

**GEO-ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF CENTRAL
ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA**

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

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for award of the degree of


MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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Date 23/7/2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **“GEO-ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF CENTRAL ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA”** submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of *Master of Philosophy* of this University is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.


Ankita Yadav

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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

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Ankita Yadav

DEDICATED TO

MY BELOVED NANA AND NANI

**SHRI LAXMI NARAYAN YADAV AND SMT. PREMA
YADAV**

***For their constant belief in me, their never-ending support,
extraordinary care and eternal love for me. I owe you all my being...***

MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA



SOURCE: Mapsofworld.com

CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

Central Asia reaches out from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east and from Afghanistan in the south to Russia in the north. It is additionally casually known as "the stans" as the nations for the most part thought to be inside the locale have the name finishing with the prefix "stan" signifying "arrive off". Central Asia is a thickly populated district with the number of inhabitants in around 70 Million, comprising of five republics Kazakhstan (population: 18 Million), Kyrgyzstan (populace: 6 Million), Tajikistan (9 Million), Turkmenistan (6 Million), and Uzbekistan (21 Million). Central Asia has been tied with the itinerant individuals and the Silk Road. It has gone about as cross street for the development of individuals, merchandise and thoughts between Europe, Western Asia, South Asia and East Asia. The Silk Road connected the Muslim grounds with the general population of Europe, India and China. The junction position has upgraded the contention amongst tribalism and traditionalism and modernization. (Stewart, 2016, pg 1). In the pre-Islamic and Islamic times, Central Asia was broadly Iranian, populated by Eastern Iranian speaking Bactrians, Sogdians, Chorasmians, and the semi-nomadic Scythians and Parthians. After the enlargement of the Turkic people, Central Asia also became the homeland for the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tatars, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and Uyghur and Turkic languages largely replaced the Iranian languages spoken in the area (Hong, 2014 pg 1-4).

From the mid-19th century till almost the end of 20th century, most of the Central Asian region was part of the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, both Slavic majority continues and the five former Soviet "stans" are still home to about 7 Million Russians 5,00,000 Ukrainians.

Central Asia is a seriously expansive locale of shifted geology, including high passes and mountains (Tian Shan), tremendous treats (Kyzyl Kum, Taklamakan), and particularly treeless, green steppes. The immense steppe regions of Central Asia are viewed as together with the steppes of Eastern Europe as a good topographical zone as the Eurasian Steppe. A significant part of the Central Asian land is excessively dry or harsh for cultivating. A dominant part of the general population win their living by crowding domesticated animals. Modern exercises focuses in the locale's urban communities (Hong, 2014, pg 1-4).

Significant waterways of the locale include the Amu Darya, the Syr Darya, Irtysh and the Hari River and the Murghab River. Real water bodies incorporate the Aral Sea, Lake Balkhash, both of which are a piece of the immense west – Central Asian endorheic bowl that incorporates the

Caspian Sea. Both of these water bodies have contracted altogether in the ongoing decades because of preoccupation of water from the waterways that feed them for water system and modern purposes. Water is a vitally important asset for the dry Central Asia and can prompt rather, huge universal debate (Stewart, 2016, pg 6).

The Period after the disintegration of the Soviet Union:

Breaking down of the Soviet Union brought this district into cutting edge, which contains five states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with an aggregate zone of four million square kilometers roughly. This district imparts its outskirts to nations like Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan. What has made this district immensely imperative for the entire world are the noteworthy energy holds in the Caspian Sea Basin and in the Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. These stores are changing the area's significance from geopolitics to geo-financial matters (Foster, 2008, 1-17). This locale was absolutely reliant on the previous Soviet Union for exchange and business subsequently after breaking down in 1991 their foundation was not adequate for these countries to investigate the stores and advantage from the chances of getting to the world markets (Khan, 1994, 354-381). The breaking down which has its own particular issues however it likewise brought open doors as the immense energy saves were free from the Soviet control so these nations were allowed to exchange and furthermore gave a chance to different countries of the world to utilize these assets for their need. This brought about numerous capital rich nations to contribute their cash specifically or through corporates of their nations. This brought about the expansion in the GDP of these countries and furthermore decrease in the swelling among Central Asia States.

The period after 1991 has seen a significant development within the sight of worldwide oil organizations and furthermore framework for the investigation of oil and gas in the Central Asia. Hosting second biggest energy holds as well as has rich assets of metals like gold, silver, uranium, magnesium and aluminum and so forth. Along these lines, Central Asia turned into a Central point of vital significance for nations Russia, China and some Trans-local forces like USA. The area appreciates closeness with the local powers and in addition the vital nations which are currently a days Central point of vital and security interests. These are Afghanistan,

Pakistan and Iran. The area and the fight for advantages among the included powers in the district makes it key rotate.

The concept of Geo-Economics.

The geo-economics by being very complex in its innate nature has given a totally different meaning to the world national security and dominance. The state and territorial integrity is now more threatened by the external threats i.e. by the entry of business corporations either through direct investment or institutional investments and is safe guarded by the economic development, economic cooperation and social cohesion (Baru, 2012). The focus under the geo-economic or new international economic order¹ has shifted to economic reforms leading to improved productivity, integration of smaller markets to regional markets and further to international markets and to raised levels of revenues and income (Baru, 2012).

Geo-economics has been defined in ways as a relationship of change in economic pattern with respect to national power and geo-politics. This can also be seen as the geo-political consequences of economic policy or as economic consequences of change in geo-political moves and national power (Baru, 2012). (Luttwak , 1993, 18-67) in his work has explained that the geo-economics is a set of policies and practices that are implemented by state or by its economic elite commonly referred as business houses that are responsible of contributing substantially to the national income. The nation attempts to enter into the new markets, both domestic and international, to create opportunities for economic expansion. These investments are being done to different extents by different nations depending upon the preference of various pressure groups as well as the availability of the opportunities. All these investments are being done with an idea of gaining advantage in the market over the other investors/nations in a defined geographical market/territory. (Luttwak, 1993, 18-67).

The existing literatures on the geo-economics of CAS have mostly presented the details of the energy resources and the strategic location of the region and how different nations of the world are investing profoundly in these resources and fail to explain comprehensively the other investment options available in other areas especially the tertiary sectors of the economy. The literature also does not take into consideration the availability of the increased income of individuals in the region and their spending patterns. The attention of the literatures has been so

far on the single issue i.e. utilization of the energy resources and how heavily dependent the nations of the region are on these resources. This study, therefore will look into the gaps and will try to fill these in terms of the other resources and other investment options available in the region and also the various options available to India in terms of investments in the developing economies of the regions.

Geo-Economic importance of Central Asia:

The geo-economic measurement of the Central Asian States (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) spins around the energy stores of the district. The thought is to pick up control of these energy alternatives to anchor future needs. The players are connecting these energy sources with their interests and vital strategies. The Central Asian States (CAS) are figuring their systems to locate their own particular place or make a specialty on the planet governmental issues. (Smith, 1996, 147-175). Two elements are vital in this measurement. These are energy holds and the area of the district. Central Asian states are centering these variables to upgrade their significance (Ahrari& Beal, 1996).

The CAS is landlocked district in the Eurasia, which fundamentally needs clear definition or boundaries. The authentic records this entire landmass was known as Turkestan and involved area starting from south of Siberia running till Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It likewise incorporates Caspian Sea, zones of inward China, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and previous Soviet Union (Kurecic, 2010, 21-48).

“In the mid 1990s, the Central Asian republics have continuously been moving from a state-controlled economy to a market economy. Eventually, the point is to imitate the Asian Tigers by turning into the neighborhood proportional, Central Asian snow panthers. Nonetheless, change has been intentionally slow and specific, as governments endeavor to restrain the social cost and ease expectations for everyday comforts. Each of the five nations (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) are actualizing auxiliary changes to enhance intensity. Especially, they have been modernizing the mechanical area and cultivating the advancement of administration ventures through business-accommodating financial arrangements and different measures, to decrease the offer of agribusiness in GDP. In the vicinity of 2005 and 2013, the offer of farming dropped in everything except Tajikistan, where it enhanced to the inconvenience

of industry. The quickest improvement in industry was seen in Turkmenistan, though the administrations division advanced most in the other four nations". (Cultivate, 2008, pg 1-17).

Open strategies looked for by the Central Asian governments center around buffering the political and monetary circles from outer shocks. This includes keeping up an exchange adjust, limiting open obligation and gathering national stores. They can't totally protect themselves from negative outside powers, in any case, for example, the steadily frail recuperation of worldwide mechanical generation and universal exchange since 2008. By and by, they have risen moderately safe from the worldwide monetary emergency of 2008– 2009. Development floundered just quickly in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and not in the least in Uzbekistan, where the economy developed by over 7% every year overall in the vicinity of 2008 and 2013. Turkmenistan played with development of 15% (14.7%) in 2011. Kyrgyzstan's execution has been more inconsistent yet this marvel was noticeable certainly before 2008 (Baru, 2012).

The republics which have fared best surfed on the flood of the items blast amid the principal decade of the new century. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have monstrous oil and flammable gas stores and Uzbekistan's own particular stores make it pretty much independent. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan all have gold stores and Kazakhstan has the world's biggest uranium saves. Changing worldwide requests for cotton, aluminum and different metals (aside from gold) as of late has hit Tajikistan hardest, since aluminum and crude cotton are its central fares – the Tajik Aluminum Company is the nation's essential modern resource. In January 2014, the Ministry of Agriculture reported the administration's goal to lessen the real estate of land developed by cotton to clear a path for different yields. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are significant cotton exporters themselves, positioning fifth and ninth separately worldwide for volume in 2014 (Stewart, 2016. 8-17).

Albeit the two fares and imports have become genuinely finished the previous decade, Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) stay defenseless against financial stuns, attributable to their dependence on fares of crude materials, a limited hover of exchanging accomplices and an immaterial assembling limit. Kyrgyzstan has

the additional hindrance of being thought about asset poor, in spite of the fact that it has adequate water. A large portion of its power is produced by hydropower. (Stewart, 2016, 15-19).

The Kyrgyz economy was bothered by a progression of stuns in the vicinity of 2010 and 2012. In April 2010, “President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was removed by a famous uprising, with previous clergyman of remote issues Roza Otunbayeva guaranteeing the between time administration until the race of Almazbek Atambayev in November 2011. Sustenance costs had risen two years in succession and, in 2012, generation at the major Kumtor gold mine fell by 60% after the site was annoyed by geographical developments. As per the World Bank, 33.7% of the populace was living in supreme neediness in 2010 and 36.8% multi year later” (Bergsager, 2012, 20-43).

Presence of external players in Central Asia:

The nations like Russia, US, China and India are seen as the keen players in the CAS. Russia has been an important link for transfer of oil and natural gas as the pipelines were connected to the Russia before the establishment of new trade routes and pipelines. These existing pipelines were being used by the many western companies as the transfer fee is much less than the cost involved in constructing new ones. Hydrocarbons remain an important factor for the consideration for the Russia as it wants to gain control over the energy resources as its own resources are getting used and also there is stiff competition from US and China (Bergsager, 2012; Marketos, 2009, 1-55). Growth of US military presence and upper hand gained in hydrocarbons by China in the region has made the Russia considers options like building a strong economic and security relations like Eurasia Economic Union (EEU) with the CAS (Gorenburg, 2011; Orttung & Overland, 2011 1-98). Russia also looks at CAS as a buffer zone between itself and troubled south against extremism and drug trafficking. Russia does have a strong military presence in CAS as it has military bases in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Romanowski, 2016, 13-49). In 2015 Russia proposed setting up joint strike force to secure CAS borders with south.

Similarly the US has made major investment in the Caspian Sea region and especially in the CAS in terms of technology transfer for the development of oil fields thus improving its relationships with the countries of the region. The US has also invested in the pipeline structure to move oil and natural gas (Nanay & Smith Stegen, 2012 17-35). The underlying fact for US is that it wants to reduce the Russian influence in the region. Just like Russia, US is too eyeing this

region to act as a logistic base for its fight against terror especially post 9/11. Although US has considerably decreased its military footprint in the region as it is withdrawing from Afghanistan it is rethinking its policy for the CAS which is more economic with Afghanistan as a major factor in it (US Department of State, 2014; Rywkin, 2011; Starr, 2011). US has started projects like CASA-1000 (Central Asia-South Asia power Project-1000), which is electricity transmission line responsible for transferring electricity from CAS to power starved Afghanistan and Pakistan. US has also strongly supported TAPI gas pipeline (Kim &Indeo, 2013; Mankoff, 2013). To strengthen its presence in the region post US led NATO forces from Afghanistan, the US has developed initiatives like C5+1 which will bring together the foreign minister of the CAS region and the US to work and cooperate in the areas of regional Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies 8 trade, climate change, water management, and education exchanges. (Catherin, 2016, 1-40).

One country that has made its presence felt in the CAS is China. It has benefited immensely on the expense of Russia whose trade with the region has gone down considerably. China's interest with the CAS is economic, security and energy (Smith Stegen, 2015). China's economic initiatives like One Belt One Road (OBOR) started in 2013 (Szczudlik-Tatar, 2013) is to improve its linkages with eastern, western and southern Asia. China also wants to see stable Central Asia as it borders Xinjiang region, which has seen Uyghar separatist movement. The energy demand in China has seen tremendous increase over the years. To fulfill this China need to explore new supply areas and CAS being energy rich and geographical location became the first choice. China has invested heavily in the energy infrastructure in Central Asia. China is ranked number one in the trade with CAS with estimated volume of \$50 billion in 2015. (International Trade Center, 2015).

India is also looking at the CAS as a major trading hub for itself. Similar to China it is actively involved in the energy resources of Central Asia. India is building pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan (TAPI) to have an alternative supply route for oil. India's engagement with CAS has seen a positive growth over the years. India was among the first countries to establish diplomacy and bilateral relations with the countries of the region. The initial relations were based more upon capacity building, knowledge and technology transfer, medicines and pharmaceuticals, cultural similarities, Sufism and Mughal connections. In 2012,

India announced a new policy of 'Connect Central Asia' to boost trade between itself and CAS which was much below its potential and also decided to hold Track II dialogue every year in one of the CAS for development of trade and cordial relations. Further, India in its extended neighborhood policy is looking to develop its trade relations with the region. India with its strong economic growth is looking to develop better transport corridors to transfer energy from the region. This includes not only Central Asian Countries but also Afghanistan and Iran. (Catherine, 2016, 60-90).

India is also engaging with Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO) and Russia led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to improve its economic engagement with the region. The trade between India and the region has reached \$2 billion which has doubled in last few years. Not only hydrocarbons India is trading in sectors like agriculture, IT, space research and pharmaceuticals. The nations are further exploring options in transportation, telecommunications, petrochemicals, commercial farming, food processing, mining sector and real estate. Initiative like International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which will reduce the transportation cost by 30 percent and distance by 40 percent and development of Chabahar port in Iran which will provide direct access to CAS to Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. (International Trade Center, 2015).

The change economies of Central Asia have encountered significant development in their money related parts this brought about opening themselves to more worldwide fund. Money related division particularly managing an account segment in Central Asian States have seen essential improvements since the nations had begun building market economies. Rising second level banks first serving huge mechanical and exchange endeavors' and later likewise begun to give money related administrations to family units and growing little and medium organizations. They had turned into an imperative stage being developed of neighborhood money related markets. It is likewise vital to take note of that budgetary parts are for the most part spoken to by the managing an account establishments and different sorts of money related mediators are still little and involve an exceptionally modest offer of the monetary markets. Keeping money resources constitute the significant piece of the monetary resources in Central Asian economies (Asel, 2010). This infers another potential region for Indian venture is keeping money and monetary administrations. Numerous Indian business houses that are working together in Central Asia regularly whine about the absence of Indian banks in the locale. There is just a single auxiliary of

Punjab Nation Bank Ltd. is available in Kazakhstan. So there exists an open door not just in the energy areas (nearness of ONGC Videsh Limited in Satpayev) however it additionally in other auxiliary administrations like keeping money, pharmaceuticals (Indian meds are known around the world), development, building consultancy, statistical surveying, administration administrations, programming improvement, mining procedures, tourism and wellbeing. (Hussain, 2009, 1-77).

Definition, rationale and scope of study:

The present study ‘Geo Economic importance of Central Asia: Implications for India’ focuses on the importance of the region especially after 1991. It looks into how the five countries namely Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan post-independence are building up strategic and economic relationships not among themselves but also with the rest of the world. The study looks into the various alliances that have been made by these five countries with the other countries in the region as well as the world and how much has it contributed towards the growth of the region.

The study also concerns with the available energy resources in the CAS and how has it shaped its relations with other nations. The region has ample energy resources not only in terms of hydrocarbons but also in terms of hydroelectric power. This has led to investment being made by countries like Russia, China, India and EU to make massive investments in acquiring these resources as well as in building transport corridors either as pipelines or road network. This has given a massive bargaining power to the CAS in terms of their choice of doing business with the interested nations. The study also takes into consideration how this investment in the region’s energy resources has changed the market dynamics of the countries in question. The added money in terms of investments either as FDI or through FII ultimately gets passed to the common population as direct income or indirect benefits. The study will look into how it has increased overall buying capacity of the population and the CAS as the new market for the world to sell their products and services.

The region because of its geography shares its border with the troubled states of Afghanistan and Iran. Therefore it becomes so very important strategically to countries like Russia and USA as well as for the Europe and NATO. The study also focuses on the strategic importance of this

region for the above mentioned nations in their fight against terrorism. A similar concern can be seen for China with issues in its Xinjiang region, therefore the focus for China is not only economic but also strategic.

Another focus of the study is India's engagement with the CAS. India has been among the first nations to recognize the region and also establish its diplomatic relations. But after a slow start the relationship has seen a big push in terms of trade, establishment of transport corridors and pipelines, energy development and development of industries in the region. India sees CAS as its extended neighborhood and there are not only economic reasons but also strategic reasons for India to maintain good relations with CAS.

Research Questions

1. What is the geo-economic importance of the Central Asian republics?
2. What are the various reasons behind the presence of the various foreign players in the region?
3. How Central Asian States are reacting to the presence of external players in the region?
4. What is the economic importance of the region for India?
5. Which sectors are lucrative for Indian investments?

Hypotheses

1. Economy is the reason behind the presence of external players in Central Asia.
2. Lack of trade routes is one of the factors adversely effecting India's trade relations with Central Asia.

Research methodology

The methodology for the synopsis will be based on the primary sources and field survey. Field survey will be undertaken in order to gain first-hand experience of the issues related to the basic theme of the study. The survey will be aimed at knowing the various projects being undertaken by the foreign countries either directly or through their corporates in the region and what are the various impacts it has made on the region. The survey will also look into the relationship between the countries of the Central Asia and how they are negotiating with the other players. It will also take into account the improvement if any that has happened in the overall lifestyles of the general population. Personal interviews and discussions with the people having knowledge

and working experience on the theme will also be conducted. Primary sources will also include government records, policy statements and publications, reports from various international organizations, etc.

The study will also be supported by the secondary sources like books, articles, magazines, newspaper reports, etc. and their interpretation making the research questions amply clear. It would be analytical in nature defining the approaches forwarded so far on the related topic. Variables would be refined and all efforts for their explanatory sustenance will be made. Internet sources and the documents from relevant websites would also be used.

Chapters:

Chapter 2: Resources in Central Asia

This chapter will highlight how the resources in Central Asia have played a major role in making impact on the external players and the institutional investments made by them. The chapter will also focus on how the resources have affected the geo-economic order in shifting to economic reforms leading to integration of smaller markets and productivity.

Chapter 3: Presence of external players in Central Asia.

This chapter will try to identify the various reasons behind the presence of the foreign players in the Central Asia. The main focus of the chapter will be on finding out the political, strategic and economics reasons that led to the investments made by the external countries in the region.

Chapter 4: Presence of external players in Central Asia: Impact on India

This chapter would try to find out the relationship between India and CAS especially with reference to India's connect Central Asia Policy. India shares a lot culturally and socially with the region and has also invested lot in building better relations with the CAS. This chapter will analyze the various investment opportunities available to India in the region not only in the energy sector but also in the other sectors and markets.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This chapter would try to summarize the various findings of the study. It would test the hypothesis and would try to answer research questions.

CHAPTER 2:
RESOURCES IN CENTRAL ASIA

This chapter portrays and investigations Central Asia from the outlook of geo-financial matters, concentrating uniquely on the key assets in the area, for example, water, hydrocarbons (oil and gas) and Uranium. The motivation behind this part is to gauge the contribution of outer performers and multinational organizations with respect to these assets.

For just about 200 years Central Asia was presented to the plans and outlines of Russia in its two forms of control: the Tsars and the Soviets. The previous Soviet republics ended up autonomous States (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) and were not any more under the political, financial and military umbrella of the USSR. This circumstance appeared to be perfect for the new Central Asian nations to make their own specific manner on the worldwide stage and to choose their own particular needs and objectives. For Central Asia, the fall of the USSR was a time of financial, political and social emergency, yet in addition of new openings, including the opportunity to look for new accomplices and partners. The US, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, China and Russia itself rushed to build up relations with the new nations. The beginning stage is what is currently known as the celebrated 'New Great Game', which is none other than a cutting edge rendition of the conventional strategic maneuvers in the region by the significant domains (in spite of the fact that the present amusement is rendered substantially more perplexing by the bigger number of players included). The restored 'Awesome Game' is because of the expanding significance of Central Asia, coming from the presence in the region of tremendous stores of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) and minerals like uranium, and due to its well established key position as a connection between real markets (Europe and Asia). (Mueller, Suleimenov, Karimov, Balgabayev, 2013, 3-59).

Central Asia is an area offering certain geo-economic advantages to countries or multinational corporations that have particular regional or global aspirations, due either to their own interests or to the need to neutralize other nations or companies which they see as rivals.

WATER

Water is an imperative asset for the economy and for socio-political steadiness in Central Asia: 60% of the number of inhabitants in the previous Soviet republics in Central Asia live in country regions and 45% of the workforce is utilized in farming. The main nation that is by all accounts

less needy upon this part is Kazakhstan. Only 8% of its GDP originates from farming, despite the fact that this 8% utilizes no under 33% of the nation's dynamic populace. Over 80% of the developed land in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is profitable on account of water system; the special case is Kazakhstan, where just 7% of cultivable land is inundated. (Information: 2009) (Miguel, 2010, 6-57).

Cotton cultivating is the monetary movement that produces most occupations in the area, and at times, as in Uzbekistan, it is likewise the fundamental wellspring of outside money for its administration, representing 60% of the aggregate.

Water is in this way the principle contribution to the economy of Central Asia especially south Kazakhstan. In any case, the conveyance of water assets in the region isn't steady, and this circumstance is definitively impacting interregional relations, which are dictated by the diverse limits of every nation to get to water, and the shifting degrees of need they stand to water's distinctive employments. Because of this specific circumstance, nations in the region might be arranged into two gatherings:

1. Countries like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which depend on water surpluses from their neighbors and consider agricultural irrigation as the priority use for water.
2. Countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, having major water surpluses, the use of which must be tailored to their national interests, in this case, hydroelectric power generation.

Over the most recent couple of years, the relations between these two gatherings of nations have turned out to be more depleted and conflictive, because of the Tajik and Kyrgyz wants to construct new dams, extends that are seen by their neighbors as an approach to additionally fix the control of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan over water streams, in this manner empowering them to utilize expanding measures of water for hydroelectric generation to the weakness of its utilization for trim water system.

Thinking about the absence of mechanical and monetary assets to attempt new activities, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have looked for universal help and, as appeared in Table 1, the principle agents of these ventures are Russia, Iran and China.

Table 1. Hydroelectric power projects

Dam	Capacity	Cost (US\$ bn)	Location	Comments
Rogun	3,600 MW	3	Vaskh River	Under construction. Negotiations: Russian and Tajik governments
Sangtuda I	670 MW		Vaskh River	Co-financed by the Russian and Tajik governments. Was scheduled for completion in 2009
Sangtuda II	220 MW		Vaskh River	Co-financed by Farab (Iran) and Barki Tajik (Tajikistan). Was scheduled for completion in 2009
Zeravsan	220-160 MW	0.3	Zeravsan River	Financed by Sinohydro (China)
Kambar-Ata I	3,300 MW	2		Under construction
Kambar-Ata I				Financing: Rao-Ues-Kazkuaty power plants in Kyrgyzstan

Source: based on Avilash Rould, 'The Elusive Yet Abundant Hydropower in the Kyrgyz Republic', EcoWorld. www.ecoworld.com/features/2009/01/15/hydropower-in-kyrgyzstan/, and Timur Valamat-Zade, 'Tajikistan Energy Sector: Present and Near Future', www.cac.org/journal/2008-01-eng/10.shtml.

Russia is the nation with moderately the biggest nearness in the new Tajik and Kyrgyz ventures, with China and Iran plainly possessing an optional position. Notwithstanding, a portion of these tasks arranged by Russian organizations might be under peril, particularly those to be executed in Tajik region, since Uzbekistan, one of the fundamental rivals of the development of new dams, seems to have achieved concurrences with Russia to constrain the effect of Tajik hydroelectric ventures by forcing conditions on their development. (Baku, 2017, 20-44).

In January 2009, at a gathering held in Tashkent between the Presidents of Uzbekistan and Russia, the Russian President Dimitry Medvedev tended to the press that the development of hydroelectric power plants in Central Asia would need to consider the interests of the considerable number of States, and in a circumstance of not achieving a typical understanding,

Russia would haul out. Medvedev's visit to Tashkent settled with a joint Russian-Uzbek dispatch expressing: 'The gatherings have finished up with the need to consider the interests of all states situated on trans-limit water streams of the Central Asian region in actualizing ventures for building hydroelectric power structures on them, guided by for the most part acknowledged principles of worldwide law. The comments by the Russian President in Tashkent along these lines seemed to help the “Turkmen and Uzbek intends to force certain conditions on the development of hydroelectric offices and move far from its previous position in which it appeared to wholeheartedly back the Tajik and Kyrgyz ventures. (Zolotova, 2018, 1-5).

“For what reason may the Russian position have changed? The adjustment in Russia's position might be related to another key asset in the area, to be specific gas. 90% of the Central Asian gas sends out utilize the Russian gas system, and its fundamental provider is Turkmenistan. The Russian government is worried in maintaining this critical stream of Turkmen gas (roughly 37.5 billion cubic meters – bcm– every year in 2007, more than the European Nabucco venture's ability) and in endeavoring to include Gazprom especially in the task and transportation of the new Turkmen stores found in the South Yolotan region (assessed to add up to between 4 trillion and 14 trillion cubic meters – tcm– and are considered among the five biggest as of late found). Towards the finish of January 2009, the Presidents of Russia and Uzbekistan consented to two-sided arrangements whereby Russia anchored a Uzbek gas supply for the following couple of years. The Uzbek President bore to build the nation's fares through Russia by 16 bcm, and Lukoil wants to separate between 15 bcm and 31 bcm per annum from Uzbek fields right now in the investigation stage. The arrangement is to exchange this gas by expanding the present limit of the Central Asian gas pipeline organize (CentGas) which goes through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. The gas business ends up noticeable to overshadow the Tajik and Kyrgyz hydroelectric assets, despite the fact that the ultimate result of this circumstance isn't clear”.

There are various pointers that seem to recommend that Russia will in fact bolster Kyrgyzstan's designs, in spite of this conceivably releasing an emergency in its relations with Uzbekistan. Toward the beginning of February 2009, “President Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan reported the shutdown of the US air base in Manas. This declaration corresponded with the endorsement

by Russia of a money related guide bundle worth US\$2 billion, which could maybe be utilized to back development of new dams in Kyrgyzstan, which Uzbekistan firmly restricts”.

Russia has all the earmarks of being executing an unpredictable exercise in careful control as go between in which it is endeavoring to fulfill all partners, and in the meantime to expand its own Energy advantages, acquiring new “gas contracts” and attempting to persuade Tajiks and Kyrgyz alike to adjust their “hydroelectric power” tasks to the prerequisites of their neighbors downstream. “On the off chance that Russia coordinates to satisfy the two targets it will reinforce its worldwide position as the world's biggest gas exporter and as the primary fare course for Central Asian gas, pushing out conceivable opponents, and it will likewise take an interest in the development of “hydroelectric power plants” that could supply capacity to China, Pakistan and Afghanistan”. “To put it plainly, Russia's part as authority in the region will be massively strengthened, and from Central Asia Russia will have the capacity to extend its impact as gas and power towards the Indian Ocean, as it at present does in Eastern Europe”.

The heading of these activities would give a significant lift to the Tajik and Kyrgyz economies, the most immature of all the previous Soviet States, and hydroelectric power age would turn into the business with the best future viewpoint in these nations since, as per the World Hydroelectric Engineering Atlas, Tajikistan is the nation with greatest hydro control potential on the planet and Kyrgyzstan positions the third, after the Russian Federation itself.

OIL

In the 1990s the media declared Central Asia another El Dorado for unrefined petroleum. The evaluations for saves in the region differed generally, contingent upon the source distributing them. As per gauges by some significant organizations created in the area, for example, ENI, the region contained just 7.8 billion barrels; Unocal, in the interim, assessed somewhere in the range of 60 billion barrels, and Lukoil put the figure at 200 billion barrels. This scope of various figures originated from the savage rivalry between the real oil organizations which were most likely expanding or reducing the genuine measure of stores relying upon their own corporate advantages. A few distributions called the region a second Persian Gulf, albeit today the figures are clearly an altogether different reality.

Table 2. Reserves, consumption, production and exports of oil in Central Asia

Country	Proved reserves (2008) bbl Mn	Consumption/year (2008) bbl Mn/day	Production (2007) bbl '000/day	Net exports (2007) bbl '000/day
Kazakhstan	39,900	229	1,554	1,325
Turkmenistan	600	123	205	82
Uzbekistan	600	111	113	2

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009-2016

Demonstrated unrefined petroleum holds aggregate to around 40 billion barrels, an exceptionally long ways from the stores in different areas. In light of the provincial arrangement of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009, the area positions 6th on the planet, with figures practically identical to those of Asia- Pacific and well underneath different areas. (Table 3)

Table 3. Ranking of global crude oil reserves by region

	bbl Mn	Percentage
Middle East	754,000	59.9
Africa	125,200	10
South and Central America	123,200	9.8
Eurasia (excluding Central Asia)	101,000	7.6
North America	70,900	5.6
Asia-Pacific	42,000	3.4
Central Asia	40,000	3.2

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016.

Central Asian stores rank 6th on the planet, and are relating to holds in the Asia-Pacific area. In send out terms, “the region markets 1,407,000 barrels (BP 2009) and Kazakhstan” is named as the “main exporter with 1,325,000 barrels, Turkmenistan second with 82,000 barrels and Uzbekistan third, with only 2,000 barrels”. “Parallel with the world's significant raw petroleum exporters, Kazakhstan positions fourteenth, on a standard with Mexico, and Turkmenistan 35th,

on a standard with Cameroon”. Based on the BP Statistical Review, “Central Asian saves presently represent 3.2% of aggregate overall stores and 1.2% of current worldwide creation”. By and large, unrefined petroleum stores and generation in Central Asia are not imperative, and don't along these lines assume a crucial part in global Energy markets. Nonetheless, raw petroleum saves do have “a noteworthy geo-strategic esteem:

(1) “Because of their location close to large centers of consumption mainly such as Europe, China and India.

(2) Because of their vicinity with Russia and Iran, countries that contain vast reserves and are leading exporters of hydrocarbons and seeking to underpin their regional and global position in Central Asia and keep competing powers out of the region.

(3) Because of the possibility for companies to position themselves in a region where there are supposed to be large undiscovered reserves. (Statistical Review of World Energy, 2016).

(4) As a supplementary source of crude oil in addition to other traditional areas, such as the Persian Gulf, which would help diversifying supply sources (energy security) in consumer countries” (Statistical Review of World Energy, 2016).

As Table 3 appears, the main nation in the region with the genuine ability to end up a noteworthy unrefined petroleum exporter in the here and now is “Kazakhstan, and it is here that the multinational oil goliaths have set their sights. The conveyance of its stores among outside organizations is as per the following:

Table 4. Distribution of reserves among foreign companies in Kazakhstan

Nationality of the company	Reserves (%)
US	45.7
Russian	22.4
Italian	9.8
British	9.8
Chinese	6.7
South Korean	1.3
Malaysian, Hungarian, Canadian, Omani	0.03

Source: the author (Mustafayev, 2017) based on data from the EIA, Kazakhstan: Major Oil and Natural Gas Projects, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazaproj.html.

Extensively, Euro-American organizations control 65% of Kazakh oil saves, with US organizations driving the field (45.7%, 10.4 billion barrels). Russian organizations are in the second position with 22% (5.1 billion barrels) trailed by China's CNPC, which controls 5.5% (1.29 billion barrels). The nearness of Western nations in the breakdown of oil saves is massively bigger than that of Russia and China. The last may raise its stakes” on the off chance that it figures out how to achieve an understanding or a settlement on the appropriation of oil holds at the “Darkhan Field”, which has somewhere in the range of 11 billion barrels of demonstrated unrefined petroleum saves and where Spain's Repsol likewise needs to pick up a solid footing. (Mustafayev, 2017, 8-29).

The Transportaion of Crude oil in Central Asia.

The table below shows the various oil pipelines that cross Central Asia:

Table 5. Working export lines (oil pipelines)

Pipeline	Route	Capacity (bbl/day)	Length (km)	Operator	Comments
Atyrau-Samara Pipeline	Atyrau (Kazakhstan) to Samara (Russia)	310,000	695	Transneft	This pipeline connects to the Druzba line
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) Pipeline	Tengiz Field (Kazakhstan) to Novorossiysk (Black Sea-Russia)	565,000	1,593	Transneft	Planned capacity increase to 1 million bbl/day (2015)
Kenkyak-Orsk	Aktyubinsk (Kazakhstan) to Orsk (Russia)	130,000		Transneft	Transports crude oil from the Aktyubinsk Fields (Kazakhstan) to the Orsk refinery (Russia)
Russia-Kazakhstan-China Pipeline	Omsk (Russia)-Pavlodar (Russia)-Atasu (Kazakhstan) – Alashankou (China)	200,000	2,896	Transneft, CNODC, KazTrans Oil	The oil pipeline initially only linked Kazakhstan and China, but Russia later joined the project

Source: EIA.

As indicated by Table 5, 76.5% of Central Asian unrefined petroleum exchanged by means of oil pipeline experiences “Russia; the staying 23.45% is appropriated between Kazakh-Iranian oil swaps, which represent 160,000 bbl/day and the Kazakh-Chinese line, with 200,000 bbl/day. It is by means of the Russian region that most Central Asian raw petroleum is transported to customer markets, which are Europe, the Persian Gulf and China. The guide drawn underneath demonstrates how a large portion of the oil pipelines in the region cross Russian region. (Condition Impact Assessment).



(Map Source: Environment Impact Assessment).

The prospects of this situation changing according to the future projects to build new pipelines in Central Asia.

Table 6. New pipeline projects

Pipeline	Route	Capacity (bbl/day)	Length (km)	Cost (US\$ Mn)	Comments
Central Asia Oil Pipeline	Kazakhstan via Turkmenistan and Afghanistan to Gwadar (Pakistan)	1 million bbl/day	4,000	2,500	A Memorandum of Understanding has been signed by all the stakeholders but there is no construction start date yet
Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran Pipeline	Kazakhstan via Turkmenistan to Kharg Island (Iran) in the Persian Gulf	1 million bbl/day	1,496	1,200	Feasibility study conducted by Total Fina Elf
Trans-Caspian	Aktau (west Kazakhstan, on the Caspian coast) – Baku, to be connected to the BTC	500,000 bbl/day	700	2,000 (4,000 if to Ceyhan)	Feasibility study conducted by Royal/Dutch Shell, Chevron Texaco, Exxon Mobil and Kazakhstan
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) Pipeline	Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk, Russian Federation	Extension from 500,000 to 1,000,000	940	1,500	

Sources: <http://www.zoomchina.com.cn/new/content/view/19541/81/>, <http://www.neurope.eu/articles/82173.php>; and EIA, 'Omsk-Pavlodar-Atasu-Alashankou Oil Starts Flowing', January 2008.

The tasks confronting most hindrances in the here and now are the Iranian, Trans-Caspian and Afghan lines. The Iranian line is said to be the least expensive and most secure for trading Central Asian raw petroleum, however it is frustrated by the US endorses; the Trans-Caspian venture, comprising of building a pipeline under the Caspian Sea, is contradicted by Russia based on natural contemplations; and the Afghan line towards the Indian Ocean has been ended by the contention in Afghanistan.

The main venture that looks suitable in the here and now is the CPC expansion. Correspondingly, in the fleeting Russia will additionally reinforce its situation as a fare course for Central Asian unrefined petroleum. Euro-American oil companies have gained control over most reserves in the superfields of Kazakhstan (Tengiz, Karachaganak and Kashagan), well ahead of Chinese and Russian companies. However, Russia is trying to close the gap by monopolizing the transfer of Kazakh crude oil. It will actually achieve this aim if the proposed routes under the Caspian Sea or via Iran do not progress and if China does not implement its projects in the region, if no new alternatives are sought and if the planned projects are not carried out.

GAS

Distribution of reserves, production and exports among Central Asian countries is as follows”:

Table 7. Distribution of production and exports of gas reserves

	Reserves in 2007 (tcm)	Production (2007) (bcm)	Consumption in 2007 (bcm)	Available for export (bcm)
Kazakhstan	1.90	27.3	19.8	7.5
Turkmenistan	2.67	67.4	21.9	45.5
Uzbekistan	1.74	58.5	45.6	12.9
Total	6.31	153.2	87.3	65.9

Source: BP.

Reserves

As indicated by the EIA (Environment Impact Assessment) figures, the local gas saves aggregate to around 6.31 tcm, an assume that has expanded in the most recent year because of new

revelations, chiefly in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The Turkmen field of South Yolotan has approximated stores of 4-14 tcm and it is viewed as one of the most extravagant four or five oil fields on the planet, keeping Turkmenistan among the best five” regarding saves around the world, while in Kazakhstan saves are likewise expanding, however at a significantly more unassuming pace (1.9-2.83 tcm). By and large, newfound gas saves in the region add up to 11.21-21.21 tcm. Central Asia, contrasted and different areas (barring the Russian Federation's stores, which add up to “44.65 tcm, since it can't be characterized as a region), is the second biggest save on the planet, behind the Persian Gulf (73.21 tcm) and in front of North America (7.9 tcm). Additionally, most productions state that the odds of discovering more saves in the region are great, since quite a bit of it stays unexplored. Based on found stores and their relative closeness to real utilization markets (Europe, China and India), Central Asian gas has turned into a significant Central point of consideration for multinationals competing for a situation in this lucrative business, and those real powers that, through their organizations, intend to augment their impact in gas transportation.

Crossing point of how the reserves of Turkmenistan, which has the largest and is the biggest regional exporter, are currently broken down.

Table 8. “Current distribution of Turkmenistan gas reserves”

Companies	Concessions	Reserves (bcm)
Petronas (Malaysia)	Block 1, Diyarbekir	150
Dragon Oil (UAE, UK)	Cheleken, Jeitun, Dugalybek	90
Rosneft, Itera, Zarabezhneft (Russia)	Exploration block in the Caspian	N/A
CNPC (China) Bagtiyarlyk	South Yolotan	1,700
Canadian Buried Hill	Caspian Block 3	N/A
Wintershall, Maersk, ONGC-MITAL	Caspian Block 11-12	N/A
Austrian Mitro-Turkmenneft	Khazar Concession	N/A
Burren Energy	Nebigdag Concession	N/A
RWE	Caspian Block 23	N/A

Source: Marco Giuli, ‘Nabucco Pipeline and the Turkmenistan Conundrum’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol. 2, No. 3, summer of 2008, http://cria-online.org/4_2.html ; ‘Turkmenistan: Energy Security and Energy Diplomacy – Part Four’, May 2009, <http://www.newscentralasia.net/Articles-and-Reports/432.html> .

As Table 8 appears, the vast majority of the Turkmen gas saves held by outside organizations have a place with the Chinese state-possessed oil and gas monster CNPC, which has a huge stake in the South Yolotan field (1.7 tcm) keeping in mind the end goal to brace supplies to the Turkmen-Chinese pipeline which is as of now under development and which will transport 30 bcm per annum.

Whatever is left of stores, exceptionally insufficient on correlation with China's offer, have a place with Petronas (Malaysia) and Dragon Oil (UAE and UK). Turkmen investigation fields without characterized amounts are equally disseminated between American, European, Asian and Russian organizations, with no multinational getting a charge out of a hegemonic position in this association.

Kazakh Gas Reserves

The main Kazakh gas reserves are in the superfields of Karachaganak, Tengiz and Kashagan. Gas reserves at Karachaganak (1.35 tcm) are distributed among concessionaires as follows:

Table 9. Breakdown of gas reserves in the Karachaganak field

Companies	Percentage
BG Group	32.5
ENI	32.5
Chevron	20
Lukoil	15

Source: Campaner and Yenikeeff (2008) and EIA.

Gas reserves at Tengiz (0.3 tcm) are distributed among concession-holders as follows:

Table 10. Breakdown of gas reserves in the Tengiz field

Companies	Percentage
ENI	16.67
Exxon-Mobil	16.67
Shell	16.67
BG	16.67
Total	16.67
Inpex	8.33
Conoco	8.33

Source: *APS Review Gas Market Trends, 31/VIII/2006.*

Gas reserves at Kashagan (0.48 tcm) are distributed among concession-holders as follows:

Table 11. Breakdown of gas reserves in the Kashagan field

Companies	Percentage
ENI	18.52
Exxon-Mobil	18.52
Shell	18.52
Total	18.52
ConocoPhillips	9.26
Inpex	8.33
Kazmuneigas	8.33

Source: <http://kazakhembus.com/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,print,0&cntnt01articleid=122&c>, 29/VIII/2007.

Following the above tables, we see that the Euro-American organizations have picked up control of gas saves in the principle Kazakh fields (Karachaganak and Tengiz), which represent 70% of the nation's generation, and furthermore at Kashagan, where gas sends out are required to start in 2010.

Russia has just a minor position in the Kazakh concessions, with a 15% stake in the Karachaganak fields and no stake in Tengiz or Kashagan, while China is absent in the gas business in Kazakhstan.

Uzbek Gas Reserves

Reserves and exploration blocks in Uzbekistan are distributed between the following gas companies:

Table 12. Breakdown of gas reserves and concessions in Uzbekistan

Companies	Concessions	Reserves (bcm)
Lukoil, Gazprom, UNG, CNPC	South Korea's KNOC Central Ustyurt Plateau	400
Soyuzneftegaz-Lukoil (Russia)	Ustyurt, Southwest Gissar	N/A
Gazpron (Russia)	7-Block	1,000
Daewo International (Korea)	North Western Uzbekistan	–
CNPC (China) Bagtiyarlyk	Namangan Province	N/A
Korea Gas (Korea)	Surgil field (Ustyurt region)	N/A

Source: APS Review Gas Market Trends, 6/X/2008 and 13/X/2008.

Most holds sold by Uzbekistan have been earned by Russian organizations and the greater part of its working fields have been granted to cartels containing Russian, Chinese and Korean organizations.

The war for gas saves in Central Asia isn't finished, rather, it has just barely started, since there are numerous more squares in activity and the fight looks set to center around the circulation of


stores at the South Yolotan superfield, where China as of now drives the path with 1.7 tcm. Be that as it may, it is yet worth reviewing that this field has in the vicinity of 4 and 14 tcm and there are a few ventures, as Nabucco, that could pay their way by connecting up to this field.

Eurasian Gas Reserves

There takes after an investigation of the courses of Eurasian gas towards the business sectors where it is devoured and the new activities to be embraced in this part.

The gas arrange in Central Asia utilizes the Russian pipelines as its principle send out course, as appeared by the guide beneath.

Oil Pipelines crossing Russia.



Source: EIA.

Roughly about, 99% of Central Asian gas is exported through Russia for marketing, and only 8 bcm, ie, less than 1% of Central Asian gas, uses the alternative route, via Iran. The routes are as follows:

Table 13. Central Asian gas routes

Pipeline	Route	Capacity (bcm/year)	Length (km)	Comments
Central Asian gas pipeline networks	Commences in Turkmenistan and runs through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan to Russia	60	4,900	Includes two branches: Bujara-Urals and towards the Brotherhood gas pipeline
Korpezhe-Kurt-Kui	Korpezhe (Turkmenistan) to Kurt-Kui (Iran)	8	199	

Source: EIA.

“The Central Asian gas pipeline framework by and by, isn't working at full limit, since it is in a dubious condition of protection. The designs of Russia and the Central Asian nations are to extend it and increment its ability to 100 bcm, keeping in mind the end goal to channel out the new holds which are to be misused in the area”.

The Iranian course has a low limit and won't equal the Russian course. Russia is at present nearly the best way to send out gas frame Central Asia, in spite of the fact that this could change in the following couple of years based on up and coming activities in the area(see Table 14).

Table 14. Projects under construction


Pipeline	Route	Length (km)	Capacity (bcm/year)	Cost (US\$ Mn)	Comments
Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline	Turkmenistan to Xinjiang (China). Could be extended to Japan	6,696 km	30	10,000 (to China)	Under construction (August 2007)
Central Asia Gas (CentGas)	Daulatabad (Turkmenistan) via Herat (Afghanistan) to Multan (Pakistan). Could be extended to India	1,400 km to Multan	27	2,000 (to Pakistan) and another 500 km (to India)	Memorandum of Understanding signed by Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. The Presidents of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan met in May 2002 to discuss resuming this pipeline project
Central Asia Center Pipeline	Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan to Saratov (Russia), connecting the Russian natural gas pipeline network	Existing route Extension	60	N/A	
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP)	Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan) via Baku and Tbilisi to Erzurum, linking up with the Turkish natural gas pipeline network	1,641 km	30	2,000-3,000	Talks are underway

Source: EIA.

Of these ventures, two face clear inconveniences in the medium term: the Trans-Caspian highway (30 bcm/year), which keeps running under the Caspian Sea floor, as a result of Russian restriction in light of ecological issues, and the CentGas highway (27 bcm/year), crossing Afghanistan towards India and which is an exceptionally troublesome prospect due to the contention in Afghanistan. Of the two residual ventures with more odds of working out as expected, one of them goes through Russia (Central Asia Center, 20 bcm) and alternate towards China (Turkmenistan-China, 30 bcm). To put it plainly, “even with the Chinese course, the Russian Federation will in any case be the main fare course for Central Asian gas. Another plausibility is to connect up the Central Asian oil pipeline coordinate with the Nabucco venture.

The Nabucco project

Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project Gas Supply Sources



Source: EIA.

The Nabucco gas pipeline would be 3,300 km long and would transport between 25 bcm and 30 bcm of gas provided by Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Central Asia and Russia, joining in Turkey and from that point be transported to Central Europe. All things considered, the association of Central Asian gas pipelines to Nabucco isn't without issues, since the association would need to experience Iran or under the Caspian Sea". Both these choices posture intense circumstances, for the reasons we have reviewed for different courses. The Iranian course does not seem to make them back for the time being, and the undersea course is obstructed by Russia.

There is almost certainly that in the following couple of decades for the European Union, Central Asian gas may turn into a genuine other option to Russian gas, accordingly diminishing Europe's dependence on Russia, however for this to happen various issues should first be settled.

1. "The political and strategic issues regarding some routes, such as the Iranian or Trans-Caspian route".
2. "The need to protect enough supply contracts or holds with Central Asian nations to sustain gas pipelines that are assembled, which is no simple undertaking in perspective of the wild rivalry amongst European and US organizations and the Russian, Chinese and Korean cartels, particularly in nations like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the nearness of Euro-American multinationals is negligible".

Briefly, gas from Central Asia in the next decade will nourish its position in the Asian and European energy markets for various reasons:

1. Increasing demand for gas in Asian countries that do not belong to the OECD will increase from 260 bcm in 2006 to 670 bcm in 2030.
2. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, depending on their stores, could turn into a supply showcase for Asia to open up the customary Russian market, yet not supplanting it in perspective of the measure of Russian tasks and holds.
3. Regarding this, China has already started building a gas pipeline (30 bcm/year) to link up to its gas network.

4. “The European Union's have to extend its Energy supply sources to stay away from reliance on Russian gas has put the Caspian region as a need region for future supply. In 2004, the Baku Process was inaugurated to accomplish the dynamic coordination of Energy and transport showcases between the Caspian and the EU. Against this scenery, the EU details making the Caspian nations providers by means of Nabucco”.
5. “Most specialists and pro bodies accord that creation in the fundamental Russian extraction fields has started to fall, by in the vicinity of 6% and 7% every year, and this is by all accounts irreversible. The answer for the supply top, as per the Russian Energy technique, is to misuse new holds situated in zones where the domain and climate conditions are troublesome, for example, the Russian Arctic tundra (Yamal Peninsula) and its seaward fields around Sakhalin Island. Be that as it may, until the point when these new undertakings are on stream, Russian generation won't have the capacity to take care of all demand for gas in Asia and Europe”.
6. Central Asian gas could tap this likelihood of bluntness in Russian gas supply. Turkmenistan could expedite its vast stores the standard, which are more effectively open than Russia's, and in this manner gain a greater offer in the Eurasian market.


URANIUM

Uranium is a fundamentally imperative metal since it is a crucial fuel in the atomic controlled power age. “By and by, the atomic controlled power utilization represents 30% of the aggregate in Europe and Japan and 20% in the US. The vulnerability of oil costs and the need to constrain ozone harming substance discharges have driven nations worldwide to think about building new atomic plants. As per the Nuclear Energy Agency, the worldwide ability to deliver atomic controlled power will increment from the current 372 gigawatts (2007) to somewhere close to 509 and 663 gigawatts in 2030, an expansion of in the vicinity of 38% and 80%. In the meantime, uranium mining limit will likewise need to increment by in the vicinity of 9,400 and 122,000 tons for every year.

There is a creating market for uranium, sooner rather than later as well as in the present, since in 2006 only 62% of interest for uranium was met by the makers of this metal, and the rest originated from reusing utilizing neglected atomic weaponry.

In the event that the assessments are right, the uranium advertise in the following couple of years will plainly develop, and electric power age utilizing uranium as the base mineral will turn out to be much more deliberately noteworthy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are real makers of uranium: hence, together they deliver 20% of the world's uranium metal.

Worldwide uranium production (%)



Source: British Biological Survey

http://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/free_downloads/home.html#WMP.

Kazakhstan is the world's second-biggest maker, evaluating for 14% of the aggregate, and Uzbekistan is the eighth, with 6%. As indicated by Table 15, Kazakhstan holds the world's second-biggest uranium stores and Uzbekistan positions twelfth.

Table 15. Proved uranium reserves by country, 2008

Ranking	Country	Amount (tonnes per year)	Global percentage (%)
1	Australia	1,243,000	23
2	Kazakhstan	817,000	15
3	Russia	546,000	10
4	South Africa	435,000	8
5	Canada	423,000	8
6	US	342,000	6
7	Brazil	278,000	5
8	Namibia	275,000	5
9	Niger	274,000	5
10	Ukraine	200,000	4
11	Jordan	112,000	2
12	Uzbekistan	111,000	2
13	India	73,000	1
14	China	68,000	1
15	Mongolia	62,000	1

Source: Energy Portal.

Both, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan assume an imperative part in this segment and this is probably going to be progressively valid, particularly on account of Kazakhstan. The Kazakh government has been intending to twofold its generation temporarily, from the current 8,500 tons to 15,400 tons in 2010, consequently turning into the world's driving uranium exporter. Subsequently, Kazakhstan has turned into the nation with most ventures and new mine openings, pushing in front of nations like Russia, Australia, Canada and South Africa, which likewise have sizeable uranium saves (Table 16).

Table 16. New Uranium mining projects

New mines	Company's country of origin	Companies	Estimated production (tonnes per year)
Eastern Mynkuduk	Kazakhstan	KazAtomProm	1,001
Southern Moinkum	Kazakhstan	KazAtomProm	500
Langer Heinrich	Namibia	Paladin	1,001
Dominion	South Africa	Uranium	1,526
Zarechnoye	Kazakhstan	KazAtomProm	500
Central Mykuduk	Kazakhstan	KazAtomProm	2,035
South Inkai	Kazakhstan	KazAtomProm	2,035
Irkol	Kazakhstan	KazAtomProm	746
Kharasan	Kazakhstan	KazAtomProm	2,035
Inkai	Kazakhstan	Cameco/KazAtomProm	2,035
Kayelekera	Malawi	Paladin	848
Western Mynkuduk	Kazakhstan	KazAtomProm	1,001
Budenovskoe	Kazakhstan	KazAtomProm	1,001
Cigar Lake	Canada	Cameco	6,784
Midwest	Canada	Cameco	2,205
Total			25,252

Source: Goldman Sachs, *Commodities Analysis*, 13/III/2007.

This development in Kazakhstan's generation limit is expected principally to capital speculation and innovative help by organizations from different nations in the state-claimed KazAtomProm, accountable for investigation, mining, administration and fare of uranium and side-effects. Its huge accomplices are recorded in Table 17.

Table 17. Foreign investment in uranium mines in Kazakhstan

Company Project or mine	Foreign investor and percentage	Investment value (US\$ Mn)
Inkai JV (Inkai Mines)	Cameco 60% (Canada)	N/A
Betpak Dala JV (South Inkai, Akdala Mines)	Uranium One 70% (Canada)	350 (in 2005)
Appak JV (W.Mynkuduk)	Sumitomo 25%, Kansai 10% (Japan)	100 (in 2006)
JSC Akbastau & Karatau (Budenovskoye deposit)	ARMZ 50% (Russia) (agreement to sell part of Karatau to Uranium One)	N/A
Zhalpak	CNNC 49% (China)	N/A
Katco JV (Moinkium, Tortkuduk Mines)	Areva 51% (France)	110 (in 2004)
Kyzlkum JV (Kharasan 1 Mine)	Uranium One 30%, Japan 40% (Marubeni, Tepco, Toshiba, Chubu, Tohoku, Kyushu)	75 (in 2005) and 430 (in 2007)
Kyzlkum JV (Kharasan 2 Mine)	Japan 40% (Marubeni, Tepco, Toshiba, Chubu, Tohoku, Kyushu)	430 (in 2007) (both mines)
Semizbai-U JV (Irkol, Semizbai Mine)	CGNPC 49% (China)	N/A
Zarechnoye JV (Zarechnoye & S. Zarechnoye Mines)	ARMZ 49% (Russia)	60

Source: Goldman Sachs, *Commodities Analysis*, 13/III/2007.

Companies from Canada, Russia, China, Japan and France are most associated with the Kazakh Uranium business.

Uzbekistan, despite with significantly less yield and with littler stores, likewise plans to build its creation by half in around 2012. With this goal, the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Geology and Mineral Resources proclaimed that the state-possessed organization accountable for abusing uranium mines, the supposed Navoi Mining and Metallurgy Combine,

intended to open seven new mines in around 2010, for which reason it required new accomplices. At the specific time, the Committee on Geology and Mineral Resources has marked a progression of Memoranda of Cooperation with Japanese organizations (Mitsui and Co. and Sojitz), French firms (Areva), and North American (Uranium Ltd) and Korean organizations (Korea Resources Corporation General) to prospect for new mines, and it has likewise marked a uranium supply settlement with South Korea.

“Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both are attempting to grow their financial specialist and accomplice portfolio keeping in mind the end goal to initiate an innovative restoration and inaugurate a procedure to discover new mines to help their working execution and lead this market, consequently finishing their customary mechanical reliance on Russia. The real powers, including China and India, are fighting for contribution in this undeniably key and limited market (80% of the world's uranium holds are controlled by only eight organizations: Cameco, Río Tinto, Areva, KazAtomProm, TVEL, BHP Billiton, Navoi and Uranium One). Against this foundation, misuse of new mines in Kazakhstan has turned out to be significant, particularly for China and India, which have vital atomic tasks. China has 11 atomic reactors in activity, is building another 16 and in the meantime is getting ready for another 25. India has 17 atomic reactors in activity, is building another 6 and plans for another 23. Neither of the two nations has adequate uranium holds and to take care of their own demand they have both consented to significant arrangements with Kazakhstan. KazAtomProm unveiled the Irkol, Semizbay and Zhalpak stores in consistence with key assertions marked with the state-claimed ventures China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC) in 2008; India and Kazakhstan have marked a Memorandum of Understanding that foreseen participation in 'the joint extraction of normal uranium in Kazakhstan', and also the movement of fuel for India's plants”.

CHAPTER -3:
PRESENCE OF MAJOR EXTERNAL PLAYERS
IN CENTRAL ASIA

This chapter is an endeavor to break down the part of Major Powers' (Russia, China and USA) cooperation in the Central Asian Republics (CAR's) for the journey of Energy repositories and to expand their dominion in this area which began the new incredible diversion. As per Mackinder, the person who controls the heartland of Eurasia, will have the capacity to control the world eventually. Following the episode of 9/11, Central Asia got much significance according to the real powers, particularly Russia, China and the United States of America as a result of its geo-financial importance. Central Asia has numerous characteristic assets like oil, gas, uranium, and so on. In particular, similar to Kazakhstan has vast stores of Energy assets. The Central Asian nations are arrive bolted and this causes a prevention in the fare of oil, gas, and so forth to the world market. In this situation, this section has been endeavored to look at the part of these real powers which is upgrading their impact in this region to get hold of the Energy supplies and make this region as another potential market for their fares.

MAJOR EXTERNAL PLAYERS IN CENTRAL ASIA

RUSSIA

Central Asia post-breaking down of the Soviet Union: Since 1991, the Russian Federation has constantly viewed as Central Asia as a region of state enthusiasm for terms of key and financial linkages underscored by noteworthy associations, nearness and the nearness of an expansive Russian diaspora. Moscow has dependably responded to endeavors at changing the current geopolitical the present state of affairs and security arrangements. Provincial specialists and scholastics share a view that a mix of interests, power and access settle on Russia the characteristic decision for practicing sway and guaranteeing Central Asian territorial security. What is critical is that Russia is endeavoring to address long stretches of disregard because of its distraction with its own political and financial strife by improving territorial commitment (Dr.Arun, 2004 3-16).

Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) on their part, were less arranged to address the difficulties of freedom and sway in the wake of breaking down of the Soviet Union. These republics were deserted from the old realm nearly without wanting to and without plainly characterized vision of their national or vital interests.

They were thought to be socially, politically, religiously and mentally antagonized from the mammoth Slavic and Christian Orthodox center of the old domain.

“An evaluation of the present setting gives a blended picture. The geostrategic area of the region is, obviously, scratch and – combined with its gigantic hydrocarbon saves – that implies it keeps on drawing extensive enthusiasm from outer on-screen characters. In what is a perplexing and liquid condition, the asset report would in any case put Russia as the most noticeable outside power in Central Asia, as far as fundamentally I) its abnormal state political connections, ii) its security participation in the region, and iii) apparently, its scope of speculation extends in these nations”. (Stronski, 2018, 1-18).

Various changes – some in progress, others hatching – makes, in any case, for a moving kaleidoscope, both inside and among outer performing artists. For instance, China will keep on increasing in essentialness as a monetary performing artist all through Central Asia, as prove not minimum by the ongoing visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to the region in the main portion of September 2013. Yet, that setting may be believed to represent a decision for some in the region: in particular, do Central Asian nations need to hazard the GDP they get in exchange from China or the GDP produced from settlements from their nationals working in Russia? Be that as it may, the formal and casual nature of these procedures (exchange and settlements) additionally devises to enable Central Asian states to artfulness and without a doubt stay away from an unmistakable decision between the two. Regardless, governments just somewhat control exchange and movement, which have a tendency to have their own particular dynamic. Maybe the principle thought to hold up under as a main priority at the start is that the five Central Asian states would incline toward not to be ruled by either Russia or China, however to have alternatives with both – incorporating with other outer on-screen characters.

ENERGY INTERESTS

“Russia still has a directing Energy nearness in Central Asia. In any case, again the photo is unpredictable. Reliably, its exercises were centered around Kazakhstan where relations among the Energy business' decision old-watch remain to a great degree close. For example, the Russian organization Lukoil is dynamic in upwards of seven oil and gas coastal tasks and three seaward investigation extends in the Kazakhstan segment of the Caspian rack. Despite everything it

controls the principle pipeline for Kazakhstani oil and by advancing the limit of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) – a task that keeps on being a significant trial of respective Energy participation, has persuaded Kazakhstan to encourage more oil into it and surrender more control. Today, Kazakhstan represents around 40 for every penny of Lukoil's demonstrated stores; extends in Kazakhstan give more than 90 for every penny of oil and more than 40 for each penny of petroleum gas delivered by Lukoil outside Russian domain. Rosneft, working in Kazakhstan under the N-Exploration mark, has been less effective in Kazakhstan up until this point. What's more, it must be put that Russia's offer in Central Asian oil deals general stays humble. In spite of a fast ascent since 2003, exchange the hydrocarbon segment is still underneath its Soviet-period levels” (Sinitsina, 2012, 12-67).

Pointers on gas are more light. In Uzbekistan the two biggest Russian organizations, Gazprom and Lukoil, are engaged with gas buys there, as well as develop their own particular creation limits also. These two organizations, alongside their members, represent more than 20 for each penny of petroleum gas creation in Uzbekistan. Russia's interests in Turkmenistan are banned to the petroleum gas part. Itera is the main Russian organization straightforwardly acting in the advancement of Turkmen Energy assets, despite the fact that Lukoil has been endeavoring to discover its way into the Turkmenistan showcase. Russia's quality there stays restricted, as Ashgabat permits outside speculation just in seaward gas fields which are more cost-concentrated and in fact hard to create (Ibid). Transcendently, send out courses are not any more only in Russia's grasp. Turkmen gas is as of now sent out straightforwardly to Iran and now to China. Kazakh oil is sent out to China and furthermore toward the West by means of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The market of shifted send out goals has implied that Moscow never again can control Central Asian gas and oil costs, as in past circumstances, since it is presently formed by the Energy needs of, for instance, Iran, the West, and China, and what they are set up to pay.

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ventures by Russian Energy organizations are described essentially by Gazprom which, through its subsidiary structures, really has a syndication of the oil item markets of these nations. In the two nations expansive scale agreeable speculation ventures with Russia are focused on electric power age. One of the principle hydropower plant ventures is Kambarata hydro-control station in Kyrgyzstan. \$2.1 billion has been reserved by Moscow for a

second Kambarata control station, to add to a current one effectively operational, yet basic leadership was at first deferred. A compromise was come to amid the September 2012 visit of President Putin to Bishkek for Russia to continue in development of a further four hydroelectric power stations in Kyrgyzstan by 2016 (Laurelle, 2013).

“In Tajikistan there was some uncertainty about Russia's situation on the development of the Rogun dam. Yet, there is greater clearness now on the hydropower station development venture. Actually, the biggest undertaking in Tajikistan is the Sangtuda 1 HPS, which was authorized in July 2009. The RF Government and Russian organizations Rosatom and Inter RAO UES claim 75 for each penny of Sangtuda 1 shares and have put about \$680 million in its development, with the Tajikistan Government contributing roughly \$120 million. A few other agreeable undertakings are either under dialog or holding up proceed. A critical factor that already kept down a Moscow choice on Russian speculation was Uzbekistan's restriction to hydropower development in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan because of natural dangers caused by the conceivable diminishment in spillover and water levels of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya Rivers. That may now change with a sign that Russia will be a functioning supporter of the Kyrgyz upstream position” (Sinitsina, 2012).

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

“Russia is never again the main exchanging accomplice of the five Central Asian states all in all, having been ousted in that part by China. All things considered, Russia's monetary responsibility with Central Asia is more multi-faceted, joining parts, for example, mining, development, the military-mechanical complex, broadcast communications, transport, and agribusiness. General exchange turnover in 2011 remained at \$27.3 billion. Russia's fundamental fares to Central Asian nations are essentially made products: to be specific, foodstuffs, apparatus, materials, and transportation hardware. The primary items sent out from Central Asia to Russia are as yet normal and farming crude materials, and in addition synthetic substances” (Parshin, 2009, 3-17).

Another critical factor to hold up under as a primary concern is that, specifically, Kazakhstan's foundation is connected to Russia, which sees its southern neighbor as the passage to the various nations in Central Asia. Besides, the issue of Soviet-period obligation to Russia is a key thought, basically as this is somewhat utilized as use by Moscow in a backhanded and in some cases less

aberrant approach to seal military-security courses of action, as watched particularly on account of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Radyuhin, 2004, 1-47).

With a specific end goal to look for its financial advantages, Moscow has started various monetary foundations – in spite of the fact that the 'letters in order soup' of associations has a variable and inconsistent reputation up until this point: the Customs Union; the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC); Eurasian Development Bank; Anti-Crisis Fund; CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement, among others. As far as concerns its, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is prescribed to be propelled in 2015.

1. A significant piece of Russian guide is passed on as improvement help to the low-wage nations of Central Asia, and this is done both reciprocally and in the system of CIS and EurAsEC and so on.
2. “Of note, however, is the way that Russia isn't among the best ten givers giving worldwide help to any of the Central Asian nations, a reality that mirrors Russia's direct investment in global improvement help programs. The aggregate sum of two-sided compassionate guide gave, for instance, by Russia to Kyrgyzstan after the savage conflicts of April and June 2010 was evaluated at \$25 million. That contrasts and \$1.1 billion to Kyrgyzstan from global money related associations distributed inside a 30-month time span for the restoration of the economy, and additionally the rearrangement and recovery of devastated structures in the south of the nation”. (Sorbello, 2014, 13-17).

Among the most unmistakable issues from Russia's financial commitment with Central Asia are those of work movement and territorial settlements. These have turned into a fundamental part of the Russia– Central Asia relationship. Exact figures are difficult to find. A few appraisals of transients to Russia and Kazakhstan, hunting down regular or brief work, as 2 million from Uzbekistan, 800,000 from Tajikistan, and 600,000 from Kyrgyzstan, at any one time. A representative for the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that there might be upwards of "4.5 million" Central Asian work transients living and working in Russia. Generally, these vagrants are untalented workers who tend to discover work as road cleaners, farming specialists, or specifically, as workers in the development business. The financial significance of work

relocation for the Central Asian states is hard to exaggerate. Once more, solid information isn't effectively feasible.

“Unmistakably settlements from work vagrants have assumed an extreme part in supporting the economies of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in the course of the last 9– 10 years. Tajikistan, specifically, is dealt with to be the most ward nation on the planet, in corresponding terms, on settlements from work vagrants. It is assessed that Tajik work vagrants sent back to their nation of origin settlements totalling \$2.7 billion out of 2011 – proportional to more than 45 for every penny of Tajikistan's recorded GDP.²² The figures are bring down for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, yet at the same time representative, with work transients' settlements supposedly representing about 29 for each penny of Kyrgyzstan's GDP and 8 for every penny of Uzbekistan's” (Omirebek, 2015, 1-33).

“For Moscow, the contribution from a sizable low-paid Central Asian work compel isn't immaterial to the RF economy, not minimum in perspective of statistic difficulties and necessities confronting Russia, and particularly on the grounds that vagrant laborers are set up to go up against modest however fundamental occupations. For the poorer Central Asian states, work relocation has offered a crucial financial 'safeguard', alleviating the social weight that larger amounts of joblessness would some way or another have developed or irritated. In any case, certain flow here are moving: ongoing proof after the worldwide monetary emergency recommends that the compensation and prizes of vagrant work in Russia are not as awesome as they used to be, and Russian opposition in a few zones towards transient laborers has been exacerbating. Numerous aversion the way that 2% of Russia's GDP is transmitted to Central Asia. Steps are presently mooted to endeavor to decrease the stream of vagrants from Central Asia. In President Putin's deliver to the Russian Federal Assembly in December 2012, he specified the year 2015 as the objective for the presentation of stricter oversight measures pertinent to outside nationals, particularly from CIS nations” (Kilner, 2012, 5-17).

An intriguing progression generally is the way that laborers from Central Asia have been pushing their Chinese rivals off the most minimal rung of the stepping stool in eastern Siberia. (Chinese subjects still include a sizeable greater part of the remote workforce in, for example, the Amur Region, and additionally different zones of the Russian Federation that outskirt China. The

proportions are changing for more Central Asians.) Aside from bring down wage desires, Central Asians have a contending advantage since they needn't bother with visas to movement to Russia (EurasiaNet 2013). Chinese specialists, then again, must adapt to a visa administration that hampers numerous eventual illegals from intersection the fringe. For the individuals who wish to work authoritatively, the endorsement procedure takes months. The upshot is that Central Asian illicit transients have all the earmarks of being discovering life somewhat less demanding in the Far East of the Russian Federation than their partners in huge urban areas in European Russia (Blagov, 2005, 1-17).

“The whole inquiry of monetary collaboration amongst Russia and Central Asian nations is nearly related to security issues, basically neutralizing drug trafficking from Central Asia to Russia, the size of which is evaluated to be similar to the volume of common authority exchange (around \$20 at least billion). In Russia this issue has, aside from the helpful effect, a monetary degree, which constitutes, as somewhere else, a noteworthy need concern. Medication trafficking fiscally bolsters the illicit monetary division, debasement, and sorted out wrongdoing in both Russia and Central Asian nations” (Sinitsina, 2012). As indicated by the UN, “the Russian opiates advertise represents 2% of the world turnover, with the yearly income from all medication deals adding up to roughly \$13 billion. Thus, Russia has the second biggest volume of medication turnover – second just to Europe, where the figures are referred to as 26 for each penny and \$20 billion, separately, as indicated by the UN report” (UN report, UNODC, 2009). What's more, opiates generation in Afghanistan, a long way from being decreased after finished a time of “International Security Assistance Force intercession (ISAF)”, is taking off once more.

SECURITY INTERESTS

Russia is the most intense security player in the region. On one hand, it has both the way to respond to an emergency and an accepted accountability to lock in. Be that as it may, on the other, it additionally has a clear hesitance to mediate and would just do as such if Russian region or key interests were in question. That was seen amid and after the 2010 Osh slaughters in Kyrgyzstan to which Russia crumbled to react, as it didn't see the savagery as an immediate danger to its interests” (Central Asia Policy Forum, 2013). “While multilateral measures (CSTO, SCO) assume their part in Moscow's eyes, there is a solid sense, and an imperative improvement

in Russia's approach towards Central Asia, that reciprocity progressively wins in the security area. With the key accentuation on respective ties with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two similarly essential columns emerge: military joint effort and financial help/use.

In the military circle, Russia's reciprocal security participation with Tajikistan includes the arrangement of its second-biggest military unexpected abroad – the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. Around 7,000 troops are conveyed at the base near Dushanbe, in three engine rifle regiments. A respective understanding was accomplished amongst Dushanbe and Moscow in October 2012, which accommodates lease free basing rights for Russian powers until 2042. It stops to be seen whether Russian outskirts gatekeepers will again profit to a part for the Tajikistan– Afghanistan fringe sooner or later finished the coming year. RF outskirts watch units left Tajikistan in 2004 (Pikalov, 2005, 297-311).

Russia-Kyrgyzstan Military Cooperation since 1991: “In Kyrgyzstan an augmentation on the Russian military advances at Kant takes those game plans through to 2032, with a conceivable expansion past that for a further five years. The new understanding was planned to keep running from 2017 and accommodate a bound together or incorporated Russian army installation in Kyrgyzstan, consolidating all the different offices at Kant and somewhere else in the nation. The Russian side has discounted generous Kyrgyz obligations to Russia, adding up to \$489 million. The same has been done in the Tajikistan circumstance. Russia had evaluated to spend over \$1.5 billion to support the Tajik and Kyrgyz militaries. Kyrgyz obligations were likewise changed over into a capital holding for Russia in Dastan, one of Kyrgyzstan's military-modern complex's solitary undertakings. In this way, obligation undoing, and significant guide (eg. \$2 billion to Kyrgyzstan), are utilized to use these military-security courses of action into put” (Cooley, Laruelle, 2013, 112-256).

“The Russian specialists kept or recovered various military and research offices in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The most specific ones in the post-Soviet space are those in Kazakhstan, which as needs be constitute an imperative component of the Russian protection framework. Since the 1990s, Astana has given Moscow the utilization of a few terminating ranges in return for military gear, specialized support, and officer preparing. Also, Moscow rents, for instance, the Baikonur space complex from Astana (70% of Russian rocket dispatches happen

there), and also rocket test terminating ranges in the areas of Karaganda, Zhambul, Aktobe, and Kyzyl-Orda. Russia does not have any military guide in either Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan” (Laruelle, 2013, 119-123).

In the multilateral security regions, the free association and necessities of structures, for example, the CIS, CSTO, and SCO, in which Russia imparts authority to China, take into consideration adaptable courses of action in which a few individuals can pick further incorporation – likewise with the Customs Union – while others can quit activities.

The disadvantage is that a considerable lot of the understandings ostensibly embraced by these structures are never authorized, with individuals frequently not endorsing the vital national enactment to bring them into compel or else not giving appropriate financing to help them. Be that as it may, from Moscow's edge, endeavors to make more grounded establishments have their own downsides. While such endeavors could make these organizations more successful instruments of Russian power, the improvements additionally estrange different individuals, who regularly either pay lip administration to the laid out responsibility and after that decrease to uphold them or, similarly as with Uzbekistan, escape them by leaving the establishments. Uzbekistan's latest withdrawal from the CSTO (June 2012) and its hesitance to completely take part in a coordination system that incorporates Russia and Kazakhstan are just the same old thing new in such manner.

CHINA

“After the fall of the Soviet Union, China has manufactured and fortified its relations with the five Central Asian conditions of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While at first the primary Central point of its political and strategic exercises was to settle the Soviet inheritance of questioned fringes, its ties with Central Asia later began to mirror a developing want to ensure more extensive financial and security interests in the region”.

“A significant system of streets, railroads, air flights, correspondence, and “oil and gas pipelines associates China to Central Asia” (Wen Jiabow, H.E., 2012, 57-224). “In 2012, doing nearly \$46 billion of exchange with the region's five states, China was the main monetary performing artist and principle wellspring of outside interest in the area. Since China developed political relations

with the five Central Asian states in 1992 and its general exchange with the region has expanded 100-fold” (Xinhua Xi, 2013). Immense financing and remote direct investment in Energy, natural resource extraction, and products, for example, “the Central Asia gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, the Atyrau-Alashankou oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China, critical interests in Energy transport and correspondence in Uzbekistan, the development of new streets and passages in Tajikistan, and the extension of street associations amongst Kyrgyzstan and China have incited numerous features”. The supply of low-intrigue advances to credit-insufficient Central Asian nations, for example, Tajikistan has additionally been an exceptionally perceptible component. In June 2012, previous “President Hu Jintao pronounced that Beijing would offer \$10bn in advances to the part conditions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)”, (Reuters, 2012). Central Asia additionally depicts a developing business sector for China's products.

Adding to a considerably more profound financial get, all the five nations in the region, have consented to vital arrangements with China. Abnormal state visits by Chinese authorities have extended. Confucius Institutes, which offer dialect courses and social projects, are currently present in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The SCO Network University was inaugurated in 2010 as another stage for participation in instruction and individuals-to-individuals trades (The Central Web Portal of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO University Project, 2011).

The Security and dependability of Central Asia matters a great deal to China not just for the wellbeing and assurance of its own interests in the area yet additionally in light of the relatively unavoidable overflow impacts that weakness and shakiness may have inside China's north-western region of Xinjiang. In addition, China has begun to wind up a player, in spite of the fact that as of recently just likely, in Central Asia's security scene (Richard, 2012. 405-407).

China's expanded investment presents numerous openings, for the five Central Asian nations, yet in addition challenges, at a basic stage in the region's history. While China's quality is gotten with various degrees of acknowledgment, resistance, or question among common society, its commitment has been acknowledged by the political elites of the region for the open doors it makes to fuel financial advancement and for putting the nearby governments in a superior

transaction position opposite the old prevailing force, Russia, and in addition Western states. (Christopher, 2006, 227-235).

“Key inquiries remain concerning China's primary advantages here and the eventual fate of its commitment, even while China's monetary impression in the area keeps on extending. “What lies at the vanguard of China-Central Asia relations? Is there a fantastic methodology for Central Asia with respect to China? Is China extremely purpose on recovering Central Asia towards Beijing and far from the world's other real powers? Is China's expanding Energy craving, especially its entrance to crude materials to fuel its monetary development, the key factor rousing its gigantic interests in the region? Or on the other hand is China primarily propelled by the security worries about Xinjiang, where the local populace aggravates for more noteworthy self-sufficiency? Are China's interests in the region 'safe'? Or on the other hand may its financial advantages, Energy security, monetary speculations, even the lives of its subjects, go under danger from weakness and clashes that methodologically erupt in the region? What are the signs of Chinese expanded commitment for peace making in Central Asia? This piece of the part on China's interests in Central Asia utilizes exceptionally wide brushstrokes to attempt to answer these inquiries and depict a fundamental diagram of the monetary, political, security, and Energy measurements of China-Central Asia relations. After quickly depicting important outside strategy rules that educate China's huge cooperation in Central Asia, the section will attempt to investigate the explanations for China's commitment in the area. Arrangement proclamations and talk are then analyzed, as are urgent Chinese financial and security mediations. This part on China closes with nearly conditional conclusions and an appraisal of a portion of the difficulties that the China-Central Asia relationship will look later on” (Milward, 2007, 45-47).

CENTRAL ASIA’S POSITION IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY

It is huge to first break down the fundamental rules that support China's remote strategy keeping in mind the end goal to acclimatize its commitment in Central Asia. Chinese remote arrangement is as yet recognized, at any rate in the official talk, by the 1954 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: regard for regional uprightness and sway, non-hostility, non-obstruction in each other's inner issues, uniformity and common advantage, and tranquil conjunction.

“The Chinese authorities broadcast that remote arrangement inquiries in Central Asia, and in addition in different regions far and wide, get from the Five Principles. They speak to China as a creating nation which isn't a piece of any power alliance, for example, that around the United States, and which through the Five Principles looks for the street of serene improvement. Stressing on China, never looking for administration, or needing to force its will on different nations (Bangguo, Wu. 2011). By gravely reporting to the world never to look for authority, China tells its littler Central Asian neighbors and the world everywhere that its fast financial development and the fortifying of its military potential won't be a danger as well as offer chances to its neighbors and accomplices in what could be depicted as a 'win-win circumstance” (Jintao, 2012, 67-88).

The Chinese strategy talk regularly underscores on the peculiarity of China's approach as a dependable awesome power (fu zeren de daguo) that regards other nations' sway, rather than what are perceived as Western forces' endeavors to meddle in other nations' social frameworks, improvement ways, and inside and outside arrangements. China's elective world model worries rather multipolarity and equivalent treatment of all nations "regardless of they are enormous or little, solid or powerless, rich or poor". Every national government alone, following up based on its own national conditions, has the privilege and capacity to legitimately control matters identified with residential, political, financial, or parties, including inner clash. Such a view on the direct of worldwide relations is obviously educated by China's own history and its affectability on issues, for example, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

However, as one Chinese researcher put it, standards must be comprehended with regards to the real world." (Wang Zaobao Lianhe, 2010). “Actually the adjust of protecting China's interests abroad while keeping up a tried and true promise to the standards of state power and non-obstruction will turn out to be perpetually questionable (Campbell I., Wheeler T., Attree L., Butler DM., Mariani B.,2012). “As Chinese authorities and researchers are ending up more mindful of the pressures between the standard of non-obstruction and China's duties as a worldwide power and have begun to understand that "endeavors to isolate governmental issues and business don't by and large succeed", (Taylor, Rierner, 2009, 187-308). China has turned out to be more versatile in its translation of non-obstruction and has been willing to play a more dynamic political part in the determination of contentions, for instance the part that it has played

in Sudan and South Sudan in the course of recent years. When voting at the UN on authorizations or mediations coordinated at settling or managing significant universal emergencies, rather than utilizing its veto control, China frequently limits in light of the fact that "As a lasting Security Council part China's negative vote would constitute a veto, rankling nations who support intercession. By not voting or throwing an abstention, China has enabled a few mediations to proceed without switching its responsibility to strategic distances." (Nathan, 2009, 103-187).

It is intriguing to perceive how security and advancement are deciphered by China, while security and improvement are the essential issues going up against Central Asia. Besides, so as to grow legitimately a nation needs a tranquil and stable inward and outer space since "nothing could be accomplished without a serene and stable condition". (Wen, 2011, 92-227). "Thirdly, security is frequently observed from the crystal of advancement: underdevelopment creates frailty and insecurity and is a main driver of contention, or as such, putting resources into improvement offers the best certification for advancing security. The security-advancement nexus was initially in view of China's national experience and later converted into outside strategy, specifically through the declaration by previous President Hu of 'the amicable society' idea where improvement and security are firmly connected". The signs and conclusions to be drawn for managing political and ethnic pressures in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or in reality different clashes over the more extensive Central Asia region, are very clear: monetary improvement has the ability to constrict, or even wipe out, political and ethnic strains.

China's prominent interests in Central Asia

Central Asia does not lead China's principle universal, financial, and security concerns. Reliably, and considerably more so as of late, China's self-assured declarations and activities have concentrated on more essential zones of interests, specifically the association with the United States, Sino-Japanese relations, cross-strait relations with Taiwan, pressures in the Korean landmass, and relations with India.

"Assertions that China has shrouded intentions in Central Asia and is seeking after a great geopolitical procedure went for extreme control and strength of the region are over the top and overstated. China has neither the potential nor the aim to be Central Asia's hegemon. As it has

been contended, there is no terrific methodology for Central Asia with respect to Beijing... What there is, in any case, is an intersection of the considerable number of exercises of these diverse on-screen characters, which, paying little heed to what Beijing needs or doesn't need, implies that China is in any case the most significant performing artist in the region". (Petersen, 2013, 23-244).

In any case, the absence of an amazing outline does not imply that Chinese remote approach in Central Asia isn't sober minded or vital or that it does not have any "geopolitical implication". There is a scope of sensible "issues and interests" engaged with the "China-Central Asia relations". Examiners contemplating China's commitment in Central Asia don't generally agree on what is the principle driver, specifically whether financial issues, particularly regular asset extraction, or inward security issues, that is, the Xinjiang question, are the primary need. What is clear is that the two arrangements of interests have an immediate relationship to China's residential issues and that they are interconnected.

Following three many years of seriously high development rates, urbanization, and a stunning social change – and with just 1% of the world's oil holds for the second biggest utilization – China needs to protect feasible Energy supply sources from somewhere else. Nations in Central Asia, particularly those with substantial hydrocarbon stores and mineral stores, similar to Kazakhstan have turned out to be chief speculation goals for China, given their geographic nearness and the open door they additionally offer to anchor mainland Energy supplies, subsequently diminishing Beijing's reliance on oceanic courses.

Regardless, "China-Central Asia strategy changes a negligible mission for assets. As expressed in the 2011 White Paper on China's Peaceful Development, the Central objective of China's tact is to make a quiet and stable worldwide condition for its improvement." (Government of the People's Republic of China, White Paper on China's Peaceful Development, 2011). "In the meantime, through upholding monetary advancement, China additionally expects to balance out the Central Asian states, which are vital for the security of the area, including the Chinese region of Xinjiang that fringes previous Soviet Central Asia. There is a basic connection associating China's commitment in Central Asia to the Uyghur question". (Peyrouse S, 2013, 23-244). China needs the region to create and balance out as underdevelopment, flimsiness, and conceivable clash may overflow and break down its endeavors to create, 'placate', and all the more

unequivocally tie Xinjiang to whatever remains of China. It likewise needs its Central Asian neighbors, which have the biggest Uyghur populaces of any nations aside from China, to all the more effectively partake in the battle against Uyghur dissent. (Doyon J., 2011). Turmoil and political agitation in Kyrgyzstan, that offers a 1,000-km fringe with China, and in the Ferghana valley, that spreads crosswise over Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan risks disturbing exchange, Energy supplies, and, at last, to undermine its own inner steadiness, particularly in Xinjiang. This was unmistakably uncovered by the 2010 mobs in Kyrgyzstan between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, which "straightforwardly influenced Xinjiang's fares there, and in addition to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan." (ICG, Asia Report No. 244, China's Central Asia Problem,2013)

Serious interventions and engagements

Economic Engagements

The economic significance of China's part and effect in Central Asia is clear in every one of the five Central Asian Republics for whom China has turned into a noteworthy, if not the main, financial accomplice through normal asset extraction ventures, interests in foundation, and low intrigue credits. More than 10% of China's oil and gas imports are currently gotten from Central Asia.

The speed at which trade relations have deepened is astonishing. This has brought many benefits to Central Asian countries: their foreign currency reserves have increased; governments' finances have become more secure; and there has also been a rise in investment and development.

China's trade data with Central Asia in 2012

Country	Trade Value (US\$1,000)	Export Value (China as the Exporter US\$1,000)	Import Value (China as the Importer US\$1,000)	Trade Value	Export Value	Import Value
Kazakhstan	25,676,790	11,001,670	14,675,120	2.9	15.0	-4.7
Kyrgyzstan	5,162,470	5,073,510	88,960	3.7	4.0	-9.4
Tajikistan	1,856,700	1,747,870	10,883	-10.3	-12.5	50.7
Turkmenistan	10,372,700	1,699,330	8,673,380	89.4	116.7	84.8
Uzbekistan	2,874,680	1,783,050	1,091,630	32.7	31.2	35.2

Source: Ministry Of Commerce of the People's Republic Of China, Department of European Affairs, <http://ozs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/date/20130220130200025487.shtml>

“An imperative key part has been surmised by the two-sided relations amongst Kazakhstan and China with extending business and key collaboration between the two nations, which was led through the foundation of an inside and out vital organization in June 2011 (Joint Statement amongst China and Kazakhstan on building up all-round vital association, 14 June 2011)”. “An Intergovernmental Cooperation Commission was made in May 2004. China has wanted to acquire a main part in developing and creating Energy enterprises in Kazakhstan, bridling Kazakhstan's oil, gaseous petrol, minerals, including uranium, and other significant Energy assets. The Atyrau Alashankou pipeline that was created by the CNPC and the Kazakh organization KazMunaiGaz is a urgent wellspring of oil for the Dushanzi refinery in Xinjiang. (Zasztowt , 2012, 47-366). In the biggest outside buy ever by a Chinese organization, in 2005, CNPC purchased PetroKazakhstan (CNPC Announces PetroKazakhstan Acquisition, Xinhua News Agency, 27 October 2005) for \$4.2bn. (CNPC anchors PetroKazakhstan offer, BBC News, 26 October 2005). CNPC pronounced in 2009 that it would loan \$5bn to KazMunaiGaz and picked up a stake in Mangistau MunaiGas, an imperative oil designer in Kazakhstan. (Melvin, 2009, 377-392). Unrefined petroleum imported from Kazakhstan in 2011 represented 4.39 for every penny of China's aggregate raw petroleum imports. (US Energy Information Administration, 2012, China's raw petroleum imports) Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev has made to date 19 official visits to China, while Chinese pioneers have additionally every now and again went to Kazakhstan. Amid President Xi's visit in September 2013, a progression of agreements worth about \$30bn were marked, incorporating bargains in the oil and gas division” (The Economist, 2013). A ‘China Kazakhstan Entrepreneurs Committee’, the first of its kind in Central Asia, was likewise established.

In Turkmenistan, China being its second-greatest exchange accomplice in the region with rich stores of flammable gas, has heightened its agreement, particularly finished the previous decade. In November 2011, a concurrence on Expansion of Natural Gas Supply was agreed upon. It was foreseen by the consenting to of an arrangement on 29 August 2008, setting up an Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee with four sub-commissions on economy and exchange, Energy, humanities, and security. This brought about the constitution of a 1,830-km gas pipeline, which was finished in December 2009, beginning in Turkmenistan's eastern fields and intersection Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan before associating with the Chinese framework. An aggregate 46.77 billion cubic meters (bcm) of flammable gas had been transported by the Central

Asia– China pipeline with an aggregate estimation of \$15.72bn before the finish of February 2013. (Necessary Finance News, 2013, Gazprom Delays Construction of China Pipeline). While President Xi was on a state visit to Turkmenistan in September 2013, respective relations amongst China and Turkmenistan were supported to a key association level. The two sides consented to additionally extend the gas pipeline keeping in mind the end goal to support yearly gas fares to China to 65 bcm every year by 2016 (Makhmudov, 2013, 233-467).

Chinese organizations are creating framework, including critical street systems and electrical cables in Kyrgyzstan which is deliberately situated at the crossing point of “geopolitical interests in Central Asia” and an essential port of passage for oil from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. A noteworthy railroad association interfacing China with Kyrgyzstan's southern territories and Uzbekistan (Smith, 2012, 3-79) is likewise discussed. “Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in July 2013, was accounted for as saying that China would keep on providing Kyrgyzstan with "a wide range of help" for Kyrgyz framework ventures. In September 2013, China– Kyrgyzstan relations were upgraded to a key organization level. Over the most recent two decades, Kyrgyzstan's exchange with China has developed colossally and China has turned into Kyrgyzstan's second-biggest exchange accomplice, after Russia”. (Nichol, 2012, 67-349). In the expressions of a previous Kyrgyz bureau serve, each independent company in Kyrgyzstan is dependent on exchange with China. (Pantucci, Li L, 2013, 244-326). The re-fare of Chinese shopper merchandise to neighboring Uzbekistan and to Kazakhstan and Russia is particularly imperative.

“China has influenced important interests in Uzbekistan in the key areas of Energy, to transport, and media communications and has turned into the second-greatest exchanging accomplice and its greatest financial specialist. A Memorandum of Understanding on the Expansion of Trade and Investment and Financial Cooperation was marked on 16 June 2004, while a concurrence on building up an Intergovernmental Cooperation Commission was marked in October 2011. Respective exchange volume came to \$2.87bn in 2012, developing just about 50 times since the two nations settled in political relations in 1992. Around the same time, in Uzbekistan, China had 35 coordinate speculation ventures with an aggregate venture of almost \$4bn. Following the information of State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 347 organizations with Chinese financial specialists, incorporating 57 with 100% Chinese capital, work in Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan's first representative executive (DPM) affirmed in 2012 that Chinese banks had provided more than \$5bn in good credits for mechanical undertakings” (Dzyubenko O, 2012). Previous Chinese President Hu and Uzbek President Islam Karimov marked a joint assertion to set up a vital association on 6 June 2012. In September 2013, amid President Xi's state visit, the two sides consented to additionally fortify their participation in the Energy segment by guaranteeing long haul, protected and stable activity of the China– Uzbekistan gas pipeline, advancing joint investigation and advancement of oil, gas, and normal uranium, and tapping the collaboration potential in sustainable power sources. 31 assertions to execute ventures worth a sum of \$15bn were said to be agreed upon (Peyrouse, 2007, 11-18).

The poorest of the five Central Asian nations, in Tajikistan, however deliberately critical given the long fringe with the Xinjiang region, China has created streets, for instance the Dushanbe-Chanak interstate, electrical cables, and hydropower plants. China is likewise a significant wellspring of credit. In 2004, Tajikistan recognized from China over \$600m of a \$900m advancement advances bundle that had been offered to SCO part states” (Pomfret, 2011, 437-488). “It was announced in June 2012 that 10 new arrangements marked by the Tajik president in Beijing would realize Tajikistan USD 1bn in new Chinese speculation, credits and help. As an indication of the developing significance that China appends to its relations with Tajikistan, on 20 May 2013, President Xi and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon articulated a joint presentation to build up a key association went for boosting reciprocal collaboration between the two nations.

Security Engagements

In Central Asia there is a clear not insignificant rundown of security dangers, from local grievances subverting steadiness to local ethnic strains and negative overflow impacts from Afghanistan. At exhibit, the greatest long haul security concern is identified with the arranged withdrawal in 2014 of NATO troops from Afghanistan. The most critical inquiry for China is whether the region will turn out to be more flimsy after NATO's withdrawal. The specific worry in such manner is whether rebel associations working in Xinjiang may discover a haven, and in addition budgetary, specialized, and preparing support in post-2014 Afghanistan, and additionally in Pakistan. The expectation of an expansion in Islamic uprising in the region,

conceivably combined with psychological militant exercises inside China's outskirts, is an extremely overwhelming prospect for Chinese pioneers (Cardenal, 2011, 67-81).

“China's immediate support in the region's security issues has been constrained, in spite of its huge financial impression and its security concerns, conceding "for the time being to Russia on Central Asian security and military issues" and demonstrating no "quick enthusiasm for expanding its part outside a multilateral structure". China has expressed "its assurance not to convey its military in Central Asia, paying little heed to the danger to Chinese subjects or speculation." What sort of occasion would forcibly trigger a reevaluate of such arrangement and raise the likelihood for China to send its military in the area? Surely, this did not occur amid the 2010 turmoil in Kyrgyzstan, which anyway had all the earmarks of being of awesome worry to China, nor amid the supposed 2005 'Tulip Revolution'. In any case, one may ponder whether an immediate risk to a lead Energy venture in the region might be such an occasion” (Curtis, 2011. 6-13).

To address the security issues that includes China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the main intergovernmental body. It additionally helps China, in the meantime to reinforce “its political ties with Central Asian states and settle the area of Xinjiang and to found an aggregate talk on the normal non-conventional security dangers they confront, which incorporates fear based oppression, transnational wrongdoing, and cataclysmic events. The SCO part states at the season of the principal SCO Summit in 2001, marked the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which perceives the battle against the "three wickedness powers" as the real undertaking of the association. The SCO part states from that point forward, have marked various security collaboration records, for example, the SCO Convention Against Terrorism, the Anti-drugs Cooperation Agreement, and the Agreement on Joint Fight Against Crimes. The security arrangement of the association has progressively extended in more extensive regions including vital security, barrier, law authorization, data security, and the battle against transnational composed wrongdoing. The SCO has two changeless offices: the Secretariat situated in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure whose headquarter is in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

“China's military collaboration with other SCO nations centers mostly around respective and multilateral counter-psychological warfare works out, which are directed all the time. The principal occurred in 2002 with Kyrgyzstan and was trailed by in excess of 20 two-sided and multilateral activities with other SCO individuals. For example, in the pre-winter of 2010, a joint hostile to dread exercise including 1,000 Chinese armed force and flying corps officers and warriors occurred at the Matybulak base, close Gvardeisky in Kazakhstan, as a feature of the SCO's 'Tranquility Mission 2010'. China and Kyrgyzstan, in the ongoing past, on August 11, 2013, held a joint hostile to fear bore, under the support of the SCO. The activities occurred along the outskirt between the two nations. Around 460 furnished police from the two nations took an interest, honing new weapons and moves. The bore proposed to enhance the two nations' capacities to coordinate in their reaction to fear monger dangers” (Individuals' Daily, 2013, China-Kyrgyzstan hold joint against dread activities).

China appears to be happy with what SCO has concurred and its future prospects, with approval. A more thoughtful examination anyway uncovers that Chinese pioneers are additionally mindful of the way that the multilateral security measurement inside the SCO stays immature. This has, to some extent in any event, been perceived by some best Chinese authorities who, for example, have indicated out that SCO needs set up an undeniable framework for security participation (Cheng G., 2013) and "facilitate and define regular positions on major worldwide political, security, monetary and money related issues, and turn out to be more competent and efficient in avoiding and overseeing emergencies. The significance of reinforcing security collaboration by upgrading the SCO's "ability of opposing genuine dangers", specifically the "three powers" that "are getting dynamic once more", have been brought up by other Chinese pioneers (Wu B., 2013) and additionally sedate trafficking and transnational sorted out wrongdoing when the security circumstance in the region is more multifaceted as local and universal hotspot issues continue developing. On a more down to earth level, there have been proposals from the Chinese side to set up a more far reaching security participation framework, effectively execute the Shanghai tradition on battling against the 'three powers', sincerely actualize the two-sided security participation assertions, extend security discourse and conference and data trade, keep on holding consistent joint hostile to fear based oppression works out, improve security participation on substantial occasions, endeavor to expand the hierarchical limit with regards to activity and quick reaction capacity, furiously battle the 'three powers' and viably control

medicate trafficking, arms pirating and other transnational composed violations to guarantee enduring peace and steadiness in the area. (Wu B., Cheng, G., 2013).

At the 2012 Annual SCO summit held in Beijing, a lead was embraced accommodating an aggregate reaction to occasions ‘debilitating the peace, dependability and security of a part condition of the SCO or the whole region’. (Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, 2012, Regional Affairs ought to be understood through provincial counsels). Such a run, theoretically, gives SCO part expresses the privilege to intercede politically and carefully, despite the fact that not militarily, in each other's interior undertakings in case of an episode of inside clash. It was a not unessential improvement whose down to earth affect, regardless, stays to be seen.

Western investigators and pundits have been considerably less hopeful, if not absolutely negative, about the accomplishments and future prospects of the SCO. They have called attention to that there is a noteworthy hole between the association's revelatory proclamations and the helpful activities that should be set up to actualize them. Specifically, SCO has neglected to synchronize joint exercises against sedate trafficking, or to end up a gathering to talk about water debate. It has never figured out how to respond to expansive scale emergencies in any of its part states. Its quiet amid the Kyrgyz turbulence of 2010 “underscored the institutional shortcomings that point of confinement its viability as a security body.

Anticipating how the SCO will advance is extreme, given Russia's fuse ventures with the Central Asian republics. It impossible gives the idea that SCO, past definitive articulations, will turn out to be at any point in the near future a functioning intercontinental assertion, ready to do its own particular security intercessions. Its future figure essence for the most part on Sino-Russian relations in the region. While China and Russia over the most recent two decades, have made extraordinary walks in Energy, speculation, high innovation, and military innovation participation, “(Open up a New Chapter for China-Russia Strategic Partnership of Coordination, Remarks by Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China at the Concert Marking the tenth Anniversary of the marking of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between China and Russia, Moscow, 16 June 2011, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t833497.shtml)” and share related security concerns, and both wish to help to repudiate US influence in the region, actually Russia likewise has a reasonable

geopolitical target of reasserting control over Central Asia, specifically through plans for an Eurasian Union, which, in the long haul in any event, will run in opposition to a developing of the SCO and will scarcely fit with China's growing monetary, political, and conciliatory nearness. In spite of the fact that Russia is an establishing individual from the SCO, it likewise utilizes another association in the area, the "Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)" to propel its political, security, and military destinations. It stays unclear what useful agreeable commitment the two associations will have the capacity to seek after later on.

Endeavors to have a military impression through setting up army installations, or even any solid mediation in Central Asia, for example, those that Russia and the US have, would run in opposition to China's standard of non-obstruction and has been immovably dismissed by China. By the by, as its monetary commitment in the region extends, and given the difficulties postured by an uncertain and precarious condition, it is difficult to perceive how China will have the capacity to ensure its enthusiasm without a more proactive interest in the strength and security of the area.

U.S.A.

Central Asia is a territory whose extent to the United States is known to develop. The Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in 2004, tended to the Central Asian nations that solidness in the zone is of principal significance and essential national premium. (Nichols, 2004, 37-68). American interests, up until now, are under assault from three sides in Central Asia: Russia and China, the Taliban and their supporters, and the tyrant mismanagement of the Central Asian governments. More awful yet, it isn't improbable that some nearby governments may fall flat. As Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte answered to Congress, "Central Asia remains tormented by political stagnation and restraint, wild debasement, far reaching neediness, and extending financial imbalances, and different issues that support radical assumption and fear based oppression. In the most exceedingly bad, yet not improbable, case Central specialist in at least one of these states could vanish as adversary tribes or regions compete for control—opening the way to a development of fear monger and criminal movement on the model of fizzled states like Somalia and, when it was under Taliban run, Afghanistan." (Negroponte, 2006, 59-188).

Even as some of these attacks are or would have been inescapable, others are due to shortcomings in U.S. policy which gave these adversaries opportunities to exploit those defects in U.S. policy to their own advantage. This monograph addresses these deficiencies and includes recommendations for extricating America from the present unhappy situation approaching it there.

US Interests in Central Asia:

“Primarily, the US interests in Central Asia, are vital. They draw first from the nearness of this territory to Russia, Iran, and China” (Talbot, 1998, 2-55). The United States and the West when all is said in done, surely get themselves dynamically more reliant on the supported dependability and improvement of the Central Eurasian area. The United States is intensely put resources into Afghanistan, and its investment there and in Central Asian states is a long haul undertaking. The fate of this area has a significant bearing on the advancement of the Global War on Terrorism and as a rule on U.S. security interests in Eurasia; the maintaining of access to airspace and region in the core of Asia; the improvement of elective wellsprings of Energy; and the encouraging of flexibility and majority rule advancement (Cornell, Swanstrom, 2006, 1-220).

The predominant U.S. objective under both the Clinton and Bush organizations has been to maintain the honesty, autonomy, sway, and security of these nations against Russian and Chinese endeavors to command them and separate their flexibility.

As expressed in June 2004 by “Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor”, Lorne Craner, The essential key objective of the United States in Central Asia is to see the improvement of autonomous, fair, and stable states, focused on the sort of political and monetary change that is fundamental to present day social orders and on the way to joining and to the world economy. The system that we take after depends on concurrent quest for three related objectives. The first of these objectives is security. Our counterterrorism collaboration reinforces the power and autonomy of these states and gives them the dependability expected to attempt the changes that are in their long haul intrigue. In any case, all together for these countries to be really steady finished the long haul and to be completely coordinated into the

worldwide network, to accomplish their potential, they should take into consideration more prominent straightforwardness, regard for human rights, and development toward popularity based approach. At long last, the improvement of Central Asia's financial potential, including its broad regular assets, requires free market economy changes and remote direct venture. This is the best way to enhance the prosperity of the region's kin, differentiate world Energy sources, and encourage the development of these nations into the world economy.

“Energy admittance, at the end of the day, however essential, isn't and ought not be the significant driver of U.S. strategy here. It decently, is a necessary chore. Opening up Central Asian states' entrance to business sectors and Energy organizations' shared access to them empowers Central Asian governments to extend their client base and access overall markets where they can offer their items at worldwide market costs. In this sense, the main thrust behind U.S. approach is hostile to restraining infrastructure, while the main impetus behind Moscow and Beijing's arrangements is regularly monopolistic in nature” (Mann, Steven, 2006, 67-350). “This arrangement of America shielding the autonomy, trustworthiness, and security of these states broadens the since quite a while ago perceived fundamental geostrategic enthusiasm of the United States in turning away the ascent of any Eurasian realm in either mainland that could provoke it. Furthermore, there ought to be little uncertainty that supreme accomplishment in Central Asia would just energize the rulers in Moscow and Beijing to broaden promote their hegemonic desires. Emphatically they have long realized that an awesome power competition or battle for impact in Central Asia is developing and respect any eccentric technique for building sorted out structures of connections there as a risk to their imperative advantages” (Goldstein, 2006, 258-420).

The other urgent interests of the United States apply, to begin with, to what may be called an open entryway or equivalent passageway for U.S. firms with respect to Energy examination, refinement, and promoting. To the degree that offers of Central Asia's states' expansive Energy possessions are limited to Russia because of the shortage of pipelines or oil and gas, they won't have the capacity to practice significant financial or remote arrangement autonomy. The Energy get to, thus, on square with terms to American and other Western firms relates intensely to the bigger goal of protecting these states' freedom, power, and prospects for secure improvement.

“The leitmotif of U.S. Energy strategy, not suddenly, has been to develop the improvement of different pipelines and various connects to outside buyers and suppliers of Energy, checking, all the more as of late, power, concerning India” (Mann, Baran , 2006, 12-117). The Central Asian Energy creating states perceive that their security and success lie in expansion of pipelines so U.S. furthermore, Central Asian prosperity are in agreement around there. Washington has tried to keep a Russian pipeline or general Energy control from framing in the oil showcase with significant achievement, while it has had considerably less accomplishment concerning flammable gas. America has, simultaneously looked to isolate Iran from Central Asian Energy by asking states to fabricate pipelines that sidestep Iran and authorizing sanctions upon those states and firms who are exchanging with Iran.

Examples of pipelines bypassing “Iran and Russia are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline where the United States long has asked Kazakhstan to associate with it and to participate in the development of a pipeline under the Caspian Sea”; an expected Turkmenistan-Afghanistan Pakistan (TAP) line, which might possibly be fathomed to India, or generally a potential pipeline utilizing newfound sizable Afghan Energy assets to the Subcontinent; and the ongoing endeavor to connect Central Asian and South Asian power systems. The U.S. what's more, Western firms, obviously, have been nearly effective in accessing Kazakhstan's oil fields as far as contracts for investigation or refinery, and showcasing. Washington in conclusion, has a noteworthy worry in propelling residential arrangements in every one of these states—the five previous Soviet republics and Afghanistan—that will lead them after some time toward democratization, open markets, open social orders, great administration, and, eventually accordingly, to their enduring security against both interior and outside challengers.

Military-Political Challenges to U.S. Interests: Russia and China:

“Each of these interests are under assault in the present situation and the U.S. approach in Central Asia is tormented and under barricade. Russia and China, and to a lesser degree Tehran, see USA's political and key nearness in Central Asia with an unaffected caution. Russia and China, to be sure and China surmise America's anxiety for bases there. In spite of Russo-Chinese protestations of help for the U.S. war on psychological warfare, in reality they wish to restrict America from the region and dread that it intends to remain there militarily, and in different

routes, for an uncertain period. Russia has led the pack in this battle, with Chinese and Iranian help. Moscow has looked for with awesome dependability and accomplishment to build up a gas cartel under its initiative. Russian President Vladimir Putin began requiring this in 2002 and has from that point forward, moved logically to accomplish this objective, under the appearance of a Energy club, which he emphasized and no more late summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)” (Glazov, Ritchie, 2006, 29-86). Moscow may actually, be in sight of this objective.

The degree, in this manner, to which Central Asian Energy markets are open or shut is an issue of awesome and mounting weight to European states' Energy security and clarifies why European enthusiasm for Central Asia, regardless of whether despite everything it is generally little, is developing (Matveeva, 2006, 120-316). This reality elevates the officially vital and clear results of any such cartel. A Russian-drove cartel, and more terrible yet the probability of a joint Irano-Russian cartel which might be implanted in Putin's proposition to the SCO and in Iranian soundings about a gas and oil circular segment with Russia, would put off Central Asian states from offering gaseous petrol on the open market through broadened pipelines and to their preferred clients, therefore propagating their backwardness, reliance upon Russia, and abating their financial development (Cohen A, 2006, 449-468). Such a cartel additionally would smooth the advance of Russia's capacity to put the crush on European clients for concrete financial, political, and vital increases to the detriment of Western interests like the authentic freedom of Ukraine, the Baltic states, Georgia, and Central Asian governments. Russia, consequently, likewise has conveyed sizeable strain to hold up under upon Kazakhstan, if not Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, to stop from supporting the “BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan” pipeline or building a pipeline under the Caspian Sea (Blagov S, 2006, 18-95). “Either Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, if not both, may be constrained to end up Russia's accomplices" in flammable gas (Olcott, 2006, 22-185). Such arrangements additionally lead, in both Russia and the neighborhood administrations, to the combination of tyrant governments that depend on asset rents to keep themselves in control, i.e., they are petro-states. Undoubtedly, ostensibly the Putin administration couldn't get by in its present structure on the off chance that it didn't overwhelm Central Asian gas and oil segments (Clear S, 2006, 267-290). American achievement, henceforth, in opening up those segments has thump on impacts in Russia in front of the all the more specifically noticeable outcomes of such advancement in Central Asia.

An undaunted crusade has been pursued by Russia to put off Central Asian states from affiliating either with the U.S. or then again Western militaries. It tries to get constrained control of the whole Caspian Sea and be the single or preeminent military power there, though, states like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan depend upon Western, and particularly U.S., help to enable them to create powers to secure their coastlines, investigation apparatuses, and regions from psychological warfare, multiplication activities, and stash of various types. (Matveyev, Baku, 2005, 1-77).

Russia, including, has framed the 'Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)' to turn away neighborhood states from lining up with the 'North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)' or getting excessively possessed with its 'Partnership for Peace (PfP)' program. Russia, as a piece of this power, now requests a veto control over other 'Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)' individuals' safeguard connections toward the West. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov expressed that, The nations of the region are individuals from the 'Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)'. What's more, [if the nations of the region are] settling on a choice about facilitating new bases on their domain, they should consider the interests of Russia and arrange this choice with our nation.

Another motivation behind the CSTO is to make lawful political reason for enduringly positioning Russian powers and bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and conceivably Uzbekistan, obviously to shield these administrations against psychological warfare. (Plugtarev I, Melikova, 2005, 53-78). Nikolai Bordyuzha, the CSTO's Secretary General, additionally had approached its individuals to synchronize endeavors to counter religious fanaticism, i.e., give it a permit to interfere in their residential undertakings. Underneath Russian administration, the CSTO, continually sleeked to expand the extent of its missions in Central Asia, moving from air safeguard to counterterrorism, and now talking about peace bolster activities keeping in mind the end goal to bond a Russian-commanded security condition there.

As indicated by an assessment by Ilyas Sarsembaev, "Some Russian military experts consider that if Kyrgyzstan were surpassed by a total political fall, Russia and Kazakhstan could force some sort of protectorate until the point when strength could be restored and new races held. In this situation, the United States would enable Moscow to make a move in Kyrgyzstan, in light of

the fact that the vast majority of its own assets would as of now be assembled in Iraq and Afghanistan—and most likely in Iran and Syria. Russian help would then be invited and very much wanted to that of China. Surely, if Russia did not set out to put itself forward as a settling power, China may utilize Uyghur dissidence." (Sarsembaev, 2006, 318-461).

This situation represents both Russia's quality of psyche and expanding capacities in Central Asia and the manner by which residential pathologies there could interface to make a universal emergency and strife.

The cases of Sarsembaev additionally substantiate that, in credibility, these Russian powers in Central Asia are there to protect Russian interests and additionally keep the on-going dictator administrations in control. In spite of Russia's relative military blemishes and continuous military decrease in 1991-2000, it presently has bases in 12 of the previous Soviet Republics, and the development of its capacity to extend control into these regions, if not past, by growing existing bases or building new ones is one of the main drivers of flow Russian military strategy (Ivanov, Plugtarev, 2005. 16-60). Similarly, another thought process power of Russian military arrangement is the push to advance, support, and task the land, ocean (Caspian), and air abilities expected to deny neighborhood governments from either getting U.S. weapons and help or permitting U.S. army installations in their domains. This expectation, for example, is one of the main impetuses behind Russia's recommendations for 'CASFOR' (Clear S., 2006). The reasonable decision of so selective a power made up just of littoral states is check the littoral states as conditions of Russia, place Iran in a subordinate position in the Caspian, and prohibit remote military or Energy nearness there (Goldstein., 2002, 39-210).

Russia and China additionally had pursued an unyielding effort since 2002 as far as possible on the span and extent of America's quality on Central Asian bases and all the more by and large in the region (Goldstein, Ivanov 2002, 42-190). On account of Washington's confused arrangements there, they got accomplishment in Uzbekistan. For example, Washington neglected to counter effectively Russo-Chinese purposeful publicity, at both the presidential and open levels, that the United States was behind the upheavals of 2003-04 in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan and furthermore behind the Andizhan uprising of 2005 (Cohen, Daly, 2006, 11-235). Moscow and Beijing are additionally much of the time expedited huge weight Kyrgyzstan

to compel the United States out of the base at Manas and submit to being a piece of a Russian and Chinese circle. (Clear, 2006, 57-78). Under household and worldwide weight, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan requested a 100-overlap increment in the prior lease for Manas of \$2 million yearly. Just the blend of profound U.S. pockets, no doubt, abnormal state mediation by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and previous Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and recharged battling in Afghanistan had enabled America to remain at Manas by giving \$150 million in help to Kyrgyzstan. (Shanker, 2006, 30-127). The ongoing development of battling in Afghanistan incomprehensibly attempted to U.S. advantage here, since Bakiyev transparently and formally had tied the expansion of the base to the level of battling in Afghanistan”.

“Russia and China have most impressively used the SCO as a stage for an aggregate security task in Central Asia, supporting both two-sided and multilateral Russian and Chinese activities with neighborhood administrations and with each other on a yearly and extending premise since 2003. The SCO's value to Moscow and Beijing does not end here. While essential contrasts exist between Russia, China, and among alternate individuals and onlookers (India, Pakistan, Iran, Mongolia) with reference to whether the SCO ought to be mainly a promoter of exchange and financial advancement, or a military union, or another Energy gathering that Russia would direct, or a reason for local collaboration as Kazakhstan and the littler states would incline toward, it unmistakably has been imagined by Beijing and Moscow since its setting up as a discussion for binding together Central Asian governments in an against American provincial security association (Cohen A.; Turner E.J., 2006). Moreover, Russia and China obviously need it to be a territorially selective association of developing stature with the goal that Central Asian states won't be individuals from some other comparative association, e.g., NATO, which could counter it. The SCO's sanction affirmation of June 15, 2001, no doubt, (before the 9/11 assaults on America) was obviously an against American approach archive and mirrored a while of Sino-Russian strategic work in Central Asia. (Karniol, 2001, 25-80).

Moscow and Beijing, to finish up, had pursued circumspect, comprehensive, and efficient endeavors to destabilize the American event in Central Asia because of U.S. bolster for law based change. These even contain routine with regards to counter-progressive military tasks. Thusly, they additionally purposely endeavor to bar even the likelihood of such changes in Central Asia. They have in this way, wind up solid champions of existing conditions which

incorporates monstrous debasement, suppression, and the guarantee of sweetheart arrangements, if not guarantees of help for Central Asian rulers' picked beneficiaries. (Safanov, 2005, 48-60). Russia's disappointment since 2004 to embed its own contender for President of Ukraine and the subsequent Orange Revolution there, Russia, China, and neighborhood governments have exceedingly grown endlessly and scattered the United States, the "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)", or the West all in all were and are behind the purported shading transformations, and are endeavoring to vanquish nearby governments and supplant them with as far as anyone knows all the more professional American and in this manner hostile to Russian or against Chinese powers who have no residential help. Russian authorities charge that such 'weight' which apparently is intruding in their local legislative issues is 'elevating strain' in the area.

As neighborhood despots have a tendency to trust that they are interesting and that all restriction is outside and fear monger in nature, this is a simple plan to offer. President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan openly and overwhelmingly condemned this new American approach in his deliver to the Kazakh parliament in February 2005, 3 months after his administration expressed that it was not changing its remote strategy. Absolutely, in his State of the Union discourse of February 18, 2005, he transparently stated, Today we are seeing superpower competition for financial predominance in our region. We need to address effectively this worldwide and geo-financial aspects challenge. We have a decision between outstanding the provider of crude materials to the worldwide markets and pause (ing) quietly for the rise of the following majestic ace or to seek after certified monetary reconciliation of the Central Asian region. I pick the last mentioned.

It is anything but difficult to offer this thought especially when it is supported by a constant state-run media crusade from Moscow, Beijing, and the neighborhood administration, and when there is no effective or sane reaction, as has been the situation with U.S. approach. The United States, despite the fact that, had burned through \$43.7 million in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan as of August 2005 to help free press activities, it was clear that this exertion was short of what was needed. In fact, it basically might be said that Washington in actuality still did not had any viable or recognizable open data strategy in Central Asia to propel its case and neither did it even take disproving these charges truly. The United States, therefore, was paying the cost for its delight and disregard. The U.S. approaches, therefore, with respect to security, Energy access, and democratization are under assault in Central Asia from the neighborhood despots, Russia, China, and to a lesser degree, Iran. (Gamova, 2005, 27-85).

CHAPTER 4:
PRESENCE OF EXTERNAL PLAYERS IN CENTRAL ASIA:
IMPACT ON INDIA

In this chapter, we will investigate the worries and premiums that rouse India's ongoing endeavors to venture up its commitment in Central Asia, approach articulations and in addition down to earth activities, and we likewise consider how India is faring in the geopolitical rivalry with the significant outer players in the area.

India's endeavors to fit set up with Central Asia has been seen by the most recent decade. As recommended by the experts, this is controlled by two essential concerns: anchoring and broadening India's Energy supplies to support monetary development; and keeping a beware of the ascent of radical Islamist bunches that may represent a danger to India's security. India is eager to tap the extensive business capability of the Central Asian region in totaling. Meanwhile, the vital area of Central Asia implies that it is a Central locus of geopolitical moving influencing India's relations with Pakistan, China, the US, and different powers in the region.

Background

“The period when the Soviet and Cold War time arrived at an end in 1991, India, the main non-socialist country with a conciliatory settlement in Central Asia, wound up in an invaluable position to fortify ties with the recently autonomous Central Asian Republics. In 1987, for example, India was one of the main nations to open a department in what later on turned into Uzbekistan's capital Tashkent” (Mukherjee, 2012, 1-2). This Indian office in Tashkent had control over the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics. In spite of the fact that the goal of the office was for the most part to systematize the Festival of India that should have been held in urban communities over the Soviet Union the next year, it's work before long extended to incorporate helping Indian understudies in the region who were contemplating on Soviet grants and encouraging the last development extends the Soviet Union granted to Indian private area organizations to assemble lavish inns in Uzbekistan.

Expanding on its essence in Central Asia through its office, India was additionally among the principal nations to be comfortable with a considerable lot of the CARs and opened its first government office in Central Asia by changing over the department in Tashkent, Uzbekistan into an international safe haven in March 1992, only three months after the disintegration of the Soviet Union (See 'India-Uzbek Relations,' Website of the Embassy of Uzbekistan in New Delhi Available at http://www.uzbekembassy.in/about_uzbekistan/indo_uzbek_

connection/indo_uzbekrelation.htm). Furthermore, the Indian international safe haven in Tashkent assumed a crucial part in encouraging individuals to-individuals contacts amongst India and the more extensive Central Asian region. (Alimdjanov, 2013, 49-70).

India was nearly related to Central Asia, generally, through exchanging courses and also progressive intrusions of the subcontinent which cleared down from the north-west. (Kaplan R, 2010). “India's relations with Central Asia post-autonomy were molded by Delhi's closeness to the Kremlin, particularly after the Sino-Indian fringe strife of 1962. Hindered by its connections to the Soviet Union, and also by a general internal looking concentration amid the Cold War time frame, India's essence in the region was for the most part limited to social trades”. (Sahgal, Anand, 2010, 25-41). The crumple of the Soviet Union energized a move in India's remote arrangement in the 1990s far from ideological collusions and towards a more sensible approach. Central Asia was presently alluded to as 'our close abroad' and India started to create reciprocal relations with the five new republics.

India propelled another “Connect Central Asia Policy” in June 2012. This flagged India would search for building more grounded political relations and fortify vital and security collaboration with Central Asian states. India's responsibility in the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)’ and the foundation of another ‘Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement’ to coordinate its business sectors with those of Central Asia was anticipated to set up. In a self evident reality, it guaranteed a cross-provincial Energy framework, new flight associations with Central Asian states, and its improvement, keeping money, and pharmaceutical businesses so as to fortify monetary connections. (Muzalevsky, 2012, 17-60).

India’s Interests in Central Asia

Energy Security. For keeping India's monetary advantages at standard, getting a certain and an endless supply of Energy is essential and India at present sources right around 75% of its oil utilization from abroad, quite a bit of it from the unsteady Middle East region. Energy security has accordingly, turned into a Central module of Indian national security and remote approach. With India foreseen to wind up perpetually dependent on imported Energy, (Roy, 2001, 3-7) decreasing reliance on the Middle East and developing elective wellsprings of Energy has turned into an imperative concern. Central Asia comprises vast hydrocarbon fields both on-shore and

off-shore in the Caspian Sea. These are home to an predictable 4 % of the world's natural gas reserves, (Source: International Crisis Group, 2007) and roughly 3% of oil reserves. (Kiesow, Norling, 2007, 33-40). Most of these resources are found in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, although Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also have prospective for generating hydro-electric power. Central Asia also, has reserves of uranium ore plus the potential for its enrichment; so the region could be tapped as a source of uranium for India's civilian nuclear programme, which would in the long term help expand its energy base (*The Hindu*, Oct 16, 2008).

India's energy security strategy in this way, significantly relies upon Central Asia. India's state-claimed Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) over the previous decade, has looked to put resources into Kazakhstan, which has three of the world's most extravagant oilfields. ONGC gained sizeable stakes in the Alibekmola and Kurmangazy oilfields in Kazakh-claimed territories of the Caspian Sea. (Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007). Likewise, ONGC all the more as of late, has endeavored to purchase an offer of US organization ConocoPhillip's holding in the Kashagan oilfield. Then again, despite the fact that the Indian Government has started putting resources into oil fields in Central Asia, its arrangement on the most proficient method to transport this oil to the Indian market or work out oil swap bargains is as yet developing.

The Government of India has been involved in drawn out exchange in regards to the 1680 km-long Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, approximated to cost US\$7.6 billion to set up. The TAPI venture is anticipated to transport 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from gaseous petrol fields in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. (BBS News South Asia, Dec11, 2010). The development of the pipeline, all things considered, has slowed down for different reasons, tallying earlier responsibility of Turkmen gas stores to Russia, challenges of drawing in with the administration in Ashgabat, and the security dangers associated with a pipeline that will go through southern Afghanistan. Subsequently, paying little mind to the promotion around the TAPI venture, there are questions regarding whether worldwide organizations will fund it. Therefore, down to earth execution of the undertaking is still at a beginning time. Moreover, following Chinese Premier Xi Jinping's visit to Turkmenistan

in September 2013, there is theory that the TAPI undertaking might be crashed out and out. (StratRisks, Sept 8, 2013).

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION OVERVIEW

To the other side from tending to India's energy concerns, building further advancement organizations with the “Central Asian area could prompt a positive effect on India's more extensive vital and improvement participation yearnings. India started to give improvement help to the Central Asian nations not long after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the autonomous countries of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan developed. Dynamic collaboration endeavors in the CAR have worked in two stages. The main stage, from the mid 1990s until 2004, focused on Lines of Credit that financed advancement and assembling ventures. Amid this stage, awards were used significantly to back dry season alleviation programs and give helpful help, for example, providing hostile to tuberculosis pharmaceuticals to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 2001” (Calculations made by IDCR in view of Grants and Loans to Foreign Governments, India Budget 2007/8 - 2012/13.) “The second stage started in 2004, has seen a move in Indian help to the CARs, with stipends constituting the mass of advancement collaboration and a stamped diminishment in the dedication of LOCs to the region. The preparation programs under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Program”, which began in the mid 1990s, keep on gaining success in the region. The advancement help duty to the CARs is a little level of India's general improvement participation. “In the vicinity of 2008 and 2013, stipends to the region arrived at the midpoint of under 1% of general awards from India to different nations”, (Calculations made by IDCR in light of Grants and Loans to Foreign Governments, India Budget 2007/8 - 2012/13) while Lines of Credit to the area have likewise found the middle value of under 1% of India's general LOC responsibilities in the vicinity of 2004 and 2013. Given that South Asia and Central Asia are two of the slightest coordinated regions on the planet and exchange amongst India and CAR nations found the middle value of at 0.1% of India's general exchange in the vicinity of 2000 and 2012, it isn't amazing that advancement participation endeavors between the two regions have remained rather limited.

Central Asian nations likewise have indispensably better financial and social pointers, which incorporates per capita wage, education rates, neediness rates, and wellbeing markers, than India and without a doubt other South Asian nations. The Oxford Multidimensional Poverty Index shows that while 54 percent of India's populace is viewed as poor by this file, a normal of just 6 % of the number of inhabitants in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are significantly poor. Be that as it may, given the geo-vital area of the Central Asian Republics, India proceeds with its improvement collaboration with the region as nitty gritty by the Connect Central Asia Policy, revealed at the main India-Central Asia Dialog held in June 2012.

GRANT

Indian advancement help to Central Asian Republics since 2004, has experienced constrained give subsidizing and philanthropic help measures. While Indian awards to the CAR have remained roughly at a similar level, loaning to the region as a level of India's general advancement collaboration has diminished from 1.2% of every 2008 to 0.4% out of 2013. Computations made by IDCR in view of Grants and Loans to Foreign Governments, India Budget 2007/8 - 2012/13.

Inside the restricted subsidizing that India allots to the Central Asian Republics, gifts are not legitimately owed to all the five nations. 69% of the aggregate awards to the region between 2008 to 2013 were focused on Tajikistan. “These awards to Tajikistan have included subsidizing to recover and propel the Varzob-1 Hydro Power Plant through the Indian Public Sector Units Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) and the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC). To be opened in 2011, the hydro control station was at last introduced in 2012 with a limit increment from 2x3.67 MW to 2x4.75 MW” ('India Tajikistan Bilateral Relations' accessible at http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/tajikistan_bilateral_brief.pdf). This hydropower venture has recognized around 47% of the aggregate conferred awards to CAR. Adding to it, Tajikistan got a concede to set up essential preparing and to enhance nearby aptitude advancement through an instrument room preparing focus that was initiated in 2012. Because of the joined spotlight on hydro-Energy and ability improvement in the vicinity of 2008 and 2013, Tajikistan built up a sum of over US\$ 27 million in gifts from India, situating Tajikistan a long ways in front of the rest of the nations in the region. (Prasad, Mulle, 2013, 3).

The remaining Central Asian nations get gifts for comparatively littler tasks. Kyrgyzstan has gotten 16% of the gifts to the region, esteemed at US\$ 6 million, to set up potato handling industrial facilities and data innovation focuses in the nation “(‘Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership amongst India and Kyrgyzstan,’ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India)”, 24th January, 2009 (accessible at <http://mea.gov.in/two-sided-documents.htm?dtl/4776/Joint+Declaration+on+Strategic+Partnership+between+India+and+Kyrgyzstan>) Turkmenistan is the third most elevated beneficiary of Indian assistance at over US\$ 2 million (or 6% of the aggregate stipends to CAR) with subsidizing focusing on data preparing focuses in the nation. And keeping in mind that Uzbekistan gets just 5% of aggregate stipends, they are random: a sum of US\$ 1 million focused on the nation in the vicinity of 2008 and 2013 has been used towards financing Entrepreneurship Development Centers and apparatus rooms that give both business intuition and essential aptitude improvement for the nation (India-Uzbekistan Relations" (accessible at <http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/UzbekistanJanuary-2012.pdf>). Uzbekistan has likewise gotten over a large portion of a million dollars towards medicinal gear. Kazakhstan gets just two percent of the gifts to the region and these are used for tertiary areas of business enterprise and data innovation improvement (‘Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership amongst India and Kazakhstan,’ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 24th January, 2009 (accessible at <http://mea.gov.in/respective-documents.htm?dtl/4776/Joint+Declaration+on+Strategic+Partnership+between+India+and+Kazakhstan>).

There are strategies to set up a therapeutic and instructive E-Network for the five nations in the Central Asian region in light of the model of the Pan African e-Network, which gives remote medicinal and instructive help to doctor's facilities and colleges in African nations. A comparative model in the Central Asian area could likewise give access to more specific medicines for the general population of CAR. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is setting up a point by point venture report for setting up the e-organize venture in the five republics. (Taraporevala, Mullen, 2013, 1)

NATIONAL SECURITY. Not simply regarding energy security but rather Central Asia is of urgent significance for India additionally for reasons of national security. New Delhi sees the area as a wellspring of religious fanaticism and is on edge to check the ascent of radical Islamist bunches which may show a fear monger risk. Central Asia has been a rich enrolling ground for such gatherings since the crumple of the Soviet Union, (McGlinchey, 2005, 12) and there are professedly scores of jihadist bunches situated in the region . (Ramachandran, 2006, 27-34). Given the intercontinental idea of these gatherings, involving joins with the Taliban and other activist gatherings in neighboring nations, this creates a high level of uneasiness in New Delhi. The dread is that if the rise of jihadist bunches isn't checked, they will at last represent a genuine danger to India's security, especially, in the challenged territory of Kashmir. (Clear, 2006, 28-45).

This misgiving is exacerbated by the circumstance in Afghanistan. There is a perspective of expanding weakness in Afghanistan consequent to the NATO withdrawal in 2014, which may overflow and destabilize delicate Central Asian States. India also, fears that a resurgent Taliban consolidated into Afghan power structures post-withdrawal will be counter to India's interests. These security issues are intensified by the multiplication of medication trafficking in Central Asia. Delicate fringe administration and elevated amounts of defilement, combined with the inability to stem opium creation in Afghanistan, have made medication trafficking a to a great degree productive industry. A significant part of the cash produced gives an imperative wellspring of money related help for jihadist gatherings. (Kucera, 2011, 49-63).

India, for reasons in that capacity, is devoted to assume a greater part in Central Asia's security grid and to forestall genuine and affirmed dangers to its national security. India over the previous decade, has looked to enhance its security resources in the area, surprisingly through the getting hold of a first remote military station in Tajikistan. Tajikistan is of particular worry for India since just a limited 20 km stretch of An afghan area isolates it from Pakistan-regulated Kashmir. India started to revamp the airbase at Ayni in 2004, purportedly burning through \$70 million as a major aspect of its guide to Tajikistan. There was suspicion in the media, despite the fact that India never freely announced its aims, that a squadron of MiG 29 aircraft would be positioned at the airbase. The Ayni airbase was seen by some as representative of India's creating key yearnings and an endeavor to extend Indian military power in Central Asia. (Kucera, 2011, 49-

63). It not exclusively would empower India to act because of circumstances in the region that undermined its security, yet in addition expanded India's choices in case of sharp strains with Pakistan, since it would empower India to strike at Pakistan from the back.

On the other hand, “Russia – still viewed as the overwhelming security performing artist in Central Asia – seems to have been unwilling to endorse India's endeavor to build up a military solid footing in Tajikistan”. (Kucera J, 2010). “Perhaps dreadful this would open the way to US and NATO impact, it purportedly utilized its use over the Tajik Government to guarantee that India did not send contender flying machine at the base”. (Muzalevsky, 2011, 167-185). Following a time of transactions between New Delhi and Dushanbe, in 2011 the Tajik Foreign Minister propelled arrangements with Russia to discuss likely sending of the Russian military at Ayni, while likewise discounting the organization of Indian or American powers at the airbase.

India proceeds diligent work to develop reciprocal collaboration on security with Central Asian states, even with this misfortune. In the years as of late, it has hinted at changing tack in its military effort to an all the more 'delicate power' approach. (Kucera, 2011, 114-120). The Defense Minister of India went by Kyrgyzstan in July 2011 and announced plans to open a joint military research focus there, and additionally an activity to prepare Kyrgyz troopers to serve in UN peacekeeping missions. It was well thoroughly considered that lower-profile activities like military healing facilities and research focuses may enable Indian military officers to construct associations with their Central Asian partners in a way less debilitating to Russia.

In April 2013, when India's Vice-President, Mohammad Hamid Ansari went by Tajikistan, the two governments worried on the heaviness of participation in managing unsurprising security dangers from Afghanistan, and India has perceived Joint Working Groups on Terrorism with Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. By and by, in spite of shared worries over security, there is minimal powerful security participation amongst India and Central Asian states. While Russia leads various joint military activities with these states under the structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization, and China does to some degree through the SCO, there is limited direct collective endeavor with India's military. (Sachdeva, 2010, 1-70).

India connected with the multilateral SCO as an Observer in 2005, and it turned into a full part amid June 8-9, 2017 at the Astana Summit. The SCO is one of the high-flying multilateral bodies with respect to Central Asia, and the issue of counter-psychological warfare frequently includes on the motivation of SCO summits. It is notwithstanding, unverifiable that India will have the capacity to use the SCO stage to propel its own particular security interests, given the significant Chinese impact inside the association and Beijing's affectability towards Pakistan, which is likewise an Observer in the SCO.

FOSTERING STRATEGIC COOPERATION: INDIA'S CONNECT CENTRAL ASIA

POLICY. “Despite India's confined exchange and venture with Central Asia, this area has gotten significance in India's remote approach over the previous decade. The rising hugeness of this area has been because of the region's key significance for India on a few fronts: India's squeezing Energy necessities, CAR's instantaneousness to Afghanistan, and an expanded Chinese presence in the region”. “In December 2012, talking at an occasion sorted out by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), India's External Affairs Minister, Salman Khurshid featured that India could before long import 90 percent of its oil and the greater part of its gas and coal prerequisites” (Energy Security Conference 2012: Inaugural Address by Union Minister of External Affairs Shri Salman Khurshid', CII and Ministry of External Affairs, Govt, of India, thirteenth December 2012, accessible at http://www.cii.in/Digital_Library_Details.aspx?enc=pZVQM37jtSRTHIkmBsithRQI+hrA7bKD420IO5OSFwMbTe9/5z5RRBJysUs7xf9f). “Central Asia's Energy sources are along these lines liable to stay appealing to India. Second, with the 2014 drawdown of intercontinental troops in Afghanistan and India's stress that potential coming about flimsiness could affect Indian security, having benevolent relations with Afghanistan's neighbors from the Central Asian Republics to China and Iran, is additionally to India's greatest advantage. Third, crisp Chinese speculations have included obtaining key stakes in oil and gas fields in Central Asia. As India makes more prominent attacks in Central Asia's Energy segment, there is an expanded probability of Beijing and New Delhi ending up in key rivalry with each other for comparable Energy assets”.

“The developing imperativeness of the Central Asian region to Indian outside strategy was outlined when India revealed its vital guide - the 'Associate Central Asia' arrangement in July 2012”. (Ahmad, 2012, 2). Looking to make more grounded respective relations and help India

develop as a noteworthy player in Central Asia, the Connect Central Asia approach comprehensively plots the part that India can attempt in the region. With a steady improvement plan at its core, the strategy expects to better coordinate the Central Asian Republics with the Indian monetary framework and add to Central Asia's advancement. This 'Associate Central Asia' approach imagines agrarian guide, utilization of India's IT learning base, closer military ties, foundation improvement, activities in advanced education and development of clinics with imperative therapeutic help as the key areas for Indian commitment. The approach, for example, looks to set up a Central Asian e-organize that would help limit working in the wellbeing and instruction parts of Central Asia by interfacing Indian doctor's facilities and colleges to Central Asia to embrace tele-solution and tele-training ventures. The approach likewise imagines setting up a Central college in the region. This period of Indian responsibility goes for a task driven approach that could bring about an expansion in the volume of Indian stipends to the Central Asian Republics.

The strategy additionally recognizes that a connected yet critical angle to its prosperity would be the advancement of Afghanistan as a center point to transport Indian merchandise by means of ocean and from ports in Iran through Afghanistan into the Central Asian republics. Iran's Chabahar port, arranged in the Gulf of Oman, and the port at Bandar Abbas close to the Strait of Hormuz will fill in as potential passage focuses for transporting products into Afghanistan and through Afghanistan to Central Asia. India, in May 2013, owed US\$ 100 million to build up the Chabahar port. Adding to it, a trilateral draft settlement between India, Iran and Afghanistan to build up the Chabahar port is effectively under consultation. A rail-interface from Chabahar to Zaranj in Afghanistan is likewise under level headed discussion with Iran as India needs to have a more feasible access course to Central Asia. India is likewise engaged with continuous chats with Iran to finish fragmentary parts of the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) associating Iran with the Afghan outskirt bringing about shorter travel time for merchandise headed for Central Asia. The Russia India-Iran started INSTC will thusly connection to the Zaranj-Delaram Road (developed by India in 2009) in Afghanistan and connection with the Afghan ring street interstate that interfaces with essential urban areas in Afghanistan, some of which are near the Central Asian Republics. Independently from setting up a protected course for Indian products to achieve advertises in Central Asia, these activities could look good for India's Energy imports from Central Asia.

INDIA'S TRADE WITH CENTRAL ASIA.

Notwithstanding the altruism that "ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program) projects and grants have created, this has been unsuccessful to convert into substantive exchange and business relations amongst India and Central Asia. At not as much as US\$ 800 million out of 2012-13, exchange between Central Asia and India stays beneath potential. India's absence of a straight overland admission to the area because of Pakistan's hesitance in enabling Indian merchandise to go through its domain has hindered India's rising exchange interests in the Central Asian region and appropriately, exchange with the CARs has just expanded bit by bit from US\$ 115 million to US\$ 738 million in the vicinity of 1996 and 2012. Then again, India keeps up a positive exchange adjust with CAR and the greater part of India's exchange to the Central Asian area is with Kazakhstan (55%) trailed by Uzbekistan (20%), Turkmenistan (10%), Kyrgyz Republic (9%), and Tajikistan (6%)" (Balci, 2015, 169).

"On the other hand, despite the fact that the volume of general Indian exchange with the area stays low, a rising pattern in the vicinity of 2008 and 2013 has been the ascent in the fare of Indian pharmaceuticals to the region. Developing at 16% every year in the CARs, pharmaceutical items presently contain India's essential fare to the area. Sold generally as finished the-counter medications, India supplies Central Asia with over 30% of its pharmaceutical needs. Imports from Central Asia to a great extent constitutes minerals, for example, zinc, sulfur and limestone. Moreover, India started to import uranium for its common atomic reactors from Kazakhstan through a concession to Cooperation in Peaceful employments of Nuclear Energy that was marked in 2011. Starting at 2013, India was intending to import uranium from Uzbekistan. Altogether, while there has been a drop in Indian imports from the region, fares to CAR have been developing". (Malhotra, 2012, 197-198).

Central Asia offers a decently unexploited market for Indian purchaser merchandise, particularly as buyers in the area have little to browse between exceptionally estimated, imported Western items and shoddy yet bring down quality Chinese made products that have snowed under the region. A grasp has just been obtained by the pharmaceutical business and Indian tea in the Central Asian market, (Gulshan, 2010, 1-70) while forthcoming for Indian venture and skill has been recognized in its regions, managing an account, development, and nourishment preparing.

(Laruelle, 2011, 10-17). A likelihood is likewise observed for India to help Central Asian states in growing little and medium-scale ventures.

India as of now, gives fractional support in a portion of these zones as a feature of its long-running ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation) Program. Lately, the Government of India has additionally started to help Indian business visionaries and business chambers to put all together exchange fairs under its CIS program, (Source: Government of India, Ministry of Trade and Commerce, Trade Promotion Program: CIS) and a joint business committee has been set up with Kazakhstan (Embassy of India, Kazakhstan). All things considered, India's somewhat piecemeal financial commitment in Central Asia, intensified by its own particular delayed monetary changes, implies that its business clout in the region is lacking. This has been reflected in the two-sided exchange figures which demonstrate that Central Asia's offer of Indian fares is 1.07%, while imports remain at an even lower 0.08%. (Administration of India, Ministry of Trade and Commerce).

India's Vice President, Mohammad Hamid Ansari amid his visit to Tajikistan in April 2013, marked arrangements to thrive respective collaboration in IT, Energy, wellbeing, training, exchange, business, mining, and agribusiness, while there are likewise plans to work in association with Tajikistan in building up an IT Central point of perfection and a Central Asia e-organize. (The Economic Times, Apr 13, 2013). The present degree of India's real two-sided participation, by the by, with Tajikistan is little, particularly when contrasted and China's financial commitment. Huge sum has been put by China in Tajikistan's IT and media communications enterprises and in mining uranium and different minerals. It has additionally rented outsized zones of land wealthy in minerals from the Tajik Government requiring little to no effort. (Vinson, 2012, 210-250).

MAJOR EXTERNAL POWERS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

RUSSIA

Russia's rising impact since the 1990s makes it a solid factor in the Central Asian States. However, the Chinese have been financially solid, Russia can adjust China's impact through the SCO and by putting different partners like India into the association. Russia remaining the

unending element in adjusting any major geopolitical moves in the Central Asian region has suggestions for others. It would be intense for any outer significant capacity to supplant Russia and take its position, whatever might be their level of monetary and political commitment in Central Asia. The five nations of Central Asia can expand their outside relations without the dread of being crushed or hegemonized since the Russian option gives them that solace. (Mustafic, 2017, 1-2).

The fundamental external power with an impact on Central Asia was and remains Russia, through its monetary, military and social impact and furthermore through the considerable number of ethnic Russians in the region. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian impact has bit by bit debilitated, and will never achieve a similar level. The Central Asian area will never observe the arrival of the Russian impact to the level found in Belarus. Regardless, Russia remains the fundamental exporter of crude materials-among them, gas and oil-from the republics and its exchange hallways with vital accomplices like India and Iran cross Central Asia. The three eastern states likewise depend significantly on the Russian military for their own particular security, especially against the hegemonic cases of Uzbekistan, yet additionally in their association with China. The "joint resistance of fringes and air space" deciphers by and by to Russian outskirt watches at the fringes of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan with China, sending a solid message toward the eastern neighbor not to have irredentist perspectives and China appears to comprehend the message. (Mustafic, 2017, 1-2).

Russia's interests in Central Asia are strikingly like those of the United States. Central Asia has lost its previous importance to Russia as a military cradle zone-first amongst Russian and British Empires and after that amongst USSR and US customer states in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between the USSR and China. After the Soviet Union's death, the Russian troops from all the Central Asian States separated from Tajikistan and some token powers on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan fringes with China. (Batsaikhan, 2017, 1-60).

Today, Russia's prevalent concern is likewise one of security. Russia's own limits has been undermined by the overflows from Afghanistan through Central Asia of Islamic militancy, fear based oppression and medication trafficking. Absolutely from the earliest starting point of his Presidency in January 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin pushed purposeful battle against

fear mongering with American and European pioneers. Putin was one of the first to support the caution about fear monger preparing camps in Afghanistan, and to caution of linkages between these camps and very much financed psychological militant systems working in Europe and Eurasia. Adding to this, Russia effectively upheld the Northern Alliance in its battle with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In December 2000, Russia joined the US in supporting the United Nations sanctions against the Taliban, and from there on offered for sanctions against Pakistan for helping the Taliban-each of the a harbinger to collaboration with the United States with the war against psychological oppression after September 11. (Swanstraom, 2012, 9).

India can accept advantage from this specific circumstance. Some other repetition in the area's geopolitics could antagonistically influence India's interests. India and Russia share comparable references on in regards to dangers to their national security from worldwide psychological oppression. They likewise share a common vision where India would make a positive commitment to global soundness as a solid power. India and Russia additionally share a background marked by coordination in the Central Asian region. Both the nations were instrumental in managing the Northern Alliance when Taliban was ready to overwhelm the entire of Afghanistan. The vast majority of the initiative in Afghanistan were from the Alliance and have a specific altruism for India and Russia. India's essence in Tajikistan isn't challenged by Russia, illuminating that Russia doesn't see India's contribution in the Central Asian area as a danger to its own particular advantages. Russia additionally has been steady in adding India to the SCO, however as a spectator at first. Russia additionally has been developing collaboration with India in the Energy part. This participation could be drawn out to Energy area in Central Asia including hydro-control division. Indo-Russian joint effort could add to the dependability in Central Asia as a rising worldwide monetary power. India could likewise dispatch the decisions of Central Asian states in different circles. (Kaneko, 2013, 1-4).

Indo-Russia collaboration in Central Asia.

The patterns in Central Asia's universal relations represent the advantage that gather to India just from the possibility of organization with America, also its reality. In fact, Russia's and China's dread about what this organization may mean have propelled them both to offer incitements to India to help every one of them, for example, expanded exchanging openings with China,

eyewitness status in the SCO, better terms on Russian weapons deals to India, along these lines, improving India's status and capacities in worldwide undertakings. (Muraviev, 2011, 14-19).

Russia underpins India's full enrollment in the SCO. So also, it is clear that Russian investigators, if not authorities, are exceptionally worried about losing the Indian Arms showcase with America. There are likewise all the more telling occurrences of common favorable position the two sides get from Indo-Russian joint effort, e.g. in Central Asia. Russian and Indian representatives started exchanges in February 2006 on the likelihood of growing the "Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)", Russia's military union in Central Asia and whether India may participate in its discussions. "The explanations behind these discoursed seem to confirm Russia's and India's energy about able difficulties there and the commitment that India could make to conquering them. Especially, two purposes behind this activity have been referred to. Right off the bat, on account of the flimsy circumstance advanced by the likelihood of a military emergency regarding Iran, India is pressurized into looking to anchor, as fast as would be prudent, access to Energy sources whose openness would be ensured by some political and military system; in a crisis, the CSTO organizations could be prepared to guarantee the security of gas and oil creation in the region. Also, a war against Iran could undermine or debilitate India's neighbor Pakistan where radical Islamists are persuasive; this could add up to a genuine danger to the whole region". (Unnikrishnan, 2017, 7-10).

India's investment in the CSTO would evade Chinese protests to its full enrollment in the SCO, fortify Russia's situation there against China's enthusiasm for securing bases in Central Asia, and in the meantime, clearly strengthen India's position and capacities in Central Asia. It is an indication of Russian partiality to India that it sees nothing incorrectly in India keeping up an air base in Tajikistan at Farkhor (Ayni) as long as it is arranged with its own base there, however vocally and staunchly contradicts some other outer military nearness in the region. Russia may have constrained India into finding the two bases together as has as of late been charged, however it has solidly contradicted any remote bases in Central Asia with the exception of this Indian base. So this potential heightening of the officially existing Indo-Russian key association has a certain incentive in additionally controlling China's ability for control projection (and not simply military power either) into Central Asia. (Unnikrishnan, 2017, 7-10).

THE UNITED STATES

Central Asia is a region of both developing significance and developing difficulties, for the United States. Its closeness to Russia, China, Iran, India and Pakistan, geology as the Central point of Global War on Terrorism and its huge Energy property make it a key area where the United States has vital, some may even say, fundamental interests. Those interests concern, as a matter of first importance, to geostrategic substances of security, particularly on the War of Terrorism. Be that as it may, they additionally include to Energy and to the push to help changing and democratizing changes. (Mearsheimer, 2014, 25-27).

The US is a key player with respect to India's part in Central Asia. Washington has bolstered and widened Indian part in the Central Asian Region, clear in the US procedure for a New Silk Road which would associate India with Central Asia-and subsequently with the West. This administration, propelled in 2011, goes for helping Afghanistan balance out and the more extensive Central Asian area by creating cross-and intra – provincial exchange, Energy and travel associations. It is likewise perceived as a methods for the US to manage its financial advantages in the Central Asian Region by sidelining Russia, Iran and China while interfacing India with Europe through Central Asia-subsequently, giving new speculation chances to US business. (Andrews, 2014, 1-6).

In the meantime, US indulging in Afghanistan is seen to broaden the political, economic and military space available to India in the region. According to **Stephen Blank**,

“Washington’s presence allows India to play, or at least aspire to, a greater Central Asian role than it could achieve on its own. Washington also counts on New Delhi playing an expanded role in Afghanistan and Central Asia as its troops depart Afghanistan.”

Kaplan goes further and avers that “As the United States and China become great power rivals, the direction in which India tilts could determine the course of geopolitics in Eurasia in the 21st century. India, in other words, looms as the ultimate pivot State”.

Notwithstanding, India is yet to benefit from this apparently crucial part in Central Asia. It keeps on being decreased behind Russia and especially China in the region. China's obstructionism towards Indian endeavors to enroll in Central Asia additionally proposes that it might see India

as a 'stalking horse' for the United States. Meanwhile, China is driving during the time spent building its own 'Silk Road'- a long time before US-India intends to restore the old exchanging course have past the planning phase. (Trenin, 2006, 6-14).

Geopolitical consequences and benefits for India:

The Indo-American discourses currently frequently incorporate a survey of all the exceptional issues of the South and Central Asia. For sure, Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill told the Indian customer base in 2001 “that President Bush tries to escalate the coordinated efforts with India over the scope of issues to the worldwide plan and inferred” that “to put it plainly, President Bush has a worldwide way to deal with US-Indian relations, steady with the ascent of India as a force to be reckoned with.” The revelation of such dialogs has just driven Pakistani experts to proclaim that the US has perceived India's "range of authority" in Asia. Different examiners confirm that this assertion speaks to a danger to Pakistani economy and security. Apparently, this understanding forecasts the subjective changes of Indian combat hardware as India will purportedly move from cooperation upon Russian weapons and advances to mix with NATO based on its norms, change of India's barrier businesses, and fast approaching arm buys from the West. (Smith, 2006, 17-60).

While the Indo-Pakistani arm race and political rivalry will continue throughout South and Central Asia, that does not alter the significance of the Indian benefits with America’s presence in the region as an external player. **Blackwill** further stated, “Washington wants to make New Delhi not just a regional ally, but a global partner.”

We see the products of such organization together in the joint exchanges and ways to deal with looking for a conclusion to common conflict in Nepal and, conceivably, more critically in Central Asia. Absolutely, in spite of the fact that this collaboration scarcely stops at Central Asia, new patterns in this area express the new associations and its deductions with specific power. For example, in 2006, the US government actuated a noteworthy discretionary exertion with India to integrate South Asia with Central Asia so as to give the Central Asian States other options to Russian Energy mastery over them. This activity encloses a re-foundation of the State Department to put the conditions of Central Asia in a recently rebuilt branch of South Asian and Central Asian Affairs with its own Assistant Secretary of State, giving this region a truly

necessary infusion of intensity in the administration. Past this and a soaks up program of abnormal state visits to South and Central Asia, beginning with President Bush's visit in March 2006, there is additionally a noteworthy US administration to invigorate infrastructural and electrical power association and speculations all through Central Asia that would enable India to play all the more enough in this region as a wellspring of the market for exchange, venture and Energy. India gaining one advantage from this activity is that it would likewise considerably enable India to fulfill its tremendous Energy needs.

The advantages for both the sides in this arrangement are not limited to that piece of Asia, or to composed dialog of strategies with Washington, and more noteworthy permission to atomic innovations and arms deals. Indian pioneers' announcements about their vision for Central Asia plainly incorporates whatever remains of the landmass in that vision. Essentially, India's honest to goodness, significant and developing interests and abilities concerning Central Asia are completely acknowledged as would be expected by all the real powers that are dynamic there. Unquestionably, they are for the most part contending with each other for impact with New Delhi whose vital use is strengthened by its capacity to draw in is non-restricting associations with America, Russia, Japan and China.

Both India and United States in Central Asia, need India to end up and be viewed as a magnet for Central Asian states' advancement. It is vital for Washington and New Delhi that Central Asia does not fall under supreme Russian and additionally Chinese impact. Since the push of the better and brighter US approach is to give nearby governments different decisions in Energy collaboration and remote venture, the development of India's presence in Central Asia and the capacity to impact key monetary and political choices there is distinctly in the US intrigue. Clearly, the same vital thinking of giving contrasting options to Russia and China remains constant for India, maybe with more accentuation on China. Russia's press in reality, as of now in 1997, revealed that in private Indo-Russian strategic discussion, "Russian and Indian negotiators energetically open the cards: both Moscow and New Delhi see a risk in the unnecessary fortifying of China and Islamic radicals". Indian specialists, in like manner, saw Russian shortcoming in Central Asia in the 1990s as opening the path to a Chinese-organized enclosure of its interests there and respected such a pattern contrarily. Consequently, India started to grow its interests and nearness in Central Asia soon thereafter.

From that point forward, it has turned out to be clear that India considers itself to be a noteworthy free financial player with a main part all through Central Asia. Therefore, India's obtainments presently, have constrained extraordinary forces like Russia, China and the United States to value the authenticity of its security and Energy interests in Central Asia and to look for Indian help either for their objectives or if nothing else to parallel them in Central Asia if not past. Keeping it as it were, they require Indian kinship to such an extent if not more than India needs their fellowship.

CHINA

Central Asia's vital area, Energy assets, rivalry for pipeline courses and the sheer number of territorial and worldwide players, were adequate purposes behind numerous examiners to make hypotheses of the "New Great Game" there. The challenge for army installations and the administration change tries through "shading transformations" added another length to this race. The examiners prior felt the genuine rivalry was amongst Russia and the U.S. China has made an enormous profile for itself through exchange, Energy bargains, military assertions and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), however starting late. The mounting Chinese impact in the region is a set up actuality.

Indian policy makers and experts trust that the Central Asian region is essential in light of its vital area, closeness – Tajikistan is only 20 kilometers from Greater Kashmir - and of its Energy assets. (Kak, 2005, 65-90). Reestablishing conventional linkages, along these lines, with its broadened neighborhood in Central Asia and past has been one of the essential key needs of the legislature. Notwithstanding the expectations and open speaking, India was never truly part of any opposition there. With no immediate street or transportation get to and hard economic situations, the region never ended up alluring to Indian privately owned businesses. The financial relations with the region have declined extensively looking upto the post-communist period. The yearly authority exchange amongst India and the entire of Central Asian region is about US\$200 million in the most recent years. Kazakhstan itself represents half of this exchange. Openings still appear to be gigantic as appeared by London based Indian steel head honcho Laxmi Mittal who possesses a 5.5 million ton limit steel plant in Kazakhstan. His organization utilizes 50,000 individuals in Kazakhstan alone from where it supplies the Chinese market. The Indian

government likewise formally endorsed its support in the US\$5 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan India (TAPI) gas pipeline venture in May 2006. There are additionally reports that India has built up an airbase in Tajikistan. The Indian Air Force will convey an armada of MiG-29 warrior planes at the Ayni airbase close Dushanbe. The airbase takes after the association of India's first military "station" in Tajikistan at Farkhor, abutting the Tajik-Afghan outskirts. The area is huge as it is near the bases of hostile to Indian fear monger bunches and in addition close to the domain where Pakistan and China are occupied with military collaboration. (Ramachandran, 2006, 182-225).

The Indian arrangement producers can be seen pretty much agreeable in managing Central Asian pioneers. They were a piece of the previous Soviet tip top, with whom India was managing for a considerable length of time. They have given consistency and are resolved to battle religious psychological warfare. Moreover, numerous experts trusted that Russia will keep on having a powerful part in Central Asia due further bolstering its good fortune of history and geology. Albeit numerous Indian experts still put stock in the reemergence of Russia (Bhadrakumar, 2006, 135-170), a calm evaluation is additionally made of a situation in which after some time China turns into an overwhelming player in Central Asia while keeping up inviting relations with Russia.

India observes deliberately as China builds its commitment in the region. Regardless of numerous positive improvements and gainful discretionary commitment, India is still extremely watchful in issues identifying with China. Both New Delhi and Beijing are still especially worried about the essential adjust of intensity contemplations, albeit both deny this suggestion authoritatively. While conveying a discourse at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, the Indian Foreign Secretary, Shri Vijay Gokhale, as of late announced that the hypotheses of "adjust of intensity" or "irreconcilable circumstance" are "obsolete in the present quick rising progression of Asia's journey for peace and thriving and its interconnectedness". He additionally attested that "India and China, as two mainland measured economies and political substances, are too huge to contain each other or be contained by some other nation". (Raman B, 2007, 85-260). All things considered, the Government of India's 2006 Ministry of Defense Annual Report comments that "China's military modernization, with proceeded with twofold digit development with all due respect spending plan for over 10 years, as likewise improvement of framework in

the India-China fringe regions, keeps on being checked". Besides "close guard trades and atomic and rocket collaboration amongst China and Pakistan keep on eliciting concern". So far as the two nations are centered more around local monetary improvement, focusing on the positive and playing down the negative, this has been the characterizing highlight of India-China relations as of late. A standout amongst the most exceptional late improvements in India-China ties is the quick increment in two-sided exchange. It outperformed US\$17.4 billion of every 2005-06. In the ongoing years, it has developed at a normal rate of in excess of 55 percent for each year. Persuaded by these patterns, both have opened a notable exchange course at Nathula in Sikkim that had been shut since 1962. This open door has more political significance than exchange. Sikkim was incorporated with India in 1975. This demonstration was repudiated by China, which made a case for Sikkim. With this opening, the topic of Sikkim being reported as a piece of India is presently for all time developed.

Most analysts began trusting that the Asian landmass turned into the new focus of gravity in worldwide governmental issues. (Tellis, 2005, 47-180). In a creating Asian monetary and security engineering, most Asian nations look towards China or India for future financial and security arrangements. The U.S., as a monetary and military superpower, might likewise want to assume a critical part in this advancing circumstance. India, in Central Asia is relied upon to assume its part as a balancer in the scenery of expanding Chinese predominance and declining Russian nearness. "India would need to convey to manage its quickly expanding political, monetary and military capacities to the table as a limit incredible power with imperative stakes in the area" in an expediently creating circumstance. (Kak, 2006, 220-260). Be that as it may, how arrangements will happen in Central Asia is as yet an unanswered inquiry.

A basic direct political rationale of authenticity, with its capacity adjusts and security difficulties would anticipate the appearance of a Washington-New Delhi-Jakarta-Hanoi-Tokyo hub with regards to a rising China and endeavors by the U.S. to contain it. (Sahni, 2005, 50-110). This is an unnerving situation for Chinese strategists. China can do everything conceivable to maintain a strategic distance from this circumstance, including pleasing some Indian security and financial concerns. With a quickly expanding exchange and monetary association with India, China may likewise attempt to construct organizations in different territories. Both have declared their goals of participation in oil and gas biddings. India's prior Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyer

likewise grasped the possibility of Asian territorial collaboration in Energy and started a discussion between vital Asian providers (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Iran, Qatar, Oman) with essential Asian purchasers (India, China, Japan, Korea). This diligent work demonstrated a few outcomes when China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) mounted an effective US\$573 million joint offer to get Petro-Canada's 37 percent stake in the al-Furat oil and gas fields in Syria. (Basu, 2006, 78-120). They prior filled in as joint administrators in Sudan. New Delhi and Beijing might participate in different regions, however with regards to Central Asian Energy, the race is savage. This was obviously shown in late 2005 when China outbid India to get PetroKazakhstan, Kazakhstan's third-biggest oil maker with CNPC raising its offer to US\$4.18-billion.

It is additionally possible to contend that an elective pivot going through Tehran-New Delhi-Kuala Lumpur-Beijing could be conformed to Asian union. (Sahni, 2005,152-170). In the Central Asian setting, a few researchers in India have convincingly contended that endeavors by the U.S. to sidestep Russia, Iran and China for travel of Caspian oil to universal markets “(like the Baku Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline)” could put in danger the Energy security of India and China. Along these lines, they contend that India, China and Iran "need to advance different systems for security and monetary collaboration in Central Asia, including trilateral structure including the three". (Patnaik, 2005, 13-17).

The ongoing U.S. move to amass nations of Central and South Asia under another authority in the State Department has added new component to India-Central Asia relations. It is an endeavor by the U.S. to move the Central Asian region far from the Chinese and Russian circle and convey them closer to South Asian nations, at an exceptionally essential level. This likewise fits in with the promising Indo-U.S. ties. As per U.S. approach hovers, the best in class new organization amongst Washington and New Delhi will be bound by numerous normal interests, which incorporates "keeping Asia from being overwhelmed by any single power that has the ability to swarm out others and which may utilize forceful affirmation of national self enthusiasm to undermine American nearness, American collusions, and American ties with the provincial states". (Ashley, 2006, 7). So for them, the U.S. strategy of building up another worldwide association with India speaks to a thought about exertion at 'forming' the rising Asian condition to suit American interests in the twenty-first century.

On the other hand, the suggestion of interfacing Central and South Asian regions must be appealing to Central Asians in the event that they have guide access to the quickly developing Indian market. This can happen just if Afghanistan settles and Pakistan gives guide affirmation of Central Asian products to India and the other way around. Afghanistan's on-going adjustment from a fizzled into a practical just state with a market economy could encourage this linkage. From the responsibilities of the worldwide network and multilateral establishments, obviously a huge push to reproduce Afghanistan's vehicle system and economy is in progress. The Asian Development Bank is as of now chipping away at numerous plans to enhance institutional and also infrastructural improvement in the region. (Starr, 2005, 45-60).

Despite the recent Taliban renaissance in the South, Afghanistan will bounce back much quickly because of the desire for peace and the entrepreneurial spirit of its population.

Keeping in mind certain intense circumstances, India's significant activity in the area has been building the North-South exchange passage. This is being developed in participation with Russia and Iran. (Clear, 2006). While this activity will speed the stream of merchandise, particularly Energy, from Central Asia to India by means of Iran, the briefest course from India to the region is through Pakistan. This is right now the significant test for the U.S. organization, as advancement of territorial participation amongst Central and South Asia is currently their recognized target. This is likewise essential for the renewal of Afghanistan's economy.

These improvements point toward India's developing future part and arrangements in Central Asia which will be dictated by the activities of the U.S. what's more, China and their military inclusion with Pakistan. On the off chance that the U.S. can't leave its effect on Pakistan for disassembling fear monger framework and encouraging travel offices, and China keeps on having close guard, atomic and rocket participation with Pakistan, India will have no choice however to work intimately with Russia and Iran rather to add worth to its two-sided relations in Central Asia. There are no signs of the breaking down of the China Pakistan relations sooner rather than later. At the point when the Indian Parliament, truth be told, was debating the India-U.S. atomic arrangement, China consented to two resistance arrangements with Pakistan.

China, on the other hand, is additionally ready to propel its quality in Afghanistan through guide and different ventures. In the event that Pakistan can marshal significant impact in Afghanistan,

at that point triangular Pakistan-Afghanistan-China collaboration is additionally another open door in the estimate.

THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO) AND INDIA. As far back as the foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, India isn't sure about what level of need this association should get. It gives an unpretentious adjust in the new geopolitical circumstance to China, Russia and the Central Asian States. Albeit Central Asians maintained India's capability to be a countervailing factor, India was never featured in this harmony. The real destinations of the SCO have been foreseen as advancing trans-outskirt peace, security and counter-psychological warfare. With the raising profile of the association, China's part is likewise winding up substantial inside the Central Asian States. India demonstrated enthusiasm for the SCO at first, however the impression is that China never extremely needed India in the gathering. India was invited as an onlooker in the SCO just on the condition when China was likewise conceded in SAARC as an eyewitness. Adding to it, China additionally carried Pakistan into the gathering. Be that as it may, India and Pakistan joined as the full individuals from the SCO on June 9, 2017 at a summit in Astana, Kazakhstan.

India has a positive knowledge of the capability of the SCO as a gadget for advancing provincial financial coordination, exchange and guaranteeing Energy security. In any case, it has numerous reservations over the political heading of the SCO. Indeed, even with the principle goal of battling fear mongering, it would be an unpleasant position for India if the Dalai Lama and his adherents, individuals from the Falungong and individuals requesting honest to goodness law based rights in Central Asian Republics were clubbed together as psychological militants/separatists/radicals. India will think that its extreme to process these elucidations when it is likewise a key supporter of the UN Democracy Fund, whose reason for existing is to help democratization all through the world.

The motivation behind multilateral relations, in addition, as frequently raised by China, is continually being utilized to counter the U.S. impact in Asia-Pacific. When its relations with the U.S. are relentlessly pushing ahead, India is cautious with its cooperation in the gathering.

In the absence of any other dynamic organization, India has participated in the SCO to improve its presence in the Central Asian States. It is also likely to strengthen Russian position in the SCO.

CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSION

Post-independence, the economic conditions of the CAS have seen a dramatic change. The region was already economically under-developed in the Soviet Union and after disintegration the economic condition went from bad to worse. The population was heavily dependent upon the industries and the agriculture supply from the mainland, which got reduced post 1990. The slow growth and the high inflation rates made CAS realize that they needed to enter strategic alliances among themselves and with the other nations of the world. The CAS understood that in the uncertain international relations of the 21st century they needed to develop regional cooperation and integration among themselves to secure peace and security which is essential for economic growth and development and also to keep negotiations at their advantage. The CAS focused on the processes of regionalization, nation building and globalization. Many parts of the world either directly or through their organizations started to gain their footholds by developing political, social and economic regional organizations like Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and European Union (EU) and others. At the same time the CAS formed new bilateral and multilateral relations with each other as well as other parts of the world.

Although Russia, United States of America (USA) and China has declared their complete support to the CAS for development and peace, but there are few contradictions. Russia, which had a long-term control over the region in the past, still considers the region under its influence and is reluctant to see the presence of other international players in the CAS like China. With the increasing footprints in the region, China is also looking to have more control in the region and is not open to the US presence in the region. The US, also, maintains a very strong military presence in this region because of its geographical location. The CAS share their borders with the troubled regions like Afghanistan, Iran and also are in close proximity to the countries like Syria which are facing problems from Islamic radical groups. Both Russia and China are concerned with the possibility of growing extremism in the region. For China the region is closer to Xinjiang. Russia also sees this region as a buffer zone between itself and the terrorism infested countries. This has put both Russia and China in an uncomfortable position.

Russia's relationship with Central Asia goes back to the 18th century when the Tsarist Empire slowly but gradually extended its empire southwards via Kazakhstan into Central Asia. Russia did not care much about Central Asia while in the post-Soviet period but when Putin became

President, the Russian policy towards Central Asia changed rapidly, also highlighting the geostrategic importance of the region. Russia is also keen in the internal stability and security as well as concerns about Islamist extremism and terrorist movements in its near abroad countries. Russia's on-going relations with the Central Asian States reflect the post-Soviet collapse relationship: up and down with longer periods of stability and cooperation.

India, over the years has emerged as a very vital player in the South Asia and Central Asia cooperation. The CAS perceives India as a country where cooperation is possible with notable fewer conditions as compared to NATO, EU and other western countries, which have a very aggressive policy towards the region. One of the major initiatives undertaken by India is on building of North-South trade corridor with the involvement of Russia, CAS and Iran. This corridor will not only increase the speed of transfer of goods especially energy from Central Asia to India and other parts of the world via Iran. The visit of Indian Prime Minister to Tashkent in April 2006 has resulted in signing of seven agreements in which three were on development and transfer of energy and minerals. India had good relations with Russia, Afghanistan and lately has forged closer links with the EU and the United States which is seen as an important input for India-CAS relations. As for their growth CAS needs to have strong bilateral relations among themselves and with other nations of the world as well as with the different organizations like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), OCSE, EU and others. They also need the help of nations like India which has strong relationships with the Central Asian States but also with the other major players/nations and also as a country which will help them protect their interests in the different world organizations.

This study has been an attempt which explored the geo-economic importance of Central Asia. In this respect it was tried to find out the importance of the region for India. The study has been aimed to find out the new opportunities that are available to India in the new emerging scenario especially with reference to Connect Central Asia policy declared in 2012. The CAS has been looked as energy rich region of the world and therefore the focus of the investment has been on the development, procurement and transfer of this energy.

The history of geopolitics and geo-economics is as old as the history of modern civilization, which includes colonization, mercantilism, imperialism or capitalism. The economic theories have also played a powerful role in shaping the geopolitical aspirations and domination of the

nations. Political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo in their works have advocated the notion that countries should keep their domination on account of their specialized production.

This geopolitical expansion post 1950s was influenced by the cold war politics between the socialist and capitalistic economies. The countries during this period were taking either sides to seek favorism from either USA or USSR (the two ends of the cold war era). These two nations asserted their legitimacy of their military interventions in any part of the world where according to them their interests are being harmed. This included especially those regions or interests which were rich in natural resources and were considered vital for the expansion of them and world capitalism or socialism accordingly. The idea was to provide generous aids and grants to the third world to ensure that they have consistent economic domination over these underdeveloped countries. But with the emergence of the globalization phase these nations have seen a paradigm shift in their relationships which are more articulate and cooperative in this new geopolitical system. It resulted into the development of the new macro regions, which comprises of the central hub region and the periphery region. This also led to the phenomenon of strengthening or regionalization tendency by changing the economic relationships. In 1970s it was also fuelled by the growing economies of the other nations which was higher than that of the developed countries, this gave them a confidence that they will be better placed to work together and attain better growth rates if they are able to form their regional alliances. This led to the opening up of the local markets which were earlier working under the policies of protectionism by eliminating custom barriers, percentage on the ownership of the project, return of investment among other, with an idea of increasing productivity and making domestic markets more accessible and competitive. This trend was seen in the countries of Europe, South Asia, South East Asia, Latin America and breakaway nations of former USSR. This expansion in the foreign investment also led to the development of the new thought, which developed as Geo-economy. The underlying idea was to have cooperation between the nations which are somewhere similar in development levels and are able to complement each other in their acquirement of development and growth.

This resulted into the understanding that the new national politics is now intended on supporting their country's businesses (businesses operating in their own territories) and to make their own system's more competitive and conducive making it more and more attractive for investments. It

also works on the strategic dimensions of company expansions that go beyond their frontiers and political control. Further many authors have argued that economic behavior of the nations cannot be delinked from the geographical differentiation of markets and competitive advantages.

The new trends and patterns in Central Asia emerged after the collapse of bipolar system as the century old two power blocks changed because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This resulted into sudden availability of the Central Asia States along with its resources to the world. Mackinder in his geopolitical theory also called Central Asia as the Heartland of the world politics. This region has always been a major attraction for the West which was initially dominated by the Britain and Russia for their expansionist policies. Central Asia has also been important for Britain and Russia as its location on the crossroads of different civilizations on the ancient silk route. So it was long realized that to control this old trade route and become an influential power player in terms of both economic as well as political dominance on by controlling this region.

Central Asia has confronted impressive political, social, social changes in the entire time frame twentieth century and the start of 21st century saw the beginning of new geopolitical changes and flow of global relations in Central Asia. There are numerous elements, which make Central Asia an essential area on the planet field. Among them is initially, the accessibility of rich Energy assets in Central Asia and the Caspian region, furthermore, geopolitical area of Central Asian among such territorial powers as Russia, China, India, Iran and exceedingly enthusiasm of US, and other significant global on-screen characters and thirdly, issue of Afghanistan, can likewise be viewed as a wellspring of conceivable dangers to neighboring nations and different nations of the world on account of the illicit medication generation, trafficking and fear mongering. All these and different components have empowered provincial and worldwide players for to contend in Central Asia in the post-Cold War period. Subsequently, post-Soviet Central Asia is imperative for the geopolitical interests of the major and provincial powers and significant universal associations and establishments like the UN, NATO and OSCE. From a vital point of view, the Western nations have been joining an expanded significance to Central Asia's Central area at the intersection of Eurasia. There are a few specialists saying that it is the arrival of the Great Game of 19 century, however with the new players.

The Central Asia States are seen as a prime investment location by the developed as well as

developing nations of the world. The Central Asia States have always been rich in terms of oil and natural gas but being a part of the USSR its resources were under the monopolistic control of erstwhile Soviet Republic. The Central Asian States possess the largest known natural gas reserves, along with the second largest coal reserves, and the eighth largest oil reserves; the world fourth largest electricity producer and is seen as the one of the biggest provider of all the world's energy needs in the coming years (Kazakhstan is rich in oil and natural gas; Kyrgyzstan is rich in coal and uranium; Tajikistan has abundant resources of hydropower and gold; Turkmenistan is rich in natural gas and oil; and Uzbekistan has ample resources of oil, natural gas and metals like copper, gold, tungsten and uranium). The region is also seen as a growing market for all the secondary goods being produced elsewhere in the world.

Countries like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia Region produce significant volumes of oil and natural gas and export it to various nations (Russia, China). These nations which were significantly dependent upon Russia for sale or export of their hydrocarbons are now forging new ventures like a pipeline build by China linking Kazakhstan to its Xinjiang area or Turkmenistan-China to be used for their export of oil and gas to other parts of the world. The availability of this natural resource has made this region an attractive destination for the international states and investors (both individual and institutional). The surplus reserves of natural gas and petroleum as well as the strategic location of these countries have provided a major geostrategic and geo-economic advantage to the region.

This has also resulted in a theory and believes that the security of Central Asia region largely relies on the economic progress and development of countries in the area. This thought is completely different from the conventional security belief. This means that there is a strong combination between the regional and international economies. Independence of Central Asia countries have provided them with the opportunity and access to the world markets. This region with its huge natural energy resources has catapulted itself into a position to negotiate and enter into different types of economic cooperation on the ground of political agreements and infrastructure.

The geo-economic dimension of Central Asian States revolves around the energy reserves of the region. The idea is to gain control of these energy options to secure future needs. The players are linking these energy sources with their interests and strategic policies. The Central Asian States

(CAS) are formulating their strategies to find their own place or create a niche in the world politics. Two factors are important in this dimension. These are energy reserves and the location of the region. Central Asian states are focusing these factors to enhance their importance. The CAS is a landlocked region in the Eurasia, which basically lacks clear definition or demarcations. The historical records of this whole landmass were known as Turkestan and comprised of a region beginning from the south of Siberia and has a region running till Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also includes the Caspian Sea, areas of inner China, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and the former Soviet Union.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought this region into the frontline, which comprises of five states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with a total area of four million square kilometers approximately. This region shares its borders with countries like Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan. What has made this region vastly important for the whole world are the significant energy reserves in the Caspian Sea Basin and in the Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. These reserves are changing the region's importance from geopolitics to geo-economics. This region was totally dependent on the former Soviet Union for trade and business; therefore, after disintegration in 1991, their infrastructure was not sufficient for these nations to explore the reserves and benefit from the opportunities of accessing the world markets. The disintegration, which has its own problems, but it also brought opportunities as the vast energy reserves were free from the Soviet control so these countries were free to trade and also gave an opportunity to other nations of the world to use these resources for their need. This resulted in many capital-rich countries to invest their money directly or through corporations of their countries. This resulted in the increase in the GDP of these nations and also a decline in the inflation among Central Asian States.

The era after 1991 has seen a substantial growth in the presence of international oil companies and also infrastructure for the exploration of oil and gas in the various regions of the Central Asia. Not only hosting the second largest energy reserves but this region also has abundant resources of metals like gold, silver, uranium, magnesium and aluminum etc. Therefore, Central Asia became a center of strategic importance for countries like Russia, China and some Trans-regional powers like the USA. The region enjoys close proximity with the regional powers as well as the important countries which are now a day's center of strategic and security interests. These are

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The location and the battle for interests among the involved powers in the region makes it strategic pivot.

The nations like Russia, US, China and India are now the keen players in the CAS for various reasons. Russia has been an important link for transfer of oil and natural gas as the pipelines were connected to the Russia before the establishment of new trade routes and pipelines. These existing pipelines were being used by the many western companies as the transfer fee is much less than the cost involved in constructing new ones. Hydrocarbons remain an important factor for the consideration for the Russia as it wants to gain control over the energy resources as its own resources are getting used and also there is stiff competition from US and China. Growth of US military presence and upper hand gained by China in the region has made the Russia considers options like building a strong economic and security relations like Eurasia Economic Union (EEU) with the CAS. Russia also looks at CAS as a buffer zone between itself and troubled south against extremism and drug trafficking. Russia does have a strong military presence in CAS as it has military bases in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2015 Russia proposed setting up joint strike force to secure CAS borders with south.

Similarly US has made major investment in the Caspian Sea region and especially in the CAS in terms of technology transfer for the development of oil fields thus improving its relationships with the countries of the region. US have also invested in the pipeline structure to transfer oil and natural gas. The underlying fact for US is that it wants to reduce the Russian influence in the region. Just like Russia, US is too eyeing this region to act as a logistic base for its fight against terror especially post 9/11. Although US has considerably decreased its military footprint in the region as it is withdrawing from the Afghanistan it is rethinking its policy for the CAS which is more economic with Afghanistan as a major factor in it. US has started project like CASA-1000, which is electricity transmission line responsible for transferring electricity from CAS to power starved Afghanistan and Pakistan. US has also strongly supported TAPI gas pipeline. To strengthen its presence in the region post US led NATO forces from Afghanistan, the US has developed initiatives like C5+1 which will bring together the foreign minister of the CAS region and the US to work and cooperate in the areas of regional Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies & trade, climate change, water management, and education exchanges.

One country that has made its presence felt in the CAS is China. It has benefited immensely on the expense of Russia whose trade with the region has gone down considerably. China's interest with the CAS is economic, security and energy. China's economic initiatives like One Belt One Road (OBOR) started in 2013 is to improve its linkages with eastern, western and southern Asia. China also wants to see stable Central Asia as it borders Xinjiang region, which has seen Uyghar separatist movement. The energy demand in China has seen tremendous increase over the years. To fulfill this China need to explore new supply areas and CAS being energy rich and geographical location became the first choice. China has invested heavily in the energy infrastructure in Central Asia. China is ranked number one in the trade with CAS with estimated volume of \$50 billion in 2015.

India is also looking at the CAS as a major trading hub for itself. Similar to China it is actively involved in the energy resources of Central Asia. India is building pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan (TAPI) to have an alternative supply route for oil. India's engagement with CAS has seen a positive growth over the years. India was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the countries of the region. The initial relations were based more upon capacity building, knowledge and technology transfer, medicines and pharmaceuticals, cultural similarities, Sufism and Mughal connections. In 2012, India announced a new policy of 'Connect Central Asia' to boost trade between itself and CAS which was much below its potential and also decided to hold Track II dialogue every year in one of the CAS for development of trade and cordial relations. Further, India in its extended neighborhood policy is looking to develop its trade relations with the region. India with its strong economic growth is looking to develop better transport corridors to transfer energy from the region. This includes not only Central Asian Countries but also Afghanistan and Iran. India is also engaging with Shanghai Corporation Organisation (SCO) and Russia led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to improve its economic engagement with the region. The trade between India and the region has reached \$2 billion which has doubled in last few years. Not only hydrocarbons India is trading in sectors like agriculture, IT, space research and pharmaceuticals. The nations are further exploring options in transportation, telecommunications, petrochemicals, commercial farming, food processing, mining sector and real estate. Initiative like International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which will reduce the transportation cost by 30 percent and distance by 40 percent and development of Chabahar port in Iran which will provide direct access to CAS to

Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The transition economies of Central Asia have experienced substantial growth in their financial sectors this resulted in opening themselves to more international finance. Financial sector especially banking sector in Central Asian States have seen essential improvements since the nations had begun building market economies. Rising second level banks first serving enormous modern and exchange ventures' and later likewise begun to give money related administrations to family units and growing little and medium organizations. They had turned into an imperative stage being developed of nearby monetary markets. In any case, it is likewise vital to take note of that monetary segments are essentially spoken to by the managing an account organizations and different sorts of money related delegates are still little and involve an exceptionally minor offer of the budgetary markets. Managing an account resources constitute the real piece of the money related resources in Central Asian economies. This implies that another potential area for Indian investment is banking and financial services. Many Indian business houses that are doing business in Central Asia often complain about the lack of Indian banks in the region. There is only one subsidiary of Punjab Nation Bank Ltd. is present in Kazakhstan. So there exists an opportunity not only in the energy sectors (presence of ONGC Videsh Limited in Satpayev) but it also in other ancillary services like banking, pharmaceuticals (Indian medicines are known worldwide), construction, engineering consultancy, market research, management services, software development, mining processes, tourism and health.

The present study 'Geo Economic Importance of Central Asia: Implications for India' has focused on the importance of the region especially after 1991. It has also looked into how the five countries namely Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan post-independence have build up strategic and economic relationships not among themselves but also with the rest of the world. The study has been attempted to look into the various alliances that have been made by these five countries with the other countries in the region as well as the world and how much has it contributed towards the growth of the region.

The study has also concerned with the available energy resources in the CAS and how has it shaped its relations with other nations. The region has ample energy resources not only in terms of hydrocarbons but also in terms of hydroelectric power. This has led to investment being made by countries like Russia, China, India and EU to make massive investments in acquiring these

resources as well as in building transport corridors either as pipelines or road network. This has given a massive bargaining power to the CAS in terms of their choice of doing business with the interested nations. The study has also taken into consideration how this investment in the region's energy resources has changed the market dynamics of the countries in question. The added money in terms of investments either as FDI or through FII ultimately gets passed to the common population as direct income or indirect benefits. The study is an attempt which has looked into how it has increased overall buying capacity of the population and the CAS as the new market for the world to sell their products and services.

Another focus of the study is India's engagement with the CAS. India has been among the first nations to recognize the region and also establish its diplomatic relations. But after a slow start the relationship has seen a big push in terms of trade, establishment of transport corridors and pipelines, energy development and development of industries in the region. India sees CAS as its extended neighborhood and there are not only economic reasons but also strategic reasons for India to maintain good relations with CAS.

Thus, the hypotheses was tested that Economy is the chief reason behind the presence of the external players in Central Asia and secondly, that the lack of trade routes is one of the major factors that is adversely affecting India's trade relations with the Central Asian States.

The methodology for the dissertation is based on the primary sources and secondary sources. This work is aimed at knowing the various projects being undertaken by the foreign countries either directly or through their corporates in the region and the various impacts that it has made on the region. The study has also looked into the relationship between the countries of the Central Asia and how they are negotiating with the other players. It has also taken into account the improvements and progress that has happened in the overall lifestyles of the general population. Primary sources also include government records, policy statements and publications, reports from various international organizations, etc.

The dissertation is also supported by the secondary sources like books, articles, magazines, newspaper reports, etc. and their interpretation making the research questions amply clear. It is analytical in nature defining the approaches forwarded so far on the related topic. Variables are refined and all efforts for their explanatory sustenance were made. Internet sources and the documents from relevant websites are also be used.

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