the Korean Transportation Ministry Statistics, around 1656 roads, 1453 bridges, 46% of the total railroad and 600 housing units were destroyed (Coe M. Pole 1994).. This destruction, even though, was incurred by both the Koreas, North Korea suffered the most as it was housing more industries than South Korea. During the period of reconstructing these industries, North Korea remained abhorrent to discuss the topic of reunification with its southern peer for period of time. But the question of legitimacy was still hovering as both the Koreas claimed the legitimacy of whole Korea. In 1950s, both the Koreas concentrated on rebuilding their war torn states by putting its reunification agenda aside and focused on the economic development of the state. This was done keeping in mind that only an economically prosperous and stable Korea could win legitimacy of whole of Korean peninsula. During this period, North Korea got the support from Socialist Bloc to help rebuild its economy. China and Soviet Union became the primary guarantor of its security. Soviet Union provided military equipment to North Korea while China stationed troops to protect North Korea from any future attack. This relieved North Korea from huge economic burden that it needed to rebuild its military. These large number of troops, provided by China, not only provided security guarantee but also helped North Korea to free up its huge man power in construction work and other form of labour needed in factories for mass production of goods (Shen Zhihua 2012). By doing so, North Korea was able to outpace South Korea's economy until early 1970s. Similarly, South Korea's major contributor in its economy and safety was United States. U.S. provided economic and military aid while leaving domestic politics of ROK on its own. Around 80% of monetary aid received by South Korea until 1980s was from the U.S. Until 1960, North Korea advocated the policy of peaceful reunification through general elections for all Korean National Assembly

under the supervision of neutral nations on the basis of equal representation. Infact, Kim Il Sung, the premier of North Korea, welcomed the move of Ceasefire Agreement and declared that it to be a positive step towards peaceful reunification and blamed those who opposed Ceasefire Agreement. Kim Il Sung declared that the Korean Workers' Party should propagate a strengthening of democratic base in North Korea so that in future if any of chance of reunification comes than North's democratic base could cease the opportunity. Kim Il Sung also asserted that, to achieve reunification, economic reconstruction was necessary and believed that the earlier attempt of reunification failed because in South Korea, Korea Workers' Party was lacking organisational strength and couldn't mobilise people effectively.

In early 1960s, South Korea witnessed a political upheavals when student movement erupted and ousted Syngman Rhee from his office. Synman Rhee's successor Chang Myon remained in office for only about an year as a coup under the leadership of Military General Park Chung Hee pushed him out of office and took control of South Korea This was shocking for North Korea since military regime in South Korea was surely not a good sign for its goal of reunification. Park Chung Hee, who was a staunch anti-communist, took control of apparently every state institution. This political shift caused North Korea to formulate its new tactics for reunification. On 15th August, 1960, North Korea proposed a new reunification plan which advocated the establishment of 'Confederal Government' by combining both the Korean Governments with their ideology intact. According to this new Confederal Government Plan, a Supreme National Committee was advised to be formed with the representatives of both the governments on the basis of equal representation and with veto power (Choi Wan Kyu 2001). The duty of this Supreme National Committee was to administer foreign relations and cultural exchanges. This proposal, however, was followed by another proposal which demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Korean peninsula. Kim Il Sung also proposed to reduce the armed forces of each nation to 100,000 or less. Apart from these political engagements, Kim Il Sung also proposed a Joint Economic Committee, which was entirely based on the principle of economic exchanges. This committee was to be composed of businessmen from both the sides. However, South Korea disagreed on every front and in a countermeasure advocated General Election under the supervision of United Nations on the basis of

proportional representation. South Korea refused the idea of Supreme National Committee as it was undemocratic. Resultantly, North Korea tried to spur a socialist revolution in South Korea by requesting its citizens to overthrow puppet regime of South Korea. In its attempt to reunify Korea by revolution, North Korea funded and fuelled public outrage against Chang Myon. In April 1960, during a student uprising in the south, Kim Il sung tried to galvanize pro North Korean sentiment among student protestors. During 1960-70, North Korea repeatedly provoked military hostility against south in an attempt to overthrow Park Chung hee's regime which was pro U.S. and anti-communist. In 1968, North Korea's commandos infiltrated ROK's presidential compound to assassinate Park Chung Hee. In mid 1960s, a news of U.S. National Security Advisor's visit to Beijing broke out, this news worried North Korea of a conspiracy to threat its regime. To counter this move DPRK launched a campaign of terrorist attacks against South Korea. Moreover, 1960s had been very crucial for North Korea as it witnessed unfavourable international political environment. For example, Firstly, 1965 South Korea normalized its relations with Japan and during the same period and Japan officially accepted South Korea as the legitimate government of whole Korea. As a result of normalisation talks, A 'Treaty on basic Relations' was signed between South Korea and Japan and as a settlement Japan provided South Korea with \$300 million grant in economic aid and \$200 million in loan, Secondly, Park Chung hee dispatched a total of 300,000 combat troops, from 1964 to 1973, to Vietnam to help support U.S. troops(John Lee 1998). The ability of South Korean soldiers to handle wars like in Vietnam and their coordination with U.S. troops was surely not in favour of North Korea. These developments in Korean peninsula pushed North Korea to opt military line during mid 1960s. For example, in 1966, DPRK instigated 50 border clashes killing 35 South Korean soldiers and in the following year North Korea provoked 547, incidents, which led to the death of 153 South Korean soldiers and civilians and many more incidents as mentioned earlier (Weisburd Arthur Mark 1997). These provocations, however, were properly calculated and pre-planned as in Vietnam War U.S. was loosing its foot and a war on two fronts was not possible in favour of U.S. The certainty of no possible retaliation by U.S. provoked North Korea to pursue military line. Richard Nixon, however, tried to sanction North Korea on many options like blockade of North Korean ports, a show of force, destroying the North Korean aircrafts off the coast of North Korea, selective air strikes etc. But none of the sanction implemented fearing an escalation with North

Korea which would have been disastrous as U.S., having engaged in Vietnam War, was not in a position to handle wars in two different regions at the same time.

Few of the events in 1960s, ruled out to be in favour of North Korea were: Defeat of U.S. in Vietnam War, Announcement of “Nixon Doctrine”, which stated that the U.S. would provide nuclear umbrella but not its defensive conventional weaponry to its allies, Jimmy Carter's decision to reduce or withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea under the domestic pressure (Litwak S. Robert 1986). Encouraged by these events, Kim Il-sung, while he was in Beijing in 1975, addressed to the public that: “If a revolution takes place in South Korea we, as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people. If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the aggressors.” During Cold War, when North Korea had relatively better position both financially and militarily than South Korea, North Korea pursued hard-line policy to implement its reunification strategy. It resorted to terrorist activities to threaten South Korea as well as its major ally US. Incidents such as seizure of USS Pueblo in 1968, kidnapping of South Korea's coast guard ship in 1974, axe assassination of two US officers in 1976, four attempts to kill South Korea President Park Chung Hee, hijacking of two airplanes in 1958 and 1969 and bombing of an airplane in 1987 were the major terrorist activities which were condemned by the international community (Stanton Joshua 2015). These terrorist activities, however, were the result of the threat perception that North Korea had from U.S. as during 1965-1975 U.S. was engaged in Vietnam War and U.S.'s decision to bomb North Vietnam, also a communist country like North Korea, threatened war on North Korea Kim Il Sung's statement demonstrate his threat perception emerged during Vietnam War:

“Today U.S. imperialist have directed their plans of invasion of Asia. U.S. imperialists have violated the 1954 Geneva agreement by implementing “Burnt Ground” operation with more and more troops being introduced in South Vietnam. This implies the U.S. imperialists policy of step by step escalation of war, which has

reached a new and serious stage. U.S. imperialists now purpose to expand the torch of war into the vast area of Asia.”

Apart from unfavourable international environment, South Korea’s domestic political upheavals encouraged North Korea to intervene in South Korea's politics by supporting the opponents of the regime and in many cases even instigating South Koreans to overthrow the puppet regime of South Korea by a people’s revolution. On July 4th 1972, however, North Korea took a moderate stance when Kim Il sung invited ROK to discuss the issue of reunification which culminated into a joint Communiqué of 1972. In this joint Communiqué, many important decisions were taken to generate detente between both the nation and to create favourable environment for reunification. Through this Joint Communiqué, the two Koreas reached an agreement on the three principles for reunification i.e independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity. The Communiqué provided thrust to the North-South dialogue to a new level, as both sides agreed to cease slandering each other, to setup a hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang, to begin various forms of exchanges, and to form a South-North Coordinating Committee to ease tensions and preventing armed clashes, and solving the issue of reunification. However, this development was unable to provide baseline to pursue unification. Throughout the Cold War, North Korea relied on two different reunification scheme. First, to reunify Korean peninsula by overwhelming military force and second, by aiding anti-government South Korean activists. However, by the end of 1980s, North Korea's view of reunification changed. North Korea now got convinced that forceful reunification on its term was not possible, for atleast, in near future. The reason for this changed view was the huge gap between North Korea and South Korea economically and militarily with South Korea’s military now equipped with advanced technology.

2.2 Nordpolitik as a destabilizing factor

Another factor which pushed North Korea on the back foot was introduction of the Nordpolitik by Roh Tae woo's administration in late 1980s. Nordpolitik was the signature foreign policy of South Korean president Roh Tae-woo. The policy was opted so that South Korea could reach out to the traditional allies of North Korea, with the goal of normalized relations with the closest allies to North Korea, particularly China and the Soviet Union. Nordpolitik was a crucial decision taken by the Roh Tae-Woo's government when it could not directly approach North Korea for improved relations between both countries, thus, the indirect approach to North Korea was more plausible way to engage with North Korea. The policy improved the South's economy while leaving the North more isolated instead of accommodating it to stabilize Korean peninsula (Yoon Sang-Hyun 1994). The decision to incorporate Nordpolitik became historic turning point of South Korea's diplomatic goals. By adopting Nordpolitik, South Korea was able to improve its relations with East European Socialist countries. East Europe as already becoming lenient of its ideology was ready to develop improved relations with its peer west, this situation was favourable for South Korea to expand its hand to Eastern bloc countries, South Korea did exactly that. South Korea believed that improved relations in Europe may lead up to improved relations of Korean peninsula as well. However, despite of much success in its Nordpolitik, South Korea lose its hand in improving inter-Korean relations and North Korea became more hostile gradually. There are many different interpretations that why Nordpolitik proved to be a failure in accommodating North Korea. However, South's success in dealing with North's allies is good enough to be commended. The policy was named after the West Germany's policy of Ostpolitik towards the then communist East Germany. Although the Nordpolitik was named after Ostpolitik, the working guidelines of both these policies were unparallel. This is one of the reasons that Nordpolitik's success could not be equated with Ostpolitik's. Ostpolitik was a grand success of West Germany regarding its improved relations with its peer East. German unification heralded the advent of a new era where artificial boundaries marked by ideological confrontation ceased to exist. Heartened by the German unification, many Koreans started believing that the day of Korean unification will also come someday. Nordpolitik normalized South Korea's relations with most of Socialist Bloc countries, which were close allies of

North Korea. As a part of Nordpolitik, South Korea hosted Asian games as well as Olympic games. The main objective of Nordpolitik was to legitimise South Korea as an internationally recognised state. In Olympics, South Korea invited many countries from Socialist Bloc, which were its earlier adversaries. In 1989, when Berlin wall fell down, a new hope for inter-Korean relations emerged, atleast in South Korea. Many Koreans then believed that a day is not far when both the Koreas would get reunited. But nothing sort of this happened, contrary to this, North Korea became more skeptical about the upcoming events as Socialist Bloc was experiencing major changes in its political and economic system, particularly introduction of Perestroika and Glasnost in USSR and Policy of Openness in PRC. However, all these events were in favour of Nordpolitik formulated by South Korea. In 1988, South Korea organised Olympiad games, which provided a fertile ground for implementing Nordpolitik. In these games, officials from 160 countries took part and more than thirteen thousands athletes participated, including most of Socialist Bloc countries. ROK utilised this opportunity to showcase its economic and social development to the international community. In subsequent years, Seoul's interaction with Socialist Bloc countries grew subsequently. However, unlike Ostpolitik, which culminated into German reunification, Nordpolitik couldn't evolve along the same lines. By introducing Nordpolitik, South Korea sought to force North Korea to open itself to the outside world, specially to U.S and Japan, and embrace changes occurring in the international political system. By Nordpolitik, South Korea tried to reach North Korea through PRC and USSR but failed. Nordpolitik instead acted as a catalyst for North Korea's security dilemma (Kihl Young Whan 2005). North Korea became more inclined to its survival strategy rather than talking on reconciliation and rapprochement ultimately leading to reunification. Nordpolitik played a role of destabilizing factor for inter-Korean relations as South Korea's approach was unilateral rather than bilateral, which means North Korea was expected to bow down under international pressure. Later, with the start of decline in the economic development of North Korea in early 1980s and South Korea's economic boom and its improved relations with Socialist Bloc in late 1980s made North Korea cautious about the question of unification. Since the latter half of the of the 1980s, in the wake of the German unification, the North Korean view of unification has been defensive, rather than offensive. In 1993, Kim Il Sung, with his defensive approach for unification wrote ten point program for unification. The plan's original title was "10-point

programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country". It regards the idea of reunification with South Korea under a loose federation, leaving the two systems and governments intact while opening the borders. The program proposes to remove outside influence from the Korean peninsula, especially the US forces based in South Korea, and proposes cooperation on trade and foreign affairs as a reunified country. The North Korean foreign policy is still dominated by this original document, which has led to better relations with South Korea, beginning with Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy, and in the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration.

In 1989, when Berlin wall fell down, a new hope for inter-Korean Relations emerged, atleast in South Korea. Many Korean then believed and expected that the day is not far that the two Koreas will get reunited. But nothing sort of this happened, contrary to this, North Korea became more cautious about the upcoming events as Socialist Bloc was experiencing major changes in its political and economic system, particularly 'Perestroika' and 'Glasnost' in Russia and Policy of 'Openness' in China. All these events were in favour of Nordpolitik formulated by South Korea. In 1988's Olympiad games held in Seoul provided a fertile ground for implementing Nordpolitik. In these games, officials from 160 countries took participation and more than 13000 athletes competed, including most of Socialist Bloc countries. South Korea utilised this opportunity to showcase its economic and social development to the international community. As a result of hosting such games, South Korea's interaction with Socialist Bloc countries increased in subsequent years. On Jan 1, 1988, North Korea's President made historical statement by saying that both the Koreas must recognise each other's existence, he further stated in September same year that in order to realise reunification, we must follow the principle of coexistence and adopt the method of leaving the two systems as they are and uniting them under a confederation, neither side swallowing nor overwhelming the other. These statements had a tone of defensive approach for reunification, unlike before, for example, after the end of Korean War, Kim il sung repeatedly denounced the concept of coexistence, in Nov, 1954, he stated that – "The idea that Korea could be separated into Northern and Southern parts and that the parts should coexist is very dangerous; it is a view obstructing our efforts for unification. Those holding this view would relegate the

responsibility of revolution in South Korea to the South Korean people and relieve the people in North Korea of the responsibility of liberating South Korea. This is nothing more than a justification of the division of the Fatherland and for perpetuation of the division”.

The 1990s heralded new developments in terms of North Korea's approach to unification - moving away from the traditional approach of aggression and revolution, in order to create a new North-South dynamic. North Korea has virtually abandoned its "One-Korea" policy and acknowledged South Korea as an entity that has the nature and function of a state. The entry of both Koreas as member states of the United Nations and the adoption of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement reflect this. North Korea has also relaxed the preconditions of its federation unification formula, allowing for the diplomatic and military rights of regional governments, and, consequently, has proposed a new federation unification formula that accepts some confederation idea. Early years of 1990s witnessed some conciliatory dialogues from both the Koreas, for example many basic agreements were signed which focused on reconciliation, non -agression, exchanges and cooperation and de-nuclearisation of the peninsula. Later in 1994, kim Il sung came up with his reunification plan which was later known as “10 point program of the great unity of the whole nation for the reunification of the country”. This reunification plan is still followed by North Korean regime. 10 point program had following points:

1. A unified state, independent, peaceful and neutral, should be founded through the great unity of the whole nation.
2. Unity should be based on patriotism and the spirit of national independence.
3. Unity should be achieved on the principle of promotion coexistence, co-prosperity and common interests and subordinating everything to the cause of national reunification.
4. All manner of political disputes that foment division and confrontation between the fellow countrymen should be stopped and unity be achieved.
5. They should dispel fears of invasion from the south and from the north, prevail-over-communism and communization altogether and believe in and unite with each other.

6. They should protect material and spiritual wealth of individual persons and organizations and encourage them to be used favorably for the promotion of great national unity.
7. They should set store by democracy and join hands on the road to national reunification, not rejecting each other for the difference in isms and principles.
8. The whole nation should understand, trust and unite with one another through contacts, travels and dialogues.
9. The whole nation in the north and the south and overseas should strengthen solidarity with one another on the way to national reunification.
10. Those who have contributed to the great unity of the nation and to the cause of national reunification should be highly estimated.

2.3 End of Super Powers Rivalry (Emergence of Multi-Polarity)

The end of Cold-War changed the security environment of North East Asia as no super power was interested in harming each other and were in fact changing there traditional security concept, which heavily depended on Military expansion, to modern security concept where economic prosperity is the main driving force (Mc Aleavy Tony 1998). Two of the major powers of the North-East Asia like China and Russia, normalized relations with U.S. This had a negative impact on North Korea's security dilemma, as two of its major security guarantor were drifting apart. China in late 1960s, was indicated by U.S. that it is willing to relax trade restrictions to which China responded positively. This later improved bilateral contacts between both countries. Two of the reasons for Sino-U.S. rapprochement was Sino-USSR boundary dispute and USSR's intervention in Czechoslovakia. These incidents changed diplomatic stance of China on U.S. as China believed that to counter balance Soviets improved relations with U.S. were mandatory. Moreover, The dying down Vietnam War and U.S. decision to retreat after the war is over made China convinced that U.S. had no intentions to expand in East Asia. U.S. on the other hand, just like China, was also trying to contain Soviets by distributing powers against the Soviets.

In a way, it can be concluded that both the countries had parasitic relations with each other. In 1971, Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor of U.S., visited Beijing secretly and met Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and President Mao Zedong. This news had varied reaction from international community, while some praised the move, some denounced it. North Korea denounced the move intensely and Next year, President of U.S. Richard Nixon visited Beijing and issued the Shanghai Communique, in this communique both the countries agreed to work toward normalisation of diplomatic relations. As a result, liaison offices were established in Beijing and Washington and U.S. acknowledged 'One China Policy'. This Normalisation of relations caused North Korea to look for its security guarantee toward USSR as it no longer could rely on China. However, China remained stuck to its North Korea policy for quite a long period of time. Soviet Union who was the primary guarantor of North Korea's security had taken U turn on North Korea's security concerns. North Korea was now moving forward for self-reliant security developments such as possession of nuclear weapons.

With the end of Cold-War came in the end of super powers rivalry, this fact again was not in favour of North Korea as North Korea was reaping many benefits from this rivalry, for example, China and USSR were providing huge support to North Korea to contain USA to 38th parallel, for achieving this goal, both the countries provided military and economic support to North Korea so that its regime continue to survive. This support, however, got diluted by the end of 1980s. Start of 1990s heralded new international political environment, an environment where North Korea had no option but to become lenient on its foreign policy. The long held military hard line policy was starting to diminish. North having no option but to keep itself in line with the changing international political environment, shown some conciliatory behaviour towards South Korea. 1990s heralded spates of conciliatory agreements between North Korea and South Korea. In the first quarter of 1990s a series of prime ministerial level talks were held, issues discussed were like joint membership of both the United Nations, development of confidence building measures, signing of non-aggression agreement, nuclear non-proliferation, discontinuation of Team Spirit annual military exercise, replacement of armistice with a peace treaty were major among all (Drury A, Chan S. 2000). As a result, in 1991 both North Korea and South

Korea became members of United Nations; this was a breakthrough as earlier North Korea consistently denied the two seat resolution proposed by South Korea for joint membership of United Nations. This was an example of North Korea's leniency, towards 'One Korea' policy, which it had pursued under the pressure of political changes that were occurring after the end of Cold-War. Another breakthrough, however, came in the form of December 1991 agreement: the agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Co-operation. The agreement demanded the recognition and mutual respect for each other's political and social system. The agreement advocated the promotion of economic cooperation, family exchanges, joint military committee, telephone hotline, creation of North-South Liaison office, establishment of telecommunication services, railway line, roads etc. Same year in the month of December both the countries also signed on a Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula. The Joint Declaration contained the provision for the promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy, renouncement of the development of nuclear weapons. These two agreements denotes that North Korea was experiencing a fundamental change in its reunification policy and was trying to preserve its regime. Early 1990s made North Korea cautious about the question of reunification as reunification on its term was not possible now. Instead North Korea was looking forward for its survival strategy. Additionally, North Korea in the subsequent years faced economic difficulties following droughts and Floods. North Korea defaulted on all foreign debts in 1980. Apart its security concerns and its legitimacy or identity crisis, North Korea was also experiencing downward economy. Russia, which earlier used barter system, started demanding hard currency payments from North Korea mostly for petroleum supplies. This was shocking for North Korea's already ailing economy as Russia accounted for 50% of its trade. All of these major security and economic concerns forced North Korea to step down from its earlier hard line policies to soft line policies.

Chapter 3

Crisis of North Korean Survival and Its Unification Policy

3.0 Introduction

In early 1990s, few of the events that occurred in international political environment made North Korea observers to predict its regime collapse. Later, the death of North Korea's first leader, Kim Il Sung in 1994, followed by famine in 1996-97, intensified the prediction. By mid 1990s, North Korea's economy was experiencing a sudden downfall. The end of Cold-War brought about an end of Soviet Union modelled economy. North Korea's major trade partner Russia's support was abandoning. Most of the east European economies changed their perception about centrally controlled economics as it was inefficient in distributing resources, was against the people's right as consumers and it suppressed economic freedom. By the commencement of 1990s, all the socialist economies were experiencing a downfall and were lacking in capacity in production sector as compared to Western or free market economies (Yoo Chan Yul 1999). In centrally controlled economies, due to increased inflation and less job opportunities, people's outrage was common and many demonstrations against the government could be seen on streets. Notwithstanding protests, governments of socialist states adopted few of the aspects of free market and later fully accepted it. President of Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev wanted reforms in centrally controlled economy and wanted to improve its relations with western economies, as a step to improve Soviet Union's ailing economy. Even when these changes were taking place in many of the socialist countries, North Korea remained reluctant to adopt the values of free market system and liberal democracy as it feared the collapse of its regime if any of these changes were to be implemented. North Korea's very foundation is based on its communist state which later changed to unique 'Juche Ideology', which advocates self reliance in economy and security. Adapting to western values means undermining its long culminated values of 'Juche' and thus, loosing faith of North Koreans in the system.

North Korea's major allies in Asia i.e USSR and China, however, adopted some of such changes in their economic system. North Korea, since its birth, has remained heavily dependent on its socialist peers, almost 90% of its trade volume was with Soviet Union until 1991. In 1990, during the reign of Mikhail Gorbachev, North Korea's trade with Soviet Union was 2.2 billion dollars, which reduced to \$365 million dollars, in 1991 [Russia' Federal Customs Service]. This huge difference between trade volume in early 1990s, marked a beginning of North Korea's economic downfall. From 1998 to 2002, North Korea's trade with Russia was not more than \$100 million (Frank, Rudiger 2015). Additionally, in mid 1990s, under Kim Jong il, new successor of the regime, initiated 'Military first Policy' which further deteriorated the North Korea's economy as the needs of the military was given first priority. By late 1990s, North Korea's foreign trade fell abruptly and at the same time country's infrastructure and capital stock deteriorated to a great extent, this was accompanied by a series of floods and droughts, from 1994 to 1998, resulting into a famine which killed around 3 millions of its citizens (D, Goodkind 2001) All these socio-economic and socio-political changes that took place in late 1980s and early 1990s shattered North Korean economy, more so because, it was at any cost not willing to change its political and market system, this might be because the very existence of North Korea is based on 'Juche' model, which is based on communism. Later, not willing to adapt to these changes, North Korea fell into diplomatic isolation. This diplomatic isolation was partially a choice of North Korea itself and partially because of the political changes that took place in North East Asia. The reason why North Korea chose to remain isolated was to not get influenced by the evolving changes in international political system that could harm its regime. Political changes in international system, that were prevalent in late 1980s and early 1990s were in favour of South Korea and against North Korea's regime, and brought in the question of its survival. North Korea, due to these unfavourable changes, now was worried about its survival as its trade was falling and at the same time political support was limited. Apart from this, two of the most trusted allies of North Korea chose to take another road for the journey ahead, by adapting to these changes. These changes led North Korea to formulate entirely different foreign policy to support its regime survival. The very first step that North Korea took in its quest for survival was to become lenient on many issues on which it had hard-line approach earlier, reunification is one of them.

During its initial years until late 1970s, North Korea tried to foment a socialist revolution in ROK, for this Kim Il sung repeatedly asserted that if socialist revolution breaks out in South Korea, North Korea would not sit with its hands folded, means North Korea would provide help to agitators in whatever way possible to overthrow government of South Korea. As a part of this strategy, North Korea resorted to armed infiltrations, terrorist attacks and other illegal activities to undermine and threaten South Korea's government. This strategy to foster revolutionary reunification continued till North Korea had an upper hand in Korean peninsula, that is until late 1970s. Even though North Korea continued its provocative activities after that but the magnitude of those reduced to record low, as North Korea by this period was outpaced by South Korea in terms of economy and legitimacy. Realisation of revolutionary reunification strategy became outdated and less feasible, North Korea shifted to another method to continue its reunification rhetoric. In 1980, North Korea proposed a new reunification formula, Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo, under this formula, ideals of Confederal states were suggested and acceptance for ideological differences between both the states was advised. On Oct 10, 1980, Kim Il sung suggested in his report on the Party Central Committee to the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party that a nationally unified government should be formed with the establishment of Supreme National Assembly comprised of equal number of representatives from both the Koreas irrespective of their population size. He also proposed to establish a Standing Committee which would see the affairs of local government of the confederal state. North Korea also accepted some of the federal elements suggested by South Korea, but its pre-requisites for reunification remained same, that is, to realise total independence first and than any step further for reunification. By total independence means, freeing of Southern part of Korean peninsula from foreign influence, and by foreign influence here means, particularly U.S. influence.

During the start of 1990s, a group of social scientists anticipated that North Korea would hardly survive through the 21st century, this anticipation became more close to reality when North Korean leader Kim il Sung died in 8 July 1994. The death of Kim

Il Sung unleashed a spate of questions in front of Korea observers, speculations about prospects of North Korea's survival, however were divided. Some speculated that North Korea's internal political structure is so strong that, even after the death of Kim Il Sung, the political elites maintain the decorum of its values that evolved during the reign of its revered leader Kim Il Sung. Contrary to that, Some speculated that North Korea would hardly survive a decade and proclaimed that North Korea would not be able to escape from the shock of the death of its first leader Kim Il Sung, who was worshipped as a God in North Korea. CIA even conjectured that North Korea would collapse within 3 years. All these conjectures made about North Korea's collapse, however, were wrongly anticipated, as it continues to survive, with its successor Kim Jong Un still ruling the regime. However, unfavourable international political environment of 1990s and death of its first leader changed the course of North Korea's reunification policy. North Korea became more conscious about its survival than the issue of reunification of Korea peninsula. In 1990s, after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il remained committed to the task of legitimisation of his rule and dynastic succession (KohB.C. 1998). In 1990s, assigned itself a massive task of indoctrination and mass mobilisation. Indoctrination of 'Juche' ideology was necessary to support its regime survival. Apart from these domestic political changes, North Korea introduced some economic reforms by opening its market in the form of establishing Special Economic Zones(SEZs). Four SEZs were installed namely Kaesong Industrial District Project (Kaesong SEZ), Mt. Kumgang Tourism Project (Mt. Kumgang SEZ) Rajin-Sunbong SEZ and Sinuiju SEZ. These SEZs were signs of North Korea's opening up of its market, though very limited, under pressure of international political and socio-economic changes of 1990s. Kim Jong Il, controlled all the major pillar of powers that is, the party, the state and the military forces. As part of its foreign policy, North Korea's survival strategy became major goal, while keeping the question of reunification aside. This Chapter looks into how North Korea survived through the dangers of its regime collapse while maintaining its rhetoric about reunification.

3.1 Detente with its Adversaries.

DPRK-US Relations in 1990s

During the Cold War period, USSR and China provided security environment to North Korea, this security assurance boost North Korea's confidence and it kept its focus on economic development. However, all these perks were deteriorated after the end of Cold War. To survive the shock of its allies' lose that end of Cold War had given to North Korea, it sought to improve its relations with its earlier adversaries like U.S., Japan and other Western democracies, imitating South Korea's foreign policy, widely known as Nordpolitik, in late 1980s and early 1990s (Beal Tim 2005). Nordpolitik provided South Korea with recognition as a legal independent state at world stage. South Korea used few of the events that occurred in late 1980s such as ASEAN Games and Olympiad Games hosted by South Korea in 1986 and 1988 respectively, as a fertile ground to implement its foreign policy of engagement with its adversaries,. These games were used by South Korea as a diplomatic tool to showcase its socio-economic and socio-political development and encouraged the visiting countries (specially Socialist Bloc countries) to see new opportunities in South Korea. The fall of 'Berlin Wall', in 1989, boosted the process of conciliation and rapprochement, through the implementation of 'Nordpolitik', with its earlier adversaries. As part of Nordpolitik, South Korea normalized its relations with its adversaries and in return those countries provided recognition to South Korea as an independent state. Seeing itself loosing the war of legitimacy, North Korea in the same vein, tried its level best to normalise relations with U.S., Japan, and other Western democracies. To achieve this, North Korea refrained from its earlier hard line policy against its enemies and resorted to more conciliatory manners to approach its adversaries. North Korea, having failed diplomatically on the issue of legitimacy, instead of talking about reunification, started advocating about co-existence with South Korea. This was because North Korea accepted the fact that it has no leverage over South Korea and reunification on its conditions was not possible. However, provision for reunification was doubtful as the pre-requisites that North Korea demanded were not viable and unacceptable for South Korea. North Korea demanded that before any form of reunification talk, South Korea must realise complete independence of Korean peninsula. North Korea believed that South Korea is still not independent and its government is a stooge of American imperialists. North Korea

proposed reunification without any foreign influence i.e. independence with the help of its own people (Uri Minjokkkiri). For this North Korea required that U.S. forces must leave Korean peninsula and South Korea should nullify 'Mutual Defence Treaty' signed between U.S. and ROK. To achieve this, North Korea tried to bring U.S. on negotiation table to sign a peace treaty by ending existing 'Korean Armistice Agreement'. North Korea also sought to ameliorate its relations with U.S as it is the most dominant external actor on the Korean peninsula and had the unmatched political and economic control of the world after the disintegration of USSR.

After the end of Cold War, U.S emerged as the most powerful military and economic power and was due to these reasons was able to manipulate or influence political activities of other states. Thus, U.S. support at that period was necessary for any state to pursue peace and development. Additionally, U.S. supported model of liberal economy was becoming dominant by the end of 20th century and U.S. dollar was the most powerful currency. In 1990, world imports from United States was US\$ 248,931 million with a partner share 18.47 percent and world exports to United States was US\$ 309,611 million, with a partner share of 22.47 percent(World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) report). At the same time, communism became weaker and outdated and was rejected by many socialist countries, even the patron of communism i.e. Soviets themselves defied it and accepted the democratic values gradually. Russia, under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, introduced the policy of Perestroika and Glasnost, which opened the doors of USSR for democratic ideals. These changes were against the maintenance of communism and led to the fall of Soviet Union. PRC, similarly, accepted few of the aspects of free markets, like private ownership of some of the firms, to foster its economy. For this very reason, economic growth rate of PRC from 1980s became high. These structural changes were necessary as the whole communist bloc was experiencing downfall in their respective economies. However, USSR couldn't survive through these socio-economic changes and ceased to exist. To escape from these socio-economic turbulence, new plans and new strategies were required to survive through these changes. As an effort to survive through unfavourable international political environment changes, North Korea tried to implement Nordpolitik like foreign policy to normalise its relations with its adversaries, specially U.S, but failed as U.S. remained adamant and continuously

refused to negotiate with North Korea on several major issues, later first nuclear crisis further worsened the situation. However, with reference to U.S- North Korea normalisation moves, in 1990s, it was expected that North Korea could collapse within a decade or before, for this reason, U.S., particularly at this period of time, kept distance from North Korea from having any sort of negotiation. But continuation of the regime even after the collapse of communism pushed U.S. to get a solution for North Korea's newly emerging nuclear ambitions. U.S- DPRK had no formal diplomatic contact from the day of end of Korea War in 1953 until 1980. Seeing North Korea's diplomatic isolation in late 1980s as potential threat to destabilise North East Asia, U.S. started informal relation with North Korea. For example, U.S. allowed visits from North Korea in cultural, sport, academic setting. U.S. also lifted ban on certain commercial and financial transaction. On March 12,1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from NPT which it had signed in 1985, possibly to bring U.S. to negotiation table. This strategy worked and U.S. became ready to talk with North Korea and 'Agreed framework' was concluded and signed. According to this agreement, North Korea would give up its nuclear proliferation or development plan and in return it would be provided with fuel oil and two light water reactors would be constructed by the U.S. by the end of 2003.

Starting in 1990s , US-DPRK remained occupied with the nuclear issue, U.S. wanted North Korea to give up its nuclear proliferation program, while North Korea kept insisting to stop military hostility in the region and to replace Korean Armistice Treaty with a peace treaty, ultimately breaking ties between U.S. and ROK. The realisation of peace treaty is a pre-requisite for a North Korea's reunification goal. U.S. somehow knew the strategic viewpoint of North Korea's foreign policy. Having known, North Korea's keen interest in realising peace treaty, U.S. refrained from setting a negotiation table for North Korea.

DPRK-JAPAN relations in 1990s

Until the end of Cold-War, DPRK-Japan relations were highly influenced by the international communism factor. Japan, being on the side of anti-communist group had a cold relationship with North Korea. However, this cold relationship thwarted by

the events of normalisation talks between ROK-Russia in 1990 and ROK-PRC in 1992. South Korea's foreign policy of reconciliation and rapprochement known as 'Nordpolitik', changed the dynamics of DPRK-Japan relations. North Korea and Japan witnessing an unprecedented period of peace talks and normalisation between adversaries, felt dire need to improve their relations as well. In 1990s, Japan could see some incentives in having improved relations with North Korea. North Korea's nuclear and missile threats were performing a good deed of coercing Japan to negotiate with North Korea (Mason Ra 2014). For Japan, North Korea's nuclear and missile threats were real at the time when its collapse was expected. Thereby, for Japan, establishment of conflicts between North Korea and Japan was becoming inevitable. For North Korea, to pursue normalisation talks came in the picture by the fact that Japan was a giant economy in Asia and was expected to surpass U.S in terms of economy. Incentivising, North Korea's efforts of rapprochement, Japan, in Sept 28, 1990 sent political delegation led by former Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru to Pyongyang. Following this, a joint declaration was released on Sept 28, 1990 which required Japan to apologise and compensate for the losses inflicted by Japan on Korean peninsula during its colonial rule and reparation cost even after the independence of North Korea. After 8 rounds of talks within a period of 2 years, both North Korea and Japan relegated their efforts to continue to normalisation talks. Japan continued to list North Korea as a 'major destabilizing factor' in North East Asia, in its 'White Papers on Defence'. Normalisation stalled for a long period of time as both the parties couldn't reach to a common conclusion fulfilling demands of both the sides.

From April to October, 2000, fresh round of talks were conducted . These fresh talks discussed Japan's harsh colonial history and North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals in 1970s and 1980s. Under the pressure of the issue of abduction, North Korea changed its demands slightly and instead of demanding 'reparations' agreed to accept 'compensation'. However, Japan, instead of compensation agreed to offer 'economic aid' of \$500 million, \$200 million as a loan and \$300 million as economic cooperation aid. These talks failed again as North Korea didn't agree to accept Japan's economic aid instead of compensation. Also, North Korea didn't agree to acknowledge any abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea. Later, One more time, as an effort to normalise relations in April 2002, North Korea and Japanese Red

Cross delegates met in Beijing. This time, North Korea agreed to acknowledge the abduction of Japanese nationals and ordered an investigation into the issue. North Korea also agreed to accept the economic aid from Japan and abandoned its demand of reparation and compensation. Later, in North Korea-Japan summit, Kim Jong Il extended his apologies for the abduction of Japanese nationals in 1970s and 1980, by North Korea. Although, these three rounds of normalisation talks were fruitful to some extent, these couldn't fully resolve the issue of abduction. Japan blamed North Korea of bluffing it on the issue of abduction. North Korea, on the other hands, said that the issue of abduction is fully resolved as Kim Jong Il already had extended his apologies to Japan. Normalisation talks, however, couldn't be accomplished as Japan set some pre-conditions before North Korea, before any transfer of compensation, like bilateral nuclear inspection of its nuclear enrichment sites, to provide information about Japanese citizens who had migrated to North Korea in 1960s with their spouses, and to provide information about the Japanese soldiers who were taken prisoner by the Soviet Army during World War 2. North Korea refused to fulfil any of the Japan's demand and normalisation talks failed.

3.2 Policy of Brinkmanship.

Ever since, North Korea experienced economic upheavals during mid-1990s, compounded by the deteriorating economic support from its earlier allies, trade deficit, chronic foreign exchange reserves, and international sanctions, North Korea have resorted to the policy of brinkmanship. The term brinkmanship was first used in life magazine interview with then U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1956. Brinkmanship means, a practice in foreign policy by which a party or state coerce other state on the brink of war in order to attain some leverage over some issues. The term was very popular during Cold-War, as both the superpowers used it on each other. However, brinkmanship policy is highly risk taking and courts potential disaster. Cuban Missile Crisis is the most relevant example of brinkmanship policy. North Korea to use its nuclear warheads as a tool of brinkmanship policy and as a part of its survival strategy, spearheaded its nuclear development program (Yi Ki Ho, Hayes Peter 2015). In past years, North Korea has survived decades using these survival policies or metaphorically could be called as foreign policy. After the

disintegration of USSR, North Korea's nuclear blackmail strategy has been very effective to achieve its economic goals as both U.S. and South Korea wielded concessions whether economic or others. In total, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests and these tests until now provided some kind of leverage to North Korea to negotiate with U.S. For example, when North Korea conducted high explosive tests at its Yongbyon facility in Dec 1990, U.S. was compelled to withdraw its nuclear weapons from North Korea in Dec 1991. The tests conducted by North Korea, however, violated the norms of NPT. North Korea under the international pressure, allowed IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association) to inspect its nuclear sites. In March, 1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from NPT. North Korea's intentions to withdraw from NPT, coerced U.S. to negotiate with North Korea and an agreement called 'Agreed Framework' was signed between U.S. and North Korea. As per 'Agreed Framework', North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear waste reprocessing program and in exchange U.S. promised to provide economic cooperation, power plant and agreed to provide fuel oil until the completion of nuclear power reactor's construction. Other occasions when North Korea used its policy of brinkmanship are ; in 1998, when North conducted its first ballistic missile test, during clashes with South Korea Navy in 1999 and 2002. Thus, these nuclear blackmailing and brinkmanship policies played major role in favour of North Korea and provided leverage over more powerful states as U.S., Japan and South Korea. Ever since, North Korea has implemented these policies, it has attracted major concessions in return. U.S. and allies have used foreign policy tools to counter nuclear proliferation threat posed by North Korea. For example, in 2002, when 'Agreed Framework' agreement failed and North Korea claimed that it had withdrawn from NPT in 2003, U.S. initiated 'Six Party Talks' which involved China, Russia, Japan, ROK, DPRK and U.S. After months of negotiations in 2005, North Korea, once again pledge to abandon all nuclear weapons and to stop reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, in exchange for fuel and energy assistance (BuszynskiLeszek 2013). But in, 2006, North Korea conducted its first ever nuclear test and talks halted. North Korea received international condemnation and many fresh sanction were levied.

To check North Korea's nuclear ambitions and curtail its economic support system, in 2005, U.S. treasury department levied restrictions on Banco Delta Asia, which is a

Chinese gambling enclave of Macao. The U.S. accused that the bank was used as a pawn by North Korea in money laundering and counterfeit- currency trafficking. As a result of these imposed restrictions on Banco Delta Asia, other international financial institutions began to distance themselves from any North Korea's illicit activities. As a result, North Korea experienced difficulty in international financial transactions. Despite these kind of restrictions, hoping to halt North Korea's nuclear proliferation program, U.S. has failed diplomatically as, North Korea now is a nuclear power which possibly has developed miniaturised nuclear warheads which can fit on the tip of ICBMs and can cause potential threat to U.S. Now due to this nuclear weapons procurement, North Korea has gained more leverage to force U.S. to come upon the negotiation table to sign non-aggression treaty or a peace treaty. Until now, North Korea's brinkmanship policy has worked in its favour, as its very survival after number of economic sanctions bears a testimony that North Korea appeared as a better diplomatic player as compared to its enemy. During these years of heightened brinkmanship strategy, North Korea has talked much less about reunification. Even though reunification has a principal position in North Korea's long term strategic goals, it has refrained from talking about it for obvious reasons that after Cold-War and disintegration of USSR, North Korea back paddled its progress under international political environment changes. As a part of brinkmanship policy North Korea has deployed certain set of rules. Every provocative act done by North Korea is followed by negotiations by U.S. and allies. North Korea promises to not provoke further but in return demands some aid or concessions. Later, having achieved its short term goals, it finds excuses to break its commitment. For North Korea, two of the major goals of its brinkmanship policy are; to act as a deterrent against United States' possible future attack in coordination with its allies like South Korea and Japan and to attract diplomatic and economic compensation, from U.S. and its allies.

By the end of 1980s, North Korea instead of its revolutionary reunification policy, started talking about the recognition of each other's existence. In his Sept speech, Kim Il sung said "In order to realise unification..... We must follow the principle of co-existence and adopt the method of leaving the two systems as they are and uniting them [under confederation], neither side swallowing nor overwhelming the other" (T'ong-ilShinbo 1988). This statement has a tone of conciliation and rapprochement

but going few decades back in 1954, he stated that the North and South could not exist separately and any idea which fosters this view is dangerous and the obstruct the efforts for reunification and those who hold this view are delegating the responsibility of reunification. These rhetorical changes in North Korea's strategic thinking is caused by the super powers politics. The detente between USSR and U.S. and conciliation between U.S. and PRC reinforced North Korea's perception of vulnerability. In the wake of USSR's reform and China economic policy changes in 1990s. North Korea, chose to remain indifferent. This continuous indifference to new reforms, suggested that North Korea has chosen to preserve its 'Juche' ideology at any cost. North Korea, even though, cautious to the question of reunification has never removed it from long term goals.

3.3 “Songun Chongchi”, Military First Policy

‘Songun’ means Military first, as per the North Korean government this policy was formulated and implemented in 1994, after the death of Kim Il sung. However, the first mention of 'Songun' policy was on 7th April 1997 in Rodong Sinmun, North Korea's official daily newspaper, under the headline “There is a Victory for Socialism in the Guns and Bombs of the People’s Army”. Songun was defined as the military centred revolutionary philosophy to safeguard the North Korean socialism that is 'Juche'. The creator of the concept was North Korea's 2nd supreme leader Kim Jong Il. To give 'Songun' a official recognition, North Korean constitution was revised on 5th Sept 1998 and National Defence Commission, the highest military body, was made the highest body of the state. This date is thus recognised as the birth date of the ‘Songun’ philosophy. For Kim Jong Il, 'Songun’ like philosophy was necessary to exercise total control over the state, in the phase of newly emerged danger of possible regime collapse. Thus Songun was introduced as a new power structure in North Korean government. Until 1994, North Korea's guiding principles were based on 'Juche' ideology constituted by supreme leader Kim Il sung , but after the death of Kim Il sung, and under the light of changing international political system and domestic realities, it was necessary for Kim Jong Il to consolidate power in the form of military

first politics (Myeong, Jeon2009). However, the reason for the commencement of military first politics is deeply rooted in the unfavourable international events for North Korea after the end of Cold-War. For deteriorating support of its allies in 1990s and diplomatic isolation caused by South Korea's Nordpolitik. North Korea's trade was totally dependent on Socialist Bloc and when it collapsed, North Korea's economy shattered, North Korea suffered heavy losses in the form of trade-deficit, Chronic foreign exchange, economic aid or concessions. North Korea, even used barter system while trading with some of the Socialist Bloc states, which was not possible after the collapse of it. Throughout the Cold War, North Korea refrained from having any kind of financial transactions with western world and for this very reason its foreign exchange, after the collapse of USSR suffered immensely as dollar outpaced any other currency. To some extent 'Juche' ideology which means self reliance bears responsibility of this economic drawback of North Korea as 'Juche' as an ideology became weaker when international trade between states increased and these states became highly dependent on each other financially. Contrary to that 'Juche' advocated to remain independent or less dependent on International trade, which caused North Korea to lack behind especially when the other states were boosting their economic relations with each other in spite of political animosity. North Korea, instead of adopting to international political changes, formulated new political strategy and new policies for its survival in mid 1990s. Kim Jong il stated “ We must not be blinded by the imperialist's slogan of 'reform' or 'opening', that is the path to death, we must nor allow it into our nation” (Kin Jong il 2000b:478). As a support base, for newly evolved Songun, Kim Jong il asserted that the fall of USSR and Europe's Socialist Bloc was due to the poor military capacity and their handling of unfaithful political groups of the state and system. To the question of Military first Politics's legitimacy, Kim Jong il expressed that military first politics is aimed at completing the revolutionary task incorporated in 'Juche' ideology. Juche's ideology being supreme in day to day life of North Koreans and its connection with newly formulated Songun, made it unquestionable to North's Citizens. Below are the clarification made

by Kim Jong il and North Korea's state institutions in support of 'military first politics' in accordance with 'Juche' ideology:

“Various socialist countries have collapsed, with no bullet shot, because they were not furnished with strong troops. There will be no people, no socialist country and no Communist Party if they are not furnished with a strong army at a time when they are constructing a socialist society under siege and threat of the imperialists. The army equals the Party, the state and the people” (Kim Jong-il 2000a: 267).

“We must make party members and workers understand that the creative principle of the ‘military-first principal,’ which rules that the army equals the Party, the state and the people, is based on the Juche idea” (Choe Song-hak 2002: 10).

“As shown in the practical experience of our revolution, military-first politics is a political formula with the Juche idea as its guideline, which was created in the course of pushing ahead with revolution in our own way, and is the most powerful political formula, which fully meets the fundamental demand of the Juche idea. It became invincible politics, which can guarantee the eventual victory of the great Juche-oriented revolutionary cause. It also is a great system of politics, which is effective for solving any problem regarding revolution and construction” (Kim Ryong-jin 2004: 10).

“While succeeding the military-first revolutionary leadership incessantly, Dear General Kim Jong-il has said that there is peace and socialist above guns, presented the creative military-first principle and further developed great leader’s military-first ideology based on the principle” (Ri Son-nyo 2004: 12).

“The military-first ideology, which was presented by the Great Leader and developed and completed by the Dear General is a great, systematic ideology developed from the military-first principle that the army equals the Party, the state and the people” (Ho Chol-su 2004: 2).

“Great Leader Kim Il-sung founded the army on a basis of the military first ideology earlier than any other institutions and opened a new way to push ahead with revolution, with the army as its main driving forces. This indicates the outstanding features of his greatness and achievements... Our army and people will glorify forever the Great Leader’s achievement of founding the army under the military-first ideology and the leadership of Dear Supreme Commander, comrade Kim Jong-il,

and will complete the great Juche-oriented revolutionary cause to the last, with invincible military power” (The Rodong Sinmun, April 25, 2001).

“Our Party, for the first time in the history of revolutionary movement, presented the theory of the army first, working class next, and set up the People’s Army as the core troop and the main driving force of evolution, based on an in-depth examination of the development of the era and the changed social class relations. The creative nature and invincible power of the military-first politics lies in that it has the People’s Army as the core and main element.”(Kim Jong-il 2005: 356)

In a speech in 2003 Kim Jong il emphasized : “If we had not made our military stronger than before, we would have certainly perished by now” (Kim Jong-il 2005: 357).

The purpose of formulating the Military first Politics was to defend North Korea's regime and building a “Powerful and Prosperous Nation” and legitimise Kim Jong il's newly emerging military regime. By “Powerful and Prosperous Nation”, North Korea meant achieving economic growth the efforts of military personnel as human resources. To realise this purpose, North Korea utilised military which could work in any sphere of economic development like in construction sites, agricultural field, road and bridges building etc. Thus by ‘Songun’ Kim Jong il meant multi-tasking military and not just the military who's duty is to protect its territory from outside imperialist forces. Apart from these, North Korea used military means as a bargaining chip to attract economic aid and concessions, through the implementation of brinkmanship policy. Another goal of military first politics was to consolidate power of new successor of North Korea i.e. Kim Jong il, who came to power at the time, when North Korea was going through the economic hardships and political upheavals caused by the disintegration of USSR, one of its main political and economic allies. However, this consolidation of power caused North Korean citizens to suffer a lot as upgradation of Military means a less attention and a lower position to working class in a typical hierarchical order of North Korea. The regime started to reserve most of the cultivated crops for military and the leftover was distributed among farmers.

In 1990s, under the Military first Policy, the number of military personnel increased tremendously and more share of cultivated crops was required to fulfil the needs of

Military, causing limited food available to farmers. This problem grew exponentially when North Korea suffered floods and droughts in consecutive years and inflicted heavy damage to North Korea's agricultural produce and the crop shortage became a huge problem. This food shortage resulted into a famine which killed approximately 3 million people (Spoorenberg and Schwekendiek 2012). Looking into the historical magnitude of famine, it seed could be traced back in 1991, even before Military first Policy was even formulated, when Soviet Union collapsed. Soviet Union was the major agricultural exporter to North Korea and apart from crops, Soviets exported fertilizers to North Korea through a barter system but when Soviet Union collapsed, it started demanding hard currency and to repay its lone, past and current both. This worsened the situation even more as North Korea solely depended on Soviets on its agricultural sector.

'Songun' policy has elicited most of the negative impacts on its internal domestic sphere as well as on its neighbouring states. For its domestic negative impacts, Songun policy bears the responsibility of destabilisation of its working force as more and more number of working males were required to serve in the military. In an already ailing economy, North Korea mobilised its work force, which could have supported economic build up, in a wrong direction. This military build up required a consumption of North Korea's valuable resources, which could be used otherwise for its people's welfare if not invested in military build up. According to Korea Defence Analysis Report (KIDA) in 2009; "the North said that it spent \$570 million on its military in 2009, however, the real amount calculated on an exchange rate based on purchasing power parity term, was \$8.77 billion". North Korea spends approximately one-third of its national income on its military build up. Despite its economic crisis in 1990s and a downward spiral of its economy in mid-2000s, North Korea has invested heavily in its military. According to North Korean figures, it's military expenditure had increased to \$570 million in 2009 from \$540 million in 2008, \$510 million in 2007 and \$470 million in 2006 (Wills and Tellis, 2005). According to North Korea watchers, North Korea has grown weaker economically since Kim Jong Il has taken power. The death caused by a famine in 1990s, which killed estimated 1 million

people of North Korea, was a failure of Kim Jong Il's economic policy and huge military expenditure. In pursuit of military development North Korea lacked in supporting its 24 million(approx.) of population's dire need for food in 1990s. Notably North Korea was richer than South Korea until late 1970s and when it was focused on its economic reconstruction rather than building its military power. During Kim Il Sung's period, North Korea even spoke of reducing the military forces in past as part of peaceful reunification strategy. In 1960s, North Korea unilaterally decided to withdraw Chinese troops stationed at North Korean border as a sign of reconciliation and rapprochement to pursue its peaceful reunification strategy. However, the international political environment in 1990s changed its reunification strategy to its survival strategy, which required strong consolidation of Kim Il Jong's power and military expansion as no other ally at the time was wholly in support of North Korea. Kim Jong Il through its 'Military First Policy' wanted to imitate the South Korean model of development during the time of South Korea's dictatorial role of Park Chung Hee. However, considering the past of military rules it remains unclear that whether it is supportive of economic development or not, for example South Korean case, the economy of South Korea prospered under dictatorial rule while in North Korea in particular and African countries in general, dictatorial rule, states struggled to find a escape from its poor economic conditions. During Park Chung Hee's period even though the politics was more repressive, the economy developed and national income developed exponentially. For his role in nation's development, Park Chung Hee is called as "father of the South Korean economic miracle". However, according to few social scientists, South Korea's fast economic development resultantly made South Korea a democratic nation. Kim Jong Il, during the early years of the implementation of its 'Military First Policy' became supportive of Park Chung Hee's role in his countries economic development, which his father Kim Il Sung denounced multiple times in his speeches as a imperialist economic model of South Korea. The implementation of songun policy of North Korea imitated the "Chaebol" model of South Korea, which was a corporate model of economic development under the state control. North Korea thus tried to convert its state controlled market to a less state-controlled market. By trying to imitate "Chaebol" model, North Korea became involved in many economic activities like foreign economic ties and trade operations (Vorontsov2006). Commencement of songun was a clear indication of North Korea's diversion from its 'Juche' ideology, North Korea

justified its flexibility for less state controlled economy and powerful military control by interpretating its goals of making a “Kangsong Taeguk” or “A powerful and prosperous state”. This change in North Korea's thinking in controlling its state through the means of military proves its less 'Juche' orientated economic planning, which was based on ideological indoctrination, and in contrast 'Songun', which is typically a less ideological and more practical institution to control the party and state.

Chapter 4

Propaganda and Reality of North Korea's Reunification in the Post Cold-War Era

4.0 Introduction

For North Korea, there are three major and consistent goals; First, to achieve nuclear weapons so that it gets the recognition at an international stage as a nuclear power state. Second, to realise a peace treaty to ensure its regime survival and Third and final, to realise reunification either under communist system or never (Terry Sui Mi (2013). Supreme leaders of North Korea has worked in this direction throughout their rule. Currently, under the leadership of Kim Jong un, North Korea has accomplished its first goal, while the two other remain unfulfilled. For North Korea to achieve its third goal that is reunification, it needs its second goal as a pre requisite. On multiple occasions North Korea has pursued its idea of realising a confederal form of reunification but many argue that it is just a camouflage of its revolutionary reunification strategy. However, North Korea's goal of achieving reunification on its own terms is a dream very far from realisation. Even if North Korea is now a nuclear power, its economic conditions are unmatched to South Korea's. Currently, North Korea's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is approximately \$34 billion, which is minuscule when compared to South Korea's approximately \$1.4 trillion GDP (World Bank Data). This huge gap between North and South Korea's economy, undermines North Korea's position on the issue of reunification. However, North Korea still continues to speak about national reunification, at the time when it is actually not in a position to do so. The reason why North Korea still use the reunification rhetoric is because it somehow helps its regime's legitimacy. Since its inception, North Korea has used the issue of reunification to legitimise his regime.

Considering North Korea's previous interim reunification policy for establishing a federation, it can be said that from its initial years, after the end of war, until 1970,

North Korea's reunification intentions were real. More so, because, North Korea's political and economic conditions were better than South Korea's. In its federation offers in 1960s and then in 1972, during joint communique of 4th July, North Korea emphasized on cultural and personal level of exchanges. North Korea knew that its better economic conditions would lure South Koreans and this would help support North Korea's united front strategy of fomenting socialist revolution in South Korea. North Korea on timely basis even invited South Korea's unemployed youths to come to North Korea and get a job, during its initial prosperous years. North Korea even offered relief packages to South Korea when it suffered from heavy floods in 1972. But this economic leverage that North Korea had, faltered soon in coming years. By early 1970s, South Korea's economy equalled to North Korea's and from here on, North Korea's economic leverage ended. For few more coming years North Korea hastened its efforts to discuss the issue of reunification since it was lacking behind rapidly against South Korea in terms of economic development. By early 1980s, North Korea became lenient on its revolutionary reunification strategy. In 1980s, reunification formula of Democratic Confederal Republic Of Koryo (DCRK) advocated co-existence rather than the hostile inter-Korea relations on the basis of ideological differences and suggested 'one nation, two states' formula for reunification. In contrast to its previous years of offensive reunification strategy, this was a new thaw in North Korea's reunification strategy (Young Ho, Park 2014). Then, again in 1994, Kim Il Sung came up with 10 point program for the reunification of fatherland, which advocated confederal government as the permanent solution for reunification. Additionally, Kim Il Sung suggested to respect each others ideology, while working in the direction of co-existence. This timely, transition of North Korea's reunification plan suggests that North Korea based its reunification plan on the basis of domestic political situation of South Korea.

In 1990s when South Korea transformed into a fully democratic nation, North Korea lowered down its offensive reunification approaches and started to use it as a propaganda to support its regime survival. North Korea, by taking reunification issue in its background, pursued propaganda which ultimately would support its regime survival. Moreover, from 1990s till now, North Korea has experienced very unwelcoming socio-economic development. These new changes have challenged

North Korea's position to the issue of reunification. North Korea however, still hopes for reunification but it might take down the long established Kim's regime. For North Korea, reunification is now just a propaganda card which help maintain its regime. This chapter looks into how North Korea changed the reality of reunification politics into a propaganda to support its regime survival and how new socio-economic changes and back-paddling North Korea to realise reunification on its own terms.

4.1 Implementation of Ideologies as a propaganda to support its regime survival.

All the political ideologies have its own goals and methods. An ideology is a group of ideas or beliefs. These ideological beliefs decide the structure or form of the government and socio-economic system. For example, in communist system, usually a single party holds the power, private ownership is demotivated and property of the state belongs to its people and market is centrally controlled. While in capitalist system or democratic system, multiple governments are mandated through Universal Adult Franchise, individual ownership of property and free market system is motivated, in which government have either no role or limited interference. The political ideology of a state has direct impact on its society. For example, in communist state, it is generally believed that the difference between rich and poor in not wide. In contrast, in capitalist state, this gap of rich and poor is wide, thus promotes classless society and is hailed for social justice. However, this claim of social justice has been proven wrong multiple times in the past as communist states ultimately transforms into a totalitarian or authoritarian state, where there is one political party and one supreme ruler(head of the party). North Korea is such an example of totalitarian state. North Korea not only controls its political and economic matters but also values and beliefs of its people. Clinging to its totalitarian type of government, North Korea has pursued propagandas to legitimise its rule under the banner of communism. To manifest its totalitarian rule, North Korea has used its unique 'Juche' ideology to manipulate its people.

As its propaganda, North Korea has consistently propagated the idea that the national liberation of the whole of peninsula is still unfinished, as in 1945, North Korean people successfully liberated themselves from the imperialist forces while people in southern part failed to do so. North Korea blamed American imperialists for the perils of division that both the Koreas are facing. North Korea accused U.S. as the biggest obstacle for Korean reunification and requested multiple times to its South Korean brethren to oust such imperialist forces. North Korean leaders have pursued a propaganda that national liberation and finally national reunification of whole of peninsula would come under the rule of Korean Workers Party, which is the party of the people itself. North Korea has repeatedly told its people that anti-socialist forces are still active in their land and KWP needs to accommodate a legitimacy to crush such forces. Kim Il Sung used this propaganda to take unconditional control of North Korean affairs. Through this narrative of national liberation and by linking it with national reunification, North Korean leaders justified their ever increasing dictatorial control of its people. In 1970s, North Korea merged the logic of reunification with its 'Juche' ideology, which is the official state ideology of North Korea. In 'Juche' national reunification is the major goal that North Korean leadership should accomplish. According to 'Juche' ideology North Korea should free up its southern brethren by formulating the strategy of fomenting the people's democratic revolution in its southern part, while strengthening its own socialist base in north and achieve national liberation. However, it advocates that people's democratic revolution should come by the people of South Korea only. Juche advocated that the people are the ultimate master of their destiny and all forms of revolution and construction are carried by them and thus people should be on top of the political hierarchy. Juche is also the foundation of the Kim Il Sung's cult of personality. Kim Il Sung persistently stated that people are unable to survive without their leader and that 'Juche' cannot be fully implemented without the subordination of Korean people to their leader. The concept of leader in 'Juche' can be compared to the Japanese Shinto Ideology, which projects its leader as divine personality. 'Juche' like philosophy offers the leader of the state, a revered position as the supreme deity. Thus, people are ought to follow what a supreme deity believes and preaches to its people. North has used this position of 'Juche' as equivalent to state religion to propagate its propaganda. Whether its the strategy of revolutionary reunification, succession of the power, formulation and implementation of harsh policies and laws, 'Juche' justifies all. By the use of such

ideology like Juche, Kim Il Sung convinced its people that whole Korean liberation and revolutionary reunification would come under his rule and divided families would again meet each other, but before that North Korea needs to develop a strong socialist base and a self dependent economic and defence structure. This propaganda helped Kim Il Sung to exercise unconditional control over its people and justified his dictatorial rule.

Even though North Korea was able to achieve economic development through its five year plans but not without the help of China and Soviet Union. This form of dependency is against the self-dependency propagated by the idea of 'Juche'. North Korea continued to get support from Soviet Union to expand its military might. Considering, North Korea's dependency on its allies throughout the Cold War, one can conclude that 'Juche' has worked little to strengthen North Korea as a state but it has surely worked to help accommodate power for North Korean dictatorial leader Kim Il Sung and his party KWP. Even after the death of Kim Il Sung, his heir Kim Jong Il never admitted the failure of 'Juche' to strengthen the state and its people. North Korea's economic downfall in 1990s and its incompetence and incapability in dealing with famines and droughts in 1994-1998, proves the failure of 'Juche'. Until today, North Korea depends on economic aid from foreign powers. Thus, if someone is to say, that North Korea has used Juche as a tool to control its people not to empower them, it would be absolutely true. This history of implementing unique ideology as a propaganda to control the domestic politics has been prevalent, like in 1990s, notwithstanding diplomatic isolation and economic downfall, Kim Jong Il formulated and implemented 'Songun' policy as a tool to control its rising domestic political disturbances. In 1990s, North Korea with no reliable ally, resorted to the development of its military ability. According to Kim Jong Il, guns and bombs are deterrent to foreign invasions and are ultimate tools to achieve sovereignty. This military first policy of Kim Jong Il was proven fatal to North Korean citizens as whatever the crops yields were, whether less or more, Military was given the priority. During North Korean famines and droughts, this was the prime reason of millions of death. North Korea stashed millions of tonnes of crops for military while its poor citizens were dying. North Korea notoriously misinterpreted its failure of public policy to prevent such outcomes, into a "Arduous March". People were told that their

sacrifices are for the benefit of the country and were requested to give up one meal a day and provide cultivated crops to military. Those not abiding to the request of government to handover larger share of cultivated crops to military were severely punished. In the name of securing sovereignty and deterring foreign invasions, North Korea kept perpetrating its dictatorial rule on its people.

In 1990s, North Korea's survival was doubtful, let alone the chances of reunification. North Korea's propaganda to mislead its people over the question of reunification split open during this period. It was this period when North Korea instead of discussing reunification in reality turned it into a propaganda. North Korea's position was in no way in favour of realising reunification under its self styled socialism in 1990s and after. Even after the death of Kim Jong Il in 2011, Kim Jong Un, the third successor of Kim's regime, continued to propagate such propagandas through the implementation of self styled ideologies, like his father and Grandfather did. Kim Jong Un also has used such propaganda in the name of Byungjin, which advocates simultaneously continuing its long range nuclear missile strike capability and economic development of its state. Currently, Kim Jong Un, continue to develop nuclear arsenal which his grandfather and father had initiated. For Kim Jong Un, achieving miniaturised form of nuclear weapon, which can be fitted on the tip of the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile(ICBM), is the way to achieve international recognition which North Korea lacked after the end of Cold-War and to support its regime survival. North Korea's new ability of striking Washington by a nuclear arsenal has improved its confidence to negotiate a peace treaty with United States. Many may assert that this is a step closer to North Korea's reunification strategy but there are serious doubts that North Korea really would want a reunification any time soon. The basic assumption for North Korea to not pursuing reunification is that even though its a nuclear power now, it is poverty-ridden economy. In coming years, instead of discussing reunification, North Korea would focus on its economic development, which he has already described in its 'Byungjin' policy line. Considering, North Korea's limited trade with the world, improvement of its economy would require a economic reforms and a healthy trade with the outside world. For North Korea to reform its economy, it would have to take a serious risk of opening its market which it had refrained in the past. But considering North Korea's new nuclear

capability and ensured regime survival, it seems that North Korea could take that risk of opening its market, though , perfectly controlled. Considering this new goal of North Korea to reform its economy first , which would take years and years, it is sure that for years to come North Korea wouldn't have any serious intentions to realise reunification. What North Korea seriously want now is the realisation of peace treaty with U.S.

4.2 North Korea's powerful elites as deterrent to reunification

Every authoritarian government has some traits of oligarchy, that is to say, the rulers of the authoritarian states are accompanied by their elites or privileged groups of the state. These elites are taken good care of by their leaders, so that any revolutionary practices by them could be averted. No single ruler of any authoritarian government have ever ruled the state without the support of its elite groups. North Korea is no exception. North Korea's elites have enjoyed many privileges from the very inception of the state. Unlike millions of ordinary citizens of North Korea, North Korean elite's life is not so bad. These elites enjoy life in amusement parks, do sporting activities, enjoy pub-culture and have full access to entertainment and internet. To preserve its rule, North Korea, since Kim Il Sung accommodated his power in 1957-60, has implemented a system of class stratification, which ensures its regime's support base. This unique system is famously called as 'Songbun' caste system. Songbun is described as state sponsored discrimination system which is partially hereditary and partially dependent on the loyalty for its leader (Benneth W. Bruce 2017). The songbun segregates people of North Korea into three broad classes; the core , the wavering and the hostile. The 'core class' is the most loyal to the Kim family and enjoys maximum human rights and includes professional revolutionaries, descendants of war heroes and peasants during the liberation of North Korea, the 'wavering class' is mostly dependent on its perceived loyalty towards Kim dynastic rulers and includes families of small-scale merchants, intellectual and relatives of people living in South Korea or China, and the 'hostile class' is one which supported Japanese colonial rule and enjoyed government posts during the colonial era and these includes landlords, capitalists, religious people, political prisoners who supported the South Korean forces during the Korean War. These hostile group is perceived by North Korean

leaders as threat to their political stability. These hostile group has the most number of relatives residing in South Korea, thus, may constitute revolutionary forces against Kim dynasty. Kim's regime maintain a data of every North Korea citizen above the age of 17. The data is managed using the software system "Faithful Servant 2.0." The digitisation of data makes it easier for authorities to access any citizen's songbun file from any Ministry of Public Security computer terminal from provincial to country levels (Sokeel J. Park, 2012). However, some of the North Koreans have defied the songbun system and came out of its ambit. A new class is emerging in North Korea which do not fall in any three mentioned classes of songbun and decided their fate on their own by making good money in public-private sector. This new class probably benefitted the most during the period of North Korea's economic crises in 1990s. The upper strata of this songbun system is indoctrinated by the North Korean propaganda that ROK led reunification of Korean peninsula is not a healthy deal and would destroy their legacy.

The new elites of North Korea are popularly known as "Dongju", which means "Masters of Money". These "Dongjus" are the product of the North Korea's growing unofficial economy or Black Market. The "Dongjus" are the small traders and operate businesses as a form of private-public partnership. They are permitted by the state to start a quasi- autonomous profit making enterprises. Only 30% of the total profit is kept by the individuals and rest goes to the state (Choi Song -min, a North Korean detector). These Donjus are changing the dynamics of the North Korean economy and altering the relationship between the government and the North Korean people. If we look at the history of Donjus, how they appeared? Mid 1990s tells the story of Donjus's rise. During the period of famines and droughts, donjus sprang up as entrepreneurs to find a way out from economic crisis. Donjus were able to access food and other consumable goods through some private channels at the time when government was not able to provide those things. In 1990s, North Korea's public distribution system failed tremendously. Those who could find a way out survived and others died of hunger. Notably, these donju now a good position on North Korea's caste system. After making money from the famines and droughts, donjus invested it in the private businesses like Karaoke rooms, billiard halls, coffee shops etc (Benjamin Habib 2015). Donjus were able to survive through governments

restrictions for doing private businesses as in 2000s North Korea relaxed its restrictions on such activities. But whenever, government felt a political threat from this nascent moneyed group, it took steps to curve it, '2009 Currency Evaluation' is an example of it. However, there is now a good mutual understanding between government and donjus .Donjus provide government with the financial assistance it needs to support its nuclear and other development program. Resultantly, donjus, and government now has parasitic relationship where both get mutual benefit. Moreover, donjus activities go in line with Kim Jong Un's 'Byungjin' policy, which advocates parallel economic and nuclear weapons development. The most significant thing here to be noticed is that, the business model of donjus, government and foreign investors signifies a departure of North Korea from a centrally controlled economic model. According to a research conducted by the South Korean government-run, Korea Institute for National Reunification (KINU), in Seoul, Dongju spend lot of money on South Korean or Japanese clothes and in tuitions for learning English language.

All high positions in military, local businesses, ministries and other state controlled institutions are occupied by these elite groups. These privileges that are enjoyed by elites might falter if reunification occurs, specially on South Korean terms. Even if the reunification comes on the equal terms from both North and South Korea. South Korean elites would outnumber North Korea's elites and would occupy major businesses. For these reasons, North Korea's elites might be reluctant to reunification on any terms. According to an interview published in NK News.org on March 1st 2018, the interviewee named Park Ui-sung stated that- "not everyone in North Korea is optimistic about reunification: privileged groups including the Kim Jong un's family do not hope for reunification. In its propaganda, the regime calls for a different kind of reunification "tanks supporting South Korean factories". Park Ui-sung further said: "For them (privileged groups), if North Korea's military power and South Korea's economic power are combined, that is reunification, then a unified Korea would become "Strong Great Country". This is just a propaganda to maintain their power. Those who are privileged are well aware that the division of the peninsula and isolationism are better than reunification, if they want to stay on the throne". Moreover, South Korea is a matured democracy now, and South Koreans are

enlightened citizens, not influenced by any form of propaganda of North, and thus might intimidate North Korean elites. It is widely believed that the nascent moneyed class may pose a threat to Kim's regime. With the rise in individuals income which increases individuals political will, the populace of North Korea may demand change in the political system of North Korea. As has been seen in case of South Korea , South Korea's political system changed with the increase of individual's income. Moreover, apart from the political implications, the rise of dongjus in North Korea also point out to the dire need of North Korea to open up its market which is becoming dependent on consumers. The rise in income, increases the demands of individuals and if left unchecked, may frustrate a strong section of populace. Resultantly, this situation may give rise to civil disobedience or civil war.

North Korean propaganda made North Korean elites believe that ROK-led reunification would exterminate the core class families first (Choi 2016). North Korean elites mostly senior, believe that ROK-led reunification would jeopardize their safety and security and may end up sending them to imprisonment after trials. The authority of reunified Korea not punish the individuals but also their family members under the provisions National Security Law. South Korea after the war implemented the National Security Law which punishes the communist sympathisers. Ina Unified Korea, North Korean elites would fear for their life let alone the hope for privilege lives they enjoy in North Korea. The perceived post-reunification scenario is horrifying for North Korean elites and thus, they are unlikely to support it. It is widely assumed that North Korea elites would try to abort the reunification process. North Korean see the fate of East Germany's Communist as the glaring example of what would happen post-reunification. After reunification of East and West Germany, East Germany communist elites and military officials were completely deprived of their privileges which they enjoyed during their partition period. Most East Germany's communist elites struggled to find a job in a new market system of reunified Germany and were discriminated as a suitable employees. Even within the South Korea, some of its former Presidents like Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo, Roh Moo-Hyun and very recently Park Geun-Hye's faced trials and were convicted of corruption. These cases of conviction of higher officials sets a negative example for North Korean elites to support reunification as they may face similar charges.

4.3 Unwelcoming Cost of Reunification for both the Koreas

Since the inception of both the Koreas, the political and economic track that both Koreas took were very different. North Korea became a communist styled economy where everything was centrally controlled and South Korea became a free market where private ownership was allowed. Since almost seven decades, both the Koreas are now so distinctive in cultural, social and political sphere that it is hard to believe that these two countries were once a part of one Korean peninsula. Despite many similarities in the past, today North and South Korea are poles apart. According to Australian National University researcher Leonid Petrov, “ Both countries have been isolated from each other they speak different dialects, understand the world differently and South Korean authorities might discriminate against their northern neighbours and treat them as “second class citizens”. However, the only benefit that South Koreans enjoy is the cheap labour, which it lacks now. The perils of division, that were imposed on innocent Koreans by the super power rivalry, were felt on both the sides. For both the Koreas to see a reunited Korean peninsula is a dream unrealised. However, both the Koreas met several times in the past to discuss reunification but failed as both couldn't reach a common conclusion. As the time passed on, their desire to realise reunification waned. Today, it is a very costly affair for both the Koreas to realise reunification. For South Korea, reunification is more sort of a burden as it would have to invest a huge amount of money to rebuild North Korea's economy, if reunited. According to Shin Je-Yoon, chairman of the Financial Services Commission(FSC), reunification would cost about \$500 billion in case of eventual reunification, the cost estimate covers a period of 20 years. Notably this is the estimate if reunification occurred gradually and peacefully, in case of sudden and violent reunification, cost of reunification is even higher. If reunification occurs following a conflict or another Korean war, the estimate cost of reunification is \$3 trillion for a period of 10 years.

The question however that who would pay for the estimated \$3 trillion cost of reunification still stands unresolved. According to a survey conducted in 2014, by reunification ministry showed that around 70% of the South Koreans supported the idea of reunification but around 50% showed no interest to pay extra taxes for

reunification. During the Lee Myung-Pak administration, fund raising campaign was started to support reunification called “Unification Pot”, but it failed tremendously as it didn’t receive expected amount of money. Currently, some private ventures are making efforts to raise funds for reunification but it is at a very minor level. However, the major concern here is not raising the funds for reunification, but the estimates that are made for reunification cost. Most of the estimates for reunification costs are made on the basis of German reunification, but many believes that German reunification's case can not be applied here as the difference between North Korea’s and South Korea’s economy is huge. In Germany's case west Germany's economy was only 8 times larger than east Germany’s. Notably, South Korea’s economy is 40 times larger than North Korea’s. Apart from this economic cost, the role of international player in Korean reunification is not supportive, however, in case of Germany’s reunification both the opposite forces that is Soviet Union and European Union agreed for the reunification. In case of Korean reunification, U.S., Japan and China would oppose reunification of two Koreas (Cho Han-bum 2012). Moreover, at the time when German reunification occurred, Germany was the fifth largest economy in the world, and in contrast South Korea is at 12th place and thus would need help from outside.

Many South Korean think that reunification would be a good for North Koreans but bad for South Koreans involving the cost that South Korea would pay for reunification. Moreover societies of both the Koreas are so apart that South Koreans would have to re-educate North Koreans about its values. The North Korea is one of the most isolated countries of the world and is not accustomed to the outside world and only 10% of the total population of North Korea have access to internet. Even though North Korea has its own internet services but it uses it for the propaganda purposes, like it has fan pages for Korean Workers Party. Economically, North Korea has lacked behind dramatically, and it would take decades to come to the level of South Korea's economy. Moreover, North Korea is not willing to change its centrally controlled market system which is a prime reason for North Korea's ailing economy. In past when socialist camp was implementing the economic reforms to open up their economy, North Korea remained reluctant. North Korea feared that introduction of the ideals of free market and individual liberty may threat its regime survival. For North Korea to ensure its regime survival is more important than any other goal.

North Korea's economy, today stands far behind from South Korea's, with only \$40 billion GDP as compared to South Korea's gigantic \$1.4 trillion GDP (Trading Economics 2015). For these reasons this is now obvious that South Koreans would never want North Korea to collapse and get involved in any form of conflict, as the cost involved in such scenarios is very unwelcoming. Even though, there are many positives for South Korea following reunification but the negatives are so ugly that South Korea would want to post-pone reunification for long.

For North Korea, peaceful reunification means de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, North Korea would have to give up all the nuclear arsenals which it have developed for a period of one and a half decades of hard work. For North Korea, de-nuclearisation itself means making its regime prone to U.S. led attack. North Korea since long has believed that U.S. wants to change the regime of North Korea as it did in the case of middle east and African countries. For this reason North Korea has always blamed the joint Military exercises conducted by U.S.-ROK and termed those as preparation for the future military expedition on North Korea. For North Korea nuclear arsenals are the best way to deter U.S. attack on its regime as it would risk not only the security of South Korea and Japan but U.S's as well. North Korea since the beginning of the 1990s has invested heavily on its nuclear development program, while risking its already ailing economy and poverty ridden citizens. Even though North Korea's impoverished citizens would get the benefit from reunification as a whole. But there is unsurity that its leader and its elites would support reunification threatening their current prestigious position in North Korea society.

Economically, according to Park Geun-Hye, reunification will be a bonanza for North Korea to get reunified with its southern peer, for instance, North Korea's unemployment youths would get jobs(even as a paid labour in South's Industries), its GDP per capita would grow making lives of millions of North Koreans better, the number would of people dying from hunger would significantly reduce. There is no doubt that reunification is a jackpot for North Korea for both short and long term. But all this be possible under the ROK-led reunification, which would encourage its free market system and liberal democracy ideals. This new environmental change in North

Korea's domestic socio-economy would end North Korea's decades old legacy of 'Juche', which is ingrained not only in North Korea's constitution but also in its society. 'Juche' being a practical ideology touches the every aspect of daily lives of North Korean. The demise of 'Juche' is something North Korean leader unlikely would support. Going back to the question of economic bonanza which North Korea would get after reunification, it is doubtful that North Korea wishes to rely on South Korea economic aid anymore. Kim Jong-Un's new "Byungjin" line policy indicates North Korea's will to improve its economy by improving its relations with South Korea and giving up its earlier brinkmanship policy which garnered economic aid from both South Korea and US (Panda, The Diplomat, 2018) becoming a nuclear power, North Korea is now sure that it is immune from any future attack from U.S. and it would focus on its economic goals. Being on a safer side, North Korea now has more negotiation power, unlike before when it feared a regime change by U.S. North Korea has rejected the reunification calls in the past, at the time when it was economically weaker and was in dire need for economic aids and at the time when there were chances of U.S. led military expedition in its territory. Today the political scenario is totally different from the previous ones, today, North Korea, due to its nuclear capabilities, is on equal footing with its adversaries, even when it lacks economic capability. North Korea would surely achieve its economic goals once it realises a peace treaty with U.S. Until then North Korea would keep its reunification rhetoric alive, merely for legitimacy and discuss reunification at the time when it equals its economic capability with South Korea's.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold-War and the disintegration of USSR concluded that the liberal democracy is a more effective political system in contrast with communist system. With this new accepted fact by the world community, governments having this system implemented gained upper hand over communist regimes. North Korea being the only communist state in North-east Asia, thus, felt crisis of its legitimacy on Korea peninsula. To solve this crisis of legitimacy North Korea, took corrective measures in the form of its new foreign policy of reconciliation and rapprochement with its adversaries but failed. This failure of foreign policy deepened the crisis of legitimacy. This legitimacy crisis impacted its reunification policy and North Korea from its earlier federation reunification method, shifted to new interim measure for reunification in the form of loose federation that accepted some features of confederation. This loose federation was more like a confederation as it allowed its member states to frame their own foreign policy and to have their own military and even currency. This proposed model was unprecedented in North Korea's reunification plan. Unlike before, North Korea's proposal for reunification in the form of Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo was the permanent solution for the reunification issue.

The beginning of the 1990s heralded the major Changes in North Korea's reunification policy, North Korea in 1990s deviated from its earlier approach of revolutionary reunification by fomenting socialist revolution in South Korea and from its interim reunification as a confederal of Koryo. North Korea's strategic reunification policy rather changed to a co-existence formula. There were several factors involved in North Korea's reunification policy changes. The demise of the Cold-War and disintegration of USSR are the most prominent ones. Other factors which back-paddled North Korea's revolutionary reunification policy was its diplomatic isolation in 1990s. This diplomatic isolation was the result of the changing

international political environment and South Korea's successful implementation of its new foreign policy of reconciliation and rapprochement widely known as 'Nordpolitik'. International political changes minimised North Korea's support from its two of the closest allies i.e. China and USSR. The disintegration of the USSR caused its member countries to either withdraw or minimise their support from any communist regime. North Korea being reluctant to give up its communist ideals lose the support of its earlier communist allies in East Europe. The lose of its support system that primarily came from its communist allies made North Korea to change its foreign policy line. Reunification policy as sub part of North Korea's foreign policy also was influenced.

Resultantly, as part of foreign policy change North Korea sought to improve its relations with South Korea. In 1991, "Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation" between the North Korea and South Korea was signed followed by the "Join Declaration of the De-nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula" which came into effect on 1992. North Korea realising that their relations, not a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards reunification. Through these agreements, both the Koreas, pledged to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful reunification. North Korea during this period of reconciliation, declined the policy of "One Korea", which indicated that North Korea now, instead of its revolutionary reunification strategy and its revolutionary front strategy through the establishment of federation or loose federation, accepted the co-existence of the two Korea. This new thaw in North Korea's reunification strategy was accompanied by the ever increasing military expansion and covert nuclear development program for its survival plans. North Korea's nuclear diplomacy was influenced by United States' Military actions in middle-east. North Korea has used its nuclear diplomacy to garner monetary and other aids from US and South Korea. North Korea since the end of Cold War has shifted its reunification policy to a survival policy.

Looking back in the past, July 4th Communique was the first instance when North Korea had shown somewhat softening tone as a part of its reunification

strategy. However, the agreed basic principles of independence, peaceful reunification and national unity, on July 4th Communique couldn't reach to any concrete solution. Later, new reunification model proposed by North Korea in 1980, called as "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" and later in 1994, "Ten Point Program for Unification of Fatherland" by Kim Il Sung had defensive tone for its reunification strategy. North Korea by this time knew that its reunification strategy through the federal form of reunification formula wouldn't be possible as it now lacked both political and economic leverage over South Korea. North Korea's new Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo as a reunification formula was more like a system maintenance formula. In DCRK, North Korea proposed a 'one nation, one state, two system, two government' formula for reunification and it was, unlike before, was permanent in nature.

North Korea's confidence for its reunification strategy was totally shattered. North Korea now was looking forward for its regime survival as it was cornered off politically by the international political changes, North Korea as part of its regime survival looked its security in achieving Nuclear Weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea, covertly had pursued its nuclear development plan. For North Korea acquiring a nuclear weapon became a part of its national security. North Korea conducted Six nuclear tests till now and is a nuclear power now. North Korea, however, has remained consistent on reunification prerequisite, that is, realisation of peace treaty with US. For North Korea, realisation of peace treaty is one of the three main goals of reunification policy. The other two are to achieve nuclear weapon and realisation of reunification under communist system or never. Since North Korea has achieved its first goal, it will take an acute turn in its reunification policy. As far as the future prospects of reunification are concerned, North Korea's position is better than the past few decades after the end of the Cold-War. North Korea's new Young leader Kim Jong-Un is concerned about the economic changes that are needed to catapult North Korea to a position of equal footing with South Korea, where it can discuss reunification on its own terms.

As of North Korea's contemporary reunification policy, North Korea still believes that its 'Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo', formulated by Kim Il Sung, is the most reasonable plan for reunification. North Korea instead of discussing reunification, pushed itself to improve its relations with South Korea. This Approach of North Korea was supported by the South Korean President Kim Dae Jun and his successor Roh Muh Hyun, from 1998-2007. As part of its reunification policy North Korea haven't not deviated from the stance that Kim Il Sung had iterated in his "10 point program for reunification of fatherland". North Korea's Reunification Policy is now substituted the policy of regime survival. North Korea which earlier talked about federations or loose federations is no more interested in discussing those models.

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