

**THE EUROPEAN UNION OPEN BORDER POLICY AND NON-
TRADITIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES**

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

NAGARAJ NARAGUNDA



Centre for European Studies

School of International Studies

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI 110067

2018



Date: 23/07/2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**The European Union Open Border Policy and Non-Traditional Security Challenges**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of the **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University



Nagaraj Naragunda


CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation



Prof. Ummu Salma Bava

Chairperson, Centre Acronym


Prof. Ummu Salma Bava
Chairperson
Centre for European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067, India


Dr. Teiborlang T Kharsyntiew

Supervisor
Assistant Professor
Centre for European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

At the outset I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr Teiborlang T Kharsyntiew for his continuous guidance and support, I am extremely thankful for him for giving me valuable inputs to my research. He has always shown keen interest in my research and his expertise in area of security has enabled me to learn more about the field. Besides my supervisor, I would like to extend my profound gratitude to our Chairperson Professor Ummu Salma Bava for making us feel at ease even at difficult times, and also for being an inspiration. I also thank all CES faculty for being an inspiration and encouragement.

I extend my heartfelt thanks to staff of the JNU central library and also the staff of the Centre for European Studies for keeping us updated about all the necessary information. I also thank all my fellow Research Scholars and Friends from JNU for helping me whenever I needed. And I would like to thank my Parents and family members for their constant love and support

CONTENTS

Chapter-1: Introduction	1-20
1.1 Background	
1.2 Concept of Border: Definitions and Characteristics of Border	
1.3 The Bases of Open and Closeness of Border	
1.4 Diverse Perspectives of Open Border	
1.5 Border as a Security Zone	
1.6 The EU and Non-Traditional Security Challenges	
1.7 Survey of Literature	
1.8 Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study	
1.9 Research Questions	
1.10 Hypothesis	
1.11 Research Methods	
1.12 Chapterisation	
Chapter-2: Global Perspective of Open Border and Security Challenges	21-40
2.1 Introduction	
2.2 Proliferation of Regional Organisations and Open Borders	
2.3 Regional Approaches to Free Movement	
2.4 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	
2.5 NAFTA: Free Movement of Goods and People	
2.6 NAFTA's Security Agenda	
2.7 African Union and Open Borders	
2.8 Sub-Regional Organisation and Open Borders	
2.9 African Union and Security Concerns	
2.10 MERCOSUR: The South American Free Trade Block	
2.11 The Arab Integration: The Case of Gulf Cooperation Council	

2.12 Economic Integration and Freedom of Mobility of People

2.13 GCC and its Security Agenda

2.14 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

2.15 Labor Mobility Provisions

2.16 The ASEAN Political-Security Community

Chapter-3: The EU Open Border Policy and Changing Threat Perception 41-63

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Schengen Borders and Its Evolution

3.3 Key features of Schengen Agreement

3.4 A Europe without Borders

3.5 Temporary Reintroduction of Border Checks

3.6 Schengen Enlargement of 2007

3.7 Schengen Border and Changing nature of EU borders

3.8 Schengen Borders and External Dimension to EU, s Internal Security

3.9 Changing Threat Perception

3.10 Schengen Expansion to Eastern Europe and Security Concerns

3.11 Framing Migration within Security Framework

3.12 Human Trafficking, Terrorism and Schengen Border

3.13 Refugee Crisis and Threat perception among Schengen Member States

3.14 The Rise of far right parties

3.15 Failed States and Regional Conflicts

Chapter-4: EU Integrated Border Management and Its Effectiveness 64-89

4.1 Introduction

4.2 EU Integrated Border Management: Conceptual Framework

4.3 Different Dimensions of EU IBM

4.4 The Four-tier Access Model Control

4.5 Cooperation in the context of IBM

4.6 Border Agencies to Promote IBM

4.7 Security, Migration management and Database Agencies of Border Management

4.8 IBM and Internal Security

4.9 Implementation of IBM in EU

4.10 Refugee Crisis and Inefficiency of the EU Border Management Agency

4.11 The European Border Guard and Coastguard Agency (2015)

Chapter-5: Conclusion

90-95

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	African Development Bank
AFSJ	Area of Freedom Security and Justice
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nation
AU	African Union
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African State
EEC	European Economic Community
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Global Security Strategy
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
EURODAC	European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database
FRONTEX	European Border and Coastguard Agency
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISS	Internal Security Strategy
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LAFTA	Latin American Free Trade Agreement
NAFTA	North African Free Trade Agreement

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OCTA	Organised Crime Threat assessment
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SBC	Schengen Borders Code
SEA	Single European Act
SIS	Schengen Information System
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER-1

Introduction

1.1 Background

The European Union's (EU) open border policy has been the landmark policy since the end of cold war. The Schengen Agreement facilitated the establishment of the Europe's Schengen region, in which the internal border controls have been essentially eliminated. It was signed by the five of the ten member states of the then European Economic Community on 14 June 1985 nearby small town named Schengen, Luxembourg (Schengen Agreement 1985). Currently it consists of 26 member states. The fundamental objective of the EU's open border policy was to establish "whole and free Europe" through facilitating the free movement of the EU citizens within Schengen area therefore "it proposed measures intended to gradually eliminate border checks at the signatories' common borders, including reduced speed vehicle checks which allowed vehicles to cross borders without stopping, allowing residents in border areas freedom to cross borders away from fixed checkpoints, and the harmonization of visa policies"(Basu 2017).

In 1990, the Schengen Agreement was supplemented by the Schengen Convention which proposed complete elimination of systematic internal border controls and a common visa policy. The Schengen Area operates like a single state for international travel purposes with external border controls for travelers entering and exiting the area, and also for common visas, but with no internal border controls. The Schengen border of EU is a manifestation of liberal democratic principles such as rule of law, democracy, human rights and good governance. These principles act as driving force to people to migrate from places where their human rights are violated due to political instability.

Borders continue to lie at the center of security debates. As with the abolition of internal borders, internal security of the European Union has taken an external dimension. With the end of cold war, disintegration of Soviet Union and advent of globalization the security challenges and priorities of EU has changed, as perceptions of security threats

move beyond focus from traditional hard security concerns such as military, current security debate encompass non-traditional security challenges. Many of these risks are transnational, such as increased irregular migration from the war torn countries, organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling of weapons, has raised concerns over the security challenges before EU. The enlargement processes in 2004 and 2007 have answered the double objective of security and stability where new security challenges linked to enlargement was recognised. The enlargement of the EU towards the Central and Eastern Europe now exposed the EU borders and potentially increased the attractiveness of the enlarged internal market for organized crime, human trafficking and illegal immigration. Thus the externalization of the European security governance system to those states was strongly characterized by security concerns. The changing Political discourse on the non-traditional threats can be seen in the recent migration crisis of 2015. Similarly, the spate of terror attacks (January and November 2015 in Paris, March 2016 in Brussels, July 2016 in France again, December 2016 in Germany and March 2017 London) has created a flux in EU security environment.

Considering the transnational nature of the non-traditional security challenges, the European Union has adopted intergovernmental approach to the external border management by seeking cooperation from member states and the third countries, one such policy is Integrated Border Management (IBM) that emphasize on cooperation beyond EU border and the operational cooperation among member states in fighting against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and trafficking of human beings. The IBM consists of five main components: a common operational co-ordination and cooperation mechanism, common integrated risk analysis, personnel and inter-operational equipment, a common corpus of legislation and burden sharing between the member states and the European Union (European Commission 2017).

In the context of these developments, this dissertation seeks to unfold the non-traditional security challenges emanating from the external borders and their impact on internal security and try to critically analyze the migration-security nexus, and also extending the concept of ‘securitization’, developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, it argues that the political process of linking migration to terrorism and other criminal

activities after a series of attacks within EU does not take place in isolation but can only be interpreted in reference to the domination of the political discourse that frames migration as security issue (Karyotis 2007). Thus this dissertation focus on three things: first it seeks to unfold how the European Union policy of open borders have become driving force for people to migrate from the conflict ridden places and how these borders have given external dimension to the internal security of the member states considering the changing geopolitics of the European Union; second it stresses on how far the migrant crisis has changed threat perception in EU and third it attempt to examine EU has been trying to maintain balance between national security and human security by addressing these non-traditional security issues from its Integrated Border Management.

1.2 Concept of Borders: Definitions and Characteristics of Borders

Since the “Treaty of Westphalia” established the modern nation-state, borders also became a symbol of national sovereignty. Borders can take many forms: natural, such as rivers and other bodies of water; physical, such as walls and fences; agreed upon lines on a map; or any combination of these (Cozine 2016). According to David Newman borders are associated with the identity, identification and belongingness and they are determined by the nature of affiliation, membership and the way the in which the processes of inclusiveness and exclusiveness are manifested through institutionalization (Kurki 2014).The border has become an increasingly complex phenomenon, not only through the proliferation of walls but also through their increasing delocalization beyond the site of physical frontiers (Walter 2006).

The characteristics of borders are often dictated by societal and political institutions within a particular country as well as their relationships with their neighbors and potential threats that lie just on the other side of that border (Cozine 2016). Prescott (1987) wisely defined the terminology of border studies: boundary was the abstract line that separated state territories, frontier was a zone category, and borders were the areas adjacent to a territory (Paasi 2012). Graham (2010) has proposed that “states are becoming internationally organized systems geared towards trying to separate people and circulations deemed risky or malign from those deemed risk-free or worthy of protection”. This ‘separation’ process occurs both inside and outside of state territorial

borders and, indeed, results in a blurring between international and urban/local borders (Paasi 2012).

Historically the concept of border has been stagnant, as it was only confined to the physical entity of the state and regarded as the only representative of the political departure of the state but over a period of time it has evolved as a broader and multidisciplinary concept however it generally conveys a sense of imaginary or real lines of demarcation of land and people of different territory and different origin. Traditionally the concept of border is overwhelmingly associated with the sovereignty of the nation-state as it has the sole authority to decide about the inclusion and exclusion of the people within its own political regime of borders, however the cultural, economic and political form of globalisation have altered the conventional understanding of the functions and symbolic meanings of apparently settled borders.

With the advent robust globalization has started to unsettle and recon-figurate this states centric system of border. Globalization as phenomenon has facilitated the creation of the regional organizations like European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and African Union (AU) and its sub regional organizations have observed these state borders into the regional borders thereby adopting the open border policy among the member states (O'Dowd, Anderson 1999).

Borders are defined as formal line of distinction between the two different jurisdictions or a broad zone of transition between different societies and centers of power (O'Dowd, Anderson 1999). External borders also outline the internal borders especially in a country where federal political system is practiced for instance in USA, and these internal borders also witness significant number of other social boundaries based on ethnicity, nationalism, linguistic or religious groups, devoid of compatibility between the state borders and other types of boundaries remains as stimulating factor of border conflicts or disputes.

1.3 The Bases of Open and Closeness of Border

The extent of openness and closeness of the border is determined by the historical context of the neighboring states, level of economic integration, dependence and other more

localized border issues such as urban settlements and classification of border population residing in border areas (Boehmer, Pena 2012). Oscar Martinez (1994) suggests to incorporate political, economic, social and cultural approach to critically analyze the open and closed borders, he conceptualize borderlands by categorized this into four forms. First he argues that closed borders manifests unfriendliness between two states therefore there is no movement of people across the international boundaries (The case of North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, East and West Germany before unification).When the normalcy is attained the relations are not close enough between states, states may share a co-existent borderlands (as in the case of Iran and Iraq, Greece and Turkey.)

However, if states share close relations at a deeper level of interaction, then they may share either an interdependent, as in the case of US–Mexico or integrated borderland like that of European Union(Boehmer, Pena 2012). The difference between two categories is that the extent of free movement of people and goods is more favorable in the latter than the former. Martinez (1994) conceptualizes open borders as the one characterized by the protocols that advocate neither a visa nor a passport. Sovereign states that are part of Schengen area of the European Union can be regarded as the highest level of openness of borders.

Borders of the states remained sealed to the people from states that they consider as a risk to their security. This should especially be the case if relations with neighboring states have been hostile in the recent past. Territory remains the single most important issue over which states fight violently (Starr and Thomas 2005; Vasquez 1993, 1995; Mandel 1980). Economic interactions are more likely to take place between states that are close in proximity due lower transportation costs to move goods across borders, wealth of the nation is the most primary determining factor to identify if the borders remains open for neighbors or not, if the country seems to have sound economic system and surrounded by the poor economic countries, it becomes natural for wealthy countries to close the borders. Wealthy states will impose more restrictive entry policies on the citizens of poorer neighboring states, sorting out potential immigrants from visitors (Boehmer, Pena 2012).

Wealthier states re-border their territory to those flows that are perceived as threats to the wealth of the community, asserting their “right” of “exclusion” on the basis of state sovereignty (Van Houtum 2002). Economic development in the developed countries become pull factor and when combined with push factors such as unemployment, civil war, political instability, persecution of the sending country will have social, economic, political implications that shape the migration policies of the receiving countries(Boehmer, Pena 2012).The possibility of social and political tension is often associated with the free movement of persons than the free movement goods across the border (Andreas 1996).The possibility of wealthy states being more open to the citizens from the rich states than to the poor states , however wealth is relative to the neighboring states, both states can be poor by international standards yet there lies difference in the economic condition that may prompt even poor states to adopt the restrictive measures the free movement of people given the limited resources. The trade among rich states account for the largest share in the global trade therefore that borders between the trading neighbor states remain more open than the border between the neighbor states that do not trade with each other (Boehmer, Pena 2012).

The dynamism of borders where development is asymmetrical will depend upon the level of cooperation and integration that exists to exploit each state’s comparative advantage. States may become economically interdependent on each other in a manner that may reduce asymmetry in development. In international relations trade is inversely related to distance. Trade between two larger economies of neighboring countries will be deeper than distant trading partners with small economies, states that are lawfully open to people from an adjacent state do not experience illegal migrant flows from that state; the illegality is a product of restrictive policies (Boehmer, Pena 2012).

Political regimes also act as catalyst in changing behavior of the states, as it is believed that neighboring states that share similar political values tend to be more open compared to the contradictory political system. S P Huntington (1991) argues that democracies do not go for war and two neighboring democracies are more likely to be more open than other types of political system because democracies share similar cultural, institutional principles relating to transparency freedom of movement etc. Democracies are often

regarded as stable because they institutionalize conflict resolution through the application of law and courts (Huntington 1991).

The present member states of the EU are having democratic political set up therefore the since its inception has not experienced a political violence among the member states. There is on average less civil war and internal violence in democracies, which reduces the need for extensive internal security measures compared to many nondemocratic states. This eases the possibility of refugee problems causing from displacement by civil conflict. The free movement of people is therefore higher in democracies than non-democratic political setup. Restriction to the free mobility of people is more likely to arise when there are security threats, especially external threat. Democracies are also less likely to fight each other in wars (Ray 1995; Maoz and Russett 1993). Therefore it becomes natural for democracies to trust the citizens of neighboring democracies, The Schengen Agreement among member states of the European Union states stands as an excellent example of open borders among democracies.

1.4 Diverse Perspectives of Open Borders

With the advent of globalization, the flow of goods and services and information has grown drastically across the international borders as advancement of science and technology has transformed our conventional understanding of the borders that was merely confined to the authority of the sovereign state and borders were regarded as the most sanctified unit of the state and always remained barricaded, They were seen as the symbol injustice ,division and discrimination and also symbol of human suffering and identity. the but post-cold war our conceptual understanding of the border has undergone tremendous change as the triumph of liberal democratic values that fostered the values of the freedom of movement ,freedom of expression. Different political traditions or political philosophies have presented different perspectives about the open borders. These perspectives comprise of market economy, political economy, liberal political theory and constructivist approaches.

Liberal Political-Theory Perspective

The supporters of liberal political theory argue that impediments on the free mobility of people violate the fundamental principles of the liberal political system. Any form of restrictions on the movement of people across the border should not be accepted by the states that seek to uphold the liberal principles. The proponent of this approach is Joseph Carens (Bauder 2015) He used a democratic principle to criticize the giving of citizenship by the states on the basis of their origin of birth. He argues that citizens do not hold the birthright to property on the territory in which they are citizen, and equates such birthright to the feudal practice and, hence should be abolished, and he further argues that the selective right to move across international state borders grounded on citizenship and the right of citizens to stay in their state of citizenship are equally defective birth privileges (Bauder 2015). By using John Rawls free and rational society to support his stand he argues that in an international human community, entering inside a state territory and right to live in the same territory must be an undeniable right of the liberal democratic political system (Bauder 2015).

James Carens (1987) uses utilitarian argument and claims that citizens of the nation states may receive ample amount of benefits by restricting the entry of migrants at the borders but the difficulties experienced by the migrants whose entry is restricted at the border is typically more compared to the advantages received by the citizens, thus open borders would enhance the overall utility of people involved and affected by the process of migration, therefore he emphasizes on having an open border political system (Carens, 1987). The other liberal proponents of open borders have built their argument on the basis of human rights that regard the free mobility of people as a basic human right. Satvinder Juss (2004) provides practical evidence to support his claim by showing that historically free mobility of people has been the norm in the society since the time of the advent of human civilization, from ancient antiquity to recent when nativism that began to shape the restrictive mechanism for the migrants by the modern nation states creating binaries between “us and them”.

From an applied ethics point of view border checks manifest a clear violation of rights (Huemer 2010) as they inflict damage if they forcefully interfere with the rights of the

migrants including their quest improve their standard of living by escaping from the war, persecution, poverty, therefore, institutionally or structurally enforced border control in any way cannot be defended ethically as it is gross structural abuse of right to life and liberty (Bauder 2015). Critics of the liberal perspectives have termed the liberal perspectives of open borders as a liberal absurdity that illustrates the inconsistency between the liberals support for open borders and arguments that borders should be regulated to safeguard the liberal political system and community, for instance liberal theorists reiterate the fact that national communities have the right to self-determine their identity and membership (Bauder 2015). In this context universal liberal societies have focused on the individual conflict with the particular kind of liberal traditions that emphasis on the community, shared identity and nationhood (Bader 2005,Meilaender 1999). Higgins (2008) points out that to overcome these kinds of liberal contradictions on the open borders one has to focus on the individual's social situation in societies and other societal institutions or founded on the civilizational roots. The contradictions and discrepancies in the liberal perspectives have prompted the commentators to advocate fairly open borders, whereas Seglow argues that states are political sovereign entities having sole authority to decide about the borders therefore neither state possess a complete authority to close nor an obligation to fully open their border (Bader 1997).

Market Economy Perspective

The classical Ricardian economic theory advocates for open borders since it believes that the free movement of goods and services and free movement of persons will bring competence to the global market as a whole (Gill 2000). It encourages countries and regions to specialize by permitting labor to move wherever it is required the most. Free market theory perceives border controls as manifestation of distortion that hampers the free movement of labor and the level of productivity thereby causing an economic inefficiency. By adopting open border policies for the movement of labor, it will bring a positive outcome including rise of global income and productivity level, reduction in the global wage disparities and improvement in the competence of the international and national economies (Basik 2013). Equilibrium theory argues that free movement across

the international borders helps in the interest of the labor, national economy and global economy as a whole (Chang 1997).

The free market economy links the migration to the liberal political philosophy that argues that use of violence that includes preventing migrants entering into territory of another state is justified on the ground of protecting the citizens that particular state and their property (Rothbard 1978). Free movement of people across the international borders should not be restricted until and unless it proves to be an imminent and existential threat to the life and property of the people (Huerta de Suoto 1998). Advocates of open borders who presume that market economies are sensitive to the impact of the free movement of the labor on the non-migrant workers and citizens Non migrant countries in migrant receiving countries such as USA may in fact gain advantage from the open borders because of their greater local language skills would give them a competitive advantage and migration raises property value and creates new jobs (Bauder 2015). In addition migrants often contribute to the welfare of the state however as a non-citizens are not endowed with a benefits (Bauder 2015). Empirical studies have shown that open borders enhance economic growth for the host countries, even those countries that advocate social welfare model especially European countries. Restricting migrants towards the social welfare model states is not necessary for the fear of taking away the citizens benefit (Doomernik 2007).

Political Economy Perspective

Unlike the other two perspectives the political economic perspective presents contradictory position with the regard to open borders, it tends to be critical of market economy and argues that the borders are the prerequisite for the contemporary political system and capitalism (Duvell 2003). Traditionally the practice of restricting the free movement of persons at the international border has been a significant factor in organizing the national economies. Most recently border checks have enabled the recreation of class hierarchy and the persistence of the neoliberal capitalism. Already there has been an open border for the highly skilled workers, while international boundaries tend to be open for privileged business persons (Bauder 2015). Border checks only are aimed at disadvantaged labors and facilitate their exploitation (Castles 2003).

If workers are prevented from crossing borders they can be exploited in a low wage countries where working standards are low and workers' rights are compromised and workers and their family have poor access to health facilities and other social welfare benefits.

The advent of free trade and the global development of capitalism that was initiated by developed countries such as the United States have deprived and displaced major portions of the population in developing and underdeveloped countries and, thus, created the migration of people who would prefer to stay (Harvey 2005). The political economy approach also focuses on the other advantages of the global capitalism especially the manner in which the capitalism has uprooted and displaced people. Today the so called immigrant problems constitute only a tip of ice berg of the enormous global chaos created by the global capital excess (Darder 2007).

Hayter (2004) suggests that open borders will remove some of the pressures on the economies and the labor markets of the developing countries triggered by the growth of the capitalism. And Pritchett (2006) argues that in terms of global development open borders will generate significant amount of economic benefits to the migrants coming from the poor countries apart from this migrants also transfer significant amount money and human capital to their countries of origin through the remittances and brain circulation.¹ And thus contribute to the development of these countries.

However Bader refutes this argument saying that open border can have only limited or even negative impact on the global development or tackling global economic inequalities. Many poor people and families in the developing countries are not able to migrate to other countries in order to improve their living standards. Moreover the migration of rich and educated section of society can only result in the economic slowdown and brain drain of the departure countries, thus he concludes by contending that open borders can be less effective in distributing the wealth and opportunity between the developed and underdeveloped countries than if the developed countries provided international development aid (Bauder 2015).

¹ Brain circulation is an alternative term for brain drain

Constructivist Perspectives

Constructivist perspective about the open borders can be understood within the framework of its perception about international relations. It is based on the premise that international system is the outcome of historical and social construction rather than the consequence of the human nature or other fundamental principles of international system like Balance power, Struggle for power, Security dilemma, Arms race (Jackson, Nexon 2002).

Constructivism emphasis on the important role of ideas and (European) values in the establishment and development of the cross-border regions, and as a result researchers underline that the aim of the building is to terminate borders and they point out subsequent re-territorialisation, which is the characteristics of borders with the EU or Schengen region (Fabian 2013). In order to understand the different kind of border region pattern and to describe the multidimensional forces which are thought to obscure European borders as a consequence of enlargement of the EU (Fabian 2013). Constructivists like Nicholas Onus argues that borders are socially and politically constructed for the sake of building a collective identity of the human beings, thus he argues that constructivism seeks to erase those borders that are based on identity, culture, nation, and any kind of border that act as barrier and impedes the development of society needs to be eliminated, he further argues that these borders creates binaries between human beings by creating distinction between us vs them.

1.5 Border as a Security Zone

The “Bruges Speech” is regarded as the political statement of the British skepticism towards EU’s common external borders. The British Prime minister in her speech stressed on an importance of the border, she emphasized on an indissoluble relation border has with the concept of security, and she also maintains that it is the responsibility of the sovereign states to ensure the security at the borders not the supranational institutions. She also stressed on the fact that the concept of state, border, and security have been an inseparable part of our collective understanding of the border as a security zone (Zaiotti, 2007).The concept border is still understood within the framework of the

security concerns. Throughout the history of nation states, the chief concern associated to border security was the risk of military intrusion from hostile neighbors or other foreign forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union and Soviet expansionism. A variety of non-state actors have long benefited from the ever-increasing openness and interconnectivity of the world to operate across national borders in violation of law and evading law enforcement to achieve their goals (Andreas 2010).

The robust economic interconnectedness blurs the distinction between internal and external (Everard 2000). This echoes considerably on the notions of sovereignty, territoriality and security. In the framework of security this process has led to the transnationalisation of security and that is, of course, against the idea of national security. If we contemplate the European security process on a larger scale, we are certain to find out, how security, or rather the delusion of it, is still fairly based on exclusionist thinking (Bigo 1998).

Security should be understood as a process of ‘securitization/insecuritization’ of the borders, and “Securitization is not an answer to insecuritization, but a capacity to manage or create insecurity” (Bigo 2000). The concept of securitization is based on the idea that all the threats are socially constructed, it means that it is difficult to assess if the threat are real or not (Leonard 2010)

1.6 The EU and Non-Traditional Security Challenges

The contemporary international relations, the process of globalization and regional integration, along with the growing interdependence and multiplication of actors international organisations, supranational organisations, NGO’s, multinational companies, etc. have challenged traditional notions of security and borders both in principle and practice. This is specifically the case with the European Union where the number of exogenous and endogenous factors has altered borders and their meaning (Gropas 2004).

The fundamental definition of non-traditional security challenges (NTS) is understood as the security challenges that are no longer dominated by the military vs military, state vs

state, pattern of threats but rather conditioned by the cultural, economic, environmental and political dimension of the threats (Maier-Knapp 2012). Many of the scholars have different point of view over what constitute the non-traditional security challenges. Some argue that non-traditional security challenges are threats to the nation state that stem from the politics of rhetoric in opposition to the traditional threats .And there is other camp of scholars who regard NTS as a descriptive tool to underline the various dimension of emerging threats and also focusing on the multi-level and multidimensional responses necessary for the so called human security issues (Maier-Knapp 2012).

The end of cold war brought tremendous changes in the conceptual understanding of the term security, as during the cold war the concept security or strategy was merely understood within the framework of the state authority, and primary security concern was only confined to military aspect of the state, and threats during this period were predictable and identifiable. However, the collapse of Soviet Union and end of cold war brought about tremendous changes in the security environment of the region as the age old threat of the Europe collapsed. The end of Cold War however, left behind the many security concerns that were based on the identity, ethnicity, religion, nationalism and environment. These new security concerns have often remained more diverse and less predictable.

It is in this context that for the first time in 2003, the European Union identifies key threats that were characterized as NTS such as Terrorism that is regarded as the most life threatening because it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of EU. European countries have been at the receiving end, and logistical bases for Al Qaeda outfits have been unfolded in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium (ESS 2003). Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is also regarded as the greatest threat, the spread of missile technology and further instability in the Schengen region, regional conflicts could hampers the interests of the European Union directly or indirectly as there is always possibility of spillover effect from the conflict ridden places. The second threat is the “state failure that is characterized by bad governance and the practice of corruption, abuse of power, absence of institutions and lack of accountability and civil conflict may destroy States from within”(ESS 2003).

In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions, “Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples, and Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism, failed state can undermine its own security apparatus, which may cause regional instability” (ESS, 2003). Third threat is Organized Crime; its growing network in the Europe has emerged as the greater cause of concern for the EU. This internal threat has an important external dimension, where cross-border trafficking in drugs, weapons, women, and illegal migrants accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries, and 90percent of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for “some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade worldwide” (ESS, 2003).

1.7 Survey of Literature

The review offers a stock-taking of the work already done on how the EU outlines its open border policy and on non-traditional security issues that are posing challenge from the abolition of internal border checks of the EU member states. The literature on the EU’s open border policy and its Integrated Border Management can be divided broadly into the following thematic areas **(a)** The EU open border Policy **(b)**Non Traditional Security challenges **(c)** The EU’s Integrated Border Management.

The EU’s Open Border Policy

The EU’s Open Borders have been manifestation of a single voice of the Europe and has ensured the freedom of mobility for its own citizens without any restrictions, this unique Policy of EU has emphasized on four freedoms within the region: Security, Liberty, Justice and Free movement of the People. Saskia Sassen (1996) regards the growth of supranational and regional influence in border control and immigration policy as a one aspect of a wider loss of sovereignty for the nation states under global conditions. An economist Nathan Smith, (2014) writing for Open Borders, published a speculative essay in which he imagined a future world in which borders had been flung open. For this

advocate of free migration, an influx of migrants into the West would demand “improvisational and authoritarian expedients”, such as the end of the welfare state and equality of opportunity (Sixsmith 2017). “Natives would retreat into gated communities.” Law enforcement would often be baffled by new and complex challenges. Local stirrings of revolt could transform the national psyche enough to make weapons training in school or even universal conscription into some sort of national police force attractive. Wallace (1992), a leading analyst of European integration, notes that the question of territorial boundaries is central to the study of political systems, legal jurisdictions and socio-economic interaction. The Indian sociologist, T.K. Oommen (2010) has even suggested that the ‘rise and fall, the construction and deconstruction of various types of boundaries is the very story of human civilization and of contemporary social transformation (O’Dowd, L 2002). Heather Grabbe (2000) in her article titled “The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen Eastwards” argues that the “expansion of Schengen towards Eastern Europe has coincided with growing internal security agenda within the EU, a policy priority area that can be understood as ‘micro-security’ is growing fast, as policy-makers respond to numerous threats to the security of their citizens by developing new mechanisms at both national and regional level”.

Open Border and Non-Traditional Security Challenges

The Open border policy was adopted by European Union at a time when the movement of globalization started growing and collapse of Soviet Union halts the decades of hostility between the two superpowers, paving way for the independence of the Central and Eastern European Countries. The end of Cold War warranted a re-evaluation of concept of security that shifted focus from traditional security challenges to the non-traditional security challenges. The concept of Security evolved to encompass many more threats that are non-military in nature (Buzan 1983; Ullman 1983). In the early 1980s, Barry Buzan (1983; 1991) of Copenhagen School was one of the scholars who introduced the five components of security threat: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental

Ries (2012) argues that in a globalized world new security challenges are diffused and are mostly interconnected than ever before, Rees (2008) in his article titled “Inside Out:

the External Face of EU Internal Security Policy” notices the paradox that the internal security has an external policy dimension. As the traditional distinction between the internal and external security disappears, the EU must protect its own space from a variety of challenges that include organized crime, illegal immigration and terrorism. The blurring of boundaries between internal and external security (Bigo 2001) is at the core of the European Union’s external security challenges.

Averre (2016) argues that threats have only increased in the last five years and present a serious challenge to the EU. As a result of the growing ethnic conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa Brussels has experienced the spillover effects of the crisis (refugee crisis and terrorist attacks). This threatens to derail the members of EU and undermine European Union as a single voice of Europe. Ioannidis (2014) points out that after enlargement, the dangerous outside is seen to have moved closer to the EU. Carl Bildt (2017) outline six challenges before European Union: Brexit, European economy, migration and refugees, political scene, foreign and security policy, digital Europe and outlook. Renard (2014) points out the potential sources of instability that have been identified by the EU in a series of documents. The 2003 European Security Strategy has identified the five external security challenges in which illegal migration is also considered as threat to the national security. ESS examined the external dimension of the Union’s security challenges. In 2010 the internal security Strategy was implemented to identify the internal security challenges, the document states that internal security signifies ensuring protection of citizens and values of democracy and freedom. It lists out common threats which are similar to the ESS, such as terrorism, organized crime, cybercrime, cross-border crime, ethnic violence, natural and man-made disasters (ISS 2010).

EU’s Integrated Border Management

The emergence of EU external dimension to its internal security can be traced from two aspects, one is the blurring of differences between the internal and external borders of the European Union and its associated policy measures towards the non EU members because the Schengen agreement has itself created a division within the EU, as a Schengen and non-Schengen member states of the EU. Rees (2008) in his article titled

“Inside Out: the External Face of EU Internal Security Policy” observes the paradox that the internal security has an external policy dimension

Sergio Carrera (2007) in her article titled “The EU Border Management Strategy: Frontex and the Challenges of Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands” observes that the primary objective of flagging of IBM is aimed at an integrated and global response to the challenges posed by the phenomenon of irregular immigration through the common external borders. The Southern maritime borders constitute one of the main targets addressed by this strategy. Lavenex and wichman (2008) points out that menaces such as Terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking originate outside EU and are mostly interconnected with wider network, hence it is very important to strengthen the external border security of EU. Christina (2003) in her article titled “The External dimension EU Immigration and Asylum Policy” points out that “there is an attempts to externalize traditional tools of domestic or EU migration control, and to prevent the causes of migration and refugee flows, through development assistance and foreign policy tools. Both are based on different assumptions about how best to influence migration flows, and will have divergent impacts on migration flows, refugee protection and relations with third countries”.

Giovanna Bono (2006) observes that EU security policies are identified with the second and third pillars of the European Union that is with Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which also includes the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and second pillar is known as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), However, when we look at the current implementation and political formulation of these policies, they cut across the three-pillars structure of the EU. (European Commission 2016).

The above mentioned review of literature reveals that there is limited work done on the complexities of the EU open borders and non-traditional security challenges and there is hardly any work done on connecting the open borders to the non-traditional security threats and how the vulnerabilities of the open borders are being secured through Integrated Border Management Strategy.

1.8 Definition, Rationale and the Scope of the Study

In the background of the increased non-traditional security challenges in Europe, this research set out to analyze the non-traditional security challenges faced by the EU from massive influx of people from war torn countries. Non-traditional security challenges are defined as challenges to the survival and well-being of people and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as, cross-border environmental degradation and, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern European countries underwent major political changes which transformed the social and political landscape of Europe. These changes were followed by a decade of political conflict and ethnic violence in the Balkan region that led to mass movement of people and challenge the EU security preparedness. Today the conflict in Ukraine, West Africa and North Africa has resulted in massive influx of people from this region to EU member countries. Besides these organized crimes like drugs, arms and human trafficking are new challenges that the EU and its member countries are facing regularly to secure both its internal and external border. In addressing these challenges, the EU's IBM was first conceptualized in 2002. The primary objective behind IBM is to regulate the mobility at the external borders effectively and address the challenges arising from irregular migration and potential future and, contributing to addressing serious crime with a cross border and ensuring high level of internal security and safeguard the free movement of persons within the Union European countries. The rationale behind this research is that a comprehensive assessment of the EU's Open Border policy and its evolution from the initial five members to further enlargement towards Eastern European States and how the elimination of internal borders have transformed the internal security priorities to the EU external borders by giving it an external dimension has remained relatively unexplored ,and the scope of the study will be limited to examining the vulnerabilities of Open borders to non-traditional security challenges and analyzing how far Integrated Border Management has been effective in combating internal security threats through its external security dimension and also examining how EU is striking a balance between human security and national security.

1.9 Research Questions

This dissertation would attempt to find an answer to the following question

- How has the Schengen agreement change the concept of Border in the European Union?
- How did the non-traditional security challenges impact the EU's open border policy?
- How has the abolition of the internal borders influenced the external dimension to the EU's internal security?
- How effective has the EU Integrated Border Management in confronting non-traditional security challenges?

1.10 Hypothesis

The EU's open border policy is impacted by the growing non-traditional security challenges.

1.11 Research Methods

The proposed study will use the deductive method of research following both descriptive and analytical method to consider both primary and secondary sources, This research will apply Barry Buzan,s three components of security such as societal security, political security and economic security, as their interdependence will help to understand the perceived non-traditional security issues associated with massive influx of people from the conflict ridden places. Using these three components, the study will critically examines impact of illegal immigration and how it has changed the dynamics of security challenges in European Union. The research is based on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources includes the Schengen Agreement and the Treaty of Rome and also various documents and reports of the different agencies of European Union such as European Commission, European Council, European Parliament and European External Action Service, European Security Strategy (2003), European Union Global strategy

(2016) and, Secondary sources includes books, articles, academic journals and internet sources.

1.12 Chapterisation

Chapter One: Introduction

This chapter introduces the research topic by giving an overview of the study and key issues proposed to be analyzed. This section will trace the research problem and introduce the concept of border and will discuss different types of border such as closed and open border. And this will also focus on the different perspectives of the border. This will introduce chapters and the methodology to be applied in carrying out research.

Chapter Two: Global Perspectives of Open Borders and Security Challenges

This chapter focuses on the global perspectives of open border, considering open borders in different regional organizations such NAFTA, African Union and its sub regional organizations, MERCOSUR in South America etc. This will also look at to what extent these organizations have facilitated free movement of people and goods among the member states of the organizations examine how Schengen border is different from other regional open borders in dealing with non-traditional security issues.

Chapter Three: The EU open border policy and Changing Threat Perception

This chapter focuses on various non-traditional security challenges ranging from illegal immigration, trafficking and organized crime, emanating from the EU external border and their impact on the internal security of the EU member states and critically examines how the issue migration has also changed the political discourse on security, and it will also focus on nexus of illegal immigration, organized crime, terrorism and trafficking and critically examine how the EU borders are impacted these challenges.

Chapter Four: EU Integrated border Management (IBM) and Its Effectiveness

This chapter focuses on “Integrated Border Management” and its various coordinating agencies of member states, and critically examines its effectiveness in combating non-

traditional security challenges emanating from external border. It also focuses on initiatives of border control practices adopted by the EU prior to the adoption of the IBM.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

This chapter presents the findings on how the open border policy has become vulnerable to non-traditional Security challenges and Europe in search of peaceful life, how its external dimension of the internal security through its Integrated Border Management has been effective in combating non- traditional security challenges.

CHAPTER-2

Global Perspective of Open Borders and Security Challenges

2.1 Introduction

The series of events such as fall of Berlin Wall and disintegration of Soviet Union remained a testimony to the end of cold war as this has brought waves of transformation in different aspects of global society ranging from security, political economy, and political system. This has drastically changed the geopolitical condition in Europe and changed prevailing institutional structures and expanded the economic and security landscape. Aspirations of freedom, democracy and the defense of human rights, the fall of Berlin further accelerated the free movement of people without any barriers, the idea of free mobility of people, goods and service is purely embedded in the liberal democratic traditions. The Changing political principles in Europe gradually started to reflect across the globe as many developing countries started to emulate the European political system and, the advent of globalization has further accelerated this movement and blurred state boundaries.

Globalization as a phenomenon has not remained isolated; it has affected every aspect of the human society from economic to societal to political and to security and impacted every part of the globe from developing to developed countries. With the advent of globalisation it is believed that borders are on the verge of losing their fencing function, as the scientific advancement as fostered robust economic interconnectedness and permitted more flexibility in different aspects (Amilhat-Szary 2007). This development can be perceived as the cause and consequence of the development of different kind of circulation including goods, capital, ideas and people (Amilhat-Szary 2007).

Global perspectives of the open borders can be attributed to the advent of the globalization that facilitated the establishment of the World Trade Organisations (WTO) which sought to remove the tariff barriers to movements of goods, many of the regional free trade areas are operating within the framework of the procedures established by the WTO. It has facilitated the stronger economic interconnectedness and also a strong increase in cross border movement of goods and services, capital labor.

According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941), openness through the mobility of people, goods or capital affects prices and wages in the same way, benefiting the abundant factor while hurting the scarce factor. Regional free trade agreements have become building blocks for the open borders and further deepening of the economic integration. In contrast, most of these same states have chosen open trade since the 1950s but have restricted immigration. Benedict Anderson (1983) once famously described nation states as “imagined communities”, “I’d like to imagine mine without border guards, barbed wire, passport control, walls, fences or barriers. The world would be a better place without them” (Young 2018). This chapter therefore seeks to examine how various regional organisations have adopted the free mobility of goods to free mobility of persons, and what are the challenges they are facing in implementing these policies.

2.2 Proliferation of Regional organizations and Open Borders

Regional organisations (ROs) or “regimes are created by states with the purpose of contributing to governance within the geographical area of which they are a part” (Langenhove, 2012). In many instances, the formation of ROs is related to economic issues example in the case of regional trade arrangements and sometimes it is related to the governance of certain public goods, including security.

The free mobility of persons appears to be challenging to accomplish at the international level, however it can be accomplished at the regional organization or supranational institution level, across the globe numerous regional organizations have adopted measures that facilitate free mobility of goods and people within the territories of their member states, measures may range from the elimination of visa-requirements to comprehensive movement rights (UNESCO 2017). The European Union (EU) has been regarded as the prominent example of a free movement area. One can see the establishment of many regional blocs inspired by EU such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, reducing the role of borders as barriers in order to stimulate commerce and flows between member states (Lange, Pires 2015).

The facilitation of the free mobility of can a primary or secondary objective of the regional integration, however the extent to which the regional integration process effects

the degree to which the free mobility of the people will be realized within the member states. However the differences also occur with regard to the free mobility of people within the member states (UNESCO 2017).

The Establishment of the liberal democratic order has given an impetus to the proliferation of the Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) which became catalyst to the regional economic integration. The present EU is the product of decades of negotiations and agreements and the open border policy of the EU is governed by the Schengen agreement of 1985, each treaty has contributed its evolution from merely an economic integration to the political integration. The reason why European Union stands out among all the regional organizations is because of its uniqueness in the functional structure of the organizations, it is the first of regional organization which initiated a process of eliminating the internal border between the member states that facilitated the free mobility of the people, goods and services, and it also took initiative to launch common currency called as Euro and the region in which this currency is applicable is known as Eurozone.

In present time major part of the cross border movement happens within the regional spaces. According to the World Bank it is estimated that free mobility is encouraged within the same geographical region (World Bank 2011). In Sub-Saharan African region, it is estimated that 63 per cent of emigrants move within the same region. And when we look at the Sub regions of the Africa such as West Africa, it is estimated that “around 7.5 million migrants move inside the same region that is estimated to be around 86 per cent of the total emigration” (UNESCO 2017). Thus the above information rightly points out that the concept of free mobility of people and goods is more prevalent within the same region than compared to the different regions.

2.3 Regional Approaches to Free Movement

With the regard to the free mobility of people and goods, primarily there are two kinds of state centered cooperation that have emerged at the regional level (UNESCO 2017). The first one involves the official regional agreements, which by envisaging various political, economic and security objectives, these have taken measures to facilitate the free

mobility of people into the complete integration agenda of the region (UNESCO 2017). There has been tremendous increase in the scope and number of regional organizations in the present times, the idea of regional cooperation and regional integration is not new, as the regional cooperation has existed in different forms such as leagues and Forums (Fawcett 2005). Several associations and forums have existed from the nineteenth century (Mattli 1999). In the present times numerous regional organizations, associations and agreements exist, and every regional organization is unique in its own way as they considerably differ in their importance, kind of functions carried out, institutional mechanism, decision making process and nature of membership (Schiff, Winters 2003).

Second, Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) have emerged since two decades, advocating intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation on international migration (Shroder 2010). These RCPs have come up in the last two decades as an attempt by the intergovernmental mechanism to resolve migration related issues at the regional level (IOM 2011). RCPs are non-binding and informal, and their informal nature indicates depoliticized space where participant states may discuss the issues of collective interest without putting forward national interest at first place (Hansen 2010).

2.4 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

The Former President of the United States Ronald Reagan proposed North American free market in his campaign during 1980, on November 13, 1979, he stated that “It may take the next 100 years, but we can dare to dream that at some future date a map of the world might show the North American continent as one in which the people’s commerce of its three strong countries flow more freely across their present borders than they do today” (Hartman 2010). It was believed to be inspired by the treaty of Rome 1957 (Hartman 2010), in fact both NAFTA and treaty of Maastricht were signed in 1993.

The objectives behind common market are outlined in article 102 of the NAFTA agreement, it states six fundamental objectives such as “removal of the trade barriers to enable the cross border mobility of goods and services of the territories of the different parties, encourage the condition of reasonable competition inside the free trade region, increasing of investment opportunities in the region and, providing adequate and effective

protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each member states, creating effective procedures for implementation and application of this agreement and for its joint administration and resolution of disputes and establish a framework for further trilateral regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of the agreement” (Abeyratne 2016). NAFTA came into force on 1st January 1994 creating a free trade area between United States of America, Canada, Mexico and this free trade agreement has deeply transferred the trilateral relations between these countries.

2.5 NAFTA: Free movements of Goods and People

With the advent of NAFTA into force export and import between Canada-Mexico and US has dramatically increased. It is estimated that before NAFTA the total US-Mexico trade imports and exports equaled roughly 81.5 billion dollars per year, but since NAFTA US-Mexico trade has shot up to be 173.7 billion dollars (David, James Rolando 2010). Despite the brief fall in trade in 1995 due to devaluation of Mexico’s Peso, in 2003, a second major wave of import and export activity began for both countries after 2001, and this marked the resurgence of the American economy after the recession of 2001. Canadian imports, exports and imports from Mexico surged. However, exports from the United States to Mexico during the 2003 to 2008 period showed rather less growth. Agricultural trade increases were a growing component of the trade expansion with Canada and Mexico (Hartman 2010). Although agricultural trade increased but the percentage of agricultural products traded remain very insignificant (Hartman 2010). However the attribution of increased import and export between the US-Mexico to the advent of NAFTA has remained debatable question among many scholars, as Hufbauer and Schott argue that “there was an overall increase in the international trade during 1993 to 2008, therefore to attribute the growth of increased trade between the Canada, Mexico and USA only to the NAFTA is debatable”.

However with the regard to the free mobility of the persons within the NAFTA member countries, there is no provision of migration among the three member countries, when US, Canada and Mexico completed negotiations for the NAFTA, and moreover the primary objective behind the establishment of the NAFTA was to strengthen the US border controls with Mexico and promulgate anti-immigration law (Solomon 1997).

Gene McNary the then the Immigration and Naturalisation Service Commissioner stated that “I feel more than a bit confident in acknowledging that if immigration is not formally on the table, someone of the table will sooner or later realize as a practical matter that moving goods and services in international commerce also involves moving the people who trade in those goods and services” (Emilio-2010).

The main logic behind the foreign direct investment and free trade agreement was that, free trade and FDI would act as catalyst in discouraging the inflow of migrants from Mexico. Consequently, only the mobility of business people or intra-corporate transferees has been enabled, while the issue about the low skilled labor has remained unresolved. (UNESCO 2017).The NAFTA’s quest to achieve standard of living in the region by generating more job opportunities and to discourage illegal migration movements between Mexico and the US, the agreement failed to deal with migration issues (Flores-Macias 2008).

Prior to coming of the Bush administration and the attacks of September 11, 2001 the whole focus was on economic prosperity in the regional integration but after the 9/11 attack it changed the course of regional integration by giving it a security angle as it provided the rationale for establishment of the Bush National Security Doctrine that security issues assumed center stage in the regional integration model (Carlsen 2008).In any given day, 800,000 people cross from Mexico into the United States legally, while some 4,600 illegal crossers are arrested and deported. Since 1995 and the United States new border administration strategies, human rights groups estimate that deaths in the desert have increased fivefold (CAP 2017).

2.6 NAFTA’s Security Agenda

The North American power elites,² during the 1990,s advocated opening of boundaries to enhance the economic interests of NAFTA, are the same power elites who have advocated closing of border in the post-9/11 era, in the face of what they perceive as a security threat(Newman 2006).

² Power elites signifies the interwoven interests of the leaders of the military, corporate, and political elements of society and suggests that the ordinary citizen is a relatively powerless subject of manipulation by those entities.

The “Bush National Security Doctrine of 2002” is a clear indication of its security agenda not just within the region but global as well, and the most commanding demonstration of U.S. hegemony since the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine openly links trade and security as two pillars of a vision that postulates what is good for the United States (as defined by the Bush administration and neo-conservative architects of the plan) is good for the world. Although better known for formulating the change from containment to regime change, the document dedicates an entire chapter to asserting a fundamental relationship between free markets and U.S national security (Carlsen 2008).

The financial market integration and trans-border financial governing arrangements would be more advanced in North America than in Europe. However, as we shall show in this article, the opposite is the case: financial and monetary integration at both the market and regulatory levels is more advanced in Europe. This is most evident in the existence of a monetary union in Europe and not in North America, but, as we shall discuss below, it is evident in financial markets and regulatory arrangements as well. Interestingly, the lack of integration in North America is due not just to the persistence of national borders but to sub-national ones as well (Edwards 2004).

Trade begins by assuming a causal chain between the free trade model, economic growth and prosperity, and national security. It is therefore not surprising that NAFTA, the pioneer U.S.-style trade agreement, also became the first FTA to be officially expanded into security. The goals are twofold: to apply the Bush counterterrorism model throughout North America and bring Canadian and Mexican national security apparatus under closer U.S. control and surveillance, and to protect investment and business throughout the region. Under-Secretary of State Thomas Shannon put it succinctly when he said that the SPP understands North America as a shared economic space, one that “we need to protect. He added, “To a certain extent, we’re armoring NAFTA” (ALIPAC 2011).

Perhaps the best example of where the SPP leads us is Plan Mexico. Originally, U.S. promoters predicted that regional economic integration under NAFTA would work toward resolving other bi national issues, including security issues. In the words of President George H Bush, in 1991 he stated that “by boosting economic prosperity in

Mexico, Canada, and the United States, it will help us to move forward on issues such as drugs, education, immigration, and the environment” (Carlsen 2009).

North America now faces security threats unimagined in 1991. In Mexico, since the launching of the war on drugs by incoming president Felipe Calderon in January of 2007, the nation has seen an explosion of drug-related violence. No one would argue that the problem of organized crime in Mexico is not real and has not reached alarming proportions. Within the SPP, negotiations began to design a U.S. military aid package that resulted in the Merida Initiative³, officially described as a regional security cooperation initiative (ALIPAC 2011).

2.7 African Union and Open Borders

Like the Free movement of goods free mobility of people is equally a keystone for the development of any regional integration and the African Development Bank’s seeks to establish the next global market in Africa. Establishing larger, more attractive markets and supporting intra-African trade are boosted by greater mobility of goods and persons. The need to create regional integration has been reinforced the success of the other regional organizations across the globe such as European Union, Latin American Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA) African union decision to open borders among its member states is purely inspired by the European Union Schengen Area, when business people and traders move more easily across the continent, they bring along greater levels of investment, fresh skills and expand the range of goods and services on offer (African union 2017).

African Union adopted the long-term development Programme known as Agenda 2063. The agenda seeks to bring up free movement of African citizens across the continent. It proposed that all visa requirements for travel by Africans within the continent would be abolished by 2018, and a common African passport introduced by 2025. As per the 2017 Visa Openness Report – an initiative of the African Development Bank, the African Union Commission and the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Africa – progress on creating a ‘visa-free Africa’ has been diffident. The report examines about

³ Merida Initiative is a regional security cooperation initiative

the accessibility of Africa's 55 countries to visitors from each of the others. The report also critically examines the requirements that each African country inflicts on visitors from other countries on the continent in terms of a three-phase model: how many countries' citizens are required to obtain visas prior to travel; how many countries' citizens are able to obtain visas on arrival; and how many countries' citizens can enter the country with no visa at all.

According to the Report in 2016 there were 2 970 requirements mandated by African countries on other African citizens – in other words, each of the 55 countries had a visa or non-visa requirement for each of the other 54 countries. Among these, a little over half (54percent) were for visas to be obtained prior to departure. This suggests that, on balance, Africa's borders remain closed. Just over a fifth of requirements (22 per cent) were for no visas, and around a quarter (24per cent) were for visas on arrival, only single country in the African continent is truly 'visa free' the Seychelles, granted citizens of every other African country entry with no visa, and it also did not impose any kind requirement to access the entry into the Seychelles (African Union 2016).

The greatest development in openness of the border in Africa can be seen among the island states and West and East African States. Ghana and Rwanda emerge as the most top countries that have made progress in the openness of the border, Rwanda has opened its borders to all the African travelers since 2013-accomodating all the visitors from the AU countries with visa's on arrival and recently announced that this would be extended to all other countries by 2018 (Corrigan 2017). Ghana adopted a new visa regime in 2016 that involves extending the visa free or visa on arrival access to all the citizens of all the EU countries. Most recently, Kenya has opened its borders. In late November 2017, newly elected President Uhuru Kenyatta announced that citizens of all African countries would be able to get a visa on arrival, however this initiative invited criticism for its blind eye to the security implications in the region in fact many experts warned that it will bring a logistical nightmare because the security agencies will be required to exercise more robust surveillance at all border points (Corrigan 2017).

Mr Simiyu Werunga a security analyst argued that though this initiative was good political statement it will have a serious national security implications considering the

fact that Kenya is surrounded by the troubled states like Somalia, a country known globally for active terrorism and has been the epicenter of the contraband trading (Kennedy, Oruko 2017).

2.8 Sub-Regional organization of Africa and Open borders

Regional Economic Communities of Africa covers five different areas of the region which includes the following: “the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)”(Segatti 2017).

Regional integration in South Africa has emerged as a response to the colonial dominance of some countries like South Africa, Mozambique, “Southern Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa”, after the decolonization of Africa by European powers, many African Southern states decided to adopt the free market and regional organisation based on the principle of the democratic political set-up under the guidance of the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (Segatti 2017). Similarly after the Cold War came to an end, the idea of regional integration found resonance in Africa and other developing countries and assertion of European Union as the unique regional organization trying to balance the Russia and United States has contributed to momentum for the establishment of the new regional integration organisations (Bach 2008).

A Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons within the region of the member states was adopted by the “South African Development Cooperation (SADC)” Secretariat in 1995 that was directed towards the elimination of internal border controls in the region, however this was replaced by the more restrictive protocol in 1997 considering the economic disparities among the member states that created an imbalance in the migration flow among the member states, this protocol was revised and adopted in 2005 that allows granting 90 days visa free stay to the citizens of the other member states, however this protocol was not enforced due to the inadequate ratifications from the member states

“The 2010 Windhoek Summit of the South African Development Community marks the fifth anniversary of its approval of the protocol on facilitating the free mobility of people”

(Segatti, 2017). “In 2010 the parliamentary forum conducted under the theme Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons in SADC, formally specified that the protocol is yet to come into practice as only four member states (Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland) have ratified it” (UNESCO 2017).

The SADC protocol on Employment and Labor SADC (2014) emphasis on the protection of fundamental rights, with the regards to labor employment, social protection is provided to migrant workers and their families. A Regional Labor Migration Policy Framework was developed in 2014 to assist SADC member States in addressing these identified priority areas. Furthermore, a revised SADC Labor Migration Action Plan for 2016-2019 was adopted in May 2016 to continue facilitating the implementation of the identified priority areas (UNECA 2018).

Since the time of its inception, ECOWAS has undertaken several initiatives and schemes to enhance the integration of the West African States, present integration provision includes the free movement of goods and services, free movement of persons, stabilization of monetary and fiscal policies, harmonization of business law, development of transport, communications and energy networks and involvement of private sectors in the regional integration process. The protocol of 1979 ensures the free movement of persons across the borders of the member states, it outlined three phased approach to attain the complete freedom of movement. Article 27 of the treaty of Lagos affirms a long term objective to establish community citizenship that could be acquired by all the nationals of the member states (UNESCO 2015). “In 2001, the protocol on free mobility of people, labor service, Right of Establishment and Right of Residence was approved. However the implementation the procedure remained very slow, as the protocol was only ratified by Burundi and some member states are still applying the protocol on “Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa requirements” (Nita 2017).

The first phase dealt with right to entry and elimination of visa, hence allowing the citizens of the member states to stay without visa up to 90 days in territory of the ECOWAS community with valid travel documents and international health certificate and it also focused on overcoming the all the obstacles for free movement within 15 years (Boulton 2009).The Phase second objectives were outlined in the 1985 protocol. The

protocol focuses on extending the right to residency including right to seek and carryout income earning employment to the community citizens in the host ECOWAS states provided they had obtained the ECOWAS residence permit and it obliges the member to grant migrant workers equal treatment with nationals such as employment security, participation in cultural and social activities and in case of job loss reemployment and training (Adepoju, Boulton, Levin 2010)

In 2000, Authority of the Heads of State and Government held a meeting in Abuja to adopt a uniform ECOWAS passport, emulating on the EU passport and with the ECOWAS emblem on the front cover. A five year transitional period was foreseen during which national passports would be used along with ECOWAS passports (Adepoju, Boulton, Levin 2007)

However the enforcement of the protocol on free movement of persons was coincided with economic slowdown in most of the countries especially those bordering Nigeria, the latter's economy was boomed by oil sector earnings there it attracted many unskilled workers from countries like Ghana, Todo, Chad, Mali and Cameroon to work in the construction and service sector but this boom was short-lived, as a result of which Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA): COMESA was established on 1994 to continue the work flagged off by preferential trade Area (PTA) towards fostering economic cooperation and integration of its member states with the objective of creating a common market, by providing membership to Egypt, it has extended its membership to North Africa(Adepoju 2001).

2.9 African Union and Security Concerns

After decolonization by the European powers, many African states attained independence, the unsettled border issues and lack of demarcation of borders of many states were considered as the source of crime, conflict and political instability (Ikome 2012).The changing nature of borders in the African region can be attributed not just to the advent of the globalisation but also to the establishment of the African Union and sub-regional organisations that have gradually started to embrace the free mobility of people, goods and services.

Ratifying free mobility of people within the African region remains a contentious issue among the member states as the issue of security concerns looms large behind the free movement of people and fear of being overwhelmed presence of the irregular migrants, These concerns have resulted in restrictive immigration policies and strengthening of border controls that have led to dreadful consequences including; exploitation and abuse of migrants rights, the perpetuation of human trafficking and smuggling by criminal networks, and the tragic loss of human lives as people undertake dangerous and illegal migration expeditions(African Union 2015).

The neglect towards the border security and lack of proper border management in the African region has exposed the region to the non-traditional security threats; African border security issues are different from the other region, as the region faces several problems including lack of institutional set-up, lack of cooperation among member states, lack of demarcation of borders, and absence monitoring and patrolling these borders has given impetus to the smuggling and other cross border criminal activities (Okumu 2011). African borders are regarded as the transnational crime zone that facilitates several crime activities such as human trafficking, arms smuggling, terrorism, drug trafficking, and source of these crime have been attributed to the absence of political will and judicious use of resources to strengthen the security at the borders (Okumu 2011).

2.10 MERCOSUR: The South American Free Trade Block

The seeds of common market in the South America were sown by the Argentina and Brazil in e as both the countries showed keen interest to initiate rapprochement and on returning to the democratic regime in the mid 1980's both the counties pronounced their commitment to economic integration in in 1985 and it was formalized in 1986 with the signature of bilateral Programme of Economic cooperation and Integration (PICE) (Gardini 2007).

The 1988 Argentine–Brazilian Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development, for the first time openly set the achievement of a common market as the final goal of the bilateral integration project (Gardini 2017).Treaty of Asuncion signed on 1991 envisioned the creation of common market .Article 1 of the treaty establishes the free

mobility of goods as the fundamental objective of the common market that The Common Market of the South America (MERCOSUR) has decided to grant a visa exemptions to journalists, scientists, specialized professions artists, sportspersons and engineers visa-free travel up to 90 days (UNESCO 2017).The provision that facilitates all the MERCOSUR citizens to live and work in any of the member states has not been implemented.

In contrast to international trade in goods and services, states seem much more reluctant to liberalize the cross-border mobility of people and to install a coherent international framework for migration. Many regional organisations aim at creating common market that facilitates the free movement of people and goods, however only few regional organizations have been able achieve it in reality. In the case of the MERCOSUR agreement of 1991 between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, no specific provisions related to the free movement of persons is contained (UNESCO 2017).

The MERCOSUR is yet to move towards general free mobility of labor; however it allows the entry mostly to service providers. “The Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services directly reflects the GATS model by linking free movement rights to specific commitment formulated in the annex of the protocol” (Trachyman 2009). As per the protocol, member states are supposed to follow usher that service providers from the third countries. “The Agreement on Residence for State Party nationals or service providers receives equal treatment as compared to national service providers from the third countries”. The “Agreement on Residence for State Party Nationals and a similar agreement including Bolivia and Chile provide that citizens of the member states have the right to entry, reside and work in other member states” (UNESCO 2017).The categories mentioned in the agreement include intra-corporate transferees, business visitors and contracted service suppliers .

2.11 The Arab Integration: The case of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The fundamental objective of many regional organization was to deepen the economic integration however the premise of the GCC was based on establishing regional security and stability as the leaders of the GCC on their 1st meeting on May 25th 1981 clearly

specified that the region's security and stability are the responsibility of its peoples and countries and that the Council represents the aspirations of these countries and their right to defend their security and independence (Pasha, 2012)

The purposes of the organization include the following:

- Accomplishment of coordination and cooperation among the members
- Promotion of cooperation among the people of member states
- Harmonization of procedures and practices in the fields of finance, economics, Commerce, education, culture, legislation and public administration
- Promotion of scientific and technological development of members
- Development of a common defense strategy
- Collection and sharing of intelligence information regarding subversive and opposition groups (Pasha 2012).

2.12 Economic Integration and Freedom of mobility of people

Liberalizing the free mobility of the people is one of the primary issues addressed through the effort of the regional organization and facilitating free movement of people and goods is one of the key to the successful regional integration. According to the GCC (1981) agreement the fundamental objective behind the agreement is to facilitate the regional integration by ensuring the free movement of persons within the member countries. The articles in the "GCC agreement on United Economic Agreement of 1981 and on New Economic Agreement 2001 comprises certain provisions that emphasis on providing free mobility rights for the GCC citizens" (UNESCO 2017). This approach to the free mobility of people and goods reflects the similar efforts of the regional integration process that has been adopted in European Union and enshrined in other regional organizations also (Baert 2008).

In the present system, the GCC advocates a "limited regime" of free movement, in which it grants free mobility provision only to specific categories of residents of a sovereign state to move freely within a broader region, while restricting other categories of residents from similar rights (Babur 2011). The GCC extends its limited regime of free mobility across the states' borders as a privilege limited only to the citizens of the six

member states. Available data indicate that this regime of partial free movement has led to only a nominal increase in movement across the borders for the purposes of occupation and employment (Babur 2011).

In 2011 GCC decides to expand its free mobility provision beyond the six member states to include the Morocco and Jordan, many of the member states perceived this initiative to the increasing security concerns to the region (Babur 2011). Advocating free movement of goods and services and People across the sovereign borders is justified on the economic and moral grounds. The economic grounds for free mobility are based on the need to allow the free flow of labor and capital for economic betterment of a region (Babur 2011). The moral grounds for free movement of people are based on normative concepts of social justice and human rights Freedom of movement in the Gulf can be seen as both in terms of basic human right as well as the economic benefits extended to citizens under a regional arrangement.

Within the GCC, provisions that privilege the citizens of the member states and increase their mobility are enacted along with the provisions that restrict free movements of third-country nationals. Provisions that endow special rights of mobility to regional citizens while restricting others do exist in different regional organisations, such as in the European Union (EU). However, in Europe, expanding free mobility to EU citizens improved ease of trade and travel for non-citizens. Such corresponding changes are not visible in the Gulf (Babur 2011). Given the fact that non-nationals makeup large portion within the member states of the GCC, the fault lines between their mobility and that of nationals seem more blatant, presently the total member states population of the GCC is estimated at approximately 39 million, out of which approximately 15 million are non-nationals who are residing and working in the region (Babur 2011).

2.13 GCC and its Security Agenda

The fundamental objective behind the establishment of much regional organization such as EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR or AU was to deepen the economic integration in the region and security dimension has come at the later stage of the organization. However this is not the similar case with the GCC as this organization was created in response to

the regional turmoil triggered by the Iranian revolution and Iraq-Iran War and concern of security dominated all other reasons to come together for the regional peace and stability (Koch 2010). The GCC member states constitutes collective security system at the regional level, by sharing similar social, economic, political conditions, these states exhibit the similar attitude towards the security concerns within the ambit of similar geographical and political touchstone(Abdulla 1998).

The GCC consider the four factors the destabilizing factor the region, the first threat is believed to emanate from the Nasserism which had significant impact on the Gulf region immediately after the end of colonialism, as it was believed that the political idea advocated by Nasser is consider replacing the traditional conservative Gulf States. Second is believed to emanate from the Marxist ideology that posed severe threat to the Gulf regional security. Third, there has been infamous effort to export the militant doctrine of the Iranian revolution to the Gulf States to destabilize the region. And finally, the impending danger to security of the GCC is the al-Qaeda terror net-work, a violent international terrorist organisation embarked to destabilize the peace and security in the region (Binhuwaidin 2015). In 2010 the eruption of popular wave of uprising against some of the Arab states governments which was called as a “Arab Spring” have had severe implications on the political, economic and social aspects of these states. It has transformed into radical movement embracing radical Islamic thoughts. Theses radical ideologies have gradually penetrated into GCC states, thereby destabilizing peace and security (Binhuwaidin 2015).

2.14 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

ASEAN was established in August 1967 with the signing of ASEAN Declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The primary objective behind its inception is to establish stability and peace at the regional level and also support social progress, economic growth and economic development (Bangkok Declaration 1967) Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. Timor Leste is presently an observer though it applied for

membership in 2011 but its application is still under scrutiny by ASEAN, s Council Working Group (UNESCO 2017).

In the beginning of its establishment ASEAN's focus was on the security issues and establishing the legitimacy of the newly independent states after the Second World War in the context of international disputes and tensions emerging from the Cold War (UNDP Asia Pacific, 2010).With the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) at the end of 2015, ASEAN accomplished a major breakthrough in the region's mounting, economic, cultural and political Throughout the 1990s, ASEAN attempted to re-energize its economic initiatives. In part, this was because ASEAN feared that the new Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum would undermine its primacy in East Asia and promote economic policies disadvantageous to the weaker regional economies (Narine 2008).

Thailand proposed the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1991, which was validated by the ASEAN summit in Singapore in 1992. AFTA is expected to provide a 'training ground' for ASEAN business and a way to attract foreign investment to the region. ASEAN pursued AFTA for four reasons. These were: "to provide ASEAN with a new purpose in the aftermath of the Cold War, to offset the growth of economic regionalism in other parts of the world and give AFTA members a greater voice and more economic clout in international economic negotiations, to make it easier for multinational corporations to establish themselves at the regional level, and to function as a regional investment area that attracts foreign investment and compete against China on a more equitable footing" (Narine 2008).

2.15 Labor Mobility Provisions

The Southeast Asia has witnessed tremendous increase in cross border mobility in the past twenty to thirty years (IOM 2008).The cross mobility can be attributed to the increased trade and investment within the region, inadequate or else excess of labors and growing disparity in the income level and standard of living within the member states of the region subsequently from the different level of economic growth. The large number

of labor mobility within the region constitutes semi-skilled and low skilled workers (UNESCO 2017).

In the context of the ASEAN, measures taken to enhance the free mobility cannot be understood with reference to the political will at the regional level in creating ASEAN Economic Community. Within the charter of ASEAN, majority of the initiatives on free mobility of people and goods have emphasized on easing the mobility of the service providers in order to expand the trade services and economic integration. Several measures on skilled labors have also been adopted to enhance the labor market attractiveness and competency in the context competition with big countries like India and China. (UNESCO 2017).

The ASEAN economic community laid down the blue print that envisages the removal of substantial restrictions on the ASEAN services suppliers in providing services and establishing the companies across the national borders within the region (MPI 2014). The “blue print identified the following actions ASEAN member states agree to support in the lead-up to 2015

- Complete the mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) currently under negotiation that is, for architectural services, accountability services, surveying qualifications, medical practitioners by 2008 and dental practitioners by 2009.
- Implementing the MRAs expeditiously, according to the provisions of each respective agreement Identify and develop MRAs for other professional services by 2012, to be completed by 2015
- Strengthen human resources development and capacity building in the area of services Facilitate the issuance of visas and employment passes for ASEAN professionals and skilled laborers who are engaged in cross-border trade and investment-related activities.
- Enhance cooperation among members of the ASEAN University Network to increase the mobility both students and staff within the region

- Develop core competencies and qualifications for the job/ occupational and training skills required in priority and other service sectors.
- Strengthen the research capabilities of each ASEAN member country to promote skills and job placements, and develop labor market information networks among ASEAN member states” (MPI 2014).

The year 2012 marked as a significant year for ASEAN, as the members of the organisation signed the agreement known as “ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons”, it facilitate the free mobility of selected persons within the region. This charter provided legal provisions to smoothen the cross-border mobility of people involved in the business of trade in goods, services and investment. More precisely, the agreement intends to create efficient and transparent procedures for business visitors, intra-corporate transfers, and contractual service suppliers to apply for immigration formalities (ASEAN 2012). And similarly the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement permits entry, short-term stay and work authorization to investors, executives, managers, and board members of corporations in the process of promising a substantial amount of capital or other resources (MPI 2014).

ASEAN member states have adopted numerous provisions to recognize qualifications and skills. Certainly, there is substantial evidence that immigrants in the region are often fail to put their skills to productive use because their knowledge qualifications and experience are not recognized in the host countries. The resulting waste of “human capital represents a loss to employers, host communities, and migrants themselves. At the macro level, this would be reflected in lower level of economic growth, work productivity and country competitiveness” (MPI 2014). However to overcome these challenges ASEAN member states have undertaken two important initiatives one is “Mutual Recognition Arrangements”, between 2005 and 2012, ASEAN member states signed MRA in six key professions that includes “engineering, nursing, architecture, medicine, dentistry, and tourism”, absence of official definition of skilled labor at the regional level has created different stand of the states on the issue, depending on their own interpretation many member states may create further limitations for free mobility of people. In order to support the free mobility of skilled labor, a proper definition is needed

to ensure that all the member states share common understanding about what involves the skilled labor (UNESCO 2017).

2.16 The ASEAN Political –Security Community

Within the ASEAN Political-Security community, issues related to the free mobility of people are largely discussed and deliberated within the context of regional effort to combat several non-traditional security issues like transnational crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and human smuggling. Trafficking is often associated with transnational crime and therefore an element of larger problem of corporate agencies that operate systematically outside the purview of the legal provisions.(Nonnenmacher 2017).

Since placing the trafficking in its crime agenda in the early 1990's, the ASEAN has addressed the issue of trafficking in its major policy. Reference to trafficking is made in the 1997 ASEAN Vision in relation to transnational crime and as an issue to address at the regional level (ASEAN 1997). The ASEAN Ministers of Interior and Home Affairs adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime in December 1997 and in 1999, the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime was created in order to implement the Declaration by strengthening regional commitments and capacities to fight transnational crime (UNESCO 2017).

CHAPTER-3

THE EU OPEN BORDER POLICY AND CHANGING THREAT PERCEPTION

3.1 Introduction

The end of Cold War brought significant changes about the understanding of the borders including increasing mobility of people, the rise of the international human rights framework, globalization and the political integration of Europe which successively replaced the Westphalia idea of states and ‘fundamentally changed the meaning of borders (Vollmer 2017).

Schengen Convention has been one of the foremost accomplishments of European integration. The establishment of Schengen region without internal borders checks, where people, goods and services can move freely has brought significant benefits to European citizens and business alike. Schengen has been one of the significant initiatives of the EU through which its citizens can exercise their freedom. The Schengen Agreement came into force at a time, when the Cold War came to an end and the significance of the traditional security threats was decreased, the accomplishment of European integration has resulted in a significant decrease in traditional security threats, which was based on of military on the security agenda of the EU in the last decades (Weaver 1993).

The 2015 “refugee crisis” has unfolded the lack of collective stand on the issue of refugees, as the crisis started unfolding the EU started to face the social, political, economic and security challenge of managing the massive influx of refugees and maintaining internal coherence, and coordination among the members of Schengen region, and several member states were closing their borders, de facto impeding the movement of thousands of refugees mainly fleeing the conflict in Syria, the return of geopolitics, the EU crisis, and the consequent rise of nationalist thought, have all created pressures at borders and placed human encounters with state sovereignty under intense scrutiny (Laine, Casaglia 2017). This chapter will trace the genesis of the EU,s open border policy and it will examine how the Schengen agreement has changed the nature of borders in the EU and it also focuses on how the establishment of Schengen region that

sought to eliminate internal borders between the member states has changed the concept of threat perception in the region.

3.2 Schengen Borders and its Evolution

The “Treaty of Rome” (1957) outlines the objectives of the free mobility of persons, goods, services and capital across the international boundaries of the European Economic Community (EEC) Member States but this proved to be aspirational in the beginning. The successive compromises made between the different states of the Community mostly avoided border issues which touched on sensitive issues of political sovereignty and security – issues which were the preserve of national states and NATO rather than the EEC (O’Dowd 2002).

The Schengen border denotes to the common external border of those European countries that signed the Schengen Agreement (1985/1990), which was incorporated into the European Union (EU) legislation. The Primary objective behind the agreement is to facilitate a free mobility of persons and goods within the member states of the Schengen area, and to harmonize the area’s external border-control arrangements (Hayrynen, 2009). The present Schengen region includes most of the EU members states excluding United Kingdom, Ireland, Romania, and Bulgaria, however the region includes the non-EU members like Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland. Apart from Romania and Bulgaria, the Schengen region currently borders with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania outside the EU. Russia has become a neighbor of the Schengen border since 2001, when Finland joined the agreement. A more dramatic shift took place with the expansion of the Schengen borders that occurred with the addition of new states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia) in December 2007 (Hayrynen 2009).

The Schengen area currently covers 26 countries (22 European Union Member States and four associated States), which apply the entire Schengen acquis. The outside frontier of the Schengen region covers the distance over 50 000 km long (80percent sea and 20percent land) and includes hundreds of airports and maritime ports, as well as land border crossing points(European Union 2015).

3.3 Key features of Schengen Agreement

- Regulate people crossing the EU's external borders, including the issuing of required visas and examine about how checks at these borders should be carried out.
- Harmonize the conditions of entry and visa rules for short stays of up to three months.
- Provide for police cooperation, including on cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit.
- Provide for judicial cooperation for faster extradition systems and for the transfer and enforcement of criminal judgments.
- Establish the Schengen Information System (SIS). SIS is an information system that supports external border control and law enforcement, by enabling data sharing between member states (European Union 2015)

The present open border initiative of the EU can be attributed to the origin of the European community projects that fostered the establishment of various regional level communities ranging from the “European coal and Steel Community” .The primary objective of the community was to transfer the power to allocate the coal and steel industry from the member states to the hands of an independent, supranational body called the “High Authority”. Originally the member countries included Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and the Netherlands (Zaitotti 2011).The “treaty of Rome 1957” transformed the ECSC, as the members states decided to expand it into other sectors. In 1957 they signed the Treaties of Rome, creating the “European Atomic Energy Community”, and the “European Economic Communities”.

In the mid-1980s, almost three decades after the Treaty of Rome, the founders of the common market understood that to fulfill the initiative of Common Market as agreed in 1957 they would need over three hundred individual regulations. This was the only way to ensure complete free movement of goods, capital, services, and people. Therefore “Jacques Delors, president of the Commission, the EC's executive body, persuaded the Council regarding the need to support a Single European Act (SEA) in 1986; few years

later it also prepared the way for the Maastricht Treaty (1992) which established the EU”(Roy 2007).

Two fundamental agreements that shaped the Schengen area are: The “Schengen Agreement of 1985” that advocates the elimination of border checks at the common borders and the second is 1990 “Schengen Convention” that supplement the Schengen agreement of 1985 and lays down the arrangements and safeguards for implementing freedom of movement. Initially there were only five member countries and later it gradually expanded to include 26 member states (European Commission 2011). In 1995 Spain and Portugal joined, in 1997 Austria and Italy Joined, in 2000 Greece joined, in 2001 Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway .Earlier Schengen treaties and rules adopted under them functioned independently from the European Union, but in 1999 Amsterdam treaty integrated the Schengen agreement within the framework of European Union, while Ireland and United Kingdom have chosen to remain outside the Schengen area. . However, under the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam both were granted the right to opt in to provisions in the future. Whilst the UK is not a member of the Schengen Area it has chosen to opt in to the SIS “in the context of law enforcement cooperation (European Commission 2016).

Schengen has emerged as the most significant area of European politics in the case of “Justice and Home Affairs” to date and it has emerged as fundamental aspect of European integration project and to the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. Schengen divided the European frontiers into internal and external. Within the internal borders, immobile border checks were eliminated in favor of moveable border checks, enhanced cross-border cooperation and surveillance, whereas the traditional border checks were shifted to the external frontiers of the EU (Schwell 2009).

3.4 A Europe without Borders

In 1986, EC member states signed the organization’s first major treaty revision in two decades, the Single European Act (SEA), and established a concrete deadline for the completion of the 1992 internal market Programme. The implementation of this objective, set out in a Commission White Paper (European Commission, 1985) and

endorsed by the European Council (European Council, 1985), would come to dominate Community affairs until the mid-1990s, marking the transition towards the EU. But while the SEA promised to deliver the ‘four freedoms’ entailed in the single market (of goods, capital, persons, and services), the abolition of internal border controls was a particularly contentious issue. Though specifically requested by heads of states and governments during a summit meeting in Fontainebleau (European Council, 1984), the British government vetoed the pursuit of the measure through a Community instrument. It opposed any form of elimination of frontier checks inside the EC on the grounds of their indispensability for identifying third country nationals trying to enter the country illegally (Whitaker, 1992). Under the circumstances, France and Germany sought to provide a political alternative by following a gradual relaxation of border controls at their common frontiers through a bilateral agreement signed in Saarbrücken, Germany, in 1984 (Schutte 1991). The arrangement was joined a year later by the Benelux countries.

The end of Cold War and collapse of the communism across Central and Eastern Europe has dismantled the traditional divide between the Eastern and Western Europe, it has brought Europeans closer to each other. In 1993, the Single Market was adopted that advocated four freedoms of: free mobility of goods, people, service and money. The 1990’s is regarded as the decade of two treaties: the “Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1993” and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. People are concerned about how to protect the environment and also how Europeans can act together when it comes to security and defense matters. In 1995 the EU gains three more new members: Austria, Finland and Sweden. A small village in Luxembourg gives its name to the ‘Schengen’ agreements that gradually allow people to travel without having their passports checked at the borders. Millions of young people study in other countries with EU support (Ribakov 2016).

The idea of abolition of internal border controls can easily stimulate feelings of insecurity among the EU citizens, as the politics of border controls are located precisely at the point of intersection between issues of security and identity (Walker 1998). Physical border checks are continued to be regarded as very much competent by the EU citizens, however practitioners are skeptical about their effectiveness and efficiency,

but when it comes to other than small crime, EU citizens instead favor investigative and surveillance policing measures (Schwell 2007).

3.5 Temporary Reintroduction of Border Checks

The Schengen Agreement has attained to greater prominence as a result of increased migration into the EU following the conflict in Syria and the consequent pressures on its borders, particularly in Greece (European Commission 2016). A factsheet published by the European Parliament points out the increased number of refugees and migrants has certainly compelled several Schengen member states to temporarily introduce the internal border checks as per the guidelines provided in the Schengen Border Code (European Parliament 2016). It also argues that: A further challenge to the passport-free Schengen area comes in the form of a heightened terrorist threat. With the November 2015 Paris attacks highlighting the ease with which suspected and even indicted terrorists entered and travelled through the Schengen area. The ongoing challenges have served to underline the inextricable link between robust external border management and free movement inside those external borders and persuaded the Commission to come forward with proposals both to enhance security checks on persons entering the Schengen area and to improve external border management (European Commission 2017).

In 2015 when EU started facing the heat from the unprecedented refugee crisis, several Schengen members like “Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Belgium - reintroduced internal border controls due to massive influx of people seeking international protection”(European Parliament 2016). All the above-mentioned countries (excluding Hungary) initially invoked the procedure under Article 28 of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC), which allows Member States to reintroduce internal border controls for unforeseen circumstances that pose a serious threat to public policy or internal security(European Parliament 2016)

As Hungary began to erect a barbed-wire fence on internal Schengen border with Slovenia at the end of September, the problem was controversially settled and the construction work was quickly came to halt under a bilateral agreement with Slovenia (European Parliament 2016). However, since 2015 July Hungary has managed to erect

the fence on the external Schengen border with Serbia and Schengen accession country Croatia. And even planned to extend the fence to Romania. Slovenia notified the Council about its internal border controls in mid-September 2015 and revoked its internal border controls as soon as mid-October 2015. Subsequently, however, Slovenia followed the Hungarian authorities in building a fence with Croatia (Surknov 2015)

Belgium became the last country to re-introduce internal borders checks on 23 February 2016 under Article 28, fearing the influx of refugees from the Calais refugee camp. However after April 2016, Belgium did not keep its internal border checks for longer period. Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Norway subsequently invoked the Article 27 of the SBC, which allows a Member State to prevent foreseeable threats (European Parliament 2016). In addition, two other Member States – France and Malta - reintroduced internal border checks in line with the procedure under Article 27 of the SBC, which can be used to prevent a foreseeable serious threat to public policy or internal security, “France and Malta initiated border checks due to important international events (COP 21 – Paris Climate Conference and the Valletta Summit, respectively) and associated these events with a terrorist threat”. Nevertheless, France, from January 1 2016, has continued its border checks after the Paris attacks due to the subsequent ‘state of emergency’ and big sporting events, such as the “Tour de France and the European Football Championship”(European Parliament 2016).At present France and Germany has announced to extend the internal border controls till November 2018.

3.6 Schengen Enlargement of 2007

Schengen and the European Union are not identical because there are non-EU member-states, which take part in the Schengen system (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland), and there are EU member-states, which decided not to join the common area (Ireland and the United Kingdom). Until today, the Schengen area has continued to expand geographically and has transformed into a complex and modern system of control with a focus on the control of its external borders (Siebold 2017).The elimination of internal border checks on persons is at the very core of the European integration project (Longman 2000).

The “expansion of the Schengen area in 2007 was a direct result of the EU enlargement in 2004, and as such it proved to be a highly emotional matter for all the parties involved, the accession of the Central and Eastern-European(CEE) to the EU in 2004 had been presented in the EU-15 as means of self-protection”(Higashino 2004). Following this argument it was believed that “only successful integration could grant the region’s stability and prevent ethno-nationalist conflicts, such as those in the Balkans”. The integration of the former communist camp to the EU, however, it proved to be a great ideological and political challenge for the EU”(Walker 2002). However, this initiative raised apprehension among the initial members of Schengen about the CEE states ability to fight against the border crimes, thus, the argument vacillated amid the two camps of “security” and “insecurity”, with the incorporation of earlier Communist bloc member states being perceived as both important to enhance the European security and also as an impending danger to it (Loader 2002).

Throughout the preparations for Schengen incorporation, the aspiring members from Central and Eastern Europe realized themselves as the “periphery members of the region, who are obliged to demonstrate their capabilities in fighting against crimes and protecting their borders” (Schwell 2008). “ With EU incorporation, these new member states were in effect, provided mere second-class membership, reduced as a buffer zone between Schengen and the non-EU members”(Gromadzki 2001).

Although the new CEE member states who had been integrated in to the EU in 2004 already had accepted the Schengen acquis.⁴ With EU incorporation, however they did not completely implement it until the end of 2007. The process of preparing for the Schengen enlargement, however, did not only take place inside the aspiring countries, and it was not just technical matter but was also emotional matter as well. The pervasive suspicion and uncertainty, in the public and political sphere, infused fear that the security of the Schengen region would be in danger, by expanding the Schengen to the Eastern Europe (Lodge 2009). This brought major change for the Schengen region and labor migration within the EU, as the older members began to eliminate work permit

⁴ “The Schengen acquis is a set of rules and legislation, integrated into European Union law, which regulate the abolishment of border controls at the internal borders within the Schengen Area, as well as the strengthening of border controls at the external borders”.

formalities for citizens from Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (Brady 2012). Three years after becoming members of EU, border checkpoints were eliminated with all these new members, ushering a freedom to travel across Europe not seen since the outbreak of World War I. Conditionality has become one of the key mechanisms to externalize the EU's JHA strategy. An efficient border security service is considered a crucial requirement for those countries that want to join the EU family. The Schengen rules have been incorporated into the "acquis communautaire" and have thus become a condition for candidate countries (Rees 2008).

Unlike the initial members for whom there was no rigid conditionality process, EU kept certain conditionality's to be fulfilled by the aspiring member states before they officially become a member of the European union and Schengen Area members, criteria for membership, starting with those laid down at the "Copenhagen Criteria of European Council in 1993". These include the requirement for states to be democratic, to function according to the rule of law and to respect minorities, while possessing a functioning market economy able to withstand the competitive pressures of membership of the single market and having the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Haughton 2007). In 2008, another non-EU member – Switzerland – joined the Schengen club, agreeing to apply EU consular and immigration rules but maintaining its own customs controls (Brady 2012). And in 2011 Liechtenstein became a part of Schengen area.

3.7 Schengen Borders and Changing nature of EU Borders

The changing nature EU borders can be attributed to abolition of internal border checks that subsequently resulted in the establishment of the common external borders. Breaking away from the traditional conception of borders when the borders were considered as sanctified and only sovereign entity as sole right over the borders. However with advent of the Schengen borders, the control of the border has been exercised by the member states in cooperation with the European Union. The transformation from Westphalia nature of borders to the Schengen borders can be understood within the framework of a negotiated compromise among EU governments, a 'reasonable response' to common

problems such as increasing illegal migration and the threat of a terrorist attack (Prokkola, 2012). European Union has witnessed a considerable upsurge in the number of those, mainly from Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the countries of the Maghreb, who are seeking residency in the EU, in response to this increase in immigration, it has been noticed that the number of those who legally settle in the country has been progressively reduced (Christiansen, Jorgensen 2000).

Schengen manifested as a significant initiative, both pragmatically and symbolically, in accomplishing a closer and deeper integration of the region. The Schengen agreement in fact facilitated the emergence of a new regional governance system of EU's external frontiers. Key decisions regarding borders and their management have become a matter of multi-lateral negotiation, involving all countries in the Schengen region, and, to a lesser extent, other EU members. This arrangement also involves a 'pooling' of sovereignty among participating members and a partial transfer of responsibilities from national governments to regional organisation like EU (Zaiotti 2007). In Eastern Europe and on the Balkans, states have fallen apart and their fragments been re-constituted as new states, thus creating new and often highly impenetrable borders, in the EU, states may have maintained their integrity, but processes of regionalization or devolution have increased internal differentiation and thus enhanced the significance of regional boundaries(Christiansen, Jorgensen 2007).

3.8 Schengen Borders and External Dimension to EU's Internal Security

The Treaty of Amsterdam facilitated the European Union to attain significant legal competence over internal security issues. The EU established an "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice" (European Union 1992). With the aim of facilitating a European space for the free mobility of people, goods and services, this was to be a space in which fundamental rights were guaranteed and safety of all citizens to be assured. The incorporation of the Schengen Convention into the Union established a borderless internal area surrounded by a hard external frontier that was designed to ensure a greater level of common security (Rees 2008). The "Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)" of the council has approved Internal Security Strategy (ISS) for the EU, it has an essential and even vital external side, most of the internal security challenges of EU, from organized

crime through terrorism to the criminal aspects of illegal immigration cannot be addressed effectively without external action, thus over past few decades especially after it began the enlargement process it has increasingly externalized its security objectives through various forms of external action (Monar 2010).

The factor that prompts externalization of EU internal security policy, the international dimension of organized crime is apparent importance: Europol's "2009 Organised Crime Threat Assessment" (OCTA) report highlights how the crime network cartels and the security landscape of the EU is shaped and nurtured by the international crime networks. All the five criminal hubs in the EU "(Southwest, Northwest, Northeast, Southeast and Southern) are nurtured significantly by organized crime groups from outside the EU" (Monar 2010).

With the increasing globalisation of crime threats to the EU are the involvement of organised crime groups from the Balkans, Vietnam and West Africa in the distribution of drugs in the Nordic member states, the extensive cooperation of the "Italian Camorra with Chinese groups in the trafficking of counterfeited goods and the growing role of West African and Nigerian groups in the trafficking of cocaine from South America into the EU". Thus, the rapidly changing external challenges cannot be found only in the traditionally strongly globalised fields of crime, such as "drug-trafficking and money laundering, but also in newer – but now very potent – phenomena such as the facilitation of illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings and commodity counterfeiting" (OCTA 2009).

EU enlargement has contributed to the dynamics of externalization of the AFSJ in two ways. First, the need to prepare the candidate countries for effective future participation in the AFSJ forced the EU to develop certain measures and mechanisms to transfer major part of AFSJ governance to the candidates during the pre-accession period in order to minimize potential internal security risks after the entry of the new member states (Monar 2010). In a sense, this set a model for the "export" of key elements of EU internal security governance in the AFSJ domain to other countries, including objectives and legislative and organizational approaches. And the second is, the eastward and southeastward expansion of the AFSJ as a result of the 2004 and 2007 expansion

compelled the EU to focus more on the internal security risks originating from its “new neighborhood”, as a result of transnational crime and illegal immigration, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has become one of the most important fields of externalisation of the AFSJ internal security rationale (Monar 2010).

Internal security concerns have been prioritized along with foreign policy priorities. A civilian aspect was included in the “European Security and Defense Policy” (ESDP) and the EU has undertaken various operations in which an internal security dimension has been important. These operations involves the “EUFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2003, ‘PROXIMA’ in Macedonia and EUJUST ‘Themis’ in Georgia; as well as two missions in Congo and one in Iraq and Afghanistan”(Rees 2008).

3.9 Changing Threat Perception

During the cold war the threat perception was understood within the framework of the military and ideological terms, however the end of cold war has not only changed the security land scape of the European Union but also changed the threat perception, It has been contended by many authors that, the end of the cold war and the collapse of the bipolar system left the military force, as a vanished enemy, beginning of identity crisis led to a assimilation of internal and external security (Eriksson Rhinard 2009).

The collapse of Soviet Union and end of Cold war has changed the security agenda and shifted away from the traditional military security concerns to non-traditional security challenges like transnational organised crime and cross border trafficking. The security concerns are believed to emanate from two sources. The first was attributed to the establishment of the European Single Market and subsequent elimination of internal border checks of the member states of the Schengen region and the second was attributed to the advent of globalization that facilitated the robust economic interconnectedness which swept the developed world (Rees 2008).

3.10 Schengen Expansion to East and Security Concerns

The EU expansion to the Southern Europe had raised similar security concerns that proved out unfounded, but the expansion to the CEE countries, nonetheless in mental categories, cannot be equated to those to the South. The North-South divide is usually transpired into dissimilarities of economic behavior, but still the “stragglers” involve the North’s sympathy (Lodge 2009). However Eastern Europe has remained as periphery that has not gained much confidence and sympathy from the West. As Wolff (1994) argues that, “already in the 18th century Western Europeans created the image of Eastern Europe as underdeveloped, to show themselves as distinct and developed states”. The Western Europe’s cultural “conception of the Eastern Europe has been built on the discourse of backwardness, insecurity, ambiguity and anxiety, strongly similar to the idea of Orientalism”(Lodge 2009). Moreover both East and Orientalism are bound to construct, both Orientalism and the “East” are meant to construct the otherness, which not only creates division between the society into “us” and “them”, but let,s “us” (Westerners, EU citizens, etc.) emerge as best, morally superior, and developed or enlightened (Lodge 2009).

All the collective identities are constructed in relation to something or the other, and “identity essentially encompasses a borderline, established through the mechanisms of categorization and self-categorization a distinction between “us” and “them”. However, there is a significant distinction between a mere comparison and the depiction of “them” as a threat. In the latter case, distinction becomes rather negative; identity becomes pathologic. For many years “Eastern Europe has been regarded as the Western Europe’s other, and subsequently the fear of mistrust and insecurity about the region have not been overcome, the emotional boundary has not expanded eastwards at the same rate as the EU’s and Schengen external frontier (Lodge 2009).

The alarm regarding the organised crime groups entering into EU from the Eastern Europe, carrying their illegal activities into profitable western markets and forming association with the local groups have remained as major security concern for EU, this concern has been proved to be justified, as Germany has often compelled to reckon with organised groups from Poland, Russia and Serbia operating within its own territory (Rees

2008). Since the 9/11 attack, which shook the security apparatus of the US, the global security landscape, since then the EU's security agenda has changed its focus from mere war related concerns and regional instability, to focus on terrorism and organised crime, both these issues have been politically associated with immigration. In the context of the EU's expansion to the CEE countries, these issues have attained significant attention (Koff 2005).

The Organised Crime Groups (OCG's) in the western Balkans have established a lucrative trade in smuggled cigarettes and small arms onto the eastern coast of Italy. Turkish crime groups have come to take over the distribution of heroin within West European cities, while Albanian gangs have developed a profile as traffickers in human beings. These challenges are characterized as the externally derived threats to the EU internal security and there is no attempt made to distinguish between the organised crime, illegal immigration and terrorism (Rees 2008). "The European Security Strategy (ESS), which was implemented in 2003, the EU recognized a various security threats, that including disease, poverty, terrorism, global warming, migratory movements and organized crime, besides more traditional security threats" (European Council 2003). Its focus on "non-traditional' security threats were perhaps become even stronger in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy" (European Council, 2008).

The call for a hard border due to increasing cross-border crime is based on incomplete and questionable evidence, as it has been argued, that "the real extent of the threat of organized cross-border crime is 'a matter of judgment rather than fact, this is especially the case with illegal activities originating in Eastern Europe because the rapid rise in organized crime is quite recent" (Zielonka 2001). Moreover, the crime statistics do not tell us how much of this crime originates in and is directed from Western or Eastern Europe. Most importantly, the statistics do not tell us how much of this crime actually a result of the hard border restrictions is. Most specialists in cross-border crime acknowledge that hardening the borders for goods and people creates a lucrative market for organized transnational criminals involved in illegal trafficking and smuggling (Zielonka 20001).

3.11 Framing Migration within the Security Framework

The political discourse relating to migration discloses that both member states and policy makers of the EU have construed mobility of persons as a risk to national security. Immigrants are largely perceived as an impending security concern to the state and to society and are frequently associated with criminal activities, a tendency that is ostensibly on the rise following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (Karyotis, 2007). Since the early 1980's migration has been politicized at both national and European level and politicization of migration reached zenith after the migration crisis started unfolding in the Europe in 2015 as many Central Eastern and Southern European countries had taken very radical stand on the issue of migrant crisis that was clearly manifested in the political behavior in these states, as countries like Hungary, Poland started to militarize the border by deploying the police force at the border and by enhancing police cooperation across the Schengen borders(Karyotis 2007). In this context the EU policy measures on asylum and migration have served as legitimized factor for the restrictive measures and cutting back the rights of the third country nationals.

In the beginning of the EU project, migration was never perceived as a major security threat for the European Communities. The genesis for framing the migration as security concern started from the Single European Act (1992) to complete the internal market and to fulfill the free mobility of persons (Karyotis 2007). The elimination of internal border checks underlined the importance of strengthening of the security at external borders. Free mobility of persons within the Schengen region led to increased attention to the mobility of third-country nationals from outside the Communities to within. Thus the EU initiated two parallel processes: “the steady ‘Europeanization’ of internal security policies and the ‘externalization’ of security threats, Informal arrangements and working parties were established for sharing experiences, exchanging information and expertise and setting up networks to facilitate contacts between Member States”(Karyotis 2007).

Even before the September 11 attacks, the interest in the relationship between globalization, migration, and security had emerged both in the policy field and in some areas of the security studies. “Migration was high on the European security agenda

throughout the 1990s. The bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and in London on July 7, 2005, only reinforced already existing fears regarding the links between migration and terrorism in Europe”. Earlier incidents, such as the 1995 bombings of the Paris metro system by Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group and attacks in various Western European states in the 1990s by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, had already raised concerns regarding the relationship between migration and security (Adamson, 2006).

Migration control systems became a challenge and as response, asylum channels and other migratory pathways became more stringently controlled by state borders .This stringency applies especially to “hot borders like Greek-Turkish border, the Mediterranean Sea or other critical border crossings at the eastern external EU border such as Terespol or Uzhgorod, and their authorities”(Vollmer 2016). Most migration control regimes were transformed – in the 1990s but more intensively in the ‘age of terrorism’ – into securitization regimes, one of the drivers of this transformation was the growing complexity of the distinction of who is a refugee and who is a migrant, and even more significantly: who is a genuine asylum seeker and who is a deceiving asylum seeker, this distinction not only became a matter of national sovereignty but of national security, thus the migration and asylum regimes became increasingly restrictive (Vollmer 2016). The terrorist attacks on September 11 brought the liberalization of European migration policy to a halt, dramatizing a publicly convenient link between international migration and security (Karyotis 2017).

In the European Union, by underlining the criminal activities associated to free mobility, migration and asylum were considered as security issues. Margaret Thatcher once stated that “we joined Europe to have free movement of goods, not to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, plant and animal diseases and illegal immigrants”(Teschfahoney 1998).This clearly indicates as an example of how migrants were frequently understood within the web of criminal activities, along with other public order threats. Migrants are also perceived as economic threat especially in the context of high unemployment and decrease in the economic growth. Migrants may not pose serious threat to the economic survival of the receiving countries however they frequently cause fear in the minds of the host population of economic decline (Karyotis 2007). As the

2015 refugee crisis exposed different stands of member states on the refugees, the massive influx of refugees has eventually compelled the EU to identify the issue of migration within the framework of the security apparatus, thus in 2016 June EU in its Global Strategy identified migration as a security issue (EUGS 2016).

To a certain extent migration has been constructed as a security threat owing to local political compulsions, like widespread media attention to dramatize and exacerbate the human tragedies and relating these tragedies to the immigration and also to exploit the human emotions. The rise of far right parties within the member states have compelled the political parties both center-left and center-right to adopt more nationalist stand on the issues related to migration (Koff 2005).

Besides that, when member states surrender their sovereignty to supranational institutions like EU, especially when they consider that due to an economic disparity and lack of institutional mechanism other member states in the region may add to the existing security issues. EU immigration policies have often stressed on the issues related to border checks and irregular migration, this clearly indicates the inherent fear associated with the free mobility of people. Although the European Parliament has tried to concentrate on anti-discrimination and human rights issues on the agenda, the unequal power distribution among the member states in the EU, its decision making process has allowed council to strictly frame immigration as security issue (Koff 2005).

Even after introducing strict measures at the borders, immigrants from the non EU states continue to enter the territory. Latest studies have revealed that human smuggling and human trafficking have increased significantly in recent years, and illegal migrants are likely to represent one-third of the foreign-born population that permanently resides in the region (Koff 2005).

Migration has been essentially regarded as socially constructed security threat to the different aspects of the society, migrants are usually perceived as someone destabilize internal security by linking crime/terror with immigrants, as challenging both welfare provision and economic growth because they cheat the system, and by threatening majority identities and values at state and regional levels (Alkopher, Blanc 2017). The

European Council presented the area without internal frontiers as something in need of protection from security threats, both internal (cross-border crime) and external (terrorism and illegal immigration) (Maricut 2017). Migration policy and border control issues have become pressing challenges, demanding a collective European response. Consequently, the call for European solidarity has become an important keyword in the debate on the future of the EU and the Schengen region (Siebold 2017).

3.12 Human Trafficking, Terrorism, and Schengen Border

The Schengen Agreement facilitated increase in the free mobility of persons between states that have implemented the agreement by eliminating internal border checks. Besides that, travellers to the Schengen region require only one visa that can be used to travel all the member states of the Schengen agreement. Two sections of the Schengen Agreement mention bearing on human trafficking. In Title II, the section dealing with the elimination of restrictions at internal borders and the mobility of people, “Article 27 call for participating countries (Contracting Parties) to levy proper penalties on any person who, for monetary gain, helps or tries to assist an alien to enter or reside within the territory of one of the member states in breach of that Contracting Party’s laws on the entry and residence of alien”. In Title III of the Schengen Agreement deals with policy and security, “Article 40 mentions human trafficking as one of the criminal offences in the investigation of which officers are permitted to cross internal borders in order to carry out surveillance on suspects” (Schengen Agreement 1990).

Terrorism has continued to be a global menace for the foreseeable future. Latest studies have pointed towards the localized (50 percent of all terrorist attacks in the world have occurred in ten countries), the domestic (93.1 percent of attacks were carried out without the involvement of foreign individuals), low fatalities (55.87percent of terrorist attacks have caused zero fatalities and 94.66percent have caused ten or fewer fatalities), and low tech (explosives were used in 46percent of attacks and weapons in 28percent of them) terrorist activities, which are expected to continue (Antony, Grand, Levis 2015). Combating Terrorism through counter-terrorism had been a paramount importance for the European Union. The EU is a foremost counter-terrorism actor within Europe and an increasingly important one beyond its borders (European Parliament 2015) According to

the Europol, following an increase in 2012, there was a decrease in the total number of terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU in 2013. 152 terrorist attacks were carried out in seven EU member states in 2013, a decrease on the corresponding figure of 219 for 2012 and fewer than in 2011 (Antony, Grand, Levis 2015). However, in 2015, a number of violent extremist attacks took place in Europe for example in France, Belgium and Denmark, which have changed the perception of the threat throughout Europe. The menace within EU member states has emerged from structured groups and networks to smaller EU-centered groups and lone terrorists, and complete activity linking to terrorism and extremism still signifies a major threat to EU member states.

EU citizens have also faced attack outside EU territory, especially in the Middle East and in North and West Africa. Attacks in Libya, a number of attacks and hostage-taking in Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Syria and Iraq including the filming and posting of beheadings on social media sites for all the world to see underscore the threat to EU citizens outside EU boundaries. On the other side of the equation, EU citizens have been going to fight for and against ISIL/ISIS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq, raising concerns that as with similar situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen such individuals will return to Europe and may engage in terrorist activities in subsequent years. Indeed, the US National Counter-terrorism Center notes that the Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies 20 number of foreign fighters who can potentially return to their home countries to participate in or support terrorist attacks exceeded 20,000, in 2015 (Antony, Grand, Levis 2015).

3.13 Refugee Crisis and Threat Perception among Schengen Member States

The year 2015 possibly is remembered as the devastating year for Europe as it had to deal with the massive influx of people fleeing conflict, since the end of Second World War. This massive migratory pressure on the doorstep of Europe has generated a ferocious public debate around the failure of one of the major achievements of European integration, namely the Schengen Area

(Alkopher, Blanc 2017). The Schengen crisis was triggered by turmoil beyond the borders of the EU, too. Armed conflict and political suppression in the Middle East,

along with difficult and miserable conditions in the countries of first refuge such as Lebanon and Turkey, significantly increased migration pressure. “Whereas the number of migrants across the Mediterranean had been increasing for several years, in 2015 migration flows shifted from the Central Mediterranean to the less dangerous Eastern Mediterranean routes, and the number of asylum-seekers in the EU doubled from the year before to close to 1.3 million” (Schimmelfennig, 2018).

The Refugee crisis that started in 2015 can be attributed to the “Arab Spring and has continuously worsened in the course of the subsequent Syrian, Iraqi, and Libyan civil wars and political disturbances in other Middle Eastern and African nations since July–October 2011”. In 2015 the Syrian crisis has transformed into a full blown European crisis, when the situation became aggravated. “The refugee crisis has threatened the stability of the Schengen system, a fundamental European regime, the pervasive presence of ISIS and the number of Europeans ready to fight as jihadists for the group that has further intensified security concerns about the integration of migrants in Europe. The homecoming of some battle-hardened jihadists to Europe exposed deep vulnerabilities in Europe’s internal security as it was confronted with terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels” (Laffan 2016). Zaiotti and Cornelisse precisely underline that, immigration-related threat perceptions are particularly inherent to Schengen, which 'has transformed over the years as a security-centered and security-driven initiative' (Zaiotti 2011, Cornelisse 2014).

Migration emerged as a full blown security issue among the member states of the European Union. The massive influx of refugee has increased at a time when the EU was already at the brink of major set of challenges, with the high drama of the Greek crisis set against the backdrop of constant economic slowdown, the rise of right- and left-wing populism within several EU member states, and the growing uncertainties about the Brexit, along with separatist movements in several countries, persistent tension with Russia and the pervasive threat from ISIS (Heisbourg 2015). At the domestic level, thousands of asylum seekers have possibly added fuel to those political movements that have already developed antagonistic attitude towards EU. The refugee crisis has unfolded new challenges for EU cutting across those already laid by the economic crisis. Within

weeks of the increase of asylum seekers entering into Greece and from there to the Balkans and into the EU's regional heartland, most of Eastern European members of the Union have made it clear that they are not ready to accept sizeable numbers of refugees on their territory.

The major development was the extreme reluctance from the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia refused to obey any EU burden sharing scheme, variously invoking their relative poverty, the intrinsic difficulties of accepting deeply alien outsiders or even the refusal of hosting non-Christians (Heisbourg 2015). "In Slovakia, we don't have mosques, we only want to choose the Christians", said one official; Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of Poland's Law and Justice Party, stated during the recent electoral campaign that the migrants carry 'various types of parasites', which 'could be dangerous here' (Tharoor 2015). In a famous speech in Budapest on 15 March 2016, the Hungarian prime minister Victor Orban draws parallel to the threat posed by EU liberal migration policies to the suppressions following the 1848 revolution or the Soviet invasion of 1956, with Hungary being a victim of 'foreign interests and foreign ambitions'.

A limited number of countries—especially, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic—refused to accept refugees in their territories, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the EU's legal decisions, similarly EU's call for structural changes in the Dublin II agreement have been largely rejected, and most the member states of the Schengen region had provisionally suspended the free mobility provision due to the growing concerns related to illegal immigration and internal security, without facing any substantial opposition from the Commission (Braghiroli, Makarychev 2017). The concern associated with massive influx of refugees has created the sharp political division within the member states of the EU on the lines of solidarity and security, as both concepts emerged out of the debate on the refugee crisis and are closely related to the issue of multiculturalism and diversity in Europe. The evolving distinction between the pro-solidarity and pro-securitization groups in the EU refugee debate pits many Western and Northern European governments against the right-wing, nationalist and identitarian parties and

some Central European governments that displayed a principled opposition to the quota system defined by the Juncker plan (Braghiroli, Makarychev 2017).

Although the underlined distinction is a complex and multi-faceted reality, the conflict between solidarity and security appears to overlap with different understandings of Europe in a broader sense: a value based, liberal, supranational and multi-cultural Europe on the one hand, and a traditional Europe, based on its religious and historical ancestral characteristics, with inter-governmental and (mostly) national policy mechanisms, on the other. Moreover, this dichotomy correlates with other conflictual encounters between what Donald Rumsfeld used to define in the context of the second Iraqi war—as ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europe, globalism and localism, supra-/post nationality and sovereignty, openness and closeness, all of them maintaining their relevance for today’s European debate on refugees(Braghiroli, Makarychev 2017).The European Council presented the area without internal frontiers as something in need of protection from security threats, both internal (cross-border crime) and external (terrorism and illegal immigration)(Maricut 2017).

3.14 The Rise of Far Right Parties

Almost two million people filed for asylum in European Union countries in 2014 and 2015, compared to 1.6 million during the previous five years (Eurostat 2018). As a result, larger population was exposed to refugees from culturally-distinctive countries, not only in cities, but also in countryside where exposure to non-European foreigners has usually been low. At the same time, far-right parties with anti-immigration agendas gained considerable support in many of the countries that experienced significant refugee inflows. Most recently, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), received 12.6percentof the vote in the German federal election 2017, making it the third-largest party in the German parliament (Stienmayre 2017)

As thousands of refugees are making their way towards the European Union, rightwing parties are projecting this as existential threat to consolidate their votes, Law and Justice party figure and former Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski warned that Muslim refugees would bring parasites and diseases to the local population Sweden Democrats'

35-year-old leader Jimmie Åkesson stated last year that "Islamism is the Nazism and Communism of our time" (Eraly 2017).

The far-right Sweden Democrats (SD) have substantially increased their popularity at every national election since the party entered the Riksdagen (the Swedish Parliament); from 2.9per cent of votes in 2006, to 5.7per cent in 2010, and 12.9percent in the most recent elections in 2014. In the upcoming elections in 2018, they are predicted to take from 17-26percent. Malmö, with its large foreign-born population, is also a stronghold for the SD (Hellstrom 2017). Terrorist threats and the attacks in the heart of Europe, in Paris and Brussels, have increased the attractive power of a Messianic leader or party. All the populist new leaders are talking about protecting nationals against foreigners, refugees and other Europeans alike, and about the abuses in the European Union. Suddenly the Union is not appealing and is not a unifying force, which renders Germany as the main motor of further integration, with France on its side. However the fracture between Eastern and Western Europe revives. Unfortunately there is an ongoing talk about two-speeds Europe or, even worse, a la carte Europe, where any member states gives and takes as much as it wants. As a consequence of this approach, common legal standards among European Union member states will be extremely difficult to set in place and that is the case with the Dublin Agreement (Postelnicescu 2016).

Nationalist, anti-liberal and anti-European parties are gaining ground all over in the European Union member states. The standoff with the Schengen agreement is pointing into a rather stressful European future: the German change of tone towards the Central and Eastern European states that refused to show genuine solidarity in the refugee crisis indicates a deeper differences that will echo on the common European security agenda and migration policy. The difficulty of reaching an agreed plan with solutions for the current migration crisis, despite a series of several meetings in the European Council, exposes deep divergences in internalizing core European values and a different degree of attachment to the European project and idea (Postelnicescu 2016). The most prominent opponent of Germany's open door policy is Hungary, through its prime-minister Viktor Orban, who refused any solidarity and proclaimed the demise of Schengen.

The gap between Germany and other European States is widening also on a number of other issues, such as the Greek debt crisis and the Euro zone and refugee crisis, using these as tools many political parties of the member states have tried to build an antagonistic perception of the EU's inability to rectify these challenges has been presented as the failure of the EU (Postelnicesu 2016). "The failure to narrow this gap might mean the disintegration of EU. The increasing number of Eurosceptic parties within the member states has also emerged as new threat for the decades of effort to consolidate democratic political setup that entails the good governance, rule of law, human rights, multiculturalism in the EU" (Makarychev 2017).

3.15 Failed States and Regional Conflicts

Failing and failed states are of particular interest due to their declining ability to control their own borders (Rotberg 2003). Pressures from climate change impacts, commodity price rises and demographic pressures may further weaken the fragile statehood in many of the EU neighboring countries (Burke et al. 2009). In 2025, three of every four youth-bulge countries will be located in sub-Saharan Africa; nearly all of the remainder will be located in the core of the Middle East. The weakness of these states may result in negative spill-over effects, such as terrorism, drugs trade and migration into rich democracies (Georgiev 2010). One could argue that the EU is effectively managing such threats in the moment with a certain number of failed states in its proximity.

In the future, the EU will probably face a number of challenges posed by regional conflicts, given the existing pressures in the Middle East, the Caucuses and Central Asia. Regional conflicts have intensified over the last few decades. They have been made more complex by the introduction of nuclear weapons dynamic (Georgiev 2010). An increase of the number of refugees seeking access to the EU may be expected, as well as other negative spill-over effects, such as proliferation of terrorism, drug trafficking activities, illegal weapons trade and even attempts to smuggle weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Sopko 1996, Halden 2007). Regional conflicts pose a serious threat even when not considered from a climate change perspective.

CHAPTER- 4

EU Integrated Border Management and Its Effectiveness

4.1 Introduction

EU external border has been associated with the abolition of internal border, the creation of common market, introduction of free mobility of people, goods and services and finally the introduction of Schengen Area. These changes and evolution of EU internal borders have over the years attained security angle. (Wolff 2009). With the advent of globalisation, increased economic interconnectedness among the states and free mobility of people, goods, and services, it has become imperative for the states to ensure the proper balance between open but secured and well-guarded borders (EUIBM 2015). Post 9/11 and the rising importance of migration management, borders are once again high on the security agenda of nation states. Similarly the EU despite of its openness in its internal borders for the smooth functioning of the common market, borders remain at the heart of the EU's security agenda (Hobbing 2005).

According to Huysmans (2006), the link between the elimination of internal border checks and strengthening the security of the external borders based on the assumptions that control of irregular mobility of persons, goods and services happens at the border. Very often "EU institutions like European Council, the Council of European Union and the EU presidency has emphasized on strengthening of the external border controls to combat irregular migration and cross border crime as their priority" (Slominski 2009). The EU reinforced stress on the protection of the external frontiers can be attributed to the apparent rise of illegal immigration and the terrorist attacks in New York (2001), Madrid, (2004) and London (2005). After the end of the Cold-War new security concerns like illegal migration and organised crime have replaced the military confrontation of Cold-War, expecting new responses in law enforcement and setting the agenda for police cooperation inside the EU and across its borders. In the context of protecting the external borders from these kinds of non-traditional security challenges, the "EU has fortified its external borders using number of measures including transnational police cooperation, coordination of border surveillance and increasing

involvement of national paramilitary forces using military equipment” (Lutterbeck 2006). It is generally maintained that in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, international actors have certainly reformed their approach in border security issues and have shown more interest in the deployment of biometric technologies as response to potential terrorist threats (Heisler 2006; Huysmans 2006; Boswell 2007). The War on terror has further given legitimacy to the use of external border management as an instrument to accomplish internal security of the region. (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 2011). This chapter primarily deals with three things first, it examines background circumstance that led to the establishment of the Integrated Border Management and second one will be the various border agencies that facilitate the smooth function of the IBM and last part will analyze about IBM’s effectiveness.

4.2 EU Integrated Border Management: Conceptual Framework

Border management is usually defined as the regulation of the borders by a professionally trained security forces with responsibilities, powers, functional mandates and a professional identity separate and distinct from other security providing structures (Marenin 2006). The techniques, procedures within any border security structure varies depending on the national and the regional context, the organizational dynamics, and the multiple rationalities under consideration (Hills 2006). The development of the European Union Integrated Border Management Strategy is purely a response to the abolition of internal borders and establishment of common border that is known as Schengen borders. By extending its free movement region to the Eastern European countries. The “Integrated Border Management” (IBM) is the modern concept for border management that has been adopted by the European Union, and also the model the EU recommends in its support to the countries of the Eastern Partnership.

In “December 2001 at Laeken, member states of the European Council raised issue of better management of the EU’s external border controls that will help to enhance the capability to combat illegal migration, network of human trafficking and terrorism in the region” (Hobbing 2010). The European Union began to develop its own model of IBM, a less comprehensive approach than the US model – where different border agencies carry out joint approach to border management. The European Union initially applied IBM in

the context of the EU's supportive activities in the Western Balkans region during the period 2002-2006. In 2004 EU created FRONTEX, a border agency specially dedicated to the management of the operational cooperation at the external borders of the member states of the European Union (European Commission 2002).

In 2002, for the first time European Commission initiated an integrated system of border management that brought the EU more closer to the common border management system, it was aimed at the establishment of the border guard within five years, based on the guidelines where national border guards would be operating under the common principle on training and equipment (Monar 2003). The year 2003 witnessed the establishment of several ad hoc agencies committed to border control and risk analysis as well as a number of joint border control exercises was carried out between member states (Monar 2004). Many of these exercises were interim in nature and lacked a strong legal basis, leading to the Commission proposal of November 2003 for the creation of External Border Management Agency.

Following the establishment of IBM in 2002, in 2006, the Justice and Home Affairs of the European Union concluded that the integrated management of the EU's external borders consisted of common legislation (in particular the Schengen Borders Code); operational cooperation between member states (with assistance from Frontex); and solidarity between member states through the establishment of an External Borders Fund. (European Commission 2002).

Integrated Border Management (IBM) in European Commission (EC) External Cooperation can be defined as national and international cooperation and coordination among all the important authorities and border agencies associated with border security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and coordinated border management in order to accomplish the objective of open but well-guarded and secure borders. The main goal of the IBM was to create more secure and open borders. Another milestone of the mechanism was that it ensures security and rule of law institutions to enhance cooperation at the local and regional levels (European Commission 2002). This cooperation involves the sharing of information and experience between police forces in Western Balkan states and the organization of joint border patrols (Hoxho 2013). IBM has

been envisaged as an important area for cooperation beyond borders in the EC's Global Approach to Migration, where member states are encouraged to improve their border management strategies(Carrera 2007).

The IBM concept for EC external cooperation first began in the European Commission 2002-2006 planning Programme for the Western Balkans by emphasizing that “a more integrated and all-encompassing approach to border management is the only way forward because the problems are so interconnected that they cannot be effectively tackled independently”(European Council 2001).Considering EU,s experience in applying the IBM concept in the Western Balkans and Central Asia, IBM was updated in 2007 by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), which was already cooperating with the EC during the development of the earlier version. In the framework of the EC funded Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA), implemented by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ICMPD has also developed specific IBM guidelines for this region (European Union 2010).

With the Treaty of Lisbon, the concept of IBM was incorporated into the fundamental law of the EU. Therefore the European Parliament and Council of the EU can now regulate legal provisions in the region. Besides this treaty states that EU should develop a policy aimed at gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders (Treaty of Lisbon 2009). The Stockholm Programme⁵ emphasizes on the further development of IBM by means of the reinforcement of Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (Council of the EU 2009).

The key elements of the IBM strategy involve the following:

- A comprehensive approach that goes beyond the physical security of borders to deal with issues of trade, transport, health and safety,
- The need for inter-agency cooperation, inter alia, customs, border police and veterinary services ,

⁵ The Stockholm Programme is the policy framework for the actions of EU on issues related to asylum, citizenship, justice, security, immigration and visa policy for the period of 2010-2014.

- Regional and international cooperation as essential components to achieve effective border security and
- The development of appropriate professional skills, which requires a shift from military border control to specialized police forces. The Schengen Catalogue is considered the guiding criteria for external border control (Council of the EU 2002).

The European Union External border management has been a significant mechanism to ensure internal security by preventing illegal migration and other cross border crime at the border and for ensuring the smooth border crossings for legitimate travellers. The concept of IBM has been developed to ensure efficient, extensive and cost-effective management of the external borders of the region to combat the crimes and illegal movement at the borders.

4.3 Different Dimensions of EU IBM

In 2006 Justice and Home Affairs Council has identified the various dimensions of the concept of Integrated Border Management (IBM) (Council of the EU 2009).

- Border control (checks and surveillance) as defined in the Schengen Borders Code, including relevant risk analysis and crime intelligence.
- Detection and investigation of cross-border crime in coordination with all competent law enforcement authorities.
- Coordination and coherence of the activities of Member States and Institutions and other bodies of the EU.
- Inter-agency cooperation for border management (border guards, customs, police, national security and other relevant authorities) and international cooperation.
- The four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, cooperation with neighboring countries, border control, control measures within the area of free movement, including return)(Council of European Union 2009)

The first two dimensions define what needs to be done (border check, risk analysis, crime intelligence, detection and investigation of cross-border crime), while the other two dimensions explain how this should be done (through coordination, coherence, inter-agency cooperation and international cooperation), and the last dimension defines where it should be done (Council of European Union 2009).

4.4 The Four –tier Access Model Control

Based on the need for both inter-agency and international cooperation (local, bilateral and multinational), the four-tier access control model is regarded as the important aspect of IBM in the EU Schengen Catalogue on External Borders Control and Return and Readmission(Council of the European Union 2009) This model comprises a set of complementary measures to be implemented in four different tiers: 1) Measures in third countries; 2) Cooperation with neighboring countries; 3) Border control (at the external border); and 4) Control measures within the area of free movement, including returns (Council of the EU 2009).

1. First-tier measures are engaged in third countries, specifically in countries of origin and transit. These measures comprise training and advice by liaison officers and document experts relating to the visa process for consular officials at consular posts and for carrier company personnel in third countries of origin or transit, which are the source of the risks generated by irregular immigration.
2. The second tier entails of cooperation with neighboring states. Agreements with neighboring states regarding cooperation in the area of border management are an effective measure for enhancing border security. Cooperation should be strengthened by establishing suitable working devices like exchange of information, proper communication networks, local, central, regional contact points, emergency procedures, handling incidents in an objective manner in order to avoid political disputes, etc. Regional cooperation structures across external borders should also be established in maritime areas. These initiatives should bring together all countries in the region.

3. Border control, as the third tier of the model, ensures systematic border controls for every individual entering or exiting the Schengen area. It also guarantees an adequate level for exposing illegal border crossings in areas between border crossing points or via sea, using false documents or hiding inside various modes of transport. Border control is part of national crime prevention, as it detects and reveals human smuggling, stolen property and other cross-border and border-related crimes as well as contributing to the detection of serious crime.
4. The fourth tier includes control measures within the area of free movement, including return. These measures check cross-border crime and irregular migration within the territory of the Schengen States by checks, surveillance measures and enhanced searches, in accordance with national law. Irregular immigrants identified within the Schengen area will be taken under the control of the authorities. They would be registered and if no grounds for residence exist and if there are no obstacles based on compelling humanitarian grounds or international law, they should be repatriated to their country of origin. Member States should define minimum standards for control measures within their territory together with other relevant authorities, of places known to be critical for third-country nationals staying illegally, cross-border traffic connections (Council of European Union 2009).

4.5 Cooperation in the context of IBM

The IBM calls for cooperation and coordination between all actors involved in border management. By improving communication, information exchange and mutual assistance of and between the services, the state border can be managed more successfully. IBM tries to achieve its objectives by cooperating at three different levels which regarded as three pillars of IBM (European Commission 2010).

1. **Intra-service Cooperation:** Intra-service cooperation denotes to procedures, exchange of information and resources within one ministry or agency. This involves (a) vertical cooperation: between local, central and regional levels and (b) horizontal cooperation: between various divisions of the same levels.

2. **Inter-Agency Cooperation:** Inter-agency cooperation refers to coordination and cooperation between different ministries or border management agencies, as well as between the liaison officers of the various agencies active at the border or ICSs. It begins at the central level where mid- and long-term strategies are discussed and extends to the operational contacts at the level of regional directorates and day-to-day operations at the BCPs. Coordination at the strategic level enables to avoid policy inconsistencies; at the local level, inter-agency cooperation would lead to more effective workflows, shortened processing times and higher detection rates of illicit cross-border activities such as irregular migration and smuggling of goods and animals
3. **International Cooperation:** Closer international cooperation in the field of border management with neighboring and other important countries is an effective instrument to help legitimate cross border trade and travel and, similarly, to fight cross-border crime and irregular immigration. Operative support can be sought from important regional/international organisations, like Frontex, Europol and Interpol, whereas capacity building and institution support is provided by several other international organisations such as, “ICAO, ICMPD, IOM, OIE, OSCE, UNCTAD, UNHCR, UNODC, WCO or WHO”.

Whereas the central level emphasis on coordination of strategic aspects like joint protection and surveillance of the border sections most at risk, cooperation at the regional and local levels focus on day-to-day operational issues. International cooperation thus refers to cooperation: Between neighboring states covering different issues, such as the organisations of joint patrols or coordination of border surveillance, joint border crossing points, information exchange, joint training, common contact offices and focal points, At the multilateral level the focus is on better approach, and common fields of work such as trans-border crime, irregular migration, trafficking in human beings, terrorism and smuggling of goods, through cooperation with international stakeholders, participation in regional/international forum and signing international agreements; At the local level between officials on both sides of the border(European Commission 2010).

When dealing with the external dimension of the EU border management policy, the first thing to be noticed is that the EU border services are not integrated at the EU level, therefore the member states continue to be competent in regulating their external borders (Wolff 2010). Apart from this, FRONTEX official stressed that member states of the EU are ready to surrender their sovereignty in the border management area, even though there is a need for more cooperation among Member States. In fact, there are huge differences within EU member states about the capabilities of border services. Most of the law enforcement authorities responsible for border control are actually police officers, except in Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland (Carrera 2010).

The legal basis for regulating the EU internal border control is called as the Schengen Borders Code (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2006). This border code came into force only after the establishment of the Frontex. The Schengen Border Code regards external border management as the policy area that should help to combat illegal immigration and human trafficking and to avert any kind of threat to the member states, public policy internal security, international relations, and public health (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2006).

In order to facilitate the integration of the border management at the EU level, the European Commission outlined a communication about IBM in 2002. The member states reluctance in the integration of the border security measures compelled the Commission to coin this concept. According to the Commission (2002), IBM allows ‘practitioners of the checks at the external borders to come together around the same table to coordinate their operational action in the framework of an integrated strategy’ (European Commission 2002). In line with the Commission Communication on IBM, the Council Conclusions in 2006 defined IBM as a concept embedding border control (according to the Schengen Borders’ Code), detection of cross-border crime, and interagency cooperation (Council of the EU 2006,)

As Wolff contends, IBM ‘is linked to the development of the EU internal security strategy’ (Wolff 2010). In this regard, Carrera (2007) stresses that the “border management” of the common Schengen regime external border must be “integrated” and must cover all border-related threats that the EU is supposed to be facing’ (2007), which

is stressed in the European Security Strategy (Council of the EU 2003). According to Carrera (2007) IBM 'legitimizes and reinforces the practice of security as coercion in the EU external territorial border'. Besides, in line with the Schengen Borders Code, the promotion of IBM and the 'strengthening of security' are intertwined. Similarly, the Commission conveyed that 'the security of the external borders of the European Union is an essential subject for European citizens' (European Commission 2002). Similarly, the Stockholm Programme, which outlines the agenda for action in the Justice and Home Affairs domain for the period 2009-2014, describes IBM as an effective policy to fight against illegal immigration (Council of the EU 2009).

However, the management of external borders has not started with the establishment of Frontex but has a long history that can be traced back to the finalization of the European Customs Union in the late 1960s. Other milestones were the creation of the Schengen framework starting in the mid-1980s and the integration of asylum and immigration policy into the EC agenda by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. The steady Europeanization of this policy field goes hand in hand with first steps to perceive migration and border management essentially from a security angle by the Tampere Program in the late 1990s. The institutionalization of IBM has originally been envisioned as a purely intergovernmental enterprise within the Council framework. In addition to formal rules, several informal forums have been created to deal with enhancing the cooperation of border management. One of the most well know informal forum has been the 'Strategic Committee for Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum' (SCIFA) which was in charge of strategic decisions related to this policy area and subsequent transnational coordination (Slominski, 2009)

As SCIFA and the modestly reformed SCIFA failed to deal with the growing workload of border management, EU policy-makers agreed to create a European external borders agency on a permanent basis. Following this political stimulus, the Council established Frontex in October 2004 (European Union 2004). While the Commission preferred a real operationally independent European Border Guard, however many member states preferred Frontex only to exert coordinating cooperative and supporting functions among national administrations (Jorry 2007). Seen in this light, Frontex appears as a politically

acceptable answer to narrow a regulatory gap between full communitarisation of border management on the one hand and a purely national approach on the other (Scharpf 1994).

4.6 Border Agencies to Promote IBM

FRONTEX

In the background of securitization of migration and asylum and also to facilitate the smooth operation of the large scale EU external border management, member states of EU came forward to launch the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU, which is known as FRONTEX. It was established by Council Regulation EC 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 with the aim of facilitating operational cooperation among member states of EU with regard to the management of the external borders, one of the most extraordinary aspects of FRONTEX is the considerable amount of attention that it has garnered since it commenced its operational activity in 2005 (Leonard 2010).

Frontex has several areas of responsibility as laid down in the legal basis

These include the following:

- **Joint operations** - harmonizes the deployment of specially trained staff and technical equipment (aircraft, vessels, and border control/surveillance equipment) to external border areas in need of further assistance.
- **Rapid response** - if any EU member state is facing crisis at the external border, particularly with the influx of large numbers of non-EU citizens, Frontex manages and coordinates the deployment of European Border Guard Teams.
- **Research** - convenes border management experts together with research and industry to make sure new technology meet the needs of border control authorities.
- **Training** – It develops common training principles for border authorities, to complement border guard education in EU and Schengen associated countries. This harmonization is envisioned to safeguard that wherever travellers cross an

external border of EU, they will encounter uniform border-control procedures. It also facilitates border guards from various countries to work together efficiently while deployed to joint operations coordinated by Frontex.

- **Joint returns** - develops best practices for returning migrants and coordinates joint return operations (but individual countries decide who should be returned).
- **Information-sharing** - develops and operates information systems that enable swift exchange of information between border authorities (European Union 2017).

After the inauguration of FRONTEX in June 2005 in Warsaw, Poland, it immediately started to work in the Mediterranean and to study how to successfully patrol the maritime border (Monar, 2006). Initial ideas involved a “coastal patrols” a network that would integrate national maritime surveillance operations with FRONTEX, guaranteeing permanent contact and the sharing of information. FRONTEX enables to establish cooperation with various border management agencies among the member states in absence of law enforcement power of its own (Munguanu 2013). FRONTEX completely depends on resources (such as equipment and officers) from Member States; however it can now acquire its own equipment (Council of the European Union, 2011).

FRONTEX has been labeled as the ‘anchor stone’ of IBM. It has been the sole border agency that has carried out activities directed towards promoting IBM in the Eastern Partnership and Russia. And it is also the only border agency of the EU that shoulders the responsibility of establishing coordinating operational cooperation along the external borders of the. FRONTEX is the nineteenth border agency of the EU and it is regulated under the provision of the regulation 2004/2007, which set the foundations for its establishment, outlining its functions and structure (Council of the EU 2004). The FRONTEX Started functioning in 2005 and its head office located in Warsaw (Council of the EU 2005). The idea of establishing FRONTEX headquarter in Poland is based on the assumption that the activity of the agency would be much stronger along the EU’s eastern borders than the EU’s southern border region. However the activity of the agency, especially its joint operations have more concentrated on irregular migration flows from the southern region of the Europe as well as from the African Atlantic coast into Canary

Islands. In Eastern Europe, FRONTEX has been deployed with others, a joint operation along the EU-Ukrainian border named as JUPITER (Sagrera 2013).

According to article 1 and 2 of the Frontex it clearly mentions that EU member states are entitled to have executive powers in border management, the FRONTEX establishment Guideline clearly mentions that ‘the responsibility for the surveillance and control of the external borders lies with the member states’ (Council of the EU 2004). And the Agency functions only at the operational level coordinating various border guard agencies of member states of the EU. Among the functions that FRONTEX performs the capacity-building for the border guards, the elaboration of risk assessments and helping joint return operations have remained significant. These techniques are launched in circumstances during which member states of the EU requires additional operational assistance in application of the principle of the burden sharing at the external frontier of the Schengen region. These techniques cost is estimated to be 60 percent of the FRONTEX entire budget. Apart from this; the Agency also encourages and conducts research on surveillance and border control (Christian Kaunert, 2015).

In February 2010, the European Commission presented a proposal that sought to reform FRONTEX, as a result of which the regulation 1168/2011 was amended in November 2011. (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2011).The new regulation constitutes a set of reforms. On the one hand, a leading role of the Agency together with member states is the deployment of joint return operations, ability to control the operational plan in case of need and to decide where EU member states’ experts should be deployed. Also, the Regulation foresees rendering compulsory the equipment contribution from member states and the possibility for FRONTEX to have its own equipment. On the other hand, the Regulation envisages the possibility for FRONTEX to fund technical-assistance projects with third countries (Christian Kaunert, 2015).

The FRONTEX Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) is the main communication channel for FRONTEX with Member States and other important players in policy making, intelligence services and migrants’ rights like the European Commission, Europol and EASO. Apart from this, an Internet-secured space managed by the European Commission ‘ICO-net’ links them virtually at all times. On this virtual interactive network, Frontex

channels updated information and member states are asked to upload their information on request by Frontex. Any delay in uploading can be noticed in the ICO-net system, and Frontex can force Member States to share the required information for its analysis. This indicates that member states are constantly monitored by the Frontex with the regard to their compliance in data sharing (Horii, 2016).

The deliberation on the new proposal regarding the prospect for FRONTEX to have access to the personal information has been subjected to controversy, as it is not law enforcement agency. With the regard to this European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) In this regard, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) voiced his concern about the lack of clarity in the proposal on the scope of activities where personal data can be processed (EDPS 2010). Finally the new regulation expects the mandatory introduction of fundamental rights approach within the content of the capacity-building training and seminars. (Sagrera, 2014).

EUBAM (European Union Border Assistance to Moldova and Ukraine)

This is yet another border agency through which the EU is trying to promote and helps to achieve the objectives of IBM in Ukraine and Moldova. Since its creation in December 2005, its command has subsequently been extended to every two years till 2011. EUBAM's specialty remains in the fact that it is a Commission mission and not a Council mission, like EUBAM Rafah. The Commission put forward to the Council the arguments that it was not a military mission and that it had extensive experience in the region (Kurowaska, Tallis 2009). It has its headquarters in the Ukrainian city of Odessa, on the shore of the Black Sea. EUBAM function has been mostly concentrate on advising and assisting on the combating cross-border crime such as trafficking in human beings control of irregular migration flows, and corruption. This mission also takes out joint operations at borders.

Apart from this, EUBAM also gives advice to the Moldovan and Ukrainian governments in the process of demarcation of their common border. A Joint Ukrainian–Moldovan Commission on Border Demarcation is in charge of the task, a difficult one because of the conflict in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Two-thirds of the common border

between Ukraine and Moldova has been demarcated so far, and the demarcation of the central section of the border started in 2010. In this regard, “EUBAM has been involved, alongside the EU Special Representative to Moldova, in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and the set-up of confidence-building measures between Chişinău and Tiraspol. As a result, the railway services between Chişinău and Odessa via Tiraspol were reintroduced in 2010”(Sagrera 2014).

The founding principles of EUBAM are mentioned in a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the European Commission and the governments of Ukraine and Moldova. The Memorandum states that the Mission ‘will promote coordinated action and assist the Governments of the Republic of Moldova and of Ukraine in areas involving border, customs and fiscal matters’(European Commission 2005).

Like FRONTEX, the EUBAM has no administrative powers and operates in cooperation with its four partners: the Ukraine State Border Guard Service and the Border Guard Service of the Republic of Moldova, and the customs services of the two countries. In 2010 member states of the EU have supported to employ 200 people by the EUBAM, EUBAM employed 200 people, and they were in charge of 1222 kilometers of common Moldovan–Ukrainian border (EUBAM 2011). So far the mission’s activity has received positive response; an official from the Mission characterized it as the most effective international EU mission (Sagrera 2014). However Kurowska and Tallis(2009) have questioned the effectiveness of EUBAM. While acknowledging the progress made by the Mission in border monitoring, they stress that its contribution to solving the Transnistrian conflict has still to be shown.

In the context of increasing numbers of people crossing the Mediterranean, the 2015 European Agenda on Migration establishes a policy agenda which prioritises increased control measures, re-iterating previous commitments to develop new border surveillance technologies and expand older databases such as Eurodac (for asylum administration), the Schengen Information System (SIS, for cross-border crime), and the Visa Information System (VIS, for visa applications) (European Commission 2015). In a process beginning at least in the 1980s, but gaining vigour and speed since the Amsterdam Treaty, border security policies in the European Union (EU) have been extraterritorialised (involving

visa controls, carrier sanctions, and interception on the high seas and in third countries), militarised (as in the case of Operation Sophia, an EUNAVFOR Med operation designed to target people smugglers), increasingly transnational (as in the case of the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard out of Frontex), and have become ‘smarter (Baird 2018).

EUROSUR: European Border Surveillance System

Within the open Schengen area, Member States remain responsible for guarding their share of the external borders. Article 12 of the Schengen Borders Code requires Member States to carry out external border surveillance between crossing points in order to discourage people from circumventing the checks at crossing points (European Council 2006).

In year 2008 marked an another milestone year for European Union as the European commission proposed the idea of establishing European Border Surveillance System , which uses aircraft, satellites, and sea-sensors to track mobile population (Baird, 2015). EUROSUR intends to improve the cooperation between national border guard forces and thus reinforces the overall control of the European Union (EU)’s external borders. It is essentially an information-exchange system that enables near real-time sharing of border-related data. In 2011, EUROSUR was proposed as law, but only in 2013 it was adopted after concluding negotiations between the Council and the Parliament. The EUROSUR Regulation was adopted in October 2013 and applies to the southern and eastern border Member States from December 1, 2013, with all others from December 1, 2014(Vermeulen 2015).

The budget of EUROSUR is estimated to be around 340 million euros between 2011 and 2020, but an alternative estimate states a bill of approximately 840 million euros (Heller & Jones, 2014). EUROSUR includes aerospace, optical, and digital technologies integrated into a system of national coordination centers managed by FRONTEX. Satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, high-resolution cameras, and various other maritime reporting technologies will be used to generate pre frontier intelligence pictures which will be analyzed and shared among FRONTEX and the national coordination centers

(European Parliament & European Council, 2013). A number of sophisticated Research and Development projects have been undertaken to simulate the capacities of the EUROSUR system, involving a range of state and non-state actors in the design and deployment of maritime surveillance technologies (European Commission 2014). Coordination over the control of the external borders of the EU has been increasingly moved up to supranational actors, down to local actors, and out to private actors (Guiraudon, Lahav 2000).

The practice of changing administrative location has resulted in a proliferation of institutions tasked with coordination and management of the EU external border. New institutions and technologies, such as the agency FRONTEX or the network EUROSUR, are created out of multiple fragmented communities of trans-governmental actors who are operationally interdependent, without single structure of interaction, mechanism of rule projection, or type of power (Lavenex, 2014). The effectiveness of any EU policy should not be assessed in isolation. From a broader perspective, the border security framework is instrumental for various other policies such as foreign policy, security and economic development (Gallup et al. 1999, Hill 2002, Andreas 2003).

4.7 Security, Migration management and Database Agencies of Border Management

The Vienna Action Plan chalked out a framework that outlines a set of concrete aims for the development of EU justice and home affairs up to 2004. The Tampere European Council approved on a Common European Asylum System, and launched an agency called Euro just which comprises of magistrates, police officers and national prosecutors to assist the co-ordination of national prosecuting authorities. Co-operation between national police units accountable for border controls and supranational intelligence units has also developed through Europol, as well as through other channels (Conroy 2000).

Schengen Agreement has regarded as sign of forced discrimination in Eastern European countries destabilizing the western ability to establish democracy and peace in this sensitive area. (Vachudova 2000). Western European states have misused the Schengen area to defend, reintroduction of internal border controls and tightening up immigration controls, decreasing massive influx of asylum seekers, increasing visa restrictions,

widening the scope of secret data collection on mixing crime and migration in a variety of forms and measures (Zielonka 2001).

Frontex, the EU border agency presently handling the cooperation between national border services is prohibited from using security databases and it is not even allowed to buy its own fingerprinting machines. Security screening at the border will improve if and when the proposed European Border Guard – with access to security databases – starts operating.

Despite opposition in some European capitals, a true European border force would help the EU to strengthen its external border, because it would support countries in managing their borders in times of crisis, and reduce the risk of terrorists and other criminals getting in and out of the Schengen area.

Schengen Information System (SIS) and SIS II

Schengen Information System (SIS) and SIS II, the Schengen Agreement which were initially operated outside the framework of EU institutions, aimed at fulfilling the long-standing European goal of free mobility of people and goods by eliminating the internal border checks among Schengen Member States (Broeders 2007). And the Schengen Agreement along with the SIS, s “dataflagship”- were incorporated into the EU through the Treaty of Amsterdam as an attempt to enhance EU’s border security by combating irregular migration (Dhian Ho 2004).

Schengen functions under two major surveillance and registration systems. The first is the Schengen Information System (SIS), a data-based surveillance and registration system and it focuses on issues concerning law enforcement, border control and national security purposes (Guild 2008). The SIS has been functioning and it has been regarded as a protected administrative database used by many member states of the EU to maintain and disseminate information on people crossing the borders (Guild 2008). The second system named as SIRENE, which stands for Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry, is associated with the SIS as a supporting system (Broeders , Fassmann 2009). The SIS is made up of a central database (called C-SIS) that is physically housed in a heavily guarded bunker in Strasbourg and of national SIS-bases (called N-SIS) in all

of the Schengen states. Its purpose is to maintain “public order and security, including state security, and to apply the provisions of this convention relating to the movement of persons, in the territories of the contracting parties, using information transmitted by the system” (Schengen Convention 1990).

The SIS provides the legal base for a huge data system that records information on persons and objects. Not all authorities have overall access to the system; immigration authorities for example only 30 have access to the data on irregular migrants (Brouwe 2008). However, the SIS was not designed for detailed data exchange and practically it works as an index to the connected SIRENE system, which enables the sharing of complementary information, comprising fingerprints and photographs (Broeders 2005,). Even though SIRENE is usually considered as the core of Schengen, there is no mention about the system in the Schengen Convention (European Commission, 2000). The data’s are stored in the SIS but it is the SIRENE system that helps to share “softer” data such as criminal intelligence information. In order to ensure the smooth functioning of the system, the national SIS and the SIRENE system in most member states are associated to the same institution, generally a central police department responsible for international cooperation.

Although the SIS is described as an mechanism aimed at securing stability, order and security in the Schengen region, its major concern appears to be with illegal migration (Guild 2001).The rapid expansion of the Schengen region has resulted in creation of second generation of the SIS system i.e. SIS II which will include the new member states and facilitate new functions (de Hert 2004).

The SIS II began to function at the end of 2008 and will permit for a comprehensive use and different types of data, and be in concomitant with the advancement of information technology (Baldacini 2008). It is important to observe that after the 9/11 attacks, its purpose was expanded to provide information in a bid to fight against terrorism and adapted to help the storage of biometric data such as photographs and fingerprints (Baldaccini 2008).

An advanced application of biometric technologies to the SIS is one of the important aspects of the present improvement in the European Information Network. More specifically, the existing SIS is based on alphanumeric data that permit only for two results: hit or no hit. However Biometric systems are designed to search for an acceptable 31 degree of similarity and are more efficient, in relating information to persons (European Commission 2008). However critics have argued that the usage of biometrics as an exclusive means for tracing identity of an individual may have severe implications for those who are erroneously identified, considering the propensity of data protection authorities to overemphasize the consistency of biometrics (Andronikou et al. 2008).

The absence of provision in dealing with misused identity or inaccurate information due to technical glitches has put the biometrics reliability under question (Baldaccini 2008). Moreover, different member states follow different national practices to recording people's identity in the SIS, and this practice seems to continue with SIS II, thus continuing to leave independence to Member States (Lodge 2006). Some Member States, notoriously Germany and Italy, interpret the criteria for listing unwanted third-country nationals rather widely, with the result that they account for the vast majority of data entered into the system (Guirandon 1999). This is a matter of considerable concern as once biometric searches are enabled those 750,000 third-country nationals (a number likely to grow considerably with the expansion of the database) will form part of a suspect population whose data will be crawled through for the purpose of police investigations (Deslol 2008). Hence, the EU's securitization agenda is resulting in a shift of purpose of the SIS from a border control tool to a reporting and investigation system for general crime detection purposes. Indeed, the SIS database, originally conceived of as a compensatory measure for the lifting of internal border controls, is being developed in a way that disconnects it from its original purpose of allowing the free movement of people in the Schengen area and makes it an objective in itself (Ho 2004). This disconnection is best exemplified in the Council's decision to extend, from 1 September 2007, SIS access to the new Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 (with the exception of Cyprus) prior to the lifting of checks at internal borders with the Member States concerned (European Council 2007).

EURODAC: European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database

EURODAC is yet another significant European Union database system, which began to function from January 2003. The decision to establish the system has been quite difficult task for the Union and it was approved on 1991, however it began to operate only in 2003 (Aus 2006). By that time, the significance of EURODOC had grown to become a comprehensive community-wide system for the assessment of fingerprints of asylum seekers by restraining the likelihood for “asylum shopping”- i.e. individuals entering into the asylum procedure in more than one country successively, and EURODOC was created as response to combat “asylum shopping” across Schengen member states and separate those classified as legitimate asylum seekers from other categories of migrants (Lodge 2004).

However, the authorities of standing committee in International Migration, Refugee and Criminal Law have argued against the widespread usage of EURODOC data. Their arguments based on the idea of the infringement of the principle of the purpose limitation; apprehensions over the stigmatization of asylum seekers; the concern over circulation of unreliable information; and the fears of threatening persons in need of protection (Sprokkereef 2008). Many samples of individuals are collected on non-voluntary basis, and the legal provisions for surveillance and profiling vary significantly from one country to another, keeping the individual in the uncertainty about the usage of his or her biometrics (Pap 2008). Therefore the apprehension about the legal provision and technical tasks of EURODOC have grown in recent years and have reinforced the necessity for the re-examination of the EURODOC’s role in the processes of migration management. With regard to the future role of this database, the European Commission recently reported that it “will explore, on the basis of examination and complete impact assessment, the prospect of expanding the role of EURODOC in regard to use its data for law enforcement purposes (COM 2007). The police access to EURODOC information may enable the law enforcement and police authorities of the EU Member States with new investigative leads making a significant contribution in combating cross border crimes. (European Council 2007).

Visa Information System (VIS)

This is another network database system that is created in the context of EU's attempt to fight against illegal immigration (Broeders 2007). Post 9/11 attacks, the Home Affairs and Justice Ministers called for tightening of the procedures for issuing of visas and the Commission should present proposal for the creation of the communication network for sharing of information related to visa issued by the Schengen Member States (European Council 2001). The scope of VIS involves collecting of and storing of fingerprints and other biometric data's of all third-country citizens applying for short-term visas (Baldaccini 2008). Therefore VIS helps to identify any of those irregular migrants who legitimately enter into the EU at any border (Broeders, Engbersen 2007).

Member States of the Schengen region are now planning for the collection of biometric data for the VIS at consular posts, in accordance with the Council's vision that areas with high risk should be prioritized hence they begun with posts in North Africa and the Near East (Boniface et al. 2008). The objectives of the VIS have been outlined in the guidelines of the Council that involves the following: to control fraud; develop consular cooperation; easing of border and police checks, preventing "visa shopping", enable the expulsion of third-country citizens; improve the management of the common visa policy in order to strengthen the internal security against border crimes and Terrorism (European Council 2004). Subsequently, the Council emphasized on the point that the objective of increasing internal security can be realized ,only when the responsible Member States for the internal security are allowed to access the VIS (European Council 2005). The main focus of the system therefore stresses on the internal surveillance of irregular migrants and its ability to notice and identify them on the territory of member states (Broeders 2007). VIS is not a law enforcement agency but it is an information system designed to facilitate the implementation of the European visa policy (EDPS 2007).

VIS is able to store data, it is capable of storing data of about 20 million visa applicants yearly and, as per the Commission estimates, 70 million fingerprint data will be stored in the system in the first five years of its operation. Routine access of data by police may involve a disproportionate intrusion in the privacy of travelers (Sprokkereef 2008). In the

context of this risk, the data protection officials have been advised that the police access to the VIS should be subjected to certain safeguards, which involve a comprehensive data protection regime for national use of the data (EDPS 2007).

VIS is seemed to be facilitating the latest effort in the EU's attempt to establish control over identity as this agency will store all visa applications and the fingerprints of the citizens of states that are required to request a visa when traveling to the EU (Guild 2003). However, it is difficult to say if this system of immigration database really be successful, as the quantity of data stored is huge and is bound to increase at a greater speed, but it is certain that the VIS database will continue to gain prominence in detection and identification of immigrants (Broeders , Engbersen 2007). At present one of the major concern is the Stockholm Programme, which will outline the EU initiatives for the next five years in the Area of Freedom, Security, Justice (AFSJ) (European Commission 2009). With regard to the data sharing, the Stockholm Programme intends to achieve complete integration through complete interoperability, and allowing police forces to the complete access of data (European Commission 2009).

The understanding is that to fight against terrorism and illegal migration it is indispensable for the police and security officials have access to EU's databases thereby leaving concerns over privacy unanswered (Baldaccini 2008,). This raises enormous privacy and security concerns and significantly intensifies the potential for surveillance and tracking of individuals. The challenging issues relate not simply to the tools like EURODOC that the EU developed to enhance its capabilities to combat international organised crime, including illegal migration, trafficking and terrorism, rather, they concern the use and purpose of those tools (IOM 2003).

4.8 IBM and Internal Security

The Stockholm Programme links IBM to the development of an EU internal security strategy and strengthening of Frontex by enhancing its scope. The Internal Security Strategy (ISS) established on the founding principle of the 2003 European Security Strategy was adopted by the European Council in February 2010. The document stresses on the need to further functional cooperation and the inter-operability of agencies like

Frontex, Europol, and Eurojust. It stresses on further exploitation of collaboration between the different law enforcement and border agencies, as well as with judicial authorities (European Council 2010). The formation of the Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI) supports such an integrated and horizontal approach. This committee covers law enforcement and border management authorities for the first time, as well as judicial authorities where appropriate, to provide assessment on EU and national security as well as priorities in the field of operational cooperation. The strategy also underlines the important role that Integrated Border Management can play for security. At the EU level this strategy implies the large scale border management. Frontex is one of the many agents implementing this holistic strategy.

4.9 Implementation of IBM in EU

The EU's strategy of IBM was first applied in the in the Western Balkans, which has become a prerequisite for accession to the EU. This strategy pursues the creation of open and secure borders. Effective border management should facilitate free movement of goods and people, but at the same time, prevent unlawful activities (Hobbing 2005). The Schengen Catalogue is regarded as the guiding criteria for external border control (Council of the EU 2002).

The main EU legal document dealing with border security issues is Regulation 562/2006 establishing a Community code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (the Schengen Borders Code). This brings into the EU framework the Schengen Convention (1990), which implemented the Schengen Agreement (1985). The Convention sought abolition of checks at 'internal' borders and created a single external border where entry checks to the Schengen area are carried out. Checks are based on a common set of rules, such as the common visa policy, police and judicial cooperation and the Schengen Information System (SIS) to pool and share data. Greece and Slovenia are Schengen members and apply the Schengen acquis. Greece began partial implementation in December 1997 with full implementation from 1 January 2000. Slovenia signed the Schengen Convention on accession on 1 May 2004 with full implementation from 21 December 2007. Croatia was required to adapt to the requirements of the Schengen border code as part of the enlargement process (Taylor 2013). The purpose of capacity

building is achieving IBM, which involves coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and integrated border management systems, in order to reach the common goal of open, but controlled and secure borders. (CEC 2007) It has three pillars: intra-service cooperation and coordination of the different levels of hierarchy within an agency or ministry; inter-agency cooperation and coordination between different ministries and agencies; international cooperation and coordination between agencies and ministries of other states or international organisations.

Security agencies suffer from substantial gaps in accountability. The Schengen institutional framework is also prone to such gaps due to the secret investigation and intelligence strategies used in cross-border police cooperation, as well as the de facto autonomy of police work (Aden 2006). However, the effectiveness of an accountable policy set-up can be more readily measurable externally.

4.10 Refugee Crisis and inefficiency of the EU Border Management Agency

The 2015 refugee crisis exposed the lack of cooperation and coordination among the member states regarding the Border management and it also highlighted the ineffective border management policy of the EU that resulted in massive influx of the refugees. Following the unannounced on-site Schengen evaluation on Greek external borders in November 2015, the Council Implementing Decision of 12 February found serious deficiencies at external borders (European Union 2016). Subsequent rounds of recommendations to address the deficiencies followed. Nevertheless, on 12 of May 2016, another Council Implementing Decision triggered Article 29 of the SBC, which allowed the prolongation of checks for an additional six months in Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Norway (European Union 2016).

EU acknowledged the failure of earlier border management efforts that lacked capability of managing the borders at a time of crisis Therefore as a response to the refugee crisis, in December 2015 European Commission adopted a European Border and Coastguard Agency to ensure strong and shared management of the external borders (European Commission 2015). The Commission also proposed to revise the Schengen Border Code

in order to introduce, at the external borders of the EU, systematic checks against relevant databases for all people entering or exiting the Schengen area. A uniform European travel document for return will facilitate effective return of illegally staying third country nationals.

The Commission also recommended for a voluntary humanitarian admission scheme with Turkey. If the irregular flows into Europe through Turkey are successfully reduced, Member States are asked to admit from Turkey persons in need of international protection who have been displaced by the conflict in Syria and who were registered by Turkish authorities before 29 November 2015(European Commission 2015).The European Commission also adopted a Concrete Handbook for managing and implementing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), two Progress Reports on the Implementation of the hotspots in Greece and in Italy and a Progress Report on the management of the refugees' crisis on the Western Balkans route (European Commission 2015).

4.11 The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (2015)

The EU has decided to establish the European Border and Coast Guard Agency as a response to the massive influx of people that Europe witnessed in 2015. On the launch of the EBCG, the commissioner of Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos, said, “Today is a milestone in the history of European border management. From now onwards, the external EU border of one Member State is the external border of all Member States – both legally and operationally. In less than one year we have established a fully-fledged European Border and Coast Guard system, turning into reality the principles of shared responsibility and solidarity among the Member States and the Union. This is exactly the European response that we need for the security and migration challenges of the 21st century” (European Commission 2016).

The proposal calls for the allotment of the additional competencies, staff, equipment and funds to strengthen the present EU Border Agency Frontex and it seek to further strengthening its capabilities by pooling resources from Frontex and EU member states, border and coast guard authorities(Hertog 2016).As per the Commission’s factsheet about

EBCG, the discrepancies in the present EU border agency, Frontex, have hampered its capability to efficiently combat and remedy the situation created by the massive influx of people, it is not capable of purchasing its own resources, it is not having its own functional staff and completely depends upon Member State assistances, it is incompetent to perform its own border management functions without the prior request of a Member State and it does not have an explicit mandate to carry out search and rescue operations. Thus the new Agency can be strengthened and reinforced to address all these issues.

The EBCG involves national borders along with coast guard (naval authorities), which would endow Frontex with responsibility to coordinate range of information exchange and operational service under the functional approach to coast guard, expanding the Frontex role include the coast guard services, it has entered into part of military actors working beyond the Schengen borders to protect the region (Hertog, 2016). The European Border and Coast Guard will facilitate in managing migration more efficiently, enhance the internal security of the European Union and protect the principle of free mobility of people. The creation of a European Border and Coast Guard will also guarantee a robust management of the EU's external borders as a shared responsibility between the Union and its Member States.

In recent years, heightened security concerns arising from the increase of transnational terrorism and crime have affected the ways in which governments in the international arena approach border security issues. As a direct result of these concerns, migratory flows have increasingly come to be seen as a non-traditional security threat to nation states which are in turn held accountable for developing more effective migration management systems as a response to security considerations. A key aspect of this new approach has been to tighten control of borders, to ensure safer travel documents as well as to promote enhanced cooperation on migration issues among states in the international stage. However, the most crucial component in reinforcing security measures for the control of migratory flows involves the introduction of biometric systems in various domains of migration management.

CHAPTER- 5

Conclusion

The participation of the several European countries in the world war-I and world war-II has brought an unprecedented economic, military and political devastation to the entire continent that subsequently reduced the significant role of European countries in the global level. The primary objective behind the establishment of the common market was not just to regain the lost economic supremacy but also to establish the stable democratic political system in Europe. Therefore, the advent of common market with free mobility of goods marked the beginning of the abolition of national borders. Slowly the free mobility free mobility of people was also included by the members of the European Economic Community that to be successful in the common market it is imperative to encourage the free mobility of the people in the region. Thus the establishment of the Schengen has been one of the significant aspect of the European Union, as it has facilitated the economic growth and transformed Europe as a prosperous region however it has not remained aloof from the growing non-traditional security challenges, it continues to face the security challenges emanating from its external borders.

The advent of globalisation has facilitated the advancement of science and technology that has further enhanced the economic interconnectedness among the different states and different regions. Globalisation as a phenomenon has every aspect of the state from politics and economics to security and cultural aspect of the state. Many liberal scholars have argued that with the advent of globalisation, borders are losing their importance and they are becoming insignificant in an age of technology where people can remain in touch with each other virtually, however it is partially true because when it comes to security aspect ,borders continue to remain significant for the state, therefore one could have noticed in the 2015 refugee crisis that many European Union member states introduced the internal border controls, and some countries like Greece, Hungary, and Austria even started fencing the borders despite the widespread opposition from the EU.

This dissertation has adopted the Barry Buzan's Securitization theory to prove that how the establishment of Schengen region after the end Cold War made it vulnerable to the burgeoning security concerns, as the end of Cold War not only not only ended the traditionally dominated military and ideological based threats ,it has also diversified threats that now dominated from different sectors such as economic, societal, environmental, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Failed States, and Regional conflicts.

This dissertation has demonstrated the evolution of Schengen region from being merely facilitator for the enhancement of the economic prosperity and expanding its priority to development of the security community by focusing on the securitization of the “EU external borders” by using various mechanisms. It has also showcased its inability to manage the external borders that became clearly visible when Europe witnessed massive influx of people. This dissertation has answered all the research questions that have been raised in the first chapter: How has the Schengen agreement changed the concept of border in Europe; how did the non-traditional security challenges impact the European Union’s open border policy; how has the abolition of internal borders has given the external dimension to the EU’s internal security; how effective has the EU Integrated Border Management in confronting non-traditional security challenges. This research has tried to answer all these questions by using primary and secondary sources as well.

The dissertation began by introducing the complete framework of the research and it has also introduced the various fundamental concepts associated with this particular research, this has introduced the research topic by providing the framework of the study and key issues proposed to be analyzed. This section has traced the research problem and introduced the concept of border and has discussed different types of border such as closed and open border. And this has attempted to examine the different perspectives of the border. This has introduced chapters and the methodology applied in the research carried out.

The decolonization and the end of Cold War has tremendously changed the political, economic and social aspects of the global politics, as it led to the establishment of the democratic liberal order. The phenomenon globalization has given an impetus to the

establishment of several regional organisations. In this context, this dissertation has examined how various regional organisations have embraced the liberal democratic principles and to what extent these organisations have advocated open border facility that encourages the free mobility of people, goods within the member states of the regional organisation. This dissertation has taken the case study of several regional organisations such as NAFTA, AU, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and GCC to test the premise of the argument. It was found that the extent of openness and closeness of the borders and free mobility of the people depends on several factors like economic condition of the member states in the region, and geopolitical situation. These factors influence the behavior of the regional organisation for example among the NAFTA member states only United States and Canada as both shares the sound economic system unlike the other member states. The reluctance within the member states to adopt free mobility measures has shifted the focus on the impending security concerns associated with free mobility has loomed larger in the background.

The adoption free mobility of people at the regional level is regarded as a key to deepen the regional economic integration .This is certainly the case with the European Union however the extent of acceptance of the free movement of people exclusively depends on the geopolitics of the region and also the social and political conditions of the member states of the regional organization. In NAFTA and ASEAN there is no provision of free movement of people within the region however they allow only the skilled labor mobility as it is believed that they contribute to the growth of economy. Post liberalization, globalization and privatization many regional organizations have taken initiative to encourage the free mobility of persons among the member states of the regional organisations however the implementation part of the initiative remains abysmally low.

The enforcement and implementation of the free mobility provision in the regional organisations has met with numerous difficulties, the slow and weakness in the enforcement part can be attributed several factors like lack proper measure to combat illegal activities, lack of institutional mechanism to deal with security issues arising the border level, political unwillingness and lack of commitment to judicious use of resources to strengthen the border security of the region. There is hardly any regional

organisation that has common policy mechanisms to regulate free mobility of the people within the region, although EU has Common Immigration policy but it has not been implemented properly, as a result of which the EU witnessed the 2015 refugee crisis. In the initial phase many regional organisations have been established for the sake of achieving the economic prosperity of the region but slowly they have expanded their priority from achieving economic prosperity to establishing security, peace and stability in the region.

The third section of the dissertation has traced the genesis of the European Union's open border policy from the initial five members to the eventual twenty six members. It has tried to examine the various stages that led to the expansion of the Schengen area from the Western Europe to the Eastern European countries that were earlier regarded as the enemy camp. It has critically analyzed how the Schengen region that was primarily designed for the economic purpose has transformed itself to be a security community, as the abolition of internal borders has shifted the focus at the external borders of the European Union. This section focused on how the establishment of the Schengen agreement after the Cold War has made it vulnerable to the various threats, as the end of Cold War has not only changed the security landscape but also changed the threat perception that were dominated by the military to a range of the non-traditional security challenges that includes the economic, political and societal threats and moreover the earlier threats were identifiable but the advent of globalisation has diversified the threats and made it difficult to identify the threats.

This section also unfolds how the enlargement of the Schengen region to the Eastern Europe has enhanced the security concerns for the Western European countries considering the traditional divide between the East and West infused the threat perception among the Western European countries, as they have always perceived the Eastern Europe as the Underdeveloped world with less economic growth, therefore the expansion of the Schengen area to the East may lead to the massive influx of people Eastern European countries in search of better employment. It has also found out that how the migration has been framed within the context of security, the response of EU member states to the 2015 refugee crisis has stood as a testimony to securitizing migration, as it

exposed the inherent security concerns associated with the free movement of people within the member states.

This section of the dissertation has also focused on how the enforcement of the Schengen convention 1995 at a time when the Cold War has come to an end has changed the landscape of the European security as now the present EU shares its borders with the former members of the communist bloc. It was also found out that how the issue of refugees has been used as a tool for the political rhetoric within various political parties, Law and Justice party in Poland and Fidesz Party in Hungary which is led by the Victor Orban have continue to consolidate their strength by increasing the Political rhetoric on the massive influx of refugees (Agerholm 2018). In a way it can be said that the issue of refugee crisis has given the greater fillip to the rise of rightwing political parties that are trying to garner more votes on the bases the identity. Going by the recent trends in Europe it appears that what Samuel Huntington (1996) predicted that the upcoming wars in the world will not base different ideologies but rather base on the inherent fault lines between various civilization ,he argued that the conflict will be based on the religion, culture, identity is coming true.

This perception reaffirms from the fact that it is not the first time that EU faced the refugee crisis, it also faced during the Balkan crisis but it did not receive the criticism from the then member states as the refugees were fitting within the framework of the European civilization, but this is not the case with the 2015 refugee crisis as most of the refugees are fleeing from either conflict ridden place or failed states from the Middle East region which is different from the Western civilization. This chapter has attempted to show how the European Union open border policy has been impacted by the changing threat perception.

The final section of the dissertation has examined the context in which the Integrated Border Management has been established, it found out that, as the Schengen convention of 1995 sought to eliminate the internal border checks among the member states of the Schengen accord, this resulted in an inseparable understanding about the internal security and strengthening of external border security. It was observed that in the wake of the 9/11 terror attack international actors have reformed their approach towards strengthening

of the external border controls, from the circumstances that led to the establishment of the Integrated Border Management it moves on to explain the conceptual framework of the IBM in European Union.

This section has unfolded different dimensions of IBM. The EUIBM operates at the four different level that tries to establish the communication between the various service officers deployed at various border agencies, it not only accumulates the information from the member states about the identity of the refugees, it also establishes cooperation with the third neighboring countries. It can be understood from the fact that in an era of globalisation and economic interconnectedness states alone cannot fight against crimes by merely by strengthening their external borders but also by establishing an information sharing cooperation with the neighboring states. This dissertation has also examined the different level of cooperation within the IBM, it has emphasized on the three level cooperation including local, regional and international level. It was found out that IBM consists of several border agencies that help to realize the major objectives of the IBM, these border agencies includes FRONTEX, EUROSUR, EURODOC, and EUBAM.

The weakness in the enforcement and implementation of the project has certainly jeopardized the security interest of EU, however the debate regarding efficiency effectiveness of the IBM continue to remain relevant. As the refugee crisis reached its peak in 2015, the incapability of the IBM as an institution to regulate the massive influx of refugees in the region was visible. This crisis has exposed the hidden incoherence, lack of coordination and cooperation between the member states in sharing the responsibilities. The inefficiency of the IBM can attribute to the lack of funds available to carry out the activities at the borders and also the border agencies like FRONTEX, EUROSUR have also suffered from the inadequate availability of the service staff and officials to carry out the work related to the IBM. This dissertation has illustrated how the EU open border policy has been impacted by the non-traditional security challenges.

REFERENCES

***i**ndicates primary sources

Abeyratne, R. (2015). *Competition and investment in air transport: legal and economic issues*. New York: Springer publications

Adamson, F.B (2006). Crossing borders: international migration and national security. *International security*, 31(1), 165-199.

Adepoju, A. (2001). Regional Organizations and Intra-Regional Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and Prospects. *International Migration*, 39(6), 43-60.

* African Union (2016). *Africa Openness Report 2016*, African Development Bank, Abidjan Cote d'Ivoire.

*African Union (2017). *Africa Openness Report 2017*, African Development Bank, Abidjan Cote d'Ivoire.

*Agreement, S. (1985). Agreement between The Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of controls at the common frontiers signed in Schengen. *Luxembourg on*, 14.

Alkopher, T. D., & Blanc, E. (2017). Schengen area shaken: the impact of immigration-related threat perceptions on the European security community. *Journal of international relations and development*, 20(3), 511-542.

Amilhat Szary, A. L. (2007). Are borders more easily crossed today? The paradox of contemporary trans-border mobility in the Andes. *Geopolitics*, 12(1), 1-18.

Anderson, J., & O'dowd, L. (1999). Borders, border regions and territoriality: contradictory meanings, changing significance. *Regional studies*, 33(7), 593-604.

Andreas, P. (1996). US: Mexico: Open markets, closed border. *Foreign Policy*, (103), 51-69.

Anthony, I., Grand, C., & Lewis, P. (2015). *Towards a New European Security Strategy?: Assessing the Impact of Changes in the Global Security Environment*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Babur, Z R (2017) *Free movement of people within Gulf Cooperation Council*, Paris. UNESCO Publishing House.

Babar, Z. (2011). Free mobility within the gulf cooperation council. CISR Occasional Papers, Georgetown University.

Bache, I., George, S., & Bulmer, S. (2011). *Politics in the European Union* (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bailey, J., & Flores-Macías, G. (2007, April). Violent crime and democracy: Mexico in comparative perspective. In *Annual Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago*, 12-15.

Baird, T. (2015). Functional Actorness? Border Security in the EU and Turkey. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 38(12), 849-859.

Baird, T. (2018). Interest groups and strategic constructivism: business actors and border security policies in the European Union. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(1), 118-136.

Bauder, H. (2015). Perspectives of open borders and no border. *Geography Compass*, 9(7), 395-405.

Basik, N. (2013). Open Minds on Open Borders. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 14(3), 401-417.

Basu, S (2017) "Photo Essay: Schengen, the Fairy-Tale Village Where Europe Banished Its Borders", *The Wire*, 25 June 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 3 march 2018 URL: <https://thewire.in/culture/sleepy-village-called-schengen>.

Bigo, D. (1998). Frontiers and security in the European Union: The illusion of migration control. *The frontiers of Europe*, 148-164.

- Bigo, D. (2000). In Europe. *International relations theory and the politics of European integration: Power, security, and community*, 171.
- Bigo, D. (2001). The Möbius ribbon of internal and external security (ies). *Identities, borders, orders: Rethinking international relations theory*, 18, 91-116.
- Binhuwaidin, M. M. (2015). Essential Threats to the Security of the GCC Countries in the Post Arab Spring Era. *Digest of Middle East Studies*, 24(1), 1-25.
- Blatter, J. K. (2001). Debordering the World of States: Towards a multi-level system in Europe and a multi-polity system in North America? Insights from border regions. *European Journal of International Relations*, 7(2), 175-209.
- Boehmer, C. R., & Peña, S. (2012). The determinants of Open and Closed borders. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 27(3), 273-285.
- Bort, E. (2003). EU enlargement-policing the new borders. *The International Spectator*, 38(1), 51-68.
- Boswell, C. (2007). Migration control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the absence of securitization. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(3), 589-610.
- Boulton, A. (2009). Local Integration in West Africa. *Forced Migration Review*, 33, 32-34.
- Brady, H. (2012). *Saving Schengen: How to protect passport-free travel in Europe*. London, Centre for European Reform.
- Broeders, D. (2007). The new digital borders of Europe: EU databases and the surveillance of irregular migrants. *International sociology*, 22(1), 71-92.
- Brown, C. P., Josling, T., Trachtman, J. P., & Lowel, P. (2009). The Genesis of the GATT. *World Trade Rev.*, 8, 351.
- Carens, J. H. (1987). Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders. *The review of politics*, 49(2), 251-273.

- Carrera, S. (2007). *The EU border management strategy: FRONTEX and the challenges of irregular immigration in the Canary Islands* (No. 261). CEPS. Brussels.
- Carrera, S. (2010). *Towards a common European border service?*. CESP Working Document No-331, Brussels.
- Carrera, S., & Den Hertog, L. (2016). A European Border and Coast Guard: What's in a Name? CEPS paper, Brussels
- Carlsen, L. (2008). NAFTA's Dangerous Security Agenda. *Peace Review*, 20(4), 442-447.
- Carlsen, L. (2008). Armoring NAFTA: the battleground for Mexico's future. *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 41(5), 17-22.
- Carlsen, L. (2009). A Pressing Case for NAFTA Review and Renegotiation. *Americas Program*, 4, 1.
- Castles, Stephen (2003). A fair migration policy - without open borders. Open Democracy. [Online]. Retrieved from: http://www.opendemocracy.net/people-migrationeurope/article_1657.jsp (accessed 3 march 2018)
- Chang, H. F. (1997). Liberalized immigration as free trade: Economic welfare and the optimal immigration policy. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 145(5), 1147-1244.
- Christiansen, T., & Jørgensen, K. E. (2000). Transnational governance 'above' and 'below' the state: The changing nature of borders in the new Europe. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 10(2), 62-77.
- Collantes-Celador, G., & Juncos, A. E. (2012). The EU and border management in the Western Balkans: preparing for European integration or safeguarding EU external borders?. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 12(2), 201-220.
- *Council of the European Union (2003), "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (ESS)", European Union, Brussels, [Online: web] Accessed 11 October 2017 URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

*Council of European Union (2010), “Internal Security Strategy for The European Union: Towards a European security model”, European Union, Brussels,

* Council of European Union (2015) “The nexus between organized crime and terrorism in EU”, Communication from EUROPOL to Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security, Brussels.

Cozine, K. (2016). Fragmentation and Interdependency: Border Security Intelligence in North America and Europe. *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs*, 18(3), 175-197.

Darder, A. (2007). Radicalizing the immigrant debate in the United States: a call for open borders and global human rights. *New Political Science* 29(3), pp. 369–384.

De Genova, N., Mezzadra, S., & Pickles, J. (2015). New keywords: Migration and borders. *Cultural studies*, 29(1), 55-87.

De Lobkowicz, W. (2002). L’Europe et la sécurité intérieure. Une élaboration par étapes [Europe and internal security. An elaboration in stages]. Paris: La Documentation Française

De Soto, J. H. (1998). A libertarian theory of free immigration. *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 13, 187-198.

Doomernik, J. (2007). Open borders, close monitoring. In: Jandl, M. (ed) Innovative concepts for alternative migration policies: ten approaches to the challenges of migration in the 21st century. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp.89–95.

Düvell, F. (2003). Some reasons and conditions for a world without immigration restrictions. *ACME* 2(2), pp. 201–209.

McKeen-Edwards, H., Porter, T., & Roberge, I. (2004). Politics or markets? The determinants of cross-border financial integration in the NAFTA and the EU. *New Political Economy*, 9(3), 325-340.

Emilio.S.V (2010) An American dilemma: The flow of trade versus the flow of people in NAFTA, *The Denning Law Journal*, 22, pp- 87-115

Eraly, R ,N (2017). How The Refugee crisis Is Fueling the Rise Of Europe's Right, *The World Post*. [Online web] https://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/europe-right-wing-refugees_us_562e9e64e4b06317990f1922.

*European Commission. (1985). Completing the internal market. White Paper from the Commission to the European Council. COM (85) 310 final. Retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/1113/1/internal_market_wp_COM_85_310.pdf.

*European Commission. (1988). A people's Europe. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament. COM (88) 331 final. Retrieved from <http://aei.pitt.edu/3831/1/3831.pdf>.

*European Commission. (1988). Communication of the Commission to the Council on the abolition of controls of persons at intra-Community borders. COM (88) 640 final. Retrieved from <http://aei.pitt.edu/3807/1/3807.pdf>.

*European Commission (2000). Initiative of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg with a view to the adoption of a Council Decision establishing a procedure for amending Articles 40(4) and (5), 41(7) and 65(2) of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of checks at common borders. , Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/police/schengen/doc_police_schengen_en.htm.

*European Commission (2010) Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission External Cooperation, document, Brussels, (online web) <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/ibm-eap/document/1-guidelines-integrated-border-management-european-commission-external-cooperation-european>.

*European Commission (2008) Border Package- facilitating travel and securing Europe's borders.[Online:web]http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/borders_08/index_en.ht.

*European Commission (2016) Back to the Schengen- A Roadmap, Brussels [Online: web] : https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/docs/communication-back-to-schengen-roadmap_en.pdf.

* European Council.(2003). President Conclusions. Thessaloniki European Council. 19 and 20 June 2003. URL: [at:http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/.../76279](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/.../76279).

* European Council (2004a). Action Plan on the Hague Programme 16054/04. Available at: ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/.../hague_programme_en.

* European Council 2007. Council Document 5291/07. 12 January 2007. Available at: http://www.web.mvcr.cz/archiv2008/eunie/.../de_program_18_month_cats.

*Europol (2009) OCTA 2009: EU Organised Crime and threat assessment, Brussels [Online: web]: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/octa-2009-eu-organised-crime-threat-assessment>.

*European Parliament (2016) Towards a New European Security Strategy? Assessing the Impact of changes in the global security environment, Brussels [Online: web] [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/534989/EXPO_STU\(2015\)534989_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/534989/EXPO_STU(2015)534989_EN.pdf).

Eriksson, J., & Rhinard, M. (2009). The internal—external security nexus: Notes on an emerging research agenda. *Cooperation and conflict*, 44(3), 243-267.

European Union (2015). The EAP-IBM Capacity Building Project,[Online web] : <http://www.eap-ibm-capacitybuilding.eu/en/about/project>.

Fábián, A. (2013). Constructivist Views of Cooperation along the Border. *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Economics and Business*, 1(1), 39-51.

Fawcett, L. (2005). Regionalism from an historical perspective. Farrell, M, Hettne, B and Van Langenhove, L(eds) *International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges*. The Hague, TMC Asser Press, pp.147-163.

- Flores-Macías, G. A. (2008). NAFTA's unfulfilled immigration expectations. *Peace Review*, 20(4), 435-441.
- Gill, N. (2009). Whoes “No Borders”? Achieving Border Liberalization for the Right Reasons. *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees*, 26(2).
- Gromadzki, G., & Osica, O. (2001). *Pro-European Atlantists: Poland and Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe After Accession to the European Union*. Stefan Batory Foundation.
- Gropas, R. (2004). Functional borders, sustainable security and EU-Balkan relations. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 4(1), 49-76.
- Guild, E., Carrera, S., & Geyer, F. (2008). The Commission's New Border Package: Does it take us one step closer to a ‘cyber-fortress Europe’? *CEPS Policy Brief No.154*, Brussels.
- Guiraudon, V., & Lahav, G. (2000). A reappraisal of the state sovereignty debate: The case of migration control. *Journal of Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (2), 163–194.
- Hansen, R (2010) *An Assessment of Principle regional Consultative Process on migration*. IOM Migration Research Series, No.38.
- Hartman, S. W. (2010). NAFTA, the Controversy. *The International Trade Journal*, 25(1), 5-34.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *The new imperialism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Haughton, T. (2007). When does the EU make a difference? Conditionality and the accession process in Central and Eastern Europe. *Political studies review*, 5(2), 233-246.
- Hayrynen, M. (2009). The transboundary landscape of the Eu-Schengen border. *Journal of borderlands studies*, 24(2), 56-61.
- Heisbourg, F. (2015). The strategic implications of the Syrian refugee crisis. *Survival*, 57(6), 7-20.

- Heller, C., & Jones, C. (2014). Eurosur: Saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders. *Statewatch Journal*, 23(3/4), 9-11.
- Higgins, P. (2008). Open borders and the right to immigration. *Human Rights Review*, 9(4), 525-535.
- Hills, A. (2006). Towards a rationality of democratic border management. *Borders and Security Governance: Managing Borders in a Globalised World*. Eds. Capering and Marenin. Geneva Center of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
- Hobbing, P. (2005). Integrated Border Management at the EU Level. CEPS Working Documents No. 227, 1 August 2005.
- Hobbing, P. (2010). The Management of the EU's external borders: From the Customs Union to Frontex and e-borders. *The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice ten years on: Successes and Future Challenges under the Stockholm Programme*, CEPS Paperback, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
- Horii, S. (2016). The effect of Frontex's risk analysis on the European border controls. *European Politics and Society*, 17(2), 242-258
- Huemer, M. (2010). Is there a right to immigrate?. *Social Theory and Practice*, 36(3), 429-461.
- Ikome, F. N. (2012). Africa's international borders as potential sources of conflict and future threats to peace and security. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, 2012(233), 16-16.
- Ioannides, I., & Collantes-Celador, G. (2011). The internal–external security nexus and EU police/rule of law missions in the Western Balkans. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 11(4), 415-445.
- International Organisation for Migration (2011). *World Migration Report 2011*, Le Grand Sacconnex IOM Publications

- Jackson, P. T., & Nexon, D. (2002). Globalization, the Comparative Method, and Comparing Constructions. *Constructivism and Comparative Politics*, 88-120.
- Jorry, H. (2007). *Construction of a European Institutional Model for Managing Operational Cooperation at the EU's External Borders: Is the FRONTEX Agency a decisive step forward?* (Vol. 6). CEPS.
- Juss, S. S. (2004). Free movement and the world order. *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 16(3), 289-335.
- Karyotis, G. (2007). European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11: The security–migration nexus. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 20(1), 1-17.
- Kaunert, C., Occhipinti, J. D., & Léonard, S. (2014). Introduction: Supranational governance in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice after the Stockholm Programme. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27(1) pp-39- 47.
- Kingah, S., & Van Langenhove, L. (2012). Determinants of a regional organisation's role in peace and security: the African Union and the European Union compared. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 19(2), 201-222.
- Koch, C. (2010). The GCC as a regional security organization. *KAS International Reports*, 11, 23-35.
- Kurki, T. (2014). Borders from the Cultural Point of View: An Introduction to Writing at Borders. *Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research*, 6(6), 1055-1070.
- Kurowska, Xymena and Benjamin Tallis (2009) 'EU Border Assistance Mission: beyond border monitoring?', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 14, 47–64.
- Laffan, B. (2016). Europe's union in crisis: tested and contested. *West European Politics*, 39(5), 915-932.

Laine, J. P., & Casaglia, A. (2017). Challenging borders: a critical perspective on the relationship between state, territory, citizenship and identity: introduction. *Europa Regional*, 24(1/2), 3-8.

Lange, E., & Miranda Pires, I. M. (2015). From “sensed” to “complex”: some reflections on borders throughout history. *Space and Polity*, 19(3), 293-304.

Larrabee, F. S. (1992). Down and out in Warsaw and Budapest: Eastern Europe and east-west migration. *International Security*, 16(4), 5-33.

Lavenex, S. (2014). The power of functionalist extension: How EU rules travel. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(6), 885–903.

Lehne, S. (2016, February 4). How the refugee crisis will reshape the EU. Carnegie Europe. Retrieved from <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/02/04/how-refugee-crisis-will-reshape-eu/itj7>

Léonard, S. (2010). EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitization through practices. *European security*, 19(2), 231-254.

Lodge, Juliet. (2004). “EU Homeland Security: Citizens or Suspects?”, *European Integration* 26, no. 3: 253-279.

Lodge, J (2009) “Security and Liberty in the European Union”, *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, no.5: 140-147.

Luca Gardini, G. (2007). Who Invented Mercosur?. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 18(4), 805-830.

Lutterbeck, D. (2006). Policing migration in the Mediterranean: ESSAY. *Mediterranean politics*, 11(1), 59-82.

Makarychev, A., & Braghiroli, S. (2017). Redefining Europe: Russia and the 2015 Refugee Crisis.

Maier-Knapp, N. (2012). The EU and non-traditional security in Southeast Asia. In *EU-ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century*(pp. 26-42).London, Palgrave Macmillan.

Manning, C., & Bhatnagar, P. (2004). Liberalizing and facilitating the movement of individual service providers under AFAS: Implications for labor and immigration policies and procedures in ASEAN. *REPSF Project*, 2(004).

Maricut, A. (2017). Different narratives, one area without internal frontiers: why EU institutions cannot agree on the refugee crisis. *National Identities*, 19(2), 161-177.

Marenin, O. (2006). Democratic oversight and border management: Principles, complexity and agency interests. *Borders and Security Governance. Vienna and Geneva: LIT Verlag/DCAF*, 17-40.

Mattli, W. (1999). *The logic of regional integration: Europe and beyond*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Mattli, W. (1999). Explaining regional integration outcomes. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(1), 1-27.

Meilaender, P. C. (1999). Liberalism and open borders: the argument of Joseph Carens. *International Migration Review*, 33(4), 1062-1081.

Migration Policy Institute (2014) A Free Flow of Skilled Labour within ASEAN: Aspirations, Opportunities and Challenges in 2015 and beyond (2), Washington, D. C.

Miller, D. (1995). *On nationality*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Monar, J. (2010). The EU's externalisation of internal security objectives: perspectives after Lisbon and Stockholm. *The international spectator*, 45(2), 23-39.

_____ (2003). Justice and home affairs. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41(Annual Review), 119–135.

_____ (2003). Justice and home affairs. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41(Annual Review), 119–135.

_____ (2004). Justice and home affairs. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(Annual Review), 117–133.

_____ (2006). Justice and home affairs. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(Annual Review), 101–117.

_____ (2009). Justice and home affairs. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47(Annual Review), 151–170.

Moravcsik, A.(1998). Centralization or Fragmentation. *Europe Facing the Challenge of Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy*. NY: *The Council on Foreign Relations*.

Mungianu, R. (2013). Frontex: Towards a common policy on external border control. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 15(4), 359-385.

Newell, J. 2016. Matteo Renzi's election prospects: A work in progress. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog.

Newman, D., & Paasi, A. (1998). Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography. *Progress in human geography*, 22(2), 186-207.

Newman, D. (2006). Borders and bordering: Towards an interdisciplinary dialogue. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9(2), 171-186.

Niemeyer, M. (1995). The K.4 committee and its position in the decision-making process. In R. Bieber & J. Monar (Eds.), *Justice and home affairs in the European Union: The development of the third pillar* (pp. 321–331). Brussels: European Interuniversity Press.

Nonnenmacher, S. (2017). Free movement within the ASEAN. *Migration, Free Movement and Regional Integration*, 347. Paris, UNESCO Publishing House.

*OECD/SWAC. (2008). *West African Mobility and Migration Policies of OECD countries*. Paris, OECD Publishing.

Oscar, J. (1994). *Border people: Life and society in the US-Mexico borderlands*. Tucson University of Arizona Press.

- Paasi, A. (2012). Border studies reanimated: going beyond the territorial/relational divide. *Environment and Planning A*, 44(10), 2303-2309.
- Parker, N., & Adler-Nissen, R. (2012). Picking and choosing the 'sovereign' border: A theory of changing state bordering practices. *Geopolitics*, 17(4), 773-796.
- Pasha, A. K. (2012). The Gulf Cooperation Council: a regional approach to peace, security and development. *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 8(1), 90-98.
- Pollak, J., & Slominski, P. (2009). Experimentalist but not accountable governance? The role of Frontex in managing the EU's external borders. *West European Politics*, 32(5), 904-924.
- Postelnicescu, C (2016). Europe's New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the Rise of Nationalism, *Europe's Journal of Psychology*, 12(2): 203-209.
- Pritchett, Lant (2006). Let their people come: breaking the gridlock on international labor mobility. Washington: Center for Global Development. [Online web]. Retrieved from: <http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/9781933286105-Pritchett-lettheir-people-come.pdf> (accessed 3 February 2018).
- Prokkola, E. K. (2012). Cultures of Border Control: Schengen & the Evolution of European Frontiers. *Journal of Social and Cultural Geography*, 13(4):424 -425.
- Pullin, T (2017) End all immigration controls – they're a sign we value money more than people, *The Guardian*, 16 Oct 2017 [Online: web] Accessed on 5th April URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/16/end-immigration-controls-money-people-barriers>.
- Rees, W. (2008). Inside out: the external face of EU internal security policy. *European Integration*, 30(1), 97-111.
- Ribakov, V (2016).History of the European Union [Online: web] URL: <http://vladimirribakov.com/history-of-the-european-union>.

Rotberg, R.I. (2003). Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: causes and indicators R.I.Rotberg, *State failure and state weakness in a time of terror*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1-25

Rothbard, M. N. (1978). *For a new liberty: The libertarian manifesto*. Ludwig von Mises Institute. New York, Macmillan Publications.

Sagrera, R. H. I. (2014). Exporting EU integrated border management beyond EU borders: modernization and institutional transformation in exchange for more mobility?. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27(1), 167-183.

Sagrera, R. H., & Potemkina, O. (2013). Russia and the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice. *Study for the Directorate General for Internal Policies–Policy Department C: Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs–European Parliament*.

Samuel, P. (1996). Huntington, 1991. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, 249-273

Scarpellino, M. (2007). “Corriendo”: hard boundaries, human rights and the undocumented immigrant. *Geopolitics*, 12(2), 330-349.

Scharpf, F. W. (1994). Community and autonomy: multi-level policy-making in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1(2), 219-242.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2018). European integration (theory) in times of crisis. A comparison of the euro and Schengen crises. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(7), 969-989.

Schutte, J. J. (1991). Schengen: It’s meaning for the free movement of persons in Europe. *Common Market Law Review*, 28(3), 549–570.

Schwell, A. (2009). De/securitising the 2007 Schengen enlargement: Austria and “the East”. *Journal of contemporary European research*, 5(2), 243-258.

Segatti, A. (2017). Mean Streets. Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa. *South African Journal on Human Rights*, 33(2), pp-346-348.

.Severino, C. R. (2006). *Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN community: Insights from the former ASEAN secretary-general*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Siebold, A. (2017). Open borders as an act of solidarity among peoples, between states or with migrants: changing applications of solidarity within the Schengen process. *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, 24(6), 991-1006.

Starr, H., and G.D. Thomas.(2005) The Nature of Borders and International Conflict: Revisiting Hypotheses on Territory. *International Studies Quarterly* 49: 123–39.

Steinmayr, A. (2018). Did the Refugee Crisis Contribute to the Recent Rise of Far-right Parties in Europe?. *ifo DICE Report*, 15(4), 24-27.

Tesfahuney, M. (1998). Mobility, racism and geopolitics. *Political Geography*, 17(5), 499-515.

Tharoor, I (2015) Slovakia Will Take in 200 Syrian Refugees, But They Have to be Christians, *Washington Post*, 19th August 2015.[OnlineWeb] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/19/slovakia-will-take-in-200-syrian-refugees-but-they-have-to-be-christian/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6a118ab1fee2.

Thouez, C., & Channac, F. (2005). Convergence and divergence in migration policy: the role of regional consultative processes. *Global Migration Perspectives*, (20), 14.

Turnock, D. (2002). Cross-border cooperation: A major element in regional policy in East Central Europe. *Scottish Geographical Journal*, 118(1), 19-40.

* Treaty of Lisbon (2009) ‘Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, OJ C 115/73.

UNESCO (2017) “*Migration, free movement and regional integration*”, Paris: UNESCO Publishing.

- Vachudová, M. A. (2000). Eastern Europe as gatekeeper: The immigration and asylum policies of an enlarging European Union. *The wall around the West: State borders and immigration controls in North America and Europe*, 153-171.
- Van Houtum, H. (2002). Borders of comfort: Spatial economic bordering processes in and by the European Union. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 12(4), 37-58.
- Van Langenhove, L. (2012). Why we need to ‘unpack’ regions to compare them more effectively. *The International Spectator*, 47(1), 16-29.
- Verbeke, P., Vermeulen, G., Meysman, M., & Vander Beken, T. (2015). Protecting the fair trial rights of mentally disordered defendants in criminal proceedings: Exploring the need for further EU action. *International journal of law and psychiatry*, 41, 67-75.
- Verlinden, A. (2010). Free movement? On the liberal impasse in coping with the immigration dilemma. *Journal of International Political Theory* 6(1), pp. 51–72.
- Vollmer, B. A. (2017). A hermeneutical approach to European bordering. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 25(1), 1-15.
- Wæver, O. (1993). *Securitization and desecuritization* . Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research.
- Walters, W. (2006). Border/Control. *European journal of social theory*, 9(2), 187-203.
- Walzer, M. (1983). *Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality*. Oxford: Martin publications.
- Wolff, S. (2010). EU Integrated Border Management beyond Lisbon: contrasting policies and practice. *Shaping the normative contours of the European Union: a migration-border framework, Barcelona*, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDoB), 23-36.
- .World bank.2011 *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011:Second Edition*.Washington D.C, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank.

Whitaker, E. (1992). The Schengen agreement and its portent for the freedom of personal movement in Europe. *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*, 6, 191–222.

Young B (2018) End all immigration controls. Immigrants are not the problem. Borders are. *The Gaurdian*, Accessed at [Online: web] .Available at: <https://pruk.org/immigrants-are-not-the-problem-borders-are>.

Zaiotti, R. (2011). *Cultures of border control: Schengen and the evolution of European frontiers*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Zaiotti, R. (2007). Of friends and fences: Europe's neighbourhood policy and the 'gated community syndrome'. *European Integration*, 29(2), 143-162.

Zaiotti, R (2007) Revisiting Schengen: Europe and the emergence of a new culture of border control, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 8:1, 31-54.

Zaiotti, R. (2011). *Cultures of border control: Schengen and the evolution of European frontiers*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Zielonka, J. (2001). How new enlarged borders will reshape the European Union. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(3), 507-536.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

