ELECTORAL RULES IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: 'CO-EXISTING PROPORTIONALITY' AND POWER SHARING UNDER FIRST PAST THE POST (FPTP) IN KERALA

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SHAHUL HAMEED MM

CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
INDIA
2018

Date: July , 2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**ELECTORAL RULES IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: 'CO-EXISTING PROPORTIONALITY' AND POWER SHARING UNDER FIRST PAST THE POST (FPTP) IN KERALA**" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of **Master of Philosophy** has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

SHAHUL HAMEED MM

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROF. DWAIPAYAN BHATTACHARYYA

Supervisor
Centre for Political Studies
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110067

PROF. SHEFALI JHA

Chairperson

अध्यक्ष/Chairperson
राजनीतिक अध्ययन केन्द्र/Centre for Political Studies
सामाजिक विज्ञान संस्थान/School of Social Sciences
जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
Jawaharlal Nehru University
नई दिल्ली / New Delhi - 110067

For my Parents

Acknowledgement

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Acronyms

AIML   All India Muslim League

AKCC   All Kerala Catholic Congress

AV   Average Voting

BDJS   Bharat Dharma Jana Sena

BJP   Bharatiya Janata Party

CBI   Central Bureau of Investigation

CMP   Communist Marxist Party

CPI   Communist Party of India

CPIM   Communist Party of India (Marxist)

CRL   Civic Rights League

CSP   Congress Socialist Party

FLP   Fiji Labor Party

FPTP   First Past the-Post

INC   Indian National Congress

INL   Indian National League

IUML   Indian Union Muslim League

JPC   Joint Political Congress

JRS   Janadhipathya Rashtriya Saba

KC (B)   Kerala Congress (Balakrishna Pillai)

KC (J)	Kerala Congress (Jacob)
KC (M)	Kerala Congress (Mani)
KC (T)	Kerala Congress (Thomas)
KCMS	Keraliya Catholic Mahajana Sabah
KLCA	Kerala Latin Catholic Association
KPCC	Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee
LDF	Left Democratic Front
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
NCP	Nationalist Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	Non Governmental Organizations
NOTA	None of the above
NSS	Nayar Service Society
PDP	People Democratic Party
PR	Proportional Representation
PRDS	Prathyaksha Raksha Daiva Sabha
RSP	Revolutionary Socialist Party
SC	Scheduled Caste
SJPS	Sadhu Jana Paripalana Sangham
SMD	Single Member District system

SNDP	Sree Nararayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam
SNDV	Sree Narayana Dharma Vedi
SRP	Socialist Republican Party
ST	Scheduled Tribe
STV	Single Transferable Vote
SVT	Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei
TCMS	Travancore Cheramar Mahajana Sabha
TSC	Travancore State Congress
UDF	United Democratic Alliance

Chapter 1

Introduction

What kind of electoral rules would help to secure democracy in societies riven by divisions of ethnicity, caste, language or religion? Several studies in past few decades explored the working of electoral rules in divided societies and reached in a consensus that democracy faces unusual challenges in them (Bogaards 2003; Horowitz 2003 and 2012; Lijphart 2003 and 2008; Reilly 2002 and 2004; Reynold 1999; Reynolds and Reilly 2000; Selway 2015; and Sisk 1993). While accepting the reality of social constraints for democracy in those societies, scholars found 'electoral engineering'- designing electoral rules to facilitate inter-group accommodation and cooperation- as one of the best solutions. The discourses in the field generated into two major schools of thoughts- the consociationalism and the centripetalism. In spite of wide ranging differences between these two strands of thoughts, they agree on the non-viability of First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system in societies divided by deep differences[1], meanwhile there are many divided societies where democracy thrives under FPTP[2]. Thus there exists a need to analyze democracy in those divided societies where FPTP works without any majoritarian tendencies and communal outbidding. This research deals with that task.

1.1 Research Question

The dissertation deals with the question of explaining the existence of proportionality and power sharing among social groups under the majoritarian electoral system in divided societies. The two major schools of democracy in divided societies- the consociationalism and the centripetalism- consider FPTP electoral system as a death blow to democracy in those societies, and both suggest electoral systems which encourage inter-community cooperation and accommodation. Consociationalism prescribes Proportional Representation (PR) and the grand coalition of political parties in the cabinet; Centripetalism prescribes Alternative Voting (AV) or any other electoral system

---

[1] The following chapter has a detailed discussion on the working, and the scholarly remarks on the non viability, of FPTP in divided societies.

[2] Malaysia and India are the best examples of such democracies. Horowitz considers Malaysia and Indian state of Kerala as places where pre-electoral alliances among ethnic groups prevent communalization of politics and produce successful multi ethnic governments (1993). Lijphart in a separate article calls India consociational democracy in which various groups take part in the governance (1996).

that helps 'vote pooling' and encourages cooperation among different communities. Scholars of both strands of thought agree on 'the surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American system of first-past-the-post'[3].

The universal applicability claim of certain electoral systems, and ruling out the possibility of FPTP in mitigating the vagaries of divided societies, by consociational and centripetal schools cannot always be true. The present work argues that the socio-political factors equally matter and there will have an interactive effect of electoral institutions with the social structure. Accordingly, the same electoral institution may have different outcomes in different societies, and FPTP is not an exception to it. In doing so, this work considers a divided society in which there are social proportionality and power sharing under FPTP electoral system. This study asks two major questions: under which socio-political atmosphere the majoritarian electoral system (FPTP) co-exists with social proportionality and power sharing in divided societies? And how does the system overcome majoritarianism, minority marginalization and communal outbidding under such electoral system?

1.2 Definitions and Assumptions

This dissertation is based on three major assumptions, which are shared by many scholars. First, institutions are at the centre of democracy (Koelble 1995; March and Olsen1984) and their roles in mitigating problems of social divisions are widely accepted (Horowitz 1991; Lijpart 1977; Reilly 2004; and Reynold 1999). Among institutions, electoral rules are, as Giovani Sartori said, `the most specific manipulable instrument of politics[4]'. Along with other factors, institutions like the electoral system would have a profound impact on type of party system and character of democracy[5].The choice of electoral rules becomes a complex exercise as it involves trade-off among number of desirable goals. Electoral systems can be designed to achieve these goals: the durability of governments, accountability to constituents, minority office holding, proportionality of

---

[3] This is a statement by the renowned political economist Arthur Lewis. Many scholars have quoted him, and this is taken from Andrew Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and Democratization in South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 93.

[4] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 12.

[5] See, Timothy D. Sisk, "Chosing an Electoral System: South Africa Seeks New Ground Rules," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 1 (1993): 79.

seats to votes, inter-ethnic and inter-religious conciliation, and victories of Condorcet winners[6]. It may not be possible to achieve all the mentioned goals with one electoral system as some of them are mutually incompatible like proportionality of social groups and accountability to the constituents.

The second assumption is that the election becomes extremely important in divided societies because it ultimately decides the inclusion and exclusion of groups in the system. It is to be noted that in divided societies there is a tendency to conflate the inclusion in government with the inclusion in community and exclusion in government with the exclusion in community[7]. Whereas the representational character of democracy is vital in those societies, there shall have measures for encouraging inter-community cooperation, either pre-poll or post-poll. The general problem of fragile democracies is that the opposition to the government is very often seen as opposition to the system[8], and opposition may be due to historical causes.

The election in divided societies is a dangerous exercise if adequate care is not taken. The pressing problem of the divided societies is in handling with the dual problems of ascriptive nature of the identities and the tendency of the parties to follow the ethnic lines[9]. As those identities are loaded with the symbolic and emotional meanings, the power-thirsty elites have a high tendency to play 'ethnic card' and to communalize the politics. The elections thus would only help entrench the divisions and tensions. In those societies, the political rewards for the ethnic outbidding are greater than the moderation of the communal appeals[10].

Third, this dissertation makes a basic assumption that the social identities matter. This assumption does not mean primordialism, the school that views ethnicity as something existed from time immemorial and ethnic violence as the result of historical hatred. However, ethnic identities are the reality of socio-political life of many

---

[6] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (2003): 116-19.
[7] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 18.
[8] Ibid p.19
[9] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Encouraging electoral accommodation in divided Societies," in *Electoral System in Divided Societies: Fiji Constitutional Review* , ed. Peter Larmour (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2012), 25.
[10] See, Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no.2 (2002): 156.

democratic societies and are empirically evident in political mobilizations and voting patterns. This work considers the social identities as an important determinant of the social and political process in divided societies. Regardless of being constructed or not constructed, ethnic or communal identities are not easy to be destroyed or deconstructed. Scholars who specialized in democracy in divided societies have taken the ethnic identities as a reality, and prescribed measures to tackle the problems emanating from it.

Defining 'divided society' is one of the complex exercises of this dissertation. Some scholars have used terms like heterogeneous society, plural society, and divided society interchangeably (Lijphart 1977; Reilly 2004; Reynold 1999; Reynolds and Reilly 2000), while others have differentiated the term 'divided society' from others (Choudhry 2008). As these terms connote different meaning, there is a need to give justification for why the present work prefers the term divided society. To begin with, Smith differentiated three forms of societies: homogenous societies, heterogeneous societies and plural societies (1960). According to him, if all individuals of a society follow single institutional system, it is called socially and culturally homogenous; if a society has one basic institutional system with various styles or one basic system with number of institutional alternatives, it is socially and culturally heterogeneous; and if there is co-existence of numerous groups of people following different institutional systems, the society is plural[11]. Meanwhile, divided society means, if to use Benjamin Reilly's words, "a society which is both ethnically diverse and where ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organised for political purposes, such as elections[12]." Scholars have used the term divided society in this meaning in different national contexts, and some of them are following: Fiji (Horowitz 2012; McCulloch 2009; Reilly 2002; and Reynolds and Reilly 2000), Malaysia (Horowitz 1993; Reilly 2002; and Reynolds and Reilly 2000), Northern Ireland (Reilly 2002; and McCulloch 2009), South Africa (Bogaards 2003; Horowitz 1991; and Reynold 1999), and Srilanka (McCulloch 2009; and Reilly 2000).

---

[11] See, M. G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 83 (1960): 773-774.

[12] Quoted from Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 4.

Which term scholars who worked on democracy in those societies preferred? In his seminal work, 'Democracy in plural societies', Arend Lijphart differentiated between homogenous societies that are without major cleavages and plural societies that are deeply segmented[13]. Lijphart seems to have considered all diverse societies as divided and problematic, and used plural society, heterogeneous society and divided society in same meaning. But the age of ethnically and culturally homogenous societies, if ever existed in history, is over, and it is hard to imagine today any society as not diverse in one or more dimensions [14]. The globalization has only accelerated the process of differentiation among the citizens of democracies.

Horowitz considered 'fluid society' and 'divided society' as two ends of the spectrum, and some cases in the middle of both (1993). By fluid society he means societies which have contained the group identities and have blended the outsiders into the dominant culture either more peacefully like in the United States and France or with some clashes like in the United Kingdom. Deeply divided societies, which are at the opposite end of fluid society, are like Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland, where structural advantages are absent, and party systems reflect the ethnic cleavages. In the middle of both, there are countries like Canada, Switzerland and Belgium which are, though severely divided, moderated by the structural advantages like the existence of competing cleavages and identities[15]. Democracy is complicated in the second category of countries, where the consensus among conflicting groups is difficult to generate.

This dissertation considers divided societies as those diverse societies in which ethnic or communal identities are reflected in the political process and party structure. As per this, all diverse societies are not essentially divided societies, but all divided societies are diverse societies. In divided societies, the routine debates on the policy issues are prone to escalate into a question of respect and recognition, and all the political

---

[13] See, Arend Lijpart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (Bombay : Bombay Popular Prakashan , 1977), 71-4.
[14] See, Sujit Choudhry, "Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies," in *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?*, ed. Sujit Choudhry (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5.
[15] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 20.

developments are viewed in the ethnic lenses[16]. Political cleavages are often not different from the ethnic cleavage, and the party system may also be the reflection of social divisions. However in diverse societies, though there can be heterogeneity at the societal level, it does not necessarily escalate into violent clashes threatening the very existence of the system.

In divided societies, the ascriptive identities are very sharp and the membership in ethnic groups is less easily changeable[17]. These societies sometimes lack mutually agreed value system and understanding on the foundational principles which are necessary for making of a constitution. These contrasting views impede peaceful adoption of liberal constitutions. Examples of such cases are Israel- between secular and religious Jews-and India- between secular nationalists and religious nationalists[18]. Even after the adoption of a constitution, there would be a wide range of issues on which there exists ambiguity or multiple interpretations, and a final decision may be fatal. For instance, in India, some of those issues are Uniform Civil Code (UCC), minority rights, secularism, and the ban on cow slaughtering.

Is Kerala a divided society? Yes. As outlined in the chapter three of this dissertation, social differentiations like caste and religion has been reflected in the party competition and the political process of the state in past years. Moreover, scholars have used the term divided society in Indian and Kerala contexts. Lijphart argued that despite deep ethnic and communal divisions, Indian experiment with democracy confirms with the consociational theory and various groups in the country have got participated in the process. According to him, India had unmistakable power sharing track record during the first two decades of the independence, continuing albeit in some attenuated form after 1967. By 1990s, however, the country has returned into the full fledged consociationalism (Lijphart 1996). In a critic on Lijphart's claim, Wilkinson argued that India had been a 'non-consociational ranked state' in the initial two decades after independence, and it has become more consociational after the mid 1960s (2000). These

---

[16] See, Sujit Choudhry, "Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies," in *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?*, ed. Sujit Choudhry (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5.

[17] See, Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979): 325.

[18] See, Hanna Lerner, *Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 29-31.

two works have dealt with India at large, and, however Kerala is a constituent part of it and has all forms of divisions that India has. Horowitz considers Kerala as a deeply divided place with the presence of four competing caste-community groups (1993). According to him, the exceptional communal harmony of Kerala does not stem from the absence of conflict but with the amicable settlement by the politics of the state[19].

1.3 On Terminologies

Precise terminologies and their clear meanings are necessary for effective communication between writer and readers [20]. Terms have multiple meanings and different scholars understand them differently. In order to avoid ambiguities in communication, a short description on terminologies is in order. First, 'electoral rules' means set of implicit and explicit regulations and principles that govern the conduct and procedures of, and determine the winner of, elections. This meaning includes not only the conventional procedures of a particular electoral system, but also the omission and commission, and the amendments, by the governing body like Election Commission. It is to be noted that a slight change in the regulations and conditions of elections may have larger impact on the outcome of a democracy. For instance, if none of the above (NOTA) option is added to the ballot, a part of anti incumbency votes may be transmitted to the NOTA category instead of going to the anti-incumbents and this may altogether change the result. The rules may be in the form of determining the demography and the border of a territorial constituency; code of conduct, conditions of election campaign and financing; and declaration of the asset and reservation of seats for marginalized. Thus, the electoral rules include these all then.

By power sharing, this dissertation means a special arrangement in divided societies with which the parties reach out to a contract or informal consensus to share the control over the decision making organs like executive among various stakeholders. At initial stages, power sharing meant only consociationalism and both were used interchangeably by scholars. However, later on, it started including all political

[19] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 33-34.
[20] Arend Lijphart accepts that hardness to define and measure concepts is a valid criticism against the consociational theory. See for details, Arend Lijphart, "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy," in *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Confict Management, and Democracy*, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 46.

arrangements in which different conflicting groups of society share the decision making bodies. Whereas consociationalism explicitly refers to the power sharing institutions like a grand coalition, the centripetalism makes it implicitly by measures like federalism and autonomy of groups. However, the power sharing arrangement in different parts of the world cannot completely be clubbed to either consociation or centripetal. Thus, when we say power sharing, it includes consociationalism, centripetalism or any arrangement which provide for cooperative rule among different stakeholders. The consideration is whether different groups in the polity are included in the arrangement or not. For instance of formal power sharing, in Fiji, any political party that receives more than ten percentage of vote share is entitled to get a berth in the cabinet, though it is not, however, mandatory to accept the offer. In 1999, when a political party- Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT)- had adequate ten percentage vote share after the election, the ruling party Fiji Labor Party (FLP) under the Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudary invited the former to participate in the cabinet. But SVT put before FLP bundle of terms and conditions, which the ruling party considered as akin to a rejection of the offer, and the court upheld the constitutionality of the decision[21]. Thus, the power sharing arrangement ensures that the minority groups would also have the opportunity to share the space in the executive with the majorities[22]. This work considers a system as involving power sharing, if different groups have stakes in the decision making of the state for a considerable period, either through explicit agreement among the parties or convention or understanding among stakeholders. The method used in this dissertation to check the involvement of groups is to analyze the social composition of cabinets, which is the supreme decision making organ of the parliamentary democracies, and the portfolios held by people of various sections.

The term proportionality has wide range of meaning: it can be political, economic or social. In the political sphere itself, it may mean proportionality in legislature, bureaucracy, cabinets, appointments, police, military and other offices. This dissertation

---

[21] See, Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, "A tale of three constitutions: Ethnicity and politics in Fiji," in *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation* , ed. Sujit Choudhry (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 307-8

[22] See, Sujit Choudhry, "Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies," in *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?*, ed. Sujit Choudhry (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25.

considers the very narrow meaning of proportionality that is proportionality in the legislature because it is the most important institution where the representation of the people matter the most. Although many scholars who specialized on divided society consider proportionality as a desired good, it is the consociationalists who took it more seriously by making it as one of four cornerstones of power sharing. They even compromise other goals like accountability and relation with the electors to ensure social proportionality.

This dissertation introduces the idea of 'co-existing proportionality' in order to differentiate it from 'polarized pluralism' that Giovanni Sartori coined. According to Sartori, moderate pluralism is characterized by bipolar centripetal forces; the polarizing pluralism is with multipolar centrifugal forces[23]. Under the party list PR system, with low winning threshold the political parties with low popular support can also be represented in the house. The outcome: there would have incentives for fragmentation rather than integration of social groups, and the party system would have a decisive influence of social cleavages. Under such situation, the formation, and maintaining stability, of government becomes a difficult task[24]. Conversely, 'co-existing proportionality' means a situation in which social groups are proportionally represented in the house, nevertheless, with few polarizing effect. Although the party system is multipolar, there is no centrifugal tendency among the players; rather the situation is integrative.

First past the-post (FPTP) is an electoral system under which the candidate securing the largest number of votes is elected, and all other votes are disregarded. Under the system, there is no stipulated winning threshold, but only situational. The system is the simplest method of the electoral system available, and it is very easy to understand also. However, a large part of the votes, many often more than fifty percentages, are wasted, particularly when there are more than two candidates in the race. Thus, it is said to be disadvantages to the social minorities. FPTP is the second most popular voting method in the world after PR, and it is practiced in two houses of the USA, the British parliament, and in many former British colonies like India.

---

[23] See, Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: a Framework for Analysis* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2005), 19.

[24] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (2003): 121.

1.4 On Research Methods

There is a large number of power sharing democracies in different parts of the world and scholars in past decades have provided a rich source of information on them. This research studies only a single case which is less explored by the 'power sharing' scholars but has high significance to the theoretical explorations. The selected case for this study is the Indian state of Kerala which has shown a very distinct form of power sharing and proportionality. Kerala is considered as a power sharing democracy, under a majoritarian electoral institution, and it showed very consistent democratic performance for a considerable period of time with stability and harmony. By selecting a single case for the research, this dissertation intends to make a thorough analysis of why the phenomena discussed here is in existence. As scholars say, the single case study method would tell us why the hypothesis held whereas large-N method would tell whether it holds or not[25].

As this is a small dissertation, it has considered only a part of the larger question that is the electoral rule and its impact in divided society, while leaving substantial part for future researchers. Majority of the materials used are secondary resources as the Kerala politics is one of the highly explored cases in India. The primary resources are election campaign songs of candidates, pamphlets, vernacular writings by political leaders, and informal discussions with media persons and experts to understand how different stakeholders approach the politics in the state. The data on census and social composition of legislative assembly and cabinets have been taken from government sources, private sites and from the studies done by research centres like Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram, and *Centre for the Study of Developing Societies* (*CSDS), New Delhi.*

1.5 Structure of Thesis

This study responds to the bourgeoning literature on electoral rules in divided societies. The study argues that the working of electoral rules in divided societies can be understood only in the context of the socio-political situations of those places, and the democratic institutions would have an interactive effect with the society. In expanding

---

[25]Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science,* (New York: Cornell University Press , 1997), 57.

that argument, the dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter deals with the theoretical discussions of the study, by analysing the rich scholarly debate on electoral rules in divided societies. The chapter also considers the discussions on FPTP electoral system and how it is working in divided societies. The theoretical propositions provided in the chapter guide other two chapters. The second chapter considers the case study- the power sharing and proportionality in the state of Kerala under the FPTP electoral system. The chapter shows the divided character of Kerala society and the evidence for the existence of power sharing and proportionality in the legislative assembly. The third chapter connects the first and second chapters by looking at why a majoritarian electoral institution did not end up in majoritarianism in a divided society like Kerala, rather produced a vibrant democratic power sharing and social proportionality in the house of the people. There the present study makes the claim that the electoral institutions will have interactive effect with the society, and the same institution may have different outcomes in different social set ups. The majoritarian electoral system works effectively in Kerala because the social cleavage structure of the state provides incentives for inter-community cooperation and moderation of communal appeals. Finally, the last part discusses the major observations and conclusions of the dissertation, which have theoretical implications for electoral rules in divided societies.

Chapter 2

The Electoral Rule in Divided Society: Intellectual Conflicts, FPTP

Societies divided on ethnic or community lines, which are referred by scholars as divided societies, pose grave challenge to democracy and thus require special treatments while designing democratic institutions[1]. Scholars agree on the point that majoritarian systems, which were successful in Anglo-American societies, are fatal blow to democracy in divided societies as the majority and minority in these societies are very often conceptualized permanently. According to them, rather than solving the existing tension, democratic institutions like majoritarian electoral system may entrench the division and intensify the violence. Thus, majoritarian electoral systems like FPTP are ill advised for divided societies.

The election in divided societies has been one of the widely researched topics in the past few decades, and the works have majorly focused on Eastern Europe, Africa and South East Asia. The scholars generally rule out the possibility of majoritarian electoral systems, and argue for a particular electoral system like Proportional Representation (PR) or Average Voting (AV), for all fragile democracies as a 'one size fits all' prescription, often without giving adequate attention to socio-political nuances of the countries. Departing from this general trend, this dissertation argues that the electoral system (including majoritarian) would have interactive effect with the societies, and the same institution may produce different outcomes in different societies. This helps answer the main question of the dissertation- under which socio-political structure FPTP would work democratically in divided societies? In doing so, this chapter revisits the debate on electoral rules in divided societies, and looks how FPTP electoral system works in those places. In the following part, the scholarly debate on electoral rules is briefed first, and then analysis on working of FPTP in such society is provided. Before conclusion, the theoretical proposition of the dissertation is also provided.

---

[1] See, Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. November 2 (2004): 96-97.

2.1 The Debate

There is a consensus among the scholars who specialised on divided societies that electoral rules play vital role in the fate of democracy in those societies[2]. Even though the function of electoral rules is only to provide a method of choosing representatives in democracy, who and how would be elected are dependent upon the type of electoral system adopted. In other words, it is the rule of the game. One can understand the importance of electoral rules from the words of American political scientist Donald L. Horowitz who said 'no electoral system simply reflects voter preference or existing pattern of cleavages in a society, or the prevailing political party configuration. Every electoral system shapes and reshapes these features of the environment and each does so in different way'[3]. Another expert on fragile democracies, Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart concurs with Horowitz on the importance of electoral rules in divided societies[4]. He says, "if one wants to change the nature of a particular democracy, the electoral system is likely to be the most suitable and effective instrument for doing so[5]." However, the agreement stops here and both scholars part into two separate schools which give two divergent views on the democratic strategy and electoral rules in societies split by deep cleavages.

There is plethora of studies on the democracy and elections in divided societies and many views have been derived from those discourses. It seems that the scholars are more deeply divided than the societies they study on matters like which electoral rule would better serve the divided lands. The intellectual conflict is in such a high volt that they think others' model as entrenching violence and promoting ethnic conflicts. These discourses can broadly be clubbed into two schools- the consociationalism and the

---

[2] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management,* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 20, Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. (Nov 2 2002): 1-2, Andrew Reynold, "Constitutional Engineering in South Africa" *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 2 (1995): 86, and Timothy D . Sisk, "Chosing an Electoral System: South Africa Seeks New Ground Rules," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 1 (1993): 1.

[3] Quoted from, Donald L. Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (2003): 1.
[4] Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 1 (1991): 72.

[5] Andrew Reynolds, and Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies," in *International Conflict Resolution after Cold War*, ed. Pau Cl Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington D.C: National Acqademy Press, 2000), 425.

centripetalism, though there are prevailing differences within each school. Other works which are outside of these schools, however, revolve around these two broader trends. Even though the prime concern of this dissertation is the choice of electoral rules for divided societies, detailed discussion of debates on the conception of democracy in those societies is also provided. This would help better understanding.

2.1.1 Consociationalism

Consociationalism is one of the major theories of comparative politics in the twentieth century. Among the democratic approaches to the divided societies, consociationalism is considered as the dominant approach[6] because of the attention it has got and the adoption in various diverse societies[7]. When one says consociational theory, it refers to the ideas proposed by Dutch scholar Arend Lijphart (2008, 2002, 1995, 1991 and 1977) through his rich writings for more than forty years and by some prominent academicians who have refined and applied the theory. Of course, the discussion on electoral rules occupies an important place when we discuss the larger consociational approach. As it is a theory which got developed through different writings during the past years, there is a need to consider the gradual development of it. Thus the stages of development and changes on the course of time and, of course, the differences within the school are discussed.

Lijphart, who is considered to be the doyen of the consociationalism[8], borrowed the term 'consociational' from David Apter who used it in 1961 in a study on Uganda and it goes further back into the seventeenth century author who used the Latin term *consociatio.* It has also famously been found in Sir Arthur Lewis's monograph *Politics in West Africa* (1961)-the first modern work on consociationalism[9]. However, it is

---

[6] See, Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. Nov 2 (2002): 15

[7] For details on the works in consociational school, see Rudy B Andeveg, "Consociational Democracy," *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci* (2000): 509-536.

[8] Stein Rokkan calls him Mr. Consociation. See, Arend Lijphart, "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy," in *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Confict Management, and Democracy*, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37.

[9] See, Arend Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 3, and Brendan O'Leary, "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments" in *From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies* , ed. Sid Noel (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 3.

Lijphart who made it a popular academic term through his immense contribution into the field during the past decades. Later on various scholars have applied it in different socio-political contexts, and refined it according to the situation.

Lijphart takes up from the well known proposition in the political science that it is not easy to establish and maintain democratic institutions in plural societies. Social homogeneity and political consensus are the prerequisites of the stable democracy, while social divisions and political differences are hindrances of the democratic institutions. In order to save the divided societies from descending into chaos, there has to have an arrangement in which elites of different social segments would come to a mutual understanding to share the power and rule for the interest of all. Thus, the elite cooperation is the corner stone of consociational democracy[10].

There are four paramount principles of the consociational democracy, and each of them will be detailed below. As this dissertation is about electoral rules, it will give more attention to it. Firstly, grand coalition of political parties which represent different social groups act as a body of elites and share power among them. As per the early plans of Lijphart, this is the most important element of the consociational democracy. However, he has departed from coalition of all segments in proportional terms to some kind of jointness of social groups in executives. Brendan O'Leary further discussed different forms of consociational executives taking on the criticism against the consociationalism from different parts. In doing so, she classified consociational executives into three: complete consociational executives, concurrent consociational executives and weak consociational executives. If leaders of all social segments, with the complete support of the ethnic group, are represented in executives, it is complete consociational executive. In concurrent consociational executives, each social segment is represented and leaders of them have majority support from respective groups. When leaders of each group get only a plurality of support (not majority support) from their groups, it becomes weak consociational executive. Moreover, the executive need not, always, be represented by all

---

[10] See, Arend Lijpart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: Acomparative Exploration* (Bombay : Bombay Popular Prakashan , 1977), 1.

sections of society. This may happen because of issues like numerical irrelevance of certain groups, deliberate exclusion, and refusal to participation or threshold effect[11].

Secondly, minority veto. Even if there is grand coalition with representation from all groups, minorities may be excluded from the decision making process and majority interest may be imposed on minority. The interest of minorities, thus, can be protected only by giving them a say over the decisions of coalition. This complete guarantee of protection can be ensured by the minority veto, which in Lijphart's words 'represents negative minority rule'. However, undue use of minority veto due to lack of understanding among groups may lead to deadlock in the system. This danger is not serious as it appears because of the following reasons: the veto here is mutual veto the frequent use of which would create problems for self interest; the availability of veto, not its actual use, is the potential weapon; and each group will recognize the problem of deadlock and undue use of it[12].

Third is proportionality. This is complementary or a necessary thing to the former two aspects of consociational democracy. This prevents the unjust allocation of office and resource among groups of society on the one side, and the domination or marginalization of certain groups in the process of decision making on the other side. Lijphart suggests the necessity of the proportionality in the decision making body. In consociational democracies, decisions are not left to the mass to be decided on the basis of majority principle, but a cluster of leaders of groups which is constituted on the basis of proportionality rule take the final decisions in order to avoid any danger of mass intervention. The choice of electoral rule which is directly related to the proportionality will be discussed at the end of this section.

Last is segmental autonomy or self rule. This is an arrangement in which minority groups would have control over the areas of their reach. On all general matters, the grand coalition will take the decision and in the matters concerning minority, the decisions

---

[11] See, Brendan O'Leary, "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments" in *From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies* , ed. Sid Noel (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 12-13.

[12] See, Arend Lijpart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: Acomparative Exploration* (Bombay : Bombay Popular Prakashan , 1977), 37.

16

would be taken by them only. This may mean an existence of a separate personal law on marriage and inheritance, separate schooling and university system, and media[13]. The autonomy may take in the form of territorial authority like federalism, though the latter can be seen in non-consociational societies as well like in the United Kingdom.

The choice of electoral rule has been a very contentious and debated issue among the scholars of consociational democracy. Lijphart views electoral rules as the most important choice that constitutional writers face. According to him, for a divided society, the most crucial consideration in selecting electoral rules is the representative character of legislature, and the PR is undoubtedly the best option[14]. When we say PR system, still it refers to large variants, out of which Lijphart goes for the PR with close party list in which the people would vote for the party and the party leadership would possess the list of candidates with them. List PR with closed list, with high winning threshold, would facilitate formation of strong party system as the entry is technically restricted.

The advantages of PR in fragile democracies have been highlighted by the scholars: (i) it is the best mechanism that would ensure the minority representation in the legislature through which the confidence of the minorities can be protected; (ii) the PR further promotes the political parties to enlist more ethnically and gender diverse list before the election, for instance, in the 1994 legislative election of South Africa, the resultant national assembly was comprised of fifty two percent blacks, thirty three percent whites, eight percent Indians and seven percent coloured which were seventy three percent, fifteen percent, three percent and nine percent of the population respectively[15]; and (iii) PR avoids the vagaries of plurality in translating the vote share into seat share. Under plurality, the votes will be valued on the basis of where the vote is cast, leading to high seat-vote share variation.

---

[13] See, John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary, and Richard Simeon, "Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation," in *Constitutional Design in Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation*, ed. Sujit Chadhry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 60.

[14] See, Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. November 2 (2004):100.

[15] Andrew Reynold, "Constitutional Engineering in South Africa," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 2 (1995):89.

Fixing of threshold in the PR electoral system is a matter of dispute. High threshold would help mitigate the problem of small party formations and thus making the party system more powerful, un-fragmented and stable. There are various instances, like Turkey has ten percent threshold while the Germany has five percent. Lijphart stands for moderate PR with high threshold and moderate partisan as in the case of Germany and Sweden, not the extreme PR in which low threshold provides space for smaller parties[16]. Reynolds (1996), conversely, shows that the cost of excluding small players by high threshold far outweighs the benefit[17]. It is because the sense of inclusion and involvement of all sections of the society, irrespective of their size, is paramount important as far the new democracy is concerned. However, the danger of list PR with low threshold is that the hardliners wreck the consociational deal as the extremist parties would find it easy to form parties and win the seats[18].

The point here to be noted is that Lijphart and others advocate list PR because it would ensure more stable form of party system and thus facilitate the negotiation between different social groups. He further suggested moderate PR with closed list keeping in mind that maximum small groups be provided the seats in the legislature without weakening the party system and consociational agreement. On the other hand, McGarry and O'Leary who have worked extensively on the consociational arrangements of different parts of the world and particularly on the peace agreements of Northern Ireland suggest that party list PR that Lijphart advocated for all societies would have made the Northern Ireland peace agreement more in trouble. Region wise party list PR would have facilitated the rise of fringe element within the communities and win vote over the mainstream parties which have created and maintained the peace agreements in the country. The low threshold that the party list PR provides would enable the replacement of the moderate political parties with fringe elements which would

---

[16] See, Arend Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 169.

[17] See, Andrew Reynold, "Constitutional Engineering in South Africa" *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 2 (1995).

[18] See, John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary, and Richard Simeon, "Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation," in *Constitutional Design in Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation*, ed. Sujit Chadhry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 59.

ultimately destroy the agreement per se. Thus, they suggest PR-Single Transferable Voting (STV) electoral system. Of course, it will not have the party discipline, as the multiple candidates from the same party tend to re-track the popular attention from party to more personalized issues. But, the high threshold would ensure the party unity which would help maintain the agreement[19]. However, the question of the representation of smaller minorities is yet to be addressed by these scholars.

Like any electoral system, PRs were also subjected to wide criticism; some of them are discussed below. Guy Lardeyret (1991) attacks the PR system by pointing three important problems of it in practice- instability, executive vacancy and non-alteration of power. He then turned to the problems that the coalition governments and proliferation of political parties would create for the fragile democracies. According to him, coalition governments which have to balance the interest of many partners tend to be reluctant on taking unpopular decisions. In such coalitions, the small parties may possess undue influences because of the weakness of the main political parties[20]. Donald L Horowitz, who has been one of the ardent critics of PR, also joins with Lardeyret in criticism and argued that it has no incentive for the moderation of the behaviour of the political elites, but motives for ethnicization of politics. Like Lardeyret, he also attacked the consociational coalitions and the resultant proliferation of political parties, as producing instability and providing space for the fringe elements by weakening the mainstream political parties. The PR is a polarizing voting system that would entrench the already existing divide in the society by promoting voting on ethnic lines[21]. Scholars like Barkan (1995) criticize PR on the ground that it has a more dangerous problem as far as a new democracy like African states is concerned: that as the people are not voting the individual candidates directly, the representatives do not have accountability with the

---

[19] See, John McGarry, and Brendan O'Leary, "Introduction: Consociational Theoryan and Northern Ireland," in *The Northern Ireland Conflict* , ed. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (New York: Oxford University Press , 2004), 13-14.

[20] See, Guy Lardeyret, "The Problem with PR," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 3 (1991): 32.
[21] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States," *William & Marry Review* 49, no. 4/7 (2008): 1221.

people under PR system. The link between people and representative is necessary for such democracies in all respect[22].

2.1.2 Centripetalism

It is agreed by many scholars that the dominant approach to the democratic solution in divided societies is consociationalism[23] and the most favoured electoral system is PR. This is because of the wide application of it in different socio political set ups and the assured representativeness of maximum sections of the society. Against the trend, centripetal approach emerged as a critic to the consociationalism and proposed more of an integrationist model of power sharing formula[24]. The general problem one would find in the consociational theories is that it assumes that the cartel of elites, with their rational understanding of the cause of the deadlock, would find the panacea for all the ills that the society faces. In other words, the consociationalism presumes that leaders would be more moderate than the rank and file and will work for the larger good of the society.

The American political scientist Donald L Horowitz (2008, 2003, 1999, 1993, 1991 and 1985), who is an expert on democracy and ethnic conflict, agreed with Lijphart in the point that the divided societies need special institutional arrangements as well as modifications of constitutional designs. He again concurs with Lijphart's realism about the existence of the ethnic divisions and the optimism on the ability to contain the civil wars caused by the divisions[25]. But he is sceptical about the stability and the working of the consociational agreements without any structural incentives for the parties to be moderate and to comply with the agreement. Under the proposed model of Horowitz, the moderate behaviour is awarded and the extremism is penalized. While the consociationalism finds the majoritarian electoral rules as anathema which cannot be

---

[22] See, Joel D Barkan, "Elections in Agrarian Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. Nov-Oct (1995).

[23] Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 20

[24] McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon 2008 counts centripetalism among accomodationist appraches with consociationalism, multi culturalism and territorial plualism. For them, centripetalism is the the integrationist edge of accomodation.

[25] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy," in *The Architecture of Democracy*, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 19.

touched upon, the centripetalism does not abandon it, but modifies the system to provide incentive for cross ethnic engagement and to make the governments as platform for inter-ethnic cooperation. This is done through electoral systems which are basically majoritarian but with some kind of proportionality features, like AV[26].

The centripetalists have invested more energy in properly understanding the nature of the divided societies, ethnicity, its people and leaders. Generally in the non-divided societies like Western Europe in which ethnicity and the identities based on ascription rarely matter in politics, and in which the politics is usually about the ideological polarization, the political parties generally compete for the median voters. This competition would make them more moderate and force them to come towards the centre. In the case of the divided societies, the political parties are ethnic parties and the voters are ethnic voters and do not generally vote for the people outside their ethnic groups. The politics thus becomes a centrifugal game and the political parties exacerbate the ethnic divisions for the political gains. The result often is the terrible ethnic violence[27].

In a social situation in which the extremism would be the most attractive way for the power seeking elites, there has to have an institutional structuring which would make the moderation and inter-ethnic cooperation necessary for the success of the political parties. This approach, however, does not believe in dismantling the ethnic parties over night, but promote them to come to more moderate positions and to be dependent on voters from outside of their ethnic groups[28]. The most important incentive mechanism is through the electoral rules in which the ethnic parties are forced to create pre-electoral coalitions which would make the electoral appeals more moderate.

PR, as mentioned before, perfectly ensures the representation of the minority groups, but does not necessarily ensure their protection. For instance, in the case of Israel, the Arab minorities may be represented in the Legislature on the basis of their population

---

[26] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States," *William & Marry Review* 49, no. 4/7 (2008): 1217.
[27] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management,* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 10.
[28] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States," *William & Marry Review* 49, no. 4/7 (2008):1217.

due to the PR electoral system, but on the same reason, they are not protected. While Lijphart and the proponents of PR tell us that the PR would force the political parties to come up with more inclusive list of candidates to woo votes from all sections of the society, there is high possibility, in a divided society, for the political parties to seek votes on the ethnic basis and by which entrenching the divisions which is apparently a threat to the working of democracy and peace. Thus there is a need to go beyond the PR model electoral system. The basic aim of all centripetalists is thus to direct the system to moderation, but there are variations in the means suggested by different scholars. This would be clearer when the choice of electoral rules prescribed by different centripetal scholars are explained.

Horowitz, the frontrunner of centripetalism, tells us that no electoral system simply reflects the existing cleavages or party system in the society. Rather the electoral rules shape and reshape the voting behaviour of the people[29]. That is said; the centripetalism strongly stands for those electoral systems which promote ethnic moderation and inter-ethnic cooperation in the politics. Horowitz supports AV system. Under AV, the voters give preferences of the candidates and that candidate who gets fifty percent of the vote share wins the election. If no one receives fifty percent of the first preferences, the candidate with lowest first preferences is eliminated and his/her second preferences are distributed among the rest. This process continues till a candidate gets the fifty percent of the vote share. In another variant of AV which is called Coombs system, the candidate with highest lower preferences is eliminated, and his/her second preferences are distributed among the rest. This process continues until one gets fifty percent of the total vote share[30].

AV voting system has the ability to make the political parties more median vote seekers and moderate appealers in elections. It is because, in the elections, if the political parties are not in a position to secure the fifty percent threshold by its own votes, the only option left is to reach out to the people outside for getting second and third preferences.

---

[29] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (2003):1.

[30] See, Ibid, 10.

Meanwhile, under plurality electoral systems the political parties can be more confident than under AV to stand alone with the hope of securing plurality of votes. In such cases, the chances of seeking votes beyond the community is limited and it may even promote ethnic outbidding to ensure group consolidation. Thus AV provides more incentive than any electoral system for political parties to come up with pre- electoral coalitions with other political parties. While the consociationalism also speaks about the coalitions in the form of grand coalitions, that is referred to the post-electoral coalitions, which does not have any moderation pulse[31]. Under AV, the coalitions would be pre-electoral, which would help moderation of the electoral appeals of the political parties.

Horowitz gives two pre-electoral examples which are not consociational sort 'grand coalitions', but coalitions formed before the elections when the political parties knew about the electoral necessity to do so. First is Malaysia in which after 1950, when the Chinese were given the citizenship, the polity which had the population of 50-50 division between Malay and non-Malay, necessitated the political parties to have the support of different ethnic groups. This led to the formation of coalitions, by some members from all groups, which are not exactly a grand coalition. This necessitated each candidate to seek votes from communities other than her own. Second case is the Indian state of Kerala- the case study of this dissertation. Kerala has four major politically influential groups: Christians, Hindu Ezhavas, Muslims, and Hindu Nayars. By 1950sand 1960s, all groups exercised some amount of power sooner or later, but it became clear that no single community can rule the state alone. The two coalitions formed, United Democratic Front (UDF) and Left Democratic Front (LDF), were also not grand coalitions, but groupings having some members from all groups[32].

Matthijs Bogaards (2006) raises two important limitations of the AV and find solution for them by showing how Horowitz's idea of vote pooling be practiced in those cases. First l would explain the problems. AV and the vote pooling can work only if there is multi party system, at least more than two political parties. If there are only two political parties, it is not difficult for a political party to get the winning margin of fifty

---

[31] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems." *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 2 (April 2014): 5-6.
[32] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 33.

percent. If the parties are few in number, the higher the possibility for the parties winning without the preferential support of other communities' votes. Secondly, the AV presupposes the constituencies as heterogeneous. Otherwise the vote pooling will not work. Meanwhile, most of the divided societies will be condemned to be with proportional systems, because most of the divided societies are having the geographic concentration of ethnic groups. Then what would be the way out?

Bogaards (2006) finds solution for the second problem from Horowitz's proposition itself. He suggests constituency pooling instead of vote pooling within a particular constituency. When constituencies are homogenous because of the geographic concentration of ethnic groups, there can be an arrangement in which the pooling of votes shall take place across the constituencies not within and support of different ethnic people becomes mandatory. This system can work not only under the AV, but under any majoritarian electoral systems, even under preferential systems. Contrary to AV, what is needed is limited number of candidates so that the pooling across the constituency becomes easier[33]. This system also suffers from number of draw backs: this is a complex system as the voters have to have better understanding about the candidates from other constituencies as well. And the attention of the candidates will be scattered among people from different parts of the country. However, this system would find answer for centripetalists across the world who would find AV as impracticable in societies in which people are geographically segregated.

Another centripetalist scholar Benjamin Reilly (2011, 2006, 2004, and 2002) considers STV as an electoral system which would help vote pooling, while providing the smaller minority groups' representation. In multi member constituency under the STV elections, the count begins after determining the quota, and if anyone gets that quota immediately, she shall be elected. If no one crosses the margin at the first instance, the candidate with the lowest preference is eliminated and her second preferences are distributed among the rest. The process continues till all the seats are filled[34]. This form

---

[33] See, Matthijs Bogaards, "Electoral choices for divided societies: Multi-ethnicparties and constituency pooling in Africa," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 41, no. 3 (2003): 64.

[34] Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. (Nov 2 2002).

of electoral system would also provide the incentives for vote pooling and moderation before the election.

By designing electoral rules which centripetalists believe as the most important institutional mechanism that would shape and reshape the behaviour of the political players in divided democracy, Reilly has three goals in mind. First, the rules would provide electoral incentives for the politicians to come towards more central appeals and cooperate with people from other ethnic groups, as without the voting support of different sections of the society it would be harder to win the election. Secondly, electoral rules would necessitate the negotiation and the bargaining between different political parties. Thirdly, inter-ethnic cooperation and communication would further help the formation of multi ethnic political parties in future[35]. These are the things that Reilly meant by what centripetalism is. The electoral rule like STV would help achieve these functions. However, the model is more dangerous than AV, when any ethnic groups have numerical domination in the constituency. In such cases, the extremists within the group would get the better of moderates in appealing to the mass.

Figure 2- 1: Electoral System Prescriptions

School	Electoral System Prescription
Consociationalism	PR and STV
Centripetalism	AV and STV (which facilitate vote pooling)

2.2 FPTP and Divided Societies

According to the famous Duverger's law, *the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two party systems*. He identifies almost a kind of correlation between simple majority single ballot system and dualism: the dualist countries adopt simple majority system, and simple majority adopted countries are dualists. Though there would always have a trend of emerging a third party, it would be eliminated because of two factors

---

[35] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management,* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 192.

working together: the mechanical factor and psychological factor. The mechanical effect is this: under the simple majority system, the seat share of the third party- the weakest party- would be inferior to its vote share, and thus it would find the electoral system as mechanically unfair to it. The psychological effect is that there would be a realization among the people that their votes are wasted under the simple majority system, and thus better to transfer their votes to other parties[36].

The advantage of the FPTP is thus that it would lead to the formation of a few political parties, without party proliferation. As the parties can secure more than fifty percent of the seats with less percentage of vote shares, it would be easier for them to form government and provide the stable one party rule. More importantly, as far as the divided societies are concerned, there would be the tendency of amalgamation and aggregation of divergent interest into less number political parties[37]. This is the reason why some scholars have suggested the FPTP for fragile democracies. Let us look at Guy Lardeyret's arguments in favour of plurality electoral systems for African countries split by deep divisions. He says that an electoral system is intended to be the one which gives the citizens the power to decide who should rule and on what policy. The plurality provides the best method to choose a government that is chosen by the people and working efficiently. It would make the political parties to synthesize different views of the people, provide a coherent policy on the governance, moderate their appeal and work efficiently. The plurality would end up in the formation of more moderate political parties as the parties would compete for the undecided voters who would decide the mandate[38].

However, for societies suffering from the deep divisions, majority of scholars scarcely prescribe FPTP as electoral system and the preferred options are PR, STV and AV. There are very few agreements among the different schools on democracy in divided societies, but they all agree on the danger of the implementation of FPTP in divided

---

[36] Mauris Duverger, *Political Parties* (Lendon : Law and Brydon Printers Ltd, 1967), 216-227.

[37] See, Donald L. Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (2003): 9.

[38] See, Guy Lardeyret, "The Problem with PR," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 3 (1991): 33.

societies. Many scholars have acknowledged this agreement[39]. It is an interesting thing that many of them, for all their apparent scholarly differences, quote the Nobel laureate developmental economist Arthur Lewis who said 'the surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American system of first-past-the-post'[40]. This is because that there is the problems of translating the votes into seat share under the FPTP system. For instance, in the latest Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, a party getting 39.7 percent of the votes ended up with 77.4 percent of seats, while parties with 21.8 percent and 22.2 percent of votes got 11.75 percent and 4.75 percent of seats respectively[41]. This is because under FPTP, the number of votes matter lesser than where those votes have been polled, and it all depends upon how the party competition is. In constituency wise, the plurality becomes more dangerous when there is proliferation of parties. It is because under such cases the electoral threshold would be very low. In 1967, for instance, one Indian National Congress (INC) party member was elected to the house of people in India from the constituency of Shahjahanpur, Uttar Pradesh, only with the bare vote share of 15.67 percent. This shows how someone without adequate support of voters may get elected under the FPTP.

Now let us see how would be the picture, if FPTP is implemented in a society impaired by social divisions like caste and religion. Suppose there are three groups in a state-A, B and C which comprise fifty percent, thirty percent and twenty percent of the population respectively, and as per the general phenomena in divided societies, these groups vote for their own ethnic parties-A_1, B_1 and C_1. Under FPTP, the party A_1 would sweep the poll marginalizing B_1 and C_1. In the case of Uttar Pradesh assembly election, the similar thing happened. The party which came to power with huge margin of 312

---

[39] See, Matthijs Bogaards, "Electoral choices for divided societies: Multi-ethnicparties and constituency pooling in Africa," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 41, no. 3 (2003):60, and Andrew Reynold, "Constitutional Engineering in South Africa" *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 2 (1995): 86,

[40] Quoted in Andrew Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and Democratization in South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 93

[41] "Uttar Pradesh: Party-wise and Vote Share," Times of India, March 11, 2017.

seats out of 400 seats did not have a single member from a community which comprises 19.26 percentage of total population[42].

There are two major concerns here as far the working of democracy is concerned. First, as the parties need only a plurality support at the constituency level, the hardliners from all groups tend to use the communal outbidding and violence as a vote winning strategy against the moderates within the group. Steven I Wilkinson argues that the communal riots in India are, far from being a spontaneous eruption, well pre-planned for the pre determined electoral gains. Using the data on the Hindu-Muslim violence in India, he says that the electoral incentives at the local and administrative level enable one to determine where and when the violence against the minority would occur, and whether the police would interfere in it or not[43]. This tells us how much the communalization and electoral politics are linked in the societies riven by deep divisions. It is not unusual that the political leaders of right wing use various forms of communal rhetoric to consolidate the ethnic votes spreading the fear and anger against enemy community. Again in the recent Uttar Pradesh assembly election, the top campaigners of BJP used communal rhetoric sidelining minority groups and instigating the majority anguish: the party president Amit Shah talked about *KASAB* (Congress, Samajwadi and BSP), and the Prime Minister Narendra Modi used terms like *kabaristan-shamshan*[44]. The result: the BJP swept the poll in which the proportion of the minority in the legislative assembly touched the historic low. Secondly, the other dangerous tendency under such situation is the loss of popular legitimacy to the elected government and the system, as the votes of larger portion of the people are wasted and parties with minimal popularity rule the state. Moreover, in societies with deep cleavages in which the majority and minority are permanent, it would lead to the permanent domination and marginalization of certain groups in the power structure. This would eventually force the underrepresented groups to show their presence through illegitimate means.

---

[42] See, Alison Saldanha, "Muslim Representation in UP Assembly Plummets With 2017 Elections," The Wire, March 14, 2017.

[43] See, Steven I Wilkinson, *Votes and Vioelence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.

[44] See, "Kerala Diversion," *Editorial,* The Indian Express, October 5, 2017.

In the contexts of plurality electoral systems, there has been demands to reinterpret the voting right by requiring to redraw the constituencies in the direction of more homogeneity to help the minority groups secure the plurality and get adequate representation in the legislature. In other cases, there has been suggestion to change the rule itself like considering the cumulative vote in multi member constituencies, in which the voters could cast all of their votes for a single candidate[45].The problem of these sorts of electoral arrangements is that it is not only the minority groups that can consolidate its votes; there would be majoritarian consolidation, also, which would be more harmful as far as the security of the minority is concerned.

One of the major problems that the critics of plurality raise in divided societies is that it enables majority group to gain seats exclusively sidelining the minority from the politics. This tends to lead the minority groups to show their presence through extra legal means and most often through violence. That would eventually destroy the possibility of peaceful transition in fragile democracies. However, as mentioned above, if the minority groups are adequately represented in the legislature under plurality electoral rules due to their support bases in areas of geographic concentration, what would be the case? If the representation had been the core concern of those societies, the things would have been settled. But there is a more dangerous part to the story.

Joel Selway gives us the case of Myanmar in which the FPTP produces the proportionality at the legislature due to the geographic concentration of ethnic groups. But the proportionality alone without any adequate incentive for the moderation would not be the panacea for all the ills that the divided societies suffer[46]. Rather, the proportionality itself creates the problem as the ethnic divisions within the society are replicated in the legislature and the politics. As the support base of the political parties have separate geographic areas, it would lead to the ethnic outbidding in the politics because the extremist sections within the groups would en-cash such opportunities. This eventually would only help centrifugal tendency and 'polarized pluralism'.

---

[45] Donald L. Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (2003): 119.

[46] See, Joel Selway, "Ethnic Accommodation and Electoral Rules in Ethno-Geographically Segregated Societies: PR Outcomes Under FPTP in Myanmar Elections," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 15, no. 3 (2015): 352.

2.3 Theoretical Propositions

In the literature on the number political parties in comparative politics, there are two major approaches: institutional approach and sociological approach. The institutional approach sees the number of political parties as depending upon the institutions like electoral rules, and sociological approach views it as the result of the cleavages within the society[47]. Later on the scholars found that these two approaches are not exclusive, rather both are having an interactive effect on the number of political parties[48]. In other words, both institutions and the sociological structure would influence the individual preference in election, and the same institution will have different outcomes in different social situations[49]. Mauris Duverger, who is considered to be the front runner of institutional approach, is perhaps the first political scientist who systematically advocated that the electoral rules interact with the social situations. He told us that the electoral systems can be "compared with a brake or an accelerator". The electoral rules would only facilitate or hinder the multiplication of parties, and the real driving factors are ideologies and the socio economic structure[50].

Scholars have reminded us again of the situation of multiplication of party system under the plurality electoral system if the voters are geographically concentrated and vote as block like in India and Canada[51]. In this direction, the scholars found that if there is geographic concentration of ethnic groups, there would be social proportionality in the legislature even under the plurality electoral system (Barkan 1995; and Selway 2015).

---

[47] Octavio Amorim Neto, and Garry W Cox, "Electoral Institutions, Clavage Structure and Number of Political Parties," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 1 (1997): 149-150.

[48] See, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder, "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 6 (2006): 679-708, Benny Geys, "District Magnitude, Social Heterogeneity And Local Party System Fragmentation," *Party Politics* 12, no. 2 (2006): 281-297, and Shaheen Mozaffar, James R Scaritt, and Glen Galaich, "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 379-390.

[49] See, Peter C Ordeshook, and Olga V Shwetzova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude and Number of Political Parties," *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (1993): 100.

[50] Mauris Duverger, *Political Parties* (Lendon : Law and Brydon Printers Ltd ,1967), 205.

[51] See, Shaheen Mozaffar, James R Scaritt, and Glen Galaich, "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 380.

This is because, under single member simple plurality electoral system, the geographic concentration of ethnic minorities would help overcome the reductive effect of the electoral system in the party system, and enable the minority political parties secure plurality of supports at the constituency level. Barkan (1996), for instance, says that in Africa except in Kenya, the SMD and PR have same result in terms of distribution of seats on the vote because the people of particular region has similar political interest and vote for same political party[52]. Under such cases, the question of minorities getting underrepresented, due to the majority group's easiness to secure plurality, does not arise.

Now let us come to the electoral impacts in divided societies. The above discussion shows that we have to take the sociological situations of the deeply divided societies more seriously in order to understand the nuances of the electoral rules in those democracies[53]. The problem one would find in the existing literature is that the scholars have considered the divided societies as same across the globe and have not gone into the sociological variations[54]. Contrary to that, this dissertation argues that the impact of electoral rules has to be understood only in the sociological contexts, and the electoral rules would only be like "brake or accelerator". Having said that, here this dissertation proposes that there would be variations in the working of FPTP in different socio political situations.

As far as a divided society is concerned, the advantage of FPTP is that, as mentioned above, it tends to amalgamate and aggregate diverse interests of the society through a few numbers of political parties. This would happen only if there are adequate incentives for power seeking political elites to do so, and the electoral system alone would not provide that. It is to be borne in mind that the more effective option for the power seeking political elites in divided societies is to inflate the divisions by playing 'ethnic card' and campaigning on narrow communal lines rather than campaigning on

---

[52] See, Joel D Barkan, "Elections in Agrarian Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. Nov-Oct (1995): 5.
[53] This has been raised by many scholars before. McCulloch 2009 says "Institutions do not operate in a political vacuum; it is thus vital to have a proper understanding of the context in which they function." See for similar views Donald L. Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers." *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (2003): 12.
[54] See, Joel Selway, "Ethnic Accommodation and Electoral Rules in Ethno-Geographically Segregated Societies: PR Outcomes Under FPTP in Myanmar Elections," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 15, no. 3 (2015): 325.

issues and ideologies[55]. Under such situations, if FPTP is implemented without any structural incentives for moderation, the moderate versions of political view tends to be squashed by extremist views of the society. Thus the hypodissertation of the dissertation is "the FPTP would work effectively without challenging the ethos of democracy in divided societies, providing social proportionality and power sharing mechanism, if there are structural incentives for amalgamation and integration of different social groups". These two features of FPTP can overcome the other feature- majoritarian tendency. Such electoral incentives may arise in socio political situations like following: no single social group is in a position to capture the power alone without the support of other groups due to reasons like clear balance of social demography, intra conflicts within groups, existence of strong secular progressive mobilizations and like. It is to be noted that such sociological backgrounds necessitate the inter-ethnic cooperation, which demands moderation of ethnic appeals, and provision of adequate representations to groups.

---

[55] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 4.

Chapter 3

Social Coalition and Power Sharing in Divided Society of Kerala

This chapter considers the power sharing arrangement in divided society of Kerala that works without having any formal constitutional inscription, but with the understanding among stake holders[1]. Analyzing the Kerala politics and its evolution, it is shown that in the political history there had been number of social and political coalitions which were more or less inclusive without permanently excluding any particular social group, and this legacy continues to guide the political process in the state by two multi community political coalitions that have been ruling the state alternatively every five year after five year since 1982[2]. After that, a descriptive analysis of social divisions, their political salience, and the evolution of modern social and political organizations, which are paramount important in understanding the present day Kerala politics, are provided. It is also shown that all major religious groups have had due role in the ministries formed after state formation and there is a near proportionality of social groups in the state legislative assembly[3].

Below, after giving description about the social divisions in the state, examples of social coalitions during the colonial period, when there were only semi democratic institutions without universal adult franchise and equal rights, are detailed. The coalitions explained below are not necessarily electoral collaborations, but which are alliances with specific purpose of winning community interests within the system. This tells us that

---

[1] Lijphart discusses formal and informal power sharing arrangements. The first model is based on the written rules and the second is on the understanding among stakeholders. Among these, he supports informal power sharing like in Kerala because it is flexible and reflects the trust among leaders. According to him, formal power sharing is to be promoted only when informal forms are impossible. See, Arend Lijphart, "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy," in *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Confict Management, and Democracy*, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 54.

[2] Even before 1982, all governments, with the exception of first communist government, formed after the state formation in 1957 were coalitions of political parties. These coalitions came to a crystallized form by 1982, when UDF led by INC and LDF led by CPIM were formed.

[3] In this dissertation, the analysis of the social composition of legislative assembly and ministries is done using the religious background of people. This has not provided caste-community data, as it would require more time and work. However, the provided data on religious composition and the already existing scholarly remarks on the power sharing in Kerala would suffice for the argument of the dissertation.

there was inter-community cooperation before the introduction of democratic electoral institutions. Then next part details the political coalitions formed after the introduction of democratic institutions among different political parties which represent the interests of various communities. Before conclusion, it shows the statistics of power sharing and proportionality in the legislative assembly from 1957, the year the first democratic government sworn in united Kerala, till 2016.

3.1 The State of Kerala

Kerala is the South Western state of India having nearly 600 km Arabian Sea shorelines. Though not a sovereign country by itself, it has population of 34.8 million, much higher than those European consociational democracies like Austria, Netherland and Switzerland. Away from the politics and society of other parts of India, the Kerala has always shown distinctive features which attracted the world attention[4]. Whereas India fared poorly in social indicators like literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality and maternal mortality, the track record of Kerala has been outstanding, similar to that of advanced countries of the world[5]. Likewise, when many parts of the country went through massive communal riots in the past decades, the state of Kerala remained as an outlier without any large scale caste or communal outbreak[6].

The state of Kerala was formed in 1956 by merging Malabar district of Madras and two princely states-Cochin and Travancore. Even before that there existed an imagination of Kerala homeland among the people speaking Malayalam language as a territory consisting of a discrete culture and way of life. From the Sanskrit literatures, it is evident that from early times the land between the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea is known as Kerala. The words 'Kerala' and 'Chera' have been used by the early writers to

---

[4] See, Amartya Sen, "More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing," *New York Times,* December 20, 1990.

[5] For discussion on the social progress of the state, see MA. Ooomen, "Interpreting the development trajectory of Kerala:Raising issues and working towards a policy perspective," *Kerala Economic Conference First Annual Conference* (2015), and Richard Sandbrook, Marc Edelman, and Patrick Heller, *Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 68-73.

[6] See, Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Yale University Press, 2003), and Steven I Wilkinson, *Votes and Vioelence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

refer to the land[7]. Despite being a sub national unit, the state has kept its cultural and political distinctiveness just like a separate country that worth separate socio political analysis.

3.2 Kerala's Divisions

Kerala can be considered as a divided society as per the standard definition provided in the introduction of this dissertation. To restate the definition, the divided societies are those societies which are diverse and 'where ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organized for political purposes, such as elections'[8]. The Kerala society is diverse with the caste and religious stratifications that have been reflected in the social and political organizations of past two centuries. All the caste and community groups have more than one social organization which are very powerful interest groups in Kerala politics making and unmaking deals with political elites and sometimes forming own political parties. The fragmented party system of modern Kerala is the 'fractured politics of fractured society[9]', and each community interest in politics has clearly been reflected in the support base of political parties. This tells us that Kerala is not merely a heterogeneous society with diversity of the people, but also a divided society in which social diversity is reflected in political processes. This has presumably persuaded scholars who have worked before on Kerala to consider the state as divided society (Chiriyankandath 1993 and Horowitz 1993).

At times, Kerala was called the microcosm of India, and even of the world[10]. It has people of all major religions of the planet. Hinduism is the dominant religion with fifty five percentages of population, followed by the Islam and the Christianity with twenty six and eighteen percentage shares respectively. Besides, there is miniscule presence of people of Jewish, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism. Hindus are further classified on the basis of well stratified caste and sub-castes, and each of them considers

---

[7] See, A. Sreedhara Menon, *Political History of Modern Kerala* (Kottaym : DC Books , 2010), 21.
[8] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 4.
[9] This term is referred by a political leader of the state, when he was asked why there asw power alteration every five year in the state. According to him, the Kerala politics is fractured politics of fractured society and a government cannot survive beyond five years.
[10] See, W Klatt, "Caste, class and communism in Kerala," *Asian Affairs* 3, no. 3275-287 (1972): 275.

themselves as distinctive communities[11]. In old Kerala, caste system was present in more rigid and inhuman form. Swami Vivekananda referred to caste ridden Kerala society as 'lunatic asylum', when he visited the country. It not only practiced untouchability like any other parts of the sub-continent, but also the un-approachability, which was determined on the basis of the status in caste ladder. The name of major Hindu castes and groups within each of them are given below in a tabular form below.

Figure 3- 1: Number of Communities in Hindu Castes[12]

Hindu Castes	Number of Communities
Brahmin & Kshatriya	58
Nayar	36
Ezhuthachan etc	70
Vellalas etc	42
Vilakkithala etc	81
Vishwakarman	22
Ezhava	8
Arayas, Valan etc	239
Scheduled Caste	70
Scheduled Tribe	48

In the table, first two castes are the upper castes, which are above the line of untouchability, and were the priests and ruling classes of the traditional Kerala society.

---

[11] Other religious groups also have caste differentiation, but less politically salient as compared to Hindu religion. See for details on stratification among Kerala Muslims, P.R.G. Mathur, "Social Stratification among Muslims of Kerala," in *Frontiers of Embedded Muslim Communities in India*, ed. Vinod K. Jairath (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011), and P.C. Saidalavi, "Muslim Social Organisation and Cultural Islamisation in Malabar," *South Asian Research* 37, no. 1 (2017): 19-36. See for caste and denominational stratification among Christians in Kerala, K.C. Zachariah, "Religious Denominations of Kerala ," *Working Paper,* CDS, April 2016.

[12] The data is extracted from R. Ramakrishnan Nair, *Social Structure and Political Development in Kerala,* (Trivandrum: The Kerala Academy of Political Science, 1976), 3.

The categories from third to sixth are artisans and crafts men who contributed to the material production, and now considered as socially and educationally backward. Below that, Ezhava is the upper among the lower castes and has been one of the major communities in the state in term of the organizational and numerical strength. Scheduled castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) are people who were on the bottom of the societal order and engaged in agricultural labour.

Within each caste group, there is large number of sub castes and they all kept, at least till recently, a sort of exclusive character, commensality and untouchability. A political scientist who wrote on the caste question of Kerala politics describes a case of nineteen forty's to show the intensity of the sub caste exclusiveness: a Nayar *Karta* who married a Nayar woman from aristocratic family would not take her into his home, and when he visits her home, he would not take any food prepared by others. He would not touch the children born out of that relation and would not allow them to touch his food fearing pollution[13]. However, caste improvement associations have been more or less successful in mitigating the sub-caste divisions, while crystallizing the caste identity.

3.2.1 Community Organizations

The caste and religious divisions that existed in Kerala society were replicated in exclusive modern community organizations which were formed as response to the socio-political changes in the colonial period. The organizations which were committed to the reforming of social structure and practices catered exclusively to different communities[14]. Consequently, the social divisions were crystallized or reinstated in the modern centralized organizational formats. The community consciousness created out of the activities of social mobilizations led to the development of community networks, communal political parties, and communalization of the politics. The following part explains community organizations of different social segments which were formed in the previous century.

---

[13] See, R. Ramakrishnan Nair, *Social Structure and Political Development in Keral* (Trivandrum: The Kerala Academy of Political Science, 1976), 6.

[14] Nissim Mannathukkaren, Communalism sans violence: A Keralan Exceptionalism?, *Sikh Formations*, 2017: 223.

Numerically Ezhavas are the most powerful caste of the Hindu religion, constituting around forty percentage of its population. In Malabar they are known as Tiyyas, and Shanars in southern Travancore occupy the same social position as Ezhavas. They traditionally engaged in the profession of toddy tapping, coir making, and unskilled labour. Although majority of the community was poor, there were some rich Ezhavas also[15]. It was in the last part of nineteenth century that the Ezhava middle class, who were formed out of the economic changes in the Travancore, sensed the necessity of a caste association that would work for the upward mobility of the community[16].

Although Ezhavas were campaigners for the Malayali Memorial, which demanded the abolition of discrimination against people of Travancore in government appointments, they did not get due consideration in the movement. Dr Palpu, the relentless Ezhava fighter, submitted a long English petition to Shugarsoobyer, the prince, in 1895. The petition highlighted the point that while converts from the community were considered par with upper castes, the Ezhavas who remained part of Hindu religion are discriminated in the state. It stated that the Ezhavas have only one course to provide for their children to get job opportunities in Travancore: conversion. When there was no replay from the government, Palpu went to Trivandrum to meet Shugarsoobyer and received assurance from him that qualified Ezhavas would be considered on the merit for all jobs except revenue, and as many schools would be opened for them[17].

Again when the educated Ezhavas were not provided adequate jobs, on 3rd September 1896, a group of Ezhavas under the leadership of Dr. Palpu submitted a memorial with signature of 13176 people to Sri Mulam Tirunal on the concern. This came to be known as Ezhava memorial. It demanded the prince that the Ezhava community also had to be given schooling facilities and job opportunities, and these are

---

[15] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Keral* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 30.

[16] In the last of nineteenth century, a few Ezhavas of Travancore got benefitted from the rise in demand for coir matt among the European middle class. They collected coconut husks for the factories which were established in the region and profited from the business. However, they found their new wealth power non-conforming with the social status and they fought against it (Jeffrey 1971).

[17] See, Robin Jaffrey, *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976), 206.

denied just because of being belonging to lower caste. Dr Palpu was himself denied of medical seat and employment opportunities in Travancore, despite being ranked in the qualifying tests[18]. They contended that their religion is the problem as the people who converted to Christianity get all the rights.

There were considerable success in mobilizing Ezhavas for the cause of fighting for share in the public resource and social dignity. The movement had created community consciousness and a sense of rights among the Ezhavas. More significantly, the community began attracting attention from the power centres of the government. However, these were restricted to the upper strata of the community and it could not reach the social majority lower sections[19].

Dr Palpu could not make dent into common Ezhava minds with his initial focus on civil rights movements and public protests. It was perhaps because of the fact that the appeals of Ezhava mobilizations actually were in congruence with the interests of affluent sections. Shortly after Dr. Palpu took job in Mysore, Swami Vivekananda paid visit to Kerala. Palpu seems to have read and known about Vivekananda, and his teachings showed way for Ezhava movements[20]. Palpu presented his problem before Swami that after long attempt the Ezhavas could not be brought under an umbrella. Mr. Swami advised him then to centre the movement to a spiritual leader and India could rise and fall only on religion[21].

Palpu, who was modern educated and western dressed medical doctor working in a distant state Mysore, at the end found a spiritual leadership in Sri Narayana Guru who went on to become the undisputed leader of Ezhava community and the greatest reformer of the state and who is reverently called as the father of renaissance in Kerala. It was Guru who helped Ezhavas build the largest caste organization of Travancore. In 1902, ten members of Ezhava community met at Aruvipuram and found Sri Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam (SNDP). The main objective of the organization was to encourage

---

[18] See, Tomy Joseph, "Empowerment of Dalits and Role of Dalit Movements in Kerala: A Study of Kottayam District" (PhD Thesis, Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2010), 66.
[19] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 54.
[20] See, Robin Jaffrey, *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976), 208
[21] Ibid 54

spiritual and secular education, and to nurture civilized culture among people of the community[22]. SNDP soon became an organization for all Ezhavas uniting them into Karayogams (village groups) for founding schools and reforming temples and religious practices[23].

SNDP today is the voice of Ezhava community in Kerala, and play important roles in society and politics. There are now 102 unions under the central leadership of the Yogam, and units have been opened in major Indian cities like New Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai and Kolkata, and in foreign countries like the USA, the UK, Oman and the UAE. The Yogam had annual budget of 800 million rupees in the year 2016, with the largest expenditure on education. There is a separate trust under SNDP, called SN Trust, which runs around fifty educational institutions including renowned colleges of Kerala[24]. It also controls large number of temples, which practice Hindu religious rituals in the reformed manner.

SNDP also had political party experiments in Kerala. Soon after NSS formed National Democratic Party (NDP) as a Nayar party in1974, SNDP promulgated its political outfit, Socialist Republican Party (SRP) in 1976. The party aligned with Congress and Muslim League against the Left alliance in 1979, but miserably failed in the wake of the Left sweep. Though this was the fatal blow to the political ambition of SNDP, it continued to play the role of religious pressure group in the state[25]. Again in 2015, SNDP revamped the old political spirit to capitalize the popularity of Hindu nationalism among the Hindu mass and to fill the alliance vacancy in National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Kerala chapter. The SNDP declared its new political outfit, Bharat Dharma Jana Sena (BDJS), and became officially part of Kerala NDA [26]. However, SNDP continues its activities as an autonomous organization, and the political outfit is yet to show any impact in the state politics.

---

[22] See, Ibid, 210.

[23] See, P.M. Mammen, *Communalism vs communism : a study of the socio-religious communities and political parties in Kerala, 1892-1970* (Culcutta: Minerva , 1981), 53.

[24] See, *Sree Narayana. com.* http://sreenarayana.com/SNDP_Unions.html (accessed April 13, 2018)

[25] See for details on SDP, *The SNDP - NSS Political Experiment of 1980s,* https://sdqali.in/blog/2014/02/09/the-sndp---nss-political-experiment-of-1980s/ (accessed June 15, 2018)

[26] "Kerala Ezhava Leader Vellappally Natesan Launches Political Party," NDTV, December 05, 2015.

Nayars and NSS

Nayars are better off upper caste group, counted as one of the dominant community in the Kerala politics. The Malayali Memorial, the first modern political mobilization of Kerala, was initiated and organized by the Nayars of Travancore. Belonging to upper strata of the caste system, Nayars played vital role in the state administration in, and occupied important official positions of, Travancore kingdom, but later succumbed to decline due to changed socio political atmosphere and internal decay. There was a wide spread feeling among Nayars that their early domination has faded and unless organized on community line, they could not compete with other communities. In 1914, under the leadership of Mannathu Pathnabhan Pillai, the Nayar Service Society (NSS) was registered[27]. It was precisely a reaction to the organizational attempts of Ezhavas and Christians who had done larger achievements in the field of education, schooling and medical facilities, posing challenges to the traditional *Kalari* leadership of Nayar community.

NSS has been a major community organization that played pivotal role directly and indirectly in Kerala politics since its formation. The doyen of NSS Mannam directly interfered in politics before and after the state formation, and was the most important leader of the Vimojana Samaram (Liberation Struggle), which toppled the first communist government in 1959[28]. It was Mannam who suggested the name 'Kerala Congress', when the Christian and Nayar groups within Congress came out to form separate political party.

NSS also had attempted floating own political party in 1974, called National Democratic Party (NDP), challenging the community based reservation and demanding class based affirmative action[29]. Although the party had MLAs and ministers in 1980s, it disappeared in the wake of internal factionalism. However, NSS is still an important communal pressure group in the Kerala polity. It runs large number of educational and social service institutions inside and outside the state.

---

[27] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 56.
[28] See, ibid, 149.
[29] See, Sreedhar Pilla, "National Democratic Party suffers major split on eve of crucial by-polls in Kerala," India Today, May 15, 1984.

Mannam is the undisputed leader of the Nayars, and still considered as the source of inspiration for Nayar associations across the world. He once declared that his god and goddess is NSS. Inspired from the efforts of Mannam and his colleagues, the Nayars today have organizations across the world, and one can see NSS committees in the UK, the USA, the UAE, Oman, New Delhi, Kolkata, and Mumbai etc. In 2010, Global Nayar Service Society was formed as a network organization of all Nayar organizations in different parts of the world[30].

Christian Organizations

Among communities of Kerala, Christians were the first to show communal solidarity and joint action. They already had network of believers in Churches which were under the guidance of well trained priests. However, like any community in the state Christians were also divided on multiple lines like caste, denominations, and class. Among the Christian castes, the dominant group is the Syrian Christians who wielded political and social power for long period in the state on account of their numeric and economic strength.

The first formal organizational attempt among Christian community was made in the form of *Nazrani Jathakiya Sangam* much before the Malayali memorial. In its formation, it was written as,

> "Christians, as a result of the division, have not only become weak like a disjointed body, but also they lack in education, civil consciousness and sirkar jobs resulting in inadequate social development. In all these they could have progressed if only they were united. Therefore, to eradicate this serious drawback many great men who love their community resolved to form an organization called Nazrani Jathyaika Sangham. All MarThoma Nazranis may be included in it[31]."

The objective of the *Sangham* was to uplift the Christian community which was backward in education and social status at the time vis-à-vis upper castes, and to provide a common platform for all Christians in the region. One remarkable activity in the direction of awakening the community was the establishment of the first Malayalam news

---

[30] See, "Global Nair Service Society launches global organisation," Zee News, October 17, 2010.
[31] Quoted in Roy Varghese,"Secularism and the Politics of Religious Minorities in Kerala with Special Reference to the Christian Community" (PhD Thesis, Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2008), 269.

paper Nazrani Deepika by Fr. Emmanuel Nidhiry, who was a renowned Christian priest and a social thinker. The title, *Nazrani*, itself shows the community aspect of the news paper and it is still the practice in Kerala that a news paper is known with the community of its owner, like Nayar news paper and Christian news paper[32]. The most popular Malayalam news paper of the day Malayala Manorama, which was established by a Jacobite Christian-Mammen Mappila, was also one initiation in the same fashion. Nevertheless, these news papers, though represented the interest of certain communities, voiced for the rights and justice of lower and backward sections of the society like Ezhavas and untouchables[33].

The Keraliya Catholic Mahajana Sabah (KCMS), which was formed by Nidirikal Kathanar and others in 1918, accelerated the activities started by the *Nazrani Jathaykiya Sangham*. The KCMS, which was also known as Catholic Mahajana Sabah, was later renamed into All Kerala Catholic Congress (AKCC). Though it was essentially a grouping of Roman Catholics, it undertook the welfare of all Christians in Travancore and later in entire Kerala. Unlike organizations of other communities, the work of AKCC was not to look after schools and colleges: there already had well nit church system in which a priest would take care of all community activities each locality. Thus the Christian organizations played the role of coordinating the activities of Churches in different parts of the state.

The Church had always had the record of owning the largest number of educational and healthcare institutions in Kerala before and after the independence. As Churches made the largest private investment in education and related activities, any attempt by governments before and after independence to interfere in the affairs of educational institutions and their ownerships were fiercely fought by the Christian organizations[34]. Their involvement in the Kerala pressure group politics was also more or less related to the policy formations of governments in education and allied activities. The Christian organizations in the past decades have directly and indirectly interfered in the politics of the state. Besides AKCC, there are denomination wise organizations like

---

[32] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 60.
[33] See, Roy Varghese, "Secularism and the Politics of Religious Minorities in Kerala with Special Reference to the Christian Community" (PhD Thesis Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2008), 270.
[34] See, Ibid, 463.

Kerala Latin Catholic Association (KLCA), which also play important role as pressure group. They are active in deal making with political parties during elections.

Muslims and Community Organizations

The Muslims are highly concentrated in Malabar province of North Kerala. Like Christians, they also had a well nit informal network in every locality in the form of mosque committees which were guided by traditionally trained spiritual mentors. The social majority traditional Muslims followed spiritual groupings of believers called *tariqats* under the guidance of spiritual guides in different names. Thus the community consciousness among Muslims had been inculcated much early and this was crystallised during the seventeenth and eighteenth century through anti-colonial struggles. Four persons are important in the development of a Mappila or Muslim consciousness in the state: Umar Qazi of Veliankode, Sayyid Alawi Tangal and Sayyid Fazal Pookooya Tangal of Mamburam, and Sayyid Sana-Ulla-Makti Tangal[35].

Umar Qazi was born in 1757 and got trained in traditional Islamic education from Ponnani under Mammi Kutti Qazi. He was not only a religious scholar, but also one who intensively fought against the foreign dominations. His call for tax boycott earned him reputation and he is still considered as a hero among the Mappilas. Sayyid Alawi and Sayyid Fasal were Arabs who came for the propagation of Islam in Kerala. They were also equally disturbed by the presence of colonial powers in the country. They actively worked on purifying the Muslim folks, majority of who were lower caste converts, from the old Hindu practices and subordination to upper castes. While maintaining a good relation with people of other faith in the region by employing many Hindus in his works, Sayyid Alawi advised the lower caste converts to stop calling the upper caste Nayars with honorific you (with plural). Sana-Ulla's activities focused on reforming the traditional Muslims and promoting education among the Muslim girls. He vehemently countered the Christian missionary missions in Kerala by arguments and debates[36]. The activities of these leaders and the movements like Mappila rebellion and *kilafath* organizationhelped create strong sense of community among the Muslims of Malabar.

---

[35] See, K.N. Panikkar, *Against lord and state : religion and peasant uprisings in Malabar, 1836-1921* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 60.
[36] See, ibid, 61-2

Unlike other communities, Mappila identity was nurtured mainly in Malabar province vis-à-vis colonial government and the upper caste *Jenmis*. The Malabar rebellion, which was the culmination of a long battle between the upper caste *Janmis* supported by the colonial administration and the rack rented Malabar peasants, gave many lessons to the Mappila Muslims. They were made aware of the weakness of the community both in the field of education and politics. They realized that lack of political unity is the cause for being educationally backward. The condition of Muslims had been deteriorated in the wake of confrontation with the British who later selectively targeted and discriminated against the community[37].

A new generation of Mappila youth was born in last part of nineteenth century and they led the later Mappila socio-political formations[38]. The rebellion awakened the Muslims to such an extent that there were spurt of organizations among them just after 1921 incident. On the religious side, Muslim *Aykya Sangam* (United Muslim), Kerala Nadwatul Mujahid and Samasta Kerala Jamiathul Ulema were formed. Of these, former two were more politically powerful, and latter was numerically powerful. However, all organizations later went on to play major roles in the social and educational level. At the political side, a group under O. Abdurahman Sahib, an alumni of Jamia Millia Islamia, joined the nationalist side of Indian National Congress, and another section under Seethi Sahib and B. Pocker formed All India Muslim League (AIML) Malabar unit. After the partition, the AIML continued as Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), which went on to play vital role in Kerala politics[39]. Meanwhile, Muslim religious organizations like *Samasta* continued to play the role of pressure group in the state.

Other Community Groupings

Once the community organization was formed by one community, all others emulated it. By the second decade of twentieth century, almost all communities in the state took to organizational forms and each group had more than one social organization always. Among communities, the Dalits and Nambutiris were relatively less successful in

---

[37] See, Roy Varghese, "Secularism and the Politics of Religious Minorities in Kerala with Special Reference to the Christian Community" (PhD Thesis Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2008), 317.

[38] See, LRS Lakshmi, *The Malabar Muslims: A Different Perspective* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 135.

[39] The detail on IUML is provided in a section below.

organizing communally for reforms and protection of rights. This was perhaps because of two evident reasons: existence of large number of sub-groups within the category; and lack of numeric strength.

Among Dalits, there were many attempts at organizing the community, and important among them were: Sadhu Jana Paripalana Sangham (SJPS) founded by Ayyankali in 1907; Prathyaksha Raksha Daiva Sabha (PRDS) by Poikayil Yohannan in 1909; and Travancore Cheramar Mahajana Sabha (TCMS) by Pampady John Joseph in 1921[40]. Ayyankali (1863-1941) is considered as the torch bearer of lower caste movements in the state. Though Pulaya by caste, he worked for, and inspired, all Dalit groups in Kerala, and Sri Narayana Guru and his Ezhava movements greatly influenced him. One of his major initiatives in this direction was fighting for opening up the road for lower castes who were denied for them according to the traditional believe. In 1893, he broke this tradition by travelling on a bullock cart in a public road in his village Vengannoor with a group of young members from lower caste. This created large uproar among the upper caste people.

Ayyankali, who was condemned to be an illiterate due to the social stigmas and exclusion, worked hard for the education and schooling rights of lower castes. He on the one side took representation to government on the rights of Pulayas for schooling, and on the other side organized the agricultural workers at the grass root level. At the organizational level, Ayyankali with his colleagues Thomas Vadhyar and Haris Vadhyar established SJPS for both Hindu and Christian lower castes. The SJPS worked for the unity and welfare of all lower caste groups, though it later came to be seen as a Pulaya organization.

Nambutiris, the Brahmins of Kerala, were very late to enter into the reform and community organizational fray. When all communities initiated the process of modernization, Nambutiris were initially reluctant to enter it[41]. Though Nambudiris were the dominant section in Kerala society by tradition, they had seen writing on the wall by the advent of modernism and the social changes. This prompted a group of Nambutiris to

---

[40] See, Tomy Joseph, "Empowerment of Dalits and Role of Dalit Movements in Kerala: A Study of Kottayam District" (PhD Thesis Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2010), 78.
[41] See, Francois Houtart, and Genevieve Lemercinier, "Socio-Religious Movements in Kerala: A Reaction to the Capitalist Mode of Production Part II," *Social Scientist* : 26.

form organizations and to reform the community like how happened in all other caste and religious groups. In 1908, a group of Nambutiris came fore to form Yogakshema Sabah as an organization for uplifting the community which they found as losing relevance with the coming of English education. When the Yogakshema Sabah met its fourth annual meeting in Kollam, its president Subramannia Potti, who was the first graduate among the Nambutiris in Kerala, said that decade before he became graduate the inferior castes like Nayars and Ezhavas produced BA holders. That session emphasized on the importance of English education in the new age[42].

EMS Nambutirippad, who went on to become the first Chief Minister of united Kerala, belonged to Nambutiri caste. He was actively involved in the Nambutiri reform movements with people like VT Bhattathirippad. EMS once conducted an all Kerala *yatra* called *Yajana Yatra* to collect money for the educational expenditure of poor in the community. He was of the view that once the education is provided, the poor would take off from there. The Nambutiri community showed their numerical strength through the Velinery Nambutiri Congress. A young section among the Nambutiris under the headship of EMS and Bhattathirippad turned to form a radical Nambutiri organization called *Yuvajana Sangam* (Youth Organization) on 4 August, 1928. The enlightened youth criticized the conservatives through dailies of *Pashupatam* and *Unninambootiri*. However, these all formations helped form a caste and community consciousness among Nambutiris to an extent[43]. The following table provides rough details about the party base of dominant caste-religious communities.

Figure 3- 2: Party Base of Dominant Communities[44]

Communities	Party Base
Christians	Predominantly Kerala Congress and Congress. Some presence in CPIM and others

---

[42] See, P Leela Moni, "E.M.S. Namboodiripad and Social Changes in Kerala"(PhD Thesis Tirunelveli: Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, 2012), 252.

[43] See, ibid, 253

[44] These patterns are not permanent, and there can be changes in elections after elections. See for details on the changing pattern of voting, J Prabhash, and KM Sajjad Ibrahim, "Changing Voting Behaviourin Kerala Elections," *Economic & Political Weakly* LII, no. 5 (February 2017): 64-68.

Ezhavas	Predominantly CPIM
	Some presence in Congress, BJP and others
Nayars	Predominantly Congress
	Some presence in CPIM, BJP and others
Muslims	Predominantly Muslim League
	Some presence in CPIM, Congress and others

3.2.2 Political Parties

The social fragmentation and caste-community stratification have reflected in the party system of Kerala. The extreme political fragmentation of the state is perhaps the reflection of social division of the state[45]. All major communities in the state have a party base, and all major political parties have a community base[46]. The radical politics further created divisions in each community on class basis checking the growth of communal organizations in the society to a large extent. The communists, revolutionary parties and socialists have attracted the people from all stripes of the society, and made a plank in community groupings. However, political parties are either communitarian with exclusive community support base or parties with numerical domination of particular community or communities. Moreover, political parties hold negotiations with community organizations before elections, and governments consult them when the community related issues arise. The following part lists out major political parties of the state and their community bases.

Indian National Congress (INC)

The origin of INC traces back to the first political mobilization of Travancore-Malayali Memorial, which was a multi-community initiation under the headship of Nayars, with the support of Christians and Ezhavas. Second landmark development in this direction was the Joint Political Congress (JPC) which was the joint formation of three communities- Christians, Ezhavas and Muslims- and which is considered as the

---

[45] See for details, Nissim Mannathukkaren, Communalism sans violence: A Keralan Exceptionalism? *Sikh Formations* (2017): 223.

[46] See, G. Gopa Kumar, "Chnging Dimention of Coalition Politics in Kerala," in *India: Selected Issues at the Centre and the State*, ed. E. Sreedharan (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2014).

predecessor of INC in Kerala. As a common platform of non-ruling communities of the Travancore, JPC demanded the proportionate share of public resources and employment for all communities. Nayars were added to the group when Pattom Thananu Pillai joined in the formation of Travancore Congress which was a grand coalition of all communities.

INC in Kerala had a very different trajectory as compared with other Indian states because it was only in Malabar, the British ruled district of the Madras presidency, that the party followed the anti-colonial nationalist politics. The politics in other two regions, the Cochin and the Travancore, was always dominated by social questions. It played the role of a common platform for the communitarian leaders of different sections who took the party merely for a ride. As a party devoid of any solid ideological commitment other vague anti-colonial nationalism, any person or community could join INC, without abandoning commitment to other organizations. Eventually, in a state in which the politics revolved around caste and community equations, INC became the vehicle for community leaders and platform for multi-community negotiations.

INC has never permanently been dominated by any social group, except in Malabar where Nayars kept the party under control for long period of time. However, Christians and Nayars outnumber not only in the rank and file but also in formal organizational positions; and upper class Ezhavas and modicum of Muslims remained in the party as marginal players. In class wise, the upper classes in all communities are generally the constituency of the party.

Communist Party

Whereas INC was the direct result of community mobilization of the twentieth century, the communist party was a by-product of this tradition. In other words, the social reform movements created two antagonistic traditions in Kerala political landscape: one more reactionary communitarian and the other more radical revolutionary. Robin Jaffrey argues, in tracing the root of communism in the state, that Kerala shared a common characteristic with China and Vietnam: 'social disintegration on a scale unequal

elsewhere in India'[47]. The matrilineal family system and the old model caste systems were fading with the socio-economic changes in the Kerala society, and the communism replaced the ideological vacuum for many young radicals.

Malabar was the stronghold of the communist party in colonial period, during which it worked within INC as a separate block as Congress Socialist Party (CSP) and often drifted from the dictum of high command at the centre. INC in Kerala was dominated by the socialists, and when there were sever differences between the centre and state committee, the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC) was dissolved by the central leadership. The socialists then declared their open affiliation with the communist party. The party after that went on to become the largest political party of Kerala, winning the very first election after the state formation, in which all political parties, with the exception of ML and PSP, competed without alliances. Although the electoral success of communists in 1957 was the success of class politics, many scholars have attributed it to the caste-community compromises that the party had done during the election sidelining the radical politics[48]. It is a known fact that the CPI secretary of the time, Govinda Menon, used his early contacts with NSS in ensuring the Nayar support for the party. Importantly, the communist party just as INC had taken care of the caste and community profiles of candidates in preparing the list[49].

In the electoral politics, the communist party has several times compromised with the communal political players, and as some scholars observed, now it is almost a social democrat embarrassing the idea of class conciliation[50]. Community wise, the party always has attracted disproportionately higher number of Ezhavas and lower castes, with some support of Nayars, other upper castes, Christians and Muslims. It is often felt that

---

[47] See, Robin Jeffrey, "Matriliny, Marxism, and the Birth of the Communist Party in Kerala, 1930-1940," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 38, no. 1 (1978): 77-78.

[48] See for literature review on the victory of communist party in 1957, R. Ramakrishnan Nair, *How communists came to power in Kerala* (Trivandrum: Kerala Academy of Political Science, 1965).

[49] See, E. J Thomas, *Coalition Game Politics in Kerala* (New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1985), 20.

[50] Heller 2003 considers CPIM as a social democrat like European social democratic parties. Williams 2008 does not agree with Heller and counters him by arguing that the transformation of party in 1980-90s is transformation from hegemony to counter hegemony. See for details, Patrick Heller, "Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lesson from India." *World Politics*, no. 52 (2000): 500, and Michelle William, *The Roots of Participatory Democracy Democratic Communists in South Africa and Kerala, India.* New York: Palgrave Macmillian , 2008, 38.

the party has sidelined the classical class politics of the communism and adapted to the community equations of the state[51]. One of such occasion was in 1967 when the Communist Party of India (Marxist) gave political legitimacy to the Muslim League, which had been the untouchable communal in Kerala politics, by giving it the first ministerial position in independent India. This was actually the compromise that the party did to come out of the crisis of 1964 split in the Indian communist party. However, after that the IUML has aligned with all major political parties of the state and played vital role in the Kerala politics.

A brief analysis of CPM's tactic on Muslim community would help understand the engagement of the party with minority communities, which has always been a Himalayan task for it. In elections, the party had aligned with hardliner Muslim communal political parties like Indian National League (INL), People Democratic Party (PDP), and Jamat-e-Islami to contain the moderate IUML. These parties allege IUML as less community sensitive in issues of anti-Muslim riots, Hindu nationalism, and Muslim minority questions. For instance, INL broke away from IUML, alleging the latter as silent on INC's involvement in the Baberi demolition. Thus, it is an irony that the radical political party like CPM makes electoral arrangement with extremist political parties to defeat more moderate Muslim League. This pattern of compromise with community organizations like NSS, SNDP and minority community organizations made the CPM weaker in tackling the question of burgeoning strength of communal parties in the state.

Muslim League

The Muslims of Kerala got community consciousness through the anti-colonial, anti-landlord rebellions of poor Mappila peasants from 1836 to1921. The long time local uprisings culminated in an organized pan-Malabar rebellion against the British administration and the malevolent Hindu landlords, and finally it was brutally suppressed by the British administration. The experience of rebellion and the colonial oppression of

---

[51] See, Victor M Fic, *Kerala, Yenan of India: Rise of Communist Power, 1937-1969* (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications Ltd , 1970), 5-7.

militancy had been a nightmare for Mappilas for long period of time[52]. Betrayed by the Congress leadership, which selectively helped the Hindus in post-riot rehabilitations and relief activities, Mappilas realized the importance of Muslim political formations. Leaders like K.M Seethi made early attempts for organizing Muslims in the forms of Muslim club and Majlis in 1920-30s. As a culmination of various efforts in these directions, the Malabar chapter of the All India Muslim League (AIML) was formed in 1935 as the platform for all Muslims in the region. Although there was a parallel tradition of nationalist Muslims in Malabar, like other parts of India, under the headship of Mr. O. Abdurahman, the alumni of Jamia Millia Islamia, the League secured the overwhelming support base among Muslims in elections after elections before and after independence[53].

After the partition, AIML was also partitioned into two- Pakistan Muslim League and Indian Muslim League in a meeting held in Karachi on 14 December, 1947 under the chair of Mohammed Ali Jinnah. In the meeting, after a voting, Madras Muslim Leader Kayide Millat Ismail Sahib was elected as the convener of the Indian Muslim League[54]. After the tragic event of partition, however, the party became merely of Kerala Muslims as coreligionists in other parts of India abandoned it in the new political atmosphere. Indeed, the League has been successful in Kerala from the vantage point of elevating Muslims as one of the dominant political communities in the state today from a very marginal position in early times. The League had electoral alliances with all mainstream political parties of the state and took part in governments both at the centre and state with very significant portfolios. In the fiercely competed multi-party democracy of Kerala, the League often played the role of 'king maker', and even of 'trouble shooter', of coalitions[55]. While in power, it occupied significant portfolios like industry, education, public works, home affairs, and local self governments. The strategy of the party is

---

[52] See, Robin Jeffrey, *Politics, Women and Well-Being: How Kerala became 'a Model'*(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 113.

[53] See, for details on the voting pattern of Mappilas, Robin Jeffrey, *Politics, Women and Well-Being: How Kerala became 'a Model'*(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 114-117.

[54] See, M.C Vadakara, *Muslim League Swathandraindiayil* (Kozhikode: Indian Union Muslim League Kerala State Committee, 2015), 31-33.

[55] The League very often plays the role of 'Mr. Solver' in the UDF alliance. For instance, in a very recent controversial decision in UDF to give Rajya Sabah seat to Kerala Congress (Mani), it is believed that the League supremo Kunjalikkutty proposed and supported the KCM demands and even the high command of INC was convinced with that. See, "Rajya Sabha seat: Now, IUML leader Kunhalikutty champions Kerala Congress(M)'s cause," *New Indian Express,* June 7, 2018,

communalism in stealth than in hype, and it transacts the deals in the coalitional arrangements with any political party of the state.

Kerala Congress

In 1960s, the community factional politics within the Congress reached its nadir, when Ezhavas communitarian leader R. Shankar made attempt to attract his community people, who were the vote base of communist party, into the party fold. Alarmed by the increased Ezhava ascendancy, a section of Nayars and Christians drifted away from the party to form a separate political front against the Congress. With the blessings of Nayar-Christian patriarchs, the Kerala Congress was born in 1960, and it was Mannath Padnabhan, the Nayar stalwart, to suggest the name for the new party. However, the party later on became the exclusive Christian political party with the minimal presence of people of other communities for name sake.

Split and merger is the common feature of the Kerala Congress parties. If one counts, there have been at least fifteen split and merger of Kerala Congress parties after its formation in 1960s. As of now, there are Kerala Congress parties in all three alliances, and KC (M) has come back to UDF after trying negotiations with other fronts. These parties are known with having mutualistic relationship with Christian organizations, and claim to represent the farming community of central Kerala, which are predominantly rich Syrian Christians. The Kerala Congress parties have been successful in translating the Christian numerical strength into political strength by capturing important offices and portfolios in both coalitions.

Other Political Parties

Other than the political parties mentioned above, there is large number of parties with influential numbers in certain parts of the state. The most important among them is the Communist Party of India (CPI), which has now 19 members of assembly (MLA) and four ministers in the state. As the party rarely comes in the discourses of the community politics, this work has not given a separate part on it. The other political parties are these: Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); socialist parties like Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Janata Dal (S), Socialist Janata, Congress (S) and Nationalist

Congress Party (NCP); Kerala Congress parties like KC (J), KC (B) and KC (Secular); and Muslim League parties like Indian National League (INL). These all parties take the benefit of the vulnerability of dominant political parties. The following table gives a rough picture of the community base of four major parties in the state.

Figure 3- 3: Community Base of Political Parties[56]

Political Parties	Community Base
Communist Party of India (Marxist)- CPIM	Predominantly Ezhavas, SC and ST Some Nayars, Muslims and Christians
Indian National Congress (INC)	Predominantly Nayars and Christians Some Ezhavas and Muslims
Indian Union Muslim League (IUML)	Muslims
Kerala Congress (Mani)	Christians

3.3 Social Coalitions in Colonial Time

The first sign of modern social mobilization of Travancore was the formation of community organizations which catered exclusively to various caste-religious groups. The region scarcely had any social or political formation that attracted people of all stripes of society under single unified popular leadership. In the social improvement struggles of colonial period, the enlightened elites turned to their primordial caste and religious groupings perhaps because other forms of organizations were not available[57]. However, these community organizations and communitarian leaders did not work in isolation; there were great deal of cooperation as well as competition among them. Ever

---

[56] There have been changes in the community bases of political parties like INC and CPM, while bases of IUML and KC are static. See for changing community base of parties, J Prabhash, and KM Sajjad Ibrahim, "Changing Voting Behaviourin Kerala Elections," *Economic & Political Weekly* LII, no. 5 (February 2017): 64-68. The scholars have identified the community base of political parties. See for instance, James Chiriyankandath, "'Unity in diversity'? Coalition politics in India (with special reference to Kerala)," *Democratization* 4, no. 4 (1997): 16-39, and Steven I Wilkinson, *Votes and Vioelence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 181.

[57] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 48-49.

since social movements started, there were issue based transactional alliances, without any permanent commitments, between two or more communities. Although the alliances were more of a kind of tactic to make pressure on authorities to respond to a particular demand, the social coalitional pattern was followed in almost all occasions as an inevitable factor. Important social coalitions in the pre-independence Kerala are detailed below.

Malayali Memorial

Between the top two caste groups, the Brahmins and the Nayars, there was huge hassle in the Travancore palace politics. The Brahmins, who occupied the top rank positions in Travancore, were confident of sustaining their hegemony[58]. The tension was exposed by the writing of a young Nayar, called G. Parameshwaran Pillai, in a Madras newspaper, *the Standard*. Mr. Pillai was a Trivandrum Nayar who was expelled from Maharajas College for writing anonymously against the Brahmin rulers in *Cochin Argus*. He was graduated from Presidency College at the age of 24, and during his life time he contributed to the Madras newspapers[59]. Mr. Pillai organized Nayars for fighting against the foreign Brahmin domination in the administration. The title of writing -'Travancore for Travancoreans'- which was one from his series of writings against the foreign Brahmins, became the slogan of Travancore political mobilizations in 1891[60]. He wrote, "The denial to the Travancoreans of a fair share in the government of their country and their systematic exclusion from the higher grades of the service…"[61]

Malayali memorial was the outcome of this tension in Travancore. It was basically a Nayar initiated project, but supported and signed by almost all sections of the society. The plan for the memorial is believed to have grown in a meeting of some young Nayars in Madras who came for competitive exams and higher education. They included Parameshwaran Pillai, C. V. Raman Pillai, and N. Raman Pillai. The authorship of the

---

[58] See, Robin Jaffrey, *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976), 157.
[59] See, ibid, 159-60
[60] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 49.
[61] The passage is quoted in George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 50.

memorial is disputed[62], but it was Raman Pillai who took the draft to Travancore and submitted to the Maharaja in 1891[63].

This is considered as the first political awakening in Travancore. The meetings were held in different parts of the state like Parur, Kottayam, Aleppey, Quilon, Trivandrum and Nagercoil, and the people cried foul of the foreign domination in the state[64]. The memorial was supported by Ezhava section, under the leadership of Dr. Palpu, and Christian community. People from Nayars, Ezhava, Christian, Nambutiri, and other Hindus caste communities signed in the memorial, and it was submitted as from all the Malayalis of the Travancore[65]. The point to be noted here is that while a sub-national identity like Malayali was celebrated throughout the movement[66], people signed in the memorial first as Nayar, Ezhava and Christian, and the Travancorean identity came next only[67]. Indeed, this movement initiated the political trend of Malayali community groups to come under a common platform for common cause without losing the primordial identity.

As far as Ezhavas were concerned, their causes were dealt in the Malayali memorial rather in passing. Dr. Palpu undertook the work to submit a memorial for the Ezhavas demanding opening up of education and employment for them. Ezhavas got provoked with the derogatory replay of administration that 'Chovas (taboo on Ezhavas) have got enough' when asked for rights. The memorial asked for the same rights enjoyed by their counterpart in Malabar, Tiyyas[68]. This was supported by different communities like Nayars and was signed by 13,176 people. It was G. P Pillai, a Nayar, who was

---

[62] According to P. K.K Menon, it was written by Mr. K. P Shankara Menon of Madras Bar, and Parameshwara Pillai and Dr. Palpu played major role in it.

[63] See, Robin Jaffrey, *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976), 166.

[64] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 50.

[65] See, Robin Jaffrey, *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976), 166-67.

[66] See, Prerna Singh, *How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India* (New York: Cambridge University Press , 2015), 8.

[67] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 51.

[68] See, Francois Houtart and Genevieve Lemercinier,"Socio-Religious Movements in Kerala: A Reaction to the Capitalist Mode of Production: Part One," *Social Scientist* (1978): 12.

assigned by Palpu to speak the Ezhava cause in the British parliament and the former spoke about the issue in Indian National Social Conference, held in 1895[69].

Interestingly, the Malayali memorial was countered by a section of Tamil Brahmins with the support of people from almost all communities. This was also in a sense a counter social coalition of different sections. The counter memorial was led by E. Ramier and R. Rmanatha Rao, who were *vakils* of the High Court. They also brought up with their own statistics disproving the claims of the memorialists and argued that the government job could be provided only on the basis of merit, not on caste. They got the support of the Muslim merchants, who were neglected by the memorialists, London Missionary converts of Tamil speakers, some section of Syrian Christians, Nambutiris, Vellalas and a few Nayars. While the memorial faction's meeting in Quilon was presided over by the priest of Marthoma Church, Mar Thomas Athanasius, the counter memorials conducted their event in Muslim centre in Aleppy under the chair of Mar Gregorious, a Jacobite bishop. In some areas, the counter memorialists could make use of the local rivalry and got Nayar for support[70].

Civic Rights League (CRL)

Between 1910 and 1920, social movements frequently referred to the caste and community names. There were attempts by groups like Kuravas, Pulayas, Latin Catholics and Nambutiris to unite on the caste line, and they also conducted meetings and protests. However, none of them were as successful as SNDP, which was then working on the patronage from P. Rajagopalajari, with whom Kumaran Ashan[71] kept a good relation. During this time, the Catholics also rose up for the civil and political rights[72]. In Travancore, the non-Hindu and *avarna* Hindu communities were denied of the government jobs in *Devaswam* adminstration, which could only be done by the upper caste Hindus, and in the revenue administration, which was not delinked from the former. Because of the purity-pollution norms, the lower castes and non-Hindus were deprived of

---

[69] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 53-54.
[70] See, Robin Jaffrey, *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976), 172-73.
[71] Kumaran Ashan was great poet and one of the founding leaders of the SNDP.
[72] See, Robin Jaffrey, *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976), 257.

jobs in the revenue sector too[73]. This prompted the un-represented and under-represented communities to form the Civil Rights League (CRL). This was organized by the Roman Catholics, but with the active participation of Ezhavas and Muslims making it a 'Triple Alliance'[74].

Whereas the Malayali memorial was a grouping of non-Brahmins against the foreign Brahmins under the headship of Nayar leaders, the CRL was a fight against the domination of Nayars in the administration, under the Christian leadership. It demanded the recognition of rights for all sections of the society irrespective of the caste and community, and the delinking of *Dewaswam* and revenue administrations so that non-*savarnas* shall also take part in the government jobs. The Malayala Manorama newspaper wrote on the issue: "Governments in Europe much stronger than the Travancore *Darbar* have not been able to withstand or oppose the insistent demand of the people for freedom or equality of civic rights. Nothing contrary to that can happen in Travancore"[75]

CRL clearly portrayed the multi-community character by the presence and participation of majorly three communities, Christians, Muslims, and lower caste Hindu Ezhavas. In a meeting held at Kottayam, E.J John, the leader of CRL contended that it is unjust to deny jobs for certain groups on the basis of social and religious consideration. T. K Madhavan, one of the best ever leaders of SNDP and then its president[76], gave full support for the movement. As George Mathew observes, this was 'secular in substance and communal in form'[77]. After the long and fierce struggle by the leaguers, the Maharaja declared the division of administration into *Dewaswam* and revenue on April 21, 1922.

Vaikom Satyagraha

In Vaikom, a village in Travancore which became a nationally important hotspot after the *satyagraha* against untouchability, various caste groups within Hindus got

---

[73] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 70.
[74] See, Varghese Roy"Secularism and the Politics of Religious Minorities in Kerala with Special Reference to the Christian Community" (PhD Thesis Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2008), 273-4.
[75] Quoted in ibid, 274.
[76] When he took the leadership of the association, SNDP had only five thousand members and it rose to eighty thousands when he died in 1930. See, See, Robin Jeffrey, *Politics, Women and Well-Being: How Kerala became 'a Model'*(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 108.
[77] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 72.

united. As it was a Hindu religious concern, the participation from other religious groups was meagre, but the Christian congress leader V. M George was invited to lead the struggle after all leaders were arrested. However, this was more of an alliance among different Hindu castes against the orthodox Hindus.

At a Congress session in Kakanad, a resolution was passed, with the initiative of Ezhava leader T.K Madhavan, to take proper action against untouchability. K Kelappan Nayar, T.K Madhavan, V. Shankaran Nambutirippad and K. Velayudha Menon were assigned to take actions within the Congress party. They had taken this propaganda into Travancore by touring in different parts of the state, and formed an Anti-Untouchability Committee in every village[78]. It was on 28 February 1924 that the party took the movement into a small village called Vaikom, where there was a temple that, like any other temple in Travancore, denied access to the lower castes. The irony was that while the non-Hindus like Christians and Muslims were allowed to use public roads near the temple, the Hindu lower castes like Ezhavas and untouchables were not allowed to[79]. This provoked reformers to fight against.

Whereas the temple authority and the orthodox group among upper castes opposed the movement with tooth and nail, a large reformist section among upper castes participated in it. It was the NSS patriarch Mannath Pathmanabhan who led the *savarna jadha* in support of the *satyagraha* from Vaikom to Trivandrum. For SNDP under T.K Madhavan, the *satyagraha* was a struggle for the social emancipation; for NSS and other reformers, there were their own interest to serve. For Mr. Mannam, by championing the cause of lower castes against the Brahmins, it was necessary to acquire a cult of a reformer to organize Nayars on the ascriptive line[80]. Moreover, Nayars also had issues with the traditional norms in temple rituals and practices, and Mannam had himself done away some of them. Likewise, unification of Hindu religion like Christians, who were becoming dominant in the state, was also an intention of Mr. Mannam[81]. Anyhow, the

---

[78] See, P.K.K Menon, *The History of Freedom Movement in Kerala Vol II* (Trivandrum: Govt. of Kerala, 1970), 116.

[79] See, ibid, 117

[80] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 64.

[81] See, ibid, 64

satyagraha brought SNDP, NSS and other Hindu reformers into a single platform against the orthodox sections within the Hindu religion.

Joint Political Congress and the Demand for Proportionality

The decade 1930-40 is apparently one of the paramount important decades in the political history of Kerala. Not only there emerged a triple alliance for the political inclusion of three major excluded communities of the state, but also the proportional representation among the communities became a commonly accepted demand in the politics. The Joint Political Congress (JPC), which was also known as 'the abstention movement', was triple alliance of Christians, Ezhavas and Muslims against the domination of Nayars in the legislative assembly and public services. Than ever before, this movement invoked the community identity of Travancoreans and brought up an alliance in a modern political struggle. As P. K. K Menon says, the backward communities rose to question the customs and started demanding the fundamental rights of representation as a sign of change in the social conception of values and the growth of democracy in the state[82].

The sudden provocation for the emergence of a powerful political formation with the active participation of three major communities was the new legislative reform, which did not bring any change in the old Nayar domination and the under representation of backward groups. Even though the legislation increased the size of Assembly, the Nayar dominance was untouched as there was no change in the eligibility criteria for a voter which was land tax payment of five rupees[83]. The challengers were more dissatisfied with the fact that while the land tax payers who contributed merely 17.6 percentage of the total revenue were given undue preference in the franchise, the excise and custom which was pursued by Christians, Ezhavas and Muslims contributing 34.7 percentage of revenue were ignored[84]. In a sense, the protesters did not question the property as the qualification for the right to vote, but they only wanted to extend that beyond the land ownership. This

---

[82] See, P.K.K Menon, *The History of Freedom Movement in Kerala Vol II* (Trivandrum: Govt. of Kerala, 1970), 348

[83] See, Robin Jaffrey, *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976), 259.

[84] See, P.K.K Menon, *The History of Freedom Movement in Kerala Vol II* (Trivandrum: Govt. of Kerala, 1970), 341.

unrest among the unrepresented communities led to the formation of JPC in 1933 as a coalition of Christians, Ezhavas and Muslims founding stone of the community coalition in the Kerala politics.

The JPC demanded proportional representation of communities in the legislature and public service, and the opening up of temples for the lower castes. For speaking in a meeting of the conference, chaired by the Christian leader George Joseph, the Ezhava leader C. Keshavan was arrested. This incident provoked the people for more intensive protest and finally government had to agree with the proportionality in the assembly and the public service[85]. As a success for the movement, which affected the normalcy of Travancore, the government brought up amendment to the franchise by extending it to all those who pay tax more than one rupee. The provision was made to give eight seats in the Legislative assembly and two seats in the Council by election for Ezhavas; and three seats each for the Muslims and Latin Christians in the assembly by means of reservation[86].

Travancore State Congress: a Grand Coalition

Social coalition of different communities for political or social demands had never been new to Travancore, as seen in the cases before. But the Travancore State Congress (TSC) can be considered as a novel initiative in this direction as a forum for all communities to compete and cooperate for the communitarian interests, though non-communal demands were there also in its agendas. When the purpose of JPC was almost served, it got weakened and demanded for a new formation[87]. At this point, the new organization, that is TSC, was formed with the effort of people from Christian, Nayar and Ezhava communities. It was on 23 February 1938 that TSC was formed with the objective of fighting for responsible government, adult franchise, and minority protection. This political consciousness for democratic government was, however, nurtured by the effort of communitarian leaders who were willing to reach the centre of

---

[85] See, P.M. Mammen, *Communalism vs communism : a study of the socio-religious communities and political parties in Kerala, 1892-1970* (Culcutta: Minerva , 1981), 57.

[86] See, P.K.K Menon, *The History of Freedom Movement in Kerala Vol II* (Trivandrum: Govt. of Kerala, 1970), 372.

[87] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 97.

political power in the state. Pattom Thanu Pillai, Paravoor T. K Narayanan Pillai, R. Gopalan Pillai, V. Achutha Menon and M. R Madhavan Warrier from Nayar community; T. M Varghis, K. T Thomas, E. John Philipose and A. J John from Christian community; and C. Keshavan and V. K Velayudhan from Ezhava community were part of the foundation of TSC[88].

However, as a strategy to obtain favour from the Maharaja, community organizations, particularly NSS, kept aloof from TSC in the initial stages. Mr. Mannam condemned TCS as the Syrian Christian Congress and ridiculed the Nayar leaders who joined it as handle of Mr. Varghese's axe. He even considered those TCS Nayars as the enemies of the community. Later, the same person joined TCS when it became an influential political party after independence. Mr. Mannam turned upside down by becoming one of the stringent opponents of Diwan, fighting for the cause of responsible government in Travancore, and even declaring himself as a covert to State Congress[89].

What one has to understand from activities of Travancore community leaders like Mannam is that ideology less matter for them, the pragmatism of winning more for the community is the mantra of their politics. This pragmatism later on became the organizational underpin of all community fronts and confessional political parties in post colonial Kerala. In Kerala politics, in General, and Congress party, in particular, communitarian political leaders followed the principle of 'the whole is the sum of its parts; when the each community would progress the state would progress'[90]. TSC became a grand coalition of communities in every sense when communitarian leaders of NSS and SNDP formally joined it. Henceforth, the party ruled Travancore for a decade (1937-47)[91]. The following table provides various movements, their demands and the communities involved in them.

---

[88] See, P.M. Mammen, *Communalism vs communism : a study of the socio-religious communities and political parties in Kerala, 1892-1970* (Culcutta: Minerva , 1981), 60.
[89] See, George Mathew, *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989), 101-102.
[90] Ibid 100
[91] See, Roy Varghese,"Secularism and the Politics of Religious Minorities in Kerala with Special Reference to the Christian Community"(PhD Thesis Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2008), 283.

Figure 3- 4: Social Coalitions, their Demands and Components in Colonial Time

Social Movements	Demand	Communities Involved
Malayali memorial	Travancore for Travancoreans (Government Jobs)	Nayars, Christians and Ezhavas
Civil Rights League	Extension of Government jobs for non-upper castes	Christians, Ezhavas and Muslims
Vaikom Satyagraha	Against untouchability and for opening public road for lower castes	Hindu organizations like SNDP and NSS with support of INC
Joint Political Congress	Extension of franchise and proportional representation for communities	Christians, Ezhavas and Muslims
Travancore State Congress	Responsible government, adult franchise, and minority protection	Christians, Ezhavas, Muslims, Nayars and others

3.4 Power Sharing and Proportionality in United Kerala

This part shows the existence of power sharing mechanism in Kerala politics after the formation of the state in 1957. Social composition of ministries and the state legislative assembly after 1957 are analyzed to see whether there is involvement of various communities in them. Then with the help of data, it is argued that there exists a power sharing arrangement and near proportionality in the Kerala politics after the state formation, perhaps as a legacy of the colonial time social coalitions.

Power sharing institutions of Kerala are not formally engineered by the constitution designers, like in many consociational or centripetal democracies, but emerged out of the social reality of state. The realization of political actors-that an extremely fragmented society cannot survive without the cooperation of all major groups and moderation of communal appeals-produced multi-community coalitions accommodating members from all social groups. Thus it is not a surprise that there has never been a government in the state after the formation without representatives from all four major communities, viz. Christians, Ezhavas, Nayars and Muslims. The other less numerical groups like Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) were also given ministerial berth generally. Even the class based political parties, which claim to

supersede all communal pressures, also consider the ethnic profile of individuals while choosing for the offices, to balance communal equations. In other words, the balance of social representation in the ministries and the legislative assembly, which is going to be shown below, are not the accidental contingencies, but the desperate manipulation by political elites to balance the community equation of the state.

First, it shows the data on the participation of various communities in cabinets, which is considered to be the most powerful institution of parliamentary democracies. The inclusion and exclusion in cabinets would tell us whether people of different communities had say in the top decision making organ of the state and if individuals of any community face hindrances of community identity. This dissertation can only show the data of religious groups, not the castes within them, as it would require deeper analysis which is out of the scope of this dissertation. There are studies which show the proportional representation among four major caste-religious communities in the state[92], and this study is only a confirmation to that with the evidence of data.

The analysis, this work made on religious background of ministers in Kerala from 1957 to 2018, shows that there were sixty percentages Hindus, twenty two percentages Christians and eighteen percentages Muslims. Although there is slight under representation of Muslims as per the new census data, this is perhaps because of the fact that Muslims were 17.1 percentages of the population in 1957, and there has been a surge in their birth rate in past decades. And the UDF coalitions have, however, considered Muslim's newly acquired population strength and increased their berth in cabinets in proportion to their population share. For instance, in the last UDF government, there were thirty percentages of Muslims in the cabinet.

In the analysis of portfolios of ministers from different communities, there is no visible difference between the type of portfolios held by ministers of minority and majority communities. Whereas Muslim ministers, say, in other Indian states are generally allocated with less significance portfolios like minority affairs, *Haj* pilgrim and others, their co-religionists in Kerala hold departments like industry, public work,

---

[92] E.J Thomas, *Coalition Game Politics in Kerala* (New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1985), 52.

education, local self governments, and even home ministry[93]. As far as Christians are concerned, they also handle important ministries whichever government is in power, and there were two Christian chief ministers in Kerala history. In this sense, the religious identity, which is the primary cleavage of Indian society, does not inhibit individuals of any community in Kerala from occupying any cabinet position.

Secondly, the analysis of social composition of the state legislative assembly also shows the near proportionality of communities, and this proportionality has become more close by 2011 and 2016 assembly elections. The scholars have identified this special case of proportionality under the majoritarian FPTP electoral system, and coined terms like 'imaginary proportionality'. The table below (page number: 67-figure 3-5) shows the religious composition of Kerala legislative assembly from 1957 to 2016.

According to the table, initially, the Hindu religion had relative over representation in the house, and on the course of time, there have been a secular decline in the share to reach into a share proportionate to its population. In the present assembly, the share is fifty six percentages, mere one percentage more than its population. The Christian community, though minority in terms of the population shares, has never been under-represented in the house, perhaps because of the internal cohesion and the political organization of the community. Although there were slight over representation in some occasions, the representation today is almost proportionate to its share in the demography. As far as Muslims are concerned, they had under-representation in initial years, perhaps because they were the late entrant into the communal politics of the state. However, on the course of time, they have converged with other communities and increased the share in the house. Though there is slight over representation of the Hindus and Christians, they are not any commendable difference like in other states of India, where minorities are extremely under represented. The good part is that the proportionality of the legislative assembly has been becoming closer with the increase in the representation of Muslims recently to reach in proportion to their demography.

---

[93] Wilkinson says in 1990, the Muslim ministers in Kerala held portfolios which had 60 percentage of the budget allocation (2004, 183).

3.5 Conclusion

At the social level, there are caste and community divisions in the state of Kerala, and this has been formalized in the form of modern community organizations which have been key role players in socio political history of the state. Fragmentation of the society has been reflected in the fragmentation of party system, but social divisions have not been replicated in latter. Other than community divisions, the class and nationalist consciousness have also been invoked in the society and formed into distinct political parties. Although the social division is well crystallized in the form of pan Kerala community organizations and confessional political parties, this has never inhibited the formation social and political coalitions. In colonial time, the social coalition was in the form of joint protest movements like Malayali Memorial and Joint Political Congress, and in the post colonial time that is in the multi community political coalitions. The post independent political coalitions were never in the form of coalition between social organizations, but between people from those groups, ensuring descriptive representation of various sections in the house of the people. By this, Kerala provides an epitome of power sharing and social proportionality in divided society.

Figure 3- 5: Religious Profile of Kerala Legislature

Religion		1957	1960	1967	1970	1977	1980	1987	1991	1996	2006	2011	2016
Hindu	No .of MLAs	86	70	86	77	82	83	86	79	71	80	77	79
	% of MLAs	68	56	65	58	59	59	61	56	51	57	55	56
	% pop- ulation	61	61	61	61	59	59	58	57	57	56	55	55
Muslim	No .of MLAs	12	19	21	15	24	28	24	29	26	26	36	33
	% of MLAs	10	15	16	11	17	20	17	21	19	19	26	24
	% pop- ulation	18	18	18	18	20	20	21	23	23	24	27	27
Christian	No .of MLAs	25	25	23	32	34	28	30	32	34	34	27	28
	% of MLAs	20	20	17	24	24	20	21	23	24	24	19	20
	% pop- ulation	21	21	21	21	21	21	20	19	19	19	18	18

Proportionality and Power Sharing in Kerala: the Interactive Effect of Electoral System with the Socio-Political Structure

In Kerala, in spite of socio-political fragmentation, FPTP created bipolar competition between two multi-community coalitions that are inclusive in character and less distinguishable now in terms of community participation and policies[1]. The outcome: power sharing arrangement and proportionality among major communities under the majoritarian electoral system. The present work argues that this is the result of interactive effect of electoral institution with the socio-political structure: the majoritarian electoral system has a bipolar tendency of aggregating votes behind two dominant parties; and the Kerala socio-political structure provides incentives for inter-community cooperation and moderation.

Communalism does exist in Kerala[2], like any other Indian sub-national unit, and the trouble often breaks into open violence as well[3]. There have been several attempts to consolidate people on antagonistic communal identities before and after the independence[4]. But Kerala becomes different in the fact that violence has been in the margin[5], controlled both by the administrative machineries (Wilkinson 2004) and the civil societies (Varshney 2003). In terms of incidents of communal and caste violence, Kerala remains as a peaceful state. Communal harmony, inter-community cooperation in politics, and co-existing proportionality of the legislature are not essentially the result of

---

[1] UDF keeps more proportionality of portfolio distributions while in power, and LDF however manages the distribution though not in exact proportion.

[2] See, Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Yale University Press, 2003), 125-126.

[3] In an incident in Marad, the sea shore of Kozhikode, nine people were killed in a communal riot. This however did not break into a larger violence because of the timely intervention of government and civil society.

[4] The Nayar stalwart Mannam had done several attempts to consolidate Hindus on religious line. In 1950, he declared scrapping of the surname 'Pillai' from his name as a gesture of being more Hindu, and he did try meeting with Hindu nationalists elsewhere in the country like Hindu Mahasabha (Jeffrey1992, 102-105).

[5] See, Nissim Mannathukkaren, Communalism sans violence: A Keralan Exceptionalism? *Sikh Formations* (2017): 226.

absence of communalism[6], but because of the realization of social structure and moderation by political parties.

The pre-electoral alliances and moderation of communal politics are the realism of political elites as a safe mechanism to secure power. Political parties realized that unless there is cooperation of people from all communities, there cannot have stable government in the state. Whenever there was attempt to communally dominate the politics, it has ended up in the coalition of others and the subsequent fall of government. Realizing this fact, all governments since 1957 have included people from four dominant communities into the cabinet[7], and political parties reached into a consensus, not agreement, that multi-community coalition is the only panacea for the fractured Kerala society, without which no political formation can sustain the regime. Below, it is explained why political players behave moderately and why inter-community coalitions become the realism for ruling the state.

4.1 Why to Moderate?

There are primarily two factors that necessitate the moderation of community appeals of political elites in the state: cross cutting associations in the form of secular groupings and class based parties, that check the communal polarization attempts by hardliners; and coalition induced moderation of political players as a mechanism to become more coalitionable to maximize votes and opportunities (moderation thesis).

4.1.2 Cross Cutting Associations

In divided societies, identities become more fluid, when other cleavages are added to the ascriptive ones[8]. Kerala has large numbers of such non ethnic associations and groupings that help interactions among people of different communities and mitigate

---

[6]Scholars have differentiated the communalism of Kerala and the communalism of other parts of the country. Varshney says, communalism of Kerala is closer to North American communalism, that is the regard for own community not the hatred for the other (Varshney2003). For detailed discussion of the difference, see Nissim Mannathukkaren, Communalism sans violence: A Keralan Exceptionalism? *Sikh Formations* (2017).

[7] See, James Chiriyankandath, "'Unity in diversity'? Coalition politics in India (with special reference to Kerala)," *Democratization* 4, no. 4 (1997): 30.

[8] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 193.

communal hostilities[9]. It is generally observed, Keralites have 'irresistible inclination to combine, associate, and organize[10],' and there is large number of associations working in different fields. As per the information provided by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in 2015, there are thirty one lakh Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) in India- one NGO for every 400 Indians- and Kerala has 3.7 lack NGOs- one NGO for every ninety four Keralites[11]. Students, traders, potters, workers, peasants, drivers, government employees, art and sport lovers, meat merchants etc are all organized, and many of them have district and local committees. To illustrate, Kerala Vyapara Vyavasayi Ekopana Samiti (Kerala Trade and Industrial United Body) which is claimed to be the largest traders' network in the world, has committees in all fourteen districts and 4000 local units, and 1400 Vyapar Bhavans in different parts of the state[12]. Vyapara Samiti is the sole traders' association in the state, and traders irrespective of community and caste join and work together in it. The Samiti is only one among plethora of non communal associations in Kerala in which people from various communities take active participation.

The associative life of Keralites provides them a space for interacting with people of all sections of the society. Varhsney, in his study on communal riots in India comparing Calicut and Aligarh, two cities from Kerala and Uttar Pradesh respectively, says,

> "Much like Tocqueville's America, Calicut (an important city of Kerala) is a place of "joiners." Associations of all kinds—business, labour, professional, social, theatre, film, sports, art, reading—abound. From the ubiquitous trade associations to Lions and Rotary Clubs, reading clubs, the head-loaders' association, the rickshaw-pullers' association, and even something like an art-lovers' association—citizens of Calicut excel in joining clubs and associations. Religiously based organizations exist, as they do in Aligarh; what is distinctive is the extent of inter-religious interaction in nondenominational organizations".

---

[9] Kerala has the highest rate of unionization among Indian states (Sandbrook, Edelman, and Heller 2007, 71).

[10] See, Patrick Heller, Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lesson from India, *World Politics*, no. 52 (2000): 497.

[11] See, "India has 31 lakh NGOs, more than double the number of schools." The Indian Express, August 1, 2015.

[12] The detail on Vyapara Samiti is taken from its website. From villages to towns, the Vyaparis are powerful pressure groups with very structured organizational forms.

This is in a sense the co-existence of exclusive community organizations and the inclusive secular non-ethnic associations. These organizations take community as a reality and consider the social profile of the people in allocating office positions, realizing the necessity of cooperation and joint efforts. For instance, in 1996, in 11 of 24 trade unions registered at Calicut, there were Muslim, Hindu and Christian office holders: if the secretary was from one community, the president was from other community[13].

The development of radical and secular political parties furthered the inter-community interactions and weakened the domination of community groupings. In a society riven by deep sense of community and caste identities, the role of radical political parties was primarily in two ways: first, they were instrumental in instilling radical spirit into the political landscape of Kerala, which was solely based on ascriptive identity politics till at least initial decades of twentieth century; and second, they politicized the class exploitation on which the reform movements were silent. Social reform movements by major caste and community organizations attacked the social hierarchy between castes without touching the socio-economic base[14], and the communists started from where the former stopped[15]. Victor M. Fic says that the Congress communists started their activities by introducing Marxism into members of community groupings and created a future leadership from those organizations[16]. The radicalized section of the early reform movements went on to constitute the rank and leadership of class parties, while the conservative reactionary section continued with community organizations[17].

---

[13] See for details, See, Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Yale University Press, 2003), 127.

[14] See, Patrick Heller, Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lesson from India, *World Politics*, no. 52 (2000): 505.

[15] The party has also carried on with the caste reform activities in more organized manner. See for details, Robin Jaffrey *Politics, Women and Well-Being: How Kerala became 'a Model'.* Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992, 126-127.

[16] See for details, Victor M Fic, *Kerala, Yenan of India: Rise of Communist Power, 1937-1969* (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications Ltd ,1970), 17.

[17] See, T.M Thomas Isac and P.K Michael Tharakan, *Sree Narayana Movement in Travancore 1888-1939,* Working Report , Trivandrum: Centre for Developemnt Studies.

Second most important function of left parties was creation of class consciousness among poor labours and peasantry, irrespective of community[18]. The communist activists attracted the mass by directing dramas with themes of Marxism on the plight of peasantry and working class, and took 'Marx to the countryside'[19]. The class appeals created cross community solidarity of lower class from all sections of the society. Nossiter says that in 1960s mid elections, the communist candidates fared better in areas where lower class Ezhavas and Scheduled Castes (SC) increasingly inhabited, while attracting votes of lower class Muslims and Christians even amid intensive communalization[20]. This is just like what Reilly observed in Fiji elections of 1987 and 1999 in which the emergence of class consciousness among poorer indigenous Fijians combined with other non-ethnic issues enabled development of cross cutting politics and overcoming ethnic issues[21].

The class grouping has always been an avenue for people of all stripes of society to work together. See, for instance, the earliest communist struggle in Kerala, the Kayyur riot, which was an anti-colonial and anti-feudal movement in content, was peopled by peasants and rural proletariat of North Malabar, both Muslims and Hindus. As one Historian writes, the organizing of peasants was quite difficult task during the colonial time, as they belonged to different caste and religious groups[22]. However, the peasant struggle of Kayyur attracted all section, and out of four martyrs, three were Hindus and one was Mappila. P.C Joshi shares his experience with the Kayyur heroes in the jail,

> "When it came to Abu Baker, I did not feel like letting his hand go. I thought of
> the great Moplahs and their heroic past. They had contributed one out of the four martyrs.
> And there are Hindu patriots who doubt the patriotic bona fides of our Muslim brothers.

---

[18] For detailed discussion on the class mobilization and mass politics of communist party in Kerala, Michelle William, *The Roots of Participatory Democracy Democratic Communists in South Africa and Kerala, India* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian , 2008), 35-62.

[19] The communist ideologue Damodaran directed two dramas, 'arrears of rent' and 'drinking blood', on the question of peasantry and labours respectively. See, for details, Victor M Fic, *Kerala, Yenan of India: Rise of Communist Power, 1937-1969* (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications Ltd ,1970), 18.

[20] See for details, T.J Nossiter, *Communism in Kerala: A Study in Political Adaptation* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 127-34.

[21] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 126.

[22] See, K.K.N. Kurup, "Peasantry and the Anti-Imperialist Struggles in Kerala,"*Social Scientist,* 16, no. 9 (1988): 37.

As I tarried, he went on repeating "Lal Salam, Comrade!" He had a very finely chiselled face and patriotic fervour glowed in his eyes[23]".

The point to be noted that while the brutal oppression of Mappila rebellion by the colonial state and the formation of Muslim League by the upper class Muslims disdained the south Malabar (and Mappilas) of any major agrarian mobilizations[24], Mappilas like Abu Backer joined with the class movements. The same was true of the famous Punnapra-Vayalar revolt in the Alleppy of Travancore. The communist party took pride in 1940s as a party of cross cutting supports in various caste and religion than any political party in India and the revolt grew out in this backdrop[25]. This sort of class consciousness beyond the community barriers helped containing the communal polarization in the society to a great extent. The trend still continues that there are considerable sections of Christians, Muslims and Hindus in communist and other secular political parties, despite these groups have well nit communitarian organizations and confessional political parties like Kerala Congress and Muslim League. This prevents the confessional parties from claiming the sole agency on representing community.

The Indian National Congress, though not a non-ethnic, has also been a multi-community party, with members from all social groups, and no group ever had permanent hegemony in the party affairs. There were also radical socialists in Congress questioning the reactionary views of leaders. Some have argued that the Youth Congress of late 1960s were as radical as communists of 1930s, opposing communalism, corruption and communal compromises[26]. A. K Antony, Vayalar Ravi and V. M Sudeeran were some among those young Turks. It is not uncommon that even today there are Congress party leaders with track record of no-compromising attitude with communalism and corruptions.

---

[23]P.C. Joshi, "The Kayyur Heroes," *Labour Monthly*, August, 1943.

[24] See, K.K.N. Kurup, "Peasantry and the Anti-Imperialist Struggles in Kerala"*Social Scientist,* 16, no. 9 (1988): 36.

[25] See, Robin Jeffrey, "India's Working Class Revolt: Punnapra-Vayalar and the Communist "Conspiracy" of 1946," *Indian Economic Social History Review* (1981): 106-107.

[26] See for details, T.J Nossiter, *Communism in Kerala: A Study in Political Adaptation* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 325.

True, caste and religious community organizations are well rooted in the state, and they play tremendous role in the socio-political process also. Political parties and governments consider the demands of community organizations, even sacrificing the party ideologies. But there are limitations for community associations also; they are only one among plethora of associations, and they have to consider the inter-woven associational and civic interactions of Keralites cutting across the community affiliations. It is to be added here that no community organization or political party has ever been able to secure the complete support of any community they claim to represent, and it is not uncommon that large section of people vote in elections against the dictum of their community patriarchs. To illustrate, majority of Ezhavas vote for the left even when SNDP leadership advises them to vote for other parties. Thus the realism for community organizations and political leaders is to behave rationally to maximize the benefit.

4.1.2 Moderation Inclusion

The moderation thesis argues that the electoral logic persuades political leaders to come to the centre of ideas, in order to maximize the vote. Jaffrelot lists out four reasons why the extreme political parties ceases their rigid ideologies and transform into a more moderate politics: first, once it agreed to contest in the democratic or semi-democratic election, it virtually accepted the system; second, to maximize the vote, it has to reach out to voters beyond the core constituency; third, if radical political parties wish to secure power and lack majority by themselves, they are forced to align with parties that do not share their ideas; fourth, the ideological parties transform themselves from niche to mass parties[27].

There have been twenty one ministries in Kerala since its formation in 1957. All of them, except the first communist ministry, were coalition governments in which parties of different ideologies and community bases took part. All parties had to come to the centre, and in a sense, there were only differences of the degree of secularism and compromises with communal issues among political parties of the state. Ironically, it was the communist party, which claims the highest secular purity in the state, to give Indian

---

[27] See, Christophe Jaffrelot, "Refining the moderation thesis: Two religious parties and Indian democracy: the Jana Sangh and the BJP between Hindutva radicalism and coalition politics," *Democratization* 20, no. 5 (2013): 876.

Union Muslim League, which was named after a community and the leaders of which had the past record of participating in the Pakistan movement under Jinnah, the first chance to participate in the post partition government. Henceforth, all the mainstream political parties in the state have aligned with the IUML or its splinter formations. The politics in past decades has been then between two similar political coalitions, LDF and UDF. The following diagram gives the vote shares of both after their formation in 1982: the performance has been similar.

Figure 4- 1: Vote Shares of Coalitions

Initially there were difference between two major political fronts formed around two major political parties- Indian National Congress (INC) and Communist Party of India Marxist (CPIM)-and both of them have become multi-ethnic and less distinguishable nowadays in terms of the policies and the character of partners. Although there is alteration of power every five year after five year between two fronts, there is continuation of policies and approach towards communities. Moreover, the flexible attitude of minor parties towards both alliances made both coalitions indistinguishable. Following table shows the name of political parties and their character in alliances.

Figure 4- 2: Character of Parties in Alliances[28]

Political Parties	Character of Party
LDF	
1. Communist Party of India-M (CPM)	Communist
2. Communist Party of India (CPI)	Communist
3. Janata Dal (Secular)	Socialist
4. Janata Dal (Virendra Kumar)	Socialist
5. Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)	Congress
6. Congress (S)	Congress
7. Kerala Congress (B)	Nayar Confessional
8. Informal allies	
a) Janadipatya Kerala Congress	Christian Confessional
b) INL and NSC	Muslim Confessional
UDF	
1. Indian National Congress (INC)	Congress
2. Indian Union Muslim League (IUML)	Muslim Confessional
	Christian Confessional
1. Kerala Congress (M)	Christian Confessional
3. Kerala Congress (J)	Revolutionary Socialist
4. Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)	Communist
5. Communist Marxist Party (CMP)	
6. Informal Allies	Socialist Republic
a) All India Forward Block	
NDA	Hindu Nationalist
	Ezhava Confessional
1. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)	
2. Bharat Dharma Jana Sena (BDJS)	
3. Other Parties	Christian Confessional
a) Kerala Congress (Thomas)	
b) Janadhipathya Rashtriya Saba	Scheduled Caste

[28] The information is from field data.

The table shows that there is no big difference between the character of political parties in two major alliances, and both have almost same type of parties. As LDF is the ruling front with access to the spoil, there are many parties with it now, and the situation may change altogether if it loses the power. NDA has so far been a marginal player in Kerala politics with only one member ever in its account in the history. However, in the 2016 assembly election, the front has secured fourteen percentage vote share, the highest ever. In NDA, other than BJP, BJDS is the only party with any influential popular base, and other parties are with very minimal vote base. As BJP and its front has played very minimal role in the political history of the state, the discussion here has given attention to other two fronts and their politics.

Political parties in both alliances do not have any permanent commitment to any, and other than two major political parties- INC and CPIM- all have changed alliances on interest basis. The bargaining power of the small political parties depends upon the coalitionability vis-à-vis other parties. For instance, Kerala Congress, which left UDF alleging bad treatment by INC, has come back to the front after trying to negotiate with LDF and NDA and secured a crucial Rajya Sabah seat from the main ally INC using its coalitionability with other fronts. The major parties, on the other hand, check the power of minor parties with their coalitionability with parties of any type. So far, with the exception of BJP and other similar extremist parties, no political party is untouchable to both fronts, and CPIM and INC have local understandings with parties of opposite front beyond the coalition.

What prompts political parties with certain community bases, in Kerala, moderate community demands and preach communal peace and tranquillity? Why do not they play communal outbidding by using antagonistic communal identities, as predicted by the scholars, for electoral purposes? To illustrate, Kerala Congress (M), Kerala Congress (B) and Muslim League having community bases in Christians, Nayars and Muslims respectively do not make community demands openly, but promote communal peace during elections and other times. These parties have many times made pre-electoral alliances and contested elections with the common political platform like UDF. The election songs of these parties, collected for this research, show that almost all of them

have contents of communal harmony, while keeping a community and regional flavour in them[29].

In a extremely fragmented party system with parties having distinct community base, the necessity for coalition mandates certain amount of moderation; and the more one is moderate the more it is coalitionable. The coalitionability and moderation would not only win bargaining power vis-à-vis other parties but also cross community support in election times. Behaving moderately, however, may cost vote base in divided societies because as McGarry and O'Learly pointed out in Northern Ireland context, the hardliners will always have every reason to form new parties realizing that their disloyalty would penalize the moderates[30]. Thus, in order to keep the extremist parties out of the stray, the moderate parties have to keep society secure from potential violence, the outbreak of which (or even mere existence of) may be capitalized by the hardliners within the community. For instance, the moderate Muslim League does seek votes in community banner, but it never result in polarization. When violence erupts, rather than inflaming it, the League moderates the tension[31]. In 1990s when all over the country went through the dangerous stage of communal violence followed by *Rat Yatra* and Masjid demolition, in Kerala also a section of radical Muslims emerged questioning the moderation of the League and its 'unholy' relation with Congress, which was alleged to be responsible for all the troubles. The League opposed any extreme forms of protests by the community in the state, and did not drift away from the Congress coalition. Instead, its spiritual cum political leader Sayed Shihab Tangal advocated the followers to be calm and to maintain peace[32]. Because the League leadership knows better than anyone that any extreme stand would only help legitimize the political stands of the hardliners within the community, and would make it less coalitionable with other political parties in future. It is to be noted

---

[29] The election songs composed for different areas are easily distinguishable. The songs in Malabar where Muslims are majority, songs of both alliances are in Mappila song parody. In pockets where Christians are dominated the songs have Christian tunes and contents of farm issues. However, almost all have terms like secular and religious harmony.

[30] See, John McGarry and Brendan O'leary. *The Northern Ireland Conflict Consociational Engagements* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 14.

[31] See, Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Yale University Press, 2003), 125.

[32] See for details on the post-Baberi developments in Kerala, Richard W Franke, and Barbara H Chasim, *Kerala: Radical Reform As Development in an IndianState* (California: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994), xiii-xiv.

that despite the presence of a powerful confessional party like Muslim League, there were very few communal incidence in Kerala, when rest of the country flamed in communal violence. If political parties of different social bases have to ask people votes from a common platform, share votes in constituencies, and cooperate in the pre and post election alliances, how one party or leader can speak extremism? The only option left is to speak religious harmony and talk about the common ground, that all of them can agree with. The community demands thus are sought only within the premise of the coalition, and rarely go out of the green room.

4.2 Inter-community Cooperation: the Realism

In the following part, it is shown that there are two major factors that necessitate inter-community cooperation in Kerala politics: firstly, there is demographic balance among socio-religious groups which inhibit any particular group to dominate; and secondly, there are intra-community cleavages that make community formations vulnerable, however, without out-rightly uprooting them. These two realities tell us that exclusive community politics is practically non-viable in the Kerala social landscape. Nevertheless, as ethnic identities and sense of community may subject to changes on the course of time, it is unknown that how the future of the state would be.

4.2.1 Demographic Balance

Multiple balance of demography among social groups is a favourable condition for the working of accommodative democratic institution, because under such conditions no group can dominate over, but forced to cooperate with, other social segments[33]. The demographic balance has two dimensions in Kerala: first, there is a balance of number among the dominant groups at the all state level; second, there is partial concentration and partial dispersion of religious groups geographically, which provide strength in certain geographical areas as well as weakness in other areas for communities. These two factors simultaneously pull community formations from domination, and push for intra-community cooperation.

---

[33] See, Arend Lijpart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: Acomparative Exploration* (Bombay : Bombay Popular Prakashan , 1977), 55.

79

First, Kerala has four numerically and organizationally dominant communities enabling a quadruple competition among them and, as scholars observed, the presence of many groups virtually prevents any group claiming majority [34]. Below, the social demography of the state has been shown pictorially.

[35]

Figure 4- 3: Social Profile of Kerala

The diagram shows that there is a balance of power between four dominant social groups of the state with no one having a decisive population share that enables to dominate the electoral spectrum. With the presence of twenty seven percentages Muslims and eighteen percentages Christians, the share of minority religious group comprises forty five percentages and the Hindu majority then have fifty five percentages share. As the political history of Kerala in pre and post independence shows, the caste groups within Hindus considered themselves as distinctive communities forming own social and political organizations, and the two other major religious groups were countered as the third and the fourth dominant communities after two Hindu castes. Thus, Nayars (twelve percentage) and Ezhavas (twenty two percentages) did not form any permanent social or

---

[34] See, Donald L Horowitz, "Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy,"in *The Architecture of Democracy*, by Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 14.

[35] The data on caste is not available from formal sources. The information provided here is from K.C Zachariah, "Religious Denominations of Kerala ." *Working Paper*. CDS, April 2016.

political coalition, but remained very often as arch rivals[36]. In that sense, demography does not provide any particular group to dominate, because no group can claim majority support. This was the reason why each community required the cooperation of others during the colonial time to prove before the state that they represent the majority. See for instance, during the time of Malayali memorial, which was basically a Nayar initiative, the leadership tried to portray the signatories as representative of the whole Travancore against the foreigners. The memorial used statistics to show the advantaged position of the foreign Brahmins (13.4%) against the native Hindus (59.8)[37] and Christians (20.76%)[38]. The same logic applies to the post colonial democratic experience in which representatives are elected under FPTP electoral system, which demands the winner to get support of plurality of voters. Thus the attempt to dominate by any community over others or attempt of any political party to seek exclusively community supports would backlash in elections as other communities may unite against. Majority of constituencies in the state are demographically heterogeneous demanding vote pooling by the candidates. This forces any party or leader to go beyond own community line.

Secondly, even if there is balance of numbers among social groups, the spatial distribution of communities also matter. Reilly tells us the best social configuration for the working of 'vote pooling' and the centripetalism is the heterogeneity of constituencies which is possible only if communities are perfectly dispersed across the country. The worst situation is the geographical concentration of ethnic groups in different localities[39], which enable the hardliners to communally consolidate votes instigating communalism. Kerala has avoided both the extremes, and there are pockets of concentrations in some geographic areas and the partial dispersion of groups over all. The following table

---

[36] There were attempts to unify Hindus by trying coalition among Nayars and Ezhavas in 1950s by R. Shankar and in 2012 by Vellapally Nateshan and Sukumaran Nayar. In both occasions, the attempts failed and the gap got further widened. When NSS formed political party in 1970s, SNDP retaliated by forming own political party just after two years.

[37] Hindu is very larger category, and Nayars are one among them. Scholars have identified around four hundred caste and sub caste groups in Hindu religion Kerala.

[38] See, Robin Jaffrey, *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976), 169.

[39] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 185.

provides details of the religious breakups of district wise population of the state as per the 2011 census data.

Figure 4- 4: Kerala Districts –Religion 2011 Census[40]

District	Hindu	Muslim	Christian
Kasargod	55.84	37.24	6.69
Kannur	59.83	29.43	10.41
Wayanad	49.48	28.65	21.34
Kozhikode	56.21	39.4	4.26
Malappuram	27.60	70.24	1.98
Palakkad	66.76	28.93	4.07
Trissur	58.42	17.07	24.27
Ernakulam	45.99	15.67	38.03
Idukky	48.86	7.41	43.42
Kottayam	49.81	6.41	43.48
Pathanamthitta	56.93	4.60	38.12
Alappuzha	68.64	10.55	20.45
Kollam	64.42	19.30	16
Tiruvananthapuram	66.46	13.72	19.10

As per the census of 2011, three dominant religious groups of Kerala spread across the state, with certain pockets of concentration[41]. Muslims who are 26.5 percentage of population have more than ten percentage share of population in eleven out of fourteen districts; more than twenty percentage shares in six northern districts; and seventy percentages in a district, Malappuram. Christians, who are 18.5 percentage of the state demography, have more than ten percentage share population in ten districts; seven districts with more than twenty percentages; and two districts with more than forty percentages of the population. The Hindus, who are the majority of the state population with fifty five percentages, have nine districts with population more than fifty percentages, whereas in none of them, it has not gone beyond the sixty seven percentage share.

---

[40] *Census 2011,* https://www.census2011.co.in/data/religion/state/32-kerala.html (accessed May 25, 2018)
[41] According to Zachariah 2016, in 2011, the index of concentration was 28.2 for the Muslims (31.6 in 2008), 27.5 for the Christians (30.5 in 2008), but only 2.8 for the Hindus (8.4 in 2008) (13, religious denomination)

The peculiar demographic structure of the state, in which there is partial concentration of community groups without creating communal enclaves provide strength as well as weakness for communities. In strength wise, groups can pressurize political parties in areas where they are dominant; and even if these groups may not be able to win an election with own vote base in certain areas, it can defeat a particular candidate in a fiercely competed election. However, any political leader needs support beyond the community in majority part of the state, and have to come to coalitions if wanted to share the spoil. This may be inhibiting political elites from communalizing voters even in a community concentrated constituency. The inter-community cooperation is inevitable thing if any political party has to be part of state government.

4.2.2 Internal Cleavages

Generally, intra ethnic cleavage is less dangerous than inter-ethnic cleavage and the former may moderate the latter. The centripetalists find internal divisions as making inter-ethnic cooperation easier. If major groups are internally divided on ethnic or non-ethnic issues, the vote pooling from other groups becomes inevitable to ensure the winning threshold[42]. In Kerala, despite communities are organized in modern centralized forms with well nit global networks, all of them are internally divided on multiple grounds like caste, class, organizational differences, and factionalism. There are more than one community associations for each community, and many often some of them find common interest with organizations outside community.

Historically, all community groups, with no exception, which formed associations with the purpose of reforming the social system faced stiff organized opposition from own communities, and the intra-group divisions were there throughout the past years. When Malayali memorial was initiated by the Nayars with the support of Christians and Ezhavas, the Tamil Brahmins brought up with the same strategy of social coalition of Brahmin, disgruntled Nayars, Muslims and Syrian Jacobite Christians. Likewise, in 1940s, when Travancore Congress was formed as platform of people of communities, a section of Nayars under the leadership of Pattam Thanu Pillai joined it, defying the dictum of NSS supremo Mannam. These patterns of counter movements against

---

[42] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 187.

community organizations and open intra-community competitions have been very common incidents in pre and post independence Kerala politics.

After the independence, with the growth of community resources and the government spoils, divisions in each community have only intensified, and like political parties community groups also go through the stages of splits and mergers. Among Muslims, the dominant community organization-Samasta Kerala Jamiyyat-ul Ulema-subjected to several splits, and in 1984 a major faction under the leadership of Kanthapuram A P Aboobacker Musliyar formed own Samasta against the intervention of Muslim League in the organizational matters. Although there were several attempts of merger by two factions, they still remain as two antagonistic associations with different political strategies. Ezhava SNDP also had several factions and splits in past years, and the most decisive challenge to it is from Sree Narayana Dharma Vedi (SNDV) under the leadership of Gukulakam Gopalan who came out of mother organization after long factional fights. In this fashion, the factionalism, split and merger discourses are prevalent among all communities.

Below, a table is provided to show the major cleavages and the type of internal groups within minority Christian and Muslim religions, and the table on majority Hindu religion has already been provided in the third chapter of the dissertation (figure 3-1). Tables provide only the dominant cleavage structure, and there are many forms of divisions other than these. In Hindu religion, the most visible division is the caste and sub caste identities which can be identified by the name of persons. The table (figure 3-1) showed major Hindu castes and the number of caste communities in them. As explained somewhere in the dissertation, there are hierarchies within each caste group on the basis of pollution-purity principle and they used to practice commensality among them. Each sub group considered themselves as distinctive communities in olden days. However, caste improvement associations like NSS and SNDP fought against the internal hierarchy differentiation while promoting caste identities.

Among minorities, the Christians and the Muslims, the most visible division is based on denominations, though caste, class, sect and region also determine the sub

identities. The following chart provides major groups in Christian and Muslims communities in denomination wise.

Figure 4- 5: Denominations among Minorities[43]

Minority Groups	Denominations
Christians	Syro- Malabar Catholics Syro- Malankara Catholics Latin Catholics Jacobite Syrians Orthodox Syrians Mar Thoma Syrians Church of South India (CSI) Dalit Christians, Pentecost, Church of God, Brethren, etc.
Muslims	Samasta Kerala Sunni (EK) Samasta Kerala Sunni (AP) Samasta Kerala Sunni (Samasthaana) Sunni Dakhshina Kerala Kerala Nadwatul Mujahid Jamath-e-Islami Kuraan Sunnath Society

Accordingly, there are nine major Christian groups: Syro- Malabar Catholics, Syro- Malankara Catholics, Latin Catholics, Jacobite Syrians, Orthodox Syrians, Mar Thoma Syrians, Church of South India (CSI), Dalit Christians and Pentecost, Church of God, and Brethren. Among the Sunni Muslims, which is ninety five percent against the Sheith sects, one can identify eight major denominations: Samasta Kerala Sunni (EK), Samasta Kerala Sunni (AP), Samasta Kerala Sunni (Samasthaana), Sunni Dakhshina Kerala, Kerala Nadwatul Mujahid , Jamath-e-Islami, and Kuraan Sunnath Society. Each of the sub group has state level associations with branches in localities and in different parts of the world where Malayali immigrants inhabit. Much of these groups have separate religious institutions, faith, and place of worship. To understand the intensity of intra community division, see one comment on Muslims of Malappuram,

---

[43] The data on Christian denominations are taken from K.C Zachariah, "Religious Denominations of Kerala," *Working Paper,* CDS, April 2016, and on Muslims from the field data.

"In pure anthropological terms, Malappuram is in fact a fascinating case study for a place where the entire majority community, in this instance the Muslims, stands united in favour of harmonious social relations with the distinctive 'other' while all markers of 'othering' within are considered unworthy of humane treatment!"[44]

During elections different religious denominations declare their supports and oppositions to parties, negotiate with political party leaders, and many often uses religious networks for and against candidates. The politicization of intra community divisions has resulted in a process what centripetalists would call inter-ethnic 'vote pooling'. Among Muslims, Samasta (EK) and Nadawat-ul-Mujahid (Mujahid Salafi groups) generally support the Muslim League and UDF, while Samasta (AP) supports CPIM and LDF. Siryan Christians among Christians throw the weight generally behind UDF, whereas Latin Christians support LDF. In some constituencies, candidates' party identity matters more than community identity. To illustrate, Samasta (AP) faction openly supported CPI candidate K P Suresh Raj against the Muslim League candidate Adv. N. Shamsuddin in a constituency in Palakkad district, namely Mannarkad. Eventually, this became a competition between the Samasta and the Muslim League, which considers the former as the arch rival. This sort of cross community support against candidates from owns community is very common in the state.

How does the internal division in communities necessitate inter-community cooperation and 'vote pooling'? How does it prevent politicians from community concentrated constituencies from communal polarization and outbidding? The answer is that divisions within communities make any communal unification in election times very difficult and any such attempts may result only in the loss of votes in other constituencies where the community is not dominant enough. It is to be added that the intra group cleavages are intense in areas where communities are concentrated. In such high intra community fragmentation, politicians have to get supports from different communities. Moreover, the intra divisions weaken the claim of community political parties as the sole agent of the group. The internal divisions in communities are reflected in the distribution of community supports to two coalitions- almost equally, and political parties consider certain denominations as pressure group allies in elections. To attract the cross

---

[44] See, Shahjahan Madambad, "Malappuram is'nt Kashmir," Outlook, August 21, 2017.

community supports, the only way is to prove that 'our party is more secular than the opponent'.

4.3 Conclusion

Despite following a majoritarian electoral institution-FPTP, the divided society of Kerala produced bipolar competitive coalitions, that are equally powerful and multi ethnic. This also produced power sharing among people of major social groups, and proportionality of legislative assembly. This case tells us that rather than focusing merely on the features of democratic institutions, there has to have focus on socio-political structure also. The Kerala case shows the interaction of bipolar tendency and the socio political incentives for communal moderation and inter-community cooperation. The majoritarian feature of FPTP that marginalizing social minorities is overcome by the structural incentives for amalgamation of voters from different sections and the force for political parties to seek median voters.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This study exposed the inability of existing literature on electoral rule in divided societies to explain the co-existence of power sharing arrangement and FPTP which is near impossibility according to the scholarships. Two major schools in the field, the consociationalism and the centripetalism, prescribed electoral systems like PR, STV and AV for all societies impaired by deep social divisions. These scholars, with all their apparent differences on prescriptions and approaches to the problem of social divisions, unanimously agreed on the non-viability of FPTP in divided societies. The present work reconsidered this agreement by studying Indian state of Kerala, which is one of those cases where democracy is effectively working under FPTP without creating majoritarianism and communal outbidding.

It has been shown in this work that the state of Kerala, the society of which is divided by ascriptive identities of caste and religion, has social proportionality in the legislative assembly and power sharing in the ministries formed after the state formation in 1957. A state, with the presence of community political parties and leaders having decisive influence on the day to day politics, has been ruled by two multi community coalitions alternating on power every five year after five year with lesser number of caste and religious violence as compared to other Indian states. If FPTP were to be a death blow to democracy in all divided societies by resulting in communal animosities, majority domination and minority marginalisation; the Kerala would have been torn into pieces. But it did not. Rather, the democracy prospered in the state than, arguably, any other state in the country[1].

In studying the impact of electoral rules on divided society, this dissertation adopted a novel approach of analysing the interactive effect of democratic institutions with the social structure. This approach enabled us understand that the institutions do not work in vacuum, but interact with the social environment. Accordingly, the same

---

[1] For details on democratisation in Kerala, see Richard Sandbrook, Marc Edelman, and Patrick Heller, *Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72-73.

electoral system may have different electoral outcomes in different societies and FPTP is not an exception to it. In the case of Kerala, FPTP produced social proportionality in legislature and power sharing in administrative bodies because of this interactive effect: the FPTP which has the tendency of creating bipolar electoral competition interacted with the social structure of Kerala which has the incentives for inter-community cooperation and communal moderation. The inter-community social coalitions of colonial period, when only semi-democratic institutions were intact, were transformed in to multi-community coalitions after the independence, when formal democratic institutions including FPTP electoral system were introduced.

From the fundamental argument that electoral rules have interactive effect with the society, four important observations are made. The observations are as follow: (i) any electoral system including FPTP cannot outrightly be rejected as an electoral system for divided society; (ii) demographic structure of the society has decisive influence on the fate of democracy in divided societies; (iii) multiplication of cleavages helps reduce the intensity of divisions; and (iv) there are challenges to the system and the survival of it depends upon the future policy measures. In the following part, a brief description of these points is provided.

5.1 FPTP cannot be Rejected Altogether

Contrary to what scholars have perceived, this dissertation underscores the idea that the FPTP cannot outrightly be rejected as electoral system for divided societies, and there are democracies which sustain stability and power sharing under this electoral system also. Theoretically, the Anglo American electoral system produces majority governments and the majority in divided societies tends to be communal or ethnic. This prompts scholars consider FPTP as a death warrant to democracies in societies riven by deep divisions. However, this cannot always be the true in all divided societies, and, as proposed in the present work, the same institution would have different outcomes in different societies.

Other than majority vote consolidation, FPTP has other two important features also: vote aggregation into two major political parties; and competition for median votes by forcing political parties to move from fringe to centre. These latter features were the

reason behind the success of electoral system in democracies where FPTP was adopted. In divided societies also, if these two features can overcome the majoritarianism, the democracy can work effectively without threatening stability and creating violence. In other words, if there are incentives for political actors to amalgamate votes of people from different communities and come to the centre seeking undecided median voters, the vagaries of FPTP can be overcome. Under such situation, other advantages of FPTP can also be used to strengthen the emerging democracies. Those benefits are simplicity of electoral system, easiness for voters to understand, stability of governments, and better relation between voters and the representative. Indeed, these are helping conditions for new democracies.

In the case study of this dissertation, the state of Kerala, the majoritarian character of FPTP did not override other features- amalgamation and competition for median votes. Two political alliances that formed in 1980s under two major political parties amalgamated votes from all communities without permanently ignoring any of them, and both have members from all major communities. Although all political parties have a community base and all major communities have a party base, this did not end up in zero sum competition and election induced violence as happened elsewhere in the world. Rather, the incentives for moderation- cross cutting associations and coalition necessity- and for inter community cooperation- demographic balance and intra community divisions- prevented majoritarianism and minority marginalisation. The outcome of FPTP in Kerala is thus the outcome of AV: vote pooling between communities and moderation of political elites due to pre-electoral coalitions. Thus one can conclude, as the competition is bipolar between two multi-community alliances, the introduction of AV may also produce similar outcome in Kerala.

This dissertation, however, does not make the claim that FPTP is unconditionally suggestive for divided societies. It accepts that in many divided societies, vote aggregation and bipolar alliances are not always the result of majoritarian electoral system. If FPTP is introduced in fragmented societies in the absence of structural incentives for cooperation and moderation, there may be proliferation of political parties and the candidates with modicum of clan support base may win the election, creating

large disparity in the representation. The result is rise in inter-ethnic violence and loss of confidence in the system[2]. Aggregation of votes and vote pooling across communities would not happen in those societies as there is little structural incentive to do so. In those societies, the only possible way-out would be electoral engineering like introduction of AV or any other according to the nature of the division.

5.2 Demographic Factor

Scholars have already discussed the importance of demography in divided societies. In the case of Kerala, demographic structure has been a decisive factor in working of power sharing. As explained in the third chapter, there are two dimensions to the demography of the state: balance of strength between four major communities; and balance of their spatial distribution. Kerala has quadruple competition among four caste and community organisation which are more or less equally important in the state politics with allowing any particular group neither to dominate nor to be marginalised. Although the ascriptive division has not been replicated in the party system in black and white, it has been reflected in the fragmentation of party structure. Secondly, the spatial distribution of social groups in the state has also been a favourable factor in working of the system. Social groups had partial concentrations and partial dispersions in the state. These factors helped groups get certain geographical areas of strength while necessitating cooperation with other groups in other areas.

From the Kerala case, this study makes certain tentative observation on demographic factor in the working of FPTP in divided societies. First, existence of three or more social groups, with political and numerical power to influence the electoral outcome, is a favourable factor for efficient working of FPTP in divided societies. The dangerous situation in those places would be when the competition is bipolar between two social groups that may degenerate into antagonistic fight and large scale violence threatening the system. The scope for cooperation and coalitions emerges only under the presence of more than two social groups. Second, if any social group has balance of power over other groups, the incentives are for internal consolidations with communal appeals leaving no stone turned for inter-group cooperation and moderation.

---

[2] See, Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004), 81-89.

Third, geographic concentration of groups makes majorities of communities in certain geographic areas without necessitating any cooperation with other groups. In such situations, political parties would find centrifugal appeals and communal consolidation as electorally attractive. With plurality supports ensured at the constituency level, the geographical concentration may allow groups to get adequate representation in legislature under FPTP, but creating a situation of 'polarised pluralism'. On the other hand, complete dispersion may weaken the power of less numerical ethnic groups in influencing the electoral results, if there is no balance of strength between communities. The partial concentration and partial dispersion create favourable condition for power sharing by providing groups adequate bargaining power without letting them completely dominating any geographic area.

Fourth, demographic structure may not remain static always. A demographic engineering by governments or political parties may change the equations in the electoral race. The change towards creating enclaves of communities would reduce the dependence on other communities in elections and other times and may incentivise extremism. On the other side, a move in the direction of geographic dispersions of social groups would make the constituencies more heterogeneous making it favourable for power sharing if no community has balance of strength. However, the alignment and de-alignment of social groups are tentative and this may change at times. This is particularly true of Hindu caste communities, who consider themselves as separate communities in Kerala till the date and may unite on the religious line changing the nature of competition in future. The parties like BJP have tried for consolidating the Hindus in India. However, BJP's politics in Kerala is yet to pay dividend.

5.3 Multiplication of Cleavage

There is more than one cleavage in Kerala society and as outlined in the third chapter the multiplication of division has helped make divisions less violent. Multiple divisions create multiple loyalties of the people preventing sedimentation of entire social, political and economic conflicts in to one dimension. The cleavages may be in the form of cross cutting the groups like class and party loyalties, or in the form of intra-group like sect and denomination differences. Both of them help mitigate the danger of deep

divisions by dual effect: first it prevents any form of antagonistic group consolidation which would wreck the social order; and second it forces political actors to look beyond own community for the electoral support which in turn necessitate compromise on communal appeal and ethnic moderation.

The third chapter has shown that there are community organisations for all caste and religious groups and they play vital roles in the socio-political process of Kerala. In such a society in which the community consciousness is high, other cleavages help check the communalisation of the society and polity to an extent. Internal divisions which are prevalent in all communities in the forms of caste, sub caste, sect and denomination are the major hindrance for community consolidations. This makes the community political parties and leaders vulnerable to seek supports beyond own group necessitating moderation of communal appeals. The politicisation of class divisions creates cross cutting solidarities that also works towards weakening communal organisations and strengthening secular politics. However, class politics has not yet emerged in Kerala as a completely autonomous political development without being influenced by the communal equations of the state.

5.4 Future Prospects of the System?

If a particular model has been successful in a particular space and particular time period, it does not mean that it would sustain in future untenanted. It can be maintained only if political actors and policy makers identify the potential threats and find solution for them within the changing social and political realm. From the case study of Kerala, this study identifies certain potential threat to the system, the ignorance of which may rock the boat.

First, the major threat to the system stems from the growing popularity of hardliners in various communities. In Kerala, though community organisations preached intra-community solidarity and unity in past decades, they left enough room for cooperation with other communities and this ideology defined the political developments of the state since last part of the nineteenth century. The realism that communal harmony and mutualistic relations are the only way-out for the social deadlock of the state guided the vision of social and political leaders of the state. The extremist views that get

acceptance at least from some segments of the society undermine this idea of mutual cooperation and coexistence. The strategy that the hardliners adopt in divided societies is to defame the moderates who part power with other social groups portraying them as the enemy within and collaborators with the enemy outside. These political propagandas make the moderation and inter-community cooperation electorally less attractive for all the political players.

The second potential threat is from the majoritarian nationalism that has been very minimal player in the political history of Kerala and which are gaining ground with the rise of Hindu nationalism in other parts of the country. The rise of a Hindu party would transform the nature of social competition in the state from very favourable quadruple to triple reducing the structural force for inter-community understanding. This would further have centrifugal dimensions as well, as the Hindu nationalist ideology considers other two major religious groups in the state, the Christians and the Muslims, as 'foreign bodies lodged in Hindu society'[3]. The same is true of the hardliners in minority communities who preach antagonism against other groups. If political parties cannot have pre-electoral coalitions in a multipolar society, FPTP would fragment the party system making the elections violent competition and the elected people representing narrow interests.

Third, the representation of historically marginalised sections in the Kerala society which are called Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) have been protected through the constitutional measure of assured reservations in the legislature. These communities have played relatively marginal role in socio-political process of the state ostensibly because of the lack of numerical strength and better organisation. Whereas many scholars defend the celebrated 'Kerala inclusive model of development' by showing the progress that the erstwhile untouchables gained vis-à-vis their counterparts in rest of India[4], their condition is not yet satisfactory as compared with other communities in the state. The scholars recently have shown the developmental deficit that the socially deprived SC and ST face in the state even after the so called

---

[3] See, Christophe Jaffrelot, *South Asia Research Hindu Nationalism a Reader* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 99.
[4] See for instance, Prerna Singh, "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India," *World Development* 39, no. 2 (2010): 288.

successful land reform (Devika 2013; Rammohan 2013; Scaria 2010; and Yadu 2017). In such a backdrop, it is not sure how far FPTP would ensure representation of these numerically less relevant communities in the absence of any constitutional protection. Notably, in the cabinet, in which policy of reservation is not practiced, SC and SC people have been allotted less significant portfolios whichever governments come to power. However, with other communities in past governments there has always been at least a representative from SC and ST category in almost all ministries formed after the state formation.

The arguments made in this dissertation underscore the point that context equally matters with institutions and the impact of any institution can be understood only in the socio-political environment. Outcome of any electoral system would be influenced by the society it is implemented. Thus, considering the interactive effect of electoral systems with the society is paramount important in studies of electoral rules in divided societies.

Bibliography

Andeveg, Rudy B. "Consociational Democracy." *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci*, 2000: 509-536.

Bajpai, Rochana. "Constituent Assembly Debates and Minority Rights." *Economic&Political Science Weekly*, 2000: 1837-45.

Barkan, Joel D. "Elections in Agrarian Societies." *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. Nov-Oct (1995).

Bogaards, Matthijs. "Electoral choices for divided societies: Multi-ethnicparties and constituency pooling in Africa." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 41, no. 3 (2003): 59-80.

Census 2011. https://www.census2011.co.in/data/religion/state/32-kerala.html (accessed May 25, 2018).

Chandra, Kanchan. "What is Ethnicity and Doe it matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006): 397-424.

Chiriyankandath, James. "'Unity in diversity'? Coalition politics in India (with special reference to Kerala)." *Democratization* 4, no. 4 (1997): 16-39.

Chiriyankandath, James. "'Communities at the Polls': Electoral Politics and the Mobilization of Communal Groups in Travancore." *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 3 (1993): 643-665.

Choudhry, Sujit. "Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies." In *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?*, by Sujit Choudhry, 3-40. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Clark, William Roberts, and Matt Golder. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 6 (2006): 679-708.

Desai, Manali. *State Formation and Radical Democracy in India.* Routledge : New York, 2013.

Devika, J. "Contemporary Dalit Assertions in Kerala: Governmental Categories vs Identity Politics?" *History and Sociology of South Asia* 7, no. 1 (2013): 1-17.

Duverger, Mauris. *Political Parties* . Lendon : Law and Brydon (Printers) Ltd , 1967.

Evera, Stephen Van. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* . New York : Cornell University Press , 1997.

Fic, Victor M. *Kerala, Yenan of India: Rise of Communist Power, 1937-1969.* Bombay: Nachiketa Publications Ltd , 1970.

Franke, Richard W, and Barbara H Chasim. *Kerala: Radical Reform As Development in an IndianState.* California: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994.

Geys, Benny. "District Magnitude, Social Heterogeneity And Local Party System Fragmentation." *Party Politics* 12, no. 2 (2006): 281-297.

Ghai, Yash, and Jill Cottrell. "A tale of three constitutions: Ethnicity and politics in Fiji." In *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation* , by Sujit Choudhry, 287-316. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

"Global Nair Service Society launches global organisation." Zee News, October 17, 2010.

Harriss, John, and Olle Törnquist. *Comparative Notes on Indian Experiences of Social Democracy: Kerala and West Bengal.* Vancouver: School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, 2016, 1-48.

Heller, Patrick. "Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lesson from India." *World Politics*, no. 52 (2000): 484-519.

Horowitz, Donald L. *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* . Berkeley : University of California Press , 1991.

Horowitz, Donald L. "Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States." *William & Marry Review* 49, no. 4/7 (2008): 1213-1248.

Horowitz, Donald L. "Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy." In *The Architecture of Democracy*, by Andrew Reynolds, 15-36. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Horowitz, Donald L. "Democracy in Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 18-38.

Horowitz, Donald L. "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers." *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (2003).

Horowitz, Donald L. "Encouraging electoral accommodation in divided Societies ." In *Electoral System in Divided Societies: Fiji Constitutional Review* , by Peter Larmour, 21-38. Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2012.

—. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* . Lendon: University of California Press, 1985.

Horowitz, Donald L. "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems." *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 2 (April 2014): 5-20.

Houtart, Francois, and Genevieve Lemercinier. "Socio-Religious Movements in Kerala: A Reaction to the Capitalist Mode of Production Part II." *Social Scientist* , 1978: 25-43.

Ibrahim, K. M. Sajad, and K. K. Kailash. "Bucking double anti-incumbency in Kerala." *News Paper Column* . The Hindu, MAY 24 , 2014.

"India has 31 lakh NGOs, more than double the number of schools." The Indian Express, August 1, 2015.

Isac, T.M Thomas, and P.K Michael Tharakan. *Sree Narayana Movement in Travancore 1888-1939.* Working Report , Trivandrum: Center for Developemnt Studies .

Jaffrelot, Christophe. "Refining the moderation thesis. Two religious parties and Indian democracy: the Jana Sangh and the BJP between Hindutva radicalism and coalition politics." *Democratization* 20, no. 5 (2013): 876-894.

—. *South Asia Research Hindu Nationalism a Reader.* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,, 2007.

Jeffrey, Robin. "India's Working Class Revolt: Punnapra-Vayalar and the Communist "Conspiracy" of 1946 ." *Indian Economic Social History Review*, 1981: 97-122.

Jeffrey, Robin. "Matriliny, Marxism, and the Birth of the Communist Party in Kerala, 1930-1940." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 38, no. 1 (1978): 77-98.

—. *Politics, Women and Well-Being: How Kerala became 'a Model'.* Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992.

—. *The Decline of Nair Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908.* New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1976.

Joseph, Tomy. "Empowerment of Dalits and Role of Dalit Movements in Kerala: A Study of Kottayam District." *PhD Thesis.* Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2010.

Joshi, P.C. "The Kayyur Heroes." *Labour Monthly*, August 1943.

Justino, Patricia. *Two Phases of Participation: The Story of Kerala.* Falmer : Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, University of Sussex, 2003.

"Kerala Diversion." *Editorial.* The Indian Express, October 5, 2017.

"Kerala Ezhava Leader Vellappally Natesan Launches Political Party." NDTV, December 05, 2015.

Kerala Vyapari Vyavasayi Ekopana Samiti. http://vyaparinet.com/kvves/ (accessed May 18, 2018).

Klatt, W. "Caste, class and communism in Kerala." *Asian Affairs* 3, no. 3275-287 (1972).

Koelble, Thomas A. "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology." *Comparative Politics* 27, no. 2 (1995): 231-243.

Kumar, G. Gopa. "Chnging Dimention of Coalition Politics in Kerala." In *India: Selected Issues at the Center and the State*, by E. Sreedharan, 317-389. New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2014.

Kumar, G. Gopa. "Socio-Economic Background of Legislatures in Kerala." In *Rise of the Plebeians?: The Changing Face of the Indian Legislative Assemblies*, by Christophe Jaffrelot and Sanjay Kumar, 391-406. New Delhi: Routledge, 2009.

Kurup, K.K.N. *Modern Kerala: Studies in Social and Agrarian Relations.* Delhi: Mittal Publication, 1988.

Kurup, K.K.N. "Peasantry and the Anti-Imperialist Struggles in Kerala." *Social Scientist,* 16, no. 9 (1988): 35-45.

Lakshmi, LRS. *The Malabar Muslims: A Different Perspective.* New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Lardeyret, Guy. "The Problem with PR." *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 3 (1991): 30-35.

Lerner, Hanna. *Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Lijphart, Arend. "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies." *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 1 (1991): 72-84.

Lijphart, Arend. "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. November 2 (2004): 96-109.

—. *Democracy in Plural Societies: Acomparative Exploration.* Bombay: Bombay Popular Prakashan, 1977.

Lijphart, Arend. "Proportionality by Methods:Ethnic Representation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe." In *Electoral Laws and theirPolitical Consequenses* , by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, 113-123. New York: Algora Publishing, 2003.

Lijphart, Arend. "Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing Systems." In *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, by Will Kymlicka, 275-287. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Lijphart, Arend. "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation." *he American Political Science Review* 90, no. 2 (1996).

Lijphart, Arend. "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy." In *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Confict Management, and Democracy*, by Andrew Reynolds, 37-54. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

—. *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice.* Oxon: Routledge, 2008.

Lustick, Ian. "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control." *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979): 325-344.

Madambad, Shahjahan. "Malappuram is'nt Kashmir." Outlook, August 21, 2017.

Mammen, P.M. *Communalism vs communism : a study of the socio-religious communities and political parties in Kerala, 1892-1970.* Culcutta: Minerva, 1981.

Mannathukkaran, Nissin. "Communism and Appropriation of Modernity, Kerala, India: A Critique of Subaltern Studies and Post Colonial Theories ." *PhD Theisis.* Ontario: Queen's University , 2006.

Mannathukkaren, Nissim. "Communalism sans violence: A Keralan Exceptionalism?" *Sikh Formations*, 2017: 223-242.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *The American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1984): 734-749.

Mathew, George. *Communal Road to a Secular Kerala.* New Delhi: Concept Pub, 1989.

Mathur, P.R.G. "Social Stratification among Muslims of Kerala ." In *Frontiers of Embedded Muslim Communities in India*, by Vinod K. Jairath. New Delhi: Routledge, 2011.

McCulloch, Allison. *Seeking Stability amid Deep Division: Consociaionalism and Centripetalism in Comparative Perspective.* PhD Thesis , Ontario: Queen's University, 2009.

McGarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary. "Introduction: Consociational Theoryan d Northern Ireland ." In *The Northern Ireland Conflict* , by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, 1-61. New York: Oxford University Press , 2004.

—. *The Northern Ireland Conflict Consociational Engagements.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

McGarry, John, Brendan O'Leary, and Richard Simeon. "Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation." In *Constitutional Design in Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation*, by Sujit Chadhry, 41-87. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Menon, A. Sreedhara. *Political History of Modern Kerala.* Kottaym : DC Books , 2010.

Menon, P.K.K. *The History of Freedom Movement in Kerala Vol II.* Trivandrum: Govt. of Kerala, 1970.

Meyer, Karl E., and Shareen Blair Brysac. *Kerala: Multiple Improbabilities.* December 29, 2011. https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/kerala-multiple-improbabilities (accessed February 18, 2018).

Mill, John Stuart. *Considerations on Representative Government .* London : The Electric Book Company, 2001.

Moni, P Leela. "E.M.S. Namboodiripad and Social Changes in Kerala." *PhD Thesis.* Tirunelveli: Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, 2012.

Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R Scaritt, and Glen Galaich. "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 379-390.

Nair, R. Ramakrishnan. *How communists came to power in Kerala.* Trivandrum: Kerala Academy of Political Science, 1965.

—. *Social Structure and Political Development in Kerala.* Trivandrum: The Kerala Academy of Political Science, 1976.

Neto, Octavio Amorim, and Garry W Cox. "Electoral Institutions, Clavage Structure and Number of Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 1 (1997): 149-174.

Nossiter, T.J. *Communism in Kerala: A Study in Political Adaptation.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982.

O'Leary, Brendan. "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments." In *From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies* , by Sid Noel, 3-43. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,, 2005.

O'Leary, Brendan, and John McGarry. "Introduction: Consociational Theory and Northern Ireland." In *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements*, by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, 1-61. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Oommen, MA. "Interpreting the development trajectory of Kerala:Raising issues and working towards a policy perspective." Thevara: Kerala Economic Association, 2015. 1-30.

Ordeshook, Peter C, and Olga V Shwetzova. "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude and Number of Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (1993): 100-123.

P.C., Saidalavi. "Muslim Social Organisation and Cultural Islamisation in Malabar." *South Asian Research* 37, no. 1 (2017): 19-36.

Panikkar, K.N. *Against lord and state : religion and peasant uprisings in Malabar, 1836-1921.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Pilla, Sreedhar. "National Democratic Party suffers major split on eve of crucial by-polls in Kerala." India Today, May 15, 1984.

Prabhash, J, and KM Sajjad Ibrahim. "Changing Voting Behaviourin Kerala Elections." *Economic & Political Weakly* LII, no. 5 (Fe bruary 2017): 64-68.

Prabhash, J. "Politics of Presence: Socio-Economic Backgroung of Members of Kerala Legislative Assembly: 1957-2006." *Gandhi Marg* 34, no. 2&3 (2012): 231-257.

"Rajya Sabha seat: Now, IUML leader Kunhalikutty champions Kerala Congress(M)'s cause." *New Indian Express* . June 7, 2018. http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/kerala/2018/jun/07/rajya-sabha-seat-now-iuml-leader-kunhalikutty-champions-kerala-congressms-cause-1824738.html (accessed June 24, 2018).

Rammohan, KT. "Caste and Landlessness in Kerala: Signals from Chengara." *Economic & Political Weakly* , 2013: 12-16.

Reilly, Benjamin. "Centripetalism." In *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, by Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, 287-297. New York: Routledge , 2011.

—. *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2004.

Reilly, Benjamin. "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. Nov 2 (2002): 156-170.

Reilly, Benjamin. "Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict Prone Societies." *Democratization* 13, no. 5 (2006): 811-827.

Reynold, Andrew. "Constitutional Engineering in South Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 2 (1995): 86-99.

—. *Electoral Systems and Democratization in South Africa.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Reynolds, Andrew, and Benjamin Reilly. "Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies." In *International Conflict Resolution after Cold War*, by Pau Cl Stern and Daniel Druckman, 420-482. Washington D.C: National Acqademy Press, 2000.

Saldanha, Alison. "Muslim Representation in UP Assembly Plummets With 2017 Elections." The Wire, March 14, 2017.

Sandbrook, Richard, Marc Edelman, and Patrick Heller. *Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Sartori, Giovanni. *Parties and Party Systems: a Framework for Analysis.* Colchester: ECPR Press, 2005.

Scaria, Suma. "Changes in Land Relations: The Political Economy of Land Reforms in a Kerala Village." *Economic & Political Weakly* xlv , no. 26 & 27 (2010): 191-198.

Selway, Joel. "Ethnic Accommodation and Electoral Rules in Ethno-Geographically Segregated Societies: PR Outcomes Under FPTP in Myanmar Elections." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 15, no. 3 (2015): 321.

Sen, Amartya. "More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing." *New York Times.* New York Times, December 20, 1990.

Singh, Prerna. *How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India .* New York: Cambridge University Press , 2015.

Singh, Prerna. "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India." *World Development* 39, no. 2 (2010): 282-293.

Sisk, Timothy D . "Chosing an Electoral System: South Africa Seeks New Ground Rules." *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 1 (1993): 80-91.

Smith, M. G. "Social and Cultural Pluralism." *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 83 (1960): 763-785.

Sree Narayana. com. http://sreenarayana.com/SNDP_Unions.html (accessed April 13, 2018).

Tharakan, P.K. Michael. "Socio-Religious Reform Movements, the Process of Democratization and Human Development: The Case of Kerala, South West India ." In *Democratization in the Third World: Concrete Cases in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective*, by Olle Tornquist and Virgilio Rojas Lars Rudebeck, 144-172. New York : Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998.

The SNDP - NSS Political Experiment of 1980s. https://sdqali.in/blog/2014/02/09/the-sndp---nss-political-experiment-of-1980s/ (accessed June 15, 2018).

Thomas, E. J. *Coalition Game Politics in Kerala.* New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1985.

Tornquist, Olle. "Making Democratization Work: From CivilSociety and Social Capital to Political inclusion and Politicization-Theoretical Reflections on Concrete Cases in Indonesia, Kerala and Philippines." In *Democratization in the Third World: Concrete Cases in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective*, by Olle Tonquist and Virgilio Rojas Lars Rudebeck, 107-143. New York: Macmillian Press Ltd, 1998.

Törnquist, Olle. "Movement, Politics and Development: The Case of Kerala." *Social Scientist* 29, no. 11-12 (2001): 57-87.

"Uttar Pradesh: Party-wise and Vote Share." Times of India, March 11, 2017.

Vadakara, M.C. *Muslim League Swathandraindiayil.* Kozhikode: Indian Union Muslim League Kerala State Committee, 2015.

Varghese, Roy. "Secularism and the Politics of Religious Minorities in Kerala with Special Reference to the Christian Community." *PhD Thesis.* Kottayam: Mahatma Gandhi University, 2008.

Varshney, Ashutosh. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India.* New Delhi: Yale University Press, 2003.

Wagner, Wolfgang, and Sofie Dreef. "Ethnic Composition and Electoral System Design: Demographic Context Conditions for Post-conflic tElections." *Ethnopolitics* 13, no. 3 (2014): 288-307.

Wilkinson, Steven I. *Votes and Vioelence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

William, Michelle. *The Roots of Participatory Democracy Democratic Communists in South Africa and Kerala, India.* New York: Palgrave Macmillian , 2008.

Yadu, C. R. "Some Aspects of Agrarian Change in Kerala." *Journal of Land and Rural Studies* 5, no. 1 (2017): 12-30.

Zachariah, K.C. "Religious Denominations of Kerala ." *Working Paper.* CDS, April 2016.