CANADA'S DEFENCE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., POST-9/11

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled **"Canada's Defence Relations with the U.S., Post-9/11"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Abbreviations

ACURL	Australia-Canada-United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory
AGF	Arctic Group of Forces (AGF
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANR	Alaskan NORAD Region
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AOPS	Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ASM	Air-to-Surface Missile
ASCM	Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
AZRF	Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
BMDR	Ballistic Missile Defense Review
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CANR	Canadian NORAD Region
CANSOFCOM	Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CJOC	Canadian Joint Operations Command
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CONR	Continental U.S. NORAD Region
CUSFTA	Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DDA	District Development Assembly
DDC	District Development Committees
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DND	Department of National Defence
DoE	Department of Education
DoPH	Department of Public Health
DST	District Stabilisation Team
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FOL	Forward Operating Locations

GAO	General Accountability Office
GBI	Ground-Based Interceptors
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INS	Inertial Navigation System
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ITW/AA	Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
KAF	Kandahar Airfield
KPRT	Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team
LACM	Land Attack Cruise Missile
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MAU	Military Advisory Unit
MCC	Military Cooperation Committee
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MLO	Military Liaison Officers
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRBM	Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MTOG	Maritime Tactical Operations Group
NA	Northern Alliance
NAADM	North American Air Defence Modernisation
NABDP	National Area-Base Development Programme
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
NWP	Northwest Passage
NWS	North Warning System
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom

OMLT	Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence
PM	Prime Minister
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
RC	Regional Commands
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RC-S	Regional Command-South
SDD	System Development and Demonstration
SFOR	Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPP	Security and Prosperity Partnership
SRBM	Short-Range Ballistic Missile
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
SU	Soviet Union
TFK	Task Force Kandahar
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UK	United Kingdom
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
U.S.	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
WHTI	Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
WoG	Whole-of-Government

Preface

This doctoral monograph studies the various dimensions and dilemmas in the defence relations between Canada and the United States (U.S.) and the several conundrums for Canadian defence and for Canada-U.S. defence relations. This study has described the Canadian strategic culture; the question of the size of its armed forces; the perennial debate on ever-shrinking defence outlays; and imperatives and level of defence modernisation. It discusses the defence policy outlook of Canada; the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF); the structure of defence; and three principal Canadian defence aims. 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. territory are said to produce many repercussions for Canada-U.S. defence and security relationship. The 'interdependence-sovereignty syndrome' remains an intractable issue for Canada.

The study discusses and delineates the changed Canadian role in continental defence post 9/11 with the creation of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). Moreover, raises the issue of relevance and revamping of North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). The Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and the new continental defence paradigm are the other overarching themes under the doctoral monograph. Meanwhile, the issues hampering the decision over the procurement of Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to replace ageing CF-18 Hornets of Canada have also been discussed.

The doctoral thesis further deals with defence-related cooperation and conflict in the Arctic region. Various aspects of Canada's participation in Afghanistan have also been studied. The war in Afghanistan has brought to the fore several aspects of the Canadian defence perception, policy and preparedness. It became the largest deployment of CAF personnel since the Second World War.

Post-9/11, the transformed and scaled-up core missions demand that the CAF be highly deployable, capable of being sustained at a great distance and interoperable with the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. This doctoral monograph concludes that the Canadian need to be well equipped and ever-ready requires a serious highest level of investment in the defence relations of Canada-U.S. Because the Canadian military is very small to make any crucial contribution to the common continental

defence, a flexible, ever-ready, highly capable and effective military with the willingness to closely operate with U.S. forces, and investment in war-fighting capabilities are what is required by Canada. The defence of Canada is as overarching as its ability to act militarily elsewhere in the world. Foremost, the perceived Canadian national interests need to be defended by Canada itself.

CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION

This doctoral monograph deals with the various dimensions and dilemmas in the defence relations between the two North American neighbours, namely Canada and the United States (U.S.) No gainsaying, the two share the unique and most intimate bilateral relationship in the world that spans culture, commerce, defence, security, economic development and cross-border movement of large populations. As for the defence dimension of the bilateral ties, this includes, to name just a few, border security, shared continental defence, counter-terrorism, cross-border intelligence, defence procurement, joint training exercises, overseas military deployments, interoperability under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). The defence ties are buttressed by the facts that the two countries share a common cultural, historical and political heritage as well as over 5,525 miles of a shared border – which is, so-to-say, the world's longest undefended and porous border. Besides, very importantly, there is a very deep interdependence that binds the two economies together. All these varied factors impinge on their defence and security perceptions and ties.

The defence dilemmas and dimensions got particularly accentuated and assumed a new strategic dimension in the wake of the terrorist events that took place in the U.S. on 9 September 2001. Normally referred to as 9/11, the unprecedented incident occurred as 19 terrorists related to the Al-Qaeda terrorist group, led by Osama bin Laden, hijacked several passenger planes and crashed them in the World Trade Centre, New York and other places in the U.S. Bin Laden, along with his group members, had planned the four coordinated terrorist attacks on the U.S. soil from Afghanistan under the protection of Taliban regime – the Islamist organisation that governed the land-locked South Asian country.

The 9/11 events in the immediate heightened the security concerns of the borders. In the years since 9/11, management of the border has become a perennial concern for policymakers as well as major stakeholders both in Canada and the U.S. The terrorist attacks had also demonstrated the unprecedented non-traditional security threats posed by non-state actors to the two North American countries.

For Canada, 9/11 was a testing incident. While bilateral defence ties have since undergone some major transformations, in the immediate the major test for Canada came a day after 9/11. The 9/12 tested Canada's defence preparedness and its ability to undertake emergency measures; besides, the very foundation of its bilateral defence relations came under close U.S. scrutiny. The world's longest undefended border was shut, and so was the U.S. airspace. Thousands of air flights destined to the U.S., with several hundred thousand passengers, were diverted to Canadian airports. It was a challenge for Canada and for its relations with the U.S. to muster required relief and logical resources to manage thousands of aeroplanes land at its various airports and feed and house several hundred thousand passengers stranded for days thereafter. Expectedly, the terrorist attacks brought into picture the trans-Atlantic military alliance. The NATO was quick in invoking Article 5 on 12 September 2001 for the first time in its history. The said article pertained to the collective defence principle of the alliance viz., "attack on one is an attack on all".

As the very issue has been dealt with in detail in the third Chapter of the present doctoral monograph, suffice to say here is that 9/11 produced a continent-wide security upheaval: the incidents interrupted the continental economic integration process; issues of sovereignty and border security re-emerged in the national political agenda of the two countries; defence and security gained priority over all else as the U.S. began going unilateral in adopting defence and security measures; and it blamed Canada for many things including for laxity on the porous borders. In nutshell, 9/11 led to security transformation of the continent. On the one hand, it called for intense cooperation between the two North American partners and, on the other hand, produced political tension related to national sovereignty and domestic matters. Canada was roundly criticised for its slack immigration and refugee policies and for its inability to properly guard the borders. Canada resented the overbearing security measures that came to be adopted by the U.S. immediately after 9/11.

9/11 produced many conundrums for Canadian defence and for Canada-U.S. defence relations. A core issue that emerged in the immediate aftermath was how to reconcile the economic interdependence of both with the imperative of "national security" and territorial protection. The 'interdependence-sovereignty syndrome' remains an intractable issue between the two countries. Many of the defence-related conundrums actually deepened after 9/11. Issues related to an enlarged and now "real" security threat, enhancement of national defence capability and coordination with the U.S., and alignment and adjustment with new defence and security measures and responsibilities came to face Canada

Deep interdependence has been a reality between the two North American countries. The 1989 bilateral Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the 1994 trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are affirmations of the reality of manifold interdependence between the two North American countries (Burney and Hampson 2014: 21; and James and James 2014: 190). 9/11 interrupted the process of North Americanisation of the three economies (including Canada, the U.S. and Mexico). The U.S. became highly sensitive to the security dimension sidelining the integration process. U.S. President George W. Bush was candid: "security trumps trade". It meant that Canadian-U.S. relations slipped back and security threats emerged as the main focus. Immediately thereafter the U.S. took a series of security steps: for instance, the 2004 *U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act* required everyone entering the U.S. (including the U.S. citizens) to show their passports or other crucial documents. Since 2008, a new documentation requirement, the *Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative* (WHTI) has also been in place. Thus, the core question that emerged in the immediate aftermath was how to reconcile the economic interdependence of both with the imperative of "national security" and territorial protection. An understanding and analysis of the interface of interdependence-sovereignty are main objectives of the doctoral thesis.

As for the overall Canadian defence policy, two phases have been noted by Justin Massie (2014): in the years immediately after 9/11, a hybrid position came into view as the Canadian government did some balancing against the U.S. interests while simultaneously "band-wagoning" with the U.S. It was a case of "soft balancing" on one hand and "band-wagoning" on the other. The second phase has begun in the more

recent years: Canada is now clearly aligned with the U.S., along with its support for military procurement and deployment. A convergence with the U.S. security and defence policy has been attained by Canada.

Philippe Lagassé (2014) makes an interesting argument at this juncture. He says that in the decade following 9/11, cooperation between the U.S. and Canada was extensive on border security and counter-terrorism; however, in the area of bilateral defence, both countries failed in obtaining "full cooperation" despite the fact that defence cooperation had intensified after 9/11. One of the reasons given by Lagassé is that due to domestic politics and other reasons, the government of Canada does not take much interest in intertwining the Canadian defence with the U.S. goals. Its primary interest in the decade since 9/11 has been to keep trade flowing across the border. The idea of deeper bilateral defence architecture seems unattractive to Canada. Now, this is a complex study area where further light has been shed in the forthcoming Chapters.

Review of Literature

The following broad themes are dealt with in the available literature.

Canadian Defence Conundrum:

Since the end of the Second World War, the Canadian defence, in terms of policies and thought processes, has been a matter of three expanding concentric circles: defence of Canada, defence of North America, and meeting international security threats at their source before they knock on the Canadian shores. These three core missions demand that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) be highly deployable, be capable of being sustained at a great distance and be interoperable with the U.S. and the NATO allies.

The conundrum of Canadian defence has precisely been this: the strategic culture of Canada, the size of its armed forces, defence spending and the level of defence modernisation – all indicate that Canada has never been up to the task. And this capacity gap between Canada and the U.S. seems to be only expanding with time. Besides, Canada faces complex and very specific defence and security challenges,

given its geography, demography, economy and geopolitics. A brief analysis is in order.

Canada is the second largest country with the largest coastline. In terms of population, the country ranks 38th and almost 90 per cent of them reside within 160 kilometres (km) area of the Canadian-U.S. border. Canada is generally regarded as a nation of "strategic distances", with a distance of over 5000 km from coast to coast. With 5,525 miles, the Canadian-U.S. border is the longest in the world. Moreover, Canada consists of 40 per cent of the Arctic region, where Russia becomes one of the close neighbours of Canada, which is very sparsely and extensively scattered where only less than 0.4 per cent of people reside. The 80 per cent of the Canadian population is urban and over 50 per cent of it remains reduced to only five metropolitan Canadian regions from Victoria to St. Johns. It brings to light the defence problem pegged with the challenges of great sovereignty enforcement. It is often said that Canada is "indefensible".

For much of its history, Canada has been protected by the vast oceans on two sides. In the south, it faces 'geographic fatalism': Canada cannot defend itself against the U.S., and it need not defend itself against anyone else. Canada has never paid a price for being militarily unprepared; it has never been invaded nor has it ever invaded another country. The historical experiences shape contemporary defence perception and policies. Since 9/11, Canada is also covered by the U.S. 'homeland security' measures.

A key issue in the Canadian defence and security policy has been that of resource allocation. The allocated military resources in order to meet defence needs have never been sufficient enough since the Second World War. Canada's allocation for defence has consistently been the lowest among the NATO members since 1960. Participation with allies in military expeditions and to thus meet threats to the Canadian defence and security far away from the Canadian borders and shores have been the crucial part of the strategic culture of Canada for over hundred years. Canada also understands that the country is indefensible without the help of the U.S. and is also indefensible against the U.S. These factors and considerations have consistently favoured the idea of a reduced military spending and reduction in the size of the CAF.

While discussing the Canadian defence conundrum, some crucial questions emerge: Does Canada actually have a defence policy?; and does it need one? If so, is there a 'grand strategy'? It has been argued by some scholars that the problem does not come with the absence of a coherent Canadian foreign policy upon which the armed forces will be built, however with the absence of a defence policy that could provide adequate armed forces for the purpose of the Canadian use in a variety of areas, such as domestic, international, and humanitarian missions. With no clear defence goals in mind, it is also not clear where and what military capabilities are required and/or would be appropriate? Without such capabilities, future missions in any policy fields are meant to be failed.

Another issue is that the Canadian political culture and public opinion have never liked the idea of a militarily strong nation. Public opinion prefers "butter over guns". In times of fiscal deficit and recession, defence budgets regularly see cuts; often to meet other spending priorities such as on health and education. The popular perception is also generally against overseas military involvements. Canadians assume that their domestic space is inviolable from any interior or exterior military threat; there is also a widespread belief in the folly of peacetime military preparedness.

Critics point out that many of the past assumptions and arguments may no more be workable in the changed conditions of past two-three decades. It needs to be stressed that technology and the forces of globalisation make Canada no more "indefensible". The "strategic distances" have disappeared. It is believed that today Canada needs to be militarily well prepared to defend itself and interests. The changed circumstances have made old questions look for fresh answers: how much Canada should spend on defence?; and what should be the size and level of modernisation of its armed forces? It is fine to assume that the U.S. will defend North America, but what would be Canada's contribution in such an eventuality? It is said that Canada spends just enough on defence so as to politely decline U.S. help. Nils Ørvik calls it 'defence-against-help'; a strategy through which even a small-sized country can also unilaterally maintain a sufficient level of defence or in cooperation with a large neighbouring country committed to the safety of smaller one, in order to stay away from "unwanted help" of the large neighbouring country. Perhaps this kind of a

strategic culture is responsible for consistently low spending on defence alongside frequent cuts in allocations; reducing the size of the CAF and poor level of preparedness; and where talks on military modernisations are often cut short.

Canada-U.S. Defence Dilemmas:

The Canada-U.S. defence relationship is known as closest between any two sovereign countries since the Canadian defence has been fully integrated into the wider context of U.S. defence concerns (Bercuson 2003: 121-122). As will be delineated in the third Chapter, for its entire history, Canada has relied on the protective umbrella of a great power – first, Great Britain and, for the last one hundred years or so, the U.S. Canada allied with the U.S. closely after it gained *de facto* independence from Britain in 1931. The Canada-U.S. defence partnership got firmly established in 1940 when U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed a bi-national defence for the continent. The new defence and security arrangement came under the Ogdensburg Agreement. With this, to address the continental defence and security matters, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) was established in August 1940. As a new strategic collaborative partnership, PJBD was a key link between both the countries throughout the period of Second World War. In 1946, the new Joint Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was also formed which maintained the cooperative approach to continental defence after the end of the Second World War (Stancati 2006: 106-107).

Partnership in the multilateral NATO in 1949 and the establishment of the bi-national the NORAD in 1958 institutionalised the defence and security relations between Canada and the U.S. Since then, the various dimensions of the defence relationship between the two North American neighbours have been inter alia, border security, shared continental defence, cross-border intelligence and procurement, joint training exercises, overseas deployments, interoperability under the NATO or NORAD and, counter-terrorism (Holland 2014: 242; Jones 2011: 457).

There are some dilemmas in Canada-U.S. defence relationship. For instance, Canada is often criticised for being a "free-rider" on the military expenditures of the U.S. It is also found to be the 'first follower' of the U.S. in defence and security matters. Almost 4 per cent of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is spent on defence; on the other hand, only 1.0 per cent is spent in Canada (Bercuson 2016: 4; and Furtado

2016). Thus, both the countries have a huge disparity in terms of their military spending as a portion of the country's GDP. It is also argued that Canada may become "militarily irrelevant" since it has a conservative attitude towards the technological transformation of the defence scenario. U.S. culture supports the development and incorporation of technologies in the defence and security sector.

So, the CAF have begun advocating higher expenditure and technological transformation so as to become interoperable with their American counterparts. There are two areas of technological innovations where Canada can be up to the U.S.: (i) Special Operation Forces (which are equipped with highly progressive instruments and weapons); and (ii) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In terms of both cost and versatility, UAVs, or the drones as they are more commonly known, have many advantages in comparison of highly technologically advanced fighter jets. UAVs can be used for surveillance as well as search and rescue operations, or to engage in warfare. It has been observed that in the Canadian quest to maintain interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO allies and achieve technological distinction, space assets are proving increasingly important to the CAF (Holland 2014: 242-243).

Ballistic Missile Defence and the New Continental Defence Paradigm:

This very issue will also be dealt with in detail in the third Chapter. As is known before 9/11, the North American defence was based on the Cold War pattern, responding to strategic bombers or possible missile attacks. Post 9/11, the Canadian role in continental defence changed overnight and expanded from peace-time based one to war-time based. A new "continental defence paradigm" started according to 21st century non-traditional threats that are considered as amorphous, unambiguous and asymmetrical.

The old Canada-U.S. defence and security paradigm had started with the establishment of NORAD; the new paradigm was based on 'homeland security' – in the form of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The U.S. unilateral approach to security gained further strength. In the defence and security relations of both the countries, a clear gap emerged indicating a further shift in political power in favour of U.S. Within U.S., the Department of Defense became more important than the Department of State (Stancati 2006: 104, 108, 112-113). U.S.

pressure on Canada increased immediately after 9/11 in order to beef up the Canadian military for both offshore operations and continental defence (Bercuson 2003: 122-123).

USNORTHCOM, activated in October 2002, was a new U.S.-only military organisation with unique Hemispheric responsibilities. Its creation was historically significant since the newly defined geographic area of defence responsibility that emerged included Canada and Mexico. Its creation revived the national sovereignty concerns of Canada. The Canadian government's main concerns were how the Canada-U.S. defence and security partnership would be affected by USNORTHCOM since its establishment questioned the utility and relevance of NORAD, which was a strategic partnership between the two based on deterrence and a bi-national retaliation to an attack (Paquin and James 2014: 1-2; Stancati 2006: 103, 104, 109). Meanwhile, on 5 December 2002, the Diplomatic Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation between Canada and the U.S. had been signed (Stancati 2006: 110).

While forming the USNORTHCOM, the U.S. had asked Canada to join in but in the absence of a timely response by Canada, U.S. unilaterally went ahead in setting up the command. It is suggested that in the wake of 9/11, the Canadian sense of urgency was not as great, compared to that of the U.S., though intensely sympathetic response had been given by the Canadian government in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. Analysts say that Canada underestimated the seriousness of the American intent. But when the U.S. created USNORTHCOM unilaterally, Canada feared its own exclusion from the continental defence. In sum, Canadian role as a "trusted partner in continental defence" was tested after 9/11 (Stancati 2006: 108-113).

In May 2006, a Canadian initiative resulted in the agreement to aggrandise defence cooperation between Canada and the U.S. Its main goal was to help Canada dealing with the trend of marginalisation that began after Canada failed to join USNORTHCOM. After 2006, the country sought to bridge the defence and security gap and to bolster its own role in the continental defence. In later years, in order to deal with the complicated border security challenges, another initiative known as "Beyond the Border" was launched on 4 February 2011 by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and U.S. President Barack Obama (Holland 2014: 244).

The cornerstone of the new continental defence paradigm is the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. Bush administration proceeded in 2002 for the deployment of a limited missile defence system. Initially, in August 2004, Canada had argued that the bi-national NORAD could provide support to the missile defence system for defence of the continental North. However, in February 2005, PM Paul Martin clearly stated that Canada would not take a direct part in the BMD programme for the defence of the North. However, the U.S. has unilaterally gone ahead with the missile defence project. Ironically, Canada closely supports missile defence within NATO but oddly enough does not accept the same for the defence of the Canadian North. Although, the national security interests of the U.S. do not seem to be threatened by the continued reluctance of Canada to completely accept a BMD function for NORAD; however, Canada has to face the issue of continental strategic defence. Several questions related to the BMD of the continent are germane: whether Canada should be defended under the missile defence system (a U.S. Senate committee report had robustly emphasised this point in 2014) or not? What should be done by Canada with regard to its own air defence that comes under NORAD? It is to be noted that the BMD was originally anticipated to be a wholly NORAD mission before Canadian reluctance to participate. The Canadian refusal to join the BMD had even raised the spectre of the demise of NORAD itself. Canadians have however argued that direct participation in the BMD system is not mandatory for NORAD's continuance. The question of whether Canada should review its stand on BMD is again on the agenda in the ongoing defence review by the Justin Trudeau government. It is suggested that with BMD, Canada will be better protected by NORAD (Jockel and Sokolsky 2015: 190-191, 194-195).

Canada's refusal to join BMD had rested on moral grounds, such as that weaponisation is evil by itself and very much un-Canadian; and that it is very costly for Canada's social comfort. On the other hand, Canada all along also has the comfort that any missile headed towards Canada would anyway be countered by the U.S. (Jones 2011: 458-459).

The issue of BMD had reignited an old debate. Truth is, Canadian defence budget has been slashed by over 20 per cent since 2010 and CAF work with obsolete weapons. In June 2006, equipment purchase of $15 billion had included ships, trucks and aircrafts;

such an announcement to acquire new weapons had come after two decades. Similarly, the 2010 decision to purchase new fighter jets, for perceived military threats in the Arctic, was one of the largest-ever defence acquisition announcement in the Canadian history ($9 billion for the purpose of purchasing and up to $7 billion extra for maintenance) (Holland 2014: 246; Jones 2011: 460).

Defence and Security of the Arctic:

The Arctic region has an increasingly geostrategic importance. It is one of "least-explored" and "least-penetrated" areas of the planet Earth whose legal status is not determined yet (Lackenbauer 2010: 880; Janicki 2012: 87). In general, the Arctic region is known as the North Pole, which covers the 21 million square kilometre area of the planet. In other words, it covers the 6 per cent surface of the planet, the parts of the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean and is located above 66.5° North Latitude of the Earth. It appears like a Circle. The Arctic Circle consists of the North American continent and the edges of Eurasia. It is beleaguered by thick ice and is expansive and tremendously inhospitable region of the Earth.

The Arctic is known as a crucial aspect of the Canada-U.S. defence and security relationship. It is the one not so developed boundary where the defence and security interests of Canada and the U.S. intersect. NORAD, the bi-national institution, has been present for almost sixty years in the Arctic. The Arctic is also considered as the most suitable region for further bi-national cooperation. Both the national operational commands of Canada and the U.S., namely, the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and USNORTHCOM, have mandates for the Arctic region for the very purpose of protection of their sovereign territories (Stephenson 2011: 9; Holland 2014: 245). When NORAD was formed, Canada had wanted NATO to be in-charge of the defence of the North. NATO being a multilateral pact, Canada had hoped to balance its defence ties with the U.S. through the multilateral pact. But that was not to be; whenever it comes to the defence of the North, U.S. always has the sole charge. In 1958, the NORAD agreement was thus signed by the two countries to set up a sequence of radars and others systems in the North for early warning of any Soviet air strike. NORAD established an integrated command structure which provides warnings of an attack on North America directly to both Canadian PM and American President.

In the Arctic region, there are conflicting geopolitical, economic and other interests of Arctic nations. From a geographical-political standpoint, five countries have territorial possession within the region: Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark and the U.S. (Huebert 2003; and Janicki 2012: 88). It is unambiguously made clear by the competition of all of the Arctic nations that the dormant mineral resources under the seabed of the Arctic Ocean are the primary reason behind the countries' attempts to grab the largest possible area of the region. And this is the primary source of conflict between countries (Janicki 2012: 91; and Beauchamp and Huebert 2008). As a consequence, a rapid militarisation, as well as commercialisation, has been taking place.

The Arctic evinces global interest due to its resources, the possibility of commerce via shorter routes, conflicting boundary claims and climate change. To have an unrestricted exploitation right, an extended continental shelf in the Arctic region is also claimed by the countries such as Russia, Canada and Denmark. Interestingly, the U.S. refuses to recognise any territorial claims over any part of the Arctic and argues that Arctic waters are international waters (high sea) open for navigation to all. Worth noting is that the U.S. has not signed or ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), the only document that governs the Arctic in the absence of any other treaty to regulate the region.

Kenneth Holland (2014) observes that by the end of the Cold War as well as because of global warming, the security situation in the Arctic appears to have changed. The Arctic is increasingly becoming more significant to international trade. With a resurgent Russia, a new perceptible threat has emerged to the Arctic and the interests of the U.S. and Canada. The U.S. maintains its missile launch sites in the Arctic due to rising tussle with Russia for the region and other developments like the Ukraine crisis. Critics view Russian resurgence in the Arctic as a sort of 'militarisation'. Interestingly, non-Arctic countries like China also have interests; the Arctic might provide a shorter route to China's North American and European markets at least for three to four months in a year. The absence of any international legal treaty to govern the Arctic is viewed by Scott G. Borgerson (2008) as a primary cause of potential armed conflicts among the countries since they want to grab the largest possible area of the region. It results in claims and counter claims of territorial rights

Canada has the second largest coastline in the Arctic Ocean and has been occupied with asserting its sovereignty over it. Canada claims its sovereignty over the disputed maritime boundary of the Beaufort Sea. Moreover, there is a debate going on with regard to the political standing of the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (Northeast Passage) (McRae 2009; and Janicki 2012: 89). Canada wants the U.S. to agree on the Canadian sovereignty over NWP as well as to resolve the conflicting boundary claim without disturbing their crucial bilateral economic and defence relations. As has been noticed, the geopolitics of the Arctic has changed in view of the climate change and resource potential of the region. The change is calling for a different level of defence and security cooperation between Canada and the U.S. Security of the Arctic has dimensions of both traditional and economic/environmental security. Canada and the U.S., both are engaged in redeveloping their military capabilities in the region. These new military capabilities would be required to meet any military threat as well as to play the role of a constabulary in more normal times.

The Arctic would have other effects on bilateral ties in case Arctic oil and gas become possible. New areas of cooperation and conflict would emerge between the two. The North American pipelines is already a complicated subject between the two; the production and transportation of Arctic oil to North American and/or Asian markets will undoubtedly further stress the relationship. The Arctic is not just climate change and oil and gas; there are also other implications for Canada in terms of food production and availability of water and how the Canadian government in the future would mitigate the worst effects of climate change and resource exploitation in the region.

Since 2008 when the Arctic states agreed to follow the UNCLOS, Canada-U.S. cooperation has perceptibly increased in the North. In the end, Canada has its sovereignty concerns; it desires a stable, rule-based region; and it wants economic growth, environmental protection, livelihood and culture of the indigenous communities. The expanding US military assets in the Arctic might, in fact, be necessary to realise Canadian goals. Arctic is not the likely area of differences and conflict between Canada and the U.S. So far, over the past many decades, both the countries have successfully managed their differences; truth is that the Canadian and

American interests seem to be well aligned to meet the changing military and commercial dimensions of the Arctic.

Some scholars have argued to the contrary; they present the Arctic as a primary source of conflict between the two closely intertwined allies. The differences over the NWP also seem to be exaggerated. Canada cannot uphold its sovereignty claim without the U.S. support; and it has so far done nothing notable to militarily buttress and fortify for the defence of the NWP. Contrary to popular perception, in the Arctic, both the countries have for long collaborated through the bilateral defence and security agreements. The enduring partnership between two nations cannot be obscured by the nationalism of Canada and the superpower role of the U.S. (Holland 2014: 245).

In fact, both the North American neighbours are committed (i) to enhance their relationship and develop new capabilities for the protection of North America from extreme threats; (ii) for the protection of the region for trade; and (iii) for security of the Arctic from environmental degradation and support the indigenous peoples. The nature of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship is underscored by the Arctic. The U.S. has been called by Canada as its crucial primary partner in the Arctic in the post-2006 documents. Cooperation of both the countries on security in the Arctic is based on the foundations laid by NORAD (Holland 2014: 245; Stephenson 2011: 9).

For approaching North American continent, the Arctic is still seen as a boulevard for the threats by state actors, which is the main concern; the issues with regard to the Arctic have been dealt with in detail in the fourth Chapter. The second concern comes from Russian investment in the Arctic region in the form of new infrastructure as well as new joint strategic command, which seems to create an almost perfect scenario for a "security dilemma" for Canada, the U.S., as well as NATO allies; leading experts to give concluding remarks that Russia has wicked intentions in the Arctic region. The third concern has risen from the increased level of marine activity in the North (for instance, the Crystal Serenity cruise ship's successful however very expensive transit through the NWP in the months of August and September 2016), which not only raises the environmental issues, search and rescue operations, but the possibility of organised crime as well. All these concerns highlight the infrastructural lack and the

lack of forward operating bases as well as maritime reach in the Arctic for both Canada and the U.S. Moreover, the operating life of one of the primary domain awareness instruments of NORAD, the North Warning System (NWS), is rapidly coming to its end. Besides, a military confrontation appears very unlikely to occur in the Arctic, however, the geopolitical developments within the region increase the possibility of the misinterpretation (by Arctic states) of the behaviour of others as suspicious or anticipated to be nefarious; thus requiring action (Charron 2017: 18).

Canada, NATO and Afghanistan:

Afghanistan mission proved to be Canada's largest participation in combat after the Second World War. At the instance of the U.S., a Canadian officer, Major General Rick Hillier became the commander of the NATO troops. It was Hillier who decided to deploy the Canadian troops as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar. A lot has been written and quite a few of the reports remain "classified", nevertheless Canada's participation in Afghanistan brought to the fore several aspects of the Canadian defence perception, policy and preparedness. Many of the things from the past came once again seeking an answer: defence spending, the size of the CAF, modernisation programmes, strategic doctrine and goals, if any, and capability to match alliance commitments, etc.

The other view is that Canada fought well along with the U.S. and other NATO countries in Afghanistan. The U.S. views Canada's contribution more favourably than that of many other NATO members. Canada came out of Afghanistan as a "credible and responsible" ally. A question is raised that: how the Afghanistan mission affected Canada's defence budget? From 2001 to 2014, Canada's defence budget and spending both went up largely as a result of the Canadian deployment as part of ISAF and NATO troops. Afghanistan mission also provided a rationale to procure new weapons and update the combat systems. In short, it is incorrect to say (as generally argued) that Canada has had a limited role in Afghanistan or that its mission failed. Canada's contribution looks small only because the U.S.-led war was otherwise a very large combat mission.

As Canada-U.S. defence relationship regularly implicates Canada's both domestic and foreign policies. So, it is argued that there was domestic support for the Afghanistan

mission at least in the initial stages after 9/11. But Canada refused to join the Iraq invasion. Some argue that the Canadian participation in Afghanistan mission was partly to compensate for being "unwilling" to support in the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Holland 2014: 241-242; Jones 2011: 455; Burney and Hampson 2014: 22). Scholars continue to debate Canada's Afghanistan mission in terms of its shortcomings and failures. But, it was the largest and most costly mission in faraway Kandahar since the participation of Canadian troops in the Korean War. In 2011, Prime Minister Stephen Harper made an announcement at the end of the Afghanistan mission. What did it mean to abandon the Afghanistan mission in terms of Canada's defence relations with the U.S. and alliance commitment within NATO?

In another instance, Harper government decided to join the U.S. and NATO allies to enforce the United Nations (UN) 'no fly' zone over Libya and then go for a violent overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Canada again joined U.S. and NATO allies in 2014 in the bombing of Syria. Some analysts suggest that Canada was doing all this essentially to mollify the U.S. But the new Liberal government of Justin Trudeau withdrew from the mission in Syria immediately on coming to power.

Rationale and Scope of the Study

It has been pointed out that the defence and security of Canada; defence of North America; and meeting international security threats through multilateral actions are all entwined very closely. However, in the period since the end of the Second World War, the strategic culture of Canada, size of its armed forces, defence spending and level of defence modernisation – all indicate that Canada has never been up to the task of defending itself, much less defending North America. Worst, in the area of defence, Canada's capacity gap is only expanding with time. As for meeting security challenges abroad, it has been quintessentially a "joiner"; more by way of its token participation in allied military operations. Truth is, in the Cold War era, Canada was more known for its UN peacekeeping rather than joining overseas allied military expeditions.

Analysts say that post-9/11, Canada needs to 're-purpose' its defence preparedness so as to match its international security commitments. But it is easier said than done.

Increasing defence budget, acquiring new weapons and seamless interoperability with the U.S. military raise varieties of questions and a furious domestic debate. It is said that the Canadian culture and its public opinion are against the country acquiring offensive capability; others cite the data to show that in the debate on "butter vs. gun", Canadians choose butter. In other words, higher social spending is preferred over military expenditure. Likewise, defence experts also argue that the U.S. culture is to imbibe the latest technologies into defence; culturally, Canadians have a disdain for high-tech war; and that explains foot-dragging over military modernisation or for that matter joining the U.S.-led BMD system for the North.

Post-9/11, many of these old assumptions are certainly not working. How much should Canada spend on defence? It is, anyway, the thirteenth largest defence spender for years. A unique situation that obtains here is that, unlike most other countries, Canada does not seem to face restrictions on acquiring sophisticated military hardware from the U.S. Therefore, how much military modernisation Canada must undertake?; and, what is the desired level of weapon technologies to imbibe in the defence system?

Canada is beset with 'geographic fatalism'. It means many things for culture, economy and politics; but in the area of defence, it means that Canada cannot defend itself against the U.S. and it need not defend itself against others. The defence conundrum for over a century is: the U.S. 'leads', often unilaterally, and Canada 'follows'. In continental defence, Canada has been the proverbial 'first follower' and 'free rider' – the first one has implications for national sovereignty and the later invites U.S. contempt and ridicule. This probably explains low defence spending, preparedness and small size of the Canadian forces for over the past seventy years.

There is the thesis that Canada spends just enough on defence so as to politely say 'No' to the U.S. in situations of contingency. Several questions emerge: what have been U.S. expectations of Canada in the area of defence of North America?; and what it is that Canada brings to the table? U.S. has been insisting on 'burden-sharing' with its NATO allies, more vocally since the 1980s. But what is the burden-sharing arrangement like between the two North American neighbours?; and what kind of defence commitments Canada does and can make for continental defence?

Remember, the U.S. had heavily criticised Canada for its slack defence and security measures in the wake of 9/11 including for lax border controls. In simple, defence conundrum has deepened since 9/11; and Canada has to enhance its capability to match its commitments.

Defence of North America comes under the bilateral NORAD. The U.S. had ruled out a role for NATO and established the bilateral NORAD. NORAD deserves in-depth study and analysis. Several issues need close examination here: for instance, what is the equation, if there is one, between NATO and NORAD over the years?; what have been the defence dimensions of the several expansions and up-gradations that NORAD has undergone since 1958?; and what is the defence dynamics of the expansion of NORAD after 9/11 since it now also covers maritime defence? Working of NORAD and an analysis of military capability require an explanation.

The events of 9/11 have given a new salience and meaning to these issues. An intense and interesting debate is on in the Canadian defence establishment and the academic institutions. Three demands are being made on the Canadian Armed Forces: CAF needs to be highly deployable; to be capable of being sustained at a great distance; and, to be interoperable with the U.S. and allies' forces. The issues became more important in the wake of Canadian participation in the U.S.-led aerial bombing in Libya as well as Syria.

Asymmetrical interdependence is the enduring feature all across the board in Canada's relations with the U.S. and it spawns many complexities in terms of issues and national policy responses. In the realm of defence and security relations, it produces several ambiguities, as discussed in the Literature Review; 9/11 has admittedly reinforced some of these ambiguities from the past. This doctoral research work studies and delineates some of these ambiguities. As a mutual player in the defence and security partnership, it is always a point for consideration as to how Canada responds to the U.S. defence initiatives at the regional and the global levels? At the continental level, Canada has to deal with its own air defence that comes under NORAD; and it also spends on the maintenance of NORAD facilities. And, at the global level, what repercussions Canada faces when it comes to abandoning the

Afghanistan mission in terms of Canada's security relations with the U.S. and the NATO?

A key issue that emerged after the end of Cold War but has gained lots of traction since 9/11 is Canada's refusal to participate in the BMD programme for North America. NORAD is acceptable but BMD is not. Why Canada has reservations on BMD for North America?; and whether Canada should be covered by the U.S. initiated missile defence system? Post-9/11, the U.S. went about reorganising military commands; it set up the USNORTHCOM. Canada also set up a separate an air defence command, namely, Canada Command (which eventually merged into CJOC). It needs to be clarified as to what is the relationship between NORAD and the USNORTHCOM and the CJOC? How they complement each other? And what about the Arctic as far as Canada's defence and security relationship with the U.S. is concerned? There seems to be more commonality of interests and perception than differences and divergent position on the question of Arctic.

Climate change and prospects of oil and minerals have changed the geopolitics of the Arctic. Russia, one of the Arctic states, is becoming militarily assertive in the region claiming a large continental shelf. China is looking for a shorter trade route to its American and European markets besides evincing interest in the exploitation of energy and minerals. The U.S. has its own complex geostrategic plans for the region: U.S. oil firms have started drilling; the U.S. refuses to recognise the Canadian sovereignty over the NWP and calls its international waterways with freedom of navigation; and, USNORTHCOM plans to set up advance air bases in the region. Scholars often highlight the points of confrontation between Canada and U.S. over the North American Arctic. The present monograph will highlight the close cooperation in defence besides many other complementarities the two countries have over the region.

Research Questions

Keeping in view the brief presentation of scholarly analyses in the Literature Review and the Rationale and Scope of the Study, the following questions deserve further study and analysis.

(i) What is Canada's strategic doctrine; and is there one, in the first place? If there is one, what are its contents like; moreover, how has it transformed in the wake of the 9/11?

(ii) What are the inherent ambiguities in the Canadian defence and security that are born out of 'geographic fatalism' and asymmetrical interdependence?

(iii) How NORAD has evolved since 1958?; what are the defence-related analyses of the NORAD; and what is the level of Canadian participation in NORAD? What does NORAD's expanded maritime defence mission mean after 9/11?

(iv) Does USNORTHCOM complement NORAD?; and what about CJOC? Where does NORAD stand as far as the defence of the North American Arctic is concerned? Moreover, what is the equation between NORAD and BMD system?

(v) How does the CAF meet the imperative of interoperability and others with the U.S. forces?

(vi) What are the defence and security dilemmas that face Canada with the rise in geopolitical significance of the Arctic? Will Canada confront the U.S. over the question of its sovereignty claim over the NWP?; or, Is there a far greater cooperation in defence matters between the two in view of a resurgent Russia and an expansive China in the Arctic waters?

(vii) What are the security challenges on Canada-U.S. border? Is "militarisation of the border" taking place somewhat like it is happening on the U.S.-Mexico border? What have major security measures been taken by Canada, post-9/11? And what do U.S. 'homeland security' measures mean for the daily over U.S. $1 billion two-day trade and movement of millions of people and vehicles, aeroplanes and boats across the border?

(viii) What are the Canadian defence and security matters that are calling for immediate attention and investment? What are the things Canada needs to be prepared for in the foreseeable future?

Hypotheses

Based on the above research questions, the study seeks to test the hypotheses:

(i) Post-9/11 defence cooperation with the U.S. has led to enhancement of Canada's defence capability.

(ii) U.S. defence and security initiatives in the aftermath of 9/11 have accentuated Canada's vulnerability to U.S. unilateralism and to international security threats.

The present doctoral work study employs a research design for three variables in consideration:

Variables:

(a) Independent: repercussion of 9/11

(b) Dependent: Canada's defence and security

(c) Intervening: U.S. unilateralism

$$[a \rightarrow c \rightarrow b]$$

Where 'a' is an independent variable i.e. repercussion of 9/11, 'b' is the dependent variable. It includes Canada's defence and security capability. The study attempts to examine the impact of 'a' upon 'b'. In the process, 'c' is taken as an intervening variable.

Research Methodology

The present doctoral monograph uses analytical and comparative approach. It would use the historical context to analyse contemporary aspects of the Canadian defence and security relationship with the U.S. The research anticipates to uncover the dynamic roles and distinctive goals of the Canadian defence through qualitative method. As Lawrence W. Neumen (2008) has written that the qualitative analysis

proceeds by extracting generalisations as well as themes from pieces of evidence and through organising data so that a consistent and coherent picture could come up.

In carrying out the study, a good use has been made of the primary sources that are available on websites of Canada's defence department and other government departments and ministries. There are specialised defence and security-related think tanks; and specific programmes also which exist in select Canadian universities: their publications have been accessed to describe and critically analyse the contemporary defence and security debate and policy initiatives. Likewise, the study of the Arctic has expanded in Canada in the recent years. Some of the surveys and data collected are available on specialised websites; these very useful sources have been used in the Chapter on defence-related developments in the Canadian Arctic.

On the whole, the research methodology is eclectic so as to give a comprehensive treatment to the subject under study within the specified time-frame. The study is inter-disciplinary and covers political, defence and strategic aspects of Canada-U.S defence relations, post-9/11. Comparative analytical methods have been used to evaluate various viewpoints and, at times, conflicting data used in the secondary source material.

Chapterisation Scheme

Chapter – I: Introduction

The present doctoral work is spread over six Chapters. The Introductory Chapter, as described in the preceding pages, introduces the subject and then covers separately the Review of Literature, Rationale and Scope of the Study, Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Research Methodology.

Chapter – II: Canada's Defence Policy Outlook

The second Chapter traces the Canadian defence policy outlook; Canada's defence dilemmas and conundrums whether and how to prioritise the defence of Canada and the defence of the continent. The second Chapter discusses and analyses the demand

and pressure of increasing the size of Canadian defence spending; interoperability with the Canadian allies and partners; issue of indecisiveness over aquiring Lockheed Martin F-35 JSF as a replacement its aging fleet; Canada's latest defence policy with new strategic defence vision and approach; the Canadian need to have a well equipped, ever-ready, greatly efficient and effective military as well as aspects of the modernisation of its armed forces.

Chapter – III: Post-9/11Conundrums in Canada-U.S. Defence Relations

The Chapter identifies the core aspects and issues in the otherwise complex bilateral defence relationship. Border security, transmigration across the border, cross-border rights of the indigenous, cross-border health and environmental security and security of the flow of goods, people and capital across the border have been all dealt with in this Chapter. It also explains various border management mechanisms, instituted post-9/11, to facilitate the movement and flow of goods, people and capital; and the kind of unusual challenges Canada encounters along the 'undefended' border. The Chapters examines some of the important security measures taken after 9/11 such as the identification papers, ship riders' agreement, and varieties of surveillance measures and detention powers given to law enforcement authorities. No gainsaying, post-9/11 measures have transformed bilateral defence and security relations.

The Chapter deals specifically with NORAD – its working, expansion and modernisation, especially in the changed circumstances since 9/11. A brief description of the growing linkages between the NORAD, the USNORTHCOM and the CJOC highlight the growing complexities in bilateral defence relations. As the Chapter details, the extension of NORAD so as to cover maritime defence also has significantly changed the meaning and importance of the aerial defence mechanism. Separate sections deal with the equation between NORAD and the BMD system, and the Chapter ends with an analysis of the Canadian debate over joining the BMD.

Chapter – IV: Canada-U.S. Arctic Relations

The Chapter describes and analyses the changing geopolitics and –economics of the Arctic, in particular, the so-called Canadian Arctic. Bilateral defence ties between the

two North American NATO partners get complicated as Canada lays sovereignty claim over the NWP which the U.S. refuses to recognise; and which rather sees as open sea. The Chapter looks into the antecedents of the sovereignty claim over the NWP and describes the maritime dispute with the U.S. over Beaufort sea. It explains the prospects of conflict and cooperation between Canada and the U.S. over resource exploitation; and their perception of the growing presence of the other Arctic and non-Arctic states in the region. This Chapter delineates various issues that lie at the centre of security in the Arctic per se; and the challenges and opportunities bilateral cooperation in the specific sub-region of the Canadian Arctic.

Chapter – V: Canada's Mission in Afghanistan

The penultimate Chapter covers the deployment of largest ever Canadian contingent since the Second World War in Afghanistan. The land-locked South Asian country has tested Canada's military capability – its war-preparedness, the capability to deploy at long distances, interoperability with the U.S. forces, working together with other NATO and non-NATO allies besides the combat ability of Canadian soldiers to engage Taliban and varieties of insurgent groups. The Chapter describes some of the perceptibly long-range and transformative implications that Afghanistan mission has for Canadian Defence Forces and Canada's overall defence relationship with the U.S. Afghanistan has implications for future Canada-U.S. defence partnerships, as became evident with the Canadian participation in the U.S.-led military operations in Libya and Syria.

Chapter – VI: Summary and Conclusions

This final Chapter captures and presents the broad arguments and views that emerge from all the preceding Chapters. These broad generalisations, which stand empirically tested and verified, are the bases of some concluding observations and statements. These Concluding generalisations are finally used to test and validate the two principal research hypotheses.

CHAPTER – II

CANADA'S DEFENCE POLICY OUTLOOK

The present Chapter of this doctoral monograph deals with the defence policy outlook of Canada which is a second largest country in the world. The National Defence institution of Canada is understood as the most complex institution in government and it consists of Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The CAF has three components: the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). The Chapter begins with the description of CAF; defence policy; the structure of defence; three principal Canadian defence aims of defending Canada, North America, and the maintenance of international order along with allies and in conjunction with organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)[1].

The Chapter further describes Canada's defence problem which is "how to prevail in the defence of Canada" and emphasises that it is time to prioritise defence of Canada and the continent in the missions of CAF. The Chapter states that Canadians may stand right under the defence umbrella of the most powerful U.S., however, Canada can no longer consider itself a 'fire proof' house due to the advancement in military technology. A target of 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on the military, laid down by the NATO allies of Canada, is another issue the Chapter is dealing with. Thus, there is a pressure of increasing the size of Canadian defence spending that Canada faces.

The Chapter deals with the issue of interoperability with the RCAF, RCN, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and with the Canadian allies and partners, as well as the indecisiveness over acquiring Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to replace ageing CF-18 Hornets of Canada. Canada needs to be well equipped and ever-ready

[1] According to many, since its emergence in 1949, trans-Atlantic alliance has been the central focus of Canadian defence and foreign policymaking.

which requires a serious highest level of investment in the defence relations of Canada-U.S. The present Chapter also mentions Canada's latest defence policy with a new strategic vision and an approach to the Canadian Defence. Because the Canadian military is very small to make any crucial contribution to the common defence, a flexible, ever-ready, greatly efficient and effective military with the willingness to closely operate with allies and partners, and investment in war-fighting capabilities are what is required by Canada.

Canadian Armed Forces and Defence Policy

The CAF conduct various types of operations such as maintaining Canadian sovereignty through surveillance and control of Canada's northern territory; search and rescue; emergency military response and prevention of natural disasters not only in Canada but around the world; humanitarian assistance by making Canadian contribution to the UN and peace support operations around the world; assist in law enforcement such as surveillance, transport and logistics; Canadian military contribution to counter-insurgency operations, training and assisting forces of the allies by providing medical, reconnaissance, military police training and other training; international security and stability through participating in NATO operations; fisheries patrol and surveillance by observing fishing vessels and enforcing regulations with regard to fishing in the North Pacific and Atlantic oceans (NDCAF 2018).

The CAF has three components: the Canadian Army, the RCAF, and the RCN. The Canadian Army, a soldier-centric, fully integrated and highly professional force aimed at "achieving operational excellence at home and abroad", is the land component and the largest of the CAF. It consists of Regular Force, Army Reserve, civilian personnel, and Canadian Rangers[2]. For the domestic and expeditionary mission

[2] Canadian Rangers are part of the CAF Reserve that provides lightly-equipped, self-sufficient mobile forces which perform duties for sovereignty or national security as well as public safety operations within sparsely settled or remote Canadian regions such as isolated northern and coastal areas (Government of Canada 2018a). They conduct patrols; collect local data for the CAF; report unusual activities; assist in search and rescue efforts; and assist with natural disasters. The country has about 5,000 of Canadian Rangers currently (Government of Canada 2017b).

purposes, the units of the Canadian Army come under the command of Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). The Canadian Army comprises of the:

> 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Canadian Divisions, the Army formations in Quebec, Western Canada, Ontario and Atlantic Canada, respectively (Government of Canada 2018a).

The mission of the Canadian Army is to form a multi-purpose, combat effective land forces to meet the defence objectives of Canada. Protection of Canadians and their interests is the role of the Canadian Army through: (i) defending the territory of Canada; (ii) maintaining the sovereignty of Canada by providing combat-ready forces and land surveillance; (iii) making contribution to the collective North American continental defence; (iv) providing assistance (armed and unarmed) to civil authorities when required for security and maintaining public order; (v) helping provincial authorities and others in the case of natural disasters (such as earthquakes, storms, floods, or forest fires) and other emergencies; (vi) supporting Canada's international interests, through contributing forces to the NATO, the UN, and other multinational operations; (vii) serving as a peacekeeper, and (viii) giving humanitarian assistance (Government of Canada 2018a).

> As far as the size of Canadian Army is concerned, 23,000 soldiers perform services as full-time in the Regular Force; 17,000 are volunteer soldiers (for part-time) in the Reserve Force (consisting of 5,000 Canadian Rangers who perform duties in remote Canadian areas mentioned above); the Army is supported by 3,000 civilian employees; 63 Regular Force and 123 Reserve Force Units in 127 communities; and 179 Ranger Patrols in 414 communities (Government of Canada 2018a).

As mentioned above, the RCAF is also a component of the CAF. RCAF defends and protects the country, continental airspace in partnership with the U.S. as well as makes the contribution in maintaining international peace and security. Through North America Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), a bi-national institution of Canada and the U.S., the RCAF contributes to continental defence, generates the overarching capabilities so that threats against Canada and to North American continent could be detected, deterred, and defeated (Government of Canada 2018b; and Government of Canada 2017a: 38). Given the vast Canadian territory, the reach and power of RCAF are very crucial for CAF's operational success at home and abroad. This is what enables global expeditionary operations of the CAF.

RCN provides Canada with an agile and responsive means so that it could respond to wide-ranging maritime situations, and serves as a tool of Canadian national power internationally. A vast maritime area is possessed by Canada: it has the longest coastline of the world, the fifth largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the second largest continental shelf in the world. All these demand naval forces which could operate in various most unrelenting or inexorable ocean conditions (Government of Canada 2017a: 34).

A significant aspect to understand is that the defence of Canada involves not just the CAF rather all governmental levels, all national power elements, and all Canadians. Defence of Canada is a "whole of Canada" endeavour (Cox 2017: 9). The National Defence institution of Canada, consisting of DND and the CAF, is understood as the most complex institution in government. Some of the complexity of defence institution is driven by the fundamental nature of military forces, the technologies employed by these forces and how they need to be structured and operate in accordance with current circumstances; some of the complexity comes from the basic requirements set by the Parliament and government central agencies; and, some of the complexity is generated by DND internally (Davies 2014: 2).

As Davies (2014) writes, the structure of defence basically revolves around the execution of the following four main processes: (i) to have a strategic defence policy and provide military advice to the government; (ii) force development, viz. that, conceptualisation of the future force and building them; (iii) force generation and the current force's regeneration; and (iv) force employment or conducting missions. In all of these processes, force generation and the current forces' regeneration is not only the largest as well as most complex defence business area but also the foundation upon which rests the success of force employment. Adequate force generation systems are required to be maintained by 21st century defence forces through which highly skilled professional military forces could be assembled, trained, certified, equipped, and deployed to meet the requirements of the operations.

As for Canadian defence policy, various scholars and observers often state that it consists of three principal aims: (i) the defence of Canada itself; (ii) the defence of North American continent through NORAD and in cooperation with the U.S.; and (iii)

the maintenance of international order along with its allies and in conjunction with organisations such as the UN, NATO, or coalitions forces (Bercuson 2016: 1). The first and second principles of Canadian defence policy are the same in essence. If there will be any external danger to Canada that must become an external danger to North America; similarly, any external danger to North America will surely be a danger to Canada. As far as the defence of Canada and North America are concerned, David Bercuson (2016) says that the true picture is that Canada, which is the second largest country on the earth with some 35,000,000 people (currently more than 36,000,000 or 36.95 million), is quite incapable to fully defend itself and can play only a marginal role both in defending Canada and North America.

Given the degree of interdependence between Canada and the U.S., it is argued that defence of Canada is indivisible from the defence of the North American continent, in cooperation with the U.S. It seems very difficult to think of any situation in which any threat to Canadian territory would not pose a danger to the North American continent as a whole. In addition to the defence of Canada and the continent, it appears to become a trend to speak about a 'third pillar' of Canadian defence policy, which is to maintain international peace and stability. For the purpose of showing its vitality to Canadian defence action, this 'third pillar' can be redesigned as "the defence of Canada and Canadian interests abroad, as required" (Cox 2017: 10). James Cox (2017), thus, identifies Canada's defence problem, that is, enough emphasis is given to the defence of Canada in the all defence policy statements, but defence attention and spending continuously put emphasis on acting abroad. He argues that after considering the three pillars of Canadian defence policy deeply, this defence problem appears fundamental and enduring: "how to prevail in the defence of Canada". This one fundamental defence problem has two basic sub-components: (i) "how to prevail in the defence of Canada within a combined continental defence framework" and (ii) "how to prevail in the defence of Canada and Canadian interests abroad, in concert with others". Canadians government needs to clearly articulate to what extent below they find "prevailing" adequate to consider for defending Canada.

Somewhat similar argument as above, the order of Canadian defence priorities is a constant feature of past Canadian Defence White Papers, for instance: defence of Canadian territory is the first priority, then the North American continent and, finally,

the world. Defending its own territory first should ideally be the first priority for any country; it would be nonsensical on the part of the government of Canada and its Armed Forces to prioritise anything else first. Despite that, there is a tendency to ignore the details with regard to the defence of Canada, rather emphasising on the expeditionary role of the CAF. The underlying assumption behind such tendency is that Canada is understood as 'fire proof'[3] house and it implies that attention should be given to international deployments (Charron 2017: 16).

It has been stated that even during the interwar period, Canadian attitude was based on assumption that it was immune to any threat of invasion and hence "could be a provider, but not a consumer, of collective security". During and after the Second World War, many changes came in the world scenario. With the advancement of military technology, Canada can no longer consider itself a 'fire proof' house, if ever Canada really was. Advancement in military technology, particularly in the air, has diminished the significance of topography and distance as natural defences against any threat or military attack (Stairs 2016: 4).

Moreover, during the Cold War, the absence of strong overarching security policy of Canada combined with its palpable desire to achieve importance as a middle power within existing alliances allowed the Canadian military to be focused on its own geostrategic commitments. All three Canadian services developed close affiliations with military forces of the U.S. and the military strategy was viewed through the prism of their support for a *Pax Americana* which took the form of the NATO, the UN, and the NORAD. Accordingly, Canadian defence policy remained diffuse without a national focus (Coombs 2015: 66).

Andrea Charron (2017) argues that it is time to prioritise defence of Canada and the continent in the CAF missions. In other words, there is a need to revisit the first two principles and recognise what is actually meant by defending Canada and the continent. Defending Canada means ensuring primary national interests of Canada, which are fundamental to Canadian existence as a democratic, prosperous, and secure

3 At the fifth assembly of the League of Nations in 1924, Raoul Dandurand, who was the government's leader in the Senate at the time, stated: "We live in a fireproof house".

country from any or all threats. And defending North American continent means ensuring the protection of both Canadian and U.S. national interests, even in the case of their differences and/or different priorities.

In delineating the significance of emphasising the defence of Canada, it needs to keep in mind that such emphasis does not limit the defence activity to the Canadian territory. Historically, Canada has dealt with threats abroad (also referred to as 'forward defence') before any threat could reach Canada. In this manner, the defence of Canada does not get limited but requires worldwide awareness and acting internationally along with allies, and other "like-minded" countries as required. In addition, in order to pursue the notion of defence of Canada diligently, more capability[4] and capacity of the CAF will be required in comparison of what it presently has, and willingness to perform as a more efficient tool of Canadian foreign policy (Robertson 2016-17: 7). James Cox (2017) has written: "Give Canada more CAF to defend our homeland and the world can have more Canada".

Charles Davies (2014) writes that if CAF really want to be effective in combat, or any other missions, they must employ the defence capabilities which comprise five functional areas: (i) 'Command', which is to ensure the unity of purpose, thought, and action in the forces, and manage the conduct of activities required; (ii) 'Sense', it is to provide data and information at all levels with the best possible comprehensive understanding and knowledge of the current and most likely future circumstances of their operation; (iii) 'Act', it is something which gets the most attention and most visible part of defence capability; (iv) 'Shield', it includes a range of measures which protect the forces from not only the actions of opponents but from natural or other hazards also so that forces act freely and their operational effectiveness could be preserved; and finally, (v) 'Sustain'.

[4] Capability refers to "the product of equipment, trained personnel, and an effective doctrine for the use of that equipment by those trained personnel". Capacity means endurance, weight, and persistence of a capability. Thus, it is a capability to have one fighter aircraft; and the availability of that, for instance, six hours or five days in a row over the target area, is capacity (Cox 2017).

In the defence of Canada, the uppermost "grand strategic" goal is to "prevail at any cost". It should be indicated that Canada will: (i) prevail in defending North American continent beyond the periphery role; (ii) prevail in the defence of continent in cooperation with the U.S., and aggrandise the efficacy of Canadian force contributions to the NORAD; (iii) prevail in the "collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic region" and aggrandise the efficacy of Canadian force contributions to the NATO; (iv) "prevail in defence against any threat to Canada or Canadian interests elsewhere, in cooperation with NATO allies, in the context of UN missions, or with any other like-minded countries as may be the case"; and (v) produce and sustain enough "military capabilities and capacity, in all domains of warfare, as per the requirement and affordability" (Cox 2017: 11-12). Cox (2017) says: "The absence of an imminent existential threat does not absolve the government from the responsibility to think about, plan, and prepare judiciously for a national crisis".

On the other hand, it has been argued by David Bercuson (2016) that every overseas war that Canada fought was undertaken by the country due to its close ties to other countries with which it shares interests and values substantially. However, worth noting aspect is that the Canadian obligations to other allies and partners are mainly political because the Canadian military is very small to make any crucial contribution to the common defence. And, 'political' in this sense means presence. It is often stated that as far as geopolitical threats are concerned, Canada is not vulnerable to powerful potential enemy forces. This is geography which makes a huge difference. Canadians stand right under the defence umbrella of the most powerful country in the world. Canada may not be directly affected by the many threats to the global order, but many of its partners get most certainly affected. Thus, Canada engages in international operations due to dangers to its partners which articulates that, based on the history of Canada, the 'third' requirement of defence policy (the maintenance of international order along with its allies and in conjunction with organisations such as the UN, NATO, or coalition forces) is as significant as any other defence issue faced by the Canadians. The third principle aim is the one that ought to guide Canadian force structure and development because expeditionary operations will always pose the greatest challenges for Canada. Where to go and for what purpose or conditions? How much to get involved and for how long? These questions seem the most difficult

to deal with. Because the military engagements of Canada are always choice-based and, usually, mandated in response to the requirements of its partners.

For instance, in the cases such as the bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the air attacks against Libya and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)[5], Canada had joined coalition partners due to the obligations of the alliance. Canada has always fought as being the part of a coalition or alliance and will always do the same. For this reason, it is argued that the real emphasis of the government-launched Defence Policy Review should be on dealing with the geopolitical challenges that alliance partners face and how CAF must be best prepared for expeditionary operations to support them (Bercuson 2016: 2).

Similarly, in the case of operation in Afghanistan, Canada was not attacked on 11 September 2001; however, in late 2001, Canadian troops were deployed to Afghanistan because a strong majority of Canadians regarded it as extremely important. And in 2003, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was joined by Canada; though under pressure after the Canadian denial to participate with the U.S. in the war in Iraq. And in 2005, the Canadian troops were further sent to southern Kandahar province of Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led operation and to help the U.S. in withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan to send in Iraq. This very issue has been dealt with in detail in the fifth Chapter of the present doctoral thesis.

Thus, assisting in deterring potential hostile forces from intrusions against Canadian allies or other countries (who may not be allied with Canada formally, but securing them is an important Canadian interest) is surely the most significant practical purpose that the CAF serve. However, the efforts of Canada will never prove sufficient for either defence of Canada or both tasks of defending Canada and North America in the face of a determined threat. Even for its own defence, Canada will always be heavily dependent on the U.S. Moreover, the defence of Canada will always be overarching U.S. national interest due to geography, historical ties, shared values, trade, and political realities. The U.S. is by far the most important alliance partner of Canada (Bercuson 2016: 1). According to David Bercuson:

[5] The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

> Canada has neither the quantity nor the range of military capabilities to offer much to the United States or to operate to complement US forces abroad except not to be a burden in guarding the sea and air approaches to North America.

Thus, the role of Canada in the defence of the North American continent must be mainly one of "reconnaissance".

Interconnectedness and interdependence of Canada and the U.S., intensified through the trade liberalisation in the form of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and bi-national institution NORAD, is often said to cause sensitivities for Canada with regard to preserving its independence from the U.S. in terms of identity and action (James and James 2014: 190). Within a global order, Canada's role to a great extent is defined by the U.S. power; however, it is a not limited to it. And the 9/11 terrorist attacks have changed the nature of the international security environment.

With regard to Canadian defence budget, a target of 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on the military, laid down by its NATO allies, is also a grave concern. Canada is the 6th largest defence budget within the trans-Atlantic alliance, but due to spending slightly over 1 per cent of GDP on defence, Canada is constantly targeted (Furtado 2016). Reasons are quite simple, because roughly 4 per cent of GDP is spent by the U.S. on defence,[6] and an increasingly hostile and resurgent Russia provides enough reason to build up NATO's deterrence. The previous Canadian government agreed to the target of 2 per cent to spend on defence, but did little to increase defence spending. By comparing the percentage of GDP spent on defence, measuring a country's resolve of making a meaningful contribution to the common defence is actually problematic. However, Canada committed itself to that target (Bercuson 2016: 4).

But, Can Canada actually do what is required? Even if Canada decides the 2 per cent target as a priority that must be achieved, or be treated as a freeloader by its allies, the

[6] NATO has been called "obsolete" and then "not obsolete" by the U.S. President Donald Trump, and in his view, "the other allies "owing" the U.S. massive sums in defence spending". With the presidency of Trump in the U.S., the atmosphere appears too much unpredictable (Hlatky and Nossal 2017: 4).

country cannot simply add some money and watch its military growing. The expansion of the entire defence infrastructure and the initiation of a far more efficient procurement process would be required. Key decisions with regard to what capabilities Canada would expand or add or even cut would also have to be made. None of the mentioned tasks is easy to achieve in a short phase of time. For instance, in the early 1950s, when defeat was looming in Korea and NATO expansion was just starting, defence budget of Canada was basically tripled in the four years that caused extreme inflationary pressures in the country and led to many incidents of gross mismanagement in both the Canadian military and the Department of National Defence (Bercuson 2016: 4). Even for resource reductions, a careful analysis is required, which is accompanied either by a reduced level of expectations for military capabilities or other efficiency improvements (Davies 2014: 5).

Even during the crucial years of dangerous Canadian operation in southern Kandahar province of Afghanistan, Canadian defence spending never approached 2 per cent of GDP. Canadians fighting and dying in the battle against the Taliban insurgents, none of the Canadian allies (especially the U.S.) criticised it for spending very less on defence. In the view of Bercuson (2016), the size of Canadian defence spending as per GDP to between 1.5 per cent and 1.75 per cent should be increased gradually, alongside increasing its international defence profile through expeditionary engagements in significant missions of allies and especially of the U.S. Moreover, Canada select whatever missions in future, it must keep in mind that the only ally that actually matters in terms of achieving, or not achieving, the target of 2 per cent defence spending is the U.S. In addition, Canada should not take part in any peace support operations under the UN auspices unless it becomes clear that Canadian forces will be operating alongside well-trained and well-equipped troops.

Canada has committed more dollars to defence in the most recent defence policy review, but the NATO target of 2 per cent of GDP will not be met. But, these are not obligations, only commitments. In addition to the pledge for 2 per cent of GDP, the target of spending 20 per cent of the national defence budget on major equipment is also there; and this target is what that Canada can meet (Hlatky and Nossal 2017: 4).

Canada and the U.S. share three fundamental, enduring, and common national interests[7]. Although their order of significance varies according to the country and time, the military plays a primary role in protecting them. Those interests are: (i) the defending the country from any armed aggression of an adversary; (ii) the economic and societal health as a whole; and (iii) the world order. The U.S. has primarily been occupied with the first national interest of defending the territory of the country since the Second World War, however, not Canada. Due to Canada's "limited military force, a blessed bulwark-like geography, and a superpower an ally", Canada has been willing to keep this priority below in comparison of most countries. The second national interest has generally been "overlooked as a defence issue". It must not be forgotten that 12 September 2001 (the border to the U.S. was closed this day) had reminded Canadians that if there is anything so vital to Canadian interest, it is trade; however, it is not less significant to the U.S. The status or role of each country within the world order is the third and final national interest. In the present time, the major concerns are the emergence of non-state actors such as terrorists, emerging powers with structures of non-democratic nature like Russia and China. These are thought to be a challenge for the global leadership role of the U.S. (a status which has provided Canada with enormous advantages hitherto) (Charron 2017: 17).

It has been argued that Canadian expeditionary operational engagements are what will continue to define and shape the CAF. For the last twenty-five years, the prime ministers of Canada have shown hesitation to commit the Canadian forces abroad on dangerous and complex missions. Worth noting aspect is that every Canadian PM from Brian Mulroney to Stephen Harper deliberately committed the Canadian forces to open combat operational missions in diverse places such as Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya; including the lesser number of equally complex or dangerous operations for peace and stability in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia (let alone the missions in Haiti, Cambodia, and East Timor) (Cessford 2017: 24). In the views of D. Michael Day (2016), in an anarchic, chaotic world and full of belligerent countries possessing asymmetric capabilities and

7 National interests and values should not be taken as same. Overarching national interests strive for the continuous survival of a country; values delineate the aspirational behaviour of a country within its boundaries as well as in its relationships with other countries. The military can assist in defending national interests; if necessary, with coercion. Canadian values are what the Canadian government (and its military) wants to spread.

worldviews, the CAF will find themselves in the places having the same characteristics as competitive, congested, and contested. Agile and vigorous Special Forces provide highly adaptive capabilities which response immediately at a very modest cost. Significantly, these forces can be deployed to avoid pre-conflict scenario, conflict or post-conflict situations to perform a myriad of tasks in support of the ever-evolving Canadian government's objectives.

Achieving specific geopolitical or national interests of Canada or its allies (especially the U.S) should be the motive behind Canadian military deployments abroad, including missions under the UN auspices. Military resources of Canada must be used for this purpose. Given the Canadian connectedness to some countries and regions more than others but limited Canadian military resources, Canada must never try to do too much and spread itself too thinly or use the military as tokens where tokenism will not count for much (Bercuson 2016: 5).

Cox (2017) talks about defence 'grand strategy'[8] for the purpose of promulgating combined joint strategies in all five domains of warfare (including land, aerospace, maritime, space and cyber). Each would contemplate: (i) sufficient capacity and capability so that Canadian landmass, airspace, and territorial waters could not be penetrated through any adversary force; (ii) sufficient decisive strike capacity to prevail over the enemy; and (iii) the sustainment of functions for both defence and strike sufficiently. Given the vastness of Canada and its geostrategic position, it is time to recognise that "Canadian aerospace warfare forces are the first and most crucial component in the defence of Canada". In the aerospace warfare domain, strategic objective is exercising command of all airspace of Canada, preventing any penetration by unauthorised missiles or aircraft of any foreign country. At present, an invasion might be unlikely, but any of the Canadian Arctic islands' illegal foreign occupation in the future scenario is not implausible. Thus, the land warfare regular

[8] As far as 'grand strategy' is concerned, it implements policy (Government of Canada 2004). It converts political motives into wider, practical, and measurable strategic motives, collectively achieving 'grand strategy' will result in desired political ends. Designing 'grand strategy' is also a "whole-of-government" endeavour because all of the national power elements are incorporated by this. The 'grand strategy' can develop any number of subordinate strategies. Strategy and policy should not be taken as synonyms. The government has responsibility for (or should own) policy which is naturally political and a visionary idea according to which high level political objectives are outlined (Cox 2017: 9).

forces' principal role should be 'forward defence' and projecting the power of land warfare internationally as according to the directions of the Canadian government.

Geography-wise, Canada may have been blessed or benefited, but the time has changed now, it cannot be seen as a "brick house" where any harming material cannot reach. By the end of the Second World War, "Canada arguably had the third largest Navy and the fourth largest Air Force in the world". In the 1950s, Canada rearmed as the Cold War reached a risky situation; as a consequence was seen a golden age of diplomacy (Pennie 2017: 47). In the later period, major drawdown has been seen in Canada.

The armed forces of Canada are ultimate tool of Canadian national power, which need capacity and capabilities in all five domains of warfare. Well trained, organised, and equipped CAF would inherently result in capabilities Canada needs in the situation of domestic stress. A bigger in size army, air force, navy, Special Operations Forces (SOF), space and cyber force are what Canada needs to decisively act in all five domains of warfare at home and abroad (Cox 2017: 13).

For detecting, deterring, and defeating air threats as well as warning of maritime threats to the North American continent, NORAD is a central bi-national institution of Canada and the U.S. (NORAD will be dealt with in detail in the third Chapter of this thesis). The strategic investment of Russia in its nuclear forces and the increasing worldwide reach of Russian precision-strike capability; the growing access of North Korea to new, mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and the erratic behaviour of its leader Kim Jong-un; disconnect between Chinese affirmation of "no first-strike policy" and its growing nuclear forces with increasing protection from any devastation; and Iran due to its cyber and missile capabilities, despite the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) framework which ensured that nuclear programme of Iran will be peaceful, are included in the major concerns or threats that have preoccupied NORAD (United States, Department of State 2016; and Charron 2017: 18).

The concern with regard to threats emanating from within the North American continent, in the form of growing home-grown violent extremism, is what is new for

NORAD and for the militaries of Canada and U.S. since 9/11 attacks. Although, the mandate of NORAD lacks in dealing with land-based events, both the countries have been investing significant resources on information collection, surveillance, analysis, legislation, and anti-terrorism initiatives including many governmental departments as well as allied partners so that such attacks at home could be prevented in future (Charron 2017: 18).

It has been argued that CAF's continuous and close cooperation with the U.S. armed forces commands would need the development of a more fully integrated Canada-U.S. command arrangement; perhaps under some new treaty arrangement. Under such an initiative, the reinvention of NORAD might be seen as "a more comprehensive continental air/sea/space surveillance arrangement" with command authority encompassing waters, the territorial lands, and airspaces of North America and the approaches to the continent. This operational area will include the Caribbean Sea and territories and, under special arrangements, Mexico. It is stated that the Canadian airpower capabilities would be rebuilt by the CAF according to the latest air combat fleet, an enlarged air transport fleet of C-17 (twelve in total), and a homeland surveillance and defence system based on space (Bland 2016: 42-43).

To accompany the U.S. or to replace it in military operations at home and abroad, Canada needs to be well equipped and ever-ready which requires a serious highest level of investment in the defence relations of Canada-U.S. The reality of armed aggression or threats to Canada and the North American continent has traditionally been underestimated by the Canadians that undervalued the significance of being willing to defend against them. Canada should not be seen as a "homeguard" for the U.S., the defence of Canada is as overarching as acting militarily abroad. The overarching Canadian national interests need to be defended by Canada itself (Charron 2017: 21).

As far as the all three contiguous oceans of Canada are concerned, defence of territorial waters of Canada is what is required. Given the nature of east and west

Canadian coastlines, littoral brown water (littoral zone),[9] green water (coastal or territorial waters to the open ocean), and blue water (the open ocean or high seas) maritime warfare capabilities are what more clearly needed. However, in the Arctic region, with the recognition of geography, climate, and oceanography of Canadian North, maritime warfare capability of blue water or green water might prove less than the best possible in such situation. Thus, it seems appropriate to consider the establishment of a vigorous littoral force of maritime warfare in North, which involves nuclear-powered submarines of Canada (Cox 2017: 12).

Here worth mentioning is "Maritime Domain Awareness" (MDA), viz. that to understand all elements in the maritime environment which can have repercussions on the safety, security, the environment or the economy adversely (Binational Planning Group 2006: 36). MDA relies on technology, for instance, satellite coverage and surveillance radars, analysis of attained data, even the flying hours spent on the surveillance of three Canadian oceans are counted. MDA is primary to the readiness of both Canada and the U.S. to preserve their maritime zones; a region both the countries vigorously attempt to improve (Charron 2017: 19).

For approaching the North American continent, the Arctic is still seen as a boulevard for the threats by state actors, which is the main concern; the issues with regard to the Arctic have been dealt with in detail in the fourth Chapter. The second concern come from Russian investment in the Arctic region in the form of new infrastructure as well as new joint strategic command, which seems to create almost perfect scenario for a "security dilemma" for Canada, the U.S., as well as NATO allies; leading experts to give concluding remark that Russia has wicked intentions in the Arctic region. The third concern has risen from the increased level of marine activity in the North (for instance, the Crystal Serenity cruise ship's successful however very expensive transit through the Northwest Passage (NWP) in the months of August and September 2016), which not only raises the environmental issues, search and rescue operations, but the possibility of organised crime as well. All these concerns highlight the infrastructural lack and the lack of forward operating bases as well as maritime reach in the Arctic for both Canada and the U.S. Moreover, the operating life of one of the primary

[9] Maritime geography is generally discussed in terms of three very loosely defined regions: brown water, green water and blue water.

domain awareness instruments of NORAD, the North Warning System (NWS), is rapidly coming to its end. Besides, a military confrontation appears very unlikely to occur in the Arctic, however, the geopolitical developments within the region increase the possibility of the misinterpretation (by Arctic states) of the behaviour of others as suspicious or anticipated to be nefarious; thus requiring action (Charron 2017: 18).

Indecisiveness over the Procurement of F-35

During the election campaign, Liberal party leader Justin Trudeau made an exceedingly rash promise that the Lockheed Martin F-35, also referred to as Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), would not be purchased by the Liberal government to replace Canada's ageing CF-18 Hornets. There would be an open competition, but it would not allow Lockheed Martin to bring the F-35, viz. that, any other fighter will have to be selected. After coming into power, the Liberal government was confronted with the consequences. The new cabinet realised very soon that the aerospace industry of Canada would be in great loss and out of Lockheed Martin's value chains worldwide if Canada does not choose the F-35 (Nossal 2017: 3)

In November 2016, PM Trudeau government's cabinet just changed the number of aircrafts which the RCAF required in order to meet NORAD and NATO requirements simultaneously. It declared that 77 Hornets fleet (reduced to 76 due to a crash) was no longer enough and the "capability gap" that exists can be filled by procuring more fighters. Thus, it was declared by PM Trudeau government "to sole-source the acquisition of an interim fleet of eighteen Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornets, and spend the next five years examining which fighter should eventually replace the CF-18". This decision threw a decision over acquiring the F-35 well beyond the next election (Nossal 2017: 2-3).

As for the replacement, since 1999, the Canadian government has been engaged in a process of replacement of its tactical fighter fleet of 122 CF-18 Hornets which were acquired in the 1980s (through competition, Canada chose F/A-18 Hornet of U.S. Navy, a twin-engine fighter manufactured by McDonnell Douglas). Much of the replacement history has been intertwined with only one aircraft, viz. that Lockheed Martin's F-35 JSF. Since 1959 cancellation of the Avro Arrow, no procurement

programme in Canadian military history has faced such intense swirling controversy. The process of selection of the F-35, along with aircraft's cost, capabilities, and attendant industrial benefits have largely been criticised in the public discourse. While doing a proper evaluation of the CF-18 replacement programme, a challenging situation was faced in the form of options constrained by the F-35 dominated international fighter market (Shimooka 2016: 3).

Canada has been a partner in the development and industrial programme of JSF aircraft since 1999 (assisted in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of F-35, that helped in gathering information for Canada's own selection process) which provided Canada with the opportunity to purchase the F-35 at the lowest cost possible, and for Canadian companies to obtain valuable subcontracts on the production and sustainment operations of the programme. It is worth noting that Canada has the fifth largest aviation industry in the world. Canadian involvement in JSF programme did not obligate the government to purchase F-35, but assisted in defining what type of capabilities are going to shape the fighter forces of future in response to evolving threat technologies as well as how Canadian industries use the opportunities in the best way through the partnership (Shimooka 2016: 4, 8).

F-35 aircraft possesses stealth capabilities that make its detection extremely difficult by the sensor systems of the enemy. With this, the pilot would be willing to "visually operate in no-light conditions"; can automatically sensor information and share data between friendly aircraft; and is capable enough to maximise the probability of identifying and keeping track of friendly and enemy forces by using automatic sensor prioritisation (CBC 2012; and Shimooka 2016: 14). As the decision regarding procuring most routine military assets become the question of Canada's role in the world (Furtado 2016); similarly, given the unfamiliarity of public, the lack of comprehensive understanding of the contemporary fighter market, and prejudicial international press as well as articles on the alleged performance of F-35, Canadians people's opinions turned against the F-35.

From 2010 to 2015, the delay in ordering a fighter for replacing CF-18 basically implies that the CF-18 will need to perform for an additional five years. Consequently, the level of capability will diminish and vulnerability to pilots will

increase, particularly when global uncertainty and challenges are growing. To have a deterrent effect, the capability in proportion to the danger faced by Canada is required by the CAF. Primary Canadian partner for aerospace defence of the continent, United States Air Force (USAF), has been transitioning to a force which largely consists of the F-22 and the F-35. Canada will have to face an interoperability gap, exacerbated by Canada's relatively low defence spending. Beyond the immediate result, this delay has a possibility for greater damage to the international standing of Canada. Since the end of the Cold War, the CAF has undergone a serious drawdown. A much needed military modernisation was promised by the governments of Paul Martin and Stephen Harper, but much of the new funding was diverted towards Afghanistan war's operational demands (Shimooka 2016: 30-31).

According to Kim Richard Nossal (2010), there has been a period between 1993 and 2006 in the history of Canada, when the Liberal governments of PM Jean Chrétien and PM Paul Martin made an attempt to reconceptualise the Canadian defence and foreign policy and articulated a fundamentally different vision of international politics. These leaders openly encouraged Canadian people to reconsider not only their country's role in the world but also its relations with the U.S. and question dominant U.S. assumptions with regard to international politics; which Canada did by defying the U.S. on issues such as the invasion of Iraq or the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system.

The indecision over C-18's replacement has not been without repercussions. For their fleet of F-35, Canada had planned before 2012 to operate a reprogramming laboratory in partnership with the UK and Australia, known as the Australia-Canada-United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory (ACURL), so that quick response to new threats or situations could be ensured by the countries. As a consequence of Canadian indecision, Australia and the UK moved ahead with the U.S. to set up a laboratory of their own (Shimooka 2016: 31).

As the primary role of the CAF is to be prepared for any fight or mission and prevail as according to the direction by the government of Canada on behalf of its citizens. The CAF must not only be combat-capable, but must be "combat-dominant" because then the CAF will inherently be provided with more enhanced capacity and capability

which (when not involved in primary CAF role) can help Canadians at home (Cox 2017: 11).

The F-35 fighter provides Canada with superior cost, industrial benefits and capability, but significant risk of fluctuating price of F-35 remains a concern. The cost of operating a fleet of F-35s is the area not well defined. Whether Canada should select the F-35 over another aircraft has not been an issue, but the excessive cost of maintaining a fighter capability (Shimooka 2016: 17, 32). For Charron (2017): "Defence does not impose an unreasonable economic or other burden on the country and society it is mandated to protect". Similarly, Cox (2017) writes: "Effective defence has never been cheap; is not cheap; and never will be cheap". It is time for maturely accepting the idea to make the CAF possibly much larger. The debilitating timidity about Canadian defence numbers must be overcome by the government of Canada.

Canada's Defence Policy 2017 and its Future Promises

As far as the Canadian defence policy reviews are concerned, the first formal Canadian defence policy review had been launched in 1964 by the Liberal government of PM Lester B. Pearson who wanted to signal the fundamental difference of Liberals from John G. Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservative Party. Since then, it seems to have become a tradition that every new Canadian government follows:

> in the first couple of years in office, the new government publishes a defence review — but only one, no matter how long the government remains in power (Nossal 2017: 1).

Due to this reason, there have been very predictable dates of Canadian defence reviews, for instance, 1964, 1971, 1987, 1995, 2005, 2008, and the recent one in 2017; all have said more or less same thing (Nossal 2017: 1; and Hlatky and Nossal 2017: 2).

As the global strategy, however, consists of more than only defence policy; PM Pierre Elliott Trudeau started in 1969 a new custom of bringing a review of foreign policy. It also emerged as a normal phenomenon: Brian Mulroney launched a foreign policy

review in 1984-85, Jean Chrétien brought it in 1995 and Paul Martin published his foreign policy review in 2005. When the Conservatives took office in Canada, the tradition of releasing foreign policy reviews was broken by Stephen Harper on the grounds of being disruptive. Thus, the Harper government published a defence policy review in 2008, but never released a foreign policy review. By immediately publishing a defence policy review, the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau continued the practice of Stephen Harper government, however, did not embrace the tradition of releasing a foreign policy review that his father introduced in 1969. However, publishing the defence policy review has largely become the same symbolic practice in which every Canadian government since the time of Pearson has involved in: publish a defence policy review which delineates the very difference of new government from the previous one and, later, put this review on the shelf (Nossal 2017: 1-2).

Moreover, the broad lines of Canadian defence policy also did not differ much from one review to another review. In fact, since the 1950s, Canada's defence policy has been stressing on the defence of the country first, then the defence of the continent in partnership with the U.S., and military engagement beyond the continent. There is nothing new in this regard (Hlatky and Nossal 2017: 2). So to speak, since the Second World War, the basic parameters of Canada's defence and security policy have remained same; Canada still remains committed to defending North America because nothing has changed about where Canadians live. However, the focus must have moved from Soviet threats to threats from non-state actors such as terrorism or violations of sovereignty (Furtado 2016).

Any government can be provided with more options to support international interventions through stronger defence capability. In military terms, Canada had policies that declared to defend Canada, the North American continent in partnership with the U.S. and make a contribution to the global stability. In practice, this discerning phasing has concealed the reality that Canada has excessively relied on the money of taxpayers in the U.S. to defend its territory for the past several decades (Pennie 2017: 48).

Here, according to Cox (2017), not only a new defence policy but a 'grand strategy' too is needed by Canada so that the fundamental defence problem of prevailing in the defence of Canada could be addressed. However, the government is apparently reluctant to do so. The political objectives of the Canadian government in the defence of Canada should be articulated in the new defence policy. For the implementation of defence policy, "whole-of-government" (WoG) grand strategic objectives would be derived by defence 'grand strategy' from policy objectives.

The current Canadian defence policy 2017 "Strong, Secure, Engaged" has stated a new strategic vision and an approach to the Canadian Defence for the coming decades. Canada that is "strong at home, secure in North America, and engaged in the world". A vision for Canada in which it will be: (i) "Strong at home", viz. that defending Canadian sovereignty, the CAF assisting in case of natural disaster, search and rescue operations, and other emergencies; (ii) "Secure in North America", viz. that activeness of Canada in a renewed defence partnership with the U.S in NORAD.; and (iii) "Engaged in the world", viz. that the CAF will play its crucial role in making the world more peaceful and stable. In a less predictable and rapidly changing world, it has been recognised that the difference between domestic and international threats has blurred. Therefore, Canada cannot become strong at home without its global engagements (Government of Canada 2017a: 6, 14).

Canada's Defence policy 2017 made claims: "This is the most rigorously costed Canadian defence policy ever developed". It is fully funded and transparent. To meet Canadian defence requirements at home and abroad, it has been stated that

> the Government of Canada will grow defence spending over the next ten years from $18.9 billion in 2016-17 to $32.7 billion in 2026-27, an increase of over 70 per cent. As a percentage of GDP, total forecasted defence spending has been expected to reach 1.40 per cent by 2024-25 (Government of Canada 2017a: 11, 43).

A flexible, greatly efficient military with the willingness to closely operate with allies and partners is a very useful tool not only for Canadian defence policy but for foreign policy. Thus, the new defence policy of the Canadian government will aggrandise its relations with key allies and partners and provide support to the Canadian joint efforts to combat terrorism, international security threats, and defend the North American

continent. Since the last Canadian defence policy published in 2008, the profound changes have come in domestic and international security environments. Among Canadians, there is strong support for a modernised military force able to meet future defence and security challenges at home, continent, and internationally.

Long-term investment in the CAF capabilities has been mentioned in the Canadian defence policy 2017; though not new. The RCN will be provided with the full funding to "acquire 15 Canadian Surface Combatant ships" essential to replace Canada's active frigates and obsolete destroyers as well as "two joint support ships, five to six Arctic offshore patrol ships, a Victoria-class submarine fleet". This will be one of the largest procurements in the history of Canadian shipbuilding. A recapitalisation of much of Canadian Army's land combat capabilities and ageing vehicle fleets, with modernising of its command and control systems, has also been stated. In addition, the capability of the light forces will also be expanded which will make the Canadian Army more effective and agile in the complex operational scenario. To counter the changed threat environment, enforce Canadian sovereignty, maintain interoperability or meet its commitments to NATO and NORAD as well as to improve air control and air attack capability of the CAF, procurement of 88 advanced fighter aircraft by the RCAF (as a replacement of the aging fleet of CF-18 and the recapitalisation of many of the RCAF "aircraft fleets such as the CP-140 Aurora anti-submarine warfare and surveillance aircraft)" has been stated. There is a critical requirement of an upgradeable, capable, resilient fighter aircraft fleet. Further, Canadian defence policy 2017 has mentioned about the expansion of the operational capacity of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and investment in the capabilities that enable Canada's agile and rapidly deployable SOF so that their unique skills could be provided both at home and abroad (Government of Canada 2017a: 33-34).

The government of Canada is considering Canadian military to evolve in order to meet the future challenges, but a clear inarguable irrefutable fact remains that there is no certainty with regard to the nature and type of those future challenges. Despite various strengths of the Canadian forces, they are "neither readily adaptable nor immediately deployable". It can be indicated by the recent past, regardless of what future is going to be, SOF play an overarching role in filling this gap. The capability

of Special Forces has over the years proven that they are remarkable in meeting a large number of demands. With their focus on the centrality of its counter-terrorism response, SOF provide a world-class capability that is willing to operate domestically coast to coast, on land or at sea, including in a nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological atmosphere (Day 2016: 1). It is generally argued that future threats will be very difficult to identify and very much diverse

Worth mentioning aspect here is that the position of SOF within the CAF is of a standalone independent organisation and a strategic tool for the Canadian government and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Any subordination of SOF will only dilute the very attributes which make it the 'go to choice' for so many operations at a variety of places; it will be "at best or at worse diminished to the point of being nothing more than yet another conventional element". The very essence of this strategic capability will be lost and nothing will be gained. It appears increasingly clear that "instead of being the force of last resort, SOF has become the force of first choice". Canada cannot afford not to enhance SOF. Thus, it should be funded, manned, and positioned accordingly (Day 2016: 2-3).

When it comes to mentioning the major threat to Canadian allies and to international peace and stability, Russia is often mentioned. To fulfil the Canadian part of the obligation to build deterrence, Canada must always be prepared so that it could demonstrate military solidarity with NATO allies. Although Russia is considered the greatest threat at the moment, the most serious long-term danger to international peace and order as well as to allies in the Indo-Pacific region is the drive of China to be the paramount power in that region of the earth and its violation of international norms blatantly. China has been seeking breakthroughs in the East and South China Seas, the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, and the Western Pacific. Canada can do very less to deter such behaviour of China, but politically Canada can provide support to key allies and its trading and investing partners, through deploying more than the extremely small military resources in the Indo-Pacific region it deploys now (Bercuson 2016: 4).

As far as the security threats to Canada at home are concerned, though Canada benefits from the deterrent effect NATO and NORAD provide to it, it has been argued

that new threats and growing challenges in the domains of space and cyber have made deterrence very essential for defence. Deterrence is related to "discouraging a potential adversary from doing something harmful before they do it". A reliable military deterrent works as a diplomatic instrument in preventing conflict. There is a need to maintain advanced conventional military capabilities in order to deter wide-ranging challenges to the world. The concept of deterrence has traditionally emphasised on "conventional and nuclear capabilities, but is also increasingly important to the space and cyber domains" (Government of Canada 2017a: 50). Terrorist and violent extremist organisations such as Al-Qaida and Daesh and the individuals attracted towards the vehement extremist ideologies of such groups pose direct threats to Canada. The traditional notion of deterrence also not seems to apply to non-state actors. Moreover, the proliferation of "weapons of mass destruction", such as nuclear, biological, chemical warheads and of ballistic missile technology for the purpose of delivering these weapons is also an increasingly grave concern.

Among the domestic challenges, the necessity of operating in the Arctic together with the Canadian Coast Guard and allies is also one of the primary ones. As part of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) project is crucial which includes the delivery of 5-6 ice-capable ships to the RCN. "Armed, sea-borne surveillance of Canadian waters" will be provided by AOPS that will enforce sovereignty, cooperate with allies and partners, and provide the Canadian government with awareness of any activity in Canadian waters (Government of Canada 2017a: 35). For stability at home, active dealing of threats abroad, cooperative working with the U.S. to make sure that NORAD is modernised to meet active and potential challenges, and procurement of advanced capabilities to be interoperable with allies and maintaining an advantage over potential enemy forces have been emphasised.

It has been stated that the size of the Regular Force will also be increased by "3,500 (to 71,500) military personnel", which would permit Canada to spread in significant areas such space, cyber, and intelligence. Moreover, the Reserve Force will grow by 1,500 to 30,000; and with the "new operational roles", it would be included into the total force further. This Canadian defence policy has enabled the Reserve Force to "achieve a fulltime capability through part-time service" (Government of Canada 2017a: 16, 33).

For the implementation of new Canadian vision, a new approach to defence has also been stated to be adopted by Canada: "Anticipate, Adapt and Act". So that, Canada could 'anticipate' new challenges, 'adapt' to a rapidly changing security environment to ensure operational success. The new Canadian approach to defence has talked about the adoption of new technologies and methods, and 'act' with more effective and efficient military capability for decisive results. For such purposes, a long-term investment in the CAF will be made by the Canadian Government, as well as the largest commitment of modernisation and capital funding (Government of Canada 2017a: 15).

There will be an acquisition of next-generation assets for space-based surveillance, remotely piloted systems (generally referred to as 'drones') in order to expand Canada's surveillance, Joint Intelligence, and reconnaissance capacity for the CAF (including in the Arctic). These capabilities will ensure the preparedness of the CAF in detecting, deterring, and defending Canada form threats or attacks; detecting, deterring, and defending the North American continent in partnership with the U.S. and through NORAD; and in supporting global stability through leading or contributing forces to alliances such as NATO or coalitions and UN peace operations in deterring and defeating adversaries. Thus, this defence policy of Canada ensures the preparedness of the CAF to defend the country; to meet Canadian commitments or obligations under NORAD (with new capacity in some areas) and to NATO allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and make contributions to international peace and stability. However, all these commitments are not new to Canada (Government of Canada 2017a: 15, 17).

In all Canadian operations, a great role is played by the RCAF and remains in high demand for UN peacekeeping, NATO, and other coalition missions with regard to global peace and security. Therefore, RCAF must have multi-purpose aviation and space-based capabilities which are equally vital to operations at home and the world, integrated with all of the CAF's capabilities, interoperable with key allies, and could adapt to the new technology. The RCAF operations have heavily relied on the fleets of C-17 and C-130J's air transport capability (Government of Canada 2017a: 39).

The RCN must have better understanding and awareness to be capable of adapting to a changing nature of maritime environment and threats. An instance of this adaptability, the Maritime Tactical Operations Group (MTOG) boarding team capability provides new innovative ways to deal with the changing nature of threats related to interdicting vessels at sea. The growing complexity of naval operational missions in the modern changing nature of the threat environment put pressure on the Navy to pursue interoperability with capabilities of the allies (Government of Canada 2017a: 34-35).

Many core capabilities of the Canadian Army, that are fundamental for their future effectiveness as an ever-ready combat-capable force, such as communications, command and control systems, soldier night vision and weapons systems, and logistic vehicle fleets will be recapitalised. Investment in war-fighting capabilities, for instance, ground-based air defence, anti-tank guided missile systems, bridge and gap crossing equipment, and vehicles to better operate in the Canadian Arctic will be continuously pursued by the Canadian Army. These investments in the Canadian Army have been expected to improve interoperability with the RCAF, RCN, SOF, and Canadian allies and partners, with simultaneously maintaining Canada's operational advantage over its potential enemy forces.

Canada should not let the U.S assume it as the vulnerability. Canada needs to very carefully manage increasing "perceived gap" between the threats assumed to be faced by the U.S. and perceived Canadian indifference to or the lack of seriousness for them. By carefully managing the gap, it meant "rediscovering the art of communication and lobbying the U.S. government to help them understand Canadian caveats and governance realities". It does not mean pandering rather it should be understood as the art of diplomacy (Charron 2017: 20). Thus, there is a need to continuously acquire modern capabilities and sustain existing capacity in order to have an operational advantage over potential enemy forces of present and future.

The commitments of Canada to enhanced NATO defence posture are relatively important for the country economically and politically, particularly in terms of expenditures and the "high operational tempo" the CAF maintains. It has been argued by the Canadian government that it intends to simultaneously meet various fighter

commitments, including NATO, NORAD, and other coalition efforts (Rasiulis 2017: 35). Because the operational stress on the CAF will only increase if any announcement is made by the Canadian government to deploy to an unspecified mission (or missions) further. With this, Canada will also become willing to demonstrate the U.S. that while the military expenditures of Canada are below the 2 per cent of GDP target for all members of NATO, nevertheless, Canada has been deploying its military assets actively for the purpose of "common defence objectives" (Rasiulis 2017: 35-36). It has also been argued: "While defence spending is an important part of ensuring appropriate defence capability, it is not the most effective measure of fair burden sharing" (Government of Canada 2017a: 43).

Canada has long been involved in contributing to international situations for the purpose of making the world a safer place, rather than defending its own territory. Any armed threat to Canada may come through the sea, from the air or through cyber. In order to deal with all these, Canada requires a more vigorous capability in all these areas (Pennie 2017: 47-48). As can be seen, in their first year in power, Canadian PM Justin Trudeau sent some more troops (although in a "non-combat" function) to coalition forces involved in fighting against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, and the commitment of more than 450 troops for several years was announced to a NATO small military force to be deployed in Latvia. The promised deployment of CAF personnel to a UN mission might well be the most difficult and dangerous operation (Cessford 2017: 24-25).

Rather than a truly extensive defence review, official Canadian documents only seem "content calling" for restricted review of national strategy, emphasising on equipping a lean CAF (Cox 2017: 8). As has been stated in a document of Government of Canada (2017a), there is an overarching need that the innovation in Canada's defence industry be aligned with the defence procurement needs of Canada.

Personnel, equipment and operations are the three traditional pillars of defence policy. Embracing the idea that military personnel, as exemplified by the phrase "people are our most important asset", are a very crucial component of defence policy is one major departure from the previous defence policy review. Though this "runs the risk of becoming a *cliché"*, but generating a broad strategy so that the atmosphere for the

specialised military could be enhanced, which was particularly missing in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy brought by the government of PM Stephen Harper. In contrast, unprecedented support for Canadian military people and their families has been promised under new defence policy by the Trudeau government. Almost half of the defence budget has already been kept for military personnel. A second most significant departure is found in the way in which the Liberal government has emphasised the reinvesting and modernising the core CAF capabilities, after recognising that the capabilities of CAF are in parlous shape as a consequence of the failure of previous governments, Liberal and Conservative, in achieving much needed defence procurement in a timely as well as cost-efficient manner (Hlatky and Nossal 2017: 2-3).

Carefully costed out massive reinvestment embraced by the Trudeau government (demonstrated the differences between funding on a cash basis versus an accrual basis) is the real departure from past defence policy reviews. But while the government is to be commended for its efforts to explain the intricacies of defence funding, there can be no escaping the reality that the recapitalisation of the CAF will take place in the future, in fact, beyond the next election. It is like promising Canadians in 2017 that the defence budget in 2031 would be so and so (Hlatky and Nossal 2017: 3).

Conclusion

In sum, this Chapter has dealt with the Canadian defence policy outlook, its defence problem of prevailing in the defence of Canada and emphasised on prioritising defence of Canada and the continent. The pressure of increasing the size of Canadian defence spending; interoperability with Canadian allies and partners; issue of indecisiveness over the procurement of Lockheed Martin F-35 JSF as a replacement its aging fleet; Canada's latest defence policy with new strategic defence vision and approach; Canadian need to be well equipped, ever-ready, greatly efficient and effective military as well as modernisation of its forces have also been stated in the present Chapter.

As it has already been mentioned, since the end of the Second World War, the Canadian defence, in terms of policies and thought processes, has been a matter of three expanding concentric circles: defence of Canada, defence of North America, and meeting international security threats at their source before they knock on the Canadian shores. These three core missions demand that the CAF be highly deployable, be capable of being sustained at a great distance and be interoperable with the U.S. and the NATO allies.

The conundrum of Canadian defence has precisely been this: the strategic culture of Canada, the size of its armed forces, defence spending and the level of defence modernisation – all indicate that Canada has never been up to the task. And this capacity gap between Canada and the U.S. seems to be only expanding with time. Besides, Canada faces complex and very specific defence and security challenges, given its geography, demography, economy and geopolitics.

A key issue in the Canadian defence and security policy has been that of resource allocation. The allocated military resources in order to meet defence needs have never been sufficient enough since the Second World War. Canada's allocation for defence has consistently been the lowest among the NATO members since 1960. Participation with allies in military expeditions and to thus meet threats to the Canadian defence and security far away from the Canadian borders and shores have been the crucial part of the strategic culture of Canada for over hundred years. Canada also understands that the country is indefensible without the help of the U.S. and is also indefensible against the U.S. These factors and considerations have consistently favoured the idea of a reduced military spending and reduction in the size of the CAF.

The overarching Canadian goals are to reinstate its "constructive leadership" in the world and to promote Canadian values and interests; serve Canadian security and its economic interests; and make a contribution to a prosperous peaceful world. Canada has always been eager to share the burden as well as responsibility for the purpose of making a safer world. Canada has a long history of working with allies and partners in a collaborative manner in order to prevent international crises or conflicts, including Canadian support for peace and stabilisation operations. Canada's commitment to

“collective security” can be observed in its time-honoured support for its primary alliances: UN, NATO, and NORAD.

But the longer-term problem of CAF, need of modernisation and a major reinvestment sooner rather than later, still remains the same. Although this Canadian defence policy review has promised a lot more, particularly its significant attention to military personnel, the CAF is not provided with the capabilities in a shorter period of time which it requires to be “Strong, Secure, and Engaged”.

As has been argued by Stéfanie von Hlatky and Kim Richard Nossal (2017) that whether it is UN, NATO or coalition operations, allies pay heed to “boots on the ground”, viz. that the best allies make instant contribution when asked, are self-sustaining in operation areas and, most preferably, do not exit abruptly. In these terms, Canada has been a steady partner in the last decade and also sending signals, through leading a NATO battle group in Latvia, providing support to the U.S. in defeating ISIS in Iraq and by making its troops available for other missions when needed, that this role of Canada will continue. The CAF is visible and that is what counts.

CHAPTER – III

POST-9/11 CONUNDRUMS IN CANADA-U.S. DEFENCE RELATIONS

The present Chapter deals with the various dimensions and dilemmas in the defence relations between the two North American neighbours, namely Canada and the United States (U.S.). No gainsaying, the two share the unique and most intimate bilateral relationship in the world that spans culture, commerce, defence, security, economic development and cross-border movement of large populations. As for the defence dimension of the bilateral ties, this includes, to name just a few, border security, shared continental defence, counter-terrorism, cross-border intelligence, defence procurement, joint training exercises, overseas military deployments, interoperability under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). The defence ties are buttressed by the facts that the two countries share a common cultural, historical and political heritage as well as over 5,525 miles of a shared border – which is, so-to-say, the world's longest undefended and porous border. Besides, very importantly, there is a very deep interdependence that binds the two economies together. All these varied factors impinge on their defence and security perceptions and ties.

The terrorist attacks on the U.S. territory on 11 September 2001 (9/11) produced many repercussions for Canada-U.S. defence and security relationship. However, for Canada, it was the day after on 9/12 which tested its defence preparedness and capability; and the very foundation of its bilateral defence relations. The world's longest undefended border was shut, and so was the U.S. airspace. Thousands of air flights destined to the U.S., with several hundred thousand passengers, were diverted to Canadian airports. It was a challenge for Canada and for its relations with the U.S. to muster required relief and logical resources. The terrorist attacks threatened the NATO and other allies of the U.S.; and alliance was quick in invoking Article 5 on 12

September 2001 for the first time in its history, pertaining to the collective defence principle of the Washington Treaty which says "attack on one is an attack on all".

As for North America, 9/11 produced continent-wide security upheavals: the incidents interrupted the continental economic integration process; issues of sovereignty and border security re-emerged in the national political agenda of the two countries; defence and security gained priority over all else as the U.S. began going unilateral in adopting defence and security measures. In nutshell, 9/11 led to security transformation of the continent. On the one hand, it called for intense cooperation between the two North American partners and, on the other hand, produced political tension related to national sovereignty and domestic matters. Canada was roundly criticised for its slack immigration and refugee policies and for its inability to properly guard the borders. Canada resented the overbearing security measures that came to be adopted by the U.S. immediately after 9/11.

9/11 produced many conundrums for Canadian defence and for Canada-U.S. defence relations. A core issue that emerged in the immediate aftermath was how to reconcile the economic interdependence of both with the imperative of "national security" and territorial protection. As the present Chapter details, the 'interdependence-sovereignty syndrome' remains an intractable issue between the two countries. Many of the defence-related conundrums actually deepened after 9/11. Issues related to an enlarged and now "real" security threat, enhancement of national defence capability and coordination with the U.S., and alignment and adjustment with new defence and security measures and responsibilities came to face Canada. There are several key issues. The present Chapter covers them under four themes – each dealt with under a separate section: the imperatives and measures for closer border policy coordination between the two countries; Ballistic Missile[10] Defence (BMD) of U.S. for the defence of North America and Canada's continued reluctance to participate in it; the revamping of the NORAD after 9/11 and its implications for Canadian defence and its

[10] The first use of guided cruise and ballistic missiles was done by Germany during the Second World War when it attacked Northern Europe and England with V-1 and V-2 cruise and ballistic missiles, respectively. Despite being so inaccurate, the use of these missiles resulted in tens of thousands of casualties (NASIC and DIBMAC 2017: 4).

defence ties with the U.S; and 'defence-against-help' approach and continental defence and security. The Chapter ends with a brief summary and concluding observations.

Imperatives and Measures for Closer Border Policy Coordination

The terrorist incidents brought to light the differences in security perceptions of Canada and the U.S. In fact, 9/11 altered and interrupted many of the usuals in Canada-U.S. relations.

Between the two North American countries, deep interdependence has been a long reality. The 1989 bilateral Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the 1994 trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are affirmations of the reality of manifold interdependence between the two North American countries (Burney and Hampson 2014: 21; and James and James 2014: 190). 9/11 interrupted the process of North Americanisation of the three economies (including Canada, the U.S. and Mexico). The U.S. became highly sensitive to the security dimension sidelining the integration process. U.S. President George W. Bush was candid: 'security trumps trade'. It meant that Canadian-U.S. relations slipped back and security threats emerged as the main focus. Immediately thereafter the U.S. took a series of security steps: for instance, the 2004 *U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act* required everyone entering the U.S. (including the U.S. citizens) to show their passports or other crucial documents. Since 2008, a new documentation requirement, the *Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative* (WHTI) has also been in place.

The Canada-U.S. border (viz the 49th parallel) of 5,525 miles (8,891 kilometres), including the 1500 miles border shared by Alaska, British Columbia and Yukon is taken into account, has generally been known as the longest undefended and porous border in the world. The citizens of both North American neighbours were not required to show passports to visit one another's country before 9/11 (Hlatky and Trisko 2012: 63; Fry 2012: 880, 886). It is also important to know that 90 per cent of the Canadian population resides within 160 km (or 100 miles) area of Canadian-U.S.

border which means daily movement of a large number of people including the indigenous and the 'metis' across the borders.

On 11 September 2001, an unprecedented incident changed this. Nineteen terrorists related to the Al-Qaeda terrorist group which operated out of Afghanistan hijacked several passengers planes and crashed them in the World Trade Centre, New York and other places. The 9/11 attacks immediately increased the security concerns at the border which had serious repercussions on the flow of goods and people. Since then, the management of the border has become a perennial concern for policymakers and major stakeholders in Canada and the U.S. (Hlatky and Trisko 2012: 63).

For the U.S., since the Japanese bombing against the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in 1941, it was the first major attack on its territory. The largely undefended and porous border drew immediate security attention that in future terrorists could cross the borders with Canada or Mexico. In essence, 9/11 was an attack on the homeland and came to be seen as the border security shock. It challenged prevailing definitions of security and left a profound impact on the nation's psyche. In the U.S., the threat perceptions had not only changed but both domestic and international security policy called for recalibration (Bowman 2005).

Several measures came to be adopted that called for closer border policy coordination between the two countries:

(i) In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, U.S. took a series of unilateral steps to strongly control the cross-border movement of goods and people. Intrusive and dilatory inspections increased to a great extent such as repeated inspections for the truck, trains etc. travelling across the border and the number of U.S. agents at Canada border from 340 to over 22,000. In addition to various security measures, U.S. increased the number of radar towers, surveillance flights, radiation detectors and remote motion sensors all along the border (Fry 2012: 882-883).

(ii) Post-9/11, U.S. signed several new bilateral border security agreements with Canada and Mexico in order to facilitate policy coordination at the

Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. borders. Moreover, the Canadian and Mexican governments were compelled to adopt new American security requirements so that the effects of 9/11 on trans-border trade and commerce could be minimised (Paquin and James 2014: 1-2). The new measures imposed, what came to be called, 'security tariffs' on goods traded across the border. With the new passport regulations, the number of Americans visiting Canada decreased to a great extent due to their unwillingness to show passports or enhanced driving licences which became mandatory to re-enter the U.S. (Fry 2012: 881).

(iii) Immediately after 9/11, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created by the Bush administration which pointed out the increasingly strong trend towards centralisation on the part of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol; U.S. Immigration and Customs enforcements and the U.S. Coast Guard became the components of DHS (Fry 2012: 882, 885). Canada followed and created its own Department of Public Safety in 2003 (later renamed as Public Safety Canada), which was expected to do the similar coordination functions as DHS. In an attempt to conform to American expectations, Canada also brought *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act* in 2009 which imposes stricter measures for crossing the border according to U.S. recommendations (Hlatky and Trisko 2012: 70-71). Fry (2012) writes that the creation of DHS had been thought to create greater cooperation between and among various agencies and to avoid struggle among them. However, over time, DHS became a large and unwieldy bureaucratic organisation. DHS consists of twenty-two agencies and almost 200,000 employees; further, the department continues to expand. It is argued that due to DHS dominated security decisions in the U.S., NAFTA has become less effective. In addition, nothing substantial could be done for the implementation of a "NAFTA-plus" arrangement which was initiated to aggrandise future business competitiveness on the continental level (882, 890).

Building 'smart' border:

The U.S. defence and intelligence budget doubled within ten years of 9/11. But the threat to the border could not be mitigated. It also gradually came to be realised that border had nothing to do with 9/11; its management has, therefore, to be unshackled from the unifocal policy of the war on terrorism. Thus, in order to deal with the complicated border security challenges, improve security along their shared border and to rejuvenate management of the border, another initiative known as "Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competition" was launched on 4 February 2011 by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and U.S. President Barack Obama (Holland 2014: 244; and Burney and Hampson 2014: 23). Within a decade, the border had become 'thick', thanks to the myriad of measures and mechanisms. By 2011, the two countries ostensibly were feeling the need to 'thin' the border to some extent. The "Beyond the Border" declaration envisioned the two countries "working together, not just at the border, but beyond the border to enhance our security and accelerate the legitimate flow of people, goods and services". It identified four major areas of cooperation: cross-border law enforcement; dealing with threats as early as possible; increasing trade, the growth of the economy and making jobs; and maintaining necessary infrastructure and cyber security. A "Beyond the Border" working group was set up, comprising representatives from relevant departments and agencies of both the countries, to deal with cross-border and intergovernmental coordination and cooperation (Fry 2012: 883). Worth mentioning here is that in March 2005, the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America had been created by the leaders of the U.S., Canada and Mexico – for exactly the same goals of enhancing regional security and cross-border economic cooperation that the "Beyond the Border" action plan of 2011 was expected to do. Since late 2009, the SPP did not remain active in the plans of any of the three continental governments.

The adoption of the 'smart' border approach was seen by many as an uncharacteristic on the part of the U.S. that it was willing to re-conceptualise its approach to its boundaries and its acknowledgement that additional security cannot be achieved through unilateral actions alone (Meyers 2003). Canada-U.S relations have for long been asymmetrical in terms of power and capability. Hlatky and Trisko (2012) argue that by making Canada a part of the creation of a 'smart' border, the U.S. manifested

that it does not hold an "overriding position in border management". The engagement of "secondary" states is seen as absolutely necessary to ensure the security of the "dominant" partner. Both Hlatky and Trisko further argue that management of border is full of issues and tensions. It requires the participation of all levels of government within both countries for better border management.

Canada-U.S. border is no ordinary border; it is the economic lifeline for Canada and, to a good extent, for the U.S. too. Following 9/11, U.S. paid scant regard to the bilateral relationship and the Canada-U.S. border became dysfunctional which impaired economic benefits to both countries (Burney and Hampson 2014: 22; and Fry 2012: 884). Unilateral measures soon came to slow down and make expensive the trans-border movement of goods, capital and people. The two North American countries share one of the largest trade relationships in the world (Hlatky and Trisko 2012: 63). The U.S. has beset with debt and deficit for long which worsened in the years following the 9/11 terrorist events. The global financial crisis pushed the American economy towards recession, one of the worst since the 1929 Great Depression. Given the deep economic interdependence, Canada could not have remained immune to the woes from the American economy. However, there were other factors that came to its rescue; foremost being the high commodity and energy prices in the decade of 2000s. Canada faced a milder recession compared to the U.S; its growth was rapid than that of the U.S. It also had a good fiscal policy and a lower rate of unemployment over the previous decade. In consequence, Canada did make itself less dependent on the U.S. through diversification of its trade and investment and by exporting less to the U.S. (Fry 2012: 879-881).

In brief, 9/11 complicated the border-related relations between the two countries. More manpower, the number of mechanisms and greater resource allocation impacted economic and security exchanges between the two countries. Canada was often at the receiving end to U.S. unilateral and intrusive measures. Some of the lessons could be instructive: a 2010 report by the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) observed that almost a decade after 9/11, only a small segment of the border could actually be secured. Out of the nearly 5,525 miles of common border in total as mentioned above, only 1,007 miles had "full situation awareness" by the U.S. authorities; despite spending so much in order to protect the border from exterior threats. In addition, over

thousands of changes in regulations (that impact upon exporters) are annually introduced by the U.S. and Canadian authorities together. On cross-border shippers, various types of fees have been imposed so that the costs of adding U.S. personnel and other facilities at the border could be mitigated. Numerous imposed fees and delays at the border actually impair both the U.S. and Canadian businesses; the U.S.-owned businesses in Canada also suffer (Fry 2012: 885, 889).

Frank P. Harvey (2014) states that in order to achieve greater defence and security relations, irritants between Canada and the U.S. must be avoided. The security priorities in the U.S., as well as Canada, will continuously be shaped by the primary social and psychological pressures for the foreseeable future. According to Harvey, public misperceptions of the probability of terrorist threats are a significant dimension of the 'homeland security' dilemma. The expectations of policymakers about public perception of threat, resulting in the overestimations by the public, greatly influence the government's security policies and practices. Thus, there is a need to resolve the 'homeland security' dilemma. Harvey further suggests that Canada should adopt a proactive security agenda in order to protect the Canadian economic interests rather than a proactive economic agenda.

The New Continental Defence Paradigm and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)

As mentioned earlier, the Canada-U.S. defence relationship is known as closest between any two sovereign countries since the Canadian defence has been fully integrated[11] into the larger context of U.S. defence concerns (Bercuson 2003: 121-122). For its entire history, Canada has relied on the protective umbrella of a great power – first, Great Britain and, for the last one hundred years or so, the U.S. Canada allied with the U.S. closely after it gained *de facto* independence from Britain in 1931. The Canada-U.S. defence partnership got firmly established in 1940 when U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed a bi-national defence for the continent. The new defence and security arrangement came under the Ogdensburg Agreement. With this, to address the continental defence and security matters, the Permanent Joint

[11] Close operational cooperation exists between the naval and air forces of Canada and the U.S. And a myriad of military equipment are supplied by the Canadian defence contractors to the U.S. Armed Forces (Bercuson 2003: 122).

Board on Defence (PJBD) was established in August 1940. As a new strategic collaborative partnership, PJBD was a key link between both the countries throughout the period of Second World War. In 1946, the new Joint Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was also formed which maintained the cooperative approach to continental defence after the end of the Second World War (Stancati 2006: 106-107).

Partnership in the multilateral NATO in 1949 and the establishment of the bi-national NORAD in 1958 institutionalised the defence and security relations between Canada and the U.S. Since then, the various dimensions of the defence relationship between the two North American neighbours have been inter alia, border security, shared continental defence, cross-border intelligence and procurement, joint training exercises, overseas deployments, interoperability under the NATO or NORAD and, counter-terrorism (Holland 2014: 242; Jones 2011: 457).

Canada-U.S. defence relationship regularly implicates Canada's both domestic and foreign policies. For example, there was domestic support for the Afghanistan mission at least in the initial stages after 9/11. But Canada refused to join the Iraq invasion in 2003. Some argue that Canadian participation in Afghanistan mission was partly to mollify the U.S. for being 'unwilling' to support it in the invasion of Iraq (Holland 2014: 241-242; Jones 2011: 455; Burney and Hampson 2014: 22). Afghanistan proved to be the largest and most costly mission in faraway Kandahar since the participation of Canadian troops in the Korean War. In 2011, PM Stephen Harper announced the end of the Afghanistan mission. The question which emerged was what did it mean to abandon the Afghanistan mission in terms of Canada's defence relations with U.S. and alliance commitment within NATO? This very issue has been dealt with in great detail in the fifth Chapter of the present thesis.

Harper government decided to join the U.S. and NATO allies to enforce the United States (UN) 'no fly' zone over Libya and then go for a violent overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Canada again joined U.S. and NATO allies in 2014 in the bombing of Syria. Some analysts suggest that Canada was doing all this essentially to mollify the U.S. But the new Liberal government of Justin Trudeau withdrew from the mission in Syria immediately on coming to power.

In terms of defence spending, almost 4 per cent of GDP is spent by the U.S. on defence; on the other hand, slightly over 1 per cent of GDP is spent by Canada (Bercuson 2016: 4; and Furtado 2016). Thus, both the countries have a huge inequality in military spending in terms of the country's GDP. This comes as another dilemma in Canada-U.S. defence relationship. Canada spends less on its defence and often criticised for being a 'free-rider'[12] on American defence expenditure. It is also found to be the 'first follower' of U.S. in defence and security matters. It is also argued that Canada may become "militarily irrelevant" since it has a conservative attitude towards the technological transformation of its defence capability. On the other hand, U.S. culture supports the development and incorporation of technologies in the defence and security sector.

Of late, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have begun advocating higher expenditure and technological transformation so as to become interoperable with their American counterparts. Experts have identified two areas of technological innovations where Canada could be up to the U.S: Special Operation Forces (which are equipped with highly progressive instruments and weapons); and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In terms of both cost and versatility, UAVs, or the drones as they are more commonly known, have many advantages in comparison of highly technologically advanced fighter jets. UAVs can be used for surveillance as well as for search and rescue operations or to engage in warfare. It has been observed that in the Canadian quest to maintain interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO allies and achieve technological distinction, space assets are proving increasingly important to the CAF. Drones can also be useful for the surveillance of the Arctic; though their usefulness is denied by some scholars. Need to note is that none of the Canadian UAVs has been armed so far since serious ethical and diplomatic issues have been associated with the deployment of armed UAVs (armed UAVs have been used by the U.S., not Canada) (Holland 2014: 242-243).

[12] According to the theory of free-ride, when the stronger partner in any alliance bears all the costs, it makes the weaker partner willing to free ride and enjoy the benefits of the alliance without adequate cost contribution (Olson 1971, cited in Hlatky and Trisko 2012: 69)

Before 9/11, the North American defence was based on the Cold War pattern, responding to strategic bombers or possible missile[13] attacks. Post 9/11, the Canadian role in continental defence changed overnight and expanded from peace-time based one to war-time based. A new "continental defence paradigm" started according to 21st century threats that are considered as amorphous, unambiguous and asymmetrical, with their source in non-state actors and 'rogue' and 'failed' states.

The old Canada-U.S. defence and security paradigm had started with the establishment of NORAD; the new paradigm was based on 'homeland security' which took the form of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The U.S. unilateral approach to security gained further strength. In the defence and security relations of both the countries, a clear gap emerged indicating a further shift in political power in favour of the U.S. Within the U.S. too there was a discernible shift – the Department of Defense became more important than the Department of State (Stancati 2006: 104, 108, 112-113). U.S. pressure on Canada increased immediately after 9/11 in order to beef up the Canadian military for both offshore operations and continental defence (Bercuson 2003: 122-123).

USNORTHCOM, activated in October 2002, was a new U.S.-only military organisation with unique Hemispheric responsibilities. Its creation was historically significant since the newly defined geographic area of defence responsibility that emerged included both Canada and Mexico. Its creation revived the national sovereignty concerns of Canada. The Canadian government's main concerns were how the Canada-U.S. defence and security partnership would be affected by USNORTHCOM since its establishment questioned the utility and relevance of NORAD, which was a strategic partnership between the two based on deterrence and a bi-national retaliation to an attack (Paquin and James 2014: 1-2; Stancati 2006: 103-

[13] There is a difference among a bomb, rocket and missile. A missile is a rocket-propelled weapon, created to deliver an explosive warhead with high accuracy and speed. A bomb is just a warhead, once released is completely governed by the laws of ballistics; it means gravitational force is the only force which acts upon it after the release. If any type of propulsion system is attached to a bomb, it turns into a rocket. Due to its means of propulsion, a rocket can go farther and faster in comparison of a bomb. And if a rocket is attached with a guiding and control mechanism, it turns into a missile. Based on origin and target, missiles are classified accordingly, such as: (i) surface-to-surface missile (SSM); (ii) air-to-surface missile (ASM); (iii) ballistic versus cruise missiles (on the working principle); and (iv) strategic and tactical missiles (on their purpose) (TNN 2010).

104, 109). Meanwhile, on 5 December 2002, the "Diplomatic Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation" between Canada and the U.S. had been signed (Stancati 2006: 110).

Canada faced one of its worst conundrums in the formation of the USNORTHCOM. While forming the Command, the U.S. had asked Canada to join in but in the absence of a timely response by Canada, U.S. unilaterally went ahead in setting up the command. It is suggested that in the wake of 9/11, the Canadian sense of urgency was not as great, compared to that of the U.S., though intensely sympathetic response had been given by the Canadian government in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. Analysts also say that Canada underestimated the seriousness of the American intent. But when the U.S. created USNORTHCOM unilaterally, Canada feared its own exclusion from the continental defence. In sum, Canadian role as a "trusted partner in continental defence" was tested after 9/11, and it was once again found wanting by the U.S. (Stancati 2006: 108-113).

In later years, Canada tried to mend the fences. In May 2006, a Canadian initiative resulted in the agreement to aggrandise defence cooperation between Canada and the U.S. Its main goal was to help Canada deal with the trend of marginalisation that began after Canada failed to join USNORTHCOM. Harper government, in particular, sought to bridge the defence and security gap and to bolster Canada's role in the continental defence. As noted earlier, to deal with the complicated inter-state border security challenges, the 'Beyond the Border' was launched by the two countries on 4 February 2011 (Holland 2014: 244).

The cornerstone of the new continental defence paradigm is the Ballistic Missile[14] Defence **(**BMD) system. Bush administration proceeded in 2002 for the deployment

[14] Ballistic missiles are classified according to their range, viz. that, "the maximum distance measured along the surface of the earth from the point of launch of a ballistic missile to the point of impact of the last element of its payload". In the U.S., the missiles are classified into four types: (i) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) (over 5,500 km); (ii) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) (3000 to 5,500 km); (iii) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) (1000 to 3000 km); and (iv) Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) (up to 1000 km). The Russian system classifies ballistic missiles as: (i) Strategic (over 1000 km); (ii) Operational-Strategic (500-1000 km); (iii) Operational (300-500 km); (iv) Operational-Tactical (50-300 km); and (v) Tactical (up to 50 km). Tactical missiles are used to hit closer targets (TNN 2010).

of a limited missile defence system. Initially, in August 2004, Canada had argued that the bi-national NORAD could provide support to the missile defence system for the defence of the continental North. In order to indicate Canadian interest in joining BMD, then Minister of National Defence, David Pratt, had written a letter to the U.S. Secretary of Defense in 2004. The letter stated:

> It is our intent to negotiate in the coming months a missile defence framework memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the United States with the objective of including Canada as a participant in the current U.S. missile defence program and expanding and enhancing information exchange. We believe this should provide a mutually beneficial framework to ensure the closest possible involvement and insight for Canada, both government and industry, in the U.S. missile defence program. Such an MOU could also help pave the way for the increased government to government and industry to industry cooperation on missile defence that we should seek to foster between our two countries (SECD 2014).

However, in February 2005, Canadian PM Paul Martin stated that Canada would not take the direct part in the BMD programme for the defence of the North. Much before that, U.S. had unilaterally gone ahead with the missile defence project. Canada's approach is difficult to fathom. It closely supports missile defence within NATO but, oddly enough, does not want the similar missile defence set-up of the Canadian North. Of course, the national security interests of the U.S. do not seem to be threatened by the continued reluctance of Canada to completely accept a BMD function for NORAD; however, Canada has to someday face the issue of continental strategic defence.

Several questions related to the BMD of the continent are germane: whether Canada should be defended under the missile defence system (a U.S. Senate committee report had robustly emphasised this point in 2014) or not? What should be done by Canada with regard to its own air defence that comes under NORAD? Be that as it may, the reality is that it is the BMD, or Ground-Based Midcourse Defence, which is the specific system within the U.S. global BMD architecture that is used to protect Canada as of today. The U.S. BMD uses ground-based missiles to intercept and kinetically destroy an incoming ballistic missile before it re-enters the Earth's atmosphere (SECD 2014).

As for the ballistic and cruise[15] missiles, many are armed with "weapons of mass destruction"[16], they are seen as a grave threat not only to the U.S. and its territories but also to the U.S. and allied forces overseas. The proliferation of missile technology has increased the threat of ballistic and cruise missiles[17]. More than 20 countries possess ballistic missile systems and missiles Many countries are attracted towards missiles because of their effective use as a deterrent, symbol of national power or a tool of coercion against an enemy with a "formidable air defense system, where an attack with manned aircraft would be impractical or too costly"; have high accuracy, the advantage of less training, maintenance, and logistic requirements in comparison of manned aircraft; and most preferably, if armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads, even restricted use of these missiles can have most dangerous consequences (NASIC and DIBMAC 2017: 4).

A ballistic missile is deployed to strike a predestined target. The route of the ballistic missile can generally be classified into two phases: (i) it is launched in a way that the most of the fuel of the missile is burnt in attaining the desired velocity in the first phase called the 'boost phase'. The missile can be provided with the guidance only during the powered phase of flight. And (ii) the second phase begins when the rocket engine shuts down. After this, the "laws of orbital mechanics and ballistics" govern the missile, which follows the flight guide of its powered phase to strike a predestined target. Though a ballistic missile can be detected, its interception is almost impossible. A cruise missile would do less damage but would be far more accurate and can also be air launched. It is a "small pilotless aircraft" that delivers conventional warheads. It is designed with wings, an engine and has very high

[15] Cruise missiles are generally categorised through their intended mission: as a land attack cruise missile (LACM) or an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). They are further categorised through their launch platform: aircraft, ship, submarine, or ground-based launcher (NASIC and DIBMAC 2017: 34).

[16] These missiles are armed with warheads both conventional and non-conventional, which are capable of having tens to hundreds of times more powerful explosive force than the atomic bombs used in the Second World War. The conventional warheads mainly rely on the detonation of an explosive. On the other side, non-conventional warheads involve "weapons of mass destruction" (such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) and nonlethal warheads (which are designed to disable equipment and do not harm personnel) (NASIC and DIBMAC 2017: 6).

[17] Over the last 30 years, ballistic missiles have been used in many conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq war, the civil war in Afghanistan, Yemen war, Persian Gulf conflicts in 1991 and 2003, in Georgia and Chechnya by Russia, and very recently in the Syrian and the Ukrainian conflicts. Cruise missiles were used by Russia for the first time during the Syrian conflict (NASIC and DIBMAC 2017: 4).

accuracy. A cruise missile also has an Inertial Navigation System (INS) (which is used in aeroplanes too) (TNN 2010).

However, missile defence cannot be considered a panacea; moreover, it is certainly not a substitute for nuclear deterrence, at least for the foreseeable future. It has been argued that missile defence will make increasingly significant contributions to underwriting not only central U.S. strategic deterrence but also to supporting U.S. extended deterrence and security assurance relationships (Thränert and Kartchner 2015: 155-156).

For the purpose of countering the threat of the ballistic and cruise missiles, the responsibility remains on the U.S. Armed Forces through deterrence and, if needed, active threat suppression which includes "attacks on missile systems (before launch and in flight) and their supporting infrastructure". Because the threats aggravated by ballistic missile delivery systems are expected to perennially grow and become more complicated[18]. The ballistic missile systems of adversaries are being more accurate, mobile, dependable, and survivable with time as well as achieving higher ranges. "Hypersonic glide vehicles" delivered through ballistic missile boosters are growing as a great threat that will result in even more new challenges to missile defence systems (NASIC and DIBMAC 2017: 4, 38).

Getting back to Canadian response, it had in 2005 refused to participate in the U.S. BMD programme. So in order to consider the influence of this policy decision better and whether Canadian security and foreign policy interests are better served by maintaining this position, the Canadian Senate Committee had in 2014 wanted expert suggestion on: how the threat scenario has progressed since 2005; the present condition of the U.S. BMD; how the BMD strategy of Canada integrates with its commitments to NATO and its defence and security partnership with the U.S.; and what possible opportunities will there be for Canada if it decides to completely participate in BMD? (SECD 2014).

[18] Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran all have an active, ambitious and diverse ballistic missile development programme.

The questions are what would participation in BMD mean? And how can Canada contribute to BMD? It has been argued that full participation of Canada in BMD would align its present policy and commitments to NATO and NORAD. The Canadian participation will bring its officials or military personnel on the same table to talk about BMD and how Canada can be better preserved as well as where, when and whether we should intercept a missile. Canadian contribution could be made through various ways such as through research and development directed towards enhancing the BMD system, supply of additional radar tracking sites and, in order to protect Canada and North America, Canada can become part of the integrated command structure (SECD 2014).

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in its report in 2014 entitled "Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence: Responding to the Evolving Threat" recommended that Canadian government, through a partnership with the U.S., should participate in a North American BMD programme. This report examined the Canadian decision of 2005 not to join in the BMD programme. The report observed that for the common defence of North America, participation in BMD would enhance as well as reinforce Canada's role in NORAD. The participation would accord Canada the privilege of providing inputs into the use of BMD assets which Canada does not enjoy presently. Such participation would affirm the commitment of Canada and importantly the U.S. to the defence and security of Canada. The report concluded that Canadian participation would reinforce its national sovereignty and the preservation of its territorial integrity (Lang and Dallaire 2014).

As for NORAD, the strategic investment of Russia in its nuclear forces and the increasing worldwide reach of Russian precision-strike capability; the growing access of North Korea to new, mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and the erratic behaviour of its leader Kim Jong-un; disconnect between Chinese affirmation of "no first-strike policy" and its growing nuclear forces with increasing protection from any devastation; and Iran due to its cyber and missile capabilities, despite the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) framework which ensured that nuclear programme of Iran will be peaceful, are included in the major concerns or threats that have preoccupied NORAD (United States, Department of State 2016; and Charron

2017: 18). The ongoing efforts of many countries to acquire long-range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles capabilities were also the reasons for Committee to study the BMD.

An interesting and crucial question is how far the threats are real? The answer is that threats which were hitherto in the realm of the theory have become real and practical. Does Canada face the prospects of a ballistic missile attack? Lieutenant General Parent, then Deputy Commander of NORAD said: "The threat is real". It should not be assumed by Canada that under the prevailing U.S. BMD system, all of the Canadian territories will be protected by default. Since Canada is not a participant of BMD programme, decisions regarding where, when and whether to intercept an incoming ballistic missile are made by the U.S. alone under its domestic defence command, viz. the USNORTHCOM, not under the bi-national NORAD structure (SECD 2014).

As mentioned in the second Chapter, the concern with regard to threats emanating from within North American continent, in the form of growing home-grown violent extremism, is what is new for NORAD and for the militaries of Canada and U.S. since 9/11 attacks. Although, the mandate of NORAD lacks in dealing with land-based events, both the countries have been investing significant resources on information collection, surveillance, analysis, legislation, and anti-terrorism initiatives including many governmental departments as well as allied partners so that such attacks at home could be prevented in future (Charron 2017: 18).

Ever since, U.S. began perceiving the proliferation of missile technology as a very serious and an urgent challenge, missile defence acquired a very crucial place in the overall defence posture of the U.S. (Thränert and Kartchner 2015: 159). The concept of a 'new triad' was supported by the Bush administration in its 2002 Nuclear Posture Review which included defences (including missile defence); offensive strike forces (both nuclear and non-nuclear); and a more vigorous nuclear infrastructure. With this, it had been claimed that this would reduce the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons while, simultaneously, underscoring the much value missile defence has for deterrence posture (Office of Public Affairs and Office of the Secretary of Defense 2002). In of 2004, the three-stage Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) had been deployed in California and Alaska. A third site had been planned in 2013 which

consisted of the deployment of an X-band radar in the Czech Republic and two-stage GBIs in Poland (United States, Department of State and Department of Defense 2013).

In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the administration of President Barrack Obama declared that “effective missile defenses are an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen regional deterrence against states of concern” (United States, Department of Defense 2010). Thus, Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) was conducted by the Obama administration and the results of which were released on 1 February 2010. This policy statement validated the role of missile defence in the U.S. national security posture. It had been clearly stipulated in the 2010 BMDR that the U.S. will "defend its homeland against limited ballistic missile attack” (United States, Department of Defense 2010).

It is to be noted that the BMD was originally anticipated to be a NORAD mission. The U.S. went ahead with BMD system only after Canadian showed its reluctance to participate. It is argued that Canadian refusal to join the BMD could have even led to the demise of the NORAD. Be that as it may, Canadians argue that their direct participation in the BMD system is not mandatory for NORAD’s continuance. The question of whether Canada should review its stand on BMD is again on the agenda of the present Justin Trudeau government. It is suggested that with BMD, Canada will be better protected by NORAD (Jockel and Sokolsky 2015: 190-191, 194-195).

Worth pondering aspect is that NORAD is tasked with only tracking of ballistic missiles and the missions to defeat them relies on the USNORTHCOM and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The fact is that Russia has both the reach and capability to destroy major North American cities while North Korea has certainly been working constantly to gain this capability. With this, the issue of BMD and Canadian participation is raised (Charron 2017: 18-19).

The arguments against joining the BMD are well-known and to some extent well-worn out too. The Canadian scholars tend to take a high moral pitch. It is said that refusal to join BMD rests on moral grounds: weaponisation is evil by itself, and that it is very much un-Canadian besides being a very costly affair. The free-ridership is also

evident in Canadian response: Canada has the comfort that any missile headed towards Canada would anyway be countered by the U.S. (Jones 2011: 458-459).

It needs to be mentioned here that there is no hundred per cent guaranteed perfect defences against ballistic missiles. Only a limited number of launches can be responded with the current very expensive defence system focused on North America, and Canada and the U.S. cannot be fully covered, no matter Canada participates or not. Nevertheless, double advantages of "agreeing" to participate in BMD alongside the U.S. have been perceived: (i) with its participation, Canada may be allowed to at least argue for protecting certain primary Canadian cities in the situation of making tough choices. However, for a number of reasons, there will be no absolute guarantee that the Canadian cities will be preferred to be protected over an American city. And, (ii) participation will show Canada as a perfect U.S. ally in every domain rather than one who chooses to assist with the continental defence (Charron 2017: 19).

However, Canada would not be allowed to join BMD for "free" by the U.S. While the BMD protection is unlikely to expand by more interceptors on the territory of Canada, investment in other required areas, for instance, research and development, aging defence infrastructure like the NWS and towards future 'offsets' could be offered by Canada. However, the more pressing concerns with regard to cruise missiles and the limited defence system of both Canada and the U.S. against these missiles or the defence against those ballistic missiles which carry numerous warheads are not addressed by the BMD. A change in emphasis from defence only against the "arrows" (viz. that against incoming missiles) to defeating or deterring the "archer" (the individual or countries with aggressive intentions) has been called for by the analysts (Charron 2017: 19).

As for the overall Canadian defence policy, two phases have been noted by Justin Massie (2014): in the years immediately after 9/11, a hybrid position came into view as the Canadian government did some balancing against the U.S. interests while simultaneously "band-wagoning" with the U.S. It was a case of "soft balancing" on one hand and "band-wagoning" on the other. The second phase has begun in more recent years: Canada is now clearly aligned with the U.S., along with its support for military procurement and deployment. A convergence with the U.S. security policy

has been attained by Canada. The present government headed by Justin Trudeau has agreed to review Canadian stand on joining the U.S.-led BMD for North America.

There is another interesting explanation of Canada's continued dilemma over BMD. Philippe Lagassé (2014) argues that in the decade following 9/11, cooperation between the U.S. and Canada was extensive on border security and counter-terrorism. However, in the area of bilateral defence, both countries failed in obtaining "full cooperation" despite the fact that defence cooperation had intensified after 9/11. One of the reasons given by Lagassé is that due to domestic politics and other reasons, the government of Canada does not take much interest in intertwining the Canadian defence with the U.S. Its primary interest in the decade since 9/11 has been to keep trade flowing across the border. The idea of deeper bilateral defence architecture seems unattractive to Canada.

Nevertheless, the issue of BMD came to reignite an old debate about defence expenditure. Truth is, the Canadian defence budget has been slashed by over 20 per cent since 2010 and the CAF works with obsolete weapons. In June 2006, equipment purchase of $15 billion had included ships, trucks and aircrafts; such an announcement to acquire new assets had come after two decades. Similarly, the 2010 decision to purchase new fighter jets, for perceived military threats in the Arctic, was one of the largest-ever defence acquisition announcement in Canadian history ($9 billion for the purpose of purchasing and up to $7 billion extra for maintenance) (Holland 2014: 246; Jones 2011: 460). Indecisiveness with regard to the replacement of C-18 aircraft fleet with F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is ongoing.

It is argued that Canada is significant to the U.S. defence due to geographical reasons. From the inception of their defence relationship, the fundamental nature has been the same; the U.S. takes the initiative while Canada responds despite being reluctant or hesitant. However, a contrary pattern is observed when it comes to the trade relationship of both the countries, viz. that Canada initiates while the U.S. responds (Bercuson 2003: 124). The revamping of the Canadian military and the interoperability of the Canadian and the U.S. forces (Burney and Hampson 2014: 23) have often been seen as the U.S. interests, but now increasingly becoming the Canadian interests too as can be observed in the second Chapter of the present thesis

which mentions the latest Canadian defence policy review, its new vision and new approach to the Canadian defence.

Renewal of NORAD

The bi-national aerospace defence structure had been formed to protect the whole of North America during the period of Cold War to tackle the Soviet air attack and against ballistic missile attack (to the extent possible). Iconic of the close and inseparable defence of the two countries, NORAD was designed for a coordinated defence, integrating the several radar detection systems (such as Pine Tree Line, Mid-Canada Line, Distant Early Warning (DEW) Radar Line, and Ballistic Missile early warning system) (Jones 2011: 456). Thus, the NORAD closely collaborates with homeland defence, security and law enforcement partners to prevent air attacks against the North American continent (NORAD 2013).

However, with the end of the Cold War and the revolution in military technology, many a time scholars have questioned the continued utility of NORAD. After 9/11, the questioning became more intense with commentators proffering the arguments of a diminished conventional danger to Canada and changed defence command structures. It has been argued that the emergence of USNORTHCOM (the first American combatant command which made the North American continent as its area of operations) in 2002, the USSTRATCOM, the Canadian decision in 2005 of not joining the BMD, and the establishment of Canada Command (eventually merged into Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC)[19]) all point towards the demise of NORAD. It is feared that NORAD would be marginalised. Post-9/11, NORAD is increasingly seen through the lens of obsolescence. Joseph T. Jockel (2007) has argued that in order to save NORAD, the Paul Martin government's decision on missile defence should be reversed. If it is not done, NORAD will soon become obsolete. With NORAD being sidelined, it is believed that its role would be usurped

[19] Worth mentioning here is that Canada created many operational commands including Canada Command, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, Canadian Operational Support Command, and Canadian Special Operations Command. In a major restructuring of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the three operational commands (Canada Command, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, and Canadian Operational Support Command) were merged to form the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) in May 2012.

by the USNORTHCOM[20]; and, at best, NORAD will have only some limited operational functions or could even morph into a lesser being.

A contrary viewpoint holds these apprehensions as being without any basis in facts. It is said that the U.S. has never insisted on the Canadian participation in BMD; and that missile defence has remained separated from the question of NORAD (Stephenson 2011: 4; Fergusson 2015: 196; and Jockel and Sokolsky 2015: 188). The roles of NORAD are watching for threats, warning and responding in which it has proven itself effective. Moreover, the bi-national cooperation is seen as outstanding in terms of NORAD. NORAD has evolved with time in order to meet the changing threat and relentlessly play an essential role in the defence of Canada and the U.S. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 point towards the continued prominence of NORAD to North American security. In order to counter domestic airspace threats, a potent military response capability is provided by NORAD to civil authorities; it also assists in fighting the flow of illegal drugs into the continent through passing the information to civilian law enforcement agencies. The unique NORAD capabilities and proven abilities will remain an overarching part of homeland defence (NORAD 2014).

Apart from defence, NORAD has also contributed to the enhanced sovereignty of Canada. Over the years, the capability advances of NORAD have contributed to the Canadian sovereignty. It can be argued that Canada's sovereign responsiveness had increased significantly with the Early Warning radar systems since they provided the first full situational awareness in the expansive northern territory of Canada. In the 1960s and 70s, the threat of the ICBM rose. Then, the function of Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) of ICBM launches had been taken up by the NORAD worldwide. This too became a source of critical information to the decision-makers of Canada. The functions of NORAD to "detect, identify, assess and warning" have a natural extension in the name of defence from ballistic missiles. It provides an opportunity for Canada to make an influence on policy and plans. Moreover, it should be noted that NORAD has evolved from the defensive force of

[20] The Command Center of NORAD-USNORTHCOM serves as a central collection and coordination facility for a worldwide system of sensors designed to provide a clear picture with high accuracy of any aerospace threat to the Commander and the leaders of Canada and the U.S. (NORAD 2014).

the Cold War and has been resilient when it comes to its mission delivery. It has always enhanced Canadian sovereignty (Stephenson 2011: 4-5, 7, 10).

The Brian Mulroney government made a decision

> to proceed with the North American Air Defence Modernisation (NAADM) programme (it replaced the DEW Radar Line with the North Warning System (NWS) and creation of five Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in the Arctic region provided Canada with the means to enforce Canadian sovereignty over the Canadian airspace via NORAD (Jockel 2007).

In the post-Cold War context during the 1990s, NORAD airspace operations shifted from "perimeter defence of the cruise missile/manned bomber towards air sovereignty missions (counter-drug operations, particularly)". However, the defence and security scenario of the U.S. (and the North American continent) changed permanently after the 9/11 attacks on its territory. And the continental defence relationship altered significantly with the emergence of USNORTHCOM. Aftermath of 9/11, Canada agreed that the Commander of USNORTHCOM can serve as the Commander of NORAD and for the merger of the NORAD Command structure into that of USNORTHCOM. Here it can be argued that whatever the scenario on either side of the border, NORAD has received full political support from the governments on both the sides. Armed forces in both Canada and the U.S. have always held NORAD relevant. The reason is that the fundamentals that laid the foundation of NORAD in 1957 remain unchanged (Stephenson 2011: 4-5).

As has been argued by Lagassé (2014) that immediately post-9/11, Canada-U.S. continental defence cooperation became a centre of the vigorous debate. So, the issues such as the meaningful expansion of NORAD, meaningful interaction between and among NORAD, USNORTHCOM and CJOC as well as to revive an official role in missile defence failed to snatch the attention of policymakers of both the countries.

Today, the task of defending the continent is shared by the USNORTHCOM and CJOC with NORAD. To the two national Commands, NORAD is an essential component of their overall effectiveness. A careful coordination between the two national commands and NORAD is required since both Canada and the U.S. hope to maintain their unilateral options when it comes to react to air threats. NORAD is a

very flexible institution and with the two national operational commands, it operates efficiently and effectively. It adheres to domestic laws and regulations when it comes to domestic air security mission (Stephenson 2011: 6-7). Time-sensitive decision-making is what is necessary in the context of Canada.

Worth noting is that NORAD basically had two primary missions for North America: (i) Aerospace Warning[21] and (ii) Aerospace Control[22]. Since its renewal in May 2006, NORAD Agreement added (iii) Maritime Warning Mission[23] for North America or "Maritime Domain Awareness" (MDA) (NORAD 2014). It has been said that the bilateral defence relationship can be reinvigorated by the greatest potential of the Maritime Warning Mission through leveraging the integral relationship of NORAD with the CJOC and USNORTHCOM as well as their domestic security partners (Stephenson 2011:7-8; Fergusson 2015: 197). However, a variety of military as well as civilian organisations (including the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Coast Guard, and the Royal Canadian Navy) already share the responsibility for maritime homeland defence and security in both the U.S. and Canada. So it was uncertain from the starting what exact function will be played by NORAD, which seems as a key structural limitation. Interesting to ponder that NORAD is an inactive receiver of maritime information and cannot give tasks to others to give information (Jockel and Sokolsky 2015: 192).

Alan Stephenson (2011: 8) argues that the importance of NORAD to Canada can be understood by identifying three essentials that make up NORAD: (i) "the essence", (ii) "the institution", and (iii) "the service delivery". It is unquestionable that security and sovereignty of territory are something that every nation seeks, so do Canada. (i) The "essence" of NORAD for Canada is that through this institution, it can best achieve its goals via contacts with senior U.S. defence and security officials and

[21] Aerospace Warning includes the monitoring of man-made objects in space; the detection, validation and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles through mutual support arrangements with other commands (NORAD 2014).

[22] Aerospace Control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defence of the airspace of Canada and the U.S. (NORAD 2014).

[23] Maritime Warning Mission includes a shared awareness and understanding of the activities conducted in the U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas and inland waterways (NORAD 2014).

making an impact in decision-making with regard to the defence of the continent. In addition, with the existence of NORAD, there will be lesser incidents of unilateral American action on the continent as well as more strategic discourse among senior government officials. (ii) As an "institution", NORAD is unique bi-national command and control structure in the world. It is an embodiment of great friendship between two nations, fosters their enduring partnership built on trust and most importantly, it gives the stage for transnational action that too in an efficient, timely, transparent manner. (iii) It can be demonstrated by the progress of NORAD for last almost sixty years that there is a plentiful possibility for the "service delivery" of a variety of defence and security capabilities in a bi-national manner. "Service delivery" is the area where it should be determined by Canada that: what are its own top interests to follow as well as where these interests fit in with the U.S. defence and security priorities? Since the actual advantage of NORAD defence cooperation for Canada lies in its burden sharing.

By giving the instance of NORAD, it can be best understood that collaboration and cooperation do not lead to subjugation. Today, with CJOC and USNORTHCOM, NORAD is an equal partner in their mission of defending North America from foreign intrusion as well as in protecting each nation from non-state actors. The political will on the part of Canada and the U.S. to ensure the success of the Maritime Warning Mission hopefully clear that NORAD will continuously grow more efficiently. The mission of Arctic All-domain Awareness for NORAD will enhance the Canada-U.S. defence relationship as well as ensure Canadian sovereignty through the close relationship of NORAD to CJOC.

'Defence-against-Help' and Continental Defence and Security

It appears that post-9/11, there is an inclination for a national approach to continental security that has guided Canadian thoughts and actions. The Norwegian scholar Nils Ørvik had, way back in 1973, described it as 'defence-against-help' approach. After 9/11, Canadian has struggled to demonstrate itself as a dependable continental security partner; at the same time, it has remained wary of getting too much subordinated to overriding U.S. defence and security interests and postures in North America.

Explaining the ‘defence-against-help’ framework, Ørvik mentioned, when it appears that the forces of a country are not able to deter an attack by the advanced forces of a neighbouring country, a small country could do one of the three things in such a situation: self-help (increase its military strength); borrowed help (rely on another state for its defence); and helplessness (maintain purely symbolic armed forces) (Lagassé 2010).

In reality, states do not have to choose; small states often end up combining all three aspects in their defence policy and preparedness. The special geostrategic situations of the state in question also decide the choice of approach, according to Ørvik. For instance, a smaller sandwiched between two powerful adversarial states would likely ‘self-help’ to convey to its larger neighbours that it is neither a vulnerable one to attack by either of them nor a hurdle to the self-defence of the larger neighbour. Thus, ‘defence-against-help’ approach allows the smaller state to prevent being “helped” by its bigger neighbour as well as preserve its national sovereignty.

During 1981-83, Ørvik had suggested that Canada should opt for ‘defence-against-help’ strategy. Lagassé (2010) writes that in Ørvik’s opinion, Canadian decision makers had underestimated threats to the sovereignty of Canada and, consequently, mistakenly assumed symbolic forces as sufficient for Canada. Since the leaders of Canada failed to fully grab these facts, they did not see the truth that the U.S. is as major a threat to the Canadian sovereignty and national security as any other aggressive opponent. There has been a strong belief in Canada that, given the closely intertwined relations and the familial ties, the Canadian and U.S. interests and threat perceptions would hardly deviate. Ørvik noted that this would be correct in only one situation if Canada is prepared to agree to a “subservient role in the relationship”. The Canadian territory’s strategic significance to the U.S. and North American security are indivisible.

Canadian leaders and defence policy planners have also been influenced by the age-old Canadian dictum: Canada cannot defend itself against the U.S. and it need not defend itself against anyone else. Regardless of the fact how the continent has been attacked, both Canada and the U.S. would be affected. The U.S. recognises this reality

and would never permit the security of the U.S. to be at stake just because of the Canadian inability to defend itself. The U.S. government would 'help' Canada in defending its territory with or without Canadian consent.

Ørvik had suggested that the implementation of 'defence-against-help' strategy was required in order to protect Canadian sovereignty, national security and self-respect. Besides, a stronger and augmented Canadian military will be "capable of credibly and independently defending Canada" (Lagassé 2010: 468).

A number of Canadian scholars have used the 'defence-against-help' framework to describe and analyse the post-9/11 foundations of the Canada-U.S. continental security relationship, and the Canadian government's defence policies. It is suggested that Canada has always been in the situation that there is a possibility of unsolicited help by the U.S. With heightened U.S. defence and security concerns in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist events, its propensity to go unilaterally and brook no discussion much less any opposition to its defence initiatives, and expand and upgrade its defence apparatus for North America, Canada fell back on 'defence-against-help' strategy, which any way it has pursued intermittently since the end of the Second World War.

In Ørvik's view, a successful use of 'defence-against-help' strategy depends on three factors:

(i) There should be the strategic significance of a smaller state's territory to its larger neighbour. The smaller state would need to invest in its armed forces as great as its strategic significance. When a smaller state reaches at the high end of the significance scale, the distinction between 'self-help' and 'defence-against-help' strategy disappears.

(ii) The armed forces of the smaller state would need to have enough training, size and equipment in order to defend itself or at least deter against its larger powerful neighbour's opponents. Though, 'defence-against-help' cannot be considered an ideal strategy for small powers that are caught between two or more powerful neighbours.

(iii) A non-alignment policy towards all states should be adopted by the smaller state except its larger neighbour and its allies (Lagassé 2010: 466).

Alongside stronger armed forces, Ørvik had urged the Canadian government to prioritise defence of its national interest. It meant (i) to recognise the importance of protecting Canadian sovereignty; (ii) to address national security gaps which could prompt American military to help; and (iii) to negotiate a more equitable security arrangement with the U.S. (Lagassé 2010: 468).

As has been discussed above, on the issue of missile defence, no Canadian money or territory seems to be required by the U.S. The U.S. seemed interested more in the Canadian political support. Scholars and military specialists have also at times suggested that Canada comes up with its own missile defence programme; other analysts more realistically have spoken of Canada fairly 'sharing the burden' instead of 'free riding' all the time for its national defence.

What the discussion in the preceding pages highlights is that a sizeable, full strength Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are not necessary for the effective defence of North America. Besides, the broader security of North America is largely a civilian affair. Today, 'defence-against-help' is as much about getting better police and intelligence efficiency as about anti-submarine warfare or aerospace defence. Post-9/11, Canada increased expenditure so as to enhance its police, intelligence gathering and surveillance capabilities. On continental defence, Canada seems to attain its 'defence-against-help' objectives (Lagassé 2010: 474). Post-9/11, Canada showed both willingness and capability to assume larger responsibility for the defence of the North American continent; and the larger world in fact. And a more closely intertwined defence and security ties with the U.S. In the decade following 9/11, the Canada-U.S. relationship has evolved substantially without any doubt.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this Chapter dealt with the various dimensions and dilemmas in the defence relations between Canada and the U.S. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. territory produced many repercussions on the relationship of both in the form of many conundrums for the Canadian defence and for Canada-U.S. defence relations. It led to security transformation of the continent. On the one hand, 9/11 called for intense cooperation between the two North American partners and, on the other hand,

produced political tension related to national sovereignty and domestic matters. The 'interdependence-sovereignty syndrome' emerged as an intractable issue between the two countries. All this meant that the Canadian-U.S. relations slipped back. With time the two countries ostensibly felt the need to 'thin' the border to some extent, to deal with the complicated border security challenges, and to rejuvenate management of the border, then they brought "Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competition" in 2011. The present Chapter raised the issue of management of border which is full of issues and tensions.

The Chapter stated that a huge disparity in military spending of both the countries as a portion of their GDP is another dilemma in Canada-U.S. defence relationship. Alongside the Chapter detailed the new "continental defence paradigm" which started post-9/11 according to 21st century non-traditional threats. As the new paradigm was based on 'homeland security' under the USNORTHCOM, it revived the national sovereignty concerns of Canada as well as questioned the utility and relevance of NORAD. Canada feared its own exclusion from the continental defence. This Chapter also brought the issue of renewal of NORAD into the light. With the end of the Cold War, the revolution in military technology, the creation of USNORTHCOM and CJOC, many a time scholars have questioned the continued utility of NORAD. It is feared that NORAD would be marginalised and its role would be usurped by the USNORTHCOM. But as the roles of NORAD are watching for threats, warning and responding in which it has proven itself effective. Moreover, the bi-national cooperation is seen as outstanding in terms of NORAD. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 point towards the continued prominence of NORAD to North American security. Today, the task of defending the continent is shared by the USNORTHCOM and CJOC with NORAD. To the two national Commands, NORAD is an integral part of their overall effectiveness. The political will on the part of Canada and the U.S. to ensure the success of the Maritime Warning Mission hopefully clear that NORAD will continuously grow more efficiently.

The Chapter further mentioned the issue of the BMD system which is the cornerstone of the new continental defence paradigm and the Canadian reluctance to join the BMD programme. The Chapter tried to answer some questions with regard to the Canadian participation in BMD and its contribution to BMD. What would be meant

by the full participation of Canada in BMD? The Chapter concludes by stating that for the common defence of North America, participation in BMD would enhance as well as reinforce Canada's role in NORAD.

CHAPTER – IV

CANADA-U.S. ARCTIC RELATIONS

The present Chapter describes the Canadian-United States (U.S.) Arctic relations. This Chapter is divided into five parts or themes. The first part is an introduction to the Arctic region before moving further to the study of the intrinsic relationship of Canada and the U.S. in the region. The second part of the present Chapter deals with the jurisdictional disagreements and disputes over the region. The third part mentions Canada-U.S. relations in the Arctic through North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), post-9/11. The fourth part states Canadian sovereignty claim and U.S. indifference to them. This portion deals with various aspects of differences as well as convergences between them. The last and fifth part of the present Chapter deals with concerns which have arisen over 'military build-up' or modernisation in the Arctic

Introduction of the Arctic

The Arctic is located above 66.5° North latitude of the Earth. It is the northernmost region of Earth, a region around the North Pole; generally known as the area within the Arctic Circle. Within this Arctic Circle lies the Arctic Ocean basin. The Arctic Ocean[24] covers an area of about 5.4 million square miles; it comprises a roughly circular basin. It is connected to the Atlantic Ocean through the Labrador Sea and the Greenland Sea, and to the Pacific Ocean by the Bering Strait.

The Arctic Region is entirely covered by water much of which is frozen in the form of glaciers and icebergs (that make up about 20 per cent of Earth's freshwater supply).

[24] The Arctic Ocean includes Baffin Bay, Barents Sea, Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea, East Siberian Sea, Greenland Sea, Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, White Sea and other tributary bodies of water.

The frozen seawater is called sea ice[25]. The Arctic is an expansive and tremendously inhospitable region of the Earth. Thus, human access is limited only to particular times of the year.

For oceanographic purposes, the Arctic region is described as that area of the northern sea normally beleaguered by ice. With an "areal extent of 13,900,000 kilometres (km^2)", the Arctic Ocean is the smallest in the world, yet "contains the widest of all continental shelves, which extends 1,210 km from the coastline at some sites off Siberia". The central basin has a "mean depth of 3,700 metres (m) and is divided by three submarine ridges. The Arctic Ocean is nearly landlocked by Alaska" (the U.S.), Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Norway and Russia, and the central area is ice-covered the whole time in the year. The primary inflow of Arctic Ocean occurs

> through the Fram Strait between Greenland and Spitzbergen (Svalbard), with important inflow also occurring through the Bering Strait between Alaska and Siberia and across the Barents Sea shelf.

The Bering Sea receives water from the Gulf of Alaska

> through the Aleutian Island chain, and the Chukchi Sea receives water through the Bering Strait. Outflow from the Arctic Ocean occurs primarily through the Greenland Sea into the Atlantic Ocean and forms the East Greenland Current (National Research Council 1995: 7).

Moreover:

> The Arctic Mid-ocean Ridge is also known as the Nansen-Gakkel Ridge. The Amerasian Basin includes the Canada Basin, Makarov Basin, Mendeleyev Ridge, Alpha Ridge, and Chukchi Borderland (National Research Council 1995: 8).

Surface water in the Arctic Ocean is fresh and cold. Except for the ice-free shelf waters, which remain warmer during summer to a few degrees Celsius, mean surface temperatures remain close to the freezing point of seawater. As has generally been observed in the oceans of the world, bottom water temperatures are among the lowest and on an average "0.53 to 0.96° C in the Canadian and Eurasian basins", respectively (National Research Council 1995: 9). Ice cover varies seasonally in the Arctic Ocean

[25] Sea ice can be understood as a sheet of floating ice on the surface of the sea, which is smaller than an ice field.

and marginal seas. Ice builds from year to year in some areas. As a reaction to pressure made through the winds and currents, the ice deforms continuously.

The Arctic region has an increasingly geostrategic importance. It is one of "least-explored" and "least-penetrated" areas of the Earth whose legal status is not determined yet (Lackenbauer 2010: 880 and Janicki 2012: 87). However, it has been expected that perennial reduction of multi-year sea ice[26] in the Arctic over the coming decades will certainly lead to so much increase in human activities in the Arctic Ocean.

The Arctic region has been isolated for long, but due to the global warming and, consequently, rapid melting of its ice caps and the retreat of sea ice, it has become a more accessible and increasingly important zone which seems a potential source of future extraction of resources. The Arctic region is believed to have ample amount of resources. It is claimed to have approximately 13 per cent of the world's undiscovered oil reserves (viz. approximately 90 billion barrels). And undiscovered gas reserves in the Arctic are estimated by the United States Geological Survey to be "30 per cent of the world's undiscovered natural gas and 20 per cent of the world's liquid natural gas resources" (viz. that, "1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids"). In total, "approximately 22 per cent of the world's undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves could potentially be found in the Arctic Region" (United States Geological Survey 2008; United States Navy 2014: 12).

The region is claimed to have $1 trillion worth of minerals. A plethora of precious elements, such as platinum, palladium, gold, diamonds, silver, copper, iron, coal, zinc, nickel, lead and other rare earth minerals are believed to be concealed under the Arctic region (USCG 2013: 9, 12). The Arctic is seen as a region having a great potential to provide the world with a source for feasible future energy in the form of deposits of methane hydrate (a form of natural gas). The Arctic fascinates as a viable and realistic reservoir of resources to be exploited.

[26] Multi-year ice is sea ice which at least survives one melting season (i.e., one summer).

Moreover, fresh water, commercial fishing and shipping make it much alluring to the countries of the world. Abundant bio-resources are also possessed by the Arctic region in addition to mineral reserves. More than 150 types of fish species are found in Arctic waters, such as cod, herring, butterfish, flatfish and haddock, which are known as important varieties for commercial fishing internationally (Kochemasov et al. 2009, cited in Sergunin and Konyshev 2017). Various distinctive animal species such as walrus, polar bear, white whale, and narwhal are also found in the region.

Jurisdictional Disagreements and Disputes over the Region

In the Arctic region, there are conflicting geopolitical, economic and other interests of the Arctic States.[27] From a geographical-political standpoint, five Arctic countries (known as Arctic Five) have territorial possession within the Arctic region: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Russia and the U.S. (Huebert 2003 and Janicki 2012: 88), who have great interests in exploring, controlling and exploiting the resources of the region. As for Denmark, according to Danish legislation, Greenland is an essential component of the territorial possessions of Denmark.

The countries interested in the Arctic are striving to mark their presence in the region and prove the legitimacy of their claims to exploit their respective areas in an unrestrictive manner. For increased interest, an additional incentive is the expected shrinking of the Northern polar ice, which could facilitate access to resources that have been assumed to be located under the Arctic seabed (Janicki 2012: 87).

Various conflicting interests have led to disagreements about jurisdiction in some maritime zones. For control and the ownership over the different parts of the Arctic region, all Arctic countries are involved in disputes. Since there is a lack of clear laws, a number of borders in the Arctic region remain disputed, the most intense disputes are:

[27] The Arctic States are any and all regions bordering the Arctic Region. The Arctic States are: Alaska (United States), Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden.

- over the Beaufort Sea and the status of the Northwest Passage (NWP) between Canada and the U.S.,
- over Hans Island between Canada and Denmark (via Greenland),
- over the Lomonosov Ridge (a mountain range across the region) among Canada, Denmark and Russia,
- over the maritime border of the Bering Sea between Russia and the U.S.
- the Lincoln Sea Dispute between Canada and Denmark.

It had been announced by Russia in 2001 that the Lomonosov Ridge, an "undersea mountain range that runs across the seabed between the New Siberian Islands and Ellesmere Island and passes close to the North Pole, is a geological prolongation of the Eurasian shelf". It had been argued that Russia will be enabled by this fact to extend its continental shelf to more than 350 nautical miles and, simultaneously, "get exclusive rights to the economic exploitation of that area". The Russians presented evidence in support of its claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). However, before Russia collected enough additional information to confirm its claim, Canada and Denmark came up with a joint counter-declaration (Holdys 2006, cited in Janicki 2012). It had been postulated by Canada and Denmark that the "Lomonosov Ridge is actually a prolongation of North America", which, if proven, would grant the right to a significant portion of the Arctic to these two countries (Holdys 2006, cited in Janicki 2012; Howden and Hoist 2005).

It is unambiguously clear by the competition of the Arctic countries that the dormant mineral resources under the seabed of the Arctic Ocean are the primary reason behind the countries' attempts to grab the largest possible area of the region and the primary source of conflict among them (Beauchamp and Huebert 2008; and Janicki 2012: 91). One of the goals of this present Chapter is to find out the extent to which the various actions of the countries competing in the race for the Arctic are truly driven by the intentions of grabbing exclusive rights to the exploitation of Arctic mineral resources, as they themselves declare.

Worth noting here is that the first document to outline the legal status of marine areas is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), popularly

known as the Law of the Sea Convention. It was signed after several decades of international negotiations. It has distinguished between 11 categories of waters of which five, in particular, are of special relevance to the Arctic: (i) territorial sea, (ii) exclusive economic zones (EEZs)[28], (iii) continental shelf, (iv) international waters (high seas), and (v) the area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, viz. that the seabed and ocean floor (UNCLOS 1982).

Territorial waters or sea stretches from the baseline of a coastal state and is considered as an essential component of the country's territory. It is elaborated as "the water line farthest from shore at low tide to a point located no more than 12 nautical miles into the body of water" (UNCLOS 1982: Articles 3, 5-7). Except for a debate going on regarding the political standing of the Northwest Passage (first known as the Strait of Anian) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the extent of the territorial waters in the Arctic region is generally not in question (Janicki 2012: 89).

The Law of the Sea Convention warrants the expansion of the continental shelf "up to more than 350 nautical miles from the baseline" if it has wider-than-average continental margin. In order to get this right, it needs to be demonstrated that "a part of the ocean floor regarded as not belonging to a continental margin does indeed form part of it". The Law of the Sea Convention provides a signatory state a period of ten years after its ratification of the Convention so that they could provide such evidence in order to prove their right to a given marine area (UNCLOS 1982: Annex II, Article 4).

Along with the continental shelf recognised by the Law of the Sea Convention, the EEZ includes "marine areas that extend to 200 nautical miles from the baseline". The state that possesses the EEZ and continental shelf enjoys "exclusive rights to the economic exploitation of the sea zone, which includes rights to fishing and exploitation of deep water and seabed resources", while recognising that "all other states have complete freedom of movement for their vessels within the EEZ", as well

[28] Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond a coastal state's territorial sea over which some of the state's rights are extended, viz. that, the respective state has the authority to exert its sovereign rights over, including the exploration and exploitation of any natural resources that may be present (UNCLOS Art 56).

as the authority to lay pipelines and submarine cables there (UNCLOS 1982: Articles 56 and 58). The root of many international conflicts is the "actual extent" of the EEZ and continental shelf of any coastal country, given the potential economic benefits.

International waters (high seas) allow complete freedom of navigation to all vessels as well as the freedom to realise any form of commercial or economic activity (UNCLOS 1982: Article 87). The provisions in Article 89 of the UNCLOS automatically preclude any claim to the international waters (high seas), only needs the expansion of a state's continental shelf to guarantee exclusive exploitation rights in the claimed area.

As for seabed and ocean floor areas, these lie outside any EEZ and are placed under special protection by the UNCLOS. According to the principle of "common heritage of mankind", the jurisdiction of seabed and ocean floor areas and "the exploitation of minerals located under seabed are inalienable rights of all countries, regardless of their geographic location" (UNCLOS 1982: Preamble, Articles 136 and 137). When it comes to international waters, just some boundary changes in the continental shelf can grant a coastal country "the exclusive rights of exploiting the resources" which are expected to be under the seabed area beyond its EEZ.

In 1996, in order to facilitate cooperation in the Arctic, the Arctic Council was established by Ottawa Declaration as a high-level intergovernmental forum based on consensus. Though not a governing body, the primary institutional framework for international Arctic issues is provided by the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council not only consists of Arctic nations: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S., but six non-governmental organisations (NGOs) representing most of the Native groups who live above the Arctic Circle are also the permanent participants. These include:

> Arctic Athabaskan Council, Aleut International Association, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous People of the North, and Saami Council. Observer status to the Arctic Council can be applied by non-Arctic states, inter-parliamentary organisations, and nongovernmental organisations (USCG 2013: 14).

As far as disputes are concerned, some of the Arctic countries who are involved in disputes have tried to reach a solution through the UNCLOS[29] and the CLCS. However, a constructive solution could not be reached which could bind those involved in claiming or disputes to abide by it, because both UNCLOS and CLCS lack the mandate to impose "legally binding" decisions or provisions in case of any maritime dispute (Foizee 2016). Such lacking of the binding legal regime makes the space for intense maritime and territorial disputes.

Interesting to ponder is that of the five Arctic states, the Convention has been signed and ratified by four: Norway (in 1996), Russia (in 1997), Canada (in 2003) and Denmark (in 2004). The U.S. has neither signed nor ratified the UNCLOS. Thus, the U.S. cannot be bound under the laws of the Convention (Janicki 2012: 89-90), which is the only document that governs the Arctic in the absence of any other treaty to regulate the region, as it is viewed as a threat to their national economic and security interests.

It is said that though the U.S. is not a signatory to the UNCLOS, but it accepts and acts according to the Convention's provisions such as pertaining to traditional uses of the oceans, like navigation and over-flight. Hence, along with four other coastal states of the Arctic (i.e., Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland), the U.S. adopted the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008 (USCG 2013: 14).

The growing interest of non-Arctic or non-bordering states in the region is also one of the most significant recent activities. Non-Arctic countries such as China and the U.K. are exerting influence for commercial and research interests in the Arctic. For non-Arctic countries, the primary concern is the Arctic Five countries' EEZs as well as the economic routes and naval advantage the Arctic provides. As has been mandated in the Article 56 and 57 of the 1982 UNCLOS (as previously mentioned, it regulates

[29] The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted on 10 December 1982 and came into force on 16 November 1994. It sets a framework for areas that are beyond the jurisdiction of a state. The UNCLOS determines the legality of the territorial claims on the Arctic and defines the rules regarding the use of the seas of the world for each nation. It sets forth a comprehensive legal framework for activities on and in the sea, the seabed, and its subsoil, as well as the protection of the marine environment and its natural and cultural resources.

Arctic territorial claims) that the coastal states have exclusive EEZs extended to 200 nautical miles from the baseline used to define the country's territorial sea that allows the Arctic Five to explore or exploit and conserve or manage the natural resources of the Arctic (Spohr et al. 2013: 21).

Moreover, there is a debate going on with regard to the political standing of the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (Northeast Passage). Canada has the second largest coastline in the Arctic Ocean and asserts its 'sovereignty' over it (McRae 2009; and Janicki 2012: 89). Canada wants the U.S. to agree with the Canadian 'sovereignty' over NWP as well as to resolve the conflicting maritime boundary claim over the Beaufort Sea without disturbing their crucial bilateral economic and defence relations. The U.S., however, refuses to recognise any territorial claims over any part of the Arctic and argues that Arctic waters are 'international waters' (high seas) open for navigation to all and regards the NWP as 'international waters'. In U.S. Presidential National Security Directive 66 (2009), the U.S. indirectly argued against Canadian 'sovereignty' claim over a portion of the Beaufort Sea.

Worth noting point here is that the Canadian Arctic is home to more than 100,000 people only, and Canada comprises 40 per cent of Arctic territory and the Canadian Arctic includes over 100,000 miles of coastline. It has been argued that the Canadian Arctic might be viewed as "architecture without building" viz. that, a more of a tentative mindscape within Canada than established landscape (James and James 2014: 187).

Interesting enough, it has been argued that the recognition of the claims and the expansion of the continental shelves according to the UNCLOS is not going to significantly impact on the total amount of resources available to any given country. The reason given for this argument is that most of the Arctic reserves lie in the areas that already form part of one or more EEZs (Janicki 2012: 95). Thus, it is worth noticing that the scramble occurs "over the central part of the Arctic Ocean, while most oil and natural gas discovered to date in the Arctic lie within the EEZs of each state" (Bird et al. 2008).

Given the increasing accessibility of the Arctic Region, as has already been stated earlier, it is very likely that exploration of such untapped resources will be viewed as a very alluring source of commercial opportunities for long-term investments by multinational corporations. However, many substantial challenges lie there for future production in the region due to the technical, financial and environmental risks associated with operating in the Arctic region. For instance, high operating costs are associated with oil and gas production in the Arctic Region. Thus, before building infrastructure, it needs to be considered carefully by companies that whether it would be commercially feasible to make investments. In regions, which are seasonally free of ice,

> the ability of commercial and military vessels to manoeuvre will remain significantly hindered due to unpredictable locations and movement of ice formations as well as the inadequate and incomplete nautical charting and aids to navigation in many portions of the Arctic Ocean (United States Navy 2014: 7-8).

The vast mineral resources of the Arctic region are claimed to hold significant wealth potential only if cost-effective and feasible means can be employed for extraction and transportation to markets (Conley 2013). It seems, however, irrational to presuppose that any state will start exploiting Arctic reserves at the uppermost latitude and the greatest depth, to extract the least approachable reserves in the region. The possibility of exploiting these distinct reserves is therefore very far, which is a rationale to "believe in the strictly political motivation behind each state's involvement in the Arctic dilemma", and not economic (Janicki 2012: 94).

It has been argued that in comparison of the rest of the globe, the Arctic is warming faster. In the last almost hundred years, average Arctic temperature has reached the level of almost double. The receding of ice has resulted in an increase in human activity, in resource extraction, fishing, and tourism which may lead to environmental challenges (United States Navy 2014: 10).

It has been expected that during the period of 2020 to 2030, there will be increasing levels of retreat in ice and increasingly open Arctic Ocean waters.

> By 2025, the Bering Strait will see up to 175 days of open water (and 50-60 days of shoulder season). These figures increase to 190 days of open water (and up to 70 days of shoulder season) by 2030. For the Northern Sea Route,

> predictions are for up to 45 days of open water (with 50-60 days of shoulder season) by 2025, increasing to 50-60 days of open water by 2030 (with up to 35 days of shoulder season conditions). This period will begin to see greater accessibility of the Transpolar Route, which is forecast to be open for up to 45 days annually, with 60-70 days of shoulder season. The analysis suggests the reliable navigability of the Northwest Passage will continue to remain limited in this timeframe (United States Navy 2014: 12).

With the opening of the Arctic Ocean, there will be an increased strategic magnitude of Bering Strait.

> This 51-mile wide strait between Russia and the United States, with a depth varying between 98 to 160 feet, represents a significant chokepoint for surface and subsurface vessels entering or departing the Arctic Ocean. The Bering Strait and access to and through the Arctic Ocean will become a more important security planning consideration as maritime activity continues to increase (United States Navy 2014: 6).

For Russia, the Bering Strait has so much of magnitude because it enables Russia to unite with her Asian and European naval forces.

> As the Pacific gateway for Russia's Northern Sea Route, the Bering Strait will become increasingly important for seaborne trade between Europe and Asia. The anticipated increase in traffic through the Strait provides an opportunity for the United States to strengthen ties with Russia, promoting maritime security and safety in the region (Kraska 2009).

Beyond 2030, environmental conditions in the Far North are likely to sustain even larger and more consistent maritime presence in the region.

> Major waterways are predicted to be consistently open, with a significant increase in traffic over the summer months. The Northern Sea Route and Transpolar Route should be navigable 130 days per year, with open water passage up to 75 days per year. The Northwest Passage will be increasingly open during the late summer and early fall (United States Navy 2014: 12).

However, a point worth pondering is that outside Bering, the Barents, and Norwegian Seas, tremendous cold weather modifications for equipment and systems, intricate logistics support, and special training are required to naval operations in the Arctic Ocean. There is virtually no supporting infrastructure and, with such vast distances, substantial impediments are faced by naval forces without specialised equipment and operational experience (United States Navy 2014: 8).

Canada-U.S. Relations in the Arctic through NORAD, Post-9/11

The Arctic region is defined differently by Canada and the U.S. The Arctic starts at 60° North for Canada[30] and, therefore in addition to its three territories, it includes the northern part of Quebec and some part of Labrador/Newfoundland. For the U.S., the Arctic begins above 66.5° North (the Arctic Circle) (Framework for Arctic Cooperation 2012). As far as NORAD is concerned, the separate definitions of both the countries are not problematic, but these different definitions reveal the strong effect of national caveats upon NORAD.

At a strategic level, the significant interest in the Arctic was stimulated, in particular, by the Cold War (Elliot-Meisel 1998, cited in James and James 2014). For a larger period of the Cold War, the Arctic has been a major focus of the NORAD. Until the end of the Cold War, the primary and exclusive focus of NORAD was regarding aerospace monitoring and responding foreign, state-based invasions over the Arctic region (Charron 2015: 215). The NORAD, which was created by Canada and the U.S. and signed on 12 May 1958, brought a significant transition in Canada-U.S. relations by marking the Arctic as a security zone.

As has already been mentioned in the third Chapter, the formal Canadian–U.S. defence cooperation had begun with the Ogdensburg Declaration on 18 August 1940, between Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Made just after the onset of Second World War, this first legal security agreement between the two countries became so crucial when leaders of both the countries saw threat intimidating, predominantly at sea (James and James 2014: 192). The Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) further institutionalised cooperation between both the countries and anticipated to coordinate North American security at the level of the PM and the President. Considerable cooperation took place on both Canadian and U.S. soil during the Second World War; in the Arctic, this incorporated the construction of the Alcan Highway and combined operations in the Aleutians. After the Second World War, the Military Cooperation Committee was

[30] It needs to be noted here that the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) Plan for the North refers to exercises north of 55 ° N that cuts across the middle of most of the provinces.

created in 1946 in order to institutionalise the details of combined strategies and activities (Bercuson et al. 2003).

From 1949 to the 1950s, the Cold War had aggravated and technology reduced the continental distance for missile delivery systems. With this change, an attack via the Arctic region had become a much more prominent prospect than before (James and James 2014: 193). In the 1950s, a sequence of radar lines, which included the Mid-Canada Line, the Pine Tree Line, and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Radar Line, were constructed across Canadian North to counter the menace of the Soviet Union. The Distant Early Warning Radar Line was upgraded in the 1980s to the North Warning System (NWS) line. The primary aim of establishing the radar networks was to give early warning of forthcoming threats. Regular air patrols enlarged surveillance (Charron 2015: 217).

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) not only made changes to the U.S. and Canadian military commands, viz. that the creation of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and ultimately the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), respectively, but also required amendments in the priorities of NORAD.

Canada-U.S. relations in the polar region were not directly influenced by the 9/11 attacks, however, this incident ushered in a phase of enlarged emphasis to Canadian military capabilities. The creation of the USNORTHCOM in 2002 for homeland defence led to a more directly significant change. Under the same NORAD commander, USNORTHCOM's area of responsibility (AoR)[31] consisted of "air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles" (USNORTHCOM 2014). Viz. that, now the Far North had come directly under U.S. scrutiny.

In reaction to the political security ambience post-9/11, Canada came up with its first-ever national security policy statement in April 2004, titled "Securing an Open

[31] AoRs are geographic regions (for instance, the Pacific region). The U.S. and Canada have divided their homelands into various AoRs. Tracking and responding to threats that move across AoRs is one of the strengths of NORAD.

Society". It was a confirmation on the part of Canada that security had come to the forefront of the world post-9/11. Three primary areas of national security focus had been identified by PM Paul Martin's Government: "protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and contributing to international security" (Securing an Open Society 2004: vii). Moreover, specific main concerns included not only the terrorism but religious and domestic extremism, foreign espionage, violent movements of secession, the proliferation of "weapons of mass destruction", 'rogue' and 'failed' states, natural disasters, infrastructural vulnerabilities, growing organised crime, and pandemics (Securing an Open Society 2004: 7-8). The report, however, did not mention the Arctic and sovereignty issue was barely noted.

The bi-national institution of Canada and the U.S., NORAD has been classified into three regions which are: Canadian NORAD Region (CANR), Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR), and Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR). On the occurrence of any threat to the North American continent, apparent distinctions have been made between command commitments (viz. that, who will ultimately have the legal authority of deploying military) and control (viz. that, what will be deployed, for how long period of time, and the essential character of the mission) of military resources. As the receiver of information from both Governments, NORAD remains on the top of the Canadian and U.S. military commands, viz. that, CJOC and USNORTHCOM, respectively. The intelligence of both the countries enables NORAD to give North American-wide domain awareness, recognise threats (air or marine-borne) and give warning. However, operations are rarely directed by NORAD; to deal with approaching missiles is an exception. Apart from that, the objective of NORAD is to collect the information given by its sources such as from the NWS, the Canadian and U.S. military intelligence, and other areas such as military operations centres in order to give a clear view of threats to the North American continent. In case, after being informed of a danger, the deployment of any military asset becomes necessary, Canada reciprocates via CANR in Winnipeg (to give a reaction through the air) or CJOC[32] in Ottawa (when needed to reciprocate via land assets or navy). In case, it is

[32] To conduct Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operations in Canada, North America, and in the world is the responsibility of CJOC. The CAF operations in which CJOC does not get involved are those carried out only by the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) or NORAD. Because

required from the U.S. to reciprocate, USNORTHCOM deploys U.S. military assets. Most of the time, the deployment of air assets (mainly fighter jets) is seen (Charron 2015: 224).

Thus, the mandate of NORAD states about defending North American continent through aerospace warning, aerospace control, and now maritime warning mission. Thus, the Arctic is relentlessly observed for any air and maritime danger. It has been argued by some that the threats encountered by the Arctic have reduced to only a few and that monitoring and detection are relentlessly done, then, the mandate of NORAD does not require any transformation. As has already been noticed when the threat of invasions by the Soviet Union receded with the end of the Cold War, research and development investments and consideration to surveillance equipment for the Arctic too noticeably decreased. Though the tensions now are considered low and few incidents, NORAD continues to provide aerospace warning and control (Charron 2015: 216-217).

As for the Arctic and the role of NORAD, it is argued whether the Arctic indicates "status quo" for NORAD or a "new ball game" with the changed scenario. Understanding of this would be determined by answering some questions, such as: What are the primary sources of challenges? What are the things perceived as urgent for NORAD? How are command and control functions employed? And what are those matters NORAD is engrossed with? According to Andrea Charron (2015), the Arctic requires much needed attention, analysis and scrutiny for now, but "there is no new ball game".

Melting ice has been interpreted as something that will result in more ice-free Beaufort Sea, the Chukchi Sea, and NWP for a much longer time in the summer season, which has now been assumed by many as going to result in more ships making a journey into the Arctic and posing more danger (Rosenthal 2012). As noticed, on the one hand, it has been argued by some that the dissipating northern ice is going to bring new traffic as well as new or a variety of threats to the Arctic region. A more military vigilance will be needed due to these threats as well as more

CANR does not have any naval or army assets at its direct disposal, CJOC would organise a land-based or naval reaction to any imminent threat.

coordination with the Canadian and U.S. agencies such as Public Safety Canada and Department of Homeland Security agencies (Borgerson 2008; and Huebert 2010). On the other hand, it has been stated that due to extended "shoulder seasons",[33] the vessel traffic in the Canadian and U.S. Arctic has certainly increased, however, this traffic is not to that extent that demands more attention of NORAD (Charron 2015: 220). And the shipping or maritime activities in the Arctic region are not exclusively driven by the melting of the polar ice, scientific research and collection of data for some other pursuits such as, for submissions to the CLCS, are also the motives.

The main reason of worrying is that the increased emphasis on the Arctic is seen in reaction to so much of growth in northern activities that may attract terrorism, criminal groups as well as many other threats that certainly demand monitoring by NORAD (Government of Canada 2008a). While dealing with the Far North in the documentation, only a few pages are seen as devoted to the Arctic even in rigorous works pertaining to Canada-U.S. relations. In comparison to various other aspects of the Canadian-U.S. relationship, the Arctic is studied very lightly.

The main challenge in defence and security policy for Canada is to handle its complicated and intertwined relationship with the U.S. It seems an exercise of "threading the needle", viz. that so much of attention seems as required. It has also been argued that Canada needs to preserve a better quality of relations with the U.S., but not to that level that Canadian PM appears in the "back pocket" of the U.S. President. Therefore, some medium level is suggested to be adopted, but the complicated question is "exactly where?" (James and James 2014: 190).

Canada and the U.S. are said to relentlessly compete in the North. Noticeably, the ongoing U.S. "intransigence" with regard to NWP via Canadian Arctic waters give the impression of being static (Parker and Madjd-Sadjadi 2009: 344). Thus, it has been argued that while both Canada and the U.S. may perennially struggle in the region to some extent, however, each country needs to be well attentive to the requirement of pursuing their corresponding interests in order to keep invaders out.

[33] The shoulder season is basically the term used to refer weeks before and after prime shipping season in the summer season.

Their bilateral institution NORAD manages such competition. Thus, the corresponding institution has tempered the innately competitive scenario in the polar region for Canada and the U.S. Simultaneously, an increasing consciousness regarding exterior threats should help in bringing these already intertwined allies towards more cooperation so that they could prevent others from making benefits in the Arctic (James and James 2014: 200).

With regard to the tensions over sovereignty in the Canadian-U.S. relations, two incidents of the transit of a U.S. ship via Canadian waters are prominently mentioned (Jockel 1991, cited in James and James 2014). The first one is when SS Manhattan (an oil tanker), which was encouraged by oil finding in Prudhoe Bay, made a transit in 1969 from the Baffin Sea to Viscount Melville Sound. The SS Manhattan is known as the first civilian ship since the Second World War which fully finished the transit for the first time through the Arctic. The journey was completed only with the help of icebreakers. The Canadian ship, John A. MacDonald, was included in ice breaking escorts of the ship and accompanied the SS Manhattan so that a Canadian presence could be maintained on the journey (James and James 2014: 193-194).

Worth mentioning is that on the question of the U.S. making an entrance into Arctic waters, the situation of Canadian PM Brian Mulroney was almost the same as PM Pierre Elliott Trudeau (as Mulroney was generally more pro-American) when the Polar Sea, the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, sailed in 1985 from Greenland to Alaska. Ottawa was informed of the transit by Washington, but the government of Canada was not asked for official permission. The U.S. maintained the claim of transiting an international strait or waters by its ship. From the U.S. point of view, requesting for transit through the passage, in essence, would have meant accepting the sovereign authority of Canada. A military presence had been put on the ship by Canada, while it had been made clear by the U.S. that it neither asked for Canadian permission nor needed. After the Polar Sea controversy, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement took place in 1988. Consequently, the U.S. now agreed to ask for Canadian permission to transit without recognising Canadian sovereign claims. This phase of controversy, as well as agreement, showed a corresponding Canada-U.S. principle that mutual disagreements must be managed through peaceful bilateral way (James and James 2014: 194).

During the Cold War, by making a transit to the Canadian NWP, the SS Manhattan and United States Coast Guard (USCG) Polar Sea created political tensions between the Canadian and U.S. governments. However, NORAD had relentlessly monitored the Arctic region as well as the North American continent; and the Canadian and U.S. personnel also worked cooperatively in a continuous manner. Moreover, the assumption regarding the source of imminent threats to the Arctic region was thought to be Soviet incursions both by Canada and the U.S. Consequently, an agreement with regard to the decisions over command and control came out swiftly. Because military-to-military collaboration provides aerospace warning and control, actions in all areas of responsibility are smooth (Charron 2015: 217).

When 9/11 attacks occurred, "Operation Noble Eagle"[34] had been launched within hours of 9/11 in which NORAD was made the main player. Under its mission of homeland defence, NORAD closely observes aircraft approaching the territories of Canada and the U.S., including the significant events organised in the territory of North America. For NORAD, "Operation Noble Eagle" brought a tremendous change, as it broadened the focus of NORAD for the first time to address both interior and exterior threats against North America (Miles 2013).

2001 was the time when the transformation of NORAD into an integrated, bi-national command was allegedly called for by the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in order to defend against threats approaching from the land, air, and sea (Lagasse´ 2014). The expanding mission roles for NORAD were rejected by Canada (Charron 2015: 218). Thus, in 2006, only maritime warning, which involves monitoring U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas, and inland waterways, has been added to the list of NORAD missions.

Post-9/11, police and law enforcement agencies were enabled by Canada and the U.S. to provide details to a coordinating 'homeland security' agencies (viz. that, the Public Safety Canada and the Department of Homeland Security, respectively), however,

[34] "Operation Noble Eagle" is the name given to military operations related to 'homeland security' and support to federal, state, and local agencies in the wake of 9/11. "Operation Noble Eagle" evolved from an improvised, temporary response to a "permanent defense requirement".

NORAD had not been united into the coordinated agencies, not even the militaries; NORAD remained separate (Knight 2008)

A new urgency for Arctic all-domain awareness and 'homeland security' was perceived and, thus, a promising 'new' role for NORAD because of the assumptions over the competition in the Arctic. In 2012, NORAD Next, a multi-working group for the purpose of reviewing ongoing and newly emanating problems and recommendations, had been launched by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and NORAD in order to meet present and future NORAD requirements until 2030. The commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, General Charles Jacoby has stated that "multi-domain coverage, particularly of the Arctic region, is a priority". Furthermore, ideas about what constitutes a security threat have expanded. While NORAD still tracks the traditional exterior invasions, however, there is

> a shift in concern, preparation from homeland defence (tracking and responding to threats emanating from outside the country) to 'homeland security' (threats emanating from within or outside the country) (Statement of General Charles H. Jacoby 2014).

It has been stated:

> But now Canadian and American militaries must track and/or aid civilian powers, via their unified commands (for instance, via USNORTHCOM and CJOC), in response to transnational crime, cyber threats, infrastructure protection, and terrorism (United States Northern Command 2014; and Canada, Department of National Defence 2014).

This simply means that NORAD is occupied in 'homeland security' via its several warning duties and association to the combined commands. The incident of 9/11 made it clear that threats may arrive from anywhere, including interior ones (Charron 2015: 218).

As for the Arctic, several similar goals are listed by both Canada and the U.S., which include ensuring security, working with indigenous populations and allies, and advanced protection of the environment. For instance, four 'pillars' (priority areas) identified as part of Canadian Northern Strategy are: exercising sovereignty, to promote economic and social development, protection of the environment, and to improve and devolve governance (Government of Canada 2009a; and United States, Department of State 2014). However, these goals are given priority differently at the

national level. For instance, Canadian emphasises is on threats against Arctic sovereignty. Canada's Statement on Arctic Foreign Policy stated: "Exercising sovereignty over Canada's North, as over the rest of Canada, is our number one Arctic foreign policy priority" (Government of Canada 2010). The first and foremost concern of the U.S. is 'homeland security' (from terrorism), while time and attention have also been dedicated to climate change and its impact on the Arctic (United States, National Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013).

The Arctic is the responsibility of USNORTHCOM on the U.S. side; however, not a priority on top. When it comes to immediate and potential threats (primarily criminal) to the U.S. homeland, the Mexican/southern border is considered as a far more pressing concern. Thus, the differences in threat/security priorities of Canada and the U.S. can also be clearly seen as Canada's Arctic priority versus the U.S.' Mexican/southern border priority, which means that the Arctic and NORAD appear and are treated differently (if at all) in the national documents of two countries. For instance, the Canada First Defence Strategy makes reference to the significance of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship, their bi-national institution NORAD, and a separate reference is made to the need of protecting Arctic sovereignty (Government of Canada 2008a). On the other hand, the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region made no reference to NORAD vis-a-vis the Arctic (United States, National Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013).

It has also been argued that Canada or the U.S. have not framed NORAD as a set of eyes on the Arctic, even though it has perennially been this. If NORAD is concerned with being "relevant" (Miles 2013), emphasising its Arctic role can be beneficial, for instance, as a deterrent to potential enemy forces.

Thus, in order to cover and warn against a myriad of possible threats, NORAD must have more sources of information so that North American-wide all-domain situational awareness could be provided. However, the differences in Canadian and American national approach do not mean that Canada has no concerns about national security or climate change, or that the U.S. has no concern about sovereignty incursions. They must be accommodated as part and parcel of a bi-national relationship and as a reality of the national caveats (Charron 2015: 219).

As for the Arctic Region, the overarching strategic national security objective of the U.S. is a stable, secure, peaceful, and conflict-free Arctic region where the national interests of the country are safeguarded and the homeland is protected (United States Navy 2014: 6).

As has been noticed, the geopolitics of the Arctic has changed in view of the climate change and resource potential of the region. The change is calling for a different level of defence and security cooperation between Canada and the U.S. Security of the Arctic has dimensions of both traditional and economic/environmental security. Canada and the U.S., both are engaged in redeveloping their military capabilities in the region. These new military capabilities would be required to meet any military threat as well as to play the role of a constabulary in more normal times.

The Arctic would have other effects on bilateral ties in case Arctic oil and gas become possible. New areas of cooperation and conflict would emerge between the two. The North American pipelines is already a complicated subject between the two; the production and transportation of Arctic oil to North American and/or Asian markets will undoubtedly further stress the relationship. The Arctic is not just climate change and oil and gas; there are also other implications for Canada in terms of food production and availability of water and how the Canadian government in the future would mitigate the worst effects of climate change and resource exploitation in the region.

Canadian Sovereignty Claim and U.S. Indifference

In respect of sovereignty, a glimpse of some Arctic history seems necessary. To deal with it, the pre-twentieth century Canadian Arctic has been divided into three phases by Smith (1966: 196–204, cited in James and James 2014): (i) The first phase lasted until 1500 when only indigenous peoples resided in the Far North and they had no formal government. A few Vikings also lived in the Arctic, but only for a short period.

(ii) The second phase started in 1500 to a slightly later the mid-nineteenth century and Europeans came to stay. Those actively working in the Far North consisted of fur

traders, whalers, explorers, and priests. Maps had numerous inaccuracies and/or omissions throughout this era; however, initial sovereignty claims took place. Encouraged not only by any economic gain but also by competition with the French, King Charles II of England granted a charter to the Hudson Bay Company in 1670. Great Britain reaffirmed its ownership of what is acknowledged as the Canadian Arctic now (called "Rupert's Land" at the time) by an order of the British Parliament in 1821.

(iii) After Confederation, Rupert's Land was transferred to full Canadian control in 1870 by the British Crown from under the patronage of the colonial agency. This incident manifested the beginning of the third phase of Canadian Arctic sovereignty (Smith 1966, cited in James and James 2014). In 1880, the remaining land in the Arctic Archipelago was transferred to Canada. Some questions emerge with this: whether Great Britain really possessed the rights to these areas in the first place or had it the legal authority to hand them over to another entity? Could this be understood as an actual transfer at all? It needs to be mentioned here that the sovereignty claims of Canada in the Arctic region "significantly preceded its full independence from British Commonwealth status and even the American Revolution" (James and James 2014: 190).

In Canada-U.S. relations, the concept of sovereignty is very crucial and lies at the centre. Throughout the Canadian-U.S. history, sensitivity about threats to sovereignty (both real and perceived) has repeatedly been demonstrated by Canadians. At best the U.S. has been unaware and, at worst, simply does not care about such concerns of Canada. The Arctic region is not an exception to this contrast between Canada and the U.S. where the U.S. emphasises on security and Canadians focus on identity.

As can be observed through the above mentioned glimpse of history, the Canadian sovereignty claims to the Arctic have long remained on thin ice, viz. that, a very limited presence, including only a few voyages of explorers, scientists, and cartographers and North–West Mounted Police. On the other side, Alaska was acquired by the U.S. from the Russian government at the time of Confederation and, in the vicinity, the significant population was absent. Under such conditions in the Far North that tensions over the Alaskan boundary arose with the U.S. It has generally

been argued that the Canadian government's efforts to establish Arctic sovereignty increased after World War I; partly due to Denmark's claim to Ellesmere Island. Thus, the posts on Ellesmere and Baffin Islands were established by Mounted Police of Canada and then government-type activities such as recording births and deaths, providing mail service, and issuing fishing licenses were performed (James and James 2014: 191-192).

Some scholars present the Arctic as a primary source of conflict between the two closely intertwined allies. The differences over the NWP also seem to be exaggerated. Canada cannot uphold its sovereignty claim without U.S. support; and, it has so far done nothing notable to militarily buttress and fortify for the defence of the NWP. Contrary to popular perception, in the Arctic, both the countries have for long collaborated through the bilateral defence and security agreements. The enduring partnership between two nations cannot be obscured by the nationalism of Canada and the superpower role of the U.S. (Holland 2014: 245).

In fact, both the North American neighbours are committed (i) to enhance their relationship and develop new capabilities for the protection of North America from extreme threats; (ii) for the protection of the region for trade; and (iii) for security of the Arctic from environmental degradation and support the indigenous peoples. The nature of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship is underscored by the Arctic. The U.S. has been called by Canada as its crucial primary partner in the Arctic in the post-2006 documents. Cooperation of both the countries on security in the Arctic is based on the foundations laid by NORAD (Holland 2014: 245; Stephenson 2011: 9).

For the defence of North America, Canada and the U.S. have been partners for decades and cooperating within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and NORAD. Homeland defence and 'homeland security' are two top priorities for the Canadian and the U.S. governments. Efforts are made to ensure common Arctic Region interests are addressed in a complementary manner. This unique and enduring partnership between Canada and the U.S. in defence cooperation is very significant to their corresponding security interests in the Arctic region (United States Navy 2014: 6-7).

As for Canadian North, Canada holds full rights and legal power over it. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) play a crucial role in this. It guards the sovereignty of Canada and defends it against threats in the Arctic region. Operation NANOOK has taken place each year since 2007. It is carried out across Yukon, Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, making it the largest military presence in Canadian North. In order to overcome security and environmental concerns in the region, the CAF also works with international military and security partners on Operation NANOOK, along with other Canadian government departments, agencies, and allied armed forces. Once a year, they all meet in the Arctic in order to train and work together to respond to threats to security and the environment. The number and makeup of CAF members sent on Operation NANOOK changes from year to year. But, it always includes 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group and 440 "Vampire" Transport Squadron. Operation NANOOK 2017 had taken place in Labrador and Nunavut from 14 to 25 August 2017, in which nearly 900 CAF members and civilians had taken part. The goals of Operation NANOOK are to:

> assert Canada's sovereignty over its northernmost regions; improve the way Canada's military operates in Arctic conditions; improve coordination in whole-of-government operations; work with mission partners to best respond to safety and security issues in the North (NDCAF 2017a).

The U.S. Department of Defense strategy also identifies certain actions in order to accomplish its various objectives, such as: to evolve the infrastructure of the Arctic region as well as "capabilities consistent with changing conditions; support existing agreements with allies or partners while pursuing new ones to build confidence with key regional partners"; partnering with other departments, agencies and countries in order "to support human and environmental safety; and support the development of the Arctic Council and other international institutions that promote regional cooperation and the rule of law" (United States Navy 2014: 10).

The enduring national security interest or objective of the U.S. is to create a safe, secure and stable Arctic region where the national interests of the U.S. and the protection of the homeland both could be advanced as has been mentioned in various documents from time to time such as the 2010 National Security Strategy or the November 2013 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy (United States Navy 2014: 10) and other later documents. The U.S., in contrast to the Canadian sovereignty

claim, has always asserted that the passages are international waterways. From the U.S. point of view, the NWP would not fall under Canadian domestic jurisdiction, rather under the strict international law.

Concerns over 'Military Build-up' or Modernisation in the Arctic

In the wake of the Ukrainian and Syrian crises, it was expected that Russia (one of the Arctic Five countries) would dramatically increase its military activities and presence in the Arctic region in the form of naval and air patrols as well as accelerate its military modernisation programmes of the conventional and nuclear forces deployed in the region. It has been argued by some scholars that new accusations of Russia "as being an aggressive and militarist power (not only in East Europe and the Middle East but also in the Arctic)" have spurred due to the occurrence of the Ukrainian crisis and Russian military intervention in the conflict of Syria. It has been claimed that Russia only wishes to use the seas for transportation, utilise the untapped natural resources of the region, protect its ecosystems and ensure that the Arctic remains a zone of peace and cooperation (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017: 171).

It has been argued that following the 1980s humiliating defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Soviet Union, "the progressive estrangement of the traditional Soviet sphere of influence", and accession to NATO and the European Union by Central and Eastern Europe, it seems that Russia is in search of a zone where it could successfully administer. The political activity of the remaining countries has been considered as a "knee-jerk reaction" to Russia's mobilisation, which has increased international tensions (Janicki 2012: 94).

Some Western analysts state that due to its economic weakness and technological backwardness, an alleged 'military build-up' in the Arctic region is the emphasis of Russia so that it could "protect its national interests in the Arctic, and this will inevitably lead to regional arms race and even military conflicts in the High North" (Bērziņa 2015: 288-289; Conley and Rohloff 2015: 112-113; Corentin 2015; Pettersen 2015; and Staalesen 2017). On the other hand, these allegations are denied by Moscow, rather it has been stated that Russia plans to use its military power only as a last resort in order to protect its lawful interests in the region. It has been claimed

that instead of emphasising on military or coercive instruments, Russian emphasise the socio-economic development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017: 172).

It has been predicted by some that the Arctic region is unlikely to be the site of "state-on-state armed conflict", given the environmental complexities and limitations of operating in the Arctic Ocean, the rate of opening of the geography, the short season for commercial shipping, and the existing geopolitical trends in the Arctic Region. Arctic nations can resolve their disputes peacefully and without military force, as demonstrated by the Russia-Norway Barents Sea agreement (Gibbs 2010).

Although it is expected that the Arctic region will remain an area of low threat, the region is an area of U.S. security interests, exemplified through threat early warning systems; combined security obligations with Canada; preventing terrorist attacks against the homeland; freedom of navigation as well as over-flight through the region; and sea and air forces are deployed as required for deterrence, maritime presence and maritime security operations (United States Navy 2014: 6).

Thus, the Ukrainian crisis has left a negative impact on the level of cooperation and brought mistrust between Russia and its Western partners. The Western economic sanctions resulted in a significant drop in the volume of regional trade and traffic via the NSR, stopping many promising projects in the energy sector as well as cancellation of military-to-military cooperation. However, major areas of regional cooperation have been managed to keep out of the current tensions between Russia and the West by the Arctic countries and focused on the soft security problematic (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017: 172). It has been argued that Russian threat perceptions in the Arctic are not coherently described in any single document.

Worth noting is that over the last two decades, as far as the Arctic policies and Russian threat perceptions are concerned, the general attention has shifted from hard to soft security. The threat of a large-scale nuclear war is no longer considered as a Russian concern, now greater attention is claimed to be paid to threats and challenges which are stemming from climate change and increasing competition over natural

resources of the Arctic region and sea routes rather than from the military sphere (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017: 172).

It needs to be noted here that the meltdown of the Northern polar ice as an implication of climate change has necessitated some serious changes in the military strategies of Arctic states, including the Russian one. On the one hand, as has been argued in the 2014 document of U.S. Navy that the surface naval activities in the Arctic region can significantly expand with an extension of an ice-free season (United States Navy 2014: 8, 16-19). However, on the other hand, Sergunin and Konyshev (2017) argued that there will be less protection to submarines with the shrinking ice cap, can make them more visible for enemy's satellites and aircrafts.

There is still this belief in both the Russian military and politicians that there is a residual U.S./NATO military threat to the AZRF. While it is believed by U.S. experts that the U.S. has quite "modest military-strategic ambitions" in the Arctic (Corgan 2014), Russian concern is regarding the U.S. military strategies in the Arctic that envisage U.S.' increased security activities in the Arctic region. Russia is especially worried about the U.S. plans to increase its readiness to conduct maritime and air patrol and interception operations; to ensure its access to global commons in the Arctic; to exercise and assert its navigation and over-flight rights and freedoms in the region; to expand its power projection capabilities, etc. (United States, Department of Defense 2013; United States Navy 2014; and United States, Department of Defense 2016).

Given the ice-free Arctic for some particular time of the year in the foreseeable future, the possibility that the U.S. could permanently deploy sea-based Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems and a nuclear submarine fleet in the Arctic Ocean has not been excluded by the Russian military analysts (UPI 2009; and Khramchikhin 2013, cited in Sergunin and Konyshev 2017). As a reaction to the 2013 U.S. doctrine, President Vladimir Putin had immediately ordered the Russian Defence Ministry to accelerate the creation of the Arctic Group of Forces (AGF), modernisation of the Northern Fleet, and reopening of the Soviet-time air and naval bases along the NSR (President Putin 2013, cited in Sergunin and Konyshev 2017).

As far as Russian threat perceptions are concerned, worth noting is the difference in threat perceptions of the Russian strategic and operative-tactical forces. The Russian strategic forces are of the view that North Atlantic, North Pacific and the Arctic create a single operation zone or, in other words, the military area where the U.S. strategic forces are confronted by them. The conventional forces are of the view that the Arctic region is an area of operative-tactical importance where Russian economic interests and state borders should mainly be protected (land, air and maritime).

> From the operative-tactical point of view, the Arctic is split into several sectors which represent various zones of responsibility. In the Western sector, the Russian land and air forces confront the NATO (Norwegian) troops, while the conventional component of the Northern Fleet protects Russia's economic interests in the Barents Sea and provides nuclear forces with auxiliary services. The Northern Fleet and Border Guards are responsible for the protection of the NSR and the Arctic Ocean's coastline, while the Pacific Fleet controls the Bering Sea, Bering Strait, and the access to the Chukchi Sea (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017: 173).

As far as Russian mid- and long-term strategies in the Far North are concerned, four key priorities have been identified in the two basic documents viz. that, (i) the Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and Beyond (adopted on 18 September 2008 by President Dmitry Medvedev); and (ii) Strategy for the Development of the AZRF (approved on 20 February 2013 by President Vladimir Putin to update and specify the Strategy-2008), which are:

- Climate change mitigation;
- Making Arctic Russia's "strategic resources basis";
- The need for sustainable development of the AZRF;
- Making the Arctic a "region of peace and international cooperation".

As for Russian threat perceptions, in brief, a clear tendency towards the increasing role of the soft security rather than hard security-related concerns has been noticed, for instance, mitigation of climate change, to ensure Russian access to and control of the natural resources and transport routes in the region, and to clean up the environmental mess. At the same time, a number of security challenges and threats are believed to be in the region by some Russian strategists, which necessitate preservation and development of a certain military potential and presence in the

Arctic region. Worth remembering aspect at this point is that overall Russian relations with NATO and its member states have been affected negatively by the Ukrainian and Syrian crises (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017: 173-174).

Russian President Vladimir Putin (2014) signed an updated version of the military doctrine on 26 December 2014 which mentioned NATO's 'military build-up' and its expansion towards the Russian borders and highlighted it as the primary external dangers to the security of Russia. The document also mentioned other threats, the development and deployment of the U.S. BMD systems, the implementation of the "global strike" doctrine, plans to place weapons in space, deployment of high-precision conventional weapons systems, as well as evolving forms of warfare such as, for example, information warfare. For the first time, the protection of Russia's national interests in the Arctic in peacetime was assigned to the Russian armed forces and the concept of non-nuclear deterrence was introduced in the document. This became a reflection of the fact that most of the military threats that Russia faces now are of the non-nuclear character and can be successfully met with conventional means (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017: 174).

Increased accessibility to the High North and its abundant resources does not bring new opportunities for multilateral cooperation only but also for competition and dispute in the region, particularly in the form of managing maritime resources and conflicting territorial claims. Disagreement among the Arctic states may lead Arctic nations to become increasingly assertive in their claims to Arctic resources and territory, which has been claimed to have the potential to further lead to the militarisation of the region. However, this is unlikely. Like other coastal states, Russia holds a strong belief in articulating its strategic interests in the High North, develop its potential with sufficient military and action in order to ensure its leadership position in the region to both anticipate challenges as well as offer transparent multilateral resolution to such challenges (Sergunin and Konyshev 2016: 32-33, 143-144).

In the present scenario in international relations as a result of instability of the world's political and economic systems and increasing tensions between various international actors, the growing role of force (consisting of its military component) has been

underscored in a new version of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept on 30 November 2016 too (Putin 2016, cited in Sergunin and Konyshev 2017).

Conclusion

During the Cold War period, the High North region became the part of the global confrontation, a home for strategic nuclear forces (in the case of the Soviet Union) as well as a significant area for important military activities. Since then, it allures the countries of the world for many reasons. The U.S. and Soviet Union both pursued the strategy of containment with the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine at its core.

As far as Canadian sovereignty is concerned, it has been argued that the challenges to control over the region have been invited by the longstanding lack of vigorous presence of the Canadian government in the region throughout its history. However, Canada-U.S. cooperation has perceptibly increased in the North. Canada has its sovereignty concerns; it desires a stable, rule-based region; and it wants economic growth, environmental protection, livelihood and culture of the indigenous communities. The expanding U.S. military assets in the Arctic might, in fact, be necessary to realise Canadian goals. Arctic is not the likely area of differences and conflict between Canada and the U.S. So far, over the past many decades, the two countries have successfully managed their differences; truth is that Canadian and American interests seem to be well aligned to meet the changing military and commercial dimensions of the Arctic.

Receding sea ice in the once remote and static geographic and oceanic area has made minerals, oil, gas, fish, and transportation routes more accessible and viable sources of profit. Thus, profitability and geoeconomic/geostrategic relevance of the Arctic region has come to light due to the dissipating northern polar ice. Regardless of the degree of accessibility to the Far North, the region will remain a unique and harsh operating environment. In brief, three primary strategic drivers are attractive factors towards the Arctic region: “environmental conditions, economic interests and strategic resources, geopolitical dynamics”.

From the point of view of Russia, the threat perceptions of the country have been affected to some extent by the Ukrainian and Syrian crises, however, Russian attitude to the Arctic did not significantly change. Russia believes in the cooperation in the region and wants the Arctic region to retain its status of the peaceful zone.

The threat of a large-scale nuclear war is assumed to be still highly improbable. An emphasis is given on the necessity to complete the demarcation process of land and maritime boundaries of Russia and delimitation of continental shelves (implying first and foremost the Arctic Ocean). The Arctic is considered as an area for potential cooperation with Canada. The significance of Arctic cooperation is emphasised in areas such as environmental protection, development of Arctic natural resources on the basis of the sustainable development, transport communications (including the NSR), and preservation of peace and stability. It is specially mentioned that Russia strongly insists on the necessity to prevent any military confrontation in the Arctic region and, thus, it wants to keep the Arctic out of the present tensions with the West.

CHAPTER – V

CANADA'S AFGHANISTAN MISSION

The present Chapter deals with the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, which began in response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (generally referred as 9/11) on the soil of United States (U.S.). Canada, however, was not the only country in responding to the attacks. In Afghanistan, Canada was part of the larger North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led and United Nations (UN)-authorised mission which included several NATO partners and other "like-minded" countries.

For many countries, 9/11 terrorist attacks[35] had basically served as the catalyst to take action and motivated the countries to join the "War on Terror"[36], also known as "Global War on Terrorism", launched by the U.S. and the campaign of a coalition to stabilise Afghanistan. These attacks by Al-Qaeda terrorist group not only culminated in the horrors of 9/11 but also demonstrated unprecedented non-traditional security threats posed by non-state actors in modern times. The North Atlantic Council of NATO immediately invoked Article 5, pertaining to the collective defence principle of the Washington Treaty, on 12 September 2001 for the first time in its history.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the U.S. territory were conducted by the members of Al-Qaeda, a terrorist group led by Osama bin Laden. Along with his group members, Osama bin Laden had planned a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks on the U.S. soil in Afghanistan under the protection of Taliban regime, the Islamist organisation governing the land-locked country of Asia. When the leader of Taliban regime, Mullah Omar, refused to extradite Osama bin Laden to the U.S. authorities, the military invasion was planned by the U.S. along with the UK that soon drove the Taliban from power and forced Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda group into hiding.

[35] Almost 3,000 people from ninety countries were killed in the 9/11 attacks (United States, Department of Homeland Security 2009).

[36] It was the U.S.-launched international military campaign against terrorism.

The present Chapter discusses how, during 2001-05, the international military invasion in Afghanistan had begun with a small and limited mandate. The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 provided optimism for building a developmental, democratic, and modern Afghan state. As Taliban insurgency intensified after 2005, international troops and aid grew and many coalition forces moved into the southern most volatile part of the country. During 2005-09, the resurgence of Taliban increasingly led to short-term stabilisation interventions in conflict-torn Afghan areas. The U.S. military and civilian surge were seen during 2009-11 and U.S. aid budget increased. And during 2011-14, began the transition which marked the end of international combat forces and was to lead to full sovereign control of Afghanistan over its security.

The overarching focus of international community (viz. that, the U.S., Canada and other "like-minded" countries) has been to help the government of Afghanistan in assuming responsibility for governance, security and development to make it a better governed country. For this purpose, countries like Canada along with allies provided assistance to improve security, development, diplomacy and human rights.

Afghanistan became geopolitically significant during the time of the Cold War. The country modernised gradually but remained very poor. After a long phase of some peace and stability under King Zahir Shah (1933-73), it saw increasing volatility in the form of a coup in 1973 led by Mohammad Daoud (the king's cousin), which instituted a republic; a Communist coup and takeover in 1978; and at the end of 1979 Soviet Union occupation which led to a debilitating and protracted conflict for more than a decade (Byrd 2013). The civil wars since 1979 not only ravaged the country but also destroyed the traditional governing institutions of Afghanistan, for instance, the *shura* (consultation) and *jirga* (assembly), and control of the Afghan villages came in the hands of armed group whosoever was the powerful enough at any particular time (Holland 2010: 278).

As Soviet military forces withdrew from Afghanistan between May 1988 to February 1989 and the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Soviet financial aid was cut-off in 1991. This precipitated the collapse of Najibullah government in Afghanistan; as they could not pay its militias and army any longer who either turned against the Afghan

government or defected. The Mujahideen regime took over but could not form a unity government. The situation of a civil war rose rapidly which destroyed Kabul and also led to the emergence and rapid expansion of the Taliban movement from 1994. In 1996, the Taliban took over Kabul and, by the end of the decade, some 90 per cent of Afghanistan was controlled by them (Byrd 2013).

The Beginning of Canadian Afghan Mission

In the post-9/11 scenario, a significant point for Canada was to determine how and what, if anything, the contribution could be made by the country to any military response to the attacks. As it was undoubtedly confirmed that the U.S. would respond to the 9/11 attacks, most likely in Afghanistan, initial indications were that allies would not necessarily be asked or invited. Despite such possibility, Canada was determined to provide Canadian assistance for two reasons: (i) deep sense of solidarity with its neighbour, and (ii) as an attempt to stem the rapid tide of restrictive border security measures in the U.S. (Middlemiss 2016: 47). As Massie (2013) has written, a commonly perceived necessity to fight terrorism at home and abroad also compelled Canada to provide full support to the U.S.' war against terror.

Whether it was to demonstrate their solidarity with the Americans or to avenge the killings of their citizens, many countries joined the coalition in order to bring Osama bin Laden to justice and defeat Al-Qaeda. Domestic politics, regional security concerns, and the opportunity to rehabilitate international reputations were also the reasons that encouraged countries to deploy their military forces or support the efforts of the coalition in some other ways. Some contributing countries conducted a wide range of ground, naval and air combat operations while the emphasis of other countries was on delivering a distinctive capability to address the need and any specific operational gap (Grenier 2015: 1-2).

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Resolution 1368 had been adopted by the United Nations Security Council which condemned the 9/11 terrorist attacks and supported the efforts by the international community to root out terrorism in Afghanistan (NDCAF 2017b). "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF) was launched on 7 October 2001 by the U.S. and the U.K. in order to dismantle the network of Al-Qaeda

terrorists in Afghanistan and for the removal of the Taliban regime from power because it had harboured leader of Al-Qaeda (NDCAF 2017b; and Holland 2010: 277).

On the same day, 7 October 2001, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced that Canada would make a contribution through land, sea and air forces to the international campaign against terrorism. The official beginning of Operation APOLLO in October 2001 marked the entrance of Canada's military contribution to the international campaign (NDCAF 2017b).

With the post-9/11 tightening of the Canada-U.S. border, Canadian economic vulnerability was severely exposed; thus, Canada sharing the U.S. goal of eliminating Al-Qaeda and preventing another attack from occurring in the continent of North America was understandable. The Chrétien government not only focused on continental security but agreed to actively join the U.S.-led "War on Terror" when the U.S. formally asked for it in late 2001 (Massie 2013: 278). The convergence of Canadian preferences with those of the U.S. in post-9/11 period thus can be illustrated by palpable Canadian desire to take on a prominent military role in Afghanistan.

While the 9/11 terrorist attacks provided a legal and moral justification for action, some other factors further motivated contributing countries. Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands were provided with an opportunity to rehabilitate tarnished reputations through the Afghanistan mission (Grenier 2015: 3). Since the Second World War, the defence system of Canada and its interests are closely intertwined with its closest partner the U.S. The war in Afghanistan was considered by Canada a chance to rebuild its defence and security credentials with the U.S. in the wake of Canadian poor and often controversial performance in the UN peacekeeping missions in Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia during the time early 1990s (Grenier 2015: 3-4; and Coombs 2015: 66). This is how the incident of terrorist attacks of 9/11 culminated in a Canadian military contribution to OEF in Afghanistan.

Canada is always sensitive to American security concerns due to its close proximity to the U.S. Similarly, after the Second World War, Canadian commitments to internationalism pegged the country tightly to international institutions and European

partners. Thus, Canadian military commitments since the Second World War have been driven by its desire of being an effective ally to the U.S. and NATO partners, as the concerns regarding reputation within the NATO often impel Canadian participation in multilateral operations (Massie 2009).

It is odd enough that the prominent starting point for Canadian involvement in Afghanistan had begun with a rejection (Middlemiss 2016: 46). The Chrétien government desired to take part in the European-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) rather than participating in the U.S.-led OEF. The crucial reason was that ISAF appeared "tailor made" for Canada, viz. that: it consisted of mostly humanitarian, stability, and peacekeeping[37] operations; in comparison, it seemed less dangerous than OEF; and most importantly, it could simultaneously demonstrate Canadian solidarity with and independence from the U.S. (Massie 2013: 279). Additionally, at first, ISAF retained responsibility only for Kabul, while the U.S., as the leading country in OEF, took the responsibility for the security of the rest of Afghanistan (Holland 2010: 278).

Moreover, because the creation of ISAF was authorised by the UN on 20 December 2001, ISAF appeared ideal to Canada because it combined the legitimacy and credibility of UN-authorised security operation (Stairs 2016: 22; and Middlemiss 2016: 47), as well as the assumption that it would be a single, sustainable, six months rotation. After the Bonn Agreement[38] of 5 December 2001, which called for the establishment of an UN-authorised force for Afghanistan, the U.K. had offered to command ISAF and requested Canada to contribute a battalion to the force. However, these plans dashed very soon. In the force generation conference in London, the U.K. strongly supported Canada as the only NATO ally who was ready and willing to offer a battalion to ISAF. The Canadian ability to field ISAF in a timely fashion was questioned by the European allies and soon they offered their own forces. Summarily,

[37] The UN defines peacekeeping as "a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the Organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace" (United Nations 2010).

[38] The Bonn Agreement of 2001 is also called the "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions". It occurred to make a plan to govern Afghanistan so that the political vacuum created due to the removal of Taliban leader Mullah Omar's regime could be filled.

the battalion offer of Canada was rebuffed by the Europeans, though the British still sought approximately 200 Canadian communications and field engineer personnel for ISAF (Middlemiss 2016: 47). Consequently, the ISAF option was rejected by the Canadian officials stating that it was not adequate for the standing of Canada as a prominent ally.

Thus, after an awkward rejection to the European-led ISAF and snubbing, Canada revised its plans, joined the anti-Al-Qaeda and anti-Taliban missions of the U.S. in February 2002, and finally ended up going to Kandahar with the U.S. as part of OEF (Lehre 2013; and Middlemiss 2016: 48). There was clearly something amiss and that was intra-alliance politics. The high-profile ISAF mission was seen as an opportunity by those EU members of NATO to "Europeanize" the new mission in a politically meaningful way. Here, worth pondering aspect is that just because Canada, with its own political agenda, belongs to NATO does not mean that the fundamental nature and rules of the trans-Atlantic alliance can be readily shaped by it according to its wishes (Middlemiss 2016: 48).

Thus, the fourth largest contingent of troops (after the U.S., Germany, and Turkey) was deployed by Canada to OEF in February 2002. However, Canada's simultaneous heavy commitment to the NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) led to the withdrawal of the Canadian battle group in the summer of 2002 from Afghanistan. As the land forces of Canada had already stretched thin, it could not deploy much more than for six months in Kandahar because both operations could not be sustained by Canada simultaneously (Massie 2013: 279; and Ettinger and Rice 2016: 378). Since the end of the Cold War, Canada was almost continuously operating in peacekeeping and stabilisation missions. By 2001, the Canadian Armed Forces (particularly, the land forces) had depleted (Fitzsimmons 2013). Thus, the initial six months Canadian commitment to Afghanistan was set due to logistical constraints that the Canadian forces were facing. The operational capacity of the forces had also diminished by budget cuts.

After less than three months of the campaign launched in October 2001 by the U.S., U.K., and Northern Alliance (NA) forces to destroy Al-Qaeda and liberate Afghanistan from the rule of Taliban, all major cities of Afghanistan came under the

control of NA. Other countries were encouraged by the initial quick victories to join the international coalition to prevent Al-Qaeda from re-establishing safe havens west of the Durand Line and to stabilise Afghanistan. Some contributing partners emphasised on delivering a specific, more limited capability while others conducted fully combat operations (Grenier 2015: 6).

To support multinational operations in Afghanistan, two-pronged military action had been undertaken by Canada during 2001-2. As the first response, the Canadian Special Forces members had arrived in late-2001. The Canadian Battalion Group, based on 3 Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, were dispatched to Kandahar in February 2002, and became a crucial part of the 187th Brigade Combat Team of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division; along with several navy ships (NDCAF 2017b; and Middlemiss 2016: 48). The coordination of most of these forces was done with the U.S.-led OEF in southern Afghan province, while the naval contribution was deployed in the Arabian Gulf. The second response consisted of long-term Canadian planning for its eventual ground contribution to the NATO-led ISAF, with the early emphasis on making a secure Kabul (Middlemiss 2016: 48). Canadians worked together with the U.S. and fought against the uprising with an aim to ward them off.

When ISAF was first deployed in 2001, individual countries led its operations on the basis of six months rotation. This pattern continued when NATO began leading ISAF[39] in 2003 and helped Canada in establishing again a twelve months commitment to Afghanistan through pegging it to a six months leadership rotation schedule of ISAF. Canada took the six months NATO-ISAF leadership command in February 2004 under the command of General Rick Hillier. Canadian capabilities were certainly stretched with simultaneous operational missions in Afghanistan in August 2003 and its leadership of Multi-National Division (South-West) in Bosnia in October 2003 (Ettinger and Rice 2016: 380). Committing more than twelve months was probably unrealistic.

[39] The UN Security Council authorised ISAF in October 2003 to extend its counter-insurgency mission beyond Kabul.

Worth pondering is that Canada's senior military leaders were reluctant to undertake any immediate mission in either Iraq or Afghanistan due to their less confidence in the service's ability at that time. The prominent reason was that the Canadian forces still had an important commitment to the NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and had taken command of the Multi-National Division in Bosnia. Moreover, a large air and ground mission with NATO's Kosovo Force was just concluded by Canada, and more than 450 Canadians had just returned from the UN peacekeeping mission of six months in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Notwithstanding serious misgivings by army about its feasibility, then Minister of National Defence John McCallum announced on 12 February 2003 in the House of Commons that Canada has chosen to assume lead tactical command of the ISAF mission in Kabul for twelve months period starting in August 2003. Not only did Canada recommit its troops between fall 2003 and fall 2004 (with 1950 Canadian troops) to NATO-led ISAF mission to Kabul, it extended this commitment for some more rotations (Middlemiss 2016: 49-50; and Ettinger and Rice 2016: 379).

It is claimed that the partial withdrawal of Canadian troops from Europe made the Canadian government willing in January 2003 to take the command of stabilisation mission of ISAF in Kabul. In 2004, the third largest bulk of troops were supported by Canada in Afghanistan, following the U.S. and Germany. As many troops were deployed by Canada as the British, Italian, and French forces combined. Due to its limited military capabilities, the main fear of Canada in Afghanistan was of being entangled and it sought indispensable U.S. and allied support, whereas the U.S. wanted the full concentration of its resources on the war against Iraq and pass the case of Afghanistan to NATO. At this point, compatible preferences converged between a middle power country Canada who was looking to buttress its reputation as a reliable military ally and a preponderant power the U.S. who was seeking an exit strategy from Afghanistan (Fitzsimmons 2012).

According to Danford Middlemiss (2016), some significant questions emerge over here: Why did the government of Canada reoffer its troops to Kabul under ISAF very soon after its only short-term commitment? And what reasons led Canada to choose to recommit to Afghanistan rather than to deploy with the U.S. to Iraq? As Middlemiss

argues, Canada started seeing the benefits of a commitment to Afghanistan because it helped Canada in deflecting a U.S. request to join its mission in Iraq.

The Canadian desire to find an alternative to deployment to the war in Iraq and to reinforce bilateral ties with Germany and, in general, ties with NATO are seen as the key motivations which led Canada to decide to return to Afghanistan (Fitzsimmons 2013). As NATO adopted ISAF mission in 2003 and it became a NATO-led operation, it was anticipated that a plenty of resources of the trans-Atlantic alliance will arrive into the Afghan mission. This not only came as an overarching chance for burden sharing but also brought a "built-in exit strategy" for the countries (Stein and Lang 2007: 96, cited in Ettinger and Rice 2016). Moreover, when the U.S. agreed to keep 10,000 troops and armed equipment in place, Canada got reassured that support will be accessible in need (Ettinger and Rice 2016: 379).

While it was the responsibility of each contributing member country to supply its own forces, most of the logistical support for the coalition was actually provided by the U.S. Since 2001, the U.S. deployed in Afghanistan a staggering amount of supplies and military hardware. The combat operations by the U.S. forces were conducted in every Afghan province and every major operation got their participation, they rarely fought alone. However, significant contributions were also made by several coalition partners, which often came at a heavy cost. The UK, Canada, the Netherlands and Australia fielded greatly efficient conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) that conducted combat and stabilisation operations throughout Afghanistan as well as fielded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), trained and advised Afghan security forces, and managed large-scale development projects (Grenier 2015: 6).

In Afghanistan, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) carried out a variety of operations consisting of air, land and sea military assets for more than twelve years. The activities by CAF included not only combat operations but also development, security, carrying training missions in many areas in Afghanistan and in varying capacities. With the deployment of more than 40,000 CAF personnel to Afghanistan since the inception of the mission, that too many times, the armed commitment in Afghanistan emerged as the biggest deployment on the part of CAF members since the Second World War (NDCAF 2017b).

Establishing the security necessary in promoting growth and creating an atmosphere conducive to the advancement of Afghan people's life and reconstruction have been the aim of the CAF activities in Afghanistan. The CAF members: (i) carried out combat operations to eradicate rebellious gangs like the Taliban; (ii) maintained security in many areas to help Afghans in rebuilding the country; (iii) facilitated the delivery of various projects and programmes in order to support rehabilitation and national economic recovery; and (iv) trained the ANSF members and senior officials in the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence in order to provide them with the necessary tools required to sustain their own security.

As military means alone cannot overcome the challenges, the Canadian effort in Afghanistan included not only military personnel but also diplomats, police officers, development workers, and experts in human rights, the rule of law, good governance, and the institutions. This gathering of a wide range of expertise was done so that a "whole-of-government" (WoG) approach could be brought to the complex task of nation-building. The CAF were only one of the components, the Canadian effort also included various governmental departments, such as

> the Canadian Civilian Police; the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada; Public Safety; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Correctional Services Canada; and Canada Border Services Agency, among others (NDCAF 2017b).

At sea, Canada was the first coalition country after the U.S. to send warships to the Southwest Asia operational area, which was the largest naval commitment on the part of Canada since the Second World War. With the main task of maintaining control of the maritime area of operations, 15 different Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) ships had been sent and deployed to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, so that: (i) military operations in Afghanistan could be supported; (ii) participation in the defence of U.S. Navy ships transporting U.S. air and ground forces; and (iii) multinational counter-terrorism activities could be supported in the region at sea (NDCAF 2017b).

The naval commitment of Canada to Operation APOLLO ended in December 2003 after four rotations. Between January 2004 and October 2008, there was a continued deployment of Canadian ships to the region as part of Operation ALTAIR in order to support the international campaign against terrorism. Under Operation ACCIUS, from

November 2002 to June 2005, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan's (UNAMA) Military Advisory Unit (MAU) was contributed by Canada with two senior Canadian forces officers.

> The UNAMA Military Advisory Unit (MAU) consisted of officers from several nations who served as military liaison officers (MLO) at UNAMA regional offices across Afghanistan. Its primary objective was to support UNAMA aims in the field of security sector reform, security capacity building, and security confidence building. MLOs supported these initiatives and developed confidence and cooperation between Afghan and coalition security forces as well as other organizations and agencies (NDCAF 2017b).

MLOs emphasised promoting trust, mutual understanding, and synchronisation. As for UNAMA, with a mandate of supporting the processes of "reconstruction and national reconciliation set out in the Bonn Agreement in December 2001", UNAMA had been created on 28 March 2002 through the UN Security Council Resolution 1401. The mandate of UNAMA has been renewed several times since then. The several functions of UNAMA include:

> lead and coordinate international efforts in assisting Afghanistan with its transition while reinforcing Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership; support the organization of elections and the sustainability, integrity and inclusiveness of the electoral process; support peace and reconciliation efforts; assist in increasing greater coherence, coordination and efficiency among UN agencies, funds and programs in Afghanistan; and coordinate and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance (NDCAF 2017b).

Phase 1 of Operation ATHENA[40] (from August 2003 to December 2011) started in August 2003 through which Canada participated in ISAF and contributed combat forces.

> For the next two years, Canada provided an infantry battle group and the command element of a multinational brigade (from February to July 2004) to help establish and enhance security in and around the capital, Kabul. CAF troops conducted foot patrols, surveillance missions, armed raids on illegal weapons caches and provided security to facilitate elections. Phase 1 of Op ATHENA ended in August 2005 and the Canadian task force began transitioning to Kandahar until January 2006. The second phase of Op ATHENA saw CAF members conducting combat operations in Kandahar province (specifically in the Dand, Arghandab, Panjwayi, and Zhari districts) until July 2011 (NDCAF 2017b).

[40] The Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-A) comprised all Canadian forces deployed in Afghanistan under the Operation ARCHER, Operation ACCIUS, and Operation ATHENA. Operation ARCHER was the contribution of Canadian forces to U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (Holland 2010: 280).

Canada in Kandahar

The perception that Canada got a higher profile within NATO councils due to the ISAF mission in Kabul buoyed the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and Department of National Defence (DND) officials to start considering how Canada can garner an even greater degree of stature within the trans-Atlantic alliance by taking on a demanding and immensely important mission in Afghanistan to satisfy the concerns of allied partners regarding equitable burden sharing. Whatever the realities of allied concerns regarding Canadian role in NATO had been, the decisions of the Canadian government on the Afghan mission reflected, to some degree, a concern of Canada about its own role in the trans-Atlantic alliance (Middlemiss 2016: 51).

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)[41] were the instruments to assist the government of Afghanistan. PRTs provide help to the democratically elected government in rebuilding the nation, extending its authority and governing ability, and giving services to its citizens. Civil-military cooperation is facilitated by a PRT as it consists of not only soldiers but civilian subject-matter experts and diplomats, working together to extend the authority of the government by supporting the efforts for reconstruction (Holland 2010: 278). Canada was in search of an appropriate locale for its promised PRT.

As NATO took responsibility for all the PRTs from the U.S., it offered Canada several PRT locations, including the Chaghcharan in Ghor Province and Herat, but those were rejected by Canada. After evaluating different options extensively, Canada finally chose the high-profile Kandahar province under the leadership of General Rick Hillier (chief of the Defence Staff) due to its operational and political visibility internationally as it was most often targeted by insurgents and satisfied the big impact

[41] In organisational structure, PRTs are similar to a military base and is commanded by a military officer. On the one hand, PRTs perform governance and development tasks and, on the other, fight the insurgents. The emphasis on reconstruction rather than combat makes PRTs more politically acceptable, especially when the public support for the military operation falls as occurred in the case of Afghanistan after 2006 while the resurgence of Taliban began. Governance and development assistance are managed by PRTs through project activities such as the Kandahar Local Initiatives Programme (KLIP) which supported small-scale projects in the province to build the governmental capacity.

criterion; it was close to the Kandahar Airfield (KAF) (NATO-operated airport in Afghanistan) as well as close to KAF based major U.S. combat units which were expected to support Canadian forces operations (Middlemiss 2016: 53; and Holland 2010: 279). The Canadian agreement to go into southern Kandahar province and engage in counter-insurgency[42] and counter-terrorism combat operations was at least partly due to its desire to repair damage incurred by Canada's decisions not to go into Iraq or participate in the continental ballistic missile defence initiative and improve relations with the U.S. (Stairs 2016: 22; and Holland 2010: 280). Additionally, as Kenneth Holland (2010) points out:

> The need to engage in combat for the first time since the Korean War provided an opportunity for General Hillier to modernize the Canadian Forces so that they could fight alongside American combat units.

On 16 May 2005, then Minister of Defence Bill Graham announced the return to Kandahar province with the plan of deploying an army task force consisting of 700 CAF soldiers and a brigade headquarters of 300 personnel for the period of nine to twelve months. The deployment of a PRT to Kandahar city was also announced by Canada for the period of eighteen months (Government of Canada 2005).

The Canadian pursuit was to make a meaningful contribution based on Kandahar. Thus, as part of its three-pronged plan, Canada had offered to take command of ISAF Regional Command-South, to provide a PRT in Kandahar province of Afghanistan, and to field a sizable supporting combat group in the province. The plan was supported by the U.S. So, Canada dismantled its Camp Julien base in Kabul, the Canadian military units involved in supporting ISAF in Kabul area were withdrawn and moved to southern Kandahar province over an extended timeline (Middlemiss 2016: 54).

In August 2005, Canada assumed responsibility from the U.S. for the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT). With the establishment of the KPRT, Canada embraced a counter-insurgency approach to the stabilisation of remote Asian country and the traditional peacekeeping role was abandoned. The KPRT was based

[42] Counter-insurgency means when the military and political efforts (for instance, warfare, development assistance or efforts to bolster the legitimacy of the national government) are taken up so that insurgency could be countered. Success and failure of counter-insurgency are decided by its willingness to provide the population security and order.

on the rationale that consisting of development, diplomatic, and military personnel will improve chances to accomplish the mission of improved governance, security, and social and economic development (Holland 2010: 276). Counter-insurgency approach of Canada in Kandahar province consisted of two distinct operational strategies: (i) an initial enemy-centric strategy[43], for instance, Operation Medusa of 2006-late 2008 as it was a time of more insurgent violence against coalition forces because insurgents were desperate to maintain their credibility; and (ii) post-2009 population-centric counter-insurgency strategy[44] which began with Operation Kantolo in 2009 (Kandahar city) launched by the Canadian forces (Jardine and Palamar 2013: 588-589). The population-centric counter-insurgency strategy consisted not only of population protection, but the capacity building of the ANSF and the government of Afghanistan also included (Dickson 2016: 140).

Canada adopted WoG approach (combined 'three Ds' - defence, diplomacy, and development) to the conflict in Afghanistan by the amalgamation of various interdepartmental perspectives, objectives, activities, plans, and programmes. The overarching objective was to persuade Afghan citizens to support their constitutional government through combined efforts of three Ds in stabilising the conflict and improving governance, economic growth, and security (Canada, Department of National Defence 2011; Coombs 2015: 68; Coombs 2012/13: 14; and Holland 2010: 277). To form a WoG team, approximately 350 police, military, foreign affairs, correctional services and development personnel had come together who committed themselves to improve the quality of life of residents of Kandahar province of Afghanistan by assisting with the provision of development, security, and governance (NDCAF 2017b). Howard G. Coombs (2015) writes that Canadian war in Afghanistan seemed different from previous conflicts in one significant manner which was a national implementation of an integrated governmental approach to military operations. This WoG approach defined the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan, in

[43] An enemy-centric strategy is characterised by military engagements between the Forces of Canada and the insurgents. It believes in eliminating the challenges.

[44] A population-centric counter-insurgency strategy aims to provide security to the population rather than to seek out and destroy the insurgents because it may result in damage to the population and they may turn against counterinsurgents. It is believed to create a most secure and controlled environment for the civilian population as it deters insurgents from targeting innocent people through consistent and palpable counter-insurgency presence in populated areas. A secure civilian population is crucial for the success of counter-insurgency (Jardine and Palamar 2013).

particular, between 2006 and 2011 in Kandahar. The WoG approach is too significant to take lightly.

Thus, Canada got involved in southern part of Afghanistan with the enlargement of the ISAF in 2006 in the region, the NATO mission took over in the south of Afghanistan from U.S.-led coalition forces. It was the phase of transition. On 31 July 2006, Brigadier General Dave Fraser and his staff formed Multi-National Brigade (South) with units from 1 Canadian Mechanised Brigade Group (Coombs 2015: 69). As Stephen Harper (2006) had spoken to Canadian soldiers while mentioning his vision of Canadian foreign security policy: "You can't lead from the bleachers". He further said: "I want Canada to be a leader...A country that really leads, not a country that just follows". He argued that in order to demonstrate its leadership role, Canada cannot afford "carping from the sidelines". Canada must not "cut and run," because "cutting and running is not my way and it's not the Canadian way".

Taliban insurgents came to Kandahar in large numbers from Pakistan in spring 2006 and the Canadian forces got engaged in heavy combat regularly throughout the province (Holland 2010: 280). Searching and destroying insurgents was the initial primary focus or operational strategy of Canadian troops when they arrived in Kandahar province in 2006, considered as 'hunting down' the insurgents. From 2006 to 2011, as part of the NATO-led ISAF and in support of OEF, Canada carried out combat operation in Kandahar province (Coombs 2015: 72; and Jardine and Palamar 2013: 589, 593). Alongside, the expansion of WoG contributions was decided by Canada in Kandahar through its KPRT. By 2010-2011, the KPRT (by then a combined effort of Canada and the U.S.) group closely worked with local officials in Afghanistan. The KPRT had a strong relationship with the Provincial Council, which was a body of elected representatives and, thus, promoted people's participation and governance of civil society. Among the people of Kandahar, the Council was best known as a place where they could come to seek help with their problems. In the form of listening to the people, finding common ground and mediating their disputes, the work of the Council was significant (Coombs 2015: 72).

There were six key policy objectives of Canada in Kandahar as per Manley Report[45] of 2008, which were: (1) to provide a secure environment and the rule of law by capacity building of security forces, justice, and corrections, (2) to provide critical services, such as water, and encourage employment, (3) to deliver humanitarian aid where required, and (4) to increase Afghanistan-Pakistan border security, (5) to support Afghan institutions assisting the Canadian initiatives in Kandahar, and (6) to support Afghan-led reconciliation initiatives meant to foster a sustainable peace and eliminate violence (Government of Canada 2009b). Coombs (2015) noted that security was involved in only one of these priorities which focused on capacity building of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Similarly, Kenneth Holland (2010) also pointed out that the main tasks of ISAF's combat troops and their support units have been to assist in the development of Afghan National Security Forces so that a more safe and secure environment (conducive to development and capacity building) could be sustained and law and order promoted.

A vigorous Special Operations Task Force was deployed by Canada to Kandahar province of Afghanistan that targeted insurgent leaders, mentored and trained Afghan Special Forces, contributed to force protection through conducting operations against improvised explosive device facilitators. The CAF also fielded Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) to work alongside and within Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) units, to mentor leaders at every rank level, to deliver individual and group training, and to provide liaison with ISAF forces in partnered operations (NDCAF 2017b). The concept of OMLT developed within NATO alliance in 2006 in response to U.S.' requests, which was seeking to reduce its embedded training forces in Afghanistan to deal with the Iraq crisis. The eventual transition of Canada from a combat to a military and police training role was facilitated by the OMLT experience (Holland and Kirkey 2013: 272).

In all of the major Canadian initiatives, it was ensured through the close partnership with the government of Afghanistan in planning and delivery that the Canadian projects' benefits were sustainable. The wide-ranging economic and social Canadian contributions consisted of: (1) the Arghandab irrigation rehabilitation programme

[45] The Manley Report is also known as the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan which came in 2008.

(designed to foster sustainable agricultural output), that included reconstruction of the Dahla Dam to revitalise vigorous agro-economy of Kandahar, (2) fifty signature schools, (3) eradication of polio (Coombs 2015: 73; Holland and Kirkey 2013: 270; and Holland 2010: 282), (4) Sarpoza Prison improvement (in Kandahar city, which met UN standards in 2009 and has become Afghanistan's best correctional facility) (5) training of police to increase their capability (along with NATO allies), and (6) to secure governance infrastructure and capacity of administration (Coombs 2015: 73; and Holland 2010: 284).

For building, expanding, and repairing fifty schools in Kandahar province as well as for improving the quality of education across the southern province, Canada also collaborated with the provincial Department of Education (DoE). Despite facing some setbacks, there were local successes also as the more responsibility was assumed by the provincial government for the newly opened schools, and improved security environment. Through Canadian representatives in Kabul, this partnership in education continues at a national level. And in partnership with the Department of Public Health (DoPH), a significant number of health clinics were built, expanded, and/or repaired by Canada, particularly in southern Afghanistan. Due to prolonged insecurity, many of the clinics had been severely damaged or destroyed. Moreover, in an effort to eradicate polio across the remote Asian country, Canada supported the immunisation of Afghan children through the UN and the DoPH (Coombs 2015: 73).

Funded and supported by the international community, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and the National Area-Base Development Programme (NABDP) are seen as one of the greatest accomplishments of international efforts. NSP was launched by the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) in 2003 to develop Afghan communities' ability to identify, plan, manage, and monitor the development projects of their own country. While NSP functions mainly at the village level, NABDP operates at the district level, fosters the rural development and builds governmental capacity to lead and coordinate participatory approaches to development. The District Development Assembly (DDA) is the principal participatory mechanism (Holland 2010: 285). With these efforts, Canadian relationships with the Afghan people improved and their presence enhanced the perception of security among Afghan people.

For increasing local capacity, District Stabilisation Teams (DSTs) consisting of small groups of Canadian and U.S. governmental advisors along with military assistance (in the form of regular military security personnel, liaison officers, and staff) closely worked with their Afghan counterparts in the district line ministries and district governors. Due to the efforts of these DSTs of dedicated professionals, the measurable growth of district governance over time was not less significant (Coombs 2012/13: 14; and Coombs 2015: 72). Emphasis on development led to the functioning of District Development Committees (DDCs), which were designed to help in prioritising and disbursing centrally controlled funds against district development needs as part of the formal processes of sub-national government (Coombs 2015: 75).

The decision of deploying combat troops to Kandahar in 2006 is considered the most consequential Canadian decision of the entire campaign in Afghanistan. The reasons for redeployment to Kandahar remain contested. However, it is certain that the deployment to Kandahar in Regional Command-South (RC-S)[46] was never anticipated to be a five years endeavour. Canada would eventually lead RC-S which started in February 2008. Before the end of the twelve months commitment in February 2007, Canada had extended its commitment for twenty-four additional months in order to meet the leadership pledge. By May of 2006, the government of PM Harper had made its first major foreign policy move by extending the Kandahar mission to February 2009, two years beyond the original 2007 end date. It had been presumed by Canada that Kandahar would be treated by NATO-ISAF as it had treated Kabul; rotation of countries on a predictable schedule (Ettinger and Rice 2016: 380-381).

As the Afghan war progressed, especially after the increase in insurgent activities in 2006, many countries were compelled to significantly augment the number of deployed troops for the stabilisation of their assigned area of operations. The coalition often saw failure in achieving its political and military objectives when the contributing members' interests did not align. For instance, limitations on their forces were placed by some governments, which are generally referred to as national

[46] The PRTs are grouped under regional commands (RC), led by different NATO member countries, such as, RC-East (U.S.), RC-West (Italy), RC-North (Germany), and RC-South (where command rotated among Canada, Britain, and the Netherlands). RC-South consisted of Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan, and Zabul provinces in which the responsibility for the Kandahar PRT was assumed by Canada in August 2005 (Holland 2010: 279).

caveats. Many leaders were encouraged by political considerations, limited military capabilities, and legal constraints to restrict the kind of operations their military forces could conduct. Some countries' troops were restricted to perform only reconstruction efforts and provide humanitarian assistance. Others permitted, or even encouraged, their forces to conduct combat operations, but only in those areas that were usually free of insurgent activities. These kinds of decisions of contributing members often strained bilateral relations between coalition partners and within NATO alliance (Grenier 2015: 2). Dickson (2016) and Grenier (2015) both write that national caveats, dictated by national governments, posed real constraints and often limited the combat capabilities of coalition forces operating in Afghanistan to comply with legal restrictions, a lack of military capacity or political constraints.

In the period of forty-one months from August 2006 to December 2009, more than half of the Canadian personnel (87 of 158) deployed in the operation in Afghanistan were killed. During such a critical period, public opinion in Canada started turning against the mission, and reportedly Canada had to try harder in order to convince some of its larger partners for removing their caveats against operating at night and for permitting their troops to reinforce those (like Canada's) encountering especially fierce fighting in southern Afghanistan (Government of Canada 2008b; and Middlemiss 2016: 57). The Canadian forces moved from an enemy-centric to population-centric counter-insurgency operational strategy, however, the environment did not change during this period. Due to the dangerous security environment in Kandahar province, reconstruction efforts remained reduced to urban areas. Through economic development and political programmes, counter-insurgency can achieve population support, but these require a secure environment for their implementation (Jardine and Palamar 2013: 591).

On 14 March 2008, the second extension for Canadian mission in Kandahar occurred for three years which was to end in July 2011. According to the extension, Canadian military presence in Kandahar was till July 2011, and by December 2011 it had to withdraw its forces. No victory in the southern province appeared imminent and proposed end date in 2009 proved untenable. The Taliban insurgency did not appear slowing down. With the increasing Canadian casualties, public support or approval was dropping and many NATO partners in Europe did not come up with their support

for peers in the southern Afghan province (Ettinger and Rice 2016: 382; Massie 2013: 285; and Boucher 2010). Additionally, the reputational costs were also associated with unilateral exit and the negative effects on Afghan people's lives with the re-emergence of the Taliban, and the sacrifices already made (Nossal 2009: 158, cited in Ettinger and Rice 2016: 383).

After critically examining the Afghan Mission, with a greater emphasis on Afghan capacity building through Canadian efforts towards diplomacy, reconstruction and governance, prolonged Canadian military commitment beyond 2009 was recommended by the Manley Report too. It also emphasised on the shifting of military mission towards the training of the ANSF (Government of Canada 2008b; and Coombs 2015: 71). The Canadian Parliament gave its approval to extend the Canadian forces engagement in southern Kandahar province until 2011, and subsequent training mission in Kabul until 2014. As a result, Canada's military strategy focused on providing security for reconstruction and development efforts in Kandahar province, training the ANSF, continuing Canadian responsibility for the KPRT. It was a comprehensive Canadian focus that involved all departments of government. Ultimately, the overarching Canadian effort on building Afghan capacity became the hallmark of its mission (Coombs 2015: 71). As per Manley Report of 2008, Canada had defined above mentioned six priorities and made a commitment of moving 50 per cent of the aid budget for Afghanistan to Kandahar; along with three signature projects (of repairing the Dahla Dam and irrigation system, expanding educational opportunities in Kandahar, and eradication of polio) (Government of Canada 2008b; and Coombs 2015: 72; Holland 2010: 282).

As can be observed with regard to the war in Afghanistan, Canadian PM Stephen Harper took three major decisions: to extend the Afghan mission to 2009, then extend to 2011, and a partial withdrawal in 2011. The preference for a mission under NATO command and the imposition of a deadline helped alleviate the fears of Canadian public of an open-ended military commitment. The motive behind fully endorsing a combat role for Canada in Kandahar province was to strengthen Canadian prestige and enhancement of Canadian status as a respectable and reliable military ally (the same reason for which the Liberals had initially committed to the Afghan war). When PM Harper had inherited the Afghan case file in early 2006, the vigorous war

contribution of Canada to the southern part of Afghanistan was expected to expire by the end of that year (Massie 2013: 281-282).

Between 2006 and 2009, the absence of a clearly articulated and consistent international strategy for Afghanistan had given rise to what critics describe as a series of "locally designed" national campaigns across the area of operations in Afghanistan, for instance, those conducted by the British in Helmand, the U.S. in the eastern provinces, and Canadians in Kandahar. In November 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama took a decision of sending additional tens of thousands U.S. troops to Afghanistan (mostly to the southern part) along with more clearly articulated leadership of international campaign, those national campaigns became more fully integrated into broader international campaigns of nation-building and counter-insurgency (Coombs 2015: 69). Stephen M. Grenier (2015) argues that prior to 2009, the lack of an overarching strategy forced military commanders and diplomatic officials to develop local strategies and focus on tactical- and operational-level issues. There were disagreements among the counter-insurgency proponents with regard to the most effective tactics and methods. Dickson (2016) also points towards disagreements with regard to the execution of counter-insurgency resulting from more serious disagreements regarding the nature of Afghan conflict.

In significant problems experienced by the coalition members, the lack of a coherent strategy was the most significant one (Grenier 2015: 8). As the initial Canadian military commitment in Afghanistan lacked clear strategic objectives or a vision of what mission success would seem beyond the stabilisation of Afghan security environment. As a result, an initial lack of comprehension of Canadian politicians ended up in an approach to the military mission that demonstrated a lack of understanding of the conflict in Afghanistan. That miscomprehension did change only when casualties began to aggravate in 2006 after the move from Kabul to southern Kandahar province (Coombs 2015: 66-67). Kandahar was considered one of the most volatile provinces of Afghanistan; the members of CAF fought the insurgency for more than five years in that province. The Canadian battle group, at its peak, included nearly 3,000 personnel and was augmented by an air wing from December 2008 to August 2011 (NDCAF 2017b).

With the success of the U.S. in 2007 in achieving military surge in Iraq and the 2008 election of President Barack Obama, the divergence of the U.S. from Afghanistan ended and it again got involved in the ongoing Afghan conflict. As a result, this provided a strategic vision and the necessary resources for creating a multinational counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. NATO efforts were provided with fresh impetus by this renewed international interest in Afghanistan to resolve the expanding extreme violence (Coombs 2015: 69). However, by 2008, efforts of reconstruction, security, rebuilding and stabilise the government of Afghanistan attempted by OEF proved once again insufficient, uncoordinated and fragmented. Not only insurgents, but corrupt government, stagnant economy and narcotics trade with many other reasons posed greater challenges to international intervention in Afghanistan (Dickson 2016: 136).

In 2009, two significant trends were evident in the changing nature of the Kandahar PRT: (i) the shift from military predominance in development and governance activities to a greater civilian role, and (ii) a larger presence of the U.S. in the area. The U.S. began shifting its counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency efforts from Iraq to Afghanistan and abandoned the search and destroy mission targeted against Al-Qaeda in support of political, social, and economic development, with an emphasis on the southern part of Afghanistan (Holland 2010: 287-288). Canadian area of responsibility in Kandahar province narrowed in the summer of 2009, as they started concentrating around Kandahar City.

The KPRT mission became a combined Canadian-U.S. effort by 2010-2011 and included sixty-two Canadian civilians. The military forces of Canada and the U.S. together composed Task Force Kandahar (TFK)[47] which implemented initiatives throughout 2010-2011 (Coombs 2015: 74; and Coombs 2012/13: 14), and could be grouped in three areas such as security area, governance-related, and development. Under the security initiatives, increasing police and army capability while directly combating the insurgency was supported. Initiatives related to governance made an attempt to build capable civil services and to strengthen district and sub-national institutions. Lastly, development initiatives, in addition to increasing economic

[47] Task Force Kandahar conducted the ISAF mission in Kandahar under ISAF RC-South.

growth, aimed at determining the priorities of local development and sustainable solutions. The insurgency in Afghanistan was fought in numerous ways by TFK and its WoG collaborators. The military efforts of Canada were focused on removing destabilising influences through establishing and maintaining community-centric security. This led to the creation of the conditions for an integrated interagency approach which formed and promoted local governance and development, that too from the bottom up. By unifying the actions of involved agencies within the context of overarching security, the net effect of the TFK was that it made a major difference in extending stability (Coombs 2015: 74-76). Thus, TFK made an attempt to create the security conditions through which the government of Afghanistan could connect with its people by providing sustainable programmes and policies helped by KPRT and DSTs.

Once appropriate conditions seem to be established, such as responsible and functioning governance, a capable ANSF, and burgeoning local economies with a rural/urban interface, those districts were transferred to complete Afghan control. Though the combat mission of Canada ended in July 2011, Canadian military contribution continued as part of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan[48] through its security and capacity building efforts. Canada has left a legacy in Kandahar province despite its departure from that area. That legacy is rooted in the service and sacrifices of the military as well as civilian personnel who have created conditions for a more stable and secure Kandahar. The impact of these efforts is expected to contribute to the ultimate goal of securing the future of Afghanistan as a functioning member of the international community (Coombs 2015: 76). However, as Grenier (2015) mentions that in Afghanistan, the political landscape remains complex. After a contentious presidential election, the Bilateral Security Agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan was signed on 30 September 2014. The U.S.-Afghanistan agreement permits approximately 9,800 U.S. troops to remain in Afghanistan.

A Status of Forces Agreement was also signed between Afghan representatives and NATO on 30 September 2014. The legal foundation was provided by the NATO-Afghanistan agreement for a new NATO-led mission, called Resolute Support, which

[48] It was created to manage the institutional capacity of ANSF.

started the day after the official end of NATO combat operations, viz. that on 1 January 2015. The Resolute Support mission permitted NATO advisors to work with high-level Afghan military staffs, Afghan government ministries and institutions (NATO 2014).

As Canada also continued the civilian commitment to Afghanistan beyond 2014, Canada and Afghanistan have entered a new phase of cooperation and partnership in a national programme that is based out of Kabul. The focus of this national programme is on four areas: (1) making an investment in the future of Afghan children and youth through projects in the area of education and health; (2) to advance security, human rights, and the rule of law; (3) to promote regional diplomacy; and (4) to deliver humanitarian assistance. This national programme is expected to build on Canadian experience in Kandahar province while working together on priorities identified by the government of Afghanistan. At the same time, Canadian objective of supporting Afghans in building a well governed, stable, and the secure country remains the same (Coombs 2015: 74). For the purpose of promoting law and order in Afghanistan, a wide variety of law enforcement officials have been given training by Canada in the country.

By 31 December 2014, the transfer of responsibility for security from the ISAF to the ANSF was considered a first step in the direction of transition process (known as *Inteqal*). In the direction of successful transition, the fully capable ANSF is necessary which could tackle security challenges on an irreversible and sustainable basis. The ANP and the ANA have grown in size and strength which were non-existent in 2001. There are nearly 350,000 uniformed Afghan police and soldiers today who are planning and leading across entire Afghanistan (NDCAF 2017b).

As a member of NATO-led ISAF, the Canadian military involvement in Afghanistan dramatically shifted from a focus on peacekeeping and logistical support to a clearly combat role to an emphasis on training of the ANA (Holland and Kirkey 2013: 269). On the one hand, it has been argued that participation in Afghanistan provided Canada with an opportunity to reinforce its NATO commitments and increase the country's ability to influence the future of the trans-Atlantic alliance (Grenier 2015: 4, 6). On the other hand, it has been said that though the traditional interest of Canada in being

a good ally, to both the U.S. and its NATO partners, is expected to create influence over its key allies; however, this could not be seen in any readily apparent way. Rather, over time, the good ally impulse of Canada greatly influenced the strategic duration (which is a time limitation placed on a country's use of force) of its operations (Massie 2016; and Ettinger and Rice 2016: 385).

While Ettinger and Rice (2016) have stated that despite years of Canadian campaign in Kandahar province Canada did not achieve that much influence. Massie (2013) has argued that from 2001 to 2011 all three governments of Canada used the opportunity in order to strengthen NATO and raise the international prestige of Canada. The level of the Canadian contribution to the Afghan war was conditioned partly on the relative ability of Canadian forces to deploy combat troops in a high-intensity environment for a prolonged period. From 2006 to 2010, Canada raised its status as a significant military and reliable ally with "just enough" troops, did not seek U.S. attention by over-contribution in Afghanistan. Additionally, a certain level of autonomy to Canada has been noticed in the Afghanistan mission; however, to resist U.S. dominance is impossible and the only constraint.

On the other side, Patrick Lennox (2009) has argued that following the Canadian refusal to take part in the war against Iraq and to join the U.S. missile defence system, Canadian PM Paul Martin's government was compelled by the pressures of continental hierarchy which led the commitment of troops to Kandahar province of Afghanistan in 2005. While the decision in the case of Iraq highlighted Canadian autonomy vis à-vis the U.S., its subsequent consequences indicated the contrary, viz. that, the need to support a U.S.-led 'coalition of the willing' that not only overstretched the capabilities of Canada but also tarnished the reputation of the country as a reliable ally (in displaying limited Canadian capabilities).

However, such continental hierarchy pressure did not come from the U.S. coercion rather it was the Canadian decision-makers' own perception with regard to overwhelming necessity to compensate for having snubbed U.S. previously. For security and trade, Canada has been highly dependent on the U.S., revamping Canadian reputation as a reliable good ally seemed significant to Canada. So, the continuation of "soft balancing" U.S. foreign policy is expected from Canada within

common institutions, for instance, NATO, viz. that constrain unilateral U.S. policies in a manner that enhance Canadian security interests and its international position (Massie 2013: 276-277).

Matthew Willis (2012) has made a point that it is built-in restrictions of the NATO playbook (a scheme or set of strategies for conducting a political campaign) that allow the less capable and smaller countries to play roles, but limited, in the military operations of NATO alliance. In the process, these states rely on a friendly partner; such kind of a partnership was mainly behind the Canadian long-term operation in Afghanistan. As has been argued by Bland (2016) that Canada based reinforcing role for NATO necessitates a specialised CAF built around four defining characteristics: mobility, high readiness, speed, and highly lethal naval, space, and air capabilities. There will be a close integration of all with the U.S. armed forces.

Compared with European allies, a relatively strong effort was made by Canada in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. It has also been argued, however, that with Canada's small air force contribution to the brief U.S.-NATO-led campaign in Libya notwithstanding, the enthusiasm of Canadians for military participation in NATO operations evaporated even before the final withdrawal of Canada's troops from Afghanistan (Bland 2016: 41). Middlemiss (2016) has also pointed out that though Kandahar represented a big impact criterion to Canada that allowed it to make a worthwhile contribution to the stabilisation of Afghanistan. However, in the interdepartmental assessments of future contribution by Canada to the ISAF, a PRT contribution by itself did not seem high-profile enough for Canada. Something more would be required in order to satisfy Canadian pursuit of higher stature within NATO.

As far as the Canadian foreign policy internationalism and impulse to be perceived as a good (or reliable) ally are concerned, it leaves the country particularly vulnerable to exterior pressures when it participates in coalition warfare. Canada finds itself caught in a dilemma: participate and be seen as a good ally, but keep control over strategic duration to exterior forces; or risk your good ally standing by not participating. Canada's strategic duration are most significantly influenced by Canadian international commitments to NATO and to key allies, whose influence the Canadian Parliament is unable to offset (Ettinger and Rice 2016: 372). According to Aaron

Ettinger and Jeffrey Rice (2016), the strategic duration of military operations demands a deep operational and political analysis. Initially, a time frame is decided in which force is used and resources are committed. In terms of operation, time limitations mean that military objectives must be met within an externally imposed set of conditions. For Canada, its already limited military capabilities imply that it can deploy Canadian forces overseas only for limited time, even when fighting alongside its larger partners. Extended commitments stretch the limits of CAF and necessitate periods of inactivity for the regeneration of forces. In political terms, strategic duration of a government hints to its partners the degree of its commitment to a multilateral mission.

Thus, during almost thirteen years in Afghanistan, six major limited term mission commitments were made by Canada and with each renewal, the duration of those missions grew longer (Ettinger and Rice 2016: 378). In their efforts of building government ministries, establishing Afghan security forces, and promoting economic development in troubled Afghanistan, the U.S. and forty-nine international coalition partners as of October 2014 spent almost $900 billion and suffered almost 3,500 troops killed and over 23,000 wounded. During the same period, more than 12,000 Afghan troops were killed and more than 37,000 wounded. Considerable resources have been invested by the international coalition partners for making Afghanistan a stable country and an inhospitable area for terrorists, where its government could foster economic opportunities, provide essential services, and protect Afghans from organised violence (Grenier 2015: 1).

Even the most enthusiastic coalition partner, willing to take risks, cannot commit its resources indefinitely. Hard decisions with regard to time period need be made. For willing coalition partners, particularly those with limited military capabilities, strategic duration matters greatly as a dimension of military participation alongside national caveats and level of commitment (Davidson 2014).

Debates regarding Canadian Afghan Mission

There are many debates over the practice of Canadian intervention abroad; whether and how peace can be achieved through peace-building or waging war? Here, Bruno

Charbonneau and Geneviéve Parent (2010) have stated that because Canada has the reputation as an international promoter of peace, this tradition of peacekeeping remained at the core of the debates for and against the Afghan mission: Was the Afghanistan war in line with the peacekeeping tradition, or was it time to forgo this tradition of peacekeeping in view of a transforming international security environment?

It is often argued that a dual challenge for Canada is posed by 'failing' or 'failed' states (in other words, ineffective states which lack in state capacity). First, the situations of suffering or humanitarian challenge these states create mortify the Canadian values and morality. Secondly, due to their 'failed' governing structures, these states remain prone to generate regional and global security threats such as terrorism or refugee flows that threaten the regional and global security and stability. More ominously, these 'failing' or 'failed' states become safe havens or potential breeding grounds for organised crime; thus, cannot be left alone. The dichotomy of the effective and ineffective (efficient and inefficient) states has been created to justify war as a tool for constructing or building peace and development (Charbonneau and Parent 2010: 95; and Canada, Department of National Defence 2005: 5).

Distinguishing between states, thus, creates an inequality of states that provides justification to the effective states' intervention inside ineffective ones. Ineffective states become the potential targets of intervention because they are not only prone to harbour terrorism, but also represent a moral obligation. The sovereignty of ineffective states is construed as negotiable and internationalised (Charbonneau and Parent 2010: 91). As the concept of human security embodies the idea of the responsibility to protect and is embedded into the strategy used for rebuilding fragile and 'failed' states, and the "stable state" is re-emphasised as "a crucial institutional framework for realising and protecting individual human rights" (Welsh 2006: 916).

According to Charbonneau and Parent (2010), Canadian peacekeeping is fraught with difficulty due to its focus on militarisation, coercion or force and raises some scepticism; for instance, if Canada is a true peacekeeper or a mythical one or if Canada is actually making peace or war. Canada's mission in Afghanistan was

authorised and legitimised in the name of international security and stability, but ultimately as a humanitarian war which linked Canada's security and prosperity to Canadian vocation in promoting security, development and peace abroad. In other words, it has been stated that peace and humanitarian tradition was re-imagined, reinvented, and rewritten so that the fact that Canada was engaged in war could be accommodated. Thus, it has been argued that in the name of global stability, Canada actually wages war against "scumbags" (former Canadian chief of the defence staff General Rick Hillier used such expression for Taliban), which is according to "traditional peacekeeping", not a contradiction.

Behind Afghan policy of Canada, alongside augmenting strategic influence and prestige of Canada, the strategy of 'forward security' has also been pointed as the main driving force which emphasises on projecting Canada's power overseas (as far away as possible from North America) in order to contain the threats to Canada and its citizens (Massie 2013: 275). A key proponent of 'forward security' is Sean M. Maloney (2010) who argued that Canada's relatively small military and financial commitments to Kandahar province of Afghanistan since 2009 (after the US "surge") and its withdrawal from the Afghan province significantly diminished the importance and influence of Canada along with the U.S. and strategic allies. Maloney suggested a "more mature and integrated approach to national security" would not have resulted in such negative effects.

As far as security, peace, and development are concerned, it has been argued that peace-building efforts of Canada in Afghanistan are grounded in gendered or Orientalist[49] representations. In other words, Canadian war has often been represented as a peace-building mission assisting Afghan individuals who are in a perpetual condition of victimhood of the Taliban, of conservative Islam, of underdevelopment, and of illiberalism; victims who are in need to be 'saved' by the Canadian soldier of peace. A discourse of an ideal Afghan victim, as the peace-building target, has been created through the emphasis on the absence of rights and freedom and maltreatment of Afghan women (and children); which strategically authorises and legitimises both the military invasion and the humanitarian management of Afghan life. Such images,

[49] An Orientalist is a person from the Western world who studies the Eastern world.

however, are presented by some as inaccurate and misleading, because Afghan life is conceived as homogeneous in both nature and condition and, thus, transformed into a subject to be governed and managed by international peace-builders. Instead of allowing numerous ways of peace to take place and allowing the full participation of Afghan 'victim' in its own peace and, thus, own political empowerment, Canadian war and practice of promoting and building peace resemble a post-colonial Western hegemonic practice of imposing a universal global order (Charbonneau and Parent 2010: 88-89, 97, 99). Some fundamental questions emerge: What kind of peace does Canada promote, build, and wage war for? Does this type of peace suggesting management of ineffective states by effective states through the use of coercion, force or diplomacy justifying?

As for Afghanistan, it is not understood as peace-building per se, rather as a war against an enemy or against terror. According to Charbonneau and Parent (2010), it would be a serious mistake to pretend that Canada is involved in doing anything other than waging war; thus, equivalent to undermining the Canadian troops' efforts, sacrifices and their mission. The dream (or myth) of peacekeeping-Canada has actually distorted military tradition that Canada has. Problems come in accepting the claims by the Canadian government and its allies of developmental progress in Afghanistan despite abundant contrary pieces of evidence.

Whatever the arguments, the ultimate Canadian aim is to leave Afghanistan to Afghans in the form of a viable, more secure, peaceful, and better governed country. The efforts of Canada would continuously support a more capable national government of Afghanistan which can better manage its borders, provide for security, and sustain over the longer term the stability and reconstruction of the country (Government of Canada 2008b: 3). Official documents have emphasised many times that Afghanistan's development means first and foremost regional and global stability and Canada's security.

It is interesting to ponder that the Canadian government along with NATO allies has claimed of the substantial progress of 'real' development in Afghanistan, though numerous reports write contrary. The tales of the fast-growing economy of Afghanistan, the millions of children (especially little girls) who returned back to

school (Byrd 2013), return of the millions of refugees after 2002 to Afghanistan, and building of the schools, roads, hospitals, and other infrastructure have been very common to hear (Charbonneau and Parent 2010: 102-103). However, on the other hand, the overall aid effort is criticised because it is said to lack coherence, irrelevant or unsuitable to Afghan wants, corrupted practices, and much more. The condition of Afghan life is yet to be changed significantly, as the international and Canadian developmental efforts have been claimed to be limited and strictly defined to serve the war effort.

Antonio Donini (2007) has talked about a deep 'perception gap' or disconnect between views of Afghans and outsiders. The understanding of outsider aid community and that of local Afghans communities on peace and security differs to a great extent. Afghans view that "the foreigners are here to get rich". He further noticed: "Aid agencies turn up unannounced, make an assessment and then disappear without result. If they do turn up again, their work is often viewed as superficial and unsustainable". As Donini has stated, among Afghan communities exists the deep malaise over the international campaign based on three Ds: disengagement, disillusionment, and disempowerment.

In its first report to Parliament, in June 2008, it had been recognised for the first time by the government of Canada that the security situation in Afghanistan had actually deteriorated and that sufficient results could not be produced through the development aid. To bring the agendas of security and development closer was the overall solution so that "rebalance" between the civilian and military programmes could take place (Government of Canada 2008b: 3). However, the war remained the main focus.

It has been argued that coalition efforts got frustrated due to the lack of a clearly understood strategy. Some governments had largely restricted their troops to reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and operated in the relatively peaceful northern and western Afghan provinces, for example, New Zealand, Germany, and the Central and Eastern European nations of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. They maintained that the primary missions of the coalition were peacekeeping and nation-building. Some other countries, who deployed combat troops, insisted on only operating in relatively safe Afghan parts. This difference created a rift between members involved in heavy combat and operated in the more

volatile southern and eastern Afghan provinces, such as the U.S., Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Australia, and members that generally avoided ground combat. Those involved in heavy combat argued that defeating the insurgency and protecting the Afghan population from organised violence was the top priority of coalition. During first five years of the war, the failure of coalition forces in creating effective Afghan security forces allowed insurgent forces to gain a foothold in eastern and southern Afghanistan's highly populated areas (Grenier 2015: 8-9).

Howard G. Coombs (2015) has stated that the international coalition partners collectively not only underestimated the strength of the insurgency but overestimated the governance and security capacity of Afghan leadership to assume full responsibility to the challenges in southern Kandahar province. Under such circumstances, the activities of Canada, on the one hand, focused on balancing its efforts on enabling authorities and security forces of Afghanistan, on the other hand, tried to keep the insurgents at bay with a single battle group in an area of operations that needed a much larger military commitment.

As has been demonstrated by the experience of Canada in both Kabul and Kandahar, the full range of capabilities was lacked by Canada in order to assume lead nation status initially. However, because Canada worked carefully with its larger allies, the U.S., Britain, and Germany gave assurances of providing the essential support capabilities for the ISAF mission to Canada (Middlemiss 2016: 60). In exchange for recognition of Canada's military stature, the U.S. wanted the credibility and legitimacy offered by the Canadian troops' participation in its counter-insurgency policy. The U.S. was annoyed by the threat of a full military withdrawal, particularly because it had come from one of the few NATO allies that had actually given their contributions in terms of blood and treasure to fight with the Taliban. The pressure for Canada to maintain troops in Afghanistan until the 2014 NATO deadline from the U.S. and European allies, notably Britain, had grown increasingly strong (Massie 2013: 285). It has been argued that despite some early success, such as Operation

Medusa[50], Canadians were mainly used as a "fire brigade" running around southern Afghanistan in order to reinforce other NATO forces or to fight (Coombs 2015: 67).

Canadian treatment of detainees was the one issue which dominated most of the domestic debate regarding Afghanistan from 2007 onwards. Canada was engulfed into a swirling controversy which was a consequence of a very heated debate in the U.S., where allegations and pieces of evidence of extensive abuse of captured individuals at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba and at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq led to a firestorm of protests and to undermine support for the U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Within NATO alliance, no detention facilities of its own in Afghanistan, responsibility for the treatment of captured individuals or prisoners of war and other detainees in Afghanistan rested with individual member states (Deeks 2008). The option that Canada would care for its own detainees and simply handed them over to the U.S. Questions had been raised as early as January 2002 regarding the relationship of Canadian detention policy to that of the U.S. (Middlemiss 2016: 55).

The U.S. gave early assurances to Canada that proper treatment according to the principles of the Geneva Conventions would be given to all those detained and transferred to the U.S. detention facilities. But later U.S. spokespersons started waffling with regard to exactly which detainees will get cover under these conventions and which provisions of the conventions will be applied to the new category of unlawful combatants. Here, it is not anticipated to cover the difficult legal debate over the requirements imposed by national and international law regarding the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan. Rather, how NATO was unable to compel its member states to follow a set of uniform principles with regard to the treatment of detainees (Middlemiss 2016: 55-56). Moreover, there was reluctance in many NATO allies on developing their own detainee policies. Others, including Canada, made an attempt several times to moderate the bad aspects of U.S. detainee policy and to seek assurances from authorities in Afghanistan on the humane treatment of prisoners handed over to them. Getting an agreement in 2005 on a policy to transfer detainees to

[50] It was a large scale enemy-centric combat operation in Kandahar that destroyed organised Taliban resurgent units in the province.

authorities in Afghanistan within ninety-six hours of their capture was the best thing that NATO could achieve (Deeks 2008).

Worth pondering aspect is that the early 1990s military operations of the allied forces, for instance in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya, were conducted by members of NATO rather than by the alliance itself. These operations did not reflect the collective interests of the trans-Atlantic alliance but the interests of particular members of the NATO. Even where members of the trans-Atlantic alliance seemed to act collectively, as in the case of Afghanistan, the appearance of commitment alone defined the entirety of commitment for most member countries. Today, an important unified NATO response to an out of Europe aggression seems unimaginable. The most that can be expected from the grand post-Cold War NATO alliance is no more than a regional military response to a clearly defined regional threat (Bland 2016: 39). Despite making considerable collective efforts, they did not prove enough to turn the ravaged Afghanistan into the peaceful and secure country as well as not enough to let Canada assume a prominent role in the decision-making councils of NATO.

There have been some regional impacts (of Pakistan, Iran through helping subversive activities) on the international campaign in Afghanistan which not only aggravated the insurgency but led to devastating effects on coalition efforts, resulted in fatalities and prevented international troops from success is beyond the scope of present Chapter (Dickson 2016; Nossal 2011; and Grenier 2015: 9).

Conclusion

As can be observed by above mentioned detailed description, the brief Canadian combat mission commitment in Afghanistan in 2002 was followed by its participation in a 2003-2004 stabilisation intervention which involved provincial reconstruction and then a deadly low-intensity conflict in 2006. The role of Canada transitioned in 2011 from fighting in Kandahar to providing advice and assistance within the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan with Canadian troops located in Kabul. In 2014, the advisory mission also ended and Canadian troops departed from Afghanistan.

Canada took part in and commanded many large-scale multinational operations in Afghanistan which aimed at reducing the influence of the insurgency and eliminating the strongholds of insurgent, protecting Afghans and creating a secure environment for development work. It has been argued by some scholars that Canada and Canadians have not become safer by prolonged Canadian commitment to Afghanistan; rather, the armed forces were overstretched beyond the Canadian limited capabilities; it neither secured Canada's overarching national security interests nor has it increased the influence of Canada within the alliance. Aaron Ettinger and Jeffrey Rice (2016) state:

> Canada's short-term commitments can quickly evolve into protracted commitments, extrication from which come with a high prestige cost that politicians loathe to incur and that may be harmful to the international society Canada holds so dear.

For a country like Canada, with limited military means, this comes as not only a problem for Canadian defence policy but also cuts into the core of Canada's national interests and identity.

Some lessons can be drawn here. (i) Canada used UN-authorised and NATO-led ISAF mission so that it could ward off further U.S. requests for participation in the more politically controversial non-UN mission in Iraq. (ii) It was a huge undertaking on the part of Canada to take on a major leadership role in ISAF mission, which could not have embarked on by Canada without the support of key allies because they possessed those capabilities that were lacked by Canada. Simultaneously, assuming a major leadership role in ISAF mission came at a price. Canada contributed so much in both blood and treasure.

The initial Canadian enemy-centric operational strategy failed in providing a secure and controlled environment for the people because insurgents rose in size and strength in response to it. The population-centric operational strategy reduced the rate of attacks against the innocent civilians in Kandahar, but in an absolute sense, more attacks against civilians were continuously initiated by insurgents in 2009-2010. The overall situation of the province continued to worsen, thus, neither operational strategy proved particularly effective. Limited Canadian battle group, higher strength and intensity of the insurgents in Kandahar, and the proximity of Kandahar province

to Pakistan have been seen as the reasons due to which counter-insurgency effort of Canada could not produce success despite using strategies. Despite the coalition partners' continued resolve, Afghanistan's long-term future will ultimately be determined by the Afghan government and regional power brokers.

As realised post-9/11, the terrorist activities not only threaten peace, security and stability of one country but also of the region and world. Dismantling the infrastructure that provides support to terrorism from across borders of Afghanistan, immediate cessation of violence, breaking all links with international terrorism is what is needed to deal with the prevailing security situation in Afghanistan. Further support the efforts of the government and the people of Afghanistan so that national peace and reconciliation process led, controlled, and owned by Afghans could be achieved and build a secure, peaceful, economically stable, and democratic nation.

Thus, for the above mentioned things to occur, the overarching motive has been to build the capacity of Afghan governing and administrative institutions at all levels. Canada did not only engage in building schools or training police officers; but also tried to rebuild and bring change in the system of Afghanistan, for instance, the educational system and the judicial system. The lack of the governmental institutions, the lack of security, poverty, illiteracy, and corruption have not only been major challenges to the development of Afghanistan but also hamper economic opportunities. A task of reconstruction on a large scale such as in Afghanistan cannot an easy task.

Due to substantial sacrifices Canada made in Afghanistan, Canada is respected and recognised as a leader in security and reconstruction operations in southern Kandahar province, the most difficult, dangerous and volatile area in the country. Appreciation and gratitude have been expressed by the U.S. and its NATO allies as well as the Afghan government and citizens. Canada has maintained development and diplomatic relationship with Afghanistan even after the end of the mission because military alone cannot result in the success of the mission in the security environment of the present time. Enduring peace requires integrated, timely cooperated efforts. And lengthy campaigns are a major challenge. There are no easy ways to understand or determine progress and success.

CHAPTER – VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The first Introductory Chapter of the doctoral thesis, while introducing the subject, has also presented a broad and select Review of Literature, Rationale and Scope of the Study, Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Research Methodology. It started with mentioning the various dimensions and dilemmas in the defence relations between Canada and the U.S.; and pointed out the several conundrums for Canadian defence and for Canada-U.S. defence relations.

While the Introductory Chapter gives a glimpse into the Canadian defence conundrum, the following second and third Chapters present in detail the Canadian strategic culture; the question of the size of its armed forces; the perennial debate on ever-shrinking defence outlays; and imperatives and level of defence modernisation. On most of the above counts, Canada seems to be invariably always falling short of the expectations. This capacity gap between Canada and the U.S. seems to be only expanding with time; and got exposed particularly in the wake of the terrorist events of 9/11. Post-9/11, the transformed and scaled-up core missions demand that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) be highly deployable, capable of being sustained at a great distance and interoperable with the U.S. and the NATO allies. The two Chapters under discussion stressed and highlighted that technology and the forces of globalisation make Canada no more "indefensible". 9/11 changed in some meaningful ways the strategic situation of Canada: one, the thesis of 'geographic fatalism' does not hold much water any longer. The argument that Canada cannot defend itself against the U.S. and that it need not defend itself against anyone else sounds a lot rhetorical in the altered circumstances of post-9/11. Equally, Canadian public opinion, which has always shaped the debate on the size of armed forces, their budgetary outlays and mission, seems to have lost the weight in view of the new non-traditional security threats. Whereas in the past it was argued that Canadian public opinion prefers "butter over guns"; expresses itself generally against overseas military involvements; and that Canada which has in the past often been described as a 'free

rider' and the 'first follower' of U.S. in defence and security matters – all this lost much of its relevance in the post-9/11 situation. Canada was criticised by the U.S. for security laxity especially in managing the borders and was found ill-prepared to share the defence responsibility – being 'free rider' for too long.

The Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and the new continental defence paradigm are the other overarching themes. Discussed at some length are the changed role of Canada in the continental defence, and the new "continental defence paradigm", which is based on providing 'homeland security', in the form of USNORTHCOM and the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. U.S. 'homeland security' measures have revived Canada's national sovereignty concerns and questioned the utility and relevance of NORAD. The Canadian-U.S. defence dilemma in fact increased after 2005 when Canadian had refused to join in the BMD programme; which had raised the spectre of the very demise of NORAD.

The fourth Chapter of the present doctoral thesis deals with defence-related cooperation and conflict in the Arctic region. As the Arctic region evinces global interest due to its resources, the possibility of commerce via shorter routes, conflicting boundary claims accentuated by the climate change, the lack of infrastructure in the region and prospects of sustainable development so as to harness the resources are the aspects that have been highlighted in the aforesaid Chapter. Though some scholars have argued to the contrary and focus on aspects of growing conflict between Canada and the U.S. on issues like the North West Passage (NWP), the Canadian and American interests seem to be well aligned to meet the changing military and commercial dimensions of the Arctic. The Chapter, in essence, argues that Canada cannot uphold its sovereignty claim without the U.S. support; and further, in the light of increased activities in the Arctic, Canada-U.S defence and security cooperation has become a major imperative for the Canadian defence planners. Truth is, contrary to popular perception, both the countries have a long history of cooperation in the Arctic region under varieties of bilateral defence and security and environmental and other agreements.

The war in Afghanistan dragged Canada into its largest ever military combat mission since the Second World War. The fifth Chapter dealt with various aspects of Canada's

participation in Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan has brought to the fore several aspects of the Canadian defence perception, policy and preparedness.

In the area of defence, a matter of concern is that Canada's capacity gap is only expanding with time. An often suggested solution is the so-called 're-purposing' of the Canadian defence preparedness; but it is easier said than done. Increasing defence budget, acquiring new weapons and seamless interoperability with the U.S. military raise varieties of questions and a domestic political debate. Scholars argue that Canadian culture is of nature where higher social spending is preferred over military expenditure. While the U.S. culture is to imbibe the latest technologies into defence; culturally, Canadians have a disdain for high-tech war; and that explains foot-dragging over military modernisation or for that matter joining the U.S.-led BMD system for the North. The Chapter also highlighted aspects of Canadian 'geographic fatalism' which means many things for culture, economy and politics of the country. But it is in the area of defence that its import is understood with gravity: Canada simply cannot defend itself against the U.S. and it need not defend itself against others – meaning thereby Canada should be ready for an American intervention in case of any exterior aggression or threat of aggression.

The above summaries of the three chapters are preceded by a discussion and description of Canadian defence outlook. The second Chapter has dealt with the defence policy outlook of Canada. The Chapter began with various types of operations conducted by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF); and it also has delineated the organisational aspects of the CAF along with its three components, namely, the Canadian Army, the RCAF, and the RCN; the size of the Canadian forces; defence policy; the structure of defence in the form of having a strategic defence policy, force development, force generation and regeneration, and force employment; three principal Canadian defence aims, namely the defence of Canada, defence of North America, and the maintenance of international order. This Chapter delineated how the defence of Canada and the North American continent are essentially the same, indivisible.

The Chapter has also briefly described and analysed the debate which emphasises that post-9/11, there is a felt imperative to prioritise the defence of Canada and the

continent in the missions of CAF. The revolution in military sciences, i.e. the advancement in military technology particularly in the air wars, has diminished the significance of topography and distance as natural defences against any threat or military attack. The Chapter stated that the Canadians may stand right under the defence umbrella of the most powerful U.S., however, Canada can no longer consider itself a 'fire proof' house.

A NATO target of 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on the military is another issue the Chapter has dealt with. The Chapter points out the pressure on Canada to increase the size of defence spending; and states that the country cannot simply add some money and watch its military grow. The expansion of the entire defence infrastructure and the initiation of a far more efficient procurement process are required. None of the mentioned tasks is easy to achieve in a short period of time. Canada has committed more dollars to defence in the most recent defence policy, but the NATO target of 2 per cent of GDP are yet to be met.

The second Chapter also deals with the issue of interoperability, with the RCAF, RCN, Special Operations Forces (SOF) putting their act together; and further achievement of interoperability with its allies. The Chapter also highlights the issues hampering the decision over the procurement of Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to replace ageing CF-18 Hornets of Canada. Since 1959 cancellation of the Avro Arrow, no procurement programme in Canadian military history has faced such intense controversy. The process of selection of the F-35, along with aircraft's cost, capabilities, and attendant industrial benefits have largely been criticised in the public discourse. But delays will only grow the Canadian interoperability gap, exacerbated by Canada's relatively low defence spending. Whether Canada should select the F-35 over another aircraft has not been an issue, but the excessive cost of maintaining a fighter capability is the issue.

Canadian need to be well equipped and ever-ready requires a serious highest level of investment in the defence relations of Canada-U.S. Canada's latest defence policy unveils a new strategic vision of "Strong, Secure, and Engaged" and a new approach of "Anticipate, Adapt and Act" to the Canadian Defence. A commitment to long-term investment in the CAF capabilities, along with the larger size of military personnel,

has been given in the Canadian defence policy 2017; though not new. As the present study reveals these broad lines of the Canadian defence policy do not differ much from one review to another review. So to speak, since the Second World War, the basic parameters of Canada's defence and security policy have remained the same; and policy papers often repeat the same goals. These papers often end up with similar looking content and analyses with the express concern of how to equip a lean CAF. However, the defence review document of 2017 in a departure acknowledges that military personnel are a crucial component of defence policy, and that achievement of defence procurement in a timely and cost-efficient fashion is the national imperative. One can conclude that because the Canadian military is very small to make any crucial contribution to the common continental defence, a flexible, ever-ready, greatly efficient and effective military with the willingness to closely operate with U.S. forces, and investment in war-fighting capabilities are what is required by Canada.

A significant aspect to understand is that the defence of Canada involves not just the CAF, rather all governmental levels, all national power elements, and all Canadians. Defence of Canada is a “whole of Canada” endeavour. However, as the second Chapter details, the efforts of Canada will never prove sufficient for either defence of Canada or both tasks of defending Canada and North America in the face of a determined threat. Even for its own defence, Canada will always be heavily dependent on the U.S. Moreover, the defence of Canada will always remain an overarching U.S. national interest due to geography, historical ties, shared values, trade, and political realities.

The second Chapter discussed the defence ‘grand strategy’ for Canada in all five domain of warfare including land, aerospace, maritime, cyber, and space; so that, Canada could have sufficient capacity, capability, and decisive strike capacity. The armed forces of Canada are ultimate tool of Canadian national power, which need capacity and capabilities in all domains of warfare. The Chapter argues that Canadian expeditionary operational engagements are what will continue to define and shape the CAF in the coming years. Given the limited Canadian military resources, military experts are of the view that Canada must never try to do too much and spread itself too thinly or use the military as tokens where tokenism will not count for much. The defence of Canada is as overarching as its ability to act militarily elsewhere in the

world. Foremost, the perceived Canadian national interests need to be defended by Canada itself.

9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. territory produced many repercussions for Canada-U.S. defence and security relationship and created continent-wide security upheavals in the form of interrupting the continental economic integration process; re-emergence of issues of sovereignty and border security; priority to defence and security over all else. In nutshell, 9/11 led to security transformation of the continent. On the one hand, it called for intense cooperation between the two North American partners and, on the other hand, produced political tension related to national sovereignty and domestic matters. The 'interdependence-sovereignty syndrome' remains an intractable issue for Canada. A core issue that has faced Canada since 9/11 is how to reconcile the economic interdependence with its national sovereignty concerns including its national security and territorial integrity.

The third Chapter also states how the overall Canadian-U.S. relations have slipped back; and how security threats have become the main focus of bilateral ties. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, U.S. took a series of unilateral steps to strongly control the cross-border movement of goods and people, signed several new bilateral border security agreements with Canada and Mexico, and created the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Canada also created its own Department of Public Safety in 2003 (later renamed as Public Safety Canada) and adopted powers of detention and deportation in the complete variance of its stated goals of Liberal Internationalism. Borders became, so to say, 'thick' after 9/11. To deal with the complicated border security challenges and to rejuvenate management of the border, "Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competition" initiative was launched in 2011 because the two countries ostensibly felt the need to 'thin' the border to some extent. Following 9/11, U.S. paid scant regard to the bilateral relationship and the Canada-U.S. border became dysfunctional which impaired economic benefits to both countries. The Chapter mentions that the management of border is full of issues and tensions. It requires the participation of actors from all levels of government within both countries for better border management but in a way that economic and other exchanges continue unimpaired. Cross-border exchanges exceed more than a US$ one billion a day and millions of people move across by

road, air and water. In short, 9/11 complicated the border-related relations between the two countries.

The Chapter details the new "continental defence paradigm" which started post-9/11 based on 'homeland security' (from non-state actors and 'rogue' and 'failed' states) – in the form of USNORTHCOM and the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. How the Canadian role changed in continental defence post 9/11; how the creation of USNORTHCOM revived Canada's national sovereignty concerns and questioned the utility and relevance of NORAD (on which the old Canadian-U.S. defence and security paradigm was based on); and how the Canadian-U.S. defence dilemma increased after 2005 Canadian refusal to join in the BMD programme. The Chapter further stated how a clear gap has emerged in the defence and security relations of both the countries; indicating a further shift in political power in favour of the U.S. Canada had to face one of its worst conundrums in the formation of the USNORTHCOM, as Canada feared its own exclusion from the continental defence. In sum, Canadian role as a "trusted partner in continental defence" was tested after 9/11, and it was once again found wanting by the U.S. In later years, Canada tried to mend the fences.

The Chapter further detailed the issue of the Ballistic Missile Defence **(**BMD) system. As the proliferation of missile technology has increased the threat of ballistic and cruise missiles, several questions related to the BMD are germane: whether Canada should be defended under the missile defence system or not? However, missile defence cannot be considered a panacea. Moreover, it is certainly not a substitute for nuclear deterrence, at least for the foreseeable future.

The third Chapter has sought to answer some of the questions, such as: What would participation in BMD mean? And, how can Canada contribute to BMD? It stated full participation of Canada in BMD would align its present policy and commitments to NATO and NORAD. For the common defence of North America, participation in BMD would enhance as well as reinforce Canada's role in NORAD. The Chapter further raised the interesting and crucial questions: How far the threats are real? Does Canada face the prospects of a ballistic missile attack? It should not be assumed by Canada that under the prevailing U.S. BMD system, all of the Canadian territories

will be protected by default. However, the more pressing concerns with regard to cruise missiles and the limited defence system of both Canada and the U.S. against these missiles or the defence against those ballistic missiles which carry numerous warheads are not addressed by the BMD.

The Chapter mentioned how the Canadian government did some balancing against the U.S. interests while simultaneously "band-wagoning" with the U.S. Following 9/11, cooperation between the U.S. and Canada was extensive on border security and counter-terrorism. However, in the area of bilateral defence, both countries failed in obtaining "full cooperation" despite the fact that defence cooperation has intensified after 9/11. This Chapter also brought the issue of renewal of NORAD into the light. With the end of the Cold War, the revolution in military technology, the creation of USNORTHCOM and CJOC, many a time scholars have questioned the continued utility of NORAD. It is feared that NORAD would be marginalised. Post-9/11, NORAD is increasingly seen through the lens of obsolescence, its role would be usurped by the USNORTHCOM. On the other hand, champions of retaining NORAD argue that the role of NORAD is watching for threats, warning and responding in which it has proven itself effective. Moreover, the bi-national cooperation is seen as outstanding in terms of NORAD. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have confirmed the continued utility and prominence of NORAD in the defence and security of North America.

Today, the task of defending the continent is shared by the USNORTHCOM and CJOC with NORAD. To the two national Commands, NORAD is an essential component of their overall effectiveness. The political will on the part of Canada and the U.S. to ensure the success of the Maritime Warning Mission hopefully will clearly establish that NORAD will continuously grow more efficiently. Under the last heading of the third Chapter, the theme of 'defence-against-help' is discussed. It can be said that in the decade following 9/11, the Canada-U.S. relationship has evolved substantially without any doubt.

As the fourth Chapter of the doctoral monograph dealt with the Canadian-U.S. Arctic relationship, it delineated how the global warming and, consequently, rapid melting of its ice caps and the retreat of sea ice, has made the Arctic a more accessible and

increasingly important zone which seems a potential source of future extraction of resources as it is believed to have ample amount of resources.

The Chapter has further dealt with the jurisdictional disagreements and disputes over the region for geopolitical, economic and other interests of the Arctic States. Since there is a lack of clear laws, a number of borders in the Arctic region remain disputed. The root of many international conflicts is the "actual extent" of the EEZ and continental shelf of any coastal country, given the potential economic benefits. Both UNCLOS and CLCS lack the mandate to impose "legally binding" decisions or provisions in case of any maritime dispute. Such lacking of the binding legal regime makes the space for intense maritime and territorial disputes.

The fourth Chapter of this thesis also discussed Canada-U.S. Arctic relations through NORAD, post-9/11. It explained Canadian sovereignty claim and U.S. indifference, rather rejection, of it. The Arctic is witnessing lots of activities and the challenge is how to sustainably harness the resources of the region; besides some scholars also see some sort of military-related developments too. Some of these concerns which have arisen on account of the so-called 'military build-up' have also been dealt with. Besides, there is the question of NWP. Canada claims it as its national waters on grounds of geography, history and demography while the U.S. regards these waters as open for free navigation.

As seen earlier, the fifth Chapter dealt with Canada's Afghanistan mission. During the almost thirteen years in Afghanistan, Canada undertook six major limited term mission commitments; and with each renewal, the duration of those missions grew longer.

The Chapter indicated how during 2001-05, the international military mission in Afghanistan had begun with a small and limited mandate. As Taliban insurgency intensified after 2005, international troops and aid grew and many coalition forces moved into the southern most volatile part of the country. During 2005-09, the resurgence of the Taliban increasingly led to short-term stabilisation interventions in the conflict-torn areas. From 2006 to 2011, as part of the NATO-led ISAF and in support of OEF, Canada carried out combat operation in Kandahar province – a

stronghold of Taliban. The U.S. military and civilian surge were seen during 2009-11 and U.S. aid budget increased. And during 2011-14, began the transition which marked the end of international combat forces and was to lead to full sovereign control of Afghanistan over its security.

Under the NATO umbrella, Canada fielded its greatly efficient conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) that conducted combat and stabilisation operations throughout Afghanistan. Canada also sent Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); trained and advised Afghan security forces; and aided and managed large-scale development projects. Canada worked through WoG approach (combining 'three Ds' - defence, diplomacy, and development). Through its various operations, such as the Operation APOLLO, Operation ALTAIR, Operation ARCHER, Operation ACCIUS, and Operation ATHENA, Operation Medusa and Operation Kantolo, it is significantly notable that Canadian forces moved from an enemy-centric approach to population-centric counter-insurgency operational strategy. The military engagement in Afghanistan became the largest deployment of CAF personnel since the Second World War.

This Chapter pointed out how the decision of deploying combat troops to Kandahar in 2006 became the most consequential Canadian decision of the entire campaign in Afghanistan. The reasons for redeployment to Kandahar remain contested. The Chapter further discussed the lack of an overarching strategy prior to 2009 and the disagreements among the counter-insurgency proponents with regard to the most effective tactics and methods. It is argued that despite years of Canadian campaign in Kandahar province Canada did not achieve that much influence or success.

The Chapter also highlights the debate with regard to the 'failing' or 'failed' states. Engagement in Afghanistan also brought to light new issues: what does it mean to work in a very different cultural environment. Some of the Canadian aid projects and peace-building missions, it is said, were insensitive if not hostile to Afghan culture. Some of the critical analyses even used the perspective of 'Orientalism' to criticise Canada's entire Afghanistan mission. Of course, on the whole, scholarly analyses talk of 'perception gap' in situations of peace-building between the local aspirations and outsiders' prescription. For instance, some of the foreign NGOs involved in

imparting training to poverty-stricken Afghans were found training them in preparing Western cuisines. Also, there were other serious issues: some countries, who deployed combat troops, insisted on only operating in relatively safer Afghan parts.

The fifth Chapter has argued how international coalition partners collectively not only underestimated the strength of the insurgency but overestimated the governance and security capacity of Afghan leadership to assume full responsibility. The overall aid effort is criticised because it is said to lack coherence, irrelevant or unsuitable to Afghan wants, corrupted practices, and much more. The condition of Afghan life is yet to be changed significantly, as the international and Canadian developmental efforts have been claimed to be limited and strictly defined to serve the war effort.

There are two hypotheses in this doctoral thesis:

(i) Post-9/11 defence cooperation with the U.S. has led to enhancement of Canada's defence capability; and

(ii) U.S. defence and security initiatives in the aftermath of 9/11 have accentuated Canada's vulnerability to U.S. unilateralism and to international security threats.

Both hypotheses are validated by the doctoral analysis in the light of the empirical evidence and rationale gathered in the present study. In short, as the study points out, the defence conundrum between Canada and the U.S. has been the same for over a century, viz. that: the U.S. 'leads', often unilaterally, and Canada 'follows'. In the continental defence, Canada has been the proverbial 'first follower' and 'free rider' – the first one has implications for national sovereignty and the later invites U.S. contempt and ridicule. These very reasons probably explain Canada's low defence spending, preparedness and small size of its armed forces for over the past seventy years. However, post-9/11, defence cooperation with the U.S. has led to the expansion of Canada's defence capability. In the latest, the defence policy review by the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promises to modernise and recapitalise the CAF. It also commits CAF to achieve interoperability with the U.S. and NATO allies.

Scholars often highlight the points of confrontation between Canada and U.S., for instance, over the North American Arctic; or the border management issue. However, asymmetrical interdependence is the enduring feature all across the board in Canada's relations with the U.S. and it spawns many complexities in terms of issues and national policy responses. In the realm of defence and security relations, it produces several ambiguities. 9/11 has admittedly reinforced some of these ambiguities from the past. Need not forget the U.S. had heavily criticised Canada for its slack defence and security measures in the wake of 9/11 including for lax border controls. In simple, defence conundrum has deepened since 9/11; and Canada has to enhance its capability to match its commitments. There can be no escaping the reality that the recapitalisation of the CAF and enhancement of combat capabilities would change the nature of CAF and the character of Canada-U.S defence ties. Canada continues to acquire modern defence systems, enhance its various defence capabilities and sustain existing capacity in order to sustain the Canada-U.S defence ties and their every expanding demands and imperatives.

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