MONGOLIA-JAPAN RELATIONS, 1905-1945

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DECLARATION

I,declare that the thesis entitled "**Mongolia-Japan Relations, 1905-1945**", submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own original work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

Kundan Kumar
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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated
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The fallacy and errors of this thesis is all mine.

KUNDAN KUMAR

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Preface

The Mongolian-Japanese relations are based on race, culture, religion and custom that bound the Mongols and Japanese together. Mongol Conquests were affected by geographical, social and economic factors. The long-range impact of the Mongol conquests had on Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Mongols linkages with Buddhism paved the way for Mongolia-Japan relations. Japanese personalities and institutions involved in Mongolian independence movement played a key role in the movement.

The two countries shared a complex and important relationship in the first half of twentieth century especially during the two World Wars. Their relations in the modern world provide a rich field of enquiry into the nature of Japanese imperialism as well Japan's complex relations with the other Asian countries. Japan's connection with Mongolia itself was a crucial part of its interaction with the Chinese and Russian up to the World War II. Mongolia also offered unparalleled opportunities for the elaboration of all the major aspects of the discourses that made up Japan's evolving claim to solidarity with and leadership of Asia. In some ways, the relationship with Mongolia was presented as distinctive, particularly because of common faith in Buddhism and supposedly shared ancestry in ethnic terms. In turn, the military, political, ideological and cultural opportunities apparently provided by Mongolia account for a wide range of groups and individuals in Japan that developed Mongolian connections and for the often close relations between these groups and individuals on the one hand, and the most powerful institutions of the Japanese state on the other.

The background story of Mongolia's contact with Japan reveals that it was the result of Mongolian conquest of Korea. Japan became the target of their efforts at overseas expansion. The Mongol ruler Qubilai Khan attacked Japan twice, in 1274, and again in 1281. In 1274, the initial invasion was a success at first. Mongol armies, once on land, began setting up an occupation government, and threatened to overwhelm Japanese defenders, who were completely outmatched by the invaders. A great storm forced the Mongols (and their largely Korean fleet) to retreat from Japanese territory. Despite these failures, Qubilai continued to harbor designs against Japan, and was

planning still another expedition at the time of his death. Because of the interest in Japan at Qubilai's court, Marco Polo heard about it and later became the first European to notice its existence.

From the early twentieth century onwards, Japan's area of interest encompassed large parts of Mongolia as well as Manchuria which was reflected in the frequent use of the term 'Man-Mo' or 'Manchuria-Mongolia', to refer to a supposed single geographical entity whose exact boundaries underwent continual adjustment.
Japan's first modern contact with the Mongols came about as a result of the country's expanding influence in China. Mongolian aristocrats and lamas in Beijing were impressed by the discipline and demeanor of Japanese troops participating in the suppression of the Boxer movement in 1900. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) in Manchuria, the Japanese hired Mongolian and Chinese bandits as auxiliaries. With the conclusion of the war Prince Güng sent several of his best students to Japan for higher education; on returning to China they became leaders in Inner Mongolia's political and cultural life. Treaties between Russia and Japan from 1907 to 1910 defined Outer Mongolia and northern Manchuria as Russia's sphere and southern Manchuria as Japan's but left Inner Mongolia undefined.

Compared to Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia's case was rather simple. When Outer Mongolia declared independence with Russian assistance in 1911, Japan's foreign ministry immediately recognized Russia's predominant influence there and refused Mongolia's several attempts to open relations. The newly created Mongolian government repeatedly appealed to Japan during 1912-14 for help and protection. Although, rejected by Japan, these early Mongol attempts to link up with Japan represent the first Mongol attempts to find a third force with which to break Russian and Chinese domination.

During World War I (1914–18) and the Russian civil war (1918–20), Japanese commercial and politico-military influence on the mainland expanded rapidly, while that of Russia receded. The Japanese Mitsui firm established a representative in Outer Mongolia's then capital, Khüriye, and in 1918 agents visited Outer Mongolia. The Japanese ideology of pan-Asianism and monarchic modernization and the Soviet ideology of anti-colonialism and class revolution became intertwined with the two

countries national interests. Supported mostly by the monarchist nobility and bandit chiefs and the Tibetan Panchen Lama, then active in Inner Mongolia, Japan lost the support of young Mongols to Soviet-supported nationalist movements.

In 1926-28, Japanese and Mongolian diplomats met several times in Moscow but nothing came of these meetings. In July 1927, the so-called Tanaka Memorandum (General Tanaka was the PM of the Japan in 1927-29) called for Japanese expansion to dominate Asia. Manchuria was occupied by Japan in 1931, and the puppet state of Manchukuo created in 1932. Japan occupied Jehol, to the south of Manchukuo, in 1933 and laid its claim over Outer Mongolia.

In 1930s, Japan became Mongolia's neighbor through its client state Manchukuo. Suddenly, Japan was knocking at Mongolia's door- using both Pan-Mongol propaganda and military pressure. The Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic's only ally, perceived these attempts by Japan as direct threat to Soviet Far East and Siberia. This resulted into signing of Mongolian-Soviet Mutual Assistance protocol of 1936 that allowed Soviet troops to be stationed on Mongolian soil. Negotiations between Manchukuo and Mongolia to resolve peacefully several border disputes ended in failure, largely due to Japanese and Soviet unwillingness to see these disputes settled.

In the Battle of Khalkhyn Gol or Nomomhan, on Mongolia's eastern border, in August 1939, after fierce fighting, combined Mongolian and Soviet forces defeated Manchukuo being defended by the Japanese forces. In 1941, a Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact was concluded and a Mongolian-Manchukuo border agreement was signed in Harbin by Soviet and Japanese officials. Further, in keeping with the agreements reached at the Yalta Conference, the USSR declared war on Japan on 9 August and Mongolia joined it on 10 August 1945 (after the U.S. atomic bombs had been dropped on Japan). Combined Mongolian and Soviet forces advanced into Inner Mongolia and southern Manchuria in the Hinggan-Mukden Operation. Thousands of Japanese prisoners of war were taken to Mongolia and employed as labourers. Many of the buildings they built, including the government palace in Ulaanbaatar, still exist. This state of war between Mongolia and Japan was technically not abolished until February 1972, when two countries agreed to establish their diplomatic relations.

Although Japanese interests in Mongolia was primarily for strategic reasons, the Japanese did not operate there as an isolated entity, but rather cultivated ties with the variety of civilian actors, while persuading their own agenda as well. It also offered unparalleled opportunities for the elaboration of all the major aspects of the discourse that made up Japan's evolving claim to solidarity with and leadership of Asia.

Chapter 1
Introduction

The relations between modern Mongolia (formerly known as Outer Mongolia) and Japan are imbedded in history. Japanese perceive its relationship with Mongolia is a special one. The Japanese had a romantic view of their identification with Mongolia, stretching back to Mongolia's prehistory as a fountainhead of Japanese culture. Many scholars and historians bolstered these links by pointing to the Shamanism and Buddhism that both shared. Many scholars believe that ties of race, culture, history, religion and custom bound the Mongols and Japanese together.

The two countries shared a complex and important relationship in the first half of twentieth century especially during the two World Wars. Their relations in the modern world provide a rich field of enquiry into the nature of Japanese imperialism as well Japan's complex relations with the other Asian countries. Japan's connection with Mongolia itself was a crucial part of its interaction with the Chinese and Russian up to the World War II. Mongolia also offered unparalleled opportunities for the elaboration of all the major aspects of the discourses that made up Japan's evolving claim to solidarity with and leadership of Asia. In some ways, the relationship with Mongolia was presented as distinctive, particularly because of common faith in Buddhism and supposedly shared ancestry in ethnic terms. In turn, the military, political, ideological and cultural opportunities apparently provided by Mongolia account for a wide range of groups and individuals in Japan that developed Mongolian connections and for the often close relations between these groups and individuals on the one hand, and the most powerful institutions of the Japanese state on the other.

Mongolia in Historical Perspective

Modern Mongolia, formerly known as "Outer Mongolia" until 1924 and from 1924 to 1992 as the "Mongolian People's Republic (MPR)" occupies a unique place in the geographical heartland of Asia. Mongolia has had a rich past and historical tradition,

which places Mongolia in the league of great civilizations. Mongolia as a region had been the home of nomads for centuries before the Mongols became popular and established one of the largest land empires in the world.

Bordered by the Siberia in the north and Gobi desert in the south and surrounded by two powerful neighbours- China and Russia, Mongolia has had a peculiar geo-strategic situation of being landlocked. Its location at the crossroads of Central Asia, Northeast Asia, Far East, China and Russia further enhances the importance of Mongolia. Mongolia is the seventh largest country in Asia in the terms of territory but it is one of the smallest in the terms of population. Its significance however, lies in the territory rather than in population, which contributed much to the shaping of its distinct nomadic civilization and its history. (Warikoo and Soni 2010: V)

The geographic setting of Mongolia was of vital importance in shaping its unique history and civilization. The vast mountainous-steppe zone of Mongolia forms part of two important regions of world civilization, the oases of Central Asia and the so-called Eurasian steppe belt stretching from the Danube to the Great Wall of China. From early times, Mongolia was at the crossroads of world communications. Two great highways, the Great Silk Route and the Eurasian steppe corridor, also known as the Silk Route of the Steppes, linked Mongolia with the centres of civilization of East and West. The birth of nomadic civilization was an appropriate response to the physical challenges in that specific part of Central Asia. (Bira 1998: 248)

Prehistory of Mongols

The history of Mongolia goes far back into the remote ages- to the era of the primitive commune system. The land now called Mongolia has been inhabited for a long time. (Hanson 2004: 3) Mongolia before Mongolians proper was inhabited by various nations since the ancient times. The earliest known governmental entity in what is nowadays Mongolia is the Xiongnu, or Hun state. Historians still argue whether the Huns were a proto-Mongolian tribe, or a proto-Turkic ethnic group. Nevertheless, the Huns formed a highly elaborate state in Central Asia. The Mongols see the Huns as their ancestors, on the basis that they were nomadic and some Hun words (recorded in Chinese) suggest that their language was related to Mongol. According to Chinese sources, Huns were called Xiongnu. The first Emperor (Shi Huangdi) of the Qin

dynasty (221-207 BC) linked together fortifications constructed by the rulers of earlier states in the northern China to build the original Great Wall as the barrier against these "barbarians". The Han dynasty (206 BC- AD 5) tried to appease Xiongnu chieftains by buying them off with gold and silk or by arranging marriages with Chinese princesses. The Xiongnu split in 54 BC and split again in 91 AD, into northern and southern alliance, then migrating westwards. These Xiongnu may have been ancestors of Huns who ravaged Europe in the fourth and fifth centuries. (Sanders 2010: 6)

Around 155 AD, the northern Xiongnu in central Mongolia were attacked by the Xianbei (Hsien-pi), who came from the Hinggan area (Inner Mongolia). The Xianbei were Mongol-Turkic people who quickly expanded their territory but were unsuccessful in their attacks on the Chinese cities. The Xiongnu remnants allied themselves with the Chinese and moved south of the Great Wall. In 308 their chief, Liu Yuan, proclaimed himself emperor of the northern Han (Pei Han dynasty) in Taiyuan. His son Liu Ts'ung seized the western Jin dynasty capital Luoyang in 311 and captured the Jin emperor. After 349, the Xiongnu leaders fell out with one another, and their power declined. (Sanders 2010: 6) The Xiongnu who were a confederation of tribal peoples are important particularly because they created the first empire on the steppes.

The Tabgatch or Toba, Northern Wei dynasty (386-528), established by the Tuoba clan of the Xianbei, had its capital from 493 at Luoyang. Buddhism flourished greatly in northern China at this time. The Tabgatch came under attack by the Jujuan (Nurun or Juan-Juan), who dominated the Gobi border. They seem to have been Mongols from Orkhon. Their capital was at Muma, an old Xiongnu site on the river Tamir. They used the title *khan* rather than Xiongnu *shanyu*. In the fourth and fifth centuries, there were raids and counter raids across the Gobi, which later cleared the way for the Turks coming to power. (Sanders 2010: 7)

The Advent of Turks

The greatest power before the Mongols to rule the steppes was the Turkish dominion in its various forms during the sixth and seventh centuries AD, which faced the great T'ang dynasty on nearly equal terms but without prolonged warfare. The centre of the

Turkish power was usually north of the Gobi in the Orkhon basin, a tributary of Selenga, and the same region, which the Mongols chose when they established their capital at Karakorum. It had the same organization of the army, and its Khans regarded themselves as chosen by Heaven to rule all the nomads, as early inscription in the Orkhon valley show. Much of the Mongol vocabulary of rule of social organization, and of military command was taken from the Turks, for they once ruled the Mongols. These are *ordu, tumen, khan, darkhan* and *ulus*. (Phillips 1969: 24)

Between the dissolution of the first empire of the Turks and the rise of Chinggis Khan lies an interval of four and half centuries, during which no one tribe or confederacy attained supremacy over the steppes. The interval was filled with the local and temporary dominance of Uighurs in Mongolia. The Uighurs, whose name is said to mean adhering to, uniting, coming together, replaced the Eastern Turks in Mongolia in 744. (Saunders 1971: 31)

The Uighur Empire lasted until 840, when Karabalgasun was destroyed and the Uighur Khan killed by the Yenisey Kirghiz. The Uighurs dispersed to Turfan and Kucha (in Xinjiang) and to Gansu. The Kirghiz people were also Turks but were nomadic barbarians with little use of towns or farms. Their control over the Orkhon heartland lasted until around 920, when they were forced to back to their Yenisey homeland by the invading Qidan. The Qidan, a Sinicized Mongol tribe originally from Jehol and Liaoning, established the Liao dynasty (947-1125) with their capital at Yanjing (Beijing). The Liao dynasty was brought to the end by the Jurchen (Nuzhen), a Tungisic people, related to the later Manchu, who established the Jin (golden) dynasty in northern and northeastern China. (Sanders 2010: 8)

The Mongols and Chinggis Khan

The rise of Mongol Empire in the 13th century was an important event in history. The Mongol Empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth century was extended what is today Korea to Hungary, encompassed the entire Asian continent up to India, South-east Asia and Eastern Europe. It existed in this size for more than hundred years and in some regions for even longer as partial of successive empire. The main difference between Mongols and earlier conquerors is that no other previous nomad empire had controlled the Asian inner steppe and vast regions of settled people. The tribes of

Mongolia in the twelfth century have to be described as 'Turko-Mongol', since it is by no means clear who were the Turkish and who were the Mongols. Even this would mean no more than they spoke Turkish or Mongolian respectively. In any case, the tribes intermarried freely, in accordance with exogamous customs. The most important of the tribes were perhaps the Tatars, living like Mongols in the eastern Mongolia; the Keraits in the centre; the Merkits to the north of them; and Naimans to the west.

The threats from outsiders might have been one of the reasons for the Mongols to unite and become powerful in order to give blow to their enemies. For this purpose they needed a mutually acknowledged leader whom they found in the person like Temuchin. (Soni 2006: 4) In 1204, Genghis Khan set off against the Naiman and fought a great battle in the Orkhon valley, in which the Naiman tayang (king) was mortally wounded. The Naiman were pursued into the Altai Mountains. The Kirghiz surrendered to Genghis Khan without a fight. The traitor Jamuqa was handed over to Genghis Khan and at his own request was killed (but without the spilling of blood). The Naiman submitted to Genghis Khan. (Sanders, 2010: 10) The unification of the Mongol tribes now more or less completed, paved the way for The Mongolian Great Assembly first convened in 1206; at it, the Mongols elected Temüchin as Great Qahan. Temuchin was proclaimed the supreme Khan of all the Turko-Mongol tribes of the area at a great Quriltai on the bank of Onon held in 1206, from which his imperial rule is commonly dated. The authority of Chinggis Khan was based on his personal prowess in war, his hereditary descent from the ancient Khans of Mongolia, and an invincible success which indicated to the people the benign approval of the heaven. (Saunders 1971: 52)

Chinggis Khan divided his empire among his four sons of his principal wife. Eventually, after his numerous grandsons had helped to expand it, the empire was composed of four Khanates. On the geographical basis, the Mongol empire may be divided into five parts: (a) Mongolia itself as the centre of empire, beginning with the rise of Chinggis Khan and ending with the death of Mongke Khan in 1259 AD (b) the Yuan dynasty in China, beginning with the enthronement of Kubilai Khan (1264-1294 AD) (c) the Il-Khans of Persia (d) the Golden Horde in Russia and (e) the Chaghatai Khanate in Middle Asia. Though the Mongol empire witnessed itself a

conglomeration of various peoples and countries and their socio-economic structure, it also had many common features and similarities that turned it into a "coherent entity" for almost the whole period of its existence. But what contributed greatly to the rapid extension of the boundaries of the Mongol empire was its military supremacy, which also resulted in the political domination of the mighty Khans. (Soni 2002: 13-14)

Less than two decades later the Mongol Empire, the first truly world empire in history, uniting much of the territory of Eurasia and a substantial part of the Old World's population under its control, was gone, replaced by four successor Khanates based in China, Turkistan, Russia, and Iran, known respectively as the Yuan Dynasty, the Patrimony of Chaghatai *ulus*, the Golden Horde, and the Ilkhanate.

Mongolia during Manchu Rule

From 1644 until 1912 this territory was nominally ruled by the Qing dynasty, and included both 'Outer' and 'Inner' Mongolia. 'Outer Mongolia' was the term applied (until the 1990s) to the more or less unified area occupied by the Khalkha Mongols in the north. Because of its geographical position, far enough from Peking to retain a semblance of independence, and its single tribal group, who could be relatively easily unified, this region was not completely dominated by the Manchu rulers of China and even achieved a degree of formal independence from the Qing empire in November 1911, shortly before the collapse of the Qing dynasty. Soviet Russia, however, was a powerful neighbour and from 1921 until 1990 Outer Mongolia was under its political sway. (Friters 1949)

'Inner Mongolia' in the south, by contrast, had been ruled by a disparate group of Mongol princes since before the rise of the Qing dynasty. Partly because of their proximity to Peking, these princes came more directly under Manchu control between 1644 and 1912. As for the composition of the population, Inner Mongolia was very varied in ethnic terms. Within its vast expanse there roamed a multitude of tribes: among them Kharachin, Khorchin, Chahar, Tumed and Ordos. Many of these peoples appended the word 'Mongol' to their name, as in 'Chahar Mongol', yet had a very weak sense of alliance with each other and of their relation to 'Mongolia' as an entity. (Narangoa and Cribb 2003: 5)

Following the collapse of the Qing empire in 1912, Inner Mongolia was first controlled by Han Chinese warlords and then by governors appointed by the Chinese Republican government. After seizing Manchuria in 1931-2, however, Japanese forces penetrated Inner Mongolia as part of an attempt to gain control of the region. This aim was largely achieved following the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, with the subsequent Japanese occupation of North China and the establishment of the Japanese-backed Inner Mongolian regime of 'Mengchiang'. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Inner Mongolia was re-incorporated into China and now forms part of the People's Republic of China." (Sanders 2003: 203-5) In this thesis, I use the term 'Mongolia' to refer to the larger area known by this term during the Qing dynasty, using the terms 'Outer Mongolia' and 'Inner Mongolia' to distinguish between the northern and southern regions where necessary.

Long before the modern period, Mongolia had been a significant power in the region, and at the time of the great khans, from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, it had been at the centre of the world stage. By the late seventeenth century, however, it was essentially a vassal state of Imperial China, with the Manchus pursuing a policy of 'divide and rule' over it. In the late nineteenth century, when Japanese elites were turning their attention to the region, Mongolia was a shadow of its former self, with its empire long gone. Nevertheless, nineteenth-century Mongolia was still perceived to occupy an important geo-political position, lying as it did between the advancing Tsarist Russian Empire of the Romanovs in the north and the decaying Qing dynasty in the south. In practice, it was subject by that time to considerable influence from Russia as well as China. Meanwhile, the important border between Russia and the territory ostensibly controlled by the Qing dynasty, including Mongolia, had been delineated by a series of treaties, notably the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, which fixed the boundary between the two, and the 1728 Treaty of Kyakhta, by which Tsarist Russia signalled its acceptance of the Qing dynasty's control over both Inner and Outer Mongolia (Sanders 2003).

Thus by the mid-nineteenth century, Mongolia had been largely reduced from a major power to a hotly contested buffer zone between Russia and China. It was into this equation that Japan advanced, tentatively during the latter part of the nineteenth

century, but with more vigour from the beginning of the twentieth, as Japanese leaders pursued their own continental policies and goals. In short, the arrival of Japan turned the bilateral Romanov-Qing tussle over borders into a trilateral contest, in which Japanese leaders sought to carve out their own sphere of influence, in the process challenging the perceived domains within Mongolia of their larger neighbours.

Historical linkages between Mongolia and Japan

The background story of Mongolia's contact with Japan reveals that it was the result of Mongolian conquest of Korea. Japan became the target of their efforts at overseas expansion. The Mongol ruler Kublai Khan invaded Japan twice, in 1274, and again in 1281. In 1274, the initial invasion was a success at first. Mongol armies, once on land, began setting up an occupation government, and threatened to overwhelm Japanese defenders, who were completely outmatched by the invaders. A great storm forced the Mongols (and their largely Korean fleet) to retreat from Japanese territory. Despite these failures, Kublai continued to harbor designs against Japan, and was planning still another expedition at the time of his death. Because of the interest in Japan at Kublai's court, Marco Polo heard about it and later became the first European to notice its existence.

Japanese history proudly speaks of two Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, both of which were driven back by the bravery of the samurai and the intervention. of the gods. By the early 1260s, Kublai Khan, grandson of the great Genghis Khan, headed the Mongol tribes, which had by then built an extensive empire encompassing a large portion of Eurasia. To the Mongols, Japan was desirable owing to its proximity to Korea and its relations with the Southern Sung. In 1266, Kublai made his first overture to Japan by sending a letter through the king of Koryo[1], who was ordered to dispatch an intermediary to accompany the Yuan messenger. This first messenger, however, was prevented from crossing to Japan and thus returned to China without accomplishing his diplomatic task. In the following year an angry Kublai issued a strict order to the king of Koryo to take responsibility for getting the Yuan letter to Japan. Given no choice, the Korean king attached a letter of

[1] Koryo was the ancient name of Modern South and North Korea.

explanation to the letter from the Yuan and provided, as before, a guide for the Yuan messenger. The group arrived in Dazaifu, Kyushu, in the first month of 1268 (Sushumu 1990: 131).
The letter carried by the Yuan envoy contained roughly the following message:

"From time immemorial, rulers of small states have sought to maintain friendly relations with one another. We, the Great Mongolian Empire, have received the Mandate of Heaven and have become the master of the universe. Therefore, innumerable states in far-off lands have longed to form ties with us. As soon as I ascended the throne, I ceased fighting with Koryo and restored their land and people. In gratitude, both the ruler and the people of Koryo came to us to become our subjects; their joy resembles that of children with their father. Japan is located near Koryo and since its founding has on several occasions sent envoys to the Middle Kingdom. However, this has not happened since the beginning of my reign. This must be because you are not fully informed. Therefore, I hereby send you a special envoy to inform you of our desire. From now on, let us enter into friendly relations with each other. Nobody would wish to resort to arms" (Susumu 1990: 132).

At this time, the man governing Dazaifu was Muto (Shoni) Sukeyoshi, the shugo of three northern Kyushu provinces. Upon receiving this message, Sukeyoshi forwarded it to Kamakura[2].

The Mongols' demand for a peaceful relationship with Japan posed a serious problem to the bakufu[3]. The text of their letter did not seem threatening: It called for peace, not subjugation. In addition, the appended letter from the king of Koryo stressed that Kublai's goal was prestige for his dynasty rather than conquest. Yet at the same time, the wording of the Mongol letter could be interpreted more ominously, and thus the bakufu had to contemplate its response carefully (Susumu 1990: 134).

Kamakura's first consideration may indeed have been Japan's ability to handle diplomatic negotiations. Even though Japan and the Southern Sung maintained

[2] Kamakura is a seaside Japanese city just south of Tokyo. The political center of medieval Japan, modern-day Kamakura is a prominent resort town with dozens of Buddhist Zen temples and Shinto shrines.

[3] The bakufu was the military government of Japan between 1192 and 1868, headed by the shogun. Prior to 1192, the bakufu—also known as shogonate—was responsible only for warfare and policing and was firmly subordinate to the imperial court.

commercial ties, formal diplomacy between the two countries had been in abeyance since the late ninth century, which meant that Japan lacked the necessary skill and confidence to assess international conditions. Second, it is likely that Japan's perception of the Mongols was extremely biased, inasmuch as the information it received about China came from either its Sung trading partners or from Buddhist monks, both of whom regarded the Mongols as unwelcome invaders. In particular, the Zen monks, many of whom were patronized by the Hojo, had come from Southern China and must have been vocal in their opposition to the Yuan request. (Susumu 1990: 134).

Moreover, the bakufu was not the ultimate diplomatic authority in Japan. The Yuan letter had been addressed to the "King of Japan," not to the bakufu, and thus in the second month of 1268 the letter was sent to Kyoto, where it was ignored. This decision, ostensibly made by the ex-emperor Gosaga, probably complied with the bakufu's own view of the matter (Susumu 1990: 134).

The Mongols, of course, were active during this period. In the fifth month of 1268, Kublai ordered Koryo to construct one thousand battleships and to conscript ten thousand men, explaining that such preparations were necessary because of the possibility of rebellion by either the Southern Sung or Japan. Despite their public, diplomatic posture, the Mongols were in fact proceeding with their preparations for armed conflict. Nevertheless, Kublai continued to dispatch envoys and letters to Japan via Koryo. After the first envoy was forced to return to Koryo empty-handed, Kublai sent a second in the eleventh month of 1268. Together with a Korean guide, the Yuan envoy arrived in the second month of 1269 at the island of Tsushima. Instead of completing his mission, however, he had a confrontation with the local Japanese and so returned to Korea, taking with him two Japanese as captives (Susumu 1990: 135).

The Japanese were taken to the Mongol capital to meet with the khan who stressed once again that his only desires were to have official representatives visit the Japanese court and to have his name remembered for generations thereafter. Kublai then ordered the return of the two Japanese, to be accompanied by another envoy carrying an imperial letter. Koryo was again made responsible for delivering the letter, and in the ninth month of 1269, this group arrived in Tsushima. The overture was no more successful than its predecessors - yet the Mongols persisted on the diplomatic front.

For example, drafts of letters dated the first and second months of 1270 stated: "The use of military force without reason runs counter to Confucian and Buddhist teachings. Because Japan is a divine country [shinkoku], we do not intend to fight with force." Nonetheless, the bakufu advised the court not to respond, and as before, the envoy returned empty-handed (Susumu 1990: 135).

The first invasion of 1274

The 1274 attack was, however, of very brief duration and bears comparison to the first phase of most of the Mongol operations described above, all of which began with a reconnaissance in force. The first Japanese operation was nonetheless carried out with a much larger army than would have been expected in a raid, although this was probably due to the added complications and dangers of having to cross water.

The above account of the conquest of the Southern Song indicates quite clearly that Mongol prowess at sea-crossing had moved on considerably since the days of Kanghwa and Croatia, but the most important factor in this arose directly from the final conquest of Korea, whose considerable maritime resources were now in Mongol hands. This meant that for the first time Khubilai Khan could seriously contemplate crossing the Tsushima Strait between Pusan and Japan's island of Tsushima with an army of invasion.

By nightfall the Japanese had been driven back several miles inland to Dazaifu[4]. The Mongols burned the Japanese dwellings, and also set fire to the great Hakozaki shrine. However, fortunately for the Japanese, the Mongols then chose not to spend the night on shore, but to return to their ships. With this tactical withdrawal the first invasion concluded, because the armies never again left their ships for Japanese soil. Instead, during the night a fierce storm blew up, severely damaging the fleet lying at anchor. The Mongols immediately set sail back to Korea, taking one full month over the journey, having suffered the loss of 13,000 dead, about one-third of their total, including one high-ranking Korean general who was drowned. (Turnbull 2003: 64-65). Contemporary Japanese sources called the great storm that saved Japan kamikaze, the "divine wind".

[4] Dazaifu is a small city in Fukuoka Prefecture that was at one point the political center of all of Kyushu.

The second Mongol invasion, 1281

Kublai Khan never saw the first invasion as a disaster, but the next few years found him preoccupied with the conquest of the Southern Sung. The Japanese, by contrast, were on a state of alert. In the fourth month of 1275, an envoy arrived in Muronotsu in Nagato, instead of at Dazaifu. The bakufu's response to this mission was harsher than before. The bakufu summoned the entire Yuan entourage in the eighth month and in the following month summarily executed them in the suburbs of Kamakura. In the meantime, the Yuan destroyed the capital of the Southern Sung in 1276 and captured the reigning Chinese emperor. By early 1279, the Southern Sung Empire was completely destroyed. At this time, the invasion of Japan was once again put at the top of the Yuan agenda. Destruction of the Sung provided the Yuan with a new approach route to Japan. Instead of going through Korea, the Mongols could use the surrendered Sung navy dispatched from China itself. Another favorable condition for the Yuan was that Koryo was growing more complacent as the Yuan expanded their borders ever closer to Korea itself. This new set of circumstances formed the background for the Yuan's plan to attack Japan a second time. (Susumu 1990: 145).

The Khan sent another envoy to Japan, carrying a message warning that if Japan failed to submit, it would suffer the same fate that had struck the Sung. This envoy arrived in Japan in the sixth month, but as before, the court and bakufu refused to receive him. All the members of his mission were executed in Hakata. In China proper, Kublai reinforced his plan administratively by establishing a new governmental organ, the Ministry for Conquering Japan**.**

The Mongol preparations were carried out on a much larger scale than in 1274 so the Mongols intended a permanent occupation of Japanese land. Eventually Mongol lost the battle. because within days of the Japanese attack at Takashima a typhoon blew up. This was the famous kamikaze, the wind of the gods. Unlike the first typhoon, this one is well documented and was devastating in its effects. In the second Yuan expedition against Japan, the Mongol army lost 69 to 90 percent of its men, a total of more than 100,000 dead. Japan's success was attributed once again to the intercession of the gods. (Turnbull 2003: 69).

Figure: 1

The Mongol invasions of Japan, 1274-1281

Source: (Turnbull 2003: 71)

The repulse of the Mongol invasions of Japan is comparable to the battle of Ain Jalut in that it represented a denial of the myth of unquestionable Mongol superiority. The events in Hakata Bay therefore hold a unique place in Japanese history. Through these battles the samurai spirit and the benevolence of the kami are combined in a way that expresses the spirit of Japan, as does no other event in samurai history. After the Mongol invasions, the samurai went back to their time- honoured tradition of fighting each other. For these few years the samurai stood together.

Mongolia-Japan Relations in the Modern Period

The Mongols resided in the central part of the Asian continent and had formerly set up a world empire, and had furthermore launched their attacks as far as Japan, that it was also likely that there was a connection between the origin of the Japanese and Mongols, the Japanese language being related the Mongol language: the facts were already part of the Japanese national consciousness when in the mid-nineteenth century Japan set up a modern nation-state. Given the significance of the Mongols in the recollection of past history and in the myth of their own ethnic origin, it may be said that the Japanese were acutely aware of the existence of the Mongols. (Tatsuo 2003: 91)

Regarding the early exchanges between the Mongols and the Japanese, the tour to Japan of Prince Gungsangnorbu of Qarachin Right Banner in Inner Mongolia is well known. In 1903, he was invited to japan along with a number of Manchu nobles and mindful of the Japanese example of promoting 'modernization from the top', he went on to set up female and military schools within his Banner, inviting teaching staff from Japan in an attempt to implement reform. He also started a set of modernization plan in his Banner. His reform programme, however, was not successful because of lack of revenue and conservatism inside the Banner. Gungsangnorbu also sent some students to Japan or to Peking (Beijing): among them was Altan Ochir, in later years a leader of the Inner Mongolian People's Republic Party and a cabinet member of the Mongol Allied Autonomous Government. However, Gungsangnorbu's passion for education should not be exaggerated. In his later years he was very wary of the younger generation of the Mongols who had received a modern education, because he thought that they had turned into potential enemies of his rights and interests as a Mongol noble. Moreover, the number of Mongol youths sent by Gungsangnorbu to

Japan was very small. The period in which a fair number of Inner Mongolian students were studying in Japan, or studying in local schools founded by Japanese, was limited to ten years between the mid-1930s and the defeat of Japan in 1945. (Tatsuo 2003: 92)

After the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, Japan began to extend its imperialist influence into a part of Inner Mongolia. Then, in the Third Russo-Japanese Entente of 1912, the Russian Empire as well as Britain and France acknowledged the eastern part of Inner Mongolia as belonging to the Japanese sphere of influence. From this time on, many Japanese used the term 'Man-Mo'- 'Manchuria and Mongolia' to describe their sphere of influence, but this term in fact did not embody ambitions as broad as might at first appear. 'Man-Mo' at that time covered only southern Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, the territories in which the other Great Power had acknowledged Japan as having special interests. (Tatsuo 2003: 92)

Around this time, in 1911, with the fall of Qing Empire, a declaration of independence was issued in Qalq-a Mongolia and the Bogdo Khan government was set up, aimed at establishing an independent state unifying all the Mongols. The Mongols expected help from Russia, but did not receive it as the Russian government had no intention of supporting the independence of all the Mongols. The question of Mongolian independence was finally resolved in 1915 by giving the Bogdo Khan government a high level of autonomy under republic of China's suzerainty but only in Outer Mongolia.

The Bogdo Khan government tried to establish contacts with the Great powers including Japan with a view to cementing diplomatic relations. In fact, between 1912 and 1914, several approaches were made to Japan but on every occasion the Japanese government gave no positive response. The Japanese government did not recognize the Mongol declaration of independence as an act of independent initiative on the part of the Mongols but viewed it in the light of Russian activities aimed at taking advantage of the confusion following the fall of the Qing empire to extend influence over Mongolia. The Japanese government, however, along with other great powers, recognizing Outer Mongolia as being within the 'sphere of influence' of the Russian empire, did not venture to interfere by taking further action. When approached by the

Bogdo Khan government, Japan, wary of Russian diplomacy, paid no attention whatsoever. Rather, from the Japanese point of view, this question of Mongol independence acted as a warning that there might be repercussions in Inner Mongolia. In these circumstances, in July 1912, the above-mentioned Third Russo-Japanese Entente, regarding Inner Mongolia, was established, confirming the 'sphere of influence' of Japan and Russia. Accordingly. Japan in no way acknowledged the hopes of the Mongols for independence and ethnic unification. (Tatsuo 2003: 93)

Figure: 2

Modern Mongolia

Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

Role played by Japanese individuals in Mongolian-Japanese Relations

The important role played by Japanese individual in Mongolian-Japanese relations is very significant. The importance of Mongolia for Japanese leaders in this period is to examine the activities of specific individuals who had both a strong connection to Mongolia and close contacts with the Japanese elites. The role the of three very

different people connected with the Meiji military, political and academic worlds who sought to develop links with Mongolia in this period, namely Fukushima Yasumasa, Kawashima Naniwa and Kawahara Misako. All three were deeply connected with events in Mongolia after 1879 but are now largely forgotten figures.

Fukushima Yasumasa was one of the outstanding Japanese military men of his time. Though no longer much remembered, he was once a household name throughout Japan because of a dramatic and well-publicised lone horseback ride he undertook from Berlin to Vladivostok in 1892-3. He subsequently had a distinguished military career, which included serving as the commander of the Japanese expeditionary force to Peking during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and as governor of the Kwantung Leased Territories. His first contact with Mongolia came in 1879 when Lieutenant-General Yamagata Aritomo, then chief of the Japanese Army General Staff, dispatched him to Inner Mongolia to spend three months undercover, gathering intelligence on the region. Yamagata's specific orders to Fukushima provide some indication of the nature of the Japanese Army General Staff's goals in Mongolia at this time. Principally, the army's focus on Mongolia stemmed from a general desire on the part of Japanese military leaders to establish control of North China, and an appreciation that the greatest threat to such ambitions was Russia.

On his return to Japan, in December 1879, Fukushima prepared a report for Yamagata detailing his five-month mission to North China and Mongolia, entitled *Rinbo heibi raku* (The Military Preparedness of Our Neighbour), and the following year this report was presented to Emperor Meiji. Between 1880 and 1885 the Japanese Army General Staff sent a number of other officers to carry out operations similar to Fukushima's, with two in particular focusing on Mongolia. In 1881, when Major Yamamoto Kiyokatsu was returning to Japan after a period of service as military attaché in St Petersburg, he travelled via Irkutsk, Urga (Ulan Bator, the capital of Mongolia), Kalgan and Peking. He thus became the first Japanese Army officer to have visited Outer Mongolia. (Boyd 2011: 39-41)

Kawashima Naniwa is remembered; it is as the adoptive father of Japan's infamous female spy, the Manchurian-born Kawashima Yoshiko, the 'Far Eastern Mata Hari'. Kawashima Naniwa himself, however, was one of the principal political activists in

Japanese attempts to establish an 'independent' Mongolia from 1912 onwards. To understand the role he played after 1912, it is important to examine his career during this earlier period. The initial activities of Kawashima were centered in China and he forged in Peking with two Manchu princes. These connections were crucial to his later activities in Mongolia, which will be discussed in next chapter.

Kawahara Misako is in some ways the most fascinating of the three, for her career illuminates the interplay of different Japanese ambitions in Mongolia in the late Meiji period and beyond, as well as contributing to the entrenchment of some important attitudes that influenced ongoing Japanese activities in the region. She was primarily a teacher who worked in Mongolia for several years, but she also engaged in undercover work for the Japanese military during the Russo-Japanese War. It was not only in the cultural realm that she was active, however, and a further dimension of Kawahara's importance is the part she played in intelligence-gathering operations prior to and during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, using her position as a teacher in Mongolia to serve the Japanese Army General Staff in its desire for accurate information on the region. Kawahara's activities on the continent, even prior to her move to Inner Mongolia in November 1903, were not unknown in Japan, and her work as a teacher received special attention in the progressive weekly women's magazine Fujo shinbun (Women's and Girls' Newspaper), a periodical with a particular focus on women's education. (Boyd 2011: 45-52)

While Kawahara Misako was not one of the prime movers of Japanese policy on Mongolia, she did play an important personal part in forging the links between Japan and Mongolia in the first part of the twentieth century, on both the military and the cultural level. The military operations for which she provided intelligence as a spy in 1904-5 were ultimately unsuccessful, but her information must have been considered valuable, given that the government later decorated her. Her more enduring legacy, however, was probably cultural rather than military. Kawahara helped to strengthen ties between Japan and Mongolia through education, presumably also doing her part to spread Shimoda Utako's Pan-Asian ideals. In the longer run, she contributed to the development of enduring themes in Japanese attitudes to Mongolia: firstly the idea that Mongolia should be regarded as separate from China proper; and secondly, the view of Mongolia as a romantic region worthy of the best endeavours of Japanese

adventurers and pioneers. Both these ideas provided important groundwork for later Japanese activities and ambitions in Mongolia. (Boyd 2011: 55)

Kawahara's career also has wider implications for our understanding of the overall relationship between Japan and Mongolia in the late Meiji period. While the accepted view is probably of a predatory Japan taking every opportunity to expand its military control of the region, Kawahara's case provides much more nuance. The relationship between Japan and Mongolia was evidently not solely military, but also had a significant cultural dimension, as shown by the teaching activities of Kawahara and others. At the same time, however, there was no clear division between the cultural and the military: after all, Kawahara was both teacher and spy. The Japanese Army had its hand in everything, so that again, the cultural and the military were not separate realms, and the distinction should not be exaggerated. Moreover, Kawahara's career also provides evidence that the connection between Japan and Mongolia was by no means one-way. The relationship was not equal — it was Japan that was the source of knowledge and aid, and members of the Mongol elite went to Japan to learn and to acquire financial support. Nor, however, was it a case of Japanese action versus Mongol passivity, as we can see from Prince Gung's approaches to Japan to further his own agenda.

Rather than a picture of Japanese imperialism acting upon a passive and powerless Mongolia, the cases of Kawahara and others point to a shifting, dynamic relationship very much influenced by larger historical events, and seeking to take advantage of new opportunities as well as meet new challenges. This pattern was repeated in the events of the next decade or so. By the early twentieth century, Japanese schemes for

Mongolia had extended beyond a few pioneering figures — partly, presumably, thanks to the efforts of those pioneers. Mongolia may not have been of primary concern in Japan's foreign policy objectives in this period, but nevertheless, military, diplomatic, political and religious considerations combined to produce a significant focus on the region and its potential from Japan's point of view. (Boyd 2011: 56)

Cultural Connections between Japan and Mongolia

In addition to Fukushima, Kawashima and Kawahara, there were a number of other groups and individuals who promoted the perceived cultural connections between Japan and Mongolia. Among them was prominent Meiji political figures, leading academics and important religious leaders. In some instances, the work they undertook was based on a rational premise. This is evident, for example, in the research done by leading academics to show that the Japanese and Mongols were racially alike, or in the attempts by Japanese Buddhist leaders to forge a Japanese-Mongol Buddhist alliance. In other instances, the claims were much more fanciful. The common thread is a clear determination among all of these groups and individuals to draw attention to apparent cultural connections between Japan and Mongolia. (Boyd 2011: 56)

There was also, of course, more serious academic research undertaken by Japanese scholars into the relationship between Japan and Mongolia. While much of the early Meiji focus on Mongolia had been military and strategic, in the period following the Russo-Japanese War, academics began to develop and disseminate the idea that the Japanese and the Mongols were in some way directly related. Moreover, several prominent Japanese academics, among them Shiratori Kurakichi and Torii Ryuzo, began to focus specifically on Mongolia.

Religion provided further links between Japan and Mongolia from an early point. Japanese religious groups cultivated ties with Mongolia, largely because Buddhism was the dominant religion in both Japan and Mongolia. In fact, in 1873, six years prior to Fukushima's first visit to the region and three years before Japanese Buddhist missions to China proper started, a group from the Kyoto Otani school's Honganji temple, home of a famous and powerful Japanese Buddhist sect, journeyed to Mongolia. After overcoming various hardships, the travellers first entered Inner Mongolia, to conduct research on Buddhist practices there, and then proceeded on to Outer Mongolia. The ultimate aim of the mission was apparently to establish an East Asian Buddhist Federation. According to Brian Victoria, the Japanese government lent its support to Buddhist activities in China as a whole because, as a Pan-Asian religion, Buddhism was seen as a useful tool in promoting the unity of East Asian people under Japanese hegemony. Certainly, Honganji's activities in Mongolia were

part of a broader interest in the region, including North China. This is shown by the temple's dispatch of a party to help wounded Japanese soldiers during the Boxer Rebellion, and to ascertain how the welfare of the troops could be improved. One prominent member of the party was Okumura Ioko, who returned to Japan to found the Aikoku fujinkai (Patriotic Women's Association) in 1901. (Boyd 2011: 59-60)

Buddhism was also useful as a cover for other activities. For example, prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, an agreement was reached between Japanese Army vice-chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Kawakami Soroku, and Otani Kozui of Kyoto's Honganji sect that all Honganji missions dispatched to China proper Siberia and Mongolia would assist the military in intelligence-gathering activities. Co-operation between the Japanese Army and the Honganji sect continued after the victory over China in 1895.

There were also more concrete ties between the Japanese Army and the Honganji sect, in relation to activities in China proper and Mongolia. One link was a language school established in Kobe by Otani around the turn of the century, which included army officers among its students. Little is known about the school, but it was definitely operating prior to the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The school employed a Mongol lama as the teacher of Mongolian, and it is reported that at least nine army officers studied the language there for a period of three years. Unfortunately, direct evidence is scanty: the only officer actually on record as having studied at the Otani school is Hayashi Daihachi, who later served in Harbin and Taonan in Manchuria in 1914, and the Russian Far East during the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention. (Boyd 2011: 60)

Otani and Japanese military intelligence were linked in other ways as well. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Otani dispatched a number of young acolytes to Mongolia, the most famous being Tachibana Zuicho. Tachibana travelled first through Mongolia and then throughout much of Central Asia, crisscrossing the region, supposedly in search of Buddhist relics, but more likely gathering intelligence for the Japanese military. His travels were reported in both the English-language press in Japan and the Western press. According to Peter Hopkirk, Tachibana's travels also attracted the attention of British military intelligence, which suspected him of being a

Japanese naval officer and lodged an official complaint with the Japanese government when Tachibana approached the border between Kashgar and British India.

An important event in Japanese-Mongolian relations occurred in the summer of 1901, and once again there was a connection with the Honganji temple. Teramoto Enga, a Zen Buddhist monk and one of the first Japanese to go to Tibet in the modern period, led a delegation of thirteen prominent Tibetan and Mongol holy men or 'living Buddhas' and Lamaist dignitaries to Japan, where they met representatives of Higashi Honganji temple in Kyoto, as well as leading political figures in Tokyo. The group was also granted an audience with Emperor Meiji. Teramoto, who had studied at the Yunghogung temple in Peking in 1898, had emerged as a hero to Tibetan and Mongol lamas of that temple in the period after the Boxer Rebellion, for his efforts in getting Russian troops evicted from the temple grounds where they had been quartered. In the aftermath of the siege of the legations, food had been scarce in Peking, but Teramoto had also succeeded in obtaining some tons of rice to sustain the starving lamas, a move that apparently led Buddhists from Mongolia to Tibet to regard Japan as the defender of the faith. The idea that Japan was the protector of the Buddhist faith in Mongolia was exploited again and again from the Japanese side in subsequent years, and the religious ties between Japan and Mongolia continued through the next half-century. (Boyd 2011: 61)

The increased contacts between Mongols and outsiders led some Mongol nobles to reassess how they viewed their existing relationship with the Manchu and the Han Chinese. Indeed, some nobles gradually became pro-Japanese, in part because they believed that with Japanese help they could achieve greater independence from the Han Chinese, who now controlled them more closely. While the desire to achieve independence was muted prior to the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the seeds that grew into greater Japanese-Mongol co-operation in later years were planted at this time.

Mongolia and Manchuria in Japanese Strategic and Economic Thinking

There were some members of the Japanese elites who regarded East Asia as an area where Japan could perhaps carry out some imperialist projects of its own, or at least as a region in which Japan had important strategic and other objectives. One target area of Japanese ambition was 'Mongolia', an ambiguous geopolitical label that

covered a vast swathe of sparsely populated territory strategically positioned between Russia and China. The term potentially included both Inner and Outer Mongolia, together with a number of other adjacent regions, stretching from the Hsingan Ranges in western Manchuria to the Altai Mountains in the west (bordering Kazakhstan), south as far as the Great Wall of China, only a few hundred kilometres from Peking, and north to the boundary between Russia and China. (Boyd 2011: 2)

Japanese thinking about overseas expansion in the early Meiji period (1868—1912) was complex, but what we would now call loosely geopolitical ideas played a significant role already in the 1870s. The international system in which Japan suddenly found itself was strongly hierarchical, with the Western great powers at the top and other states to varying degrees vulnerable or subordinate to them. In this interna tional order, the possession of an empire seemed to be both a sign of and an essential element in great power status. Securing Japan itself from the predatory West, therefore, seemed to many Japanese to demand the creation of an empire. And the rapid pace of Western expansion in Asia meant that Japan should move quickly if it were not to miss out. This rather vague feeling that an empire was something Japan should have was a major element in abortive plans for an invasion of Korea in the 1870s, in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894—1895 and in Japan's penetration of Manchuria which led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. As a result of this last war, Japan had obtained, among other things, the right to lease the Liaodong peninsula and the southern half of the Manchurian railway, which had been constructed by Russians. Japan thus not only limited Russian influence in China, but also secured a base on the Asian continent. In order to be informed about northern Manchuria, which remained in the Russian sphere of influence and about the border between China and Russia, Japan began to send secret agents and expeditions to Manchuria and the Mongol lands, which were sandwiched between Russia and China. Previously, the Mongol lands in particular had been known only in the vaguest terms, mainly in the form of legends about the Mongols and their invasions of Japan in the thirteenth century. In this way, the Mongol lands emerged as an important location in Japan's view of the world. (Narangoa 2004: 49-50)

The region of 'Man-Mo'

At the beginning of the twentieth century a number of different labels were applied simultaneously to the region of the Qing Empire north of the Great Wall. As we have seen, the geopolitical construct often termed 'Mongolia' was further divided into 'Inner Mongolia' (also known as 'Southern Mongolia') and 'Outer Mongolia' (also known as 'Northern Mongolia'), the latter being the region that achieved nominal independence from the Qing Empire in November 1911. Moreover, the Qing, and later Republican, geographical construct of 'Mongolia' was further complicated by the simultaneous use of the term 'Eastern Mongolia' to refer to the eastern regions of both Inner and Outer Mongolia, and by the fact that 'Eastern Mongolia' contained some provinces that had been established in the late Qing dynasty and others created by Republican China. In both cases the authorities had established these provinces in an attempt to bring the region more directly under central control, first of the Qing and then of the Han Chinese regime. At the same time, the older, Mongolian governing structures also remained in place. (Boyd 2011: 12)

In 1907, the Qing administration created the three provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Fengtien, in the area that was the homeland of the Manchus and was known by both Westerners and Han Chinese as 'Manchuria'. The aim was not only to bring the northeastern region of the empire under more direct control, but also to counter Tsarist Russian expansion. Despite the establishment of these provinces, the existing Mongolian administrative structure of leagues and banners remained in place in Heilungkiang and Fengtien. Then, in 1914, the government of Republican China divided 'Inner Mongolia' into the four 'special administrative districts' of Ninghsia, Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol. Fourteen years later, in 1928, these districts were formally recognised by the Republican Chinese government as fully-fledged provinces. (Friters 1949: 199)

While the four new provinces were now technically under central control, once again, alongside the Republican administration there continued to exist the older, Mongolian governing structures through which the Mongol princes maintained some control, even after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912. The overlap of either Qing control or Republican administration at the national level with the Mongol leagues and banners at the local level resulted in confusion in the geographical terms used for

parts of the region, a confusion that was subsequently both reflected and exploited by the Japanese elites as they sought to implement Japanese control there.

In the Third Russo-Japanese Entente of 1912, Russia and Japan recognised their respective spheres of influence. That is, Japan recognised Russia's interest in Northern Mongolia (Outer Mongolia) while Russia in return acknowledged Japan's special interest in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. Already in 1913, Japan had been negotiating with China about establishing railways, which would cross the Mongol areas of Manchuria. In 1915, when the Western powers were engaged with the First World War in Europe, Japan handed China the so-called Twenty-One Demands. In this document Japan for the first time made an official claim to special rights in 'Eastern Inner Mongolia'. From about this time, the term ‘Man-Mo’ (Manchuria Mongolia) began to appear in the Japanese media. At this stage ‘Man-Mo’ referred to southern Manchuria and the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. The term became so popular from the 1920s that ‘Man-Mo’ was presented as the 'lifeline' (*seimet sen*) of Japan. This term was meant in both military-strategic and economic terms. The military strategic significance of Manchuria was as a buffer to prevent Russia’s eastward and southward expansion and so to defend the core of the Japanese heartland. In economic terms, Japan had two key interests in addition to its general commercial interest in China, which were being served by the 1895 unequal treaty of Shimonoseki under which Japan obtained trading rights in China on a par with the other Western powers. Japan was interested in Manchuria and Mongolia as a sphere of influence in which it could obtain raw materials and develop its manufacturing capacity, and it saw the region as a territory which could absorb 'excess' population from Japan. (Narangoa 2004: 50-51)

In the first decade of the twentieth century, Japanese occupation in the region covered only a comparatively small part of Southern Manchuria, an area of some 3,500 square kilometres located on the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, known as the Kwantung Leased Territory. From this perch, gained by Japan following its victory over Tsarist Russia in the war of 1904-5, Japanese observers looked north towards the area of Manchuria that Russia had occupied during the Boxer Rebellion, which remained under Russian control even after 1905.

Even before the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese observers had already coined the term 'Man-Mo'. The term was applied to a geographically vague area including both Manchuria and Mongolia, although how much of either was unclear. Over the course of the two decades following Japan's victory over Russia, the area encompassed by the term changed, so that for some observers it came to include the Mongol leagues and banners within Jehol province, lying to the west of Manchuria. The area covered by the term grew even larger to include, by the 1920s, sections of Suiyuan and Chahar, even further to the west. By 1915, as W. G. Beasley has noted, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were 'customarily elided in Japanese drafting', with the compound 'Man-Mo' commonly used by Japanese officials. (Beasley 1987: 112) It is significant that the term 'Man-Mo' or 'Manchuria-Mongolia' is found only in Japanese sources, unlike 'Manchuria', a label found also in Chinese and Western sources. This suggests that, consciously or otherwise, the term 'Man-Mo' was associated with Japanese interests and, ultimately, Japanese imperialism.

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japanese leaders negotiated a series of diplomatic agreements with Russia and China within which their objectives in Mongolia were first outlined and then confirmed. Elements within the Japanese military and political elites were, at times, united in the pursuit of their shared objective in Mongolia, namely either direct or indirect control of the region; when diplomatic means failed to achieve the desired ends, they resorted to military force. Japanese leaders, however, never considered their relations with Mongolia except as part of a complex web of objectives in the region as a whole. The attitude of the Japanese elites towards Mongolia is shown by the way in which they referred to the region: the conviction among certain groups that Japan should gain strategic control over Mongolia, in addition to Manchuria, was expressed from the 1910s onwards in Japanese sources, frequently through reference to the supposed region of 'Man-Mo'.

The threat that Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union might pose to Japan's perceived strategic goals was crucial in military thinking, particularly from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, as Russia expanded eastwards. Tsarist Russia had established a presence in Mongolia by the turn of the century, and used the excuse of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 to seize much of Manchuria as well. While official

Japan's attention, both military and diplomatic, was largely focused on Korea, the 'dagger poised at the heart of Japan', part of the problem for the Japanese government was that Korea might be especially vulnerable in light of Russia's expansion into Northeast Asia. Accordingly, from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 through to the catastrophic encounter in 1939 between Japanese and Soviet forces at Nomonhan on the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian border, Japanese military leaders sought to gain control of the northwestern region of the Chinese continent to block their northern nemesis. The steps that the Japanese military took to ensure control first of Korea, and then later of Manchuria, have been well documented. The role that Mongolia played in this equation, however, particularly following the annexation of Korea in 1910, has usually been neglected.

Review of Literature

The intention in this section is to survey the existing literature on the Mongolian-Japanese relations during the period of this study. Survey of literature centres around four sub themes, namely Mongolia-Japan Contacts during Mongolian Independence Movement, Japanese Support to Pan-Mongolism, Power Politics at Mongolian Borderland and Mongolian-Japanese Conflicts and its implications for the Second World War.

Mongolia-Japan Contacts during Mongolian Independence Movement

The Mongolian-Japanese relations are based on race, culture, religion and custom that bound the Mongols and Japanese together. Mongol Conquests were affected by geographical, social and economic factors. The long-range impact of the Mongol conquests had on Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Mongols linkages with Buddhism paved the way for Mongolia-Japan relations (Saunders 1971). Japanese personalities and institutions involved in Mongolian independence movement played a key role in the movement. In all three movements between 1912 and 1922 there was consistency of purpose on the part of elements of the Japanese military and right-wing, as well as continuity in Japanese personnel both in civilian and military. Valliant, however, overlooks several points of conflicts over Mongolia among the Japanese elites (Valliant 1972).

At the beginning of twentieth century, the Mongol leaders faced an old dilemma in their search to protect Mongolia from its two neighbors. In order to survive, the Mongols sought Russian help and proclaimed their independence. Tsarist Russia, however restrained by secret treaties with Japan, was not able to full support. In the eyes of the Mongol leaders, Japan-which defeated Russia in 1905-, was the only country capable of supporting them. The newly created Mongolian government repeatedly appealed to Japan during 1912-14 for help and protection. Although, rejected by Japan, these early Mongol attempts to link up with Japan represent the first Mongol attempts to find a third force with which to break Russian and Chinese domination (Batbayar 1999).

Japan made important contribution to the development of nationalism in both Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia during the 1911 Chinese Revolutions and again during the 1930s (Bulag 1998). Japan was involved in Outer Mongolia to the development of Mongolia as a nation, both prior to the declaration of independence from the Ching dynasty in 1911 and in the decade following. Various Russo-Japanese agreements signed between 1907 and 1916, with particular reference to the establishment of Russian and Japanese military support between 1918 and 1922 for the pan-Mongol movement, which calls for the union of all the various Mongol peoples into one 'Greater Mongolia' (Baabar 1999). Baabar, however, pays little attention to the wider ramifications of Japanese religious, business and academic activity in the region.

Japanese policy makers were interested in influencing and perhaps dominating Mongolia from the late nineteenth century on. Thus conventional wisdom has been that the Japanese military drove Japan into armed confrontations regarding Manchuria and Mongolia. The government officials recognised the geo-political significance of Mongolia and sought to capitalise on the Qing dynasty's collapse in 1911 to become the dominant force in Northeast Asia. The Communist revolution in Mongolia in 1921 precluded a role for the Japanese, so they turned their attention to Inner Mongolia, a region where they would meddle in the 1930s (Boyd 2011).

Japanese Involvement in Pan-Mongolism

Russian revolution of 1917 gave the reason to Japan for active and open involvement in Mongolian affairs. It was also because those Russo-Japanese secret treaties of 1907

and 1912 were meaningless due to removal of Tsarist government by Bolsheviks. The confused environment in Russia followed by Russian Revolution thus provided a fair chance to the Japanese to play an active role and to exploit the idea of pan-mongolism. Ataman Semenov was the first who received the Japanese aid to promote the idea of pan-mongolism. However, today it is matter of argument whether the Japanese aid was given to Semenov to fight Bolsheviks or to create pan-Mongolian state (Valliant 1972).

Pan-Mongolia was created by a few man around the negotiating table and approved on paper only. Therefore, it never materialized nor had any chance of survival. Japan alone supported its formation. The Soviets were extremely alarmed at this plan because if such a state were in fact created it would certainly be used as Japanese military stronghold against the Soviets. Pan-Mongolism factor was exploited by foreign players like Japan, Russia and China but especially by Japan. They left no stone unturned so far as exploitation of the Pan-Mongolism concept for their benefit is concerned (Soni 2006).

Japan tried to provoke Mongol nationalism in her favor between the years 1918-1939 by influencing the practice of Buddhism in Mongol territories. For centuries Buddhism was an integral part of Mongol culture, and with the shift in the political situation of the Mongols in the early twentieth century it was Buddhism that Mongol nationalism rallied around. The Japanese keenly recognized this and attempted to further use Buddhism as a unifying force to build a "Great Mongol State", in hopes of bringing together all Mongol ethnic groups under Japan's control. However, despite their knowledge of the Buddhist religion, their attempt to manipulate Mongolian Buddhism for the end goal of promoting Mongol nationalism eventually failed (Mishigish 2012).

Japanese were always pragmatic while supporting pan-Mongolism movement. They had their agenda of Panasiatism in doing so. By maintaining the white movement in Siberia and supporting development and dissemination of Pan-Mongolism, Japan was preparing the background for conquering Mongolia the buffer zone in the Far Eastern conflict. To take it under its firm control meant to win good chances for the further expansion in the Soviet Far East. Japan didn't considered the Mongols to be

competitive in the struggle for hegemony in Asia, tried to maintain their national feelings and direct them against western domination and red colonialism in particular. The ideal instruments for spreading anticommunist propaganda and tendencies for Japanese sake in Mongolia were the high lamas' circles (Morozova 1999).

The Japanese imperialism in Asia traditionally faced the inescapable dilemma: on the one hand, the necessity of unity with other Asian countries of the East in opposition to the West, on the other, tendency to control the neighbours, sacrificing their national interests. At any rate Tokyo did not care for Mongolian independence. Oppositely, skillfully using the internal structural weakness of lamaistic institute by encouraging intrigues and suggesting a fundamental pan-Buddhist idea of all Mongol tribes' unity at the same time, japan was planning a progressive penetration into the northern china, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan and Tibet. The Mongols could not help understanding it and, naturally, didn't entirely trust the Japanese agents (Morozova 1999).

Japan's strategy between 1932 and 1945 was to recruit Mongolian Buddhism as part of its imperial strategy in Northeast Asia. Japan's main aims were to win Mongol support in the region by appearing to be a patron of Buddhism and to use Buddhism as a vehicle for modernizing Mongol society in the broader interests of the war effort. In pursuit of their goals, they promoted changes in Buddhist religious practices and fostered the use of monasteries as conduits for modern education and health care (Narangoa, 2003).

The Japanese encouraged and granted Mongolian national movements and Buddhism for both political and spiritual reasons. However, the consequences of their pragmatic and aggressive tendencies, the defeat in the Second World War made japan reconsider the role it has been playing on the historical arena. Many Mongolians still believe that Japan before 1945 had offered perhaps the best hope: keep China out of Mongolia, force the Russians out, support Pan-Mongolism and Buddhism, and withal, do these things from a distance (Rupen 1963).

Power Politics at Mongolian Borderland

The relationship between Mongolia and Japan cannot be seen into isolation especially during the first half of twentieth century. The relationship includes powers like USSR and Japan in the initial period (1911-1933), and Allies and Axis powers of World War II in the later period. Mongolian territory became the arena for securing the dominance in Asia due to its geographical and strategic locations. The whole gamut of the relationship between Mongolia and Soviet Russia is also in this context (Soni 2002).

Japan was interested in the Mongols primarily because of the territory they occupied an area that would be geopolitically important in the event of a conflict with either China or the Soviet Union. The Mongol lands were both a potential base for military operations northwards or southwards and a potential buffer against Chinese or Soviet counterattacks. The eastern part of Inner Mongolia was strategically important because it lay closest to the Manchurian plain, where the Japanese had been developing powerful strategic and economic interests since early in the twentieth century. The region was politically important as well. The Japanese believed that if they won the support of Mongols there, they would also win support and sympathy from Mongols living in the regions dominated by the Soviet Union and China. Japan was also concerned that control of Inner Mongolia not be costly in personnel or administrative terms. For this reason, they wanted a regime in the region that would be broadly acceptable to the Mongols, that would be economically self-supporting, and that would even contribute to the war effort. These three goals were in some respects contradictory. Winning acceptance by the Mongols involved accommodating to existing Mongol institutions, whereas economic self-sufficiency in wartime implied important social, economic, institutional changes. Japanese policy never really managed to resolve this contradiction (Narangoa 2003).

Japan emerged as a third force in the international politics of the Mongols. Japan had no direct influence on Mongol nationalism in Outer Mongolia. It played an indirect role as a counter weight to China and Soviet Union. In Inner Mongolia, Japanese presented themselves as cooperating in a ‘revival of the Mongols’. However, Japan’s presence influenced Mongol consciousness or nationalist feeling, both by publicizing their ‘help’ to the Mongols and by limiting Mongol nationalism. Japanese praise of

Chinggis Khan gave Mongols some kind of confidence in their Mongol identity. On the other hand, limiting Mongol nationalism led the Mongols to resist Japan and this in turn strengthened their Mongol identity (Nakami 2003). Manchukuo (1932-1945), the Japanese puppet state in northeastern china or Manchuria, was the first major laboratory for the implementation of pan-Asian ideology of Japanese military, in particular, of Kwantung army, which controlled the region. In the name of pan-Asiansim and support of pan-Mongolism, the establishment of puppet state of Manchukuo was an imperialistic act (Duara 2011).

The Inner Mongols collaboration with the Japanese in the 1930s was because of frustration with Han Chinese rule than from a positive desire to support Japan. (Boyle, 1972) There were few people in Manchuria who were encouraged to collaborate by the Confucian world view that gave high priority to the different to the efficient management of society- in other words, they collaborated because of Japanese were perceived as better managers than the Chinese. (Mitter, 2000) The hopelessness of Mongol efforts to hold back the Chinese provided Japan with a ready-made Mongol policy in Manchukuo; and apparently this has been executed with a good deal of success. Japanese continental policy cannot be complete without an active Mongol policy. Japan, having created the state of Manchukuo, and given it a Mongol policy by setting aside the province of Hsingan, can no longer avoid extending its interest into the western part of Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia (Lattimore 1934).

Outer Mongolia was the scene of the Japanese war with the Soviet Union. Japanese believed that Outer Mongolia has been separated by force from other Mongols, and that this separation hinders their development. It is stated also that they look "yearningly" to Japan for their "liberation"; liberation to be brought about by a war between Russia and Japan. In this regard, Pan-Mongolism and Kodo (Imperial Way) are supposed to serve these ends (Mishima 1942).

From the early 1930s onwards, Manchuria became the object of Japanese aggression. The Japanese government, seeking to “legalise” its occupation of Manchuria, inspired the creation of the new state of Manchukuo. The period of occupation lasted from 1932 to 1945. During this time, substantial changes were made in the political and administrative structure of the region. During the Japanese period, the Buryat

khoshun, until then an independent unit with the right to determine and regulate the main issues of domestic life, was abolished and became part of Solon khoshun (Bille 2012).

Soviet Union carried out negotiations with China to consolidate its control over Outer Mongolia and finally drew it into Soviet-led Communist bloc. The methods it adopted, find parallels in soviet policy in Eastern Europe after World War II (Elleman, 1993-94). The revolutionary change and transfer to the "non capitalist" way of development was resulted from the merger of traditionally systemic and external factors. These were the objectives to shift towards socialism and Mongol nationalists' decision to ally with Soviet Russia (Morozova 2009).

Mongolian-Japanese Conflicts and its Implications for the Second World War

Nomonhan was the first major defeat for Japan in World War II, one that forced a change in its military direction leading ultimately to the attack at Pearl Harbor and the Asia-Pacific War. Japan identified Russia as the primary hypothetical enemy on the continent in the First Imperial National Defense Policy of 1907. The Japanese army was interested in launching a decisive offensive against Russians in Manchuria in the years following the Russo-Japanese war. To implement their plan they needed a big military presence in South Manchuria. Thus, it was the beginning of the talk about the formation of the Kwantung Army, which later led the Japanese army expansion into north Manchuria and Mongolia (Coox 1985).

Japan had identified three hypothetical foes: Russia remained the army's main enemy, America- the Navy's, and China – the third hypothetical enemy. In 1923, the Japanese army decided to draft contingency plans against these three enemies. However, Coox provides a skewed picture of Nomonhan by presenting it exclusively as a battle between Japan and Russia, neglecting the Mongolian dimension. All Russian and Japanese writings on the subject focus on their own forces and those of their nemesis, downplaying or sometimes conveniently forgetting the involvement of their respective Mongolian allies (Coox 1985).

The efforts of the Russians, the Japanese and the Chinese to each carve out for itself a sphere of influence in greater Mongolia culminated at Nomonhan in a final separation

of the Mongols (Friters, 1949). the setting for Nomonhan incident in which the Japanese, with their dream of a Greater East Asia including Manchukuo and Mengkukuo, had direct conflict with the Soviet Union, which desired an isolated and divided Mongolia. Japan, aware that to conquer China she must isolate her from continental Russia, could only gain from the conquest of Outer Mongolia (Prawdin 1961).

The situation would have been different if Japan would have been winner in Nomonhan incident. Nomonhan marked the high point of Japanese expansion in Northeast Asia. Had the thrust into Outer Mongolia been successful and not been challenged by the Soviet Union, the Inner Mongol hope for Mengkukuo might well have become a reality. The Nomonhan incident resulted in complete turn-around of Japanese policy, in Inner Asia in particular. The total defeat of the Japanese at Nomonhan, combined with the retreat forced by the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, temporarily ended the Japanese Army's total control of the direction of Japanese foreign policy (Moses 1967).

(Bulag 2009) brings to the fore the role of a long neglected party to the Incident, namely the Inner Mongols, who fought on the Japanese side. The point is not to highlight Inner Mongolian contributions to the Incident, thereby gaining a perverse sense of satisfaction, however significant their role might have been. What need unraveling are the entangled relationships involving the Soviet Union, the MPR, Japan and Inner Mongolia that a simple picture of a Japanese-Soviet duality disguises. Clearly, in this relational approach, we can neither simply dismiss the MPR as a minor "puppet" power fighting alongside the Soviet army, nor the Inner Mongols on the Japanese side as playing an auxiliary role of little significance.

The lesson learned by the Japanese in the Nomonhan incident has been a strong factor in inhibiting Japanese military action to the north (Phillips 1942). The most notable result of Nomonhan was that the crushing defeat convinced the Japanese to give up, at least for the time being, the idea of going to war with the Soviets, leading them into the Pacific War. In addition, Nomonhan helped pave the way for the Nazi-Soviet pact. Militarily, the battle proved the effectiveness of Soviet operational art; though not until Moscow in December of 1941 did the Germans begin to notice (Goldman 2012).

Prior to analyzing the Yalta conference and its outcomes there is a need to review the American policy with regard to China and the Soviet Union in 1944-1945 to get a clear picture why the Americans sought to secure the Soviet entry into the Pacific war, and how it helped Mongolia secure its independence both politically and geographically. Stalin saw in the war against Japan an opportunity to realize some of his ambitions in the Far East. Stalin wanted to choose a most advantageous moment to enter the war so that the Soviet Union would get maximum benefit at the minimum sacrifice (Cheng 1975).

The works identified above provide a far better understanding of the way in which the state and non-state actors in pre-war Japan interacted, especially with regard to Japan's relations with China and Russia. Thus they are particularly useful to study of the relationship between Japan and Mongolia, in which so many individuals and agencies were active, often in concert with each other. At the same time, analysis of Japanese projects in Mongolia complements and refines the insights of such earlier works.

Thesis Argument, Sources, Approach and Structure

This study can be defined as an attempt to study the nature of Mongolia-Japan relations during the first half of twentieth century. A major aim of this study is to explore the range of Japanese individuals and groups that were active in Mongolia and that often played a mediating role in Japanese imperialism there. In particular, the study expands the range of conscious or unconscious 'partners' of the Japanese military, well beyond the usual focus on politicians and bureaucrats, to include religious, academic and business figure among others. In doing so, it builds on a theme evident in a number of recent studies that have recognized and explored the contribution of state and non-state actors to Japanese imperialism.

The study also acquires importance as it seeks to examine the Mongolian revolutionary movements. Mongols sought help from regional imperialist powers *viz,* Japan and Russia to achieve their goal of separate statehood and Pan-Mongolism. It is then possible to understand why the Chinese, in spite of the fact that they too had been struggling through a long revolutionary process, had less influence than the Russians did for the cause of Mongol nationalism. This study is also makes an attempt to

examine how religion and ethnicity arise out of specific types of interaction between non-state actors and elites in both countries.

The scope of the study is limited to the period from 1905 to 1945. It was in 1905 when Russo-Japanese war took place in which Japan defeated Russia. This paved the way for Japan for seeking a greater role in Asia. In 1911, Asia's first modern revolution took place on Mongolian territory that soon followed the Mongol attempts to link up with Japan. This represents the first Mongol attempts to find a third force against Russian and Chinese domination. Yet another Mongolian revolution in 1921 marked an indirect Japanese involvement, which led to the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924. The year 1945 has been chosen as the cut-off year because Japan before 1945 had offered perhaps the best hope to keep China out of Mongolia, force the Russians out and support Pan-Mongolism as well as Buddhism. But it did not happen as Mongolia remained under Soviet protection and followed Soviet wishes even against Japan. The Second World War eventually involved Mongolia and Japan into direct conflict thus making it difficult for the two countries to come close for a long time. Moreover, the period between 1924 and 1945 witness the Mongolian attempt to get international support for the recognition of Mongol's independence in which several external powers played an important role. In 1946, after a plebiscite the International Community finally recognized Mongolia's independence.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1) What were the main historical processes underlying the Japanese involvement in Mongolian National movement?

2) What were the motives behind the Japanese support for pan-Mongolism?

3) How far pan-Mongolism successfully served as an ideology for unified Mongol state?

4) How far former Soviet Union and China made an impact on continuing Mongolia- Japan relations?

5) What were the overall implications of Mongolian-Japanese conflicts especially the Nomonhan or Khalkhin Gol incident at national and international levels?

6) What impact Yalta Conference made on Mongolian issue of the recognition of its independence?

HYPOTHESES

- Mongol attempt to link up with Japan was motivated by finding a third force to use against Russian and Chinese dominance of Mongolia.
- Detachment of Manchuria from China and establishment of a Manchu-Mongol State was a failed attempt by Japan due to its 'go-slow' foreign policy.
- Pan-Mongolism was used by Japan for extending its own sphere of influence rather than helping the Mongols to form a united Mongol state.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In terms of methodology adopted, the present study makes use of historical, descriptive, comparative and analytical methods while approaching the subject. The study relied on primary as well as published secondary sources. Both primary and secondary sources consulted to analyses the research questions. The primary sources on the issue of Mongolia-Japan relations include various treaties and agreements (bilateral and trilateral) concluded among Mongolia, Japan, Russia, China, United States, etc. between the periods under study. It also includes such documents as speeches, memoirs and interviews etc. relevant to this study.

The secondary source comprises of the available literature covering books and articles dealing with the theoretical approaches used in this case study and the works dealing with the case study itself. Secondary sources also are consulted to substantiate and corroborate research questions. I have visited various libraries abroad also to collect those materials, which were not available in India related to this study.

CHAPTERISATION

1. Introduction

It highlights the pre-1911 historical ties based on race, culture, religion and custom that bound the Mongols and Japanese together. It also deals with Buddhist linkages between the two countries. The geostrategic importance of Mongolia also discussed to give a perspective on Japanese interest in the region that resulted in the inclusion of eastern Mongolia into Japanese territory after Russo-Japanese war of 1905.

2. Mongolia-Japan contact during Mongolian Independence Movement

It deals with the contacts between the two sides during the period beginning from 1911 to 1924 when Mongolia achieved its statehood. It especially deals with Mongolia's search for a 'third force' (Japan) in order to break Russian and Chinese domination after 1911. The reasons for an indirect rather than a direct Japanese involvement in the Mongolian Independence movement of 1921 also discussed to find out the origins of the uncooperative nature of relationship between the two sides.

3. Japanese Involvement in Pan-Mongolism

It discusses the Japanese involvement in Pan-Mongolism, which was a strong Mongol national identity largely based on ethnicity and religion. The chapter deliberates upon the motive behind Japanese involvement in the movement for the establishment of a Pan-Mongol state. It also focuses on the success and failure of the Pan-Mongolist movement in the context of Mongolia-Japan relations.

4. Power Politics at Mongolian Borderland

This chapter deals with Mongolia-Japan relations in the context of Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations that involved the Mongolian borderlands. It also highlights the Tanaka Memorandum (1927), which called for Japanese expansion towards Asia. The impact of Tanaka Memorandum on Mongols highlighted through Japanese occupation of Manchuria (1931) and the creation of puppet state of Manchukuo (1932) as well as fall of Mongolian border territory of Jehol to Japanese (1933) leading to claim of Mongolia.

5. Mongolian-Japanese Conflicts and its implications for Second World War

It discusses the Soviet response to Japanese claim of Mongolia leading to the "Nomonhan Incident" (1939) in which Mongol-Soviet joint forces defeated Japanese military. It also highlights the deliberations of Yalta conference on Mongolian issue of recognizing its independence and how this issue impacted the Second World War regionally and globally resulting into a severe blow to the Japanese.

6. Conclusion

It gives a broad conclusion of the nature of relationship between Mongolia and Japan during the period from 1911 to 1945 on the basis of discussions as outlined in the previous chapters.

Chapter Two

Mongolia-Japan contact during Mongolian Independence Movement

At the beginning of twentieth century, the Mongol leaders faced an old dilemma in their search to protect Mongolia from its two neighbours. In order to survive, the Mongols sought Russian help and proclaimed their independence. Tsarist Russia, however restrained by secret treaties with Japan, was not able to full support. In the eyes of the Mongol leaders, Japan-which defeated Russia in 1905 was the only country capable of supporting them. The newly created Mongolian government repeatedly appealed to Japan during 1912-14 for help and protection. Although, rejected by Japan, these early Mongol attempts to link up with Japan represent the first Mongol attempts to find a third force with which to break Russian and Chinese domination (Batbayar 1999).

Japanese personalities and institutions involved in Mongolian independence movement played a key role in the movement. In all three movements between 1912 and 1922 there was consistency of purpose on the part of elements of the Japanese military and right wing, as well as continuity in Japanese personnel both in civilian and military. Valliant, however, overlooks several points of conflicts over Mongolia among the Japanese elites (Valliant 1972).

The Declaration of Independence, December 1, 1911

The Mongolian declaration of independence on 29 December 1911 was a monumental event in the modern history not only of Inner Asia, but also of East Asia; it not only contributed to the fall of the Qing Empire, but more importantly it led to the formation of two separate national states on the debris of the Empire: China and Mongolia. The day after the founding of the new Mongolian state, on 30 December 1911, a telegram was sent by the Mongolian parliament to the Foreign Affairs, Internal and Advisory ministries of the Qing government, which may be construed as Mongolia's formal Declaration of Independence (Bulag 2012).

The immediate context, which led to Khalkha Mongols' decision to secede from China, was the collapse of the Qing dynasty on October 10, 1911. As a result of

uprising in Wuchang on this day a revolutionary government was established in China that led to secession of 14 out of 18 provinces from Qing government. In response to this new development, the Khalkha Mongol leaders went ahead to proclaim their own independence on December 1, 1911 in the name of Provisional Government of Mongolia (general Provisional Administrative Office for the Khalkha Khuree) The Proclamation entitled "A Proclamation on the Mongols, Russians, Tibetans, Chinese and All Ecclesiastical Secular Commoners" was issued in the name of the Khans of the four Khalkha Aimags, Vans, Beises, Guns, Zasangs, Khambha, Shanzuda and Da Lamas.

The Proclamation reads as follows:

> "At present we often hear that in the southern land [China], the Manchus and Chinese are creating disturbances and are about to precipitate the fall of the Manchu state. Because our Mongolia originally was an independent nation, we have now decided, after consultation to establish a new independent nation, based on our old tradition; without the interference of others in our own rights. We should not be ruled by Manchu-Chinese officials. After taking away their rights and powers, an ultimatum for their extradition [to China] has finally put an end to their power, although by sending them back we do not intend that ordinary honest Chinese traders who stay at the Chinese trading towns should suffer" (Bulag 2012)

The December 1, 1911 Declaration of Mongolian independence is considered the first in Asian history to emulate the modern tradition that came into vogue since the American independence declaration of 1776 to issue independence Declarations to mark the birth of new state. In contrast the independence declaration of Mongol's arose from "revolution in 1911, when, with the imminent collapse of the Qing dynasty, the assembled khans proclaimed "to the Mongols, Russians, Tibetans, Chinese and all ecclesiastical and secular commoners" the resumption of their historic independence and their resolution no longer to be ruled by "Manchu-Chinese officials" (Armitage 2007: 131-132).

Royal Proclamation of Independence by Bogd Khan

Soon after, on December 28, 1911 formal proclamation of independence of Mongolia was made heralding the birth of a new state named "the Empire of Mongolia". On December 29, 1911 the Mongol aristocracy went ahead to crown Jebebsundamba

Khutukhu, the Tibetan "Living Buddha" of Urga as head of the Lamaist Church and State under the title of Bogd K.haan. This Mongolian state which, continued upto 1919 is known in Mongolian history as the Bogd Khaan Era (1911- 1919).

After the founding the new Mongolian state, on December 30, 1911 the Mongolian Parliament sent a telegrams to the Foreign Affairs, Internal and Advisory Ministries of the Qing government intimating them on a more formal basis the decision of Mongol's to secede. This read as follows:

> "For over 200 years since Mongols submitted to the Qing dynasty we have been enjoying the blessing of the Holy Khaans and worshipping them as Gods. It is only proper for us to serve them well and to share all happiness and suffering with unwavering loyalty. But during the last few decades, the government has lost its high principles, the ministers in charge of frontier affairs and high-ranking officials of the ministries have violated laws and regulations" (Bulag 2012).

The declaration further condemned Manchus for their moral failing to fulfill the original pact of alliance, and vowed not to get dragged into the mess they had created for themselves. It held that "there was no other recourse than cutting off relations from the celestial majesty, we all elevated the Bogd [Jebtsundamba] as lord and called [the state (or dynasty)] by the name of Mongolia'- altan ordnony zug handaj tengeriin gegeenees hagatsahyn yosoor morgood bugdeer Bogdyn orgomjlon ezen bolgoj ulsyn tsolyg Mongol hemeen" (Bulag 2012). In fact, a letter was also issued in the name of last Qing ruler by the Urga government in which the Mongols declared their independence and expressed a desire to establish diplomatic relations after order had been restored in the Chinese provinces (Tatsuo 2005: 358).

This declaration concerning Mongolia's independence issued by the Mongolian Parliament has been considered historically of great significance since it was issued in with all semblance formal authority and brought to formal end the more than 200 years of Mongol subordination under the Manchu-Qing dynasty. The Declaration of independence signed on December 30,1912 also preceded the formation of the Republic of China and refutes the subsequent Republic of China claims as its 'parent state' (mubang), even though international powers such as Britain and Russia insisted on China's 'suzerain' status over Tibet and Mongolia (Bulag 2012).

The Mongolian declaration of independence on 29 December 1911 was a monumental event in the modern history not only of Inner Asia, but also of East Asia; it not only contributed to the fall of the Qing Empire, but more importantly it led to the formation of two separate national states on the debris of the Empire: China and Mongolia. The day after the founding of the new Mongolian state, on 30 December 1911, a telegram was sent by the Mongolian parliament to the Foreign Affairs, Internal and Advisory ministries of the Qing government, which may be construed as Mongolia's formal Declaration of Independence.

International Position of Mongolia

Though under a widely accepted authoritative customary international law, which stipulates explicitly that "political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states", the new Mongolian state could not ignore the disposition of a powerful non-recognizing state, in this case China, in authenticating its claims of independent statehood status. The New Mongol state under the Bogd Khan in consideration of this fact sent proclamation to the ministries of various countries such as France, Belgium, England, Japan, Germany, the United States, Denmark, Holland and Russia in 1912 informing them of Mongolia's new status as a nation-state (uls tur) and the elevation of Jebtsundamba Khututkhu as the Khan of Mongolia. These documents explicitly proposed signing treaties and encouraging trade so as to 'deepen inter-state friendship' underlying which remained the central concern of the newly established regime's to strengthen and showcase its position as legitimate authority. In an era of imperialism and secret diplomacies these powers hardly took note of the Mongolian efforts and went by the regional hegemons interests i.e., due deference were given to Japanese and Russian imperialist designs in Mongolia. After Russia's signing of a secret protocol with Japan, Mongolian question was treated as a bilateral concern to be decided by the Russians and Chinese (Bulag 2012).

The significant developments as far as the advancing the international recognition of the new Mongolian state were Mongolia's relations with Tsarist Russia and Tibet. Disregarding Chinese protests, on November 3, 1912 (21 October 1912 as per Old Russian calendar), the Tsarist government for the first time decided to enter into a settlement with the Bogd Khan regime, which resulted in a Russo-Mongolian Agreement which was the first ever international agreement signed by the Bogd Khan

government with any foreign country. This agreement recognized a legal independent existence of Mongolia's autonomy while Russia's larger role in Mongolia was emphasized at the expense of Chinese authority. This 4-clause Russo-Mongolian Agreement endorsed "Mongolia's" 'autonomy' and its 'right' to have its own national army. The fiction of Mongolian autonomy to maintain such a relationship with foreign powers was stated in the preamble of this Agreement, which necessarily maintained on the basis of Mongolian declaration distributed in the name of all-nation conference and thus stated:

"In accordance with the desire unanimously expressed by the Mongolians to maintain the national and historic constitution of their country, the Chinese troops and authorities were obliged to evacuate Mongolian territory, and Jebtsundamba Khutukhu was proclaimed ruler of the Mongolian people. The old relations between Mongolia and China thus came to an end" (China Year Book1921-22).

On the strength of agreement with Russia, Mongolia went ahead to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Tibet in January 1913. In fact, Tibet was the only independent country with which Mongols managed to conclude an independent treaty. Under this treaty Tibet and Mongolia recognised their mutual independence and sovereignty, promised each other assistance against dangers without and within, and agreed to an exchange of views to support Buddhism (China Year Book 1914: 629). It is contended that Mongols signed this "rather harmless" agreement for the sake of the gesture of signing a treaty with a nation other than Russia; a nation, moreover, whose position with regard to China was similar to that of Mongolia (Friters 1937:174).

But the real significance of the treaty was that even though Mongolia having already signed an agreement with Russia in 1912, already fulfilled in de jure sense the requisite for its international recognition as a state even though in de facto sense such a sanction from a third side is not held to be mandatory. Considering this line of argument, the treaty between Tibet and Mongolia was meant to further advance the mutual requirement for the two newly independent provinces of Qing Empire quest to lend legal recognition to each other as a state. But in the contemporary context existence of any such a treaty authorized by the 13th Dalai was denied due to British pressure that feared Russia might use the treaty to gain influence in Tibetan matters. Russian too saw in recognition of Mongolia and Tibet as independent states an

invitation to other powers to intervene in their backyard. If these evidences hold true this point toward efforts to arrive at unity of the two Buddhist countries in a Pan Buddhist framework at the highest level authorities of their respective countries.

Mongolian declaration of independence of December 1, 1911 together with December 30, 1911 Proclamation, Petition of July 1911 to the Tsarist government and proclamation seeking Qings from foreign countries in autumn of 1912 are together held to constitute a series of documents confirming legality of the Mongolian statehood in 1911 itself. These documents further shed light on constellation of relevant issues involved in Mongol-Chinese historical relations and their current Conceptualizations of independence. They clearly, point out that like the Chinese, the Mongols were independent from China prior to their alliance with the Qings. Their nationalist aspirations of Mongols were also clearly held as different from the Chinese republicans.

When Mongolia became independent in 1911 from Manchu Empire, both Russia and Japan had been contesting the Chinese position in Mongolia. Japan having first definitely asserted an interest in Inner Mongolia in 1915, while Russia had centered its policy on Outer Mongolia, where a most interesting condition and set of relationship had been in process of development (Vinacke 1967: 542).

It will be recalled that a movement among the Mongols toward independence of China began almost coincidentally with the establishment of the Chinese Republic. By 1933, in spite of its status as a dependency of China, Outer Mongolia had became a separate region with its own government, and with intimate relationship existing between the Mongol's People Republic and the Soviet Union. With Soviet "advisers" attached to each government office, the Mongolian army actually under Soviet command, and the Mongolian economy being integrated with that of the Soviet Union, "Outer Mongolia was the first component whose area and people became a part of the Soviet zone (Vinacke 1967: 542).

Nevertheless the Mongolian "independence" movement was as much anti-Chinese as pro-Russian, representing a defensive reaction against the glacial movement of the Chinese colonists into the Inner Mongolian grassland, and the extension to Mongolia

of the Chinese administrative system, forecast in its introduction inner Mongolia in 1928. The tribesmen were either forced to move on with their herds as the colonists pushed in and began cultivation or they were impoverished. The perception of the ultimate end of this process helped to bring about establishment of the Outer Mongolian autonomous regime which was given tripartite recognition until 1921-1922, when Russian "white" and then "red" influence helped to establish an "independent" government. The Soviet government in 1924, however, to improve its relation with china, accepted Chinese sovereignty over Outer and Inner Mongolia, with the status of the former being that of virtual autonomy (Vinacke 1967: 542).

The Japanese had expressed an interest in Inner Mongolia when they served their Demands on China in 1915. But up to 1933 they had not been overly successful in penetrating the region. When they established their control over Manchuria, however, they were brought into a position of neighbourhood, of territorial proximity, to Mongolia. The addition of Jehol to Manchuria brought the frontier even closer. Manchukuo, when finally established, numbered approximately two millions Mongols in its population, thus giving japan control over a large proportion of the mongol "nation" than was contained in either outer Mongolia or inner Mongolia. These were organized into a separate province in Manchukuo and were, at first, given quite liberal treatment, to the point almost of autonomy. This was apparently done in the double hope of winning the Manchukuoan Mongols to voluntary accept of their new status, and of using them as a magnet to attract the Inner Mongolian princes and Bannerman to union with Manchukuo. It was also hoped that enthronement of the last Manchu Emperor of China as Emperor of Manchukuo would serve to draw the other Mongols into the new state, since the dynasty had been the bond of union between Mongolia and China (Vinacke 1967: 543).

Japan made important contribution to the development of nationalism in both Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia during the 1911 Chinese Revolutions and again during the 1930s (Bulag 1998). Japan was involved in Outer Mongolia to the development of Mongolia as a nation, both prior to the declaration of independence from the Ching dynasty in 1911 and in the decade following. Various Russo-Japanese agreements signed between 1907 and 1916, with particular reference to the establishment of Russian and Japanese military support between 1918 and 1922 for the pan-Mongol

movement, which calls for the union of all the various Mongol peoples into one 'Greater Mongolia' (Baabar 1999). Baabar, however, pays little attention to the wider ramifications of Japanese religious, business and academic activity in the region.

Japanese policy makers were interested in influencing and perhaps dominating Mongolia from the late nineteenth century on. Thus conventional wisdom has been that the Japanese military drove Japan into armed confrontations regarding Manchuria and Mongolia. The government officials recognised the geo-political significance of Mongolia and sought to capitalise on the Qing dynasty's collapse in 1911 to become the dominant force in Northeast Asia. The Communist revolution in Mongolia in 1921 precluded a role for the Japanese, so they turned their attention to Inner Mongolia, a region where they would meddle in the 1930s (Boyd 2011).

The Geopolitical Aspect of the 'Independence' Movements

Throughout this period, Japanese-Mongolian relations were again strongly coloured by changes in Japan's relations with both China and Russia. Sino-Japanese relations were profoundly affected by the collapse of the Qing dynasty in February 1912 and the establishment of the Han Chinese republic, a development that cannot have been completely unexpected by the Japanese authorities. Prior to the downfall of the Qing dynasty, some in the Japanese government and military had supported its overthrow by providing arms and financial assistance to anti-Qing groups, as well as political asylum for their members in Japan. The general aim of this assistance seems to have been to ensure a weakened China, one that could be more easily influenced by Japan (Boyd 2011: 73).

The fluidity of the situation on the Chinese continent affected both the Japanese and the Mongols. In December 1911, eighty Mongol princes had gathered in Peking for consultations about the possible future of the Manchu dynasty. Some of the princes went so far as to suggest that China should be divided in two, with the southern part becoming a republic and the northern part remaining a Manchu monarchy, though it is not clear why they suggested such a move. Others opted to join the so-called 'royalist party', headed by a Manchu prince who was supported to a limited extent by the Japanese military and Japanese right-wing groups. As a part the plan it was proposed that an independent country called 'Manchuria-Mongolia' be established under Japanese and Russian protection (Onon and Pritchatt 1989: 31-32).

Prince Gung of the Inner Mongolian Kharachin Right Banner, who was probably a member of the 'royalist party', then requested Japanese support for a Mongolian independence movement. Japanese leaders were quick to exploit this opportunity, and in the same month as the princes met in Peking, the Japanese Foreign Ministry approved a loan of 200,000 taels (approximately US$148,000) to Prince Gung through the Yokohama Specie Bank. Other princes followed suit and applied to Japan for loans. The Japanese Army General Staff negotiated with the Mongols through Major Taga Muneyuki and Kura Kihachir, head of kura-gumi, one of the largest Japanese industrial-financial combines. A total of ¥110,000 (approximately US$55,840) was loaned, with the security being mining rights in the five banners of the Chao-uda League. Nor was Japanese aid restricted to loans. In an effort to ensure the success of the independence movement, Prince Gung also requested arms and ammunition (Boyd 2011: 74).

Accordingly, in December 1911, the Army General Staff dispatched three army officers, Major Taga, Captain Matsui Shinsuke and Captain Kimura Naoto, to liaise with Prince Gung. All three subsequently figured prominently in operations in Mongolia. Japan's dealings with the Mongol princes in the region did not go unnoticed. Chao Erh-sun, the Han Chinese Governor-General of the three Northeastern Provinces, that is, Manchuria, complained to Peking about the subsequent smuggling of arms by Japanese to the Mongols.

In the secret convention with Russia of July 1907 "the Imperial Government of Japan, recognizing the special interests of Russia in Outer Mongolia," undertook "to refrain from any interference which might prejudice those interests." In return, the Japanese Government received from Russia the assurance that she would not interfere with Japanese interests in Korea. The early use of the term *Outer* Mongolia in a treaty-text was due to Japan's unwillingness to admit that the whole of Mongolia should come within Russia's sphere of influence. The Japanese refused to mention Mongolia in an open treaty, because it would not have been "in accord with the treaty with China and might be interpreted in a sense unfavorable to Japan" (Price 1933: 26).

Japan's ally, Britain, was informed of the contents of the secret agreement, as was the Russia's ally, France. Germany did not know if there was a secret agreement, but

suspected one in which Japan recognized Russia's special position in Outer Mongolia in return for Russia's acknowledgement of Japan's in Manchuria (Friters 1949: 218).

There were difference opinions regarding exact limits of the Japanese and Russian zones of influence. "In order to avoid all cause of misunderstanding over their special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia," a secret Russo-Japanese convention in July 1912 fixed the meridian of Peking as the line of demarcation between Japanese and the Russian zones. This in a very rough way corresponded both to the frontier between Outer Mongolia and the Barga region in Manchuria, and to the line dividing western Inner Mongolia (provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan) from Eastern Mongolia, which was later partitioned between Jehol (Jo-oda and Josoto Leagues) and the Manchurian provinces of Fengt'ien , Kirin and Heilungchiang (Jerim League) (Friters 1949: 218).

Japan's relations with Tsarist Russia were also changing rapidly. In the years following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Japanese government made a concerted effort to resolve territorial differences with its former enemy through a series of diplomatic agreements. As discussed in the previous chapter, the first of these agreements, signed in May 1907, divided the contested region of Manchuria and Mongolia between Russia and Japan: Russia recognised Japan's pre-eminent position in South Manchuria and in Inner Mongolia to the east, while Japan recognised Russian influence as paramount in Northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang. This first Russo-Japanese agreement was followed, in July 1910, by a second that more precisely delineated the respective Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in Northeast Asia. Russo-Japanese relations, however, were complicated by Outer Mongolia's declaration of independence, a development that neither Tsarist Russia nor imperial Japan could ignore. When the Outer Mongolian forces ousted the Chinese officials in Urga in November 1911, the Russians reacted swiftly to replace the Chinese, sending troops to Urga 'for the protection of Russian residents and also for maintenance of peace in Mongolia' (Boyd 2011: 75).

Following these Russian troop movements, the Japanese press raised the question of how Japan's own position on the continent might change. For its part, the Japanese government clearly viewed Russia's actions with alarm, and political negotiations

between Russia and Japan recommenced, culminating in the third Russo- Japanese agreement, signed in July 1912. This agreement not only reconfirmed Russia's pre-eminence in Outer Mongolia, but also fixed the line of demarcation between the respective spheres of influence of Russia and Japan at the meridian of Peking, meaning that Outer Mongolia, the Barga region of northwestern Manchuria, and the portion of Inner Mongolia found in Chahar and Suiyuan provinces were placed under Russian influence, while Jehol and the three Manchurian provinces were placed under Japanese influence (Boyd 2011: 76).

Tsarist Russia and Japan signed a fourth and final agreement in 1916, in which the two countries agreed to work together to prevent China falling under the control of a third power, the most likely contender being the United States. All four agreements, however, were overturned in November 1917, in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. Russo-Japanese relations were further affected by the Russian civil war from 1918 to 1922, and by Japanese involvement in this war through the provision of support for the White Russian forces. In the Russian Far East, a series of actions ensued that became known in Japan as the Siberian Intervention, during which elements of the Japanese military once again sought to seize control of Outer Mongolia.

The advance of the Russians in Mongolia was "a matter of concern" to Japanese policy. The practical value of the Russo-Japanese convention was put to the test when the Mongols approached the Japanese on two occasions. When in 1912 Da-Lama, the pro-Chinese Minister of the Interior, attempted a journey to Japan, the Japanese council in Harbin adopted a most unfriendly attitude and made it impossible for him to proceed. In the beginning of 1914 the Urga Living Buddha addressed a letter to the Emperor of Japan soliciting the assistance of the Japanese government in Khalkha's struggle for Mongol unity, and asking him to send a Japanese diplomatic representative to Urga. It was said that the Living Buddha had been inspired to send this message by the visit of a Japanese officer, Kodama, to Mongolia. The Japanese government categorically denied that Kodama's visit had any official character. The Mongol Foreign Minister, on the other hand, claimed that he had declared during his visit that if the Mongols were to grant certain trade and territorial rights and

concessions, Japan would not be disinclined to take up the cause of unification of all Mongols and their complete separation from China (Friters 1949: 221).

The Hutukhtu's letter was transmitted by the Russian Government to the Japanese Government. Russia was thereby observing strictly, as the Russian Minister in Tokyo said to the Japanese Minister of foreign Affairs, the spirit of the political agreements existing between two countries. The Japanese Government, having been acquainted with the contents of letter by the Russian Minister, refused to accept it. The letter, in the words of the Japanese Foreign Minister, would have "put the Japanese Emperor in a dilemma"; moreover it was not possible for him to accept a letter from a foreign ruler with whom Japan did not have a diplomatic relations. The Russian Minister was urged by the Japanese Foreign Minister to keep the fact of the Hutukhtu's sending the message secret and was asked to take measures to prevent the Mongols from giving publicity to the incident (Friters 1949: 222).

In July 1915, directly after the conclusion of the tripartite agreement of Kiakhta, it became known that a Japanese officer disguised as a pharmacist had conferred with the Inner Mongolian Prince Babojab and had promised him money and arms to gain the independence of Barga. Barga was expressly excluded from the territory of Outer Mongolia by the treaty of Kiakhta and a Sino-Russian agreement on Barga was concluded only in November 1915. Prince Babojab had sent one of his officials with the Japanese to Japan to procure arms for his 7,000 troops for whom he received payment from the Mongolian Government. It seems that Babojab aimed at a quasi-independent status for the territory over which his influence extended. The Russian Vice-Consul at Hailar thought it possible that Babojab together with other princes were aiming at a revolt "in which, apparently, the Japanese will participate" (Friters 1949: 223).

The fact remains, however, that Japanese Government had never openly declared its approval of these not very numerous exploits of individual Japanese, mainly officers. It disclaimed them, though it had not the courage to do this openly for fear of the military clique. The aggressive anti-Chinese policy of Japan during the Great War was, on the other hand, welcomed by the Russia in so far as it provided her with a

means of exercising pressure on the Chinese delegation at Kiakhta (Friters 1949: 224).

In a speech in the Duma made at the end of July 1915, Sazonov was able, when referring to Russo-Japanese relations, to express the hope that "our present relations with Japan, having actually the character of an alliance, would be the starting point for a still closer understanding." The Russo-Japanese agreements, which were concluded in 1916 took away nothing of the importance of the earlier agreements of 1907, 1909, and 1912, and constituted "a rapprochement even more binding than an entente cordiale and almost equal to an alliance for the maintenance of peace in the Far East (Friters 1949: 225).

Japan's attitude toward Outer Mongolia in the days of Tsarist Russia, i.e, after the first Russo-Japanese agreement, was thus based on treaties, which gave Outer Mongolia to Russia as a sphere of influence. We have knowledge of isolated attempts by Japanese militarists to make contact with the Urga Government. These became more numerous with the downfall of Tsarist Russia as becomes clear from a message of the Russian diplomatic agent in Urga in the last days of the Provisional Government (September 1917) when Russia was not able to provide the Mongols with arms. "I am afraid," he wired, "that the Mongols will buy the arms from the Japanese, whose number has increased lately in Urga." On the other hand, the Japanese Government never made official attempts; on the contrary, such overtures as there were came from the Mongolian Government and did not meet with any response (Friters 1949: 225).

Valliant seeks to look behind the broad term "Japanese Imperialists." There were several groups involved in the execution of Japanese foreign policy. Some were imperialists; some were not. Perhaps one of the main features of Japanese foreign policy in the early twentieth century was its lack of unity. By focusing on the three so-called independence movements in Manchuria and Mongolia in 1912, 1916 and 1919, we can perhaps arrive at a truer estimation of Japanese motives and actions. Just who were these groups? What were their interests? What were their objectives?

The first Independence Movement, 1912

After the Chinese revolution of October 10, 1911, the Japanese government decided on a formal policy. The cabinet called for the maintenance of the status quo related to Manchuria. It felt that time had not yet arrived for japan to press forward for the settlement of her problems. These problems were defined as the extension of the lease on the Kwantung Territories and various matters concerning the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) (Valliant 1972: 2).

A cabinet meeting in November spelled out Japanese policy towards Manchuria in more detail. Essentially the policy was one of neutrality. Japan would aid neither the Chinese government nor the rebels. More particularly Japan would avoid troop action unless the SMR or Japanese lives were threatened. The SMR was to be impartial and not transport either government or revolutionary troops. Should the railroad or Japanese lives be threatened, Japanese officials were to call on the Kwantung government for the assistance of Japanese troops. And if the Manchu court fled to South Manchuria, japan would protect it (Valliant 1972: 2).

At the beginning of 1912, the most senior military figures among Japan's top leaders, Yamagata Aritomo, Katsura Tar and Terauchi Masatake, had all come to the conclusion that Japan should send reinforcements to the Kwantung Province, in the southern part of Manchuria, where Japanese troops had been stationed since 1905, to defend Japan's territorial interests from the consequences of the Chinese revolution.

Desiring to avoid arousing international suspicion, however, the cabinet in fact decided on 12 January 1912 not to move troops, but rather to initiate talks with Russia about Japanese and Russian spheres of interest. This rejection of the military advice resulted in dissatisfaction among certain Japanese Army officers, who saw the ongoing Chinese revolution as an opportunity for action. In this context, a plan was formulated by Major-General Utsunomiya Tar, a section head in the Japanese Army General Staff, and Kawashima Naniwa, and then attached to the Peking Legation, to encourage the separation of both Manchuria and Mongolia from the rest of China. Accordingly, throughout January and February of 1912, Japanese Army officers were assigned to different parts of Mongolia, and ordered to gather intelligence, especially

on the attitude to Japan of the Mongol nobles, as well as to conduct topographical surveys (Boyd 2011: 76).

However, one of the difficulties for the Japanese in Manchuria was the inability of the government to enforce this policy. Other groups began to meddle in Chinese politics almost immediately. Among the first was the SMR. Its president, Nakamura Korekimi, provided funds for a Chinese revolutionary, Wang Kuo-chu. According to men actually involved, Nakamura was controlling Wang at the behest of Terauchi Masatake, Governor general of Korea (Valliant 1972: 2).

Another manifestation of disunity in Japanese policy was the action of the civilians, the contential adventurers or ronin. In fact the man behind the independence movement was a civilian, Kawashima Naniwa. Kawashima claimed that he had the agreement of the Inner Mongol princes Karachin, Pinto, Ao-Khan besie and three more. Karachin had told him that Mongolia was not part of China, that the Mongols owed a great debt to the Manchus, but nothing to the Chinese nation. However, since the Mongols had little strength, independence could only be realized with Japanese support. According to Kawashima's plan the movement would be strictly Mongol, but the Japanese would aid the Mongols behind the scenes. There were to be uprisings in both Manchuria and Mongolia. Preferably, in Manchuria first because without success there, a rising in Mongolia could be put down easily. With Manchuria in a hostile hand how could Japan get aid to the Mongols? Since his plan would depend in large part on the good will of the Chinese officials in Manchuria, Kawashima was anxious that Japanese aiding the revolutionaries be suppressed. (Vinacke 1967).

However, the Chinese viceroy in Manchuria, Chao Erh-sun, and his lieutenant Chang Tso-Iin, was opposed to the revolutions at this time. This made some Japanese hope that Chao and Chang could be induced to declare Manchuria independent. Even the Japanese government made contact with them. However, when Ochiai Kentaro, the Japanese consul-general in Mukden, expressed doubt as to Chang's usefulness to Japan and asked for a policy decisions, Uchida Yasuya, the Foreign minster, cautioned him about committing the Japanese government to anything (Valliant 1972: 3).

Soon afterwards Chang began to speak of the inevitability of recognizing the Chinese republic since neither he nor Chao had the arms or money to hold out. Part of this "inevitability" involved bribes by Yuan Shih-kai, president of the Republic. Another part, no doubt, arose from the actions of the Japanese themselves. While Kawashima and his group wanted to use Chang, other Japanese were aiding revolutionaries. When some revolutionaries tried to seize T'iehling there were Japanese with them. Then when Chang tried to send a punitive expedition, the Japanese guards in the city refused to let his troop enter. Nor would the SMR transport government troops to put down the revolutionaries. It is little wonder that Chang doubted the policy of Japan (Vinacke 1967).

As Kawashima envisioned his plan, one of the Manchu royal family, Prince Su, would be set up in Manchuria as the head of an independent state under Japanese protection. To this end prince Su was smuggled out of Peking to Port Arthur. However the Japanese Foreign ministry was not in favour of any action compromising Japanese neutrality and it wanted the prince out of Japanese territory. After consultations with officials in the Army and Navy ministries, it was decided there was no place else to send him, so he remained in Port Arthur. The Japanese foreign ministry was determined to uphold its policy of neutrality, and in late February when Colonel Takayama Kimimichi told Ochiai, the Consul in Mukden, that several Japanese were coming to Mukden to establish a Royalist Party, Ochiai suggested to uchida that the movement be suppressed and Uchida agreed (Bulag 2012).

At the same time Uchida proposed to Kawashima, via Fukushima Yasumasa, Vice-chief of the Army General Staff, that prince Su be sent elsewhere. Kawashima again replied there was no place else for him to go. After negotiating with the Kwantung government it was decided Prince Su could stay on condition he have nothing to do with any independence movement. When Kawashima became the go-between for Prince Su and the movement he was ordered back to Tokyo to explain, but a decision of March 19 once again allowed the prince to remain in Port Arthur. (Valliant 1972: 5)

The names of Japanese military men figure prominently in the first independence movement. The Governor-General of Korea, Terauchi Masatake was involved but he evidently did not support the movement whole-heartedly. Another men intimately involved was the Fukushima Yasumasa. At times he almost seemed to be be Kawashima's right hand man. Of the military men in Manchuria and China, the most important were Colonel Takayama Kimimichi, Major Taga Munesuke and Captain Matsui Kiyoshi. They had been ordered to china after Inner and Outer Mongolia and on the Manchu royal family. However, their main activities seem to have been smuggling arms and getting money for Mongols (Valliant 1972: 5).

The other Japanese activities involved loans for the Mongols. Kawashima telegraphed Fukushima in December 1911 that Prince Karachin was asking for 200, 000 taels. Fukushima passed this request to the Foreign Ministry which approved it and forwarded it to the Yokhomo Special Bank. Soon other Mongol princes were asking for money. Prince Bairin wanted 10, 000 taels and prince Pinto an unspecified amount. In return as security the Mongols put up mining rights in the 5 banners of the Jo-oda League.

The first attempt by some Japanese to set up an independent Manchu-Mongol state under the aegis of Japan failed. Japanese historians have distributed the blame for this variously. Somura and Yasamoto see it in the disunity of Japanese policy and the fear of international complications. However, Yui denies disunity was the reason, claiming that the Foreign Ministry had no policy until the British protest in February and the defection of Chao and Chang to Yuan's government undercut the movement. Nishimura agrees, emphasizing the actions of Chao and Chang. However, he feels that the actions of Japan had little to do with these men going over to Yuan. Rather it was the pressure of internal events in China. Finally, Kurihara offers a rather simple explanation. It failed because Japanese government suppressed it. These explanations all have an element of truth and it would be difficult to choose one over the others.

The Second Independence Movement, 1916

At the beginning of 1916, plans to implement direct Japanese control over Mongolia reemerged among factions of the Japanese military and the right wing, setting the

stage for the second Manchurian-Mongolian 'independence' movement. The lead-up to and subsequent collapse of the movement have been well documented elsewhere.

At the start of 1916 several different military and right wing groups within Japan actively supported two different coalitions on the continent that apparently had the same aim — separating Manchuria-Mongolia from Republican China. In late March 1916 the Japanese Army General Staff dispatched three officers, including Major Koiso Kuniaki, to the continent to oversee the merging of these two existing indigenous political groups, one of which was led by the Manchu Prince Su, the other by the Inner Mongolian leader Babujab, whose ties to the Japanese military dated back to the Russo-Japanese War. Presumably, a merged organisation was considered likely to be more effective than two separate ones. The army's promotion of such a merger seemingly indicates that the General Staff favoured the idea of Manchurian-Mongolian independence from China at this point. Koiso was undoubtedly chosen for the 1916 mission because he had commanded the seven-man army survey team dispatched to 'Eastern Inner Mongolia' the previous year (Boyd 2011: 86).

After the failures of First independence movement matters did not settle down. This feeling brought about a new alignment of personalities in the Japanese government who would support a renewed independence movement. There were three possibilities open to the Japanese activists. One was to bring forward Prince Su again, which Kawashima did. A second was to support the Mongol Babojab. This was also done. The third was to try and persuade Chang tso-lin to either declare Manchuria independent or join with Prince Su. This was also tried. Again there was a difference on how to establish an independent state in Manchuria and Mongolia. However, this time, which is the most noticeable, is the rivalry between Japanese officials and ronin. Uchida Ryohei claims the Army was hostile toward his civilian-led plan but later changed its mind on the condition that Army be in charge of carrying it out (Valliant 1972: 8).

The money to finance all these activities was obtained from the Okuragumi. Prince Su granted Okura a concession on the Yalu as security. In addition he also pawned some of his treasures in a Tokyo pawnshop. A contract was signed with the Taiheigumi (composed of the Okura, Mitsui and Tanaka companies) for the purchase of 5,000

rifles and 8 field guns and ammunition. These were to be distributed to Prince Su and Babojab. Babojab was one of those princes of Inner Mongolia who renounced his loyalty to China and recognized the authority of Outer Mongol Government at Urga. Urga was paying him, but at the same time feared him. At one time he had a force of about 7,000, but the Chinese defeated him and he fled. His aim seems to have been to secure a place he could settle with his men and their families. In this area he wanted autonomy. This time Peking government refused to negotiate, and Urga feared settling Babojab and his men in one place because of their potential for trouble (Friters 1937a).

Although he asked Russians for aid, the Japanese were his main suppliers of arms and instructors. He sent two envoys, Tasa Shubu and Bata, to japan in search of arms in the summers of 1915. The Japanese government refused, but fortunately Tasa met Ohara Takeyoshi who put him in touch with Kawashima. Kawashima and his group decided to aid Babojab because he had worked for Japan during the Russo-Japanese war. To get an idea of conditions in Babojab's camp, two Japanese, Aoyanagi Katsutoshi and Kizawa Nobu, went to Mongolia in late 1915. Aoyanagi returned the following January with his report (Valliant 1972: 9).

The second independence movement was said to have been planned by Kawashima Naniwa in 1916. At that time, Yuan Shikai, the President of Republic of China, was laying plans to become the emperor of China. At first the Japanese government and army watched tacitly, but with the anti-imperial restoration movements emerging all over China, they decided that Yuan, who was not necessarily uncooperative with Japan, would be toppled from power. During the course of these of events, the attention of the Japanese army, through Kawashima and the *tairiku ronin* group, was on Babojab and his troops. (Tatsuo 2003: 94)

Kawashima's plan was to supply Babojab with food and ammunition. He spy out the conditions and lay plans for the raising of troops in all cities of Manchuria. In addition to send Japanese reserve officers and recruit men from among the bandits who were loyal to the Ching.. The military, however, had other ideas and in late Colonel Doi Ichinoshin, Major Koiso Kuniaki and Matsui Kiyoshi were sent to Manchuria. Doi

was to take charge and merge Babojab' s movement with the one under Prince Su (Valliant 1972: 10).

However, the Foreign Ministry and its representatives opposed any rising. On March 18 Ishii telegraphed Yada Shichitaro, the Consul—General in Mukden, to suppress these aiding Prince Su's Royalist Party and the revolutionaries. March 31 Tanaka Gilchi, evidently feeling the pressure, telegraphed Nishikawa Torajiro, the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, that no action was to be taken until further notice. Tanaka must have realized that it would not be easy to stop Doi because he later asked Nishikawa to watch Doi.

In meantime the Japanese were trying to use Chang Tso-Iin. Ishii instructed Yada to try and persuade Chang that the best course would be to rely on Japan. And Tanaka told Nishikawa to hint that it would be desirable for Japan if he (Chang) were independent, and that If and when he declared his independence, Japan would supply him with arms, ammunition and money. However the Kwantung Army General Staff did not believe Chang could be trusted. Yada agreed but felt that in light of Japan's interests in Manchuria there had to be some accommodation with him. Doi also opposed the idea of Chang's declaring independence. He had no confidence in Chang and was afraid that once Chang was Independent the Japanese would not be able to achieve their objectives. Nor did it accord "With his plan for Chang to link up with the revolutionary faction. If Chang acted first, the revolutionaries, in whom a lot of money and time had been invested, would lose their opportunity (Friters 1937a).

Then on April 20 Tanaka ordered Doi to stop preparations. His reasons were three 1) Matters weren't going fast enough in the South. The arms and money wouldn't reach there before the middle of May, so there was no possibility for concerted action; 2) Yuan might use a rising in Manchuria as a pretext and unite the North and South behind him; 3) Since the overall situation in China was going against Yuan, perhaps would reach a point where he would be forced out of office. However opinion in the Army was not united e Koiso returned to Tokyo in early May and talked to Tanaka and Fukuda, chief of the intelligence Department of the General Staff. They explained Japanese policy and aims to him, but he thought, he saw enough of a contradiction to go ahead. He then informed Doi and Nishikawa of the necessity of

beginning preparations. Certainly part of these preparations meant shipping arms to Babojab. Babojab was even naive enough to ask the Russian authorities for permission transport 1,000 rifles and 50,000 rounds Of ammunition over the CER from Changchun to Hailar. He claimed the Japanese had sent them to Changchun. Ishii asked the Japanese consul in Chaagchun, Yamauchi Jirö, to investigate. At the same time he instructed the consul in Tsitsihar Nigame Heiji, to lock into the activities the Japanese in that area and their connection wlth Babojab (Valliant 1972: 11).

A report by a secretary of the consulate In Tsitsihar to Nigane described the ronin and their relationship to Babojab and the way in which arms were shipped. Aoyanagi Katsutoshi was in charge of shipping the arms. Since one batch had been confiscated by CER officials, the japanese had decided to take the shipments to Chengchiatun. The mongols had to pick them up there. Under Babojab there were 2,400 cavalry with rifles and ammunition. Yoshiwara, the secretary, felt some Mongols would insist on going ahead with the rising If there were no further possibility of obtaining arms from Japan. He also thought Babojab's two sons were being held hostage in Port Arthur (Friters 1937a).

Yada knew Doi was determined to go ahead with the plot and asked for instructions. Ishii wired back that the General Staff had told him there must be some kind of misunderstanding that there was to be no rising. He then ordered Yada to suppress any attempt. Yuan Shih—Kai 's death in early June meant nothing to Dol. He thought a second or third Yuan would emerge and nothing would be changed, so he was going ahead. However on the evening of June 7 an order came from Tanaka via Nishikawa forbidding any rising. The Japanese government had decided to support Li-Yuan-hung. Doi left for Tokyo two days later 'to clarify matters. Koiso claims Doi found opinion in Japan divided (just as Koiso had in May) the Foreign Ministry wanted to support Li, but the General Staff and others felt that the fighting and confusion in China would just continue. Finally on June 23 it was decided that if set up a cabinet and was responsive to Japanese opinion, then Japan would give Its positive support. (Valliant 1972: 12)

Though conditions remained confused in China, the Foreign ministry wanted the movement disbanded. Because the Army was so obstreperous, Ishii visited Yamagata

Aritomo and asked him to persuade the military to come around. It must have worked but even then disbanding the movement was not easy, and some arms had to be seized by the consul in Changchun to keep the ronin from getting out of hand. Finally an agreement was reached with Kawashima Naniwa. The men under Prince Su would be disbanded within sixteen days, each Japanese officer receiving ¥1,000-2,000 to return home (Boyd 2011).

One thing that might have hurried the Japanese disbandment of the movement was the Russian inquiry of August 14 on Japan's attitude toward the Royalist movement. The Russian government had information that the movement was being supplied, trained and led by Japanese. Since the Man-Mo Empire would include Russia's sphere of influence in Manchuria, she needed a clarification of Japanese policy to formulate her own attitude. By this time the Japanese reply was received on September 7 the movement had already been disbanded officially.

However the fighting did not end. Babojab was fighting his way north when he was killed in October. The remnants of his band along with the Japanese accompanying them finally reached the area around the Hailar in December. In January the Russian ambassador asked Motono Iichiro, the Foreign Minister, to take measures to keep Japanese from aiding the Mongols in Russia's sphere of influence. On February 1 the Japanese government informed the Russian Ambassador that Nigame Heiji, the Japanese consul in Tsitsihar, had been instructed to cooperate with the Russian Vice-consul in Tsitsihar in settling the matter. After some discussions the Japanese consul persuaded the ronin to leave (Prawdin 1967).

Two Japanese histories claim that the Mongols and their Japanese advisers captured Hailar In June 1917 and proclaimed it independent. When they heard rumors of Chinese and Russian troops movements against them on the CER, Irie Tanenori, ono Of the Japanese reserve officers, visited the Russian Vice—Consul in Hailar, Pavel Kiriiovich Usatyi, and threatened to blow up the tunnel if the CER transported troops. Usatyi reportedly denied any Intention of using the Hailar remained independent until were forced to return to the south by the Japanese Army General staff. Once they were gone the Russian and Chinese attacked and routed the Mongols. (Valliant 1972: 14)

The Pan-Mongol Movement, Spring of 1919

In 1918, following the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the success of the Bolsheviks, Japan joined the Allied expedition to the Russian Far East, more commonly known in Japan as the Siberian Intervention. While the principal objective of Japanese involvement in the Siberian Intervention was to block the spread of Communism, some army personnel also viewed support for the anti-Bolshevik White Russians as a way to revive the failed Manchuria-Mongolia independence plan. Moreover, some officers who had seen action in the second independence movement actively participated in the Siberian Intervention. The third Mongolian 'independence' movement, also known as the Pan-Mongol movement, was connected with the Siberian Intervention. It began in late 1918, and built on an earlier idea that had been promoted by two of the White Russian figures supported by the Japanese army in the Russian Far East, namely Grigorii Mikhailovich Semenov and Baron Roman Nicolaus Feodorovich von Ungern-Sternberg. (Boyd 2011: 88-89)

The confused events in Russia, Manchuria and Mongolia following the Russian Revolution allowed yet another attempt to be made at an independent Manchuria-Mongolia. However, this time the Mongols were the ones most involved. The Pan-Mongol movement and the Cossack Grigorii Mikhailovich Semenev are two intertwined strands. Yet Semenev's activities, the Pan-Mongol movement, and Japanese interests in the movement and in Semenev are all distinct. The Japanese were aiding Semenev. There can be no question of that. However this aid was to fight Bolsheviks, not to set up an independent Mongol state.

In middle of February Otani Kikuso, Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in Siberia, reported to Fukuda Masataro, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, that Semenev's plan was to sympathize with Outer Mongols and set up a state comprised of the Transbaikal Cossacks, the Buriats, the Outer Mongols in the Transbaikal, the Barguts and the Karachins. The capital would be in Hailar, the capital of Barga, and Semenev wanted to put his state under Japanese protection. Yet a month later the Japanese authorities in Tokyo were denying that Semenov was involved in the Mongol independence Movement. (Valliant 1972: 15)

At the same time the Army denied there were any Japanese participating in Semenov's movement. This was not the case. In March 1918 Captain Kuroki Chiyayoshi, at his own request, had been appointed to Semenov. There were also some ronin aiding Semenov. In February 1919 a group of then visited Mukden and in cooperation with one of Semenev's men decided to begin raising 2,000 Mongol troops. These troops would be sent to Siberia disguised as loggers and miners According to the leader, Ishimoto Gonjiro, the money to finance the project was to come from the Japanese and French governments. The Foreign Ministry however, disapproved, and Uchida Yasuya cabled Akazuka Shosuke, the Consul—General in Mukden to stop Ishimoto (Friters 1949)

This aid to the Mongols was indirect since it was routed through Semenov. The next step was for the Mongols themselves to ask the Japanese directly for aid. Apparently they never asked for much. The first request was to be allowed to send students to Japan. The second was for a printing press with moveable type so they could publish a newspaper. A third was for three doctors and advisers. These men would stay in Manchuria for one or two years and be paid 1,000 rubles a month. The last request was for ten Japanese military instructors. At the same time the Buriats wanted to send ten Mongols to japan for military training. None of these requests seems to have been honored. If nothing else this would serve to indicate a lack of Japanese interests in Mongol independence. (Valliant 1972: 16)

What has come to be called the Pan-Mongol movement began to materialize with a series of preliminary conferences in January and February 1919. There was a Japanese observer at all of them. However, the main conference was held in Chita, beginning February 25. Presents were Semenev, Captain Suzue (Called Suzuki in most writings) attached to the Japanese Third Division in Chita, six Buriyats, five Barguts and three representatives from Inner Mongolia. Outer Mongolia refused to participate.

This conference decided to a Mongol state consisting of Inner and Outer Mongolia, Barga and the Buriats in Siberia. It was to be a federation and a provisional government of four men was named, The capital was to be in Hailar, but was to be temporarily located In Dauria, a few miles from Manchouli on the Russian side of the

frontier. Furthermore there would be a 24,000 man defense army. To maintain the government a 20—year loan was to be obtained from a foreign government against the security of the federation's gold, silver, salt and mineral wealth. In addition the lender was to have the unlimited right to build railroads. The conference also decided to send representatives to the Paris Peace Conference (Valliant 1972: 16)

The official Japanese representative, Suzue, listened in silence. His reports are neither more informed than those of the Russians, nor do they indicate any form of Japanese planning. A recent Mongol writer has claimed that Semenov Instigated the conference, but that all the work was managed by the Japanese military official backstage. The evidence In the Japanese Foreign Ministry files will not bear this out. (*ibid*: 17)

Perhaps it is more significant that the conference sent two men to Kuroki with a report. Kuroki said he was satisfied with the work of the conference and would leave immediately for Japan. He promised full support in the name of the Japanese government. It is difficult to ascertain just where the basis for his statement lay. Fukuda, in a memo to the Chief of Staff, Uehara Yüsaku, wondered If Oba Jirö, Commander of the Third Division, was sending Suzue to the conferences to furnish liaison with the Mongols or to spy on Semenov. One would think that if Kuroki Was so important the General Staff would have known of all Semenov's actions and had no need to spy on him (*ibid*).

Japanese military thinking on the Man-Mo question was embodied in a memorandum from Tanaka Giichi, the Minister of the Army, to Uchida Yasuya, the Foreign Minister. Tanaka saw Japanese policy towards Outer Mongolia and Barga as being intimately related to Japan's po1icy toward China. He advocated caution. Since China was trying to re—establish her position along her northern frontier while Russia was weak, any Japanese action there would be looked on with suspicion. Tanaka wanted to deepen Sino—Japanese cooperation, but he wanted to guide Chinese policy to the Mongols' advantage. He also wanted to encourage the Buriats and Outer Mongols to work together, and at the same time he felt Japan should prepare both China and Mongolia for Russian aggression (*ibid*).

The official Japanese policy came with the cabinet decision of March 16. Concerning Japanese participation in a Mongol independence movement, the cabinet recognized that Japanese living in Manchuria and Siberia had a direct part in lt. News of Japanese participation was common among Chinese officials in Peking and Manchuria. Therefore the cabinet decided that in the light of anti—Japanese feeling in China, Europe and the U.S., Of the history of failure of the previous movements, and of the fact that could complicate military and diplomatic relations with the other powers in North Manchuria and Siberia, all Japanese participation In a conspiratorial plot must be stopped. Military and civilian officials were strictly forbidden to participate in any conspiracy and citizens were warned to be cautious. Concerning Mongol students coming to Japan and the request for a printing press, the cabinet felt that a decision should be put off pending further investigation (Friters 1937a).

In spite of this policy, rumors of Japanese aiding the Mongols kept circulating. Chang Tso—Iin was upset enough to threaten to aid the Koreans if the Japanese government did not halt the actions of its citizens. Uchida asked his consuls in Manchuria to investigate. They did by asking the Chinese generals. On April 11 Obata Tori kichi, the Ambassador In Peking, presented a note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry with the results. According to the note there were surprisingly few Japanese involved. Some around Mukden, but none in Tsitsihar or Chengchiatun. Most rumors were just that rumors and could not be verified (Lattimore 1933).

Because the Chinese were so agitated, Japanese Army officers were also recommending caution. The commander in Tientsin reported that Peking assigned the responsibility for an independence movement to Semenev, but felt that, in the background the Japanese General Staff was pulling the strings. Major General Sato in Tientsin warned of the same thing. And Major General Higashi in Peking thought that the foreigners were trying to use claims of Japanese participation in Mongol independence movement to drive a wedge between Japan and China. He felt japan should have absolutely nothing to do with any movement, and any Japanese involvement should be suppressed.

Evidently all this pressure had some effect. According to Speranskii Kuroki was replaced by Major Kurosawa. At Kurosawa's first meeting with the head of the

Mongol provisional government, Neise—gegen, Kurosawa told him there was no necessity of sending a Mongol delegation to Japan, that Japan would secretly support the Mongol movement with arms and money. It would seem that Kurosawa replaced Suzue since the latter's name no longer appears on reports. At the end of May Oba reported that Daghi Sampilon, a Buriat leader, said that Kurosawa had told him that Japan had no intention of aiding the Mongols. Then in the middle of June, Kurosawa himself reported that most of the people connected with the Mongol independence movement realized that there was no possibility of Japanese aid (Boyd 2011).

According to the Russian vice—consul in Hailar, at the beginning Of June the Mongols were losing confidence in Semenev, too. They had not gotten the loan Semenov had promised in February. No Mongol delegation had been sent to the Paris Peace Conference, nor had the meetings of the Mongol leaders with the foreign representatives, arranged by Semenov, yielded positive results.

Finally the last hope of Japanese aid disappeared in October when Fukuda, the Vice—Chief Of the Army General Staff, ordered Major General Higashi in Peking to inform the Outer Mongol government informally that Japan was in no way involved in any plot to aid Buriat Mongolia to become independent.

One of the things that strike one going through the documents is the lack of commitment to a plot to detach Manchuria from China on the part of the Japanese government. The government was more than willing to work for a settlement In Japan's favor, that did not mean there agreement on any one particular policy or even how a policy, once decided on, would be carried The Foreign Ministry was usually the one that advocated a go-slow policy, but even within that ministry men like Koike Chozo were in a hurry to achieve the Japanese objectives. The army, and within the Army the General staff, was most often the agency of plans to secure a firmer base In Manchuria. But even within the Army opinion was divided. Then there was an agency like the South Manchurian Railway with plans of its own. In 1912 the government seemed to be feeling out Chang Tso—lin, but at the same time other Japanese were supporting the revolutionaries, Chang's mortal enemies. In 1916 the government again was willing to use Chang, but the activists on the scene in

Manchuria objected, feeling Chang was not trustworthy. This disarray in Japanese policy hampered the execution of a peaceful policy (or even an aggressive one) and aroused the suspicions of the Powers (Friters 1937b).

Certainly the Japanese showed a great sensitivity to the actions of the Powers. Yui believes that in 1912 it was Great Britain that forced the Foreign Ministry to take a firm attitude toward the activists. In 1916 Russia also had an interest in any Japanese sponsored independence movement that would encroach on her sphere of influence. When the Japanese government protested to the powers that it was trying to suppress the independence movements, it usually was. It was the civilian activists who were causing all the trouble. They and their sympathizers in the government and Army earned the Japanese government a bad name. But they were never strong enough to thwart government opinion when it decided to suppress them. (Valliant 1972: 20)

Finally in 1919 when the time was opportune to set up an independent Manchu-Mongol state in Manchuria the Japanese showed little interest. There were men like Kuroki involved, but he could be classed more as a civilian activist than as a representative of the Japanese government. It was Suzue, nor Kuroki, who was the observer at the Mongol conferences. Perhaps the greatest indication of a lack of interest on the part of Japanese was their refusal to honor even the simplest Mongol requests. It was not until later that the balance changed and authorities in Manchuria gained enough confidence to oppose the desire of Tokyo.

Mongolian Overtures to Japan

Japan's relationship with Mongolia at this time undoubtedly was largely moulded by the Japanese elites. As in the earlier period, however, it was not a one-way relationship, and there were ongoing, albeit sporadic, attempts throughout these years by leading Mongols to establish closer links with Japan. As Narangoa and Cribb and others have noted, Japan's early success in industrialising, together with its spectacular and unexpected victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, inspired many Asians, who saw in Japan both a model and a possible source of assistance for their own plans for modernisation and independence. The Mongols were no exception. Indeed, in some instances, it could be argued that the Mongols welcomed

the opportunity to forge closer ties with Japan equally as much as the Japanese sought to cultivate the Mongols. (Narangoa and Cribb 2003: 2)

The first recorded diplomatic overture from the new Outer Mongolian government, established in 1911, to another country was in early 1913, when a delegation visited St Petersburg in an attempt to establish a closer relationship with Outer Mongolia's larger northern neighbour, through a guarantee of Russian support against any possible Chinese Republican incursion. The same delegation, however, also sought to limit the influence that Russia exerted in Outer Mongolia through the establishment of diplomatic relations with other nations, in particular, Japan. As a part of this attempt to open diplomatic relations with Japan, the Outer Mongolian delegation in St Petersburg forwarded a letter to the Japanese emperor from the Bogd Khan, the supreme religious ruler of Outer Mongolia and head of the Mongolian government. The letter, however, was returned to the Mongols unopened. (Onon and Pritchatt 1989: 50-54) The Japanese presumably rebuffed the Outer Mongolian overtures because, under the Russo-Japanese Agreement signed in July 1912, Outer Mongolia was deemed to fall within Russia's sphere of influence.

Despite the rebuff, in February 1913, the Outer Mongolian government made a second attempt to open diplomatic relations with Japan. On this occasion, the Home Minister of the Bogd Khan's government, Tserenchimed, sought to have Japan establish a protectorate over Inner Mongolia while simultaneously recognising the independence of Outer Mongolia and also the notional sovereignty of Outer Mongolia over Inner Mongolia. One major object was to enable the Outer Mongolian government to achieve its aim of nominally uniting Inner and Outer Mongolia, in order to create the Greater Mongolia that some in Outer Mongolia dreamed of. To achieve this aim a delegation was dispatched to Harbin to meet with the Japanese consul there, as the first step in a planned trip to Japan to petition the Japanese government. Unfortunately for the Outer Mongolian delegation, the Japanese consul informed them that because Russia opposed the trip to Japan, he could only advise the Outer Mongolians to avoid unpleasantness and return to Urga. The Japanese go-between for this second attempt was Miyazato Yoshimaro, a 'Mongolian adventurer' (Mko rnin), later connected with Babujab, the Mongolian leader of the 1916 independence movement. Miyazato supposedly succeeded in persuading both the

Harbin consul-general, and the Japanese military staff in Changchun, to accept the Mongolian mission, but because of pressure from Russia, the Japanese government declined to allow the mission passage to Japan. (Boyd 2011: 99)

In early 1914, the Outer Mongolian government may have made a third attempt to open diplomatic relations with Japan. On this occasion, the Mongolian Special Envoy in St Petersburg granted an interview to the Japanese press in which he called on the Japanese government to promote closer ties with Inner Mongolia. The envoy's reason for doing this is unclear, but it may have constituted another attempt by Outer Mongolia to gain Japanese recognition of Outer Mongolia's notional sovereignty over Inner Mongolia. Moreover, from the tone of the interview, it appeared that the Outer Mongols were becoming frustrated with Russia. (Boyd 2011: 100)

Evidently, parts of the Outer Mongolian government were seeking to strengthen Japan's position in Inner Mongolia, perhaps hoping in the future that Japan might counter Russia's dominant position in Outer Mongolia as well. The fact that this interview was published in Japan also suggests that elements of the Japanese media regarded the Outer Mongolian overture as an opportunity to secure for Japan a stronger position in Inner Mongolia, and were not shy of conveying this opinion, albeit indirectly.

Despite the earlier rebuffs, in the middle of 1915 Miyazato Yoshimaro was again approached to act as a go-between in Mongolian attempts to secure Japanese military assistance. On this occasion, Miyazato assisted two Mongols, one of them Babujab's brother-in-law, to travel to Japan, where the pair came to the attention of Kawashima Naniwa, who had been involved in the first Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement, and others of like mind. Following a meeting of the Mongols, Kawashima and others, the Japanese military decided to dispatch two reserve army officers to Mongolia to assess what aid Babujab's army required. (Boyd 2011: 100)

Conclusion

The attempts by members of various interest groups to increase Japanese control of Mongolia during the Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements of 1912 and 1916 and the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22 should not be examined in isolation. Rather, the three operations, and the ongoing diplomatic overtures by Japan to China and Russia, must be seen as part of a larger pattern. The independence movement of 1912 was not the first attempt by Japanese military officers to enlarge Japan's sphere of influence into Mongolia, though earlier efforts had been less ambitious. The Japanese military had made several attempts prior to the collapse of the Qing dynasty to strengthen Japan's position in Inner Mongolia, including by such means as encouraging the activities of Kawahara Misako as teacher and intelligence officer in the months preceding the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and placing Japanese Army officers in parts of Inner Mongolia prior to the collapse of the Qing dynasty.

One thing that is distinctive about this period, however, and yet has been neglected in other works, is the high-level tolerance of apparently renegade army actions in Mongolia. From the first independence movement of 1912 through to the end of the Siberian Intervention in 1922 the pattern of apparent insubordination, and tolerance of it, grows steadily larger. In 1912 it was probably only a handful of officers out in the field who disobeyed official orders, although it is possible, as Valliant has suggested, that Fukushima Yasumasa, a senior officer in the high command, was quite deeply involved.143 In 1916, apparent insubordination again seems to have been accepted in connection with operations in Mongolia, as seen by the evident lack of censure of Koiso by the Army General Staff, although the General Staff did appear to follow the wishes of the civilian government in officially suspending assistance to the forces led by Babujab. By the time of the Siberian Intervention even the semblance of willingness by the Army General Staff to kowtow to the civilian authorities had ceased, as can be seen in the call by high-ranking army officers for aid to White Russian leaders in May 1921, some two years after the civilian government had decided to suspend such aid. Clearly, some in the high command were prepared to ignore the civilian authorities when it came to operations in Mongolia, especially if the decisions made by the civilian authorities interfered with attempts by the military to extend Japan's control over the region. Operations were conducted, however, in such a way that the high command could plead ignorance of what had occurred if the attempt failed.

Despite the failure of the various Japanese-backed attempts to gain control of Mongolia during this period, the degree of attention shown by the Japanese military and other groups to Mongolia indicates the perceived strategic significance of the region to Japan. Moreover, the overtures made by some in the Outer Mongolian government to Japan, in an attempt to gain diplomatic recognition for their independence from Han Chinese domination, to counter Russian interference, and to enhance their own claim to influence over Inner Mongolia, indicate that some Outer Mongolians favoured the idea of Japan playing an active role in their future. These overtures no doubt also served to strengthen Japanese leaders' belief that Japan was or could be the leader of Asia.

Chapter 3

Japanese Involvement in Pan-Mongolism

Pan-Mongolism can be considered as the first modern nationalist ideology. This doctrine, unusually dynamic in the early decades of the twentieth century was maneuvered in the building of nationhood in Mongolia; in Ataman Semenov's political projects; in the intellectuals of Buriat and in the colonization of Northern Asia by Japan. Till the fifties of the twentieth century, diverse Mongolian activists belonging to Inner Mongolia were inspired by the idea. Even to this day, it has managed to survive on the fringes of a discourse, ethno-political in nature, but quite frequently becomes a posit of cultural collaboration between Mongolian groups residing in various countries. (Zbigniew 2012: 13). The ultimate end of the archaic inter-ethnic orders in the Russian and Manchu empires and the changes that followed soon after gave rise to Pan-Mangolism. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the native administration called the Buriat Steppe Dumas were dissolved along with an organized and colossal resettlement of the peasants from the Russian Empire's European part to Transbaikalia (Atwood 2004: 66). The fight for land rights inflamed inter-ethnic disputes and led to political maneuvering of the Buriats. The same political activity and desire to unite with Outer Mongolia was the reaction of the Tuvinians to the intensified Russian colonization in the first decades of the twentieth century (Baabar 1999: 186-188).

Throughout the twentieth century, Japan had taken a keen interest in Mongolia. In their effort to promote Pan-Mongolism, the Japanese soon learnt that Soviet Russia would be a major obstacle, more than she had been in the past. Pan-Mongolism, as such, was neither a positive Russian nor a Chinese policy as it was with the Japanese. Earlier attempts in this direction were made by Japanese militarists and buddhist scholars (in thename of pan buddhism) but Tsarist and Soviet Russian intervention ended the scheme.In reality, no ideal of a Pan-Mongolian state could be realized as long as Soviet power was left unchallenged in outer Mongolia and China's power in inner Mongolia.

The staggering Manchu power during the same period exterminated restrictions associated to the settlement of Mongolian regions by the Chinese (Han) population. The intrusion of Chinese agricultural colonists led to disputes associated to leasing of land. The dominion of the local Mongolian princes did not encompass the Chinese colonists, and hence the Mongols saw it as a larceny of their territories (Bulag 2000). There was a pervasive feeling of economic enslavement felt by the Mongolian nomads by trade companies run by the Chinese. A major influence that took place due to Europe's idea of nationalism that focused on the right to self-determination and self-government of every nation was that it sensitized the diverse Mongolian-speaking groups about freedom and emancipation. This in turn helped them in fighting the socio-economic tyranny and enslavement . The Mongolian-speaking groups used nationalism as a weapon to counter the challenges of modernization. The Daurs started changing their existing ethnic-social relations, which were established by Manchu authorities. Daurs enjoyed many privileges in the Qing Empire. However, they were not considered as Mongols by the Manchus who referred to them as the 'new Qing', i.e. younger kins of the reigning empire . Nonetheless , the Daurs, post the end of the Manchu dynasty started to accentuate on their Mongolness. In the early twenties they started adding the name 'Mongol' to their ethnonym. In 1924, Merse, a Mongolian-Daurian national activist and one of the leaders of Mongolian communists,in his work *The Mongolian Issue* highlighted the five principal groups that compose the Mongolian nation:

1.Khalkha-Mongols residing in Outer Mongolia.
2.Oled-Mongols residing in Qinghai and Northern Tianshan.
3.Daur-Mongols from Heilongjiang, Hulun-Buir and Bhutan.
4. Buriat-Mongols inhabiting the Transbaikal territory and the Irkutsk province.
5.Kalmuck-Mongols living on the Volga.Merse opines that a common language, pastoral economy and Buddhism kept all of them united (Bulag 2002: 149).

Common origin as an idea along with the practice of one cultural, religious and linguistic realm was utilized in Pan-Mongolism. This concept recognizes all Mongolian people as a single nation entitled to the amalgamation of all Mongolian people within a single state organism. It aspired to merge the inner and outer Mongolia and Barga, and encourage the exodus of Mongolian groups to the domain

of an independent Outer Mongolia. The Proclamation of People's Party of Mongolia of 1921 reads as follows:

"Mongolian jazguurtan, struggling against an oppressive enemy occupier— will declare our rights and power, praising our nationality [jazguuründes], and will build the state of our real nationality. To increase the population of Mongolia it would be right to resettle Buriats, Torguts, Inner Mongols, Barguts and other Mongolian peoples to Mongolia, if they wish, and make them citizens, providing them with accommodation. The purpose of unification of Mongolia by establishing links with numerous aimags of the Mongolian ugsaatan is an important task for our party. Until now Barga, Inner Mongolia, Uryanhay and other Mongols of our religion and nationality [jasündes] have not had a possibility to unite." (Lhamsüren 2006: 88).

It can be said that, Buriats, Torguts, Barguts and the dwellers of Inner Mongolia were recognized as mongolündesten, i.e. people of Mongolian nationality. Hence, it deals with an ethno-cultural idea of a nation coupled with Gellner's definition (2006: 1), the statement about compliance of national and political boundaries. The roles played by Buriats Tsyben Zhamsarano and Elbeg-DorzhRinchino in the Pan-Mongolian movement of Mongolia have been special and noteworthy. Their roles as politicians went to the extent of forming the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party's nationalist policy . Zhamsarano's involvement in the institution of a fresh national-ethnic parlance into the state dialogue was predominantly aided by the Bolshevik nationalist theory. The following Mongolian equivalents were defined for Russia: clan— ovog, tribe—aimag, nationality—yastan, nation—ündesten (Bulag 1998: 31).

In the years that followed this ideology underwent substantial change and utilized in the ethnic policy. The idea of civic nationality, which was straight away linked, to involvement in state reality to the Mongolian national-ethnic discourse was too introduced by Zhamsarano. For him the Mongols living in the structure of the Mongolian statehood were monggolündesten (mongolündesten in modern Mongolian), however, those Mongols residing beyond the borders of the statehood were monggolobogtan (mongolovogtan)—Mongolian tribes, groups with the similar roots and language; they could become a nation only by merging with the Mongolian state. Zhamsarano stressed on the need of a functioning collective language, religion, origin, traditions and the most imperative requirement was a common state (Lhamsüren 2006: 60).

However, the Pan-Mongolist movement witnessed a crisis in the third decade of the twentieth century in Mongolia and USSR. This was primarily due to the imperialist policy of Japan that tried to use the concept of pan-Mongolism and pan-Buddhism in order to effectively expand its territory. Japan generated and spread the concept of amalgamation of all Mongols under its patronage and the emancipation of the Mongolian people from the enslavement of the Chinese and the communists. In retaliation to this, USSR's communist government and later MPR started persecuting the ideologists of pan-Mongolists and lamas as well often accusing them of spying for Japan. This led to a vast cleansing and defragmentation of the territory of the Buriat Autonomous Republic in the USSR. The Japanese-Mongolian-Soviet conflict and later the Soviet-Chinese confrontation turned into a long-term mutual distrust between the Mongols of Outer Mongolia and those of the Eastern part in Inner Mongolia (Morozova 1999: 159).

Pan-Mongolism as a concept gained popularity in the early twentieth century although it has a longhistory. The will of the indigenous Mongols to possess a state unified on the model of Genghis Khan's empire was represented in this period. Due to its depth as a concept it desired for the re-amalgamation of all the Mongols spread all over along with all the Mongolian territories into a single 'Greater Mongolian state'. This notion of building a state that would primarily be a Pan-Mongolian one, essentially emphasized on encompassing territories consisting of not only Outer and Inner Mongolia as well as Buryat region of Siberia but also the territories of Tibetans, the Kyrgyzs and Kalmyks of Central Asia, thereby stretching the whole area from the Caspian Sea to Lake Baikal. But, Pan-Mongolism did not succeed as a movement for a single unified state even though the native Mongols wished for. Their region now was divided into divergent areas by disparate powers. The principal reason that led to this failure was the geopolitical significance of the Mongol areas, that allured different powers chiefly Russia, China and Japan to gain their dominance in the region. In this process the concept of Pan-Mongolism got exploited in different cases, all for their individual benefits and the Mongols were left with nothing but a dead craving of having a Pan-Mongolian state (Soni 2007: 51).

The fact of the matter is that the Pan-Mongolist perception of ethnic Mongols notwithstanding their inhabitable areas was to comprise the inhabitants of a big

region, the chief players were the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongols, Buryat Mongols and Kalmyks who were to be merged into a new politico-cultural set up. In this process the heritage of Genghis Khan as well as the distinct nomadic culture seemed to have played a very important part. Genghis Khan became a role model as it was under his leadership that the first unified Mongol state emerged in the thirteenth century (Soni 2007: 52).

Japanese Involvement in Pan-Mongolism during Independence Movements

The corollaries of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 allowed imperial Japan to not only establish control in considerable territories in Continental Northeast Asia, but it also acquired prestige all over the world for its political and military strength. Japan enjoyed specific advantages in Eastern Inner Mongolia and Manchuria out of the Sino-Japanese Agreement of 1915. The attempt of the Japanese was to strategically and economically utilize Manchuria by gaining authority of the prevailing transportation systems and constructing of new railroads and the same time exploiting its natural resources. Hence, Japan belligerently forwarded its military furtherance to East Asia, competing with the calculated interests of both Russia and China.

During the formation of the Mongolian state, and the struggles for autonomy and independence in Outer and Inner Mongolia, the concept of national movement is seen to be united by language, culture, and ancestry destined for the creation of an independent state. Distinct in language, history, culture and putatively in race from the ethnic Chinese or Han, the Mongol demand for independence was from 1921 on expressed in the idiom of national self-determination. As formulated ion the European continent in the nineteenth century, this doctrine held that every national-linguistic group had a moral right to form its own state. An invention of liberal thinkers in the first half of the nineteenth century, it was inherited by the '*Socialists Second International*' after the liberals abandoned it for imperialism (Hobsbawm 1992: 101-30).

In 1911, when the Manchu Empire broke up, the old tribal cleavage between Inner and Outer Mongolia at once became evident. Revolutionary movements actually

began earlier in Inner Mongolia than in Outer Mongolia, but never made so much head-way; with the result that many early leaders of anti-Chinese risings in Inner Mongolia acceded eventually to Outer Mongolia.

At the time of the Chinese Revolution, several attempts were made to assert Inner Mongolian independence and to unite with Outer Mongolia; but they came to nothing, partly because the Inner Mongolian princes believed that independence would lead to their being overshadowed by the princes of Outer Mongolia, and partly because of greater economic dependence on China. Many Inner Mongolian princes were heavily interested in Chinese trading firms which handled the trade of the Mongols, and did not want to risk the loss of the large revenues thus obtained. Undoubtedly, however, the most important single reason was the feeling, among the Mongols, that China, under the Republic, would be a weak state with which they could conduct their relations as they liked. There can be no doubt that they also feared the spread of Russian influence in Outer Mongolia, and believed that they would have more real freedom in nominal association with China than under a nominal independence, controlled in reality from Russia. Thus, during the first independence movements in Inner Mongolia the Chinese troops were everywhere defeated and driven out with startling ease, but independence was never really clinched, and in the end, some of the Inner Mongolian princes were 'sold out', by accepting high office under the Republic of China (Lattimore 1934a: 17).

A momentum was gaining among the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, the feeling of Pan-Mongolism, 'a concept that represent the desire of indigenous Mongols to bring into fore a unified State based on the model of the Empire of Chinggis Khan. The concept was so deep rooted that it called for reunification of all the Mongols wherever they were as well as all the Mongolian areas into a single "Greater Mongolian state" (Soni 2006: 127).

It was around this time that the Pan-Mongolist feeling found its expression. But the foreign factor, especially the three main powers namely, Russia, China and Japan left no stones unturned so far as exploitation of the concept of Pan-Mongolism for their own benefit is concerned. In fact, the failure of Inner and Outer Mongolia to unite during 1911-12 might also have been influenced by the policies of Russia and Japan,

who at that time due to Chinese revolution, were trying to come to a 'new understanding' about the balance of continental power in North East Asia (Soni 2006: 130).

Apart from its territorial ambitions, Russia wanted to protect its eastern borders from any future Chinese and Japanese encroachments, and the Mongols of not only outer and inner Mongolia but also Barga area of Manchuria (Eastern Inner Mongolia) remained under the influence of events manipulated by Russia, China and Japan. Already in 1907 and later on in July 1912 secret Russo-Japanese treaties had confirmed 'Russian rights and interests in Outer Mongolia', while defining the position of both powers in Inner Mongolia. It is, therefore, noteworthy that despite Mongol insurrections against Chinese rule in both the eastern (Manchuria) and southern Inner Mongolia, recognition of Japan's special interests in eastern Inner Mongolia under the Russo-Japanese treaty of 1912, further cast a shadow on any possibility of Russian support for Pan-Mongolism (Soni 2006: 130).

As per the terms of the Russo-Japanese secret treaty of 1912, Inner Mongolia was divided into two spheres of interest, the meridian of Peking being the line of demarcation between the Russian and Japanese spheres. Article II of the treaty reads as follows:

"Inner Mongolia is divided into two parts: one to the West and the other to the East, of the meridian of Peking. The Imperial Government of Russia undertakes to recognize and to respect the Japanese special interests in the part of Inner Mongolia to the East of the meridian above indicated, and the Imperial Government of Japan undertakes to recognize and to respect the Russian special interests in the part of Inner Mongolia to the West of the said meridian."

The immediate cause for the signing of the treaty seems to have been influenced by the events unfolded in the Barga region of Manchuria in eastern Inner Mongolia. The Barga Mongols or the Barguts, as they were called, inhabited the area west of the Hsingan range in Heilungchiang province. Soon after the fall of the Manchu Dynasty the Barguts revolted against the Chinese warlords and on 2 January 1912 it declared that 'Barga joined itself to the new Autonomous Government at Urga [the capital of Outer Mongolia].' This declaration was much against the Russian policy, which was

opposed to the union of Barga with Outer Mongolia, as it would encourage rest of Inner Mongolia to follow suit. The fact that Japan too wanted to gain their influence in 'Eastern Inner Mongolia' might have led to the end of the Russo-Japanese secret treaty (Soni 2006: 131).

On the other hand, pressure from Russia on the Urga Government to set aside its interests in Inner Mongolia and Barga led the Mongols to turn to Japan mounted and it has been well documented by the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov in March 1914: 'The Government of Urga remains convinced of the possibility of obtaining agreement with Japan for union of Inner and Outer Mongolia.' But any direct involvement in the Mongol affairs, Japan on its part at least before 1917, keeping in view the line of demarcation set down in the 1912 secret agreement with Russia, generally limited her interests confined only to eastern Inner Mongolia. Furthermore, in May 1915 similar Chinese recognition was secured by Japan as stipulated in Group II of its famous 'Twenty-One Demands'. Russia, on the other side, considered any development towards formation of a united Mongolia as against its Far Eastern policies and, therefore, a Russo-Chinese agreement was concluded in November 1915 that 'awarded' Barga to China. Nevertheless, Pan-Mongolist ideas did not come to an end which is evidenced by the fact that 7000 strong Bargut troops led by Babojab, an Inner Mongolian prince, continued to resist the Chinese even after the Russo-Chinese agreement. This kept the feeling of nationalism alive among the Inner Mongols. Though Babojab died in 1916, his resistance movement continued and it is believed to have ultimately merged with the Japanese-sponsored Semenev-Neisse Gengen Pan-Mongol movement (February 1919-January 1920) (Soni 2006: 132).

Although, the Russo-Mongolian agreement of 1912 was followed by an additional agreement between two sides in 1913 and a tripartite agreement between China, Russia and Mongolia confirming the autonomous status of Mongolia, Russia due to its involvement in World War I could not pay much attention to Mongolia (Soni 2002: 63). Taking advantage of quite a new situation that emerged after the Russian Revolution of 1917, Japan became interested in the Mongol affairs for its own benefit. It was more so because Japan was aware of the fact that Bolsheviks had already toppled the Tsarist government and so the Russo-Japanese secret treaties of 1907 and 1912 were meaningless. The Japanese now realized that instead of paying lip service

to the fact that southern [Inner] and northern [Outer] Mongolia were spheres of special influence, the creation of one large united Mongolia would help exert pressure on China and create favourable grounds for the Japanese occupation of the Far East. The confused events in Russia following the Russian Revolution, thus, provided a fair chance to the Japanese to make another attempt to exploit the idea of Pan-Mongolism. Among the anti-Communists who first received Japanese aid and support towards realizing the Pan-Mongolian hope was Ataman Semenov. However, today it is a matter of argument whether Japanese aid and support was given to Semenov to fight Bolsheviks or to create a Pan-Mongolian state. While discussing the Pan-Mongolian Movement of 1919, Valliant clearly states:

"The Pan-Mongolian movement and the Cossack GrigoriiMikhailovich Semenov are two intertwined strands. Yet, Semenov's activities, the Pan-Mongolian movement, and Japanese interests in the movement and in Semenov are all distinct. The Japanese were aiding Semenov. There can be no question of that. However, this aid was to fight Bolsheviks, not to set up an independent Mongol State."

The Japanese made at least two strong attempts at exploiting Pan-Mongolism and its variant, Pan-Buddhism. At the time of the civil war in Russia, after 1917, when Japanese troops occupied parts of eastern Siberia, they broached an appeal to the Mongols through the Ataman of the Transbaikal Cossacks, Semenov (a Buriat). 'Pan-Mongolism' became the slogan through which at least some Japanese thought they could win over all Mongolian groups and effectively separate the Buriats from Russia, simultaneously furthering Japanese influence in Central Asia. This movement crystallized at Dauria, at a conference in February 1919. A khutukhtu (the highest rank in the Buddhist hierarchy) from Inner Mongolia, Neisse Gegen, nominally headed the movement, which called for an establishment of a ' Greater Mongolian State' from Baikal to Tibet and from Manchuria to Eastern Turkestan. But when the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia refused to participate, the movement was doomed, and the Japanese quickly disavowed all connection with Neisse Gegen and his associates (Rupen 1956: 391).

Whatever may be the reasons behind Japanese aid to Semenov, there is consensus that 'together they called a Congress to create Pan-Mongolia'. It is further evidenced by

the fact that during this Congress, which took place in Chita from 25 February to 6 March 1919, Capton Suze, generally known as Suzuki who belonged to the Japanese Third division in Chita, had also participated. It indicates some degree of Japanese support to the cause of Pan-Mongolism. Besides, the Congress led by Semenov himself was also attended by a number of representatives from Inner Mongolia, Buryat Mongolia and Barga area of Manchuria. However, Outer Mongolia was not represented at this Congress. Finally it was decided to form a Pan-Mongolian state having an Inner Mongolian Khutukhtu, Neisse Gegeen being its Prime Minister with capital located at Hailer, though temporarily Dauria was chosen as the seat of the government. Although Semenov was successful initially, his Pan-Mongolia scheme met a terrible fate. As Baabar observes:

"Pan-Mongolia was created by a few men around the negotiating table and approved on paper only. Therefore, it never materialized nor had any chance of survival. Japan alone supported its formation. The Soviets were extremely alarmed at this plan because if such a state were in fact created it would certainly be used as a Japanese military stronghold against the Soviets. Without losing any time, Moscow sent a statement to both Outer Mongolia and to China, expressing support for Mongolia's independence."

Semenov's position began deteriorating as Soviet Red Army made inroads to recapture its 'lost' territory in Siberia. He faced stiff resistance not only from the Soviets but also from China and Outer Mongolia, and even Japan under pressure from all sides stopped backing him. Following Outer Mongolia's opposition, Mongols of Inner Mongolia, Barga and Buryat too backed down from Semenov's Pan-Mongolia plan. Later on, time and again the question of Pan-Mongolism was raised on various occasions but the desire for a union of all Mongols into a 'Greater Mongolia' did not materialize. While both Soviet Union and China were able to oppose consistently and successfully such an idea, Japan too did not seem to be very much interested, albeit few instances of manipulating Inner Mongolian nationalist movement against the Chinese domination. Only in the 1930s did Japan again embark on an ambitious Mongolian policy, concerning its occupation of Manchuria and creation of Manchukuo as a puppet state (Soni 2006: 133-4).

However, another plan for uniting the Mongols soon came to the forefront towards the end of 1920. But this time, under the sponsorship of Baron von Ungern-Sternberg,

a former aide of Semenov, who also had some links with the Japanese. When Ungern invaded Mongolia, several Japanese served his brigade but it is doubtful whether his campaign against Mongolia was instigated by the Japanese. In fact, Ungern himself dreamt of the new Chinggis Khan era and, therefore, he tried to use Pan-Mongolist card in his activities in Mongolia. Both ethnicity and religion in terms of nomadism and Buddhism were exploited in the name of uniting the Mongols. What he really did was trying to consolidate his own position 'by instituting a bloody purge that became a virtual reign of terror.' It obviously posed a clear threat both to the Buryat Mongol populated area in Siberia and to the whole Russian strategic position in northeast Asia. Having succeeded in his campaign against Mongolia, Ungern realized that the time was now ripe for the establishment of a Pan-Mongolian state (Soni 2002: 65).

Like Semenov, Ungern's dream of the restoration of a Pan-Mongolian empire also did not materialize. In July 1921, a joint Soviet-Mongolian force defeated him and finally he was executed. In both cases, the idea of Pan-Mongolism was destined to fail. Considering the circumstances in which it was planned to be developed, it seems that the idea was politically motivated for personal gains rather than for the welfare of Mongol tribes as a whole. This might have been one of the reasons why Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia resisted it and and later on the Mongols of others regions too followed suit (Soni 2002: 66).

Buddhist Factor in Pan-Mongolism

The First Period of Japan's Policy Towards Pan-Mongolism and Buddhism

The starting of the twentieth century in the East saw the awakening of Asia which was characterized by the emergence of different conceptions of national development, rise of Pan-Asiatism and reformism as an imperative determinant in international politics. In various regions of the East, those activists who stood up against the suffering of the crisis of identity eventually became the propagators of nationalist conceptions and ideas of Asian development (Morozova 1999: 147).

Historically, in the first half of the twentieth century, a crucial role was played by Mongolian Buddhism in building Mongolian nationalism, in the regions of Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Buryat (Buryat Autonomous Region in Russia), and Oirat (Western) Mongolia. 'Mongolia Proper', explained as the core

territory in which ethnic Mongol inhabited is located in the western side from the eastern shores of Lake Balkash in Kazakhstan to the modern city of Harbin in Manchuria in the east; and in the south from the Great Wall (just north of the city of Urumqi) to the north until Lake Baikal in Siberia. Till 1950, what we know today as geographical borders of the region were not made. During this time, the treaty which was signed in unison between the Communist China and Soviet Union reached at the self determination of the Mongolian People's Republic. The borders of the state were decided and the treaty divided the diverse Mongol tribes who today inhabit the Chinese, Soviet and the Mongol territories. It consolidated the borders which was a n intersecting point for all the aforementioned countries (Mishigish 2012: 39).

The Japanese example demonstrates very clearly the appellation towards Buddhism for proving the unique and selected role of the nation. It looks like facing inadmissible and unusual for Buddhism aggressive feature. According to the doctrine of Tanaka Tigaku (1861-1939), the Buddhist-layman, who considered himself to be a follower of Nichiren, the Buddhist teaching had appeared in japan to combine the way of this religion with the fortune of Japanese nation and to turn the rest of the world into a vast Buddhist country. It seemed easy and natural to find an excuse for militarization of Japan in the 30s and its invasion in Asia as spread of its influence (Morozova 1999: 147).

Keeping aside the religious reason, the motive behind the unification of the ethnic Mongols also connoted a one single unified Buddhist culture. Hence, Pan-Buddhism as a form of Pan-Mongolism, was propogated by Agvan Dorjeev, a popular Buryat Lama (1853-1938). Attempts to utilize Buddhism as means to unite and build nationalistic feelings were made by other Buryat leaders like Jamtsarano, Baraadin, AgvanDorjeev, Tsybikov and Bato-Dalai Orchiv as well (Soni 2007: 52).

The one factor that united the Mongols against the Chinese and Russian clutches of the their respective areas and that which built robust nationalist feelings was Pan-Buddhism.. A concept like this which was modeled on religious sentiments gained more popularity as 'Russian pressure on the Buryats (and Kalmyks), and Chinese pressure on the Inner Mongols, increased.' One can say here that the introduction of Buddhism or more specifically Lamaism in Mongolia in the seventeenth century,

brought about a common identification among the Mongols but it was also used as a tool in many ways for political reasons .Thus, religion, played a key political role in all the Mongolian areas- Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Buryatia. As far as Outer Mongolia was concerned , a Russian observer in 1912 noted: 'No Mongols have any notion about the Chinese Emperor, but every Mongol even the children, knows about the Bogdo Gegen [JebtsunDambaKhutukhtu], who unites both temporal and spiritual power.' Thus, Pan-Buddhism in a way desired to build interrelations among Outer Mongols, Inner Mongols, Buryats, Kalmyks and also Tibetans in order to achieve a Pan-Mongolist vision (Soni 2007: 52-3).

The widespread expansion of Pan-Mongolism to Pan-Buddhism led to the planning of Tibet being included in the unified Mongolian state. But, Pan-Buddhism could not unify the Mongols before 1917, which was prior Tsardom's fall in Russia. The following factors have been highlighted by Rupen that led to this setback (a) Tibet's inclusion into the Mongolian area that wanted self determination ; (b) Tibetan language being used in the Lamaist Church in lieu of Mongolian language ; and (c) the contention between the 8thJebtsun Damba Khutukhtu of Urga and the 13th Dalai Lama . Apart from these factors there were a lot of other developments happening in most of the areas where the ethnic Mongols resided that led destroy Pan-Mongolian identification. According to Rupen, 'Mongolian unity did not really exist.' In order to support his assertion, the following reasons were cited by him, "a) Russian influence provided the Buryats with interests and sophistication unknown to the Khalkhas and caused them to suspect the Buryats of un-Mongolian activities; b) Chinese influence similarly divided the Inner Mongolians from the Khalkhas; c) some Buryats and some Inner Mongolians were de-nationalized by Russian and Chinese contacts; d) Irkutsk Buryats often disagreed with TransbaikalBuryats; e) the Kalmyks were too far away for any real cooperation and Oirats resented domination by Khalkhas; and finally f) the Mongolian area best suited to independence, i.e., Outer Mongolia had the least developed nationalism and the greatest apathy, due in large part to the curses of illiteracy and disease" (Soni 2007: 53).

Japan tried to use Mongol nationalism in her favor by effecting the exercise of Buddhism in those territories inhabitated by the Mongos from 1918 to 1939.For centuries, Buddhism was an important component of the Mongolian culture , and in

the early twentieth century and due to changes in the political scenario of the Mongols, Mongol nationalism reassembled around it. After being aware of thisthe Japanese tried its best to create a 'Great Mongol State' by utilizing Buddhism as a weapon to unify. They wanted to have control of all the Mongol ethnic groups by bringing all of them together. In the early twentieth century, Japans policy was based on studies on local culture and religion of the Mongols living in various areas .Japan already had an advantage of the prevailing knowledge and practice of the Buddhism that helped Japan manipulate Buddhism practiced by the Mongols. This further rejuvenated Mongol nationalism. In order to get political favors , Japan tried to propagate Buddhism in Buryat Mongolia in the early 1920s. Among the Eastern and Inner Mongols in the 1930s,they took same initiative with a greater zeal in putting forward their religious propaganda. But the result of this was not one which they wanted and it also ended the aim of propagating Mongol nationalism by altering Mongolian Buddhism (Mishigish 2012: 39).

Everyone had realized the significance of Mongol Buddhism in dealing with the Mongols; Mongolia's northern neighbor, Tsarist Russia (later the Soviet Union), southern neighbor, the Manchu (Qing) Empire of China, and a rather distant neighbor, the Imperial Japan. Apart from being geographically connected to China and Russia Mongolia as such did not have any links with the other countries but they had started making new allies. The 8th Jebtsun Damba who was the spiritual and poitical leader of all Mongols in 1914 sought help of the Manchu emperor for the unification of the Mongols. He was of Tibetan origin , and was enthroned as the Khaan of all Mongols and was known as the eighth reincarnation of the first Buddhist spiritual leader of the Mongols.The 1911 national uprising for self determination from the Qing Dynasty was the reason behind this . The Mongolians had sought independence three years ago from the Manchus and this was a precarious period for the Mongolian independence to survive . However, the Japanese silently turned down the request. This for the first time was a direct attempt by the Mongols to make direct connections with the Japanese in the twentieth century (Cheney 1968: 44).

An important episode which took place in Urga in 1904 led the Mongols to seriously think of independence from the Qing Empire. Because of the In 1094, the 13th Dalai Lama of Tibet (*Ngag-dbangBlo-gzangThub-ldan)* flew to Urguu due to the British

occupation of Lhasa. As After the fall of the Qing Empire, both the Tibetans and the Mongols were independent now and it was strategically important in pursuing political aid from the Mongols..But ,the authority of the 8th Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu, the political and spiritual leader of the Mongols would have been subverted by the Dalai Lama's visit. More so, post 1911 independence movement; the Jebtsun Damba was to be enthroned as the Khan of the Khalkha Mongols. The Jebtsun Damba apart from accepting any challenge from the Dalai Lama with regards to his political authority ,recognized only the religious authority of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama was followed by Buryat, Khalkha, Oirat, Inner, and Eastern Mongols.so much so that he was considered as a Living Buddha by them and greatly showered their tributes and respect. In the past, Lhasa was never seen as a centre of political leadership by the Mongols hence, there was no suspicion of a direct political influence by the Dalai Lama's visit to Mongolian territories.. However, the Dalai Lama was followed by thousands of Mongol Buddhists. This showed that the Mongols had a robust Buddhist religious connection among themselves (Mishigish 2012: 42).

This time also gave an opportunity for those thousands of Mongols, from various Mongolian territories to assemble together and to discuss their economic and political lives under the Qing Dynasty, which by this time was no longer a strong hold in the Mongolian territory. During this time, the Mongols became aware of the Russian and Chinese intrusion into their lands. These huge get togethers became a platform where all the Mongols could come together and exhibit their nationalistic feelings. At that time Dalai Lama's political refuge in magnolia was being closely monitored by Russia and China. More significantly, the Dalai Lama's esteemed religious effect on the Mongols must have had some influence on the policy of its neighbors towards Mongolia and its Buddhism. Perhaps, this aided external powers to become aware of the importance of Buddhism to be used as a tool to bring in their interests among t the Mongols and in their territories (Mishigish 2012: 42-43).

Historically, Buryat was taken over by Buddhism via Outer Mongolia and Tibet in the seventeenth century. Since then there were robust religious links of Buryats with both Urga and Lhasa. With Russian force strengthening and with the expansion of their interests, a few Buryat intellectual lamas tried to build a kingdom of Buddhist-

orientation , exemplifying their cultural and religious unity. Agvan Dorjeev was one of these intellectuals, who visualized a Mongol-Tibet Buddhist state led by the Dalai Lama (Rupen 964: 106). The idea was to build a powerful Buddhist state in Central and East Asia.Pan-Buddhism idea of Agvan Dorjeev was an expansion of Pan-Mongolism, but Tibet was added to the Mongol areas and there would be religious unification between the two nations.

Later, the Japanese propagated the idea of Pan-Buddhism, when over 70,000troops were sent by them to aid Admiral Kolchak in his counter-revolutionary campaign against the Bolsheviks in Siberia. Rupen opined that Agvan Dorjeev and Tserenpil , the two leading Buryat Buddhist leaders were supporters of Kolchak. In order to resist the socialist and revolutionary movements among the Buryats Agvan Dorjeev was paid a handsome monthly amount of 20,000 rubles by the Kolchaks (Rupen 964: 106). Since the Japanese funded the Kolchak regime, the activities of Khambo Lama Agvan Dorjeev's were also sponsored by the Japanese indirectly. This was done to win over the Buryat Mongols and separate them from Russia by incorporating them into the greater Pan-Mongolism initiative modeled on a Buddhist and nomadic culture. The Japanese for the first time tried to extend the propaganda of 'Asia for the Asiatics' including the local Buryat Mongols.

Phillips was of the opinion that, all Japanese agents were Buddhist monks, perhaps disguised as Mongol lamas. Phillips states, "Japanese agents, often Buddhist lama priests, went around the tribes preaching that Japan was heaven and the Japanese troops were divine avengers of earthly injustice and wickedness…" (Phillips 1942: 27). This powerful affirmation was warranted by a mysterious Buddhist prophecy of the Army of *Shambala* (Mon: *Shambal*; Tib: *Tyan-p'yogskyi Sam-bha-la*). The original idea of *Shambala*is that the Great King *Eregden Dagbo*, who resided in his Buddha-land *Shambala*, which existed in the far northern space, would someday descend to earth to destroy evil and promote the Dharma or the teachings of the Buddha. Interestingly, this mysterious prophecy was then re-interpreted by the Japanese that heaven *Shambala* was located in the east, in the land of Japan, and the Japanese troops as the Army of *Shambala* came to defeat 'heretics and atheists', meaning Bolsheviks, and to restore order. Finally, all the 'evils' would be wrecked by Rising Sun troops and all Buddhists would be empowered (Phillips 1942: 69).

However, the Semenov were favored more by than the Japanese by the Buryats because of familiarity of Russian culture politics that was built over two centuries. The Japanese, a year later made efforts in building a 'Pan-Mongol movement', which was to re-establish a 'Great Mongol' Empire or 'Mongol Proper'. During this time, the interest of the Japanese were more in Pan-Mongolia rather than Pan-Buddhism. It was clear that Japan wanted to propagate nationalism amongthe Mongols by manipulating Buddhism but *not* to build a Buddhist state. Semenov in this regard took the initiative in bringing together a group of Inner Mongols and Buryats in Chita, Siberia. There were five representatives from Inner Mongolia, six from Buryat Mongolia, and four from Eastern Mongolia (extending into Manchuria) who attended the congregation. Sutusi, the Japanese Major Sutsui, an adviser for Semenov and Semenov actively participated in the conference. However, there was no one to participate from Outer Mongolia in the meeting because of both foreign pressure and domestic hesitance (Mishigish 2012: 43).

The main agenda of the conference was that it formulated the Pan-Mongolian State Government's first Constitution and it was decided unanimously that Japan, because its powerful Buddhist tradition and military power, would be the foremost external protector of the newly formed state. It was promised by Semenov that he would furnish one million rubles for the new government along with military weapons for the new Mongolian army. But Sememno failed in doing so due to the costly civil war with the Red Army.. Semenov sans the Japanese aid was not able to carry out his promises. Japan on the other hand hesitated to continue its help of Semenov because to its own economic hindrances, most notably its inability to supply arms in Manchuria. This, was coupled by the external pressure by the Chinese and ultimately it led ot the failure of the Pan-Mongolia plan. The newly formed government's enduring effort to attract the Jebtsun Damba for religious and political leadership of a newly unified Mongol nation-state resulted in vain.(Mishigish 2012: 44)

There was suspicion in the Jebtsun Damba of Urguu regarding Semenov and some Buryat leaders ever since the establishment of Pan-Mongolian State. It was clear nn the one hand, that the presence of the Outer Mongolian leadership was important for the new government to last long . On the other hand, the political situation seemed

quite complex as only Japan aided the new government and a makeshift conglomerate of former Tsarist (White) Russians, while both the Bolshevik Russians and the Chinese warlords opposed this initiative. It was obvious for the Chinese to robustly pressurize the Jebtsun Damba to not to be a part of the government.

The Japanese agents were granted permission to travel without being stopped throughout Western Buryat . Even after the Buryat Republic was established under the Soviet rule, the monetary and ideological influence of the Japanese still remained. The allegiances of the Buryats were not to be trusted quite often as they were known during this time to play with the sides of Red vs. White Russian revolution and counter-revolution. According to Phillips many imperative Government officials of the Buryat-Mongol Soviet Republic were in fact Japanese agents, the Bolshevik Party Secretary Yerbanov and some members of the People's Commissars were also included. Phillips further says:

> "Throughout western Buryat-Mongolia, where the Buddhist church was still strong, Japan spread her propaganda by means of lama monks. The propaganda was of two kinds: one for the dispossessed upper layers of the old regime, and one for the still superstitious elements of the Buryat peasantry" (Philips 1942: 68).

It can be easily read from the above account that Japan attempted to lure and prejudice monks of high class and noble families vanquished by the Russians, and then make the common men hopeful of the formation of a new state would harness prosperity in Buddhism, their traditional religion.

As the new Pan-Mongolian regime did not receive much support from the Jebtsun Damba, the most imperative person of the new government was Neisse Gegen, the most popular reincarnated Buddhist lama of Inner Mongolia, who lead the government for a short span. A delegation to the Paris Peace Conference was sent by Neisse Gegen to gain global recognition for the recently built regime (Rupen 1964: 135). However, the prupose of this delegation was not successful. Not only this but the Pan-Mongol Government was not able to secure any assistance from the Khalkha Mongols of Outer Mongolia who were their brothers. Seeing this the Japanese

withdrew their support. This time the Gegen himself tried to re-establish link with the Japanese, but in vain. This was followed by the collapse of the Pan-Mongol Government and The Gegen was kidnapped and killed by the Chinese soon after.

But, this was not the end, and in 1920 the Japanese tried again.Baron von Ungern-Sternberg, a high-ranking officer of Semenov was assisted financially and armed by the Japanese and was sent to Urguu, where he declared to remake a Great Mongol State with the help of the Japanese. The JebtsunDamba was under house-arrest , put by the Baron and was forced to accept his puppet government named 'Ikh Mongol' (Great Mongol). XuShuzheng, the Chinese warlord simultaneously grabbed Urguu and ended the Jebtsun Dmaba governme. Interestingly, from the JebtsunDamba himself to the ordinary people, the Mongols much favored the Baron since he was the key figure who freed Outer Mongolia from Chinese colonization. For his victory over the Chinese, the JebtsunDamba awarded the Baron with the title of a Buddhist reincarnation (Mishigish 2012: 45).

The order of Ungern-Sternberg's to his officers shows that he was guided by Ataman Semenov and they were both receiving help from the Japanese (Phillips 1942: 35). But , the Baron's government quickly estranged the Mongols and it collapsed soon . The Baron's regime fell primarily due to the economic exploitation of first the Russian expatriate community in Urguu in which all the wealth of the expatriate community was take away by the Baron, and second, economic misuse of the Mongols themselves. Hence, the Mongol sentiment for the Baron quickly disappearedr as soon as he roseto power. Soon, the absence of Mongol support led to the defeat of Unger-Sternberg's troops by the Soviet Red Army. In 1922, he was captured and executed by the Soviet militia in the Western Mongol region. Although this ended Japan's attempt in building a Pan-Mongolian state in Buryat and Outer Mongolia; however, Japan's did not give up (Mishigish 2012: 45).

The Second Period of Japan's Policy for Mongol Nationalism and Buddhism

Inner Mongolia in the 1930s and 1940s fell into three zones for practical political purposes. Stretching from Jehol north to the Soviet border, the Japanese into the client state of Manchukuo incorporated the eastern region, . The western region comprised mainly of the Chinese provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan. Though the cChinese had

control over these provinces in reality the Japanese heavily dominated it. A robust effort for self-determination was made by Prince Demchugdongrob (Prince De).

Japanese interest in the Mongols was mainly due to the territory they usurped —an area that would be important geopolitically in case a conflict arose with either the Soviet Union or China. The Mongol lands served as a potential base for military strategies northwards or southwards and as well as a potential buffer against Soviet or Chinese counterattacks. Inner Mongolia's eastern part was strategically imperative as was the nearest to the Manchurian plain, where the Japanese since the early twentieth century had been creating powerful strategic and economic interests since. The area was important politically too. It was the belief of the Japanese that if they were victorious on getting the aid of the Mongols there, they were that they would get the support and sympathy from Mongols living in those regions controlled by China and the Soviet Union. What worried Japan was also the cost that would be incurred in controlling Inner Mongolia personnel or administrative wise. Due to this, they looked forward to a regime in the region that would be mostly acceptable to the Mongols that would be economically self-sufficient, and that would even contribute to the war effort. These three goals were in some respects contradictory. If they won the acceptance of the Mongols it meant adjusting to prevailing Mongol institutions, however, economic self-sufficiency in wartime meant imperative economic, social and institutional changes. Policy of the Japanese could not r really manage to settle e this contradiction (Narangoa 2003: 492).

'Banners'—administrative units controlled by hereditary princes —and the Buddhist monasteries were the two Mongol institutions, which were of prime importance at that time. To Japanese in order to get support of the princes, made repeated signals — which of course were never serious —that they would give some level of Mongolian independence or at least autonomy of degree under the Japanese. The princes of Inner Mongolia post the independence of Outer Mongolia in 1911 hoped to achieve independence for themselves too. However, the princes believed that the Chinese were a hindrance to their ambition as the borders of Inner Mongolia were close to Beijing the Mongol lands had a huge Chinese population in the Mongol lands. Given these circumstances, Japan was seen as a natural ally by them. But Japan's general imperial goals and its relationship with China constrained it from supporting

Mongolia's independence. Japan's policy concerning China was complex. In a sense it meant trying to convince the local Chinese that rather than the communists or the GMD, Japan was a better custodian of their interests. The hesitance from the Japanese in giving independence was also because it was aware that most of China's political elite left and right, believed that the Mongol areas were owned by the Chinese (Narangoa 2003: 493).

Hence, winning the Mongolian Buddhism support was imperative for the Japnese Almost all the Mongols practiced Buddhism and each household wanted to send at least one son into the monastic system. In every level of society the Buddhist monks played an imperative social role, especially in the field of health care and education. Japan's offered Buddhism support and patronage so that the Mongolian Buddhists would be happy with the Japanese presence and in return hoped that there would be no resistance resistance or hostility to Japan from the monasteries. The Japanese realized very strongly the influence the Buddhist monks had over the princes and believed that the best way to avoid resistance by the princes would be if the monks remained sympathetic to Japan. Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia societies were both multiethnic: The population of Manchuko population was mostly Chinese but with noticeable presence of Mongol, Japanese, Korean, and Manchu minorities. Inner Mongolia consisted of Mongol, Chinese and Muslim communities, whose relative significance depended on where the political borders were drawn. Japanese rhetoric in both Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo therefore emphasized the harmony of the distinct ethnic groups and claimed to guarantee their cultural autonomy. In the case of the Mongols in Manchukuo, this autonomy was formalized in the Xing'an Office, a separate administration for the Mongol regions (Narangoa 2003: 494).

Some Japanese authorities also saw Buddhism as a potential tool for the economic and social change of Mongol society. Orthodox Buddhist practices, they thought, were important hindrances to the modernization of Mongol society, but they were of the belief that Mongolian Buddhism was compliant to reform and they were pretty sure that Buddhist institutions, if brought into line with 'modern' and Japanese practice, could become both a medium for the modernization of Mongol society and tool of mobilizing Mongols in aid of the war effort. Hence, Modernization was another constituent in the political strategy of Japan in the region. Like how they did

in China, the Japanese made use of their own success in rapid modernization at home to present them as the force best able to deliver modernity to other Asian peoples. Dealing with Mongolian Buddhism was an important part of this strategy because of Buddhism's potential both for blocking and for facilitating social and economic change. In other words, the Japanese advocated reform within Mongolian Buddhism so as to make it a more potent tool for Japanese interests. With regards to this, the Japanese experience with Buddhism in Inner Mongolia was comparable to its later encounter with Islam in Indonesia and Malaya, as we will see below. In these areas, the vast majority of the indigenous population practiced Islam, as Buddhism in Mongolia. The Japanese in both the cases saw religion as an important key to reaching their aims (Narangoa 2003: 494).

The Japanese wanted to reform Mongolian Buddhism on basis that an empathy between Mongolian and Japanese Buddhism existed, but their policies were mainly built on calculation that reforms in Mongolian Buddhism would aid in to modernizing the Mongolian society and that it would contribute more significantly to the war effort.

However, the Japanese had ambitions for Manchukuo and these needed them to get involved with Mongolian Buddhism. Japanese authorities constructed a worldview in which Japan was to be the agent for the modernization of the rest of Asia and they regarded Manchukuo as an opportunity to devise a blueprint for this modernization process. The development strategy of the Japanese, which was multifaceted, included the construction of infrastructure in Manchukuo and the mobilization of its people as well. For the Japanese, it was imperative that the people's energies be used productively, both directly in aid of the war effort and generally for the sake of development. Japanese development ideology highlighted on both technical development — new varieties of crops and livestock, new industrial production techniques and so on—and increased effort. The Japanese believed that their hard work and discipline had got them their achievements and hencelaziness, indiscipline, inefficiency, and lack of direction were significant hindrances to economic development in the rest of Asia. They dominated the territories throughout, therefore, not only in Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia but later also in Southeast Asia, the Japanese all the time accentuated that other Asian societies would get great things

only if they acknowledged the want for decorum and hard work and on the Japanese model (Narangoa 2003: 496).

With the war emerging in China the need for raw materials for production increased along with the demand for human resources to fight and this gave the Japanese another reason to make the Mongols (and other Asians as well) work. In all the societies encountered by the Japanese social forms and practices were sought after by them as they believed that they could develop a spirit of and hard work. Buddhism's power was felt in the Mongolian society with strong conviction that it provides discipline and moral robustness to the Mongols. As a result they not only supported traditional Buddhist activities but also propagated the idea of utilizing Buddhist monks as chaplains for armed units and other official and semiofficial organizations as they employed Japanese monks as chaplains in the Japanese Army (Narangoa 2003: 496).

In order to mobilize the people of Manchukuo to aid the creation of a new state, a propaganda campaign was launched by Japan's Kwantung Army, starting in the second half of the 1930s, to put forth Manchukuo to the Mongols in terms of Buddhist doctrine. They asserted that Pu Yi, the former Qing emperor, who was placed as an emperor of Manchukuo by the Japanese , was Manjusri Boddhisatva of Wutaishan's reincarnation (Mountain of the Five Terraces) and the creation of heaven was that (Narangoa 2003: 497).

To the Japanese Buddhism was also imperative to be used as a defense against communism. Traces of communist influences were seen by the Japanese military in Japan itself. Manchukuo, Korea and the Mongol lands as a dangerous indication as it went crossed national and ethnic boundaries. According to them it was risky, that Soviet hegemony of the MPR would be a medium for the infiltration of communist influences into Inner Mongolia and on into Manchukuo. More so after the Soviet-inspired purges of leading politicians and monks in the MPR began in the late 1920s, Mongolian Buddhism was seen by the Japanese as a authentic bulwark against communist influence. Hopes of good will towards Japan in Outer Mongolia were seen if Buddhism was patronized. This later could help Japan in their imperial plans (Narangoa 2003: 497).

Eventually, Buddhism was seen by the Japanese authorities as a bridge to create a special alliance between Mongolia and Japan making religious brotherhood as a solid base. Japan's dominant religion was Buddhism, and it was hope by the Japanese that a sense of shared religious belief would evoke sympathetic feeling among the Mongols towards Japan.

Reform of Mongolian Buddhism in Manchukuo

Japan's proposition to utilize Mongolian Buddhism in the aforementioned techniques needed alterations in Buddhist institutions and practice. The aim of these reforms was make sure that Mongolian Buddhist institutions was not a hindrance to modernization and to use the institutions' strengths to the fullest to bring about development. These reforms involved decreasing the number of monks, moulding the monasteries into a medium for health care and modern education, and enfeeble the linkage between Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhism.

Mokobukkyo which meant Mongolian Buddhism by the Japanese, were complicated and, even conficting. In the eyes of many Japanese officials and researchers, Mongolian Buddhism had deteriorated into antique superstition that hindered the construction of a modern society in Manchukuo. They especially felt that the lamas were like leeches on the rest of Mongol society and the labor force of the monks showed an important untapped human resource. It was said that the Mongolian clergy comprised of about half of the adult male population. Since the monks were exempted from both military and economic responsibilities, they were considered useless for economic progress defence of Manchukuo by the Japanese authorities. Hence, the Japanese wanted to mobilize this 'unproductive' labor force. In actuality, the level of participation in the monasteries was probably much more modest. In 1934, a survey was conducted that indicated that 4 per cent of the population of the Xing'an provinces lived in monasteries, rising as high as 13 per cent in Northern Xing'an (Hulunbuir). However, the Japanese believed that monkhood was a significant drain on Inner Mongolia's resources. The Japanese were aware, however, that it would not be easy to release this ''unproductive' labor. They became aware that they would alienate the Mongols if they publicly showed their unflattering opinions or if they marched too swiftly to make reforms (Narangoa 2003: 498).

In general, there was selective retort of the Mongol leaders in Manchukuo to Japan's reform efforts. They were content with the bringing of of modern amenities like as health care and medical training and they were not averse to broadening of the education system and the propagation of Mongol culture. However, more strictly and especially on doctrinal issues, the politicians and the Mongolian lamas saw meager grounds to amend their rooted practices and beliefs at the wishes of the Japanese. Hence, the Japanese idea to exterminate the celibacy of Mongolian lamas and instead permit lamas to marry as Japanese Buddhist priests do was entirely declined by the Mongols. The lamas only in some cases were forced to do physical work like coal mining. Even then, the Mongol leaders avoided direct confrontation with the mighty Japanese authorities. More so, a lot of reforms put forth by the Japanese had in fact been discussed within the Mongolian Buddhist circles since earlier in the century (Narangoa 2003: 501).

Despite their orthodox inclinations, a lot of Mongolian leaders realised that Mongolian Buddhism could not be perpetuated in its conventional form if the Mongols wanted to make a modern nation and find their spot in the new world order. For example, the idea of recognizing the reincarnation of the eighth Jebtsundamba Khutuktu was not supported by Prince De and he resisted the enthroning of a new NoyanKhutuktu, whose reincarnation the Japanese had found next to the border with Outer Mongolia. He and other enlightened Mongolian intellectuals, aware of past political manipulation of reincarnations by the Manchu emperors, did not wish to be manipulated again by the Japanese. More so, if the Japanese proposal for bringing the 9th JebtsundambaKhutuktu to Inner Mongolia had been successful , the Japanese would have been able to bypass the prevailing Mongolian leaders and utilize him as a medium to secure their own influence over the Mongol society. Immediately, this would have ended the hopes of creating a Mongol state in Inner Mongolia. The want of Prince De and the other Mongolian leaders was to unify the Mongols using their religion, but they did not wish the religious authorities to be powerful than the secular polity, especially if ' other people 'intended to control religion" (Narangoa 2003: 508).

In 1931, the three eastern provinces of Northeastern China were invaded by Japan and were declared independent from China under the name of Manchukuo. The size

and strategic position of the territory populated by Mongols in Manchuria gave the Mongols a greater advantage over other ethnic groups in the region when dealing with the Japanese. A former Inner Mongolian province was also annexed by the Japanese in 1933 and they moved further into the western part of Inner Mongolia. In the absence of an active Mongol policy, Japan's continental continental expansion in Inner Asia could not be completed. The in order to win Mongo support the Japanese chose Mongol Buddhism to be their most favored one. In the long run, this Japanese policy was intended to attract the Khalkha Mongols via the Inner and Eastern Mongols whilst further distancing them from Soviet influence. The implementation and the policy itself of Pan-Mongolism became quite aggressive in Inner Mongolia in the 1930s. The Inner Mongolian nationalist movement was manipulated and the Khalkha refugees (who had escaped from Mongolian communist rule) was exploited by the Japanese, and they tried to stop Outer Mongolia from being ideologically and economically influenced by the Soviets (Mishigish 2012: 45).

The Inner Mongolian nationalist movement was divided into two groups , one supported by the Chinese Communists which was Ulanfu Group and Pa'I Yun-t'I group who collaborated with Chiang Kai-shek. Prince Demchugdongrob, also known as Te Wang was one of the leaders of the group who supported Kuomintang. Tlast Prince of the *Altan Urag* was Prince Te, the Golden Clan of Chinggis Khan. He was born in the Sunid Right Banner of Inner Mongolia. Prince Te was the first person with whom the Japanese contacted during the early days of Japanese expansion into Inner Mongolia. Sasame Tsueno who was also a Japanese Buddhist monk, brought a letter from General Matsui Iwane and General Hayashi Senjuro to Prince Te. The letter explained Japan's desire to help the Mongols gain their independence with the help of Japan (Mishigish 2012: 45).

The Japanese Special Service Officers and the Good Neighbor Association (*ZenrinKyokai*) carried out Japanese activities in Inner and Manchurian Mongols .The association was created based on Sasame Tsuneo's idea , which was formally established in 1933 with the aid of General Hayashi Senjuro and MazumoroKoryo. The Association looked after other educational and cultural (religious) programs besides conducting intelligence work,. There was more than one branch of the

Association in various banners of Inner Mongolia. The Good Neighbor Association in collaboration with the local administrative offices sent a number of Mongolian students, including some monks, to Japan to study. Even Te Wang sent his eldest son to Tokyo to receive education in 1939.

During the early days of the Manchurian occupation, the young lamas were forced by the Japanese to serve in its military in Manchuria. However, it soon dawned on them that this was not a good move, as any anti-Buddhist activity would work against their policy and the Mongols would be driven away from the Japanese. In this situation the Mongols of Manchuria were equally important as the Mongols of Inner Mongolia with regards to their role in Japan's further expansion into Continental North/Inner Asia. They had the option of disfavouring Japan if at any time they felt disaffected by Japanese policy. They could well side with Outer Mongolia or China and this would be a source of perpetual threat to the increasing strategic interest of Japan's expansion and territorial dominance in the region. Hence, , Chinese immigration into the Mongol territory was prohibited by the Japanese and worked towards strengthening Mongol support by treating its religion in a more 'special' way. Hence, when Inner Mongolia was invaded by Japan, it made use of a more friendly policy towards the monasteries and the lamas. Due to political influences of monasteries in Mongol areas, the Japanese pursued a policy to '*Japanize*' Mongol Buddhism.

Gubler is of the opinion the legitimacy given to the Pan-Buddhist movement in Asia was by the founding of the 'Buddhist Association of Japan and Mongolia' *(Nichi Mo Bukkyokai*) in 1938 in Tokyo. Later, this association was reorganized as a more inclusive organization named 'The Buddhist Association of Asia under Japanese Leadership' (Gubler 1968: 28). There was another association called 'Association for a Good Neighborhood' (*ZenrinKyokai*) that did important scholarly works on Mongolian religion and culture. Apart from these, a lot of research work and study projects were carried out by government funded associations and some religious sects. On this Jagchid (1999) provides a clear account stating:

> "This Japanification policy was run by the Koyazan sect, with roots in the Japanese Shinganshu sect. Koyazan was a tantric Buddhist sect that had many similarities to the esoteric Buddhism of Tibet; it dispatched many monks to visit Mongolian monasteries and conduct research into Mongolian religious beliefs and practices" (Jagchid 1999: 271).

A different Japanese Buddhist sect that took on the religious policy of Mongol Buddhist reform was *Omoto-kyo*. A Buddhist priest named Ideguchi who was intelligent as well led this group. This was formed during the Meiji period, Katsumi opined that Ideguchi was the head of the group and had a missionary plan to spread the teachings of the Omoto-kyo sect among the Mongols. Similarly, Higashi Honganji was another individual who wanted to spreadthe religious teachings religious missionary . While studying Buddhism in Mongolia, Honganji became a lama of Mongolian Buddhism.

Gubler (1968) also highlights that a lot of Japanese Buddhist priests resided in Mongol monasteries, learned the Mongolian language, and dressed as Mongol lamas.The belief that some Japanese Buddhist monks lived in Mongol monasteries temporarily and pretended to be Mongol lamas was actually reinforced to be true by Katsumi in 1999. The activities of the Buddhist monasteries and temples were observed and these monks did surveys. The 'missionary' work obviously was seen more in scholarly works and gathering of rather than religious conversion.

Japan after having carefully studied the Mongol religion and culture led their Buddhist propaganda, which forced the local people to accept certain aspects of Japanese culture. It was obvious in this case that Japanese Buddhism was the tool that worked to influence Mongol culture and religion. During Japans early expansion days, the Ministry of Education of the Japanese government funded the research works, which were extensive in nature. In the later years during the war, organizations as the Manchuria Ethnology Association set up in 1941 funded the research projects and funding was also done by the Northwest Institute established in 1943; both these organizations were situated in Manchuria. Katsumi (1999) opined that, a lot of researchers made their way to Inner Mongolia and Manchuria to conduct a number of research projects and they were dispatched by the Ethnological

Institute, which was funded by the Japanese Navy and Army. It seems that this process of utilizing Mongol Buddhism for collecting information by the Japanese continued, which shows that this policy was organized and a deliberate one throughout its lifespan.

The Japanese faced difficulty in trying to foist their new religious reform policy on those lamas who were of higher rank and influence, which were not ready to accept the promotion of Japanese Buddhism as a superior sect of the Buddhist faith, which was a Japanese propaganda. Hence, the Japanese instead decided to recruit young lamas who were in their twenties and send themfor religious education and training to Japan. They were sent to Shingon University at Mt. Koya, where they studied various religious subjects of Shingon Buddhism. It was called *Koa MikkyoGakuin*, school for young lamas. The course was for a period of three years and the curriculum had instruction in every single thing right from an elementary Japanese language program to complicated religious content and training (Gubler 1968: 47). The expectations from these young lamas were that they would go back to Mongolia and bring about reformation in Mongol Buddhism.

Due to their limited ability (mainly due to language and cultural differences) to teach Mongolians in Japan at the time, the number of Mongol students sent to Japan for Buddhist training was relatively small. The local government services in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria recruited those who qualified. As an example, only thirty young lamas from Manchuria were enrolled in the program in 1934 (Gubler 1968: 49). The majority of these students returned earlier than expected. For various reasons, the dropout rate among the Mongol students was roughly thirty percent. Those who remained for two or three years completed the program, with a few continuing their studies conducting research in Japan after completing the three-year program. However, the outcomes of the religious reform policy of the Mongols did not live up to the expectations of the Japanese. As Jagchid (1999) mentions, most of the lamas who went to Japan did not change their religious beliefs; the number of students was insignificant and the length of the program was not sufficient enough to convince these young lamas to change their religious values and day-to-day practices. The cultural and linguistic difficulties while in Japan, coupled with the lack of an incentive to reform their own understanding of Buddhism led to the failure of this

religious “study abroad” program.

Similar practices and teachings were shared by Mongol Buddhism and Shingon sectarian Buddhism. Regardless these similarities, the leaders of local Buddhist monastic institutions resisted the Japanese priests. These institutions were against any kind of reform to the traditional religious way of life. The more the Japanesetried to put forth their reform policy the more resistance they faced from the higher Mongol lamas, who wanted the protective side of Japan’s reform policy, rather than the ‘purification’ elements of it.

In May 1943, the ‘Second Conference for the Restoration of Mongolian Buddhism’ took place in Kalgan (today’s *Hohot*, the capital city of Inner Mongolia). A year earlier The First Conference had taken place and it was not productive and had meager significance. The Second Conference was attended by the local officials, high-ranking lamas, and chief Japanese advisors; their primary aim was to circumvent Japanese involvement in religious affairs and to highlight the significance of the traditional religious system. The conference’s goal was to set up the Secretariat Office of Lamas’ Affairs (*Lama-yin TamgynGazar*) to manage and regulate religious issues. Most influential Mongol reincarnations and high lamas made up the office. Interestingly, YukeiKogan, a Japanese military officer was appointed to the post of advisor to the Secretariat Office. YukeiKogan was the head of the local intelligence bureau and a Buddhist monk (Jagchid 1999: 297). The outcome of the conference was rather symbolic than practical given that those Mongol lamas who were influential wanted their religious affairs to be run as independently as possible and in a traditional way without the spiritual authority being compromised.

During the ‘Japanification’ of Mongol Buddhism, diverse Buddhist sects both Mongol (to a lesser degree) and Japanese led forth wide reaching education and training programs to bring about ‘cultural unification’ with the aim of making more powerful Japan’s new order in East Asia. In the summer of 1940, along with the Buddhist reforms, the Japanese brought Shintoism to the newly occupied territories as well and Changchun was one of them, the capital of Manchukuo where the spirit of *Amaterasu Omikami* was transferred, and a new Shinto shrine was built to exemplify Japan’s dominance over Manchukuo. The purpose of puting in other races

as subjects of Japan, along with compassion for Buddhism, was included into the expansion policy of Japan . Hence, Japan's religious policy towards the Mongols was well prepared as diverse religious groups were involved actively (Mishigish 2012: 48).

Post 1937, the Japanese made further advancement in Inner Mongolia advocating a 'renaissance of Buddhism', which attempted to reorganize Buddhist monasteries. This propaganda also included a declaration of a 'Holy War' against Communism (Rupen 1964: 227). Most of the influential lamas supported this Japanese policy and this was actually done to change the monastic institutions structure and the way do the life of their monks. For, e.g. , Japanese monks worked to make the Mongol lamas engage in farming. To the livestock handling Mongols this was surprisingly unusual and contradictory to their spiritual teaching and daily life rituals and practices.

Historically, the most interesting and important mission the Japanese aimed at doing was looking for the next reincarnation of the 8th Jebtsun Damba, the spiritual leader of all Mongols. If they were successful in this mission, the Japanese could have considerably profited in assuring the Mongols that they had the right to influence Mongol Buddhism. The support of the 13th Dalai Lama was sought by the Japanese to assure Mongol lamas and lay Buddhists of their intentions:

> "In the worst class is the manner of working among the Red [Communist] people. They do not allow search to be made for the new Incarnation of the Grand Lama of Urga. They have seized and taken away all the sacred objects from the monasteries. They have made monks to work as soldiers. They have broken religion, so that not even the name of it remains." (Rupen 1964: 228).

This kind of dominant statement of Tibetan and Mongol religious leaders became the core-guiding principal for the Japanese in their search of the 9thJebtsunDamba in Tibet. But with the demise of the 8thJebtsun Damba in 1924 all hindrances for the Mongolian People's Party (MPP – Communist Party of the People's Republic of Mongolia) were removed and the socialist regime in Outer Mongolia was strengthened further. This ended the powerful economic, political, and religious spot

of Mongol Buddhism in Outer Mongolia. That same year, it was announced by the Outer Mongolian MPP Government that there would be no further reincarnation of the Jebtsun Damba in Mongolia. Since the sixth century, all Mongols had looked towards Urguu, the capital city of Outer Mongolia as called before 1924, and specially the JebtsunDamba for political and spiritual leadership (the revolutionary government changed the name of the capital city of Mongolia to Ulaanbaatar, literally meaning Red Hero, in 1924).

Hence, Mongol Buddhism's unification ability to bring together the scattered Mongol tribes was known and the 9thJebtsunDamba reincarnate would be the only political figure who would be able to bring all the Mongols together. Hence, procuring the ninth reincarnation would give the Japanese massive religious and political dominance over the Mongols. As a result, in the quest to find a new reincarnation a group of influential lamas and Japanese advisors were sent to Lhasa.. The most influential lama among the delegates was the Dilowa Khutukhtu, a reincarnate lama of the highest order of Outer Mongolia (he escaped the Communist oppression of Buddhism in Mongolia in the 1930s and defected to Inner Mongolia after nearly being executed by the communist authorities in Outer Mongolia). Spiritual counseling to the Mongol Buddhist and Japanese plan of procuring the 9th reincarnate of the JebtsunDamba was offered by the 13th Dalai Lama. Jagchid (1999) highlights the entire 1935 journey to Lhasa and its greater plan of implementation was financed by the Japanese (Jagchid 1999: 271). But, the pan to look for the 9th Jebtsun Damba was unsuccessful due to the robust resistance from the Outer Mongolian government as well as the Chinese and some Inner Mongolian nationalist leaders, such as Te Wang. Perhaps as a corollary of this search, so as to attract the Mongols the Tibetan authorities found the 9thJebtsunDamba.

The issue was so belittled that time that no attention was paid to it either by any external power or the Japanese as well. The Japanese in 1942, professed in Outer Mongolia, the reincarnation of another high lama, the NoyonKhutuktuDanzanravjaa, who was a highly influential reincarnate lama in southern Mongolia. The reason for in doing so by Japan's is very interesting. He was placedat one of the finest Inner Mongolian Temples on the border with Outer Mongolia by the Japanese (Jagchid

1999: 271). But, he was not able to attract much of the Mongols of Outer Mongolia under his political influence as he held less spiritual leverage. The ones who were truly happy to have a new reincarnate were only the local Inner Mongols because it brought a purely spiritual importance to them at the local level.

The Japanese by the late 1930's and early 1940's, brought about reforms in education, organization/structure in Mongol Buddhism so that their economic, political, and territorial interests could be developed in the region. They wanted to bring about reformation in Mongol Buddhism by re-educating young Mongol lamas in Japan and Mongol territory. Then they sought to make changes in hierarchical structure of the Mongol Buddhist church by setting up a new oversight office, and then they wanted to influence the search and political/religious positions of key reincarnates such as the JebtsunDambaKhutukhtu, the DilowaKhutukhtu, and the NoyonKhutukhtu. However, in the end because of the regional nature of Mongol Buddhism, a religion regional in nature that crossed political boundaries, the Bolsheviks consolidation of power in Russia and the Mongolian People's Party in Outer Mongolia, and the confusion at that time in China, the Japanese policy of utilizing Buddhism to put forward its interests manifested to be too manifold and the consolidation of political power in the region became unmanageable .

It can be said that in the early twentieth century, Buddhism in Mongolia played a very important part in fostering nationalism amongst various ethnic groups of the Mongols. The Mongols developed nationalist movements throughout Buryat, Eastern (Manchurian), Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia in reaction to Russian, Chinese and later Japanese strategic interests and territorial expansions, These nationalist movements developed parallel with Japan's intrusion in Inner Asia and they, to a large extent, manipulated such movements and even fostered them for their political and cultural policies towards the local Mongols in the 1920s and 1930s.

Japanese attempt to solve the Mongol question in Manchuria in the context of Pan-Mongolism

In the 1930s, when Manchukuo was established, the Japanese found it convenient once more to foster Pan-Mongolism, and it is apparent that the idea had grown into a potent political movement, counteracting Chinese pressure on the Mongols from the south, and Russian pressure from the north. Buriat leaders embraced it as a means of fighting russification, and Inner Mongolian leaders (e.g. Teh Wang), to fight sinification. The Japanese thus attempted to exploit it in both directions, against the Soviet Union and against China (Rupen 1956: 392). Apparently the Japanese were cognizant of the advantages in promotinga pan Mongol movement. The Japanese attempted to use the Mongols as a basis for frustrating Chinese and Russian aims in Asia. Dismissing the possibility of a concerted Japanese effort toward a Pan-Mongol movement, there were, however, some Japanese officers who felta Pan-Mongolian state, supported by Japan, would effect exclusion of Bolshevism in Outer Mongolia. Nonetheless , in 1931 the Japanese were in a favourable position to use the Mongols as allies against future confrontation with China and Soviet Russia.

Perhaps, the takeover of Manchuria on september 18, 1931 and the subsequent occupation of eastern Mongolia the following year had given the militarists another opportunity to fullfill their dream of a Pan-Mongolian state and thus continent power beyond Manchukuo. Obviously Japanese policy was not to limit Japan's hegemony over the Mongols to Eastern Mongolia itself; its aim was to include 'all Mongolia, which would give them [the Japanese] an enormous leverage in any policy towards either Russia or china.' (Lattimore 1934: 139).

The very fact that Japan had established an 'autonomous' Mongol province in Eastern Mongolia was suggestive to the idea of a Pan-Mongolian state under Japanese control. Such a policy was antithesis to Russian aims. Besides, China would not condone such a move. However, a possible Japanese willingness to surrender Eastern Mongolia to a Pan-Mongolian state is reported by Fisher in 1936 as follows :

"The writer related that he had heard near the borders of Inner Mongolia rumors that Japanese agents were riding about among the Mongol tribes urging their princes to declare InnerMongolia Independent. If they fell in with the project, accordingo the rumors, the Japanese-sponsored state of Manchukuowas

ready to make them a handsome gift in the form of nearly fourth of its own territory, the entire western province of Hsingan, where many Mongols already live under theJapanese domination. the Tokyo official [unnamed] did much more than merely confirm the rumor." "Certainly Manchukuo stands ready at any time to handover Hsingan to an independent Mongolia, he affirmed. "Observe that the government of Mongol provinces never has been made an integral part of the government of Manchukuo. Its administration is quite separate, under a Mongol prince. So that it could be conveniently and painlessly detached at any necessary time."

But such an independent Mongolian state ought to include much more than Inner Mongolia. It should not only incude Outer Mongolia but also the Buryat Republic (in Siberia). Those Mongol populations must be inevitably drawn by the magnetism of the independent regime in Inner Mongolia and of the liberated Mongols now living in Manchukuo. (H. E. Fisher, 'Russia Faces Japan on Vast Asian Front', New York Times (April 5, 1936), p. 5)

Lattimore asserts that had the Japanese created a Mengkukuo, or 'independent Mongol Nation', made up Eastern Mongolia and Chinese Inner Mongolia they could have established Mengkukuo as the training ground for a pan-Mongol movement, aiming at the conquest of Outer Mongolia (Lattimore 1962b: 404). However, when the Kwantung army overran Inner Mongolia in 1937 "it did not unite this region with Hsingan area to form a 'Mengkukuo' as a basis for the Pan-mongol empire of which some of the Mongols dreamed. Instead, a separate Megnchiang, or Inner Mongolian, regime was establishe.The Inner Mongols were soon to learn as their counterparts in Hsingan that their "autonomous" government was not very much within the terms of Japanese policy. In short, they found that they were merely puppets and that real power was in the hands of Japanese (Jones 1949: 66).

The result of this situation, of course, did not encourage a favourable image for the Japanese. Nonetheless , the dream of a Pan-Mongolian state, on the part of the Japanese militarists, failed to materialize because Japanese policy itself was shortsighted; it failed to comprehend aspirations of the Mongols. Its administration was paternalistic, bound and arbitrary. Besides the following occurrences hampered seriously any realization of a Pan-Mongolian state: 1) the serious border incidents between Soviet-Outer Mongols and Japanese-Hsingan Mongols along the outer mongolian border in 1935-1936; 2) the Japanese invasion of North China in 1937; 3)

the nomonhan battle between Soviet Russia and Japan; and 4) the demise of the Kwantung Army in 1945.

Conclusion

Pan-Mongolia was created by a few men around the negotiating table and approved on paper only. Therefore, it never materialized nor had any chance of survival. Japan alone supported its formation. The Soviets were extremely alarmed at this plan because if such a state were in fact created it would certainly be used as Japanese military stronghold against the Soviets. Pan-Mongolism factor was exploited by foreign players like Japan, Russia and China but especially by Japan. They left no stone unturned so far as exploitation of the Pan-Mongolism concept for their benefit is concerned (Baabar 1999: 186).

From 1918 to 1939, Japan attempted to use Mongol nationalism in her favor by trying to influence the practice of Buddhism in Mongol territories. Buddhism for centuries was an important part of Mongol culture, and changes in the political situation of the Mongols in the early twentieth century. It was Buddhism that Mongol nationalism rallied around. This was keenly recognized by the Japanese and an attempt was further made to use Buddhism as a force that united to create a 'Great Mongol State', hoping to bring all Mongol ethnic groups under the control of Japan. However, even though they knew about the Buddhist religion, their efforts to manipulate Mongolian Buddhism in order to promote Mongol nationalism did not succeed (Mishigish, 2012: 39).

While aiding the pan-Mongolism movement they Japanese had always been pragmatic. In doing so their agenda of Pan-asiatism was kept in mind . By perpetuating the white movement in Siberia and aiding development and dissemination of Pan-Mongolism, Japan was slowly building the background for winning Mongolia the buffer zone in the Far Eastern conflict. If it could control Mongolia it was confident of a successful expansion in the Soviet Far East. The Japanese never considered the Mongols competitive in the fight for hegemony in Asia. They tried to keep their national feelings and used it against western hegemony and especially red colonialism. The consummate weapon used for spreading

anticommunist hate and tendencies for Japanese sake in Mongolia were the high lamas' circles (Morozova, 1999).

There was an inescapable dilemma faced by the Japanese imperialism in Asia traditionally. On the one hand, the necessity of unity with other Asian countries of the East in opposition to the West, on the other, tendency to control the neighbours, sacrificing their national interests. Tokyo cared the least for Mongolia's independence. On the contrary, the internal structural frailty of lamaistic institute was skillfully used by encouraging intrigues and recommending at the same time a basic Pan-Buddhist idea of all Mongol tribes' unity , Japan was strategizing a progressive intrusion into Inner and Outer Mongolia, northern China, Tibet and Eastern Turkestan. The Mongols could not help understanding it and, naturally, didn't entirely trust the Japanese agents (Morozova, 1999).

As a part of Japan's imperial strategy, Japan sought to recruit Mongolian Buddhism in Northeast Asia. The main aim of Japan was to win the support of the Mongol in the region by showing to be a patron of Buddhism and to utilize Buddhism as a medium to modernize the Mongolian society in the broader interests of the war effort. In a lot of ways, these two aims seemed to contradict each other, because patronizing Buddhism meant conserving aged practices while modernization meant bringing about reforms. In the Japanese policy this contradiction was never worked. However, more significantly, Japanese plans were compelled and aided by the yearning of the Mongols themselves. As it was difficult for them to make policies for Mongolian Buddhism, realization dawned on the Japanese authorities that they had infiltrated a complicated world of Mongol politics, in which a tussle between conservative and progressive groups existed to shape the future of their nation. Japan's hesitance to back up any group meant that its policies were a drive for Mongol aspirations rather than for its own. The alterations that Japanese intercession brought about in Mongolian Buddhism were in the end more a result of domestic Mongolian politics than of Japanese intentions (Narangoa 2003: 509).

For spiritual and political reasons the Japanese encouraged and allowed Buddhism and Mongolian national movements. However, Japan had to reconsider the role it had been paying internationally after the consequences of their realistic and aggressive

nature, the defeat in the Second World War. A lot of Mongolians are of the opinion that Japan prior 1945 had perhaps showed the best hope, kept China out of Mongolia, forced the Russians out, supported Pan-Mongolism and Buddhism, and withal, and kept a distance doing these things.

Chapter 4

Power Politics at Mongolian Borderland

The relationship between Mongolia and Japan cannot be seen into isolation especially during the first half of twentieth century. The relationship includes powers like USSR and Japan in the initial period (1911-1933), and Allies and Axis powers of World War II in the later period. Mongolian territory became the arena for securing the dominance in Asia due to its geographical and strategic locations. The whole gamut of the relationship between Mongolia and Soviet Russia is also in this context (Soni 2002).

Japan's interest in the Mongols was mostly due to the geographical area that was under them and the importance of the area geopolitically in case any conflict took place with either the Soviet Union or China. The Mongol lands were a capable base for military operations northwards or southwards as well a potential buffer against Chinese or Soviet counterattacks. Inner Mongolia's eastern part was important strategically as it was situated very close to the Manchurian plain, where Japan's strong economic and strategic interests were being developed since the early twentieth century. The region was politically significant also. It was the belief of the Japanese that if they could win the Mongol's support there, then winning the sympathy and support of the Mongols living in the areas controlled by China and the Soviet Union was evident. A concern of Japan was also that control of Inner Mongolia would be financially worrisome with regards to administrative or personnel terms. This reasoning made them want a regime in the area that would be economically self-sufficient and also predominantly acceptable to the Mongols, , and that would contribute to the war effort as well. In some respects these three goals were contradictory. To win Mongol acceptance meant adjusting to prevailing Mongol institutions, however, being economically self-sufficiency in wartime meant significant changes economically, socially, and institutionally. However, this contradiction couldn't really resolved by the Japanese policy (Narangoa, 2003).

Japan emerged as a third force in the international politics of the Mongols. Japan had no direct influence on Mongol nationalism in Outer Mongolia. It played an indirect role as a counter weight to China and Soviet Union. In Inner Mongolia, Japanese presented themselves as cooperating in a 'revival of the Mongols'. However, Japan's presence influenced Mongol consciousness or nationalist feeling, both by publicizing their 'help' to the Mongols and by limiting Mongol nationalism. Japanese praise of Chinggis Khan gave Mongols some kind of confidence in their Mongol identity. On the other hand, limiting Mongol nationalism led the Mongols to resist Japan and this in turn strengthened their Mongol identity (Nakami 2003). Manchukuo (1932-1945), the Japanese puppet state in northeastern China or Manchuria, was the first major laboratory for the implementation of pan-Asian ideology of Japanese military, in particular, of Kwantung army, which controlled the region. In the name of pan-Asiansim and support of pan-Mongolism, the establishment of puppet state of Manchukuo was an imperialistic act (Duara 2011).

The Inner Mongols collaboration with the Japanese in the 1930s was because of frustration with Han Chinese rule than from a positive desire to support Japan. (Boyle 1972) There were few people in Manchuria who were encouraged to collaborate by the Confucian world view that gave high priority to the different to the efficient management of society- in other words, they collaborated because of Japanese were perceived as better managers than the Chinese (Mitter 2000). The hopelessness of Mongol efforts to hold back the Chinese provided Japan with a ready-made Mongol policy in Manchukuo; and apparently this has been executed with a good deal of success. Japanese continental policy cannot be complete without an active Mongol policy. Japan, having created the state of Manchukuo, and given it a Mongol policy by setting aside the province of Hsingan, can no longer avoid extending its interest into the western part of Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia (Lattimore 1934a: 19).

Outer Mongolia was the scene of the Japanese war with the Soviet Union. Japanese believed that Outer Mongolia has been separated by force from other Mongols, and that this separation hinders their development. It is stated also that they look "yearningly" to Japan for their "liberation"; liberation to be brought about by a war between Russia and Japan. In this regard, Pan-Mongolism and Kodo (Imperial Way) are supposed to serve these ends (Mishima, 1942).

Manchuria was the target of Japanese aggression since the early 1930s. In order to "legalise" Manchuria's occupation the Japanese government stimulated the making of the new state of Manchukuo. From 1932 to 1945 the occupation took place. During this time, significant alterations were made in the administrative and political structure of the region. In the course of the Japanese period, the Buryatkhoshun, which until then was an independent unit that had rights to regulate and control the primary concerns of domestic life, was scraped and became a component of Solon Khoshun (Bille, 2012).

Soviet Union carried out negotiations with China to consolidate its control over Outer Mongolia and finally drew it into Soviet-led Communist bloc. The methods it adopted, find parallels in soviet policy in Eastern Europe after World War II (Elleman, 1993-94). The revolutionary change and transfer to the "non capitalist" way of development was resulted from the merger of traditionally systemic and external factors. These were the objectives to shift towards socialism and Mongol nationalists' decision to ally with Soviet Russia (Morozova, 2009).

Tanaka Memorial

The authenticity of "Tanaka Memorial" is surrounded with debates. The memorial is said to be a secret petition of 13,000-word presented by Prime Minister Baron Tanaka[5] Giichi to Emperor Hirohito on 25 July I927. It outlined a program of economic expansion into Manchuria, China, and Mongolia that would prepare for Japan's subjection of Asia and Europe. In 1929, the Chinese exposed the document and in the 1930s it gained international notoriety. Despite Japan's vehement disclaimers and objections, it was translated and passed around in the United States and Europe. Majestic designs expressed in a language that might have aroused incredulity or mirth in calmer times sounded uncomfortably genuine in the context of Japanese behavior in East Asia and the Pacific between 1931 and 1945. (Stephan

[5] Tanaka was Prime Minister of Japan from April 1927 to July 1929. Giichi Tanaka died on September 29th, 1929. Tanaka was first and foremost a soldier, that is to say, a general. His military experience was almost exclusively connected with Russia and Manchuria. He was Chief of Staff to Marshall Kodoma at siege of port Arthur in the Japanese war with Russia in 1905.In 1915 he was Vice-chief of General staff. Finally, he became Minister of war a post he held in three Cabinets. While there, he was responsible for the campaign of intervention against Soviet Russia in Siberia in 1918 and 1919,When he had under his command British, French, Italian and the United States Divisons.

1973: 733)

The corollary of the Tanaka Memorial manifested in being both rooted and lasting. It manifested itself as an important mean to mobilise international sentiment against Japan in the 1930s like how the 'Twenty-one Demands' had done two decades earlier. It unveiled the cynicism and opportunism that fascinated and shocked the readers. It affirmed the suspicions of those who saw Japanese expansion overseas as the result of a military or capitalist and imperial conspiracy. (Stephan 1973: 733)

The seeds of Tanaka Memorial were sowed at the Eastern Conference which was held in Tokyo from 27 June to 7 July 1927. This conference aimed to discuss diverse issues, which were a corollary of the civil war in China. The conference was called on by the then Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tanaka Giichi and twenty-two top civilian and military officials attended it. (Stephan 1973: 735)

It is difficult, if not impossible, to check the truth of these or similar reports. One may also be puzzled by the problem of the authenticity of the Tanaka Memorial. The Japanese prime minister Prime Minister, General Baron Giichi Tanaka (1863-1929), who from 1918-1921 was minister of war and in 1925 leader of the seiyukai party, is said to have submitted to the emperor in 1927 a memorial in which he had set out in detail the aims of japan foreign policy. During the Sino-Japanese controversy before the League of Nations in1931-32, the Japanese delegate described it as a "forgery from beginning to end". Others think that its "genuineness is no longer doubtful" as nearly all the plans mentioned in this memorial were later carried out. It is impossible to dispute this last fact, and forgery or not; it seems important to know what this document had to say about Japan's policy toward Outer Mongolia (Friters 1949: 233).

According to the quasi- legendry Tanaka report, if Japan is to conquer China, she must first get possession of Mongolia, and must begin by achieving control of Manchuria. It remains uncertain whether Tanaka really penned the aforesaid memorial and actually submitted it to the emperor of Japan. Japan's enemies may have invented the document. But at any rate the formation of Manchukuo and the policy pursued by the state would be unmeaning unless Mongolia was the goal. The resources of Manchuria, in Japanese hands, would certainly help to solve without

armed conflict the problem of access to the raw materials, which are so urgently needed by the Island Empire. Timber, coal, iron, aluminium, manures, oats, millet, soya beans, etc., could be attained in abundance. Nevertheless Manchuria, sandwiched between Russia and China, could not serve as the basis for an expansionist colonial policy, and would tend, rather, to endanger the Japanese homeland. That was why Japan created the new set of Manchukuo "as the first step towards the re-establishment of the east; the re-conquest of the freedom and the glory of Asia, which was the mother of civilisation (Prawdin 1961: 541).

Many of the aims of Japanese policy as enunciated in the Tanaka Memorial were realized by the creation of Manchukuo, including Manchuria and Jehol. The declaration of the establishment of the new government of Manchukuo, dated March 1, 1932, spoke of the state as comprising "the territory of Manchuria and Mongolia." The result of this was to confront Outer Mongolia (Friters 1949: 234). Within Manchukuo, the province, which bordered on Outer Mongolia was the "autonomous" province of Hsingan, itself inhabited by Mongols. The setting apart of a province, in such a manner, within the new state, in itself suggested the idea of a future unification of all Mongol territory under Japanese control and following a course of development agreeable to Japanese interests. For the Mongols this was a reminder of the earlier idea of Mongol unity centring in Outer Mongolia, and at the same time a challenge to the idea. To the Soviet Union, it must have appeared as an ominous step towards an attempt, long foreseen, to assert Japanese influence in Outer Mongolia (Friters 1949: 235).

Theorizing Manchukuo

Revealing of the peculiar character of Japan's imperialism in Manchukuo, then, was its exaggerated preoccupation with the idea of a special, Pan- Asian leadership. Japan always tried to play a hegemonic role in order to claim leadership and also at the same time shielding Asian and Japanese cultural and strategic interests, of a unconventional and as old character as well, and that for the sake of a greater Asian civilization, and even possibly for the whole of humanity. Such a self-perception on Japan's world role gave rise to the most immediate question of how to reconcile its bid for an Asian leadership with the rise of modern Chinese nationalism (Hotta 2007: 114).

It must be remembered too that Japan had evolved a Monroe Doctrine for Asia. General Araki, when Minister of War, wrote an article in 1932 in which he explained that Japan considered herself as the protector of other Asiatic races. Referring to the Mongolian People's Republic, he wrote that "Japan naturally deplores the existence of a tract of wild land, such as Mongolia, bordering on a region in which she has vital interests. She would like to have a Mongolia of the Orientals with peace and security forever. It is out of the question that she should permit it to be invaded by a foreign power. There is every possibility that Mongols may prove a greater barrier in the way of Japan's mission of peace and order than Manchuria has been. It is no idle boast to say that if anything obstructs Japan's mission of peace, we are ready to do away with it" (Friters 1949: 240).

In 1929, at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference in Kyoto the concerns of Japan became transparent, when the Chinese criticism was responded to by Matsuoka, the future Foreign Minister saying that Japan had already gained a lot from its existence in Manchuria, and that it was the right time to return it to China. Matsuoka retaliated:

> "I hardly need point out, as you all know well, that the South Manchuria Railway and other things that came into our possession upon conclusion of the [Russo-Japanese] War, we got from Russia, not from China, and even these things would not have meant very much to us but for the investments that followed after the War. You could certainly not run a railway, for instance, without money to run it. (laughter) Japan has been making, down to this day, a huge investment (one billion six hundred million yen) in Manchuria, and this has largely enabled us to keep up our works in Manchuria. . . . Has China contributed to this huge investment of Japan, which has been and is being expended for the development of Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia? Not a cent! Whatever Japan is getting, she is getting not from China, but is being earned through her own investment and by her own efforts."

Matsuoka then continued to point out Japan's lone effort in preparing for a possible Soviet advance in terms of a clash between the two great pan-nations of Pan-Slav and Pan-Asia, stating:

> "The reaching out for ice-free seas is one of the blind forces of the Slav race. This may impel that race to strike out in other directions, but at least one direction points to the Far East. . . . Against this comeback or onslaught of the Slavs, are our Chinese friends prepared to come forward with a reasonable measure of assurance that China will successfully guard her northern frontiers . . . ? History repeats itself, and we Japanese entertain a very grave apprehension on this point. . . . What concrete and satisfactory consideration are you ready, my Chinese friends, to accord to us Japanese for the sacrifices of the past in blood and treasure? And then, are you prepared to extend us a guarantee . . . in the serious question of national security? In short, unless and until some satisfactory answers are offered to these fundamentals, I am afraid we cannot get very far in any attempt to solve the so-called Manchurian Questions" (Young 1998: 27-28).

The aforementioned reasons highlights Japan's emotional and historical bond to Manchuria had huge implications. While superficially, working under the indirect apparatus of a puppet state, Japanese leaders in Manchukuo developed on that prevailing base to acquire a far-reaching objective and extensive participation than any other old concepts of informal imperialism could have foreseen.

As such, broad categories of imperialism fall short of explaining the all encompassing fashion in which a critical segment of educated, middleclass Japanese—including leftist intellectuals, some of whom were strongly beholden to anti-imperialist ideas—mobilized for the construction of Manchukuo's new sovereignty and national identity. In this manner , Louise Young's thesis of "total empire" looks well grounded in its capacity to express why Manchukuo attracted the Japanese imagination to such an unimaginable level.For example , welcoming the creation of Manchukuo, the metropolitan daily *Osaka Asahi Shimbun* reported that it was not only the zaibatsu conglomerates "but small and medium businesses that were at the bottom of despair" who were "rushing into the midst of the storm like Manchurian fever, to the new land of promise" (Hotta 2007: 115).

Japanese Imperialism and Manchukuo

On 1 March 1932, Manchukuo was established by the Kwantung Army, under the mottos of "harmony of the five races" (usually implying the five "racial" groupings of

Chinese, Manchurians, Mongolians, Koreans, and Japanese). Manchukuo was treated as a pseudo-autonomous empire within an empire as it could not be treated as Japan's formal colony, nor as a customary area of influence. The establishment of Manchukuo astonished Tokyo initially especially the civilian leaders (Hotta 2007: 110).

Manchukuo (1932-1945), was the first big testing area for the execution of Pan Asian ideology of the Japanese military, specifically of the Kwantung army, which had dominance in the region. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russ-Japanese War in 1905, accepted China's sovereignty in Manchuria, however, it permitted Japan and Russia lease on the Guandong (Kwantung) peninsula and the south Manchurian Railroad. Since then growth in Japanese interests and influence was seen in this area. By 1927, Japanese foreign investment in China was about 85 %, and out of it's Chinese investment, 80 was invested in Manchuria. In the investment of the South Manchurian Railroad alone was 440 million yen. By 1932, Japan's share of the total industrial capital in Manchuria was 64%, while the Chinese share was 28%. The Japanese controlled Manchuria through a tacit and rocky alliance with the warlord of the region Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin, 1875-1928), whom they assassinated in 1928. When his son and successor, Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang, 1901-2001), declared his affiliation to the resurgent Nationalist Party (Guomindang/GMD, or Kuomintang) on the mainland, the Kwantung army engineered the Manchurian incident of 18 September 1931 and established Manchukuo in 1932 (Duara 2011: 163).

From 1932 to 1945 the Japanese mobilization for Manchukuo was notable, not because it was done under war conditions, but that it was carried out in spite of them. From an unalloyed strategic viewpoint of trying to win the war in a materialistically, Japan could have easily made more constructive and logical resource allocations—and that, particularly after the wars broke out with China in 1937 and with the Soviet-Mongolian troops in Nomonhan in 1939—in order to conserve its national interest in a better way . In reality, the continuing Japanese preoccupations with its wartime *mission civilisatrice* of the rest of Asia, with the creation of Manchukuo as the first and premiere case, is an constituent of the Fifteen Years' War that cannot be understood without taking into account the broader appeal of Pan-Asianism. An ideology such as this which has such galvanizing power cannot be examined in

isolation without taking into consideration the moral and normative judgment that surely follows the dystopian outsome of Japan's Pan-Asianist programs. (Hotta 2007: 110)

Although the establishment of the puppet state was an imperialist act, elements of Japanese military were also swayed by the rhetoric of Pan-Asianism. While it became increasingly a front for Japanese expansionism, pan-Asianist ideals were pursued by the several Japanese idealists and found institutional expression during the early period until 1937. The military learned of the necessity for some kind of compact with the Chinese communities from the settler communities of the area. The Japanese settlers, represented by such societies as the Daiyuhokai (Great Majestic mountain association) and the Manshu Seinen Renmei (Manchurian Youth League), were painfully aware that Japanese interests and domination in Manchuria were doomed without a framework of Sino-Japanese coexistence (Duara 2011: 164).

The idea of *kyowa* (*xiehe* in Chinese) or collaboration between races or nationalities and the dismissal of colonialist attitudes was developed by the Manchuria Youth League. The idea was incarnated in a fascistic mass organization in Manchukuo known as Kyowakai or Xiehehui and translated into English as the Concordia Society. The base of the association was on the rhetoric of eternal peace engraved in the ideals of East Asian and a structure of mutual collaboration among diverse people. It promotes anti-imperialism and even thought of a new type of anti-colonial state that would replace all imperialist powers- including the Japanese. However, more steadily after 1937, the Kyowakai became an instrument of propaganda for the Japanese army's intrusion into mainland China and Asia. In all of this the idea of Pan Asianism took root by the mid 1930s into Toa Renmei (East Asian League), the Toa Kyodotai (East Asian Community), and still later the idea of the Daitoa Kyoeiken (Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere) (Duara 2011: 165).

Japan by 1931 was no longer a novice in the world of imperialism. Actually, it had itself come to exercise some sort of imperialism both formally and informally, owing to its successful triumphs in the Russo-Japanese War and Sino-Japanese War. In the 1920s and the 1930s, a lot of people could still clearly remember, either through education or actual experience, the reminiscences of sacrifices made by Japan so as

to win those wars. A popular repetition was that "100,000Japanese soldiers died and 2 billion yen in national reserves spent" in shielding Japanese motives in Manchuria, making up the the common understanding that Manchuria was the resource-strapped Empire's "lifeline" (the term allegedly coined by Matsuoka Yo - suke) and that the area almost comprised a part of Japan had to be defended . Hence, the proposal that somehow Japan acquired Manchuria during the Manchurian incident was seen even on a fifth-grader, who grumbled: "How callous of them, those bad Chinese soldiers who are trying to drive Japanese out of Manchuria! Please, dear soldiers . . . please do protect our precious land of Manchuria." Same types of letters of moral support frequently came out in the magazines and newspapers (Hotta 2007: 111).

Such Japanese sentiments were officially seen in the more constrained language of the protocol signed between Japan and Manchukuo in September 1932. It unraveled Japan's popular and formal recognition of Manchukuo, hinting "the Japanese government and the government of Manchukuo shall maintain the existing friendly relationship for eternity, respecting each other's territorial rights and striving to secure Asia's peace." The declaration was based on deferential and international legalistic vocabulary, were the stories of power politics and old diplomacy were seen. TakMatsusaka points out aptly that Manchukuo's independence was almost a fictitious construct whose domain was seen as a possession of the Japanese, not enjoying anymore sovereignty than the previous colonies of Korea or Taiwan. Yet another important fact e on second reflection looms large: the founders of Manchukuo actually did bother to create such a fiction, thereby keeping Manchukuo away from the previous examples of Korea and Taiwan (Hotta 2007: 111).

Moreover, as noted by Duara, the creation of a sovereign state (be it a nation-state, multinational state, or pan-national state) was an undertaking that Japanese rulers continued to take seriously, even after the country's exit from the League of Nations. The withdrawal in theory would have made it unnecessary for Japan to continue that fiction of sovereignty. Perhaps, this suggests that the Kenkoku enterprise had important ideological constituents for Japan that supplanted the reasons and logic of power politics.

By the late 1931, Ishiwara Kanji, the brain child at the back of the Manchurian incident, had become convinced of the feasibility of creating a clear independent state of Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian utopia with a republican structure, for which it is known that he was ready to give up his own Japanese citizenship as well. He acknowledged publicly that Yu Chonghan the local land-owning leader was the one who gave his best to create Manchukuo as he came up with the Kingly Way platform as the foundation of independent Manchukuo's national identity. Pan-Asianist interests on the part of its ideological forbearers could not achieve their best, but , left most historical decrees to accept that Manchukuo was a constituent of Japan's "colonial" or "wartime" empire. But it cannot be said that the general defeat of Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian utopia does not mean that Pan-Asianism as a kenkoku ideology was not successful on influencing the reality of Japan's real nation-building endeavour (Hotta 2007: 112).

In the beginning, Japan's motives in China was shaped by its more casual character. After its triumph over Russia, Japan at first was able to influence the northeastern provinces of China, where it swiftly converted the previous Russian railway network into the robust quasi-official joint-stock corporation, the South Manchurian Railroad (Mantetsu or the SMR). The "quadripartite governance" (yontoseiji) that constituted of this sectionalism of four Japanese administrative organs in Manchuria arose between 1905 and 1931 under this "railway imperialism" (Hotta 2007: 113).

The four basic building blocks from which the Japanese later assembled Manchukuo's administrative system were the 1) Mantetsu, established in 1906; 2) the Kwantung Army stationed around the Railroad concessions to protect the Mantetsu-related interests; 3) the Foreign Ministry with its extensive network of consulates, acting under the terms of extraterritoriality with the Consul General based in Mukden; and finally, 4) the government of the Kwantung Leased Territory (Kanto-cho-), a civilian agency responsible to the Colonial Ministry in Tokyo situated on the Liaotung Peninsula. The structures, which were inherited, could aid in the swift running of Manchukuo up to a point. It became clear within a few years of the Manchurian Incident, that the Kwantung Army was sure to rule . With its ascent, Pan-Asianism of progressively Meishuron inclination began to occupy a central place in the formation of a national identity for Manchukuo (Hotta 2007: 113-14).

Figure: 3



Map of the contested region

Source: (Boyd 2011)

Sino-Japanese contest over Inner Mongolia and Manchuria

There had been a gradual immigration of Chinese into Inner Mongolia, especially into Manchurian Inner Mongolia. This was the territory, occupying in the seventeenth century about a half of what is now Manchuria and most of Jehol, held by the Mongols who first joined the Manchus as allies. Chinese immigration first affected what is now Jehol, and the region south and southwest of Ch'angch'un (now Hsinching or Hsinking, the capital of Manchukuo). The Manchus opposed it, because they wished to keep the Mongols "tribal" and thus better available as military reserves, but the Mongols themselves favored it, because they then had land to spare, and wanted the grain supplies and land rentals of the Chinese, and because the Mongol princes wanted to live at ease as overlords of the Chinese, like their Manchu allies (Lattimore 1934a: 18).

With the building of railways, Chinese penetration became quite different in character. It started to overwhelm the Mongols; and the Mongols, though alarmed, were helpless. The Peking-Suiyuan railway started colonization among the Chahar Mongols, north of Kalgan, and in Olanchab League, north of Kueihua; but the chief railway construction was in Manchuria, and the chief sufferers were the Manchurian Mongols. The problems of Jehol, in this respect, are identical with those of Manchuria, since the only railways that open up Jehol approach it from the Manchurian side. The Mongols were pushed back from a frontier that had reached as far east as Harbin and Ch'angch'un (Hsinching), and to within eighty miles of Mukden, until they had lost about two thirds of their territory in Jehol and about a third of their territory in Manchuria (Lattimore 1934a: 18).

The sudden dominance of the Chinese made the Mongols irresolute. A number of desperate uprisings did something to slow down the rate of the Chinese advance, but Mongol princes capitulated too often to the Chinese, with the idea of saving what they could for themselves, at the expense of the Mongols as a whole. The Chinese adopted a policy of supporting the princes in such territory as had not yet been reached by colonization, and of giving them a share in the profits of colonization. This divided the interests of princes and commoners, and ensured that the princes, as a class, would work against "revolutionary" Mongol movements. It should, however, be said, to the credit of the princes, that almost every Mongol rising in defence of Mongol soil was led either by ruling princes or by men of princely family (Lattimore 1934a: 19).

The hopelessness of Mongol efforts to hold back the Chinese provided Japan with a ready-made Mongol policy in Manchukuo; and apparently this has been executed with a good deal of success. All of the uncolonized Mongol territory in Manchukuo has been set aside as an autonomous Mongol province, under the name of Hsingan province, from the Hsingan range, which runs through it. Land in which Chinese decidedly outnumber the Mongols has not been included within Hsingan, but local “offices of Mongol affairs” protect Mongol interests The autonomous province itself has a greater degree of freedom in its internal affairs than any other part of Manchukuo. The Mongols are ruled partly by their hereditary princes and partly by elective and appointive officials. They are even allowed to maintain their own troops. The province thus organized is the largest in Manchukuo, and its domestic importance

to Manchukuo is obvious. It lies almost entirely west of the railway network in Manchukuo and thus forms a marginal territory beyond the zones in which troops can be moved easily by rail (Lattimore 1934a: 19). It sets up a framework for controlling Manchukuo by dividing the interests of the Chinese, naturally more hostile to Japan, from those of the Mongols, naturally more friendly to Japan because of being saved from the all-extinguishing effects of Chinese colonization. In its frontier aspects it is comparable, at least to a certain extent, with the Northwest Frontier of India-a border region of separate economic and social character, with a population of warlike tradition from which may be recruited troops to hold down the more numerous but less warlike Chinese population of the southeast.

Economically, this great Mongol province within Manchukuo has possibilities, which the world at large has not yet appreciated. The Chinese exploitation of Manchuria was weak in manufacturing, mining, forestry-everything but agriculture. It was not only overbalanced by agriculture, but the agriculture was predominantly of a low-grade type-the hand-cultivation of the great estates of absentee landlords by refugee colonists with no capital and no economic independence. For the raising of livestock the Chinese had no tradition and no aptitude. It is, indeed, a regular characteristic of the Chinese colonization of Mongol land that first-rate pasture land is ploughed under for crops and exhausted within a few years, after which it is unproductive either for farming or for pasture. This meant that Manchuria, under Chinese control, was lacking in economic diversification. Japanese control will certainly tend to remedy this, because Japan needs not only the grain and beans of Manchukuo, but its minerals, timber, meat, wool and hides. Japan at present buys wool from Australia. Nothing can be more certain than that a serious effort will be made to develop a supply of wool in Manchukuo. The segregation of Mongol territory, with laws protecting the Mongols against Chinese colonization, opens the way for experiments in the improvement of livestock that will benefit both Japan and the Mongols. The agricultural experiment stations of the South Manchuria Railway succeeded years ago in "stabilizing" a crossbred Mongol-merino sheep, and other kinds of livestock, which never made headway because of the decline of the Mongols and Chinese lack of interest. With the experimental stage already completed, breeding on a large scale can begin at once (Lattimore 1934a: 20).

Soviet-Japanese Ventures on the Mongolian Land

In the period from 1921 to 1945, there was a sort of Cold War between Moscow and Tokyo that made each side bristle at any comparison between their Mongolia, the abode of peace and development, and the benighted Mongol regimes on the other side of the frontier. A mixture of direct military force and political maneuvering to win local support created the regimes of Soviet Russian, and the Imperial Japan in the Mongol lands. The Red Army advanced into Russia's Buriat Mongol lands in the winter of 1919-1920. In July 1921, the Soviet Russian troops expelled White Russian troops from Neislel Khüriye. Similarly, Japanese advance into the Mongol lands took place in two stages. One from 1932 to 1933 put Eastern Inner Mongolia under Japanese control. In the second stage, from 1933 to 1937, the Japanese pushed into central Inner Mongolia (Atwood 2009).

The Far Eastern territory of the Soviet Union was invaded by Japan immediately after the Revolution of I9I7. Japan took the lead in this intervention, although forces from Great Britain, France and the United States participated in the blockade of Soviet ports and in the Siberian Expedition. To the Japanese military this invasion, though described as a campaign to restore "peace and order" in revolutionary Russia, was just a good opportunity to attempt expansion on the Continent. Great Britain seems to have been sympathetically interested in giving Japanese imperialism an "outlet" into Siberia. The official Izvestia, which denounced the invasion as a Japanese attempt to seize the territories of Siberia, also pointed out that Britain was "hand-in-hand with Japan in working Russia's ruin," and that "the American Government, it seems, was against the Japanese invasion." The Siberian adventure ended in utter fail- ure, with the expulsion of the invaders from Soviet territory (Asiaticus 1941: 274).

This fiasco paved the way for resumption of normal diplomatic relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, which remained up to I93I on a peaceful and good-neighborly basis. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, however, was the signal for another display of anti-Soviet hostility. Litvinov, then Soviet Foreign Commissar, in a speech before the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., December 1933, explicitly denounced the new anti-Soviet Japanese policy: "Japan began her military operations two years ago on the assumption that she would only have to declare that these operations were directed against the Soviet Government in order to win the

whole capitalist world to her side and to obtain its blessings on her actions." In the same speech he affirmed that the Soviet Union still wanted to live at peace with Japan: "We say to Japan: we do not threaten you; we do not want your land or any territories on the other side of our boundaries; we want to live at peace with you as we have done up to the present; respecting your rights and interests, and asking only that you adopt the same attitude toward our rights and interests." He stressed that up to the end of i93i Soviet relations with Japan had been of a most neighborly character, and since there had been until then no occasion for mistrust "we left our Far Eastern border almost without any defense" (Asiaticus 1941: 275).

Though the occupation of Manchuria was "a violation of the Portsmouth Treaty, confirmed by the Peking Agreement [both signed at the end of the Russo-Japanese War of I904-05], according to which Japan has no right to maintain more than a defined minimum number of troops in Manchuria," the Soviet Union did not seek conflict with Japan. He further recalled that in I93I the Soviet Union offered Japan a non-aggression pact, which was rejected, and in I933 sold Japan the Soviet share of the Chinese Eastern Railway. As the Japanese policy of concentrating troops along the Soviet frontier was a direct threat, the Soviet Government had to take the necessary military measures. These, however, were "exclusively defensive," and the Soviet Union did not want "to profit by a favorable situation" for waging war on Japan (Asiaticus 1941: 276).

Outer Mongolia categorically refused to enter into diplomatic relations with Manchukuo. When the latter thereupon declared Outer Mongolia to be a “danger zone” whose existence on its frontiers could not be tolerated, Soviet Russia responded by entering into an offensive and defensive alliance With the Mongolian People’s Republic ; equipped Outer Mongolia with airports, wireless stations and hundreds of armoured cars; established a military academy at Urga; founded machine-gun works, munition factories, and textile mills; provided the Mongolian army with up-to-date weapons; and made the herdsmen into warriors once more (Prawdin 1961: 540-41).

Thus in 1932 there happened what Mongolia had tried to prevent two decades earlier When Mongolian national aspirations began to be voiced. The country was severed into three parts, under distinct leadership, each having its own peculiar prospects and

developmental trends. But in each of these three parts the propagandists of rival powers- China, Russia, and Japan- continued at work.

This penetration of Inner Mongolia forecast the ultimate encirclement of Outer Mongolia on the east and to the southeast. Thus it brought Russia again into the foreground of relationships. The creation of Manchukuo had established a frontier between the Japanese controlled state and the the Russian, as well as a common frontier to the north along the Amur and its confluents. Already there had been frontier disputes between Manchukuo and Mongolia, inevitably so because of the largest undefined nature of the frontier. The first of these came in January 1935. Each side claimed in this, as in subsequent incidents, that the clash occurred because the troops of the other were on the wrong side of the frontier. Attempts were made to settle these questions in a conference of representatives of Mongolian and Manchukuo, but only partially successful. The conference, which convened on June 3, 1935, was immediately deadlocked on account of the refusal at the Mongols to entertain the demand that more than the immediate frontier incidents should be considered. The Japanese-Manchurian desire was to agree upon conditions of opening Mongolia to trade and residence. These Mongol authorities were not willing to consider, although agreeing to "exchange of the resident representatives." They however, specified, "that the competence of the representatives should be restricted to the settlement of border disputes and that they should be stationed at prescribed points near the boundary. Manchukuo agreed to this, but on conditions that the number of representatives and the place where they were stationed should be considered at a subsequent conference (Vinacke 1967: 544).

Negotiations were renewed in October but no agreement was reached because of insistence on the part of Japan that three representatives should be appointed for residence in the principal cities of each country. Threats failed to move the Mongolian representatives beyond an acceptance of the appointment of a purely frontier representative for each party.

The Japanese ascribed to the fact that neither frontier had been fully and definitely marked out ascribed these incidents, on both frontiers. The Russians asserted that Manchurian-Siberian frontier had been well defined by treaty and by accompanying

maps. The Japanese, however, insisting on a new demarcation of boundaries, refused to accept such treaties and maps as a basis. As to the Manchurian-Mongolian boundary, there appears to have been no detailed delineation at any time. Custom and traditions had established it satisfactorily until Japan, bent on expansion, began to think in terms of strategic frontiers, with boundaries always well advanced from the customarily accepted lines. Until an agreement on frontiers had been reached, boundary disputes of at least a minor sort were certain to continue (Vinacke 1967: 545).

But what began as a series of minor incidents, with individual sentries and patrols sniping each other, grew progressively as the border forces on both sides were increased. Each was apparently determined to test the other's mettle. Thus the minor incidents of 1934-1935 led up to major clashes in 1936. Such a major incident on the Mongol-Manchurian border February 8-10, 1936, brought a crisis when several hundred Japanese and Manchukuoan troops, using trucks, tanks and planes, penetrated some six miles into Mongolia. In the encounter, which followed the Japanese, definitely worsted, withdrew behind their own boundary. An even more dangerous climax was reached on the Manchukuoan-Siberian frontier when a Russian force of about 4,000, consisting of all arms, faced a mixed Japanese-Manchukuoan force of about 2,500 from March 25 to 29, 1936. A little discretion on the part of either of the commanders would probably have committed the two countries to a war for which, obviously, neither side was ready. In particular, japan was forced to realize that the process of successive penetration and seizure, almost uniformly successful against China and Inner Mongolia, could not utilized for the moment against Siberia, or Outer Mongolia backed by Russia. Once the fact was clear, the border incidents relapsed for a time into minor affairs (Vinacke 1967: 545).

In all of these negotiations, and in the resistance in general to Japanese pressure, Russia stood behind the government of Outer Mongolia. A pact of Mutual Assistance, in essence a defensive alliance between Russia and Outer Mongolia, was announced by Moscow on March 31, 1936, and Stalin further definitely stated that an attack on Outer Mongolia by Manchukuo, supported by Japan, would be considered as an act of war on Russia itself. This defensive alliance checked Japanese and Manchukuoan border aggressions. No other position could really have been taken by Russia since

Japan's control of the territory would enable her readily to cut off and establish control of Siberia. It probably would not be very far from the facts to conclude that one Japanese interests in securing control of Outer Mongolia was strategic in relation to the Russian Far East. An additional reason for the attempt at penetration may be said to have been the desire to establish a buffer territory between Russia, Inner Mongolia and North China. These circumstances paved way for the signature at Berlin on November 25, 1936, of the German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact (Vinacke 1967: 546).

The Strategy of Unstable Borders

Manchuria and Mongolia (Man-Mo) was central to Japanese strategic thinking in the 1920s, especially in military circles. Itagaki Seishirö, one of the initiators of the Manchurian Incident (September 1931) which eventually led to the foundation of the new state Manchukuo, explained the geographical importance of Manchuria and Mongolia for Japanese military strategy and security policy: by holding Manchuria and Mongolia, the Japanese empire would achieve a frontier for national defence which not only would ensure the security of Korea but also would prevent Russia's eastward expansion. Furthermore, it would strengthen Japanese power over China. In this statement, we can see one of the main dynamics of geopolitics in its political sense. Japan had annexed Korea to preserve its own security; now it was pushing into Manchuria in order to protect Korea. Later it would clash with the Soviet Union and push into China for the sake of defending Manchuria, and eventually it would push into Southeast Asia and the Pacific in part in order to encircle and defeat China (Narangoa 2004: 50).

The dynamic in which an imperial power expands to create a new frontier but finds circumstances on that new frontier which draw it inexorably into still more conquests is commonly seen as a weakness of the imperial format. In 1930s-style geopolitics, however, it was no such thing. Rather, it was a positive fact, which facilitated the triumph of the fittest states. To geopolitical thinkers, there were no natural boundaries, only a constant competition for space in which the strong prevailed over the weak. In this competition, moreover, opportunism played a major role; the successful power exploited its opponents' weaknesses and guarded against their

strengths. In this respect, Japan's expansion was a series of ad hoc moves consistent with the nature of geopolitical theory (Narangoa 2004: 51).

The creation of Manchukuo simply transferred Japan's security concerns to a new set of borders. Manchukuo had a border with the Soviet Union of about 4,000 kilometres in the east and north, and a border with the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) of about 740 kilometres in the northwest, as well as a shorter border with China to the south. On the one hand, Japan wanted to make these new borders impervious to outside penetration as a matter of state security, but on the other it wanted to make the frontiers highly porous and flexi ble so that Japan's influence could seep through into neighbouring territories and set up another dynamic of instability and expansion. No sooner, for instance, had the state of Manchukuo been created within publicly announced borders than the Japanese army moved westwards and occupied Jehol (Rehe). This region was strategically important, because it was close to the main trade route which connected China, Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia from south to north: Beijing, Kalgan, Uliastai and Urga (today's Ulaanbaatar) (Narangoa 2004: 51).

The Mongols were marked out for a crucial role in this dynamic. Mongols dominated more than one third of the territory of Manchu kuo, although even in these regions there were already large numbers of Chinese immigrants. This Mongol region was located in the northwestern part of Manchukuo and thus had common borders with both Outer Mongolia and the western part of Inner Mongolia (see Map). The boundary between Manchukuo and the western part of Inner Mongolia was blurred. For most of its length it was unmarked, and Mongols had traditionally moved freely across it. Mongols from the western part of Inner Mongolia were welcome in Manchukuo, and Mongols from Manchukuo were also allowed to go to the west. Indeed some princes and intellectuals refused to remain in Manchukuo under Japanese occupation and went instead to Beijing or to western Inner Mongolia. This kind of blurring of boundaries was, of course, deliberates and was useful for the Japanese army's westward expansion. By staking a claim over part of the scattered Mongol nation, the Japanese made an implicit claim over all Mongols, and worked to draw both Outer Mongolia and the rest of Inner Mongolia into their sphere of influence. From about this time the Japanese sent secret agents and civilian activists into the western part of Inner Mongolia to undertake 'cultural work' (bunka kosaku).

This policy was meant to embrace the western Mongols by implementing cultural activities, such as establishing schools and health institutions while ostensibly supporting the Mongolian independence movement. In 1936, Japan supported the Mongols in establishing a military government that later became the Mongolian Alliance League Autonomous Government (Narangoa 2004: 52).

The blurred southwestern border of Manchukuo facing the west ern part of Inner Mongolia then became even more blurred and the Japanese army expanded its buffer zone westwards. This expansion made the army think of securing the border of the newly obtained area too. The Kwantung Army built watch posts along the border with Outer Mongolia. This task was mainly carried out by the Tokumu kikan, the Kwantung Army's intelligence agents. Local Mongol were also used in the construction work. The Japanese made special use of Buriat Mongols who had fled to Inner Mongolia during the suppression of Buddhism in Outer Mongolia and sought asylum there; they served as border officers and were even sent as counter intelli gence agents to Outer Mongolia.15 Mongolian temples and monaster ies were useful places for the Japanese agents to seek shelter and to search for information and collect materials (Narangoa 2004: 52).

Japan's interest in Outer Mongolia was to separate Mongols from the Soviet tie and to win them over for its own purposes. In order to achieve this goal the Japanese organised propaganda displaying the wonderful life of the Mongols in eastern Mongolia that is in Manchukuo while showing how the Mongols in Northern Mongolia suffered under the Soviet yoke. Given uncertainties over the boundary between Manchukuo and the MPR, there was ample opportunity for Japanese forces in Manchukuo to initiate border clashes and then demand negotiations to 'settle' the conflict. Japan demanded that it be allowed to set up representative offices in several places in Outer Mongolia so as to expand its influence there, demands resisted by the Mongols. The Mongolian side proposed instead to exchange only one border dispute representative from each side and to place the Manchukuo-Japanese office in Tamsag, close to the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. In 1939, border clashes led to the bloody batde at Nomonhan, which is known in Mongolia as Khalkhin golyun baildughan (War or Battle at the Khalkha River). In Japan it is known only as the Nomonhan 'incident'. The Japanese sought to downplay the scale of the batde, in

order to avoid creating alarm amongst the public at home and in Manchukuo. After several months of fighting Japanese and Manchukuo forces were defeated, with heavy losses on both sides. The number of dead and wounded were 18,000— 20,000 Japanese-Manchukuo army, 9000—10,000 Soviet army, 1130 the Mongolian army. Japan nevertheless claimed victory in order to preserve morale of soldiers. The battle of Nomonhan marked the end of Japanese interest in Outer Mongolia. But Japan had established its power and influence in Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo including the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, and these regions remained a buffer zone against the Soviet expansion (Narangoa 2004: 53).

When the Japanese Kwantung army incorporated the three Chinese northeastern provinces into Manchukuo in 1932, the borders of the new state included Mongol lands in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. The Mongols were administered by the Xing'an Office, which was supposed to foster Mongolian cultural independence. Initially, the Xing'an Office had a special status and was able to make decisions concerning Mongol affairs. However, its 'special status' was gradually limited. The Mongols of Manchukuo were to view them selves as part of Manchukuo and to support the harmony of the five ethnic groups and nation building spirit. Within this framework, they were to maintain their traditional culture. The creation of Xing'an Office in Manchukuo was on the one hand to give an initial hope to Mongols who were aiming for self-rule; and on the other hand it fit ted the Japanese geopolitical strategy very well as a showcase to win influence with the Mongols from the west and north. (Narangoa 2004: 63)

The second manifestation of Japanese sympathy towards Mongol nationalism was 'support' for self-determination movements in the western part of Inner Mongolia. When Japan included the eastern part of Inner Mongolia in Manchukuo in 1932, the princes of the western part saw an opportunity to use the threat of Japanese involvement and possible ideological influence from Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolia to put further pressure on the Chinese government to grant autonomy. Their campaign soon attracted the attention of the Japanese army, which sent secret agents to contact the Mongo lian princes and began a kind of informal penetration of the region. In 1934, the Mongols in this part of Mongolia founded Mongolian Political Council and declared the region to be formally autonomous.

The leading figure in this movement was Prince Demchugdongrob, commonly known as Prince De. Ignored by the Kuomintang, Mongol leaders in western Inner Mongolia agreed to 'accept' Japanese support from about 1935 and they established the Mongolian Military Government with Japanese advice in 1936. This government was supported by the Japanese only under the condition that Mongols outside Manchukuo were to rely on Japan and maintain friendly relations with Manchukuo. This region was to be made a base for expansion towards Outer Mongolia and gradually towards Xinjiang. Outer Mongolia was a vast land and therefore expansion by military force meant not only inviting Soviet interference but also incurring huge expenses of resources. Therefore, winning the Mongols' hearts and minds was the best strategy. For this purpose the Japanese made extensive use of the imagery of Chinggis Khan, who was still revered by the Mongols. They allowed the Mongolian Governments to use the Chinggis Khan calendar, both to show their sincerity and to encourage the Mongols to intensify their work for the sake of the East Asian struggle (Vinacke 1967).

In colonial Taiwan and Korea, Japan actively suppressed local identities and sought to remould their subjects in the image of the Japanese (though without corresponding legal equality). In Manchu kuo, Japan tried to manufacture a modern-oriented nationalism based on ethnic harmony and Japanese leadership. Amongst the Mongols, however, for the first time they encouraged the nationalism of another Asian people, but within the framework of subservience to Japanese power. They believed that by encouraging Mongol national ism in regions still beyond the reach of the Japanese army, this would encourage Mongols to gravitate into the Japanese orbit. In the end, however, the Japanese were ambivalent or lukewarm towards Mongol nationalism, and their efforts to encourage Mongol nationalism had, at best, ambivalent results concerning Mongol attitudes toward the Japanese (Narangoa 2004: 64).

Increasingly wary of the difficulty of controlling Mongol national ism, the Japanese sought to reduce the authority of the Mongol princes over land, and from 1937 they cut back the authority of the Xing'an office. The possibility existed that Mongols from Manchukuo, although under Japanese control, would join with the Mongols in the western part of Inner Mongolia to resist Japanese rule in Manchukuo. In 1937 the second Sino-Japanese War broke out and security was crucial. During the Nomonhan

War of 1939, moreover, the Japanese army was disconcerted to discover that a number of Mongolian soldiers from Manchukuo refused to shoot their compatriots from Outer Mongolia and instead fled the battlefield.

They were arrested, accused of disloyalty to the Manchukuo emperor, and executed. The Japanese considered this episode as a loss of face for the Mongols as descendants of the great hero Chinggis Khan. They even blamed the lamas for not being able to educate Mongols in discipline. In the case of western Inner Mongolia, in 1939, the successor of the Mongo lian Military Government had to join with two other Japanese puppet regimes (Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi) in north China to create a new government, the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government. Unofficially, some high-ranking Japanese army officers such as Itagaki Seishirö and Tanaka Ryükichi promised independence. However, it was never intended that it should be realised. After a long and hard process of struggle, the Japanese allowed the Mongolian government to use the name of Mongol ulus (Menggu-bang in Chinese, Möko-hö in Japanese). The Japanese meant by this term 'autonomous domain', but the Mongols wanted to understand it as 'state', because in Mongolian ulus means both domain or state. These developments are reminiscent of the fate of Korea. Japan's influence there had included the encouragement of Korean independence from China, but this encouragement had been a device to open Korea to Japanese influence and eventual control. Japan's flirtation with Mongol nation alism was, thus, enough to complicate its geopolitical strategies with out ever really taking shape as a distinct policy (Narangoa 2004: 65).

Conclusion

To sum up, The Japanese creation of Manchukuo and occupation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia has left a legacy among the Mongols of these regions, the discussion of which falls outside our field. But we cannot refrain from adding that the recent history of Outer Mongolia might have been different if Japanese strategy had turned northwest instead of south.

Mongols in Manchukuo were to be made into models for Mongols from other parts of the continent. The Japanese army supported the establishment of a series of autonomous governments in the western part of Inner Mongolia on condition that

these governments would rely on Japan and with the aim of creating a base for Japanese expansion further west, north and south. Japanese 'support' for Mongol nationalism went only so far as building amongst the Mongols in Manchukuo a certain level of political conscious ness, so that they could influence their brothers and sisters in the other parts of the world. But it was only under the circumstance that it would not harm the harmony of Manchukuo. Japanese army's support for the Mongolian independence movement in the western part of Inner Mongolia was very much conditioned by Japan's pol icy towards China. Like any other Japanese colonies, Manchukuo and the Mongol lands were to be modelled as submissive servants of the great Japanese Empire and contribute to the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.

In 1932-1936 the structure the USSR MPR Manchukuo China was forming. Solving the Japanese soviet conflicts under consideration of the axis Rome-Berlin-Tokyo and the aggressive Panasiatic Japan's strategy must have happened and did happen in the form of military conflict. Despite of all Japanese attempts to use the right and left mistakes of MPRP, to win the most important Party departments, government, administration and military apparatus, the USSR firmly adhered to forming the military-political axis Moscow Ulan Bator and was maintain MPRP according to the Soviet model. That provided the Soviet strategy with victory not only at Khalhin-Gol in 1939 but at the final establishing the social course of development in Mongolia.
However, Inner Mongolia did not share that fate. It became a victim in the play among the Soviet Union, Japan and China. (Morozoa 1999: 150)

The recognition of a regional Mongol interest by the creation of Hsingan province is important because it means instead of two nations, each treating its Mongol subjects as auxiliaries or victims as seemed expedient, three nations are now bidding for power. This in turn means that the Mongols no longer be disposed of arbitrarily: they must be Courted, and thus they have once more become to a certain extent agents to their own destiny. Until a year ago, they had only the choice of extinction under Chinese rule or drastic social revolution under Outer Mongolia, affiliated as it it with soviet russia. Now they have at least a margin of bargaining power, for any concerted action, or even the Action of a minority, can profoundly effect the policies and strategic positions of Russia, China and Japan. (Lattimore 1962b: 329)

It can thus be seen how the creation of Hsingan province in Manchukuo has tightened up all the latent tensions in Mongolia. Until the Japanese intervention of 193I, two main forces were at work among the Mongols. In Outer Mongolia, a Mongol nation was being built, under strong Russian influence but nonetheless nationalistic in character. Throughout Inner Mongolia, the Chinese were encroaching and the Mongols were being wiped out. The princes were supported by the Chinese authorities, and were encouraged to assume absolute powers (powers a good deal greater than those they had exercised under the old, pure Mongol tradition) in the domains that were left to them; but at the same time they were forced to yield fresh grants of land to the Chinese every year. (Lattimore 1934a: 23)

This deprived the Mongols of their natural leaders, and faced them with the bitter choice of extinction if they remained under Chinese domination, as against combined rebellion and social revolution if they should attempt to break away. The princes, as a class, were necessarily opposed to union with Outer Mongolia, because it would have meant that many of them would have been killed and the rest deprived of all their powers and revenue. By the creation of Hsingan province, however, a fresh alternative was made possible. Since the Mongols of Manchukuo have been given regional autonomy, with a status, which approximates to alliance with the Japanese, the princes have been able to assume once more the position of natural leaders of their people, in a movement, which may yet restore unity and nationality to the Mongols. The princes therefore are no longer defeatists by the necessity of their position, and Inner Mongolia has emerged into open and dangerous rivalry with Outer Mongolia. The choice before the Mongols, as a whole, is between revolutionary nationalism, in association with Russia, and conservative nationalism, in association with Japan but led by their own princes, descendants of the holy House of Chingghis, and fortified by their own religion, which as part of the old "feudal" system has suffered heavily in Outer Mongolia. (Lattimore 1934a: 24)

Chapter 5

Mongolian-Japanese Conflicts and its implications for Second World War

The new official interest shown by Japan in Outer Mongolia changed the whole aspect of Outer Mongolia diplomatic relations as well as of Soviet-Japanese relations. For, after the creation of Manchukuo by Japan, one of the chief points at issue between the USSR and Japan was connected with Outer Mongolia. The Manchukuo-Mongolian frontier and the whole status of Outer Mongolia were in dispute between the two countries. As for the frontier, the Japanese considered Lake Bui Nor as a part of Manchukuo and the Khalkha River as "the natural boundaries between the two countries." The Outer Mongolian maps (and apparently also Soviet maps), however, included the Khalkha River and Lake Bui nor within the territories of the Mongolian People's Republic (Friters 1949: 235).

It is important to note that the dispute between Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic was not so much one of delimitation of frontiers, but was concerned mainly with the demands of Manchukuo to have a formally accredited Manchukuo agent with wide powers, virtually equivalent to diplomatic status, to protect Manchukuo interests in Mongolian capital and to participate in the settlement of frontier incidents. Manchukuo went even further and asked to be permitted to maintain representatives, in addition to the representative in the capital, Ulaanbaatar, in five other places in Outer Mongolia, of which three were near the frontier. That would have meant that Manchukuo would have recognized the Mongolian People's Republic as an independent state and then recognition by Japan would have been only a matter of form (Friters 1949: 235-36).

Japan had identified three hypothetical foes: Russia remained the army's main enemy, America- the navy's, and China – the third hypothetical enemy. In 1923, the Japanese army decided to draft contingency plans against these three enemies. However, Coox provides a skewed picture of Nomonhan by presenting it exclusively as a battle between Japan and Russia, neglecting the Mongolian dimension. All Russian and Japanese writings on the subject focus on their own forces and those of their nemesis,

downplaying or sometimes conveniently forgetting the involvement of their respective Mongolian allies (Coox 1985).

The efforts of the Russians, the Japanese and the Chinese to each carve out for itself a sphere of influence in greater Mongolia culminated at Nomonhan in a final separation of the Mongols (Friters 1949). The setting for Nomonhan incident in which the Japanese, with their dream of a Greater East Asia including Manchukuo and Mengkukuo, had direct conflict with the Soviet Union, which desired an isolated and divided Mongolia. Japan, aware that to conquer China she must isolate her from continental Russia, could only gain from the conquest of Outer Mongolia (Prawdin 1961).

Figure: 4

Eastern Asia 1937

Source: Narangoa 2003: 493)

Soviet-Japanese Confrontation in Outer Mongolia: The Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan)

The Soviet and the Japanese armies in the summer of 1939 clashed on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier in a conflict less known with wide spread ramifications. This wasn't just a border clash, but it was an undeclared war that went on from May to September 1939 involving over 100,000 troops and 1,000 tanks and aircraft. The casualty amounted to about 30,000-50,000 men killed and wounded. The Japanese were defeated in the climactic battle that lasted from 20-31 August 1939. However, this coincided especially with the end of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (23 August 1939) – the green light for Hitler's invasion of Poland and the upsurge of World War II a week later. These events were correlated and decisions were also taken in Tokyo and Moscow in 1941 on basis this conflict that influenced the conduct and eventually the consequence of the war (Goldman 2012).

A notorious Japanese officer named Tsuji Masanobu provoked this conflict (called the Nomonhan Incident by Japanese, the Battle of Khalkhin Gol by Russians). He was the main leader of a coterie in Japan's Kwantung Army, which occupied Manchuria. Georgy Zhukov on the other side was the one who would later make the Red Army triumphant over Nazi Germany, commanded the Soviet forces. In May 1939 when the first big clash took place, a Japanese punitive ambush was unsuccessful and a 200-man Japanese unit was wiped out by Soviet/Mongolian forces . The Kwantung Army got infuriated and surged the fighting throughout June and July, initiating a big bombing ambush right inside the Mongolian territory and launching an attack across the border in division strength. As the Red Army rebuffed a successive Japanese assault, the Japanese continually became smarter, believing that Moscow could back down if they forced them. However, Stalin stunned them by outmaneuvering the Japanese by launching a simultaneous military and diplomatic counter strike (Goldman 2012).

At dawn on May 11, 1939, a large force of Outer Mongolian cavalry clashed with border guards of the Japanese-Manchukuo 23rd Division along the ill-defined eastern border of the Mongolian People's Republic. At first this incident appeared to be one more in an endless series that had taken place along the entire Manchurian border separating Manchukuo, Mongolia and the Soviet Union. They had taken place with

regularity since the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and, since 1937, had also increased in intensity. Each spring saw the Japanese testing the Soviet defences - first on the Amur in 1937, then at Lake Hassan in 1938, and finally at Nomonhan in 1939. Before Nomonhan, each of these summer incidents had been broken oif by either the Russians or the Japanese after a short period of fighting. The rapidity with which the battle at Nomonhan developed into a modern, mechanized war and the tenacity with which the Japanese held to the offensive throughout the summer of 1939 suggests that the Japanese had at last initiated the long planned campaign to establish a Mengkukuo[6] to complement the Manchukuo established in 1931 (Moses 1967: 64).

The war at Nomonhan, which resulted from this direct challenge to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, has been lost to history in the maelstrom of World War II. Nomonhan-Khalkhin Gol reverberates not at all in comparison with the cataclysmic battles of Stalingrad, Iwo Jima, and El Alamein. And yet, the significance of Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol for a greater Mongolia was as great as were those battles for the political existence of the Soviet Union, the United States and Europe. That summer war placed the final stamp of history on the separation of the Mongol peoples along the lines of today's Inner and Outer Mongolia [Mongolian People's Republic]. The efforts of the Russians, the Japanese and the Chinese to each carve out for itself a sphere of influence in greater Mongolia culminated at Nomonhan in a final separation of the Mongols - the result hoped for by first Tsarist and then Soviet Russia (Friters 1949: 133).

The Japanese forfeited by their complete defeat the last vestiges of their role as protectors and promoters of Mongol nationalism; a role which had begun to wane as early as 1937 due to the failure of the Japanese to recognize the great need for social reform in Mongolian Manchuria and Chinese Inner Mongolia (Lattimore 1937: 422). Despite the overtly imperialistic aims of the Japanese they remained, up until 1939, the only source of political power by which the Mongols of greater Mongolia could hope to attain unity; they themselves were not strong enough; the Russians did not

[6] Independent Mongol Nation. It would have included Manchuria Inner Mongolia, the Chinese provinces of Chahar, Suiyiian, and parts of Ningshia, as well as all of Outer Mongolia. (Lattimore, Owen (1937), "The Phantom of Meng- kukuo," *Pacific Affairs,* 10 (4): 420-428)

desire such a unified state on their long eastern border; the Chinese lacked acceptance by any but a very small group of Inner Mongol princes, who were themselves unpopular with the Mongols (Lattimore 1936: 395).

This, then, was the setting for Nomonhan: the Japanese, with their dream of a Greater East Asia including Manchukuo and Meng- kukuo, in direct conflict with the Soviet Union, which desired an isolated and divided Mongolia. Japan, aware that to conquer China she must isolate her from continental Russia, (Prawdin 1961: 541) could only gain from the conquest of Outer Mongolia: the promises to the Young Mongol nationalists of Inner Mongolia would be fulfilled, (Lattimore 1933: 320) assuring a strong ally on Japan's eastern flank; the troublesome Communist armies in Shensi would be circumvented; three of the four supply routes from the Soviet Union into China would be closed; Chinese Tur- kestan, the back door to China down the old Silk Route, would be open to the Japanese; the Trans-Siberian railroad would be vulnerable to a Japanese thrust along most 1,000 miles of track stretching from Irkutsk to Vladivostok (Moses 1967: 66).

The Soviet Union, in this same period (1931 - 1939) held to a defensive position, refusing to follow up its military victories at Lake Hassan or Nomonhan (Dinerstein 1958: 29). Its primary foreign policy objectives in Northeast Asia were to prevent Japan from attacking the Soviet Union, to repel any attacks made, to maintain its Far Eastern borders and to enforce the "independence" of the Mongolian People's Republic. (Asiaticus 1941: 275)

Caught between them were the Mongols of the three Mongolias - mindful of the need of a powerful sponsor of their dream of a unified greater Mongolia but increasingly aware that none of three major powers surrounding them was willing to give sponsorship without also acquiring a restrictive political tutelage over them (Prawdin 1961).

By 1937, Inner Mongolia could survive only if Japan forced the creation of a Greater Mongolia - a *Mengkukuo*, which had to include Outer Mongolia. Without Mongolia, *Mengkukuo* would not have provided the Mongols an escape from the Chinese and like- wise would not have been a viable economic entity. Most importantly, it would

not have furthered Japan's aims for the continent. The Russians saw war between Japan and the Soviet Union as almost inevitable after 1931. Unable to defend the Far Eastern provinces and the long, single track Trans-Siberian rail- road, the Soviet Union first pursued a conciliatory policy toward Japan. As the strength of the Soviet Far Eastern Army grew, this policy was gradually abandoned and replaced by one of intransigence. In November 1934, an oral agreement was effected between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union by which the latter proclaimed her readiness to defend the Mongolian People's Republic against outside aggression. In March 1936, a formal pact was signed between the two countries, which further strengthened the defense arrangements between them. The battle lines were now drawn: Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union ranged against Japan's Kwantung Army and the silently acquiescent princes of Inner Mongolia (Moses 1967: 67).

The initiative in the Far East belonged by default to Japan. The Soviet Union was involved in an intricate series of diplomatic problems after 1936 and was intent upon securing her Far Eastern flank in order to devote her full attention to Europe. Her policy toward Japan therefore was somewhat contradictory: allow Japan to continually violate the Manchukuo-U.S.S. R. borders and respond with only enough force to turn back their attacks but, once turned back, make no move to pursue the Japanese or widen the battles (Dinerstein 1958: 279).

Japan, by the end of 1938, held all of China necessary to controlling trade and communication. All of the major coastal cities, lines of communication, and railroads of importance were controlled by the Japanese Army. The Japanese Army, which had held the political initiative in Japan's expansion program since 1931, feared loss of this initiative to the Navy. The Navy, in turn, had long favored expansion to the south into Southeast Asia and was using criticism of the heavy casualties in the China war as a pretext to take control from the Army. The Army's program of expansion northeast into the Asian continent and eventual war with the Soviet Union was, by 1938, in danger of being put aside (Moses 1967: 67).

The lull in the China War in late 1938 and early 1939, gave the Army an opportunity to implement its ambitions for the Asian interior. The flank exposed to Outer Mongolia was the logical area for a strike, circumventing as it would the strong

Chinese Communist forces in Shensi province. At the same time a direct conflict with the Soviet Union could be avoided if such a strike was not immediately met by Soviet retaliation. Careful testing of the border of Outer Mongolia began in December 1938, and continued with increasing regularity and size throughout the winter of 1939. The area chosen was the vaguely defined eastern border area between Outer Mongolia and the Hsingan area of Manchukuo. The border claimed by Outer Mongolian ran 15 miles to the east of the Khalkin Gol [Khalkha River] and was marked by a series of earthen mounds called obos (border markers]. The easternmost of these markers was that of Nomon-Khan-Biird-Obo (Moses 1967: 68).

The plain of Nomonhan is a low-lying, grassy oasis, marshy in character, dotted with sand hills, which reach a height of 10 to 15 feet, and sand bunkers of about the same depth. The sector, which was in contention between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia, is a narrow rectangle 50 miles long and 15 to 20 miles wide stretching along the Khalkha River. The entire area is commanded by the higher, western (Mongolian) bank of the river. A small hill, called Bain Tsagan, a short distance back from the river on the western side, presents a panoramic view of the lower, eastern (Manchukuo) bank of the river. Another hill, Khamar-Daba, further to the south near the eastward-turning bend of the river presents a similar view of the area to the south.

Bisecting the Khalkha and flowing into it, is a small tributary stream, the Khailstin Gol. This stream was the meridian line on either side of which the major battles of late August were fought. At the eastern end of the stream, 15 miles distant from the Khalkha River, two small hills flank either side of the Khailstin. On the summits of these two hills lie the two obos of Nomon-Khan-Bürd-Obo (Moses 1967: 68).

The summer war of 1939 developed in this area in four general stages. The first stage, beginning in December of 1938, was marked by small patrol skirmishes in which the Japanese always retreated beyond Nomonhan when challenged by Mongol border patrols. The first stage ended about May 28, 1939 when the first large-scale Japanese offensive began. The second stage, commencing with this Japanese offensive, lasted until about July 6, 1939 and gave the Japanese their only victories of the war. After July 6, the Japanese were thrown back across the Khalkha initiating the third stage of the war, a hiatus during which both sides brought up reinforcements for a

final offensive. The Soviet-Mongol forces initiated the fourth stage with a massed artillery barrage on August 20, 1939. This final stage lasted only eight days and by the end of August had resulted in almost total annihilation of the Japanese-Manchukuo army (Moses 1967: 69).

The impetus for the war was the Japanese insistence on creating an incident based on their contention that the border had historically followed the Khalkha. A map issued by the Kwantung Army command, published by the Land Survey Department of the Japanese Imperial Army on July 15, 1937, showed the border of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo as lying on the Khalkha River from a point far south of Nomonhan to its entry into Lake Büir. This was the first official support for the Japanese contention that the border between the two areas was the Khalkin Gol and not to the east through Nomon-Khan-Bürd-Obo. The Japanese continued to insist, as late as the war crimes trials in 1946-1948, that the border had historically followed the Khalkha River and not the more easterly course through Nomonhan.

Japanese publications, however, had long recognized the more easterly border through Nomonhan. A semi-official Japanese publication had, in 1932, produced a map clearly showing the oasis area as being within the border of the Mongolian People's Republic. Mongols from both sides of the border had moved freely into, and across, the oasis under the watchful eyes of both Bargut border guards at the Japanese border outpost at Nomonhan, and border guards of the Mongolian People's Republic on the western bank of the Khalka. It was the practice of the Outer Mongols to regularly patrol the oasis area in relatively large numbers. Outer Mongolia had officially declared its eastern border to be east of the Khalka River in a map published for official use in 1926. That neither Manchukuo nor Outer Mongolia considered the area vital, is evidenced by the fact that neither country had, by 1939, constructed fortifications, or structures of any sort, in the entire rectangle. Both, however, had built numerous border outposts at the edges of the rectangle.

Japan's role in the Nomonhan area can be explained only as an exploratory thrust to test the willingness of the Soviet Union to fulfill the mutual aid Pact of 1936. Japan had been preparing for this thrust for many years and in 1938 began large-scale preparations to support it. By 1935, they had completed a direct railroad line between

Hsinking and T'aoan (Paichengtzu) which permitted movement of troops across the Hsingan mountain range to the vicinity of Nomonhan (Jones 1949: 111). In July 1938, the Japanese General Staff initiated preparations for a thrust in the direction of the Soviet Transbaikalia (Irkutsk) area by way of the MPR. To carry out the thrust a new Japanese division - the 23rd Infantry Division - was transferred from Northern Kyushu to Manchukuo with duty station at Hailar 100 miles north of Nomonhan. This division was one of the most modern in the Japanese Army and was organized along western military rather than the more traditional Japanese lines.

The first stage of the war, that of testing of the Mongol border and of Mongol-Soviet responses began in December 1938 with the first small Japanese-Bargut patrol into the rectangle. The patrols continued through the winter of 1938 - 1939 gradually increasing in size to about 40 men. In April 1939 a large element of about 3,000 men of the 23rd Division, called the Yasuoka Unit, moved from Hailar to sites near the border.

Throughout April and early May, the Japanese regularly pushed patrols past Nomonhan toward the Khalka River. Up until this time, the cavalry patrols had been quickly driven back by the Mongol patrols without fighting. The Japanese made no attempt to hide their actions and were constantly observed by the Mongol outposts spaced 15 kilometers apart on the western bank of the Khalka. On May 11, 1939 there occurred the first large-scale penetration of the border. A force estimated at more than 200 cavalry, swept almost to the river and engaged a Mongol patrol of 50 men. After a short skirmish in which several Mongols were killed, the Japanese- Bargut cavalry withdrew from the rectangle (Mishima 1942: 59).

The news of the large-scale Japanese penetration was relayed to Tamtsak-Bulak, about 100 miles inside the MPR. The 6th Mongol Cavalry Division stationed there had been reinforced in March by a mixed detachment of Russians under Senior Lieutenant A. E. Bykov. Bykov's detachment, which included two mechanized rifle companies, a battery of 45 mm. guns, and several armored cars, was the closest Soviet force to the border.

Bykov, after consulting with the Soviet Command in Ulaanbaatar, was ordered to take a platoon to the border to reconnoiter. After crossing the river on May 22, he was immediately attacked by Japanese-Bargut cavalry and forced back across the river. The Japanese had now occupied the rectangle in force, thus violating the MPR border as defined by Outer Mongolia and the USSR. The Soviet Union had been clearly challenged to fulfill the promises made in the Mutual Aid Pact of 1936.

On May 25th, the 6th Mongol Cavalry Regiment (250 men) crossed the Khalka and took up defensive positions 5 miles east of the river. On May 26th, the bulk of Bykov's unit, about 1200 men, also crossed the river and reinforced the Mongol positions. Opposing them were Japanese forces, which included Colonel Yamagata's Special Detachment, the 64th Infantry Regiment of the 23rd Division, a reconnaissance unit under Lieutnant General Azuma, a motorized company under Captain Kawano, the 8th Japanese Cavalry Unit, and the 1st and 7th Bargut Cavalry Regiments. This force totalled about 4,500 men - three times the Soviet-Mongol forces (Moses 1967: 72).

The Soviet-Mongol preparations were greatly hampered by the remoteness of the area. Whereas Japanese railroads were but 100 miles removed at Hailar and 60 miles away at Solun Handagai, the nearest Soviet railhead was almost 500 miles away at Borzya, on a spur from the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In addition, the Japanese had constructed two hard surface roads to Nomonhan while the rear of the MPR lines had only one undeveloped trail paralleling the border. The difficulties of supply were greatly hampered in the early stages by constant Japanese air strikes.

On May 21st General Lieutenant Kamatsubara, Commander of the 23rd Division issued the orders, which began the second stage of the war. The orders were to encircle and destroy the Soviet Mongol forces in the rectangle. All operations were to be completed in 7 to 10 days. The offensive began on the morning of May 28th north of the Khailstin Gol. The Japanese attempted a flank movement north and west of the Soviet-Mongol entrenchments in order to pin them into the corner of the Khalkha-Khailstin confluence. Heavily outnumbered in men and light weapons the Soviet army fell back under the protection of their artillery massed across the river on Bain Tsagan hill. Late in the evening of the 28th, the 149th Rifle Division under Major

Remizov arrived, after a forced march, and was immediately thrown into battle. This, plus the commanding fire of the Soviet artillery, turned back the Japanese offensive (Moses 1967: 73).

During the month of June both sides brought up massive reinforcements. Most of the action in June took place overhead where Japanese and Russian air-units fought continous dogfights with both sides claiming fantastically lopsided victories. No reliable figures exist for actual planes brought down. Each side managed, however, to test its very latest fighter planes. By the start of July Japanese forces had reached a total of more than 20,000 infantry and 4700 cavalry supported by 158 emplaced machine guns, 170 guns of 75 mm. or more, 124 anti-tank guns, 98 guns of less than 75 mm., 130 tanks, and 6 armored cars, and 2 Air Divisions totaling 225 planes. Opposing them were 12,500 Soviet-Mongol troops, of which probably no more than 500 were Mongols. Supporting them were 139 stationary machine guns, 86 light and heavy guns, 23 anti-tank guns, 186 tanks and 266 armored cars. It can easily be seen from these figures that the Japanese envisioned a trench war similar to World War I. Their 20,000 troops were entrenched along a 50-mile front by July, with artillery massed to the rear with a minimum of armored mobility. By contrast, the Soviet forces were highly mobile with almost 500 armored vehicles at their disposal. This mobile superiority played an immediate role in early July (Moses 1967: 73).

On July 2nd the Japanese launched their largest offensive to date. After a heavy artillery barrage, tank and infantry units commanded by General Lieutenant Yasuoka struck at the Soviet-Mongol center and succeeded in pushing back the left (northern) flank of the Soviets to the south-west. At the same time, General Kobayashi crossed the Khalkha, 150 yards wide, north of the fighting and seized the bridgehead behind the battle. Here he concentrated his strike force of infantry, supported by 60 tanks, and on the morning of July 3 took the artillery position on Bain Tsagan hill. In the process he lost 30 of his tanks, however, and was seriously short of armor or defensive fire power. The Soviet forces across the river were seriously threatened - outnumbered and without artillery. The war had now definitely moved into the territory of the MPR.

The Soviet-Mongol commander, General Zhukov, the hero of Stalingrad three years later, immediately used his mobile armored superiority to cut off and isolate the Japanese on Bain Tsagan. The 11th Tank Brigade, under Brigade Commander Jakovlev, was sent to the north base of the hill, the 24th Motorized Infantry Regiment to the northwest, and the 7th Armored Brigade, which had just arrived, to the southern flank. The Japanese on the hill, now completely surrounded, launched attack after attack to break out but the armored ring held. Soviet aircraft were brought in to support the final Soviet drive up the hill. At noon on July 3 the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade attacked from the west and northwest driving the Japanese before them. At three o'clock of the same day the Japanese were driven from the hill into the Soviet-Mongol lines and destroyed. By Soviet estimates, the Japanese lost almost 4,000 men in this battle. The Japanese offensive stage was largely ended by July 6th and from then until late August the initiative was with the Soviet forces (Moses 1967: 74).

From July 8 to July 12 the Japanese tried repeatedly to gain a foothold on the western bank but were unsuccessful. The remainder of the third phase, lasting until August 20, was, for the most part, marked by continuous artillery barrages and air strikes. By July 25 the Japanese were increasingly pressed by Soviet thrusts and had begun constructing defensive fortifications.

About this time, the Japanese High Command had decided to increase the Japanese commitment at Nomonhan. Organizationally a new army was created - the Sixth Army - and Lieutenant General Rippei Ogisu was moved from command of the 13th Division in Central China and made Commander of the 6th Army, Kwantung Army Command. His orders were to make preparations for winter encampment at Nomonhan. Three new divisions, about 60,000 men, were to be transferred to Nomonhan in late August for a final offensive. Two of the divisions were to come from China and one from the mainland. The Japanese would then have had almost 100,000 men concentrated on the border. Obviously there was no intention of abandoning the war. But before the Japanese could regain the initiative other events outran them.

With the Japanese temporarily on the defensive, the Soviet com- mand decided to take the offensive and clear the Japanese from the Nomonhan rectangle. Reinforcements poured down from Borzya. The 82nd and 57th Infantry Divisions, one regiment of the 152nd Infantry Division, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 126th Artillery Regiment, the 85th anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment, several companies of flame-throwing tanks, the 212th airborne and another Mongol Cavalry Division were moved to the front. Because of the complete absence of railroads or highways, all the reinforcements were carried in cars and light trucks. At the start of August over 2600 cars were shuttling back and forth to the theater of operations from Borzya.

Japanese reinforcements also moved to the front in the first weeks of August. All of the 23rd Division was committed to the battle as was part of the 7th Division, the entire Manchurian Mixed Brigade (Koreans, Inner Mongolians, Manchurians), three regiments of Bar- guts, three regiments of heavy artillery, and all of the Anti-Tank Batteries of the 1st Infantry Division. By this time the Soviet- Mongol forces were clearly superior in all categories, and to an over- whelming degree in amored vehicles, as can be seen from Table One. The battlefront on August 20, 1939 followed the curve of the Khalkha River for almost 50 miles. The Soviet Mongol forces stood with their backs to the river facing east toward the Japanese lines. The Japanese were evenly distributed on either side of the Khailstin Gol. The Soviet artillery on the high western bank of the Khalkha still commanded the entire front and their armor moved freely from one bank to the other (Moses 1967: 75).

Soviet headquarters envisaged two stages in the offensive: the first stage from August 20 to 23 was intended to split off the Japanese flanks and destroy them; the second stage, from August 24 to 31 was to completely encircle and destroy the main force. The link-up behind the Japanese at Nomonhan would cut off retreat and interdict reinforcements. On August 23rd the Northern and Southern groups linked up at Nomonhan exactly on schedule. The encircled Japanese forces were unable to break out of the ring and were quickly isolated in small pockets. Reinforcements were too far from the scene because the Japanese High Command had not intended to undertake major operation until the end of August. By August 31, 1939 the Japanese threat to Outer Mongolia had ended. The Japanese lost 52-55,000 men of which almost 25,000 were killed. About 10,000 dead were from the Japanese 23rd Division,

and almost the same numbers were killed from the 7th Division. Soviet-Mongol losses were estimated at 9,000 killed, but no really reliable casualty figures exist (Moses 1967: 79).

Figure: 5

The Location of Nomonhan incident

Source: (Bulag 2009)

The Nomonhan incident gave rise to the immeasurably great repercussions within the Japanese Army. Regardless of what the Soviet Union may have intended to achieve, this demonstration of the might of the Red Army and the ignominy of the defeat suffered by the highly considered Kwantung Army had the effect of causing the Japanese military authorities to restrain the previous militancy of the forces stationed in Manchukuo. After the Nomonhan Incident, border disputes along the frontiers of Manchukuo declined sharply. The cause to which both the military authorities and the Japanese public attributed this was the recently concluded Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact. It is, of course, true that this development both radically altered the power situation in Europe and placed Japan in a state of political isolation. However, the Nomonhan affair basically altered the estimate of the Soviet Union held by the Japanese military, as well as their estimate of their own capabilities *vis-d-vis* those of the Red Army. After Nomonhan the keynote of the attitude of the Japanese military leaders were caution, and the change of policy toward the Soviet Union, a change characterized by the attempt to reduce friction between the two countries (Young 1967: 100).

The Outcome of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan)

The most important and durable consequences of Nomonhan were a loss of confidence on the part of the Japanese military. Their attitude became much more circumspect in matters concerning hostilities with the Soviet Union. This reticence was mirrored by later diplomatic policy, which became opportunistic in the extreme. The anxiety produced the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in the fall of 1940, while on the other hand the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was concluded in the spring of 1941. It seemed that after Nomonhan, the Japanese course was impossible without allies (Young 1967: 101).

For the Soviet Army, Nomonhan was a highly successful test of contemporary Soviet military strategy. Before World War II Soviet theory held that the initial period in any war would be marked by a covering operation carried out by a minimal force with the main emphasis in this initial period on waging a battle for air superiority. During this period the main forces would be mobilized, concentrated, and deployed. This in part explains the early successes and rapid reversals of the Japanese forces in all of the Soviet-Mongol border incidents from 1935 until 1939; each time the Japanese

interpreted the small Soviet border force as either a measure of the lack of Soviet commitment to a particular area or saw a chance to seize an undefended portion of territory quickly and present the Soviet Union with a *fait accompli* (Moses 1967: 81).

The result was a complete turn-about of Japanese policy, in Inner Asia in particular. The total defeat of the Japanese at Nomonhan, combined with the retreat forced by the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, temporarily ended the Japanese Army's total control of the direction of Japanese foreign policy. The temporary shift of power to the Navy turned Japan's attention southward to the Asian empires of France and Great Britain. The Army, forced into a period of realignment and reexamination, was, for the moment, powerless to support or further Inner Mongol nationalism. Events of the next five years in Asia did not again allow an opportunity for forcing a Mongol Union. By 1945 the last possible support for Mongol union the Japanese had been destroyed.

The foremost and major defeat for Japan in World War II was at Nomonhan. This led to an alteration in its military direction finally leading to the attack at Pearl Harbor and the Asia-Pacific War. Russia was identified by Japan as an important hypothetical enemy on the continent in the First Imperial National Defense Policy of 1907. The Japanese army wanted to launch a conclusive offensive in Manchuria against the Russians inning the following years post the Russo-Japanese war. To execute their plan a huge military presence in South Manchuria was the need of the hour. Hence, the undertaking of the talk about the creation of the Kwantung Army, later led to the Japanese army's expansion into Mongolia and north Manchuria (Coox, 1985).

The situation would have been different if Japan would have been winner in Nomonhan incident. Nomonhan marked the high point of Japanese expansion in Northeast Asia. Had the thrust into Outer Mongolia been successful and not been challenged by the Soviet Union, the Inner Mongol hope for Mengkukuo might well have become a reality. The Nomonhan incident resulted in complete turn-around of Japanese policy, in Inner Asia in particular. The total defeat of the Japanese at Nomonhan, combined with the retreat forced by the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, temporarily ended the Japanese Army's total control of the direction of Japanese foreign policy (Moses, 1967).

It was no coincidence that the fighting at Nomonhan coincided with the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. While Stalin was overtly brokering with France and Britain for a professed anti-fascist union, and covertly negotiating with Hitler for their final union, Japan-German's ally and anti-Comintern partner attacked him from behind . It was clear by the summer of 1939 that Europe was initiating a war. Hitler was determined to move east, against Poland. Stalin's nightmare, to be avoided at all costs, was a two-front war against Germany and Japan. His consummate result would be for the militarist/fascist capitalists (Germany, Italy, and Japan) to brawl the bourgeois/democratic capitalists (Britain, France, and perhaps the United States), keeping the Soviet Union on the sidelines, the arbiter of Europe after the capitalists had exhausted themselves. In order to achieve his outcome at the most he was signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact. It not only pitted Germany against Britain and France but did not involve the Soviet Union in a fight it ensured Stalin the independence to deal confidently with an isolated Japan, which he did at Nomonhan. This is not merely a hypothesis. The connection between Nomonhan and the Nazi-Soviet Pact is transparent even in the German diplomatic documents published in Washington and London in 1948 (Goldman 2012).

Japan's account of their way to Pearl Harbor is known well. However, what is not known of that story is their defeat at Nomonhan that made them go to war with the United States.Tsuji who played a key role at Nomonhan was also influential in advocating expansion towards the South and then war with America. Nomonhan incident brings to light the role of the Inner Mongols, a party neglected for long and who fought on the side of the Japanese. This is not to bring to the fore the contributions of the Inner Mongolian to the incident, thereby acquiring a perverse sense of satisfaction, but what is required is the unveiling is the intertwining of relationships of Japan, Soviet Union, the MPR and Inner Mongolia. Hence, in this relational approach, the MPR cannot be dismissed as a small "puppet" power fighting alongside the Soviet army, nor the Inner Mongols on the Japanese side as playing an auxiliary role of little importance (Bulag, 2009).

For Inner Mongolia, Nomonhan symbolized Japan's inability to fulfill her promises of a greater Mongolia. It also heightened the disillusionment with the Japanese, which

had been building since 1935. In 1939 Japan began encouraging movement of Chinese settlers into Manchuria and remained adamantly opposed to Prince Teh's appeals for a union of Hsingan and his own Meng Chiang, established in 1937. Prince Teh, who has wrongly been termed a Japanese puppet in the image of Wang Ching-wei, continued to work for Mongol union; if not of all the Mongols then at least the Mongols of Chinese Inner Mongolia.

Prince Teh, in the extremely difficult situation, occupied between Russia, China, and Japan, and remained above all else a Mongol nationalist. His political activities were always predicated on the hope that some formula could be arrived at by which his people could gain political autonomy and protection from Chinese encroachment. Of all the Mongol leaders of Inner Mongolia of the period, he remains the most sympathetic and most devoted to the ideal of Mongol union. Only events outside of Inner Mongolia ended his efforts (Moses 1967: 83).

The political demands of the great powers determined the fate of Inner Mongolia, as have great power politics in every instance since 1911. Chinese Communist successes in establishing a strong base of power in northern China during the war years meant the Soviet Union now had even further reasons for opposing a greater Mongol union. The Inner Mongols who hoped for a Pan-Mongol nationalist movement under the aegis of the advancing Soviet-Outer Mongolia forces in 1945 were doomed to further frustration and disappointment. Soviet-Chinese Communist negotiations had, by 1945, already established that the Chinese Communists were to have full authority in Inner Mongolia.

The military advance of the Russians was therefore largely an empty gesture for the Inner Mongols. It differed from the possible political significance of the Nomonhan campaign in that it served only to allow the Soviet Union the opportunity to establish which Chinese army was to control Inner Mongolia; Nomonhan had at least offered the possibility of Mongol union even though under Japanese dominance.

Inner Mongolia's futile efforts up to 1949 to establish autonomy were doomed by the political needs of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. There was no way in which an autonomous Mongol area could be established in Chinese Inner Mongolia

and western Manchuria without seriously hampering Soviet post-war aims for Manchuria and Chinese Communist plans for all China.

Mongol union remains a dream; a dream that lost substance at Nomonhan in 1939 and lost reality in 1949 with the establishment of a strong, centralized Chinese government. China's establishment of an Inner Mongolian Autonomous area including the Manchurian and Chinese Inner Mongolian areas pays only lip service to Mongolian autonomy. The great new steel and coal complexes being built across Inner Mongolia, and the extension of the communes into the Mongol lands guarantee that Chinese will continue to move into the Autonomous area. Inner Mongols seeking any semblance of Mongol directed autonomy or independence no longer have a choice of foreign protectors as in 1911 and 1931; the only choice today is the lesser evil of the Mongol directed social and economic revolution of the MPR and then only by fleeing to the MPR. In reality, the MPR is as politically unable to direct its Pan Mongol ambitions, if any such exist, as are the Inner Mongols. Freedom for a Mongol in Inner Asia today means the politically dependent freedom of the Soviet dominated MPR; a freedom far more preferable to most Mongols than the growing sinification of Inner Mongolia.

If Japan had decided to attack northward in 1941, that could well have changed the course of the war, and of history. Many believe that the Soviet Union could not have survived a two-front war in 1941-1942. The Soviet margin of victory in the Battle of Moscow, and at Stalingrad a year later was excruciatingly thin. A determined Japanese foe in the east might have tipped the balance in Hitler’s favor. Furthermore, if Japan had moved against the Soviet Union in 1941, it could not also have attacked the United States that year. The United States might not have entered the war until a year later, under circumstances in Europe far more unfavorable than the actual grim reality in the winter of 1941. How then would Nazi domination of Europe been broken? (Goldman 2012).

The Far East and Yalta conference

Before examining the Yalta conference and its ramifications it is important to evaluate the American policy as far as it's relation with the Soviet Union and China in 1944-1945 so as to get clarity on why the Americans wanted to secure the Soviet entry into the Pacific war, and how was helpful in securing Mongolia its independence geographically and politically as well. Stalin foresaw in the war against Japan a chance to acquire some of his interests in the Far East. Stalin was waiting for the best opportunity to make an entry into the war so that maximum benefit was acquired by Soviet Union at the minimum sacrifice (Cheng, 1975).

Before the Yalta conference, Soviet and American military officers held discussions on their joint ventures against Japan. Tien-fong Cheng with regards to Stains ambitions in the Far East argues that, "he wanted to choose a most advantageous moment to enter the war so that the Soviet Union would get maximum benefit at the minimum sacrifice" (Cheng 1975: 263). Hence, Stalin at Moscow Big Three Foreign Ministers' Conference as well as at Teheran Conference in 1943 made public his motives to join the Allied force when he defeated Germany on the western front.

The conference which discussed, among others, the future of Europe and ways to end war in Asia, reached an agreement on 11 February 1945, by which US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchil agreed to Joseph Stalin's term for Soviet entry into the war against Japan (Soni 2006: 102).

Since the Yalta agreement greatly influenced the events that followed in deciding the status of the Mongolian People's Republic, the diplomatic concerns witnessed on various issues during the conference need to mention here. First of all, the main concern that encouraged the US officials to conclude and put into operation the Yalta agreement were certainly military in nature, i.e., ensuring soviet participation in the pacific war so as to secure the categorical surrender of japan, thereby reducing the probability of substantial American causalities. That concern, directly or indirectly, also centered on its political effects on the internal situation in China. Secondly, there might have been concerns to prevent the balance of power from being totally upset by the Soviet Union working in coordination with the Chinese communists (Kennan 1960: 349-69).

However, Stalin was in a good bargaining position because the United States was desperate of getting Soviet entry into the war before American attack on Japan. When it became clear that Stalin wanted some concessions in return for entering the war, the United States appeared to be agreed to certain compromises but in return they also wanted not only Soviet assurances for entry into war but also support for Chiang Kai-shek's leadership in China. Already in December 1944, two months before Yalta conference, stalin had informed Ambassador Harriman about his own political conditions, including the demand for "the recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia as an independent identity." (US Department of State 1955: 379) In sum, Stalin was desirous of "the recovery by the USSR of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin (Karafuto), leases on Dairen (as a commercial port) and port Arthur (as a naval base), long term leases on both the CER [Chinese Eastern Railroad] and south Manchurian Railway systems, and acknowledgement by China of the status quo (effectively independence from China) for Outer Mongolia." (Clubb 1971: 336) While approaching the diplomatic situations at Yalta, as Clubb rightly points out:

> "Stalin and his advisers would have had prominent in their minds the longstanding strategic issues of Northeast Asia: how to reduce the menace of Japanese power, how to confront the insistent thrust of the United States in the direction of East Asia and Soviet Far East, and how to provide for buffer protection on the south against American sea and air power as well as against … traditionally imperial minded China".

China would have obviously been concerned with almost all of the Soviets proposals or the so-called *preeminent interests*, excepts for those related to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, if it were represented at Yalta. It was not even informed of the agreement until June 1945 when T.V. Soong, the Foreign Minister of China, went to Moscow to negotiate a Sino-Soviet agreement with Stalin. After three days of deliberation during Yalta conference, the leaders of the three allied powers, i.e., the USSR, the USA and Great Britain reached to a six-point understanding. Provisional two of the understanding reads as follows:

> "The USSR would enter into war against Japan within two to three months after the capitulation of Germany. In return, the Soviets would take under their jurisdiction the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin. Although Manchuria is under Chinese Sovereignty, Roosevelt agreed to seek permission from Chiang Kai-shek to give exclusive rights to Soviets in the use of the port and the

railway. The USA and Great Britain recognized the status quo of the Mongolian People's Republic" (Baabar 1999: 404).

The above mentioned provision finally led to the conclusion of a secret agreement, Known as "Yalta Agreement concerning the Far East," which stipulated the following: The leaders of the three Great Powers- the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain- have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on conditions that:

(1) The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;
(2) The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored;
(3) The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. It is understood that the agreements concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek. The president will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advise from Marshal Stalin. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated. For its part the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese Yoke (Clubb 1971: 337-8).

Thus, as discussed earlier the Yalta secret agreement related to the Far East was mostly discussed between the Russians and the Americans. The Americans of course were not much in agreement with the Soviet motives immediately. Chinese approval was required as far as the provisions for the Dairen port, Chinese Eastern Railroad, South Manchurian Railroad, as well as maintenance of the status quo in Outer Mongolia was concerned. Hence, after discussing the above issue an agreement was reached by both the sides which was declared in a statement:

"It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshall Stalin" (Feis 1974: 515).

The Soviet Union unveiled its desire to enter a pact of alliance and friendship with the National Government of China and to help its armed forces. Hence, at the Yalta conference, it was formally agreed by the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan. On 8 August 1945 a war on the Soviet Union was declared by Japan as assured after joining the Potsdam Declaration. A day later at the same time Mongolia, an ally to the Soviet Union, declared war on Japan. The Soviet army entered the North East China in the morning of 9 August 1945 in three big fronts and occupied Manchuria, Sakhalin and Kurile islands in a very short interval and liberated towns in North Korea. On 20 August, Mukden, Kharbin, Chanchung and Giring were decared independent and on 23 August Port Arthur was liberated.

The Mongolian question and Yalta Diplomacy

Right from establishment of independent Mongolian People's Republic in 1924 till 1946, the international position of Mongolia remained unclear in the community of nations as this independence was only recognized by USSR. Mongolian People's Republic had no treaty or official relations with any other republic except for the Republic of Tannu Tuva until latter's incorporation into the USSR in 1944. It was only in January 1946 when China also recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia that Mongolia acquired her place as member of the community of nations of the post-war world. Such a major change in Mongolia's status owes much to the outcome of the Yalta conference and its effect subsequent signing of a Sino-Soviet treaty, both events took place at the hilltop of the Yalta in Crimea in February 1945.

One of the provisions of the Yalta Secret Agreement with regards to Mongolia was a very significant clause for this country. After almost 200 years of Manchu control the people of Mongolia declared their independence and the 1921 revolution confirmed this independence. Mongolia's independence was deliberately not being recognized by China but claimed it to be a part of their territory. Thus, a provision "the status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be restored" was a favorable advance in achieving Mongolia's independence. Initially China refused

to recognize the Yalta agreement especially the clause on Mongolia, as they were depending on the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924, which identified the Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia even though it had ceased to prevail many years before. To the Chinese and the Americans as well the Soviet demands went beyond the Yalta agreement's provisions. The Chinese were advised by the Americans against making any compromises past the Yalta Agreement's terms. Then, "on August 10, 1945, Mr. Harriman, acting on instructions, informed Dr. Soong as a matter of record that the United States Government considered that the proposals which he had already made fulfilled the Yalta Agreement and that any other concessions would be with the understanding that they were made by the Chinese Government because of the value it attached to obtaining Soviet support in other directions." Even when the Chinese were ready for any kind of concessions to get back Outer Mongolia they accepted this provision "should a plebiscite of the Outer Mongolian people confirm this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia with the existing boundary as its boundary". The people of Mongolian People's Republic were obviously content enough to assert their wish for independence. A referendum was held on 20 October 1945 in Mongolia under the aegis of the Chinese government and the people of Mongolia voted for their independence. The Mongolian People's Republic as an independent state and was finally recognized formally by the Chinese Government on 5 January 1946. On 27 February a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between Mongolia and Soviet Union.

The Yalta conference forced China to recognise the independence of Outer Mongolia, and the outer Mongolian troops who in august 1945 marched into Manchuria were equipped with same armament and used the same tactics as the Russians. Less than two years later the Mongols of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia proclaimed an Autonomous Mongolian government with its seat at Wangyehmiaou two hundred miles to the west of Harbin, sent their troops to help the Chinese communists in their fight against Nationalists, and Chinese communists recognised inner Mongolia as autonomous region and began to develop its economic life in the same way as the Russian did in outer Mongolia (Prawdin 1961: 547).

There were accusations over Mongolian autonomy between Russian and Chinese. The Chinese accused Russians that Mongolian autonomy was the work of Tsarist imperialism. The Russians denied this charge and claim Japan as a common danger. Moreover, there is a common danger to you, to the Mongols, and to us. It comes from the ambitions of Japanese imperialism. It would be bad for you, and it would be very dangerous for us, if the Japanese were to conquer Mongolia. The Mongols say that if the Japanese attack, they will resist. That being so, we shall certainly help them, by equipping and training their army and by eco-nomic and other programs that will strengthen them as allies.

Soviet Russia continued this policy until, as one of the consequences of the Yalta Conference, Chiang Kai- shek (with American approval) agreed to a plebiscite to determine the question of sovereignty in Mongolia. The genuineness of this vote has sometimes been questioned, because of the mistaken notion that it meant "a vote for Russia"; but the only question the plebiscite was asked to decide was that of Mongolian independence *versus* Chinese rule—and of course the Mongols voted joyfully and overwhelmingly for independence. The decision of the plebiscite was accepted and ratified by the govern-ment of Chiang Kai-shek, a fact that became very important later, because it meant that among the nation-alistic claims which the Chinese Communists took over when they defeated Chiang Kai-shek there was no longer a claim to Mongolia (Lattimore 1962a: 14-15).

Conclusion

It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Japanese strategy in World War II might have been different if Japanese started the miniature and Manchukuo troops in the Nomonhan area near Outer Mongolian frontier in 1939 had not resulted in severe defeat. As we have seen, border incidents in that region were long standing, but the intensity of the battles, including the use of aircraft and tanks provided a new element. There is no evidence to show that the Mongols of Manchuria took this opportunity to revolt and thus to increase the difficulties of the Japanese. However, Japanese plans had certainly received a setback, which not only influenced their general policy towards Russia, but also their plans in Manchukuo. Their strategic railway construction had brought them close to the Outer Mongolian Frontier at Wen Chuan

(Arshan). It was intended to continue this railway northwards so as to link up with the former Chinese Eastern Railway at Hailar, but the project was not carried out, possibly because such a line would have run too near the Outer Mongolian frontier and particularly near the Nomonhan area, where the Mixed Border Commission, set up at the end of the fighting in September 1939, was making no progress because, as an official Japanese statement put it, of "technical difficulties unforeseen by both parties; and the approach of severe winter left no choice but to suspend the work" (Friters 1949: 241).

The lesson learned by the Japanese in the Nomonhan incident has been a strong factor in inhibiting Japanese military action to the north (Phillips, 1942). The most important consequence of Nomonhan was that the squashing defeat assured the Japanese to surrender, for the time being at least , the plan of going to war with the Soviets, heading them into the Pacific War. Nomonhan additionally helped make the way for the Nazi-Soviet pact. The battle militarily proved the efficaciousness of the operational art of the Soviets; though not until Moscow in December of 1941 did the Germans begin to notice (Goldman 2012).

The powerful demonstration at Nomonhan of the Soviet Union's willingness to commit large forces to the defense of the territorial integrity of the MPR established the de facto existence of the MPR as a separate, independent state. Border negotiations between Japanese-Manchukuoan and Soviet-Mongol representatives over the next ten months [September 1939 - June 1940] served to confirm the existence of a Mongol nation made up of an area defined by Tsarist ministers in 1915. The Soviet Union had thus tested its eastern buffer zone, Outer Mongolia, in battle, and subsequently tested it politically at Yalta. The Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference says simply: "The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved." This recognition of Outer Mongolia as an independent entity confirmed the Soviet sphere of influence there and, in effect, the separateness of Inner and Outer Mongolia.

Nomonhan marked the high point of Japanese expansion in North- east Asia. Had the thrust into Outer Mongolia been successful and not been challenged by the Soviet Union, the Inner Mongol hope for *Mengkukuo* might well have become a reality. Instead the Mongols of Inner and Outer Mongolia were effectively and finally split apart by the Japanese defeat. Six years later the cleavage of the two Mongolia was formally recognized by the Yalta agreement by which the Great Powers recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia.

Chapter- 6
Conclusion

This thesis has elaborated the relations between Mongolia and Japan during the period between 1905 and 1945. In this study, Mongolia has been discovered to be far more important to Japan than previous studies have recognised. Furthermore, the connection began quite early, five years or so at most after Japan's reemergence on the international stage, and continued throughout the entire period. There were many Japanese personalities and agents involved in this relationship. One of the significant aspects of relations was military personalities involvement in Mongolia. Japanese elites were seeking to co-exist with their continental rivals, Russia and China, and at the same time to carve out Japan's own sphere of influence on the continent.

At the beginning of twentieth century, the Mongol leaders faced an old dilemma in their search to protect Mongolia from its two neighbours. In order to survive, the Mongols sought Russian help and proclaimed their independence. Tsarist Russia, however restrained by secret treaties with Japan, was not able to full support. In the eyes of the Mongol leaders, Japan-which defeated Russia in 1905-, was the only country capable of supporting them. The newly created Mongolian government repeatedly appealed to Japan during 1912-14 for help and protection. Although, rejected by Japan, these early Mongol attempts to link up with Japan represent the first Mongol attempts to find a third force with which to break Russian and Chinese domination.

Japan made important contribution to the development of nationalism in both Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia during the 1911 Chinese Revolution and again during the 1930s. Japan was involved in Outer Mongolia to the development of Mongolia as a nation, both prior to the declaration of independence from the Qing dynasty in 1911 and in the decade following. Various Russo-Japanese agreements signed between 1907 and 1916, with particular reference to the establishment of Russian and Japanese military support between 1918 and 1922

for the pan-Mongol movement, which calls for the union of all the various Mongol peoples into one 'Greater Mongolia'.

Since the late nineteenth century Japanese policy makers were wanted to influence and perhaps dominate Mongolia. Hence, the general knowledge has been that the Japanese military drove itself into armed encounter with Manchuria and Mongolia. The geo-political importance of Mongolia was recognized by the government officials and wanted to take advantage of the Qing dynasty's collapse in 1911 so as to become the controlling force in Northeast Asia. In 1921, the Communist revolution in Mongolia prevented the Japanese a role, hence their attention was turned to Inner Mongolia, a playing region for them in the 1930s.

Russian revolution of 1917 gave the reason to Japan for active and open involvement in Mongolian affairs. It was also because those Russo-Japanese secret treaties of 1907 and 1912 were meaningless due to removal of Tsarist government by Bolsheviks. The confused environment in Russia followed by Russian Revolution thus provided a fair chance to the Japanese to play an active role and to exploit the idea of pan-mongolism. Ataman Semenov was the first who received the Japanese aid to promote the idea of pan-mongolism. However, today it is matter of argument whether the Japanese aid was given to Semenov to fight Bolsheviks or to create pan-Mongolian state.

The attempts by members of various interest groups to increase Japanese control of Mongolia during the Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements of 1912 and 1916 and the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22 should not be examined in isolation. Rather, the three operations, and the ongoing diplomatic overtures by Japan to China and Russia, must be seen as part of a larger pattern. The independence movement of 1912 was not the first attempt by Japanese military officers to enlarge Japan's sphere of influence into Mongolia, though earlier efforts had been less ambitious. The Japanese military had made several attempts prior to the collapse of the Qing dynasty to strengthen Japan's position in Inner Mongolia, including by such means as encouraging the activities of Kawahara Misako as teacher and intelligence officer in the months preceding the Russo-

Japanese War of 1904-5, and placing Japanese Army officers in parts of Inner Mongolia prior to the collapse of the Qing dynasty.

One thing that is distinctive about this period, however, and yet has been neglected in other works, is the high-level tolerance of apparently renegade army actions in Mongolia. From the first independence movement of 1912 through to the end of the Siberian Intervention in 1922 the pattern of apparent insubordination, and tolerance of it, grew steadily larger. In 1912 it was probably only a handful of officers out in the field who disobeyed official orders, although it is possible, as Valliant has suggested, that Fukushima Yasumasa, a senior officer in the high command, was quite deeply involved. In 1916, apparent insubordination again seems to have been accepted in connection with operations in Mongolia, as seen by the evident lack of censure of Koiso by the Army General Staff, although the General Staff did appear to follow the wishes of the civilian government in officially suspending assistance to the forces led by Babujab. By the time of the Siberian Intervention even the semblance of willingness by the Army General Staff to kowtow to the civilian authorities had ceased, as can be seen in the call by high-ranking army officers for aid to White Russian leaders in May 1921, some two years after the civilian government had decided to suspend such aid. Clearly, some in the high command were prepared to ignore the civilian authorities when it came to operations in Mongolia, especially if the decisions made by the civilian authorities interfered with attempts by the military to extend Japan's control over the region. Operations were conducted, however, in such a way that the high command could plead ignorance of what had occurred if the attempt failed.

Despite the failure of the various Japanese-backed attempts to gain control of Mongolia during this period, the degree of attention shown by the Japanese military and other groups to Mongolia indicates the perceived strategic significance of the region to Japan. Moreover, the overtures made by some in the Outer Mongolian government to Japan, in an attempt to gain diplomatic recognition for their independence from Han Chinese domination, to counter Russian interference, and to enhance their own claim to influence over Inner Mongolia, indicate that some Outer Mongolians favoured the idea of Japan

playing an active role in their future. These overtures no doubt also served to strengthen Japanese leaders' belief that Japan was or could be the leader of Asia.

Pan-Mongolia was created by a few men around the negotiating table and approved on paper only. Therefore, it never materialized nor had any chance of survival. Japan alone supported its formation. The Soviets were extremely alarmed at this plan because if such a state were in fact created it would certainly be used as Japanese military stronghold against the Soviets. Pan-Mongolism factor was exploited by foreign players like Japan, Russia and China but especially by Japan. They left no stone unturned so far as exploitation of the Pan-Mongolism concept for their benefit is concerned.

From 1918 to 1939, Japan attempted to use Mongol nationalism in her favor by trying to influence the practice of Buddhism in Mongol territories. Buddhism for centuries was an important part of Mongol culture, and changes in the political situation of the Mongols in the early twentieth century, it was Buddhism that Mongol nationalism rallied around. This was keenly recognized by the Japanese and an attempt was further made to use Buddhism as a force that united to create a 'Great Mongol State', hoping to bring all Mongol ethnic groups under the control of Japan . However, even though they knew about the Buddhist religion, their efforts to manipulate Mongolian Buddhism in order to promote Mongol nationalism did not succeed.

While aiding the pan-Mongolism movement the Japanese had always been pragmatic. In doing so their agenda of Panasiatism was kept in mind. By perpetuating the white movement in Siberia and aiding development and dissemination of Pan-Mongolism, Japan was slowly building the background for winning Mongolia the buffer zone in the Far Eastern conflict. If it could control Mongolia it was confident of a successful expansion in the Soviet Far East. The Mongols were never considered competitive in the fight for hegemony in Asia by the Japanese. They tried to keep their national feelings and used it against western hegemony and especially red colonialism . The consummate weapon used for spreading anticommunist hate and tendencies for Japanese sake in Mongolia were the high lamas' circles.

There was an inescapable dilemma faced by the Japanese imperialism in Asia traditionally. On the one hand, the necessity of unity with other Asian countries of the East in opposition to the West, on the other, tendency to control the neighbours, sacrificing their national interests. Tokyo cared the least for Mongolia's independence. On the contrary, the internal structural frailty of lamaistic institute was skillfully used by encouraging intrigues and recommending at the same time a basic Pan-Buddhist idea of all Mongol tribes' unity , Japan was strategizing a progressive intrusion intoInner and Outer Mongolia, northern China, Tibet and Eastern Turkestan. The Mongols could not help understanding it and, naturally, didn't entirely trust the Japanese agents.

As a part of Japan's imperial strategy, Japan sought to recruit Mongolian Buddhism in Northeast Asia. The main aim of Japan was to win the support of the Mongol in the region by showing to be a patron of Buddhism and to utilize Buddhism as a medium to modernize the Mongolian society in the broader interests of the war effort. In a lot of ways, these two aims seemed to contradict each other, because patronizing Buddhism meant conserving aged practices while modernization meant bringing about reforms. In the Japanese policy this contradiction was never worked. However, more significantly, Japanese plans were compelled and aided by the yearning of the Mongols themselves. As it was difficult for them to make policies for Mongolian Buddhism, realization dawned on the Japanese authorities that they had infiltrated a complicated world of Mongol politics, in which a tussle between conservative and progressive groups existed to shape the future of their nation. Japan's hesitance to back up any group meant that its policies was a drive for Mongol aspirations rather than for its own. The alterations that Japanese intercession brought about in Mongolian Buddhism were in the end more a result of domestic Mongolian politics than of Japanese intentions.

For spiritual and political reasons, the Japanese encouraged and allowed Buddhism and Mongolian national movements. However, Japan had to reconsider the role it had been paying internationally after the consequences of their realistic and aggressive nature, the defeat in the Second World War. A lot of Mongolians are of the opinion that Japan prior to 1945 had perhaps showed the best hope, kept

China out of Mongolia, forced the Russians out, supported Pan-Mongolism and Buddhism, and withal, and kept a distance doing these things.

The Japanese creation of Manchukuo and occupation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia has left a legacy among the Mongols of these regions, the discussion of which falls outside our field. But we cannot refrain from adding that the recent history of Outer Mongolia might have been different if Japanese strategy had turned northwest instead of south.

Mongols in Manchukuo were to be made into models for Mongols from other parts of the continent. The Japanese army supported the establishment of a series of autonomous governments in the western part of Inner Mongolia on condition that these governments would rely on Japan and with the aim of creating a base for Japanese expansion further west, north and south. Japanese 'sup port' for Mongol nationalism went only so far as building amongst the Mongols in Manchukuo a certain level of political conscious ness, so that they could influence their brothers and sisters in the other parts of the world. But it was only under the circumstance that it would not harm the harmony of Manchukuo. Japanese army's support for the Mongolian independence movement in the western part of Inner Mongolia was very much conditioned by Japan's pol icy towards China. Like any other Japanese colonies, Manchukuo and the Mongol lands were to be modelled as submissive servants of the great Japanese Empire and contribute to the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.

In 1932-1936, the structure the USSR MPR Manchukuo China was forming. Solving the Japanese-Soviet conflicts under consideration of the axis Rome-Berlin-Tokyo and the aggressive Panasiatic Japan’s strategy must have happened and did happen in the form of military conflict. Despite all Japanese attempts to use the right and left mistakes of MPRP, to win the most important Party departments, government, administration and military apparatus, the USSR firmly adhered to forming the military-political axis of Moscow-Ulaanbaatar and to maintain MPRP according to the Soviet model. That provided the Soviet strategy with victory not only at Khalhin-Gol in 1939 but at the final establishment of the social course of development in Mongolia. However, Inner Mongolia did not

share that fate. It became a victim in the play among the Soviet Union, Japan and China.

The recognition of a regional Mongol interest by the creation of Hsingan province is important because it means instead of two nations, each treating its Mongol subjects as auxiliaries or victims as seemed expedient, three nations are now bidding for power. This in turn means that the Mongols no longer be disposed of arbitrarily: they must be Courted, and thus they have once more become to a certain extent agents to their own destiny. Until a year ago, they had only the choice of extinction under Chinese rule or drastic social revolution under Outer Mongolia, affiliated as it it with soviet russia. Now they have at least a margin of bargaining power, for any concerted action, or even the Action of a minority, can profoundly effect the policies and strategic positions of Russia, China and Japan.

It, can, thus, be seen how the creation of Hsingan province in Manchukuo has tightened up all the latent tensions in Mongolia. Until the Japanese intervention of 193I, two main forces were at work among the Mongols. In Outer Mongolia, a Mongol nation was being built, under strong Russian influence but nonetheless nationalistic in character. Throughout Inner Mongolia, the Chinese were encroaching and the Mongols were being wiped out. The princes were supported by the Chinese authorities, and were encouraged to assume absolute powers (powers a good deal greater than those they had exercised under the old, pure Mongol tradition) in the domains that were left to them; but at the same time they were forced to yield fresh grants of land to the Chinese every year.

This deprived the Mongols of their natural leaders, and faced them with the bitter choice of extinction if they remained under Chinese domination, as against combined rebellion and social revolution if they should attempt to break away. The princes, as a class, were necessarily opposed to union with Outer Mongolia, because it would have meant that many of them would have been killed and the rest deprived of all their powers and revenue. By the creation of Hsingan province, however, a fresh alternative was made possible. Since the Mongols of Manchukuo have been given regional autonomy, with a status, which approximates to alliance with the Japanese, the princes have been able to assume

once more the position of natural leaders of their people, in a movement, which may yet restore unity and nationality to the Mongols. The princes therefore are no longer defeatists by the necessity of their position, and Inner Mongolia has emerged into open and dangerous rivalry with Outer Mongolia. The choice before the Mongols, as a whole, is between revolutionary nationalism, in association with Russia, and conservative nationalism, in association with Japan but led by their own princes, descendants of the holy House of Chingghis, and fortified by their own religion, which as part of the old "feudal" system has suffered heavily in Outer Mongolia.

It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Japanese strategy in World War II might have been different if Japanese started the miniature and Manchukuo troops in the Nomonhan area near Outer Mongolian frontier in 1939 had not resulted in severe defeat. As we have seen, border incidents in that region were long standing, but the intensity of the battles, including the use of aircraft and tanks provided a new element. There is no evidence to show that the Mongols of Manchuria took this opportunity to revolt and thus to increase the difficulties of the Japanese. However, Japanese plans had certainly received a setback, which not only influenced their general policy towards Russia, but also their plans in Manchukuo. Their strategic railway construction had brought them close to the Outer Mongolian Frontier at Wen Chuan (Arshan). It was intended to continue this railway northwards so as to link up with the former Chinese Eastern Railway at Hailar, but the project was not carried out, possibly because such a line would have run too near the Outer Mongolian frontier and particularly near the Nomonhan area, where the Mixed Border Commission, set up at the end of the fighting in September 1939, was making no progress because, as an official Japanese statement put it, of “technical difficulties unforeseen by both parties; and the approach of severe winter left no choice but to suspend the work.”

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the way for the Nazi-Soviet pact. The battle militarily proved the efficaciousness of the operational art of the Soviets; though not until Moscow in December of 1941 did the Germans begin to notice.

The powerful demonstration at Nomonhan of the Soviet Union's willingness to commit large forces to the defense of the territorial integrity of the MPR established the de facto existence of the MPR as a separate, independent state. Border negotiations between Japanese-Manchukuoan and Soviet-Mongol representatives over the next ten months [September 1939 - June 1940] served to confirm the existence of a Mongol nation made up of an area defined by Tsarist ministers in 1915. The Soviet Union had thus tested its eastern buffer zone, Outer Mongolia, in battle, and subsequently tested it politically at Yalta. The Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference says simply: "The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved." This recognition of Outer Mongolia as an independent entity confirmed the Soviet sphere of influence there and, in effect, the separateness of Inner and Outer Mongolia.

Nomonhan marked the high point of Japanese expansion in North-East Asia. Had the thrust into Outer Mongolia been successful and not been challenged by the Soviet Union, the Inner Mongol hope for *Mengkukuo* might well have become a reality. Instead the Mongols of Inner and Outer Mongolia were effectively and finally split apart by the Japanese defeat. Six years later the cleavage of the two Mongolia was formally recognized by the Yalta agreement by which the Great Powers recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia.

In sum, certain common themes are evident throughout this formative period in relations between Mongolia and Japan, themes that embedded themselves in Japanese discourse about the region and remained persistent for decades afterwards. Some Meiji-period observers believed that Japan and Mongolia shared a common racial heritage; along with this the idea developed that there was something inherently romantic about Mongolia. Underlying the romantic perception, however, was the far more important fact that Mongolia occupied a vital geo-strategic position, lying as it did between Russia and China. This was the

overriding concern for those in the Japanese elites who cast their eyes towards Mongolia, though they couched their views partly in culturally romantic terms. Alongside geo-strategic considerations, another significant feature of the Japanese-Mongolian relationship that was established in this early period was the interdependence of military and civilian elements in the quest for greater Japanese control over Mongolia, an interdependence that continued until 1945.

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APPENDIX I

AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND MONGOLIA, WITH ACCOMPANYING PROTOCOL

Signed at Urga, October 211 November 3, 1912

In accordance with the desire unanimously expressed by the Mongolians to maintain the national and historic constitution of their country, the Chinese troops and authorities were obliged to evacuate Mongolian territory, and Djebzoun Damba-Khutukhta was proclaimed Ruler of the Mongolian people. The old relations between Mongolia and China thus came to an end.

At the present moment, taking into consideration the facts stated above, as well as the mutual friendship which has always existed between the Russians and the Mongolian nations, and in view of the necessity of defining exactly the system regulating trade between Russia and Mongolia:

The Actual State Councillor Jean Korostovetz, duly authorized for the purpose by the imperial Russian Government; and

The protector of the ten thousand doctrines, Sain Noyon Khan Namnan Souroun, President of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia;

The plenipotentiary Tchin-souzouktou Tzin-van Lama Tzerin-Tchimet, ·Minister of the Interior;

The plenipotentiary Daitzin-van Handa-dorji, of the rank of Khan-erdeni, Minister o f Foreign Affairs;

The plenipotentiary Erdeni Dalai Tzun-van Gombo-Souroun, Minister of War; The plenipotentiary Touchetou Tzun-van Tchakdorjab, Minister of Finance; and The plenipotentiary Erdeni Tzun-van Namsarai, Minister of Justice;

Duly authorized by the Ruler of the Mongolian nation, by the Mongolian Government and by the ruling Princes, have agreed as follows:-

Article 1

The Imperial Russian Government shall assist Mongolia to maintain the autonomous regime, which she has established, as also the right to have her national army, and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonization of her land by the Chinese.

Article 2

The Ruler of Mongolia and the Mongolian Government shall grant, as in the past, to Russian subjects and trade the enjoyment in their possessions of the rights and privileges enumerated in the protocol annexed hereto.

It is well understood that there shall not be granted to other foreign subjects in Mongolia rights not enjoyed there by Russian subjects.

Article 3

If the Mongolian Government finds it necessary to conclude a separate treaty with China or another foreign Power, the new treaty shall in no case infringe the clauses of the present agreement and of the protocol annexed thereto, or modify them without the consent of the imperial Russian Government.

Article 4

The present amicable agreement shall come into force from the date of its signature.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries, having compared the two texts, Russian and Mongolian, of the present agreement, made in duplicate, and having found the two texts to correspond, have signed them, have affixed thereto their seals, and have exchanged texts.

Done at Urga on the 21st October 1912, corresponding to the 24th day of the last autumn month of the 2nd year of the reign of the Unanimously Proclaimed, according to the Mongolian calendar.

Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol.lO (4): 180-182, American Society o f International Law, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2212302, Accessed: 01/04/2009.

APPENDIX II

Protocol annexed to Russo-Mongolian Agreement of the. 2F1 October (3rd November), 1912

By virtue of the enactment of the second article of the agreement signed on this date between Actual State Councillor, Ivan Korostovets, plenipotentiary ofthe Imperial Russian Government, and the President of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Sain-noin Khan Namnan Souroun, the protector of ten thousand doctrines; plenipotentiary and minister ofthe Interior, Tchin-souzouktou Tzin-van Lama Tzerin Tchimet; the plenipotentiary and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Daitzin van Handa-dorji of the rank of Khan-erdeni; the plenipotentiary and Minister of War, Erdeni-Dalai Tzun-van Gombo-Souroun; the plenipotentiary and Minister of Finance, Touchetou Tzun-van Tchakdorjab; and the plenipotentiary and Minister of Justice, Erdeni Tzun-van Namsarai, on the authority of the Ruler of Mongolia, the Mongolian Government, and the ruling Princes; the above- named the plenipotentiaries have come to an agreement respecting the following articles, in which are set forth the rights and privileges of Russian. subjects in Mongolia, some of which they already enjoy, and the rights and privileges of Mongolian subjects in Russia:

Article 1

Russian subjects, as formerly, shall enjoy the rights to reside and move freely from one place to another throughout Mongolia; to engage there in every kind of commercial, industrial, and other business; and to enter into agreements of various kinds, whether with individuals, or firms, or institutions, officials or private, Russian, Mongolian, Chinese or foreign.

Article 2

Russian subjects, as formerly, shall enjoy the rights at all times to import and export, without payment of import and export dues, every kind of product of the soil and industry of Russia, Mongolia, China and other countries, and to trade freely in it without payment of any duties, taxes, or other dues.

The enactment of this (2^{nd}) article shall not extend to combined Russo-Chinese undertakings, or to Russian subjects falsely declaring themselves to be owners of wares not their property.

Article 3

Russian credit institutions shall have the right to open branches in Mongolia, and to transact all kinds of financial and other business, whether with individuals, institutions, or companies.

Article 4

Russian subjects may conclude purchases and sales in cash or by an exchange of wares (barter), and they may conclude agreements on credit. Neither “khoushuns" nor the Mongolian Treasury shall be held responsible for the debts of private individuals.

Article 5

The Mongolian authorities shall not preclude Mongolians or Chinese from completing any kind of commercial agreement with Russian subjects, from entering into their personal service, or into commercial and industrial undertakings formed by them. No rights of monopoly as regards commerce or industry shall be granted to any official or private companies, institutions, or individuals in Mongolia. I t is, o f course, understood that companies and individuals who have already received such monopolies from the Mongolian Government previous to the conclusion of this agreement shall retain their rights and privileges until the expiry of the period fixed.

Article 6

Russian subjects shall be everywhere granted the right, whether in towns or "khoshouns," to hold allotments on lease, or to acquire them as their own property for the purpose of organizing commercial industrial establishments, and also for the purpose of constructing houses, shops, and stores. In addition, Russian subjects shall have the right to lease vacant lands for cultivation. It is, of course, understood that these allotments shall be obtained and leased for the above- specified purposes, and not for speculative aims. These allotments shall be assigned by agreement with the Mongolian Government in accordance with existing laws of Mongolia, everywhere excepting in sacred places and pasturelands.

Article 7

Russian subjects shall be empowered to enter into agreements with the Mongolian Government respecting the working of minerals and timber, fisheries etc.

Article 8

The Russian Government shall have the right, in agreement with the Government of Mongolia, to appoint consuls in those parts of Mongolia it shall deem necessary. Similarly, the Mongolian Government shall be empowered to have government agents at those frontier parts of the Empire where, by mutual agreement, it shall be found necessary.

Article 9

At points where there are Russian consulates, as also in other localities of importance for Russian trade, there shall be allotted, by mutual agreement between Russian consuls and the Mongolian Government, special "factories" for various branches o f industry and the residence o f Russian subjects. These "factories" shall be under the exclusive control of the above-mentioned consuls, or of the heads of Russian commercial companies if there be no Russian consul.

Article 10

Russian subjects, in agreement with the Mongolian Government, shall retain the right to institute, at their own costs, a postal service for the dispatch of letters and the transit of wares between various localities in Mongolia and also between specified localities and points on the Russian frontiers. In the event of the construction of "stages" and other necessary buildings, the regulations set forth in Article 6 of this protocol must be duly observed.

Article 11

Russian consuls in Mongolia, in case of need, shall avail themselves of Mongolian Government postal establishments and messengers for the dispatch of official correspondence, and for other official requirements, provided that the gratuitous

requisition for this purpose shall not exceed one hundred horses and thirty camels per month. On every occasion, a courier's passport must be obtained from the Government of Mongolia. When travelling, Russian consuls, and Russian officials in general, shall avail themselves of the same establishments upon payment. The right to avail themselves of Mongolian Government "stages" shall be extended to private individuals, who are Russian subjects, upon payment for the use of such "stages" of amounts, which shall be determined in agreement with the Mongolian Government.

Article 12

Russian subjects shall be granted the right to sail their own merchant-vessels on, and trade with the inhabitants along the banks of, those rivers and their tributaries which, running first through Mongolia, subsequently enter Russian territory. The Russian Government shall afford the Government of Mongolia assistance in the improvement of navigation on these rivers, the establishment of the necessary beacons, etc. The Mongolian Government authorities shall assign on these river places for the berthing of vessels, for the construction of wharves and warehouses, for the preparation of fuel, etc., being guided on these occasions by the enactments of Article 6 of the present protocol.

Article 13

Russian subjects shall have the right to avail themselves of all land and water routes for the carriage of wares and the droving of cattle, and upon agreement with the Mongolian authorities, they may construct, at their own cost, bridges, ferries, etc., with the right to exact a special due from persons crossing over.

Article 14

Travelling cattle, the property of Russian subjects, may stop for the purpose of resting and feeding. In the event of prolonged halts being necessary, the local authorities shall assign proper pasturage areas along travelling routes, and at cattle markets. Fees shall be exacted for the use of these pasturing areas for periods exceeding three months.

Article 15

The established usage of the Russian frontier population harvesting (hay), as also hunting and fishing, across the Mongolian border shall remain in force in the future without any alteration.

Article 16

Agreement between Russian subjects and institutions on the one side and Mongolians and Chinese on the other may be concluded verbally or in writing, and the contracting parties may present the agreement concluded to the local government authorities for certification. Should the latter see any objection to certifying the contract, they must immediately notify the fact to a Russian Consul, and the misunderstanding, which has arisen, shall be settled in an agreement with him.

It is hereby laid down that contracts respecting real estate must be in written form, and presented for certification and confirmation to the proper Mongolian Government authorities and a Russian consul. Documents bestowing rights to exploit natural resources require the confirmation ofthe Government of Mongolia.

In the event of disputes arising over the agreements concluded verbally or in writing, the parties may settle the matter amicably with the assistance of arbitrators selected by

each party. Should no settlement be reached by this method, the matter shall be decided by a mixed legal commission.

There shall be both permanent and temporary mixed legal commissions. Permanent commissions shall be instituted at places of residence of Russian consuls, and shall consist of the consul, or his representative, and a delegate of the Mongolian authorities of corresponding rank. Temporary commissions shall be instituted at places other than those already specified, as cases arise, and shall consist of representatives of a Russian consul and the prince of that "khoshun" to which the defendant belongs or in which he resides. Mixed commissions shall be empowered to call in as expert persons with a knowledge of the case from among Russian subjects, Mongolians, and Chinese. The decisions of mixed legal commissions shall be put into execution without delay, in case of Russian subjects through a Russian consul, and in the case of Mongolian and Chinese through the
prince of the "khoshun" to which the defendant belongs or in which he is resident.

Article 17

The present protocol shall come into force from the date of its signature. In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries, finding upon comparison of the two parallel text as of the present protocol- Russian and Mongolian- drawn up in duplicate, that the texts correspond, have signed each of them, affixed their seals, and exchanged texts.

Executed at Urga, the 21 51 October 1912 (o.s.) and by the Mongolian calendar, on the twenty-fourth day of the last autumn moon, in the second year of the administration ofthe "Unanimously Proclaimed".

[In the original follow the signature of M. Korostovets, Minister plenipotentiary; and in the Mongol language the signatures of the President of the Mongolian Council of Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, War, Finance, and ofJustice.

Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol.lO (4): 182-187, American Society o f International Law, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2212302, Accessed: 01/04/2009.

APPENDIX III

AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHINA, RUSSIA AND MONGOLIA
Signed at Kiakhta, June 7/ May 25, 1915

The President of the Republic of China,

His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russians, and

His Holiness the Bogdo (Great) Cheptsun (Venerable) Damba (sacred) Hut'okht'u (Reincarnated) Khan (Ruler) of Outer Mongolia,

Animated by a sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement various questions created by a new state of things in Outer Mongolia, have named for that purpose their plenipotentiary delegates, that is to say:

The President of the Republic of China, general Pi kuei-fang and Monsieur Ch'enLu, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China to Moxico;

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, His Councillor of State Alexandre Miller, Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General in Mongolia; and

His Holiness the Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Hut'ukht'u Kakn of Outer Mongolia, Eerh-te-ni Cho-nang Pei-tzu Se-leng-tan, Vice-Chief of Justice, and T'uhsieh-t'u Ch'in Wang Ch'a-K'o-tu-erh-cha-pu, Chief of Finance.

Who having verified their respective full powers found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

Article I

Outer Mongolia recognizes the Sino-Russian Declaration and the Notes exchanged between China and Russia of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (23 October 1913).

Article II

Outer Mongolia recognizes China's suzerainty. China and Russia recognizes the autonomy of Outer Mongolia forming part of Chinese territory.

Article III

Autonomous Mongolia has no right to international treaties with foreign Powers respecting political and territorial questions.

As respects questions of a political and territorial nature in Outer Mongolia the Chinese Government engages to conform to Article II of the Notes exchanged between China and Russia on the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (23rd October, 1913).

Article IV

The title "Bogd Vheptsun damba Kut'ukt'u of Outer Mongolia" is conferred by the President of the Republic of China. The calendar of the Republic as well as the Mongol calendar of cyclical signs are to be used in official documents.

Article V

China and Russia, conformably to Article II and III of the Sino-Russian Declaration of the 51h day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China, 23rd October 1913, recognize the exclusive right of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia to attend to all the affairs of its internal administration and to conclude with foreign Powers international treaties and agreements respecting all questions of a commercial and industrial nature concerning autonomous Mongolia.

Article VI

Comfortably to the same article III of the Declaration, China and Russia engage not to interfere in the system of autonomous internal administration existing in Outer Mongolia.

Article VII

The military escort ofthe Chinese Dignitary at Urga provided for by the Article III of the above-mentioned Declaration is not to exceed two hundred men. The military escorts of his assistants at Uliassutai, at Kobdo and at Mongolian- Kiakhta are not to exceed fifty men each. If, by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, assistants of the Chinese Dignitary are appointed in other localities of Outer Mongolia, their military escorts are not to exceed fifty men each.

Article VIII

Of all ceremonial or official occasions the first place of honor is due to the Chinese Dignitary. He has the right, if necessary, to present himself in private audience with His Holiness Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Kut'uhkt'u Khan of Outer Mongolia. The Imperial representative of Russia enjoys the same right of private audience.

Article IX

The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants in different localities of Outer Mongolia provided for by Article VII of this agreement are to exercise general control lest the acts of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia and its subordinate authorities may impair the suzerain rights and interests of China and her subjects in Autonomous Mongolia.

Article XI

Comfortably to Article IV of the Notes exchanged between China and Russia on the 5th day of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (23rd October, 1913), the territory of the Autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the regions, which were under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban at Urga, of the Tartar-General at Uliassutai and of Chinese Amban at Kobdo; and connects with the boundary of China by the limits of the banners of the four aimaks of Khalkha and of the district of Khobdo, bounded by the district of Houlon-Bouire on the east, by Inner Mongolia in the south, by the province of Singkiang on the South-West, and by the districts of Altai on the west.

The formal delimitation between China and Autonomous Mongolia is to be carried out by a special commission of delegates of China, Russia, and Autonomous Mongolia, which shall set itself to the work of delimitation within a period of two years from the date of signature of the present government.

Article XII

It is understood that customs duties are not to be established for goods of whatever origin they may be, imported by Chinese merchants into Autonomous Mongolia. Nevertheless, Chinese merchants shall pay all the taxes on internal trade, which has been established in Outer Mongolia. Similarly, the merchants of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, when importing any kind of local production into Outer Mongolia, shall pay all the taxes on trade which have been established in Inner China and which may be established therein in the future, payable by Chinese merchants.

Goods of foreign origin imported from Autonomous Outer Mongolia into Inner China shall be subject to the customs duties stipulated in the regulations for land trade of the 7th year of the Reign of Kouang-Hsu (of 1881).

Article XIII

Civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese subjects residing in Autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be examined and adjudicated by the Chinese dignitary at Urga and by his assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia.

Article XIV

Civil and criminal actions arising between Mongols of Autonomous Outer Mongolia and Chinese subjects residing therein are to be examined and adjudicated conjointly by the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, or their delegates, and the Mongolian authorities. If the defendant or the accused is the Chinese subject and the claimant or the complainant is a Mongol of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, the joint examination and decision of the case are to be held at the Chinese Dignitary's place at Urga and at that of his assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia; if the defendant or the accused is a Mongol Autonomous Outer Mongolia and the claimant or the complainant is a Chinese subject, the case is to examined and decided in the same manner in the Mongolian yamen. The guilty are to be punished according to their own laws. The interested parties are free to arrange their disputes amicably by means of arbiters chosen by themselves.

Article XV

Civil and criminal actions arising between Mongols of Autonomous Outer Mongolia and Russian subjects residing therein are to be examined and decided comfortably to the stipulations of Article XVI o f the. Russo-Mongolian Commercial Protocol of 21st October 1912.

Article XVI

All civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese and Russian subjects in Autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be examined and decided in the following manner; in an action wherein the claimant or the complainant is a Russian subject and the defendant or accused is a Chinese subject, the Russian Consul personally or

through his delegate participates in the judicial trial, enjoying the same rights as the Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his delegate or his assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Mongolia. The Russian Consul or his delegate proceeds to the hearing of the claimant and the Russian witnesses in court session, and interrogates the defendant and the Chinese witnesses through the medium of the Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his delegate or of his assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia.; the Russian Consul or his delegate examines the evidence presented, demands security for "revindications" and has recourse to the opinion of experts, if he considers such expert opinion necessary for the elucidation of the rights of the parties, etc.; he takes part in deciding and in the drafting of the judgment, which he signs with the Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his delegate or his assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia. The execution of the judgment constitutes a duty of the Chinese authorities.

The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia may likewise personally or through their delegates be present at the hearing of an action in the consulates of Russia wherein the defendant or the accused is a Russian subject and the claimant or the complainant is a Chinese subject. The execution of the judgment constitutes a duty of the Russian authorities.

Article XVII

Since a section of the Kiakhta-Urga-Kagan telegraph line lies in the territory of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, it is agreed that the said section of the said telegraph line constitutes the complete property of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia.

The details respecting the establishment on the borders of that country and Inner Mongolia of a station to be administered by Chinese and Mongolian employees for the transmission of telegrams, as well as the questions of the tariff for telegrams transmitted and of the apportionment of the receipts, etc., are to be examined and settled by the special commission of technical delegates of China, Russia and Autonomous Mongolia.

Article XVIII

The Chinese postal institutions at Urga and Mongolian-Kiakhta remain in force on the old basis.

Article XIX

The Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia will place at the disposal of the Chinese Dignitary of Urga and of his assistants at Uliassutai, Khobdo and Mongolian-Kiakhta, as well as of their staff, the necessary houses, which are to constitute the complete property of the Government of the Republic of China. Similarly necessary grounds in the vicinity of the residence of the said staff are to be granted for their escorts.

Article XX

The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants in the other localities of Auttonomous Outer Mongolia and also their staffs are to enjoy the right to use the courier stations of the Autonomous Mongolian Government comfortably to the stipulation of Article XI of the Russo-Mongolian Protocol of 21st October, 1912.

Article XXI

The stipulations of the Sino-Russian Declaration and the Notes exchanged between China and Russia of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (23 October, 1913), as well as those of the Russo-Mongolian Commercial Protocol of the 21 October, 1912, remains in full force.

Article XXII

The present agreement drawn up in triplicate in Chinese, Russian, Mongolian and French, comes into force from the day of its signature. Of the four texts which have been duly compared and found to agree the French text shall be authoritative in the interpretation ofthe present agreement.

Done at Kiakhta the 7th day of the sixth month of the fourth year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the twenty-fifth of May (seventh of June), one thousand nine hundred fifteen.

Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol.lO (4): 251-256, American Society of International Law, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2212159, Accessed: 01/04/2009.

APPENDIX IV

DECLARATION MADE BY RUSSIA AND CHINA UPON SIGNING THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHINA RUSSIA AND MONGOLIA OF JUNE 7/ MAY 25, 1925

KIAKHTA, May 25 1915,
June 7

The undersigned Imperial Delegate Plenipotentiary of Russia to the tripartite negotiations at Kiakhta, duly authorized for this purpose, has the honor, on proceeding to sign the tripartite agreement of this day's date relating to Autonomous Outer Mongolia, to declare in the name of his government to their excellencies Messieurs Py Koue Fang and Tcheng Loh, Delegates Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to the tripartite negotiations at Kiakhta, as follows:

It is agreed that all the telegraph offices which are situated along that section of the Kalan-Urga-Kiakhta line which lies within Outer Mongolia and of which mention is made in Article XVII of the agreement of Kiacta, are to be handed over by the Chinese officials to the Mongolian officials within a period at most of six months after the signing of the agreement; and that the point of junction of the Chinese and Mongolian lines is to be fixed by the technical commission provided for in the aforesaid article.

The above is at the same time brought to the knowledge of the Delegates Plenipotentiary o f the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia.

The undersigned seizes this occasion to renew to the Delegates Plenipotentiary of the Republic o f China the assurances o f his very high considerations.

(signed)
A. Miller.

To MM. General Py Koue Fang and Tcheng Loh,
Chinese Delegates Plenipotentiary

KIAKHTA, May 25 1915
June 7,

The undersigned, Delegate Plenipotentiary of Russia to the tripartite negotiations at Kiakhta, has the honor to acknowledge to their Excellencies Messieurs Pu Koue Fang and Tcheng Loh, delegates Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to the tripartite negotiations at Kiakhta, the receipt of the following note of to-day's date:

"The undersigned Delegates Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to the tripartite negotiations at Kiakhta, duly authorized for this purpose, have the honor, on proceeding to sign the tripartite agreement of this day's date relating to Autonomous

Outer Mongolia, to declare in the name of their government to his Excellency, Mr. Miller, Imperial Delegate Plenipotentiary of Russia to the tripartite negotiations at Kiakhta as follows: From the day of signature of the present Sino-Russo-Mongolian agreement the Government of the Republic of

China grants a full amnesty to all Mongols who submitted to the Autonomous Government o f Outer Mongolia; it leaves to all the Mongols o f Outer Mongolia as of Inner Mongolia the freedom as before of residence and travel in the said regions. The Government of the Republic of China will not place any restraint upon Mongols going in pilgrimage to testify their veneration to His Holiness Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Hut'ukhtt'u Khan of Outer Mongolia.

The undersigned seizes this occasion to renew to the Delegates Plenipotentiary
Of the Republic of China the assurances of his very high consideration.

(signed)
A. Miller.

To MM General Py Koue Fang and Tcheng Loh,
Chinese Delegates Plenipotentiary.

Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol.lO (4): 257-258, American Society of International Law, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2212160, Accessed: 01/04/2009

APPENDIX V

MONGOLIA-THE USSR FRIENDSHIP PACT, 1921

All treaties and agreements concluded between the former Tsarist government of Russia and the former government of Autonomous Mongolia, which was forced to such signature by the annexationist policy of the former, have lost their force by virtue of the new situation, which has arisen in both countries. The People's Government of Mongolia on the other hand and the Government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist republic on the other, therefore, moved by a sincere desire for free mutual friendliness and cooperation between both their neighboring peoples have decided with that aim in view to enter into negotiation.

Article 1- The Russian Soviet and the Revolutionary Mongol Governments mutually recognize each other as the only governments in the territory of Russia and Mongolia.

Article 2- Both Governments agree mutually to respect each other, and not allow on their respective territories formation of groups, or the recruiting of troops, hostile to one of the contracting parties, as also not to allow the transportation of arms and the transit of troops, hostile to one of the contracting parties, through their territory.

Article 3- Both Governments will establish, at their discretion, consulates in necessary places.

Article 4- The question of frontier delimitation must be decided immediately by a joint Russo-Mongol commission.

Article 5- Citizens of either Contracting Party residing in the territory of the other must be judged, both in civil and in criminal cases, according to the laws of their own country.

Article 6- Taxes on imports and exports will also be fixed by a Russo-Mongol mixed commission.

Article 7- The Soviet Government undertakes to establish in Mongolia, free of charge, postal and telegraphic communications and will supply necessary materials for this purpose, whereupon a special postal and telegraphic convention will be signed.

Article 8- The Mongolian Government recognizes the right of property on land within its territory and agrees to give the ground-space necessary for building of diverse kinds and for railways built with Russian capital. Article 9- The present Pact comes into force from the day of signature by the representatives of the Contracting Parties.

Moscow, 5 November 1921

(Source: Soni 2006: 237-38)

APPENDIX VI

MEMORANDUM ON THE POSITIVE POLICY IN MANCHURIA, PRESENTED TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN ON JULY 25, 1927, BY PRIME MINISTER, M. TANAKA.

Since the European war Japanese political and economic interests have been in an irregular state. This is due to the fact that we were not able to make use of our special privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia and entirely realise the rights we had gained. When I was appointed Prime Minister, I was particularly instructed to defend our interests in this sphere and to lose no opportunities for further expansion. Tasks of this sort cannot be considered lightly. Since I, in my capacity of a simple citizen, have been in favour of a positive policy in regard to Manchuria and Mongolia, I have been constantly endeavouring to put this policy into force. A special conference was called for the purpose of working out plans for the colonisation of the Far East and the development our new continental Empire, which worked for eleven days-from June 27 to July 7. All civil and military officials connected with Manchuria and Mongolia were present at this conference. The outcome of the discussions in which they participated was the passing of a resolution which we humbly present to Your Imperial Majesty for examination.

PREAMBLE

Manchuria and Mongolia include the Fengtien, Kirin and Hei Lung-Kiang province and Inner and Outer Mongolia. The whole of this district covers 74,000 square miles with a population of 28 million. This territory is over three times as large as that of our own Empire without Korea and Formosa, although the population is three times smaller than ours. The country is an attraction not only because of the sparsity of the population: nowhere in the world can there be found such rich forests, such a wealth of mineral resources and agricultural products. The South Manchurian Railways Company was specially created for the purpose of exploiting these riches and increasing our national glory. According to plans which should be equally advantageous both for China and for Japan, we invested no less than 440 million yens in our railways, shipping, forestry, steel, agricultural and cattle-breeding undertakings. This, without doubt, is our biggest investment and strongest organisation. Although this undertaking is nominally in the collective possession of the Government and the people, actually it is entirely in the hands of the Government. In so far as the South Manchuria Railways Company is empowered with diplomatic, police and ordinary administrative functions for the purpose of putting through our imperial policy, it is a special organisation which has exactly the same rights as the Korean Governor-General. This fact alone speaks of the enormous interests which we have in Manchuria and Mongolia. The policy being pursued towards this country has been pursued since the time of Emperor Medji, on the basis of his instructions, and is bringing about the development of a new continental Empire, which is essential for the further development of our national glory and the prosperity of innumerable future generations.

Unfortunately, since the European was there have been constant changes in home and foreign policy. The powers of the three Eastern provinces have also become alert and,

following our example, are making efforts at reconstruction and industrial development. We have to admit that there have been astounding successes which have most seriously hindered the growth of our influence. This has placed us in an unfavorable position and our negotiations with the constantly changing Governments of Manchuria and Mongolia have been unsuccessful. Moreover, the Nine Powers Agreement, signed at the Washington Conference, limited our special rights and privileges, to such an extent that we lost all freedom there. Our country's very existence is threatened.

If these obstacles are not removed, there will be no safeguard for our national existence, and our national power will not develop. Moreover, sources of wealth are concentrated in North Manchuria. If we are going to have no right to penetrate into North Manchuria, it is clear that we cannot lay hands upon the wealth of that country. Even the resources of South Manchuria, which we gained during the Russo-Japanese war, are severely limited by the agreement of the Nine Powers. As a result, while our people cannot freely settle in Manchuria, the Chinese are setting in huge numbers. Hordes of Chinese arrive each year in the three Eastern provinces and they number millions. They so menace our rights in Manchuria and Mongolia, that our annual surplus population which is over 800,000 persons can find no refuge for themselves there. In view of this we have to confess our failure in the attempts made to establish equilibrium between the size of our population and our food supplies. If steps are not taken to stop the influx of Chinese immediately, their number at the end of five years will exceed six million and we shall be faced with much bigger difficulties, in Manchuria and Mongolia.

It must be borne in mind that when the Nine Powers Agreement was signed, which limited our freedom of movement in Manchuria and Mongolia, public opinion was seriously disturbed. The late Emperor Taischo called a conference at which Yamagata and other high officials of the army and the fleet were present, to discuss ways and means of fighting against this new obligation. I was sent to Europe and America unofficially to obtain information concerning the attitude of important statesman on this question. They all considered that the agreement between the Great Powers was concluded upon the initiative of the United States of America. The other Powers who signed the agreement had nothing against the growth of our influence in Manchuria and Mongolia, provided we remain in a position to defend our interests in international trade and international investments. Declarations to this effect were made to me privately by political leaders in England, France and Italy. Unfortunately, just as we were about to put through our policy and, with the consent of those whom I had interviewed during my journey, to declare the Nine Powers Agreement invalid, Seiyukan Cabinet suddenly came to an end, and our policy could not put through. We regret this very strongly. Having exchanged opinions with the Powers about the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, I travelled back through Shanghai. In Shanghai a Chinaman made an attempt upon my life. An American woman was wounded, but I, thanks to the providential assistance extended to me by the spirits of my dead Emperors, was saved. It is obvious that sacred Providence wishes me to help Your Imperial Majesty to open up a new Era in the Far East and to develop our continental Empire.

The three Eastern provinces in the political sense are an imperfect stain upon the Far East. in the interests of self-defence and the defense of others, Japan cannot remove

the difficulties in Eastern Asia, without pursuing a policy of "blood and iron." But in pursuing this policy we shall be brought up face to face with the United States, who are directed towards us by the Chinese policy of fighting against the poison with help of poison. If we wish, in future, to gain control over China, we must crush the United States, i.e., behave towards the United States as we did during the Russo-Japanese war. In order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we are able conquer China, all the other Asiatic countries and the countries of the South Seas will fear us and capitulate before us. The world will then understand that Eastern Asia is ours, and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan entrusted to us by Emperor Medji, and its success if of substantial significance for our national existence.

The Nine Powers Agreement in exclusively the reflection of the spirit of trade rivalry. England and America wanted, by means of their great wealth, to smash our influence in China. The proposal for the limitation of armaments is merely a means of curtailing our military power and depriving us of the possibility of conquering the huge territory of China. On the other hand, the wealth of China will be in their hands, exclusively. This agreement is a plan by means of which England and America wish to smash our plans. The Minseito Government made a great affair of this Nine Powers Agreement, and emphasised our trade rather than our rights in China. This policy is incorrect: it is a policy of national suicide. England can allow herself the luxury of talking about trade only because she has India and Australia, which supply her foodstuffs and other goods. The same refers to America, for South America and Canada satisfy her requirements. Their energies can be wholly devoted to the development of trade in China for the purpose of enriching themselves. But the reserves of foodstuffs and raw materials in Japan are becoming less and less as her population increases. If we put all our hopes upon the development of trade, we may be smashed by England and America, with their invincible capitalist might. In the end we get nothing at all. A more dangerous factor is the fact that the Chinese people may wake up one fine day. Even now, in these days of internal confusion, they can peacefully toil and try to mimic us and displace our goods, thus hindering the development of our trade. When we remember that the Chinese are our only purchasers, we must fear the day when China unites and her industry begins to flourish. Americans and Europeans will compete with us, and our trade with China will be smashed. The proposal of Minseito to leave the Nine Power Agreement in force and pursue a trading policy towards Manchuria is nothing but a policy of suicide.

Having studied the existing conditions and possibilities inside our country, we have to confess that our best policy amounts to taking positive measures for the purpose of safeguarding our rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. They will make it possible for us to develop our trade. This will not only hold back the industrial development of China itself, but will disallow the penetration of European Powers into China. This is the only sane policy, the best policy.

In order to win real rights in Manchuria and Mongolia, we must use this district as a base, and penetrate into the rest of China under the pretext of developing our trade. Armed with already safeguarded rights, we shall seize the resources of the entire land. With all the resources of China at our disposal, we shall pass forward to the conquest of India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia and even Europe. But the first step must be seizure of control over Manchuria and Mongolia, if the Yamato race

wishes to surpass itself in continental Asia. The final victory will fall to that country which has sufficient food stores. Industrial prosperity is possible only in countries which are secure from the point of view of foodstuffs and raw materials; the full development of national power is possible only in a State which extends over an enormous territory. If we pursue a positive policy, extending our rights in Manchuria and in China, all these conditions so essential to a mighty nation will cease to be problems. Moreover, our surplus population will be provided for, amounting as it does to 700,000 annually. If we wish to begin a new policy and guarantee the permanent welfare of our Empire, we must pursue a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia.

MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA ARE NOT CHINESE TERRITORY.

From the historical point of view Manchuria and Mongolia are not Chinese territory or Chinese possessions. Dr. Yano has made a fundamental study of Chinese history and has come to the conclusion that Manchuria and Mongolia were never Chinese territory. This fact has been made public to the world by the authoritative representative of the Imperial University. The investigation of Dr. Yano are so meticulous that there can be found no professor in China who disputes them. Nevertheless it is a most unfortunate circumstance that in declaring war upon Russia our Government openly recognised the sovereignty of China over all other countries and repeated the same thing at the Washington Conference, when we signed the Nine Powers Agreement. As a result of these two mistakes of ours, the sovereignty of China in Manchuria and Mongolia is now established in diplomatic relations, and our interests consequently suffer. Although China talks about the Five Races Republic, nevertheless Tibet, Sintsiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria were always in the past special districts, and the princes had their own custom rights. In actual fact, therefore, the princes held the sovereign rights. We must explain the true state of affairs to the world at the first opportunity. We should also have penetrated into Inner and Outer Mongolia in order to reform the country. While the princes carry on their former administrative functions there, sovereign rights are in their hands. If we wish to penetrate into these territories, we must look upon the rulers and negotiate with them concerning rights and privileges. We shall have a fine opportunity and our national influence will rapidly grow.

OUR POSITIVE POLICY IN MANCHURIA

As for rights in Manchuria, we must take decisive steps on the basis of our twenty-one demands and attain the following in order to safeguard the rights we have won:-

1. When the agreement concerning trade leases expires in 1931, we must obtain the opportunity of extending the period as we wish. Further, our right to lease land for commercial, industrial and agricultural purposes must be recognised.
2. Japanese citizens must have the right to travel through, and live in, the Eastern part of Mongolia and engage in trade and industrial occupations there. China must free them from subjection to the Chinese law. They must not be liable to illegal taxation and illegal interrogation.

3. We must have the right to exploit nineteen coal and iron works in Fengtien and Kirin, and also the right to exploit the rich forests.
4. We must have the first rights in connection with the construction of railways and the placing of loans for this purpose in South Manchuria and East Mongolia.
5. The number of Japanese political, financial and military advisers must be increased. We must have the first right to give our own advisers.
6. We must have the right to organise police stations for the defence of Koreans in China.
7. The term of direction and development of the Kirin-Chanchung railway must be extended to 99 years.
8. We must have the exclusive right to sell special goods, and first right to support marine traffic from Europe and America.
9. We must be given the exclusive right to work up the mineral sources in Hei Lung-kiang.
10. We must be given the right to build the Kirin-Hoiren and Tsen-Tsin-Dalai railways.
11. Should money be required to buy up the Chinese-Eastern Railway, the Japanese Government should be given the first right to offer a loan to China.
12. We must be given special rights in the Andun and Inkow Ports and the rights of transit transportation across these harbours.
13. We must be co-partners of the Central Bank of the three Eastern provinces.
14. We must have the right of exploitation and of pasturage.

The POSITIVE POLICY TOWARDS INNER AND OUTER MONGOLIA.

Since Manchuria and Mongolia are still in the hands of the native princes, we must in future recognize them as the rulers of these lands and offer them support. Guided by this consideration, the daughter of the Kwantun Governor-General, Fukushima, risked her life by living among the barbarian Mongolian princes have become considerably closer. All princes of Inner and Outer Mongolian hold us in great respect, especially since we encourage them with special gifts and protection. There are at present nineteen retired Japanese officers in Tuschitu. We have already obtained the monopoly of the purchase of the wool, and the exploitation of mining resources there. We shall send secretly a still larger number of retired officers. They must be dressed as a Chinamen, in order not to draw the attention of the Mukden Government. Scattered in various places, they may engage in agriculture, cattle-breeding and the trading of wool. We can behave towards other princes just as we behaved to the prince in Tuschitu. We must have retired officers everywhere, in order to gain control in the princes. When there will be enough of our people in Inner or Outer Mongolia, we shall buy up the lands, paying for it one tenth of its true value, and begin to grow rice there in order to grow stock of foodstuffs. Where the land is not for the production of the rice. We can engage in cattle-breeding and breed horses, which would be very important in military senses. In other places we can engage in the canning industry and exports our goods to Europe and America. We shall also gain much by developing the fur and leather industry. Finally, Inner and Outer Mongolia will fall entirely into our hands. Since the question of sovereign rights is not sufficiently clear here, and the Chinese and soviet governments are engaged on other

affairs, we can peacefully extend our influence. When we have a large section of land in our hands, there will be no longer question as to whether Mongolia belong to the Japanese or to the Mongolians. Backed up by our military forces, we can realize our positive policy. In order to achieve this plan, one million yen must be assigned from the "secret fund of the War Ministry" and 400 retired officers must be sent to Inner and Outer Mongolia. These officers dressed as Chinese citizens and acting as teachers, must live among the population and the gain the confidence of the Mongolian princes, obtain from the right to engage in cattle-breeding and mining, and thus lay the foundations of our national interests for the coming hundred years.

IN SUPPORT AND DEFENCE OF KOREAN IMMIGRATION.

Since we annexed Korea, we have had very little trouble there. However, the declaration of president Wilson concerning the self-determination of races, made after the European war, played the role of a sacred revelation to the oppressed nations. The Koreans were no exception and the spirit of dissatisfaction spread throughout the land. As a result of the freedom which they enjoy in Manchuria, thanks to the imperfect police station, and also owning to the wealth of the land, no less one million Koreans are to be found in the three Eastern provinces. This development is extremely advantageous for us, and has considerably raised our influence from the economic and military point of view. On the other hand, this gives us fresh hopes in the sphere of administration for the Koreans. They will be our vanguard in the colonization of untouched lands and will be the links which binds us with the Chinese people. On the other hand, we would be able to make use of naturalized Koreans for the purpose of purchasing lands for growing rice, on the other hand, we could give them financial assistance through our co-operative societies, of the south Manchuria railways and so on, and thus we should be able to use them first of all for our economic penetration. This would mitigate our position in connection with foodstuffs and at the same tine open up the new possibilities of colonization. Koreans who become Chinese subjects are only Chinese formally and they will probably return to us. They cannot be compared with the naturalized Japanese in California and south America. They have merely become Chinese temporarily. When their number reaches two and half-million and more, and we shall support them, assuring then that we are suppressing the Korean movement. Since not all the Koreans become Chinese subjects, in the other hand, countries it will be known who actually brought about the Disorders-Chinese or Japanese Koreans. We shall always be able to mislead world public opinion.

Since it is possible to use the Koreans for this purpose, we must take measures to ensure that Chinese do not use them against us. But Manchuria as much under our jurisdiction as it is under Chinese. If the Chinese try to make use of the Koreans for war against us, we shall have an excuse for making war upon China. In that case Soviet Russia would be the most dangerous factor. If the Chinese use the "reds" to influence the Koreans, then the outlook of our people will change and a great danger will threaten us. The present Cabinet, in view of this, is taking all precautionary measures against this possibility. If we want to use the Koreans for the purpose of developing our new continental Empire, we must work out measures for their defense as carefully as possible. We must increase our police in the North Manchuria on the basis of the Mitsuia Agreements, in order to be able to use this force in support of the Koreans and to help them to move forward rapidly. Totku Kaicha (the Society for the

Development of the East) and the south Manchuria Railway company must also give them financial assistance. The Koreans must be placed specially advantageous conditions in order that they may develop the riches of Manchuria and Mongolia and monopolise all rights of the trade. The influx of Koreans into these territories is of such enormous economic and military importance, that the imperial government cannot fail to support it. It opens up new propects of our Empire. Since the Washington conference swept away all the advantages of the agreement concluded between Lansing and Ischi, our position can be restored only by the presence in Manchuria of the several millions of Koreans. As regards international relations there can be no difficulties in this respect.

The RAILWAYS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NEW CONTINENT

Transport is the basis of the national defense, the guarantee of success and the starting point of economic development. The Chinese railways extent over 7,200-7,300 miles, 3,000 of which are in Manchuria and Mongolia. Taking into consideration the size of Manchuria and Mongolia and the abundance of their natural resources, we may say that more railroads are required there, extending over no less than 5,000 to 6000 miles. It is a great pity that our railways are concentrated mainly in Southern Manchuria and do not extend to the sources of wealth which are to be found in the northern part of the land. There are many Chinese in South Manchuria who are favorably inclined towards our military and economic plans. If we wish to develop our natural wealth and strengthen our nation defense, we must build railways in North Manchuria. We can then send more Japanese to North Manchuria. From there we shall able to strengthen considerably our political and economic development in South Manchuria and strengthen our national defense in the interest of peace and order in the Far East. The South Manchurian railway was built mainly for economic purposes. There are no circular railroads, which are so necessary for the mobilization and transport of troops. From now onwards we must pursue our military aims and surround the heart of Manchuria and Mongolia with circular railways, in order, on the other hand, to smash the military, political and economic development of China and, on the other hand, to hold back the penetration of Russian influence. This is the key to our continental policy.

There are two main railways in Manchuria and Mongolia: The Chinese-Eastern and the South Manchurian. As for the railroads constructed by the Chinese, they will doubtless be of huge importance now because of the financial support of the Kirin Provincial Government. Based upon the combined resource of the Fengtien Government and the Heilunkiang province, the Chinese railways considerably overtake our south Manchurian Railway in development and begin violent competition. Fortunately for us the financial situation in the Fengtien Government is extremely disturbed and without our help the Chinese powers cannot put matters to rights. We must make use of this. We must take positive steps and gain to manipulate, the banknotes of the Fengtien Government will become entirely worthless and the province the be unable, of course, to think of developing Manchurian way. It forms the letter “T” with the South Manchurian Railway. This system does not answer our military purposes. If we look upon the south Manchurian Railways main branch, then Chinese should build their railroads in the direction of North to South, which would answer their requirements. Thus our interest ought not therefore to come into conflict with the Chinese. Now that Russia has lost all her influence and is not in a position to

penetrate into Manchuria and Mongolia, the Chinese must support us in our railroad construction. To our surprise, however the fengtien Government recently constructed two railways from Taguschin to Tunliao and from Kirin to Hainin for exclusively military purposes. These two railways are extremely unfavorable for our military plans in Manchuria and Mongolia and to the interests of the Mongolian railways. We most energetically protested, therefore, against this construction work.

If in the end these railways were constructed, this is because our representative, equally with the representative of the South Mongolian Railway, under-estimated the possibilities of the Fengtien Government. When we intervened, it was already too late and railway was finished. The Americans tried to invest capital in port Hulutao and to develop it with the help of British capitalists. The Fengtien government made use of this and invested American and British capital in these railways in order to deliver a blow at us. All we can do now is to await a suitable moment for opening up negotiations with china concerning these two railways.

Of late rumors have been spread to the effect that the Fengtien Government intends running a road from Taguschan to Harbin via Tunliao and Fu-Yu. This will be a direct line between Peking and Harbin via Tunliao and Fu-Yu. This will be a direct line between Peking and Harbin, which will not touch either the South Manchurian or the Chinese-Eastern Railways. More astounding still is the fact that they intend running another line from Mukden to Harbin via Hailun, Kirin, Uchan. If this plan is carried out, these two lines will surround the South Manchurian Railway and limit its sphere of activity to the minimum. This will smash our political and economic development of Manchuria and Mongolia, the aim or the Nine Powers Agreement will be reached, .10d our powers limited. The completion of these two railways will make the South Manchurian Railway entirely useless. The South Manchurian Railway Company will find itself face to face with a real crisis. However, in the existing financial conditions China cannot construct these two lines farther north than the South Manchurian line. This should put us somewhat al case. But if these two lines are built anti the Chinese Government fixes cheap rates in order to compete with the South Manchurian line, then not only we, but the Chinese-Eastern Railway as well will sustain a loss. Japan and Russia, of course, will not permit China to put through these measures of obstruction, the more so since the Chinese-Eastern Railway is largely dependent upon freight dispatched from Tsitsikar and Harbin.

The South Manchurian Railway does not answer out purposes. Taking into consideration our present requirements and our activities in the future, we must have control over the railways both in North and South Manchuria. The number of Chinese grows so rapidly in South Manchuria that our political and economic: interests sustain losses. We are compelled in the circumstances to take aggressive measures in North Manchuria in order to safeguard our prosperity in the future. But if the Chinese-Eastern Railway, belonging to Soviet Russia, develops in this district. then our new continental policy will receive a blow which will inevitably bring about conflict with Soviet Russia in the near future. In this case we shall again be obliged to play the role we played in the Russo-Japanese war. The Chinese-Eastern Railway will become ours just as the South Manchurian Railway became ours, and we shall seize Kirin as we seized Dniren. It seems that the inevitability of crossing swords with Russia on the fields of Mongolia in order to gain possession of the wealth of North Manchuria is part of our programme of national development. Until these hidden rocks are blown

up, our vessel cannot move rapidly ahead. We must demand from China the right to build important military railways. When these railways are finished, we can fill North Manchuria to overflowing with our forces. Soviet Russia will have to interfere and this will be our pretext for open conflict.

We must insist on the construction of the following railways:

(1) Tunliao-Sheches Railway. This will extend over 447 miles and the cost of construction will be 50 million yen. When it is completed it will be enormously useful in our struggle to develop Inner Mongolia. This, incidentally, is the most important railway line for us. Careful investigations by the War Ministry have shown that there are enormous stretches of land in Inner Mongolia suitable for the cultivation of rice. With this district properly developed, no fewer than 20 million of our Japanese population can live there. As many as two million head of cattle can be bred there, which we can use both for food and for export to Europe and America. Finally, there is the wool. The Mongolian sheep give three times as much wool as the Japanese. The South Manchurian Railway Company has made several experiments to prove this fact. The Mongolian wool is far better than Australian. Thanks to their cheap high-quality wool which they have in enormous quantities, Mongolia is a potential source of enormous wealth. If we support this industry by developing the railways, the output will increase ten times at least. We are hiding this fact from the rest of the world so that England and America may not begin to compete: with us. We must therefore as a first step get control of the transport and then begin to develop the woolen industry. If other countries get to hear of this in advance, we may find it is too late. With the railways at our disposal, we can develop the woolen industry not only for our own requirements, but for export to Europe and America. We shall be able to achieve our plans for the possession of Mongolia. This railway is a vital question for our policy in Mongolia. Without it Japan cannot play any role in Mongolian development.

(2) The Solun-Taonan Railway, this line will extend over 136 miles and will cost 10 million yen. 1f we look into the future of japan we have to admit the inevitability of war with Russia on the fields of North Manchuria. From the military point of view this railway will not only allow us to threaten Russia from the rear, but will deprive Russia of the possibility of bringing up reinforcements into North Mongolia. From the economic point of view this road makes it possible for us to exploit the rich resources of the Tao-Erho valley and strengthen the position of the South Manchurian line. The princes of the surrounding districts, who arc friendly disposed towards us, will be able to use this line to increase our influence and open up their territories to us. Our chances of co-operating with the Mongolian princes, obtaining land, mines and pasture-lands, and opening up trade with the native population, which is essential to our further penetration into the land, all depend upon this railroad. This, together with the Tunliao-Shcches Railway, will mean two railroads leading into Mongolia. When industry is fully developed we shall be able to spread our influence throughout Outer Mongolia. This line is dangerous, however, in that it can facilitate the migration of the Chinese into this new district and thus harm our policy. Remember the South Manchurian Railway. Does it not serve the interests of China? An important point is that the land and the mineral deposits lying in the neighbourhood of the railway belong to Mongolian princes. If we obtain possession of these lands and mines there will be no need to fear Chinese immigration. We can even compel the princes to pass laws prohibiting Chinese immigration. If life becomes difficult for the Chinese, they will, of course, leave the place. There are other methods as well, by means of which it

would be possible to prevent the Chinese from inhabiting these places. If we are sufficiently energetic, no sign of the Chinese will be left on Mongolian territory.

(3) The Chanchun-Tnonan section. As this railroad goes from Chanchun ta Fuyu and Dafai, the line between Chanchun and Taonan will extend over 131 miles and cost approximately 11 million yen. This line is of enormous economic importance, for the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia is concentrated in North Manchuria. We shall obtain access to North Manchuria and help the South Manchurian Railway, thus aiming a blow at East China. The railroad pass- through the valley of the River Sungari, where the soil is extremely fertile and there is an abundance of agricultural products. Near to DaIai ore the Yuelian waterfalls which can be used fur electrical energy. It is clear that this section of the railway will become a flourishing centre of industry and agriculture. Having built this line we can convert Dalai into a base for our advance upon Siberia along three roads: via Taonan. Anchan and Tsitsikar. The wealth of North Manchuria will fall into our hands. This line will help us to advance to Heilunkiang as well. Together with the road between Chanchun and Taonan, This will form n circular line which will be of strategical importance in our aim to penetrate into Mongolia. The population here is very sparse, but the land is rich. For a period of fifty years, there will be no need to use fertilisers. Having possession of this road we can control all the riches of North Manchuria and Mongolia. Here another 30 million people at least can live. When the Dunchuask road is completed and joined up with the line running from Hoiren to Korea, all products can be transported direct to Osaka and Tokio. In case of war, we should be able to send our troops into North Manchuria and Mongolia through the Sea of Japan direct, which would give the Chinese troops no chance of penetrating into North Manchuria. Neither American nor Russian boats can pass through the Korean Straits. As soon as the roads between Kirin and Hoinen and Chonchun and Dalai are completed, we shall be independent in the sphere of provisions and raw materials. In case of war no country can interfere with us. Therefore, when negotiations begin about Manchuria and Mongolia, China will have to submit and agree to our demands, if we want to put an end to the political existence of Manchuria and Mongolia, in accordance with the third phase of the plan of Emperor Medji, we must complete these two railways. Chanchun- Dalai Railway will considerably raise the value of the South Manchurian Railway and will itself be a paying concern. This is a most important beginning in our effort to penetrate into this territory.

(4) Kirin-Hoiren line. Although the Kirin-Dunchwk line is already complete, the Dunchuask-Hoiren line has yet to be constructed. The narrow 2ft. 6in. gauge which we have between Hoiren and Laod-Goigoi is of no use for the economic development of tire new continent. Eight million yet must be spent to broaden the gauge in this part of the line and 10 million yen on the construction of the Laod-Goigoi Hunhua line. This will cost approximately 20 million yen. When this is done we shall achieve success in our continental policy. Up to now, persons travelling to Europe have been compelled to travel either through Ddren or Vladivostock. Mow they can travel direct from Tsen-Tsin over the Siberian Railway. When this enormous transport system is in our hands, we shall have no need to hide our intentions in Manchuria and Mongolia, which form the third phase of the Medji plans. The Yamato race will then go forward to conquer the world. According to the legacy of Medji, our first step was to conquer Formosa and the second to annex Korea. Now the third step must be taken which consists in the conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia and China. When this has been

done, all the rest of Asia, including the islands of the South Seas will lie at our feet. The fact that these tasks have not yet been fulfilled is a crime on the part of your servants.

The people living in Kirin, Fengtien and a part of Heilunkiang are called in history the Suchans. The Suchans are scattered along the sea coast and the valleys of the Amur and Tiumen rivers, during various historical epochs they were referred to as Kulnyams, Suchons, Guebeys, Pals, Vots, Fuyus, Kendans, Bokhnys, Nushens. They are a mixed race. The forefathers of the Manchurian dynasty were born here. At first they possessed Kirin and then established their power in China for 300 years. If we wish to pursue our continental policy, we must take historical fact into consideration and first of all settle in this district. Hence the necessity for building the Kirin-Hoiren Railway.

The decision as to whether this road should finish in Tsen-Tsin or Lochin, or even Sunitsi, will depend upon circumstances. From the point of vim of national defence, Lachin is the ideal harbor and the ideal terminus. It is possible that this will be the best harbour in the world. On the one hand it will ruin Vladivostock and on the other hand it will be the centre of the rides of Manchuria and Mongolia, Daim is not yet our territory, and while Manchuria is still not part of our Empire, it will be difficult to develop this town. As a result we should be in a difficult position in case of war. The enemy could blockade the Tsusirna and Senshina Straits and we should be cut off from Manchuria and Mongolia. Having lost our resources, we should be conquered, the more so since England and America have been working jointly to cut down our power in these districts. One day we shall have to fight against America to defend ourselves and to be a warning to China as well. The American Asiatic Fleet whose base is in the Philippine Islands, would be near to Tsusima and Senshina. If they were to send submarines to these places we should be completely cut off from our Manchurian and Mongolian sources of provisions and raw materials, But if the Kirin-Hoiren Railway were completed, we should have a big circular line around the whole of Manchuria and Korea and a small line in North Manchuria. We would have complete freedom of movement in all directions and could send our soldiers and the necessary sup plies in all directions. If we were able to supply all necessary materials to our ports in Tsuruga and Nigata, with the help of this railway line, the submarines of the enemy would not be able to enter the Japanese and Korean Straits. In this case nobody could interfere with us and the Japanese Sea would be the centre of our national defence.

Having safeguarded the transport of provisions and raw materials, we would have nothing to fear from the American fleet or the Chinese or Russian armies. We could put dawn the Korean movement. I repeat, if we want to pursue our new continental policy, we must build this line. Manchuria and Mongolia are Eastern countries which are absolutely undeveloped. Sooner or later we shall have to fight against Soviet Russia. The fight will take place in Kirin.
In order to take the third step of the Medji plan as regards China, we must act as follows: -
I. We must mobilise the army divisions in Fukuoka and Hiroshima and despatch them into South Manchuria through Korea. Thus we shall prevent the movement of Chinese soldiers to the North.
2. We shall send the army divisions at present in Nagoia and Huansi by sea to Tsin-

Tsin, and from there to North Manchuria by the Girin-Hoiren Iine.
3. The Kwantun army will be despatched through Nigata and Chuchii or Login, and from there by the Kirin-Hoim road to North Manchuria.
4. The army divisions at present in Hokaido and Sendai must be despatched by sea from Aomori and Hokodato to Vladivostok, and from there by the Siberian railway to Harbin. They will stop at Fintuan, seize Mongolia and prevent the Russians from moving south.
5. All these divisions will form two large armies. In the south they will occupy Shanghaihuang and defend it from the northward march of the Chinese troops. In the north they will defend Tsitsikar from the movement of Russian troops into the south. Thus all the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia will fall into our hands. Even if the war continues for ten years, we shall have no fear of being left without supplies and armaments.

Let us see how far the Girin-Hoiren road is from our ports. Taking Tsin-Tsin as the starting point, from there to Vladivostok would be 130 miles, to Tsuruga 475 miles, to Modji 500 miles, Nagaski 650 miles, Fusan 500 miles. Take Port Tsuruga as the starting point. In this case we must take Osaka into consideration as the industrial centre.
I. From Chanchun to Osaka is 406 miles by land via Login and 475 miles by sea. The journey takes 51 hours.
2. If the journey is made through Dairen and Kobe, then Chanchun is 535 miles from Osaka by land and 870 miles by sea. The journey takes 92 hours.
If Tsuruga is the point of departure instead of Dairen, an economy of 41 hours is made If we reckon 30 miles an hour by land and 12 miles an hour by sea, we can curtail the length of the journey by one half, using the best ships and fast trains.

Manchuria and Mongolia are the Belgiums of the Far East. During the Great War, Belgium was converted into a battlefield. In our wars with Russia and the United States we must make Manchuria and Mongolia bear all the horrors of war. As it is obvious that we shall have to violate the neutrality of these territories, it is essential that we build the Kirin-Hoiren and Chaadun- Dalai railways, as they are necessary for our military preparations. In case of war we can then easily increase our military forces, and in peace time we can transport thousands of people into this district and cultivate rice there. This railway line, therefore, gives us the opportunity of economic development and of conquests with the help of armed forces.

The construction of the Kirin-Hoiren railway must be completed during the dry weather. The road has to pass through granite mountains. In order to make the tunnels the most up-to-date machines must be used. There is plenty of sand, bricks, clay and so on in this district, so we shall feel no shortage in this respect in building the road. Only rails, trucks and locomotives will have to be brought up. For this reason it will be possible to lower the cost of construction by at least 30 per cent. and finish the work in half the usual time required.

Careful investigations have been made by our General Staff Headquarters in the South Manchurian Railway Company, which show that in those districts lying along the railway, there are 200 million tons of timber. If we fell one million tons annually for import into our country, we can do this for a period of 200 years. We shall then not require American- timber, which costs us 80 to 100 million yen annually. We

cannot speak of this openly, for if China and Russia hear that we receive so much timber from Manchuria, they will want to compete with us and will themselves take over the construction of this line. Moreover, the United States might purchase the right to exploit this timber from the Fengtien Government. America could then kill our paper industry.

Kirin was called the "ocean of trees" even during the reign of Emperor Tsiaa-Lunia. Since then new trees have been planted. It would be difficult to imagine the wealth of these forests. In order to transport this timber from Kirin to Osaka through Chanchun and Dairen, a distance of 385 miles has to be covered. We have to pay 34 cents for each cubic foot of timber. In view of the expensive cost of transport, we cannot compete with America. However, if the Kirin-Hoiren railway is constructed, this distance can be curtailed by 700 miles. We could then despatch our timber by sea to Osaka at the cost of only 13 cents per cubic foot. We should then, of course, displace America entirely. If we reckon that one ton of timer gives a profit of 5 yen, then two milliard tons of timber would make it possible for us, thanks to the railway, to easily make a profit of one milliard yen. We should prohibit the import of American timber to Japan. Moreover, thanks to the reduction in the price of timber, we should be able to make another ao million yen a year through our furniture, paper, industries, etc.

There are the coal-mines of Sinchin as well, with 600 million tons of coal. In quality it is higher than the Fushun coal, it is easily obtained and from it, kerosene can be produced, which we could use ourselves or sell to China. The Kirin-Hoiren Railway would bring us several other advantages without the slightest difficulty. The coal would be an addition to that of the Fushun mines. With both these coalfields in our hands, we should have the key to the industries of China. We could make 5 yen a ton on the transport of Sinchin coal to Japan. This profit would rise to 16 yen, if we use all the chemical by-products from this coal. If we reckon an average of 15 yen profit on one ton, we should obtain on an average 200 milliard yen profit. All this wa should obtain exclusively as a result of the Kirin-Hoiren Railway. Further, there are the goldfields along the River Mutan, As soon as the Kirin-Hoiren Railway begins to work, the South Manchurian Railway Company will be able to make use of the rights it has gained in connection with the goldfields in Tsepigoy and the Kirin industrial and timber resources. A huge quantity of agricultural products, wheat and so on- can be had near to Dunhua.

There are also to be found 20 wine distilling works, 30 factories working up vegetable oils and so on. All this can be ours if we build the railway. Along the railroad, trade can be carried on with an annual turnover of 4 minion yen. The transport of agricultural products alone will not only cover all the exploitation Costs, but will give a net profit of 200,000 yen a year. If we take into consideration the profits to be gained by the transport of timber, coal and by-products, we should obtain the figure of 8 million yen annually. Besides this, our position on the Manchurian Railway would be consolidated; we should acquire rights in connection with timber, mines and so on and a huge number of Japanese would be migrated into North Manchuria. As a first step it is important to curtail the distance between Japan and the sources of wealth in North Manchuria. It will take only three hours to reach Hailin from Tsin-Tsin. Three hours would be required to travel from Hoiren to Sanfin and three hours more to cover the distance between the river Tiuminula and Luntsintsun. In 60 hours we could reach the rich resources of North Manchuria. This road alone will make it possible for

us to seize the enormous riches of North Manchuria.

4. Hunchun- Hailin railroad. The road will cover 173 miles, and cost 24 million yen to construct. Along this line there are dense forest lands. This road is essential if we are to strengthen the Kirin-Hoiren road and exploit the timber and mines of North Manchuria. It is essential if we are to convert Hoiren into a flourishing centre at the expence of Vladivostock. To the South of Hoiren and to the north of Dunhua there is Chintso Lake, which can be used for electrical energy. With this supply of energy at our disposal, we can gain control of agricultural and industrial undertakings of Manchuria and Mongolia. The investigations of South Manchurian Railway Company show that the lake can give at least 800,000 horse-power. With this mass of electrical energy we can easily conquer the industries of Manchuria and Mongolia. Rich resources will be available near to this enormous power centre, which will increase with phenomenal rapidity. We must quickly build this railway to facilitate the transport. The Sin-Kai lake is in the possession of China and Russia, and can also be used for purposes of electrical energy. In order that these two countries leave our plans untouched, we must pass a resolution at the international Electro-Conference which will take place in Tokio this year to the effect that in no district should there be more than one power station. The paper factory-Odju-has also obtained considerable rights in connection with timber near Nigata and Hailin. This factory requires that a power station be constructed immediately on Lake Chinpo, and the Hunchun-Hailin Railway be constructed as quickly as possible, for then it would be possible with great rapidity to transport raw materials growing wild in Mongolia.

If the Fen-Kirin-Uchan Railway Company and the Kirin authorities intend building the Uchan and Kirin-Mukden Railway, with Hulutao and Tientsin as ports, this is because they wish to gain possession of riches of North Manchuria. Having built the Hunchun-Hailin Railway we should not only strengthen Kirin-Hoiren, but would smash the Chinese plans and direct the flow of Manchurian riches to Port Tsin-Tsin. The cost of Transport would be one-third of the cost on the Chinese Railway and one-half of the Siberian. They would be incapable of competing against us, and the victory would be ours.

The total trade turnover in Manchuria is 7 to 8 milliard yen annually, and all this trade would be in our hands. Our trade in wool, cotton, soya beans, iron, amounts to one-twentieth of the world trade. Our trade is continually increasing. However, the wealthiest street in Dairen is in the Hands of the Chinese. And this is not all. The production of vegetable oil is the main branch of industry in Manchuria. Our share of this industry is only 6 per cent. Out of 38 factories in the vegetable oil industry in Inkow, there is not one Japanese, and out of 82 or 83 in Dairen only seven are Japanese. This is great pity. In order to gain our lost positions, we must firstof all develop the transport. Having gained control of the monopoly of finished product and raw materials, we should occupy a dominating position in this industry. Moreover, we must help the Japanese, engaged in this industry, by granting them large credits and thus displace the Chinese. In Osaka there are many Chinese trading our manufactured goods in Mongolia and Manchuria. They put up a strong competition against the Japanese living in China. It is more difficult for the Japanese, since their standard of living is higher and they require a higher rate of profit. On the other hand the Chinese also have their weak points. They obtain goods of an inferior quality and, on the other hand, they have to pay at least 10 per cent. more than the Japanese. They have to pay

2.70 yen more than the Japanese for every ton of goods, but in spite of this they successfully compete against our merchants in Manchuria. This speaks clearly enough of the incompetence of our people. The mere thought of this is horrifying. The Chinese is left entirely to himself and is given no help by the Government. The Japanese, living in Manchuria, is protected by his own Government and afforded long-term credits at an insignificant rate of interest. We should therefore organise an export co-operative society for trade with china. It should have special facilities on streamers and on the South Manchurian Railway, and the Huandun Government should afford it credits at a low rate of interest. We shall then be able to compete successfully with the Chinese merchant, develop our own industry in Manchuria and export our goods to all parts of the world.

The first step towards gaining control, financial and mercantile, in Manchuria and Mongolia consists in obtaining the monopoly of the sale of the products of these countries. We must have the monopoly rights on the sale of Mongolian and Manchurian products, because only in this case shall we be able to pursue our continental Policy, prevent the penetration of American capital and undermine the influence of the Chinese merchants.

Although Manchurian and Mongolian goods must pass through three ports-Dairen. Inkoi and Andun-nevertheless Dairen is the most important in the given case. There is an annual traffic of 7200 vessels through this port with a total tonnage 11,565,000. This amounts to 70 per cent. of the total Manchurian and Mongolian trade. From this port fifteen different steamship lines diverge. The majority of these lines serve the coastal shipping. We control all the transport system of Manchuria and Mongolia. We mayeven obtain the monopoly of the sale of special Manchurian products. In this case we should be able to develop our ocean transport and force the nikoi and Aundun ports into the background. We should control the trade of enormous quantities of beans, widely consumed in Central and South China. The Chinese use vegetable oil in their food, and in case of war we could cut them off from their supply of oil and they would suffer very considerably. With the control of their source foodstuff and the transport we could develop our own production of rice, increase the amount of fertilisers obtained in the form of by products from Fushun coal. In case of war we should place an embargo upon fertilisers and prohibit their import to Central and South China. This would be considerably curtail the output of foodstuffs by China. We should not forget this side of the question in building up our continental Empire. Neither should we forget that Europe and America also need enormous supplies of beans for the purpose of fertilisation. When we become the monopolisers of these products and control the transport both on land and on sea, then countries requiring the special products of Manchuria and Mongolia will seek our favour. We must gain control of the whole system of transport in order to obtain the monopoly of trade in Manchuria and Mongolia. Only thencan we suppress the Chinese merchant.

However, the Chinese are learning from our example and are hitting our trade with their own methods. We have not yet learned to compete successfully against them in the production of vegetables oils and in the sphere of water transport, we shall be able to pursue a double-edged policy. On the one hand we should endeavour to see that the Japanese learn from the experience of the Chinese in this business. At the same time we should not allow the Chinese to learn our industrial methods. Previously we had factories in Manchuria and Mongolia near to the sources of raw materials. The

Chinese were thus given the opportunity of discovering our secrets and opening their own factories which competed with our own. We must therefore send our raw materials to japan and work them up there, afterwards exporting them to China and other countries in the form of manufactured goods. We should thus give work to our own unemployed, hold back the influx of Chinese into Manchuria and Mongolia, and deprive the Chinese of the chance of copying our new industrial methods. The iron obtained in Penish and Anshaw, as well as Fushun coal would also be sent to china for final working up.

All this speaks of necessity of developing our ocean transport. We must extend the Dairen Company "Kizen Kaisha" and our Government must afford it a loan through the South Manchurian Railway company, at a high rate of interest. Next year we shall receive 50,000 tonnage for our ocean transport. This is quite sufficient to enable us to occupy a dominating position in trade with the far East. On the one hand we have the South Manchurian Railway which Guarantees our transport on the land, and on the other hand we have the control of an enormous amount of Manchurian and Mongolian products waiting for transport. The iron laws of economics guarantee us success if we extend our ocean transport from Dairen as the central port.

THE GOLD STANDARD IS ESSENTIAL.

In spite of the fact that Manchuria and Mongolia are within the sphere of our activities, the main currency there is silver. This brings about a partial contradiction with our gold standard and reacts unfavourably upon out interests. If Japanese living in these regions have not become wealthy, it is exclusively because the silver money system is in operation there. The Chinese stubbornly maintain the silver standard and we cannot, therefore, establish our plans for colonisation on a firm economic basis. We sustain losses as follow as a result:-

1. We carry money into Manchuria, based on the gold standard. There we have to exchange it for Chinese silver dollars. The exchange rate of the dollar frequently fluctuates as much as 20 per cent., causing heavy losses to our people living in Manchuria. Speculation is a common occupation and the investment of capital has fallen to 160,000 or 150,000 dollars (Chinese) as a result of the fall in the exchange rate of the silver money. Consequently we have several cases of bankruptcy.
2. The Chinese merchant makes use exclusively of silver money, and therefore suffers no losses from the fluctuations in the exchange rate. Although the Chinese have no exact idea of the exchange value of gold and silver, they always win in all forms of business. This is a natural gift of theirs, and we suffer from it. We suffer losses although we are supported by the banks. As a result of the imperfect money system, the population of Central and South China buy their beans exclusively from the Chinese. Here we can do nothing, and must therefore conquer the whole of China.
3. The Chinese Government can count the number of bank notes according to the increase in the amount of Japanese money in circulation. As a result our banks cannot fulfil their mission of increasing the influence of Japan in China.
4. If the gold standard were introduced, we could freely issue our banknotes on the basis of this standard. Backed up by these banknotes we could obtain the rights on all immovable and natural wealth and undermine the credit of the

Chinese silver banknotes. The Chinese could not compete with us, and the money circulation of Manchuria and Mongolia would be completely under our control.

5. The Governmental Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, the Transport Bank, the Frontier Bank and the General Credit and Financial Bank have silver banknotes to the value of 38 million dollars. It is obvious that these Chinese banknotes should have lost their value and they remain in circulation only because of the support afforded them by the Government. Until we discredit the Chinese silver banknotes, we shall not be able to displace them with our own gold banknotes in Manchuria and Mongolia and thus obtain the control of the financial monopoly in these two countries. With these valueless silver banknotes, the Three Eastern Provinces Government buys all sorts of goods, thus violating our interests. They demand gold when they sell these goods to us and this gold they keep inside china for the purpose of smashing our financial interests and trade. For this reason it is essential that the gold standard be introduced.

   We must displace the Manchurian silver banknotes and deprive the Government of all its purchasing power. We shall then be able to use our gold banknotes and thus seize the economic and financial business of Manchuria and Mongolia. We shall be able to force the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces to call in financial experts to help us to occupy a dominating position in the sphere of finance. when the Chinese banknotes lose all their value, our gold banknotes will take their place.

   EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO ENSURE THAT OTHER POWRES INVEST THEIR CAPITAL

Our traditional policy consists in not allowing a third Power to invest its capital in Manchuria and Mongolia. However, since the Nine Powers Agreement fixed the principle of equal opportunities for all, the principle of the international consortium according to which Manchuria and Mongolia are outside the sphere of our influence, an anachronism has arisen. The powers watch every movement we make and everything we do arouses their suspicion. In these circumstances it would be better if foreign capital were invested in the electrical undertakings and the alkali capital were invested in the electrical undertakings and the alkali industry. With American and European capital, we can develop Manchuria and Mongolia according to our own plans. We would thus allay international suspicions, clear the road for broader plans and compel the Powers to recognise the fact of our special position in this country. We should welcome all efforts on the part of the Powers to invest their capital, but we must not allow China to do business with the large Powers as it would like to do. Since we wish the Powers to recognise our special position in Manchuria and Mongolia both in the political and economic sense, we shall be compelled to interfere and to carry all the weight of responsibility, together with china. We must endeavour to ensure that our policy expands to take in also the diplomatic relations of China with other countries.

THE NEED TO MODIFY THE ORGANISATION OF THE SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY.

The South Manchuria Railway Company functions in Manchuria like the Korean Governor-General in the face of annexations. If we want to build our new continental Empire, we should change the whole organization of the company and remove the difficulties with which we have to fight. The functions of the company are many-sided. Every change in the Cabinet causes in the administration of the South Manchurian Railway and on the other hand the activities of the railway influence the Cabinet to a considerable extent. The point is that the South Manchuria Railway is semi-governmental. The Powers therefore consider this railway more in the nature of a political organ than a commercial enterprise. As soon as measures are taken for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, the Power turn to the Nine Powers Agreement in the order to smash the plans of the South Manchurian Railway. This has considerably harmed our interests. The South Manchuria Railway is under four-fold controls: the control of the Huandun Governor, the Supreme Representative of the authorities in the Dairen, the General Consul in Mukden and, finally, the President of the railway itself. These four plenipotentiaries have to exchange opinions in the Dairen before the railway company can take any important steps. Although their meetings take place behind closed door, nevertheless the Chinese powers of the Three Eastern Provinces learn a great deal. They do their utmost to prevent the Central Chinese authorities from their giving the necessary permission for the putting through of new measure, and moreover, all the decisions of the railway company have to receive the consent of the ministry for foreign affairs, the ministry of transport, the war ministry, and the approve the decision, then the railway company is powerless to act. Because of this, our present premier, although he recognizes his failures, nevertheless has taken upon himself the responsibilities of the minister of the foreign Affairs. Consequently we can more easily keep our plans in Manchuria a secret, and we can put them through with dispatch and determination. The south Manchurian Railway must be reorganised. All undertaking belonging to the railway must be converted into independent companies under the leadership of the South Manchurian Railway. We can then take decisive measures for the conquest of Manchurian and Mongolia. On the other hand we must take the proposition to the Chinese, Europeans and Americans, that they invest their money in the South Manchurian on the condition that the majority of the bond remain in our hands. The control of the railway will then remain with us. And we shall be able with even greater energy to carry our imperial mission. In inviting other powers to take part in the development of the South Manchurian Railway, we shall deceive the whole world. Having done this, we shall move forward into Manchuria and Mongolia, free ourselves from the limitations of the nine powers Agreement and strengthen our activities with the help of foreign capital.

The following are large undertakings belonging to the South Manchurian Railway:-

1. Iron and Steel.

Iron and steel are closely connected with our national development. However as a result of lack of ore, we cannot solve this problem. Up to now we have been compelled to import the ore from the Yangtze valley and the Malay Peninsula. The secret investigations of our headquarters show, however that there are rich deposits of iron in Mongoliaand Manchuria. According to the most modest accounts there are 10

billion tons of iron there. At first, when technique was not so highly developed, the Anshan iron and steel works had an annual loss of 3 million yen. Later when new methods were worked out, this deficit became smaller. In 1926 it was equal to no more than 150,000, and a year later the works were giving a profit of 800,000 yen. If the Martin furnace is overhauled, we shall make no less than 4 million yen annually. The quality of the iron from Pensih is excellent. This iron together with the Onshan ore will make us independent in the sphere of iron and steel supplies.

The deposits of iron in Manchuria and Mongolia are equal to approximately 1,200 million tons; those of coal 2,500 million tons. This deposit of the coal is sufficient to supply the requirements of the deposits of iron ore. With these enormous supplies of iron and coal in our hands, we shall be completely independent for a period of at least seventy years. Reckoning 100 dollars profit on 1 ton of steel, we shall be able to make a profit of 35,000 million yen on 350 million tons of steel. We shall economise 120 million yen, which we pay annually for imported steel.we have sufficient iron and steel for our industry, we shall become the leading world power, and will be able to conquer East and West. For this purpose the metal works must be separated from south Manchurian Railway.

2. Oil.

Another commodity of enormous importance of which we have a deficit is kerosene. It is essential for the life of nation. Fortunately there are 5,200million tons of raw oil in the coalmines of Fushun from which 6 per cent, refined oil can be obtained both for automobiles and steamship. At present japan import 700,000 tons of oil annually at a cost of 60 million yen. As the Fushun mines have 50 billion tons of refined oil, we can, at the rate of 5 percent, obtain 250 million tons of best oil and if we raise the percentage to 9 percent, then we can obtain 450 million tons. We can obtain an average of 350 million tons. Reckoning at the rate of 15 yen per ton, the Fushian oil will give us 2,250 million yen. This will be a great industrial revolution for us. Oil is the great factor from the point of national defence and national wealth. Our army and fleet will be invincible fortress if we have the iron and oil in Manchuria. Without doubt Manchuria and Mongolia are the heart of empire.

Agricultural fertilisers Ammonia sulphate and other Products.

For the production of foodstuffs, agricultural fertilizers are essential. Ammonia sulphate can be obtained from coal for chemical fertlization. The Fushun coal is particularly rich in this respect. At present we use 500,000 tons of ammonia sulphate. Half of this amount we work up in Japan, using the Kashlan and Fushun coal. The other half of this amount we work in japan, using the kalshan and Fushun coal. The other half we have to import from abroad at the cost of 35 million yen a year.as our agriculture is growing and we intend developing our new Empire in Manchuria and Mongolia, we shall require a million tons of ammonia sulphate annually during the next 10 years. From the by products obtain from the Fushun coal during the smelting of steel, we can obtain enormous amount of ammonia sulphate. If we work up 300,000 tons annually, we shall increase our annual income by more than 40 million yen. This will give a total of 2,000 million yen in the course of of fifty years. This money can be used to raise our agriculture, and if there is a balance we can buy fertilisng manures and supply all the agricultural undertakings throughout China and South Sea Islands. The bussiness must also be separated from South Manchurian

Railway, and we shall then have complete control over the fertilising materials throughout the Far East.

We are importing 100,00 tons of soda at a cost of over 10 million annually. Both soda and soda ash are essential for military and the industrial purposes. Soda is obtained from salt and coal, which are to be found in abundance in Manchuria and Mongolia. If we take up this work we shall be able to satisfy the requirements not only of japan but will be able to sell to China and obtain the monopoly of this branch of industry. We should gain a profit of no less than 15 million yen annually. This should also be removed from the control of the South Manchurian Railway.

MAGNESIA AND ALUMINIUM.

According to information of the South Manchurian Railway and the assertions of Dr. Hont from the Tohoku University, there is an abundance of aluminium and magnesia in Manchuria. Magnesia is to be found in the neighbourhood of Tashichaw, and aluminium close to Entai. Here are the largest deposits in the world. A ton of magnesia costs 2,000 yen and aluminium 1,700. The total value of the deposits of theses minerals in Manchuria is 750 million yen. These minerals are particularly useful for the manufacture of aeroplanes, medical instruments, ships, etc. There are large deposits only in the United States of America. These metals are becoming more and more essential every day and the supply is continually falling. The prices rise rapidly. The deposits on our territory in Manchuria and Mongolia are the gift of God. They are essential for our industry and national defence; and this industry also must be made independent of the South Manchurian Railway. The metals must be worked up in Japan in order that the Fengtien Government may not copy our methods, and also to ensure that British and American capital have no opportunity of observing our progress. Having seized these deposits in the Three Eastern Provinces, we could then use the water-power of the River Yalu to work it up. As aviation is continually developing, the whole world would in the future apply to us for materials for aeroplane construction.

If all these undertakings are independent of each other, they will be able to progress rapidly and give us no less than 60 billion yen profit annually. The industrial development of South Manchuria is of enormous importance for our national defence and economic development. It will lay the foundations of our industrial Empire. As for cultural institutions like hospitals, schools and so on, they are the heralds of our progress in Manchuria and Mongolia. They will raise our prestige and authority. They must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway in order that they may double our power in moving into North Manchuria.

When these big undertaking become independent and freed centers of national prosperity. We shall rapidly move forward on the wings of economic development, without arousing the suspicions of the Powers and without calling forth anti-Japanese activities among the population of the Three Eastern Provinces. With the help of these circumspect methods, we can create our new continental Empire.

Foreign loans afforded to the South Manchurian Railway must be used by those railways alone which are already completed. The remaining railways built by us, but nominally under the control of china may be amalgamated with the finished railways, or may be made independent, according to the desires of the investing Powers. The

slogan of "equal chances" will give us the opportunity of getting foreign loans and allaying all suspicion as regards our intentions in North Manchuria. In any case, foreign capital will be required by us for developing our continental Empire. When the foreign powers are given the opportunity of investing their capital in the South Manchurian Railway, they will gladly give us more money and China will be able to do nothing against it. This is the best way of developing our plans in Manchuria. We must lose no time, but must take up the same line with regard to the riches concentrated in North Manchuria and Mongolia. We must convert the new roads from Krin to Hoiren and from Chanchun to Dalai into separate undertakings, as well as timber and mining undertakings.

The exploitation of North Manchuria will considerably enrich the Manchurian Railway. We must permit foreign Powers to invest their money in South Manchurian Railway and to receive their share of the profits. When they begin to receive profits, they will cease to hinder our activities in Manchuria. Enormous masses of Chinese are migrating into South Manchuria. Their position will become stronger every day. The position of our immigrants is becoming gradually worse, since the right to rent land is not yet fully safeguarded inside the country. Even with the support of our Government, they cannot compete with the Chinese, whose standard of living is lower. Our only chance is to beat the Chinese by investing considerable sums of money. But to do this, we need foreign loans. The wealth of North Manchuria must be joined up with our forces in South Manchuria, and the problem will be immediately solved once and for all. If we fail in this task, they will be able to hold out in North Manchuria and will provide us with foodstuffs and raw materials. As the interests of North Manchuria and Japan are closely connected, we must immediately enter North Manchuria and pursue our policy there.

WE MUST FORM A COLONIAL DEPARTMENT

The exploitation of Manchuria by Japan will take many forms. The opinions of influential persons so frequently differ that even the most advantageous undertakings end in failure. As a result of the tardy way in which the work is done, the truth is frequently let out, and the Mukden Government makes use of it for propaganda against our country. If any new undertaking is planned in Manchuria or Mongolia, the question is discussed in Dairen in dozens of conferences. Not only is the approval requires of the four above-mentioned officials, but also of the Government. Whole months go by, therefore, before any results are obtained. In the meantime the Chinese make use of Japanese adventures, draw out our secrets and before we have a chance to fulfil our plans, the Chinese and the whole world know of it. The public opinion of the whole world is turned against us and more than once we have found ourselves in great difficulty in this way in pursuing our policy in Manchuria and Mongolia. The Opposition Party also uses this for attacks upon the Government. We must change our work. The center of control must be removed to Tokio. This will safeguard the secrecy of our negotiations and drafts, will prevent China from knowing of our plans in advance, will rid us for the suspicious attitude of the Powers who hear of our plans before they are put into action, will unite our control in Manchuria and establish firm connections between our authorities in Manchuria and Mongolia and the Center Government, which is very important for our relations with China. For all these reasons we should carry out our primary plan of absorbing Korea which was elaborated by Ito and Katsura, and create a colonial department which will occupy

itself with the question of our expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia. Nominally it would deal with the control of Formosa, Korea and Sakhalin, but actually it would work on the expansion of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia. This would help us to deceive the whole world and to hide our secrets more easily from the whole world.

Personally, I consider that if the absorption of Korea could not be carried out during the time when Ito held sway, it was because of the lack of a special organ of control. As a result there was constant difference of opinion and it was impossible to pursue our secret policy. This opened up the way for international obstruction and Korean opposition. Masses of propagandists arrived in Europe, America and Korea and declared that we recognize the independence of Korea and have no claim on her territory. As a result it was possible for us to retrieve international confidence once more. If we create a colonial department as though for Formosa, we shall gain our ends. It is quite clear that a special institution is required for the development of colonization and immigration. The creation of the new Empire in Mongolia and Manchuria is of enormous importance for the existence of Japan. There must be a special colonial department in order to control our policy over this enormous territory direct from Tokio. Our officials there must merely accept our orders, but must not interfere arbitrarily in the pursuance of our policy. This will safeguard that proper secrecy is reserved and hostile nations will be unable to discover our secrets concerning our colonial activities. International public opinion will not then be able to follow our movements in Mongolia and Manchuria and we shall not have to fear their interference.

As for our undertakings on the South Manchuria Railway, like the Development Society, the Land Society, the Trust Company, etc., control of theses undertakings should be in the hands of the colonial department. They should all be under united control for the purpose of helping us in the policy of expansion in Mongolia and Manchuria, which is being pursued by the Imperial Government, and thus assist in the building up of the new Empire.

THE VALLEY OF THE TALIN RIVER ON THE PEKIN-MUKDEN RAILWAY

The valley of the Talin River is an enormous, sparsely-populated territory. The place seethes with bandits. Many Koreans have placed investments here, especially in the rice plantation. The district gives promise of becoming a nourishing centre. Furthermore, it is easy to move forward into the Sheches district from here. We must do our utmost to defend our Koreans and then use the first available opportunity of obtaining the right to colonist this district from China. Our immigrants must obtain an opportunity of living here and playing as our vanguard in the advance upon Sheches and Mongolia. In case of war this valley will be a strategical point for the large armies. We shall then be able not only to prevent the Chinese from moving north, but will rule over the enormous riches in South Manchuria. If the Koreans come to this district we must offer them financial support through our trust societies and other financial organisations.

These organisations must have property rights, and the-Koreans will be limited to the right to work upon the land. Formally, however, the Koreans must have property rights. Then we can obtain these rights from the Chinese Government. The trust societies and financial organs must fully support our Korean subjects in their efforts

to obtain land. If they need money to buy land, the financial organs must help them. We shall thus, unnoticed, gain the control of the best rice plantations which our immigrants, i.e., the Japanese, must receive. They will have to (displace the Koreans who, in their turn, will seek new lands, which, in the future, will also come into the hands of our people. This is our policy in the work of colonising the rice and bean plantations. As for cattle-breeding the Development Society must receive special powers and place large herds at the disposal of our country. This society must engage in horse-breeding, choosing the best Mongolian horses for the purpose of national defence in Japan.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CHINESE IMMIGRATION

The internal conflicts in China have forced an enormous number of Chinese of late to settle down in Mongolia and Manchuria. This has formed a great menace to our immigration. We must here take the corresponding measures. The fact that the Chinese Government welcomes this immigration and takes no measure against it is a serious menace to our own immigration. A well-known American specialist on China declared that the owners are pursuing such a fine policy that everybody is settling down on its territory. Thus the influx of immigrants is regarded as a sign of the energetic policy of the Mukden authorities. This conflicts with our interest. If we put no end this immigration, then in ten years time China will engulf us with the help of our own policy. In the political sense we should make use of our police force to keep back the influx of Chinese, and our financiers should drive out the Chinese by lowering wages. Further, we must develop the use of electrical and thus develop thus displace human labour power.

HOSPITALS AND SCHOOLS.

The hospitals and schools in Manchuria must not be dependent on Manchurian Railway. It is well known that people frequently regard them as organs of imperialism and refuse to turn to them for assistance. When they become independent institutions, people begin to value our kindness and be grateful to us. In opening schools, we must think of normal schools for men and women. In these schools, we can educate the people in a friendly spirit towards Japan. This is the first principal of our cultural construction work.