# MEMORIES OF WAR AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHER: AN ANALYIS OF MAINSTREAM INDIAN ENGLISH NEWSPAPER DISCOURSE ON CHINA AND PAKISTAN

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
for the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2018

Date: 20th July 2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "**MEMORIES OF WAR AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHER: AN ANALYIS OF MAINSTREAM INDIAN ENGLISH NEWSPAPER DISCOURSE ON CHINA AND PAKISTAN**"submitted by me for the award of thedegree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. Thethesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any otheruniversity.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedication

To Dr. Jojin V. John

To Carrion Crows of Pangong Tso which don't need visas for exploring Aksai Chin and beyond

To the sands of Nubra Valley which don't need to be afraid of border guards while crossing the invisible line

Contents

Acknowledgements

Recollecting the waves of impediment and gales of fervour which convoyed my PhD-surfboard, I would like to express my indebtedness and adoration to all those who comforted me in this voyage, in material and non-material ways. First and foremost I wish to convey my candid gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Jayati Srivastava who guided me throughout my M.Phil.-PhD academic life with illuminating comments and creative criticism. I could never have completed this work without her prudential supervision and tremendous support. The stress-free work environment she provides to her students definitely requires a special mention.

In this moment of felicity, I would like to earnestly register my gratitude to Prof. Rajesh Rajagoplan and Prof. Alka Acharya for their insightful suggestions and meticulous comments on my work. This thesis is an outcome of the treasured guidance and stirring ideas that I have received from many great teachers in JNU. I would like to remember all my wise intellectual gurus with unfeigned gratitude. My full-hearted thanks to Prof. Varun Sahni, Prof C.S.R. Murthy, Prof. Swaran Singh, Prof. Yeshi Choedon, Prof. A. K. Ramakrishnan, Prof. P.R. Kumaraswamy, Prof. Kamal Mitra Chenoy, Prof. B. S. Chimni, Prof. B. H. Desai, Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra, Prof. Rajendra K. Jain, Prof. Niveditha Menon, Dr Sidharth Mallavarapu, Dr Moushumi Basu, Dr J. Madhan Mohan, Dr Happymon Jacob and Dr Archana Negi.

In the beginning of this work, I had received valuable suggestions and comments from Dr Jabin T. Jacob and Dr P. K. Anand of Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi. I must say that the constructive criticism and great support given by Dr Jojin V. John of Indian Council of World Affairs and Dr Rajeesh Kumar of Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis were immensely helpful for shaping this study. I would like to convey my profound gratitude to all of them.

This work is largely based on the data that I collected from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library and the National Archives of India. I would like to extend my gratefulness to both of these prestigious institutions and special thanks to the staff in the micro-film section of NMML. Along with these two institutions, it is the tranquil environment of Dr B. R. Ambedkar Central Library of Jawaharlal Nehru University which greatly aided my writing process. I would like to express my reverence to all those who work hard for the betterment of its academic environment.

It is despairing that I am not dexterous enough to convey my gratitude to the people who were there always with a wish of knitting a serene and scintillating life for me. I do not have enough words to appreciate Shihabudheen Kunju, Jojin V. John and Haritha Thazakkal. I am certain that your good hearts will remain as a light for so many people, grappling with the vehemence of life. My vocabulary is insufficient to convey my

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20 July 2018

Chapter 1

Introduction

The question of identity has emerged as a major theme in International Relations (IR) theorizing in recent decades, especially after the end of the Cold War (Lapid 1996). In this period, challenging rationalist epistemology of mainstream IR theories, constructivist, postmodernist, post-positivist, poststructuralist, feminist and social psychological approaches' attempts at understanding international politics introduced non-material factors such as culture, language, identity etc. into IR discourse. Definitely, this new development in IR theorizing was an extension of a general trend that has been prevalent in the field of social sciences since 1960s. Producing a large number of literature "on the definition, meaning, and development of ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, gender, class and other identities and their roles in processes of institutional development" multiple social science disciplines and subfields rallied with this trend (Abdelal et al. 2006: 695). It has also seen some absolute rejection of 'identity' as an 'analytical concept', by arguing that it is ill-suited to perform a great deal of social analysis because of its conceptual ambiguity and contradictory meanings (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). However, within the discipline of IR, the attempts at studying profound changes in the post-Cold War international politics, identity emerged as a major analytical concept for understanding actors' interests and foreign and security policies.

Though defining the term 'identity' is a strenuous task because of its fluid nature; by assessing dominant forms of usage of the concept, it can be understood as "a ground or basis for social or political action, a collective phenomenon denoting some degree of sameness among members of a group or category, a core aspect of individual or collective 'selfhood', a product of social or political action, or the product of multiple and competing discourses" (Lebow 2008: 474). Essentially, identity is a social instrument which helps individuals to form a collective, to associate with a collective and also to dissociate with a collective. Even personal identity of an individual is defined through the collective constituencies with which she/he identifies herself/himself or being identified by others. Moreover, identity can be formed or constructed only in a binary framework, in relation to a difference or many differences that have become socially recognized, as

'us' vs. 'them' or 'self' vs. 'other' (Connolly 1991). These differences are essential to its being. In other words, "if they did not coexist as difference, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity". Precisely, "identity requires difference in order to be [what it is], and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty" (Connolly 1991:64). It is also important to note that neither identity nor the difference in relation to which identity has formed is fixed by nature: and the 'difference' itself is an identity (Campbell 1992). In terms of social identity theory, as part of natural cognitive process, individuals have a tendency to sort themselves into categories in any given social setting. It asserts, "although the speed of the sorting and salience of the categorization can vary (e.g., high salience when you are a very distinct minority on a sorting dimension), the placement of objects into categories always occurs and the placement of the 'self' in one category immediately creates an 'other'" (Rousseau 2007: 747).

The formation or construction of identity is largely a political act, although some identities can be strictly non-political in representation. Because every identity creates a set of power relations, it is only through such power relations that an identity can have its meaning in any given social setting. Moreover, every identity requires certain discursive practices to find its existence in any social system. In other words, "identities are constituted in and through discourse and performed through representational practices that reproduce, negotiate, challenge, and subvert these broader discourses" (Rumelili 2007: 13). Sometimes, particularly related to certain forms of collective political identity, like state identity, such discursive practices may involve certain forms of violence, including war. Because 'political' largely works in terms of friend-enemy dichotomy, conflict/war is very intrinsic to this structure. Definitely, war is "the most extreme consequence of enmity" as it is "the existential negation of the enemy". However, war will remain as a real possibility "as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid". And, "as an ever present possibility", war will remain as "the leading presupposition which determines in characteristic way human action and thinking" (Schmitt 1996: 33-34).

As it is organised around the question of war and security, the mainstream IR discourses treat identity either as an element which creates or sustains possibilities of the conflict in

international system or as something which acts as an element for reducing the conflict in it. In terms of neorealist theory developed by Kenneth Waltz, states are egoistic self-interested units that depend on 'self-help' for survival and maximising security; they are "unitary and functionally undifferentiated" (Katzenstein 1996). For neorealists, it is the anarchic international system which constitutes actor's identity as self-interested egoistic units (Mercer 1995). Under anarchy, self-interested egoistic states will always "engage in a competitive process of balancing their power". Therefore, war remains as a persistent possibility in an anarchic international system (James 1995: 183). Neoliberals and constructivists also support neorealist premise of an anarchic international system. However, they share different views on transformative role of other factors in overcoming the problem a 'self-help' system.

Approaching identity as a result of interaction, not given as neorealists assume, constructivists argue that states have no permanent identity and interests. Challenging the neorealist assumption that "international and domestic environments are largely devoid of cultural and institutional elements and therefore are best captured by materialist imagery like the balance of power or bureaucratic politics", constructivists assert that the "security environments in which states are embedded are [majorly] cultural and institutional, rather than just material" (Jepperson et al. 1996: 36). They argue that cultural environments can influence not only actors' behaviour but also their basic identity. In terms of their understanding, "norms, laws, economic interdependence, technological development, learning and institutions can fundamentally change state interests" (Mercer 1995: 231). Precisely, as per constructivist theory, since it is the identity of a state which determines its interests and policies, changing state identity can transform its interests and thereby its policies. Therefore, they argue, even though "states are still organized to fight wars, changing international norms and domestic factors have 'tamed' the aggressive impulses of many states, especially in the West, thus creating a disposition to see war as at best a necessary evil" (Jepperson et al. 1996: 37).

Like constructivists, neoliberals also challenge neorealist views on transformative capacity of international institutions to argue that "in an interdependent world, international institutions provide an alternative structural context in which states can

define their interests and coordinate conflicting policies" (Katzenstein 1996: 6). Focusing on the role that institutions and regimes play in international politics, by facilitating cooperation between states and thereby reducing uncertainty, they assert that institutions can fundamentally change state policies and behaviour (Mercer 1995). However, although some neoliberals have questioned neorealist assumptions on state egoism and some of them have stressed on domestic roots of state identity formation, neoliberalism in general does not share a common view on identity questions in international politics. Similarly, constructivist theories also have multiple views on the process of construction of state identity and transformative role of identity in state interests and policies. Thus, there is no conceptual agreement or methodological uniformity within the mainstream IR discourse for using identity as an analytical concept for understanding actors' interests, behaviour and policies in international politics.

Outside the mainstream IR discourse, postmodernist, post-positivist, poststructuralist, feminist and social psychological approaches have largely used identity as an analytical concept. Definitely these 'post' theories of IR are not strictly different independent units, and they are not strictly same either. In a simple sense, post-positivism is an epistemological stand which rejects positivist epistemology of systemic theories by arguing that scientific rationalism and empiricist observation cannot be employed in the study of international politics. Postmodernist, poststructuralist, feminist, and a group of social constructivist theories follow post-positivist epistemological framework. Postmodernist writers assert the dynamics of power-knowledge relationship to argue that there is no absolute 'truth' as positivist theories envisage (Smith 1997). Post-structuralism which finds its theoretical roots in the writings of Nietzsche, Kristeva, Foucault, and Derrida etc. also primarily focuses on the importance of language, specifically 'discourse', in constructing reality. They argue that "any 'reality' is mediated by a mode of representation" and "representations are not descriptions of a world of facticity, but are ways of making facticity" (Shapiro 1989: 13-14). Therefore, in IR discourse, there is only a blurred line of difference between post-modernism and post-structuralism (Shapiro 1989; Brown and Ainley 1997; Waever 2002). In general, postmodernist/poststructuralist approaches are trying to understand international politics and foreign and security policies as a discursive practice which can neither be fixed in a

structure-agency paradigm nor be interpreted in terms of material power relations and institutional interactions. In terms of these theories, on one side, foreign and security policies largely rely upon representation of identity which creates "various forms of global otherness" and on the other side, these policies help to produce and reproduce the identity of states (Shapiro 1989; Campbell 1992; Hansen 2006). Though postmodernist/poststructuralist theories are the ones which familiarised the method of discourse analysis in IR, other theories like social constructivism also helped to enrich discourse based research in the discipline.

Rejecting 'scientism' of mainstream IR, discourse research developed more efficient methods for understanding the problem of self-other dynamics in international politics (Milliken 1999). It helped largely to overcome the most important conceptual problem with other identity-based studies, which is limiting the focus on a particular dimension or an aspect of identity, like cultural, institutional, regional, etc. (Urrestarazu 2015). Discourse research begins from an understanding that "discourse confers meaning to social and physical realities, and it is through discourse that individuals, societies and states make sense of themselves, of their ways of living and of the world around them" (Epstein 2008: 2). In simple sense, discourse is meaning making practices that help individuals to understand, define and communicate meanings of objects, subjects and events in their living environment. In essence, it is through such discursive practices, meaning(s) of every material and non-material reality in any social system is being created (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Following this growing model of discourse research in IR, this study attempts to understand the self-other dynamics, which defines modern Indian identity.

If we analyse Indian public discourse on issues of national security, foreign policy and other general international affairs, by following Carl Schmitt's (1996) assertion that 'political' always works in terms of friend-enemy dichotomy, we can see Pakistan and China as the two most frequently appearing enemy figures in Indian narratives. If we assess this fact with the premise that identity is always formed in relation to 'other(s)', we will be drawn to a conclusion that the enemy images of Pakistan and China have a determining role in shaping modern Indian identity. However, it leaves a question about

what essentially constitutes the enemy images of these countries in Indian public discourse. Tracing the source of contemporary Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan, we can find two major issues with the potential for adversely affecting the images of these countries in the Indian public discourse. Firstly, the issues related to the unsettled boundary and territorial disputes between India and these two countries. Secondly, the historical factors since these are the major countries with which India fought one or more wars in the past. However, considering the fact that India had decades-long territorial disputes with Bangladesh which did not lead to the making of an enemy image of Bangladesh in Indian public discourse, it can assumed that the territorial dispute as such does not necessarily lead to the making of an enemy image of the 'other'. Perhaps, it is the related violence, including war(s), than the matter of territorial dispute itself, which contributes the most in shaping Indian discursive image of Pakistan and China. This assumption takes us to certain fundamental questions regarding Indian identity and Indian discursive images of these countries. Firstly, if it is the war which created the enemy images in the first place, what was the pre-war image of China and Pakistan in Indian public discourse? Secondly, if war had created an explicit change in India's discursive representation of these countries, what was the impact of that transformation on India's own identity? Thirdly, if the issues of war(s), as a historical concern, continue to be a major force in shaping Indian discursive images of these countries, how do collective memories of war(s) being represented in contemporary Indian public discourse? These are the essential questions this study is attempting to answer by placing itself within the growing trend of discourse analysis in IR.

Borrowing from Lene Hansen (2006), this study treats identity as political, discursive, relational and social. By *Political*, it means that creation of every identity involves creation of a set of power relations and it is through such power relations that identity defines its existence in any social setting. As far as a state is concerned, domestic and foreign policies are the most important means for establishing such power relations, with various internal and external agents like its citizens, other states and institutions. By *Discursive*, it means that there is no objective identity as located in some extra-discursive or non-discursive realm. Every identity requires certain continuous discursive articulations to maintain its existence. As David Campbell (1992) observed, most often it

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is a continuously articulated security discourse projecting a threatening other which helps the states to define its existence. By *Relational*, it means that identity can be constructed only in relation to an 'other' or many 'others'. In the sense that an identity as 'Indian' can have its existence only in the presence of an identity as 'non-Indian', which can be Pakistani, Chinese or any other 'non-Indian' identity. By *Social*, it means that identities are always established "through a set of collectively articulated codes, not as private property of the individuals or psychological condition" (Hansen 2006: 6).

Taking identity as political, discursive, relational and social, this study asserts that foreign and security policies are one of the most important means through which modern Indian identity is constituted in relation to a set of 'others'. It means, firstly, that India's foreign and security policies are always meant to construct and reconstruct a set of power relations which define India's identity in international politics. As many observed, since its independence, Indian foreign policy expressed "India's quest for strategic autonomy" and its "desire for status transformation in the international political system" (Sahni 2007: 21-22). In its early years, adopting the policy of non-alignment and demanding greater role for international institutions, such as the United Nations, in matters affecting larger international community, India had asserted itself as an ideational face of the newly emerged independent Afro-Asian countries which rejected power politics of both the West and the East. Seeking the UN intervention in Kashmir dispute and actively engaging with UN peacekeeping, peace-making and humanitarian efforts, India projected itself as a responsible modern state which strictly follows democratic ethos. Definitely, it is not a rejection of the view that India had/has multiple mutually exclusive identities that often create foreign policy ambiguity (Smith 2012). In fact, the study supports such a view as it considers multiplicity as one of the defining features of every discourse. The study took one particular form of identity as an example here merely to disclose a dominant pattern of connection between Indian identity and India's foreign and security policy. Moreover, it assumes that every radical change in India's foreign and security policy, like that happened in 1962 against China and in 1965 against Pakistan, had transformative capacity to change India's own identity and its power relations.

Secondly, it asserts that Indian foreign and security policies have always been a medium

for continuous articulation of certain discourses which define Indian identity. During the early years of its independence, by asserting Gandhian ideas of peace and non-violence, Indian policies were largely against war, militarisation and nuclear proliferation. In this period, by supporting democratic and egalitarian values, it clearly established its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist credentials. Indian public discourse of this period also expressed its commitment towards democracy and secularism through narrating strong anti-communist sentiments. Though such sentiments were largely the product of the Cold War ideological politics, until India-China tension at the Himalayan frontier became evident, its major target was communists within India, rather than any particular communist country. Since its tension with China and Pakistan began to take violent turn, Indian security discourses greatly helped to define Indian identity by continuously articulating these countries as India's existential threat. Definitely, such are articulations are the ones which helped India to change its approach towards nuclear weapons and justify its status as a nuclear state.

Thirdly, it emphasises that India's foreign and security policies have always been a medium for constituting India's identity in relation to other(s). Whether it is India's approach towards international institutions or its policies against any other country, the ultimate purpose of Indian foreign and securities policies has been nothing, but to create and recreate its identity in relation to 'others'. It implies that Indian identity is in a persistent mode of evolution through its foreign and security policies. Fourthly, it denotes that foreign and security policies are always meant to assert India's power and status in a language, which is collectively understandable among the international community. Whether it is the changing of India's nuclear policy or seeking permanent membership in the UN Security Council, the ultimate aim is to define India's power and status in international politics. In other words, neither promoting world peace nor building an egalitarian international system can be considered as the ultimate purpose of India's foreign and security policies.

For locating itself within the paradigm of discourse research in IR, this study is developed on three theoretical commitments suggested by Jennifer Milliken (1999) as a condition for organising discourse research in international politics. The first theoretical

commitment of the study is that it approaches discourses as systems of signification. It means that discourses are 'sense making practices' which "construct things and give people knowledge about social reality". It can be said that "discourses operate as background capacities for persons to differentiate and identify things, giving them taken-for-granted qualities and attributes, and relating them to other objects". However, it does not mean that discourses always exist 'out there' in the world as 'background capacities'; rather, "they are *structures* that are actualized in their regular use by people of discursively ordered relationships in 'ready-at-hand language practices' or other modes of signification" (Millikan 1999: 231). This study aims to analyse the language practices, or discourse, not in a structural term by addressing grammatical and rhetorical questions, but in a historical term by addressing the way through which certain meanings have found their way into language. Borrowing from the methodology adopted by Rumelili (2007) for studying regional community identity, it takes "narrative" conception of Indian foreign and security policies and evades the question what they really were/are by focusing on how they are narrated—how Indian public discourse has featured Indian foreign and security policies. Precisely, approaching discourse as a *structure* of meaning-in-use, this study empirically analyses Indian narratives on China and Pakistan to draw out a general structure of collectively shared Indian knowledge about these countries.

The second theoretical commitment of the study is that it incorporates issues of discourse productivity to explain how discourses produce social 'reality', by selectively choosing some over others and by granting narrative authority to some and denying others. In other words, it is an attempt at explaining how Indian public discourses produce the images of China and Pakistan that it defines. It has identified two factors as the most important driving force of Indian public discourses on these countries. One is the 'political ideology of the observers' and the other is 'interest of the policy makers'. Definitely there are certain elements linking these two factors together at some points, as policy makers largely operate in terms of a political ideology. For making sense of Indian public discourse on China and Pakistan, this study explores Indian media narratives, specifically Indian English language newspaper narratives on these countries. It is generally agreed that the English language dailies in India largely represent the elitist views in the country and they are significant in shaping India's strategic thoughts and policies (Bajpai 1997,

2007). It focuses on four mainstream newspapers, published from four major Indian cities; *The Indian Express* New Delhi edition, *The Times of India* Mumbai (Bombay) edition, *The Statesman* Kolkata (Calcutta) edition and *The Hindu* Chennai (Madras) edition. By choosing different city editions, this study aims to assess whether there are any regional variations in Indian public discourse on China and Pakistan. Essentially, in terms of narratives in these newspapers, this study has identified that certain political ideologies and interests of elite policy makers largely determine the dominant Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan. It has also found that editorial comments, opinion pieces and commentaries in the selected newspapers are largely shaped by these two forces. Moreover, it should be noted that by representing these two forces, some have turned as narrative authority of the Indian public discourse on these countries, of course, by denying space for certain other views.

The third theoretical commitment of the study is of addressing the play of discursive practices. It is definitely an extension of incorporating issues of discourse productivity. Making this commitment, this study asserts that every discourse requires continuous efforts at producing and reproducing the meaning and power relations it established in a social system. Such efforts could involve certain practices that repress and control every counter narrative and create a sense of legitimacy for continuous articulations of that particular discourse. It is only through such practices, a discourse can become hegemonic in a social system. Analysing the pattern of Indian media narratives on China and Pakistan, this study reveals that it is only those narratives which comply with certain political ideologies or interests of the ruling elites, could dominate Indian public discourse on China and Pakistan. That is to say, these two driving forces have repressed and controlled every challenging perception, often by projecting them as seditious and questioning their commitment towards the nation. Definitely, such discursive interventions have played a greater role in shaping nationalist sentiments in India.

Employing the method of discourse analysis, this study examines the narratives of the four selected newspapers, from three different historical contexts, specifically, pre-war narratives, wartime narratives and the contemporary narratives, for mapping Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan. This study focuses mostly on editorials and

articles published on the editorial pages of these newspapers. However, for making proper sense of certain stories, it uses news reports, including news reports on opinion of various Indian leaders, on that particular subject. Similarly, for explaining the international community's approach towards India-China war of 1962 and India-Pakistan war of 1965, in some instances it uses the opinion of various international news media reproduced or interpreted in the selected newspaper.

Assessing the pre-war narratives of the selected newspapers, this study explains how China and Pakistan were represented in Indian public discourse during the pre-war years and how Indian approach towards these countries was shaped in relation to India's own identity during this period. For this purpose, it examines the newspapers in a period of six months from the immediate pre-war period of each war in focus here to map the pre-war narratives. That means, for making sense of the pre-war narratives on China, it examines the newspapers from 20th April 1962 to 19th October 1962, as 20th October 1962 to 21st November 1962 is taken as the period of India-China war, and for making sense of the pre-war narratives on Pakistan, it examines the newspapers from 5th February 1965 to 4th August 1965, as 5th August to 22nd September 1965 is considered as the period of India-Pakistan war of 1965.

Analysing the wartime and immediate post-war narratives, this study explains the impacts of war in India's own identity and in Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan. For mapping the immediate post-war narratives, it examines the newspapers in a period of six months from the immediate post-war period of each war in focus here. Specifically, it analyses the newspapers from 20th October 1962 to 22nd May 1963 for finding the impact of war in Indian discursive images of China. In the case of Pakistan, it employs newspaper from 5th August 1965 to 22nd March 1966. With the help of contemporary narratives, it explains how collective memories of war(s) is/are being represented in the present Indian public discourse and what impact they have on contemporary Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan. In this case, the term collective memory refers to the images of the past which are regularly represented in public discourse through various practices like commemoration ceremonies, memorials, museums, movies, television programmes and news media etc. For mapping the contemporary narratives, it

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examines the same newspapers in a period of two months from the fiftieth anniversary of each war in focus here. That means, for making sense of contemporary narratives on China, it examines the newspapers from October-November months of 2012 which marked the 50th anniversary of the India-China war of 1962, and for making sense of contemporary narratives on Pakistan, it examines the newspapers from August-September months of 2015 which marked the 50th anniversary of the India-Pakistan war of 1965.

Chapter Outline

Extending the conceptual introduction given in this chapter, the second chapter of the thesis builds a theoretical framework for analysing significance of collective memories of war(s) in constituting Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan. In order to do so, it borrows largely from Foucauldian understanding of discourse, power, and subjectivity. In the first part, by analysing various established theories of power and discourse-power relationship, it asserts that discourse approach could better explain power and power relations than any other mainstream theories of international politics. Building on the view that power is simultaneously a product and a producer of discourse, the second part of the chapter directs the attention to discursive process of identity creation. It asserts that acting as a link between the past and the present, collective memories play a significant role in the formation of various identities. In the third part of the chapter, by linking various theories of collective memories and Foucauldian understanding of discourse, it states that collective memories are always a product of certain discursive practices and they cannot be used as an independent analytical concept for understanding social reality. Assessing the structure of discursive practices which create collective memories, this chapter argues that the present needs rather than the details of the past are the ones which create images of the past in everyday public discourse.

The third chapter extends the theoretical framework developed in the second chapter to build a framework for explaining the relationship between modern states and collective memories. Borrowing from Benedict Anderson, this chapter asserts that modern states are highly depended on certain discursive practices which create a sense of continuity of the

past amongst its people for justifying its present existence. It underlines that modern idea of 'nationalism' is one of the most important products of such discursive practices. Analysing various forms of memory discourses created by the modern states, it discloses that during wartime, states have high tendency for seeking support from the past, often by constructing particular images of the past, for justifying certain actions and policies, and during peacetime it largely employs the past for creating a sense continuity that integrates its people and represses every discourse which threatens its power relations.

The fourth chapter attempts to understand the way in which Indian discursive image of China has been constituted and the impact of collective memories of 1962 war in it. Tracing the self-other dynamics between Indian discursive image of China and Indian understanding of its 'collective self', the first part of the chapter explores Indian narratives on China during the pre-1962 war period. Assessing the narratives of four selected newspapers, it argues that the origin of India's 'enemy' image of China is not particularly related to the tension between India and China at the Himalayan frontier. It reveals that during the pre-war period, Indian public discourse had largely depicted China as an expansionist country and a communist 'other'. However, Indian identity as a peace-loving, pacifist, non-violent, non-aligned country of Gandhi forced India to follow a friendly relationship with China. In the second part, it analyses wartime and immediate post-war narratives of the selected newspapers to assess the impact of war on Indian discursive image of China and on India's own identity. It shows that in the context of 1962 war, the dominant image of China in Indian public discourse was that of an expansionist communist enemy which is attempting to destroy India's democratic system of government, democratic ways of economic development and Nehru's image in international politics. In relation to the setback in the war, India's image of the 'self' had radically transformed by bringing explicit changes in its foreign and security policies. The third part explores narratives of these newspapers during the fiftieth anniversary period of 1962 war to examine contemporary Indian discursive image of China and to assess the impact of collective memories of war in it. This part reveals that, though there is a significant improvement in India-China relationship, especially in trade relationship, the memories of 1962 war still remains a major factor which is adversely affecting Indian discursive image of China. In addition, various related issues, like unsettled territorial

dispute, China-Pakistan friendship, China's construction activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, and China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean region, continue to shape Indian public's perception of Chinese threat.

The fifth chapter attempts to reveal various layers of Indian discursive image of Pakistan and the significance of collective memories of wars in it. The first part of the chapter analyses the narratives of four selected newspapers during the pre-1965 war period for making sense of pre-war image of Pakistan in Indian public discourse. Following India's official stand, this study treats 1965 war as the first India-Pakistan war. Assessing partition narratives in Indian media during the pre-war period, it asserts that the foundation of India's anti-Pakistan sentiments lies within the very idea of partition. It reveals that issues such as continuous refugee flow from Pakistan, Kashmir dispute, attack against Hindu minorities in both the western and the eastern Pakistan, and growing Sino-Pakistan relationship were adversely affecting Indian discursive image of Pakistan during the pre-1965 war period. Closely observing the issues of identity in Indian media narratives during this period, this study argues that it was in relation to Pakistan's Muslim identity that India developed its secular identity. In the second part, it explores wartime and immediate post-war narratives of the selected newspapers to examine the impacts of 1965 war in Indian discursive image of Pakistan and in India's own identity. It reveals that, in the context of 1965 war, in relation to Pakistan's identity as a theocratic military dictatorship and China's identity as a communist dictatorship, India strongly defined its identity as secular democracy. Bringing entire land border of the country under security threat, from both Pakistan and China, the war of 1965 radically transformed Indian approach towards militarisation. It helped India to realise the inevitability of achieving self-reliance in economic and military field. The issue of self-reliance eventually transformed Indian approach towards nuclear weapons. Most importantly, India's decisive upper hand against Pakistan in 1965 war, helped India to deconstruct its status as a weak defeated country, which was prevalent in both domestic and international level ever since India's setback at the Himalayan frontier in 1962. The third part examines narratives of the selected newspapers during the fiftieth anniversary period of 1965 war for making sense of contemporary Indian image of Pakistan and for finding the impact of collective memories of wars in it. This part reveals that the memories of 1965 war as such

are not particularly active in Indian public discourse even though memories of India-Pakistan wars, as general, are active theme of Indian popular media, like movies and television programmes. Assessing the selected newspapers' narratives on Pakistan, it argues that the issues of cross border firing and Pakistan sponsored terrorism in India are the two most important factors which constitute the present image of Pakistan in Indian public discourse.

The sixth chapter assesses the major findings of this study to make some concluding observations about the modern Indian identity, its security discourse, and Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan. It asserts that the India-China war of 1962 and the India-Pakistan war of 1965 have played a significant role in shaping the modern Indian identity. Explaining the major transformations that happened in Indian identity in relation to these wars, this study argues that a sense of security-threat is evolved in India through these wars and through various issues of conflict the same sense of security-threat is relentlessly being recreated as the fundamental conflicts remain unsettled between India and its two troubled neighbours. It concludes by reminding that India cannot have better relationship with China and Pakistan unless it addresses the problems of the past and settle the fundamental disputes.

Chapter 2

Discourse, Power and Collective Memory

The term 'discourse' has several meanings. Similarly, discourse theory has several manifestations, as dispersed into various disciplines, ranging from Linguistics to International Relations (Jaworski and Coupland 1999; Schiffrin et. al. 2001). In this study, the term 'discourse' signifies a system of meaning-making practices which enable social communication, including verbal and non-verbal communications (involving signs, symbols, and body languages) and constitute meaning(s) of subjects and objects in a social environment. Discourse is viewed here as something which binds individuals together through a collectively communicable language to form society and social institutions. It gives meanings to social realities and facilitates production and diffusion of knowledge; it simultaneously enables and constraints society for thinking, speaking and writing. It constitutes order and power hierarchies within social life, mostly with a heavy cost of oppression and dominance. However, multiplicity, flexibility, and temporality are the three fundamental features that can be attributed to the structure of any discourse. It means several discourses simultaneously operate within any society, on every known subject, even though sometimes one or more discourse(s) becomes hegemonic and/or repressive to others. In its essence, discourses are subject to change/transformation, even though mostly they exhibit reluctance towards any form of change in its conventional structure as it is likely to challenge the status quo of already established power relations. Besides, the spatio-temporal dynamics constitute the structure of every discourse, even though certain hegemonic discourse(s) such as various religious discourses claim their universal and eternal existence without any change in their structures. In short, discourse helps people to make sense of, or to give meaning to, the universe of their life.

This study draws largely on the Foucauldian understanding of discourse which explains discourse as "practices that systemically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault 1972: 49). Foucault introduced discourse as bodies of knowledge that operate within every society as discontinuous and violent practices. According to him, "discourses must be treated as discontinuous practices, which cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed

with one another, but can just as well exclude or be unaware of each other". He further added, "We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them" (Foucault 1970a: 67). He familiarised it as power, not just as something which constitutes the idea of power but as something which stands in itself as power. In his words, "history constantly teaches us, discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized" (Foucault 1970a: 52-53). It does not mean that, as some critics argue, Foucault was negating the existence of material power or any other material reality. Instead, he was arguing that it is only through discourse(s), 'material realities' can have its meaning(s) in social life. In other words, material realities cannot have independent social value if there is no support of meaning(s) constituted by discourse(s).

In Foucault's theory, power can be a constraining as well as an enabling agent of discourse production in every social system; it could operate in both repressive and productive ways. He explained that "in thinking of mechanism of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and insert itself into their action and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives" (Foucault 1980; 39). In another work, he asserted that "in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality" (Foucault 1970a: 52).

The theory of power that Foucault introduced was a challenge to many conventional perspectives, including the Marxist theories which attempted merely to explain the negative and material form(s) of power to argue that power is always a repressive agent. Moreover, in terms of Marxist theories, power is always concentrated on state and its apparatus, and it is mostly controlled by bourgeois/ruling class. However, Foucault's works explicitly challenged this reductionist narration of Marxist scholars and introduced power as something which is discursively constructed and that exists in every realm of a social system, from micro-level interpersonal interaction within a family to macro level

social/cultural/political institutions, even though on unequal terms. In terms of his view, working class's resistance against bourgeoisies' oppression is actually working class's exercise of power against bourgeoisies' oppressive power; in other words, resistance is also a practice of power. Interestingly, such an understanding of power, while being a departure from conventional Marxist views, offers a new framework to overcome limitations of conventional liberal and realist interpretations of power which are largely based on materialist ontology.

Foucault's view of discourse that is inextricably linked to his understanding of power, was a departure from the conventional linguistic approach which interprets discourse as text, either written or spoken. He disentangled the linguistic limitations of the term and placed it in a complex amalgamated system of power relations. His main concern was politics evolving in and around a discourse, not the structure or grammar of a text. He wrote,

> I believe one's point of reference should not be to the great model of language (*langue*) and signs, but to that of war and battle. The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning…Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts (Foucault 1980: 114).

Foucault explored deep within the complexities of discursive ontology and exposed hollowness of 'objective' realities advocated by the mainstream knowledge system; while addressing the question of discourse/power dynamics in the conditioning of subjectivity, his studies problematised structure of twentieth-century European knowledge system. However, he never attempted to provide a well-structured definition to the concept of 'discourse' or a full-fledged theory of 'discourse analysis.' He wrote in *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* "instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 'discourse', I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements" (Foucault 1972: 90).

For Foucault, 'statement' is the fundamental building block, or in his own words, 'atom',

of discourse. He explained that "a linguistic system can be established (unless it is constructed artificially) only by using a corpus of statements or a collection of discursive facts" (Foucault 1972: 30). In addition to this, in Foucauldian discourse analysis, 'statement', as a basic unit of discourse, occupies another vital role; specifically, it helps to analyse the operation of repressive mechanisms working within the structure of every established discourse. Foucault asserts that "we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine the condition of its existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlation with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it excludes" (Foucault 1972: 30). He noted in a different context that "the manifest discourse is really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this 'not-said' is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said" (Foucault 1972: 28). However, as in the case of the term 'discourse', Foucault's works did not provide any structured definition to the concept 'statement'. Definitely, as a critique of structuring of meaning, which is a constraining or controlling mechanism within every social system to maintain the status quo of established power relations, creating 'definitions' was not the purpose of Foucault's works; indeed definitions are nothing more than a tool for controlling or constraining meanings.

Though Foucault's work did not provide any overt conceptual definition or grand methodological framework for the universal application of discourse analysis, this study intends to draw on Foucauldian concept of discourse because of two reasons. Firstly, Foucault's works on discourse (Foucault 1965, 1970, 1972, 1973) provides a framework for comprehending political dynamics within the structure of every knowledge system. From *Madness and Civilization* to *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, even in his later works, it can be observed that Foucault was addressing a taken for granted knowledge system within the Western society and he was problematising the way it had been constructed to constitute certain forms of subjective identities. His studies, by exploring the structure of discursive practices which constitute meanings in social life, attempted to draw a picture of ontological fault lines within the twentieth-century European knowledge system. Focusing on discursive ontology, he unraveled hidden interests of power operating within every dominant structure of knowledge. Therefore, his studies on discourse can be taken as an ideal model for understanding transformations within a

discursive practice and to analyse politics which constitute such a transformation. Secondly, Foucault's concept of discourse advocates a new method, based on discursive ontology, for comprehending the complexity of power and its operations within every social system. His concept of discourse is neither a mere extension of representation thesis advocated by various scholars nor a mere development within the linguistic method of discourse analysis. However, it can engross the essence of both representation thesis and linguistic method of discourse analysis in a way which extricates a clear picture of complex political dynamics within the structure of meanings in our social system.

The present chapter, under the larger framework of Foucauldian discourse analysis, intends to analyse the structure of narratives of the past subsumed within mass media discourses to understand its political dynamics and its effects on society. The questions here are how memory-discourses, especially war-memory discourses, are being presented through media narratives about international politics, how such memories influence society's/societies' understanding of collective self, and how it may help to constitute apparatuses for collective othering. For that purpose, the first part of the chapter examines political structure of discourse in general and the relationship between power and discourse in particular. By bringing major theories of power in focus, this section attempts to explain why discourse is always linked with power. The second part of the chapter analyses the ways in which discourses constitute individual and collective subjectivity. The objective of this section is to explain, with the help of Foucault's theory, the role of discourse/power in conditioning subjective identities of individuals. The third part of the chapter addresses the question of 'othering' in discursive construction of subjectivity in general and the specific role of 'othering' in international politics in particular. The last part of the chapter, by addressing discourse-memory relationship, explores the way in which discourses of the collective memory of is being presented within the mass media discourses and the potential effects of memory discourses within every social system.

Power and Structure of Discourse

If we follow Foucauldian understanding of discourse, it can be learned that there is no

definitive starting point for any discourse. The foundation of every new discourse is based on a meaning-structure which is already established within a social system. In this sense, every new discourse has an old beginning, which is mostly untraceable within the linguistic structure of a particular cultural landscape as the process of forming language and culture is based on complex set of social relations. In Foucault's words, "all manifest discourse is secretly based on an 'already said'" and "all beginnings can never be more than recommencements or occultation" (Foucault 1972: 27). He states in another work that "in a philosophy of the founding subject, in a philosophy of originary experience, and in a philosophy of universal mediation alike, discourse is no more than a play, of writing in the first case, of reading in the second, and of exchange in the third" (Foucault 1970a: 66). However, it does not mean that discourse is a natural social phenomenon evolving in a continuous phase without being interrupted by any external force. Instead, discourse needs to be understood as a social practice constituted by society with various interests, including political interests, for giving meaning(s) to objects and subjects in their collective life. It is important to note that society has no unified interest, or, in other words, there are multiple interests at work within every society and those are always subject to change/transformation. In addition to that, society is not a naturally unified peaceful democratic institution, rather it is a sum of diverse and complex collectivities, and there remains a constant threat of clash of interests in inter and intra social relations. Because of these reasons, in an atmosphere of constant threat and violence formed by various clashing individual and social interests, 'power' has a decisive role to play, in protecting self-interests, in repressing every other threatening interest, and in maintaining social order in a way that does not challenge established power relations. Therefore, to understand discourse, its structure, and its process of transformations, firstly we need to understand power, its constituting elements and its ways of operations within every society.

As rightly observed by Joseph Nye (1990: 12) "power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure". As experience is not a complete material phenomenon, understanding power in its material totality is an improbable, if not an impossible, task. Stewart Clegg (1989) wrote in his seminal work *Frameworks of Power* that "there is no such thing as a single all-embracing concept of power", and, similarly, Steven Lukes

(1974), one of the most famous theorists of power, agreed that power is an "essentially contested concept". From Elitist-Pluralist views to Behaviourist-Marxist views, there is no scholarly agreement with regard to the definition of power. Neither Steven Lukes' ([1974] 2005) much-celebrated theory called 'three faces of power', nor a long range of theories of power within International Relations have succeeded in bringing a binding definition of power. All these explicitly suggest that there is a significant linguistic difficulty in defining the concept of power in a way which absorbs every possible meaning the word 'power' invokes in our current discourses.

The modern discourse on power begins from sixteenth-century Italian philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli and seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Machiavelli, mainly targeting the sixteenth century Italy through his political writings, addressed power as an authority which brings order within society with the help of institutionalised laws and organised military (Holler 2009). In his view, power, specifically power of the Roman Republic, derives from "the recognized duty of the citizens concerning the common good, the law which specifies the duty, and political institutions that implement the duty in accordance to the law and revise the law in accordance to the duty" (Holler 2009: 342). However, he regarded strong military organisation as an indispensable part of state authority, and, of course, as the most important element of power. Therefore, the ontology of Machiavelli's concept of power was based on a mix of material capability derived from organised military and institutional authority which control society with the help of a system of laws and practices. In the language of critics, Machiavelli's conception of power was "imprecise, contingent, strategic and organizational" (Clegg 1989: 4).

Unlike Machiavelli, Hobbes' concept of power was much more precise and clear, in a common man's perspective. He advocated a grand definition of power in the beginning of chapter 10 of *Leviathan.* He wrote, "The power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means; to obtain some future apparent good; and is either *original* or *instrumental.*" Following this, he explained what is *original* or *natural power* and *instrumental power.* For him, *natural power* is "the eminence of faculties of body, or mind; as extraordinary strength, from prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility".

However, the *instrumental power* is that "which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: as riches, reputation, friends and the secret working of God, which men call good luck" (Hobbes[1651] 1962: 74, emphasis in original). Though this definition is very much individualistic in approach, Hobbes had never been an advocate of individual freedom above the interests of the state. His theories suggested ways for bringing order within society, which is, according to him, anarchic in its natural form, by compromising individual interests. Because of this reason, he remains to be a classical theorist of power; a proponent of state supremacy over individual freedom. In short, for Hobbes, power is man's "present means to obtain some future apparent good"; it may derive from "faculties of body or mind" and material things like "riches" can also be constituting element of power. In this sense, power can be physical strength, capability, control, and/or influence.

However, Hobbes analysed power mostly in relative terms, where the power of the Sovereign is "a function of the lack of power of the subjects" (Read 1991: 506). He wrote, "the power and honour of subjects vanisheth in the presence of the Power Sovereign" (quoted in Read 1991; 506). His theory of social contract suggested that, as men are naturally self-interested violent beings, the formation of Sovereign or state, where every man compromises his individual interests for the well-being of a common good, is the only way to establish peace and order within the society. For the establishment of Sovereign, individuals compromise most of their powers; though not all of them. Therefore, the power of the state is nothing, but a collection of individual powers; that means physical strength (police and military), capability (material resources, including revenues and military) control (system of laws and practices, with the help of various institutions) and influence (by making threat of punishment or through diplomacy).

In its essence, Hobbes' understanding of power is not intrinsically different from that of Machiavelli. Though they have analysed it in different ways, ultimately, the constituting elements of power are almost similar in both of these classical theories. However, when it comes to later theories, meaning-structure of 'power' gets expanded into various new directions and becomes highly complicated. For example, in Max Weber's definition,

"power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (quoted in Uphoff 1989: 299). As per this definition, power is the ability of an actor to achieve objectives despite resistance. Here comes the question about the elements which constitute such ability. Weber says, it derives from "all conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable combination of circumstances [that] may put him in a position to impose his will in a given situation" (quoted in Uphoff 1989: 299). For a reader, this multifarious explanation brings more questions than clarifying anything. Weber's theories did not provide any clear cut simplified answers to the question such as what are these conceivable qualities of a person and conceivable combination of circumstances. But if we examine his definition of the state, it can be seen that Weber's understanding of power is certainly linked with a conventional notion, even though his theories brings various complex dimensions into it. According to him, the state is a "territorially-defined organization with an administrative staff that successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its orders" (quoted in Uphoff 1989: 301-302). The most important point to note here is that Weber takes 'physical force' as an essential component of the state, just like Machiavelli and Hobbes. It means even Weber was dependent on materialist ontology, to an extent, to define the state power.

In his book *Power, Ideology and Control,* John Oliga classifies the whole range of theories on power into three major categories; subjectivist, objectivist, and relationalist approaches. In this classification, the subjectivist approach conceives power as 'possessed by agents' (individuals or collectivities), as "the capacity to bring about a desired outcome" (Oliga 1996: 73). The proponents of subjectivist theories of power argue that "power is a subjective capacity to realize one's interests, but is dependent on other factors" (Oliga 1996: 71). Oliga brings elitist, pluralist, and radical views on power under this category, as they all approach power in terms of a "capacity-outcome" model.

The subjectivist theories mostly treated power as something which is intrinsically tied with conflicts, "an empirical relation of cause and effects" (Issac 1987: 8). It suggests that in the absence of conflicts, the presumption is that "there is a consensus on the existing

socio-political values, preferences and institutional practices" (Oliga 1996: 73). In these approaches, power is not a well-defined concept, as its primary focus is on how power works and who has power, not on what power is. However, it can be assumed that, in terms of subjectivist view, the things which help subjective agents to secure their desired outcome constitute power; it can be material capability or non-material factors like ability to influence others by knowledge or social status. The behavioralist theories, which include Robert Dahl's (1957) "one-dimensional" view of power and Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz's (1963) "two-dimensional" view of power, and Steven Lukes' (1974) theory of "three-dimensional" view of power are essentially based on "capacity-outcome" model of subjectivist understanding.

Dahl's theory, a pluralist model, treats power as "an empirical regularity whereby the behaviour of one agent causes the behaviour of another" (Issac 1987: 8). For him, power is a relation between actors, who "may be individuals, groups, roles, offices, governments, nation-states, or other human aggregates" (Dhal 1957: 203). He defines power "in terms of an individuals' successful attempt to secure a desired outcome through processes entailing the making of decisions on key issues over which there is an observable (overt) conflict of subjective interests" (Oliga 1996: 73). The "two-dimensional" view advocated by Bachrach and Baratz, which is essentially an elitist theory of power, extends Dahl's theory by including "non-decision making", "whereby decisions are prevented from being taken on issues and potential issues over observable (overt or covert) conflicts" (Oliga 1996: 73). That means "mobilization of bias" is always not meant for decision-making, and preventing "any challenge to the predominant values or to the established rules of the game" also constitute an important task of it (Bachrach and Baratz 1962).The idea of "mobilization of bias" is borrowed from Schatttschneider who argued that "all forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and suppression of others because *organization is the mobilization of bias*. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out" (quoted in Steven Lukes 1974: 7).

Essentially, the theory of Bachrach and Baratz was a reminder that, as Stewart Clegg (1989: 11) puts it, "power might be manifested not only in doing things but also in

ensuring that things do not get done". Steven Lukes' theory of "three-dimensional" view goes beyond both of these behavioural understanding by including "social forces and institutional practices as sources of bias mobilization, control over political agenda through ideological processes of preference shaping and selective perception, and articulation of what count as social problems and conflicts, and latent conflicts representing a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the 'real' interests of those they exclude" (Oliga 1996: 73). However, for him, "power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised)" (Lukes 1974: 12). His analysis of power concentrates more on explaining moral/ethical responsibility of human agent who is exercising power, and provide very little insights on the constituting elements of power. Precisely, subjectivist understanding of ontology of power is less helpful in making sense of power-discourse relationship.

The advocates of objectivist understanding of power focused primarily on usability of power; that is power to accomplish a common goal. It included various positive views which take power as "integrative capacity arising from the transformative capacity of individuals harmoniously working in cooperation" and Marxian views which primarily focused on capitalist mode of production and the effects of the state power on society. Moreover, the objectivist approach conceives power "either as transformative capacities of social systems as cooperative enterprises, or as capacity (to dominate or resist) located in social structures" (Oliga 1996: 71).

In Oliga's (1996) classification, functionalist theories come under the category of objectivist conceptions of power, even though functionalists mostly analysed power as connected with subjective interests just like Steven Lukes (1974) has presented it in his "three-dimensional" view on power. The difference, in his view, is that functionalism focuses primarily on harmonious interests, whereas subjectivist theories deal with conflictual interests. In terms of functionalist understanding, power is "a generalised transformative capacity, a system or societal medium for regulating social relations in the pursuit of collective goals or common interests" (Oliga 1996: 74). It conceives power as a property of a social system developed for controlling interactions between subjects—in other words, it talks primarily about authority.

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Marxian structuralism is another major theory that Oliga (1996) brings under the category of objectivist conceptions of power. In this theory, power is an "effect of institutional structures" characterising capitalist mode of production. In terms of Marxian understanding, individuals are "bearers or supports of predetermined relations of production" working under structurally constrained condition by "occupying socially determined and pre-given positions". Because of this reason, it defines power as "the capacity of a class to realise its specific objective interests" (Oliga 1996: 75). Though it is a grand generalisation of human history which constitutes the foundation of Marxian structuralism, and it overlooks value of human agency by reducing it to mere relations of productions, the Marxian understanding on exercise of control over individual subjects, especially Gramscian concept of hegemony, offers many valuable lessons for making sense of discourse-power relationship. Gramsci asserted that from religious and educational institutions to media "all the institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations [are] consistent with the hegemonic social order [constituted by the bourgeoisie] (Cox 1983: 164)"

The third category in Oliga's (1996) classification of power theories is relational conceptions of power. The advocates of relational approaches conceive power "as a relational phenomenon: a property of interaction among social forces involved" (Oliga 1996: 71). In his classification, this approach includes five different lines of development on theories of power. The first category of theories explores power through the lens of "micropolitics", focusing on the exercise of power both in "on-going everyday situations and in specific arenas of struggle" (Oliga 1996: 72). He divides this category into two different streams; one as focusing on specific conditions of particular struggle, which he terms as "differential conditions", and the other as focusing on the limited field of social strategies, which he terms as "the analytic of relations of power". To elaborate this, he writes that "the "differential conditions" view is opposed to totalizing perspectives or "a priori" judgments about power as capacity or attribute belonging to particular agents" (Oliga 1996: 76).

Oliga (1996) connects the second stream within the "micropolitics" power analysis, "the analytic of relations of power", with the views advocated by Foucault and Minson.

Foucault's notion of "disciplinary power", which deals with the invisible exercise of power in shaping knowledge and subjectivity of individuals, is well placed in this category. Oliga (1996: 77) writes,

> According to Foucault, power is assumed to be diffused throughout society at all levels, just as practical, everyday life knowledge is. Power is thus a process tied closely to practical knowledge through the general tactic of disciplining human bodies for social purposes. He therefore challenges the idea of truth or pure knowledge, because actual knowledge in society is a political activity, the product of power and its disciplinary techniques. This is the idea in Foucault's concepts of "will-to-truth" or "will-to-knowledge," which explicitly echo Nietzsche's concept of "will-to-power." For both writers, knowledge cannot be divorced from power.

The second line of development, which he terms as "power and negative relationism", focuses on power as a medium for securing or defending sectional interests. This approach acknowledges "the interdependence of social relations and their transformative capacity". However, he insists, "the transformative capacity is seen primarily in negative terms, as power "over others" and not "with others"" (Oliga 1996: 79). He brings Gidden's notion of "dialectic control" which analyses the interdependence and the structures of domination between "power-full" and "power-less" in a social system under this category.

The third line of development of power theories, Oliga (1996) terms it as "power and positive relationism", conceptualises power as a creative, productive, transformative potential embodied within the interdependency of social relations. He writes,

> Knights and Willmott (1985) provide a relational but positive conception of power, both as a critique and extension of Giddens's negative formulation. The existential significance of interdependence as an endemic feature of social relations, they argue, is central to an understanding of how power connects to the agent's social identity, with positive or negative consequences for the potential for transformative capacity in the form of collective power (Oliga 1996: 80).

The fourth line of development, he terms it as "power and rational agency", focusing on "a priori" natural interest of every individual to become a rational (self-determined) agent. Elaborating this view, he states that,

> The agency view of power is 'relational', positive, and existential. Human agency presumes power. Without power, subjectivity, and hence action, is not possible. For instance, in Nietzsche's (1966, 1968) concept of 'will-to-power', power refers to the ontological conditions of possibility for rational agency. The securing of

self-identity implies the subjective capacity ('the feeling of power') to experience oneself self-reflectively as a causal, self-determined agent in an experiential, historical world (Oliga 1996: 81).

Nevertheless, this approach is yet to become a dominant part of mainstream literature on power. As Oliga (1996) observes, this approach has not received the attention it deserves perhaps because of the reason that "it is seen as more focused on the human teleological capacity to transform nature and self, rather than directly on the transformation of the structures of social relations" (Oliga 1996: 82). He takes our attention to a valuable insight from Gidden's structuration theory, which states that "the constitution of agents and social structures are not two independent phenomena" (Oliga 1996: 82), to assert the significance of agency view of power. However, as this rational-agency approach for understanding power focuses primarily on individual level of analysis, he brings his fifth category in the relational conceptions of power as based on social level of analysis.

The fifth line of approach (Oliga terms it as "power and contingent relationism") which is introduced as the counterpart of the "rational agency view", by recognising the relational nature of power, seeks "to eschew the position that the nature of this relationism is the one that necessarily leads to the pursuit either of social interests or of collective interests in situations of interdependence" (Oliga 1996: 72). He terms it as "contingent" because "it conceives of power as having a positive as well as a negative potential" (Oliga 1996: 83). Elaborating the point he writes,

> Viewed negatively, power reflects the oppressive and exploitative effects of relations of domination, as often evidenced in manifest situations of antagonistic sectional or self-interests. Viewed positively, power reflects either (1) the creative, productive transformative capacity deriving from synergism but abstracted from issues of distributive conflicts, or (2) an emancipatory potential, an enablement, a process of *empowerment* in which an oppressed group comes not only to gain enlightenment about its situation, but also to acquire a resolve and the will to act in concert for its emancipation (Oliga 1996: 83).

Apart from all these theories mentioned here, the concept of power is analysed and theorised in a large number of literature belonging to the disciplines such as sociology, political science and international relations. When it comes to the discipline of international relations, power is conceived primarily as material capability, involving military, economy and geography, and control over resources, others and/or outcomes

(Holsti 1964; Peterson 2011). Though there has been many attempts to broaden meaning of power within the discipline by bringing non-material factors like democracy, liberal institutions, culture etc. as its constituting elements and coining the terms like "soft-power" (Nye 2004), the realist conceptualisation in terms of materialist ontology, that is "the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do what they otherwise would not" (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 40), remains to be dominant in the study of international politics.

Why are there so many theories dealing with the concept of power? Which among these is more successful in understanding and explaining power? Definitely, every attempt to make a judgement on the value of these theories will be guided by subjective cultural and ideological bias. Because, every author makes her/his theory and analysis in accordance with her/his perceived version of reality, it can never be completely accurate and objective. Every individual and society perceives their version of reality on the basis of some ideological and cultural values which determine their identity and self (Morgan 2007). Therefore, the meaning of a same object or subject or event will not necessarily be the same for every individual or society. However, it does not mean that there is no absolute social value or that every individual and social perception is value neutral. Definitely, particular perceptions of certain individuals and societies may appear to be detrimental or intimidating to the very survival of various other individuals and societies or it may appear as an impediment to peace and order within an entire social system. For example, when slavery was in practice during the pre-twentieth century period, every individual or society which was engaged in that practice may not have perceived it as an unscrupulous practice or as a ferocious violation of human rights. Even John Locke, one of the most influential modern philosophers and a preeminent theorist of natural liberties, profited from slave trade and justified slavery in his writings (Hall 2004). Investing in the slave trading companies, mainly in the Royal African Company which was formed in 1672 to trade along the West Coast of Africa and to provide the slaves to planters in America, and acting as secretary and advisor to three different groups involved in the Affairs of American colonies, John Locke enjoyed the benefit of slave economy (Glausser 1990). Moreover, he helped to "author the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, which guaranteed Englishmen 'absolute power and authority' over African

slaves in the colony, and created a just-war theory of legitimate slavery in [his well-known work] *The Second Treatise of Civil Government*" (Hinshelwood 2013: 563). Justifying slavery, he asserted that the "Christianity gives not anyone any new privilege to change the state which he was in before. In whatsoever state a man is called, in the same he is to remain, notwithstanding any privileges of the gospel, which gives him no dispensation or exemption, from any obligation he was in before" (Glausser 1990: 203-204) For many people who were enjoying the benefit of slavery related socio-economic system, a slave was not much different from any other domesticated animal. In their perceived version of reality, slaves and non-slaves were not alike, with similar pain and pleasure, emotions and sentiments. However, it does not mean that their version of reality was value neutral or that they had the right to perform such callous activity as their perception of reality was different. Their perception was unequivocally intolerant and detrimental to the life of many other individuals and societies. The point is that there are various factors playing significant role in constituting individual and social perception of reality which may not necessarily be value neutral or value positive for everyone in every period of time.

In addition to the complexity within human perception of reality, the limitations of languages for communicating objective meanings constitute another major hurdle for understanding power. The Oxford English dictionary provides nine versions of meanings the word 'power' invokes. Presenting his theory of power, Robert Dahl (1957) observed, "unfortunately, in the English language 'power' is an awkward word, for unlike 'influence' and 'control' it has no convenient verb form, nor can the subject and object of the relation be supplied with noun forms without resort to barbaric neologisms" (Dahl 1957: 202). Every language has such limitations in communicating meanings, especially when it comes to inter-cultural or cross-cultural level of interaction. This linguistic problem, which is of course based on cultural system, is another important factor that constitutes diversity in human knowledge.

Every individual and social perception of reality is formed by a set of complex factors and every language constitutes meanings in relation to a particular cultural system. With this basic understanding one can assume that every version of power theory, from

behaviourist view that "*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not have otherwise do" (Dahl 1957: 202-203) to post-structuralist view that "power is the means by which all things happen" (Oliga 1996: 77), represent one or other versions of reality. At some point of focus, power can be observed as oppressive or negative, at some point it can be positive and emancipatory, and at some other point it can be said that "there is no need to valorise repression as negative and production as positive" (Spivak 1993: 38). It can be material capability, influence, knowledge, authority, control etc. in accordance with the observers' perception of reality and nature of problem he/she is attempting to address. However, it still leaves a question that how the word 'power', or any other words possessing similar meaning, even in other languages, emerged in the first place.

There is no universally accepted theory on evolution of language to help us to understand the formation of words in a linguistic system (Laks 2008). However, mostly linguists agree that modern form of every word, in every language, has evolved to represent a particular meaning or a set of meanings which was already active in social communicative practices (Bickerton 1981, 1990; Knight 2004). It implies that meaning making practices precede actual linguistic expression of every concept. In this study, such meaning making practices are called 'discourse'. It can be verbal or non-verbal, involving signs, symbols and body languages. It can include anything from a simple social interaction about an idea of using an instrument to eat, instead of using fingers, which they later called 'fork' or 'spoon' or some other words representing similar meanings, to very selective intellectual interaction about making a machine to do rapid mathematical calculations, and they later named that machine 'computer'. This process can be better explained by focusing on the way of evolution of a comparatively recent word in English language. The word 'google', which is so familiar in cyber space today, can be taken as an example. Today even the Oxford English dictionary provides its meaning as 'to type words into the search engine 'Google' in order to find information about somebody/something'. How did that word evolve? It is well known that the word 'google' has evolved only after the internet became popular in our societies and people began using the search engine 'Google' for searching information.

It is evident that meaning making practices or discourse constitute shared understandings within a social system and all social interaction takes place in terms of such shared understandings. In this sense, just like the meaning of any subject or object, the concept of power is discursively constructed. Whatever is the meaning the word 'power' represents, after all, it is discourse which produced such meaning and it is always subject to change/transformation as it is discursively constructed. Definitely, the discursive construction of power involves a complex process. Foucault wrote,

> It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies (Foucault 1978: 92-93).

Foucault's studies focused on complex interrelationship between discourse and power; definitely, while asserting that power is essentially discursive. Approaching discourse as "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault 1972: 49) could help to better understand the complex interrelationship between discourse and power. In this sense, particular discursive practices are the ones which produce power in the first place; whether it is as the state, military and economy or as subjective authorities like the King, the Pope, the President and the Prime Minister or as any religious, cultural and political institutions, or as any other form of disciplining and controlling social practices. As discourse is always subject to change/transformation and as it can be "a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance, and a starting point for an opposing strategy" (Foucault 1978: 101), for every established power relations, relentless control over discourse is inevitable for maintaining status quo or to accumulate more power by eliminating opposing interests. Therefore, power, though it is a product of particular discursive practices, persistently shapes structure of discourse in a way that helps to secure its interests. Foucault (1978: 101) reminded us that "discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power", and he added, "discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it

possible to thwart it".

Discourse and Subjectivity

Power maintains its control over discourse in various ways. In Foucault's view, exclusion is the most important mechanism of control that power relentlessly exercises over discourse. The practice of exclusion occurs in several forms, including prohibition, division and rejection. Censorship is a familiar tool of prohibition that we can identify today as a widely used mechanism of control over discourse production. As far as India is concerned, Indira Gandhi's infamous censorship of press during the period of the National Emergency (1975-77) remains to be a dark episode in its history. Even today, with the help of various laws, including Information Technology Rules of 2011, Government of India continues to exercise certain level of control over mass media discourse. In addition to that, institutions like the Central Board of Film Certification are active in monitoring/controlling discourse production in the country. However, it is not just the state which always attempts to control challenging discourses by the practice of censorship or through any other means. It is important to note that banning of Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* and withdrawal of American Indologist Wendy Doniger's book titled as *The Hindus: An Alternative History* from the market occurred in India mainly due to violent protests from fundamentalist believers. The social unrest created by certain communities for banning movies like *Vishwaroopam* and *Padmavati* could better explain discourse-power relations and the struggle involved in the process of discourse production.

The exercise of control over discourse with the tool of prohibition can happen through various other means. Foucault (1970: 52) wrote, "[i]n the taboo on the object of speech, and the ritual of the circumstances of speech, and the privileged or exclusive right of the speaking subject, we have the play of three types of prohibition which intersect, reinforce or compensate for each other, forming a complex grid which changes constantly". Other than prohibition and its various means, Foucault noted, division and rejection are the most important practices through which the mechanism of exclusion is being exercised over discourse production. There is no doubt that dividing practices are active in every

social system through enormous number of ways; in terms of gender, sexual preference, race, culture, belief, ideology, background of birth, pattern of behaviour etc. Such divisions have never been an innocent exercise for identifying specific types of individuals from a diverse society. Instead, they all are formed with definite political interests, by various discursive practices, by rejecting, resisting, controlling and many countering discursive practices, to establish dominance of certain discourses and its concerned power relations. Perhaps, Kant's categorical rejection of statements of a 'Negro carpenter' by arguing that "this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid" in *Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764) better explains the way such control over discourse has been exercised historically (Hall 2004: 34).

Though the ultimate objective of power in structuring discursive practices in a particular fashion is to secure its interests, the processes which exercise such control over discourse in a system have significant impacts on individuals and society. They produce certain types of individual and collective identities, and thereby constitute particular structure for everyday life of individuals. Such involvement of power in discursive practices can be seen throughout human history. All types of human cultures, customs, religions, rules and laws, and codes of behaviour are simultaneously tools and effects of discursive practices structured in particular ways. However, in the pre-modern period or until the birth of modern state in the sixteenth century, institutionalised power had certain limitations in structuring discourse in terms of its interests. The birth of modern state and its apparatus, changes in socio-economic system and dramatic advancement in science and technology in recent centuries have intensified the involvement of institutionalised power in discursive practices which objectifies individuals in a particular fashion to produce particular type of subjects (Foucault 1982). Explaining the dynamics of new political power, Foucault (1982: 213) observed,

> Since the sixteenth century a new political form of power has been continuously developing. This new political structure, as everybody knows, is the state. But, most of the time, the state is envisioned as a kind of political power which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality or, I should say, of a class or group among the citizens. That's quite true. But I would like to underline the fact that the state's power (and that's one of the reason for its strength) is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power. Never, I think, in the history of

human societies—even in the old Chinese society—has there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques and of totalization procedures.

Foucault was not the first scholar to problematise such a systemic or structural constrain existing over the freedom of individual subjects. Many scholars have addressed the same problem, prior to Foucault, in different ways. For example, Karl Marx asserted that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (quoted in Elder-Vass 2010: 1). Similarly, Emile Durkheim argued that "the individual is dominated by a moral reality greater than himself: namely collective reality" (quoted in Elder-Vass 2010: 1). However, it was Foucault who directed our attention into irrefutable role of a network of power relations extending from micro level politics to macro level political institutions such as prisons and military in shaping everyday life of individual subjects, and familiarised that problem as "discursive production of subjects". Later, scholars like Edward Said (1978) and Judith Butler (1997) have made some interesting contribution to our understanding of the same. In *Orientalism*, Said explained how 'colonial discourse' structured in particular form enforced certain regulatory principle to assist imperial powers to establish hegemonic control over colonised people and to create colonial subjectivity. However, Butler's (1997) studies brought new insights into the complex process of subjection and clarified that even though it is the social discourse which constitutes the subject, through the process of subordination and attachment, the subject is indeed capable of resisting pre-established social order which determines its very being.

In his essay "The Subject and Power" (1982), Foucault wrote that his works during the last twenty years had dealt with "three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects". The first mode of objectification explains how various modes of inquiries assume the status of science, as linguistics, economics and biology etc., by turning human beings into the subjects. In the first mode of objectification, he analysed objectivising of speaking subjects in linguistics, productive subjects in economics, and living subjects in biology. In other words, explaining the first mode of objectification, he showed "how the discourses of life, labour and language historically developed and structured themselves as sciences, and how sciences further constituted man as their

object of study" (Oksala 2005: 3). In the second mode, he studied objectivising of subjects through "dividing practices". He wrote, "The subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This process objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the 'good boys'" (Foucault 1982; 208). Explaining this mode of objectification, he showed how various disciplinary mechanisms constitute the subjectivity of individuals. In the third mode, he addressed "the way human beings turn himself or herself into a subject". He had chosen the domain of sexuality as an example, to show "how men have learned to recognize themselves as subjects of 'sexuality'" (Foucault 1982: 208). He showed that as an effect of discourse/power networks, individuals recognise themselves as a subject of sexuality.

The critics have problematised Foucault's works on power-discourse involvement in constituting subjectivity on various grounds. One of the most important among them was that "Foucault totalizes the social space in terms of discipline, despite his explicit refusal of totalization as a theoretical strategy" (Bignall 2010: 135-136). It is true that Foucault's studies display totalising tendencies, especially when it deals with repressive involvement of discourse/power in conditioning subjective identity. However, it will be wrong to assume that he takes social space as an organised whole which binds everything. His conceptualisation of power explicitly shows it is the multiplicity of forces and dynamic relations that takes central stage in his analysis. Asserting dynamic relations he wrote, "It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization" (Foucault 1978: 92). In a different work he argued that "relations of power are interwoven with other kinds of relations (production, kinship, family, sexuality) for which they play at once conditioning and a conditioned role" (Foucault 1980: 142).

Problematising Foucault's argument that mechanism of discipline can condition subjectivity of an individual, a critic wrote "anybody can be disciplined but not everybody ends up simply as a worker or, in the eyes of the law, a criminal" (Macdonell 1986: 120). But the question is whether Foucault's theory gives an impression that power always works in a similar fashion and produces identical subjectivities. It was Foucault

who argued that "there are no relations of power without resistances" (Foucault 1980: 142). Elaborating the point, he added,

> [Resistances] are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power. It exists all the more by being in the same place as power; hence, like power resistance is multiple.

As long as power is multiple and resistance is an intrinsic part of power relations, there will be substantial space for conditioning different forms of subjective characteristics. In this case, subjection may come not just because of control of power, but also as a means of resistance against some opposing powers. Foucault (1982: 212) asserted that "there are two meanings of the word *subject*: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to". Therefore, making of subjectivity need not necessarily be an act of compulsion or control by an external force. It can be the result of individuals' conscious action, as a means of protection of certain interests or as a resistance against repressive discourses/power. Even if this is the case, individuals' "attachment to subjection is produced through workings of power" (Butler 1997: 6). In this context, it is necessary to note that "power is not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on for our existence and what we harbour and preserve in the beings that we are" (Butler 1997: 2)

Though often in the discussions on subjectivity, the procedures of subjection are analysed as connected with sovereign power and rule of law, it is not just state, even though it is the most important one in this period of time, as Foucault noted, which enforces regulatory principle over discourse as a means of conditioning individual subjects disciplined in a particular fashion. The institutions of religion and certain other social/cultural institutions still remain as a significant force capable of exercising control over discourse production and conditioning of subjective identity. The religious or cultural education an individual receives from her/his early childhood indeed works as a disciplinary practice which influences conditioning of her/his subjective identity. Foucault insisted that "any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledge(s) and power(s)

which they carry" (Foucault 1970a: 64). In a different context, he asserted that "the discipline is a principle of control over the production of discourse. The discipline fixes limits for discourse by the action of an identity which takes the form of a permanent re-actuation of the rules" (Foucault 1971a*:* 61).

When we deal with the role of system of education in production and enforcement of discourses, it is important to note that the most imperative medium of discourse circulation in this period of time is definitely mass media which include television channels, newspapers, radio, movies, and internet based media like social media and online news portals. Though in the past, mass media largely remained under the control of institutions like state and religion, since the developments of visual media, especially movies and television channels, and recently with the advancement of internet based social media, its role in a social system has transformed dramatically. It is no longer a mere distributor of discourses produced by someone else, instead, today, it is a powerful agent of discourse production possessing significant influence over subjective identities of individuals. With these developments, hegemony of institutions like state and religion in producing and maintaining discourses is largely being challenged. Similarly, such institutions' efforts to control challenging discourses through exclusion and prohibition began to be less effective, especially since the advent of internet based media. However, even with these developments, states successfully maintain its disciplinary discourses and thereby continue to hold its supremacy in conditioning subjective identities of individuals. Though Foucault's works did not specifically address these recent developments in the role of mass media in the production of discourses, his larger theoretical framework on power/discourse relationship with subjectivity is indeed helpful for making sense of involvement of media discourses in structuring of subjective identities.

Discourse and Othering in International Relations

The conditioning of subjective identity, in terms of Foucault's theory, materialises not in an isolated vacuum, instead it always depends on an active universe of discourses where exclusionary mechanisms and disciplinary practices relentlessly function. Such a domain

of discourse not only creates the binary framework of the self and the other, but also maintains and modifies such discursive practices on the basis of interests it represents. Therefore, the practice of othering is not an extraneous element within the structure of any discourse which constitutes subjective identity of individuals. The very meaning that a subjective identity represents is constituted only with the presence of an opposing/different identity. In this sense, there is no 'patriot', 'sane person', 'labourer', and 'woman' unless there is 'traitor', 'lunatic', 'industrialist' or 'entrepreneur', and 'man', respectively. In other words, "it is only through recognition of the 'other' that one is constituted as a 'self'" (Greenhill 2008).

Every collective identity, constituted in terms of nation, religion, culture, caste etc., has a background of certain discursive practices that is developed at the cost of constructing many collective others. Indeed such discursive practices are the ones which enable the existence of a nation as a unified institution, and facilitate a larger collective 'national identity' beyond the discursive limitations of all minor collective identities. Such discursive practices have crucial importance in the discipline of international politics because of various reasons. Most importantly, as Alexander Wendt (1999: 21), the leading figure of constructivist school in International Relations (IR), asserted, "the daily life of international politics is an on-going process of states taking identities in relation to Others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the result". He insisted that for every state, its pattern of behaviour in the international system "continually produces and reproduces conceptions of Self and Other" (Wendt 1999: 36).

However, it is important to note that the states were not always organised in terms of national identity, as in its present sense of the term. But, the history shows, the discursive production of collective othering within the international politics goes far beyond the birth of nation state. Iver B Neumann's (1996, 1999) study on identity formation in international politics gives valuable insights on pattern of othering in the pre-nation state international system and demonstrates "how the Self/Other nexus is operative on all levels of European identity formation" (Neumann 1999: 161). It traces the historical roots of European identity narratives and exposes the discursive practices which constituted the Turks and the Russians as 'other' for conditioning of the European collective 'self'. In

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the European discursive practices which constituted their collective identity, the image of Turks had two different manifestations. At first, within the discourse of highly religious medieval European community, the Turks were represented as 'infidel', an Islamic collective 'other' to their Christian collective 'self'. However, in later centuries, during the period of Ottoman Empire, European discourses had largely depicted the Turks as 'barbarians'. Meanwhile, Neumann asserts, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onwards the European discourses framed the Russians as uncivilized barbarians, who are alcoholic, lazy, fatalistic, and little attached to life. When Russia became great power under Tsarist regime, Europeans treated them as "barbarians at the gate of Europe". However, during the Cold War years, for Europeans, Russia was "an Asiatic/barbarian political power that had availed itself of the opportunity offered by the second world war to intrude into Europe by military means" (Neumann 1999: 102).

By depicting identity formation as a multilevel process centred on society, Neumann writes that "certain collective identity cannot be unequivocally privileged, because self and other are not only mutually constitutive entities but also are necessarily unbounded". He adds, "[t]he self and the other merge into one another" (Neumann 1999: 161). In this sense, any transformation within the discursive practices which constitutes a particular collective identity can in turn affect discursive representation of its other. Lene Hansen's (2006) study on security and foreign policy discourse also attempts to place the question of collective othering in international relations in such a framework. For Hansen, identity is discursive, relational, political and social. She insists that "there are no objective identities located in some extra-discursive realm". It means a continuous discursive articulation and re-articulation are inevitable for constituting and maintaining any collective identity. Such discursive articulation, she argues, is always a political action. She approaches identity as relational since it is always "given through reference to something it is not". In other words, every discursive construction of identities, like 'American', 'European', 'civilised' or 'developed', simultaneously constitute opposing identities, like 'non-American', 'non-European', 'barbaric', or 'underdeveloped', within the same discourse. She introduces it as social on the ground that identity is always "established through a set of collectively articulated codes, not as a private property of individual or a psychological condition". According to Hansen, the "conceptualization of

identity as discursive, political, relational and social implies that foreign policy discourse always articulates a self and a series of others". She adds, the "security discourses have traditionally constituted a national 'self' facing one or more threatening 'others', whose identities were radically different from the one of the self"(Hansen 2006: 6).

Explaining the process of state identity formation, Alexander Wendt (1994) observes that each state has two forms of identity; one is corporate identity and the other is social identity. The corporate identity is defined as "the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality". This identity, he argues, generates four basic interests or appetites: firstly, "physical security, including its differentiation from other actors", secondly, "predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities", thirdly, "recognition as an actor by others", and fourthly, "development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life". However, the social identities are defined as "set of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of the others". He asserts that "how a state satisfies its corporate interests depends on how it defines the self in relation to the other, which is a function of social identities". The point is that the states have freedom to define its relationship with the other and thereby transform its identity in international system.

However, the study of David Campbell (1992) suggests that relationship between collective self and the other in an international system cannot be easily defined, as it involves multi-layered complex discursive practices. In his view, identity is "more than something which derives its meaning solely from being positioned in contradistinction to difference; identity is a condition that has depth, is multi-layered, possesses texture, and comprises many dimensions". He adds, "identity is a condition for which there can be catalogued no single point of origin or myth of genesis; the manifold, diverse, and eclectic ingredients that comprise a settled identity cannot be reduced to any single spatial or temporal source" (Campbell 1992). His study shows that one of the most important discursive practices which helped the conditioning of the American as well as the European collective identity is "the inscription of the other as the barbarian who stands in opposition to the 'civilized' self". Asserting that the problem of self/other binary expressed in international politics cannot be limited within mere identity of states,

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he writes,

> At one time or another, European and American discourse has inscribed women, the working class, East Europeans, Jews, blacks, criminals, coloreds, mulattos, Africans, drug addicts, Arabs, the insane, Asians, the Orient, the Third World, terrorists, and other others through tropes which have written their identity as inferior, often in terms of their being a mob or horde (sometimes passive and sometimes threatening), which is without culture, devoid of morals, infected with disease, lacking in industry, incapable of achievement, prone to be unruly, inspired by emotion, given to passion, indebted to tradition, or . . .whatever 'we' are not (Campbell 1992.:100).

The discursive practices which constitute collective othering in international politics are not an exceptional exercise controlled only by the institutions of the state. They involve many other social, cultural and political institutions and multi-layered complex structure of discursive practices. They begin with a process which combines history and myths together to form a living past which assists the imagination of a collective identity (Anderson 1983). Through various celebrations, commemoration ceremonies, monuments, museums, cultural practices, text-book discourses, media discourses, speeches and public lectures of intellectuals and leaders, and various other modes of discursive practices, images of such a carefully drafted past continuously gets articulated in the dominant discourse to make it a collectively shared memory of the past within the social system. Such collectively shared images of the past are inevitable for any social order to legitimise its present existence (Connerton 1989). Definitely, such collectively shared memories of the past are the ones which legitimise the exercise of every disciplinary mechanism within the discursive practices that constitute collective subjectivity. Therefore, the process of collective othering in discursive practices requires keeping of certain type of collectively shared memories of the past as alive and active in public discourse.

Discourse and Memory

Memory is an individual faculty, in the sense that it is an individual who thinks and remembers. However, remembering is not always an individual activity; rather it is a subjective action (Fentress and Wickham 1992). The most important reason why scholars of collective memory assert this claim is that, as Maurice Halbwachs (1952) notes, "it is

in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize and localize their memories". Halbwachs' (1952) theory of collective memory suggests that all individual recollections take place within a context shaped by his/her group and within a socially structured framework. Similarly, Paul Connerton (1989) asserts that the process of remembering is a cultural rather than individual function; and, he adds that certain performances are the ones which convey knowledge of the past to individuals. Definitely, this is not a negation of personal memory or personal act of remembering; rather, it merely means that social aspect of memory is more significant in the collective lives of individuals.

However, other than these remembering aspects, the most important factor which limits subjective authority over memory is that it is only through the existing discourses, which are undoubtedly social, that individuals can attribute meanings to even their very personal memory. Because, it is always within a framework of discourses, not necessarily within the hegemonic discourse that individuals make sense of themselves and their surroundings. Nevertheless, the purpose here is not to problematise the element of 'personal' in memory, instead it intends only to explore functioning of collectively shared memories in discursive practices.

The term 'collective memory' is one of the widely applied concepts in contemporary social sciences and humanities. Scholars have defined it in various ways by drawing largely from Henri Bergson, Emile Durkheim and Maurice Halbwachs. But, essentially all of these definitions direct us to one general meaning: collective memory is a shared image of the past in a society. For instance, Barbara Misztal (2003) defines the collective memory as "the representation of the past, both that is shared by a group and that which is collectively commemorated, that enacts and gives substance to the group's identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future". However, for Jill Edy (2006), collective memories are "the stories that everyone knows about the past, even if not everyone believes the story".

The construction and maintenance of collective memory or certain images of the past in any social system inevitably depend on certain discursive practices. It can be

commemoration ceremonies, museums, monuments, cultural practices, school textbook discourses, media discourses, public lectures/speeches of leaders and intellectuals or any other modes of discourse articulation. At present times, in every society, various forms of commemoration, as connected with culture, religion, and politics, are being practiced, as an unquestionably institutionalised exercise (Assman and Czaplicka 1995; Connerton 1989; Fentress and Wickham 1992). In recent decades, with the influence of various international and global forces, commemoration of war and heroes of war has become a regular affair everywhere in the world (Sumartojo and Wellings 2014). Many countries, including India, largely encourage such practices to make its war memories alive in discursive practices. Academic discourses addressing the question of war memories, and its various forms of representations like war memorials, monuments and museums, have proliferated during this period (Assmann and Conrad 2010; Huyssen 2003; Misztal 2003; Roudometof 2002; Olick 2007, 2008; Zehfuss 2007).

Many studies, addressing the question of memory in discursive practices, have asserted that the dramatic transformations in the field of information and communication technology since the second half of the twentieth century have radically transformed society's relationship with the past (Gutman et al. 2010) and today "the past has become part of the present in ways simply unimaginable in earlier centuries" (Huyssen 2003). However, such transformation in society's relationship with the past, or in society's approach on articulating images of the past, has both positive and negative repercussions. On the positive note, such discursive articulation of the past helps the society to understand better about the danger of war, holocaust and other forms of violence, nuclear weapon etc., its social cost, the suffering it brings to the humanity, and inspires them to create a new discourse of peace which respects humanitarian values and justice. In the negative way, such articulation encourages practices of hatred, thereby expansion of divisions within society, strengthening of identity-politics, and ultimately it inspires new violence. It should be noted by considering the fact that the threat of identity/culture based violence in the world has touched new heights in recent decades (Cairns and Roe 2003; Oppenheimer and Hakvoorts 2003; Edy 2006; Fierke 2006; Roudometof 2002; Makdisi and Silverstein 2006; Wang 2012). In this context, the major challenge for social sciences, including IR, is to approach such collectively shared images of the past in a way

that could extract its positive effects efficiently and limit and reduce its negative consequences. Jens Bartelson (2006) correctly observed, "memory (and) forgetting played a central role in the very foundation and subsequent stabilization of the modern spatially differentiated international system, and that only through understanding the manner in which this occurred can we attempt to forge a more cosmopolitan world". In other words, instead of glorifying our violent past and relentlessly recreating its memories in our everyday public discourse, we should problematise the past through various discursive practices which reveal its injustice, in order to control the dividing practices within society and to forge a more peaceful international system.

As already mentioned, various types of discursive practices are the ones which constitute meanings of collectively shared memories in any society, through an exercise of relentless articulation and re-articulation of the selected/constructed images of the past. Indeed, the mass media, which include television channels, newspapers, radio, movies, and internet based media like social media and online news portals, have significant role in articulating such images in everyday discourses. Considering this factor, there were many scholarly attempts to understand the effectiveness of mass media in shaping society's perception or in constituting public discourses (Klapper 1960; Schramm 1969; McQuail 1987). Based on such studies, it is generally agreed that mass media plays significant role in conditioning society's perception on various matters, even though there are many scholars who do not accept media as the major player in the formation/transformation of a public discourse. For instance, Denis McQuail (1987) asserted that the media are dependent on and instruments for the exercise of power by others. In other words, there are many other institutions directly involved in production and maintenance of discourses in every society and the effects which they can produce in society is significantly greater than the effect of mass media. However, by considering recent transformations in media's involvement in discursive practices, Saima Saeed (2013: 4) insists that the "media do not merely inform us, but 'decide' what we know, how we know, and most importantly, how much we know"… "They [media] generate consensus, profoundly shape thought-process and mystify or alternatively force radical questioning".

Though there are many other actors involved in discourse production, it is certain that as a primary source of information on contemporary affairs, media, especially news media, play a crucial part in shaping individual/social understanding of the present. Definitely it does not mean that the role of media is significant in the construction of every public discourse. As some scholars have argued, the role of media in the formation and/or transformation of discourse vary from issue to issue and from society to society (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 1976). However, quantifying the amount of influence media possess over the construction of a discourse is quite difficult task, if not an impossible one. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus among the scholars that "media discourse is part of the process by which individual construct meaning" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). In other words, it can be said that even if societies are not a passive consumer of meanings produced by the media, the meanings produced by media certainly have influence over the social construction of meanings. Allan Bell's (1994) study on discourse of climate change, Rita Manchanda's (2010) study on discourse of terrorism, and William Gamson and Andre Modigliani's (1989) study on public opinion on nuclear power are the few among many examples of studies which articulate the complex role of media in the formation and/or transformation of a discourse.

Considering the importance of media discourse in creating meanings in contemporary societies, scholars have addressed the questions ranging from security and identity to international norms and institutions within the framework of discourse analysis. Many among such studies insist that the discursive practices are the ones which guide formation and/or transformation of every state policies and certain discourse can influence policies of a large number of states (Epstein 2008; Deitelhoff 2009). Such studies assert that, in any society, discourses can legitimise or delegitimise an action hitherto concerned as illegitimate or legitimate, as it is the discourse which "confers meaning to social and physical realities [and] it is through discourse that individuals, societies, and states make sense of themselves, of their ways of living, and of the world around them" (Epstein 2008; 2). On this ground, applying the method of discourse analysis, many studies problematise the very concept of power which is excessively applied in the studies of international politics. They advocate that, as discourse plays a central role in moulding a state's behaviour in international politics, the changes in discourse can affect state's

interests, actions and policies in various ways (Shapiro 1990; Hansen 2006; Epstein 2008; Deitelhoff 2009).

The discourse approach begins by "identifying the discourse within which interactions take place in a particular issue-area of international politics" without presuming that "states are the *only* actors to have a say in shaping international politics". It operates on a set of key principles concerned with "the relationship between language, agency and identity". These are, "first, language is effective and that to speak is also to act. Second, social actors are first and foremost speaking actors. That is, speaking is both a key modality of their agency and of the way in which they position themselves in the world. Third, actor behaviour is regulated by pre-existing discourses that structure the field of possible actions" (Epstein 2010). Based on these principles, there are many studies analysing how existing notion of security/insecurity evolved in international politics (Campbell 1992; Milliken 1999a) and how the change in a discourse could restructure state policy and action (Epstein 2008; Deitelhoff 2009). The study of David Campbell (1992), on security and foreign policy of the United States, is one of the earliest attempts to understand the role of discourse in shaping foreign policy and in constituting perceptions of threat and security. In his view, "the cold war was a powerful and pervasive historical configuration of the discursive economy of identity/difference operating in multiple sites," (Campbell 1992: 249). He argued that the new manifestations of threat are evolving in the post-Cold War world to constitute the 'otherness' in discursive economy. Moreover, in his study, the security is "first and foremost a performative-discourse constitutive of political order" (Campbell 1992: 253). If Campbell's main focus is on discursive practices of individual state, Jennifer Milliken (1999a) identifies collectively shared discourse in international politics as a constitutive of collective identity and collective threat.

Similarly, the study of Lene Hansen (2006) on Bosnian war also applies the method of discourse analysis to understand the functioning of foreign policy decision making. Hansen, by placing post-structuralist discourse analysis within the field IR, states that "foreign policy discourses are inherently social" as "decision-makers are situated within a larger political and public sphere, and that their representations as a consequence drawn

upon are formed by the representations articulated by a larger number of individuals, institutions, and media outlets" (Hansen 2006: 6). She asserts that discourse analysis "can be used to theorize the constitutive relationship between representations of identity and foreign policies". Approaching foreign policy as discursive practice, she argues that "identity and policy are constituted through a process of narrative adjustment". Hansen's study insists that, "security can be seen as a historically formed discourse centred on the nation state and as a particularly radical form of identity construction with a distinct political force that invests political leaders with power as well as responsibility" (Hansen 2006: 15-16).

While the above mentioned literature addresses the questions of security and foreign policy within the framework of discourse analysis, scholars like Nicole Deitelhoff (2009), Anna Holzscheiter (2010), and Charlotte Epstein (2008) use the same method to analyse how discourse matters in institutional level policy formations and/or re-formations in international politics. The study of Nicole Deitelhoff (2009) on institutional change in international politics, with the formation of International Criminal Court (ICC) as a case study, suggests that persuasion and discourse within the process of negotiations can alter state's interests and thereby make way to the formation of new international institutions. The study of Anna Holzscheiter (2010) on the 1989 United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) demonstrates "how norms and institutions are *transformed* in and through discourse and the effects of such a transformation on global and domestic policy-making" (Holzscheiter 2010: 2, emphasis in orginal). The study of Charlotte Epstein (2008) on anti-whaling discourse shows that the transformation in a discourse can constitute to the change of state's interests and thereby to the change of state policy.

Conclusion

Placing this study within the framework of Foucauldian understanding of discourse, power and subjectivity, this chapter explained that the method of discourse analysis can help us better understand the self-other dynamics in international politics and its complex role in setting state's interests and policies. Asserting that discourse is nothing but meaning making practices, it explained how discourse can be simultaneously a product

and producer of power. It analysed discursive ontology of power to reveal that power always shapes subjective identity of individuals in relation to an 'other' or multiple 'others' and it has direct implications in international politics. Precisely, approaching discourse in terms of Foucauldian understanding, this chapter disclosed that certain discursive practices are the ones which constitute and give meaning to collective memories in every social system and such discursive practices are so significant in constituting self-other relations. Therefore, the ways of representations of collective memories in the present and its impacts in collective life of every society can be identified by analysing everyday public discourse. This method will be more efficient for studying certain dynamics of self-other relations in international politics, especially the one concerned with 'threat-perceptions' and 'enemy images'. In this study, this method is being employed for making better sense of the self-other dynamics between India and its 'others', in this case China and Pakistan.

Chapter 3

Memories of War and Construction of the Other

It is often a discourse of historical continuity which legitimises the present existence of various social institutions. Such a discourse can be constituted only through certain practices which combine carefully drafted images of the past, which can be real or imaginary or a combination of both, with the present day social realities to create a sense of continuity of the past in everyday social life. However, there is no guarantee that such practices will always be unopposed and peaceful in every society; sometimes, it may be violent and destructive, as Foucault's (1970a) understanding of discourse suggests. State is one of the most important institutions which depend on such a discourse of historical continuity. From justifying its particular actions and policies to legitimising its very existence, states have numerous issues that demand indisputable support of a discourse of historical continuity. Most importantly, it is for creating a temporal condition which helps its people to imagine a collective identity, modern states constantly produce certain discursive practices that establish an inseparable link between the past and the present (Anderson 1983). In other words, "the construction of historical continuity is necessary to constitute a nation as a collective identity" (Reicher 2008: 150).

Historically, it was largely by employing factors such as ethnicity, culture, language, religion etc. that states constituted discourse of historical continuity. However, with the advent of modernity, such elements became less dominant in state-society relationship. In this period, redefining the state-society relationship, nationalism emerged as a force that forms a collective identity in terms of people's belonging to a particular geographical area. Definitely nationalism was not a rejection of other collective identities (Smith 1991, 1999). Rather, it was something which evolved to accommodate many differences to form a larger collective identity; it became a force that alleviates the inter-identity friction involved in a multicultural society. Scholars defined the term 'nationalism' in many different ways and there is no scholarly agreement or consensus about the relationship between nationalism and the state. While some approach nationalism as a political ideology crafted by elites for establishing power, others see nationalism as a popular or cultural phenomenon that developed over other already existing collective identities

(Breuilly 1993; Smith 2003). However, the concept is widely in use for denoting a collective feeling evolved out of a sense of belonging to a particular geographical area. Since the focus of this study is not on complexities within the concept of nationalism, the term is applied here with this general meaning. Essentially, by borrowing from debates on nationalism or national identity, this study underlines that, often by using nationalism as a tool, modern states create discourses of historical continuity required for legitimising its actions and policies.

Taking insights from the idea of 'imagined community' popularised by Benedict Anderson (1983), this study asserts that unlike other collective identities, construction of a collective identity based on nationalism largely depends on relentless articulation of memories of collective struggle, including war, in everyday public discourse. It is a link established between memories of collective struggle and the present day social reality that helps national identity to be a supra identity which goes beyond the boundaries of every other collective identity. Like every identity, construction of national identity also involves construction of an 'other' or many 'others'. Every discursive image which helps construction of a national identity in turn helps to constitute a national 'other'. Therefore, articulation of memories of war not only makes a link between the past and the present but also produces a discursive image of an 'enemy'.

Constructing historical continuity required for the formation of nationalism, memories of wars, resistances, struggles, sacrifices, individual and collective heroisms for the national cause etc. play a significant role in the discursive practices of contemporary society. Never in the human history, war memorials, war related monuments, war-museums, and commemoration ceremonies of wars and stories of heroes of wars have occupied more importance in social and political life than it is in the present (Mosse 1990; Huyssen 2003; Winter 2006; Grant 2005). Today, from school textbooks to mass media, including television channels and movies, every medium of social interactions relentlessly articulates memories of wars, stories of war-heroes and their sacrifices in public discourses. This dependency on war-memory discourses has both positive and negative effects in contemporary social life. Asserting the significance of war-memory discourses in modern nationalism, Anthony Smith (1999) observed that "the fraternity of the nation

is lived in and through the sacrifice of its citizens in defence of the fatherland or motherland". Similarly, in a different context, stating that "only the dead can grant us legitimacy", Robert P. Harrison (2003: 11) noted, "humans bury not simply to achieve closure and effect a separation from the dead but also and above all to humanize the ground on which they build their worlds and found their histories".

The history of modern states reveal that a state can employ war-memory discourses either for justifying military build-up and achieving public support for war and other forms of armed violence or for controlling militarisation and promoting peaceful domestic and foreign policies. However, considering the fact that society is a mix of numerous agencies with numerous interests, there is no guarantee that states' efforts for articulating memories of war will follow a unified pattern of representation in public discourse. That is to say, since states have no monopoly over collective memories of war or representation of the past in general in contemporary public discourse, the outcome of continuous articulations of war-memory discourses in a society will always be highly uncertain.

Extending the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter, this chapter attempts to develop a framework for understanding the way in which states employ war-memory discourses for constructing a historical continuity that supports its actions and policies. It explains that modern states deploy war-memory discourses primarily for two purposes. Firstly, for (re)constructing enemy image of 'other(s)' in everyday public discourse to create a sense of insecurity and threat in society and thereby justify their particular actions and policies. Secondly, for (re)creating social awareness about the mistakes of the past, and thereby avoid such things happening in the future. This approach helps the states for developing anti-militarisation policies and peaceful foreign and security policies.

The first part of the chapter examines wartime narratives to understand how the past in general and war-memories in particular influence behaviour of state during the period of war. It analyses different practices through which states link the past with the present day social reality during wartime for mobilising public support for their actions and policies.

The second part examines the representation of the past in general and collective memories of war(s) in particular in peacetime discursive practices of states to understand the significance of war-memory discourses in constituting 'other(s)' and in shaping actions and policies of a state. This study asserts that there is no unified pattern for representing war-memories in public discourses and there are numerous factors involved in determining the outcome of continuous articulation of war-memories in a society. However, as the most powerful institution, states have a decisive role in shaping hegemonic war-memory discourses in every society.

The 'Past' in Wartime Discourses

The concept of wartime requires some explanations. Though we generally imagine war in a fixed time-frame, the actual experiences of war can never be analysed within such a fixed temporal boundary. If we approach war as "an exception to normal life", we can see that social ramifications of war always begin earlier than the start of actual fighting and they never end with the conclusion of actual fighting (Dudziak 2012). It does not mean that wartime includes the entire period of tension or threat of war in a society. It means that wartime is a situation in which order of a society remains disturbed due to war or threat of war. If we take this broad approach, situations of other forms of collective violence such as civil war, racial conflict, and communal violence can also be counted as wartime, if they rupture order of a society. In this study, the concept of wartime is employed by taking into account this broad meaning.

There is no better case to study than Nazi Germany to understand discursive practices which a state could employ during the wartime to link the past with the present and thereby mobilise public support for its actions and policies. It is in a wartime-like political context, that the National Socialist German Workers' Party, often called Nazi Party, emerged as a dominant political party in interwar Germany. The legal and socio-economic order of Germany was in chaos during this period due to the Great Depression, massive unemployment, threat of workers' revolution, and most importantly widespread public sentiment against the humiliating peace treaty that Germany was forced to sign after the First World War (Shirer 1961; Stackelberg 1999, 2007). In such a context, Nazi

discourse suggesting that Jews and Marxists are responsible for every German's misery, whether it is the humiliating peace treaty or the unemployment of German youths, had easily gained public acceptance. It insisted that "a conspiracy of Jews and socialists had undermined the morale of the home front [in the First World War] and [they] stabbed the courageous army in the back" (Stackelberg 1999: 71). Asserting Jews as the source of unemployment and economic crisis, it said "the offices [are] filled with Jews. Nearly every clerk [is] a Jew and nearly every Jew [is] a clerk…. [the] whole production [is] under control of Jewish finance…The Jew robbed the whole nation and pressed it beneath his domination"(Shirer 1961: 28). It is by closely watching the attitudes of the people in Germany that Nazis shaped their propaganda and to establish their dominance, Nazis projected almost all other political parties as the enemies of the nation (Speier 1943). Though Nazis established their dominance through propaganda, they could not succeed in creating a unified German public discourse (Welch 1993, 2004).

Organising numerous public rituals, Nazi Germany commemorated the dead and celebrated their sacrifices for the nation. Such practices created a sense in public that the setback in the First World War could be reversed and a mightier German Empire could be established. Essentially, by exploiting "the cult of death" and "the culture of mourning", Nazis mentally prepared the German public "for a resumption of war when conditions for likely victory in a new round of fighting were right" (Stackelberg 2007: 110). The same practice strengthened anti-Jewish sentiments in the country, as the Jews were projected as the cause of German setback in the First World War. The economic condition of the country and the threat of workers' revolution created material background for the public acceptance of the Nazi discourse. It is important to note that the Nazis "placed the onus of capitalist exploitation exclusively on 'the Jew', almost always referred to in the singular to avoid any sense of differentiation between Jewish people" (Stackelberg 1999: 90).

Nazi Germany was not a peculiar incident in the human history that witnessed purposefully employing selected/constructed images of the past and war-memory discourse to secure power and propagate racial or communal violence. As Yuen Foong Khong (1992: 3) rightly observed, "statesmen have consistently turned to the past in

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dealing with the present". There are numerous studies dealing with the issue of historical analogies at wartime. They assert that states often employ constructed images of the past for creating a sense of historical continuity in the society that justify their particular actions and policies during the war. Moreover, it is often through such analogies that states legitimise war and mobilise the public support. Such studies have well recorded how the United States employed the Second World War analogies during the Korean War of 1950-1953, the Vietnam War of 1955-1975, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the latest War on Terrorism (Khong 1992; Schuman and Rieger 1992; Angstrom 2011; Brands 2016). While some consider that historical analogies are essential during the war, others argue that analogies are historically unsound and strategically unhelpful (Neustadt and May 1986; Miller 2016; Williams 2006).

Though there are many concerns regarding its strategic efficacy, historical analogies are significant part of modern wartime discourses. The past, mostly selected/constructed images of the past, is often used by the states during wartime to mobilise public support or/and to legitimise their actions. Such analogies help the states to create convincing narratives for society and provide meanings to their actions. Borrowing from Yuen Foong Khong (1992: 6-7), historical analogy is defined here as "an inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another". Explaining the concept, he wrote,

> Analogical reasoning may be represented thus: AX:BX::AY:BY. In other words event A resembles event B in having characteristic X; A also has characteristic Y; therefore it is inferred that B also has characteristic Y….Consider Lodge's use of Munich analogy: appeasement in Munich (A) occurred as a result of Western indolence (X); therefore appeasement in Vietnam (B) is also occurring as a result of Western indolence (X). Appeasement in Munich (A) resulted in a world war (Y); therefore appeasement in Vietnam (B) will also result in a world war (Y). The unknown consequences of appeasement in Vietnam (BY) are inferred through the analogy to Munich (Khong 1992: 6-7).

Lodge's Munich analogy is one the most important historical analogies Khong analysed in his seminal work *Analogies at War.* He takes our attention to a famous statement made by the then US Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, during the National Security Council (NSC) meeting between President Lyndon Johnson and his principal advisers on July 21, 1965. The meeting was convened to discuss "whether the United

States should commit one hundred thousand troops to South Vietnam". After a long discussion and many sharp criticisms against the move from various members, Ambassador Lodge made his well-known statement that "I feel there is a greater threat to start World War III if we don't go in. Can't we see the similarity to our own indolence at Munich?"(Khong 1992: 3)

Lodge was comparing the situation with 1938 Munich Conference in which European Great Powers, mainly France and Great Britain, conceded to Hitler's demand for Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia by misreading Germany's military capability. Their decision to appease Hitler, of course with the hope of avoiding a world war, in turn granted enough time for Germany to prepare for a massive military mobilisation and that ultimately led to the Second World War. If they did not attempt to appease Hitler in Munich by considering his demand for Sudetenland as legitimate, and if they had gone for an offensive strike against Germany to protect Czechoslovakia, now evidence clearly shows, they could have avoided the Second World War; of course by risking a European War (Ferguson 2010). After the Second World War, this Munich incident became a major historical point of reference for policy makers and intellectuals alike.

Adding to the long list of studies addressing historical analogies, more recently, the study of Jan Angstrom (2011) analysed four major historical analogies which dominated within the US political and academic discourses on War on Terror. They compared War on Terror with the Second World War, the Crusades, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War. The Second World War analogies were more prominent in the War on Terror discourse than any other historical analogy. Angstrom observed that, in the beginning, the September 11 attack was widely compared with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour during the Second World War. Asserting that such an analogy had several advantages, he wrote "it is hardly possible in the American context to think of Pearl Harbour without invoking feeling of betrayal and being stabbed in the back". Pearl Harbour attack marked the United States' entry into the Second World War, by leaving its policy of isolationism. By invoking Pearl Harbour, Bush administration wanted to signal the American public that military operations against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is a contest between good and evil and it will end in the unconditional surrender of the evil (Angstrom 2011). Munich

analogy was also widely in use during War on Terror, especially for justifying the US invasion of Iraq (Krebs and Lobasz 2007; Record 2007; Angstrom 2011). To assert the inevitability of war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, President Bush reminded the people on March 2003, about the Munich incident to underline that "in the twentieth century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, [and] whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war" (quoted in Angstrom 2011).

The second major historical analogy within the War on Terror discourse had evolved within the background of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilisation thesis, as depicting war against terrorism as the new Crusade against the Islam. In his seminal work titled *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Huntington (1996) argued that wars based on cultural or religious identity, in other words, clash between civilisational identities, will be inevitable in the post-Cold War world. After the September 11 attacks, many analysts and political leaders attempted to place war against terrorism as new Crusade against Islam. Even President Bush once remarked, may be by mistake, while talking about the War on Terror, that "this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while" (Flannery 2016). However, Angstrom (2011: 232) insist that "even if the analogy with the Crusades and the clash of civilizations was frequently referred to and debated—not necessarily accepted, and often refuted—in the academic discourse, the analogy of the war on terrorism with the Crusades did not take root in US political discourse". But, such analogy indeed helped al-Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalist groups to claim that the United States and its allies trying to convert Muslims to Christianity (Angstrom 2011).

The Vietnam analogy was the third major historical analogy during the War on Terror. From late 2003, "when the operations in Iraq were transformed into a counterinsurgency effort, the analogy with the war in Vietnam became a part of both the pro-war and the anti-war agenda in the United States" (Angstrom 2011: 233). For those who supported the invasion of Iraq, the Vietnam analogy was immensely helpful to show the contextual difference between Iraq and Vietnam, and assert that Iraq will not be another American disaster. Jeffrey Record (2007: 171) wrote,

In Vietnam the aim was regime preservation; the United States sought to preserve the status quo by saving the non-communist government of South Vietnam from a communist takeover by the North. In Iraq the United States has sought to overthrow the status quo by regime change culminating in the establishment of a democracy…. Next, consider the differences in the duration and scale of the fighting. The United States conducted major combat operations in Vietnam for eight years (1965–73), including a massive air war against North Vietnam that had no equivalent in Iraq, with US forces peaking at 543,000 troops in 1969. The fighting in Iraq, beginning with large-scale conventional warfare in March 2003 and morphing quickly thereafter into counter-insurgent operations, is in its fourth year, with US forces peaking at 175,000 in the aftermath of the invasion and then settling down to about 140,000. In Vietnam, the war evolved in exactly the opposite direction, from an insurgency to conventional warfare. There is no comparison between the sizes of forces committed.

President Bush also used Vietnam analogy, in 2007, in a speech to the National Convention for US Veterans in Kansas City, to warn "of the consequences of an early American withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan" (Angstrom 2011). For those who were critical of Iraq invasion, the same analogy was a tool to articulate the possible setback from such a move. The critics argued, just like the Vietnam War, the war in Iraq would end in defeat and they demanded early exit from Iraq to avoid a disastrous climax.

The Cold War analogy was the fourth major historical analogy during War on Terror. Using this analogy, many analysed the War on Terror as a war of ideas, similar to the ideological struggle during the Cold War. President Bush declared, in his speech to Congress after 9/11, that "this is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom" (Angstrom 2011: 236). In 2007, he proclaimed that "war on terrorism is a decisive ideological struggle between freedom and totalitarianism– now in the shape of fundamentalist Islam". Again, in 2008 the State of the Union address, he asserted that "we are engaged in the defining ideological struggle of the twenty-first century" (Angstrom 2011: 236). However, such comparisons raise a question whether historical analogies are mere rhetoric without having any relationship to the reality. The Cold War was an ideological struggle between two great powers; however, War on Terror was a powerful state's and of course its allies' fight against a non-state actor that held legitimate authority over neither a defined territory nor a community. But, Yuen Foong Khong's (1992) Analogical Explanation (AE) framework underlined that

historical analogies could help policy makers in various ways. He asserted in his study that,

> The analogical explanation framework suggests that analogies are cognitive devices that help policy makers perform six diagnostic tasks central to political decision-making. Analogies (1) help define the nature of situation confronting the policy makers, (2) help assess the stakes, and (3) provide prescriptions. They help evaluate alternative options by (4) predicting their chances of success, (5) evaluating their moral rightness, and (6) warning about dangers associated with the options (Khong 1992: 10).

Developing this theoretical framework, Khong (1992) argued that Korean War analogy significantly helped the Lyndon Johnson administration's decision to intervene in Vietnam. Explaining this, he wrote that,

> Korean analogy (1) shaped the administration's definition of the challenge in Vietnam, (2) assessed the political stakes involved, and (3) provided an implicit policy prescription, and on the ways it also "helped" evaluate this and other policy prescriptions by (4) predicting their chances of success, (5) assessing their morality, and (6) warning about their dangers. By defining the situation and evaluating the options in these ways, that is, by performing the diagnostic tasks the AE framework claims for analogies, the Korean analogy introduced choice propensities into the administration's decision-making: it predisposed those who took it seriously toward certain policy options and turned them away from others. In so doing, it played an important role in influencing the decision outcome (Khong 1992: 97).

However, there is a problem in the conceptual level that whether such war analogies should be treated as appropriation of history or discursive articulation of memory. The undefined conceptual boundary between history and memory creates a tension in the intellectual exercises dealing with the past. As Barbara Misztal (2003: 99) observed, "some scholars accept that memory and history are different, others strongly object, while still others overlook the distinction and write about 'remembered history', or 'historical memory', or even view the historian as a 'physician of memory'". However, scholars like David Lowenthal (1985: 187) assert that "memory and history are normally and justifiably distinguished: memory is inescapable and prima-facie indubitable; history is contingent and empirically testable". Though mostly historians recognise memory as a "raw material of history" or "the living source from which historians can draw", there is a continuous tendency within academics to treat memory as something less authentic than 'objective' history (Ricoeur 2004). The historians who reject memories as a subjective

representation of the past always ignore the fact that though "meticulous objectivity is history's distinctive noble aim, that aim never is – and never can be – achieved" (Lowenthal 1998: 106). Moreover, it should be noted that "historian is always influenced by the 'point of view' of his/[her] time and place, [and] from which he/[she] cannot detach himself/[herself] completely" (Funkenstein 1989: 22).

In his *Philosophy of History*, Hegel wrote, "history combines in our language the objective as well as the subjective sides. It means both *res gestae* (the things that happened) and *historica rerum gestarum* (the narration of the things that happened)". He explained that there is no history without memory of the past and "collective consciousness presumes collective memory" (quoted in Funkenstein 1989: 5, emphasis in original). In other words, it is only within a framework of collectively shared meaning making practices that collective memories can have their existence. Moreover, it must be noted that "no memory, not even the most intimate and personal, can be disconnected from society, from the language and the symbolic system modelled by the society over many generations" (Funkenstein 1989: 7). Indeed history, more accurately historical consciousness, has significant role in constituting such shared meaning making practices within any society. However, it does not mean that history can be more objective than memory, which is indeed a personal experience of individuals and is always subject to various kinds of influence and transformation. For history, inevitably narration is a subjective practice and without narration history has no existence in social life. Narration is indeed depended on memory just like any shared experience of memory depends on collectively shared historical consciousness of society. Therefore, from the blurred boundaries of meaning, the memory-history relationship can be summed up in this way; "on the one hand, 'history' appears as a pseudo-objective discourse that rides roughshod over particular memories and identities, which claim to have an experiential reality and authenticity that history lacks, on the other hand, memory appears as an unmeasured discourse that, in the service of desire, makes claim for its own validity that cannot be justified" (Megill 1998: 38).

The roots of conflict between history and memory can be traced to a problem evolving out of the very conceptualisation of history and, to a certain extent, memory. When you

treat history as a mere intellectual recording of the past, it inevitably brings the question of objectivity and temporal impartiality of narration. In this sense, history can neither independently represent the past in everyday public discourse nor efficiently aid conditioning of living experience of collective memory in everyday social life. Instead, it remains merely as an intellectual recording of the past that can discursively represents the past only within the intellectual dealings with the past. Similarly, when you treat collective memory as something which can be represented only through customs, traditions, rituals and certain practices of community, other forms of representations of the past in discursive practices which go beyond the limitations of community identities inevitably get removed from the conceptual boundary of memory. In this sense, neither language nor political or legal institutions of the present, represent collective memories of the past. Only by limiting the conceptual boundaries of memory and history in this fashion, it can be argued that "we speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left" and today "there are *lieux de memoire*, sites of memory, because there are no longer *milieux de memoire*, real environments of memory" (Nora 1989: 7). The sites of memories, like monuments and museums, are definitely very much part of discursive practices which link the past with the present in everyday social life. Similarly, the transformations in certain cultural practices which represent the 'real environments of memory', are not a valid evidence to argue that society is being estranged from their past.

Those who differentiate history and memory in this fashion argue that the modernity – that means the dramatic transformations in technology, in socio-economic life of human beings, and in political institutions facilitated by the Western Enlightenment –which questioned and rejected the traditional ways of collective life have essentially transformed our relationship with the memory. For them, democratic and secular history has invaded the past which was traditionally represented by memory in discursive practices. Asserting this view, Pierre Nora (1989:3) stated that,

> The remnants of experience still lived in the warmth of tradition, in the silence of custom, in the repetition of the ancestral, have been displaced under the pressure of a fundamentally historical sensibility. Among the new nations, independence has swept into history societies newly awakened from their ethnological slumbers by colonial violation. Similarly, a process of interior decolonization has affected ethnic minorities, families, and groups that until now have possessed reserves of memory but little or no historical capital. We have seen the end of societies that

had long assured the transmission and conservation of collectively remembered values, whether through churches or schools, the family or the state; the end too of ideologies that prepared a smooth passage from the past to the future or that had indicated what the future should keep from the past—whether for reaction, progress, or even revolution.

Nora's approach definitely overlooks the fact that "memory and history are process of insight; each involves components of the other, and their boundaries are shadowy" (Lowenthal 1985: 187). Moreover, he ignores that "all awareness of the past is founded on memory [and it is] through recollections we recover consciousness of former events, distinguish yesterday from today, and confirm that we have experienced a past" (Lowenthal 1985: 193). In other words, no sense of history, whether it is individual or collective, can be separated from memory. However, it is true that modernity has dramatically transformed society's relationship with the past; it has destroyed many conventional practices, rituals and customs; it has modified many traditional skills and eliminated a system which entrusts a particular community as a hereditary authority over particular skill. And, above all, with the modernity the state became supreme authority of the 'past'. But that does not mean history has evolved to eliminate collective memory, as Nora (1989: 9) writes, "history is perpetually suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it". Instead, it means that modern developments have constituted a new way of representation of the past, of collective memory, in discursive practices. As Funkenstein (1989: 19) observes, "historical consciousness does not contradict collective memory, but rather is a developed and organized form of it".

It is only by recognising the blurred boundaries that exist between memory and history, and by accepting that both of them depend on each other for their very existence that we can draw a map of discursive representation of the past in everyday social life. Such intellectual exercises must be done with an understanding that "the past is the remembered present, just as the future is the anticipated present [and] memory is always derived from the present and from the contents of the present" (Funkenstein 1989: 9). Therefore, this study asserts that it is the system of meaning making practices or the discourse of the present which determines the meaning of representation of the past in discursive practices, whether it exists as history or memory. In terms of this view, both

memory and history are equally subject to change/transformation within every social system.

Though there is no scholarly agreement regarding the significance of historical analogies in shaping policies of a state, it is undeniable that such analogies could help the state, especially during the wartime, to mobilise public support and discursively legitimise its actions. The use and abuse of selected/constructed images of the past in wartime discourse explicitly prove that the past has significant command in constituting social perceptions. It is this influencing capacity of the past, including its various discursive representations such as monuments, manuscripts, architecture, libraries, cultural sites and cultural practices, which creates enormous challenge for those who attempt to establish hegemonic control over people and public discourse. On this ground, construction and/or destruction of everything which represent the past become inextricable part of discursive practices of every institution which seeks to establish/maximise its power. This is what makes the attack over sites of memory a common practice during the wartime. The targeted destruction of manuscripts, monuments, and architecture representing a particular past, during the wartime must be analysed within this framework of understanding. From the Nazi's destruction of Jewish architecture to the Islamic State's attack on ancient and medieval cultural sites of Iraq and Syria, the examples of wartime targeted destruction of such representations of the past are plenty. Robert Bevan (2006) observed in his study on 'architectural and cultural warfare',

> There has always been another war against architecture going on – the destruction of the cultural artefacts of an enemy people or nation as a means of dominating, terrorizing, dividing or eradicating it altogether. The aim here is not the rout of an opposing army – it is a tactic often conducted well away from any front line – but the pursuit of ethnic cleansing or genocide by other means, or the rewriting of history in the interests of a victor reinforcing his conquests (Bevan: 8).

The history of conquest explicitly shows how the powerful invaders, from Alexander the Great to Adolf Hitler, destroyed the past of the other to establish their control over occupied territory and the people who inhabits in it. From Greece to Indian peninsula, Alexander's campaign witnessed destruction of many cities and villages; of course, along with every cultural symbol it had represented (Gabriel 2015). However, when it comes to the modern age, the level of such destruction increased many fold, definitely with the

development of modern tools of destruction. It formed contextual background for developing many international laws prohibiting attack on cultural heritages (Francioni and Lenzerini 2003; Bevan 2006).

One of the most important incidents of such destruction in the modern time that need to be analysed in this context is the Nazi invasion and destruction of Poland during the Second World War. Observing the Nazi destruction of Poland, Bevan (2006: 97) wrote,

> During the invasion residential areas were unnecessarily levelled, monuments destroyed, museums sacked and Warsaw savaged… Poland had vanished and Poles *as Poles*, a people with a collective identity and history, were marked for oblivion. Of the official pre-war list of 957 historic monuments in Warsaw, 782 were completely demolished and another 141 were partly destroyed…The most historic and aesthetically important buildings were burned or dynamited. Among the monumental losses were the national archives and national library, St John's Cathedral, the churches of St Jacek and Holy Trinity, Długa Street, and many more.

Nazis' attempt for eliminating Polish culture was rigorous and bloody. It touched almost every level of discursive practices; they imposed ban on art exhibitions and performing classical music, folk or patriotic songs in invaded Poland. Moreover, they selectively targeted Polish intellectuals, including doctors, lawyers, teachers, artists and writers, the clergy and the nobility to annihilate all brains which could perpetuate Polish culture and become the leader of Polish community. Explaining Nazi atrocities in Poland, Bevan (2006: 94) observed that "almost one in five Poles died – half of them Jews – and its territory became the killing fields for the whole of the Third Reich". Definitely, Nazis' attempt for destroying every trace of discursive representation of the Polish past did not succeed. Bevan (2006: 95) wrote, "Poland could see the threat before the war – valuable art collections were moved and moved again, bricked up in cellars and evacuated out of the country altogether. Churches, synagogues, monasteries and museums hid their priceless artefacts".

If it was an ideology propagating the German racial superiority which guided the Nazis atrocities against every other culture, it was religious fundamentalism which guided the destruction of mosques in Bosnia and Kosovo, rock sculptures of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Taliban's Afghanistan, and ancient and medieval cultural monuments in

Islamic State's Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, in Taliban's Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo, and Islamic State's Iraq and Syria, it is proved that such destruction of the past will continue as long as the menace of collective violence remains within human society. In 2001 Taliban regime of Afghanistan announced its plan to destroy "cultural heritage representing religious and spiritual traditions different from Islam" (Francioni and Lenzerini 2003). Following the announcement, they have destroyed "two ancient Buddha statues which were carved in sandstone cliffs in the third and fifth centuries AD in Bamiyan, about 90 miles west of Kabul". They justified destruction of the statues, which stood at 53 and 36 metres respectively and were considered as cultural treasures of Afghanistan, by arguing that "it was to be done for the implementation of Islamic order" (Francioni and Lenzerini 2003: 627).

The destruction of two Buddha statues was not an isolated incident in Taliban's Afghanistan; it was part of a systematic plan prepared by the regime to eradicate "ancient Afghan cultural heritage in its entirety" (Francioni and Lenzerini 2003). Islamic States' destruction of ancient cultural sites in Syria and Iraq also follows Taliban's 'Islamic order' thesis. Harmansah (2015) observed that "since the summer of 2014, the Islamic State has developed an unusual practice of deliberately damaging archaeological sites and museums, alongside its continued attacks on local shrines and holy places that are dear to local communities". The heritage sites which were subjected to the attack of Islamic State include "the Mosul Museum, the archaeological sites of Nineveh, Nimrud and Hatra, and possibly Ashur and Palmyra". Such destruction of monuments and cultural sites aims not only to modify or transform the sense of belongingness of the people who inhabit that region but also to establish a hegemonic discourse of fundamentalist Islam. With these examples, it can be argued that, from historical analogies to destruction of monuments and museums, the wartime discursive practices are inseparably linked with collective memories and its various forms of representations. During the wartime, it is not just construction and/or articulations of the images of the past which help the state and non-state actors, sometimes it is the destruction or the controlling of representation of the past and other forms of discursive practices which help them to achieve desired end.

The past has significant role in deciding any groups' belongingness to a particular territory. Buildings, including anything from houses to the places of worship, manuscripts and cultural practices are fundamental in constituting the past or memories of any group. Mostly it is through such artefacts and practices, the past of a group discursively represented and communicated through generations. For every group, such representations of the past are the ones which define its heritage, constitute its identity, legitimise its authority over a place, and, above all, give meanings to its life in the present and the future. Therefore, for any group, destruction of such representations of their past would mean nothing but attack over its identity and challenge to the legitimacy of its claim over particular geography. Because of this reason, for every conflicting group, destruction of all manifested representations of the past of the other is essential to establish complete control over them and their discursive practices.

The 'Past' in Peacetime Discourses

The prevalence of war-memory discourses in contemporary society owes not only to regular commemoration ceremonies of war and mushrooming sites of war memories, such as war-memorials, war-museums and other kinds of monuments and architectures reminding war(s) and war heroes, but also to the dramatic transformations in mass communication technologies that produced television channels, movies and internet based social media and so on. Redefining societies' as well as state and non-state political actors' relationship with the past, these technological transformations play a significant role in shaping various policies of modern states. Since these technologies help us to keep memories of our notorious past alive and active in everyday public discourse, the "images of Vietnam war limit support for American military activities [and] memories of the Nazi period constrain German foreign and domestic policy" (Olick 1999).

After the Second World War, international politics has witnessed many episodes of what many termed as 'normalization politics' and 'reparation politics' (Nytagodiaen and Neal 2010). Through such attempts, the notorious states of the Second World War, especially Japan and Germany, addressed their ugly past to do justice to their victims. It was the

development of a new 'human right discourse' and the transformations within international economic and political relations which created the background of such moves from former aggressive powers. The efforts for addressing the infamous past allow 'normalization' of "relations between states whose shared histories may contain events—usually wars—in which one party is seen to have been grievously wronged by the other" (Lawson and Tannaka 2010: 406). Essentially, such efforts for normalisation can be considered as an attempt to forge a new discourse of peace by problematising the mistakes of the past. However, for states, dealing with war-memory discourse is not an easy exercise as it always needs them to confront many social agencies having different interests and propagating different discourses. The Japanese example of addressing the question of war-memory, especially after the end of the Cold War, clearly shows how complicated can be the war-memory discourses in domestic politics as well as in international relations.

Japan was one of the first Asian countries to choose the Western model of economic modernisation. As a result of this, it became economically powerful by the end of nineteenth century. Following its economic development, like the Western powers, imperial Japan began its efforts for colonisation, especially in Southeast Asia. Its victory over Russia in 1905, in Russo-Japanese war, became a turning point in its colonial ambitions. After the victory, the world began to accept, indeed with a great surprise, Japan as one of the super powers, and China and Korea became the primary victims of Japanese colonialism (Mishra 2012). The imperial Japan's wartime atrocities include the infamous 'Rape of Nanking' in China, "in which 300,000 men, women and children are estimated to have perished, with more than 20,000 women raped"; "the forced sexual slavery of so-called 'comfort women' particularly, although not exclusively, in Korea" (Lawson and Tannaka 2010: 410); and Nanjing Massacre in which "more than 200,000 soldiers, civilians, women and children were massacred from December 1937 to March 1938" (Togo 2008: 65). Though in the past, such inhuman practices were common during the wartime, in the new climate of post-Second World War, with radically transformed intellectual and political discourse, the war crimes of Japan became one of the most complicated problems to deal with in East Asian history.

After the war, successive Japanese governments have acknowledged the imperial Japan's wrong doings and apologised to the victims (Lawson and Tanaka 2010), but never admitted war responsibility (Yamane 1995). Their attempts to normalise relationship with South Korea started in 1960s and China in 1970s; and, as part of this effort, they have provided economic aids to both of them. However, Japan never treated such aid as reparation for their atrocities of the past, as Germany, its European ally in the Second World War, did after the war. Moreover, they have never abandoned their notorious past as a whole, as Germany did, and they continued to employ selected images of the past for the purpose of building nationalism. If the post-Second World War monuments in Germany are meant to commemorate the victims of German aggression, Japan expanded its famous Yasukuni shrine to commemorate all those who have dedicated their life for imperial Japan, including hundreds of war-criminals. In addition to this, many conservative Japanese leaders often made visits to Yasukuni shrine to add flavour of sacrifice in the Second World War to the Japanese nationalist discourse (Berger 2008; Kim and Schwartz 2010). Within the domestic politics of Japan, the right-wing nationalists demanded to revise "the interpretation of Japanese history in such a way as to justify Japanese colonialism and aggressions". However, the left-wing intellectuals attempted to create a discourse suggesting that "everything happened in modern Japanese history is a series of unlimited transgressions against Japan's neighbours and that historical reconciliation can be achieved only by the wholesale rejection of Japan's modern history"(Togo and Hasegawa 2008: 3-4).

In Chinese and Korean discourse, Japanese atrocities remained as a humiliating collective memory, and they continuously demanded Japanese apologies for the wrong doings of the past. In their view, "Japan not only violated the entitlements of their citizens but also offended their nation's honour, shamed and demeaned it and refused to repent by humbling itself, as it had humbled them, through convincing apology" (Kim and Schwartz 2010: 6). However, during the Cold War, war-memory discourses of China and South Korea were not much expressive in their relationship with Japan. If China was more concerned with ideological matters until 1970s and thereafter much required Japanese investment and economic aid, known as Official Development Assistance (ODA), South Korea was a Cold War ally of Japan and it was benefitting significantly

from Japanese economic aid in 1960s and 1970s (Hasegawa and Togo 2008; Rozman 2008). After the Cold War, with the end of ideological politics, East Asia became the centre of war-memory discourse and the wounds of the past began to hurt Japan's relationship with both China and South Korea. Asserting the significance of war-memory discourse in the region Kim and Schwartz (2010: 2) observed that "in the countries of Northeast Asia, the past is present at every business negotiation table [and] debates over historical events complicate [their] domestic politics and international relations".

Studies find three major reasons for the growing importance of war-memory discourse in East Asian domestic politics and international relations after the Cold War. Firstly, a new wave of nationalism emerged in these countries after the collapse of ideological politics of the Cold War. For these countries, "the end of the Cold War meant the disappearance of strategic interests that united them against a common foe" (Togo and Hasegawa 2008: 2). If it was an ideological opposition against the Communist bloc of the Cold War that helped to unite Japan and South Korea, for China, its troubled relationship with the Soviet Union was significant in forging a relationship with Japan. Some observers argue that after the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe, the communist ideology became inefficient for the Communist Party of China to legitimise its one party authoritarian rule in the country. Therefore, it replaced communist ideology with nationalism for asserting its supreme control over the Chinese people. With this change, war-memory discourse emerged as a tool for creating nationalist sentiments. In the case of South Korea, they argue that with the collapse of communist bloc of the Cold War, the anti-communist sentiments lost their significance in South Korean identity and war-memory discourse emerged as a substitute for anti-communist sentiments. Recently achieved economic prosperity has given it confidence to assert war-memory discourse for creating new nationalist sentiments (Togo and Hasegawa 2008). Meanwhile, in Japan, Togo and Hasegawa (2008: 2) observed,

> The ideological divide that once separated the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the permanent opposition party, the Socialist Party, disappeared in 1993 with the collapse of the 1955 political system that defined most of the post-war period in Japan. Together with the end of this once-bedrock political stability, the collapse of the bubble economy and the continuous economic recession severely shook Japan's confidence. Amid this confusion and erosion of traditional values, a strong right-wing revisionist movement has emerged, calling for a new

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interpretation of history restoring the positive aspects of modern Japanese history, with some justifying Japan's past aggressions and colonialism.

The new reality of economic development in East Asia can be treated as the second major factor which prompted memory politics in the region after the Cold War. Since 1990s, both China and South Korea emerged as economic powers and they began to challenge Japan's economic supremacy in the region. Until then, "cooperation with Japan was a *sine qua non* precondition for economic development for China and South Korea" (Togo and Hasegawa 2008: 2). Essentially, the newly emerged nationalism in these countries was "an expression of their growing confidence in their own economic power". However, the new wave of nationalism in Japan was "a psychological reaction to compensate for the loss of its economic supremacy and resentment for the latecomers that have attained their current economic status, thanks to Japan's generous helps, but that are now challenging this supremacy" (Togo and Hasegawa 2008: 2).

The third factor which helped the growth of memory politics in East Asia was the new social changes created by the economic prosperity in these countries. Both in China and in South Korea, new wave of nationalism was an expression of empowerment of the newly emerged middle class. The changes in the field of information technology also played a greater role in this social transformation. The new developments in the information and communication technologies have transformed the nature of public participation in politics everywhere in the world, including in these countries. They have redefined government's control over the people, even within the authoritarian states. Therefore, when the new wave of Japanese right-wing nationalism began to justify and glorify the notorious episodes of the Japanese past, the Chinese and Korean popular sentiments awakened against Japan (Togo and Hasegawa 2008).

The lack of sincerity in Japanese apologies for the mistakes of the past was often reflected through many of their actions. The conservative leaders had asserted many times in the past that "they have the right, as a sovereign nation, to define their history as they believe it to be". They argued "how Japanese textbooks deal with historical atrocities, or how the Japanese prime minister chooses to commemorate the nation's war dead, are issues that other countries have no right to meddle with" (Berger 2008: 17).

The Japanese government's failure to break itself away completely from its notorious past has intensified anti-Japanese sentiments in China and Korea, and it is most often reflected in Chinese as well as South Korean relationship with Japan. Analysing the issue, Berger (2008: 17) observed that,

> while such an unapologetic stance can be viewed as the exercise of Japan's sovereign right as a nation, it comes at a price, and it is commonly argued that Japan's obstinate unwillingness to admit its past wrongdoings is at the root of many of Asia's ills, including simmering disputes over territorial issues, an exaggerated sensitivity to every gyration in Japanese defence policy, and the relative inability of East Asia to construct a strong framework of regional institutions.

As far as Japan is concerned, war-memory discourses play a greater role not just in its international relations; the memories of the Second World War, especially the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic-bombing, continue influencing its domestic politics. Memories of atomic bombing have crucial role in shaping Japanese public's approach towards nuclear weapon and militarisation (Yamane 1995). The Japanese popular sentiments against modifying the post-Second World War Constitution, which imposed strict control over militarisation and constrained use of the Self Defence Force, explain it better how war-memory discourse attempts to legitimise an anti-militaristic identity of Japan (Hook 1996). The discourse suggesting that the "Japanese people were victims of their own leaders in taking the country into [the Second World War]" constitutes the Japanese public sentiments against the militarisation (Lawson and Tannaka 2010). Precisely, the war-memory discourse influences the Japanese domestic politics and international relations in various fashions. On the one side it helps the unapologetic right-wing nationalists to find glory in their past and legitimise imperial Japan's notorious actions in the past. That leads to enshrining the war criminals into the state supported Yasukuni shrine and issuing school textbooks legitimising the Japanese actions in the Second World War. Definitely it is this unapologetic attitude which adversely affects Japan's relationship with China and South Korea and ultimately the peace and stability in East Asia. On the other side, the same memory creates a popular sentiment against the imperial Japan's notorious actions in the past and the current governments' attempts for remilitarising the country. It creates demand for total rejection of the infamous Japanese past by the government for adopting an anti-militaristic culture of peace. Precisely, the

Japanese public discourse on the policies and actions of imperial Japan explicitly shows that collective memories of war can be represented in diverse ways and it could influence domestic politics and foreign and security policies of a state.

The dynamics of discourse-memory relationship of the present cannot be fathomed without considering the significance of media in the contemporary social life. Media plays a crucial role not only in the construction of collective memories and but also in their articulation in everyday public discourse. It is through mass media, such as newspapers, television channels, movies and social media, modern societies largely develop their understanding about the past. That is the reason why media's attempts for challenging an established discourse through new narratives often meet contention and violence. It is due to this transformative potential of media, modern states relentlessly exploit media for creating the discourse which supports their interests and policies. Obviously, this capacity of media brings enormous challenges to power. Modern states' persistent efforts for curbing media discourse through censorship and other forms of controlling mechanisms explain well the significance of these challenges. This study analyses Indian media narratives on China and Pakistan in the following chapters, definitely by considering this transformative potential media discourse.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to develop a framework for understanding the relationship between modern states and collective memories of war. Analysing various discursive practices, it asserted that modern states are largely dependent on collective memories not only for creating its identity in relation to 'other(s)' but also for legitimising its various actions and policies. For making sense of war-memory discourses, it explored discursive practices of Nazi Germany, historical analogies employed by the United States to justify and legitimise its various actions and policies, and the issue of Japanese memory politics. Taking insights from various policies adopted by Germany and Japan after the Second World War, it asserted that states are capable of creating a culture of peace through articulating war-memory discourses in a positive way. However, because of various reasons, states are largely reluctant to exploit the positive

effects of war-memory discourses. Perhaps it is the prevailing dominance of the material power in defining the identity of a state which prevents states from employing the war-memory discourse as a tool for promoting culture of peace. Analysing the Indian public discourse on China and Pakistan within this theoretical framework, the following chapters of this study will be explaining the impacts of wars and collectively shared memories of wars on Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan and on India's own identity.

Chapter 4

Memories of War and Images of China in Indian Public Discourse

"The subcontinent is learning to say no to denial. Today for the first time ever, the top military leadership will honour the dead of the 1962 India-China conflict. Half a century after the event, the defence ministry will memorialise those that it had chosen to simply forget." These lines borrowed from *The Indian Express* (2012) editorial published on 20th October 2012, on the fiftieth anniversary of India-China war, disclose a dominant contemporary Indian discourse regarding the events that happened between India and China at the Himalayan frontier during the final months of 1962. The newspaper used the word 'conflict' instead of 'war'; it applied the term 'war' nowhere in that editorial to describe the event. Perhaps it was upholding an established view that the war of 1962 cannot be counted as a 'war', since it lacked all major characteristics of a war. In terms of this view, it was a unilateral military raid and withdrawal by China on India's frontier. Asserting that the effort of India in honouring its fallen soldiers of 1962 war was minimal or none until 2012, the editorial argued, "India chose to forget it's fallen because the authorised version of the 1962 debacle had become too embarrassing and too complicated". The disappointment expressed by the newspaper over the negligence of the Indian government reflects the significance that memories of the 1962 war occupy in contemporary Indian public discourse.

The official commemoration of India's only lost war, in 2012, in its fiftieth anniversary, has initiated many discussions and debates regarding the nature of contemporary India-China relations and the level of peace and cooperation involved in it. The question was how far this relationship has improved from the dark days of 1962 which conferred a traumatic and humiliating experience for India. Drawing on the well-established economic partnership of the present, some argued that the 1962 is an isolated island of the past, which has no practical significance in this age of advanced trade relations. Asserting that unsettled boundary dispute and various other troubling issues still exist between these countries, many argued that the relationship between India and China is yet to make any significant improvement from the troubled years of 1960s even though economic partnership gained momentum in recent years. Those who advance this view

insist that beyond its relatively calm trade relations, the dominant public opinion in both India and China hardly perceive the other as a friendly partner (Pant 2012; Roy 2013; Mattoo and Medcalf 2013). An opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre also shows similar result. It revealed that most of the Indians continue to perceive India-China relationship as one of hostility and China's growing economy as a threat to India (Pew Research Global Attitude Project 2012). Why do most of the Indians continue to believe China as an enemy and a threat to India's national security even though there was no major armed conflict between these countries after 1962?

Though there are many factors that influence an individual's perception of the other, studies on social psychology suggest that discursively articulated images play the most significant role in this process (McKinlay and McVittie 2008). Definitely mass media is one of the most important actors in the construction and the diffusion of discursive images in a society. In this sense, Indian social perception of China is directly related to Indian media discourse on China. Therefore, a detailed analysis of Indian media discourse can reveal the nature of India's discursive images of China and the significance of war and memories of war in it. Moreover, it can disclose why the dominant image of China remains to be negative in Indian public discourse and why advancements in the economic partnership between these two countries do not transform society's perception of the other.

This chapter intends to examine the images of China in Indian public discourse through the narratives of four major mainstream Indian English newspapers, namely *The Hindu, The Indian Express, The Statesman* and *The Times of India*. This is not an attempt to assert a truth or judge Indian media's articulation of China; the purpose here is to analyse the significance of India-China war of 1962 and its collectively shared memories in Indian discursive images of China and in India's own identity. For making sense of India's pre-war approach towards China and for identifying the features of India's pre-war identity, the first part of the chapter explores Indian discursive articulations of China during the pre-war period. Following this, it examines the wartime and the immediate post-war narratives to map the impact of war on Indian discursive images of China and on India's own identity. The last part of the chapter examines contemporary narratives of

the selected newspapers to analyse the representation of collective memories of India-China war of 1962 in contemporary Indian public discourse and its influence over the discursive images of China.

This study focuses mostly on editorials and articles published in the editorial page of the selected newspapers. However, in some instances it employs news reports and opinions of various Indian leaders, as reported by the newspapers, for making detailed picture of certain stories. Similarly, for explaining the international community's approach towards India-China conflict, in some instances, it uses the opinion of various international news media reproduced or interpreted by the selected newspaper. The time period of the newspaper data employed for this study is as follows: for making sense of the pre-war discourse, it analyses the narratives of the selected newspapers in the period of six months prior to the war, specifically from 20th April 1962 to 19th October 1962; for making sense of the changes brought by the war in India's discursive image of China, this study examines the data from the period of war that is 20th October 1962 to 21st November 1962 and a six month period following the war, specifically from 22nd November 1962 to 22nd May 1963; for making sense of contemporary discourse, it analyses the data from October-November months of 2012 that marked the 50th anniversary of the war.

The Pre-War Indian Discourse on China

There are various issues, ranging from unresolved boundary disputes to China's naval activities in the Indian Ocean that give form and structure to the contemporary Indian public discourse on China. Some of those issues indeed place China as a threatening 'other' in India's discursive articulations. The root of such discursive images rests in the collectively shared memories of 1962 war; because the war of 1962 was the first incident that clearly exposed violence in modern India-China relations and shattered a well-established myth of peace and friendship. If the war had never happened, perhaps, the discursive image of China would have evolved in a totally different direction in India's public discourse. However, for making sense of the real impact of 1962 war on Indian

discursive articulations of China, we need to develop an image of pre-war Indian discourse on the same. This section of the chapter is an attempt in that direction.

It is often said that our perception of the other is inseparable from our perception of the self; that means it is from the background of our understanding/imagination about our own identity that we develop our image of the other. Some would state the same in a different way that "it is only through recognition of the 'other' that one is constituted as a 'self'" (Greenhill 2008: 344). Therefore, it can be argued that every collective sense/imagination of the 'other' is rooted in a collective sense/imagination of the 'self'. In terms of this view, a public discourse on the 'other' must be analysed in relation with a collective identity of the 'self' advanced by the same public discourse. In this context, every image of China in the Indian public discourse depends on a sense of Indian identity asserted by the same discourse.

The analysis of the selected newspaper discourse reveals that the image of self or national identity in Indian public discourse during 1960s had certain distinctive features. It reflected world views of many leaders and the nature of India's involvement in international politics. It is important to note that since the independence in 1947, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister, India attempted to develop a distinctive identity for the country. When the world was ideologically divided, during the Cold War, India opted to go in a different direction to resist the pressure of both ideological camps and to acquire an independent voice in international politics. India, along with many other Afro-Asian countries, formed a 'non-aligned bloc' and actively participated in international efforts for protecting human rights and building peace. Based on such policies, within the mainstream Indian media, the country had an image of a prominent actor in the international politics who is responsible for protecting democratic values, human rights, and, above all, peace and stability in an ideologically divided world that has experienced two catastrophic world wars in the first half of the twentieth century.

The discourse shows, during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union were competing to conduct nuclear tests, when the world was anticipating a nuclear war at any time, India, by acting as a responsible peace loving country, often appealed to the Big Powers to desist from rivalry in conducting nuclear tests. In Nehru's view, such

irresponsible attitude of the Big Powers was "a crime against the humanity" (*The Statesman* 1962). By criticising the Soviet tests, he observed during a speech in parliament that "as a result of the last Soviet tests alone, 50 million children yet to be born could be said to have suffered genetic death or deformity" (*The Statesman* 1962). In this period, voice against war and militarisation was predominant in Indian public discourse. Perhaps the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, the first-hand experience of non-violent freedom movement and the tragic evidence of the Second World War might have had influence on such discourse. In the international forums, India was viewed as "peaceful, pacifist, non-violent, non-aligned, neutralist country of Gandhi" (Mankekar 1962b). Many Indian leaders were ardent supporters of disarmament, not just denuclearisation, and they often asserted that only the universal disarmament can establish world peace. In an anti-nuclear arms convention in New Delhi, the first President of India, Dr Rajendra Prasad, a well-known advocate of disarmament, demanded that "India should disarm unilaterally if her appeal (to world Powers) for unilateral disarmament is to carry any weight". He added, "since India had the unique privilege of achieving independence through non-violent means under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, she should set an example to other countries by disarming unilaterally". In his view, "the vicious circle of mutual fear and distrust stood in the way of universal disarmament", and "if India took the lead to disarm unilaterally she could help break such circle of fear". He argued that the only antidote to the atom bomb is "non-violence of the highest type" (*The Hindu* 1962; *The Statesman* 1962a).

In early 1960s, even after the emergence of tension between India and China at the Himalayan border, many Indian leaders, including the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, often asserted that India can never think war as an option against China's belligerent attitude. They had immense trust in negotiation and international efforts for building peace. Being influenced by their views, the hope of a peaceful settlement of India-China border dispute was very much alive in Indian public discourse, until the war became a reality. In early 1960s, while tension with China was growing at the Himalayan frontier, many in India assumed that the Soviet Union, the leader of communist bloc to which China belongs, would stop China from entering in a war with India to protect India's friendly relationship with the communist bloc.

However, it does not mean that such a discourse of peace, propagating non-violence and non-alignment within the ideologically divided Cold War international system, was hegemonic within the Indian public sphere. Definitely, in parallel with the discourse of peace, there were many counter discourses demanding militarisation, stringent stand against communism and non-compromising approach towards boundary disputes. During these years, the ideological politics of the Cold War had significant influence over anti-communist sentiments in India. Asserting the threat of communism, many argued that India should abandon its policy of non-alignment and make an alliance with the West. However, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and many others in the Congress leadership always discouraged such demands by arguing that the policy of non-alignment is inevitable in that particular historical context as India can never risk one more catastrophic world war.

Another factor reflected during the pre-war Indian discourse, as a defining feature of India's collective identity, was strong anti-Pakistan sentiments. Various issues related to the Kashmir question, attacks against Hindu minority in both West and East Pakistan, and Pakistan's alliance with the West had central role in generating anti-Pakistan sentiments in India. The most important issue in India's national security debates of pre-war period was the military aid that Pakistan had been receiving from the United States. An interesting fact is that even when tension with China was growing rapidly at the border, many in India had worries only with regard to the threat of Pakistan. Media debates of early 1960s regarding India's negotiation with the Soviet Union for a MiG fighter jet deal clearly show that the primary concern of Indian media and opinion makers during this time was Pakistan's growing military capability. Indian media competed with each other to blame the United States for arming Pakistan and leading India for militarisation; a compromise on India's non-violent and anti-militarisation values. They continuously highlighted that "it was only after the Americans had made their F-104 supersonic fighters available to Pakistan that we turned to Russia" (*The Indian Express* 1962). On 19th May 1962, *The Times of India* (1962) wrote in its editorial "the need for augmenting our air strength arises from US military aid to Pakistan, which has received two squadrons of American super-Sabre jets, while the urgency of the requirement is related to country's renewed belligerence over Kashmir". In an opinion piece, Mankekar (1962)

explained that, "Pakistan's military ambitions have been all the more stimulated by a liberal supply of arms, war planes and equipment. It is vis-à-vis Pakistan in particular, therefore, that our people feel concerned whether our arms, planes and equipment can match Pakistan's if trigger-happy Pakistanis start trouble".

In the background of anti-Pakistan sentiments, an impression had emerged in India during the early phase of border tension with China that it is a Pakistani trap to push India into a war with China; to destroy its military capability and thereby weaken India's defence against Pakistan in Kashmir (Rangaswamy 1962a). Even Prime Minister Nehru argued that "Pakistan, for its own purpose, is greatly interested in seeing India embroiled in a shooting war with China" (*The Indian Express* 1962h). Recurring tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir dispute and India's previous violent experience with Pakistan might have supported such thoughts. Moreover, during this time India had to address the threat of Pakistan at both of its western and eastern borders.

The analysis of the selected newspaper discourse clearly shows that the dominant Indian public discourse mostly disvalued the Chinese military capability during the pre-war years because of various reasons, including China's economic problem created by the failure of Mao's 'Great Leap Forward'. Many Indian leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru, often asserted that India was completely ready to face any threat from China, if they risk attacking India. In an article published by *The Indian Express* on 9th May 1962 D. R. Mankekar (1962) wrote,

> Indeed, at no time was China interested in – or was in a position to afford – more than the tactics of border nibbling. It was never prepared to fight a regular war with India on that difficult border and hostile terrain. Peking's policy in that region has all along been to take advantage of India's declared policy of peace and reluctance to resort to force of arms and nibble away at our unguarded and uninhabited border region.… [India] will not provoke a general war with China, for the simple reason that China can ill afford it.…It is a safe bet that for quite a time to come, China will not venture upon a war with any country, and least of all with India on the difficult Tibetan terrain where both man and nature are hostile to the Chinese. The greatest deterrents against any such adventure are the US 7th Fleet in the South China Seas and the Chiang threat of invasion of the mainland. To these curbs, is now added lack of Soviet support if China went to war with India over the border question.

On 5th May 1962, *The Statesman*'s (1962b) editorial commenting on a Note (referring the diplomatic note used for correspondence) that India sent to China observed, "on the north-east, India's position seems strong. In the Ladakh area, the terrain is no more favourable to the attacker than to the attacked. Whatever happens, and nothing catastrophic may, the Chinese can no more plead that they have not been told in advance the consequences of further aggression". In July 1962, in an article published by *The Hindu*, J B Appasamy (1962) observed that China has no professional army capable of challenging trained armed forces of India at the Himalayan region. During this time, opposition parties, excluding the communist parties, were largely convinced that "so soon after their emergence from civil war and their failure in the 'Leap Forward' programme China may not be possessing more resources and trained manpower than India" (Rangaswami 1962). On 28th April 1962, *The Statesman* (1962d) insisted that "the past three years have given China's industrial ambitions a setback such as not even World War II caused in Russia. There are doubts whether the peasant can ever again carry the worker on his back into the new millennium of tall chimneys and great power plants". Precisely, during the pre-war period, Indian public discourse was not only ill-informed about China's military capability but also failed to do any realistic assessment of India's strength and weakness against the enemy power. However, recent studies indicate that within the official circles, the perception was quite the opposite; army chief, General K. S. Thimayya was "acutely aware of the threat which China could pose" (Raghavan 2010). As the concern here is not the official discourse, it can be argued, with the evidence from the selected newspapers' articulation of China's military capability, within the dominant Indian public discourses, image of the self (collective identity) was economically and militarily superior to the image of China. Therefore, the threat of China was not a major national security concern in Indian public discourse until the 1962 conflict episode.

If a society's perception of the 'other' indeed develops in relation to its perception of the self, the above mentioned features of India's national identity during the pre-war period might have had significant influence in shaping India's discursive image of China during the period. Such a sense of identity was perhaps the reflection of multiple worldviews simultaneously prevailing within the Indian public discourse. Among them, both anti-China sentiments and pro-China approach, especially from a section of Indian

communists who were expecting a Chinese model proletarian revolution in India, had parallel existence. Moreover, the Nehruvian internationalism that advocated a non-aligned active involvement within the bipolar Cold War international politics to protect the interests of weaker countries and to ensure peace and stability within the polarised world, and the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence that demanded disarmament and demilitarisation as it upheld that no violent means can bring a peaceful end in international politics had tremendous influence in Indian public discourse during the pre-war period. Similarly, the influence of many counter discourses rooted in either radical leftist or rightist ideologies that challenged both Nehruvian and Gandhian idealism also cannot be ignored. However, in that troubled environment of Cold War ideological politics, the most important image of China in the Indian public discourse was that of a 'godless' communist other who is attempting to destroy democratic system of India; definitely, the anti-communist sentiments ignited by the West had significant role in shaping such an image.

1. *China, the Communist Other*

The Communist Party of China led by Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, after their victory in the Chinese Civil War. India was one of the first countries that recognised the Communist China and established diplomatic relations with it. From the very beginning of their movement, as Shri Ram Sharma (1999) observed, "the Chinese communists were dedicated to uniting China and expanding its frontiers to places which they claimed to be theirs". Soon after the establishment of PRC, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the armed force of Communist Party for China, began its invasion of Tibet, until then an independent country on the northern side of Himalaya, and by 1951 the region became fully incorporated into the communist China. Though India was very much concerned about the Chinese invasion of Tibet, especially because of its violent and aggressive nature, its policy during this period was "avoid provoking China" and "provide moral and material support to Lhasa". Srinath Raghavan (2010: 234) writes,

> In the aftermath of the invasion Nehru too began to have considerable doubts about Chinese intentions; but was not prepared to go too far in condemnation, making it inevitable that a break should take place. Nehru elaborated an idea in an

important note. He conceded that neither India nor any other external power could prevent the Chinese takeover of Tibet. However, discounted the possibility of an invasion of India as 'exceedingly unlikely', for any such invasion would 'undoubtedly lead to a world war'. At the same time there were 'certainly chances of gradual infiltration across our border and possibly of entering and taking possession of disputed territory, if there is no obstruction to this happening'. India had to prepare to counter the 'infiltration of men and ideas'. In the ultimate analysis, wrote Nehru, 'the real protection we should seek is some kind of understanding with China'.

Nehru's concerns regarding the Chinese-threat were largely based on ideological politics of the Cold War even though the context was demanding a realistic assessment of national security. However, there were some attempts to mitigate confusion regarding the India-China border and settle the boundaries. Though such attempts could not bring any settlement to the border questions, on 29th April 1954 India signed an agreement with China on Tibet; with this agreement, "India gave up its rights in Tibet and recognized it as a region of China" (Raghavan 2010). This agreement included the famous five principles of peaceful coexistence or *Panchsheel* as a key to India's friendly relationship with China. As a tribute to the friendship, India provided immense support to China in international politics; including the support for China's membership in the United Nations and transfer of permanent membership in the UN Security Council from Republic of China (Taiwan) to PRC. However, neither *Panchsheel* nor India's 'friendship' helped in controlling China's designs on occupying the entire piece of land it claims from the Indian Territory.

In the pre-war period, though India was attempting to continue a friendly relationship with China without paying much attention to the trouble at the border, in the Indian public discourse, China was viewed primarily through the frame of anti-communist sentiments created by the ideological politics of the Cold War. Indian media often highlighted the tragic state of social life in communist China to depict the brutal nature of the communist system. For instance, K V Narain (1962) explained in an article published by *The Hindu* that,

> [In China] every resident and every member in each family has his or her name registered and everyone has to carry a registration card which, in effect, is sort of a life history of the person, showing the name, age, permanent residence, occupation and other details. No one without a registration card can get a food

ration card. Virtually every food item with the exception of salt is rationed…. Moreover, security officials visit every house at least once a month to check on the family members. Furthermore, the families are organised into neighbourhood blocs and any change in a family is to be reported to the security authorities. When they find that a family has visitors from the rural areas, the security authorities cut down the family's rice ration on the grounds that they have enough surplus to be in a position to receive a country kinsman. Therefore, city dwellers frown on visits from their country folk.

Similarly, in an article published by *The Indian Express*, Wolfgang Leonard (1962) wrote that in China "people are nothing but pliant tools of the Party… and no attention is paid to the suffering of the population". He added, by problematising communist expansionism in general and the Chinese foreign policy in particular, that "while people go hungry, the Chinese leaders are giving away economic aid [to foreign countries]".

Tibetan sentiments against the communist China also occupied a dominant place within the Indian public discourse. Desmond Doig (1962) wrote in an article published by *The Statesman* that "Chinese Communism continues to stifle Tibet, Lhasa has been regimented; political lectures have replaced prayer meetings; and people starve because of stringent food controls". By elaborating the stories of Chinese repression and torture in Tibet and Tibetan people's escape from the communist control, he added,

> To be without work, any work, in Lhasa today is to court disaster. To subsist without employment means one has private undisclosed means. Torture can discover how much. So the once-rich, mostly officials of the old Tibet, go out to work, as street cleaners and pullers of conservancy carts. Humiliation is one of the most potent weapons in the Chinese armoury…Young Lamas have been sent to China, forced to work and break their vows of celibacy. Lhasa today is a city of Tibetan women. The men have gone, despatched to China or to distant work camps. Chinese troops are lords of Lhasa. Their barracks often are former chapels and monasteries….The great tragedy of the moment is hunger. Tibet is plagued by a shortage of food. In Lhasa people are dying of starvation. 'Corpses are carried out of prisons by the dozen every day'… Tibetans are forced to eat rubbish; even the soles of their uncured leather and felt boots…. [It added as a Tibetan explained] 'At first we believed the Chinese when they said there would be prosperity for all. They distributed land and for many of us it was the first land we were working for ourselves. Then when our granaries began to fill they taxed and rationed us and nationalised all property. We own nothing now, not even our souls and our dignity'.

This story, while explaining the sufferings of the Tibetan people under the communist regime, clearly conveys the message that communism has no real solution to offer for the

problems of poor and it has no respect towards people's faith and their sacred places of worship. Such stories may have helped to intensify anti-communist sentiments within India; indeed such sentiments were necessary at that time to challenge the growth of communism within the country. It must be read with the fact that more than half of India's population was below the line of poverty at that time (Sarangi and Panda 2008) and poverty was indeed the most significant factor which helped the growth of communism everywhere in the world. *The Indian Express* (1962a) editorial published on 19th May 1962 by addressing the question of refugee crisis in Hong Kong expresses the worries better regarding the growth of communism in India. The editorial began by asking a question, "what lies behind ever growing streams of refugees who are fleeing from Red China to Hong Kong, only to be turned back when they reached their destination after having risked their lives to arrive there?" It proceeded with an answer that "the reason for the mass exodus can be summed up in one word: hunger. Whole villages in large areas of Mao's proletarian paradise on earth are reported to have been hit by crop failures". Then it extended a warning for Indian communists and their sympathisers,

> Hong Kong is faced with a dilemma for a while. It is apparent that the authorities do not wish to turn back these unfortunate victims of Red experiments, [though] Hong Kong cannot possibly contain them [as it is] being itself overcrowded. Some 800,000 Chinese have entered Hong Kong from 1959 to 1961 and possibly 200000 children have been born to them in this cramped island since then. For India the grim tragedy of China carries a lesson for our Peking patriots and their accomplices inside the Congress ranks. This is what follows on the heels of communising land holdings and creating a new despotism of rural bureaucrats.

The anti-communist sentiments in this fashion were so prevalent in the mainstream Indian public discourse during the pre-war years. To counter the growing threat of domestic communism, in a period of global ideological war, Indian conservatives and liberals required a strong anti-communist discourse. It is logical to assume that the very foundation of such a discourse had to be based in a counter thesis on communist promise of an economic system having no problems of exploitative capitalist economy. Perhaps that was the most important concern of anti-communist discourses in India. In an article published by *The Indian Express*, M. Ruthnaswamy (1962) insisted that "many arguments may be used to advance socialism – that it will increase productivity, that it

will raise the standard of living of the poor, that it makes for equality and so on and so forth. But one argument may not be used – that it is the latest cure for economic malaise. In the free world it is but a 'pomp of yesterday'".

The image of China as a communist other was justified in Indian public discourse not only through problematising the communist economic system that was regressive and disciplinary but also by counting them as enemies of belief systems and God. The anti-communist discourses constantly asserted that Chinese communists pay no respect towards people's beliefs and practices. Indian newspapers highlighted the stories of Communist China's atrocities against monasteries and monks of Lhasa, after their invasion of Tibet. It explained that party lectures replaced prayer meetings and monasteries and chapels became party or army camps after communist invasion (Doig 1962). Such stories might have had significant influence over the highly religious Indian society. Moreover, many Indian leaders frequently shared a view that India's conflict with China is a fight between believers and godless people. Leaders like Master Tara Singh often appealed the people to be prepared for a 'crusade' against the Chinese aggressor (*The Indian Express* 1962g; *The Times of India* 1962a). Prominent religious leaders like Acharya Vinoba Bhave described communism as an "international movement that challenge[s] those [who] believe in God" (*The Statesman* 1962c). The suffering of minority communities in communist countries also was highlighted in the Indian media as an evidence of communists' disrespect towards people's beliefs and practices. For example, Frank Moraes (1962) observed in an article published by *The Indian Express* that, "communist regimes the world over, while professing great respect and attachment for nationalist minorities, are always prone to suppress them. That is what is happening in Burma where Ne Win's military regime is ruthlessly suppressing the Karens who are largely Christians and the Shans who are strictly non-Burmese".

Being influenced by the ideological politics of the Cold War, a section of the Indian mainstream media was extremely critical on India's soft line approach on communist China. Obviously, in that particular historical context, the indignation of the supporters of Western model of capitalism and liberal democracy against India's China policy was quite understandable. Many Indian leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Krishna

Menon had to face sharp criticism for their unrealistic approach in handling the Chinese threat. In such a critical discourse, Krishna Menon was depicted as a communist sympathiser who was clandestinely working to help communist revolution in India. *The Indian Express* (1962b) editorial on 25th April 1962 observed, "Mr Krishna Menon's habit of playing pianissimo vis-à-vis Communist China and of striking fortissimo whenever Pakistan looms into the picture is well known and has not gone unnoticed. Perhaps it is part of the forward march to socialism". New Delhi's tenacious attempts to find a diplomatic solution for India-China conflicts, while China continued incursion at the border, had invited sharp criticism from every corner. In a different editorial addressing the Defence Minister Krishna Menon's comment on an incident of Chinese incursion, *The Indian Express* (1962c) wrote,

> New Delhi is again flexing its muscles when confronted with yet another incursion by Peking but in contradistinction to the Defence Minister the Prime Minister evidently does not regard the latest Chinese infiltration as creating "no new situation". Emboldened perhaps by Mr Menon's calculated complacency his Chinese friends are now brandishing their fists in India's face. Mr Nehru's firm declaration that India has no intention of yielding to Peking's threats is reassuring and he can count on popular support so long as his assurances do not add up to his Defence Minister's brave promises that not a further inch of our territory will be allowed to fall into China's hands only to permit 12000 square miles of Indian land to be occupied with impunity by the Communists across our northern border....Some day we may suddenly discover that the Chinese guerrillas have not merely crossed the Himalayan ranges which were once held up as an impenetrable barrier but have infiltrated into the lower reaches of our defence system.

Similarly, in another editorial published on 31st July 1962, addressing Krishna Menon's meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi at Geneva and Prime Minister Nehru's justification for such a meeting, *The Indian Express* (1962d) wrote,

> The Prime Minister's explanation that Mr Krishna Menon had met the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, in Geneva at Mr Nehru's request does not condone but aggravates this singularly insensitive piece of behaviour. There is nothing extraordinary or childish in the resentment and criticism which the Defence Minister's sustained cavorting with his Chinese Communist friends evoked at a time when our soldiers in Ladakh were being fired upon and subjected to various pressures in defence of our country. Mr Nehru's apologia that this constitutes a "diplomatic way" to warn the aggressor introduces a new exercise in the semantics of international relations....Judging by the news agency reports fortified by pictures distributed throughout the world neither the Chinese Marshal nor our valiant Defence Minister could bear to let other out of his sight.

In the three days he spent in Geneva Mr Menon found time to lunch with Marshal Chen Yi who acted the gracious host almost about the time the Chinese in Ladakh were opening fire on our forces and Peking was insulting New Delhi with another intemperate cascade of notes.

Indeed such a critical discourse was inevitable in that context to enlighten the Indian public about the potential consequences of the Government of India's insouciant approach towards a serious national security threat. However, most of the time such a critical discourse failed in conveying the message in a realistic manner due to its over emphasis on expressing anti-communist sentiments. Instead of making efforts to create a unified voice against an external enemy, they focused on problematising the internal differences; as this editorial reads: "the Indian people should be on the alert to ensure that our Peking patriots, in the forward march towards socialism, do not persuade or push our government into further weak-kneed parleys with a Government [China] whose assurances are worth exactly nothing" (*The Indian Express* 1962e). These lines borrowed from *The Indian Express* attempted to assert two important points; first, by referring to Indian communists and their sympathisers as 'Peking patriots' it implied that Indian communists are essentially anti-nationals or traitors. Second, by raising such a warning, it attempted to make a sense that Indian communists have a strong influence within the Central government and they are attempting to weaken India's position against communist China to make communist revolution easier in this country. Such a critical discourse not only excluded a large section of Indians by questioning their commitment towards the nation but also evaded analysing the socio-economic context which was making communist advancement possible in this country.

The anti-communist opinion makers remained sharply critical about the Government of India's efforts at finding diplomatic solution for India-China border dispute ever since the Chinese incursion became evident. They argued that "the Union Government is greatly mistaken if it believes that the people of India will complacently accept the reopening of negotiations with a regime whose deeds prove that its words are worth exactly nothing" (*The Indian Express* 1962f). Related to the same issue but in a different context, *The Indian Express* (1962i) sarcastically observed in its editorial that "Mr Nehru's exercise in appeasement threatens to outrival Mr Neville Chamberlain's performance at Munich". It

is definitely a good example of historical analogy employed by the supporters of the West during the pre-war period to problematise India's China policy. They often expressed that Nehru's foreign policy, including non-alignment, failed to bring any meaningful outcome. They argued that it is the 'non-alignment' which brought the Chinese threat at India's Himalayan frontier (Ruthnaswamy 1962a). In an editorial published on 25th April 1962, *The Indian Express* (1962b) observed,

> The success of foreign policy is gauged largely by the relationship it fosters with a country's immediate neighbours, and however resounding our voice purports to be at the UN or in the corridors of Geneva's Hall of Peace, the net result of our foreign policy after 15 years of Independence is an aggressive China, a minatory Pakistan and a suspicious Nepal on our borders.

The same newspaper wrote in another editorial published on 5th May 1962, by criticising Nehru's five principles of peaceful coexistence which was defining India's relationship with China at that period of time, "let us be done with the pitiable folly of Panchshila [*Panchsheel*] on which Peking still trades and which it evidently means to exploit" (*The Indian Express*, 1962c).

Though there was enough space for critical discourse, the undeniable fact is that in the pre-war period, the voice of Jawaharlal Nehru and his supporters had more space and acceptance within the mainstream Indian media. By counting on the quantity and reach of the voice of Nehru and his supporters, it can be assumed that the influence of critical discourse on shaping Indian public opinion was very minimal at that point of time. Recurring pieces of opinion defending the views and policies of the Government and Nehru conveyed that India remains in a right direction as far as its foreign and strategic policies are concerned. For instance, D. R. Mankekar (1962) observed in an opinion piece during this period, "In the world of international relations this country [India] enjoys credit, which has proved an asset to us in our activities in that arena. Whether in regard to Pakistan or China, the close friendly support this country has enjoyed from Soviet Russia, while simultaneously retaining warm friendly relations with and respect of the Western bloc is the main, and unique, factor of our diplomatic strength. This is a triumph of Panchsheel policy of peaceful co-existence, notwithstanding China's perfidy".

Precisely, being influenced by the Cold War ideological politics, anti-communist sentiments were prominent in Indian public discourse; from newspaper reports to parliament debates such sentiments always had expressions during the pre-war period. Such sentiments might have helped to develop a fear of communist invasion and Chinese enslavement of Indian people since China invaded Tibet. It is from the background of such fear, many in India demanded, when China's aggressive posture became evident at the Himalayan frontier, that India should make an alliance with the West or non-communist neighbouring countries to counter the communist threat. Opinion makers wrote in newspapers, "Mr Nehru strongly disapproves of communism at home, and is also prepared to fight it on his own borders. Then why can't he make common cause with other neighbours who are all individually fighting the same 'enemy' with varying degrees of success" (Mankekar 1962a)? Their line of argument was that communism, which was mostly used as a synonym for China, is the common menace to the security of India and South-East Asian countries like Laos and South Vietnam. Therefore, why they cannot all join together on the lines of the NATO in Europe, under India's leadership, in the common battle against the Chinese communist menace so as effectively to checkmate the adversary instead of allowing it to take on each other, individually, while the other countries watch helplessly, if not unconcernedly. Those who were demanding an alliance with the West reminded Prime Minister Nehru that, "[a] military alliance even with the USA should not be fraught with danger to India. The interest of India, the interests of its security, its integrity and its independence require it. To govern is to choose, and the Prime Minister of India should choose between the friends and the enemies of democratic freedom (Ruthnaswamy 1962a)".

Though pro-West sentiments were prevalent in the Indian public discourse, the West was not seen as sympathetic towards India's concerns; of course due to India's official policy. One of the most important issues which expressed the West's non-sympathetic approach towards India during this period was the Kashmir question. In the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, many in the Western camp unequivocally registered their support to Pakistan; of course it was an ally of the West in their fight against communism. It was a total disappointment for the Indian sympathisers of the West. In the context of Chinese incursion, they argued that "the West in criticising our presence in

Kashmir ignores one vital fact. India cannot counter the Chinese in Ladakh unless she preserves her lifeline from Srinagar in Kashmir to Leh in Ladakh. Our presence in Kashmir has a political justification but in the present context, it is also militarily vital and necessary" (*The Indian Express* 1962).

From the evidence of above mentioned narratives in the selected newspapers, it can be assumed that, in the context of ideological politics of the Cold War, anti-communist sentiments had significant role in shaping the image of China in Indian public discourse. The factors such as Indian leadership's immense trust in the western model of democracy, dissatisfaction of capitalists and their sympathisers in the growth of communist/socialist movements within the country, and largely conservative outlook of Indian society might have helped to sustain anti-communist sentiments within the Indian public discourse during that period. Prevalence of anti-communist sentiments probably had influenced the Indian opinion makers to write, when China began its incursion at the Himalayan frontier, that "it is obvious that it is not territory that Chinese are after; even security considerations, according to any standard, would not require the Chinese advance over a distance of 150 miles from the international boundary across a high altitude mountainous region where not a blade of grass grows" (Rangaswamy 1962a). Obviously, in heat of the Cold War ideological politics, many in India believed that China was attempting to bring communist revolution to the subcontinent. As inseparable from the image of communist other, but with certain distinctive features, China had another important discursive image in India during that time; that was of an expansionist power.

2. *China, an Expansionist Power*

Even before the Chinese incursion to the Indian territory at the Himalayan frontier became evident, there was a strong impression in Indian public discourse that communist expansionism is intrinsic part of China's foreign policy. China's invasion of Tibet in the early 1950s, their involvement in Korea, Vietnam and Laos, and the general perception regarding the communist expansion had constituted the background of such a view in Indian public discourse. Therefore, there was a tendency in India to delineate the China's

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aggressive policy at the Himalayan frontier as an attempt for communist expansion to the Indian subcontinent. Such discourse implied that India's democratic way of life is the fundamental target of communist China. In a political context defined by the war of ideologies such a thought was not an embellishment of the truth.

There were two dominant perceptions aiding China's image as an expansionist enemy in Indian public discourse. One is that expansionist tendencies are intrinsic to China's political culture. In terms of this view, regardless of the political ideology of its ruling establishment, China has always been an expansionist power. Whether it is Communists or Kuomintang, the expansionist policies of China will remain the same. They insisted that "expansionism is endemic in the Chinese character and today it is identified with the Communist regime" (Moraes 1962a). Those who were advocating this view did not attempt to blame communist ideology in general for China's expansionist tendencies. Prime Minister Nehru was among the people who held such a view. Frank Moraes (1962b) explained in an opinion piece that,

> The irredentist urge of China is by no means confined to the Communists. It has been expressed by Chiang Kaishek and before him by Sun Yat-sen who early in this century declared: 'we lost Korea and Formosa to the Japanese, Annam to France and Burma to Britain. In addition, the Ryukyu Islands, Siam, Borneo, Sarawak, Java, Ceylon, Nepal and Bhutan were once tributary states to China'. The list is embarrassingly inclusive and has been subsequently repeated by Chiang Kaishek and later by Mao Tse-tung. These countries, sooner or later, must be recovered by China.

The other group however added that expansionism is inevitable part of communist systems. In their view, communist ideology was also equally responsible for China's expansionist moves at the Himalayan frontier. They problematised Nehru's differentiation between communism and Chinese expansionism. For example, an editorial published by *The Indian Express* (1962j) reads,

> Mr Nehru proceeded to draw a distinction between Chinese expansionism and Chinese communism where with all respect to his thinking we are afraid we cannot agree. It is true that expansionism is endemic in the Chinese character and has expressed itself under Ming, Manchu, Kumintang and communist rule. But expansionism is endemic in communism and in fact, is inseparable from that creed. It is in the nature of communism to be expansionist as its evocative appeal to the proletariat of the world to rise and break its chains demonstrates. The Prime Minister is right in pinpointing Chinese expansionism but, we fear, he is wrong in

drawing a distinction between expansionism and communism. They are not two different things. They are two faces of the same coin.

The proponents of the second view were passionate about describing India's resistance against the Chinese incursion at the Himalayan frontier as India's resistance against the communist expansionism. They not only refused to accept the tension between India and China as a border dispute between the two countries but also used the opportunity to problematise the Government of India's approach towards communism and communist countries. By exploiting the anti-communist sentiments with the country, they challenged the Indian communists and justified violent mob-attack against communists and communist party offices (for example, see *The Indian Express* 1962p). Being influenced by the Western categorisation of communist countries as one monolithic bloc, they doubted that China might be getting support of international communist movement and most of the communist parties in the world for attacking India (Jain, 1962b). They argued that China's target is nothing short of expanding communism to the whole Asia. Therefore, they demanded that India should make alliance with the West or other non-communist countries, including Pakistan, to fight against communist expansionism to the Indian subcontinent (Mankekar 1962a).

However, the proponents of the first view tried to differentiate the Chinese communism from the Soviet communism. They insisted that "fanatical first generation Communist China, with its militant Stalinist ideology and aggressive expansionist policy, is today the greater menace while the fourth generation Communist Russia of the Khrushchev era is more mellow and rational in its attitude to the non-communist world" (*The Indian Express* 1962k). They argued, "Russia had made great strides, through science and technology, and what she desired was world peace to achieve further progress. China, on the contrary, had no such stakes in peace. She, therefore, did not care if millions of her people died in an atomic holocaust" (*The Statesman* 1963). As an advocate of this view, Prime Minister Nehru "discounted the possibility of an invasion of India as 'exceedingly unlikely', for any such invasion would 'undoubtedly lead to a world war'" (Raghavan 2010). However, later, once the war became real at the Himalayan frontier, even Nehru could not discount the possibilities of a full-scale invasion attempt from China. He described the Chinese expansionism as a "menace not only to India but also Asia and the

world" (*The Hindu* 1962a). Other Congress leaders like Lal Bahadu Shastri also argued that "China's aim was nothing short of enslaving the whole Asia" (*The Hindu* 1962b).

The analysis of the selected newspapers' discourse reveals that image of China as an expansionist country was prevalent in Indian public discourse during the pre-war period. The major factors helping the development of such an image were anti-communist sentiments boosted by the Cold War international politics and an Indian presumption regarding the expansionist tendencies of China, which was, of course, proved in the context of Chinese invasion of Tibet in early 1950s.

3. *China, a Friend of Pakistan*

The wounds of partition were incessantly hurting Indian sentiments when tension between India and China emerged at the Himalayan frontier in 1950s. The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, problems evolving from the unsettled boundaries, various issues related with migration, and attacks against Hindu minorities in both East and West Pakistan were significant in Indian public discourse on Pakistan during that period. In the backdrop of all these issues, anti-Pakistan sentiment was a defining feature of India's collective identity (see chapter 5). Therefore, in terms of the old aphorism that 'the friend of my enemy is my enemy', within the Indian public discourse that delineates Pakistan as the arch-rival of India, anyone who maintains a friendly relationship with Pakistan has enormous chance of getting an 'enemy' status. The theory of structural balance which suggests that "interactive subjects can always be partitioned into two opposing sides" argues by drawing from cognitive and social psychology that two enemies sharing a friend is not a balanced relational pattern (Schwartz 2010). In this sense, China's friendship with Pakistan that evolved in early 1960s, at a time when India was having an adverse relationship with China at the border, might have had a significant impact on Indian social perception of China.

The analysis of the selected newspaper discourse during the pre-war period reveals that many in India had observed China-Pakistan relationship as a disturbing development in international politics. Suddenly developed intimacy between a Western ally, Pakistan, member of two major alliances, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and

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the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), established with the aim of containing communism and a major communist power that actively involved in communist expansion in Asia, had bewildered Indian opinion makers. In the beginning they had largely failed to apprehend the strategic importance of such a relationship for both Pakistan and China, because of their attention on ideological politics of the Cold War. Instead of analysing potential consequences of that partnership on India's national security, they blamed Pakistan for 'flirting with Red China' while accepting the Western military aid for containing the communism (Sagar 1962). But soon they realised that the only aim of Pakistan is to seize every opportunity they get to use against India. Yet they were not certain about China's anti-India motives in that relationship. In an editorial published on 28th May 1962 *The Indian Express* (1962L) observed,

> Peking's offer of economic aid to Karachi is a political gesture meant as an irritant to India. It has no meaning in the context of aiding Pakistan's industrial development. In any case, China with manifold problems of her own is in no position to aid another nation. At the present moment when China has on her hands the most serious problem to confront her since the Communists came to power—famine over wide areas and thousands fleeing from their homeland—for Peking to come forward with a fantastic offer of aid is a cruel mockery of her own starving millions.

In the early 1962, China and Pakistan announced their plan for opening negotiations for demarcating the border between China and parts of Kashmir held by Pakistan (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir)[1]. As a response to the move, India registered its protest and made it clear that India would not recognise the arrangement that comes through the negotiation between China and Pakistan. Even in this context, though leaders like Nehru were questioning the Chinese and Pakistani "interference with India's sovereignty over Kashmir" (*The Statesman* 1962e), a section of the Indian media failed to analyse the issue in a realistic manner because of their overemphasis on the Cold War politics. The central focus of their analysis was on how such a move from China and Pakistan would affect the Great Powers and the Cold War politics. For instance, *The Statesman*'s (1962f) editorial on the issue read,

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[1] As a reaction to India's refusal to give the border concession that it was demanding, China made a provisional agreement with Pakistan to demarcate boundaries between PoK and Xinjiang province of China and informed India in early 1962 that it had never accepted Indian position on Kashmir without reservation (see, Dobell 1964).

The proposal of Pakistan and China to demarcate the border between Sinkiang and the portion of Kashmir held by Pakistan is a diplomatic blow to the United States and even the USSR, not at India alone. Mr Nehru in Parliament has made it abundantly clear that India will not be bound by any settlement arrived at between the two Governments, but it is deeply regrettable that Pakistan, out of pique, may be, is setting a course against the logic of Asian interests, ideological and strategic. Not to learn from Indian experience about the fate of dealing with China is to be ostrich-like.

In its editorial, *The Hindu* (1962c) observed that "by a curious paradox, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union approves of the move which their military allies have undertaken". Rangaswamy (1962b) asserted in an article published by *The Hindu* that "[t]he United States felt embarrassed by her military ally, Pakistan's approaches to China. The West saw clearly Pakistan's game of blackmail. If the West would not help Pakistan on Kashmir question Pakistan would turn towards China". Perhaps, placing the issue in a larger framework of international politics was necessary during that period to attract wider attention. When we consider the Kashmir dispute, from the communist bloc, India had strong support of the Soviet Union. However, China's stand on the issue was equivocal until they developed the special relationship Pakistan. When they disclosed their plan for negotiation with Pakistan for settling the border between Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Xinjiang province of China, it became clear in India that "unlike the Soviet Union, they [Chinese] do not accept Kashmir as an integral part of India" (*The Hindu* 1962d). From the West, both the United States and Britain were openly critical of India's stand on Kashmir (*The Indian Express* 1962).

In terms of the Cold War framework of understanding, China-Pakistan negotiation for border settlement was a move against the Great Power interests. Indian media asserted that the move is a clear evidence of growing rift between China and the Soviet Union; and added, it is a Chinese declaration that no external intervention is allowed in their strategic decision-making. Some of the opinion makers explained that "China is entering into negotiation with Pakistan as the latter is in the military control of the border in that region". They added, "[t]his is to be provisional agreement; later after the Kashmir dispute is settled the 'sovereign authorities' will reopen negotiation with the Chinese Government". Why is then a provisional agreement if the question is to be reopened later? They explained, "[o]ne reason given by China to her friends is that she did not wish

to fall into the trap of the CENTO and SEATO by any incidents on the border with Pakistan" (Rangaswamy 1962b). Precisely, if we exclude all analytical pedantry on the Cold War politics, in their analysis there was nothing so alarming for India in China-Pakistan negotiation or border settlement.

However, by mid-1962, Indian media's analysis of China-Pakistan relationship became largely realistic. It is clear in *The Statesman*'s (1962g) editorial published on 6th June 1962, analysing China's response on India's protest Note on China-Pak negotiation for settling the border. This time, it observed that China is making every possible move to isolate India in the region; they are trying to exploit tension between India and Pakistan and they are making reasonable border settlement with every other country in the region. The editorial insisted,

> There is more than routine rudeness in the latest Note from Peking. Not only does it impertinently accuse India of "Big Power chauvinism", in which Chauvin himself might usefully have taken some lessons from China, but it also implies a dangerous stand on Kashmir. On the "ownership" of Kashmir, the Note says, China is "impartial" and immediately proceeds to claim a common frontier of several hundred kilometres with Pakistan—as if there was no contradiction….China describes the Indian Note of May 10 as an attempt to sow discord in the relations between China and Pakistan, which have very good reasons for being very bad. It is surely more correct to say that it is China which is seeking to take advantage of the strain in Indo-Pakistan relations. This is all of a piece, part of the Chinese pattern of appearing to be reasonable with Nepal, Burma and Pakistan, in fact every country except India.

Since China and Pakistan announced their plan for negotiation for settling the border, China's differential treatment of its border dispute with India became major discussion in Indian media. They highlighted China's willingness to make reasonable border agreements with Nepal and Burma and suspiciously observed their adamant stand against India on the same front. *The Hindu* (1962e) wrote in its editorial, "It is striking that in the case of Burma and Nepal the watershed principle was accepted and an agreement signed, after some exchange of doubtful territory. Chinese motives in rejecting such principles on the Indian frontier are obscure and lead to the suspicion that there are political reasons for Peking's provocative movements". Indian opinion makers critically observed the Sino-Nepalese relationship and influx of Chinese nationals to Nepal, especially in the context of their joint project for developing a road from Tibetan border to Kathmandu. In this

context, in an opinion piece published by *The Times of India*, Prem Bhatia (1962) observed, "India's defence requirements can no more be met by increasing vigilance along the north-east frontier. Attention must also be paid to what the Chinese may be up to in Nepal. Consistent with the respect that is due to Nepalese independence, India has to take steps on her own soil, close to Nepal, to prevent further surprises from the Chinese". In a different context, addressing the China-Nepal border agreement, *The Statesman* (1962h) wrote: "To Nepal the implication of the agreement means much more than formalisation of the state of affairs following the actual demarcation of the boundary; while what is in store for the future only the inscrutable Chinese know". Then it added,

> The matter is not without its significance to India. It is another in the series of those friendly gestures towards Burma or Nepal by which China settles the border problem in all amity and by mutual discussions. "Scientific delimitation" of the boundary takes place on the line basis of the traditional boundary line and other matters settled on the basis of age-old customs and usage. Why the Chinese behave differently when India tries to solve the same problems, throwing these principles to the winds, perhaps shows clearly the real Chinese intentions so far as India is concerned.

Because of their disinclination towards settling the border dispute with India through reasonable negotiation, as they had done with Nepal and Burma, and their attempts to settle border with Pakistan without giving any respect for India's claim over Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, China became more and more inscrutable in Indian public discourse. It created a ground for advancing the view that China is not a trustworthy country and India should prepare mentally and physically to meet any challenge, including war, from China. Since the special relationship between China and Pakistan became evident, the presumption that China is playing against India everywhere became predominant in Indian narratives. For instance, when there was a public protest in Indonesia against G. D. Sondhi, Senior Vice-President of the Asian Games Federation Council, who was accused of leading a movement to have the name of the Asian Games changed because of the exclusion of Taiwan and Israel, some of the Indian media argued that perhaps the 'Expel Sondhi Riot' might be a planned move by Indonesia and China to challenge India (for example, see, *The Statesman* 1962i). Definitely, Taiwan's entry into the Asian Games was against the Chinese interests and they did place diplomatic pressure on Indonesia, the host country of 1962 Asian Games, to influence the decision concerning Taiwan.

However, whether China had any role in Indonesian public protest against Sondhi is unclear (Bell 2003). Another good example for such a narration can be seen in media debates on the second Bandung Conference – the event which did not take place due to various reasons, including the Sino-Soviet split. By referring to the conference Krishan Bhatia (1962) wrote in an article published by *The Statesman*,

> What is worse, the second Bandung, with Soekarno presiding over it, may well develop into a massive demonstration of hostility towards India. The conference is still months away but Pakistan and China, enthusiastic supporters of the proposal, must already be sharpening their talons. If she goes to Bandung—and there is little chance that she will not—India will undoubtedly return bruised in spirit and reputation.

Thus, the analysis of the selected newspaper discourse reveals that China's special relationship with Pakistan had negative impact on discursive representation of China in India during the pre-war period. However, even in the presence of all negative images, there was a hope, at least within an optimist section of Indians who were adamantly supporting the non-alignment and disarmament, that there will never be an India-China war. The war had broken that hope and India's two thousand year old ally officially became India's 'enemy number one'.

The Wartime Indian Discourse on China

Though the real fight between India and China lasted only for a month – from 20th October to 21st November 1962 – the wartime discourse of India cannot be limited within that timeframe because of various reasons. The most important among them is that both the war and ceasefire were China's unilateral initiation because of which there was a prolonged uncertainty in India regarding the conclusion of the war. A strong demand for retaliation that emerged in India after the terrible loss and humiliation and China's unwillingness to vacate the entire piece of land that they occupied from the Indian Territory since the pre-war period of tension[2] had constituted such uncertainty. Therefore, this study uses data from about a six months' period following the war, in addition to the actual period of war, to analyse India's wartime discourse.

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[2] Declaring unilateral ceasefire on 21st November 1962, China initiated its withdrawal from the eastern sector. However, they refused to withdraw from Aksai Chin area in the Ladakh sector.

The analysis of pre-war discourse revealed that China's expansionist tendency, expressed through their incursion attempts at the border, and their suddenly emerged interest in India's arch rival Pakistan, an ally of the West, had created a sense in India that China was making ground for an armed conflict with India. In terms of a dominant discourse, China was trying to destroy Indian democracy, India's supremacy in the Afro-Asian region and Nehru's respected leadership in the international politics. It explained that China could not tolerate a successful democratic system in Asia; they were disturbed by India's economic progress achieved through democratic means. They wanted to destroy India's democratic system to prove that the Chinese model of communism is the most appropriate system for Afro-Asian countries. In an editorial *The Hindu* (1962i) observed, "Whether we desired it or not, we have become the symbol, for all Asian and even African countries, of a country, fully wedded to democracy, seeking to raise the condition of its people by democratic planning". It argued, "the success of the Indian experiment will be a great inspiration to the newly-freed countries, as its failure would provide an opportunity for the Communists to claim that theirs is the only effective road to economic advancement". When the war began, Vadilal Dagli (1962) argued in an article published by *The Indian Express* that "the real aim of China's attack was to discredit the experiment of economic development through democratic process; the best method is to force the Indian Government to increase defence expenditure and thus cause an economic crisis". However, in China's perspective, reality was different. For them, India occupied a large area of their territory, part of 'their' Tibetan province, challenged them by setting up more and more military posts at the frontier, they called it India's "Forward Policy", and refused to go for negotiation to settle the border dispute (Maxwell 1970; Singh 2013). Brigadier J. P. Dalvi (1969) wrote, in the preface of his well-known account on India-China war, that

> On the night of 21st November 1962, I was woken up by the Chinese Major in charge of my solitary confinement with shouts of 'good news-good news'. He told me that the Sino-Indian War was over and that the Chinese Government has decided to withdraw from the areas which they had overrun, in their lightning campaign. When I asked reason for this decision he gave me this Peking inspired answer: 'India and China have been friends for thousands of years and have never fought before. China does not want war. It is the reactionary (sic) Indian Government that was bent on war. So the Chinese counter attacked in self-defence and liberated all our territories in NEFA and Ladakh, in just one month.

Now we have decided to go back as we do not want to settle the border problem by force. We have proved that you are no match for mighty China'. He concluded with this supercilious and patronising remark: 'we hope that the Indian Government will now see sense and come to the conference table at once so that 1200 million Chinese and Indian can get on with their national development plans and halt Western Imperialism'.

As mentioned above, there were two dominant perspectives in Indian public discourse regarding India-China conflict when tension between these countries was growing at the Himalayan frontier. In terms of the first, a war between India and China was seen as highly unlikely because of various reasons, ranging from China's massive financial crisis and famine created by Mao's 'Great Leap Forward' to the high possibility for a world war emerging in the context of Communist China's attack on democratic India. In their analysis, China was doing nothing more than trying to occupy largely "un-administered areas" in the non-demarcated border region where "not a blade of grass grows". They dismissed reports on China's preparation for a war against India by arguing that though not a blade of grass grows in the Chinese occupied land "the crop of rumours can be a bumper one" (*The Statesman* 1962j). In terms of the second view, a war between India and China was seen as extremely possible, may be necessary, as India, a leader of the free-world, was responsible for preventing the Chinese communist expansion in this region. They argued that China regarded India as "the great stumbling block in Asia against Chinese expansionism" (Bhat 1962b). The proponents of this view observed China's incursion at the border as part of its expansionist strategy and as preparation for a war against India. They demanded alliance with the West and/or other democratic countries in the region to counter Chinese communist expansionism.

In the middle of these two extreme perspectives, India's official discourse remained highly complex and disturbingly silent. The lack of official statements addressing the question of India-China conflicts or the Chinese incursion from the Government of India, including the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister, had undoubtedly provided a complex nature to the official discourse. Neither the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru nor the Defence Minister Krishna Menon were keen on informing the public about the reality of the Chinese threat at the Himalayan frontier; their statements were mostly underestimating the gravity of the threat or having a blind faith on India's military

capability. Lack of information on the subject often exasperated the Opposition parties and media; *The Statesman* (1962j) wrote in its editorial, when reports on the Chinese incursion in the Eastern Sector became public for the first time after 1959, that

> The country is not entitled to, nor does it expect, detailed information on military moves; even Chinese movements cannot always be publicized….what is the Government can give the country, without the slightest loss to security, is a clear and authoritative indication of the threat constituted by the Chinese and of the degree, necessarily in general terms, of India's preparedness. It cannot be said that the country has got it from the Government.

Even when the Chinese crossed the McMahon Line in September 1962, for the first time after 1959 Longju incident in which China crossed the McMahon Line to occupy its claimed area in the Eastern Sector and withdrew back after India's protest, neither the Prime Minister nor the Defence Minister was present in New Delhi to give official explanation about the situation at the Himalayan frontier. In this context, only information delivered through official channel was a statement from an External Affairs Ministry spokesperson acknowledging that "some Chinese forces have appeared" on the Indian side of the McMahon Line. The statement indeed reflected an official reluctance to acknowledge the gravity of the threat. Such tendency of the Government of India invited sharp criticism from various corners. *The Times of India* (1962b) wrote in its editorial,

> There is seemingly, even at this stage, a persistent reluctance to describe this 'appearance' as violation of the Line. Tentativeness exaggerated to this degree almost creates the impression that the Chinese troops, in a spasm of absentmindedness, found themselves on Indian Territory. This kind of hesitation in describing an incursion as an incursion serves no purpose whatsoever and—what is more unfortunate—deflects attention from the motives by which the latest Chinese move has possibly been inspired.

The opinion pieces and editorials appeared in the selected newspaper following the incident reflected on one side an extreme confidence in the Indian military capability and on the other side an extreme dissatisfaction for the Government of India's approach towards the Chinese threat. Referring India's defence in the Eastern sector, *The Hindu* (1962f) wrote in its editorial,

> Indian troops have been told not to make any forward movements at all, even under Chinese provocations. The idea is to prevent the outbreak of a frontier war which would create further tension and ill-will. Apparently, the Chinese ignore[d] this danger in their anxiety to win over the frontier people to their side, but after

what they have done in Tibet, it would be very strange indeed if they could induce the villagers to swallow their bait.

In the same context, Krishan Bhatia (1962) asserted in an opinion piece published by *The Statesman*,

> NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency) is different from Ladakh in one respect. While India's defence forces were nowhere in Ladakh when the Chinese began their intrusion, NEFA and the rest of the Eastern Sector of the border [have] always been claimed to be well defended. Instead of marching forward blithely, as they did in Ladakh, the Chinese may, therefore, be forced to have a showdown with India fairly early in their advance across the McMahon Line. Unhappy though this development will be, it should at least clear the confusion in thinking and the double-mindedness that the recent Chinese references to the desirability of talks seems to have created in Delhi. It was probably this pathetic hope in the ultimate goodness of the Chinese heart which prompted the Government to indulge in a mild euphemism on Thursday [referring to India's official response on China's crossing of the McMahon Line]. The Chinese threat to the Indian post was described officially as the 'appearance of some Chinese forces in the vicinity of one of our posts'.

Analysing India's position in NEFA, Frank Moraes (1962c) observed in an article published by *The Indian Express*,

> The Prime Minister can confidently take the Indian people's unity in the face of aggression for granted. But is there unity in the mind and heart of the Government? Is there in fact a Government functioning effectively and unitedly in Delhi? On urgent and essential matters the cabinet continues to speak with two voices…While the Prime Minister has roundly branded the Chinese as "a menace to us", his Defence Minister recently and significantly after the Chinese had crossed the NEFA border declared "action will be taken only when something serious occurs." …The heart of the people of India is sound. The mind of the Government of India is confused.

Following the incident, *The Indian Express* (1962n) wrote in its editorial that "if anything is calculated to awake New Delhi from the illusion of a negotiated settlement with Red China it is the rude reality of latest Chinese thrust into NEFA". It observed that the intrusion happened "after Mr Nehru's recent warning that the McMahon line was a settled fact and Peking's summary rejection of that interpretation". It noted, answering questions in the Lok Sabha on August 13, 1959, the Prime Minister stated that the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai had given him the definite impression that "having regard to all the circumstances, they accepted the McMahon line as the international frontier". However, the newspaper highlighted, "Mr Nehru did not disclose when the Chinese

Prime Minister conveyed this impression but it could only have been either in 1954 when our Prime Minister visited China or in 1956 when Mr Chou En Lai visited India". Emphasising on the uncertainty remaining over the issue, it warned that "whatever the date [of Chou En-Lai's assurance], this assurance, like all other Communist assurances, was plainly designed to lull India without committing China" (*The Indian Express* 1962n).

Though the Chinese crossing of the McMahon Line in September 1962 had created a situation of panic in India, the Government of India maintained its hope on peaceful settlement of the border dispute and expressed satisfaction with the steps being taken in NEFA to keep the Chinese out of Indian Territory. During this time, in the Chinese media the story was that of India intruding into China's territory and provoking military clash (*The Statesman* 1962k). Analysing the Chinese narratives, Indian media reported that the Chinese newspapers argue that the "Indian intrusions and serious provocations on the Indo-Tibetan border have created a dangerous situation in which armed conflict may be touched off at any time". They asserted that the Chinese media warned India that if it was bent on attempting "territorial expansion by the use of armed force" the Chinese would defend themselves resolutely and India must bear full responsibility for the consequences (*The Statesman* 1962k).

After the Chinese crossing of the McMahon Line in September 1962, a view suggesting that an undeclared war is on at the Himalayan frontier became dominant in the Indian public discourse. It supported a widely shared perception that chances for peaceful settlement of the India-China border dispute are negligible. In this context, Krishan Bhatia (1962a) observed in an opinion piece,

> The chances of Indians and Chinese sitting round a table to resolve their dispute were always slim. Now, following the intrusion, they have reached further. Quite apart from what the public might have to say on the subject – in the past that has never been particularly important – the Chinese action in crossing the McMahon Line imparts a dangerous twist to the proposal for talks.

After the Chinese crossing of the McMahon Line, stories of the Chinese attack on the Indian posts in NEFA and border firing by both sides regularly appeared in newspapers.

Meanwhile, the exchange of Notes between New Delhi and Peking continued unabated. After facing severe criticism from the media and the Opposition, the Government of India began to take more realistic approach in its dealing with the border question and asserted that India will not negotiate with China under duress. It is important to note that, at one point in the peak of tensions, the Government of India was willing to go to Peking (Beijing) for negotiation without even considering that the Chinese had crossed the McMahon Line and fighting was going on at the border. Problematising the Government's approach, critics asked, "why should the victim of aggression despatch a representative to the capital of the country guilty of aggression" (*The Times of India* 1962d)? Definitely, the negotiation attempt was a reflection of Government of India's commitment to find a peaceful settlement of the India-China border dispute. However, public sentiment in India was largely against having any such negotiation with aggressors until they stop fighting and withdraw completely from the Indian Territory. Later, considering the public sentiment, Nehru unequivocally declared that "we shall meet force with force", and "India will not allow her territorial integrity to be violated" (*The Statesman* 1962L). He rejected China's final proposal for negotiation before the war as they refused to retire to the positions they held in early September, prior to their crossing of the McMahon Line. However, he insisted that "being peace lovers we shudder at the thought of going to war, but it is humiliating for us to give the impression that we have been cowed" (*The Statesman* 1962m). Nehru's rejection of the Chinese proposal for negotiation indeed affected India's image as a peace-loving country, even though it might have helped to satisfy India's domestic sentiments (Jain 1962).

Though part of the Chinese troops which had crossed the McMahon Line, withdrew after some days due to India's protest, tension did not ease at the Himalayan frontier as bulk of them still remained entrenched on the Indian side of the border (*The Times of India* 1962c). However, in terms of the Chinese narratives reproduced by the Indian media, the Chinese media remained firm on their stand even in this context that the Indians are the ones who made trouble at the border with expansionist 'Forward Policy'. Their report stated,

> The Chinese Government's consistent stand is to bring about a peaceful solution to the Sino-Indian boundary issue through negotiations. If, however, the Indian

side is bent on going its own way trying to realise its designs for territorial expansion by the use of armed force, Chinese border units will resolutely effectuate their self-defence and the Indian side must bear the full responsibility for all consequences arising therefrom (*The Times of India* 1962c).

After the Chinese crossing of the McMahon Line in September 1962, the Government of India had proposed two preconditions to have any negotiation with China; first, the threat in the frontier must ease, and second, talks must relate to specific points, concerning mainly the western sector of the border. In an editorial addressing the issue *The Statesman* (1962n) observed,

> Too often in the past has China moved quietly into the Indian Territory while negotiating with this country's representatives. On this occasion India has laid down the only two conditions without which talks can have no meaning. If there is slightest truth in China's proclaimed desire for a peaceful settlement, there should be little difficulty in accepting India's suggestions.

However, China turned down India's conditions and used harsh language against India in its Notes exchanged with New Delhi. They wanted India to give up all pre-conditions and go to Peking (Beijing) for discussing the entire boundary question. The Indian media and opinion makers observed this move as an attempt to cover up weakness of their case against India (Bhat 1962). Being exasperated with such attitude of China, Indian media argued that China is doing "diplomacy by bad manners" and they are attempting to do "negotiation by insult" (*The Statesman* 1962n). In his address to the Ceylon (Sri Lanka) Parliament, on 13th October 1962, by emphasising on the advantage of democracy and parliamentary system, Prime Minister Nehru declared that he did not like the idea of getting entangled in international disputes as he wanted to give all of his time and energy for improving the standard of life of India's common people. However, he added,

> It was an extraordinary situation that India, which had been conditioned to pursue a peaceful approach to problems since the time of Mahatma Gandhi, found herself today, in a position to deal with situations that were far from peaceful. That extraordinary situation had arisen in the case of India's frontiers with China. Such situations are the contradictions of life. We do not want to do certain things. But we find ourselves in circumstances which compel us to do what we do not like (*The Statesman* 1962o).

By mid-October the fighting between India and China at the border began to intensify; casualties of both sides became regular stories in newspapers. Reporting heavy causalities that China had to suffer from the north-eastern sector, the Chinese media blamed India

and Nehru for the new developments at the Himalayan frontier. They argued "it is Mr Nehru who refused to negotiate and it is Mr Nehru who issued the order to fight" (Bhat 1962c). Following such stories, in the context of intensified fighting at the frontier, the Indian media reported that "blasphemous and insulting words of hate are continuously being hurled at our leader and our country from Peking". They urged the Government of India to "wage a full-fledged military operation either singly or with the aid of a friendly power". However, they observed, that "it is indeed a tragedy that we are being driven, against our wishes, by our 2000 year old ally, to have to use military force against her to protect our honour and security: sentiments apart, we will have to be resolute, not merely in words, and mobilise all resources to meet this challenge" (Cariappa 1962).

Though there was no formal declaration of war from either side, a statement issued by the Chinese Defence Ministry, on 23rd October 1962, stated explicitly that it was willing to risk an armed fight with India if it did not follow Chinese directions regarding the McMahon Line. It read,

> In its efforts to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through peaceful negotiations, the Chinese government has repeatedly declared that 'we absolutely do not recognize the illegal McMahon Line in the eastern sector but we will not cross this line'. But the Indian government has once and for all broken the bounds of this line. Now the Chinese side formally declares that in order to prevent Indian troops from staging a comeback and launching a fresh attack, the Chinese frontier guards no longer needs to restrain themselves to the bounds of the McMahon Line (Bhat 1962a).

By the last week of October, it became clear in India that "China has unleashed an undeclared war against us in pursuance of her expansionist aims" (*The Hindu* 1962g). In his address demanding people's sacrifice and hard work for defending the country, Prime Minister Nehru defined Chinese action as an "unabashed aggression by an unscrupulous opponent". In its editorial *The Hindu* (1962g) argued that "one of the aims [of China], no doubt, is to demonstrate to the smaller Himalayan States as well as to other Asian States that China is a Great Power which can and will enforce her claims to border areas whatever the real legal position [is]". When the fighting intensified at the border, many in India demanded that India should declare war against China and prepare for the climate of turbulence that may exist at the frontier for many years to come. In their view, "India, indeed Asia one might say, will never be the same after the Chinese invasion" (Noorani,

1962). Though India had been suffering setback at the battlefront, they argued that the initial advantage in a surprise attack always rests with the aggressor and "the gallant Indian Army is fully capable of giving the enemy measure for measure and defending our motherland" (*The Hindu* 1962h). The demand for severing diplomatic ties with communist China was also prevalent since the fight had begun. The critics wrote, "[w]hat earthly reason is there to continue our diplomatic relations with Peking, thereby providing the enemy with a nest of insulated, protested listening and transmission posts in our country at this time of peril?" (Moraes 1962d). They observed, "[a] rather puzzling feature of India's foreign policy today is that even when the Chinese have committed "unabashed aggression" this country continues to maintain diplomatic relations with Peking". And reminded that "India terminated such relations with Portugal in 1955 for much less"[3] (Bhatia, 1962c). Following the attack, on 22nd October, *The Times of India* (1962e) wrote in its editorial,

> For over three years there has been no doubt in the mind of the people about the real aim of the Chinese. If there was any doubt it was in the mind of the Government. …To talk of negotiations at a time when our soldiers have suffered heavy casualties will be an act of surrender. If there are any negotiations they can only be held after the last inch of the Indian Territory has been wrested from the Chinese.

The critical narration of *The Indian Express* (1962m) was more vehement than any other selected newspapers during that period. It often problematised India's approach towards China, demanded in its editorial that the "Political Schizophrenia" which had bedevilled India's China policy and led India to regard the "Red Chinese as friends" while they were treating India as foes, must end. Defining "Red China" as India's "number one enemy", it added, "that fact should be brought home to India's people and as to China by deeds and not by an endless and meaningless farrago of words". In the context of intense fighting at the frontier, it reminded the Government,

> What exists on our northern borders is not a state of sporadic fighting but a state of undeclared war. If we mean to defend our territory and eject the aggressor this state of war must continue. It may be that we shall have to live with an unsettled climate of turbulence for many years to come. Let us prepare for and condition ourselves to that eventuality (*The Indian Express* 1962m).

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[3] They were referring to the tension in India-Portuguese relations after the Portuguese refusal to surrender Goa. Through a military intervention India annexed Goa in 1961.

The most important targets of Indian media's critical narration during the period of war were the Government of India, including Nehru and Menon, and the Communists, international communists in general and the Indian communists in particular. The blame on the government stemmed primarily from three factors; firstly India was not aggressive enough against the enemy, secondly India did not abandon the policy of non-alignment in the wake of communist aggression, and thirdly India continued its lenient policy towards communists even after the Chinese attack. The communists became one of the prime targets of Indian media's critical narration due to the ambiguous stand taken by many Indian communists with regard to the India-China conflict, silence or neutral stand of friendly communist countries, including the Soviet Union, in the wake of the Chinese aggression, and the general anti-communist sentiments created by the Cold War politics.

Another notable feature of India's wartime narratives was an excessive use of the Second World War analogies. Definitely the Second World War was not so distant a memory during the period of India-China war. Perhaps that might be the reason for dominance of such historical analogies. After having a disastrous setback in NEFA, on 24th October, Nehru called the country to imbibe the Dunkirk spirit of the British during the Second World War. He reminded the country that the British had not given in when their troops had suffered setbacks during the World War II. Instead under the leadership of Winston Churchill, they had rebuilt themselves and defeated the enemy. Nehru declared, "[t]o some extent we have to do the same" (*The Statesman* 1962p). Similarly, Krishan Bhatia (1962c) wrote in an article, by referring to the setbacks India faced at NEFA, that "for the faint-hearted it might be reassuring to recall the setbacks and reverses that the Allies suffered in the last World War before the tide turned in their favour". He added, "[t]he Chinese have caught India in [a] state of relative unpreparedness – an unpalatable fact which must be admitted – but it by no means indicates that the ultimate victory will be theirs". *The Statesman*'s (1962q) editorial commenting on Nehru's attempt to compare the Chinese action at the Himalayan frontier with "the full-blooded imperialism of the 18th and 19th centuries" perhaps explains well Indian media's obsession with the Second War analogies. The editorial observed, "Nehru did not need to look back so far; the nearest parallel, in deceit and the ruthless exploitation of force, is with the Nazi-Fascist policies of World War II".

1. *The Friends and Foes of India*

The tendency for counting India-China border dispute as part of the Cold War politics was explicit within a section of the Indian media and opinion makers from the very beginning of the issue. Definitely, the dominant discourses regarding the communist expansionism and anti-communist sentiments created by the Cold War provided background for advancing such a view. For its proponents, India-China conflict was a war between Democracy and Communist Dictatorship; they argued, "[o]ur fight is with communism which the invader wants to impose on India" (*The Times of India* 1962f). In their view, making an alliance with the West was the best possible option for India, the largest democracy in the world, to defend the country from the threat of communism. Therefore, India's decision to continue the policy of non-alignment even in the wake of the Chinese aggression at the frontier invited sharp criticism from those who were keen on placing the issue within the Cold War ideological politics. When fighting intensified at the border, in an editorial titled 'Where are Our Friends', on 25th October 1962, *The Indian Express* (1962o) wrote,

> The West may be self-interested; the Russians may have perfectly good excuse for remaining more or less neutral; the non-aligned may feel they cannot afford to take sides. But the facts remain. One lot is ready to support us. The others aren't. It is in times like these that we find our friends. No doubt it would be a different story if we were fighting Pakistan. But we happen to be fighting China and we may yet be fighting for our lives. And it is the West with which we have so often squabbled (the fault being on both sides) that is standing with us, and will be standing with us if the day ever comes when we find ourselves fighting not on the Chip Chap river but the banks of the Ganga.

In the context of war, Frank Moraes (1962d) observed in an opinion piece that "the basic mistake we made from which the present consequences have flowed was completely to have misunderstood and underrated the character, objectives and propulsive force of communism and Chinese expansionism". Problematising the hype regarding the rift between China and the Soviet Union, he wrote, "anyone who believed and still believes that there could be a rift in the communist lute to the extent of a sharp cleavage between comrades Mao and Khrushchev should read and re-read the statements made by the two men over some years". He added, "Moscow's support to Peking's latest 'peace offer' should remove the scales from the eyes of the deluded who are now disenchanted".

Similarly, K M Cariappa (1962) asserted in an article that he did not believe in "often reported alleged estrangement between the USSR and China". He reminded, it is "only recently Mr Khrushchev made it abundantly clear to the world that Russia will stand by China firmly should China be threatened with aggression by anyone". The Soviet Union's support to China's proposal for negotiation that they offered after the massive aggression at the frontier had shattered a prevalent hope that the Soviet Union would support India or remain neutral and help India to achieve rapprochement with the communist China. In this context, *The Times of India* (1962i) wrote in its editorial, "Russian endorsement of Peking's latest proposal for negotiation, unaccompanied by any criticism of the Chinese aggression in NEFA, is a very welcome clarification of what appears to have been obscure to some of the nation's leaders in New Delhi". Similarly, *The Indian Express* (1962r) observed in its editorial that "Mr. Khrushchev's plea in support of China has finally shattered the wishful illusion that on the Sino-Indian front, Moscow was inclined to look more kindly on New Delhi than on Peking; now we know that Mr Khrushchev's bland benevolence cloaks a determined and dedicated mind". Meanwhile, for highlighting China's commitment towards the Communist bloc beyond the hype of Sino-Soviet rift, critics quoted Mao's statement that, "[t]o sit on the fence is impossible. A third road does not exist. Not only in China but also in the world, without exception one either leans to the side of imperialism or socialism" (Moraes 1962d). Perhaps, such presumption about the communist unity was the major driving force behind the demand for alliance with the West. Emphasising the need of such an alliance, *The Indian Express* (1962q) wrote in its editorial,

> Both in peace and in war the United States has demonstrated that she is one of free India's friends. In time of peace she gave massive aid ranging from food to technical assistance to ensure that India could progress and become a strong nation. Now with India's security imperilled she has once again demonstrated that her brand of friendship is strong and constant, something quite different from Soviet Russia's conception of "friendship" which means siding with the aggressor and not the victim of aggression….We have far too long lived in a dream world and imagined that the whole world loved us because we said we were friends with everyone. Recent events have demonstrated forcefully that this was far from being the case. Self-delusion in the realm of international politics leads to self-destruction.

The pro-west section of the Indian media and opinion makers were keen on blaming the government for ignoring the warnings of the United States, regarding the threat of communism and China. They reminded that "[what] every note of warning sounded, when we chose to plough our lonely furrow of non-alignment and flaunt our banners of co-existence and 'Chini-Hindi Bhai Bhai' and 'Russi-Hindi Bhai Bhai', has come true". Problematising India's approach towards the Western military alliances for containing communism, critics observed that "they told us that by taking military aid from them [the West] we would be saving ourselves and helping to save democracy on this planet, and that even from the point of view of our own narrowest security interests, we would be well advised through mutual defence treaties to make a threat to our security a threat to world peace" (Parasuram 1962). Highlighting the failure of non-alignment, D. R. Mankekar (1962b) stated in an opinion piece published by *The Indian* Express that,

> For ten years or more the United States has tried in vain to persuade India to accept the leadership of Asia in the task of containing Chinese Communism in the region. India wouldn't bite. Now Mao has forced upon us that role. With one Himalayan swipe Mao has also brought down the house that Khrushchev so laboriously built among the neutralists. Non-alignment as a bloc has been disrupted, with these countries truly scared of international communism and their faith in its professions of friendliness badly shaken. The South-East Asian countries living on the periphery of China are once again getting nightmares of the big bad wolf prowling on their northern border—the traditional image of China in these countries. They have been alerted and are beginning to see Red.

The major purpose of the 'friend and foe' discussions emerged in the Indian media in the wake of the Chinese aggression was to assert the failure of India's non-aligned foreign policy and emphasise the need of an alliance with the West. A section of the Indian media and opinion makers argued that the war had created an opportunity to find the real friends and foes of India. They stated, "[f]rom the Western countries, notably Britain and the United States, there have come not only unequivocal assurances of sympathy but concrete support in the way of arms and equipment coupled with the generous promise that India's requirements will be met on request and that the mode of payment is no major consideration; France has offered aid and West Germany seems likely to do so" (*The Indian Express* 1962r). Problematising the approach of the Soviet Union and most of the non-aligned countries towards the India-China conflict, they argued that "to pretend India's policy of non-alignment has not received a jolt by recent events and

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developments is to continue to live in what the Prime Minister Nehru labelled an 'artificial atmosphere of our own creation'". They insisted, "[w]e now know who our friends are and who our enemies are. If China's aggression has not taught us this lesson, nothing ever will" (*The Indian Express* 1962r).

Analysing the history of India-China relations, C. V. Viswanath (1962) observed in an article that "betrayal beyond redemption by the erstwhile bosom friend, Red China, has, if anything, at least awakened the country to the compelling need of shaking off the stupor induced by a credulous faith and ruminating too much over the unbroken record of 2000 and odd years of cordial relations with China". He argued that the Chinese aggression led to a situation in which it was no longer possible for India to cling to the "original and more puritanical" form of the non-alignment policy. Explaining certain necessary changes India needed to make in its foreign policy to meet the Chinese challenge, he underlined, "the urgent need to secure arms and equipment from whatever source, to check the invader on the northern border, left the Government with no choice, nor the time to go into the moral aspects of accepting foreign military aid". Similarly, asserting the failure of India's policy of non-alignment, Frank Moraes (1962d) stated in an article that,

> From our bemusement with Panch Shila [*Panchsheel*] and coexistence and the virtues of non-alignment much of our befuddled and wishful thinking has arisen. China, we argued, could never be our enemy since 4000 years of friendship subsisted between our two ancient lands and in any case the Himalayas constituted an impenetrable barrier….Both our foreign policy and military preparations were demonstrably off beam. Both were guided by wishful thinking and the mistakes of the first led inexorably to the sins of the second. …Since our cherished friends of the Eastern Bloc seem unwilling and are unlikely to help us, we must turn to the West who, for whatever reasons they might have, have proved to be friends in need.….The very policy of non-alignment which we have sponsored and espoused is now flung in our face by our good friends—the UAR, Indonesia, Ghana and a large part of the Afro-Asian group—to pressurise us into an acceptance of a peace formula which, doubtless, will emerge from the pourparlers between Nasser, Sukarno and Nkrumah with the blessings of Khrushchev.

Although it was the critical narration which dominated the discussions regarding 'friends and foes of India', the views justifying the policies of the Government of India were not totally absent in the Indian media discourse. The proponents of such views argued that it

is the policy of non-alignment which helped India to gain friends in both the camps of the Cold War, even at the time of Chinese aggression. For instance, *The Hindu* (1962h) observed in an editorial, "[i]t is heartening that in this crisis we do not stand alone. We have friends. In fact, contrary to doubts expressed by critics of our non-alignment policy, we have friends in both the Western and the Eastern camps". Analysing the support India had received in the wake of war, it added, "not only have offers of help quickly come from the United States, Britain, Canada, and other Western sources, but even as the Chinese are pursuing their policy of unabashed aggression against us, the President of Communist Rumania has been pledging us his country's friendship and help for our economic development". Moreover, those who were advocating the benefit of India's non-alignment policy insisted that when the world would realise the truth about crisis at the Himalayan frontier, there would not be any major country to support China. They wrote,

> Peking has a few friends who it quotes in great detail in its broadcasts. In Asia, the chief supporter is no doubt North Korea, which cannot forget that it was China who saved it from defeat in the Korean War……In Europe, the most vocal friend is Albania which acts as a mouthpiece for Chinese views in Soviet bloc conferences. Albania was originally a satellite of Yugoslavia but later switched its allegiance to Moscow. More recently, Albania has quarrelled with Russia and made friends with China. She is clearly an unreliable ally and the same is true of Guinea, who is now profusely quoted by Peking as a leading representative of African opinion…..Peking may soon be "going it alone", a difficult course for a country which has so many economic weakness (*The Hindu* 1962L).

Though the demand for making alliance with the West was prevalent, it could not affect the policies of the government. Ignoring such demands, the Prime Minister Nehru made it clear that though India would buy arms from all the available sources, it would not accept military aid from any country and the policy of non-alignment would continue unchanged. In the view of those supporting the government, Nehru's policy was the most appropriate to challenge the Chinese propaganda campaign in the non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa that India was playing the Western game. They argued, if we continue our policy of non-alignment "the whole civilized world will see China in her true colours" (*The Hindu* 1962L). However, the critics asserted that,

> To preach the virtues of non-alignment in the present context may be necessary but seems incongruous. It may be necessary in order to impress on our people that it has brought us friends and sympathisers in both camps. But if that is so, it does

seem slightly incongruous that while the MIG deal with Russia was defended vehemently and passionately, even a whisper of India's seeking some aid from the West is immediately discounted. So we still persist, even after our experience with China, to be neutral on one side? (*The Indian Express* 1962s)

Those who preferred a balanced approach tried to raise certain concern in this context, even though they were not ready to ignore the benefit of non-alignment. For instance, while accepting that the policy of non-alignment was working well for India, K. M. Cariappa (1962) wrote in an opinion piece that "will not the rapidly changing patterns of friendship and loyalties between countries today, make it incumbent upon us as a big Asian country to do some serious rethinking about this policy?" Upholding the presumption that the USSR and China are "very close allies with a jointly declared ideology on world communism", he demanded that the Government of India should request the Soviet Union to find an immediate solution to the crisis at the Himalayan frontier. He stated,

> Russia has repeatedly professed her sincere goodwill and friendship to us. She is helping us very generously and willingly, as some other similar great countries are helping too, in many of our nation-building projects. She is today the one and only great power who can persuade China to call a halt to her aggression, vacate our land immediately and then to discuss with us her frontier problems. We should therefore cash in on these factors favourable to achieve our aim and go flat out to appeal to Russia to step in and help as indicated above. The sincerity of Russia's friendship and goodwill toward us will be gauged from her response to this appeal.

As part of the 'friends and foes of India' discussion, the Indian media and opinion makers had analysed the views of almost every countries, their leaders and media with regard to the situation at the Himalayan frontier and categorised countries in terms of their support to India, neutral stand or silence, and their open support to China. Perhaps, the following examples could reveal the general pattern of such categorisation.

> Colombo, October 16: The "*Ceylon Daily News*", in a leading article, said today that democratic people everywhere recognized that the latest crisis on the Sino-Indian border was of China's making that it was the natural sequel to the opportunist policies of China, which, to a borrow a phrase from Mr Nehru, "marches first and is only prepared to talk afterwards" (*The Times of India* 1962g).

> Beirut, Oct 27: Not a single expression of sympathy for India has come from any Arab Government in West Asia, any political party or newspaper or public

personality even after a week of the Chinese invasion. This negative attitude, which seems to derive in equal measure from apathy, ignorance and fear of China, is all the more strange because in the last few days President, Nasser's Government and Gen Kassem personally have publicly and officially condemned the American blockade of Cuba. One might have expected from President Nasser, an equally firm taking of sides on an Asian issue which is much more their concern. (*The Statesman* 1962r)

It has been said that with the Chinese capture of Indian townships, the Arabs are waking up to the seriousness of their attack. If so, the coming week will show if India has any friends among the Arab Governments: at the moment she appears to have none (G H Jansen, 1962).

In staunchly anti-Communist countries like Malaya and the Philippines, Chinese communities have largely chosen to be silent rather than offer unreserved support to India. Malaya and Singapore provide telling examples of this…The two main Chinese language newspapers—Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh—have had no editorial comment on the recent bitter fighting on the border…The only comment by either of these two newspapers during the last two weeks was by Sin Chew Jit Poh which wrote on October 14: "In comparison it is obvious that Pakistan, which is an anti-Communist country belonging to the Western camp, is having peaceful negotiations with China while India, which is well known for her neutralism, is clearly demanding war if victory is not possible"…In striking contrast Malay language newspapers have offered India full support—particularly after Tengku Abdul Rahman's expression of sympathy for India. (Nihal Singh 1962)

In an unconditional offer of aid and sympathy the Malayan Prime Minister has associated his country with the Indian people with the task of resisting Chinese aggression. It is handsome offer to which India will respond with gratitude and appreciation (*The Times of India* 1962h).

Bonn, October 22: Leading West German papers today supported India's cause in her border conflict with China…The widely respected "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" in an editorial said that India "has a chance of balancing her military inferiority by the political support of the whole world"….Bonn's leading paper, "General Anzeiger", said whatever be Mr Nehru's own position regarding East Germany every German would wish him luck and success in his fight for stable and clear border….The Albanian reports are as lopsidedly prejudiced as the Yugoslav ones are cautiously balanced. (M. V. Kamath 1962)

In addition to the tendency to analyse the issue within the Cold War ideological politics, certain policies of the Government of India also might have had influenced the Indian media for categorising countries in terms of their perception with regard to the India-China conflict. When fighting was escalated at the frontier, in the latter half of October

1962, Nehru wrote to the heads of States and Governments of 111 countries of the world, excluding South Africa and Portugal. In the letter, he explained China's aggressive behaviour at the frontier and sought their support for India's resistance against the Chinese aggression. He asserted that the Chinese aggression on India "will have far-reaching consequences on the standards of international behaviour and on the peace of the world". He wrote,

> The issue involved is not one of small territorial gains, one way or the other, but of standards of international behaviour between neighbouring countries and whether the world will allow the principle of "Might is Right" to prevail in international relations. Bearing this in mind India will continue to resist aggression, both to preserve its honour and integrity and to prevent international standards from deteriorating into the jungle law of "Might is Right". In this hour of crisis, when we are engaged in resisting this aggression, we are confident that we shall have your sympathy and support as well as the sympathy and support of all countries not only because of their friendly relations with us but also because our struggle is in the interests of world peace and is directed to the elimination of deceit, dissemination and force in international relations (quoted in *The Indian Express* 1962t).

Nehru received response from many countries with a positive note, many did not give any reply, and Albania remained as the only country to respond negatively. In the context of war, Indian media was very keen on analysing each country's response on Nehru's letter. For instance, on 1st November 1962, *The Statesman*'s (1962s) report titled "More Nations Rally to India's Support: Tito and Ayub still Silent on Nehru's Letter" stated that "India has received further messages of support and sympathy from the President of Mexico and the Prime Ministers of Thailand, Denmark, Nigeria and Israel. There is no news yet of any message from the Presidents of Yugoslavia and Pakistan, to whom letters were sent by Mr. Nehru at the same time as his letters to all other countries". It added, "President de Gaulle of France also had not replied so far to Mr Nehru's letter". A week later, newspapers reported that President Ayub Khan of Pakistan replied to Mr. Nehru's letter on the Chinese aggression against India. However, it added that content of the letter is not made public by the Government of India. In another report, the same newspaper wrote,

> Meanwhile, the number of countries which have expressed support and sympathy towards India and unequivocal condemnation of China has gone up to 40. Israel is among the five countries which have expressed sympathy with India and concern over the conflict with China, but have refrained from condemning the Chinese

aggressors. Albania is the only country so far to have answered Mr Nehru's communication with an unabashed support for the Chinese aggressors…The countries which have offered sympathy and concern are: The Vatican, Israel, East Africa, Somali and Finland (*The Statesman* 1962t).

Two months after the war, Indian media reported that President Tito of Yugoslavia had replied to Nehru by condemning Chinese aggression. *The Statesman*'s (1963a) report stated that the Yugoslav President wrote in his letter that most communist parties of Europe were seriously concerned over the Chinese aggression of India. The report added, "the letter is described by well-informed sources as extremely significant because firstly it was written after the Yugoslav President's visit to Moscow and secondly because this was the first time he had clearly defined the Chinese action as 'aggression'". Earlier, in an opinion piece published by *The Hindu* K. Rangaswami (1962c) observed that "Marshal Tito has expressed his concern over the Sino-Indian border conflict". However, he added "Tito has not condemned China as the aggressor; but his communication is interpreted to indicate unmistakably where his sympathy lies". With regard to the same issue, in an editorial explaining the ideological differences within the communist bloc, the same newspaper wrote,

> The leading Chinese journal, *People's Daily*, has come out with a powerful blast against "modern revisionism" which is identified openly with Marshal Tito and indirectly with Mr Khrushchev. These revisionists, says the paper, hold that in the face of imperialist armed aggression, the oppressed nations should not wage an armed struggle and under the sign board of non-alignment, the revisionists peddle to the Asian, African and Latin American countries, the neo-colonialism of the United States (*The Hindu* 1962j).

Although India had more external supporters than China, many countries remained silent with regard to the situation at the Himalayan frontier. Japan was one of the major Asian countries among this group. However, many in India had hoped that Japan would change its attitude and lend support to India on the issue. *The Hindu* (1962k) wrote in its editorial, "[t]he Japanese Prime Minister's neutral attitude to Chinese aggression on India may change in the near future when the Japanese people begin to realise the treacherous character of the Communist Chinese attack on India". Addressing various countries' attitude towards the India-China conflict, in an editorial titled "Friends and Foes", *The Indian Express* (1962r) wrote,

> Besides the West and Britain, the Commonwealth countries – with one conspicuous exception (Pakistan) – have rallied to our support. Malaya's Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, has expressed his country's "warmest and strongest sympathy and support" and has unreservedly denounced China's aggression and rightly alerted the democratic world against Han expansionism and imperialism. Canada has offered military aid to India, and from Australia and New Zealand have come warm assurances of support. Ceylon, applying the lesson she learned at India's feet, is non-aligned and favours the opening of negotiations with the Chinese. But she has not attempted to embarrass us.

Precisely, in terms of Indian media's categorisation, the countries which had offered their sympathy and support to India and condemned the Chinese aggression are; Ethiopia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jordan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Dominican Republic, the USA, the UK, Bolivia, Nicaragua, France, Ceylon, Cyprus, New Zealand, Australia, Trinidad, West Germany, Holland, Sweden, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Iran, Norway, Chile, Haiti, Japan, Greece, Libya, Congo (Leopoldville), Uganda, Panama, Canada, Philippines, Iceland, Nigeria, Argentina, Thailand, Italy, and Malaya. The countries which had offered sympathy and concern are: The Vatican, Israel, East Africa, Somali, and Finland. The only country which declared open support for China was Albania.

As explained earlier in this chapter, the anti-China/anti-Communist sentiments were prevalent in the Indian public discourse much earlier than the war at the Himalayan frontier, primarily due to the Cold War ideological politics. However, it was not generally reflected as anti-Chinese sentiments in Indian media until the war broke out. As a result of China's aggression, the anti-China sentiment in India largely transformed as the anti-Chinese sentiments. In the context of war, Indian media and opinion makers problematised the views of overseas Chinese communities, especially those who settled in South-East Asian countries, with regard to the border crisis. They questioned why the Chinese community settled in other countries do not respond to communist China's aggression at the frontier. They argued, "the Chinese [people] – whatever their political sympathies and leanings – nurture a pride in their race and apparently view with sympathy Chinese territorial claims" (Singh 1962). In an article published by *The Indian Express*, D. R. Rajagopal (1963) wrote,

> An American foreign correspondent based here, who has married a pretty Chinese girl tells his friends that this wife forbids him even the mere mention of the McMahon Line at the breakfast table "unless", she says, "you want the Sino-

Indian border dispute running through our house". This is a typical instance of the attitude of Chinese here – pro-Communist, pro-KMT, or neutral – to the undeclared war between China and India…It is assumed by every Chinese that all Chinese claims, even if they are made by Communists are correct. Yet these are the very same people who have no compunction in spitting at the mention of Mao Tse-tung's name…The near universal standpoint is that the disputed area of the Himalayas must belong rightfully to China, because it is Peking that says so. The Indians are wrong and aggressive to boot. The educated [Chinese] are too arrogant, and the uneducated too bigoted, to stomach the possibility that there may be another side to the coin.

Definitely the major driving force behind the anti-Chinese discourse in Indian media was the new national security concern developed in the context of war. The developments at the frontier naturally made the Chinese community residing in India a target of suspicion. That was the factor which influenced Indian media to write that "there is no reason why Chinese nationals should be permitted to stay at places like Kalimpong and other towns on the border well known to be listening posts for the enemy and his agents. Chinese residing in vulnerable cities such as Calcutta and Delhi should be rigorously screened and deported if security reasons so demand. We cannot be too vigilant in the defence of India (*The Indian Express* 1962m)". Whatever the reason is, ultimately the anti-Chinese sentiments developed into an environment of hatred against the Chinese community living in India and any person with Mongolian features, had to suffer on that ground. An editorial published by *The Hindu* (1963) in early 1963 could explain this situation well. It wrote, as an apology note for a Japanese national, who mistakenly became subject of people's expression of hatred in India,

> The incident in Tanjore in which a Japanese professor was mistaken for a Chinese and came in for some rough handling by a crowd, who suspected his intentions in taking photographs inside the Art Gallery, will be widely regretted….Ever since the Chinese attack, Japanese residents in India have sought to avoid unfortunate incidents of this nature by carrying badges or other identification marks to show that they were Japanese—not Chinese.

Definitely, attempts for countering discourse of hatred were also prevalent in India. Many leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru, urged that "we must be strong but free from hatred" and insisted that "India had no quarrel with culture and people of China; we are only fighting that part of the activity of the Chinese government which we describe as imperialistic". Persuading the people to get rid of hatred and violence, he reminded that

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"under the guidance of Gandhiji and Gurudeva, we fought British imperialism but did so without ill-will towards anybody" (*The Statesman* 1962u).

2. *The West and India-China War of 1962*

Though India never abandoned its policy of non-alignment and attempted to make any military alliance against communism, since the conflict escalated at the Himalayan frontier, India received wide support from the West, including the western media, something that Indian media commented upon. In the wake of war, many in the western media demanded that the West should help India in every feasible way to resist the communist expansion to the Indian subcontinent. For instance, a major British newspaper *The Daily Telegraph* wrote, "the defensive policy of the West in the Far East is founded on the containment of potential Chinese aggression. With this aggression becoming actual there could be no question about helping India in every feasible way to resist it, even though she has rejected military alliance against communism"(Jain 1962a). Though the West had no clear policy on what kind of relations it wants with India (Jain 1962), once the fighting between India and China escalated, the Western powers, especially the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia, expressed their willingness to help India. In the wake of war, T. V. Parasuram (1962a) wrote in an article that the "Communist Chinese dictatorship is looked upon by the US as even a worse tyranny than Hitler's". He explained, to meet the Chinese challenge "the USA has promptly promised India all assistance she needs". Similarly, a report in *The Times of India* (1962L) stated that, by condemning the Chinese aggression, the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, informed the House of Commons that they would do any help which India requests to meet the Chinese threat. He added, the newspaper wrote,

> The British have seen with the deepest sorrow the heavy strains to which the people and the Government of India are now subjected. Our connection with India was not severed by the constitutional changes of 1947. There are still happily the most intimate links in trade and commerce between our countries (*The Times of India* 1962L).

The new developments at the frontier intensified the Cold War spirit in the Indian media narration. For a section of the Indian media and opinion makers, India-China conflict was primarily an ideological war; an extension of the dispute between Communist and

Capitalist blocs of the Cold War. In their articulation, the crisis at the Himalayan frontier was essentially a democratic country's resistance against communist expansionism, rather than a border dispute between two neighbouring countries. Therefore, their demand was that India should join with the Western bloc to fight against communist expansion to the Indian subcontinent. Definitely they were disappointed when India decided to continue with its policy of non-alignment even in the wake of Chinese aggression. However, the positive development in India's foreign policy in the context of war was that it accepted that a "closer military and political collaboration with friendly Western powers can be fully reconciled with non-alignment" (*The Times of India* 1962m). For timely assistance, Indian media and opinion makers greatly appreciated the West. For instance, on 1st November 1962, *The Times of India* (1962n) wrote in its editorial that "although New Delhi continues to be inhibited by fears and complexes of its own making, the country as a whole will not hesitate to express its appreciation of and gratitude for the speed and generosity with which the United States and Britain have responded to the currently desperate need for military equipment." Similarly, on 4th November 1962, *The Statesman* (1962w) observed in its editorial,

> The ready response from USA, Britain and Canada to India's appeal for arms and equipment is heartening. The thoughtful American enquiry about the sufficiency of our food supplies and the general desire to conform to India's susceptibilities about the terms of military assistance – Mr Heath's receptivity to Mr Harold Wilson's idea of lend lease, for example – show the deep and common concern felt by all friendly countries.

In the wake of the war, many in the Western camp of the Cold War demanded that India and Pakistan should settle their differences over Kashmir and form a united front against China to meet the threat of communism. However, instead of supporting India, Pakistan tried to exploit the situation; they attempted to establish an advantageous position in the Kashmir crisis at the expense of India's tension with China. As India was not willing to make any compromise on Kashmir question, Pakistan adopted a policy favouring China, though it never openly supported any side during the war. Questioning Pakistan's pro-China approach, *The Guardian* wrote, "[t]hey [the Pakistanis] ought to realise India's danger is their danger too. And even when that danger is passed they will still have to share the subcontinent with their Indian neighbours" (quoted in *The Times of India* 1962j). However, another British newspaper, *The Daily Express,* reminded India that "it

is a moment when Mr Nehru should try and heal the divisions that have sprung up between the two lands which were once united under British rule" (quoted in *The Times of India* 1962j). In the wake of India-China war, the then President of the United States, John F Kennedy, sent a letter to Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan, to remind that the Chinese invasion of India is a threat to the whole Indian subcontinent that includes Pakistan (Vohra 1962). The Prime Minister of Britain, Harold Macmillan, also held a view that India-Pak unity is essential to prevent the Chinese expansion to the subcontinent. Both Britain and the United States demanded that India and Pakistan should make an agreement over Kashmir dispute, at least on a temporary basis, to meet the Chinese threat together. Krishan Bhatia (1962d) wrote in an article,

> Contrary to the general impression, the proposal for a gentleman's agreement over Kashmir came not from India but from the USA and Britain….Neither Mr Macmillan nor President Kennedy intend their suggestion to be regarded as a "solution" of the Kashmir dispute. All they want is that Pakistan should realize the grave implications of the Chinese aggression and refrain from doing anything which might divide India's military energies. If Pakistan's response is favourable the result will be only a temporary truce. But, with a measure of understanding and goodwill in both countries, the "freeze" may well become the beginning of a happier phase in their relationship.

However, all the mainstream western media were not supporting India's cause during the Sino-Indian border conflict. For instance, an analysis of the foreign media narratives reproduced by the Indian media shows that, a few days before China began its massive aggression at the Indian frontier, a major British newspaper, *The Times,* wrote in its editorial that "the Chinese action [in violating the McMahon Line] is evidently in relation against India's moves in the Ladakh area earlier in the summer". It insisted that "the Chinese had always questioned India's borders fixed by the British rulers" (Jain 1962). Similarly, *The Daily Telegraph* asserted in its editorial on 12th October 1962 that, "the conflict seems now to be nearing a crisis, both diplomatically and operationally. It is Mr Nehru who has slammed the door, however futile any negotiation must have been" (Jain 1962).

Though India had to face sharp criticism from the Western media because of various reasons, the Western camp of the Cold War not only remained as firm supporter of India in its conflict with communist China but also effectively used the issue to deny China's

entrance to the United Nations. However, the biggest irony in this context was that without even considering the tension at the frontier, India voted for China's admission to the UN, to assert its moral position in international politics. Revealing the contrast between the Indian and the Western approach towards China's admission into the UN, and by showing the Western concern about the Chinese aggression, a report published by *The Times of India* (1962k), regarding the UN General Assembly debate on China's admission to the organisation, stated that the representative of the United States argued in the debate that "China's increasing military aggression along the Indian frontier showed Peking's 'scorn' for the United Nation Charter." In terms of the report, he insisted that,

> The Chinese regime is a dictatorship, its ideology is power, and its aim—professed with pride and arrogance—is conquest... It is a new imperialism, a new colonialism that seeks to carve out a new empire—not only in Asia—and dash the hopes of liberty the world over. Indian subcontinent is victim of China's increasing military aggression along its borders (*The Times of India* 1962k).

However, the Soviet Union which opened the case of UN recognition of communist regime described China as 'peace loving' country and argued that denying UN membership to People's Republic of China is equal to forgetting 600 million people of the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, in that attempt China failed to get enough votes required for its entry to the UN. Definitely, India was one among the countries which voted for China's entry into the UN, without even considering then on-going fight at the Himalayan frontier. India's voting for China's admission generated mixed reaction in the Indian public sphere; though one group was sharply critical towards Nehru and the Government of India for that decision, others used a balanced approach as China could not secure enough votes even with the Indian support. *The Statesman* (1962v) wrote in its editorial, after India's voting for China's admission in the UN, that,

> With a magnanimity for which it is not easy to find historical parallel, India again voted for China's admission to the UN this week. From practical point of view abstention might have been better….But China is still well short of obtaining a majority even in a General Assembly enlarged by new admissions, let alone the required recommendation from Security Council….For this it is foolish to blame "capitalist" alliances (which are far from unanimous on this point) or other conspiracies. The plain truth is that the majority considers China's record too black, in fact, one of ruthless expansionism ever since the Communist regime was proclaimed in October 1949.

Interestingly, during the period of India-China conflict, no ardent Indian critique of the West publically opposed India seeking assistance from the West. However, Prime Minister Nehru, as a champion of non-alignment, did not express any special concern for the Western assistance. Moreover, Nehru tried to equate the United States' military assistance with that of the Soviet Union. Indeed Nehru's such treatment invited criticism from the western media. The western narratives reproduced by the Indian media revealed that referring to the issue *The New York Times* wrote, "It hurts westerners to find Mr Nehru apparently quite as interested in the theoretical help from the Soviet Union as in the actual help from the United States" (Vohra 1962a).

3.   *The Communists and India-China War of 1962*

A prevalent understanding during the early years of the Cold War was that communism is an ideology that is essentially pitted against the principle of nationalism. The nationalist tendencies within the communist movements, especially in Asia, and differences within the Communist camp, primarily the crisis between revisionists and traditionalists, had not attracted much attention from the mainstream Indian media as they were more focused on the threat emerging from the monolithic unity of the communist world[4]. The nationalist orientation of communist movements in Asia was dismissed with an argument that "in the long term, they work for the destruction of broad-based nationalist and democratic regimes and for their substitution by Communist-led governments" (*The Hindu* 1963a). It is from the background of such an understanding Indian media insisted when all communists in the country were target of suspicion due to the conflict between India and China that "there cannot be a "nationalist" Communist in the accepted sense of the world" (*The Indian Express* 1962u).

The dominant face of Indian communism during the period of India-China conflict was the Communist Party of India. Accepting India's parliamentary democracy, it participated in country's electoral politics and became significant force in certain States, especially in West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala; it was the second largest political party in the Lok

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[4] In early 1960s, China was extremely critical of the Soviet 'revisionism' that demanded rapprochement with the West. It was the period which saw forceful assertion of China's leadership ambitions in international revolutionary movement and more explicit expressions of the ideological difference between China and the Soviet Union (See, Luthi 2008; Jersild 2014).

Sabha during that period. However, as within the Communist camp of the Cold War, ideological differences had been creating internal crisis in the CPI even before the tension escalated at the Himalayan frontier. Regardless of the India-China border conflict, a tension between revisionists who support the Soviet Union's policy of 'peaceful coexistence' with the West and traditionalists who support Mao's call for promoting 'class war' was growing within the CPI since late 1950s. Definitely, with the Chinese aggression, the ideological split within the party had widened uncontrollably. While the Soviet supporters gained one more reason to denounce the Chinese model of communism, the major concern of rebels was whether they should use the opportunity created by the India-China tension at the frontier for bringing proletarian revolution to the subcontinent. Nevertheless, National Council of the Communist Party held on 31st October 1962 denounced the Chinese aggression and extended full support to the Government of India's efforts aimed at defending integrity of the national borders. Analysing the developments within the CPI National Council meeting, some observers wrote that "while 17 of the Council's 110 members were absent from the meeting and three abstained, 23 members voted against the resolution" (Kagal 1962). Similarly, most of the state councils of the party also expressed their full support to the Government of India for defending the country and repulsing the Chinese aggressors.

However, the pro-China section within the CPI was not ready to accept such decision emerging out of nationalistic sentiments. Breaking the code of discipline some of them worked against the party's approach and issued a secret circular for reminding the party members of their common interest with the Chinese Communist Party. The circular asserted that "the Chinese people, the Chinese working class and their vanguard, the Communist Party of China, point the way for the Indian working class and party" (*The Times of India* 1962o). When media leaked the hidden agenda of radical group within the CPI, not just theirs' but whole Indian communists' commitment towards the nation became target of suspicion. In this context, Indian media and opinion makers, including leaders of various political parties, questioned the authenticity of the CPI resolution that declared its support to the Government of India in its fight against the Chinese aggression. Many argued that the CPI's denunciation of the Chinese aggression is nothing but "a mere camouflage to cover up its basically anti-national and anti-

democratic attitude". Following this, the demand for banning the CPI had gained momentum in the country and popular anger found expressions in demonstration against the communists and pro-communist organisations. The critics observed,

> If one goes by the book, a national communist is a contradiction in terms, an ideological monstrosity. How far, the CPI's protestations of patriotism be taken at their face value? The answer to this question must determine the nations' attitude to the CPI now and in the months ahead…the CPI has become nationalist not by choice but by sheer necessity (Kagal 1962).

In this context, many in India sarcastically observed that "the Indian Communist Party has a "Pro-Moscow wing" and a "pro-Peking wing" but has no pro-Indian wing". They asserted that as long as the CPI looks for inspiration abroad and seeks to subordinate Indian national interests to the interests of its international affiliates, the loyalty of its members will remain suspected and any Government concerned about national security cannot afford to take risks with such uncertain elements. They warned, "If the present anti-Peking group that is dominant in the Party is unable to assert itself and bring about a real change in the attitude and activities of the pro-China elements in the Party, sterner measures by the Government may become inevitable" (*The Hindu* 1963b). Definitely sterner measures by the Government had followed later to control pro-China activities of the Indian communists[5].

As it happened with the Indian communists, the communist bloc of the Cold War was also divided in their approach towards the India-China conflict, even though it was technically the conflict between a communist country and a democratic country. The monolithic unity of the communist countries that many in India were afraid of, certainly being influenced by the West, had no expression in this context. The primary factor that divided the communist opinion with regard to the crisis at the Himalayan frontier was definitely the ideological differences within the communist camp. Even though it was not explicit, the rift between China and the Soviet Union was growing rapidly during that

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[5] The pro-China fraction (left-communists) within the CPI began to be more active after the India-China war. Branding the anti-China group within the party as "revisionists" and the "tail of the ruling Congress Party", they demanded that the government of India should directly communicate with China to break the deadlock between the two countries. China welcomed the new developments within Indian communist movement. However, India was highly suspicious about their intentions. It assumed that they are attempting to launch a violent struggle in India. Therefore, by late 1964 the government of India began to take sterner action against them and arrested a large number of left-communists (see, Dutt 1971; Wood 1965).

period. Perhaps, India's friendly relationship was also a significant factor in shaping the opinion of some communist countries. It is important to note that in the beginning of the conflict, except Albania, North Vietnam, and North Korea, no other countries of the communist bloc had openly expressed their support to China (Vohra 1962). When India-China conflict began to escalate, *The Statesman* (1962x) observed in its editorial that "as the result of her [China's] intransigence the last sands of sympathy for her were running out even among the Communist parties of the world". Following the differences within the communist bloc created by the India-China conflict, stern critics of communism observed, "it is still too early to assess the impact of this on the future of the creed, but already it seems to have done away with, once and for all, the fearful monolithic unity of the communist world" (*The Times of India* 1962p). However, they maintained that "Russia's ideological and other differences with the Chinese communist party are not a recent development and can be traced back to the days when Stalin preferred to encourage the Kuomintang rather than his fellow communists in China". Invoking the threat of communist unity, they asserted "there is a danger of both over and under-estimating the significance of the rift between Moscow and Peking" (*The Times of India* 1962q).

Those who were following a balanced approach towards the communist bloc had asserted two major factors as the fundamental reason for China's aggression on India; one was that China was intending to "divert the Chinese people's attention from their domestic miseries" and the other was that they were attempting to "snatch the leadership of the Socialist camp from the Soviet Union and undermine Mr Khrushchev's influence at home and abroad" (Rangaswami 1962d). In the context of India-China conflict and the Cuban missile crisis, *The Hindu* (1962j) wrote in its editorial that,

> The Chinese have been trying, over and over again, in Algeria, Laos, Indonesia and now Cuba and India, to provoke a World War between Russia and the US. The Chinese would doubtless like to see some such development as America bombing Cuba or intervening directly in the conflict in India. They may calculate that if Russia and the United States can be brought to a head-on clash and destroyed in a nuclear war, they would easily regain Formosa and Outer Mongolia and dominate Asia. Both Mr Khrushchev and Mr Kennedy are of course, well aware of this, and both have therefore been patiently negotiating over the Cuban dispute and refraining from direct intervention in the Sino-Indian conflict.

The most interesting development in India's relationship with the communist world during the period of India-China conflict was the Indo-Soviet MiG deal. Definitely, India's "purpose of purchasing the MIGs was to offset the two squadrons of F-104s that Pakistan had been promised by the United States in 1961" (Graham 1964: 823-824). Though India's conflict with China was growing rapidly while the Indo-Soviet negotiation for MiG deal was progressing, the Government of India's major concern at that point of time was not the Chinese threat. In the beginning of negotiation, the United States was worried that the proposed MiG deal may turn to be the first step to a large-scale Indian dependence on the Soviet military supplies. Until then, all of India's fighting planes came from Britain and France, none at all from the Communist bloc. By mid-1962, the United States had delivered twelve F-104s to Pakistan, and "it became a matter of political 'face' for New Delhi to take whatever steps were necessary to 'match' the Pakistani aircraft" (Graham 1964). Following this, early in October 1962, the Indo-Soviet MiG deal became a reality. Considering the Indo-China conflict, many in the West observed in this context that the Indo-Soviet MiG deal is a clear sign of Sino-Soviet split (Vohra 1962). *The Financial Times* insisted that,

> If Moscow should sell more MIGs to India while Indians are engaged in a shooting war with Chinese troops, the relations with Peking could be subjected to impossible strain. The shoots being exchanged across the Thag-la Ridge on the McMahon Line could mark the beginning of the end between Moscow and Peking and eventually bury for all time the myth of international communist solidarity (Jain 1962).

However, once the Sino-Indian conflict escalated, the Soviet Union extended 'moral support' to its communist ally, though it had declared that they would be strictly neutral on the issue. Moreover, ignoring the situation at the frontier and India's stand, they supported China's offer for peace and negotiation which demanded both forces to withdraw 20 km from the Line of Actual Control. As far as India was concerned, China's offer was an attempt to have negotiation under the threat of force. Therefore, India rejected the offer and insisted that China must withdraw to the position of September 8, 1962, the day China crossed the McMahon Line for the first time after the 1959 Longju incident. It is when the Soviet Union supported China's peace offer that the Indian media and opinion makers turned critical towards the Indo-Soviet relationship. In this context, they demanded that the Government of India should drop its hope on the Soviet help for

peacefully settling India's border dispute with China. In an editorial titled "A Shattered Illusion", *The Times of India* (1962i) asserted that,

> New Delhi can no longer continue to cherish a wide variety of disastrous illusions. One of these was Soviet respect for its 'friendship' with this country and its ideological differences with communist China would incline Moscow, if not fully to support the Indian case, at least to restrain the Chinese….Why should it have been assumed that Soviet policy would in some manner help this country to achieve a rapprochement with Communist China?....The point is not that the Soviet Union has let us down but that New Delhi had no business whatsoever to suppose that it would do anything else.

Precisely, the rift between the Soviet Union and China and the differences within the communist bloc of the Cold War, did not benefit India in the critical moment of India-China conflict. Excluding a few, most of the communist countries either remained neutral or supported China in the context of India-China war; many communist parties from non-communist countries, including the British Communist Party, also extended their support to the Chinese position in the border dispute. The only prominent communist leader who upheld India's stand over the border dispute was President Tito of Yugoslavia.

4. *Pakistan and India-China War of 1962*

The only Commonwealth country which refrained from condemning China when the fighting had escalated at India's Himalayan frontier was Pakistan. Ignoring the fact that it was a part of two major Western alliances established with the 'containment of communism' as their sole purpose, Pakistan tried to exploit the situation for its advantage in its dispute with India over Kashmir. Though officially Pakistan was not supporting China, the words and deeds of Pakistani leadership during the time of conflict were largely targeting India and helping China. Challenging a widely shared opinion that China's motive is nothing less than expansion of communism to the whole subcontinent, Pakistani leaders argued that the Chinese attack in Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency is a "private quarrel" between India and China and it does not pose any threat to the subcontinent as a whole. When the United States accepted India's request for arms and equipment in the context of intense fighting at the frontier, Pakistan served notice to the United States that arms and supplies should not be given to India unless Pakistan is also given an equal amount. Their argument was that an increase in India's armaments

would upset the balance of power in the region. In early November, when fighting at the frontier was intense, President Ayub Khan declared that "the large amount of military equipment that is being rushed to India from the US and the UK to meet the Chinese aggression may have the effect of enlarging and prolonging the conflict between China and India". He added, "[t]he arms supply would also add to the serious concern in the minds of our [Pakistani] people that these weapons may well be used against them in the absence of an overall settlement with India" (*The Times of India* 1962s). Moreover, while India was facing setback at the frontier, Pakistan mobilised its force along the Dinajpur border in East Pakistan, along the rail and road routes to Assam and the NEFA, "to embarrass the Indian defence in the critical region" (*The Hindu* 1962n).

Meanwhile, Pakistani media was openly supporting the Chinese stand on the issue and blaming India for 'betraying' Asia. For instance, when fighting intensified at India's border *Dawn* wrote in its editorial titled "Betrayal of Asia" that "[b]e it said to the eternal shame of India's present leadership that they should seem too willing to play the role of white man's stooge and act as agent-provocateur against a fellow Asian nation". It added, "[t]he India of Nehru many be likened to a wolf that has been fattened with economic aid and equipped with military fangs by Communist as well as non-Communist white powers to fall on the Chinese sheep beyond the Himalayas". The crux of the editorial was that "all the talk of the Chinese being the aggressors is 'Washington-brewed tommy-rot' and the border trouble on India's frontiers with China has been stirred up by India on purpose" (*The Hindu* 1962m). Definitely such attitude of Pakistani leadership and media had invited sharp criticism from the Indian side. Observing Pakistan's approach towards the situation, *The Indian Express* (1962r) wrote in its editorial, "While the Chinese tiger rages on our northern frontier the Pakistani jackal prowls in our barnyards wondering what helpless prey he can lift and what garbage he can leave behind".

Assessing Pakistan's approach towards India-China border dispute, *The Times of India* (1962r) stated in an editorial that "the studied cynicism with which Pakistan is trying to exploit India's border conflict with China must surprise even the most hardened of politicians". It observed,

President Ayub Khan is apparently enamoured of the cliché that in international affairs the enemy's enemy is one's friend. Before the Sino-Indian dispute broke through the surface of Panchshila, Pakistan's relations with China were to say the least noticeably cool. The big change occurred the moment it became apparent that there would be no early settlement between New Delhi and Peking.

Similarly, *The Hindu* (1962m) observed in an editorial that in the past Pakistan was regarded as the central Asian pillar of the South-East Asian Treaty Organization that was formed to stop communist expansion in the region. But when the conflict between India and China escalated Pakistan made haste to embrace the Chinese in order to pursue its quarrel with India over Kashmir. The editorial read,

> This will give Peking great pleasure though Pakistan's allies are likely to be very disappointed. It cannot be said that Pakistan's attitude comes as any great surprise to India because it was clear to us from the start that Pakistan had only joined those alliances in order to obtain weapons free of cost to carry on her vendetta against us. But it is equally clear that if Pakistan pursues this line officially she will be extremely short-sighted. The Chinese have shown only too plainly that their friendship lasts only so long as is required by their national and imperial interests and no longer. If Pakistan goes all out to welcome the aggressor she may live to regret it later.

Meanwhile many in India were warning Pakistan that Indian experience with China clearly proves that it cannot be trusted. Asserting that China violated all pledges and pacts to embark on a massive aggression against India, they reminded Pakistan that "no country could have done more to befriend China than India" (*The Hindu* 1962o). Problematising Pakistani approach towards the Chinese aggression, they observed, "it is a pity that Pakistan refuses to see the Chinese menace in its true perspective" (*The Hindu* 1962o). They insisted that the threat of Chinese expansionism in the region is not limited to India and the complex nature of the terrain in the border region makes the support of neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan, inevitable for resisting the Chinese expansion. Reminding that China is a common threat to both India and Pakistan, *The Times of India* (1962t) wrote in its editorial on 2nd November 1962 that,

> If NEFA were lost [to Chinese], there is no doubt that East Pakistan, which is both politically and militarily vulnerable, would immediately be threatened. Likewise, if Daulet Beg Oldi and other Indian positions guarding the approaches to the Karakoram Pass were ever to fall, then even as the Pakistani Ambassador in Peking, General Raza, continues to clink glasses with Marshal Chen Yi, the door would have been thrown open for Chinese penetration into those areas of Baltistan and Hunza which are at present with Pakistan and to which the Chinese

have laid claim. Once there, the latter would no doubt seek to infiltrate into more sensitive areas like Gilgit, Dir and Swat from where their interest could spread to what both Peking and Moscow might come openly to denounce as another 'notorious' and 'illegal imperialist frontier', the Durant Line. The Chinese threat to NEFA is a threat to Assam and Assam, tenuously linked to the rest of India by a narrow 20 mile strip of sub-montane territory between Nepal and East Pakistan, cannot ultimately be defended if Pakistan is hostile. The mutual interests of both India and Pakistan dictate a moratorium on our smaller problems while India meets the challenge that threatens both. Later, when the Chinese invaders have been thrown back, India and Pakistan must settle their differences honourably.

However, ignoring such warning, anti-India narratives remained prevalent in Pakistan during this period. Pakistani media's continuous depiction of India as an 'expansionist' country that is 'poised for aggression' was met with severe criticism in the Indian media narratives. Analysing China's 'peace offer' that India rejected by arguing that there will not be any negotiation under threat of force, Pakistani media argued that the Chinese ceasefire offer was a "great act of statesmanship" and "evidence of Peking's desire for peace" (*The Times of India* 1962v). Observing such a story, *The Times of India* (1962u) wrote that "the language employed in Pakistan's anti-India stories reminds one of familiar communist Chinese tactics of first occupying Indian Territory and then shouting 'aggression' when steps are taken by the victim of the aggression to vacate it". It insisted that such a move is aimed at "maligning India in the eyes of Pakistan's Western allies" and "making common cause with China against India". In its editorial, *The Indian Express* (1962v) stated that "the recent exhibition of brinkmanship and the hysterical outbursts against India by the Pakistani press and even responsible Ministers have apparently shocked Britain and the US even more than India". It added that the main purpose of such a move might have been to exert pressure on Pakistan's SEATO and CENTO allies to desist from giving military aid to India to meet the Chinese aggression. Assessing Pakistani response towards the reports of Indian reverses at the Himalayan border, Sintanshu Das (1962a) wrote in an opinion piece that,

> The state of mind which produces this reflex is a paranoiac persecution complex vis-à-vis India, sedulously cultivated over the years by the press and politicians in Pakistan. In this hatred of India, Pakistan would appear today to be eager to welcome the Chinese into the subcontinent to spite India…The average Pakistani's reaction is: 'it serves them (Indians) right! They bull has met his match'…Rarely one meets a Pakistani who ponders over the implications of the reverses in terms of Pakistan's own defence problems. When these are pointed

out to him, he is apt to admit them without questioning his unprincipled pathological hostility towards India and his pleasure at India's military misfortune. He would add, 'To be sure, we would sooner or later run up against Chinese expansionism, but meanwhile it is good see India cut to its size'....Innumerable editorials in newspapers and speeches of responsible officials reflect this line of thinking, although, officially Pakistan has been silent on the border conflict.

Meanwhile, both the United States and Britain were thinking in terms of Indo-Pakistan defence cooperation as the most efficient way to protect the security of Indian subcontinent against the Chinese aggression. They were concerned about the Pakistani reaction towards the situation at India's Himalayan frontier. Observing the approach of Pakistan, many in the West commented that "the US finds itself in the astonishing position of urging its 'ally' to join in the defence of non-communist territory against unprovoked communist aggression while a 'neutral' expends the lives of its forces that have not enjoyed US subsidy in the past decade" (Vohra 1962a). Many warned Pakistan that if it puts its developing friendship with China above its commitment against communist threat, the West will discontinue their military and economic aid to it. During the same time, many in India began to argue that "the Government has been living in a world of illusions. One of the illusions that must go now and for ever is that Pakistan rather than China is the real enemy. Differences with Pakistan are related to the past while China's quarrel with us concerns the future. It would do great damage to the national interest if the past is allowed to become the enemy of the future" (*The Times of India* 1962t). Following wide criticism and the Western pressure, by the end of November 1962, Pakistan agreed to have negotiation with India for solving all outstanding issues between the two countries and making a joint defence effort against the threat from the north. Observing the new development *The Statesman* (1962y) wrote in its editorial,

> The joint announcement of early discussions between India and Pakistan is excellent news. From the massive Chinese aggression on India only one conclusion could be drawn by anyone concerned for the safety of the subcontinent as a whole: that India and Pakistan must come together as soon as possible for agreement on the maximum number of needs held in common. Direct talks between Mr Nehru and President Ayub Khan, the final stage of the proposed discussions, will not come at a better moment.

Similarly, *The Indian Express* (1962v) observed in its editorial comment,

The agreement of the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minster of India to make 'renewed efforts to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters' will be hailed with widespread relief not only by the people of this subcontinent but also by their friends and well-wishers all over the world.

However, the hope did not last long as Pakistan was not committed towards finding a peaceful and honourable solution for its disputes with India. It continued making secret negotiations with China for settling the border between the Kashmir region in their control and Sinkiang province of China. They concluded an in-principle agreement on border settlement with China by the end of December 1962, the time India-Pakistan ministerial level talks in Rawalpindi were about to begin. The announcement of Sino-Pakistan agreement, even though it was a provisional agreement (as China made it clear that the final boundary will be negotiated with whatever power is in occupation of that part of the border after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute), was definitely a death knell to the plan for Indo-Pak joint defence against the Chinese threat. The context raised a question: "how can India be expected to go to the conference table at Rawalpindi to parley with a Government capable of such unashamed, if also unintelligent, opportunism and cynicism?" (*The Indian Express* 1962w). Many demanded that India should withdraw from the proposed talks as there was no chance for any positive development between these two countries. However, many argued that India should go ahead with the talks and expose Pakistan's inherently cynical policies against India. Ultimately, the Indo-Pakistan ministerial level talks at Rawalpindi and many rounds of talks at other locations took place as planned, irrespective of Pakistan's insouciant attitude; but failed to produce any meaningful outcome.

In the context of Sino-Pak agreement, Indian media argued that "while Peking plans to embarrass India and the United States, Pakistan's objective is to blackmail New Delhi and pressurize Washington" (*The Indian Express* 1962w). In an editorial, *The Hindu* (1963c) observed, "ever since the Chinese attack on India, Pakistan has made no secret of her desire to exploit the situation to serve her own designs on Kashmir". The new development in the Sino-Pak relationship explicitly proved perpetual presence of hatred in Pakistan's approach towards India and China's relentless attempt to isolate India in the region. In an opinion piece, K. Rangaswamy (1963) insisted that "what is noticeable

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among a section of the ruling classes [in Pakistan] is blind passion and unreasoning hatred of India". He added, "in fact this is a continuation of the anti-Congress and anti-Hindu attitude of the Muslim League in pre-independence days and which later projected itself as the national policy of Pakistan". As far as China is concerned, he wrote, "the border agreement with Pakistan is yet another move in their concerted drive to isolate India" (Rangaswamy 1963).

Precisely, by challenging India's then prevalent identity, a peace-loving non-aligned country, the war of 1962 radically transformed Indian discursive images of China. Influenced by the Cold War international politics, ever since the tension between India and China intensified at the Himalayan frontier, Indian media and opinion makers had tried to locate the issue of India-China conflict within the Cold War ideological framework. Therefore, binary narratives like democracy versus dictatorship and liberal or free society versus communism were dominant in Indian media's articulations of tension between India and China. A major section of the Indian media and opinion makers failed to see the issue as a border conflict between the two neighbouring countries, as they were busy in asserting the anti-communist discourse and theorising China's strategies for communist expansion to the Indian subcontinent. Perhaps, it is due to the dominance of such unrealistic narratives India's setback in the frontier war/conflict is being perceived as a great humiliation for the country.

Contemporary Indian Discourse on China

The amount of writings, discussions and debates that occurred in the context of fiftieth anniversary of the India-China war itself explains how significant the memories of 1962 are in Indian public discourse. Even after five decades and tremendous improvement in economic and political relationship between these countries, Indian media and opinion makers are still obsessed with country's defeat at the Himalayan frontier. They continue arguing that perhaps the result of the war would have been different, had Indian leadership behaved more responsibly and used the assistance of the Air-force. They continue discussing possibilities of a new India-China war and the potential of multilateral strategic alliance against the Chinese threat. Perhaps, the fundamental reason

for such obsession is that the wounds of defeat affect public sentiments more intensely than the glory of victories. Joining the debate initiated by the fiftieth anniversary of 1962 war, Shekhar Gupta (2012) observed in an opinion piece published by *The Indian Express,*

> It is a sad but touching fact that nations and militaries tend to have stronger, more durable memories of their defeats than of their victories. Maybe because victories soon lose their euphoria in the inevitable economic aftermath of a decisive war, high inflation, arrogant, victorious establishments and so on. We have the post-1971 (Bangladesh War) turn of events in India, leading to 27 per cent inflation and the Emergency, as a sobering example. Maybe it is also because the pain of a military defeat sours our minds much more, leaving permanent scars that endure through generations.

Analysing the media debates in the context of fiftieth anniversary of India-China war, it can be learned that the contemporary Indian image of China and the Chinese threat are deeply rooted in the memories of the lost war. Such memories are dominant in Indian public discourse due to the prominence given in the media narratives to the tension between these countries. Arguably, issues ranging from unsettled boundary dispute to the Sino-Pakistan friendship and China's involvement in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir constitute relentless tension between India and China. However, it does not mean that there is no parallel positive development in India-China relations. It means parallel narratives emphasising on India's emerging multi-level partnership and cooperation with China or two thousand years of friendship and cultural ties that continue to exist between these countries do not get much attention in India's contemporary discursive image of China as the memories of war and humiliation dominate the public discourse.

The two fundamental questions which dominated the fiftieth anniversary debate were that why India lost the war and whether the result would have been different if India had taken a different approach towards the border dispute. A supplement to these questions was who the real culprit was in the India-China war of 1962 or who was responsible for India's defeat and humiliation; whether it was the political leadership or the military leadership or both of them. Though there are many established views regarding the failures of 1962, many continue to argue that the real answers to the above mentioned questions lie in a report prepared after the war by Lieutenant-General T. B. Henderson Brooks and Brigadier Premindra Singh Bhagat. However, the report examining India's

defeat in the war is yet to be declassified by the Government of India; it continues to ignore public demand for declassifying the report by asserting its implications for the national security. The fiftieth anniversary debate in 2012 had once again intensified the demand for releasing Henderson Brooks-PC Bhagat report on India-China war. In this context, many commentators observed that it is the government's unwillingness to make Brooks-Bhagat report public which prompts India's obsession with the 1962 war. For instance, Jug Suraiya (2012) wrote in an opinion piece published by *The Times of India* that "to a great extent, the reason that India hasn't recovered from the trauma of 1962 lies in the fact that the exhaustive official enquiry into the debacle has never been made public and to this day remains in the secret realm of classified material". Similarly, C. Raja Mohan (2012) observed that "in India, the debate on 1962 generates more heat than light. Much of the problem lies in the fact that the government of India is not willing to put out a comprehensive version of its story or open its archives to the scholarly community to construct an objective account". He added, "with no effort to historicise the conflict, all kinds of myths and half-truths have acquired lives of their own". Commenting on the fiftieth anniversary of 1962 war, *The Indian Express* (2012a) stated in its editorial that,

> Dealing with the raw memory of being found defenceless involves revisiting the circumstances and events of that episode. Officialdom has never quite mustered the confidence to do so, and a symbol of that failure to address that war fully in the public domain remains the refusal to make the Henderson Brooks report public. The report, prepared by Lt General Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P.S Bhagat, was submitted in April 1963, and thence forwarded on to the defence ministry. And there it has presumably remained, with the Centre failing—refusing—to declassify it. In the absence of a detailed reading of the report, the public domain has been flooded with speculation about where the authors have situated India's key failing – its spare equipment and weapons stores, the quality of military planning, the dynamic between the military and political leadership or even the type of resistance offered on the ground before abandoning key posts…It does our democracy no good to disallow scholars from reading official accounts of that very difficult month in Indian history (*The Indian Express* 2012a).

The most important legal defence that the Government of India employs against making the Brooks-Bhagat report available to public is the 'exemption from disclosure of information' clause from the Right to Information Act of 2005. Section 8(1) (a) of the RTI Act states that "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no

obligation to give any citizen information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence". Using this legal defence, in recent years the government argues that as the report contains sensitive information regarding India's troop deployment in the area, making it public would have a "demoralizing effect on our forces even now" (Suraiya 2012). However, many critics insist that it is the Congress Party's interest (to protect the face of their erstwhile leaders who were involved in decision making during the period of India-China war) that prevents Indian citizen's right to know the truth about the failures of 1962. Interestingly, non-Congress governments in the past also had shown no interest in declassifying the report, even though they were keen on blaming the Congress leadership for the debacle at the Himalayan frontier.

In the context of fiftieth anniversary of the 1962 war, various points were made by those who demand for declassifying the Brooks-Bhagat report and challenge the unwillingness of the Government of India in making the report public. Their concern was rooted in a view that frank assessment and debate on the report are necessary to have a better understanding of the failures of 1962 and to be cautious of such happenings in the future. Several former and serving military leaders demanded that the report should be part of the essential readings for military leaders. Countering the government's claim that declassifying the report would help China to access sensitive information regarding India's military deployment in the area as it has not changed much from 1962, some critics observed that China already has better information regarding India's troop deployment at the frontier. Addressing the concern that the report would raise accusation against former civil and military leaders, some observers noted that as all the persons concerned with the decision making of 1962 are no longer alive and hence no such accusations are possible. The most important point raised in the context of fiftieth anniversary of India-China war was that denying public the right to know the truth about the failure of 1962 is indeed against the principles of democracy.

Though the Government of India refused to declassify the Brooks-Bhagat report, various articles referring to the content of the report had appeared in Indian media in the context

of fiftieth anniversary of the India-China war. For instance, referring to the sources aware of the content of Brooks-Bhagat report, Pranabdhal Samanta (2012) wrote in *The Indian Express* that it is poor military leadership which prevented the Indian Army from fighting better than it did in India-China war of 1962. As an indirect reference to the concern of Congress Party, it mentioned that the report gives special attention to the then Defence Minister V. K. Krishna Menon's interference in military matters, particularly "on the shuffling of senior generals in the run-up to the month long war". However, it insisted that the report gives no direct comment on the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. It added, "[t]he important revelatory aspect of the Brooks-Bhagat report is its conclusion that shortages in ammunition and equipment were not among the primary reasons for the defeat". It read,

> In fact, the report, sources said, makes it clear that much has been stated about the 'poor quality' of equipment and weapons making the Army unfit for battle. The authors have put on record that in their considered view 'the levels of stores and equipment didn't constitute a significant handicap'. Instead, they have identified poor military leadership as the main reason for the Army not having fought better than it did (Samanta 2012).

A major debate in this context was over the use of air power against China in 1962, even when Indian army was suffering setback on the ground. Joining the debate, the then Air Chief Marshal Norman Anil Kumar Browne argued that the outcome of the India-China war would have been different, had Indian Air Force been used in an offensive role in the battle. Following this, former Air Chief Marshal Anil Yashwant Tipnis blamed the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for not employing air power against China in 1962. He argued that Nehru was the "major contributor" for India's debacle at the Himalayan frontier (*The Indian Express* 2012b). He insisted that Nehru had surrendered national security interests to realise his ambition to be a world leader. In his words, "it was more or less universally accepted, perhaps grudgingly not openly in some Indian quarters, that to serve the dubious purpose of political survival that Pandit Nehru with his grandiose vision of a conflict free non-aligned world surrendered vital national security interest to the ambition of being a world leader" (*The Times of India* 2012). Responding to Browne's remark, Chinese daily, *Global Times* commented that China's airpower was more advanced than India during the period of border conflict. Indeed it was trying to assert a point that China would have had upper hand in the conflict even if India had

employed its air power. Challenging this view, the then Air Vice-Marshal of the Indian Air Force, Arjun Subramaniam (2012), observed in an article published by *The Indian Express* that IAF was in more advantageous position against China in 1962 because of various reasons that include geographical advantage. However, he added,

> In the final analysis, all-round lack of understanding of the capabilities of air power, and a perceived fear of escalation, should it be employed, led to it not being exploited. After the Kargil experience, which did not lead to any escalation when India employed offensive airpower, significant progress in air-land synergies has been made in India. This will ensure that 1962 is never repeated as far as the use of air power in high-altitude terrains is concerned (Subramaniam 2012).

Nevertheless, not everyone agrees to it that India's decision to not employ IAF in offensive role during India-China conflict was a mistake. The Congress leaders continue to argue that the "use of Air Force would have escalated a localised operation into a much bigger war with the possibility of Indian cities being targeted by the enemy air force". They insist that "the political leadership made a wise decision of not using the air power against the enemy who may have had a better capability, and therefore the risk was not worth it" (Pubby 2012). Definitely the critical views against the former Congress leadership were the ones which dominated the 2012 debate on India-China war; only a few outside the Congress ranks doubted that Nehru and Menon must share the fundamental responsibility of India's defeat and humiliation in 1962. In the context of fiftieth anniversary of the war, commentators widely shared their resentment against the then Congress leadership which is considered as responsible for the debacle at the Himalayan frontier. In an opinion piece, Inder Malhotra (2012) observed,

> At the root of everything going absolutely wrong was the woeful misreading of Chinese intentions. Inexplicably, Jawaharlal Nehru had convinced himself that while there would be border skirmishes, patrol-level clashes and even some what bigger spats, the Chinese would do 'nothing big'. No one, not his civilian and military advisers, nor his inveterate critics, questioned this judgement. "Panditji knows best" was the governing doctrine. The Personality and role of Krishna Menon, defence minister since 1957, enjoying complete immunity for all his excesses because of being the prime minister's 'blind spot', was the second cause of our humiliation. By insulting service chiefs and playing favourites in top military appointments, he had done incalculable damage to the cohesion and morale of the army.

Similarly, expressing his resentment towards Krishna Menon, Shekhar Gupta (2012) wrote in an article published by *The Indian Express* that,

> All I want to do is change the name of the avenue in central New Delhi named after Krishna Menon, the man primarily responsible for not just the humiliation of 1962 but also the loss of so many lives. A political system, that still names avenues after an obstinate, autocratic disaster like him (whatever his filibustering brilliance), and that too, the avenue leading to its military headquarters, needs to introspect and correct its view of history.

In this context, responding to the critical remarks on Nehru some also tried to assess the historical context in which India-China conflict emerged and transformed as a frontier military conflict or war. They analysed the intensity of Cold War politics and India's domestic and international status during this period and argued that most of the critical remarks on Nehru for 1962 emerge from the lack of perspective on the historical context in which the war was materialised. Definitely, the early 1960s was a crucial moment in the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union; fear of nuclear war and another catastrophic world war was dominant in every public discourse during this period. In such a context, many peace loving countries including India remained critical not only of nuclearisation but also of the idea of war and militarisation. Perhaps, because of this ideological predisposition, Indian leaders were unable to foresee the worst possible situation in India-China border dispute. Defending Nehru, in an opinion piece published by *The Times of India* Shobhan Saxena (2012) argued that "the reason we still see 1962 through arguments like 'Nehru was a dreamer' is because we haven't put the war in its context". He added,

> In the early 1960s, the Cold War was quite hot, the Dalai Lama had just fled to India; under Nehru, India was progressing quite well and his own stature as the leader of the developing world was growing. In such an atmosphere, China wanted to make an ideological statement and reset the balance of power in Asia. A day after the Chinese crossed the border, legendary British reporter James Cameron explained the Chinese motive in just one line. 'This operation is to drive India, morally and economically, to the wall' (Saxena 2012).

However, a series of articles published by Ananth Krishnan in the context of fiftieth anniversary of 1962 war insisted that ultimately the war was a result of Nehru's policy failure. Referring to the recently declassified Chinese documents, he asserted, through various articles published by *The Hindu,* that Nehru's unwillingness to negotiate with

China, India's 'Forward Policy'[6] and most importantly India's interference in the Tibetan issues were the fundamental factors which led to the military confrontation at the Himalayan frontier in 1962. His analysis of documents revealed that in early 1950s, Nehru's approach towards the Tibetan issue was being perceived in China as India's interference in its internal affairs. In Chinese perspective, he wrote by quoting a document, "India pretends not to have any ambition on Tibetan politics or land, but desires to maintain the privileges that were written in the treaties signed since 1906". He added, "even as India voiced support to China on the Tibetan issue in 1950 by not backing appeals at the United Nations, the Chinese, internally, continued to suspect Indian designs to destabilize Tibet" (Krishnan 2012). They accused India of spreading reactionary publications in Tibetan language and argued that India was holding an "irresponsible" position on Tibet. In 1954, with the hope of improving relationship with China, India recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as part of the People's Republic of China and gave up its extraterritorial privileges over the region that India inherited from the British (Mehra 2004). However, India's printing of new map delineating its northern and north-eastern frontier in the same year and Nehru's refusal to have any discussion over it had sustained Tibet as the hotspot within the India-China relations. When India's new map turned out to be the seed of India-China border dispute, Tibetan revolts and granting of asylum in India to Dalai Lama following the 1959 Tibetan uprising became the fundamental source of Chinese displeasure towards India. Ananth Krishnan (2012) insisted, "[t]he [Chinese] documents make clear that Tibet, more than the unsettled boundaries, was by far the fundamental issue that concerned China in the 1950s". He wrote in a different article, "Chinese internal communications from the time establish that the Tibetan issue emerged as perhaps the most significant driving force behind China's decision to launch an offensive against India on October 20, 1962"

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[6] Reports about China's construction of new military posts in Ladakh, beyond its 1956 claim line, began to appear in Indian media by early 1961. The Chinese advance to the Indian territory added to the growing criticism on Nehru's China policy. As a response to the domestic criticism and the Chinese advance at the frontier emerged India's 'forward policy'. Explaining the 'forward policy', D. R. Mankekar (1968) wrote in *The Guilty Men of 1962*, "on, December 5, 1961, the Army H.Q. directed Eastern as well as Western Commands to patrol as far forward as possible towards the international border; to establish additional posts to prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also to dominate any Chinese posts already established in our territory; to be in effective occupation of the whole frontier, to cover gaps either by patrolling or by posts; and finally to make a re-appraisal of tasks" (quoted in, Noorani 1970: 138)

(Krishnan 2012a). Explaining the Chinese displeasure in India's involvement in Tibetan issue, he wrote in the conclusion of an article,

> On October 8, 1962, 12 days before the Chinese offensive, Zhou Enlai reflected on his 1956 talks with the Dalai Lama in a candid meeting with the Soviet Union's Ambassador in Beijing, suggesting that it was a turning point in how he viewed India's role in the Tibetan question and intentions regarding the boundary dispute. According to the minutes of the meeting, he said India had, in 1956, "exposed their desire to collude with the Dalai Lama and attempt to maintain Tibetan serfdom." "At that time, I found Nehru inherited British Imperialist thoughts and deeds on the border issue and the Tibet issue," Zhou said. "However, considering the friendship of China and India, we took a tolerant attitude and did not convey this to Nehru. In 1958, serfs in Tibet, Xikang [Sichuan] and Qinghai rebelled. Nehru could not wait and took advantage of the border issue to interfere with China's internal affairs. The Dalai Lama rebelled in 1959 and fled to India, and this was caused by Nehru's inducement." Zhou's views largely characterized the thinking in Beijing three years later, when the Tibetan uprising began to unfold in 1959. China's leaders, internal documents show, became increasingly convinced – on the basis of questionable evidence – India was to blame for their own failings in Tibet and that the resolution of their Tibetan problem was inextricably linked to the boundary dispute – a conviction that would have fateful consequences (Krishnan 2012).

Recently declassified Chinese documents revealed that other than India's interference in the Tibetan issue, China's major consideration in the lead-up to 1962 war was Nehru's 'Forward Policy' and changing dynamics between China, India and the Soviet Union. However, Tibet remained at the core of all these issues. Suspecting India's involvement in the Tibetan affair, China attempted to place India as the core reason for its failures in the region. It blamed India for the Tibetan unrest that resulted from the colossal failures of the Communist Party's initiatives for reforms. Though there was not enough supporting evidence for India's involvement in the Tibetan unrest, by late 1950s "Mao became increasingly convinced of Indian expansionist designs on Tibet". He accused Nehru of encouraging the Tibetan rebels in India and argued that "Nehru and the 'bourgeoisie' in India had sought to maintain Tibet as a buffer and restore its semi-independent status". Ananth Krishnan (2012a) asserts that "Chinese suspicions that linked Tibet and the border continued to heighten towards the end of 1961, when the Forward Policy began to be implemented". By then all attempts for peaceful settlement of the border, including the one initiated by Zhou Enlai's 1960 visit to India, had ended up in stalemate. India's continuous demand for Chinese withdrawal from the Aksai Chin

area had established "a link in Chinese minds between the border issue and China's ability to control Tibet" as the road passing through that terrain was crucial for them for connecting Xinjiang and Tibet and sustaining their military posts in the region. Meanwhile, in the eastern sector, challenging increasing Chinese military presence in the region, India began creating military posts at the north of McMahon Line, "claiming that its boundary extend[s] up to the Thang La Ridge" (Srikanth 2012). In the context of fiftieth anniversary, *The Times of India* (2012a) wrote in its editorial, "New Delhi wanted the McMahon line, drawn up by the British, to be accepted as the border between India and China, but the Chinese never agreed with that view. Jawaharlal Nehru then implemented his disastrous 'forward' policy, which involved maintaining isolated army outposts at or near the McMahon line to strengthen India's claims, which the Chinese took to as a provocation". Moreover, India repeatedly turned down China's request for negotiation and ignored their warnings. India never expected that China, a poor communist country that was struggling with enormous domestic and international challenges, could afford a war with India. Explaining the Chinese warnings that India had ignored while it went ahead with the Forward Policy, Ananth Krishnan (2012b) wrote,

> Zhou and the Chinese leadership saw the final three months as making a military confrontation inevitable, and blamed Nehru entirely for the course of events. 'This serious Sino-Indian border conflict is completely caused by the Indian Government's long-term deliberate attempt,' Zhou alleged in a November 13, 1962 letter to Ayub Khan in Pakistan. The failure of the two meetings in July had emerged as a final turning point. Following his meeting with Krishna Menon in Geneva, Chen Yi flew to Beijing the next day and reported to Zhou Enlai. After hearing Chen Yi's report, Zhou commented, 'It seems as though Nehru wants a war with us', John W. Garver writes in *China's Decision for War with India in 1962*. 'Yes', Chen replied. Menon had showed no sincerity regarding peaceful talks, but 'merely intended to deal in a perfunctory way with China'. 'At least we made the greatest effort for peace,' Zhou reportedly replied. 'Premier,' Chen replied, 'Nehru's forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death'.

In addition to seeking culprits of 1962 and making alternative history, a major attempt by the Indian media and opinion makers in the context of fiftieth anniversary of India-China war was to create a narrative on India's heroic resistance against the Chinese in 1962. As part of this attempt, the battle of Rezang La that happened on 18th November 1962 under

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the command of Major Shaitan Singh gained wide media attention. The story of Indian Army's resistance against the Chinese from the Rezang La post which stands 18000 foot high in Ladakh sector became a symbol of Indian heroism during the 1962 war. Asserting that "Ladakh did not see fighting of the scale, and incursions of the depth, seen in the east" due to the Indian Army's much better engagements with the Chinese in this sector, Shekhar Gupta (2012) argued that "the defence of Ladakh was a more glorious chapter of 1962 but has remained largely unacknowledged". In this context, Manu Pubby (2012a) wrote in an article published by *The Indian Express* that the battle of Rezang La is a "shining example of bravery by a company-sized formation that stopped an estimated 3,000-strong Chinese formation, denying them access across the mountains and into the Chushul valley". Due to the brave defence of Indian Army, he continued, "the Chinese never crossed Rezang La to enter Chushul valley, from where it would have been a free run to the town of Leh". However, in an article titled 'Don't Forget the Heroes of Rezang La', published by *The Hindu*, Mohan Guruswamy (2012) stated that "the loss of Chushul would not even have had much bearing on the ultimate defence of Ladakh". Definitely he was upholding the view that the Chushul was only a matter of national honour in those dark days of 1962. He wrote that C Company of the 13 Kumaon at Rezang La on November 18 1962 "gave it's all to defend Chushul, a small Ladakhi village, which for one brief moment in our history came to symbolize India's national honour". Explaining the challenges faced by the Indian Army at Rezang La, Praveen Kulkarni (2012) observed in article,

> On November 18, 1962, it was unusually cold with snow falling lightly over Rezang La. Never before in the World's military history had a major battle been fought at such an altitude. The Battle of Rezang La commenced hours before the shelling that the rest of Brigade saw from a distance. Within no time every man of the Kumaon Company under Maj. Shaitan Singh was at 'ready for action' state. According to those who visited Rezang La, three months later, 'The dead men were found in their trenches, frozen stiff, still holding their weapons. Broken LMG bipods, and some men holding only the butts of their rifles while the remaining weapon had blown off, bore witness to the enemy fire'.

In 2012, in the context of fiftieth anniversary of India-China war, when Indian media and opinion makers were occupied with discussions, debates and creation of alternative narratives on India's setback at the Himalayan frontier, China was largely silent. Though China's obsession with memories of war was well known, especially with the memories

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of Sino-Japanese war and the war in Korea with the United States, the 1962 war remained largely out of public discourse in China, even in the context of its fiftieth anniversary (Mohan 2012). An important official comment from China in this context was a statement made by the Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei. Responding to the Indian media commentaries on the war, he stated that "the two countries are cooperation partners instead of rivals". He added "their common ground far outweighs disputes and common interests outnumber conflicts". He also reminded that "the current world has undergone deep and profound changes; as the two most populous developing countries and emerging economies both China and India face important opportunities of development" (Varma 2012). In the similar tone, *Guangming Daily*, a newspaper run by the Chinese Communist Party for China's intellectuals, wrote in a commentary that "the border issue does not define the 'whole' of the bilateral relationship and should, therefore, not affect the overall development of Sino-Indian relations. Before a final settlement is reached on the border dispute, the two sides must work together to jointly safeguard peace and stability in the border areas" (Bagchi 2012). In this context, Deng Xijun (2012), *Chargé d' Affaires* of Embassy of the People's Republic of China in New Delhi, argued in a commentary published by *The Indian Express* that the unpleasant experience between India and China is "only a drop in the ocean". His commentary read,

> If we only focus on the conflict of 1962, the whole picture of China-India relations will be neglected. That is missing the woods for the trees. Relations between China and India date back to over two thousand years ago. It is a long and complicated relationship. But, in four sentences we can capture the headlines: the two great civilizations interacted frequently in ancient times; they supported each other in modern times; their relations experienced ups and downs in the contemporary era; and they are strategic and cooperative partners in the 21st century (Xijun 2012).

Definitely, similar views were found in the Indian media commentaries appeared in the same context. For instance, Ravni Thankur (2012) asserted in an article published by *The Times of India* that both India and China have "changed enormously since 1962" and "both have a lot to gain from changing mutual perceptions of each other". She reminded that though theoretically there is a chance for rivalry to grow between India and China for resources and markets as both of them are rising economies, "investing in a sound mutually beneficial economic relationship and increased people-to-people contact is the

best way forward". Similarly, C. Raja Mohan (2012) wrote in an article published by *The Indian Express* that "in the 1950s, India and China were weak developing countries and had little to offer each other except political rhetoric and presumed solidarity. Today, China is the world's second largest economy and India is in the top ten". Asserting the inevitability of peaceful relationship between these countries, he stated that "if the opportunities for mutually beneficial economic engagements are real, the costs of political and military conflicts are much larger". Shobhan Saxena (2012) also shared similar opinion in a commentary published by *The Times of India*. Challenging those who are obsessed with India's setback in 1962 war, he wrote,

> India in 2012 is not the country of 1962. Today, trade between India and China is getting closer to $100 billion. In the fast-changing global scenario, New Delhi and Beijing cooperate with each other in world forums on trade, environment, finance and even security. Today, a democratic India and a single-party-ruled China have no conflict about their mode of development. They both tend to gain from cooperation and not confrontation. But those who are haunted by the ghosts of 1962 still want us to live in fear. It's time to bury these ghosts.

In an editorial published in this context *The Times of India* (2012b) observed that "for a too long, India-China relations have been held hostage to the past, with Beijing viewing New Delhi through the Maoist prism of confrontation. But if growth is the common pursuit for both countries, there are huge areas of cooperation ranging from trade and energy to information technology and manufacturing". Reminding India's mistakes of the past that ended up in a military conflict with China, the same newspaper wrote in another editorial,

> The sense of national humiliation [was] intense enough to prevent us from thinking about what might have happened had India accepted a Chinese counter-offer made by Zhou Enlai in 1960. If India were prepared to relinquish its claims over the Aksai Chin plateau the Chinese, in turn, would be willing to accept Indian claims in the eastern sector. In other words, the territorial issue would have been settled roughly along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) today. And the war, a poisoned chalice for subsequent India-China relations, wouldn't have happened (*The Times of India* 2012a).

However, the most important question emerged in the context of fiftieth anniversary was whether India has learned anything from the experience of 1962; definitely with regard to the Indian military preparedness and dealing with China. As per the dominant opinion shared by media commentaries, India has failed to learn from its mistakes that ended up

in a debacle at the Himalayan frontier and on the ground nothing much has changed since 1960s as far as government's approach towards military preparedness and addressing the Chinese threat is concerned. Critics asserted that even after five decades of the India-China war, India has not learned any valuable lessons and "completely failed to understand the Chinese mindset and strategy as far as securing the country's borders are concerned and even today there is a serious disconnect in political and military relationship in the country". Mohan Guruswamy (2012a) stated in an article published by *The Hindu*, "[f]ifty years [are] a long time ago and the memory of 1962 is now faint. But what should cause the nation concern is that the lessons of 1962 still do not seem to have been learnt" (Guruswamy 2012a). He argued, "[i]f at all anything, the Indian Army is now an even greater and much more misused instrument of public policy. If in 1962, it was a relatively small army with 1930s equipment, it is a million-man army in 2012 with 1960s equipment". Problematising the weapons and logistics of the Indian Army, he sarcastically observed, "[l]et alone the Chinese PLA, almost every terrorist and insurgent in Jammu and Kashmir has better arms and communication gear than our soldiers". As a conclusion he wrote, "[w]e persist in benchmarking against the Pakistanis when we should be benchmarking against the Chinese, if not the Russians and Americans" (Guruswamy 2012a). Asserting the similar view, Ravni Thakur (2012) observed in a commentary that "India is well behind China in its military modernization and border area infrastructure development". Precisely, the memories of 1962 war remain as a ladder that exists between Indian public's security concern and the Government of India's approach towards national security.

The media debates in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of India-China war explicitly show that recent developments in the bilateral relationship, including advanced trade relations, have not much bearing in altering India's discursive image of China. As Debyesh Anand (2012: 231) observed, the primary lens through which Indians view China continues to be that of 'betrayal' and "the Chinese cannot really be trusted is almost a mantra in India". Moreover, "understanding of contemporary events and dynamics of international relations between the two countries is almost always coloured through this lens that has its origin in the border dispute and 1962 war". It means memories of the war are not only very much part of contemporary Indian public

discourse but also it has a significant role in shaping the present Indian discourse on China. The media commentaries reveal, many in India share a perception that the 1962 can be repeated even though both are now nuclear-armed states. Definitely, they do not take growing economic partnership and other bilateral relationship between India and China seriously. Precisely, the once dominant Indian perception that China will never attack India had evaporated with the war of 1962. In the following years, the war became a shadow over the narratives that asserted the significance of a peaceful relationship between India and China. The war narratives had created an impression in India that the war was a Chinese betrayal and that can be repeated. This version of history either blamed China alone or blamed both Chinese expansionism and Nehru's leadership for everything that happened at India's Himalayan frontier in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Anand 2012). Indian media narratives on China largely supported such discourse and helped to constitute a public perception that India and China are natural enemies. The following sections of this chapter analyse the major issue areas which continue to associate Indian discursive image of China with the memories of 1962 war.

1. *Disputes and Negotiations*

A significant part of contemporary Indian media narratives on China is somehow related to the unsettled boundary between the two countries and on-going negotiation for settling the border dispute. Though such stories do not always mention the war of 1962, they are always a reminder of deep rooted tension that exists between these countries. For an informed reader, media narratives on Chinese incursion into the Indian Territory or their air-space violation at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) are nothing but a reminder of the military conflict that once happened between India and China even if such stories do not mention the war or conflict. There is no doubt that such stories can reinforce discursive image of threatening China in the Indian public discourse even when there is a steady improvement in bilateral relationship between these countries. Interestingly, stories of Chinese incursion and airspace violation have no paucity in the media as there is no demarcated border between India and China and both sides have different perception about the LAC. Moreover, as media reports of such violations hardly focus on the technical details of those happenings, such stories often create a hype of India-China

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conflict in the Indian public discourse. Frequency of such media stories and public criticism about the Government of India's inability to prevent incursion at the border sometimes compels India's civil and military leaders to come up with explanation for such happenings; they often explain that it is happening due to having different perceptions about the LAC and both sides patrolling up to their respective perceptions of LAC. However, recurrences of such media stories indicate that today even official narration hardly makes any difference in shaping discursive images of China and Chinese threat.

Since the betrayal narratives are predominant in Indian public discourse, sometimes, incursion stories get exaggerated when they come out as media reports. In this way, sometimes, even incidents of firing between Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and the Chinese army are created in the Indian media narratives. Definitely it does not mean that the Indian media fabricates stories of conflict while China is strictly working towards maintaining peaceful relationship with India. Even after having signed four confidence-building agreements between India and China, in 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012, the PLA is not keen on respecting the Indian concerns at the frontier (Chansoria 2014). However, there were no major incidents of firing, at least since 1996 agreement which stated that "with a view to preventing dangerous military activities along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, the two sides agree as follows – Neither side shall open fire, cause biodegradation, use hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometres from the Line of Actual Control" (CN IN_961129 1996). Definitely this prohibition is not applied to routine firing activities in small arms firing ranges in the area.

The media narratives on border disputes are not limited to only the stories of Chinese incursion and airspace violations. Reports on China's military build-up in the border, road construction in the area, China's protest over Indian leaders' visit to Arunachal Pradesh, and China's issuing of stapled visa to Indian citizens belonging to the disputed territory are other major issues within contemporary Indian media discourse on India-China border dispute. As the memories of 1962 war are dominant in the Indian public discourse, reports on Chinese military build-up at the border can naturally inflate Indian

public's security concern. On the similar ground, for Indian public, China's construction activities along the border area cannot be perceived as anything less than preparation against India. Moreover, reports on China's military activity along the border often appear in India as a weapon against the government's irresponsible attitude towards the Chinese threat. They create opportunities for analysing India's military preparedness against China and problematising India's calm attitude towards the Chinese threat. Critics and opposition leaders mostly utilise such media reports to remind the government of the price India had to pay in 1962 for ignoring Chinese activities at the frontier and for blindly trusting China's friendship. Therefore, these reports are significant in associating memories of 1962 war with contemporary Indian discursive image of China.

Protest by China over Indian leaders' visit to Arunachal Pradesh which they call "southern Tibet" is another major issue that often appears in media as a reminder of deep rooted tension between India and China. In Indian narratives, such protests often figure as a Chinese assault on India's sovereignty over region. However, China perceives Indian leaders' visit to the disputed territory as a provocation and it blames India for harming its territorial integrity. To assert its claim over the territory, it issues stapled visa to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh. In the past, China issued stapled visa to the residents of Jammu and Kashmir too, for asserting the disputed status of the state. Because of India's protest, in 2012 China agreed to stop issuing stapled visa to the residents of Jammu and Kashmir. Precisely, the Chinese claim over some 90,000 sq. km of land in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Chinese possession of some 38,000 sq. km of land in Ladakh, a part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, constitute the core of India-China border dispute. In the broader picture of the dispute 5180 sq. km of land that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963 from the Kashmir region under its control is also included.

2. *The Sino-Pakistan Partnership*

It is in the background of Sino-Indian hostility that China developed its friendship with Pakistan; following an old aphorism that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. In the beginning, India did not take this relationship seriously, as it was an anomaly in the Cold War international politics. Indeed it was difficult to assume a friendship between

Pakistan, an ally of the West in its fight against communism, and China, a key member of the Soviet led communist bloc, during the period of ideological politics. However, following the 1962 war and Sino-Pakistan agreement for settling the border between Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Xinjiang province of China, India began to understand the magnitude of threat it could pose to country's national security. Helping Pakistan with magnifying tension at India-China border during the 1965 war and openly declaring political support to Pakistan during the 1971 Bangladesh War, China proved its commitment towards the Sino-Pakistan partnership. When the United States suspended arms supply to Pakistan in the context of 1965 India-Pakistan war, China stepped in to become one of the most important arms suppliers to Pakistan (Smith 2013). Thereafter, helping Pakistan to balance against India by providing immense military supplies and enormous financial and technical assistance, even by assisting them to develop nuclear weapon in the context of India's successful nuclear tests, China ensured that India's attention remains constrained within the subcontinent.

Since its inception, the Sino-Pakistan partnership was a sensational topic in Indian media discourse. In the beginning, many in India were keen on warning Pakistan about the danger in collaborating with a communist country that betrayed India's friendship. Focusing through the Cold War ideological framework they blamed Pakistan for working against strategic and ideological interests of Asia. However, witnessing enormous changes in international politics and in India's relationship with Pakistan, such ideological obsession in the media narratives disappeared over the years. Today, knowing that India is the strategic thread that holds China and Pakistan together, Indian media narratives on Sino-Pak partnership are largely an assessment of the threat it creates for India's national security. Therefore, media narratives on Sino-Pak partnership have significance in shaping the present Indian discursive image of China and the Chinese threat. Definitely, as related to various issues, the Sino-Pakistan friendship remains one of the recurring topics in contemporary Indian media narratives. The issues like China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme, civil nuclear programme, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which includes construction of a highway passing through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir for connecting China's Xinjiang province with Pakistan's Gwadar port, Sino-Pak defence cooperation and China's financial and technical support

to various projects in Pakistan are central in making the Sino-Pak friendship a recurring subject in Indian media narratives.

Though it has no direct bearings on associating memories of 1962 war with contemporary Indian discursive image of China, for Indians the Sino-Pak strategic partnership cannot be perceived as anything less than their joint preparation against India. Many of their joint ventures, including infrastructure building activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir by ignoring India's sovereignty over the region, reinforce such a perception. Definitely not everyone in India shares this perception; challenging dominant reservation, many argue that India is no longer the central concern of the Sino-Pak partnership. However, within the dominant Indian public discourse such counter views are yet to gain any acceptance. Considering the context of its origin and the present status of India's relationship with both of these countries, the dominant Indian public discourse continues to depict the Sino-Pak partnership as a balancing act of these two enemy countries against India.

3. *China in the Indian Ocean*

China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean region is another major issue that frequently appears in the Indian media narratives as a reminder of the tension between India and China. Over the last two decades, with tremendous growth in its economy, China is seen making its presence known in the region. As it has no territorial claim in the Indian Ocean, by assisting small countries in building infrastructure and other development initiatives, China is attempting to gain a foothold in the region. Its strategically significant infrastructure development projects in the region include construction of ports in Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and Gwadar (Pakistan). In terms of a widely shared view, construction of Gwadar port is based on China's strategic interest in building a blue-water navy. In addition to this, China is associated with various projects in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Maldives; in terms of media reports it has plans for building ports in Bangladesh and Myanmar and for developing a naval base in Maldives. Moreover, asserting its ambition for being a pre-eminent maritime power, recently China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. The base will ensure China's permanent naval presence in this vital strategic position linking Red Sea and Gulf of

Aden. Such a presence is definitely a challenge for India's strategic interests in the region.

In India's perspective, China's activities in its Indian Ocean backyard is nothing less than a grand plan for encircling India, which is named as China's 'string of pearls' strategy. Experience at the Himalayan frontier and China's assertive behaviour in the South China Sea (it is where China has disputes with Japan, Philippines and Vietnam) reinforce Indian concerns regarding China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, frequent sighting of Chinese warships, submarines, destroyers and intelligent-gathering vessels in the region inflate India's worries. However, denying Indian concern, China insists that their naval interests in the region are completely peaceful and not directed at any specific country. They project ensuring the security of their maritime trade, especially transportation of oil, as the core of their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. But, as the most important maritime power in the region, India cannot ignore the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, especially on the ground of their troubled relationship and China's growing super power ambitions. India is highly concerned about possible future upgrade of China's trade oriented ports in the Indian Ocean to its permanent naval bases. China's assertive behaviour and naval modernisation programme obviously support Indian concern regarding China's super power intentions. Though it is not directly related to the 1962 war, Indian media narratives on China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean region have significant role in associating collective memories of the India-China conflict with the present Indian discursive images of China.

Conclusion

Analysing the Indian media narratives on China from three different historical contexts, this chapter attempted to disclose the dominant images of China in Indian public discourse, their transformations in relation to the 1962 war and the impacts of memories of 1962 war in it. The first section of the chapter revealed that a dominant impression in India during the pre-war period was that there would never be an India-China war. Developing an insight from the pre-war narratives, the evolution of such an impression can be related to three major factors. Firstly, an exaggerated sense of the self; it was essentially based on an unrealistic assessment about India's military capability and its

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ability to achieve diplomatic success. Secondly, an underestimated image of China's ability; it was based on an unrealistic calculation about China's economic weakness and flawed assumptions about its international challenges. Thirdly, an obsession for linking everything with the Cold War ideological politics; although India was a non-aligned country, the tendency for relating India with the 'democratic' block led by the United States was dominant in the Indian mainstream narratives. Precisely, during the pre-war period China was largely figured in Indian public discourse as a weak communist country that is trying to expand its territory – on ground of Tibetan invasion – without sufficient material capability.

The second section of the chapter, with the help of wartime and immediate post-war narratives, analysed the transformations that occurred in the Indian discursive images of China and in India's own identity in relation to the war of 1962. It asserted that the war has radically transformed Indian understanding about national security and established China as India's enemy number one. India's setback at the Himalayan frontier became a great humiliation for the country and transformed the then prevalent identity of India— the peace-loving, non-aligned country of Gandhi. The war has transformed Indian approach towards militarisation and non-alignment, though it never abandoned the policy of non-alignment. Definitely, these changes have occurred in relation to the transformation in India's own identity. The third section of the chapter, with the help of contemporary Indian media narratives, revealed that the collective memories of 1962 war remain as a significant force in shaping the images of China in contemporary Indian public discourse. Ignoring the developments in the bilateral relationship between the two countries, certain issues that feature the dispute between the two, continue to associate the memories of 1962 war with the present Indian discursive images of China. Therefore, instead of being a liberating force and helping to forge a better relationship between the two countries, the memories of 1962 war remain as a negative force which prevents positive impacts of developments in the bilateral relationship between India and China.

Chapter 5

Memories of War and Images of Pakistan in Indian Public Discourse

More than fifty years have passed since India and Pakistan fought in a full-fledged war for the first time in 1965; nothing much has changed since then in the relationship between these two countries. There is no development over the Kashmir question, the core of India-Pakistan conflict; no end to Pakistan sponsored terrorist activities against India, the most important stumbling block in the way of peace; and, no pause in cross border firing, the relentless reminder of armed tension in the subcontinent. Reminding India's heroic moments in the battlefield, in 2015, during the Golden jubilee of the 1965 war, for the first time, India celebrated its victory in the war. In this context, challenging Indian victory narratives, Pakistan argued that there was no decisive victory for India as their 'resistance' had failed India achieving its objective through 'aggression'. Moreover, in the same period, Pakistan celebrated the "Defence Day" to mark the anniversary of their 'resistance' against India's 'aggression' in 1965. In this spirit of celebrations, both parties have engaged in a verbal conflict and asserted how significant is Kashmir for each of them: while Pakistan Army Chief described Kashmir as an "unfinished agenda" and warned India of "unbearable damage" if it tries for any long or short "misadventure" against Pakistan, India reiterated that Kashmir is an integral part of India and, added, "if there is any subject related to Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan it is how the parts of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir can be again included in India" (*The Statesman* 2015). Neither the war of 1965 nor any other war that has happened in the following years has helped to find a permanent solution to the burning problems between these two countries and even after the seven decades of conflict, there is no sign of lasting peace in the subcontinent.

The background of tension between India and Pakistan had materialised even before the British Empire leaving the subcontinent and establishing independent India and Pakistan. It evolved out of the very idea of partitioning the British India, to form a separate state for Muslims. The demand for Pakistan came from a group of Muslim elites who were worried that they will be marginalised in a free India dominated by the Hindu leadership. They exploited the religious identity of Muslim community to assert that Muslims hold a

separate 'national identity' within India and it could never peacefully coexist with the Hindu majority. Naturally, the demand for a separate state for Muslims encouraged the Hindu radical organisations to advance their demand for Hindu Rashtra and intensified the Hindu-Muslim tension in the country. The secular Indian leaders of British India were against the idea of partitioning the subcontinent in terms of religious identity as they were considering the diversity of India as a matter of pride, and not a problem. Besides, they were certain about the impossibility of dividing India in such a way as the demographic distribution in the subcontinent was extremely diverse and largely inappropriate for partitioning in terms of people's religious identity. However, when widespread communal violence prompted the partition as an inevitable option, the British Government and Indian leaders conceded to the demand for a separate state for Muslims and established independent states of India and Pakistan by partitioning the Indian subcontinent (Hiro 2015).

The partition of India created one of the largest mass migrations in the human history, and witnessed a 'communal holocaust' with "death toll of five hundred thousand to six hundred thousand, divided almost equally between Muslims and non-Muslims" (Hiro 2015: 102). Thus, at the very moment of birth of Pakistan, it was proved that what was expected to be a solution for Hindu-Muslim tension in the subcontinent is going to be a greater threat for peace in the region. Along with the violence erupted in the context of partition, the question of Jammu and Kashmir – the accession of a Muslim dominant state ruled by a Hindu King to India – and Pakistan's attempt to invade Kashmir through military means in later months of 1947 and 1948 constituted the character of animosity between the people of India and Pakistan. Later, when India's conflict with China intensified in early 1960s, Pakistan's friendship with China became an incentive for India-Pak game of hostility. From this background of history, the present chapter attempts to analyse the image of Pakistan in Indian public discourse, as represented in three different time periods in four mainstream Indian English newspapers; namely, *The Indian Express, The Hindu, The Statesman,* and *The Times of India.*

The first part of the chapter examines discursive representation of Pakistan in these selected newspapers prior to the 1965 war. Such an analysis is required to know about

both the images of Pakistan in pre-war Indian public discourse and the effects of war in Indian discursive articulation of Pakistan. The second part explores the selected newspapers' narratives on the 1965 war and the immediate events following the war to mark the changes brought by the war in the Indian public discourse on Pakistan. The last part focuses on the contemporary Indian discourse on Pakistan: by analysing the selected newspapers' narratives on Pakistan during the fiftieth anniversary of 1965 war, in 2015, with the intention to understand how significant are collective memories of war in shaping the image of Pakistan in contemporary Indian public discourse. This study focuses mostly on editorials and articles published in the editorial page of the selected newspapers. However, in some instances, it employs news reports and opinions of various Indian leaders, as reported by the newspapers, for making detailed picture of certain stories. Similarly, for explaining the international community's approach towards India-Pakistan conflict, in some instances, it uses the opinion of various international news media reproduced or interpreted by the selected newspaper. The time period of the newspaper data employed for this study is as follows: for making sense of the pre-war discourse, it analyses narratives of the selected newspapers in the period of six months prior to the war, specifically from 5th February 1965 to 4th August 1965; for comprehending the changes brought by the war in India's discursive image of Pakistan, this study examines data from the period of war that is 5th August to 22nd September 1965 and a six month period following the war, specifically from 23rd September 1965 to 22nd March 1966; for unravelling the contemporary discourse, it analyses data for the month of August-September of 2015 that marked the 50th anniversary of the war.

Pre-War Indian Discourse on Pakistan

Considering the conceptual problem in defining the 1947-48 Kashmir conflict as the first India-Pakistan war, on the ground of its limited nature and involvement of various other parties, like tribal militias and Jammu and Kashmir armed forces, in this study, the war of 1965 is treated as the first war fought between India and Pakistan. Moreover, it is in the context of 1965 war, the Government of India, for the first time, declared that there is a state of war between India and Pakistan (Dixit 2002). Therefore, in order to understand the pre-war Indian public discourse on Pakistan, this study examines the selected

newspapers' narratives on Pakistan prior to the 1965 war. Definitely, it is not ignoring the fact that the 1947-48 Kashmir conflict had significant impact on the pre-war Indian public discourse on Pakistan.

For analytical convenience, the Indian media narratives on Pakistan during the pre-war period can be placed under four broad categories, though they overlap sometimes and certain narratives may remain outside of these categorical framework: firstly, the narratives on partition related problems including the question of Kashmir and memories of partition violence; secondly, the narratives on border problems including frequent exchange of fire at some areas and issues related to unsettled border in many areas, especially in (former) East Pakistan; thirdly, the narratives on Pakistan's friendship with China, another threat to India, especially after intensifying tension at the Himalayan frontier in early 1960s; and fourthly, narratives on Pakistan's alliance with the West, as there was a concern regarding Pakistan's exploitation of such an alliance for having leverage against India.

1. *Partition Memories and Kashmir*

There is no doubt that partition of India was one of the most horrific incidents in the history of human civilisation. It was simultaneously a communal violence, ethnic cleansing, sadistic violence, and organised violence through the use of paramilitary forces (Menon 2013). The damage it created in the region was immeasurable, both in material and non-material terms. There is no consensus regarding the death toll of partition violence; earlier scholars argued that it was between two hundred thousand to two million, recent studies assert that it was between five hundred thousand to six hundred thousand (Hiro 2015). Whatever is the number, undoubtedly, partition experience had shaken the lives of millions of people in the subcontinent; agony had no boundaries and no discrimination in terms of religion. After witnessing the disastrous episodes of partition, *The New York Times* correspondent Robert Trumbull noted,

> I have never been as shaken by anything, even by the piled-up bodies on the beachhead of Tarawa [World War II incident]. In India today blood flows oftener than rain falls. I have seen dead by the hundreds and, worst of all, thousands of Indians without eyes, feet or hands. Death by shooting is merciful and uncommon. Men, women and children are commonly beaten to death with clubs

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and stones and left to die, their death agony intensified by heat and flies (quoted in Collins and Lapierre 1975: 332).

The horrendous cataclysm of partition obviously created an enemy image for Pakistan in Indian public discourse. Later, reinforcing such an image, Pakistan's attempts at invading Kashmir confirmed that it is a threat to India's national integrity. But, even then, many in India shared a perception that partition was a temporary solution and Pakistan would reunite with India sooner or later (Hiro 2015). However, relentless advancement in Pakistan's aggressive posture towards India shattered such expectations and the enemy image of Pakistan became predominant in Indian public discourse. Definitely, such an enemy image of Pakistan helped India in dwindling domestic differences and hastening the process of national integration. However, in Pakistan, anti-India sentiments were turned as a fuel for constructing a new identity that was convenient for an Islamic republic; in its discourse, India was a Hindu enemy threatening the existence of a Muslim Pakistan. For asserting its claim over Kashmir, Pakistan tried to create a discourse that Muslims in India are being treated as second class citizens and a sense of insecurity is prevalent among them. India challenged such attempts of Pakistan by highlighting its commitment towards secularism. Indian media's pre-1965 war narratives reveal that Muslims in India also refuted such campaigns of Pakistan. For instance, countering Pakistani attempts for depicting Muslims as second class citizens within India, *The Hindu* (1965) wrote in its editorial, "Indian Muslims have resented Pakistan's persistent propaganda efforts to make out that a sense of insecurity is widespread among them and their spokesmen have pointed out in refutation that they are safe with their Government and they can look after themselves without any meddling patronage from outside".

The tension created by the partition violence somehow continued in Indian public discourse even in 1960s because of various reasons. Issues such as attacks against Hindu minorities in the West and East Pakistan, continuing flow of refugees to India, border disputes, Pakistani assistance for Naga rebels in India and most importantly Kashmir conflict had been ensuring the continuation of tension in the subcontinent. Precisely, the question of Kashmir was so significant in the process of new identity construction in both India and Pakistan; while India considered Muslim majority Kashmir as the essence of its

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secular identity Pakistan wanted to integrate the same territory into it to justify its religious nationalism and the whole idea of partition (Menon 2013).

The analysis of pre-war Indian media discourse reveals that there were many attempts from Indian side to find an end to the conflicts and bring peace in the subcontinent, especially due to the growing threat of communist China. However, Pakistan's approach towards Kashmir remained a stumbling block to the peace between India and Pakistan. The Pakistani attempt for integrating the Kashmir region under its control, which is known as 'Azad Kashmir' in Pakistan and 'Pakistan Occupied Kashmir' in India, was creating a serious tension in India during the pre-war period. Many in India, especially opposition parties, used the issue as a tool to question Congress government's commitment towards the national integrity. Such criticism often forced the government to "make bellicose statements [against Pakistan] merely to remain in the saddle" (Khanna 1965).

Though Kashmir remained at the core of India-Pakistan tension, not everyone in India believed that finding a solution for Kashmir conflict could bring lasting peace in the subcontinent. Many strongly believed that India-Pak enmity is deeply rooted within the very idea of Pakistan: they argued that the very existence of Pakistan as an Islamic country depends on creating/maintaining anti-India or anti-Hindu sentiments in its public discourse. Analysing India's security challenges, Nandan Kagal (1965) wrote in an article published by *The Times of India* that,

> A 'settlement' of the Kashmir dispute would no doubt lead to a period of Indo-Pakistani friendship. However, we can be quite certain that the amity would be short lived. This is because religion, rather communalism, is the most active ingredient of Pakistani nationalism. It is only the cement of religious particularism which binds the two grotesquely separated parts of the country. Pakistan in the interests of its survival as a nation-state cannot afford to allow this cement to weaken. It must be remembered that though India is a secular state, the rulers and the people of Pakistan regard it as a Hindu state in which 50 million of their brothers in Islam live on sufferance as second class citizens. This is of course an erroneous belief and must properly be described as political myth, but it is a powerful myth and one which Pakistan must cling to, to justify its very existence. The rulers of Pakistan know very well that they cannot afford to make friendship with India a basic objective of their national policy.

Similarly, Morarji Desai (1965) stated in an article published by *The Indian Express* that,

If we remember how and under what circumstances Pakistan was formed, it can be said without any fear of contradiction that Pakistan was formed by the creation of hatred in the minds of Muslims against Hindus, introduced skilfully by the British government and later systematically utilized by Mr. Jinaah, who became the chief executive of the idea of Pakistan….Mr. Jinnah and his followers who ran the Government of Pakistan after its creation were full of hatred, with the result that its formation did not make the two countries friendly. India has been trying to be friendly with Pakistan from the very beginning, but Pakistan has not cooperated in this matter so far.

Asserting that Kashmir is not the core of tension between India and Pakistan, in an editorial, *The Hindu* (1965a) observed,

There is a feeling that, if Kashmir is handed over to Pakistan, Indo-Pakistan relations will be bright sunshine thereafter. This is the kind of misconception that led to the betrayal of Czechoslovakia which was supposed to be the last territorial demand of the Nazis. The fact is that Pakistan is a discontented and unstable State which tries to raise its national morale by making claims to neighbouring territory.

Precisely, the India-Pak dispute over Kashmir was inseparable from the memories of partition and both had significant role in shaping India's discursive image of Pakistan during the pre-war period. As related to various issues, partition narratives were continuously articulated in Indian public discourse during that time. Such narratives while asserting the religious dimension of Indian and Pakistani national identities insisted that Pakistan is the major threat to India's national integrity. Therefore, to an extent, the construction of India's new identity and creation of an enemy image for Pakistan were part of the same discursive process even before the 1965 war.

2. *Border Problems*

The analysis of pre-war Indian media discourse shows that the border dispute, including frequent exchange of fire at certain parts of the border, was a major issue which influenced India's discursive image of Pakistan during the pre-war period. Because of relentless border tension, Pakistan was regarded in India as a "discontented and unstable state which tries to raise its national morale by making claims to neighbouring territory" (*The Hindu* 1965a). However, casualties related to border firing were relatively low during this period. Following an incident of exchange of fire between Indian and Pakistani armed forces, on 19th March 1965, *The Times of India* (1965) wrote in its

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editorial that "the latest series of Indo-Pakistani border incidents has followed the familiar pattern of petty trespass, tension, firing and angry recrimination". It added, "most of these incidents are quite small and inconsequential in themselves but have a tendency to escalate, resulting in loss of life, damage to property and a general deterioration in relations between two countries".

The major areas of border tension, excluding incessant problems in Jammu and Kashmir area, were Kanjarkot in the Kutch-Sind border area, Cooch Behar Dahagram enclave border, Mekliganj sector and Berubari in the West Bengal-East Pakistan border, and Lathitilla Dumahari sector of the Assam-East Pakistan border. As far as Jammu and Kashmir border is concerned, the then Defence Minister of India Y. B. Chavan declared in the Lok Sabha in February 1965 that "Pakistan had committed 390 violations (firing, intrusion and improvement of defences) along the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir between December 24 and February 15". He added, "Pakistan had fired on 528 occasions between December 1 and February 15 along the ceasefire line and the international border in Jammu and Kashmir; nine persons were killed and 20 wounded on the Indian side" (*The Times of India* 1965a).

The trouble spots that were triggering tension between India and Pakistan at the border, excluding Jammu and Kashmir, can be brought into two major categories: disputed areas and un-demarcated areas. The first category included Kanjarkot in the Kutch-Sind border area and Cooch Behar Dahagram enclave bordering West Bengal and East Pakistan. There were some attempts in the pre-war period to solve the dispute over these borders, though they were largely inconclusive. The second category included Lathitilla Dumahari sector of the Assam-East Pakistan border. Exchange of fire between Indian and Pakistani armed forces was a frequent affair in both of these categories of trouble spots.

Though they remained largely inconsequential, some of the India-Pak border problems had the potential to escalate into larger armed conflict; of course in conjunction with other problems. The Rann of Kutch conflict of April 1965 was indeed one such incident. The India-Pak dispute over Kutch-Sind boundary emerged after the partition and

accession of the state of Kutch to the Indian Union on 4th May 1948, as the partition commission chose to ignore "regional territorial contention between the province of Sind and the princely state of Kutch". Pakistan argued that "Sind had exercised jurisdiction over the northern half of the Rann since the British annexation in 1843 and historical records suggest it was indeed part of Sind, which now forms part of Pakistan". India repudiated Pakistan's argument by claiming that "the Kutch-Sind boundary was undisputed, except for a small section, the right to which need to be settled…[and] since the Rann was part of the state of Kutch, the accession of the later to India made the Rann also part of India"(Misra 2010: 82-83). Though the dispute remained unsettled, the marshland of Rann of Kutch was not strategically important for both of these countries until Indian geologists proposed to explore the area for oil, in 1959; therefore, till then both of them were maintaining only a few armed police posts in this region. However, in early 1965, when anti-India sentiments surged in the country following some problems related to Kashmir, Pakistan began to intensify its military presence in the region and later, on 9th April 1965, it captured "an Indian police post [Sardar Post] near the Kanjarkot fort and claimed all of the Rann of Kutch" (Hiro 2015: 178). When Pakistan captured Indian police post, Indian Army rushed to the spot and took over the defence of Kutch border; naturally, Indian army's attempts to recover the lost posts intensified the conflict.

The analysis of the selected newspaper discourse revealed that, during the early stages of Kutch conflict, one of the dominant narratives in India was that with the Kutch provocations, Pakistan is attempting to destroy India's image in the Western and Eastern capitals. Many in India asserted that Pakistan's target is to block the Western aid to India which began after the Chinese aggression in 1962 by projecting it as an aggressor that is threatening peace and stability in the region. They insisted that Pakistan's primary objective is to create anti-India sentiments in international politics and thereby limit the Soviet and US assistance to India's military build-up. For instance, *The Times of India* (1965b) observed in an editorial analysing Pakistan President Ayub Khan's trip to Moscow and Washington that "his [Ayub's] primary aim in this is to dissuade both [US and the Soviet Union] from building up India's military strength on the plea that this would compromise the chances of stability and peace in the area". In a different editorial,

the same newspaper asserted that "with the Kutch aggression Pakistan has possibly sought to activate the Indo-Pakistan border in order to draw attention to the 'dangers' of military assistance to India and the Kashmir question on the eve of President Ayub's meeting with President of the United States" (*The Times of India* 1965c). In this context, *The Statesman* (1965) observed that "heightened tension with India can serve Pakistan in two ways: it can be used as a smokescreen for Pakistan's increasing collusion with China, and it can be employed as a handle to press the persistent Pakistani objection to US military aid to India". Extending the view, *The Indian Express* (1965) stated in its editorial that,

> Pindi's [Rawalpindi] border pressures, timed to coincide with President Ayub's Odyssey, which began in Peking in March and which will culminate at the second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in June (with stop-offs en route in Moscow and Washington), are therefore not unexpected. They are likely to increase in tempo and intensity during the next two months until the Pakistan Head of State arrives in Algiers. President Ayub is out to prove a point. This is to hold up India before the capitals of the Eastern and Western world, in Asia and Africa, as an aggressor calculated at all times to disturb the placid calm of peace-loving nations such as Pakistan. In Peking, President Ayub was preaching to the converted, who indeed had already assumed the role of fellow-conspirators. How far the President succeeded in eroding India's image in Moscow has still to be revealed, but if he failed it could not be for want of trying. Washington marks a crucial stage-post in his journey, for here the flow of Western aid to India will be determined largely by the conviction he carries of India's aggressiveness in the corridors of power running from the White House to the Pentagon and the Capitol. If all goes well, Algiers should mark the climacteric.

Along with this international dimension, Indian media narratives during this context asserted two other possible reasons for Pakistani adventure in Kutch: one is the "near certainty of oil being found in this inhospitable area" and the other is "the outrages in Kutch might be used by Pakistan as a cover for some bigger military incident elsewhere, probably in Kashmir". They insisted that "Pakistan is getting increasingly frenzied about Kashmir's progressive integration with the rest of the Indian Union" and the steady increase in Pakistani violations of the ceasefire is a clear indication of its growing concern with Kashmir's approach towards Indian Union (*The Statesman* 1965). In addition to these, some observers argued that a subsidiary objective of the Pakistani attacks on Kutch was to disrupt the then planned Moscow visit of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri (Malhotra 1965). Later, during his visit to Moscow, Shastri stated that

"the Chinese and Pakistani aggression was no border conflict; it was an attack on the very concept of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence and anti-colonialism for which both India and the Soviet Union stood" (Malhotra 1965a). Following the Moscow visit, Shastri argued that "essentially the trouble lies in the fact that Pakistan, like China, was jealous of India's swift economic progress along a peaceful and democratic path. And both wished to place obstructions in the way of this country's progress" (*The Statesman* 1965b).

With the Kutch conflict, the view that the dispute between India and Pakistan cannot be limited to the Kashmir question began to become dominant in Indian public discourse; it made many realise that Indian policy towards Pakistan must be something more than one of merely responding to Pakistan's military moves along the borders and Rawalpindi's diplomatic moves on international stage. In an editorial published in this context, *The Times of India* (1965d) observed that "there is some reason to fear that New Delhi has at no time examined the question of Indo-Pakistani relations in its entirety. There has been a tendency to regard this question almost solely in the context of Kashmir question". It added, "the time has surely come to make a comprehensive assessment of India's relations with Pakistan in terms of the national interest". However, the impact of Kutch conflict in Indian narratives on Pakistani threat was limited; as India-Pak border tension was a regular affair, there was a tendency to perceive the incident as an extension of it. In an editorial published in this context, *The Hindu* (1965b) explained that,

> There is no need to take an unduly alarmist view of Pakistani moves which are probably politically motivated. It should be pointed out, however, that they have chosen an area for major operations which gives them considerable strategic advantage. Most of the 3500 square miles of Kutch which they claim will be under water in a month's time, and meanwhile it is a marshy area which hampers heavy military build-up on our side. This is a challenge that has to be accepted and it is for our military commanders to decide how best to strike back and where it should be done.

Though the incident was largely being perceived as an extension of relentless border tension, the demand for retaliatory action against Pakistan was prevalent in India during this period. Definitely, opposition parties were effectively using this opportunity to criticise the government and demand for large scale retaliation against Pakistan, without considering its potential consequences. They challenged Prime Minister Shastri both

inside and outside the parliament and projected him as a spineless leader. Such criticism often forced the Prime Minister to make bellicose statements against Pakistan, even though that was against India's policy of finding a peaceful solution to border disputes (Khanna 1965). As *The Indian Express* (1965e) observed in an editorial "[India's] known emphasis on the need for economic development—a process which can be followed only through peaceful means—[was a] proof of its aversion to military adventures of any kind". It is important to note that the security threat to India during this time was not constrained to any particular point of the border. India's entire land border was under grievous security threat from both China and Pakistan. Therefore, the probability for ending in a fiasco was high for any impetuous military adventure of India under the existing circumstances. Observing the squabble in Parliament, *The Statesman* (1965d) wrote in its editorial that,

> The voice of discord has been raised again in Parliament. Only a few days ago there was an impressive display of unity of purpose. Since then more familiar habits have intervened; if they are not checked in time they could become a source of comfort to Pakistan. The Army has done its deeds admirably well. It has made superior forces of the enemy pay dearly for every inch that they gained; it has left no one any room for hope that Indian Territory is [a] fruit ripe for the plucking. But matching deeds by the politicians have been short-lived; signs of disunity have started to reappear.

Denouncing impetuous reactions of Opposition parties and supporting Prime Minister Shastri, *The Indian Express* (1965c) stated in its editorial in this context that,

> Mr Shastri's role in the present situation is delicate and difficult. It does not advance the country's cause nor consolidate its interests by sniping at the Prime Minister when the vital need is for the country to rally behind him as one man. Patriotism is not monopoly of any one individual, group or party and neither vehemence nor vituperation enhances it.

Blaming the irresponsible attitude of Opposition parties at a time of national crisis, *The Indian Express* (1965e) wrote in another editorial that,

> To engage in this hour of danger in petty arguments to prove that Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri or Mr Nehru had failed to live up to the cantankerous philosophies of their opponents can only be described as deplorable and utterly wanting in the spirit which should inspire the country today. These quarrels can surely be put in the cold storage for the time being, and in as much as the Opposition are not prepared to do so they will be judged by the country in the proper light. So far as the Government is concerned, it should [be] rest assured that the country on the

whole is behind the Prime Minister in his determination to defend our frontiers through peaceful methods if possible and through other means if necessary.

Problematising the demands for retaliatory action against Pakistan, *The Hindu* (1965c) wrote in its editorial that, "a number of members of Parliament found it hard to understand why the Government of India had been so slow in repelling the initial acts of aggression on our territory. Some of them called for offensive action against Pakistan not only in Kutch but elsewhere to teach Pakistan the lesson that it cannot trifle with India's security". It added, "speeches and questions of this type do not take into account the political aspects of the conflict with Pakistan nor consequence that may flow from an extension of the military aspect. On the one hand, Pakistan has the support of China in its border forays and, on the other hand, it gets benefit of the doubt from the United States and Britain, with whom it has had alliances for the past ten years". Reminding the significance of self-control that all political parties should exercise in such context, it added,

> Border conflicts between neighbouring states are unfortunately all too common nowadays and there is no need to take too tragic a view of the constant skirmishes that Pakistan organises. The Kutch incursion is bigger than usual, but we are quite capable of repelling it. What is important is that all political parties should exercise self-control, neither pressing for large scale retaliation nor advocating a policy of unlimited appeasement. The political presentation of our case is almost as important as the military aspect and we should take care to see that the outside world learns the truth about the Pakistani attack on our soil.

In this context, *The Statesman* (1965a) reminded the critics that "tension on the borders, whether Eastern or Western, might serve Pakistan's interests; it does not serve India's. This is sometimes overlooked by those who urge instant retaliation for every provocation that Pakistan chooses to serve up with hot words or guns". Similarly, *The Indian Express* (1965) observed in its editorial that "India, familiar with this pantomime, need not be excessively disturbed: but knowing the pattern, her Government and people must be prepared for all eventualities. In such situations the ancient counsel of trusting in God and keeping one's power dry could not be bettered".

Nevertheless, counter views suggesting that Kutch conflict is largely different from other border skirmishes between India and Pakistan also had prevalence in Indian public

discourse during this period. For example, K. Rangaswamy (1965) wrote in an opinion piece after the incident that,

> The battle of Kutch has ended. An undeclared cease-fire is in operation. If the incident had been just another of those never-ending border intrusions, there would have been no occasion for a formal cease-fire. But here Pakistan wanted to establish a right to the area at the point of the bayonet. Friends had to intervene to put some sense into the Pakistani leaders. Pakistan was forcibly reminded that there were civilised ways of settling a border dispute.

In the context of Kutch incident, problematising India's consistent mode of defence against intruders, many in India argued that enemies know that there will not be any serious retaliation from the Indian side even if they intrude into its territory and assert a claim over it, and that is the reason why China and Pakistan continuously create trouble at the Indian border. They asserted that "India appears to Pakistan today as a flabby giant, distracted by numerous problems, constantly questioning and divided within itself" (Bhatia 1965). The proponents of this discourse wanted India to give a befitting reply to the aggressors. They insisted that instead of being defensive, India should let them know that force will be met with force. Analysing India's approach towards border conflict, Maharaj Chopra (1965) wrote in an article titled 'Rethinking Needed on Border Defence' published by *The Indian Express* that,

> There is no place to recapitulate our border experience with Pakistan which includes loss of territory, abduction of men, capture of posts and terrorisation of frontier populations, not to say aid to Nagas. But the question is, how is Pakistan with one third of India's resources and an absurd geographical personality capable of such bravado? This, it is said, has something to do with her military alliances or, currently, her collusion with China. It may even be due to some strange primitiveness of Central Asia, once radiated by Genghis Khan and now emanating from Mao. But the real explanation may lie somewhere else, in the fact that India has put up little show of strength anywhere except in Parliament with the help of a fat defence budget…Sometime attack is superior to defence. India should threaten two posts of the aggressor for every one threatened by him—as far Pakistan is concerned, there are many such posts up from Poonch to Gilgit and down from Cooch-Behar to Chittagong.

Those who were demanding that India should have aggressive approach against intruders argued that, as China did in 1962, Pakistan also humiliated India with their Kutch aggression. They added, "only strong nations are respected and that if India was to stop being pushed around it must rearm further, build up an army of three to four million men

that could take on both Pakistan and China and, if necessary, cut back on development and postpone the fourth Plan for a few years" (Verghese 1965a).

However, the supporters of India's conventional mode of defence asserted that a nation's first defence lies in its foreign policy and its ultimate defence in its economic strength and morale. Challenging the demand for postponement of development initiatives for some years in the context of growing threat from Pakistan, they argued that "development is defence both directly, in so far as it creates conditions for the support of a larger and more sophisticated defence machine, and indirectly, to the extent that it underpins political stability and popular morale through economic betterment" (Varghese 1965a). Moreover, they reminded the critics that "the Indo-Pakistan differences are certainly not beyond settlement" (Verghese 1965).

In this context, for problematising the demand for aggressive approach against Pakistan, many sought the help of India's constitutional directives for settling international disputes. They asserted 'arbitration' clause in the directive principles of state policy to demand for peaceful settlement of border disputes with Pakistan. For instance, challenging those who demand for retaliation against Pakistan in the context of Kutch aggression, in an article published by *The Times of India,* B. G. Verghese (1965a) wrote, "Article 51 (d) of the Indian Constitution, under the heading 'promotion of international peace and security' says that 'the state shall endeavour to encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration'". He reminded the critics that "the defence of India lies in more than a mere show of armed might. Its political and economic aspects cannot be ignored". He added, "security lies in combining all three elements through appropriate policy planning and in knowing when and how to deploy each of them in accordance with a single grand design". Moreover, the advocates of peaceful approach insisted that those who demanded aggressive action against Pakistan did not consider the political aspect of the conflict and they ignore consequences that may flow from a military adventure. An editorial published by *The Hindu* (1965c) after the Kutch conflict explained well this argument. It read,

> The long and complicated Indo-Pakistan borders have not all been demarcated and there are disputes in certain areas which can be exploited to give a wrong picture to the outside world. In the case of Kutch, we stand by the historic frontier

between Sind and Kutch, but Pakistan refers to other criteria. Rawalpindi may claim it has a case, but there is no excuse for moving into areas of Kutch unilaterally before coming to the conference table. This is contrary not only to the ground rules of 1960, but of the United Nations Charter. We need not take it for granted, as some members of Parliament seem to do, that the Western Powers will continue forever to condone every act of Pakistani aggression. It is necessary to convince them as well as the rest of the world that Pakistan has gone far beyond any disputed border and is attempting to seize large slices of Indian territory. It is necessary also to make it clear that it is not India that refuses to negotiate. These requirements of correctitude in international relations need not inhibit us, however, from striking hard at invading forces who appear well within our territory and this is exactly what the Indian Army has done.

Though Kutch conflict had sparked demand for retaliatory action against Pakistan, the Indian media narratives on Pakistani threat did not undergo any significant transformation during this period. Perhaps, the most important reason for the lack of media hype on threat of Pakistan was that, in Indian view, Pakistan was nothing more than a weak opportunist dictatorship that holds neither resources nor capability to challenge India which is geographically more than three times larger and economically and militarily much superior to it. Indian media often asserted that "Pakistan by itself is not a mighty adversary and that it is not necessary to lose sleep over its military capacity to do us great damage; Pakistani aggression would constitute a danger only if it had the support of greater nations, like the United States or Britain" (*The Hindu* 1965d). Maharaj Chopra (1965a) wrote in an article titled 'An Estimate of the Power of Pakistan', published by *The Indian Express*,

> Pakistan is a fraction of India from the point of view of area or population. She does not have much of an economic power at present, not even potential. For a good 10 years her internal politics have been a matter of joke, and for another eight years it has been monopolised by a militarised clique. Her armed forces are not particularly strong, do not have much of a striking power and are divided over two fronts. Geographically, there could be nothing more absurd than a Pakistani State. How does this nation, which is not even a fourth-rate Power and is vulnerable in many sectors, continue to occupy part of Kashmir and now make a bid for Kutch?

Precisely, various issues related to the border questions were maintaining an atmosphere of tension between India and Pakistan during the pre-war period. The issues related to the Pakistan-China friendship can also be seen as their extension.

3. *Pakistan-China Collusion*

Though the image of Pakistan was that of a weak politically unstable country in Indian public discourse, China-Pakistan friendship often figured as a greater security threat to the country in Indian media narratives during the pre-war period. Definitely it was India's humiliating experience with China at the Himalayan frontier in 1962 which prompted such narratives. The tension between India and China became irredeemable after the Chinese aggression and unilateral withdrawal; after the war, India refused to have any negotiation on Chinese terms as it believed that such negotiation will be a "confirmation of the image of India that China [was] portraying—that of a defeated nation" (Dutt 1965). Moreover, India wanted to resist the Chinese influence in the Asian region. However, Pakistan was busy in convincing the West that there is no way ahead in international politics without accepting China's significance in the region. Having a better relationship with China was a strategic imperative for Pakistan, as its fundamental objective was to challenge India's dominance in the region.

In Indian perspective, there was nothing in common between China and Pakistan other than enmity towards India to become an incentive for developing friendship between these countries (Kagal 1965a). Therefore, Pakistan's growing relationship with China, an avowed enemy of India ever since its military debacle at the Himalayan frontier in 1962, was a major concern in Indian media narratives during the pre-war years. A tendency for suspecting Chinese hands in every move against India and for categorising everyone who leans towards China as an anti-Indian was explicit in in this period (Rangaswamy 1965a). On this ground, China was figured in many Indian media narratives as a major source of inspiration to Pakistan for its every anti-Indian move in international politics as well as for its attempts to create trouble at the border. This tendency for aggrandising Chinese role often invited criticism from various corners (Khanna 1965). Indian media's obsession with China-Pak relationship can be well-revealed with the help of a sarcastic editorial published by *The Indian Express* (1965a) in early 1965. The editorial titled "Bulls of China" wrote,

> According to a news item, China has asked Pakistan for pedigree bulls and cows to be airlifted to Peking, and PIA [Pakistan International Airlines] is considering whether to send them as ordinary cargo on one of its regular flights or to make

special arrangements. Good fortune, it seems, make a man acquainted with strange bed-fellows, even more than ill fortune. Currently Pakistan and Red China seem to be basking in the beatitude of bhai-bhaism, and in a fine frenzy of fraternal fervour Brother Mao has asked, of all things, for Pak bulls.

Perhaps it is, after all, not so strange, for the bull and China are old friends, and the bull will find himself in his natural element. The bull proverbially revels in a China shop, and he will now have the pick of Chinese crockery to play with. But he should better be careful lest, instead of revelling in Chinese crockery as he hopes, he will find himself in the mouth of the Chinese crocodile. PIA needs also to be warned, for long before Russian and US aeronauts approached the moon the cow had jumped over the moon. Finding themselves in space on high altitudes, Pak bulls and cows might be tempted to take a leap in the dark, and jeopardize the safety of the aircraft.

The bull dog breed of John Bull is now a pathetic memory of the past. Ever since Britain parted with its imperial heritage, and the last of Imperial Romans had, in his finest hour, to make way for the rule of miners and engine drivers, John Bull's hours and hooves have lost their goring and stampeding power. A more aggressive breed of bulls and bull dogs may now emerge as a result of this proposed union of Pak bulls with the Chinese cow. The only hope lies in the moody Russian bear, who may yet curb the antics of the wild progeny of the Sino-Pak union.

The root of India's obsession with Sino-Pak relationship can be located in the failures of 1962. The military debacle at the Himalayan frontier seriously affected India's image in international politics. With the defeat, India had lost its status as a major Asian power and leader of the newly independent Afro-Asian countries: New Delhi's opinion on crucial international issues no longer carried any weight in world politics (Rao 1965). Referring to India's image in African countries, A. N. Dar (1965) wrote in an article that "to most countries in this part of the world the Indian image is that of an old man leaning on a stick and, by inference, incapable of being angry even if slighted". He added, "[t]his image has slowly built up after the Chinese attack and Mr Nehru's death, followed by last year's famine, the language riots and the poor showing over the Sheikh Abdulla's affair"[7]. Other countries began to fulfil the role that once India had been playing as a link between two competing blocs of the Cold War international politics. Pakistan was one of the major countries that tried to benefit from India's fall: it began to be accepted in the West in "international do-gooders' role" which India fulfilled so effectively from 1947 to 1962 (Das 1965). China-Pakistan relationship had evolved in this background, fuelled by

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[7] He was referring to the anti-Hindi struggle led by DMK in Tamil Nadu in early 1964, and the issues related to the release of Sheikh Abdulla in April 1964 (See, Hardgrave, Jr. 1965; Guha 2004).

their shared enmity towards India. Therefore, for Indian media and opinion makers, this development was nothing more than a strategic collaboration of two enemy countries to form a common front against India. Observing the Sino-Pak relationship, some of them argued that "incandescent hatred of another country as Pakistan has for India is a most unsound motivation for any country's foreign policy" (*The Statesman* 1965c). Analysing the pro-Chinese trends in Pakistan's foreign policy, *The Hindu* (1965e) wrote in its editorial,

> The Chinese have made no secret of their objective of eliminating American influence and power from all parts of the world, especially Asia and Africa. Since Pakistan depends heavily on the United States for economic and military support, we may take it that it does not share the Chinese animosity towards America. Why Rawalpindi then attempted to exploit Chinese diplomatic and military strength? To weaken India is the obvious answer to this question.

Sino-Pakistan agreement for settling the border between Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Xinjiang province of China established India's concern over this relationship. From the very beginning of Sino-Pakistan negotiation for settling the border, India argued that Pakistan has no right to enter in such a negotiation or conclude agreements with any country for settling the boundary of Kashmir and India will never accept any agreement reached between China and Pakistan in this regard. India insisted that Pakistan's presence in Kashmir is based on aggression and illegal occupation and they have no *locus standi* over the region. Ignoring Indian protests China and Pakistan signed an agreement to settle the border and Pakistan ceded 2000 square miles of territory in the area to China. In Indian view Pakistan's motive in concluding the agreement was to "share the fruits of aggression with the People's Republic of China and exploit the Sino-Indian differences in pursuit of Pakistan's hostile policies against India" (Sharma 1965).

Assessing the Sino-Pakistan relationship, Morarji Desai (1965) wrote in an article published by *The Indian Express* in early 1965 that "Pakistan has nothing in common with China and yet, having no regard for the nature of the means it can utilize for achieving its aims, made friends with China on its own terms". He added, "[the motive of Pakistan] was to utilize the invasion of India by China for getting Kashmir and whatever else Pakistan wanted from this country". Explaining the driving force of Chinese enmity towards India, he stated that,

China has always been an imperialist country as can be seen from its past history of many centuries. The present Communist regime of China has not only welcomed this inheritance but is fanatically more determined about it. It wants to expand on all sides. It has aims in several countries in South-East Asia, and also wants huge chunks of territory from the USSR. It wants to show that it is the Power which will dominate the whole world….China has also gone the Communist way and wants to see that the only progress for humanity is the Communist way. India believes firmly in the democratic way of life and also believes that humanity can never progress and be happy unless individual freedom is safeguarded. It has, therefore, chosen the democratic way of progress. The growing success of the Indian experiment is a great danger to the Chinese communist way of life.

In the conclusion, Desai argued that "their main motive is to humiliate India so that it is relegated to a secondary position and loses the goodwill of the neighbouring Asian countries and incidentally of other nations of the world". Definitely it was not an isolated personal opinion in that period; such narratives were prevalent in Indian media. Observing the growing friendship between Pakistan and China, in an opinion piece published by *The Indian Express*, Shiv Shastri (1965b) wrote that "the military strength, which the West has provided to Pakistan for 'fighting communism', is now available to the Chinese communists in their efforts to further subvert the territorial integrity of India". However, some observers argued that Pakistan's friendly relationship with China is a tactical move against Anglo-US military assistance to India and their failure to compel New Delhi to surrender at least the Kashmir Valley to Rawalpindi (Jain 1965). Asserting the fact that there is no military alliance between the two, they argued that there is no need for India to worry much about the Sino-Pakistan relationship. For instance, problematising India's over-emphasis on the significance of Sino-Pakistan relationship, Maharaj K. Chopra (1965a) wrote in an opinion piece that "while not minimizing the dangers of collusion, we must remember that China has enough troubles of her own elsewhere, that she has done little to save North Vietnam from being destroyed, and that she is not likely to support militarily any action anywhere other than on her own frontiers and for her own security". Similarly, explaining the Pakistani objectives in leaning towards China, *The Times of India* (1965e) wrote in its editorial,

Pakistan's policy of friendship towards China is no longer wholly inspired by its animus against India. China's first nuclear explosion was perhaps the turning point in its attitude. Since then influential organs of public opinion in Karachi have described China as the "natural and logical leader" of Asia….President

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Ayub Khan's motives in wooing China are complex. The desire to secure Peking's support in his efforts to isolate India in the Afro-Asian world is only one of them. At the moment he appears to be more interested in projecting himself as a mediator after the style of Mr Nehru in the early fifties. He has offered to mediate in the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia and has maintained a non-committal attitude regarding the merits of the dispute. After his current visit to China and projected visits to the Soviet Union and the United States, it is reasonably certain that he will seek to play an important role in any negotiations over Vietnam. Whatever the popular impression, it has not been too difficult for him to reconcile his membership of SEATO and CENTO with friendship for China. As early as the first Bandung Conference the Chinese accepted Pakistan's assurance that its adherence to the West sponsored alliance was in no way directed against them. That is one reason why Peking studiously refused to follow Moscow's lead in supporting India's claim to Kashmir. After some mild expression of displeasure, Washington has reconciled itself to President Ayub Khan's cultivation of friendly relations with China. In fact Pakistan's bargaining position with the United States has visibly improved and even the Soviet Union is showing greater interest in better relations with it. The Indian Government will be making a grievous mistake if it fails to draw the appropriate conclusion from the changes in the alignment of forces in this part of the world.

The major concern of those who were sceptical of the Sino-Pakistan relationship was that whether there will be a situation in which India needs to face both of them simultaneously at war front, though there was no military alliance between them. Their question was what if China restarts its aggression while Pakistan makes trouble at one side. Definitely, no one doubted India's capability to resist Pakistani aggression, even along an extended frontier. However, they argued, "it is rather rash to pronounce our fitness for a war with Pakistan and China at the same time". They reminded, "in fact, even a small diversion which the Chinese might create in the north would be a severe handicap to a major operation against Pakistan". Therefore, they demanded that India should not hesitate to ask for American military support for resisting the Chinese aggression, if such a situation arises. In an article published by *The Indian Express*, Prem Bhatia (1965a) wrote,

> We know that the USA will not aid either India or Pakistan in bilateral conflict, but the USA should be made to see that a conflict between India and Pakistan may not remain bilateral. A clear pronouncement by Washington that, if the Chinese tried to fish in troubled waters, they would not be allowed to do so could do a lot of good. It would almost certainly prevent Pakistan from undertaking a hazardous adventure, and it might deter the Chinese from causing difficulties in the north.

For a section of Indian media and opinion makers, the major concern in this period was Pakistan's lack of ideological commitment towards its Western allies. Prioritising the significance of ideological politics of the Cold War, they saw Pakistan's attempts for developing relationship with the communist China as an irresponsible approach of a Western ally involved in two major anti-communist coalitions, SEATO and CENTO. Asserting this point, they wrote that "with whom is Pakistan aligned – with its good friend China, or with the West to whom it is supposed to be bound by two military alliances" (Moraes 1965). Moreover, on this ground, they mostly denounced Pakistan's foreign policy as unscrupulous and unprincipled. Due to such unrealistic approach for understanding Pakistan's foreign policy, these Indian observers failed to have any realistic assessment of Pak strategies. Perhaps, this unrealistic approach was dominant in India's official circle too during this period. An editorial article published by *The Times of India* (1965f) provides valid inputs for developing such an assumption. Problematising India's foreign policy, the article stated,

> It is small comfort to denounce Pakistan's foreign policy as unscrupulous and unprincipled or triumphantly to point out the apparent inconsistency between membership in SEATO and CENTO and Rawalpindi's dalliance with communist China. The point is that inconsistency or not, Pakistan is in fact a member of western-sponsored alliances and does in fact maintain friendly relations with Peking. These facts have not reduced Pakistan's capacity to make itself felt in the Afro-Asian world and not necessarily in relation only to Kashmir. With the United States on the one side which considers that India is simply one more Asian State that has fallen into line and with the Afro-Asian world on the other drifting beyond the reach of New Delhi's indeterminate foreign policy, India's position today cannot be more characterless than it is.

Countering Indian criticism, Pakistan often asserted that Sino-Pakistan relationship is not aimed at India and settling the border with China was part of their policy of strengthening neighbourly relations. They accused India of 'big-power chauvinism' and argued that 'confused and irrational' policies of India hinder Pakistan's attempts to establish good neighbourly relations with India (Sharma 1965a). However, in Indian view, it was Pakistan which created a stumbling block in the way of peaceful relationship between these two countries. Asserting this point, *The Hindu* (1965e) wrote in an editorial that,

> The United States, Britain too, have long taken the view that Pakistan and India should settle their outstanding problems and co-operate against the threat from

China, which was shown to be real in 1962. New Delhi has done its best to meet Pakistan half way and to hold out the hand of co-operation. But Pakistan has not given up the idea of territorial gains at India's expense. It is this over-riding objective that had led Pakistan into the Chinese camp; it is a policy which has failed to bring any worthwhile dividend.

Explaining why tension between India and Pakistan persists, Shiv Shastri (1965) wrote in article published by *The Indian Express* that,

Pakistan would want to "conquer" India and bring it under Islamic rule. India, on the other hand, welcomed any form of association with Pakistan that would vindicate the principle of secularism and promote a common foreign policy by both countries. It is, of course, well known that Pakistani leaders imagine themselves to be the descendants of the Mughals and that, to emulate their "ancestors", they would like to re-establish the old empire by a "re-conquest" of India. In proportion as such re-conquest is unrealistic, there is the manifestation of hate and anger – sometimes tinged with fear because of its own guilt complexes.

Sino-Pakistan relationship was a major topic of discussion in India when Pakistan attacked Indian police posts in Kutch. In this context, many Indian leaders, belonging to both Congress and Opposition parties, argued that "the border incidents in Kutch and other regions, were, no doubt, started at the instigation of China" (*The Times of India* 1965g). In its editorial, *The Indian Express* (1965d) stated that "in collusion with their Chinese friends, the Pakistanis have embarked on a common design of needling India at various points on her long, straggling frontier and it may even be, in other ways, within our borders". It is important to note that there were some similarities between Pakistan's attack in Kutch and Chinese invasion at the Himalayan frontier in 1962. In both of these cases, India was on the defensive side, and lost part of its territory to the invaders. Observing the similarity, *The Times of India* (1965h) wrote in its editorial that "it would perhaps be helpful to regard the Pakistani incursion not as an isolated military operation but as a politically inspired manoeuvre in which the use of force is only one element". It added, "there is every possibility that in adopting this technique, President Ayub has taken a leaf out of China's book since in NEFA and elsewhere these are the tactics which Peking consistently used". Similarly, when Pakistan proposed that both sides should withdraw 20 miles from the disputed border as a precondition for holding negotiation, *The Hindu* (1965b) wrote in its editorial that "this tactic is obviously copied from Chinese diplomacy over the Himalayan border and is equally fantastic since it forces us

to withdraw from territory that Pakistan claims while India had claimed nothing in the area from which Pakistan is supposed to recede". In this context, asserting that various foreign observers also suspected the Chinese involvement in Pakistan's aggression in Kutch, *The Times of India* (1965i) wrote,

> The actual frontier issue would hardly have led to fighting on this scale at this time without the influence of outside factors – and the most obvious of these is the recent display of cordiality between Pakistan and China. India may well believe that the intrusion of which she accuses Pakistan has been made at Peking's instigation. However that may be, it is plain that conflict between the two Powers of the subcontinent can profit only China.

Chinese action during Pakistan's Kutch adventure was indeed justifying Indian sceptics' concern over Sino-Pakistan relations. While India was busy in defending Pak aggression at Kutch, China intruded into "what the Chinese Government itself had conceded as indisputable Indian territory in the Ladakh sector of the Sino-Indian border" (*The Indian Express* 1965b). Perhaps, that was a psychological move to divert Indian attention and resources, carefully planned by both China and Pakistan.

Definitely, not everyone in India suspected Chinese involvement in Pakistan's attack on Kutch. Reminding the long history of Pakistani attempts for creating trouble along the border, Nandan Kagal (1965a) observed in an article published by *The Times of India* that,

> President Aub Khan and Mr Bhuto are neither the agents nor the stooges of Peking and they have always been willing to create tension along the Indo-Pakistani border for reasons which have nothing to do with the Sino-Indian conflict. It is a different matter that their capacity to create difficulties for New Delhi has increased as a result of the Sino-Indian dispute. The purpose of Pakistan's aggressive attitude along its borders with India is the fairly obvious one of probing this country's military preparedness and the Indian Government's political determination. Rawalpindi perhaps calculates that if it can keep up the tension long enough New Delhi might begin to lose its nerve and subsequently become more amenable to the kind of pressures that the United States and Britain have exerted in the past for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It knows that despite its flirtation with Peking, Washington will not find it easy to alter the American stand on Kashmir if and when the issue is revived in the Security Council.

Precisely, the analysis of pre-war Indian media narratives reveals that Pakistan's growing relationship with China was observed suspiciously by Indian media and opinion makers

during this period as anti-China sentiments were prevalent in the country due to its setback at the Himalayan frontier in 1962. Of course, it is not negating that the fundamental aim of the Sino-Pakistan axis was believed to be crating troubles for India. It merely asserts that being figured as enemies' preparation against India in media narratives, the Sino-Pak relationship might have influenced the shaping of Indian public's perception of threat in this context. Based on the pre-war Indian media narratives on China-Pakistan relationship, it can be assumed that Pakistan's relationship with China was a major factor which was adversely affecting Indian discursive image of Pakistan in this period.

4. *Pakistan and the West*

Analysing Indian media narratives during the pre-war period, it can be learned that Pakistan's membership in the Western anti-communist alliances such as SEATO and CENTO was perceived in India in different ways, in terms of observer's ideological inclinations. While those who had pro-West views took it as a positive development in Pakistan's foreign policy, the supporters of non-alignment shared mixed opinion and the left sympathisers took it as a serious mistake from a poor third world country. However, beyond the ideological predisposition, Indian observers had largely shared concern regarding the enormous supply of Western military aid to Pakistan. Most of them worried that Pakistan would use its military leverage derived from the Western assistance against India, if they see favourable circumstances. Many of them argued that the sole objective of Pakistan in being part of the Western alliances is to secure free supply of American weapons that they can use against India and they are least interested in resisting communist expansionism. When Pakistan used American weapons against India during the Kutch conflict in early 1965 and later in the war it is proved that their concern was very much valid. In the context of Pakistani aggression on Kutch, Shiv Shastri (1965a) wrote in an article published by *The Indian Express* that,

> Western policy towards Pakistan must be judged by Pakistan's conduct towards India. For many years we have been lulled with American assurances that arming of Pakistan was intended as a defensive measure against communist attack or subversion. We, of course, knew that Pakistan cared precious little for communism one way or the other, but that its main purpose was to acquire enough power to deal a mortal blow to India. Nevertheless we hoped that the

USA would make at least some efforts to prevent such an outcome. American response to Pakistan's use of American weapon in the Rann of Kutch shows that even such slender hopes are ill-founded. Under these circumstances there is no alternative for us but to reassess our policies and to prepare ourselves for fundamental departmental departures from the past.

As a benefit of being a member in the Western camp of the Cold War international politics, Pakistan enjoyed support of the United States and Britain on various issues, including Kashmir. Even its attempts for developing good relationship with China, by exploiting Sino-Indian tension at the Himalayan frontier, did not change the West's approach towards Pakistan. In early 1965, T. V. Parasuram (1965) observed in an opinion piece that "the USA is still playing favourites and there is no doubt that Pakistan's Peking orientation has not caused any strains on her relations with the USA". Such a strong relationship between the West and Pakistan definitely owed much to India's attempts for developing a 'non-aligned' third way in a troubled bipolar Cold War international politics. Though India often asserted that 'non-alignment' does not mean neutrality in every international issue, it never succeeded in convincing the West that non-alignment is not essentially anti-West (Parasuram 1965). Moreover, India's inclination towards the Soviet Union also affected the Western approaches towards India. It is on this ground, even though India was in direct conflict with a major communist country, Western sympathies largely remained with Pakistan.

Though the 1962 war was an opportunity for India to develop a better relationship with the West, it largely failed to exploit the situation, especially due to its reluctance to have any compromise on the policy of non-alignment. Moreover, Pakistan was to an extent successful in convincing the West that as long as Kashmir issue remains unresolved, arming India against China would affect the balance of power in South Asia. In the context of Sino-Indian war, both the United States and Britain had tried for settling the Indo-Pakistani differences with a view of forging a common defence line against communist expansionism in the subcontinent. The Western efforts for finding a solution for Kashmir crisis and bringing both India and Pakistan together against communist China failed to have any positive results due to uncompromising position of both of these countries in the Kashmir dispute. However, many observers argued that, it is the West's favouring of Pakistan, instead of adopting a neutral and unbiased approach towards the

dispute, which failed their attempts at settling Indo-Pakistani differences. Asserting this point, Frank Moraes (1965) observed in an article that "they [US and Britain] pretend to hold the balance between India and Pakistan, but the scales are always heavily weighted in Pakistan's favour". In the context of Kutch dispute, referring to the Western mediation attempts, *The Indian Express* (1965c) wrote in its editorial,

> In the past Anglo-American efforts for mediation, notably on Kashmir, have foundered on the feeling that the Anglo-American concept of holding the scales even between the two sides expressed itself in the reputedly Irish formula of "swerving neither to partiality on the one hand nor to impartiality on the other. The suspicion lingers. On the Rann of Kutch the feeling persists in India that the Anglo-Americans are more interested in stalling the crisis than in solving it.

It is the West's favouritism to Pakistan which led many in India to consider that having a good relationship with the Soviet Union is better than depending on the Western assistance for fighting against the Chinese expansionism. They argued that "treating the Pakistanis as the 'chowkidars' of the Indian subcontinent, the USA has supplied heavy equipment to Pakistan, dismissing India's fears by arguing that a smaller country cannot afford to attack a bigger neighbour". They asserted, "on the same logic, India is given only equipment of the type that will be useful in mountain warfare against Communist China, leaving our plains vulnerable to the arrogant and ambitious Pakistanis whose boast that they could have marched from the Rann of Kutch to Bombay was widely publicised in the USA" (Parasuram 1965a). However, the Soviet Union was helping India by providing the types of military equipment which the US had denied to India with a fear of offending Pakistan. Moreover, Soviet's stand in Kashmir issue was largely supportive to Indian interests. As far as settling the Kashmir dispute is concerned, the Soviet Union insisted that "India and Pakistan should settle their differences peacefully by direct negotiation without the intervention of imperialist quarters" (Moraes 1965). In early 1965, explaining the Western favouritism to Pakistan, Inder Malhotra (1965b) wrote in an article published by *The Statesman*,

> The current mood among the British policy makers is very different from what it was during the Chinese invasion of 1962 when Britain rushed in with military aid to India. The present British feeling seems to be that a fresh Chinese attack on India is unlikely, and that after a prolonged stalemate, some sort of peaceful settlement between New Delhi and Peking will be attempted. Therefore it is no longer necessary to build up Indian strength to meet the Chinese challenge irrespective of Pakistani feelings. In other words, Pakistani protests against

military aid to India are unlikely always to fall on deaf ears although not even the habitual India-haters here will accept the Pakistani contention that any arming of India against China really poses a threat to Pakistan.

In this context, some Indian observers argued that the Western support to Pakistan is primarily motivated by their desire to prevent India becoming a major Asian power. Their disinclination for problematising growing Sino-Pakistan relationship reinforced such concern of Indian observers. Explaining the anti-India attitude of the West, Shiv Shastri (1965b) stated in an opinion piece that,

> To a large extent the circumstances that led to the partition of India and to the subsequent Western policy of providing Pakistan with sinews of its hostility to India was motivated by the desire to curb India becoming a major factor in Asian politics. Perhaps this was the kind of new colonialism to which nobody adverts. Our own response to Western designs was to seek freedom from its pressures by an accommodation with China. The communist victory in China was undoubtedly a setback. But, faced with the persistence of Western encouragement of Pakistan, we had no alternative but to renew our efforts to arrive at an understanding with Peking.

The Western favouritism to Pakistan was a major concern in Indian media narratives during the time of Kutch aggression. Questioning the Western reluctance in accepting that Pakistan is guilty of attacking India, *The Indian Express* (1965g) wrote in its editorial that "Pakistan is guilty of undistinguished aggression in the Rann of Kutch as is obvious on the cartographical evidence of the British maps accepted by the Americans – what prevents Whitehall and Washington from declaring this patent truth"? Following Indian criticism, Western powers tried to portray both India and Pakistan as equally wrong in creating trouble at Kutch. Indian media and opinion makers challenged this approach of the West by asserting various facts. They insisted, (a) "The incursion of Pakistan in Rann of Kutch is an incursion in Indian territory", (b) "It is an Indian territory is proved by pre-partition maps prepared under the authority of the British government", (c) "Even if this fact is, for some reason, to be 'disputed', there has been a status quo on the Sindh-Kutch border ever since Pakistan came into existence, that is, for over 17 years", and (d) "The use of force for the settlement of actual or fancied border claims is impermissible: on the other hand, defence against such use of force is an inherent right of every State" (Shastri 1965a). Asserting such facts, they argued that American and British policy of equalling India and Pakistan is indeed an open partisanship in favour of

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Pakistan. West's reluctance in accepting the role of Sino-Pakistan partnership in Kutch attack and their failure to prevent Pakistan from using American weapons against India were also negatively portrayed in Indian media narratives during this period. Explaining British attitude towards the Kutch dispute, K C Khanna (1965) wrote in an article published by *The Times of India*,

> There seems to be a dangerous tendency in New Delhi to overestimate the impact of Pakistan's 'flirtations' with Peking on Rawalpindi's relations with the West. The theory that Pakistan marched its forces into the Rann of Kutch in collusion with Communist China is not taken seriously here [in Britain] though it is conceded that the assurance of Peking's moral support may have figured in President Ayub's calculations.

Challenging the Western failure to see Sino-Pakistan partnership's involvement in creating tension at Kutch, Indian media and opinion makers argued that "we should use every [international] forum to expose the Sino-Pakistani axis which American leaders are trying to cover up hoping that it is a calf love" (Parasuram 1965a). Referring to Pakistani use of American weapons against India, *The Hindu* (1965c) wrote in its editorial that "it has been proved that Pakistan has been using American tanks which were given to it on the condition that they should be used only in self-defence. It is for the United States to take the appropriate action on this matter". Explaining the issue, Shiv Shastri (1965a) wrote that "the inability of the US Government to come forward with a forthright warning to Pakistan for its misuse of American arms constitutes an encouragement for repetitive acts and contrary to oft-repeated American assurances". In this context, questioning the American logic in arming Pakistan, *The Indian Express* (1965f) wrote in its editorial that,

> With a curious obstinacy the US Government persists in the belief that the military aid given to Pakistan was to be used for fighting Communism. Now that this fictitious aim has been exposed through Pakistan's détente with China, further excuses are being found to justify the aim. Pakistan's real enemy, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has now been told, is the Soviet Union. Time may again prove the folly of such an assumption. Meanwhile the only tangible use which Pakistan is making of American military aid is to commit aggression on Indian territory. It is hard to believe that American credulity could have gone so far as to give Pakistan credit for an objective which everyone except perhaps the Americans themselves knew was only a decoy.

However, beyond these critical narratives on Western favouritism to Pakistan, a section of Indian media strongly argued that India should continue working for developing a better relationship with the Western powers. In their view, that was the best possible way for challenging Pakistan's proximity with the West. Asserting this view, in the context of Kutch crisis, *The Hindu* (1965c) wrote in its editorial,

> We need not take it for granted, as some members of Parliament seem to do, that the Western Powers will continue forever to condone every act of Pakistani aggression. It is necessary to convince them as well as the rest of the world that Pakistan has gone far beyond any disputed border and is attempting to seize large slices of Indian territory. It is necessary also to make it clear that it is not Indian that refuses to negotiate.

Precisely, there were many issues adversely affecting India's discursive image of Pakistan during the pre-war period. Since the very idea of Pakistan, as a separate state for Muslims, was not a well-received subject in Indian public discourse and brutal violence during the partition and Pakistan's attempts for invading Kashmir had already created the foundation for anti-Pakistan sentiments in India, there was no room for developing any positive image of Pakistan in Indian public discourse even during the pre-war period. Relentless flow of refugees from Pakistan and the brutal stories of rape, murder and arson they brought to the country, developed Indian public's perception of Pakistani hatred towards India and Hindus (Iengar 1965). As Pakistan was involved in its anti-India activities, by creating trouble at the border and supporting rebel movements in India, like Naga separatist movement, enemy image of Pakistan was already prevalent in Indian media narratives. Therefore, 1965 war was not a turning point in Indian discursive image of Pakistan, although it might have greatly influenced Indian public's perception of threat.

Wartime Indian Discourse on Pakistan

The rehearsal for an India-Pakistan war began with Pakistani aggression in Rann of Kutch in early 1965. Unlike other incidents of border clash between India and Pakistan, Kutch incident had high potential for escalating into a major war due to various reasons. It includes Pakistan's success in the initial phase of the conflict and geographical factors limiting India's retaliation efforts. In the initial phase of the conflict, geographical

condition of Kutch helped Pakistan's intrusion into the Indian territory and attacking Indian armed police posts. Since the geographical condition of the region was favouring Pakistan, India had to choose other locations for retaliation, which opened the possibilities of escalation of the conflict. Moreover, as its setback at the Himalayan frontier in 1962 war with China had already demeaned the image of the country in international politics, India was very unlikely to choose a peaceful approach against a Pakistani aggression.

Bringing back the Indian attention from the Himalayan frontier and the then India's enemy number one China to Pakistan, Kutch aggression had created a new security alert in India. Intensifying public demand for retaliation against Pakistan, the incident brought back India's enemy number one status to Pakistan, the natural born enemy of India. Unlike resisting the Chinese aggression, which had the guarantee of Western military support if situation demanded, resisting Pakistani aggression was a solo adventure for India. Kutch incident proved that the Western sympathies would largely remain with Pakistan, even if they appear as neutral and unbiased. Moreover, growing relationship between Pakistan and China added a new security concern in Indian public discourse. The possibility of Sino-Pak alliance and India's preparedness for two separate and simultaneous wars, against both Pakistan and China, became major discussions in the Indian media. Thus, the Kutch incident was the beginning of a transformation in Indian understanding of security and threat. In the context of Kutch crisis, Prem Bhatia (1965b) observed:

> The threat for India developed for the first time in 1959 and culminated in a real conflict of arms in the late autumn of 1962. From then on the process of building up our strength, though not spectacular, has been real. But not until Pakistan struck in Kutch did the Indian mind as a whole feel totally involved in the business of defence. In a war with China one could count upon outside help. Against Pakistan, however, the country must fight alone....Pakistan may not be alone. Indeed, the major success of the foreign policy of Pakistan in the past two years or so is their un-spelt alliance with China. It is inconceivable that, even if the Kutch dispute is resolved for the time being, we shall be able to sleep in peace for a long time. In fact, if a sound sleep is at all attainable in the world of today, it will come to us, in so far as Pakistan is concerned, only when it is proved beyond doubt not only that we are much stronger than this undependable neighbour but also that we shall not hesitate to use our strength....India must remain prepared for 'little wars' with Pakistan for a long time to come. Kutch may prove Mr

Krishna Menon was right in his *assessment of Pakistan as India's enemy number one* (emphasis added).

Though the Kutch conflict ended with a British mediated ceasefire agreement, before getting escalated into a major war, the peace was yet to come in the Indian subcontinent. Just a month after the ceasefire agreement, media began to report mass infiltration of armed men from Pakistan into the Indian side of Kashmir. The Pakistani plan was to smuggle a sizable force of well-armed, but disguised men into Srinagar through different routes and start an insurrection on August 9 – the anniversary of Sheikh Abdulla's first arrest in 1953, observed by his supporters as a day of mourning (Dasgupta 1965). Meanwhile, they calculated, the Pakistan Army would engage the Indian forces all along the ceasefire line from the beginning of August. The Indian Army would be lulled into the belief that the border trouble was of the same old pattern and there was nothing new about it. While the armed forces would be engaged in minor clashes along the border, the infiltrators in civilian clothes would be quietly slipped across the border during the night into the Valley in small groups. Explaining the Pakistani plan of infiltration, Rangaswami (1965b) wrote in *The Hindu*:

> Each small group of infiltrators consists of three persons. The first is a combatant soldier and he is assisted by two others, one of whom is a Mujahid (a volunteer dedicated to the cause of Kashmir liberation) and the other is a helper who is more or less a cooly for carrying supplies, including food and ammunition. Both the soldier and the mujahid carry arms and a week's ration. This was exactly the tactics employed by the Chinese in the NEFA campaign. In the case of Chinese, it was a case of direct advance into Indian territory and an assault on the Indian Army. The Chinese did not expect any assistance from the local population. As a matter of fact, the population in NEFA is mostly tribal and very small in numbers. In the case of Pakistan, its strategy was different. Its infiltrators, after crossing into Kashmir, were to assemble in groups at pre-determined points and form bigger units under the command of senior officers. These infiltrators should not make their presence known or felt until August 9 when there would be a mass protest meeting to mark the anniversary of Sheikh Abdulla's detention in 1953.

In terms of Pakistani plan, all the infiltrators would be joining the procession on August 9 to provoke incidents where the masses would become infuriated with the police and would start fighting. Once the violence would begin, they calculated, they could start firing at the police and announce to the people that armed assistance had come from outside to liberate Kashmir. They planned to drop ammunition at selected spots and

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secure the support of sympathisers for obtaining supplies of food. Contrary to Pakistani expectation, there were only a few protest meetings on August 9 and none of them developed into mass processions. Moreover, as the number of pro-Pakistani supporters in the valley was very much limited, and as they failed to get mass sympathy, they could not get required assistance from the local people. Pakistani infiltration and ceasefire violations proved to India that "[for] Pakistan all ceasefire agreements are just scraps of papers which could be torn to bits when the right opportunity occurred" (Rangaswamy 1965b). Following the infiltration, India realised that Pakistan is deliberately trying to keep up an atmosphere of tension and "the only effective form of defence is to hit back, and hit hard". In this context, *The Indian Express* (1965h) wrote in its editorial, "No mercy should be shown to the Pakistani armed infiltrators in civilian clothing. Our troops along the ceasefire line should remain vigilant. The last 18 troubled years have highlighted one fact, only firmness pays".

Disgruntled by relentless violations of Pakistani armed forces, India took stringent measures to push out armed infiltrators and prevent further infiltration. Indian army crossed ceasefire line at some points and established new posts to resist attackers from advantageous positions. Mopping up operations of the Indian army against infiltrators caused heavy casualties for the raiders. Unlike in the past, this time India was certain that the "failure of its present attempt in Kashmir is by itself no guarantee that Pakistan will not try again" (Malhotra 1965c). Therefore, with stringent retaliatory measures, India wanted to make unambiguously clear to Pakistan that force will be met with force. As part of this, when Pakistan began to threaten Srinagar-Leh highway, Indian Army attacked and occupied Pakistani posts in Kargil area. Pakistan responded to the Indian moves by massing troops along the border and crossing ceasefire line at some areas to attack Indian army. Thus, attacks and counter-attacks soon leaped into a major full-scale India-Pakistan war. Explaining these developments, *The Statesman* (1965e) wrote in its editorial that,

> Hostilities which should never have started, have grown into a war which few people want – few in India at any rate and in most other countries. It has been obvious for some time that India has decided she has had enough of Pakistani affronts; hence her sharp riposte, after years of patience, to each provocation as it has come. The threat to Leh road, created by Pakistani posts at Kargil, had to be

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answered decisively – and it was. The UN's truce machinery was given a chance to take over; but when it failed, Indian forces intervened once more….When Pakistan's army showed its armoured hand, and that not across the ceasefire line but the border between West Pakistan and Jammu, the die was cast in its present and most dangerous form. Now Indian forces have crossed into West Pakistan and barring the technicalities, we are at war.

Though there is a confusion regarding the exact starting point of 1965 war, it is widely held that the war began with the infiltration of Pakistani-controlled guerrillas into Indian Kashmir around August 5, 1965 (Ganguly 1988). Analysing media reports, it can be learned that skirmishes between Indian armed forces and Pakistani infiltrators began as early as August 6 and the first major fight between the two armies took place on August 14, 1965. The war ended on September 23, after both parties accepting the UN Security Council resolution calling for "a ceasefire at 0700 hours GMT (Greenwich Mean Time) on September 22, 1965, negotiations to settle the Kashmir dispute, and a subsequent withdrawal of 'all armed personnel' to the positions held before August 5" (Hiro 2015).

Indian media's wartime narratives reveal that though the demand for retaliation against Pakistan was strong in India, the idea of a full scale war against Pakistan was not at the centre of Indian public discourse. The crux of the demand was that, with stringent retaliation measures, India should address three major concerns. Firstly, it should prove to the world that India is not a weak country that is afraid of war as it was portrayed by the international community since India's setback in 1962 war. Secondly, India should teach Pakistan that it would not continue its peaceful approach against every Pakistani action challenging its national integrity. Definitely there was no misconception that a war could end every anti-India activities of Pakistan. Asserting that the war would not be the beginning of a peaceful era in the subcontinent, *The Statesman* (1965f) wrote in its editorial that "only the reckless believe that this war will settle anything; the rest only hope that the evil necessity for it will vanish". Thirdly, India should declare in strong voice, especially to the United Nations, that there will be no compromise on India's stand on Kashmir question. In the context of war, problematising the UN's approach towards Indian stand on Kashmir issue, *The Indian Express* (1965i) wrote in its editorial,

> There has been a tendency on the part of the United Nations to think that conciliatory moves by New Delhi amount to a confession that the Indian stand on Kashmir is weak and unreasonable. It is, of course, nothing of the sort; but the

> UN will perhaps not be convinced of this unless, as in the Kargil area [referring to the Indian occupation of Pakistani posts], India acts sharply and without hesitation.

However, unlike in the past, there was no lack of confidence in the capacity of the Indian army to give a fitting reply to any aggressive Pakistani move across the ceasefire line in Kashmir. The only doubt widely shared by media and opinion makers in this context was that of willingness and capacity of the Government of India to take a political decision empowering the army to cross the ceasefire line. The order for mopping up operation against infiltrators and for crossing the ceasefire line to establish advantageous positions aimed at preventing further moves of the aggressor had asserted government's determination in giving befitting response to Pakistani aggression. In the context of war, the mainstream media and opinion makers largely endorsed the government's approach and remained critical of both radical and appeasing stands of opposition parties. In the wake of war, K. Rangaswamy (1965c) wrote in an article published by *The Hindu*,

> It was a very bold decision that the Prime Minister, Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri, took to permit the army to move into Pakistan. No decision of the Government of India in the past several years had ever been acclaimed with such satisfaction and enthusiasm throughout the country as the one to call Pakistan's bluff and put it in its place. Although the Kashmir Ceasefire Agreement with Pakistan was concluded in 1948, India has never had any peace on the border. Its armed forces and popular feelings had been kept in firm leash for the last 17 years principally by the powerful personality of the late Jawaharlal Nehru. This had created a distorted picture of India and its people. For the first time in the 18 years after independence, the nation is now reacting and acting in a manner in which every self-respecting national would. Whatever may be the outcome of the present conflict this country will not be the same as it was before the conflict began.

In the context of war, Indian opinions were largely favouring the government's decision to take stringent retaliatory measures against Pakistan. Even some notable socialists, like Jayaprakash Narayan, denounced Pakistan's mischief in Kashmir and supported Indian approach towards Pakistani adventurism. Referring to Jayaprakash Narayan's opinion regarding the conflict, *The Indian Express* (1965k) wrote in its editorial that "it must be regarded as evidence that Pakistan's perverse and dangerous actions have alienated even the small but influential section of Indian opinion which has hitherto persisted in interpreting Pakistan's policies and actions in the most charitable way". However, though it was meagre, there were commentaries in the Indian mainstream media problematising

India's 'enthusiasm' for making a war against Pakistan. Such commentaries raised concern over potential consequences of a war in the daily life of common people. For instance, analysing Indian public's response to Indian army's crossing of ceasefire line, Nandan Kagal (1965b) wrote in an opinion piece,

> It is remarkable but disturbing fact that the outbreak of hostilities seems to cause as much jubilation as the conclusion of peace. Both in Parliament and outside it, the Defence Minister's statement on Monday that Indian troops in the Punjab had moved across the border in the Lahore sector was greeted with thunderous cheers. The reaction to the announcement was completely spontaneous and to the extent that it is indicative of high morale and of the total support that the Government enjoys on this issue from all sections of opinion it must no doubt be considered an encouraging sign. But the real test of the country's determination and of the people's morale will come when the cheering dies down and when the hostilities begin to take their toll and affect every aspect of the citizen's life. There are grim days ahead and the sooner this is realised by the people at large the greater will be their capacity to carry the burden of what the Prime Minister has described as 'a full-scale war solution'.

The wartime narratives continued its linkage with the pre-war discourse, albeit with a greater degree of othering. For the analytical convenience, this chapter has placed Indian media's wartime narratives in the following categories.

1. *Infiltrators and Memories of 1947*

The news reports on Pakistani infiltration and Indian army's efforts for clearing out the raiders brought memories of previous infiltration and Pakistan's attempts for invading Kashmir back to the mainstream media narratives. Stories of heroism and sacrifice of the Indian army during the first infiltration, suffering of the local people and other civilians, and ferocious and nefarious activities of previous invaders regularly appeared in newspapers. Opinion makers wrote columns comparing similarities and differences between the present and the past infiltrations in Kashmir. In both the occasions, Pakistan denied such an infiltration attempt from their part and argued that it was a spontaneous uprising against the government of India. Analysing the narratives of the selected newspapers, it can be learned that for India the experience of the 1947 infiltration was a great force of inspiration for taking stringent retaliation measures in 1965. Recollecting the memories of 1947 Pakistani infiltration in Kashmir, *The Indian Express* (1965j) wrote in its editorial,

History, they say, repeats itself because men repeat their mistakes. Twice, within less than two decades, Pakistan has attempted to secure by gulls and force what she was unable to gain by constitutional procedure. In September 1947, less than a month after partition, tribal raiders, ostensibly from the No Man's Land between Afghanistan and Pakistan, moved through the North West Frontier into Kashmir, looting murdering and raping as they converged on Srinagar. These men, armed and equipped by Pakistan and actively assisted by Pakistani Army personnel, were given transit through Pakistan territory by motor and rail, provided petrol, food and accommodation, and delivered every possible aid and comfort on their way to Kashmir. They failed and were thrown back. Then, as now, Pakistan protested that this was a spontaneous uprising in which she had nothing to do….If the latest flare-up in Kashmir proves anything, it is than Pakistan has clearly no intention of living in peace with India, and it would be dangerous self-delusion on our part to cherish the hope that it is otherwise".

The major highlight of media narratives on memories of 1947 infiltration was stories of loot, murder, rape by the infiltrators and heroic resistance of the Indian army. In the context of Pakistani infiltration in 1965, recollecting the Indian army's heroism against the infiltrators in 1947, Iengar (1965a) wrote in an article that "[we] hope that the ultimate justification for the blood of our men spilt on the snows of Kashmir will be peace to the beautiful valley of Srinagar consistently with the honour and dignity of India. [But] that does not look possible today. […] there shall be no shadow of doubt that force should be met with relentless force". Similarly, Frank Moraes (1965a) observed in an article that,

Early in 1957, 10 years after Baramula had shot into world headlines, I visited this small township midway between Srinagar and Uri and heard from the nuns of the local Catholic Franciscan convent school and hospital something of seven-day rule of murder, terror, looting and rape they had lived through in that terrible week of November, 1947….Then, as now, the invasion was launched by infiltrators armed and equipped with Pakistani munitions and guns and aided by Pakistani troops, and then, as now, Pakistan denied all complicity in the matter.

In terms of media narratives, there were two features that distinguished the 1965 aggression from the previous Pakistani attempts to seize Kashmir by force. The first was the attempt to portray the event as a "war of liberation" against an imperialist power (India) holding down a rebellious people who want freedom. Explaining this feature, *The Hindu* (1965f) wrote in its editorial that "this technique, copied from Communist China, Pakistan's new ally, is made to appear plausible by reporting that "Revolutionary Council" is operating in the Valley with its own radio station and that it has announced

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that the hour for liberation has struck". It added, "this technique is unlikely to succeed so long as the infiltrators do not win the support of the local people, who cannot tolerate looting of their property or destruction of their buildings". The second feature of the 1965 aggression was that it was perfectly timed to coincide with protest demonstrations organised by some organisations (Plebiscite Front and Relic Action Committee). These organisations had announced that they would raise black flags and peaceful marches to call for the release of Sheikh Abdulla and Mirza Afzal Beg. Pakistan expected these movements to set the whole of Kashmir in revolt and prepare the way for armed support from outside (*The Hindu* 1965f). As their protest demonstrations did not show any violent intentions, Pakistan could not succeed in creating an atmosphere of public uprising and, thereby, they had failed to implement the idea of armed assistance from outside.

2. *United Nations, Kashmir and India's Discontent*

In the context of war, Indian media explicitly and repeatedly asserted two points regarding the failure of the United Nations in addressing Indo-Pakistan conflict. Firstly, they argued that it is the UN's failure to prevent Pakistan from blocking Srinagar-Leh highway, India's most important supply line to Ladakh, which caused the escalation of the present conflict into a war. One of the key reasons for escalation of the 1965 conflict was India's crossing of ceasefire line in Kargil to attack and occupy Pakistani posts which were threatening Srinagar-Leh highway. Prior to this event, India demanded that the UN's truce machinery, which monitors the ceasefire line since 1949, should take control of the Pakistani posts in Kargil as they were blocking India's supply line. As the UN was helpless, India had to choose military means to prevent Pakistani aggression on India's vital supply route. Explaining this point, *The Hindu* (1965g) wrote in its editorial,

> As everyone knows, Kargil heights were used by Pakistan to block the Srinagar-Leh highway which is our supply line to Ladakh. If that road was made impassable by snipers, our forces in Ladakh could only be supplied by air lift. We told the United Nations that we were willing to stand aside, if they could guarantee that Pakistan did not block the road. The UN Observers could not get Pakistan to obey, and so we were forced to take the posts.

Secondly, they insisted that it is the UN's reluctance to accept Pakistan's aggressive designs and impertinence towards civilised international conducts which prevented finding a solution for Kashmir problem all these years. Explaining how Pakistan violated previous ceasefire agreements and continued its anti-India activities, they argued that peace with Pakistan is not possible as "militarist leaders of Pakistan [are] obsessed with the idea that they could use force against India to compel it to make concessions in Kashmir and elsewhere" (Malhotra 1965e). Indian media and opinion makers reminded the critics that for 18 long years, the UN machinery has been unable to prevent Pakistan's uninterrupted violations of the previous ceasefire agreements. On the ground of these discontents, Indian media and opinion makers largely denounced the UN's call for ceasefire in the early phase of the war. Problematising the UN's call for ceasefire, *The Indian Express* (1965L) wrote in its editorial,

> The enemy, with his paranoiac hate for this country, will stop at nothing as he has proved by his opportunism and adventurism time and again – on our eastern borders, in Rajasthan, in Kutch, and Kashmir, and in his grossly cynical cultivation of Communist China's aid and comfort. Experience again proves how loaded, dangerous and deleterious has been the UN's intervention in the affairs of this country on Kashmir. For the UN Secretary General to call for a ceasefire at this juncture is like asking as householder to desist from putting out a fire lest both he and the arsonist are consumed by the conflagration.

In this context, explaining why such ceasefire cannot bring any positive outcome, *The Hindu* (1965h) stated in its editorial,

> By issuing a call to India and Pakistan for an immediate ceasefire, the UN Security Council members may feel satisfied they have done their duty for bringing about a cessation of the hostilities Pakistan has unleashed in Kashmir. But the ceasefire they have suggested can no more bring about peace and tranquillity than its ill-fated 1949 predecessor. In fact the 1949 Cease-Fire Agreement enjoyed upon the two sides sterner conditions, including a ban on either party increasing its military potential in the area. All that did not deter Pakistan from arming the people on its side of the Cease-Fire Line, raising a force of Majaheeds (a kind of holy war crusaders), keeping up tension at fever pitch though repeated border violations and a continuous stream of incendiary hate propaganda against India, sending into Kashmir trained and armed saboteurs and following it all up with an overt attack with its regular army. Against this Pakistani record, for the Security Council members to expect that merely calling for a cease-fire is going to bring peace to that area is to betray a naïve faith in Pakistan's good intentions".

As far as the question of ceasefire is concerned, there was not much difference between the view of government of India and the dominant Indian public opinion. Considering India's previous experience with Pakistan, both were certain that an untimely ceasefire would not bring peace to the subcontinent. India clarified repeatedly that it has no objective other than peace and stability to achieve by the war. For that, it argued, Pakistan should know that force will be met with force. Citing Pakistan's delinquent attitude towards ceasefire agreements, India critically approached the UN's call for peace in that critical period of the conflict. Problematising the UN Security Council resolution calling for ceasefire, Prime Minister Shastri pointed out in his address to the nation that "a cease-fire is not peace. We cannot simply go from one cease-fire to another and wait till Pakistan choose to start hostilities again" and "we cannot go from one cease-fire to another without our being satisfied that Pakistan will not repeat its acts of violations and aggression in the future" (*The Hindu* 1965h). Problematising the UN's approach towards India, *The Hindu* (1965j) wrote in its editorial,

> The UN Security Council's latest call for a cease-fire in the Indo-Pakistan conflict should be unexceptionable if the Council, in issuing that directive, had not once again shut its eyes to some facts which have an important bearing on the situation. The very way the ceasefire call has been worded is a cover-up for Pakistan's intransigence. Right from the start the Council members and the Secretary-General seem to have been bending over backwards to maintain some kind of mechanical equality between India and Pakistan, notwithstanding the fact that Gen. Nimmo, the UN's own man on the spot, had put the finger squarely on Pakistan as the villain of the peace. Both our Prime Minister (in his letter to U. Thant) and Mr Chagla (in the Security Council) have already categorically stated that India was prepared to accept a ceasefire unconditionally. But Pakistan had rejected the UN's earlier appeals by setting impossible pre-conditions for halting hostilities. Under the circumstances, for the Council again to put out a ceasefire call to both parties, as if India too has all along been holding out against the UN's peace efforts, is manifestly unfair to India and unwarranted.

Analysing the wartime narratives, it can be learned that the most disturbing thing for India in the context of war was observers' attempts for equating the role of India and Pakistan in the conflict. International observers often ignored the fact that it was Pakistan which initiated the violence, which violated the ceasefire agreement, and which created the ground for escalation of the conflict into a major war. India wanted the UN to brand Pakistan as the aggressor since they were clearly guilty in terms of international law. There was clear evidence suggesting that it was Pakistan which initiated the conflict in

Kashmir and its use of force against India was not with the purpose of self-defence. Chief of the UN Military Observer Group (UNMOG), General Nimmo, confirmed that "from August 5, 1965, took place a massive infiltration of armed personnel in civilian clothes from the Pakistani side of the ceasefire line into Indian territory". He agreed that "the infiltrators were responsible for widespread sabotage, arson, loot and plunder in Jammu and Kashmir". Moreover, as Shubrata Chowdhury (1965) observed in an article published by *The Statesman*,

> There was evidence to show that the operations were carefully planned in Pakistan and that the infiltrators were trained in a military headquarters set up in Murree in West Pakistan in May 1965, under General Akhtar Hussain Malik of the Pakistan Army. The attack on the Baramula sector in India's territory by the raiders on August 7 and 8 and their use of weapons manufactured in Pakistan have been corroborated by the UN Observer.

Questioning the United Nation's attempts for equating the role both India and Pakistan had in the conflict, K. Rangaswamy (1965e) wrote in an opinion piece,

> India has put a great deal of faith in the United Nations as a body which could ensure world peace based on justice. It is in this faith that the late Mr Nehru took to the Security Council his complaint against Pakistan's violation of Indian territory in Kashmir in 1947. Subsequently, in Korea, Gaza and Congo, India wholeheartedly cooperated with the United Nations in spite of criticism from many countries. The testing time, may be the final one, has come now. If the Security Council again equated the aggressor with victim, Indian opinion will be irreparably shaken in the utility of the world body. In the present case, it should be borne in mind that India is not only a victim of aggression, but India alone has accepted the UN proposal for an unconditional cease-fire.

Nevertheless, amidst all these discontents, there were some developments from the UN which was favouring India in the context of 1965 conflict. One among them was the UN Secretary General U. Thant's report on Kashmir conflict. The report confirmed that the conflict began with Pakistani infiltration and ceasefire violations. Placing the entire responsibility of the conflict on Pakistan, the report demanded that Pakistan should take effective measures to prevent crossing of ceasefire line from its side of the border (Reddi 1965). General Nimmo's report was also in similar lines. However, during the period of conflict, the UN did not publish this report stating that Pakistan was clearly guilty of aggression. Indian media and opinion makers argued that the UN's unfair approach towards India is driven by certain Western interests. Analysing the play of Western

interests in UN's reluctance to brand Pakistan as the aggressor, *The Indian Express* (1965o) wrote in its editorial,

> To give the benefit of no doubt to the aggressor is an old UN custom, sanctified by several precedents, at least one of which has touched India. This notorious instance also related to Kashmir when India initially referred the issue to the Security Council. Then as now it did not suit the book of certain Western countries to have Pakistan exposed and branded as the aggressor. Then as now, when faced with the facts which were demonstrably clear, the UN (which in effect is the Security Council) refrained from doing its elementary duty which was to call upon the invaders to withdraw and to request Pakistan to desist from letting her territory employed as a base for invasion and attack.

Precisely, the United Nations failed to have an objective approach towards the India-Pakistan conflict of 1965. Since the Western powers were largely sympathetic towards Pakistan because of various reasons, India's genuine demands were left unheard and factual evidences were unheeded in this world body. However, ignoring the play of power politics, India largely followed the UN's directions for bringing peace into the subcontinent and accepted the ceasefire proposal of the Security Council without making any preconditions since it is the only available instrument for the preservation of peace (Menon 1965).

3. *Unifying India and Dividing Pakistan*

As a multicultural and multilingual state, national integration was not an easy exercise for India. On the ground of enormous challenges, ranging from poverty to language and culture, many expected in the early decades of its independence that India would fall apart sooner or later as it would be extremely difficult for it to survive as a single nation. However, India addressed these challenges efficiently by asserting 'unity in diversity' as the core of its identity and integrated the country as one powerful nation. Resisting the pressure of numerous regionalism and separatist movements, India successfully established the dominance of unifying elements of the Indian identity in its public discourse. Analysing the media narratives in the context of 1965 war, it can be learned that widely shared anti-Pakistan sentiment was one of the most important unifying elements of the Indian identity in the early decades of its independence. Definitely, religion remained at the core of anti-Pakistan sentiments – in terms of conventional

wisdom, Muslim Pakistan remained as a natural born enemy of Hindu India. It was certainly not a one-sided process; India's anti-Pakistan sentiments developed in relation to Pakistan's anti-India and anti-Hindu sentiments. Issues such as relentless border firing, Kashmir dispute, and attacks against Hindu minorities in both East and West Pakistan continuously reinforced the image of Pakistan's anti-India and anti-Hindu sentiments in the Indian public discourse.

Indian media's wartime narratives reveal that, in the context of war, widely shared anti-Pakistan sentiments greatly helped India's war efforts. Unlike during the India-China war of 1962, critical opinions on war were rare and insignificant during the Indo-Pak war of 1965; public opinions remained largely in supportive to the government's war efforts mainly due to widely shared anti-Pakistan sentiments. Excluding communal tensions in certain areas, in the context of war, the people of India displayed unprecedented level of national spirit and unity. Numerous articles appeared in the Indian media during this period, observing with great surprise the astounding amount of unity felt in the country. Observing the unity, *The Hindu* (1965i) wrote in its editorial that "the enemy will soon realise that in the hour of crisis we are one people, regardless of language, creed or caste, that Indian democracy is not to be trifled with and that aggression will not pay". Referring to India's unity against Pakistani aggression, Inder Malhotra (1965d) wrote in an article published by *The Statesman* that "it must be a source of discomfort and dismay to our enemies that in spite of all its amorphousness and flabbiness, the Indian giant invariably manages to rise to the occasion, especially when the occasion is momentous and the stakes are high." He added, "[a]nd now, faced with the Pakistani challenges to its sovereignty and self-respect, the country has produced a response which is a magnificent combination of strength and sobriety". The then President of India, Dr Radhakrishnan declared in a speech delivered in this context that "there is a general upsurge in the country which has dissolved our minor differences and integrated our people to a remarkable extent. There is oneness of feeling and purpose among our people, especially among the 50 million Muslims who have given striking testimony of their deep patriotism" (*The Times of India* 1965j). After the war, K. Rangaswamy (1965d) observed in an article, "the Indian people have shown that neither differences of language and religion nor the political rivalries afflicting the ruling party would come in the way of

their rising as one man in a crisis to defend the honour and territorial integrity of the country".

The war, which helped India for lessening its internal differences and integrating its people, was not a positive force as far as Pakistani national identity is concerned. It exposed the depth of linguistic and geographical differences within the Pakistani identity and began to enlarge the division between East and West Pakistan. Unlike the West Pakistanis, the East Pakistanis or East Bengalis had little or no emotional attachment with Kashmir. Therefore, they were less interested in a war for 'liberating' Kashmir. As India chose not to extend the war to the eastern sector, East Pakistan remained largely unaffected by the war. Moreover, as the Bengali presence was relatively small in the Pakistani army, the war did not directly affect many families in the East. However, the war became a major turning point in East Pakistan's relationship with West Pakistan, especially due to the exclusion of East Pakistan from war related decision making (Guha 1965). Precisely, Pakistan's war for integrating Kashmir with the grand idea of Islamic republic of Pakistan hastened disintegration of 'East Bengal' from it.

Indian media's wartime narratives reveal that, following the exposure of growing differences between the East and West Pakistan, India attempted to single out West Pakistan and specify that it had no quarrel with the East. Referring to the differences within Pakistan, Samar Guha (1965) stated in an article published by *The Times of India* that "the people of East Pakistan, who for the past 12 years have relentlessly challenged colonial domination by the western wing, and demanded for themselves the right of self-determination, are out of sympathy with the anti-India war hysteria unleashed by the Ayub Regime". He added, "[East Pakistanis] are unwilling to join in Rawalpindi's chorus of Islamic Jihad against Hindu India". Along the same lines, Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan declared in the Lok Sabha that "India has no quarrel with East Pakistan, even though Indian troops have taken up positions in order to meet any threat of aggression by Pakistan in the East" (*The Indian Express* 1965m). Commenting on Defence Minister's statement, *The Times of India* (1965k) stated in its editorial that "unless West Pakistan wants to extend its war to the eastern wing, India has no quarrel with East Pakistan or, indeed, with the people of Pakistan as such". Definitely, Pakistan tried to mitigate its

internal differences with various propaganda campaigns. Asserting Islamic unity, they argued that "India was never reconciled to the existence of Pakistan, as a separate homeland for Muslims" (*The Hindu* 1965g). However, such campaigns failed to push Pakistani nationalist sentiments in East Bengal. Soon after the war, political groups opposing Ayub Khan's regime formed a revolutionary council with an objective of setting up a separate sovereign state in the East. This movement opened way for formation of independent Bangladesh in 1971, and ultimately proved that Pakistan's attempts for integrating the East was a colossal failure.

4. *Crisis of Muslims and Communists in India*

Indian media's wartime narratives reveal that the 1965 war had created a special kind of crisis for Muslims and communists in India due to certain intricate reasons. Their commitment to the nation was placed in question at least in some corners of the country and a kind of ethical pressure was put on them to prove their patriotism. The question about the commitment of Muslims in India is deeply rooted in the very idea of partition of India and creation of a separate state for Muslims. The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 developed a general sense in India that Muslims of the subcontinent have formed their new motherland by creating an 'Islamic Pakistan'. This understanding has cast a shadow of doubt over the Indian Muslims' allegiance to India. Such doubts were reinforced by various radical thoughts advocating the Hindu identity of India and depicting the fight between India and Pakistan as a fight between Hindus and Muslims. The activities of both Muslim and Hindu fundamentalist groups in India and Pakistan's propaganda campaigns for patronising Indian Muslims have also helped to diffuse such thoughts. Pakistan's attempts for portraying the war as Jihad against infidels may also have played a part in it.

When the tension between India and Pakistan began to grow in early 1965, many observers argued that a war between the two may lead to a large scale communal violence and separatist movements in both the countries (Vohra 1965). In this period, many envisaged communal violence as the most ferocious threat to the peace in the

subcontinent. In the context of war, asserting the danger of widespread communal violence in the country, *The Indian Express* (1965n) wrote in its editorial,

> The emergency created by the Pakistani aggression is as real as the one created by the Chinese aggression in NEFA some three years ago. Moreover, in some ways the situation today is potentially more dangerous than the one which the country faced in the autumn of 1962. This is because hostilities with Pakistan, even if they are confined to Jammu and Kashmir, almost inevitably have internal repercussions of a particularly pernicious nature. There is always the danger that an armed conflict between India and Pakistan will be exploited by communal elements. Communal incidents sometimes occur during religious festivals but in normal circumstances they blow over fairly quickly. However, the situation today is abnormal and the capacity of communal elements to create murderous mischief is, therefore, greater…. The national crisis created by Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir should also open the eyes of the Akalis and induce second thoughts on the Punjabi Suba issue among all concerned.

Since the cloud of communal tension was fused with the presumption that Muslims do not bear their allegiance to India, distancing from communal tensions and denouncing Pakistani aggression in unequivocal terms became an ethical responsibility of Muslim leaders and groupings. Statements of Indian Muslim leaders and outfits, denouncing Pakistani aggression and declaring their support to India, became one of the major news in Indian media in the context of war. Such statements asserted that the Muslims of India regard Kashmir as an integral part of the country and Muslims of India, along with other fellow citizens, would fight as they had done in the past. Some of them insisted that Pakistan's policy has nothing to do with Islam and their actions are not guided by religious interests. For instance, a report published by *The Times of India* (1965m) stated,

> Pakistani leaders continually talked of Muslim interests but the history of Pakistan from the inception proved that political ambition has been its guiding principles. It had tried to conquer Kashmir for political considerations. During the Suez crisis, Pakistan's sympathies were not with fellow Muslims of the Arab countries but with those who had committed aggression. In spite of her profession of friendship for Muslim countries, Pakistan had conducted a bitter conflict with Afghanistan for many years. Pakistan's alliance with Mao's China offered conclusive proof that Pakistan's policies had nothing to do with religion but were motivated by military and political ambitions.

Rejecting Pakistani propaganda campaign that the fight between India and Pakistan is a Jihad, many argued that "the part played by the Muslim soldiers and officers in the Indian Army, leading to the highest military awards to some of them, proves the

absurdity of the Pakistani attempt to give the character of a religious war to its unashamed and naked aggression against a peaceful neighbour which, in its Constitution, has accepted the concept of secularism as an article of faith" (*The Times of India* 1965n). Some Muslim religious leaders called upon every Indian Muslim "who lives in this land and eats its grains and drinks it water to prove true to the salt at this hour by extending full support and cooperation in the struggle against Pakistan" (*The Times of India* 1965n). They went on to argue that the "one who lent an iota of support to Pakistan forfeited his right to live in this country and such an attitude is tantamount to treason" (*The Times of India* 1965n). Problematising Pakistan's religious nationalism and its attempt to portray India-Pakistan war as a fight between Hindus and Muslims, *The Indian Express* (1965q) wrote in its editorial,

> The Jihad against 'Hindu' India which Pakistan has been preaching venomously over the years is as out of date as the Christian crusades against the Saracen. If the two-and-a-half million Muslims of Kashmir are Pakistan's special interest as she now impudently claims, what is to prevent her tomorrow from claiming India's remaining 55 million Muslims as her special patrimony after partition?

Definitely counter opinions were not totally absent among Muslims of India in the context of war. Responding to the pro-Pakistani approach of certain Indian Muslims, Rangaswami (1965d) wrote in an article published by *The Hindu*,

> Some educated Muslims here seem to think that a strong Pakistan would in some way constitute a source of strength to them. This line of thinking is not only foolish, but dangerous. A weak India in relation to Pakistan would be a signal for the rise of the reactionary forces and the numerical superiority enjoyed by the Hindu community would assert itself. It is in the interest of the Muslims in India that India must relentlessly combat Pakistani communalism. It is a tribute to wisdom of all communities that in the present crisis there was not the slightest of a communal trouble anywhere in India.

The question raised on Indian communists' commitment towards the nation was in the backdrop of two major reasons. Firstly, as there was a prevalent view that a section of Indian communists are more loyal to communist China, and as China was supporting Pakistan in its war against India, anti-communist observers placed Indian communists' allegiance to the nation in doubt. Secondly, as a group of communists did not support the view that Kashmir is an integral part of India and they often supported the demand for plebiscite, the critics questioned their commitment to the nation while India was fighting

against Pakistan in the name of Kashmir. Definitely, the pro-Soviet groups within the Indian communists were largely out of this shadow of suspicion over their allegiance to the nation. Explaining the issue, *The Times of India* (1965L) stated in its editorial that,

> The war crisis has one again shown how on the issue of national integrity, as on other crucial questions, communists in this country continue to be woefully divided. The right communists have taken up a forthright nationalist position and denounced not only Pakistan for its aggression but also China for aiding and abetting it. The left communists, as was only to be expected, have been more equivocal. But for all their studied equivocation they have not been able to cover up their aims. If one is to judge them by the editorial in the latest issue of their party journal they condemn the Pakistani aggression only to justify Pakistani demand for a plebiscite. To say that Kashmir is not a part of India is in effect to argue the case for the aggressor…. [The] left communist attitude, like the Chinese position, has nothing to do with ideology. The Chinese at least have the excuse of serving what they believe to be their national interest. That consideration does not even seem to enter the calculations of the left communists.

Some observers argued that by taking a pro-Pakistani approach towards the Kashmir issue, left communists are trying to gain sympathy of uneducated Muslims in India. They insisted that such a move is dangerous for communal harmony in the country. Many leaders warned Muslims that they should "not fall into the trap set by the communists" and "they must continue to stand loyally with the rest of the people to support India's defence measures" (*The Times of India* 1965o).

5. *The other 'Other' - China and the 1965 War*

Indian media's wartime narratives reveal that in terms of a dominant view the war of 1965 was a joint effort of China and Pakistan for humiliating India, and for destroying its democracy and democratic way of progress. Some opinion makers argued that China's stake in the war is larger than Pakistan's even though it was Pakistan which was directly involved in the fighting. In the context of Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had singled out China as the one country which does not want peace in Asia. In this context, some observers argued that "what happened on the Himalayan borders in the autumn of 1962 may be mere probing operations, compared to the plot now being hatched by Pakistan and China" (Sivaram 1965). When the fighting intensified, many insisted that it "appears to be inspired by China, or at least seems to serve China's interests" (Vohra 1965). Some observes argued that both India and

Pakistan are pawns in a game played by China and its real targets are the United States and the Soviet Union. In terms of their view, China was trying to destroy the influence of its key enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union, in the Indian subcontinent by using the longstanding differences between India and Pakistan (Roberts 1965).

Analysing the narratives of Indian media during the 1965 war, it can be learned that in terms of Indian understanding, China was attempting to bring entire underdeveloped nations into its orbit by establishing communist governments in these states. It insisted that in terms of Mao's understanding, entire Asia was "direct target of his policy of ideological and political expansion" (*The Statesman* 1965g). In Asian, African, and South American countries, China promoted revolutions using guerrilla tactics that Mao developed in the Chinese civil war to overthrow the pro-Western governments and to destroy the Western influence (Roberts 1965). India, with its democratic system, was a major challenge for China's ambitions in the Afro-Asian region. Mao was well aware that "he can have masses of Asia on his side only when India is on the rocks". The Chinese had found "a willing and enthusiastic accomplice in Pakistan in their design to weaken India and clear way for Chinese domination of Asia" (*The Statesman* 1965g). Moreover, China believed that Sino-Pak collaboration could help it to consolidate its position in Tibet and to extend its influence in Central Asia. With the help of Pakistan, by sending armed infiltrators into Kashmir, China was trying to employ Mao's guerrilla tactics against India. It openly declared that "the struggle in Kashmir is a 'people's war' in which the largely Muslim Kashmiris are rising against their Hindu masters in India" (Roberts 1965). There had been persistent reports that hundreds of training centres, with Chinese army officers specialised in guerrilla warfare as instructors, were set up along India's borders with the eastern wing of Pakistan. Commenting on China's attempts for employing guerrilla war tactics against India, *The Hindu* (1965k) wrote in its editorial,

> It was reported some time ago that large numbers of Pakistani officers were sent to China for training in subversion and guerrilla warfare. It is, therefore, possible that the sending of armed raiders into Kashmir dressed in civilian grab was of Chinese inspiration. The Chinese provided such instruction for the North Vietnamese who are directing guerrilla operations in South Vietnam.

As further evidence for China's involvement in Pakistani armed infiltration into Kashmir, Indian Army had seized China-made instruments and cigarettes from Pakistani

infiltration and sabotage gangs. Arguing that China and Pakistan are trying to turn Kashmir into another Vietnam through guerrilla warfare, M. Sivaram (1965) observed in an article published by *The Indian Express* that,

> Sometime in the sixth century BC, just after Lord Buddha achieved the supreme enlightenment in India, China's hero was Sun Tsue Wu, an eminent military strategist and father of guerrilla warfare. While the Buddha's gospel of *dharma* spread from India to the far corners of Asia, Sun Tsue Wu was busy writing a thesis on *adharma* in warfare for the benefit of prosperity – a textbook on the tactics of infiltration and hit-and-run attacks, sabotage and subversion, arson and assassination, and the advantages of an incessant barrage of downright lies, aimed at friends, enemies and dupes alike. Today, nearly 25 centuries after Sun Tsue Wu, his disciples seem to be near the frontiers of India, in both wings of Pakistan, drilling and training thousands of men in guerrilla warfare, and menacing the independence and integrity of this country.

In the context of war, China had charged India with a "naked act of aggression against Pakistan" and extended its firm support to Pakistan in resisting India's "expansionist action" against "Pakistani Kashmir" (*The Hindu* 1965k). It led a campaign against the United Nations, particularly against the Secretary General U Thant, for making what it called "partial and unfair report" on the incident and for bringing a ceasefire proposal that 'favours' India (Narain 1965). Moreover, for putting pressure on India, it sent a diplomatic note to New Delhi alleging intrusion of Indian Army into the Chinese territory on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border and warned that it would strengthen its defences and heighten its alertness along its borders. In the Note, alleging Indian Army's violations at Tibet-Sikkim border China gave a three-day ultimatum to India; it said, unless India withdrew in the meantime they would enter into Indian territory to demolish Indian military installations at the Sikkim border (Thomas 1965). Responding to the Chinese threat, Prime Minister Shastri stated that "India and China should jointly inspect the area of alleged violation of Tibet's border with Sikkim". Explaining the Chinese intention in making such a threat, *The Statesman* (1965h) wrote in its editorial that,

> It might wish to kill several birds with one stone: to offer much need[ed] encouragement to Pakistan, to hamper India's defence of her border in the west, to help this conflict grow further and make the subcontinent more ripe for China's designs and, not least, to rescue China from the reputation it is fast acquiring over the Vietnam war, that it is a paper tiger which pushes others to do its fighting and does not go to their help when they are in distress.

In the context of China's 'three-day ultimatum', many Indian observers argued that China would strike India at the end of its ultimatum at least in some measured degree. Referring to certain diplomatic sources, some argued that "having set the clock to a time of its own choosing, to retract would, in Peking's eyes, mean loss of face in a critical period of history before an Asian audience" (Thomas 1965). However, observers largely agreed that the chances for a full-scale Chinese intervention are very limited since it could possibly bring Great Power intervention in the conflict. Ultimately, China's 'three-day ultimatum' did not open any new avenue of India-China conflict as it ended without an armed violence between these two countries.

The Sino-Pak friendship often figured in Indian media narratives as an attempt of enemy powers to destroy India's democracy and secularism. Such narratives asserted that both of them have failed to show any respect towards democratic and secular values: one was a theocratic military dictatorship and the other was a communist authoritarianism. India was one among the very few stable democracies in the Afro-Asian region. Analysing the Sino-Pak friendship, Indian observers argued that Pakistan is either intentionally or unintentionally helping the expansion of communism to the Indian subcontinent. Therefore, Pakistan has no moral right to be part of anti-communist alliances such as SEATO and CENTO. India found both Pakistani and Chinese interest in the self-determination of Kashmiris as ironical, since both of them were not concerned about the rights of their own people (Menon 1965). On this ground, Indian media asserted that there is a deep conspiracy between Pakistan and China to undermine India's security and to create unrest and chaos in the country. They insisted that "Pakistan and China are out on a game of conquest to seize Kashmir; and there may be an understanding between them to share it, or to establish their respective sphere of influence. This will, naturally, suit China which is interested in maintaining its road to Sinkiang across Kashmir territory. And Pakistan will have satisfaction of getting even with India in the long-drawn-out Kashmir conflict" (Sivaram 1965).

Though China was supporting Pakistan in the war and threatening India of military intervention, some observers did not give any weight to the potential of Sino-Pak friendship or the threat of Chinese intervention in the war. They were confident that the

Western support would come for India if China intervenes in the war. In terms of their view,

> The rest of the world would not look on unconcerned if China, with or without the aid of Pakistan, threatened to overwhelm India. It is, therefore, patent that while Peking is willing to adopt threatening military postures as an extension of its diplomacy to achieve certain clearly defined political ends, and might even be prepared to indulge in strictly limited military incidents, it will not rush into any kind of war in which it would inevitably risk escalation and great power confrontation unless its own vital interests and very security are at stake….The Chinese threat should certainly not be underestimated. This would be folly. But it would be equally foolish to overestimate it (Verghese 1965b).

On the ground Sino-Soviet tension, some observers had expected that even the Soviet Union would support India if China attempted to escalate the war by its direct intervention (Rangaswamy 1965e). Being inspired by the ideological politics of the Cold War, many argued that "the Chinese are supporting Pakistan against India because India, a democracy, is China's chief rival among the big under developed nations of Asia". However, they noted,

> Chinese troops were used against India in 1962 and may be used again now, but not in an overt invasion to conquer India. Rather, they are being used to humiliate India, in carefully controlled action along disputed border lines in such a way as to avoid giving the USA a clear pretext to respond with American military power (Roberts 1965).

Some observers were highly critical of Indian media's obsession with Sino-Pak friendship and their attempt to exaggerate the Chinese involvement in Kashmir issue. In the context of China's 'three-day ultimatum', they stated that "there is reason to doubt even whether any genuine solicitude for Pakistan is a factor in China's calculations since Rawalpindi has nothing to gain but further disrepute from an association inspired, it would seem, exclusively by considerations of cynical expediency" (*The Times of India* 1965r). Critically observing the Indian tendency for linking both Chinese and Pakistani interests in the war, *The Times of India* (1965p) wrote in its editorial,

> It must be supposed that whatever China chooses to do will be inspired exclusively by a consideration of its own interests and not by any 'particular' understanding that may be assumed to exist between the Mao and the Ayub regimes. As a comparatively major power its [China's] interests, as those of the United States, are primarily 'global' and, therefore, relatively unconcerned either with the Kashmir issue as such or with specific problem of Indo-Pakistani relations. The inhibitions that impelled Peking to limit its operations in NEFA in

1962 are as valid as ever before—a major penetration into Indian territory serves no rational political or military objective.

Precisely, in the context of 1965 war, China was dominantly figured in the Indian media narratives as a major threat to the country. Definitely it was not an understanding evolved out of certain miscalculated views on communist aggression, though the Cold War inspired anti-communist sentiments were one of the major driving forces of Indian approach towards China. Openly declaring its support to Pakistan and intensifying tension at the Himalayan frontier while India was engaged in fighting at the other front, China was clearly expressing its interest in the war. Moreover, the bitter experience of 1962 had clearly established that China was particularly interested in humiliating India. It was on these grounds, the Indian media often asserted that the "problem of making Pakistan a law-abiding country is only peripheral to the problem of ensuring peace and stability in Asia, the biggest threat to which is China" (*The Hindu* 1965m).

Indian media narratives reveal that with the war of 1965 China became a major supplier of weapons to Pakistan. After the war, China lavishly helped Pakistan to replenish its arsenal and to rebuild its defence forces. The Chinese help to Pakistan included supply of an unspecified number of MiG fighters and training for Pakistani pilots to fly these aircrafts. Moreover, China gave Pakistan a secret loan in foreign exchange to enable it to buy necessary military equipment. Though the Sino-Pak collaboration had begun to grow with the war, its influence over Indian perception of threat had begun to decline in the same period. India's explicit dominance in the war had brought an unprecedented level of confidence against the threat of China and Pakistan in Indian public discourse. Precisely, for Indians, it was a clear breaking point of the mental barrier created by the setback in 1962 war. After the war, analysing the Chinese threat at the border, *The Hindu* (1965n) wrote in its editorial,

> Our military strength on the border today is not inferior to the Chinese and our troops are well prepared for mountain warfare. We too have a network of airfields and planes capable of attacking Chinese supply lines. The Chinese have the disadvantage of having to manage abnormally long supply routes.

Even after the war, Indian media incessantly articulated China's interests in sustaining Indo-Pak conflict and in preventing peace and stability in the region. China's recurring

allegations of India's border intrusions and warnings of grave consequences remained as a source of inspiration for such narratives in Indian media. Pakistan's unwillingness to stop ceasefire violations even after ending the war and China's allegations of Indian intrusions were observed as part of the same play which aimed at disturbing peace and stability in the region. Later, Pakistan's uncompromising attitudes at the negotiating table also became a major reason for articulating Chinese interests against the peace in the region (*The Hindu* 1966). Indian observers argued that "Chinese are deeply suspicious of the Tashkent meeting which they regard as a Soviet conspiracy to win over Pakistan and set both that country and India against China" (*The Times of India* 1965s). Precisely, by the end of the war, the view that India's conflicts with China and Pakistan must be regarded as the two sides of the same coin became dominant in the Indian public discourse.

6. *The East and the War*

Pakistan's efforts for making better relationship with the Soviet camp of the Cold War paid off well in the context of India-Pakistan war of 1965. No country in the Soviet camp unequivocally accepted India's stand on Kashmir and criticised Pakistan's attempts for creating trouble in the region. Analysing the Russian and the East European media reports on India-Pakistan war, Maharaj K. Chopra (1965b) observed in an opinion piece that "[they extend] cleverly worded support for India, a hand of friendship for Pakistan, an indirect warning to China, [and] a kick at the trouble making imperialists. There was very little about actual fighting". In this context, commenting on an editorial published by *Pravda*, the official journal of the Russian Communist Party, *The Hindu* (1965L) observed in its editorial that "Moscow does not wish to pass judgement on Pakistan's armed infiltration of Kashmir State and condemn it plainly as illegal aggression". The editorial of *Pravda* pointed out that the Indian and Pakistani press gave different versions of the situations and they shall not discuss which of them reflects the course of development most correctly. It added that "the main thing is to find a way for the immediate cessation of bloodshed and the liquidation of the conflict". The official Pakistani propaganda about the conflict in Kashmir was that it was a purely local revolt. But India had produced plenty of evidence to show that it was nothing of the sort and that

the heavily armed raiders were Pakistanis, in many cases, personnel of the regular Army. Explaining the Soviet approach, *The Hindu* added in its editorial that,

> In the Western countries allied to Pakistan, there is a growing acceptance of the fact that Paksitan has trained and sent in the raiders, but these countries still believe that Pakistan has some claim on Kashmir. The Russians, on the other hand, recognize Kashmir as an Indian state, but are unwilling to admit that the invaders are Pakistanis and not local rebels. The Russian hesitation will no doubt prove highly encouraging to Rawalpindi, which has been making diplomatic moves to improve its relations with Moscow….Russia may welcome the new orientation of Pakistani policy which implies a loosening of its traditional ties with its Western allies and a closer relationship with Russia and China. But it would be most unfortunate if the Russian anxiety to detach Pakistan from its Western alliances led Moscow to turn a blind eye to the facts relating to Pakistan's aggression of India, be it in Kutch or Kashmir sector.

Yugoslavia was the only communist country which endorsed India's stand and openly criticised Pakistan for sending armed intruders into Kashmir. Referring to the support extended by President Tito of Yugoslavia, *The Indian Express* (1965p) wrote in its editorial that "never before has India received such unequivocal support on Kashmir, which some other countries would like to see a perpetual cockpit within which to preserve and perpetuate their own interests". It asserted that "by acknowledging Kashmir as 'an internal affair of India' and by describing the recent conflict between India and Pakistan as 'a result of external attempts to impose by force concepts and solutions', the joint Indo-Yugoslav communiqué puts the entire problem in proper perspective and projects it as it really is".

Though the Soviet approach towards the crisis was disappointing for many Indian observers, Indian media and opinion makers were not highly critical towards the Soviet Union. Perhaps Russia's continuing support to India for securing necessary military equipment, while the Western countries ceased their military supply to both India and Pakistan in the context of war, was influencing Indian opinion on this matter. Expressing its disappointment in the Soviet approach towards the crisis, *The Hindu* (1965o) stated in its editorial that "even the Soviet Union, after reiterating that Kashmir is an integral part of India, chose to assume, like several other countries, a posture of "neutrality" when it came to pulling up Pakistan". It added "[n]eutrality in a case of aggression like Pakistan's really loads the dice in favour of the aggressor". However, it asserted that the

Soviet Union is genuinely interested in peace and stability in the region. In terms of the dominant Indian view, Russia followed the policy of 'neutrality' with an aim of influencing Pakistan's relationship with both China and the United States. But it was largely accepted that "the USSR is in no mood to sacrifice its 'traditional' friendship for India to please Pakistan" (*The Statesman* 1965i). Expressing its commitment towards India, the Soviet policies in the UN Security Council remained favourable to India (Sagar 1965). Explaining the Soviet approach towards the war, K. Rangaswamy (1965e) observed in an opinion piece that,

> The Soviet Union is genuinely concerned at the prospect of escalation of the conflict. Perhaps the SU has reason to believe that the Chinese are planning to enter the conflict in a big way. The Chinese ultimatum to India to dismantle the Indian military posts at the Sikkim border, alleged to have been established in Chinese territory, within three days is perhaps intended as a prelude to some action. The Chinese entry into the conflict will again throw the Socialist camp into disarray as at the time of the Chinese attack on India in 1962. The Soviet Union in such a development will naturally find itself in an embarrassing position and subject to diverse pressures in the domestic field as well as in the Communist world. At the present moment, while Britain and the United States have virtually imposed sanctions against India, the Soviet Union has continued to honour its commitments to India in regard to the supply of a variety of essential goods. The Soviet Union, therefore, keenly desires that the Indo-Pakistan conflict should end immediately and that no outside power should intervene.

Analysing the narratives of Indian media, it can be learned that the Soviet policy of 'neutrality' was influenced by two major factors. Firstly, with a hope of detaching Pakistan from its western partners, Russia was trying to improve its relationship with Pakistan. However, it did not want to make that improvement at the expense of Soviet-Indian friendship. Its refusal to join those who decided to impose an embargo on the supply of arms to India and its continuous assertion that they consider Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian Union explain its commitment towards the Soviet-Indian friendship better. Secondly, the Soviet Union was highly concerned about peace and stability in the region as it falls in its immediate neighbourhood. It was worried that China would try to escalate the conflict because of various reasons including the rivalry between China and the Soviet Union. China's attempts for creating troubles at the Himalayan frontier, in the context of India-Pak fighting, reinforced the Soviet concern. As media observed, "the new Chinese threat [had] given an edge to its fear that a

prolongation of the conflict [would] only serve the interests of those who want to foster conditions of instability in the subcontinent" (*The Times of India* 1965q). Therefore, instead of siding with either party in the conflict, they attempted to avoid escalation of the conflict and inspired both parties for finding a peaceful settlement. Analysing the Soviet approach towards the crisis, Shiv Shastri (1965c) wrote in an opinion piece that,

> The USSR no longer views the Kashmir question in the additional perspective of the Cold War. It is anxious to acquire influence on the subcontinent as a whole – which means that Pakistan is not any more to be treated, in principle, as a Western stooge….Basic to the USSR attitude on the 'political problems' between Pakistan and India is the view that such problems should be solved bilaterally by the parties themselves.

The Soviet Union asserted its interest in peaceful settlement of Indo-Pak conflict by organising Tashkent meeting. The Tashkent talk, held in early 1966, initiated certain measures for settling the dispute and building peace in the subcontinent. However, that initiative did not succeed in making a long-lasting peace between India and Pakistan. Wartime narratives reveal that other than taking efforts for finding peaceful settlement, the Soviet Union continued supporting India in its development initiatives, both in industrial and agricultural sectors. It provided commercial credits and developmental aid to ensure that "Indian industries [were] running at maximum efficiency and full capacity". On the ground of such assistance, the Soviet Union was figured in Indian media narratives as the most reliable partner during this period. Commenting on the Soviet assistance, *The Indian Express* (1965r) stated in its editorial that, "the help by the Soviet Government, despite its own needs of development and its heavy commitments to other developing countries, is proof of its abiding interests in the economic development of India."

7. *The West and the War*

In theory, the Western powers had taken a strictly neutral approach towards the Indo-Pakistan conflict even though it was one of its allies that involved in the fighting. The United States suspended its military aid to both Pakistan and India when the fighting had begun and encouraged all other partner countries, such as NATO, SEATO, and CENTO members, to do the same. Britain, which was the major supplier of arms to India,

responded to the crisis by installing an arms embargo against India and Pakistan. They called for immediate ceasefire and warned both India and Pakistan of punitive measures such as sanctions if fighting continued. The idea of Western 'neutrality' was mostly well received in Indian media narratives even though the British move for an arms embargo was a major blow to India at the time of crisis, especially by considering that Pakistan had the support of many sophisticated offensive weapons supplied by the United States and India was waiting for the delivery of millions of pounds-worth finished weapons, essential spare parts and raw materials from the United Kingdom. Commenting on the Western powers' decision to suspend military supply to India and Pakistan, *The Times of India* (1965t) stated in its editorial,

> Washington's decision to order an immediate halt to US military aid to Pakistan – and India – is one that should be welcomed if it means the beginning of a sober reappraisal of long-term policy in regard to Western military alliances in this part of the world.…The latest American and British moves will have some merit if they result in a more sober appraisal by those countries of their role in creating the present situation and their responsibility in avoiding its recurrence in the future. India is committed to peace, and has worked for peace in the world. More especially, it sincerely desires to live in peace with its neighbour, Pakistan. But peace on the subcontinent cannot be purchased by patience and restraint on one side – because it is bigger and stronger and peaceably inclined – and aggression, abuse and hate buttressed by huge doses of western military assistance on the other. The gift of 1000 tanks to Pakistan has resulted in aggressiveness and aggression and has corrupted the peace. This must not happen again.

In practice, the Western powers were mostly sympathetic towards Pakistan and the Western public opinion remained largely anti-Indian during the time of crisis. The US efforts at controlling Pakistan from using American weapons against India were minimal or none. Moreover, despite Anglo-American arms embargo, arms and ammunitions continued flowing into Pakistan from Western European countries, including Britain (Reddi 1965a). Turkey, a member in NATO and CENTO alliances, and Iran, member in CENTO, helped Pakistan to get Western arms and other essential supplies. Indian observers argued that "if US military aid reaches Pakistan through Turkey or Iran then the United States is as much involved as these countries in what can only be described as an unfriendly act towards India" (*The Times of India* 1965u).

In the Western media narratives, the war was largely depicted as a result of India's aggressive approach against Pakistan. Ignoring the facts on Pakistani armed infiltration and border firing which forced India to take stringent measures, they asserted that India initiated the war by crossing the ceasefire line at Kargil. They neither supported Indian stand on Kashmir issue nor considered Pakistan's attempt for invading Kashmir as an act of aggression. In terms of a dominant Indian understanding, the Western anti-India approach was largely shaped by their attitude towards India's freedom struggle against Britain. In an editorial comment, *The Hindu* (1965q) observed that "British Tories and British Tory Press could never forgive the Indian National Congress and its leaders for initiating the freedom struggle in India which ultimately resulted in the liquidation of Britain's empire". It added, "[a]n anti-Indian attitude came naturally to these elements, which put their faith in Pakistan as a country both dependent on and looking to the British for support". The American tendency for copying British opinion on India and their misunderstanding with regard to India's non-alignment policy can be seen as the reason for anti-India approach of American media. Analysing the anti-India attitude of the American press, *The Hindu* (1965q) stated in its editorial,

> While the Pakistani bias in Britain is understandable, India has suffered from a similar treatment from the American press and from Washington on account of two major factors. For one thing, because of the Anglo-American alliance, there has been a tendency in Washington to take the cue from Whitehall with regard to matters affecting the former British colonies. This has often been responsible for Washington dittoing any suggestion that may emanate from London regarding India. But an equally adverse factor that had operated against us for many years was Washington's initial misunderstanding of India's non-alignment policy and the general campaign in the American press against Mr Nehru that he was not only a pro-communist but anti-West. It took quite some time for India to disabuse Washington of the untenable character of this impression.

Britain was the major source of information on India-Pakistan affairs for many West European countries, since it was, on account of its imperial and Commonwealth relationship with India and Pakistan, credited by a superior knowledge of the subcontinent. Therefore, the myths and prejudices on Indo-Pakistan affairs circulated by the British agencies influenced public opinion in other countries (Das 1965a). Explaining the Western media narratives on India-Pakistan conflict, Girija K. Mukherjee (1965) observed in an opinion piece that,

Public pronouncements and press comments on the Indo-Pakistani conflict have been almost universally anti-Indian in virtually every country in Western Europe. Though the degree of anti-Indianism has varied from country to country – the smaller countries being more anti-Indian than the bigger ones – there have been very few people indeed who have spoken or written with either understanding or sympathy of the causes which led to the conflict.

During the war, Pakistani claims had received wider attention and publicity in the West. In the American and British media narratives Pakistani success against India in the battle field was exaggerated and India's military success was largely ignored (Parasuram 1965b). Moreover, due to its anti-India sentiments, western media largely underrated the ability of Indian democracy and secularism to resist a religious coloured war with Pakistan. They argued that the war would initiate widespread communal violence in India as the war would be regarded as a fight between Hindus and Muslims. After the war, criticising this approach of the Western media, Nandan Kagal (1965c) observed in an article published by *The Indian Express* that,

> The war has shown that the secular base on which Indian democracy was developed in the Nehru years is considerably stronger than was realised not only by foreign observers but by Indians themselves. Radio Pakistan did its utmost to incite communal violence across the border. Its broadcasts were addressed not to the people of Pakistan but to the Mussalmans of the sub-continent. But despite the incitement, communal harmony was not shattered in any part of this country. The only thing that was shattered was the two-nation theory. Foreign correspondents waited in vain to file their vivid despatches on the outbreak of Hindu-Muslim riots.

In context of the war, Indian media asserted that Pakistan's entire belligerent attitude towards India in general and over Kashmir in particular had thrived on the encouragement it received from the Western Powers and the enormous military aid it obtained from the SEATO and CENTO alliances. The United States had always sought to allay India's fear that Pakistan may use American weapons it secured under the anti-communist alliances against India by giving assurances that it would never permit Pakistan to use American arms, meant for containing Chinese expansionism, against India. However, it was indeed American offensive weapons which helped Pakistan to attack India in 1965. In terms of a dominant view, "spread of the war over a wider front would not have occurred if Pakistan had not been encouraged by the availability of massive American armour and airpower to launch on the overt invasion of Kashmir in

the Chhamb sector, designed clearly to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India" (*The Hindu* 1965q). Therefore, in the context of Pakistani aggression many in India insisted that a great deal of responsibility in preventing an escalation of hostilities rests with the Western powers and they should not hesitate to exercise their firm restraining hand on the military adventures of Pakistan. Some observers considered Pakistan's aggression on India, with the help of Western weapons supplied for the resistance against communist expansionism, as a failure of Western policy towards Asia. For instance, *The Times of India* (1965v) stated in its editorial,

> Indo-Pakistani conflict is conclusive confirmation that US policy in Asia has failed completely. This has been a constant theme of New Delhi's non-alignment policy and the fact that it has been fully vindicated has unfortunately been obscured by the assumption that India and Pakistan alone are responsible for the present crisis with Kashmir as the centre of the conflict. Yet the truth is surely that Pakistani actions have sprung from a US policy that has yielded few dividends from Korea to Formosa to South Vietnam and, finally, to Pakistan. In none of those areas have peace, stability, responsible government and democracy been promoted as a response to the communist challenge. In all these areas on the contrary instability, autocracy, inefficiency and arbitrary rule have been encouraged as a direct result of a policy of indiscriminate military and economic aid. Pakistan's case is more blatant than any other so-called Asian 'ally' of the United States in that the military equipment it received for the specific purpose of defence against aggressive communism was diverted to satisfy Rawalpindi's political ambitions.

In the beginning of the war, some Indian observers argued that Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir helped political observers in the United States and Britain to see Pakistan's true motives in joining the Western military alliances and there is recognition in both centres that Pakistan is primarily responsible for the recrudescence of hostilities. They observed that "the US officials now realise that there should never have been any doubt that concern about India, rather than Communism, led Pakistan to join the South-East Asia Treaty Organization and Baghdad Pact, now known as the Central Treaty Organization" (*The Hindu* 1965p). It is on the ground of these military alliances Pakistan qualified for massive military aid and established a well-trained and well-equipped army and air force. Western military aid to Pakistan included nearly 1000 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery, strike aircraft, including a squadron of supersonic F-104 Starfighters, and a submarine (*The Times of India* 1965t).

When India began to assert that Pakistan misused the Western weapons, Pakistan reacted with a similar story featuring India as the culprit in its place. It argued that India had been strengthening itself with the Western arms, ostensibly to defend the country from communist China but in reality to attack Pakistan (*The Hindu* 1965i). Analysing the Indian media narratives, it can be learned that Pakistan's trust in the alliance with the West had begun to crack when "India's difficulties with Communist China brought evidence that Washington was at least as concerned about 450 million Indians as about 100 million Pakistanis" (*The Hindu* 1965p). When the western sympathies towards India became evident, Pakistan developed good relationship with communist China. This relationship helped Pakistan in many ways; especially as balance against India and as a bargaining chip against the United States and later the Soviet Union. Indian observers wondered why Pakistan continued to enjoy the patronage of the West while it was flirting with communist China (Moraes 1965b). Referring to the Sino-Pakistan friendship, they insisted that Pakistan is not a loyal ally of the West (Mehta 1965).

Indian media and opinion makers articulated various reasons for the continuation of the West's sympathetic approach towards Pakistan, even by ignoring its problematic friendship with communist China. One of them was that the Western oil interest in the Middle East and other economic interest in China might be greatly influencing their approach towards Pakistan. In an article published by *The Indian Express* H. V. R. Iengar (1965b) argued that "the British have extensive oil interests in the Middle East which is overwhelmingly Muslim, and they appear consistently to have thought that, for the protection of these interests, they should favour Pakistan which is contiguous to the Middle East and also predominantly Muslim". Explaining that the Chinese market can be another major factor shaping the British approach towards Pakistan, he added,

> On a long term view – and in foreign affairs a long term view is always wise – they might well think that China will get over its present revolutionary brand of Communism and settle down to something less difficult to live with as has happened in the USSR. It is true that India could also be great market, but China could be even bigger. The British are now trading fairly actively with that country; and the future prospects are even more enticing. Therefore, as a matter of long term strategy, they must, in self-interest, maintain reasonably friendly relations with China. If this is correct, in a situation in which both China and Pakistan are on one side, we cannot assume that the British will necessarily have

sympathies with India; and so long as China does not indulge in a massive attack, they might well continue to support Pakistan.

In addition to these factors, Iengar observed that "it is also possible that the direction of British sympathy might well have been coloured by the fact that during the Second World War, the Indian National Congress, which was the spearhead of the Independence movement, non-cooperated with the authorities when the British were fighting with their backs to the wall, whereas the Muslim League, which was the spearhead of the Pakistan movement, did not". Moreover, he added "from the beginning, the British appear to have adopted the line that because Pakistan is the smaller country, their sympathies must lie with that country irrespective of whether it behaved well or not" (Iengar 1965b). During the war, American and British attempts to equate both India and Pakistan and place them both as equally guilty also seen in India as an approach favouring Pakistan (*The Hindu* 1965p). Problematising the Western attempts for equating the aggressor and attacked, *The Indian Express* (1965s) wrote in its editorial that "the Anglo-US combine have sought at every step, within the UN and outside, to embarrass and even harass India to Pakistan's advantage and for her convenience". In this context, some observers argued that such approach evolved from the West's interest in maintaining the balance of power in the region. Frank Moraes (1965b) asserted in an opinion piece published by *The Indian Express* that,

> The reason why the West, particularly Britain, is bent on maintaining the equation between India and Pakistan is that only by this balance of power can the West hope to maintain and exert its influence on this subcontinent. Balance of power has obsessed British foreign policy since the days of Palmerston, and though military and political development over the years have made it largely effete in the advanced areas of Europe today, it still operates in the so-called developing but independent countries of Asia, Africa and South America.

In terms of Indian understanding, the American and British decisions to suspend military and economic aid to India and Pakistan in the context of war were not neutral policies. Indian media asserted that in practice such policies of the West were undeniably favourable to Pakistan as they were adversely affecting India more than Pakistan. Some observers argued that the US's decision to suspend military aid to India, even after providing clearest possible evidence that in Kashmir, as in Kutch, Pakistan flagrantly deployed American Patton tanks and US Sabre jets against India, was an act of equating

the aggressor with the attacked (*The Indian Express* 1965s). The suspension of Western economic aid badly affected many development initiatives in India, including supply of fertilizers and thereby food production. However, the West justified such a policy by arguing that, "if economic aid is continued as before, the Indian Government will use all its other available resources for procuring military supplies" (Iengar 1965c). In their view, such policies were means of forcing India and Pakistan to end the conflict and reach a settlement on Kashmir dispute. Commenting on the Western decision to suspend economic aid to India, H. V. R. Iengar (1965c) observed in an opinion piece that,

> In effect, it hurts India enormously more than it hurts Pakistan for, politically, it puts pressure on India to settle with a country which has been venomously hostile to her over the years, which has deliberately made friends with China in order to spite us, and which has attempted to seize Kashmir by every kind of force and subterfuge…If this pressure succeeds then all the blood split over the years, all the heroism of our soldiers, and all the attempts to make Kashmir the symbol and essential prop of our secular democracy will have proved in vain…On the economic side, too, the pressure created by the suspension of aid will hurt us more than it hurts Pakistan. We are more vulnerable in our food supply. Our industrial base is more widespread and sophisticated than Pakistan's but it has not reached the degree of technical maturity when it can move forward on its own momentum.

Adding to the blow of suspension of economic aid, the United States advised its businessmen to be cautious with regard to India, even though it was clear that war did not affect peace and stability in the country (Iengar, 1965d). Moreover, rejecting Indian demand that Pakistan should be recognised as aggressor, the West had clearly proved that their sympathies remain with Pakistan. The acceptance of Pakistan's aggression would have established that Pakistan has no right over Kashmir. Analysing the Western sympathetic approach towards Pakistan, Rangaswamy (1965f) observed in an opinion piece that "Britain and the United States, each for its own reason, lend strong support to Pakistan's illegal claims to Kashmir". He added, "Britain, as the author of the division of India on communal lines, has assumed the role of guardian of its abnormal creation, Pakistan. The US has bound itself by the military security agreement to support Pakistan in return for military bases." The pro-Pakistan policies of the West helped to develop anti-West sentiments in India. In this context, some observers argued that India should stop leaning on the West and start to diversify its international relations. Criticising the

Western approach towards the conflict, *The Indian Express* (1965p) wrote in its editorial that,

> Much of India's hesitations on Kashmir have stemmed from the equivocations, duplicity and double dealings by Pakistan's Western friends who in order to achieve their own ends and those of their client have over the years done everything they could to cloud, befog and confuse the issue… Despite our policy of nonalignment, the truth is that because of our long association with the West, particularly with Britain, we tended to lean heavily on the West and to view events and developments largely through Western spectacles. Ignorant to a large extent of countries like Russia, her neighbours, as also of lands like post-war Yugoslavia, and even of our Asian neighbours and the up-and-coming countries of Africa, we tended to ignore them and to identify the world with the West. Recent developments, chiefly the attitude of the West to India's relations with Pakistan, have torn these blinkers from our eyes and have enabled us to see more clearly.

However, others saw the pro-Pakistan policies of the West as part of their attempt to detach Pakistan from communist China. Since it was apparent that India would have to face a hostile Pakistan and China for a long to come, they argued that India should forge special bonds with countries like the United States and Japan, as their major interests in Asia synchronise with that of India's. They insisted that, "it is in close cooperation between the United States and India and other democratic countries in the area that the best chance of containing Chinese expansionism and maintenance of peace and freedom in this part of the world lies" (*The Hindu* 1965r). Asserting this view, *The Hindu* (1965o) wrote in its editorial,

> It is imperative for us to convince the United States of the unwisdom of arming a country like Pakistan, a theocratic dictatorship which has made hatred of a peaceful neighbour the sheet-anchor of its foreign policy. Pakistan's capacity for mischief is directly in proportion to the amount of military assistance it receives from abroad. The Dulles concept of containing Communism through a network of military bases has become obsolete in this age of guided missiles, nullifying any value Pakistan may have had in America's global strategy in the past. Pakistan, by its collusion with China, has also established its unreliability as an ally and we hope Washington realises the danger of basing its Asia policy with Pakistan as one of its pillars….In a meaningful India-US *entente,* supported by other democratic countries like Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia, lies the best hope for democracy and freedom in Asia and peace in the world. It is towards forging such an association that India and the US should work.

Precisely, the Western approach towards the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 was largely favouring Pakistan, though it appeared as neutral. The United States and Britain

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supported Pakistani stand on Kashmir issue both inside and outside the United Nations and refused to acknowledge Pakistan as the aggressor, even though there was enough factual evidence to prove so. However, Indian observers were confident during the war that if China joined the war, the Western support would come for India.

8. *Friends and Enemies of India*

In the context of 1962 war, since China was a declared enemy of the Western camp of the Cold War, identifying friends and enemies of India was an easy task. In the context of 1965 war, though Pakistan was an ally of the West, identifying friends and enemies of India was not an easy task, because of various reasons. Firstly, since Pakistan was not a declared enemy of the communist bloc of the Cold War, there was no opportunity for getting unconditional sympathy from the communist camp on the ground of Pakistan's alliance with the West. Secondly, Sino-Pakistan friendship and China's open support to Pakistan in its war against India made the ideological dimension of the war more complex. Definitely, many Indian observers saw the war as a fight between secular democracy and theocratic dictatorship. But, outside the country, such views were either not taken seriously or regarded as irrelevant (Martin 1965). Thirdly, since Pakistan was enjoying the support of China, India was seeking the Western sympathies, even if they denied material support.

As explained earlier, in 1965 India had unconditional support and sympathies from neither the East nor the West. Definitely they were not extending the same to Pakistan either. The countries which openly supported Pakistan were China, Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey. However, some argued that Iran and Turkey, members of CENTO alliance, supported Pakistan because of certain pressures. In their view, the support of Iran and Turkey "had come not wholeheartedly but because it had to be announced when Pakistan invoked the treaty, their open refusal would have meant, in letter as well as in spirit, the final death-knell of CENTO" (Narain 1965a). Definitely, Sino-Indian rivalry was the natural force behind the Chinese support to Pakistan. In terms of dominant Indian view, "China, in the pursuit of its ambitious plan for establishing unrivalled hegemony in Asia, seeks to spite, humiliate and hurt India by any means, because it is out to crush India's

prestige and influence if it can help it and, therefore, finds it in its interest to support any cause that goes against New Delhi" (Narain 1965a). Only Malaysia and Singapore were there to extend open support for India during the war (*The Hindu* 1965o). After the war Yugoslavia came out openly to criticise Pakistani aggression and endorsed Indian stand in Kashmir in unequivocal terms, as discussed earlier (*The Indian Express* 1965p). Precisely, most of the countries remained silent towards the Indo-Pak conflict by adopting a policy of neutrality. Commenting on other countries' approach towards the Indo-Pak conflict, *The Hindu* (1965o) observed in its editorial that,

> If world reaction to the present Indo-Pakistan conflict has proved anything, it is that no country, except Malaysia and Singapore, was prepared to come out openly to support us. This despite the fact that the reports of both the UN Secretary General and the UN Observers in Kashmir have shown Pakistan to be guilty of provoking the conflict, in other words, of aggression.

In the context of the war, India was expecting the support from all friendly countries, including the great powers, since it had a perception that "any tendency to isolate the conflict in terms exclusively of an Indo-Pakistani struggle would be politically unrealistic" (*The Times of India* 1965w). Producing evidence of Pakistani violations, India asserted that Pakistan was clearly guilty of aggression and with the support of China, it was trying to invade Indian territory. It argued that the Sino-Pak collusion is a threat to peace and stability in the region. However, since Kashmir was already a subject of dispute, India failed to convince the world about Pakistan's violent intentions (Martin 1965). Many countries suspected that it is India's aggressive approach towards Pakistan which led to the fighting, as India is the bigger and more powerful party in the conflict.

The attitude of friendly countries definitely disappointed many Indian observers. Analysing friendly countries' unwillingness to support India in its crucial time, Nandan Kagal (1965d) stated in an opinion piece that "we have been more or less betrayed by our friends abroad at a time when this country is plainly the victim of Pakistani aggression." In this context, some observers reminded that "on many occasions India proclaimed with celebrity, its support for other countries like the United Arab Republic or Indonesia when they found themselves in critical situations, and this India did even at the cost of the sympathies of the Big Powers of the West because it regarded the causes supported as

just" (Narain 1965a). In an editorial, commenting on the world opinion on Indo-Pak conflict, *The Statesman* (1965j) wrote,

> We expect the world to recognize who started the conflict and direct its efforts to persuading the transgressor to see reason…This is unlikely however to happen for several reasons. Some countries evidently wish to play safe; whatever the duration of the present conflict, there will still be both Pakistan and India to live with at its end. Others quite rightly believe that their power to mediate in the conflict or moderate its intensity would be lost if they seemed to taking sides. Finally, it is not always easy for the outsider to see a dispute in terms of black and white, especially one as complicated and long-lasting as Kashmir.

While India was seeking sympathies and support of other countries by producing evidence on Pakistan's aggression and by disclosing unholy Sino-Pak alliance against India, Pakistan was busy in projecting the war as a Jihad against Hindu India. Demanding all good Muslims to come to the aid of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey helped Pakistan in its propaganda campaign in Muslim countries. Besides, other than Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia no other Muslim country supported Pakistan's Jihad against India (Dar 1965a). Interestingly, one Muslim dominant country, Malaysia, was openly supporting India. It is important to note that during this period there was a dominant tendency to equate India and Pakistan on religious lines, branding India a Hindu country and Pakistan a Muslim country (Narain 1965a). Essentially, it was with the same line of thought the world was judging the Kashmir dispute. Therefore, 'Muslim' Pakistan's claim over Kashmir is viewed as more valid than 'Hindu' India's claim. Analysing Pakistan's propaganda campaign against India, K. P. S. Menon (1965) observed in an article published by *The Statesman* that,

> Pakistani President's broadcast on the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan was a thinly veiled cry for Jehad and Radio Pakistan has been raucously shrieking for it. This cry, however, found no response in the hearts of our 50 million Muslim fellow-citizens, nor did it result in a resolution favourable to Pakistan at the Arab Summit Conference at Casablanca….Pakistan did, however, find some support in three Muslim States, not because they are Muslim but for other reasons. One was Turkey which, under Kemal Ataturk, was the first Muslim country to discard theocracy and obscurantism. Another was Iran which sprang into modernism under the aegis of the founder of the present Pahlavi dynasty. Both belong to CENTO, to which Pakistan also ostensibly belongs. The only other Muslim state which indulged in anti-Indian antics was Indonesia.

Precisely, the war of 1965 was a moment of many realisations for India. It failed to mobilise the world opinion in favour of it, even though there was enough evidence to prove that Pakistan was clearly guilty of aggression. Both the great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, refused to recognise Pakistan as aggressor even though they did not openly support Pakistan. The Sino-Pakistan friendship did not transform the West's approach towards Pakistan. On the ground of all these facts, 'self-reliance' became a major topic of discussion in India during this period.

9. *Non-alignment, Self-Reliance and A-Bomb*

The war of 1965 was the beginning of many radical transformations in Indian understanding of the self and the other. India's decisive upper hand against Pakistan in the war has finally liberated Indian self from the shock and humiliation of 1962. The first military victory has redeemed the honour and dignity of the nation and exploded the myth which had gained ground in some circles that India had neither the capacity nor the will to fight in defence of its territorial integrity (Soares 1965). After the war someone observed that "if the Chinese invasion in October 1962 gave us a traumatic shock, last month's fighting with Pakistan was an exalting experience: the former shattered the unrealistic world of our own making in which we were living, the latter has projected us as a valiant, dedicated and united nation" (Jog 1965).The war was a declaration that the peace-loving pacifist country of Gandhi will no longer entertain any attack on its territorial integrity. In the context of the war, India made it clear to itself and to others, including to the great powers, that Kashmir cannot be a subject of discussion or debate with any third party or country (*The Indian Express* 1965t). The show of unity in the country during the war proved that India is not a weak nation as its critics always propagated. The lack of major communal violence in the country, even after Pakistan's relentless propaganda campaign depicting the war as a fight between Hindus and Muslims, helped to strengthen India's national solidarity and asserted secular democracy as its identity (Kagal 1965c). Many described the success of India's war effort as a triumph of India's secularism and democracy, and a vindication of India's stand on Kashmir (Jog 1965).

The war of 1965 had initiated many significant transformations in India. One of such transformations was in India's approach towards international politics and international institutions. After the war, India's world view began to transform in relation to the response it had received from 'friendly' countries, including the great powers, at the time of its biggest crisis. Unlike 1962, in the context of 1965 war, the demand for abandoning the policy of non-alignment was rare and insignificant. Definitely some observers were there to note that "the policy we have been following since independence had actually found us without any country actively supporting our stand in the present conflict with Pakistan" (*The Hindu* 1965r). But the view that "as rapidly as possible, India should make herself less dependent upon the opinion others hold of her" was gaining momentum in the country (*The Statesman* 1965k). Indian media and opinion makers largely supported the government's decision to stay with the policy of non-alignment: though the decision was to continue the policy of non-alignment, it was accepted that there will be greater flexibility in the implementation of that policy to suit the altered international circumstances (*The Hindu* 1965r). Perhaps, the popular acceptance of Prime Minister Shastri, after the military victory against Pakistan, was a major factor which helped the government to get wide support for its post-war policies. Since the pro-Pakistan attitude of the West was making ground for anti-West sentiments in the country, the demand for adopting pro-West policy became insignificant in this period. However, everyone was aware that India could not afford an anti-West approach since it needed their support to defend against communist China. During this period, since the Chinese attempts for creating trouble at the Himalayan frontier during the war had clearly established the existence of an alliance between China and Pakistan, commentators were arguing that "India must be prepared to face this unholy combination on the battlefield at some time or other in the future whenever it suits the dictators" (Rangaswamy 1965d).

Many observers were certain by this period that India cannot live in peace with these "two aggressive, unscrupulous and implacable neighbours" (Jog 1965). They argued that China has classified India as a country to be destroyed since it finds India as a threat to its hegemonic ambitions in Asia. They insisted that the manner in which China came to the assistance of Pakistan, by unprovoked intrusion and issuing an ultimatum, is a clear proof of China's basic intentions towards India. Therefore, their verdict was that

"friendship with China is impossible for India to achieve" (Rangaswamy 1966). In terms of their view, the earlier phase of friendship with China was really the result of an inadequate assessment of China's characteristics and ambitions. They argued that "the disastrous conflict with China rudely awakened the nation from its deep slumber and there can be no going back to the old days". As far as Pakistan is concerned, they noted "everyone in India deeply desires friendship with Pakistan, but the question really is whether Pakistan wants India's friendship" (Rangaswamy 1966). The basic issue was whether Pakistan could exist without keeping alive the hate-campaign against India. They rejected the theory that once the Kashmir dispute is solved, Indo-Pakistan friendship would be firmly established and insisted that Pakistan's objective is not just to grab territory, but to humiliate India.

The Pakistani attitude after declaring the ceasefire made it clear that the end of war would not bring peace to the subcontinent. It continued ceasefire violations and declared that there would be no peace until it had a Kashmir solution to its satisfaction. However, with the immense sense of confidence given by the military victory, India was certain that it could resist any Pakistani or Chinese aggression in the future (Soares 1965). With the war Indian Army has established itself as a power to be reckoned with and it made Pakistan realise that India will hit back at any place of its choice if they attack. It is on the ground of this new confidence, India's post-war foreign policy debates took its shape. One of the most important features of the new foreign policy discourse was the dominance of a sense of pragmatism. Many insisted that "in the evolution of a new foreign policy Mr Shastri should be governed principally by the demands of national interests and not by the urges of international ideologies as until recently we have been too prone to be" (Moraes 1965c). Until then, India's foreign policy initiatives were largely "under the crippling burden of the thought, how they would affect Indo-Pakistan relations and the world's opinion about Kashmir". After the war, it was argued that "now India has the opportunity to shed the burden and move from the narrow waters of the past few years to the high sea of diplomatic options" (Chopra 1965c).

Since its independence, India's foreign policy had been postulated on the assumption that as it was maintaining good relationship with everyone, no one would make a major a

security threat to it (*The Hindu* 1965r). This theory was proved wrong when China attacked India in 1962. In the face of Chinese attack, India's well celebrated policy of non-alignment proved ineffectual and Jawaharlal Nehru had to modify the policy to say that "where China is concerned, India is not and cannot be non-aligned" (Rangaswamy 1966). The setback in the 1962 war had established a sense that India has no will and capacity to defend its territorial integrity. Analysing the post-1962 war status of India, in an article published by *The Statesman*, Pran Chopra (1965c) observed that,

> Everyone was convinced [after the 1962 war] that this country was sick beyond recovery and deserved only to be abandoned. The only choice that appeared possible for India was to sit down and take, after the drubbing in the battlefield, a drubbing in diplomacy, and this is precisely what happened. India was drummed out of all the areas where she was once supreme; at home her spirits drooped as they had never done before, confirming everyone in this suspicion, however unfounded it might have been, that India's sickness was incurable.

Though India was humiliated, the 1962 war helped to create a greater emphasis on issue of national security in the country. The ever-present threat to India was further emphasised by Pakistan's aggression in 1965. After the war, many argued that "in any review of our foreign policy, the emphasis will have to be on the safeguarding of our national security". They insisted that "in devising measures for the maintenance of this security, we would be unwise if we allowed the strict letter of non-alignment to stand in the way of seeking understandings with other countries which have a common interest with us in countering the threat to peace in this region and which believe in and value the things we stand for, freedom and democracy" (*The Hindu* 1965r). Until the 1965 war, Indian foreign policy was based on a view that "all people should support India all the time on every single issue". Frank Moraes (1965c) observed that "this illusion or misconception arises from the basic fallacy in the policy of non-alignment as Nehru preached and practiced it – that the rest of the world outside India are her permanent friends, and should be treated as such." This attitude has radically transformed after its war with Pakistan, when most of the 'friendly' countries either remained neutral or refused to support India. One of the best expressions of this attitude change was India's firm stand against the proposal for setting up a UN Commission for settling the Kashmir dispute. In this context, India declared that "Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union and its political status is neither negotiable nor a fit subject for examination by any

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UN Commission, even one composed of four of the five permanent members of the Security Council" (*The Indian Express* 1965u). The government's decision to prioritise national interests against ideology, even if it continued to follow the policy of non-alignment, had best expressed the influence of pragmatic thinking in foreign policy decision making (*The Hindu* 1965r).

With a new wave of pragmatic thinking, Indian discourse on foreign and security policies began to transform radically. Thus the lesson of self-reliance, economically and militarily, became the greatest lesson India was taught by Pakistan's aggression (Verghese 1965c). The war helped India understand that self-reliance is the only way through which it can avoid leaning towards friendly countries at the time of crisis. Referring to the Western countries' decision to suspend military supplies to India, many argued that "we can no longer remain at the mercy of those who can choke of the promised supplies of defence material when they are needed [the] most" (Jog 1965). Problematising India's economic policy, some observers argued that India's efforts for achieving self-reliance, particularly on the industrial front, should give importance to the private sector as it is the only progressively efficient way to increase national production. They insisted that "this must have its impact on economic thinking and planning which cannot continue to be geared to out-of-date slogans but must be conditioned by imperative realities" (Moraes 1965b). Analysing the general nature of Indian thinking on self-reliance, *The Times of India* (1965x) observed in its editorial that,

> The country has an abundance of human and material resources which are all too inadequately harnessed. Import substitution, the development of a technology suited to the needs and circumstances of the country, and avoidance of a crippling dependence on imported equipment, skills and know-how are all facets of a single problem of self-reliance. Hitherto there has been a marked tendency to seek foreign collaboration whether necessary or otherwise and to assume that anything indigenous must, by definition, be inferior and at best second-best. In this atmosphere Indian scientists and technologists have found themselves at a considerable disadvantage and have not been given the support and latitude they deserve.

In the discourse on defence and security, the new pragmatism was more explicit: as someone observed, "the old tendency to equate strength with violence, and to deprecate the first because it involved the second has vanished almost overnight" (Moraes 1965d).

Many argued that if it is necessary, India should mobilise its entire economy for defence: industrial priorities should be recast to suit defence requirements. Definitely, this meant the denial of goods and services for civilian consumption. However, those who were advocating this view argued that "an hour comes in the life of every nation when it must prefer guns to butter". They reminded, "[i]f we have to survive as a free nation we have to tighten our belt and build our military strength just as Soviet Russia did in the thirties to face the Nazi challenge" (Jog 1965). Countering this radical view, conservatives argued that in a poor and highly populous country like India defence priorities can be given only in relation to the overall economic development of the country. They insisted,

> It would be a serious mistake if the response to recent events takes the form of only an increase in defence expenditure and 'defence orientation' is taken to mean simply greater self-sufficiency in the manufacture of military equipment. Indeed, if this is all that is done, without correspondingly greater attention being given to the strengthening of the economy as a whole, the net effect might be to make ourselves more vulnerable to external pressure than before (Raj 1965).

The issue of self-reliance initiated a debate on nuclear weapons and many began to argue that India should develop its own nuclear weapon if it needs to be self-reliant on its defence against the growing threat of Sino-Pak collaboration. However, they asserted that India wants nothing more than to be left in peace in order to improve the living standards of its people. But even for that it ought to be prepared for war, since its neighbours have violent intentions over its territory. Therefore, it must cultivate *Shakti* for sheer national survival. Definitely the new pragmatism was finding expressions in government's approach towards military and national security, even though it was discouraging the idea of developing India's nuclear weapon (*The Hindu* 1965s). Analysing the new policy level changes, Maharaj K. Chopra (1965d) observed in a commentary that,

> For the first time India would be making a major weapon of attack with a considerable effort of her own. She has so far been almost wholly concentrating on weapons for defence, the small arms, medium guns, [and] fighter aircraft. Of the three main weapons of attack – the bomber, submarine and tank – only tanks would be forthcoming at present. Still they are welcome and would plug some at least of India's military as well as mental gaps.

Those who were demanding that India should make its own nuclear weapons asserted many reasons to support their view. The most important among them was that China was

making atomic weapons and it would assist Pakistan for doing the same. The two explosions in the deserts of Chinese Sinkiang had convinced many experts that China was producing its own uranium-235. They argued that "at its current rate of progress China will have an H-bomb by 1970" (Moraes 1965e). Joining the debate on India's nuclear weapons, Inder Malhotra (1965f) observed in an article published by *The Statesman* that "not only has China already a small stockpile of nuclear bombs, but it has made an impressive advance in developing a delivery system". He added, "Peking's own intermediate range missiles are now a harsh reality, and it would not be long before the launching pads on the Tibetan plateau become operative".

As far as Pakistan's nuclear programme was concerned, Indian observers had no definite explanations. According to some observers, Pakistan's leaning towards communist China despite the difficulties it had created in its relationship with the United States was based on a Chinese assurance on assistance for its nuclear programme. Some argued that Pakistan is playing a game "to put international pressure on India not to go in for atomic weapons while it tries to catch up on nuclear technology with a view to producing weapons" (Parasuram 1965c). As far as nuclear delivery system was concerned, many observed that within eight to ten years China would possess a missile with a range of 2500 miles. On the ground of these evidences, many envisaged that "a situation of diplomatic tension between India and China in the early 1970s, when a Chinese threat to destroy half-a-dozen crowded Indian cities might force some diplomatic humiliation on India that would be even more galling than the reverses of 1962" (Buchan 1965). Moreover, it was argued that India's hopes of posing as the liberal alternative to communist China in Asia would be jeopardised if it could not prove that it is not only as technologically advanced but also as determined a nation.

Challenging those who demanded that Indian should develop nuclear weapons on the ground of Chinese nuclear threat, some observers argued that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could afford to let China attack India in depth, and, whether they act jointly or singly, they would always possess a marked strategic advantage over China. But there was considerable scepticism about the question whether the great powers could in any sense 'guarantee' the integrity of India. Sceptics argued that a nuclear umbrella

provided by the Western powers would naturally be given only on their own terms. They asserted, "this was made evident recently when China threatened to confront us simultaneously with Pakistan, and when the West made it clear to both India and China that it would only intervene when the Chinese threatened the plains of the Brahmaputra" (Moraes 1965e). Many found it hard to believe on the one hand that "India could be regarded as a vital American interest, in the sense that Western Europe is a vital American interest"; on the other hand, they doubted whether "there would be a complete rupture between the Soviet Union and China, of a kind that would enable Russia to undertake precise commitment to India" (Buchan 1965). Critics argued that if India moves for manufacturing nuclear weapon that would be a supportive statement on nuclear proliferation and it would negatively affect the great powers' approach towards India. However, those who demanding Indian Bomb argued, "the big powers who between themselves are unable to agree to cut down their nuclear stockpiles are in no moral position to preach to the non-nuclear countries whether they should or should not proliferate" (Moraes 1965e). Insisting that manufacturing nuclear weapons would adversely affect India's both military and economic security, *The Times of India* (1965y) stated in its editorial that,

> [If India develops the bomb] China would immediately make available its Bomb to Pakistan. India will be buying troubles, not security. Militarily, nuclear weapons will be used as weapons of last resort through a process of military escalation. Therefore, possession of the Bomb will not absolve India of the burden of conventional arms. On the contrary, a nuclear India, by triggering a new spiral of regional rearmament, will probably find itself compelled to augment its conventional forces. The economic burden would consequently be even greater and, if unbearable would destroy India from within before it is destroyed from without. …Any country dropping a nuclear bomb or threatening to do so anywhere in the world becomes at once an enemy of the world…If five or ten years from now the world appears more wicked and uncertain than today, India could then more credibly determine its future course of action.

For many, India's own nuclear weapon was an issue of power and prestige. They argued that even if water-tight guarantees from the nuclear powers could be negotiated, India could not go for a special treatment by the great powers while China stands on its own feet. In their view, "India must not be dependent on borrowed strength" (Buchan 1965). They insisted, "the world being what it is, it is only the strong [that] are respected: the weak go to the wall" (Jog 1965). France was the ideal success model of power in the

world for these realists. They noted, "if France, after its ignominious capitulation in the Second World War, can again hold its head high, it is because General de Gaulle has built his force de frappe" (Jog 1965).

Some observers sought the help of Gandhian philosophy to assert the need of India's own nuclear weapon. For instance, Shiv Shastri (1965d) stated in a commentary that "Gandhiji used frequently to admonish that true non-violence is nonviolence of the strong, not of the weak. In terms of inter-state relations this means that India's dedication to non-violence will be evidenced less by a posture of military weakness than by the policy it adopts". Analysing the Indian nuclear debate, Alastair Buchan (1965) observed in an article published by *The Indian Express* that the radical arguments for an Indian bomb are based on one or more of the following premises.

1. Even if the great powers were prepared to give assurances of support for India in the face of nuclear threats, how could India be sure that they should act in her interests in a crisis unless she had some nuclear weapons of her own?
2. India is a great power by any standard, and if there is to be any permanent identification between nuclear weapons and great power status, then she must buy herself a seat at the top table, especially if the super-powers show no sign of disarming.
3. India must prove that she is technologically the equal of China if she is not to lose all her influence as Asia gradually moves into the technological age: she could if necessary demonstrate her remarkable progress in nucleonics by an explosion for some peaceful purpose like building a dam in the Himalayas.
4. Finally, a nuclear weapons programme would be an assertion of the national will which would help unite the country and once more give it a purpose.

The influence of these radical lines of thinking was limited within the government of India during this period. The conservative school remained as the most influential in the Congress hierarchy, in the higher civil service, among the military leaders and the businessmen. And, "they did not argue that India should forgo for ever the right to produce nuclear weapons, simply that to do so at that moment would be to alienate the big powers and ensure a permanent rift with Pakistan"(Buchan 1965). They were with a view that India will face a definable threat to its security which may grow in complexity when China becomes an operational nuclear power, but India will also face a grave and permanent threat to its economy. Therefore, India should use all its influence to persuade the United States, the Soviet Union, and the European powers to develop a coordinated

strategy for the containment of China. Problematising the demand for making India's nuclear weapon, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (1965) stated in an article published by *The Times of India* that,

> I feel that we should take a strong stand against the manufacture of nuclear weapons. A nation whose most deadly threat comes from its deeply entrenched poverty and all that stems from it cannot afford the luxury of manufacturing the Bomb…While there is a single hungry child in India, while there is a shelter-less family, while we line up in queues to get an opportunity of earning a miserable pittance, while ignorance and superstition undermine the nation, how can a sane person talk in terms of prestige or competition in the art of destruction?...If we have atomic energy, surely our first duty lies in using it for peaceful purposes, to grow more and better food, to banish illness and disease. Thus we not only serve humanity, but gain a higher position in the eyes of the world…Public memory is short and probably few people remember that it was we who first suggested in the United Nations that atomic energy should be used only for peaceful purposes. This view we have continued to hold all these years, and we have reiterated our faith in it. It is not by any means an idealistic view. It makes a sound practical common sense… If we the people of the world mean what we say when we speak of the need for permanent peace, if the Charter of the United Nations is not just another scrap of paper, if we were genuine in hailing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a step in the right direction, if the conferences on disarmament have any meaning, then surely the manufacture of the means of destruction more horrible than any kind of conventional weapons becomes a mockery of all we claim to believe in.

The debates on self-reliance and nuclear weapon were essentially linked to the process of India's identity transformation. As Alastair Buchan (1965) observed, "it should be recognized that the Indian debate on the bomb arises partly from internal stresses, the search for a new national identity after Nehru". There were no Indian leaders with comparable stature of Nehru who could take over the role Nehru played in both domestic and international politics. Indian media's 1965 wartime narratives revealed that India-Pak war of 1965 was a crucial turning point in the formation of Indian identity. Specifying theocratic military dictatorship Pakistan and communist dictatorship China as the two most important enemies which are threatening the very survival of the country, India has strongly defined its identity as secular democracy. The attitude of other countries at the time of Indo-Pak war was a major external force which helped to redefine the Indian identity and foreign policy.

Contemporary Indian Discourse on Pakistan

Analysing contemporary Indian media narratives, it can be learned that other than increasing usage of certain terms, like terrorism, there is no significant transformation in Indian public discourse on Pakistan even fifty years after the 1965 war. This invariable nature of Indian discursive image of Pakistan, definitely owes to the persistent lack of progress in India-Pakistan relations. As in the past, for Pakistan, Kashmir remains at the centre of its conflict with India. However, for India, the question of Kashmir is only one among the many issues which comes in the middle of its peaceful relationship with Pakistan. Issues ranging from Pakistan sponsored terrorism to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passing through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir exist as forces of interruption on Indian attempts for making better relationship with Pakistan. All these years, every initiative for improving the relationship between these two countries has failed mostly because of Pakistan's political instability, lack of commitment towards the process of building peace along the border and its direct or indirect involvement in terrorist activities in India. In the context of fiftieth anniversary of the 1965 war, assessing Pakistan's present approach towards India, a former Major-General of the Indian Army, Harsha Kakar (2015), observed in an article published by *The Statesman* that "there has been no positive change in the last fifty years in terms of ground realities and in the minds of the leaders of Pakistan".

Indian media narratives during the fiftieth anniversary of 1965 war reveal that, though there is no positive development in Indian discursive image of Pakistan, the attempts for keeping memories of 1965 war specifically alive in public discourse were rare in India. Perhaps it is the profusion of other issues of violence with Pakistan which reduced the significance of 1965 war in Indian public discourse. However, there is no dearth of memories of Indo-Pak wars in India: the later wars, specifically the war of 1971 and the Kargil war of 1999, often appear as themes in Indian popular media, including movies and television programmes. Indian popular media's lack of interest in the 1965 war was probably guided by the fact that India's victories in the later Indo-Pak wars were more decisive in nature. Moreover, in the past, there were not many attempts by the Government of India for remembering the 1965 war even though "Pakistan celebrates 6

September every year as Defence Day in remembrance of the manner in which its armed forces supposedly defended the nation against attacks from India in the 1965 war" (Kakar 2015). It is only in 2015, on its fiftieth anniversary, for the first time that the Government of India has decided to celebrate the war of 1965 as a 'great victory' of India against Pakistan and widely campaigned to create public awareness about this forgotten war. However, the question whether India had a decisive victory in 1965 continues to be a topic of debate. Interestingly, even India's official war history, by making a realistic assessment, has defined the end of 1965 war as a stalemate (Pandit 2015).

Introducing a new narrative of the 1965 war, in the context of its golden jubilee, the Government of India argued that it is on the ground of certain misplaced assumptions and wrong calculations that sceptics challenge the Indian victory narratives. However, most of the Indian media and opinion makers continued asserting the view that the war of 1965 had ended in a stalemate and it was India's missed opportunity for making a decisive victory over Pakistan (Bajpai 2015; Devasahayam 2015; Nayar 2015; Raghavan 2015; Singh 2015; *The Times of India* 2015). In addition to the debate on the nature of final result of the war, a major focus of Indian media narratives during the fiftieth anniversary was on unaltered violent nature of Pakistan's approach towards India. Focusing on these narratives, following sections of the chapter will analyse most important issue areas in India-Pakistan relationship on which the contemporary Indian discursive image of Pakistan is being formed.

1. *Disputes and Negotiations*

Essentially, the dispute between India and Pakistan is largely about identity, not merely about territory (Nasr 2005). Both parties consider Kashmir as one of the most important elements that defines their modern identity. For Pakistan, to justify its religious nationalism and two-nation theory, the incorporation of Muslim dominant Kashmir to its territory is an inevitable requirement. For India, which rejects the idea of religious nationalism and upholds secular democratic culture, Kashmir is a defining element of its ancient civilisational identity and modern secular identity. Therefore, for both parties,

any compromise on their claim over Kashmir is a compromise on their national identity. However, beyond this framework of perceptions remain certain issues that hinder development of peaceful relationship between these countries. These issues are intrinsically related to each country's approach towards settling the dispute. From the very beginning, Pakistan has tried to use various means of violence to cut off Jammu and Kashmir from India. Analysing the pre-war and wartime narratives of Indian media, the previous sections of chapter explained Pakistan's early approaches on using violence for settling the Kashmir dispute. Indian media narratives during the fiftieth anniversary of the 1965 war reveal that there is no positive development in Pakistan's approach even after five decades. In fact, over the years, it has normalised using "Jihad as an instrument of foreign policy to force India to come to the negotiating table to discuss J&K" (Misra 2007).

Tracing the roots of Pakistan's persistent lack of interest in building peace in the subcontinent, many in India observed that the primacy of military leadership in determining Pakistan's India-policy is the most important factor which prevents any meaningful development in the diplomatic way of peace between these two countries (Jaffrelot 2015; Kakar 2015; Mohan 2015; Sood 2015). The military leadership of Pakistan continues with considering Kashmir as an unfinished business of partition and it is still obsessed with the idea of military solution to settle the dispute even though all their previous military adventures against India were colossal failures. Many in India insist that military leadership of Pakistan is yet to abandon its policy of making 'India bleed with thousand cuts' that was so active for a time since the late 1980s (Narayanan 2015). It is widely agreed that even if the civilian Government of Pakistan takes any initiative for building peace in the region, they cannot implement it unless they have the army's consent. The persistence of anti-India approach in the Pakistan army is based on a concern that making peace with India would probably reduce the influence of military establishment in Pakistan (Mazumdar 2017). Precisely, it is only by projecting India as an enemy that threatens its very survival as a nation, Pakistan finds meaning in maintaining a large army. But, it should be noted that, by being optimistic in the future of Indo-Pak relations, some observers reject this view to argue that "Pakistani army's dominance over Pakistan's internal political space has now lasted for so many years, and

is so complete, that it should no longer need an external threat to justify its rule" (Menon 2009).

Though Pakistan's attitude towards India remains unchanged, many other things, in both domestic and international sphere of both countries, have transformed radically over the past fifty years. Firstly, during this period, India has clearly established its relative military, diplomatic and economic superiority over Pakistan. This development has created a new asymmetric power balance in the subcontinent, by making Pakistan a weaker party in the conflict. However, "Pakistan has been successful in reducing the asymmetry through strategy, tactics, alliance with outside powers, acquisition of qualitatively superior weapons and nuclear arms since the late 1980s and low intensity warfare" (Paul 2005). Secondly, by understanding Pakistan's desires over Kashmir, India began to take more realistic approach towards Pakistan's overt and covert violence that meant to disturb peace, stability and territorial integrity of India. Thirdly, as a sign of success of Indian diplomacy, over the years, the Western countries' widely problematised tendency for equating India and Pakistan has disappeared. Perhaps, India's economic development also might have influenced other countries' approach towards India. Finally, but most importantly, by creating a threat of mutual and total destruction, both countries achieved nuclear capability and developed credible nuclear delivery system. This development has also created a new threat of nuclear terrorism in the subcontinent, based on a concern that Pakistan's terrorist networks may somehow get access to nuclear weapons. It even led to describe the subcontinent as "the most dangerous flashpoint on earth" (Mehta 2003). However, since both countries achieved nuclear capability, counting on the high-risk of a nuclear war, observers largely ruled out the possibility of an all-out military conflict between India and Pakistan (Rajain 2005; Singh 2015a). But, the question of nuclear stability in the subcontinent still remains a subject to be addressed by both countries (Menon 2015).

In India, the necessity of building peace in the region is widely accepted even though there is no consensus on "either the terms of engagement or on the give and take that must be part of any serious efforts to find a new political compact between the neighbours" (Mohan 2015). Indian observers largely agree that managing its relations

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with Pakistan is the only way to control Pakistan's hostility becoming an unwanted distraction (Sood 2015). Many in India argue that the persistence of crisis in the subcontinent is indeed harming India's super power ambitions and it should settle its dispute with the neighbour to play bigger role in international politics. However, India is not willing to give any concession on Kashmir as Pakistan demands since it will be a compromise on India's national identity. When it comes to the negotiation table, both parties seek different things: for India, the first priority is peace and stability in the region, for Pakistan, settling the Kashmir dispute is the most important one (Swami 2015). Commenting on the process of India-Pakistan negotiation, Rakesh Sood (2015) observed in article published by *The Hindu*,

> It does not anticipate any breakthroughs with Pakistan but acknowledges that there are elements in Pakistan's decision-making circles that would seek to sustain a hostile relationship with India…. As long as these elements remain influential, a normal state to state relationship will elude us. Pakistan's internal politics will need to change before these elements can be neutralised. In a democratic India while there is consensus on the need to have normal and peaceful relations with Pakistan, there is also a strong sentiment that Pakistan's support to terrorism against India prevents normalisation. A dialogue should therefore be considered not an outcome but only a process.

Precisely, the contemporary narratives of Indian media reveal that though India sees negotiation as the only way ahead between these two countries, Pakistan's persistent lack of interest in the process of peace building which is often reflected through ceasefire violations and terrorist activities in India sustains conditions of distrust and tension in the subcontinent. Since Pakistan continues to support Jihadist activities against India, every Indian initiative for trust-building and negotiation fails to achieve its desired ends.

2. *Terrorism and Ceasefire Violations*

The issues related to Pakistan sponsored terrorism and India-Pakistan border skirmishes occupy a major space in Indian public discourse. In terms of a dominant Indian view, the most important issue that hinder peaceful relationship between India and Pakistan is terrorism (Menon 2009). However, for some observers, both the question of Kashmir and the issue of Pakistan sponsored terrorism are clearly indivisible, since it is "difficult to imagine how a dialogue on terrorism can proceed without some discussion on Kashmir"

(Mehta 2003). Analysing contemporary Indian media narratives, it can be learned that the India-Pakistan relations remain deteriorated primarily due to recurring skirmishes at the LoC and frequent Pakistan sponsored terrorist attacks in different parts of India. In the context of golden jubilee of the 1965 war, explaining Pakistan's anti-India policies, many observers argued that even today all major Indian cities are under constant threat of Pakistan sponsored terrorism. In terms of media narration, the issue that the perpetrators of terrorist crimes against India go scot-free in Pakistan also largely affects the relationship between these two countries (Ansari 2015). Essentially, since both countries failed to create a sense of common benefits from cooperation, terrorism remains a major political instrument in the subcontinent.

It is widely agreed in India that Pakistan assumes that it can force India into giving up Kashmir by continuous use of terrorist violence (Bajpai 2003). Some argue that "Pakistan's military establishment has learned that covert war against India can be pursued with impunity, as their crisis-averse neighbour will, sooner or later, return to the negotiating table" (Swami 2015a). In the context of fiftieth anniversary of the 1965 war, many observed that India's response against Pakistan using terrorism as a foreign policy tool to make India talk about Kashmir often remains as nothing more than a talk of war threat.

Analysing Indian media narratives, it can be learned that, in recent decades, India's withdrawal from talks with Pakistan following every major Pakistani sponsored terrorist incident in India has become an established practice. Explaining the problem of terrorism in India-Pakistan relationship, Shivshankar Menon (2009) observed in article that "for Indians the dialogue with Pakistan, and the entire relationship, is predicated on an absence of violence against India from Pakistan". However, Indian media narratives reveal that, though India often insists that there will not be any talks with Pakistan until it stops supporting terrorist activities against India, the Indian attempts at bringing Pakistan into the negotiation table had no total termination in the recent decades — definitely, short term breaks followed after every major terrorist incident in the country. Perhaps it is because of a realisation that there is no other way than dialogue to manage Pakistani terrorism against India. As far as India is concerned, terrorist incidents not only affect the

peace and stability in the region but also become a greater challenge for India's great power ambitions, since they exemplify India's inability to keep its own backyard in order (Mehta 2003). Moreover, as P. B. Mehta (2003) observed, "the psychological vulnerability terrorism creates has a direct bearing on Hindu-Muslim relations [in the country]".

Tracing the origin of Pakistan's terrorist tactics against India, Praveen Swami (2007) argued that "the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir had in fact raged on ever since Jammu and Kashmir acceded to the Union of India in 1947 and Indian troops landed in Srinagar to defend the state against Pakistani irregulars". However, some observers insist that: "it was Sikh separatism [in 1980s] that actually introduced the issue of terrorism in India-Pakistan relations" (Noor 2007). In an article published by *The Indian Express*, during the fiftieth anniversary of 1965 war, Praveen Swami (2015a) asserted that "the first terrorist bombing in Srinagar did not take place in 1989, but in 1957". Precisely, though India had experienced isolated terrorist activities even in the earlier period, it is since 1980s Pakistan began widely employing its terrorist tactics against India. As some noted, "since then, not only have the infiltrating terrorists been better trained, but the non-Kashmiri combatants appear to be greater in number than their Kashmiri counterparts" (Ganguly et al. 2003). In terms of number of incidents and target area, Pakistan sponsored terrorist activities against India largely expanded during this period.

Indian media narratives during the fiftieth anniversary of the 1965 war reveal that contemporary Indian discursive image of Pakistan is largely shaped by the issue of frequent skirmishes at the border and Pakistan sponsored terrorism against India. Since India-Pakistan border, especially in the Jammu area, witnesses frequent violations of ceasefire, reports on civilian and military casualties — due to Pakistan's cross border firing and shelling — hardly stops appearing in Indian media narratives. It is often asserted that such cross border firing of Pakistan is mostly meant to give cover up for infiltrating terrorists and traffickers (Das 2014). In other words, border firing is an overt side of Pakistan's enduring covert violence against India. However, though the relationship between India and Pakistan is yet to show any positive outlook, the recent news from Pakistan gives better hope on future of the relationship between these two

countries. In terms of these reports, after suffering certain serious terrorist incidents within its own territory, Pakistani establishment has begun to realise the problem of maintaining the terrorist network. Explaining the new realisation in Pakistan, *The Hindu* (2015) wrote in its editorial during the golden jubilee of the 1965 war that,

> Today Pakistan suffers festering wounds inflicted by its own strategy of terror. There is some degree of realisation among its civilian establishment that the nexus between the security establishment and the *jihadi* complex has hurt its fledgling democratic institutions. This led to an assertion of civilian supremacy in the latter half of the decade of the 2000s, and a degree of acceptance by the security establishment of the need to do away with military preponderance. But there has been little reorientation in Pakistan's overall foreign policy towards India, beyond tokenism and a grudging acceptance of a changed world at large that has little tolerance for terrorists and their sponsors.

Apart from the question of Kashmir, terrorism, and border skirmishes, the issues such as Sino-Pakistan relation, Chinese construction activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, cross border drug trafficking, and attack against Hindu minorities in Pakistan also have great significance in contemporary Indian public discourse on Pakistan.

3. *Sino-Pakistan Relations and Other Tensions*

The anti-India dimension of the Sino-Pakistan relationship that began in the context of India-China war of 1962 and strengthened in the context of India-Pakistan war of 1965 is well-known in the Indian public discourse. Over the years, the anti-India dimension of this partnership is clearly revealed through various policies of China that include its helping of Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons to balance against India's nuclear capability and, at Pakistan's request, routinely blocking (until Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008) UN Security Council's attempt for imposing any sanctions on Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is widely acknowledged as a front organisation for militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba that is responsible for many terrorist attacks in India (Lakshman 2010; Klintworth 2013; Small 2015). Lately, when China helped Pakistan to reciprocate India's nuclear agreement with the United States that was signed in 2008, the threat of Sino-Pakistan nuclear axis became more evident for India. Following this incident, quoting well-known nuclear proliferation analyst Gary Milhollin's statement, "if you subtract Chinese help, there won't be a Pakistani [nuclear] program", Indian media and opinion makers are keen

on reminding that the Sino-Pakistan nuclear axis is the greatest threat to peace and stability in the subcontinent (quote from Corera 2006). Definitely, growing Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership and Pakistan's persistent anti-India posture solidify their concern: it should be noted that, in the recent past, "China has emerged as Pakistan's largest arms supplier, selling everything from aircraft to missiles to naval vessels" (Smith 2013).

Linking with its perceptions of threat over the presence of the United States in Asia-Pacific, in recent years, growing Indo-US relationship also became a major impetus for China to intensify its strategic ties with Pakistan. It assumes that the Indo-US strategic partnership is part of the United States' effort for containing China through 'encirclement' (Rakisits 2015). Having this assumption with regard to the US presence in the Asia-Pacific, and because of certain other reasons, China envisages a potential threat in strategically significant Malacca Strait on which about eighty percentage of its energy supply and a major chunk of its other trades are depended. Adding to this problem, both Indonesia and Malaysia did not support "the idea of any external power being involved in maintaining secure traffic through [the Strait]" (Kumar 2007). Therefore, China seeks to develop an alternate maritime route to overcome possible crisis in strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait. Developing a deep sea port in Gwadar in Pakistan's Baluchistan province, China has been trying to link its mainland with the Indian Ocean and thereby ensuring an alternate route for its trade and energy supply at the time of a crisis. However, considering the strong military character of the Sino-Pakistan partnership, India perceives China building a port in its neighbourhood as part of China's containment strategy against India. Assessing the possibility that China could use the port as a naval base in the future, many observers insist that Gwadar port is part of Chinese strategy for establishing dominance in Indian Ocean (Rakisits 2015; Smith 2013; Small 2015). Though there is a strong argument that China's interest in the region is "guided less by the perception of geostrategic competition with India than by a broader comprehensive conception of security", India public discourse remains highly suspicious about every Chinese moves in the region (Freeman 2018).

The other issues that frequently appear in contemporary Indian media narratives, as related to the Sino-Pakistan partnership, include China's construction activities and

growing military presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). Ignoring India's protests, China has been engaged in various construction projects, such as dams and roads, in PoK for many years. However, in recent years, rebranding these projects as China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which intends to connect "the Persian Gulf port of Gwadar [in Pakistan] with Kashgar in northwest China's Xinjiang province", China intensified its engagements in this Pakistan occupied territory (Garlick 2018). Since India considers entire Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of its territory, many observers see China's activities in PoK as a violation of India's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, China's activities in this tough terrain often become a subject of India's security concern. Essentially, by supporting Pakistan in economic, military and diplomatic means, China is trying to ensure that Indian attention is contained within the subcontinent.

The issue of drug trafficking and the problem of Islamic fundamentalist violence against Hindu minorities in Pakistan are other notable matters affecting contemporary Indian discursive image of Pakistan. Though there is a credible decline in the number of media reports on fundamentalist violence against Hindu minorities in Pakistan, when we compare it with the media narratives of 1960s, the issue still remains a matter of concern in India since it witnesses occasional refugee flow from Pakistan due to this problem. Similarly, though there is a sharp decline in recent years, the issue of drug trafficking from Pakistan still remains a major problem in India. Through various routes and various means, heroin and hashish produced in the 'Golden Crescent' region (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) continue to be trafficked to India via border-states of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir (Das 2014). Precisely, the role of collective memories of 1965 war, or any other later India-Pakistan wars for that matter, is not prominent in shaping contemporary Indian discursive image of Pakistan. Since India always displayed a credible military superiority over Pakistan, the memories of India-Pakistan wars have no significant influence over Indian social perceptions of Pakistani threat. Indian media narratives during the fiftieth anniversary of 1965 war reveal that it is the problem of terrorism and frequent cross border firing at the LoC which dominate contemporary Indian public discourse on Pakistan.

Conclusion

Analysing the Indian media narratives on Pakistan in three different historical contexts, this chapter attempted to reveal the dominant images of Pakistan in Indian public discourse and the significance of collective memories of wars in it. In the first section, with the help of pre-1965 war narratives of Indian media, it is revealed that the foundation of India's anti-Pakistan sentiments lies within the very idea of partition. The partition violence and the territorial dispute, especially the Kashmir question, solidified such sentiments. Though there were serious efforts during the pre-1965 war period to forge a better relationship between these countries, and there were limited success stories like the Indus Water Treaty, Pakistan's adamant stand on Kashmir dispute remained as a stumbling block to achieving profound results. The second section, analysing the 1965 wartime and immediate post-war narratives of Indian media, revealed that the war of 1965 was a crucial moment in the formation of India's modern national identity. It is in this context, in relation to Pakistan's identity as a theocratic military dictatorship and China's identity as a communist dictatorship, India strongly defined its identity as a secular democracy. The third section, with the help of Indian media narratives during the fiftieth anniversary of 1965 war, revealed that collective memories of wars have no significant impact on contemporary Indian discursive images of Pakistan. Obviously, the fact that India had decisive upper hand in all its wars against Pakistan is the most important factor which makes memories of war insignificant in shaping Indian perception of Pakistani threat.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The present study is an attempt to understand the role of war and collectively shared memories of war in discursive construction of the 'other' in international politics. It does so by assessing the impact of war(s) and collectively shared memories of war(s) in Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan. It is partly an approach for understanding the contextual backdrop of currently dominant war narratives in Indian public discourse and partly an attempt at understanding the process which constructs negative images of China and Pakistan in the Indian public discourse. It analyse the narratives of four mainstream Indian English language newspapers, *The Hindu, The Indian Express, The Statesman* and *The Times of India*, for making sense Indian public discourse on these countries. This study treats the newspaper narratives as one among the few dominant discourses which shape Indian images of China and Pakistan.

This study is developed on an ontological standpoint which asserts that social realities are constructed through certain meaning making practices and they are always subject to change/transformation in accordance with those meaning making practices. It borrows largely from Foucauldian understanding of discourse, power, and subjectivity to develop a theoretical framework that helps to explain the process which creates/recreates collective memories in a public discourse and to analyse the role of collective memories of war in the construction/reconstruction of 'other' in international politics. Building on the premise that the construction of 'other' is very intrinsic to the process of identity formation, it argues that the 'enemy' images of China and Pakistan in the contemporary Indian public discourse have evolved through the same discursive practices which created modern Indian identity.

This study is based on a presumption that the existing studies on Indian identity do not adequately explain the significance of war(s) and collectively shared memories of war(s) in the modern Indian identity. Taking non-alignment, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, third-worldism etc. as the determining forces of the modern Indian identity, the studies on Indian foreign policy have clearly examined the link between India's national identity

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and foreign policies (Chacko 2012; Singh 2013a). However, such studies hardly explain the impacts of war(s) and collective memories of war(s) in the formation of modern Indian identity. Analysing the Indian media narratives on China and Pakistan, this study asserts that India-China war of 1962 and India-Pakistan war of 1965 had brought explicit changes to Indian identity and, thereby, have contributed to the transformation of India's foreign and security policies.

The first chapter of the thesis, by assessing various approaches in IR for studying the self-other dynamics in international politics, introduces the research problem and the rationale of the present study on Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan. It explains that the mainstream IR theories, due to its tendency for adopting positivist epistemology, are not particularly helpful for analysing the impact of war(s) and collectively shared memories of war(s) in the process of state identity formation. These theories, excluding a stream of constructivist approaches, assume a pre-given ontological status for the states; it is to say that they assume states either as similar units shaped by the international system or as functionally similar units created by the interactions between international system and domestic milieu. These theories largely ignore the transformative nature of discursive practices and overlook the impact of various socially significant factors in the formation/transformation of state identity. Since it is an ontological problem, this study followed poststructuralist/postmodernist understanding of state, popularised in IR by scholars like James Der Derian, Michael J. Shapiro, David Campbell etc., to explain the impacts war(s) and collectively shared memories of war(s) in state identity and in its construction of 'other'. In terms of this view,

> we can understand the state as having 'no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality'; that its status as the sovereign presence in world politics is produced by 'a discourse of primary and stable identity'; and that the identity of any particular state should be understood as 'tenuously constituted in time . . . through a stylized repetition of acts', and achieved, 'not [through] a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition' (Campbell 1992:9).

From this premise, the second chapter of the thesis develops a theoretical framework that helps to analyse Indian discursive images of China and Pakistan. By defining discourse as meaning making practices that construct social reality and help individuals in making

sense of subjects and objects in their social life, it asserts that the construction of identity, whether it is individual or collective, always depends on certain discursive practices. It asserts that such discursive practices persistently create certain power relations and conveniently link images of the past with the present day social reality to establish a sense of historical continuity among the people. Bringing the concept of collective memory into this framework, this chapter explains that it is only through the discourses of the present that collective memories can have their existence in any public discourse. In other words, it is always the meaning making practices of the present which define collective memories and it is the interests and objectives of the present, rather than the 'reality' of the past, which create images of the past in everyday public discourse.

Extending the theoretical framework developed in the second chapter, the third chapter of the thesis underlines that modern states have decisive interests over the construction of collective memories of war in everyday public discourse. It borrows from national identity debates to explain that it is by linking memories of collective struggle in the past with the social realities of the present that modern states create a sense of unity among its citizens and it is over such sense of unity, every national identity finds its existence. Besides the purpose of identity construction, this chapter reveals that, states are highly depended on the past for justifying its various actions and policies in the present. Therefore, modern states persistently construct collective memories of war(s) that support its interests and objectives, through various discursive involvements in social life such as commemoration ceremonies, war memorials, museums, and mass media interventions through movies and television programmes celebrating glories of war.

Assessing Indian media narratives on China in three different historical contexts, specifically, the pre-1962 war narratives, the 1962 wartime narratives and the contemporary narratives, the fourth chapter of the thesis analyses the impacts of India-China war of 1962 and its collectively shared memories in India's own identity and in Indian discursive images of China. In the first part of the chapter, by analysing pre-1962 war narratives, it explains the major features of Indian identity and Indian image of China during the pre-war period. Identifying the prevalence of sentiments against war, militarization, and nuclear weapons etc. in Indian narratives as the manifestation of the

pre-war Indian identity, it asserts that the principles of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, non-alignment, and strong commitment for building international peace had shaped Indian foreign and security policies during this period. It was a strange mix of Gandhian understanding of peace and non-violence and the Western ideas of equality and liberal democracy which determined Indian values and ethics during the pre-war years. As a result of this, while remaining anti-communist, India maintained good relations with all communist countries, including China. Similarly, while remaining as a strong supporter of the Western democracy, Indian kept itself away from the power politics of the Western countries. At the domestic level, unlike many other newly formed democracies, India mostly refused to employ military means to suppress communist movements within the country. Instead, by bringing the communists into the democratic space, India established a tactical resistance against communist movements in the country through ideological means. Precisely, the pre-war narratives of the Indian media clearly reveal that, having values based on a combination of Gandhian principles and the Western liberal ideologies, India had enjoyed a respectable position in international politics during this period. Through active participation in UN peacekeeping missions and by acting as a link between the two competing power blocs of the Cold War international politics, India was ranked as a leader of newly independent Afro-Asian countries. Definitely it was this sense of identity which had constituted India's approach towards others during the pre-war years.

Though India had maintained a good relationship with China, the dominant image of China in Indian public discourse was not that of a friendly country during the pre-war years. The stories of two thousand years of friendship or ancient civilizational ties between these countries had hardly figured in Indian media narratives during this period. Instead, the stories of China's violent culture and age old expansionist tendencies often appeared in Indian media. Ever since China invaded Tibet, the stories of Chinese expansionism became dominant in Indian public discourse. On the ground of Chinese invasion of Tibet, many in India suspected that China would continue its expansion into the Indian subcontinent and many believed that China would support Indian communists to destroy India's democratic system. Essentially, it was driven by anti-communist sentiments which largely shaped Indian images of China during the pre-war years. Later

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when China's presence at the Himalayan frontier had begun to grow and their construction of a road passing through Aksai Chin had been noticed by India, reinforcing such doubts of Indian observers, China began to figure as a threatening 'enemy' in Indian public discourse. Assessing Indian media's pre-war narratives on China, it can be argued that evolution of the 'enemy' image of China in Indian public discourse is not particularly related to the India-China war of 1962.

Focusing on the wartime and immediate post-war narratives of the Indian media, the second part of the chapter explains the impact of 1962 war on India's own identity and on Indian discursive images of China. It maintains that the war had radically transformed anti-war and anti-militarization sentiments within the country, though a small minority remained strongly critical of war and militarization. The war created a new sense of national security among the people and ensured public support for India's militarization efforts. In the context of war, depicting the war as a fight between democracy and communist dictatorship, the mainstream narratives asserted 'democracy' as a defining feature of Indian identity. However, due to such narratives, based on anti-communist sentiments within the country, Indian communists became an internal 'enemy' of India. Except for this dividing element, the war was largely helpful in Indian efforts at national integration, as it alleviated India's internal differences, like Tamil movements, in the presence of an external threat. Due to the lack of support from other non-aligned countries when expansionist communist China attacked India, the war challenged India's policy of non-alignment, raising public demand for seeking the Western support to resist the communist aggression. Such challenges forced India to redefine the idea of non-alignment, by emphasising that non-alignment is not 'neutrality'. The changes in Indian approach towards militarization and non-alignment can be treated as a result of war induced transformation in Indian identity. However, the most explicit transformation of Indian identity emerged through India's setback in the war. Shattering India's status as a leader of the Afro-Asian countries, the debacle at the Himalayan frontier gave India an image of a weak defeated country which is incapable of protecting its own territorial integrity.

Following Indian fiasco at the Himalayan frontier, Indian public discourse began to redefine the enemy image of China through the betrayal narrative suggesting that China had betrayed India's friendship and the victimhood narrative depicting India's setback in the war as a great humiliation for the country. Analysing Indian media's wartime and immediate post-war narrative on China, it can be learned that, within the mainstream Indian public discourse, the war had established China as an expansionist communist enemy which is attempting to destroy India's democratic system of government, its democratic ways of economic development and its esteemed status in international politics. Invalidating a dominant Indian belief that there will never be an India-China war, the war of 1962 manifested the gravity of Chinese threat to India and opened up possibilities of full-fledged India-China war in the future. The war authenticated a view that China is attempting to destroy India to prove the inefficacy of the Indian model of democracy to the newly independent Afro-Asian countries, to assert that communism is the most appropriate model of political system for them. Many observed that, through intensifying tension at the Himalayan frontier and through forcing India to increase its military spending, China intends to divert India's attention from economic development to militarization and, thereby, ultimately to prove that democratic ways of economic development is ill-suited to the Afro-Asian world. Many saw China's hegemonic ambitions in the region as the driving force of its attack on India's Himalayan frontier and argued that China considers that destroying India's status in international politics is imperative in order to maximise its own influence in the Afro-Asian region.

Though the tendency for depicting India-China conflict as a fight between democracy and communism has disappeared over the years, the war of 1962 continues influencing Indian public's perception of China and Chinese threat. Analysing the narratives of Indian media during the fiftieth anniversary of 1962 war, which is October-November 2012, the last section of the chapter explains the way in which memories of India-China war is being represented in contemporary Indian public discourse. It asserts that the sense of Chinese threat manifested by the 1962 war in Indian public discourse is continuously being reproduced through various discourses concerned with the issues such as unsettled border/territorial dispute, China-Pakistan relations, Chinese military presence and construction activities in PoK, and the growing presence of China in the Indian Ocean

region. Merging with the problems of trust deficit between the two countries, these issues constitute a significant part of the contemporary Indian narratives on national security. It is mostly by referring to the 1962 war as historical analogy, such narratives underline the unpredictable nature of the Chinese threat and examine the possibilities of a new Chinese attack on India. Moreover, through the above mentioned issues, the 'betrayal narrative' and 'humiliation narrative' continue finding expressions in contemporary Indian public discourse. Therefore, such narratives not only helps to create the memories of 1962 war in contemporary Indian public discourse, but also continuously reproduce the sense of insecurity created by the India-China war. While such a sense of security-threat remains dominant within society, other positive developments in the India-China relations fail to make any notable impact in the present Indian discursive images of China.

The fifth chapter of the thesis is an attempt to understand the significance of India-Pakistan war(s) and collectively shared memories of those war(s) on India's own identity and in Indian discursive images of Pakistan. Similar to the pattern of the fourth chapter, this chapter analyses Indian media narratives on Pakistan from three different historical contexts, specifically, it examines the pre-1965 war narratives, the 1965 wartime narratives, and the contemporary narratives (by focusing on narratives during the fiftieth anniversary of 1965 war in 2015). It treats the 1965 war as the first India-Pakistan war, by following the official stand of the government of India. However, the chapter gives particular attention to the issues of partition and the 'unofficial' first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947-48 while mapping the Indian discursive images of Pakistan. The first part of the chapter, by analysing the pre-1965 war narratives of the Indian media, explains various discourses which determined the Indian images of Pakistan in relation to India's own identity during the pre-1965 war years. It finds four major categories of narratives as dominant in Indian public discourse: firstly, the narratives on partition related problems which include Kashmir dispute, refugee crisis and memories of partition violence; secondly, the narratives on border problems which include frequent cross border firing at some areas and various issues related to unsettled border in many areas, especially in (former) East Pakistan; thirdly, the narratives on Pakistan's friendship with China, especially after intensifying tension at the Himalayan frontier in early 1960s; and fourthly, the narratives on Pakistan's alliance with the West, as there was serious concern

regarding Pakistan's use of such an alliance for creating leverage against India. This chapter asserts that due to various issues of conflict, concerned with the partition and Kashmir dispute, the anti-Pakistan sentiments had been prevalent in India during the pre-war years and the enemy image of Pakistan in Indian public discourse is directly linked with the very idea of 'Pakistan', as a separate state for Muslims, and the process of partition of British India which involved one of the most violent episodes in the history of human civilization.

Analysing the relationship between India's own identity and Indian approach towards Pakistan, it can be seen that though anti-Pakistan sentiments were prevalent in India during the pre-1965 war years, it was India's identity in international politics rather than such public sentiments which largely determined its approach towards Pakistan. In relation to India's pre-1962 war identity, it was essentially that of a peace-loving, anti-militarist, responsible, democratic leader of Afro-Asian countries. In line with that, there were continuous efforts from the Indian side to develop a better relationship with Pakistan. The Indus Water Treaty, signed in 1960, is one of the best results of such efforts. However, Pakistan's intransigent approach towards the Kashmir dispute and their continuous efforts at creating trouble for India, through cross border firing and supporting the rebel movements in India, like Naga separatist movement, constrained the positive outcomes of such attempts. Meanwhile, through the relentless flow of refugees from Pakistan during partition and the brutal stories of rape, murder and arson they brought to the country, developed a strong view in India about Pakistan's hatred towards India and the Hindus. Later, when India-China relations had deteriorated, Pakistan tried to take advantage of the situation and forged a better relationship with communist China, even though it was a member of two anti-communist alliances formed by the West. Challenging Indian stand on Kashmir, China and Pakistan signed an agreement to settle the boundary between PoK and Xinjiang province of China. Thus, the Sino-Pakistan relationship became the most explicit evidence of Pakistan's anti-India activities. In the same period, in relation to the 1962-war induced transformations in Indian identity, Indian approach towards Pakistan also began to transform. Following its debacle at the Himalayan frontier in 1962, changing the image of a weak third-world country that is incapable of protecting its own territorial integrity became the most important concern for

India. It began to prioritize material power over the moral values and began to take uncompromising stand on protecting its national integrity. This transformation was well revealed through India's approach against Pakistan's Kutch aggression in early 1965. Later, when Pakistan attempted to create political instability in Kashmir by sending armed infiltrators, in relation to India's new identity, the war of 1965 became a reality.

Assessing the wartime and immediate post-war narratives of Indian media, the second part of the chapter argues that the war of 1965 had no significant impact on Indian discursive image of Pakistan, as India had already been familiar with the aggressive intentions of Pakistan and as it had managed to have a decisive upper hand against Pakistan in the war. However, it asserts that the war had made some explicit changes in Indian understanding of security threat, in its approach towards international politics and, ultimately, in its own identity. Revealing the magnitude of vulnerability of India's land border, sharing with both China and Pakistan, the war of 1965 developed a better understanding in India about its security threat and defence capability. Though India fought only against Pakistan in 1965, the wartime narratives clearly show that both China and Pakistan had more or less equal role in shaping Indian narratives on security threat during this period. It is primarily due to the reason that while India was fighting against Pakistan, China was creating serious security tensions for India, especially at its Sikkim border, to support Pakistan's war efforts. From this development, emerged discussions and debates in the Indian public discourse regarding the situation which was forcing India to fight two separate and simultaneous wars against both Pakistan and China. Moreover, unlike the war of 1962 which India fought with a hope that the Western military support would come for India if communist China attempts to prolong the war, during the war of 1965 India had support of neither the West nor the East. In the context of war, the West suspended its military supplies to both India and Pakistan to assert their neutral stand and to put pressure on both parties to settle the dispute. However, the Soviet Union refrained from declaring open support to India, as it was trying to develop good terms with Pakistan, even though it continued assisting India through economic and military means. Outside the Cold War power blocs, only Malaysia and Singapore came forward to declare their support to India during the war. The immediate post-war narratives of the Indian media clearly reveal that it is in the backdrop of the lack of international support for India

in its war against Pakistan, the debates on 'self-reliance' emerged in Indian public discourse and ultimately popularised the idea of 'India's own nuclear weapon'. Definitely, such debates had significant role in transforming Indian approach towards nuclear weapons.

The immediate post-war narratives of the Indian media that this study has analysed were not particularly helpful in making any conclusion about the impact of the lack of international support for India during the war of 1965 on India's post-war relationship with various countries. However, it clearly revealed that the UN's refusal to brand Pakistan as an aggressor and its attempts for equating the role of both India and Pakistan in the conflict, by ignoring the clear evidence on Pakistan's armed infiltration, had significant impact on Indian approach towards international institutions. The pro-Pakistan approach of the UN indeed helped to solidify India's stand on third party intervention in Kashmir dispute. A comparison of India's new stand against the UN intervention in Kashmir dispute with its earlier approach towards the UN, clearly indicates that the war of 1965 had fundamentally transformed Indian approach towards international politics. The changes in India's approach towards the UN intervention in Kashmir dispute and later in its approach towards developing nuclear weapon can be treated as reflections of the 1965 war induced transformations in Indian identity. Analysing the wartime and immediate post-war narratives of the Indian media, this study reveals that in relation to a theocratic authoritarian state of Pakistan and a communist totalitarian state of China, India clearly defined its identity as a secular democracy. It asserts that India's decisive upper hand against Pakistan in the war had helped India to transform its post-1962 war identity. In other words, with the war of 1965, India proved its will and ability to protect its territorial integrity.

Focusing on the Indian media narratives during the fiftieth anniversary of 1965 war, which is August-September 2015, the last part of the chapter analyses the significance of memories of war(s) in contemporary Indian discursive images of Pakistan. It identifies that the efforts for constructing memories of 1965 war in particular is frivolously sporadic in India, even though memories of India-Pakistan wars in general are very much alive and active in Indian public discourse, especially through movies and television

programmes. Asserting it is the memories of later India-Pakistan war(s), specifically the memories of Bangladesh war of 1971 and Kargil war of 1999, which dominate the Indian public discourse, this study argues that the war memories have been insignificant in shaping contemporary Indian social perception of Pakistani threat due to the prevalence of various other issues. It observes the frequent cross border firing at LoC and the issues related to Pakistan sponsored terrorist activities in India as the two most important factors which largely shape the contemporary Indian discursive images of Pakistan. Obviously the fact that India had an upper hand in its all wars against Pakistan is also a major factor which reduces the significance of memories of wars in shaping Indian discourse on Pakistani threat.

Essentially, by analysing Indian media narratives from three different historical contexts, this study attempts to understand the way in which modern Indian identity has evolved in relation to its two most important 'others', China and Pakistan. Its finding suggests that certain discursive practices which helped to create the modern Indian identity has simultaneously constructed a new discourse on national security which not only limits the possibilities of cooperation between India and its two largest neighbours but also restricts India's own development. This study clearly reveals that the India-China war of 1962 and India-Pakistan wars in general have played a significant role in the process of national integration in India. Unifying the public sentiments for a larger cause of national security, the wars have helped to mitigate India's internal differences and created a new sense of collective identity. Through a continuous reconstruction of the sense of security-threat created by the wars, the collective memories of wars in Indian public discourse also help the process of national integration in India. However, the persistence of security threat adversely affects India's relationship with both China and Pakistan and, ultimately, it confines India's great power ambitions, by constraining its attention within the neighbourhood. Therefore, it can be argued that the deconstruction of the present sense of security-threat is inevitable for India's development, both in political and economic terms.

Definitely it is not just experiences of the past which shape the present sense of security threat in India. The status of India's present relationship with China and Pakistan, the

balance of military power between India and these countries and, most importantly, their approach towards India also have significant role in shaping the present sense of security-threat. However, essentially it is the lack of trust in India's relationship with its two troubled neighbours which manifests the question of security in Indian public discourse. Obviously it is India's past experience with these countries which constitutes the trust deficit in the present relationship. It means that India cannot develop a better relationship with China and Pakistan without addressing the problems of the past. In this case, addressing the past requires efforts from both sides and it cannot be done without settling the fundamental disputes between India and these countries and/or 'forgetting' the past. For that, both sides need to have appropriate incentives. In a world where environmental issues are threatening the survival of entire humanity on earth, where environmental pollution kills more people than wars and natural disasters, where non-state security-threats like terrorism are growing rapidly, only a few could have trouble finding such incentives.

Looking into the tempestuous tribulations created by the border in the collective life of humanity, and by knowing that "our knowledge of any past event is always incomplete, probably inaccurate, beclouded by ambivalent evidence and biased historians, and perhaps distorted by our own patriotic or religious partisanship" (Durant 1968: 11-12), we cannot ignore the problems of the past which adversely affect our collective life in the present. Our attempts for addressing the problems of past must be guided by the fact that from health to terrorism, environment to space explorations, issues that require collective actions are growing rapidly in the present world. It is only by learning from the mistakes of the past we could create an environment which gives no space for imagining the 'other' as an enemy. Such a deconstruction of 'enemy' would definitely redefine the idea of 'security threat' and, ultimately, forge a war-free world. In this changing world, nothing but breaking the constraints of our own imagined borders is the most rational option for us, as humanity, to survive, flourish and prosper.

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