CONTESTATIONS AND CONVERGENCE WITHIN BRAZILIAN FEMINIST MOVEMENT, 1985-2015

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
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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation titled "**Contestations and Convergence within Brazilian Feminist Movement, 1985-2015**" submitted by me in partial fulfilment for the award of the Degree of **Master of Philosophy** is my original work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

The feminist movements are not monolithic and the various segments within a larger movement represent varied interests. The various subgroups within a larger movement have conflicting notions about fundamental aspects of their common interests, often contesting and despite being homologous are categorised distinctly. However, their common aspirations are the decisive factors in consolidating such a movement, granting expressions to specialised interests among the common interests and seeking common redress. Thus, the internal dynamics that lead to contestations within different strands of feminisms including the events that contain the possibility of precipitating a convergence are examined in the case of the Brazilian Feminist Movement after the return to democracy in 1985 through the initiation of impeachment proceedings against President Dilma Rousseff in 2015.

The dissertation has been divided into six chapters including the conclusion that summarises the entire monograph. The introductory chapter proceeds by giving a background to the study and draws out the scope, rationale, hypotheses to be validated, along with the methodology. A discussion of the relevant theoretical debates in Western Feminist discourse and Latin American Feminism is provided.

The second chapter traces the historical trajectory of the Brazilian Feminist Movement, relating it to the development of the theoretical precepts of Brazilian Feminism. It problematizes the 'waves' categorisation to unpack the intersectional dimensions that give credence to its diversity. It delves into the various landmarks and achievements of the movement by examining it chronologically.

The third chapter discusses the role of various external actors who are allies of certain segments within the feminist movement while opposing other sections. The five actors that have been identified are the Brazilian State, the United Nations, the *Encuentros*, the Churches and the Political Parties. They exacerbate the internal contestations and affect the contours of the larger movement often deliberately and at times unconsciously.

The fourth chapter examines the popular representation of women historically in the context of greater visibility of women in the public sphere. The presence of women in key decision making spaces like Political Parties, the Government, the *Encuentros* and United Nations that enable them to exercise their agency and advance their interests effectively has been studied at length. The mechanisms that support them in gaining a more enhanced role in the public sphere yet get restricted through patriarchal structures are scrutinised.

The fifth chapter presents a short biography of Dilma Rousseff, her ascent to the Presidency and her relations with feminists before and after assumption of this role as Head of the State. With greater detail, her impeachment proceedings are examined to draw out the explicitly sexist nature of them. The impact of the proceedings in rejuvenating the feminist movement in the country could be an area of subsequent research.

The concluding chapter tests the hypotheses provided at the outset of research along with providing a final overview of the enduring contestations and apparent convergence seen in the period under consideration. The key research questions raised in the first chapter are collated through the examination of every chapter. Additionally, the recent responses of the feminists to the advent of a conservative government and their efforts to safeguard their rights within is explored.

The attempt is to investigate the persistent contestations and durability of the apparent convergence within the different strands of the Brazilian feminist movement through the examination of primary and secondary sources.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The tenure of the thirty-sixth President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff had a remarkable bearing on the course that the feminist movement acquired in Brazil. The commencement of impeachment proceedings against Dilma Rousseff in December 2015 led to massive demonstrations against the 'sexist impeachment' by all sections of feminist. This event was crucial in terms of triggering a seeming convergence between various feminists within Brazil who since 1985, had sought to diverge in their struggles from that of the others leading to a 'highly diverse, radical yet fragmented' feminist movement (Sternbach et al. 1992). This divergence has led to multiple formulations of feminisms which are exclusionary with respect to each other, resulting in either diluting their agenda or getting downgraded to the second tier with respect to other social movements. The disagreements among the various strands are on the issues, with other actors who are their allies and background of the women activists that condition their subjectivity. The differences play an important role in giving rise to the multiple contestations on the meaning of women's rights in Brazil which ultimately resulted in a divide between the Women's movement. One stream consisting of rural, less educated, economically less secure and religiously conservative women often mobilised by the progressive wing of the Roman Catholic Church (Liberation Theology) stood to oppose the other stream of professional, educated and Middle-class women on contentious issues like abortion and sexuality. Within this setting of the divide, the proposed study utilises the prevalent binary of 'popular feminists' and 'professional feminists' for conceptual clarity. This division encapsulated as the differences between 'Grassroots feminists' and 'Academic feminists' among other binaries in authoritative texts have been deliberately utilised in this contextualised study of Brazilian feminism. This divide largely persists despite various regional initiatives like the Feminist Encounters (*Encuentros*) which bring together various strands of feminism in order to bring about greater awareness of the others' lived experience and influence the formulation of public policies.

Latin America, in general, is characterised by a strong, conservative, patriarchal tradition of *Machismo* –the notion of a heterosexual, assertive performance as the only agency of males and is linked to other forms of male privileges like *Patria Potestas* (which gives a man the authority over his family, denying women the right to become the heads of households). This not only means the loss of a woman's agency but also their mistreatment and subjugation. A tendency of 'othering' what a woman should be like, imposes on women characteristics of what is known as *Marianismo*- the veneration of feminine virtues in Hispanic American culture. Patriarchal structures and notions have been legitimised by Government policies in Brazil which recognise male-led households by providing social security benefits till recent times only for such households and thus impoverishing the marginalised, widowed women or single mothers who are rendered more vulnerable. This illustration shows an area where both Popular feminists who have been more active in the protests and the more Academic feminists who have often specialised in theory building can jointly collaborate. However promising it may appear, this aspect of collaboration has often been missing due to multiple contestations.

The role of and importance Dilma Rousseff, as a prominent activist who strove for multiple benefits for women namely, political representation of women, equal pay, issues of reproductive health of women is crucial. Despite opposition from within her Party, ruling coalition and the powerful Catholic Church, she rose to become the first female President that gave her the unique cross-sectional support of the women's movement who identified with her struggles against a hyper-masculine opposition. Seemingly, Rousseff transcended the myriad issues that are the basis of the divide between the Professional and Popular Feminist. Thus, a natural protest by feminists occurred against her impeachment proceedings on actions committed with impunity by previous Presidents on the basis of *Pedaladas Fiscais* – using public bank funds to finance federal and state social programme. The protests were precipitated by multiple investigations which found no evidence of personal wrongdoing and the role of the conservative media in mocking "masculine Dilma" and promoting the wife of the present President, Michel Temer as "demure, obedient" as an ideal, which is an explicit reinforcement of *Marianismo*.

In this proposed study, the terms contestations and convergence refer to the dynamic within the feminist movement. The Contestations between Popular feminists and Professional feminists are on various grounds - *first*, issues like greater representation for marginalised women of colour or

indigenous origin, the autonomy of bodies and reproductive health or role of women in the community; *second*, on the mode of protest- whether to collaborate with the State through elections and representation in public sphere, autonomous from the state through NGOs or local level incorporation of environmental or racial social movements; *third*, actors who can be allies whether it can be the Liberation Theology wing of the Catholic Church, the Brazilian State or the United Nations. The prioritisation affects the entire course of the feminist movement in terms of what it wishes to articulate or even which issues get articulated better. The Convergence refers to a historical moment when both contending strands of the feminist movement apparently came together for the first time in 2015 in response to President Rousseff's impeachment and the Popular feminists who had eschewed the label of 'feminist' so far began to explicitly identify as feminists. This study seeks to consider the nature of this coming together, evaluating whether it was a convergence that altered the subjectivities of those who did not identify with other strands and affected their self-identification to form a consolidated feminist group or a long drawn alliance due to the advent of a conservative government.

Until now the accounts of convergences and collaboration of joint movements like the '2015 Feminist Spring' were created by the Professional feminists who are more articulate, while the larger segment of the Women's movement is the Popular feminists, whose identification as "Feminists" is seemingly inexplicable and sudden. This is largely due to the absence of a consolidated account of the evolution of Feminist Movement from the subaltern lens- from the perspective of Indigenous, Black, Lesbian, Landless, Rural, Urban Working Class and other marginalised feminists who are often more concerned with their own strand of feminism. Their multiple vulnerabilities prevent a monolithic account of the lived experience that may provide an alternate account, yet the issues that affect all women, proximity and exposure to other strands through social media may explain why 2015 onwards, the movement revived.

A study to investigate the explicitly sexist impeachment of President Rousseff and the responses of various feminists, the diversity in terms of responses and the impact on the general movement ongoing at the time and subsequently strengthened as a form of protest against the incumbent conservative government and its regressive policies require a theoretical exploration of the feminisms that define the subjectivities of the actors that identify as such or even don't identify as feminists but undertake forms of mobilisations which are generally understood to be in

consonance with the spirit of feminism of that context. This endeavour by no means is exhaustive and cannot comprehensibly address every facet of feminism and thus the emphasis will be specific types of feminisms that have had an impact on the shaping of Latin American Feminism and Brazilian Feminism, which would be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Theories: Global, Western, Regional and Local to locate Brazilian Feminism

This section will analyse various theoretical perspectives to understand the notional interrelationships that shape the contours of current Brazilian feminism and how it is posited and influenced in relation to the dominant approaches in the field, which would be discussed across this and the subsequent chapters. This section commences with the introduction of certain selective concepts that are important in relation to the subsequent theoretical formations and then proceeds to analyse the main traditions of WWestern Feminism and a special extended section is devoted to the intersectionality paradigm. Next, the linkages between the Western and Latin American Feminism are traced to identify the main debates and to see if a comprehensive regional understanding has emerged. Last, this section closes with a short treatment of Brazilian Feminism whose debates and concepts are dealt with at length in the next chapter depicting the historical evolution of the movement and the accompanying discourses.

The essentialist understanding of feminism was devoted to an ideal abstract woman, essentialising 'womanhood' and theorised in the First Wave of feminism of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century gained parlance in Latin American countries and decisively influenced the region's First Wave and the demand for suffrage. This conception of a universal woman was context-specific, applicable to only Western Europe and Northen America but as later theorists like Jane Jaquette (1989) and Claudia Lima Costa (2000) observe, the production of knowledge and dissemination to create a universal standard is another characteristic of colonisation of knowledge and to articulate the interests and feminism of the Global South, one needs to generate one's own knowledge and reclaim the right to articulate while simultaneously

unpacking the bias against women by feminist writers of the Global North. This destabilises any notion of a universal experience (gender realism) and subsequent waves and dynamics of Latin American Feminism have emphasised the diversity based on different classes, race, ethnicity and genders which shapes their subjectivity.

Defining feminism with its diversity is not a simple task and the meanings have changed over time. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines feminism as both an 'intellectual commitment' and a 'political movement' premised on the quest for justice for women through the end of sexism. This dualism is evident also in the tensions between the 'Popular Feminist' and 'Professional Feminists'(Alvarez 1991,1998, Sardenberg and Costa 2014) about prioritising an identity based on imbibing theoretical considerations or being an active participant in the various movements that they believe in, often they deny the ontological presence of the other in the context of Brazilian and Latin American Feminism. Prominent Feminist Adrienne Rich (1976) draws attention to the aspect of inculcating conscientiousness about the embedded nature of patriarchy, 'feminism implies that we recognise fully the inadequacy of a male descriptive world and perspective) for us, the distortion, of male-driven ideologies and that we proceed to think and act out of that recognition.'

PREVALENT DISCOURSES IN WESTERN FEMINISM

 Feminism as a term was formulated in the 1890s in France, making this a relatively new term despite a much older history of activism and mobilisation by the women. Definition of Feminism is inclusive and narrow, where the older First Wave understanding as it emerged in the 1840s in the United States was primarily aimed at securing the right to vote for middle-class white women can be now evaluated as narrow, but it also generated a language of equal rights that women aspired to gain on which later waves and scholarship on the field has been bolstered. A more inclusive understanding of feminism was provided by leading Black and Lesbian feminist Barbara Smith (1979) for whom feminism also encapsulated the need to address racism, as 'feminism is the political theory and practice to free all women: women of color, working-class women, physically challenged women, lesbians and old women- as well as white, heterosexual

economically privileged women.' Feminism since the Second Wave has also problematised the sex/gender debate and the narrative in the second Wave and especially in the Third Wave have unravelled the subjectivity of both males and females to more inclusive and socially constructed understanding of gender to extend feminism to even explore the performative aspect of gender for males under patriarchy. As gender appraises how ones' performance of masculine and feminine roles is socially constructed, the biological deterministic perspectives that characterised the thought of previous ages has given way to a more critical understanding of the demands from previously marginalised sections like the Transgenders which are studied under the rubric of feminism. Another influential aspect that Judith Butler highlights is the performativity aspect of gender, which had enormous influence on the Third Wave of Feminism globally. While rejecting gender realism, she problematises the attempt to define a woman as such definitions imbue norms that exclude those that do not fall under the parameters even defined by women (1999). These normativities are a result of power dynamics within the feminist movement ignoring the specificities and divergences. For Butler, the performance of one's gender through 'stylised habitual acts' unpacks the fixity of the woman and enhances the scope of feminism to address an audience that is excluded in such definitions. While abandoning the category of woman as the focal point of feminism, Butler advocates that feminists should probe into the operation of power in society at large and even within the movement to illuminate how a conception of womanhood is generated. These aspects had a decisive influence on the moulding of feminisms especially from the margins that emerged since the 1980s in the region, challenging the dominant discourses of popular versus professional feminists to making the field more responsive to the demands of the more persecuted.

Before delving into the main theoretical approaches to the study of feminism in North America, clarification about certain concepts and dynamics that delineate the aims of feminism over the ages is needed. Feminism has emphasised historically on the reclamation of the 'self' for the woman, that is recognising and upholding the subjective self of a woman. The second wave feminism globally was deeply influenced by the works of Simone De Beauvoir and Betty Friedan. The former who had interacted with many of the feminists who were exiled from Latin American countries in Europe had a massive impact on the middle class and educated feminists who later led the movement in the 1970s and early 1980s. As Simone De Beauvoir's work 'The Second Sex' (1949, 1997 Re.) explains that a definition of a woman is articulated on how she is

not a man, while when a man is defined, it is not reciprocally defined in relation to a woman, making the conception of a woman dependent on a man. Furthermore, the dualism that operates in the Western Philosophy creates binaries of good-evil, positive-negative, rational-irrational, scientific-unscientific where an implicit bias works in, providing for a hierarchy in the interrelationship. This extends to the duality in the relationship between a man and woman, where the woman is attributed characteristics intrinsically seen as inferior like irrational, emotional, and in the mind and body binary, the latter is what women are often reduced to, which provides justification for subordination of not only the bodily self of the woman but also her subjective self. De Beauvoir further analyses the edicts of philosophers like Aristotle who saw women as 'naturally defective' and St. Thomas declared that women were 'imperfect men and incidental beings'. These pronouncements were legitimised as truth and this knowledge acted as another axis for subordination. The duality is indicative of the woman, as Beauvoir notes, being the "Other" to the man who is "Absolute", the latter has subjectivity while the former's subjectivity is stripped to become the object throughout history, to be always defined in relation to the Absolute rendering them being lacking in autonomy.

This unequal relationship is given credence by science that seemingly objectively assures categories which conceal the bias of stereotypes associated with gender and questions the notion of an 'eternal feminine'. As Beauvoir reveals in her first chapter, the description of the female reproductive cell, the gamete or ovum is described as passive and outdated attributes on the egg (now Ovum represent the female) are projected on a woman and define her performance as a woman. Another point that Beauvoir drew out based on her existentialist understanding was about how 'one became a woman' made possible to interrogate the process of socialisation that generated makes a woman view her body in a specific way, usually seeing it as disadvantageous. Based on many case studies of different contexts, Beauvoir questions whether what are perceived as disadvantages of the female bodies are disadvantages per se or the society affirms them to be disadvantageous, opening the ways for women to reclaim their bodies as theirs, to develop own subjective opinions on it and overcome the systemic control over body and conscience.

The specific aspects that have been highlighted selectively deal with certain concepts and views in mainstream feminism germane to the discourses in English speaking nations which have a strong impact on both Latin American and Brazilian Feminism, who utilised these to further their

quest for justice and generated their own perspectives. Latin American Feminism has borrowed and critiques Feminism developed in the Global North and it is necessary to understand the characteristics of the main variants of Western Feminism (Beasley 1999) in brief to understand how Latin American and ultimately Brazilian Feminism were influenced.

Theoretical Approaches

The main approaches to feminism, according to Alison Jaggar (1983), have four steams of feminist political philosophy- Liberal Feminism, Marxist Feminism, Socialist Feminism and Radical Feminism, where these divisions often mirrored the debates within political philosophy, borrowing the language and orientation while also critiquing the approach, building on the work done in the First two waves.

As Beasley elaborates, Liberal Feminism is viewed as the moderate and mainstream form of feminism which grounds the subordination of woman on unequal rights due to restrictions on admittance to the public sphere. The rights discourse premised on unequal legal, political and institutional rights hindering the access to the public sphere and hence not allowing women to be on par with men is the scrutinised. Liberal Feminism assumes that there is a commonality between the sexes, both have a 'fundamentally sexually undifferentiated human nature' (Beasley), which translates to women having the right to obtain what men have. This leads to the need for reform of society rather than revolutionary change and providing for redistribution of benefits rather than outrightly challenging the organisation of society or addressing the embedded patriarchy. Liberal Feminisms espouse welfare liberalism which requires a degree of government intervention to regulate individual and collective competition rather than accept laissez-faire liberalism. Liberal feminist opine that the discrimination between men and women is due to the sex of the women, which prevents the true realisation of potentials for which government intervention is welcome. The extent of engagement of the government is a matter of debate as North American feminists disagree with extensive engagement in line with re-enforcing their own autonomy whereas some others want multiple networks of engagement.

More than the other approach, the theoretical developments of Liberal Feminism were strongly accompanied by liberal feminist activism as activists asserted their autonomy over themselves

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and protested against domestic violence in the 1970s and the scholarship problematised the public-private divide and how domestic violence needs government intervention even though it occurs in the private sphere, till them immune from regulation and makes it a site of subordination for women. This approach was also the earliest approach that enabled the granting of the political right of representation, to be allowed in the public realm of politics and become equal members of the political community. The First and the early Second Wave in Latin American Feminism was heavily influenced by the approach in the context of authoritarian regimes that violated the personal autonomy of women and in many pats denied them suffrage. Furthermore, the moderate orientation of the approach finds a broad audience in the region pervaded by *Machismo* that increases their ability to articulate certain immediate demands like protection from violence and provide space in the spectrum of feminisms available here.

Liberal Feminism has been widely critiqued for its tendency to universalise the experience of North American Women while ignoring the contextual specificities that define the understanding of self of women. Notable in this regard is the perspective of the intersectionality of race, class, ethnicity and sexuality that have a tendency to increase discrimination and the resultant identity formation differs and their subsequent interests. The Liberal Feminist Approach has been similarly critiqued by Radical feminists who uphold the principle of 'difference' over 'equality due to sameness', where they recognise that women and men are not the same and the differences are to be celebrated. These differences should be regarded in a non-hierarchical and non-normative manner.

The Marxist Feminist approach had a greater impact in the 1970s but remained an authoritative approach in Western feminist philosophy, having contributed to the approaches of psychoanalytic feminism, post-modernist and poststructuralist feminism as well as intersectional feminism. Deriving from Karl Marx's formulations, the antagonistic class relations between two unequally posited classes based on ownership of means of production, of those do not own the means of production are then subjected to oppression and all inequalities. Class division precedes sex oppression and leads to males assuming the dominant position. This translates to the private property leading to hierarchy on the basis of class divisions and then women being commodified- thus 'sexual oppression is one of the many dimensions of class divisions.' Furthermore, Marxist Feminists hold that the oppression has economic basis rather than founded in ideas and attitudes,

in consonance with the Marxist base-superstructure dialectics where issues concerned with sexuality are shaped by economic conditions. Like Liberal Feminism, Marxist Feminism also examines the role of women in the public sphere, but associate the capitalist marketplace and the economy to be patriarchal, evident in the provision of low wage jobs to women, the conception of wage labour also illustrates the unpaid work that women perform in the domestic sphere. Thus, they advocate the overthrow of capitalism through a revolution that would also erode superordination by men.

While there is relatively lesser attention paid to the operation of power with relation to sex and the benefits that men gain from the unequal power dynamics, the operation of power through relations of production in the form of private property is investigated at length. As unequal rights were the main problem for Liberal Feminism, for Marxist Feminism, the problem is capitalism and the unequal relations it spawns. But this is also an approach rooted in sameness and equality as it essentialises women as somewhat the same. Marxist and Socialist Feminism has been largely critiqued due to the inherent economic determinism and with the end of the Cold war, these two traditions based on the grand narratives have been less utilised (Curthoys 1997). Yet, these approaches were pivotal to the formation of the other theoretical paradigms. Moreover, the presence of Leftist Feminists in Latin America and their activism against the military regimes was crucial, initial women's organisations emulated the structure and programme of the Left and even today, the socialist and communist parties in the region not only act as a platform for mobilising the popular and professional feminists, these are among the more progressive forums for representation and formulation of public policies.

Socialist Feminism like Marxist Feminism has been losing influence and relevance yet it is too premature to pronounce an end to it. Socialist Feminism had a profound impact on the Second Wave in terms of extending it to the more popular sections of the feminists. According to Beasley, Socialist Feminism's development in the 1960s and 1970s was in the context of the debates between Marxist Feminist and Radical Feminism. The approach tried to incorporate elements of Marxist Feminism like the examination of how labour and class relations impact the autonomy of a woman with Radical Feminisms contention that sexual oppression is not a consequence of only capitalist classes. They argued that subordination of the marginalised, here

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women occurred before the classes formed and thus cannot be reduced to capitalism. Socialist Feminisms can be further subdivided into three strands based on their integration of the concepts of Radical Feminism and Marxist Feminism. The *first strand*, utilising Freudian Psychoanalysis, delved into the social construction of gender. While using the Marxist terminology of class relations, it seeks to understand the oppression that women face as a result of psychological social functions. It reflects the dual system model of social analysis which examines the power that classes formation and sex can contain in the construction of social organisations founded on them, capitalism and patriarchy through various procedures. The psychological model is historically contextualised by the economic relations. The criticism that is directed at such a study is due to the economic determinism that the study exhibits due to the primacy of the economic relations of classes in the base-superstructure diad over the psychological aspect of sexual oppression which is consigned to the superstructure.

The *second strand* of Socialist Feminism draws concepts from both Radical Feminism and Marxist feminism into a unified system called capitalist patriarchy model. The *third strand* also provides a dual system but capitalism and sex are seen in material terms, unlike the psychological dimension attributed to patriarchy. Both systems of oppression are interrelated and operated without being dependent on the other, which does not reduce the importance of the other in creating social relations. Both Marxist and Socialist Feminism utilised theoretical concepts like labour to understand how patriarchy undervalues their productive and reproductive work which is necessary for the functioning of capitalism. Yet, the bilateral focus on only class and sex divisions as sources of power that are used to subordinate women make these theories poor in terms of analysis other sources of marginalisation in the society, especially, the lack of interrogation of race and ethnicity.

Radical Feminism, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, was more indigenous in developing its own conceptual tools and language than the other three philosophical traditions that borrowed from the mainstream grand narratives. It refutes the liberal feminist objective of celebrating the sameness of women to enable them to assimilate in the public sphere, rather it asserts the difference that distinguishes women from men and exposes the systemic subordination that women face due to them being women. This highlights that women face

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oppression not because they belong to a specific class, but because they are women, signified by the oppression due to their sex. Earlier forms of Radical Feminism sought to project a sort of global sisterhood where similarities in the experience of being a woman were recognised more than the differences. This tendency, according to Beasley, leads to a degree of separation from men, ranging from supporting other women in their struggles to advocating a completely separate existence. This theoretical approach criticises the heteronormativity prevailing around that has systemically privileged heterosexual men, thus, lesbianism is seen as a challenge to that existing order. To overcome the order that privileges men, Radical feminists focus on the sexual oppression that women face and seek to prioritise women. In contrast to the Marxist and some Socialist feminists, sexual oppression is seen as the earliest and most institutionalised form of inequality and other forms of oppressive power like Class relations are derived from these.

Radical feminists posit patriarchy as a fundamental form of oppression and the 'primary form of oppression for women', where men are seen to beneficiaries of it and thus are viewed as the 'main enemy'. This is due to the fact that men across all social categories are seen as gaining from such an unequal social organisation, which does not mean that they see all men as invariably oppressive or that some men may be male feminists, working to overcome the system. This prioritising of patriarchy as the main systemic form of oppression was in response to the tendency of Marxist feminists to relegate sexual inequality to a lesser priority in the 1970s as the latter devoted much of the attention to the paid labour aspect and how women stood as wage workers while undertaking sexually differentiated jobs.

Additionally, Radical Feminists celebrate the differences that set women apart and through their work attempt to recover the positive attributes of femininity as a challenge to the prescribed social conditioning that treats it as something deficient as elucidated in the previous sections. They formulate an ontologically different conception of men and women that is a result of the social system, not an inherent trait that men possess which puts into sharp relief their differences. They consider patriarchy to be socially embedded and to overcome this, they advocate revolutionary social changes which commences at the local organisational level rather than centralised hierarchical structures to coordinate (opposed to Marxist central committee guiding even the women's sections). Unlike the Liberal feminists, they view the government and their policies for intervention as suspicious because the state itself is seen to embody patriarchy.

The focus on sexual oppression makes the control over women's bodies a central concern of this approach. Radical Feminism examines attitudes and psychological patterns, cultural and contextual values that shape the experience and understanding of being a woman rather than the more material economic bases that are the foundation bases of oppression in the public sphere and in such cases where both the public and private space is to be understood, the female body becomes a material site to analyse, seen in the context of Brazilian feminism through the hypersexualisation of female bodies and differing responses to women about body images and female bodies in public. 'Material' as a term alludes to the tangible structural forms of social organisation, including the economic, physical or bodily aspects. The primacy of bodily materiality in current discourse of feminisms globally was a result of the pioneering efforts of the radical feminists who rebutted the Liberal feminists' proclivity to obfuscate the bodily difference and unpacked it as a site of oppression as well as something to be celebrated. The Radical feminists made considerable contributions to the study of the embodied self, that is, the understanding of feminine subjectivity and conception of the self, ranging over topics of violence, sexuality, the maternal body and conferring meaning on self. The body is not seen as separate from society as social practices evolve from the interaction between them and one of the agendas of Radical Feminism is to empower women to gain control over their bodies. The work on body politics has been taken ahead by post-structural and postmodern feminists.

Radical Feminism has been critiqued on various aspects, especially the fragmented nature of the theoretical approach provides more than one account of emancipatory strategies. Liberal feminists have dismissed certain strands as extremists and untenable and often the hyper theorising tendencies create a gap between practical immediate solutions. Furthermore, Radical Feminism in the quest to illuminate the common experience of women which separate them from men tends to overemphasise on womanhood and essentialises it, ignoring contextual experiences that shape their own perspective of being a woman.

The other prominent theoretical approaches that range from the psychoanalytical feminism to poststructural and postmodern feminism are those generated after the 1980s which make the field more inclusive but for the purpose of this study, an added emphasis on intersectional feminism dealing with race and ethnicity will be provided as Latin American Feminism since the 1980s which sought to give greater recognition to the interests of the women from the margins. In this

context, the perspectives and theories of indigenous and Black Feminism will be presented in the second and third chapters.

Intersectionality in Feminist Theory

In North America, since the 1970s, women of colour have protested against the universalisation of white English speaking feminist experiences, which are detrimental to the understanding and rehabilitation of the contextual and greater oppression faced by those who belong to marginalised races, ethnicities, sexualities and regions. The normalisation of white heterosexual feminism under the Second Wave which sought to combat inequalities in the family, workplace and autonomy over bodies and control of own sexualities projected concerns that are very contextual, germane to the white middle-class women but was projected as concerns of all the women. The period between the end of Second Wave and the start of Third Wave feminism was space of ferment for these discontent to be articulated and these formed the basis of the wider acceptance of diversity in the trend of the Third Wave. In North America, among the many voices that spoke out, Barbara Smith, her twin sister Beverly and Demita Frazier authored the Combahee River Statement (1977) was one of the first explorations of multiple sources of oppression, critiquing the sexual oppression in the Black community and the heterosexist norms of feminism. This led to a national cultural dialogue about the intersection of race, class, gender and sexuality and provided Black women with the chance to communicate about their aspirations through the press that Smith started. Subsequently, bell hooks publication of the influential 'Ain't I A Woman?' in 1981 revealed the particularity of the mainstream feminist movement that was concerned with the needs of only the white, middle-class feminists. This prompted a movement to account for multiple identities and more diverse experiences. Of these, the more theoretically prominent paradigm of intersectionality emerged, where Kimberle Crenshaw (1989,1991) highlights the deficit in prevalent feminist theory and anti-racist doctrine which does not account for the experiences of Black women, marginalising them further. This paradigm has been deeply influential and popular among the marginalised sections globally and has been utilised by feminists in Latin America to promote more context-specific understandings of feminist experience and then formulate policies on that basis. The forums like *Encuentros* have aided in the dissemination of these discourses to many of the subaltern and Popular feminists,

who have incorporated this in the formulation of their context-specific theories. It has had a strong impact among theorists of Afro-Brazilian Feminism who critique the dominant discourse of Brazilian Feminism as not addressing their needs, the ways it can be more responsive and the policies that are required to ameliorate their marginalised status.

Crenshaw (1989) argues that one of the reasons the subjectivity of Black women are not realisable within the dominant feminist discourse and the anti-race discourse is due to the tendency of treating race and gender as mutually exclusive rather exploring the intersection of their operation to unravel experiences that have hitherto been marginalised. 'Single axis framework of experience of discrimination informs anti-discrimination laws and is also reflected in feminist theory which distorts the analysis required to address the multidimensionality of the experience of a Black woman. This leads to the erasure of their experience and the theoretical limitations which frustrate efforts to broaden the movement. The lack of participation of Black women in subsequent movement due to their alienation and lack of address of demands stemmed from the understanding of subordination in dominant discourse occurring due to a specific and single social marker like gender or sexuality or race or ethnicity or class, never the intersection of these. Often the standards of what constitutes discrimination for these movements are restricted to the articulation by the relatively privileged members of the movement and generators of these discourses based on the single axis framework, in this case, white women and Black men. The side-lining that women from marginalised class, race or ethnicity face due to this single axis framework distorts the narrative of race and sexism that is simplistic and reductive when using the discrete rather than intersectional experiences and unwittingly justifies the oppression. Besides, Crenshaw argues that the mere inclusion of Black women into these movements and discourses do not help in remedying their historic exclusion due to the existing analytical framework in places are those constructed on the basis of experiences that are not intersectional and hence alien to them.

Intersectional experiences are greater than the sum of racism and sexism which needs to be considered for the formulation of appropriate policies. Using multiple case studies, Crenshaw reveals that in most of the legal cases where Black women have not be rehabilitated, there appear contradictions. In one of the more revealing judgements, the assumption by the Court that 'discrimination against women' automatically alludes to gender discrimination faced by white

women in the absence of the signifier "Black" and legal suits that Black women bring forward were more about race than gender, an observation that is sexist and normalises the prioritisation of her identity over her agency as a woman to do so as well as illuminates that discrimination as an experience is legitimised as a White woman's experience. Crenshaw continues that for white women, 'claiming sex discrimination is simply a statement that if not for their gender, they would not have been disadvantaged'. Given the other aspects of privilege that they enjoy, gender becomes the only axis on which they can be discriminated, which generates the dominant discourse on single axis of discrimination framework and implicit in the Liberal feminist framework where fighting for certain rights where all other factors are seen to be the same, human nature is the same and only sex is the source of disadvantage. Theoretically, this can be extended to explain how the multi-causal axis of discrimination which does not apply to white women often is problematised by an intersectional study.

Theoretically, intersectionality addresses the 'hybridity' of the claims that people from marginalised identities can bring forward as often they are confined within their multiple identities that lead to greater disadvantages when they are asked to choose which one they identify more with, be it for participation in movements, articulation of their experience or in cases of legal petitions. The experience that marginalised women have cannot be encapsulated in the general categories that the dominant discourses provide for. Another grievance that the Black women have with the feminist movement is when white women who have very different subjectivities speak for all women, assuming a commonality which they feel does not exist and prevents them from being active participants with an equal stake.

The added critique that occurs in the discourse of intersectional feminists is that the normalisation and legitimation of the standards and experience of White women projects experiences under patriarchy is a specific way. Since the First Wave, especially, the Liberal feminists postulated that subordination of women was rooted in unequal access to the public sphere buttressed by legal, economic and political structures which restricted them to their homes. On the other hand, poorer sections of the population, especially women of colour and those in rural areas have been working outside of their home and the operation of patriarchy at homes in the form of domestic violence and even in the public sphere in the form of sexual harassment was never the main contentions nor even asserted. The diversity of the movement is

further undermined when the issue of domestic violence only recently has been acknowledged to be an endemic problem through identification of the private sphere as also a site of violence but the First Wave feminists who argued for public employment and representation with qualifications only the middle-class white women could have, they neglected to raise issues of the other more disadvantaged sections. The instance of rape laws shows how differing penalties awarded for raping women of colour and white women, the portrayal by the media and the resources that the women cannot afford to expend to get substantial legal aid highlights the institutionalisation of their disadvantaged status. The general stereotype of the Black male rapist and white female victim which is prevalent as a racist bias leads to many in the Black community from dealing with sexual abuse, suspicious of their portrayal and this leads to Black women who are inhibited from accessing their legal options when they are violated. This leads to hesitancy in challenging the gender barriers if it can jeopardise their anti-race agenda, clearly a prioritisation of one identity marker over the other. Hyper-sexualisation of women of colour in the United States and in Brazil is also the result of dominant racist bias that portrays women as promiscuous and thus justifies their sexual assault or rape and the penalty awarded to white men for perpetrating sexual crimes on women of colour is the least, in such cases the claim of bodily autonomy shaped in the white feminists see is vastly different for Black women for whom the body has been taken from her subjectivity in ways that the former cannot empathise with.

In the above-mentioned critique, the need to adopt intersectional perspectives to reflect greater ground realities are required. Intersectionality provides a way to reconceptualise identities that are not constructed on a uni-dimensional axis at the expense of other identities that one assumes. Crenshaw (1991) proceeds to delineate **three types of intersectionality**-
 First, structural intersectionality, where the remedies available to women who were survivors of violence are of little use to women who are located at the margins of race, gender and class. The structure of language, race and class are all oriented towards the amelioration of the plight of white women, as public policies that immigration, reporting of domestic violence or seeking aid in a shelter require de-privilege them. Immigrant women do not report violence due to fear of deportation like women who face violence in the name of honour and the lack of dissemination of information and costs of counselling further deter those who are marginalised from availing option for rehabilitation.

Second, political intersectionality deals with the difficulties that arise out of the mutually exclusive understanding of race and gender by the feminist and anti-racist groups which disempowers Black women and reinforce their subordination even within the movements. Politicisation of rape and domestic violence is treated differently. The reporting of domestic violence is generally discouraged to 'protect the community' as it brings attention to the cases and the dominant racist discourse about poor men, often of colour are generally violent feeds into the stereotypical narratives. This silences the survivors who are already reluctant to let public authorities into their private lives when their experience with the police has often been marked by violence and discrimination.

Third, representational intersectionality critiques the cultural imagery that prevails about the marginalised and these play a role in the construction of gender and race hierarchy based on the centrality of issues. Representational intersectionality includes the process of the construction of these images through the dominant narratives about the marginalised women and the critiques of racist and sexist representation normally do not devote attention to the marginalised women.

Thus, the intersectional theory does not provide for a separate theory of the self but it looks into the conception of selfhood that women at the margins evolve which are conditioned by belonging to multiple subordinated groups (Willett, Anderson and Meyers 2016). It also offers 'epistemic advantages' as they have an internal understanding of which of their traditions can lead to them overcoming the liabilities of subordination while at the same time being critical of the very issues as Crenshaw has shown inherent in the communities that can be derived from the multiple identities they ascribe to.

GENESIS OF LATIN AMERICAN FEMINISM

Latin American Feminism's genesis was heavily influenced by the international trends and influences where the right to suffrage was demanded after being inspired by the struggles in North America and Western Europe, yet to locate the trajectory of the region's feminism since then in the categories of Second Wave and Third Wave feminism in consonance with what was occurring in the Global North can be problematic. Among the 33 nation states, women's

movement and feminist movement diversified within and in relation to other, the right to franchise and representation as a right was not uniformly achieved by the time some countries proclaimed to have started to experience the second wave and the nature of the second wave feminism with different agendas from those countries in the Global North. In many of the Latin American states, the initial demand for suffrage was led by few white and educated women, who meant that they were from the middle or upper classes and based it on an essentialist understanding of women, not taking into account the particularities of different sections of women based on their differing subjectivities. The question of subjectivities and self, of body and autonomy, emerged in the Second wave feminism which was given fillip in the context of Latin America also by the international context, like the convening of the 1975 United Nations' World Conference on Women in Mexico City and the transnational networks of feminists that enable the flow discourses globally an their exchange and deliberation at multiple forums in the region lead to multiplicity of perspectives on what Latin American Feminism is or if there are multiple narratives of feminisms.

However, Caulfied and Schettini (2017) elucidate that before the study of gender relations and sexuality was conceptualised as part of the feminist movement as waves, the binaries between women seen through intersectional lens brought about the roots of subsequent contestations. The subject position of women varied based on their race, their class and their area of origin, exemplified in the problematisation of Liberal Feminism when it came to women of colour. As expostulated above, the premise of Liberal Feminism or Latin American Feminism was initially to gain access to the public sphere that was applicable to middle class, educated and largely white women, but not to Afro-Brazilian women who as freed slaves or as housemaids were compelled to be in the public and in the market for their survival. Thus this wave of feminism did not represent their interests and was narrow in its scope.

Latin American feminists historically collaborated across their national boundaries for shared interests, the First Wave of Latin American Feminism was constituted by educated, middle class and mostly white women came together in a spirit of Pan-Americanism in the early 1900s to 1940s who were inspired by the suffrage movement of their allies in the United States which was granted in 1920 (Marino 2012). The promotion of social democracy and women's equality were common concerns of the feminists from Latin America and the United States which were Liberal

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feminist in orientation. This direct link to one of the major sites of mainstream feminism provided Latin American feminist with direct exposure to these ideas. With the fragmentation of the movement and the assumption of leadership by Latin American feminists like Bertha Lutz[1] from Brazil and Paulina Luisi from Uruguay, there were strong demands for enfranchisement which were granted in six countries before 1945- Brazil, Uruguay, Cuba, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Guatemala and Costa Rica. This fragmentation with the United States' feminists due to political circumstances and their assumption of primacy in the continental movement gave them the experience to mobilise for social movements at home as well as aided them in their identification as 'Latin American feminists', which obscured their regional, race, class and political diversity. The Latin American feminists began to articulate broader interests like anti-imperialism and welfare measures that brought recognised other classes of women. The activism of these women, especially Lutz at the San Fransisco Conference that led subsequently to the formation of the United Nations, recognised women's rights under human rights and her recommendation led to the creation of the UN Commission on the Status of Women.

The Second Wave of feminism in Latin America occurred at diverse times(not in tune with the timeline in Europe or North America) in different countries, as Sardenberg and Costa (2014) opine, the Second Wave commenced in Brazil since the late 1970s with the gradual removal of restrictions on political activism to Chinchilla's (2016) contention that the Second Wave started in Central America by the end of 1980s. The context of military authoritarianism across the region and support from the Liberation Theology wing of the Catholic Church allowed for the massive mobilisation of women who protested against repressive laws like forced sterilisation, inflation, torture of activists, the reduction on social expenditure. Women initially utilised the traditional gender construct of 'Motherhood' to protest in the public sphere against authoritarian excesses and inflationary pressures, this popular section of women's movement did not identify as feminists but nevertheless, this reflected the politicisation of their personal lives by bringing such issues into the public. Yet, feminism in Argentina and Mexico grew among university-

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[1] Bertha Lutz was a pre-eminent figure in Brazilian and Inter-American feminist movement. She established the Brazilian Federation for Women's Progress in 1922 for suffrage and was actively involved in movement for women's right to vote which was gained in 1932 and after her election as a Congresswoman, she introduced the "Statute of Women" which was ultimately not accepted. She held positions of leadership in many Inter-American feminist organisations.

educated middle-class *mestiza* or white women in this period and there was a perceivable distance from the grassroots movements' struggle against the Dirty War and a palpable disconnect between the socio-political linkages between them (Duarte 2012). Another theoretical contribution of early 1970s feminism with regards to Latin America was the cultural critique of the Roman Catholic Church as its mainstream's inherent hierarchies and tendencies to preserve the social order made it a proponent of the Right Wing elements, even the dictatorships. Feminists pointed to the proclivities of religious hierarchy in aiding to reproduce subordination of females by projecting and legitimising the image of women as passive, sacrificing and submissive and also how the close relationship between the State and the Church gives such constructs greater power when the State legitimises them.

 Similarly, Alvarez (1998) notes that initially, there was an attempt by the women who identified as feminists to build alliances with the popular sections like militant female trade unionists, agricultural workers and those involved in the community organisation to articulate demands which were influenced by the Leftists organisations. The influence of Marxist Feminism and Socialist Feminism advanced for redistribution of resources based on gender-sensitive policies that benefitted the poor women, representational rights for all women, end of repression on many of its activists which highlighted the orientation of feminism at this time which was more about bringing the masses of women, especially those who were from economically challenged backgrounds to the mainstream of politics. This also sheds light on the primacy of class and subsequent categories of education as a factor in the articulation of interests, not of race and ethnicity. Yet the embedded sexism within Leftists organisations disillusioned many of the educated, middle-class feminists who with the advent of Radical Feminism espoused a more autonomous movement, but was not very popular among the masses.

In this time period, the struggle between the boundaries of feminists and non-feminists in Latin America was drawn on the prioritisation by the respective individuals of the 'general political' struggle for democracy, representation and social justice through redistributive policies versus those feminists who advocated specific cultural process to develop a feminist conscience who refused to privilege the former. The theories of the time which were generated by the educated feminists expressed the need to adopt strategies inculcate consciousness (*conscientizacion*) about self and their autonomy, about reproductive health and to combat domestic violence. While the

emphasis on sexuality made the Church deeply uncomfortable, the prevailing conservative climate coupled with the divisions within the Opposition especially the Leftists who saw this as scuttling the unity of the general struggle, made for strong resistance to these measures. Efforts to broaden the perspectives and enhance the exchange of insights of various forms of feminisms and consultation with different regional women's movements was made possible by the Latin American and Caribbean Women's *Encuentro* held every two-three years since 1981 which gives the platform to deliberate and share views to the thousands of women activists and theorists who gather here. This endeavour was premised on building a non-hierarchical, autonomous, informal, individualistic conception of a space for women to interact and to incorporate a plurality of practices. This allowed for greater diversity in the identification of Latin American Feminism and acknowledgement of multiple feminisms, especially those from the margins. By the end of the 1980s, Sternbach et al (1992) note that the *Encuentros* grew to the status of mass movements with the popular feminists contributing to feminist discourses while also being empowered as citizens and not only as followers of the educated feminists.

The 1980s and 1990s were periods of intense debates for the Latin American feminist movement in terms of the 'participants'/ agents' identities. The *Encuentros* were the sites of debates, alliances, conflict and generated a wide range of discourses that brought to the fore the different understanding of what it means to be feminists for the participants and which have played out throughout the decades and have echoes in the national and sub-national *Encuentros*. These *Encuentros* allowed women who were marginalised due to their gender gain a safe platform to articulate their views and also gain leverage on their national governments by airing their views in a regional forum which acted as a pressure group (Alvares et al. 2003, Alvarez 2000) and hence became a form of 'imagined Latin American Feminist community' where a common but contested feminist grammar in the form of 'recreating collective practices, deploying new analytical categories, new visibilities and even new languages being invented' (Vargas 1992) developed. But this transnational site of discourse saw *differences on the basis of the "autonomy" debate* geared first towards the requirement of the movement to dissociate from or reduce dependence on the Leftist organisations and then with regards to institutionalisation due to Neoliberal- Formal Arenas of Politics. Autonomy is of extreme concern to women of the region who identify as feminists as to how autonomous the movement can be with its expansion of influence and constituents, its changing nature to increased incorporation of diverse

perspectives on feminism while differences arise with regards to ideological, political, financial and organisational independence.

The *first dissension* was related to the proximity of the movement to the Leftist organisations, where the *feministas* argued for autonomy from the latter as their experience led them to believe that gender is sidelined due to excessive focus on class relations and the entrenched patriarchal relation, while the *politicas or militantes* emphasised on double militancy for the general struggle and the feminists struggle. The concerted influence of the Left did lead the latter to have similar structures which helped in a transnational scope and in creating connections but also led to tensions with the *feministas.* As Alvarez et al. illustrate, this debate between these sections eased with the moderate understanding of engaged autonomy where contribution or presence in the Leftist organisations continued while adopting a more self-reflexive approach through a critical feminist engagement. This was exemplified in the process of operation of the feminist from the Central American republics who lived in times of civil strife and for whom double militancy was a necessary pre-requisite, but they prioritised feminist demands within the organisation and later took an active part in peacebuilding efforts while combatting a strong Right Wing Opposition which disputed their entry into the public sphere.

The *second aspect of disputation* with regards to the autonomy debate came in the 1980s with the increasing numbers and diversity of participants who attended the *Encuentros*. The latter part of the Second Wave brought with it mobilisation of working class and marginalised women, especially in the Central American Republics who did not identify as feminists, which was in stark contrast to the White-Educated-Middle Class women who were the preeminent participants in the 1970s. The unprecedented number of participants from the popular women's movements (*Movimiento de Mujeres*) at the Third and Fourth *Encuentros*, at Bertioga in 1985 (Brazil) and Taxo in Mexico (1987) was simultaneously indicative of the growing expanse of feminist movement in the region and yet many of the older generations of educated feminists felt that the former's elementary knowledge about feminism prevented any constructive efforts to generate genuine feminist knowledge and there was a decided lack of strategies about the feminist agenda in contrast to the previous years. This translated to one section resenting the *Encuentros* being more of training grounds for newer generations of feminists, an assumption that the popular feminists felt designated them as being not 'feminist enough' and brought out the implicit bias of

standardising who can be a feminist (*feministometro*). This debate was placed in terms of autonomy for popular feminists who asserted that 'those who wish to identify as feminists are feminists' while the older generation of educated feminists sought autonomy from influences of popular movements and their other configurations of identities as part of the wider Women's Movement in order to advance a more 'genuine feminist agenda'.

Alvarez (2000) explores the contentions between the feminists in the 1990s over autonomy in a different context of institutionalisation of the movement in the period of democratisation and advent of Neoliberalism. In the concomitant operation of the 'two logics', the older logic of "identity-solidarity" which was more based on creation of feminist identities, communities, ideas more or less overtly away from formal arenas of politics to maintain autonomy and prevent co-option by the State and the newer logic of 'policy advocacy' where numerous feminists sought to use the formal State and Non-Governmental Organisations operating at the national and international levels to promote and create gender just policies. The Costa del Sol and Cartegena *Encuentros* highlighted the deep divisions about the autonomy debate when the process of preparation for the Beijing World Conference on Women led to bitterness among the participants about which logic should be prioritised. The solidarity-identity logic saw the policy-advocacy logic being a result of co-option of feminists in patriarchal institutions like the State and UN, the privileging of educated feminist as the spokesperson of the entire movement who headed NGOs receiving international funds for policy research from agencies which had a role in fomenting civil wars in the very region and the resultant hierarchy that the specialisation created.

The crucial outcome was that the specialisation gained by certain feminists who worked with the government and NGOs transnationally gave them competitive access to resources and knowledge, giving them influence in formulating policies to address short-term problems while neglecting long-term structural imbalances that feminism should address. The advocates of the other logic saw the rigidity of these feminists as hindering the use of enhanced spaces of co-operation and their non-pragmatic approach could cost them the opportunity to influence global discourses on feminism. Second a more practical approach to engagement with policymakers empowers women to tackle daily issues, informing them of rights and gives them leverage against governmental non-compliance. The conflict over the sidelining of the popular women's movement who operated more with the identity solidarity logic led to discussions on autonomy,

whether to be autonomous from the *institucionalizadas*, feminists who espoused the advocacy-policy logic in an institutional setting by the *autonomas.* These two logics are not to be construed as Alvarez (2000) argues are merely competitive, they are complementary as they equipped the popular feminists with the requisite understanding of rights and also to focus projects to alleviate immediate crises of the region. The two logic operated at the same governmental or non-governmental sites but the identity solidarity non-hierarchial logic was more suited to the Encuentro while the policy advocacy logic became prominent with increased engagement of feminists beyond the *Encuentros* in the transnational NGOs and UN agencies. The transition of the dominance of one logic to the other shows the dynamics of the political culture that fostered the growth of Latin American Feminism in the 1970s through informal networks that were organised in the *Encuentros* since 1980s and then these became institutionalised in the 1990s through the transnational NGO and policy networks, a change from the bottom-up formation to top-down policy being oriented towards the women as targets.

These altering but the consistent emphasis on autonomy in successive *Encuentros* draws out another dimension of the feminist movement in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s, that of inclusion and exclusion. With the growth of the movement in terms of a number of participants and the diversity that it admitted, there were the inevitable crises of who should be included based on who identifies as the feminist. This debate was particularly influential with regards to the autonomy debate as the autonomous feminists sought to exclude those they felt did not prioritise the gender problems over their other struggles or later were seen to be complicit with the patriarchal forces operating in institutions and utilisation of methods to undermine the solidarity of feminists and their larger objectives. This was met with protests from the Popular Feminists who felt these were ways to exclude by imposing a standard as then the conflicted shifted to between *autonomas* and *institucionalizadas* about the appropriate levels of engagement, sites of activity and allies. These conflicts generated a plethora of literature about these internal contestations that characterised the movement in the 1990s with the meeting point in Beijing having separate arrangements and sites of operation for the participants. Thus far, this conflictual trend was visible globally and helped forge global feminist networks.

The Third Wave Feminism in Latin America of the 1990s came in the context of a differing political situation where re-democratisation coupled with Neoliberal fiscal policies impacted the

lives of women (Alvarez 1998), while many feminist scholars reject the advent of the Third Wave in the region. This radicalised the women from the working classes as well as many of the grassroots feminists who spoke up about the issues that marginalised women who are oppressive due to their race, lack of education, ethnicity and sexuality are facing due to lack of social expenditures. Furthermore, the self-reflexive tendencies that national Encuentro was fostering led to the wider articulation of various subaltern forms of feminism, namely, indigenous feminism, lesbian feminism and due to the influence of intersectional studies, Black Feminism especially in Brazil. Concomitantly, the divergence between women from the popular section or those belonging to the wider women's movement and the more educated, middle-class feminists grew which led to the theoretical divergence as well. This period saw greater transnationalisation and professionalisation of these feminists in response to the structural adjustment programmes directing policies in certain ways and the availability of funding that these educated feminists could help the government utilise. The profusion of feminist NGOs which had a specific notion of what incorporating women in the 'development process' should entail created a more hierarchical formation in the feminist movements s they had greater access to funds, resources and availed transactional networking and lobbying to posit their understanding of what feminists should do. These 'femocrats' were alienated and critiqued extensively, while the theory of these times saw a greater focus on development and policies.

In this context, the transnational logic founded in the policy advocacy area bolstered identity solidarity logic when it came to the marginalised feminists, as the foreign funding provided an incentive to incorporate diversity into the local women's movement and function in the advocacy of their specific needs. This pertained to the Afro-Latin American/ Black feminists, indigenous women, lesbian feminists among others. This trend enabled bringing their demands into the mainstream policy arena and enriching the diversity hen experts from their communities were appointed to provide insights into the making of the policies, thus, empowering them through their participation in the formal spaces. The Black feminists, Indigenous women and Lesbian feminists have been at the forefront of critiquing the existing feminist movements tendencies to make the 'intersections invisible' (Alvaez et al. 2003) because of embedded heteronormativity, racism and universalising tendencies that are hegemonic. Their efforts at forging transnational linkages made them launch their own *Encuentros* where they were exposed to various novel anti-racist and anti heteronormative narratives and theoretical lenses.

In more contemporary understandings about feminism, Cypriano (2012) argues that Latin American Feminism is essentially transnational with a multiplicity of demand and interests where a large section of the feminists often mobilise and converge on anti-capitalist and anti-patriarchal agendas. This is shaped by their context where their selfhood is shaped by the Neoliberal policies that exacerbated inequalities in an already deeply unequal society followed and the pervasive culture of Machismo. Cypriano identifies Latin America with the Global South and in consonance with the reformulation of feminist perspectives to yield a more inclusive and realistic narrative done in other parts of the Global South, this involves generating indigenous knowledge. The privileging of knowledge as postcolonial studies highlight provide for viewing the region as only sites of oppression 'rather than as creators of feminist theory or agents of change.' Among the theoretical formulations, one is the requirement to formulate a new feminist political theory, relacing western canons, of the region which probes the intersection of various forms of colonisation and oppression that shaped the political culture and the conception of selfhood. The understanding of the 'political' can be re-worked based on the indigenous experience of the feminists in their occupation of the civil society and their relation to the State. Third, with the second wave, Cypriano argues that the entrance of feminists into the academia has enabled greater spaces for dissemination and creation of discourses which give impetus to addressing various feminists goals rather than just persisting with a fixed notion of one goal. Fourth, with the horizontal feminism of the 1970s being replaced by the hierarchical professionalisation of the 1990s, it has been seen that feminists take more pragmatic decisions rather than those informed by ideology. Yet, as Matos (2010) contends, the arrival of "fourth wave" feminism in the region has led to "circuit of diffusion feminist" who has been active in the more horizontal formations of feminist activism and mobilise in multiple movements within civil society that are directed from the boundaries between civil society and the state, while the conversations about who defines the interests of the movement and what are the interests persist.

Marginalised Latin American Feminisms

The boundaries of feminist movements in the region have often been contested; the lack of inclusivity and visibility affects the legitimacy conferred on the diverse subjectivities that women assume themselves. The transnational tendencies that developed in the 1990s buttressed the

existing linkages that the marginalised feminists of the region utilised to develop alternate feminist imagined communities (Alvarez 2000). The emphasis on identity to project the various sites of discrimination that women face, not just restricted to gender challenged the prevalence of racism and heterosexism in the movement but also to extend identity-based transnational networks via events, conferences, workshops, etc. Among the Latin American and Caribbean Black Women's movement, the most influential is the Afro-Brazilian women's feminist network that discerned the double discrimination they face due to gender and race presents difficulty in not only gaining a space of protest in either anti-racist or feminist movement, but it obscures chances of gaining access to tools and methodologies to resist the oppression. This will be dealt with in greater detail while explaining the nuances of **Afro-Brazilian feminism** under the rubric of Brazilian Feminism.

The trajectory of both Indigenous and lesbian feminism is drawn in contrasts as a critique of the prevalent Liberal Feminism of Latin America. The dialogue presents a formidable criticism of the hegemonic tendencies that marginalise these voices, while also gaining important insights and conceptual tools to overcome their marginalisation to make them more contextual. Secondly, the central focus of Latin American Feminism which Duarte (2003) classifies as 'Liberal Feminism' is gender relation and equality that does not explicitly address the problems of racism or heterosexual dominance. Indigenous women question the emphasis on individuals and not the community as the target of collective action in the defence of gender rights. The pivotal demands that have existed since the 1980s to the present still revolve around reproductive rights, access to formal politics and economic benefits which are clear priorities attributed to the white, middle class, heterosexist and educated section of women, an indication of the discourse being primarily being dominated by them. The assumption of the role of being the spokesperson of all feminists by this section obfuscates the real interests of the marginalised and prevents opportunities for them to gain access in the public sphere where they may have chances to alter the discourse. Instead, the status quo hegemonic tendencies also conceal biases that try to prevent the lesbian feminists from coming to the fore as 'it may stain the public image of feminists and perpetuate the stereotype that all feminists are lesbian' (Duarte 2012).

Indigenous Feminisms' intersectional struggle sheds light on their efforts to gain cultural recognition from their people and organisation in the wider movements and in feminist discourse

as well as acknowledgement of their gender-based demands from their peoples. This has given rise to a new epistemological approach that combines the demands of recognition of indigenous people with feminist demands. The movement is not a monolith due to the presence of diverse indigenous groups and the different gender roles assigned to women as well as their relation to various actors, but women have connected through the transnational endeavours to share insights and question the legitimacy of naturalised claims. In countries like Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia and Guatemala, where the indigenous movement is considerably strong, the women have played a role in influencing the national policies, for Ecuador and Bolivia in the redefinition of the State to include pluricultural elements and participating in the elections, for Guatemala in identity politics has assumed importance due to migration and formalisation of their rural economies which affected the women in particular.

The Liberal Feminism's limitations according to them that stem from its conception of the state includes the gender policies premised on the feminist concept of equality that does not take into account contextual specifications. The dispute between the liberal understanding of the individual and the indigenous understanding of the collective have deep roots that are inherently not very compatible and then extend into their political organisations. The greater access to education and employment benefit women individually and yet orient them in ways that are alien to their culture, by sidelining their educational systems and while not addressing their shrinking employment opportunities that are a consequence of Neoliberal policies that are a consequence of taking their land which is not just an economic asset but a site of spirituality. The repeated emphasis on collective emancipation rather than individual also alters their vision of justice and equality, generating new methodologies that they borrow from feminism but calibrate it to their situation. Another strand of indigenous feminism does not engage in substantial dialogue with the feminism which they construe as foreign to them but posit an alternate 'cosmovision', where the advance the understanding of *z'aqat* or the existence of complementarities. The construct of complementarities that was germane to Mayan cosmopolis reflects on the indispensability of all elements and none being superior or inferior to the other, the diversity of gender and social functions for Mayan men and women made them complementary to each other. This construct, however, is historical and is not seen nowadays, but indigenous women are trying to reclaim these philosophical principles from their past that present a more gender just order to them.

Castillo (2010) adds that indigenous women have a different conception of personhood that is governed by fundamentally different ways of relating to nature, including *respect* that replaces the notion of the survival of the fittest and the endemic violence that promotes, the debunking of the superiority of the masculine over feminine by presenting the theory of *duality* that shows that both masculine and feminine elements are part of the same totality and *gender neutrality* to tackle *machismo*. Yet, it has to be asserted that indigenous women as activists often construe feminism to be the domain of educated, urban and middle-class women and have substantial differences with. While identifying with the wider women's movement and being their allies, the discourse of indigenous women is being transnationalised despite being very particularistic to each tribe and the different gender performances they have. This transnationalisation received a fillip with the Zapatista women's movement in 1994 whose drafting of the *Women's Revolutionary Laws* became a standard for others to emulate which contained a wide variety of demands that not only spoke of respect for the comrades in their communities but also gender-based demands. Additionally, the mobilisation of indigenous women in politics by the Leftists Groups and in peasant struggles produced a different discourse on women's role in politics.

Yet, there are significant criticisms that have been directed against Indigenous feminism, where the diversity of the discourses leads to a tendency of hegemony where some are promoted and others are not, those who reject close linkages with feminism which is essentially foreign to those who see indigenous practices as being gender unjust and the need to self-reflect on them (Castillo 2010). Echoing some of the sentiments, Liberal Feminism critiques that the principles of complementarities are used to perpetuate age-old gender practices and impose traditional roles rather than overcome them (Duarte 2012).

Lesbian Feminisms intersectionality locates their dialogue with both mixed gender homosexual organisations and the feminist movement, their critique of the latter since the 1970s about the invisibility of alternate sexualities and lesbophobia also reflects the importance of redefinition of identity that differs from a standard second wave understanding of feminist movement in that time period. While concentrated in urban areas and gaining prominence in the Southern Cone countries, lesbian feminists in the Central Americas organised in the 1990s but with greater homophobia from other sections of the marginalised populations. The prevalence of specific demand, concentration in the urban areas and the feminists were more or less well educated

made the lesbian feminists more amenable to the advocacy policy logic of UN fora. The network of Latin American Lesbian Feminists established in 1987 also enabled them to congregate with others in a transnational space they otherwise would be marginalised in or stigmatised.

Theoretically, Lesbian Feminists interrogate Liberal Feminism's neglect of sexual preferences, generating a rich debate on sexual roles, the differences between sexuality and reproduction and its relation to one's own body and the consequent individual understanding of self-hood, which they feel, is made heteronormative by the Liberal feminists (Duarte 2012). They also unpack the institutionalisation of this bias in the State that reinforced certain gender roles by discriminating against lesbian candidates in formal politics and elections where Liberal Feminism often eschews the lesbian choice to present a more 'presentable woman who would be more acceptable to the mainstream, especially patriarchal elements'. This rejection of 'radicalisation' denies basic rights to those who have the agency to alter the discourse rather than have heterosexual women acting as advocates on their behalf who lack the understanding of being doubly discriminated. They also face sexism from the mixed group homosexual organisations, where they have used the tools feminism has made available to them to reveal their biases and the contribution of lesbian feminism to the theoretical canons of feminism has been valuable. The engagement with the homophobic state and the feminism that is hegemonic is premised on three strands of either comprehensive rejection of capitalism and patriarchy, while other strands see democracy as a viable space for becoming the true representatives of their community and the last section takes a moderate path that seeks to use democratic means to re-define the boundaries of the state and the prevalent discourse.

The interrelationship between the marginalised sections of feminism is both productive in generating solidarity while also suffering from entrenched biases that further the process of othering. The role *Encuentros* in forging networks that often lead to alternate *Encuentros* for alternate identities (or *desencuentro*) also provides the space for transnationalisation that widens their perspective and made them more likely to ally in gaining clout in the UN policy processes.

Anatomy Of Brazilian Feminism

Brazilian feminism bestows several pivotal dimensions to Latin American Feminism as according to Sternbach et al. (1992), it expresses 'perhaps the largest, most radical, most diverse and most politically influential of Latin American feminist movements.' Similar to the trajectory of feminism in Latin American countries which were undergoing the process of re-democratisation, the 'Second Wave' (Alvarez 1991, Sardenberg and Costa 2014) emerged in response to the greater availability of the public space for civil society to organise. In consonance with the current topic, the study will seek to understand the changes in discourses generated with the convergence of feminists over the 'sexist' impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and to analyse the interests and identification that inform their identities as feminists or not and the possible reasons why they relate to the ousted former President. The coming together of feminists across the *'Primavera Mulheres'* (Feminist Spring) and due to the repeal of progressive gender policies by the current conservative government yielded massive co-ordinated mobilisations which would have also had an impact in generating new theoretical insights about this seeming convergence. Theoretical innovations contributed by certain marginalised sections of Brazilian Feminism and newer ways to look at feminism due to the advent of a newer generation into the movement. These present a diverse critique of existing practices and discourses which do not address their issues while also providing newer methodologies. Brazilian Feminism was greatly influenced by the Afro-Brazilian Feminism which emerged in the late 1970s, highlighting the multiple sources of discrimination for Black Women, racism, sexism, economic disparities and lack of social and cultural capital that is due to these factors and perpetuated since. Black Feminists highlight that where the race model is dictated by the Whites, the subjectivity of Black people and especially Black women 'relating to their sexuality and their affection' is distorted and difficult to assume (Santana 2015). These will be explored in greater detail in the subsequent chapters to reflect the formation of theoretical dimensions through ground realities and how these operate in the overarching dynamic of the feminist movement.

DEFINITION, RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Feminism, since its origin as a body of thought and action, has evolved in meanings, **definitions** and the goals it advocates of establishing equality of social, economic, political and cultural rights vis-à-vis the rights of men. In addition to the definitions provided in the theoretical section, a few more are provided to impart a more holistic understanding. The evolution of the feminist agenda started with the First Wave in Europe in the late 1800s, spreading to North America and ended in 1920s. It was centred on the demands for suffrage, property rights and economic benefits. The Second Wave of feminism, which would be considered in the scope of this study goes beyond the reformative aspect to critique the system of patriarchy that is embedded in social, economic, political and cultural spheres which jeopardise the autonomy of a woman and subordinates her agency to the gender norms of femininity to the expected domination of a man' performance of masculinity. Even though feminism's inception was in an Anglo-Saxon context, the later waves of feminism have sought to remedy its limitations to provide a more diverse understanding of the everyday experience of men, women, transgender and other individuals who are forced into heteronormative gender roles. This study seeks to articulate the multiple understandings of feminism that prevail in Latin America even at present, with specific examination of Brazil and are advocated in contestations with each other, thus enriching the over-arching feminist framework with diverse lived experience. Due to the engagement of the Popular feminists, the terms feminist movements and women's movements have been used interchangeably.

The pioneer of feminist studies in Brazil, Heleieth Saffioti grounded feminism in the Brazilian context of domestic violence and addressed the use of gender and patriarchy to explain the performance of gendered roles. This reflects the fundamental difference in Brazilian feminism-the divide between the academic-professional feminists and the popular feminists based on the praxis of feminist theory in everyday lives (Saffioti 2001). Sonia E. Alvarez (1998,2000), a prominent contemporary feminist characterises feminism in 1970s and 1980s as "an expansive, polycentric, heterogeneous discursive field of action which spans into a vast array of cultural, social and political arenas" which recognises the co-existence of multiple forms of feminisms based on their subject positions, going beyond the realm of theory to engage with the other feminist movements, valuing the difference in experience to form a network of regional

discourses which is polycentric and thus, not privileging one over the other. Finally, relevant to this study is the understanding of intersectional feminism, which was coined by Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) who defines intersectional feminism's scope as "the view that women experience oppression in varying configurations and in varying degrees of intensity. Cultural patterns of oppression are not only interrelated but are bound together and influenced by the intersectional systems of society. Examples of this include race, gender, class, ability, and ethnicity." Thus, the forging of greater interconnections within the different variants of feminism will require a greater empathy and engagement of the various strands with each other to bring about effective public policy changes for greater equality of rights.

The **rationale** of the study is to understand the processes that led to the convergence among the different sections of feminists leading up to the protest against President Rousseff's impeachment which was widely seen as sexist. The identification of issue areas and mechanisms to foster co-operation to bring about the '*Primavera das Mulheres*' (Feminist Spring) in October 2015 (Hao 2106) and the role in the emergence of other social movements centred on reclaiming rights is one of the objectives of the study. Second, in most accounts of the contestations between feminists' and women's movement, the perspectives of the educated- professionalised and academic feminists are easily accessed but the target subjects of the study are the working class, marginalised, church-going women, whose accounts are again articulated by the former which confers subjectivity and associated bias to such narratives.

The **scope** of the study deals with the contestation between feminists in Brazil on what a feminist movement in Brazil should advocate in contemporary times. This study draws from intersectional feminism in deconstructing the various social parameters that influence the configuration of discrimination that women face. The difference in these configurations leads to the variation in lived experience spawning these different feminist movements, yet the genesis of intersectional feminism is with regards to the intersection of racial and gender discrimination within a broader feminist study. This study is restricted in terms of dealing with the nuances of Catholicism and Pentecostalism but will additionally highlight to an extent possible the influence of personal beliefs and Christian faith in empowering working-class women to break out of the mould of '*Marianismo*'. Another limitation of this study may be personal- the difficulty in

accessing and comprehending documents and data which may be in Portuguese, for which the academic proficiency is yet to be attained.

The particular periodization of the proposed study is based on two facts- the blossoming of the Second wave of feminism in Brazil could occur only after the process of re-democratisation in 1985 that enabled substantial civil society spaces to be reclaimed for interest articulation which is the starting point of the proposed research. The closing period of 2015 marks the commencement of the impeachment proceedings of President Rousseff which saw a remarkable convergence among the various categories of feminists being considered in the research.

The perusal of the topics under consideration revolves around **certain key questions** that have arisen after careful understanding of the theme whose answers would be elicited from the subsequent research. What are the issues and modes of activism of the 'popular feminists' and 'professional feminists' strands leading to the original contestations between them? What is the nature of intervention of other non-feminist actors in the different feminist movements in Brazil leading to convergences or divergences in the movement? What are the demands of the popular feminists' based on their social markers and sources of marginalisation vis-à-vis the professional feminists since their convergence? In the current scenario of the conservative backlash, what is the impact on the nature of popular representation of women in politics? Is this convergence a result of political expediency or does it indicate significant transformations in the identification and the nature of feminist movement? As the research unfolds, appropriate answers to these pertinent questions would be searched and discussed in the concluding chapter.

These questions generate **two hypotheses** whose affirmation or negation would be the guiding factor in the study of primary and secondary source materials. These would either be accepted or negated as the subsequent chapters would unfold

i.   The enduring contestations between the popular feminists and professional feminists are precipitated by the differing subject positions of the feminists which influence their self-identification.

ii. The persistent differences between the nature and course of the feminist movement between the professional feminists and popular feminists prevent an enduring convergence between them.

The application of research methods to delineate and simplify the complexities of this kind of topic would require the use of mixed methods- quantitative and qualitative to gather data and understand the subject positions of the sample identified. Questionnaires are to be formulated, translated into Portuguese to collect data about grass root level women's organisations and would consist of open-ended questions with the option of explanation. This is to be supplemented by the recording of oral narratives and conversations with the leading activists from both sides of the feminist spectrum, members of the Women's Departments and Women's Divisions of the main conservative and progressive political parties. For data collection pertaining to the Professional feminists, interview with open-ended questions would be a viable option. These would be utilised through online/ electronic communication as field study is not feasible at this stage of research.

The use of primary sources such as government publications on the Conferences for National Plan, for National Plan for Public Policies for Women, United Nations Publication on regional agreements on Women's issues, Publications of Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean would be useful to understand the position of Brazilian Feminism in the broader context of Latin American Feminism. The findings of both are to be analysed in the quest to answer the research questions.

Additionally, feminist research comes under the reflectivist paradigm which seeks to problematize positivist research methodology; the objective of the former is to deconstruct the 'normal' power relations leading to universal or objective conclusions. The contemporary feminist research methodology attributes a closer look into the formation of meaning through a fluid interaction between the texts, the research subject and data, a process which may help to understand the new meanings emerging within the feminist movements leading to wider convergences and the acceptance of being a feminist. Furthermore, 'feminist research methodology aims to bring together an inclusive narrative of multiple feminisms by the realisation of multiple meanings and acceptance of cultural contextuality' (Wickramasinghe 2010), enabling a closer look at the contestation and identity formation among feminists in their cultural contexts in Brazil.

This section thus provides a general introductory overview of the background of the study, an extensive provision of the theoretical approaches that locate the dynamics and shape of Brazilian Feminism over the period under consideration and the rationale, scope and definitions of the proposed study. Furthermore, certain questions and hypotheses that emerged out of the preliminary stage of study would be addressed during the process of completion of the research. Finally, a methodological framework was provided about how the research has been undertaken.

In the subsequent chapter, a historical account of the evolution of feminist movement in Brazil will be imparted, with special emphasis on the movement's Second wave in the period under consideration while linking and exploring the theoretical perspectives surrounding Brazilian Feminism and also scrutinising whether the categorisation of the movement are appropriate as well as examining certain trends that inform the orientations of the future.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION AND DYNAMICS OF THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN BRAZIL

A preliminary examination of the theories of feminism along with the associated concepts in the previous chapter enables us locate Brazilian Feminism theoretically, which was influenced by multiple factors: global and regional discourses, facilitated over the years through exchanges with feminists from the West; greater access to education, and by efforts of women's groups to bring about changes in their social context to ensure greater equality in gender relations. Brazilian Feminism developed as an outcome of the dynamics within its own society, the influences from the Pan-American Feminist meetings and those of feminists in exile in Europe, leading to the struggle for greater recognition of intersectional feminists in more recent times. This chapter will locate the theory in practice by taking a deeper view on how the particular forms of feminisms germane to Brazil developed in tandem with ground realities, the policy changes that the feminists impacted and the present practices that determine what it means to be a feminist. In addition, attempts would be made to scrutinise what should be the articulation and mobilisation mode of the movement, and the clear priorities or determine if there exists a homogenous movement or contestations between the diverse and rich strands of Brazilian feminisms.

This chapter first will theoretically examine the nature of Brazilian feminism and its relation to the general discourse on Western and Latin American Feminism as discussed in the previous chapters; how it is distinguished with respect to the experiences of feminists in the West; the interactions that Brazilian feminist strands have had over the years with Latin American Feminism; and the interactions on global platforms that bolster their transnational profile and scope of influence. The next section aims to trace the trajectory of the Brazilian Feminist Movement in the context of re-democratisation in 1985, where the feminist movement was one of the stronger oppositional groups to the military regime. However, the region's 'largest and

most radical feminist movement' (Sternbach et al. 1992) has to be contextualised and differentiated from the Latin American feminism and is to be seen holistically as a response to the politics of the Brazilian State. Brazilian Feminism, according to one of its early activists, Heleithe Saffioti who eschewed conventional feminist understandings and the label, was situated in the larger struggle against capitalism embodied by the elites, foreign vested interests and grounded the ideology in issues of division of labour at home, domestic violence and lack of resources available to women (Saffioti 1978). She was critical of autonomous feminist movements which she contended were 'middle class trailing social classes', which were situated antagonistically to each other- thus obviating a common 'we-feeling' and ultimately in danger of vying for turning into ruling classes feminism.

Reflecting over these contestation that arose during the inception of the 'Second Wave' at the theoretical level, Brazilian feminism led by the professional women and scholars began defining itself differently from – (a) the militant and theoretical Left(Saffioti was associated with the latter where gender oppression was de-prioritised in the face of the general class struggle), (b) to non-feminist women who espoused to be *femininas nao feministas'*,who were allies of the ruling elites, (c) those who feared that feminist struggles would undermine the Opposition's concerted struggle against the military, (d) the many grassroots women's organisations who were termed as progressive yet their proximity to the Catholic Church led to exhibited conservative views on issues of reproductive rights and sexuality and, (e) in sharp divergence to the image projected by the media about 'bourgeoisie man-hating imperialists' of North America and Europe (Alvarez 1998). Saffioti echoes this when she compliments the achievements of Brazilian Feminism as being inclusive of men and women to overcome the negative connotations associated with feminism (Mendes and Becker 2011). Thus, the origins of the Brazilian Feminist Movement saw a divergence in its articulation and the shape it was supposed to assume right from the beginning and these contestations persist to this day. There have been attempts to co-operate on larger issues and several mechanisms are available to facilitate cooperation through enhanced spaces of interaction which ultimately led to convergence in 2015 over the 'sexist impeachment' of Dilma Rousseff, the first female president of the State which will be elaborated in a subsequent chapter. This episode projected a seeming change in identification among non-feminists and anti-feminists as 'feminists' who were covered under the broad umbrella of women's movement while rejecting the label of 'feminists'.

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LOCATING BRAZILIAN FEMINISM THEORETICALLY

Brazilian feminism bestows several pivotal dimensions to Latin American Feminism as according to Sternbach et al. (1992), it expresses 'perhaps the largest, most radical, most diverse and most politically influential of Latin American feminist movements.' Similar to the trajectory of growth of feminism in Latin American countries which were undergoing the process of re-democratisation, the 'Second Wave' (Alvarez 1991, Sardenberg and Costa 2014) emerged in response to the greater availability of the public space for civil society to organise itself. From the 1970s onwards, a distinctive break from the influence of the First Wave of feminism led by Bertha Lutz and others for suffrage and enhancing access of women to the public sphere, was witnessed when the advent of Marxist Feminism which sought to raise a whole different gamut of issues. With the publication of 'Women in Class Society' (1978) by Saffioti, the contours of the pre-eminent debates in feminism at that time revolved around the position of women in a capitalist society based on labour power and sought to raise awareness about issues like domestic violence and exploitation in markets where the wages are depressed. The participation of the popular sections and women grassroots activists in the movement for restoration of democracy and against the excesses of the military regime led to closer links between certain sections of feminists who advocated such theories. Marxism evidently had deeply influenced the Popular Feminists when it came to the ideology of waging simultaneous struggles, organisation and mobilisation of members and allies for their struggle.

The growth of autonomous feminists as separate from those involved in the general struggle against the military regime (*political*) generated a different range of theories that sought to assert the rights of women over their bodies and sexuality. The contestations between the Professional Feminists and Popular Feminists (Alvarez et al. 1998,Duarte 2012, Sardenberg and Costa 2014) were thrown in sharp contrast based on their allies and interests as the relations between the feminists and the wider women's movement deteriorated due to deep ontological differences with regards to the direction and leadership of the feminist movement. The fulfilment of certain demands by the 'lipstick lobby' (Machado 2016), that included the incorporation of certain demands by the feminists on in the Constitution of 1988 allowed for the growth of 'state feminism'. This marked a divergence from the previously held notion of State as the common enemy to being a provider a space of deliberation for their interests and benefits. This led to

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further fragmentation of the dominant discourse as many feminists still sought to highlight the embedded patriarchy in the State and advocated autonomy. In the 1990s, as illustrated above, Alvarez's authoritative study on the 'NGOisation' and professionalisation of feminism led to further changes in the theoretical formulations, where those theories generated by them harped on the primacy of policies in the emancipation of women and the independence of research because those dependent on the funds from the external sources, often voiced whatever these agencies wanted them to communicate.

The backlash to NGOisation and the distinction between the labels of 'good NGO and bad NGO' (Alvarez 1999) led to greater focus on another trend that emerged in the 1990s, the generation of discourses that had local effects due to the transnationalisation of the feminism. This broadened the participation of various sections of feminists in international conferences and a significant role in domestic policymaking process by the government since the tenure of Luis Inacio 'Lula' Da Silva (2003-2010). The different levels of *Encuentros* within the country bestowed confidence on the Popular Feminists who hold primacy in the dynamics of the current feminist movement.

Theoretical innovations contributed by certain marginalised sections of Brazilian Feminism and the advent of a newer generation into the movement resulted in newer ways to look at feminism. These present a diverse critique of existing practices and discourses which do not address their issues but also provide newer methodologies. Another impact on Brazilian Feminism was that of the Afro-Brazilian Feminism which emerged in the late 1970s, highlighting the multiple sources of discrimination faced by Black women, namely, racism, sexism, economic disparities and the consequent lack of social and cultural capital. Black feminists highlight that wherever the race model is dictated by the Whites, the subjectivity of Black people and especially Black women 'relating to their sexuality and their affection' is distorted and difficult to assume (Santana 2015). Black women are subjected to domestic violence and economic pressures when their families are put under strain as the menfolk are either incarcerated or killed for crimes. The tendency to 'whitewash' the educated Black women puts them in close proximity with the White women, outside their ghetto that creates a discord in terms of generating a sense of belonging to either group and the negative socialisation of Black women, who due to societal norms, perceive their own physical appearance as defective. The Liberal Feminist target of claiming autonomy over

bodies presents a different dilemma for Black women who have been hypersexualised over the ages, from their position as house slaves to the *Carneval* today especially in media portrayal of their bodies in ways that have influenced their self-perception. The movement of Slutwalk, as Santana notes constitute a divergence for Afro-Brazilian Feminists who do not envision autonomy through the reclaiming of the term 'slut', which have been used to oppress women differently, while one section they were repressed by moral codes of decency when it came to their body while the Afro-Brazilian bodies were overexposed.

Jaimee Swift (2017) makes a more direct analysis of the intra-racial dynamics of the Feminist Movement, criticising the ways in which White Feminists have exploited Black women. There has been an evident sidelining of insights from the Afro-Brazilian feminists by not being incorporated as part of Gender studies programme because academia is one of the more potent areas where discourses related to them can be generated and changed. The trajectory of feminism in the standard narratives is often Eurocentric and non-intersectional due to the entrenched racism according to Swift. This is why many Black women are willing to work with feminists, but not identify as one because this puts them in a subordinated position, whereas what they actually demand are sovereign places of functioning to assert their intersectional perspectives. The formation of national networks like *Colectivo de Mulheres Negras de Sao Paulo* which monitor public policies and also posit a cultural critique of aesthetic norms have generated insights about how the difference in worldview through intersectional lens garners a more complex understanding of feminism.

The prevalent impression of women in the Latin American region where the ideology of *Machismo* and *Marianismo* condition the worldview vary from that of Liberal Feminism. The traditional liberal feminist understanding of men as provider and women as the homemaker varies when applied to urban poor, working-class women in Brazil. Kevin Neuhouser (1989) presents some interesting insights into the context of *Marianismo* and harsh economic realities allowing for a degree of manoeuvring for women in gaining resources and status. *Marianismo* as a derivative of the Iberian patriarchal culture places women as morally superior but subject to prolonged suffering throughout their marriage to attain sainthood. On the other hand, the complex relationship between patriarchy and capitalism in the development discourse has reduced the power of women in the public sphere by making only the lowest paying jobs

available to them. This reinforces another aspect of *Machismo* which, first, justifies men to be more fit to control activities of the economy and politics than women. While working-class women in many *Favelas* have not challenged this ideology explicitly, their role in the distribution and creation of economic resources, food and control of the domestic sphere lends credence to this belief. Second, the advent of Neoliberalism means that despite getting a lower percentage of the wages accrued to men, women have to take up additional jobs to sustain themselves in conditions of poverty, in order to gain greater social status and a degree of independence and control over the household income. Third, the social networks of these women in *Favelas* consisting of their own children, relatives as well the *Compadrio* system not only those living in poverty but also is a location of exchange and solidarity, headed usually by grandmothers. They also are active in the *Catholic Comunidades de Base* (CEBs) which gives them moral influence. The women are active in other religious systems and exercise power over their communities, which enables their politicisation and entry into the public sphere.

Another aspect of feminism in Brazil pertains to the changes brought about by the coming of "Youth Feminists" into the folds of the mainstream movement. Coming of age in an era where democracy and Neoliberalism was the norm, their understanding of objectives, institutions and methods of mobilisation vary significantly from the older generation of feminists. Youth/ Young feminists questioned the tutelary role of the older feminists in *Encuentros* or in policy-making bodies that have led to the creation of hierarchy in order to effectively sideline them. Since the mid-2000s they have assumed an active role, forming networks which are diverse, a departure from older forms of organising based on identities where women from different identity groups come together to discuss the oppression of patriarchy in differing ways and their meetings and linkages are often in the cyberspace.

NATURE OF FEMINISM IN BRAZIL IN 1985- IS IT ACTUALLY THE SECOND WAVE?

Before engaging with the central aspect of contestation among the differing strands of feminists in Brazil since the 1980s, the categorisation of the feminist movement under the proposed periodisation as 'Second Wave' needs to be examined. The classification of the waves of the feminist movement is based on the issues of interest that the movement aims to articulate. While such classification and chronology are rooted in the experience of the Women's Movement in the United States, there is a tendency to create analogous classificatory schemes that can be witnessed in other parts of the world which reinforce the hegemony of mainstream feminist frameworks which are normally deemed to be exclusionary and not commensurable to the context (Miller 1991).

Based on the American experience, the chronology of the waves commence with the First Wave of feminism occurring in the late nineteenth century with the pervasive influence of liberalism. The aim of this wave was to ensure the expansion of public space available to women as equal citizens that ultimately materialised in the demand for suffrage and later ancillary demands like rights of representation and property were also forwarded. The struggle in the United States inspired women in many regions, especially white, middle class and somewhat educated women to agitate for such rights in Latin American countries. The Second Wave of feminist movement that occurred around 1960s and continued till 1990s, was informed by Marxism, Anti-war protests and in conjunction with the global anti-establishment social movements, addressed the question of identity, patriarchal structures, gender and sexuality, manifest in the demands for reproductive rights- easy access to contraception for women and right to abortion along with inclusion of the more marginalised and their lived experiences like the lesbians, blacks and indigenous. While this wave sought to go beyond the elites in terms of participants of the struggle, it also led to sharp conflicts among feminists as well as conservative forces like the Church. The Third Wave of feminism began in the 1990s with the change in context- the collapse of the Soviet Union and a global Neoliberal democratic era, the latter sought to further problematise heteronormativity and the relation between gender and sexuality. The gender fluidity, as well as transnationalisation of feminist NGO networks globally, led to more comprehensive understandings of feminism as intersectional feminism decentred the

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understanding of feminisms (Crenshawe 1989). Furthermore, the refusal to think in terms of 'us versus them' and celebrate ambiguity by the reclamation of the many aspects that the Second Wave feminists found problematic characterise the Third Wave. There have been discussions across academia about the possible Fourth Wave which takes into account the gains of feminism which is to make discrimination visible and to alter the discourse to make incorporate this in order to overcome it in a post-truth world in which those at the margins are made more vulnerable due to a global conservative backlash (Rampton 2015).

Based on these insights, Julie Shayne (2007) draws on Miller's work to illustrate that the aims of the First Wave as conceptualised consisting of gaining suffrage, the betterment of labour laws and access to higher education beyond the mould of 'feminine education'. On the one hand, the completion of this wave in the United States culminated in the gaining the right to vote in 1920, which did not occur concomitantly in Latin America, while on the other hand, certain restrictions on education and improvement in conditions of the workplace occurred before. In Brazil, the right to vote was granted by President Vargas after a long struggle by feminists like Bertha Lutz which was in accordance with his populist interests but the rest of the region saw the granting of women's suffrage much later between the 1950s and 1960s. The general demarcation of the waves and the thrust issues addressed by them yields little consensus when situated in the Latin American context since the demands on the basis of which these waves were classified were conceptualised differently. For Shayne and Miller, the First Wave and Second Wave occurred simultaneously and the Second Wave is still continuing due to the pervasiveness of *Marianismo* and patriarchy across the Latin American public sphere.

Notably, other feminist scholars shed light on the similarities across the world on issues of problematising of gender and interrogation of patriarchy- amidst the glaring lack of representation of women. Scholars on Brazilian and Latin American Feminism characterise this period as being coterminous with the global Second Wave due to similarities across contexts like the coalition of opposition with other social movements against the Establishment, that is, the Brazilian Military regime. A diverse range of participants emerged that were advocating diverse issues from right to form a union, the reduction of cost of basic amenities, to the autonomous feminists who questioned federal measures for reproductive rights (Alvarez 1991,1998 Costa and Sardenberg 2014). For the purpose of this study, the use of 'Second Wave feminism' is not to

discount the variations that occur over the contexts or not to ascribe to the hegemonic knowledge production that imposes analogous categories but to concur with regional scholars in problematising and accepting with qualification this classification for the purpose of drawing parallels and establishing alliances across feminisms in the region.

Feminism in Brazil Before 1985 and the Evolution of Contestation

In Latin America, the prevalence of *Machismo* which roughly translates to 'being manly' by protecting one's family, especially the women, but more commonly understood as hypermasculinity normalises the heteronormative agency of men to extend over to women. Through the concept of *Patrias Potestas,* the patriarch or any male in his lineage can have absolute authority over his family's affairs. The hypermasculine orientation has also led to the justification of men using the family's share of wages for alcohol, indulging in extramarital affairs leading to abandoning of families and wife beating or wife battering across Latin America, especially in Brazil. While abject violence is more frequent for working-class women, the demand for more women in the judiciary and the provision of women's police stations across Brazil in the 1980s came through the efforts of all sections of the feminists.

In tracing the history of the position of women in independent Brazil and the feminist movement before 1985, one can lean on the period of transition from monarchy to republic in the late nineteenth century when one of the reasons stated for the need for republicanism was the lack of male heirs to Pedro II. While briefly, the oligarchs considered Princess Isabel's husband, they did not agree to a woman being the monarch in fear of the message it would provide about the neglect of household duties and the possibility to venture into the public space (Skidmore 1999). Furthermore, the pervasiveness of the Iberian culture which tended to be monist and oriented towards Oligarchy, along with the strong presence of the Roman Catholic Church, created public spaces which favoured the males and openly discriminated against the women. The argument Skidmore presents in this regard is that Brazil emerged as a monarchy when it attained independence in 1922 in contrast to its South American Spanish neighbours which on independence became republics. While both types of governments had deeply entrenched Patriarchal cultures, the upholding of political systems that were less representative prevented

the growth of a political culture that was open to change and inclusivity- further jeopardising the probability of women playing an active role in the formulation of public policies by the state.

Interestingly, there were few feminist presses and suffrage movements during the drafting and promulgation of the 1891 Constitution, yet women were granted the right to suffrage much earlier than the neighbouring South American countries in 1932 (Hahner 1979). This First Wave of feminist struggle was led by Bertha Lutz whose writings in weekly columns since 1918 provided an impetus to the moderate women's movement in the 1920s. The gradual access to women in higher education enabled them to compete for high-level government bureaucratic positions by the early twentieth century. This later led to the demand for suffrage as they came to know of the successful achievement of the suffrage movement in Europe and North America. As with the nature of these demands which were classically characteristic of the First Wave, the participants were the minority White, Middle Class and newly educated women whose privileged positions enabled them to negotiate with President Vargas, who in turn saw this as a successful ploy to co-opt women into his populist policies (Hahner 1979). As observed globally, the First Wave failed to address the issues of the rest of the marginalised population, especially women who were illiterate, of those belonging to indigenous groups in non-urban areas, who were Black and had different demands. The seeds of the contestation that were laid would widen with time owing to the different subject positions they occupied based on their social backgrounds which would then lead to differences in the prioritisation of issues and modes of mobilisation. With the coming in of dictatorship and the creation of Estado Novo in 1937, there was a lull in the feminist movement because of the fulfilment of their demands of the women of the First Wave who were conscious of their rights and capable of launching a movement.

An important landmark of the Women's Movement was coming to power of the military regime in 1964. The differences between the women's movement and the feminist movement in the form of support for families, motherhood and support for the Church (which itself supported the military initially) created public spaces which were appropriated by the anti-feminists in the form of Soup Kitchens, Mother's Clubs. The constituents of these organisations were White, Middle Class and educated socially conservative women who supported the Military's policy of purging the Leftist organisations, to which incidentally some of the more progressive feminist organisations were also allied. The Feminist Progressive organisations which were also

constituted by White, Middle Class and Educated women were forced to operate in a clandestine manner and often the members were tortured by the agents of the Military Government. Dilma Rousseff, a Marxist Guerilla was aligned to some of the Progressive Feminist organisations which were broadly Leftists and thus was subjected to torture by the military. The scale of the atrocities perpetrated by the military, as Skidmore notes made the conservative women sympathise with the progressive women as many of their own daughters and the younger generation were part of the progressives being purged. They registered their protests through massive rallies and "organisations of Mothers" which were widely covered by the media throughout Latin America as a symbol of resistance against the authoritarian rulers. In Brazil especially, the gradual process of opening or *Abertura* provided greater space for the Conservative women to protest.

Simultaneously, the working class women had their own crises, notably with the depression of wages by the Military government to create the 'Brazilian Miracle'. To recover from a recession since 1968, the ability of the households to buy basic commodities sharply fell. This triggered women across classes, led by housewives to organise the "Against the Cost of Living" Movement that opposed the government's economic policy and further instilled a sense of confidence among them in their protest against the authority. This movement expanded to the *Favelas* where the working class, urban poor women demanded better access to basic infrastructural facilities through neighbourhood groups which were strongly supported by the Liberation Theology branch of the Catholic Church. Their demands expanded to family-centric issues like availability of government-funded daycare and schools which impacted the immediate practical interests of the working classes and were later supported by feminists who otherwise espoused more strategic gender interests (Molyneux 1985) and were not engaged to a great extent with demands of material benefits to be provided by the State.

Meanwhile, the rural women's movement also gained momentum as a protest against the government policy of extension of credit to owners of large farms to promote capital-intensive agriculture. With the loss of employment as a result of the use of this scheme, rural women, who were landless and a large part of the tenants and squatters and were displaced from the sugarcane fields, organised themselves into powerful rural unions. Their demands which encapsulated

better working conditions and an increase in wages coalesced into unionisation in the early 1980s.

Another important issue that united the women's movement and the feminist movement was that of domestic violence- the Iberian Patriarchal culture condoned the prevalence of wife beating and *Patrias Potestas* and *Machismo* are a toxic combination that justifies a man subordinating a women with violence in an effort to exercise the masculine agency in the name of being the head of a family. Till now, South American records show the highest rates of domestic violence and femicide as a result of such socialisation, exacerbated by the inadequacy of laws that failed to redress the situation. The working class who were less cognizant of their rights benefitted from the feminists, claim for rights over their own person and body. Protests against the judiciary that dismissed cases of domestic violence because *Machismo* and *Patrias Potestas* justified the killing of a woman by her partner on the mere suspicion of being unfaithful and the lack of police redressal of these grievances.

Probably the most contentious issue in the divide between the Women's Movement and the Feminist Movement globally and especially in the Brazilian Feminist Movement has been the issue of reproductive rights. Feminists belonging to the Second Wave and who due access to higher education and being relatively financially stable was capable of advocating for autonomy of the movement from other political actors and the State have made the women's right to one's own body, the right to have abortion and contraception primary issues of the women's movement. This is strongly contested by women who are less educated, those from poorer backgrounds and by some middle-class women who are religiously conservative due to their association with the Catholic Church which opposes the former section of feminists and projects them as 'man-hating', anti-motherhood and unnatural (Costa and Sardenberg, 2014). Yet, when it came to clandestine abortion that the poor women had to resort to in unhygienic conditions, a degree of co-operation between the Feminists and the poorer women emerged. This issue was further complicated in 1981 when Sao Paulo's Conservative Governor Paulo Maluf implemented family planning via sterilisation measures for the poor women in the state. Feminists who did advocate state support for the availability of contraceptives protested against the targetted sterilisation of 'inferior women' who they felt were deliberately misled into the programme (Skidmore 1999). Thus, a picture of strict divisions between the women based on their socio-

economic backgrounds and religious orientations may exaggerate their contestations at the cost of many instances where co-operation has been across the classes and divides in the midst of the right-wing military rule was seen.

Another dimension of the grievances that the women protested against was the lack of representation of women that was a continuation of the First Wave of feminism. During military rule, the question of representation was not phrased in terms of having women elected representatives in the legislatures or executive but meant only the representation of their interests in the public sphere. The demand for representation by women merged with the larger opposition to the military rule and the democratic protests. Surprisingly, this led to unity amongst the different sections of the feminist and women's movement who along with the different social movements and protests formed the larger Opposition with the strong support from the Catholic Church against the military regime, identified as the common enemy. The intensity of the protests increased with *Abertura* and the gradual opening of the democratic spaces for the articulation of varied interests, leading to what Sardenberg and Costa call, 'dual struggles' of simultaneous demands for more rights for women while diluting a certain part of this agenda for the identified 'bigger goal' of re-democratisation. The autonomous feminists took a more distinctive path, whose position will be clarified when the dimension of contestation would be discussed, through their support for the alliance with other social movements, but not political parties making them part of the heterogeneous and polycentric re-democratisation movement. This strengthened the different groups that came together for a common cause even though their conceptualisation of the State and the regime varied greatly. Another factor impacting the amorphous women's movement was the 1975 World Conference on Women in Mexico City which added weight to the demands of the women globally and aided in the evolution of a regional feminism in the setting of a common Iberian culture which made women vulnerable to many common atrocities.

With *Abertura*, there was another transformation visible in the feminist movement- certain sections of feminist observed that being directly involved in the formulation of public policy pertaining to health and reproductive rights could promote the feminist agenda. From the early 1980s, the feminists worked at the local levels with health secretariats where they advocated women's health while also being incorporated into the health councils present across the country.

Initially, *Programa de Assistencia Integral a Saude da Mulher* (Programme of Integral Assistance to Women's Health) was launched by the city of Sao Paulo which laid the foundation for the creation of spaces in public policy where the feminists and the government could negotiate on issues related to women on various policies and official bodies. This was the period of the emergence of 'State Feminism'. For instance, the first *Conselho da Condicao Feminina* (Council for the Condition of Women) was established followed by the *Conselho Nacional dos Dereitos da Mulher*/CNDM (National Council for Women's Rights) and the *Delegacia Especializada de Atendimento a Mulher*/DEAM (Police Stations for Battered Women) in 1986.

MOVEMENT DURING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

With the election of Tancredo Neves as President in January 1985, the process of re-democratisation commenced and got consolidated further with the assumption of Presidency by Jose Sarney in March 1985. While the social movements were the main drivers of the democratisation due to the internal conflicts within the main political parties and the military regime over succession, the initial spurt of social protests died down due to disagreements within the Opposition about the clause of Direct Elections (Mainwaring 1986). A negotiated transition meant that the far-reaching reforms that the Opposition wanted was diluted as the old clientelistic politics and accommodation of politicians from all major parties further shrunk the space available to the social movements in the creation of the new regime. Furthermore, Mainwaring (1986) sheds light on another compromise of the transition which partly undermined the hope of the Progressive sections from the new democratic regime- the stipulation that the new Constitution would be drafted by politicians after elections rather than by an autonomous Constituent Assembly. The creation of Constitutional provisions by elected members in the Assembly in 1986, belonging to diverse parties which not only participated in the compromise of transitional democracy and were also those who wanted a degree of continuity with the Old Regime meant that the demands of the social movements, including those of women's rights would not be prioritised.

Alvarez (1998) noted that with re-democratisation and the opening of the confined spaces to politics, there occurred a change in the nature of the women's movement as the feminists who advocated autonomy by refusing to engage with both the State and the Left-led Opposition during the authoritarian rule, looked to electoral politics and participation in the local government in order to exert pressure for the cause of feminism. This brought them closer to those sections of the women's movement whose association through the Leftist organisation and oppositional parties during re-democratisation led to a point of co-operation despite organisational hierarchy and specialisation that the educated autonomous feminists often cultivated.

To append to the change in nature of the movement, the Constituent Assembly formed in 1986 for the purpose of drafting the Constitution (later adopted in 1988) had 26 female members. Interestingly they pointed out to the Assembly President that despite women comprising 54 per cent of the population and 53 per cent of the electorate, they were severely under-represented as was evident in them constituting just 4.9 per cent of the Assembly (Mainwaring 1986). This glaring difference along with international pressure from United Nations rejuvenated the demand the feminists had made about the need to ensure women's representation at every level. To address the neglect of women's issues during deliberations of the Constitution, a large section of the feminists re-evaluated their understanding of the State from being a repository of economic and social benefits to that of creating lobbies for direct action to influence the Assembly Members. Labelled as 'lipstick lobby', these feminists took the help of the National Council for Women's Rights to mobilise and exert pressure in order to get 80 per cent of their demands accepted in the Constitution (Sardenberg and Costa 2014).

After the transition to democracy, the space for the articulation of various kinds of interests within the feminist movement grew and the immediate needs for labour reforms and agricultural redistributive policies were felt. This led to Afro-Brazilian women, members of the labour union, Church women and the women of community organisations who did not till now identify as feminists encountering feminists in the newly created space by utilising the regional framework of the '*Encuentros*'. *Encuentros* which were initially organised to give space to diverse sections of the women's movement and feminist movements across Latin America to come together, share insights and evolve solutions to their problems while trying to create an in institutionalised

and hierarchical framework for this purpose. Such *Encuentros* was emulated in Brazil across national and local levels. These *Encuentros* gave space for deliberation as well as for articulation of intersectional issues- sexism complicated by racism, lack of access to economic resources, illiteracy and inability to gain government benefits which make them vulnerable to double discrimination. The White, Middle Class and educated women who embodied the term 'feminists' and usually defined and manoeuvred the movement got the opportunity to gain insights into the struggles and perspectives of the other sections of the Women's Movement which diversified the Second Wave in Brazil. Yet, this large, heterogeneous and polycentric movement faced multiple levels of contestation within and thus fragmented on the divide between feminists and those who were part of the women's movement yet did not identify themselves as feminists.

Contestation and Binaries

The Brazilian feminist movement has undergone transformations and notably, this study seeks to explore the contestation between educated, White, Middle-Class feminists who heralded the 'Second Wave' of the feminist movement as autonomous from oppressive Military State and the Opposition dominated by the Left and the Catholic Church. These women opposed the military not on the basis of a reproductive rights issue or questioned the subject position of women in general discourse, but on grounds of crises of survival and their marginal identity exacerbating their suffering, their financial backwardness, discrimination faced on the basis of their race or indigeneity and for being denied. On the other hand, there were women who aligned their interests with the Leftist opposition and waged a dual battle for general liberation from authoritarian rule while also struggling for popular demands like lands rights. The internal dynamics of the evolving feminist movement prevent any clear-cut and coherent classification between the women, there have been efforts to explore the contestations among the strands of the feminist movements by scholars globally.

The understanding of contestation between the feminists is not broadly based on the two sections of the movement of women highlighted here but also on the basis of a large and radical movement which engages with different discourses and modes of actions, there are bound to be

contestations and convergences between various subgroups within these two large strands identified here. Furthermore, another dimension of contestation that can be identified here is between the feminists and the Church and between the Left organisations and the State which influence the contestations. Before exploration of the binary between the two strands of feminists or the divide between the feminists and the women's movement, one needs to historicize and contextualise the emergence of this contestation. As was pointed out in the previous sections, the origins of feminist movements have been studied in the form of waves in Brazil that interestingly mirrored those in the Western countries where a small section privileged and educated women wanted representation. This exclusivist character of the origins of feminism not only ignored the gendered rights of the less privileged women but also failed to acknowledge the intersectionality of demands that are based on the different types of discrimination they face, in addition to being a woman. Thus, there were differences on grounds of prioritising the issues that were to be articulated and the modes of mobilisation in alliance with actors like the State or the Church.

It has been observed that those with greater access to education, financial resources and racial advantage of being white often took the mantle of leading the feminist movement while lacking to address the needs of the women belonging to the poorer sections, who were illiterate, indigenous or Black. This contestation narrowed in the face of authoritarian excesses and due to co-operation on issues through social movements. Yet, the struggle for dominance in terms of which issues should the movement articulate, which actors are to be allies and the framework of the public policy that would address their needs has led to the persistence of contestation. For instance, many of the feminists who argued for autonomy from the State would emphasise on the autonomy of the women when it came to decisions on their bodies and reproductive rights while being critical of the Church and the State in opposing these rights but would face opposition from religiously conservative women and women from working classes who saw them as 'unfeminine'. With the feminist movement undergoing professionalisation and with the influx of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), it was observed that professionalisation of the feminists, in collaboration with the State and to further supplement the State where there was a rollback due to Neoliberalisation, created another level of contestation. (Alvarez 1998). This contestation was a source of tension within the middle class educated feminists who refute the collaboration with State as well as the feminist activists from the grassroots disputing the short-term benefits nature versus long-term struggle. In recent times with the introduction of electoral

quotas, education and social policies aimed at upliftment of the working class and enhanced scope of interaction among various strands of feminists and reliance on *Encuentros* have led to a change in the dynamics between the educated professional and middle-class feminists and the grassroots activists. The latter has started taking an enhanced role in articulating their interests rather than just following the former who did not completely address their interests.

Sardenberg and Costa (2014) identify subcategories like academic feminism and state feminism to illustrate changing dialectics of the feminist movement which also posit their differences from the mainstream groups. This has the potential for co-operation and conflict between them while emphasising the heterogeneous and polycentric nature of the movement, thus establishing the existence of multiple feminisms. Academic Feminism emerged in the 1980s which is indicative of dissemination and consolidation of feminism in the academic spaces. In many ways this was the continuation of the First Wave with regards to the exclusivist and elite nature of this trend and as this was propagated by those who were financially secure and gained access to education that helped in embedding the feminist discourses and practices that would be the fillip for the Second Wave. With the proclamation of 1975 as the Year of the Women by the United Nations, small societies and scientific societies led by women were established in the larger cities of Brazil that debated gender issues and autonomy in consonance with the spirit of the Second Wave. Post-transition, these women and their specialisation enabled them to be professionals in the 'feminist careers', which helped usher in Professionalisation in the 1990s which would be explored subsequently.

State Feminism as was alluded to above, emerged even before Academic Feminism when the process of *Abertura* enabled a gradual opening of space for negotiations between Feminists and the State to address issues pertaining to women's right. As an example of collaborative efforts between the Middle Class- educated Feminists and the women coming from socio-economically less privileged sections who were less educated, the needs of reproductive health and bodily autonomy merged to demand policies relating to family planning, contraception and prevention of domestic violence and femicide. Government responses via institutions like DEAMs and Council for the Condition of Women and most notably by CNDM in the period of transition were constructive measures that impacted the dynamics of the feminist movement in addition to uplifting the general condition of women. The CNDM was a result of the lobbying by the women

who took advantage of the gradual opening of a space for the re-establishment of a civil society. It was an organ of the Ministry of Justice whose President and budget were decided by the President of Brazil, its members were Councilwomen who were both representatives of the government and civil society, which helped in creating a consensus amongst all women's groups. Yet, the pervasive sexism and racism within the government led to curbing of the autonomy of the first CNDM and subsequently the resignation of leading feminists from the body. This was symptomatic of the larger patriarchal political context in which the feminist movement negotiated its position during re-democratisation, where the paternal state restricted autonomy and representation leading to certain demands being prioritised over others and exacerbating the internal contestations between the women activists all over the country. This clearly illustrates the role of external actors like the Brazilian State in impacting the dynamics of the feminist movement which will be dealt with at length in the next chapter. The deliberate use of 'women's groups' rather than 'feminists' is also to shed light on the overwhelming support of the grassroots-based Women's Movement for engagement with the State while a large strand of the 'feminists' were the autonomous feminists who were opposed to any engagement with the State.

The divide mentioned above has been categorised globally as binaries between the Feminist Movement and the Women's Movement (Sardenberg and Costa 2014) when certain issues and modes of mobilisation create a divide which is neither water-tight nor static, but subgroups within them often converging at times. The binaries of the groups have been conceptualised in various ways by different scholars. Peruvian Feminist Virginia Vargas (1992) observed that the feminist movement across Latin America which addressed the post-enfranchisement demands were constituted by participants who could be categorised as- the feminist stream, women belonging to political parties and the women from the popular classes. Elucidating on the issues they prioritised, Julie Shayne (2007) highlights that for the first strand, the important issues were voluntary maternity and responsible paternity which encapsulates the autonomy of the women and restructuring of gender roles that critique *Patrias Potestas* of the males, the issue of personal autonomy that revolves around the demand of autonomy over their person in terms of motherhood and the right to abortion and contraception; the reform of divorce laws that in the past prevented abused women from gaining easy divorces; and strengthening of judicial mechanisms of enforcement of supports to be paid, the need for equal pay for women who were hitherto paid substantially less even in the government departments despite attaining higher

levels of qualification; and challenging the discourse about the portrayal of women by the media that re-inforced *Marianismo* and also disparaged the feminist demands. The second strand consisted of women from different classes, albeit belonging largely to the middle class whose demands were a continuation of First Wave feminism, namely, that of increasing the scope of representation in politics. The third strand consisted of diverse groups that prioritised economic and social rights of prevention of discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity rather than an overt attack on patriarchy. The last strand consisted of anti-feminists who emphasised on being feminine, mothers who agitated for the disappeared persons across Latin America, those who organised community soup kitchens, those involved in trade unions and Leftist unions, indigenous women, Afro-Brazilian women as well as landless agricultural labourers who later got associated with unions like the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) among many others.

Maxime Molyneux (1985) problematises the notion whether all women can have a single interest, given gender inequality is caused by multiple factors, mediated by patriarchal structures embedded in different contexts and the difference between gender interests. Due to the lack of consensus on exactly what constitutes women's interests, she advises on the need to accept differences about women's struggles and identifies three interests that determine how they identify themselves, which issues they advocate and modes of mobilisation they deploy: **Women's Interests, Strategic Gender Interests and Practical Gender Interests**. While the first category is contentious due to lack of consensus on what exactly are the interests of women, an abstract category of the woman across cultures may be created when it comes to experiencing oppression, but the causes of oppression and structures that mediate it vary across contexts. Thus, Molyneux formulates '**gender interests**' to overcome this abstract monolithic projection of interests. Within gender interests, the two categories germane to this study are **Strategic Gender Interests** and **Practical Gender Interests**. The first entails 'the formulation of strategic objectives to overcome women's subordination' related to reproductive rights, a self-reflexivity about gendered roles in the family about child rearing and domestic violence, the alleviation of discrimination embedded in the institutions and granting of greater political rights to ensure equality. These demands are generally associated with the 'feminists' whose struggle are to challenge the dominant patriarchal consciousness through long-term action. On the other hand, Practical Gender Interests are more tangible due to their lived experience of oppression in the

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gendered division of labour, they are a response to an immediate interest of economic survival and social distress rather than envision a strategic endpoint of emancipation. Thus, it is more experiential than created by external intervention (as is in the case of strategic interests) as they do not challenge the prevalent sexual division of labour while arising out of it, for example as was seen in the 'Cost of Living Movement' where the unavailability of public provisions and inflation led to direct collective action. Thus, a closer intertwining with class, race, disability, ethnicity and other social markers is more visible.

In consonance with this division, scholars have used the division of feminists and the larger women's movement to highlight the differences as well as the initial years of co-operation that took place between them during the authoritarian rule (Alvarez 1998). The feminists were successful in instilling a degree of radicalism through encouraging poor and working-class women to participate in the overall struggle and interacted closely with them through their unions like the community organisations, militant trade unions and human rights movement. Gradually, within the larger feminist movement which consisted of feminists and non feminists, the former distinguished themselves by: (i) the need to wage war on both the authoritarian capitalist regime and the pervasive sexism that is embedded in the personal sphere and in the political sphere occupied by the Leftist Opposition, (ii) the need to not de-privilege the 'cultural' struggle of overcoming patriarchy in the 'political' domain and (iii) to discover innovative ways of doing politics with the aim of inculcating consciousness at the interpersonal level. They were not in favour of cosmetic changes but advocated changes in the institutional structures of class in the public sphere. While the feminists argued for autonomy, they remained within the organisations involved in the larger Opposition where the non-feminists were active and continuous co-operation took place. Alvarez's account projects an optimistic picture of the early years of contestation between feminists and the larger women's movement, with the former seemingly taking on a role similar to educating vanguards, but this narrative also draws attention to the growing rift that increased over the years with changing circumstances.

Other scholars have utilised the binary of 'Popular Feminists' and 'Professional Feminists' to explore the division and contestation to highlight the points of difference and co-operation in terms of issues and modes of direct action (Sardenberg and Costa 2014, Alvarez 1991,1998). The former conventionally includes women from diverse groups who are alternately termed as

grassroots feminists including women belonging to trade unions, agricultural unions, who articulate interests related to discrimination based on race and ethnicity in addition to gender like Afro-Brazilian Women and Indigenous Women, community organisations linked to the Catholic Church for whom the practical gender interests of availability of basic facilities are extremely important. This is not to present a monolithic category within different groups, rather they face contestations within the group and the term Popular Feminists may itself often be appropriated by community-grassroots feminist activists to define themselves by excluding the rest. For the purpose of this study, the division utilised by Sardenberg, Costa and Alvarez in identifying the constituents and dynamics of the term Popular Feminists will be used. Professional Feminists were the early proponents of Second Wave feminism in the region who were predominantly white, were middle class and used their educational attainments to gain entry into public spheres and launched professional feminist careers and were capable of disseminating feminist discourse across the public sphere. The differences between the first group, many of whom refused the label of feminists as a self-signifier is based on their class and racial-ethnic identity, the issues emanating from which were not addressed in the Second Wave. While many sections of the women's movement eschew the use of the term feminists (*femeninas nao feministas*), the use of the term Popular Feminists for the purpose of clarification may appear to be an imposed term which denies their agency in terms of their self-identification while privileging the framework used by feminists. As Alvarez narrates, the de-centring of feminism and inclusion of intersectionality in recent times has made feminism a more inclusive and polycentric site of discourse and practice and this study utilises the prevalent binary of popular and Professional Feminists purely for academic convenience and clarity.

Furthermore, growing contestations were also interspersed with instances of convergence and co-operation between them with the coming of the Neoliberal market policies and the rollback of the State. With professionalisation and transnationalisation of feminist networks that started to include plural voices and exchange of experience in *Encuentros* since 1981, the region saw greater collaboration between them with the proliferation of NGOs. However, there are disagreements that have emerged about these categories and their constituents. With the emergence of a more intersectional understanding of feminism, the agents classified as either popular or Professional Feminists have undergone changes as many women of colour, indigenous women or even lesbian feminists are not seen as part of Popular Feminists, but as

another section of feminists who are marginalised because of their non-gender identities in addition to their gender. Popular Feminists for Duarte (2012) and Castillo (2010) refer more to the working class women, trade unionists, female agricultural labourers and those active in the broader Women's Movement as part of the community outreach who have contestations with the Professional Feminists on many points. The lesbian feminists can belong to both sections while Afro-Brazilian Feminists and Indigenous Feminists have been historically and statistically deemed to be more discriminated than others, their position is often more precarious than Popular Feminists. Nevertheless, this study while recognising their separate identity from the 'Popular Feminists' views their efforts to strive for more sensitive policies while generating their own discourse that leads to contestations and convergences.

Afro-Brazilian Women's Movement

An axis of contestation based on race has been the movement spearheaded by the Afro-Brazilian women who have pointed out the dominant discourse of feminism since the 1970s, modelled after Noth American and European 'Second Wave' has widened the equalities between women as the persistence of domestic labour being performed by Afro-Brazilian women in white middle-class households enabled the white feminists to avail the opportunities in the public sphere that further empowered them. As noted in the subsection pertaining to intersectionality, the locational dilemma faced by Black women when it comes to the feminist movement and the anti-race movement compelled them, according to Sueli Carneiro (2003) to 'blacken' the feminist movement and to 'sexualise' the anti-race movement'. This added a divergent discourse to this movement as well as consolidated their status as new political subjects.

 In the context of Brazil, 'Racial Democracy' was a deep-seated notion about their national identity' prevailed. This pointed to the exceptionalism of the absence of racial discord due to the harmonious intermixing of the three races- Whites, Blacks and the Indigenous (Rodrigues and Prado 2013). The more apparent reality was the policy promoted by the government called 'whitening', where encouragement to intermarriages and miscegenation was premised on the inherently racist claim the government espoused. This claim was that 'white traits' being superior to 'black ones' would erase the Afro-Brazilian population and would result in a mixed

population (Skidmore 1999). This discourse was promoted between 1930-1970 and was a favoured view of the military regime. The Afro-Brazilian population drawing inspiration from the Civil Rights movement in the United States responded in the 1970s by forming the United Black Movement. The Black women who identified more with the anti-race movement than feminist movement played a pivotal role in its inception and were encouraged towards political activism and public participation under the regime (Rodrigues and Prado 2013).

Within the nascent feminist movement in Brazil, the first contestation regarding race arose in 1975, where the activists at the Conference for Brazilian Women formulated the Black women's Manifesto that problematised the notion that all women have the same rights yet unity based merely on gender is not possible, so alliance between Black women and the white women under the rubric of feminist movement is conditional (Within the United Black Movement, there was a demand to include issues related to sexuality and since the 1980s, the Afro-Brazilian women started their autonomous movement). The trajectory of the movement in negotiating with positions in the public sphere through elections in local and state elections, in many ways was similar to the larger movement of the feminists. The establishment of councils and the agitation led by Black women led to the inclusion of diversity in these councils. The growing presence in National Councils like CNDM trained Afro-Brazilian women in initiating policy discussions with the State, which proved beneficial to the anti-race movement their political experience and additionally helped them impart training to the men who started the dialogue much later. The proliferation of the movement can be discerned by the organisation of Black women within the regional *Encuentros* since 1985 and later the convening of the First National Encounter of Black women in 1988.

The issues they articulated can be compiled into five categories- the promotion and preservation of their own culture against the imposition of the dominant discourses; to rectify the discursive construction of a Black woman as inferior; to build esteem through solidarity, a greater dialogue on sexual and reproductive rights, human rights, and monitoring of implementation of policies. Similar to the feminist movement, the internal contestations became evident between two dominant trends in the Afro-Brazilian women's movement that differ on objectives- the mode of political dialogues with institutions and community organisation and approach, that is, a top-down versus a bottom-up input.

THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN THE 1990S

The Feminist Movement in Brazil in the 1990s can be studied through two axes- firstly by tracing the trajectory of the feminists' preparation for the Fourth World Conference on Women held in August-September 1995 in Beijing and through understanding the changes that occupied in the altered political context in Brazil; and examining the changes that occurred with the introduction of the electoral quota. While this chapter will delve solely into the effects and nuances of these policies more than the formulation, clauses and implementation will be addressed in the subsequent chapter.

Among the literature available to explore the changes in the nature of the feminist movement in Brazil in the 1990s, Alvarez's(1998) analysis of five visible trends reveals the complexity and plurality of the movement. In the scenario of democratic consolidation in Brazil and with the introduction of Neoliberal market reforms, the Brazilian State 'rolled back' its domain which led to many of the autonomous feminists who had started collaborating with the State to establish NGOs and align with transnational networks to fill the vacuum.

(i) The **first trend** was the decentering of feminist practices that had been observed in the 1970s and 1980s within either the autonomous feminist movement or the women's movement. A transformation was observed pertaining to the raising of women's issues where every global event was to be analysed through a gender lens. This enlarged the scope of intervention of women in the public discourse while drawing attention to the systematic marginalisation that hitherto existed through exclusion in spheres designated as male-centric. This allowed the reformulation of concepts like reproductive rights to be ensured by the secular state since their denial is a reflection of sexist tenents of religion influencing them. This gave the chance to marginalised sections within feminism like Black Feminism, Lesbian Feminism, Ecofeminism, Popular Feminism, Christian Feminism to become proactive in various arenas. The analysis through intersectionality explored in the previous chapter problematised the previous division between feminist and non-feminist, the latter also including a section of the Popular Feminists as the debate about who can be classified as feminists not versus identify as one has been stressed upon in the contest of the *Encuentros*. A noticeable generational change from the previous generation's Second Wave *historicas* in the understanding of feminism has taken place that looks at gender identity as a complete package comprising of race, ethnicity, sexuality and age. This

shows that since the 1990s the reconceptualisation of feminism due to the active role of Black Feminists who introduced a more nuanced intersectional understanding and the Popular Feminists and trade unionists women who collaborated yet exerted a distinct identity from the feminists shows a decentering from the mainstream feminists' understanding. This further made the movement more diverse and representational yet prone to multiple contestations.

 (ii) The **second trend** was the selective adoption of feminist discourses by civil society and policymakers including the State that was a result of the dissemination across public spaces of issues that were important to women due to the intensive lobbying by the feminists. Many of the outcomes like calculating representational quotas, the projection of domestic violence issues under human rights in conferences supported by the United Nations and the involvement of feminists in the government departments can easily be attributed to the empowerment of women and increased articulation by feminists from marginalised sections like the Afro-Brazilian feminists. The caution in praise and apprehension stemmed from the fact that the measures were largely oriented around the policy arenas which were still permeated by patriarchy, thus restricting only a few culturally acceptable measures to be imbibed and restricted the scope of comprehensive gender equality. Second, the merely signing of UN and OAS conventions relating to provisions of women's rights and protection assured to women against domestic violence does not imply the presence of a proactive government that would enforce them and especially with the rollback of the State, the agreements that could have ensured the protection of women lacked the requisite strength to do so.

The **third trend** was the NGOisation of Latin American feminisms. This was a consequence of two factors- first, the structural adjustment programmes forced the State to withdraw from regulating the lives of its citizen and the democratisation gave a fillip to extra-governmental groupings to operate. The vacuum left by the rollback of the State was filled with NGOs where the Professional Feminists were at the helm and their specialisation was beneficial in moulding legislation enacted by the State. This was a result of the selective absorption of feminist discourse, international commitments to protocols relating to women's rights as well as the nature of a Neoliberal state. A Neoliberal state which emphasises efficiency that requires technical knowledge that can be structured as a policy to respond to women's needs. This was precisely when the Professional Feminists which were specialised could gain access to materials

and research resources and avail grants from international agencies and corporate foundations to directly influence public policies. On the other hand, this created tensions between the feminist NGOs and the larger movement with whom they collaborated. Feminist NGOs became highly professionalised with hierarchical structured and international funding. Yet on the flipside, they were responding more to the needs of agencies rather than the grassroots. The USAID became the main bilateral funding agency of the 1995 Beijing Conference which meant that the few Professional Feminists had access to these funds which they used to direct the course of the feminist movement in Brazil, rather than the informal bottom-up consensus created through discussions with target groups before.

The **fourth and fifth trend** is connected and the highlight of the increased scope of articulating their demands and transnationalisation of feminist agendas respectively revealed the regional and global solidarity networks that the feminists forged, largely through the NGOs which had an effect of the nature of the feminist movement. These differed from the informal *Encuentro* networks in being highly professional and specialised which held meetings restricted to feminists, social scientists and representatives rather than the local subregional organisations. While having similar links with global feminist networks at the institutional level like the Beijing Conference, this as trend also permeated at the national and sub-national level with the need to translate the gains of these forums into actual policies. A national level coalition of women which were more inclusive of local groups was created with the support of the government like the National Conference of Brazilian Women in mid-1995. These played the role of coordinating within the coalition and with the State, increasing the possibility of inclusion of feminist issues in national policy and consolidated themselves in articulating feminist agendas.

Newer Contestations arose within the feminist movement in Brazil, as it did in other Latin American countries in tune with the changes encapsulated in the five trends. In addition to the generational change that came with the dissolution of informal activist role of feminists to the and taking up new roles with growing professional and specialisation in highly hierarchical corporate NGOs, there was a degree of alienation that the larger Popular Feminists felt that this indicated being co-opted into the narrative of a narrow state-centric understanding of what feminist movements should articulate. This gave rise to another binary of contestation between *feminists complices*, who were more radical and informal and *institucionalizadas* who abandoned

the creation of an alternate feminist worldview for reproducing patriarchal logic when promoting limited needs. The institutionalisation of feminist NGOs, many feminists felt, promoted 'gender technocracy' as their ability to access funds and lobby with public officials gave them a more privileged position of being interlocutors over the other stream of feminists. Given the sharp differences over collaboration with the state, sections of feminists especially the Popular Feminists felt alienated over the undermining of their demands by the 'femocrats'.

An additional source of tension was USAID's status as the main financier for the Beijing Conference preparatory process for Latin Americans as many objected to its past role in supporting the dictatorship in Brazil as well as favouring few specialised NGOs to be the recipients of funds which led to centralisation. Throughout the 1990s, as a result of the development narrative due to Neoliberalism, women came to be seen as clients of the State and policies accrued as benefits instead of being conceptualised as inherent natural rights as was done in the pre-Neoliberal era. This contractual relation led many women to gauge collaborating with the State differently- some saw the state as a viable arena to promote their demands like the Professional Feminists, while radical feminists and Popular Feminists wanted to move away from State centrism to rejuvenate the movement by re-emphasising on changing the cultural discourse. The criticism about lack of representation and privileging of professional feminist NGOs became widespread and the need to reflect about the consequent hierarchies was felt even after this decade.

Another pivotal dimension of the changing dynamics of the feminist movement in the 1990s was the introduction of electoral quotas in Brazil for women. This dimension will be explored at length in the subsequent chapter while dealing with the representation of women in politics. The objective would be to study the impact of electoral quotas in the dynamic between the Popular Feminists and Professional Feminists. The democratisation process requires consolidation based on increasing the representation of those sub-groups who have been marginalised. In 1995, following the example of Argentina, using Law 9100 designated quotas for members of Municipal Chambers and reserving 20 per cent of the seats. This was further extended to state legislative assemblies and Federal Chamber of Deputies by Law 9504 in 1997. Law 9504 also increased the percentage of quota to 30 per cent across all levels which exist today. Yet lacunae like competition within the Open lists among candidates for the votes; the lack of attainment of

the quota figures being due non-mandatory provisions; women candidates not enjoying access to same financial resources; and unequal campaign time in media as men show the embeddedness of structural patriarchy at play (Miguel 2008). In terms of the changes that have occurred and how those changes to the dynamics, especially with the introduction of the quota, there has been a slight improvement in the percentage of women becoming representative overall while recent elections have also shown at the national level, the percentage decreasing (Frazier 2008), a contradiction that came about when number of women being fielded had increased by the number being elected is falling. In an area wise breakdown, after the quotas were first introduced, the percentage of women getting elected from the relatively poorer regions like north-east and central Brazil was higher than the percentage of women elected from richer and cosmopolitan urban sections. It was surmised through the logic of increased representation that the women representatives of the backwards parts of the country would represent the diverse interests, aligning themselves with the agendas of Popular Feminists, yet most of them were relatives of wealthy governors and politicians. The more cosmopolitan Southern urban areas continued being the strongholds of males as centres of power. Yet, recent elections have shown how more Popular Feminists are getting elected, a tendency that diversifies the demands that are to be articulated at the national policy level and also creates leverage in their contestation with Professional Feminists.

In the 1990s, the Afro-Brazilian Women's movement became transnational in character in the run-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women. Here the Brazilian delegations brought race into the forefront of issues that needed to be considered in assessing the degree of oppression. Their intersectional focus was expressed to a global audience when they participated in the World Conference again Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban in 2001 where Brazil's delegation was the largest and dependent largely on the organisational and negotiating capacities of the Black women who had been duly trained as part of the wider feminist movement.

THE NEW MILLENIUM AND CHANGES

The course of affirmative action in the form of electoral quotas and greater professionalisation of the feminist movement generated tensions that continued to the next decade, over what Alvarez (1998) identifies were differences related to 'appropriate sites, targets and goals of feminist policies.' At the institutional level, the transnationalisation of feminist NGOs which linked them to other global social movements made by Brazilian feminists, both Popular and Professional sections, participants in global conferences like the World Social Forum and organisations like MERCOSUR. Smaller NGOs and groups reoriented their relations with the professional NGOs that they had previously opposed and began to exert pressure on them to be more representative while many of the popular movements began to directly pressurise the IGOs and the State. In 2002, which was the last year of President Cardoso's tenure, SEDIM or the National Secretary for Women's Rights was created which drew heavily from a large number of feminists NGOs. This collaborative effort between the non-State Feminists and the State assumed a watchdog's role for reviewing commitments to international conventions like the CEDAW with all sections of feminists being proactive in ensuring that the rights are not undermined under the assumption of "Women's Rights are not Facultative (UN 1996, A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women)."

As a response to the sensitisation during the Beijing process, the 2002 elections saw feminists presenting the Feminist Political Platform created by the Brazilian Women Conference constituted by women in many local women's forums to all the candidates in which their interests are clearly articulated. Further collaboration with the State increased with the coming of President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva in 2008, whose political party *Partido das Trabalhadores* (PT), considered to be more progressive in terms of women's issues came to power. The aspect of institutional measures taken during this period would be analysed in Chapter Three. Admittedly, the nature of the coalition under PT with diverse groups further impacted the nature of the feminist movement. PT was strongly supported by trade unions, farmers' unions, Leftist unions, the Liberation theology branch of the Catholic Church among others which undermined the prominence of the Professional Feminists. The election of many grassroots activists made their demands more prominent. The Professional Feminists were beleaguered by the problems that professionalisation generated which led to a change in their orientation, a stage that Alvarez

identifies as the **sixth trend** in the course of the Latin America feminism and Brazilian Feminism in specific.

At the national level, conferences that sought to draw out many of the marginalised feminists were held periodically and the national *Encuentro* prepared feminists to be active members in the national policy-making spheres. The institutionalisation of Special Secretariat for Women's Policies which had members elected from across the country and from civil society organisations made the representative character more democratic- this civil society and government collaboration led to the organising of important national conferences like the First National Conference on Policies for Women/ I CNPM (CNPM I) and the formulation of First National Plan of Public Policies for Women/ I PNPM (PNPM I). These conferences, notably the second CNPM led to groundbreaking legislation like the Maria da Penha Law that took seriously the charge of wife battering and introduced stringent measures for domestic violence. While the scope of operation has increased, Haas (2001) comments that fundamental changes in the attitude of men in formal political parties and unions towards the participation of women have remained unchanged. She notes that the creation of women's departments and the presence of a more progressive ruling party does not automatically ensure that the access of feminists to require policies is made easier. Pervasive marginalisation within parties coupled with lack of enforcement of measures made for empowerment continues to present a challenge to the movement.

In 2003, for the Afro-Brazilian Feminists, their formal participation in the government under President Lula as well as heightened awareness to issues they had articulated for so long was made possible under the aegis of SPM and the Special Secretariat for Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR). SEPPIR focussed on multiple issues directly related to material conditions as well as discursive aspects such as health, criminalisation and poverty of Afro-Brazilian men, agriculture, reform of education and changes in narratives in school textbooks (Rodrigues and Prado 2013). However, this led to contestations within their movement based on representation, echoing the struggles of the feminist movement and women's movement.

The anatomy of the feminist movement so far has revealed that despite institutional reforms perceptible changes were not evident. Thus, the dialectics of dominance for articulation and mobilisation among the various strands of feminists across the defined periods show how the

contestations have developed, the actors and why they identify with certain issues and their subsequent categorisation. Yet, these categorisations are not mutually exclusive as they spread across classes. The scope of collaboration and dissension has increased with democracy that consolidates the movement had not led to a convergence. The assessment of scholars provided above project a narrative that can only come from those who can articulate their versions and the available literature is sparse when it comes to providing an alternate understanding of the women's movement from the perspective of the Popular Feminists/Subaltern Feminists. Thus the conceptualisation of these contestations are largely based on the views of one section and that cannot be generalised either.

The next chapter focuses on the different external actors who influence the existence and contours of the feminist movement in Brazil. The operation of this external actor, often in tandem and at times in opposition to the feminist movement galvanises support for certain demands while fragmenting the movement internally. The primary actors identified and analysed with regards to gauging their impact on the movement include the Brazilian State, the United Nations and the *Encuentros*, the Church including the Roman Catholic Church and the Pentecostal Church and finally the political parties which had an important role in extending the agenda of women's rights and when they adopt decidedly anti-women stances. The chapter examines the internal dynamics of the movement, precipitated by the different interactions the different sections of the movement have had with these actors and how this interaction ultimately decided the agenda, the modes of mobilisation, the identity of the activists and the future course of action that the movement chooses in this altered context.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ACTORS INFLUENCING THE CONTESTATIONS AND CONVERGENCE

An overview of the historical trajectory of the feminist movement in Brazil provided in the previous chapter highlighted the diverse interests that were articulated by multiple voices, often in contestation with the others. The successive waves brought with them differing articulation of demands by different sections of women over the generations and the time period under consideration delves into certain demands that are advocated in conjunction with other social movements and actor, drawing out the interlinkage between movements and the influences that flow between them.

This chapter will focus on the interrelationship between the specific actors who are relevant to the study and the feminist movement. The identified actors are important by the way of having a decisive impact on the constitution, operation and mobilisation of the movement. The actors include the State, seen through the legislation of successive governments, and ease of access to women positions of power in the State, the United Nations and *Encuentros*, the political parties and the Church that includes the Roman Catholic Church and the Pentecostal Churches. Their responses and continuous interactions shaped the contours of the feminist movement and laid down the norms of engagement with each other. While these actors are not monolithic and the list of actors with whom the feminist movement engages is not exhaustive or so clearly categorised, the selection of the four main actors is based on their immediacy and intensity of impact on the overall feminist movement in fundamental ways. While many of these actors act as allies to certain sections within the feminist movement, they are opposed by the other sections, resulting in variable degrees of contestations within them. This is most evident in the opposition to the Roman Catholic Church's position on abortion by many Professional Feminists while many of the activists from the larger women's movement active in the Catholic Base communities and influenced by the Liberation Theology branch of Catholic Church support the Church's position over these issues. Furthermore, the relationship between the various feminist movements or rather the multiple forms of feminisms and these actors are not static, their

perception towards each other is dynamic, varies over time and then based on the actions of one of the actors, there can be differing reactions from the different feminisms which prevent a consolidated understanding or a stand taken by the feminist movement on them.

THE STATE AND THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT

Among the actors, the role of the State is fundamental as the relations of the feminist movement and the State, reified as the government and the associated organs of it determine the course of action, the form of the movement and the internal dynamics within the movement. The State is the target of demands for rights and holistically for the creation of conditions that generate a discourse and practice of transforming inequality in the traditional gender roles. In Brazil, the First Wave was characterised by the demand for the right to vote which was secured in 1934 by white, middle-class and educated women who had benefitted from the State's role in creating more employment and educational opportunities in the late 1890 and early 1900s (Hahner 1979, Marino 2012). Yet, the fundamental character of the Brazilian State, which was a monarchy when it gained independence reflected the greater concentration of Patriarchal and Monist values. The uniqueness imparted due to the relatively greater degree of miscegenation in Brazil created another level of contestations and for Afro- Brazilain women and their intersectional needs. This section will elaborate upon the changing relationship of the feminist movement with the State, the differences within them over consultation with the State and the potential of the State to consolidate the movement.

The impetus to the 'Second Wave feminist movement' in Brazil specifically and in many nation-states of Latin America was generally participation in the 'general struggle' against authoritarian military regimes. It simultaneously articulated the need to express demands of human dignity and women's rights (Alvarez 1998). Here the State, duly represented by the government was conceptualised as 'exclusionary, oppressive and self evidently inimical to claims of social justice, including gender justice' which meant that the political public sphere was characterised by restrictions on political participation of women, leading to women joining clandestine organisations which were oppressed and persecuted by the military. Thus, the early years were

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characterised by envisioning the State as the oppressive enemy by many sections of the women's movement and the Liberation Theology branch of Catholic Church endorsed the Opposition by leading the denouncement of the State.

<u>Impact of *Abertura*</u>

There was a change in the perception of the State for a section of the women's movement, where the process of *Abertura* initiated in 1974 led to a less restrictive public sphere which enabled the civil society to gain space to articulate their interests, place their demands before the State and thus allow for the agendas of women activists to be included in public policies. (a) Dilution of the public-private divide- This marked the beginning of the problematising the rigid public-private divide in Brazilian society because of the efforts to shed light on the issues that remained isolated in the private sphere and the need to politicise them by bringing them into the public sphere so as to garner attention and mobilise more and more women around it.

(b) Health issues- Addressing the health concerns of women of all sections, the Programme of Integral Assistance to Women's Health saw the feminists and federal health ministry establish a dialogue on extending care to women in 1983, the first instance of co-operation between the ministry and feminists. In 1983, in numerous states of Brazil, the Councils for the Condition of Women were established to address issue based help that women might require, ranging from domestic violence to literacy, to housing and gender justice employment.

(c) Administering gender justice- The State Councils were made subordinate to the National Council for Women's Rights or *Conselho Nacional das Direitos da Mulher* (CNDM), created in 1986 and was constituted by feminists from different networks in order to allow them more autonomy to act. The Council was established under the Department of Justice after the end of military rule in 1985, with 17 council persons being nominated by the President of Brazil and led by a president having a Cabinet rank. Additionally, after re-democratisation and during the process of deliberations on the provisions of the new Consitution for the democratic state, the "lipstick lobby" or feminists group lobbied successfully with the aid of the CNDM for the inclusion of gender rights and provisions of equity. With the promotion of national campaigns and the presenting the *Carta das Mulheres* which contained specific demands to address discrimination to wide-ranging demands of social justice to mobilising the cross-party women

deputies of the Women's Caucus or *Bancada Feminina* to proactively support the women's rights, the CNDM played a radical role in enabling many of the older generations of feminists to participate in policymaking roles and to utilise the State as an ally for it to be an instrument of advancement of rights. As Molyneux (2003) notes, this transformation of the perception of the State from an enemy to recognising the power of the state to positively influence society, the role of legislation in effecting the desired changes and securing their rights, policies and cultural regulation mechanisms in the education and public communication to set the tone of the desired discourse on gender was instrumental in the decision of older feminists to collaborate with the State to advance the cause of women's rights.

(d) Steps to curb violence- In 1986, the urgent requirement to address violence directed against women led to the creation of Police Stations for Battered Women/ *Delegacia Especializada de Atendimento a Mulher* (DEAM). These police stations have specially trained female officers and first responders to emergencies, counselling facilities and access to safe shelters as remedial measures.

(e) The issue of abortion: A more difficult issue to build a consensus among the activists of the women's movement was abortion. Abortion was made legal based on two conditions in the 1940s: when the survivor becomes pregnant as a result of rape and when the pregnancy threatens the mother's health. Almost a million women undergo an abortion in Brazil annually, the majority of which is performed in unsafe conditions for poor women (Machado 2016, United Nations Women 2005). This results in women being admitted to hospitals with complication arising from unsafe abortions, most of them poor and Afro-Brazilian.

Disputes related to Rapprochement between the State and Sections of Feminists

This rapprochement between a section of the feminists and the State was not without disputes – First, the section which emphasised on autonomy, from political parties and the State perceived the joining of feminists with political parties and the State as a setback to unity. The tendency to absorb only implying that there would be demands which were acceptable and moderate, in order not to be destabilising the patriarchal base (Alvarez 1998). This led to contestations in the National Encounter of 1986. Second, the problems of implementation of policies directed at

women like the refusal to entertain complaints, the lack of sensitivity of male policemen to domestic violence survivors, lack of female police personnel and the stigma attached to reporting of crimes which originated in the private sphere led to a degree of ineffectiveness. As Machado (2016) analyses, DEAMs and judicial mechanisms dedicated to the redress of the domestic violence survivors were ineffective to the cultural tendencies that were steeped in misogyny and discrimination yet were legitimised through civil and criminal codes of jurisprudence. Furthermore, the proactiveness of CNDM was not generally welcomed, causing the Brazilian Government to reduce the powers and leading the mass resignation of prominent feminists. Third, concomitantly, the 'Rollback of the State' under the aegis of Neoliberal reforms meant that the social expenditure was drastically reduced and the agendas of women's rights after CNDM reduction of power suffered from neglect.

In the wake of the above, the responsibility for women's rights was undertaken by Non-Governmental Organisations that led to changes in the demands of feminists, the way they articulated and those who could be the articulators (Sardenberg and Costa 2014). This tendency brought widespread changes in the very nature of the feminist movements not only in Brazil but across the Latin American region, effected through the older regional transnational linkages.

The Brazilian government supported preparatory efforts to mobilise for participation in the Fourth World Conference on Women to be convened at Beijing in August- September 1995, organised by the United Nations Developmental Fund for Women. Women's forums across the country at municipal and State levels sought to co-ordinate through an informal mechanism like the *Articulacao de Mulheres Brasileiras* (Articulation of Brazilian Women for Beijing or AMB) whose functions included raising funds, laying down the activities of the movement, to relaying information to all members as well as ensuring democratic ethos in the participation process. This informal participatory dynamic of AMB strengthened the feminists to collaborate with the Ministry of External Relation to publish an official document after hosting multiple-level seminars to decide on the provisions. This Official Document served the dual purpose (i) of being a representative document sanctioned by the Government which expressed the recognition of the Beijing Platform and (ii) the agenda of women's rights and through better assimilation of the demands that the women across municipalities, states and national levels by the federal government. According to Alvarez (1998, 2003), among the five trends pertaining to the feminist

movement visible in the 1990s during this preparatory process, the relatively rapid incorporation of feminist discourses by the dominant institutions occurred, notably, the State which responded through the creation of ministries and bureaus. Yet, critics of the trend occurring of NGOs dominating the agenda saw the instrumental, specific short-term nature of the demands raised by Professional Feminist NGOs as detrimental to the older and larger struggle to transform the patriarchal logic of the state. They also saw these measures as co-option by the State. While acknowledging that the State is powerful for their cause, they continued to view the State as not an ally but a site of patriarchal relations.

In the 2000s, Sardenberg and Costa (2014) noted the trend of greater consultation between the State and the feminists in what they categorise as 'State Feminism'. With the backlash against the NGOs taking a proactive role and often going to the extent of substituting the State in certain aspects, many feminists disagreed with the creation of hierarchies among the NGOs and larger women's movement due to external factors like funding from dedicated foreign think tanks,   or access to information as highlighted in the previous chapter. Furthermore, in 2002, the last year of President Henrique Cardoso's tenure, the Secretaria da Estado dos Direitos da Mulher (Secretariat of State for Women's Rights or SEDIM) was formed which was concerned with enhancing the participation of women in political institutions and labour market and also to combat violence. SEDIM was instrumental in sending the first comprehensive evaluation of CEDAW provisions being implemented and feminists groups like AGENDE and CLADEM also compiled a Shadow Report to highlight newer and large-scale dimensions that the delayed report did not include. This was a reaction to what Keck and Sikkink (1998) called the 'boomerang effect' of transnationalisation of feminisms in the 1990s where the international leverage added pressure on the government to act.

These developments of government bodies dedicated to monitoring of women's rights and growing number of NGOs dedicated to this cause gave a fillip to the feminists to organise as a 'Feminist Platform" to prioritise feminist objectives by presenting to the electoral candidates certain demands that needed to be included in their campaigns and ultimately in their policies once they are elected. The extent of collaboration and mediation between the State and the women's movement, of which feminists were a distinctive part, heightened with the ascendancy of Luiz Ignacio 'Lula' da Silva to Presidency in 2003. In that year, the *Secretaria Especial de*

Politicas para as Mulheres (Special Secretariat of Policies for Women or SPM), headed by a Secretary with cabinet rank, was formed for gaining budgetary autonomy and creation of public policies that would mainstream the gender discourse. Furthermore, the composition of CNDM was altered so that the members were allowed to openly declare their membership in other networks, like Trade Unions and Professional Networks which enabled greater coordination between government bodies, civil society groups and feminist by providing a platform for feminists to elicit broader and more intersectional policies; aided in greater exchanges with the government that could take more progressive positions; and finally implement them at various levels, according to Machado (2016). She also opines that this enabled the feminists in trade unions and Professional organisations to garner a more favourable response within their organisations to their concerns and cross-referential policies about women could be adopted by other ministries, monitored by SPM and CNDM. The implementation and experience of these policies became the foundation of future policy plans for Women.

With 2004 being declared as the 'Year of the Woman' by the federal government, the SPM convened the National Conference on Policies of Women I, which brought women delegates from municipal to federal levels together in dialogue with the State and led to the *Plano Nacional de Politicas para Mulheres I*(First National Plan for Public Policies for Women or PNPM I). The PNPM I was the culmination of the cooperation of seven ministries forming an Inter-Ministerial Working Group under the Presidential Decree. The Ministries and the Secretariats like Health, Education, Labour and Employment, Justice, Agrarian Development, Social Development, Planning, Budget and Management of the Special Secretariat for Policies Geared towards Racial Equality, CNDM and SPM Ministries constituted this Inter-Ministerial Working Group and the resultant Plan exhibited the wide-ranging considerations on providing women with holistic policies. The Plan was to be carried out between 2005 and 2007 taking into account various facets of the condition of women in Brazil: addressing their demographic share, participation in the workforce classified age groups; the racial composition; social status and the discrimination they face in employment, education, income and health care. The tendency of women to earn less despite being more educated, the lesser life expectancy of Afro-Brazilian Women and the indigenous women who were misfits between the blanket policies designed often with proximation to the White women as standards, contraception and asymmetry in power relations between partners in the family, HIV- related concerns, violence they face as citizens

and double propensity to violence as women was acknowledged. The Budget and Principles of the PNPM I recognise the role of the State in 'implementing public policies related to women, and the consolidation of citizenship and gender equality' (Special Secretariat for Policies for Women (2005), National Plan of Policies for Women I /PNPM I).

In 2007, the second CNPM was held which affirmed that the State bore the responsibility for financing, formulation and implementation of public policies for women and the responsibility to articulate socio-economic policies that have a redistributive character and to link these policies to those of ministries of health, education. The ultimate responsibility of the State was to monitor the execution of the 'provision of affirmative actions, in the spirit of the principles of equity and equality'. Moreover, the intersectional character of these objectives prompted a closer exchange between all government arenas. The CNPM delegates were elected from a broad movement spanning all municipalities and federal districts. CNPM II first and foremost focused on affirmative action policies, bringing about a gender balance in terms of access to economic resources and legal rights as well as increasing political participation. Second, to combat distinct forms of appropriation of body and the exploitation every woman faces, with regards to the harassment in particular that women of colour face in *Carneval*, trafficking and violence. Finally, the oppression of women is to be understood as a structural problem and has ethnic, racial and gender dimensions that indicate varying degrees of vulnerability (Sardenberg and Costa 2014).

CNPM II was the basis of the Maria de Penha Law, Law Number 11340 which contained more stringent punitive measures against domestic violence, that fairly is common in the region and is rooted in the *Machismo* values and the toleration of which is accepted through *Marianismo*. It marked a step ahead of numerous measures taken over the years through the "cultural struggle" part of the feminist movement geared towards inculcation of values that reject this violent manifestation of patriarchy. Measures like the DEAMs, the Belem do Para Convention or the Inter-American Convention to Prevent Sanction and Eradicate Violence Against Women in 1994 which brought the private issue to the public sphere were politicised in order to subject them to legislation and also replaced Law Number 9099[2] which was applied in minor courts and had

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[2] Law Number 9099- The law that dealt with domestic violence in Brazil till replaced by Law Number 11340 in 2006 and was considered widely to ineffective. Cases of domestic violence were tried in minor criminal courts with service sentences for the convicted.

pecuniary sentences. Yet, Law Number 11340[3] had limitations as judges themselves were hesitant to subject the accused to the punishments, found it far too harsh for men, reflecting the entrenched *Machismo*. This was supplemented with the SPM's National Pact for Combating Violence Against Women. Furthermore, the Government enlisted the aid of many Feminist Consortiums to provide support, especially in the monitoring and rehabilitation level when the Courts were not delivering justice.

On the issue of decriminalisation of abortion, one of the central demands of the feminists, especially the Professional Feminists, since the 1990s, with regional conferences exerting pressure to transform the attitudinal values, abortion was sought to be decriminalised, the Feminist Network for Health, Reproductive Rights and Sexual Rights leading the movement in Brazil. With the transnational support of CLADEM, the Feminist Health Network sought cooperation with the Ministry of Health and local facilities for the availability of legal abortions options, creating a favourable public opinion about abortion as well as monitoring and engaging with the legal aspects of abortion especially in the legislature. There have been intense oppositions from the Catholic Church, their allied federal deputies as well as the Evangelical bench, which has forced political parties to take a conservative stand during elections. Since the mid-2000s, with public opinion disfavouring abortion, CNPM I and the PNPM I voted overwhelmingly in favour of legalisation of abortion, but the Tri-party Committee which included members from the government and civil society could not pass muster due to the prevailing political climate which destabilised the progressive government and strengthened the conservative Opposition.

In the event of national political turmoil over corruption charges in 2005-2006, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) led government under Lula da Silva, as Machado (2016) elaborates, sought to sacrifice the issue of legalisation abortion in exchange for support of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of Brazil and the draft which was presented by the federal government to the Commission on Security for Society and Family of the House of Representatives was not proceeded with further. Immediately in the National Congress, two Parliamentary Fronts

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[3] Law Number 11340- Also known as Lei Maria de Penha in honour of Maria de Penha who was shot and crippled by her partner, replaced Law Number 9099 in August 2006. It increased the sentence from 1 to 3 years in prison for those convicted in domestic violence and also allowed for preventive arrests and other measures to protect women.

emerged which were 'in defence of life against abortion' and 'in favour of the family'. These front changed composition but remained. In 2003, the multiparty Evangelical Bench was created which consisted of members who were opposed to the reproductive rights of females including the right to abortion, emphasised traditional family values. The member of this bench was the prominent leaders of the Fronts.   Furthermore, with the strengthening of the position of the Catholic Church, the Evangelicals, as well as the neo-conservative movement, were strengthened. This group's diametrically opposite position to the feminists on the female reproductive rights issue led to contestations within the PT, mostly reflected in resistance emerging to reproductive rights and legalisation of abortions.

The vulnerability of political candidates in Presidential elections in the form of reliance on the support of the Church was witnessed in the 2010 campaigns between Dilma Rousseff and Jose Serra. Due to the proximity of many of the parliamentarians to the Church based on their religious beliefs and the dependence on the Church's support, many positioned themselves to be against abortion and against legal recognition to homosexual unions. The ability of the Church to influence constituencies through churches made them influential actors in politics and they declared their support for the candidate that endorsed traditional values. As the Evangelical bench consisted of members from many parties and the Congresspersons were dependent on the support of the Church, often parties changed their stances on abortion to closely follow the Church's wishes and hence had very little differences on decriminalisation of abortion. This gave feminists little hope of a consistent alliance with any party as the powerful influence of the Church led to all parties opposing or distancing themselves from the abortion debate. This positioning translated in a shift in the character of the State, this positioning and influence of the Catholic and Evangelical Church on the State and its impact on the rights of women were premised on a confrontation between the Secular State's responsibility to ensure the rights over privacy, life and body of women against the conception of a Moral State, imbued with the doctrine of Perfectionism which was in defence of traditional values that asserted the old *Machismo* Patriarchal values.

Despite President Rousseff's declared position in favour of legalisation of abortion, the dependence of her government on the Catholic allies within the party meant that this issue was not taken up seriously. President Rousseff's term marked the beginning of the end of the

collaboration between the feminist groups and the government, a trend that had started during President Lula's tenure. The feminists were further disappointed with another regression of the Government with reference to education for gender equality, which too occurred under pressure from the Church (Machado 2016). Between 2005 and 2013, the SPM supported Gender and Sexual Diversity Programme and all other cross-referential policies that were inserted into the programme of the Ministry of Education resulted in the dissemination of study materials that promoted not homophobic and lesbophobic language. The National Congress by 2011 had a more conservative composition who not only objected to these materials but also decided to not address gender inequality in the National Education Plan of 2014-2024, thus creating pressure on the Executive to withdraw the use of gender in PNE 2014-2024. The reason for this was that gender, according to them, was likely to impose foreign values and going 'against traditional family values' and was seen as a way to oppose homosexuality. This led to an impasse between the PT-led progressive Executive and Conservative National Congress. Thus, this regression in recent times ultimately resulted in the government conceding on various policies that were the result of long drawn feminist struggle and collaborations, ultimately culminating in the demise of the SPM. The impeachment of President Rousseff as this study will argue in subsequent sections and chapters was the result partially of sexist considerations. Chinchilla (1993) opines that Brazilian feminism's focal point is the State as the unusually large number of the feminist joined the government in policymaking positions and became more dependent on the State by the power it has to distribute and redistribute through policies many of the benefits through policies that advance their rights.

Consequently, the State, due to its regulatory role and its ability to shape public opinion plays an important role vis-à-vis the feminist's movement. Not only is the State at centre towards which feminists extend their demands for rights due to its power to allocate, also it is the site of convergence of opinions and collaborations between feminists themselves and between feminists and government officials.

(i)   First, the State is perceived as an ally when it advances the issues a section of feminists support while viewed as a source of contestation when certain sections of the women's movement disapprove of feminist collaborating with the State for narrow 'politics specific'

issues. By not addressing the long-term cultural need to inculcate consciousness, the State's locus as a patriarchal and hierarchical site continues.

(ii) Second, certain feminists point to the implicit power relations that mark hierarchies when certain sections of feminists speak up as representative of the movement, gain funds and access to more policy-making functions themselves.

(iii) Third, the marginalised sections of women articulate the need for more comprehensive policies which take into consideration the intersectional nature of their situation.

(iv) Fourth, the persistence of patriarchal values and opposition from the more conservative section makes the government either regress from previous policies or substitute those policies with a more conservative ones that jeopardise present gains, highlighting how the support of the State is not constant and the need is to generate favourable public opinion, sensitisation across the region and depend on greater transnational linkages to gain leverage.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT

While many scholars attribute the rise of women's movement in Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s to the oppressive conditions within the prevailing military regime and the dependent capitalist state (Alvarez 1991, Sternbach et al 1992, Pitanguy 2002 Machado 2016), other scholars (Sardenberg and Costa 2014, Pinto 2003) point to the pivotal role played by the United Nations (UN) played in revitalising the women's movement and its subsequent impact on the genesis of the *Encuentros.* The 1975 Women's World Conference convened at Mexico City and the designation of 1975 as the International Year of Women impacted the feminist movement in Brazil. The military dictatorship of 1964 to 1985 was premised on traditional roles of women and restoration of piety, and many women who supported Right-wing politics or were in close association with the Church accepted the traditional socialisation that restricted their movement in the public sphere, yet hyper-inflation and government crackdown on the women protestors of the Left mobilised them to take to the streets. This local struggle got encouragement from the UN's legitimisation of women's role in the public sphere and through UN initiative of organising

various conferences. These culminated in the creation of the *Centro de Desenvolvimento da Mulher Brasileira* or Centre for the Development of Brazilian Woman and gave impetus to many feminist societies in universities that marked the beginning of Academic Feminism (Sardenber and Costa 2014).

There are divided views on the impact of the conferences sponsored by the UN. Alvarez et al. (2003) opine that UN conferences had a temperate impact on the feminist movements in Latin America with the exception of Brazil and Mexico. Pitanguy (2002) underscores, the UN-sponsored seminars and events across Brazil between 1975 and 1978 which engendered the growth of feminist organisations that discussed the issues of discrimination, status of women in society and their experiences in different organisations, and finally induced the formation of the first explicitly feminist group, Brazilian Women's Centre in Rio de Janeiro in 1975. This ensured connections between the local struggles and the national and regional discourses, granting greater legitimacy to them in the public sphere. Additionally, as Alvarez (1998) illustrates, in response to increased activity of UN in the region, many of the older generations of the feminist, who were the pre-eminent exponents of the Second Wave of the movement joined the UN and its associated agencies after adjudging it to be a platform via which the feminist agenda could be expanded. Their presence provided legitimacy in the eyes of a section of feminists while they actively sought to promote the agenda of the region.

Coupled with the growing changes in the political context where authoritarian regimes were giving way to democracies due to the widespread opposition to repression, the support extended by Liberation Theology wing of the Church to the working class activists and social movements that opposed the excesses of the dictatorships, the problems associated with Neoliberal policies especially hyperinflation had a transnational character and the UN involvement added to that character. Yet, in response to common problems that women face, cutting across borders, Marino (2012) calls attention to the older process of regional meetings, a process that women resorted to through the *Encuentro* in Bogota in 1981 and occurring since. The relation between the *Encuentro* and the UN is complex: they mutually reinforce the politicisation of gender issues throughout the region and the *Encuentro* offer a more frequent, informal and participative process which is legitimised and supported by the UN processes that involve exchanges of a more formal content and UN objectives are disseminated and discussed in national and local

Encuentro. Yet, there is an aspect of alienation as UN favours the more Professional transnational networks that only a few feminist NGOs can participate in while many feminists and activists of the larger women's movement present the formalisation and creation of hierarchies that come into the equation.

Sardenberg (2015) identifies the 1990s as the decade when Brazilian feminism began to have a global presence as its diversity and size enabled it to grow transnationally and consolidate its networks back home. This started with preparations for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development or the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and the role played by Brazilian feminists brought about the recognition of women's rights as human rights in the presence of thousands of NGOs at the World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna. Subsequently, Brazilain Feminists co-coordinated with numerous feminist of other countries to build a common global perception about the reproductive and sexual rights of women, with the support of the Ministry of External Relations in assuming a more progressive stand.

A perceptible change that the women's movement experienced in Brazil was during the run-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) to be organised by the UN in 1995 in Beijing. The deliberations on participation were discussed at the Costa del Sol *Encuentro* in 1993, with many feminists opposing this due to the lack of transparency about the selection of the Forum Coordinator for the region as well as the funding by United States Agency for International Development. At this juncture, as Alvarez et al. (2003) note, most of the feminists did not have any experience of UN international conferences as NGO participants or representative of their region or country. While a minority resisted participation, the majority of feminists directed their energies at local, national and regional level preparation for Beijing, directed by the guidelines of the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the creation of national Beijing Initiative Groups which coordinated efforts through subregional meetings that culminated in the region-wide meeting at Mar del Plata in Argentina, also in association with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

The preparatory aspect which benefitted certain groups within the movement politically and financially, thus, incentivising the formation of Professional and transnational NGOs to specialise in women's advocacy issues, direct research and funds for a more policy-making approach, capable of exerting pressure on the national governments to implement policies and to

generate more independent overviews about the status of women, a proclivity Alvarez (1998, 2003) terms as 'NGOisation' across the region. The positives that this preparatory process engendered were the outlook adopted by the feminists as to how this was both 'a text and pretext' for the feminist movement in the region. The mobilisation would actually influence the 'texts', government reports and the documents of UN in consonance with their demands and perspectives, imbibing a language and approach that is more gender just, having a greater say in the creation of policies and monitoring, as well as the FWCW, would be the pretext to rejuvenate the feminist movement and foster greater debates about gender rights. This dialectical relation between aims served by the text and pretext angles for the UN conference carried forward to the FWCW at Beijing where there was a divergence witnessed between the more informal, representative and diverse NGO Forum and the Professionalised, 'thematically specialised and transnational feminist NGOs. The latter were lobbying to influence the drafting of the Offical Platform of Action by the Offical delegation who functioned on the basis of hierarchies and in less democratic space. This exacerbated the power imbalances that were widening during the preparatory process when certain groups were given easier access to political, financial and cultural capital which made them assume spokespersonship of the entire movement while others who were denied access became disillusioned and thus weakened the solidarity.

Thus, UN international conferences strengthen what has been described in the first chapter as the institutional policy advocacy logic (Alvarez et al. 2003), where well endowed NGOs became more powerful and more focused on influencing the text at the cost of the pretext of revitalising the movement. The UN bolstered the formal section of the feminist movement and widened the scope of their operation in the civil society and also as elucidated before, had a boomerang pattern of influence in enforcing accountability of implementation on the government. Furthermore, feminist NGOs were at the helm of the successive UN Conferences held to evaluate the outcome five and ten years later.

As mentioned in the previous chapter the continuous dialogue between the *Itamaraty*, the governmental committee formed by representatives of CNDM and the National Council of Women, academic feminists and NGOs for the preparation of a report to the UN brought greater proximity and consonance in the views of these actors which shaped the response of the feminist movement, leading to greater convergence within the movement at this point of time, a

characteristic of 'participative State Feminism' (Sardenberg 2015). Thus the increased scope of feminist activities in the form of monitoring and consulting with government agencies regarding UN commitments was an inadvertent outcome of UN's activities in the region, allowing more representative participation, making available state resources for feminist demands that spread to a wider population and also creating municipal, regional and national level deliberation spaces for feminists.

With the backlash that the trend of NGOisation received (Alvarez 2009), the economic crisis of Neoliberal policies and the increased involvement of the Brazilian State in social sectors saw a new period of feminist groups and State engagement in what has been called State Feminism. The State again expanded which enabled many more sites of co-operation and contestations with the feminist movement and the UN. In this regard, SEDIM was created in consonance with Beijing 1995 Conference after sustained transnational pressure from the feminist networks and it began preparing Brazil's report to the CEDAW Committee which had been delayed for over a decade with the help of many NGOs, that is monitoring the implementation of the Facultative Protocol of UN which Brazil signed in 2001 and ratified in 2002[4].

Yet, as Sardenberg (2015) observes, following the Beijing Platform for Action, the participation of Brazilian feminists in the official follow-ups after five and ten years were considerably less, largely due to the global conservative tilt that affected not only the defence of hitherto gained rights but also inability to proceed with more due to opposition. Yet, amongst them, Brazil remains in contemporary times, a representative of more radical positions, arguing for reproductive rights championed by the presence of SPM Ministers, seeking prominence in the Committee for the Status of Women. Leading the 60th session in 2016, having the ability to garner support of other Latin American and Caribbean feminist networks to form Some Latin Ameican and Caribbean Countries or 'SLAC' bloc presented a more radical line than that by the conservative sections as well as shedding light on the intersectional aspects of women's interests, that is, to consider race and ethnicity as social markers that affect the status of women.

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[4] Brazil signed the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) in 1984. CEDAW's Article 18 requires all signatory states submit a periodical report every 4 years which Brazil had not submitted until 2002.

Thus, the current evaluation of the linkage between Brazilian Feminist Movement and the UN shows that the former has taken the role of being a steady and radical source of articulation of women's rights which has earned global recognition and given them leverage to expand their influence beyond borders in UN-sponsored international conferences. This acknowledgement has enabled the feminists to not only become more Professionalised, adept in the ways of manoeuvring governmental and non-governmental functions to emphasise their agendas, educate people across the nation and provides a platform for the exchange of ideas and generation of new ways of living that could empower them.

THE ROLE OF *ENCUENTROS* IN SHAPING THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT

*Encuentro*s are the veritable sites where the convergences and contestations between the feminists have been witnessed since the inception of these meetings in 1981 in Bogota. Latin American and Caribbean feminist *Encuentro*s are region-wide meetings of women that confer the regionally distinct understanding and the existence of a Latin American Feminism. Sternbach et al. (1992), in their influential documentation and analysis of the evolution of the *Encuentro*s, explain their beginnings as sites of exploring being feminist in a region in the backdrop of the legacy of the Left. The influence of the Left on the feminists led to serious contestations that persisted until the last decade about being an autonomous feminist or being a participant in other organisations that strive for other forms of social justice (Sternbach et al. 1992, Alvarez 2000, Alvarez et al. 2003), yet one of the catalysts was the conflict with the patriarchy within the Left that women sought to problematise.

A brief historical trajectory of the first few *Encuentro*s will draw out the experiences of the feminists in transnational movement building that grew to continental proportions and is associated as a bloc in international organisations. This is the period when the 'identity-solidarity logic' (Alvarez 2000, 2003) was predominant in transnational linkages between the feminists as elaborated in the first chapter. Brazilian feminists have been participants of regional initiatives since early twentieth century (Marino 2012) and have been described as the 'largest, most radical, most diverse and politically influential of Latin America's feminist movement.'

(Sternbach et al. 1992). The debates that took place, often acrimonious are replicated at national and sub-national level *Encuentro*s which is why an overview is to be studied to understand the contestations and convergence occurring as discourse and practice.

<u>History of the Early *Encuentros*</u>

This section will look at the organisation and dynamics of the first five *Encuentros* in detail so as to give a foundational understanding of the region-wide contestations. This period marks the time when the *Encuentro* informal logic was predominant and the UN-Professional logic had not yet emerged.

(i) The **First *Encuentro*** was organised at Bogota in 1981 which brought together feminists at the continental scale for the first time to "engage in the feminist practice" and also to "exchange experiences and opinions", the objectives being to identify problems and examine the viability of various practices while determining the future course of action (Navarro 1998). While it was primarily a congregation of white, middle class and educated feminists, activists belonging to the popular women's movement (*Movimientos de Mujeres*) were few. The themes that were to be discussed at the *Encuentro* would continue to persist as sources of dissension within the movement for many decades; the themes being that of autonomy from ideological and organisational influence, especially of the Left; concomitantly participating in the feminist struggle and in another political party; and the relation between feminism and imperialism. As elucidated in the first chapter, the divisions between women across nations, race and class were centred on the need for autonomy as women's interests must be advanced independently of political associations that tend to sideline them (*Autonomas*) versus the position that spoke for feminism being organically part of political parties and their structures (*Militantes*). Despite some heated debate, this experience forged solidarity and revealed mobilisations amongst Latin American women on a large scale.

(ii) The **second *Encuentro*** at Lima in July 1983 revolved around the topic of 'patriarchy' and the participants were asked to identify themselves individually rather than as representatives of any organisation. With a clear favouring of the autonomous and an exclusive feminist position by the coordinators, this meeting saw the delineation of the distinction between a feminist and those who work for and with women, another aspect that would lead to future dissensions. While

many of the older feminists spoke for the need to create and preserve feminist spaces that would centre on sharing of experience and not theories and avoid having feminist standards (*feministometro*) to judge who can be labelled as a feminist, which translates to the problem of inclusivity discussed in the first chapter. This meeting explored patriarchy theoretically, how it operates in the material, ideological, cultural, linguistic, institutional aspects and simplified the understanding of gender power relations and the interlinkages with other forms of oppression in the region. Yet, there were many opinions that this *Encuentro* was too theoretical and since it was foreign to many from the popular women's movement, it was elitist and alienating. Thus, simultaneously, workshops aimed at problematising the understanding of women's questions, the presence of lesbians and indigenous along with Black women managed to create their autonomous space within the larger meeting while ruing the lack of space given to them. The continued disagreement between the *feministas* and the *militantes* related to conflicting notions about the interests of women did not ebb. Yet, this meeting also established the pattern where those who attended this and subsequent *Encuentro*s became strongly associated with the movement in their countries.

(iii) In the Brazilian city of Bertioga hosted the **Third *Encuentro*** in 1985 where the participants themselves were astonished at the large participation and diversity and the site of the meetings was open and informal which precipitated sharing and openness. Second, this *Encuentro* sought to extend participation to those who could not afford by raising funds and scholarships. Third, older debates were taken forward in the context of Brazil's transition from military authoritarianism to democracy. Finally, groups were formed on the basis of many identities like class, country, sexual preference, race which politicised issues of common interests in conjunction with their gender.

(iv) The **Fourth *Encuentro*** convened in Taxco in 1987, Mexico brought to the fore the Central American Feminists, largely from the popular women's movement and a staggering number of participants which Sternbach et al. opine was due to the 'geometric expansion of feminist activism throughout the region' and it assumed the stature of a mass movement. Women from diverse backgrounds engaged in political, social and cultural activities were delegates and this *Encuentro* was followed by *Encuentro*s of lesbians, showing how these were replicated at the national levels and also by groups. The participants were those who worked not only with

gender-related issues but also with gender-specific issues, adding a more pragmatic and constructive dialogue to the greater narrative here. The presence of grassroots activists who had been till then reluctant to join due to their alliance with the Catholic Church and the Left indicated that feminist ideas were permeating through to the more popular sections and towards the politicisation of these issues. Yet, there was the added danger of co-option and subversion by political parties who sought to capitalise on the women's questions and use women as a bloc for their own gains as well as by those anti-feminist partisan groups whose members sought to participate to counter the narratives of feminists.

(v) The **Fifth *Encuentro*** at San Bernado in 1990 was introspective in taking stock of almost a decade of such meetings while being celebratory. The multitude of themes and workshops encompassed intersectional issues, linked with other movements of social justice and global movements. Moreover, Black Women and the Indigenous Women held their own *Encuentro*s and the former formed the Latin American and Caribbean Black Women's Network. The contentious issue of abortion was discussed and the demands for legal recognition of reproductive rights was made. Two other trends noted was the presence of legislators from various countries that underscore the significance that the *Encuentro*s had gained and established transnational networks met and from here on utilised the meeting spaces which consolidated their connections.

A visible change that Alvarez et al. discerned was the domination of the policy advocacy logic over the identity solidarity logic from San Bernardo with many of the participants being legal experts, part of electoral politics and also agents of their States. This led to heightened dissent among the feminists in the next few *Encuentro*s at Costa del Sol in El Salvador 1993, Cartagena in Chile in 1996 and Juan Dolio in the Dominican Republic in 1999. The tendency to privilege leaders and representatives from transnational networks who had Professionalised under the aegis of the United Nations and creation of discourses that favoured the policy advocacy logic led to tensions.

Evaluation of *Encuentros*

*Encuentro*s have had more space opened to diverse sections of the feminist movement and with a greater number of national-level *Encuentro*s and meetings based on class, race, sexual preference

and ethnicity, regional *Encuentro*s have become the large-scale meeting place held every two or three years, with the common understanding that the need to incorporate more and sustain the dialogue is needed (JASS 2009). The proliferation of UN activities that are also transnational in scope even though they provide reinforcement yet diminish the importance. Yet Alvarez et al. (2003) opine that the informality that the *Encuentro*s nurture provide a most amenable environment for the discussion of multifarious and controversial topics.

The *Encuentro*s have many stated aims and few that have evolved over the years with experience. The coming together of women from different political contexts necessitated the *Encuentro*s to be political spaces where women shared experiences and opinions that shaped and reshaped their identities and interests, affecting the prevalent discourses and practices. This was done informally among hundreds of feminist that engendered a distinctive feminist identity. These extra-official sites of interactions have been critical mechanisms to foster solidarity, deliberate on forms of political practices and disseminate discourses to challenge the entrenched values of *Machismo*. The exchanges between the delegates also lead to the creation of new cultural meanings that challenged prevailing notions, creating an 'imagined Latin American Feminist community'(Alvarez et al.). These meetings help in identification of issues and by politicisation draw the attention of the government to address them, the expostulation of issues and demands of feminists from one country may inspire others to demand the same and question their subject positions.

The intermingling of feminists and activists from the popular women's movement have an ideational aspect here interactions make them more adept at recognising their status, learning various intricacies of the theories, adapting to changing political contexts to negotiate governmental and non-governmental lobbying and operations and form coalitions.

While the movement is heterogeneous, Sternbach et al. and Alvarez (1998) contemplate that the *Encuentro*s serve as bases for the evolution of a 'common Latin American feminist political language' and despite the contestations regarding what it means to identify as a feminist, what are the goals that the feminists must aspire to and the methods of achieving these and who should be the spokesperson of the movement. These areas also mediate differences and conflicts between feminists of a state or a country or foreshadow problems that may arise in the path of the movement in one country based on the experience in another. The rotation of the venues of

Encuentro are coordinated are meant for local problems to gain attention and for local feminist to gain exposure. *Encuentro*s also are a source of innovation as new modes of communication through art, theatre, musicals which often eliminate the differentials between the capacities of 'verbal and analytical modes' that are privileged over other options of expression.

Brazilian Feminists and *Encuentro*s

Brazilian Feminist Movement has been deeply influenced by the transnational *Encuentro* process as the transnational linkages with feminist from other states mutually reinforce the strength in pushing the feminist agendas. The *Encuentro*s were the sites where diversity is acknowledged and Brazil has the largest Black population in the Southern Cone and a radical Afro-Brazilian Feminist movement, this space was utilised by the latter to explore their potential, articulate their problems. Furthermore, the experience of the Bertiago *Encuentro* which was held in Brazil was not without certain controversies. The debate on inclusion and identity of feminists played out in the case of the working class women of *favelas* who wanted to attend. Their denial of entry due to inability to furnish the requisite admission fee highlights the exclusivity that is fostered and the suspicion of many feminists that the entry of working-class women who do not identify as feminists would jeopardise the space they created to safeguard feminist discourses.

While *Encuentro*s have been less selective and more welcoming in admitting participants, this experience had repercussions in the national *Encuentro*s. The regional agendas are widely deliberated upon in national and sub-national level meetings of women who then rely on their networks to ensure the lobbying for, monitoring and implementation of policies. The *Encuentro*s also allow for the government to participate in gauging the interests of the women which Brazil has taken seriously. Finally, Sardenberg (2015) notes that Brazil has gained global acceptance as one of the pre-eminent articulators of a progressive feminist stand not only due to its proactivity in the UN agencies but also due to its diverse and radical feminist networks that are strengthened through these periodic meetings allowing for a common voice to be formed.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND BRAZILIAN FEMINIST MOVEMENT

The genesis of Latin American Feminisms in the second half of the twentieth century was facilitated by the participation of women in the General Opposition to the military rule where they advocated the rights of women and challenged patriarchy as the military rule was the "purest and highest expression of patriarchal oppression"(Alvarez 1991). Along with these, other agenda were denouncing the exploitation of the working class, the political opponents and military excesses, what is termed as the 'cultural-specific struggle' and 'general- political struggle' which underscore a degree of hierarchy and compartmentalisation of interests among the participants (Sardenberg and Costa 2014, Alvarez 1998, Sternbach et al. 1992, Castro Hallewell 2001, Haas 2010) . In most of the dictatorships, the authoritarian regime was implicitly supported by the Right-wing and centre-right parties that endorsed the traditional view of women founded on piety, confined to the private sphere and eulogised the role of the mother. Many conservative women mobilised for the restoration of dignity in politics in support of the military and sought to distinguish themselves from the Leftists and feminists (Skidmore 1999, Sternbach et al. 1992).

There has been an uneasy relationship between the Left organisations whose impact on feminist ideologies and organising practices have been documented in previous sections. Their emergence and intertwined political activism facilitated an alliance- the women's movement of which the feminist movement was geared against the Neoliberal policies that brought economic hardship. Women due to traditional roles were seen as the articulators of the private sphere and repression of radical women. This radicalised their position to demand a revolutionary transformation where gender justice would be promoted, democratisation would be practised at the level of daily life and would help in gaining a voice in public decision making. Similarly, the Left promoted popular participation, revolutionary democracy and to the guaranteed representation to the marginalised like the women (Haas 2010). Simultaneously, a section of the Left perceived feminism to be a bourgeois ideology that detracted from the common goal of transformation of class relations and overhauled the means of prosecution. This gave rise to the contradictions and theorised that with the end of class domination, unequal gender relations would become obsolete. This view prevailed in the discourse and practice of many Leftist organisations, compelling the feminist to leave them due to the relegation of gender issues to the margins through sidelining

the women's organisation in departments that were reduced to mere wings and not the mainstream and the pervasive sexism that characterised them.

Furthermore, the Left categorised women activist as good feminists based on their prioritisation of the general struggle against class oppression and the bad feminists were conceptualised as bourgeois and imperial, as they advanced gender interests without focussing on the other forms of oppression. This incentivised the formation of the powerful Autonomous feminist movement across the region and in Brazil, yet the relation between the feminists and the leftists were more comfortable due to the feminists initially favouring the general-political struggle because of the predominance of the *militantes* (feminists within the leftist organisations) (Saffioti 1978, Cavilha and Becker 2011). The uneasy alliance persisted due to their presence in the common opposition and their fear of losing contact and influence over the more popular section of women activists who were part of the Left and the Catholic Church that virulently opposed them. The initial period of feminist activism was to instil consciousness about the subjectivity of women, to try to alter the patriarchal structures and to try to address the grievances of poor and marginalised women by working in close proximity. With democratisation, in most countries, feminist utilised the enhanced public space, joined the progressive political parties that would forward their interests.

Fiona Macaulay (2006) presents an in-depth examination into the aspects of gender relations within a party and the attitude of the party towards the agency of women. Premised on factors like the proportion of women among the founders of the party, the involvement of the voters of the parties in civil society organisations creates what she calls a 'gendered political habitus'. This creates a structure within an enabling environment to act and think in certain ways, where new entrants are socialised in those ways, the identification of entrants to the party is influenced by their own life experiences that must have had a gendered aspect. Thus, while many women shared the class and racial identity markers that made them coalesce into larger opposition groups against dictatorships, this could not be sustained for long within the progressive socialist communist parties due to their experience being gendered. It was, as Macaulay notes, a result of 'andro-centric political culture' that sought to privilege trade unionism over political actions.

The Relation of Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and the Brazilian Feminist Movement

This section would delve into the relation of the Brazilian Worker's Party/Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) with the Brazilian Feminist Movement to highlight the articulation and aggregation of feminist interest and pattern of participation as feminists largely joined PT and were nominated as candidates more than in other prominent parties. As Macaulay (2006) opines, the unconventional origins and early influences culminated in the formation of the PT as a Left party. PT can be distinguished from the communist party, growing from the grassroots and relatively newer in comparison to the pre-dictatorship parties made it more sympathetic towards the agency of women with regards to their participation in politics and the subsequent experience of the sexual division of labour.

Both PT and the feminist Movement emerged in the context of opposition to the military dictatorship, as part of the New Left (Sternbach et al. 1992, Haas 2010) and had similarities in objectives of radical democracy and representation to the marginalised. PT arose in the late 1970s by being an umbrella of many diverse opposition groups like the landless labourers, radical trade unionists, *favela* community activists, having the support of the Liberation Theology wing of the Catholic Church. Organisationally it was more accountable to its members. By 1989 elections, candidates who contended for power despite PT being a relatively new party, became a major political player in Brazil as its candidates Luis Inacio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff became Presidents between 2003 to 2015. The Women's Movement had eschewed popular politics during the authoritarian regime and visualised the State and its associated political parties as sites of patriarchal oppression. Even though after re-democratisation, they were suspicious of the traditional political parties yet recognised the potential of advancing their interest in the role of policymakers. For this purpose, many women joined the PT as well as the PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement) as well as the PSDB (Social Democrats). Under the Sarney and Collor governments, the power of the CNDM was reduced, many women were disillusioned. Most women agreed with the representative character of the PT and its tendency to challenge the polyarchical nature of Brazilian politics. PT facilitated co-operation by extending a progressive feminist agenda and nominating more women candidates than other parties.

The PT and a section of the women's movement that participated in electoral policies bolstered each other's cause, which Haas traces, the Left explicitly supported PT with whom they felt an affinity. **First**, they were impressed with their support for other movements for social justice; their presence in the neighbourhoods of marginalised communities that would give feminists access to work there and in the 1982 elections more than 40 per cent of their membership was female. Their electoral manifesto contained provisions relating to government-funded creches, easier availability of contraception and laws that would govern relations at the workplace, society and within the family to promote more gender-equal relations. **Second**, the Party did not have women's department or wings like previous leftist organisations because that does not politicise their issues and makes them mainstream and ultimately is subjected to the deliberations only by the female members. Instead, PT formed the women's division which would have oversight function over the Party platforms, the associated function of advising and educating members and aligning the women's movement with other social movements under the umbrella of PT. This benefitted PT as women were an active and mobilised political bloc with experience in public agitations and their ability to reach out to different women's struggles and identification of their interests. For women, participation in formal institutionalised politics availed them the opportunity to get empowered through policymaking roles, creating greater space for women and also to take advantage of the State's mechanisms to regulate public opinion and political communications. Their larger presence in an unconventional new party allowed them to gain greater space for manoeuvre and the discourse within the party did not just reduce them to political agents, rather utilised their agency in more traditional and moral terms that attracted many popular grassroots feminists.

In reality, there are divergences between the promising platform that PT promotes and the implementation of these. PT was the first party to introduce a quota of 30 per cent to elected women to positions of leadership but interestingly this was supported by the more anti-feminist sections and opposed by the party feminists. This would restrict the membership of being top leaders to only 30 per cent. This was due to the fact that the party had failed to elect and promote women to the top due to structural imbalances, a reflection that the discourse within PT was also sexist. The relation between activists within the party and the party organisation can be understood through the contrast to other parties. Unlike other parties that utilised women as vote banks through certain separate departments, PT was loosely organised with strong links to other

movements and women with experience in other movements and organisations formed committees and caucuses. The feminists within the party sought to institutionalise the gender aspect through a Secretariat in 1988. The secretariats were established at the state and the national level but have in recent times have become less effective. Second, PT discussed and implemented an internal quota for women in decision making roles in 1991, one of the first parties across the region to do so as well as compared to other parties, has had a consistent record of promoting more women on the ballot and those who have nearly no political connections or capital. Moreover, PT which has a preeminent role in trade union activities along with the Central Trade Union/ *Central Unica dos Trabalhadores* (CUT) has not addressed the violation of workplace anti-discrimination laws like easy dismissal, forced sterilisation tests and unsafe working conditions.

Furthermore, the position of feminists within PT was complicated by the presence of contending parties that are opposed to women's rights explicitly or implicitly. This pervades the leadership's attitude, including that of President Lula who was described by female deputies as patronising or contemptuous and had to be educated before public functions to (a) not be inappropriate about issues concerning gender; (b) to the disapproval of the male leaders towards the growth of women leaders and (c) to prevent discrimination in the functioning of the party where the women's division has been relegated and their deliberations have been marginalised similar to the women's departments in other parties and (d) the lack of facilities for female activists to participate in meetings like flexible meeting timings and creches.

The feminists have the greatest contention with the presence of members of Community Ecclesiastical Bases who are associated with the Liberation Theology branch of the Catholic Church. They have been active in promoting various social causes but they oppose the feminist demands relating to reproductive rights and the efforts to redefine the traditional gender roles. This prompts the Church to organise the activists working at the community level and from the popular women's movement in opposition to the feminists, thus creating an enduring contestation between the women activists in the same party. Furthermore, in conflicts that arise between the divergent positions, the PT has a tendency to support the Church over the feminists as was seen in the withdrawal of the electoral promise of the legalisation of abortion from the 1994 electoral platform. This was also seen in the case of the 2010 election of Dilma Rousseff

who was forced to recant on her support to reproductive and sexual rights of the women and also withdrew under pressure the use of gender in national education policy as illustrated in the previous section. The electoral and political dependence of PT on the Catholic Church has increased in recent times due to the conservative turn the politics of the nation and the region has taken, which has further endangered the position of feminists within the Party. Vilma Reis (2007) provides a more nuanced and intersectional view of racism that adds to Afro-Brazilian Women being neglected even when the rhetoric is progressive and provides remedies through public policies that are focused on health, education, employment and imageries as well as to address the internal institutionalised racism that pervades the party. This makes implementation of policies undertaken thus far nearly impossible.

Finally, with relation to the Leftists within PT, a constant source of disagreement remains the deferment of women's issues to the 'larger goal' of socialism. Thi mirrors the subordination of women in patriarchal structures and disillusions many. This prompted the feminists to largely follow an autonomous path but participate in close proximity to the government and intergovernmental organisations. Thus, political parties have acted as a platform for women to exercise their role as citizens and consolidate their position in the public sphere but there persist obstacles in the fulfilment of their true potential as citizens. The alliance between political parties and feminists is mutually beneficial but the efforts of feminists within parties are directed at re-orienting the structures to their benefit and to aggregate more feminist demands.

THE CHURCHES' APPROACH TOWARDS BRAZILIAN FEMINIST MOVEMENT

The Roman Catholic Church has played a decisive role in the formulation of private and public domains in the history of Latin America, with a strong Ibero-Catholic base aiding the consolidation of colonial rule. It specifically impacted through supplementing the traditional *Machismo* and *Marianismo* perspectives and grounding the relations between men and women (Mainwaring 1986). The definition of spheres and legitimising of oppression continues to be an issue of contestation that determines, largely conflictual relations between the feminist movement and the Catholic and Pentecostal Churches. Yet, the influence that Catholic Church

wields generates contestations between feminists, many of the grassroots activists disagree with feminists on various issues, especially abortion and reproductive rights that fragments many of the struggles and torments greater conflicts (Alvarez 1991, Haas 2010). This section seeks to explore this dimension.

Brazil is the world's largest Catholic country with over 126 million devotees, yet the share of those who identify as Catholics are declining due to the rapid proliferation and mass appeal of the Evangelicals, manifested more prominently in the form of the Pentecostals (IBGE 2010). While the share of Catholics fell from 92 per cent in the 1970s to approximately around 65 per cent in 2010, the share of Protestants increased from 5 per cent to 22 per cent in the same period. This growth is largely due to religious switching, that is people leave the sect they are born in and convert to Pentecostalism. A Pew Research Study (2013) found that the popularity of Pentecostalism was more among the younger generations who found the teachings of the Catholic Church outdated, indicating a generational aspect. Pentecostalism spread widely in the urban areas, while Catholics tended to be older and rural. Complementing this, Drogus (1994) opined that women are more prone to religious behaviour and attend Church frequently. Catholic women are more religiously educated than their Protestant counterparts. Other findings indicate that non-White women attend Church more regularly, a negative correlation was found between income and Church Service and interestingly, better-educated women exhibited more religiosity.

Adding to their greater degree of religiosity, Levine (2014) and Drogus (1994) believe, Churches offer opportunities to participate as groups to women who often hail from the working class and reciprocally, given the number of Churchgoers are largely women, they are better situated to play act an active, mediating role in Latin American Churches. Consequently, Gender plays an active role in the discussion but the discourse is regulated. Levine (2014) underscored the feeling of 'sisterhood' that emerges due to an empathetic understanding of marginalisation in political and cultural spheres, the latter being demarcated as women's area by the prevalent ideology of *Marianismo*. These groups innovate on lesser hierarchies and thus give women the space to venture in public in a restricted manner but fulfil needs that are not redressed elsewhere. In Pentecostal domicile councils and Catholic Ecclesiastical Base Communities throughout Brazil, these organisations allow women to share insights and experiences, possibly reformulate their

roles within the family and the wider political sphere and also alter their self-image that has wider repercussions.

Drogus (1994) argues that Traditional Catholicism in the region was challenged by the Liberation Theology branch and the rapid expansion of Pentecostalism in contemporary times. With different interpretations of cultural norms, they allow women to reconceptualise gender roles in a restricted manner but feminists argue that these are not enough to overcome their subordination. The reliance of both the sects on groups which are largely constituted by women required them to address the concerns of women, largely what Molyneux (1985) terms 'practical gender interests' like cost of living, family income, creches, working conditions, family problems, violence, these groups act as sites of socialisation. However, socialisation is not to be construed in radical terms as the Churches are guided by the prevailing patriarchal logic which views, in consonance with *Marianismo*, women as the socialisers of religiosity as they are purer and 'more moral', and these groups seek to enforce the gender roles that are drawn from tradition with few changes.

Alvarez(1990) traces the growth of *Comunidades Eclesiales de Base* or (Catholic Base Communities or CEBs) and their changing understanding of women's rights from the 1960s. While the Church was a firm supporter of conservative forces and backed the military coup in 1964, the discussions of the Vatican Council (1962-65) prompted a drastic reorientation of the Church's conception and role in the region that led to a prioritisation of the poor, a defence of human rights and protest against military abuse. This was reflected in subsequent region-wide conferences of the bishops that ultimately became the cause for the inception of the Liberation Theology Branch. Before 1969 the Puebla Conference of Bishop, this period saw the tacit approval of even birth control to highlight the degree of radicalisation.

Despite the conservative turn since the 1970s, the Liberation Theologians who were influenced both by Marxism and Feminism continued to be radical. This confluence of influence led to CEBs seeing women's problems in economic terms driving from their role as mothers. This as Alvarez argued, 'doesn't question a socially constructive, exclusive identification of women with maternity and family.' Brazilian Church compared to other Church was vocal in criticising discrimination against political and economic exclusion but is conservative on questions of family and reproduction.

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This was seen in the virulent opposition of the Catholic Bishop's Confederation and Evangelical Branch who used allied legislators to block the proposals for reproductive rights and mounting an overwhelming protest for 'pro-life, pro-family' against what they called the 'lipstick lobby' of CNDM during the drafting of the Constitution of 1988 in the Constituent Assembly during 1987.

In a comparative study of Pentecostalism and CEBS in their relation to women, Drogus (1994) highlights similarities in utilising women in networks, legitimising the participation of women in era domestic activities and act as a site of social mobility within the Church as leaders and pastors yet restrict their ascent to higher positions.

While both encourage women's clubs, Pentecostals nominally offer greater opportunities to women in traditional roles and foster equality within the domain of family, there is an assertion of equality with the husband by entrenching a primary role in the domestic sphere and controlling the family income and the Church plays a mediating role in family disputes and in many cases, the Church takes the women's side and integrates men deeper into the family. Yet, Pentecostalism with its overemphasis on traditional roles does not politically socialise women but explores more traditional women-centric occupations like faith healing. In contrast, CEBs with their strong community association linkages and operational proximity with Leftists groups allow women to engender politically the role that allows for women to reconceptualise their gender role or to at least question it a lot more than their Pentecostal counterparts. This translates to their demands for greater decision making roles but the Church also plays a regulatory role in redirecting them towards the more traditional aspects that align with the image of a mother. Thus, as Mariz (1989) comments, Pentecostalism brings men into the private sphere and CEBs politicise women and bring them into the public sphere.

Notably, the Church plays a decisive role in fomenting contestations but the portrayal of feminists as anti-family and anti-life generates a discourse that shows feminism being centred only reproductive rights. This entails the alienation of the grassroots working-class feminists who identify and sanctify their role as mothers (Tarlau 2006). Furthermore, the joint action of the Evangelical Branch in recent times to sponsor regressive legislation that undoes many of the progressive legislation of previous periods related to women highlight the recent conservative backlash that has created a bigger danger for the wider feminist movement that even those who opposed the feminists, or the grassroots women active in CEBs have been facing.

The next chapter will give an overview of popular representation of women, translating the theoretical aspects of women's subjectivity and agency into concrete practices of representation of various interests and examine the dynamics within the movement and its relation to two primary actors the State and the United Nations. The chapter will focus on various sites which women have utilised to project their demands and combined they seek to expand their presence in the public sphere yet face obstacles that undermine the full realisation of their agency.

CHAPTER FOUR

POPULAR REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN BRAZIL

External actors have clearly impacted the contours and internal dynamics of the feminist movement in Brazil and have played a historical role in their formation and subsequent transformation. The operational aspects of the feminists and the women's movement at various sites, both formal and informal to advance their interests need to be studied at length. The previous chapter delved into the role of the Brazilian State, reified in the form of the successive governments that have interacted with the feminist movement through extending organisational aid, providing training and platforms for deliberation, mediation and finally through the creation of public policies. These policies have catered to the interests of some of the groups while hindered certain interests. Then the role of the International Organisations in providing logistical and discursive materials on which gender norms are redefined and acting as transnational sites by providing their good offices for greater engagement with global counterparts was scrutinised. In the context of Brazil, Macaulay (2006), tellingly opines that gender legislation in Brazil was advanced, to a large extent, not by a ministry of the government but by a political party, in this context the Partido Dos Trabalhadores (PT). She highlights certain unique characteristics of Brazil's feminist movement with regards to securing representation and the special interlinkage between PT and the feminist movement. One of the main dimensions of the current chapter is examining the developments in the aftermath of President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment by delving into the problems encountered by women representatives in public, their depiction by the media and the condition of the gender discourse this aspect of representation uncovers.

This chapter would commence with a theoretical overview of representation and the feminist engagement with the concept, the next section will highlight the formal and non-formal sites of representation available to the feminists with an elaborate examination of the evolution and efficacy of quotas in Brazil. The subsequent section will examine the different techniques that enable women to participate and get mobilised to represent their interests, the utilisation of various media interfaces and the efficacy of their efforts undertaken thus far. Finally, this section will examine at length the different problems that have emerged currently that prove to hinder

expansion of representation, especially those associated with problems inherent in the nature of democracy being practised in Brazil and the conservative backlash that the movement has received.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF REPRESENTATION

While there is no consensus on a specific definition of representation with the concept evolving to denote the exercise of political agency of various actors that enables participation by them in decision making through representatives when it becomes unviable for a large number of constituents to be directly involved or when the constituency is spatially dispersed. Yet, the qualifications towards representation, the role the representative has with the constituency and the construction of interests and the methods to advance the interests have generated contestations that reveal the multidimensional aspects of the concept and how it varies over contexts. Political Representation is viewed as ' the activity for making citizens' voices, opinions and perspectives present in the public policy-making processes' (Dovi, 2017). Moreover, Dovi (2017) outlines a few crucial components of political representation- **first**, the representative who can be a person can be an organisation like the State or transnational networks that represent a section of people to advance their interests, the **second** component are those who are being represented, who can have certain commonalities that enable them to have common interests that a representative may advance; the **third** aspect is the conception of common interests and how it can be articulated by the representative and translated into credible decisions for the benefit of the constituency; the **fourth** is the spatial and temporal site where this representation takes place, which according to the context can point to different sites of people identifying common interests, coming together and having a representative articulate those at appropriate government agencies and institutions, community organisations or international bodies; and last, representation of interests especially for translating those to public policies are competitive and contentious to each other. So a dominant interest emerges at the cost of other recessive interests which are not represented relatively and tend to undermine some of those who are being represented- for instance, policies that do not take into account the intersectional nature of

identities that benefit only the privileged interests but not the needs of those who face discrimination from multiple social bases.

This notion when alluding to citizens and public policies are indicative of the liberal democracies where participation of the people in the decision-making process is mediated through representatives and direct democratic participation is not possible. Yet, the right to articulate one's interests in the decision-making process was not granted to all, and marginalised groups including women in many countries have been extended the rights only in recent times and thus the discourse and practices mark the various levels where representation occurs as patriarchal: This, **first**, has deep implications for the policies, judicial codes, normative outlooks of the State and population is conditioned by and is prone to influence a system that is patriarchal. It is given an authoritative role in setting the discourse that benefits the males at the cost of females who are denied equality in participation even in those spheres which affect their lives. **Second**, the sites of representation have evolved beyond the state to various levels in the public domain, which leads us to focus on different sites and interests that women have within the larger public sphere and in the manner they communicate with each other.

In one of the most comprehensive and authoritative overviews of political representation, Hannah Pitkin (1967) examines the different meaning attached to representation and identifies four main categories that have different approaches to the conceptualisations and standards for assessing if the representation has truly been occurring. **First, Formalistic Representation** is the conventional understanding of how representation operates in liberal democracies through institutions that are created for and initiate the process of representation. This form of representation has two facets where 'Authorisation' which refers to the means or institutional processes by which a representative gains this position and 'Accountability' assess the responsiveness of the representatives to the needs of the represented and the mechanisms by which the latter ensure the former advances their agendas and the means they utilise for this. **Second**, is the **symbolic representation** which attributes certain meanings that the represented attach to their representatives, the sentiments that representatives generate by virtue of representing a certain section of people, for instances those from under-represented sections. **Third, Descriptive Representation** is where there is a commonality in terms of shared interests and lived experience between the representative and represented and is more closely studies for

special interests and the marginalised groups since some of the unique aspects of their interests that do not conform to the general standards are sought to be expressed.

Finally, Substantive Representation delves into the activities of the representative and his or her role in acting for the represented and assessed in terms of the policies that are proposed.

While Pitkin's discussion was formulated in a specific context, the debates about representation have extended to consider more unconventional and informal aspects of policies and articulation of interests than what occurs at the institutional level. Furthermore, the division of representation occurring at the formal or informal level is problematised by the proliferation of civil society organisations and their collaborations with the government in deliberations on public policies which is a fundamental facet of democratic associational life. Contemporary debates about representation which engage with the constructivist paradigm and collate the interests by the representative and the claims they represent. The critical examination of representation in light of those who are marginalised essentially see among other things, the prerogatives of the representative seeking to mediate the interests and creating a special constituency of those who are united on the basis of their past experiences (Williams 1998).

Dynamics between Different Forms of Representation in Latin American Experience

Childs and Lovenduski (2012) critically engage with descriptive representation which is more associated with feminist politics of representation where a representative resembles those who are represented by virtue of special characteristics, like gender or race. Pitkin's poor assessment of this type of representation stems from the emphasis on the special characteristics that the representatives share that take away the scope to evaluate the functioning of the representative. Women's representation in political theory was not addressed until the late twentieth century and current debates according to Childs and Lovenduski are influenced by Pitkin's study and Anne Phillip's work 'The Politics of Presence' (1995). These deal with the problems and salience of descriptive representation and focus on the participation by certain groups whose presence is required in democratic deliberations on policies so that the valid interests are addressed. Feminists have sought to re-work the various approaches by which one can study representation, especially, emphasising descriptive and substantive representation.

Additionally, symbolic representation is explored through studies about the depiction of women leaders in media and the underlying biases, stereotypes and treatment they experience that differs from the coverage that male politicians get. Symbolic representation also pertain to studies about the 'role model effect' where the presence of women politicians inspire other women to step into similar roles and become more active participants in the public sphere yet there are mixed reviews about the effect of women's presence in representative roles and the political engagement in terms of interest and activism that will be examined in subsequent sections. Lesser attention has been paid to the portrayal of women as political symbols and the construction of those symbols as metaphors, stereotypes and how they are ranked in preferences by men and women.

In more recent literature about the feminist examination of representation, a discernible shift in focus from the descriptive representation that relates to the presence of women in a position of being representatives of women's interests to that of substantive representation where the kind of policies they seek to advance is noticed. A shift from the 'critical mass' argument has occurred where it was believed that greater number of women would lead to more number of legislation and provide more outlets of engagement for civil society leaders to interact and advance the interests to understanding the constructivist 'claims to make' aspect, about the kinds of claims that are constructed and the competitive nature of claims among the women that the representative has to mediate and construct to advance in policy-making process.

By raising certain pertinent and fundamental questions to roll out the different dimensions, Childs and Lovenduski (2012) interrogate Pitkin's categories and provide the rationale for extending women's representation as a separate group. Goetz (2008) engages with a few of their questions that outline the rationale for extending opportunities and exclusive spaces of representation to women in Latin America, especially in Brazil. (i) First, they begin by answering why women must be granted representation through the justice perspective whereby being historically denied, it is unfair to let men dominate the aspect of descriptive representation along with the pragmatic argument that women act as a constituency whose votes the political parties solicit, in exchange they must advocate women's agendas and allow them space to formulate those. The heterogenous angle advocates that men and women have different interests and the latter's interests are often marginalised and because women do not essentially form a

monolithic category and it is necessary to address the diversity of interests. (ii) Second, it is invariable that women are represented by *Men* with very few women in recent times gaining the right to endorse varied interests that are explicitly feminist and in many countries, women still are denied the right to vote and the right to contest elections. Furthermore, the impact of the UN recommendations of minimum 30 per cent gender quotas through the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action and the dynamics of electoral processes are explored through this question to see the changes that occur when more women are made representatives. Moreover, the combination of socio-cultural, economic and political factors that influence the representation of women is one of the major dimensions that vary contextually. (iii) Third, the nature of women representatives is critically examined when studies show the anatomy of women who become representatives and often they do not resemble those they seek to represent and this disjuncture is witnessed in both descriptive and substantive representation. This difference that many feminists study through the lens of intersectionality investigate the claims of different kinds of women that these representatives make or do not make. (v) Finally, related to this, the conception of women's interests is studied under substantive representation where it is debunked that women have uniform and universal interests and the construction of these claims and their translation into policies show an overt elitist orientation and generalisation besides many demands of popular-grassroots and marginalised women are being sidelined through blanket policies that are formulated in response to the dominant sections of feminists or women legislators.

Leslie Shwindt-Bayer (2010) closely examines the implications of the increase in the number of women representatives in Latin America and while in terms of descriptive representation, the growth of the number of women contesting elections at various levels is steadily increasing but the number varies across the region. The manner in which it (descriptive representation) translates to substantive representation is broadly studied beyond the policy-making aspect to focus on attitudinal dimension and engagement with informal representative work. While Brazil has one of the lowest percentages of women representatives in the region, its polity paradoxically is conducive to multiple sites of engagement for women as well as having the one the most diverse, largest and most radical women's movement (Sternbach et al. 1992). Research on Latin American Women and representation as women's representatives in the institutionalised setting of the State is recent given the process of re-democratisation. The extension of gender quotas in electoral processes and the obstacles that women representatives face even today while women's

engagement and representation within the movement have been studied relatively extensively even though they are recent phenomena. Furthermore as Macaulay (2006) notes, the premise of the women's movement as anti-authoritarian Opposition meant that a significant section of them wanted to be autonomous from the State and saw the latter as being a vehicle of co-option while many of the feminists saw in State the potential to advance their agenda after democratisation and sought electoral offices as representatives. This conflict between the *Autonomas* and *Politicas* as discussed in previous chapters provided multidimensional and multiple sites of representative opportunities to women.

In addition, Schwindt-Bayer constructs an integrated understanding of representation that measures the impact of each category of representation in an interrelated manner on other. She proposes that formal representation in the form of amendment of electoral rules that enable a greater number of women to be representatives alter the nature of descriptive representation both in terms of numbers as well as the representation it allows for women from more marginal sections who may portray different interests and thus more closely reflects the sociological diversity of the women constituency. The changes in Formal and Descriptive Representation together impact Substantive Representation when women legislators act through cross-party coalitions to forward more progressive legislation and women voters often reward them by voting them again to power based on the policies they have advanced. The greater diversity of women's interests represented through different women candidates enables the expression of interests that otherwise might have been eclipsed and more gender-sensitive legislation are promoted that take into account the intersectionality of the voters. The concomitant operation of a more diverse and responsive character of the representatives through Formal, Descriptive and Substantive Representation allows for greater trust to be bestowed on them by the electors. It allows for multiple examinations of symbolic representation where the policies, presence and practices of women legislators may lead to change in the prevalent patriarchal discourses, like the perception that women are most now considered to be more accountable legislators and the growing acceptability of quotas (Macaulay 2006). Furthermore, another instrument of formal representation that underlies the increase in women's representation in the region was the provision of the proportional representational system and the affirmative action policies manifested in the form of gender quotas

WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

This section will provide a historical overview of representation of women in Brazil particularly in the formal and associational life, the sites of representation and the methods utilised by the representatives to facilitate the greater progress of women's agenda and the diverse ways of expressing their interests.

Brazilian women secured the right to vote in 1932 after sustained lobbying by well educated and well-connected women led by Bertha Lutz, in a context when polyarchy and limited participation made them securing the vote during the tenure of Getulio Vargas, albeit because of populist motives and this was an important step towards legitimating their role in the public sphere. This was disrupted due to the *Estado Novo* (1937-45) where political participation was severely restricted and the democratic populists led by Vargas. They did not mobilise women and many women who otherwise supported his conservative regime protested against him. Yet, the number of women elected as representatives in the legislative and executive officer at the sub-regional or municipal levels has been higher than at the national levels. **First**, during the military rule, the centralisation precipitated by the policies of the military regime led to the erosion of the prestige and power of the local level of governance and also weakened the entrenched rural agrarian interests, and this led to the male representative favouring the more prestigious and financially powerful state or federal level elected positions. **Second**, industrialisation led to male migration to cities and left women in charge of the rural households and their labour participation rate was high. Thus, in the few mayoralties where women mayors were chosen, Blay and Soeiro (1979) opine that their municipalities which were often in the less industrialised North and North Eastern part of Brazil elected them partly due to the votes they received from women and also because male members forwarded them as replacements when they became legislators at the state level. This was not due to the influence of feminist values nor a function of descriptive representation. Among the early mayors who were the predecessors to *Abertura* and Redemocratisation Era female representatives, the socio-economic characteristics of these women ranged from being primary school teachers, housewives and interestingly, even if they had other professions, they chose to be housewives or assumed their husband's trade or profession. This is indicative of political socialisation of that cultural context where women have to abide by the traditional *Marianismo* limits of being associated with the home or highly

dependent on men to the extent of even identifying with his profession. Yet being socio-economically weaker than the men, women had lower prestige and lower income than their male mayoral counterparts.

 In terms of age span, women were younger and were expected to withdraw sooner than males who could have a prolonged their political career. Traditional views propounded that women are perceived to mature faster than men which allowed them to go through the marriage and childbirth early, which revolved around the domestic-reproductive roles and thus, the private sphere was earmarked as her sphere and associated with lesser value than the political arena. Blay and Soeiro (1979) classified the women representatives into three categories- **The Mayor Colonel**, where the women assumed the role of their husband's colonel and belonged to landowning families where family members were appointed to local electoral positions to preserve the authority of the family. Their husbands had often been mayors and the socialisation of leadership extends to the wives. The second category was that of the **Mayor Wife** where the husband who cannot contest for the position makes his wife contest and often these women themselves had no interest in politics but were subservient to their husbands. Finally, the **Petit Bourgeois Mayor** by her own initiative was unlike the other two, not part of the *latifundia* and *minifundia* agrarian system, and by 1970s was the most prevalent category who became leaders for their own political careers and ambition to improve the civic situation of their municipalities.

Among them, the difficulties the representatives faced were the problems of having a dual role of a domestic wife and a public figure and the political practices and social context made her role more difficult when it came to frequent travels to the capital to gain funds for their municipalities, the convincing of family who expected conformity with the gender role of a housewife and the discrimination faced by male politicians.

In the period of transition, as Alvarez (1998) and Macaulay (2006) elaborate, the emergent women's movement was fragmented based on the decision of one section to be autonomous of the formal institutions like the State and the political parties, while another section wanted to utilise the space provided by representational politics to represent the interests of women in the public policy-making sphere. In 1978 elections, one section of the women's movement supported the opposition parties and at the municipal and state level, some feminists were already elected-this is the origin of State Feminism that consolidated later in the 1990s. Furthermore, the

participation of women in the social movement and eschewing the State gave them a non-institutionalised arena to become representatives, spearheading many grassroots movements that shared the overarching anti-military regime Oppositional character. The issues that were sought to be articulated not within the state as Schwindt-Bayer (2010) illustrated but more to create common bonds across groups within some similarity in the larger discourses- issues like childcare, the rising inflationary pressures on women, healthcare to women utilising unions, political parties and churches to give voice to their demands. The feminists especially those who focussed on a specific cultural struggle forwarded demands of protection from gender violence and reproductive rights.

With regards to political institutions, the *Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro* (PMDB) which was the 'official' opposition party sought the votes of the women's movement and constituted a 'women's branch' which was mimicked by the successor to the ARENA, the *Partido Democratico Social* (PDS) when the two-party system was abolished and multiple Leftist parties also emerged. PDS, as a successor to the conservative, pro-military party provided conservative sympathetic women representation in its ranks by generating an alternate women's movement that advocated more female candidacies, representation at the leadership positions within the party and also State gender policies. These party based alterations highlighted that during the period of transition, the conservative Right's political positioning was more predicated on keeping state power rather than on concrete values and morals and the actual recognition of women as an electoral constituency. In 1982, PMDB elected three feminists from the twelve that were running for the Congressional elections and until the emergence of Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) as a strong contender by the end of the decade, PMDB remained the party of favour for women.

After re-democratisation in 1985, women identified multiple areas where that sought to advance the interests of women and became representatives. The most important, as Pitkin argues, is the realm of formalistic representation through elections at the federal, state and municipal levels.

 Women's Representation In Brazil's Legislature

During the period of military dictatorship, women's representational level never rose above 0.6 per cent, and in 1982, eight women were elected as deputies and the number rose to 26 in the

1986 Constituent Assembly elections. This was highly beneficial to the women's movement as these women along with the CNDM pushed for progressive provisions in the Constitution (Miguel 2008). Yet, until the 2004 elections, the presence of women in national politics was quite low which is ironic given the diversity of the Brazilian women's movement and the leadership position Brazilian feminist movement has assumed in transnational regional meetings and international organisations (Htun 2002, Sardenberg and Costa 2014). That election onwards and specifically till 2004, the number of female representatives in the lower chamber remained at only around 5-6 per cent. Ironically, there was a slight decrease in the percentage of women being elected after the introduction of the affirmative action laws through the quotas. However, thereafter a steady rise in the number of women being elected since 2004 was witnessed which can be attributed to a vast number of women candidates and the benevolent influence of PT, which is one among the prominent parties that have espoused firmly the cause of electoral quotas. Until 2012, the provisions of the laws that seek to provide greater representation to women were not followed in spirit, but recent electoral amendments and judicial interventions have bolstered the cause of women gaining greater space to assert their interests. Miguel (2008) argues for another method of gauging the success of representational means, the measure of greater representation is the rate of females getting elected to the total number of female candidates contesting. The 1996 law that increased the number of candidates competing from a party for one electoral seat by 150 per cent allowed for the dilution of effects of the quotas. There has been some growth in the number of women getting elected but translates in proportion, that is because of the larger number of women candidates running for elections.

The proportional representation electoral model coupled with open lists at the federal level allows the voter to list the preference, leading to competition within the party often leads to women losing out (Htun 2002). Compared to Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, the Senate has more women and the trend has been largely positive even though the quota law does not apply here. In both 1982 and 1986 elections, women candidate were not successful in registering electoral successes in terms of selection but in the three subsequent elections held in 1990, 1994 and 1998, two to three female Congresswomen were elected. There was a significant increase in the number of women senators in the 2002 elections when eight new female senators joined the two existing ones to take up the tally to 10, at this point in time, whereby they constituted 12.3 per cent. In the current scenario, they constitute 16 per cent of the Senate (WPL 2018).

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Furthermore, another way in which women despite their limited numbers can advance the interests of women in totality is through the formation of women's caucus (*Bancada Feminina*) in the legislatures (Htun 2002, Macaulay 2006, Sardenberg and Costa 2014, Ogando and Rezende 2016). This group informally formed and was named the "Lipstick Lobby" after the women's movement, as discussed earlier, mobilised their votes to elect many feminists to the Constituent Assembly during 1987-88 so that their demands could be enshrined in the Constitution. The operation of the *Bancada* showed close proximity and collaboration between the government's CNDM and the feminist NGOs and was led by a representative from the PT. All the female representatives of the Chamber of Deputies are members of the caucus and most of them support its operation.

Most national political parties in Brazil till the mid-2000s did not have a radical stand on reproductive or gender issues and women members even from Centre-Right Parties followed the agenda that was set by the Cente Left as ideological differences did not characterise their functioning. This has enabled the *Banacada* to successfully manoeuvre bills on gender quotas, on reforms of the civil and penal codes, on rights of women prisoners and reproductive rights. The *Banacada* coordinates the actions of cross-party women through regular meetings, committee and regular publications. This caucus works with CFEMEA, which is a prominent lobby group of the feminist that has certain political salience in terms of educational and ideational functioning that lets the Assembly discuss various interests of women. It leads to attitudinal change that influences the prevailing discourse about gender and its policies are followed up by groups that are linked informally by feminist networks, it consolidates the women legislators across party in a separate bloc that enhances the descriptive and symbolic representative potential and sends signals to all legislator that women's issues need to be discussed taking special interest.

Electoral Quotas For Women

Electoral Quotas are aimed at increasing the political participation of under-represented groups. As Miguel (2008) traces the history of the implementation of the quotas, it is noted that they were first implemented at the municipal level for the mayors and members of municipal

chambers in 1995 by Law No. 9100[5] which was followed by the adoption of Law No. 9504 in 1997 that regulated state and federal election which increased the number of candidates placed on the list who have to be women to a minimum of 30 per cent.

There are certain characteristics of the operation of quotas and the electoral system that have to be analysed to understand the salience of the quotas for women's participation and representation- *First,* the quotas are for the candidates placed on the party lists, not for the seats. They are only applicable to elections that utilise the proportional representation model, which at the federal level only applies to the Chamber of Deputies. *Second*, while the quotas made the presence of women candidates mandatory on the list, a provision introduced in multiple electoral laws allowed for parties to field 150per cent more candidates for a seat, which effectively means that for ten seats there are now fifteen contenders of whom only five have to be women. This means that parties can field ten men in the open list and five women in ways that reduce the chances of women getting elected since there are more men than women and voter bias against women play a role in their loss. Thus measures to increase representation which actually does not come at the cost of reducing male numbers does not lead to viable results. *Third*, it has been observed that the vacancies that the lists reserves for women are not filled by the parties and the above-given law increase the number of men which again makes for a gender unbalanced list. These factors combined, substantially reduce the efficacy of quotas in terms of increasing representation.

The electoral system of Brazil which is in these cases a system of proportional representation in the plurinominal district have parties pool in the votes and then allocate the votes to candidates based on the voter's preferences who are then determined to be the successful candidates based on the highest votes received by each of them. Thus, this creates competition among the candidates for securing votes within the party and women have been historically been disadvantaged in terms of political resources and campaigning capabilities. They often lose out to their successful male counterparts due to the systemic biases against them. In contrast to the closed list systems like in Argentina where representation increased exponentially, in open list systems with contradictory laws and the presence of loopholes means that the functioning of quotas in Brazil has actually disadvantaged the women from winning.

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[5] Law Number 9100 which mandates that 20 per cent of the party list must be filled with women candidates

Miguel (2008) and Macaulay (2006) use the standard of Female Success Index (FSI) to gauge the actual increase in the number of women legislators. It is based on the calculation of the proportion of successfully elected women candidates to the proportion of total women candidates fielded. The operation of the quota has been called into question when the gap between the number of women elected and all women running for election widened after its introduction. These scholars opine that before women were not seen as a separate constituency and after its introduction they were further alienated from the male voters. In the open list system, the candidates rather than the parties are being voted upon and before the electoral quotas provision in the 1990 and 1994 elections, women were elected almost in proportion to their candidacies while an electoral gap opened up after it was applied.

Furthermore, the quota pressured many parties to field a greater number of women who had little preparation, campaign resources or any connection to the federal districts they seek to represent. Another disadvantage that nullified the potential of increasing representation of women through quotas was the dependence of the individual on their own self to generate campaign resources and not the parties. Most importantly, the quotas have become ceilings rather than bases in Brazilian politics that restrict representation rather than increase it, as a large number of the rank and file of parties are women.

As Macaulay notes, in 1999, only 63 per cent of the Congressmen were in favour of retaining the quota and rest were vehemently opposed to it being implemented in the executive and judiciary. There are certain reforms that have been suggested to improve the FSI and to reduce the gender gap by repurposing the quotas and to incentivise its utilisation to the parties and sanction non-compliance. PT women deputies recommend advertisement campaign to educate about electoral quotas, the notification of candidates sex to the Electoral Court and the assigning of a minimum amount of Party Fund for women to promote and train them in their campaigning. This was partially done through a law in 2009 in response to Report of the Political Reform Project (PL 1210/07) which mandates that a small percentage of TV time and campaign funds given by the states to the parties must be utilised for this end and stem warnings from the judiciary that threatened to remove the male candidates to make women's election the only option on the list (De Paula 2015).

Htun and Piscopo (2014) suggest some other changes, for instance, the Quotas when applied on lists should have placement mandates that do not cluster the name of women candidates or place them at the end. Rather they should be arranged alternately to male candidates. Another support can be to remove the titular candidate rule that makes women substitutes rather than official candidates in the ballots.

Executive And Judiciary

In Brazil, the executive positions are elective and the nominees of the political parties win by the virtue of a majority vote with a run-off when necessary, which applies to even the President of the Republic, the state Governors and mayors of large cities or by a plurality by the senators and mayors of smaller cities. There is no provision of quota in the executive offices. Among the political parties, the tendency of the Leftist Parties (Macaulay 2006, Funk 2015) to be more accepting of fielding women candidates in the primaries benefits women's representation and enables many to attain executive offices. Dilma Rousseff (2010-2015) was the first and the only female President of the Republic and her impeachment revealed the tribulations that women in executive office face, which will be explored in the next chapter. Other notable female executive position holders include those who become part of the cabinet and hold portfolios, are State Governors and Mayors. In 2014, women constituted above 26 per cent of the Cabinet during the tenure of President Rousseff while after her impeachment, her successor, President Michel Temer glaringly had an all-male cabinet with the late induction of one woman to a soft portfolio (Htun 2014). This aspect of allocation of soft portfolios, congregating them only in certain special committees that deal with 'issues not of national importance' or only 'women's issues' prevents gender from being mainstreamed in the policy-making process and shows the underlying prejudices. Unlike some other countries in Latin America, Brazil has quotas only for the Federal Chamber of Deputies, state legislatures and municipal elections, not for the executive, judiciary or civil society organisations mandated by law.

Executive Agencies like the Councils directed towards the promotion of women's rights were created with governmental initiative and pressure from the United Nations and the domestic women's movement in the 1980s, for instance- the *Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Mulher* or

National Council for Women's Rights which had representatives from the government and from the civil society movement, with the latter being elected to the position by their members. The section of the feminists who sought to engage with the State became proactive in the process of making policies, leading to diffusion of feminist ideals and also giving the activists the mediate across interests of women. In 2003, *SPMulheres* or Special Secretariat for Women's Policies was instituted with Cabinet Status which was dedicated to creating national plans after convening national conferences where delegates from all over the country who represented women came together to deliberate (Sardenberg and Costa 2014). Thus, these agencies created by the executive gave platforms to different types of representatives to exchange ideas and make policies.

Viewed in the short term, the increase in the number of female judges in the Brazilian judiciary was considering where from 0 in 1998, it increased to 18vper cent in 2010 (Kalantary 2012). Currently, only 2 Judges are women and were elevated to the Federal Supreme Court during President Lula's tenure (Buchanan 2015). There have been instances of widespread instances of violence against women judges, especially those who have advocated progressive thoughts or have identified as feminists, like the assassination of Patricia Acioli in 2011. Furthermore, with many of the male brethren judges taking very conservative stances and being critical of the progressive legislation, the scope of operation of female or even progressive judges is curtailed (Sardenberg and Costa 2014).

OTHER SITES OF REPRESENTATION

Municipalities

In consonance with a theoretical overview of the creation of the women as subjects associated with the domestic sphere bound by her reproductive functions orient them towards non-political public sphere, as opposed to the masculine subject whose realms are related economy and polity. As Macaulay (2006) expostulates, " the feminine political subject…has been framed as an actor within the social, local and private sphere, associated with home, neighbourhood and the micro-

management and reproduction of human capital and social values." Thus the proximity of the women and municipal governments to the community make the former ideal for political engagements at the local level. The agency of women as political actors at the municipal levels involve a greater number of Popular Feminists and closer association with other social movements that translate to the mayor working in tandem with many social actors and often being members of more than one network. This decentralisation of gender policies in ways which are different from that executed at the national level brings a different definition of gender into the discourse and mainstream women's issues as well. With Miguel (2008) observing that the quotas have had some effect at the municipal levels, to yet most of the women mayors in the North and the North Eastern States where most of the municipalities are concentrated are from the conservative parties and governing on the behest of their political families to further entrench the local political oligarchic ambitions.

Another point to note is the decentralisation of gender policy at the sub-national level was carried out by the *Conselhos*, which are executive institutions that offer representatives a platform to discuss but often have been co-opted by the party in power. Many mayoralties and municipalities, as well as state governments led by the PT, have various innovations where representatives of the local women's movements play a limited role in the formulation of public policies and extend this to advancing women's rights. Yet as Funk (2015) argues, empirical research shows that women mayors are not more likely than their male counterpart to increase the participation opportunities of women or to forward policies designed towards women, an argument that goes against the critical mass argument of women's participation. Other possible reasons are the gendered nature of the mayoralty that pressurises newly elected women to exhibit leadership skills by conforming to a masculine ideal, assimilate to the institutionalised roles and not promote radical changes and at times to not extend more participatory opportunities due to restrictions of their context.

Interactions between Feminists and Political Parties: The case study of PT

Political parties, according to Macaulay (2006) are one of the most important determiners of representation due to their position as gatekeepers between the larger public domain and the

State and their function in structuring the political choice by 'their near monopoly on representation.' Yet, Parties are gendered institutions that contain the embedded gender ideology of their members by having an internal political culture that shapes the women's agencies and then disseminates the created gender norms. Furthermore, parties act as one of the key elements of a gendered regime of representation that delves into the institutional systems that provide for differential access to political ability to articulate and forward one's interests to men and women.

Parties extended suffrage to women in the times of realignment in the region and the proponent of extending representation to the women came not from the Liberal parties who were more progressive but from the conservative parties and the Church who in accordance with the *Marianismo* tenets, sought the calming and cleansing influence of women in politics. The conservatives also did not want the Liberal party from gaining women as a constituency if the first extend suffrage to them.

Political parties in Brazil during the process of *Abertura* starting from 1974 started to integrate women by granting them representation through women's departments. The PMDB's women's branch had conflicting perspectives about mainstreaming the women issues and their involvement. The leftist and radical elements wanted to form federations at different levels for women. Other parties soon followed granting women a degree of representation through special units. Currently, the PT's women's secretariat is the largest and the most effective body. The return of the traditional political parties after re-democratisation marginalised the possibility of women entering the newly expanded civil society and advocating their rights within these parties. PT was formed after the return of democracy and was centred around granting greater representation to the marginalised sections, including women. With the integration of non-traditional actors during its period of consolidation, women played an important role in the creation and proliferation of the party and had founded the local branches in their towns. Second, their presence during the process of consolidation of a new party meant that their participation and representation remained, sidelined because recruitment by departments as it happens in the other parties did not occur here and they were not treated as a constituency that had to be captured. However, the permeable aspect of gendering in parties meant that women also faced difficulties in articulating their needs within the party and hence in 1988, the National Women's Sub-secretariat was formed which expanded to become the Secretariat. The activities included

discussion on interests and the educational aspect of imparting information and teaching gender sensitivity to the rest of the Party members.

Internal Quota for women in the Party with regards to decision making was first proposed by the women leaders during its conception and later it was fully voiced in the National Congress in 1991. Since 1988, these women demanded a quota of 30 per cent on internal decision-making bodies and in the process of reviewing the Party's orientation, they raised the issue of the disjuncture between the touted respect for justice while in reality, there was no scope for justice extended to women due to forced under representation. These women also grounded their arguments in the rhetoric of institutionalised discrimination rather than basing them on *Marianismo* that justifies their subordination. Given the internal factional structure of the PT, the women also sought to influence these factions and to use the influence of prominent feminists to extend to senior party members. Sacchet (2002) examines that this movement was short lived and yet successful as the women were a powerful and integral section is a party that was still less institutionalised and thus open to revisions. The Party's adoption of quota unlike that in the legislature guaranteed actual representation to women as it did come at the cost of male members. The quotas of 30 per cent to the decision making bodies and the Secretariat would be implemented along the scheme of proportional representation which meant the factions had to back women candidates.

Despite the reservation and efforts of smaller sections to negate this, the perseverance of the feminists within the party and the respect that most members showed to this proposal meant that the number of women in the decision making machinery grew exponentially- from 6.1 per cent in 1990 to 30.1 per cent in 1995. This had a ripple effect on the Party bureaucracy as women overcame the sexual division of labour that the quota revealed in the Party where women did the less prestigious work. Yet, there is still a dissonance with reality where this quota has become the ceiling and not the foundation for extending the representation of women and certain inherent political practices still make the party patriarchal as Haas (2001) had indicated in the previous chapter where timings of Party meetings, location of power remained concentrated in few male leaders and the other sections in the Party in recent times have been swayed more by the Catholic Church and opposes greater presence of women.

Yet, this voluntary adoption of the internal quota meant that this was the model that was emulated by many parties where horizontal expansion of representation to women was granted within other Leftist parties too. The Central Trade Union (CUT), the national university and secondary student unions and other major trade unions also introduced a 30 per cent quota. In 1996, PT introduced a bill to implement electoral quotas and proportional elections at the national level and then state governments led by PT introduced this in the state legislatures in 1999. The mechanism translated vertically in other parties and state institutions. Yet, PT stopped short of introducing 30 per cent quotas for executive positions but advocates quotas in steering committees.

In terms of proportional positions, PT has had a relatively larger number of federal and state deputies and city councillors who are women. The greater number o women being fielded but not elected, which indicated a deteriorating female success index reveals the inherent problems of the electoral quotas and deeper problems of embedded patriarchy.

In comparative terms as Macaulay highlights, the PT has sponsored more bills than others, notably in the progressive orientation which have a direct or indirect bearing on women like health, labour, reproductive rights, environment, poverty reduction and security. Furthermore, they have taken the inspiration from the gender sensitive and progressive norms that are applied at the party level and translating them into policies. All these steps go on to establish that PT also had a deep-seated commitment to gender rights, to be brought about gradually.

United Nations and the *Encuentros*

As elaborated in the previous chapter, the United Nations and the *Encuentros* not only act as spaces for women to exchange insights and evolve common strategies to secure rights and to evolve a language of regional feminist discourse but also given the delegates the power to represent their interests. Feminists, especially those from the marginalised sections like the Black Feminists, the Lesbian Feminists, the Indigenous Feminists from different groups as well as those from geographically remote and economically backward regions gain newer feminist perspectives to re-imagine their situations and formulate their strategies for gaining rights, while also gaining a platform to express their insights and share experiences that problematise and

make the prevailing understanding of feminism more diverse (Alvarez et al.2003). Secondly and more importantly, these activists gain the personal ability to be representatives of their communities and articulate their interests in a transnational network and in the UN system which tries to redress their situation. The discussion of their perspectives in *Encuentros* allows for them to contest the domination by certain kinds of feminists and advance a more intersectional understanding of what constitutes women's interests (Duarte 2012).

Additionally, the UN through the Beijing Platform for Action 1995 provided the impetus to many of the region's States to adopt electoral quotas to correct the disproportion in representation and signatories were recommended to follow up. Likewise, the UN also called upon the member states to form women's departments and executive agencies that would allow for representation at the level of decision making and enable a greater flow of insights and understanding about issues that were confined to the public sphere. Indeed as Goetz (2008) argues that the presence of feminists in policy making reorients the way policies are constructed and brings to the fore a feminist reformulation of the issues of human rights, security, poverty, health that enable a more gender sensitive and progressive policy-making exercise.

NGOs are also sites of representation that got the fillip after the 'rollback of the State' due to Neoliberal policies introduced during President Cardoso's tenure. Yet, the professionalisation and short-term orientation that has been addressed at length in the previous chapter led to a crisis of representation that ultimately questioned the legitimacy of the NGOs (Alvarez 1998, 2009). Rather as Goetz elucidates globalisation generated new networks that enhanced communication and experimentation for increasing governmental accountability, platforms for feminist participation and greater global prestige, as witnessed in the conferring of consultative status to NGOs by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. This legitimised the position of feminists as makers of global policy. Particularly, as elaborated above the transnational networks and NGOs are also sites for creating pressures on government to comply with international standards, bring certain issues to the fore and represent the needs of diverse sections of women. They also play a fundamental role in the creation of region-level documents that outline their needs that the governments can take into account for making policies. The community-level organizations, municipalities and city councils that have more participatory mechanisms that

allow for many citizens to come together and play a role in the formation of their budgets and policy councils are another site of altering the policies to suit the needs of women (Funk 2015).

MEANS OF ADVANCING WOMEN'S INTERESTS

The presence of women representatives in arenas where public policy is deliberated and formulated is crucial not only because that enables advancing of policies that take into account the needs of women which have been historically marginalised or policies have been created that do not take women's opinions into consideration. Thus women who have struggled to increase their presence in various sites to participate and represent their interests do so through multiple means that attract the attention of policymakers, inform them of the contents and nuances and also set in motion the alteration of gender discourses with the added objective of revealing and correcting the 'gendered regime of representation' (2006).

First, representatives of women's interests who are elected legislators at the different levels address the needs through ordinary legislation that impact the other spheres, from education, judicial procedures, electoral laws to health and welfare. Htun (2002) provides a wide-ranging list of legislation that the *Banacada* secured in collaboration with CFEMEA- In 2002, laws authorised judges to issue restraining orders against suspected perpetrators of violence against women, adoptive mothers to be provided with the right to maternity leave and benefits, in 2001, laws were adopted that criminalised sexual harassment, mandated health insurance coverage for plastic surgery in case of breast cancer, legislated a new civil code that granted equality of status when it comes to marriage and children. The steps are taken thus destabilised the entrenched *Patria Potesta*. In 2001, laws decided frameworks for educational courses on sexual education in secondary and primary schools and in 1999, laws were made to incentivise the recruitment and employment of women workers. Law No. 11340 of 2006 is vital because this became the major instrument to combat domestic violence that allowed for preventive arrests and increased the quantum of punishment.

Banacada or the women's caucus as mention is another means by which the women legislator deliberate and put forward bills about women's needs. In the executive realm, the agencies and Councils which are participatory and directed specifically towards women's rights and are designed to address a diversity of demands were instituted. Subsequently, the creation of Women's Special Secretariat (SPM) and CNDM, the convening of national participatory conferences and creation of plans was another method by which representation enabled translation of demands into policies. The executive also plays a pivotal part in the dissemination of gender progressive ideas through collaboration with other ministries like the SPM, worked with the Ministry of Education to conduct the Gender and Sexual Diversity Education Program (Machado 2016).

As Goetz highlights, the fundamental form of political representation for the women have been the social movements that exert pressure on the formal institutions of power to take heed of their demands and the emergence of the feminist movement was premised on going against the authoritarian state and then led ultimately to its fragmentation about associating with the State. This galvanised the women to enter the public sphere, articulate their demands and gain experience in the organisation of a social movement that bolstered their role as representatives of their own interests. Often led by certain feminist groups, social movement provided an opportunity for these groups to represent the interests and exert pressure through lobbying and campaigning extensively for their causes. Women also used ' socially prescribed ways' that utilised their gendered identities which become politicised to bring to the attention of the patriarchal policymakers yet also seem to subvert these roles by stepping into the public (Waylen 2005).

Encuentros also use methods that go beyond lobbying and direct action which open up theoretical dimensions of the construction of the feminine that includes using art, theatre and musical expressions that go beyond the 'privileged verbal and analytical modes' by which the prevalent movement has always been conducted (Alvarez et al. 2003).

PERSISTENCE OF PROBLEMS

In the mid-2000s, multiple *Latinobarometro* studies showed that women had a favourable public opinion on their side when it came to the popular perception of female representative in relation to men. Women representatives are seen to be more honest, more accountable and more likely to foster participation. On the last account, Funk (2015) disagrees by positing that social opinions that construct women to be more participatory may diverge from the result of her empirical studies where political ideology and education played a pre-eminent role in determining who was more proactive in fostering greater participatory opportunities, especially those directed at women.

Similarly, in the late 2000s, with the conservative backlash across the region, the share of women legislators fell and many women in executive positions were shunted out of office. In the case of Dilma Rousseff, the nature of impeachment was explicitly sexist that will be seen in the next chapter. The coming of more conservative forces to power in policy-making positions has also meant that the many avenues that were available for representatives in non-formal spheres for lobbying in the formal spheres have decreased along with the worrying tendency of retraction of progressive policies and their replacement by the regressive ones (Machado 2016).

Finally, as Goetz analyses, the debates on women's participation have swung from politicising women's issues in civil societies to populating the formal institutions with women to the current realisation that political institutions are characterised by gender bias. The subordination of women's issues must be addressed through more innovative participatory collaboration with the informal section of women's movement in the current times. As, Goetz comments, the number of women found in formal politics is neither the best indicator of women's political participation and effectiveness of this descriptive representation towards gender equality policies.'

Thus for a detailed look at the concept of representation and the obstacles a women candidate faces, the example of Dilma Rousseff which was at the forefront and given the convergence it precipitated among the feminists and women's movement, Goetz's argument deserves some serious consideration. The need to broaden representation beyond institutional bounds is necessary to be seen the various levels at which women participate and represent their interests.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE 'CONVERGENCE' IN THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT: THE TENURE OF DILMA ROUSSEFF

The previous chapter dealt with the aspect of the popular representation of women in Brazil and evaluating whether the increase in the number of representatives in the popularly elected bodies, the executive and the judiciary or in organisations like political parties, trade unions and government-civil society consultative organisations meant that in a region where tendencies of *Machismo* subordinating women in endemic, women's agency for decision making was being recognised. Efforts were made so that their exclusion was less apparent. Yet, the ground reality of embedded sexism in the public sphere was apparent and will be reflected in a substantial extent in this chapter where the case of Dilma Rousseff's Presidency and her impeachment would be assessed. Moreover, the impeachment proceedings and the advent of a conservative successor, Michel Temer's Cabinet has galvanised the women's movement and guided them to unprecedented levels of solidarity, where one can witness a rare apparent convergence between the different fragments of the women's movement.

The response of feminists, the means of mobilisation and their extension of support to President Rousseff is what the chapter will examine.

The first section will deal with the biography and tenure of Dilma Rousseff and will attempt to unearth certain experiences and conditions that endorse her as a unifying factor for feminists who chose to set aside their differences. The second part will deal with the impeachment proceedings, that many deem to be unfair in addition to being a sexist and would authenticate with the previous chapter's assessment that women in public sphere have not been able to overcome entrenched patriarchy. The last section would deal with the reactions of the feminists and their actions in Rousseff's favour while trying to comprehend the reasons they advanced for their support. This would enable us to study the nature of their unprecedented solidarity and to ascertain whether this convergence is one that will endure.

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF DILMA ROUSSEFF

Dilma Vana Rousseff was born in an upper-middle-class family, to a schoolteacher mother and an entrepreneur father on December 14, 1947, in Belo Horizonte. Her father, Petar Stefanov/ Rusev had fled Bulgaria in 1929 to avoid persecution due to being a member of the Communist party which was banned in 1924, settled in Brazil in the 1930s and changed the name to a local Portuguese version, Rousseff. Her father instilled in her the love of reading and she was an inquisitive child, who attended the Colegio Izabel Hendrix for preschool and Missionary boarding school at Colegia Nossa Senhora de Sion (Archer 2015, Maklouf Carvalho 2009). In 1964, she enrolled at the Central State High School which was radically more different than the conservative Sion and the students protested against the military regime whose seizure of power coincidentally also occurred in that year. While colleagues at her schools remembered her as being studious and winning accolades, this was the period of her political radicalisation where she became involved in political organisations, which were splinter groups of the Communist or the Socialist Party. In 1967, she joined the *Politica Operaria* or Worker's Politics which fragmented due to the means to be used to advance a Marxist agenda, electoral or armed struggle. Dilma Rousseff, influenced by writings like Regis Debray's 'Revolution in the Revolution' (1967), supported the second path and this group became the *Comando de Libertacao Nacional* or National Liberation Command in 1968. During this period, she met Claudio Galeno Linhares in Worker's Politics, who also had joined National Liberation Command and the two entered wedlock in 1968.

Life as a Guerilla

In the National Liberation Command, Rousseff's role included the advocacy of Marxist politics amongst the Labour Unions and also in the capacity of an editor of the newspaper *The Piquet*. After a robbery executed by the organisation in Minas Gerais, Rousseff fled to Rio de Janeiro after police investigated their home. In Rio de Janeiro, living separately from her Husband, she met lawyer Carlos Franklin Paixao de Araujo who headed a faction of the Brazilian Communist Party. After her divorce from Linhares, she married Araujo (Archer 2005) and both became instrumental in the merger of National Liberation Command with *Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria* or Popular Revolutionary Vanguard to form the *Vanguarda Armada Revolucionaria Palmares* or Revolutionary Armed Vanguard Palmares. Yet, dissensions

remained about the main objectives and methods, where the Popular Revolutionary Vanguards favoured an armed struggle over working with the masses, the latter line was favoured by Rousseff (Maklouf Carvalho 2009).

The Revolutionary Armed Vanguard Palmares were targets of Military and Police investigations. In this group, Rousseff was entrusted with tasks that did not involve direct armed actions, yet the perception of her exact role in the group has been contentious. The police and *Operacao Bandeirantes*, the paralegal machinery of the Armed Forces that dealt with intelligence and torture attribute the role of being the mastermind to her, with her being labelled as the "she-Pope of Subversion" (Maklouf Carvalho 2009). Rousseff was also perceived to be the primary brain behind important actions like the heist of the safe of the Governor of Sao Paulo to finance the activities of their organisation and the attempted kidnapping of the most powerful civilian in the military regime, Antonia Netto, to whom the "Brazilian Miracle" is accredited.

Rousseff herself has denied having such a role, where her husband was one of the six prominent leaders of Revolutionary Armed Vanguards Palmares (Barrionuevo 2009). Furthermore, she also denied having any knowledge of the plot to kidnap which is corroborated by former comrades who describe her role as merely political and never paramilitary. Carlos Minc, who was the Environment Minister in her Cabinet and a former colleague as a guerilla commented that her role has been exaggerated and her eminence in the group was also false as she was a member with no distinction. He endorsed that her public profile added to alternate versions emerging that confers a larger role as a way of sensationalising (Globo 2008). In 1969, with the internal tensions breaking out within the group, broke it and the faction with which Rousseff remained, continued to be identified as Revolutionary Armed Vanguard Palmares. Her primary responsibility was the safekeeping of weapons and money from the other faction. She took refuge for this purpose with Maria Celeste Martins who would later be her Presidential Chief of Staff.

Tribulations During Imprisonment

Rousseff was arrested in early 1970 due to the forced testimony of one of her captured comrades who was tortured and later compelled to be undercover in the plot to arrest her by the police (Maklouf Carvalho 2009). Her comrade, Jose Olavo Leite Ribeiro was tortured to divulge the

place of their regular meeting and was coerced to meet Rousseff undercover along with other policemen on January 16, 1970, which she tried to evade. However, she was frisked and upon the discovery that she was armed, she was captured and then sent to the Headquarters of the *Operacão Bandeirantes*, where declassified documents also contained a photo which showed her awaiting trial. On this photo, President Cristina de Kirshner of Argentina commented on the defiance on Rousseff's face and the judges who hid their faces (Hoare and Mannering 2012). She was tortured in prison for twenty-two days using electric shocks, punching and also, as per her interview to Christiane Amanpour of CNN, she was hung by her arms and knees on wooden planks (CNN 2016). The tortures were geared for her to disclose more names but she managed to not give any information about her husband and about Celeste Martin.

Soon after her Husband's arrest in 1970, she was sentenced to six years of conviction. Two years after, in her trial by the Supreme Military Court, her sentence was shortened to two years and a month. By that time she had already served that stipulated period, she was allowed to go but her political rights were to remain suspended for the next eighteen years (Seabra 2009). In 2006, Dilma Rousseff and eighteen other former political prisoners sought indemnification against Sao Paulo enforcement agencies before the Special Commision for Reparation of the Human Rights Office for the State of Rio de Janeiro. She asked for compensation from the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais as well as the deferral government. Moreover, Rousseff also announced that she is not seeking the actual amount but rather the indemnification have symbolic value and this is to be processed only after she leaves office. In multiple interviews, Rousseff has identified the torturer and has denounced the military. Simultaneously, she spoke at length about the experience affecting her political choices and the value of fortitude in the face of physical torture (CNN 2016). Her lived experience of being an urban guerilla did play a part in the popular imagination and can be seen as a linkage to many women who sympathised with her personal trials as a young married woman in jail, to the torture that she like many of the Marxists of the time from different classes and operating in many cities faced, her role as an Opposition to the military rulers and finally as someone who left a life of privilege and struggled to make ends meet.

Having been released in 1972, she finally settled in Porto Allegre where her husband was imprisoned. Due to her politically radical activities and past as a guerilla who was arrested, the

Minas Gerais Federal University which she was forced to leave in 1969 expelled her in 1973. Subsequently, she took the entrance examination to gain admission to the Rio Grande do Sul Federal University specialising in Economics. Until her graduation in 1977, she chose to not actively participate in the student politics and had given birth to her daughter Paula in 1976. She started her internship at the Foundation of the Economics and Statistics where she was respected for her competence. Concomitantly, she helped in the foundation of the Brazilian Labour Party in 1979, assumed the executive position of the Secretary of the Porto Allegre Farms and was judged to be competent in the selection of deals which reflect that she continued her involvement with the working classes despite not being active in student politics. She then moved to the Institute of Social and Political Studies where she extended support without being officially affiliated to the legitimate opposition Party during the *Abertura* period, The *Movimento Democratico Brasileiro* or Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) through organising lectures that included scholars like Fernando Henrique Cardoso. This does indicate a shift in her politics and political position with a tilt towards less radical and more pragmatic party politics. In consonance with this proclivity, she supported the city council candidates fielded by the MDB and even worked on their campaigns. She then sought to obtain her Master's degree in economics from the Campinas State University but with the formation of a new group she could not submit her thesis and later attempted to enrol in the Doctorate program which she had to leave upon becoming a minister (Maia Menezes Globo 2009).

POLITICAL CAREER AFTER RE-DEMOCRATISATION

With the return of multiple parties after the military returned to the barracks, Rousseff initially became a member of the Brazilian Labour Party but during intra-party dissensions, the Party registry ceded the control and leadership, Ivette Vargas. Dilma Rousseff supported the rival faction led by Leonel Brizola left and they helped establish the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) in which Araujo was a Deputy of the State and Rousseff gained her position as the advisor the members of the Rio Grande do Sul Assembly. Following this, Rousseff played a pivotal role in the mayoral campaign of Alceu Collares (1986-89) who made her the Treasury Secretary and

secured her important responsibility in the executive wing (Maklouf Carvalho 2009). Rousseff remained in this capacity till 1988 when she resigned to help her husband's campaign for mayorship while in between, in 1986, she had also acquired a special advisory role for the gubernatorial election nominee of the PDT, Aldo Pinto. The controversial aspect of this election was the presence of Nelson Marchezan as the running mate but who was more reputed as a prominent civilian in the military government with Rousseff later justifying his candidacy based on him not being a radical supporter of the former military regime. Upon her departure, which she cited was voluntary and based on the problems of coordination with the personnel, Collares praised her efficiency while her successor had widely different views. However, since 1988 where PDT did not have a significant presence in the local legislature, Rousseff lost her executive positions but was appointed as Director General of Porto Allegre's City Council only to be dismissed soon after.

In 1990, with the electoral victory of Collares in the State Gubernatorial elections, Rousseff was appointed as the co-chair of the Foundation of Economics and Statistics where she had interned twenty years ago. She was provided with the portfolio of Secretary of Energy and Communications where she served until 1994, and in 1995 returned in a more committed capacity to the Foundation. She was regarded as competent and efficient by her colleagues and was the editor of academic magazines. During this period she started her Doctoral degree at the Campinas University which as mentioned above she had to abandon with the victory of the Partido Dos Trabalhadores/Worker's Party (PT) in the Rio Grande do Sul Gubernatorial elections where PDT had extended support. She then became the State Secretary of Mines, Energy and Communication in the Cabinet of Olivio Dutra who personally respected her stances of being less populist but more leftist (Maklouf Carvalho 2009). This again would illuminate some degree of political shifts as Dilma Rousseff became more open to working in the executive positions, and her interactions with people would include those with women who could be identified as Professional Feminists, educated with political influence and generally from the middle class. This can also explain another facet of her support base of diverse women.

As noted before where her early days as an Urban Guerilla garnered the sympathy of many women who belonged to the popular sections, this period with the tempering of her radical tendencies and proximity to positions of power and education gained her respect from women

colleagues who, if they identified as feminists would probably be part of the Professional Feminist category. In her tenure, certain measures that she undertook gained her respect like heavy investment in public infrastructure for the transmission of electricity that prevented the heavy power cuts that the rest of the country had to face. It is important to go into the background when she had previously advised President Cardoso that without good infrastructure, the only other option was rationing electricity as the electricity that was produced could not be transmitted and which would lead to power cuts. Admittedly, her foresight in public investment in the energy sector enabled the state to avoid rationing, premised on the view that electricity was a public good and this model was based on anti-speculation and state involvement according to Professor Greg Grandin (Grandin 2011). Yet in response to the power cuts, the federal government had granted compensation to the states but not to the Rio Grande do Sul even when Rousseff had petitioned for it.

Simultaneously, there arose tensions between the PT and the PDT, with the PDT despite having few important portfolios observed the lack of decision-making opportunities available to them. The tensions heightened with the mayoral alliance for the Porto Allegre elections and led to them fielding different candidates against each other. Rousseff supported the candidate from PT, Genro against Collares and supported her own administration, implicitly refusing to step down from her executive position when asked by Brizola. This led to Rousseff and certain others leaving PDT for PT in 2000.

During the preparations and policy planning for Luiz Inacio 'Lula' da Silva's Presidential candidacy from the PT, Rousseff was invited by prominent energy engineers and planners Luiz Pinguelli Rosa and Ildo Sauer due to her objectivity and knowledge in this area. Surprisingly, being a novice in the Party and in administration, upon Lula's victory, she was chosen to be the Energy Secretary in 2003. Lula's choice for Rousseff was explained in the 2013 Electoral Campaign video where he highlighted that her work ethics and technologically savvy aspect of using laptops to collate data rather than tedious paperwork, her expertise in energy management led to her selection as energy secretary of Rio Grande do Sul to benefit from. Other factors that Maklouf Carvalho (2009) indicates included the approval of key personalities like Governor Dutra and Lula's Finance Minister Antonio Palocci who felt that Dilma Rousseff had a more pragmatic approach towards negotiating with private companies and was more amenable to the

market-friendly facets that PT introduced during this campaign than Pinguelli. Yet, they both were against the privatisation of the energy sector and felt that the energy crises could be controlled with governmental interventions. Yet Rousseff's approach, in reality, went towards instituting less control of the electricity sector in the hands of the government that was praised by the private operators as the "new Model" but generated contentions with other colleagues. Her concern with preventing blackouts and thus heavy investment led to serious clashes with the Environmental Minister Marina Silva who felt a rapid increase in public electric infrastructure without environmental assessment was detrimental to the ecology of the region and heir disagreements needed mediations overseen by the Presidential Chief of Staff.

Sauer and Pinguelli were allotted the charge of Petrobras and Electrobras respectively but they clashed with Dilma Rousseff on issues of State control and personal differences that necessitated the intervention at the time by President Lula himself, both left the Ministry. She also defended the new industrial policy that would be attributed to shipbuilding and other ventures to generate jobs. Another notable policy was the 'Lights for All' (Greg Grandin 2011) that sought universalised access to electricity to Brazilian homes but subsidising the costs for consumers and through this ambitious project did not meet its target in the first deadline, so was extended multiple times. The instance of Rousseff overseeing one of the so-called hard portfolios, which are usually kept in the hands of men indicate a shift in the representation of women but also explains why Rousseff did not advocate or appeal to a constituency of women that many other women ministers do to be assigned 'soft' portfolios that usually deal with women.

She was chosen to take over as the Presidential Chief of Staff on June 21, 2005, the first women to do so like her position as Energy Minister after the resignation of Dirceu due to the *Mensalao*[6] scandal and the decision to elevate her came not only due to the political expediencies of her not being a part of any faction of the PT but also due to her competence and dynamism. She continued in this position in what Professor Grandin terms as "Lula's Prime Minister" as someone who saw the implementation of the domestic policies until 2010 when she was started her campaign for the Presidency and ultimately went on to become the first female President of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

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[6] Mensalao- was a vote buying scandal that emerged in 2005 in Brazil. It revealed the dubious dealing of the ruling PT government buying votes of other deputies and led to a political crisis which threatened the stability of the political order.

Her Presidential Campaign was greatly amplified in effect with Lula's support and her promise of continuing his policies that appealed to the working class as well as her efficient yet pragmatic stances allowed her to win the favour of those who traditionally did not vote for PT. These enabled her to have a lead over her rival Josee Serra of the centre-right coalition led by the Brazilian Social Democratic Party. Rousseff organised a nine-party coalition that ensured that they had more electoral campaigning time on TV. Interestingly, opinion polls gave her a large lead over her rival who was leading until her announcement of candidature from 2 per cent to 21 per cent lead (Data Folha 2010). Despite this difference of margins, Rousseff failed to secure more than 50 per cent of the votes in the first round, securing 47per cent to Serras 33per cent of votes and was that led to the second round of the elections where Rousseff won with 56per cent of the votes over Serra who received 44per cent of the votes (BBC 2010).

The Presidential Campaign of 2014 was different in nature to that of 2010 as Rousseff was battling protests that had started since 2013 and the public opinion in her favour had fallen from her first term. It was a deeply divided and contested campaign where the focus was not just on the policies and orientation of the candidates but also on polarising the rhetoric bring to the fore the focus on identities, where the race and class of the candidate were stressed upon. Wesja (2014) offers the data from the Pesquisa DataFolha that women were more inclined to vote for Rousseff and people from the North East where poverty rates are higher would favour the PT. This indicated the appeal to the certain constituency for Rousseff, including women and the Afro Brazilians as well as the working classes, despite all being primary constituencies for the PT but Rousseff cultivated closer ties. Smith (2014) attributes the victory of PT to issues of race, gender and class. Feminists who were disappointed with her hesitancy to advocate their cause or to advance their interests substantially still rallied behind her in the face of her opponents who were seen as upper-class, patriarchal and conservative.

Dilma Rousseff's Presidency and Feminism

While the ambit of evaluating President Rousseff through her two terms (2010-2014, 2014-2016) on major policy issues is far beyond the scope of this study, therefore this section will largely remain confined to the relations between the President and the women's movement, her policies

that directly affected women and her political stances on issues that are central to the women and feminist movement. This narrowed down focus would enable a critical engagement with the themes of feminism that is central to this study and the need to understand the nature of the convergence that was precipitated with President Rousseff's impeachment among the feminist.

During her first term, she did not appeal specifically to the women as a constituency, but the significance of the process was that many of the supporters who turned out emphasised on her being a woman in power and their association with this ideal. While feminists usually vote on the Left and added to this, Lula's federal policies those which affected women that Dilma Rousseff sought to extend, and gave them cash benefits made women one of the principal electoral constituencies of PT. On her inauguration, she did acknowledge the significance of being the first female President as a 'sign of democratic progress' and the need to eradicate the lack of parity between the genders in terms of access to rights. Moreover, she addressed that one of the main goals was to make available opportunities to women so that the parents could 'be proud of the capabilities of their daughters' (BBC 2010). In her first speech as President, she did project an image of being a champion of women in terms of hoping to provide more opportunities to a wider section of women to enter politics, a sphere they have been underrepresented in (Hoare and Mannering 2012). At the UN General Assembly in 2011, where she became the first female to address the opening the session spoke of articulating with a 'feminine voice', endorsing the values of democracy and equality and the fervent wish to hope for a women's century (Hoare and Mannering 2012).

Yet, there have been assessments that the increased leverage that the National Confederation of Catholic Bishops (CNBB) has over the Congressmen, the spectacular growth of the Evangelicals in the Assembly and the formation of the Evangelical Parliamentary Front has led to the government being compromised on the passage of its policies. While the relation between the feminists and the State improved exponentially during the tenure of President Lula, scholars like Machado (2016) disagree to some extent about the breach between the feminists and Rousseff's government and trace the roots of the marginalisation of feminists, especially regarding the right to termination of pregnancy, to have begun in 2005-06 when the government was weakened due to the *Mensalao* crisis. During this period, ironically Rousseff did support the right of the women to decide on abortion while she reversed this and adopted a pro-life profile during her

campaign. To augment this, her support for the CNBB proposal of a declaration regarding refusal of the passage of legalisation of the termination of pregnancy bill or to at least not implement any provisions associated with the bill was guaranteed by her coalition colleagues in exchange for the support of the Church. Thus, the topic was not discussed throughout her Presidency and the ambitious bill prepared by Nilceia Freire in 2005 was not supported by the Government in the Commission on Security for Society and Family in the House of Representatives.

Notwithstanding the fact of her being a woman, the disappointment of women increased when the government was pressurised by the Legislature which had become more conservative to reduce the funding and withdraw policies of gender equality in educational videos and the non-homophobic and non-lesbophobic educational guides in 2015. This was maintained by the *SPMulheres* which itself was wound up in 2015 under pressure from the conservatives and merged with other aspect areas of marginalisation like race and human rights that diluted the agenda of each as critiqued in the previous chapter (Machado 2016, Chalhoub et al. 2017). Meanwhile, other areas of disaffection included Rousseff's own views on abortion where she had declared support towards legalisation of abortion, yet later under her regime she avoided openly supporting because the bill was revived later and promoted to add another condition in the legalisation of abortion after the Supreme Court decision in 2011 that allowed abortion when the foetus develops conditions that prevent cerebral growth. Another source of the tension was to her opposition to gay marriage which she deemed is a religious issue and state intervention was not appropriate while she advocated same-sex unions which the Supreme Court in a landmark case approved in 2011. Curiously, the day of the judgement, she withdrew previous progressive measures about the distribution of same-sex educational videos under the Ministry of Health and Education as she felt that these are propaganda which the state should not indulge in, in line with the conservative views of the Evangelicals who protested this.

While many feminists complain that she did too less (Hao 2016), Jalalzai and Dos Santos (2015), argue the exact opposite and highlight despite not taking any strong feminist stands, her mere presence alters representation in Brazilian politics in what they labelled as the 'Dilma Effect', where 'the Brazilian President affords enhanced descriptive and substantive representation to women.' First, despite the multifarious pressures to induct candidates of coalition partners and her own party that constraints allocation of berths to women, Rousseff initially inducted nine

women or 24 per cent of the Ministry were women in 2011 which increased to 26 per cent with ten women in 2012 in her first term and in her second term the number came down to eight or 21 per cent which is relatively higher than previous Cabinets. In her first four years, she has selected fourteen women as ministers. Another important dimension as mentioned before was related to the nature of the portfolio, the masculine or hard portfolios that are associated with higher respect vis-à-vis the soft portfolio which is allocated to women and their over-representation. President Rousseff allocated many of the so-called masculine portfolios amongst women and despite frequent cabinet shuffles, the number of women remained more or less steady. Thus, the facet of increasing the descriptive and substantive representation under President Rousseff, in terms of her Cabinet was an improvement, albeit incremental. Furthermore, Rousseff, in her first term was firmly behind her comrade Eleonora Menicucci who was openly bisexual that incurred the displeasure of the conservatives and was promoted to the Minister of Secretariat for Policies on Women. While not declaring herself to be a feminist, she does emphasise on the feminine power that allows women to view the world differently and more substantially (Hoare and Mannering 2012, CNN 2016, Zambrano 2016).

IMPEACHMENT PROCESS AND SEXISM

Rousseff's impeachment process has been criticised and is a fundamental axis of this study. It forms the basis on which the hypothesis of the resultant convergence amongst the feminists is formulated. The impeachment that culminated in the removal of Rousseff from office on August 31, 2016, after nine months of being initiated nine months ago was premised on the allegations of *Pedalas Fiscais* or manipulation of government accounts by transfer of money from State-run banks to finance social policies that concealed the massive fiscal deficit.

Using the authoritative study by the fact-finding delegation of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) sent to Brazil to investigate the fairness of the procedural and substantive grounds of impeachment in mid-2016, the whole process can be scrutinised in detailed using aspects they identified as guidelines. The compiled report was formed on the basis of interviews and examination of documents and reports where the mandate of the LASA delegation was ' to

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determine whether the charges on the basis of which impeachment was forwarded was constitutional and whether the Brazilian Congress has followed appropriate standards for due process' (Chalhoub et al. 2017)

Procedural and Substantive Grounds of Impeachment (LASA 2017)

Based on the findings, the report enlists a few reasons that led to the process being initiated and the public demands for it.

(i) First was the Large Scale Protests of 2013, during President Rousseff's first term which started off as a small localised protests by the *Movimento Passe Livre* regarding hike in public transportation charges, this suddenly grew into massive anti-government protests that induced a sense of general crisis due to conservative media coverage. While acquiring the anti-incumbency operation, it was seen that most of the protestors were white, middle-class men, some of whom even called for military intervention. This does indicate that her government was becoming unpopular while her personal popularity at the end of her first term in 2013-14 remained high and over 50 per cent. Concomitantly, hate campaigns by the media and virulent attacks on her on social media continued that did impact the protestors.

(ii) Second, the Report of the delegation saw the election campaign of 2013-14 producing divides on the basis of social markers and was particularly observed to be nasty. Many of the marginalised community addressed the rhetoric of the PSDB candidate, Aecio Neves that alienated them and firmly put them on Rousseff's side, yet making them vulnerable to attacks from the privileged white middle classes.

(iii)The third factor was the early stages of the investigation and disclosure of corruption by *Operação Lava Jato* that involved that involved kickbacks, allegations of graft that were received by many politicians from the ruling coalition, prominent business members, paid by the cartel formed secretly by the executives of notable construction companies, notable Odebrecht who often overcharged on the bids with Petrobras and send the excess as the kickbacks (LASA Delegation Report Chaloub 2017). In return, Petrobras only gave the bids for construction to these firms and these kickbacks amounted to over 5.3 billion US Dollars. These findings came to light in 2013 and with the first official arrest made in 2014, millions took to the streets as the revelation of few political and business elites profiting at the cost of the rest of the country mired

in recession. Simultaneously, charges of political corruption played a massive role in their call for impeaching President Rousseff based on a direct linkage since the bribes and irregularities occurred mainly when Rousseff was a director of Petrobras between 2003-2010. Virtually every leader and multiple investigations by attorney generals have emphasised that there were no personal wrongdoings on the part of Rousseff and she has been the only high-level politician not implicated personally in the corruption (Rosario Sanchez 2016). This clean-up was led by Judge Sergio Moro whose handling of the case was also controversial, especially for President Rousseff. This scandal involved members of all parties, but given PT was in power and the skilful deflection of attention by the conservative media, the charges were directed towards the PT.

(iv) Furthermore, the role of Eduardo Cunha of PMDB, which was in coalition with the ruling PT (the Vice President, Michel Temer belonged to the same party, PMDB) was controversial and pivotal. As the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Cunha was entrusted with the responsibility of admission of formal allegations of misconduct including impeachable offences that he used to his advantage. Cunha was the first to be placed under investigation and formally charged under the *Lava Jato* scandals and many political commentators and President Rousseff herself saw the impeachment process as a direct outcome of vengeance on part of Cunha against her for not protecting him from Ethics Committee investigation in the aftermath of *Lava Jato*. When he became aware of impending investigation confirming his role in the *Lava Jato* scandal, he received the demand of impeachment from certain anti-Rousseff groups. While it had very few supporters except for PSDB, his own party, PMDB was reluctant to proceed due to lack of evidence of wrongdoing that could be established against President Rousseff. The possibility of criminal activity was initially floated because *Pedalas Fiscais* was not the main premise yet. A day after police were ordered to search Cunha's belonging and properties after it was found that he had aggressively asked for bribes of up to 5 million US Dollars, he announced on July 17, 2015, that he was personally withdrawing from the government and wanted more autonomy, while PMDB remained in coalition with PT. He made a number of threats to colation's stability since that day

(v) The Fifth factor was the *Pedalas Fiscais* which came to be the centre of the criminal responsibility on the basis of which the impeachment was forwarded and despite the content of

the accusations, it did not pertain to personal wrongdoing. It entailed that it was more of a political infraction of the President with regards to budgeting and accounting practices. The impeachment moved on the basis of the violation of Art. 36 and 38 of Law No. 10.028/00, promulgated in 2000 that fixed the upper limit of government spending and public debt and in it are contained the provisions of *crimes de responsibilidade* or criminal responsibility that relate to Art. 85[7] of the Consitution. The legal framework of this impeachment proceeding also referred to Law No. 1.079 expanded the infractions.

President Rousseff has argued that her impeachment was a direct outcome of her refusal to negotiate with Cunha or offer protection or concessions in response to him sabotaging the legislative agenda of the government through increasing spending when the executive had already announced austerity measures. With revelations in late 2015 of his personal financial wrongdoings, he started to soften his stance and agreed to a climb down on the *Pedalas* charges constituting a motive for impeachment. He was dependent on PT support to avoid a trial by the Ethics Committee for the breach of decorum and when he was made aware that the government would not shield him, he accepted the impeachment petition in December 2015. On December 16, 2015, the Public Prosecutor's Office requested the Supreme Court to suspend him as the President of the lower House and also as a deputy of the Chambers and was ultimately suspended four months later.

Immediate Triggers for Impeachment

(a) *Pedalas Fiscais* entailed the use of funds from government banks to finance government deficits, allowing for government spending on social programmes before the revenue was collected. This is a common and routine practice across the governments of the world, though not very sound as a practice. This tendency increased more during Rousseff's tenure due to the

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[7] Article 85 of the Constitution- According to article 85 of the Constitution, acts of the President of the Republic that breach the Constitution are crimes of responsibility (*crimes de responsabilidade*), especially those against the I – existence of the Union; II – free exercise of the powers of the Legislature, Judiciary, Public Prosecutor's Office (*Ministério Publico*) and constitutional powers of the units of the Federation; III – exercise of political, individual and social rights; IV – internal security of the country; V – probity in administration; VI – the budget law; and VII – compliance with the laws and court decisions. Article 85 further determines that these offenses must be defined in a special law, which must also establish rules of procedure and trial. (Library of Congress- In Custodia Legis).

worst economic recession in the history of the State in recent times that saw the GDP fall by 4 per cent. Professor Igor Fuser also pointed to the fact that the funds were returned to the Government banks within a year and there was no possibility of personal wrongdoing but to keep assisting poor families (Rosario Sanchez 2016).

(b) Eduardo Cunha also tampered with the impeachment motion by removing the period prior to 2014 to be considered for the period of Rousseff's wrongdoing as her supporters felt that of her two consecutive terms, the first term expired in 2014 and trying her would be retrospective. Yet, as the investigation saw irregularities in accounting in 2015, Cunha altered the period to 2015 which allowed the opposition protesters to file a new complain that he readily admitted. Yet, this action of nullifying 2014 and prior period as not under consideration meant that the charge of the opposition that the kickbacks were utilised in the campaigns of the 2014 election by the PT were not to be investigated yet, during the proceedings it was seen that most of the Senators has premised very little on *Pedalas Fiscais* and those who did, referred to the period that was not under consideration, according to the LASA Delegation Report (2017).

The other factor was the Federal Auditing Body of the Public Finances (TCU) refusing to pass the 2014 budget due to irregularities, making it the first one since 1937 to have been returned. Based on this refusal to pass the Government accounting reports, the second body, the Federal Audit Court also refused to pass the government's budget. The LASA Report notes that most of the auditors who were deputies were themselves under investigation and this was more of a political decision than administrative. On the other hand, Rousseff's detractors argue that passage of an inflated government budget reliant on funds from government banking during a recession would have made the budget untenable and this would lead to electoral advantages in 2014 through the populist measures for which the government had fewer funds.

All the factors combined left no alternative but for the impeachment proceedings to be initiated.

The Impeachment Proceedings

In response to massive street protests that had started in March and April of 2006, where protestors numbering up to a million came to the streets, three PSDB deputies submitted a

petition to Impeach Rousseff on September 16, which referred to irregularities committed during the period of 2014 which Cunha refused to consider. This prompted a fresh petition that only concentrated in the period of 2015 that was accepted by the Speaker on December 2, 2015. In a somewhat controversial move, which many commentators believed was to save Lula from direct investigations, Dilma Rousseff appointed Lula her Chief of Staff on March 15, 2016, which prompted massive criticism after Judge Sergio Moro exposed a secret phone tapping that seemed to provide credence to the charge that Rousseff was evidently protecting Lula. The motion to consider the petition in the lower house was passed and the vote to impeach in the Chamber of Deputies took place on April 17, 2016, with a total of 513 members voting, out if which 53 were women. The impeachment motion was passed with 367 votes in favour where the required threshold was 342 and was then forwarded to the Senate (Rosario Sanchez 2016, Sims 2016, Ray and Wallerfeldt 2017).

In May 2016, the Senate deliberated upon the impeachment petition and subsequently the Supreme Court ordered Cunha to be removed for obstructing the investigations into corruption and his replacement, Walder Maranhao initially suspended the impeachment notice by noting the irregularities observed in its passage, the Senate decided to go ahead disregarding the opinion of the Speaker due to which he was forced to back the Senate's decision. On May 12, 2016, Dilma Rousseff was suspended for a period of six months pending the vote of impeachment and Temer was directed to complete her term. Later on August 10, 2016, the Senate voted 59: 21 to reopen the impeachment proceedings which began on August 25. On August 29, Rousseff formally defended herself before the Senate where she argued in her 30-minute defence that she had not done anything atypical that previous Presidents had not done and called her successor an usurper of the position. She also asserted that this was the price she paid for refusing to quash the corruption investigation against her colleagues who were not impeaching her and reiterated the role of corrupt lawmakers in her impeachment, calling this a Parliamentary Coup even though Brazil has a Presidential system, the connotation of which will be discussed shortly (Fox News 2016). Most of the Senators accused her of being the reason for the recession and ignoring the obvious signs for the downward spiral of the economy, a far cry from the *Pedalas Fiscais* charges. As Sandy (2016) opined, during her defence, almost no Rousseff supporter came to add to her defence which echoes the political isolation she had been facing within the party, which was seen in the refusal of PT to back her proposal of a plebiscite vote.

Yet, in an unprecedented move which the LASA Report of 2017 also questions on grounds of constitutionality, the impeachment article consists of the provision of removing the impeached President from office and also to debar the person for eight years from public office. Controversially, on the initiative of the PT Congressmen, the Supreme Court Justice presiding over this allowed these two provisions to be de-linked and the Senate deliberated on two questions (i) removal of Rousseff as President and (ii) banning her from Public Office for eight years.

On August 31, the Senate voted 61: 20 to remove her from office while previously the Senate allowed through 42: 36 in favour of not removing her privileges to run for office. In the vote, the dedication of the votes by Congressmen to conservative symbols and others plus the lack of address of the official charges highlight the controversial nature of the impeachment. Many dedicated their votes and their cause of voting against her to "God", "Fatherland", the nuclear family and Senator Bolsanaro dedicating the vote to notorious military era torturer Ustra.

In response to the proceedings of the impeachment and establishment of charges, she filed a review which the Supreme Court denied in 2017.

As many political commentators note, in sharp contrast to the millions of protestors that walked the street to demand her impeachment, there were muted reactions with the sporadic incidence of celebrations, noting the political divisiveness and turmoil that took a toll on the nation and the people were simply exhausted (Lulu Garcia Navarro 2016, Sandy 2016).

Critiques of the Impeachment

The impeachment process has been greatly scrutinised globally and many point to multiple dimensions that made it compromised. With regards to the legal provisions, Article 85 of the 1988 Brazilian Consitution provides for seven grounds for impeaching the President which relate to acts that undermine the existence of the Federal Union like the independence of legislative power, the judiciary, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, National Security, transparency in administration, budgetary law and the rule of law and these are further elaborated under Law 1.079 of 1950 which relates to crimes of responsibility that differentiate it from ordinary criminal

responsibility (Art. 86). The impeachment has to be executed in the legislative chamber that makes it an intensely political process and in the case of Roussef, there was not an explicit crime of responsibility. As Bowater and Moraes (2016) comment, the only way criminal responsibility could have been instituted was to establish a direct link between the kickbacks to her election campaign. Furthermore, those who voted against her also voiced suspicion of the legal basis and spoke of voting against her based on lack of governability (Chaloub at al. 2017). Examining the the technical basis on which she was tried, of altering the federal deficit and enacted decrees of credit that were supplementary and the government was not meeting the targets, which on investigation was found could not be tallied due to the delay in the approval of the revision by the Congress as well as internal reallocations based on surplus.

The second aspect relates to *Pedalas Fiscais*, which had been a routine practice of Presidents before her and the revisions for which the government had repeatedly requested the Congress were not deliberated upon in a timely manner, coinciding with the actions of Cunha that made coalition politics influence the course of the bill that prompted the President to issue supplemental decrees. This authorisation to increase the deficit for Temer in May 2017 when Rousseff was suspended was speedily dealt with which casts suspicion on the motives of the Congressmen. This prompted Chaloub et al. (2017) to argue that the impeachment was more of a mechanism like the no-confidence motion that exists in the Parliamentary system and the process from mid-2015 to mid-2016 was intended really to make Rousseff's continuation in office untenable with the use of any legal method available. Another legal dimension is that to treat *Pedalas* as crimes of responsibility to impeach a President would have to show the direct involvement of the President which could never be proven conclusively in terms of the requirements laid down in Art. 86.

Moreover, many critique the very processes which highlight the profiles of those who impeached her. First, in the leaked recording, the Planning Minister Romero Juca of ally PMDB spoke of impeaching her to prevent the large-scale investigation of corruption that would implicate him and his party members and position Temer as President 'would stop the process' that stops the investigations against Deputies (Jonathan Watts 2016). Second, those who spoke to the LASA delegation on the dubious legal basis of impeachment but persisted in voting against Rousseff spoke of the need to remove based on her stemming the political crisis. Furthermore, street

protests and instigation by conservative media added to the disenchantment and the LASA Report criticised the conduct of the head of Impeachment Committee who told the congressmen to listen to the 'voice on the streets' rather than an actual substantiation of the crimes of responsibility, where protestors were often influenced by incorrect reports. Third, the conduct of Judge Moro who led the crusade against the politicians came under question when he leaked the tape that contained the conversation between Rousseff and Lula when he was appointed as the Chief of Staff that shielded him of impending investigation in the *Lava Jato* cases whether he was implicated.

The stark aspect is the criminal records and corruption charges against many of the Congressmen who impeached her. In the Chamber of Deputies, out of 513 more than a 100 members were under investigation (Chaloub et al. 2017). Of the total 594 Congressmen, 352 had accusations of criminal wrongdoing and corruption against them with many implicated in the Petrobras Scandal; of the 65 who investigated the charges of wrongdoing against Dilma Rousseff, 37 were being investigated themselves (Rosario Sanchez 2016). Vice President Temer too faces investigations and has been accused of shielding the guilty. To add to these, the TCU audit members who refused to pass the federal accounts of 2014, prompting the charge of *Pedalas Fiscais*, were questioned for the content and timing of the report given of the nine, four members themselves were under investigation of corruption and issues of using undue influence.

The delinking approved of the two provisions of the impeachment process (i) of removal from office and (ii) debarment from public office for eight years seems unprecedented and this may be due to the reason that many of the Senators themselves knew that Rousseff was not personally guilty and the immediate concern was to impede the investigation against them (Chaloub et al. 2017).

The impeachment was thus roundly criticised by multiple sources, important among them is Noam Chomsky who viewed it as a coup by a 'bunch of thieves', in reference to the tainted reputations of those who were trying her (Telesur 2016) and the basis on which she was impeached as a routine procedure across nations, which is also agreed to by Professor Igor Fuser (Roario Sanches 2016). Most of her Leftists allies in the region also decried this as a constitutional coup and Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela termed this a coup and recalled their ambassadors. The Organisation of American States' (OAS) Secretary General Luis Almagro

expressed his misgivings where he characterised the process as political and also not in accordance with the rules. The UNASUR also strongly criticised the proceedings as 'dangerous criminalisation of governance.' Furthermore, the LASA Fact-Finding Delegation composed of Sidney Chalhoub and others denounced the impeachment process as 'anti-democratic', warning against the dangerous precedents that were being instituted for political gains than of any other reason (LASA Delegation Report 2017).

Implied Sexism in the Proceedings

One of the fundamental themes of this study has been premised on the nature of the impeachment which many believe was brought on by the explicitly sexist tones on display during the proceedings as well as precedents of men doing the same and not being subjected to punitive measures. The sexist nature of the proceedings places into sharp relief the endemic nature of patriarchy that pervades the public sphere and was at the helm of political power. The presence of Rousseff as Sims (2016) and Rosario Sanchez (2016) opine disturbed the status quo and also provided reasons to believe that the impeachment was not just a result of political expediency to toppling a political opponent but also as a result of deep-seated bias.

Interestingly, the comprehensive LASA report highlight certain aspects that project the view that it was not just about gender but the political elites revolted against the possibility of another term by the Worker's Party. Many from the marginalised sections, who are in fact the majority of the population and those who have benefitted from the social expenditures and social schemes of the government feel that this was the reaction of the political elites- wealthy, middle to upper class, male and white against the less privileged who were lifted out of poverty and came into prominence under the PT terms. The social gains from affirmative actions, an extension of the right to the marginalised community, efforts to strongly counteract racism, the creation of discourse that now takes into account intersectional demands threatened those who felt their erstwhile privileges based on exclusion was being harmed. Endorsing this view are scholars like Werneck and Carneiro claim that this was a coup against social equality rather than legality to keep their class and race privileges unharmed while trying to stem the advance of citizenship and structural societal changes that Brazil has witnessed. This was precisely the view that many

others espoused and was encapsulated in the movements that were directed against her, especially instigated by the large media houses which wanted to 'Make Dilma Bleed' that not only accompanies an attack on social democratic gains but also lends credence to the sexist nature of it.

Others like Brian Winter (2016) agree with a previous assessment of Keating (2010) about the stubbornness and decided lack of intentions to make political deals that characterise Dilma Rousseff and attribute her arrogance and stubbornness and lack of charisma to her downfall which were the reasons why she failed to manage her coalition as well her predecessor did.

In contrast, many feminists and political commentators have explicitly pointed to the abject sexism that was visible during her impeachment proceedings. Rousseff herself in many interviews has decried the sexist nature of her impeachment, in an informal interview with the Centre for Women's Global Leadership, she declared that her impeachment is a sign that misogyny pervades Brazilian politics till date. One of the reasons why her impeachment was forwarded was because she was a woman and 'the very traits that would be seen as desirable in a man were used to undermine my government' (Rousseff 2017). In dialogue with feminist, she spoke of the enduring need of women politicians to prove their competence, to possess higher educational attainments and work harder and for much longer as the political odds went against them and pointed to the need of women in judiciary and police to effect certain advances.

Despite differences with Rousseff's views, almost all feminists and women activists have spoken out against the sexist nature of the impeachment and are more wary of the conservative forces that seek to regress their gains (Hao 2016). As Rousseff highlighted the openly misogynistic undertones of her impeachment proceedings at the UN in a speech delivered in 2016, Brazilian women rallied around her which included even those who opposed her. Arnet (2016) notes that degrading and dehumanising media portrayal that fuel the millions of largely apolitical but White Middle class who wanted her impeached, the distribution of stickers by the Opposition that depict the raping of Dilma Rousseff shows the disaffection centring on her gender identity, disregarding the fact that personally she did not gain or be conversant with the technicalities of the charges against her.

Another argument that sheds light on the problem of sexism was the proceedings of the Senate during her impeachment and the explicit sexist attitudes on display. As many noted, the use of expressions like "*Tchau Querida*" or 'Bye Darling' expressed embedded condescension and would not have been seen in the impeachment proceedings if a male President was being impeached (Phillips 2016, Matos Madeiros 2016, Arnet 2016). The naked hostility to a woman who was a public figure in this patronising tone tended to negate her tenure and work as a politician and was rooted in *Machismo* sentiments of making her return to the private domestic sphere. Besides, the male senator Casio Cunha Lima told female senators Vanessa Gazziotin and Gleisi Hoffman who were colleagues of Rousseff, 'calm down, girls', which prompted them to respond to the abject sexism on display, to problematise the tendency of men in power to legitimise the women as unfit due to their 'hysterical' and irrational, emotional nature (Arnet 2016). During the proceedings that included bizarrely singing, shouting and spraying of confetti, extreme right-wing Senator Jair Bolsanaro went on dedicating the vote to military torturer Carlos Ustra who operated during the time Rousseff was jailed and tortured and his supporters waved flags containing the "*Tchau Querida*" slogans. This openly sexist and homophobic politicians combined with their nostalgia for authoritarianism shows the regression in the level of public debate when it comes to the advent of conservatives in the legislature (Hertzman 2016). Drawing on this tendency, most dedicated their   vote to God, to the country and to the nuclear family and some to their husbands- revealing the pervasiveness of the Evangelical agenda that is deeply uncomfortable with women in power and places them back in the sphere of the family as ordained by God according to the *Machista* ideology (Rosario Sanchez 2016, Telesur 2016). Similarly, standing out, male Senator, Jean Wyllys, who specialises on issues of sexuality and gender openly condemned the proceeding as sexist and he offered personal testimony on the behaviour of fellow Congressmen who have difficulty admitting women is President and hence the blatant disregard for her (Rosario Sanchez 2016, Sims 2016).

 Indeed, Brazil in the recent conservative backlash is witnessing conservative, anti-feminist lawmakers getting elected who seek to overturn the gains and deliberately attack the feminists. Donna Bowater (2016) contends that Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, despite her uneasy relation with questions of feminism and gender, is a defeat for ambitious women and her actions often lead to the narrative of her essentially being Lula's deputy even when in office. Marc Hertzman (2016), along with Bowater, proclaims that the treatment of women leaders has always been

more sexist than political. He highlights that even though occurrences of *Pedalas Fiscais* in a more expansive scale were carried out during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's tenure (17 cases) as well as in Lula's tenure (34 cases) and amounted to serious charges but they were never prosecuted.

The above observation highlight that Brazil's problem of sexism is thriving despite the celebratory tones of having a woman President in 2010. The vicious campaign on social media, endorsed by the opposition, shows her as suffering a nervous breakdown on the cover of a magazine, *IsoTe*, her former colleagues even spoke of her mood swings and stubbornness which would not be commented on if she was a male politician which went on to create a narrative that she was incapable of running the country. These include instances of her kicking chairs and shouting and punching the tables, which Rousseff in an interview (Leahy 2016, Rosario Sanchez 2016) admitted are fabrications, expostulating that men in power are 'described as powerful, while women are decried as hard', implying she did not conform to the feminine norm.

Hertzman(2016) and Rosario Sanchez (2016) draw attention to the degrading social media campaign that was carried out against her, with posters showing her as being raped and being promiscuous began circulating. This was followed by stickers as mentioned above which show her spreading her legs, which was modified as a car sticker to be placed in the fuel tank, exhibiting sexual innuendoes and doctored pornographic tapes with her were circulated. The social media posts that called her out as the 'lying prostitute' went to certain levels that prompted the UN Women's Office in Brazil to request for the cessation of sexist political violence against her. This was followed by appeals made by many women's organisation.

As a fine critique, Rosario Sanchez (2016) highlights the implicit sexism in the media coverage even internationally of Rousseff. Using the piece written by Brian Winter, which has been used above, she argues that she was seen as inept, as arrogant, as someone who does not understand politics due to her tendency to net make political compromises or to concede to corrupt practices, she highlights the dismissal of a career politician only because she happens to be a women, her political vices would have been seen as virtues if she had been a man, her personal property because of her not making deals with corrupt officials is not focussed on. The arrogance reputation that the Guadian and Al-Jazeera have consistently advanced in their coverage indicates that the emphasis of the whole affair was more on her personality traits than on the

neoliberal designs of the Opposition, euphemistically put by Siegel of the Borgen Project (2016) as ' attempts to reduce spending.'The Saturday Night Live episode aired in late May would spoof President Rousseff plays to every regional stereotype as well as one which is deeply misogynistic.

Sanchez puts forth the concept of the "Abrasive Trap", formulated by Kieran Snyder (2014) that postulates that men and women in power are judged differently and women who are compelled to adopt more masculine characteristics to be taken seriously fall into the 'trap' of being sketched as hard or arrogant. Otherwise, they have to play to their feminine stereotype which according to dominant public masculine discourse is too soft for the public sphere. This dichotomy is convenient in labelling a woman as incompetent according to the author.

Additionally, as many feminists see Rousseff, not as a feminist icon as her actions and spoken words have undermined her own agendas, yet many others defend her as she was made a scapegoat for her male colleagues. She was undermined as a politician in her own rights owing to being was chosen as Lula's successor and yet her hesitancy to embrace the feminist cause may have cost her a consolidated feminist constituency according to Zambrano (2018), an assessment many commentators disagree with.

THE RESPONSE OF FEMINISTS

Differing from Zambrano's opinion above, many commentators have put forth various ways in which women have protested against the impeachment and have set their differences aside in the adverse conservative environment for the protection of their rights.

Rousseff herself started reaching out to women to protest against her impeachment, mobilising them through meetings with groups and supporters who would meet her with red motifs and tokens as a reference to the colour of her political Party (Phillips 2016). Many saw the " beautiful, demure and at home" online campaign which will be discussed subsequently as a sexist attack by right-wing press against Dilma Rousseff who they posited against as a contrast of Marcela Temer, Michel Temer's young model wife. This prompted many to protest against

this stereotype through an online campaign, a resource that many women have utilised in recent times to tackle sexism (Machado 2016, Phillips 2016). The degrading campaigns directed against her resonated with many women who denounced the narrative, even those who opposed her, which bolstered her support from the women.

As referred to above, the publication of an issue by Veja Magazine, describing Marcela Temer as " beautiful, maidenlike and a housewife" in the event of her having taking over as the First lady evoked widespread outrage as well as amusement as women denounced the implication of positing a 'good woman image' by virtue of embodying these qualities and basically patronising them to remain in the private realm. Women across Brazil created a Twitter hashtag campaign and creation of memes where they used the same description but put photos of themselves and others doing the opposite like partying, drinking, etc (Sims 2016). This protest had an underlying theme of calling out *Machismo* in society and to reject the prescription of dressing in a particular way or being just a domestic partner to her husband. This outrage was furthermore on the implicit comparison of Mrs Temer to President Rousseff, highlighting that she is not an ideal woman as she lacks these qualities, making even women who did not support her come to her defence.

Many women Congresspersons, largely from PT have taken a proactive step to check the sexism of their male counterparts, with Marina Silva who supported the impeachment asking for more vigilant and bolder actions from women Congresspersons. As the Veja article indicated about the prevailing discourse, feminists in Congress highlighted the rightward shift in the discourse required corrections (Romero and Kaiser 2016). Many of the women in power opposed Rousseff and believed her removal was not sexists and felt that her removal would not affect the trajectories and careers of other women politicians.

Hao (2016) and Arnet (2016) argues that the proceedings compelled most feminists who remained divided on their opinion of Rousseff during her regime to come together to decry against the sexist impeachment. Notably, thousands of women across cities have taken to the streets in solidarity. The impeachment has generated new social movements like the *Mulheres Pela Democracia* or Women for Democracy and has been sending her mementoes to express solidarity. This comes in the backdrop of the number of conservative policies that roll back on the progressive gender legislation: like the discontinuation of gender-sensitive material in

educational institutes that the government distributed; the assignation of personhood from the period of conception that makes abortion a murder; the criminalisation of abortion in the event of a rape; the promotion of family to mean union of man and woman; and also abortion was outlawed in the case of mother contracting Zika virus. This gradual retrogression of women's and gender rights prompted the women to launch the Feminist Spring in 2015. There is according to Hao (2016), a degree of unprecedented convergence between the feminists who have come together, many of those who did not identify as feminists before are now identifying as one, the use of the term in popular discourse has risen exponentially and are becoming more conscious about sexism. The feminist movement, according to sociologist Avila (quoted by Hao) is showing a great deal of resistance in defence of Rousseff who was the first democratically elected female President, and a moment in the history of the movement, when it regenerated. Agreeing with this assessment, Sims (2016) refers to the widespread criticism that Temer's all male and white cabinet faced, with women's activists shutting down the main road in Sao Paulo on May 15 2016. His offering the portfolio of the Ministry of Culture to many women through invitations was refused and he was forced to appoint a male member. The reasons for refusal ranged from believing his Presidency is illegitimate to disaffection ranging the demotion of the SP*Mulheres* and other ministries. To add to these, there were immediate protests against the edicts of the new health minister to crack down on abortion in consultation with the Church. These developments precipitated the discourse regarding the 'place of a woman' in Brazil where women are coming forward spontaneously, attempting to articulate the demystification of feminism and making themselves more vigilant against the Evangelical led rightward shift, where their main problems are the blending in of political conservatism with religious conservatism in Congress.

Sims (2016) argues that the *Veja* article enabled women to be made aware of the implicit sexism in the discourse and that prepared them to resist the overtures of this government. In face of the backlash about the composition of his Cabinet, Temer sent invitations to certain women instead of appointing people from his coalitions and even women who espoused a conservative ideology chose to reject the appointment invitations extended by him. Furthermore, this response to the article marks two moments for the feminist movement where they discovered the power of social media in the creation of social power, albeit through memes that have the power to disseminate far and easily convey their messages as well as a moment of resurgence.

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Khazan (2015) notes since December 2015, coinciding with the tail end of the Feminist Spring, women have marched against Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha. In addition to his financial misdeeds and underhandedness in politics, he was deeply unpopular amongst the women for his regressive views. In 2015, he proposed to make abortion difficult for rape survivors who would require a police report and body examination to determine whether or not they had been raped. This prompted women, especially those who were poor and can not afford the procedure due to higher costs in clandestine clinics to protest.

Nevertheless, the sexism of the impeachment process lead to greater awareness of sexism across the public sphere and interrogation about the place of a women, garnering social media outpouring of personal testimonies on the twitter, for example, the trend of '#primeiroassedio' or their first assault experience and '#meuamigosecreto' or my secret friend to open up about the everyday experience of sexism, practice like these that break the taboo about talking about assaults, create empathy and also instill awareness of feminist politics online.

Anti-Cunha coalitions thus coalesced through online mobilisations, formed on various issues and became part of the mainstream when they joined others who were protesting against him on other issues, like the members of PT, giving rise to nascent new movements.

Summing up, the protests against the conservative regime and the mainstreaming of the protests have led to a concerted and identifiable women's movement that many see as the resurgence of the feminist movement in the backdrop of Dilma Rousseff's impeachment proceedings. This coming together of the women and formation of new social movements, the nature of the discussion and its linkages with other movements, the intersectional nature of it suggests a new dimension in the trajectory of the feminist movement, which is of convergence. This study argues that in the immediate circumstances of the impeachment proceedings coupled with the political climate that was vitiated, made them more aware of sexism and made them embrace feminism to an extent previously unseen and surprisingly also included women who had so far resisted the label. The next chapter would conclude this study by testing out the nature of the convergence and whether it could really be seen as a convergence or a long tactical alliance in the radically diverse feminist movement of Brazil.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The exploration of the historical trajectory of the feminist movement in Brazil over a thirty year period brought to the fore the nature and existence of a feminist movement vis-à-vis a women's movement where feminism is contested strongly while also questioning the contestations between various sections of the feminist and women's activists. Gradually, greater acceptance and understanding of feminism among those who had initially resisted it while advocating women's rights, widening of the definition and dimensions of feminism that added to the diverse understandings of the term as well as the political climate that promoted greater dialogue among feminists and women's activists were witnessed. Subsequently, the regression of gender rights with the advent of a conservative government after President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment has galvanised the movement according to many scholars (Sims 2016, Martini 2016).

While the impeachment proceedings of President Rousseff was condemned as sexist, it also could make many women across classes, sexuality, race and educational levels aware that the conservative, hyper-masculine shift in the political climate was perilous to their hard-earned rights. The possibility of greater dialogue fostered by the internet and through social media provided another platform for women to be utilised for advancing their agenda. These dynamics of the Brazilian Feminist Movement reflect conformity and diversity with the trends of the global feminist movements as well.

As was drawn out in the introductory chapter, the theoretical precepts that distinguish Brazilian Feminism from Latin American Feminism and the dominant forms of Western Feminism, while also being conditioned by them are the local contexts and responses of the State. The radical, diverse and massive form of the movement (Sternbach et al. 1992) in its inception followed the Western Feminisms' demands for greater rights to attain equality with men and access to the public sphere through education, employment and suffrage. This was advanced by few women who had the economic resources, class and racial privileges that enabled them to utilise the advantages in the First Wave, that is, during the end of the nineteenth century and also forged links with Feminists in North America (Marino 2012). Yet, differences between them not only

led to a Latin American Feminism evolving a separate identity out of the efforts to forge a hemispheric feminism ideal but also laid the foundation for the transnational linkages that would be crucial later during what scholars like Alvarez (1998) would describe as the 'Second Wave'. Among them, Brazilian Feminists led by Bertha Lutz would become prominent for emphasising on rights that would be closely related to the Liberal Feminist strand. Furthermore, as elaborated in the second chapter, the Second Wave of the feminist movement was seen at times as revivalist (Martini 2016) while many attribute the struggle of the women against the military dictatorship as the genesis of the movement drawing continuity to this day. The dissensions within the movement amplified the contestations entrenched through the First Wave where the suffrage rights to few women were seen as the only objectives and not extending it further to the interests of the marginalised women based on their race, sexuality, class and education levels. The difference between those who advocated a specific struggle for women's rights and shirking a general struggle that would subsume the concerns of women within the larger opposition to the military and class relations (Alvarez 1998, Alvarez et al. 2003) formed one aspect of the contestations within the women's movement.

Another basis of contestation was the division between those did not advocate explicitly feminist demands and those who did, yet at the beginning as Alvarez (1998) notes, there were attempts by those identified as feminists to instill feminist ideals and make other women aware of their subjective positions, build alliances with trade unionists, community organisations and other spaces which were also associated with Leftist Organisations. This was a consequence of the influence of Socialist and Marxist feminists of Europe on the feminists and women activists who were exiled to Europe during the military regime. This was reflected in the works of pioneers like Saffioti whose works highlighted the oppression women face in a capitalist society and the need to shed light on issues of domestic violence, the oppression based on gender being rooted in a capitalist form of production (Saffioti 1978). Concomitantly, women who protested through the "Cost of Living Movement" did not share the same perspectives which help to draw out Molyneux's (1985) classic differences within gender interests for different strands of feminists.

These differences in interests based on the activists' class, race and sexuality form one of the foundations of the contestations. This study borrows the conventional binary division between the 'Popular Feminists' who engender the practical gender interests of their immediate subject

position based on their everyday economic situation and to ease the difficulties that emanate from sources of economic and social marginalisation and not espousing the immediate aim of a social revolution to overthrow patriarchy. This category does not subsume the dimensions of marginalisation that Afro-Brazilian women, or lesbians or indigenous women face, whose struggles are better understood through the lens of intersectionality (Duarte 2012). On the other hand, Professional Feminists are those who are usually white, middle class, university educated and tend to identify their movement with strategic gender interests that seek to transform social relations to counter sexism. Yet, with the dissemination of information, multiple platforms of collaboration, social media connectivity and education, these categorisations are not water-tight and with the potentials of the convergence, these divisions are further problematised. The study provides a historical narrative of the various debates and contestations that fuelled the movement, like the debate on exclusion and inclusion of women based on their understanding of feminism, their prioritisation of feminist principles to determine a broad or narrow view and the methods to mobilise which entailed engagement with the State, drawing sharp criticisms from feminists who endorsed autonomy, themes which found expression in the *Encuentros*.

The **first chapter** dealt with the theoretical lens of intersectionality, formulated comprehensively by Crenshaw is 1989 that has been fundamental in the formation of discourse for Afro-Brazilian Feminism, that forms a unique part of Brazilian Feminism. Brazilian Feminism has been made diverse by the various strands within it that bring in focus the various angles of marginalisation that women face, for instance, Black women in Brazil are given 44 per cent less wage than white women in paid work (Miguel and Biroli 2014) highlights that these women are not only discriminated because of their gender but also because of their race. This also relates to the issue of cyber-activism in Brazil which marks one of the facets of the coming together of feminists since 2015, precipitating the seeming convergence among the different sections, yet the participation of Black women in the conversation online has been disproportionately low (Martini 2016), reflecting the lack of articulation of their perspectives. Furthermore, as Castillo (2010) and Duarte (2012) elucidate, the policies that the government formulated were in response to those that are required by the women from the dominant classes, these blanket policies did not redress the problems faced by women who require further assistance from the government as they were more vulnerable in terms of discrimination based on other social markers. This creates contestations between the Afro-Brazilian feminists, Indigenous feminists,

Lesbian feminists, activists from the *favelas* who demanded a voice in the movement. As Sardenberg and Costa (2014) opine, in recent times, with increased access to education and employment, greater representation in platforms and government institutions due to a greater number of interactions between the State and the movement, especially, when *Partido Dos Trabalhadores*/PT was in power (2003-2016) and its effect on other organisations, popular feminists have become a dominant voice which has further diversified the movement. It has become more grounded in popular demands, articulating the needs of women from marginalised communities and fundamentally has altered the nature of the movement.

Another aspect of the movement has been the trend of transnationalisation, associated with the proliferation of NGOs that operate with Professional Feminists in international forums, with funds from government and donor agencies and are organised hierarchically for short-term policy targets that have supplemented the role of the Brazilian State in certain areas. These NGOs, which in the 1990s became an intense site of contestations due to their mediating role between the movement and the government have in recent times reoriented their roles based on the criticisms and with the diversification of feminist objectives and sites, they have ceased to be seen as enforced spokespersons that conceded to the neoliberal agenda by focusing on short-term policies over long-term goals of inculcation of consciousness of subjectivity (Alvarez 2009).

These internal dynamics of the feminist movement are symptomatic of not only in Brazil but are also witnessed in other Latin American Countries. But these trends are not to be generalised across feminist movements in all Latin American countries as the pace of spread of ideas, the government policies that have shaped the response of the feminists are highly contextual and this study does not deal length deal with the specificities of Latin American Feminism and later Latin American and Caribbean Feminism which is reflected as discourse and practice at the *Encuentros,* but keeps Brazilian Feminist movement as its focus (Alvarez et al. 2003, JASS 2009).

These dynamics has also illuminated the actors that generated contestations and shaped the contours of the feminist movement, as explored in the **second chapter** that generated internal debates between the larger movement that related to the women's movement largely constituted by the Popular Feminists, Marginalised feminists and the Professional Feminists to advance the agendas of the feminist movement, mobilising them for allied causes as well as against other

sections of feminists. Furthermore, these actors have acted as forums for conversation and sharing of insights, negotiations and mediation among themselves, as sites to create and alter discourses, gain policies in response to demands and also have engendered new perspectives on gender roles, subjectivity and leadership within their community.

The actors examined in this study include the Brazilian State, in the form of the policies adopted by successive governments between 1985 and 2015, the relations they cultivated with the feminists and the women's movement activists, as the target of demands from them, as a platform for co-ordination between various sections of feminists, government agencies and international organisation, as an agency responsible for implementation of international charters and conventions that relate to women's rights as well as the fundamental instrument in formulation of dominant discourses about the role and place of women. Moreover, the International and Regional Organisations have played a pivotal role in giving a fillip to the women's movement in the area, enabling activists to gain leverage in pressuring their governments for policies through their regular meetings, monitoring capacity and generation of newer ideas. Furthermore, these acted as sites for women to represent their interests, gain insights from others and develop representational roles, that gave their activism and movement a global profile.

Related to the transnational and international potential of the feminist movement, the movement in Latin America is unique owing to the influence of the *Encuentros*, where feminists, women's activists and at times even those who do not strictly adhere to women's agendas have participated, shared insights and formulated their interests that articulate a regional vision while expressing the myriad diversities. Brazilian Feminism has benefitted from this exercise as it engaged them with others who might have encountered similar situations, the informality of the *Encuentros* has enabled many marginalised women to speak up as well as given motivation to marginalised women like the Indigenous, Lesbian and Black Feminists to form alternate *Encuentros* to equip them to carve a separate space for themselves in these regional meetings. They are transnational in character yet serve as inspirations for national *Encuentros* that take place regularly, like the first one in Brazil took place in 1985 (Martini 2016). Additionally, the **third chapter** also delves into the role of the political parties and the Church in creating tensions among feminists and yet being their allies in certain struggles. With regards to the Church, the

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Roman Catholic Church in Brazil has been an ally of the Popular Feminists since the time of Opposition to the dictatorship and the Popular Feminists also abide by certain teachings, that leads to sharp differences between them and the Professional feminist. The Church, which strongly disagrees with issues of gender, reproductive rights and abortion often have tended to posit one section of feminist against other, thus creating more divisions (Haas 2001). Pentecostal Churches that are increasing in influence are more about community organisation and tradition in the domestic sphere while being moderately more open about reproductive rights in certain cases, but on the whole, the conservative shift in the Churches has united them in opposition to progressive legislation against feminists' demands on reproductive rights.

Finally, the political parties have been scrutinised, with special emphasis on the *Partido Dos Trabalhadores* or PT to which President Rousseff belonged and the party that seemingly has taken a more progressive stance on women's issues in Brazil. A careful consideration of the internal working, the gender-sensitive nature of the operations and the position of women in the Party has been examined to give credence to their stances and also to highlight the entrenched patriarchy that is present in this site that women have sought to overcome.

The **fourth chapter** weaves through the actors to the phenomenon of popular representation of women in Brazil, which also weighs in on the kind of women being represented seen through the lens of intersectionality. This chapter has evaluated the representation of women in the Federal legislature of Brazil, the Executive and Judiciary, the municipal corporations, in state legislatures, female governors as executives of states, in political parties and trade unions, in International Organisations and *Encuentros* to provide a wider spectrum of sites which are the interfaces for women to evolve in order to represent their interests. Besides, the chapter also reflects the reasons that underlie the insufficient representation and the rampant sexism that prevent women from fully accessing the public sphere.

The **fifth chapter** explores the life of Dilma Rousseff, the first female President of Brazil and her experiences as an urban guerilla opposing the dictatorship; as Secretary of important Portfolios; as the first Chief of Staff of the President; as well as the anointed successor of President Lula made her a figure that many sections of feminists sympathised with. The impeachment proceedings and the sexist nature of the proceedings led to the coming together of women across Brazil. This unity was solidified and some suggested an expansive notion of

change in the subject position of those who came to identify as feminists with the change in the regime. The coming of conservative, right-wing government under Michel Temer and the nature of policies that were advanced which went against the progressive gains of women's rights mobilised the women into a consolidated movement. This many speculated formed the basis of a convergence among different sections of feminists and this study throughout has examined the nature of this convergence and probed whether the convergence was real or a relatively long-term alliance between the different sections of feminists in the face of an adverse political climate.

Analysis of Insights as Responses to the Research Questions

The legacy of the feminist movement in Brazil to date along with the dynamics aid in providing some insights with reference to the questions that arose in the preliminary stages of this study as was presented through the substantive chapters. In an effort to justify the theme of the monograph, a compilation of insights is sought to be projected in this section. The insights while acting as responses to the myriad questions that arose and the inability to gain a substantive and definitive answer, but really nuanced and often contradictory findings prove how complex the interrelationship between the two main strands of the movement are. Admittedly transforming ground realities that impact the women whose interests differ despite sharing common social markers.

With regards to the issues that have led to considerable differences in terms of prioritisation of articulation, methods of agitation or advancement of influence and/or allies to engage with, they have changed over the years with the changing political reality. While the divergences between Professional and Popular Feminists in Brazil have been explained in detail, this enduring binary persists pointing to not only the persistence of certain issues of difference and reconciliation but also the emergence of new ones. As was indicated in the second and third chapters, Molyneux's (1985) categorisation of interests of the women is based on their subject positions, the earliest condition was around access to public resources. This was seen as planting the first seeds of contestation due to the exclusivist nature, that is, one advances her interest often at the cost of the other or not taking into consideration that interests of a wider population. Over the years, the need to prioritise the interests at the cost of other, the methods of articulation through the use of

State and official channel, through autonomous grassroots movements, in representative capacities or by NGOs has led to debates.

With regards to the question of non-feminist/ external actors and their influence on the movement, the activities and agendas of the five identified actors in the third chapter highlight their role in often bringing Brazilian women of the different strands together as was seen through the formation of the Councils to those who see the State as repository of patriarchal values and any engagement being seen as collusive or deceptive. The role of the United Nations, of the political parties and the Church remain pivotal in forging alliances with the different strands of feminists in Brazil, while at times pitting them against each other. This complicates the provision of an easy and direct answer as to the role they played by them in the larger movement while being strategic allies to the various strands on a number of issues.

In the advent of the apparent convergence in times of exposure to social media and the conservative government policies, the demands have ranged from the restoration of government social security policies to safer *favelas* and more importantly to women's safety. The coming together of anti-government forces in recent times is reminiscent of the Opposition protests in Brazil against the military rule while their ire is directed at elected politicians like Cunha whose bill to outlaw abortion was sharply criticised and led to demands for better family planning services (Leite 2016). The mainstreaming of gender issues across the divides of contestations have led to something new: previously there were issues based on which the divide between Professional and Popular Feminists was articulated, often at the cost of the other, now due to gender mainstreaming and this coming together of movements, these demands are incorporated by each other and articulated together in what has come to be termed as the 'feminist spring' (Robertson 2015). The proliferation of social media presence and portals dedicated to Black women, to lesbians, to indigenous has led to greater reflection and a more comprehensive understanding of interests. Yet, as the study argues, the common interests or alliance does not indicate a convergence to the level argued, that is almost all of those women's activists who had shirked the label of a 'feminist' to adopt it and the divide seemingly disappears. What has assuredly evolved in Brazil is an enhanced understanding of the other and consequently the possibility of coming together on issues which now they identify as common.

The widespread criticism of the current government led by Michel Temer emerged when a gender and race-diverse cabinet was replaced by an all-white male body which right from the start downsized departments and ministries dedicated to the disadvantaged. The government especially sought to forward policies that would curtail the rights of the women gained over the years, led to only meagre concessions by the government like inducting one female member into the Cabinet. Importantly, the public outcry and coming together of the Opposition of the PMDB government on issues of women's rights shows the rejuvenation of the movement after years of dormancy and the start of many conversations among women of different sections of the society eased by social media. This meant that discussion on taboo topics like abortion to calling out the Brazilian President on his speech on Women's day has become common, the women are reclaiming their voices. Thus, the number of women in the official representative capacity within Brazil has sharply declined but the women coming on to the streets to protest and exercise their agency has increased (Ferghali 2016, Alegretti 2017, The Independent Staff Agency 2017, Brito and DiLorenzo 2018).

The argument put forward by Hao (2016) which projects an unprecedented degree of convergence and the potential to be completely transformative has not been substantiated in other literature of the period. While contemporary writings hail the unity and even suggest greater scope for interactions, the persistence of the divide mainly due to the nature of the origin of these differences continue to exist to the present day in Brazil.

Contestation and Identity

One of the objectives was to investigate the nature of contestations that arose in the thirty year time period earmarked for the study and to examine the differences in the understanding of their subjectivity that it precipitates among the women in Brazil. This is in direct reference to the first hypothesis proposed, that, *"the enduring contestations between the Popular and the Professional Feminists are precipitated by the differing subject positions which have a direct bearing on their self-identification"*. As has been explained in the previous chapters and sections of the conclusion, the divergence between these two strands on the movement along with their constituent elements is not static, besides the roots of their divergence lie in other social variables

in addition to their gender that condition their priorities. An intersectional study, taking into account the disadvantages attributed to race, education levels, sexuality and region bring out the reasons for differing responses. As was expostulated in the first and the second chapter, the orientation of the First Wave of feminism in the Western and the local discourse was exclusivist, privileging one section of women over other. The ones who were privileged took the initiative to mould the movement based exclusively on certain gender interests while ignoring the necessities of many women who are further disadvantaged due to their race, sexuality and lack of financial resources which led to the evolution of their understanding of their own interests being very different from those of the privileged feminists. Testing of this hypothesis has been undertaken through literature review as the possibility of a field trip to bolster or reject the findings was not possible at this preliminary stage. A closer inspection of the literature provided a narrative of change and continuity to the contestations while also enabling the location of these dynamics in the political and social realities within Brazil.

The extension of political rights and access to the public sphere became the main agenda of the First Wave and was characterised as a 'feminist' demand. This narrow understanding of the white, middle class and educated feminists did not acknowledge that marginalised women had worked in the public sphere for very low paying jobs for survival while having no access to government and publicly funded education as well as the hollowness of suffrage rights in isolation, of not bestowing fundamental socio-economic rights.

The Second Wave marked a culmination of dissatisfaction against the authoritarian military regime in Brazil amongst almost all sections of women who created an alliance. Furthermore, the international context of the rise of Second Wave feminism, the increased proximity of the Professional Feminists to the Popular Feminists and goal of the Professional instil feminist values among the Popular section gave impetus to the latter to exercise their agency for raising their demands in the public sphere while disagreeing sharply on certain ideological aspects. The other dimension of contestation arose due to the alliance within the Opposition parties to the military rule which related to nature and alliance aspect of contestations. The role of the socialist and communist parties which initially was one of the sites of interaction between the two strands as well had major leverage in the formation of the autonomous feminist movement in the Latin

American region. This facilitated contestations within the movement that threatened the unity as women sought to define feminists as those who were exclusively motivated to identify with a strategic gender interest and not in conjunction with other party based interests. This related to the widening of the divide among the feminists who became more professional with the advent of the phase of NGOs. They later went on to associate themselves with the democratic government in advancing their agendas while others sought to distance themselves from the state as their radical position developed out of the argument that the Brazilian State itself was a source of oppression. On the other hand, grassroots feminist activism which operated in conjunction with other identities and interests rejected this narrow understanding of gender interest and sought the amelioration of everyday problems as the first step to providing some financial and social security rather than an overhaul of the existing social order. Importantly, during this period the debate about engaging with the State also entered the discourse of the Popular Feminist with many not being able to engage as they did not have enough resources to do so, unlike the Professional Feminists for whom it was a choice (Alvarez 1991, 1998, Sardenberg and Costa 2014). This divide widened with the phase of professionalisation in the 1990s where the transnational links created through *Encuentros* were replaced by transnational and professional NGO links favoured by the United Nations and the Neoliberal State. Consequently, it disempowered many women, many of them from the popular section who were exploring their subjectivities within the *Encuentros*. Furthermore, as highlighted in the first and third chapter, the *Encuentros* was a site of ferment, dissension and innovation as this idea of exclusivist understanding of 'who was a feminist' versus a more connected and nuanced understanding played an important role in shaping the aspects of contestations.

As was explored in theoretical precepts of the Regional Feminism in the first chapter and the third chapter, a major axis of contestation arose to be the actors who could assume the role of allies or obstacles. The divergence of interests across a changing context led to an exacerbation of the feminist-nonfeminist divide as many of the activists chose to work with the State while many avoided it, based on the changing nature of the neoliberal state, the services that were prioritised for the marginalised over a short-term basis with NGOs versus those who actively sought a long-term imbibing of feminist consciousness and instilling role for the movement, where the movement operates less in the economic material sphere but more for the consciousness-building cultural sphere. Furthermore, the gulf between the Professionalised

Feminists and the Popular Feminists also increased with the coming of 'NGOisation' (Alvarez 1998) as Professional Feminists became the spokesperson and the NGOs the medium, undermining the traditional channels of social movements and a section of the Popular Feminists whose interests they did not articulate. Additionally, the Political parties, as well as the Church, became points of contention for the alliance. Similar agendas and ideologies between many Popular Feminists and the political parties as well as the Church alienated them from autonomous Professional Feminists. This divide was utilised by the allies, especially the Church to strengthen their bases while also diluting the feminist unity. However, in recent times with the extension of secular government education and a greater number of spaces of interaction through participatory government mechanisms have led to greater consciousness. The dawning of the realisation of multiple levels of operation of patriarchy, how demands like sexual rights and abortion which are more associated with the Professional Feminists are also being demanded by those who initially opposed it,(like the marginalised women) have led to greater appreciation and as the study shows increased identification among the younger generation about the label of being feminist.

Another and more complicated reality emerges within Brazil through the adoption of the intersectional lens, where the interest and demands of Afro-Brazilian women, Indigenous women and Lesbian feminists are explored. Their position within this artificial binary is difficult as was exhibited in their efforts to build different *Encuentros* devoted to a more intersectional understanding of interests and finding ways to overcome their compounded disadvantages. As was highlighted earlier, the contestations that arose between them based on class and education levels mirrored those between the Popular and Professional Feminists. The categories of Professional and Popular thus later encapsulated many women of colour, of indigenous origins and those from various socio-economic backgrounds. The binary often concealed many complex realities while at the same time could bring to the fore the commonalities among the different fragments of the movement and how each social marker became a source of contention based on the advantages of those who had it and who did not, how the Brazilian State addressed these at the cost of other demands and how the Church accepted some sections while pitted them against another.

Undoubtedly, the subject positions form their allegiance and identification with a specific strand within the larger feminist movement indicate contestations that have emerged and have been reformed over the years. While a greater understanding of the others' interests has ensued, the adverse political climate and influx of social media have galvanised a greater understanding of more expansive gender interests. Recent developments in Brazil divers like the assassination of Marielle Franco in August 2016 that cut across divides as well as women playing football to feminist beer has given hope of a more united movement, even though the divisions between the various strands persists (Mosbaugh 2015, Moore 2015). **This validates our first hypothesis of the enduring contestation and the precipitation by varying ideas of interests based on the participant's subject positions.**

Potential for Convergence

To consider the nature of the convergence of the feminist movement within Brazil, given expression through literature in recent times, that is from 2015 onwards of 'feminists coming together', 'feminists are united' (Hao 2016, Martini 2012) and greater awareness and conversation of issues that would be part of an explicit feminist movement, one needed to commit to current literature review and analysis of social media trends. The literature review was not exhaustive and there was limited scope at this stage to undertake field research to gain a more authentic picture of the ground reality of self-identification among the women. Second, social media trends are restricted to counting the number of tweets, mentions by the government and youtube views to discern the dissemination and impact of the message and the start of a conversation that deals with sexism. Within these limitations in the course of the research, this section seeks to evaluate the second hypothesis of the study, that is, "*the persistent differences between the nature and course of the feminist movement between the professional feminists and popular feminists prevent an enduring convergence between them*".

Arnet (2016) and Hao (2016) have indicated the coming together of women who initially were against Dilma Rousseff as well as women who did not identify as feminists to protest against sexism. Hao (2016) identified the unity among women as something unprecedented as this points to the regeneration of the movement as well as greater awareness of their subject position, the

effects of institutional patriarchy and the need to safeguard women's rights against regressive policies. For this cause, a number of movements both online and on the streets have been launched that point to the greater active participation by women across all sections of society, the coming together of different sections of the movement that had worked in isolation with special interests, like the Black Women's March saw the participation of others. Complementing this, Martini (2016) in her thesis extensively studied social media trends that saw the google search for the terms feminism and female empowerment rise by 86.7 per cent and 354.5 per cent respectively in the period between January 2014 and October 2015 in response to movements on the streets and on social media about various incidents about blatant sexism. Many testimonies of these scholars point to Popular Feminists, who had so far shirked the label and self-identification of 'feminist' beginning to identify themselves as feminists and become more aware of their oppression. Furthermore, through the movement, the dialogues and sharing of insights provide another aspect to argue that women were becoming more aware of the subjectivity, breaking the taboo around forbidden topics like abortion and also resisting the new Brazilian regime through concerted campaigns that built alliances across racial, ethnic and class lines.

Coupled with these findings in the review of other literature, this consolidation of the movement in recent times in response to President Rousseff's impeachment, the adverse policies of the new government led by Evangelicals and social media campaigns have unquestionably led to greater awareness among women and also an understanding of a more holistic view of women's rights through the interconnectedness for many women and intersectional analysis, for example, hundreds of women in 2015 protested on the streets against Eduardo Cunha who would later be removed as the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies for proposing a bill, 5069/13 that would make abortion for rape victims difficult (Robertson 2015), with the slogan 'Get Out, Cunha' across Brazil's metropolises. The understanding of younger and more progressive women and men in 2015 protests against such legislation as well as of Afro-Brazilian poor women who are victims of sexual violence and making abortion illegal increase the cost of illegal procedures that are unsafe- a view that such conservative measures affect women across different sections of society that leads them to form alliances during protest movements.

However, on examination of the available literature of the period, it was ascertained that while indicating greater coordination and alliance among various feminists and women's movement,

who still differ but have cast them aside for the larger objective of resistance seem to be the implication of most of them rather than overt and large-scale change in their identification as feminists. Thus, the tenability of a convergence as well as its existence can be disputed.

The present movement in Brazil that many see originating in 2015 saw certain events that led to the resurgence of the movement, growing to be what the second largest selling magazine in Brazil, *Revista Epoca*, termed as the most important movement as of then in Brazil (Grillo et al. 2015). The special dimension of this movement was utilising the internet through social media to shed light on sexism. Robertson (2015), Martini (2016), Moura (2016), Hao (2016) among others point to a chain of events that incited protests known subsequently as the *Primavera Das Mulheres* or 'Feminist Spring in 2015' where the dialogue on patriarchy, discrimination was not just restricted to government councils and online portals but also to the streets, the bars, entrance exams and became part of the national discourse. In addition to the enhanced search about 'feminism' and 'female empowerment', ThinkOlga (2015), a Brazilian feminist research institute estimated that discussions on feminism and associated themes in Brazil surpassed half a million social media interactions. A chronological study of Twitter hashtags and the corresponding responses show how social media websites have become another site for conversations among women, one that has the ability to overcome the social markers as well as alter discourse.

The presence of government on these websites also provide activists with another outlet to approach, to report and to aid in changing the dominant patriarchal discourse where the information flow is not linear and is a lot more unrestricted in terms of quantity and spatiality. In 2015, President Rousseff announced harsher punitive measures for femicide and soon social media users engaged with a more complex debate on gender stereotypes when a Youtube channel posted about women wearing red lipstick which is symbolic locally of more promiscuous women, the debate also roped in the division between good and bad women, the right of women over their bodies and expression and the societal perceptions. In August, social media users were made aware of the *Marchas das Margaridas* (that commemorates the murder of female labourer Margarida and has been marked by rural women marching for better working conditions, gender equality that led to over 70,000 women in Brasilia marching for the cause).

From October to November, the greatest extent of the online phenomenon of the Feminist Spring in Brazil was witnessed with the online campaign of "#*primeiroassedio*" or

#myfirstassault and the "*#meuamigosecreto*" or #mysecretfrind. Triggered by the comments directed at the 12-year-old contestant of the Brazilain version of a cooking reality show, which were sexual in nature and reflected the societal attitude of considering young girls as women and normalisation of this sexual behaviour, Juliana de Faria, the founder of ThinkOlga started the online Twitter campaign using '#primeiroassedio' that invited users to share their stories of being assaulted and harassed. This effort garnered 82,000 tweets as responses within the first four days. The endeavour not only demystified the taboo of talking about topics like these on public forums but also contained an educational angle of exposing the various dimensions of harassment, acts that are normalised which are actually harassment and the ways to identify and report such incidences. The campaign amassed massive attention when the Brazilian government profiles and blogs followed and shared this, encouraging the reporting that made this private issue public, helped in changing the sexist discourse that normalised this behaviour previously and sought to give women greater agency over her self and her body. The global media and large Brazilian media houses extensively covered this and UN Women came forward to support this. This prompted similar campaigns in the United States, Great Britain, in the Netherlands and in Chile where women started sharing their stories. Thus, this campaign generated new data led to debates in the Congress and publicity was given to mechanisms to tackle and report harassment (Martini 2016).

The second campaign was a spontaneous online campaign similar to #primeiroasedio which was based on Christmas traditions of anonymous sharing. However, in this case, women and men revealed normalised sexism though sharing stories under the hashtag, which were anonymous. As Martini (2016) elaborates Starting on November 23 in 2015, which marks the commencement of the 16 days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence (a campaign that started in 1992), commemorating International Day for Elimination of Violence Against Women, the sharing of stories online made visible the supposedly normalised acts of hypocrisy and violence which also was publicised on news portals. While it did not enjoy global or as extensive a coverage as the previous campaign, many prominent politicians and Congresswomen like Luciana Genro, Jandira Ferghali and Maria do Rosario participated. This prompted federal, state and municipal organisations responsible for human rights and safety to encourage reporting and use of hotlines against violence. This campaign led to the realisation of many facets of harassment, prompting

investigations into the conduct of officials and professionals as well as a 40 per cent increase in the calls received to the hotline of violence against women in 2015 compared to 2014.

The response of men on social media varied, the first campaign which was far more explicit saw men coming forward to acknowledge their fault through #*meuculpa*, which saw the mixed reaction from feminists who either welcomed it or argued that men should not hijack the conversations and should not listen rather only respond to defend. The second campaign was more subtle which led to men complaining and creating a counter-campaign, '#*minhaamingasecreto*' or my secret friend directed at women, which did not receive widespread attention.

In response to the initiation of impeachment proceedings against Rousseff, the widespread protests against her in March and April of 2015 did not have a comparable counter response from her supporters and feminists. In the later stages, however, thousands of women came together 'Women for Democracy' in support of Rousseff (Hao 2016).

Admittedly, the limitations of online campaigns relate to the limited users of the social media. Most of them are young and progressive compared to many others who do not have access to social media and argue on issues that are not relevant to all sections of women which fragments the movement. Yet, social media provides access to information that is beneficial for mobilisations, setting the agenda and gaining knowledge about other struggles, as the current divergence between the "#MeToo" and the French dissent against it was analysed at length in Brazilian social media (Canineu 2018).

On the streets, women had marched for many causes in response to these online campaigns and in more recent times, in response to the Veja article regarding the First lady as detailed in the previous chapter, women have started talking about and exposing casual sexism which was till recently viewed as normal. While social media has an educational aspect in making people aware of the entrenched nature of patriarchy, the conversations are more in line with strategic gender interests than practical gender interest (Molyneux 1985). This alteration in the nature of interests definitely alters the identity and this study explored where this alteration affected the self-identification of those who had resisted being called feminists so far. However, conversation restricted to certain age groups and classes highlight that those who would be categorised as

Popular Feminists or not feminists would not have the voice to articulate their views or their counterpoints. To add to this, the current government in Brazil has continued to promote a conservative discourse and eliminated many avenues of government- women's movement coordination, reduction in representation of women that have had an adverse effect in the articulating ability of Popular Feminists who under PT-led government started setting the agenda of the feminist movement. The dissensions of Popular Feminists with Professional Feminists and the ensuing dynamics were interesting and educational, yet due to the dearth of literature about the alteration of perspectives to the extent of changing their identities, the protests that are reactions to the conservative policies of the new regime highlight that the adverse political climate has played a significant role in galvanising women together. The intersectional and participatory nature of these reactions and protests, however, **invite further query and research into the new dynamics of the feminist movement**.

The research in this regard has remained inexhaustive due to lack of data from the field as well as testimonies from participants. The study can be extended to problematise the long drawn alliance amongst women, which is not a convergence but solidarity forged similar to the situation seen during the early Second Wave against the military regime in Brazil. This solidarity, empowered by exchanges over the worldwide web can transform identities and subjectivities of women, where the discourse that has been altered through the online campaigns can also be impacted favourably to the cause of women. The backlash to the dissolution of the Brazilian Cultural Ministry through widespread protests can also be generated for women's movement as even those who opposed PT have come in support of the recent protests in reaction to government policies and proposals. The solidarity that can be forged among women, through greater access to information and exchanges, like online *Encuentros*, without hierarchies can empower many to stand for each other's causes. The convergence that is not premised on tactical alliances, that would entail genuine enduring linkages amongst women and their groups during times when feminism is facilitated by governmental support would be a more viable convergence, which does not negate or nullify the hypothesis completely that convergence did not occur.

The convergence did not occur according to the literature reviewed on a scale that could lead to changes in that nature of the feminist movement at large, while there might be instances of

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certain women becoming more aware of their subjective positions. Thus, **the second hypothesis is largely validated, highlighting that the feminists have the potential to forge solidarity on gender interests, but borrowing Molyneux's terminology, their subject position determines whether it will be practical or strategic and as long as the distinction remains preponderant, the possibility of absolute convergence is unlikely**.

However, the exploration of this greater proximity between the different strands of feminists within the country and the inevitable transformation in their perspective leading to convergence on a smaller scale can be explored in subsequent studies through testimonies, interviews and observation with the activists in Brazil, which is viable through a field trip. In the present scale of this study, the research was based on exploration only through review of primary and secondary sources. A more nuanced understanding of the ground realities can be the subject of further research. Moreover, this research gap can be extended to include regional perspectives and the various movements across Latin American countries where progressive governments have given way to conservative ones, the interlinkages of the feminists in the region can be examined to see if there is a concerted or an isolated country-specific resistance movement. In conclusion, the study sought to provide an overview of the dynamics of the vibrant movement that was revitalised in recent times and the emancipatory aspect of studies that dealt with feminism in general and how different strands of Brazilian feminists devised ingenious strategies to overcome instruments of patriarchy in their own ways.

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