

**A CRITICAL STUDY OF PROVINCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN,
2001-2011**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
for the award of the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Date: 5th January 2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "*A Critical Study of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 2001-2011*" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

MUKESH KUMAR VISHWAKARMA

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROF. SHARAD KUMAR SONI
(Chairperson, CIAS)

DR. AMBRISH DHAKA
(Supervisor)

*This
Work
Is dedicated
To*

PARENTS

Preface

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, Afghanistan became the imperial chessboard as a buffer between the two European countries in Asia. After getting independence of Afghanistan, it was influenced by the USSR and Britain. Both these countries started strategic interest and started economic assistance to Afghanistan for overall development. After the Second World War, the United States took an interest in Afghanistan in pursuit of new markets and containment of communist ideology. The communist ideology was spreading the USSR in Afghanistan. In this period, the Cold War started between these super-powers. In the twentieth-first century, Afghanistan highlighted due to 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States. After it, the US involved in Afghanistan with coalition forces and overthrown Taliban from the power. A new form of government came to power with the assistance of these forces. The US-led coalition partners started their political and strategic interest along with started economic assistance to Afghanistan for overall reconstructing and developing the basic infrastructure of Afghanistan. For this, they made Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRT made with the combination of civil and military of allied. The US took interest in Afghanistan in pursuit for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency.

We had questions in mind how much PRT affected Afghanistan and how much these PRT got interested from it. Besides it, one thing is very important that how PRT play a vital role for Afghanistan as well as the US-led coalition partners. It analyses how the shifting pattern of strategic cooperation altered the flow of economic assistance into their military expenditure in Afghanistan. Here, we have done the critical analysis of Provincial Reconstruction Teams for finding out the results of reconstruction and development process as well as military assistance to Afghanistan. How much this PRT becomes fruitful for Afghanistan and how much these face challenges?

In this thesis, it has been searched all these questions through both the primary and secondary sources. Lastly, we would like to say that it will be a matter of great personal happiness if this thesis helps lift the veil of darkness that the US-led coalition partners have put around Afghanistan

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CONTENTS

	Page No.
Map of Afghanistan	i
Preface	ii
Acknowledgements	iii-iv
List of Tables	ix
Abbreviation	x-xiv
Chapter 1 Introduction	1-26
1.1. Introduction	1
1.2. Human Security and Traditional Security	8
1.3. Peace Operations in Afghanistan	11
1.4. International Aid and PRTs	14
1.5. Research Questions	18
1.6. Hypotheses	19
1.7. Research Methodology	19
1.8. Chapterisation	19
1.9. Summary	25
Chapter 2 The Role of NATO-ISAF in Promotion of Security in Afghanistan	27-57
2.1. Introduction	27
2.2. NATO's Organisational Structure in Afghanistan	35
2.2.1. NATO in Lead	36
2.2.2. NATO in Support	36
2.3. UN Resolution and UNAMA Model	40
2.4. The Conceptualisation and Rationale Civilisation Aid Arms in War Zone	45
2.5. NATO Operations and Steps a Civilian Factor	46
2.6. Trans-border NATO Operations in Af-Pak and Civilian needs of Aid	51
2.7. Summary	56

Chapter 3	Civil-Military Relations under Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)	58-95
3.1.	Introduction	58
3.2.	Evolution of PRT	62
3.3.	Territorialisation of Security in Afghanistan under ISAF	63
3.4.	UNAMA Mission and the Objective of PRT	66
3.5.	PRT Composition and its Guidelines	67
3.6.	PRT Models and Approaches	70
3.6.1.	U.S. Model	70
3.6.2.	UK Model	71
3.6.3.	German Model	72
3.7.	International Donors and NGOs	74
3.8.	Civil-Military and its Importance	79
3.8.1.	Difference between Traditional Civil-Military and Modern Civil-Military	80
3.8.2.	Importance of Civil-Military Coordination	80
3.8.3.	Dimension of Civil-Military Coordination	81
3.8.3.1.	Military	81
3.8.3.2.	Peacebuilding and Stabilisation	83
3.8.3.3.	Security	84
3.8.3.4.	Humanitarian Assistance	85
3.9.	Civil-Military Relations and Governance in Afghanistan	86
3.10.	Civil-Military Operations	87
3.11.	New dimension of Civil-Military Relations- PRTs in Afghanistan	88
3.12.	Contention between Military and NGOs in Afghanistan	89
3.13.	Role of Military and NGOs in Short and Long term Humanitarian work	90
3.14.	Clarifying the Role of PRT	91
3.15.	Improving cooperation between Military and NGO actors	91
3.16.	Summary	92

Chapter 4	Functional Linkage between PRT and State Institutions	96-129
4.1.	Introduction	96
4.2.	PRT Activity (Goal)	98
4.3.	PRT Linkage with International Community and International Agencies (NGO and International Organisation)	99
4.4.	Local Governance and Community Development Project of USAID/Afghanistan	102
4.4.1.	Support Local Public Administration and Governance	102
4.4.2.	Community Mobilisation and Development Component	103
4.4.3.	Local Stability Initiates Elements Experience Delays	103
4.5.	Key Documents and Institutional Frameworks	104
4.5.1.	Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals	105
4.6.	Framework of Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and Conceptualization of Development of Afghanistan	105
4.7.	Functional Structure of the ANDS	107
4.7.1.	Security	108
4.7.2.	Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights	109
4.7.3.	Economic and Social Development	110
4.7.3.1.	Infrastructure and Natural Resources	111
4.7.3.2.	Education	112
4.7.3.3.	Health and Nutrition	112
4.7.3.4.	Agriculture and Rural Development	113
4.7.3.5.	Social Protection	114
4.7.3.6.	Economic Governance and Private Sector Development	115
4.8.	The Afghanistan Compact (AC): Purpose, Principle of Cooperation	115
4.8.1.	Principles of Cooperation (The Afghanistan Compact 2006)	116
4.9.	Ministry of Afghanistan in the Development Process. It's Nature And Objectives	117
4.9.1.	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)	117
4.9.2.	Ministry of Finance (MoF)	118
4.9.3.	Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL)	119

4.9.4.	Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)	119
4.9.5.	Ministry of Education (MoE)	120
4.9.6.	Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN)	120
4.9.7.	Ministry of Defense (MoD)	121
4.9.8.	Ministry of Interior (MoI)	121
4.10.	Linkage of PRTs and Ministry of Afghan Government	121
4.11.	Summary	125
Chapter 5	The Role of PRT in Security Transition and Challenges	129-157
5.1.	Introduction	129
5.2.	Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme	135
5.2.1.	DDR	136
5.2.2.	Anti-Personnel Mine and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction	136
5.2.3.	Heavy Weapon Cantonment	136
5.2.4.	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups	137
5.3.	Security Sector Reform	137
5.4.	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme	139
5.5.	The Afghanistan Security Forces and its Origins	140
5.5.1.	Afghan National Army	141
5.5.2.	Afghan National Police	143
5.6.	Ethno Challenges raising the Infrastructure	144
5.6.1.	Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan	145
5.6.2.	Regionalisation of the Resistance Pocket: Mazar-E-Sharif, Helmand, Nangarhar	146
5.6.2.1.	Mazar-E-Sharif	147
5.6.2.2.	Nangarhar	148
5.6.2.3.	Helmand	149
5.6.3.	Special Operation Groups in Afghanistan	151
5.6.4.	Volatility of Durand Line	153
5.7.	Summary	155
Chapter 6	Conclusion	158-172
References		173-198

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>Page No</u>
Table 1.	64
Table 2.	69

ABBREVIATIONS

AACA	Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority
AAF	Afghan Armed Force
AC	Afghanistan Compact
ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development
ACU	Aid Coordination Unit
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	Afghanistan Development Forum
AIA	Afghan Interim Authority
AKF	Aga Khan Foundation
AMDG	Afghanistan Millennium Development Goal
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANASF	Afghan National Army Special Force
ANASOC	Afghan National Army Special Operations Command
ANBP	Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Force
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANCB	Afghan Non-Governmental Organisations Coordination Bureau
APMASD	Anti-Personnel Mine and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ARP	Afghanistan Reintegration Program
ARTF	Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
AWN	Afghan Women's Network
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CENTCOM	Central Command
CCC	Coalition Coordination Council
CCCG	Cross Cutting Consultative Group
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CHLCs	Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIMITs	Civil-Military Teams
CIP	Commanders Incentive Programme
CJM	Criminal Justice Model
CJCMOTF	Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
CMO	Civil-military Operations
CMOC	Civil-Military Cooperation Centre
CNFT	Counter Narcotics Trust Fund
CoC	Combination of Commando
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMISAF	Commander of ISAF
CSO	Central Statistics Organization
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Committee
CTCED	Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
ECJM	Expanded Criminal Justice Model
ETT	Embedded Training Teams
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HALO	Hazardous Areas Life-support Organisation
HCS	Health Care Service
HDI	Human Development Index
HNS	Health and Nutrition Sector
HRA	Humanitarian Relief Agency
HRF	Harmonized Reporting Format

HWC	Heavy Weapon Cantonment
I-ANDS	Interim-Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IGO	International Governmental Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JFC	Joint Force Command
JFCB	Joint Force Command Brunson
JRT	Joint Regional/Reconstruction Team
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MAIL	Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MMR	Maternal Mortality Ratio
MCN	Ministry of Counter Narcotics
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MRD	Ministry of Rural Construction and Development
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MTA	Military Technical Agreement
MTTF	Medium Term Fiscal Framework
NABDP	National Area-Based Development Programme
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDFB	National Development Framework and Budget
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NGHA	Nongovernmental Humanitarian Assistance

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NJP	National Justice Program
NSC	National Security Council
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
OMLT	Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
OPC	Operation Provide Comfort
OSC	Oversight Committee
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PAF	Police Auxiliary Force
PCI	Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory
PDC	Provincial Development Committee
PDP	Provincial Development Plans
PJCM	Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism
PRSP	Afghanistan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSO	Peace Support Operation
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
RC	Regional Command
ROZ	Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
SCT	Sustainable Conflict Transformation
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SMW	Special Mission Wing
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOK	Special Operations Kandak
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCN	Troop Contributing Nations
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States

USD	United States Dollar
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD	United States Dollar
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program
WM	War Model

Chapter-1

Introduction

“Those who governed well did not arm, those who were armed well did not set up battle lines, those who set up battle lines well did not fight, those who fought well did not lose, and those who lost well did not perish.”

---- Zhuge Liang, 3d Century

1.1. Introduction

More than two decades of armed conflict left Afghanistan shattered. Its national institutions have become virtually non-existent, and its economy is in ruins. Afghanistan has been continuing to undergo from a lot of competing for ethnic, religious and regional rivalries. Additionally, issues like the illegal drug trade are quickly developing as a narco-terror industry and a large number of supportive bases of Taliban insurgency have hampered the process of building state structure, development and aid efforts in Afghanistan. Due to this, the task of rebuilding Afghanistan has become more difficult. The government of Afghanistan is not capable of sorting out these types of problems. Presently, insurgency affects directly almost one-third of the country. Literacy and life expectancy are key indicators of Human Development Index (HDI). That declined further during the last decades. The HDI of Afghanistan currently reached near the bottom of the list. It has done due to atrocities against the people of Afghan is at the height of the period of the Taliban. When the Taliban government has fallen, the capacity of Government was becoming very weak at the Central level as well as regional and provincial level of the country. Afghanistan's economy has long been under stress due to the insurgency, which has resulted in the diminishing of the state institution and the economy. Moreover, many regions of the country deteriorated security conditions that threaten to disrupt reconstruction, weaken capacity building efforts of state, unfavourably affect other aspects of political normalisation, and decrease non-public enterprises activity. Security keeps it in the unofficial, illegal, wealth. During the long period, the growing revival and spreading opium production have fuelled insecurity and funded anti-governmental interests. “Drugs and insecurity covers large parts of the country that are regional power brokers. The weak capacity of the state revenue contributes to a

self-reinforcing ‘vicious circle’ that would keep Afghanistan insecure, politically fragmented, weakly governed, poor, dominated by the informal/ illicit economy, and a hostage to the drug industry” (Dutta 2009). It seems that revenue is the engine of any country. Without it, the function of state institutions cannot prosper in healthy manner. Afghanistan is only the country that is suffered due to it.

Afghan government has many challenges. One of the most prominent challenges in front of the government of Afghanistan is to make strong relations between the Central government and the provincial government; provincial government and local governments themselves. If these relations become good in themselves, then the scenario would become change. For this, the government should be efficient power, with trustworthy fiscal, administrative and policy link to get the assurance of Afghanistan. It is possible merely if the security of Kabul from outside is considerably better. It is important for Afghan government to see security sector reforms, not as an end in itself, but it has to improve a method to make capable Afghan authorities to expand its power entire the country. For this, it has to ensure some international actors to give politically and economically support in its security while Afghanistan has been getting strong support from these. “It will break out these vicious circle and move towards a ‘virtuous circle’. It would improve security, the country capacity building measures, revenue mobilisation, formal private sector development and sensible, coordinated actions against drugs eventually reinforcing one and another to put Afghanistan on a path to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction” (Dutta 2009).

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States (US), its government released a lot of policy papers for adjusting novel priorities for its military forces. These documents highlighted required to change the traditional methods of the nation’s military that used for warfare toward operating asymmetrical conflict and fighting terrorism. The war in Afghanistan certainly represented on a powerful factor that drove this orientation and institutional adaptation. The US military leaders made attempts to align their command elements and develop a nationwide counterinsurgency campaign. The US-led coalition forces have intervened in Afghanistan. Intervention always has political implications. For instance, the U.S. intervened in Somalia preferred one claimant to power over the other. Of course, the

US-led coalition peacekeeping forces have used as a political manner instead of the original mission of setting a democratic form of government and enhancing feasible country. The military strategy used in Afghanistan produced long-term political ramification that is at odds with post-conflict reconstruction (Misra 2004).

The international actors involved in reconstructing Afghanistan after the post-conflict. It has no idea how to combat terrorism group. It requires some knowledge about the region where the Taliban and Al Qaeda are hiding. For this, international community depends upon Afghan government as well as local peoples or local governments. At the present scenario, any aggression happened in Afghanistan seems extremely complicated for the Afghan government to handle it because the condition of the Afghan Government is technically not strong. There is a substantial store of arms. Anybody can easily buy weapons in the country. The interim coalition government is unstable. Some sections of the population are mainly jobless because of lack of resources. They feel separated from the current government, institutional body and opponent of warlords. So the ethnic groups became simply and rapidly polarised (Misra 2004). That is why these factors play a vital role for creating fewer jobs in the country.

Afghanistan has been getting external assistance for a long period. It can go a long way in providing vital guidance. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1401 established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 2002. It is as a political and “integrated” mission in charge of coordinating all the United Nations interventions and helping to implement the Bonn Agreement (Margesson 2010). The role of UNAMA is nurturing civil society, enhancing the capacity building and co-ordinating a large number of post-war reconstruction projects of Afghanistan (Misra 2004). Besides it, many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international donors/agencies are helping Afghanistan to strengthen its basic conditions and the Afghan government. These have made an intensive endeavour to unite their resources and expertise to introduce multi-pronged social regeneration projects. “The Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Ministry of Rural Construction and Development (MRD) have coordinated their strategies and plans of action. They established a National Area-

Based Development Programme (NABDP). The objective of the NABDP is to develop the capacity of government at national and local levels to formulate and manage recovery and development strategies through an inclusive process” (Misra 2004). These inclusive processes have been going in Afghanistan.

The Bonn Agreement held in Bonn (Germany) in December 2001 that allowed for the deployment of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan together with the coalition forces under the same command in the campaign against terrorism. The United Nations have formed an ISAF. The functions of ISAF maintain the peaceful environment by and large in the fragile or unstable country. The UNAMA should prolong to help the Afghan government to merge its authority entire the country and implement national policies. A strong international community has committed and reassures with Afghan authorities for averting provincial interfering in Afghanistan, decrease their fears of being besieged by the outer intrusion and provide them with the assurance to cooperate more strongly with their neighbours (Dutta 2009). In this situation, Civil-military becomes significant for protecting life and relieving of human perspectives. In current years, the cooperation of civil-military has faced major and consistent challenges.

Afghanistan lacked credible national armed forces or police forces. For strengthening these national forces and police forces, it can possible with support of ISAF and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). ISAF was considered essential to meet a security vacuum of the Afghan state. During the initial phase, ISAF had a mandate to act only in Kabul and on the outskirts of the capital, which did not fully meet the security needs in Afghanistan. ISAF found out that Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) were not capable of handling any non-violent situations. They were not highly experienced and technically sound, who were still need to train for providing security of the Afghan government as well as Afghan people. International organisations and a nongovernmental organisation called for NATO forces for maintaining the peacekeeping in Afghanistan. They have tried to dwell in this gap and the growing significance of civil-military cooperation.

ISAF expansion beyond the capital was authorised by the UN Resolution 1510 in October 2003. During the two years when ISAF expansion blocked, it sought that

international coalition forces establishing other ways of presence in Afghanistan. Thus, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) became the chosen solution. As an innovative approach to building peace and security, the PRTs in Afghanistan were largely a response to unpredicted circumstances. Ironically, their military components are now linked back to ISAF, which itself is under NATO command.

For strengthening Afghanistan, the US has used the concept of PRT to support reconstruction efforts in an unstable state with consisting of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction experts. PRTs were largely new in structure. PRTs were established first time in Afghan history at the early dawn of 2002. The formation of PRTs aims at the broad amalgamation of security and sovereignty; developmental and humanitarian assistance; and the strengthening of broad governmental and political capacity. PRT coordinates economic development activities that was seen as an indication of transition and certainly represented an important step to align economic development activities with the military operation (Russel 2013). These elements have altered the ground for reaction by foreign communities in response to worldwide intimidation. These have started to latest methods of intrusion. In such conditions of the clash, the latest role of stability and rebuilding has developed. The explanation for assistance shown is more than what the conformist economic assistance players used to provide. It works at province to province in Afghanistan by international communities in different fields such as health, security, medical, school etc. It will also provide some job at the local level for developing the province.

A large amount of money had spent on all public and government services. This money comes from international aid. It had provided to release of necessary services for the Afghan people. The International community has to take a step for consequential and durable undertaking in terms of aid for reconstructing Afghanistan. But contributors have been unsuccessful to provide sufficient aid to Afghanistan. A lot of economic assistance from rich countries wasted due to corruption and warlords. Warlord is balancing the central government as well as local government. That is why warlord bargains at central level with international actors while bargains with terrorist groups at local level. Some level of international donor could not come freely to spending money on Afghanistan because of a sizable corruption, incompetent government and unsuitable security conditions. But the size of deficit shows the

requirement for a donor that makes good efforts to face up the difficulty. The unequal amount of economic assistance pursues the conflict. It has been used for fulfilling political and militaristic goals instead of downsizing poverty. The American media reported that PRT doesn't have any sustainable plan for the reconstruction projects because they spent their money on small projects, which cannot fulfill the basic needs of the Afghan people (Dutta 2009). This report reveals the story of PRT.

Afghanistan needs to maintain and end of all violent warfare. After it, the foundation for a peaceful transition creates a new government, economic development and social reconstruction. The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) became the most important policy priority for the post-Bonn era. Afghanistan intends to carry on its transitional government that can move towards the rule of law and stronger civil administration. The Afghanistan Compact (AC) asserts that this process must be government while it backed and led by strong foreigner support (Dutta 2009).

NATO has been working in Afghanistan collaboration with the coalition actors. The United Nations also always remains erect for supporting Afghanistan by any means of assistance. NATO-led ISAF worked in collaboration with development and humanitarian assistance actors such as civil societies (NGOs). However, these civil societies cannot work efficiently without adequate security. Only military forces have the capacity to handle it. It seems that civilian societies have not the capacity to available in each and every corner of the country. Armed forces may be required to fill up space. International coalition partners started programmes for reinforcing to make strong democratic government, socially, and economic development of the country. These programs are important for achieving stability and developing the local capacity.

PRT has been working in Afghanistan in the name of development and reconstruction, whereas PRTs became unsuccessful to meet the existing security needs. Another acknowledged challenge related to the affirmation that PRTs do not get deeply close and engaged with the local people and government officials. Moreover, some PRTs have displayed a considerable shortfall in institutional memory. It did affect PRT's skill to involve efficiently with the actors from the civil society domain and also with the local people. PRTs possess a huge array of operational styles in itself that gives unclear vision about their central role (Save the

Children 2004). Due to wide range of operational activities, PRTs had not focused every operation that has functioned in Afghanistan. Some of PRTs works according to their countries perspectives in developing field, but the most of PRT are working for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism perspective in which military forces are still active in this operation.

It argues that PRTs have commenced a better and comprehensive approach to defence by the armed forces. It takes explanation of the correlation among the political, economic, and social and security dynamics. Nonetheless, the inference of it has highlighted the persisting restraint of PRT-led security efforts in reverberating and addressing the multifarious character of insecurity in Afghanistan (Save the Children 2004). Moreover, the presence of military forces in PRT creates certainly some problems. They affect the activities of the international organisation and NGOs in their area. More than that, the projects were not entirely efficient, and the criticism of expenditure funds in spite of the cultural characteristics of the country should stand for lessons learned for the coming provincial reconstruction teams (Bojor and Cosma 2013). It is because the cultural structure of Afghanistan is Islam in which different dialects due to different ethnic groups exist here. These ethnic groups have different in characteristics that does not match each other. Pashtun is dominating ethnic group among them.

From the beginning of PRTs, the concept was contentious among the community handling the development and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and also within the Government of Afghanistan. The principal objectives of PRTs were to follow approaches related to larger stabilisation of which they were also a part rather than the needs of affected people. It aimed for military and political assistance by aligning aid with stabilisation objectives. Civil-military is only option that can stabilise any unstable country with their assistance efforts. PRTs have been at the centre of all debates related to civil-military connections in Afghanistan (Jackson and Haysom 2013). It is because PRT is a means through which the US-led coalition partners can fulfill their aims.

1.2. Human Security and Traditional Security

‘Security’ and ‘insecurity’ have used in different contexts with relative meaning. The stem of insecurity comes from extremism, domestic violence, the spread of conflicts, displacement, human rights, etc. Nonexistence of insecurity and threats are the simplest definition of security. In the context of realism, security has connected with threats to the endurance of states. Threats to individual and communities are posed instead of human security (Xiaofeng and Sandano 2014). In broader terms, “human security means freedom from want, freedom from fear and a life of dignity”. While traditional security is state-centric, that was the defining paradigm in the times of the Cold War. Conventionally, the definition of national security is to defend its interests from exterior threats in the context of capacity of the state. The broader definition of this interest is generally as territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the nation.

According to Buzan (1991), he analyses the post-Cold War and the post-East-West relations. Moreover, he outlines the outcomes of transformed relationships between the developed countries (centre) and developing countries (periphery). He argues that the developed country is currently more leading. The developing countries are more dependent on it since decolonization began. It means that capitalism ideology has conquest over both communalism and developing country’s ideology.

He also writes that community concerns are probably to presume fame on the safety agenda. They have not happened as before the establishment of the contemporary European state system. Kim (2010) explains the emergence of an Eastphalian (historical region of Germany) order. It denotes to get better security for people. In the post-Cold War period, the notion of human security raised itself to importance. The notion of human security grew in importance during the post-Cold War period. Both supporter and critic draw to its effort to move security idea far away from the nation and toward persons. Moreover, human security appeared to reverberate with related about how globalisation turned into conventional ideas of sovereignty and security fewer pertinent, producing the want for extra innovative methods to assume about and attain security.

Tsai (2009) mentioned traditional approaches to security to focus only on community's security or culture's security while the constructivist perspective suggests extra theoretical apparatus during its insight into the matters of human awareness, state identity, and curiosity configuration. The author's major intention is to investigate human security as clarified by the constructivist perspective. This study shows that particular matters will be analysed in the light of dependence between human security and constructivism, the constructivist interpretation of human security, and the implication of human security for constructivism. Baldwin (1997) search for extricate the concept of security of human rights, economics, the environment, drug traffic, epidemics, crime, or social injustice. Additionally, conventional security related with exterior armed forces menace. "Such is usually buttressed with a mixture of normative arguments about values of which people should protect and empirical arguments as to the nature and magnitude of threats to those values (Baldwin 1997)."

Acharya (2001) examined diverse perspectives about the human security, especially complete security and helpful security. The author found that the anticipated tenseness between 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' is succeeded by an examination of the resemblances and disagreements between human security and currently existent security concepts in this region. He also explains the correlation between human security and humanitarian intervention to considering the type of polygonal act. There would be a possibility to endorse human security in the region in the circumstance of the gravest as freedom from want shall be enhanced with further attempts to expand human security such as freedom from fear. It appears to be the recent highlighting of regional governments. On the similar approach, Afkhami et al. (2002) mentioned human security concept and recognised its parameter and also show the limitation of the traditional human security definition. Moreover, they widen it encircles a broader range of both human material and spiritual needs. They also discussed a value system that puts the welfare of people at the centre, highlights power and endorse a financial structure that partaking at all levels. It promotes sustainable development, human rights, social justice, gender equality, and democracy. Conteh-Morgan (2005) argues that human security can be more efficiently understand at the individual, institutional and structural-cultural levels in the process of peace-building. Both matter and socio-cultural perspectives are

considered decisive factors to human security and peace building. Moreover, serious efforts are prepared to shift away from temporary functions of upholding a ceasefire, disbanding and disarmament, and controlling competitive elections among earlier opponents. These concerns briefly applied to specified cases of post-war reconstruction and reconciliation. Zwiernie and Graf (2010) discussed the contribution on the pre-modern and modern history of human security and tried to measure the arrogance latent of the concept for historical research. She (Theede2008) explored human security as operative discourse in the Americas based on Foucault's concepts of governs mentality and bio-power and, illustrated in the term of Haiti. Paris (2001) describes the different aspect of human security in the following ways. First, he examines the existing definition of human security. Second, he explores the restrictions of human security as a pragmatic guide for intellectual research and strategy creation. Third, despite its limitations, he considers routes in which the concept of human security may make an input to the study of international relations and security.

Axworthy (2001) draw rising recognition of human right that must be a principal concern for safety of persons. The concept is old. The human rights of recognition are at least as vital as those of the country have been achieving impetus since the ending of the Second World War. "The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Genocide and Geneva Conventions all recognised the inherent right of people to personal security. They challenge conventional notions of sovereignty when grave infringements of rights occur". Verdirame (2001) mentioned the efficiency of a specific body of worldwide law, the customs prohibiting discrimination against women, in the perspective of the global legal and institutional responses to sexual apartheid in Afghanistan. Similarly, Obleitner (2005) addresses in some important areas of international law that appears mainly prone to be sighted in the course of the lens of human security and on the United Nations as the core institution of the international legal order.

King and Murray (2001-2002) suggest an easy, scrupulous, and an assessable definition of human security. They defined human security as the number of years of forthcoming life spent outer a condition of "generalised poverty." Generalised poverty

happens when an individual falls below the threshold of one of the main domain of human well-being.

According to Ogata and Cels (2003), they explained six broad aspects on interconnected fields of conflict and poverty: the security of people in vicious conflict, on the move, and in post-conflict situations; and measures to prevail over financial uncertainty, recover health and health services, and convey knowledge and skills. To promote its work, it behaves as a stimulant for further thinking and rational applications to the treatment of human rights commission about human security evocative rather than comprehensive. It has been recently responsible for governments, international organisations, scholars, and practitioners to move away from the commission's conceptual steps and recommendations. BusumtwiSam (2002) argued that the cosmopolitan and solidarity-based ethos should support human security. He has worn in support of realist-based strategic and self-interest considerations.

Schmeidl (2002) elaborates that how the recent security deadlock produced and whether migration by itself can be considered as the force which is destabilising, or if it is the policies dealing with the migration- security dilemma that is at fault. It is a significant difference general freely of refugee due to the political chaos and aggression. The main directive of the refugees is not to destabilise the country that provides to them a secure sanctuary. Due to the bombardment of US or United Kingdom (UK), Afghanistan faces again a critical assignment of state-building while Pakistan is moving towards a likely collapse. Sidel (2006) discovers “the increasing tendency of governments to view the third sector as a source of human insecurity and uncivil society in the wake of terrorist attacks. He also discussed the means of governments use to control third sector activity. They view as potentially linked to terrorism, the need for comparative analysis of these measures, and the role of the third sector”.

1.3. Peace Operations in Afghanistan

The first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces were founded in the year 1956. Its decree is “to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel, and the UK from Egyptian Territory,

and after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire.”International community is trying to build a sustainable peace by getting cooperation from all actors that presented in Afghanistan. Here actors mean local governments, international NGOs and International Organisations in Afghanistan. International military forces need to be able to cooperate with civil societies like national and international NGOs and other civilian actors. William Durch describes four kinds of peace operations on the basis of their characteristics: “traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peace operations, peace enforcement and humanitarian interventions”. According to Runge (2009), he describes a PRT as a role model for civil-militaryrelations in perspective of a humanitarian. It analyses the safety dilemma in Afghanistan as well as the impact of the PRTs on the releasing of humanitarian, economic assistance. Moreover, it will also discover the outcomes of blurring the line between humanitarian aid and objectives of the military. He also discussed the humanitarian community as German humanitarian NGOs, which have made clear their stand on civil-military cooperation and PRTs. He showed that “the coalition partners’ military operations effect varied context of security and conflict in Afghanistan on different humanitarian assistance actors”. On the similar approach, Goodhand and Sedra (2007) mentioned from the time of Bonn Agreement (2001), the role of the international economic assistance provider communities in Afghanistan. They explore especially the sphere and efficacy of peace conditionality as a mechanism for the consolidation of peace in the background of a war-to-peace transition, a fragile situation. The institutional and geostrategic interests have resulted into an unqualified assistance by international actors.

Sedra (2005) outlines the development of the concept of PRT and its operation and effects. On the similar approach, Lane and Sky (2006) tried on behalf of identifying the fundamentals of stability and seeking to fill the latest theoretical space, the conceptual role of PRTs in providing stability at the regional level, recognising the actions that PRTs should be performed to deliver stability, and setting out PRT exit strategy. The conceptual approach of PRT is one that could apply to other contexts in which the foreign community is involved in stabilisation of the country. The violence level in Afghanistan is very high. Such other agencies cannot function peacefully and proper manner. That is why PRT applied here. On the similar approach, Stringer and

Sizemore (2012) describe the concept of PRT by defining the feeble country and underlining the significance of expectation in conflict avoidance in Afghanistan. Additionally, they discussed the genesis of PRTs and their use in Afghanistan. They also describe a functionally-oriented PRT structure while highlighting the mandatory for organisational achievement in conditions of financial support, employees resourcing and safety of these new units. Congressional Committees Report (2008) describes the organisation, staffing and funding agencies for PRT in Afghanistan.

Franke (2006) argues the procedure pattern examine cooperation between civilian and military actors in concord assistance operations. The writer draws that civil-military cooperation procedures follow six consecutive steps: “decision to cooperate, partner selection, design, and implementation, transfer of tasks and responsibilities, and evaluation”. On the similar approach, Estelle (2011) evaluates the three NATO-led ISAF objectives such as providing basic growth, strengthening of the governance and expanding safety with a connection to the functions of the German, U.K and the U.S. PRT models. She proposes that the lead nations PRT structure, mission focuses and cooperation with other development actors in their provinces of operation are critical things for persuading their overall efficiency. Lastly, she evaluates the U.K. Model as the mainly successful with significant features. Both German and the U.S. PRTs could sketch their model with the experience of UK model from Afghanistan. Date (2011) underscores the generic outcomes founded on a comparison between PRT models of Netherland, Germany and Hungary in Afghanistan and dialogues with army personnel who worked for these PRTs.

Nash (2007) drew highlighting the humanitarian and security context of Afghanistan. The author also highlighted the concept of PRT background and the problems faced by it. The militarization of humanitarian activities found a negative impact on broader humanitarian and stabilisation goals to conquer the minds and hearts of the people of Afghanistan. As a result, it can reduce by greater attempting of military endeavours in areas of relative military benefit. According to Farhoumand-Sims (2007), she mentioned the complexities resulting from militarism and violence. She touches three relevant issues on peace in Afghanistan. The first is the deteriorating security situation that poses a severe challenge to development and reconstruction efforts, particularly in the rural areas. The second ongoing concern is

the undeserved and continued power and authority bestowed upon warlords who support and benefit from the drug trade and who use threats, intimidation, and injury to secure support. These warlords continue to violate human rights with impunity, yet have seats in the parliament and represent people who truly did not want them as representatives. This culture of warlordism and the warlords' presence in political scene, even in the parliament as well as in the ministries, and also in the judiciary is the unique most ubiquitous menace to the transition of Afghanistan from a broken state to an untroubled and democratic state. The third concern is the lack of progress on the advancement of women and the international community's failure to deliver on promises made to Afghan women five years ago.

According to Høglund and Kovacs (2010), they mentioned a new method of conceptualising deviation of peaceful environment in post-war societies. "Beyond the absence of war, there are striking differences regarding the character of peace that has followed". Warnecke and Frank (2010) analyses the model of Sustainable Conflict Transformation (SCT). It gives a plan for appraising the input of international actors in peacebuilding efforts. The United Nation's Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory (PCI) is organising the SCT model around the local sectors. It creates an appraisal instrument that facilitates us to account specially for measures aimed at supporting the conversion of subjective clash motivators such as conflict posture and personalities. Afghanistan PRT Handbook (2011) gives an information base to individuals operating in, or in support of a PRT, facilitating these individuals to work efficiently as a team achieving the purpose of the PRT and providing PRT members with joint functioning guidelines and insight into PRT best practices. It is a supplement and subordinate to present ISAF orders, instructions, guidance, and significantly the ISAF PRT Handbook.

1.4. International Aid and PRTs

Afghanistan received a lot of aid from foreign countries. The U.S., the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and Britain played a vital role in the field. Besides it, other countries also provided aid to it. In the Cold War period, the international development programme has implemented as an instrument for gaining and upholding geopolitical interests of western countries who are funding. Despite United States being relatively clear about its use international economic assistance in

acquiring its international strategic goals, other countries are handling in a more delicate way except however dynamic in utilising geopolitical priorities in global growth. The geopolitical thought influence cannot underestimate. Nevertheless, it is supportive to imagine the influence at a time with greater influence on one end and lower influence on others. “Whereas countries still claim the supremacy of morality as the imperative for foreign aid and in international development, some still do pursue strategic economic, political and military self-interest and use international development as a tool for achieving these ends” (Sudi 2009). Again, Dalby and Tuathail (1996) lead the latest branch of decisive geopolitics in the Cold War period. In this period, geopolitics can understand on confrontations between two superpowers like the U.S. and the USSR. They refer to geopolitics as an expedient fiction, a name which suggests different combinations of politics and geography, still a difficult fiction, a loaded symbol overburdened due to many diverse importance. This may propose modifying from superpower engagement to more diverse actors interest and objectives. On similar approach, Alesina and Dollar (2000) mentioned big donors like the US, Japan, France, etc. The allocation of the economic assistance of these countries may be very effectual at supporting planned interests. But the consequence is that two-sided economic assistance has merely a feeble organisation with poverty, democracy, and good policy. The US aid targeted to poverty, democracy, and openness. Lancaster (2007) argues that domestic political support for aid giving foreign countries or organisations. It has always used and will continue to achieve a different mixture of goals. International economic assistance had used for key purposes: diplomatic, development, humanitarian relief, and commercial. It had also used for cultural purposes, but at present less famous.

Goodhand (2002) focused on the historical and contemporary role of aid about the Afghan crisis. Suhrke (2007) observes the post-war rebuilding programme in Afghanistan as well as discussed that it has the seeds of drastic community change. She feels worried about the current rebuilding project in light of the erstwhile experience of similar programme. In the past time, Afghan rulers and their foreign supporters had launched this programme. Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) (2008-2013) mentioned an overview of the intention of present growth and rebuilding that is, to assist constructs a stable, democratic and wealthy country. It supports to provincial and worldwide safety from terrorism. The Afghanistan

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) and the AC guides to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA). The GoA is working with foreign countries to deal with the momentary as well as long-term wants of the country in various areas such as education, health, governance, agriculture, policing and rehabilitation of infrastructure. The author also mentioned the primary hindrance to development and reconstruction. The domain of prime importance is the weak safety conditions in the Afghanistan. On the similar approach, UNDP (2006) has delivered humanitarian and substantial assistance throughout Afghanistan during the war and the period 2000-2005. The United Nations has also started programs. "The structure, content and management of its program have been modified over time to follow the prevailing economic, political and security environment and the stance of the international community as expressed at the United Nations". Menocal (2011) analyses two leading approaches specifically peace-building and state-building. These have guided by external countries and the organisation's efforts to endorse peace and development in conflict cause problems brittle States since the 1990s. Thus, she explores how the processes of peace-building associated with the method of building more expandable, efficient and approachable states in post-conflict settings. It gives an outline of the advancement of these two concepts and evaluates key harmonising between peacebuilding and state-building. She also finds out the challenges that occur for both by these harmonising. Abbaszadeh et al.(2008) argue that the most important subjects that occur for PRTs, commencing from the funding and management on the part of contributing countries to the coordination and implementation of activities in the field research. "They have divided the report into four segments are (1) Politics and Bureaucracy, (2) Civil-military Relations, (3) Activities and (4) Relationships and Evaluating Impact. Here, they conclude with recommendations that distill the most relevant action points for the United States government and other countries operating PRTs".

Critiquing by Hoogvelt (2001), mercantilism stimulated pragmatist viewpoint. The world is a chaotic field where it finds nation-states contesting for power by the way of political and economic strength. Here, the author mentioned that international economic assistance used as tools which are at disposal to assemble the influence of the state on other nation-states. The statements put forward are not the physical

position, but are also the political, social, cultural entities (Sudi 2009). On the similar approach, Heady (2008) argues bilateral economic assistance had no important consequence of growth during the Cold War but had an important and substantial result subsequently. In contrast, multilateral economic assistance seems to have had substantial and important effects throughout the world. Hattori (2001) mentioned 'what is aid?' this uncomplicated question has three basic answers in term of international relations theories. "In the Cold War period, political realism is originated. It used as a strategy to influence political justice to the receiving countries in a bipolar struggle. According to Liberal Internationalism, it is a set of programmatic measures planned to increase the socio-economic and political development of receiver countries. Lastly, according to the World System Theory, it is a means of constraining the development path of recipient countries, encouraging the imbalanced accumulation of wealth in the world". The extensive international economic assistance has used as strategy apparatus. These emphasise effects are incomprehensible. Nevertheless, it also tends to decrease the understanding of international economic assistance to the tools concerns of donors. Ruttan (1989) argues that neither the donor self-interest nor the moral accountability argument can discard on reasonable or hypothetical grounds. He also asserts that the experiential proof in support of both the financial and the strategic self-interest arguments is extremely feeble. The moral accountability arguments inflict fewer burdens on the experiential proof, but they issued with constant challenges by moral philosophers and political theorists.

Afghanistan is fragile as well as Taliban affected country. Its security concern drove the fact. It has a weak economic base and troubles neighbourhood in the form of Pakistan. It is unable to handle the security challenges and the development goals simultaneously. Therefore, PRTs have acted as a surrogate for the nascent state till it acquires the capability to handle its challenges. No one country is ready to go to Afghanistan for peace building. Therefore, civil-military is only one option to handle the twin objectives of security and development in Afghanistan. That is why civil-military became necessary for Afghanistan. Civil-military can do their work in the high-risk zone. It is providing security from one side to military and another side of reconstructing Afghan's basic infrastructure with NGOs. It is working with PRT. In PRT, NATO-ISAF is working for reconstructing infrastructure development,

government institutions and security. ISAF has needed for training the ANP and ANA future security perspective.

The proposed research intends to fill the vacuum by critically analysing the PRTs involvement in the Third World countries for development and reconstruction of basic infrastructure by providing foreign aid in fragile regions. It will help us to understand how civil-military combined initiatives determined the process of state-building in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the main purpose of the proposed research study is to analyse the PRTs engagement in the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The research gap is that the civil-military model of cooperation has worked in Afghanistan. It cannot be the alternative to state government. Therefore, one has to look into important function's attributes of PRTs that can emulate in the state institution. The study highlights these areas. Therefore, it would analyse PRTs objectives, operational and organisational structure and strategies. It would also examine the nature and type of PRTs in Afghanistan. An attempt will be made to evaluate how and to what extent PRT has succeeded in supporting the Government of Afghanistan, to expand its authoritative power over national territory and to create the premises for ensuring a safe and secure Afghanistan. Reconstruction and development efforts had made by central and local government authorities, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations have also highlighted in the study. The study will analyse the critical point of views towards the organisational structure of ISAF PRT.

1.5. Research Questions:

1. How Afghan government integrates traditional security with human security?
2. What is the objective of PRTs in Afghanistan?
3. What impacts does civil-military co-operation have on the acceptance of the aid organisations among the Afghan population?
4. To what extent, the PRTs have succeeded in reconstruction and development of Afghanistan after the peace conflict?

5. What are the scope and dimension of peace operation by NATO-ISAF in Afghanistan?
6. What types of challenges the international community has to face while undertaking a peace-building process in Afghanistan?
7. What are the impacts of PRTs in Afghanistan?

1.6. Hypotheses:

1. The integration of security and development under the civilian and military approach helped in diffusing the traditional resistance toward foreign forces in Afghanistan.
2. There has been a substitution gap between organisational structure of PRTs and the state agency.

1.7. Research Methodology

This research problem aimed at studying the discourses and their interpretation in contemporary analytical perspectives. The foremost reason for grounding the study in the contemporary perspectives is to analysis the PRT model involvement about foreign aid and peace operation along with basic infrastructure by the developed countries in Afghanistan and its positive understanding as a product of peacekeeping. In this research, primary sources of data will consist of government documents, records, reports and interviews with concern authorities. The secondary sources consist of books, article, periodical, newspapers, etc. In such a conceptual framework, the proposed study will adopt a qualitative and quantitative method to formulate an understanding of development assistance and its impact on institution building, governance reform, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan in the modern era.

1.8. Chapterisation:

The entire research work has divided into six chapters. Each chapter has been mentioning below:

1.8.1. Chapter One: Introduction

The first chapter introduces the topic in broad perspectives. It will discuss in term of creating an environment in which reconstruction activities can take place for long-term activities for nation or state-building along with counter-insurgency.

1.8.2. Chapter Two: Role of NATO-ISAF in Promotion of Security in Afghanistan

The second chapter describes working of PRTs under NATO-led ISAF and the role of NATO-ISAF in the field of security for the Afghan people in the post-Taliban era. It supported in the field of peace-building and maintaining the law and governance of the Afghan government.

1.8.3. Chapter Three: Civil-Military relation under PRT

The third chapter has mentioned the relationship between PRTs and civil-military in the field of Afghanistan's security. Simultaneously, it will also focus on the donation of the international actor in the Third World countries like Afghanistan.

1.8.4. Chapter Four: Functional linkage between PRT and State Institutions

The fourth chapter has discussed the relation between the state agency and PRT. It will also focus on the substitution gap between organisational structure of PRT and state institutions.

1.8.5. Chapter Five: The Role of PRT in Security Transition and Challenges

The fifth chapter has discussed the role of PRT and its projects. It also takes initiatives of development, reconstruction of basic infrastructure, peace-building and ensures security in Afghanistan. It would also show challenges of PRT policy guidance in Afghanistan.

1.8.6. Chapter Six: Conclusion

The sixth chapter has provided outlining the summary and conclusion of the research work. It would also discuss the finding of research and the impacts of PRTs in state-building in Afghanistan.

Most of the international community is working in Afghanistan in the name of reconstruction, maintaining security, prosperous economy and making a democratic government. One of which the international community has promised their determination for the reconstruction of Afghanistan to eliminate the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the name of terror from its root. It will be enormously important to examine that Pakistan despite as a friend of America in the international ‘*war on terror*’, cooperating in the reconstruction process or not (Dutta 2009). From above statement, it finds out that they are working in different provinces of Afghanistan. But the US-led NATO forces have focused on Af-Pak region that are known for sanctuary of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and many more terrorist groups. The aim of civil-military forces focused to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism on the operation of ‘*war on terror*’. It will analyse how much the US-led NATO forces have become success on this operations?

In the reconstruction process, the basic focus has given to military build-up, and socio-economic dynamics of reconstruction has given lip services, which needs to be taken into account. The facts justify that since 2001 to 2006 the United States poured 88.2 billion \$ as military aid. During that period only 11.4 billion \$ has been poured for the reconstruction process. Even, military need to understand local people and their diverse cultural identity. It puts some mark of their respect and then only external force could a challenging job of providing military cover to the reconstruction process. The Dutch forces have done this in Uruzgan province. They first started to mix with the local people and then construct a bridge, road and local bazaar. This way they have won the hearts and minds of common Afghans, which is the task of the coalition forces in Afghanistan. In the meanwhile, they did not leave the main job to eliminate the Taliban. But first, they mixed with the local peoples. They did some charity with their due representation and then fought against Taliban. This policy of the Dutch forces is well known as “Oil spot” approach (Dutta 2009). This approach may be successful in particular regions but it cannot be success in entire Afghanistan because terrorist groups do not like any type of reconstruction process that was supported by military. The militants groups have feared of modern culture and military activities that ruins their indigenous culture and their existence respectively.

The reconstruction process and war against terror are mutually dependent and needless to say that one success would be helpful for another. It is not only that the prevailing menace of Kalashnikov and Heroin culture could not be eliminated without ensuring reconstruction process. In Iran, the numbers of drug users were three million. In such a way, Pakistan is also. It is grown in Central Asia and even in Russia, China and India too. It is high time to allocate adequate attention for the success of the reconstruction process. It would not only bring peace and prosperity in Afghanistan. It will also facilitate energy flow from Central Asian to South Asia in a natural manner. Moreover, it will be extremely helpful to restore law and order in all of its surroundings in particular and in the rest part of the globe in general (Dutta 2009). Thus, we can say that entire world with their neighbouring country should bring closer to take step rigorously to enhance large amount of reconstruction process in Afghanistan.

The process of reconstruction, including the pressure on building infrastructure, slowed down, and projects have remained limited to small, short-term projects through NGOs. Due to lack of a system, there has not been monitoring mechanism for the international aid coming for Afghanistan's reconstruction. Recently, if there is no strong government system that cannot monitor the aid coming into the country, corruption and waste of money can easily take place. It seems that if the state is weak, there should be no question of effective implementation of reconstruction programs, especially in post-conflict situation. In these conditions, feeble state can promote corruption and block the reconstruction processes (Dutta 2009). Thus, it can say that it is applying suitably on Afghanistan. The most important point regarding existence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan is that Af-Pak region is heaven of terrorists.

As the Afghan government lacks the capability to wear down Mujahidin and the assorted militia insurgency will continue to threaten the security of the country, particularly in the southern and eastern areas. NATO forces have struggled to bring these elements under control without much success. In 2007, it saw that the worst violence since the fall of the Taliban, over 6,200 deaths, including about 900 Afghan police officers; many experts see a bleak future for peace in 2008 even with the speculation that new strategies might succeed in attempts to reconcile some insurgent

elements (Dutta 2009). From above statements, it can easily extract capacity of Afghan government that can incapable to handle the terrorist groups. That's why, NATO-ISAF forces have to face a lot of challenges to providing security to Afghan government and people from terrorist attacks. Many innocent Afghan people have killed due to counter attacked against terrorist groups by NATO military forces.

The UN mandated the ISAF in Afghanistan. International organisation and coalition partner of the US have a particular challenge of international coordination for collective security from terrorism. That's why they have given a merited special attention on PRTs as a tool. Twenty-five PRTs operated under command of the NATO-ISAF. PRTs led by the US and twelve countries linked with NATO and other coalition partners. However, a dozen of countries contributes personnel, financial and material support. The main purpose of PRTs is to expand the power of the Central government to the provincial level. PRTs focused in three areas: "governance, reconstruction and security". They should highlight the planned outline of the U.S.-led NATO efforts in Afghanistan that function an allocated task and modified to the local circumstances. When international coordinators appointed, they should be a task of supervising the process of estimating, optimising and synergy the PRT mechanism. NATO should intend to generate this process under its auspices. NATO allies received liability for its success. In this success, 26 allies of NATO have made their military presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, 11 non-NATO countries have also involved in it. Everyone needs to understand that with the resurgence of the Taliban, ISAF became a failure in their purpose and the retreat of allied forces would come accompanied with severe penalties (Dutta 2009). Because Afghan security forces are not so strong that can protect their people and Afghan government from the Taliban.

Although it cannot say that the country has not moved forward in any way, there appears no end in the mass in which the U.S. finds itself. Coalition partners took their responsibility in different fields such as German took charge of training the police in Afghanistan, developing of workable judiciary was taken up by Italy and management of opium poppy production was undertook by Britain. But it can analyse and find some problems in the coordination among them. A comprehensive harmonisation of humanitarian activities tackled by international institutions, governments, and non-government organisations is inexistent. The only pertinent

saving grace for the success of the peacekeepers is that Afghanistan's presidential elections and the parliamentary election have conducted. The levels of support by President Hamid Karzai are comparatively high. According to a December 2007 public opinion poll, the work of President Karzai was rated positively by 63 percent of Afghans. But much needs to be done to facilitate a noticeable change in the overall situation (Dutta 2009).

The government officials at both national and local levels are considered as self-serving and corrupt which have made people of Afghanistan increasingly frustrated. This sentiment is equally present in both rural as well as urban areas of the country. The military officers of U.S. decry unchecked corruption in structural that has not just a question of corrupt individuals. It reflects the low level of income of officers. They say that the Taliban fighters received a pay of around \$150 a month, considerably higher than in the Afghan police and army, where the wage is \$ 60 a month, with a part of that being taken away by the officers. Many officers of the government at the national, provincial and district levels are engaged in drug-trafficking. They are interested more in making money than in well-being of their populations. The augmented cultivation, production, and trafficking of poppy have taken a toll on governance (Dutta. 2009). It has also increased work for the U.S.-led coalition forces to curtail of drug-trafficking racket through support of Afghan government. It is a big problem ahead for the US and allied partners to stop this activities.

The United Nations had little capacity to handle a demanding humanitarian situation. It was obvious that strengthening over capacity to identify the requirements and coordinate the response now had to be a priority. The UN Security Council had given this task to UNAMA in its mandate. A plan for strengthening over overall humanitarian capacity was developed and presented to the UN headquarters in New York and some humanitarian UN agencies. The plan would allow us to recruit more than ninety new staff members, international and Afghan, and deploy them in Kabul and access the country. Some humanitarian NGOs emphasised that UNAMA was a political organisation, with a mandate to work in close connection, too closely- in collaboration of the Afghan government and the coalition military forces. Therefore, humanitarian assistance coordinated through UNAMA could not consider neutral and

impartial which would make it more vulnerable to attacks from the insurgency. In my view, this argument did not hold in practical life. Attacks against humanitarian workers and NGOs had been steadily increasing and had nothing to do with the UNAMA's mandate. Of course, the UNAMA would not itself deliver assistance that would be left to different UN agencies and NGOs as well as the Afghan government. The Taliban directed their attacks against humanitarian and aid organisations because they had seen as supporting the Afghan government, receiving money from countries that had troops in Afghanistan are trying to undermine Islam (Eide 2012). This is very negative things for restructuring for Afghanistan. This is also a big challenge before afghan government as well as the US-led coalition partners to sort out this negative aspect from the mind of the Taliban.

1.9. Summary

Afghanistan shattered from a long period due to the external incursion. It has undergone a lot of competing among ethnic, religious and regional rivalries. Beside it, drug trade and narco-terror industry support to insurgency groups. These are hampering the development of Afghanistan. The conditions of the Afghan government are not so strong that can recover their development and reconstruction. The democracy is not fully strong. So the contribution of people in the election is very less in number. The security conditions also depend on the legitimate government. Security condition is very worst conditions because the Taliban had influenced all the people the government as well as people of Afghanistan. There are three challenges at central, provincial and local level. They all are not making mutual relationship among them. At last, the Afghan government came to contact with the United States of America after 11 September 2001 attack. In the initial stage, the United States developed a good relationship with Afghanistan and started an operation against Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. After some interval of time, the international community came to America with full support in term of the global threat of terrorism. They decided for reconstructing and developing the Afghan state. They started PRT for the capacity building of Afghanistan. PRT is combined form of civilian and military. Both of them have been working in Afghanistan. They supported each other for sustaining peace environment. NATO-ISAF forces also

involved themselves for the rebuilding process. Moreover, they provided security to the people and strengthening the capacity of Afghanistan National Security Forces.

PRT is the model of stability operations of the future. They needed to contest challenges within regarding the sharing of information, coordination, security and the role of the military in providing assistance. Moreover, the maintenance of humanitarian space is expected to emerge whenever military and civil organisations from many nations are acting in war and other non-permissive environments. They have been continuing the fight against the international terrorist activities. These activities have done the pursuit for an open dialogue and effective bondage between global non-military assistance players and the military alliance. Both of them have been facing same challenges (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005). They are still functioning in some parts of Afghanistan. PRTs focused on counter-terrorist groups because the international community still feels threats of these terrorist groups. These terrorist groups have not ended existence from the Afghanistan. They are still operating their terror activities in the country and neighbouring countries while the US forces and NATO-ISAF forces also conducting operation against these groups.

Chapter-2

The Role of NATO-ISAF in Promotion of Security in Afghanistan

2.1. Introduction

Afghanistan suffered innumerable wars and intruders, and its capacity to provide peace and security to Afghans has weakened over the period. Afghanistan has also been facing several challenges due incompetent government system, less economic capacity, human rights security and international orientation. Currently, the biggest threat to Afghanistan's security, stability and prosperity is terrorism that is more deadly and destructive than anything else. Nowadays, non-state actors (terrorist groups) are spreading biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons which are posing a serious security threat to the world. The various technologies of mass weapons destruction are now easier to acquire. (Robertson 2003). Due to the pertinent threat from terrorism Afghanistan is lagging behind day by day. It requires a particular type of security mechanism that would promote stable social, economic and political atmosphere. Military force can be one of the several key ways to achieve this. The United Nations (UN) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) are taking the risk for the promotion of security, and the both organisation have started working in Afghanistan on its agenda of "doctrine of peacebuilding"(Suhrke 2008). A foundational definition used in the peacebuilding enterprise as experienced in locales such as Afghanistan is Boutros-Ghali's original formulation in *The Agenda for Peace*: "Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict". Boutros Ghali expanded on his original definition in his 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* and clarified the essential goal: "the creation of structures for the institutionalisation of peace". These reports outlined a new vision for the UN following the tumultuous period of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Boutros-Ghali envisioned an empowered and emboldened UN system as actively and effectively engaging in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post conflict peacebuilding. To this end, the Agenda for peace makes clear the aims of the UN to intervene earlier, more fully, and more frequently in conflicts around the globe. As a result, the UN has moved well beyond its

traditional peacekeeping roles, and has taken on responsibility for complex and multidimensional peace missions aiming to cement the foundations for stable and legitimate governments that can ensure sustainable peace (Thiessen 2013).

On 11 September 2001, the terrorist attack shook globally and worried the people of the United States (US). The US started incursion in Afghanistan for self-protection in reply to the attacks on 11 September 2001 rather than constructed as a humanitarian intervention. There were no peculiar plans for prolonging stability and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The George W. Bush administration declared, “Afghanistan was a target within the context of counter-terrorism, not humanitarianism” (Ayub and Kouvo 2008). President George W. Bush was very concerned about the activity of Taliban and Al Qaeda, and once again he called the major menace to America. The US intervened in Afghanistan to counterinsurgency for the purpose of their people’s security from again terrorist attacks. By the support of the US, a new regime of government started in Afghanistan after decline of the Taliban regime under the leadership of the Hamid Karzai. After that, he supported the US forces for defeating and dissemination of Taliban. Hence, he brought an end the disastrous phases of Afghanistan. The Taliban left behind an awful legacy of devastation. They kill and carnage in the name of Islam (Usha 2004).

The United States started the operation for fighting against the global terrorism in which the Taliban and Al Qaeda came first in priority list of it (Usha 2004). It is because Al-Qaida took responsibility for this attack. Its leader name is ‘Osama bin Laden’. “President Bush responded swiftly to the attacks on the Twin Towers and retaliated by declaring war on international terrorism and those who harboured terrorists” (NMML 2002). In directly, the US government threatened Afghanistan and Pakistan because Af-Pak border regions are famous for terrorist sanctuary. Here, the new terrorist created by training. For starting campaign against these terrorist groups, America demanded military and financial support from their coalition partners like European countries and also some important organisations such as NATO. Moreover, America also informed the ‘United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’ and its fellow members that it would be beginning a military strike against terrorist groups of Afghanistan. According to the UN Charter, the US and United Kingdom (UK) armed forces had started self-protection campaign in Afghanistan.

The US-led coalition partner's campaign name is 'Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)'. Its objectives were to devastate the base camps of terrorist from Afghanistan, to detain or murder the leadership of Al Qaeda and to eliminate the Taliban government. Though, this campaign had started near the broader areas of Afghanistan. It also included intelligence, discreet, economic and strategy initiatives (NMML 2002). So that, they can precede their campaign in right direction and fulfil their objectives.

The US and its allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization-International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) signed an agreement with the Afghan government on 4 January 2002. The name of the agreement is 'Military Technical Agreement (MTA)'. This agreement collaborates among the coalition forces and Afghan armed forces. The International organisation had come in Afghanistan to support in the field of security, development and reconstruction. Hamid Karzai led interim government has accepted the offer of agreement and promised to provide information relating to threats and security. Besides it, it also supported to the international organisations that were taking an interest in therebuilding process. ISAF had separated from the 'Alliance Forces' because these forces were doing their function according to America and accountable to combat the residues of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. These terrorist groups reside in the south-eastern and southern part of the frontier with Pakistan. These regions are known as "heartland of Taliban" (Saikal 2006). These regions are secure for terrorist groups because Afghan armed forces have not capacity to go and remove the base camp of the Taliban. As we know that Taliban foothold in Afghanistan was very strong.

But, Taliban regime was fully overthrown in 2006. It can be possible only with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives and the Special Forces. These also get support from Northern Alliance and other Afghan commanders for controlling the situation on ground level, while American air power is also supporting them (Rubin 2007). After it, a new phase of campaign started there. It supported the United Nations attempt to guide political change and to make a new government. Moreover, it unwillingly accepted to give security and prepare police forces through ISAF. Though NATO came with the US operations against the international terrorism in Afghanistan, NATO started working for the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts

in the country (Sperling and Webber 2009). Besides it, the United Nation Security Council also passed a resolution against global terrorism. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 created ISAF on 20 December 2001. The United States originally led ISAF while its initial role is limited. The first time ISAF mission was deployed in Kabul. ISAF was taken command by NATO under the United Nations mandate in August 2003. The matter of mandate was to give safety to Afghan people post-Taliban Afghanistan (Wilkinson 2006).

In the promotion of security of Afghanistan, NATO has consequently increased its troops from five thousand to nine thousand in the early stage of the campaign. Itsstrategical point of view had identified for an extension to fifteen thousand troops by the end of 2006 (Daalder and Goldgeier 2006). The total number of American and coalition forces is approximately 32,000 that engaged in providing security to the Afghan government and Afghan people as well as in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Counter-terrorists are a constant story of need and ferocity. It also affected civilians. NATO and allied forces requires more forces for this campaign. Though, extra 8,000 allied armed forces were further engaged in the counter-insurgency campaign. However, international actors have been playing a vital role in stabilisation of Afghan government by financially and physically. These can be possible with coordination of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Financial assistance plays an important role in concentrating the situation of constant poverty. Poverty obstructs the government development while foreign aid supports to make feasible the employment of jobless youths in Afghan security forces (Rubin 2007). Besides it, international community also started small projects in Afghanistan that also supported for providing jobs of local people. People of Afghan indirectly supported for boosting economic growth of Afghan government that support for making a perfect government.

The intention of the mission is to provide assistance, the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. But the task ahead was more complex. The insurgent groups are creating obstacles to the campaign. This type of activity was happening war distorted society. It's become a land of roaring voice. As a result, the feeble government created a social vacuum (Rane 2007). America's coalition partners toughened the acuity in some decision taken in Washington. With the helping of

coalition partners, it would be easier to carry out the campaign in which they have to offer a fewer military support. In the decision making, they might hinder in well-organized decision-making (Gordon 2002). Here it is also seen that the US has dominated in decision making for this campaign in which other coalition member's decision had not given priority by American government. Initially, the US discarded NATO's plan for operating the campaign. Again, the USA welcomed its military objectives that took participated in the campaign. In this campaign, some NATO members such as Canada, Germany, Italy and France took initiated. These members had given their significant contribution to ground combat campaign. They dedicated an imposing allotment of national naval and air resources to the overcome of the Taliban (Sperling and Webber 2009).

At this time, NATO made operation plans that include counter-terrorism strategy and to guide and support ISAF for supporting the government of Afghanistan. It was also applying its power and manipulates throughout the nation. However, ISAF took charge from the US-led coalition forces in the southern part of the country in 2006. ISAF is working for the security of the country (Rane 2007). ISAF made control the comparative security of Kabul and its environments. Gradually the forces have continuously extended its accountability of Afghanistan. It also extended into the unsafe southern region of it. This region is dangerous because it is base camp of the Taliban and Al Qaeda that trained their militia. It is very close to Pakistan border. Pakistan supports terrorism indirectly against its neighbouring country like India (Daalder and Goldgeier 2006).

Afghan forces have turned away from a tipping point. The insurgents planned to capture western district of Kandahar as well as to hope take the capital city of Afghan. In spite of this hindrance, the Taliban started militancy is still alive nearer the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. Refugee camp started again in this region. Opium cultivation is producing at record levels in Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan (GoA) has not fully control over this production. That is why terrorist groups have been getting opium from poor farmers at a high level and illegal drug trafficking trade through the border of Afghanistan to Pakistan and some Central Asian countries. From this, they earn a lot of money. Therefore, Afghanistan revenue has been coming down that had failed to satisfy the most basic requirement of the

population. Moreover, the several ethnic leaders blamed the government in the term of the major source of violence and lack of confidence (Rubin 2007). The government of Afghanistan is not capable to provide a basic demand of people. It requires a healthy amount of financial environment.

The voice of people did not like NATO control over ISAF because both the characteristic is different. NATO is only operating any plan through military forces. It has not helpful nature while ISAF has functioning here for people assistance. But, it can extend role for the force beyond the capital. NATO decided to take over the task in May 2003. NATO had started its work in the field of reconstruction and development in the different field. These recent development and reconstruction sort out the basic problems of finding revolving command for the force. These activities made NATO stronger among coalition partners, and it created a burden to the alliance and ISAF (Saikal 2006). Due to it, there create dissidence between NATO and coalitions forces.

Pakistan is the main centre of terrorism “of global reach”. Al Qaeda has been working intelligently for re-establishing its militant base camp on both the side of Af-Pak border regions by using its sharp skill for taking advantage of the weak point of the country in the ethnic strap of Pashtun. So, Al Qaeda has succeeded in their aim. Military Commander’s words that until we change the ethnic strap; the US is at danger (Rubin 2007). Afghanistan is risk prone zone. It is a historically proven fact that the foreign actors have never occupied Afghanistan due to geographical structure of Afghanistan that is a mountainous, rocky and up and down a level. It was/is not an easy task to the intruders to handle the situation of Afghanistan. Besides it, tribal areas are the hub of Taliban and Al Qaeda. However, the USA and its alliance partner ‘NATO’ have been doing their job fearlessly since 2001. They are still functioning in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan created intimidating impediments to both NATO personnel and machinery. Rebuilding and stabilisation must take place, whereas combating campaigns persist (Morelli and Belkin 2009). According to some critic said that failed states show a menace to global order. There is no normative problem because the big power is imposed particularly with protecting global concord and safety under the United Nations Charter 7 (Misra 2004). Besides it, the Bonn Agreement was held on 5

December 2001. The Agreements on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan and it had been pending the re-establishment of Afghan permanent government institutions. The first of series of agreements designed to reconstruct the state of Afghanistan following the U.S. incursion on after 11 September 2001 attack. The Bonn Agreement had provided a framework and agenda for security and stability, rebuilding of the country, the institutionalisations of main Afghan government's bodies, and the preservation of human rights. It comprises supplies to undertake martial disbandment and the harmonisation of ex-combatants into civilian life, global peacekeeping and monitoring of humanitarian privileges (UNDP Report 2006). All the main benchmarks for peace and reconstruction were set to support Afghanistan infrastructure.

NATO commences enlarging the role of ISAF. The main military headquarters of NATO is Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE exercises its strategic control over ISAF. SHAPE operates the Joint Force Command Brunson (JFCB). JFCB had deployed for the operation, training and deployment of ISAF personnel. ISAF has turned into more unified than ever before (Saikal 2006). The headquarters of ISAF Headquarters, Kabul Multinational Brigade, Kabul International Airport Division and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are four important components of force structured in Afghanistan. We described the functions of all these components such as Kabul Multinational Brigade is accountable for the planning the troops' command on the ground level. Kabul International Airport Division has taken the responsibility of the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism of the entire activities of the airport. PRTs operated in eighteen provinces of Afghanistan with tactics in progress to expand them to 24 provinces soon (Saikal 2006).

When we talk about the security status of Afghanistan, we find out less safety. So, we can say that the western and northern parts of the country were comparatively greater stable on the rest part of Afghanistan. The Taliban have obviously damaged by strategic defeats in consecutive activities against ISAF and the U.S. forces. Furthermore, the Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to produce skilled military on time to time. So, it can take part an extra extensive role in coming a time in giving safety of Afghanistan (Roi and Smolynech 2008). Additional forces had also sent to

Afghanistan's NATO-ISAF by the coalition partners such as the US contributed 30,000 troops, and 7000 combine troop of NATO countries and other allies. NATO is using these forces for security promotion. It also provided security NGOs and international organisation for developing and reconstructing the basic structure of Afghanistan. America has also promised to support in rebuilding and growth (Mullen 2010). However, the US and coalition partners have contributed the biggest number of troops in ISAF. Recently about 3200 German forces are providing service in Afghanistan. This force took third largest place in contributing to ISAF allied forces. These forces are set up in the capital of Afghanistan and northern ISAF's regions. Germany started its PRTs in 'Kunduz and Feyzabad' with a double civilian and military command (Kaim 2008).

The operation of counter-terrorist was planned to overturn the float in NATO strategy. It is carrying visible success in the fight against the Taliban. Moreover, it increases the confidence of competent Afghan security force against Taliban. After this, the civilian surge was to be launch in a combination of a military campaign. They focused on attaining a high-level growth of government capacity; a reduction in corruption and an increasing the popular view about governing elite of the country. The Afghan government was poor in term of tackling corruption, but it was trying to do so. It is little astonishing for NATO. Recently, NATO established its organisation to deal with the corruption. In October 2010, '*Shafafiyat*' or Transparency has been functioning entirely Afghanistan. Its main aims are to make strong relations between the Government of Afghanistan and the global actors to handle the problem easily. ISAF utilised its approach for constructing them in such way that does not worsen the situation. Moreover, it was also deploying to improved NATO assets and staffs reinforce as well as assist in a campaign of Afghan anti-corruption. Therefore, NATO has also engaged one respected general in charge of transparency (Dodge and Redman 2011). That is why NATO has done a marvellous job in Afghanistan in term of security promotion as well as overall development and reconstruction.

Barack Obama government announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 2009. The purpose of this was to unite military, civilian, and political as well as development initiatives alongside the Durand Line. The latest strategy is shortly known as the short term '*Af-Pak*'. The key objectives of the strategy

are disrupting, demolish and to crush Al Qaeda. Besides, it also destroys its secure sanctuary in Pakistan as well as to stop their come back to Pakistan or Afghanistan (Lunn and Smith 2010).

Afghanistan wants sustainable peace, safety and development Afghanistan. It can be possible through democratic political transformation. Afghanistan displays both the limitation and strength of the UN (Ponzio 2007). For the preparation of National Development Framework and Budget (NDFB), the United Nations (UN) and the GoA have acted very closely. In the Budget, it also set full priorities for support to the country. The World Bank (WB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) launched an Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) in May 2002. It had done with the purpose of reform international economic assistance to Afghanistan by regulating promises in a particular method (Griffin 2003). That boosted Afghanistan economic strength in temporarily manner.

2.2. NATO's Organisational Structure in Afghanistan

The U.S. has involved in Afghanistan combating Taliban and Al Qaeda in which NATO is functioning mainly helpful role for American efforts. The aim of Western Countries is “*fight against terrorism*” and “*war on terror*”. Due to the terrorist threat, NATO is performing a defensive task in the Mediterranean. For preventing a terrorist attack, it has endorsed policies developing latest technology and getting managed result. The coalition partners have supposed a vanguard role in searching to refute insurgency groups a toehold in Afghanistan. It is the first time NATO making de facto warfare operation yet. In the US *war on terror*, the NATO contributed in following fields: ***prevention and defence, denial, counter-terrorism, and consequence management***. These all are required to deal with terrorism comfortably. These supported the strategy of America and political and military efforts of NATO to fight terrorism (Nevers 2007).

In 1999 Strategic Concept of NATO recognised terrorism as a primitive peril menacing NATO safety. During Prague Summit in 2002, NATO adopted a ‘Partnership Action Plan’ for combating terrorist and controlling its results. NATO applied two great roles such as “NATO in ***Lead***” and “NATO in ***Support***”

involvement in counter-terrorism (Kaim 2008). Security and development are competing for demands before NATO-led ISAF. But it required two interrelated strategies: first, it concentrated on Afghan domestic affairs, ecological and human safety; second, reformation of security sector with the creating an expert Afghan military and police service that can take whole accountability for countrywide affairs without global help (Wilkinson 2006).

2.2.1 NATO in *Lead*

NATO applied for an individual role in ‘NATO *in Lead*’ in the counter-insurgency campaign. It enlarged with enough command, control and intelligence structures. It has also included with a skilled force for instant response in an adversity situations. Special attention has given to certain aspects of planning. It has also included events and abilities. They supported to accelerate decision cycles that would be successful for identifying and attacking time-sensitive goals in the counterterrorism conditions. It will also get access to flexible and capable joint-fires that will ring from precision-guided stand-off weapons to direct conventional fires. In short, it will require the extra expertise counter-terrorist forces (Rane 2007).

2.2.2 NATO in *Support*

NATO *in Support* permits the allied partner for supplying its resources and abilities to any anti-insurgency campaign. Counter-insurgency campaign conducted with the help of worldwide organisations. NATO has played a numerous role: first, alliance enabler and interoperability supplier have the capability to backfill domestic needs. Second, the broader coalition efforts are supported by the forward deploying forces. Third, the appearance of opinionated and martial obligation. Fourth, host-nation support manifested the practical support and logistical assistance. It includes overflight and pedestalling rights. Fifth, the using operational planning and force creation abilities of NATO to plan a task. Sixth, NATO as a force for an alliance of one mind NATO members to support and sustain the operation (Rane 2007).

At the initial phase, NATO has allowed the limited area of ISAF’s mission. It has put Kabul under ISAF for patrolling. ISAF has started extending its mission into Western and Northern provinces of Afghanistan since 2004. Afterwards, it extended in the East and South part of the country. ISAF has also deployed many PRTs. The

U.S. military developed a model such as PRTs that includes capacity building of the country. In October 2006, ISAF supposed accountability for security throughout the nation. It was the largest operation of NATO includes approximately 31,000 forces. In this operation, approximately 12,000 American staff was working under the supervision of ISAF (Nevers 2007). All these staff and forces were working in different provinces of the country with their program projects.

ISAF divided Afghan territory into five Regional Commands (RCs). ISAF started function into four different regional commands, including the capital of Afghanistan (Regional Command- Kabul), while expanded its access in a sequence of anti-clockwise steps entirely towards Afghanistan. Different lead nations lead Regional Commands. Here, we describe the lead nations. Germany has served in RC-North. The Italians began its operation in RC-West. The British, Canadians and the Dutch rotated their functional leadership in RC-South. Additionally, the United States stated their operation and controlling the RC-East. The U.S. armed forces continuously operated their campaign across the country in parallel with ISAF armed forces (Auerswald and Saideman 2014). America was very excited to kill Osama bin Laden in earliest. That is why these forces were to continue their campaign. NATO pledged that it would operate any campaign for combined security for entire partners. In combined security, there are disparities such as “uneven deployment, uneven operational commitment and conditional deployment”. It shows a clear picture that NATO did not give full focus on Afghanistan as a mission for stabilisation of security problem, but a deployment of a temporary coalition forces. Uneven deployment reflects a real difference of public and political opinion (Ibrahim 2009). The U.S. has an uneven operational commitment with its coalitions as well as some of them had a conditional deployment of the military. It did not help to Afghan government.

At the end of 2008, it adopted accountability for the safety of Afghanistan's southern region. Further, it took extra resilient involvement. NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan openly helps to American objective of rebuffing terrorist's safe sanctuary there. ISAF is in concentrate to conduct anti-terrorism operations. This operation is the first combat mission of NATO since its formation. The U.S. Special Forces take lead role in counter-terrorism in Afghanistan without NATO armed forces. Besides it, ISAF has the largest contingent of American troops (Nevers 2007).

The role of ISAF is to provide safety to the Afghan government to extend its rule and regulation to overall the country. The reconstruction and development efforts can be a successful implementation where security is allowed. Thus, NATO forces necessary to deploy effectively to give out the tangible security advantages so that common masses in Afghanistan can be pursued to support the government (Wilkinson 2006).

NATO has a particular principal that follows in involvement in Afghanistan. NATO signified a hybrid principle structure in operation. A hybrid principle involved in a structural relationship in a state that has delegated an accord independently with the military agent. However, it further made to share a second delegation accord with the similar nature of agent as an ingredient of a combined principal. The conditions of the two-phase process are established by hybrid relationship for guiding the deployment of military representative. The first phase includes a competition between the single principal (NATO members) and the combined principal's other members over what will comprise the ideal policy of combined principal. According to its internal procedures and forward decision, the collective principal accesses a decision that had shared with a military representative (Auerswald and Saideman 2014). Both ISAF and NATO members functioned with their principles in a different way for deploying their armed forces commanders in the regions. Thus, the two lines of command mean the different command of both NATO and ISAF commanders in the same campaign. It created harmonisation troubles and paralysed decision-making processes (Ettinger 2015). It is the best way through which created a mutual understanding in trouble states confront. NATO can play a vital role in producing general opinions about terrorism. However, the United States gives an opinion about NATO as a precious forum to persuade its European allies who contributed the similar objectives and facing the similar menace during '*war on terror*'. They continue to give importance to the coalition (Nevers 2007). Without coalition partners, the US troops has to face a lot of challenges there. But, it does not mean that they had not faced problems there.

But the military and police of Afghan became not capable of dealing the conditions harshly to militant groups. That is why the Taliban again emerged in Afghanistan in 2007-08. NATO-led ISAF has had again to engage in an anti-terrorism campaign in a larger fraction of Afghanistan. It is not easy victory over Taliban. The

official documents of the United Nations showed the role of ISAF in Afghanistan. It includes neither ISAF nor the Afghan government has given sufficient safety. Consequently, we find out that the political and financial conditions of Afghanistan were not performed in right directions and right manners. Income sources of militant groups are coming from opium production and drug trafficking that signifies basic menaces to weak political, economic, and social institutions of Afghanistan. It created the hurdles for the rescue of civilian aid to broad parts of the country. Military experts propose that Taliban-controlled surrounded the entire territory of Afghan capital (Kaim 2008). So, it can be seen that it is a big hurdle ahead the US-led coalition forces to give sufficient security as well as financial assistance to the Afghan government.

President Barack Obama's declaration stated that the new plan was proposed to reinforce the resources of stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan. "The stabilisation efforts became low of the profile during of Bush government," said many officials. Moreover, the policy emphasised the requirement to reinforce and improve the government of Afghanistan. The official document of America is the 'White Paper'. It has focused on Afghan civilian life. It emphasised dramatic changes that were needed to extend institutions at the central stage but also at the regional stage and local stage. The policy envisaged the number of staff is increasing in UNAMA. Also, it establishes its offices in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. While it allocated finances and security conditions, it gave only in the short space of time for a much more limited expansion. Also, civilian efficiency built up designated for assisting control the bribery (Morelli and Belkin 2009). The US and NATO has been supporting for controlling the corruption and bribery, including the capacity building of Afghan government with their fund. Besides it, they have been funding extra money for reformation the Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF) with basic training and made strengthen recruiting process for armed forces in the country. The quality of ANSF has become improved with compare to erstwhile Afghan security forces (Dodge and Redman 2011). In coming future, we are hoping that ANSF will provide security to Afghan people. It may be possible when Afghan government becomes strong with democratic and financially.

NATO Summit held Chicago (2012) in which coalition partners decided that they will be providing support to the NATO-ISAF. Afghan government issued Summit Declaration related to the future of the country; including the beginning of the permanent transformation policy in 2011. The entire coalition partners explicated their pledge to make a sovereign, secure and strong democratic state as well as unbreakable their accord to finish the mission of ISAF by the end of 2014. They also reaffirm their close relationship with the Afghan government. Afghanistan also affirmed its promise for creating a strong democratic society. It would based on the rule of law and good governance (Ayub and Kouvo 2008).

2.3. UN Resolution and UNAMA Model

The Afghan Government requested to the United Nations to support the establishment of peace and sustainable development. The United Nations established a political mission in Afghanistan. Its name is “UNAMA”. It is formed to assist Afghan government and its people by functioning on the ground level programme for upholding peace and progress. The UNAMA’s role is to encourage concord and stability in Afghanistan, while the international community also led in this effort. The UNAMA supported Afghanistan authorities for taking the task to organised attempts to rebuild the nation and make stronger governance, progress, and stability (Morelli and Belkin 2009). Additionally, it is managing numerous post-war restoration programmes for capacity building, including the Central Bank of Afghanistan operation, providing information of measles immunisation plans in the rural and urban areas and the executing of English medium education (Misra 2004). Similarly, the ADB has assured 500 million dollars for a livestock ranch, schools, power generation and roads. These funds will give a very important uplift from nearly missing basic requirements of the civil society (Misra 2004). Nevertheless, the numbers of donors which are working in Afghanistan found it difficult to co-ordinate for UNAMA to implement (Morelli and Belkin 2009).

NATO was committed by the Berlin Accord to stay in Afghanistan until the military and Afghan security adequately comprised and functioning. The United Nations mandates are rebuilding and stabilisation of Afghanistan. NATO also agreed on UN mandate enlarges some PRTs all over Afghanistan. Besides it, the ARTF and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) were two multifaceted grant

organisation established by NATO (Sperling and Webber 2009). According to UNSCR 1510 in 2003, the role of ISAF expanded outside the Kabul and continued with the agreement of Bonn. It also endorsed to give safety, reconstruction support throughout the country and to provide economic assistance in combat terrorism. It also protected from crime and drugs. Similarly, UNSCR 1623 talks about above matters. However, there are several diverse explanations of that the mandate had huge trouble in intra-alliance relations within ISAF and between ISAF and OEF and hampered its efficiency operations (Sperling and Webber 2009). “ISAF was a UN-mandated international force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, eighteen UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) related to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1817, 1833, 1890, 1917, 1943, 2011, 2069, 2096, 2120, and 2145” (NATO 2015). According to the UNSCR 1386 (2001) approved the formation of ISAF that appealed in the Bonn Accord to uphold safety in the capital and its surrounding areas. The UNSCR 1401 on 28 March 2002 set up the UNAMA. It is as a political and incorporated mission. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations supported and directed to this mission and also assist it in execution the Bonn Accord (Margesson 2010).

The Security Council passed Resolution 1746 on 23 March 2007 to update and renew the mandate of UNAMA for one year. The mandate has included six major components: first, giving the strategic and political suggestion for the peace building procedure as well as reinforcement rising democratic bodies of the country and giving good quality offices. Second, supporting the Afghan administration in the harmonisation and monitoring the execution of the Afghanistan Compact (AC). Third, co-chairing the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). Fourth, promoting human rights and capacity-building of government bodies. Fifth, giving technological assistance in sectors and dissolution illegal armed groups, where the UN displayed comparative advantage and expertise. Sixth, assist to the Independent Electoral Commission. Additionally it controlled all UN humanitarian relief, reconstruction, recovery and development activities in Afghanistan (Prologue 2007).

The United Nations have put a “Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)” like Lakhdar Brahimi started UNAMA in Afghanistan. It has given two special responsibilities of Afghanistan. The first responsibility of it is the political

head of the UNAMA. Second responsibility, it is the leader of the entire UN family (Eide 2012). The UNAMA would target on capacity building in the Afghan government and contribute other assistance operations contained in the mandate. Nevertheless, the disparity between Bonn's agenda (state-building) and the bright impression of the UNAMA added to the larger malfunctioning during the intermediate period (Ayub and Kouvo 2008). The U.S. and Afghanistan had signed a 'strategic partnership agreement'. That has described both sides' pledge after the U.S. military withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014, while international partners harassed their combined pledge to build up a steady and sovereign country. Besides, the international community also decided to "strengthen long-term strategic cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including advancing peace, security, and reconciliation, strengthening state institutions, supporting Afghanistan's long-term economic and social development, and encouraging regional cooperation." America also accepted to design Afghanistan as "Major Non-NATO Ally" to contribute an enduring framework for cooperation and security (ILM 2012). Gradually NATO-ISAF mission and functioning accountabilities have become wider. That is why the interim government of Afghan and the UN's personnel unit can manage in safe surroundings (Roi and Smolyneec 2008). The Interim government will remain to uphold accountabilities of security. The Bonn Conference assembled beneath the aegis of the UN. The conference incorporated dialogue for sharing of power agreement in a transitional government. But it also engages in peace talks. The Bonn accord put a time-frame for the creation of a transitional government, establish a commission to outline the fresh constitution, Loya Jirga passed an emergency to sanction appointments and the election of the country (Ayub and Kouvo 2008). After it, the new form of government came in power.

The UNSCR 1659 (2006) determined that the Afghan administration and its people must assist in making the successful completion of the Bonn process. It has been recognising the interrelated character of the challenges in front and asserting sustainable progress on security, governance and development. That has essentially involved in the capacity building of the country. They are jointly strengthening for continuing fighting with terrorist and narcotic threats because they face daily threats by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. These groups have been pressuring the regional cooperation that comprises an efficient means to promote

security and development of the country. According to UNSCR 1701 (2006), the Afghan compact damaged dissimilarity between the ISAF and OEF missions. According to UNSCR 1707 (2006), it has mentioned that the coalition forces of OEF and ISAF supported the Afghan Security Forces (ASF) in contributing to the security of Afghanistan. ASF welcomed the extension of ISAF into the Southern region of Afghanistan. ISAF started their effect on 31 July 2006. Further, ASF made a plan for ISAF expansion into Eastern part of Afghanistan. It has also increased coordination between ISAF and the OEF coalition. After 2006, the safety surrounding in Afghanistan created a noticeable move in the ISAF mandate that has included in the UNSCR 1776 (2007) and 1833 (2008). ISAF and OEF addressed the menace caused by extremist groups such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda. But ISAF directed to discuss with intimately with OEF in the carrying out of the force mandate (Sperling and Webber 2009). This force mandate has been also applying for counterinsurgency.

The “UNSCR 1735 intends at publicising the names of major drug lords, banning their travel, and seizing their assets” (Mullen 2010). The United Nations has mentioned the problems spreading in Afghanistan. Moreover, the international organisation's agencies regular point out some solutions such as to give alternative livelihoods to weaker and rural development that support poor instead of cultivation of opium (Mullen 2010). In Afghanistan, NATO and ISAF are protecting of civilian against militant groups in different regions. In which, some casualties have happened. Some of the data it find from the UNAMA annual report. In 2008, civilian deaths raised about 40 percent in the last years. Civilian casualties registered in Afghanistan. In these casualties, the contributed of anti-government armed forces are 55 per cent, while the pro-government army credited 39 percent to the good side representation (EPW 2009). This is consequences of military operations in Afghanistan.

The UNSCR 1833 (2008) expanded the authority of the ISAF in Afghanistan for one year. The UNSCR 1868 (2009) enlarges the “UNAMA that had established by Resolution 1662 (2006) and Resolution 1659 (2006). It further endorsed the Afghanistan Compact until 23 March 2010 (UNSCR 2009)”. According to the UNSCR 1890 (2009), it is “acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations mandate of the ISAF for twelve months as established under Resolution 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003)” (UNSCR 2009). The UNSCR 1943 (2010) determined that the conditions of

Afghanistan still comprises of menace to security and worldwide peace. Besides, it also decided to make sure that full implementation of the mandate of ISAF. It makes harmonisation with the Afghan administration and functioning under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UNSCR 2010).The UNSCR 1963 reaffirms terrorism in one of the strictest threats in all formats and also challenges for international peace and security. The Security Council explains the essential objective of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) that makes sure the filled execution of Resolution 1373/2001. It also reminds the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) because it helps the CTC for the fulfilment of their mandate and verdict. Under the strategic guidance of the CTC, CTED will continue to function as a special political mission (Kaim 2008). The UNSCR 1974/2011 reaffirms its sustained support for Afghan people and government. The Security Council decided a decision for expanding the UNAMA's mandate until 2012 (UNSCR 2011). Again, the UNSCR 2041 /2012 extended the mandate of UNAMA until 2013. The Security Council summoned all the representative of the global community in its members and Afghanistan to manage with the UNAMA. It is pressuring the role of UNAMA in opinionated Afghan-led processes of reconciliation and peace (ILM 2012). The UNSCR 2055, established on 29 June, 2012, increased the size of the committee of Security Council that made internal controls to thwart the propagation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons as well as their way of deliverance. They establish suitable controls over the interrelated substance. Even though, the mandate for the resolution was originally planned to be only two years due to the Committee's considerably increased workload over the course of its mandate. It was extended in 2011 until 25 April 2021 (UNSCR 2012).

When it talks about the context of Afghanistan, it finds that there was a grave lack of cooperation found among the countries in nearby areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Pakistan has been providing a safe sanctuary to terrorist groups. In these particular regions, the UN Security Council wanted to see more violent leading role of the UN. Moreover, the UNAMA had given tasked to provide assistance to the forthcoming election at centre level and local level to assist the Afghan administration in efforts of conciliation with the Taliban (Eide 2012). From above analysis, it seems that the UNAMA has been functioning positively role in rebuilding of Afghanistan.

2.4. The Conceptualisation and Rationale Civilisation Aid arms in War Zone

Civil society and uncivil society groups will play a significant role in determining the upcoming of Afghanistan. Civil society comprises the common population, private contractual, civilian government workers and non-governmental organisation (NGOs). An uncivil society consists of illegal merchandise traffickers, warlords and dishonest leaders. Civilians supported with the humanitarian assistance, developmental projects and economic assistance. Moreover, the concept of winning the hearts and minds of Afghan, humanitarian space operated under it. By using the economic assistance can enhance the security of the country. Despite, projects have resulted continuously flow of funds in the country. Since 2002, more than US \$ 17 billion have flooded economic assistance into Afghanistan (Rothstein and Arquilla 2013). This money assisted Afghan government for paying salaries of staff's members and planned some programme for welfare of society.

Afghanistan adopted a significant policy "reconstruction and development". For this, international actors organised several conferences globally. In 2002, the International Conference held in Tokyo on topic "Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan". In this Conference resulted in promises estimated at US \$ 4-5 billion. In 2004, Berlin Conference held in Berlin on the topic of Afghanistan that resulted in promised of more than US \$ 8 billion. Later, it surpassed by pledged from the 2006 London Conference of over US \$ 10.5 billion (PIRS 2007). The flood of money through economic assistance made money making business. An international organisation may be politically neutral and providing their services with a financial incentive. While the unintentional results of those services are political, economic assistance is a business for fulfilling their strategic goal. The politicised aid creates a problem for NGOs to function their projects in a war zone, while another lies in its operations. Unbiased organisation or agencies need to provide assistance to a military operation. The professional military requires for functioning in a war zone so that they can easily start a military operation against the terrorist (Rothstein and Arquilla 2013). All these substantial assistance had invested in rebuilding infrastructure of Afghanistan. Most of foreign aid had diverted into military assistance for security perspective in Afghanistan. Rest amount of foreign aid left Afghan government.

As a result, it seems that a large amount of aid have been landing in the hands of warlords and politicians. They have done little for the poor. Economic assistance did not distribute superlatively, whereas it has always been ending up in the hands of the powerful. Besides it, it also used in prolonged conflict (Rothstein and Arquilla 2013). Due to weak government, they were not capable to check and balance over it. That is why the national government is not capable of providing essential requirements and demands of people as well as basic infrastructure that made the life of them easily. Security is first and foremost requirement of any sovereign country that protects their civilian from internal and external intrusion. Meanwhile, international actors tried filling up security gap with their economic and military support to Afghanistan.

2.5. NATO Operations and Steps a Civilian Factor

Before starting operation by NATO, it took 'security' as a first and instant objective for Afghanistan because it was needed to improve the situation of recent fragile states. But NATO started its operation throughout the country to make the effective security of Afghanistan. The Afghan Government faces security problem critically due to porous border with neighbouring countries like Pakistan. Additionally, it also created hurdles for NATO-ISAF operations against terrorist. Their policy for Afghanistan had to make cutting down militants' groups from Pakistan and the constant eradication of the Al Qaeda from there. It was one of its main outlines of the campaign (Roi and Smolynech 2008).

NATO has been functioning in Afghanistan with their strategy. Any anti-terrorism plan has two major elements: *measures* and *responses*. In the counter-terrorism, responses can be summed up into two models: first, the Criminal Justice Model (CJM). Second, War Model (WM). CJM focuses on the assertion of the defence of democratic values in the battle against terrorism. While the WM works on a diverse assertion, it gives priority to counter-insurgency rather than preserving tolerant, democratic values. In both models of responses, the country chooses the Expanded Criminal Justice Model (ECJM). It is a hybrid of CJM and WM (Rane 2007). American strategy for counter-terrorism can be divided largely into two stages: first, to keep away from a militant attack; second, to organise a post-crisis management. In this management, there are two agencies such as law enforcement

agencies and the crisis management groups. These two play critical positions after a terrorist attack. A significant component of this juncture is to build up suitable reply at the global stage (Rane 2007). NATO's European partners acknowledged that the Afghan capital is facing a challenge itself. The challenges of Afghanistan's government root out rebellion from Kabul remains a significant intention for the long-lasting stability of Afghanistan. Destabilisation of Kabul was caused due to scarce of armed support and resulted in the essential breakdown of then ISAF mission. Under the leadership of NATO, a large contingent of Canadian soldiers could help deliberate on these challenges (Fitzsimmons 2013). They were functioning smoothly with compare to other allied forces by contacting with local people. They got positive support from the local side.

NATO's responsibilities have governed by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions in Afghanistan. NATO-led ISAF confronted mighty problem caused by a feeble administration of Afghanistan, with the rough territory, and reconstructing a nation devastated by warfare and supple narcotics trade. The Agenda of NATO's mission put significant components of the campaign of reconstruction and stabilisation of Afghanistan to support the government in counter-narcotics efforts. They have trained the Afghan army police, judiciary, market infrastructure along with repressing the Taliban (Morelli and Belkin 2009). These made beneficial for local people in terrible circumstances. According to mandate, ISAF had about 4,500 forces in the Afghan capital to assist the interim authority. American' allied soldiers were searching for "Osama bin Laden" and his acquaintances in the south-eastern border of Afghanistan nearer Pakistan. After six years, these armed forces had been a presence there in changed form of government. For this, the intercontinental troops had also increased their number approximately 50,000 in regarding the security of Afghan government from militant groups (Suhrke 2008).

The US-led coalition partners and NATO raised its combat operations at a high level in Afghanistan. For this, it needs a high level of assets to function its job properly in these harsh conditions. When we find these on ground level, commanding officers were facing with impractical claims from their assets to support in capacity building and enhancing the growth. They were incapable of implementing due to the rising insurgency who was discouraged by the lack of security, and the economic

assistance official was also an absence. Besides it, they were easy to create good linkage with local warlords. While military officers found themselves in the middle of the ethnic conflict, that could block their attempts. The U.S. Senior officers had access to considerable funds that have come for the “reconstruction projects”. But they were capable of exercising these grants to advance strategic purpose. Such a way, we can say that development and reconstruction were not being continuous. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that Afghanistan enclosed by hostility, incompetence central and provincial government. Moreover, it also lacked a united military strategy and the difficulties of starting economic assistance. It represented such an approach that was unfeasible to put into practice (Suhrke 2008).

International armed forces achieved a sensational victory after the assassination the senior Taliban military commander, Mullah Dadullah, in 2007. By the end of 2008, their number was increased and reaches at 65,000. But the New President of U.S.A came into power in 2008 and entered his office in January 2009. There was no one of a document signed by him related to being suppressed insurgency. An innovative method of counter-terrorism is required. The strategy of ISAF must be convincible and resilient for Afghans. The key point is shielding the inhabitants from lengthy a significant tenet of counter-insurgency thoughts. Therefore, ISAF required studying more intimately with the Afghan people whose requirements, identities and complaints differ from valley to valley and from province to province (Dodge and Redman 2011).The United States Department of Defence stated that “the ISAF and its Afghan coalition alliance have made significant safety gains, overturning ferocity likely in a lot of the country, and starting the transition to Afghan security. It conducts in seven provinces like Kabul, Panjsher, Bamiyan, Mazar-e-Sharif city, Herat city, and the towns of Lashkar Gah and Mehtar Lam.Mazar-e-Sharif, Panjsher and Herat”(Maley 2012). The Taliban damaged all these provinces. These provinces made a witness. However, the government of Afghanistan and its global supporters remained certain in their promises to keep on the course to transition (Maley 2012). It would be good for Afghan government.

US troops have been putting the stress on militant by using some offensives intended to abolish the Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. In 2003, the biggest Allied offensive operation was introduced “*Operation Mountain Viper*” since the attack on

the USA. It has used armed forces and air forces. Again, “*Operation Avalanche*” instantly launched with the involvement of 2,000 American and other allied armed forces. In early 2004, “*Mountain Storm*” operated. The US and its allied forces wait for the strain for searching and devastate operations in seven provinces. It stretches from Kunar to Kandahar. ISAF-led set up little “Civil-Military Teams (CIMITs)” in comparatively peace regions of the western and northern part of the country (Suhrke 2008). NATO-ISAF stretches its operations in the east and south. The operation was the last operation of them. It shows that NATO-ISAF got whole accountability of the country with the integration of a large number of U.S. forces. The number of ISAF troops rose to 6,250 in 2004, while it again rose upto 8,500 in 2005. Both the U.S. and ISAF established a sequence of PRTs that planned to uplift improvement in particular regions with military support. The insurgency was comparatively low-intensity until mid-2006. But it increased radically subsequent ‘*Operation Herrick*’. Taliban had developed a new segment of manipulating both sides of Afghanistan border regions. It allowed establishing its attacks considerably. These activities had also been raised scope for ISAF. For the South region, ISAF noticed its assumption of accountability and providing extra 10,000 forces and a considerable extension into areas. It has seen little progress in any international forces and very few developments in the field of government, policies presence and growth. It happened when the Taliban was already recognised and fully set up. Meanwhile, the rising presence of the Taliban throughout the South would surely create problems in the mission of ISAF. Despite, UK battle group inserted into Helmand, while Canadian troops pursued it into Kandahar and the Dutch and Australian in Uruzgan (Dodge and Redman 2011).

It can be analyse that NATO has been facing challenges to provide adequate assets in Afghanistan. Therefore, European countries of the U.S. alliance partners were incapable or reluctant to provide adequate resources to its ISAF. NATO should have opened its door to those countries which have shared principles and objectives. However, they deserve cautious contemplation about the NATO’s countries. Indeed, much of NATO's strength receives from its network of partnerships. The alliance of NATO has a long history of cooperation with non-member countries (Hallams 2009). These non-member countries have been supporting NATO for sending assets for Afghanistan. The extremist group have implemented several tactical intentions such as the throwing out of ISAF troops and removing the Karzai regime, while some

militant groups want a re-establishment of Salafist Islamic regime. The uprising is raised mainly from the major ethnic groups of Afghanistan such as Pashtun. The most of these Pashtun are inhabited in the south-west, east and south of the state. Besides, some pockets of Pashtun ethnic are doing partial action in the Afghan capital and northern and western regions (Dodge and Redman 2011).

The relation between the Afghan government and coalition forces has regularly been facing a source of tension and distrust because of Afghan civilian casualties. Due to civilian deaths, the US military proclaimed new action commitment measures as well as reducing utilisation of air strikes in the densely inhabited region. In 2009, it supported to reduce 28 percent Afghan civilian deaths caused by forces. However, we found by and large growth of 14 percent civilian death over the last year. When we talk about the governmental report of UNAMA, we found 41 percent civilian deaths rise caused by Afghan militant groups (Mullen 2010). For strengthening this campaign, Obama Administration were sent 30,000 additional US troops to tackle the enemy. In this operation, many US troops as well many civilian had killed in counteringterrorist. During 2010, military casualties for U.S. troops had reached400 higher than overall time annual. Moreover, Afghan forces undergo a large number of fatalities. Civilian casualties regularly happened six to seven per day (Maley 2011). The operations have been running in Afghanistan by these coalition forces. General McChrystal said, “The legitimacy of the NATO-ISAF had severely damaged in the eyes of people of Afghanistan because of an over-reliance on firepower and force protection” (Rothstein and Arquilla 2013).

Afghan people had been facing challenges from the involvement of foreign countries as well as international organisations and the interim government. Foreign countries are coming in Afghanistan for their interest. They came here in the name of development and reconstruction, but they had not fulfilled its agenda that made with the Afghan government. The Afghan government depends upon international assistance because it has not large resources to get money from there. The Afghan government institutions are flooded with corrupt practices and insufficiency of the administration to run the country. The withdrawal of government from administration and governance had provided scope to insurgent to dominate the Afghan people by

controlling populated areas. Thus, they are being used as a source of recruits and income (Dodge and Redman 2011).

The functions of government institutions had not functioned properly. It promotes illegal opium trade and drugs cartels. Moreover, the people of Afghanistan had not busy in full time in his occupation. Therefore, unemployed people hadan easy option for livelihood and attracted toward the rebellious profession. Gradually, it converted into a militant. That is why some Afghan people adopted full-time terrorists. Several foot militaries are an adolescent who caught weapons on a temporary basis. Most of these warriors are encouraged by local gripes. Also, they took with the wish to retaliate due to casualties of relative's members and acquaintance skilled before fighting with Afghan forces and NATO. The composite and fluid ethnic systems of Afghanistan have made it complicated for ISAF to recognise the disparity among them. Moreover, the terrorists have added to the social intricacy by utilising and escalating gripes between ethnic groups, mainly over a land dispute (Misra 2004). However, the people of Afghan are uncomplicated. They do not request to them to the resolution of disputes and security depends upon an unlikeable explanation of *Sharia* law.

2.6. Trans-Border NATO Operation in Af-Pak and Civilian Need Aid

NATO forces faced the incurable trouble of the militant's movement and sending material into Afghanistan from Pakistan. US commanders and Senior NATO recognised that the Taliban and Al Qaeda presence in Pakistan. These militants groups created a major threat to a long period of security of Afghanistan. Washington agreed to National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that the insurgent threats to the US homeland. It has also recognised that Al Qaeda had re-organised itself in the 'Federally Administered Territories of Pakistan (FATA)' regions which lofty impacts assaults in opposition to a target in America. The Af-Pak border may create a critical challenge for NATO and its long period of Afghan operation (Roi and Smolyneec 2008). This is place from where terrorist groups feel safe and planned against NATO and allied forces.

NATO summit held in April 2009. The principles of the new *Af-Pak* strategy delivered in this summit as well as the pledge to enlarge and improve training skills of

the ANSF. Security becomes a big challenge for Afghanistan in the mid-year of 2009. The President of U.S. Barack Obama proclaimed a strategy '*Af-Pak*' in the early of 2009 as well as other coalition partners instantly followed rule and regulation taking place against the terrorist of Pakistan. The central idea of '*Af-Pak*' strategy is a single point of agenda to counter-terrorism and religious fundamentalism of the entire Afghanistan-Pakistan region (Gross 2009). This strategy created for hunting the location of Taliban and its Al Qaeda associates. This strategy impacted on these militants. They are searching its secure sanctuary in the western Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan confronting the insurgency crisis require distinct strategy surrounding border areas of these countries. The strategy signifies a better provincial approach to proclaiming safety concerns within Afghanistan and also focusing on Pakistan (Mullen 2010).

Pakistan is the creator of terrorist. Tribal areas of Pakistan have been using by Al Qaeda and international warrior. It was strengthening their presence as well as made them a base camp. They projected attack on the foreign forces and NATO military in Afghanistan by using its base. While Pakistan was begun to pressurise by America for deploying armed forces against militant groups, Pakistan started some operation with the support of the U.S. coalition forces. Though, unsustainable levels of Pakistan military deaths had raised by these operations and that made surrender of some tribal militant. After that, the agreements were being signed with tribal leaders in 2004 and 2006. The agreements quickly broke down between them. It simply served to strengthen the status of South and North Waziristan of Pakistan. These regions are a Pashtun-speaking belt that supports to militants for understanding their jobs. That's why several activities assigned to ethnic militant groups. It also supported by local factors such as profitable smuggling routes and their ideology philosophy. They have easily controlled in this regions. So, it creates a tension between Pakistan government (Dodge and Redman 2011). Pakistan government has faced day by day problems due to it. Pakistan also wants some support from international actors for sorting out from this tension.

Religious fundamentalism was the most problematic factor that was spilling out of Afghanistan to borders areas of Pakistan. Borders regions of Pakistan are FATA and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). These regions are the rugged

mountain terrains that have sheltered Al Qaeda leader (Mahapatra 2009). However, the Taliban has been indirectly supported by Pakistan state as well as given secure sanctuary to Al Qaeda. These militant groups functioned all over the country and continued the fight with foreign forces. In the same period, dozens of Al Qaeda leaders have been arrested by Pakistan government and quietly given authorise America to carry out drone strikes in its regions. “The principal strategic interest for Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan has been the quest for ‘strategic depth’ in regards of the power asymmetry its arch-rival with India” (Sperling and Webber 2009). The fact is that these strategies show Pakistan leader’s national security agenda. So, the strategic goal of Pakistan is to eradicate Indian closeness with Afghanistan government by influencing with their reconstruction and development work along with Pashtun ethnic nationalism while upholding the trust of American on Pakistan security collaboration (Rothstein and Arquilla 2013). Pakistan’s strategy could not successful at current situation. Gradually, India made good relationship with Afghan government and a large amount of reconstruction works has been going on Afghanistan with assistance of India.

In the Cold War period, Pakistan was good friend of America because Pakistan had supported the US against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)’s red army in Afghanistan. From that time, Pakistan had got opportunity to gain some financial assistance from side of America. Pakistan got benefit by American’s new policy against religious fundamentalism and counterterrorist But, Pakistan has compensated an enormous operation against Al-Qaeda and the local Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)) on its nearer side of the border. Besides, it had given havens and help to Afghan terrorist groups (Haqqani terror group and the Afghan Taliban). They escalate attacks on the government forces as well as ISAF forces and its natives in Afghanistan from their bases in Pakistan (Sperling and Webber 2009). Pakistan Taliban and Afghan Taliban have their agenda to encourage radical Islam as well as targeting entire programme and projects of international actors (Mahapatra 2009).

The US government has been further reviewed the security situation in Afghanistan from a long time. After getting the outcome of the review, the American government has reached this point that should provide additional US forces to

Afghanistan. So, President Barack Obama proclaimed 30,000 extra the US military for this country. That military deployed in Afghanistan after the end of half of 2010. The total number of American's staffs is around 100,000 working in Afghanistan. In November 2009, British government proclaimed, "it would increase its forces presence by 500 staffs. The total number of UK staff in Afghanistan is nearly 10,000" (UNDP 2006). In the financial year 2010-11, the British government has granted £ 4 billion for UK military operation in Afghanistan. These granted were those estimate important to carry out policies to build up the capacities and strength of the ANSFs. Such they can provide safety to them. In the financial year 2010, US \$ 9.2 million was spent by the US administration on the Afghan forces. The United States has raised 63 percent more than the previous budget spent on Afghan forces in 2009 (Lunn and Smith 2010). This foreign aid had used less for civilian needs but most of them spent on military operation against Af-Pak campaign.

There are two major components supporting to the regular insurgency. One is the supply of economic assistance from a donor, the transport of terrorists from Iraq. The nature of Pakistan's government is continuously unstable. It has provided a sanctuary for the Taliban, and Al Qaeda and the border regions remain un-protective and unreachable. The other component sustained willingness on the part of the local population to bear the insurgents. Afghanistan has a follower that continues to follow Islamic fundamentalism. The local population choose sides from that section that can provide them with a better defence. The legitimacy of the Afghan government has also questioned because the commanders of former Northern Alliance played the prominent role in it (UNDP 2006). "The total number of NATO troops in Afghanistan will be about 140,000 to fight against about 25,000 Islamic fundamentalists and violent extremists called Taliban" (Katzman 2010). The situation in Afghanistan is complex. Because of there is an amalgamation of ethnic groups. They are simple in nature and easier for them to attract towards extremist's activities. They thought that foreign forces do not always stand for permanent security of them. After spending some time on foreign forces, they will leave our country. On that time, we will come under of Taliban. This situation cannot be sorted out without winning the heart and minds of the local people. For this, the US needs strong collaboration from regional powers like Pakistan to winning the heart of local people and control over the security situation in Afghanistan. The US President Barack Obama sent a letter to the Pakistan

President Asif Ali Zardari, who urged the leadership of Pakistan to end the exercise of the insurgent groups. In return, the US pledged to Pakistan for starting a business in the field of weapons as well as economic assistances. But the question rose that how far American can deliver these grants to Pakistan? The fund was continued to Pakistan unless the Pakistan army and civilian establishment come forward together to support the strategy (Mahapatra 2009). The fund has allotted by American government at 2015. Currently, the fund has stopped from the US government to Pakistan.

Initially, the Obama government tactical deals with Afghanistan and Pakistan as specific issues such as (1) institutionalizing stronger method for bilateral and trilateral cooperation among American, Pakistan and Afghanistan; (2) providing US military support to Pakistani forces for conducting counter-terrorism campaigns against militants in the country; (3) rising foreign aid to Pakistan (US\$ 1.5 billion per year for the next five years); (4) encouraging improvement of local governance in Pakistan where militants operate, and (5) promoting external investment in important sectors of the economy like energy as well as supporting Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZ) (Morelli and Belkin 2009). All these things have been doing for enhancing the capacity of both government. So that they cannot give an excuse for executing theirs forces and support external forces against militants. Transitional phase of Afghanistan depends upon the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. The most transitional phase of improvement in Afghanistan came with the assassination of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011. Besides it, there is more work left to international security forces and Afghan security forces because the main target of terrorist activities has to end from both the countries. But these are currently going on. However, the outgoing chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen said that the Haqqani network as an authentic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is conducted by Pakistan government (Maley 2012). So, it can say that it is very difficult task to handle the situation of terrorist activities in these countries without the support of local people.

2.7. Summary

NATO-ISAF has played a vital role to further growth of security conditions of Afghanistan. They were providing wider support to build up strong Afghan forces that can protect Afghan government and people from the insurgency. Further, the Afghan forces have increased their strength, but it was still incapable to handle the security problems. The political strategy of NATO concentrated on developing safety entire the state so that provincial and local security could come in the hand of Afghan security forces. It can make possible for good effort to understand continuously with key militant groups. Further, this required to be improved provide public services with governance. So, economic development can put in better condition by planning. When the international community started to concentrate on the country's governance and economy, these strands of effort were still stressed. The Afghan government has been facing the economic and security problems. NATO allies have also faced short of difficulty in this country. The US-led coalition partners did not have sufficient troops that can cover throughout Afghanistan. In the period of 2001, the Western countries concentration was quickly distracted by planning for the incursion of Iraq. That is why the international community required more troops to plan of counter-terrorism in Afghanistan. The coalition partners proposed more forces in Afghanistan. But, they did not have satisfactory success for counterinsurgency. The problems of Afghanistan are that insurgents have enough money to organise in areas of weak security for openly created breathing space. It can be possible due to fragmented tribal, low rate of educational attainment and contested territorial control.

The Allied partner's policy makers begin to give due concentration the challenges faced in Afghanistan. In that time, the Taliban had reconstituted itself and presented furious resistance. It took another three years to the US. Under a new administration of American, it was ready to perpetrate to a surge. The new administration would provide enough troops to execute a counter-terrorism policy. The US provided military training for counter-terrorism purposes. Moreover, Washington pledged to retain a substantial commitment to Afghanistan. It will come through the form of economic assistance. The ANSF and its ISAF allies hold the cities. They acquired in the larger part of the northern and western regions of the country. They have made great progress in the south and south-west. But they lacked

behind for reinforcing to extract critical control in the eastern part of Afghanistan. In the transitional development phases, international forces have less capacity for collecting information about Afghanistan. Even, they enhanced requisite for surveillance and intelligence to uphold situational alertness (Misra 2004). The native intelligence used in the country as a political tool rather than in the national interest. The ISAF has influenced the Afghan government that will most likely decline as the latter benefits in strength and confidence. They believed that the requirement of NATO would be less in the mission. That is why they do not listen according to NATO. It may well lead to rising deviation in strategy. NATO emphasised on building an efficient affiliation with important officials, politicians, intelligence personnel and police and military commanders.

Military weapons could simply repress terrorism for some time. But it cannot root out the basic problems of Afghanistan which give increase to it. International community committed to reform the liberal democratic and constitutional rule of government in the country. That is the process the solution of social and political in Afghanistan. It could be effective in facing terrorism. However, the alliance also comprises authorization regimes. Certainly, it would fail to resolve the problems of terrorism. The rogue state is that state which is to be punished by a superpower. The long term major challenges before Afghan government is to improve its stability of governance. That will have been insufficient to remove many of the root causes of popular discontent. It used to the fuel of the insurgency. If governance does not dramatically improve, then an increase in insurgent violence can be expected. But with the US, NATO and other nations have withdrawn most of their forces; the revived insurgency would have to be primarily countered by the ANSF.

Chapter-3

Civil-Military Relations under Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

3.1. Introduction

The Civil-Military relationship in Afghanistan has been in the context of politics since the overthrow of the Taliban. The international actors used PRT for fulfillment of counter-insurgency agenda. From 2002, the international community strongly promoted it inside and outside Afghanistan in order to provide concrete results in development and reconstruction process and to improve the security situation. Moreover, the extension of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in the country, since 2003 onwards mainly took place through ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)’, which aimed to integrate the civil-military approach in Afghanistan. The first PRT was started in Gardez, Afghanistan by January 2003. After four years of the presence of NATO forces and other organizations in Afghanistan, twenty-five PRTs were started in different provinces of Afghanistan by thirteen different nations (Stapleton 2007). These PRTs were working for civilian as well as military purposes.

The Civil-Military concept developed by NATO since the 1990s. It plays a specific role in the context of PRTs that are constructed to work in semi-permissive conditions normally following the open combat. They were also created as a transient arrangement to provide better security and for the promotion of reconstruction and economic development. The first time PRT was used in 2002 by the United States during “*Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)*” subsequent to the incursion of Afghanistan. Since then, PRTs have been used as a model by the United States, NATO, European forces as well as other coalition members in Iraq and Afghanistan for post-conflict rehabilitation, rebuilding safety, and development activities. Since, Afghanistan under conflict situation, it is continuously behaving hostile and will pose a challenge for the whole world. For this purpose, PRTs form an indispensable part of security and peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. Subsequently, they have been creating more interaction with Afghan civilians and government bodies. But, they have also been criticised for their mixed potency, excessive emphasis on military

goals and preferences, malfunction to synchronise and establish a communication with with the United Nation (UN) and other non-governmental organization (NGO) efficiently, and the difference in staffing and mission (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008).

The current security scenario of Afghanistan is slowing down the reconstruction projects due to heat and drought. Moreover, the reconstruction process is also affected by various problems such as economic crisis, security, etc which arose in most post-conflict situations. Some of the problems arise from the conflicts whose root causes are historical, geographical, social and cultural in nature. Security problem is one of the major problems among other problems; other problems lack of financial resources for the development and reconstruction projects, the unresolved disbandment issues, transitional justice, narcotics and the flooding of foreigners in the capital Kabul. Due to these reasons the country continues to remain in the state of turmoil. Meanwhile, foreign troops have been working in Afghanistan in order to provide security to civil societies and to counter terrorist menace. As a consequence, many militant groups targeted the international troops as well as non-governmental organizations (Afsah et al. 2005). Among these international forces, some are working for people while others are working for their own purposes.

PRT is strongly involved in the security maintenance. It strengthens the dominion of the government of Afghanistan in and around the provincial and central level. Additionally, it helps local authority to stabilize and rebuild the region. The responsibilities of PRT are to observe security, to encourage the preferences and policies of the central government along with the regional authorities, and to initiate improvement in the security domain (Capstick 2007). Civil-military teams have been working for reconstruction and diplomatic assistance to people on the side of the Afghans, working alongside a national defense body of Afghan National Army (ANA) sections on the defense side. PRTs were situated in Mazar-e-Sharif, Gardez, Kunduz and Bamiyan while the United States, New Zealand, Germany and the United Kingdom support one another PRTs (Dewey 2012). Besides it, another PRT is also working in different provinces with different sponsor country.

Civil-military communication begins with the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and PRTs. PRTs were looked upon by many in troop-contributing nation (TCN) governments and armies as providing a

creative apparatus for more and more stabilization. PRTs are meant to reduce the potential effect of security threats and set up an approach 'light' in nature, to capacity building of a nation, eradicating the need to give advanced levels of troops and economic resources (Jackson and Haysom 2013). All these resources have strengthening the protection capacity of Afghan government. "Within PRT, Canada and other countries working with Afghans for peace and reconstruction must use all channels-diplomatic, financial (development aid), and military (security enhancement) - to promote gender analysis and implementation by the Afghan government" (Farhoumand-Sims 2007). Additionally, the PRT is in accord with humanitarian employees. But, they neither work side by side on the projects, nor the PRTs try to guide humanitarian workers working on the field. The defense staff acknowledges the need of humanitarian employees' for total impartiality. PRT defense staffs are inconsistent throughout and never try to be addressed as humanitarian employees (Dewey 2012). These inconsistencies can be seen even now in Afghanistan. From the above statement, it can be analyzed as how is Afghanistan a stable state?

The key advantage of PRTs are placed on which no other actor can do in remote and unsafe regions: "bring a combination of civilian and military resource to put up with on local causes of violence, support the development of practical governance and security sector institutions, and strengthen the hand of groups with an interest in stability"(USAID 2006). While some PRTs did commendable works, they were not constantly capable with the rights proficiency to quickly recognise and deal with the causes of conflict. These conflict can be sorted out with the help of PRT and tackle the issues underlying regional violence. For this, they have made a plan. The plan comprises recognising and connecting vulnerable inhabitants, for example jobless young population; who are living on the boundaries of the prescribed economy; as well as the factions who worked along with the Taliban, either as a consequence of pressure or as a result of the services provided by Taliban. Tribal conflict attributes more than one-third of violence in southern Afghanistan. PRT staffs at times were ill suited for this project and shortened of reached support capacity to handle the tribal conflict. They did not try to handle directly the reasons behind these conflicts which threatened the success of Mission (USAID 2006). For this mission, the US-led coalition partners along with Afghanistan and Pakistan should seat a

particular place and made a strategic plan. It would be successful, if the US government will have to win confidence of Pakistan government. The civilian of Afghanistan and warlords also play a vital role in raising the terrorist activities. So, it also required civilian and warlords assistance.

The objective of civilian assistance in Afghanistan is to develop the scope of institutions in Afghanistan to survive and weaken the menace put forward by radicalism. Moreover, it is providing substantial assistance for the highly impacted agricultural sector-to develops work opportunities; diminish the financial support received by Taliban through poppy cultivation, and pull militants away from the battlefield. PRT is further regulating programs to find out the local realities of local and enlargement its support and involvement at the regional and district levels. So that it increases the visibility, cooperation, and responsibility of the institutions that mostly impact Afghan lives. There is a significant increase in civil presence at the sub-national level, as well as a growth in the needs for mobility, security and life support. Civilian efforts enhance followed the rule and regulation, development and governance. The rule is considerably damaged if civilians are not able to move around in order to unite with their Afghan counterpart, get involved with the people of the region, and direct projects. Mobility is an important issue for the civilian staff of U.S. at non-U.S. PRTs (USADOD 2010).

To continue the projects, the international community granted US \$ 180 million to ten PRT in 2004. They have influenced by substantial and other means. Besides this, the civilian representatives have selected some projects which are being implemented by International Organization for Migration (IOM) and United Nations Development Programmes (UNDPs) after getting security platform. There are many projects based on infrastructure developments, including roads, offices and schools. For this, combatant troops funded a fraction of economic assistance to direct provision of humanitarian assistance (Rana 2004). It helped in betterment of Afghanistan. It seems that there are different types of Civil-Military relationships with Afghan government. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan is to defend the inhabitants while extending the legality and efficiency of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and declining the effectiveness of militant elements. The PRT model attempts to link safety, governance and developed by bringing together

civilian and military government staff in civil-military integrated programs. While a range of PRT lessons erudite reports to examine the difficulty of the civilian government to military integration within PRTs, for not as much of exists to describe the relationship between ISAF and civil societies (Schirch 2010).

The PRT concept was evolved basically for the purpose of transition assistance. It was envisaged as a strategy to ‘hand over’ power to Afghan government, by developing the capability of governing themselves. The security sector of Afghanistan provides and maintains security and stability in the country. The capacity building of Afghan institutions to undertake long duration sustainable projects will be improved so that the engagement of the United States could become insignificant. In brief, PRTs were established to focus on the three main aspects of peace-building, which are development, security and governance. PRTs were planned to create combined outcomes of three significant agencies on the terrain, which are, Development, Defense and Diplomacy (usually known as ‘3D’). Hence, PRTs adopt an interagency 3D approach to tackle with three sided issues of peace-building. In fact, the PRT concept facilitated a method to assist the incorporation of three importance agencies for peacebuilding and provided an approach to institutionalise such an interagency 3D approach (Uesugi 2009).

3.2. Evolution of PRT

The bitter debate on the relations of the Civil and the Military in Afghanistan goes farther back than the introduction of the concept of PRT. From the introductory period of the strategy of military alliance, the U.S. defense forces emphasised the critical significance of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) efforts. The World Food Program (WFP) and Humanitarian agencies, as well as Inter Action, were summoned to take part in a Coalition Coordination Council (CCC). It is situated at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. It was established to appreciate harmonisation among alliance members, the Nongovernmental Humanitarian Assistance (NGHA) community and UN agencies after the fall down the Taliban regime in December 2001. Meanwhile, it recognised a Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) to supervise Civil-Military activities. Under the support of CJCMOTF, the Coalition established Coalition Humanitarian Cells (CHLCs) in many key city centers across the countryside. The task of the CHLCs was

multifaceted: “to ‘*win hearts and minds*’ among the Afghan population; to save the support of local communities by showing the caring face of the Coalition; to jump start rebuilding efforts; and to achieve optimistic exposure for the combat effort in the United States” (Sedra 2013).

The Coalition commander (General Mc Neill) initiated a strategy that would extend security beyond Kabul and improve stability in Afghanistan. The general has established ‘Joint Reconstruction/Regional Team (JRT) in November 2002. The team is to pursue a programme that will pull security improvements along with it, as reconstruction will make people feel more secure and blunt the impact and propaganda of the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Clements 2003). It also an attempt to energise the weakening reconstruction process and restrain rising anti-coalition feeling in the Pashtun-belt,’ JRTs could deploy, the U.S. on the advice of the Government of Afghan renamed the units ‘PRTs’. It provided them with a new mandate. The Office of the U.S. Ambassador issued elaborated PRT Working guidelines in February 2003. The principal goals of the PRTs were “to extend the influences of the central government outside of the capital; provide a security umbrella for NGHAs to operate; facilitated information sharing, and carry out small-scale reconstruction projects based on concise needs assessments and local consultations” (Sedra 2013).

3.3. Territorialisation of Security in Afghanistan under ISAF

The situation of security has deteriorated in several areas of Afghanistan. The U.S. and the NATO-led ISAF started their engagement in Afghanistan in December 2001. Intensive violence happened in the Southern part (sanctuary of Taliban) and in the Eastern part of Afghanistan. The regions became the most exposed due to cross-border activity from neighbouring Pakistan. The Taliban restructured itself when it became weak and had merged into a flexible and developing insurgent organisation or movement. The insurgency is trying to dominate the GIROA in the regions of the east and the south, and also wished to spread in the western regions (USADOD 2009). This activity is not favourable for Afghanistan in the entire field of development and government’s institutions as well as Afghan people. The ISAF got authorisation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through Resolution 1386. It has been supporting for Afghan safety and stability simultaneously. Moreover, NATO is also

supporting the GIRoA in enlarging and exercising its power and influence across Afghanistan and making the environment feasible for rebuilding and stabilization. The main tasks of ISAF comprise supporting the GIRoA to expand its power, performing stability and safety operations in co-ordination with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), advising and assisting the ANA. Again, it is supporting GIRoA's programmes to remove weapons of the illegal weaponries groups. ISAF's PRTs have an important part in the international community's inclusive approach to Afghanistan by facilitating assistance for rebuilding and development acts and to support democratic institutions. All military supervision for ISAF forces came from Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) by the way of the Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum, Netherlands. The strategic direction for ISAF was approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) (USADOD 2009).

Afghanistan is divided into five regional commands (RCs), with each region under the command of a different ISAF country. Regional commanders report to the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF). On the regional level, supporting nations shall act as the lead in a region. Moreover, they normally set up task forces inside the region that consists of a forced element and a PRT. The supporting states and command states shown in Table 1.

Table.1

Lead and Supporting Nations Regional Commands, November 2008

	RC-North	RC-West	RC-South	RC-East	RC-Capital
Lead	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	United States	France
Supporting	Sweden	Spain	U.S.	Poland	Italy
	Hungary	United States	Denmark	France	Turkey
	Norway	Lithuania	Estonia	Czech Republic	
			Canada	New Zealand	
			Australia	Turkey	
			Romania		

The coalition partners of ISAF have fielded 42 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) for helping to build a more effective ANA. These units always remain with ANA units, like the U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETTs). The U.S. military has been using these teams since 2003. These teams use themselves as trainer and adviser of Afghan forces (ANA and ANP). The key effort of ISAF operations focused on defending the most endangered inhabitants in the heartland of the Taliban (Kandahar and Helmand Provinces). The split of Regional Command-Southwest (RC-SW) and Regional Command-South (RC-S) are making progress toward setting up and uphold security in Afghanistan. An initial mark of this advancement is noticeable principally in central Helmand, where ISAF and ANSF have been undertaking counterinsurgency operations for more than a year. Although the militants pursued to retaliate to the coalition forces and ANSF actions, it expanded military forces towards the southern region of Afghanistan. The armed forces slow and steady moved ahead the safe regions of militants (USADOD 2010). Both ISAF and ANSF's combined forces in Regional Command-Capital (RC-C) kept maintaining a relatively safe atmosphere for the population of Kabul and its surrounding districts. Around one sixth of the whole Afghan population lives in this region. The combined forces in the city of Kabul performed distinctly fine in the preparation and the implementation of security for the Kabul Conference and the Peace Jirga, including through Parliamentary elections. In fact, the conversion of key safety functions and tasks that have already taken place in RC-C. It envisage existing throughout the country in the upcoming years. As in the near future, ISAF will lay emphasis on enlarging security in the neighbouring provinces of the Kabul, predominantly in Regional Command East (RC-E) (USADOD 2010).

The command of the Taliban and Haqqani Networks have been continued to put on pressure and interruption by the RC-E. Combine forces in RC-E are safe decisive lines of infrastructure and communication that hold up the trade to and from Pakistan. Further, RC-E have been stressing on some of the most dangerous rival networks in Afghanistan, enlarge safety of population from Kabul to key population centers in Logar and Wardak, counteracted the Haqqani Network's grip and obstructed its contact to Kabul, and safeguarded the prime financial crossing point on the frontier at Torkham. The U.S. forces primary operational area is RC-E and often engaged in full-range operational in cooperation with ANSF. The overall strategy is

“clear, hold, and build”. The better security conditions paved the way for enhanced local governance and economic development (USADOD 2009). Despite latest sophisticated events, the militancy has unsuccessful to achieve important grips in Regional Command-West (RC-W) and Regional Command-North (RC-N). ISAF and ANSF efforts have gained advantage from extended partnership relation and continue purposeful on getting better security in important districts and ensured steadily getting better freedom of movement along Highway (USADOD 2010).

3.4. UNAMA Mission and the Objective of PRT

The United Nations focuses on capacity building in Afghanistan, including the growth of local governmental and managerial engagements. Its main demonstration is the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which has the responsibility of synchronising activities of all UN agencies present in Afghanistan. The role of UNAMA is to further stability and peace in Afghanistan. It is also playing the role of a leader for the international community to further the actions in this direction. To assist the government of Afghanistan, UNAMA is given the task to manage activities to reconstruct the country by strengthening governance, providing security and infrastructure development and stability. However, the number of donors and their national priorities have functioned its role in Afghanistan. It had created difficulties for UNAMA to implement its mission.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1401/2002 established the UNAMA as a political and integrated mission. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations directs and supports UNAMA and to help the implement the Bonn Agreement. The Bonn Agreement was the primary phase of agreements which was passed on 5th December, 2001, and planned to reestablish the state of Afghanistan after its invasion by the U.S. as retaliation to the terrorist attacks which took place on 11th September, 2001. UNAMA intends to juxtapose two main elements- “one with a political focus and the other deals with humanitarian and development efforts” (Margesson 2010). Lakhdar Brahimi was Special Representative for the U.N. Secretary General to Afghanistan, who managed the Bonn Agreement and directed UNAMA until December 2004. The mandate of UNAMA is renewed in March every year. The UNSCR 1868/2009 continued UNAMA’s until 23 March 2010 (Margesson 2010).The UNSCR 1917/2010 is documented that “the main role of UN

plays in arranging global efforts in Afghanistan, and the decisive support UNAMA delivers to the Government of Afghanistan in the fields of governance, provincial assistance and security, The UN is expected to play a significant task execution the promises made by the Government of Afghanistan and the global community at the London Conference on January 2010. On 28 January 2010, Staffan de Mistura (Sweden) was appointed as the new representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Afghanistan. His name is. The UNSC Resolution 1917/2010 mandates “UNAMA and the SRSG continue to lead international civilian efforts on the rule of law, transitional justice, anti-corruption, Afghan Government development and governance priorities, and strengthening cooperation between ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative to improve civil-military coordination. This mandate also extended for another year until 23 March 2011” (USADOD 2010).

The PRTs started by the allied members had charged with multi-purposes incorporated mission and the delivery of “hearts and minds projects”. It appears to resonance developments at the UN. However, it has within more extensively diverse assistance sector (Sidell 2008). PRTs have three purpose: “first, to access local needs and facilitate the exchange of information of all players in the field to ensure that aid is well coordinated and reaches the most vulnerable; second, to encourage a security environment that makes it possible for aid to reach the needy beyond Kabul; third, to help align the central authority with local authorities, in that way raising the central government’s profile throughout the country” (Dewey 2012).According to NATO documents, the key objective of PRTs are “(1) supporting the Government of Afghanistan in the development of a more stable and secure environment; (2) assist in expanding the power of the Government of Afghanistan; (3) support where suitable the Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives; (4) facilitate the rebuilding attempt and reinforce countrywide growth priorities; (5) enable unity of effort amongst civil actors; and (6) demonstrate the International Community’s commitment to Afghanistan’s future” (Ankersen 2008). The main features of all PRTs are military operations for stability, reforms in security sector, and the redevelopment of infrastructure (i.e. roads, schools and wells). The unique objective and importance given to these jobs vary on the basis of the regional location and countrywide goals of a PRT (Ankersen 2008).

3.5. PRT Composition and its Guidelines

NATO's PRT exists of three elements. The first element is the civilian element. This element provides humanitarian, economic assistance, growth and rebuilding projects. The second element is the military element. This element supervises the security situation, stabilises regional safety and monitors provincial Afghan security forces. They make easy the growth of safe surroundings in Afghan provinces as well as constructing relationships with local actors of influence. The last one is the support group. This group consists mainly out of military staff. They give local contracting, logistical and linguistic support. They help as Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects, inside means and abilities, to make possible the reconstruction effort. This effort needs generating a self-leading administration and financial system and other projects planned to increase the welfare of the population (Rohr 2006).

PRT is a combined operations group of civil-military elements consisting of 50 to 150 staff. The reach rear capability could enforce the extra capability for additional civilian-military resources. The Principal of PRT Guidelines encourages civil-military combination to produce unity of efforts amongst different actors on the ground, infringe the existing civil-military guidelines. The Principles of PRT Guidelines had six components: "(1) focus on improving stability; (2) operate as an incorporated civilian-military organisation; (3) work to a common purpose or end-state with unity of effort; (4) make certain that projects do not duplicate the work of others; (5) put the foundations for long-lasting, sustainable changes; and (6) be alert of and respect, civil-military sensitivities". The PRTs have basic guidelines "to build up plans and assess the surroundings to attain the three principles, approve rebuilding projects and coordinate with local government and national ministries. The PRT Guidelines Principles does not seem to match with the NATO CIMIC doctrine" (Uesugi 2009-01). Although all PRTs even operated under NATO/ISAF command and NATO acknowledges and its activities should elude negative effect on the efforts of the humanitarian organizations, and also on their unbiased nature. Though maximum of the elements in the PRT Guidelines Principles continue in the limits of the already elaborated guidelines for civil-military relationships, the basic approach of

civil-military incorporation in the concept of PRT contradicts with the central argument of ‘separation’ in existing guidelines (Uesugi 2009-01).

Table 2

List of the tasks of PRT Personnel, According to the NATO doctrine

<i>NATO in Afghanistan: Task list for PRTs in Afghanistan Governance Security Structure Development</i>
Enable provincial governance and assist capacity building
Monitor the credibility and effectiveness of provincial governance
Inform and promote provincial governance activities to the local population and traditional institutions
Physical presence and engagement with the Afghan population through patrolling
Support provincial authorities in mediation dispute and resolution
Support security sector reform (ANA, ANP, Judicial Reform, DDR and Counter Narcotics)
Provide assistance in protection and evacuation to international organisations and NGOs
Facilitate, monitor and assess provincial development
Carry out humanitarian assistance and quick impact projects when needed
Conduct village/area profiles when conducting patrols

Sources: Stapleton, 2007

To support the deeds, the UNAMA created a different mechanism at the state level to supervise, escort and facilitate the activities of PRTs. Moreover, it created arbitrating function between the alliance and NGOs. The UNAMA attempts to avert the replication of deeds carried out by PRTs and NGOs. Therefore, NGOs are continuing worried about PRTs engagement in humanitarian activities. The UNAMA recognized regions with NGOs and the Coalition partners’ forces where PRT should expand their relative interest area, which would be incapable for NGOs to stride (Stapleton 2007).

3.6. PRT Models and Approaches

PRTs are started by several countries under NATO/ISAF control in Afghanistan. Additionally, they have developed in reply to diverse surroundings. They are differing in edifice, size, and mission. The notion of PRT has started to the preface of several models. Lt. General David W. Barno, the US and Alliance Armed Forces' commander, has started the "concept of PRT" in May 2004 in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is varied in nature- geographically, politically, economically, and ethnically. The PRT structure is not practically regular. However, this should not undermine the importance to embed a considerable set of guidelines to notify the behavior of PRT. The difference in the key models of PRT can be credited further to the vision and approach of each implementing countries rather than to the wish to modify the concept in order to address the regional conditions. The subsequent PRT models described below:-

3.6.1. U.S. Model

In Afghanistan, the PRTs were implemented for the first time in 2002. It has been increasing concentration to the role of these joint civil-military units act towards the developmental projects in Afghanistan for fulfilling America's national. Securing Afghanistan is a part of US's core national interests. The national interest of US defined on Afghanistan. It includes generating steady national governments with legitimacy and capacity, avoiding the growth and stretch of political fanatic ideology, and counteracting militant and terrorist elements. These interests need the expansion of governance, civic and economic capacities. It is a very difficult task for functioning in unbalanced security situations. PRTs have viewed as the most promising medium for inducing above capacities outside of safe zones. It integrates civilian expertise with the military capability (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008). The U.S. model has been giving more attention of Afghan people due to the PRT concept. They criticised the projects of PRT. The areas of projects have aroused criticism. This criticism is because of its excessive concentration on actualizing small-scale, 'quick-impact' projects of development; its propensity to manage out of consistent and in unmarked vehicles; and its utilization of economic assistance conditionality. One more antagonistic matter has been its vague political identity. While General Barno asserted that the PRT was determined to "combine security and reconstruction, and extend the reach of the

central government”. But in practical, its several activities are adapted more to improve the aims of ‘OEF’. It is obvious from the past that the aim of this operation and further of the larger Afghan reconstruction process could be mismatched. The overlapping contents of the PRTs, NATO and the Alliance have promoted perplexity regarding the role of the PRT (Sedra 2013).

3.6.2. UK Model

The United Kingdom (UK) model normally has 100 staffs’ members of which about 30 are civilians. Civilian emphasises particularly on local capacity building, and a capability to function in unstable areas. The United Kingdom is one of the supporters of the US. The joint military operations has a long history with the US and NATO to be deliberately precious to its national interest. Participating as a fighting partner in coalition in Afghanistan was significant for the US-U.K. alliance. In Afghanistan, UK cares for its engagement as a piece of the UN-endorsed NATO operation to stabilise Afghanistan. It sets upon a path toward financial growth and augmented political liberties. Britain’s military has involved in Iraq with waning eagerness. It has formed UK’s promise in Afghanistan. U.K. has practised the leadership in Afghanistan since 2002 by taking the lead role of state in counter-narcotics operations. UK's PRT had merely established in Helmand province in Afghanistan. Helmand produced opium in the highest volume in the country that contributes 42 percent of the world's opium production. PRTs are used by Britain mainly as an instrument to precede its mainly foreign policy objectives and carry out “robust military diplomacy”. Further, the British’ PRTs have two objectives: “One, to co-locate and combine the post-conflict efforts of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to create a whole of government approach; and Second, to support the government of Iraq and Afghanistan to extend their governing capacity and better serve their own people” (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008).

3.6.3. German Model

A German model normally has 400 staffs of which around 20 are civilians. It has a 'dual-headed' guidance of one civilian and one military leader. It has emphasized on long-lasting, stable development and functioning in further permissive areas.

Germany has engaged itself in the ISAF stabilization task forces. Subsequent actors are allied with the United Nations declaration of “unlimited solidarity” with the US in the wake of the 9/11 attack. Germany has also been involved in ‘OEF’ to fight against militants in Afghanistan (Venro 2009). At recent, Germany is the third major troop provider actors in Afghanistan. It has been lead country accountable for RC-North since June 2006. RC-North is based in Mazar-e-Sharif. The first German’s PRTs started in Kunduz for enhancing development growth of Afghanistan. It is overcrowded, more planned, and less secluded than Feyzabad. Its PRT is bigger than other countries PRT. German contribution in Afghanistan has been largely framed in the conditions of supporting in humanitarian assistance and development to the population of Afghan. When German military within ISAF has confined to the safer northern regions of the nation, they are restricted from engaging in ‘offensive operations’ in the southern regions. However, the primary inspiration of Germany had not shown its interest for sending troops to Afghanistan in the name of ‘development’. Germany has not taken a correct nationwide interest in the Hindu Kush. The engagement of Germany in Afghanistan is attributed further to its pledge to the Atlantic Alliance (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008).

The most of the PRTs had a comparatively little civilian constituent approximate to be on an average around 5-10 percent of the total accompaniment of a distinguish PRT in 2004. The US’ PRTs have normally 100 military staffs and around five civilians. In theory, all US PRTs were supposed to include State Department and the USAID representatives. In many PRTs these posts were vacant. There were about 40 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel in Afghanistan in 2003, while the large number of them situated at the embassy in Kabul. The model of PRTs have also varied guidance structures: military commanders served as the official guide of all the US PRTs, while the guidance for the UK PRT remained with a civilian. The leadership of German PRTs divided between a military and civilian head that lead mechanism which was functionally and spatially detached respectively. The US was extremely militarized and had a short-term approach. At first, US PRTs concentrated on ‘Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)’ planned to ‘win hearts and minds’. Civil-military teams borrowed private contractors to implement the work. They were involved mainly in the construction of schools, clinics, wells and other small projects proposed to foster cordial relations with Afghans and gather

information. By supporting the governance they succeeded in promoting the authority of local power-holders (old warlords or militia commanders) that perceived to favour the government. The UK PRT also emphasized on QIPs in Helmand province of Afghanistan. Such type of projects has eventually added to gain mass support for the government of Afghanistan. Germany's approach laid emphasis on responsibility, integrating local labour involvement and also in making communities to work in a combined manner. A civilian is functioning for the Badakshan PRT during this duration. It explained how rebuilding projects were chosen and applied by a committee which consisted of military, civilian and government officials. Grants were extending from a joint bank account held with the director of the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) (Jackson and Haysom 2013).

PRT budgets vary considerably. The US had the larger grant US \$96 million for combined QIP and Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in 2004. It grew to US \$238 million by 2008. From 2001 to 2008, the US spent \$ 465.11 million on QIPs and more than \$1 billion in CERP funds of PRT. Smaller budgets were spent for reconstruction activities and managed by civilian government agencies. In 2006, the Lithuanian PRT spent around \$ 462,000 on development projects in Ghor province, while the Italian PRT spent \$ 4.5 million in Herat province. German PRTs has worked intimately with the German Development Agency GIZ, which managed the bulk of financial support from the Germany for reconstruction and development (Jackson and Haysom 2013). It has found out that the use of PRT model can help in stabilising other post-conflict environments. PRTs are seen by many as a usual mechanism to coordinate military and civilian efforts in building stable, desirable governments.

3.7. International Donors and NGOs

Since, international economic assistance started with the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s in Europe, but donor actors have handled a complicated and apparently uncompromising perplexity. They has been confronting in trying to assist Afghanistan to recuperate from the past 25 years of exterior armed interference and interior conflict (Montgomery and Rondinelli 2004). It is required to rebuild war-torn states following interventions and conflict. It has started to a quest for latest strategy mechanisms to reinforce capacity, establish command and provide essential financial

and welfare services of Afghanistan. Though international countries partaking in the Bonn Process, they saw stability for attaining through a number of simultaneous methods: “reconstruction of the country’s war devastated infrastructure, financial growth escorted by the private sector, improvement of public government, and security sector reform which would require disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), the making of a new Afghan army, a renewed police force, judicial reform and counter- narcotics” (Sidell 2008).

Although PRTs are vital to secure platforms, they also support foreign civilians and military to provide economic assistance to provincial and local governments. However, PRTs have limited the role of civilian, when security situation is poor. Moreover, they are included largely of the military, portraying both the shortage of civilians and the unwillingness to place civilian in hazards. Most important things are that they are not planned to give safety for the complete set of activities, people, and resources that civil counterinsurgency (COIN) requires- ‘the amenities, partial services, native structures and employees, and government administration’. PRTs have been capable of bringing self-effacing consequences despite the menace of aggression. It should be taken as confirmation that a more ambitious strategy to manage risk for civil COIN by using safety assets to decrease susceptibility. It would provide further considerable results. Thus, PRTs are the first step only toward securing civil COIN under fire (Gompert et al. 2009). “In Afghanistan, the international community is trying to build a lasting peace by cooperating with all actors present in the country (including local actors and NGOs and International Organizations). The international military forces should cooperate with the civilian actors, like national and international NGOs and other civilian actors” (Kloker 2009).

After the Bonn agreement, the international actors and assistance organisation gave less interest at the reconstruction process than detecting the terrorists. Decades of aggression has damaged the local financial system and the government institutions of the nation to give public services. NGOs and Humanitarian assistance groups support native people to return to their homes and help them stay alive. They also require reconstructing the essential infrastructures like roads, financial institutions, schools and power supplies. Most of these infrastructure had destroyed during the

war. Another matter for the humanitarian community is the rebuilding of the human capital through training, education and health care. Finally, they need to address the unlawful economy of drug trafficking (Rubin 2006). Although the US and its allied had attended the International Conference in Tokyo in 2002 on the topic of 'Reconstruction Assistance' for Afghanistan. They declared more than US \$ 4.5 billion for Afghanistan's reconstruction, while they estimated the roughly US \$15 billion for it. It will be spent to improve the economy of Afghanistan in the coming decade; the forecast for achievement are unsure (Montgomery and Rondinelli 2004). At the London Conference (2006), the European community and its member states pledged to grant US \$ 2.4 billion (about EUR 2 billion) for reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan over the coming years (UN 2007). In June 2008, more than 80 representatives of countries participated in the International Conference for the purpose of reconstruction assistance of Afghanistan and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The US \$ 250-300 million is the basic operational budget of ANA in per annum. Now the US \$ 120 million is contributed to Afghanistan by the US from its national budget and the rest of money comes from several donor countries (UNDP 2006).

Economic Assistance Groups are likely to be supporting a combination of humanitarian, development and rehabilitation oriented aid, in collaboration with a range of actors including central government, the provincial government, local authority and society based shuras. It is essential to make it certain that economic assistance does not demean peacebuilding efforts. Besides, it may harmonise other policy instruments attempting to build structural stability. The primary actors within the economic assistance system were the official economic assistance donors like United Nations agencies, NGOs and the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The architecture of economic assistance in Afghanistan was very complicated and heterogeneous. It also involved a variety of diverse actors and different coordination mechanism that developed in provisional. The donor actors used the plan of the failed state to suppose and justify its role as a 'proxy government' (Goodhand 2002). As such, the economic assistance groups were frequently competing as cooperating, the elaborate coordination structure. For instance, the USA, EU, Japan and UNAMA were explicitly at loggerheads over the judgment to construct regional militias (Suhrke 2007). The role of UN would be to help the Interim

Government and the intermediate government through programs. These programs are focusing on drug control, security and justice, public administration, development planning, support for the civil service, economic assistance harmonisation and management, as well as community-led development and regional governance. It also plays an important role for itself in serving Afghanistan to find opportunities for employment and provide alternative means of livelihood to restrict the cultivation of poppy (Montgomery and Rondinelli 2004). It supports to check and balance of narcotic trafficking. It also reduces the financial support of terrorist and its strategic for spreading violence overall the world.

The Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), ANDS, the Afghanistan Compact (AC), and the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) are functioning with international coalition partners to focus the country's instant and long-lasting stability. It required overall development in such areas as governance, policing, health, education, agriculture; and infrastructure rehabilitation. Moreover, the important international organizations include the UNAMA, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Other UN agencies include the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) that are making an effective influence on reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The World Food Programme (WFP) is active in supporting in an emergency situation as well as reintegration and revival on food assistance and food distribution. The World Bank has pledged more than the US \$ 1.4 billion for 33 projects and two budget support operations since 2002. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has supported in advance as aid by US\$ 892.28 million, making Afghanistan the ADB's 17 biggest borrowers. Canada provided US \$ 1.2 billion from 2001 to 2011 in the field of international assistance (Mychajlyszyn 2007). Since 2001, the U.S. has given more than US \$32 billion to the Afghan government. It distributed about \$ 22 billion in the reconstruction process. PRTs have been continuously supporting the Afghan government in strengthening its power to make safe and stable environments. The US has started twelve PRTs in different provinces of Afghanistan. PRT was funded about US \$ 273 million by international donors, Department of Defense (DOD), and USAID in 2008. An amount of US \$ 642,000 was funded by Additional Commanders Emergency Response Program (USADOD 2009).

It could be inferred that foreign aid had played a vital role both positive and negative in making stable and secure Afghanistan. Foreign aid had been coming from the international organisations and international donors in Afghanistan. It is sufficient for changing the fortune of Afghanistan. Due to this reason, the Afghan government and Afghan warlords have focused towards international economic assistance without knowing severe negative results. From 2002 to 2011, the US has allocated around \$56.1 billion in the name of aid and rebuilding Afghanistan. The total amount of international aid pooled in was about US \$15.7 billion in 2011 which is equal to the entire national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Afghanistan. Hence, Afghanistan is known as the largest rentier in the world. According to the World Bank report, the heavy amount of economic assistance was spent in the security field. While around US \$ 6 billion fund was facilitated in humanitarian assistance in a year. It is nearly about 40 percent of Afghan GDP. In 2010, the fifty percent of Afghanistan 'score budget has been funded by the international donor. Besides it, international assistance is about the US \$ 9.4 billion for the same years. This dependency on assistance is roughly very high in levels in the world (Muggah 2014).

NGOs are playing a significant role in Afghanistan. They are providing a supporting role between political instability and violence all over the provinces in Afghanistan. They are applying their ability to execute programmes efficiently and carefully. They are gradually more scared due to failing safety situation in Afghanistan. In some regions, NGOs have considerably abridged or have completely halted their functions or even withdraw their staff. Such as, it is the duty of international donor agencies to take accountability to recognize the situation and manage their relations with military active in Afghanistan (Baag and Enna 2009). NGOs are frequently functioning in those countries that are anguished by the insurgency. However, NGOs are functioning sometimes beyond this area. Their relations with native and intervening governments are difficult in these fields due to the politically biased, operationally overlapping situation, working officially at arm's length, and these relations are sometimes pleasant and sometimes tense. Questions are being raised that government efforts to protect civil counter-insurgency should include the operating patterns and needs of NGOs (Gompert et al. 2009). NGOs have also created an important place in the field of reconstruction and development process. Many NGOs are functioning in Afghanistan. They have a vast scope here for

their activities. They are the medium through which donors are providing a grant towards for the purpose of reconstruction and development. They have been functioning in Afghanistan since 1961. The names of certain NGOs working in Afghanistan are the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Mychajlyszyn 2007). Oxfam is an international NGO which are provided training to the people of Afghanistan against violence against women. Medica Mondiale (2007) is also an NGO. It provides counselling for trauma and psychological conditions; support of medical and free legal defence representation and advice. It is also involved in specific researches related to violence against women. Besides it, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) recently involved in family-related research and its connection with the family violence. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded organization and its equivalent organization have provided an assemblage programmes. This programme is focusing on women's rights and violence against women.

The UN's agency's name is 'United Nation Development Programme (UNDP)'. The UNDP works in collaboration with national NGOs and civil societies broadly as partners in its programme. The UNDP programmes operate for social vibrancy and mobilization and reconstruction of the basic infrastructure for Afghan people. The UN and its agencies engage for functioning directly with the regional community in order to decide its priorities for future. In several cases in Afghanistan, programmes are working according to Islamic Organization (*Shura*). They also work on small projects, repairing basic infrastructure such as local roads, irrigation canals, water supply system, bridges and drain system. The UNDP programme has started fully funded training for human rights, women rights and child rights in Kabul and all of its regional and provincial offices. It has also supported in making radio and television broadcast for human rights in Afghanistan. Although the UNDP has not functioned with most of these NGOs for long periods and many of its experienced staff, have left from the PEACE Programme (UNDP 2006).

In the case of Afghanistan, the military is required for protection of international donors that inspires the donor to provide economic assistance. The worldwide NGOs have remained pessimistic regarding the military safety of their

operational activities which they witnessed as comprising an infringement of the basic need to save civil assistance stipulation from political and military misuse in conflict hidden areas. It may go even further making the humanitarian agencies vulnerable to attacks. An international donor's conference was held in Kabul in July 2010 where the Afghan government shown commitment to undertake structural improvement of the international donor in order to create an efficient, responsible, and transparent government. It may provide services to the people of Afghanistan; defend country's interest; reinforce government's institutions and emphasise the constitutional rules and regulations that assure and implement rights of people and responsibilities (Muggah 2014)

3.8. Civil-Military and its Importance

The cordial relations between civil-military and Afghan government is set an example. Civil-military were developed their structural bases in Afghanistan to conduct their operation. It is found that how brilliantly to tie together the reinforcement of both groups to efficiently move forward humanitarian assistance, to rebuild in post-conflict and conflict regions. Civil-military is working under the guidance of UNAMA. It supports border assistance groups to recognise military's role and to understand each other; to assist in making a channel in passing information between the NGOs and military; and the government of Afghanistan. It makes a good understanding of each other's concerns. ISAF frequently executes the mandates of United Nations. It affects the security inspection in Kabul. Many PRTs were situated almost all provinces of Afghanistan. It also executes civil-military cooperation projects entire operational regions. It is not only recognised by some security perspective but also known as financial supporter of armed forces. The United States has authorised it for the majority of its troops on combating Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgents (Feickert 2005). A Foreign government has been declaring the complete approach to maintain peace with the help of economic assistance workers, politician and humanitarian. They are working together to provide a better solution to complicated emergencies situations. It has also seen that donor funding is augmenting to relocate from NGO development field to military assistance work (Bragg 2011).

3.8.1. Difference between Traditional Civil-Military and Modern Civil-Military

The traditional Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) concept comprises civilian actions that are performed by the military in context to increase force security. It has enhanced into more comprehensive notion of civil-military deeds with a broad range. The first source of this is based on traditional combat. It could be seen in warfare of the Second World War; US Army civil affairs and NATO CIMIC in the Cold War. Herein, CIMIC has been working in Afghanistan to support in the operational instrument, designed for military purposes; and executed by special units and experts. It often separates from a strategic sequence of order. The second base of CIMIC established in the past combat and counter-insurgency doctrine. The central principle of CIMIC is counter-insurgency. 'Every soldier's job' and the concepts of function designed towards political purpose rather than a working for experts unit and staffs in support of attainment entirely military goals (Rietjens and Myriam 2008).

The modern civil-military concept has emerged in the late 1990s. During that time, NATO personnel were working on the new CIMIC concepts. They appealed the image of Eisenhower plaintive about the inhabitant impediments. It had to be cleared by civil-military units in the context for warfare troops to operation at the spirit and overcome the opponent military. NATO would have operated its troop in the region in a healthy way by appealing the reminiscence of General Templer. It has been giving instructions to his commanders, district administrators and superintendent of police (Rietjens and Myriam 2008).

3.8.2. Importance of Civil-Military Coordination

Afghanistan is a fragile state. Afghanistan became insecure in the field of economic, political and security. At the present context, it finds a plethora of factors such as corruption and economic criminality that is responsible for it. It can be possible with the support of civil-military coordination. The role of the military is to ensure safety of economic assistance agencies, their staff, projects and recipient communities. NGOs must comprehend and manage their simultaneous existence and communications with NATO-led ISAF, the US-led 'Coalition Operation Enduring Freedom' troops; the forces of Afghanistan and an array of militant groups. Civil affairs relation develops as a part of their wider political and military policy. NATO

describes “civil-military relations delivering on the mission of commanders”. Civil-military has particularly focused on PRTs in Afghanistan. The civil-military coordination (CIMIC) activities and its engagement reconstructed plans and project for uplift the basic facilities of the Afghan populations. That is why PRTs emphasised the importance of the civil-military role in Afghanistan. It also has a basic agenda to “*win heart and minds*” of Afghan people. However, ISAF has faced several challenges in facilitating of these goals (Enna and Baag 2009).

3.8.3. Dimensions of Civil-Military Coordination

It describes the different dimensions of Civil-military Coordination. The following dimensions are below:

3.8.3.1 Military

From the very beginning, international military forces are engaged in civil matters in Afghanistan. It is because there has been a political vacuum for a long time. They are incapable to fulfill the requirement of military demands. Afghanistan is infested with insurgency. Insurgent groups were running all illegal activities. That is why the civil-military requires countering the insurgent groups. Besides it, civil-military was also encouraged by international actors in Afghanistan. I will provide better results in the field of security as well as reconstruction and development field. It can play a leading role in basic infrastructure improvement of Afghanistan (Sidell 2008). Moreover, the foreign armed forces have merely one job for determinedly conflict region and to give protection of the new government. But the government of Afghanistan is still not able to protect itself. The UNSCR 1386 authorized “Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to provide assistance to help the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces” (Weinberger 2002).

Afghanistan requires a great amount of humanitarian assistance along with a minimum level of security. The military can help in ensuring economic assistance to affected populous regions. It can also secure warehouse. They possess a huge variety of assets that may be helpful to the humanitarian society in conflicts, contributing logistical support, and tactical aeroplane and sealift capacity, mobile hospitals, field level medical expulsions and engineers. Besides this, they have the capacity to

facilitate security for civilians in the circumstances of conflict by furnishing short-term stability so that the NGO workers can assist in immediate relief works (Bragg 2011). The military has a new task in peacebuilding process of Afghanistan. The new tasks include “demobilising combatants, facilitating elections and assisting in the rebuilding of political” (Sidell 2008).

Afghan communities also want long-term development assistance based on transparency, accountability and local ownership. Policy and practice of both military and civilian agencies require being more informed about and inclusive of Afghan perspectives. It can be possible with the help of foreign armed forces and international donor. They also support the new local forces and Afghan police forces from security point of view. The US-led coalition force has been active in many provinces of Afghanistan. It is conducting offensive military operations in pursuit of various wanted individuals. It has a huge civil-military element that is recently executing a US \$ 5 million civilian support programme for entire the nation. Many coalition forces are involved in the military operation for humanitarian support by wearing civilian clothing and carry weapons. (Morris 2002). Military operations are inefficiently responsive to Afghan social and cultural norms which define ideas of an individual or community’s security and dignity. International donors and humanitarian organisations require more investments more for the cross-cultural transformation of the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and freedom, as well as focusing on access negotiations with all parties in the conflict. Development of Afghanistan can be fruitful with combined and synchronized military-humanitarian actions. Therefore, Civil-Military Relations and its guidelines have become more critical in the attempt to outline the military’s involvement.

3.8.3.2 Peacebuilding and Stabilisation

Afghanistan has been suffering from war. There are some considerable missions regarding to disposal of remains of war. Consequently, it can be said that the former security system dissolved completely. DDR are necessary for the society of the ex-combatants along with clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance. These are important conditions for peacebuilding. Such types of activities may be possible with the support of deployed forces. However, the reintegration of whole armed forces of ex-combatants is a great and difficult job. They are not allowed to

legalise. In the absence of Afghan security forces, the state's control after the fall of the Taliban is dependent on coalition countries. The UNSCR 1386/2001 authorise the establishment of an ISAF to maintain security in Kabul. The UN and international NGOs called for growth of ISAF. However, the US is leading several contributing countries. These countries were not ready to promise provide for stabilisation force. This position echoed at the UN Security Council, which declined to approve a growth of the mandate of ISAF (Sidell 2008).

After the 9/11 attack, stabilisation gained better significance among and across external governments, transforming the approach and structure of both military and civilian agencies. Stabilisation discussions influenced military principles; external economic assistance, and essentially changed the relationship between the military and civilian mechanism of governments (Jackson and Haysom 2013). Stabilization is the intelligence gathering and local political analysis under the deployed forces. It is a normal part of military agenda. It is demanding task about the ability to understand the very different setting about cultural and political sensitivity. These deployed forces put into difficult and risky situations by international, regional or local politics. Peacebuilding in Afghanistan needs the extension of lawful government for entire the country to extend safety and financial resources. But the government lacks the strength to implement the rule of law. The military also can not implement the rule of law. Instead, a plan based on achieving a monopoly of force and giving regional commanders incentives to participate in the political process is required (Sidell 2008). The peacebuilding and stabilisation are continuing process with the support of its good law and regulation in the country. These can be possible with the support of strengthening with some internal forces as well as it requires a good basic infrastructure of the country. The civil and military personnel are working towards ensuring stability for the Afghan government by developing and reconstructing the provinces with the help of international actors. In this, PRT is playing an important role in securing development, stability and peacebuilding of Afghanistan. But, somehow it could not succeed fully in its mission because of they are not familiar to the mountainous regions as well as not getting fully support from the side of local people.

3.8.3.3. Security

Afghanistan needs full security for people and Afghan government along with coming international organisations and some non-governmental organisations because in the inverse situation they cannot deliver its aid and humanitarian assistance to the troubled Afghanistan. The most fundamental efforts are to address the humanitarian assistance of rising insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. It has happened due to the deployment of external security forces. In 2002, Security General Kofi Annan underlined that the aid from the international donor could not distribute among the governments of Afghanistan due to the continued insecurity. Relief agency workers cannot provide food and basics supplies without safety; in this circumstances, large number refugees movements and globally displaced persons create new difficulty. Insecurity comprises the function of the specialised military in changing and replying to forces attacks and training native security forces as well as also helping indigenous police to maintain rule and regulations in cooperation with civil society. ISAF was mainly to create security situations authorising peacemaking to happen among combatants the civil conflict in Afghanistan. However, it also allows delivery of humanitarian relief. Thus, the presence of ISAF had seen as a requirement in initiating a peacebuilding process different from the US-led anti-terrorism campaign (Weinberger 2002).

The important feature of PRTs is providing security. They try to assess the local situation intimately and create a better relationship with local actors. It would resolve the recent problems. Moreover, they have attained back facility to call for fortifications air strikes or other help from Bagram Airfield (Wardle 2004). PRTs have ameliorated security in Afghanistan by developing circumstances that create economic growth. In the aftermath, it would facilitate an opportunities for the local people because some of them are engaged in an illegal activities such as theft or the narcotics trade. PRTs forms and deploys the units of National Army of Afghanistan and also mentors its National Police. They have also formed a highway patrol agency that has created a checkpoint on the Ring Road, halting the movement of drugs and illegal weapons. PRTs are capable of providing important communication inputs to the UN regarding the security conditions in isolated rural areas as well as give status updates on the projects of crucial infrastructure development. PRTs are particularly

good at creating negotiated agreements between warlords because they have seen as honest brokers (Hoshmand 2005).

PRT personnel and coalition forces had complexity-both theoretical and practical-in linking with Islamic institutions of Afghanistan and tribal structures. This could be explained obviously as a product of cultural differences between eastern values and western values. But it also displayed the common assumption among them. These strong customary social institutions were harmful to state development and democratic values such as elections and women's rights. International militaries struggled to understand the district and provincial politics of Afghanistan. However, they intended to focus their efforts on fulfilling small projects and infrastructure rather than creating an apparent understanding of what came to known as human terrain. They turned incapable because of the scarcity of cultural knowledge of Afghanistan. They are trying to understand the political and economic conditions. It becomes easy for them to flow heavy amount of funds. However, both donors and militaries also found it difficult to prioritise and sequence their governance interventions. Additionally they have often been producing an ambitious and different range of policy options and responsibilities (Muggah 2014).

3.8.3.4. Humanitarian Assistance

Afghanistan has been facing huge humanitarian problems. The conditions of humans are highly critical after the long post 9/11 American military campaign in Afghanistan. Indeed, the U.S. attacks in Afghanistan signed the commencement of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. Even now, the basic facts of a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan are well known. Six to seven million people approximately are to be tremendously helpless due to three years of rigorous famine and more than twenty years of war. Due to these reasons the economy is crushed and it offers very few employment opportunities (Oliker et al. 2004). At present, humanitarian assistance is the major component of civil-military operations (CMOs). All operations are happening under the supervision of US. The leadership of US powerfully supported the humanitarian assistance aspects of CMO during major warfare in Afghanistan and for small quick-impact projects after that. But all guidance and funding related CMO did not go far beyond Defense of Department of America. Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account are limited to

humanitarian activities. It should have been merely a little mechanism of any CMO efforts. It is not to claim that CMO should have started the state-building effort in Afghanistan, but rather CMO should have enhanced coordination into the global community's wider capacity building and reconstruction efforts. However, the experiences of soldiers in the wars field was that they were to live completely out of anything that looked like state-building (Ankersen 2008).

Even now, humanitarian measurement holds a more unstructured set of functions, ranging from providing of emergency food and medical relief to the planning of short and long-lasting economic policy and plans for sustainable development. It is considerable including the requirement to change former combatants into gainfully working inhabitants (Weinberger 2002). PRT have provided humanitarian and development aid, which has given rise to the debate in the aid community about delimitation of responsibilities and tasks between the traditional, civilian aid providers and the deployed forces.

3.9. Civil-Military Relations and Governance in Afghanistan

The international government and members countries of NATO started making a better relationship with the Afghan government. Along with this, military was always emphasised to win the confidence of local and provincial government through financial support and reconstruction projects. In the context, the report of Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds intended a basic development to bring security and stability to Afghanistan. The spreading violence is not primarily the consequences of poverty, nor will economic incentives by assistance for different military presence or government in Afghanistan. External military intervention and aid have been pouring into Afghanistan from a long of time. The Soviet occupations had also involved in Afghanistan in the Cold War period. Afghans are familiar with and doubtful to '*win hearts and minds*' strategies. Moreover, aid represents very few components of most of Afghan's managing strategies of conversion and conflict period. Major strategies include mutual collaboration on treatment and remittances (Enna and Baag 2009). Afghan government has been influenced less by external military strategy. They became weak in balancing Afghan complaints related to culturally inappropriate behaviours or civilian deaths which happened during military operations. In this context, military uses a short period of the fund to utilised local NGOs in

implementing of CIMIC projects. Such funding pays inadequate attention to the needs of those local NGOs regarding their organisational and development, human resource development and most importantly safety and security.

3.10. Civil-Military Operations (CMO)

Civil-Military Operations (CMO) plays a major role in Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) because of the relatively safe surrounding and instant humanitarian mission. CMO was predominantly functioning about logistics such as transporting and distributing supplies, organising camps, etc. (Ankersen ed. 2008). Military forces are working offensive operations against Taliban havens in the Eastern Mountains. However, they are giving some advance knowledge for shaping Afghan security and providing Humanitarian Relief Agencies (HRA) in protecting the population at risk from the severe winter. The level of security and development diverge significantly for the entire nation. Moreover, the commanders must allocate their assets to greatest benefit (Flavin 2004). Two separate military organizations are operating in Afghanistan with different intentions simultaneously. 'OEF' is started by American with coalition partners and focused on eradicating the Al Qaeda and Taliban threat. The OEF operates throughout the country wherever the threat might locate. ISAF is also worried about security and stability of Kabul. The U.S. CMO principal used OEF based on a combination of Desert Storm and Balkan experience. Hence, ISAF uses NATO's CIMIC principal based in the Balkans and Northern Ireland. NGOs, International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), and the relief community were uprooted and displaced after 9/11 attack. Additionally, they are adapting to a new reality. Concerned for their safety, the most of international NGO and IGO personnel departed Afghanistan leaving behind their created humanitarian space to deliver essential services such as health, agriculture, road repair and water. Therefore, their departure had an important effect. After the military operations had stabilised the situation, these NGOs and IGOs returned and are trying to re-establish themselves under a different political reality than existed under the Taliban (Flavin 2004).

3.11. New Dimension of Civil-Military Relations PRTs in Afghanistan

It has been evident that the centre for civil-military relations is working with civilian and military officers with the aim of ensuring democracies. And it has also

been noticed that for the purpose of developing comparisons the analytical focus exclusively on civilian control and armed forces in national defence is not adequate either empirically or conceptually. Militaries have long been engaging in humanitarian assistance. Despite being the fact that more and more countries opted to provide peacekeepers, Peacekeeping became increasingly critical in the former Yugoslavia, parts of Africa, East Timor and elsewhere. Attacks by international terrorists in Bali, Nairobi, New York, Washington, Madrid, London, Amman, and elsewhere, and the launch of Washington's 'global war on terrorism', made militaries forced everywhere to take action against terrorism. In this situation, it had found necessary for the leaders to take into consideration the matters both of control and outcomes, and with instruments beyond the armed forces; they must provide for security that today is both domestic and international, with the latter including at least peace support operation (PSO), as in providing troops to NATO in Afghanistan, and cooperation in intelligence to counter the threat of international terrorism. In short, the challenge today is not only to assert and maintain control but also to develop effective militaries and other security instruments to implement a broad variety of roles and missions (Bruneau and Matei 2008)

PRT are working with a civil and military component that works together as a team to develop strategies to achieve their aims. Their working doctrines show their structural composition of PRT. It is designed to allow civilian workers to operate in areas previously considered also dangerous for them to operate. Each PRT was probably to address the most major issues in its area of responsibility. They engage in humanitarian assistance activities in certain instances. The civil affairs component of the PRT may include activities such as the provision of food and water supplies. Where there is an NGO presence in the province, the military component will focus very 'narrower range projects'. Although this flexibility has allowed PRTs to adapt to their particular location, it has also resulted in a lack of a visibly defined role for some PRTs who have struggled to balance their military and civilian components successfully. PRT represent a structural commitment to civil-military relations in a broader form. They have broadly seen as a success by the US and UK governments, who have transferred funding from NGOs to PRTs in the last few years. It is undoubtedly true that many NGOs found that the UK led PRTs, in particular, had been successful in mediating and diffusing tensions between local commanders. PRT

military deputation would improve security. However, PRTs have also criticised by those in the aid community for their lack of transparency regarding their role. It is because they appear to focus more on ‘hearts and minds’ activities than on security (Bragg 2011).

3.12. Contention between Military and NGOs in Afghanistan

It seems that the intervening military has been supporting safe and secure environment in which the indigenous, national and international actors are capable of fulfilling their roles. However, the military will be involved in aspects of state building. It could be the first instant when the military could get nearer in conflict with the interests of the NGOs. The policy of NGO’s working is far different from the method of military’s function from province to province in the country. While indigenous NGOs are working long period, other international NGOs are functioning some offyears. NGOs are working peacefully and humanitarian basis while the military is only focusing the insurgent's groups. They will often know if reinstalling electrical power will help an ethnic or religious group. However, they can be incorrect or have a plan of their own. During every military operation, the military were faced challenges such as ethical antagonisms, economic disparities and immigrant problems. By making contact with the inhabitants, relief agencies, the UN agencies and local government played a significant and inevitable role of military actions. Indigenous people will lose their trust and faith in the external militaries if they do not assist effectively with other actors in the area of operation. It is necessary for local people to have a good image of the international force presence. If they consider the external forces to be a legitimate one, they will be ready and eager to help more efficiently with them. If they feel the presence is invading their country and regard their presence as illegitimate, they will join anti-governmental groups and criminal groups (Kloker 2009).

3.13. Role of Military and NGOs in Short and Long Term Humanitarian Work

The international forces have particular agenda for working in any country of the world. They have two types of agenda like a short term and long term for protection of human assistance. Similarly, international NGOs have also done on this

basis. But the basic difference is that military is providing security of human from terrorist, while the civil societies provided basics requirement of human needs and its rights affected by natural catastrophe and any human activities. The military is functioning with the international rules. International law creates these rules, military principles and NGO policy and another participant that provides direct relief assistance for human beings. Under the leadership of UN, several humanitarian agencies are functioning short and long-term projects to address humanitarian needs and civil agencies. In exceptional situations, the international military has an engagement in direct relief assistance according to military principle. Both military and NGOs know very well where they require military assistance is necessary and appropriate for human safety and required of NGOs for it. Both understand each other very well. Here it is clear that military is used merely as a stop-gap measure rather than a long-term substitute for humanitarian assistance.

In the long term humanitarian work, there must be a better effort to sketch the difference between human development assistance and politically to '*win hearts and minds*' projects. Humanitarian developments have an essential ideological difference that aims to provide long term advantage to the people. They are instructed to serve based exclusively on their requirements. Additional military assistance stands on political inspirations that can never be truly impartial. Because of this, there needs to be an understanding that the two activities are specifically separate. Besides it, the goal of achieving quick impact projects has directed to an eminence of short-term projects. These projects have served to destabilise more sustainable NGO efforts. These efforts aim to construct local capabilities. From some interval of time, NGOs have been conveying concerns about the menace '*hearts, and minds*' actions pose to humanitarian agencies. For enduring this, military '*quick impact projects*' should be topic to a cost-benefit study that takes into explanation the long term results and ideally engages in local contractors. So that, it adds to the capacity building of community and Afghan institutions. It also applies to PRT development activity. It is critical that PRTs make more of an effort to involve with local NGOs and Afghan civil society to come to agreement about what their development component should be, it is to exist at all (Bragg 2011)

3.14. Clarifying the Role of PRT

PRTs worked in Afghanistan for humanitarian assistance. In these circumstances, the military should assume assistance activities while humanitarian work is both essential and enviable. However, NGOs are functioning their works comparatively security while PRTs should refrain from ‘heart and minds’ work. PRTs have operated functions that have gone well beyond their primary agenda, such as involved in long-term improvement work and involved themselves in local political affairs. It has also attracted towards ‘substantial local offence’. PRT have created a difference between civilian and military players. It has conducted to extremely relating to the results of it. Some critiques argue, ‘PRT should remain a security maintain body’. (Bragg 2011). “Many PRT commanders have recognized that there needs to be a greater explanation of PRT’s role. So that, Afghan locals do not puzzle PRTs with NGOs. The analysis provided here suggests that if the PRT model is to be simulated elsewhere, then the clarification of roles between the military and civilian actors is paramount” (Bragg 2011).

3.15. Improving Cooperation between Military and NGO actors

Military is doing their activities for security. When the military has left space for security, it opened space for NGOs to undertake short and long term humanitarian work wherever possible. There must be better coordination between military and NGOs actors. So, they can efficiently cooperate in such ground that they can use their resources mutually according to their requirements for handing the security situation. They created mutual understanding and co-operated each other actor like NGOs can use military assets and logistics, and the military can use NGO local proficiency and connections. If they have to work in the same province in difficult crisis, better communication and coordination should help for keep away from some of the functioning impediments that have characterized civil and military harmonisation in Afghanistan.

There are two significant methods in which the military and NGOs can do better harmonisation in their activity in a constructive way. First methods, pre-deployment training, are important so that military staff enhanced comprehend the work of inhabitant players. These training should engage both kinds of players

coming together to share perspectives on the nature of humanitarian assistance. Additionally, it should also involve the consequences and potential problems of the militarization of economic assistance. This kind of preparation should help for stretching much further support in military and NGO training. So that, it becomes easy to understand each other's activity and nature. Gradually, this training is becoming institutionalized. Second methods, this institutionalized can get better civil-military coordination with incorporated processes between NGOs and Western military defence departments strategically. The military has sought to improve its relationship with NGOs through the evolution of Civil-Military Cooperation Centres (CMOCs), as well as a relationship between officers, have attached to the leading NGOs in the field.

3.16. Summary

PRTs have become an efficient instrument for stabilization in Afghanistan. PRT are combined form of civil and military. They have strengthened at many places the hand of groups who support the central government. Moreover, they have helped create an environment in which political, social, and economic development is possible. PRT engaged in Afghanistan has confirmed to be a supply model for post-conflict reconstruction. For this, the United States and its coalition partner have permitted and remain promised. PRTs are an exclusive mixture of development and security. It is still work-in-progress. It should promote those who resist it by predominantly and to involve in the Civil-military community. It will help and influence its upcoming growth. So that it confirms all stakeholder interests, apprehension, and equally shared objectives are recognised and integrated into the model (Borders 2004). Military and civilian representatives were doing extraordinary work under complex situations. They were smart, energetic, and dedicated. One of the major lessons of the Afghan experience is that economic development and good governance are essential elements of security and stability. Most of the expertises needed to defeat strongly minded militants has been long recognized by the military however military force is inadequate to defeat a strong-minded insurgency. Thus, security without sustained development and good governance will unavoidably be temporary.

There is a lack of coordination between civil and military in national and local government with development projects. It is serious challenge for them. It had also been noticed that PRTs efforts often becomes less effective for managing better relations with Afghan Government institutions or plans such as the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), Community Development Plans and Provincial Development Plans. The inadequately intended involvements emphasise the jeopardy of military CIMIC projects trailing more the 'hearts and minds' than they win. Each participated country forces in ISAF have a different approach to supporting the GoA. These approaches make it complicated to expand comprehensible 'nation-building' plans by differing priorities, goals and means. The GoA is implicit as having little influence over international military strategy. However, it became feeble in dealing Afghan complaints associated with 'culturally inappropriate behavior or civilian casualties' which occur through military operations.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. military provided humanitarian-type assistance and involved in combat operations. But it did not contribute in the upholding of a safe environment and in creating a situation in which NGOs and others were expected to participate with combating coalitions forces in backing efforts. Even though, these forces did not assist security for those efforts. The ISAF became a success in Kabul. Though, the other international forces have not been continuing to provide suitable secure and safe environment rest of the entire the country. It suggests that the US might have been better advised to address the public security needs of the country at an earlier stage. Moreover, it has also included the establishment of a secure environment in the mission of the U.S. and coalition forces (Oliker et al. 2004). International donor agencies and NGOs are remaining in Afghanistan. Military strategies have severely battered the difference between warriors and civilian economic assistance players in the eyes of both rebels and common Afghans. It has encouraged to negative notions of economic assistance agencies. It presented bigger safety risks for assistance workers in lofty jeopardy environment. From the beginning, the Afghan government and security forces constantly unsuccessful engage in civil-military discourse. But it could not become fruitful in coordination between of them. Earlier engagement by them would surely have had a larger impact on Afghan security forces and its practice. From this, we indicate that international economic assistance agencies must start a discourse on civil-military with Afghan security

forces. The capability and willingness of the ANSF remain unclear to engage in this discourse. However, international economic assistance agencies will have to recognise new plans and new means of engaging to make certain that. They are capable of safe and to develop a defence for the populations. Their aim to assist it

The relationship between civilian and military assistance provider have diverse views. Current models of civil and military coordination had incorporated by one contributing policy to 'help the people'. But that makes caution. They do not display a sincere planned level alignment between growth and safety agendas in Afghanistan. Another argues that they have not helped to gain development and security goals improved or quicker in Afghanistan. Another argues that the structure for civil and military coordination in UN integrated missions have intentionally fractional objectives. They were never meant to coordinate the greater security and development programmes of the mission. While coalition forces had done their operation in integrated approaches, but international forces has faced several challenges for the protection of civilians and their rights (Olson and Gregorian 2007).

The US and its coalition partners have intervened in Afghanistan with some purpose to accomplish regime change in Afghanistan and fought for their people to prevent further terrorist attacks on the homeland. But an important part of the mission in Afghanistan is about rebuilding process in its vast sense: 'establishing efficient political and administrative institutions, establishing security, the rule of law, getting healthier livelihoods as well as the development of basic infrastructure and services'. The providing of reconstruction activities was an essential part of coalition strategy in Afghanistan following the initial phase of 'Operation Enduring Freedom'. Therefore, the U.S. and its alliance required to safe an efficient delivery method to achieve stated objectives (Sidell 2008). The United States and its coalition partners will be probable to face fierce and ingenious rebels for the unsurprising upcoming in Afghanistan. The U.S. military has made significant marches in acclimatising to the wants of counter-insurgency in the past several years. "U.S. civilian agencies are placing their employees in PRTs and other unsafe places. They are working out of their institutional comfort zones so that they can work on decisive diplomatic and development issues important to counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. The U.S.

military and civilian counterparts are still in the foothills of meeting the larger challenge” (Gombert et al. 2009).

“The civil-military representatives have got bitter experience from Afghanistan. It proved that it requires more than the delivery of peace dividends through development project to win the peace in Afghanistan. PRTs cannot win the hearts and minds of local people or the local acceptance by simply delivering QIPs and other types of development projects. Individually, development projects cannot generate confidence of local people in the current administration at both levels of national and provincial” (Uesugi 2009-01). “Winning the peace in the Afghanistan, the current peace-building process must regard as trustworthy and the current government as legitimate by the Afghan people. Indeed, development without governance is meaningless, and governance without development is unachievable. But governance without security is unachievable, and security without governance is meaningless. So far, the international community created PRTs to fill in the civil-military gap and the security-development gap, but it has not been able to address this security-governance gap or the local capacity gap. In fact, local capacity development is a key to the successful handover of peace-building responsibility to the local authority and thus an effective transition strategy for PRTs, but nobody is out there in the remote provinces except for poorly equipped PRTs” (Uesugi 2009-01).

Chapter-4

Functional Linkage between PRT and State Institutions

4.1. Introduction

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are a modern approach to making peace and security in Afghanistan. Besides, they are also reconstructing the country. They help the Afghan Central government to expand its power into the regional government. The components of PRT model were largely new in structure. It can be analysed that PRT is a combined form of military and civilian staff into one entity with the intention of providing better security, governance, and financial growth. Moreover, they are working in different provinces of Afghanistan to provide safety for aid works and help humanitarian assistance (NATO Review 2007). In the meanwhile, PRTs are involved a large extent than any organisation with weapons. It could render regions excessively hazardous for civilians and prevent them to move ahead for development. It paves the way for civilian organisations to move ahead and do the genuine rebuilding work. Indeed, the United States uses PRT as a major instrument for applying it at a very extensive level for rebuilding process to do better security in Afghanistan. However, it has been used by external community on the softer side of counterinsurgency (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009).

The United State Agency for International Development (USAID), the Afghanistan government and the U.S. troop are doing creating jobs for Afghans. Project and training program have been conducted by the USAID to build up the financial progress among the population of Afghanistan. The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is one such respective program of the Afghan government which tried to link local villages and the national government by the rule of Shuras. USAID and NSP are working together in Afghanistan. Both of these are helpful for the betterment of state-building and sustainable financial growth rather than PRTs. PRTs have not provided any advantage to some provinces from their work. Moreover, many nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the United Nations (UN) agencies do a large scale reconstruction works as well as the humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009). Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are “private, self-governing, non-profit civilian organisations dedicated to easing human suffering,

promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights and conflict resolution; and encouraging the creation of democratic institutions and civil society” (U.S. Department of Defense 2007).

While the US is a major actor, which continues to play a bigger role in Afghanistan, this PRT type of model was first time used by it in Vietnam. Thus it was after a long period, that it was used in Iraq and Afghanistan. This team concept is designed by the United States of America to help and enhance stability in Afghanistan. Different agencies of the U.S. are functioning in Afghanistan. The purpose of PRT is as a “coordinating interagency for diplomatic, economic, reconstruction and counterinsurgency efforts among U.S. agencies in the country” (Congressional Committees 2008). A PRT would set up base in a local area and help rebuild a school, build a hospital, repave roads, or dig wells. They also help to protect NGOs such as the Red Cross or the United Nations Children’s Fund (Wolny 2005). The U.S. military established humanitarian assistance teams that developed PRTs after the overthrow of the Taliban era. According to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Provincial Reconstruction Handbook, PRTs is known as “Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs)”. The American troops were given information by these teams related to humanitarian requirements. All of these teams were executed by U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) that funded projects, to build trust and confidence among the local population (Congressional Committees 2008). This PRT concept is further supported by “the Department of Defense (DoD)”, “Department of State (DOS)” and the USAID in Washington. “New Joint Regional Teams (JRTs)” were anticipated to manage village assessment, recognise and coordinate rebuilding tasks, and connect with the provincial commanding officer. Hamid Karzai was the interim president of the Afghan Transitional Authority that was supported by the international community for its functioning in the country (Mitchell 2015). The primary objectives of creating these teams were political. But PRTs have also closely seen the reality of Afghanistan’s instability such terrorism, warlords, unemployment and grinding poverty. Hence, they started dealing according to these conditions (Perito 2005).

Guiding Principles in PRT Working Relations’ document was established with a general set of limitation by the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan with United Nations

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), NGOs and Local Government. These principles have included three main aims for the PRT program: enlarge the power of national government, get better safety and encourage rebuilding process (Perito 2005; HASC Oversight and Investigations Staff 2008). PRT Executive Steering Committee authorised these objectives. Afghan Minister of Interior chaired this Steering Committee. It creates a platform for making a discussion point among Ministries of the Afghan government, UNAMA, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and American military commanders and representatives of donor countries. Unluckily, the Steering Committee had no power to harmonise PRT operations, while the donor country steered PRT operation according to their priorities. PRT Working Group's subordinate staff is working as information exchange. But it does not have the capacity to give supervision. Therefore, PRT has no power to control central authority. Each sponsoring country of PRT is independent to construe the whole guiding principles and to operate functions supported by its national interest and the regional situations. It brought helpful suppleness. But it has also resulted in a temporary approach to Afghanistan's requirements for safety and growth (Perito 2005).

4.2. PRT Activity (Goal)

The PRT activity is guided by two sources: ISAF and the member nations leading the teams. Even though, the most important basis of guidance of PRT is delivered by ISAF, but the PRTs get financial resources from the international countries individually. Each country has political instruments for influencing how PRT team should operate. PRTs have been operating in different provinces in Afghanistan. PRTs would often change their way, goals, and plans which depend on the proficiency of individuals inducted. The PRTs are involved in actions related to those of their NGO counterpart. Their task is attached to the counterinsurgency policy of the alliance partners (Mitchell 2015). Besides it, PRT is also working on various activities. These activities are mentioned below.

PRTs' activities include:

- Development
- Governance
- Education
- Health
- Human Rights
- Economic Development
- Rule of Law
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Security

4.3. PRT's Linkage with International Community and International Agencies (NGO and International Organisation)

PRTs are formed with the assistance of the global community that is working in Afghanistan. They are working with the contributions made by several countries' military forces and civilian support for reconstruction, peacebuilding and stability of Afghanistan. Besides it, many international and national agencies and NGO are functioning in Afghanistan. The PRT led nation's support packages are being used for rebuilding capacity of the Afghan government and it is projected through the United Nations or Afghan National Development Programs (ANDS). In the similar way, funding is channelled via Afghanistan's programs or contracted NGOs for development and reconstruction. Leading nations have managed to twist state level efforts to provide the assets to their regions (Eronen 2008). However, Afghanistan can take a leading role in its reconstruction and development. But it does not have the capacity to build up its reconstruction and development. It has failed in its reconstruction. That is why it requires some international support. The global actors help in strengthening its development ambitions, including the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the goals of the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) (Parliamentary Information and Research Service 2007). It helps for strengthening the capacity building of Afghanistan. "The ANDS Cross Cutting Consultative Group (CCCG) on Gender Equity will strengthen as the primary vehicle for ministries, international community and donors to

coordinate monitoring and advise the government on the implementation of its gender commitments” (ANDS Volume (5) 2008/09-2012/13).

PRTs are a key instrument by which the global partners deliver support at the regional and district level in the country. Each province has to function one PRT in Afghanistan, but some PRT covers more than one province. PRT are looking for creating a more suitable atmosphere that provides a peaceful environment for national civilian agencies and international humanitarian agencies. PRTs had made in such a unique composition that it is capable of providing development process and support in less secure areas too (USAID 2017). Moreover, “global partners are active in health, education, infrastructure, food aid, landmine clearance, governance and institutional capacity-building, and rural and agricultural development”. The PRTs are linked with following key players:-

- United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
- United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
- United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
- United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)
- World Food Program (WFP)
- World Bank (WB)
- Asian Development Bank (ADB)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

NGOs are conducting a broad range of humanitarian assistance activities. There are two types of NGOs such as International NGOs and Domestic NGOs. Both have their areas of expertise, funds, and functional structure bodies, its methods of working and regions of operations (Mitchell 2015). Some NGOs get their financial support from the state government or International Governmental Organizations (IGOs). Some might turn towards executive associates regarding funding ordeal (U.S. Department of Defense 2007). They can be secular or faith based. Many of their aim and purposes are analogous. However, the organisations have a division of field that severely held to a politically unbiased sharing with those that adheres political

advocacy and structural improvement (Mitchell 2015). “Whereas groups in the former camp focus their efforts strictly on providing relief, those in the latter engaging in such activities as post-conflict reconstruction, human rights advocacy, democracy promotion, conflict resolution, and peace building. All official organisations registered under the Ministry of Economy and the Government of Afghanistan’s Law on NGOs” (Mitchell 2015). Some NGOs uphold unadorned freedom from state institutions and belligerents. These NGOs are less interested in openly connecting with armed forces. NGOs play vital roles in solving many difficult issues in which insurgencies are important. Although, numerous NGOs appear earlier than armed forces and stay later. They can sustain and assist at the last stage of stability. Trust based relationship is an important to stabilise a harmonisation in societies of Afghanistan (U.S. Department of Defense 2007).

The NGO Coordination Council are composed of Afghan Non-Governmental Organisations Coordination Bureau (ANCB), the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development (ACBAR) and Afghan Women’s Network (AWN) (ANDS Volume (5) 2008/09-2012/13). All these have made guidelines for other NGOs or their methods acts as a guide for others. NGOs are involved in humanitarian assistance, rebuilding, and growth in Afghanistan. The intention of the rules was to endorse enhanced considerate of NGO, transparency, responsibility, and high-quality administration practices and enhanced excellence of services. The set of rules also emphasised the liberty, neutrality, and impartiality of organisations. It is predictable that various NGOs were unwilling to cooperate with PRTs. However, the respite job was the containment of insurgency (Mitchell 2015). NGOs’ coordinating bodies have been strengthening and continuing to serve as the important connection with the Afghan government to the NGO community on gender as well as relief and development issues. NGOs are encouraging directly to women because they easily accomplice with its scheme. It also supports women to give chances to take participant in decision making within their organisations. Name of some NGO’s working in Afghanistan are as followed:-

- International Committee of the Red Cross
- World Vision
- Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)

- Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE)
- Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)
- Save the Children
- Mercy Corps
- Academy for Educational Development

In the context of security, elements of the NGO remain suspicious of the military. The elements are committed to the idea of impartiality in humanitarian space which they should occupy rightly. Many governmental agencies have their own interests and objectives and they attempt to justify them by resource flows that equip them to perform their tasks more efficiently. However, between the military and civilian domain, the cultural drift act as a roadblock in harmonizing smooth relation between them (Hynek and Marton2012).

4.4. Local Governance and Community Development Project of USAID/Afghanistan

The USAID started its local Governance and Community Development Project in the southern and eastern provinces in Afghanistan. The Afghan government is also working with it. In this project, local communities are working in partnership to create constant environments for long lasting economic and political development works. PRTs are also closely working with in these projects to promote stability. USAID working with Afghanistan led Local Governance, and Community Development Projects are substantially slowed down due to three major project: “(A) supporting local public administration and governance, (B) promoting community mobilisation and development, and (C) aiding local stability initiatives” (USAID 2009).

4.4.1. Support to the Local Public Administration and Governance

The USAID has hired a private contractor for giving suitable training in public management, public involvement and society knowledge in the course of the professional training to Afghans people. It has given an endorsement to the yearly work plan. Moreover, it has also provided workplace for private contractor to provide knowledge about an information technology apparatus to Afghans administrative

bodies as well as a beginning to the subprojects to improve government infrastructural strength. However, the contractor had not taken an interest in enhancing knowledge of Afghan government staffs. Further, it had postponed the execution of the activities related to training, equipment support and infrastructure work under this segment (USAID 2009).

4.4.2. Community Mobilisation and Development Component

The US had started a mission for the development of Afghanistan. The mission too approved some subprojects. These were developed on the societal and regional levels. The contractors were supposed to implement these subprojects. Additionally, the task permitted and did not set the prediction mentioned in the deal under this element. The subprojects became petite because the outworking had no ideas largely policies for execution the element. Provincial and Central workers have a scarcity of basic knowledge that supervises the operational execution activities, where the declaration of the work plan is also wide. Moreover, the staff of the mission does not realise their particular acts and accountabilities regarding the deal. Consequently, the scheme does not attain its main goal of providing the regional administrations as a means of giving public deliveries to their peoples. Thus, these elements lost a large amount of the impact. It could have had an escalating desirable opinion that the regional governments are accountable to community needs (USAID 2009).

4.4.3. Local Stability Initiates Elements Experience Delays

The objective of the contractor's component of local stability initiatives was to attain a temporary period of stabilisation by executing temporary period of subprojects. It addresses the reason for belligerence. The outworking did not attain its goal. The contractor faced and got some experience of various intricacies and delays in gathering its designed aims due to the shortage of skilled employees, joined with recurrent personnel turnover, incompetence in the subproject endorsement procedure, personals who transgressed their power, and deprived subcontractor recital. Consequences of the delays, the element lost a large amount of the impact on the local stability initiative. It could have on endorsing local stability in targeted areas (USAID 2009).

From the above description, it can be analyzed that there are showing of understanding between the Afghan institutions and the international community. The international actor has been working on very short-term stabilisation and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan while regional government and a local contractor are working on local stability initiative projects. But contractors were face hurdles for getting a skilled staff and well known staffs in information technology. Contractors are managing and creating a place of new foreign staffs in that place where it's required. Supplier used Afghan peoples in reconstructing and development projects because they have unskilled.

4.5. Key Documents and Institutional Frameworks

Afghanistan is currently the poorest and least developed countries in the world. In such conditions, it produces a sequence of progressive, vulnerability and clash. It makes a pave the ways for deteriorating conditions of Afghanistan. So, Afghanistan creates anxiety regarding security issues for the provincial and global level. The post-Taliban Afghan government has put a direction for development and reconstruction. For this, it requires a particular process and method that can guide Afghan government. The UN has been playing a vital role in reconstructing of Afghanistan with its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) programme. This programme has been working for the entire world. MDGs are also functioning in Afghanistan for purpose of providing the basic requirement of people with the support of entire nations. "Afghanistan's MDGs attainment and to ensure the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact, the Afghan Government has developed the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), which will form the basis for consultations leading to the full Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)" (ANDS Report 2005).

The Afghanistan Compact (AC) of 1384 (2006) flourishes "the Bonn Agreement of 1380". The framework of the international community is given by the Bonn Agreement to assist Afghans in making a justifiable administration, while the Afghanistan Compact gives a structure for the external countries to support the people of Afghanistan to make a statement and build up their nation. "Afghanistan is trapped in a circle of injustice. They intend to transform this circle of injustice into a circle of justice through the ANDS, the Afghanistan Compact, and achievement of our MDGs"

(ANDS Report 2005). The structure of it establishes its priorities and policies for this effort.

4.5.1. Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals (AMDGs)

The international community is working with the people of Afghanistan and the Government to meet the challenges of security while continuing to meet humanitarian and rehabilitation needs. But it is now time for the people to assess the development challenges that they face and with the international community set a path for overcoming them. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are yet another signal of the Government's commitment to move Afghanistan on the development path and away from the destruction of the last two decades (MDGs Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Country Report 2005).

At 2004, MDGs Program reached late in Afghanistan. The UN endorses MDGs programme to begin planning its contribution to global task. The UN has targeted a lot of population of the world to provide the least amount necessities of people by the year 2015. Afghanistan MDGs were special in term of enlarging to demonstrate the realities of local people. They chose data for their baseline in the particular period i.e. 2002-2005 while the deadline has extended from 2015 to 2020. "The key issues reflected in Afghanistan's MDG targets are poverty and hunger, universal primary education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, environmental sustainability, a global partnership for development and security" (Parliamentary Information and Research Service 2007).

4.6. Framework of Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and Conceptualization of Development of Afghanistan

The ANDS was developed by the government and endorsed by donors in 2008. The present ANDS is a successor to the interim-ANDS, which had developed for the period 2002 to 2008 (Ministry of Finance, Directorate General Budget 2012). The Interim-Afghanistan National Development Strategy is an interim document of the Afghan government. It suggests "policies and priorities of investment for dialogue and modification during 1385 and 1386 (2006/7 and 2007/8) with a broad assortment of partners such as members of the Government at the national and sub-national

levels, the National Assembly, donors, the United Nations, NGOs, civil society, and the private sector. By these, government creates worldwide and domestic support for full Afghan ownership of the Government's state building vision" (ANDS Report 2005). Additionally, the ANDS delivers as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of the country. PRSP is a policy for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction for the Afghan people (Ministry of Finance, Directorate General Budget 2012).

The Afghan government's policy and programmes has been helping for developing in Afghanistan. "The ANDS is the product of extensive national, provincial and local consultations. National consultations involved all major government and civil society institutions, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), cultural associations, religious communities, tribal elders, the private sector, development experts and the international community. Sub-national consultations involved discussion with provincial governors, provincial representative bodies, village councils, parliamentarians from each province, local civil society leaders, representatives of PRTs and prominent individuals in all 34 provinces. More than 17,000 people, nearly 50 percent of who are women. It is directly participating in the consultations" (ANDS 2008-2013). The Government of Afghanistan (GoA) mandated the ANDS Oversight Committee (OSC) to create an "MDGs and in the structure of PRSP to the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the international community. The OSC met on a usual basis to design, discuss and oversee the development of the strategy, including the identification of the needs and grievances of the people, and the prioritisation of resource allocations and actions" (ANDS 2008-2013). The fiscal policy of Afghan government has many aims in which one of the main aims is to help in reduction of poverty. It is designed in its poverty reduction strategy of the ANDS. The Afghan government created Medium Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) that dedicated to reinforce its financial statement formulation and implementation actions to help the execution of the ANDS and growing civic self-assurance. The adaptation of the MTFF provided as the stage of self-assurance in the government process. It played an important role in protecting donor funding process in late 1385 at the "London Conference" (ANDS First Annual Report 1387 2008/2009)

The basic services and assistance provision have filled the gap by NGOs. More than 1,735 NGOs (305 international and 1,430 local) have been recently recorded in Afghan government database. The largest number of those functions as sub-contractors for diverse funding countries and implementing of growth financial statement schemes. NGOs are supervising and coordinating between local and international actors to further conducting the way to the execution of projects (ANDS Annual Progressive Report 1389). ANDS are working as an observer of international actors and international NGOs, and it also evaluates its functions. .

4.7. Functional Structure of the ANDS

The ANDS procedure consists of dynamic connection within and outside of the Afghan government at the central and provincial level. The ANDS Secretariat took an active role in harmonising the grounding of the ANDS “to perform its task successfully; the ANDS have institutionalised within the Government and the sub-national administrations: each ministry has established ANDS focal points and rendered deputy ministers responsible for the ANDS process” (ANDS Progress Report 2007). Afghan Government formed the ANDS Oversight to supervise on the whole economic, strategy and policy procedure for the execution, checking and growth of the ANDS. Moreover, it makes certain that its aims congregate the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals (AMDGs). “The Oversight Committee is composed of Cabinet Ministers, including the Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Economy and Labour, Justice, Education, Commerce and Industry and the Chair of the National Security Council”. It has been meeting on a regular basis to manage the ANDS formulation process (ANDS Progress Report 2007).

In the functioning of the ANDS, the Afghan Compact provided a better platform for discussion on development issues at the country level among government, foreign funding countries, NGOs and civil society. In a second way, the Provincial Development Committees (PDCs) and the Offices of Afghan Governors played a vital role in assisting the sub-national consultation. It makes its certain positions in the list of Afghan government plan in which the ANDS will be situated on an underneath up rather than top down the way of position (ANDS Progress Report 2007). The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has taken the accountability to supervise and assess the execution of the ANDS by pointers and milestone. MoF is the major

coordinating corpse for financial and social strategy. It is to interpret facts and development measured by the marker. Indicators are given by line ministries and the Central Statistics Organisation (CSO). Ministry of Education (MoE) develops and applies methods, efficient supervising instructions, and generates reports on ANDS advancement. All these reports is presented to the Cabinet Minister of Afghanistan (ANDS Annual Progressive Report 1389).

The ANDS provides as Afghanistan PRSP that applies the pillars, policy and yardsticks of the Afghan Compact as a basis. The pillars and objectives of the ANDS are:

4.7.1. Security

Security is necessary for economic growth as well as reducing poverty in all the regions of Afghanistan. The long term strategic vision of ANDS is security field that ensures security of the state, persons and assets during the condition incorporated and sustainable national security infrastructure and law and order policy (ANDS Volume (2) 2008/09-2012/13). While attainments have been outlined below, the government and the international community acknowledge refused security conditions as well as an authentic requirement to reinforce security efforts more in the regions (ANDS Annual Report 2008/09).

- Expanding an Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) with the intention to endorse harmonisation between the Afghan and international security forces for enhanced safety delivery.
- For addressing the coordination of military's security, it is required for the national and international community to recognise its priorities to ensure efficient operations through the set-up of 15 harmonisation centres at the provincial police regions and regional security instructions. Though, safety menaces still mattered at the district level.
- Reinforced the ANA and ANP through planned and trained them with the advanced skilled and equipping staff, and escalating their figures from 86,089 to 134,000. Their process is succeeding with its technical training opportunities enlarged both at central and provincial levels.
- ANP achieved 91 percent of its goal.

- Completed the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program in 31 districts with important improvement created in another 39 districts.
- In the program, registered 4,000 persons for light arms ownership.
- Conducted efficient counter-narcotics attempts, of which 18 regions coverage nil poppy cultivated and 11 regions getting about to zero stages.
- According to UNODC reports, 74 narcotics manufacturing labs were destroyed and vacated greater than 22 hectares of poppy's land.
- The UNODC survey show 19 percent decrease in poppy cultivation compared to 1386 report.
- Vacated 25 percent of targeted areas of mines and Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs)

4.7.2. Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights

Afghanistan needs good governance, proper rules and regulation and proper functioning of justice system. All these create better facilities for human rights as well as reduction of poverty and constant increasing financial development in a high ratio. For this sector, the ANDS strategic aims are the establishment of Steady Islamic constitutional democracy. The state has three branches i.e. executive, legislative and judiciary that are functioning efficiently and comprehensively. They are responsible and support the law and essential human rights. The Afghan government reclaims to give better services to Afghan people. For achieving these objectives, it has to establish transformation and reinforce government bodies at national and provincial stages with strengthening transparency and capability of delivery of services. These consequences are created by the administration, and changing lawmaking procedures such as the conducting of free and fair elections. So, this supports the Afghan government to make better policies maker, regulate rule and regulation (ANDS 2008-2013). The World Bank evaluates the "quality" of Afghanistan's governing bodies as declining in lower position. It was 1% of the whole countries. At 2001, the progress of Afghan governance comprises the acceptance of the constitution, successful presidential and parliamentary elections, development in enhancing the living, welfare of women and other disenfranchised groups (ANDS Volume (1) 2008/09-2012/13).

However, “major components must be concentrated on the subsistence of several and frequently in similar structures of state and non-state governance institutions. These institutions has bewilderment over core centre-periphery administration and economic relations, weak public sector institutions and undeveloped governance and administrative capabilities, high levels of corruption, fiscal uncertainty, weak legislative development and enforcement, weak political and parliamentary oversight capabilities, weak community and civil society institutions, gender inequality and underdeveloped human rights enforcement capacities” (ANDS Volume (1) 2008/09-2012/13).

The rule and regulation have never attained quickly in any country. It is very complicated to build considerable improvement regarding safety and financial growth. So we can say that an up-and-coming political and executive emptiness is filling up with non-state institutional bodies driven by illegitimate and sedative interests, not by the Afghan Government (ANDS Volume (1) 2008/09-2012/13). It would be a very dangerous situation for the Afghan government. So it requires enhancing its governance capacity better with the support of international actors.

4.7.3. Economic and Social Development

The Afghan government’s policies are dedicated to make favourable condition to private sector. Private sector are started a market economy that deals with elevated and maintaining economic growth. The key to poverty reduction initiative of Afghan government has supported the private sector. This sector is the most effective vehicle for escalating job facilities and income producing. At the same time, the Afghan government identifies the requirement of the people and targeted assets at the poorest and weaker sections, to be attained through economically consistently and translucent transfer income policies. The government has taken primary priorities on trying to give health and education services to all Afghan people since 2002. These strategies will carry on for reinforcing and enhanced human development index indicator considerably (ANDS 2008-2013). For getting success in the field, these policies must have total support from the government of Afghanistan, the international community and by the side of the Afghan people (ANDS Report 2005). “However, they must meet the needs of the Afghan people, who, having endured the long, turbulent years of war, now hope and expect to turn their skills and knowledge to the building of

peace, prosperity, and social justice as citizens of a legitimate and effective state” (ANDS Report 2005). The ANDS is the standard instrument by which the Afghan government and people will construct stable state (ANDS Report 2005). Afghan government made ANDS. In this strategy, there is a public investment that structured six sectors of economic and social development. Those are playing a vital role in it. These six sectors are mentioned below:

4.7.3.1. Infrastructure and Natural Resources

Natural Resources are a backbone of any country that creates a path for earning revenues. Infrastructure also supports for balancing financial conditions of the country. Both things requires for strengthening the state. Its functions very efficiently in induction, pumping drinking water and agro machinery that support in time-saving, reducing women’s workloads, supporting in a medical instrument for health improvement and extend financial capacities. In this strategy, the transportation and aviation sectors play an important role in providing better facilities to children and mothers, reserve seats for women in public transportation and safe those from pestering, and consult women through shuras and women’s organisations on policies affecting them as well as the key sector of gender sensitisation. The Water Resource Management ensures that women are represented and joined in social projects. It also permits the assimilation of a women view widely range of all sector activities such as engineering design, management positions and decision making at council membership. For women, the information and communication technology makes it easier to work at home. It also makes very convenient in mobile and electronic commerce within the cultural restraints on their mobility. It also helps in business, public services, and state institutions. It supports in transparency in the works.

Other sector names are Urban Development that also supports in reaching the Afghan to improved basic services related to it and inexpensive house for poor people of Afghanistan. For reducing poverty in urban areas, it has been promoting sustainable financial growth for Afghan. It adopted and executed gender perspective laws that include land policy, housing policy, mortgage law, water distribution law, municipal law and land acquisition law. While the Mines and Natural Resources sector do the same, it commits to enhance job opportunities for Afghan as managers and technical professional and in ‘spin-off’ operations like processing, geological

surveys, design, cutting, polishing and marketing. The Government will return some percentage of revenues to mining communities to support based businesses. This sector supported the universities to promote the enrollment of women in the course. Indirectly, it will support in the Mines sector (ANDS Volume (5) 2008/09-2012/13).

4.7.3.2. Education

The Constitution of Afghanistan has already given the right to education for all Afghans. The sector has a long term of hallucination based on the Afghan constitution in spite of gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status or religious connection. Every Afghan has a similar right to access quality education to make it possible for them to increase their knowledge and skills. In this way, they can capitalise their potential. The effect of education can be seen in good governance, poverty reduction and prosperity. This sector produces a healthy workforce with relevant skills and knowledge. These support in long term financial development (ANDS Volume (4) 2008/09-2012/13).

This strategy outlines the way forward to achieving government vision through a series of immediate, medium and long-term benchmarks that will facilitate the development of an education sector (ANDS Volume (4) 2008/09-2012/13). It is important sector that can illuminate of entire societies of Afghanistan. “The education sector will reduce provincial disparities in access to education. It will develop and implementation a comprehensive gender-sensitive strategy, plan for training and capacity building for all levels of staff at central, provincial districts and school levels, organise remedial programs for women and girls. Those women and girls who drop out of school and to establish and to equip centres of excellence in Islamic education with access for girls in every province” (ANDS Volume (5) 2008/09-2012/13).

4.7.3.3. Health and Nutrition

Last two decades, Afghanistan has been taking a destructive charge with human and socio-economic indicators. It has been still floating below the international Human Development Index (HDI). The health sector has been devastated. It has left a blemish behind health professional, who are predominately male, where it is more complicated to employ qualified female staff in regions/ remote areas. Afghan life expectancy at birth (LEB) is 47 years for men and 45 years for women. It is a little

more than that of the richest countries in the world (ANDS Volume (4) 2008/09-2012/13). Health conditions of Afghans people are not so good. “The country suffers greatly from very high levels of Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) at 129/1000 live births, Under 5 Mortality Rate (U5MR) at 191/1000 live births and the Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) is estimated at 1600 for every 100,000 live births, the highest in the world except Sierra Leone. By all measures, the people of Afghanistan fare far worse, regarding their health, than any other country in the region” (ANDS Volume (4) 2008/09-2012/13).

The Ministry of Public Health’s mission is to improve the health facilities to the Afghan populations. Moreover, the dietary status of the people of Afghanistan is under fair and sustainable conditions through excellence Health Care Services (HCSs). HCS Provision (HCSP) endorses healthy environment and better condition of living as well as living healthy lifestyles. The objectives of the Health and Nutrition Sector (HNS) are working efficiently with communities and to improve status of Afghan people. It has greatly focused on women and children and remote regions of the country (ANDS Volume (4) 2008/09-2012/13).

4.7.3.4. Agriculture and Rural Development

A large number of populations reside in the rural areas. Agriculture is major source of economic of Afghanistan. It is the only backbone of the country. The Agriculture and Rural development is only sector that provides better opportunity to women. It consigs to make certain that women have access to representatives of community while helping in becoming better of the legal framework for gender equality and support of gender sensitive planning and budgeting. It is also executing and supervising of agricultural policies, programs and projects. It will also give access to significant infrastructure such as irrigation canals, storage, and value chain services for women farmers (ANDS Volume (5) 2008/09-2012/13). Besides it, another sector also promotes women to enhance their financial stability. “Backyard poultry production will be promoted through the formation of women’s groups, distribution of improved breeds, and training of women extension and marketing agents. Vegetable production, extensive sheep and goat production and the formation of producers’ associations focusing on wool processing, cashmere collection and processing, etc. will also are promoted” (ANDS Volume (5) 2008/09- 2012/13).

4.7.3.5. Social Protection

The ANDS has a plan for social protection while reformation of it is challenging. It ranges from the need to help that plan are reinforcing jeopardy avoidance, alleviation and managing methods. It shows that about 12 million Afghans are under poverty. They are either poor or very close to the below the poverty line. Afghan people are falling into poverty. They need humanitarian assistance from the side of Afghan government. A rough data on Afghan government shows that it would need annually around the US \$2 billion just to keep the poorest and weakest above the poverty line. The government has objectives to start a welfare reform. This reform is to help the protection of human assets, poverty and vulnerability reduction and escalating social inclusion (ANDS Social Protection Sector Strategy 2008-2013).

4.7.3.6 Economic Governance and Private Sector Development

The objective of Afghan government is to advance the management and responsibility of public disbursements. The Government is working on budget. The budget is an instrument of government policy. They utilised the resources effectively through the budget. Moreover, the government has other objectives to make a situation in which private sector can thrive actively and competitively, contributing to the financial development, job formation and poverty reduction. The effective financial management system is important for providing better facilities to the Afghan peoples. It will create a suitable environment for private sector growth. The Afghanistan government has made considerable progress in attaining macroeconomics permanency. Small to medium scale private sector activities have witnessed growth. Moreover, the telecommunications industry also plays a significantly roles for driving small to medium sector activities. The private sector has been mostly unwilling to undertake medium to long-term productive investments. Trade has increased at double digit levels. The largest amount of trade has exported to Pakistan or Iran, while imports mostly have financed by the international economic assistance and the drug economy (IMF 2006).

Due to the long period of war, the rule of law, a formal regulation and provision of services, the largest number of private activities exists constantly as informal economy. While the informal economy is necessary to Afghan substantial

health in short period development, to generate anti-competitive stress, promote illegal money, and refuse to provide security for workers and customers. Therefore, the key priority of government is to provide an environment that makes competitive gains for the private sector to function in the formal economy (IMF 2006). For this, Afghanistan and international actors would be prepared by physically, economically and psychology. After that, the business and trades can be existed in Afghanistan. It will also support to generate revenue for the Afghan government “As more business benefits improved access to fruitful resources, particularly access to finance, formalisation of the economy will also enhance productivity levels. It will allow the government to gradually increase its tax base and domestic revenues, which is essential for improving its capacity to deliver basic services and to reduce its dependence on foreign aid” (IMF 2006).

4.8. The Afghanistan Compact (AC): Purpose, Principle of Cooperation

President Hamid Karzai, the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair presided over a conference in London (Rubin and Hamidzada 2007). At this conference, there were 60 countries and international organisation that participated and issued the Afghan Compact. It has decided “to set onward both the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s commitment to state-building and reform over next five years. It was supported by the ANDS” (Rubin and Hamidzada 2007). The compact gives a policy for generating an efficient, with indented for enhancement in safety, governance, and progress wherein donors provide financial assistance to make further efficient. It creates a device to supervise adherence to the timelines and yardsticks. The compact places accountability for assembly of these aims of the Afghan government, which can simply detain answerable, and the ‘international community’ (Rubin and Hamidzada 2007). Both AMDGs and the Interim-ANDS were interconnected and signed an agreement at London Conference in 2006. AC is a political accord through which Afghanistan is devoted to making growth in the I-ANDS with support of the global actors. Global actors are agreed to give funds to assist this effort and to enhance the efficiency and responsibility of such support (The Afghanistan Compact 2006).

The Government of Afghanistan and the International actors have contributed their support in Afghanistan in following fields (The Afghanistan Compact 2006):-

- They reinforced to enhance the lives of Afghan people and to add peace and safety at state, provincial, and international level
- Confirmed their collective commitment to carry forward in the will of the Bonn, Tokyo and Berlin conferences, to labour toward a steady and affluent Afghanistan, with high quality of governance and protection of human rights by the rule of law, and to uphold and reinforce that pledge above the word of this Compact and beyond
- Identifying the audacity and fortitude of Afghans who have laid the basis for a democratic, nonviolent, pluralistic and wealthy nation. That is based on the principles of Islam by defying vicious fanaticism and adversity;
- Noting the filled execution of the Bonn Accord in the course of the acceptance of the latest constitution in 2004, and to conduct election of Presidential and Prime Ministerial in 2005 as well as Provincial Council election, which has made possible the country to improve its rightful place in the global community (Sigar 2008);
- Transitional phase of the Afghan government is not yet certain about peace, security and stability. But their sturdy worldwide involvement will persist to be requisite to speak to residual challenges;
- By setting the conditions for sustainable economic growth and development resolved the inheritance of conflict in Afghanistan. Intensification state bodies and civil society
- Eliminating residual terrorist menaces
- Meeting the challenge of counter-narcotics
- Reconstruction capability and infrastructure
- Reducing poverty and,
- Meeting basic human needs

4.8.1. Principles of Cooperation (The Afghanistan Compact 2006)

As the per Government of Afghanistan and the International actor's board on the execution of this Compact, they will:

- “Respect the pluralistic culture, values and history of Afghanistan that are based on Islam;
- Work by a partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community with its sovereign tasks. In this, the United Nations had played a central and impartial role (Afghan Ministry of Public Works 2007)”
- “Engage further with the deep-seated traditions of participation and aspiration to ownership of the Afghan people;
- Follow financial, institutional and ecological sustainability;
- Build Afghanistan long-lasting reconstruction capacity and efficient state and civil society institutions, with particular emphasis on building up human capacities of men and women alike” (The Afghanistan Compact 2006);
- “Make certain unbiased and transparent allotment of domestic and international resources to offer all parts of the country concrete prospects of well-being;
- Recognise all programs and policies that men and women have equal rights and responsibilities;
- Support regional cooperation; and
- Combat corruption and ensure public transparency and accountability” (SIGAR 2008)

4.9. Ministry of Afghanistan in the Development Process. It’s Nature and Objectives

It has discussed below the Ministry of Afghanistan that have been supporting for reconstruction and development in their country. Besides it, it also focused below the distinguished Afghan ministry’s nature and its objectives.

4.9.1. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)

MRRD was established for developing and implementing programs in rural areas. It is accountable for social and economic development in rural areas. Ministry is also promoting socially backwards people in rehabilitation as well as giving priority to the non-agricultural sector. It has deployed workers/staffs in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Both Ministry itself and international community deliver program funds in the large scale of these provinces. A healthy, poverty free and

opium-free Afghanistan should require independence society, strong democratic governance, self-reliability and equitable development for the weaker sections in the regions (MRRD of Afghanistan).

“The objectives of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development are improving human security and endorsing equitable development through poverty reduction by empowerment. It supports to the poor and weakest people in Afghanistan, helping individuals, households, and communities to better manage perils by supporting sustainable rural living strategies and direct provision of assistance to people who are unable to help themselves” (MRRD of Afghanistan). The objective of this ministry is very strong on paper, but it do not work physically on ground level in the regions.

4.9.2. Ministry of Finance (MoF)

Ministry of Finance has the most important task to manage, finance dealings, and return compilation, investment on expenditures and drawing extra assistance to uphold economic stability and financial intensification in the nation. Financial laws are dominate in a self-contained Afghanistan with a strong economy. The Ministry of Finance is responsible and accountable for the necessity of the people. It is an essential principle of MoF for upholding leadership. The MoF has its different priorities such as short-term, medium-term and long-term plans for development of economic capacity of the country (MoF One-Hundred-Day Plan 2015). The government should have to work efficiently manner for fulfilling these plan “To achieve these objectives will take the following actions: fundamental reforms in anti-corruption activities, improving administration and public finance system, preparing financial regulations and procedures and streaming frameworks to be transparent and accountable for the purpose of administration effectiveness” (MoF One-Hundred-Day Plan 2015). With the relationship of Ministries budgets and national priorities, Ministry of Finance is giving it close concentration to least developed provinces by allotment of extra economic resources to these provinces. The Afghan government’s income of source comes from agriculture and foreign aid. On behalf of that, the government makes five-year plan regarding policies and programmes upcoming years of Afghanistan. These programs are playing a big role in reformation for the execution of government policies. These policies support to lead financial growth, the

creation of employment, reducing poverty, reinforcing private sector and enhancing the living standard of Afghan. Afghanistan has limited economic resources to maintain its expenditure from its income. It requires more economic assistance in alternation. Economic assistances are a matter of the obligation in diverse fields, harmonisation, follow-up actions and coverage on shared and multilateral commitments. That would help to become more capable the Ministry of Finance (MoF One-Hundred-Day Plan 2015).

4.9.3. Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL)

MAIL has framed a natural resource management program with international actors. It has improved coordination of natural assets for its benefit. The value of this way pivots critically on the engagement of international actors. It is not executing itself for natural resource management. But it is happening with the support from the government (Squires 2012). It is also supporting the development of canal facilities and providing advanced technical equipment to the peasant of Afghans on irrigation of Agriculture. Moreover, Ministry of Agriculture supports livestock of farmers. Agriculture is backbone of Afghanistan in terms of earning resources. All things indirectly depend upon the cultivation of crops. “MAIL restores Afghanistan’s licit agricultural economy through empowered human resources, agricultural production and productivity, natural resource management and improved physical infrastructure and market development” (MAIL of Afghanistan). The government of Afghanistan has to work hard for providing latest machinery for cultivation of crops that would support to raise its economic growth.

4.9.4. Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)

MoPH is competent, answerable and responsible for the functioning of health facilities of all people of Afghanistan. It uses its power and authority to benefit the health of citizens. MoPH have to improve itself to make more efficient utilisation of government funds and help in the growth of economic assistance, make certain impartiality and comprehensiveness, and be more transparent and do better implementation of laws and regulations. It is a part of state-building in Afghanistan. Failure to do so will result in yet more corruption and poor quality, inequitable health services (MOPH Statement 2015). All citizens of Afghanistan give their full potential

support in strengthening the capacity of health sector that indirectly contributes to their peace, stability and sustainable development of Afghanistan (MOPH website).

4.9.5. Ministry of Education (MoE)

Education develops human assets. The education structures of Afghanistan are based on Islamic ethics. Education is the basic human right required for all Afghan people to make capable them to understand right and wrong. It is backbone of human being. Education creates suitable path to human being. It dynamically supports in maintaining continuous progress, financial development, being stable and safety of Afghanistan. MoE strives to achieve this vision by executing a comprehensive plan that targets to improve admittance, excellence, significance and managing of education delivery mechanism in the years to come (MoE website).

Many massive challenges exist in confronting the education sector in spite of impressive achievement. Here, it is mentioning few challenges before the student. “The high numbers of out-of-school children and youth, gender and rural/urban disparities, low quality of education and administrative limitations are a few of the many challenges that the Ministry of Education has yet to overcome to achieve Education for All and MDGs by 2020” (MoE website).

4.9.6. Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN)

The vision of the Afghan government is a country free of illegal drugs trafficking, human trafficking and narco-drug production. The cross-cutting subjects of ANDS are the Counter Narcotics, Intoxicants Law and counter-narcotics. It has been included in the Afghan constitution. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics will: “lead counternarcotics policy and program formulation, coordinate the counternarcotics budget with the Ministry of Finance, coordinate pertinent counternarcotics efforts in line with ministries and organisations. It also monitors and reports on the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. The MCN will work with other partners to create a secure environment for a healthy society with a strong licit economy, through evidence-based policy-setting, effective coordination and full accountability to the people of Afghanistan and their government” (Afghan Govt. Website).

4.9.7. Ministry of Defense (MoD)

The MoD envisions balanced Afghan force structure and making better infrastructure and willingness. The MoD also recognises their priorities. In the same way, the Chief of General Staff (CoGS) is paying attention to raising the professionalism of the Army, an apolitical and non-ethnic officer corps. The MoD can still improve the use of resources in spite of attainment in various fields. Critical areas of weakness in the MoD include logistics, procurement, acquisition, budget, and finance. Reform in each of these areas is essential (MoD, MoI, ANA General Staff and Master Ministerial Development Plan 2015-16).

4.9.8. Ministry of Interior (MoI)

The MoI is making development toward self-reliant operations, increasing the number of departments operating with minimal or no coalition assistance. Progress is happening in some capability development initiatives such as operational planning and many others. It has to improvised policies that would support for balancing better environment. It should be familiar with the local government that will help to make harmony among administrative bodies of government. “While MoI capacity to give decisive functional support has progressed, there is still necessitate for enhancement in legal affairs, personnel management, facilities, procurement, and finance departments. Lastly, the MoI logistics and supply systems are not yet capable of effectively sustaining all units, particularly those forces like ANCOP and ABP stationed in remote areas” (MoD, MoI, Afghan National Army General Staff and Master Ministerial Development Plan 2015-16).

4.10. Linkage of PRTs and Ministries of Afghan Government

The Afghan government has recognised an important role in the international community that is supporting the ministry of the Afghan government for its development and reconstruction through the concept of PRT. The government has encouraged the PRTs to help in the priority project implementation by the Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) in concern with state interests (ANDS). In this regard avoiding recurrence, all PRT will require reporting their actions to the state institutions through the Harmonized Reporting Format (HRF). This format executed since 2007. This format facilitates the government to admittance inclusive and

harmonised information on economic assistance flows. Foreign aid is provided to the Afghan government by the donor. Moreover, the substantial funds are granted by external community for projects and programmes that are going in Afghanistan. Besides it, all projects funds have been passing through the main budget of the government of Afghanistan. The Afghan budget circulates an international fund into the different fund projects of the country (IMF 2008). “The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) and Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNFT) will be fully integrated into national planning and resources accountability systems across the different layers of Government” (IMF 2008).

The international community has been supporting the Afghan government’s ministerial bodies in the field of education and health, price stability and financial progress. To the large extent, PRT was constructed in response to humanitarian assistance and emergency economic assistance. The percentage of economic assistance for rebuilding and growth will have to increase and making the better prospect of Afghanistan reaching its benchmark targets and the MDGs (ANDS Report 2005). “A large proportion of international assistance has flowed through the external development budget rather than through the government’s core budget. Even though resources that bypass the government budget still finance key national priorities and projects within the national developmental budget, this trend is a reflection of a lack of donor confidence in the government’s ability to manage funds and oversee program implementation on a large scale” (ANDS Report 2005).

Both PRTs and the Afghan interim ministry have established a connection, linkage, particularly the national security forces. Indeed, the direct tasks have firstly attempted to the United States PRTs, in which the Ministry of Interior has made relation to the upper level of administrators since 2004. Similarly, only some other PRTs have also made linkage with it through such officers. Nevertheless, the PRT guideline is the strongest for helping Afghan National Police or Afghan National Security Forces. The PRT components have frequently and directly established its connection with ministries. A large amount distinct grant had aligned with the state institutions in functions and growth, where the PRTs should have a facilitation role.

But they are frequently doing their self-regulating projects (Eronen 2008). They are not working according to Afghan government guidelines.

Through PRT, the US-led alliance military have given critically support in making the nation stable. The NATO-led ISAF supported the Afghan Ministry of Defence indirectly for spreading its forces from Kabul to Northern and Western Afghanistan. It is contributing in gradual extension of stability in different regions. According to ANDS Report 1380 (2001/2), the Afghan government conceded with international funding agencies or countries to congregate each year to appraise its growth priorities. Consequently, the government of Afghanistan has arranged an Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF) in Kabul every year since the Tokyo donor conference. The purpose of it is to improve harmonisation between the government and donors and among the latter. Shortly after the Berlin Conference, the second ADF took place in 2004 and made report 1383. The third ADF held in 2005 and created report 1384. It provided the first international donor forum for Afghanistan's democratically elected President and his new cabinet (ANDS Report 2005).

The international coalition and regional partners with ISAF have been providing training and advance skill to the Afghan national army and Afghan police through military cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior. Besides it, it also supports through new technical equipment. "In Afghanistan, the principal partners of international forces have been the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which have three important elements. The first and largest is the Afghan National Army (ANA), followed by the ANP, and the Afghan Intelligence Service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS). All three are subordinate to Afghan political leadership, with the ANA and ANP under the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior respectively, while the NDS are a cabinet level agency reporting directly to the political leadership. All of these had developed with the ability to organise, train, and equip forces and tactical operations by US military forces. So, the ANA has made important progress in both organisation and tactical operation; it remains dependent on international forces for a variety of key enabling capabilities, such as logistics. It is also highly dependent on foreign funding from the US-Afghan Security Forces Fund, the NATO ANA Trust Fund, and some additional direct contributions from other nations. Absent these enablers and funding;

ANA capabilities will decline precipitously” (Long 2016). It means that all developmental projects have been depending upon international funds. It can be analysed that Afghanistan has no financial capacity to do some extra projects works. “The NDS is accountable for providing help to the military and police in fighting terrorism, anti-government elements and narcotics. It fulfil its duties by collecting and analysing information and offering specific recommendations on security. It has also shared information and cooperate with international security organisation stationed in Afghanistan. The NDS is non-political institutions with merit-based promotion system” (ANDS Volume (2) 2008/09-2012/13).

It can be analyzed that the international community and donors countries are basically working directly on technical assistance to the Afghan staffs, but they have lacked behind for harmonising mechanism in the province where they exist. The Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism (PJCM), held at the Rome Conference in 2007, assist in improving the releasing of fairness backing in every province reliable with this policy and the National Justice Program (NJP) (ANDS Pillar (2) 2007/08-2012/13). It has been creating platform for dialogue between international actors and Afghan government. “PJCM will focus on coordinating actions of donor to adhere to three goals: (1) to facilitate the comprehensive and consistent reform of justice systems in the major cities, (2) to ensure comprehensive regional assessment of formal and informal justice systems in each PJCM area and (3) to expand justice programming by identifying and helping to target future justice assistance to the district level and more remote provinces. UNAMA will provide supervision of the PJC, which is funded by donors” (ANDS Volume (2) 2008/09-2012/13).

Aid effectiveness issues are conducted by the Afghan Ministry of Finance. Within the budget Department, the Aid Coordination Unit (ACU) is accountable for most of the issues such as funding from a donor that are releasing and monitoring of exterior help. The economic assistance policies of government laid out favoured economic assistance modalities on the releasing of developmental assistance by NGOs and PRT (IMF 2008). International fund creates favourable conditions for Afghan government that supports for coordinating plan in proper manner in Afghanistan. “International communities and Afghan ministry’s institutions establish and maintaining natural resources in entire Afghanistan and describe regimes of

utilisation that achieve a balance between maximum production and productivity in all agricultural land uses effective maintenance and enhancement of natural resource bases” (Squires 2012). The UNDP works with the Government of Afghanistan to enlarge regional capability and supporting for solving of Afghan’s fundamental problems. The UNDP programs had shared with the Afghan government for focusing on catastrophe avoidance and recuperation, elected governance, reduction of poverty and sustainable livelihoods (UNDP website). UNDP helped to enhance Afghan National Police in its proficient capability and competence. Thus, the UNDP supported the Afghan government in peace and revival efforts. Consequently, it has increased faith of people and confidence in the Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan Police to give peace and safety (Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock).

4.11. Summary

PRTs formed with the assistance of the US-led coalition partners. Military and civilian are supporting in the reconstruction process, peacebuilding and stability of Afghanistan. Besides it, international and national agencies and NGO are functioning in Afghanistan. PRT led nation’s support packages have used for capacity building in the governance of Afghanistan that is directed through the United Nations or Afghan national development programs. The objectives of the PRTs are “to help the government of Afghanistan to enlarge its authority to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment, capable security sector reform and the reconstruction effort”. In this activity, the international actors are involved in stabilisation where the level of violence is not being sorted out by themselves, while other agencies cannot come in front to operate as per normal (Lane and Sky 2006). It can be analysed that PRT is not fully successful in Afghanistan as they are incapable of winning the heart and mind of Afghan people which is necessary for inclusive reconstruction and sustained development of Afghanistan.

PRTs served well in supporting the Disarmament, Democratization and Reintegration (DDR) process. Moreover, they also constructed political system after the Bonn Agreement in Afghanistan. These are dynamically flourishing schemes of state-building. PRT is obviously a cost-effective mechanism for attaining a high quality development and governance (Eronen 2008). PRTs have a large transaction of

controversy with strategy communities, with some International NGOs, inquiring the suitability of military started humanitarian programs. These are not controlled by personnel with specialised training or wide understanding of humanitarian relief or growth. However, the more deep critique is that the PRTs provided in an atmosphere where the humanitarian and growth tasks are becoming militarised. Therefore, it has been shown as immature work that has been seen as a source of insecurity (Christie 2012)

The IMF, the World Bank, USAID and other main funding organisations have created huge pressure on the government of Afghanistan. They have adopted special strategies and time limit for congregate that indisputably move ahead of the speed of the procedure. Additionally, they do not look merely pretentious the excellence of work, but also broaden the space in understanding and make feeble opinion among the participants (stakeholders). Moreover, Afghan government depends upon the foreign aid which creates a limitation of development policies. The lack of technical capacity inside state institutions creates strategies and policies that also decrease state influence in the decision making procedure. There is a lack of harmonisation inside the international funding agencies or organisation. As a result, between the Afghan government and donors countries have put their weak prioritisation and harmonisation of development priorities (Shah 2009).

The United Nations General Assembly Security Council (UNSC) report explained: “popular alienation remains a key factor behind the revitalised insurgency and stems from in appropriate government appointments, tribal nepotism and the monopolisation of power and the marginalisation of those outside the dominant social and political groups”. The AC was recognised these problems for the first time after the plunge of the Taliban period. Both the Afghan government and its main funding countries accredited the significance of provincial rules and regulations sustainable for getting success in the developmental and political ambitions. The most important things are that they address the matters with their commitment. The interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy is undertaking the rebuilding efforts. It also overtly recognises the recent fault of public administration and marked the significance of provincial governance more largely for the attainment of political and developmental goals (Lister 2009).

The AC highlights various components of the plan for sustained safety, governance, and growth. The ANDS goals are to significantly decrease the number of poverty, enhance the living standard of people and establish the base for a safe and steady country. The ANDS conducts the strategy of the government. It also describes the policies, programs and schemes for a period of five years. The overall functions of ANDS are to efficiently execute, supervise and assess these actions (Ministry of Finance, Directorate General Budget 2012). That is very suitable for countering terrorists. The ANA plays a vital role in boosting regional security through these actions. There is some intention shown by the presidential verdict to establish Afghan National Army's achievements. Due to this, the excellence and capacity of ANA are quickly growing. It will carry on to rise until the army is competent for balancing the permanence, protecting its sovereignty and provincial security (ANDS Volume (2) 2008/09-2012/13).

USAID started its local Governance and Community Development Project in the southern and eastern provinces in Afghanistan. The Afghan government is also working with it. In this project, local communities are working in partnership to create constant environments for long lasting economic, political and developmental goals. PRTs are closely working with this project to promote the stability. But, these are substantially delayed due to some major substitution gap between local public administration and governance, the Afghan government and the international community (USAID 2009).

It seems that PRT and the Afghan government are working jointly under a different state institution, while there is also a provincial government that is playing a vital role in Afghanistan. Without the help of local government, no program and project can be successful, on the other hand, international communities have not made long-term program and projects for reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan. International coalition partners are involved in undertaking counter terrorism and counter narcotics measures. They supported ANSF for furthering their objective and to make possible through financial support, training of ANSF, delivery of new equipment and technical knowledge and intelligence. Besides this, it also supported in the development of basic infrastructure for people such as making school, building a hospital, digging well, making facilities of transportation, etc., while NGOs have also

helped in changing the negative mindset of people about external actors. In support of NGOs, international forces are functional operations in Afghanistan.

It can be analyzed that the Afghan government and the US-led coalition partners are working in Afghanistan for their interests. Nevertheless, at some points their interests are not common. As a result there has been some substitution gap between both of them. They are not satisfied with themselves. This has made Afghan people weaker. In this situation, they feel helpless. However, international forces had bombarded in different provinces in the name of Taliban and Al- Qaeda groups. This has resulted in the death of many innocent Afghan people. Thus, we can conclude that the PRT has not been doing the best job in Afghanistan. They were not successful in winning the heart and minds of Afghan people.

Chapter-5

The Role of PRT in Security Transition and Challenges

5.1. Introduction

Afghanistan has been facing a security threat for a long period due to external intrusion. Afghanistan is known as the heart of Asia. Many intruders attacked on this country for reining it, but they could not win over this country. In the Cold War period, Afghanistan had been interfered by several countries like the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India in its domestic affairs. These countries were utilising various ways such as extreme hostility and combating proxy wars. Moreover, they supported for improving Afghan military security by preventing fighting in Afghanistan (Ahmad 2012). In the field of reconstruction and security sector reform of Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been working to refrain from providing unconditional assistance. The coalition partners use PRT as an instrument for applying conditionality in the periphery to enhance good governance. PRT cooperated only with provincial governors and district superintendents. These governors and superintendents show a pledge to principles of better governance and helping national level growth programs and improving processes. However, PRT conditionalities will have a limit at the sub-national; they are not parallel by the application of disincentives at the central level targeted to fail patronage networks that provide political cover for corrupt provincial officials (Goodhand and Sedra 2006).

After fall of the Taliban's regime, the capacity building of Afghanistan government requisite reformation process of the security forces in Afghanistan. It ensures that international funding did not waste. Private armies divert fund in terms of security. The U.S. Department of Defence (USDOD) created PRT. The task of PRT is improving the security condition and indulging in the community development projects. The mandate of ISAF explained to support the government and maintain security in Kabul. The mandate mentioned in the UN Security Council Resolution 1510/2003. Its mandate expanded to major regional centres. A major task involved the building and reconstructing the capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Another task involved building the Afghan National Police (ANP). A Police Auxiliary

Force (PAF) created in 2007. The United States took the lead role in the creation of the ANA, while Germany has involved and took an important role in training the police forces and set up a police academy in Kabul. Although, it neglected police training in the provinces. Italy provided funds and expertise to reform the justice sector. In 2003 the United States took over the training of the police force. In additionally, the US subcontracted the work to U.S.-based DynCorp International¹, which spent US\$ 24 million setting up seven training centres entire the country with a three week concentrated training course to fight the insurgency (Emadi 2010). The international community does all of this task. This task shows the ability of coalition partners that create effective and democratically responsible security sector of Afghanistan. Thus, it can be said that security sector capable of giving safety, controlling conflict and affirming domination over the use of coercive force. This security capability shows the legitimacy of the government (Goodhand and Sedra 2006).

Regarding the security transition process in Afghanistan, the conditionalities of the international community could serve as a proficient machinery to jumpstart reform. However, their competence is dependent relatively on improvements in donor harmonisation and greater government rights of the procedure. It is reinforcement the capacity of the National Security Council (NSC) that serves as a controller and central point for Security Sector Reform (SSR). The SSR could help to meet these prerequisites. International donor/organisation attention should focus on creating managing capacity administrative reforms and personnel restricting. More potent pressure will have to be brought to bear on both the line security Ministries and the Executive to remove obstinate actors (Goodhand and Sedra 2006). Recently, the United States led coalition partners to provide monetary and advisory assistance to the Government of Afghanistan to facilitate a better training, equipping and monitoring to ANA and ANP as well as sustainable Afghan National Defence Security Force (ANDSF). ANDSF provides safety to the people of Afghan. They have been fighting to defeat the remaining of Al Qaeda and disturb allied terrorist groups to maintain peace in Afghanistan. So, they entirely affect a safe sanctuary for Al Qaeda and

¹ DynCorp International is an American private military contractor. In beginning, it started with aviation. After sometimes, the company also provides flight operations support, training and mentoring, international development, intelligence training and support, contingency operations, security, and operations and maintenance of land vehicles.

Taliban for planning and attack against the government of Afghanistan as well as the western countries of the world (USDOD 2016). That is why the US forces and ISAF used the largest military forces in Afghanistan. These international forces are fighting with insurgents and supporting ANA to maintain peace and stability in Afghanistan (Younossi et al. 2009). The US has been supporting the Afghan security forces with creating extra special operational forces in Afghanistan. Special Operation is different from normal military operation in the stages of physical and political risk, functioning technically, and method of recruitment amongst other factors (Best Jr. and Feickert 2009).

The objectives of Afghanistan's national security forces are safeguarding the territorial integrity, defeating insurgency and terrorism, providing the steady and safe surroundings, restructuring different defence sectors, and causative to regional and international security and stability. In the current situations, the national interest of Afghanistan focuses on the affluence of the Afghan people, to check and balance of the rule and regulation and make a stable government by the central government as well as provincial government (Younossi et al. 2009). While the purpose of the special operation is to plan, direct and execute the operational plan on conducting the war on terror in the context to disturb, overcome and obliterate terrorist networks. Terrorist groups threaten the United States as well as European countries (Best Jr. and Feickert 2009). Afghanistan did not perceive any direct menace from any provincial administrator in the recent past. However, the current and upcoming Afghanistan has been facing various internal issues challenges (Younossi et al. 2009). Besides it, other external issues also affect at present. It found that such type of problems will held in upcoming future of Afghanistan.

Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other insurgent allied groups coming from the border areas creates the internal disturbance for Afghanistan stability. Illegal armed groups are directly threat for disturbance the institutional bodies of government as well as the people of Afghanistan. Opium trafficking is indirectly critical threats for Afghanistan. It supports for getting an illegal trade (Younossi et al. 2009). Warlords and the Taliban created wealth through illegal drug trades; economic assistance from external sources, taxation, and through different forms of criminal activity (B.I.C.C. 2003). It supports in spreading corruption in the system by providing much money to

provincial and central level officers relatively with their salary. Moreover, terrorist groups buy weapons for influencing the central government of Afghanistan. The lack of education and scarcity of livelihood is a major indirect menace to Afghanistan's security. Terrorist groups also motivated to the Afghan people to come and join in this group. In Afghanistan, it is an easy process for recruitment in terrorist groups. That is why the uneducated and low-level standard of living is more vulnerable to fanatic ideas. So, the creation of a secure, prosperous popular is crucial to Afghanistan's future security (Younossi et al. 2009).

The external financial assistance is an important element of the Afghan government because the conditions of Afghanistan in all over the world came in the bottom place of GDP. Foreign aid contributes 40 per cent of Afghan budget and 100 per cent of the development budget. The Afghan government made capable of reaching 11 per cent of the entire budget needs by enhancing its income compilation since 2009. Afghanistan still required of US\$7.2 billion dollars for maintaining its safety and growth impetus shortly (Dhaka 2014). But the financial assistance has not produced concrete consequences. Hence, foreign aid has enhanced the lives of people and worked to reduce the breach between rich and poor. The huge amount of the financial assistance are using in the external military forces in the name of security, while rest of fund used in Afghan developmental project through budget programme. Drugs and narcotics trafficking generate incomes that assist the lifestyles of emerging rich in the country. They have no social difference and lack a social base of support. So, they continuously serve their requirement. The Afghan people believe that religious leaders were a pioneer of society growth. Religious leaders use Islamic charitable trust funds for making a better lifestyle of the Afghan. But, they have been using these funds to enhance their programmes and business dealings. That is why they have become richer and richer with compare to common people. They have no curiosity in participating in reconstructing basic infrastructure of the country. Moreover, they have extra worked integrated their power bases by setting up grand *madrasas*. They inspire the younger generation for fulfilling their dream through Islamic beliefs and principles (Emadi 2010).

Counter-terrorism is the main concern of the International communities, but it delayed and twisted Afghanistan's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme. After fall of Taliban, the Bonn Agreement did not comprise DDR. In 2003, DDR started to concentrate on anti-Taliban militias in Afghanistan. The first DDR Programme presented individual erstwhile militia commanders and political rendezvous as an inducement to go through DDR. The program did not have a positive outcome regarding setting into place political appointees. The public is not happy with these appointments. They have been accused of human rights abuses and corruption (Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli 2015). Afghanistan faces complex challenges of a DDR process in which multiple facets of life have been affected by war (Ozerdem 2002). Furthermore, the main factors of Afghan insecurity can be divided into five categories: "warlordism, total spoiler groups, the narcotics trade, the interference of regional states and crime" (B.I.C.C. 2003). All these categories show the significant critical problems for the administration of Afghanistan in promising a political order. In the long period of civil war in Afghanistan, it produced all these challenges. It decentralised political tradition. Warlords use the ethnicity as an apparatus to make certain the faithfulness of their followers and mobilise support from the people (B.I.C.C. 2003). The ethnic affinity network remains an important source for gaining power for warlords. These networks exploited by the Taliban or rogue warlords for intrigue (Dhaka 2014). However, it is power and wealth, but not tribal individuality or religious zeal runs them (B.I.C.C. 2003).

It has been analysed that for making the DDR Process successful, first of all, it requires three basic principles. The following principles are firstly, compulsion to admit the authority of armed forces responding to the conflict. It should no longer be the norm; Secondly, the warlords as powerbrokers influence highly the system of government that can merely be prevented by the survival of an active state to ensure stability and security. Thirdly, in the surroundings there live massive numbers of combatant belonging to different militias' faction entire Afghanistan. Consequently, the post-war recuperation plan should be designed (Ozerdem 2002). Disarmament is the collection and development of responsible weapons management programmes that manage and discard off minute weapons and light weapons. Demobilisation is the procedure whereby the security force of the administration and opposition or militias forces either scale down or part. Reintegration is the procedure by which erstwhile

fighters and their families as well as other expatriate persons are incorporated into the economic and social life of civilian communities. All these principles are connected to each other. They are a sequence of activities. They recover societies from conflict (Ozerdem 2002).

Afghanistan's border is permeable and has active arms market. The Government of Afghanistan has a paucity of capacity to implement rule and regulation on the open transport and criminal use of weapons. A scarcity of legitimacy of government, financial and safety environment augments the importance of safety and monetary value for the people that is why the people have been using these weapons. All these three incidents illustrate the safety status of Afghanistan. Due to these reasons, DDR process was designed for Afghanistan to monitor these activities properly (Ozerdem 2002). Before proceeding further, it should identify some important quandaries in the security transition methods for establishment of peace building and reconstruction. It will describe the quandaries in the upcoming part of this chapter. By collecting the common views about security process, we found the significant roadblocks such as "disarm the people so that they do not resort to arms to settle disputes in the future; disband warlords through consultations and dialogue; settlement of age-old enmity between the major warring factions, the Northern Alliance and the Pashtuns" (Ahmad 2002). All these should be a part in the reconstructing and peace building process for making a stable government.

Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic society. Pashtun, Uzbeks, and Tajik play a vital role due to their number and influence in political activity. Afghanistan may not achieve its goal of peace unless a genuine consensus is reached between these three groups. These three have been playing a significant role in making the government of Afghanistan. In spite of this, they also function in administrative bodies of the country (Ahmad 2002). Because of the less participation of other ethnic groups in the election. That is why, the clash of interest developed in Afghanistan in which the terrorist groups have benefitted and were able to easily influence the central government. Security is the fundamental requirement of the Afghan government through which it can prevent itself from external invaders for protecting its liberty and sovereignty. Moreover, it supports in protection of its people from external attacks as well as internal terrorist attacks. After that, reconstruction is one of the necessary aspects of

the development of the country. It requires a continuous and long-standing process of arbitration between varied domestic interest groups and political leaders. In this context, the concern for continuous peaceful resolutions must be seen at the provincial level of the country. But, it also needs to make a better connection with influential coalition partners and global donors (Barakat 2002).

5. 2. Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP)

Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) is a scheme of the UNDP. It was generated in 2003. The ANBP got its managerial assistance from the UNDP and the diverse ministries of Afghanistan. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) provides political guidance to it. The ANBP is responsible for SSR and its programming as well as DDR. For fulfilling these programmes, the different international countries took interest and participated in it. They choose their role according to the programs. Many foreign countries took an interest in this programme in which Japan funded DDR; the U.S. and Germany funded in police training; the United Kingdom funds anti-drug trafficking efforts; Italy funds Judicial reform and the United States funds reform of the military (Sanz 2009).

The ANBP focuses its work on four areas (Sanz 2009). These are the following:

5.2.1. DDR:

“DDR is a group of activities that forms a fraction of the strategies for peace building after the civil war. Peace agreements include provisions for DDR in the context to reduce the number of people under arms and help forces to find another and peaceful ways of living. However, DDR is planned to encourage national security rather than human or community security” (Verkoren et al. 2010). If national security is in better conditions, automatically the human security will become better. A new generation of DDR Programmes imagined local commanders and their groups. They could disarm together through a mediated process. It also highlighted the local people's protest against local commanders and the Taliban. Afghan civil society was the only stakeholder in Afghanistan that has the capability and carry out a mediation based DDR model. It has been implementing peace building programme to mediate water and land disputes, the internal violence of the country and family related issues

in Afghanistan since the 1990s. In addition, the conflicts within community development council have been setting over development priorities. In spite of this, civil society designed a programme to tie together Afghan peace building capacity to the new generation of DDR (Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli 2015). The Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (D&RC) coordinates government and inter-ministerial tasks together with UNAMA and the UNDP. These are the major executive bodies for DDR in Afghanistan. One for disarmament, another for the recruitment and training of officials, and another for recruitment and training of soldiers integrated into the Ministry of Defence (Sanz 2009). Although the DDR program succeeded in disarming some warlords, private militias and armed groups continued to operate throughout the country. Some warlords covertly maintained their militias, disguising them as members of political parties, business groups, and even private security firms. Individuals possessing arms preferred to sell their arms to prospective private buyers, as the government did not provide adequate compensation to them for surrendering their arms. The government remains weak and inefficient. Warlords are the de facto rulers in the country-side and the highly centralised systems of governance that had degenerated into a more decentralised system (Emadi 2010).

5.2.2. Anti-Personnel Mine and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (APMASD)

APMASD is known as “*Ammo Project*” and continued from December 2004 to March 2008. APMASD engaged in searching, collecting and obliterating armaments in DDR. Later, its names got changed as DIAG or Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. Canada contributed \$16 million for APMASD. The ANBP and Ministry of Defence (MoD) executed the work of the APMASD. It has found 32,300 tonnes of ammunition while 15, 833 tonnes of it destroyed 2007. In addition, it had transferred 9,443 tonnes to the Ministry of Defence, while 496,717 anti-personnel mines and 16,125 anti-tank weapons have also been demolished (Sanz 2009).

5.2.3. Heavy Weapon Cantonment (HWC)

HWC was implemented from 2004 to 2006. HWC had congregated 12,248 armaments in 2005. Heavy arms were removed from circulation. The HALO (Hazardous Areas Life-support Organisation) Trust, is an international NGO, actually developed and sustained, long-term mine clearance program in Afghanistan (Bolton

2008). The HALO Trust was accountable for HWC implementation while the ISAF and ANBP disregarded armaments storage (Sanz 2009).

5.2.4. Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)

DIAG was created in 2005. It follows on from 2002 to 2006 DDR of Afghan Military Forces that was carried out by the ANBP of UNDP (Poulton 2009). DIAG is as “the continuation of DDR and Commanders Incentive Programme (CIP) under a new name and with different parameters”. DDR and CIP are in actuality diverse in activity and sympathetic, while the ANBP differentiates the two (Sanz 2009).

5.3. Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been efficiently used in consequence of the political violence, where the opponents of specific conflicts were compound together under the auspices of a new government. However, this term mainly created in the 1990s from the debate on security matters connected to contributor deeds. In the Cold War period, military assistance programmes were conducted by the two super powers all over the country. They focused on only strengthening the military forces by training and equipping. They were showing less attention on political supervision and democratic governance (Thruelsen 2011). SSR is being used for rebuilding and improving the Afghan security forces.

The basic objective of the government is maintaining security. Security is multifaceted which consists of human, physical, economic and social-political security. Failures of these securities have resulted in ground level violence and increase in demand for weapons (Verkoren et al. 2010). Boosting of the security requires a perfect democratic government. The objective of SSR is liberal democratic that facilitates the efficient and competent security delivery within this structure. SSR is largely significant in war-affected countries, whereas it is not adequate to establish continuous peace. Security forces’ improvement is most pressing for war-torn conflict areas, where paramilitary police often faced with challenges of insecurity. Modern conflicts’ characteristics have a diverse role for paramilitary statutory, while unofficial military staffs are prone to abusing human rights. It requires for security forces to ensure the security of the citizen so that they can believe in them. Therefore, the military and paramilitary police must restrain the interior safety of the country.

SSR connected deeds like disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Demilitarisation is a component of security force reform (Friesendorf 2011).

DDR play a vital role in peacebuilding process in conflict-affected countries. It plays an effective role in Afghanistan as there are approximately 8 to 10 million guns in the country. Additionally, there were combatants between 100,000 and 250,000 in all phases of the conflict. The Japan government has suggested various tactics for DDR in Afghanistan, but none has materialised. Even if, the Japanese continue to stay the primary founder for DDR, they have mainly delayed the accountability for DDR arrangement and sustenance to the UNAMA, UNDP and the United States. While UNAMA commenced DDR program titled “The Afghan New Beginning Programme”. The program is well framed. It has ample monetary support for it's in the early years of the campaign. However, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) reformed its activities that enforced and a real political agreement relating to DDR among Afghanistan's warlord achieved. The program will probably remain grounded. We have observed that the action of police will be extremely difficult without DDR. Due to it, the terrorist groups and free market of arms create problems of police for balancing the check and balance of the rule of law and making peace environment. The police isequipped with the latest technology weapons that support in the maintenance of peace and stability and also properly organize these forces. These forces must be demobilized the reintegrated into inhabitant society for civilian policing to be practicable (B.I.C.C. 2003).

For development of Afghanistan, a better condition is required. It could be possible with proper security that can handle counter-terrorism. The success factor of counter-terrorism efforts require rebuilding, training, equipping and advising police forces in Afghanistan. If security forces of Afghanistan are trained, equipped and mentored in huge numbers, the police and military can play an important action in every step in counter-insurgency. Hence, they can easily handle the problems of insurgency by recognizing conditions of local level, where people actually live. They have the capacity of holding the area to link with local people of Afghan. By doing these, they will gain confidence of the locals. Moreover, they become capable of gathering required intelligence; they can help in providing needed safety and stabilize the atmosphere by intermingling with the native people. This will provide the

necessary environment where reconstruction can take place. Marcus Skinner stated that “the police provide a vital connection to the population and a level of local knowledge and intelligence vital to the population and a level of for defeating insurgencies” (Thruelsen 2010).

The US and its coalition forces have been operating their campaign for many years in Afghanistan. They are reconstructing native security forces that would act as decisive elements of any exit strategy, including the support to the governance and the rule of law. But they are different in their strategic interest with the policy of Afghan government. This operation may not be the practice in conditions of intrusion operations; it presented the largely difficult conditions for SSR. The entire sector of the countries requires their construction especially in the context of conflict rather than the comparatively benevolent situations of post-conflict like the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia (Barley 2008). Unluckily, this has not happened in Afghanistan. Here, problems are so different than those countries. The corruption and immoral activities in the police department have added to civilian trepidation and unfriendliness. It may have instigated the public to turn away from the government (Thruelsen 2010). The highest quantity of opium is produced in Afghanistan. It is at top position for producing opium in the world. Poppy cultivation had about wrecked under the Taliban, but it is again increasing. Opium trade may currently account for one-third of Afghanistan’s GDP. It is one of the most serious challenges faced by the Afghan government. The illegal trade in narcotics is one of the main difficulties that threaten to undermine development (Zaidi 2006).

5.4. Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP)

The Afghan National Security Council issued the “Program Document” for APRP. This program was consequently corroborated mutually by the Afghan government and the global community in the Kabul Conference in July 2010. According to the “Programme Document”, the APRP objectives are “to promote peace through a political approach. It will encourage regional and international cooperation. It will create the political and judicial conditions for peace and reconciliation. It will encourage combatant foot soldiers and commanders, who formerly sided with the armed opposition and extremist groups to renounce violence and terrorism, to live within the laws of Afghanistan, and to join a constructive

process of reintegration and peace” (Zyek 2012). This document indicates that “the APRP seeks to enable local agreements where Afghan government supported communities to encourage them to stop fighting, and rejoin their communities with dignity and honour. Also, the administration reaches out to insurgents to address their grievances”. The ISAF document and the APRP “Program Document” both emphasised on the reasons which have led fighters to join the militancy and on the need for “grievance resolution” (Zyek 2012).

In 2010, at London Conference, it recognised mechanism to move towards larger Afghan leadership in which they discussed fields of safety to financial growth as well as balancing a healthy relationship with governance to regional forum. In this conference, the president Hamid Karzai pointed out the peace and reintegration programme. This programme targeted to enhance the peaceful environment in the country through dialogue. The programme comprises the creation of a national peace council. The function of this council is to control the reintegration of armed opposition fighters and to setup a peace reintegration trust fund. This trust fund supports the production of jobs and monetary incentives for those who relinquished hostility (Report of the Separatism 2011). The Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP) is an initiative function, while America funded it directly. It is mainly separate from the APRP. Afghan government received US \$50 million for this program in 2011. In next year, Afghan government also got the second instalment of fund allotment. ARP has funded activities such as “vocational training for reintegration and their communities, support for provincial governor outreach efforts, the establishment of Provincial and District Reintegration teams detainee release Shuras, support to the High Peace Council and construction of reintegration countries” (Zyek 2012).

5.5. Afghanistan Security Forces and its Origins

Within the SSR, Afghan governmental bodies have to take a responsible step to improve their security. The Afghan government and the United States determined to augment to reinforce of ANA and ANP. Besides it, other international communities such as Germany also came in front for giving training and providing new knowledge of technology. These have led new recruitment campaigns in a country. The Government of Afghanistan (GoA) also decided to support the creating of local community level self-defence forces by the Afghan Local Police Programme and

other community defence initiative (Report of the Separatism 2011). That will support in preventing Afghan people. Here we describe some Afghan armed forces.

5.5.1. Afghan National Army (ANA)

Ahmad Shah Durrani was the first ruler who maintained an army on regular basis since 1747. Army witnessed many ups and down experience of situations. It was frequently reformed and reorganised. The last re-organisation of the army took place in the 1870's under Sher Ali Khan. This reformed army rapidly crumbled against British imperial troops in 1878. The ethnic ruler left taxes to fight against the interlopers. In the period of 1880's, Abdur Rahman Khan established a stronger army. In the regime of Amanullah Khan, he has acquitted himself in the British-Afghan war in 1919. However, Amanullah stopped giving much of concentration to requirements of the army, which underwent a steady refuse until it crumbled again during the civil war of 1929. The King Nadir Shah started to re-establish it from 1930 onwards. The Afghan Army almost crumbled in 1980 due to confrontation with a massive degree of insurgency and political turmoil. The Army was surviving at that time only because of the Soviet support. After the Soviet Union had withdrawn from Afghanistan, the civil war started between Najibullah and mujahideen. At last, mujahideen conquered the war and also the control over Kabul in 1992. They had a lack of knowledge about the political will that controls a regular army. The Taliban defeated the mujahideen and captured Kabul in 1996. The Taliban made new type of central army with some success. But, once again the central army crushed following the U.S. intervention at the end of 2001 (Giustozzi 2007).

PRT was started by the US and coalition partners that lead developmental projects in Afghanistan. PRTs are composed mainly of military personnel and concerned as much with security as with reconstruction and development (Zaidi 2006). The US-led Coalition partners began to work towards creating a modern ANA. For making modern ANA, these coalition partners had training, equipping and mentoring as well as empowerment efforts for both men and women. Regarding enhancement of security forces, it requires making a self-sufficient and ethnically balanced participation in Afghan security forces. It will support to make certain enforcement the rule of law throughout the country. Despite, the ANA and its improved ability required the strategy to manage operations. It promotes continuous

training efforts, advice in developing a sustainable defence planning process and assist in defence reform initiatives. These can be possible by the contribution of trainers, resources and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) through the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (Report of the Separatism 2011).

The misfortune of Afghanistan, the United States altered the strategy with the Central front of its *war on terror* to Iraq before stabilising Afghanistan. This had paralysed and affected the Bonn Agreement, which sought to build endless governance institution in Afghanistan. It weakened the efforts, while it targeted at Emergentan inhabitant Afghan security equipment. The Afghan Army instead sustained plagued with several exterior and interior challenges. The capital of Afghanistan, Kabul, frustrated over the scarcity of a proper trained and equipped Afghan military seems to be under mounting threat as the Western style hesitates under the Taliban pressure (Chandra 2008). The Afghan National Army played a significant role in a transitional phase of the country after 2014. Though, it has revealed yet again that the ANA could uniformly turn into a power for stability or strong mechanism of destabilisation. If the ANA is to create an optimistic involvement among the people of Afghan for the upcoming of the country, it requires being internally interrelated and staying away from a break down along sectarian or class lines (Wood 2012).

Despite better training and a better fighting spirit, the ANA is unable to deploy a large number of units against terrorist activities and groups. The commanding and controlling capacity of ANA are still feeble. Thus, we can say that ANA is not capable to operate campaign against these activities itself. This cannot be possible without the leadership of the international community. According to ANA report, the campaign connecting more than 100 troops cannot conduct powerfully an operation freely. Moreover, the International community is not involved in the fight against the insurgency despite thousands of troops (Dorrnsoro 2009 b). From above discussion, we find that ANA has to work hard for getting training and equipping. The Government of Afghanistan has spent a lot of money for buying latest technology of weapons and provides better education to all the ethnic people as well as to create a democratic government.

5.5.2. Afghan National Police (ANP)

In the Cold War period, both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic had worked in Afghanistan in the field of police development. During this period, the Soviet Union had organised the Afghan Police based on its model. The Soviet model is a two-track system in which first are career officers, and second are the Afghans employed for short-period, who service for two years as patrolmen or as to join the military officers. Officers were getting an education at a police academy. The police militarised as well as included a light infantry force. National Civilian Police Forcedid not exist in Afghanistan because civil war was continuously happening between mujahideen and Taliban regime. However, there were approximately 50,000 men working as police in 2002. But they were not trained, unprepared and uneducated. They owned their commitment to warlords and local commanders. That is why they did not connect with central government. During the mujahideen rule, they used the police for indemnity prepared for the people and making democratic states. Some professional police officer from Afghan National Police of the USSR period remains, but their experience and instruction were not suitable for the twenty-first century. The Interim Afghan Government had required building a latest specialised police service with skilled officers, trained career non-commissioned officers and patrolmen with the international assistance. Afghan government welcomed German for training and equipping the Afghan police. The trainingis based on a European model that would offer university level education to all the staff of police as well as short-term course. The Germans pledged to provide \$70 million towards refurbishing the police academy in Kabul (Perito 2009).

The objectives of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan are to make sure that the Afghan government can manage its territory in the background of avert terrorism, transitional illegal activity and the anarchy. This objective should be understandable for ANP. The police are features of the government. The ANP has large responsibility for the security of community as well as the prohibition of illegal trade crossing from the border. The former chief of intelligence and counterterrorism activities was still more unambiguous. In his words, “The most important thing for the future of policing in Afghanistan is the mind of the police; they must understand the people of the

country and the values of the country. The problem arises when we just put a homogeneous group, so they appear like police but do not act as police. This has created a gap between the people and the government (Hughes 2014)". The United States can optimistically affect the future of the ANP in the direction of meeting with America's national security goals by putting the weight of its efforts behind activities. It has built collective effort in regard to the police. It includes programs, targets and activities that support for law enforcement and security sector governance. Afghan's Ministry of Defence has particularly recognised as critical to achieve mission and vision of the ministries (Hughes 2014).

The US Department of Defense (USDoD) started holding up the training of lower ranking police. The USDOD supported many times, and still, it is continuing. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was born in 2006. The U.S. effort placed a larger emphasis on the counterinsurgency and paramilitary role of the police. The US spending on police rapidly dwarfed that of the Germans. The German spent US\$80 million from 2002 to 2007, while the CSTC-A planned US\$ 964 million budget for assisting the ANP for the fiscal year 2008. The Italian effort lagged behind in the enhancement of the police project because of a lack of resources and with little harmonisation. These were merely incidental mutual support. This situation remains to the present. The U.S. has spent more than US\$ 10 billion on policing in Afghanistan till early 2010 (From et al. 2010). Recently, the US has been funding to make stronger security in Afghanistan. Thus, it can prevent from the threat of the Taliban, Al Qaeda and its allied groups.

5.6. Ethno Challenges raising the Infrastructure

The diverse ethnic groups live in Afghanistan. They have been facing a long war. Due to that, their conditions become so weak that influenced the resources. The scarcity of resources is the main concern of raising conflict between these ethnic groups. That is the reason; the civilian of Afghanistan supported the Taliban throughout the country because the Taliban easily provides employment to unemployed and poor people. It is working as a force of order. Moreover, the other cause of conflict is competing for power in central government between Pashtun and Northern Alliance.

The new government has a primary challenge to concentrate on resistance in the north of Afghanistan among the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance includes Uzbek and Tajik units that connect with the erstwhile mujahideen forces. They inhabited in the mountains. They engaged in asymmetrical conflict with the Taliban army. But they were not strong enough to crush it. During the current situation, Afghanistan became the centre point of jihadist organisations which received a welcome reception from the Taliban government. The most notorious terrorist group was Al-Qaeda headed by Osama Bin Laden. After 11 September 2001 attacks, Afghanistan became a primary target of the US-led Coalition forces' fight on terror against the Taliban and Al Qaeda groups. The confrontation continues unrestricted under the government of Hamid Karzai. The resistance is set up by the US. This government has failed to provide stability and peace for their people (Bosin 2009). Afghanistan has been continually suffering with the tension among the Afghan National Security Forces, Taliban groups and the external forces.

5.6.1. Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan

Afghan forces attacks on the US-led coalition forces. It is called Green-on-Blue attacks in Afghanistan. These attacks have emerged as a major menace in the decades of war in Afghanistan. All attacks in Afghanistan in which a person is claiming to associated with the Afghan security forces. These attacks have increased dramatically between 2011 and 2013. During this period, they gave the explanation of 15 per cent of coalition forces deaths (Roggio and Lundquist 2012). Whether the Afghan security forces includes Afghan National Army, Afghan Local Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Air Force, other branches, or Security personnel hired by Afghan authorities are considered 'green'. Similarly, all persons claiming to associated with US, ISAF or NATO Security Forces, including interpreters and civilian contractors are considered 'blue' (Roggio and Lundquist 2012).

NATO commanders stated that the 90 percent coalition forces' assaults in the beginning were due to the cultural dissimilarities and individual hostility. The first assaults started in 2011. The President Barack Obama proclaimed the sketch to full the surge of the forces and end warfare action in 2014. He decided to change security charge to the Afghan forces. The Taliban also have claimed to have stepped up

labours to penetrate the Afghan National Security Forces. Although cultural and personal discrepancies may contribute a significant role to enhance attacks, Afghan security staff supported the Taliban in infiltration and detection. Afghan security personnel have decided to ingratiate themselves with the Taliban by attacking NATO forces. NATO forces probably play a far more important role than NATO officials admit. It is impracticable to have a full understanding as to what stimulates Afghan security personnel to turn on their external partners (Roggio and Lundquist 2012).

ISAF Responses

ISAF Commander General Johan Allen said that “about half of the green-on-blue attacks have been carried out by Taliban penetration. He also mentioned that approximately 25 percent of the green-on-blue attacks were due to Taliban infiltration and or coercion of Afghan forces” (Roggio and Lundquist 2012).

Taliban Claims

The Taliban have detained on the ‘green-on-blue’ attacks in their agenda. They regularly declare every assault to be an effect of penetration. Mullah Omar was the preceding leader of the Taliban or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He addressed “the issue of green-on-blue attacks in a statement released on 16 August 2012. He claimed that the Taliban cleverly infiltrated in the ranks of the enemy according to the plan given to them last year and urged government officials and security personnel to defect and join the Taliban as a matter of religious duty. He also stated that the Taliban have created the ‘Cell and Guidance, Luring and Integration’ department, ‘with branches...newly operational all over the country’ to encourage the defections” (Roggio and Lundquist 2012).

5.6.2. Regionalisation of the Resistance Pocket: Mazar-E-Sharif, Helmand, Nangarhar

The resistance of US occupation in Afghanistan is not as strong as Iraq. America demonstrates Afghanistan as an example where democracy is in progress. The confrontation has not finished. Remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda are still in stronger position especially in southern part of Afghanistan. Besides, ‘Warlordism’ has also sustained in Afghanistan. The warlords preserve their private army and

collect revenues in their stronghold. They are also involved in activities like smuggling and drug trafficking. Some of them are even the members of the Transitional Authority. Thus, President Karzai's government has been unsuccessful to disarm the militias and counteract the warlord's power. The Taliban operation has driven a wedge between coalition forces and the people. It has given the Coalition forces a glimpse of the supporters of the Taliban. On the contrary, the public believed that alliance military is ethnically insensitive, cause superfluous inhabitant victims and is unsuccessful to proffer suitable compensations for those victims. Thus, the public becomes cuddle and raise passive support for the Taliban and generate a puddle of possible new fighters (Afsar et al. 2008). Resistance against the coalition forces has continued. The Taliban are part of this resistance. The main priority of US there became stability rather than major battle. Guerrilla attacks on Afghan as well as the US and NATO troops (Zaidi 2006).

5.6.2.1. Mazar-E-Sharif

Balkh is situated in the northern part of Afghanistan. Its border touches with Tajikistan in the northeast, Uzbekistan in the north, Samangan in the south-east, Kunduz in the east, Jawzjan in the west and Sare-Pul in the south-west. Mazar-e-Sharif is the capital of Balkh. Mazar-e-Sharif is the unofficial capital of northern Afghanistan. This capital has been comparatively secluded due to the clash in the last decades. Its political and financial power is large and reaching greater heights. Mazar-e-Sharif is situated on a significant connection between Herat in western and Kabul and Kunduz in eastern. Its border is also connected with Uzbekistan by which lies an important economic dry port of Hairatan. It is a doorway to and from Afghanistan. It is a strategical location for the international military and makes it easy to cross the border of Afghanistan. It is a route through which both supply and withdraw of international forces takes place (EASO 2016).

Edinburgh International is private security company in London. This company stated that "An increase in armed attacks is currently occurring in the regional hub Mazar-e-Sharif and neighbouring districts of Balkh, raising the prospect of a brief revival insurgent activity in line with seasonal trends. While such attacks remain almost exclusively directed against the national security forces, sporadic bombings in Balkh's major cities have been known to extend the civilian targets and could pose an

indirect threat to the multitude of international and non-governmental agencies which operate from the city”. Chintal and Chahar Bolak are the western districts that were deemed practically insecure along with Balkh districts. These districts are the hub of poppy cultivation. Moreover, these districts are also famous for cultivating cannabis that is also a key factor of unsteadiness. According to Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organisation (APPRO), ANA and ANP are usually well thought-out competent, supportive and respectful to women. ANSF are doing their work effectively in this province. Due to it, the number of insurgent activities has reduced (EASO 2016). But the resistance activities between Taliban and coalitions forces are still going on.

5.6.2.2. Nangarhar

Nangarhar province is a mountainous province in Afghanistan. It's border is connected with the autonomous tribal areas such the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan. There are close ties between these regions. Consequently, a lot of movement happens across borders in both directions. Pashtun ethnic comprises the majority, while remaining population is made of Pashayas, Tajiks, Gujar and Kuchis which are very less in number (Report 2016). From the security perspective, Nangarhar has been famous for several years for the largest number of recorded security incidents in Afghanistan. Nangarhar has consolidated its position as a province with significant insurgent activity. Nangarhar has long been the home of several rebel groups such Taliban, Al Qaeda and other Afghan resurgent groups as well as other international groupings. The ethnic composition is strong in the greater part of Nangarhar. It means that local village leaders have great influence all over the ethnic community. They negotiate with these groups by whatever means they consider best to benefit their area and populations needs. The common civilian saw that the insurgents are attacking government's institutions and personnel. Staff members of ANSF are especially vulnerable to insurgent attacks. They also attack other insurgent forces. People were assumed to be linked with the government or other insurgent groups (Report 2016).

By increasing the terrorist attacks against ANSF on the main Bati Kot highway, it had determined security condition. Moreover, the Taliban had also targeted on the trunk road Torkham-Jalalabad. According to the Long War Journal

(LWJ), “Nangarhar is a strategic province for both the Taliban and the Coalition forces. The province has connected the border with Pakistan that is a tribal agency of Khyber and hosts the main supply route from it. Gunmen also attack civilians on the Kabul-Jalalabad highway” (EASO 2016). Regarding their strong presence, the insurgent takes benefit of rivalry, ethnic clashes, territory dispute, including the confrontation against the crackdown of opium farming. That has increased by 400 percent between 2012 and 2013 (EASO 2016).

5.6.2.3. Helmand

Helmand is an especially attractive province for the Taliban in its ongoing struggle for territory. This province is the most important locus of opium production in the whole country. Besides, its southern part is being connected to the Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan, where opium traffickers move heroin and morphine-based out of the country. Helmand is the largest province of Afghanistan. It is gradually weakening because of the Taliban’s strength and their offensive against the Afghan government. Nawa-i-Barakzai district is the closest to the provincial capital district of Lashkar Gah. Nawa-i-Barakzai became the latest of Helmand’s 14 districts to fall under the Taliban. The Taliban control 11 out of 14 districts of the province. The fighting has lately been going on for many weeks in Helmand. But the tide of battle appears to be errand the Taliban (Panda 2016).

Why the coalition forces chose Helmand? It is because there are two important reasons behind it. These reasons are mentioned here. First, Helmand is the leading opium-producing province. The Taliban has obtained very less financial assistance from opium. The crackdown of opium would slow down the insurgency. Here, the insurgency operates on the cheap. While the Taliban’s other sources of financial assistance are from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Gulf states. The Taliban have a lot of stocks of weapons in Helmand province. Helmand gives easy and direct access to Pakistan. It also connects by roads to the western provinces (Ghor, Herat and Badghis) of Afghanistan. The Taliban have easy access to using the northern part of the province. The Coalition forces cannot occupy the Northern provinces because of the difficult nature of the land. Despite, it is the key route for insurgency into the western provinces. The Pakistani security forces do not take interest to close the border for the insurgents. Pakistan government has not followed proper rule and

regulation and agreement with Afghanistan to control the southern border. It is impossible to control. This is the real reason to deploy one-fifth of Coalition troops in this insignificant regions because of the British troops already became failure there such as a case of “path dependence”. The Taliban have manipulated the agenda of the coalition forces. After that, they have been using it as a force to fight the coalition forces on ground favourable to them (Dorrnsoro 2009 a).

Preponderantly Afghan Local Force is making recruitment easily because of the Taliban have got a fairly support from the population. It has promoted by a religious-nationalist reaction against foreign troops, coalition operations, consequent subordinate harm, and the misbehaviour of bureaucrats. So far, the population does not resist the taxes levied by the Taliban. The Taliban are capable of averting offence in places where they are fully in control. The coalition forces targeted the insurgency region, while it remained precarious because the ANA is weak to the replacement of these forces. This area is very dangerous. The troops cannot withdraw without the consent of the Taliban. Thus, the provincial government is not capable of securing all the districts. It can hope to control the centre of these districts (Dorrnsoro 2009 a). So, the coalition forces have been unsuccessful to clear a major portion of the province of Taliban fighters. Helmand’s border with Pakistan is open broadly; it cannot be controlled with merely the U.S. troops. While Pakistan has not supported the Coalition forces in catching the terrorists, they allow Taliban groups havens when they need it (Dorrnsoro 2009 b).

Helmand is suffering from thestruggle between external forces and Taliban. It emphasises the challenges for Afghanistan. The United States can continue to strike Taliban positions around the city, but Afghan security forces infiltrated into Lashkar Gah. The campaign is retaking any possible significant territory in Helmand may be long and difficult (Panda 2016). This province is the most unstable among the southern provinces of Afghanistan. Here, armed militant groups are functioning and are regularly carrying out insurgency activities against the government (EASO 2016). It shows that the Taliban is continuingconfrontation with external forces in which the people of Afghan are facing security threats on both the sides. Besides, the civilians have been dying due to it.

5.6.3. Special Operation Groups in Afghanistan

The US has proposed to build a prolonged Afghan security sector structure. The Special Operational Forces (SOF) are the important ingredient of this. In the development of Afghan SOF an important role has been played by the U.S. and coalition forces. The United States SOF includes U.S. Army Special Forces, U.S. Navy SEALs, and U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Teams. The main focus of SOF built up is on the Afghan Commandos and Special Forces. International forces provide several skilled personnel related to the intelligence, planning, and logistical support to facilitate Afghanistan in SOF to attain instant functioning effects. The Afghan government can improve their security capacity through it. They can utilise intelligence, plan and logistical support in counter-insurgency (Long et al. 2015). The USDoD defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, information, and economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement” (Best Jr. and Andrew Feickert 2009). Provincial Response Companies (PRCs) depended upon the regional level. Moreover, the individual Provincial Chiefs of Polices (PCOPs) watch over directly PRCs. These companies are projected to perform special police operations at provincial-level to counter-insurgency and narcotics trades, including hold up operations against illegal groups. PRCs face different challenges which are entirely stemming from their provincial-level focus (Long et al. 2015).

The SOF has played a significant role in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001. SOF has to necessarily turn to the execution of U.S. national defence plan on the war on terror against Islamist extremism. Islamist extremism will probably be more and more indirect in his war against the countries, while the United States was not at war. SOF played a crucial role in coordinating with the U.S. for getting accuracy in air force operations in managing with the asymmetrical Afghan resistance forces to attain quick government change and eradicate Al Qaeda’s primary heaven. After fall of the Taliban, SOF has played a crucial role in improving the capacity of the ANA, giving the personal security staff for senior Afghan officials, and killing of senior Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders. Besides, they have also been working effectively in operations near the Afghanistan and Pakistan border as well as

giving training components of Pakistan's Frontier Corps and Special Service Group (Martinage 2009). "SOF is building partner capacity, collecting intelligence, conducting counterterrorism operations and hunting high-value targets in multiple countries across several continents. Recently, over 80 percent of SOF capacity had allocated to just two countries: Iraq and Afghanistan" (Martinage 2009).

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) is the national-level headquarters for all special operation's units within the Afghan MoD. ANASOC is the division-level headquarters for the Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASFs), the Commanders and KtahKhas (KKA). The command has over curving task to train, advise, assist, and provide work for Special Operations Kandaks (SOK) which is battalion levels units (USDOD 2013). The Kandaks include the Commando Kandaks, the ANASF Kandaks and the KKA Kandaks. The ANASF are similar in structure and mission to the U.S. Army Special Forces. The KKA are Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA)'s national armed task for special operations force. The KKA perform offensive campaign in Afghanistan. It degrades rebellious networks to avoid them from setting up functioning important safe havens. The ANASOC are continuously creating new units and personnel sections. The long-term projects include the collaboration of Special Mission Wing (SMW) and KKA night time operations. This mission did not complete till 2013. The Special Operations Kandaks (SOK) formed with the combination of Commando (CoC) and ANASF (USDOD 2013).

The ANASOC has been working to develop its institutional capability to carry out training programs. Recently, some syllabus was introduced at the Division School of Excellence. It has made 12,241 commanders and 1,131 ANASF. ANASOF continues to develop self-regulating operations and self-sustaining capabilities. Recently, ANASOF functioned at a lofty cadence. It has been affecting the operations extra than their number would suggest. Several campaigns have been entirely depended upon ISAF air transportation. The Afghan Armed Force (AAF) does not have the competence to provide sufficient helicopter mobility to the ANASOF for making up for the exit of the most of the ISAF forces in 2014. ISAF's air support has less number of availability of planes thus ANASOF will have to travel through on the ground. The road transport is very troubled in various regions of the country. This

transportation is taking more time than the air transportation. It will consequently reduce ANASOF's efficiency (USDOD 2013).

5.6.4. Volatility of Durand Line

Durand Line was demarcated in 1893 by the British India between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the demarcation line, the ethnic Pashtun belt of Afghanistan was effectively divided into two parts. Thus, it has been implanted the seeds for an eternal conflict. The name of Pashtu's belt before demarcation line was Pashtunistan. After demarcation line, the region of Pashtuns became separated into two parts. "The British control of these regions that would later become Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). When Pakistan became an independent state in 1947, it was declared the line of the international border with Afghanistan. Making the situation more complicated is the existence of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) within the Northwest Frontier Province. These areas remain outside the direct control of Pakistan's administration. Its residents cross the border without any restriction" (Conference Report 2007). The pashtun families got separated due to this border division.

Pashtuns sympathetic to link with the Taliban in FATA and NWFP have been inference by the security forces of Pakistan. During the Soviet regime of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States used the FATA regions as recruiting grounds for subsidised mujahideen for fighting against the Soviet army. The tribal belt was the source of extremism by the development of *madrasas* and a plenty of modern weaponry coming through these border areas. Moreover, returning refugees radicalised the surroundings. After the departure of Soviet Union, various foreign mujahideen had settled in the FATA. Many of them engaged into marriage. The inhabitants of these areas increasingly favoured the Taliban due to ethnic, religious, ideological and cultural affinities. After 11 September 2011 attacks and OEF, drastic components mobilised some support for the Taliban in the FATA. Additionally, they began marking the Pakistan government because OEF is supported by this government. For the purpose of countering-insurgent groups, Pakistan has deployed over 100,000 troops in the FATA. In the similar operational signatures insecurely associated with the Taliban in Afghanistan (Afsar et al. 2008).

This demarcation line creates many problems between these two nations. The border is not properly fenced. There is porous border between these countries. As a result, the Pakistan and Afghanistan border region has been continuously under turbulence. The areas near Durand Line are one of the most volatile and hazardous places in the world because of the terrorist safe sanctuaries and due to negligent Government control. Various forms of criminal activities such as smuggling of weapons; narcotics, vehicles, timber and electronic goods are a routine matter. Through these areas, most of the drugs produced in Afghanistan find their way into Pakistan (PILDAT Report 2015). “FATA is the major transit route for large-scale smuggling business from Afghan territory into Pakistan” (Conference Report 2007). These constitute a significant threat to the Afghan government and indirectly a threat for U.S. national security. This region was almost surely home to both Osama bin Laden and his lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri. This region has again become a locus for a resurging Al-Qaeda network. It continues to be home to a host of terrorist groups who bent on exporting Jihad which also includes the Taliban. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that “Al-Qaeda got continuous funding from radical Saudi Arabia Wahabist sources. The Al-Qaeda group has not been built only of its commanding base in the border region but has continued to recruit and train operatives to infiltrate the United States and other Western countries” (Johnson and Mason 2008). Thousands of the Taliban fighters and its senior leadership of Shura have found asylum in FATA. Pashtun ethnic groups completely dominated this region. Besides it, FATA is also a heaven for Al-Qaeda. FATA is the base camp of Afghan Taliban for operating cross-border attacks on the Government of Afghanistan (Conference Report 2007). Moreover, the Taliban and the other Islamic extremist insurgent elements operate their activities both the side of Durand line. Most of the violent religious extremism from both Pakistan and Afghanistan are centred within a single ethno-linguistic group. This group is not completely grabbing with government policy community that has long downplayed cultural dynamics (Johnson and Mason 2008).

There are many base camps of terrorist groups near the Durand Line. The Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its militant's groups have been threatening the Afghan government. FATA region is the international hub of Islamic radicalism that promotes terrorist threat at the international level and looks for destabilising Afghanistan. Some

other problems are drug trafficking that also affects the revenue of government. The Pakistani government has great financial incentives with the situation to remain in such a vague state. Pakistan directly benefits from the high volume of illegal trade into Afghanistan (Payne 2012). In this environment, the situation continues to suppurate, as “Afghanistan blames Pakistan for fuelling the insurgency in Afghanistan to destabilise the government of Hamid Karzai and install a more compliant government in Kabul” (Grare 2006). The Taliban through a series of many attacks is targeting American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. It indicates that the insurgents are much stronger and more organised than the coalition forces. Besides this, Pakistan frequently supports the Taliban in its activities for disturbing the peace environment of Afghanistan “NATO forces have failed to prevent Taliban insurgents from controlling a large swath of Pashtun-dominated eastern and southern Afghanistan. A major challenge for the coalition is how to wind down the war, reducing violence, while also preventing a wider regional conflict. Ending the war will not be possible without a power-sharing agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban, followed by an accord that includes the support of regional players with a legitimate stake in Afghanistan’s future” (Hussain 2011).

5.7. Summary

Afghan government started improving security sector with support from the international community. For this, the US and its coalition partners came in Afghanistan for security transition. PRT is a source through which these international coalition partner function for reconstruction process in which security is the most important factor both the Afghan government and coalition partners also. There are many programs started with the support of domestic government and international community such as SSR, ANBP, APRP and DDR. SSR has been efficiently used in consequence the political violence, where the opponents of specific conflicts were compound together under the auspices of a new government. The ANBP is a project of UNDP. It got its managerial assistance from the UNDP and the diverse ministries of Afghanistan. The UNAMA provides political guidance to it. The ANBP is responsible for SSR and its programming as well as DDR. It was launched to disarm private armies and teach them new skills to enable them to support themselves and integrate themselves into civil society (Emadi 2010). The major political difficulty for

DDR are disagreements about the leadership, composition, and role of the MoD itself, lack of full US participation in the effort to provide the leverage needed for such sensitive and difficult operation, and the absence of any offer of international military observers for the demobilisation process.

The US-led coalition forces heavily support by giving training, mentoring, equipping and providing the latest technology of weapons. After getting all of these things, the ANA and ANP continue to face significant challenges in effectively countering the menaces of insurgent groups across the country (UNGASC 2016). The ANP faces huge problems of capacity, corruption, and retention, all of which have contributed to the failure of establishing an efficient civilian police. Another central problem of police reform is that it cannot be successfully carried out without parallel programs of judicial reform. The government of Afghanistan and the international community has been not progress speedily, but it functions slowly (Skinner 2008). There is currently a growing realisation among all the international coalition forces that the war may not end in Afghanistan but some political settlement with the insurgents. It would need direct talks with the Taliban. There is also a grave concern that withdrawal of foreign forces without any negotiated political mechanism in place will be disastrous. That would not only thrust Afghanistan into a violent contest over territory and population by various tribal groups and factions (Hussain 2011).

The main problem is the lack of security and law enforcement structures. This statement is about Afghan Security Forces and judges. Not enough money has been directed towards institution building, the justice and security forces (Afghan National Army and Afghan Nation Police). Programs have been a total failure while the Government of Afghanistan is entirely dependent on international economic assistance. International economic assistance is not getting proper management in the Afghanistan that produces as fuels in Afghan dissatisfaction. International Assistance is dispersed by many subcontractors with too little harmonisation and responsibility to Afghans and their interests. Thus, new Afghan elites accumulated wealth due to which the people especially feel betrayed. International economic assistance is part of a war economy. This economic assistance has made a rentier country where global wealth is considered a prerogative. The people rely on an international fund of which a small part directed to infrastructural development. These funds are circulated by

PRTs or other international bodies. Far from conciliating social anxieties, this has made high prospects, growing discontent, and a large contract resentfully between communities. Moreover, the insurgency has advantages as much as the population from the arrival of money through extraction (Dorrnsoro 2009 b). That is why security is not the prime concern for warlord and bigger leader that are connected to the Taliban and Al Qaeda and its allied groups in Afghanistan. Ethno challenges are the big problems for rebuilding the Afghanistan. Without solving the ethnic problems, the security, as well as reconstruction process, will not be possible in Afghanistan. For sorting all these problems, the Government of Afghanistan should provide a liberal democratic environment in which all ethnic groups can take participation by forming a representative government. The people of Afghan have to think about it.

Chapter-6

Conclusion

Afghanistan had shattered for a long period due to the external incursion. It has undergone through a lot of competing values by ethnic, religious and regional rivalries. Besides this, drug trade and narco-terror industry support insurgency groups. All of these have been hampering the overall development of Afghanistan. Moreover, it also affects the rule and regulation of the country as well as creates security threat among the population. These activities are not new but have been prevailing for a long period. At the same time, it is also observed that the government of Afghanistan has not been so strong to establish the rule of law and make regulations against illegal activities. The democracy in Afghanistan is not very strong because the participation of the people in the election is very less numerically. The security conditions also depend upon the legitimate government. Therefore, the Afghan government is dependent on the other forces for making their development and reconstruction process more effective.

The United States (US) and its coalition partners have intervened in Afghanistan with a definite purpose to accomplish regime change in Afghanistan. They have also fought for Afghan people to prevent further terrorist attacks on the homeland. But an important part of the mission in Afghanistan is about rebuilding process in its vast sense: 'establishing efficient political and administrative institutions, security, the rule of law, getting healthier livelihoods as well as the development of basic infrastructure and services'. The initiation of reconstruction activities was an essential part of coalition strategy in Afghanistan which follows the initial phase of '*Operation Enduring Freedom*'. Therefore, the US and its alliance required safe and efficient delivery method to achieve stated objectives. Under the protective security umbrella of the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, the newly independent media and civil society rose and established both local and international training and educational institutions in Afghanistan that produced some Afghan graduate and Afghan armed forces. It has offered fundamental opportunities for democracy in Afghanistan.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) led nation's support packages have used for capacity building in the governance of Afghanistan. It has been directed through the United Nations or Afghan national development programs. The international actors are involved in stabilisation where the level of violence has not diminished. PRTs have become an efficient instrument for stabilisation in Afghanistan. It is the model of future stability operations. They have strengthened various sectors that support the central government in the process of nation-building. Moreover, they have helped create an environment in which political, social, and economic development can be achieved.

PRTs are considered to be a model that started work for reconstruction process in the post-conflict period. For this, the US and its coalition partner have made promises to the Afghan government. PRTs are an exclusive mixture for the development and security of Afghan people which expects all stakeholders to secure their interests and share its objectives collectively. They have had to face challenges because of lack of information sharing, coordination, security and the role of the military in assisting the Afghan populace. Whenever civil-military organisations (PRTs) are operating in combat, and other non-permissive environments, the protection of humanitarian space is likely to arise. They have been continuously fighting against the international terrorist activities. With all these activities, there have been attempted which searches for open dialogues between international civilian assistance providers and the military alliance. So, it can create a fruitful relationship between them. For rebuilding their relations, the coalition forces had been operating against terrorist and insurgencies groups. As a result, they had to face many challenges. Moreover, the international community had invested a lot of energy in the name of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. However, they had not overcome it. The reason behind this is that the geographical structure of Afghanistan is mountainous and terrorist groups have familiarity with the region. It works like hideouts and provides safe havens to militants. Therefore, terrorist groups have still not been wiped out from Afghanistan. Moreover, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been getting support from their neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and some international terror organisations like ISIS, etc. That is why these militants groups are still regulating terror activities in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries

like Pakistan and India. Terrorist groups are always trying to get an opportunity to unleash terror attacks on different countries to spread terror all over the world.

Afghans are adamant about taking responsibility to prevent their homeland from becoming a terrorist safe haven once again, through a mutual and key US national security objective. This emphatic demonstration of Afghanistan's embrace of the democratic process has already led to the signing of an Enduring Strategic Partnership and Bilateral Security Agreement. It assures a long-term commitment to the newly established Afghan democracy. Regardless of whether the US commitment will be long or short, it won't be forever. Thus, the local, regional, and international opportunities for advancing the stability of Afghanistan must be assessed. It should happen within the broader principle of democracy which has significance for US national strategy. It will further shore up the democratisation process in Afghanistan with greater regional economic integration. It will go through targeted and innovative economic development programs. Further, it will establish a more solid foundation for the advancement of the democratisation process in Afghanistan and beyond.

Since the World War I, the concept of foreign aid has followed two interesting trajectories. On particular occasions, the recipient country has received the aid without its asking for it, and in some other, it has received whenever they ask for it. In a twentieth-first century, Afghanistan is one of a particular country that has followed both the trajectories. Afghanistan is still struggling to strengthen its capacity building capability but has not succeeded yet. It still needs substantial foreign assistance to create its infrastructure and for the developments of human resources through which the county can sustain in the longer run.

After 2001, it can also be highlighted that Afghanistan tried to consolidate itself in which it was squeezed between two hostile dynamics: first, the centralising goals of its ruling elite such as writing a constitution; second, the reality of the weaker state bodies. Because of abovesaid conditions Afghanistan is struggling to provide jobs to the majority of their population. The civilian assistance community have been working in Afghanistan at their best. Meanwhile, the military and terrorists attacks have been continuously happening in the country. Due to that, their working speed is reduced. However, coalition partners have been helping NATO more effectively regarding problems like capacity building, reconstruction, terrorism, protection of

power (energy) infrastructure. These problems are impacting on “*Agenda of NATO*” over the next 10-20 years.

The second chapter titled “**Role of NATO-ISAF in Promotion of Security in Afghanistan**”, which tries to highlight the role of NATO-ISAF in enhancing the security promotion in Afghanistan with specific reference to the PRT. It also explains the role and purpose of NATO-ISAF. The NATO-ISAF plays a vital role in Afghanistan. NATO forces entered in Afghanistan specifically to provide security from terrorist organisations to all the western countries. For this, the United Nations (UN) also formed its forces with the assistance of the member’s countries like ISAF. It can play a very significant role in protecting Afghanistan and the entire world from the Taliban and Al Qaeda and some other international terrorist.

The primary focus of NATO’s mission is to provide security to the Afghan and international organisation for reconstructing its basic infrastructure and stabilising the country. Later on, its primary focus shifted to counterinsurgency activities. It means that the intentions of coalition forces are not positive regarding Afghan people and government. They used Afghan government for engaging in counter-terrorist majors and removing terror from Afghanistan. Germany is a country which has played a vital role for providing high-level training to the Afghan forces to maintain the security of the people, though; Germany did not support the counter-terrorism campaign driven by the US. The key motto of this mission is to fight worldwide terrorism. But they gave priority to Afghanistan to maintain peace and stability in this region. They have fulfilled their purposes but have not fully succeeded in it. Military and civil society’s representatives have been doing extraordinary works under complex situations. They have been smart, energetic, and dedicated. One of the major lessons of the Afghan experience is that security and stability are essential elements for economic development and good governance. Most of the military experts have recognized long before that mentally strong military can defeat strongly minded militants while psychology weak military force is inadequate to defeat strong-minded insurgency.

The third chapter titled “**Civil-Military relation under PRT**” deals with civil and military relations under the supervision of PRT. It elaborates how civil-military coordination plays an important role in defining strategic interests of the US-led

coalition partners in Afghanistan. In fact, Uesugi (2009-01) says that “development without governance is meaningless, and governance without development is unachievable. But governance without security is unachievable, and security without governance is meaningless. So far, the international community created PRTs to fill in the civil-military gap and the security-development gap. But it has not been able to address this security-governance gap or the local capacity gap. Indeed, local capacity development is a key to the successful handover of peace-building responsibility to the local authority. Thus, it is effective to transition strategy for PRTs, but nobody is out there in the remote provinces except for poorly equipped PRTs”.

Under the PRT, the civil and military made cooperation with international aid organisations as well as Afghan population. International communities and many organisations such the UN, Asian Development Bank (ADB), etc. cooperated with economic assistance for strengthening Afghanistan. For strengthening, the civil-military coordination has made a plan for basic infrastructure that required for Afghan people. Besides, they co-operated with each other in their works. The non-government organisations (NGOs) had constructed hospitals, school, roads, etc. with the support from the side of military forces. Without military support, it would not have been possible in harsh situations that were created by a terrorist. The external military forces have been struggling in the country for protecting the people from terrorist attacks. For countering these terrorist groups, they have trained Afghan nationals and police forces with the latest technology as well as have provided weapons. It would enable Afghan forces to protect from terrorist attacks after withdrawal of external forces from Afghanistan. The civil and military approach has helped in winning the hearts and minds of local people to some extent. The mindset of local people has changed towards foreign forces with these development and security projects. It is an argument that satisfies hypothesis of ongoing work which is diffusing the traditional resistance towards foreign forces.

In Afghanistan, the US military provided humanitarian assistance and involved in combat operations, but it did not contribute to the upholding of a safe environment. It has created an opportunity for NGOs to act with combating coalitions forces together for making the environment amicable. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) did not assist in security operations because it succeeded in

Kabul by working with civil society only. The other international forces have not been able to provide continuously a suitable, secure and safe environment in Kabul. Moreover, ISAF has also contributed to the establishment of a secure environment in the mission of the US and coalition forces. For achieving this purpose, international donor agencies and NGOs are providing funds and staying in Afghanistan.

From the beginning, the Afghan government and security forces persistently engaged in civil-military discourses. Earlier engagement by them would surely have had a larger impact on Afghan security forces and its practice. Apart from this, international economic assistance agencies started a discourse on civil-military cooperation with Afghan security forces while the capability and willingness of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) remains unclear. Because of this, international agencies have recognised and started new plans and new means of engagement to make certain that they become capable of creating a safe environment to develop a defence mechanism for the Afghan populations.

Those who look for establishing a relationship between civilian and military assistance have diverse views. Current models of civil and military coordination had incorporated the contributing policy which is to 'help the people'. But that makes us cautious because they do not have a genuine plan for growth and safety agendas going together in Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not helped to gain development and security goals in Afghanistan. Another important fact is that the structure for civil and military coordination have deliberately unfinished objectives in the UN integrated missions. It was never emphasized to coordinate the greater security and development program of the mission. While coalition forces had done their operation through integrated approaches, ISAF has faced several challenges for the protection of civilians and their rights. Moreover, the Civil-Military representatives have got bitter experiences while working in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the external forces are still operating against terror activities. It can be analysed that they have never worked honestly for the betterment of Afghans and are involved in several operations for the fulfilment of their own interest.

PRTs served well in supporting the Disarmament, Democratization and Reintegration (DDR) process. Moreover, they also constructed political system after the Bonn Agreement (2001) in Afghanistan. These are dynamically flourishing

schemes of state-building. PRT is obviously cost-effective for attaining a high quality of development and governance. It is not controlled by personnel with specialised training or wide understanding in humanitarian relief or growth. However, the more deep critique is that the PRTs provided in an atmosphere where the humanitarian and growth tasks are becoming militarised. Therefore, it is perceived as immature work which is considered as a source of insecurity. PRT had got support from the local people in particular province. PRT has done a marvellous job that created conditions making increased social, political, and economic development possible. It is another argument that satisfied the hypothesis of the thesis. From the western point of view, PRT experiment has been successes in Afghanistan, while it got criticism by non-governmental actors. As a result, it seems that PRT is not fully successful to win the confidence of local Afghan people.

The fourth chapter titled “**Functional linkage between PRT and State Institutions**” discusses the functional linkage between PRT and Afghan state institutions. It has highlighted the functional approach of PRT towards Afghanistan. It mentions about the nature of Afghan government that connects with PRT. Here, it also shows similarity and dissimilarity of a working pattern of PRT and Afghan administration machinery. It seems that PRT and the Afghan government are working jointly with different state institutions, while there is also a provincial government that is playing a vital role in Afghanistan. No one program and project can be successful without the help of local government. PRT has started short-term projects while the Afghan government also started programs with the assistance of the international community.

Afghan government depends upon the foreign aid which creates a limitation of development policies. The lack of technical capacity inside state institutions creates strategies and policies that also decrease state influence in the decision making procedure. It can be analyzed that there is the existence of lack of institutional, structural coordination between the central government and international funding agencies or organisation. Both the Afghan government and its main funding countries accredited the significance of provincial rules and regulations sustainable for getting achievement in the development and political ambitions.

The interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) is conducting rebuilding efforts. It also recognises the recent fault of public administration and marked the significance of provincial governance more largely for the attainment of political and development goals. The Afghan Compact (AC) provides various components of the plan for sustained safety, governance, and growth. The ANDS goals are (1) to significantly decrease the number of poverty (2) to enhance the living standard of people and (3) to make the base for a safe and steady country. The ANDS implements the strategy of the government. It also describes the policies, programs and schemes period for five years. The overall functions of ANDS are; efficiently executing, supervising and assessing these actions. These things can happen in the right direction after legitimate government with the full support of people. Afghan Nation Police (ANP) faces problems of corruption, capacity and retention. All of these have contributed in the failure of making an efficient civilian police. Further, police reform cannot be successfully carried out without parallel judicial reform programmes.

PRTs have not made long-term programme and projects for reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan. However, they provide financial support, delivery of new equipment and technical knowledge and intelligence. They support in reconstructing the basic infrastructure of people such as making school, building a hospital, boring well, making facilities of transportation, etc. while NGOs under the umbrella of PRTs support for changing the mindset of Afghan people. It further supports external forces for continuing operation against terror activities. In this operation, many innocent Afghan civilians become victimised. As a result, it can be implied that PRTs have done a good job in a short-term project to some extent. But, it has not been capable to make a stable and strong Afghanistan.

It has been observed that PRTs efforts often becomes less effective for managing better relations with Afghan administration or plans such as the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), Community Development Plans (CDPs) and Provincial Development Plans (PDPs). The insufficiently intended involvements plan emphasised the jeopardy of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) projects. Every participant country in ISAF has a different purpose such as political and strategic in helping the Government of Afghanistan (GoA). These approaches

make it complicated to expand comprehensible ‘nation-building’ plans by differing priorities, goals and means. The Afghan government has implicitly little influence over international military strategy. However, the national government becomes feeble in dealing with Afghan complaints that are associated with ‘culturally inappropriate behaviour or civilian casualties’ which occur through military operations.

The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program are used to integrate private armies into civil society and disarm them. DDR further teach them new techniques which enable them to support themselves. Because of disagreement about composition, the leadership, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) role DDR has faced challenge. Lack of full US participation did not allow it to function in full force. Consequently, it did not have the control needed for such sensitive and difficult operation. Further the absence of any offer of international military observers for the demobilisation process made the work of DDR more difficult. That is why the militants have not been reduced in large numbers after conducting many programmes and operations by international forces for more than one decade. Nowadays, the external forces are still functioning in Afghanistan.

It can be analyzed that the Afghan government and the US-led coalition partners have been functioning to serve their interest. This has created conflict among them since their interest is not common. To fulfill their interest, the PRTs have been working as an independent entity away from the influence of Afghan government. On the other hand, the central government is also functioning in some areas without the assistance of the international community. That is why, there has seen some substitution gap between them. They have not joining hands with each other, which has affected the reconstruction and development process of the country.

The fifth chapter titled “**The Role of PRT in Security Transition and Challenges**”. The US military did not receive the needed civilian support to enhance local governance and to achieve economic development programmes to a level that could adequately assure political stability. Rigid centralised state structure badly challenges all of these. Moreover, it is more destructive than insurgency and terrorism. The improvement of local governance and economic development programmes could have supported the “hold” and “build” phases of

counterinsurgency in areas influenced by the insurgent groups. It would also allow for investments in both political and economic development in those parts of the country where there was no insurgency. The limited presence or total absence of civilian support in conflict-inflicted districts left the burden of hold and built on the military. This is something for which military is not skilled or prepared.

The main problem is the lack of security and law enforcement structures, which creates a gap between Afghan Security Forces and judicial functions. Not enough money has been allocated to judicial institutions and programs for Afghan security forces. That's why it became a failure, and the Government of Afghanistan is entirely dependent on international economic assistance. International economic assistance does not have a proper expenditure management in Afghanistan. It is adding fuel to Afghan dissatisfaction among the warlords and masses. Foreign aid is dispersed by many subcontractors with too little harmonisation and responsibility towards Afghans and their interests. The Afghan civilians do not like it and feel bitter for subcontractors' activity. Therefore, international economic assistance is part of a war economy among warlords. Thus, it makes Afghanistan a rentier state where global wealth is considered a privilege. Far from conciliating social anxieties, this has grown discontent and resentment among communities. Moreover, the insurgency has taken advantages from all the above said conditions. In this way, security is not the prime concern for the warlord and Afghan government leader. They also have amicable relationships with Taliban and Al Qaeda and its militant groups in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has a diversity of ethnic groups. These groups have their own interest in Afghanistan. For fulfilling these, they fight with each other and also with external forces. These are the big hurdles for the capacity rebuilding of Afghanistan. Without solving the ethnic problems, the security transition cannot be possible in Afghanistan. For diminishing all these problems, the Government of Afghanistan should have provided a liberal democratic environment in which all ethnic groups can easily take participation for strengthening government that could support for the transition of security scenario. For this, all ethnic community should also think for the betterment of Afghanistan rising well above their personal interest.

The Afghan government and international community have been supporting for maintaining peace and trying to settle conflicts among the ethnic groups. For this

process, they face some hurdles. The non-Pashtuns are opposed to the settlement process. In some areas, minority ethnic groups influence local strong-men in the regions. They have started preparing for a prolonged regional civil war after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. They observe the compromise process as surrender to the Taliban and feel threatened by the prospect of the Taliban returning to power in Kabul.

The militarization has occupied Afghanistan political and economic development spaces. As a result of this, the key issues of Afghanistan are job creation, economic opportunities, and democratization. The Afghan government and the commitment of the US government have not been able to tackle these issues. The worst thing about Afghan government leaders is complete lack of political will that affects entire development of Afghanistan. The lack of adequate civilian roles on the US side significantly contributed to the prolongation of the war and substantial human and financial costs.

After more than a decade of intervention, the results of efforts put by the external forces are becoming apparent and contentious. Donors and foreign governments are quick to point out significant successes such as significantly higher rates of girls attending school and relative security in urban centres. However, despite intense efforts on the part of the international community, most of Afghanistan has failed to realise sustainable development or peace and remains under the constant threat of violence and civil war as foreign actors retreat.

The findings of my study in broad terms are:

1. Afghanistan is the centre of Taliban and Al Qaeda. They recruited new militants and trained them for spreading terrorist activities all over the world. Opium cultivation and narco-drug generated money for these terrorist groups for spending money on buying weapons and new militants.
2. Terrorism and corruption made Afghanistan economically unstable.
3. Afghanistan government still depends upon external economic assistance.

4. After 9/11 terrorist attack on the US, its forces involved in Afghanistan in the overthrow of Taliban government and killed Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and established a new government.
5. PRTs worked there for protecting people and developing fundamental requirement of the people with projects. It tried to diffuse the transitional resistance towards foreign forces.
6. The US-led coalition partners entered there in pursuit of its interest, i.e. counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency.
7. There has been a substitution gap between the organisational structure of PRTs and the state agency.
8. PRT was supporting overall reconstruction and development process in the long run. But it has no longer project plan that creates more fear among Afghan people, and the situation becomes more volatile after withdrawal of external forces.

Hence, it can say that Afghanistan has got some improvement after the intervention of PRT. They concentrated more on counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations. Despite it, PRT tried to improve the basic infrastructure of people and also trained Afghan forces for the future protection of the Afghan government as well as people. It will take a lot of time for strengthening Afghan security forces because education is basic nature of understanding any language. For this, the international community has to work more for providing employment, security and proper schooling of Afghan people. After that, they would be prepared for any work. Afghanistan education system is based on traditional methods. It also requires changing the pattern of the education system. For this, it requires full financial, physical and psychological government support. Through PRT's quick impact project, overall development of Afghanistan has not been possible. It also requires a long impact projects. It suggests that if the US-led coalition partners want to reconstruct and develop Afghanistan by all aspects, they have to talk to the Taliban, warlords, and the Afghan government at any particular point. In that case, it may be possible. Otherwise, possibility of achieving desire goals will remain bleak.

Recently, after withdrawal of international forces in 2014, the security status of Afghanistan has been changed. Most of PRTs closed down in 2013, before the

definitive withdrawal of ISAF at the end of 2014. It implies on the phase of transition in security to the ANSF by 2014. The ANSF is in a determining phase. It is dependent on external assistance and gradually assuming responsibility in some locales. The US would like to maintain its status-quo in Afghanistan. That's why some form of military forces is present over there. However, it is doubtful whether it can stabilize the country. Chandra (2012) is mentioning about the "three critical components of the current US strategy- Afghanistan of the reconciliation process aimed at the top insurgent leadership operating from Pakistan; rebuilding of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); and security transition to the ANSF by 2014-are least likely to yield the expected results. Presently, Afghanistan appears to be on the verge of entering into a prolonged phase of anarchy and violence".

India remains a strategic partner in Afghanistan. India tries to enhance capacity building through small development projects and programmes. Expansion of India's small development projects has reached to Taliban influenced regions and also reaching out to the Pashtun tribes in the southern regions. However, it does not mean that there is no threat to the Indian presence. Although, India remains a key player in a capacity building of Afghanistan, it has not shown its desire to engage directly in the Afghan security matters. In recent times, the US government wants more pro-active approach on the part of Indian government regarding Afghan security issues.

There is no doubt that the US Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (ESPA) signed in May 2012 and the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) signed in 2014 can help Afghanistan with improving the ability of the country's National Security Forces (ANSF). However, Afghanistan doesn't have the economic resources yet to sustain such an improved ability of the ANSF beyond 2017 to provide a secure environment which needed for economic development, governance, and the rule of law. The severe shortfall intangible investment in the economic development of Afghanistan revealed a chronic shortfall in the US policy toward Afghanistan. US policy toward Afghanistan has been a continuously security-driven approach with sustained militarised overtones. On the issue of corruption, Afghanistan saw it as a political matter, but the United States treated it from a security angle; corruption feeds insurgency. For this reason, such a narrow policy approach tolerated the most corrupt officials at the highest government levels, and millions of dollars flowed to the same

individuals because “they had a presumed instrumental role” in US counterterrorism efforts. This policy approach continued while simultaneously investing in the small industries of the Afghan private sector investment was falling apart due to a lack of funds or financial credits (Nojumi 2016).

Going forward beyond the ISAF withdrawal of 2014, it is crucial for the United States to introduce a politically defined within the American values and what the United States stands for in global leadership. Since the US combat mission has ended, Washington needs to deploy capable civilian leadership on the ground with needed capabilities tasked with Key areas of political and economic development. It means that the ESPA and BSA must be backed by matching technical and human resources capabilities on the civilian side. Afghanistan’s ability to serve as a functioning economic hub and birthplace for a new regional order in Southwest and Central Asia demands to broaden policy angles in Washington (Nojumi 2016).

Scope and Strength

Afghanistan, geographically, historically and culturally is a very vibrant country. It connects south, central and middle east along with European countries. Afghanistan is very important from a research point of view as it has suffered historically through wars and internal conflicts and now it is still facing both kinds of challenges; traditional as well as non-traditional viz. Taliban and Al Qaeda, etc. After 2001, the US-led coalition partners intervened in Afghanistan and dethroned the Taliban government with military forces and established a new government. PRTs have been chosen for research because it is a relevant topic regarding the capacity building of Afghanistan. For this, I have dealt with the development and reconstruction model used by the international communities such as the US, UK and Germany. For the stabilization of Afghanistan, they have used a form of the hybrid civil-military model. One of the key features of the research is regarding security vacuum in Afghanistan since it has remained a conflict zone for the longer period. Primary data has been used by the United Nations and Afghanistan government website for strengthening the thesis.

The thesis also analyses my Afghan friend’s experience regarding PRT. During completion of thesis, I got priceless experience about Afghanistan which will

have great impact on further research work. This country will always be very important strategically for the entire world as well as research students. The thesis would be valuable for understanding the basic problems of Afghanistan. It also suggests that the US and its coalition partners have focused largely on counter-insurgency rather than understanding the genesis of terrorist. The thesis explored that the external community has not given the priority of local problems of Afghanistan, but they put their problems ahead. PRTs have tried to reconstruct and develop basic infrastructure some extent, but these PRTs have become unsuccessful in the overall development of Afghanistan. Without peace and stable Afghanistan, the reconstruction process and development cannot be possible. Here, it suggests that mutual understanding and cooperation within regional and international big actors such as US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, India, Russia, etc. are solution to the problems of Afghanistan. It also requires negotiation or dialogue with Taliban and brings them in a political framework. India and China have been working in Afghanistan in reconstruction and development projects.

Limitations

The thesis is based on Provincial Reconstruction Teams of Afghanistan which requires field visit to Afghanistan. But, I could not visit provinces in Afghanistan because of security issues. Though I have used the United Nations, US and Afghanistan's primary data, but these are not sufficient for such a relevant and valuable research work. The paucity of materials has been another limitation of this research work. Secondary data has been used in the thesis. I have not highlighted foreign aid given by the external countries or agencies separately in the form of tables. Afghanistan government's administrative bodies work and structure, characteristics of Taliban and Al Qaeda have not been mentioned properly.

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