Sri Lanka's Maritime Security: A Study of Military and Non-Military Responses

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
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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "Sri Lanka's Maritime Security: A Study of Military and Non-Military Responses" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AIS	Automatic Identification System
ARIF	Alliance for Release of Innocent Fishermen
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
Aus-AID	Australian Governments Overseas Aid Programme
BC	Before Christ
BIISS	Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CCD	Coast Conservation Department
CEA	Central Environmental Authority
CICT	Colombo International Container Terminals Ltd
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CMHI	China Merchants Holdings International Co. Ltd.
CNVF	Ceylon Naval Volunteer Force
CO	Colonial Office
CPC	Ceylon Petroleum Corporation
CRNVF	Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Force
CRNVR	Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve
CSI	Container Security Initiative
CZMP	Coastal Zone Management Plan
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFAR	Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
DFID	Department for International Development
DMA	Disaster Management Act
DMC	Disaster Management Centre
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DS	Divisional Secretary/District Secretaries
Eco-DRR	Ecosystem-based Disaster Risk Reduction
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ENSO	El Nino-Southern Oscillation
EU	European Union
EXIM	Export Import
FAC	Fast Attack Craft
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARA	Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation

FOC	Flags of Convenience
FPB	Fast Patrol Boat
GCF	Global Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GHG	Green House Gases
GIS	General Information System
GNP	Gross National Product
GOSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GPA	Global Programme of Action
GSMB	Geological Survey and Mines Bureau
GTZ	Department for International Development German Technical Assistance
Ha	Hectare
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HMCYS	His Majesties Ceylon Navy Ship
HMS	Her/His Majesty's Ship
HNS	Hazardous and Noxious Substances
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
ICZM	Integrated Coastal Zone Management
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMBL	International Maritime Boundary Line
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
INSTCOM	Institutional Strengthening of Oil Spill Contingency Management
IOPZ	Indian Ocean Peace Zone
IOTC	Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
IPA	
IPC	Inshore Patrol Craft
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPIECA	International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
IPKF	Indian Peace Keeping Force
IPOA-IUU	International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ISC	Information Sharing Centre
ISPS	International Ship and Port Facility Security
ITLOS	International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
IUU	Illegal Unreported and Unregulated
JBIC	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
JVP	Janata Vimukti Paramuna

JWG	Joint Working Group
Kg	Kilogram
KL	Kilo Liter
Km	Kilometer
Kt	Kiloton
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
M	Meter
MARPOL	Marine Pollution
MCPA	Marine Conservation and Protected Areas
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MEP	Mahajana Eksath Peramuna
MEPA	Marine Environment Protection Authority
MM	Millimeter
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSR	Maritime Silk Route
MT	Metric Ton
MV	Motor Vehicle
MW	Megawatt
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NAP	National Action Plan
NARA	National Aquatic Resources Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCDM	National Council for Disaster Management
NCSD	National Council for Sustainable Development
NDMC	National Disaster Management Centre
NDMCC	National Disaster Management Coordinating Committee
NDRSC	National Disaster Relief Services Centre
NEAP	National Environmental Action Plan
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIE	National Implementing Entities
NM	Nautical Mile
No.	Number
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NOSCOP	National Oil Spill Contingency Plan
NROU	National Relief Operation Unit
NUG	National Unity Government
OPEC	Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPRC	Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation
OPV	Offshore Patrol Vessel
ORF	Observer Research Foundation
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation

PSC	Parliament Select Committee
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
RABS	Rapid Action Boat Squadron
RALL	Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd
RDX	Research and Development Explosives
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
RENRIC	Regional Environmental and Natural Resources Information Centre
RHIBs	Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats
RN	Royal Navy
ROV	Remotely Operated Vehicle
RPG	Rocket-Propelled Grenade
Rs	Rupees
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACEP	South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme
SACRTF	South Asia Coral Reef Task Force
SAM	Special Area Management
SAR	Search and Rescue
SASP	South Asia Seas Programme
SBS	Special Broadcasting Service/Special Boat Squadron
SEK	Swedish Krona
SIDA	Swidish International Development Agency
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SL	Sri Lanka
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCDMP	Sri Lanka Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme
SLCG	Sri Lanka Coast Guard
SLFP	Sri Lanka Freedom Party
SLINEX	Sri Lanka India Naval Exercise
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SLN	Sri Lanka Navy
SLNS	Sri Lankan Navy Ship
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communications
SLPA	Sri Lanka Port Authority
SLRs	Sri Lanka Rupees
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
Sq KM	Square Kilometre
SUA	Suppression of Unlawful Acts
TAFLOL	Task Force for Logistics and Law and Order
TAFOR	Task Force for Relief
TAFREN	Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation
TAFRER	Task Force for Rescue and Relief
TCMS	Trilateral Cooperation on Maritime Security

TIP	Trafficking in Persons
TNT	Tri Nitro Toluene
UDA	Urban Development Area
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNP	United National Party
UPFA	United People's Freedom Alliance
US	United States
USA	United States of America
US-AEP	United States-Asia Environmental Partnership
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UXO	Underwater Un-exploded Ordnance
VMS	Vessel Monitoring System
VOA	Voice of America
WB	World Bank
WG	Working Group
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Introduction

Sri Lanka, an island consisting of 20 million population, is one of the most strategically important states in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean region. Known in the past as 'Sirindib Island', 'Taprobone' and 'Ceylon', the country is surrounded by the Arabian Sea on the west, the Bay of Bengal on the northeast, and the Indian Ocean on the south. As an island nation, Sri Lanka does not share land borders with any country, but does have maritime borders with India and the Maldives. With a length of 435 kilometres (km) north to south and breadth of 240 km east to west, the teardrop island encompasses tropical beaches, mountains, plains, rivers and lagoons. Sri Lanka has a total area of about 65,610 square km. The coastline extends a length of about 1,300 km.

Since it is surrounded by ocean, maritime security is an important component of Sri Lanka's national security. However, since independence in 1948, the country has been afflicted with political turmoil, militant youth movement, armed ethnic conflict as well as economic problems. In this context, the thesis aims to study Sri Lanka's maritime security. What are the challenges Sri Lanka faces in or from the maritime domain? How does Sri Lanka respond to such maritime security challenges? Does Sri Lanka have the capability to deal with such challenges? All these questions will be explored in the subsequent chapters.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the theme of the thesis and explain the rationale of the study. The chapter also reviews the existing literature on the subject and outlines the structure of the thesis.

Sri Lanka's Maritime Domain: An Overview

Since 1702, Sri Lanka had maintained a territorial sea of the three miles as per customary international law. The limits were extended to six miles and twelve miles in 1957 and 1971, respectively (Jayasinghe 2003). Until 1974, the maritime boundary was not demarcated between Sri Lanka and its maritime neighbours. In 1921, negotiations were held to demarcate boundaries in the Palk Strait, Palk Bay and the Gulf of Mannar

between India and Sri Lanka for fishery purposes (Suryanarayan 1994: 11). However, the talks did not yield any outcome as the agreement reached during the negotiations was not ratified (Jayasinghe 2003: 3). In 1974, the maritime boundary was demarcated between India and Sri Lanka by signing a Maritime Boundary Agreement from a point of about 18 nautical miles (NM) northwest of Point Padro in the Palk Strait to Adam's Bridge (Kodikara 2008). A further Maritime Boundary Agreement of 1976 extended this boundary to the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal. The agreements were implemented by the adoption of Maritime Zones Law No. 22 in 1976 (Kodikara 2008). Under this law, Sri Lanka declared several areas of national maritime jurisdiction, in compliance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), such as internal waters[1], historic waters[2], territorial sea[3], contiguous zone[4]; and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)[5]. Delimitation of the continental shelf is still pending. On 8 May 2009, Sri Lanka submitted its claim on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), in accordance with Article 76, paragraph eight of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations 2010). However, its claim is overlapping with India's claim. Therefore, both India and Sri Lanka have decided to file their cases in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and reconcile there (Aggarwal 2013). Reportedly, Sri Lanka's proposal will be taken up in 2025 for consideration due to the long queue of applications received by the commission (Fernando 2012). In the mean time, Bangladesh and Maldives also reportedly objected to Sri Lanka's claim on the continental shelf (Zaman 2016).

Thus, as per the Maritime Zones Law of 1976, the extent of Sri Lanka's territorial sea is 21,500 sq. km and the area enclosed by the EEZ is 517,000 sq. km, which is 7.8 times the total land area of the country (Joseph N.D). All these vast areas are under the jurisdiction of the Sri Lankan government. However, during the Eelam Wars (1983-2009), the

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[1] Internal waters mean waters in the landward side of the baseline from which the limits of the territorial sea is measured.
[2] Palk Bay, Palk Strait, and Gulf of Mannar areas are called historic waters.
[3] The territorial sea extends to a distance of 12 nautical miles from the baseline.
[4] The contiguous zone extends to a distance of 24 nautical miles from the baseline.
[5] The EEZ extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline.

presence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) posed severe challenges to the government in the effective management of the waters in the north and east. It was only in May 2009, with the defeat of the LTTE, that the entire maritime area came under the full control of the Sri Lankan government.

The wealth and resources within these vast maritime areas are enormous. The resources are broadly: ocean bed minerals; petroleum, gas and shale; and fishery resources. In addition to the ecological value, these resources contribute immensely to the economy and food security of the country. Sri Lanka has the potential to generate 20,740 Megawatt (MW) wind power. In 2011, two natural gas fields were discovered in the Mannar Basin (*The Economic Times* 2011). Second round of bidding for oil exploration was opened in 2014, under which six blocks were offered to carry out geo-physical studies and to collect associated seismic data. The study has not yet started.

Mapping of all the potential marine resources in Sri Lanka is still work in progress. Once the mapping is done, the economic value of such resources can be evaluated. As of now, fishery, tourism, shipping, port, ship-building and the ship-repairing industry make significant contributions to the Sri Lankan economy. In 2016, the fisheries sector accounted for 1.4 per cent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the current market price and 1.3 per cent at constant (2010) prices (Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development, Government of Sri Lanka 2017). The tourism sector accounts for 5.3 per cent of GDP in 2017 (World Travel and Tourism Council 2018) and the shipping industry contributes 10 per cent of the GDP (Sri Lanka Port Authority 2015). The livelihood of a large section of the population depends on these sectors. As it is surrounded by the Indian Ocean from all sides, its export and import depend on the maritime domain. Sri Lanka has served as a hub port to most of the countries around as it is located at the centre of the global maritime route from East to West. Therefore, a safe, secure and clean maritime domain is extremely crucial for the economic prosperity, survival and development of Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka's Maritime Security: Concerns and Threats

Interestingly, while sea has been a great source of livelihood and economic prosperity, it has also been a source of Sri Lanka's insecurity. Due to its natural resources including precious gems, natural harbours and its proximity to India and its location in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka has attracted traders and maritime powers for centuries. The distance between India and Sri Lanka at the narrowest point is around 16 km (Raju and Keethaponcalan 2006). It is said that Sri Lanka was a part of the Indian subcontinental mass, but got separated by a shallow sea, called Palk Strait, in 7000 BC (De Silva 2005: 1). Due to this proximity, Sri Lanka on the one hand enjoyed positive cultural, religious and trade interactions with India and on the other hand, also faced several invasions from Indian rulers. The flourishing irrigation civilisation in the fertile northern plains of the country made the island vulnerable to invasions from South India (Embree 1988: 3). Sri Lanka was an important trade point not only for Indians, but also for Arabs, Chinese and other Western traders. The natural harbour provided a convenient and safe anchorage for vessels to those plying the Indian Ocean (Jayasinghe 2003: 2).

Until the 16th century, Sri Lanka attracted attention due to its location as an important trade point or trade routes. However, since the 16th century onwards, it also became strategically important, as the Western colonial powers found the island a "valuable staging post for their conquest in the East" (Jayasinghe 2003). Its strategic location in the Indian Ocean, the natural harbour of Trincomalee and Kattunayake airport provided excellent naval and aerial facilities as a military base.

The first colonial power to have control over the island was the Portuguese. By 1600, the Portuguese took control over the parts of the coastal region and continued for 60 years (Embree 1988).Towards the end of the 16th century, Portuguese power was on the verge of decline in many parts of Asia. Control over maritime regions of Sri Lanka allowed the Portuguese to "control the seaborne traffic from the Malabar coast to Sri Lanka" and also the pearl fishery (De Silva 2005: 148). However, after 60 years of rule, the Sri Lankans overthrew the Portuguese with the help of the Dutch. But very soon, Sri Lanka came under the control of the Dutch.

The main aim of the Dutch was to control the cinnamon trade and, therefore, they laid claims on the ports of Sri Lanka to keep the other Western powers out of the island's trade and control traffic to the island. As the Dutch strengthened its foothold on the island, Sri Lankan rulers sought British help to counter the Dutch. The British captured Dutch possessions in the maritime region of Sri Lanka in 1795. The East India Company administered the maritime regions of Sri Lanka until 1802 when the entire island became the British Crown Colony. The British ruled Sri Lanka till 1948. On 4 February 1948, the British granted independence to Sri Lanka by peaceful transfer of powers to the Sri Lankans.

There was a shift in global politics post World War II and in the post- colonial period. From the 1950s to the early 1990s, the Cold War between the two super powers dominated world politics and in the post-Cold War period, while there has been supremacy of the United States of America (USA), there has also been a competition among several regional powers to gain supremacy in the Indian Ocean. In this changing scenario of world politics too, Sri Lanka has retained its importance. Therefore, in the post-colonial period, big powers tried to influence Sri Lanka by various means to gain control over its maritime domain. After the British withdrew from Sri Lanka, it could continue its interest in the Indian Ocean through a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Sri Lanka until 1956. In the 1980s, the USA managed to have a listening post in the Trincomalee harbour. After China decided to expand its role in the Indian Ocean, it is trying to have close cooperation with Sri Lanka as one of its partners in China's Maritime Silk Route (MSR) initiative. Amidst all these developments, India has kept a close eye on Sri Lanka's association with the foreign powers. On several occasions, India also overtly expressed its concerns about foreign presence in Sri Lanka.

Thus, though a small island, Sri Lanka often faces pulls and pressure due to big power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Due to its commercial and strategic importance, world powers seek to control the island and influence its policy. Absorption by bigger naval powers and loss of autonomy thus have always been security concerns for Sri Lanka.

In addition, Sri Lanka's maritime domain has been severely threatened by non-state actors during the ethnic armed conflict in the country. Sri Lanka has been a victim of maritime militancy for more than two decades. Militancy combined with trafficking of arms, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, armed robbery and human trafficking have challenged the maritime security of Sri Lanka. Even though incidents of sea piracy in and around Sri Lankan waters are not very common, Sri Lanka is concerned about the possible threat to its merchant vessels from the Somali pirates. As the number of Sri Lankan boat-people has increased, their safety and prevention of trafficking have become major concern for the government.

Degradation of the marine environment is another aspect of Sri Lanka's maritime insecurity. Urbanisation, unregulated commercial and developmental activities, recreational activities, transport and communications, tourism development, sand and coral mining, and illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU) fishing among others, are taking a heavy toll on Sri Lanka's coastal environment. Coastal erosion is a major problem in Sri Lanka. Many of Sri Lanka's pristine reef systems such as the Bar Reef were severely degraded, decreasing live coral cover on the Bar Reef from nearly 80 per cent to less than one per cent. The tsunami of 26 December 2004 led to heavy loss of human and animal life and marine resources, degradation of agricultural land, and losses to the fishing industry of Sri Lanka. The economic loss was assessed to be in excess of US$1.5 billion (Government of Sri Lanka and Development Partners 2005). Many things which contribute to ecological stability were damaged, including mangroves, coral reefs, sea grass beds, estuaries and bays. The rising sea level is another major environmental concern.

In short, both traditional and non-traditional challenges pose threats and concerns to Sri Lanka's maritime security. Among the government's countermeasures to enhance the nation's maritime security have been improving the navy's capacity to interdict and patrol the country's territorial waters and to provide quick humanitarian services during natural disasters. Further, the Sri Lanka Coast Guard (SLCG), a non-military law enforcement agency, was formed by Parliament in 2010 under the Ministry of Defence

(Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka 2010). To protect marine resources, environment legislations have been enacted, which includes the Coast Conservation Act, the National Environmental Act, the Fisheries Act Marine Pollution Prevention Act and so on. Sri Lanka also has bilateral cooperation with other countries to deal with maritime security threats and concerns. It also resorts to multilateral diplomacy. It is a party to some regional and international maritime security related conventions and organisations. At the regional level, Sri Lanka collaborates with South Asia Seas Programme (SASP) under the South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP). At the international level, it has bilateral and multilateral cooperation with various international donor countries and international intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to manage environmental security, which also includes relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in the tsunami-affected areas.

The Government of Sri Lanka has been successful in addressing or managing some of the challenges effectively. For example, challenges from maritime terrorism have been successfully thwarted by Sri Lanka. Maritime boundary dispute with India has been resolved amicably. However, several security threats and concerns continue to challenge Sri Lanka.

In this background, the thesis aims to study the various dimensions of the maritime aspects of Sri Lanka's security. Given the country's size, resources and capability, this study investigates and explores Sri Lanka's responses to its maritime security challenges and concerns.

Review of the Literature

Maritime security has been the most neglected topic in studies on Sri Lanka. This is quite ironic that a subject which is supposed to be one of the most important aspects of security of an island nation lacks academic attraction. The reason of this lack of scholarly attention probably is that despite being an island nation, it has never thought or behaved like a maritime nation. Jayasinghe (2003) says "in spite of being an Island, with no part of the country distant from the sea, Sri Lanka does not have a long maritime tradition."

Fernando (2013), however, contests Jayasinghe's argument by alluding to the rich marine archaeology of Sri Lanka, ancient ports, and its maritime connection to the outside world through trade and so on. De Silva (2005) talks about the importance of ports like Mahatittha, the principal port of Anuradhapura in the ancient period, and Trincomalee, particularly in the modern period, and the importance of Sri Lankan ships and its expertise in shipbuilding and of complicated voyages across the Indian Ocean. De Silva also discusses Sri Lanka's war with other dynasties of South India and South East Asian countries like Burma (Myanmar) over conflicting commercial interests. However, none of these wars were fought in the ocean. Not much is known about the naval capability of the dynasties in Sri Lanka in the pre-colonial period.

Pre-colonial Sri Lanka is known for its economic activity rather than military prowess in the maritime domain. Nonetheless, maritime economic activities during the Portuguese, Dutch and British colonial periods declined significantly. Wickremesinghe (2014) says that after the colonial powers took control over the island, plantation sector became the main focus of the economic activities and thus maritime activities like boat building started declining. Singh (2002) also discusses how the development of a navy in seafaring nations got affected due to neglect during British period. According to Kohona (2015), 300 years of forced separation from the ocean under the colonial power led to the Sri Lankans losing their historical affinity with the sea.

All the literature on Sri Lanka's political history and foreign policy mentioned above have discussed the importance of Sri Lanka as an important strategic maritime nation to all the great powers over the centuries. However, the statements on maritime importance of the country in these literature were made in passing. The literature on colonial history of Sri Lanka suggests that none of the colonial powers had brought the country under their control through direct naval attack. In fact they were invited to the island by local rebels to overthrow an occupied power and gradually took control over the island. Any resistance experienced by the colonial powers was from local rebels within the island and not at sea. The absence of any major fight between naval forces on the island and colonial navies probably discouraged academicians from doing full-fledged research on maritime

affairs. As colonial rule brought about changes in the society, economy and political administration of the island and caused new movements and uprisings on the island, these issues became the main themes of the literature on the political history of Sri Lanka.

After the country got independence, the scholars were fascinated by Sri Lanka's dealings with the international community in the context of Cold War bloc politics. Despite having economic difficulties, Sri Lanka's refusal to join any of the power blocs attracted the attention of scholars on the foreign policy of the Indian Ocean island and in that context Sri Lanka's approach to security situations in the Indian Ocean during the Cold War period was examined by the scholars. A range of literature was produced on Sri Lanka's foreign policy to analyse the viability of the approach of the Third World in the Cold War context, such as Kodikara (1992) and Prasad (1973). Sri Lanka's security concerns from the super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean and its proposal for the Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ) have been discussed by the scholars, but they were not studied from the maritime security perspective, perhaps due to the reason that Sri Lanka did not look for naval responses to those security concerns.

Nevertheless, scholars like Kodikara and De Silva do mention Sri Lanka's threat perception of India in the maritime domain in the immediate aftermath of its independence; however, the maritime aspect of security challenges from India was overlooked in the studies on India-Sri Lanka relations after the resolution of the maritime boundary dispute.

Thus, it can be argued that studies on Sri Lankan security during the 1940s-1970s provide very limited analysis on the maritime aspect of security. This could be because of the government's lack of attention to the navy and its policy of using diplomatic channels to address security concerns. Domestic political problems such as citizenship issue of the Indian Tamils, communal riots and insurgency in the south of the country also diverted attention from maritime issues.

The 'maritime security discourse in Sri Lanka' got some scholarly attention only with the emergence of the maritime wing of the LTTE-the Sea Tigers- and the Sri Lankan Navy's successful operation against them in the final Eelam War. Significant contribution are made by authors like by Bharadwaj (2000), Gunaratna (2001), Singh (2002), Suryanarayan (2004), Sakhuja (2006), Ramachandran (2006), Edirisinghe (2008), Hashim (2014) and Colombage (2016). All these authors have approached maritime security from a narrow prism that is ensuring security from illicit activities at sea by militants and other non-state actors. As the Sea Tigers were mostly operating in Sri Lankan waters, the main responsibility to thwart any terrorist activities fell on the Sri Lankan Navy. The main focus of these literatures is how the Sri Lankan Navy evolved over the years and emerged as an exemplary force to fight asymmetric warfare at sea against militants. According to Edirisinghe (2008), change of past strategies and operational tactics led to the naval victories since the year 2007. The successes of the naval fleet units led to choking of military supplies to the LTTE which ultimately led to the defeat of the LTTE. Hashim (2014) and Colombage (2016) provide detail accounts of the fight between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces at sea. Another important work on the evolution of the Sri Lankan Navy since independence till 1999 is by Singh (2002). Singh mentions that the Sri Lankan Navy's role in low intensity and anti-insurgency needs to be studied in greater detail by developing countries, but he poses valuable questions: what will be the role of the navy in the post-insurgency period? Will it develop into a more responsible navy capable of fulfilling its role as the guardian of the crucial sea-lanes traversing the Indian Ocean from east to west? All these questions, however, remain unanswered.

As mentioned in the introductory paragraph, in addition to safe and secure seas, Sri Lanka needs to have clean seas. But the environmental aspect of maritime security has been completely ignored. Several scientific studies have, however, been conducted which have clearly shown the environmental challenges Sri Lanka faces in the maritime domain. According to Seneviratne (2005), unregulated coastal uses and unsustainable use of resources have had tremendous impact on the coastal environment. Rekha and Shaw (2006) analyse the impact of climate change on Sri Lanka's coastal economy and

recommend incorporation of development issues, scale issues and multi-stakeholder issues in the Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) and community participation at the local level. Issues and challenges of post-tsunami recovery have been studied by Jayasuriya et al. (2006). A scientific study now has also been initiated to assess the impact of rising sea levels. The Coast Conservation Department (CCD) and Survey Department of Sri Lanka in collaboration with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency and Asian Institute of Technology has initiated a mini project programme on the impact of sea level rise in the south west coast in the Galle administrative district (Government of Sri Lanka 2000). Studies on the impact of sea level rise in other parts of the country have not been initiated yet. While the aim of this thesis is not to conduct a scientific mapping of the impact of rising sea levels in Sri Lanka, it would try to examine the policy response of the government on this issue based on the scientific study already being undertaken.

After the end of Eelam War, there has been a greater recognition by policy makers that the concept of maritime security is multi-dimensional. To ensure security in the maritime domain, both military and non-military aspects should be given equal emphasis. However, there is hardly any literature, which puts all the maritime security concerns (both traditional and non-traditional) together to make a comprehensive analysis of Sri Lanka's maritime security. In the post-independence period, particularly during the Cold War period, a state-centric approach was taken on the security discourse and the focus shifted to non-state actors with the emergence of the armed ethnic conflict. In fact, during the Cold War period, though the challenges from state actors like India or the bigger powers were studied, maritime aspect of the security challenges were given the least attention. As a result the maritime security discourse in Sri Lanka is being associated with maritime militancy only. Whole lists of other challenges have been and are being ignored. No academic literature is available on emerging challenges in the maritime domain in the post-LTTE period in Sri Lanka. Though the Sri Lankan government has initiated various mechanisms and policies to manage maritime security, no academic investigation of those policies has been done so far. In the post-Cold War period, particularly in the new millennium, new security situations have emerged in the Indian

Ocean with the growing maritime ambition of the Asian countries. Mohan (2012) says that in the new security situation tension will be not only between emerging India and rising China, but will also involve the USA. According to Mohan (2012: 5), "before the rising naval powers crash into each other, they will run into the United States, which for now and the foreseeable future will remain the dominant force in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans." Scholars are yet to analyse the impact of the emerging "triangular maritime dynamics" (Kaplan 2009) in the Indian and Pacific Oceans on Sri Lanka. Therefore, an attempt has been made in this thesis to give a comprehensive analysis of Sri Lanka's maritime security, which includes the whole gamut of maritime concerns and threats as well as Sri Lanka's responses to deal with such challenges.

Rationale of the Study

The rationale of the study comes from the fact that the 21st century is a maritime century. Importance of the seas is growing with globalisation of the world economy and its impact on global sea-borne trade, growing needs for energy and marine resources. While the sea is important to all nations of the world, it holds particular interest to the island nations as their entire security is dependent on secured and safe seas. It has been acknowledged by Sri Lankan leaders over time that a secured sea is extremely important for Sri Lanka. Yet maritime security has not been given its due importance. Of late, however, the concept seems to be gaining greater importance in Sri Lanka. Now there is a realisation among top-level government officials that maritime security did not get as much importance as it should have (Wickremesinghe 2015). At government and civil society level discussions, emphasis has been given on the need for a sound maritime strategy for a secured sea, as the government is planning to turn the island into a business, logistical and developmental hub in the Indian Ocean. The Sri Lankan Navy has released the 'Maritime Strategy 2025' in November 2016. Since 2011, Galle Dialogue has been organised annually by the Ministry of Defence and the Sri Lankan Navy to discuss various aspect of maritime security. Special focus is being given to maritime security issues during bilateral and multilateral discussions. But as mentioned above, there is dearth of academic analysis on the subject. So it is believed that this is an apt time to do

comprehensive academic research to find out how a small country like Sri Lanka ensures its maritime security.

Conceptual Definition

To address the central question of this thesis, that is: how is Sri Lanka responding to its maritime security challenges, the analytical framework is formulated based on theoretical debate on the small state's responses to its security challenges. Even though Sri Lanka is not in the list of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), or cannot be termed as a small state as per the definition of the Commonwealth[6], it is a small state in terms of population, economy, and psychogeography as defined by scholars on small states like David Vital, Lake and others. According to Vital (1967: 8), an under developed country with a population of 20-30 million should be considered as small state. Sri Lanka's population at the time of independence was 6.7 million. Now the total population of Sri Lanka is 202,63,723, according to the Sri Lankan Government's Census of Population and Housing carried out in 2012. Similarly, according to the definition of small state put forward by Lake (1988), which includes the states which have less than five per cent of world trade, Sri Lanka falls under the category of small state. According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (2015) report, Sri Lanka's share in the world's total export in 2014 was 0.06 per cent and share in the world's total import was 0.10 per cent. Moreover, the Sri Lankan leadership have themselves acknowledged that they belong to a small state. Hence, the analysis of a small state's responses to its security challenges would provide an apt analytical framework for this thesis.

Though there are differences of opinion on the definition of small states, there is unanimous agreement on the fact that the lack of resources, poor capability and fragile polity make the small state vulnerable to an entire gamut of security threats. As it is incapable to deal with its security threats on its own, it depends on external sources for its security; however, it faces several issues while availing external assistance. How much assistance is forthcoming from external sources depends on the strategic importance of

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[6] Commonwealth Secretariat in its lists of small states includes those states which have population less than 1.5 million.

the receiving small state to the assistance provider. Even though the analytical framework draws upon the various aspects of realism to analyse the maritime security of small states, it does not restrict only on one variable i.e. the structure of the international system as emphasised by neo-realism, but also uses the geographical position and the domestic political system as variables.

The discourses on maritime security traditionally focused on ensuring security from threats of naval aggression across the seas. However, the state-centric view of traditional security has shifted to a broader perspective which incorporates economic, social and environmental dimensions under the non-traditional security framework. The term 'traditional security' equates with state actors and military force and does not include non-state actors. Therefore, maritime terrorism is generally considered as non-traditional security challenge. Nonetheless, in the case of Sri Lanka, it has been observed that Sri Lanka faced a formidable military challenge from non-state actors for years. The Sri Lankan Navy was engaged in battle with the LTTE Sea Tigers. Non-state actors had virtually controlled over one-third of Sri Lanka's water and territory. Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity was under severe threat. Maritime militancy in Sri Lanka was linked with the internal ethnic conflict which directly threatened the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Since, Sri Lanka faced considerable military challenges from the LTTE, maritime militancy has been considered as a military security challenge in this thesis. Therefore, instead of using the term traditional and non-traditional, the thesis categorises Sri Lanka's security challenges as military and non-military challenges.

Generally, the contemporary perspective on maritime security talks about seven dimensions of maritime security which includes: State-on-State (deterring threat emanating from another state or confrontations over ownership of the EEZ or other maritime area), trade protection (protection of Sea Lanes of Communication), resource management (sustainable management and development of marine resources), smuggling (countering smuggling of people, money, drugs and weapons), terrorism (deterring terrorist activities in the ocean), disasters (mitigating the impact of man-made and natural

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disasters in the coastal zone) and oceanography (Sloggett 2014: 36-38). In the Sri Lankan case, it can be observed that some of these dimensions are overlapping and challenged by one particular source. Hence, all these seven dimensions have been put into two broad categories based on military and non-military aspects. The military dimension encompasses the threat from state actors, maritime terrorism and the protection of sea lanes of communication. The non-military security dimension includes resource management; prevention of illegal activities such as human and drug trafficking; and management of disasters like tsunami and rising sea levels.

Hypotheses and Methodology

The thesis proposes two hypotheses: one, small states are vulnerable to security challenges due to their fragile polity and weak economic and military infrastructure. Two, their limited military capability and resources make smaller island states dependent on external sources for their security. Both multilateral and bilateral diplomacy are used to sensitise the world community to their insecurity; however, such diplomatic efforts do not guarantee free flowing international support. International support is determined by the strategic importance of the insecure state.

The study is carried out by employing historical and analytical method. For this purpose, both primary as well as secondary sources are used. As far as secondary sources are concerned, the data was collected from the existing literature – books, published articles and news from different magazines, newspapers and internet sites. Seminar and study reports by eminent researchers and scholars were also consulted. For primary sources, data was collected from government documents, texts of various acts and speeches, joint press statements, media releases, etc.

Chapterisation

The thesis consists of seven chapters including conclusion. The first chapter provides a conceptual framework of the study. The chapter examines maritime security challenges faced by small island states and their responses to those challenges. To understand the security concerns and nature of responses to such concerns, the behaviour of small states

has been studied. The chapter discusses the various options preferred by the small state to deal with its security challenges and their pros and cons.

The second chapter analyses the military sources of Sri Lanka's maritime security threat both from state and non-state actors. Security dynamics in the Indian Ocean both during the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period have been discussed to analyse why is the power rivalry in the Indian Ocean a concern for Sri Lanka. A section has been devoted to Sri Lanka's perceived security concerns that emerged from India's ambition in the Indian Ocean. The chapter also discusses the challenges faced by Sri Lanka from the LTTE, particularly in the maritime sphere. Maritime security concerns in the post-LTTE period have also been examined in this chapter. The chapter highlights how and why security concerns and threat perception in Sri Lanka has changed with the change in domestic, regional and global politics.

The third chapter discusses the non-military sources of insecurity. The chapter identifies unsustainable use of marine resources, degradation of marine environment and natural disaster as some of the factors causing security concern. Analysis has been done to understand how these factors impact Sri Lanka economically, politically and socially. The chapter also argues that the ethnic conflict, lack of preparation and management and inadequate resources further aggravate the problem.

The fourth chapter analyses Sri Lanka's political initiatives and measures to protect its maritime security. The chapter underlines two main political and diplomatic approaches employed to deal with its maritime security concerns and threats: Bilateral cooperation and multilateral diplomacy at the global and regional levels. In this context, Sri Lanka's bilateral and multilateral, political and diplomatic engagements on maritime issues are analysed. An attempt has been made in this chapter to analyse the effectiveness and limitations of these political measures.

The fifth chapter analyses Sri Lanka's military responses to maritime security threats. The chapter discusses evolution of Navy from a token navy to a fighting navy with the emergence of the Sea Tigers. Since 1983 onwards, the Sri Lankan Navy had been

engaged in a war with the LTTE and finally in the fourth Eelam War, they completely destroyed the Sea Tigers' maritime capability. The chapter assesses the role played by the Sri Lankan Navy during the war and peace time.

The sixth chapter focuses on Sri Lanka's management of non-military security challenges. The chapter examines policy initiatives on the issue of maritime governance and their implementation. Global, regional and bilateral cooperation on maritime governance and their efficacies are discussed.

Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the arguments made in the previous chapters and then tests the hypotheses. It highlights the changing dimensions of Sri Lanka's maritime security concerns and challenges and assesses its capability to overcome security challenges. The conclusion also highlights that due to its strategic importance, Sri Lanka can turn many of its vulnerabilities into opportunities and avail assistance from foreign countries without losing its strategic autonomy, if the ruling elites can follow a balanced foreign policy.

Maritime Security of Small Island States: An Analytical Framework

Given the increasing maritime interests of countries for their trade, food and energy security, ensuring maritime security has become one of the prime concerns of all countries, whether big or small. For smaller island countries, maritime security is a special concern because of its multi-faceted and multi-dimensional relationship with the sea as well as its inherent disadvantages and vulnerabilities in terms of size, resource and capability to deal with the security challenges. However, not much academic attention has been given to the study of maritime aspects of security of small island states despite the availability of vast literature on the behaviour and security of small states. Generally there is a difference in the way security is perceived by a small and a big state. Consequently, responses of the small states and big powers to security challenges vary. This chapter, therefore, aims to analyse the maritime security of small island states to understand whether the challenges faced by them are different. Is there any difference in the way small states respond to maritime security challenges?

To assess the maritime security of small island states, the chapter first looks at the concepts of small state and maritime security in general and then examines how the maritime security challenges faced by small island states differ from other states. Finally, the chapter analyses the strategies adopted by small island developing states in pursuit of their maritime security.

This chapter uses two main contested concepts—maritime security and small states. Essentially contested concepts signify a general agreement in the abstract, but they induce incessant and irresolvable disagreements about their practical meaning (Bueger 2015: 2). Both the terms have been defined by different scholars differently.

Defining Small Island State

An island is an area or land mass surrounded by water. By this definition, United Kingdom (UK) or Australia should also be considered as island. But usually when one talks of islands, size is an important element. Geographers define islands by reference to

their relatively small size rather than the fact of being enclosed by water (Crawford 1989: 277). Therefore, island state generally refers to a small state.

The term 'small state' is again a debatable concept. There is no consensus on what constitutes a small state. One approach to defining small state is to measure size by three variables, viz. area, population and Gross National Product (GNP) (Amstrup 1976: 166). According to Vital (1967: 8) "if an economically advanced country has population of 10-15 million and under developed country has a population of 20-30 million should be considered as small state". The Commonwealth Secretariat (2014), on the other hand, in its list of small states includes those states which have population less than 1.5 million. According to Karl Deutsch, a small state is a state whose total GNP is less than one per cent of the world's GNP (Quoted in Azar 1973: 29), whereas Lake (1988) includes those states which have less than five per cent of world trade.

Baehr (1975: 460), on the other hand, says that rigid criteria, particularly quantitative criteria, cannot be applied to define the concept of small states, because these variables are not constant and subject to change over a period of time. So a definition on the basis of fixed population or GNP may not be relevant after a period of time. Also how can one justify why a state producing 0.99 per cent of the world's GNP is considered a small state, but countries with 1.01 per cent of the world's GNP is not included in the list.

Robert Rothstein puts forward a psychological and material definition of small state. According to Rothstein (1968: 29), a small state is one which recognises that it cannot obtain security by use of its own capabilities, and therefore, it must rely on the aid of other states, institutions, or process. Similar kind of definition is forwarded by Keohane. According to Keohane (1969: 296), "a small power is a state whose leader considers that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system". Vayrynen (1971: 91-102) says, "small power is a state which has a low objective and/or a low perceived rank in the context where it is acting."

Though there is no consensus on the definition of small states, scholars have identified some common characteristics of small states which include: poor economy, weak military capability, fragile polity, limited capability of crisis management, dependence on others, low objective and low perceived rank, inability to have significant impact on the system, sovereignty sensitive, and vulnerable. As a small state, island state also shares all these inherent disadvantages.

Article 121 of the UNCLOS under Part VIII defines island as a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by water, and continues to be above water at high tide (UN 1982: 66). The same article also provides the islands the right to have territorial waters, contiguous zone, EEZ, and the continental Shelf. UNCLOS has set the limits of national jurisdiction of all these areas, as every state has the right to establish "breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines" (Article 3, UNCLOS, UN 1982: 27); contiguous zone up to 24 nautical miles from the baselines (Article 33, UNCLOS, UN 1982: 35); the exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles (Article 57, UNCLOS, UN 1982: 44); and continental shelf "shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (Article 76, UNCLOS, UN 1982: 53). As a result, islands with a smaller land area generally have a much larger maritime domain. Maritime domain is defined here as "all the areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, oceans or other navigable waterways" (Burgess 2016: 28).

With limited resources, securing the maritime domain is a major concern for small island developing states. The sea has been the lifeline for small island states in the sense that it provides livelihood, energy, economic growth and food security. While the ocean provides all kinds of benefits to the island, it also becomes a great source of insecurity for the island nation, particularly small island developing states, because of their intrinsic disadvantages and vulnerabilities due to their smallness. Environmental, social and political fragility and high degree of economic vulnerability expose the small island states to external pressure (UNCTAD 2004: vi). How does a small island developing state then ensure its maritime security with these disadvantages?

Defining Maritime Security

In general terms, maritime means an assortment of thing pertaining to the sea, connected with the sea and living or found near the sea. Therefore, maritime security means absence of security threats or challenges in the sea or emanating from the sea. Now the question is threat from what? Traditionally maritime security was linked with military threats from state actors. However, it has been acknowledged over the years that maritime security can be threatened by a host of non-military challenges or by non-state actors as well. Non-military challenges include all those activities which affect environmental, economic and human security. Hence, a broad definition of maritime security refers to the absence of maritime inter-state disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking of narcotics, people and illicit goods, arms proliferation, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, or maritime accidents and both man-made and natural disasters. While this broad definition has gained currency in the new millennium, there is no unanimity among countries across the globe in their definition of maritime security. "Each country with a coastline can experience a different mix of threats and situations depending upon their local geography, the demographics of their population, economic development and climate" (Sloggett 2014: 140). Moreover, governments also make a conscious effort to define maritime security as per their political and economic interests. While some countries prefer a broad definition of maritime security, others prefer a narrow definition of maritime security for their policy and strategy. Usually, countries with extensive areas of marine jurisdiction prefer a broad definition, whereas countries with small and confined area of maritime jurisdiction and extensive shipping interests prefer a narrow definition of maritime security (Bateman 2011). As there is no universal definition of maritime security, there is also no set strategy to ensure it. The strategy adopted by a particular country to ensure maritime security depends on how the government of that country defines maritime security as well as its capability.

Dimensions of Maritime Security

Maritime security is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted, involving both military and non-military issues. The multi-dimensional aspect of maritime security became popular particularly after the end of the Cold War. Traditional analysis of maritime security had a

military focus. But with growing incidents of terrorism and crime at sea and frequent large-scale environmental disasters, it has been widely accepted that in the new millennium, the sea should not be seen only from a military or naval approach.

Military Dimension: Concerns of Small Island States

The discourse on maritime security in the traditional sense refers to naval warfare, importance of maritime power projection and the concept of sea power. Domination of sea was considered important to project power. Mahan (2003) had argued that sea and sea power have exerted decisive influence on history. All the great powers for their geo-economic and geo-strategic interests try to have full control over the sea as history has proved that command and control of the sea is the key to become a global power (Mahan 2003: 35-42). By controlling the maritime domain, countries can control lands far off. So states try to control maritime routes and deter other powers from having such control. Many important battles in history were fought at sea for this purpose.

The possibility of large-scale conventional naval battle between major powers is much less in the 21st century. However, naval confrontations among states cannot be ruled out completely, as the strategy to command and control the sea and deny the same to enemies, remains key to protect maritime interests. With the evolution of the concept of an EEZ extending up to 200 miles from the shore and acceptance of an enlarged continental margin, a large number of new, opposite and adjacent boundary problems have been created. These exacerbate serious disputes particularly between states with already strained relations (Sharma 1996). Unresolved boundaries may affect economic activity, such as exploration work or fishing and cause disputes and tensions between the maritime authorities of conflicting parties. Blockading by one of the parties may cause serious tensions and may lead to overt conflict at sea. Moreover, the need to protect important Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) may lead to a conventional arms race (Sloggett 2014). Thus, though there is an inhibition on the part of the maritime powers to lead a conventional war at sea, the sea has not become free from military activities. The sea now has been frequently afflicted by proxy war, gunboat diplomacy, asymmetric

warfare and insurgency. Countries can protect their maritime interest without physically attacking or occupying or annexing another country. Powerful countries can militarily intervene in another country without resorting to war and by using coercive and military particularly naval diplomacy. Small island developing states are mainly vulnerable to this kind of intervention.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the great imperial powers needed bases to project naval power and to keep open the lanes of commerce. For this purpose, they preferred to exercise control over islands out in the seas, without large populations to govern, from which counterattacks is impossible (Singh 1977). Thus, the great powers used to control small islands to ensure their strategic position. With the process of decolonisation in the 20th century, though many of these islands got independence from the imperial powers, these islands still offered advantages for projecting power. Most of these small islands got their independence at a time when the whole world was divided into two power blocs. Both the blocs were trying to include as many countries as possible in their respective blocs through alliance politics or proxy war. Both the blocs tried to acquire strategically located islands for their naval base. New weapon systems acquired by the bigger powers also made it necessary to acquire islands as bases to launch such weapons (Namboodiri et al. 1982). Even after the end of the Cold War, the quest to control the sea has not diminished. To protect the sea lines of communication for their strategic interests, great powers look for bases on strategically located small islands far off from their own shore. Different methods are being used to acquire base facilities on these islands.

One of the methods used by the states to acquire an island is by capturing it through naval attack as well as controlling the sea around through sea denial. However, due to their economic and security vulnerability, small islands can be influenced to provide base facilities to a bigger power without capturing them militarily. One of the methods used by the great powers is 'gunboat diplomacy'. Gunboat diplomacy is "the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state" (Cable 1994: 14).

Through limited naval force, a situation can be created in which the small island has no option but to agree to an "escalation or surrender with meek compliance", or can induce the smaller state to take some action or to prevent it from doing so by employing a warship (Cable 1994:14; Ghosh 2001).

Bigger states can even avoid use of limited force to influence a smaller state. They can be influenced through economic coercion or through economic and military aid and assistance Vital (1967) that economy is the weakest element of the small states' national strength. One dimension of economic vulnerability is the extreme debt burden. To come out of the debt trap, they rely on other economic powers or institutions which limit state autonomy. The poor economic conditions also impact military security. Due to their poor economic condition, they are not able to acquire sophisticated military capability. When small states are targeted, they are incapable of coping or resisting. Due to these weaknesses and inabilities, they are dependent on others for military assistance. Military assistance may also make small states vulnerable to subversion and unable to resist the pressure of bigger powers to overthrow its government or alter its political system (Akram 1987: 128).

Military challenges to maritime security come not only from state actors but also politically motivated non-state actors who threaten sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country and challenge the capability of the state to command and control the sea under its jurisdiction.

At one point, people used to debate the viability of terrorists using the maritime area. But in recent years, the ocean has been frequently used as terrorists find it a convenient way of moving men and materials. There are also fears expressed of terrorists using merchant ships for transporting Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or using them as a WMD (Prakash 2005). There are examples of non-state actors possessing credible maritime capability and threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. Some terrorist organisations with maritime capability indulge in criminal activities at sea to disrupt the economy of enemy nation or to exploit fear among the international

community through violence. However, there are a few organisations whose main aim is to throw out the existing regime and have full control over the land and water to claim their sovereign rights, (for example, armed separatist groups). Threat of violence is used by these separatist groups to pursue political change in the maritime domain. The separatist groups are active in those parts of the maritime areas where they demand exclusive rights. Therefore, they want to have full control over the maritime domain and the EEZ, so that they can have exclusive rights over the resources and use the sea to have free flow of trade and supply of weapons and cadre to support their armed struggle (Raman 2004).

Since the main aim of separatist groups is to make the national government accept their political demands and control the territorial waters to claim their sovereign rights, most of the unlawful and terrorist activities of these groups take place in the maritime zone instead of the high seas beyond them. However, they cannot remain completely localised. These separatist groups resort to armed robbery, drug trafficking and smuggling to finance their operation. Though they are not pirates, they develop a nexus with pirates to finance their movement and indulge in acts of piracy and armed robbery in important SLOCs. They hijack ships and convert them into a 'phantom ships' or 'ghost ships'— vessels that have been registered on the basis of false or inaccurate information, for smuggling of drugs and arms (Kraska 2011: 56). Drug trafficking is the most lucrative way to generate funds for separatist movements. The funds raised from the sale of drugs are used to purchase arms and sophisticated weaponry. The separatist groups or terrorists register their vessels in countries that provide the facilities of 'Flags of Convenience' (FoC)[7] for easy registration with minimum or no taxes and no restrictions on safety standards or crew's nationality. These ships are difficult to track since their ownership is concealed and the ships also frequently change their names and registrations (Khurana 2005: 60). Thus, they can easily conduct illegal activities at sea through these ships. The FOC registered ships have made maritime terrorism by localised separatist groups into a transnational and global affair. It is however, not necessary that all those who indulge in illegal activities in the sea, such as drugs and human trafficking or piracy, are terrorists.

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[7] A FoC ship is a vessel that flies the flag of a country other than the country of ownership.

Unlike terrorists, the pirates or traffickers do not have any political motive. Their interest is purely economic.

Like the state actors, terrorist groups particularly the separatists use the maritime domain for political purpose and their maritime capability for sea control and sea denial. Maritime terrorism is considered an "unlawful act of violence at sea or that originating from the sea, with an intention for political or destructive ends, but not those associated with war declared under the laws of war" (Paleri 2003: 352-72). Nonetheless, there are instances where state maritime forces have engaged in full-fledged war at sea with terrorist groups. Therefore, during a declared war, challenges from politically motivated non-state actors, who threaten territorial integrity and sovereignty of a country, should be considered as military challenge. Small island developing states are vulnerable to military challenge from non-state actors too.

According to Sveics (1969), even though small nations are militarily much inferior, a united and politically strong state can resists big power intervention through political defence. However, most small states lack social and political cohesiveness due to distorted state structures, faulty nation-building process, fragility of political institutions and inequitable resource distribution. Small states are often troubled by ethnic conflicts, religious sectarian strife, struggle for greater shares in development resources and crisis of political succession (Rahman 1987: 225-28). In some cases, these conflicts take the shape of armed conflict and separatist movements which threaten the territorial integrity of the country. Though the root cause of these conflicts is politico-economic, it causes military threat to the country as and when it turns into an armed conflict. In an island nation, armed movement does not restrict itself within the land boundary. Due to the very nature of geography, armed movement gets extended to the maritime spheres too. To continue a movement on land, separatist/militant groups of an island country rely on the sea for their logistics. Hence sea-control becomes an important strategy of armed separatist groups of an island nation.

Internal conflicts of small states are often aggravated by overt or covert interventions of neighbours and major powers. This is another way the big powers can militarily intervene and influence the policies of small states to protect their strategic interests. These interventions take different forms: ranging from outright physical occupation to coercive diplomacy, which consists of demonstrations of the use of force without war and arms supplies (Rahman 1987: 225-28). Under the pretence of trying to help one group against another group, foreign powers seek to dominate the affairs of small state and to use its economic and military potential to secure their local or strategic objectives.

Hence, it can be argued that threats to military security for small island states come not only from external sources, but also from internal sources. In the post-World War II period very few states have been captured militarily. Big powers in the post-war period basically try to influence the politics of smaller states by military, economic and other means without capturing it militarily. A conflict-ridden small state provides opportunities to big powers to easily intervene and influence the politics. The big powers very often directly or indirectly allow local conflicts to flare up to secure their strategic objectives. Alford (1984), therefore, argues that small states need to worry more about internal threats than external threats.

Thus, from a military perspective, maritime security means protecting the territorial integrity of a state from armed attack or use of force by another state or non-state actors who are politically motivated, and as maintenance of freedom of navigation in the SLOC.

While military challenge can threaten the maritime security of any state irrespective of size, small states are comparatively more vulnerable and prone to be affected as they are fundamentally less capable of offering adequate resistance. Some of them may even be totally defenceless. The factors which make smaller island states vulnerable to military challenges include geographic location, poor economy, socio-political fragility, and limited capability.

The location makes small states vulnerable to big power intervention. The level of vulnerability, however, varies depending on the importance of small states to big powers. In terms of geo-strategy, the importance of a state depends on its location. A small state can become geo-politically important when it is located in or near a theatre of clash between global or regional powers. The importance of a small state can be due also to its natural resources needed by big states and by the world in general. In other words, small island states must offer some geo-political or geo-strategic advantage—whether in war, in a big power rivalry or to prevent a potential military opponent. The geo-strategic importance makes small states a pawn in the game of international power politics (Azar 1973). They become an attractive target for big regional or extra-regional powers to attack or interfere.

Non-Military Dimension: Concerns of Small Island States

Though the UNCLOS does not give any clear-cut definition of maritime security, it identifies the sources of threat. They include not only a series of military activities but also IUU fishing activities, wilful and serious pollution, natural disaster like tsunami and sea level rise (Klein et al. 2010: 6). All these dimensions are inevitably linked to economic, energy, human and environmental security. Resource depletion and degradation of marine environment have severe impact not only on sea and land but also on human population. The main aspects of human security concern are food, shelter, sustainable livelihoods and safe employment. Since fisheries are a important source of food and employment for many coastal states, IUU fishing is a major problem impacting human security and environmental security. Illegal and unregulated fishing can cause depletion of resources, which not only affects the ecology but also the livelihood of the fishermen as there will not be any resource to fish, if unregulated fishing continues for long.

With the growing sea-borne trade, use of ocean for transit of goods has increased considerably. At the same time, economic and developmental activities have mounted tremendous pressure on the coastal areas. Consequently, marine pollution, caused by both

land-based and marine sources, has emerged as a serious issue affecting both ecology and human health.

Disasters like tsunami and sea level rise caused by marine hazard affect human, economic as well as environmental security. According to the Working Group (WG) I to the Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) Report, 2007, global sea level rose by about 120 metre(m) during the several millennia that followed the end of the last ice age (approximately 21,000 years ago), and stabilised between 3,000 and 2,000 years ago. But there was no evidence of significant change in global sea level from then until the late 19th century. It has been estimated that in the 20th century, global average sea level rose at a rate of about 1.7 milimetre (mm) per year. On the basis of satellite data, the WG I to the Fourth IPCC Report 2007 says that since 1993, sea level has been rising at a rate of around 3 mm ever year, significantly higher than the average during the previous half century (Solomon et al. 2007). The sea level is not rising uniformly around the world. The economic and social development of many low-lying islands is at great risk due to sea level rise.

Small islands are located among the most vulnerable regions in the world. They are impacted by the intensity and frequency of natural and environmental disasters primarily in the form of hurricanes, cyclones, volcanic eruptions, floods, droughts and earthquakes, and face disproportionately high economic, social and environmental consequences. The small island states are specifically vulnerable due to their dependence on coastal and marine resources for their livelihood including food security; dependence on tourism which can be easily impacted by climate change and natural disasters; limited freshwater resources; limited land resulting in land degradation and coastal erosion, which affects waste management, and vulnerable biodiversity resources (SIDS 1998 a). Environmental disasters and oil-spills, for instance, are a grave concern to the ecosystems of these islands. Natural hazards seriously affect the economies of small islands. One of the major challenges with regard to natural hazards is the time small states take to recover from them (Parry et al. 2007). Due to the coastal zone concentration in a limited land area, the adverse effects of climate change and sea-level rise or uncontrolled developmental and

economic activities, cause considerable risks to the sustainable development of small islands. The resources critical to island and coastal populations such as beaches, freshwater, fisheries, coral reefs and atolls and wildlife habitat are at risk. Small islands are particularly vulnerable because of the limited physical size, which effectively reduces adaptation options to climate change and sea-level rise. In extreme circumstances, sea-level rise and its associated consequences could trigger abandonment and significant "off-island migration," at great economic and social costs (Nurse and Sem 2001). Environmental degradation is an immediate threat to numerous people in terms of deepening poverty and uprooting their way of life, as most of the population lives in the coastal areas. Destruction and degradation of the coastal and marine environment will not only endanger the lives of large section of the population but also cause the submergence of these areas and thus will create the problem for the very existence of the country itself. In such circumstances, environmental migration or environmental refugees can create havoc. Environmental refugees may cause conflict between states and ethnic groups (UNGA 1994).

The Working Groups to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, 2007 talked about the contribution of complex interaction of external and internal processes in heightening the vulnerability of the island's social and ecological systems to climate change (Parry et al. 2007). According to the report, external pressures that contribute to the vulnerability of small islands to climate change include energy costs, population movements, financial and currency crises, international conflicts, and increasing debt. Additionally, internal processes such as rapid population growth, unsustainable development, weak infrastructure, increasing income inequality, unemployment, rapid urbanisation, political instability, growing gap between demand for and provision of health care and education services, weakening social capital, and economic stagnation creates vulnerabilities. Low economic resilience, poorly developed infrastructure and limited funds and human resource skills limit the capacity of small islands to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change or other crisis (Nurse and Sem 2001). With limited resources and capacity, these islands find it challenging to adopt a path of sustainable development. Vulnerability studies conducted for selected small islands show that the costs of overall

infrastructure and settlement protection are a significant proportion of GDP, and well beyond the financial means of most small island states (Parry et al. 2007).

Maritime security, therefore, is described not in terms of naval strategy alone but also refers to both preventive and reactive measures to manage disaster and illegal activities at sea or from the sea. It is noteworthy that the threats identified above can affect the security of any state irrespective of its size. However, small island developing states are more vulnerable to such challenges compared to the bigger states due to their inherent disadvantages. The Commonwealth Secretariat (1985: 24) argues that military or non-military threat may damage the "core values of a small state".

Due to the intrinsic vulnerabilities, it is generally believed that the opportunities for small states to shape and implement effective, creative or independent security policies are very limited (Seselgyte 2013). As a result, small states behave quite differently from bigger powers in times of emergency.

Maritime interests of small states also vary with the interests of great powers. While a big state projects power not only within its maritime jurisdiction but also in the crucial SLOCs and the high seas to protect its maritime interests and ambitions, small states prefer to deal with the challenges crucial to its survival. This is basically due to the low perceived rank of the small states and their limited capabilities. The main concern of the sovereignty sensitive small states is how to deal with maritime challenges without losing its strategic autonomy and sovereignty. Before venturing into how small island states respond to maritime security challenges, the following section analyses the general measures required to be taken to ensure maritime security.

Maritime Security Measures
As maritime security in the traditional sense implies protecting the domain from military attack from a state actor, emphasis was given on naval strategy to ensure maritime security. Mahan (2003) and Corbett (1888) talk about maritime strategy during war where the enemy is visible and obvious. However, in today's context decisive battle is

not possible as war in the maritime domain, if there is any, is mostly asymmetric (Sloggett 2014: 201). As newer threats and situations are being identified in the maritime domain, horizon of the war-centric strategy is getting expanded (Hattendorf 2013). Due to the multi-dimensional nature, maritime security can be ensured through a broader inter-agency approach that goes beyond a maritime or naval approach. States need to factor the following aspects to ensure maritime security.

Maritime Domain Awareness

Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the key to ensure maritime security. MDA can provide policy makers with inputs on strategic priorities that need to be focused on to create a secure maritime environment.MDA basically means effective understanding of anything which is associated with the maritime environment that could impact the security, safety and economy (International Maritime Organisation 2010). In other words, MDA means keeping oneself aware about the activities in the maritime areas of interests through intelligence gathering either through technology or through human intelligence. However, mere collecting information does not help if the collected information are not analysed to assess the impact. An effective maritime domain awareness system, therefore, requires: 1) information collection from human intelligence and surveillance, 2) analysis of the gathered information, and 3) Sharing the analysed information and data with concerned authorities.

For an effective MDA, deployment of Automatic Identification System (AIS) satellite based reconnaissance and long range radars and long range unmanned aerial vehicles are required (Sloggett 2014: 90). The sea areas need to be constantly patrolled by navy or coastguard. For effective guarding local fishermen can also be involved. As they are well acquainted with the sea, fishermen can provide intelligence to the security forces. The capability to integrate information derived from a range of open sources and intelligence material gathered from sensitive sources, and developing maritime and land-based domain awareness are a crucial element of any coherent maritime response. An information sharing centre needs to be built for the purpose which can work 24x7 and

monitor, collect, analyse and share information with the concerned authorities to prevent a crisis.

Maritime Security Policy

An effective overarching maritime security strategy based on maritime domain awareness and in consistence with international laws is another important aspect of maritime security. As maritime security is multi-dimensional and its aspects are interlinked, a comprehensive policy is imperative. The provision of maritime security is a major inter-agency challenge at the national level. Due to the wider range of issues involved with maritime security, several agencies, ministries and departments are involved, such as ministries of transport, fisheries, agriculture and trade, and legal agencies, navy, coast guards, port authorities, border guards, the police and intelligence services. It is, therefore, essential to have national coordination, joint policies and operations, and information sharing among the different functional agencies, including civil-military coordination. A well-formulated policy guides the authorities to take appropriate measures to respond to their security challenges. Legal framework also needs to be formulated at regional and global level due to the transnational dimension of maritime security issues.

Developing a Capable Maritime Force

Having a capable maritime force is an important requirement to ensure maritime security. Though the conventional war time maritime strategy is not enough to deal with the 21st century challenges to maritime security, the main thrust of the naval strategy—sea control and sea denial—still holds relevance. To enforce national or international law at sea to deny the enemy any control over the domain, whether the enemy is a state actor, terrorist, a poacher, illicit drug and human trafficker or polluter, the country must deploy the navy or coast guard at the area of interests.

The main role of the navy is to defend its own territory as well as protect its interests in the SLOCs and high seas. Additionally, the navy plays a constabulary role to deal with non-military security challenges. Therefore, to ensure maritime security a country needs

to have a versatile maritime force, so that it has the flexibility and agility to deploy it wherever its maritime interests is in danger (Sloggett 2014: 108). Broadly a country must have inshore patrol boats, offshore patrol vessels, fast patrol boats with guided missiles, minesweepers, theatre missile defence, frigates, destroyers and other surface vessels to deter or destroy any attempt by an adversary to gain access to the EEZ, submarines to intercept threats to the state's SLOC or the EEZ, and manned and unmanned air craft surveillance capabilities. It is also imperative to have adequate scientific and technological capability, early warning system and infrastructure to conduct research as well an information sharing centre to provide information gathered through surveillance with the concerned agencies at national and regional levels.

Regional and International Cooperation

To ensure maritime security, the government needs to protect itself from the challenges and threats to its national interests that exist in its local waters, the immediate littoral and in the global maritime domain. Due to the global and transnational nature of the challenges as well as the vastness of the ocean areas, it is not possible for a single country, howsoever powerful it is, to deal with the challenges on its own. Cooperation is required at the regional or global level. An international framework of cooperation is required that draws maritime forces from various countries together so that they can share their variety of capabilities (Sloggett 2014: 218). In this kind of cooperation, capable maritime powers can play a lead role. For example, the collaborating efforts of the major naval forces to protect the sea lines of communications. Smaller countries with lack of maritime capability may not contribute in this kind of exercise at the high seas, but they can ensure safety and security at the local level, which is important not only for their own interests but also for the interests of other countries. In this regard, it is the responsibility of the bigger and capable state to train and develop the small state's maritime forces and capability. An international approach is also imperative to develop MDA.

Emphasis on Management of Marine Resources and Sustainable Development

Managing marine resources is an important aspect of maritime security. Marine resources have immense economic value. But uncontrolled and unregulated use of these resources

can have a disastrous effect on the marine environment and the economy. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government to see that the resources are used in sustainable manner for the growth and development of the country. Several measures need to be adopted to manage the marine environment, in addition to law enforcement and apprehending perpetrators of illegal activities at sea. The government must find out the root cause of illegal activities at sea and subsequent actions need to be initiated. Some of the measures include: sensitising people to the need to protect marine environment from pollution and providing adequate employment opportunities to divert people from indulging themselves in illegal activities. A land-based management approach is required. Traditionally, sectoral management of marine resources is in practice (Antunes and Santos 1999). However, since the 1980s, emphasis has been given to integrated environmental management or integrated marine and coastal area management as the sectoral approach has not proven to be an efficient system. Integrated management must follow a participatory approach involving all the stakeholders associated with the management of marine resources for the sustainable development of the ocean (Gupta 2005: 40). This is an adaptive process which considers problem assessment, policy priorities, formulation and implementation through adequate instruments and measures by taking into account the stakeholders involved (Antunes and Santos 1999: 217).

Small States' Response to Maritime Security Challenges

Ideally, the above mentioned measures need to be adopted by all the states to ensure maritime security. However, it may not be possible for all kinds of states to strictly adopt all these measures. Acquiring maritime domain awareness and maritime capability are costly affairs, which may not be afforded by a small developing state. The bigger state can initiate its own effort to deal with any challenges or lead a collaborative mechanism whereas the small island state seeks assistance from others.

Due to the lack of capability, a small state cannot be as proactive as the big states to have control over the maritime domain or to deny sea control to its enemies. In that context, the Mahanian strategy of power projection cannot be used by the small states or they prefer not to use it. Given the lack of capability, small states usually avoid military

options to deal with security threats from state actors. But to prevent and manage illegal and unregulated activities by non-state actors, small states need to have some kind of control over maritime jurisdictions so that they can deny perpetrators any control over sea to conduct their illegal activities. In this regard, states need to develop maritime capability to monitor, regulate and deter such activities as well as to enforce national legislation and implement the provision of international laws.

According to Rahman (1987: 224), small states take both "minimalist approach" and "maximalist approach" to deal with security threats. In "minimalist approach", the overall focus is directed towards the protection of the state from physical attacks both from within and without. This approach emphasises centrality of military security and credible defence against external threats. The maximalist approach, on the other hand, gives emphasis to both strengthening internal capacity and establishing broader linkages with the international system (Rahman 1987: 224). Drawing upon this argument, the responses to maritime security of small island developing states are analysed under the following subheadings.

Political Responses

For long there was debate in the discipline of international relations on the viability of the small state. However, as the number of small states was increasing in the post World War II period, the focus of the debate shifted to the role or behaviour of small states in the international system. One of the typical behaviours of the small state identified by scholars is the tendency to avoid war or military conflict with a state actor. Imoboghe (1987: 329) argues that adopting a conventional deterrence of arms build-up against the threat from a big power is the most futile exercise any small state would want to indulge in. To avoid conflicts with big states, small states adopt "defensive strategy" (Vital 1967: 144). As a defensive strategy, neutrality is used as an option by some of the small states to protect themselves from war.

Fox (1959) has talked about small states' policy of neutrality. In the pre-World War II period, the option of neutrality was used to ensure security, particularly in war-like

situations, considering that the small state would not be attacked if they did not take sides. But in today's context and particularly in the realm of maritime security, the option of neutrality is hardly used. A small state can be challenged by a maritime power without declaring any direct war. Even if a small state follows the policy of neutrality, the competing great powers may try to bring the small state into their fold for their own interest. This is particularly so, if the small state is located in a strategically important area. Hence, the discussion on the policy of neutrality as a security measure has not been given much attention in this thesis.

Alliance Politics

Another option used by the small states as a defensive strategy is alliance politics. A security alliance with a great power provides the leaders of small states the opportunity to allocate limited resources on domestic welfare goals, as security is taken care of by the alliance partners. Alliance with great powers can be done either through "balancing" or "bandwagoning". Nonetheless, policy of balancing and bandwagoning can be used by states without entering into a formal alliance system too. States can enter into 'non-allied security partnership' during peacetime (Shambaugh 2009: 139).

Balancing refers to aligning or collaborating with others against prevailing threat, while bandwagoning refers to aligning with the source of danger (Walt 1985). According to Walt, small states prefer bandwagoning with threatening great powers than to balance them. Walt (1985: 25) states:

> The weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon. Balancing may seem unwise because one's allies may not be able to provide assistance quickly enough. . . . States that are close to a country with large offensive capabilities (and that are far from potential allies) may be forced to bandwagon because balancing alliances are simply not viable.

However, when the process of decolonisation started after the World War II, most of the newly emerging small independent countries tended to use the method of balancing. They preferred to have security arrangement with the former colonial master, fearing a possible domination by the bigger capable power in the neighbourhood.

This security arrangement between an extra-regional power and a small state is not free from disadvantage. As small states' policy of balancing a regional power with the help of a extra-regional power is seen as external intervention in the region and thus encourages the regional big power to enhance its military capability to deter such move by external power and also to portray the image of a power capable to provide security to the region. Such flexing by regional powers may add to the security dilemma faced by small states. The security dilemma will lead the small state to increase the proximity to the extra-regional powers, and giving more reasons to the regional powers to put pressure on the small state.

Moreover, even if small states have a tendency to trust the extra-regional powers, there is no guarantee that the latter will not pose any security challenge to the former. According to Imoboghe (1987: 331), "acceptance of big power protection as a way of avoiding huge build-up may cause possible loss of freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre and strategic deployment, possible blackmail by the protecting power, and possible loss of international respect". Moreover, the protecting power would calculate its own interests before providing any assistance to the small state. In other words, under an alliance system, a small state "could pursue those interests that are in consonance with those of the protecting partner or partners" (Imoboghe 1987: 332). It is not always in the hands of the small state to enter into an alliance system or cooperative security arrangement. Much depends on whether a big power is interested or not to in a security arrangement with a smaller partner. Moreover, the stability of alliances and organisations where small states seek their security guarantees depend on the "cohesiveness of the coalition", equal commitment of all the allies and "will of the major contributing naval power" (Sokolsky 1998). Shying away from commitments in order to protect national interests by partners and allies may be a cause of instability and insecurity (Kaljurand 2013).

Nonetheless, despite the issues involved with the alliance system, particularly the politics of balancing, small states try to maintain the balance of power to ensure uninterrupted military assistance at the time of need. By playing the role of balancer among the regional powers or between the regional and extra regional powers, small state tries to ensure that

no single power achieves hegemony or dominates the system (Staden 1995). According to Keohane (1971), a geo-strategically important small country may use the tool of blackmailing or with the alliance partner or non-allied security partner to defend itself from unwarranted pressure.

Negotiated Settlement

Another option available to a small state to defend itself from military challenge from another state is-resolution of bilateral issues through negotiations. They try to adhere to the principle of mutual understanding and accommodation. However, this option too may not guarantee success to a small state. Cohen (1989) argues that however sincere a small state's effort is to arrive at peaceful coexistence or resolution of its problem through negotiations, there is no guarantee of reciprocity from big powers. Negotiations can bring a positive outcome only if the bigger power's interests are involved. Generally, it is believed that small states have limited administrative, diplomatic and financial capabilities compared to big states, which may hinder the former from effectively influencing the outcome of negotiations. However, empirical evidence suggests that small states may influence the outcome of negotiations by using bargaining strategy or by developing personal relations at the leadership level (Keohane 1971).

Reliance on International Organisation and International Law

Small states rely on the international organisations or international law, though mostly they are at times discriminatory towards the small states or developing states. Small states rely on the international organisations because they provide the platform where they have formal equality and capacity to restrain the great powers. Rappard (1934) argues that small states being militarily weak, have everything to gain from even an imperfect international system of law and order. He believes that small states have gained effective influence on world affairs by being part of the international organisations. According to Vayrynen (1971: 109-121), on the other hand, small states are protected by the international institutions which establish norms and develop mechanisms by which crisis

can be prevented and mitigated. Small states can also exercise influence through international institutions. In the international fora, smaller states can use collective international pressure on the bigger powers to enforce international law. However, there is no guarantee that such pressure will help the small state in fulfilling its interests. Success of such effort depends on the perseverance of small states to work collectively to put pressure on the big powers.

Developing Domestic Maritime Capability

Maritime security cannot be ensured by the above mentioned political means alone as challenges come from non-state actors and non-military sources too. The state must have the ability to protect its own EEZ and land from criminals, those engaged in illegal activities, terrorists and potential aggressors and also to protect the SLOCs to protect trade to ensure maritime security (Sloggett 2014:193). These demand a force which is capable of both surveillance and timely interception. To achieve this, sound equipment, good communications, modern technology, well trained personnel and good links with intelligence services and security forces ashore are essential. Therefore, the states put emphasis on military or naval capacity building to deal with the challenges in the maritime domain. However, the cost factor inhibits small island states in establishing an effective maritime security capability. It also requires industrial and technological capability. Vessels and maritime patrol aircraft, their equipment and support facilities are all relatively expensive. Therefore, to defend themselves from security challenges, small states often make security partnership arrangements with other states at bilateral level, or through multilateral security arrangements.

For military security arrangement, small states prefer to avoid cooperation with smaller powers even though they cooperate at the small-states level in matters of political issues such as the harmonisation of viewpoints (Skagestad 1974). Cooperation with other small powers is less beneficial in terms of military or economy. According to Gunnar Skagestad (1974: 192) in matters of practical, 'operational' character, conditions would most likely favour some of the forms of "maxi cooperation". According to him, cooperation between a big and a small state would give the latter advantages which it

would not be able to obtain from cooperating with other small states whose resources are as limited as its own (Skagestad 1974: 189). Moreover, small states' interests and positions are too divergent to have a common voice.

Usually, a small state prefers to have security cooperation with distant powers rather than a neighbouring regional power. However, in case of crisis in the maritime domain, a neighbouring country can provide assistance more quickly than a distant partner. Moreover, given the global nature of the challenges, it will not be viable for a state to depend on one particular state for maritime assistance. So, states prefer to have bilateral cooperation with as many countries as possible and also trilateral or multilateral security arrangements. Entering into a multiple bilateral security arrangement was not easy for a small state during the Cold War period due to the bloc politics, even if the small state was non-aligned.

The end of the Cold War facilitated the entry of small states into multilateral security arrangements. Even though the big powers are still competing for influence in the maritime domain in the post-Cold War period, the end of a bipolar world and the emergence of new transnational challenges paved the way for multilateral system where collaboration among previous adversaries as well as non-aligned countries were now possible. As competing powers are entering into multilateral cooperation, it has become easier for smaller countries to be part of multiple security arrangements with both regional and extra-regional powers.

In the post -Cold War period, most of the multilateral naval cooperation are led by the USA, which was seen by some as American intervention. It is, therefore, believed that a small state can get maximum benefit from a multilateral system within the region without involving an extra-regional power. According to Gupta (1987: 263), "regional cooperation organization which promotes normalisation of bilateral and multilateral relations between and among its members, are probably the best insurance that small states in today's world can buy for the security of their national frontiers against external challenges, threats and invasions" provided the relationship between members of the

organisations are normal; and the organisation is visibly and demonstrably independent of superpowers. However, often, smaller states feel insecure about the large regional power, even if the latter is not an ally of the super power, as the larger regional states have their own ambitions for power and influence.

Regional cooperation can be successful if all the member states perceive common security threats. It is quite unlikely that all the member states within the region perceive threat from a common extra regional power. However, there is every possibility that all the members are threatened by a common non-state actor or have common environmental challenges. In case of common enemy, such as maritime terrorism, piracy, etc., military cooperation at the regional level can be successful. Nonetheless, it is important that there is at least one country in the region capable enough to play a leadership role. It can be expected that in case of a common threat, the capable country will try to seriously implement regional security measures to protect its own interests, and thus will also make the small state secure.

Pugh (1994), however, argues that regional arrangements are institutionally weak and multinational naval cooperation is comparatively rudimentary. Just having integrated or coordinated patrol among the regional navies is not enough. A common approach or a regional criminal code is required to deal with transnational issues such as piracy, trafficking of persons and narcotics (Brandon 2008). Unfortunately, this kind of cooperation is lacking at the regional level.

Whatever measures are adopted, either at the bilateral level or multilateral levels, the issue of sovereignty is a major concern for small states. They feel that in the name of military assistance, big powers may encroach upon their sovereignty. Therefore, preference is given to cooperative arrangements that do not weaken sovereignty, such as integrated or coordinated naval cooperation, joint exercises or voluntary information sharing, capacity building or humanitarian assistance, etc.

Managing Marine Environment

While political or military assistance from other powers are important components of the security of small state, they alone cannot ensure foolproof security until and unless measures are adopted at national level to manage the marine environment. Island states are dependent on marine resources: both living and non-living, for their economic growth and development. Therefore, it is imperative to manage the resources and govern the maritime domain to ensure its sustainable use. Sustainable management strategies not only require the monitoring and enforcement of laws and regulations but also addressing the root cause to prevent illegal activities that affect the marine environment. Small states may not have control on external threats emanating from international sources but it can take preventive measures to avoid challenges from home grown terrorism, coastal erosion, oil pollution, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and human trafficking by focusing on the issue of governance. For this, it is imperative to have a land-based approach as the sources emanate from land or coast. Providing job facilities, removing poverty, uplifting the living standard, and spreading environmental awareness are all essential elements to prevent illegal activities at sea. But developing states often fail to fulfil these requirements.

It has been mentioned before that maritime domain awareness is the key to secure maritime environment. But given the cost, resources and technology involved to acquire MDA, it may not be possible for small island states to invest in effective MDA. Sloggett (2014) talked about the use of 'soft power' to engage the local population to be vigilant and oppose illegal activities at sea. NGOs and concerned government authorities can organise workshops to make the local people aware and get involved in coastal zone management.

Since small states are unable to concentrate on the governance and management issues due to resource crunch, several regional and global bodies are forthcoming to provide assistance in terms of resource, training and capacity building to enhance the capacity of the small states. If there is political will on the part of the ruling elites, small states can manage to get assistance from the international community. Unfortunately, small states

are seen to have a lukewarm approach to the issue of governance not only in terms of resource allocation but also because of their narrow perception on the issue of security. According to Khan and Kabir (1987), there is a tendency in the small states to identify regime security with state security, resulting in obvious distortion in conceptualisation of national security and neglect of the environmental aspect of maritime security.

Conclusion

The discussion so far has shown that several options are available to small states to ensure maritime security. All the options have their own advantages and disadvantages. It is on the political leadership to choose the appropriate response to a particular challenge. The political leaders generally get influenced by several factors while making a policy choice which includes: the external and international security environment, state's human and material resources, state's administrative and military capability, and most importantly, the political will, vision and ambition of the national leaders. Maintaining maritime security also requires a right balance between local, regional, global, and also between bilateral and multilateral responses. However, maintaining such balance is difficult for small states because of their intrinsic vulnerability due to fragile polity and weak economic and military capability. Since security for small states means not only absence of threat but also absence of vulnerability, efforts need to be made to remove some of the vulnerabilities. Keohane (1971: 162) argues that "weakness does not entail only liabilities; for smaller states it also creates bargaining assets." Small states can use the bargaining assets to defend itself from external threats or ensure foreign assistance to deal with the security challenges. Much depends on the vision and will power of the ruling elites; how they can turn disadvantages to opportunities to ensure maritime security.

Military Sources of Threat

Strategically located small island states are generally vulnerable to military security challenges. The possibility of military challenge is more if the island possesses important strategic resources and is marred with internal conflicts and political disturbances. Sri Lanka, one of the most strategically located islands in the Indian Ocean, possesses one of the best natural harbours in the world. Though it has never been occupied or invaded by a foreign power since it got independence from the British in 1948, big powers have tried to influence Sri Lankan politics for their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. The island has also been affected by civil war for three decades from the 1980s till 2009. In this background, this chapter aims to explore if Sri Lanka faces any military security challenges in the maritime domain.

Military threat to maritime security traditionally refers to naval conquest or aggression. But in the post-World War II period, direct naval battle between state actors at sea is rare. A state actor can pose threat to maritime security without resorting to war too. While countries still want to control sea and deny the sea to their enemies to pursue their maritime interests, there is an inhibition on the part of state actors to invade a territory or island in pursuit of their interests. Naval bases are acquired either by using coercive methods short of war or influencing the policies of the countries where bases are sought. A country can be influenced through gunboat diplomacy or intervening in the internal affairs of the country. In such cases, a country does not lose its sovereignty but strategic autonomy gets affected. Hence, military threat to maritime security can come in terms of direct naval attack, naval blockade, gunboat diplomacy or using naval forces to coerce or to influence policies of other countries. In this context, the chapter examines three developments: India's emergence as a regional power, big power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean and emergence of the Sea Tigers (naval wing of the LTTE) to identify Sri Lanka's military security concerns and threats in the maritime domain.

The chapter argues that while the LTTE undertook direct physical attacks on the country, India's emergence as the regional power and big power rivalry in the Indian Ocean were

perceived as threats to Sri Lanka's strategic autonomy by the Sri Lankan leaders. Therefore, the chapter is divided into two broad categories: security concerns from state actors and maritime security threats from non-state actors.

Sri Lanka's Security Concerns from State Actors

Sri Lanka's maritime security concerns emerge from four basic sources: Sri Lanka's geographic location, its importance to countries who want to dominate the Indian Ocean, its inability to protect itself in case of any invasion due to lack of armed forces and past memories of coming under foreign occupation. These concerns were clearly articulated by D. S. Senanayake, the first Prime Minister of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) at the time of independence in 1948. Senanayake in his speech in the House of Representatives on 1 December 1947 said:

> The defence of its country is one of the primary obligations of an independent State, and this is not the sort of world in which small nations can be secure without large and expensive armed forces. We are in specially dangerous position, because we are in one of the strategic highways of the world. The country which captures Ceylon could dominate the Indian Ocean. Nor is it only a question of protecting ourselves against invasion and air attack. If we had no imports for three months, we should starve, and we have therefore to protect our sea and air communications (Senanayake 1947).

Sri Lanka is located on important maritime trading routes in the Indian Ocean which connect Europe and the Middle East to China and the rest of Asia. America, Japan, China are dependent on this route for transporting their energy resources. Securing the sea lines of communication for their energy imports through this route is the prime concern of these countries and therefore, Sri Lanka is an important country in the security calculation of these countries.

Source: IDSA, GIS Lab

Map 1: Sea Lines of Communications

The teardrop island also has military importance. It is ideally located for monitoring and domination of South Asia. Trincomalee in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka is one of the best natural harbours in the world.

In the struggle for command of the sea, Sri Lanka had been colonised by the Western sea powers. For 442 years, the maritime provinces of Sri Lanka were under European occupation (Senanayake 1947). Prior to that, the island was invaded several times by South Indian invaders. There were also instances of Chinese and Arab traders coming to the island. De Silva (2005: 7) mentions that Gokanna (now Trincomalee) was a "natural port of disembarkation for boats arriving from the Bay of Bengal" which might have facilitated the wave of colonisation by North Indians. De Silva (2005) accounts that "there is possibility that traders reached the island while sailing down the Indian Coast and that the natural products of Sri Lanka may have provided incentive for some of them to found settlement there." Vincent Coelho (1976: 30) mentions an event where, the Chinese on a punitive expedition led by Admiral Cheng Ho brought a fleet of 65 ships, attacked the royal stronghold at Kotte and, having captured Vira Alakesvara and his family, carried them away to China as hostages. Thus, for various reasons, Sri Lanka from very early in its recorded history had attracted settlers and invaders and mercenaries from far and near. However, the ancient invaders did not have the intention of commanding the sea. Only the European powers beginning with the Portuguese had the intention of denying the maritime route to their adversaries and making them free for their own trade by controlling Sri Lanka and its waters. Thus, the first in terms of military threats to maritime security that Sri Lanka faced was from the Portuguese, when it imposed its control over Jaffna to make its communications between the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts safer (De Silva 2005: 169). Subsequently, most of the coastal area came under the governance of the Portuguese viceroy in Goa. Sri Lanka thus came under the Portuguese and Dutch within a century and a half. A hundred and fifty years later Sri Lanka came under the British rule (Coelho 1976: 3-4).

The attacks in the past and the arrival of the colonial powers have shaped Sri Lanka's threat perception in the post independence period. It was believed that the countries

which dominate the Indian Ocean would try to capture Sri Lanka; and in the absence of adequate military capability, it would be difficult to deter such attacks.

At the time of independence, Sri Lanka was dependent on limited foreign market for its export produce and on the foreign aid and assistance for its economic progress. It did not have the capability to defend itself from major aggression. The maritime capability of Sri Lanka was very weak. At the time of independence, Sri Lanka did not have any ships or crafts. The Royal Ceylon Navy, which was formed on 9 December 1950 under the Navy Act, Chapter 358 of the Legislative Enchantments of Ceylon, had 100 personnel (Singh 2002: 233). It was impossible for this miniscule navy to deal with any kind of naval aggression on its own.

Moreover, as an island nation, Sri Lanka is totally dependent on maritime trade. Sri Lanka's food and energy security is dependent on the smooth flow of imports. There is a fear that any kind of disruption in the maritime trade routes and sea lines of communication may seriously affect imports to the country. This was realised when the Suez Canal was occupied by the French, British and Israeli forces following nationalisation of the canal by the Government of Egypt as 75 per cent of Sri Lanka's trade used to pass through the canal (Bandaranaike 1956). The developments unfolding in the Indian Ocean region in the aftermath of World War II made Sri Lanka vulnerable to military challenges even if it was not directly targeted by any state actor. The two sources of military security concerns from state actors include: India's ambition in the Indian Ocean and the super power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean.

India's Ambition in the Indian Ocean and Sri Lanka's Concerns

As the process of decolonisation began after World War II and the British decided to withdraw from the Indian Ocean area, it was believed that India would fill the vacuum created in the region. The strategic thinkers in India those days were advocating Indian supremacy in the Indian Ocean. Indian strategic thinker K. M. Panikkar (1951: 92) argued that "India's security lies on the Indian Ocean" and therefore, "its future is closely bound up with strength she is able to develop gradually as a naval power." He suggested that India should develop its naval power capability by herself for defending her interests

in the seas vital to her and for maintaining supremacy in the Indian Ocean area. In case Britain withdraws its forces from the important Sea Lines of Communication in the Indian Ocean, "the entire defence of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal will fall on India and it is against this contingency that India has to organise her navy in the immediate future" (Panikkar 1951:95-96). Also, highlighting the strategic importance of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) Panikkar (1951: 82) suggested that its defence, both naval and land, should not be separated from that of India.

In line with the Indian strategic thinkers, India's political leadership like Nehru envisaged Indian Navy playing the role of an independent naval power to protect its maritime interests. After independence ten year naval modernisation plan was initiated in 1948. Indian navy expanded rapidly during 1965-77. Since 1978 onwards India initiated the programme to develop blue water capability of its navy, which considerably raised India's sea denial and force projection capability.

Since independence, India's foreign policy has been influenced by the idea that the Indian subcontinent is India's sphere of influence and hence it should make all efforts to prevent the intervention of great powers in the affairs of the region. India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru emphasised the need to keep foreign powers out of the region in the context of the attempt by the extra-regional powers to reoccupy territories after World War II (Mohan 2003). Following the same argument, Indira Gandhi, during her premiership, insisted that problems in the region must be resolved bilaterally without involving extra-regional powers. Indira Gandhi (1972: 77) said:

> the countries of Asia are now politically free but the continuing interplay of international forces impedes our struggle against economic backwardness and the shadows of the past. We share many problems which can be solved through cooperation among ourselves rather than merely through assistance from the outside, which has tended to cause misunderstanding among us and which was motivated more by self-interest than by a genuine understanding of our needs.

Articulation of the ambition to dominate the Indian Ocean by Indian leaders and strategic thinkers and India's naval development and attitude of Indian leaders towards the region in the post-independence period made the Sri Lankan leaders believe that the leadership

of independent India would try to acquire a naval base in Trincomalee to fulfil such ambitions. Sri Lankan leaders have exhibited this kind of fear from India even in the pre-independence period.

The Governor of Ceylon, Sir Andrew Caldecott, who assumed the post in 1939, talked about the existing Indian fear in the mind of the Sri Lankans (both Sinhalese and Jaffna Tamils) in his eighth periodical report for the Colonial Office (CO) on 11 April 1940. In his report Caldecott (1940: 64) says, "Dislike and fear of the Indians had its roots deeper in the past". Sri Lankans linked collapse of the ancient Sinhala civilisation to the Indian invasions. Indian traders were made responsible for squeezing out the Sinhalese traders from urban trade. Caldecott (1940: 64) mentions in the report that when he met D.S. Senanayake and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on 29 March 1940, they were "suffering violently from Indophobia". Caldecott in the same report also talked about how Nehru's statement on inclusion of Ceylon in an independent greater India instilled fear in the minds of the Sinhalese. Nehru's interest in Ceylon, in his view, was because of its "strategic importance as providing a naval base in Trincomalee and air bases in other parts of the island" (Caldecott 1940: 64)

Later, Governor Sir H. Moore (1947: 276), in his letter to Parliamentary Under- Secretary of State, Creech Jones, too talked about Senanayake's fear of Nehru's ambition to make India a "dominant power in this part of the world". The United National Party (UNP), which assumed power at the time of independence and the first Prime Minister of Ceylon D.S. Senanayake, the leader of the UNP and his successors, subscribed to this Indiophobia. The India fear was, however, mostly perceived than real.

In the post-independence period, Nehru himself assured Sri Lankans that India does not believe in any policy to absorb the island. He said this at a public reception in Colombo during his visit to the country on 8-15 January 1950. He said twice in the same speech,

> I made a passing remark in the earlier part of my speech to the possible fear in some quarters about India's intentions towards Ceylon. Let me assure you that any such notion about India is completely wrong for a variety of reasons…Our whole

policy is of a different kind and I am convinced in my mind that no such attempt will ever be made by India (Nehru 1950: 4-5).

Despite such commitment from Indian Prime Minister, Sri Lankan ruling party leaders in the initial years of independence were concerned about the report that Ceylon had been included as part of India's defence plan without consultation (Senanayake 1955). India's intention to carry out fleet exercises in the Palk Strait and using the Katchatheevu Island as bombardment target in 1949 was observed by Sri Lankans as intervening in Sri Lankan territories (Jayasinghe 2003: 24). Katchatheevu Island became an issue between the two countries when Madras officials asserted India's rights on the island in October 1921. However, the Sri Lankan side refused to acknowledge India's claim and considered it as part of Sri Lankan territory. Therefore, when V.V. Giri, the then High Commissioner for India in Sri Lanka, wrote to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence and External Affairs on 11 August 1949, to inform about the Royal Indian Navy's (RIN) intention to carry out fleet exercises in the Palk Strait, in non-territorial waters and to use Katchatheevu as bombardment target, the permanent secretary to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence and External Affairs Kanthiah Vaithianathan responded in writing that the island was not outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) and that if the RIN desired to conduct fleet exercise, it would be necessary to obtain permission of Ceylon Government to do so (Jayasinghe 2003: 24-25). However, the High Commissioner of India did not pursue the matter further. Later in 1955, when the Sri Lanka Air Force was planning to use Katchatheevu as a bombing and gunnery range bordering an area falling within the Madras Flight Information Region, India once again asserted that the island belonged to India and asked Sri Lanka to not to use the island as a bombing and gunnery range (Jayasinghe 2003: 25-26). Katchatheevu Island continued to be an issue until the signing of a maritime boundary agreement between the two countries in 1974.

It was believed in Sri Lanka that India had territorial ambition in Sri Lanka and hence was trying to acquire the Katchatheevu island which was under Sri Lankan territory. However, Prime Minister Nehru never ever made any strong claim on the island (Lok Sabha 1956). He acknowledged the fact that the island belonged to the Zamindari of the Raja of Ramnad, but he left it to the court to settle whether India had natural sovereign

rights over the island (Lok Sabha 1960). He made it clear in the Indian Parliament that he would not "spoil relations with a friendly country over a tiny island" (Lok Sabha 1956). Nehru on a number of occasions expressed that Sri Lankans have a wrong notion about India and, thus, an unsubstantiated fear complex. Hence, Nehru was against using any pressure tactic on the issue of Katchatheevu as suggested by some Indian parliamentarians. In his view, pressure tactics would further increase the fear and make any solution a little more difficult (Nehru 1954).

Indira Gandhi, who became Prime Minister in 1964, also followed Nehru's approach on the issue of Katchatheevu. Like Nehru she also believed that a rock, which is not even an island, is of "no strategic value to India" (Bhasin 2001: 75). Finally, it was under Gandhi's tenure the issue was resolved between the two countries.

India once again became a source of security concern, when J. Jayewardene, who was known for his cynicism towards India, became Prime Minister in 1977. Later he became President after the new constitution was promulgated. J. R. Jayewardene, prophesied back in the 1950s that small states like Sri Lanka would have to look for protection from other countries from Indian aggression in case a person with imperialistic ideas gain control of the reins of government in India (Jayewardene 1954: 8). After becoming Prime Minister, he viewed his Indian counterpart as one with imperialistic attitude. To counter India, The Jayewardene government subserved the US interest in the Indian Ocean by providing it facilities within Sri Lanka. It concluded an agreement on 9 December 1983 permitting the Voice of America to establish a transmission station in Sri Lanka (Bhasin 2001: xxvii). The Government of Sri Lanka also planned to lease Trincomalee Tank Farm to the Coastal Corporation of the USA.

Jayewardene's action prompted India to intervene militarily in Sri Lanka. Subsequently, by signing Indo-Lanka accord in 1987, India managed to keep the foreign powers out of Sri Lanka and safeguarded its interests in Trincomalee. At the time of signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987, the Prime Minister of India managed to get an assurance from the Sri Lankan government that "Trincomalee or any other port in Sri Lanka will not be

made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests; the work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka; Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organizations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes" (See PM of India's letter to President of Sri Lanka in 1987 in appendix no. 3)

After signing the agreement, India has been widely perceived as an interventionist power in Sri Lanka. It was widely believed that on the pretext of providing security assistance, India intended to influence Sri Lanka to protect its interests in the Indian Ocean.

It should be noted that while India is willing to provide security to the smaller states in the region on the principle of non-reciprocity and non-intervention, it also expects that its security sensitivities in the region will be respected by the smaller states (Sahadevan 2011: 124-126). India's main attempt in the post-independence period was keeping the small states, including Sri Lanka, in its security perimeters so that they cannot be used as proxies by the extra-regional power. In 1980s Sri Lanka was intervened not because of India's imperialistic intention, but due to the insensitivities of the Sri Lankan leadership towards India's security interests in the Indian Ocean.

Super Power Naval Rivalry in the Indian Ocean

Due to the immense geo-political and geo-strategic significance of the Indian Ocean, European powers–Britain, France and Holland–tried to gain supremacy in the region in the pre-World War I period. However, Britain succeeded in having military control over the Indian Ocean and by 1900, the ocean was akin to a British lake and this position continued till the end of World War II (Braun: 1983:6).

In the post World War II period, the world got divided into two blocs. The Cold War between the two blocs influenced global politics. In the initial years of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean was a low priority area in the military confrontation of the two superpowers

(Singh 1977). Europe, North Pole, North Africa, North Atlantic and the Pacific were the areas of strategic significance (Singh 1977: vi). The Indian Ocean became a theatre of military confrontation in terms of nuclear or conventional weapons with the introduction of the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system, especially after the perfection of the Polaris A-3 missile, with the range of 2,500 nautical miles and the introduction of the Poseidon and the Trident missiles (Singh, 1977: vi). The SLBM demanded control of the high seas to ensure a trouble-free functioning. The new weapons system necessitated that the USA consolidated its influence on places which would provide base facilities for their smooth operation. The USA entered into the Indian Ocean in 1964 to secure the area for the use of its Polaris submarines, because these submarines, operating from the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Bay of Bengal, could cover a substantial part of the Soviet Union and the whole of China (Singh 1977: 26). Following the US presence, the Soviet Navy also entered into the Indian Ocean in 1968.

The super power naval activity in the Indian Ocean made the region a theatre of conflict and dragged the region into Cold War politics. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, when the United States dispatched a Naval Task Force on 10 December 1971 to the Bay of Bengal to threaten India along with a nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, the Soviet Union reacted by sending a Task Force on 12 December from its Pacific Ocean fleet (Bhatt 1992:56). During the Arab-Israel War in 1973, the United States ordered one of its Pacific Fleet carrier groups (nuclear attack carrier Hancock, 4 escorts and supporting auxiliaries) to the position east of Singapore. The Soviet responded to this American move by sending a modified Sverdlov-class command cruiser, Admiral Senyavin and a Kashin-class destroyer to the Tsushima Strait, near Japan in the Pacific Ocean on 3 November 1973 (Bhatt 1992:58). By August 1974, following the entry of the US Task Force after the October 1973 war and during the mine clearing operations near the Suez zone, the Soviet naval presence had grown to six surface combat crafts, twelve supply vessels, one intelligence-gathering vessel, one helicopter carrier and six or seven minesweepers and supply ships (Bhatt 1992:59). Between June 1977 and February 1978, the two super powers had four rounds of Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) to reach an accord to curb the naval arms race in the Indian Ocean. However the talks got

suspended after the fourth round and by 1979, both the US and erstwhile USSR increased their naval presence and activity.

Naval presence in the strategically important waters made the neighbouring small island states vulnerable. Sri Lanka became concerned that militarisation of the area would affect its maritime trade. After S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike came into power in 1956, occupation of the Suez Canal by the French, British and Israeli forces, following the nationalisation of the canal by the Government of Egypt, was a matter of concern for Sri Lanka as 75 per cent of Sri Lanka's trade used to pass through the canal (Bandaranaike 1956). The crisis made it clear that militarisation in the seas far off, particularly important Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), can have a negative impact on Sri Lanka, even if it was not targeted directly.

Initially when the US entered into the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka's main concern was nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka under Sirimavo Bandaranaike had expressed its concern to the United States on 16 December 1963 over the report that a Nuclear Task Force was to be sent to the Indian Ocean (Keerawella 1990). Mrs. Bandaranaike appealed to the US not to send vessels with nuclear capability to the Indian Ocean. She also added that her country would deny entry to any planes or vessels carrying nuclear weapons or those equipped to carry such weapons, to demonstrate Sri Lanka's opposition to the further spread of nuclear weapons and to support the creation of atom free zones (Keerawella 1990).

In 1971, Sri Lanka urged not only for a nuclear-free Indian Ocean, but also wanted the Indian Ocean free from great power rivalry. Sri Lanka feared that the base politics of the two super powers during the Cold War period would bring about the same fate it faced due to the power rivalry among the European colonial powers during the 16th and 17th century. In the past, to free the country from the Portuguese, Sri Lanka took the help of the Dutch and thus the Dutch gradually came to control Sri Lanka. Again to defeat the Dutch, the British entered into Sri Lankan politics and finally ruled the country for almost 200 years. Given these experience in the past, the naval and base politics of the super

powers made Sri Lanka extremely worried. Expressing Sri Lanka's concern about the US-USSR rivalry, Sirimavo Bandaranaike (1971) said, "it was the intrusion of these power rivalries into the Indian Ocean that resulted in the big power rivalry in the 18th century was main reason of the Asian Countries losing their freedom. We certainly do not wish to see a recurrence of that situation".

The super powers did not explicitly show their interest in Sri Lanka, but Sri Lanka's strategic importance made it to think that it would attract the super power any time. Trincomalee, one of the best natural harbours in the region, could provide excellent air and naval facilities to the super powers to manage their naval activity in the region. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (1977: 270) talks about importance of Sri Lanka for the naval rivals in the Indian Ocean:

> For a distance of nine thousand miles South of Sri Lanka, there is no patch of land until one hits the Antarctic. The sea distances between land are also very great. From Cape Town to Singapore it is 5,631 nautical miles, from Cape Town to Calcutta 5,480 nautical miles and from Suez to Jakarta 5,510 nautical miles. Added to all this is the fact of a scarcity of natural harbours... In this context Trincomalee is very important to the rival powers in search of air and naval facilities.

The US might have specific interest in Sri Lanka because of its location. It is believed that a Polaris or Poseidon nuclear missile located on the island could strike both the Soviet Union and China (Wilson 1977). According to Sirimavo Bandarnaike (1971), "weapons attract weapons, and bases, whatever they might be called, will attract bases…" (*Observer*, 22 January 1971). Given its weak military capability, Sri Lanka was not confident enough that it would be able to resist any such move by either of the two super powers.

Sri Lanka felt that development of missiles, nuclear submarines and warships of external powers at its doorstep would affect its national unity, stability and external relations, either in part or wholly. The main security concern for Sri Lanka during these periods was that the implication of the naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean might affect its

sovereignty and independent decision-making. Involvement of one super power would involve the other super power and would create proxy war-like situation.

Thus, because of the historical experiences and economic and military vulnerability, Sri Lanka was concerned about its security. However, these concerns cannot be dismissed as mere figments of imagination. The US did try to influence the Sri Lankan Navy to support US presence. Admiral Robert Hanks of the US Navy had admitted that in 1973 that he tried to persuade the Sri Lankan Navy to support US naval presence as a counter to an imaginary threat from India (Namboodiri et. al. 1982: 229). A facility at Trincomalee was also sought.

However, the security concerns from the above mentioned sources were not persistent over the years. Security concerns from state actors kept on changing with the change of regime. Since independence, two main political parties, UNP and the SLFP, have led the government. While UNP governments were generally considered to be subscribed to Indophobia, SLFP-led governments did not suffer from it. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who became Prime Minister in 1956, from the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), was critical about India in the pre-independence period. However, during his brief tenure as Prime Minister of the Island (1956-59), he did not express much concern about India. His government downplayed media reports in 1957 on India's proclamation on extending her territorial waters beyond conventional three mile limit which would make Sri Lanka part of India. Reacting to media reports, official spokesperson of Bandaranaike said, "such media reports were obviously making a mountain out of a molehill. These were not such serious issues" (Official Spokesperson of Sri Lankan Government 1957).

Sirimavo Bandaranaike, wife of S.W. R. D. Bandaranaike, became Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in 1960. Though she largely followed S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's policy, her government (1960-65) did not rule out the possibility of aggression from India. Felix Bandaranaike (1963), the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs and Defence in the Sirimavo administration, said in his statement in Parliament (on the

defence policy of Sri Lanka) in 1963 that the defence policy of the country should not based on the assumption that the island would never get into difficulty with India.

During her second term (1970-76), however, her approach towards India was friendlier as compared to the first one. The nuclear test by India in 1974 made Sri Lanka concerned, but did not affect bilateral relations and maritime issues were resolved amicably by signing maritime agreements in 1974 and 1976. The two countries also fought for common cause in the United Nations on the issue of naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean. However, towards the end of her tenure, the Sirimavo government did express concern about regional powers going nuclear indirectly. Sir John Shirley Amerasinghe, the then Sri Lankan representative at the United Nations, stated in the first Committee that: "we do not want any great power here. By the same token, we do not intend that we should drive out Satan by Beelzebub and allow some other powers within the group of littoral and hinterland states to take the place of super powers" (Quoted in Keerawella 1990: 187) This comment was a hint towards India. Yet, it can be argued that under the SLFP, Sri Lanka was not having acute India fear and did not perceive any military threat, not only due to the assurance given by the Indian leaders, but also due to the common views on global issues, non-alignment, militarisation and so on.

On the contrary, despite supporting the cause for decolonisation and disarmament, the India and Sri Lanka had differences on the presence of extra-regional powers in the region under the UNP government. The UNP leaders were usually pro-West and anti-Communist. When India was in favour of keeping extra-regional powers out of the region, the Sri Lankan government under the UNP provided facilities to the US and the UK. India-Sri Lanka relations under the UNP government particularly under Jayawardene regime was one of suspicion and fear.

While the governments led by the SLFP expressed serious concerns about the super power naval rivalry, the UNP governments particularly under the presidency of J. R. Jayewardene saw the benefit in the presence of an extra regional power in the region. In the 1980s, the Sri Lankan ruling elites perceived India as a greater threat than the

presence of super powers in the region. The concerns of a section of Sri Lankan leaders that India would never accept any big power presence in Trincomalee, became real. So to the common people of Sri Lanka, despite the concerns of super power naval presence in the Indian Ocean, India became the real interventionist power. With the end of the Cold War, the issue of super power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean lost its relevance in the security discourse of Sri Lanka, but India's military presence in Sri Lanka during 1987-1990 keeps haunting the Sri Lankans till date.

Post Cold War Geo-Strategic Environment in the Indian Ocean: Impact on Sri Lanka

The Cold War naval rivalry between the USA and the erstwhile USSR ended, but power competition in the region continued. While in the post-Cold War period, the USA remained the dominant naval power in the region, India and China enhanced its maritime capability significantly. Due to the changed political relationship, the USA did not perceive India's maritime capability enhancement with concern. However, the USA perceived China's foray into the Indian Ocean with concern. India too has concerns about the growing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean region. While the USA, India and China all want to enhance their influence in the region, in the current power competition in the Indian Ocean region both the USA and India can be argued to be on one side.

China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean was insignificant in the 20th century. Since the first decade of the new millennium, the Chinese Navy has made forays into the Indian Ocean in the pretext of anti-piracy operations. Since December 2008, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has continually deployed at least two to three surface vessels in the Arabian Sea in some 19 separate deployments (Brewster 2018). However, China does not yet have sea control or sea denial capability in the region which the US and India have. China's naval activity in the region as of now is focusing more on military operations rather than on war (Brewster 2018).

As China is dependent on the Indian Ocean region for its trade, it is imperative for China to gain a strategic advantage in the maritime domain by having a permanent naval

presence or secure access to port infrastructure in the region. As of now, however, China does not have any naval base except in Djibouti. China currently is focusing on arrangement for contingent and limited access to critical infrastructure in countries where it has friendly relations through various measures including maritime silk route initiatives, security and defence diplomacy, naval strategic and equipment modernisation, maritime capacity build-up, bilateral cooperation, and construction of maritime facilities in the friendly countries (Brewster 2018, Kondapalli 2018). In other words, China is making a geo-political arrangement with smaller countries in the region to create supporting infrastructure for the PLAN to operate in the Indian Ocean. According to Menon (2018: 128), this geo-political arrangement is made through an offer of capital investment to boost trade; offer to build infrastructure and special economic zones; obtaining economic foothold, creating pro-Chinese perception by portraying the image of benefactor; getting indebted to China to the extent that it become impossible to resist a provocative offer; and conceding a base for China's operations in the Indian Ocean. The US and India have expressed concerns and emphasised on the need to prevent such Chinese activities in the region.

In the new millennium, though India's approach to the region has shifted, its interests in the Indian Ocean remain the same. India's main concern at present is the growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. Even though there is wide acknowledgement of the need on India's part to accept the reality, there is a constant effort to limit China's influence in the region. However, the efforts are not very successful as the smaller countries in the region have welcomed China, with its entry in the Indian Ocean being seen as benign and not as a military threat. The smaller countries in the region have extended full cooperation to China's maritime silk route concept and allowed China to develop maritime infrastructure in their territory. However, it is largely believed in India that commercial maritime facilities can be turned into military facility. China has already done that in Djibouti. In the South Asian region, China is developing maritime infrastructure in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Maldives.

In Sri Lanka, China is involved with Hambantota port, Colombo International Financial city project and the Hambantota Special Economic Zone. China has got land on lease for 99 years for some of these projects. Though the security of these areas is kept under Sri Lankan authority and Sri Lanka has said that it would not allow any of its territory to be used against India, India is concerned over China's growing influence. Many in Sri Lanka's strategic community, therefore, fear that India's military diplomacy may turn into coercive diplomacy if India's maritime and security interests get severely affected due to the close proximity of Sri Lanka to China.

In the current scenario all the stakeholders in the Indian Ocean are competing to win over Sri Lanka. While China has made Sri Lanka an important partner of its 'Belt and Road' Initiative, India, Japan and the USA are trying to reduce China's influence in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain. Efforts are being made to reduce China's influence in Sri Lanka through positive engagement and cooperation. The invitation to Sri Lanka as an outreach partner of the G-7 Outreach Summit in May 2016 can be interpreted as one of such efforts. The US has encouraged Sri Lanka to participate in its Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor initiative to increase economic connectivity among South Asian countries and with Southeast Asia during the first annual US-Sri Lanka Partnership Dialogue held on 26 February 2016. The US and India have already agreed to promote this corridor in their Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (US Department of State 2016).

The current power rivalry in the Indian Ocean provides Sri Lanka an opportunity to maximise its interests by cooperating with all the stakeholders. Hence, Sri Lanka does not perceive any serious challenge to its maritime security from the ongoing big power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. However, there is a concern that Sri Lanka will be affected if the disputes of the Pacific between China and the United States, which are military in nature, spill over into the Indian Ocean which is hitherto free from large-scale military disputes. Both the USA and China are inclined to have a single combined security strategy for the two Asian oceans – the Indian and the Pacific. Freedom of navigation often gets disrupted in the Pacific Ocean, which is not the case in the Indian Ocean yet.

The growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean may lead to joint efforts by the USA, India, Japan and Singapore, which may affect freedom of navigation. In such case, Sri Lanka's trade will be severely affected.

Though at this point Sri Lanka does not perceive any threat from Chinese engagement in the region as it is considered pure economic in nature, in the long run Sri Lanka may get affected as China might seek military facilities. In 2015, China in its White Paper China's Military Strategy signalled its ambition of becoming a maritime power (Menon 2018: 125). Protect its interests in the Indian Ocean naval base in Djibouti or Gwadar would not be enough. It would seek more naval bases as without bases, sea control in the area would not be possible (Menon 2018: 128). So China can be a potential threat for Sri Lanka in the long run. To have control over the Indian Ocean, China would need an effective maritime domain awareness for which at least 12 maritime patrol aircraft are required to operate from at least three divergent bases. Additionally China would require tactical air cover to surface fleet in the Indian Ocean, communication infrastructure, and bases with port and repair infrastructure, communication facilities and military airfield (Menon 2018: 128-33). As of now, the Hambantota port is a commercial port. But it can be turned into a military port quite easily if they manage to coerce or influence the Sri Lankan government. China has got lands on lease for 99 years, which means they are practically Chinese property. Though security of these leased lands is with the Sri Lankan authority, they can be utilised for Chinese military and strategic purposes. It would be relevant to mention here that both the countries were reportedly expected to sign an agreement on construction of a military aircraft maintenance facility in Trincomalee with Chinese help during Xi Jinping's visit to Sri Lanka in 2014 (*South China Morning Post*, 16 September 2014). According to the *South China Morning Post*, the agreement was not signed due to India's objection. Hence, there is a possibility that Chinese interest in Sri Lanka in the long run may not merely be economic.

China has already made its geo-political move in Sri Lanka. The two countries entered into strategic cooperative partnership in 2013. Bilateral trade has increased significantly. To further the trade, a free trade agreement is being negotiated. The Chinese are involved

in several significant infrastructure development projects which include: construction of ports, airports, special economic zone, International Financial City, power plant and so on. To create a pro-Chinese perception within Sri Lanka, the Chinese are also investing in cultural and people-to-people relations. On the one hand, the Chinese are creating pro-Chinese perception in Sri Lanka by providing economic and military assistance and without interfering in the internal political affairs, on the other hand, they are making Sri Lanka indebted to the Chinese loans extended for big infrastructure projects. Commercial loans borrowed from China (EXIM Bank, CIDB, etc.) were around five billion dollars during 2006-2014. As a large portion of government revenue goes into servicing them, the Sri Lankan government has urged the Chinese to "adjust the terms of the loans to make them more viable" (Roy Chowdhury 2015). The Chinese have agreed to do so as well as agreed to assist Sri Lanka to address the crisis of its debt-ridden economy on the condition that the National Unity Government would not cancel the Colombo Port City Project which was signed in 2014. Moreover, China has clearly said that in case of cancelation of the CPC, the issue would be taken to court as it was a legal agreement. In that case, Sri Lanka will have to give back a huge compensation. The firm, which got the CPC contract, has reportedly said that the company was incurring an initial direct loss of US$380,000 per day due to suspension of the project (*The Economic Times*, 12 March 2015). In other words, in case of cancelation of the project, the Sri Lankan Government would have to pay both the interest on the loan obtained for the project as well as the losses incurred to the company, due to cancelation of the project. As a result, the Sri Lankan Government had to renegotiate the agreement. The Colombo International Financial City as named under the revised agreement has been extended from the initial 233 hectares to 269 hectares and the agreement converts freehold land to 99-year leased land (*Daily FT*, 13 August 2016). Subsequently, the Sri Lankan Government ceded a controlling interest to Beijing-controlled China Merchants Port to manage and operate the Hambantota port for 99 years in exchange for a $1.1billion debt write-off (Mundy 2017). Despite protest at home, the Sri Lankan government went ahead with these projects. China is thus using the debts as a means to blackmail and coerce Sri Lanka. Thus, so far, China has put economic pressure on Sri Lanka but there is a possibility that it might coercion the island for its military interests in the future.

Security Threat from Non-State Actors

Since the 1980s, with armed ethnic conflict gaining momentum, Sri Lanka started facing a real threat in the maritime domain from non-state actors–the LTTE. After failing to achieve legitimate rights within the united Sri Lanka, the militant Tamil groups pledged to form a separate state for the Tamil people–Tamil Eelam, consisting of the Northern and Eastern province of Sri Lanka as well as the territorial waters of these provinces. In fact, the LTTE managed to have de-facto control over these two provinces and their contiguous waters almost for two decades. The Sri Lankan Navy vessels had to face severe attack from the LTTE whenever they tried to enter these waters. The LTTE even denied the fishing rights of the non-Tamil people in these waters. In addition to Sri Lankan Navy's vessels, the LTTE attacked foreign merchant ships too. The naval wing of the LTTE was also involved with piracy and armed robbery, hijacking, smuggling, arms and drug trafficking. Additionally, the LTTE attacked targets on the mainland using the sea. Assessing the maritime threat from the LTTE, former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapksa (2010) said, "The LTTE's naval power and its control over so much of the coastline was a grave threat to this country. Their ability to attack our naval vessels, as well as attack targets on the mainland using the sea, was a significant security challenge. The arms, ammunition and equipment that it procured and smuggled in through international waters posed an even greater problem."

LTTE's Maritime Profile

The Sea Tigers–the naval wing of the LTTE–came up in 1984 (Martin 2006). Initially, it did not emerge as a credible fighting force. In the early stages, the LTTE used locally made small fishing boats, trawlers and motor launches to transport domestic cargo such as food grain, building material and other general necessities of daily life, LTTE personnel and military hardware, including arms and ammunition between Jaffna and South India (Sakhuja 2006). However, the LTTE had to get down shipments amid tremendous difficulty since it did not have effective control over the coastal areas. LTTE supremo Prabhakaran realised that to continue smooth supply of arms for their armed movement they needed to control the sea. By having full control of these waters, it can deny the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) monitoring of these waters and they can carry on their

illegitimate activities as well as the arms supply activities smoothly. With this objective in mind, Prabhakaran laid emphasis on building LTTE's naval strength (Suryanarayan 2004: 404-411). Prabhakaran said that, "geographically, the security of Tamil Eelam is interlinked with that of its seas. It is only when we are strong on the seas, and break the dominance the enemy now has, that we will be able to retain the land areas we liberated and drive our enemies from our homeland" (Quoted in Suryanarayan 2004). With this aim in mind, LTTE developed its naval wing into a 'versatile maritime force' with all the components of sea power over the years. Versatile maritime force means having those capabilities which provide agility and flexibility to perform the activities and conduct operations to have sea control over a specific area (Sloggett 2014: 108).

The Sea Tigers had 12 sections: Sea Battle Regiments, Under Water Demolition Teams, Sea Tiger Strike Groups, Marine Engineering and Boat Building Section, Radar and Telecommunication Unit, Marine Weapons armoury and Dump Group, Maritime School and Academy, Recruiting section, Political, Finance and Propaganda Section, Exclusive Economic Zone-Marine Logistic Support Team, Reconnaissance Team and intelligence Section, Welfare Section and the Registry (Gunaratna 2001). The women's organisation, naval intelligence organisation (operating under the head of military intelligence) and the Black Tiger organisation also worked closely with the Sea Tigers. According to Rohan Gunaratna (1998), LTTE consistently acquired a brown (coastal), green and blue (deep sea) water maritime capability. It also had indigenously built ships. Shipbuilding activities were done at extensive and camouflaged boatyards located along the Vanni coastline (Davis, 2001).

The LTTE also had a fleet of ocean-going merchant ships so that it could have reliable logistical support for the arms and weapons acquired from different places. Initially it used to bring weapons from India. Until 1983, the LTTE had limited shuttle capability between India and Sri Lanka. In 1984 it purchased the first large vessel–MV Cholan– from a Mumbai based shipping magnate. At about the same time, it also reportedly placed orders for construction of another vessel. After Rajiv Gandhi's assassination in 1991, the LTTE lost its logistical support from India and that is why it increased ocean-

bound maritime fleet to get arms and ammunition from foreign markets.[8] Subsequently, its fleet increased to five or six small freighters, which were registered under the ownership of several dummy companies having their offices in Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. The LTTE fleet had 11 vessels, by March 2000, most of which were well equipped and capable of trans-oceanic long distance sailing (Sakhuja 2006).

With these vessels, the LTTE began to source weapons from North Korea and Myanmar, and arms dealers in Europe and the Middle East, Bulgaria (SA14, LAW), Ukraine (TNT and RDX), Cyprus (RPGS), Cambodia (Small Arms), Thailand (Small Arms), Myanmar (Small Arms), Croatia (32,400 Mortars), China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and South Africa (*The Island*, 13 February 2007; Chalk 1999).

Weapons from these countries were brought to Sri Lanka following well-established trafficking routes by the LTTE's shipping network. In the 1980s, the LTTE unloaded weapons and ammunition from the Far East, Europe and Middle East at the port in Nagapattnam and then transferred them to smaller boats which were stealthily infiltrated into Sri Lankan waters (Hashim 2014). Weapons from China, North Korea and Hong Kong were trafficked across the South China Sea, through the Malacca and Singapore Straits to the Bay of Bengal and then on to Sri Lanka. Arms from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar were transited through Thailand before being loaded onto vessels at the Southern port of Ranong for the trip across the Bay of Bengal (Chalk 1999). Weapons from Eastern Europe, Ukraine and the Middle East passed through the Suez Canal, around the Horn of Africa and then on to Sri Lanka. Munitions from Africa were smuggled to LTTE jungle strongholds either around the Cape of Good Hope from ports in Liberia, Nigeria and Angola or via Madagascar from Mozambican coastal town Beira (Chalk 1999).

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[8] LTTE's fleet of deep sea vessels was known as Sea Pigeons. The LTTE owned and operated ocean-going merchant ships, functioning independently of Sea Tiger command, control and communication (Gunaratna 2001). David alias Captain Piraisudi started the Tiger Shipping Corporation. Later, KP was entrusted with the task of building the LTTE's own shipping fleet (Gunaratna 2009).

All these arms and ammunitions acquired by the LTTE used to be stored in floating warehouses possessed by the LTTE. These floating warehouses used to wait in international waters for small boats. Usually they used to loiter about 1,500-2,000 km from Sri Lanka and then advance to within 300-400 km of the coast to transfer armaments to small boats. The small boats were then escorted by the Sea Tigers fighting cadres and suicide boats (Fish 2009). The fast attack craft of the Exclusive Economic Zone Marine Logistics Support Team armed with multiple 23 mm cannon, four 12.7 mm machine guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and other ordnance, used to escort these ocean going warehouses during logistic runs (Povlock 2011).

The Sea Tigers' manpower was much less compared to the Sri Lankan Navy. The Sea Tigers had approximately 3,000 trained personnel and 100-200 surface and under water vehicles (Gunaratna (2001; Suryanarayan 2004). Still the Sri Lankan Navy had to face severe blows by the Sea Tigers due to their adoption of asymmetric warfare. As of 2001, the Sea Tigers destroyed about a third to a half of Sri Lanka Navy's coastal patrol craft, fast attack craft, ocean patrol vessels and fast gunboats (Gunaratna 2001).

Sea Tigers' Asymmetric Warfare Tactics

Asymmetric warfare is resorted to leverage inferior tactical or operational strengths against the vulnerabilities of a superior enemy to achieve unequal effect with the aim of undermining enemy's will to achieve the inferior actors' strategic objectives (Burkett 2003: 20). The LTTE was aware of the fact that the Sri Lankan Navy is superior to them in terms of manpower and conventional war fighting capability. Therefore, it adopted asymmetric warfare capability. The tactics adopted by the Sea Tigers include suicide attack, deception and swarm tactics.

In the initial years of its formation, the Sea Tigers used small boats to ferry its cadres and weapons in the Palk Strait area. But when the Sri Lankan Navy increased patrolling, the LTTE started using faster crafts with more powerful engines. To hunt down the faster craft of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Navy acquired Dvora-class Fast Attack Craft (FAC) from Israel and also from China. The FACs helped the Navy significantly in its mission

against the LTTE. To outrun the Sri Lankan Navy, the LTTE then adopted the suicide boat attack or 'ramming' tactics by using four main types of fibreglass boats: 45 Kt Thrikka, with four crew and machine gun; the 10 Kt Sudai, armed with a single machine gun; 45 Kt Muraj, with a crew of ten and three machine guns and 45 Kt suicide craft fitted with explosives designed to detonate on impact. By using such ramming tactics, the Sea Tigers sank a number of naval FACs. Two Dvora-class FACs were sunk on 29 August 1995 and 30 March 1996. Two super Dvora Mk I-class vessels were sunk on 29 August 1993 and 1995. Two Super Dvora Mk II boats were sunk in 2000 (Fish 2009). The LTTE also sank a 68 tonne United States-built Trinity Marine-class craft, two Shanghai II-class craft (acquired from China in 1991) and three domestically built Colombo-class craft (Fish 2009).

The 'do or die' Sea Tiger spirit was also introduced to the LTTE's commercial fleet, particularly, when they engaged in arms transfer activities (Gunaratna 2001). Explosives were fitted on these commercial fleets and wired just before starting their journey to prevent being captured. This practice was developed after the Indian Navy interdicted the LTTE ship MV Ahat in January 1993 (Gunaratna 2001).

Deception was an integral element in Sea Tiger tactics (Gunaratna 2001). Under the deception tactics, Sri Lankan naval craft were entangled into sea ambushes by attacking commercial craft and then they used 'Wolf pack' or cluster tactics against the naval vessels. They also used to attract naval craft nearer to the shore where LTTE land-based weapons were kept and then bombarded the Sri Lankan naval vessels. In one case, "Sea Tigers covered with seaweed pretended to be dead airman and lured at least one Sri Lankan Air force helicopter low enough to open fire and destroy it" (Gunaratna 2001). Towards the end of fourth Eelam War, the Sea Tigers adopted random surprise attacks on Sri Lankan naval vessels by deploying mines and using frogmen with semi-submersibles. Two naval vessels–a Colombo-Class FAC and the auxiliary logistics ship A520–were sunk due to underwater explosions in 2008 (Fish 2009).

The Sea Tigers also adopted a "swarm" of both conventional and suicide fast attack craft. Here, three conventional craft operated in a "V" formation. They waited among the fishing vessels in the shallow coastal waters for Sri Lankan Navy vessels. As they saw the navy vessels, the Sea Tigers used to advance toward the vessels to disable it by shooting out its engines. At the same time, they kept on firing on the target. Simultaneously, the Sea Tiger Suicide vessels, also operating in threes used to coordinate their ramming attacks with gun fire from the conventional vessels (Povlock 2011). This tactic of the Sea Tigers gave hardly any time to the Sri Lankan Navy to react.

Due to these innovative asymmetric warfare tactics the Sea Tigers had leverage over Sri Lankan Navy, which was much superior conventional force.

Sea Tigers as Military Challenge to Sri Lanka

The LTTE through its credible naval force had de-facto control over two-thirds of the country's coastline. They did not allow any Sri Lankan naval ship to enter these waters. Even during the peace process (2002-06), it warned that it would move Sea Tigers naval vessels, armed or otherwise, in the seas adjacent to the land areas under the LTTE control and retaliate if Sri Lankan vessels intercepted them. In its letter to Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) dated 11 May 2006, the LTTE mentioned that, if the Sri Lankan Navy disrupted its activities in the sea adjoining the land in its control, the navy would have to face retaliation (*TamilNet*, 11 May 2006). It also claimed exclusive control over marine resources in these waters and denied fishing rights to non-Tamil fishermen in these waters. There were incidences of attacks on Sinhalese fishing villages in the districts of Vavuniya (1984)[9], Welioya (1984; 11 people were killed) and Puttalam (1990; 23 people were killed and two were wounded). Since the Sri Lankan Navy did not have any control, it faced a real challenge in stopping the illegal activities of the LTTE. Other than waging a sustained campaign of maritime guerrilla warfare against the Sri Lankan Navy, and maritime terrorism against civilian owned and operated fishing vessels, the Sea Tigers also engaged in piracy against foreign owned and operated commercial vessels (See

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[9] On 29 November 1984, in Dollar Farm in Vavuniya 33 people were killed by the LTTE. Again on 30 November 1984 in Kent Farm, Vavuniya, 29 people were killed by the LTTE.

appendix). It indulged in armed robbery, piracy, smuggling and all kinds of criminal activities in the maritime domain. In September 1997, the Maritime Intelligence and Counter Piracy Operations Centre issued a warning that the Sri Lankan waters had become extremely dangerous areas for maritime traffic. According to statistics maintained by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Sri Lankan waters witnessed the fifth largest number of piratical attacks in 1997 (Bogollagama 2007) . However, many find it problematic to accept IMB piracy reports. But be it piracy or not, it is clear from those reports that illegal and criminal activities had been going on in Sri Lankan waters. Following the attacks on ships, Lloyds of London declared Sri Lanka as a war-risk zone (*Marine Link*, 8 August 2001).

By controlling the sea, the LTTE denied Sri Lankan authorities any control over two-thirds of its own territorial waters. It constantly challenged the Sri Lankan Navy both in the sea as well as on the shore by using asymmetric warfare tactics. To sustain any activity at sea, the forces require a land base. Since the north and part of the eastern province were under LTTE control, it was difficult for the Sri Lankan Navy to operate effectively at sea without a land base. The Sea Tigers conducted amphibious operations to attack the isolated naval headquarters in the north and east. The Sea Tigers played a role in amphibious operations by deploying guerrillas in LTTE offensives against the military bases of Pooneryn (1995), Mullaitivu (1996), Trincomalee and Elephant Pass (2000) and the Jaffna Peninsula (2001). In 2000 they penetrated the well-guarded naval complex at Trincomalee, sank a ship and damaged a few. In the same year, they carried out a successful amphibious type of operation in landing 1,500 guerrillas for the battle of Elephant Pass on the Jaffna coast forcing the Sri Lankan forces to withdraw. As the waters in the north and the east were under LTTE control, Sri Lankan navy's sea lines of communication to supply man and weapons to the isolated military base in Jaffna was often disrupted. On the other hand, the LTTE by sea control and sea denial tactics kept its sea lines of communication open to supply weapons acquired from abroad to continue its armed separatist movement on land which was a severe challenge to Sri Lanka's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Until the fourth Eelam War, the Sri Lankan Government had failed to develop a comprehensive strategy to counter the Sea Tiger threat. As a result of the military offensive that started in 2006, Sri Lankan armed forces captured the entire northern and eastern seaboards that were once controlled by the LTTE and thus deprived the Sea Tigers of the bases and coastline including the headquarters of the Sea Tigers in the town of Mullaitivu. On shore, the Sri Lankan Army has been able to capture several Sea tiger boats and a boat yard. On 19 May 2009, the Sri Lankan government annihilated the Sea Tiger force by killing the Sea Tigers head Colonel Soosai along with other topmost leaders including Prabhakaran.

Since the end of the Eelam War, no case of maritime terrorism has been reported so far. However, Sri Lankan authorities, particularly a section of the armed forces, do not totally rule out the threat to Sri Lanka's maritime security from non-state actors. Many of them believe that the LTTE's international network is still intact. Former Commander of Sri Lankan Navy Wasantha Karannagoda (2010), who was the commander of the navy during the last Eelam War, claims that they have information that the LTTE's four merchant vessels are doing legitimate business in South China Seas. He believes that they can be used anytime for illegal activities to disrupt Sri Lanka's security.

Nonetheless, such assumptions are often made by a section of armed forces to justify the presence of military and high security zones in the north and east even after the end of war. While it cannot be certainly said that peace will be maintained forever, the chances of re-emergence of Sea Tigers and similar military activity in the Sri Lankan waters are dim. Those who propagate the fear of re-emergence of the LTTE substantiate their arguments by citing the example of the presence of Tamil diaspora in the West who are still demanding a Tamil Eelam. Activities of the Ava group in the north were considered by many in Sri Lanka as prelude to the re-emergence of militancy in the country. However, the Government of Sri Lanka has downplayed such kind of propaganda. It is believed that fear is being spread by a section of people who have strong objections to the reconciliation of the ethnic issues.

Having said this, it should be kept in mind that people in the north and east are losing their patience on the government's slow progress on the Tamil question. There do exist hardliner Tamils who do not have much hope from the Sri Lankan government. Yet, the repeat possibility of the Sri Lankan waters as a theatre for LTTE-like activities is poor. The Sri Lankan government in the 1980s had marginal control of the port facilities. Now high security zones are there in the northern and eastern coast. In the 1980s, the Sri Lankan forces hardly had any intelligence gathering capability. In the post-2009 period, continuous surveillance is being conducted in the north and the east. Patrolling in the waters has also increased. The most important point is that unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, Sri Lankan militants will not have any support from India. After the 9/11 attacks, international maritime cooperation to curb illegal activities at seas has also increased. Hence, getting arms and weapons would not be that easy. It can, thus, be argued that Sri Lanka currently does not have any military threat from non-state actors.

Conclusion

The security concerns from the state actors largely depend on the ideology and foreign policy approach of the ruling elites. It should be mentioned here that the line between the threat to the regime and the threat to maritime security is thin. At times, regime security is equated with maritime or the nation's security. As a result, sometimes the government may exaggerate a concern as real threat and sometimes may ignore a real threat to maritime security, if regime security is not under threat. Nonetheless, Sri Lanka is vulnerable to the influence of state actors who have maritime interests in the Indian Ocean, due to its strategic location. In that context, concerns about coming under the pressure of a state actor cannot be laughed away. In the power rivalry among the big powers in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka has felt the pulls and pressures through coercive and naval diplomacy intermittently. However, possibility of such pressure depends on how the ruling elites manage their threat perception and security dilemma.

Non-Military Security Concerns

Maritime security of a country cannot be assessed by focussing only on military dimension of security. Non-military aspects such as resource decline, unsustainable development, environmental degradation and marine hazards are important elements of a country's maritime insecurity. Unfortunately, non-military security challenges are often get ignored as the impact of these challenges is not felt immediately. Nonetheless, ignoring the non-military issues may have severe repercussions on the economic, human and environmental security.

Due to the state centric approach and armed conflict, Sri Lanka's focus has been on the military aspect of security. It is only after the end of the Eelam War, the government's attention has been drawn to the non-military security concerns. The chapter highlights issues of concerns in the marine environment, which have had or is likely to have negative impact on the country.

Unsustainable Development of Marine Sector

The contribution of the maritime resources for the well-being and prosperity of the country is immense. Some of the important sectors such as fishery, tourism, shipping, port, ship-building and ship-repairing industry contribute significantly to the country's economy. The fishery sector plays a crucial role with respect to employment opportunities for 575,000 people and livelihoods for 2.6 million people, generation of national income, foreign exchange earnings and required protein for the masses in the country (Ministry of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources Development 2016 a). The fishery sector of Sri Lanka is divided into two broad categories: Marine fishery and inland fishery. Traditional marine fisheries have been a vital economic sector in the coastal belt of Sri Lanka. In 2016, marine fish production was 456,990 Mt (Ministry of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources Development 2016 a). Its contribution to national export earnings and GDP was 1.8 per cent and 1.3% (at current price) respectively. Around 830,560 household population were dependent on marine fishing (Ministry of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources, Government of Sri Lanka 2017).

Year	Fishing Households (Marine Sector)	Fishing Household population (Marine Sector)	Active Fishers (Marine Sector)	Annual Fish Production (Marine) MT	Export of Fishery Products		Contribution to National Export Earnings (%)	Contribution of Marine Fishing to GDP at Current Prices (%)
					Quantity (Mt)	Value (SLRs Mn)		
1982	56320	292,200	68,900					
2001	98,157	441,707	115,014					
2005	137,300	641,700	160,300	130,400	15,985	10,695	1.7	
2010	184,100	816,500	212,920	332,260	18,325	19,834	2.1	
2011	187,340	820,580	215,430	385,270	18,462	21,876	2.0	
2012	188,480	823,230	218,550	417,220	18,631	26,363	2.3	
2013	1 90,210	824,680	219,400	445,930	23,910	31,792	2.5	1.4
2014	1 90,780	825,120	221,350	459,300	26,320	34,797	2.4	1.4
2015	1 90,960	830,560	221,560	452,890	17,461	24,716	1.8	1.3
2016	1 88,690	827,480	218,830	456,990	17,593	26,802	1.8	1.3

Source: Ministry of Fishery and Aquatic Resources, Government of Sri Lanka (2017).

Sri Lanka has always been involved in fishing activities. However, total fish production in the early years of independence was very less as traditional fishing fleets were used. In 1952, total production was to the order of 25,000 tonnes. To increase production level, the government decided to modernise the fishing sector during 1958-65 through motorisation of small traditional craft and the introduction of a small motorised fibre-glass boat, a 3½ ton plank-built motorised boat and the nylon nets. As a result, production reached 85,000 tonnes in 1965 (Food and Agriculture Organisation 1984). To expand the fish production further, the government introduced multi-day fishing boats in the mid-1980s (Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (2013). However, as the Eelam War broke out, fishing activities declined. There was ban on fishing activities in the waters of north and east during the war. Since 2010, there was surge in fishing activities and production started growing as the ban on fishing was withdrawn after the end of war.

In March 2014, the Sri Lankan government decided to increase the export of fish. To increase the catch of fish eight high capacity Chinese-built and owned Purse Seiner vessels were introduced. These 45 metres long commercial ships can catch as much as 300 metric tonnes of fish per trip. These vessels can catch 100 times more per trip than the small-sized indigenous Sri Lankan boats (Samaraweera 2015).

All these developmental policies had increased the fish production and thus the contribution to the economy. Nonetheless, the introduction of motorised boats resulted in over-fishing and over-exploitation of fishery resources as the modern crafts could operate under much rougher sea conditions and carry a larger number of nets and other fishing gear than the traditional crafts (Dayaratna, et. al. 1995). Critical marine and coastal habitats are being threatened by destructive fishing methods, unsustainable fishing practices such as catching small-sized fish, use of dynamite and other destructive practices and use of advanced technology in fishing, uncontrolled aquaculture development, and mining, use of nylon nets, entry of private sector entrepreneurs and introduction of ice to freeze the catch at sea have all affected the coastal resources (Regional Resource Centre for Asia and Pacific, 2001).

As fishing in Sri Lanka reached the maximum sustainable levels, the government officially banned some of the destructive methods, yet such activities are still continuing. The government has banned coral mining and dynamite blast fishing. However, illegal mining still goes on to collect calcium oxide for building and for other industrial and agricultural purposes (Berg 1998). As lime is excessively used in the building industry, regulation on mining does not stop the miners. Coral mining activity is not only affect the reef structure, but also cause coastal erosion.

The tourism sector accounts for 5.3 per cent of total GDP in 2017 (World Travel and Tourism Council 2018). Tourism was the third largest source of foreign exchange earnings in 2016 after foreign remittances and garments and textile. Foreign exchange earnings in 2016 were US$ 3,518.5 million. Tourism's contribution to total foreign exchange earnings in 2016 amounted to 14.2 per cent (Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority 2016). The number of tourists who came to Sri Lanka in 2017 was 21,16,407. The tourism sector generated employment (both direct and indirect) for 359,215 people in 2017. It should be noted that the total number of tourists in 1960 was 46,247. That year, the tourism industry provided employment to 12,078 people. Revenue in that year was US$3.6 million (Ministry of Tourism Development and Christian Religious Affairs 2016). A government sponsored tourism development programme started in 1966, and by

1975, arrivals had climbed to over 100,000 per annum (Oslen 1992). Since then, there has been a significant growth in the tourism industry, except during the war. While it has benefitted the country's economy immensely, it has put heavy pressure on the coastal areas and marine ecology as tourism in Sri Lanka has primarily focused in the coastal areas. Most of the hotels in the coastal areas lack sewage disposal system, which is one of the contributing factors of the coastal and marine pollution. There was no provision for permit system to regulate the developmental activities until the 1980s, even though tourism development programme started back in the 1960s. As tourism has grown, use of motor boats and the glass bottom boats are also increasing exponentially for coral watching and other entertainment purpose of tourists. Use of these boats affects the natural growth of the corals. Commercial activities on the beach also affect the turtle habitats (Rathnayake 2015).

Table 2: Tourism Growth and Trends 1970-2017				
Year	Tourist Arrivals	Official tourist receipts (US $)	Accommodation capacity (Rooms)	Direct Employment	Indirect Employment
1970	46247	3.6	1408	5138	6940
1971	39654	3.4	1767	6397	8640
1972	56047	7.3	1891	7040	9500
1973	77888	12.8	2468	7134	10780
1974	85011	16.4	2905	8551	11550
1975	103204	22.4	3632	10148	13700
1976	118971	28.2	4581	11752	15900
1977	153665	40	4851	13716	18520
1978	192592	55.8	5347	15404	20795
1979	250164	77.7	5599	18472	24937
1980	321780	110.7	6042	19878	28022
1981	370742	132.4	6891	23023	32232
1982	407230	146.4	7539	26776	37486
1983	337530	125.8	8852	22374	31234
1984	317734	104.9	9627	24541	34357
1985	257456	82.8	9826	22723	31810
1986	230106	82.1	9794	22285	31199
1987	182620	82	9921	20338	28473
1988	182662	76.6	9977	19960	27944
1989	184732	76	9459	21958	30741
1990	297888	132	9556	24964	34950
1991	317703	156.8	9679	26878	37629
1992	393669	201.4	10214	28790	40306
1993	392250	208	10365	30710	42994

1994	407511	230.7	10742	33956	47538
1995	403101	225.4	11255	35068	49095
1996	302265	173	11600	31963	44748
1997	366165	216.7	12370	34006	47608
1998	381063	230.5	12770	34780	48692
1999	436440	274.9	12918	36560	51184
2000	400414	252.8	13311	37943	53120
2001	336794	211.1	13626	33710	47194
2002	393171	253	13818	38821	54349
2003	500642	340	14137	46761	65465
2004	566202	416.8	14322	53766	75272
2005	549308	362.3	13162	52085	72919
2006	559603	410.3	14218	55649	77909
2007	494008	384.4	14604	60516	84722
2008	438475	319.5	14793	51306	71828
2009	447890	349.3	14461	52071	72899
2010	654476	575.9	14714	55023	77032
2011	855975	838.9	14653	57786	80899
2012	1005605	1038.3	15510	67862	95007
2013	1274593	1715.5	16223	112550	157600
2014	1527153	2431.1	18078	129790	170100
2015	1798380	2980.6	18954	135930	183506
2016	2050832	3518.5	21126	146115	189544
2017	2116407	3924.9	23477	156369	202846
Source: Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (2018).					

The shipping industry contributes 10 per cent of the GDP (Sri Lanka Port Authority 2010). Due to its strategic location, the Colombo port has emerged as one of the busiest ports in Asia. It is expected that in the coming years, activities in the newly constructed Hambantota port and other ports in the country will increase too. At present, around 300-350 vessels pass through Sri Lankan waters daily. The growth of shipping industry makes Sri Lanka extremely vulnerable to marine pollution from oil spill and ballast water. Several cases of oil spills in Sri Lankan waters have been reported due to break down or mishaps in the ships passing by Sri Lankan waters.

Table 3: Ship Traffic by Port 2009-15							
Ports	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Colombo							
No. of ships arrived	4114	3910	4124	3870	3667	3742	4197
Total Gross Tonnage	120,200	118,909	127,528	127,630	128,457	135,975	161,410

Total Net Tonnage	61,091	58,796	62,469	63,589	64,579	68,735	81,854
Trincomalee							
No. of ships arrived	310	109	126	161	134	127	164
Total Gross Tonnage	1,818	1,752	2,008	2,561	2,231	2120	2,401
Total Net Tonnage	1,016	998	1,122	1,242	1,199	1,169	1,503
Galle							
No. of ships arrived	32	48	73	69	36	60	72
Total Gross Tonnage	186	274	384	382	200	423	472
Total Net Tonnage	95	153	209	203	102	213	255
Hambantota							
No. of ships arrived			9	34	139	335	295
Total Gross Tonnage				564	5654	14253	14332
Total Net Tonnage				557	2400	4958	5287
Kankasenthurai							
No. of ships arrived	136	8	26	44	48	34	32
Total Gross Tonnage					81	19	27
Total Net Tonnage					53	9	13
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka (2016).							

Poaching and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

Sri Lanka considers IUU fishing as a grave challege to the sustainability of fisheries in national jurisdictions and high seas both by the local and foreign fishermen (Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 2013). With the emergence of concepts like EEZ and continental shelf, many of the states are having boundary disputes with neighbours.

Unresolved boundary disputes and competition for marine resources in the disputed area put the small island states in a disadvantageous position. Sri Lanka had a maritime boundary problem with India but the problem was resolved amicably between the two countries by agreements in 1974 and 1976, respectively. Nonetheless, the delimitation of maritime boundary between the two countries could not stop poaching in Sri Lankan waters by Indian fishermen and now it has become a major issue between India and Sri Lanka.

Poaching by Indian fishermen is creating both ecological as well as livelihood problems for the fishermen in the northern province of Sri Lanka. Exploitation of local marine resources by the Indian fishermen using bottom trawl-nets and monofilament nets; severing of fishing nets of local fishermen in the sea; and threatening behaviour in the water are considered as intense acts of violence by local fishermen (Soosai 2011).

Both Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen have been fishing in each other's waters for decades. Even after the demarcation of the maritime border in 1974 and exchange of letter in 1976, fishermen of both the countries continued this practice. The problem started with the ethnic war in 1983 as fishing in these waters by Sri Lankan fishermen was banned by the government. However, Indian fishermen continued fishing in these waters even at the cost of their lives. Thus, though Sri Lankan fishermen were not fishing in these waters at least for 20 years or so, fishing by Indian fishermen that too with the trawlers affected the marine resources. After the end of war in 2009, the ban on fishing in the Northern province was removed. Even though Sri Lankan fishermen have started fishing, they are facing difficulties due to the presence of a large number of Indian trawlers. According to Sri Lankan fishermen, their nets and fishing gear get lost due to the method of bottom trawling used by the Indian fishermen. They explained that each nets cost around LKR36,000 and each boats uses nearly 30 such nets for fishing. They lay their nets in the sea and wait for the fish and as they wait, the Indian trawlers using powerful engines enter in numbers, cross the path where they have laid their nets and cut their nets into pieces while passing through causing immense losses (Rajasingham 2014).

According to Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Ministry of Sri Lanka, the fishery industry lost an estimated US$78.9 million worth of fish due to illegal poaching from South India in 2013. US$19.72 million is reportedly lost from their shrimp catch alone due to Indian poaching. According to a Sri Lankan estimate, an average of 1,056 Indian boats encroach into Sri Lankan waters (Jayasinghe 2013). The Ministry in 2016, in its revised estimate in 2016, said that nearly 5,000 fishing boats enter Sri Lankan waters illegally each year and harvested 6,000 metric tonnes of fish, causing Sri Lanka an annual loss of about LKR9,000 million (*The Indian Express*, 19 December 2016).

Poaching is not only affecting the fishery industry and livelihood of the fishermen but also affecting the marine ecology of this area. The trawlers used by the Indian fishermen sweep away the coral reefs from the sea bed. In an international conference at the Kotelawala Defence University in 2013, the term "trawler war" was used to describe Indian poaching in Sri Lankan waters (Fernando 2013).

The issue has caused irritants in India-Sri Lanka relations. Indian fishermen are arrested and imprisoned in Sri Lankan jails. During 1991-2011, there were 167 incidents of shooting on Indian fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy. 85 fishermen were killed and 180 injured in these incidents (*The Times of India*, 18 August 2012).

However, Sri Lankan fishermen also enter Indian waters illegally. Many Sri Lankan fishermen are languishing in Indian jails, having been arrested by the Indian authorities for violating the Maritime Zones of India Act of 1981, Passport Act and Foreigners' Act. In India, in 2009, 128 boats and 693 Sri Lankan fishermen were arrested. The cost incurred by the government in repatriation of fishermen increased from INR300,000 in 2006 to INR2,261,127 in 2009 (Amarasinghe 2011). In 2014, 64 Sri Lankan fishermen were arrested by the coastal security groups of India.

IUU fishing by the Sri Lankan local fishermen on the high seas and waters of national jurisdictions of other coastal states is rampant. Some Sri Lankan fishing boats cross into waters under the national jurisdictions of neighbouring coastal states. The EU had

complained of about 11 cases of encroachment of Sri Lankan fishermen into territorial waters of other countries in 2011 (*The Sunday Times*, 25 November 2012). Greenpeace too complained of such encroachment by Sri Lankan fishermen in 2012 (Greenpeace 2012).

Due to continuous illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, the Sri Lankan fishing industry had to endure an EU ban on import of Sri Lankan fish products imposed on 14 October 2014, which came into force on 14 January 2015. As a member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), it is mandatory for Sri Lanka to comply with international regulations on fishing in the high seas to ensure the sustainability of common resources. The EU imposes bans on countries that fail to comply with these regulations.

An investigation mission from the European Commission, during its visit to Sri Lanka in 2010, found Sri Lanka to be non-compliant with standards enforced by the IOTC. It was found that many vessels were fishing in the high seas without valid licences. Out of the 1,615 vessels involved in fishing activities in the high seas, only 86.3 per cent had valid licences and many vessels submitted catch certificates even without a logbook. Only 35 vessels out of 1,615 had Vessel Monitoring Systems in place. The European Union gave a warning to Sri Lanka by issuing a 'yellow card' on 15 November 2012 that if Sri Lanka did not take measure to stop IUU fishing, the EU would ban Sri Lankan fish imports.

Sri Lanka incurred loss of about US$100 million every year due to the ban on fish exports by the European Union. The EU is the largest market for Sri Lanka's fish and fisheries product (*The Sunday Times*, 25 November 2012). According to the Central Bank report of 2014, Sri Lanka earned US$252.7 million from seafood exports. However, earnings declined by 36.5 per cent in March 2015 following a 77.6 per cent decline in seafood exports to the EU market (Paranagamage 2015).

Marine and Coastal Pollution

Coastal pollution is a fast growing problem in Sri Lanka. There are two sources of marine or coastal pollution: Land based and ocean based. About 90 per cent of marine and coastal pollution is caused by land-based activities like agriculture, misuse of land and water resources, population pressure, rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, in the coastal areas. Lack of water and sewage disposal facilities is one of the major factors contributing coastal and marine pollution. About two-thirds of Sri Lanka's industrial plants are located in the coastal regions. These industries produce wastewater, which are often contaminated with chemicals or large amounts of nutrients. Most of the factories do not have treatment plants and dump these effluents directly in a river or a wetland. This causes water pollution which sometimes results in the death of fish (Rajasuriya and White 1995).

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                    Marine Pollution Sources

        ┌─────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────┐
        │   Land Based    │              │   Ocean Based   │
        │     >90%        │              │     <10%        │
        └─────────────────┘              └─────────────────┘
                 ↓                                 ↓

                        Fertilizer
   Agriculture ⟹                      Ship Accident ⟹ Oil
                        Pesticide                       Hazardous
   Matter

                        Disposal
   Urbanisation ⟹       Sewage          Exploration  ⟹ Oil
                        Solid Waste                     Suspended
   Matter

   Industries  ⟹        Effluents &     Dumping      ⟹ Oil
                        Solid Waste Discharge           Garbage
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Figure 1: Marine Pollution Sources
Source: Marine Pollution Prevention Authority, Sri Lanka (2006).

About 10 per cent marine and coastal pollution is caused by ocean-based activities like oil spills, exploration, and dumping of oil and garbage in the ocean. Oil pollution results

from accidents, washing oil tanker holds, the discharge of oil in bilge water and other discharges form mechanised boats. Sri Lanka has considerable oil pollution. Tankers carrying oil over 525 million MT transports in and around the Sri Lankan EEZ per year (Wijayapala 2015). Crude oil imported to Sri Lanka is pumped to the land-based storage tanks via an under-sea pipeline from the offshore terminal of Colombo Port. The terminal is operated throughout the year, even during the monsoon and approximately two tankers carrying 120,000 tonne parcels of crude oil are transferred to the tanks ashore every month (Joseph N.D). Any mishap will severely contaminate the waters and surrounding areas. Other maritime activities such as expansion and development of ports and new construction of ports; offshore supply of bunkers and ship repairing industry; exploration of oil, etc., have also increased the potential threat from oil and chemical spills. Sri Lankan waters have also been polluted due to oil spill from the ships several times. Large numbers of ships were sunk during the battles between the Sri Lankan Navy and the Sea Tigers. However, the exact impact from these oil and chemical spills are not known, as Sri Lanka does not have the capability to measure such damage. Another bio-pollutant is ballast water which poses a serious ecological, economic and health threat due to the transfer of harmful organisms and pathogens in the ships' ballast water tanks to the sea. (Gunawardena 2014).

Construction of Artificial Infrastructure on Sea

Concerns have also been expressed from time to time regarding the construction of artificial infrastructures on sea. One such major concern arose after the Indian government's decision to construct Sethusamudram canal to connect the Gulf of Mannar and the Palk Bay by cutting a channel at the approaches to Adam's Bridge for enabling deep sea ships to navigate from the west to the east coast of India. The project was aimed at shortening the sea route between India and Sri Lanka by dredging the canal as the water is not deep enough for ships to navigate. The idea was originally conceived in 1860. Later, on the request of the government of Madras in 1955, the Central government of India constituted a committee to do a feasibility study of the Sethusamudram project. The committee, in its report submitted in 1956, concluded that an integrated Sethusamudram project was feasible and desirable (Report of the Sethusamudram Project

Committee 1956). However, it was only in 2005 that government of India announced the inauguration of the project.

Environmentalists were concerned that the project would destroy Adam's Bridge, a natural chain of limestone shoals. They pointed out that the project would be detrimental as it would disturb the Gulf of Mannar, one of the world's richest marine biodiversity spots. Sri Lankan environmentalists argued that continuous dredging in this area would result in soil deposits on the bottom habitats such as coral and sea grass beds (Rodrigo 2013). The Sri Lankan cabinet set up a panel of experts to study the project's impact on marine life near Sri Lanka's coasts. According to the report, Sri Lankan marine environment and resources could be negatively affected by this project. The excavation of the canal and its impact could easily destroy the marine ecosystem. Oil spills due to accidents and leakage discharges from the increased ship traffic can also affect the marine ecology (Mendis 2007).

In the meantime, pursuant to orders of the Supreme Court, the Indian Government set up a committee of experts headed by R. K. Pachauri to consider an alternative alignment for the project. The Pachauri committee said in its report submitted in July 2012 that an alternative alignment was not "economically and ecologically feasible" (Manoj 2014). Currently, the matter is before the Supreme Court. Therefore, work on the project has been suspended.

As a result, concern over the canal has died down. The new concern now is about the Indian proposal for a sea bridge and tunnel connecting Sri Lanka. Reportedly, Nitin Gadkari, Indian Minister of Road Transport and Highways, said in a suo motu statement in the Lok Sabha that Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed the project with his Sri Lankan counterpart Ranil Wickremesinghe during the latter's visit to India in September 2015 (*The Hindu*, 24 March 2016). It was also reported that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has agreed to fully finance the bridge-building project connecting Rameshwaram (India) with Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government, however, rejected the report, saying that India has not made any formal proposal to Sri Lanka about the construction of a

bridge; a section of Sri Lankan civil society was protesting against the project. It is feared by some in Sri Lanka that the construction of a bridge will generate harmful erosion and siltation with sand buildup over the years will destroy the marine ecology. It is also believed that the construction of the bridge could even lead to heavy erosion of the Jaffna peninsula (De Vos 2015).

While speculation is on about the proposed bridge project, the real concern at this point is the construction of the Colombo Port City Project which is now known as Colombo International Financial Centre project. Environmentalists argue that the project would cause serious environmental problems due to the extraction of rocks and mining of sand from the sea as well as affect the livelihood of the fishermen community of the area. In January 2016, the People's Movement against Port City, a leading protest group, presented a document with 128 negative opinions against the EIA (Perera 2016). According to the environmentalists, "the water level of the area depends mostly on the granite rocks and if the granite rocks are destroyed, the ground water level in the area will definitely decline" (Iddamalgoda 2016). Due to sand mining, the fishermen have lost the shore area where they used to tie up their boats (Iddamalgoda 2016). It was also argued that the sand mining was causing a serious impact on the reef located in the shallow sea and coastal erosion, thereby altering the marine habitat (Corea 2016). Environmentalists fear that,

> The construction of the Colombo Port City adjacent to the Colombo South Terminal will alter the current flow between Sri Lanka's coast and its distal coral reefs and will cause an increase in pollution. The increased sedimentation of toxic heavy metals (from unprocessed industrial waste) may result in their getting into the food chain via detritus feeders fauna found in coastal waters. Nearly two-thirds of the protein consumed by Sri Lankan people comes from the sea. Hence there is a risk that people may consume heavy metals via the food chain (Corea 2016).

Unlike the environmentalists, the government however is not concerned about the negative environmental impacts and is justifying the Colombo International Financial Centre project in the hope that it would bring economic benefit to the country by creating thousands of jobs.

It is usually a common tendency of almost all governments to ignore the environmental impacts of projects perceived to be economically beneficial. Due to short-term gains, often the analysis of long-term impacts is ignored. As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, Sri Lanka has suffered several times due to its short-sighted policies. The unsustainable development policies have made Sri Lanka's marine ecology extremely vulnerable not only to man-made disasters but also to natural disasters.

Natural Disaster

Sri Lanka is extremely prone to natural disaster. Every year the country is hit by flood as well as drought. But in 2004 for the first time, Sri Lanka experienced unprecedented disaster due to a tsunami or tidal waves following seismic activity in the ocean. Actually there was a tsunami in Sri Lanka long time back, but it did not make much impact on the population and infrastructure. Therefore, the country had never experienced any threat from tsunamis until December 2004. When the island was hit by the tsunami, it was totally unprepared to deal with the catastrophe. Scientists have also predicted a possible threat to the country from rising sea levels in the future.

Impact of Tsunami in Sri Lanka

Tsunami tidal waves on 26 December 2004 devastated 985 km of Sri Lanka's total coastal belt causing severe damage to life and property (Government of Sri Lanka 2005). The geographic impact of the tsunami in Sri Lanka was uneven. It is important to mention here that due to the involvement of number of government and non-governmental organisations and lack of coordination among these organisations, it is difficult to get authentic and accurate data. Even the Disaster Management Centre of Sri Lanka has acknowledged the fact that they don't have 100 per cent accurate figures. However, the Statistical Summary Report on the Tsunami Disasters in Sri Lanka, 2005 prepared by the Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) and Department of Census and Statistics of Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka is considered as authentic and data on tsunami mentioned in this chapter is mostly taken from the report.

Deaths and Missing People

The death toll is estimated at over 37,000 (including missing persons) (Government of Sri Lanka 2005). The majority of victims were women and children. The northern and eastern Provinces were particularly hard hit accounting for two-thirds of deaths. The highest number of people died in Ampara district (10,597) followed by Hambantota (5,834) and Galle (4,894) and so on. The following table shows the number of deaths and missing people due to the tsunami as of 1 May 2005.

Table 4: Number of Deaths and Missing People due to Tsunami		
District	Total Population (2001)	Deaths and missing
Colombo	2,234,289	91
Gampaha	2,066,096	11
Kalutara	1,066,800	347
Galle	990,539	4,894
Matara	761,236	1,942
Hambantota	525,370	5,834
Ampara	589,344	10,597
Batticaloa	486,477	3,315
Trincomaee	340,158	1,123
Mallativu	121,667	3,421
Kilinochchi	127,263	560
Jaffna	490,621	3,180
Total	**9,799,860**	**35,315**
Source: Department of Census and Statistics (2005)		

Population Displacement

An estimated 800,000 people were displaced due to the tsunami. The northern and eastern provinces were particularly hard hit accounting for almost 60 per cent of the

displacement. Around 88,488 houses were damaged and 266,277 families were affected and an estimated 150,000 people lost their primary source of livelihood.

Table 5: Number of Displaced Population due to Tsunami					
District	Total Population (2001)	Displaced Population on 3 January 2005	Displaced Population on 31 March 205	Effected Families	Damaged Houses
Colombo	2,234,289	16,139	33,511	9,647	6,345
Gampaha	2,066,096	32,000	1,449	6,827	854
Kalutara	1,066,800	37,595	34,671	11,497	5,741
Galle	990,539	120,000	121,934	24,583	11,696
Matara	761,236	41,900	9,491	21,140	6,238
Hambantota	525,370	27,351	14,165	14,344	2,374
Ampara	589,344	183,527	103,949	59,275	18,810
Batticaloa	486,477	203,807	55,935	64,151	17,405
Trincomalee	340,158	51,863	72,986	30,547	7,531
Mallativu	121,667	24,557	22,557	6,745	5,691
Kilinochchi	127,263	49,129	1,603	2,754	288
Jaffna	490,621	48,729	41,006	14,767	5,515
Total	**9,799,860**	**836,596**	**513,257**	**266,277**	**88,488**
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka (2005).					

Impact on Infrastructure and Economy

There was massive damage to infrastructure and capital assets: estimated at around US$1billion (4.5 per cent of GDP), particularly in tourism and fisheries sectors (Jayasuriya et. al. 2006). Hotels in the coastal areas were severely damaged. More than 240 schools were destroyed. Several hospitals, telecommunication networks, coastal railway network, etc., were also damaged.

Table 6:Tsunami Impact on Infrastructure							
District	Townships	Tourist Hotels	Schools	Health Institutions	Boats/crafts Destroyed	Harbours	Anchorages

District							
Colombo	10				284		
Gampaha	4	1	2		289		2
Kalutara	10	14	8	6	592	2	2
Galle	13	26	25	20	1,253	2	3
Matara	6	7	12	7	1,367	1	2
Hambantota	7	7	6	5	1,579	3	6
Ampara	10	0	40	12	1,673		4
Batticaloa	4		37	18	2,510	1	2
Trincomalee	9	6	23	9	5,261	1	1
Mallativu	2		14	6	1,775		1
Kilinochchi				1	186		
Jaffna	2		16	4	2,172		2
Total	77	61	183	88	18,941	10	25
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka (2005)							

The Sri Lankan economy was shattered by the tsunami. Destruction of private assets in the affected districts was substantial, with losses estimated at around US$700 million. Output losses resulting from the damage of assets and the disruption in economic activity in the affected sectors were estimated at US$330 million during 2005 and 2006 (around 1.5 per cent of GDP). Thus, the total loss was around US$1.3 billion (6 per cent of GDP) (Government of Sri Lanka 2005).

Table 7: Tsunami Impact on Economy			
Sector	Asset Loss (US$ Million)	Output Loss	Total Loss
Percent of GDP	4.4-4.6%	1.5%	6%
Tourism	250	131	381
Housing	306-344	-	~325
Fisheries	97	200	297
Excluded Items	90	-	90
Roads	60	-	60
Health	60	-	60

Water and Sanitation	42	-	42
Education	26	-	26
Railways	15	-	15
Power	10	-	10
Environment	10	-	10
Agriculture	3	-	3
Total	969-1,007	331	~1,319
Source: Department of Census and Statistics Sri Lanka, (2005).			

The tsunami badly affected Sri Lanka's tourism industry. Nearly a third or 29 per cent of the tourism industry was damaged; 61 hotels were affected. In terms of rooms, about 3,500 out of a total of 13,000 rooms in medium to large-scale hotels were out of service in late February 2005 (Jayasuriya et. al. 2006). In terms of employment, thousands of people lost jobs in tourism and tourism-related activities.

Also, about 23 per cent of fishing industry got affected due to tsunami. Fish production decreased to 200,000 tonnes from 300,000 tonnes. In terms of employment, 100,000 people lost jobs in the fisheries sector (Jayasuriya et. al. 2006).

Impact on Environment and Ecology

With regard to ecological environment, tsunami had damaged the ecological stability of the coastal ecosystem. There was much debris on most beaches. Alien invasive species were spread by the tsunami to new areas (Ranasinghe 2007).

Out of 680 sq. km of Sri Lanka's coral reef, 200-300 sq. km were affected to varying degrees as a result of the tsunami. Total destruction of corals had been reported from the Dutch Bar area in the east coast where the living component of the reefs, which was nearly 52 per cent in 2003, had fallen to 12 per cent in January 2005 (The Foundation for Coexistence 2005).

Thus, the 2004 tsunami made it clear that Sri Lanka is vulnerable to low frequency, high impact events with extensive damage. The severe impact it had on the people, infrastructure and economy, makes it clear that while due to human intervention marine resources get affected, a disaster caused by marine hazards can affect the people and resources on land too. While the Sri Lankan government has more or less sorted out the problems that emerged due to the tsunami, the country might soon face similar kinds of problems from rising sea levels if proper measures are not initiated to mitigate and adapt to the fallout of rising sea levels. It is observed that initiatives taken by the governments in the past to mitigate damages caused by natural disaster were mostly reactive in nature, emphasising relief and recovery, rather than being proactive with damage prevention or minimisation strategies (Jayawardane n.d).

Possible Impact of Sea Level Rise on Sri Lanka

The coastal zone of Sri Lanka is going to be seriously affected by rise in sea level. The scenario of sea level rise in Sri Lanka is 1.0 m rise by 2070 (Government of Sri Lanka 2000). Sea level rise would lead to inundation of low-lying coastal areas, shoreline retreat, intrusion of salinity and impacts on coastal habitats. Increased wave height due to sea level rise would disturb equilibrium beaches and make them more prone to erosion. The National Communication of Sri Lanka, 2000, has identified that the most direct impact of the rise in sea level is the inundation of highly populated low-lying coastal settlements and coastal wetlands located just above the water level prior to sea level rise (Government of Sri Lanka 2000).

Sri Lanka has been experiencing an erosion rate of 0.30-0.35 m per year for 45-55 per cent of its coastline (Jayawardane n.d). A rise in sea level would increase the present rates of erosion and also result in the loss of land and increase the vulnerability of coastal communities. Due to lack of research work, it is difficult to provide statistical data and analysis of the impact of sea level rise on Sri Lanka. The Coast Conservation Department and Survey Department of Sri Lanka in collaboration with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency and the Asian Institute of Technology has initiated a mini project programme on the impact of sea level rise in the south-west coast that falls within the

Galle administrative district. It has been estimated that 0.30 m sea level rise will cause a loss of 6.0 sq. km and 1.00 m sea level rise will cause land loss of 11.5 sq. km in the area (Government of Sri Lanka 2000). It has also been estimated that with 1.0 m sea level rise, 91.25 sq. km area will be inundated around the lowlands adjacent to marshlands, lagoons and estuaries of the south-west coast of Sri Lanka (Jayawardane n.d: 67).

A rise in sea level has other ecological impact too. It increases the salinity of an estuary by altering the balance between fresh water and salt water hydraulic regimes, increases erosion as well as the possible increase in the frequency of storms and flooding (Government of Sri Lanka 2000).

In the western and southern coastal areas, railway lines run along the coast. Therefore, railway lines in Sri Lanka are at risk from 0.3 m of sea level rise (Nianthi & Shaw 2006). According to Nianthi and Shaw, existing structures in the ports of Galle and Colombo are able to withstand the impact of a 0.3 m sea level rise, but not 1 m rise which is the 2070 scenario. Similarly, several highways are also vulnerable to 1 m sea level rise. In other words, sea level rise will further intensify the existing coastal zone management problem of Sri Lanka. Loss of prime land on the shore front has already had an impact on the tourism industry, particularly in the case of beach resorts. A rapid rise in sea level would, therefore, inevitably increase the cost of coast protection.

Coastal regions of Sri Lanka encompasses 32 per cent of the country's population, 65 per cent of the urbanised areas, 41 per cent of urban places, over 80 per cent of tourist hotel rooms and two-thirds of all industrial production of Sri Lanka (Senaviratne 2005). Thus, if proper measures are not taken on time, sea level rise will affect the population and infrastructure in low-lying coastal areas. Many people will be displaced. Since a large number of population in the coastal areas is dependent on the fishing and tourism industries, the impact of sea level rise on these industries will affect the livelihood of these people which will further impact the overall economy of the country.

Conclusion

The coastal and marine resources of Sri Lanka comprise of living and non-living resources. The living resources include fish and shell-fish, squid and cuttle fish, ornamental fish, sea cucumbers, coral reefs, mangroves, sea grass beds, salt marshes and peat marshes. The non-living resources include the beaches, sand and sand dunes, seas and bays. Both the living and non-living resources have immense economic potential. But all the issues mentioned above have impacted negatively on these resources. Destructive fishing methods, pollution and over-fishing cause depletion of resources with a negative impact on the economy. Beaches and mangroves are natural barriers to coastal erosion. Due to illegal infrastructure on many of the beaches and destruction of mangroves, they could not effectively act as natural barriers during the tsunami (Ministry of Environment 2007). Scientists argue that the much of the infrastructure in the coastal areas could have been protected had the mangroves and coral reefs remained intact. Destruction of marine ecology may not immediately threaten a country's security but they have considerable long-time impact.

The fishing, port and tourism industry are major contributors to the Sri Lankan economy, but these industries are directly or indirectly getting affected by the various challenges mentioned above. While some of the maritime challenges are affecting the growth of these industries, unregulated and uncontrolled development of these industries is affecting the marine and coastal ecology of the country. In other words, the country is facing a problem of unsustainable development. If these industries are not developed in a sustainable manner, it may backfire upon the country's economy in the long run.

Many of the non-military security challenges get aggravated due to poor governance. It can be argued that it is beyond anybody's control to prevent natural disasters from occurring. However, it is very much in the hands of the government to minimise the negative impact of natural disasters if precautionary measures are taken well in time. For example, the impact of the tsunami would have been much less had there been an early warning system. Secondly, resource depletion can be controlled if proper attention is given on sustainable development at the policy making level and instead of taking

regulatory measures like banning, alternative livelihood facilities are provided to the perpetrators who conduct illegal activities at sea.

In most cases, the problem arises due to lack of vision and lack of political will. Due to narrow political and economic interests, often the larger interests of the country are ignored. A particular issue gets attention of the government only when it goes out of control and cause challenges to the regime in power. Yet, it is not fair to blame the government's poor governance for each and every challenge. Sometimes challenges come from foreign sources. Involvement of foreign nationals or foreign countries complicates situations. The real challenge before Sri Lanka, therefore, is to initiate development measures for the growth of the country with limited resources and without affecting the ecology, as well as protecting and preserving marine resources both from domestic and foreign poachers without spoiling its relations with the international community.

Political Responses: Bilateral Cooperation and Multilateral Diplomacy

The response of a country to its security challenges depends on the threat perception of the government and on the strength of its military capability. As observed in the previous chapters, since independence, different governments in Sri Lanka had different security concerns. On the one hand, there was the fear of coming under the influence of ambitious neighbour in the Indian Ocean; on the other hand, the possible spillover effect of power competition in international politics. While Sri Lanka wants to free the Indian Ocean region from militarisation, arms race and power rivalry among the great powers, it also does not want domination of the area by a single power. Sri Lanka, however, is not confident that it can deter the bigger powers and ensure its security by military means on its own. Therefore, Sri Lanka has adopted several political and diplomatic means to deal with security concerns. While issues with India were dealt with at the bilateral level, general concerns about militarisation and arms race in the Indian Ocean were approached at the multilateral level. As far as militancy was concerned, Sri Lanka dealt with it by military means and ultimately eliminated militancy in its soil in 2009. The military responses to its security concerns are discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter focuses on the political and diplomatic moves of the Sri Lankan government to address its military security concerns and threats.

The two main political parties–the UNP and the SLFP–at the helm of affairs since independence have a partisan foreign policy approach, even though both parties uphold the principles of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism, advocate the cause of disarmament and arms control, oppose military pacts and support the idea of Asian-African solidarity. The UNP is considered to be pro-Western and the SLFP is oriented towards socialist countries. It was also observed in Chapter 2 that particularly during the Cold War period, the UNP governments were very concerned about India's ambition in the Indian Ocean whereas the SLFP governments downplayed the India threat. For the SLFP, militarisation and super power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean was a major concern even though it was not completely free from Indophobia. In the post -Cold War period, as new security situations emerged, the main concern has been how to keep the area free from single

power domination. Therefore, the political and diplomatic measures taken by various governments since independence varied depending upon the intensity of threat perceptions and ideological affiliations and foreign policy orientation of the leader in power.

Bilateral Diplomacy

Sri Lanka got independence at a time when the world was divided into two blocs. Both the blocs tried to entice the countries into their camps through military alliance. Sri Lanka, however, was opposed to joining any bloc or entering into an alliance system. It wanted to follow a middle path and sought assistance from other countries at the bilateral level to address its security concerns without being a party to any of the military pacts. However, in the first decade of independence, the Sri Lankan leadership was tilted towards the West. Realising the fact that it would be difficult to manage its security on its own, it relied on its erstwhile colonial master. The security arrangement was done even before the country got independence.

Sri Lanka signed a defence cooperation agreement on 11 November 1947 (De Silva 1997). In reality, the agreement was a precondition of independence because the British wanted their security interest in the Indian Ocean region to be adequately protected (Cabinet Report by Chief of Staff 1947). However, Sri Lankan leaders saw the benefit of signing the agreement and therefore the UNP regime continued with the agreement after the independence in 1948 and allowed the UK to use its naval base at Trincomalee and air bases at Katunayake (Senanayake 1947). In return, the UK undertook the responsibility of the island, particularly the responsibility of the maritime security. However, the naval strategy designed by the British served the purpose of British interests in the Indian Ocean more than the Sri Lankans. Yet, the Sri Lankan leadership was satisfied with the fact that they were under the shadow of the former colonial master who would curtail the influence of India.

The agreement was considered as an insurance against possible challenges from India. This was confirmed by Gordon Walker (1948), in his 'Report on Ceylon: Cabinet

memorandum on the independence celebrations and the political situation in Ceylon' on 17 March 1948. Walker (1948) mentioned in his report that D.S. Senanayake sought a close military tie-up with Britain to prevent India from controlling the Indian Ocean. Walker (1948) says:

> His (Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake) desire to get a firm defence agreement that will allay his fears about excessive Indian influence in the affairs and future of Ceylon…in part Ceylon fears Indian pressure and for this reason wants a close military tie-up with us. They want to be treated on their merits and do not wish to come too closely within the Indian orbit.

Despite protests within Sri Lanka against providing a naval base to the British, the UNP government felt that defence cooperation would be the best deal to assure security of the country. It was argued by the Sri Lankan leaders that the agreement by no means infers that Sri Lanka was joining alliance politics. Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala (1954: 96) said that in the post-independence period, Sri Lanka had been "received into the Commonwealth family on equal terms" and on "truly democratic basis". As a Commonwealth member, Sri Lanka signed defence cooperation agreement with Britain as an equal partner, where Sri Lanka was not only under British protection but, if required, it would also provide assistance to Britain.

A new government led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike came into power in 1956. He opposed the provision of base facilities to outsiders and therefore, asked the British to withdraw their bases. With this, Sri Lanka's maritime security came under the responsibility of the Ceylon Navy. India was not perceived as a threat by him and hence felt it unnecessary to provide base facilities to a third country to counter India. Rather, he advocated the policy of friendship with all.

After the assassination of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, his wife Sirimavo Bandaranaike came into power in 1960. Though she followed S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's foreign policy approach, Sirimavo Bandaranaike tried to ensure strategic autonomy by getting close to China and maintaining friendly relationship with India simultaneously. Her close proximity to China during her first tenure (1960-65), her approach to the Indo-China War in 1962 and the signing of the Maritime Agreement with China in 1963 raised

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doubts in India. According to Prasad (1973: 398), Sri Lanka under Sirimavo Bandaranaike was inclined towards China in search for "reinsurance against India". This assumption was made basically because of the maritime agreement Sri Lanka signed with China in 1963.

The 1963 Sri Lanka-China Maritime Agreement gave 'most favoured nation' treatment to commercial vessels of the two countries engaged in cargo and passenger services. Defending the agreement, the then Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Defence and External Affairs, Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike (1963 a) stated, that it was "a purely commercial agreement dealing with commercial vessels…" But at that time Sri Lanka did not have any commercial vessels. Therefore, the necessity of signing the agreement was questioned. It was speculated that there was a secret agreement with China to lend Trincomalee as a Chinese naval base.

Signing of the agreement also raised doubts because of Sirimavo Bandaranaike's attitude towards the Chinese attack on India in 1962. After the India-China war in 1962, Sirimavo Bandaranaike took the initiative along with other Afro-Asian countries to propose India and China come to the negotiating table to prevent further escalation of the war. The Sri Lankan Government claimed that it was trying to facilitate talks between India and China without taking any sides. However, Sri Lankan opposition leaders at that time and several analysts had criticised the Bandaranaike government for indirectly supporting the Chinese, as Sri Lanka did not condemn China as an aggressor (Prasad 1973: 358-67). As a non-aligned nation, Sri Lanka was expected to condemn China. Also, the Sri Lankan government took the Chinese line on the border dispute, according to which, borders between the two countries were not delimited. India, however, held the position that the "Indian frontier with the Tibet region is well recognised and clearly demarcated" (Prasad 1973: 361). Therefore, it was believed that Sri Lanka's pro-China policy was not only to cater to the economic interests of the country, but also to show that Sri Lanka would not be "acquiescent to India" (Prasad 1973).

Sirimavo Bandaranaike's approach towards India, however, changed during her second tenure, because of the Indian support she got for her proposal to make the Indian Ocean peace zone for the Indian assistance during the JVP insurrection. A policy of engagement rather than countervailing India was preferred by her. During her second tenure, therefore, she initiated negotiations with India to resolve the long-pending Katchatheevu Island dispute. It should be noted here that the negotiations on the Katchatheevu island was initiated by her predecessor Dudley Senanayake in 1968. But the negotiations ended in deadlock. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, after coming to power, made consistent efforts and thus resolved the maritime boundary issue, which had been an irritant in bilateral relations.

The UNCLOS (Article 279-287) provides option to the state parties concerned to settle their dispute through negotiation or other diplomatic measures between them at anytime or can approach the court or tribunal having jurisdiction over their issues. According to the Article 287 of the UNCLOS, one state can settle their disputes by approaching: (a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; (b) the International Court of Justice; (c) an arbitral tribunal; (d) a special arbitral tribunal (UN 1982).

Though Sri Lanka under Dudley Senanayake took up the case with India, he wanted to go in for international arbitration. But India refused the option. Senanayake had discussions on the issue of Katchatheevu with Indira Gandhi in New Delhi in November 1968 and then in London in January 1969, when both Prime Ministers were in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference (Jayasinghe 2003: 43-57). In the first round of talks, both the leaders mentioned their strong legal claim over the island and domestic political difficulties in surrendering sovereignty over Katchatheevu. Senanayake then hinted that he might consider referring the matter to international arbitration (Suryanarayan 2005). However, Indira Gandhi opposed adjudication by a third party. Gandhi rather suggested "a condominium, partition, joint activities in the Palk Strait and perpetual lease" (Jayasinghe 2003: 49-50). Senanayake did not accept those proposals and was adamant on Sri Lanka's claim over the island. Indira Gandhi then hinted that there must be some quid pro quo from Sri Lanka which she could offer to Tamil Nadu.

Senanayake in his report on the outcome of the discussion mentioned (as quoted in Jayasinghe 2003: 54):

> In the circumstances it would appear to be desirable to agree to the Indian proposal for the establishment of a demarcation line which, in the critical area, would leave Kachchativu on the Ceylon side but pass closer to Kachchativu than the distance of the territorial waters round Kachchativu that we now claim. The indications are that with this connection, the Indian Prime Minister might be able to persuade the Madras Government to accept recognition by India of Ceylon's sovereignty over Kachchativu.

The second round of talks between the two Prime Ministers was held on 8 January 1969 in London. The Indian Prime Minister was accompanied by her Principal Secretary P.N. Haksar and the Sri Lankan Prime Minister was accompanied by Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs G.V.P. Samarasinghe. Following the Prime Ministerial meeting, Haksar and Samarasinghe met again on 16 January 1968 and agreed to prepare the outcome of the discussions and the procedure for giving effect to the consensus reached between the two Prime Ministers. According to W.T. Jayasinghe (2003), G.V.P. Samarasinghe wrote a secret letter to P.N. Haksar on 22 March 1969 mentioning the consensus reached between the two leaders. As mentioned by Samarasinghe in the letter, "the two Prime Ministers agreed that the line agreed to between the two countries on 26 October 1921 may be the basis for the settlement of the issue and it would be recognised that each country had exclusive jurisdiction and control over the waters and territory falling on its side of the 1921 line" (Jayasinghe 2003: 55). The letter also mentioned that Indira Gandhi referred to fishing areas on the Sri Lankan side which Dudley Senanayake agreed to settle after finalising the demarcation line. India responded to the letter in February 1970. The then Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India, Vincent Coelho, said in Colombo that the letter did not correspond with India's understanding of the situation (Jayasinghe 2003: 56). With this, the discussion ended in deadlock. Negotiations on the Katchatheevu island resumed again only after Sirimavo Bandaranaike came to power in 1970.

In June 1970, the general election took place in Sri Lanka which saw the departure of Dudley Senanayake and the return of Sirimavo Bandaranaike. After Sirimavo Bandaranaike came to power, she raised the issue in a letter to Indira Gandhi on 28

September 1971 and sought an early settlement. Though Gandhi did not respond to the letter immediately, she discussed the issue with Sirimavo Bandaranaike in a one-to-one meeting in Colombo during her visit to Sri Lanka in April 1973. The discussion was not disclosed to the public given the sensitivity of the issue. However, W.T. Jayasinghe, who was in the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, gave details about the meeting in his book. According to Jayasinghe, in the April 1973 meeting, Indira Gandhi indicated that officials should first have discussions and prepare a joint memorandum which the two Prime Ministers could then discuss. Accordingly, officials from the two countries met four times between June 1973 and October 1973 in Colombo and Delhi and outlined the basis of their claim over sovereignty. After thoroughly studying the claims presented by both sides, Bandaranaike wrote to Indira Gandhi on 21 November 1973 about the strength of Sri Lanka's position and urged India to acknowledge Sri Lanka's sovereignty over Katchatheevu (Jayasinghe 2003: 69). Indira Gandhi responded to the letter on 18 December 1973, stating that any decision on the subject would create strong reactions in both countries. Therefore, it would be of "joint interest to ensure that passions are not inflamed in either country" (Quoted in Jayasinghe 2003: 75). Indira Gandhi's letter was handed over to Prime Minister Bandaranaike by the then Foreign Secretary of India, Kewal Singh. Explaining India's difficulty to accept Sri Lanka's sovereignty over the island given sensitivities in Tamil Nadu, Kewal Singh made three proposals which, in his view, could be difficult but would not be impossible to handle for the Government of India. Those three proposals were (Suryanarayan 2005: 55):

1. "each side maintains its sovereignty, but will exercise concurrent jurisdiction, will exploit resources including sub-soil jointly and share equally; the territorial limits extension of half way dividing line"

2. "The island is partitioned, in half or otherwise, as negotiated; each side will exercise sovereignty in its part and has right of exploiting its side and its territorial waters; the territorial waters will be an extension of the partition line".

3. "India has sovereignty but will give perpetual lease on nominal rent or without rent.

Reacting to these three proposals, Sirimavo Bandaranaike wrote letter to Indira Gandhi on 1 January 1974 explaining that accepting any of these proposals would be considered by Sri Lankan citizens as relinquishing established rights of Sri Lanka over the island. However, in the same letter, Bandaranaike proposed a new approach which could be used as quid pro quo. Her suggestion was that India would withdraw its claims over Katchatheevu. In return, Sri Lanka would demarcate its territorial sea in the vicinity to Katchatheevu to "concede to India an area of sea and sea-bed, and their resources through an agreement" (Jayasinghe 2003: 79).

Following the suggestion, negotiations between the two countries focused on the limit of the territorial sea and the base line from which the territorial sea was to be measured. The Indian side proposed that Sri Lanka's territorial limits would be confined to half a mile to the west of Katchatheevu.[10] Further, "the baseline from which Sri Lanka's territorial sea would be measured might be a straight line joining the outer-most edge of Delft Island and Talaimannar" (Jayasinghe 2003: 85). The Sri Lankan side rejected both the proposals. Sri Lanka's position was that the baseline should be measured from Katchatheevu, as it is its furthest landmass. Indian and Sri Lankan officials had several formal and informal meetings to negotiate on these two points, but the both sides were adamant about their positions.

As the talks got stuck, Sirimavo Bandaranaike during her visit to India to attend the Republic Day celebration wrote a letter to Indira Gandhi on 24 January 1974. In that letter, Bandaranaike refused to limit the territorial sea to only half mile as was demanded by India, but proposed to concede a further 40 square miles of sea to India (Jayasinghe 2003: 92). Subsequently, a one-to-one informal meeting was held between the two Prime Ministers at Indira Gandhi's residence. During the discussion, Bandaranaike mentioned that efficient utilisation of the island would not be possible with a half mile territorial sea. Sri Lanka needs at least two miles territorial sea for exploration and uses. "Indira Gandhi responded that it would be difficult to carry such a package with Tamil Nadu", but she

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[10] Sri Lanka's territorial sea in the vicinity of Katchatheevu extended to seven and half miles to the west of Katchatheevu that time, according to the 1921 fishing line.

"agreed on a compromise of one mile of territorial sea on the west of Katchatheevu" (Jayasinghe 2003: 93). Finally, the boundary line agreed to was based on the principle of equidistance except in the vicinity of Katchatheevu, where the island was one mile to the north and west (Suryanarayan 2005).

By resolving the problem, Sri Lanka addressed the long-drawn suspicion that India had territorial interests in Sri Lanka. Yet, the India fear did not disappear from the anti-India constituency in Sri Lanka. Hence, when a new government came into power in Sri Lanka in 1977, countervailing approach was adopted against India by getting closer to the USA.

In 1977, UNP leader J. Jayewardene became Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. Jayewardene was known for his anti-India attitude since independence. In his memorandum to then Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake on 19 March 1954, he mentioned that "India would play a dominant role in this region and pose a danger to our independence if her rulers are imperialistic" (Jayewardene 1954). He suggested as a small nation, it is necessary to see that the states in this region are not cut off from the rest of the world from economic and military aid. He stressed that India should not be allowed to "proclaim a 'Monroe Doctrine' in the Indian Ocean where she will play the role that the USA plays in Atlantic" (Jayewardene 1954).

His perceptions on India did not change when he became Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in 1977 (later he became President of Sri Lanka under the new constitution). Therefore, President Jayewardene ensured Sri Lanka's security from Indian domination by deepening relations with the West, particularly the USA. In 1981, Colombo lifted the nine-year old ban on foreign warships calling at Trincomalee (Bhasin 2001: xxvii). In 1983, it signed an agreement with the USA under which Voice of America (VOA) was allowed to expand its activities on the island. Sri Lanka provided these facilities to the USA, hoping to avail security assistance to deal with Tamil militants as well as to curb Indian influence. Other than the USA, Sri Lanka also approached other countries–UK, China, Pakistan, Israel and Malaysia–for military and political support, ignoring India at least until 1986.

However, J. Jayewardene failed to keep India away from Sri Lankan affairs. As the security situation deteriorated due to the militant movement, J. Jayewardene himself asked for Indian assistance. The threat of militant movements took precedence over fear from India in the maritime domain. Hence, since 1990 till the end of the Eelam War in May 2009, Sri Lanka's main concern was to address the security threat posed by LTTE for which military means were adopted. Sri Lanka entered into bilateral security cooperation with multiple countries to continue its war against the militants, including India.

Sri Lanka thus adopted the policy of both engagement with and countering India to address its security concerns. Countervailing regional power in the neighbourhood with the assistance of the extra-regional power is a common trait of small states. However, the policy did not benefit Sri Lanka much. Sri Lanka's interests are protected better whenever Sri Lanka followed the policy of engagement with India rather than countervailing. In fact, the countervailing policy had negative consequences if Sri Lanka overtly used the card of an extra-regional actor for the purpose, which was hostile or not so friendly to India. Though tried by the Sri Lankan leaders, they could not sustain the policy of countervailing India long, as India is too important maritime power in the region to be ignored. Sri Lanka as a small state cannot rely on one or two extra-regional power to ensure its maritime security.

Multilateral Diplomacy

Since its independence, Sri Lanka wanted to be a part of an international organisation which was above bloc politics, such as the United Nations. However, as Sri Lanka could not become a member of the United Nations until 1955, the Commonwealth was considered as the only organisation of autonomous countries which were equal in status irrespective of size and capability. Membership of the Commonwealth provided mutual trust and confidence between the newly emerging independent countries and their erstwhile colonial master. It was also believed that the membership would allow Sri Lanka to receive economic aid without having any alliance with any of the two power blocs. According to Prime Minister Kotelawala (1954), "Commonwealth offers an

excellent opportunity of bridging the economic gap between the East and West, in a spirit of friendly co-operation, rather than in an atmosphere of mutual obligation".

When S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike came into power in 1956, he too perceived bloc politics as a major threat to the world and, therefore, felt that those institutions which can follow a middle way between two extremes–the USA and the USSR–should take the lead role in dealing with the negative impact of the bloc politics. In his view, both the Commonwealth and the United Nations qualified for such role. He, therefore, used the platform of Commonwealth as well as the UN to address his concerns against bloc power politics. At the same time he was not ready to "blindly follow the Commonwealth or the UN". He followed the policy of neutralism by which he meant the right of criticising friends when they do not act correctly (Bandaranaike 1957). The SLFP leaders renounced the UNP mindset that all the enemies of Commonwealth are Sri Lanka's enemy and all friends of Commonwealth are friends of Sri Lanka (Bandaranaike 1963). The UNP as a member of the Commonwealth provided base facilities to the UK despite opposition within country. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was against any action to please anybody if it went against Sri Lanka's interests. Therefore, during the Suez crisis, despite being a Commonwealth member, he opposed the Franco-British–Israel invasion on Egypt, as he felt that militarisation of important SLOCs can have a negative impact on Sri Lanka (Bandaranaike 1956). Sri Lankan delegates actively participated in the UN debate on the Suez crisis. They persistently supported the UN resolution calling for a cease-fire and for complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory (Gunewardene 1957). At the United Nations, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike clearly said that his Sri Lanka opposed any action which affected the sovereignty of a country (Jayawardane 2004: XIV).

Since the 1960s, Sri Lanka has tried to garner the support of littoral states of the region against naval activities in the Indian Ocean by the super powers. The initiative in this regard was taken by Sirimavo Bandaranaike. She used the platform of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth and the United Nations General Assembly to express her country's concerns over the presence of super powers in the Indian Ocean. The Commonwealth as well as the Afro-Asian contribution within the United Nations

helped significantly to amend the very basis of disarmament negotiations (Bandaranaike 1964).

The Sri Lankan government raised the issue of nuclearisation for the first time in the Non-Aligned Summit in Cairo in 1964 where Mrs. Bandaranaike proposed a nuclear free zone for the Indian Ocean and "registered a protest at the establishment of bases by external powers in the Indian Ocean" (Keerawella 1990: 176). Three resolutions were presented by Sri Lanka at the Cairo conference : "1) to extend the concept of nuclear free zones to cover areas and oceans which were free from nuclear weapons earlier; 2) all non-aligned nations should take steps to close their ports and airfields to ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons; 3) all colonial powers should not only liquidate bases already existing in their colonial territories, but also refrain from establishing new bases in such territories which could potentially be used for aggressive purposes" (Kodikara 2008: 56). Her suggestions were incorporated in the Cairo declaration, known as 'the Programme for Peace and International Cooperation" (NAM 1964). The declaration was forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly by Mohamed Awad El Kony, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations, for circulation as a document of the General Assembly (UNGA 1964).

However, in 1965 Sirimavo Bandaranaike lost the elections and Dudley Senanayake became the Prime Minister. Though the Senanayake government continued the policy of non-alignment and friendship with all, Sri Lanka's opposition on the presence of super powers in the Indian Ocean was not as vocal as it was during the Sirimavo Bandaranaike period. During 1965-70, Senanayake tried to improve relations with the USA which had deteriorated under the Bandaranaike period. Nonetheless, Sri Lanka under Sirimavo Bandaranaike assumed leadership in the advocacy of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ) concept after she came back to power in 1970.

The proposal of a nuclear-free zone was developed to a broader concept of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone in the third NAM Summit in Lusaka in 1970. "The Lusaka summit endorsed the proposal and included in the final declaration on 'Peace, Independence,

Development and Democratisation of International Relations', and "called upon all states to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace from which great power rivalry and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air force bases are excluded. It also called for nuclear weapons free zone" (NAM 1970).

The idea of establishing a peace zone in the Indian Ocean also figured prominently in the Commonwealth meetings. Sri Lanka presented a Memorandum on Indian Ocean Security to the conference of the Commonwealth Heads of States held in January 1971. The memorandum found general acceptance at the conference but Britain and Australia had some reservation. However, the final communiqué of the conference stated that they agreed on the appeal of Indian Ocean as an area of peace and stability (Commonwealth Secretariat 1971).

In October 1971, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, for the first time, outlined the details of what the peace zone would mean in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The then Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka at the UN, Shirley Amarasinghe, formally requested the Secretary General on 1 October 1971 that the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace be included on the Agenda of the 26th session. Tanzania joined later on 6 October 1971 as a co-sponsor. After the plenary meeting of the General Assembly which included the request on the agenda, it was referred to the First Committee to consider and report back. On 16 December 1971, the General Assembly passed the resolution without any change with 61 members for the resolution, none against and 55 abstaining.

The Resolution 2832(XXVI) requested the Secretary General to report to the General Assembly as its 27th session on the progress that had been made with regard to the implementation of this declaration (UNGA 1971). But when the Secretary General of the UN requested the members to inform him about the measures taken for the implementation of the resolution, he did not get any satisfactory response. Therefore, the IOPZ resolution was once again included in the UN Agenda in 1972 and the General

Assembly passed Resolution 2992(XXVII) with 72 votes to none, with 35 abstentions in December 1972. According to the resolution, a 15-member Adhoc Committee on the Indian Ocean was appointed with the Sri Lankan representative to the UN, Shirley Amarasinghe, as the Chairman (UNGA 1972). The Adhoc Committee held 11 meetings between 27 February and 4 October 1973. As Chairman of the Adhoc Committee, Sri Lanka occupied an important position at the centre of discussions on the Indian Ocean issue. The report submitted by the Chairman included a working paper prepared by Sri Lanka (Keerawella 1990: 187).

The two super powers objected to the peace zone concept. Yet, in June 1977, delegations of the USA and the erstwhile USSR met in Moscow and exchanged opinions on arms limitation in the Indian Ocean. The next year both countries came to an agreement on the framework for stabilising their naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka, however, was not satisfied with the discussion between the two super powers' decision to "demarcate boundaries for each other's military activities. Sri Lanka demanded "total elimination of super power military presence and bases". This was made clear by the then Sri Lankan Foreign Minister A.C.S. Hameed in his address to the ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau in Havana in May 1978 (Kodikara 2008: 71). Nonetheless, the agreement between the two super powers was ignored following the "Ogaden war in the Horn of Africa and the crescent of crisis in the Persian Gulf area" (Kodikara 2008: 72).

Though Sri Lanka succeeded in garnering support for the peace zone concept in the United Nations General Assembly, implementation of the UN Declaration of 1971 on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was a major problem. The International Workshop on Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace organised by the Bangladesh Institute of Strategic Studies (BIISS) and the IPA, in Dhaka from 23-25 November 1985 observed that realisation of the concept of IOPZ was difficult because the support that had come forward were more of moral than functional nature. Moreover, the supporting states had divergent views on the measures of implementation of the proposal (Andersen and Rose 1986). Andersen and Rose (1986: 3) have rightly observed that "many littoral states

sought super power assistance either against domestic opponents or against sub-regional antagonists. They continue to do so because such help has often been perceived as vital to the recipient states' domestic and sub-regional security." Some littoral countries were continuously providing support to the super power. Many states of the region want the presence of super powers as insurance against a hostile neighbour or against direct threats from other super powers. For example, Pakistan gave its consent for setting up of the headquarters of the United States Central Command in Karachi to control military activities in the Indian Ocean region. Electronic surveillance bases were set up in Peshawar, Gwadar and Sargodha to provide support for military operations in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf as well as to gather intelligence about India, Afghanistan and South-west Asia (Bhatt 1992: 105). According to Jayanta Dhanapala (2010), Mrs. Bandaranaike rushed to introduce the resolution and did not have enough consultations among the littoral states and the major powers.

Sri Lanka itself found it difficult to ensure the strict implementation of its proposals due to economic and security compulsions. At the end of 1963, the Sri Lankan government refused permission to the US Seventh Fleet to enter Ceylonese territorial waters and protested against the presence of this fleet in the Indian Ocean (Kodikara 2008: 53). However, after the speedy assistance provided by the USA and the erstwhile USSR along with India, Britain Pakistan and Yugoslavia during the 1971 JVP insurrection, the Sri Lankan government welcomed both the US Pacific Fleet as well as the Soviet Pacific Fleet on goodwill visits in its waters (Kodikara 2008: 62).

Economic compulsions also made it difficult for Sri Lanka to implement the resolution. Sirimavo Bandaranaike's economic policies, such as the 'Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Bill, 1960' and 'nationalisation of oil companies', the initiative on a nuclear-free zone in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans and pro-socialist approach worsened relations with the Western countries. As a result, the IMF refused to make further aid commitments to Sri Lanka seemingly under the influence of the USA and the UK. Concurrently with this measure, the Federal Republic of Germany too joined the UK and the USA in rejecting economic assistance to Sri Lanka as a consequence of the diplomatic recognition

extended to the German Democratic Republic (Karunadasa 1997: 73-74). As a result, Sri Lanka's economy saw an unprecedented degradation. Mrs. Bandaranaike had to seek food assistance from the US.

Hence, while Mrs. Bandaranaike showed special concern over the US naval expansion at Diego-Garcia (she wrote a personal letter to the then US President Richard M. Nixon expressing her concerns) but not much publicity was given to the issue in Sri Lankan media. In a Memorandum to President Richard M. Nixon on February 25, 1974, US Secretary of State Kissinger mentions:

> Mrs. Bandaranaike's letter expresses her government's "grave anxiety" and "deep concern" over the Diego Garcia expansion, and urges that it be reconsidered. Her position is not surprising; she has long been personally committed to the concept of a demilitarized "zone of peace" for the entire Indian Ocean (a concept which we have not supported because of its impracticality and its inconsistency with broader US policy objectives). In addition, she probably wants to avoid being attacked by the many influential Ceylonese politicians within and outside her coalition government who periodically accuse her of being too friendly toward the United States. She remains anxious to maintain good relations with the US, however. Therefore, she has handled the matter through a personal letter to you rather than by turning it into a major public issue. Her letter is generally restrained and avoids making any threat or suggestion that our bilateral relations will be damaged. Meanwhile, her government has been minimizing the amount of publicity being given to the Diego Garcia question in Sri Lanka's largely government controlled press. (Office of the Historians, Department of States 1974)

In 1977, Sirimavo Bandaranaike lost the elections and J. Jayewardene came into power. With the emergence of the Tamil problems, the government's attention got diverted from the peace zone concept. To deal with the Tamil militants, Jayewardene sought arms from countries such as the USA, China and Israel and loans from the West. For the arms to reach Sri Lanka, foreign ships were required to enter into the territorial waters of Sri Lanka. So, it lost its enthusiasm on the IOPZ. Also for Jayewardene, India was a bigger concern than the super power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean. It was believed by Jayewardene that the presence of extra regional power was important to curb the influence of India in the region. Due to all these factors as well as his pro-West foreign policy approach, the USA was offered base facilities on Sri Lankan territory.

With the end of the Cold War in 1990, there was change in the global order. The USA as the sole super power dominated the global scene, but soon regional powers emerged as competing powers in the region.

Emphasis on Regional Cooperation

Since the second decade of the new millennium, Sri Lanka has been emphasising Asian solidarity and regional framework to deal with maritime security concerns. The Maithripala Sirisena administration which came into power in 2015 clearly articulated an Asia-centric middle path foreign policy (Sirisena 2014: 43). Even in the past, Sri Lankan leaders have used the rhetoric of Asian solidarity, but the thrust is more now as countries in the region have developed significant maritime capability. The idea of reintroducing the peace zone concept also came up in the Galle Dialogue.

Sri Lankan emphasis now is on regional cooperation among Asian countries particularly South Asia and the Bay of Bengal, where the members of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) have important stakes and can provide a launch pad for strategic cooperation in the Indian Ocean through the advancement of cooperative security (Sirisena 2016). President Sirisena suggested inter-regional cooperation among the South Asian Association for regional cooperation (SAARC), Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), (BIMSTEC). The current Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Ranil Wickremesinghe (2016) at the Indian Ocean Conference in Singapore, proposed an agreement on an Indian Ocean Order by regional cooperation. Similarly, President Sirisena (2017) at the IORA Leadership Summit suggested to the member countries to work out a stable legal order to confront drug trafficking through seas in consonence with the principles of the freedom of navigation. He said:

> It is universally recognised that all littoral states possess a maritime area bordering their coasts within which they exercise complete authority. However, beyond this limit comprise high seas and are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state. Most of the illicit drugs are smuggled into a country from the sea beyond the territorial waters. I suggest IORA to work out a stable legal order to confront these concerns in conformity with the principles of the freedom of navigation.

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Sri Lanka since 2017 is playing an important role in IORA for establishing a rule-based regional system. Sri Lanka is the lead coordinator for IORA's working group on maritime safety and security. It has prepared 'A code of Conduct for the Indian Ocean' in January 2018, which is expected to be submitted to the IORA.

The main reason for Sri Lanka's thrust for regional cooperation is to avoid single power domination in the region. However, the above mentioned regional or sub-regional cooperation on maritime issues is still at a nascent stage. In practice, cooperation on operational issues particularly in the maritime domain needs to be led by a capable country. In all these regional arrangements, India is a maritime capable country which can play a lead role. However, many within the region may not like to be led by India. Moreover, though Sri Lanka has been talking about an Asia-centric middle path in its foreign policy, it has been tilted towards China. Failure to portray the image of an unbiased state is likely to raise suspicion on Sri Lanka's effort and thrust for regional cooperation. Be it global or regional, the negative point of multilateral cooperative arrangements is that they are not of much use in providing practical and operational assistance.

Conclusion

The above discussion shows that Sri Lanka has adopted several measures at bilateral, regional and international level to address its security concerns and threats. These responses are being influenced by the political ideology of the ruling elites, political economic and security compulsions at the domestic level as well as global and regional security situations.

It can be observed that the security response at the regional level has not been useful at all for Sri Lanka, as nothing constructive has been done yet. Maritime security cooperation at the regional level so far has been very poor or non-existent. For a small country like Sri Lanka, international organisations provide a useful platform to challenge the bigger powers. But this kind of platform is useful for moral and ideological support and does not help in term of practical and operational purpose.

Bilateral cooperative arrangements can be more useful, if Sri Lanka can maintain a proper balance while entering into bilateral security arrangements or cooperation. Ignoring a regional power and totally relying on extra regional powers for its security is not a good policy for a small state like Sri Lanka.

Military Responses: Development of the Navy

Sri Lankan leaders have always had maritime security concerns. Yet, strengthening the navy into a credible maritime force by increasing its fire-fighting and blue water capability was not a priority of the government at least until the outbreak of the Eelam War. At the time of independence, though Sri Lanka was not in favour of any military alliance, it did sign a Defence Cooperation Agreement with the British and left its maritime security in the hands of the British Royal Navy until 1956. With the emphasis on removal of foreign bases within the country and support for non-alignment policy, maritime security became the complete responsibility of the Sri Lankan Navy after 1956. However, the government decided to not spend much on the development of the navy and tried to deal with maritime security concerns through diplomatic and political means. The Sri Lankan Navy's role in the 1960s and 1970s, therefore, was limited to controlling human smuggling and disaster relief and rescue operations. But with the emergence of the Eelam War in the 1980s, the Sri Lankan Navy got engaged in battle at sea with the LTTE's naval wing–the Sea Tigers. The navy's role expanded from coastguard operations to counter-insurgency operations. During the 26 years of war, the LTTE kept improvising its fighting tactics to challenge the Sri Lankan Navy. This compelled the Sri Lankan government to develop a limited deep sea capability and to destroy the LTTE's international logistic network with intelligence support received from India and the USA. The Sri Lankan Navy has successfully thwarted militancy from its waters. But does the Sri Lankan Navy have the capability to address other challenges faced by the country in the maritime realm in the post- war period?

The chapter argues that the Sri Lankan Navy at present has inshore territorial defence capabilities, making it capable of coastal combat and some constabulary role. However, it is not capable of dealing with all the challenges in its vast maritime area or to protect its maritime interests in the post-war period in the absence of larger vessels and maritime surveillance capability.

This chapter provides a detail overview of the evolution of the Sri Lankan Navy over the years and analyses the factors contributing to its development. The chapter also discusses the role played by navy during the Eelam War. The capability of the navy to ensure maritime security has also been assessed.

Evolution of Sri Lankan Navy: From a Ceremonial Navy to a Counter-Insurgency Force

Historical records suggest that Sri Lanka was involved in sea-faring activities in the pre-colonial period. Sri Lanka played an important naval role in the Indian Ocean from time to time depending on the power and prosperity of the kings of Sri Lanka (*Sri Lanka Today*, July-August 1972). According to the Devanagala rock inscription, Parakramabahu I sent a fleet of a thousand ships and invaded Burma in 1164. (Dias 2003). However, the Western colonial powers–the Portuguese, Dutch and the British–did not encourage maritime traditions in Sri Lanka during their rule. The British felt the need for developing the Sri Lankan naval force only before the beginning of World War II. It was only then that the naval base in Trincomalee was extensively developed as the headquarters of the East Indies station. Trincomalee became the core of British naval activity in the region (Goldrick 1997: 172).

In 1932, it was made mandatory for the British colonies to assume a responsibility and contribute towards the defence of its territory and the Empire (Yatawara 2008). Accordingly, the Ceylon Naval Volunteer Force (CNVF) was established. In 1938, it was replaced by the Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Force (CRNVF) (*The Sunday Times*, 12 October 2008). On 31 August 1939, the CRNVF was mobilised for war duties.

During World War II, it functioned as an adjunct to the British local defence forces. A total of 926 personnel and 10 vessels, including minesweepers and patrol craft, of the CRNVF were incorporated into the Royal Navy as Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (CRNVR) in 1943. After the World War II, about 100 officers and ratings–without any ship–were retained on active duty under the command of Royal Navy till March 1946 (Goldrick 1997: 172). After that it reverted to the Ceylonese government

control, but continued to be called CRNVR. Royal Ceylon Volunteer Naval Force was formed on 9 January 1952 as per the Navy Act 34 of 1950 and was renamed as Sri Lanka Volunteer Naval Force on 22 May 1972.

After independence, the 100 officers who were active in CRNVR were incorporated into the Royal Ceylon Navy, which was formed on 9 December 1950 under the Navy Act. By signing a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Sri Lanka in 1947, Britain committed to provide military assistance to Sri Lanka (See the appendix no. 1 for full text of the Agreement). Therefore, the British offered to set up the Royal Ceylon Navy by supplying men and material. Captain William Banks of the Royal Navy was put in charge of the newly created Royal Ceylon Navy. Captain Banks secured from the Royal Navy an agreement for the Royal Ceylon Navy to take over the sea-ward defence of Colombo in late 1951 (Singh 2002: 236). Till 1955, Royal Navy officers looked after the Royal Ceylon Navy. In 1955, the last of the Royal Navy officers, Commodore P.M.B. Chavasse, left and was replaced by a senior Sri Lankan officer, Captain Royce de Mel.

The country saw a political change in 1956. The SLFP-led Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) formed the government in 1956 and the SLFP leader S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike became the second Prime Minister of the country. After assuming power, he immediately asked the British to hand over the naval base in Trincomalee and the airbase in Katunayake. By then, the British were also not very eager to continue the bases in Sri Lanka. They handed over their bases to Sri Lankan authority in 1957. With this, the Royal Ceylon Navy became the complete responsibility of the Sri Lankan naval chief, Captain de Mel.

The Sirimavo Bandaranaike administration promulgated a republican constitution in 1972. As Sri Lanka became a republic, Royal Ceylon Navy became the Sri Lanka Navy. The Naval Ensign removed the St. George's Cross, and Flag Officers' flags were redesigned. The term "Captain of the Navy", was changed to "Commander of the Navy" and "Her Majesty's Ceylon Ships" became "Sri Lanka Navy Ships" (SLNS).

From the early 1980s till 2009, the Sri Lankan Navy was engaged in civil war with the LTTE. After meeting severe challenges from the Sea Tigers, the Sri Lankan Navy was able to destroy LTTE's arms supply network along with the floating warehouses on the high seas where arms acquired from different sources were stored.

Thus, the Sri Lankan Navy evolved from a ceremonial navy to a counter-insurgency force with a limited "blue water" capability. The threat perception of the political leaders influenced the evolution of naval strategy and arms acquisition by the navy over the years.

Threat Perception and Expansion of the Navy

It has already been discussed in detail in Chapter 2 that at the time of independence, Sri Lanka had serious concerns about India. Sri Lanka thought that after withdrawal of the British from the region, India would try to dominate the Indian Ocean and in the process would try to dominate Sri Lanka. Therefore, in 1947, when the British offered independence and a Defence Cooperation Agreement, the Sri Lankan leaders immediately agreed to sign the agreement. Britain wanted to continue the defence network to protect its interests in the Indian Ocean even after the transfer of power to its colonies in South Asia (CAB 129/18, CP [47] 147, Cabinet Report by Chief of Staff, 5 May 1947). For the UK, control over the naval base at Trincomalee was of immense importance to control the Indian Ocean as it formed an "essential link in the UK's cable and wireless network to Australia and the Far East" and occupied a commanding position in relation to the UK's sea and air communication in the Indian Ocean (CAB 129/18, CP [47] 147, Cabinet Report by Chief of Staff, 5 May 1947).

By signing the Defence Cooperation Agreement with the UK, the newly formed Sri Lankan government authorised the UK to base its naval, air and land forces in Sri Lanka and use its naval and air bases and ports in its anti-Communist mission. British fighter planes based in Trincomalee appeared to have been used for action against the Malayan Communists in 1948 (Kodikara 1982: 86). According to the Defence Cooperation Agreement, the British offered to supply men and material for the navy. This assistance

continued till 1956. In fact, Sri Lanka completely relied on Britain for development of the navy, naval strategy and training of navy personnel. British however, formulated the naval strategy to suit their interests in the region. They clubbed the strategy of the Royal Ceylon Navy to the concept of the Commonwealth naval strategy for the region, i.e. limited defence of the sea lanes and of the ports. The initial plan in 1951, therefore, was to create a naval force comprising three frigate-size fighting vessels, twelve coastal minesweepers and six sea-ward defence boats (Singh 2002: 236). However, the civilian government of Ceylon that time was reluctant to pay for naval expansion on such scale. The initial proposals to expand the navy thus had to be scaled down. Till 1955, Ceylon acquired two ex-Canadian frigates from Israel: *Gajabahu* (commissioned in 1960) and *Mahasena*; two large armed Algerian class escort minesweepers: *Vijaya*[11] and *Parakramabahu* from the UK; one sea-going tug; one Ford-class sea-ward defence boat (*Kotiya*) from Britain. The light force was also strengthened during 1955-56 by the addition of two Hansaya-class and four smaller Seruwa-class fast patrol boats from Italy (Sri Lanka Navy 2010).

It is noteworthy that since the mid -1930s, Sri Lanka has taken pride in its social welfare system. Hence, there was an apprehension about investing more on the security services. Till 1957, military expenditure of Sri Lanka as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was below one per cent (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 1950-57). The following table outlines Sri Lanka's military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

Table 8: Military expenditure of Sri Lanka as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product								
Year	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Expenditure	0.4%	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	0.8%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%
Year	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Expenditure	1.0%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.7	0.75	0.7%
Year	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Expenditure	2.1%	1.6%	2.1%	2.8%	3%	3.1%	3.4%	5.3%	5%
Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005

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[11] In 1949, H.M.S. Flying Fish, an Algerian class fleet minesweeper was acquired by Ceylon from Britain on loan. It was commissioned as H.M.Cy.S Vijaya.

Expenditure	4.2%	4.1%	3.6%	4.5%	3.9%	3.1%	2.7%	2.8%	2.6%
Year	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**
Expenditure	2.9%	3.3%	3.7%	3.6%	2.7%	2.7%	2.2%	2.2%	2.4%
Year	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**						
Expenditure	2.6%	2.1%	2.2%						
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (1953-70; 1988-2017)									

With a change of government in 1956, the naval strategy of the Royal Ceylon Navy also changed. After the British withdrew from Trincomalee in 1956, the concept of a Commonwealth naval strategy lost its relevance. With the withdrawal of the British, the entire responsibility to protect its waters came on the Sri Lankan Navy, which had 48 officers and 510 sailors during 1951-1958.

The following table gives an idea about the fleet strength of Sri Lanka during 1947-1964:

Table 9: Number of Fleet during 1947-1964	
Frigates	2
Escort Minesweepers	2
Medium, Ford Class	1
Small	6
Hydrofoil Boat	1
Source: Singh (2002 a: 91-99).	

The Royal Ceylon Navy, under Captain de Mel, demanded a larger force to take on the responsibilities that the British naval ships were undertaking earlier. Nonetheless the government refused to have a large flotilla of warships, but agreed to acquire in 1957, a second Algerian-class escort-minesweeper. Captain de Mel had some ambition for the navy, but unfortunately, he got involved in a liquor scandal in 1960 and a coup attempt in 1962. As a result, he was forced to retire. During 1958 - 1961, military expenditure slightly increased to about 1 per cent of the GDP. However, after the coup attempt in 1962, it again declined to 0.8 per cent (SIPRI 1958-62).

Since the 1960s, Sri Lankan leaders were concerned about nuclearisation and super power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Those issues were addressed diplomatically at

the multilateral level. The Sri Lankan government never thought of a military option to address its concerns. SLFP leaders like S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and Sirimavo Bandaranaike did not have an acute sense of fear from India. Whatever boundary related issues Sri Lanka had with India, they tried to resolve them through dialogue. Therefore, the political leaders took a conscious decision to do away with heavier surface vessels like frigates and escort minesweepers and to acquire only smaller ships like patrol boats and fast attack craft (FAC) for coastal surveillance, and for checking smuggling and illegal migration that was happening between India and Sri Lanka (Singh 2002: 239). It was argued that the existing naval vessels were not equipped for that role and had high operational costs. During that time, Sri Lanka was going through a difficult economic situation. In retaliation of nationalisation of oil companies, the US Government had cut off its financial aid to Sri Lanka under Hickenlooper amendment (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1994: 12). Hence, Sri Lanka did not or could not spend the foreign exchange required to develop and expand the navy.

Meanwhile, a devastating cyclone hit Sri Lanka on 12 December 1964 in which the escort minesweeper, *Vijaya*, the seaward defence boat *Kotiya* and two tugs were sunk. As a result, by 1965-66, only the frigate *Gajabahu* was retained on the active list of the navy (Sri Lanka Navy 2010). Political leaders felt the necessity to expand the navy only when they faced the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) insurrection in 1971.

Though the 1971 JVP insurrection was a land-oriented threat, there were reports that the insurgents were getting arms through sea routes. During the insurgency, the navy assisted the army to contain it. Sri Lankan navy also undertook the security of those areas which could not be controlled by the police. However, the Sri Lankan Navy felt handicapped as its capacity was not enough to prevent the arms and supplies from being brought into the country to facilitate the rebel group. As a result, Sri Lanka had to take foreign assistance to thwart the insurgency. Britain sent a 7.4 tonne Cougar boat and a flotilla from the Western Fleet of the Indian Navy went to patrol Sri Lanka's maritime areas (Samaranayake 2008: 310; Hiranandani 2005: 186).

In the post-insurgency period, the Sri Lankan Navy saw limited expansion. It acquired six Shanghai II class fast patrol boats from China in 1972 at "Friendship Prices" and Mol class fast patrol vessel from the erstwhile USSR in 1972. A limited programme of small craft building was also begun at Colombo Dockyard in 1976 (Goldrick 1997: 179). The following table shows the number of fleet the Sri Lankan Navy possessed during 1972-2009.

Table 10: Sri Lanka Navy Strength 1972-2009		
Year	Personnel	Number of Ships/Crafts
1972-73	2300	1Frigate, 1 Hydrofoil, 27 Small Patrol Craft
1973-74	2300	1Frigate, 1 Hydrofoil, 29 Small Patrol Craft
1974-75	2400	1Frigate, 5 Fast Gunboats, 21 Small Patrol Craft
1975-76	2400	1Frigate, 5 Fast Gunboats, 24 Coastal Patrol Craft (1 Hydrofoil)
1976-77	2400	1Frigate, 5 Fast Gunboats, 23 Coastal Patrol Craft (1 Hydrofoil), 1 Osa Class FPB
1977-78	2400	1Frigate, 5 Fast Gunboats, 23 Coastal Patrol Craft
1978-79	2400	6 Fast Gunboats, 20 Coastal Patrol Craft , 5 FPB
1981-82	2740	8 FAC(G), 26 Coastal Patrol Craft
1982-83	2825	8 FAC(G), 19 Coastal Patrol Craft
1983-84	2960	8 FAC(G), 31 Coastal Patrol Craft (on Order 7 Coastal Patrol Craft)
1984-85		8 FAC(G), 26 Coastal Patrol Craft
1985-86	3960	7FAC, Patrol Craft: 2 Large and 28 Coastal, (On order 3Jayasagara Large and 12 Coastal Patrol Craft)
1986-87	3960	6 FAC; Comd: 3 Ships, 3 Tenders; Patrol Craft: 2 Large, 42 Coastal and 4 Harbour; 4 Amphibious; (On order 3Jayasagara Large, 2 Coastal Patrol Craft and 6 Landing Craft)
1987-88	4000	12 FAC; 8 Comd.; Patrol Craft: 2 Large, 38 Coastal

		and 4 Harbour; 2 Amphibious; (On order 3Jayasagara Large, 8 Super Dvora, 2 Coastal Patrol Craft and 8 Landing Craft)
1988-89	5500	36 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 2 Amphibious; 4 Support and Miscellaneous
1989-90	5500	36 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 2 Amphibious; 3 Support and Miscellaneous
1990-91	8100	38 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 2 Amphibious; 4 Support and Miscellaneous
1991-92	8500	43 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 2 Amphibious; 3 Support and Miscellaneous
1992-93	8900	44 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 6 Amphibious; 3 Support and Miscellaneous
1993-94	10100	44 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 6 Amphibious; 3 Support and Miscellaneous
1994-95	10300	43 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 6 Amphibious; 3 Support and Miscellaneous
1996-97	10300	40 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 5 Amphibious; 1 Support and Miscellaneous
1997-98	12000	39 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 9 Amphibious
1998-99	10000	54 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 8 Amphibious
1999-2000	10000	54 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 8 Amphibious
2000-2001	10000	39 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 1 Amphibious
2001-2002	18000	40 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 1Amphibious plus 7 Craft
2002-2003	20600	61 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 1 Amphibious plus 9 Craft
2003-2004	15000	61 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 1 Amphibious plus 9 Craft
2004-2005	15000	61 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 1 Amphibious plus

		9 Craft
2005-2006	15000	113 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 10 Amphibious
2006-2007	15000	120 Patrol and Coastal Combatants; 1 Amphibious plus 9 Craft
2007-2008	15000	
2008-2009	15000	130 Patrol and Coastal Combatants, 17 Amphibious
Source: IISS (1972-2009).		

In the 1970s, the new law of the sea and delimitation of boundaries with India and the Maldives granted a large maritime area under the jurisdiction of Sri Lanka. It was argued that to patrol the large EEZ, the Sri Lankan Navy would require further expansion. However, expansion on a large scale took place only when Sri Lanka faced threats from the Sea Tigers. Military expenditure also increased with the outbreak of the Eelam War.

The Sri Lankan Navy faced major challenge in the maritime domain from the Sea Tigers during the Eelam Wars. The first Eelam War was fought between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE during 1983-87. The navy's main task during this time was to control the arms smuggling and defending government forces on the coast and at sea. To perform this role, the navy required larger vessels than it possessed at that time. As the navy did not have sufficient funds to acquire sophisticated offshore patrol vessels (OPV) from abroad, it decided to construct them in the Colombo dockyard. Orders were placed in the Colombo dockyard in 1981 for the construction of the two 130 feet offshore patrol boats (Colombo Dockyard PLC 2018). At the same time to contain militant activities in the shallow waters of the north, six small merchant ships of 3,000-4,000 tonnes were converted into surveillance-cum command ships (Singh 2002: 245). Sri Lanka had acquired six such command vessels in 1984. Three of them–the Abheeta class–were obtained from Singapore. Three other–the Mahaveli class–were obtained from the Netherlands. Another 40-45 small boats were also procured to operate from the command ships.

However, the Sri Lankan Navy boats were slower than the LTTE boats. The craft used by the LTTE were faster and equipped with more powerful engines. This allowed the Sea Tigers to outrun the slower Sri Lankan Navy patrols (Fish 2009: 21). To meet the challenges of the faster craft of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Navy acquired Dvora-class FAC from Israel.[12] Sri Lanka also acquired three Sea Killer-class patrol boats from South Korea, which were commissioned in 1988 (Singh 2002: 246). By the mid-1980s, the navy acquired amphibious capability. Yet, the Sri Lankan Navy lacked adequate craft to cover all the sensitive areas and the coastline. After deliberation in Parliament in 1989, a five-year development plan for the navy was approved.

As per the five-year development plan, several new vessels were acquired: three Modified Shanghai II class FAC in 1991; two medium sized LCU of Yunnan class from China in 1991 and 1995; and three Houxin class large patrol craft from China. Sri Lanka also improved its maritime surveillance system by establishing shore-based radar stations to monitor coastal traffic and by improving its communication system (Singh 2002: 249). It acquired one Beech Super King Air for maritime surveillance. Manpower during this period increased from 5,500 in 1990 to 10,300 by 1995. Yet, the navy's performance was poor.

The Sri Lankan Navy was able to challenge the Sea Tigers only in a limited way through the FACs. To deal with the FACs of the Sri Lankan Navy, the Sea Tigers improvised and adopted "swarm tactics". By using this asymmetric tactics, the LTTE succeeded in sinking several Dvora –class FACs, during the Eelam War II.

Three new Haizui class FAC were acquired in September 1996 from China and MK-II version of the Super Dvora class were acquired during 1995-97. Sri Lanka also acquired three fast patrol boats of 55 tonnes from the USA during 1996-97. Additionally, several medium size fast patrol boats as well as small interceptor boats were being constructed at the Sri Lankan Dockyards (Singh 2002: 249). However, all these acquisitions did not give the Sri Lankan Navy any upper hand. While the Sri Lankan Navy was focusing on

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[12] Sri Lankan bought the first pair of 47 tonne Dvora-class FAC from Israel in early 1984.

conventional war fighting, the LTTE was engaging in unconventional and asymmetric warfare.

The Sri Lankan Navy gained the first blue water capability and ability to directly target the floating warehouses on the high seas with the acquisition of *Sayura*, offshore patrol boat from India in 2000. It was a 1900 tonne and 101 metre craft fitted with one .60-caliber gun and two smaller machine guns (Subramanian 2000). The navy achieved its first success on the high seas when the *Sayura* sank LTTE owned *MV Koimer* in early Mach 2003 (*The Island*, 15 July 2012).

The fourth Eelam War started in 2005 after Mahinda Rajapaksa came into power. The new government decided to fight and defeat the LTTE with proper strategy and planning. The military was given a free hand to develop their war strategy. Maritime security cooperation was sought with several countries including the USA, India and China. On 5 March 2007, Sri Lankan signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the United States (*Daily News*, 6 March 2007). Under the agreement Sri Lanka received military equipment such as Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), Underwater Un-exploded Ordnance (UXO), the radar-based maritime surveillance system and the Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) (Gamage 2007). India provided naval intelligence to Sri Lanka to detect the floating warehouses on the high seas. Reportedly, Sri Lanka received US$10 million worth of Chinese arms shipment in 2006 and US$75 million in 2008 (Samaranayake 2011). Due to lack of data, it is very difficult to identify the share of naval arms in these shipments. With new technology, strategy and proper vessels and weapons systems, the Sri Lankan Navy defeated the Sea Tigers in the fourth Eelam war.

Even though the LTTE has been defeated, the Sri Lankan government does not rule out the possibility of re-emergence of militancy. So the government is still vigilant of their actions. In the post-war period, some more issues like illegal activities at sea (IUU, poaching, illegal migration, smuggling and drug trafficking), marine pollution, man-made and natural disasters are also challenging Sri Lanka. So the Sri Lankan Navy is now trying to increase its manpower and capabilities. A new unit 'Marine Forces' was

established in September 2016 for UN peacekeeping duties, to give humanitarian assistance and management in natural disaster situations in Sri Lanka as well as in the region. The first group of Marine Corps consists of 164 marines, including 6 officers and 158 sailors (*Colombo Page*, 27 February 2017).

Sri Lanka's current fleet include five OPVs, two FMVs, two FPBs, 11 FGBs, six LCM/LCUs, four FPCs, 57 FACs, 73 IPCs, 160 Arrows (*Sri Lanka Navy's Maritime Strategy 2025*, Unpublished). After successfully defeating the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Navy has gained the confidence that it can play a bigger role if adequate facilities are provided. It has acknowledged that the existing capabilities and vessels are not adequate. Hence, the Sri Lankan Navy in its *Maritime Strategy 2025* proposed for additional four OPVs, two FMVs, two FPBs, two FGBs, two LCM/LCUs, two Frigates, two Corvettes by 2025 to turn it into a 'Medium Regional Force Projection Navy'. In the post war period, Sri Lanka acquired two Bay-class patrol boats from Australia to monitor human smuggling. It has also commissioned one OPV with the facility of hangar for an Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) from India in 2017 and the other advanced OPVs in March 2018. Japan has offered Sri Lanka patrol boats to help improve sea lane security in the Indian Ocean. According to Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), Sri Lanka is in talks with Russia for the purchase of Gepard-class frigates (*Sputnik International,* 29 June 2017).

Role of the Navy during War and Peace

The role of navies has been conceived as a trinity, the character of which is defined by three modes of action, namely, military, policing and diplomatic functions (Booth 1977). Military role forms the base of the trinity and is played by the navy during both peace and wartime. Peacetime military functions include: strategic nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence and defence, extended deterrence and defence, and maintenance of international order. If a state is not able to secure its objectives by military power, then the state resorts to military force. The use of force at sea can be divided into four types of war: general war, conventional war, limited wars and interventions, and guerrilla war. Policing or constabulary role mainly takes place in territorial waters and is concerned

with maintenance of good order at sea. According to Booth (1977: 17), "it is a maritime version of the work of the police, border guards, and the idea of military aid to the civil authority". Thus, the policing role basically includes coastguard and nation-building responsibilities. The diplomatic role of navies refers to management of foreign policy short of the actual deployment of force. It supports state policy in particular bargaining situations or in general international relations. The diplomatic role has always been an important one for major navies and involves a variety of operational tasks which encompass implicit or explicit coercion, naval aid and all those actions which improve influence and prestige (Booth 1977: 19).

It is, however, not mandatory that each state uses its navy for all these aforementioned roles with equal importance. What kind of role a navy plays with what degree of importance depends on the maritime interests and problems of that particular country.

The Sri Lankan Navy basically plays the military and policing role. Its diplomatic role as of now is not very significant.

Military Role

Prior to independence, particularly during 1939-1946, the Sri Lankan naval force known then as the CRNVR, carried out several operational, escort and guard ship duties at sea. It also conducted search and rescue operations at sea. In the 1930s, the immediate task of the Ceylon Naval Volunteer Force was mine sweeping off the Colombo coastline. After its title was changed to CRNVR, the force was assigned peacetime roles and it conducted minesweeping, escort, seaward defence and communication duties in Trincomalee, Colombo and Addu Attol in the Maldives (*Sri Lanka Today*, July-August 1972).

After independence, as the British clubbed the strategy of the Royal Ceylon Navy with Commonwealth naval strategy in the Indian Ocean, the navy's role was focused to protect the ports of Sri Lanka, clear inshore and off-shore mines as well as to facilitate safe sea-lanes between South Africa and Aden to Singapore and Australia (Singh 2002: 234-236).

In other words, the Royal Ceylon Navy played the role of a blue water navy by using the vessels acquired from Britain.

After the British withdrew from Sri Lanka in 1956, Sri Lanka reconsidered the blue water oriented Commonwealth naval strategy and opted more for a coastguard role of the navy. It was only with the advent of the Eelam War in the 1980s that the Sri Lankan Navy became active in its military role.

Role of Navy during the Eelam War

The navy's main task during the first Eelam War was to conduct surveillance and control arms smuggling. During the initial years of the war, the LTTE's maritime activity was to transfer of cadres and weapons between South India and Jaffna through the Palk Strait. The LTTE used small boats for this purpose. To prohibit these illegal arms supply, in April 1984, the Sri Lankan government declared a 'Naval Surveillance Zone' around the northern parts of the island up to the Indo-Sri Lankan maritime boundary. Within this zone, any craft without board engines was banned. In November 1984, the surveillance zone was reinforced by a prohibited zone along the coast between Mannar and Mullaitivu, extending 100 yards out to sea and 100 yards inland. In December of the same year, the prohibited zone was extended to Puttalam on the west coast. Hence, the prime responsibility of the navy was to conduct surveillance in these zones. However, the navy faced a tremendous challenge in identifying LTTE boats due to the presence of a large number of fishing craft.

On 2 March 1986, Colombo declared a 'fishing ban' on Sri Lankan fishing boats operating around the northern and the eastern coast, authorising the navy to shoot at sight. The navy was given powers to intercept, examine and if necessary seize vessels. The Sri Lankan Navy used patrol boats in its operation. However, the LTTE at this point began to use faster craft with more powerful engines. This allowed the Sea Tigers to outrun the slower Sri Lankan Navy patrols (Fish 2009: 21).

To meet the challenges of the faster craft of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Navy acquired Dvora-class Fast Attack Craft (FAC) from Israel in the 1980s. These FACs gave a major challenge to the LTTE. However, the Sri Lankan Navy's jurisdiction was limited within its territory only. As per international law, it cannot cross the Indo-Lanka maritime boundary line. Hence, Sri Lanka proposed for a system of joint patrol by the Indian and Sri Lankan navies in 1985. By signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987, India agreed that its navy and coast guard would cooperate with the Sri Lankan Navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka (2.16 (b) of Indo-Lanka Accord). Accordingly, one coast guard ship ex-Chennai and one IB/IC ex-Mandapam remain on continuous patrol in the Palk Strait. Also, a Dornier aircraft ex-Chennai carried out air surveillance in the Palk Strait and Gulf of Mannar (Ministry of Defence, Government of India 2002-03). Indian forces were directly involved in anti-LTTE operations until the Premadasa regime compelled the IPKF to withdraw from Sri Lanka. As a result, the LTTE found it difficult to get weapon supplies from South India. The navy also tried to deny the LTTE use of the sea route between the north and east as a supply line.

Hence, the LTTE developed its own shipping line to supply weapons from various other countries. The LTTE also improved its strategy to deal with the Sri Lankan Navy during the subsequent periods and continued its guerrilla operations. With the formation of the naval wing of the LTTE, the Sea Tigers, the role of the Sri Lankan Navy expanded to defend the Sri Lankan armed forces on the coast and at sea. It built up a limited amphibious capability to transport men and material from the main base to isolated bases in the north and the east. Subsequently, the Sri Lankan Navy got involved in a long-drawn, high intensity anti-insurgency operation. The navy also began to coordinate with ground forces in combat operations against the LTTE. It helped in the intrusion and extraction of commando units into areas dominated by the LTTE, during the Operation Liberation in 1986-87.

During the second Eelam War which began in June 1990 (Hashim 2014: 98), fighting intensified around the Elephant Pass which connected Jaffna Peninsula with the mainland. Sri Lankan forces could not receive supplies overland. During this period, the

navy played an important role in sea-lifting troops and supplies and was also involved in the amphibious operations of the government forces. Several amphibious operations were launched during 1993-94, but it did not achieve much success

During the Eelam War III, Sri Lankan Navy got involved in ground operations to support the army by deploying its personnel in areas liberated by the army as they needed more manpower to engage in offensive operations. During the Operation Jaya Sikuru, the navy undertook the security of Kayts, Mandativu, Pungudutivu and Delft Island to free the army troops operating there. It also undertook the security of Thalaimannar Island in late 1999. In the year 2000, it undertook the security of areas in the north of Trincomalee, Sampur, Silavathura, Arippu, Vankalai, Nanaddan (Wijayapala 2008).

The navy through its operations could hit some LTTE bases and ships, but the overall success level during the Eelam War III was low (Edirisinghe 2008). There were issues in the strategy of the navy during the Eelam Wars I-III. The navy concentrated in neutralising the LTTE on land and did not invest enough in effective amphibious operations against LTTE dominated areas (Singh 2002: 255). Secondly, the navy conceptualised small boats with high speeds, extremely manoeuvrable with a very strong fire power. However, during the sea battles, the LTTE used to outnumber the Sri Lankan Navy (Jalaldeen 2009)**.** Its personnel were under trained and could not make the best use of the weapons available to them (Singh 2002: 248). The LTTE's armed struggle was completely depended on the arms and equipment acquired from foreign countries. Since the arms were supplied through the sea network, the responsibility of destroying the arms procurement activities of the LTTE lay on the Sri Lankan Navy. But unfortunately, no proper strategy was made to tackle the LTTE procurement network until 2005. The navy relied on its FAC squadrons intercepting arms smuggling trawlers on the northern and eastern waters, assuming that the FACs alone could effectively block the LTTE's arms replenishment efforts (Ferdinando 2007). This strategy was not effective enough.

Lack of credible intelligence was another factor causing the failure of the navy. The navy was entrusted with the task of detecting merchant vessels smuggling arms and

ammunitions, which were coming from foreign ports. But lack of credible intelligence made the task of detecting LTTE ships out in the sea difficult.

The Sri Lankan Navy lacked right equipment. The capability of the navy had strengthened over the years, but due to the constant war, it lost many of its vessels. The navy also did not get enough funds to acquire the required equipment and ships. Sometimes, the fund was used to acquire useless equipment. For example, a hovercraft was acquired at an exorbitant cost of LKR250 million. However, the vessel acquired in 1998 was never used for operational purposes. When the government decided to get rid of it, it could not find any buyer (Ferdinando 2007).

Lack of comprehensive strategy to counter the Sea Tigers' threat, lack of credible intelligence and use of appropriate equipments and vessels were some of the factors responsible to these failures. The Sri Lankan Navy's strategy had been to fight the Sea Tigers at sea, without making effective attempt to destroy the Sea Tigers' infrastructure on land, especially the boat production and training facilities. As long as the LTTE retained its control over the land areas, it was very difficult to destroy the Sea Tigers. The LTTE used these land areas as the Sea Tiger base and kept their craft there instead of keeping them in harbour or at the beach. As such, the Sri Lankan Navy could not do much to destroy the vessels until and unless they put their vessels out to sea (Gunaratne 2001). In other words, the Sri Lankan Navy basically was following a "waiting mission". Moreover, the Sri Lankan Navy was concentrating on "a specific enemy sea route expecting that the enemy would arrive on a pre determine path" (Edirisinghe 2008).

The naval top leaders took notice of the mistakes made in the previous missions. Accordingly they prepared proper strategy to destroy the LTTE's maritime capabilities both in Sri Lanka and overseas. The navy realised that if they were to destroy Sea Tiger capabilities effectively, they needed to address the operational challenges faced by them during the first three Eelam Wars. Hence, the Sri Lankan Navy decided to address these key operational challenges. It was acknowledged that it had to counter LTTE's deep sea

movements, small boat movements and Sea Tiger fighting elements. Accordingly, they adopted a comprehensive strategy and tactics.

The first task of the navy was to stop the LTTE's supply of arms and ammunition. The LTTE used to store the weapons acquired from various sources in floating warehouses on the high seas, from which the multi-day trawlers were transferring smaller quantities of war materials (Wijayapala 2008).

Then Navy Commander Karannagoda and his team developed an operational plan to destroy the floating warehouses. The Sri Lankan Navy followed a waiting mission in the previous wars, but in the fourth Eelam War they went "hunting" the LTTE ships in the high seas. To carry out this mission, the navy was upgraded to a blue water navy from a brown water navy. The *SLNS Sayura* and *SLNS Sagara* (acquired from India) and *SLNS Suranimila* (acquired from Israel) and two logistics vessels- A 520 and A 521- formed the naval task force which participated in these operations. The navy scored its biggest success when the task force destroyed three large ships about 2,800 km south east off Dondra (Ferdinando 2010). The navy seized one of LTTE's Wave Rider-class large attack crafts named *Indumathi*, on 19 June 2007 off Thalaiadi.

Domestic and naval intelligence played an important role in locating these warehouses on the high seas. India and the USA provided the intelligence support. The navy also improved its own intelligence unit, which was not very active during the previous wars. Acquisition of sophisticated military hardware, effective management and trained personnel also helped it to achieve its victory over the Sea Tigers.

Destruction of these Tiger ships was considered a turning point in the fourth Eelam War. By destroying these three vessels, the navy prevented the Tigers from receiving military supplies on land. It crippled the Tiger international maritime network, which was actively engaged in smuggling arms and ammunition for the LTTE (Karannagoda 2010).

The Sri Lankan Navy also eliminated the LTTE's seaward escape route and prevented supplies from reaching the LTTE by creating a "defence barrier" of vessels four layers

deep, consisting of FAC, OPVs, gun boats, and the Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS) and Special Boat Squadron (SBS) (Fish 2009: 20-21). The RABS and SBS were introduced to destroy LTTE's suicide boats, fighting craft of various sizes and other underwater tactics. The RABS and SBS units with their stealth nature created difficulties for the Sea Tigers to monitor sudden movement of these elements from one place to the other.

The Sri Lankan Navy introduced "Arrow Boat" concept. The arrow boats are capable of taking rough seas and had the capability of continuing fire power accurately. The boat had adequate space to place weapons without compromising its manoeuverability or any other operational aspect. The special boat construction project started in year 2006 to build Inshore Patrol Crafts and Arrow Boats. The number of naval personnel also increased to 15,000.

With the new strategy and technology, the navy undertook important amphibious operation and protected the sea front by blocking Sea Tiger reinforcement and supplies, during the liberation war in the east. It also averted an LTTE attack on a passenger vessel. Navy intelligence operatives also got active (Wijayapala 2008). Then Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, gave detail accounts of the Sri Lankan Navy's support to the land forces during the fourth Eelam War in his interview with Wijayapala (2008). According to him:

> Starving the LTTE of ammunition and war-like material and preventing the LTTE from induction and de-induction from the Eastern theatre of war from the sea. During the attempts of LTTE to capture the whole of Muttur area Sri Lanka Navy action of, holding of the pier against heavy bombardment and repeated assaults; and induction of navy and army troops and military hardware into the area by the navy changed the whole scenario of the battle enabling Sri Lankan force personnel to carry out the operation successfully.

During the war in the eastern province from July 2006 to July 2007, the navy succeeded in destroying four LTTE large arms ships and ten trawlers at sea, transporting ammunition for heavy armament (Wijayapala 2008). It was estimated that each trawler

was carrying around 300 shells whilst each ship was laden with over 1.000 tonnes of ammunition and war materials. The loss prevented the LTTE from using its heavy artillery weapons extensively which was an enormous advantage to the land forces in their operations. Further, many attempts to transport reinforcement from Mullaitivu to Sampoor and Vakarai area by sea was averted by the Sri Lankan Navy. As a result, adequate assistance could not come from Vanni to the LTTE fighters in the east. Trapped Tigers' attempts to flee was prevented by intensified naval patrols on the coast of the eastern sea board and ashore. Attempts to evacuate injured LTTE cadre from the sea off the Peraru Jungle was also averted on many occasions (*Daily News,* 19 July 2007).

During the last phase of the war, the navy fought the LTTE and ensured the safety of sea lines of communications, security of harbours, escorted merchant vessels to the Jaffna Peninsula, transported troops from Trincomalee, and undertook surveillance of the EEZ and territorial waters to prevent the LTTE from bringing in arms and ammunitions (Fish 2009: 22).

Role of the Navy in the Post-Civil War Period
In the post- war situation, the navy's role is to maintain the freedom and the security of the sea lanes of communication, maintain the freedom and the efficiency of the coast around Sri Lanka as well as protecting offshore ocean resources and assisting the government and agencies appointed to explore these resources in a safe, economical and efficient manner (Jayanath Colombage 2016). Even though Sri Lanka has eliminated terrorism on its territory, there is a concern that it may re-emerge. There is also a fear from global terrorism. In that context, the onus of protecting ports from terrorist activities lies on the navy. The current problems of piracy in the Horn of Africa do not direct affect Sri Lanka, but to protect its maritime trade, Sri Lanka is concerned about the security of the sea lines of communications. Sri Lanka, therefore, cooperates with regional and non-regional naval powers and the Sri Lankan Navy has had several joint naval exercises with various countries to build confidence and understanding to operate together in complex maritime mission if required. Since 2005, both the Indian and Sri Lankan navies have been conducting joint naval exercises called SLINEX. Since 2013, Sri Lanka has been a

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participant in the multinational naval exercise organised by the Pakistan Navy 'Aman' to enhance capabilities to deal with the challenges of human trafficking, narcotics smuggling and terrorism in the region. United States and Sri Lankan maritime forces have commenced the cooperation in afloat readiness and training (CARAT) exercise from 2017. Sri Lanka, India and the Maldives signed a trilateral agreement for cooperation in carrying out surveillance, anti- piracy operations and in curbing illegal activities, including maritime pollution.

Policing Role

The Sri Lankan Navy plays a constabulary role in addition to its military role. In fact, after the British withdrew its bases from Sri Lanka in 1956, the Sri Lankan Navy's role was limited to the coastguard role only until the late 1970s. The policing role of the navy includes:

1) Constant patrolling of the sea.
2) Anti-illicit immigration and anti-smuggling operations.
3) Assistance to shipping corporations by providing trained personnel to man corporation vessels.
4) Aid to civil power
5) Non-naval tasks as may be required, namely technical in nature and including specialised float duties in the ports of Colombo and Trincomalee, functioning of the cities' sewage systems and managing of major power installations at Colombo.
6) Flood relief
7) Rescue of fishermen lost at sea.
8) Assistance in manning tugs of the Sri Lanka Mineral Sands Corporation.
9) Dealing with the issue of marine pollution
10) Ocean management

To ensure and protect the marine environment, the navy arrests the law violators and hands them over either to police or other concerned authorities. Navy vessels are deployed for routine patrol to monitor and control illegal fishing in Sri Lankan waters.

The task of the Sri Lankan Navy is to arrest the fishermen illegally operating in Sri Lankan waters and hand them over to officials of the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. They also confiscate vessels of Indian fishermen who are involved in illegal fishing.

Human smuggling through Sri Lankan waters has been a common practice. Usually people were smuggled to and from South India. But over the years, people are trafficked to Australia, Canada and other Western countries too. The Sri Lankan Navy plays a major role in intercepting people illegally going to foreign countries through the sea route. It has intercepted several people illegally bound for Australia or other countries in multi-day trawlers. The Sri Lankan Navy also assists the Sri Lankan Army and police in maintaining law and order during operational requirements and other emergencies on land.

The Sri Lankan Navy facilitates the conduct of the annual festival of St. Anthony's Church located on Katchatheevu Island. The navy provides all the facilities, including electricity and drinking water, for the festival. Special life-saving and medical teams are deployed to ensure the safety of the devotees attending the seven-day annual festival.

The Sri Lankan Navy plays an important role in preventing and controlling drug trafficking by deploying naval intelligence along the coast (Wijayapala 2012). It works in association with the police and personnel of special narcotics units to nab the traffickers.

Salvage operations is another important function of the Sri Lankan Navy. The Maritime Rescue Coordinating Centre based in Colombo, manned by the Sri Lankan Navy, works in coordination with other centres in foreign countries to rescue people in distress at sea. Flood is a perennial problem in Sri Lanka. The navy conducts flood relief operations. It also conducts rescue operations and is called upon to rescue Sri Lankan citizens and Indian fishermen at sea. The Navy's Rapid Response Rescue and Release Squadron (4Rs) is a specialised unit set up to provide life-saving and relief assistance during natural

disasters. The squadron consists of naval personnel specialised in disaster management and craft especially designed for its operations.

It would be relevant to mention here that to share the burden of the Sri Lankan Navy in the constabulary role, the Sri Lanka Coast Guard (SLCG), a non-military law enforcement agency, was formed by the Parliament in 2010 under the Ministry of Defence by replacing the Coast Guard Unit, which earlier operated under the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (Ministry of Defence 2010). The SLCG has been empowered with legal authority to search and arrest ships, craft and personnel engaged in illegal activities in maritime zones and the territorial waters of Sri Lanka and constitute legal proceedings against the offenders. The coastguard is deployed under three commands. The main deployment is in the northern theatre of operations in Kankesanthurai, where ten fast patrol boats and eight Inshore Patrol Craft (IPCs) are deployed in support of the Sri Lankan Navy operations aimed at denying Indian poachers access to Sri Lankan waters. In line with a five-year development plan (2012-2016), the SLCG will take delivery of 10 fast patrol craft, two surveillance vessels, 10 IPCs and two search and rescue vessels. Manpower too will be increased to about 2,000, comprising of 128 officers and 1,733 sailors. With the gradual expansion of the department, there will be new stations at Oluvil, Kalpitiya, Hambantota and Tangalle, Silavathurai and Panama, Arippu and Mullativu and Pulmoddai. (*The Island*, 11 November 2012). India has been providing assistance to build up the SLCG. In 2016, Japan granted JPY1,830 million to the for improving the maritime safety capability of the Sri Lanka Coast Guard by enabling it to procure two petrol vessels to help safe navigation and freedom of merchant ships, counter-piracy operations, prevention of transnational crime and protection of marine environment and resources (Colombage 2017). Since the Sri Lanka Coast Guard is still at the early stage, the navy deals with many of its tasks.

Maritime Security in the Post-LTTE Period
By defeating the LTTE in 2009, Sri Lanka has earned the reputation of being the only navy in the world to successfully thwart maritime terrorism from its soil. The Sri Lankan Navy has assisted internal security to a great extent at crucial times in the conflict.

However, Sri Lanka's maritime security is challenged by several other factors as well, such as growing competition among bigger powers in the region, marine pollution, poaching, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, man-made and natural disasters. Sri Lanka is specially concerned about militarization in the SLOCs. Sri Lanka is vested with 200 nautical mile EEZ and pollution free zone which is eight times its land area. Sri Lanka's search-and-rescue region, which borders with India, the Maldives, Indonesia and Australia, is almost 27 times its land mass. It has also submitted its claim on the continental shelf. If the arbitration favours the Sri Lankan claim, a huge maritime area will come under Sri Lanka's jurisdiction. To cover all these vast maritime areas and respond to any crisis, Sri Lanka needs vessels with considerable endurance. At present Sri Lanka has very limited deep sea going capabilities. It has a total of five Offshore Patrol Vessels. The Sri Lankan naval fleet is well equipped with brown water capabilities but with limited strength to perform the role of littoral combat ships. The Sri Lankan Navy's current status can be described as an 'Inshore Territorial Defence Navy', which means it has primarily inshore territorial defence capabilities encompassing the capability to undertake constabulary duties as well as coastal combat duties. Sri Lanka has acquired two Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessels from India, built in Goa Shipyard in 2017 and in 2018. They are expected to conduct patrols, policing, surveillance, reconnaissance, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and pollution control missions in Sri Lanka's maritime zones. It will slightly improve Sri Lanka's capability, but more needs to be done. The Sri Lankan Navy has shown interest in obtaining some more OPVs from China, Russia and the USA. But to conduct exclusive patrols in the EEZ and the extended EEZ, Sri Lanka needs to acquire minimum two frigates and Corvettes in addition to the OPVs (Sri Lankan Navy Maritime Strategy 2025, Unpublished).

To improve surveillance at sea so as to prevent and control IUU fishing, poaching and human smuggling, Australia has also committed to supply OPVs to Sri Lanka. Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott during his visit to Sri Lanka to attend the Commonwealth Summit agreed to give two patrol boats to Sri Lanka to monitor and crack down on human smuggling. To enhance its surveillance capabilities, the navy is also seeking to

negotiate the use of the Sri Lanka Airforce helicopter fleet for maritime duties (Ranasinghe and Sutton 2015). According to media reports, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) provided equipment and assistance to Sri Lanka's Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to deal with the influx of asylum seekers, which include the Jade Investigator software program, IBM's i2 Analyst's Notebook, a powerful tool to visualise networks of people being targeted by a police force, machines to extract information held on mobile phones, including deleted emails, texts and location data (Welch and Noyce 2015). In 2014, the International Organisation for Migration trained 54 newly recruited Sri Lankan Department of Immigration and Emigration officers in techniques to improve border surveillance and combat human trafficking (US Department of State 2015).

There has been a plan to make the country drug abuse free by 2020. However, the lack of manpower and surveillance capability act as limitations. As many as 24,000 containers arrive at Colombo Port every month but due to lack of staff, officials can only inspect 180 containers in a month. A minimum of six Customs Narcotics Controls officers should be allocated to examine a container within a day. But due to lack of manpower, officials take three days to examine a container (Weerakkoddy 2015). One of the major methods of trafficking drugs to Sri Lanka is through fishing vessels. It is practically impossible to check each and every fishing vessel that leaves and enters the country (Wijegunaratane 2015). Presence of Indian fishing vessels further complicate the process of monitoring. Lack of intelligence is another issue.

Sri Lanka cooperates with UN bodies and other national and international organisations to deal with drug-related problems such The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in partnership with the World Customs Organization (WCO). The UNODC initiated the Container Control Programme in South Asia in 2013. The US made financial contributions for the programme. UNODC and donor country assistance received by Sri Lanka is comparatively much less than many other countries around the world (Jayawardana, 2017). Another major legal issue is that the Sri Lankan authority is not authorised to take action against illegal activities in the high seas. So Sri Lanka has proposed the formulation of a legal framework among the Indian Ocean countries to deal

with the menace. Australia has also expressed its interest to cooperate and assist the Sri Lanka Coast Guard in tackling the drug menace (*Colombo Page*, 26 May 2017).

The Sri Lankan Navy, along with Sri Lanka Coast Guard, Sri Lanka Army, Sri Lanka Air Force, Sri Lanka Police, National Aquatic Resources Agency, Sri Lanka Ports Authority, Ceylon Petroleum Cooperation, Ceylon Petroleum Storage Terminals Ltd. and other responsible organisations, renders assistance in the National Oil Spill Combat Exercise which is organised by the Marine Environment Protection Authority to rehearse and test the capabilities of the stakeholders responsible to act during an oil spill as per the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan. However, Sri Lanka has limited mechanical clean-up equipment which can be used within the port or sheltered waters. In the event of major spills, foreign assistance is sought. India has provided assistance on several occasions.

The Sri Lankan Navy in its roadmap towards 2025 suggested that the navy should possess some distinctive characteristics to ensure capabilities and protect national security. These features include professionalism, operational versatility, interoperability, deployable information focused, agility, the right expansion and strategic partnership (Sri Lanka Navy's Maritime Strategy 2025, Unpublished). Around 1,200 personnel of all ranks from the navy are annually trained overseas (Ministry of Defence, Government of Sri Lanka 2015).

Challenges to the Sri Lankan Navy: *Lack of Vision of the Sri Lankan Leaders*
The Sri Lankan leaders at the time of independence did not have a clear concept of the navy's future role. They saw the role of navy as limited, for maintaining a degree of surveillance over the waters surrounding the island. Even though ex- officers of the Royal Ceylon Navy wanted to create a modern navy for Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan leaders pushed for a navy designed as a strong customs force and subsequently, after the mid- 1980s as an anti-insurgency force (Singh 2002: 238). In other words, the maritime security threat perception of the political leaders determined the role and expansion of the navy. In the maritime domain though, both the UNP and the SLFP regimes saw possible challenges from state actors, they tried to address it through diplomatic means. Therefore, political

leaders mostly ignored the expansion plan of the naval commanders until the 1980s. Necessity of well-equipped navy was felt during the JVP insurrection, but the movement as such did not have maritime dimensions. During the insurrection, the navy was required to prevent the supply of arms to the rebels through the sea route. Therefore, the government was not very keen to spend on the navy from its meagre resources. Though, following the JVP insurrection, initiatives were taken to reorganise the armed forces, the navy got least priority. With the emergence of armed ethnic conflict, political leadership agreed to modernise the navy, but the naval leadership failed to assess the situation appropriately. As a result, the navy failed to formulate appropriate strategy and acquire suitable vessels. The attitude of the leadership changed during the fourth Eelam War and the adoption of asymmetric warfare by the navy gave it victory. After the war, the threat scenario in the maritime domain has completely changed. A new vision, strategy and capability is required to deal with the current challenges.

Lack of Resources

In addition to the lack of vision on part of political leaders, lack of resources was also a reason for the slow growth of the Sri Lankan Navy. Till 1957, military expenditure of Sri Lanka as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 0.8 per cent. During 1958 - 1961, it slightly increased to 1 per cent of the GDP). However, after 1962, it again declined to 0.8 per cent and remained the same until the Eelam War. Therefore, real expansion of the navy took place only in the post 1980s. After the end of war the military expenditure has gone down at around 2.2 per cent from 3.6 per cent in 2009.

The experience during the fourth Eelam War showed that if the security situation is properly assessed and strategies formulated accordingly, resource may not be an issue. The navy needs to adopt innovative and alternative ideas. For example, if it does not have the resource to invest in technology and vessels to improve surveillance capability, it can make use of human intelligence by taking the local community onboard. For example, the Sri Lankan Navy gets adequate assistance from local fishermen in apprehending foreign poachers.

Getting assistance from other countries is also not difficult for Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has the geo-strategic advantage to get foreign assistance. Given its strategic location, important stakeholders of the Indian Ocean like to have engagement with the Sri Lankan Navy in dealing with maritime security issues. Undoubtedly the assistance providers have their own interests in extending naval assistance, but Sri Lanka can use this to its advantage. However, Sri Lankan leaders will have to be careful that seeking assistance from one stakeholder in the Indian Ocean does not create a security dilemma with another stakeholder.

Conclusion

Despite being an island country, Sri Lanka did not have a navy as such at the time of independence. Though a small navy was developed after the independence, its growth was very slow due to lack of vision for the future, lack of proper strategy, lack of political interests and lack of economic resources. Development of the navy was given the least priority. However, with the change of government and new sets of security challenges, the navy has evolved from its post- independence ceremonial role into a force capable of confronting an opponent possessing expert-asymmetric-warfare skills in the maritime domain (Fish 2009: 20).

Assistance from foreign countries helped the Sri Lankan Navy immensely in its evolution. However, credit should also be given to the political will and determination of the leadership to eliminate militacy from the country, innovative ideas and strategy of the naval leadership in the country. The political leadership on the one hand gave complete freedom to the military to plan their war tactics, and on the other, provided all kinds of facilities the military required during the war to carry on their mission smoothly. This proves that if there is a political will and support, the navy of a small country can also emerge as a credible force. However, there are challenges and problems. The Sri Lankan Navy performs many other roles to ensure safety and security of the maritime domain, other than the military role. As a result, it is overburdened. It can be assumed that with the formation of the coastguard, it will soon have a lesser burden on its shoulders. Today, the Sri Lankan Navy is a counter- insurgency capable force. But it is not capable of

meeting the multi-dimensional challenges in the post-war period. To meet such challenges at present and in the coming years, the Sri Lankan Navy prepared a Maritime Strategy for 2025. The navy in the past too forwarded proposals to modernise the navy but the political leadership did not show much interest. The current National Unity Government, however, on several occasions, has highlighted the importance of adding blue water capabilities to the Sri Lankan Navy and also the consolidation of the coastguard (Wickremesinghe 2015). So it can be hoped that the government will give attention to the modernisation of the navy. After successfully defeating the Sea Tigers, the Sri Lankan Navy has now expressed its confidence that if there is support from the government, it can aspire to become 'Medium Regional Force Projection Navy'. It is believed that despite being a small country, due to its strategic location in the Indian Ocean it should be able to contribute to the regional and global effort to ensure maritime security. Nonetheless, the civilian government needs to make political and financial investment for the Sri Lankan Navy to take such responsibility.

Managing Non-Military Security Challenges

Resources and activities in Sri Lanka's marine and coastal areas contribute significantly to the well being of the country. Sustainably, managing the marine and coastal areas are, therefore, imperative for Sri Lanka. However, UNEP (1986) in its country report noted that prior to the 1970s, little attention was given to environmental considerations in Sri Lanka's economic development planning. The report mentions, "there was little awareness in Sri Lanka of the close relationship between development and environment" (UNEP 1986). This caused significant damage to the marine ecology which, in turn, impacted the economy and human security of the country. It was only in the late 1970s and early 1980s that Sri Lanka realised and expressed concerns about environmental problems. Environmental legislations were brought about and special agencies were created to integrate environmental dimensions in the development planning process at the national level. The disastrous impact of tsunami in 2004 made Sri Lankan authorities realise the need for a pro-active approach to prevent disasters caused due to marine hazards. Several policies and action plans were formulated in this regard. National legislations have since been upgraded regularly to comply with the international arrangement to manage the marine environment. How far are these measures initiated at the national level effective in managing Sri Lanka's marine environment?

This chapter argues that though Sri Lanka's capability to manage marine resources in terms of formulation of policies, legal and institutional framework and enforcement mechanism have improved significantly over the years, they are still not adequate.

This chapter critically analyses Sri Lanka's national effort to manage maritime resources with special focus on the issue of marine pollution; IUU fishing and disaster at or from the sea such as tsunami and rising sea levels. Due to the global nature of these challenges and the limitations of an individual country to take action against these challenges beyond its jurisdiction, measures need to be initiated at the regional and international level too. There are several international and regional frameworks available. This chapter examines the measures initiated in the South Asian region as well as at the international

level on specific issues of concern for Sri Lanka and analyses how the island can benefit from such measures.

National Management of Marine Resources

Sri Lanka liberalised its economy in 1977 and saw a massive flow of aid and assistance from international donor agencies and countries into large infrastructure projects and the establishment of 'free trade zones' (Athukorala, and Jayasuriya 2012). Economic growth surged, from an average of 2.9 per cent during 1970-77 to over six per cent during 1978-83 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2015). Tourism, fishery and port sectors started to boom. With the growth, the necessity was felt to protect the environment. At the global level also, linking environment and development had become a trend since the 1970s (Harris 2004: 272).[13] These two factors encouraged the Sri Lankan Government to make legal, policy and institutional interventions to address environmental issues since the 1980s.

The legal measures adopted on marine and coastal issues include the Coast Conservation Act No. 57 of 1981; Marine Pollution Prevention Act (MPPA) No. 59 of 1981, the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act (FARA), No. 2 of 1996, which was subsequently amended in 2000, 2004 and 2006 to make provision for the management, regulation, conservation and development of fisheries and aquatic resources in Sri Lanka; Fisheries Regulation of Foreign Fishing Boats Act No. 59 (FEBA) of 1979 to regulate, control and manage fishing and related activities by foreign boats in Sri Lankan waters; Disaster Management Act No 13 (DM Act) passed in 2005, which in its definition of disaster includes tsunami, maritime hazard and inland and marine oil spills along with several other disasters.

Almost all of these acts focused on sectoral management, except the Coast Conservation Act. Traditionally, taking a sectoral approach to environmental problems was a common feature of the environmental management process across the globe. However, post-1970s

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[13] In 1972 the international community came together to discuss the link between environment and development and sustainable development at the UN Conference on the Human Environment. In 1992 the UN Conference on Environment and Development held at Rio de Janeiro raised awareness of environmental and development issues.

it was considered as inefficient procedure. The concept of integrated environmental management was introduced as an alternative to the sectoral approach (Antunes and Santos 1999). In the earlier period, coastal erosion was considered as the major problem of the coastal areas of Sri Lanka, and it was thought that the erosion could be curbed through engineering solution by construction of protective structures. No consideration was given to the complex interrelationship among ecosystems and human activities in the coastal zone that had resulted in an intensification of coastal problems and degradation of the coastal environment. Later, however, there was a realisation that developmental and commercial activities in the coastal areas directly impact the marine environment, and therefore, a comprehensive approach to manage the coastal zone was required. This led to the enactment of the Coast Conservation Act in 1981 and the integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) in 1990. Yet, national CZMP that was prepared as per the Coast Conservation Act 1981 and approved by the Cabinet in 1990 did not cover every coastal problem. The CZMP of 1990 focused largely on erosion control, coral and sand mining, the loss of critical habitats and sites of historical and cultural value. The revised CZMP of 1997 incorporated coastal pollution and the concept of Special Area Management (SAM), in addition to the issues addressed in CZMP 1990. SAM is a "bottom-up" and collaborative management strategy to plan resource management within a defined geographic area. It was believed that by involving the local community and local government, the national authorities can act collectively to ensure that resources are used sustainably (Coast Conservation Department 1997: 99).

The revision of the CZMP was done again in 2004 which integrated coastal fisheries and aquaculture with coastal zone management. The revised CZMP also extended the SAM to newer coastal sites.[14] It was recognised that marine areas outside the coastal zone have a definite impact and implication for coastal zone management (Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resource, Government of Sri Lanka 2006).

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[14] CZMP 2004 identified 36 coastal sites for special area management (SAM) of which eight are already under implementation as SAM sites by the Coastal Resource Management Programme.

The government has again amended the principles enactment in 2011 to provide the required mandate to formulate an effective coastal zone and coastal resource management programme. As per the new amendment, the legally defined coastal zone has been extended to cover riparian land of water bodies, and the legal provisions have been spelt out to enable to carry out the SAM process in a collaborative manner. In addition, legal provisions were also made to designate conservation areas and affected areas as required. Similarly, emphasis was also given to ensure public access to beaches by making legal provisions to formulate a "Coastal Access Plan". The Coastal Zone and Coastal Resource Management Plan 2016 is prepared as per the provisions of the Coast Conservation / Coastal Resource Management Act No. 57 of 1981, and the Amendment Act No. 49 of 2011. However, the Cabinet is yet to approve it.

Thus, the Coast Conservation Act has been amended and the CZMP has been regularly revised and the scope of coastal zone management has been expanded to make it a comprehensive and integrated management plan. However, Sri Lanka's plan does not address all the issues faced by Sri Lanka in the marine sector and instead, focuses on limited areas of concerns.

By addressing the issue of coastal erosion, the Coast Conservation Department (CCD) takes adequate measures to deal with the sea level rise. One of the main focus areas of the first CZMP of 1990 was shoreline protection. Though measures recommended for protection against coastal erosion could be applied in response to the sea level rise, the revised plan of 1997 specifically covers the issue of sea level rise too. To minimise the impact of sea level rise, the CCD relies on three kinds of solutions: Structural solutions, non-structural solutions (ecosystem) and institutional solutions. Under structural solutions, the CCD builds structures to protect the coast from flood, cyclone, and sea water intrusion. Under non-structural solutions, the CCD tries to regenerate the ecosystem by rehabilitating mangroves and coral reefs, etc. Under institutional solutions, the CCD implements no-build zone (setbacks), prepares zonal plans and disaster prone area maps at the District Secretariat (DS) level and conducts educational and awareness programmes on coastal disasters. The CCD also takes adaptive measures to manage the

coastal areas by following the method of protection, accommodation and retreat. As an adaptive measures, CCD tries to protect the land from the sea by constructing hard structures like seawalls, as well as using soft measures such as beach nourishment. In certain cases it tries to make some *accommodation* so that people can continue to occupy the land but make some adjustments by elevating buildings on piles, growing flood or salt tolerant crops. In extreme case the method of *Retreat* is followed, which means abandonment of coastal areas.

To prevent pollution, the CCD under the CZMP ensures that high and medium-polluting industries are not located in the coastal zone and an effective sewage system and waste water treatment system are set up within the coastal zone. However, the Coastal Zone Management Plan does not address all sources of marine pollution. The responsibility to address the issue of marine pollution falls on the Marine Environment Protection Authority under the Marine Pollution Prevention Act of 1988 along with Central Environment Authority. In 2004, coastal fisheries have been integrated with aquaculture under the revised CZMP but two different legislations are there to deal with issues in the fishery management.

Though the integrated CZMP system is being implemented in Sri Lanka, sectoral management of the marine environment particularly to deal with the issues of pollution, IUU fishing and disaster management is also functioning. The presence of both the sectoral and integrated management approaches makes Sri Lanka's marine resource management effort a complex one.

Reactive Approach
Sri Lanka's approach towards environmental issues so far has been more reactive than pro-active. Legislations and policies are being formulated piecemeal over the years with the new threats and challenges. For example, the FEBA was enacted in 1979 to regulate, control and manage fishing and related activities by foreign boats in Sri Lankan waters. The necessity to enact this legislation was felt following the signing of the 1976 agreement which completely demarcated the maritime boundary between India and Sri

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Lanka and prohibited fishing activities by Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan waters. While this act provides for necessary actions to be taken against the illegal foreign boats in Sri Lankan waters, no legal provision was made to address the issue of IUU fishing by local fishermen on the high seas. Even the FARA, which governs the fishery sector of Sri Lanka, did not include provisions to implement measures which were needed to combat IUU fishing activities by local fishing boats in the high seas and waters in national jurisdictions of other states. It was only in 2013 and 2015 that amendments to the FARA were introduced to address the problem of IUU fishing activities at the high seas by local fishermen. Amendment Act No. 35 of 2013 (to incorporate international obligations) was approved by Parliament on November 2013 and the 2nd amendment was incorporated to provide for enhanced sanctions in February 2015. Action has also been initiated to incorporate provisions in FARA that enable DFAR to control fishing activities conducted by local fishing boats in the high seas and national jurisdictions of other coastal states, and thereby preventing and detering local fishing boats from engaging in IUU fishing activities outside Sri Lanka waters. These amendments were introduced after the EU issued a warning that it would impose a ban on the import of Sri Lankan fish products.

Similarly, until the tsunami occurred, Sri Lanka did not have any disaster management strategy. A cabinet sub-committee was appointed by the government to examine disaster preparedness in 1991. An initial framework "Disaster Counter Measures Act" was prepared in 1992 (Limon 2015). Due to political and ethnic problems in the country, it was not passed by Parliament. The National Disaster Management Center (NDMC) was established in 1996 under the Ministry of Social Services to initiate the activities proposed in the draft policy. However, it too remained ineffective. As a result, the government only emphasised relief and recovery in case of the occurrence of disaster rather than taking proactive measures with damage prevention or minimisation strategies. As per the recommendations of the Parliament Select Committee (PSC) on Natural Disasters (2005), which was convened immediately after the tsunami and the Disaster Management Act, a National Disaster Management policy was formulated to ensure the sustainability and resilience of the nation. In November 2005, the Ministry of Disaster Management was formed to protect people through effective prevention and mitigation

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from man-made and natural disasters. The Act establishes the National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM), It is the supreme body for disaster management in Sri Lanka. The Ministry for Disaster Management in 2007 established the National Disaster Management Coordinating Committee (NDMCC) as the national platform. To implement the government policies, the ministry functions through four institutions: Department of Meteorology, Disaster Management Centre, National Building Research Organisation, and National Disaster Relief Services Centre.

Emphasis on Sustainable Development

An effective ocean governance system needs to focus on sustainable development. In 2007, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Environment took the initiative to develop a National Strategy for Sustainable Development for 2007-37 (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2007). An action plan, 'Caring for the Environment 2008-2012 – Path to Sustainable Development', was developed by the ministry in 2008. This action plan was updated in 2009 which covers the period 2009-2013. Subsequently, the Presidential Secretariat developed these plans to prepare an Action Plan with short-, medium- and long-term goals for the period 2009-2016, which was called the *Haritha* (Green) Lanka Programme. Under the *Haritha* Lanka Programme, the government established a National Council for Sustainable Development (NCSD) which functions as a national platform to launch and promote the process of achieving sustainable development, and to oversee and guide the implementation of its Action Plan. Despite the emphasis on sustainable development in the national strategies, it has been ignored while undertaking developmental activities.

Management Tools

The tools being used to manage marine resources in Sri Lanka include: regulation; monitoring; research; education and awareness programme, and plan and policy development.

Regulation

The legislations mentioned above have mandated regulatory powers to duly appointed authorities and bodies to prevent illegal activities in marine and coastal zones and any violation of law. Some of these agencies are CCD to implement coastal zone management; MEPA to prevent and control pollution, and Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to deal with fishery management. However, these agencies share responsibilities with several other agencies which also have jurisdiction in the coastal and marine areas. Sri Lanka has banned several environmentally harmful activities in coastal areas or at sea. Developmental activities are being regulated in the coastal zones. Any developmental activities in the coastal zone are subject to permit and environment impact assessment requirement. The CCD issues permits only after assessing the environmental impact of such activities on coastal resources. The regulatory power provided to the MEPA by MPPA No. 35, facilitated it to take stern actions against the perpetrator of marine pollution. MEPA also has specific responsibility for waste management. In order to prevent pollution due to waste oil and garbage discarded by ships, the MEPA operates a waste reception service at the Colombo and Galle harbours through third parties (MEPA 2011). The FEBA prohibits fishing in Sri Lankan waters by foreign boats without permits duly issued by the Sri Lankan authority. The responsibility to administer the FEBA has been mandated to the Secretary, Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, and is assisted by commanders of the armed forces to establish and maintain an effective system of surveillance over fishing and related activities by foreign fishing boats in Sri Lankan waters. As mandated by the FEBA, Indian fishermen who illegally enter Sri Lankan waters to fish are regularly captured. Their boats are also being confiscated. The FEBA (Sections 15-17) provides for sanctions against foreign fishing boats engaged in IUU fishing in Sri Lanka waters. Currently, Sri Lanka has increased the sanction. As provided by FARA, the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources has banned several illegal fishing methods such as purse seine including Laila, Surukku and Podu, blast fishing using dynamite or other explosives for the coastal fisheries (Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources).

Monitoring and Assessment of Problems

Effective ocean management requires the identification and assessment of problems (Antunes and Santos 1999: 220). It is important to develop monitoring systems capable of providing information on marine eco-systems and their responses to pressure generated by human activities. The Coast Conservation Act of 1981 for the first time made provision for a survey of the coastal areas of the country to identify the coastal problems that need to be addressed and subsequently prepared a plan to effectively deal with such problems. The National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change for the period 2016-2025, suggests the "implementation of a continuous programme for monitoring shore line changes and study of the impacts of sea level rise on coastal habitats over short-, medium and long-term horizons and identification and preparation of maps on areas vulnerable to extreme events and inundation". The MEPA under the *Sonduru Sayura* Programme regularly inspects the level of pollution in the streams that flow into the ocean, monitors the quality of sea water, at several locations where foreign and local tourists visit regularly and manage monthly database (MEPA 2012).

Research

Continuous research work is considered as an important aspect to find solutions to specific management problems and this has been acknowledged by all the national policies and action plans. Sri Lanka's NEAP recommends all the concerned authorities to prepare reports on marine pollution, sea level rise and other environmental issues to conduct priority research to identify the magnitude of the problem; potential site specific impacts and to recommend on optimal response strategies.

Education and Awareness Programme

The basis for effective prevention measures is creating awareness about the possible threat, and pre-determined plan to respond and react to such threat along with credible deterrent and interdiction capabilities. As the common people are both victims of the marine hazards as well as responsible for resource depletion and pollution, it is essential to make them aware about the negative impact of environmental degradation. Regular awareness programmes can empower coastal communities for facing the risks of climate

change, need for pollution control and prevention, sustainable use of resources, and disaster preparedness. The Fisheries Ministry, MEPA, CCD and several regional and international organisations conduct such awareness programme among the coastal communities.

Plan and Policy Development

Sri Lanka has regularly formulated policy and plans on marine environmental issues as discussed above. It has adopted the National Environmental Action Plan, which has been regularly updated, Comprehensive Programme of Action for Disaster Risk Management, National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, National Climate Change Policy and so on. Aims of all these policies and action plans are to provide guidelines and recommendation to implement the national legislation effectively.

Efficacy of National Efforts

Since the 1980s, Sri Lanka has regularly formulated legislations, policies and strategies to improve marine resource management. Even though many of them have come into existence as reactive response, they have helped in improving the situation. After introducing the permit and environmental assessment system, developmental activities in the coastal zones are being regulated to a great extent. Authorities are trained and prepared to respond to an event of oil spill as a national oil contingency programme is rehearsed in regular intervention. SAM, though not yet evolved into a perfect system, has paved the way for participation of the local communities in the resource management approach. There are several success stories where MEPA's intervention has minimised environmental damage from oil or chemical spills.

The Disaster Management Act 2005 and implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Action for Disaster Risk Management over the years have presumably improved the disaster preparedness with the instalment of early warning system and regular awareness programme conducted by the DMC on how to respond to disasters. The DMC has reported that about 90 per cent of the population in tsunami prone districts was evacuated to safe locations in response to the tsunami warning issued on 11 April

2012 (Ministry of Disaster Management 2014). It is believed that the future loss of life due to tsunami would be substantially reduced.

Nonetheless, there are several issues associated with management of the marine sector. Protection of structures and economy from low frequency, high intensity disasters is still an issue. Despite national legislation, fishery sector management is poor. IUU fishing by both local fishermen and foreign fishermen is still rampant. Many vessels flying the Sri Lankan flag and authorised to fish in the high seas outside the jurisdiction of Sri Lanka's waters do not have valid licences. CCD has constructed structures to protect the coast, but it has failed to protect the entire coastline (Clemett 2003). During the tsunami, considerable infrastructure in the coastal areas was destroyed. While Sri Lanka has made progress in terms of legal policy formulation and strategies, implementation of these provisions is a major problem. Proper implementation is not done due to the following factors:

Lack of Coordination

The major issue is lack of coordination among the various cross-sectoral bodies. As newer laws and policies come up, the number of institutional bodies mandated to deal with the concerned issues also increases. As the issues in the marine and coastal sectors are inter-linked, proper coordination requires among the various agencies. But coordination of these organisations becomes difficult due to the presence of both sectoral and integral approaches. The mixed system of management causes overlapping and duplication of work, as same work is delegated to different organisations. For example, in Sri Lanka, some four or five ministries co-ordinate with one another for environmental decision-making, including the Ministries of Environment, Energy and Industry, Ministry of Disaster Management. To deal with the issue of fishery sector, the National Environmental Act authorises the Central Environment Authority to coordinate with other bodies dealing with the same issue. Similarly, to deal with land-based pollution, MEPA needs to coordinate its work with other agencies like the Coast Conservation Department. In case of an oil spill, as per the contingency plan, MEPA needs to coordinates with the Disaster Management Centre on the provisions of National Disaster

Management Policy and Plan as the plan is applicable for waters under the jurisdiction of Sri Lanka, including the EEZ, pollution zone and territorial sea. The oil spill events are categorized into three tiers. The responsibility to implement the plan in the case of first tier oil spill events lies on the CCD, Sri Lanka Port Authority, Ceylon Patroleum Corporation and the navy under the monitoring of the MEPA. In respect of tier II and tier III oil spills, MEPA is the implementing agency and it works in collaboration with the DMC, SLPA, CPC, navy, air force, army, police department, CCD, NARA and the MET department. The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Coast Conservation Department, Urban Development Authority, and Ministry of Disaster Management are mandated to jointly develop coastal area and resource management plans to address the adverse impacts of sea level rise.

Some of the functions of certain institutions are contradictory to the very spirit of the Coast Conservation Act. Under the Urban Development Authority Act, No. 41 of 1978, the entire coastal zone has been gazetted as an Urban Development Area (UDA). As a result, there is overlap of functions between the UDA and the CCD. Two directly conflicting authorities are the CCD and the Geological Survey and Mines Bureau (GSMB). While any development activity within the coastal zone requires a permit from the CCD, the GSMB is vested with the authority to issue permits under the same provision for mining activities. Similarly, provision is made for the Board of Investment to bypass the authority of the CCD (Samaranayake 2006). Again the Central Environment Authority has the mandate to issue permits to an industry. While CCD has the mandate to issue permits within the coastal zone, the CEA's area of jurisdiction is not clearly defined. Overlapping of responsibilities, presence of different legislation and policy on the similar issue complicates the coordination process among the concerned authorities and departments.

Lack of Resource

The key constraints in giving effect to the policies developed over the years for marine and coastal area protection are the lack of human and financial capacities. The authorised bodies and agencies often face a resource crunch to effectively undertake their

responsibilities. For example, rehabilitation of the coastal and marine ecosystem by artificially growing corals or rehabilitation of the mangroves are good solutions to protect the coastal areas from disaster. However, rehabilitation of the ecosystem requires adequate scientific knowledge and material resources. Though the CCD has undertaken rehabilitation work, progress is slow due to lack of capability and resource (Premaratne 2010). The fund allotted for the implementation of SAM by the government is limited. Consequently, it has to seek funding from donors and the private sector (Clemett 2003). The MEPA had to cancel many of its pollution control programmes and projects due to lack of resources.

Lack of Scientific Knowledge

Scientific knowhow is a must to develop a result-based monitoring and evaluation system. Sri Lanka is lagging behind in this area. There are several institutes which conduct research work. The Central Environment Authority has its own research unit but their research is more on land-based activity. The National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency conducts scientific research on aquatic activities and resources. However, there are limitations. In most cases, Sri Lanka lacks material, scientific and technological expertise to conduct studies. The country has to depend on international assistance. International community is forthcoming in this regard. Several projects have been initiated with the assistance of donor countries and international organisations. The Australian Government Overseas Aid Programme (Aus-AID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Department for International Development German Technical Assistance (GTZ), the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States-Asia Environmental Partnership (US-AEP) have all provided technical and research assistance to Sri Lanka. However, these foreign funded projects are for a fixed and limited period. There is no institutional framework to follow up and monitor the projects once the foreign-funded projects are complete. Though all the national action plans have acknowledged the issue

of lack of institutional framework and recommended it to strengthened, no proper action has been initiated in this regard.

Lack of Alternative Job Opportunities to Divert People from Illegal Activities

All the national action plans and the CZMP contains a policy mandating the development of an alternative employment programme for the miners and all those who conduct illegal fishing activities, but no final programme has been developed yet (Ministry of Environment and Parliamentary Affairs 1991). Anil Premaratne, the former Director of the CCD, says that the adaptation mechanism the CCD is mandated to undertake fails because there is no planned programme to provide alternate employment opportunities to divert people from the coastal areas. Since the coastal areas are densely populated and the livelihood of large number of people is dependent on the beaches (people associated with tourism, fishing, etc.), it becomes difficult to follow the technique of retreat or protect. Construction of hard structures like seawalls on the beaches has a negative impact on tourism. Further, people who are associated with tourism or fishing industry can also not be asked to retreat without providing them alternative livelihood (Premaratne 2010). There was a ban on coral mining and operation of lime kilns within the coastal zone. However, in the absence of alternative employment opportunities there is no decline in such illegal activities (Rajasuriya 2009). Some of the SAM feedback state that people have gone back to illegal activities due to lack of alternative employment (Clemett 2003).

Bilateral Effort to Deal with the Fishermen Issue

As the national measures could not resolve the fishermen problem between India and Sri Lanka, the country deals with the issue at the bilateral level. Sri Lanka and India amicably resolved the Katchatheevu dispute because of the political understanding between the then Prime Ministers of the two countries. However, the two agreements which were signed in the 1970s to resolve maritime boundary issues did not solve the fishermen issue between the two countries. The Indian fishermen and Tamil Nadu believe that the Central Government of India has not signed the agreement legally and, therefore, demand that the agreement should be repealed. Indian fishermen also feel that they have traditional rights to fish in Sri Lankan waters and no boundary line can stop them.

However, the Sri Lankan side believes that Indian fishermen no longer enjoy a traditional right to fish in Sri Lankan waters. This difference in opinion is basically due to the different interpretation of the 1976 agreement by the two sides.

On 28 June 1974, both India and Sri Lanka signed the maritime boundary agreement which resolved the long standing problem regarding the ownership of the Katchatheevu Island. Even though the Katchatheevu island became part of Sri Lanka, the agreement safeguarded the rights of fishing by Indian fishermen and pilgrims to visit the island in the same manner they were doing before the agreement was signed (Suryanarayan 2005). Article 5 of the agreement says:

> Subject to the foregoing, Indian fishermen and pilgrims will enjoy access to visit Kachchativu as hitherto, and will not be required by Sri Lanka to obtain travel documents or visas for these purposes (See the appendix no.2).

However, both India and Sri Lanka had a different interpretation on Article 5 (Suryanarayan 2005). India considers that the agreement allowed Indian fishermen to fish[15], but according to Sri Lankans, Indian fishermen were only allowed to dry their nets on the island. However, the 1976 agreement and the exchange of letters between Kewal Singh, then Foreign Secretary of India, and W.T. Jayasinghe, then Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Government of Sri Lanka, cleared the doubt that Indian fishermen do not have any fishing rights in the "historic waters". It was argued that by 1976, the fishermen in the region had started using nylon nets so that day did not have to dry the net. However, Indian fishermen continued fishing in Sri Lankan waters which resulted in death, attack and imprisonment of Indian fishermen (Suryanarayan 2005). This became a serious bilateral issue between India and Sri Lanka.

To resolve the issue, a Joint Working Group (JWG) on fisheries was formed in 2004. Two rounds of meeting of the India-Sri Lanka JWG on fisheries were held in April 2005 and in January 2006. But the meetings were discontinued until 2011due to the war in Sri Lanka.

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[15] The issue was debated in the Indian Parliament on 23 July 1974 and it was established by Swaran Singh that the 1974 agreement "clearly provided for the continuation of the rights of Indian fishermen to fish even around Kachchativu". For detail discussion on the debate, see V. Suryanarayan (2005).

In 2008, India and Sri Lanka agreed to put in place practical arrangements to deal with bonafide Indian and Sri Lankafn fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL). This was agreed to during the visit of Basil Rajapaksa, Senior Adviser to then President of Sri Lanka, to New Delhi on 26 October 2008. As part of these practical arrangements, it was also agreed that Indian fishing vessels will not venture into government of Sri Lanka designated sensitive areas. Further, there will be no firing on Indian fishing vessels (Ministry of External Affairs 2008).

Despite such understanding, attack on fishermen continued. Following the uproar in India on the incidence of killing of two Indian fishermen by Sri Lankan Navy in January 2011, the JWG meeting was held in March 2011 and January 2012(Ministry of External Affairs 2011, (Ministry of External Affairs 2012). In the JWG meetings both sides agreed to take speedy measures for faster repatriation of fishermen who get stranded in waters of the two countries; develop joint fisheries and marine resources in the Palk Bay area and the Gulf of Mannar; initiate programmes for bilateral exchanges in aquaculture and fishing related activities, including training in fisheries management, genetic improvement of cultured species, fishing technology, exchange of scientists, etc (Ministry of External Affairs 2012).

In the JWG meetings, both the government representatives acknowledged that the issue involved the socio-economic and livelihood dimensions of the fishermen and agreed to enhance cooperation that would allow both countries to pursue their fishing activity in a safe, secure and sustainable manner. Both sides also agreed to discourage fishermen from using destructive fishing methods. It should be noteworthy to mention here that the Indian fishermen use trawlers to fish. Trawling is considered to be a destructive method. Sri Lankan fishermen often complain that due to the use of trawlers by the Indian fishermen, there is hardly any resource left for the Sri Lankan fishermen to catch. Even though the Indian government representatives acknowledge the need to stop the use of trawlers, it could not encourage the fishermen to discard the trawlers.

One of the reasons for this is the differences in opinion between Tamil Nadu and the Central Government of India on the resolution of the fishermen issue. In Tamil Nadu, it is believed that Central Government of India has given away the Katchatheevu Island to Sri Lanka which was possessed by the Raja of Ramnad. Therefore, Tamil Nadu believes that the only way to resolve the issue is by retrieving the island back whereas the Central Government of India is opposed to reopening the signed deal. Instead, the latter wants to explore other means to resolve the long-pending issue.

Both the governments, have arranged interactions between the fishermen of India and Sri Lanka. For the first time, interactions were facilitated by the Thiruvananthapuram -based Alliance for Release of Innocent Fishermen (ARIF), when the Chief Executive of the ARIF V. Vivekanandan led a 21-member Indian delegation to Sri Lanka in May 2004. Though no permanent solution could be achieved in this interaction, fishermen of both countries agreed on the following points (Suryanarayan 2005: 144):

1) Indian fishermen recognised the reality that unrestricted trawling by them in Sri Lankan waters was posing a threat not only to livelihood of Sri Lankan fishermen but also to the resource base of Sri Lanka.

2) Indian fishermen will keep a distance of not less than three nautical miles from the Sri Lankan shores.

3) Indian trawlers will not use the pair trawl, roller net, mixture net and chank net.

4) If any Indian fishing boat violates the agreement mentioned above, Sri Lankan fishermen organisations will not take the law into their own hands. They will bring the violations to the notice of Indian fishermen's associations, which will take strict action against the erring fishermen.

5) The two sides will appeal to the two governments to drop all cases against fishermen and to repatriate them with their boats without delay.

However, neither side followed what they had agreed upon during the first meeting. After the end of civil war, fishermen of the two countries met again in August 2010. The visit of Sri Lankan fishermen to India in 2010 was reciprocated by the representatives of Indian fishermen from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka during 20-23 March 2011 (Ministry of

External Affairs 2011). In these meetings, both sides agreed on the need to generate greater understanding between them. Additionally, fishermen association- level talks were held twice in 2014, the first in January 2014 in Chennai and the second on 12 May 2014 in Colombo (Swaraj 2014). The May 2014 meeting ended on an unpleasant note as both sides were adamant on sticking to their points. The Northern Sri Lankan fishermen demanded immediate halt of bottom trawling in Sri Lankan waters by their Indian counterparts. But, Indian fishermen asked for at least three years to completely phase out trawling, but they offered to bring down the number of days they engage in trawling from 120 to 90. However, Indian fishermen could not convince their Sri Lankan counterpart on their commitments (Srinivasan 2014). Both India and Sri Lanka then decided to resolve the issue at the government level. The India-Sri Lanka Joint Committee on Fisheries related issues held its first meeting in New Delhi on 29 August 2014.

Fishermen level talks were resumed again in March 2015. The Indian fishermen again requested permission to allow them to engage in fishing in Sri Lankan waters for 83 days per year for three years. The Sri Lankan side, however, refused to give any concession to the Indian trawlers. The Indian and Sri Lankan governments again resumed the JWG in December 2016, but nothing new came up from the meeting.

Thus, given the sensitivity of the issue and the complex relationship between the two countries, efforts are being made to resolve the matter through dialogues at the very high level as well as at the fishermen level and also through institutional mechanisms. Despite these efforts, no permanent solutions have been found. Ignoring the fishermen interest is not in the political interest of any government. At the same time, neither side wants to make the already complicated relations more problematic. Therefore, both sides have tried to understan towards each other's compulsion and have agreed to continue the dialogue process. In the meantime, the Government of India has initiated a scheme to encourage fishermen to stop bottom trawling and instead go in for deep sea fishing. However, it is unlikely that fishermen who have been fishing in the shallow waters of the Palk Strait would volunteer for deep sea fishing. So until and unless the Government of

India takes stringent action on Indian fishermen fishing in Sri Lankan waters, poaching by Indian fishermen is unlikely to be prevented.

Regional Arrangements to Manage Marine Environments

Many of the challenges Sri Lanka is facing today (such as IUU fishing, marine pollution and sea level rise) are not unique to the island alone. These issues are faced by other countries in the region too. The United Nations in its 2003 list of protected areas ranked the South Asia region among the lowest in the world in terms of declared marine and coastal protected areas and the Indian Ocean as the most poorly protected ocean (Samuel and Titumir 2011: 47). No regional protocol exists to deal with the common regional and marine issues, though the effort for the same was initiated in the 1980s itself under the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP).[16] In 1984, at a national focal point meeting held in Bangkok, the five maritime nations of the SACEP - Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka- committed themselves to the development of an action plan to protect and manage the marine environment of the South Asian Seas region. Accordingly, after a decade, the South Asia Seas Programme (SASP) was formally adopted in 1995. The Action Plan for the SASP was adopted in the same year at a Meeting of Plenipotentiaries of the concerned countries in New Delhi. The Action Plan identified four areas requiring immediate attention (SAS 1995):

    1. Integrated Coastal Zone Management,

    2. Development and implementation of national and regional oil spill contingency planning

    3. Human resources development through strengthening of regional centres of excellence

    4. Protection of the marine environment from land-based sources of marine pollution

After the 2004 tsunami, the development of strategies to cope with natural disasters has also been included in the SASP. Nonetheless, there is no regional convention on these areas yet.

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[16] SACEP was formed in 1982.

Prior to the adoption of the SASP action plan, a collaborative mission of the UNEP, UNDP and the IMO compiled a South Asian Marine Pollution Emergency Action Plan in 1989, which has not been updated since (SACEP 2016). As prioritised by the SASP action plan, a Regional Oil and Chemical Pollution Spill Contingency Plan and associated MoU were developed in association with the IMO and the SACEP. The final adaptation has been pending since 2000. Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have signed the MoU. India is yet to sign it. The Indian Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has decided to approve (PIB 2018).

The first regional meeting of the national authorities responsible for oil spill preparedness and response in South Asia was organised in Colombo on 26-28 February 2014 by the IMO and the SACEP. The meeting adopted a three-year work programme of activities to ensure the effective implementation of the OPRC.

SASP is also working with the IMO for formulating a Regional Strategy and Action Plan on Ballast Water Management. Acknowledging the contribution of the land based pollutant to the marine pollution, the South Asia Seas secretariat is engaged in facilitating activities to achieve the objectives of minimising land-based pollution.

The South Asia Coral Reef Task Force (SACRTF) has also been established under the South Asia Marine Conservation and Protected Areas project, through funding from the European Union, to facilitate coordination in the management of coral reefs and associated ecosystems at a national level, and to promote collaborative action at the regional level.

The SACEP Secretariat was established in Sri Lanka in 1982 and the host facility is provided by the Government of Sri Lanka.[17] The Regional Environmental and Natural Resources Information Centre was established in July 1990 with the support from the ADB to share information among the member countries. It has set up GIS Training Units at University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. It has also set up National Coordinating Units at the Ministry of Environment, Government of Sri Lanka. Workshops are being organised

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[17] SASP also functions under the same secretariat.

by the SACEP and SASP regularly to develop capability and raise awareness in society. Its functions are, however, limited to holding workshops. It lacks fund to undertake meaningful projects as the Trust Fund is mostly used for the maintenance of the secretariat. The secretariat also lacks capability. Responses from the governments of the member countries are also very slow due to low inter-agency collaboration at the national level (Perera 2011).

The South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) took interests in collaborative efforts on the marine and coastal issues in the region only in 2008. The SAARC Workshop on Coastal and Marine Risk Mitigation Plan in 2008 acknowledged that the coastal countries of South Asia share the common Indian Ocean basins of Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea and therefore it is essential to develop a common protocol at the regional level addressing the coastal and marine risks (SAARC 2008 a). Accordingly, a road map on Regional Cooperation on Coastal and Marine Risk Mitigation Plan for South Asia was prepared and a declaration was issued by SAARC on environment. Two specialised regional organisations viz., SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre (SCZMC), Male, and SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC), New Delhi, were given responsibility to address coastal protection as well as coastal and marine risk reduction issues. The two organisations work in synergy on the methodology for the development of national and regional Coastal and Marine Risk Mitigation Plan (SAARC 2008 a). Implementation of the regional plan is the responsibility of the SAARC Disaster Management Centre.[18]

To build capacity and information sharing, the SAARC Disaster Management Centre has conducted more than 50 training programmes and workshops. But, unfortunately, due to

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[18] The SAARC Disaster Management Centre was set up in October 2006 at the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) premises, New Delhi. In November 2016, it expanded its purpose by merging other regional centres namely SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC Dhaka, Bangladesh); SAARC Forestry Centre (SFC, Thimphu, Bhutan); and SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre (SCZMC, Male, Maldives) with SDMC. Now, it is operational from Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management (GIDM) Premises, Gujarat since 24 May 2017. The Centre is equipped with a programme on application of space technology in monitoring and managing risks. For details, see Ministry of External Affairs 2017.

the lack of follow-up measures and cooperation, the SAARC has failed to accomplish any significant achievements in building cooperation on environmental issues.

The regional collaborative efforts in the South Asian region on the management of marine resources are not very encouraging. The efforts do not go beyond discussions and planning process due to political issues among some of the member countries, lack of priorities and interests particularly on the marine environmental issues and lack of commitment and material support from the member countries. Most of the projects discussed above are funded by the International organisations or donour countries.

International Measures

UNCLOS provides legal framework for the countries to enjoy their rights in the maritime domain as well as their responsibilities to protect and preserve ocean resources. UNCLOS also provides for international agreements and conventions on specific issues of concerns as well as regional agreement to protect regional seas. Being a framework convention, all other global conventions covering specific areas, are generally read subject to the UNCLOS. There are innumerable international conventions on the marine pollutions, fisheries management and other environmental issues. The parties to these conventions are obliged to implement these provisions at national level. Some of them are non-binding in nature. These conventions are effective only when the parties to these conventions seriously implement the provisions.

Table 11: International Conventions on Marine Pollution and Fishery Management	
Issues	**Convention**
Marine Pollution	The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954
	Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958
	The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969
	The International Convention on the Establishment of an

	International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971
	The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, 1972
	The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)
	The Montreal Guidelines on Land-based Marine Pollution, 1985
	The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990 (OPRC)
	The International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996
	International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, 2001
	The Ballast Water Management Convention, 2004
	The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009
Fishery Management	FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 1993
	UN Fish Stocks Agreement,1995
	FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries1995
	International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 2001
	FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 2009
Climate Change	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,1994
	Kyoto Protocol, 2005

	Paris Climate Agreement

As a party to the UNCLOS, Sri Lanka is obliged to cooperate with the international community in implementation of the global instruments to deal with the marine pollution. Though Sri Lanka has not signed all the conventions mentioned in Table 11, it is party to most of the important conventions. On marine pollution, Sri Lanka is party to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958; International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, and, MARPOL. To implement the provisions of these conventions, Sri Lanka has updated its national law by enacting Marine Pollution Prevention Act No. 35 of 2008. Sri Lanka has not yet ratified the OPRC. However, it has formulated a national oil spill contingency plan (NOSCOP) in 1995 which was approved by the cabinet of ministers in 2004 (MEPA 2011). As oil exploration activities and number of ships navigating through Sri Lanka have increased after the Eelam War necessary steps were taken in 2012 to update and implement the NOSCOP.

Sri Lanka has not yet become a signatory to the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediment. However, MEPA in 2017 launched a project with the technical assistance of the IUCN for the Development of Policy Strategies and National Action Plan for Marine Protection in keeping with international conventions and Sustainable Development Goals. Sri Lanka works with the UNEP Global Programme of Action for the Protection of Marine Environment from Land and Sea Source Pollution.

Sri Lanka is a party to the legally binding Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 2009. It has prepared a National Plan of action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing in accordance with the guidelines given by the International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU Fishing (IPOA-IUU) adopted by Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). An amendment has also been made in its national legislation, FARA, to incorporate

provisions required to give effect to obligations of Sri Lanka under the UNCLOS, UN Fish Stocks Agreement, IOTC Agreement and IPOA-IUU (Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 2013). Even though officially Sri Lanka claims that necessary measures have been taken to prevent IUU following the international guidelines, in reality it has not implemented them properly.

Sri Lanka signed the Paris Climate Agreement in April 2016 and it was ratified by the Sri Lankan Parliament in September the same year. It has also adopted a National Adaptation Plan following the guidelines of the UNFCC. The Paris Agreement has made provisions for facilities to fund measures taken by the poor countries to reduce emissions level. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) approved a grant of US$38 million to finance a climate adaptation project (Project FP016) in Sri Lanka (*Colombo Page*, 4 July 2016). The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has approved grants of approximately US$259 million, to finance 47 climate change projects in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka is thus party to many of the global efforts seeking to manage the marine environment. Nonetheless, just being party to these global conventions does not help. As a developing country, Sri Lanka needs assistance too from international community to implement the commitments. International organisations like the UNEP, ADB, World Bank and IMO provide technical and material assistance to Sri Lanka to implement the provisions of the international convention. UNEP has been assisting Sri Lanka in several environmental projects. Immediately following the 2004 tsunami, it assisted in Sri Lanka the environmental assessment of tsunami impacts and rehabilitation activities including mangroves and coastal ecosystem rehabilitation projects. UNEP also provides training course on Ecosystem-based Disaster Risk Reduction for Sustainable Development in Sri Lanka.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has provided significant assistance to Sri Lanka for coastal and marine resource management. During 1969-2002, ADB extended 11 Technical Assistance Grants to Sri Lanka amounting to US$4.46 million and six loans amounting 106.07 (ADB 2002). ADB also provides technical assistance to the Climate

Change Secretariat of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources on climate change adaptation.

The World Bank provided US$75 million for tsunami emergency recovery programme project for the period February 2005-September 2008. Further, the World Bank assisted the Government of Sri Lanka with US$14.80 million to improve the institutional and policy framework for environmental management during 1997-2003. The Ministry of Disaster Management together with the World Bank launched a Climate Resilient Programme in 2014 (World Bank 2014).

Conclusion

Sri Lanka has made considerable progress in the management of marine resources by incorporating some important management strategies such as integrated approach, special area management approach and sustainable development. While these approaches are underlined in the periodic environmental policies and action plans, implementation of these measures is a real issue. Despite having an integrated coastal zone management plan, sectoral management of the marine resources takes precedence as all issues in the marine and coastal areas are not covered by the coastal zone management plan. Sri Lanka lacks a comprehensive maritime policy which covers all issues of concerns in the maritime zone. Lack of comprehensive approach and presence of both sectoral and integrated coastal zone management complicate the national effort on ocean governance. Additionally, lack of resources in terms of money, scientific knowhow and infrastructure affect the management of marine resources. Sri Lanka does get regular assistance from the international community, but it is mostly project based and meant for specific areas and limited period. Hence, global assistance cannot alone help Sri Lanka to have an effective management system, until and unless the country improves its domestic capability. Sri Lanka lays too much emphasis on regulation such as banning illegal activities without addressing the socio-economic issues of the local community and the users of marine resources. Sri Lanka, therefore, needs a comprehensive maritime management approach with special focus on overall governance and socio-economic aspects of the users of the marine resources.

Conclusion

Sri Lanka's perspective on maritime security has shifted from a state centric traditional approach to a comprehensive approach, which includes both military and non-military dimensions. Since its independence, the leadership was preoccupied with the fear of possible military challenges from the state actors. Small size, geo-strategic importance, inadequate resources and weak economic and military infrastructure also contributed to this fear. The main security concern of the island was largely the perceived threat of coming under the domination of the big powers which have had strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. It was believed that due to Sri Lanka's strategic location, countries with ambitions of dominating the Indian Ocean would try to control the island. Secondly, Sri Lanka would unnecessarily get dragged in any power politics among the rivals in the Indian Ocean.

The concern, however, was not unjustified. All the important big powers had placed Sri Lanka in their security considerations as it lies in the vicinity of the maritime trading routes in the Indian Ocean, which connect Europe and the Middle East to China and the rest of Asia. The country possesses Trincomalee, one of the best natural harbours in the world. Thirdly, it is an ideal location to monitor and dominate Asia.

While all these factors together have caused genuine concern, political ideology of the ruling elites has also influenced Sri Lanka's security perceptions. Therefore, the sources of maritime security threat kept on changing with the change of government in the country. Sri Lanka's foreign policy in the first decade of its independence was based on the perception that due to the strategic importance of the island, India had an imperialistic intention towards the island. This perception was nurtured by some other leaders in the later years too. During the 1970s, militarisation of the Indian Ocean by the super powers was perceived as a main security concern.

Because of this varied threat perceptions, views were also divergent on the issue of military bases in the country. On the one hand, the island expressed its security concerns

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of coming under the influence of big powers, on the other it voluntarily sought to offer base facilities to extra-regional powers in return of security assistance. The interest in foreign military bases was justified on the ground that it would protect the country from naval aggression from a third country, perceivably from India, in case it ever had an expansionist intention. However, the SLFP government refused to endorse this view as it did not perceive India as a major threat. Thus, the security concern resulting from the state actors was mostly perceived than real. Perceptions depended mostly on the foreign policy orientation of the political leadership.

The real challenges to its maritime security came from non-state actors in the form of home-grown maritime militancy. Failure to maintain social and political cohesion and mis-governance, which has resulted in political and ethnic problems, have impacted maritime security. Sveics (1969) and Rahman (1989) have talked about how poor governance and fragile political administration make smaller states vulnerable to big power intervention. In Sri Lanka's case, it can be observed that all these factors have made the country vulnerable to military security challenges. The Sea Tigers threatened Sri Lanka's territorial integrity and sovereignty by establishing de-facto control over two-thirds of the country's territorial waters for almost two decades. The Sri Lankan Navy was denied access to these waters. Sri Lanka was ill prepared to deal with this kind of maritime security challenges from within, as its entire focus was on the external sources of insecurity.

Sri Lanka also experienced a similar kind of shock, when the 2004 tsunami hit the country. Sri Lanka is a disaster prone state. Flood and drought are perennial problems, but the impact of the tsunami was unprecedented. The assessment made in the post-tsunami period points out that the country could have avoided loss of many lives, properties and infrastructure had there been a system of disaster preparedness and early warning. This disaster caused by the marine hazards made the authorities realise that the country is vulnerable to low frequency–high intensity disasters. Therefore, the government has realised the need to adopt a comprehensive approach to maritime security. A state centric approach is not sufficient to address the problem. A

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comprehensive approach to maritime security demands a concerted effort of military, non-military, political and diplomatic responses at national, regional and global levels.

The existing theories on security and foreign policy behaviour of small states suggest that they generally have a low perceived notion about their own capability to obtain security (Rothstein 1968, Vayrynen 1971, Keohane 1969). Therefore, they rely on bigger powers particularly on extra-regional powers for their security. Small states prefer to have security cooperation with extra-regional powers than neighbouring regional powers. Due to security concerns from regional neighbours, smaller states use the policy of balance of power, first, to ensure that regional power does not dominate the system; second, to ensure that uninterrupted military assistance is obtained at the time of need (Staden 1995).

The study finds that Sri Lanka does not have a proper maritime strategy to respond to security challenges. The responses so far have been ad hoc and are constantly changing with a change of government, threat perceptions and compulsions of the ruling elite. Knowing well that it did not have the capability to deal with a belligerent external naval power, Sri Lanka adopted a defensive strategy. Small states generally follow defensive strategy by adopting the policy of neutrality (Vital 1967: 144) or by entering into an alliance politics with big power. Sri Lanka, however, did not follow either of these policies. It had a 'non-allied security partnership' (Shambaugh 1985) with its former colonial state through a military pact. However, with the change of government, Sri Lanka's defensive strategies also got changed, which included the policy of countervailing the regional power in its neighbourhood and, at the same time, engagement and friendship with all, and also establishing broader linkages with the international system to sensitise and seek cooperation to address its security concerns.

Theories suggest that countering or balancing a regional neighbour with the help of distant power is a common practice among the small states. However, for Sri Lanka, this policy has been the most counter-productive. Even though it tried to counter India, it could not succeed. The policy also contributed to the security dilemma of Sri Lanka. In

fact, Sri Lanka had to face military intervention for a brief period for trying to counter India. The most important reason why countering India does not work for Sri Lanka is the fact that India is the most capable maritime power in the region. At the time of need, India can provide the quickest assistance to Sri Lanka as compared to other powers. Since both countries share common waters, they have common security concerns. Therefore, security engagement with a regional neighbour would protect mutual interests. Defence agreement with the UK might have helped Sri Lanka to improve its naval capability to some extent, but the maritime interests of the former were granted more attention than Sri Lanka's need.

Under the defence cooperation agreement, Sri Lanka's maritime security was looked after by the British. But the naval strategy that Britain prepared for Sri Lanka was more in the line of the commonwealth strategy than addressing specific security concerns of Sri Lanka. As the vessels acquired during the period suited the purpose of British interests in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka did not have any suitable vessel to protect its immediate maritime security interests. Thus, it can be argued that countering a regional neighbour does not promote Sri Lanka's interest. The best policy option for Sri Lanka is to maintain friendship with all powers

Seselgyte (2013), however, argues that small states have limited opportunities to shape and implement independent security policies. The Sri Lankan case reveals that if there is a political will and determination, a small country can create great opportunities despite its vulnerabilities. The Sri Lankan Navy, after receiving setback in the first three Eelam wars, fought the fourth Eelam war with a new strategy, equipment, planning and resources, which played a crucial role in eliminating militancy in the country. The Navy got all the support from the government as both the government and the armed forces were on the same line on the issue elimination of militancy. Usually, a small country gives less priority to development of military due to the lack of resources. But Sri Lanka has made huge investments on the navy to develop its capabilities as well as used its diplomacy to get support from foreign countries. During the last Eelam war Sri Lanka could manage to get assistance from those countries which were refusing earlier to

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provide any weapons. This experience negates the view that small states do not have diplomatic capabilities.

Sri Lanka has previously exhibited its diplomatic skills in the 1970s when it took up the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal and undertook a diplomatic campaign for its success. The resolution of the maritime boundary dispute with India in 1974 was also an example of Sri Lanka's diplomatic skills. However, Cohen (1989) argues that negotiations can bring a positive outcome only if big power interests are involved. Many in India too believed that the maritime boundary problem between India and Sri Lanka was resolved because India wanted it to be. In the case of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal also, it was seen that despite the success in passing the resolution in the UN General Assembly, it could not be implemented as the two super powers did not agree to the proposal. In fact, Sri Lanka itself lost interest in the proposal due to its economic compulsions and dependence on the super powers. Thus, it can be argued that however serious a small state's effort is, it tends to face limitations due to its vulnerabilities.

Keohane (1971), however, argues that weakness not only entails liabilities for small states, but also creates certain bargaining power. He says that geo-strategically important small country may use the tool of blackmailing or bargaining with its alliance partner or non-allied security partner. Sri Lanka can use its strategic location as a bargaining power. But it needs to be very careful while using its bargaining power. It should not be seen as an attempt to countervail or balance one power against another. In today's regional and global order, it is conducive for Sri Lanka to seek assistance from all the countries across the world. During the cold war period, military cooperation with extra-regional powers was a sensitive issue. As a non-aligned country, Sri Lanka had to be very careful in its military cooperation with any of the two super powers. Secondly, as a small country, Sri Lanka could not ignore security sensitivities of regional power in the neighbourhood. During the cold war period, India was very much concerned over the presence of extra-regional powers in its vicinity. Hence, it was watchful of Sri Lanka's military ties with the extra-regional powers. But with the end of the cold war, India has become less

worried about the presence of extra-regional powers provided they do not affect its security interests.

In the changing world order, there is also shift in approach of the big powers to achieve their interests. When they are still competing for supremacy in the Indian Ocean, they are also cooperating with each other to protect their common interests. Now all the stakeholders feel the necessity to protect the sea lines of communication from piracy, terrorism and other illegal activities to ensure smooth flow of international trade. In this atmosphere of cooperation, it has become much more easier for Sri Lanka to forge maritime security cooperation with several countries not only in dealing with military challenges, but also in addressing non-military challenges and improving its maritime capabilities. Sri Lanka does participate in combined maritime exercises and joint task forces to tackle disaster and illegal activities both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The discussions above validates the hypothesis that 'limited military capability and resources make smaller island states dependent on external sources for their security'. Multilateral and bilateral diplomacy is used to sensitise the world community of the need to protect their insecurity. However, such diplomatic efforts do not guarantee a free flow of international support. International support is determined by the strategic importance of the insecure state.

At the beginning of the study, three questions have been posed: What are the challenges Sri Lanka faces in or from the maritime domain? How does Sri Lanka respond to such maritime security challenges? Does Sri Lanka have the capability to deal with such challenges?

The study finds that Sri Lanka's maritime security is not militarily threatened by state actors. The real threat came from within--both military (from non-state actors) and non-military sources. Despite having security concerns, Sri Lanka has never come under any military aggression from a state actor in search of naval base or other maritime facilities in the island. The external powers could have acquired military base facilities in the island by providing economic, political and security assistance to Sri Lanka. In fact, the

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Sri Lankan leadership had shown willingness in the 1980s to offer such facilities to the USA out of threat perception. The military intervention India made in the island in the 1980s was not to acquire a naval base or occupy its territory, but to protect its own security interests. There is no denial of the fact the Sri Lanka is always in the strategic calculations of the big powers which want to protect their interests in the Indian Ocean. As Azar (1973) says, the geo-strategic importance makes small states a pawn in the game of international power politics. Sri Lanka has felt the pulls and pressures from the competing powers in the Indian Ocean and its strategic autonomy was at times undermined but its maritime security never came under the direct physically attack of state actors.

As a matter of fact, the real physical attack to its maritime security came from the militants. At present Sri Lanka does not have any problem of militancy, but the country is susceptible to internal political disorder and challenges. Security of a small state means not only the absence of threat but also the absence of vulnerability. Without addressing the vulnerabilities Sri Lanka cannot ensure its maritime security. Unfortunately, the Sri Lankan leadership lacks political will to rectify the mistakes made in the nation–building process in the initial years of independence. As a result, country suffers from political fragility and poor economic growth.

Nevertheless, the country has developed its military infrastructure, particularly the navy in a significant manner. With an improved naval capability, Sri Lanka has successfully responded to the challenge of militancy to the maritime security. Today its navy is capable enough to tackle any kind of home-grown maritime militancy. However, the country has failed to address the root cause of militancy. As a result, the island remains vulnerable to military challenges from within.

Further, Sri Lanka's maritime security is extremely vulnerable to the environmental challenges, which cannot be addressed with a military approach alone. The country has initiated policies to improve the management of marine resources by incorporating some of the important management strategies. However, implementation of these measures is a

real issue. Due to its failure in generating employment opportunities and lack of investment in sustainable development, the island remains immensely vulnerable to the marine environmental security challenges too.

No doubt, Sri Lanka experiences economic and political vulnerabilities, but they can be tackled if the country's leadership is able to develop a comprehesive policy. Thus, Sri Lanka can turn many of its vulnerabilities into opportunities and avail assistance from the international community without losing its strategic autonomy, provided its leadership choses to pursue a balanced foreign policy.

Appendix No.1

United Kingdom-Ceylon Defence Agreement

Whereas Ceylon has reached the stage in constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown; And whereas it is in the mutual interest of Ceylon and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the necessary measures should be taken for the effectual protection and defence of the territories of both and that the necessary facilities should be afforded for this purpose; Therefore the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows:-

(1) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon will give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide. The Government of the United Kingdommay base such naval and air force and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for these purposes, and as may be mutually agreed.

(2) The Government of Ceylon will grant to the Government of the United Kingdom all the necessary facilities for the objects mentioned in Article 1 as may be mutually agreed. These facilities will include the use of naval and air bases and ports and military establishments and the use of telecommunications facilities, and the right of service courts and authorities to exercise such control and jurisdiction over members of the said Forces as they exercise at present.

(3) The Government of the United Kingdom will furnish the Government of Ceylon with such military assistance as may from time to time be required towards the training and development of Ceylonese armed forces.

(4) The two Governments will establish such administrative machinery as they may agree to be desirable for the purpose of co-operation in regard to defence matters, and to co-ordinate and determine the defence requirements of both Governments.

(5) This Agreement will take effect on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force.

Done in duplicate, at Colombo, this 11th day of November, 1947.

Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Henry Moore

Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon.

D.S. Senanayake

Source: Jayawardane (2005).

Appendix No. 2

**Agreement between Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka
"On The Boundary in Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related
Matters",
New Delhi, June 26, 1974 and Colombo, June 28, 1974.**

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Sri Lanka,

Desiring to determine the boundary line in the historic waters between India and Sri Lanka and to settle the related matters in a manner which is fair and equitable to both sides,

Having examined the entire question from all angles and taken into account the historical and other evidence and legal aspects thereof,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The boundary between India and Sri Lanka in waters from Adam's Bridge to Palk Strait shall be arcs of Great Circles between the following positions, in the sequence given below, defined by latitude and longitude:

Position 1 : 10° 05´ North,   80° 03´ East
Position 2 : 09° 57´ North,   79° 35´ East
Position 3 : 09° 40.15´ North   79° 22.60´ East
Position 4 : 09° 21.80´ North   79° 30.70´ East
Position 5 : 09° 13´ North   79° 32´ East
Position 6 : 09° 06´ North   79° 32´ East

Article 2

The coordinates of the positions specified in Article 1 are geographical coordinates and the straight lines connecting them are indicated in the chart annexed hereto which has been signed by the surveyors authorized by the two Governments, respectively.

Article 3

The actual location of the aforementioned positions at sea and on the seabed shall be determined by a method to be mutually agreed upon by the surveyors authorized for the purpose by the two Governments, respectively.

Article 4

Each country shall have sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction and control over the waters, the islands, the continental shelf and the subsoil thereof, falling on its own side of the aforesaid boundary.

Article 5

Subject to the foregoing, Indian fisherman and pilgrims will enjoy access to visit Kachchativu as hitherto, and will not be required by Sri Lanka to obtain travel documents or visas for these purposes.

Article 6

The vessels of India and Sri Lanka will enjoy in each other's waters such rights as they have traditionally enjoyed therein.

Article 7

If any single geological, petroleum or natural gas structure or field, or any single geological structure or field of any other mineral deposit, including sand or gravel, extends across the boundary referred to in Article 1 and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of the boundary is exploited, in whole or part in, from the other side of the boundary, the two countries shall seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure or field shall be most effectively exploited and the manner in which the proceeds deriving therefrom shall be apportioned.

Article 8

This Agreement shall be subject to ratification. It shall enter into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification* which will take place as soon as possible.

Sd/- Indira Gandhi   **Sd/- Sirima R.D. Bandaranaike**
for the Government of   **for the Government of the**
The Republic of India   **Republic of Sri Lanka**
New Delhi   26.6.74   **Colombo   28.6.74**
Source: Bhasin 2001

Appendix 3

Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka, Colombo, July 29, 1987

The Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and **the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,** His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987;

Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka and

acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well-being and prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka.

Having this day entered into the following Agreement to fulfil this objective;

1.1 **Desiring** to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka;

1.2 **Acknowledging** that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society consisting *inter alia,* of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors), and Burghers;

1.3 **Recognising** that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured;

1.4 **Also recognizing** that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking people, together in this territory with other ethnic groups;

1.5 **Conscious** of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi-ethnic, multi lingual and multi-religious plural society, in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations;

2. **Resolve that:**

2.1 Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining Provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a Referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:

2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (*i.e.*) from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.8 to the date of the

referendum as specified in para 2.3, the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.

2.3 There will be a referendum on or before 31st December, 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether:

(A) The Eastern province should remain linked with the Northern province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the Northern Province as specified in para 2.2, or

(B) The Eastern province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.

The President may, at his discretion decide to postpone such a referendum.

2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence, or other reasons, will have right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created.

2.5 The referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief Justice, a member appointed by the President, nominated by the government of Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by the President, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the Eastern Province.

2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the referendum.

2.7 Meeting and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will be allowed before the referendum.

2.8 Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in any event before December 31, 1987. Indian observers will be invited for elections to the Provincial Council of the North and East.

2.9 The emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern provinces by August 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the island within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on May 25, 1987. The process of Surrendering of arms and the confining the security personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.

2.10 The Government of Sri Lanka will utilize for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and Eastern provinces the same organizations and mechanisms of Government as are used in the rest of the country.

2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back to the mainstream of national life. India will cooperate in the process.

2.12 The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and expect all others to do likewise.

2.13 If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the government of Sri Lanka will implement the relevant proposals forthwith.

2.14 The Government of India will under-work and guarantee the resolutions, and cooperate in the implementation of these proposals.

2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986 Residual matters not finalized during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this agreement. These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India co-operating directly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.

2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the following actions if any militant group operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely:

(A) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.

(B) The Indian Navy Coast Guard will cooperate with the Sri Lanka Navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.

(C) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India will cooperate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.

(D) The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian Citizens to India who are resident there concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.

(E) The Governments of India and Sri Lanka, will cooperate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

2.17 The Government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the Northern and Eastern provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this agreement. The Government of India will extend full cooperation to the Government of Sri Lanka in this regard.

2.18 The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official languages.

3. This agreement and the annexure there-to shall come into force upon signature.

In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto. Done in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the Twenty ninth day of July of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.

Junius Richard Jayewardene   President of Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of the Republic of India

Annexure to the Agreement

1. His Excellency the Prime Minister of India and His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agree that the referendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its sub-paragraphs of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Election Commission of India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.

2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Government of India to be invited by the President of Sri Lanka.

3. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agrees that the Home Guards would be disbanded and all paramilitary personnel will be withdraw from the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fare elections to the Council.

The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such paramilitary forces, which came into being due to ethnic violence into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.

4. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that the Tamil militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lankan Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross.

5. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that a joint Indo-Sri Lankan observers group consisting of qualified representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka would monitor the cessation oh hostilities from 31 July, 1987.

6. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that in terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(c) of the Agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.

Prime Minister of India

July 29, 1987

Excellency,

Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millennia and more, and recognizing the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to

allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.

In this spirit, you had during the course of discussions, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:

(i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations.

(ii) Trincomalee or any other port in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.

(iii) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.

(iv) Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organizations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

In the same spirit India will:

(i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.

(ii) Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces.

India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.

Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours Sincerely,
(Rajiv Gandhi)

His Excellency
Mr. J.R. Jayewardene,
President of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Colombo

President of Sri Lanka

July 29, 1987

Excellency

Please refer to your letter dated the 29th July 1987, which reads as follows:

Excellency,

Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millennia and more, and recognizing the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.

2. In this spirit, you had, during the course our discussions, agreed to meet some of India's concern as follows:

(i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations.

(ii) Trincomalee or any other port in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.

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3.   In the same spirit India will:
(i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.

(ii) Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces.

4.   India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.

5.   Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration."

This is to confirm that the above correctly sets out the understanding reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

<div align="right">

Sd/-
(J.R. Jayewardene)
President

</div>

His Excellency
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of the Republic of India, New Delhi.

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Appendix No.1

United Kingdom-Ceylon Defence Agreement

Whereas Ceylon has reached the stage in constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown;

And whereas it is in the mutual interest of Ceylon and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the necessary measures should be taken for the effectual protection and defence of the territories of both and that the necessary facilities should be afforded for this purpose;

Therefore the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows:-

(1) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon will give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide. The Government of the United Kingdommay base such naval and air force and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for these purposes, and as may be mutually agreed.

(2) The Government of Ceylon will grant to the Government of the United Kingdom all the necessary facilities for the objects mentioned in Article 1 as may be mutually agreed. These facilities will include the use of naval and air bases and ports and military establishments and the use of telecommunications facilities, and the right of service courts and authorities to exercise such control and jurisdiction over members of the said Forces as they exercise at present.

(3) The Government of the United Kingdom will furnish the Government of Ceylon with such military assistance as may from time to time be required towards the training and development of Ceylonese armed forces.

(4) The two Governments will establish such administrative machinery as they may agree to be desirable for the purpose of co-operation in regard to defence matters, and to co-ordinate and determine the defence requirements of both Governments.

(5) This Agreement will take effect on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force.

Done in duplicate, at Colombo, this 11th day of November, 1947.

Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Henry Moore

Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon.

D.S. Senanayake

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