

**THE TIBETAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AND ITS APPROACHES TO
TIBET-CHINA DISPUTE**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for award of the degree*


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
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
DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "THE TIBETAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AND ITS APPROACHES TO TIBET-CHINA DISPUTE" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of **Master of Philosophy** has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.



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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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Dedicated to my brother Sonam Lama and T.H.S Mie

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Abbreviations

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPC	Communist Party of China
KMT	Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)
MWA	Middle Way Approach
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
TGiE	Tibetan Government in Exile

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Chapter One

Introduction

Tibet was an independent country, a sovereign nation before the Chinese forces annexed it in 1949/1950. According to Shiromany, this fact is confirmed in both Chinese and Tibetan history (Shiromany 1998, xviii). Tibet had all the four attributes to be a state in the international law before the invasion of Chinese; a) Population; the Tibetan constitutes a distinct population where even the People's Republic of China (PRC) accepted Tibetans as one of the 'minority nationality,' b) Territory; the PRC has never refused that there was a Tibetan territory even though there were conflicts between two countries about the definite boundaries of the Tibetan territory. It was fact that the ethnic Tibet and its history reach was more than the borderline of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), c) Government; Tibetans were governed by the Tibetan government known as Gaden Phodrang headed by the Dalai Lama since 1642, d) and, treaty-making capacity; Tibet had the authority to make treaty with rest of the states, for instance Tibet's treaty with Mongolia in 1912, with Nepal in 1856 and tripartite of Tibet, Great Britain and China in 1913-1914 and so on and so forth (Praag 2013). After the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) completed its total domination of China in 1949 and formed the PRC. They had also decided to use military force for the occupation of Tibet. As a result, the Chinese finally led to the forceful signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement with Tibetan representatives on the agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 23 May 1951.

Therefore, Tibet was reduced to the status of "national regional autonomy" under the supremacy of PRC. The Dalai Lama and his Tibetan government tried to protect and implement the autonomy as mentioned in the Seventeen-Point Agreement till 1959. But there was no such intention from the Chinese government to implement the agreement. Finally, the popular uprising took place in Tibet especially in Lhasa, which forced the Dalai Lama and his government to leave Tibet and seek exile in India where they remained till present. The Dalai Lama and his government in exile has rejected the Seventeen-Point Agreement after arriving in exile and Tibetan government had decided to reclaim the independence of Tibet from the CPC until

their official announcement of its new approach in Strasbourg in 1988 which known as “Strasbourg Proposal”¹ (DIIR 2010) where it proposed the Middle Way Approach (MWA) as their new way forward.

The Tibetan Government in Exile

At last, *de facto* Tibetan government was established in the northern India town of Dharamshala with Indian government’s permission. The Tibetan Government in Exile was not a new government that formed outside the Tibetan territories; rather it was the continuity of the government of Tibet in Lhasa (M. Praag 1987, 187). The objective of its establishment was to “restore freedom in Tibet and rehabilitating the Tibetan refugees” (McConnel 2016, 4). Tibetan Government in Exile known as “Central Tibetan Administration”, today it is not legally recognized by any governments or states. This institution has no legal authority over the territory in Tibet or in exile; it operates under the authorisation of Indian government. The formation of government in exile has forced Tibetans to a paradigm shift in their political system. The Tibetan traditional hereditary system of elite leadership in Tibet has come to an end. However, Chinese government considered exile government as a “separatist political group campaigning against the motherland” (ibid, 2). The PRC also does not recognize Tibetan Government in Exile. For them, Tibet was not a problem instead it was the Dalai Lama and some of his followers who tried to split the China.

The structure and function of Tibetan Government in Exile was very similar to that of other states where it organizes through democratic elections, providing health and education services, collecting taxes through voluntary basis, issuing of Tibetan identity document (IC) through Indian government and the establishment of quasi-embassies. Yossin Shain stresses the importance of securing national loyalty and international support for any exile organization to maintain its political structure and to achieve the set goal. Tibetan Government in Exile is also getting international and individuals support to run their departments.

¹ On 15 June 1988, in an address to the European Parliament at Strasbourg, France, the Dalai Lama made the first official proposal offering to give up Tibetan independence in return for autonomous rights and “associate status” within China.

Table No. 1: **Tibetan Government in Exile at Glance**

Population	Approximately 1,28,014 (Approximate world-wide distribution: India 94,203; Nepal 13,514; Bhutan 1,298; and rest of the world 18,999), Demographic Survey of Tibetans in exile 2009, by Planning Commission of Central Tibetan Administration, 2010.
Government	Democratic and popularly elected
Judiciary	Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission
Legislature	Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile with 45 members
Executive	The Kashag (cabinet) is the apex executive body. The Sikyong (Tibetan political leader) is elected directly by the exile population for a term of five years. Under the Kashag are the main department of Religion and Culture, Home, Education, Finance, Security, Information and International Relations, and Health
Major Non-Government Organisations	Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC). Tibetan Women's Association (TWA), National Democratic Party of Tibet (NDPT), Gu-Chu-Sum Movement
Foreign Missions	Based in New Delhi, Kathmandu, Washington DC, London, Geneva, Moscow, Brussels, Canberra, Tokyo, Pretoria, Taipei and Sao Paulo
Livelihood	Agriculture, agro-industries, carpet weaving and exports, service sector. The winter sweater selling business is the economic mainstay of about 70 percent of the exile population in India
Education	Total school enrolment is 85 to 90 percent of the school-aged children in exile. According TO 2009 Demographic survey of the Planning Commission of CTA, Effective Literacy Rate of the total Tibetans in India, Nepal, and Bhutan is 82.4%

Source: Tibet.net URL: <http://tibet.net/about-cta/tibet-in-exile/>.

The functional relationship between Tibetan Government in Exile and its people are completely of a volunteer basis. The Tibetan Government in Exile issues a Green Book to those Tibetans who are willing to contribute the “Chatrel”² to the government. This Green book is used as a *de facto* passport by the exiled Tibetans to demand their rights from the exile government and also on that basis to claim Tibetan citizenship in the future. The existence of Chatrel symbolizes the Tibetan people’s recognition of Tibetan Government in Exile as their legitimate representative (DIIR 2018). Whereas the presence of the Dalai Lama in exile and functioning of Tibetan Government in Exile act as continuous challenges to the legitimacy of the Chinese government’s administration in Lhasa. The successful reconstruction and advancement of the exile community as a whole, moreover, present a tangible and viable alternative to the highly unsuccessful and tragic attempt at the transformation of the Tibetan plateau (M. Praag 1987, 187).

Non-Governmental Organizations in Exile

There is a plethora of Tibetan non-governmental organizations (NGO), which are mainly set up to the restoration of Tibet’s independence. These NGOs such as Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), Student for Free Tibet (SFT), Gu Chu Sum, Tibetan National Congress (TNC), Tibetan National Democratic Party, etc are basically established to restore Tibet independence and return the Dalai Lama back to independent Tibet. All of above organizations were established in exile and they are politically in nature. Even though Tibetan Government in Exile has shifted its political demand but many of these organizations did not change their political demands. Thus, the challenges to these organizations are to stand opposite to their government’s position and struggle against Chinese government as well as trying to survive within the Tibetan community without surrendering its political demands. There are cases where the division has happened within one organization in terms of its political position. Other than that these organisations have been able to survive under the framework of Tibetan democracy in exile with plethora of challenges within Tibetan Diasporas as well as from Chinese government’s accusations. These NGOs has played a vital role

² Chatrel: A form of tax to exiled Tibetans where it contributes voluntarily to their government on yearly basis.

in maintaining and functioning of Tibetan Government in Exile and keeping the Tibetan struggle alive within the Tibetan Diaspora as well as international stage.

The Middle Way Approach

After the Dalai Lama's statement in Strasbourg in 1988, Tibetan Government in Exile has made it official that the government is seeking for a meaningful autonomy through Middle Way Approach (MWA) that demands mutual benefits to both Tibetans and Chinese. Since Strasbourg Proposal, the Dalai Lama has mentioned that Tibetans remaining with China is beneficial to Chinese government and having a meaningful autonomy to the Tibetan people is beneficial for Tibetans as well. Therefore, MWA is equally beneficial to both Tibetans and Chinese. According to the official account, the idea of MWA emerged in 1970s when the Tibetan Government in Exile's cabinets, parliament speaker and Dalai Lama had discussion on the future policy of Tibet. It is necessary to understand the atmosphere of PRC and also very important to know why the shift in political took place particularly during these periods. The official account of the Cultural Revolution passed by the Communist Party of China in 1981 mentioned that the beginning of the Cultural Revolution as May 1966.

However, for the Tibetans, Cultural Revolution can be traced back to February 1966 till 1976, for the first time the Chinese government has banned the celebration of the "Monlam"³ ceremony in Lhasa (Shakya 1999, 317). By the end of Cultural Revolution, the condition of Tibetans in Tibet was in a very critical and dire situation. They were in need of the situation to have contact with Chinese government to resolve the dispute. The urgent solution was required to resolve Tibet and China dispute. Kalsang Gyaltsen, envoy of Tibetan "task force" mentioned that in 1970s Tibetan government needed to contact with the Chinese government to resolve the very critical condition inside Tibet. If Tibetans continue to struggle for its independence, then it was impossible to have dialogue or mutual agreement between the Chinese government and the Tibetan government. Therefore, there is a need to adopt a holistic approach for both China and Tibet that could be a mutually beneficial. The end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, there had a couple of talks between

³ Monlam; Religious festival in Tibet held every year.

Tibet and China. At the end, it had to stop without any fruitful results. So the Tibetan Government in Exile has decided that; the Dalai Lama should announce his demands against Chinese government to the world.

Therefore, in 1987 Dalai Lama announced a proposal known as “Five Point Peace Plan” at the U.S Congress (Phenpo 2015) where he announced the five points to resolve Tibet issue with the Chinese government. The fifth-point of this proposal was on negotiation between China and Tibet. Then in the coming year, the Dalai Lama has elaborated on the fifth-point in a speech to the “members of the European Parliament” in Strasbourg at France. He proposed that Tibet that consist of Tibet’s area popularly known as “Cholka-Sum” U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo, should be allowed to run as “self-governing democratic political entity” under the constitution of PRC to protect Tibetan identity and their natural and cultural environment. The Communist Party of China will be responsible for the defence and foreign policy of Tibet. The Tibetan government will maintain their relations in terms of commerce, education, culture, etc and other non-political activities through its own foreign affairs bureau (Lama n.d.). Therefore, the Dalai Lama has finally surrendered the demand of Tibet independence. Since then, Tibetan Government in Exile’s demand is to have a meaningful autonomy for the Tibetan people.

The Dalai Lama’s Strasbourg Proposal was a turning point in Tibetan Government in Exile’s political status. For the first time in exile, the Tibetan government had to compromise its political demand where Tibet’s sovereign independent status was no more their official demand against the Chinese government. Even though, the compromise strategy was not new to the Tibetans and there were cases where similar steps had been taken. The official account claimed that the Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet decided MWA unanimously through democratic process. It is a debatable how inclusive the decision making on MWA was and how they had collect the votes or opinions from inside Tibet. The Tibetan Government in Exile was ready to stay with PRC if the Chinese government was willing to give a meaningful autonomy to the whole of Tibet. The Strasbourg proposal has become the basis of the Dalai Lama initiatives to bring about dialogue with Chinese government. The Tibetan official account claimed that the MWA is the best option proposed by Tibetan Government in Exile where it argued that Tibet is neither seeking for its sovereign independence nor accepting the status quo. In the same way,

the Tibetan traditional political system was not acceptable to the Tibetans and also the current divisions of Tibet was not acceptable.

Remaining in exile as well as practicing the imagined state becomes very challenging to the Dalai Lama and his government. The political shift in Tibetan Government in Exile changed the whole political scenario between Tibet and China in their future possibility. This new approach was not accepted easily within the exiled Tibetan community. There were many heated debates within exiled community on this new approach and it will be a never-ending debate in Tibetan exile politics until and unless there is a change in its approaches. However, it is very hard to predict what positive changes MWA will bring in the near future between Tibet and China. As of now, the Chinese government condemn the MWA and considered it nothing more than a political tool to split China (DIIR 2016, ii). The “principle stand and basic attitude of the Chinese government regarding the Dalai Lama and his followers have been consistent and clear, with no changes at all” (DIIR 1994). All Chinese premiers stated that Tibet is an inseparable part of China and the Dalai Lama should recognize it and stop internationalizing Tibet issue because it is a domestic affair. This is impossible to accept for the Dalai Lama and his fellow Tibetans.

For Dalai Lama, this is a demand of rewriting Tibet’s history where it is not possible to him and Tibetan Government in Exile. The Chinese government argued, “Dalai Lama has not abandoned his stand for the independence of Tibet. This is the largest obstacle to negotiations” (DIIR 1994). At present scenario, both the nations are trying to have negotiations on negotiation so that there will have a discussion on the solutions. The Tibetan government argues that the Chinese government is waiting for Dalai Lama to pass away so that, the Tibet issue will disappear. This is a major misunderstanding by the Chinese government. Many incidents have shown that Tibet issue is not only for the Dalai Lama and some elites classes. For instance, having division within Tibetan community on the political demand has shown that it is not only about the Dalai Lama status. The sooner they understand it, the better it will help both the nations to resolve their dispute.

The research interest of this paper is not to just highlight the political shift in the Tibetan Government in Exile’s approaches towards resolving Tibet issue with the Chinese government, which is very much visible in Tibetan Diasporas. This dissertation has focused on a brief history of the political relationship between Tibet

and China both during Chinese Kuomintang period as well as Communist Party of China and how their relations understand themselves with the Tibetan government. The understanding of Tibet and China's historical relations from the present perspective is very different from their actual relations. And it also discusses on the factors which forced political shift of Tibetan Government in Exile's approaches towards resolving the Tibet issue with China. The consequence of Tibetan Government in Exile's political shift on the Tibetan Diasporas has also been also studied in this dissertation.

Review of Literature

There are many scholarships on Tibetan Government in Exile's democratic system but very few scholarships are available on the Tibetan Government in Exile's political shift or the origin of the MWA. It is necessary to understand the nature of geopolitics and domestic issues in which this decision was taken by the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in Exile. Dawa Norbu mentioned in his book "China's Tibet Policy" as well as in many of his articles that there was an international impact on the changes of Tibetan Government in Exile's political approaches. But he has not elaborated further on his arguments. Warren Smith, a scholar on Tibet said in his book "China's Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation" that the PRC's ultimate intention is assimilation rather autonomy. In the absence of any solution, Smith advocates the promotion of Tibet's right to self-determination as the most viable strategy for sustaining international attention and maintaining the most essential elements of Tibetan national identity. Michael Walt Praag has proposed in his book 'the Status of Tibet' and many of his articles that the best solution available for both China and Tibet is through negotiation. He was a legal advisor of Dalai Lama and Tibetan government in exile. Therefore, he has big impacted on the concept of MWA.

The dominant discourse about this debate was that the MWA was not suddenly formulated by the Tibetan Government in Exile. Their official account says, since the early 1970s, Dalai Lama held a series of discussions on this issue with, and solicited suggestions from, the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, the Kashag (Cabinet), scholars and experienced people. Particularly in 1979, the late Chinese paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping's proposal to

the Dalai Lama that “except independence, all other issues can be resolved through negotiations,” was very much in agreement with the Dalai Lama's long-held belief of finding a mutually-beneficial solution. Immediately, Dalai Lama gave a favourable response by agreeing to undertake negotiations and decided to change the policy of restoring Tibet's independence to that of a meaningful autonomy through MWA.

Some scholars such as Warren Smith trace the origin of MWA farther back in the history of Sino-Tibetan relations. The formal announcement of the MWA in 1988 caused consternation among many Tibetans. The distress and demoralization experienced by many Tibetans were temporarily overshadowed by the award of the “Nobel Peace Prize” to the Dalai Lama in 1989. Many foreign supporters of Tibet and the international community, in general, were more welcoming of the Strasbourg proposal because of its seemingly pragmatic character. Nevertheless, Strasbourg Proposal or MWA created a new division in the Tibetan community between those who are pro-independence and who are pro-Middle Way approach. The MWA has only widened the gap within the Tibetan community as the policy has failed to produce any resolution with China (Smith n.d.).

In this dissertation, it has been tried to analyze that whether there has any similar incidents of other proposal taken place like Strasbourg Proposal in Tibetan history and if yes, then how far it is different or similar to the Strasbourg Proposal. As mentioned earlier, the compromise strategy is nothing-new strategy for the Tibetans. The ‘Seventeen-Point Agreement’ was an example of how the compromise strategy worked in Tibetan politics.

Nothing changes on its own so it is also not possible to have changes in the nature of whole Tibetan political shift by itself. So here it will study whether there is any both outside and inside factors, which impact Tibetan Government in Exile's political shift.

Research Questions

1. What are the compositions which have led to the political shift in 1988 of the Tibetan Government in Exile's approaches towards resolving its political issue with China?

2. Is the Middle Way Approach a better strategic option than sovereign independent to the Tibetans under given structural constraints?
3. Has the Middle Way Approach lead to division within Tibetan community in exile?
4. What are the responses of the international community on the Tibetan government in exile's political shift in their demand?

Hypotheses

1. There are internal and external factors which influenced to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile's shifting of their approaches towards Middle Way Approach from sovereign Independence.
2. The Middle Way Approach has created a wider division within Tibetan community in exile instead of unifying the Tibetans under one political demand.
3. Even though Middle Way Approach has been able to internationalized Tibet issue but it has also created political division within Tibetan Diaspora.

Research Objective

Raising questions on the policies of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile are quite difficult as well as challenging to any individuals or organisations. This is not so much welcome in Tibetan community and especially within the Tibetan Government in Exile. The common understanding of Tibetan people towards MWA is that it is proposed by the Dalai Lama to resolve the dispute between Tibet and China. So, many have Tibetans critical thinking and rationality is overtaken by their belief and faith when the judgments are made on the policy. Asking the question about MWA policy is something, which majority Tibetans has never thought of and it is also difficult to digest even if others do. The critical analysis on the policies of Tibetan Government in Exile is not so common and even if there are few but he/she has to remain outside Tibetan community to a extend. Majority of Tibetans believe in MWA not because they understand it so well and why it is a better option for the Tibetans to resolve the dispute with China. But they knew it is proposed by the Dalai Lama, so it is the best option for them as he thinks about six million Tibetans.

It is vital to break this innocent and ignorant belief on such policies and needs to analyze without any biased and fear. It is not that Tibetans rationality could not work on such policies but they don't use their rationality. The difficulty for the Tibetans is that there are hardly any resources available other than the government narrations. It needs to understand that the government narration is a one part of the whole perspective and all other perspectives are needs to welcome. To have the policy more polished and clear to the Tibetans and its counterpart. Both the perspectives should be available to the public to debate and decide.

The Tibetan Government in Exile argued that MWA is a policy adopted democratically by the Tibetan Government in Exile. The Tibetan people through a series of discussions held over a long time. It is necessary to explore what are the factors, which has influenced to this political shift and how democratic the process of discussions is in the decision-making process. There has been a lot of criticism, which posed that the discussants were all pro-government and already the supporter of MWA. It is debatable how representative this kind of selection to decide both inside and outside Tibet's future policy. However, the political situation of Tibet under Chinese government needs to analyze during 1970s. The Cultural Revolution was already begun and thereafter changes in Chinese leadership etc.

There are many scholarships on Tibet and its relations with neighbouring countries. Many scholars have done their research on Tibet's factors in "Sino-USA relation" or "Sino-Indo relation" and so on where most researchers mainly focus on the importance of Tibet in other country's bilateral relations or vice versa. The Tibetan democratic system is another common topic to do research. They are very few scholars who are doing research on the Tibetan Government in Exile and its political strategy towards resolving the dispute with the Chinese government. There is no doubt that MWA is a very sensitive topic in exile where Tibetans sentiment has been attached. The researchers need to be very careful with their research. It is not that it is sacred to the Tibetans or anyone else but it is because of Tibetans blindly belief on the Dalai Lama and his philosophy. Therefore, criticising Dalai Lama's policies is similar to criticising the Dalai Lama himself, which is not acceptable to the majority of Tibetans. The end of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death in 1976 had a huge impact on Chinese political system. The new leader has initiated the economic reform and introduced "four modernizations" of China. The new leader Deng Xiaoping has

took bold initiative to resolve minority disputes. But it will be studied in this dissertation whether there has any impact of these changes on the Tibetan Government in Exile political changes.

In term of international relations, there is an improvement in the Sino-US relations after Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's secret travelled to China in 1971 and thereafter President Richard Nixon's visited to China. The relations between USSR and China start to deteriorate. This new relation of US and China had negative impacted for Tibet and the Tibetan resistance movement who had been jointly controlled by US and India since 1963 (Bhutia 2013). "The Indian government too had started to pressurize the Dalai Lama to intervene in Mustang Operation as India wanted to avoid any kind of war in Mustang where Tibetan resistance movement's base was established" (ibid, 69). Gradually, Dalai Lama begins to shift Tibet issue with the socio-economic welfare of the Tibetan people and de-emphasizing the political dimensions of the issue. This has marked his fundamental departure from the earlier official position on the sovereign independence of Tibet (ibid, 77).

From 1979 to 1985 the Tibetan Government in Exile has sent four fact-finding Delegations to Tibet. The overall conclusion of the tour was that the situation inside Tibet was becoming worst then pre-1959 Tibet. The relation between the Tibetan Government in Exile and the Chinese government was also not improving. These tours were the first opportunity where both parties can convey their demands and try to reach a conclusion. Unfortunately, the tour could not achieve their initial objective so it remains unsuccessful. In the contrast, the tour of the find-finding delegates concluded that Tibetans inside Tibet have not forgotten the Dalai Lama and their connection with him even after thirty years. The Chinese government misunderstood the Tibetans that all Tibetans were happy and satisfy under the Chinese government. However, these fact-finding tours became a morale boost to the Tibetan Government in Exile and Tibetans who remain outside Tibet. Therefore, the understanding of MWA and how it has evolved with the time is necessary to understand for Tibetans and the Chinese. There were many factors, which influenced in the shifting of Tibetan government in exile political approaches, which needs to analyze openly.

Significance of the Research

The MWA became official position since the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg proposal in 1988. Since then, the MWA has been kept evolving and more and more people are debating on it. The Tibetan Government in Exile has built a grand narration on MWA as well as why it has been the most viable solution between Tibet and China dispute. Every year the government make the effort to spread the awareness of the MWA in the exile Tibetan settlements. There are very few scholarships available on this subject other than the official publications. Even though it is an ongoing process and keeps evolving. It is necessary to analyze the origin of the MWA as well as under what circumstances this approach has been implemented.

The Chinese government completely rejected this proposal and it claimed that the MWA has hidden agenda of semi-independence, independence in disguise. Whereas Tibetan Government in Exile argued that MWA is the best solution, which can mutually beneficial to both the parties. There is no doubt that MWA is not fruitful as the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama expect it. Instead there has created a demarcation within the Tibetan community in exile because of MWA. The Chinese government is trying not to understand the MWA. Instead they consider death of Dalai Lama and economic development in Tibet can be the solution of the Tibet issue. The Chinese government need to understand that the problems it faces in the non-Chinese areas particularly Tibet were not merely economic and few people's dissatisfaction towards PRC. At root they were political and, as such, can only be solved by political change (DIIR 2005). But the most difficult one is the trust deficit between the Chinese government and the Tibetan government. The Tibet issue can only resolve through the development of mutual understanding and trust between Tibetans and the Chinese government (Shiromany 1998, 42). This can only be possible through negotiation between them.

After the closed and negative attitude from the Chinese government, the Dalai Lama felt that his commitment to these ideas has become ineffectual. He argues that the logical step is to acknowledge our failure in this endeavour to reach out to the Chinese leadership. He said in his 10 March statement in 1994 that he has left no stone unturned in his attempts to reach an understanding with the Chinese government. So now he has places his hopes on international support and help in bringing about meaningful negotiation between him and the Chinese government. If

this fails, then he will no longer be able to pursue this MWA. He will consult to the Tibetans on the future course of Tibetan freedom struggle (DIIR 2005, 110). Jamyang Norbu argued that though in the past, Tibetans made the mistake of being absolutely suspicious of all foreigners. It does not help things now to be absolutely trusting of them either. Tibetan national policies must be formulated by Tibetans to serve Tibetan interests (Norbu 1989). In 1994, the Dalai Lama proposed referendum to clarify the political course of Tibetan struggle. The assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies and the Kashag has provided the Tibetan people with four alternatives to debates and vote.

Finally, the assembly of the Tibetan People's Deputies adopted a unanimous resolution on 18 September 1997, stating that the Dalai Lama should decide on the issue of Tibet with changing political situation in China and in the world (DIIR 2010). But there was heated debate and general public was strongly attached to the cause of independence but at the same time did not want to disappoint the Dalai Lama. It was a traumatic, confusing and extremely divisive period for Tibetans in exile. Even within families the referendum caused much bitterness and discord. Norbu argued that referendum was supposed to happen between "independence" and "Middle Way Approach" but in order to downplay the stark contrast between these two choices. The two quite irrelevant options such as "self-determination" and "truth insistence" were added (Norbu 2000).

The independent researchers who are not affiliated to both sides of the governments can probably provide more detail on this subject in the public space. These independent researches can provide more factual as well as rational to be as a reference point in resolving conflict between Tibet and China. The understanding of the origin of MWA is vital to both Tibetans and Chinese. This dissertation is one step towards that direction.

Research Methodology

Broadly speaking, the primary objective of this dissertation is to acquire a thorough understanding of the factors, which has forced the political shift of the Tibetan Government in Exile since 1988. The research method use is descriptive, analytical as well as historical. The primary sources that are relevant materials to this dissertation will be studies such as policies, statutes, and regulations, published by the Tibetan

Government in Exile and other international bodies and individuals. The secondary sources include books, articles published in edited volumes, research journal, written interviews, oral interview and individual articles. Internet sources such as websites and YouTube are also been used in this dissertation.

Structure of the Dissertation

The first chapter discusses the overall historical background of Tibet and China. It was divided into four parts, in the initial; it presents the broad understanding of term “Tibet” and “Tibetans”. There was no Pan-Tibetan identity before the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1959 but the Tibetans themselves imagine as one identity in a broad sense. Secondly, Simla Conference's initial objectives and the outcome have been discussed. This conference became one of the most important conferences made by the Tibetan government to represent themselves and show their *de facto* independence. Thirdly, the Indian government’s policy towards Tibet is present and how it has effect to the other countries policy in terms of Tibet. The chapter concluded by discussing the occupation of Tibet by Chinese people’s liberation army (PLA).

The second chapter presents why the Tibetan government could not resist both the Kuomintang as well as Communist Party of China’s (CPC) assertion over Tibet. After the death of thirteen Dalai Lama, the Kuomintang government sent a mission known as “Huang Mission” in 1934 to reassert their power over Tibet. The Kuomintang government established their representative in Tibet through this mission. Then after two decades later, the CPC overthrew the Chamdo government and controlled by them in 1950, and it forced Tibetan representatives to signed “Seventeen-Point Agreement”. Thereafter Tibet has lost its *de facto* independence and became a part of China. The role of America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to both the Tibetan rebellion as well as escaping the Dalai Lama to exile has been discussed.

The third chapter presents the factors, which impacted on the shifted of the Tibetan Government in Exile’s political demand. There are many incidents such as the involvement of America’s CIA in the Mustang Operation as well as it disconnects with them had an impact to the political shift of Tibetan Government in Exile. The

internationalization of Tibet issue during the Dalai Lama's abroad travelling in 1970s and the international responses on Tibet issue had also impact to Tibetan Government in Exile's political shift. The Tibetan Government in Exile's response to CPC new leader's initiatives was a major game changer in the Tibetan government's political demand. Finally, the debates between pro-Middle Way Approach and pro-independence has been discussed and what are the impact of these divisions on the unification of Tibetans within the Tibetan community in exile.

Chapter Two

The Simla Conference, Tibet Legal Status and Government of India

"Tibetans shall be happy in the land of Tibet and Chinese in the land of China"

-From the Treaty signed in 821 between China and Tibet

Introduction

This chapter is divided into four sub-themes which all focus on brief historical presentation of Tibet. The first theme traces the geographical composition of Tibet through in terms of its political and social ground. The second sub-theme focuses on the major compositions and the outcome of the "Simla Conference" in 1913-14 signed between China, Tibet, and British India, and will analyze these participant countries' different perspective on the convention. This conference became significant to all three states, particularly for Tibet as proof of its *de facto* independence. This conference has played a vital role in the defining of Tibet's political status till 1951. The third sub-theme analysis the perception of Indian leaders after India's independence on the status of Tibet and especially the contradictions among India political leaders, which include Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru and 'K. M Panikkar'⁴ who were favourable and trusted towards China's policy on Tibet. On the other hand, there were leaders such as Jayaprakash Narayan who were very critical of China's policy towards Tibet in the 1950s. In this chapter it will be argued that the position of the Indian government had an immense influence on other states' political position on Tibet. In the final section, colonization of Tibet by the CPC will be discussed as well as the counter-strategies that the Tibetans implement during the 1950s to assert their status quo.

What is Tibet?

The history of Tibet is difficult to understand by the understanding of the modern Tibet through the lens of modern epistemology. The term "Tibetan" as used by western academic understanding that the population, which had common history and

⁴ K.M. Panikkar was a Indian Ambassador during both Nationalist and Communist government of China

tradition and share the common myth about their origin. But there was no indigenous term, which holds the population denoted by the western academics. The local term such as “Bodpa” (Tibetan) was very restrictive and it was referred to the inhabitants of Central Tibet or Lhasa valley.

In the Buddha's teaching, “Tibet was referred to as land of snow in the north” (Rinpoche 2008, 62). So, the singular marker of identity emerges only in opposition to “the other” which was not very visible with Tibet before the Chinese invasion (Shakya 1993). Tibetans have multiple identities that were there in the other societies as well. But under some conditions, there was a Pan-Tibetan identity, which had, exists otherwise the sub-national identities emerged among Tibetans (Norbu 1992).

The sub-national identities were based on sects and regions before 1950. Tibetan Buddhism has four sects vis. Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya, Geluk, which existed in Tibet. Regionally, Tibetans identified themselves as Khampa, Topa, Tsangpa, Amdowa and so on. Sectarian identity was based on the different traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, so it comes more to the fore among the monks and lamas. The regional identities and allegiance to the ‘homeland’ were more popular among the lay people (Shakya 1992). So, there was no particular identity identifying the Tibetans before 1950. It could be argued that term “nangpa”⁵ united all Tibetans except “Bonpos”⁶ (and the tiny Muslim community), although it also included Mongolians.

In practice, the sectarian and territorial identities sometimes overlap and reinforce each other, although the sectarian identity were more powerful than the territorial identity. The Buddhism was a bridging point between the imperial China and Buddhist Tibet, which led to the Lamaist form of tribute relations (Norbu 2001, 30). Thus, the relation between China and Tibet was that of “Cho-Yon” (priest-patron) and there was no implication of country-to-country or state-to-state relations (ibid, 2). This kind of non-coercive Lamaist regime has created structural contradiction. Internally, Tibet was highly decentralized polity including autonomous local powers such as Derge, Nyarong, Sakya, and Shigatse. And externally, the Tibetan government lacked an armed force and led the Lamaist regime to depend on external military support (ibid, 138).

⁵ Nangpa (insider) refers to Buddhist in Tibet.

URL. <http://www.rigpawiki.org/index.php?title=Nangpa>.

⁶ Bonpos refers to a person who worships the Bon religion. Bon is a indigenous religion of Tibet before the arrival of Buddhism in Tibet. URL. <http://www.religionfacts.com/bon>.

Therefore, the priest-patron relation was understood in terms of a symbolic hierarchy, which cannot define in terms of the modern concepts of equality or domination. Thus, the relationship between China and Tibet rested on “symbolic acts” and “ceremonial”. The ceremonial relation between the two states implied that the Chinese Emperor treated the leading lama of Tibet as near equals (Norbu 2001). The relation between China and Tibet was something unique and complex which cannot be fully understood in the context of contemporary international legal terms.

After Chinese Revolution in 1911, the bitter experience that Manchu had from the western power has taught China a new political language and new way of thinking. Chinese government has used this strategy on Tibet, and it has clearly shown the Chinese government thinking was very different from its traditional understanding of mutual relations. There were two ways that the political language of nationalism was developed within China that was distinct from the traditional understanding of relations (Norbu 2001, 160-161).

“Firstly a new generation of Chinese officials had come into existence as a result of western education in treaty ports, and they increasingly spoke in western political language in relation to Tibet. Second, Great Britain and China had a series of negotiations regarding Tibet; the frame of these negotiations was dictated by the British, being the greater power. Such negotiation particularly the Calcutta talks in 1890, unwittingly taught the Chinese to conceptualize their views on past Sino-Tibet ties in modern western political and legal terms” (Norbu 2001, 161).

The model of nation-state was introduced to Tibet at the beginning of the twentieth century but without great success. Pre-modern Tibet was not defined by lines drawn on a map or by the modern logic of a seamless unity between territory and politics. The Tibetans “sense of independence was based more on the independence of life and culture which was more real to ordinary Tibetans than law or history, canons by which the neighbouring states decided the fate of Tibet” (Norbu 2001, 212). The Tibet was connected by the sense of allegiance and relationship between centre and periphery. Therefore, the line drawn on the map and the territory and politics relationship does not defined Tibet. In 1993, Geoffrey Samuel argues in his monumental study *Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies*, that “Pre-modern Tibet is best thought of not as a centralized or even a decentralized state, but as a series of societies existing in a continuous social field” (Samuel 1993, 3). The

political and social formations across Tibetan societies were wide with immense of variety. Some groups were subordinate to others, and some were self-governing and many, but not all, of these groups were subordinate to the Dalai Lama's administration in Lhasa. Yet the administrative aspects of rule were not weighted more heavily than the ritual or performative aspects of rule. For example, control of people, which relied on performative practices, was considered more important than control of land, which relied on administrative practices (McGranahan 2010, 40-41).

Therefore, Georges Dreyfus argued, "Tibet should be understood as a semi-bureaucratic state, in which the inequalities in bureaucratic administration across Tibetan territory are typical of any pre-modern state, which is defined not by boundaries but by a complicated network of overlapping allegiances" (Dreyfus 1995, 136). Therefore, before the Chinese invasion in 1950, the line drawn on the map or territory was not much matter as compared to their belongingness or allegiance to the Lhasa government.

Moving from a state-level view to a regional one offers a valuable sense of how the Tibetan state and nation were experienced, organized, and understood locally as well as insight into how local practices would later be deployed and rethought. The Kham region, for instance, combined of some thirty-odd 'phayul', a term which translates literally as 'fatherland' and structurally as native places, areas, or territories. Each phayul was combined by various sizes and sects of many villages and monasteries, which were demarcated by the rivers and massive mountain ranges that cut through them. Before 1950, Khampa system of governance was different by area, many were kingdoms, or ruled by chiefdoms, and still, some were ruled by lama lineage. The entirety of some phayul was one administrative unit, while another phayul governed via separate internal units (for example, the north under one chief, and south under another). Phayul was flexible in form, had no generic or shared administrative format, and were defined as much by social markers as by political ones (McGranahan 2010, 40).

The difference between one phayul to another was shown in both secular and sacred ways, such as dialect, clothing, and ornamentation and also through sects, lamas, and the local deities. All the areas or monasteries were not assumed as similar, and many were nominally or entirely under the leadership of other ones. Beyond its internal boundaries, Kham was a distinct part of Tibet, yet their relationship was determined not only by politics but also through a series of shifting religious, political

and economic relationship with the various power holders in Lhasa (Lhasa government). At times, portions of Kham fell under Chinese influence. For the most part, daily life in Kham was regulated not by direct or even absentee Lhasan or Chinese authorities, but by local rulers. As in the rest of Tibet, continuity and succession were as structurally important in Kham as fluidity and flexibility (ibid, 42).

The Europeanization of Sino-Tibetan relations took place roughly between 1905 and 1913. This has led to the major changes in the relationship between China and Tibet. The reference point of their relations was no more based on the Qing Emperor and the Dalai Lama. They were now based on the territorialisation and nationalization of the Chinese nation-state. The issues were no longer defined in terms of tributes and title exchanges but of the "Chinese nation-state" monopolization of Tibet's traditional ties with British India, Nepal, Bhutan, etc. This territorialism and nationalizing process amounted to the cessation of the traditional Sino-Tibetan relations and ultimately led to the integration of Tibet to the Chinese body politics in the name of political modernization (Norbu 2001, 162). Post-1959, the Tibet which was referred to the three regions; Kham, Amdo, and U-Tsang, was a modern Tibetan Government in Exile construct and it has tried to unify all three regions together under one umbrella as Tibet.

Simla Conference in 1913-14

This section analyses the context in which the participant states led to the inception of the conference. The Simla Conference was held in 1913-14 to settle the “question of Tibet” and its relation with neighbouring countries such as China and Tibet after several failed attempts by the British India. There were mainly two reasons that led to the organization of this conference. First, recognizing Chinese suzerainty on Tibet, British India signed various treaties with China relating to Tibet. The Tibetan government however rejected the treaties which had been signed between China and British India such as “1890 treaty”⁷ or “1893 treaty”⁸ etc. The Tibetans succeeded in making the treaty unenforceable (Praag 1987, 29). Therefore, British India had to bring all three countries to the negotiating table (Norbu 2001, 170). The perspective of

⁷ The Anglo-Chinese treaty on 17 March 1890, which recognized the British protectorate over Sikkim and sought to demarcate the Sikkim-Tibet border

⁸ The Anglo-Chinese Trade Regulation in 1893 which permitted British right to trade with Tibet at trade mart established in Yatung (Dromo)

each country in connection with the conference will be studied separately, as well as consequences of the conference for each state, and, finally, its relevance at present.

British India's Perspective

The emergence of European imperial power taking place in Asian countries led to major changes in Asian politics and its relations with neighbouring states. In the case of British India, the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 forced to the self-imposed exile of the thirteenth Dalai Lama to Mongolia, then finally to China. So, the British India has imposed a trade concession on Tibet. A few years later, in 1908 the Qing military advanced towards eastern Tibet and thereafter to Central Tibet because the Tibetan army was too weak to defend the country in such military conflict. As a result, the priest-patron relationship between the Machu Emperor and the Dalai Lama broke down. So government of Tibet tried to get protection from other foreign states. In the beginning, British India didn't want to interfere between the two states due to its commercial ties with China and its wish to keep Tibet as "buffer zone". But later in 1912, British India discovered that the Chinese Republic was planning to invade Tibet and this had a negative impact on the border between Tibet and British India. Therefore, British government reluctantly pressurized Republic of China to agree to participate in a tripartite conference to settle the dispute between Tibet and China (Praag 2014, 29-30).

The British government did not want to have hostility from Tibet towards British India and also, on the other hand, the Soviet Union was also trying to expand their power in Asia especially Mongolia and Tibet which could have an immense impact and hugely lost to British India if the British India let it happen. Thus the British reluctantly organized the tripartite conference so that the interest of British India will not affect. The British India wanted to negotiate the borderline between Tibet and British India and also the boundary between Tibet and China which has emerged as "Inner" and "Outer" Tibet.

Overall, there have been three major bilateral relations between British India and Tibet, but as of now, it focuses on the bilateral relationship between them on the border issue. This bilateral treaty was drawn up on 24 and 25 March 1914 in the form of "notes exchange" and "a map" displayed the agreed border, signed and sealed by both states representatives and signed before the final decision of Chinese representative not to sign the Simla conference (ibid, 35-36).

The British India wanted to have a defined boundary between Tibet and British India for their security reasons by acquiring territory, which was under the Tibetan polity until now such as Tawang. The Tibetan government had loosely administered the Tawang and its adjacent areas but the main parent monastery of Tawang was in Lhasa which had dominant power in the Tawang areas. So, the Tibetan government was not willing to cede to the British India government but the British India government was able to make the Tibetan government give by giving the unwritten assurance of the Tibet's autonomy and they will provide diplomacy and limited military support (ibid, 36). Therefore, the border came to be known as "McMahan line" in today's world map.

Tibetan's Perspective

The Tibetan statement presented by its representative Lochen Shatra clarified the historical relations of the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperors as a priest-patron. It stated "Tibet and China has never been under each other and will never associate with each other in the future" (Goldstein 1989, 70). It declared that Tibet was an independent state and it was ruled both temporary and spiritual affairs by the Dalai Lama (Praag 1987, 54). The Simla Conference was very crucial to the Tibetans because this conference can prove the *de facto* independence of Tibet irrespective of its outcome. Simla Conference from the Tibetan side was an effort to seek "*de jure*" recognition of the *de facto* independent status (Gyalpo 2014, 18).

It is necessary to understand the policies, which the thirteenth Dalai Lama has tried to implement prior to the Simla Conference to project Tibet at the international stage. The reforms that were introduced by the thirteen Dalai Lama were the consequent of many events during his period. Melvyn C. Goldstein in his book "A History of Modern Tibet 1913-1951" has argued three main events that finally begin to Simla Conference in 1914. The first event was the growth of British India's interest in Tibet, which led to the military infiltration of Tibet and Lhasa in 1904. Thereafter, the second event was the Chinese began to invade Tibet in 1908 due to weak position of Tibet and, finally the overthrow of Manchu dynasty in 1911 by the Kuomintang government but the position of China didn't change towards Tibet (Goldstein 1989, 65).

The second event has been begun when the Tibetan was in weak position in term of resources or military that forced to seek the Qing military protection to avoid British invasion. Thereafter, the Qing military got the legitimacy to start controlling the Tibetans and its territory. Even though, the Machu government was overthrow but, nothing has changed in new China's position in term of Tibet instead they continued to carry the position of Qing dynasty that Tibet is an inevitable part of new China. So, the condition of Tibet was unstable and Chinese military already began to invade Tibetan territory. The Dalai Lama has urged the British India to mediate between the new Chinese Republic and Tibet to settle the dispute and establish a clear border between them (Praag 2014, 30).

Initially, the Tibetan representatives had taken a hard-line position and the representatives strict on the reunification of all the Tibetan-speaking areas under the Central Tibetan Government and forbidden to enter the Chinese officials and troops in Tibet. Therefore, the demand presented by both Chinese representatives and the Tibetan representatives were completely contradictory to each other. The Lonchen Shatra who was Tibetan representative had argued that the Tibet should be recognized as an independent country and the territory of Tibet should include all the Tibetan-speaking areas up to Dartsedo in the east and Kokonor in the northeast. But the other side of the argument was of Ivan Chen who was Chinese representative who argued that Tibet is a part of China due to the conquest of the Genghis Khan and there was acceptance of title by the Tibetan lamas from the Chinese empire (Arpi 2001, 177-178). The title exchange had also happened between the Mongol Khans and the Tibetan lama but this doesn't prove that Tibet is a part of Mongol or China. Therefore, mere exchanging of the title doesn't validate that one small state was part of the dominant state. The issue between Tibet and China was far more complex and sometimes there were overlapping each other which make it more difficult to argue in a transparent and clear cut manner whether the two states were independent or not. There were depended on each other for a period of time in history.

The British India has divided the Tibet into two parts to have a 'fair deal' (ibid, 179) as 'Outer' and 'Inner Tibet'. The 'Outer Tibet' was considered as an autonomous Tibet under the control of Lhasa government where the government of China had no power to interfere in its administration and the selection of the Dalai Lama etc. But the 'Inner Tibet' was under the influence of Chinese government as a province. The Tibetan representatives have reluctantly agreed with this territory

demarcation proposal to settle the dispute. Simla conference was a tripartite treaty between Britain India, China, and Tibet but the Chinese government refused to ratify it (Norbu 2001, 170). The Chinese government was “totally unwilling to agree to the border delimitation, which meant giving up control of important ethnic Tibetan territories such as Chamdo” (Goldstein 1989, 75). So it refused to sign the treaty.

China’s Perspective

The Chinese government participated in the Simla Conference with the aim of negotiating on the “status of Tibet” and the “settlement of boundary between Tibet and China”. If the Chinese government did not take part in this conference then the validity of China influence in Tibet will lose its ground and the relation between British India and Tibet will be taken as two independent states. Therefore, in this endeavour, it has emerged two distinct position of China that was the “status of Tibet” and the boundary between Tibet and China as later bifurcated as “Inner and Outer Tibet”.

On the status of Tibet, the Chinese government argued that Tibet cannot be an independent state because it claimed to have established sovereignty over Tibet in 1793, after the Imperial armies had protected Tibet from foreign invaders. The Chinese have refused to accept Tibetan claim and argued that the basis of negotiation should be as follow:

1. “Tibet was to form ‘an integral part of the territory of the Republic of China,’ and China’s rights in this regard would be recognized and respected by all the parties; China would engage not to convert Tibet into a province, whereas Great Britain would agree not to annex any portion of Tibet.
2. The Chinese would have the rights to appoint a Resident in Lhasa with an escort of 2,600 Chinese soldiers.
3. Tibet would be guided by China in foreign affairs and defense matters and enter into negotiation with other powers only through the intermediary of China” (Praag 1987, 55).

In addition, the Chinese demand territory stretching as far west as Giamda, close to Lhasa, and included all of Amdo and much of Kham (ibid, 55). So, based upon these reasons Kuomintang/nationalist party argued that the Tibet cannot represent themselves as an independent or equal footing in the negotiation. But later, under the

pressured of British India, the Kuomintang (KMT) has accepted to initiate the negotiation between three states with equal footing and also the China and British India has accepted the creditability of Tibetan representative Lochen Shashtra but in the end, the Chinese representative Ivan Chen had refused to ratify the agreement.

The Chinese government was not invited in the dialogue between British India and Tibetan on the border issue and, even the Chinese government has not raised any question about the “Note Exchange” because the Chinese government had no say on the border between Tibetan and British Indian.

Consequences of Simla Conference

The Simla Convention has failed to achieve any of the country’s initial objectives but it was able to settle the conflict between Sino-Tibetan borders and settled it for quite a long period. The Chinese government wanted to draw the borderline near the Lhasa as the border between Tibet and China but the Tibetan government and also the British did not accept it. Once the border was drawn, it was quite far from the Lhasa and even the Chamdo was not coming under the Chinese government. When the Inner and Outer Tibet was proposed in the draft and the Chinese government tried to acquire much more than that but at the end, the Chinese government could not secure their proposed border demarcation. Thus, the Chinese government refused to ratify and sign the Simla Convention. Without signing the conference, the Chinese government failed to get the acknowledgment of Tibet being the part of China and the recognition of China’s suzerainty over Outer Tibet. But this has led to the Tibetans to make separate treaty with the British India and to confirm their international status to make treaty with other states (Praag 2014, 38).

As it was mentioned above, the outcome of the convention varied to all the three states but it was not same to all states. In 2014, Micheal Walt has categorized into three as mention in his article “The Simla Agreement in International Law” a) the recognition of Tibet's independent treaty-making capacity, b) recognition by the Great Britain of the territorial integrity of Tibet and c) three bilateral treaties between Great Britain and Tibet (ibid, 30-35).

The recognition of treaty-making capacity of the Tibet among these three states was the first in the Simla Conference on the “equal stature” with another state. There were many treaties that were signed between Tibet and British or Sino-Tibet. But Simla Conference was different than previous treaties, not only because it was a

tri-party treaty, but also in this conference Tibet sent its representatives as an independent state deciding the Tibet's position with other states on equal footing. Thus, it could be argued that Tibet and China's relationship was more complicated than just on incident or situation of a particular period could decide who belongs to whom. As it was mentioned earlier, there were a lot of overlapping and complexities in Tibet-China historical relationship and, that makes it difficult to argue the status of each state in terms of modern political and territory terminology. However, this treaty made it clear Tibet's capacity to make a treaty with other states.

The recognition of the territorial integrity of Tibet was very important even in today. The complexity of Tibetan boundary with China needs to be analyzed properly and the claim which was made by both states were very different to each other and it needs the third state to act as a mediator between the two states. As in this conference, British India has played the role of the third party. The territorial claims of both states were mutually exclusive from the very beginning of the Simla Conference. The Tibetan government argued that all of Kham up to Dartsedo and much of the Amdo belong to Tibet but on the other side, the Chinese claim all of Amdo and almost all of Kham up to Giama, a little over 100 miles east of Lhasa belong to China (ibid, 32). The problem with the Chinese claim was that it did not have enough evidence to prove their territorial claims even though it tried to trace from early Qing dynasty but on the other side, the Tibetan representatives produced hundreds of original documents, which prove their claim over the territory. The relation between the Central Tibet and its periphery were through religious, administrative institutional and political. These included records of tax collections, monastic estate revenue flows, legal cases, appointments of local lay and monastic officials in Kham and parts of Amdo and their correspondence (ibid, 33).

The important issue here was to understand the nature of Asia polity in general and the Tibet polity in particular. So, the nature of Tibet polity couldn't understand in term of the modern concepts of nationhood and statehood and also its status and boundaries could not be argued in the modern political and legal terms. It was not possible to completely demarcate the boundary between Tibet and China in term of modern epistemology due to the political complexity and their nature of priest-patron relationship but the borderland was characterized by overlapping sources of authority, open zones, and autonomous polities.

The Tibetan state, as mentioned by Carole McGranahan;

“Functioned under a set of rules that combined religious and secular authority, centralized and decentralized administration, ritual and performative aspects of allegiance, and allowed for high degrees of autonomy for certain areas within its sphere of influence.... Structures and dynamics of state-local relations were not consistent throughout Tibet but varied in different areas as well as overtime” (McGranahan 2003, 39).

The relationship between the Central Tibet and its periphery areas were not set in a defined political boundary but it was mainly through the religious allegiance with the Central Tibet and most of their parent monasteries were in Tibet. The evidence, which was brought to the Simla Conference, was not uniform to all the Kham and Amdo areas but those were based on the relationship of Central Tibet with each particular local authority.

Therefore, the evidence, which was brought by the Tibetan representatives, has led to the recognition of the integrity of Tibet by the British government as claimed by the Tibetan representatives. But the core claim which was made by both the Chinese and the Tibetan states have been left unfulfilled as in the proposal, then Tibetan representatives claimed for the recognition of whole of Tibet as one but it came out to be demarcated as “Inner and Outer Tibet”. It granted the Chinese some rights to interfere in the eastern part of Tibet. But the Chinese representatives refused to sign the treaty on the account of delimitation of the boundary of “Inner” and “Outer Tibet”. Therefore, the administrative division of Tibet was never effectuated, and the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and special rights in “Inner Tibet” conceded.

The third category which was on the bilateral relation between British India and Tibet and between these two states, it has made three treaties during these period first, the “Exchange of Notes” between the Tibetan representative Lochen Shatra and the British representative Henry McMahon on 24 and 25 March 1914, second, the Anglo-Tibetan declaration of 3 July 1914 which consists of convention between Tibet, British India and China and the final was the Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulation of 3 July 1914 (Praag 2014, 36).

The first agreement took place in the form of “Notes Exchange and Maps” between two representatives and it was signed before the refutation of Chinese representative signing of Simla conference. Therefore, the border between these two

states came to known as the McMahon line under the name of British representative sir Henry McMahon (ibid, 36). The British India wanted to draw a defined boundary at their north-east region to protect from the external invasion and the Tibetan government was searching for a protector to protect them from the Chinese invasion. Therefore, the Tawang came under British India even though it was loosely administered by the Central Tibet and the Tawang monastery mainly ruled the Tawang as its parent monastery was in Tibet. The Tibetan government has sacrifice the Tawang region due to the promise made by the British government to protect the Tibetan territory and provide military and diplomacy facilities. So, the important point that needs to understand was that the treaty between these two states was made without the pressure of external actors.

By analyzing the above treaties, it can be concluded that the treaty between British India and Tibet was made without external influence even though the situation in which it was made was dire. It does not matter the relations of Tibet with the Mongol Khans or later with the Manchu kings were and these never resulted that Tibet is a part of China. Despite the claim made by the Chinese government but the Chinese government has never exercised sovereignty or suzerainty or any other forms of authority until the PRC's invasion in the 1950s. Tibetan government asserted their independence once their relation with the Manchu had stopped to exist and it never came under the Republic of China originated in 1912 (ibid, 44).

The Simla Conference was become one of the most important conference in the history of Tibet where it was able to assert its status and the Conference has lasted till 1951. At the global stage, the First World War was just begun in 1914 and the whole world's attention was on the world war and in China, the KMT was building their foundations. So, the Tibet issue had become a minor issue on the international stage.

Indian leader's Perspective on the Status of Tibet, 1950s-1970s

India was and is one of most close and crucial neighbouring country of Tibet and history has depicted its vital relationship between these two countries in terms of religion, culture, and language etc. Politically, India's policy on Tibet will determine the rest of countries perception on Tibet due to its close historical relation with Tibet as Jaya Prakash Narayan argued that India should not fail to lead Tibet because the world expect Indian to lead for Tibet (Guha 2010, 416). This would be necessary to analysis under what circumstance the Indian leaders had to take its position on Tibet

and how these leaders perceived the Chinese strategies towards Tibet and India itself at the time of the Chinese liberation of Tibet. With regard to the political status of Tibet, there were two groups within the Indian government, a) those led by K.M Panikkar, wanted India's policy based on the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, that was to say, to recognize a degree of China's suzerainty that somehow amounted to China's direct control of Tibet, b) The other group held that India should continue her Tibet policy based upon the 1914 Simla Convention, advocating real autonomy of Tibet under a vague form of Chinese suzerainty (Goldstein 1989, 634). India has just got its independence from the British after two hundred years. Thus, India was not in a very strong position to completely oppose China's occupation of Tibet. When the Tibetan delegates met with Nehru in Delhi, he explained that India was a new nation with little power so it could not mediate in the Sino-Tibetan talks at the time (Norbu 2001, 200). But the vision of Nehru was driven by the idea of the new Asia so he saw the importance of India and China's friendship to build a new moral order in third-world countries. Therefore, Nehru saw "Tibet was a threat to build that relationship" (Goldstein 1989, 824). India also strongly opposed U.S or any other foreign countries involvement in the Tibet issue. The Indian government policy on Tibet had forced the Tibetans to settle with China on China's terms (ibid, 824).

Nehru officially did not recognize the exile Tibetan government so when the Dalai Lama response to a question about it. Dalai Lama replied "wherever I am, accompanied by my government, the Tibetan peoples recognize us as the government of Tibet". It become popular that Tibetan Government in Exile was established therefore, India had to clarify about it and refused to recognize Tibetan Government in Exile's existence in India (Shakya 1999, 223). Until the 1962 war between India and China, Indian government had tried every possible to conciliate the Chinese government. Panikkar, as a chief advisor to Nehru on Chinese related foreign policy matters, began to defend the CPC and argues that Chinese revolution was a part "of the great Asian resurgence". "Asian solidarity" and friendship between India and China will become the two most popular among the Indian politicians (Arpi 2007, 88). The loss of Tibet was worth the price of liberating Asia from western dominance for Panikkar and Nehru (ibid, 59). Nehru shows no signs of any changes in his intention to maintain towards China the conciliatory attitude outwardly based on "panch shila" (Barber 1960, 88). But there was no denied that the very survival of today's Tibet and Tibetan issue was because of Indian government's support towards the Dalai Lama

and Tibetans even when there were not in a strong position. Today the Tibetans can exercise their full freedom without difficulties in India and travel to any part of India without facing any restriction because of being a Tibetan and also outside of India. Therefore, the contribution done by Indian government towards the survival of Tibet issue since 1959 was immeasurable. Even though, India had 'panch shila treaty' with China.

On the other hand, Gyalo Thondup argued that when Dalai Lama arrived in Tezpur, 'Indian foreign ministry has already crafted a press statement' and perhaps if not written but certainly approved by the Prime Minister Nehru. Surely his staff consulted with the Dalai Lama, but the statement was written in the third person and read by an Indian official (Thurston 2015, 192). Pandit Nehru still held hope that the difference between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government could be solved and some form of a settlement could be reached. Therefore, before knowing the Dalai Lama views, the Tezpur statement was an act of skilful diplomacy (ibid, 193).

After breaking the news of Dalai Lama flight to the world, the international media were interested to cover his story but the Nehru was not in favour of this, which might affect their relations with China. Nehru described Dalai Lama as his honoured guest and he wanted his honoured guest's asylum to remain humanitarian rather than political (ibid, 193). Nehru wanted the Dalai Lama out of the limelight and away from the international press, therefore, he was sent to Himalaya hill station of Mussoorie which was relatively away from the press and yet near to New Delhi (ibid, 194). Initially, the Indian government was unwilling to give unrestrained freedom to the Dalai Lama in India and the international press was not allowed to proceed to the border area to meet with the Dalai Lama (Shakya 1999, 215).

The importance of Tibet was not only beneficial to Tibetans but also to India's security. Ramchandra Guha argued that importance of Himalayan barrier had two vital conditions, first was that if the external force began to enter from the Himalaya side then India's basic security was in great danger and second was the sentiment which was the life-blood of India past many centuries would be shattered. So Himalaya had been an important part of India's existence throughout centuries other than anything else. It was important to India's security and cultural inheritance even in the present age of highly modernized weapons (Guha 2010, 356).

Even though many of leaders such as Jaya Prakash Narayan argued that India must not withdraw his responsibility at this critical moment not because of their own

security concern or their spiritual and cultural bonds with Tibet but the fact that our neighbour who was being wronged and they have put trust on us, so it was India's responsibility to protect them (ibid, 417). On 30-31 May, 1959 under the president ship of Jaya Prakash Narayan, it held the first "All India Convention on Tibet at Calcutta" and the coming year in New Delhi, he convened the "Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet and against colonialism in Asia and Africa" to build up and demonstrate the international support for the Tibetan cause (Tsering 2010). The India's acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet had not only gave some form of legitimacy to China's action on ground of morality and legality of occupying Tibet but it also stops the opinion of the Afro-Asian on the issue of Tibet. And the remaining countries followed the India's position on Tibet (Guha 2010, 418). Jaya Prakash Narayan has the opinion that it was necessary to create a world opinion on the Tibet issue and present to the world in all naked reality. He was in a favour that the world opinion should make against the Chinese aggression and for the independence of Tibet. He insisted on common bloc of Afro-Asian to come together and present a means to protect the rights and freedom of smaller nations (ibid, 423-424). In March 1969, Jaya Prakash Narayan has led a group of 'Indian parliament members' to urge the Indian government to make new assessment on their policy in term of Tibet. They have argued the strategic importance of Tibet for many of Asian countries' national security including India. The remaining of Tibet as an independent country was not only importance to the India's national interest but it was also the interest of Soviet Republics of Central Asia, of Mongolia, of Pakistan, of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Burma (Norbu 2001, 229).

But on the other side, Jawaharlal Nehru has full trust in his friendly relationship with the CPC. Therefore, he was not moved by the opposition's advice or serious warning. Later, this friendship had backfired as Sardar V. Patel argued that Indians considered Chinese as their comrade, on the other hand Chinese had never consider Indians as their comrade (Patel 2010, 16). At last, 1962 war took place between India and China where the Indians was no match militarily for the Chinese, who easily defeated their resistance and made deep inroads into Indian territory (Guha 2010, 356). The main reason for the defeat was due to lack of proper transportation, communication channel and high altitude where Indian army use to stay at low altitude (ibid, 357). The Chinese motive behind this war was not only expansion of its territories and possession of the areas but due to project its disliked non-alignment

idea and their willingness to have a clear polarization of the different countries in the world (ibid, 360-361). The occupation of Tibet was based on their expansionist idea and a one step closer to achieve their goal as a global leader.

Nehru's policy did not appease the Chinese, who continued to launch attacks about Indian expansionism. He had never made any formal approach to Beijing on the Tibet question. The opposition parties and leading Indian politicians like Jaya Prakash Naraya and Acharya Kripalani continued to campaign outside parliament. They argued that the Dalai Lama should be given full freedom to appeal to foreign countries as well as the Indian government should bring the Tibet issue to the United Nations (Shakya 1999, 218). Nehru was the architect of India's policy towards Tibet. He had continued the British India's policy on Tibet. He told Malcolm Macdonald who was the British High Commissioner in Delhi that, "the proper aim of our policy should be to try to ensure that the Tibetans will enjoy autonomy under Chinese suzerainty". Nehru told Dalai Lama that Tibet independence was not pragmatic. Therefore, if the Tibetans demand for "autonomy" then not only Chinese government but world opinion would be in favour of the Tibetans (ibid, 219).

Lost *de facto* Independence of Tibet

Early in October 1950, about 40,000 troops under the command of General Zhang Guohua entered into Tibet border and attacked Chamdo. Tibetan troops numbering only 8,000 and much inferior in training as compared to the Chinese and they were defeated (Praag 1987, 142). The People's liberation Army (PLA) took Chamdo on 19 October, and Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, who was sent from the Lhasa government as a governor in Kham was captured as a prisoner of war even though his treatment was different from the rest of prisoners at Chamdo. Ngapo has tried many times to inform to the government of Lhasa about the status of Chamdo but the response from Lhasa government was too late which led to the surrender of Chamdo to the Chinese PLA.

The Chinese government has given the task to Baba Phuntsok Wangyal, the Tibetan communist to talk with Ngapo about the policies of the communist party of China and there was no point in opposing China (Schaik 2011, 259). But Ngapo hardly needed convincing, and he has sent a letter to the Lhasa about the good behaviour and treatment of Chinese government towards Tibetans and there should be peaceful liberation instead of war that would lead to the suffering from both sides. And at the same time, there was a change in the political status of Lhasa. So Lhasa

government were in desperate need of a leader and the Dalai Lama was sixteen years old and he has left two more years to take the reign of power.

At the end of the day, after the letter received from Ngapo about the status of Chamdo, the majority of ministers argued to have peaceful negotiations with China. Lhasa government decided to have negotiation and sent Ngapo as a head the negotiation delegates who will travel straight to Beijing (ibid, 260). Finally, the negotiation delegates reached Beijing after a very long discussion about the venue of negotiation, and Ngapo realized that there was no room to negotiate about the statements, which were sent by the Lhasa government to him to discuss with the Chinese government. When Ngapo has decided to discuss the statement but the Chinese negotiator argued that the status of Tibet was not there on the negotiation table. It was informed that Tibet is always part of China so there was no reason to negotiate on it. Whereas the Chinese government has already drafted the agenda and the Tibetan negotiator's job was to approve and sign it. The Tibetan negotiation delegates informed the Chinese delegates that they need to inform the Lhasa government about this but it was not allowed to contact with Lhasa government. So, in the end, the Tibetan delegates signed the agreement on 23 May 1951, which was known as "17-Point Agreement".

This Agreement has been discussed in detail in the third chapter and the first two articles of the agreement show the tremendous concessions of Tibet, the first article mentioned that Tibet would be returned to the big family of the motherland i.e PRC. This will immediately delegitimized Tibet's *de facto* independence. The second article of the agreement stated, "The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the PLA to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defence". Basically, this article allowed Chinese force to enter within Tibetan boundary without any opposition. Most of the other articles were about the concession to the Tibetans such as religious freedom, gradual reform, etc and also the status of Dalai Lama and the Tibetan political system. The Tibetan government at Lhasa came to know about the agreement first through radio broadcast done by PRC.

On 7 July 1951, all of the high lamas and officials gathered for a heated meeting in the frontier town of Yudung (temporary resident of Dalai Lama) to decide whether the government should accept the "Seventeen-Point Agreement" or not. Then, after three days of debate, the majority has decided that the Dalai Lama should go back to Tibet and accept the treaty once he had consulted with the National

Assembly. Thus, independence of Tibet, which the thirteenth Dalai Lama has fought for, was given up (ibid, 264).

Mao Zedong considered Tibet's inclusion within China's territory as non-negotiable but he didn't use the overt force in the beginning by knowing that there has no grass-roots support for the socialist reform. The Chinese government had to use the gradual method since 1951 to 1959 as either appeased the Tibetan aristocrats and landowners or to turn common people against them. And there were little changes in the hierarchical social system in Tibet. Dalai Lama and some of Tibetan elites have support the presence of Chinese in Tibet and suppressed the Tibetans, who resisted or campaigned against the Chinese (ibid, 266-267). But in the later part of the 1950s, the Chinese Generals has tried to introduce the "democratic reforms" and the presence of Chinese soldiers in Central Tibet has increased extremely so the local Tibetans begin to raise their voice against this process. Also, the uprising in Kham began to spread to Central Tibet as well and by 1958 over 15,000 Khampa families from eastern Tibet arrived as a rebel or refugees and settled in Lhasa. Dalai Lama and his government tried to stop the violent activities but it was unsuccessful. At the beginning of 1959, the Tibetan government was paralyzed, unwilling to support the Khampa rebels and unable to stop the rebellion.

After the Seventeen-Point Agreement, the Chinese government has slowly and gradually begun to introduce reform in Tibet through re-education policy to the Tibetan elites and few who were in government positions or monastery heads. The so-called liberation has begun from top to bottom instead of other way around. Mao Zedong did it very strategically by knowing that there was no material support in Tibet and culturally the Chinese were distinct from the Tibetans so he had to use those who were educated in their set up schools and those criminal who were punished for their crime under the Tibetan officials to instigate the revolt against the government officials and monastery heads. And many a times through "struggle" (Thamzing) or "mass shaming" etc. But the reaction and response by the common people were quite slow and varied from one place to another. As Dawa Norbu mentioned in his book "Red star over Tibet" that "there has neither declared state of emergency nor conscripted the young into the army". Instead the government and individual order to perform religious rites called magdog to prevent the war (Norbu 1987, 104).

After the 1959 revolt, many of influential monks were arrested for practicing magdog (Schaik 2011, 264). The Khampa resistance was not been organized under one unify command and it has about twenty-three different bodies that fought against PLA to defend their home or local monasteries. But later under the leadership of Gonpo Tashi Andrugtsang, he organized all these groups under one epicentre organization known as “Chushi Gangdrug” (Four Rivers Six Ranges) which became the defender of the faith, and also some of the Lhasa government officials secretly supported the resistance movement. The Chinese had to accept that the uprising in Kham has turned into a full-scale Tibetan rebellion.

With the mounting of all these situations at the moment, the PLA headquarter sent an invitation to the Dalai Lama on 10 March 1959. The Tibetans were suspicions to this invitation due to the timing of invitation where the ‘Great Prayer Festival’ was going on in Lhasa and by the repeated insistence of them and the condition under which the Dalai Lama has to come without escorts of any Tibetan security personnel. The Tibetans, under such situation thought that the Chinese invitation was a trap to capture the Dalai Lama and an attempt to overtake Tibet. But as argued by Dawa Norbu, there was no such intention from the Chinese side (Norbu 2001, 224).

The rumour spread fast across Lhasa city and eventually Norbulingkha palace was surrounded by common people to safeguard the Dalai Lama by the morning of 10 March 1959. Dalai Lama has consulted state oracle “Nechung” whether he should stay or leave but it seemed oracle encouraged him to “Go, Go now!” Finally, Dalai Lama's officials and from his family, mother, sister, and younger brother escaped Lhasa and later many have joined with him. It was after the nightfall when the Dalai Lama himself left, wearing a long black cloak and carrying only a rifle and a silk painting that belonged to the second Dalai Lama. His destination was Lhuntse Dzong, near the border with India. Once the Dalai Lama has reached to Lhuntse Dzong, he and his ministers issued a public rejection of the Seventeen-Point Agreement on the grounds that the Chinese had breached their side of the deal.

Finally, Dalai Lama and his relatives, close officials were accompanied by two Khampa rebels who had been trained by the American CIA and was a carrying a radio transmitter. So, using this, Dalai Lama sent a message through Gyalo Thondup to Jawaharlal Nehru, to ask for asylum in India. The Indian government has immediately welcome Dalai Lama and his people. Then, a new chapter in Tibet’s history has begun (Schaik 2011, 287-289).

Chapter Three

The Communist Party of China, Kuomintang and the Tibet's Question

Introduction

The nature of political relation between the Tibetans and the Chinese before 1913 was controversial. Thus, it was not easy to apprehend this complex issue through the lens of contemporary legal epistemology. The nature of their relationship was mainly based on religion and culture, as a “priest-patron” relation where one recognized the other as an equal that performed a different, complementary role. It was discussed in the second chapter, after the declaration of Tibet's independence by the thirteen Dalai Lama as well as Simla Conference in 1913-14. It was very clear that the Tibet was controlled by an autonomous Tibetan government in terms of both external and internal control, until the Seventeen-Point Agreement was signed with China in 1951. But on the other hand, both the KMT and Communist Party of China believed that the Tibet is a part of China since ages and it needs to reunify with the “mother” country. It will be describing in the coming section, how the KMT has used the death of 13th Dalai Lama as an instrument to convince the Tibetan leaders to admit that, Tibetans was one of the five races (ethnic group) that made up the new Republic of China by sending the ‘Huang condolence mission’ in Tibet. But both the countries had different understanding of their history, culture, language and so forth. This has created a tension and conflict between these two countries. Both the countries tried to come to a negotiable ground where both the Tibet and the China could able to achieve their demands. Finally, in 1951, for the first time in Tibetan history, Tibetans had to agree the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet without any option (Goldstein 1989, 815).

The occupation of eastern Tibet was a turning point in the fall of the Dalai Lama's government. So it is necessary to examine the major causes, which are finally led to the signing of Seventeen-Point Agreement on 23 May 1951. Even though Tibetans got thirty-eight years to prepare for the confrontation since Simla Conference in 1913-14 but due to weakness in its military strength, they were not able to be victorious.

This chapter discusses about the “Huang Mission” in 1934 sent by KMT government in Tibet after the death of 13th Dalai Lama as a condolence mission to reassert its dominance over Tibet. This was one of the turning points, the first official occasion where the presence of Chinese people within Tibet had occurred since 1911. The second section discusses on the Seventeen-Point Agreement of 1951 which was signed between the PRC and Central Tibet/Lhasa government after the Chinese invasion of Chamdo (Eastern Tibet) and resulted to loss of Tibet's existing independence. The background of the agreement will be studied to understand under what circumstance the agreement took place and how this has changed the future relation between China and Tibet. In the third section, post-1959 political discourse as well as role-played by the United States’ CIA in Tibetan national uprising and thereafter. The chapter concludes by discussing the Tibetan Government in Exile’s political position and how far it has been able to extend.

Conservatism versus Modernist Tibetans

There were many factors both internal and external which led to the loss of Tibet independence. The reason behind the weakness of the Tibetan military capability was Tibet's religious segment who believed in its traditional pattern of rules and customs and also against the idea of modernization. There were many reformers who have initiated the reformation in Tibet such as 13th Dalai Lama himself and others such as Lungshar, Taktra Rimpoche, and so forth, who strongly believed in the modernization of both the government and the army of Tibet to preserve its status quo (ibid, 816).

Internally, there were instances, which catalysed to civil unrest and violence within Tibet. Firstly, one of the turning points involved the 1920-1925 disputes over the expansion of the Tibetan army. After the return of 13th Dalai Lama in 1913 from self-imposed exile, he has initiated a number of reforms and innovations intended to modernize Tibet, such as opening western schools and development of the army, and so on. But to sustain and expand the army required a regular income, yet the funding which was available to the Tibetan government were inadequate to run an expanded military since the bulk of its income goes to monasteries, religious ceremony and the aristocracy. The confrontation took place between military and monastic segment, monastic supporters. The young and active western-oriented military officers’ corp

was perceived by the monks and other religious conservatives as a threat to the very foundations of the Lamaist state (ibid, 818). These initiations, innovations, and reforms had cost the military greatly. At the end they couldn't implement the reforms due to strong opposition from the conservative members. To these members, the perseverance of Tibet as a religious nation and the seeking of Buddhism was the main ambition. This religious ideology has historically taken two major concrete forms a) the ruler of the state was an incarnate lama, b) the religiosity of the state was measured by the size of its monastic community (ibid, 816). So, the entrenched political leadership stood on one side of the argument with the monastic communities and the military leadership on the other.

The second turning point occurred immediately after the death of 13th Dalai Lama in December 1933, when the National Assembly's selection of the regent. Many wanted a politically experienced regent with some understanding of outside world affairs. Because of this it was suggested that a lay official and a monk official be appointed. On the other hand, the monastic segment argued that owing to Tibet's unique religious national identity it should need an incarnate lama as regent, in order to have someone to venerate. Therefore, the National Assembly appointed the very young and inexperienced Reting Rimpoche, an appointment which directly instigated chaos and a civil war by mid-1940s (ibid, 818). Lastly, after the appointment of Reting as regent and the lay official Lungshar has tried to reform government structure such as making limited the terms of the Kashag (Cabinet) as well as made it partially responsible to the National Assembly. Instead of implementing his reforms, the Tibetan government removed his eye and his estates were confiscated, and his progeny was prohibited from serving the government (ibid, 819).

Externally, during these periods the political situation was very unstable due to the demised of 13th Dalai Lama and appointment of his temporary replacement until the enthronement of next Dalai Lama. In a significant way, the domestic politics, which was taking place between the pro-Reting and the pro-Taktra factions actually brought about greater external problems. Reting and his advisors plotted to overthrow Taktra by illegal means in order to regain their regency. Therefore, they appealed to KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek for assistance and promising in return to maintain close and friendly relations with the China. The Tibetan government has put their best effort to get the recognition of its independent status from the outside world but the outside

response was not affirmative. Most of the countries denied to recognized independent status of Tibet. Even though there was a treaty with the British India but British India always recognized Tibet as isolated nation between China and Russia to maintain their commercial interest.

The British India has therefore neither assists toward Tibet's independence nor toward incorporating Tibet into its Indian empire as a protectorate as it has done for Sikkim and Bhutan. The British India maintained Tibet as an autonomous country and in the same way it recognized the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, which means Chinese subordination, was nominal and symbolic against Tibet (ibid, 822). Tibet has also appealed to the United Nation to assist in the recognition of its independent status and to stop the forceful invasion of China but it got rejected.

The Huang Mission in 1934

The Manchu was overthrow in 1911 but still the Manchu notion of an empire, which comprised of the Han people and four minority nationalities; the Tibetans, the Manchu, the Mongolian, and the Moslems of Sinkiang still existed in the KMT's agenda.

Chiang Kai-shek's primary aim was to the reunification of China. Tibet, therefore, was from the beginning considered by him to be an integral part of the new Chinese Republic. He established a commission for Mongolian and Tibetan affairs in 1928 (ibid, 213-214). In late 1929, Chiang Kai-shek initiated contact with the 13th Dalai Lama through Konchok Jungnay, the Tibetan abbot of the Yungong monastery in Peking who was returning to Tibet with two other Tibetan officials. He also separately sent Liu Man-Ching, a translator at the commission for Mongolian and Tibetan affairs, as an unofficial envoy with an order to report for him on the condition of Tibet. Therefore, Dalai Lama has shown its interest in Chiang Kai-shek's initiative to improve bilateral relations and granted Liu a private audience and convey his appreciation and gratitude and looking forward to a day of mutual aid (ibid, 215).

Chiang Kai-shek sent a letter to the abbot of Yungong monastery who was arrived on 16 July 1930 where he has suggested settling the differences between China and Tibet. He has raise eight points, which aim to clarify between them to restore the relation and in which one of the questions he raised was how shall the

autonomy of Tibet and its scope be defined? Where the Dalai Lama response would be concluded that he was mainly focuses on the priest-patron relationship and expected the Chinese government will return those districts which originally belonged to Tibet but which were now not under its controls so that peace and harmony will surely be the result (ibid, 216).

The Tibet has enjoyed *de facto* independence since 1913 to 1951 and it was achieved not through nation-building but due to the fact that China was busy with revolution and civil war (D. Norbu 2001, 104). Dalai Lama's death on December 1933 left Tibet in a state of political shocked and insecurity (Praag 1987, 67). Therefore, the death of Dalai Lama was used as a pretext for sending an official funerary delegation by the Chinese. General Huang Mu-sung, Deputy Chief of the General Staff was selected for this purpose. He and other functionaries arrived in Lhasa by way of Doto (Kham) in July 1934 with a radio transmitter and operator. They have stayed at Kytopa's house in Lhasa. The Chinese representatives were empowered to renew relations with Tibet and wished to restore the previous relations between China and Tibet. The Tibetan cabinets argued that they would gladly discuss the priest-patron relationship between them, but they were to confer on the term of the Simla Conference of 1913-14, then we need to do it through the intermediary of the British India government. Otherwise, it would not be good for China and Tibet to confer directly. The Tibetan authorities declined the "generous autonomy" package offer by general Huang and insisting on "complete autonomy" (Praag 1987, 104).

However, after discussion on the recent situation, the Tibetan government has accepted a limited delegation through the Do governor. Shakabpa who was Finance Minister argued that this was Tibetan government's most serious mistake (Shakabpa 2010, 851). But for the KMT, the death of the strong-willed, autocratic, and fiercely independent 13th Dalai Lama created new condition which allowed them to assert a new found, yet imagined "traditional," subordination over Tibet. And also the fall of Lungshar (politician/reformer), an official whom the Chinese saw as one of their main enemies, enhanced this promise. The Huang Mission, therefore, was intended to test whether Tibetans intransigence regarding the eastern Tibet border and subordinate political status had diminished after the passed away of the 13th Dalai Lama (Goldstein 1989, 223-224).

The main mission of this condolence was to inducing Tibet to admit it was one of the five races that made up the Republic of China by focusing on the similarities of both China and Tibet, which was opposite to the British (ibid, 224).

Before Huang Mu-sung left China, the KMT government settled on the following position:

1. “Concerning foreign relations, Tibet must accept inclusion into China. All the major issue should be dealt directly between China and Tibet without interfering outsiders such as British. All the treaties made by Tibetan with foreign countries without China’s approval must be submitted to China for examination and decision.
2. Concerning political relations, Tibet was subordinate and Chinese administration and authority must be restored. There would be permanent Chinese officers in Tibet and also need to send a permanent representative to China. The candidates for appointment to higher posts would again be approved by China. There would be complete freedom of trade and movement for Chinese in Tibet (and vice versa).
3. Concerning the eastern border, even though areas east of Giamda belonged to the Chinese province of Sikang at the end of Qing dynasty, it is willing to cede to Tibet if Tibet accepts the first point. However, Chamdo (capital of East) would be retained as a part of China.
4. Concerning military disposition; after the number of Tibetan troops were established, China would send instructors to train these troops, which would be responsible for maintaining peace in Tibet. They would become under the unified command of China, and all weapons and ammunition would come from China only” (ibid, 225).

Huang did not discuss the political issue until the Tibetans agreed to a condolence and memorial ceremony as well as the presentation of the posthumous medal (ibid, 229). On 16 November 1934, the Tibetan government responded to the above demand by mentioning ten points, which tried to delay by allowing submission to China within the structure of complete autonomy and territorial readjustments in Tibet's favour (ibid, 239).

On 17 September, Huang Mu-sung invited the four “shapes”⁹ who were heads of the Kashag/Cabinet to his office and raised the issue of Sino-Tibetan relation but the Tibetan point of view was mainly stand on the Simla Conference of 1914 (ibid, 230). In the coming months, couple of letter exchanges took place between Huang Mu-sung and Kashag about the issue of Tibet and both Li and Khung (a member of Huang's party) has indicated that the fundamental argument of Huang's proposal was; a) Tibet was unquestionably part of the Republic of China, b) Tibet must hold China in esteem. (Li writes; must obey the Central Government). Huang's proposal stated that these two points could not possibly harm either Tibet's religion or its government. Since the situation in Tibet was different from that of China, internal conditions would be recognized and the wishes of the people taken into account (ibid, 238). The Chinese government was ready to give some autonomy if the Tibetan Central government agreed to be part of China.

By looking at the counter-proposal, the Tibetan government argued that since 1912, Tibet is an independent country. But in some incidents, Tibet has shown its readiness to agree the nominal subordinate status under the Chinese government with the understanding that Chinese government will not interfere in Tibet's internal system and Chinese should forgo its control in the Tibetan ethnic groups in Kham and Amdo (ibid, 241). The Tibetan leaders were prepared to consider accepting a degree of Chinese suzerainty along the line contemplated in the Simla Convention (Praag 1987, 69). Even though the Tibetan government was unwilling to agree China's presence in Tibet but it was terrified of aggression on her east and northeast frontiers. Therefore, there were ready to compromise to protect further aggression. It was argued that if the Lungshar conspiracy represents a turning point in internal political affairs, the Huang Mu-sung delegation marks a turning point in external affairs. Therefore, the idea of remaining under the China with having strong internal autonomy has occurred because the Chinese government's pressure has accelerated and Tibet's own weak military capability. In the similar case, the signing of Seventeen-Point Agreement in 1951 by the Tibetan government with Chinese government was under the political and military pressure of China over Tibet and its incapability to counter the Chinese military force from eastern Tibet. Finally, the agreement has compromised Tibet *de facto* independence.

⁹ Shapes refer to the four cabinet ministers of Tibetan Government in Lhasa

Fall of Chamdo in 1950

On 1 January 1950, “Radio Peking New Year’s broadcast announced that the People’s Liberation Army’s tasks for 1950 included the liberation of Tibet, Hainan, and Formosa from British and American imperialism” (Goldstein 1989, 644). Whereas, the situation of Chamdo was in a critical condition even though Lhalu, the governor in eastern Tibet has begun to increase his troops by collaborating with local Khampas which later become a failure. The strength of Lhalu troops was very weak and poorly trained with outdated weapons. Therefore, the Lhasa government has initiated the negotiation with China to settle the disputes. The initial contact between China and Tibet began through Gyalo Dhundup wife's father Chu Shih-Kuei, who was a member of Peking's Mongolian and Tibet Commission Office. The Lhasa government sent a letter to the Chu asking Chinese to send a representative to discuss Sino-Tibetan relations in a neutral place near China, such as Hong Kong or Singapore (ibid, 644-645). Shakabpa and his colleagues reach Kalimpong (India) in early March 1950. They received an informal reply from the Chu that Chinese government would send a representative so they should leave to Hong Kong immediately (ibid, 645). But the Indian government and British government were not in favour of the negotiation.

Therefore the British refused to issue a transit visa (D. Norbu 2001, 181) as well as the Hong Kong and the Singapore governor refused to accept them. The British, America and Indian policies towards Tibet were quite distinct, if not divergent. The British operate its Asian policy based on its traditional assumption that China enjoyed suzerain rights in Tibet but Tibet has also enjoyed autonomy in British sense of the term. The British has restrained the US officials and their agents who were more active to assist Tibet (ibid, 181-182). The British government was expecting that Indian government will take a leading role in the Tibet question after the transfer of power to them and also Indian’s self-interest was there (ibid, 182). But the Indian government has a different view on the question of Tibet, they were afraid of losing their influences on the PRC, especially on the international issue such as Korean War by their fruitless involvement in Tibet (ibid, 182). So the negotiation between Tibet and China could not take place on time and it keeps delaying due to external pressure and obstruction.

On 6 September 1950 the Tibetans met with the Chinese charge d'affaires, Shen Chien and informed him that the Tibetans were ready to negotiate once the ambassador arrived. In the meantime, Peking should refrain from causing any trouble in Kham. Shen Chien described China's view of future Sino-Tibet relations.

It mentioned that:

“China's soldiers will go to Tibet to liberate it but when they reach Tibet they will not change anything in Tibetan culture and religion. The present Tibetan army will come under China and will be called 'Border Security Guard'. All their weapons, military supplies, etc will be paid by the Central Government. Those Tibetans who are in the past have had friendly relations with the Kuomintang, the British and the Americans will not be harmed if they do not try to obstruct or block the Communist Party” (Goldstein 1989, 672).

Shen Chien has changed Chinese position by saying that all talks will take place in China therefore meeting in Delhi were simply a formal introduction (ibid, 672). The Tibetan delegations have discussed with Nehru about its unwillingness to go to Peking unless it guaranteed Tibet independence in advance. But the Indian government response was not positive as India continued to carry their policy on the line of British India's period where Tibet externally a part of China but internally independent (ibid, 673). Then, Tibetan government tried to get support from British and American but it could not succeed without getting real support from the Indian government.

Therefore, on 16 September 1950 the Tibetan delegates met with new Chinese ambassador, Yuan Chung-hsien and demand that there was no need of liberation since Tibet was governed and protected by the Dalai Lama, without any foreign intervention. The ambassador has responded that he would be so glad if there was no foreign power or influences in Tibet but China won't hold talks pertaining to the continuance of Tibetan independence. He has given three preconditions which Tibetan delegates need to accept to continue further talks; a) “Tibet must accept that Tibet is a part of China, b) the defense of Tibet must be handled by China, c) all political and trade matters concerning foreign countries must be conducted through China” (ibid, 676). Thus, Shakabpa has informed this to the Kashag and waiting for the response but on the other side, the PLA has begun to attack the Tibetan army in Kham. Mao

Zedong was very clear how to strategize and implement them on the Tibetans in the name of “peaceful liberation” as he said to Dalai Lama during 1954 visit to China.

“He (Mao) said it was the mission of China to bring progress to Tibet by developing its natural resources, and that the generals who were in Lhasa, Chang Chin-wu and Fan Ming, were there as representatives of China to help Dalai Lama and the people of Tibet. They had not gone there to exercise any kind of authority over the Tibetan government or people” (D. Norbu 2001, 185).

The first task of the Tibet-bound PLA was not to fight but to propagate the Tibet-specific teaching and to project an image of a ‘new Han’ (ibid, 184). The psychological warfare message was to show that the PLA was totally different from any previous Chinese army sent to Tibet and they won’t take even a needle from the Tibetan people. These tactics worked for few of Tibetan elites where there were convinced and in return tried to convince the Tibetan national assembly. So, looking at the conversations which took place between PLA officials included Mao and Tibetan officials included Dalai Lama could be concluded that the Chinese government might begun with good intention for the imposition of imported revolution in Tibet. As Norbu argued in his book ‘China’s Tibet Policy’ that “the problem with Marxist good intention” was that they were forcing their ambitions on the other people who were not ready and also they take guaranteed that they knew what was good for these people. Therefore, it completely neglected the local people’s nature of society and history. For instance, it ignored their ethnicity and ethnic identity, religions and its distinct characteristic. So the initial ‘good intention’ in Tibet has now degenerated into Han hegemony (ibid, 185).

The Seventeen-Point Agreement in 1951

On the 17 October 1950, two weeks after the Chinese offensive began in Kham. The Kashag had informed Shakabpa who was in Delhi about the invasion of Chamdo, with the intention that he should contact the Chinese ambassador immediately to stop the invasion. So, he has accused the Chinese government about the attack without warning while the peace negotiations were in progress. The Chinese ambassador countered this accusation by blaming the attack on the Tibetan government’s failure to go to Peking for the negotiation (Goldstein 1989, 698-699). Therefore, at the end of

November 1950, the condition in Lhasa was grim. Kham and the entire military force stationed were lost the fight. The U.S and Britain government refused to extend their support, but still continued to stand on the *de facto* autonomy of Tibet. The United Nation was not getting majority support to consider China's invasion of Tibet, and India was not in a strong position to give support (ibid, 737). The Chinese force was ready to enter Central Tibet at any time. The main logic behind the invasion of Kham was to put pressure on Tibetan government for the negotiation. Ngabo Ngawang Jigme and his colleagues became prisoners of war in Chamdo. Chinese officials were in full effort to convince him about the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet by China. Ngabo was convinced that Tibet's only chance of preserving a degree of autonomous status was to negotiate but he has no authority to start the negotiation. Therefore, Ngabo tried to initiate the discussion between the Chinese government and the Lhasa government by sending a personal letter to his colleagues in the Kashag (Goldstein 1989, 742).

The Lhasa government has no other option except negotiation with the Chinese government. Shakabpa has informed to the Tibetan national assembly about the negative response from the United State, Britain as well as the Indian government towards Tibet issue and the United Nations could not raise Tibet issue without having strong support from the members. The external assistance was very limited. Therefore after ten days of meeting at Dromo, the majority of Tibetan national assembly members were in favour of starting serious negotiation with China (Goldstein 1989, 758). Tibetan national assembly has sent their representatives to China with a ten-point proposal. But after analysing ten points within Tibetan representatives, Ngabo has argued that based on these points, it was not possible to have negotiation with China. They decided not to present ten-point proposal to the Chinese representatives. They have decided to take all of the major decisions without referring back to their government. Even though, the order was specific that they should refer back to the Tibetan government before taking major decisions.

The Tibetan representatives thought that the abbots and other conservatives in the national assembly have no idea of the modern world and the CPC. If they refer to them of the major decision then it will take weeks and months, which would, rode China's patience and renew their invasion of Tibet (ibid, 760). Finally, the negotiation began on 29 April 1951. Li Wei-Han, "the chairman of the national minority

commission” was the head of Chinese representative whereas Ngabo Ngawang Jigme was head of Tibetan representative. The negotiation begins with the proposal of a “draft agreement” by the head of Chinese representative but the Tibetan representatives refused it. The draft demanded that Tibet is a part of China and help to liberate Tibet. The heated debate was taking place for several days where both the representatives remained firm on their initial position. Therefore, the Chinese has introduced a modified draft and this one was also not acceptable to the Tibetans. The draft failed to recognize the independence of Tibet instead it admits Chinese control over Tibet’s military and foreign affairs. But the Chinese representatives were not ready to make any further changes. Therefore, Tibetan representatives was left with only two options first to sign the proposal and second was to accept the responsibility of Chinese military advancement in Lhasa (Praag 1987, 147).

Finally, after almost twenty-five days later where the actual talk lasted eleven days, (D. Norbu 2001, 181) both the representatives has signed the agreement on 23rd May 1951, what has been come to known as “Seventeen-Point Agreement”. Therefore, Tibetans has remained under Chinese rule till 1959. Once the Dalai Lama reached to exile in 1959, he and his government refused to accept the agreement and said it was signed under force. It was a debatable who broke the agreement. But the agreement declared Chinese territorial and political sovereignty over Tibet; the agreement gave some concessions to Tibetans, which amounted to a special autonomous for Tibet under the PRC. Such status was not negotiated nor granted to any other minority nationality. If earnestly implemented, this treaty would grant a high degree of autonomy to Tibet (Norbu 2001, 104).

Surprisingly, Tibetan government as well as the rest of the world has heard about the “Seventeen-Point Agreement” through the radio announcement in 26 May 1951 which was a shock to the Tibetan government. The Tibetan government has tried to receive the copy of agreement, but due to claims of its sensitivities and confidentiality it couldn’t receive it. So, the representative returned to Lhasa and presented the proposal with explanation to the Tibetan national assembly. Now Tibetan leaders were left with two options; i) accept the 17-Point Agreement or ii) reject the “agreement” and seek exile in India.

After a lengthy debate, the Tibetan national assembly has pronounced to accept the 17-Point Agreement because it does not endanger the Dalai Lama's status and nor did threaten the existing religious and political system of Tibet (Liming 2007, 39). The majority of the articles were in favour of Tibetan elites and the agreement was only pertinent to the Tibetan areas, which were under the control of the Dalai Lama (Norbu 1979, 74-93). So, it was recognized as a heavy concession it did not have the appearance of being a total loss or defeat. In contrast, this was an immense victory for the Chinese. The agreement legalized its sovereignty over Tibet and gradual transformation of "local" government of Tibet and reformation of social and economic system. The "peaceful" liberation avoided the very negative international criticism and excluded the interference from anti-communist countries such as the United States (Goldstein 1989, 772).

Comparative Study between Kuomintang and Communist Party of China on Tibetan Autonomy

A comparative study between KMT and communist China's proposal on Tibetan autonomy might show the commonalities and difference between these two different rulers. The KMT general Huang Musung's proposal in 1934 offer a partial autonomy to the Tibetans but the Tibetan were demanding on "complete autonomy" (Song 1997, 907). The CPC has offer on "national regional autonomy" but the Tibetan Government in Exile has demanded the "sovereign independence" of Tibet. The difference between KMT and CPC was on the degree of regional autonomy and national integration on Tibet. The Huang Musung mission has demanded the Chinese territorial and political sovereignty over Tibet. The CPC also has similar claims in the "Seventeen-Point Agreement" but they have turned it into an ideological and historicize narrative. It claimed that Tibet is already within the boundaries of China and it reunification with China achieved through "liberation". In term of foreign affairs and defense, both KMT and CPC have almost same position. Both the "Huang Musung mission and Seventeen-Point Agreement" has promised that the protection of Tibetan Buddhism and running of Tibetan traditional political system without any interference (D. Norbu 2001, 103-104).

The Seventeen-Point Agreement shows that the CPC has imposed “an almost total integration and assimilation of Tibet with China proper”. On the other hand, the KMT has no such hidden agenda (ibid, 106-107). Therefore, the hidden communist agenda and the use of force are the instruments which Communist government use to enforce their concept of ‘autonomy’ over Tibet, which was not there in KMT. The Huang Mu-Sung proposal in 1934 basically means what it states whereas the Seventeen-Point Agreement in 1951 conceals more than it explicitly promises (ibid, 109). Generally, the Tibetans were very critical about the concept and practice of autonomy by the PRC. But since 1970s the Tibetan Government in Exile has surrendered that the point of reference for negotiation with PRC was the autonomy for Tibet rather than independence. Officially after “Strasbourg Proposal” in 1988, Dalai Lama has recognized Tibet as a part of China. So the question is now the “degree of autonomy and non-integration” to protect the Tibetan cultural identity and meaningful autonomy (ibid, 107).

One of the major differences between the KMT and CPC were the use of force to implement their concept of autonomy over Tibet. The KMT has no such intention of using military force to implement their conception of autonomy on Tibet.

The Post-Seventeenth-Point Agreement

The Tibet has lost its *de facto* independence and became a part of “Motherland,” after the “Seventeen-Point Agreement” now a country whose future role was one of supposed “national regional autonomy” underneath the unified leadership of the Chinese government (Richardson 1984, 189). This agreement begins with a lengthy preamble which took the opportunity of falsify and fabricate history, declaring “the Tibetan nationality was one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China”. Thus, Tibet issue was becoming an internal issue and *de facto* independence status does not stand in the history of Tibet now.

The Chinese official views that Tibet’s *de facto* independence from 1912 to 1950 as a function of “imperialist deception and provocations” which the Tibetan government did not reject (Norbu 2001, 194). The CPC mentioned that Tibetans were liberated from outside “foreign imperialist” and internal “Chinese nationalist” force. But this does not make sense because there were very few numbers of non-Chinese

foreigners who were present, and there were no Chinese nationalist present in Tibet at that point. But the proposal of the PRC was not much different from the proposal, which was given by KMT during the Huang Mu-sung Mission in 1934 as discussed above (Liming 2007, 34). The CPC's practice of autonomy was much more restricted and centralized than the form of British India and the KMT government had agreed (D. Norbu 2001, 102).

Therefore, Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government put the pressure on PRC that they want the Chinese government to accept some conditions before accepting "Seventeen-Point Agreement" by the Tibetan government. But due to asymmetry balance of power, Chinese government refused to accept any preconditions. So the only option in front of the Dalai Lama was to work with the Chinese government and tried to make most of the "agreement" for the benefits of Tibetan people (DIIR 2007, 22-23). But the reaction of the Tibetan public after the arrival of bulk of Chinese army who enter into Lhasa was very disturbing and unwelcome. The introduction of reform at Kham and Amdo was strong and reluctant to accept the presence of Chinese. Therefore 'Migmang Tsongdu' (People's Assembly) was formed on 31st March 1952 to struggle against Chinese army. They initiated various protest such as putting poster on public walls during the night, throwing rocks at the residences of Chinese officials, as well as street songs etc., being a visual and vocal disturbance to the occupation. But the Chinese were determined to destroy and unrest with brutal force (ibid, 24).

The overall Chinese government's policy towards "political Tibet"¹⁰ was realistic and imaginative. But in terms of "ethnic Tibet,"¹¹ their policy was based on a rigid legality and not pragmatic which means the ethnic Tibetans who were not directly under the jurisdiction of Lhasa were not included. This was a great mistake of Chinese government to base any policy on such sensitive issue through rigid legality, which was far away from the real condition. This was the basic cause of the revolt in the 1950s. During these periods, it does not matter whether eastern Tibetans was far or near from the Lhasa or even how they were close to the Chinese side. Their way of life and actions were similar to any other Tibetans in Lhasa (Norbu 1979, 79). The value system was one, which was derived from Buddhism, and it has an absolute

¹⁰ Political Tibet refers to the territories of Tibet which comes under the rule of Dalai Lama or Lhasa government.

¹¹ Ethnic Tibet refers to the whole of Tibet including three regions of Tibet; Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang.

ideological monopoly. When “social system” in particular, the value system was working, there will not have a revolt against that system. It does not matter even if others might think it was unjust. They will protect that very value system in the face of any threat. Even if the intentions of those opposing the system are pure and objective the people have such an innate and strongly held connection to the system, as a source of personal identity, that they will defend it. This was exactly happened in Kham and Amdo in the 1950s when the Chinese has tried to liberate them from the feudal system. The Tibetan rebellion was in protection of their value system, which was based on Tibetan Buddhism, as well as its political system and sacred institutions, which were based on such values (Norbu 1979, 81).

The religion was becoming the origin of the uprising whereas some intellectuals argued that the uprising of 1959 as actually “anachronistic” and from the twentieth- century perspective, it was but the kind of traditional society that prevail before 1950 or even before 1959 in Tibet, there was nothing else to expect something so modern in nature. The Tibetans did not consider PRC’s “occupation” as a danger over Tibet’s “territorial integrity,” even though Tibet was assumed as a different geographical body as a different nation since the seventh or eighth centuries. Tibetans considered it as a danger to their faith (Norbu 2001, 226).

Therefore, to have a rebellion against the Tibetan theocracy, Tibetans have to secularize, discarding the foundation of the identities in the process. Any sort of indigenous revolution in Tibet would have to become “anti-Buddhist,” as well. The existing “value system” would have to lose its meaning and consider Dalai Lama as a man rather than a Buddha. There was no likelihood of any such revolt occurring, such was the Tibetan connection to their religious and social identity, and that condition was very far from what the Chinese government wanted to have. To introduce revolution on a working society was similar to burying a living man.

In such a situation “one man’s conception of revolution inevitably becomes another man’s destruction”. Therefore, the Tibetan resistance movement took place in 1959 (D. Norbu 2001, 227). The uprising movement in March 1959 was the culmination of years of resistance and repression, and it erupted into an open and all-out revolt in the Tibetan capital (Praag 1987, 162).

Tibetans Contact with America's "Central Intelligence Agency" (CIA)

The causes and under what circumstance brought to the uprising of 1959 has been discussed in detail in the second chapter. Thus, after unsuccessful peaceful liberation in Tibet has forced the Dalai Lama and his people to seek asylum in India. The role of CIA in Tibetan freedom struggle and also Tibetan warrior's guerrilla warfare training with providing arms and ammunitions to fight inside Tibet against Chinese PLA will be discuss. It will also analyze whether CIA was involved in the escape of Dalai Lama to India.

In 1954, the CIA contacted Thupten Norbu who was Dalai Lama's brother at Hongunji Monastery in Japan and asked him to introduce Gyalo Thondup with some of CIA operative in India. The Dalai Lama's brother Thupten Norbu has arranged Gyalo Dhondup's first official contact with the CIA (Thurston 2015, 167). Even though, Gyalo Thondup has approached the British intelligence for their support to the Tibet in the 1960s but they refuse to assist and suggested to talk with Americans (ibid, 168). Therefore, in Calcutta, Gyalo Thondup and his brother Thupten Norbu met with Miss Terry. She explained that she was meeting Gyalo Thondup under her government's instructions and said that the US was wanted to help Tibetan cause in whatever way Tibetans needed. But it becomes more concrete after John Hoskins took her post in September 1956. By then the resistance movement in Tibet, especially in Kham, was well under way. The CIA was prepared to train some of the Tibetan freedom fighters as radio operators and guerrilla warriors. Gyalo Thondup (2015) does not need to go to Tibet to find Tibetan freedom fighters but a number of them already reside in Kalimpong and Darjeeling (ibid, 169).

The resistance movement was completely spontaneous and independent both from the Tibetan government in Lhasa and any foreign supports in the initial period. The CIA has decided to send the first batch to Tibet without having contact with the Dalai Lama. Gyalo Thondup (2015) with the help of Gompo Tashi and Gompo Tashi's nephew Wangdu Gyatotsang selected the volunteers. In 20 March 1957, they have been sent to the border in two groups. One was dropped in Lithang (Kham) and other was dropped near Lhasa (Thurston 2015, 172-173). Even though CIA has trained some of Tibetans in guerrilla warfare but it was not so much effective in Tibet.

Even the weapons, which were provided to the Tibetans guerrilla force, were outdated and not very much useful to them. The U.S main intention was to break the power of communist party of China rather than supporting Tibet issue.

As the resistance continued and so did, the Chinese counter-attack in Kham and Amdo (ibid, 178). By 1957 the Khampas were in the need of weapons and the China's PLA were in the full force on them. The Khampas has to go out of their home or villages and seek refugees in the Central Tibet. Therefore, these Khampas has entered the central Tibet as pilgrims. But there were not getting any support from the Tibetan government as well as from the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan government was trying to implement the "Seventeen-Point Agreement". Therefore, they didn't want any forceful measure from the CPC in Central Tibet (Shakya 1999, 163).

A group of wealthy Khampa traders living in Lhasa decided to offer the "golden throne" to the Dalai Lama whereas the Chinese could not stop the assembling of people because of it religious festival. This festival had serious social and political ramifications. This was only time, Tibetans were united for a unify goal and share values which help to recognized their opponents (ibid, 167). This was one of the most crucial political strategies use to submit all Tibetans loyalty to the Dalai Lama and declared him as their leader and their symbolic defiance of any alternative system and reforms introduced by the Chinese. The Khampas were in a difficult situation to stay in Lhasa as they had pressure both from the Chinese government and the Tibetan government. Finally, they moved to Lhokha, which provide easy access to India for escape, and also there was less Chinese military presence. The meeting within Khampas in Lhokha has decided the formation of a "pan-Khampa resistance movement" known as "Chushi Gangdrug" (Four Rivers Six Ranges). It was symbolic that the group adopted the ancient name for Do-kham which refers to Amdo and Kham territories (ibid, 167).

Later in 16 June 1958 in Lokha where Gompo Tashi unfurled and officially proclaimed the transformation of the "Chushi Gangdruk" into the "National Volunteer Defence Army". This transformation meant to signify that this movement no longer confined to Khampas but it has also become nationwide in scopes (Thurston 2015, 178). But the effectiveness of this operation was not much as compared to the counter force by the Chinese PLA whereas some of them disappeared and many were dead during the fight. But the number of PLA has continued to grow, and Chushi Gangdrug

units found themselves repeatedly retreating. Therefore, on 29 April 1959, Gampo Tashi decided to cross India for regrouping the army so around two thousand Chushi Gangdrug soldiers entered India and surrenders their weapons to the Indian government (McGranahan 2010, 106). It is interesting to analysis, was there any relation between the end of Chushi Gangdrug in Mustang in 1974 and the Tibetan Government in Exile's shift in their political demand. In the fourth chapter, the end of Chushi Gangdrug and whether it has any impact to the Tibetan Government in Exile's political shift has been discussed in detail.

Dalai Lama Flight to Exile

On 17 March 1959, H.H the Dalai Lama secretly left Norbulingka dressed in layperson. He and his small entourage were led out of Lhasa by Tibetan army officers to a river crossing, where they met up with a Chushi Gangdrug unit led by Ratuk Ngawang. The unit escorted the Dalai Lama and his entourages on their three weeks escape to India and on the way Athar Norbu and Lotse joined with them who was trained on radio operator by the CIA in Saipan (ibid, 105). The Chushi Gangdrug was a non-governmental organization and it had immense influences in the protection of Tibet during the 1950s. This group was unofficially known as “defender of the faith” whereas PLA was “enemy of faith”.

Dalai Lama has sent an advance party to seek asylum in India where Gyalo Thondup was already in India. Therefore, he arranged the asylum for Dalai Lama after meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru. Thus, Shri TS Murthy, assistant political officer, Tawang received Dalai Lama on 31st March at Kenze Mane (Khenzimane) which demarcate the frontier in Chuthangmu area (DIIR 1959). Even though there were many debates on the policies of India in term of Tibet and China. But no one can deny that Indian government had welcomed the Dalai Lama and his people without thinking the consequences for them afterwards. The Chinese government was very critical at the time about Indian government's action. Once the Dalai Lama arrived to India, Indian government has given almost complete freedom to preserve their religion, culture, language etc. For instance, allowing the Tibetans to establish an unofficial Tibetan government and building of separate schools and settlements for

themselves were the most important contribution to the very survival of Tibetan identity.

The Tibetan Government in Exile's Repudiation of Seventeen-Point Agreement

Dalai Lama has released his first press statements in Tezpur on 18 April 1959 after coming to exile in India where he announced that Tibet was function as an independent country before the Chinese invasion. He also repudiated the Seventeen-Point Agreement and at the same time argued that it was signed “under the duress of the government of China”. Even though, the agreement has promised to give full autonomy to the Tibet but in practice, after the occupation of Tibet by them. The Tibetan government could not entertain any kind of “autonomy” even in the domestic matters whereas PRC enforced complete power in Tibet’s affairs (Lama 2007, 137). Dalai Lama has charges numbers of cases against Chinese local rulers on the violation of the spirit and the letter of the Agreement. He had to dismiss his two Prime Minister, Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi in April 1952 under the pressure of Chinese on the charges of involvement in an anti-communist movement and organization called mi-dan tsogs-du (People's Assembly). Dalai Lama notes that, “he did not appoint any successors. It was no use having prime ministers if they were merely to be scapegoats for the Chinese” (Norbu 2001, 205). The intention in which “Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region” formed was to systematically undermine the existing status, functions, and authority of the Dalai Lama, which was permitted in the fourth “article” of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. The creation of two pro-Chinese blocs in “Outer Tibet” such as Chamdo Liberation Committee in the Kham and Panchen Lama Committee in western Tibet was to reduce it as a constituency and the jurisdiction of the “local” government of Tibet (ibid, 205). Dalai Lama has charged the Chinese local rulers present in Tibet with interference in the exercise of religious freedom that was a violation of Article 7 of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. During the course of Khampa revolts in eastern Tibet, the PRC’s armed force had dismantled a numbers of monasteries and killed many monks. The monks as well as Tibetan officials were taken to employ them on the road constructions in China (ibid, 206).

Dalai Lama has charged the Chinese authorities with stopping the reforms such as land reform introduced by the Tibetan government. Dalai Lama agreed that Tibet was an ancient society and it needs to reform for the benefits of the Tibetan people. In Tibet, main three groups such as monasteries, aristocracy and state controlled the land. Therefore, the Tibetan government has tried to reform it but every time it was stop by the Chinese government (ibid, 206). Finally, he argued that the Chinese government has no intention of carrying out the agreement. Even though he has accepted the agreement without any choice but the Chinese government did not missed any space to threaten his authority and sow factions within the Tibetans(ibid, 206). There were many contradictories within the “Articles” which gives Dalai Lama and his “local government” a limited time to continue. CPC was gradually and systematically preparing the groundwork in Tibet, which would unavoidably require the undermining of the traditional authority structures of Tibet (D. Norbu 2001, 206-207).

On the other side, the Chinese government replied to “Dalai Lama’s Tezpur statement on 19 April through Peking Radio Broadcast” that Tibet is always part of China from thirteen to eighteen centuries where it was governed by the Chinese government in Peking. The Tibetan independence in modern history was a strategy of British imperialism for assault to Chinese and Tibetan themselves. The Chinese statement argued that Dalai Lama was abducted by rebellion on 17 March and there was no killing and destruction happen in Tibet (China n.d.).

The Agreement was signed on the basic premise that Tibet was and is an integral part of China that virtually rules out any Tibetan expression of nationalism (Norbu 2001, 207). To be a Tibetan nationalist meant falling under the imperialist deception and being anti-national in the larger Chinese sense of the term. Therefore, the Chinese did not and does not tolerate any expression or act of rebellion that were nationalistic overtones. The Chinese took the most serious view of the 1959 revolt, which tore the Agreement to shred (ibid, 207). Even Gyalo Thondup says that Tezpur statement was craft certainly or approved by Nehru with the consultation to the Dalai Lama and it was also written in third person form. But overall, through this statement, Tibetan government has refuted the “Seventeen-Point Agreement”.

The question of who violated the Agreement was a controversial as Dalai Lama's Post-1959 statements repudiate the Agreement by claiming that it was signed

under “duress” and at the time of the bayonet. Whereas the Chinese maintain that it was a handful of separatists who tore up the Seventeen-Point Agreement in March 1959 by launching “an all-around armed rebellion” (ibid, 204). But in a larger and more objective sense, the violators of the Seven-Point Agreement were the Khampas whose homeland did not fall within the purview of the Agreement. The Agreement was applicable only to “Outer Tibet” and the instigators of the violation of the agreement were American agents (ibid, 207). When the Khampa revolts flared up in 1956, they at once caught the CIA imagination. And between September 1957 and January 1960 the CIA made 19 airdrops of 47 trained Khampas and 18 airdrops of arms inside Tibet (ibid, 207). “The 1959 revolt was a watershed in the modern history of Sino-Tibetan relations. As Tibet lost its independence in 1951 by signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, it again lost its autonomy in 1959 with the death of the agreement” (Liming 2007, 42).

Demand of “Sovereign Independence”

Since 1959, Dalai Lama and his Government in Exile have struggled for “sovereign independence” after the repudiation of “Seventeen-Point Agreement”. Dalai Lama argued in his statement of the 2nd anniversary of the “Tibetan national uprising day” that “the spirit of his people remains uncrushed and unshaken in their resolve to fight on till independence is regained” (Lama 2005, 1). So the complete independence was the goal originally set by the Dalai Lama therefore the autonomy was not acceptable to the Tibetans at the time. For stance, when the resolution made by the United Nations in 1959 for “the cessation of practices depriving the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and their traditional autonomy, he asserted that it was not autonomy but independence of which Tibetans were deprived” (ibid, 1). He argued that “the United Nations passed a resolution on the declaration of the grant of independence to colonial possessions. Until now, Tibet was an independent country but now it had been reduced to a status of a colonial possession” (ibid, 2).

The Tibetans, in any occasion, had refuted the “right to self-determination”. Thus, seeking of external solidarity as well as support was vital to the Tibetans where Tibetan history has shown in many occasions how important it was whether it was after the passed away of the 13th Dalai Lama or the occupation of Chamdo in 1950s.

Dalai Lama had already visualized a new Tibet after returning from India in 1957 by attending the 2500th birth anniversary of lord Budha as invited by Mahabodhi society of India. Tibet needs plethora of human resources to bring Tibet in agreement with the essence of democracy without giving up Tibetan cultural and religious heritage as well as its soul. Even though he and the Kashag made effort to initiated land reform as well as other reforms in Tibet but it was blocked by the Chinese government. The reforms he visualized were “preserving the intellectual, moral and religious freedom; bring about an equitable distribution of wealth of the country” which was not there in Tibet. But the land reforms which enforce by the Chinese today on the Tibetans will, by design, reduce them to the state of mental and economic serfdom which was not different from the old Tibet. So having the opposite effect of the reforms introduced by the Chinese government, Dalai Lama envisioned that “in order to have a rich, strong as well as vigorous nation, the special privileges and the large estates enjoyed by the Tibetan monasteries or the Tibetan aristocratic families, will have to go” and distribute equally among the common Tibetans. All Tibetans have to learn to live a simple life by helping the common people (ibid, 3). He was looking for a new Tibet where it has equal distribution without having any privileges to anyone whether it was monastery or aristocratic family. This kind of reforms was not possible before the Chinese invasion as Tibetan political system was mainly dominated by monasteries and aristocratic families. So even in the political structure, he argued that it needs to have reform so that common Tibetans were more closely connect with Tibetan government policies and its administration (ibid, 3).

Rajni Kothari argued that Dalai Lama has

“involved simultaneously in two major endeavours the struggle for liberating Tibet from colonisation and subjugation on the one hand and engagement in spreading his message of love and compassion base on a philosophy of altruism, of human rights and world peace and environment and above all of non-violence and universal responsibility” (Kothari 1998, xii).

The Tibetan Government in Exile has demanded sovereign independence from Chinese until it has changed in their political demand in 1988 at Strasbourg.

Establishment of *de facto* Tibetan Government in Exile

On 29 April 1959, Dalai Lama officially found “Tibetan Exile Administration” presently known as “Central Tibetan Administration” (CTA) in the north Indian hill station of Mussoorie. This was the continuation of pre-1959 Lhasa government and its direct connection with the Lhasa government claim to be the legitimate representative of the Tibetan nation and provided the security in the beginning years of exile (McConnell 2016, 58). And in May 1960, Tibetan Exile Administration was moved to “Dharamsala with the material attributes of statehood; from a parliament chamber to courtrooms, shelves of official reports and letter headed with the government’s emblem” (ibid, 8). The nature of Tibetan body politics exists on the principle of non-violence and endeavour to advocate the individual freedom and the Tibetans welfare by the “dual system” of government based on the “Federal Democratic Republic” (Administration n.d.). According to Tibetan Government in Exile, the Tibetan people, both inside and outside of Tibet see to the Central Exile Administration as their one and only legitimate representative. Right from its inception, as mention above, the Central Exile Administration “has set itself the twin task of rehabilitating Tibetan refugees and restoring freedom and happiness in Tibet. The rehabilitation agenda includes three important programmes,” a) promoting education agenda within the exile Diaspora; by constructing separate schools to the Tibetans with the permission of Indian government, b) establishing a solid culture of democracy and c) establishing the way for self-reliance; selling seasonal sweeter and agriculture were the major source of income for Tibetans in the beginning.

The second goal was to restore the freedom of Tibetan; the Central Exile Administration’s experiment with modern democracy system suitable to the temporary ideals of the Tibetans (ibid, ii) in particular, was a rehearsal for the re-establishing of Tibet when freedom was restored in Tibet. Therefore, Tibetans have a parliament name as “Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies,” was formed on 2nd September 1960 and gradually it has developed and now it was known as Tibetan Parliament in exile (DIIR n.d.). The claim of Tibetan Government in Exile as one and only legitimate representative both inside and outside Tibetans needs further study.

The Central Tibetan Administration has been functioning on the basis of “imagined” state or “state in waiting” (McConnell 2016, 2) even though it was not legally recognized as government. Over 3000 staff of the Tibetan Government in

Exile was function as any other states do with thinking that sooner or later, they will work “for real state” back in the homeland (ibid, 2). The role, function, and practices are what Fiona called it “rehearsal state” whereas this was intentional and self-conscious political movement (ibid, 3). The conceptualisation and understanding of state was very distinct to the Tibetan community from the general conceptualisation of state.

Theoretically, state was established because of the negative experiences such as fear, anxiety and suspicion among the people. But Tibetan Government in Exile was established on the basis of hope, aspiration and culture security of the Tibetans (ibid, 6). If we understand the state in terms of Max Weber’s definition then the state needs to fulfil “list of criteria including a stable government with a bounded territory, a self-defined people and a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, then Tibetan Government in Exile polity will never count as a state” (ibid, 28). But argument given by Timothy Mitchell advocated that the “state should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist,” which means a belief that the state exists. Then the Tibetan government in exile can be inquiry how their functions in exile (Mitchell 1991, 94) and how it has gain legitimacy both inside Tibet and exile Tibetan people.

The visibility and voice of Tibetan Government in Exile was limited because it was not officially recognized by other states but the institution able to preserve its distinctiveness in the foreign state under the permission of Indian government. Initially, the desire of Tibetan leaders was to re-build an independent Tibetan state (McConnell 2016, 18). The relationship between sovereignty and territory, and make explicit claims to legitimate governance needs to understand in the context of Tibetan Government in Exile without having the recognition from other states. When government function was analyzed, it includes the “provision of welfare services for the sizeable dependent population, the promotion of nation-building policies, the establishment of democratic institutions, and their operation within defined territories in a host state” (ibid, 21).

Therefore, the relationship between Tibetan Government in Exile and its people in exile was constructed through a direct link with pre-1959 and the charismatic leader who has the potential to unify all Tibetans under one institution. A Pan-Tibetan identity was symbolized by the Dalai Lama in exile (D. Norbu 2001,

350). Dalai Lama as an institution was an immense influenced on the construction of Tibetan Government in Exile and its political position. But critical analysis on this institution was rare as well as the space was also shrink in Tibetan academic discourse.

Chapter Four

The Tibetan Government in Exile and its Changing Approaches to Tibet-China Dispute

Introduction

By consideration of international and domestic politics, Tibetan Government in Exile headed by the leadership of the Dalai Lama, a series of discussion and consultation were held among the parts of its departments of Tibetan democratic administration such as Cabinet, Speaker and Deputy Speaker etc about the alternative solution to the Tibet issue. Finally, in the year 1974, Tibetan Government in Exile has internally decided that they will seek for a complete autonomy to all Tibetans including all three regions of Tibet such as Kham, Amdo & U-Tsang (DIIR, 2016, p. v). Thus, 1974 onwards Tibetan Government in Exile (TGiE) has implemented a policy known as “Middle Way Approach”¹². The Tibetans in exile, as well as their supporters, were not conscious of it until the Dalai Lama’s speech in Strasbourg in June 1988 (Lama, 2008).

Finally, in 1988 in European Parliament at Strasbourg, the Dalai Lama presented his government’s future political policy popularly known as “Strasbourg proposal”. The proposal discussed on the self-governing democratic polity to the Tibetans. The MWA is the best option to resolve Tibet issue smoothly without any violence action between two nations. This approach discuss about the building of mutual understanding among the Tibetans and the Chinese based on equality and mutual trust (Gyari, 2010). But the concept of autonomy was a problem between China and Tibet in resolving Tibet question and its operational meaning vary widely as it was discussed in the second chapter. The genesis of this problem was rooted in nineteenth-century British colonial history in Asia. It raises general problems of interpretation and cross-cultural understanding, which emerged when the west encountered the east (Norbu 2001, 101).

¹² Middle Way Approach is a “mutually-beneficial policy that is based on the principles of justice, compassion, non-violence, friendship and in the spirit of reconciliation for the well-being of entire humanity. It does not envisage victory for oneself and defeat for others” (DIIR 2016, 1)

The “Strasbourg Proposal” demand for “a self-governing democratic political entity that includes all three regions of Tibet founded on a separate basic law of its own” (DIIR 2016, 8). The “Huang Mission” in 1934 was proposed a generous package of a high degree of Tibetan autonomy whereas the CPC’s appropriation of autonomy was very restricted and centralized. The present Dalai Lama has first-hand experienced of Seventeen-Point Agreement's miscarriage of Tibetan autonomy and was very critical of it but then after Strasbourg proposal in 1988, he begin to mention that the MWA was the best solution between Tibet and China through mutual compromise. Then, the autonomy became the subject of the future negotiation (Norbu 2001, 101) and one of the basic reasons was that of growing Confucius consensus, which means the general consensus on Tibetan autonomy among the Chinese dissents and international support to the MWA (DIIR 2016, 1). Since then, the exile Tibetan government’s political position was through MWA that demanded “complete autonomy” within the PRC.

Therefore, the study of both internal and external factors, which has impacted to the formulation of MWA, is necessary to understand the Tibetan Government in Exile’s political shift. For instance, in 1987 at Washington, Dalai Lama’s supporters and his old friends advised him that he need to make a specific proposal where the Chinese government can able to accept the specific terms. Thus, he proposed a “Five-Point Peace Plan” in the address to the members of the US Congress in 21 September 1987 (Lama 1998, 52). Michael Praag in his book, “the Status of Tibet” advocates, under the concept of “association” Tibet was surrendering its independence and accepting to be a part of PRC (Praag 1987, 201-202). A year later the same terms was used in the Strasbourg proposal put forward by the Dalai Lama on international stage. Jamyang Norbu argues that the Tibetans have made the mistake in the past by isolating ourselves from others and always suspicious about them but even in the present it will not help by completely trusting the foreigners. Therefore, the Tibetans must formulate their own policy so that it will fulfil their interest (J, Norbu 1989).

Therefore, in this chapter, the main theme is to discuss the factors, which have influenced the shifted in the political demands of Tibetan Government in Exile from “complete independence” to “Middle Way Approach”. In some cases, both the internal and external factors overlapped each other. These factors have been study through various approaches, which will help to understand the MWA such as realist

approach, pragmatic approach and welfare and humanistic concept etc. And in the conclusion, it has discussed the consequences of the Middle Way Approach within the Tibetan community in exile.

The Role of Michael van Walt van Praag

Michael van Walt van Praag was a legal advisor to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile from 1984. His tasks involved advice on all matters relating to public international law, constitutional law and human rights law as well as on international relations and strategic issue. He was also a coordinator of H.H. the Dalai Lama's first visit to Europe (1973), the USA (1979) and Latin America in 1986 (Praag, n.d.). He has become important advisor to the Dalai Lama in the structuring of "Strasbourg Proposal" in resolving the conflict between Tibet and China. He argues, that given the status and rights of the Tibetan people, the ultimate status of Tibet could take on one of three forms as suggested by the United Nation General Assembly classification; a) "actual re-emergence of Tibet as a sovereign independent state, b) free association with an independent state, c) integration with an independent state" (Praag 1987, 198). The first alternative, which was the re-emergence of Tibet as a complete independent country, was not pragmatic at the circumstance. The second alternative needs to be discussed here and how it influenced the Strasbourg Proposal.

In the absence of any changes either in the structure of the Chinese state or the formal claims of China over Tibet, the Tibetans should, at least, be granted actual, rather than merely nominal autonomy. The term autonomy should refer to governmental autonomy, which is self-government, as well as cultural, religious, and economic autonomy. The self-government refers to both the 'actual'¹³ and 'formal independence'¹⁴ of the autonomous body in its political decision making process in the internal matters of Tibet. Diplomacy and military are usually control by the central, or national government. However, the Tibetan government should have the authority to make international agreements concern of cultural or economic issues (ibid, 198-199). The "Strasbourg Proposal" also demanded that Tibet, which included

¹³ Actual independence is meant to exercise of effective governmental authority independent of an outside power.

¹⁴ Formal independence exists where the source of a state's governmental authority is vested within the state.

“Cholka-Sum”, should turn into a self-ruling democratic political body in association with the PRC. PRC could “remain responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy whereas Tibetan government should develop and maintain relations through its own foreign affairs bureau in the field of commerce, education, culture, religion, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities” (Lama 1988).

The constitution of PRC has given autonomy under its article 31, where it allows for the establishment of special administration regions when necessary. Therefore, the policy of “one country, two systems” which was implemented with regard to Hong Kong and Taiwan can also implement on Tibet case. The Chinese government recognized the local government to resolve and regulate their own internal issues as well as to preserve their different social and economic system. The local government was allowed to maintain their own judicial system and separate executive and legislative bodies (Praag 1987, 199). But the Chinese government completely refused to accept the granting of “one country, two systems” to Tibet. It argued that Tibet was reunified with motherland over many decades ago, whereas Taiwan and Hong Kong are yet to be unified.

Praag argued that an arrangement, which would satisfy both, the Tibetan and the Chinese primary interest was the free association relationship, which also explained in the General Assembly Resolution of 1960. The concept of association was legally acceptable and realistic in that it observed the constitutional statutory principle of independent equality of states while observing the actual inequalities between the central and local government. The factors, which determine the free association in international law was, mention in Principle 7 of 1960 Resolution 1541;

1. “Free association should be the result of a free voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes. It should be one which respects the individuality and the cultural characteristics of the territory and its peoples, and retains for the peoples of the territory which is associated with an independent state the freedom to modify the status of that territory through the expression of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes.

2. The associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitutional without outside interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people. This does not preclude consultations as appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free association agreed upon” (ibid, 201).

Praag mention the feature of free association between two sovereign states. First, the relationship between two independent states must be accepted one, and the terms must be surely and thoroughly set down, in a form mandatory of the states. Second, the association must be the outcome of a “free and independent choice” of the population of the associate state, declared by enlightened and equalitarian method. Third, the associate state retains international personality and can enter into international relations and conclude treaties with respect to specific areas of national interest, for example, in the domain of economic, cultural, educational or scientific affairs. The associate state can even be member of the United Nations. Fourth, the government and people of the associate state exercise full autonomy in their internal affairs free from intervention by the central government. Fifth, the people of associate state always retain the right to modify the status of their territory, including the right to terminate the relationship of association altogether (ibid, 201-202). The clauses of Strasbourg proposal have many similar points, which Michael Praag has already discussed. It can be argued that he has immense impact on the Strasbourg proposal.

The conclusion of an agreement of “associate” between Tibet and the PRC would fulfil the basic requirement of both states and fully accord with the demands of international law. Tibetan government will continue the practice of its autonomy, whereas Chinese government can resume the authority of Tibet’s relation with other states and its military control (ibid, 202).

Social Independence versus Political Independence of Tibet

The leaders such as Dalai Lama and former Prime Minister Samdhong Rinpoche focus on the reality of Tibet. They argued that whole boundary of Tibet was covered by its neighbouring countries so it need to depend on neighbouring countries for its economic growth and industrial development, etc. So remaining with the PRC will get more material benefits rather than remaining separate (DIIR 2016, 6). The ideological

foundation of the MWA was based on the interdependent approach where it does not matter whether it is develop or not and economic inequalities between nations, communities, families, where all people were dependent on each other for their survival and prosperity and humanistic approach where all people desired for happy life rather than suffering life (Rinpochen 2016). Samdhong Rinpoche notes that, ideologies did not matter for the Tibetans if they are happy and satisfy with what they have (Rinpoche 2016, 66). Dalai Lama also argues that in the past Tibet was a separate country and it was very important to China to know the relationship between Tibet and China. As for the future, the options were open (Lama 1998, 166).

The Dalai Lama asked for a referendum to decide the future of Tibet since 1960s till early 1970s. The debate between autonomy and independence exists within the officials of Tibetan Government in Exile. He informed the Indian media that the choice before him was “complete sovereignty or federation”. Dalai Lama has expressed his desire to choose an option, which was more favourable to the Tibetan population. He started to reconsider the basis of the Tibetan issue and now the issue was about the well being of Tibetan people. In the similar period, the Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping was also talking about the welfare and well being of his new China, where the new policies were to bring success and joy to the Chinese. Therefore, there was some degree of willingness between Tibetans and Chinese to have dialogue on the basic issue (Shakya 1999, 375).

When the direct contact happened with the Chinese government, Dalai Lama said, his main goal was to get some kind of understanding or compromise. Compromise means both sides will have to give some concessions to each other. Therefore he stresses the importance of happiness and welfare (Lama 1998, 174-175). The pressures on him were both from his own people and from Chinese government which means he had no better alternative than genuine autonomy.

Dawa Norbu argued that religious freedom in Tibet where Dalai Lama as a head of it was the basic demand of the Tibetans. The Tibetans wanted to have social-cultural sovereignty rather than the political sovereignty and it was shown many a times in the Tibetan historical experience where they were not willing to allow Chinese or any outside to interfere in their social life (D. Norbu 2001, 100-101). Samdhong Rinpoche mentioned, “We have to accept ground realities of the new world order. We feel that the Dalai Lama’s MWA is seek genuine autonomy for

Tibetans is an achievable objective and are therefore moving ahead for it” (Rinpoche 2005). The whole argument was based on the idea of welfare and happiness of Tibetans and territory does not matter much to them. The Tibetans were kept apart from China for centuries, not so much because of political will or armed resistance but it was more to do with the non-Confucian Buddhist culture and its unique institution, which was sustained the spirit of Tibetan social independence (Norbu 2001, 110).

America’s Interference on Tibet-China Dispute

Theoretically, “from 1959 to 1973, the TGiE position on Tibet was its independence, while practically TGiE knew that the international support was not so strong for them. There were hoping the support of Americans particularly through the CIA to the Tibetan resistance operating out of the Mustang region of Nepal” (Smith n.d.). Dalai Lama and his people, was reached to the point where there was no option left to them other than having dialogue with Chinese government and try to gain complete autonomy within the PRC. One of the factors which this realization came about more clearly was after US withdrawal of Tibet issue in the beginning of 1970s where the Sino-American appraisalment start (D. Norbu 2001, 315). By 1968 American backing has declined to almost nothing because CIA was not satisfied with the resistance operation inside Tibet (Smith n.d.). And in the same period in 1967/1968 Dalai Lama has begun to think about the alternative policy for Tibet’s future (DIIR 2016, 6). The American clandestine aid continued as long as Tibet remained useful to the United States as a Cold War front in the containment of Chinese communism (Hall 1978, 18).

Even though, the role of CIA in Tibetan polity was not officially informed to the Dalai Lama and his government. It was run by the Dalai Lama’s brother Gyalo Thondup. He managed all the relations or contacts between CIA and Tibetan guerrilla force. Even though there was no direct contact between the Tibetan government and the CIA. But the end result of CIA and Mustang guerrilla force contact has a vital impacted on the changes of Tibetan Government in Exile political shifted. As mentioned above, the role of CIA was present even before the 1959 rebellion took place in Lhasa and continued till the 1970s. The United States sees the “Mustang”¹⁵ operation primarily as an intelligence-gathering force, whereas for the Tibetan force,

¹⁵ Mustang: A place in Nepal where “Chushi Gangdrug” run its operation from 1960s until 1974 with support of America’s CIA.

this operation played as the continuum of its military actions, and it was not only for the information gathering from Tibet. The Loss of the American support, as well as the demand from the Dalai Lama to lay down arm force in Mustang, left guerrilla force with little hope as to what the future might hold (McGranahan 2010, 161).

The Tibetan guerrilla force under the banner of “Chushi Gangdrug” was able to settle in Mustang. The key to Chushi Gangdrug presence in Mustang was the support of two kings; the backing from the local king of Mustang and non-vocal consensus of the king of Nepal (ibid, 138). Moreover, Mustang was not only the military unit, which existed in exile, but other unit was also present in India. It was not governed by the Tibetans guerrilla force but it was incorporated into Indian army. The connections with Indian government were coordinated with the CIA after Tibetans came into exile in 1959. After the 1962 war between India and China, government of India created two new armed forces, which were “Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force” in 24 October 1962 and “Establishment 22” later known as the “Special Frontier Force” (SFF) in 24 November 1962. The force was jointly trained by the United States and India till the U.S-India bilateral relations soured. The United States of American stopped their participation but later Russian KGB (Committee for State Security) began supplying trainers and equipment (ibid, 138-139). The Tibetans didn't have common backing from U.S. In the beginning of 1960s, the US administration changed from Dwight D. Eisenhower to John F. Kennedy leadership. Kennedy was not interest in Tibet issue. The Tibetan operations were on the table whether they should or should not continue to support on the Tibetan guerrilla force in Mustang (ibid, 149).

William Grimsley, head of CIA in Delhi had broken the news about stopping aid to the Tibetans guerrilla force in Mustang. In 1969, U.S President Nixon was already in office, and Henry Kissinger was his national security adviser. Neither of them knew much about Tibet, nor did they care about Tibet issue (Thurston 2015, 231). The negotiation was going on between U.S and China, which led to the inauguration of the much acclaimed Sino-American *détente* in 1971 (D. Norbu 1974, 22). The Chinese government's precondition for *détente* with the United States was a) sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan and b) terminate all contacts with and assistance to groups under the leadership of the Dalai Lama. President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972 dramatically ended American's fear of Red China and United States

has agreed upon demands put forward by the Chinese government. This resulted in the termination of all the supports from the U.S to the Tibetan guerrilla force in Mustang (Thurston 2015, 231-232). Then, the joint intelligence office in India continued and took over support for much of the work that the CIA had been funding, including Mustang. The Mustang operations continued for several more years and finally through a combination of internal dissent and withdrawal of external support. The operation came to an end since it was not in a position to continue further (ibid, 232). In July 1974 Dalai Lama has also sent his brother-in-law Taklha Phuntsok Tashi to Mustang, with a tape recorded in his voice to requesting the Mustang guerrilla force to surrender their arms and search for peaceful ways to achieve their objectives. Several of Wangdu's (leader of one faction) men were so distraught over the message that they committed suicide rather than surrender. And many of them were killed by Nepal army and many have remained as a prisoner in Nepal for a long period (ibid, 233).

Then after couple of years, U.S President Jimmy Carter made his tour to PRC and the mandatory side-tour to Tibet. He also congratulated the Chinese leaders about the development happened in Tibet. After Jimmy Carter's tour to China, the Tibetan Government in Exile got a letter from the "Carter Crisis Center" suggesting the settlement between the Tibetans and the Chinese. Carter's position towards China was essentially one of absolute conciliation (J. Norbu 1989). In the 1977 President Jimmy Carter's avowed on the human rights in Tibet and the renascent of American public interest in the Tibet issue but still Tibet was continued to remain outside the scope of Jimmy Carter's official attention and the State Department's stand reaffirmed the Sino-centric American foreign policy vis a vis Tibet:

“No U.S policy or action is based on the premise that Tibet is not a part of China and the United States does not recognize the Dalai Lama in any respect as the government of Tibet” (Hall 1978, 19).

The United States still held to its traditional interpretation of the status of Tibet and conscientiously resisted Tibetan overtures to *de jure* acceptance of its *de facto* political independence. The Tibet issue has always been conditioned by and subordinate to the larger and more international important consideration of Sino-American relations. Therefore, the support, which the Tibetans were trying to get

from American on its political independence, was almost impossible because of improvement in the economic relations between U.S and China. The best option where the Dalai Lama could get strong support from the international organizations, states and particularly Americans, were by seeking genuine autonomy within PRC.

Even though, Tibetan Government in Exile was able to internationalize its issue but still the supports were mainly on moral grounds and on humanitarian basis. There was no particular state even U.S. who came forward and extent their political support to resolve Tibet issue with China. It was difficult to resolve the conflict by depending only on international supports. These supporters could be a third party when the negotiations take place. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru argued that “according to principles I uphold, the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else” (Nehru 1950, 13). The American’s has used Tibet when it served its purpose. Whether it was Tibetan Government in Exile or its various NGOs, many were depended on U.S aid and there are still providing it but the aid which was stop to the guerrilla force in Mustang has affect the Tibetan Government in Exile’s political changed.

Post-Mao: Deng Xiaoping’s Initiatives on Tibet

The environment of both international and domestic political changes has impacted both the China and the Tibet’s political strategy. It was in 1978, two equally pragmatic leaders Deng Xiaoping and Dalai Lama to break the ice of the Tibetan and Chinese negotiation. After the passed away of Mao Zedong in 1976, it was an opened to a new epoch in China and its relation with the Dalai Lama (Sharlho 2004, 2). It was a part of Deng Xiaoping’s reform introduced in 1978 which included not only modernization such as agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology but also took bold initiatives to resolve some of the outstanding national problems such as Taiwan and Tibet inclusion with China (D. Norbu 2001, 315).

Deng Xiaoping initiated a bold policy towards resolving the problem of Taiwan and Hong Kong under the slogan of “One Country, Two System”. Taiwan could be unified with the mainland through existing capitalistic economic and social system. This flexibility was welcome news for Dalai Lama, who saw it as a possible solution to the Tibetan crisis (Shakya 1999, 374).

He took a bold initiative to contact the Dalai Lama to resolve the Tibet issue. On 3 December 1978, Deng Xiaoping conveys three points to Dalai Lama's elder brother Gyalo Thondup that “the basic question is whether Tibet is part of China or not. This should be kept as the criteria for testing the trust... so long as it is not accepted that Tibet is an integral part of China, there is nothing else to talk about,” (Gist 1984) second, Dalai Lama can send the delegation to Tibet to investigate the actual conditions, and the third point, he accepted the Tibetans suggestion that fifty Tibetan teachers would be allow from India to teach Tibetan language in different parts of Tibet (D. Norbu 2001, 316).

China under Deng Xiaoping was widely praised by western countries and his first visit to America was in the year 1979. He became the *Time* magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1980. The growing popularity of Deng in the west had put pressure on Tibetan Government in Exile in response to recent changes in China. Dalai Lama responded by agreeing to send “fact-finding delegation” to Tibet (Shakya 1999, 376).

However promising the talk might be, but it could not find any substantive result since then (Sharlho 2004, 3). The initiation of the talk was because of China's strategic benefit without losing any political cost. Even though China had introduced a radical reform but the policy towards Soviet Union remained unchanged. But in the late 1970s, Dalai Lama was trying to win over Russians by claiming that Tibet issue was not the problem of ideology and there was some compatibility between Buddhism and Communism. In June 1979, Dalai Lama visits to Soviet Union as well as Mongolia to attend the Asian Buddhist Conference for peace, organized by a Russian-inspired Buddhist NGO. The relation between Russian and Dalai Lama was becoming closer which was not well received by China. Therefore, China had an urgent compulsion to find a *modus Vivendi* with the Dalai Lama (Shakya 1999, 374-375).

The Chinese government agreed to send three rounds of fact-finding Tibetan delegates in Tibet to see the developments and actual condition under the PRC. The government of China miscalculated the political sentiment inside Tibet as well as political sentiment in the exile community. The first fact-finding delegates arrived in Tibet. The Chinese officials were more concerned about the hostility which may show to the Tibetan delegates by Tibetans inside Tibet rather than support for them. But the reception shown by the Tibetans to the first fact-finding delegates surprised to the Chinese government as well as proved its policy failure towards Tibetans. This

surprised reception shown by the Tibetans forced to reassess China's policy towards the Tibetan minority (Sharlho 2004, 5). The Chinese officials in Beijing had little knowledge or understanding of the devastation of the past twenty years has engulfed Tibet (Thurston 2015, 264).

Therefore, under the leadership of Hu Yaobang, China initiated their fact-finding in 1980. After the end of nine days' tour in Tibet, Hu Yaobang gave a speech where he recognised the failure of the party inside Tibet and initiated the reforms. He had introduced various policies that could highly impact the regions political economy and also mentioned that the Chinese had to change their thinking towards Tibetan culture and ethnicity (Sharlho 2004, 5). On 28 July 1981, Hu Yaobang has forward Gyalo Thondup about China's "Five-Point Proposal" to the Dalai Lama but the proposal was only talks about the Dalai Lama's personal status and his return to Tibet. The proposal has just reduced Tibet issue as the Dalai Lama's personal issues and thereby completely ignored the Tibet issue at hand. So it was not accepted by the Tibetan Government in Exile.

Whereas in the end, Dalai Lama had to compromise his political stand on Tibet issue by late 1970s in shifting the essence of his struggle from the independence to concerns of the economic welfare of the Tibetans (D. Norbu 2001, 315-316). It was the aim of the approach to keep the struggle alive and also trying to have negotiation with the CPC in term of MWA. But many of the Tibetans said that the MWA was too moderate for them but he was also trying to construct a public opinion around the world which can help to resolve the issue (Lama 1998, xiii). On 10 March 1978, Dalai Lama has declared that "if the six million Tibetans in Tibet are really happy and prosperous as never before, there is no reason for us to argue otherwise" (Lama 2005, 53) and a year later he explained that Tibetans were in exile because of the welfare of six million Tibetans.

In 1980s he was very open that the basic issue for the Tibetans was the well-being and ultimate joy of the six million Tibetans. So to do it, Dalai Lama made the basic precondition for negotiation that the question of Tibet's independence wouldn't be raised (D. Norbu 2001, 316). Now the argument he was trying to convey was on the basis of the welfare of six million Tibetans rather than its political independence. Jamyang Norbu argued that when Tibetan delegates touring Tibet and China "seeking truth from facts". Tibetan Government in Exile found that Chinese new leaders were

“reasonable” and Tibetans sacred goal of independence was “unrealistic” (J. Norbu 2018, 6).

The Tibetan Government in Exile announced the rejection of Hu Yaobang’s Five-Point proposal and present a counterproposal by the Dalai Lama known as “Five-Point Peace Plan” at US Congressional Human Rights Caucus on 21 September 1987. Where he talks about;

“Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; (ii) Abandonment of China’s population transfer policy; the transfer of population was a one of most dangerous strategy to eliminate the root of its origin which was already happened in other Chinese minority cases. (iii) Respect for the Tibetan people’s fundamental human right and democratic freedom; which was basically about the individual rights and community rights within the People’s Republic of China (iv) Restoration and protection of Tibet’s natural environment and the abandonment of China’s use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear waste; (v) Commencement of earnest negotiation on the future status of Tibet and on relations between Tibetans and Chinese peoples” (Lama n.d.).

In the coming year, the fifth point was further elaborated to the members of the European Parliament at Strasbourg.

1988 “Strasbourg Proposal” at the European Parliament

On 1988, Dalai Lama has elaborated on the fifth point about the Sino-Tibet negotiation where he talks that “China could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy and defense but Tibetan government should have its own Foreign Affairs Bureau dealing with commerce, education, culture, religion, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities” (Lama 1988, 2). Therefore, as far as Strasbourg proposal was concerned, Dalai Lama has compromised Tibetans political demand and seek for a genuine autonomy where China’s sovereignty or security concern remained unaffected. Even though a couple of meeting took place between the Chinese representatives and the Dalai Lama's representatives during 1980s, but there was no concrete result between two parties. Even then, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang want to resolve the Tibet issue through negotiation with Tibetan leader. The Chinese were nearly succeeded in side-tracking international concern by showing its willingness to

negotiate with the Dalai Lama or his representatives. And those who were in solidarity with Tibetans were in huge relief after hearing this (J. Norbu 2006, 99).

Deng Xiaoping declared in 1979 that the Dalai Lama could discuss with the Chinese leaders “anything except all independence of Tibet” and similarly, Hu Yaobang was receptive to the idea of reunification of ‘Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet’ (D. Norbu 2001, 327). On the other hand, Dalai Lama talks about the internal and social independence of Tibet rather than its political independence. Theoretically, the two parties were on the same page to resolve the Tibet issue where genuine autonomy was the best solution for both the parties to have a satisfying result. But there was a major trust deficit between these two parties to come to a conclusion which was acceptable to both the parties. By mid-1980s, the situation was not very stable and no leader wants to take the risk in negotiation and Deng Xiaoping was also retreating from the liberal reform agenda and Hu Yaobang was also removed in 1987. After him, no one came forward to have a dialogue with the Dalai Lama (Sharlho 2004, 9). After the death of 10th Panchen Lama on January 1989, Dr. Zhao Puzu wrote an invitation in his own handwriting and delivered to the Dalai Lama to conduct memorial service in China. But the Kashag persuaded Dalai Lama not to go and the excuse was that there was not enough time to make the arrangements but the real reason was there were still afraid that he might be kidnapped (Thurston 2015, 280-281).

Even though the negotiation had failed to bring the solution between two leaders, Gyalo Thondup add that this was a good opportunity where Dalai Lama can meet the Chinese officials where he had already met in China on his visit in 1954 and built the trust with them. Gyalo Thondup was a controversial figure and minister in the cabinet of Tibetan Government in exile. He was one of main person who has tried to spread words within the Tibetan communities to give up hopeless independence and return to Tibet. Norbu argued that he and his family has shown any desire to give up their comfortable lifestyles in exile and return to Tibet (J. Norbu 2006, 101).

After the death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989, the Chinese students took the occasion of his death to call for an end to corruption and demand the institution of new democratic reforms. As the protest intensified, many have predicted the demise of Deng Xiaoping, Tibetans and people across the globe urged Dalai Lama to come forward and make statement in support of the students. Kashag was also requesting

him to extend his support and finally, he spoke in support of the students' democratic goals. But instead of achieving it, Deng Xiaoping brings the army in and brought the situation under control by crushing the protesters at Tiananmen Square in 1989. It had also influenced the negotiation between China and Tibet and the Chinese has never followed up on the question of negotiation (Thurston 2015, 282-283). This was one example of how brutally the Chinese government tried to crush the voice of dissent or anti-establishment who was trying to overthrow the government. No matter how liberal the leader might be but it was evident from the Tiananmen Square massacred in 1989. It shows how the Chinese government was not hesitant to crush dissent and any voice, which was against the government. Therefore, observing the whole situation during the 1980s, Dalai Lama realised that genuine autonomy was the best option to preserve Tibetan identity, rights and its culture. Therefore, Dalai Lama's proposal of Middle Way Approach to resolve Tibet issue had been influenced by various events witnessed in China and Tibet simultaneously.

On the other hand, Jamyang Norbu has describes the situation of Chinese new leaders and Tibetan Government in Exile into two parts; first, that surrendering Tibetan national sovereignty in the naïve hope that the PRC would come to an accommodation on the Tibet question was futile, perhaps even suicidal. Second, despite its economic "liberalisation" the Beijing regime, far from embracing liberal democracy was steadily and calculatedly moving towards a neo-Maoist Era of gleaming upmarket totalitarianism (J. Norbu 2018, 11).

International Response on Tibet Issue

The Chinese leadership was not in a mood to have dialogue with the Dalai Lama and they remained silent on Tibet issue with the Dalai Lama. Thus, the only option left to the exile Tibetan leaders was to seek international support. The Chinese has turned against the Dalai Lama for internationalizing the Tibetan issue. But he argued that there was no other option left to him other than seeking support from the world community. He had tried seven years with the government of China to reach a negotiation where both could find a solution which are beneficial for both of them (Lama 1998, 52). The Tibet issue had become more popular among the west after the Dalai Lama begins to travel to the west in 1973s. In the beginning, the intention of his

travelling to west was basically as a religious leader (Gupta 1973, 16). But Dalai Lama as an institution inherently carries with him political implications (Anderson 1979, 14). “The non-political in essence can still become political in effect and the very talk of refugees and the very suggestion of his spiritual leadership of the Tibetan people carry serious political implications” (Gupta 1973, 16).

Dalai Lama’s personal qualities conquered the world and the gains from his international visits were immense in term of new experiences, new friendships, and drawing attention to the Tibet issue (ibid, 16). Even though, tour to the west was consciously based on religion and build support on this line. Dalai Lama’s meeting with Pope John Paul in Rome indicates a great care was taken to stick to religious discussions. Similarly, Dalai Lama’s visit to Sweden was with the condition that he should not make political statements in Sweden. These factors prompt the Tibetan leader to abandon the longstanding call for independence and instead turn to the Chinese with a greatly moderated demand (Bhutia 2013, 60-70).

The former British Prime Minister Edward Heath took a trip to Tibet in 1979 and later he congratulated Deng Xiaoping about the good work he had initiated in the Tibetan areas. When Edward came back to San Francisco, he met with Dalai Lama and “reportedly made lengthy and heavy-handed attempts to coerce the Dalai Lama into dropping his struggle for a independent Tibet, and into making his peace with the new leadership in China” (J. Norbu 1989). Lord Ennals, a former Foreign office minister had also offered similar advice to the Dalai Lama and he was very closed with many of Chinese leaders and also considered to be an advisor to the Tibetan Government in Exile. When the Chinese government was accusing Dalai Lama of demanding Tibet independence, Ennals response that China misunderstood the Dalai Lama and the demand for Tibet’s independence was came from Tibet. He has been to Tibet a year before the announcement of Dalai Lama’s Strasbourg proposal. So it was hard to indicate that there was no outside influenced on Dalai Lama’s political shift. Norbu argued that the British were more interested to surrendering the demand of independence by the Tibetans and live under the Chinese government (J. Norbu 2018, 115-117).

On the one hand, the relation between US and China was beneficial to the PRC, on other hands, the rivalry increased between Soviet Union and China. When China was busy with the Culture Revolution, USSR had deployed its army at its

border close to China. Later the military clashes took place between two communist states. USSR was showing interest to contact with the Tibetans. So in June 1979, Dalai Lama had travelled his first tour to the Soviet Union and the Mongolia to inaugurate the “Asian Buddhist Conference for World Peace”. These tours had put pressure on government of China to initiate contact with the Dalai Lama. Many writers in the USSR began to criticise Chinese government and started speaking in Tibet’s favour. T. Rakhimov pointed out that the “Maoists did not even honour their commitment to local autonomy” provided in the Seventeen-Point Agreement in 1951 and the demarcation of Tibet as Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was to disunite and disperse the Tibetan people' (Bhutia 2013, 71).

However, it is necessary to understand Soviet Union interest shown to Tibet and any other minority was not because there was genuine concern about the minority people. It was a reaction to China’s rising of the territorial question and the associated nationality question in the Soviet Union. Later the Soviet Union realised that it would require active intervention in which he was not ready (ibid, 71). This whole episode had helped to put pressure on the Chinese government to have the dialogue with the minority issue.

As per George Patterson's¹⁶ account, the Chinese government initiated the rapprochement with the Tibetans in the early 1970s through him. With his help, “a series of meeting” was held in April 1970 in Hong Kong between W. G. Kundeling, a Tibetan Minister in the Tibetan Government in Exile and New China News Agency (NCNA) journalists, who were also Communist Party of China members. Patterson mentions that some of the Tibetan officials were prepared to accept Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Therefore, the debate took place within the Tibetan Government in Exile but lack of consensus, Kundeling did not have the authorisation to initiate it. Krishna Prakash Gupta confirms that “the existence of the debate in exile in 1972 itself- between doves favouring autonomy and hawks favouring independence” (Gupta 1973, 10).

Later, Dalai Lama’s travels to the west took a more political dimension and it revealed a dual strategy. On one side, the Tibetan Government in Exile were showing many signs which indicated its willingness to “forget and forgive” past brutality and

¹⁶ Patterson was a Scottish missionary and a British journalist well known in India. He had been expelled from India owing to his support for Phizo, the Naga leader (Arpi 2009, 30)

the Dalai Lama will return to Tibet. The Tibetans were ready to accept the Chinese sovereignty and in return they were expecting to give genuine autonomy to Tibet. On the other side, Dalai Lama has openly talks about the Tibetan Government in Exile surrendering of Tibet's independence and ready to work within the CPC (Gupta 1973, 16). This political shift was more visible around 1979 when the Dalai Lama began to use the phrases such as "happiness of six million Tibetans", the welfare of the people, etc more often than "independence" or "freedom" whenever he was confronted with the inevitable question. For instance, in 1960s, Dalai Lama used highly vituperative phrases to describe Chinese; invader, conqueror, military occupation, regain independence etc. Dalai Lama had not been very categorical when he was asked to explain on what he means when he says "happiness". This has provoked the international press to say that Dalai Lama has now dropped the demand for total independence of Tibet.

After the collapse of negotiation with China, Dalai Lama had launched the international campaign to secure increased political support. After shifting in Tibetan strategy, Dalai Lama openly began to request political support from the international community. One of the first big steps towards this new approach was taken on 21 September 1987 at the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus about his "Five-Point Peace Plan". Later he elaborated on the fifth point, therefore, the international response was positive towards his new approach but it has shocked the exile Tibetan community. Many Tibetans in exile thought, that this was a breath-taking compromise that built to a betrayal of their trust (Sharlho 2004, 11). When the Dalai Lama was still in United States in 1987, some of the monks in Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet came on the street to demonstrated their support on the Dalai Lama and the against the Chinese presence in Tibet. In the beginning, the CPC blamed the demonstration on the Dalai Lama but later the CPC has more focus on its internal policy in Tibet (Goldstein 1998, 87).

The United States Congress amends to the "Foreign Relations Authorisation Act" which was signed in 1987 and it mentioned that "U.S should make the treatment of the Tibetan people an important factor in its relations with China, respect internationally recognised human rights and end violations against Tibetans. And also urge China to release all political prisoners in Tibet and reciprocate dialogue with the Dalai Lama on Tibet's future" (ibid, 88).

Dalai Lama's proposals were well accepted by the global community. He says that "he was much encouraged by the positive response to his Five-Point Peace Plan as received in Asia, Europe, and the United States" (Lama 1998, 29) But the Dalai Lama's "policies and strategies have been adapted with the shifting of international power relations. On the other side, CPC's Tibet policy was certainly based on its constant assessment of an adjustment to great-power relations" (He 2010, 719). For stance, the Nobel Peace prize to the Dalai Lama in 1989 may be taken as an indication of western support on Dalai Lama's approach if not world public opinion. And between the 1987 and the 1991 the US Congress passed six resolutions on Tibet; the European Parliament passed two resolutions in 1987 and 1989; the Council of Europe one in 1988; the West German Bundestag in 1987; the Italian Parliament in 1989. International conventions or hearings on Tibet were held in Bonn in April 1989; in New Delhi in August 1989; in Tokyo in May 1990; and in London in July 1990 etc.

Therefore the Dalai Lama's proposal has received wide support at the international platform because of it more realistic to implement for both the parties having to maintain their own interest (D. Norbu 2001, 356). Dalai Lama urged to the elected leaders and representatives of Europe to bring changes to Tibet and their concern expression not only the renewed courage to the Tibetan people, but also show to China that, the global community does care and China cannot suppress the Tibetans without being answerable to the global community (Lama 1998, 42). The MWA was and remains a successful way to popularise Tibetan issue around the world and to achieve an international political support (Vernerey 2008). In 1980s Chinese government was receiving immense international pressure to have negotiation with the Dalai Lama's representatives. A number of resolutions were passed as mentioned above. But in a larger perspective, the Chinese government's responses to these pressures had been turned back to Tibetans and portrayed them as the unwilling party to negotiate (DIIR 1994).

On the other hand, Beijing was not ready to negotiate with Dalai Lama's terms and conditions instead of that, Beijing blamed him for seeking "semi-independence" or "independence in disguise". China argues that he was interested to promote anti-Chinese rhetoric and activities rather than making a serious kind of political compromise that they could agree. Chinese communist party denied that there was any problem among the Tibetan within Tibet and the project that the international

organisations extend their support is all because of Chinese rapid advancement (Smith n.d.). Chinese government believed that their policy of economic advancement and material development would unify the Tibetans with China, no matter what the Dalai Lama and Tibetan nationalist think of (Goldstein 1998, 89). Even if it did not occur then the policy of Han migration inside Tibet and economic modernisation will completely turn the demographic composition of Tibet and its economic nature, which will help to control over Tibet (ibid, 90). The Dalai Lama argues that our true aspirations will not achieve until and unless both the parties did not act according to the real existing circumstances.

The Chinese government lacked understanding of the actual situation in Tibet and also they intentionally ignored it (Lama 1998, 22). Even though there were many international representatives who had suggested the Chinese leaders to begin dialogue with the Dalai Lama's representative and resolve the dispute. Instead, the Chinese government has introduced tougher policies. Their objective was to isolate and maintain low profile of Dalai Lama and Tibet issue. The time is also favours the Chinese government where the Chinese was in the rising power and the Dalai Lama becoming old (He 2010, 719).

Chinese government response to the MWA, and particularly to the "Memorandum on Tibetan Autonomy", makes it clear that Chinese government has no intention of giving any kind of 'autonomy' proposed by the Dalai Lama. So now the question was how long Tibetan Government in Exile will strict to this approach? Smith advocated that change in approach will be possible only after the passed away of the Dalai Lama. The MWA strong support was mainly based on the loyalty towards the Dalai Lama so once he is no more than the support for MWA will be reduce. But still, Tibetan loyalty to his legacy will play pivotal role (Smith n.d.).

Tibetan Exile Community: Middle Way Policy versus Independence

Even though the Strasbourg proposal had been able to internationalise the Tibet issue, but it has dropped an atomic bomb to the Tibetan exile community where it shocked the whole community. "The distress and demoralisation experienced by many Tibetans were temporarily overshadowed by the international acclaim received by the Dalai Lama and the increased attention to the Tibet issue due to the Nobel Prize in

1989” (Smith n.d.). Many of nationalist, who were die-hard independence proponents were not ready to accept Dalai Lama’s proposal. The TYC has gone to the extent of bringing out stickers and posters saying, “We don’t want autonomy, we want independence” (Tsering 1983, 19).

There was an open demonstration towards the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg proposal from many individuals and bodies of Tibetans around the world. Majority of them blamed to the Tibetan Cabinet members that they couldn't give proper advice to the Dalai Lama. Some of the criticisms were against the Gyalo Thondup. Even though he was not active in the Tibetan politics and lived in Hong Kong, but he was having compromise talks with the Beijing, where the Tibetan Government in Exile did not recognized it as official talk (J. Norbu 1989). “An ugly climate of fear and suspicion has been created in Dharamshala where a person could be accused of being against the Dalai Lama’ for merely stating your desire for Tibetan independence” (J. Norbu 2006, 102).

Since 1987, Tibetans were advocating their demand through the human rights language and it was accepted by the international organizations, individuals and many more in the west. The whole argument was built on the basis that source of Tibet issue were a failure to maintain human rights. It was a kind of normative thinking that changed the Tibetan issues which was a national issue into human rights issues (He 2010, 720). History has proven that China will not strict to their commitment therefore majority Tibetans did not believe that the Chinese government will strict to their commitment. They believe that Tibet independence can only restore and preserve their rights (Lama 1998, 30).

According to Jamyang Norbu, the independence of Tibet is the only option to preserve the Tibetan identity. The CPC was using every method to assimilate the Tibetans with Han Chinese by sending Tibetans in China or turning the Tibet as “special economic zone”. The policy of Chinese transferring inside Tibet will be the dangerous method for the very survival of Tibetans in Tibet.

Therefore, it will be impossible to preserve the Tibetan identity and its unique language, culture, history etc by getting some kind of ‘autonomy’ or any other option where the Tibetans are promise to accommodate within the Chinese government. Instead of that all these options will only help to divide the Tibetans within the

Tibetan community (J. Norbu 2006, 110). Jane Ardley reveals that the “Dalai Lama further compromise on the status of Tibet was one possibility but, then the divisions within the exile community will deepen” (Ardley 2000, 33-34).

The TYC was and is become one of the strong advocates of Tibet independence as well as in any respect; the TYC's decision to launch on the hunger strike has important consequences for the upcoming Tibetan movement. Their method to protest was not same to the government so the disapproval with the Dalai Lama has occurred. It challenges the political methods of Tibetan Government in Exile which was not usual in Tibetan politics (Owen 2014, 155). Despite concerted efforts made by the Tibetan Government in Exile to maintain political and ideological unity among the Tibetans, but still the opinion were divided within the Tibetan communities in term of MWA and complete independence (ibid, 155). The Tibetan Government in Exile has used different methods to please the Chinese government and try to gain credit to their new approach by telling the Tibetans in exile not to protest against Chinese leaders those who were in foreign visits. The government was using their full power to spread the awareness of MWA within the Tibetan communities and the alternative options were very difficult to debate within the community (Smith n.d.).

On 23 May 2010 at the New York City, Samdhong Rinpoche made a comment that “Tibetans advocating independence or calling for genuine democratic in exile society were more dangerous than “Shugden”¹⁷ practitioners or the Chinese communists” (J. Norbu 2010). This kind of statement was very influential in Tibetan communities especially when it was made by somebody who has the charisma to influence. Jamyang Norbu argued that “whatever our criticisms about Dalai Lama’s giving up of the Tibetan independence, we have to appreciate the fact that he has consistently stated that he did not oppose those Tibetans who refused to accept the MWA” (ibid).

Smith advocated that MWA had created a division within the Tibetan community and the gap keep widening. As an approach, MWA could not produce any concrete solution with Chinese government. Tibetan community was now deeply divided into two sections based on the status of Tibet. One section who strongly believed that independence of Tibet is the only solution for Tibetans whereas other

¹⁷ Shugden is an entity associated with the Gelug schools (Yellow Hat sect). He is against the mixing of the four main schools of Buddhism where the Dalai Lama favours the inclusion.

section believed that Dalai Lama knows what is better for the Tibetans so Tibetans should follow his policy of MWA (Smith n.d.). This division was once just a difference of opinion but eventually it was turned into a tool to silence one side by other. If an individual holds different opinions other than the Middle Way Approach, then it was considered to disloyal or even treason against the Tibetan cause. A person could be ex-communicated and ostracised from the Tibetan society. “The difference between the two sides among Tibetans often comes down, as it always has to a large extent, to their relative religiosity and loyalty to their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama” (Smith n.d.).

According to the Tibetan official account, it claimed that “even if independence is restored based on Tibet’s recent history, there is no way Tibetan could get more than the TAR area” (DIIR 2016). Jamyang Norbu argued that it was just a “pseudo-historical assumption of a particularly simple-minded kind”. This line of claim was to create panic among the Khampas and especially the Amdowas to give up the demand for the freedom struggle. The relationship between Amdo and the Central Tibet was mainly constructed through the “monastic network of spiritual, scholastic, cultural” etc. All the Tibetans including Amdo and Kham considered Central Tibet as the centre of its civilization. The Amdo people were using a “traditional aphorisms as ‘lho-nyim Lhasa’ which means ‘Lhasa the sun of the south’ or when I close my eyes I see U-tsang’ to express their feeling for their cultural and historical roots” (J. Norbu 2013).

It is very difficult to measure the success of MWA even the Dalai Lama made in his 10 March 1996 and 1997 statements that the Tibetans should decided through referendum, what are the better options to resolve the conflict with China (DIIR 2016). In the end, innocent and ignorant Tibetans requested the Dalai Lama that he should decide on the Tibet future. This whole debate on the referendum was one indication of MWA failure or a strategy to seek support within Tibetan community. The Tibetans in exile were becoming more frustrated and impatience so it was difficult to predict the future actions.

The year 1988 became a very important year in the Tibetan history particularly to the exile Tibetan history where the Dalai Lama has withdrawn demanding independence from Chinese occupation. The major factors which influenced in shifting of Tibetan Government in Exile political stand of “genuine autonomy” from

“independence” were studied here such as whether American's CIA role in Tibetan guerrilla force or the changes in the Chinese leadership's initiatives and Dalai Lama's compromise policy and internationalization of Tibet issue.

The overall, since 1979, the social independence became more important than the political independence of Tibet. As the Dalai Lama argues that material development was very much needed to develop the nation, therefore, remaining with China was more beneficial to both the Tibetans and the Chinese government. The world became more interdependent and every human wishes for happiness rather than suffering. Therefore, Dalai Lama focused on the happiness of the six million Tibetan and shift political policy towards genuine autonomy.

After the death of Mao and his successor took a bold initiative to contact Dalai Lama to resolve the Tibet issue and on the other hand, Dalai Lama had also begun to compromise his demands but there was no substantive result. The main reason for this result was due to trust deficiency and politically correct solution to resolve the dispute. China was more interested in the Dalai Lama and his personal status rather than Tibetans as a whole. Even though a couple of fact-finding delegates and negotiation has take place but there was no fruitful result. The efforts put forward by the Dalai Lama to bring Tibet issue at the international platform and tried to get support from international has put moral pressure on China but it was not much effective as China was becoming one of the global leader. Instead of putting pressure on Chinese government, Dalai Lama has compromise its political stand so that there will be more support from outside on Tibetan political demand.

Now the Dalai Lama has recognised Tibet as being part of China since 1979, the critical question shifts to the degrees of autonomy and non-integration which can ensure Tibetan cultural identity and genuine autonomy (D. Norbu 2001, 107). But there was a deep division within the Tibetan exile community between the Middle Way policy and complete independence. The division has immense negative impact to the unification of Tibetans in exile.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

This dissertation has focused on the Tibetan government's relations with Kuomintang government and Communist Party of China and also the factors which had impacted the Tibetan government in exile's political shift that occurred in the 1970s under the administration of His Holiness 14th Dalai Lama. Since Tibet was annexed by China in the 1950s in the name of 'liberation' from the feudal system and imperialism from the foreign country. The Tibetan Government in Exile and the non-governmental organizations have fought against the Chinese invasion as well as the struggle for 'complete independence' from China until in the 1970s.

But the CPC claimed that Tibet is a part of China since the ancient period. The understanding of relation and dispute between Tibet and China is not possible by only trying to understand the recent history unfolded between two. The complexity of these two countries relation was so deep which needs to go back to the history and analysis the relationship between these two and how their relationship have defined and understand each other. The relation between Central Tibet and China was not same throughout the history and particularly when there was a change in the regime from any side. Central Tibet's relation with the Kuomintang government was not same as Central Tibet's relation with the Communist party of China.

However, in 1988, Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in Exile proposed a new approach to resolve Tibet issues with the Communist Party of China at Strasbourg, which came to known as "Strasbourg Proposal". This proposal proposed that Tibet which includes all three regions of Tibet popularly known as "Choka-Sum," U-Tsang, Kham, and, Amdo should become a "self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of China" (Lama n.d.).

The Tibet's foreign policy and defence shall be in the hand of Chinese government. Whereas Tibetans will have the rights to maintain their relation with other country in terms of commerce, education, religion, culture, science, tourism,

sports and other non-political activities through its own foreign affairs bureau (Lama n.d.). Dalai Lama wants to make Tibet a zone of peace, where there is proper recognition of human rights, environmental conservation, and rights to demilitarize and, stop the transfer of Han population into Tibet. The resolution which he proposed was based on the realistic means which can re-build the identity of the Tibetans separately and also bring back their basic human rights while maintaining China's own interest of the maintaining the territorial integrity. Dalai Lama's shift in policy focuses on the welfare and happiness of the Tibetans rather than its rights to remain independent as a nation.

The 'Strasbourg Proposal' had become a turning point in Tibetan history particularly in the history of exile Tibetan where it shocked the Tibetan community and brought drastic change in the international perception towards Tibet issue. There was no denying that this policy has left many Tibetans unhappy and to many it was like a betrayal for them. Even then the Dalai Lama was aware that number of Tibetans would be discontented by the new approach they practice (Lama n.d.). The impacted within Tibetan exile community was discussed in the third chapter and also discussed how viable this approach has been. The Tibetan Government in Exile's major shift in their political goal was not merely because of its domestic politics but more so of dynamics in international political relation and Tibetan Government in Exile's weak relations with other countries. It was also because of the responses from Chinese leaders showing interest to talk about a solution other than independence.

The Dalai Lama mentioned is his Strasbourg Proposal;

“We are encouraged by the keen interest being shown in our situation by a growing number of governments and political leaders, including former President Jimmy Carter of the United States. We are encouraged by the recent changes in China which have brought about a new group of leadership, more pragmatic and liberal” (Lama n.d.).

The influences of geopolitics and emerging of new leaders in China who seemed more liberal and pragmatic as compared to its predecessors has impacted the decision. It is discussed in the chapters that global politics and changes in China's leadership has immensely affected the Tibetan Government in Exile's political shifted.

One of my research hypotheses was that there are internal and external factors, which have influenced the political shift of Tibetan Government in Exile in 1988. The factors such as withdrawing of American fund of Mustang operation in 1974, the improvement of China's relation with the other countries and post-Mao Zedong Chinese liberal leader's initiatives etc were the major factors which impacted the Dalai Lama's political shift in the 1970s. Whereas, the responses from Chinese government had remained static, even when the Dalai Lama 'gave up' the complete independence for the Tibetans and demanded 'genuine autonomy' for the Tibetans within the PRC.

The historical definition of Tibet and Tibetan was complex which needs careful study. The concept of Tibet as well as Tibetan and its components are difficult to understand in the modern context. There are differences in understanding of Tibet between the Tibetans and the Chinese government. When the Chinese government talks about Tibet today, they refer only to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) whereas the Tibetans refer Tibet as the composition of three regions; Kham, U-Tsang, and Amdo. Historically, the term Tibetan was very restrictive and it was referred to the inhabitants of Central Tibet or Lhasa valley. There was no singular marker of identity which the modern academic explains. The single marker of identity emerges only in opposition to 'the other', which was not very visible with Tibet (Shakya 1993).

The Simla Conference that was held in 1913-1914 was one of the most crucial treaties signed by the Tibet with its neighbouring countries. Even though in the initial, British India, Tibet and China were supposed to sign the treaty but in the end, China refused to sign the agreement. The main reason for which this treaty got convened was firstly to understand of the nature of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and secondly, the treaty which was signed between China and British India on Tibet was not recognized by Tibetan government. Therefore, this treaty was initiated by British India to have a treaty where all three countries can agree on the common ground. All the three countries had their own agenda to fulfil in this conference as it was discussed in detail in the second chapter. The British India wanted to have a defined boundary with Tibet that later came to be known as McMahan line. Through this conference Tibetan government has tried to prove their *de facto* independence of Tibet irrespective of its outcome. And they wanted to turn the *de facto* independence into *de*

jure independent but it was not completely successful. So to have a fair deal, British India has divided Tibet into two parts; where Lhasa government governed 'Inner Tibet' whereas 'Outer Tibet' was governed by China. In the end, the Chinese representative refused to sign the treaty because it couldn't achieve their initial objectives. The objective behind China's participation in the conference was about the "status of Tibet and the boundary between China and Tibet".

Overall, all the three participants could not achieve their initial objectives but the responses from this conference were varied for all participants. Particularly to the Tibetans, this treaty became very significant in their treaty-making process. The Chinese government refused to sign the treaty and their action led to the failure of China's acknowledgement of Tibet being a part of China as well as recognition of China's suzerainty over 'Outer' Tibet. However, Tibet separate treaty with British India shows that, Tibet has international status to make the treaty with any other states (Praag 2014, 38).

Tibet remained *de facto* independence since the Simla Conference until the invasion of Chinese in the 1950s. After the Seventeen-Point Agreement was signed between Tibet and China, the neighbouring country India has become important to the Tibetan government. India has just got its independence in 1947 from British colonialism after two hundred years. Indian government's political position towards Tibet was very vital for the recognition of the status of Tibet. Most of the countries had no relation with Tibet. Therefore, the other countries tried to understand Tibet through the lens of India's prism. The Indian government's policy towards Tibet was mainly with the continuation of British India's policy towards Tibet. The Indian leaders were divided into two groups on the bases of India's policy towards Tibet. One group that was mainly influenced by K. N. Pannikar and Nehru so their policy was to remain away from Tibet conflict with China. Nehru was more interested in the idea of new Asia where India and China relationship matter the most so he was ready to sacrifice the smaller country to achieve this vision. Tibet has become more of a threat to his vision of Asia. Even though Nehru was very clear that Tibet matter a lot in term of India's security but he was not interested in internationalising Tibet issue and still he was hoping that there will be a dialogue between Tibet and China. Therefore, he was completely against the U.S involvement in Tibet and China dispute. Whereas the other groups which involved Jayaprakash Narayan, as well as many

others, were very critical of China's invasion of Tibet. This group argued that the intention of China was to capture the whole Asia gradually. Therefore, they favoured to support Tibet.

Even though, there was a division in Indian leaders position towards Tibet but overall support of the Indian public was immense towards the Dalai Lama. When he arrived in India for asylum, the Indian government and public have very warmly welcomed him. There was a huge pressure on Jawaharlal Nehru both from his own people and Chinese government when Dalai Lama came to India in 1959. And he took the bold decision to receive the Dalai Lama and provided him asylum. India had to suffer consequences a couple of years later.

In the third chapter, it discussed the relationship between the central Tibetan/Lhasa government with the Kuomintang government as well as the Communist Party of China through two different cases. The Kuomintang has sent the "Huang Mission" in 1934 after the death of thirteen Dalai Lama to reassert their domination over Tibet and in the similar way the Communist Party of China has forced the Tibetan representative to sign the "Seventeen-Point Agreement". Even though, the concept of autonomy which the Dalai Lama has asserting since 1988 from China is not the same as the understanding of autonomy during these two periods. The understanding of the term "autonomy" has been different amongst the Chinese government, the Central Tibetan government and the west. The historical relationship between Tibet and China is not possible to understand through the lens of modern epistemology as well as the concept of western autonomy; as it is visible many a times in the history of both China and Tibet to define their relationship.

For instance, both the Kuomintang and Communist Party of China declared their sovereignty over Tibet and both of them give assurance on the protection of Tibetan Buddhism and on the continuation of the traditional political system. But there were differences in the degree of regional autonomy and national integration between Kuomintang and Communist Party of China (Norbu 2001, 106). In retrospect, it appears that the hidden communist agenda was in the purpose and function of merely to communize Tibetans as an ideologically embraced Maoist mission. Their main objective was to minimize the essence of its social-political, which was the backbone of Tibetan autonomy and identity (1951-59). Since the 1950s, the Communist Party of China's policy and its practices was there to design to completely

integrate, assimilate and incorporate the Tibetans with the Chinese population in the field of political and economic as well as cultural, linguistic, and social. The assimilation policy in the name of 'revolution' led to a systematic destruction of Tibetan autonomy and the sinicization of Tibetan identity. The main reason of Tibetans opposition to the sinicization was not because they disrespect Confucian culture but because they love their own culture more, like most ethnic groups does (ibid, 109).

The Huang Mu-sung's condolence mission in 1934 was another turning point in Tibet external affairs. The Kuomintang's aggression and pressure on eastern and northeast frontiers of Tibet and Tibet's weak position just after the death of thirteen Dalai Lama was one of the reasons Tibetans had to compromise their position. The KMT has used Panchen Lama and argued that he was a strong supporter of China. He was trying to return Tibet by using arm forces therefore until and unless Tibetans recognized themselves as a part of PRC; the Chinese government would not be able to stop him (Goldstein 1989, 233). But the Panchen Lama had no such intention to use force to return Tibet. Tibetans volatile eastern border dispute which might turn into warfare and precipitate an invasion of Central Tibet and put an end to Tibet's de facto independence was the real threat to them (ibid, 241). The KMT took the passed away of Dalai Lama as an opportunity to reassert its dominance on Tibet through condolence mission in 1934. Even though the mission couldn't succeed its objectives but the presence of Huang Mu-sung's wireless units and some officials in Tibet was agreed even after Huang Mu-sung left Tibet. So this was a great success to China.

The Central Tibetan government was ready to compromise if the Chinese government untouched Tibet internal system and surrender of his control over ethnic Tibetan areas in Kham and Amdo. Basically Tibetans demanded the position that was in the Simla agreement of 1914. However, the KMT was not satisfied with the uncertain political relationship of the past. Therefore, the KMT could not maintain their real political administrations (Smith n.d.).

“The Huang mission not only re-established a Chinese presence in Tibet but also set in motion a period of intense international jockeying, with Britain vying to forestall Chinese control over Tibet” (Goldstein 1989, 251).

When the CPC came to power in October 1949, one of their remaining tasks was to 'liberate' Tibet and integrate with China. The Tibetan government has completely disagreed and claimed their independence. In short, the Chinese government informed the Tibetans to forward a negotiation delegates to discuss the Tibet issue. In December 1949 the Tibetan government appointed a negotiation team headed by Tsipon Shakabpa (McKay 2003, 591). There was a plan to meet in Singapore or Hong Kong but the British refused to allow the negotiation in their territory and advised the Tibetans to discuss in New Delhi. The Chinese refused to accept the venue and insisted that Tibetans should go to Beijing (ibid, 591). The Tibetan representatives headed by Shakabpa were lasted almost one year in Delhi as well as they had unofficial negotiation between him and Chinese ambassador. Tibetans were stress on the traditional relations of priest-patron between Tibet and China.

On the other hand, the Chinese ambassador Yuan Chung-hsien gave them three points as mention in the third chapter. Shakabpa has informed to the Kashag about the proposal and request to proceed to Peking for further negotiation. The Tibetan government refused to accept the proposal and order Shakabpa to observe the international situation. On 6 October 1950, the China's PLA began a full-scale military incursion to Tibet and the primitive Tibetan defences in Chamdo collapsed with little resistance (ibid, 593). The Tibetan government had no option left other than negotiation with China or to seek asylum. The Tibetan national assembly decided to have negotiation with China therefore finally both the representatives Tibet and China signed the agreement on 23 May 1951 at Beijing known as 'Seventeen-Point Agreement'. But Dalai Lama and his government in exile have argued that the agreement have been signed under force and was therefore invalid (Kvaerne 1994, 739-754). Tsering Shakya has revealed that if the negotiation had happened in natural atmosphere and one that was free of Chinese intimidation, it was most likely that the Tibetans would not have given in to Chinese pressure.

The Seventeen-Point Agreement has historical significance to China which represents its legal and historical basis for Chinese rule in Tibet (McKay 2003, 590). The Chinese government celebrates this agreement with a grand festival as well as propagates all over the world about Tibet progress as well as development which was taken place under the Chinese government since 1959 and also displays how backward Tibet was before the Chinese liberation.

In the initial period, the Tibetan representatives were very vocal about their independence and argued that Tibet and China's relationship was based on "Priest and Patron". But once the situation becomes worst and in the end, they have the instruction from Tibetan government, which stated that if the discussion reached the deadlock, then they could accept Tibet as part of China, on the following conditions;

1. "Tibet must enjoy full internal independence
2. No Chinese troops would be stationed in Tibet.
3. The Tibetan army would be responsible for defense.
4. The Chinese representative to Lhasa, his personal staff and guards must not exceed one hundred men.
5. The Chinese representative must be a Buddhist" (ibid, 597).

The Seventeen-Point Agreement was signed in 23 May 1951 but most of its important clauses were already introduced on the ground while the negotiation was under the process. The Tibetans were at the end ready to compromise on their position to protect their internal independence. Ngabo stated that "the Kashag had already agreed to make a major concession in accepting Tibet as part of China, and therefore all other issues were the only minor" (ibid, 597). After signing of the agreement, Tibetans has tried to get support from the America and other states. The American wanted to repudiate the agreement and wants Dalai Lama to seek asylum. But at the end for various reasons, the Tibetans did not take the advice from the Americans.

By analyzing both the Huang Mission and the Seventeen-Point Agreement, it can be concluded that the threat from China towards Tibet was nothing new in today's time. There were many cases of conflict occurred between Tibet and China in the history. One thing is clear that in all these incidents, Tibet lacked the material development in term of arms and ammunition to challenge against both the internal and external enemy. The Tibetan government was always depended on the external support in this regard. The Tibetan people did not take Chinese invasion in the 1950s as a threat to its territorial integrity but rather to their value system such as Buddhism as well as the traditional political system. Even in Huang Mission or the Seventeen-Point Agreement the Tibetans were in a way ready to compromise if their internal administration and value system remains undisturbed. The main issue of 1959

rebellion was to protect the Dalai Lama and their faith rather than the territorial integrity. The Seventeen-Point Agreement has received their support mainly from the monastery institutions and the secular nationalists were opposing the agreement (Norbu 2001). The division within the Tibetan assembly was mainly based on the protection of their own authority and post.

The involvement of American CIA's in Tibetan rebellion in 1959 was not the factor which led to the revolt; instead Tibetan guerrilla force was already taken place before the CIA involvement. Even though CIA was present and took part in the revolt but there were minor and not much effective in the beginning. The cause of the 1959 revolt was mainly because of China's misunderstanding of Tibetan as a whole. The Seventeen-Point Agreement mainly focused on Central Tibet and the Dalai Lama's status. It excluded Kham and Amdo that was ethnically Tibetans and the reforms were already introduced in these places where the local people were not ready. Therefore, hundreds of ethnic Tibetans left pilgrim to Central Tibet and seek for refugee but there was no response both from Central Tibet government as well as the local people. The local Tibetans consider Khampas as a bandit and considered them almost similar to the Chinese as an outsider. In the beginning "Chushi Gangdrug" aim was to organize their group in Central Tibet and then move to their own place to fight against the Chinese army. But in the 16 June 1958, Gonpo Tashi has officially transformed from the Chushi Gangdrug (Four Rivers, Six Ranges) to a "National Volunteer Defence Army". Now, this was not only confined to the Khampas but it became nationwide in scope.

After 1959 revolt, the "Chushi Gangdrug" was settled in Mustang in Nepal. There were trained under the America's CIA and the operation was run without the support of Tibetan government in exile until its end in 1974. It got closed down in 1974 because of several reasons including the U. S's cut of funds, lack of strong support from Nepal's new king and there were also some internal dissents. At the end of the 1970s, the Mustang issue became out of control and finally, Dalai Lama had to send Takla Phuntsok Tashi with a tape and urged in his own voice that they should lay down their arms and search for peaceful ways to obtain their objectives. For the Dalai Lama, Mustang was turning out to be an international embarrassment. Dalai Lama and his government maintained the image of Tibet as a non-violent, compassionate and peaceful people, and the Mustang incident could damage their international

reputation (Shakya 1999, 363). The Mustang operation was not fit in this Tibetan Government in Exiles' narration of Tibet. Therefore, the whole 'Chushi Gangdrug' movements which took place both inside Tibet as well as in exile was never publicly recognized by the Tibetan Government in Exile. There are only few autobiographies of these members available in public domain about the Tibetan guerrilla force but this whole operation remains public secret within the Tibetan community in exile.

Even though there was no direct link between Tibetan government in Dharamshala and the Mustang operation in Nepal, but this operation has left a huge impact in the Tibetan Government in Exile's political shift. The changes in the international relations between the states especially the relation between China and the U.S has improved after Henry Kissinger secret visit to China. And also in 1972 India and Soviet Union sign a treaty. Therefore, in this changing dynamics of international politics, the Tibet became a victim of the larger international game. The closed down of Chushi Gangdrug in Mustang has been one of the major factors which impacted the Dalai Lama's decision in 1988. Even though the Tibetan Government in Exile and, the Dalai Lama had no relation with Mustang operation but this operation played the major role as the alternative to the Tibetan movement. The Mustang operation helped the Tibetan Government in Exile to understand the reality of world politics and its support towards Tibet issue.

After the death of Mao Zedong, China has begun to modernize its economy through the opening of their market to the outside world. The new leaders Deng Xiaoping also initiated to resolve its minority issues. There was a shift in the party's ideological stance from rigid Maoist orthodoxy to a more versatile and pragmatic policy of winning over the minority nationalities (ibid, 371). Deng Xiaoping has sent message through Gyalo Thondup that other than independence, anything can be resolved through negotiation, and later this has become one factor which the Dalai Lama has changed its political position as discussed detail in the fourth chapter. Therefore, the Chinese was showing its willingness to negotiate with some preconditions. Therefore, both the leader has initiated the negotiation and it couldn't achieve the demand. In the same period, China's open door policy has also some impact on the Tibet. So, there were also changes in its policy inside Tibet. Therefore, Dalai Lama has adopted a policy of 'wait and see'.

There was some policy relaxation and sort of a temporary freedom in Tibet after China's open door policy as well as the negotiation between the China and the Dalai Lama's representative took place. After a couple of negotiations between them, there was no substantive result. The consequences of this fact-finding delegate were vital for both Tibetan Government in Exile and CPC. The Chinese government believed that their policy towards Tibet was successful and Tibetans were happy under its new political system but the welcome response that was given to the Tibetan representatives by the local Tibetans has shocked the Chinese officials. The Chinese government has to revise its policy towards Tibet. On the other hand, for the Tibetan Government in Exile, the response to their representatives has become a morale boost to their actions as well as their future goal. But it is the fact that it is not possible to have negotiation as well as solution based on both countries position before the Strasbourg proposal. Therefore, Dalai Lama and his Government in Exile begin to compromise their political demands. They have started focusing on the economic welfare and happiness of six million Tibetans.

But the Chinese government wanted to assimilate the Tibetan identity with Han identity. The Chinese government assumed that when the Dalai Lama dies, Tibet issue would also die. If China wants to resolve Tibet issue, then it was necessary to understand that Tibet issue was not only the issue of few elites headed by the Dalai Lama. It was China's policy failure and miscalculation. Chinese government assumed that once they manage to advance the economy of Tibet, and then gradually the younger generation will forget about their religion and their past history. But in reality, this policy was not working in China's favour.

Dalai Lama had begun his abroad tour in the 1970s and it was a purely religious trip in the beginning. But Dalai Lama as institution and his very talks as a refugee and leader of Tibet, it naturally has had many political implications. But when the Dalai Lama was not getting positive response from the Chinese government, his abroad tour was become more political in nature and he began to internationalize Tibet issue. Even though, Dalai Lama was receiving hard criticism from the Chinese government for internationalizing Tibet issue. He argued that it was because of Chinese government's unwillingness to resolve Tibet issue. The official initiative of his new approach began from 'Five Point Peace Plan' at the US Congress and later his elaboration of its fifth point at Strasbourg known as 'Strasbourg Proposal'. The

proposal received positive responses from international leaders as well as many international unions based on moral and humanitarian as well as human rights. After the Dalai Lama's strong compromise on Tibet political demand, there has been many international resolutions to put pressure on the government of China to have discussions with the Dalai Lama to resolve Tibet issue. The honouring of 'Noble Peace Prize' to the Dalai Lama in 1989 was an indication of international positive response to his new approach. The MWA was able to gain international support on Tibet issue but it could not manage the unity within the exile Tibetan community.

The second hypothesis of my dissertation argued that even though the MWA has been able to internationalised Tibet issue but it has also created ideological division within Tibetan Diaspora. In the beginning the difference between MWA and independence was just difference of opinion between some individuals but now this difference has turned out to be an instrument where one side use to silence the other side. There were many incidents that took place between the pro-MWA and pro-independence. The differences between them keep increasing instead of closing within the Tibetan community in exile. It is difficult to argue whether the MWA is more viable than the complete independence. By looking at the responses from Chinese government and within the exile community, it looks very vague and chances are slim to achieve its goal.

The nationality problems in China such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, etc were mainly emerged due to over-centralized control and Han domination. Therefore, it was in such context that a number of Chinese dissident intellectuals in 1994 drafted a constitution of Federal Republic of China and former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui 'Taiwan's viewpoint' in 1999 and the Dalai Lama Strasbourg proposal in 1988 had pragmatically proposed a federal system for China where major minorities would have autonomous statehood (Norbu 2001, 115). The Chinese government has denied the discontentment among Tibetans and also argued that the western countries interference was to denigrating China and prevent China's global power.

But the Strasbourg Proposal in 1988 has shocked the Tibetan community and many of Tibetans were not agreeing with this decision. It was not easy to criticise the Dalai Lama and show their disagreement in public space. There were many individuals who had shown their disagreement through various ways. Through this dissertation, it can be concluded that there is a division within Tibetan community in

terms of their political demands. Many of ignorant and innocent Tibetans assumed that those who are in support of Middle Way Approach are the pro-Dalai Lama whereas those who are in support of complete independence are anti-Dalai Lama. This is a new division which has created in Tibetans in exile after the introduction of MWA as a new way forward. It is necessary to question within Tibetan community that how effective the MWA is. And what are the chances of this approach to resolve Tibet issue in near future. Even though, it is able to garner the positive responses from the international community. The most important response needs to come from the Chinese government but their response was completely remain static and also against this approach and there is no change in Communist Party of China's policy towards Tibet even after the 'Strasbourg Proposal'. Their main intention was to eliminate the Tibetan identity by assimilating with Han majority.

Instead of having dialogue with the Chinese government, there was more division within the Tibetan exile community. What are the demands of Tibetans inside Tibet in term of these two political positions was not clear and it is difficult to find any scholarship on it. Their main demand is to return the Dalai Lama and preserve their identity. There are some questions, which need to do further research. For instance, is the Middle Way Approach the best option to the Tibetans? How to reduce the gap between the Middle Way Approach proponents and independence proponents? Is the negotiation only way to resolve Tibet and China disputes? As far as my research conclusion, MWA could not help to unify within the Tibetan community instead of that, it created a new division based on future status of Tibet.

There are very few academic scholarships available on the Tibetan Government in Exile political genesis. The most of the works available were mainly produced by the governments. This dissertation is a small step towards exploring the Tibetan Government in Exile's political genesis.

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