

**CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING CHRETIEN
PREMIERSHIP, 1993-2003**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**Canadian Foreign Policy during Chretien Premiership, 1993-2003**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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Mummy-Papa

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List of Acronyms

AFN	Assembly of First Nations
APL	Anti-Personnel Landmines
APM	Anti-Personnel Mines
AU	African Union
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BNA Acts	British North America Acts
CANZ	Canada, Australia and New Zealand
CCW/CCWC	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference of Disarmament
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CUSFTA	Canadian-United States Free Trade Agreement
DEAIT	Department of External Affairs and International Trade
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defense
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAST	Free and Secure Trade
FLQ	Front de Liberation du Quebec
G7	Group of 7
G20	Group of 20
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee on the Red Cross
ICJ	International Court of Justice

ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDA	Disarmament Division of DFAIT
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRPA	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
LSN	Landmine Survivors Network
MAC	Mines Action Canada
MI	Medico International
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North American Treaty Organization
NDP	New Democratic Party
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	Organization of American Union
P5	Permanent Five Members of United Nations Security Council (United States of America, Britain, Russia, China and France)
PMO	Prime Minister's Office OR Office of the Prime Minister
PQ	Parti Quebecois
PR	Permanent Residence
PSEPC	Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VVAF	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation

Chapter I

Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union brought a significant change in the international system. The United States became the sole remaining 'superpower'. Having the United States as a next-door neighbour increased the challenges for a country like Canada, which was considered a 'middle power' in the power structure of the international system. Its prospect of becoming a satellite of the United States was very high. The major concern of the Canadian policymakers was to save Canada from such a constrained status in the international community. Undoubtedly due to the transformed environment, trends in Canadian foreign policy changed. It was evident that Canadian foreign policy had to operate under a complex and uncertain environment. A new set of questions concerning how and where Canada fits into the international system emerged. It became apparent that Canada's 'middlepowermanship', a key basis of Canadian foreign policy during the Cold War, was at stake. The question of the relevance of a 'middle power' came to the forefront. The major problem for Canada was to clarify its position in the changed world order due to which a grave situation before Canada emerged.

In 1993, shortly after the end of the Cold War, the Canadian government changed, and the Liberal party of Canada came to power for the next decade under the leadership of Prime Minister Jean Chretien. Canada was then also facing two significant domestic challenges which complicated the situation for its foreign policymakers. One was from the francophone province of Quebec where nationalists wanted to separate it from Canada, although the result of a referendum in the province in October 1995 kept the country intact only by a narrow margin. The other challenge was the massive fiscal deficit and resulting budget cuts which impacted the Canadian presence in international affairs within and outside the United Nations.

A peaceful change of government is a normal phenomenon in any democratic country. Being a country with high democratic values such a change in government was not new to Canada and Canadians but these changes usually brought about some fundamental transformation in Canadian foreign policy outlook. Moreover, change in the international system, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower contributed to the changes in Canadian foreign policy profile.

In Canada's 35th general election held in November 1993, the Liberal Party led by Jean Chretien emerged victorious and formed a majority government with massive support, to become the Prime Minister of Canada. The Liberal Party came to power and formed a majority government after almost one decade in opposition.¹ Having seen the charismatic leadership of Liberal Party Prime Ministers such as—Lester B. Pearson from 1963 to 1968 as well as Pierre Trudeau from 1968 to 1979 and again from 1980 to 1984, the people of Canada had high expectations from Chretien's government that too in a very different and challenging time. The Chretien decade lasted from November 1993 to December 2003 as Chretien formed majority governments in 1993, 1997 and 2000 Parliamentary elections.

In the post-Cold War era, Canadian foreign policymakers were cautious in weaving a new fabric for Canadian foreign policy. Since Canada was struggling with its internal problems, policymakers waited for the right time. As soon as the Quebec referendum of October 1995 endorsed a united Canada a sea change in Canadian foreign policy took place. In January 1996 Lloyd Axworthy became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chretien's government. After assuming the portfolio, Axworthy proposed several innovative ideas. One was the concept of human security, inserted into Canadian foreign policy by Axworthy himself. Under human security, several other concepts evolved, notably, the democratisation of foreign policy, New Multilateralism, Responsibility to Protect and the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

Literature Review, Research Questions and Hypotheses

This study on the foreign policy of Canada during the premiership of Chretien revolves around a central question focussing on why Canadian foreign policy of Canada during the Chretien decade switch from an emphasis on national unity (1993-95) to human security (1995-99) to transnational security (2001-03)? This central question attempts to bring out the changes that took place in Canadian foreign policy. It also makes an effort to understand the reasons due to which the trends in foreign policy were changing.

¹ From September 1984 to November 1993 the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada was in power under the leadership of Brian Mulroney until June 1993 and then by Kim Campbell for the rest of the period.

Review of Relevant Literature

The primary and secondary literature on the Chretien period in Canadian foreign policy overwhelmingly noticed changes in foreign policy in a transformed world order. Not only foreign policy scholars but also the policymakers focused on this transformation. Almost every foreign policy scholar discusses the need for a change after the end of the Cold War. In the opening lines of an introductory chapter titled 'Contested Images' Canadian foreign policy scholar Andrew F. Cooper in his book *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (1997) wrote: "the time is ripe for a fundamental re-examination of the nature of Canadian foreign policy" (Cooper 1997: 1). He pointed to the changed world of the post-Cold War era where there was neither bipolarity nor ideological war. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the end of the Cold War, and the United States became the undisputed victor of the 'ideological' war which had lasted for four and a half decades. He further said that the changing world posed some serious threats to Canadian identity. The major question was—how and where Canada fits into the international system? No doubt, this 're-examination' of Canada's position and its relevance as a middle power in a very different world led policymakers to reconstruct the fabric of Canadian foreign policy. Canada had played a significant role in international affairs during the Cold War period and had gained a very distinct identity as a middle power. This identity was questioned as the Cold War came to an end. Depicting the challenge for policymakers Cooper wrote that after "the relative comfort extant during the Cold War years, Canadian foreign policy now has to operate under conditions of heightened complexity and uncertainty" (Cooper 1997: 1).

After proposing a new outlook for Canadian foreign policy, different scholars proposed different pathways by which Canada could achieve a new identity at the international stage as domestic and international challenges compelled Canada to adopt a new pattern of foreign policy. Cooper in his article *In Search of Niches: Saying 'Yes' or 'No' in Canada's International Relations* (1995) recommended that rather than focusing everywhere without getting good results, Canada should involve itself only in those areas where it had a comparative advantage and expertise. This careful and selective response by Canada in foreign policy was termed by him as 'niche diplomacy'. He argued that this approach was the best approach for Canada because of the fiscal constraints the country was facing, the increasing gap between Canadian global commitments and the changed context of the post-Cold War period.

Evan H. Potter in his article *Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy* (1996-97) similarly said that due to the process of globalisation the task of multilateralism had become more and more complicated. The time had come when Canada should not involve itself everywhere but should take part in those issues which it can handle with more comfort and can produce reasonable output. According to him, the private and philanthropic organisations of Canada could reduce the burden on the Canadian government by doing such tasks that used to be done by the government, such as—development assistance, mediation in conflict-ridden areas of the world and participation in international agreements. In this way, he came out with the new concept of 'privatization' of Canada's international relations.

Along with the domestic problems of fiscal deficits and budget cuts, Chretien government in its early years faced a challenge from Quebec, a French-speaking province of Canada. Quebec nationalists wanted to separate their province from Canada on a linguistic rationale. To resolve the Quebec question, a referendum took place in October 1995. In this referendum, with a narrow margin, the people of Quebec chose a 'united' Canada. As soon as the Quebec referendum supported an undivided Canada a drastic change took place in Canadian foreign policy. In January 1996, Jean Chretien appointed Llyod Axworthy as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Axworthy came out with an innovative idea of human security, propounded by the famous Pakistani economist Mehbub ul-Haq in 1994, to give a new direction to the Canadian foreign policy. Defining human security in his article *Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership* (1997) Axworthy wrote that human security "includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life and a guarantee of fundamental human rights" (Axworthy 1997: 184). The focus of the concept of human security is the individual being, yet it is not a traditional concept of security. The traditional concept of security revolves around state security or territorial security and is not concerned with the human being. The traditional concept of security gives importance to border security that was in vogue during the Cold War period. Significantly, the concept of human security has a very wide scope because it involves all the aspects of the well-being of an individual. As described by Axworthy, it encompassed "sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity" (Axworthy 1997: 184). Showing confidence in the capacity of the Canadian government Axworthy claimed that Canada had both capability and credibility to play a leadership role in support of human security in the developing world.

The concept of human security was a new way of changing the course of Canadian foreign policy. The concept is based on the notion that only securing the borders is not enough for a safe world and that the changed context demands the need for the re-evaluation of the traditional concept of security. In a later article *Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First* (2001) Axworthy wrote: "human security today puts people first and recognises that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security" (Axworthy 2001: 20).

In this way, the Chretien government focused on an issue that had not hitherto been given importance in the world order. A sea change thus came in the policies and practices of the Chretien government when Axworthy was appointed. The newly developed concept of human security gave a boost to foreign policy in Canada because many new ideas such as—niche diplomacy, new multilateralism and the democratisation of foreign policy became part of Canadian foreign policy priorities. Out of these, several new Canadian initiatives arose. The Landmine Ban Treaty (1997) is the best example of the democratisation of foreign policy as well as the new multilateralism. Similarly, the establishment of International Criminal Court² (2002) is an exclusive instance of the new multilateralism.

But the concept of human security could not sustain much, and a rude shock came with the 9/11 attack on American soil. The horrific terrorist attack took over 3000 lives, and the world witnessed the most fearful day of the 21st century. The security of the international borders again became an important issue in world politics and dismantled the concept of human security. The then Canadian Foreign Minister John Manley said that the world had changed for Canada after the incident.

Christopher S. Raj in his article titled 'Canada and International Terrorism Since 9/11' published in his edited volume *Canada's Global Engagements and Relations with India* (2007) said that the very next day, the incident changed the foreign as well as domestic policies of Canada. In his words "9/12 Canadian trade panic across the 49th parallel produced dynamic Canadian responses that transformed Canadian foreign and domestic policies in the post 9/11 years" (Raj 2007: 147). The shutdown of the porous border that Canada shares with the United States led to long traffic lines of raw material and finished

² The Rome Statute, adopted in July 1998, serves as a foundational and governing document of the International Criminal Court.

goods. This situation culminated in the loss of trade and related profit on both sides of the border. The terrorist attack influenced policymakers in Canada, and their focus shifted back to the security of the state and the citizens inside rather than the security of the individual abroad. Christopher S. Raj in the same article highlighted the following changes in Canadian policies. Shortly after the terrorist attack, Canada responded by passing the Anti-terrorism Act (2001), and it was alleged that the Act curtailed the civil liberties of the citizens. The Act was so stringent that not only demonstrations, strikes etc. came under the orbit of terrorist activities but also overlapped the writ of Habeas Corpus. After the 9/11 incident immigration policy also changed. In 2002 an act called the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, passed by the Chretien government, replaced the long-standing Immigration Act of 1976. Canada which used to celebrate its liberal and multicultural image in the world tried to control and regulate immigration to its land. The Canadian government also established the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) which was called the Canadian version of the United States' Department of Homeland Security. It shows that Canada took a U-turn on the concept of human security which it had been highlighting in the late 90's.

Devoting a whole chapter on the policies and moves of the Chretien government John Kirton in his book *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (2006) kept himself in one of the three schools which believes that Canada is a 'principal power' in the international system. According to him, Canada became more engaged in global politics under the Chretien government. The principal power school 'highlights Canada's rise to global leadership during the Chretien years'. Kirton further stated that "Canadian foreign policy became far more globally engaged, intrusive in the internal affairs of foreign societies around the world, and influential in creating a new Canadian like world order" (Kirton 2006: 156). Using complex neo-realist theory, he projected the Chretien period as one when Canadian foreign policy was hyperactive about the changed world order. He described how economic and trade agreements were negotiated in that period using all the possible methods like multilateralism, plurilateralism, bilateralism, unilateralism as well as continentalism. The use of military force by Canada in different regions of the world, as well as some other pressing issues of domestic and international importance, were presented to show that Canada is close to 'a principal power position in a rapidly changing world' under the leadership of Jean Chretien.

But Kim Richard Nossal has a different viewpoint. In his book *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (1997), he says that the post-Cold War era for Canadian foreign policy was an era of confusion and the dominant ideas on foreign policy were 'in flux'. Presenting his views about Canadian foreign policy, he said: "In the 1990s, one can see evidence of different ideas about Canada's proper place in the international system" (Nossal 1997: 160). In an article titled *Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of 'Good International Citizenship' in Canadian Foreign Policy* which he wrote a year after his book mentioned above, Nossal blamed the Liberal government for pursuing policies for electoral mileage by keeping themselves away from the foreign policies of the previous government. In his words: "Trying to do foreign policy differently from the Conservative often meant doing the exact opposite of what the Mulroney government had done" (Nossal 1998: 94). In the same article, he described the Canadian diplomacy as 'Pinchpenny Diplomacy' and said that Canada was neither following the policy of internationalism nor the policy of isolationism but the Canadian image declined in the changed environment.

Following the same line of argument, Douglas Alan Ross says that in the changed circumstances Canada had to change its policies. In his article, *Canada and the World at Risk: Depression, War and Isolation for the 21st Century?* (1996-97) he presented a gloomy picture of Canada when he said that on the eve of the development of the new century Canada had a 'poor' foreign policy and national economic planning. He is of the view that though the end of the Cold War brought a new era, yet the balance of power politics and coercive diplomacy were still in vogue. He further blamed the Canadian government and said that cutting down the military budget was a sign of military weakness on the security front, which made Canada vulnerable and thus put Canada at risk. Similarly, Jean-Francois Rioux and Robin Hay (1998-99) also noticed a declining trend in Canadian foreign policy. They blamed the Chretien government for not following what the Liberal Party Red Book³ had promised at the time of 1993 general election. The Red Book had emphasised that domestic and foreign policy were not distinct from each other but closely linked. Along the same lines, the Chretien government produced the Defence White Paper and Foreign Policy White Paper popularly known as *Canada in the World* (1994) which argued that defence and foreign policy change was required. But the deeds of the government never followed the White Papers. According to them there was no wrong in the selectivity of the response

³ The election manifesto of the Liberal Party titled 'Creating Opportunities' also known as Red Book because of the colour of the cover page of the document.

as such but only focusing on economic aspects, and the promotion of trade and commerce can never be the internationalist approach for which the liberal party was well known. They said that the use of domestic and international constraints as excuses would only degrade the image of Canada as a liberal internationalist. In such a scenario, budget cuts in peacekeeping and development assistance affected Canadian foreign policy.

These views of Canadian foreign policy scholars very well depicted the causes and consequences of the policies of the Chretien government but their focus was only on political and economic outcomes. These writers did not mention public opinion on the policies of the government. Did the general public of Canada want Canada to follow different policies or did the civil society support the agenda of the Chretien government? Such questions have an essential place in a democratic and literate country. The scholars did not discuss the viewpoint of the Conservative Party which was in opposition. This research work explores the above questions and analyses the extent of support of the general public for the Chretien government policies and their impact on the entire nation as a whole.

Research Questions

- How did the end of the Cold War pose severe challenges to the identity of Canada for the Chretien government?
- What were the primary domestic obstacles faced by the Chretien government in its early years?
- Why did Chretien government shift its focus on global issues such as humanitarian intervention?
- How was the middle power approach replaced by the New Multilateralism? Did Niche Diplomacy pay real dividends to Canada?
- Did 9/11 compel Canada to give up the ‘democratization of foreign policy’ and to pursue the national security concept?

Hypotheses

- The more the post-Cold War international order emerged, the more the Chretien government focused on human security, new multilateralism and democratisation of Canadian foreign policymaking.

- The greater the financial constraints on Canada's federal government as measured by government deficits and accumulated debt of the total percentage of GDP, greater was the reliance in Canadian foreign policy on Niche Diplomacy and the New Multilateralism rather than middle-power diplomacy of old.
- The more the deadly global terrorist incidents in and near Canada that killed Canadians with the shock of 9/11 as the peak, the more the Canadian foreign policy shifted from a focus on human security to a focus on transnational security.

The Canadian foreign policy according to John Kirton (1983) can be seen through three critical theories—peripheral dependence, liberal internationalism and complex neo-realism—where Canada is seen respectively as the satellite of the United States, as an internationalist middle power, and as a principal power in the world. The study traces the underlying nuances of Canadian foreign policy in Chretien period in relation to these three theories. The decade-long period of Chretien's government matches almost all the theories to varying degrees. With their help, the fundamental, as well as the twists and turns in Canadian foreign policy, can also be traced.

The study is based on the relevant literature available in the field. Primary and secondary sources have been used. Primary sources include government documents, party manifestoes, personal interviews and the statements of the government or its representatives in the parliament or on international platforms. Secondary sources include books and articles of international as well as Canadian scholars on the subject. This study also used internet sources like the government websites of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade now known as Global Affairs Canada, Canadian International Development Assistance and others as well as articles from academic journals. Interviews and lectures of different scholars related to this field have also been incorporated to understand the aspects of the concepts presented in the research work.

Major Determinants of Canadian Foreign Policy

Before looking deep into Canadian foreign policy under the premiership of Jean Chretien, it is useful to understand the policy-making process in Canada. Foreign policy making is not a small task and can't be done by a single institution/department/individual. Undoubtedly, foreign policy is made with the help of different ministries, departments and offices of the government. Societal actors do play a crucial role in determining the foreign

policy of any country, and Canada is not an exception to this. It is important to note that not only domestic but also international determinants influence the making of foreign policy.

Individual and Governmental Determinants

Canada follows the parliamentary form of government in which the executive branch of the federal government controls the legislature. In a parliamentary system, Prime Minister is the head of the government who appoints ministers in his cabinet. The cabinet plays a crucial role in making policies for the country. Before looking into several other governmental factors involved in decision making it is pertinent to examine different views on the role of Prime Minister in Canadian foreign policy making by competing primary school of thoughts. John Kirton (2006) argued that there exist three major schools of thoughts. First and the long-dominant school featured 'international fate' as the most crucial reason that influences the decision making of the Prime Minister. This school of thought is developed by James Eayrs (1967), in his famous work titled *Fate and Will in Foreign Policy*, who belong to the first generation of Canadian foreign policy scholars. It was later developed by Kim Richard Nossal (1997) in his work *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Both the scholars argued that every Prime Minister of Canada had to overwhelmingly rely on the international situation or external determinants while taking decisions on foreign policy. Questioning the locus of authority in Canadian foreign policymaking, Nossal argued: "One cannot understand the locus of authority for foreign policy decisions without referring to the nature of the contemporary international system" (Nossal 1997: 175). This is true, particularly when "the external environment is marked by tight Cold War like priorities, penetrating dependencies, constraining international institutions and acute international crisis all created and controlled by hegemonic state" (Kirton 2006: 205).

The second school argued that apart from the Prime Minister the foreign ministry also matters a lot in foreign policymaking. This school is of the view that a foreign minister who takes an interest in innovative foreign policy and possesses exposure to foreign affairs can influence foreign policy more than any other factor. Denis Stairs (1974) in his book titled *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* propounded this view and argued that "an internationalist foreign minister and foreign office, can have medium salience in the making of Canadian foreign policy" (Kirton 2006: 205). Canada

had several foreign ministers who had good experience in the area of international affairs. Lester B. Pearson, a Nobel Prize winner and Lloyd Axworthy, an academic of international affairs are the best examples who had their own style of foreign policymaking.

The third school of thought suggests that not only Prime Minister but also the government in Ottawa is crucial in foreign policymaking. This view first emerged when Bruce Thordarson's book on PM Pierre E. Trudeau titled *Trudeau: A Study of Decision-Making* came out in 1972. This view was later enhanced by Dewitt and Kirton (1983) who claimed that "Canadian government's decision-making process, the Prime Minister, and his or her beliefs have high salience, sensitivity, and ultimate control in determining Canadian foreign policy" (Kirton 2006: 205). This had been proved several times in the past by different Prime Ministers of Canada. For example, the then office of the Prime Minister and other government offices in Ottawa decided to join the US forces in the Gulf in 1990 and not to do so in 2003.

The debate on the Prime Minister as the locus of authority in foreign policy-making continues among the scholars of the Canadian foreign policy. One can argue that several factors constrain the freedom of action of the Canadian Prime Minister, yet no one can deny that Prime Minister occupies a central position in Canadian foreign policy. John Kirton (2006) described six significant factors that are responsible for influencing the beliefs of Prime Ministers. The first factor is undoubtedly his interest, experience and expertise in foreign policy with which a Prime Minister enters the office. For instance, Prime Ministers such as—John Diefenbaker, Joe Clark, Brian Mulroney, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau became Prime Minister without any experience of being a part of government in the past whereas, Jean Chretien had nineteen years of experience before becoming Canadian Prime Minister and was minister of different ministries in the past.

The second factor is the presence of strong and influential personalities in the cabinet. It becomes tough to dismiss the views of those cabinet colleagues who possess high stature in the party or belong to some particular language and regional group. Similarly, politically powerful and strong-minded ministers with a great deal of experience in international affairs do influence the decision of the Prime Minister. Choosing Andre Ouellet, a francophone from referendum ridden Quebec as his first foreign minister over Lloyd

Axworthy was a tough call for Chretien keeping in mind Axworthy's considerable experience and expertise in the international affairs.⁴

The third factor is a capable bureaucracy that has strength and determination of implementing the foreign policy. Professional bureaucrats who work behind the stage lay down the foundation of success on behalf of political masters. Defining the importance of bureaucrats in influencing the foreign policy Kirton said: "The department of external affairs and national defense that produced the peacekeeping and collective security triumphs from 1945 to 1956 were much more powerful than those inherited by Pierre Trudeau in the aftermath of the foreign policy failures of 1967" (Kirton 2006: 204).

The fourth factor is the election mandate with which Prime Minister enters the office. A majority government can operate foreign policy better than minority government. The parliamentary majority gives power to the party so that it can freely exercise its promises made in the election manifesto, whereas post-poll alliance hampers the decision-making ability of any political party. This happened in Canadian politics in the past when Pierre Trudeau (1968-79, 1980-84) was dependent on New Democratic Party (NDP) during his initial years as Prime Minister. The fifth factor is the domestic compulsions. The best example of this factor as a major constraint is national unity crisis and fiscal deficit faced by Canada in the early phase of Chretien decade (1993-2003). Arguing about the positive side of such domestic compulsions Kirton argued: "Societal pressures can also force otherwise uninterested prime ministers to become more deeply involved in international affairs, as with Pierre Trudeau in 1968" (Kirton 2006: 204). The last but not least is the international system. In a transformed international environment, it becomes more difficult for the Prime Minister to work without hindrances. The change in the international system changes the course of foreign policy of several countries. The best example of this would be the changes that had been noticed in Canadian foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and also after the 9/11 terror attack on the North American soil.

Thus, it could be claimed that although there are several constraints on the head of the state, he/she can influence the foreign policy of Canada. That is why Nossal had argued that "Prime Ministers tend to put their own stamp on foreign policy, even if they come to the

⁴ It is believed that Andre Ouellet was given preference over Lloyd Axworthy to influence the result of 1995 referendum for separation in Quebec.

office without intending to do so or having much interest in international affairs” (Nossal 1997: 189).

Domestic Determinants

Domestic environment existing in the society is also crucial in shaping the decisions of policymakers. Not only the external environment but also the local internal factors are essential in transforming the course of foreign policy making of any liberal democracy. Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane Roussel and Stephane Paquin in their book, titled *International Policy and Politics in Canada* argued that the “relationship between the state and society is particularly important in a liberal democratic country like Canada, where the relationship between governors and the governed is shaped and conditioned by the normative principles of liberal democratic theory” (Nossal, Roussel and Paquin 2011: 84). Here ‘normative principles of liberal democratic theory’ mean the equality of all citizens, the consent to be governed, the supremacy of common citizens and the accountability of the government. Kirton argued that “foreign policy should increasingly be determined by the federal government and societal groups within Canada, and not by the more powerful external actors and processes to which it must adjust” (Kirton 2006: 227)

The most important domestic actor with international interest is Canadian provinces particularly Quebec. In most of the states generally, the national government makes foreign policy for the whole country. In Canada, however, provinces play a crucial role in determining policies domestically as well as beyond Canada's border. Canadian provinces are independent and can maintain relations with other nations as well as international organisations. The relationship between Quebec and France and its membership in Francophonie⁵ is the best example of provincial autonomy enshrined in the Canadian constitution. Canadian federal government while making policy had to take all the provinces and their interests into consideration. Canadian federal government also tries to balance the national interest and the specific provincial interests while preparing its domestic as well as foreign policies. In fact, the federal government shares power with the provinces on some of the international issues. Kirton argued that “Ottawa also shares power with the provinces in internationally relevant fields such as—agriculture, immigration and the environment (where an estimated 85 per cent of the powers lie under provincial

⁵ Also known as Organisation of Internationale de la Francophonie and la Francophonie.

control)" (Kirton 2006: 230). Sometimes the difference in the ruling party at provincial and federal level had created tensions in the federal-province relationship. But there was a time when fiscal deficit and budget cuts in the 1990s during the Chretien premiership when provincial governments joined hands with Ottawa's initiatives for fiscal consolidation. In this way, there exists harmony among provincial autonomy, federalism and foreign policy in Canada.

Another critical domestic actor with greater demands and involvement in Canadian foreign policy making are big groups such as—business, labour and interest groups. Several business, labour and interest groups exist in Canada, and they have their own interests in a globalised world. They also try to influence the foreign policymaking in Canada--directly as well as indirectly. The members of such groups do contest elections to change the policy-making directly by becoming members of parliament. They sometimes also support through fundraising, or campaigning for a particular candidate; who after becoming a member of parliament raise the issues of these groups in the parliament and within the circle of his/her party.

The Canadian media is another important factor that shapes the foreign policy of Canada. In the early 20th century Canada was penetrated by the American media. But Kirton (2006) claimed that now things have changed, and most of the television networks are nationally owned, and the news that they offer is overwhelmingly produced by Canadians. Undoubtedly, the development of television network news and the spread of internet-enhanced the reach of media to the Canadian citizens. Kirton described the importance of media in building an opinion on Canadian missions abroad by stating that "media-driven public support is necessary for the 'mobilization of consent' that Canadian governments need to sustain costly, complex and long investments in combat that can bring casualties abroad" (Kirton 2006: 237).

Public opinion also became important in the making of Canadian foreign policy. It has also been questioned that does mass public opinion on Canadian foreign policy exist? It is difficult to believe that mass public opinion exists in Canada because a subject like foreign policy is very specific and demands specialisation. But Canadians now in the 21st century have a deep understanding of international affairs. Don Munton and Tom Keating have argued that "Canadians have an underlying structure of attitudes related to internationalism, not random or assorted views" (Munton and Keating 2001: 546). Echoing similar view,

Kirton wrote that public opinion "has become more influential, as the government has come to rely upon ever improved and more frequent polling for guidance in an uncertain world, and as Canadians have developed deeper and more structured attitudes about the world abroad" (Kirton 2006: 238).

Canadian national values form another group of factors that are capable of influencing the foreign policy of Canada. It had been noticed that with active Canadian participation in international affairs, the foreign policy of Canada focused on few issues which were never compromised while developing or maintaining a relationship with other countries and also at multilateral forums. Maintaining peace in the world order, building trade relations, keeping the track record of human rights of the other country in consideration, environmental protection, peacekeeping, developmental efforts through developmental assistance etc. are some of the major Canadian national values. Emphasising on the importance of national values in Canadian foreign policy, Kirton wrote that "the presence of distinctive national values is evident in the strong, stable priorities that Canadians almost unanimously select as a focus for their governments involvement in world affairs" (Kirton 2006: 239).

Describing the importance of society in determining the foreign policy of a country Nossal (1997) argued: "Policy makers in any society are always affected by the patchwork of ideas, attitudes and beliefs that are dominant in their society in any given time. And in any way society leaves its most profound mark on the environment in which decisions are made. This is as true for foreign policy as it is for purely domestic decisions" (Nossal 2007: 138).

External Determinants

Some theorists of international politics particularly Realists, assert the primacy of external determinants of foreign policy than that of other determinants. They believe that the nature of the international system derives the behaviour of states. Kenneth Waltz (1979), the proponent of 'Structural Realism', in his seminal work *Theory of International Politics* argued that it is the structure of the international system that determines the behaviour of a state towards other states of the world. Describing the importance of 'international setting' as a source of foreign policy for any state, Nossal (1997) wrote: "There are two distinct, but interrelated, aspects to the international setting. The first is the environment in which the state must operate. The second is the condition of the state in that environment" (Nossal

1997: 7). The first aspect, described by Nossal, echoed the realist viewpoint and gave primary importance to the international environment in which a state had to survive. While describing the second aspect, he further wrote: "A consideration of the state's condition in this system would include the state's geographic location, its status relative to other states, its external economic linkages, its alignments in international politics, and its capabilities and power" (Nossal 1997: 7-8).

How and up to what extent international determinants influence the foreign policy making of a country is still a question of considerable debate. John Kirton (2006) in his book described three major schools of thought. According to him the first and the most important school of thought is 'fate not will' approach pioneered by James Eayrs (1967) and later developed by Kim Richard Nossal. Nossal wrote: "Canada's foreign policy objectives and the means used to attain these goals, will inexorably be shaped by the unyielding constraints and imperatives" (Nossal 1989: 38). Describing geography, economic structure, alignment, and the capabilities as the major conditions responsible for constraining the decision making of foreign policy makers he further said that "Such conditions set stringent limits on what the government can do in foreign policy; they will frequently define what it must do; and more often than not they dictate how it may or must be done" (Nossal 1989: 38). Thus, the combined result of this approach is a heavily externally constrained foreign policy.

A second school pioneered by Andrew Cooper (1997) believe that particularly after the end of the Cold War Canada became more independent, then it was during the Cold War period. Cooper argued the end of the Cold War brought new opportunities for a country like Canada. He wrote: "No longer hemmed in by the rigid contours of the Cold War, many of the fundamental aspects of Canada's foreign policy have opened up" (Cooper 1997: 281). Moreover, in "the light of the transformation in international politics, Canada has both greater room for manoeuvre and a greater margin of safety. Military threats are of less concern in the post-Cold War world. Multilateralism has become more refined and pervasive. These tendencies play into Canada's source of strength and away from its weakness" (Cooper 1997: 282-283). Thus, this school of thought insists on a reactive and responsive Canada.

The third school of thought believes that the post-Cold War period intermingled with globalisation and decline of American power brings a situation for Canada in which it can

play a very significant role with greater freedom in a friendlier world. This school was named by Kirton (2006) as 'world made for Canada' school. Describing the viewpoint of this school Kirton wrote: "This 'world made for Canada' school claims that a demographically and economically open, multicultural, soft power Canada has a first mover advantage in a rapidly globalizing, democratizing, integration, post-Cold War world, where the hard power of the military force now counts for far less than the soft power of attractive values and ideas" (Kirton 2006: 245).

The debate among these competing schools is still on. Apart from this, it had been observed that while making foreign policy of any country one has to take the international scenario into consideration. Several external reasons play a significant role in determining the foreign policy. The changes in the foreign policy of a country occur due to the changes in the power structure. For example, the rise and fall of a powerful country transform the foreign policy setting and behaviour of a country. This happened after the World War II when the focus of international politics shifted from Europe to America. In the Canadian context, the changing role of a hegemonic America in the past, particularly during the Cold War, post-Cold War and post 9/11 terror attack, influenced Canada's foreign policy. The second important determinant is the existing equations in the world politics about polarity or alignment. During the Cold War bipolarity, Canada proved itself to be a loyal member of the Capitalist bloc on several occasions. The Cuban Missile crisis in 1962, nuclear weapons in 1963 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 are the best examples that showcased Canadian foreign policy alignment during the bi-polarity period. This may or may not be true in the case of non-aligned countries, but Canadian foreign policy had been influenced by alignment and polarity.

A third major determinant is the process of globalisation which left small countries like Canada more vulnerable. Since globalisation influenced things with much greater speed, scope and scale than ever before, the international environment changed a lot. In the changed scenario, the foreign policy of a 'middle power' was now more deeply driven by the determinants abroad. However, scholars like Stephen McBride (2001) in his book titled *Paradigm Shift: Globalization and the Canadian State* argue that society and the state still matter in the globalised world. They claim that the external determinants still have low salience, while state and society have greater salience. The debate on the role of globalisation in changing the foreign policymaking is still on. After 9/11 it had been argued

that vulnerabilities would be another major determinant of foreign policy in the 21st century. Those who think that the 21st century brought forward an era of vulnerabilities believe that the existing hegemony of the US is at stake. According to this viewpoint, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, on America changed everything. Clarkson (2001) argued that "September 11 has made an inward-looking America preoccupied with homeland security and closing its borders, forcing a trade-dependent Canada to give a great deal of sovereignty to maintain the economic access to the U.S. markets" (Kirton 2006: 244). But the event made the US more vulnerable, and one can argue that the US became more dependent on its allies than Canada. For them, this event gave greater freedom and relevance to US neighbour in terms of making foreign policy 'independently'. The 9/11 attack and its impact on Canada have been discussed in the last chapter of the thesis extensively.

Another external determinant is the powerful international organisations. Some international organisations such as—the United Nations have an international presence, and they impact the foreign policy of different countries of the world. Canada had been a member of the United Nations since its inception and had followed the path of multilateralism particularly during the Cold War years. Canada took part in almost all the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. Due to the Canadian commitment for the establishment of peace and security in the international order, Canada played a very crucial role in the development of several international laws such as—Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which was an attempt to protect the fundamental rights of human beings, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Rome Statutes (1998) etc.

Thus, the foreign policy of any country is designed by governmental determinants with individual preferences mainly by the choices of the head of the state. Domestic situations also influence the foreign policy making of a country. At the same time, international scenario/elements play a very significant role in determining the course of foreign policy of the states.

Dominant Ideas in Canadian Foreign Policy

Canadian foreign policy had at least one dominant idea at its core since its colonial period. In every political community certain beliefs, attitudes and values remain dominant in a sense that they are held by a majority of the members of the community. Society over a

period develops social relations. For example, the idea of slavery was legitimate and accepted in the 19th century. Now in the 21st-century slavery is unacceptable as well as illegitimate. Similarly, political communities also evolve with the passage of time. The foreign policy like any other society or political community changes its course with the change in the socio-political scenario. In fact, the choices of foreign policymakers of any country are framed and determined by the major ideas that are dominant at one time.

Imperialism: Before the World War I

In the 19th century, before the process of decolonisation started, big powerful empires were dominating international politics. During this era, when there was political and economic organisation existing only in the form of empires, Canada as a part of British Empire had self-determination only in very few matters. Canada had very little freedom to decide its domestic policy, and on the matters of foreign policy, self-governance existed only in theory. Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granatstein (1994) in their seminal work *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* wrote: “It could run its own domestic business for the most part, but it had no foreign policy of its own, no international status, no standing” (Hillmer and Granatstein 1994: 1). They further argued that although Canada emerged as a political unit after the British North America (BNA) Act, 1867 passed by Britain’s parliament “Britain was superior-legally, constitutionally, diplomatically. As a future prime minister would put it, Canada was a nation that was not yet a nation” (Hillmer and Granatstein 1994: 1).

Imperialism was a dominant idea in Canadian foreign policy during this period, and Canada was social, culturally, politically, economically and linguistically connected to the British Empire. There were three fundamental premises behind this dominant idea of Canadian foreign policy. The first premise was that Canada was a member of the British Empire. Canada had two colonial masters--French and British. Until the Treaty of Paris⁶ (1763) which ended the Seven Years War, both France and Britain had their colonial claims on Canadian territory. Treaty of Paris ended the conflict between two European colonial powers, and Canada became a British colony. Secondly, the majority of Canadians shared the same civilizational connect with Britons. The linguistic and cultural affinity with

⁶ Treaty of Paris also known as Treaty of 1763 formally ended Seven Years' war known as the French and Indian War in North American Theatre. The agreement took place among Britain on the one hand and France, Spain and Portugal on the other.

Britain was also a major reason for the establishment of this dominant idea of imperialism in Canadian foreign policy. Nossal (1997) argued that imperialism "was also a matter of sentiments--the emotionalism of attachment to patria-fatherland or native land--though Canadians from Britain seemed to prefer the more maternal appellation, Mother Country" (Nossal 1997: 145). Third and the most crucial premise was that Canada's security was best assured by its membership in the empire. This argument is very close to the Realist approach of international politics which gives importance to national security and believes that the nature and behaviour of a state heavily dependent on its national interests and the structure of the international system.

As a result, a broad opinion emerged among Canadians that Canada should support the empire and should also contribute to the security of the Empire as a whole. Nossal in his book wrote "Imperialism is a dominant idea in Canadian foreign policy enjoyed a remarkably speedy rise, reaching its height at the time of the South African War⁷" (Nossal 1997: 145). During this time imperial sentiments in Canada were very high, and Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee (1897) increased such sentiments. Nossal further noted that "The highest stage of Canadian imperialism was to be found in the advocacy in the institutionalization of the Empire. This form of imperialism, widespread after the surge of imperial sentiment occasioned by Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee of 1897, favoured a federative empire" (Nossal 1997: 145). The proposal of a federative empire was in the minds of Canadians. It is important to understand that the imperialism for Canadians was always a political idea and not an economic idea.

The major reason behind this was the safety and security of the Canadian territory. Canadians believed that Canada was safe in the hands of the British Empire and Canada would be unable to pay the cost if it discontinued its relationship with Britain. Nossal, Roussal and Paquin argued that "English speaking Canadians- believed it was Canada's membership in the empire and British military power that guaranteed Canadian security and prevented the expanding United States from swallowing Canada" (Nossal, Roussal and Paquin 2011:123-124). Canadians thought that Canada should also contribute to the defence of the Empire. Due to this sense of security that Canada received from Britain, it decided to contribute forces to the Boer War and the World War I. That is why it had been

⁷ Boer War (1899-1902) is also known as South African War.

argued that "imperialism was a response to external challenge and perceived vulnerability" (Hillmer and Granatstein 1994: 16).

Imperialists did face challenges during this era. There was a debate between the imperialists and non-imperialists. The latter used to call themselves nationalists. Henri Bourassa was a significant figure among nationalists. He was one of Canada's foremost nationalist and a very fervent opponent of imperialism. Imperialist sentiments faced two major problems during this time. The first problem came from the dualistic nature of the Canadian society. The linguistic divide became a major source of anti-imperialist sentiments among Canadians. Describing imperialist sentiments of Upper (French) and Lower (British) Canada he put it in 1917 (Levitt 1970: 174):

French-Canadians are loyal to Great Britain and friendly to France; but they do not acknowledge to either country... The only trouble with the French-Canadians is that they remain the only true 'unhyphenated' Canadians. Under the sway of British Imperialism, Canadians of British origin have become quite unsettled as to their allegiance... The French-Canadians have remained, and want to remain, exclusively Canadians.

The membership of the Empire became second major issue because it was not compatible with the idea of self-governance. Being a part of the Empire, Canada could not take important decisions related to such matters as—building relations with non-British colonies and the matters of war and peace. Nossal noted that “Neither the government nor the people, even the most imperialistic, had any formal say in the most important decision a community faces--the waging of war” (Nossal 1997: 146). Both English-Canadians and French-Canadians were hesitant to accept that Canada would remain the part of British Empire in future. Bourassa while addressing the Canadian public in 1912 had said that the “seven millions of people in Canada have less voice, in law and in fact, in the ruling of that empire, than one single sweeper in the streets of Liverpool.. He at least has one vote to give for or against the administration of that empire” (Levitt 1970: 64).

These incompatibilities mostly remained latent during regular peaceful days, but the voices of ordinary Canadians used to change during the war. Nossal wrote that "when the Empire was at war, the second incompatibility seriously exacerbated the first and the contradictions broke into the open" (Nossal 1997: 147). During the World War I many Canadian soldiers went to war in August 1914. The declaration of war against Germany was announced by the king of Britain after receiving advice from the cabinet ministers of the British

government. Undoubtedly, Canada had no voice as Bourassa had said. It was a common understanding that when Britain was at war, the whole Empire, by default, was at war.

But World War I exposed the internal contradictions within the Empire. These contradictions negatively impacted the Canadian imperial sentiments. The war was massive due to which not only Canada but also other colonies swept by the disenchantment among the 'subjects' of the Empire. India was also dissatisfied with the cost that she paid for her colonial masters. Quoting David Lloyd George, the then British Prime Minister, Donald Creighton (1970) wrote that the dominions "have made enormous sacrifices, but we have held no conference with them as to either the objects of the war, or the methods of carrying it out. They hardly feel that they have been consulted" (Creighton 1970: 145). In fact, World War I was in the debate during the general elections in 1917. Although the Unionist Coalition⁸ under Robert Borden won with a clear majority, it was evident that Canadians were not happy with the World War I.

The second reason for disenchantment was the length and nature of the war. Nossal noted that by "the end of 1916, the insatiable appetite of the trenches had largely exhausted the supply of those willing to volunteer for overseas duty. Borden had to decide whether to limit Canada's contribution to the war to those who volunteered or to maintain a high level of military activity by conscription" (Nossal 1997: 147). Unsurprisingly, the willingness to join the war among French-Canadians did not come out of an emotional commitment to the 'mother-land'. The unwillingness of French-Canadians resulted in Anglo-French divide on this issue. These divergent interests led to sectarian violence in Quebec during Easter weekend in 1918. Consequently, the war not only strained the relationship between the imperial and the dominion governments but also exposed the linguistic cleavage within the country.

The nationalist sentiments arose with the demand of autonomism. Anti-imperialists advocated for autonomism even before 1914, but its acceptance among the common people of Canada increased after the end of the war. After the war, Borden's government insisted on the effective consultation on the issue of war, independent membership (outside the Empire) for Canada in international organisations particularly in League of Nations and also separate representation at the peace conference (1919). It took more than a decade after

⁸ Unionist Coalition was the only coalition in which members of both Liberal and Conservative parties together formed the government.

the World War I to formally end the Empire. The Statute of Westminster in 1931 evolved a new league of British colonies now known as the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Isolationism: During the Interwar Years

The second dominant idea in Canadian foreign policy emerged out of World War I was isolationism. Isolationism was not new in foreign policy and was an integral aspect of American foreign policy since the adoption of the American constitution in 1789. Isolationism became a well-defined doctrine of American foreign policy until the end of World War I. During the interwar years Canadians borrowed the idea of isolationism from America. Americans adopted isolationism due to two major reasons. First was to avoid the interference of European politics in the newly developed American republic. The second reason was to refrain from becoming a part of alliance politics existing in the contemporary world. Although the United States entered in the Great War in 1917, the policy of isolationism became evident after the war when the Senate refused to rectify the Treaty of Versailles and thus kept the US out of League of Nations.

Isolationism that appeared in Canadian foreign politics between 1919 to 1939 had some commonalities with the isolationism adopted by the United States. But there exist some deep differences between them. Americans left isolationism, for a brief period, during the war but returned to the same policy of isolationism after the end of the war. Whereas, Canada embraced isolationism due to the war. The human cost of four years long war for Canada was very high. The number of casualties was so high that Desmond Morton (1981) described it as 'human wreckage'. Describing the gruesome figures of the war, Nossal quoted Morton and wrote that in "1916, Canada's population was roughly eight million. More than 619,000 served with the forces, of whom 446,000 were volunteers; 425,000 served in Europe. The percentage of casualties was high: 230,000 or a quarter of all men of military age. Fully 60,661 nearly one per cent of the entire population were killed. Of those who survived, 34,000 needed artificial limbs and 60,000 received disability pensions" (Nossal 1997: 151-152).

The sufferings that Canadians had to face during the war encouraged Canada to withdraw from the international politics. It was argued that Canada should not get involved in European matters and must use its resources for its own affairs. C. G. "Chubby" Power, a Liberal Party Member of Parliament from Quebec during the debate in House of Commons

said: "Our policy for next hundred years should be that laid down by George Washington absolute renunciation of interference in European affair. I believe that the people of Canada will approve of this policy, namely, to let Europe be the arbiter of its own destiny while we in Canada [turn] our energies to our own affairs" (Nossal, Roussal and Paquin 2011: 131). Echoing the words of Liberal Member of Parliament N.W. Rowell, the representative of Canada to the League of Nations said in the meeting of the League that "Fifty thousand Canadians under the soil of France and Flanders is what Canada has paid for European statesmanship trying to settle European problems" (Eayrs 1960: 61).

Due to the fear of getting engaged in any European crisis in future, Canadians were also sceptical about the provisions of the League of Nations. Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations had the provision of collective security. The concept of collective security preserves against the external aggression and believes in 'one for all, all for one' during aggression, threat or danger from any country. Canada believed that North America was not prone to war or aggression rather, it was Europe which had a political crisis that could escalate anytime into a full-fledged war. That is why, according to Canadians, the provision of collective security was adopted by the League to ensure the security of European countries and Canada had to engage in European wars due to this provision.

Support for isolationism was prominent across Canada but it was quite noticeable among French-Canadians. The francophone community of Canada was least interested in the British Empire. They mostly remained indifferent to the British Empire even when Canada was not independent on foreign policy matters and used to follow the foreign policy derived from imperialist sentiments. Robert Bothwell and Norman Hillmer (1975) quoting French-Canadians noted that "French Canadians are in favour of isolation in one form or another... From this, it follows that we do not intend to have Canada become one of the policemen of the world. 'Charity begins at home', and our internal problems are quite enough for us" (Bothwell and Hillmer 1975: 20).

The 'internal problems' scholars, parliamentarians and common citizens were talking about included not only the rift that emerged between the two linguistic communities but also the sharp division by income which appeared after the end of the war among people of Canada. Nossal, Roussal and Paquin argued that "the international policies of the Canadian government in the interwar period were framed by a desire to avoid reopening the wounds of 1917 and to promote reconciliation and economic development" (Nossal, Roussal and

Paquin 2011: 133). In fact, the Canadian government, unlike the Americans, started following the policy of isolationism during the interwar period to promote national unity.

Another difference between Canadian and American isolationism was about joining international organisations. American Senate rejected the proposal to join League of Nations to protect their policy of isolationism after the war whereas, Canadians were eager for their membership in the League as an independent member. This difference was based on the belief that an independent membership in the League would be a symbol of Canadian autonomy. The Canadian government was of the view that membership in the League would give Canada a voice and opportunity to assert an independent identity on the world stage. In fact, "when a Conservative Senator introduced a motion for Canadian withdrawal from the League in 1934, he was disallowed by his leader, Prime Minister R. B. Bennett" (Nossal 1997: 153). Summing up the whole debate between autonomism and isolationism Nossal further argued "autonomism demanded membership in the League, but isolationism demanded that every effort be made to avoid entangling Canada in obligations that might again draw the community into a foreign war, exposing new and deep divisions on this most important question" (Nossal 1997: 153).

On September 1, 1939, German troops invaded Poland. This invasion later started World War II and public opinion in Canada went against the policy of isolationism. On September 10, 1939, King George VI announced the declaration of war against Nazi Germany after the approval by the Canadian parliament. Every member of parliament was not in support of war but the majority of parliamentarians saw Hitler's Nazism as a threat to the world peace and gave their consent for the war. During this war, the government of Canada promised not to introduce conscription. But in 1944, the Canadian government under the leadership of King decided to renege on its promise and introduced conscription. It is important to note that unlike World War I there was little enthusiasm for World War II among common Canadians. Nossal, Roussal and Paquin wrote that "there was very little enthusiasm for war in English Canada either. Certainly, there was none of the jingoistic zeal that had greeted the outbreak of war in 1914; the memories of that war were still too fresh" (Nossal, Roussal and Paquin 2011: 134).

The end of World War II in 1945 gave way to the Cold War which continued for more than four decades until the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Cold War period, Canada followed the policy of internationalism which has been discussed in the next section.

Canadian involvement in the war eroded the policy of isolationism and the end of the World War II marked the end of isolationism in Canadian foreign policy. But as the case of imperialism, the idea of isolationism remains in the foreign policy even during the Cold War years.

Internationalism: The Cold War Era

Canada adopted the policy of internationalism during the Cold War years which was precisely opposite to isolationism in many respects. Isolationism was about non-involvement in the external affairs mainly, the affairs of Europe and thus concentrating on the internal issues by devoting domestic resources and energy. On the other hand, "internationalism is a doctrine that supports an active engagement in international conflict and a commitment to global organizations charged with maintaining peace" (Nossal, Roussal and Paquin 2011: 135). The second significant difference between isolationism and internationalism is that isolationism was a response to the public opinion emerged out of the cost incurred by the Canadians due to their involvement in World War I whereas, internationalism came into being not because of public opinion but due to the experience gained after the war. In fact, the cost of World War II in which 60 million people were killed out of which 42,000 were Canadians propelled the country to look outward and actively engage in global politics.

The primary purpose, according to Nossal (1997), of this new dominant idea of Canadian foreign policy was the same as isolationism. Both isolationism and internationalism wanted to avoid wars in the future but the means to achieve this goal was entirely different. It has been discussed in the above section that by subscribing isolationism Canada tried to avoid war for the sake of Canadian unity by using its resources to resolve its own issues and not the European affairs. On the other hand, internationalism was adopted to avoid wars by involving in international affairs constructively.

Nossal, Roussal and Paquin (2011) argued that the idea of internationalism was driven due to two major reasons, namely, strategic calculation and moral concern. They wrote that "Internationalism rested on a simple strategic premise: the idea that peace is indivisible" (Nossal, Roussal and Paquin 2011: 135). In other words, the peace of the international system and the fate of any state are interconnected. Canadians understood the fact that a war at a distant part of the globe could disturb the peace of other parts of the world and

physical distance was not a guarantee to peace and stability. The concept of 'fireproof house' which was developed during the interwar/isolationism period became obsolete. The idea of internationalism was also driven by moral concerns. Canadians were of the view that a peaceful world will always be in favour of Canada. That is why the policymakers of Canada were genuinely concerned for peace and wars. Nossal, Roussal and Paquin wrote: "Internationalism thus rose from this desire to contribute to the construction of a more peaceful and just world" (Nossal, Roussal and Paquin 2011: 136).

Nossal (1997) argued that internationalism during the Cold War period had few noticeable elements. The first was the sense of responsibility for playing a constructive role in the international affairs to avoid wars in a bipolar world. Responsibility became a hallmark of Canadian internationalism and management of conflict through diplomatic channels was in vogue to address the challenges to peace and conflict. Second, Canada considered multilateralism as the best tool to defuse the clash of interests which could lead to war. Acting unilaterally in a complex interconnected world could harm the existing peace among countries and capable multilateral platforms could provide an environment to discuss possible reasons for conflict. It had been noticed that lack of communication also distorted relationships in the past. Multilateralism had been very useful in maintaining order within the community of the states in the Cold War years.

The third element was active participation in international institutions. A commitment to international institutions follows naturally because these institutions promote multilateralism automatically. Canada during the Cold War period religiously participated in different operations of the United Nations and showcased its commitment to international organisations. The fourth element was the willingness to use national resources for the promotion of peace through international institutions. This element derived from the third element. Finally, reinforcement and respect for the international laws were also followed as a cardinal principle by Canada. Canadian policymakers were of the view that it is important to follow the rules and regulations to protect peace and stability in the international order. It is worthwhile to note that Canada also contributed to the development of international laws.

Internationalism is also called as 'liberal internationalism'. Canadian scholars use this term because this approach was first implemented by the Liberal Party government. Louis St. Laurent was the first Liberal Prime Minister who formulated this policy. But more

importantly, the term liberal is used as an adjective because internationalism promotes liberal values across the world. Nossal, Roussal and Paquin wrote that “not only is internationalism founded on liberal values (such as: peace, freedom, justice and democracy), but the means to promote it are inspired by some of the key tenets of liberal philosophy: individual rights, equality, the rule of law, transparent system of governance and the management of economic exchange" (Nossal, Roussal and Paquin 2011: 136). Internationalism gave an opportunity for Canada to distinguish itself from other powerful countries such as the US and Soviet Union which were following the ‘realist’ approach to global politics. Internationalism with multilateralism enhanced Canadian ability and capacity to play a role of a mediator or peacekeeper which other countries could not.

It is noteworthy that the internationalism adopted by Canadians was different from the internationalism of other countries such as Sweden. Military alignment with the US and western Europe and participation in such multilateral forums particularly, NATO during the Cold War was an integral aspect of Canadian internationalism. In fact, Canadian internationalism was framed in the context of rivalries between two existing major powers, i.e. the US and Soviet Union. The policy of internationalism for Canada was carefully crafted by the most experienced and learned personalities. Louis St. Laurent, the then Prime Minister of Canada, with Lester B. Pearson who later became Prime Minister and other senior civil servants, namely, Norman Robertson, Escott Reid contributed significantly in the development of this dominant idea.

Lester B. Pearson (1972) in his memoir titled *Mike: The Memories of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, vol.1: 1897-1948* wrote: "Everything I learned during the war confirmed and strengthened my views as a Canadian that our foreign policy must not be timid or fearful of commitments but activist in accepting international responsibilities" (Pearson 1972: 283). Escott Reid, a senior official in External Affairs, proposed that there must be a formal alliance of Western countries. Eventually, his suggestion became a reality with the formation of NATO in 1949. Escott Reid (1977) in his book titled *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949* wrote that he with Pearson also recommended non-military cooperation among the members of the alliance (Reid 1977). Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which confirmed such cooperation among the members, reads: “The parties will contribute towards the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions... to eliminate

conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them” (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949).

Following the path of multilateralism and internationalism, Canada during the Cold War period participated in the majority of peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the United Nations. Canadian leaders took interest and initiatives to maintain peace and stability in the world order which was the ultimate aim of Canadian internationalism. Pearson's diplomatic efforts during the Suez crisis (1956) is a glaring example of Canadian mediation between the rival parties. Internationalism according to John Holmes "was almost a religion in the decade after the Second World War" (Holmes 1982: 119). With the passage of time, several changes took place in the contemporary world. The world in the 1960s was different from the world of 1950s. Decolonisation changed the political equation with the emergence of non-aligned states. The rise of China altered the balance of power in world politics. Similarly, détente decreased tension between the two superpowers. The task of the United Nations became more difficult and Canada also faced challenges from the changed world scenario.

Apart from the external environment, domestic politics in Canada also changed. Pierre Elliott Trudeau became the Prime Minister of Canada in 1968 and openly criticised Canadian internationalist policies and their relevance. In 1970 his government brought foreign policy review which questioned the basics of Canadian internationalism. Nossal, Roussal and Paquin wrote: "The Trudeau review called into question many of the traditional manifestations of internationalism, including the relevance of the United Nations peacekeeping, Canada's role in international affairs, and even the commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (Nossal, Roussal and Paquin 2011: 140). But the Canadian internationalism did not disappear from its foreign policy even after prime ministerial assaults. In other words, the idea of internationalism was so deeply rooted in the Canadian foreign policy during the Cold War phase that it sustained vociferous protests and criticism that emerged from different quarters. Nossal, Roussal and Paquin further opined: “During Trudeau’s long tenure as prime minister, the institutions created between 1945 and 1950, particularly the United Nations and the Atlantic alliance, remained at the heart of Canada’s international policies. Likewise, international policies, such as peacekeeping, development assistance and initiatives to protect human rights and promote disarmament remained popular” (Nossal, Roussal and Paquin 2011: 140).

In short, internationalism remained alive and active until the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the world politics. The change in the international environment popped up several questions before Canada which was commonly known for its mediatory role as a middle power in the Cold War years. It had been argued that although the governments after the end of Cold War did not use the word ‘internationalist’ to describe their foreign policy, yet the foundational principles of internationalism continued to guide the Canadian foreign policy makers.

The challenges that Canada faced after the Cold War were not only external, i.e. coming from the international environment but the domestic challenges that were lingering in the 1990s also made an impact on Canadian foreign policy. The changed scenario of world politics and the challenges from within such as—Quebec nationalism and fiscal deficit have been discussed in the next chapter. Chapter II also elaborates three major contending connotations of Canadian power. Small power, principal power and middle power are three approaches to understand Canadian power in the international system. The chapter also discusses the promises made by the Liberal party's election manifesto during the federal election in 1993. The last section of the chapter dealt with diplomatic response to the changed international scenario by Canada.

Until 1995 Chretien government was engaged with the domestic issues. Quebec nationalism was posing a threat to the unity and integrity of Canada. The separatists were demanding for a separate nation for Francophone community. In October 1995, the referendum took place in Quebec and by a narrow margin separatist lost the referendum which kept Canada united. By this time the Canadian economy also improved and Chretien government appointed Lloyd Axworthy as Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1996. After his appointment, many innovative ideas were introduced by Axworthy in Canadian foreign policy. During the election campaign, Liberal Party promised a more democratic foreign policymaking. Chapter III elaborates the debate around democratisation of foreign policy and the role of NGOs in foreign policymaking. The chapter expounds Ottawa Process which lead the way for an international Anti-Landmine Ban Treaty in 1997 and the leadership role of civil society in preparing the ground for a global movement against landmines. This chapter showcased how and why the concept of human security sneaked into Canadian foreign policy.

Chapter IV titled *Human Security and Responsibility to Protect* focuses on the sovereignty versus intervention debate. The concept of Responsibility to Protect established that sovereignty is not a prerogative but the responsibility of a state. The chapter elaborates the reasons for the emergence of the concept and its broad scope encompassing responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild. The chapter also deals with the efforts of the Chretien government in the field of human security. Undoubtedly, the concept of human security became a dominant idea and continued to guide foreign policy makers until the 9/11 terror attack. The terrorist attack on the United States changed the direction of international politics. The last chapter revolves around 9/11 terror attacks on the North American soil and its impact on Canadian foreign policy. Chapter V also discuss previous acts of terrorism faced by Canada in the past and how those were different from the contemporary crisis. It elaborates on domestic debates about the stringent laws made by Chretien government, namely, Anti-terrorism Act.

Chapter II

Canadian Diplomacy and the Changing World

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the ideological war between the two major blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union came to an end. It was time for countries to re-examine the significant issues of their foreign policy. Canada was no exception but was, in fact, more vulnerable than other nations of the world due to its geographical location. Having the image of a middle power, Canada faced an identity crisis. The problem with such countries was about their new role in the changed international system after the end of Cold War. This question was a source of tension among policymakers of Canada. The end of tight bipolarity and alignment to one bloc opened a new door for Canadian innovative actions and activities. Complexity and uncertainty also arose at the end of the Cold War years.

Canadian influence in the international affairs had increased after the end of the World War II. From the late 1940s to early 1960s Canadian diplomats were at their best in what is popularly known as 'golden era' of Pearsonian foreign policy. During this period Lester B. Pearson was handling foreign affairs as the senior official, then minister, leader of the opposition and later the Prime Minister. Canada skilfully showed its creativity in organising the United Nations Emergency Force to solve the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. The efforts made by Canada to resolve the Suez crisis led to the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Lester B. Pearson in 1957.

In this way, the Canadian diplomacy in the immediate post-1945 era was distinct from that of other countries. Canada was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a security alliance of different countries around the globe. As a member of NATO, the prime task before Canada was to confront the expansion of Communist ideology and follow the concept of 'Collective Security.'⁹ Canada was also the founding member of the United Nations. Under the umbrella of the United Nations, the primary task was to ensure peace and security in the world.

⁹ Collective Security is a type of coalition building in which the nations of that group agree not to attack one another and to defend each other from any attack launched from outside.

Different Approaches to Canadian Power

Before looking at the Canadian response to the changed circumstances at the end of the Cold War, it is important to briefly review Canadian foreign policy in the post-World War II years. The foreign policy of Canada, during this period, was primarily based on its image as a 'middle power'. However, there are three contending connotations of Canadian power and behaviour in the international arena—as a 'Satellite or dependent state'; a 'major power'; and a 'middle power' (Dewitt and Kirton 1983; Nossal 1997; Kirton 2007).

Canada as a Satellite

Canada was a colony of Britain at a time when the colonial rule was at its peak. Even after the end of colonial rule, Canada could not come out of the image of being a colony. Although the series of British North America (BNA) Acts (first passed in 1867) provided partial autonomy to Canada, yet Canada remained mostly dependent on the British government for its foreign policy. Subsequently, the Canadian parliament was given powers to make changes to the BNA Acts. The first embassy of Canada was established in 1931 in Washington D.C., and the Statute of Westminster was passed in the same year by the British parliament, which provided the necessary independence to British dominions including Canada. But these acts did not bring about much of a change in the Canadian outlook. The country continued to be perceived as a colony when global 'hegemony' was transferred from Britain to the United States.

Canada shared economic, ideological and cultural linkages with the United States, even when it was a colony of Britain. Some scholars have argued that Canada was closer to the US than to any other country of the world. Archibald MacMechan (1920) while describing Canadian position just after World War I pointed out that Canada was becoming Americanised, so much so, that it appeared as an American "Vassal State". Similarly, A.R.M. Lower (1946) declared that Canada was a "subordinate state" and also that "it was a complete satellite of the United States" (Resnick 1970: 99).

The above views of the scholars reflected the inability of Canada to take decisions independently. These views formed a critical debate regarding Canada's importance in international politics. The notion that Canada is a principal power or a middle power was rejected by several of these writers. Assessing the role of Canada in the world, James M. Minifie wrote "close association with policies of military and economic imperialism...

makes Canada the glacis for the defence of the continental United States, makes Canada the coreboy of the western world and returns Canada from colony to satellite in three generations” (Minifie 1960: 52).

Some cases of Canada's response to contemporary international affairs support the view that there was no major change in the approach of post-colonial Canada about international issues. It is believed that due to the influence of US, Canada did not recognise the communist government of China. The policies of the Canadian government during the Vietnam War (1955-75) gave the impression that Canada was following the United States. Michael K. Hawes alleged that Canada, even at the time of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson which is considered as the ‘golden age’ of Canadian diplomacy, used ‘quiet diplomacy’ to express its differences with the United States on any particular issue (Hawes 1984).

At a time when the United States was in confrontation with the communist powers in the Cold War, some scholars were of the view that it was all right that Canada was in the back seat. Similarly, scholars like George Grant lamented the ‘homogenization’ of North America and said that “Canada’s disappearance as a nation is a matter of necessity” (Grant 1965: 280). He expressed the view that cultural, economic, social, technological and political ‘homogenization’ was inevitable in North America. The Americanisation of Canada became unstoppable when the industrial sector ownership went into the hands of Americans. Canada started industrialising due to the demands during the Cold War. Such a situation led to the establishment of several industries on Canadian soil, but the fact remained that the ownership of these industries was with the capitalist class of the United States. In a very blunt manner, George Martell stated: "our culture, our politics, our economy are almost entirely packaged in the United States. We are Americans now, and I think we have to begin dealing with the fact" (Martell 1970: 291).

John Kirton (2006) described four thematic variants of peripheral dependency, namely, economic, political, cultural and institutionalised dependence. For him, peripheral dependence is driven by the vulnerabilities that threaten the survival of a country. The country may appear normal from outside, but actually, it is dependent on some other country for its survival and has no specific place in international order. Canadian economic dependence on the US is evident in the work of Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects published in 1956. Kirton argued that Canada became economically dependent

due to "the massive inflow of direct investment from the United States" (Kirton 2006: 66). According to him, the political dependence on the US started with the acceptance of American nuclear weapon in 1963 after the Cuban missile crisis. Canadian involvement in the Vietnam War (1955-75), Gulf War (1990) and War on Terror in Afghanistan (2001) are other examples of Canadian political dependence. Cultural dependence on the US by adopting American values of democracy, liberalism, corporate culture etc. had its worldwide influence, and Canada was not an exception. American cultural influence increased so much in Canada that the Canadian government had to protect Canadian owned print and broadcast media. Last but not least, the institutional dependence described by Kirton is a unique contribution by him in the dependence approach to Canadian foreign policy. Canadian dependence on the international institutions such as: The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) ultimately forced Canada to work under the dictates of the United States because these institutions reflected the values and interests of the United States (Kirton 2007: 66-67).

Canada as a Major Power

A second approach considers Canada as a major power in the international system. This approach is based on the presumption that Canada is playing a significant role in world politics. This approach asserts that Canada has enormous capability to deal with international issues. James Eayrs, one of the prominent proponents of this approach gave three primary reasons for the prominence of Canada in the international order. In his key writing, he identified three changes in the 1970s: first, the rise of oil-producing states; second, the growing importance of natural resources, e.g. fuel and food in international politics; and third, the declining hegemony of the United States after the Vietnam War. Eayrs (1975) said that "Canada has almost sinfully bestowed upon it the sources of power, both traditional and new... the technology is there or waiting... the manpower is there or waiting... the resources are there or waiting too-animal, vegetables and mineral" (Nossal 1997: 62). He concluded by saying that Canada is now a 'foremost power'.

The terminology used by James Eayrs was adopted by Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson in the title of their book on Canadian foreign policy.¹⁰ In this book, they

¹⁰ The title of their book is 'A Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World'.

described how much importance Canada gained in the years when world politics changed. They wrote "at the very least Canada is not a small and fragile nation, the 'modest power' of which Prime Minister Trudeau spoke in 1968" (Hillmer and Stevenson 1977: 2).

Peyton Lyon and Brain Tomlin both supported the view that Canada is a major power. Their analysis was empirical and data-based. They produced the data related to the economy, military, resources and diplomatic capabilities of different nations. These nations included Australia, Sweden, Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the United States. By these facts, they found that Canada secured the sixth rank in the international system in the overall ranking. They concluded that Canada should now be considered as a major power (Lyon and Tomlin 1979).

David Dewitt and John Kirton also considered Canada as a major power but gave a new concept to describe the power status of Canada. The title of their book includes the term 'principal power' which they think is most suitable to define the Canadian position in the international system. According to them, there exist three ways to determine whether a state is a principal power or not. First, such states 'stand at the top of the international status ranking', secondly, they 'act as principal' and not as an 'agent' of other states in the international system. Third, principal power has "a principal role in establishing, specifying and enforcing international order" (Dewitt and Kirton 1983: 38).

It is important to note that Dewitt and Kirton came to this conclusion when the international order started changing and diffusion of power intensified. According to them, the world was no more in tight bipolarity because the hegemony of the United States was challenged and countries such as China, Japan and other European nations were emerging as different poles of power in the world. They declared that Canada was "an ascending principal power in an increasingly diffuse, non-hegemonic international system" (Dewitt and Kirton 1983: 40).

John Kirton, in his recent writings, supported his view that Canada is a principal power, with the help of additional theoretical underpinnings. He said that scholars had seen Canada only through two different lenses. One is the Liberal Internationalist perspective which claims that Canada is a 'middle power'. The second perspective is Peripheral Dependency which looks at Canada as a dependent or satellite power. Unfortunately, scholars have ignored the realistic perspective to understand Canadian power in the international system.

According to him, the Canadian foreign policy debate can get a more accurate as well as new direction with the help of the third perspective. He writes "a third perspective makes observers sensitive to those occasions when Canada acts in a way that departs significantly from the mainstream internationalist or alternative dependence pattern" (Kirton 2006: 73).

By giving a few examples, Kirton explained his point of view. For him, Canada tried to behave as a principal power during the Cuban Missile Crises (1962) when the then Prime Minister of Canada, John Diefenbaker unilaterally proposed an initiative to resolve the issue which increased the heart beats and the danger of the next world war. Taking a different and robust position during an international crisis, without adhering to the United States and also without any discussion with any of the traditional like-minded countries, Canada proved its principal power position in the world.

But the major power approach was not given enough attention. The approach not only got limited support from the Canadian scholars and academicians but also from academics outside Canada. Due to lack of popularity for the concept, the most active proponent of the approach adopted a different way to prove the point. The 'fall-back position' adopted by Kirton to justify his view was based on the elevation of the status of Canada at the international level as an active and fully engaged part of the elite grouping of powerful nations, i.e. the Group of Seven (G-7). This fall-back position was also criticised by several scholars. They said that membership in the G-7 reduced Canada's ability as an effective member of the international community. They suggested that Canada should not direct its action according to the small scope of this elite group and should regain its position along with like-minded countries (Cooper 1997: 10-11).

These arguments were not given importance by supporters of the major power approach. By noting the 1991 Gulf War in which Canada took part, Kirton in his article *Canada and the Persian Gulf War* wrote that its "ability to deliver... in the face of international uncertainty and the domestic division, ultimately placed it, along with US, Britain, France and Italy in a very exclusive club of the worlds' principal powers" (Kirton 1992: 238).

Cooper (1997) identified two factors on which the principal power approach would rest in the future. The first quantitative factor is the position of Canada in the international hierarchy, based on whether Canada could retain its place in the G-7. The second, qualitative factor is Canada's national will (Cooper 1997:12-13).

Canada as a Middle Power

Canada was a colony of Britain and had such an international image until World War I. After the end of the War, Canada demanded separate representation in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Similarly, Canada sought separate membership in the League of Nations, which was the quest for an independent image of Canada in the international system. This demand for a distinct identity raised questions about the position of Canada in the international order, i.e. where Canada fit in the international hierarchy. The question was complicated to answer because during the inter-war years more than half of the world was colonised and the rest were winners, losers or colonial powers. The irony was that Canada was none of them.

Canadian officials were sensitive to the question and concerned about the relative status of Canada within the ranks of small powers. During the discussions for the Peace Conference some countries, especially the United States, objected to the separate representation of Canada. They thought that giving a vote to Canada would be giving an extra vote to Britain. The proposal to exclude such dominion states did not go well with Canada and other countries because their position and status would then be the same as the other small countries.

The role of Canada in World War II was pervasive. It raised the ability of Canada to be recognised as a major player in international affairs. Canadian officials demanded a seat in the decision-making body of the alliance. But Britain and the US claimed that an increased number in the decision-making body would hamper the decision-making capability of the alliance whereas, Canadian officials demanded representation by the principle of functional representation (Holmes 1976). They claimed that smaller states, providing enough support in those areas which were the areas of interest and expertise, should be given the right to be represented in those decision-making bodies. Though this principle received limited support from the powerful nations, it provided scope to the Canadian activities during the war.

The contribution of Canada during the war was sizeable enough that Canada could demand a revision in its status in the power hierarchy of the international system. The term 'middle power' was not used to describe Canada until the end of World War II. The Canadian government itself was slow to use this term to describe Canada's position in the

international political order. The discussions about the establishment of the United Nations started during the war, and Dumbarton Oaks meetings concluded that there should be a universal organisation which would try to maintain peace and stability in the world. The major powers of the day, namely, the US, Britain, USSR and France, decided to make themselves, along with China, the permanent members with the veto power of the Security Council, the main decision-making body of the international organisation. Canada and other nations mainly, Australia, which was interested in the organisation and wanted to establish peace and stability in the world, objected to the veto power for great powers without recognising the importance of the strength of smaller but still significant powers. These smaller but important powers argued that they were not far behind the great powers in the maintenance of peace and stability and should be given equal place in the new international organisation.

What exactly is middle power? For some scholars, the ranking of a particular country in the international system, based on national capabilities such as population, economic ability, military power as well as their voice in international affairs, constitute a middle power. Such attributes place these countries below the position of great powers but not among the small states, which do not have a significant role in international affairs. Another concept claims that middle power has nothing to do with a hierarchy but a particular style of foreign policy. It is thus, the behaviour of a particular country on international issues that make it a middle power. A "middle power's" diplomacy implies 'a certain type and a certain content of foreign policy' (Painchaud 1966). Robert O. Keohane described middle power as "a state whose leader considers that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systematic impact in a small group or through an international institution" (Keohane 1969: 295). Barry Buzan while describing the difference among superpower, great powers and middle powers argued that the states which play international roles beyond their comfortable home regions, such as Canada, Sweden and Australia could be put in a different category of "middle power" (Buzan 2004: 90).

The foreign policy followed by the Canadian government in the immediate post-war period was different from that of other countries. Its role during significant issues such as—the Suez Canal Crisis (1956) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) when the world was on the brink of another world war, gave a new dimension to the Canadian approach to world affairs. Paul Painchaud while commenting on such behaviour of Canada in the Cold War

period claimed that “middle power” had become an ideology (Painchaud 1966). John W. Holmes, a leading writer on Canadian foreign policy, gave a new term "middle-powermanship" to describe the attitude adopted by the Canadian foreign policy. He said in a third variant of the concept that “middle-powermanship” gave rise to a new brand of diplomacy (Holmes 1966). It is worthwhile to note that, being geographically sandwiched between the two superpowers, namely, the United States and the Soviet Union, Canada tried to reduce the tension of the Cold War period by bridging the gap through diplomatic efforts.

The primary purpose of Canadian diplomacy at the time of the Cold War was to avoid any such situation which could lead to the Third World War. The role of a ‘linchpin’ between the two superpowers of the world was the main focus of Canadian foreign policy. But during the Cold War period, Canada remained part of Western Bloc whereas the diplomatic efforts gave the impression of a middle power image to Canada. Canada was never an ideologically neutral country and always kept to the side of Western Bloc. Canadian policy makers possibly found that the country was caught in the disputes and tensions and with no option left, it was decided to take the task of solving the issues emerging during the Cold War.

Frank R. Hayes gave an entirely different version of Canadian engagement in mediation efforts during the Cold War years. According to him, Canada was involved more in mediating the intra-bloc than inter-bloc issues. Canada made such mediation attempts in several coalitions where Canada was a member state, e.g. attempts by Canada during the Suez crisis among the members of Western Bloc. Canada also tried its best but failed to influence the foreign policy initiatives of the United States that could escalate into a big crisis and even the issues of the Commonwealth like racial domination in African countries (Hayes 1980).

One of the most important aspects of Canadian middle power diplomacy was that Canada always feared the possibility that a local conflict could take the shape of a global war in future which was not in the interest of Canada. So, it was their responsibility to stop any such escalation of war through institutionalised methods, which evolved in the post-war period. As a result, Canada came closer to the United Nations to achieve peace and stability and became an integral part of UN peacekeeping missions on several occasions.

Canada thus pursued the path of a middle power, and the Canadian government continued to claim that it was a middle power. However, in the late 1960s when Pierre Elliott Trudeau became the Prime Minister, he rejected the term 'middle power' to describe the diplomacy of Canada. Of course, this rejection meant that Canada would not take up different diplomatic roles in the name of middle-powermanship. But even under the Prime Ministership of P.E.Trudeau, the same foreign policy continued. It had been an integral part of a middle power country, and the diplomatic roles are chosen by Canada also gave a glimpse of middle-powermanship. It is important to note that by this time, the term 'middle power' was removed from every government document and the officials also refrained from using the term publically. The same pattern of middle power diplomacy, however, continued to be used by each and every government in Canada. The roles of Canada in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations continued. Canada also kept engaged in international affairs, e.g. the issue of apartheid within the commonwealth (Nossal 1997). Nossal also says that reason behind Canadian middle power activism was the belief that the Canadian diplomats were capable of building an environment in which Canada could intervene and make changes in world politics through such interventions.

The end of the Cold War and the change in the international environment demanded a transformation in the foreign policy of several nations, but middle power diplomacy continued to be practiced by middle powers such as—Canada, Australia and other new nations which joined the ranking of middle-sized powers (Cooper 1993). The foreign policy review of the Liberal government under Jean Chretien consisted of the elements which were earlier used for middle power diplomacy, but the term 'middle power' was not in vogue to define the Canadian diplomacy (Nossal 1997).

Indication of Change and Challenge from Within

The end of the 1980s brought several changes in the Soviet Union as well as the Eastern European states which impacted the Canadian perception of the world. The dramatic changes that happened in the later part of the decade transformed the ideological makeup of the Soviet Union and other East European countries. Mikhail Gorbachev came into power in 1985, and the socio-political and economic changes that took place in the Communist bloc were experiments with the Soviet system under his leadership. The essential dimensions and reorientation of the Soviet system were described by Lenard J. Cohen (1990) by three different but closely related facets. The first and the major dimension

is 'Economic Rejuvenation' which not only changed the industrial and business sector as well as the foreign trade practices and the organisation of agricultural production. Secondly, 'Political Liberalization' was an attempt to make the electoral and legislative system more participatory. He also tried to change the role of Communist Party in the Soviet political system and the legal issues related to the rights of the citizen. Last but not the least, was 'reform of Soviet Foreign Policy' which was a transformation in the basic principles of Soviet foreign policy (Cohen 1990: 19-20).

Canada in the Changed Environment

Although the reforms started by Gorbachev did not bring fruitful results, the political reforms were more successful than the economic reforms. The outlook of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union also changed. This impacted its relations with the other countries of the world. The new thinking in the foreign policy lead by Gorbachev provided the basis for an improvement in superpower relations, arms control between the two major blocs and participation of the Soviet Union in the international organisations, e.g. the United Nations and world court (Cohen 1990: 25). By the adoption of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' the way to see capitalism also changed. The close advisers of Gorbachev were of the view that although there existed a close connection between the militarisation and the evolution of capitalism, the level of militarisation was different in different capitalist countries. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney visited the Soviet Union in 1989, which embarked an entirely new stage for the Soviet Union-Canada relationship. The trip to Moscow by the Prime Minister was accompanied by the heavyweights of business, numbering 240. This gave a sign that Canada-Soviet commercial ties had strengthened. In this visit, the leaders signed several important and mutually beneficial intergovernmental agreements in areas such as environmental policy, anti-terrorism policy, illegal drug trafficking and the Arctic. This high-profile visit was the Canadian response to the Gorbachev experiments (Cohen 1990: 31-37). Canadian-Soviet relations took a leap forward in the late 1980s.

The dramatic changes that took place in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s transformed conditions and a new relationship started emerging between the Eastern and the Western blocs. The response of the Canadian government was not very swift. In fact, Canadian policymakers took calculated steps leading to a slow response to the changes. Being part of the Western alliance, Canada always tried to keep a balance between Europe and the United States. At the time of 'détente' in the 1970s between the two superpowers, the

Liberal government of Canada under the leadership of the then Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau tried to develop a new foreign policy direction so that Canada could enhance trade with European countries through which the Canadian dependence on the United States could be reduced. But this period of 'détente' was very short, and the tensions between US and USSR re-emerged by the end of the decade (McMillan 1990: 60).

The policy Canada adopted during the cold-war era was very much business-oriented. Canada promoted ties with the countries of the rival bloc to do trade with business for business sake approach. Agricultural products constituted the major export to the USSR in the Cold War period. One-fourth of the grain that Canada exported was purchased by the USSR alone in the 1980s. Interestingly, this was the situation at a time when the Canadian government announced a broad set of sanctions against the Soviet Union. The then Prime Minister Joe Clark applied sanctions including a partial grain embargo, tighter export controls and suspension of all official visits in January 1980 (McMillan 1990: 62). Although the sanctions were removed one by one after the death of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982, the relations between the two never reached the level of warmth of the 1970s. No doubt the relations between Canada and the Soviet Union revived in 1989 when the Canadian Prime Minister visited Moscow, but the bilateral relationship had passed through different phases during the Cold War period. Canada tried to change its policy towards the Eastern bloc as per the requirements of the time. In the period of 'Détente' Canada decided to build a good relationship in the 1970s but the period was very short-lived, and the return of the Conservative government changed the Canadian policy towards the rival bloc. It changed again with the adoption of reform policies by Gorbachev and Canada took steps to come closer to the Soviet Union. In this way, Canadian policymakers tried their best to maintain a relationship with other countries of the world according to their national interests.

The event which took place in 1989 was very important. The destruction of the Berlin Wall was not expected by anyone and brought a paradigm shift in international affairs. The event surprised the Western bloc and also changed the basic premises of foreign policy. No doubt the fundamentals on which Canadian foreign policy had been based since the end of the World War II also transformed. East European countries were under the pressure of change. It was a great challenge for the government of Canada to give appropriate responses to the

changed international environment, keeping an eye on the changes that might happen in the future.

Describing the transformation, Canadian foreign policy scholars Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson termed the scenario for Canada as 'the challenge of change'. They said that "the current and continuing challenge for the Mulroney government would be its ability to adapt a variety of critical events unfolding in many places around the world" (Molot and Hampson 1990: 6). The challenge was also posed by the economic changes that were taking place not only in Eastern Europe but also from Western Europe. The countries of the Western part of Europe were coming together to build a common market, which could produce difficulty for Canadian trade in Europe. It was expected that trade would remain the preferred mode of international economic activity and would be done by the multilateral policies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This raised concern about the appropriateness of Canadian international economic activities (Molot and Hampson 1990: 9).

The challenge of economic changes for small economies like Canada was from transforming trade policy and competitiveness emerging out of the integration of different economies of the world. The ability and capacity of the Canadian firms to remain competitive in the globalised market was doubtful because the foreign policy Green Paper that came out in 1985 from the Department of External Affairs and International Trade (DEAIT) claimed that Canada had not developed any strategy to increase the competitiveness of Canadian firms in global markets.

The growing complexity in different areas such as—trade, foreign policy and defence due to the rapidly changing international environment, was stressing Canadian institutions. The decision-making process was under considerable stress because the authority to take a final decision on several issues was the sole responsibility of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Not only the Department of External Affairs and International Trade (DEAIT) in Canada but also the bureaucracies of other countries were facing similar challenges due to the inclusion of several entirely new as well as diverse issues like the environment, energy, trade, culture etc. The pressure on DEAIT originated from different areas such as: heterogeneous foreign policy agenda, the interest and activities of the Canadian Prime Minister in foreign policy, the department's (DEAIT) isolation from other bureaucracies

working in Ottawa and its nonalignment with the initiatives taken in the 1980s and the budget cuts in the department (Molot and Hampson 1990: 12-13).

In this way, the changes in the international environment led to a difficult time for Canadian policy makers as well as the existing institutions. Not only the policymakers but also Canada's decades-old institutions faced challenges from the transformed environment. The time was ripe to build a clear-cut strategy to achieve foreign policy goals and prioritise them according to Canada's national interests. What Canadians had done in the Cold War period faced major challenges created by the extraordinary changes in the East-West relations. The last decade of the 20th century asked for new directions from Canada and Canadians.

The unification of East and West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall was an important event in the history of the Cold War.¹¹ This event gave a sign that the Cold War would end and East Europe and West Europe would come closer to each other. With the unification of Germany, the animosity of the Cold War between the two superpowers ended. Consequently, they moved from confrontation to dialogue. Similarly, the hegemony of the superpowers was also coming to an end. The bipolar pattern of the Cold War also ended and 'multi-polarity' emerged with the rising new powers in Europe and Asia (Halstead 1989: 144). Thus, the end of the Cold War brought changes in the international environment which posed serious challenges to the entire world. Canada having performed a 'middle power' role in the international system during the Cold War needed to take on a new role. This task was very difficult for Canada because it challenged the well-set pattern of the Canadian foreign policy in which Canada had become an expert.

Canada also faced serious problems at home. The most important were the Quebec/national unity question, and the financial crisis arose out of late 1980s depression which led to budget cuts. The Quebec question is related to the societal cleavage between Francophone and Anglophone communities in Canada. This French-English cleavage had been of great importance among all the ethnic/cultural/linguistic issues dominating Canadian politics. It was firmly attached to Quebec nationalism. Another significant problem Canada started facing was related to the international financial crisis. Being an export-driven economy,

¹¹ The wall was constructed in Berlin during the Cold War period in 1961 which not only divided Germany but also divided Europe. Although the wall demolished completely in 1992, the government officials opened it in 1989.

Canada had limited economic options. Due to the fiscal deficit, Canada started budget cuts in the late 1980s.

French Canada and the Quebec Question

The French-English relationship in Canada is as old as the history of modern Canada. Even before the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867 by which Canada became a confederation, relations between the Francophone and Anglophone communities were part of discussions in Canada and particularly in Quebec. In 1759 when the British conquered Quebec by defeating France on the Plains of Abraham, the conquerors took control of the government as a part of their colony. However, the people in Quebec continued to speak French and follow the Roman Catholic Church. Several attempts were made to accommodate and assimilate the French people of Canada residing in Quebec with the help of different laws and acts by guaranteeing them cultural, religious, linguistic and other rights related to civil laws. The BNA Act also ensured the considerable autonomy of Quebec by recognising the aspirations of the French-speaking people. French as well as English were given official status in the federal parliament and laws were to be passed in both languages by parliament.

The position of Quebec in Canada and French-English relations were the results of the emergence of Quebec nationalism. The emotional attachment to Quebec was primarily due to the notion that Quebec was a distinct society in Canada and was based on language, ethnicity, culture, territory and religion. People in Quebec were demanding autonomy or self-determination due to their firm belief that Quebec was different and autonomy was guaranteed by the BNA Act of 1867 itself. Quebec nationalism started looking outwards in the 1960s and the Quiet Revolution during this decade gave a new voice to it. In response, the Diefenbaker government (1957-63) introduced simultaneous interpretation in French in the parliament, began printing federal government cheques in bilingual form and appointed a French-Canadian governor general. When Pearson became Prime Minister in 1963, he established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and increased federal funds and taxation powers to the provinces including Quebec. The Official Languages Act of 1969 was passed under Trudeau to make the Canadian public service bilingual (Dyck 2002: 47).

During the 1960s, the voice for separatism by Quebec nationalists emerged but only through democratic means. However, the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) was not in favour of the democratic process because they were of the view that the process was not speedy enough. They supported violent means. To quell this violence, Trudeau the then Prime Minister of Canada invoked the War Measures Act in 1970, which gave the police and armed forces special powers to handle the violence. Two major bills were passed by the provincial governments led by Robert Bourassa (1970-76) known as Bill 22 and Bill 101 under Rene Levesque of the Party Quebecois which came to power in 1976. The main purpose was to make French a predominant language of the province. The more that Quebec moved towards French unilingualism, the policy of national bilingualism promoted by Trudeau was opposed by English Canada. These bills also changed the demography of the province because a large number of Anglophones left Quebec (Dyck 2002: 49).

Important developments concerning Canada-Quebec relations took place in the 1980s and 90s. The most important were the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 and The Charlottetown Accord of 1992. The Constitution Act of 1982 passed by the federal government, including the Charter of Rights and Freedom, was operational in Quebec although it was rejected by the government of the province. When Brian Mulroney became Prime Minister of Canada, he included Quebec nationalists in his cabinet and asked the government of Quebec to cooperate with the federal government. The Quebec government led by Bourassa put five demands before the federal government (Manmohan 1991).

Mulroney called the premiers of different provinces to Meech Lake in April 1987 where the premiers unexpectedly agreed to the demands made by the Quebec government. The resulting Meech Lake Accord soon faced severe criticism from various directions. The main point of controversy related to the 'distinct society clause' which was ambiguous while giving the role to the government and legislature of Quebec to 'preserve and promote' the distinctiveness of Quebec from the rest of Canada. The critics also raised concern about the status of English and Aboriginal minorities in Quebec and also the French-speaking minority in other provinces. Feminists were afraid of their freedom, equality and other rights in Quebec because of the 'distinct society clause' added in the accord (Cairns 1991).

The supporters of Meech Lake Accord thought that the accord would help Quebec overcome its feeling of isolation and bring confidence to the residents of the province. The

province would turn to the constitutional fold, and the accord would provide flexibility to the province to keep it satisfied within the confederation.

According to the provision for amendment adopted in 1982, the accord had to be approved by the federal as well as by all provincial legislatures within three years, or by June 1990 for the Accord. In this way, the Meech Lake Accord had to be approved until June 1990. New governments of Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Manitoba had reservations about the accord. The Meech Lake Accord thus failed (Dyck 2002: 53-55).

The failure of the Meech Lake Accord led to the development of nationalist and separatist sentiments among Quebeckers. They felt betrayed, which raised the demand for a referendum on sovereignty for Quebec that would take place in 1992. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney appointed Joe Clark as the Minister of Constitutional Affairs to produce a new proposal to solve the issue of Quebec nationalism. Clark put forward a proposal, which was accepted by the premiers of different provinces and leaders of aboriginal and territorial peoples. Initially, Quebec was not interested in the scheme but it joined the negotiations after some time. Several rounds of talk took place, after which the final touch was given to the proposal at Charlottetown. The Charlottetown Accord had four major parts. Two were devoted to Quebec, and the other consisted of the Canada Clause and changes to the division of powers (McRoberts and Monahan 1993).

The Canada Clause acknowledged the distinctiveness of Quebec society within Canada. It discussed the values and major characteristics of the country which encompassed the democratic ideals, the rule of law, parliamentary government, federal system, aboriginal peoples and their rights, the minorities of Canada, cultural and racial diversity, gender equality, equality and diversity of the provinces etc. The other part of the Accord was about the federal- province relationship, which went beyond the Meech Lake Accord. The Charlottetown Accord gave more power to the provinces in several policy issues. In return, it was expected that Quebec would increase its relationship with other provinces, especially its economic ties by removing interprovincial trade barriers (McRoberts and Monahan 1993). The rest of the accord related to aboriginals.

The accord would become effective only when it got ratification by parliament and by all ten provincial legislatures. But the federal government on October 26, 1992, announced a nationwide referendum on the Charlottetown Accord. It did so to address the criticism that

the Accord had no support from the Canadian people as with the Meech Lake Accord. Quebec had already decided to hold a referendum on constitutional change. Thus, the announcement would give more validity to the new Accord. But the referendum rejected the accord. Even Quebec voted against the Accord. Although the result of the referendum was not binding, there was no need to go for the ratification since the people of different provinces had voted against the Accord (Dyck 2002).

In this way, the Charlottetown accord died, and the problem of French Canada remained unresolved. Meanwhile, the Conservative government failed to return to power in the general election held in 1993. The Liberal Party under the leadership of Jean Chretien came to power with a full majority and with the promise that if they come to power, they would concentrate on improving the Canadian economy. Quebec nationalism was a major challenge before the newly formed government. A year later in 1994, the Parti Quebecois returned to power in Quebec, and Jacques Parizeau became premier. The federal government ignored the issue, but the Quebec premier wanted a referendum which took place in October 1995. Initially, Parizeau took a hard-line separatist stand and wanted to drop all connections with the rest of Canada. But due to public opinion, he changed his position and came out with an extensive list of continuing links with Canada.

Parizeau's referendum was held in October 1995. With the chance of a possible victory by the Parti Quebecois, Prime Minister Jean Chretien came out with a promise in the last week of the campaign that reform would take place if the 'No' vote won. The separatists faced a narrow defeat with 49.4 per cent of votes in their favour, whereas the 'No' got 50.6 per cent. The result led to the resignation of Parizeau. Although the result of the referendum kept Canada united, the sentiments of Quebec nationalism was not dead and reverberated from time to time.

Fiscal Deficit and Its Impact

Canada also faced challenges on the economic front. The number and the complexity of the opportunities related to foreign policy had increased but the recourses to manage this increased burden had decreased (Potter 1996/97: 25). According to Evan Potter, Canada had three choices if it wanted to carry out the fundamental foreign policy concerns such as—economic and trade diplomacy, multilateralism, alliance politics and the role of a middle power. The first was to increase foreign policy budgets, which was essential to cope

with the expanded foreign policy issues. The second option was doing everything with fewer resources and not expecting much result. The third was giving lower priority to some issues, which were not important, keeping in mind the limitations of fiscal austerity. The growing fiscal pressure at the domestic level did not allow Canada to increase expenditure to produce the Canadian dream of becoming a global player in the age of interdependence and interconnectedness.

The Liberal Party was concerned with the economic challenges Canada was facing during the post-Cold War period. During 1993 federal elections Liberal Party announced in its election manifesto that "Our balanced approach to economic policy will deal with five major, interrelated problems facing the Canadian economy today: lack of growth, high unemployment, high long-term real interest rates, too high levels of foreign indebtedness and excessive government debt and deficits" (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 14). The Liberal Party accused the Conservative rule for mishandling the Canadian economy. Red Book of the Liberal Party claimed that "after nine years of Conservative government, Canadians are facing hardships: 1.6 million unemployed, millions more on welfare, a million children living below the poverty line, record number of bankruptcies and plant closing" (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 15). The financial situation was so bad that the Wall Street Journal declared that Canada had become 'an honorary member of the third world' and dubbed Canadian dollar as 'Canadian peso' (Wall Street Journal 1994). The Liberal Red Book accused the Conservative government for this situation of the Canadian economy. According to Red Book "Nine years of Conservative government has seen Canada's debt almost triple, from \$168 billion in 1983-84 to \$458 billion today" (Liberal Party of Canada: 1993: 19). "The election manifesto issued by the Liberal Party during 1993 federal election declared that "A strong economy is the essence of a strong society..... The role of government in economic policy is twofold: to establish the overall framework, which include monetary and physical policy, federal-provincial fiscal relations, and trade policy; and to work in partnership with provincial governments, business, labour and non-governmental institutions to achieve national economic objectives" (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 15). Regarding fiscal and monetary policy Red Book further announced that if the Liberal Party came to power, it would "adopt two track fiscal policy, matching a drive for jobs and growth with a comprehensive approach to controlling debt and deficits. The two tracks run parallel: fiscal discipline will support economic growth and jobs will enhance government revenues" (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 16).

The leading debates “emerged due to the Canada 21 report, the first two National Forums on Canada’s International Relations (1994 and 1995), final parliamentary and defence reports and Ottawa’s programme reviews (I and II). They stressed the need to make hard choices” (Potter 1996/97: 26). The first National Forum on Canada’s International Relations was co-chaired by Pierre Pettigrew¹² and Janice Gross-Stein¹³. The report produced by this forum was prepared after brainstorming a two-day workshop and a plenary session in the presence of PM Chretien, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence Minister and also Minister of International Trade. In the plenary session the participants were asked to consider the following points (Report of National Forum on Canada’s International Relations 1994: 1):

- To identify the most important economic, technological, scientific, social, cultural, political and military forces that are directly relevant to Canada and Canadian policy.
- To consider the principle and ties of Canadian foreign and defence policies.
- To address the multilateral, regional, binational and transnational partnerships that Canadians should build and
- To examine how Canadian can best build policies that can meet the challenges of an increasingly global and multi-layered international society and command public support and engagement.

The Forum emphasised on the necessity to make choices among priorities. The report stated that “in broader conception of international relations, the government cannot be everywhere and do everything, nor should it try. The government cannot legitimately be expected to do more and more with less and less. The government must improve its capacity to mobilise and coordinate its society’s resources in pursuit of national objectives” (Report of National Forum on Canada’s International Relations 1994: 3). The report identified a few areas of importance and came up with the priorities of Canada's foreign and defence policies. Human Security topped the list of priorities (Canadian Foreign Policy 1994: 165-168).¹⁴

¹² Pierre Pettigrew later became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paul Martin’s government.

¹³ Janice Gross-Stein is the founder and former director of Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto.

¹⁴ The report gave second priority to trade and economics which was followed by human rights, assistance, peacekeeping, United Nations, defence and NATO.

Undoubtedly, the report focused that Canadian foreign and defence policy must focus on human security. This report later became the foundation for ‘Axworthy doctrine’¹⁵.

Canadian policymakers were aware of the changing equation and started reprioritising the Canadian foreign policy. The time had come to draw a different route to pursue diplomatic goals. Regarding trade and commerce, Canadian dependence on the rest of the world increased with the growing bilateral as well as multilateral trade. In 1960 total exports accounted for only 17 per cent of the total national income of the country whereas it had increased to 37 per cent by 1995 (Potter 1996/97: 27). After the end of the Cold War era, the Canadian economy was not in a sound condition. Due to the fiscal deficit, budget cuts came in different departments. The budgets of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and even the Department of National Defense (DND) were cut. One of the examples of such budget cuts in the Department of National Defense is the cancellation of Conservative governments order for 43 new EH-101 military helicopters, which was a campaign promise by the Liberal Party (Chretien 2007: 54). It was estimated that the budget of CIDA would come down from \$ 1.9 billion to \$ 309 million by the fiscal year of 1998-99 which will be the lowest since the 1960s. Similarly, the budget of DFAIT (now renamed as Global Affairs Canada), an agency which looked after diplomatic relationship and international trade with other countries in the 1990s including the Canadian international involvement in different international organisations such as—United Nations (UN), International Labour Organization (ILO) and other international organisations would face setbacks due to the total cut worth \$ 292 million by 1998-99 (Potter 1996: 29). Chretien in his autobiography wrote that “we announced our intentions to cut programme spending by \$17 billion over three years from previously planned levels—by reducing cost in the Department of National Defense, tightening the qualifications for unemployment insurance, freezing the transfers to the provinces for the health and higher education and so forth.” (Chretien 2007: 59).

Even the Department of National Defense, responsible for the protection of Canadian interests at home as well as abroad, faced severe budget cuts. It was expected that its budget would fall from a 1994-95 level of \$11.4 billion to \$ 8.7 billion by 1998-99 at a time when the security threats were mounting because of illegal migration, drug trafficking, illegal

¹⁵ The innovative ideas based, on human security, introduced by Lloyd Axworthy in Canadian foreign policy during his tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, are collectively termed as ‘Axworthy doctrine’.

and overfishing etc. (Potter 1996/97: 30). The fiscal problems of Canada affected Canada's presence in the international arena. This situation demanded a new path for Canadian diplomacy.

Prime Minister Chretien in his autobiography described financial difficulties and wrote that "how bleak our days looked at that point in our history. To be frank, Canada was in terrible shape- exhausted, demoralised and fractured. The federal, province and the municipal governments were virtually bankrupt, and their combined debt was greater than the countries total GDP" (Chretien 2007: 3). He said that the situation of Canada was one of the worst since the 1930s and blamed the Conservative rule for this "made in Canada" recession. He persuaded Paul Martin to become the Minister of Finance and wrote "I know you want to take over from me someday. But if we don't solve the deficit, there will be nothing left to take over. It is the biggest problem we have" (Chretien 2006). As soon as Liberal Party formed the government PM Chretien announced the establishment of an ad-hoc committee of seven ministers chaired by Marcel Masse "to undertake a systematic review of every federal programme, department by department, with an eye to cutting cost and rationalising services" (Chretien 2007: 60) The committee was called Coordinating Group of Ministers on Programme Review. The importance and the relevance of the programme would be judged by some simple questions such as—whether it is serving the public interest, role for this government in a programme, how to make it more effective and the remaining programme is affordable or not? (Chretien 2007: 63-64). The findings of the committee were incorporated in the 1995 and 1996 budget. According to the suggestions of the committee, several tough decisions were taken by the government and "we sold off the Canadian National Railways, most of Petro-Canada and Air Navigation System because they no longer serve national public policy objectives." (Chretien 2007: 68).

The government faced severe criticism on budget cuts. Even the resentment among the ministers of Chretien government was noticed. The level of harshness of the decision over the financial reductions could be imagined by the accusation made by unhappy ministers. Chretien in his autobiography wrote that ministers started saying that "the finance department deliberately demanding more cuts than were necessary so it could consistently outperform the budget forecasts." (Chretien 2007: 64). But it is also important to note that while Canadian government was closing down military bases and cutting different subsidies; the government was putting money into programs for young, disadvantaged and

vulnerable such as—Prenatal Nutrition Programme, National Literacy Programme, Youth National Program and internship programs (Chretien 2007: 70-71).

Liberal Red Book and Response by Canadian Diplomacy

The previous Conservative government had been accused by the opposition that the foreign policy tradition of Canada was deteriorating slowly. The federal election due in 1993 the Liberal Party had come with its manifesto, carefully prepared in the preceding years after consultation with different stakeholders. In September 1993 when the manifesto of the Liberal Party titled *Creating Opportunities: The Liberal Plan for Canada* was launched, the then leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Ministerial candidate Jean Chretien wrote:

To govern in the 90's the Liberal Party had to adapt to the immense changes in Canada and the world since it left office in 1984. I asked members of my caucus to consult with the Canadians and prepare a discussion paper on a wide range of issues. We sponsored round-table discussions across Canada on subjects such as the economy, the environment, trade and foreign policy.¹⁶

The academic world and practitioners had taken great interest in this exercise where they provided ideas, insights and suggestions to the Opposition Liberal Caucus. The purpose was to come out with the way to adapt the role of Canada to the rapidly changing post-Cold War environment.¹⁷ For the 1993 Federal election, the Liberal Party came out with its party manifesto which is also called as the Liberal Red Book. Its foreign policy priorities were based on suggestions made during the symposium that took place in October 1991.

Red Book Promises

W. Andy Knight described the foreign policy priorities of the Liberal Party manifesto under five different headings. (Knight 1999: 26-41). The priority was to give a new direction to the Canada-US relationship. The Red Book promised that under the Liberal Government Canada would "foster a mutually respectful relationship with the US with a desire to seek out new avenues of cooperation and dialogue made possible by the end of the Cold War and other new realities" (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 106). The above statement connotes some important things. The first and foremost indication of the term "mutually respectful relationship" is harmonious relations with the US, while remaining close friends and most

¹⁶ The words were used by Mr Chretien in the message written by him.

¹⁷ A select group of public and private NGO's was invited by the National Level Caucus Committee on Foreign Affairs to take part in a public symposium on 24-26 October 1991.

significant trading partners. Canada would also seek other alternative areas of mutual cooperation. This was the period when Canada and the United States were involved in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations. Chretien publically stated that the Liberal Party would reopen NAFTA for discussion to improve the Canadian position so that the country would be less dependent on the US.

The second foreign policy priority was concerning peacekeeping. The Red Book promised that a "Liberal Government will strengthen Canada's leadership role in international peacekeeping, in part through a reorientation of Canadian defence policy and procurement practices to emphasize key priority of peacekeeping" (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 106). The Liberal Red Book made the following promises:

- To strengthen Canada's leadership role in the international peacekeeping.
- To give priority to Canadian efforts to improve UN peacekeeping policies and operations.
- To reorient Canadian defence policies and procurement practices to emphasise the critical priority of peacekeeping.
- To create a special brigade and train both military and non-military personnel.
- To convert surplus military bases into peacekeeping training centres.

Canada played a very significant role in international affairs during the Cold War period. This role gave Canada the image of a "Middle Power". Canada's role in international organisations, especially in United Nations peacekeeping, crowned Canada with a "good international citizen" image. But in the changed international environment it was required to review Canada's role in international organisations. Canada was involved in almost all the international peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations. The time was ripe to have a closer look at past Canadian peacekeeping policies. The Red Book promises wanted Canada to take up a leadership role in peacekeeping. Canada would try to improve the previous peacekeeping policies of the UN. Canada would above all redefine and synchronise its defence and peacekeeping policies through reorienting defence policy, training of military and non-military personnel and converting its military bases as peacekeeping centres in the affected countries. This was a new and revolutionary step in peacekeeping.

Third Liberal Red Book promise was that in “contrast to Conservative government, a liberal government will not arbitrarily and without prior consultation cut off aid programs to entire region of the world, such as East Africa, that continue to face desperate poverty and deprivation” and made the following promises about foreign aid (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 108):

- To conduct a comprehensive and public review of Canada’s foreign aid priorities.
- To develop a coherent policy framework for distributing Canadian aid to developing countries.

The Liberal Party realised that the money for foreign aid was being spent on the military establishment and not on areas such as—poverty alleviation, health and education. That is why the Red Book promised a review of priorities, with the aim to address the basic needs of underdeveloped countries. Unlike the Conservative government, the Liberal Party decided not to cut off foreign aid arbitrarily. Their focus was to spend the money in those part of the world where it was badly needed, particularly, Third world countries. Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was the body which looked after the foreign aid.

Since multilateralism had been a major basis of Canadian foreign policy, the Red Book gave fourth priority to multilateral organisations. It reads “The UN is experiencing a renaissance in its authority and stature in the world, much as its founders hoped it would be. Canada’s strong legacy of support for the UN and the reputation we have built there give us a unique opportunity to help lead its reform” (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 108). After the end of the Cold War voices started coming from different quarters that the structure of multilateral organisations, particularly, the United Nations should be changed. Countries like India, Germany and Japan asked to increase the number of permanent members on the Security Council. The main argument was that the number of independent sovereign countries had risen due to the end of colonialism and to accommodate these countries it was important to include them in the key decision-making body of United Nations, i.e. the Security Council. At the same time, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali came out with "An Agenda for Peace" in 1992 to suggest ways for improving and strengthening the role of UN in maintaining peace and security. The purpose of Mr Ghali's report was to ensure the long-term, lasting relevance of multilateralism. The Liberal Red Book assured that Canada would respond to the challenges posed by this report.

In 1995, a UN Charter Review Conference would take place in commemoration of 50th anniversary of the international organisation. Liberal Party in its Red Book decided to give full support for the commencement of the Review Conference.

Just a year before the federal election the Liberal Party had declared that

We must demonstrate support for the freely expressed will of peoples for self-determination, within the parameters of the commitment to democratic practices, a commitment to non-violence in the pursuit of political, economic and social goals and a commitment to clear respect and protection for minority and individual rights. Peoples meeting those commitments would contribute to the building of a true new world order (Liberal Party of Canada 1992: 4).

This was the fifth promise made against the secretive and exclusive foreign policymaking by the previous government. The Red Book declared that a National Forum on Canada's International Relations would be established to discuss the significant issues of Canadian foreign policy in Canada's interest. The Forum was supposed to include representatives from government and non-government actors involved in world affairs. The Liberal Party also promised to "expand the rights of parliament to debate major foreign policy initiatives, such as deployment of peacekeeping forces and the rights of the Canadians to regular and serious consultations on foreign policy issues" (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 109).

Response by Canadian Diplomacy

In this way, Canada faced problems from changing international circumstances and domestic issues related to the unity and integrity of the nation and Canadian involvement in international affairs through United Nations due to fiscal challenges. The end of the Cold War brought a new era where bipolarity ended and there emerged 'a new world (dis)order' with the "rise of American power and American uni-polarity" (Ikenberry 2004: 84). The first foreign policy document by the Liberal government came out in 1995 with title *Canada in the World*. The introduction of the document started with recognising the importance of the changed international scenario. As per the document many "of the old certainties that guided foreign policy through the Cold War have collapsed, but now, more than five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, construction on a new order is only at its beginning.... This is therefore a time of a great uncertainty, but also of great opportunities" (Canada in the World 1995: 1).

The evolving context for foreign policy scholars like Kenneth N. Waltz and Samuel P. Huntington claimed that the end of bipolarity was not going to exist for a long time. Huntington proposed the idea of 'uni-multipolarity'. Looking at the writings of American academicians, describing power politics, Canada nowhere fits as a powerful state. Canadian academicians, on the other hand, focused on the position of Canada in the world order as a middle power state with the role of middle-powermanship. Scholars such as Andrew Cooper, Kim Nossal, J.L. Granatstein, Cranford Pratt and Maureen Appel Molot described Canada as a middle power (Kirton 2006).

When the Liberals came to power, they could not change the dependence of Canada in terms of its balance of trade with the United States as per the promises made by the Red Book. Canada continued to remain subordinate in the Canada-US relationship. This led Canada to adopt a diversification strategy more rigorously in the area of trade and foreign policy (Cooper 1997: 268). Meanwhile, in 1994 a Joint Committee of the Canadian Parliament recommended the Canadian government to follow an "overall integrated trade strategy, a long-term plan for creating and promoting an international orientation for business in Canada, in cooperation with interested provinces" (Joint Committee 1994). Following the recommendation, Prime Minister Chretien adopted a new strategy which is now called as "Team Canada" approach.

This new approach tried to shift the concentration of Canadian trade from North America particularly the US. It also depicted the Liberal quest to link domestic and foreign policy when in November 1994 Chretien leads the "Team Canada" to China with all heads of the Canadian provinces, excluding the head of the Quebec government. Although the visit to China resulted in contracts and memoranda of understanding, the Liberal government was criticised by the opposition and other human rights groups for shaking hands with the Chinese for which the Liberals themselves criticised the previous government for ignoring the Tiananmen Square incident where a massacre of innocent civilians took place.

During the election campaign, the Liberal Party had promised: "job, jobs, jobs" for the Canadian people and especially the youth of the country. The creation of jobs in any country depends on the ability of the particular country in searching for more avenues around the world. When the Liberal party came to power, it tried its best to strengthen its relationship with other countries of the world. The canvas became bigger with the availability of East European countries due to the end of the Cold War. Some members of

the Liberal Party were against these steps taken by the Chretien government by shaking hands with China which had a poor human rights record. In support of Canada's "new" friendship with China, it was argued by the government of Canada that the enhanced trade between the two countries would help Canada in creating new jobs as well as supporting economic, social and political reform in China. But such arguments did not fit well with the pre-election promises to support liberal democracy and respect for human rights worldwide.

On the issue of 'peacekeeping' which was the second most important promise made during the federal election, different scholars have different views. According to W. Andy Knight, the peacekeeping role of the Canadian government during Chretien premiership was "maintained if not strengthened" (Knight 1999: 31). The Liberal government continued with a leadership position on peacekeeping but it was also made clear by the Liberals that Canadian involvement in UN operations would not be automatic as in the past. The Liberal government made rules and guidelines for future engagement in UN operations. These guidelines were based on two important principles. First, Canada would not involve itself anywhere and everywhere. Second, Canada would support peacekeeping operations only in those areas where Canada had expertise like command, communication and logistics. This clearly shows that the foreign policy of Canada was driven by domestic considerations, particularly the financial deficit. Canada was committed to multilateralism with keeping the domestic economic constraints in mind. This selectivity of response was described by Andrew Cooper as "niche diplomacy" (Cooper 1997). In the process of downsizing and rationalising to save money, the Liberal government converted military bases to peacekeeping training centres or completely closed them. The impact of the fiscal deficit made the difference.

Canadian involvement in the peacekeeping programmes went down. The Liberal Red Book had promised that after forming the government, the Liberal Party would re-examine Canadian priorities in the area of peacekeeping. After assuming power, the Liberal government made it clear that in developing its foreign and defence policy the economic situation of Canada would be taken into consideration. This depicts the Liberal intentions on public spending vis-a-vis UN programmes as well as bilateral relationships. The defence budget was cut with the argument that the end of the Cold War certainly demands some 'peace dividend'. When Liberal Party was in opposition, they had protested against the

Conservative plan to purchase the 45 EH-101 helicopters and argued that at a time when the deficit was growing the deal was not in the interest of Canadian economy (Johnson 1997). As soon as the Liberals came to power, they scrapped the helicopter deal and saw the defence budget as an area where cuts were possible.

Andrew Cooper suggested that Canada in this time of economic distress should not focus on every aspect of its middle power role. Instead, Canada should focus on those areas where it had the expertise and could perform with more comfort. Involvement in several areas with a lot of resources and less expertise would come with a bigger cost. The economic and domestic compulsions would not allow Canada to engage everywhere. Cooper said that Canada had a choice of engaging itself in those areas where the results could be produced without much effort. According to Cooper "to continue to play a leading role Canada must make its priorities clear and effectively marshal its talent and resources by developing responsibilities to other countries and societal actors" (Raj 2007: 150). This selectivity by Canada based on its comparative advantage or expertise is known as niche diplomacy. The term "Niche Diplomacy" was propounded by Andrew Cooper and further promoted by Evan Potter. Niche diplomacy is important in Canadian foreign policy because while following this strategy Canadian policymakers came out with a new kind of thinking to pursue its foreign policy goals through an altogether different path.

Cooper further elaborates niche diplomacy and describes it as choosing that role which suits Canada. He proposed this type of diplomacy so that Canada could continue with its effective role in world politics. In his words "to continue to play a leading role Canada must make its priorities clear and effectively marshal its talent and resources by devolving responsibilities to other countries and societal actors" (Cooper 1995: 13). Similarly, Evan Potter proposed niche diplomacy as a tool with which Canada could play a useful role in global affairs by taking hard political choices to remain credible. He advocated four ways to achieve an active global presence.

According to Potter first Canada should continue to close its foreign missions which are not very important for 'economic and political interests'. This was proposed to curtail the expenses of the government on various international activities. Since budget cuts were the reality of that period the option before departments like DFAIT and others was to curb spending by reducing the number of staff. Secondly, he proposed to break completely from business promotion in different areas of the world, especially Europe and the United States.

The reason was to ensure less expenditure by the Canadian government. Third, the expensive and inefficient use of soldiers as peace builders should be stopped. Burden sharing and division of labour among NGOs, military, other governmental agencies and departments was badly needed. Fourth, developmental aid to developing states must be reduced due to the financial situation of the country. He also suggested that Canada should not take an interest in military alliances such as NATO and must shift towards international social and economic institutions such as WTO and G-7 (Potter 1996/97: 30-31).

Potter proposed that Canada should change its foreign policy to bring more results. Having a nice background, Canadian diplomacy had comparative advantages on several fronts. The role played by Canada during the Cold War period gave a lot of exposure and experience to Canadian diplomats. To balance the financial problems on one hand and Canadian presence on the other hand 'privatization of international relations is the need of the hour'. He wrote that "The government will become more of a facilitator and less of a doer. Over time, Canada's private and philanthropic sectors would be forced either to support this Canadian presence or to let it die" (Potter 1996/97: 32).

On foreign aid, the Liberals did live up to their promises made during the federal election. The Liberals reviewed and examined the policy used by the Conservatives to distribute it. But aid was reduced by the Liberal government. In the first budget presented by the Chretien government for 1994-95, a 2.3 per cent cut was proposed in foreign aid and cuts continued for the next two years (Robinson 1994: 17). The reductions in foreign aid were worse than those of the previous government. In 1995 foreign minister of Canada Andre Ouellet announced in an interview that Canada was planning to use foreign aid as "reward" for cutting military spending in different areas of the world. The words of the foreign minister of Canada clearly showed that the idealism of the pre-election period of the Liberal Party was overshadowed by the stark domestic economic reality. This also indicates that the country's financial situation would be more important than fulfilling the bilateral and more importantly multilateral commitments. The policy of aid had been used by Lester B. Pearson and was supposed to be the greatest tool for maintaining good relations during the Cold War period. It became an unfruitful exercise due to the changed environment. But the end of Cold War rivalry, as well as the fiscal constraints, forced the Canadian Liberals to rethink the policy adopted by them four decades ago.

Another promise made during the election was about Canadian involvement in the multilateral organisations. While showing its commitment towards multilateral organisations, the Liberal government when came to power lent full weight to restructuring the UN system. The Liberals were of the view that in the changed world environment it was important to reorder the decades-old structures. To achieve the objectives of bringing peace and stability to the world, reforming international organisations had become very important. Committed to reforms in the existing multilateral institutions, the newly elected Liberal government sent Andre Ouellet the then Foreign Minister to UN to emphasise the fact that that change in the UN system was of “high importance” for Canada (Keating 1994: 74).

In 1994, Andre Ouellet while addressing UN General Assembly reiterated the Canadian commitment to multilateral organisations and also discussed the following proposals for an improved UN (Knight 1999: 37):

- To improve the UN’s capacity to wage “preventive diplomacy” through the early use of economic and humanitarian aid to the region on the brink of civil conflict.
- To overhaul the organization’s economic and social agencies in order to eliminate the duplication and waste that is often the result of their actions.

In spite of the above proposals, the Canadian government attempted in 1994 and formed a study group with the help of DFAIT, DND and the Department of Veterans Affairs. The group aimed to come up with practical ways with which the UN's ability could be enhanced to respond rapidly to handle peace support operations. This effort of the Canadian government improved its image among the members of the UN. In 1995 the Canadian government presented a report titled "Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations" to the Secretary-General of the UN (DFAIT 1995). The report was discussed in the General Assembly in 1995 on the occasion of 50th anniversary of the UN. The report was of the view that the nature of the conflicts has changed in the post-Cold War era. It gave importance to non-state actors such as—NGOs, humanitarian bodies and human rights group in peace operations around the globe. Overall twenty-six recommendations were made by the Canadian government through this report and most of them were implemented in one or other form.

Conclusion

With the end of the Cold War, the world changed for Canada. During the Chretien premiership, Canada was passing through a phase of transition where Canadian scholars and foreign policy practitioners were trying to fix the major issues. Although the change in the international scenario did not happen overnight, yet Canada was not very much confident to cope with the newly developed complex and uncertain international environment. The three contending images of Canadian power; namely, small power or satellite state, major power and middle power present the picture of Canadian foreign policy outlook. Scholars have different views regarding the image of Canada in the world politics. But the changed environment in the world politics created a complex environment for a country which was neither a superpower nor a small unnoticeable state.

Similarly, the domestic issues pertaining to national unity due to Quebec nationalism and budget cuts because of growing fiscal deficit were major challenges before the Liberal government. The resentment emerged among the ordinary Canadians due to the derailed economic conditions which gave an opportunity to the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party of Canada did not miss the chance and promised for a healthy Canadian economy. The promises of the Red Book discussed above gave hope to the people of Canada. At the same time, the quest for a new role in the new international order was demanding for an entirely different type of foreign policy. This was the time when Canadians were looking for a new set of issues having global importance.

After the Quebec referendum in October 1995 and the appointment of Lloyd Axworthy as Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1996, the foreign policy of Canada got a boost. The Chretien government followed the human security agenda which got personal attention from Axworthy. The human security phase of Canadian foreign policy is also known as 'Axworthy Era' due to the contribution made by Lloyd Axworthy in the development of the concept of human security. The next chapter will discuss the Anti Landmine Ban Treaty which was an integral part of the human security agenda. An open process for foreign policymaking was also promised by the Liberal Party Red Book during the election period. The next chapter will also elaborate on the steps taken by the Chretien government when it came to power.

But it is clear that the Canadian foreign policy was determined by both internal and external determinants. The end of the Cold War era brought severe challenges for a country like Canada and the federal election around the corner made the situation even more complicated. The foreign policy adopted by the Conservative government under the leadership of Mulroney/Campbell was criticised by the opposition party. But the changed international environment and domestic constraints posed serious questions for the new Liberal government when it came to power in 1993.

Chapter III

Democratisation of Foreign Policy and the Ottawa Process

Democratisation of foreign policy was promised by the Liberals during the federal elections. The 1993 Red Book titled “*Creation Opportunities*” promised an ‘open process for foreign policy making’ as one of the priorities of the Liberal government if it came to power. But in the first term of the Prime Minister Chretien the openness of foreign policy was not given much attention. Until the appointment of Lloyd Axworthy in January 1996 the promise largely remained unfulfilled. The pressure to include civil society groups in foreign policy making was propagated during previous governments. But after the announcement in the Red Book, it became difficult to stop the growing movement to exercise greater input from civil societies in foreign policymaking. Civil society groups like churches, NGOs, academics, business organisations, women’s movements, gay and lesbian rights activists, peace groups, environmentalists and even members of parliament raised their voice in support of the democratisation process.

This chapter will discuss the debates and discussions that started taking place in Canada after Lloyd Axworthy became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chretien government. Undoubtedly, the Canadian foreign policy grew more active during ‘Axworthy Era’ (1996-2000). The first section of this chapter focuses on the concept of democratisation of foreign policy and the debate between democrats and supporters of inclusiveness that emerged during that period. Both sides were representing two different poles and presented their views on the meaning and definition of democratisation of foreign policy. This section will also discuss the role of NGOs in ‘democratization’ of foreign policy and the major efforts made by the Liberal Party of Canada which had promised ‘democratization’ in its election campaign.

The second and third section of the chapter are discussing the international movement to ban Anti-personnel Landmines popularly known as the Ottawa Process. Within these sections, the role of civil societies in building public opinion at the international level and their constructive engagement in Ottawa Process has been discussed briefly. The Canadian government led by Chretien played a very significant leadership role in Ottawa Process which culminated in the signing of Anti-personnel Landmines Ban Treaty in December 1997.

Before going deeply into the debates associated with the democratisation of foreign policy and Ottawa Process an attempt is made to look at foreign policy making in the Canadian political system and the institutions involved in the Canadian foreign policy-making process. The most important institution responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs is the Department of External Affairs which came into being in 1909 as a result of a growing need for a self-governing dominion, i.e. Canada. After World War II Department of External Affairs expanded due to the increased Canadian involvement in the international affairs. The Department was renamed in 1993 as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) after the different agencies were brought together by the Canadian government. Undoubtedly, the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is very crucial in determining the path of Canadian foreign policy.

When Jean Chretien became the Prime Minister of Canada, he appointed Andre Ouellet as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the tenure of Andre Ouellet (1993-1996), Canada came up with two significant foreign policy documents. The first document on Canadian foreign policy, titled *Canada in the World* released on 7th February 1995 was the first formal statement of the Chretien government. The document identified the priorities of Canadian foreign policy “first, the promotion of prosperity and employment through trade; second, the promotion of global peace to protect Canada’s security; third, the promotion of Canadian values and culture” (Kirton 2006: 159). A few months before this document the Canadian government also brought out its defence policy document in November 1994, known as the *Defense White Paper*. The Defense Paper declared that the Canadian armed forces would be a "multipurpose, combat-capable" force which can "fight alongside the best, against the best" (Defense White Paper: 1994). It argued that "the priorities were first to protect Canada, second to cooperate with the US in defence of North America, and third to participate in peacekeeping and the other multilateral operations elsewhere in the world" (Kirton: 2006).

It has been alleged that during its first mandate (1993-1997) the Liberal Party could not achieve the agenda promised by the party during the election (Knight 1999). Even the major promises made in the election agenda *Creating Opportunities* were not fulfilled by the new government. It was argued that “In the five areas in which the Liberals made specific pre-election foreign policy promises, the difference between the Conservative and the Liberals government’s actual foreign policy was very small" (Knight 1999: 41). But with the

appointment of Lloyd Axworthy as Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1996 Canadian foreign policy became more active. Axworthy held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs for almost four years under the leadership of Chretien from January 1996 to October 2000. Due to his high-profile activism, Canadian foreign policy reached a new height. The traditional style of foreign policy was abandoned during his period, which was very much needed to fulfil the agenda he set for himself.

Axworthy displayed larger ambitions which “led him to force-feed the development of a daunting international agenda for both the foreign service and the galaxy of non-governmental partners with whom Canada officials now routinely, if sometimes uneasily, work” (Stairs 2001: 20). Axworthy was not overseeing the whole department and was sharing this department (DFAIT) with the Minister of International Trade. But his active involvement in the department did not go unnoticed. Kirton in his book titled *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* described Axworthy’s activism in the department as the “*Axworthy Doctrine*” and claimed that when Axworthy became foreign minister in January 1996, the Chretien doctrine acquired a new dimension. The Axworthy doctrine is about the new approach of the state on the security and safety of the individual rather than on the protection of the borders. The concept of human security will be discussed in the next chapter whereas, this chapter will focus on the concept of the democratisation of foreign policy and the Ottawa process. The Landmine Ban Treaty signed through the Ottawa Process is also an element of the concept of human security. Axworthy was the most vocal proponent of democratisation of Canadian foreign policy. He supported democratisation even before becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was also appointed as Minister of Human Resource in the new Liberal government and had been External affairs critic for the Liberal party.

Democratisation Debate, Role of NGOs and the Liberal Party of Canada

The idea of democratising foreign policy was prominent in Canadian foreign policymaking during the first mandate (1993-1997) of the Chretien government. But the way foreign policy making took place during these years was no different from the period of the previous government. For example, Liberals during the election campaign promised a ‘new direction in Canada-US relations’ and criticised the Mulroney government for drifting towards continentalism. But after forming the government, Chretien could not reopen NAFTA agreement, and the trade with US and Mexico remained almost unchanged.

Similarly, the Red Book also promised for a renewed leadership role for Canada in UN peacekeeping under the Liberal government, but it was evident that Canadian participation declined during the 1990s due to the fiscal deficit. Andy Knight in his article claimed, "Canadian peacemakers were more active under the Mulroney/Campbell regimes than they are under the Chretien Liberals" (Knight 1999: 42). Cameron in his article says that "a volume commissioned to assess the Liberal record on this front in 1995 found little tangible evidence to suggest that the Liberal government was conducting foreign policy any more democratically than its predecessor" (Cameron: 1998 47-48). He further wrote that this led to confusion about the actual meaning of democratisation of foreign policy. This dilemma about the exact meaning of democratisation was also raised by Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot. They ask: "is a democratic foreign policy one in which the largest number of 'average citizens' participate or where a balance is struck between a wide spectrum of politically relevant stakeholders, such that no major group's interest and values are overruled?" (Cameron and Molot 1995: 19).

Democracy, War and Foreign Policy

The use of the phrase 'democratisation of foreign policy' raises a natural question—does democracy matter in the making of foreign policy and if so, then to what extent? There is no doubt that democracy is the best available option to govern any country. Although there are some countries which are not democratic and follow a different path, democracy has been established as the best way on the basis of the experience the world has gone through. Cameron and Molot argue that "democracy matters both as a source and objective of foreign policy" (Cameron and Molot 1995: 1). The making of the foreign policy in a democracy is different from other types of governance because the government cannot ignore the sentiments of the common individual and their interest groups which are the source of these policies. This is common with all the democracies of the world. The principal objective of foreign policy for democracies is to promote peace and stability in the world. As per the democratic peace theory, democracies like to encourage other countries to adopt democratic systems. This peculiar behaviour of democracy is due to their belief in peaceful coexistence.

Within the liberal theory of International Relations, the democrats believe that democracies are peaceful and do not go to war against each other. As democracies coexist peacefully with other democracies, democracy must be promoted abroad. This conviction came into

the realm of international relations way back when Immanuel Kant wrote an essay titled *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* in 1795. Contemporary scholars like Michael Doyle (1983) have supported this argument. Robert H. Jackson in his article argues that "the thesis about the democratic 'zone of peace' implies that democracy and security are not fundamentally in conflict; indeed, it implies that the expansion of democracy is the surest path to world peace" (Jackson 1995: 46). But in an anarchical world, the security dilemma leads to an arms race among states, whether democracies or non-democracies. The main reason behind such behaviour of a particular state is due to the misunderstanding of intentions by the other state. The confusion between defensive and offensive intentions have been the major source of collective insecurity among sovereign states. Still, it is quite evident that democracies are different from the non-democratic states in terms of the foreign policymaking. Democracies are different from non-democracies not only in foreign policy making but policy-making of any kind. In democratic countries, the policy-making process is more open and inculcates a broad range of voices from different people coming from different sections of society and from different parts of the country. That is why democracies are less prone to the conflict that can result in a major war.

Due to the inclusive character of foreign policymaking, it has been argued that wars are very costly for democracies even when it has been supported by the people of the country. It becomes even more expensive when the public does not support the decision to go to war. Democratic peace theory does not claim that the democracies never go to war. Instead, in the past democracies have been engaged in wars with non-democracies as well as democracies. There were also examples when the wars were started by the democracies. Even the modern democracies like the United States and France were born out of the revolution. Jackson claims that "democracy when aroused against an enemy, are among the most formidable warrior states" (Jackson 1995:47). During the Cold War, it was very evident that democracies made military alliances due to the presence of hostile, threatening or aggressive non-democratic states. The end of the Cold War changed the conception that internal/domestic reasons have nothing to do with the external policies of a nation and it became clear that the domestic equation within the country also plays a vital role in defining the foreign policy priorities. Thus, the end of the Cold War renewed the significance of the internal sources of foreign policy.

Meaning of Democratisation

Nossal says that it is complicated to understand what democratisation of Canadian foreign policy means because it is very 'ambiguous, imprecise and heavily dependent on the context' (Nossal 1995: 29). For him, democratisation refers to two entirely different *external* and *internal* political phenomena. When democratisation is referred to as an external phenomenon, it is "the pursuit of democracy as a goal of Canadian foreign policy and the various efforts taken by the Canadian government to encourage and embrace democratic ideals and practices by other governments and peoples" (Nossal 1995: 29). As an internal phenomenon democratisation refers to "the degree to which Canadian foreign policy is itself democratic" (Nossal 1995: 29). On the other hand, Cameron says that it is very difficult to understand what democratisation is in the context of foreign policy. For him, the best way to understand democracy is by distinguishing between the classical notion of democracy which believes in self-governance under the rule of law and the modern notion of liberal or representative democracy.

Without a doubt, the term democratisation itself raises the eyebrows of democrats. They argued that when Canada has a national parliament responsible for the path and direction of Canadian foreign policy and a set pattern of framing foreign policy by the institutions established by the constitution, then what makes Canadian foreign policy less democratic? According to the democrats, there exists no conflict between the fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy and the will of the majority. On this basis, the democrats disagreed with the term 'democratization' of Canadian foreign policy. Here the distinction of the context proposed by Nossal is significant. Nossal believes that

the Canadian political system is already marked by the institutions of the representative governments that exist by the consent albeit hypothetical, of the broad mass of Canadian adult citizens, exercised periodically in elections that by general concurrence are both fair and free from coercion... In short, if we were to ask whether the Canadians themselves have achieved the "democratic ideals" that they want to press on others in the international system, the answer would most probably be in the affirmative (Nossal 1995: 31).

But at the same time if the Canadians are asked if Canadian foreign policy is democratic, then the answer may come in a resounding "No" from different quarters (Nossal 1993: 105).

The above statement depicts that the term democratisation used in an international context has an entirely different outlook and perception than when it is applied in the domestic context. In other words, Canadians want other countries to organise their political community as Canadians do, behave in a particular way on a specific issue as Canadians do as well as organise their government and address the grievances of their citizens as Canadians do on their sovereign land. Keeping the above parameters in mind as a defining character of democratisation, Canadians will not face any difficulty in judging any other foreign country and the level of democratisation it achieved. But when it comes to its domestic context, the story seems paradoxical. Keeping in mind the growing movement of the civil society groups for the inclusion of their representatives in foreign policymaking, Canadian citizens may respond in affirmative if they are asked about making the Canadian foreign policy more democratised. Even the election agenda of the Liberal party for the federal election of 1993 titled *Creating Opportunities* alleged the “undemocratic” foreign policy of the Conservative government. The Liberal Red Book reads that Conservative government was “unwilling to carry on a serious dialogue with the Canadian people on the foreign policy issues and rarely either the public or the parliament on important foreign policy decisions” (Liberal Party of Canada: 1993).

Advocates of democratisation of foreign policy argue that although Canada has liberal democratic institutions as well as mechanisms to review foreign policy, there exists the problem of the effectiveness of such institutions in liberal democracies because they are "less democratic than they appear" (Cameron 1998: 149). That is why ‘openness’ is required to improve the democratic values in foreign policymaking. A consultative approach by the government can improve the level of democratisation in Canadian foreign policy. Tim Draimin and Betty Plews are in favour of a change in the foreign policy-making process in Canada and claim that they "are only in a nascent stage of democratisation of foreign policy" (Draimin and Plews 1995: 64). They say that there is a need “to make it more transparent (through the development of policy options, decision making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) and more accessible (by such means as publishing documents, holding hearings, roundtables and townhalls).” This can happen through “expanded opportunities and for people participation” (Draimin and Plews 1995: 64).

The term ‘people participation’ does not mean simply meetings with the stakeholders. Rather, it has an entirely different meaning that is “the process must have as a goal the

expansion of the public's understanding in increasingly complex issues by engaging its attention in ways which develop its capacity to analyse and understand the trade-offs involved in policy choices" (Draimin and Plews 1995: 64). In short, the real purpose of such a kind of democratisation is establishing a deliberative policy based on thoughtful and active citizenship. The adoption of any such process never goes unchecked by the academic world. It was natural that several questions surfaced during this time around such as—how new is this phenomenon? From where did it come? What was the need for such a process? To answer the above questions, we have to look back.

After Chretien's new government took charge and the Canadian parliament started functioning, the democratisation theme became recurrent during the debates in the parliament. Quoting the debates that took place during this period, Nossal writes "indeed many speakers during this debate complained that there had been no debates on foreign policy at all during the Mulroney era and praised the Chretien government for holding such debates" (Nossal 1995: 32). This statement clearly showed the reasons behind the need and emergence of democratisation theme in the Canadian political quarters during the federal elections in 1993. But some more serious questions emerged: Was it just a transition or a permanent theme? What is the significance of it? What will be the role of the state and civil society in conducting the Canadian foreign policy in this phase of the Chretien years?

Liberal Democrats V/S Supporters of Inclusiveness: Debate on the Role of Non-Governmental Organisations

With respect to the role of civil society, different scholars offer competing views. Some believe that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can play a very crucial role in the democratisation process. Others say that NGOs will not be able to make the foreign policy process more democratic as per the expectations. Draimin and Plewes noted that "NGO's are becoming much more self-critical about their role, their representativeness and their accountability" (Draimin and Plewes 1995: 66). For Liberal democrats, representation means speaking on behalf of somebody else in a public meeting or assembly. They believe that the foreign policy could be made more democratic by improving the representativeness of the political parties. For democrats, it is more logical than that of expecting NGOs or civil societies to play a significant role in the foreign policy-making by increasing their say. It has also been argued that the foreign policymaking is not the task of the commoners, but it should be done by the experts. Bureaucrats, scholars from academia, foreign policy

practitioners etc. are considered as the most suitable people for making foreign policy (Cameron 1998: 149). While this argument highlights the problems of greater participation, it sounds elitist.

However, the argument produced by liberal democrats is subtle. They say that the inclusion of non-elected bodies outside the established procedure and rule made by the constitution for representation may be good or bad but "it hardly counts as democratisation of the policy process" (Cameron 1995: 149). In this way, the democrats, mainly the participatory democrats, do not believe that democratisation can be fostered through closer links between the institutions of the state and civil society. Their view is important, but this argument has limitations. This is because the proper functioning of liberal institutions depends on the active involvement of citizens. The participation of citizens in periodic voting for the election of a new political elite cannot be considered as active citizenship.

The involvement of the NGOs in the policy-making process is based on the view that liberal democracy cannot be successful until the full potential of citizens is used. Liberal democracy cannot achieve the desired goals if the limited perspective of citizenship such as—taking part in the periodic elections remains the cornerstone of any democratic setup. Deliberative democrats have an entirely different viewpoint from the procedural democrats. Deliberative democracies give more attention to the inputs that come from public opinion. Jurgen Habermas, a famous exponent of deliberative democracy, says that "liberal institutions will function at their best when they operate within the context of a vital and dynamic public sphere as the informal networks for communicating information and points of view through which public opinions are formed and articulated" (Habermas 1996: 359-366).

Legislatures play a crucial role in converting public opinion into legislative action, but this depends heavily on the activeness of civil society. For example, the initiative to ban anti-personal landmine was taken by legislatures not only in Canada but in other countries too, and the success of such legislation depended on public pressure (Cameron 1998: 151). Publicity is an important aspect of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democrats believe that debates are important in democracy and ideas should be open for criticism. The cross-examination of policies by the public through discussions and debates injects new life into the democratic process.

The critics of any such bond between the government and civil society, especially NGOs gave several arguments against it. David A. Lenarcic has a sceptical view when it comes to the role of NGOs in foreign policymaking. He warns of the unprecedented involvement of non-governmental organisations in the international policy-making process. He also suggests that "Canadians might want to ask to themselves if this 'new-private order' makes for the government that is more attuned to their national concerns or one that has become beholden to unaccountable special interest groups which are far less concerned with consensus building than Canadian governments have typically been both at home and abroad" (Lenarcic 1998: 70). To overcome these concerns, he proposed that the Canadian government not become 'hostage' to such special interests.

The possibility of NGOs capturing the Canadian government or the government co-opting the NGOs was a genuine concern on the part of both the government and the NGOs. But they both cannot be right because there must be clear-cut criteria for determining when a government has become 'hostage' of any or many NGOs or when a social movement has been 'co-opted' by the government. In this debate of 'hostage' and 'co-opting,' there is also another viewpoint. According to this third school, there is a possibility that the government and the NGOs may converge on the basis of the merit of the issue. Public opinion on an important issue like landmines ban, environmental degradation etc. helps government and the NGOs reach on a consensus for a kind of convergence in the perspectives of both government and NGOs.

In this way, according to Cameron, the theses of hostage and co-optation should be set aside and "the relationship between government and civil society need not involve the surrender of one to the other as long as policymaking is open and transparent" (Cameron 1998: 152). Apart from this debate, some questions arise, such as—how liberal democracy will be affected by the process of democratisation. Cameron asks "does such an approach to foreign policy development represent a threat to liberal democracy or the contrary enhance the vitality of liberal democratic institutions by using them to encourage greater public deliberation and participation in decision making?" (Cameron 1998:152).

Basically, the confusion with respect to the use of the term democratisation of foreign policy is due to the diverse interpretations of the meaning of democracy. These different views of democracy are due to the diverse interests of the people for participating in democracy. Cameron and Molot argue "business executives are mainly concerned with

improving their 'bottom line'. They, therefore, have little incentive to participate, except where the policy process directly affects their interests" (Cameron and Molot 1995: 19). Such business agents do have direct access to policymakers and can influence foreign policy. For such people, there is nothing bad if they do not take part in the initial stage of policy-making through the democratisation process. The foreign policy review process is 'irrelevant' to them.

In contrast, groups in civil society want to take part actively in policymaking. They are not capable enough to influence the formulation of foreign policy like the other powerful organisations which have access to the higher level of authority involved in policymaking. Cameron and Molot write "they often see a great intrinsic value in participating in the policy process, precisely because groups in civil society represent heterogeneous constituencies and they also confront major action problems" (Cameron and Molot 1995: 19).

In a developed democracy where the people are aware of what is happening in the country and how that will affect the life of an ordinary citizen of the country, it is very important for the government to encourage public participation in the policy-making process. Public participation not only justifies the existence of the government but also increases the legitimacy of the state. Participatory legitimacy¹⁸ alone is not enough in a developed democracy. Rather representative legitimacy¹⁹ enhances the qualitative aspect of a democratic country. It is assumed, that public involvement may improve the quality of statecraft. On the other hand, too much participation can politicise the policy process and make policymaking more complex and cumbersome.

Efforts of The Liberal Party

The idea of the democratisation of foreign policy was the central issue of discussion in different quarters in Canada during 1994-95. It started a useful debate about the role of NGOs in Canadian foreign policy. As soon as the Liberals came to power, attempts were made to fulfil the promises made in their election manifesto. A Special Joint House of Commons and Senate Committee was formed to review the Canadian foreign policy.²⁰ The

¹⁸ The legitimacy that a democracy receives by the common people based on the free and fair elections.

¹⁹ The legitimacy that a democracy receives by the common people based on the representation of their voices in the government.

²⁰ The committee was chaired jointly by honourable Allan J. MacEachen, (Senate) and Jean-Robert Gauthier (House of Commons).

newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre Ouellet wrote to several organisations that were supposed to take part in the democratisation process. According to Knight “the Liberal’s Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to several hundred NGO representatives and to a large number of companies, consultants and universities asking them to submit information concerning their vision of Canadian foreign policy and to consider presenting their ideas to the Special Joint House of Commons and Senate and Committee charged with reviewing Canadian foreign policy” (Knight 1999: 40).

The Joint Committee of both houses received 561 suggestions, of which 277 were made by NGOs, 115 by the individuals, 70 by educational and cultural groups, 49 by business organisations, six by labour associations, four by international organisations, two by military and marine associations and one by a municipal/provincial government. "Over eighty meetings were held by three parliamentary/senate panels that crisscrossed the country and in addition twenty-two round tables and focus groups were convened separately to address the foreign policy issues of security, trade, international assistance and regional perspectives” (Knight 1999: 40). In this way, efforts to include civil society started at a very initial stage when Canada was also facing several other domestic problems, particularly, budget cuts and Quebec nationalism. The election manifesto also promised that the Liberal Party would establish a National Forum on Canada’s International Relations. The purpose of this National forum would be to take care of Canadian engagement in international affairs. In March 1994 a National Forum was convened in Ottawa to kick-start two parliamentary reviews-one of foreign policy and another of defence policy. By holding this National Forum, which was a unique step in the area of the Canadian foreign policy, the Liberal government portrayed its commitment towards an ‘open process for foreign policy-making’.

The National Forum gave an opportunity to Canadians to voice their views about the direction of foreign policy and contribute at least at the agenda-setting level to Canadian foreign policy. The Forum invited approximately 130 individuals who were chosen very carefully from different areas, e.g. region, language, sex, ethnic community, interest group affiliation and professional expertise. The Forum was so big and diverse that it was not easy to build a consensus or agree on different issues. But the government was sure that such assemblies would continue to discuss Canadian foreign policy issues. One can also argue that they were unable to play an important role and would remain an ‘honest broker’.

The participation of NGOs was looked down upon by government officials. The effort of the Liberal Party to encourage NGOs for vigorous and vociferous participation was based on the fact that they would remain interested in the foreign policy-making process. Government officials "believe that the larger public was largely uninterested in foreign affairs and wanted the government, as much as, possible to go about its business without bothering them" (Cameron & Molot 1995: 20). But the number of suggestions that came to the Joint Committee of both the houses as well as the number of individuals attended the meeting of the National Forum that took place in Ottawa tell a different story.

Ottawa Process and the Leadership Role of Canada

The Ottawa Process is considered as one of the leading cases of the democratisation of foreign policy. Public participation in the Ottawa Process is the only case in the world which concluded with an international treaty to ban anti-personnel landmine within fourteen months. After describing two contending views of the democratisation of foreign policy Maxwell A. Cameron argued that "public diplomacy modelled on the Ottawa Process has the potential to contribute to the quality and vitality of liberal democratic institutions" (Cameron 1998: 147). Banning anti-personnel mines through the Ottawa Process brought new forms of multilateral diplomacy in the post-Cold War period. Under the Ottawa Process, the fast track diplomatic initiative made an impossible thing possible.

An International Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union brought several new ideas into focus such as—democratisation, human rights and good governance. These were never at the core of the debates that took place during the Cold War. Similarly, the new era also changed the nature of war and conflicts. Inter-state wars were no more a big threat to the sovereignty of the states. Instead, intra-state conflict within the territory of states was a significant concern. In such a situation the loss of human lives, particularly that of innocent civilians including women and children, became an international issue. Another important variant of the post-Cold War threat was the existence of fragile, failed or failing states. Such states were not capable enough to handle internal issues and sometimes in the name of managing conflicts gross violation of human rights took place.

The then UN General Secretary, Mr Kofi Annan observed:

State sovereignty in its most basic sense is being redefined--not least by the force of globalisation and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their people and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty--by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual enshrined in the Charter of UN and subsequent international treaties- has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights (Economist 1999: 49-50).

In simple terms, Kofi Annan stated that state sovereignty is for individuals and not state itself. The discourse was changing. The traditional concept of sovereignty having the ultimate goal of protection of the borders at any cost and the security and safety of state borders was fading away and a new notion of security of the individual was overtaking the traditional one. In fact, the concept of human security replaced the conventional concept of state security. During the Chretien decade (1993-2003) the Canadian foreign policy shifted its course from national unity, discussed in the last chapter as domestic constraints, to human security which emphasised the protection of the innocent lives of the ordinary people to the relatively new concept of transnational security after the 9/11 attack on the North American soil.

The idea of human security will be discussed more fully in the next chapter with the concept of Responsibility to Protect. Nevertheless, the movement to ban anti-personnel mines is closely associated with the emerging trends in the post-Cold War world. Since the focus of attention was changing in the post-Cold War era from state security to human security, the significance of landmines increased. Landmines are associated with both state security and human security. Landmines had been a powerful weapon during the Cold War era to protect the border areas of a country. At the same time, they had taken several innocent lives of the people living near the borders or made them permanently disabled.

Anti-personnel landmines (APL) or Anti-personnel mines (APM) have been described as “weapon of mass destruction in a slow motion” (Matheson 1996: 10). Although AP mines have been used by military forces for several decades, they were not seen as a big threat to the life of individuals. Describing the lethal nature of landmines Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson and Brain W. Tomlin in their edited volume titled *To Walk without Fear: the Global Movement to Ban Landmines* wrote that "AP mines are at the root of a global humanitarian crisis....An AP mine can take its deadly toll many decades after it was first laid; it is not a weapon that respects a cease-fire and it is indifferent to the distinction

between civilians and soldiers" (Maxwell, Lawson, Tomlin 1998: 2). Landmines were used by the states to defend its borders. Later, it was claimed that the AP mines were very destructive and around 25,000 innocent people either lost their lives or faced injuries every year due to their explosion. It had been claimed by the aid agencies, particularly by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) that the existing mines are potential threats to the life of people involved in the aiding process.

According to Axworthy, "Landmines are invisible killers of non-combatants. Traditionally sown by armies for protection against foe, they remain under the ground long after the conflict is over, presenting a huge danger to an unsuspecting passerby" (Axworthy 2003: 129). The worst sufferers faced the wrath of these mines, were women or children. The psychological trauma the victims of landmines suffered is beyond imagination. The doctors treating such victims say that if "the children victimised by these weapons the worst result was not physical. Modern prosthetics could restore most of their physical facility. The most serious consequence was psychological trauma, the aftermath of being suddenly mutilated, of having their lives drastically changed for having no reason." (Axworthy 2003: 131). People going from one place to another place, children playing in the field became the target of the mines laid down by the military forces/warring sides in the conflict areas. Even after the end of the conflict the mines which were sown in the past targeted innocent people. Lawson argued that "the world had just begun to reap the bitter harvest of millions of mines sown during conflicts that had already become synonymous with human suffering-- Afghanistan, Somalia, Croatia, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Bosnia" (Lawson 1998: 83).

AP mines targeted victims in large numbers at a time in different locations of the world. The field research done by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations claimed that the accuracy of the number of the mines existing beneath the crust of the land could be between 50 million and 130 million deployed in around 70 countries (mostly in developing countries) during the conflict. It was estimated that there are 100 million mines active under the crust of the earth before the signing of the landmines ban treaty. It is also a fact that the cost of laying the "buried terror" is less than the US \$ 3 whereas, the cost of removing a mine is very high and can be between US\$ 300 to US\$ 1000 (Raj 2007: 114). In this way, the actual cost of planting mines was meager as compared to the cost of removing them. The loss of life and injury during the task of

removing the mines should also be taken into consideration while estimating the disaster done by mines.

Pre- Ottawa Laws and The Role of NGOs

Landmines do not distinguish between a soldier and a civilian. Whenever war or conflict takes place, innocent people also die as a consequence of the use of weapons of mass destruction. The cause of casualties due to a landmine blast is higher among civilians than combatants. Lawson argues "AP mines are by design and effect indiscriminate; over 70 per cent of AP mine casualties over the past decade were civilians" (Lawson 1998: 83). Wars and conflicts caused unnecessary suffering to civilians in the history of the world. After the end of the World War II, it was decided that even during wars there should be differential humanitarian treatment between civilians and military personnel. The Geneva Conventions (1949) extensively described the basic rights of wartime prisoners (Civilians and military), wounded and sick people. It established an international humanitarian law for the protection of civilians in a war-ravaged area. The Geneva Conventions consist of Four agreements and Three additional protocols that have different provisions. The Geneva Conventions were ratified by 196 countries in whole or with reservations.

The international humanitarian law concluded by the Geneva Conventions in 1977 under Article 51 reads "The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against danger arising from military operations... The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack" (Protocol I 1977: 265). Thus, the protocol categorically states that the parties involved in the conflict must always distinguish between civilians and combatants. Any attack on the civilian population is prohibited. Thus, the use of such weapons which can cause unending suffering to innocent civilians should not be used in the battlegrounds for humanitarian reasons.

The UN Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which was concluded at Geneva in 1980 and came into force in 1983, was about the prohibition of using certain conventional weapons with landmines included under conventional weapon and restricted in use²¹. The second protocol of the Convention is about a prohibition on the use of mines, body traps and other devices. The Convention

²¹ The full title of this convention is "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

was initially signed by 50 states. The number of parties to the Convention increased, and currently, 115 members have ratified the Convention. But the production, use, stockpiling and transfer of the mines were not achieved through international law. Lawson writes “while landmines protocol placed restrictions on the use of AP mines, by the early 1990’s it was clear that these restrictions were not reducing their impact on civilians” (Lawson 1998: 83).

NGOs played a crucial role in gathering support for a total ban on AP mines. Robert O. Muller, the founder of Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAFA), had been surprised to see the number of landmines victims during his visit to Cambodia in the 1980s. In 1991, Muller with Thomas Gebauer of Medico International (MI), a German aid group, launched a campaign supported by different NGOs for landmines ban. It was believed that a coordinated effort by NGOs could alter the situation. Within a year these organisations were joined by Handicap International from France, Human Rights Watch, Mine Advisory Group from the United Kingdom and Physicians for Human Rights from the USA. In 1992, these six NGOs met in New York and decided to sponsor the first International NGO Conference on Landmines in London in 1993. These NGOs together formed International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)²². ICBL apart from International Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC) were two most significant NGOs coordinating the landmines ban treaty. Jody Williams, the co-coordinator of ICBL, was made international campaign coordinator²³. Discussing ICBL, Short wrote that “ICBL did not function entirely as a coalition of 1000 organisations but rather as a single, homogenous bargaining voice with a unitary position” (Short 1999: 484).

The landmines protocol which was adopted during the Geneva Conventions had little impact on the miseries of human beings during the Cold War period due to the indiscriminate use of mines to protect borders, particularly in former colonial states. Mentioning the acceptance of the mines among the countries, Axworthy wrote in his autobiography titled *Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future* that “At the end of the Cold War, landmines were an accepted part of virtually every country's military arsenal, subject to some desultory arms control negotiations but barely on the radar screen of the

²² ICBL is a global network of non-governmental organisations, currently active in some 100 countries, working for a world free of anti-personnel landmines. <http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/about-us.aspx>

²³ Jody Williams was later awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts which resulted in Anti-Personnel Landmines Ban Treaty, 1997.

governments" (Axworthy 2003: 128). The protocol related to landmines applies to international conflicts between states or group of states which were also seen as a limitation of the protocol. Since the nature of the conflicts also changed with the end of the Cold War, the landmines protocol become obsolete. In the post-Cold War period, the conflicts were more often prevalent within the states among warring groups and not between the states.

People were not aware of the disastrous impact of mines on the lives of individuals. There existed no clear-cut view about the issue of landmines during the early 1990s. Although the laws made during the Geneva Conventions prohibited the use of mines, the general public was not looking at the mines issue as a serious threat to the human race. Commenting on this Brian W. Tomlin wrote that "Internationally the mines issue was morass, hopelessly tied up in the UN's consensus-based, just where the major powers wanted it. In any case, the idea of an outright ban on the production and use of mines was not deemed to be a credible policy alternative to any government" (Tomlin 1998: 186). That is why the most difficult task was to spread awareness about the seriousness of the issue among common people. ICBL took up the responsibility and started an international campaign to inform the general public of the problem of mines. With the help of conferences, the ICBL was able to develop momentum in support of a ban on landmines. After the first NGO conference in London (1993) the second and third NGO conference took place in Geneva (1994) and Phnom Penn (1995) consecutively. In 1995 a series of seminars were also conducted by the NGOs in different parts of Africa.

The impact of these conferences led to pressure on policymakers not only from local NGOs but also from the foreign governments who supported a ban. The international campaign created a new wave in support of a ban. The NGOs involved in the awareness campaign brought mine blast survivors with maimed bodies before the public who described their worst nightmares. To build public opinion against the landmines NGOs worked day and night. The NGOs involved in the campaign were non-profit and the funding for such an international campaign for awareness and strong opinion for landmines ban was raised by these organisations through government and private sources. Nicola Short wrote:

Financial records regarding the campaign were not available regarding the campaign. Apparently, however, during the campaign the ICBL received roughly one-third funding from the Open Society Institute, one third from governments (particularly Canada, Norway and Sweden) and one third from

other NGO's and International Organisations such as UNICEF (Short 1999: 484).

Describing the role of Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), Axworthy wrote in his autobiography that “A unique partner in the coalition was the Landmine Survivor Network, which brings together survivors, their family members and aid workers” (Axworthy 2003: 130). At the same time, using the print media and other means of communications, the NGOs changed public opinion. The stories narrated by the survivors gained the attention of international media and also gathered the support of the Pope and celebrities, particularly, Princess Diana. Although approximately 70 per cent of the victims were men, the civil societies cleverly portray the pictures of women and children to describe landmines as ‘epidemic’. Like poison gas, landmines have been ‘stigmatised’ in a remarkably short span of time. In this process, the supporters of the ban used all possible means of communications. John English wrote, “The success of the pro-ban movement in many countries derived in part from the use of powerful images of the impact of landmines especially through the medium of television” (English 1998: 130). Describing the role of NGOs in gathering public support Axworthy wrote in his autobiography:

Within a few short years, the combined efforts of various non-governmental groups succeeded in turning it into a humanitarian issue commanding worldwide attention. It was an early demonstration of how civil society can raise the profile can raise the issue and public support at global level (Axworthy 2003: 128-129).

Almost 2000 organisations worked day and night in coordination to bring public attention to the serious issue of APMs. The result of this campaign was the endorsement of the idea of a ban by the UN General Secretary (UNGA). Meanwhile, Belgium became the first country to implement a total ban on the use, production, procurement, sale or transfer of the landmines. Even Belgium’s Minister of Defence said the country would destroy the existing stock of the mines.

Describing the need for the Ottawa Process and a ban, John English said that

A global landmine crisis was like a patient that is haemorrhaging. Before anything else can be done, the bleeding must be stopped, and the patient must be stabilised. A ban on APM will do this and provide the opportunity to deal effectively and definitely with the enormous challenges of assisting and rehabilitating the victims and clearing the existing mines (English 1997: 171).

Canada Assumes Leadership

Describing the Landmine Treaty and the leadership of Canada in achieving a global ban Lloyd Axworthy in his autobiography wrote that "Promoting, negotiating and implementing the land-mine treaty gave Canada both a new role and a distinctive voice on international matters and helped reshape certain of our assumptions governing global affairs" (Axworthy 2003: 127). Describing the Canadian approach to the Ottawa Process as 'very simple' John English argued that Canada had an advantage in taking up the leadership role and would be able to go through the Ottawa Process due to three major reasons. First, by taking urgent action on the mandate given by 155 countries in the UN General Assembly in support of ban on landmines. Secondly, the effort for the ban was basically humanitarian as well as the APMs are not strategic weapons which means that they would not be treated as nuclear or chemical weapons. Third, the Ottawa Process was open to all. Countries supporting a ban were welcomed by Canada (English 1997: 170-171). Whereas, Veronica Kitchen claimed that the Canadian involvement to ban landmines started accidentally. Quoting John English, the then member of the Canadian parliament, she wrote:

In 1995, the United Nations published a list of countries that adhered to an export moratorium on anti-personnel landmines. Mistakenly, the list includes Canada, which had enacted no such ban. The Department of National Defence (DND) did not want to tell the United Nations of the error, and so, under the pressure from DFAIT, it consented to an export moratorium by November 1995 (Kitchen 2001: 41).

Canadian involvement in the landmines issue may be "accidental", but it is also worthwhile to note that Canada was considered as the only middle power suitable for the leadership role. English claimed that Canada was the "reasonable choice" among all the middle powers. Middle powers from across the world even wealthy nations of Europe and other countries were not capable enough to take the leadership role due to some or the other reasons (English 2000).

However, in Canada, the campaign had been started by Celina Tuttle, a member of Physicians for Global Survival, by writing letters on the issue of mines. She was also invited to attend the Second International NGO Conference to Ban Landmines of ICBL held at Geneva in 1994. In 1995 Mines Action Canada (MAC) became an organisation as more

than 20 NGOs joined in support of a landmines ban²⁴. Celina Tuttle became the coordinator of the MAC and started looking after the day to day campaign strategy within and outside the country. The vision of the organisation was to bring humanity one step closer to peace and social justice by eliminating the impacts of indiscriminate weapons and restoring the rights and dignity of affected individuals and communities. However, the initial objective of MAC was “to ban the use, production, stockpiling, sale, transport and export of APMs and the destruction of existing stockpiles; to support humanitarian mine clearance efforts; to provide assistance to the victims of landmines; to exchange information at international level with the ICBL to promote a global ban” (Raj 2007: 119). Axworthy in his autobiography mentioned that the process of banning the use of mines in Canada started before his appointment as Foreign Minister. He wrote in his autobiography “As early as 1994, my predecessor Andre Ouellet, had begun to advocate to the defence minister, David Collenette, the idea of declaring a moratorium on the use of landmines by Canadian forces to demonstrate Canadian seriousness” (Axworthy 2003: 133).

The campaign started by MAC was unique in nature. The purpose was to give a message to the government of Canada and bring the issue of mines into national debates. MAC started writing letters to the government of Canada. Andre Ouellet, the then Foreign Minister of the Canadian government once said: "he received more letters on mines than any other issue except national unity" (Cameron 1998: 154). At the same time, MAC also started a signature campaign, and the gathered signatures were sent to the House of Commons, which exerted a lot of pressure on the policymakers of the country. However, there were members of parliament who favoured the use of mines, but the pressure built by the NGOs and the way arguments were presented by them compelled the supporters of mines to change their perceptions. In the words of Cameron “NGO leaders countered the arguments of Canadian officials, saying that nothing was likely to happen in the CCW (the convention was around the corner) and Canada had little to lose by taking the moral high ground” (Cameron 1998: 155).

²⁴ Physicians for Global Survival, CARE, CUSA, Oxfam, Project Ploughshares, the United Nations Association of Canada, World Vision, several churches as well as the Canadian NGO umbrella organisation, the CCIC joined the coalition.

To reach a consensus among the Canadian leadership under Axworthy used a well-planned strategy:

We developed a three-pronged approach. First was to give high level attention to the strategy meeting being planned in Ottawa. Second, we would step up diplomatic activity at the UN to establish Canadian engagement and to invite participation in Ottawa discussions--especially important because US was, as we have seen showing a lively commitment of its own on landmine matters. Third, we would continue working with minister of defence and his staff to convince them of the importance of getting rid of the Canadian landmine stockpile (Axworthy 2003: 134-135).

The way NGOs campaigned made one thing very clear that the issue of mines had become known to the public. Simultaneously, the mines ban movement and the support for it made policymakers think about the issue. The landmines issue in Canada could be resolved with the help of closer co-ordination between the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Because these were the two major departments which had the responsibility for mines and other issues associated with mines. Foreign Minister Andrew Ouellet was convinced by the arguments in support of a ban. Whereas, the then Defence Minister David Collenette was saying that removal or the elimination of mines is almost impossible until an effective and more humane alternative to mines is not found. Ouellet tried hard to persuade Collenette to ban landmines. Tomlin writes that Ouellet again wrote to Collenette and mentioned his wish to change the course of Canadian foreign policy (Axworthy 2003). Ouellet wrote in his letter that "he wanted to announce the Canadian moratorium on landmine exports and co-sponsor the US resolution in the UN and he wanted to declare Canada's commitment the eventual elimination of the landmines". DND compromised with its position on the issue of mines and was ready to accept the "eventual elimination of mines and the export moratorium". As a result of the campaign, in January 1996 Canada came out with a moratorium on the production, use, stockpile and transfer of anti-personnel mines. Canada was the first among the G-7 members and fourth after Belgium, Norway and Austria to do so. But this was not an end. Rather, it was a start to an international movement to ban landmines all across the world. It was a beginning to construct a new post-Cold War world order.

Progress of the Ottawa Process

The NGOs started pressurising the Chretien government to cut the defence budget. These organisations also geared up to pressurise the Liberal government. Valerie Warmington

and Celina Tuttle wrote that "Canadian NGOs had already begun raising the landmines issue during foreign and defence policy reviews initiated by the newly elected Liberal government in 1993" (Warmington and Tuttle 1998: 49). In January 1996, Lloyd Axworthy replaced Andre Ouellet as Foreign Minister of Canada. As soon as he was appointed, he asked his officials to advise him about Canadian foreign policy priorities. The Disarmament Division (IDA) identified two major priorities, namely, small arms and Anti-Personal Mines. Axworthy signalled to the Disarmament Division (IDA) of DFAIT to exert pressure on the Defense Department to destroy the stockpile of the mines. Under the leadership of Axworthy IDA came out with a comprehensive plan by March 1996. The Canadian Action Plan to Reduce the Global Use of Landmines drafted by IDA proposed two different tracks for the mines ban movement. "The first was continued Canadian participation in the CCW Review Conference, scheduled to meet in Geneva in April. The second track was that contained the seeds of the Ottawa Process" (Raj 2007: 120). It was evident from the gestures of the three important countries, United States, United Kingdom and France that they wanted to include the issue of landmines in the Conference of Disarmament (CD)²⁵ which according to IDA would not be able to conclude the issue of landmines.

First Ottawa Landmine Conference

Following the strategy, Canadian officials during the CCW Review Conference met the representatives of NGOs and those states who were in support of mines ban. The purpose was to understand and explore the possibility of any new way which could help in dealing with the issue of landmines. Those who were in support of ban were left disheartened by the Review Conference as it concluded without any decision. Sensing the opportunity to assume leadership on the issue of banning landmines, Canada at the end of the Review Conference in Geneva on 3rd May 1996 announced that it would host an international meeting to discuss the strategy for an international ban on the mines. Lawson says that during early 1996 Canadian officials "engaged in an intensive series of consultations on the form and content of the Ottawa conference with representatives of the NGO community as well as like-minded and not so like-minded states" (Lawson: 1998 84). The Ottawa Process started even before the first Ottawa Conference took place. Two important

²⁵ The Conference on Disarmament (CD) had been established in 1979 by the international community to discuss and negotiate the multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements and particularly Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Traditionally, CD had the responsibility for landmines and other booby traps.

meetings took place between states and NGOs in January 1995 and in April 1996. The first meeting was the idea of Pieter Van Rossem of Pax Cristi Netherlands. “His intention was to assemble “good” countries for a discussion of how the issue could be moved forward independently. Ten of 20 good countries attended this first meeting in Vienna gave their enthusiastic support for a subsequent meeting” (Short 1999: 482). The list of these ‘good’ countries was prepared by Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch. The second meeting took place in April 1996 in Geneva between those states which took part in the last meeting and NGOs. These ten states, namely, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, South Africa and Switzerland were later called ‘Core Group’ (Short 1999).

One major question before the organisers of the conference (IDA) was about the guests. IDA officials were in a dilemma whether they should invite everyone or only to those who supported the ban because there was a possibility of sabotage by the opponents. The opposition by countries like the US, UK, France was known to the organisers. It was next to impossible to avoid these countries which were sharing a platform with Canada within NATO, G-7 and other multilateral organisations. To avert this, IDA officials carefully chose the self-selection process by preparing a draft declaration. It was proposed that those who were ready to take a unilateral step towards ban would automatically become part of the Ottawa Conference. Governments were given the declaration in advance. It was expected that those who would attend the Conference would endorse the declaration in the conference.

Meanwhile, officials of IDA also kept in touch with the NGOs, particularly ICBL and MAC. The leaders of the international NGOs which were involved in the international campaign in support of banning mines, i.e. ICBL were consulted extensively. Steve Goose and Jody Williams were leading the campaign of ICBL and were given enough importance by IDA officials. It was decided after consultations that a representative of MAC would be the part of the Canadian delegation in the Ottawa Conference.

The Ottawa Conference started on 4th October 1996. Axworthy explained the purpose of the Ottawa Conference as an effort to “build consensus on a strong forward looking resolution to the 51st session of the General Assembly” (DFAIT Statement, 24th September 1996). A total of 74 countries took part, out of which 50 participated, and 24 came to attend the conference as observer states. Earlier, it was expected that only 15 states would come

forward to attend the Conference. The representatives of UN, UNICEF, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, ICRC and several international and non-governmental organisations also took part. The conference was described as an “exercise in unconventional diplomacy”. It was also unique because “the conference featured ministers and officials sharing plenary and workshop platforms with mine victims, parliamentarians and representatives from international and non-governmental organizations active in advocacy for the ban, mine clearance and victim assistance” (Lawson 1998: 85).

In the Conference, the first and foremost task was to negotiate and discuss the declaration, later called ‘Ottawa Declaration’. The declaration focused on the elimination of mines as early as possible and also sought a global ban. The declaration was signed by all the 50 participating states. The next important task was the adoption of a Chairman’s Agenda for Action which would be the roadmap for the governments and the NGOs to achieve the global ban on mines. The Agenda for Action was very important. It was prepared by asking the delegates to propose the future activities of governments and NGOs. The Ottawa Conference concluded with the unanimous adoption of the final declaration and the Chairman's Agenda for action. Seeing the enthusiasm, IDA officials asked Llyod Axworthy to announce the next meeting before the end of next year, i.e. 1997 to sign an international treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines. But this was very risky at that stage, keeping in mind the allegation made by the US about the Canadian initiative was "too fast and too far". According to John English "Many delegation, even those supportive of a ban, were initially shocked by this ambitious timetable. But they realised, as had Canada, that there existed not only real momentum for a ban but a special window of opportunity that had to be exploited" (English 1997: 170).

In the closing session of the International Strategy Conference Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines on October 5, 1995, Llyod Axworthy addressed the participants of the Conference. He announced:

Today, I commit Canada to this goal, to work with our global partners to prepare the treaty that can be signed by December 1997 and implemented by the year 2000. I am convinced that the real possibility of a treaty by a fixed date will exploit the unprecedented momentum that we now enjoy and will make it easier for countries to take the necessary national decision to make our group larger, much work needs to be done but my country will do everything it can and will work with all of you so that, we can return here in 1997 to make our common goal a reality (Axworhty 2003: 138).

After giving his closing remark at the International Strategy Conference Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines on October 5, 1996, he observed: "The reaction in the hall was a mixture of surprise, applause and incredulity. The NGO contingent rose to their feet. The representatives of many governments sat on their seats, too sound to react, severely barely suppressing their anger and opposition" (Axworthy 2003: 138).

The standing ovation showed that the participants of the conference were enthusiastic about the bold step was taken by Canada and the IDA officials. Not only the pro-ban states but also the NGOs had a joyful moment. ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga and ICBL leader Jody Williams supported the initiative taken by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this way, the Ottawa Process was launched.

Ottawa Process Concluded

The Ottawa Process started by setting up the targets. To achieve them three different tracks were laid "First, we started by enlisting a core group of countries, beginning with Australia, Norway, South Africa, New Zealand, Switzerland, Belgium and Mexico, to act with us as a coordinating team" (Axworthy 2003: 138). The second track was "to develop a close working partnership with the NGOs and international organisations such as—the Red Cross that had already displayed an impressive ability to mobilise opinion and pressure governments" (Axworthy 2003: 138). The third overlooked track was to "get a full approval and commitment of our own government" (Axworthy 2003: 140). As per the Chairman's Agenda for Action, the follow-up conference would take place in Belgium in June 1997. It was decided that the Ottawa group (Pro-ban states and NGOs) would prepare a draft of the landmines agreement. In February 1997 experts from 111 nations met behind closed doors in Vienna, Austria to discuss the draft of the agreement. China, Pakistan and India did not attend this meeting while, Russia, Ukraine and Egypt sent observers (Raj 2007: 127). The task of preparing such draft had been given to Austria during the Ottawa Conference. "Austria provided a draft treaty as a basis of Ottawa group discussion on developing, producing, acquiring, storing, selling and using landmines" (Raj 2007: 127).

The next meeting in the process of developing a consensus took place in Tokyo, Japan in the next month on the initiative of the then Prime Minister of Japan. But the major scheduled meeting took place in Germany. About 120 nations send their experts to the meeting which to discuss the draft of the treaty prepared by Austria. In this meeting, some

of the nations were in support of calling this treaty an international humanitarian treaty whereas, other states were in favour of considering it chiefly as an arms-control agreement. The idea of an arms control agreement was dropped, and it was decided that the treaty would be an international humanitarian treaty. The next meeting, as decided in the Ottawa Conference took place in Brussels in June of the same year. The purpose of this meeting was to review the progress achieved by the international community on a global ban on landmines.

The discussions started in mid-June. In the four-day (24-27 June) Conference the representatives of different countries²⁶ decided to sign the Brussels declaration and also made a commitment to sign the Comprehensive Landmine Ban Treaty in December 1997. But different views emerged at this conference. Australia was of the view that the ban should be negotiated in the UN Conference on Disarmament. The US with Greece and Turkey decided not to be the part of the Ottawa Process whereas France, UK, Italy and Germany supported the Ottawa Process. India participated in the conference as an observer.

The US, Russia, China, Pakistan and India were the largest producers as well as stockholders of landmines. But it is an irony that US and Russia participated as observers in the Ottawa Conference which took place in 1996 whereas, in the Brussels Conference, India and Pakistan were the only observer states participating in the conference. In Brussels, it was decided that the participants who signed the Brussels declaration can take part in the next meeting, which was announced to take place in September 1997 in Oslo, Norway.²⁷ Meanwhile, ICBL, an umbrella organisation of NGOs claiming the membership of around 1000 organisations in approximately 50 countries around the world, came out with the basic principle in April 1997 in its brochure. The brochure reads that "The Campaign calls for: an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and sale, transfer and export of anti-personnel landmines, increased resources for humanitarian demining, increased resources for landmine victim rehabilitation and assistance" (ICBL 1997).

The pre-condition declared during the Brussels Conference made it clear that the purpose of the Oslo Conference was to conclude the Ottawa Process and negotiate the final draft of the treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines. "The task of the negotiator at Oslo was to turn

²⁶ Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lesotho, Malawi, Portugal, Rwanda, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

²⁷ The Oslo Conference which is also known as "Diplomatic Conference" held between 1-27 September 1997.

the draft Austrian treaty – the "single negotiating text" containing twenty articles--into a legally binding convention" (Raj 2007: 134). Even during the Oslo Conference, there was a tight division between the two groups of states. The pro-ban states were led by Canada whereas the states which were not satisfied by the Ottawa Process and were not sympathetic towards an umbrella ban on the landmines were led by the US. Canada tried its best to persuade the US for its inclusion in the list of signatories of the landmines ban treaty. On the other hand, the US was lobbying for support of its opposition. "Reports indicated that White house during the three-day weekend, contacted various national capitals seeking support for compromise" (Raj 2007: 132).

The US tried hard to pass its compromise proposal but failed. During the Conference, an announcement was made on 17th September 1997 by Bill Clinton the then President of US. He announced that "he could not in "good conscience" sign the convention that had been finalised at Oslo and that the treaty was deficient on two grounds". The first was related to the alternative technology which could supplement the use of the APMs in the Korean Peninsula, and the other was the use of APMs as anti-tank mines. It was known that the US was using APMs in Korean Peninsula and also as anti-tank mines. Clinton said that as Commander-in-Chief, he would never send soldiers to defend the freedom of American people and the freedom of others without doing everything we can to make the soldiers as secure as possible. Prime Minister Chretien in his autobiography titled *My Years as Prime Minister* claimed that "Clinton came close to signing the final version of the treaty being prepared in Oslo, Norway in September 1997, but he was forced to back up at the last minute because his defense chief was threatening to resign over the issue" (Chretien 2007: 337). It is important to note that in his first speech, on September 26 1994, to the UN General Assembly, President Clinton went so far as to call for eventual elimination of anti-personnel land mines. By October, the United States also outlined a 'control regime' to reinforce CCW and to reduce reliance on landmines. Veronica Kitchen in her article pointed out a significant difference between the Canadian and American approach to the landmines issue. According to her, "the debate in Canada centred around landmines as a humanitarian issue and its effect on civilians. In the United States the debate remains an arms control issue; ban proponents never successfully redefined it in humanitarian terms" (Kitchen 2001: 37). Consequently, this ban initiative never captured the imagination of the American public as it did the Canadian public.

However, after the announcement by the president, US delegates left the conference. When the US left the Ottawa Process, the clouds of uncertainty were there, but Canada was confident that a ban would be achieved by this year. The reason behind this was the support from different countries of the world. In the summit meeting held in Harare, Organization of African Union (OAU) committed for an African mine-free zone. In the same week, in Lima, 34 countries of Organization of American States, reaffirmed their support AP mine-free zone. Meanwhile, Foreign Ministers of Central American countries and the Caribbean countries already declared their commitment to a mine-free region by 1999. The most important among these developments were “the June (1997) conference in Brussels- which drew representatives from 155 countries and more than 100 NGOs--the movement experienced yet another breakthrough when 97 governments expressed their public support for the Ottawa Process by signing Ottawa Process” (English 1997: 171). The next day, on 18th September the treaty was adopted in the plenary session. In this way, the Oslo Conference came to an end. After that, Axworthy welcomed all the 122 signatories and 38 observer governments and more than four hundred representatives of the international and non-governmental organisations to come back to Ottawa to sign a ban convention. The fourteen months long exercise of persuading the international community and the awareness campaign about the destructive nature of the landmines came to an end when 122 countries signed the convention to ban APMs in Ottawa during 2-5 December 1997. For the practical implementation of the treaty, some important measures were taken into consideration. "Beyond the signatures were the endorsement of a major action plan and the pledging of more than \$ 500 million for demining and victim assistance, a result of our officials having thought ahead to move implementation of the treaty forward before the ink was dry" (Axworthy 2003: 148).

Thus, the implementation aspect of an international ban on the production, use and stockpiling of landmines was also taken into consideration. Veronica Kitchen in her article wrote that the prohibition was achieved by

practicing public diplomacy--through telephone calls and faxes between the core group members, sharing diplomatic correspondence, and working with local NGOs in each country--Canada worked to win the support of other middle and minor powers in the hope of attaining strength through numbers. In this way, a comprehensive well supported ban was achieved even without the support of all permanent five members of the Security Council or the consensus of Conference on Disarmament (Kitchen 2001: 52).

It was described as an extraordinary accomplishment by all the players involved in the Ottawa Process. Jean Chretien, the then Prime Minister of Canada, described the treaty as 'without precedent nor parallel'. In his autobiography he wrote, "for me, it will always be one of the greatest achievements in Canada's diplomatic history" (Chretien 2007: 337). In this way, Canada successfully constructed a new global order in the post-Cold War period in the high hard domain of political security and military force. The Landmines Ban Treaty is arguably the most successful effort by Canada in the area of building a new global order which came into existence outside the United Nations.

Conclusion

The treaty contains twenty-two articles, and the very first article reads that after the signing of the treaty the signatories will not use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or transfer to any other country and will commit to destroy all APMs (Convention 1997). The most important aspect of the treaty is that it is not subject to any reservation (Article 19 of the treaty) which the US and other non-signatory states were demanding. Currently, there are only 35 states which are outside the treaty whereas 162 countries are state party to the international landmines ban treaty (ICBL 2018).

The treaty signed in such a short span is a unique example of fast-track diplomacy. The speed with which the results came out is un-paralleled. "The Ottawa Process clearly pushed the boundaries of multilateralism, building on Axworthy bold gamble and drawing its strength from new sources of diplomatic influence in the post-Cold War era" (Lawson 1998: 96). Without a doubt the middle power and civil society coalition forged by Canada to develop an environment in support of mines ban harnessed the new avenues and sources of influence. These new avenues and sources of diplomacy changed the viewpoint of policymakers at every level, namely, state, national and international. The diplomatic efforts made by the foreign ministers and other officials of Canada and the working pattern of a coalition of different NGOs not only from Canada but also from different parts of the world is also unprecedented. Axworthy credited civil society organisations. According to him, the "need to fasten the treaty was a compelling reason to develop a close collaboration, with the NGO's organising public meetings and mobilising direct pressure on parliaments and cabinets." (Axworthy 2003: 129).

In this way, the promise of democratisation of foreign policy made by the Liberal Red Book during the federal elections of 1993 took its shape through the construction of partnership between the government and the civil society. The way Canada assumed the leadership to impose an international ban on landmines with the help of several international and non-governmental organisations was a unique example of the involvement of civil society in framing an international treaty. According to Cameron: “The Ottawa Process democratized foreign policy within the framework of existing representative institutions by using a partnership with civil society to expose policy to the test of publicity” (Cameron 1998: 161). The public diplomacy practised in the Ottawa Process by civil society groups made Canadian policymakers think on a subject which was not the burning topic of the time. Even the opposition by the superpowers, namely, Russia and the US proved unfruitful in the face of the campaign run by the coalition of small and big; national and international NGOs. Undoubtedly, Canada had disproportionate influence as the leader of a campaign to ban landmines despite being an insignificant producer, user and exporter of landmines because of its image as a peacekeeper among the countries of the world. The Ottawa Process gave a kind of breakthrough to Canada with respect to its image as a nation that stands for human security and consequently to peaceful world like the concept of peacekeeping did forty years ago (Kitchen 2001).

The roles played by national and international coalitions such as—MAC, ICBL etc. raised the level of awareness about the problems due to the use of landmines. This led to the development of strong public opinion among individuals which consequently built a strong consensus. “Triangulation between policy makers, NGOs and mass public contributed to the success of Canada’s foreign policy initiative to ban landmines because it tapped into a deep current of idealism and Pearsonian internationalism that had long been neglected by the new pragmatism espoused by the foreign policy establishment” (Cameron 1998: 162). Giving credit for this extraordinary achievement to the major players and people involved, Axworthy wrote in his autobiography that “the success of this effort was due to the work of many people including Jody William of ICBL, the late Princes of Wales, the Mine Action Group, Kofi Annan and the United Nations... Andre Ouellet and especially Lloyd Axworthy gave it their highest priority at Foreign Affairs” (Chretien: 336).

The success of the Ottawa Process definitely established few things. Axworthy said that "the campaign to ban landmines produced not only a significant victory in international

disarmament but also epitomized broader changes that have shaken the foundations of international relations" (Axworthy 1998: 448). At the world stage, it became very clear that after the end of the Cold War the very nature of international politics changed. The way civil societies campaigned for landmines ban enhanced their importance as a key non-state actor. Similarly, the new style of multilateralism, popularly known as 'New Multilateralism', came into being. A new door opened where consensus outside the UN, that too without the involvement of sole superpower, was possible. Although the military forces did not become irrelevant, their importance declined. The changes took place not only in international politics but also in Canadian foreign policy. Canada showed its commitment to human security, human rights and also showcased its soft power. Ottawa Process demonstrated that Canada could lead the 'coalition of willing' and thus established itself as first among the middle powers.

The use, production, development, and implanting of mines was a concern during the Cold War period. Tight bipolarity as well as the security of borders, i.e. state-centric security rather than the people-centric human security was a major challenge before the states in the Cold War era. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the security-related perception of the international community started taking a new direction. Now the more important aspect of security was the security of the individual, i.e. human security. The Ottawa Process not only balanced the promise of democratisation of foreign policy but also the concept of human security. Under the concept of human security, Canada played a very significant role in developing the idea of the responsibility to protect.

Chapter IV

Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect

The concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) is concerned with the protection of the life of an individual. Humanitarian intervention is at the heart of the concept of R2P. The aim of responsibility to protect is to save people from mass atrocities such as—genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

A nation must provide a healthy environment to its citizens so that they can develop themselves. But what happens if a state is not able or is not willing to protect the life of its people; or is involved in acts which endanger the life of its people or a section thereof. To deal with such situations, the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ came into being. The concept states that if a particular state cannot protect the life of its civilians, then it is the responsibility of the international community to protect the lives of innocent individuals.

Due to the emerging circumstances in the last decade of the 20th century and the ineffective role of the United Nations; the then General Secretary of United Nations, Kofi Annan in 1999 challenged the member-states of the United Nations to prevent another Rwanda²⁸ and to reach a consensus on the issue of humanitarian intervention. Thus, there was an effort to make the world a safe inhabitable place for the innocent. The concept of responsibility to protect was first of its kind. Earlier, the international community had not reached consensus on any such issue of humanitarian intervention. The international community later adopted the concept in 2005 at the World Summit of United Nations²⁹. The concept of R2P was given recognition by 191 (now 193) representatives of the member states in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.

The concept of R2P finds its first mention in the report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which came out in December 2001. The Commission was established in 2000 by the Canadian government. The purpose of the Commission was to answer the question: “... if humanitarian intervention is an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violation of human rights?” (Evans 2008: 31). The result of Kofi Annan’s appeal was the setting up of the Commission to examine aspects of humanitarian

²⁸ In 1994 several people died in horrific crimes committed in Rwanda.

²⁹The World Summit (2005) was a follow-up summit meeting of the United Nations’ 2000 Millennium Summit.

intervention and state sovereignty. ICISS was an independent commission chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun. This initiative of the Canadian government brought a new dimension in the field of humanitarian intervention.

When the report of the Commission came in December 2001, it elaborated on the concept broadly. The most important contribution of the ICISS report was the transformation of the notion of sovereignty as 'authority' into sovereignty as 'responsibility'. R2P recognizes sovereignty as the responsibility of a state to take care of its citizens. This aspect of sovereignty changed the notion and provided a new dimension to sovereignty versus humanitarian intervention debate. Traditionally, sovereignty was considered as a prerogative to state, but after the report produced by ICISS, sovereignty became a responsibility and consequently emerged as a people-centric notion.

It is believed that the concept of R2P is one of the products of Canadian quest for a role in international affairs; in an international situation that emerged towards the end of the twentieth century. Earlier, since the middle of the decade of the 1990s, Canada had come up with the refurbished idea of Human Security, emphasising, not dissimilar to R2P, on the security of the individual. It credited itself with success in securing the Anti-personnel Landmines Ban Treaty (1997) and later the establishment of the International Criminal Court (2002) besides a few other achievements.

For most of the Cold War period, Canada was content to project itself as a middle power – one which upheld the values of liberal internationalism; and thereby of multilateralism and peacekeeping. Canadian foreign policy-makers were convinced that only in a rule-based multilateral order, Canadian foreign policy could be an activist; besides norms and institution-based order was deemed essential for Canada's economic development and well-being of its people. The end of the Cold War admittedly raised new issues and the international context posed new challenges for the liberal internationalist foreign policy pursuits of the self-avowedly middle power. Some scholarly writings declared the end of the road for Canada being a good international citizen. It was suggested that the new situation posed a question mark on the importance and relevance of the middle power. In sum, the conclusion was that the geopolitics of the Cold War was replaced by Geoeconomics of globalisation and regionalisation. 'High' issues of military security and defence alliances had been replaced by 'low' issues of social development and environmental protection etc.

Now, at this juncture, several questions were emerging: what made Canada develop and support the concept of responsibility to protect?; Is responsibility to protect nothing more than a reframed and repackaged idea of the Canadian human security agenda?; Is the enunciation of R2P proverbially a flash in the pan of Canadian foreign policy or does Canada desire to use responsibility to protect as a tool to have a voice of its own in international affairs as a power of some standing – middle or major?

Answers to these questions bear relevance. After all, the idea of being perceived as a major power is never far from the Canadian mind. But before coming to a conclusion, it is important to understand the concept of R2P; its relevance, scope and associated issues such as—human security, humanitarian intervention etc.

Understanding the Concept of Responsibility to Protect

The concept is popularly known as 'Responsibility to Protect' is abbreviated as R2P. To understand R2P, it calls for comprehending the notions and the terminologies which are often used with the concept. R2P revolves around the concept of sovereignty and non-intervention. It also deals with the issue of intervention in the name of saving individuals from a rogue state popularly known as humanitarian intervention. In fact, humanitarian intervention is the backbone of the concept because it is a problem of intervention which is responsible for the birth of R2P. The terminology which is used in the concept like "mass atrocity crimes" or "mass atrocities" must also be understood before examining the concept further.

The concept of R2P addresses “mass atrocities crime” or “mass atrocities”—both the terms are used by the scholars interchangeably. In R2P “mass atrocities” refers to ‘genocide’, ‘war crimes’, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘crime against humanity’. These four crimes also define the scope of the concept and were included within R2P by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2005 (World Summit Outcome Document 2005: 30). Atrocities such as—the massacre of innocent citizens, forced displacement, and sexual violence against women were passed on from the very beginning of the civilisation and kept on coming about even in the recent decades. Here adjective "mass" was used intentionally because the R2P addresses the crime only when the lives of a significant number of people are at stake. It means that R2P cannot be implemented when a small group of people are tortured, murdered, raped or terrorised.

What are “Mass Atrocities”?

As per the World Summit Outcome Document (2005) “mass atrocities” encompasses four types of crimes. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crime against humanity were at the centre of international policy debate in the 1990s (Evans 2006: 328). Genocide was defined, for the first time, in Genocide Convention³⁰ adopted by UNGA in 1948. Article 2 of the Convention (Resolution 260 (3) A of UNGA 1948) describes

...genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group such as:

- Killing members of the group;
- Causing bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- Deliberately inflicting on the group condition of the life calculated to bring about its physical destruction on the whole or its part;
- Imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group;
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

In the 2nd part of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court³¹, the 6th Article reiterated the same words about genocide.

Ethnic cleansing “has no formal definition but it can be regarded, like genocide, as subsumed with the scope of both war crime and crime against humanity” (Evans 2008: 12). In simple words, ethnic cleansing can be described as a process by which an unwanted group of people belonging to a particular ethnic or religious group are murdered, displaced or threatened so that the territory would become purely homogenous with single ethnicity, religion, culture or history.

In the Article 7 and 8 of part 2 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002) ‘crime against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ were defined widely. According to the Rome Statute, “a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population” will be considered as a crime against humanity. These attacks include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,

³⁰ Genocide Convention is also known as ‘The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’.

³¹ The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is a treaty which established the International Criminal Court. It is also known as the International Criminal Court Statute or the Rome Statute.

enforced sterilisation or any other type of sexual violence of comparable gravity, enforced disappearance of persons, the crime of apartheid etc. (Rome Statute 2002: 3-4). Similarly, war crimes were also described in the Rome Statute, and it encompasses all the actions of breach of Geneva Convention of 12th August 1949, including laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict (Rome Statute 2002: 5-10). Gareth Evans in his book wrote that "the scope of each overlaps not only with that of genocide and ethnic cleansing but also with each other" (Evans 2008: 12). It is worth noticing that in R2P war crimes stand for the crime committed within the territory of a particular state. It does not include cross-border conflicts.

The above four crimes (genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crime against humanity) which are included in the concept of R2P have different definitions though they overlap with one another. Genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity constitutes the scope of R2P (Evans 2008). R2P can be applied only when one of the above crimes is committed in any part of the world. It should also be noticed that R2P can be considered when a crime is going on or assumed to take place on a large scale.

Sovereignty versus Intervention Debate

Sovereignty is one of the four ingredients of state. The concept of sovereignty can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The concept of sovereignty says that a state is free to manage its international affairs and no other state has the right to intervene in the domestic matters of any state. This concept ultimately provides supreme power to the state to manage its matters. In this way, sovereignty is a notion which essentially focuses on the principle of non-intervention. This viewpoint looked at sovereignty as an authority and based on the assumption that world order can sustain only when states respect the sovereignty of one another and do not intervene in the internal matters of one another. Sovereignty can be said as the legal identity of a state in the international law. The importance of sovereignty lies in the notion that only sovereign states are regarded as equal, irrespective of their size or wealth (ICISS Report 2001: 11). In fact, the charter of the UN supports the concept of sovereignty. Article 2.1 of the UN charter says that the UN is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members. Sovereignty is considered as a norm of non-intervention. The UN charter, in the Article 2.7, also talks of the non-intervention in the internal matters of a member state by the UN.

Thus, intervention is against the concept of sovereignty because it directly hampers the sovereignty of a particular state. There are two contending views regarding intervention. The supporters of the concept of absolute sovereignty say that intervention in the internal matters of a state is against the norms set up by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and it may destroy the harmony of international society. On the contrary, the interventionists say that any state which is not able or not interested in protecting its citizens, cannot use sovereignty as a tool of impunity. The debate on humanitarian intervention was fierce, intense and bitter and the twentieth century ended without making any conclusion on intervention on humanitarian grounds (Evans 2006: 332).

Intervention gained attention during the Cold War period. At the time of the Cold War, the world was divided into two major power blocs— the United States of America was leading the capitalist bloc whereas, the Soviet Union was heading the communist bloc. On several occasions, the two superpowers confronted each other directly or indirectly. The Cold War increased the use of intervention as a tool by the two contemporary superpowers of the world to include neutral states in their particular blocs.

Intervention is a term which can be used in several ways. Offering assistance by another state to a state whose population is in need, the preconditions proposed by the international financial institutions before providing loans to the states, economic sanctions, blockades, diplomatic and military threats can also be seen as intervention by a state on the other (ICISS Report 2001: 8). The proclaimed goal of humanitarian intervention is to protect the violation of the human rights of the citizen belonging to the victim state or failed/failing state.

The debate on humanitarian intervention continued since the 1970s when intervention came off in several parts of the world, e.g. intervention of India in East Pakistan (1971), Tanzania in Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin (1979) and support of the French government in Central Africa (1979) (Evans 2008: 135). At that time, these interventions were not authorised by the United Nations Security Council and were against the Article 2(4) of the UN charter and were consequently denounced and declared as illegal by the United Nations.

When the Cold War came to an end in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there emerged a new scenario which not only changed the structure of the world politics but also brought forward new concepts as well as changed the existing notions. Bill

Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs during last years of Chretien premiership, in his autobiography titled *The Call of The World: A Political Memoir* wrote that "the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union initiated resentment of the multilateral institutions, laws, and regulations built to deal with the cold war". He further wrote that "Nothing was spared: the role of United Nations and its peacekeeping missions, the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its possible expansion, the defence of North America, the notion of sovereignty of nations, the place of nuclear weapons—everything was on the table" (Graham 2016: 177)

Though the humanitarian intervention was not a new concept, it gained momentum only after the Cold War. The definition of the intervention changed in the 1990s because of two reasons: first "intervention is increasingly defined in terms of purposes or goals" and secondly, "intervention is sought to be projected as being undertaken by or on behalf of the 'international community' rather than by a state or a coalition of states" (Ayoob 2002: 83).

Humanitarian intervention divided the international society into two major categories. One of those states that are capable of protecting the lives of their citizens; whereas, the other is of those states that are unable to protect the life of their citizens. Mohammed Ayoob (2002) termed this partition of the international society as 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' zones. The countries of the civilized zone enjoyed absolute liberty as well as sovereignty whereas, the countries of the uncivilised zone became fragile to intervention consequently deprived of their sovereignty.

Thus, the intervention in post-World War appeared to be against the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and created much uproar in the international politics. The concept of R2P emerged to address the issue of intervention. In other words, R2P did not come in a vacuum. Rather, it has a background which turned up in the last decade of the 20th century. The nature and characteristics of the conflicts also changed after the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War years, conflicts were majorly inter-state in nature whereas, after the end of Cold War the world observed several intra-state conflicts (Cooper 1997). Conflicts within former Yugoslavia are glaring examples of the intra-state conflicts which were the result of the end of Cold War.

Reasons for the Development of R2P

The end of the Cold War brought several changes in the nature and character of the national and international system as well as structure. The major reasons were the changing equations in the world order, the emergence of new states, splitting of some big states particularly Yugoslavia and also the collapse of the Soviet Union. These changes caused a gross violation of human rights and large-scale loss of life due to ethnic conflicts, territorial disputes etc. Unfortunately, the United Nations could not take sufficient measures which ultimately concluded in “the debacle of intervention in Somalia in 1993, pathetically inadequate response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the lamentable failure to prevent ethnic cleansing in the Balkans particularly in Srebrenica in 1995 and the Kosovo in 1999 where intervention took place without authority of Security Council” (Evans 2006: 706).

Mass murder in Rwanda (1994) in which the ethnic Hutu and Tutsi ran at each other, resulting in the deaths of almost 8 lakh people. Similarly, in 1995 despite the presence of UN peacekeeping forces in the ‘safe heavens’ of Srebrenica in Bosnia at least eight thousand people succumbed to death (Evans 2008: 26). After three weeks of peace talks, an agreement took place at the Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio is known as ‘Dayton Agreement’ to end the war in Bosnia. In 1999, NATO forces started bombarding against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to protect the Albanian population in Kosovo. The first two examples of Rwanda and Srebrenica were the result of the inaction of the UN; however, the action taken by the NATO forces against former Yugoslavia was illegal because it was not authorised by the UN Security Council. Such heartbreaking conflicts took place because there was no internationally approved law that could help those unfortunate people who lost their lives in the violence.

These events not only started endless debates worldwide to carry out intervention for humanitarian purposes in any part of the world but also proved the UN's inability to react appropriately at the right time. Bernard Kouchner, a French politician who was the UN Special Representative in Kosovo, in the 1990s, advocated the notion of ‘right to intervene’ so that the mass atrocities could be stopped. The world started shifting its focus to the safety and security of human rights after these incidents, in which the world witnessed systematic rapes, war crimes; displacement of masses, starvation etc. These grievous episodes compelled the international community to change its perspective towards humanitarian intervention in the early and mid-1990s.

This collectively brought forward challenges before the international community to strike a balance between the sovereignty of a state and intervention on humanitarian grounds. This was the time for stern action by the international community to bear down such incidents which were causing harm to the whole humanity. The mass murder of the people around the globe put pressure on the United Nations to come up with a proposal so that the life of the innocent people could be saved. In 54th session of UNGA, the then General Secretary of UN Kofi Annan, set forth his views and challenged the member states to come out with a consensus on humanitarian intervention so that ‘another Rwanda’ could be prevented. His words set out the process setting up a new framework for humanitarian intervention.

Emergence of the Concept of R2P

The Canadian government, in the 54th session of the United Nations itself, announced the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) at the General Assembly in September 2000. Bill Graham in his memoir wrote that “Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo also promoted the Chretien government to spearhead the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ... Its mandate was to define the circumstances in which the world community would be entitled under international law to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state”. (Graham 2016: 186). The aim of this Commission was to bring forth a common ground with a possible solution to catastrophic situations. The Commission talked over the legal, moral, operational and political aspects of humanitarian intervention.

The report was brought out in December 2001, and the theme was reflected in its title "The Responsibility to Protect". R2P was based on a thought that it is the responsibility of the sovereign states to protect their citizens from inhumane situations like mass murder, systematic rape, starvation, displacement etc. But if the states are unable or unwilling to do so, the responsibility automatically transfers to the international community. The Commission gave ninety pages long report in 2001 which described the concept of R2P at length. The report included three elements of R2P—Responsibility to Prevent, Responsibility to React and Responsibility to Rebuild which collectively constitute the scope of R2P. The question of authority and the operational dimension of the concept were also discussed in the report. Earlier, the newly independent states of Asia and Africa were

sceptical but R2P, for the first time, was embraced by the newly emerged African Union (Evans 2006: 334).

Serious efforts were made to develop a mechanism that could protect the innocent lives of people from catastrophic situations. A report titled *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (2004) produced by a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change was submitted to the General Secretary of UN. This report discussed the same concept which was later included in R2P with these words: "We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort" (Evans 2006: 714). Another report was the comprehension of these recommendations by the General Secretary in his proposal entitled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development Security and Human Rights for All* (2005). This was a working paper for the proposed World Summit scheduled in the September 2005. These two reports were instrumental in the adoption of the concept by the UN. The milestone came when the concept of R2P was adopted in the World Summit by the UN (Evans 2006).

In September 2005, the UN General Assembly endorsed the concept of R2P in paragraph 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document. It was the 60th Anniversary World Summit which was attended by more than 150 heads of the member states. The adoption of R2P was described as "one of the few achievements of the United Nations 2005 world summit" (Bellamy 2009: 111). Since then, R2P was referred three times by the UN Security Council while addressing the catastrophic situation. Resolution 1674 of April 2006 and 1874 of November 2009 were brought by the UN Security Council for the protection of civilians in the arm conflicts. The first resolution that linked R2P to a particular conflict was resolution 1076 passed in August 2006 on the situation of Darfur. UN General Secretary Baan-Ki-Moon released his report titled *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* in 2009 and also appointed Edward Luck as special advisor to promote R2P (Badescu 2011: 3). In this way, the concept of R2P evolved through the conventions and the efforts made by the international agencies.

The formation of ICISS by the Canadian government was a herculean task. Gareth Evans, former minister of Australia and Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat and special adviser to UN General Secretary, co-chaired the Commission. Besides these two the commission was composed by another ten commissioners who belonged to different

countries and were eminent scholars. The reason for such a diverse composition of the Commission was to inculcate different viewpoints, public opinion and the personal experiences of commissioners.

The primary objective of the commission was to develop a mechanism through which protection of ordinary people became possible in failed or failing states. In spite of this main objective, ICISS was having four basic objectives (ICISS Report 2001: 11):

- To establish clear rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether, when and how to intervene.
- To establish the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary and after all other approaches have failed.
- To ensure that military intervention when it occurs, is carried out only for the purposes proposed, is effective and is undertaken with proper concern to minimize the human costs and international damage that will result; and
- To help estimate where possible the cause of conflict while enhancing the prospects for durable and sustainable peace.

The concept came forth at a time when the world was focusing on human rights and human security. Landmines Ban Treaty (1997) was an attempt to protect those people who were not involved in conflicts but became victims when landmines went off. Similarly, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, through Rome Statute adopted on 17th July 1998, was a task to deal with crime against humanity that took place in Rwanda, the Balkans and Sierra Leone. These steps were significant developments occurring to change the standard and behaviour of the so-called sovereign independent states.

R2P is a concept which not only turns to human security but also human rights. The debate on military intervention is combustible within the international community because there exist differences between codified international behaviour and the actual state practice (ICISS Report 2001). The Commission was of the view that the debate about intervention for humanitarian purposes should not focus on ‘the right to intervene’ but on ‘the Responsibility to Protect’.

ICISS believed that R2P is not just military intervention because of three major reasons (ICISS Report 2001: 17):

- R2P takes the side of needy or helpless persons rather those who consider intervention as paramount.
- The idea of R2P gives primary responsibility to the concerned states.

- R2P is such a big concept which includes- Responsibility to Prevent, Responsibility to React and Responsibility to Rebuild.

These three major differences between R2P and military intervention are the characteristics of the concept. The Commission pointed out that the responsibility first falls on the people or citizens of the conflicting state to come up with a solution to a catastrophic situation. The domestic authority must take the best possible action to prevent the crisis that can escalate into a major conflict. R2P gives fall back responsibility to the international community only when the state facing calamity is not able to protect the life of its people.

The Scope of Responsibility to Protect

As stated earlier, the concept of R2P has three basic elements—Responsibility to Prevent, Responsibility to React and Responsibility to Rebuild. These three elements not only form the scope of R2P but also provide a structure for the implication of the concept. However, R2P works in three stages where these three elements become a tool for the operationalisation of the concept at three different levels.

In R2P, the rudimentary level of the conflict preventive measures under 'responsibility to prevent' must be taken so that the conflict could not escalate, actions under the 'responsibility to react' should be used at the time of the crisis whereas, the tasks under 'responsibility to rebuild' must come after the crisis (Evans and Sahnoun 2002). It is an important feature that R2P first tries to solve the problem at the domestic level, but if it does not work then, the international community becomes responsible for handling the man-made catastrophic situation.

Responsibility to Prevent

The charter of the UN in its 6th chapter led with the principles of prevention of conflict. This chapter describes the preventive measures to stop and settle down the conflict through peaceful means. These peaceful means as per Article 33 of the UN Charter include “negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement”, whereas, Article 52-54 of charter eight permits resort to regional agencies and arrangements. Similarly, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's renowned 1992 *Agenda for Peace* also emphasised the importance of the use of “diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results” and described preventive diplomacy as a “most desirable and efficient” tool (Agenda for Peace, Paragraph 15 and 23).

Responsibility to prevent comes before the intervention. Effective prevention is less costly than reacting after the conflict which can claim several lives and pose harder situation before the players involved in the conflict resolution (Hamburg 2008). Similar words were used by the ICISS report (2001) that it is better to work on prevention before opting for intervention and prevention of the conflict must start at the domestic level. World Summit Outcome Document (2005) reads "Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary measures" (World Summit Outcome Document 2005: 30).

The concerned states, different communities as well as institutions of the concerned state are responsible for the prevention of the deadly man-made catastrophe. However, prevention is not just a local affair because if it fails, then there could be drastic consequences for the whole world. So, the task of prevention and support from the international community may become important. The international support can be of different types such as—development assistance, efforts to advance good governance, reestablishment of the rule of law, and mediation efforts. In fact, preventive measures could be applied at three different levels--domestic, regional and global.

The logic behind prevention is to eliminate or at least reduce the chances of intervention. The UN General Assembly and Security Council adopted several resolutions "recognizing the vital role of all parts of the United Nations system in conflict prevention and pledging to enhance their effectiveness" (ICISS Report 2001: 19). Despite the recognition of preventive measures as a significant tool to veto the emerging crisis by the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000); it is unfortunate that lack of resources had been an obstacle in performing the task successfully. According to ICISS, for effective prevention of the conflict three things are necessary. First is 'early warning', i.e. exact knowledge of the situation and the risks associated with it. Another essential condition is 'preventive toolbox' which help in understanding the policy measures that enable to make a difference and the final one is the 'political will' to implement these measures (ICISS Report 2001: 20).

Here, 'early warning' includes not only the data but also the analysis of data and implementation of the policy based on the analysis. Failure of 'early warning' sometimes indicates that the problem is not the lack of warning but the timely response. Now early

response became so important that many non-state actors such as— NGOs, human rights groups, and Red Cross emerged as a great source of information about the conflict. Despite the involvement of many international actors, it is well understood that regional actors, including domestic actors, are better placed to provide early warning signals.

On the grounds of early warning a 'preventive toolbox', i.e. preventive measures are used in R2P. It is essential for the success of these preventive measures that they must address the root causes of the conflict. The root causes of any conflict may be the political needs or deficiencies, economic deprivation or the lack of economic opportunities, legal problems, or social issues. Preventive measures must be used according to the requirements of the nature of the conflict. Only the use of preventive measures is not enough because effective conflict prevention depends on the careful and strategic use of 'toolbox' by the actors involved in the task. Thus, 'political will' becomes an important aspect of prevention. Undoubtedly, genuine commitment is required for the prevention of any conflict.

Responsibility to React

If the preventive measures fail to address the conflict at the rudimentary level and conflict becomes violent, then the concept of R2P gives the responsibility to save the life of the individual to the international community under the provision of responsibility to react. But the responsibility to react can be justified only when the responsibility to prevent has been fully exhausted. The tools which could be used under the responsibility to react include political, economic or judicial measures and in extreme cases military actions (ICISS Report 2001: 29). Evans described these four tools as political, economic, legal and security measures respectively (Evans 2008: 106).

It is important to understand that intervention does not necessarily mean military intervention. R2P under responsibility to react entails that before opting for military actions; coercive measures such as—political, diplomatic, economic as well as military actions must be imposed. Sanctions are important because they prohibit states from using its resources in facilitating such actions within its borders. Sanctions could be imposed in three different areas such as—military, economic, political or diplomatic (ICISS Report 2001: 30). Sanctions are the first step under responsibility to react.

Within the political measures, there are two alternatives, namely, diplomatic peace-making and political incentives. Both could be utilised under responsibility to react. In 2008

diplomatic peace-keeping was used in Kenya when several people died and were displaced due to inter-ethnic violence erupted after general elections. Badescu said that "Kenya is the best example of diplomatic peace-making" (Badescu 2011: 140). Diplomatic efforts done by the African Union (AU) brought positive results, and the mission succeeded. Although there are several other examples when diplomatic negotiation was opted but did not yield happening results. Diplomatic mediation could be done through regional organisations, international organisation, inter-governmental organisations and NGOs.

The other option under political and diplomatic strategies is political sanctions and incentives. According to Evans, political sanctions include "withdrawal of diplomatic recognition, expulsion from international organisations, suspension of sporting contacts, 'naming and shaming' through condemnation in international forums and travel bans in case of influential individuals" (Evans 2008: 111). Though suspension of sporting contacts may not yield good outcomes, other incentives have given results such as—the expulsion of Zimbabwe from Commonwealth in 2002.

Under the economic measures, economic sanctions and economic incentives could be used. Economic sanctions encompass not only trade sanctions but also financial sanctions. Trade sanctions hamper trade relations with other countries whereas financial sanctions stop financial support from developed countries and international financial institutions such as—the World Bank, and WTO. Apartheid South Africa is the best example of economic sanctions which forced the country to come to the negotiating table (Evans 2008: 113). But the problem with these sanctions emerges when such sanctions last for a long span and affect the life of common people of the country. Withdrawal of economic incentives like concession on trade access, developmental assistance by different countries, trade agreements, and membership of a regional economic organisation could also play a major role when a state is involved in the massacre.

Scholars like Evans (2008), talk about criminal prosecutions under the legal strategies. The purpose of such prosecution is to stop individuals from committing mass atrocities for their narrow interests. The prosecution could be done with the state's resources or with transnational assistance. The establishment of the International Criminal Court through the Rome Statue is a significant achievement in this field because of its advantageous placement other than the existing two options, namely, ad hoc tribunals and national courts.

The military strategies include peacekeeping acts, declaration of the safe-havens and no-fly zones and arms embargoes. There are several examples of peacekeeping operations after the establishment of the UN. Such operations have increased since the end of the Cold War (Cooper 1997). Safe haven is an area where security is provided to the people who may fall victim of conflict whereas, no fly zone is an area where aircrafts are not permitted to fly e.g. Iraq (1991-2003). Arms embargo is also an important ingredient of military strategy to halt an ongoing dispute.

According to the concept of responsibility to protect, the military intervention would be used as last resort. It was suggested that only in special cases responsibility to react might involve military actions. Military action should be used under responsibility to react when a state could not solve its internal problems; posing a threat to the basic security of the civilians and consequently hampering the peace and stability in the world order. In this way, the use of military interventions for human protection purposes could take place as an exceptional and extraordinary measure to end the conflict. Thus, military intervention could not be taken into considerations until all the preventive or peaceful measures had been exhausted.

To avoid the misuse of military intervention the report of ICISS described six major criteria on the basis of which military intervention could be used. These criteria are the preconditions before opting for military intervention in any part of the world. These are right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects (ICISS Report 2001: 32).

The primary criterion for military intervention is the 'right authority' authorisation to an intervention by an international agency. Authorisation is a very important and debatable issue. Authorisation could be used in two conditions; first, when the loss of life on a large scale is taking place and state is not able to take any action. Secondly, when 'ethnic cleansing' is going on and causing mass murder, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. Apart from these two conditions, natural calamities, democratic failures and other conflicts do not harm people 'seriously and irreparable' and could never justify intervention (Acharya 2002: 374). Commenting on the 'just cause' criterion of the intervention, Acharya (2002) holds that the ICISS report does not justify intervention under R2P for the restoration of democracy, stopping human rights abuses as well as intervention by states to protect their nationals outside their boundary. Evans argued that the criterion of 'just cause'

was included to exclude unconscionable behaviour (Evans 2006: 710). Whereas, 'right intention' focused on the purpose of intervention to halt or ward off human suffering. Other than this the use of 'right intervention' to overthrow regimes or alterations of borders would affect the basic aims and objectives of intervention. To ensure 'right intention', the intervening force must be composed of the military forces of different countries rather than from a single country. The ideal situation would be when the self-interests are not involved (ICISS Report 2001: 36).

'Just cause' and 'right intention' would help in reducing the controversy about humanitarian intervention by keeping the interventions away from political, economic and other narrow motives. The next criterion is 'last resort' which established that military intervention should be used only as the last option. This meant that before using 'last resort' as an option, peaceful and non-military measures must have been used to stop the horrific situation and this must be assured that these measures could not tackle the situation (Evans 2006: 711). 'Proportional means' signify minimum necessary scale, duration and intention of the planned military interventions; which is essential for the fulfilment of the proposed purpose of intervention. The last criterion is 'reasonable prospects' which is, in fact, an estimation of a reasonable chance of the success of the military intervention in its objectives. According to Acharya, reasonable prospects are actually a repackaging of 'doability' principle (Acharya 2002).

The option of military action which is considered as the last resort was described very broadly under the concept of R2P. The coercive military action as per R2P is legitimate only when the prerequisites for the action exist. That is why it is essential for the authorising body to necessarily reconcile whether the event occurring at the ground level are fulfilling the criteria.

Responsibility to Rebuild

The concept of R2P does not end with the responsibility of settling down the conflict. The process continues until the building of durable peace, the promotion of good governance and sustainable development. Responsibility to rebuild comes after responsibility to react. The responsibility to rebuild would be a process of follow through in a conflicting zone. Responsibility to rebuild was described as post-intervention obligations. These obligations

include peace building, security, justice with reconciliation and development (ICISS Report 2001: 39-43).

Peace-building involves a range of measures that are targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing and relapsing into conflict by strengthening capacities for conflict management and thus strive for sustainable peace and development. Under peace-building reconciliation, efforts such as—repairing infrastructure, rebuilding houses, doing plantation and harvesting are included. Peace-building is an effort which is essential because it brings back the situation of peace and co-existence. Another obligation is providing security to the people in war-ravaged areas. There are several examples when conflict was reborn due to revenge-killing or reverse ethnic cleansing. In such circumstances, R2P tries to protect the life of people through responsibility to rebuild (ICISS Report 2001: 39-40).

Justice is an important feature of responsibility to rebuild. The purpose is to bring perpetrators of the crime to the justice. An effective and efficient judicial system also makes a difference in war-ravaged areas. It is the local judicial authority that provides justice to refugees and internally displaced people from reclaiming their property. Similarly, economic growth and sustainable development constitute the last but not least important part of the peace-building responsibility. The purpose of R2P would remain half achieved until the economy of the war affected territory starts functioning properly (ICISS Report 2001: 40-43).

The authority responsible for peace-building must support nation building for the establishment of security in the post-conflict zone. Evans argued that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration must be the priority under responsibility to rebuild. Security sector reform such as—strengthening armed forces, police and intelligence services must also be in the top slots of responsibility to rebuild (Evans 2008: 51-58).

Good governance is also an imperative of post-conflict reconstruction. Effective, smooth and transparent governance is a demand of every democratic country. In the case of a failed state where the conflict took place, the establishment of a system that could deliver good governance became paramount. For good governance, rebuilding of the institutions of governance and the maximisation of local ownership played a crucial role (Evans 2008). Social and economic development as well as the role of peace-building commissions is essential for fulfilling the aims and objectives of responsibility to rebuild.

In this way, responsibility to rebuild is an effort to normalise the situation in a war-ravaged area. Responsibility to protect holds that the aim of intervention in any form under responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild is to protect the life of the innocent people and consequently establish peace and stability in the world order. Protection of the people at risk is the ultimate aim of R2P which allows military intervention under responsibility to react in extreme cases in a conflict-ridden sovereign country.

Canada and the Responsibility to Protect

Responsibility to Protect was the result of tireless efforts made by the Canadian government. In 55th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2000, the then Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced that an independent commission would be established in response to Secretary-General Kofi Annan's challenge to the international community to build consensus on the issue of intervention for human protection purposes. The outline of the Commission (ICISS) was framed by the Jean Chrétien government. It was evident by the time that the Liberal Party of Canada was focusing on human security agenda after the appointment of Lloyd Axworthy as the Foreign Minister of Canada. The role played by the Canadian government in the Landmines Ban Treaty was, in fact, an attempt to secure the life of people from mine blasts. Canada was overwhelmed by the response it received from different countries of the world and civil society. The emerging situation in different parts of the world during the 1990s particularly in Rwanda, the Balkans, Sierra Leone and in Kosovo gave an opportunity to the Liberal government in Canada to carry forward its human security agenda. The Commission was to come out with the solution of the problem posed by the man-made catastrophe and Kofi Annan's call. When the Commission was launched on 14 September 2000, the then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who played a crucial role in the establishment of the Commission said that "the purpose of the Commission would be to promote a comprehensive debate on the issues, and to foster global political consensus on how to move from polemics, and often paralysis, towards action within the international system, particularly through the United Nations" (ICISS Report 2001: 81). The Commission was given a period of one year to provide its final report.

Liberal Party and R2P: Human Security Perspective

During the larger part of Cold War years, Canada followed Pearsonian approach, also known as Liberal approach, while making Canadian foreign policy. The shift occurred when the Progressive Conservative government was formed under the leadership of Brian Mulroney in 1984. Mulroney government started focusing on the strengthening of Canada-US relations. With the signing of Canadian-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1987 Canada came closer to the United States during Mulroney years.

The end of Cold War brought major changes in the international order. The romanticism increased in the post-Cold War period, and negotiation took place among Canada, US and Mexico. This culminated in the signing of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which superseded CUSFTA in 1992. This did not continue for a long time, and change in the power at the centre took place after the general election of 1993 in which Liberal Party came back to the power almost after a decade, and Jean Chretien became the Prime Minister of Canada.

As discussed earlier, the initial days for the liberals were tough because of the changed scenario in the international system. On the pretext of the end of the Cold War, several scholars such as—Andrew Cooper, Molot and Hillmer and Jennifer Welsh were of the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union troubled Canadian middle power image. Andrew Cooper argued about the position of Canada in the changing world that “Canada can no longer operate on the assumption that it can be a ‘global boy scout’” (Cooper 1995; Quoted in Kirton 2006: 155). Similarly, Maureen Molot and Norman Hillmer described the last decade of the 20th century as ‘hard decade’ and termed Canada as an “incredible shrinking country” (Molot and Hillmer 2002; Quoted in Kirton: 156). Not only at the foreign policy front but also at the domestic level the then Chretien government faced challenges. It had been argued that the domestic and international challenges collectively became hurdles for the Canadian administration in moving forward.

The policy of multilateralism which was pursued by Trudeau's liberal government but abandoned by the Mulroney's conservative government again became the cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy during Chretien years. It is important to note that these developments took place only in the latter half of the decade when in 1996 Chretien government appointed Lloyd Axworthy as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Axworthy

during his years in office focused on the newly developed concept of human security conceptualised by Mahbub ul- Haq in 1994.

Human security has comprehensive and essentially a far broader meaning than that of the traditional definition of security. Traditionally, at the time of the Cold War, security was regarded as the concept that is aimed to prevent attacks from the rival group, i.e. the other bloc existing at that point of time. Major instruments in performing this herculean task of maintaining the security were militarisation of budget expenditure, arms build-up, alliance formation, arms transfer, disarmament, and negotiations. Traditional security aspires to secure the borders of the countries of the world that is why it is also known as territorial security.

On the other hand, the concept of human security addresses the predicament of innocent people of the world. Human security "includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life and a guarantee of fundamental human rights" (Axworthy 1997: 184). The scope of the concept of human security is vast; it encompasses "sustainable economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equality" (Axworthy 1997: 184).

In fact, human security is different from the traditional concept of security. Rather, human security gives more importance to the individual than that of the state's security. The changed scenario and the advent of 21st century demanded the transformation of world view. It was a conviction of Lloyd Axworthy that only securing borders is not sufficient for a safe world. According to him, the time had come to re-evaluate the traditional concept of security. In his words, "human security today puts people first and recognises that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security" (Axworthy 2001: 20).

Being an export-based economy Canada wanted a rule-based international society which could help Canada in the development process. A peaceful and secure environment had been in favour of Canada which led the country to support multilateral institutions. "Human Security agenda is based on the premise that the promotion of human security is more conducive to international peace and security than the other way round" (Bernard 2006: 233). Axworthy claimed that "Canada has both capability and credibility to play a

leadership role in support of human security in the developing world” (Axworthy 1997: 184).

Having faith that Canada could play an important role and had the capability to assume leadership Canada under Axworthy's notion initiated international negotiations in 1995 to ban landmines and launched a campaign to ban Anti- Personal Landmines that gave a boost to the liberal leadership. The involvement of various actors especially NGOs in the foreign policy-making gave a new flavour to the Canadian foreign policy. The advent of the concept of democratisation in the foreign policy of Canada has been discussed in great detail in the last chapter. Justifying the involvement of civil society, Axworthy said "actualizing the human security requires all actors—states, international organizations, NGO's and businesses—to act responsibly" (Axworthy 2001: 23)

At the time when Axworthy was the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996-2000), he followed same policies adopted by the Liberals in the past. In fact, he presented the same recipe in a different way. His efforts to ban landmines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court reflect ‘traditional Canadian preoccupations' (Donaghy 2003: 39). The idea of human security was existing in the Liberal agenda even before Axworthy was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The policy statement of 1995 titled *Canada in the World* identified several issues like mass migration, epidemics, overpopulation, underdevelopment, global warming and several other non-traditional security threats to the security of Canada (Donaghy 2003: 41). This depicted that the idea of human security was not born out of Axworthy's mind. It was the legacy of the Liberals which was followed but undoubtedly Axworthy prioritised the legacy under foreign policy objectives. Bernard said that “As two foreign policy models, the Axworthy doctrine and middle power internationalism are similar to the extent that they are derived from Canada's tradition to active international involvement” (Bernard 2006: 234).

Human security prioritised and proposed by Lloyd Axworthy was based on the notion of soft power, reliance on like-minded nations and NGOs (Bernard 2006: 234). By the time Axworthy retired as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2000; he gave a new shape to Canadian foreign policy. His approach succeeded and the best examples are the signing of Landmines Ban Treaty and the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The

ICISS which brought the concept of R2P was initiated by Lloyd Axworthy. To stop the mass murder of the innocent people in the failed or failing states the groundwork was done by the Commission and the report prepared by it was submitted to the United Nations the very next year of its establishment.

Axworthy was replaced by John Manley in October 2000 by the Liberal government. After Manley, Bill Graham and Pierre Pettigrew became Minister of Foreign Affairs who also pursued liberal internationalism as the basis of Canadian foreign policy. In the post-Axworthy era the momentum to change the humanitarian intervention concept by R2P as an international norm increased. In 2003 Paul Martin replaced Jean Chretien and became the Prime Minister of Canada. Under Martin's leadership, Canada made several formal as well as informal statements in support of making the concept an international norm. The statements made by Martin and Allen Rock the then representative of the Canadian government in the United Nations played a major role in giving a boost to the advocacy about the adoption of the concept by the General Assembly.

Efforts of Liberal Party: Chretien and Martin Years

The Canadian government under the leadership of Jean Chretien invited Gareth Evans who was the then president of the International Crisis Group³² and former Australian foreign minister as well as Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat to co-chair the Commission. In consultation with the co-chairs, ten other members of the Commission were appointed. The commissioners came from different regions of the world with different experiences and expertise (ICISS Report: 81). Out of the twelve, Canada was represented by two (Gisele Cote-Harper and Michael Ignatieff) as members. To assist the Commission, an advisory board was constituted by the newly appointed Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley. The task of the board was to help the Commission in building a concept based on current political realities (ICISS Report 2001: 82).

For administrative support, a Secretariat was housed within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa. Its job was to raise funds, organise round table consultations and commissioners' meetings and engage governments and build political support for the debate (ICISS Report: 84). The Commission was funded by the

³² The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit and non-governmental organisation formed in 1995 to prevent deadly conflicts. Its headquarters is at Brussels, Belgium.

Canadian government as well as by international foundations like Carnegie Corporation of New York, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Simons Foundation (ICISS Report 2001: 85).

The government of Canada also advocated R2P in the United Nations. In 2003, Chrétien's government was replaced by Paul Martin's government, but the support for R2P continued. Canada gave several statements at the UN in support of R2P. The Canadian statement at the 59th session of the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2004 was based on R2P. In this statement, Paul Martin as Canadian Prime Minister spoke of the importance of R2P in the 21st century while citing the example of Darfur. He insisted that R2P was based on the fundamental principle of the UN—a body which came into existence to maintain peace and security in the world.

Paul Martin, the then Prime minister of Canada, gave a speech in the United Nations General Assembly which focused on the responsibilities of the states of the world. He identified R2P as the top of the priority list and described R2P as a concept which could fulfil the gap existing in the international law regarding intervention on humanitarian grounds (Statement at the 59th Session of the UNGA on 22 Sept. 2004). In his words, "what we seek is the evolution of international law and practice of that international action may be taken in situations of extreme humanitarian emergency" (Statement at the 59th Session of the UNGA on 22 Sept. 2004). In this statement, he also talked about the reforms within the United Nations and urged to adopt R2P as a norm on humanitarian grounds. On 11th October 2004, the Deputy Representative of New Zealand made a statement on behalf of Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ) (Statement at the 59th session of the UNGA on 11 Oct. 2004). In this statement, same words were repeated which were used by Paul Martin in his speech on 22nd September 2004 before the General Assembly Statement at the 59th session of the UNGA. This showed that not only Canada but also other middle powers especially Australia and New Zealand were supporting R2P.

In the same session Allen Rock, the then permanent representative of Canada to the United Nations delivered a lecture on 30th November 2004. He said that the challenges to peace and stability posed due to problems in the Middle East region must be addressed through peaceful efforts by the United Nations (Statement at the 59th session of the UNGA on 30 Nov. 2004). In his next presentation on 8th April 2005, Allen Rock reiterated Canadian support for R2P on the United Nations platform (Statement at the 59th session of the UNGA

on 8 April 2005). In the Security Council Open Debate on the role of the Security Council in humanitarian crisis held on 12th July 2005 Allen Rock again emphasised the importance of R2P in tackling the problems where the life of people is in danger (Statement at the 59th session of the UNGA on 12 July 2005).

The statement given by Canada in the General Assembly on 21st September 2005 analysed the World Summit Outcome Document. This statement talked about the achievements of the Document and emphasised on the implementation of R2P for a safe world. Similarly, Canadian Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada on behalf of Canada, Australia, New Zealand (CANZ) in a statement in the general debate of United Nations General Assembly presented on 29th September 2005 stated that “we are particularly pleased that that the membership was able to agree on strong language on the responsibility to protect, which articulates for the first time universal acceptance of our collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity” (Statement at the general debate of 60th session of the UNGA on 21 Sept. 2012). The support for the adoption and then implementation continued till the Liberal government was in power.

Although the concept of R2P was initiated by Lloyd Axworthy, it was put forward after his departure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Liberal government. It could be argued that the efforts made by Chretien and Martin governments in the post-Axworthy era gave a boost to R2P and the tireless efforts of Allen Rock in the United Nations made the mission successful, and the concept was accepted by the member states of the United Nations. The public statements of leaders and practitioners of Canadian diplomacy revealed that the Liberal government supported and advocated the concept of R2P from the very outset. It might also be affirmed that the concept of R2P was the corollary of human security agenda adopted by the Liberal government in the late 1990s. Lloyd Axworthy, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs propounded the concept of human security through the soft power approach which resulted into “a series of international initiatives--the treaty banning anti-personal landmines, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the development of the responsibility to protect doctrine” (Tomlin 2008: 230). The Liberal government which was governed by the soft power approach gave a more meaningful profile to Canadian middle power diplomacy and liberal internationalism.

Impact of the Liberal Party

When the Liberals were in power and controlling the government, they supported as well as advocated R2P not only at the domestic level by appointing and funding ICISS but also internationally through its several statements in the United Nations. The question raised by Kofi Annan about building a consensus on humanitarian intervention was accepted as a challenge by the Canadian Liberal government obsessed with its capability to prove Canada as a successful international negotiator. The attitude of the Liberals towards the concept gave R2P a boost at the international level. Adopting different measures, Liberals tried their best to include this concept as an international norm in the books of international law. The Liberals didn't only play a big role in the evolution and development of the concept, but the concept also influenced Canada domestically and internationally.

The most important thing that Canada gained out of R2P was the leadership role in the world affairs after a long gap in the post-Cold War years. Neither Anti-Personnel Landmines Ban Treaty nor the International Criminal Court gained full support from countries of the world. It was only the concept of R2P that got recognition from all the countries of the world in the 2005 Millennium Summit. A total number of 191 countries were present at the time of the summit and adopted the World Summit Outcome Document. This was a diplomatic win of the Liberal government which was following the liberal values. The initiation of the concept by Canada gave it an opportunity to capture space on the international platform.

Another impact of the development of R2P was the closeness it brought among the 'like-minded countries'. Like-minded countries or the middle powers which were hyperactive during the Cold War became less important after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The concept of R2P gave an opportunity to such states and the lobbying done by these states such as—Canada, Australia, and New Zealand resulted in the formal adoption of the concept as well as increased the declining importance of these middle power states. R2P and the International Criminal Court both deal with similar crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass murder and crime against humanity. Undoubtedly, the concept of R2P gave a boost to the development of the International Criminal Court.

The most important impact made by R2P was dismantling the image of the post-Cold War world where it was a prevailing notion that 'uni-polar' world had no space for countries like

Canada. The diplomatic win of the relatively small or like-minded nations gave a message to the world that the voice of a small country could have a similar impact on the United Nations or any other international institution in spite of the presence of the major powers of the world.

In this way, it could be argued that the Liberal government of Canada succeeded in its aim of projecting Canada as an important player in international affairs. With the help of its human security agenda, Canada presented a new idea to the world, and this initiation gave recognition to Canada all over the world for which Canada was in search for in the post-Cold War era. The adoption of the concept of R2P was beckoning Canada to become a major leader among those who were known as like-minded nations.

Conclusion

The concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) came into being in the 21st century and could be considered as one of the achievements of this century. The role played by Canada was incredible in advancing the concept at the international level. The main objective of International Commission on Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was to come forward with a workable norm that could protect the life of the masses from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crime against humanity. The report framed by the Commission shifted the paradigm of sovereignty and changed the whole debate of sovereignty versus humanitarian intervention.

The concept, propounded by the efforts of Canada, dealt the issue of humanitarian intervention with sophistication. The concept first transformed the notion of sovereignty and presented it as a responsibility then it tried to solve the issue as early as possible with the help of preventive measures. Unlike humanitarian intervention, R2P provides more space to the domestic factors to perform the job efficiently before recommending for intervention from outside. Although the Commission tried its best to dismantle all the prejudices attached with the intervention in the name of humanity, yet R2P faced reservations among small countries. These small countries strongly opposed to accept R2P as a norm because the concept had the residue perception of prone to be misused by the powerful states for their narrow interests.

There is also a big question mark on the process of implementation of R2P. The concept includes three elements--responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility

to rebuild which created confusion and enlarged the process of implementation. Due to this confusion, R2P did not gain popularity in terms of success in tackling some of the horrific episodes relating to the issue of human security in fragile states of Africa and West Asia. Therefore, there was a need for early resolution of reservations to form a consensus on humanitarian intervention. Positive response to R2P would enable actions to protect the innocent people who might fall victim to the man-made catastrophes.

R2P gained support due to Canadian commitment to liberal internationalism which had been the guiding principle of Canadian foreign policy. R2P was perceived as a part of the liberal internationalist policy which had been followed by Canada since the end of the Second World War. The role played by Canada in the peacekeeping operations as well as in developmental assistance programmes demonstrated Canadian commitment towards the United Nations in the Cold War era. Canada is regarded as the proponent of the UN peacekeeping programme; the role played by Canada in the peacekeeping mission is incredible. Simultaneously, Canada also involved itself in several development assistance programmes especially in African continent which provided Canada with a base for its policy of multilateralism during the Cold War period.

The changed nature of the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union required a new style of diplomacy, particularly from the middle-level powers. Canada encashed the opportunity and started working on a newly developed concept of human security which culminated in the emergence of R2P. To establish R2P as a code of conduct at the time of crisis Canada did its best even in the United Nations. It persuaded the group of middle powers such as—Australia and New Zealand in favour of R2P. R2P was an effort of Canadian quest for peace because a peaceful and rule-bound world had been in favour of Canada. The support to R2P in the United Nations was an example of Canadian middle power liberal internationalism. The purpose to support R2P in the United Nations was to capture the leadership role in the international affairs and build unanimity among the members of the international body, i.e. United Nations.

It is noteworthy that unlike Landmines Ban Treaty, R2P was not the result of new multilateralism. Since new multilateralism takes place outside the United Nations, the discussions and debates on R2P were held in United Nations and was included in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Consequently, the concept did not come out as a result

of the new multilateralism. But the concept of R2P was certainly a part of Canadian liberal internationalism.

The concept of Responsibility to Protect was an important part of Canadian human security agenda and was an effort to save the life of people belonging to any part of the world. R2P was projected after the world witnessed a large scale of violence in many parts of the globe in the last decade of the 20th century. That is why Canada was in favour to launch R2P as an international legal norm so that the concept could be implemented practically anywhere in the world.

In fact, the concept of R2P assigned middle power role to Canada through the United Nations in the international affairs. The Liberal government of Canada under the leadership of Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) and Paul Martin (2003-2006) supported R2P. With its support for R2P and liberal values, the Liberal government abided by the legacy of liberals. But the conservatives gave low priority to internationalism as well as multilateralism and focused on the policy of continentalism. Consequently, they started to pursue good relations with the close door neighbour, i.e. United States. The concept of R2P which came out as the last derivative of human security had lost relevance to the Canadian Conservative government, and it became very clear that currently, Canada has reduced importance to the notion of human security and consequently to the concept of R2P.

Unfortunately, even after the adoption of the concept of R2P by the members of the United Nations; the consensus on the issue of Darfur could not be reached among the members of Security Council. The international community had not taken a firm decision on the issue of intervention for humanitarian purposes. The problem arose recently in Arab countries which gave birth to 'Arab Spring' was also not addressed by the international community. The cases of Syria, Libya, Egypt and other countries of the Arab world where people have several kinds of demands regarding their rights have not been taken seriously. In this region clashes between the protesters and supporters of the existing regimes had become daily headlines of the newspapers of the world. These clashes are claiming the life of several innocent people in the affected areas.

The concept of R2P addresses issues where the life of masses is in danger had not been taken into consideration. The dubious standard shown by major powers of the world dazed the small countries because of the selectivity of intervention. Therefore, it appears that the

selective response is the biggest reason behind the failure of the international community in implementing R2P impartially.

R2P was the result of a brilliant effort done by the ICISS to legitimise humanitarian intervention theoretically. But the concept of R2P which talks about the three elements to address the conflict at different levels could not change the existing notion about the intervention. Responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild try to solve the riddle of intervention but the question of misuse of intervention gets precedence over the concept of R2P. Therefore, the three elements discussed under the concept do not legitimise the humanitarian intervention practically.

On the other hand, Canada brought the concept at the international level but failed to build consensus at both fronts. Neither the superpowers especially the permanent five (P5) listened to the urge of ICISS for not using veto when the national interests are not at stake so that the Security Council can work efficiently, nor the small countries considered the concept of R2P as a concept that will not hamper their sovereignty. Because of these two major reasons the concept of R2P suffered setbacks even after its adoption by 191 members of the United Nations. This indicates that the discourse on R2P is facing a problem due to poor international support.

Undoubtedly, the concept of R2P brought a new debate not only in the domestic politics of Canada but also at the international level. The abandonment of R2P gave a shock to the image of Canada as a middle power in the post-Cold War era. It is unfortunate that at a time when the world was turning more unstable due to 'Arab Spring' and the danger of misuse of power by the despotic rulers, the scope for the practical implementation of R2P increased but the international community missed the opportunity.

Chapter V

9/11 Attack and its Impact on Canada

It has been discussed in previous chapters that Canada developed an interest in the concept of human security particularly after the appointment of Lloyd Axworthy as Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1996. The protection of the life of the individual was at the core of Ottawa Process and Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Human security was dominating Canadian foreign policy during this time and 'high' level issues such as—wars, safety and security of borders, military alliances were replaced by 'low' level issues, namely, protection of innocent civilians, coalition of willing for social development, environmental protection, safety and security of most vulnerable sections of society, i.e. women and children. Thus, Canadian foreign policymakers were trying to build new norms for international community and to an extent they succeeded in doing so by achieving Anti-personnel Landmines Ban Treaty (1997), establishing the concept of R2P in international discourse and also by playing a crucial role in developing Rome Statute (1998) which later culminated into the establishment of International Criminal Court (2002)³³.

In fact, Canadian foreign policy was operating smoothly, and Canada was gaining ground in projecting itself as a significant player or 'principal power' (Kirton 2006) in the international order. But the international scenario changed with the terrorist attack on the United States, the only 'super-power', on 11th September 2001. The event not only changed the continuing discourse in the international order but also transformed the foreign policy priorities of different countries of the world. This attack transformed the geo-political equation in international politics. The subsequent war in Afghanistan (2001), the controversial attack on Iraq (2003) and the incidents of insurgency and civil war in different parts of Arab World are some of the examples of the impact of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the international political environment. As a close door neighbour sharing a porous border with the US, Canada faced an entirely new set of challenges after this attack on the North American soil.

Until 9/11 the international environment was relatively peaceful because there was no threat of 'expanding communism' before the US. The clash of ideologies of the Cold War era in international politics came to an end, and the US was celebrating its 'victory' over

³³ These initiatives by the government of Canada were taken to pursue the Canadian human security agenda.

the Soviet Union. Suddenly, 9/11 gave a rude shock to the 'global hegemon', and an enemy in the form of non-traditional security threat emerged before the US. George W. Bush and his foreign policy advisors encountered a 'new threat' from internationally active Jihadi terror group called al-Qaeda. They had to respond to this newly emerged threat for the safety and security of common individuals and more importantly a sovereign nation. 9/11 changed the entire focus from human security to border security. In fact, the safety of borders/territory from terror activities originating from a distant part of the world became the first and foremost important issue for countries particularly the United States.

After 9/11, vociferous protests against the terror groups operating in different parts of the world emerged, and every country came in support of US and sent their emotional messages to grieving Americans. This attack on Canada's next-door neighbour had immediate and immense consequences for Canada. Around three thousand people were killed and six thousand injured in the attack. The dead included twenty-four Canadian citizens who were either travelling on those planes or were inside the building into which these 'human-guided missiles' crashed. After the attack on the World Trade Centre, Canadian officials decided that all the planes that could not return to their place of origin could land on Canadian soil. No one was sure that no further attacks would take place, but the Canadian officials showcased their bravery by allowing planes into the Canadian airspace. Due to lack of space planes landed on far-flung airports of Canadian territory. At some places, the passengers were housed in Canadian military bases. Moreover, Canada declared a national day of mourning after September 11. No doubt Canadians were the most affected individuals after the Americans. That is why Canadians responded in a very generous manner to the suffering of their neighbours.

This chapter examines how 9/11 terrorist attack on the North American soil influenced the foreign policy as well as domestic policies of Canada during the Chretien decade. A set of new questions emerged such as: What were the significant changes that took place in Canadian domestic and foreign policies? How have these changes in local policies impacted the lives of common citizens of Canada and the Canadian society as a whole? Did the new laws that came into force in Canada receive appreciation from citizens across the country and how the status-quoists reacted to these changes? Apart from these a very significant question arose: Was joining the 'War on terror' in Afghanistan (2001) nothing

but a Canadian quest to play a new role in international affairs or was it an attempt to protect Canadian trade with the US across 49th parallel?

While these are important questions, it is worthwhile to have a look at the previous act of terrorism that marked bloodshed on Canadian soil and how 9/11 was different from them. A section of this chapter also discusses the new laws made by the Chretien government after the horrific attack and the debate that took place around these new laws.

Terrorism, 9/11 and Canadian Response

9/11 terror attack was different from other terror attacks that took place in the past. The first and foremost reason for this is that although the incident took place in one country, i.e. the US, the impact was immediately observed throughout the world. Secondly, the attack was carried out by a small group of individuals with the help of most powerful and sophisticated technology. Third, the buildings which were targeted were not ordinary buildings. The World Trade Centre was the symbol of world financial network whereas, the Pentagon is the symbol of the United States' military power. In this way, the 9/11 attack gave an idea of a globalised world where an incident in one part of the globe impacted the other regions as well.

Previous acts of Terrorism

It was not that Canada faced the wrath of terrorism for the first time, but 9/11 was different in many ways. In 1971 an Air Canada plane was hijacked. An Air India flight had been bombed in 1985. Writing about this incident Kent Roach said: "Terrorism took a deadlier turn with the 1985 bombing of an Air India flight from Vancouver, killing all 329 passengers on board" (Roach 2003: 4). Canadians had never experienced suicide hijacking on this scale ever before.

During the Cold War years, Canada faced a major internal security crisis popularly known as the 'October Crisis'. It was a horrific act of terrorism when in October 1970 the violent group *Le Front de Liberation du Quebec* (FLQ)³⁴ kidnapped the British trade commissioner James Cross and kidnapped and later murdered Quebec Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte.

³⁴ FLQ was a paramilitary separatist group of Quebec, influenced by the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The group was founded in 1963, and the goal was to establish an independent socialist Quebec state.

This incident brought Canada into the global spotlight, and the crisis loomed large impacting the Canadian image before the world.

This was primarily a domestic crisis, and the Canadian federal government imposed the *War Measures Act*. According to Whitaker, Canada acted “swiftly, forcefully and with no regard for civil liberties”. The provisions of the Act, which gave power to the police to arrest people without any warrant, came into force at 4 o’clock in the morning. In the words of Whitaker “the federal government placed Quebec under what amounted to a state of martial law. Extensive use of power was made available to the police to detain and interrogate without charge, without counsel, and without *habeas corpus*. The media was censored, and the FLQ was declared a banned organisation” (Whitaker 2010: 44). Kent Roach also pointed out how the FLQ was declared “unlawful” by the Cabinet, and about 500 people were taken into custody simply because they were “guilty of the new offences of being a member and supporter of the FLQ” (Roach: 2003: 4).

In a developed democracy like Canada where public opinion impacts the decision of the government, the sentiment of the people was in support of the *War Measures Act*. Not only was the Anglophone community in support of the Act but also a majority of the Francophone citizens were in favour of the way Canadian federal government handled the issue. William Tetley noted the widespread support of the *War Measure Act* by both the Anglophone and Francophone communities. He wrote that “In the Gallup Poll,³⁵ 89 percent of the English-speaking Canadians and 86 percent of French Speaking Canadians supported the introduction of War Measures Act” (Tetley 1970: 103).

Although the methods used by the federal government were debateable, they produced some extraordinary results for the internal security of Canada. According to Whitaker, “the result was clear and unequivocal: the FLQ, and with it the entire terrorist tendency of the sovereignty movement of Quebec was eradicated” (Whitaker 2010: 45). Moreover, the execution of the Quebec Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte by the FLQ proved a self-destructive move. The public support of the organisation particularly in Quebec came down sharply as soon as it was announced that the minister had been murdered by the group. With the destruction of the militant group, in the same year, the issue of Quebec nationalism

³⁵ Gallup Poll was a public opinion poll took place in December 1970.

was grabbed by the Parti Quebecois (PQ), but its means to achieve the goals were legitimate, lawful, peaceful and democratic.

9/11 Attack: How Different was It?

The terrorist attack of 11th September 2001 on the United States was a series of four coordinated attacks by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda. Four passenger planes took off from American soil bound for California. These planes of two different airline companies (United Airlines and American Airlines) were hijacked by terrorists of al-Qaeda. Two of them were crashed into the North and South towers of the World Trade Centre in New York. The third hijacked plane partially hit the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense, popularly known as the Pentagon. The fourth plane crashed in the fields as it was approaching Washington D.C. This was a watershed moment for the world because it changed the course of action of several countries particularly, the countries of the West.

Canada had earlier taken part in the Cold War, which was a 'war against Soviet Communism', in alliance with the Capitalist bloc. After joining NATO, based on the concept of collective defence, Canada started defending against Communist expansion in North America and Europe. Canadian troops also took part in the Korean War to stop Communist expansion on the Korean peninsula. Its middle power diplomacy gave Canada a new identity, but its close connections with the United States made it a partner of the Western alliance in the Cold War. A few considered this partnership asymmetrical and termed Canada a 'very junior partner' in the Western alliance. During the same time, Canada continued its commitment to the United Nations and followed a policy of multilateralism.

The threat to the Canadian people due to the Canadian involvement in the Cold War period cannot be equated with the fear that emerged out of the 9/11 incidents. But Reg Whitaker argued that there exist some connections between the Cold War and the 'War on Terrorism' after the 9/11 attack. He said that "Just as Canadian troops have found themselves fighting 'terrorists' on the front lines in Afghanistan, Canadian soldiers in the Cold War soon found themselves battling 'communists' in Korea. Both wars included a home front and the identification of enemies within. Both wars involved Canada in ever closer integration with the Americans" (Whitaker 2010: 37-38). In this way, he drew parallels between the Cold

War and the 'War on Terrorism'. Commenting on 9/11 terror attack in Special Session on Canadian Parliament in Ottawa, Canadian Foreign Minister John Manley said "On September 11, 2001, the world changed for Canada... We are a war against terrorism now... but it is unlike any war we have fought before" (Manley 2001). This statement by the foreign minister describes the panic that emerged out of terror event.

While describing the 9/11 attack as *déjà vu*, Reg Whitaker says that it had some different elements. According to him, "9/11 constituted a violent attack on American civil society" with the objective of spreading fear amongst the Americans. "Moreover, the targets have been publically designated in al-Qaeda pronouncements as any and all Americans, not being limited to state officials, military/security personnel, or corporate executives as was the case with some earlier terrorist groups" (Whitaker 2010: 47). In his article, comparing the 9/11 attack with the previous threat that emerged from the Cold War tight bi-polarity, he describes the threat as a "diffuse threat" that emerged out of the act of terrorism in the 21st century (Whitaker 2010: 48). After the attack on the United States, it became a common concern that how American centred unipolar world order will operate? Commenting on this and post 9/11 international scenario Andrew Cooper said "Empire and regime change through the use of force has come back in vogue" (Cooper and Rowlands 2005: 4).

Unlike the 'October Crisis', the popular sentiment of the public after the 9/11 attack was in favour of the total elimination of terrorist heavens. This led to pressure on governments to fight against the terrorists at any cost. Quoting Globe and Mail-CTV-Ipsos Reid Poll Christopher Raj wrote that "The survey done between 17 and 20 September, found that 73 percent of Canadians favouring joining the United States in its battle against terrorism: (Raj 2007: 157). But being a close ally of the United States, the possibility of another terrorist attack could not be ignored by the Canadian government. Even the statements issued by the terrorist groups were aimed at Western countries particularly after the 'War on Terrorism' was launched against al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups. The bombing of the trains in Madrid, Spain and on the London Underground by the terrorist organisations in 2005 left other Western countries vulnerable to such acts of terrorism.

Although Canada did not take part in the Iraq War (2003) the Liberal government under Paul Martin and the Conservative government under Stephen Harper continued the presence of the Canadian military in Afghanistan to fight against the terrorists. This was because Canadians continued to sympathise with the United States after the 9/11 event and

the general sentiment was against terrorism. But with respect to the Iraq War, the Canadian open-ended support of the actions of the United States came to an end. The two years long sympathy and similar opinion of the public of the two countries came to an end because Canadians were not in favour of the Iraq War and Americans had a firm belief that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Whitaker points out that

the Iraq War draws a sharp line of demarcation between Canada and the United States, involving critical public opinion as much as, if not more than, official governments doubts about American judgement and intensions. The Liberal governments of Jean Chretien and Paul Martin were seen by many in Washington as 'Anti-American' and the Conservatives under Stephen Harper as more favourably inclined to the Bush administration (Whitaker 2010: 49).

Scholars of Canadian foreign policy gave very divergent views on the Canadian response to the 9/11 event. Undoubtedly, the security of the borders was the major and the primary concern of the Canadian government. On the other hand, the economic dependence on the United States was a major cause of concern for the business groups active on both sides of the border. No doubt Canada was fighting on two different fronts. On the first front, the Canadian government by becoming part of the coalition to fight against the terrorists was giving a message to the general public that the government was also worried about the safety and security of every citizen of Canada and would protect Canada from any terrorist attack and was also ready to do this at any cost. On the other front, which was less prevalent among common citizens, was the American interpretation of the need for national security on the border. The northern boundary with the United States which was important for Canadian exports and the flow of people was a significant issue for Canadian policymakers. Michael Grunwald (2001) in his article in Washington Post wrote that "Canada is the biggest player: more trade occurs between the United States and Canada at the Detroit-Windsor border than occurs between the United States and the European Union". If tight security were imposed on this border by the United States, the economic interests of Canada would inevitably be impacted unfavourably, an outcome unacceptable for Canada.

The two fronts were interrelated with each other. This makes it even more difficult to understand the protection of Canadian economic interests as an aspect of the border security initiative taken by the Canadian government. Whitaker further argued: "Everything that Canada contributes to the 'War on Terrorism' and to maintain strong security against terrorism within Canada, tends to relieve pressure on the border" (Whitaker 2010: 50).

Canadian Response to 9/11

Canada responded quickly to the terrorist attack. On the occasion of the memorial service on 14th September 2001 at Parliament Hill, Prime Minister Chretien delivered a very emotional speech. In the presence of Paul Cellucci, the then American ambassador to Canada, he said "Our friendship has no limits. Generation after generation we have travelled many difficult miles together" (Chretien 2001). He assured the ambassador that Canada would be with the US in every possible way. In response to the words of Chretien, the US ambassador said that the tragedy had brought the two countries together. "It has once again shown us that the differences that divide us are far less important than the ties that bind us" (Sands 2002: 72).

Canadian response was not only quick as a neighbour but also as a member of the international community. Canada gave its full support to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 which brought a new definition of terrorism. Moreover, Canada responded to the abuse of refugee status by the suspected terrorists by imposing barriers on the admission of all refugees. The boundary that Canada and the United States shared made Canada think twice about the free flow of potential terrorists across the border so that the porous boundaries between the two countries could not provide safe movement to suspected terrorists. Commenting on suspicion of the American public and policy makers Kent Roach said: "Canada drafted a new anti-terrorism law with an eye to American fear that it might provide a safe haven for terrorists" (Roach 2011: 361).

The response involved the pooling of resources in security and intelligence with additions in the budget, the development of a National Security Strategy, the formulation of a new umbrella Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), more powers to the anti-terrorist law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies and close coordination among the like-minded states. Such a large number of measures were taken for Canadian economic security by assuring the United States that Canada was taking the security of the US very seriously.

The Canadian government passed an act in the parliament of Canada very soon after the terrorist act on American soil, namely, the Anti-terrorism Act. Anti-terrorism Act is considered as the most important law that emerged after 9/11 incident. Kent Roach writes "A little more than a month after September 11, it (Canada) introduced a massive and

hastily drafted Anti-terrorism Act (Bill C-36). The Bill included new legal concepts such as—investigative hearings, preventive arrests, broad motive-based crimes for participation in or support for terrorist groups at home and abroad, as well as new powers to list terrorist groups, deprive them of charitable status and take their property” (Roach 2011: 8). This act was enacted with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in mind and defined crimes of terrorism under the Canadian Criminal Code. Roach wrote that the Anti-terrorism Act was “defended by the Liberal government as consistent with the charter and required to meet Canada’s international obligation under resolution 1373” (Roach 2011: 376).

Although there was a consensus among the people from various walks of life with respect to the response to the terror activities, the Bill faced severe criticism from different quarters. Supporters of civil liberties, lawyers, unions, aboriginal people and the refugee community raised their voices against some of the provisions of the proposed Bill. Due to this opposition from the general public, some changes were made to the Bill. The Bill with these changes became an act on 18th December 2001 after securing royal assent. The impact and the debates around this Bill are discussed later in this chapter.

After passing the Anti-terrorism Act, the Canadian government came with another parliamentary Bill known as the Public Safety Act. The Bill proposed to provide new powers to the ministers in the government to declare military security zones around areas of protest. The Bill also provided more powers to control airport security but was withdrawn after vociferous criticism. The fear of biological and chemical attacks on Canada by the terrorist groups changed the environment, and the bill was reintroduced in parliament with some restrictions on the use of powers by the concerned authorities. Public Safety Canada formerly known as Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) came into being in 2005 after the passing of the Public Safety Bill. The government department was responsible for protecting Canadian citizens and maintaining a peaceful and safe society. The website of the Canadian government says:

Public Safety Canada ensures coordination across all federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians. Public Safety Canada works with five agencies and three review bodies, uniting in the single portfolio and all reporting to the same minister. We also work with other levels of the government, first responders, community groups, the private sector and other nations (Public Safety Canada 2017).

In the same year 2001, the federal government announced a budget allocation of \$ 8 billion for security. This allocation was popularly known as the ‘security budget’ and its spending was “devoted to policing, the military, increased airport security, and border and immigration controls but not to matters such as health care that many Canadians saw as a more immediate threat to their personal security” (Roach 2011: 10). The main impact of this budget was the increase in the numbers of police officers, security officials, immigration officials and border guards. However, Kent Roach believes that the “immediate concern for the many Canadians after September 11 was not distant events in Afghanistan, new legislation or even aviation security, but ensuring that the almost \$ 2 billion in trade that crosses the American-Canadian border everyday continued to flow” (Roach 2011: 11).

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) was a Canadian version of the US Department of Homeland Security. Christopher Raj in his edited volume writes “Ottawa also responded to the US government in creating in 2003 Canadian version of Department Homeland Security called Public Safety Emergency Preparedness Canada” (Raj 2007: 164). But the Canadian version of Homeland Security was not as large as the US one as it never received the required funds.

The government also made changes in its immigration policies. In 2002 the government replaced the old Immigration Act of 1978 with a new act called the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The purpose of the act was to be "tough on those who pose a threat to Canadian security but maintain Canada's humanitarian tradition" (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2003: 2). The Canadian government felt that Canada should not fall prey to terrorist organisations due to its lenient immigration policies. The act primarily focused on the issues such as—immigration to Canada, refugee protection, enforcement and the Immigration Refugee Board. After the 9/11 event, foreign nationals were increasingly seen as ‘terrorists’ or ‘threat to Canadian security’.

Raj has pointed out that although the provisions of the act relaxed some restrictions, overall the "act conveys a negative tone". He writes that "rather than welcoming and fostering the integration of the immigrants and refugees, the act appears defensive in seeking to protect Canada by highlighting control, containment and regulations" (Raj 2007: 161). The act prescribed to immigration officers that the people who want to come to Canada should be thoroughly investigated and those who have been involved in serious crimes should not be

given permission to come to Canada. Margaret E. Beare writes that "Background checks are performed, and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration may issue a danger opinion that may allow the removal of the person from Canada and refusal of his application and issue security certificates allowing Citizen and Immigration Canada to remove a person posing a security threat" (Beare 2003).

In this way, the association of 'foreign nationals' and 'terrorists' encouraged the 'security threat' perception among the policymakers as well as the general public. This mentality drove the whole notion of preventing outsiders, i.e. people from other countries, entering Canadian territory. The PSEPC bill when proposed in parliament echoed a similar mentality of a security threat from foreign nationals. It reads that 'the best way to stop terrorists from entering Canada is to stop them before they get here'. This also produced the sense that the threat to Canadian security was not from within but from outside. In other words, it was believed that the security threat to the Canadian people is from far beyond the borders.

Anti-Terrorism Act and Its Criticism

Canadian parliament just after 9/11 attack passed an act popularly known as Anti-terrorism Act. The Act criminalised any activity directly or indirectly related to terrorism. It faced serious criticism particularly from civil liberty groups, human right groups and several other organisations. The Act was defended by the Chretien government through several different arguments. The government claimed that for the protection of common individuals from acts of terrorism it is necessary to have stringent laws. The government of Canada did receive a lot of support from Canadian citizens, and undoubtedly public opinion was in support of the total elimination of terrorism.

Criminalising Terrorism

The main response to the September 11 attack was Bill C-36 known as Anti-terrorism Act. The 175 page-long Bill was passed by the Canadian Congress in less than two weeks. Raj wrote that "The anti-terrorism was subject of heated debate and controversy as the liberal fast-tracked it through the House of Commons and the Liberal dominated Senate" (Raj 2007: 159). Due to this Act, the Canadian Criminal Code was changed, and a new part was added in it titled 'Terrorism'. This was the first time that the Criminal Code of Canada had a definition of terrorism. Any support whether financial, facilitation or participation in any

terrorist organisation was made a criminal act under the Criminal Code. Kent Roach opined that "it represents a massive and permanent change to Canadian criminal law with respect to terrorism. Many pages were added to Canadian criminal laws but almost none of the provisions were used during the first year after the Anti-terrorism Act came into force" (Roach 2003: 23).

The newly introduced law was stringent. Some of the practitioners argued that it jeopardised the civil liberties of the citizens of Canada. According to Raj, "the act trampled on civil liberties because it gave police sweeping new powers including the ability to arrest people and hold them without charge up to 72 hours if they are suspect of planning a terrorist act" (Raj 2007: 159). Commenting on the stringent laws made by the Anti-terrorism Act Roach wrote that "had the September 11 terrorists planned their crimes in Canada and had law enforcement officials been aware of their activities, the existing laws would have allowed them to be charged and convicted of a serious crime before they boarded the aircraft" (Roach 2003: 23). Before 9/11 it had been tough to agree on a definition of terrorism. The first attempt to define terrorism was done in Canada just after the World War I but the provisions were criticised and were levelled as fringe elements of civil liberties. Due to severe criticism, the provisions were repealed in 1936. There was no definition of terrorism in the War Measures Act of 1970. The main culprit of the October Crisis, *Le Front de Liberation du Quebec* (FLQ) was not declared a terrorist group but an unlawful association. The definition of terrorism was now made very extensive and it was agreed that terrorism included not only the attempts to topple the government of Canada but also the governments of other countries. Even attempts to disrupt public and private events by politically motivated activities would be considered an act of terrorism.

Patrick Macklem has said that "terrorism is a crime without a name and after September 11 its time to give it a name" (Macklem 2001: 362). With respect to the definition of terrorism, a debate arose. The Supreme Court of Canada proclaimed in a case that "there is no single definition that is accepted internationally. The absence of a single authoritative definition means that at least at the margins the term is open to politicised manipulation, conjecture and polemical interpretation" (Roach 2003: 29). Even the international community failed to define the term terrorism. Some countries, particularly Third World countries, were of the view that freedom movements should not come under the act of terrorism and that freedom fighters should not be considered as terrorists.

The concern of Third World countries is based on a fact which was discussed by Irwin Cotler. He wrote that “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” (Cotler 2001: 113). Gee writing for *Globe and Mail* recalled the words of Nelson Mandela who in the United Nations said that “terrorism is a relative term ... you become a terrorist if your aim and objective fail” (Gee 2001). But this does not mean that there was no agreement on what should be called terrorism. In the International Convention for the Suspension of Financing Terrorism, adopted by General Assembly of United Nations in Resolution 54/109 on 9 December 1999, terrorism was defined as “any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian... when the purpose of such act by its nature or context is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act” (Resolution 54/109 1999).

The new definition adopted by the Canadian authorities in the Anti-terrorism Act was comprehensive and complex. Commenting on the broad and complex definition of terrorism Raj said: "the definition of terrorism was so broad that they could be used against the people who participate in demonstration, strikes, or political or institutional dissent" (Raj 2007: 159). Terrorism now became part of the Criminal Code and many acts such as— financing and facilitation of terrorism became a crime under the new act. Even acts committed in far-flung areas of the world by the perpetrator would be considered as crimes of terrorism in Canada. Canadian authorities, as per the instructions from the Supreme Court of Canada, excluded the terrorism committed by the armed forces of a country until such forces violated international laws. Earlier, the Canadian Supreme Court of Canada noted that "Nelson Mandela's African National Congress was, during the apartheid era, routinely labelled a terrorist organisation, not only by the South African government but by much of the international community" (Roach 2003: 31). The Act also did not allow Canadian citizens to extend any financial support to the struggles taking place in other parts of the world. Any single penny crossing the border to support any such activity would be investigated and the guilty would be prosecuted according to Canadian laws in case of violation.

It had been argued that the drafting of the provisions for the new acts was done haphazardly. Kent Roach explains that "the complex drafting of the provision was influenced by Canada's desire to demonstrate that it was implementing the international conventions it had signed against terrorism" (Roach 2003: 32). The Canadian government was in a hurry

to come out with the act to show the international community that it was with the international community on the issue of terrorism. Raj said that the Chretien government introduced the bill on 15 October in response to "American USA PATRIOT Act and the United Nation's Security Council resolution 1373 of 28 September – which set out the responsibility of member states for preventing terrorism and requested update on how they proposed to meet those responsibilities in 90 days" (Raj 2007: 158).

Here it becomes a genuine question--what were the provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act that made it 'complex and confusing'? The most important provision, directly impacting the citizens of Canada, was with respect to participation in demonstrations. This provision was aimed particularly at those individuals, NGOs and other groups which engaged in strikes and protests. The Act said that strikes and protests disrupting essential services would fall under acts of terrorism. Scholars and lawyers of civil liberties were against these provisions. They argued that Canadian law was breaking new grounds regarding defining the act of terrorism. The act said that terrorism is an "intentional causing of serious interference with or disruption of 'an essential service, facility or system whether public or private'" (Roach 2003: 34). The prohibition by the act went beyond threats to the life of the individual and the term essential services included electricity, gas, roads, transportation, communication systems and much more public and private services. This broader definition covered a large number of acts which were not crimes under the Canadian Criminal Code earlier. Nevertheless, the Act exempted 'awful advocacy, protest, dissent, or stoppage of work' only if they were not harmful and were taking place in a good sense.

But the term 'lawful' was a cause of concern for many lawyers and activists. Most protests occur to change existing laws or redundant laws. These would come under 'unlawful activity'. Similarly, most times protests or demonstrations took place without any permission from state authority, such as police administration. This would again fall under the category of 'unlawful activity'. After vociferous criticism, the term 'lawful' was removed by amending the Bill. Now, politically motivated strikes and destructions of essential public and private services would invite prosecution under the Canadian Criminal Code.

The second most important provision of the act was the intention of the incomplete activities that could threaten the life of an individual. The Anti-terrorism Act made such provisions that allowed Canadian police to thwart an activity even before it was committed.

“The police do not have to wait until an act of terrorism has been committed to charge a person, and a person can be convicted for agreeing to, attempting, or assisting terrorism or for helping a terrorist to escape” (Roach 2003: 35). In fact, the Canadian parliament said to the judiciary that anyone who breaches the law made by the act can be convicted for planning, counselling or assisting others to commit acts of terrorism.

To sum up, the complex and lengthy definition of terrorism which became the part of the Canadian Criminal Code was exhaustive and broad in nature. On the one hand, disruption of essential public and private services and strikes, and protests with wrong intentions would be an act of terrorism at the domestic level whereas, at the international level any assistance whether financial or another kind would also be considered as a crime under the Anti-terrorism Law.

The Anti-terrorism Law defined not only terrorist activities but also terrorist groups. According to this act, a group or organisation was a terrorist outfit if it was ‘an entity that has one of its purpose or activities facilitating and carrying out any terrorist activity’. Even a group or organisation would be considered as a terrorist if it had an association with such entities. This meant that any outfit which had never carried out any act of terrorism but had an association with such a group which had been involved in terrorist activity would automatically fall into the list of the terrorist group. The act also gave power to the federal cabinet to declare a group a terrorist group and from now onwards could prepare a list of terror outfits. On what criteria could a group become a listed entity responsible for terror acts? The federal cabinet decides that if it is "satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a) the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or b) the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity referred to in paragraph (a)" (Roach 2003:37).

The declaration of an entity as a terrorist entity by the Federal Cabinet was not new in Canada. During the October Crisis (1970) when the War Measures Act was invoked, the Canadian Cabinet did not use the term terrorist as such but declared the FLQ to be an illegal organisation. This was a unique case of a declaration of an organisation as a terror organisation because in most of the cases in the world it is the judiciary which does this job after evaluating the evidence against the particular organisation. Al-Qaeda and six other related groups were declared as terrorist entities by the Canadian cabinet in July 2002. The decision was taken very late by the cabinet, as the act was passed in December 2001. The

government was criticised for not including several other outfits from West Asia or the Middle East. In the same year, the Gaza based organisation called Hamas that claimed responsibility for suicide bombings in Israel as well as the Lebanese based group Hezbollah were added in the list in November and December respectively.

The number of the groups in the list started increasing, which also led to controversy. After some time, the listing of the group by the Canadian cabinet became a subject of lobbying. Even the countries from where the groups in the list belonged raised questions about the criteria for choosing a group. For example, Lebanon complained about the inclusion of Hezbollah in the list and claimed that several other groups were more dangerous than Hezbollah. The reason for this concern was the serious repercussions of being named in the list of terrorist groups. The Solicitor General once said that "being listed under Bill C-36... is very serious matter. They can have their assets seized and frozen and association with those groups is considered to be a crime" (C. Clark 2002).

In this way, the Act established that Canada was very serious with respect to the spread of the terrorism in the globalised world. Due to the exclusive nature of the act Ronald Daniels described it as a "landmark act" (Daniels 2001). The Canadian government also showed its willingness to fight against terrorist regimes all over the world. Even small support of any kind to terrorist activity would come under the category of terrorism itself.

Offences Under New Act

How would these new offences under the Anti-terrorism Act help the Canadian effort to deter such activities? The major argument in support of the new act was that this would 'disable and dismantle' the terrorist groups existing in different parts of the world. Financing terrorism became a major issue. To stop terrorists from committing crimes, it was important to block the gates from where they received funds. By this argument, the Canadian government through the Anti-terrorism Act made a provision that it was an offence to collect money from different sources or to fund a terrorist organisation from one's pocket personally. The law also said that the person would be held accused of this only if he/she knew about the use of the whole or some amount of money for committing a terrorist activity. People who supported an organisation but were not aware of the use of the money they were donating or contributing and the money was being diverted to finance violent actions, would not be convicted for the offence. Thus, the act was not very rigid in

this case and gave a chance to the innocent to not become a fundraiser or fund provider to an organisation guilty of spreading violence. The organisations mentioned in the list by cabinet would give an opportunity to the people to check whether their money was going for a good cause or being diverted for violent acts against the innocent people.

The phrase 'financial and other related services' brought in a new debate. As observed by Kevin Davis "on the one hand, it does not seem farfetched to target a person who sells a crop-duster to a known terrorist. On the other hand, it does seem a bit farfetched to convict a restaurant owner simply for serving food and drink to known terrorists or even for serving customers who he knows are in the habit of making contributions to terrorist groups" (Davis: 2001: 301-303). Similarly, the Criminal Code of Canada also debars anyone from contributing to terror activities. Even to "possess property intending or knowing that it will be used directly or indirectly in whole or part for the purpose of facilitating or carrying a terrorist activity" (Roach 2003: 39). Thus, not even being overtly active but possessing the property and knowing that it was going to be used in the terror acts would be a crime according to the Criminal Code.

The focus was on the terrorists and not the terrorist activities. Kent Roach notes that "Landlords or vendors of property could be imprisoned for up to ten years for renting or selling property to those they know are members of a terrorist group or are controlled by a terrorist group" (Roach 2003: 40). According to the Criminal Code, any such support would come under the umbrella of financing offences and the property of the supporter would be forfeited. The Criminal Code allowed the forfeiture of the property owned by a terrorist, even if the property had never been used or was to be used for terror activities.

To sum up the financing clause of the Anti-terrorism Act, it can be argued that although the provisions were not going to impact terror activities directly, such provisions were surely going to deter the third party from providing the funds or other similar financial assistance to the terrorists. Apart from the above mentioned traditional support through financing or facilitating a terrorist, the Canadian parliament also prepared some more punishable offences. According to the Canadian Criminal Code, as mentioned by Kent Roach, parliament "also created an important new offence punishable by life imprisonment to those who deliver, place, discharge and detonate an explosive and lethal device (including biological agents, toxins or radioactive material) into a place of public use or into a public or private infrastructure system distributing services such as water energy and

communication for the benefit of the public” (Roach 2003: 45). The parliament must have made these provisions keeping in mind the new technology that was used now by the terrorist groups and was extremely dangerous as well as capable enough to harm scores of people by taking away their lives or permanently disabling them for the rest of life.

To implement the provisions mentioned above, the act also described several powers given to different agencies according to their areas. Investigative agencies, police, agency responsible for surveillance etc. were given enough powers to impose harsher penalties. The major argument behind these tougher penalties was to stop people from becoming part of any terrorist activity. "The act provides for increased and mandatory consecutive sentences for all terrorism offences and increased periods of ineligibility for parole" (Roach 2003: 46). The new Anti-terrorism Act gave several new investigative powers to the police. The civilian investigative agencies were not offered new powers and but it gave recognition to the Communication Security Establishment for the collection of intelligence from other countries. Earlier, the police could only keep electronic surveillance for a period of two months whereas, now with the new act this surveillance could be done for up to one year with respect to terrorist offences. The power of surveillance was so much that the police could hide the fact from the person who was under surveillance for up to three years.

But this power of surveillance was subject to judicial authorisation and supervision. The public support was against surveillance which would affect the privacy of the individual. Even after the 9/11 incident, the support for such surveillance did not get a positive response from the public. In a poll that was conducted on the topic of electronic surveillance a tiny percentage (29%) of people supported it and were of the view that they will not have any problem if their mobile phones were on surveillance without their consent (Ipsos-Reid 2001).

A new power of preventive arrest and investigative hearings was severely criticised from different parts of the society. Civil libertarians, various NGOs, and lawyers criticised this power provided to the police and other law enforcement agencies by the act. The government was of the view that these provisions were in line with the Charter that was adopted by the United Nations and necessary to prevent terrorism. Both powers, i.e. preventive arrest and investigative hearings required the consent of the Attorney General in exigent circumstances prior to judicial authorisation. The term ‘preventive arrest’ was nowhere used in the Canadian Criminal Code. Rather a phrase ‘recognizance with

conditions' was used in the Criminal Code. The preventive arrest could take place only when the police officer had reasonable grounds on which the 'recognizance with conditions' could be imposed. The police officer must be sure that the arrest was going to avoid terrorist activity which was supposed to be carried out by the person.

As per the preventive arrest laws, the police must produce the person arrested before a judge within twenty-four hours. The judge was given the power to adjourn the hearing up to forty-eight hours, which meant that a person would remain under arrest for a maximum period of seventy-two hours on the basis of suspicion. In an opinion poll a majority of people (58%) were in favour of indefinite arrest of those who are supposedly going to involve themselves in terror activities (Ipsos-Reid 2001). The poll took place just after the September 11 attack. The preventive arrest might last for a long period if the judge was satisfied that the person arrested would commit a terror activity shortly. The judge might ask him/her to go for a recognisance or peace bond which required the person to behave peacefully and not to possess weapons or explosives for twelve months. But if the person refused to follow the commands of the judge as per the recognisance or peace bond, then he/she might be jailed for the same period of twelve months. On the other hand, if the person violated the conditions of the recognisance or peace bond then the guilty invited imprisonment for two years. But it is difficult to say that the impact of such recognisance or peace bonds helped Canada to stop terrorists from committing criminal activities.

The Anti-terrorism Act also gave birth to the concept of investigative hearings. The concept was included in the Canadian criminal law with the implementation of the act. The investigative hearing was controversial, like preventive detention. For preventive arrest, the prior permission of the Attorney General was required. After the arrest police had to put facts and figures before the judge with respect to the arrest, which required investigation and information. To fetch such information police had to make efforts for which police were given the power to go to the judge and then the judge could order the person to answer the questions raised by the police and produce relevant documents. "A person subject to investigate hearing may well fear subsequent prosecution under the many broad offences related to the financing and facilitation to terrorism" (Roach 2003: 50). As per the new Canadian law, "No person shall be excused from answering a question or producing a thing... on the ground that the answer of thing may incriminate the person or subject the person to any proceeding and penalty" (Criminal Codes. 83 (28)).

But if a person refused to cooperate with the investigative procedure or did not follow the directions, the judge had the power to decide the punishment for contempt of court. The Anti-terrorism Act had no specific guidelines with respect to disobeying the order of the judge. The reason for less or no cooperation from those involved in giving assistance to terror activities would be caught by the investigators on the basis of their statements. Still, there is no doubt that the power of investigative hearings could be used for past terror activities.

Criticism of Bill C-36

Bill C-36, which was proposed by the parliament and later became the Anti-terrorism Act, was criticised particularly by the civil libertarians and legal groups led by criminal defence lawyers. During the 1990s, civil libertarian group and defence lawyers had opposed the amendments in the criminal law to facilitate the prosecution of sexual assault cases. For this they were constantly and effectively opposed by the feminist group and as a consequence lost all the battles. Similarly, the civil libertarian groups were opposed by several minority groups, human rights commissions on their stand on hate crimes and war crimes against minorities, particularly visible minority.

Aboriginal groups, as well as groups of the Muslim Canadians, supported these civil liberty groups because they worried that the broad definition of terrorism would affect them negatively. On the basis of the past incidents and examples, the Arab Canadians were of the view that their support for fellow countrymen to immigrate to Canada could come under the criminal acts after the enforcement of Anti-terrorism Act. These groups opposed the new laws on the basis of their personal experience, keeping the possible danger in mind. The group of lawyers who were against the proposed bill were of the view that the powers which were given to the police such as—preventive arrest and investigative hearings should not be misused by the police. They were sceptical about the role of the police and the procedure that would emerge once the Bill became an Act (Tyler 2001).

It was argued that the broader definition of terrorism would affect peaceful protests for legitimate demands and might include strikes by hospital staff for better facilities in the hospitals. It was also argued that the enhanced powers given to the police by the bill without giving any responsibility to any agency to monitor and audit the police acts could lead to the emergence of a 'police-state'. Eric Rice who was the President of the Canadian Bar

Association also raised a number of concerns with respect to the bill. After a hectic examination of the bill by almost two hundred lawyers associated with the Canadian Bar Association, it was argued that the provisions of the Act are violating the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. Francois Legras wrote that "It would be a mistake to believe that this law will not eventually be used against Canadians and Canadians who are not terrorist" (Raj 2001: 163). Even Canadian women associations, particularly the National Association of Women and the Law, did not support the bill. Andree Cote, the representative of the association, said: "We are dismayed that this bill allows for arrest on mere suspicion. This is highly subjective criteria that will allow for uncontrolled abuse. Given the current climate, it may also give rise to a wave of discriminatory arrests against radicalized persons and groups" (Cote 2002).

Such arguments were also given by the Aboriginal and Christian groups. The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) opposed the Bill because it would affect the daily lives of aboriginal people. Their argument was based on past incidents. According to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the aboriginal groups were sceptical about the introduced Bill because of the risk posed to the First Nations by the legislation that gives heightened powers to police that narrows the civil rights of those involved in legitimate descent and protest activities and limits or suspends the civil rights of those perceived by the government to be involved in terrorist activities (Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights 2001). The Canadian Council of Churches and Catholic Bishops were concerned about the clause of the Bill which dealt with the issue of charities in different parts of the world. For these groups "the section could catch church groups that in good faith, and after due diligence, provide funds to their overseas partners for humanitarian and development assistance" (Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights 2001).

Thus, different groups had different issues. Bar associations, women associations, aboriginal groups, and church organisations were worried about the possible negative impact on their major working style and the overall impact on society. In addition to the above groups who had reservations on one or another clause of the Bill, several labour or employees organisations were concerned for their liberty. The Canadian Union of Public Employees, the Canadian Labour Congress, and unions of different provinces had similar problems. All of them made their reservations about keeping the strikes mostly illegal, mindful that such unions do this from time to time. It feared that members of their union

might be deemed to be terrorists and charged as per the new law for taking part in demonstrations or protests. As per the Canadian political environment, these organisations sent their representatives to put their views before various parliamentary committees.

Similarly, the organisations of visible minorities, Arab Muslims and Muslims from other areas of the world, and Canadian Jews also presented their views before the committees of parliament. Their main cause of concern was the charity donations the people from different areas of the world send to their homelands. According to them, this activity of the people who send money abroad from Canada could come under the clause of 'financing and facilitating terror' broadly discussed in the Anti-terrorism Act.

The Bill also faced opposition within the government. Some parts of the bill were criticised by governmental bodies. Roach says that "independent agencies of the federal government, including the privacy commissioner, the information commissioner, and the Canadian Human Rights Commission, all voice concerns about the bill" (Roach 2003: 64). George Radwanski, who was a private commissioner at that time, used his oratory skills to make his points before the government against the infringement of privacy of Canadian individuals. He wrote letters to the ministers of the Chretien government and presented his views criticising provisions that were taking away privacy rights.

Cabinet solidarity was also tested by the Bill. Fisheries Minister Herb Dhaliwal commented that "Civil liberties are extremely important to Canadians... certainly as someone from the ethnic community and visible minority this is something extremely important to me" (MacCharles and Thompson 2001). He further said that "People come to Canada because of its freedom, its openness, the diversity of this society. We have to make sure that these strengths are being protected" (MacCharles and Thompson 2001). Echoing the voice of Dhaliwal, another minister from Chretien's cabinet, Hedy Fry, who was in charge of the Ministry of State for Multiculturalism, said that the bill should be very clear on the civil and political rights of Canadians.

In fact, the Liberals in parliament who were not so vocal on other issues put their viewpoint before their respective houses. Irwin Cotler, one of the Liberal members who was also a human rights lawyer, opposed some parts of the Bill. He came out with eleven reservations. His reservations were

overbreadth in its definition of terrorism, the lack of prior notice to a group listed as a terrorist group, concerns about access to information and right to privacy, the need to sunset provisions for preventive arrests and investigative hearings, the need for charities to have a due diligence defence if their charitable status was revoked and the need for more oversight mechanism, such as parliamentary officer to monitor and supervise the legislation” (Roach 2003: 65).

Donald Savoie in his book *Governing from the Centre* said that it was unfortunate that the Bill C-36 faced criticism from the ministers in the cabinet and also from the other members of the Liberal Party in parliament. In a parliamentary form of government, which is also known as the ‘rule of cabinet’ any bill which is presented by the government gets support from all the members of the ruling party/coalition. But in the case of Bill C-36, although Prime Minister ordered cabinet ministers to present a united front, opposition came from within the government (Savoie 1999).

The committees of both the Senate as well as House of Commons played a very crucial role in recommending amendments to the Bill. They also gave a chance to the public and different civil society groups to express their concerns. The Special Senate Committee suggested recommendations on the bill. Not all but some of the suggestions given by the committee were considered by the government. "In its late November amendments, the government provided some time limits and judicial review on security certificates, five-year sunset on investigative hearings and preventive arrests, and required annual reports on the exercise of these powers” (Roach 2003: 66). Thus, some of the important issues were addressed by the government. But parliamentarians got little time to debate Bill C-36. Former Prime Minister Clark criticised the limited period given to the Bill for debate and discussion in the parliament and described it as ‘travesty of democracy’. In response, the then Minister of Justice Anne McLellan said that our friends and those who are concerned are moving and it would be irresponsible for us as a government not to move. Our primary objective is to ensure the safety and security of the citizens of Canada.

Government’s Defence of the Bill

The government’s defence was based on three major arguments. Quoting Irwin Cotler’s statement in support of Anti-terrorism Act, Raj wrote that the Act is a

human security legislation which seeks to protect both national security...and civil liberties. As the United Nations put it, terrorism constitutes a fundamental assault on human rights... while counter-terrorism law involves protection of

the most fundamental of rights, the right of life, liberty and the security of the person as well as the collective rights of the peace" (Raj 2007: 160).

On the same line of thought, the Canadian government supported the Act vociferously. The first and foremost was that the existing laws were not sufficient enough to tackle the issue of global terrorism, so it was necessary for the safety and security of the citizens of Canada. The main defence was that the criminal laws of the Canadian Criminal Code were inadequate to prevent attacks similar to the 9/11 incident. So according to the government, if Canada wanted to be immune from such acts of terrorism, new criminal laws were needed, which should be more stringent than the existing ones. Several arguments were made by the government's side in support of new and stringent laws which could avoid terror activities on Canadian soil. Anne McLellan, while giving an interview to the reporter of a newspaper said "the graphic shot of the second plane exploding into the World Trade Centre became a mental touchstone and kept in mind as she debated with the colleagues the measures necessary to ensure that such actions would not happen in Canada and that terrorists would not use this country to launch more attacks on the United States" (Globe and Mail 2001).

After facing the horrors of the 9/11 attack, its impact on Canada made the arguments more valid and appealed to the public for adopting more laws capable of protecting the life of the individual. The Canadian people were not in a position to debate on the issue and gave their support to the bill with more powers to the police, investigative agencies and other law enforcement agencies.

The second important argument from the government was that the bill was synchronous with the charter. This is why the government was arguing that there was no need to make this an emergency provision. According to the government, the charter of rights was kept in mind while making rules and regulations under this Bill. While introducing Bill C-36 in the House, the justice minister said that the individual rights and freedoms of Canadians were kept in mind in developing these proposals.³⁶ But the public opinion poll taken in the same month of the year even before the Bill was introduced, tells a different story. In the poll, 58% of Canadians believed that in the name of the fight against terrorism the rights and freedoms of the Canadians would be infringed and 38% of the respondents said that

³⁶ The Bill was introduced on 15th October 2001.

the charter of rights should be respected even when preparing themselves to fight against the evil terror forces (Ipsos-Reid 2001).

While drafting a bill, it is important to keep the Charter of Rights and Freedom in mind. In fact, it is the duty of the officials to prepare the draft of the bill consistent with the Charter. The government should not make this a point to sell the proposed bill among the parliamentarians and the common public. Roach said that "justice officials were doing their job of ensuring compliance with the charter in a difficult situation does not diminish the danger of the government's political decision to stress that Bill c-36 was charter proof" (Roach 2003: 76). Consistency with the charter should be accepted more as a necessity than sold as a virtue.

The third argument from the government's side was that the bill strengthened the Charter of Rights and Freedom. This element was used by the Canadian government in its defence with an argument that Bill C-36 was going to support human rights. In her address to the parliament, while introducing the Bill, the then Minister of Justice said that Bill C-36 reaffirms the equal right of every citizen of whatever religion, race or ethnic origin to enjoy the security, protection and liberty shared by all Canadians.³⁷ In support of this argument Minister of Justice further said that terrorism in any part of the world is an extreme violation of human rights. She felt that Canada's responsibility is to defend human rights and Bill C-36 does this with the help of provisions made by the government of Canada. It had been argued that terrorism is not only a contest between the state and some individuals who are involved in terror acts. Rather, terrorism is an assault on the rights of the individual and most prominently the security of the life of an individual. Although on the basis of the past experiences it can be argued that tougher laws rarely deter the perpetrator from committing crimes. Kent Roach in his monograph writes that "in my view, the two dozen Canadian victims of September 11 would have been better honoured by appropriate memorials, victim compensation and temporary tax relief than by the rushed amendments that were made to the criminal code" (Roach 2003: 82).

No doubt Bill C-36 built new narratives in Canada after the September 11. The Anti-terrorism Act was an attempt by the Canadian government to protect the life of the individual. The act reflected the purpose of the government that it could not allow the use

³⁷ Minister of Justice Anne McLellan described the features of the bill on 16th October 2001.

of Canadian soil for terror activities. Although the broad definition of terrorism fetched criticism from different quarters, every Canadian wanted to be immune from terror strikes.

This was a major shift in the policies of the Chretien government. In the late 1990s, Canada was in support of the concept of human security which was entirely different from the traditional concept of security, i.e. border security and focused on the development of the concept of responsibility to protect. But with the 9/11 attack, the whole concept of human security was overshadowed by the traditional concept of border security which was in vogue during the Cold War period.

Border Safety and Military Response after 9/11

The extensive debate and discussion that started in Canada after the horrific attack on 9/11 compelled the Canadian government to bring about new laws. Apart from the laws that were made by the Canadian parliament, it is also important to see how Canadian government responded with respect to the safety and security of the porous border with the United States across the 49th parallel. Similarly, when the countries of the world were joining the US for 'War on Terrorism' the government of Canada could not remain a silent spectator. In this section, we will also have a look at the military response by Canada.

Border Security Initiatives

The border between Canada and the US is considered as one of the busiest borders in terms of cross-border bilateral trade. The attack of 9/11 disrupted the flow of goods between the two countries amounting to a loss of around \$ 2 billion every day. No two countries except Canada and the US are as dependent on each other for everyday trade. This could be observed by the argument made by Stephen Flynn. He reported that "just 36 hours after the September 11 attack, Daimler Chrysler announce that it would have to close one of its assembly plants because Canadian supplies were caught in an 18-hour traffic jam at the border. Ford then announced that five of its assembly plants would have to lie idle the following week" (Flynn 2002: 60). At that time closing down the border was the only option before the US government which later became a serious problem for the factories or plants which were dependent on supplies from Canada.

Those who incurred heavy losses out of the closing of border raised their voices and conveyed their concerns to the government of both the countries. The business

communities of Canada and the US started lobbying for a new plan to make sure that such acts of terrorism in future in any part of the continent would not affect the interests of the business class. John Manly, the then Foreign Minister of Canada started discussing border-related safety and security matters with Tom Ridge, the newly appointed US Homeland security advisor and informed each other about the necessity of a mutually acceptable alternative to prevent any such situation in the future. After several rounds of talks, an agreement was signed between Canada and US on 12th December 2001 popularly known as Smart Border Declaration. Commenting on the 9/11 attack and its impact on Canada-US porous border Daniel Drache wrote that "September 11 redefined not only the border but also North America as a geopolitical region.... In this new security age, every country is a potential partner (or enemy) for the US" (Drache 2004: 90).

The US had claimed that there were some terror groups active in Canada and the main reason for this was Canadian refugee and asylum policy. That is why, for the US, the prime objective of the Smart Border Declaration was the security of US territory. The agreement was based on a 30-point action plan to avoid any terror incident originating from Canadian territory. Christopher Raj has argued that "30-point action plan was based on four pillars: (a) the secure flow of people; (b) the secure flow of goods; (c) secure infrastructure; and (d) information sharing and coordination in the enforcement of these objectives" (Raj 2007: 171).

The primary cause of concern for Canada was the protection of trade and commerce that took place across the border. Canadian policymakers had economy in their mind while dealing with the US on Smart Border Declaration. In an interview, John Manly told the *Toronto Star*, a Canadian daily newspaper that "I felt that the greatest risk to Canada as a result of September 11... was to the economy" (Toronto Star 2002: A6). Thus, the urgency with which he negotiated the 30-point border action plan with Tom Ridge was driven by economic necessities.

It is estimated that almost three lakhs people cross the border from both sides every day. Managing this large number of people had always been a tough task for both Canada and the US. After 9/11 it became vital to regulate the flow of the people at the border. The problem had been solved up to a great extent by using sophisticated technology for surveillance and screening. Who is eligible to cross the border by land and air was determined by a mutually acceptable programme called NEXUS. This programme made

crossing easier with minimal inspection through dedicated lanes. Those who frequently cross the border had been issued electronic passes and were allowed to use the fast lane to cross the border. Those who are not the citizens of Canada and have the nationality of the third country are given Permanent Resident (PR) cards equipped with biometric identification to stop fraud and duplication. Raj claimed that "with these advances in technology Canada and the United States have moved towards a policy of harmonization and coordination on a number of issues including immigration systems and processes, refugee/asylum seekers and third country visa exemption and restrictions" (Raj 2007: 172).

To ensure the free flow of goods across the border a Free and Secure Trade (FAST) programme was concluded between Canada and the US. This programme is a clearance programme dedicated to the commercial traffic entering the US from Canada and Mexico. The official website of Department of Homeland Security of US reads: "Initiated after 9/11, this innovative trusted traveller/trusted shipper programme allows expedited processing of commercial carriers who have completed background checks and fulfil certain eligibility requirements" (Department of Homeland Security 2017). Thus, with the help of this programme approved importers, carriers, and registered drivers are allowed to cross the border with minimal inspection. Undoubtedly, this helped the businessmen from Canada and Mexico to conduct commercial trade relatively easier with the United States.

Canada's Military Response: 'War on Terrorism'

As soon as it became clear that the 9/11 attack had been orchestrated by a terror outfit called al-Qaeda from the safe havens in Afghanistan with the support of Taliban regime, William Maley and Jack Cunningham wrote that "it was only a matter of time before robust military action was taken to smash the al-Qaeda network and displace the Taliban regime that had provided it with a home" (Maley and Cunningham 2015: 9). Canada's policy towards Afghanistan dominated Canadian foreign policy quarters after it became clear that the terror attack on the US had been planned in Afghanistan. Commenting on the importance of Afghanistan in Canadian foreign policy, Bill Graham who later became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 2002 wrote that "the issue of Afghanistan occupied a central place in our political environment. It figured very important in our foreign policy and our relations with our most important allies; it shaped the foreign dimension of our defense policy and procurement needs and provided an experience that had marked our military for

a generation” (Graham 2015: 50-51). Undoubtedly, Canadian foreign policy also impacted domestic politics considerably.

Within a month after the attack, ‘War on Terrorism’ rhetoric proposed by the then President of the US Mr George W. Bush became a reality. The Canadian contribution to this fight against ‘evil’ started as a part of its commitment to the concept of collective security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Highlighting Canadian commitment to NATO Bill Graham wrote that “After NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson made that announcement on October 4, 2001, Canada was obliged to support American-led efforts to hunt down the al-Qaeda terrorist behind the 9/11 attacks and overthrow the Taliban regime that allowed them to use Afghanistan as a base of operations” (Graham 2015: 51). On October 7 2001, when the US and British warplanes started bombing in Afghanistan, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced that Canada would join the US war against the terror-exporting hubs in Afghanistan. Soon after this announcement Defence Minister of Canada made it clear on the very next day that Canadian Armed Forces would take part in this battle against terrorism. Graham wrote, “As quickly as October 8, our defence minister, Art Eggleton, announced Operation Apollo, a Canadian operation in support of the American Operation Enduring Freedom” (Graham 2015: 51).

In this way, Operation Apollo was a Canadian operation in Afghanistan that took place from October 2001 to October 2003. Under Operation Apollo Canada sent its naval ships to the Persian Gulf followed by surveillance and patrol aircrafts. Apart from this Canada also sent armed forces of around 2000 troops to take part in the Operation. Canadian contribution was relatively small in comparison to other countries which were taking part in the campaign in Afghanistan. Commenting on Canadian contingent Raj wrote, “it represented nearly one-third of the country's naval fleet and was the largest combat force Canada had sent abroad since the Korean War” (Raj 2007: 165). By the end of November 2001, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan came to an end. In the very next month, UN Security Council recognised Hamid Karzai's government as the interim government in Afghanistan.

Canada's initial engagement was very limited. Before Canada decided to start Operation Apollo, the major focus of Canada was to build an international campaign against terrorism. It is important to note that Canada played a pivotal role in an international campaign which culminated in United Nations Security Council resolution 1368. But over a period of time

Canadian engagement evolved. Operation Apollo was the first engagement which lasted until July 2003. After Operation Apollo Canada started its new commitment under the aegis of NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) which is popularly known as Operation Athena. Craig Stone describes Operation Athena as "presented by the Department of National Defense (DND) as a two-phase operation, with phase one involving operations in Kabul from August 2003 until July 2005, and phase two taking place in Kandahar from August 2005 until July 2011, when a transition force assumed responsibility for closing out Canada's mission in Kandahar" (Stone 2015: 133).

Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan came to an end on July 7, 2011. After Operation Athena came to an end in 2011, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced at the NATO summit (2012) in Chicago that Canadian soldiers would continue to train and support Afghan National Army until March 2014. According to Stone, "Canadian contribution to Afghanistan was reduced from almost three thousand people to just under one thousand and repositioned to Kabul to focus on training Afghan National Army" (Stone 2015: 134). In its fourteenth and final report to the parliament titled *Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan* the government of Canada claimed that the task of Canada from 2011 to 2014 would be based on four priorities (Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan 2012: 38):

- Investing in the future of Afghan children and youth through development programme in education and health and improving the lives of Afghans, especially women and children;
- Advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, including through the provision of up to 950 Canadian Forces trainers and support personnel as well as approximately 45 Canadian civilian police to help train Afghan national security forces;
- Promoting regional diplomacy; and
- Helping deliver humanitarian assistance.

The estimated cost of Canadian presence in Afghanistan is subject to considerable debate. Canada continued to be involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan through security programme and development assistance. On July 9, 2016, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced a comprehensive package of \$ 465 million in security and development support to Afghanistan. In 2015 Bill Graham wrote that "a presence that endures today and has evolved the deployment of troops in many different capacities at the cost of C\$ 14-18 billion" (Graham 2015: 50). Craig Stone also estimated total costs for Canada similarly. He wrote: "When looking at total cost for these areas (incremental costs for the mission, capital

depreciation and liabilities of death and disability), the Afghan mission will have cost the Canadian taxpayer between C\$ 15.6 and \$19.5 billion" (Stone 2015: 147).

Apart from financial cost Canada also paid in terms of the lives of the members of its armed forces. During the combat mission in Afghanistan, 158 members of Canadian Armed Force died. The number of deaths was very low until 2005. The major turning point occurred when the Canadian government under the leadership of Paul Martin decided to join Kandahar province. After this, the number of Canadians killed in Afghanistan increased dramatically. "Between 2002 and the fatality in October 2011, the causes of death were as follows: IED's, roadside bombs, or landmines (ninety-six); combat or other hostile fire (twenty-three); suicide bombers (thirteen); and accidents (eleven). Also, six lost their lives in 'friendly fire' incidents; four died from non-combat related causes; three committed suicide; and two died in a helicopter crash" (Nossal 2015: 212).

Canadian involvement in Afghanistan took place after a very long time. Although Canadian forces were involved in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations, the military operation in Afghanistan raised the question of its necessity. Public opinion on Afghanistan did change over a period of time. Graham wrote: "I believe that the mission had considerable support at the beginning, but it gradually eroded in the face of significant and mounting casualties, the lengthening commitment, and a sense amongst the Canadian public that we are carrying an unfairly heavy share of the burden in Afghanistan" (Graham 2015: 72). He further believed that there was "at the beginning, a resistance in significant part of the public to a combat role for Canada and a belief that Canada was better equipped for and historically committed to traditional peacekeeping operations" (Graham 2015: 72).

As soon as *Operation Enduring Freedom* campaign of US in Afghanistan came to an end in 2002, the then President turned American attention and shifted the sources from Afghanistan to Iraq against Saddam Hussein. It had been argued by Nipa Banerjee that Canada enhanced its role in Afghanistan to avoid its engagement in Iraq. While discussing the lessons from Afghanistan, she claimed that "Canada joined the US-led war in early 2002 as compensation for not agreeing to join US-led operation in Iraq and to fulfil our obligations as NATO member once NATO had approved the mission" (Banerjee 2015: 178). She further said that "in absence of any evidence that the Taliban posed threat to Canada, the public continues to wonder if the war was necessary to protect the Canadians" (Banerjee 2015: 178). Resonating similar views, Craig Stone wrote: "With Canada and

others having drawn down from Afghanistan in 2014, many of those whose lives have changed the most from this mission will continue to ask if it was worth the cost” (Stone 2015: 148).

Conclusion

It is difficult to conclude whether the invasion to Afghanistan was necessary or not but it is a fact that Canada proved itself a concerned neighbour by changing the course of domestic and foreign policy after 9/11 and also a defender of collective security as a NATO member by its twelve-year long military operation in Afghanistan. The changes made by the Canadian parliament in domestic laws were very extensive. Due to the introduction of the Anti-terrorism Act, the Canadian Criminal Code was also changed, and new offences were added. The primary purpose of the Anti-terrorism Act was to secure Canada from terror activities. The best way to eliminate terrorism is to cut the funding sources which will make such groups vulnerable and virtually handicapped. Forming a new department, namely, Public Safety Canada also known as Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) by the federal government which is responsible for the safety and security of the common Canadian citizens was a new initiative after 9/11. Similarly, bringing new legislation on immigration policy showed Canadian commitment to resolve the threat of global terrorism by stopping ‘possible terrorists’ on the border. These stringent laws did face protests but the issue of terrorism was very important to tackle, and it was felt that the Canadian government could not take chance by putting the lives of innocent civilians in danger.

On foreign policy front too, Canadian foreign policy makers made several changes. The time was ripe to revisit foreign policy after the 9/11 terror attack. Canada took part in Afghanistan, but at the same time, it is also important to note that it did not agree to participate in the Iraq War (2003) because of the lack of evidence of the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Describing the importance of Iraq, Bill Graham, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, wrote in his memoir that “Iraq was a multi-layered problem. One level was Canada-US relations, another was multilateral relations, the third was domestic politics—all three were interacting each other all the time... If we started a war without authorization from the Security Council and without proof regarding the WMD, there could be terrible consequences” (Graham 2016: 273, 289). Undoubtedly, 9/11 changed the priorities of Canada. Before the terror attack, the Canadian

government was focusing on human security and was taking innovative steps for the security of individuals. But after the attack, human security did not remain first priority for Canada. Instead, the safety and security of Canadian people from non-traditional security threats mainly from terrorism became more critical.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

Canadian commitment to international affairs increased after World War II. Canadian foreign policy was considered to be in its 'golden period' when in different roles Lester B. Pearson was handling the foreign policy of Canada. Canada as a middle power had showcased its negotiation skills during the Suez Canal crisis (1956). These efforts made by Pearson who later became the Prime Minister of Canada led him to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. During the Cold War period, Canada had acquired a very distinct image of a good international player. Following and contributing to the development of several international laws, using the policy of multilateralism, Canada played a very significant role in international affairs. The ideological war between the United States and the Soviet Union came to an end in the early 1990s. The advent of a new era of international politics forced countries to re-examine their foreign policy. A middle power like Canada faced serious questions in an entirely new international environment. The relevance of middle powers in a post-Cold War period was questioned. How to define their role in the post-Cold War phase was the major problem before these middle powers. In an uncertain and complex world, the question of Canada's relevance and significance put a lot of stress on its foreign policymakers. This was the time when the Liberal Party of Canada under the leadership of Jean Chretien, came to power and continued for almost ten years from November 4, 1993, to December 12, 2003.

The objective of this study was to understand the twists and turns in Canadian foreign policy during the Chretien premiership and to analyse the response of the Liberal government to the challenges brought out by the end of the Cold War. Canada's identity crisis due to the changed international scenario along with domestic obstacles complicated the situation for its leadership. During the Chretien premiership, Canada was in pursuit of a new role in the international affairs. This study focusses on how the Chretien government dealt with the challenges that affected Canadian foreign policy during the early 1990s. The major task before the majority Liberal government was to tackle not only domestic but also international challenges.

The Liberal Party had promised that if it came to power, it would bring the derailed Canadian economy on track. Jean Chretien announced that employment generation and cutting down the fiscal deficit would be the Liberal Party's top priority. Regarding NAFTA,

Liberal Party promised renegotiation of Free Trade Agreement, but it failed to do so when it came to power. On foreign policy front the Liberal Red Book, election manifesto of the party, promised a new direction to Canada-US bilateral relationship. The Liberal Party of Canada alleged that the foreign policymaking under Mulroney government was extremely bureaucratised. That is why Liberal Party manifesto also assured democratisation of Canadian foreign policy which emerged as a debate in Canada. The Liberal Party manifesto also focused on previous commitments such as—peacekeeping under the umbrella of the United Nations and financial aid to developing countries.

Jean Chretien was the 20th Prime Minister of Canada who won three consecutive mandates in 1993, 1997 and 2000. Unlike, his predecessor, Chretien had extensive political experience and was part of the Liberal cabinet since 1965. Canadian foreign policy under the dynamic leadership of Chretien shifted according to time and occasion. The Chretien decade (1993-2003) saw many twists and turns in Canadian foreign policy. Chretien and his foreign ministers, particularly Lloyd Axworthy, left imprints on Canadian foreign policy which are evident. While most scholars examine the Chretien premiership as a continuity, this study attempts to bring out the nuances of Canadian foreign policy by dividing the Chretien decade (1993-2003) into three different phases namely: the national unity phase (1993-1995), the human security phase (1996-2000) and the transnational security phase (2001-2003).

The Liberal Party during the election campaign vociferously criticised Conservative Party government under the leadership of Brian Mulroney. Undoubtedly, Canadians who voted for a change were looking at the Liberal Party policies and governance with hope. The most important issue during 1993 federal elections was the deteriorating condition of the Canadian economy. The late 1980s recession was responsible for high unemployment and fiscal deficit in Canada. While the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was an important issue, it was not the central theme of the election debate. Similarly, Quebec referendum was not a prominent nationwide election debate but was evidently an important issue in Quebec. The Liberal Party also criticised the previous government for its foreign policy priorities. Mulroney was blamed for not building sound relations with European countries and for following the policy of continentalism.

The initial years of Chretien decade were primarily limited to domestic challenges due to the looming national unity crisis and fiscal deficit. During this national security phase

(1993-1995), the famous legacy of Pearsonian internationalism followed by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson (1963-68) and Trudeauvian nationalism adopted by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968-79, 1980-84) were kept aside by Prime Minister Chretien. Apart from improving the hovering economic crisis, the Liberal Party of Canada was also concentrating on the upcoming Quebec referendum. The Liberal Party of Canada was trying hard to win the Quebec referendum for a united Canada. To overcome the economic crisis, the Federal government was concentrating on fiscal consolidation through budget cuts. Although the focus of the government was on these two domestic challenges, yet the government with limited resources tried to expand global leadership of Canada during this phase of national unity. Chretien government focused on economic prosperity and employment generation with the promotion of trade in different parts of the world. Geographically, Canada shifted its focus to the Asia-Pacific region and the Americas. The signing of historical treaty i.e. North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993, joining Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1994 and visit by 'Team Canada' led by Prime Minister Chretien along with provincial premiers and big business houses for trade promotion to China, Hong Kong and Vietnam in 1994 and then Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Hong Kong in 1996 are some of the examples of Canadian foreign policy priorities in the early years of the Chretien premiership.

Under the leadership of Jean Chretien, another major priority of Canadian foreign policy was to promote global peace for Canadian security. This was achieved through summit diplomacy and military combat operations. Chretien visited a large number of countries between 1993 to 1996. In his first year, Chretien visited 36 countries. In the next two years from December 1994 to July 1996 Canadian government increased its global involvement and met the leaders of 124 different countries (Kirton 2006: 161). Canada also engaged very selectively in military operations during this period of domestic challenges. Canadian forces invaded Bosnia alongside France in the spring of 1992. The Chretien government inherited this war from the Mulroney government and was reluctant to join NATO forces. Similarly, the challenge to establish democracy in Haiti was also inherited from the previous government. The goal was to restore the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in a fellow francophone country. The military involvement in Bosnia and Haiti was inspired by the Canadian commitment to establish peace in the world and thus securing Canadian borders from the repercussions of wars in distant places in a globalised world. But it should not be ignored that in both the cases France was involved

and the decision to join NATO forces was somewhere motivated by the upcoming 1995 Quebec referendum.

The challenge of national unity came to an end with Quebec referendum in October 1995 and the national unity phase (1993-1995) of the Chretien decade concluded. The domestic and international challenges before Canada in the post-Cold War scenario have been discussed at length in chapter II of this research work. But the economic crisis was still looming large. The resource distribution in the area of international affairs increased only in 1997 when after a long gap a budget with a fiscal surplus was presented by the Chretien government.

The foreign policy document titled *Canada in the World* (1995) rearranged Canadian priorities to promote Canadian values and culture across the world. The projection of Canadian values and culture was an entirely new target set by the Chretien government. The promotion of Canadian values and culture namely: respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights were emphasised during the second phase (1996-2000) of the Chretien decade. Thus, it can be concluded that during the first phase (1993-1995) of the Chretien government the focus was to strengthen the Canadian economy and more importantly to secure national unity. Although Canada was involved in the international affairs, yet the Canadian commitment was very limited due to financial constraints, Quebec referendum and changing global equations.

The second phase (1996-2000) of the Chretien government started with the outcome of the Quebec referendum and got a boost after the appointment of Lloyd Axworthy as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1996. In this phase, Canadian foreign policy under the leadership of Axworthy changed its course of action. Due to the end of the Cold War, several concepts were revised, and the concept of security was one of them. In the post-Cold War period, the focus of the security was not on states but the common people. The lives of innocent people were in danger even during the Cold War period but the attention on life threats, such as—crime, terrorism, drugs, human rights abuse and other non-traditional security threats, increased only after the end of the Cold War. Violence increased due to the changing nature of the conflict. The number of intra-state conflicts increased in failing or failed states during 1990s such as—the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

During this second phase, the Chretien government promoted human security as a Canadian value which was the commitment made in the foreign policy document in 1995. The Ottawa Process which became an international movement to ban Anti-Personnel Mines (APM) and the development of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) were an integral part of Canadian human security agenda. The Chretien government particularly Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy played a very crucial role in the signing of an international agreement banning the use, production, stockpiling of landmines. The APM treaty was signed outside the United Nations framework, and the concept of New Multilateralism came into being. The speed with which the results were achieved is unparalleled.

The Ottawa Process is closely related to the concept of democratisation of foreign policy which was promised in the Liberal Party election manifesto. The involvement of NGOs and IGOs in foreign policy making and the democratisation led to a debate in Canada discussed in Chapter III of this study. The democratisation of foreign policy promised by the Liberal Party during the election campaign was delivered by the Chretien government by involving more than 1000 organisations during the second phase. The way Canada assumed leadership to impose an international ban on landmines with the help of several international and non-governmental organisations was a unique example of civil society involvement in framing an international treaty. Undoubtedly, the success of the Ottawa Process established few facts. It became evident that international politics changed after the end of the Cold War, civil societies could launch movements at international level and a new style of diplomacy, i.e. outside the framework of UN, popularly called as new multilateralism opened the doors for future endeavours. Apart from this, the Canadian leadership in Ottawa Process also showcased the relevance of middle powers like Canada in the changed international scenario and its commitment to human rights, human security and the willingness to address such issues of global importance.

Similarly, the concept of responsibility to protect is centred around the security of individuals from failing or failed states. The concept of R2P tries to protect the life of people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The concept of R2P gives responsibility to the international community to secure the life of an individual if a state is not able or unwilling to do so. The situation during the 1990s particularly in Rwanda, the Balkans, Sierra Leone and in Kosovo gave an opportunity to

the Liberal government in Canada to carry forward its human security agenda. Taking advantage of this, the Chretien government announced the establishment of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) at UN General Assembly in 2000 and played a very significant role in the development of the concept of R2P. ICISS published its report in December 2001 which consequently transformed the notion from sovereignty as 'authority' to sovereignty as 'responsibility'. Traditionally, sovereignty used to be considered as a prerogative, but the concept of R2P recognised sovereignty as the responsibility of the state to look after its people. Chapter IV of the thesis discusses the emergence of the concept of R2P, the debates around humanitarian intervention, the scope of R2P and the role of the Chretien government inside and outside the United Nations.

Responsibility to Protect was the outcome of indefatigable efforts of the Chretien government. It became evident that the Liberal Party of Canada continued its focus on human security agenda after the grand success of Ottawa Process. The Landmines Ban Treaty was an attempt to secure the life of people from mine blasts whereas, the R2P tried to protect people from mass atrocities. R2P attempted to check man-made catastrophe and thus strengthened Canadian commitment to human security. Human security agenda was based on the premise that international peace and security could be maintained by securing the life of common individuals. Since Canada is an export-based economy, a rule-based international society had been in favour of Canada. This study thus highlights the fact that the concept of human security is directly related to the Canadian economy. Undoubtedly, a peaceful and secure environment would help in the process of development of the Canadian economy. Canadian policymakers were of the view that Canada was capable enough to contribute in maintaining peace and stability in an era of complexity and uncertainty. Thus, the second phase of the Chretien decade was more engaging and brought positive results for Canada not only in terms of gaining recognition in the post-Cold War period but also to strengthen the Canadian economy. In this way, this study concludes that the human security phase (1996-2000) was closely connected with the national unity phase (1993-1995) of the Chretien decade.

The Canadian quest for a new role in the changed environment fulfilled through a human security agenda. Human security remained an integral part of Canadian foreign policy for the rest of the Chretien decade. Pursuing the concept of R2P in the United Nations which was adopted in the World Outcome Document in 2005 and proposing International

Criminal Court which entered into force in 2002 are some of the examples of Canadian human security agenda in later part of the Chretien decade.

But after the 9/11 terror attack, the focus of the Chretien government shifted. The human security agenda faced a set back after the act of terrorism. The attack on American soil made Canada vulnerable to similar attacks. The attack changed the course of Canadian foreign policy, and a new phase started. This is called as transnational security phase (2001-2003) of Canadian foreign policy. The impact of this deadly attack by globally active terror organisation changed the paradigm of global security debate. Globally, security at the borders was increased, and US-Canada border was sealed as soon as the attack took place. The sealing of the border gave a rude shock to the export based Canadian economy. A long traffic jam of loaded trucks at the US-Canada border where the trade of almost \$2 billion occurs between the two countries produced dynamic responses from Canada. The Chretien government took several decisions which transformed the foreign and domestic policies of Canada. Several new acts were passed by the Canadian government. The impact of 9/11 attack and the response by the Chretien government have been discussed in chapter V. The legislations passed by the Canadian parliament--Anti-terrorism Act, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Public Safety Act--virtually transformed Canadian outlook towards security, immigrants and terrorism. In the name of national security, civil liberties were compromised in the post 9/11 era. Immigrants who were considered as the contributors to Canadian multiculturalism, after the 9/11 attack, were viewed as threats to Canadian security. While making such laws, Canadian policymakers had the Canadian economy in their mind. A Canadian daily newspaper, *Toronto Star*, quoting the then Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that "I felt that the greatest risk to Canada as a result of September 11... was to the economy" (Toronto Star 2002: A6).

After 9/11, Canada upheld terrorism as an international threat. The security of the Canadian civilians became the most prominent priority of the Chretien government. Canada not only elevated its counter-terrorism responses but also moved towards a national security state. In this process Canada started harmonising its policies on immigration, refugee, visa, border control, trade, custom, security and intelligence with the United States. Canada also engaged alongside the US in 'War on Terror' against al-Qaeda in the safe havens of Afghanistan. The last chapter (fifth) discusses the Canadian position on Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). The major focus of Canadian foreign policy during this phase was on

securing Canada from external threats and thus indirectly protecting the Canadian economy. The transnational security phase ended with the end of Chretien decade (1993-2003).

The first hypothesis that 'the more the post-Cold War international order emerged, the more the Chretien government focused on human security, new multilateralism, the democratisation of Canadian foreign policy making' stands verified. In the second phase (1996-2000) the Chretien government focused on the concept of human security, which culminated in new international laws. Under the umbrella of human security, Canada concentrated on banning landmines and the concept of responsibility to protect. Canada succeeded in establishing a new international regime in the form of Anti-Landmine Ban Treaty. Since the negotiations took place outside the framework of the United Nations, the treaty became an example of new multilateralism. Similarly, the role played by the civil society in decision making and developing an international movement in support of ban fulfilled the Liberal Party commitment of democratisation of foreign policy. Also, the responsibility to protect was an attempt to build a consensus for the protection of human lives particularly from failing or failed states. Anti-Landmine Ban Treaty and Responsibility to Protect are discussed at length in two chapters (III & IV).

The second hypothesis: 'The greater the financial constraints on Canada's federal government as measured by deficits and accumulated debt of the total percentage of GDP, greater was the reliance in Canadian foreign policy on niche diplomacy and the new multilateralism rather than middle-power diplomacy of old' stands partially true. In the early years of the Chretien government, Canada faced fiscal constraints. To tackle such situation Canadian policy makers engaged in those areas where Canada had the expertise, and this gave birth to the idea of niche diplomacy. The Chretien government diplomatically supported the concept of human security. The way Canada pursued human security through Landmine Ban Treaty, the concept of responsibility to protect and later through International Criminal Code and the issue of child soldiers Canada showcased its negotiation skills which had been a part of Canadian middle power diplomacy in the past particularly during Cold War years. The budget cuts in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid restricted Canadian involvement in international affairs. The Chretien government did follow niche diplomacy because of fiscal constraints but did not abandon middle power diplomacy and continued to pursue the human security agenda by negotiating skilfully.

Canadian middle power diplomacy which always stressed on coalition building continued to be an integral part of Canadian foreign policy.

The third and the final hypothesis is about the change in Canadian foreign policy after the 9/11 terror attack. The hypothesis states: 'The more the threat of deadly global terrorist incidents in and near Canada that killed Canadians with the shock of 9/11 as the peak, the more the Canadian foreign policy shifted from a focus on human security to a focus on transnational security' also stands proved. The changes that took place in Canadian foreign policy after the terror attack substantiate the above hypothesis. 9/11 attack changed the outlook of international affairs for the whole universe. The dynamic response of the Chretien government introduced a new era in Canadian foreign policy. The transnational security phase (2001-2003) in the Chretien decade started after the attack and continued till Chretien premiership. The changes that took place in Canadian foreign and domestic policies discussed extensively in Chapter V. It is also worthwhile to notice that Canada did not blindly follow the United States after the 9/11 incident. The Chretien government did join the United States in 'War on Terror' but refused the invasion in Iraq in 2003. The Canadian government was not sure about the American allegation that Iraq possesses Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD). Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and his colleague, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham, were sceptical about Iraq War. They were of the view that until the United Nations did not pass a resolution or the United States provide some authentic proof about the existence of WMDs, Canada could not engage in Iraq.

Several new concepts such as—niche diplomacy, new multilateralism, the democratisation of Canadian foreign policy and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged in Canadian foreign policy during the Chretien premiership. These new concepts shifted the trend of Canadian foreign policy and brought in some less explored areas such as—human security and humanitarian intervention into the Canadian foreign policy debates. Lloyd Axworthy, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, took a personal interest in the concept of human security. He along with Prime Minister Chretien pitched for international consensus on banning landmines. This study concludes that Canadian leadership in the Ottawa Process produced desired results for Canada in terms of its role and activism in international affairs. The ban shifted the focus from state/military security to human security. Canada successfully changed the debates around the concept of security. Allen Rock who was

Canadian permanent representative in the United Nations gave several statements in support of the concept of Responsibility to Protect. Both landmine ban and R2P were part and parcel of Canadian human security agenda followed by the Chretien government. The concept of human security which became the central idea of Chretien's foreign policy shifted the focus of Canadian foreign policy. This study traced the emergence of these concepts, their promotion and inculcation in Canadian foreign policy.

Thus, the Chretien decade which started at a time when Canada was facing difficulty in wading through a very complex and uncertain environment came to an end on an optimistic note. In the early 1990s Canadian foreign policy was facing challenges due to internal and external reasons. But the new millennium came with new promises for Canada. Now there was no internal problem as such, and the challenges that came out were not entirely new for Canada and Canadian policy makers. Jean Chretien as a Prime Minister of Canada was successful in bringing Canada out of its financial crunch and keeping Canada intact from secession in 1995. His role during the Quebec referendum will always be remembered by the Canadians.

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Appendix I

JEAN CHRETIEN'S MINISTERIAL EXPERIENCE

Minister without Portfolio attached to Finance, 1967-68

Minister of National Revenue, 1968

Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1968-74

President of the Treasury Board, 1974-76

Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1976-77

Minister of Finance, 1977-79

Minister of State and Social Development, 1980-82

Minister of Justice, 1980-82

Minister responsible for La Francophonie, 1984

Minister of Energy Mines and Resources, 1982-84

Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of States for External Affairs, 1984

Appendix II

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THEIR MAJOR CONTRIBUTION DURING CHRETIEN PREMIERSHIP

Andre Ouellet (1993-96) better known for his efforts during later years as Minister of Foreign Affairs by initiating the Ottawa Process. It is believed that Ouellet was given preference over Lloyd Axworthy to influence the Quebec Referendum in 1995.

Lloyd Axworthy (1996-2000) is considered as the most important figure in Canadian foreign policy during Chretien decade. During his tenure, human security became the core agenda of Canadian foreign policy. He was nominated for Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for his contribution to Landmines Ban Treaty. Although, he did not win but was thanked by the recipient, International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

John Manley (2000-02) is applauded for improving strained Canada-US relationship. After the 9/11 terror attacks, he talked to his US counterpart and promised for all possible support by Canadians to grieving Americans. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, he skilfully dealt Canada-US border issue which was causing a ruckus among the Canadian businessmen and hampering export based Canadian economy.

Bill Graham (2002-2003) is known for his role during the Iraq war. His objection regarding Canadian involvement in Iraq without UN sanctions was supported and criticised by the people of Canada. He successfully convinced Jean Chretien for not joining the war under any pressure. He later became Minister of Defense under Paul Martin government.

Appendix III

LIST OF MAJOR EVENTS DURING CHRETIEN PREMIERSHIP

Phase I (1993-1995)

October 25, 1993

Jean Chretien wins a majority Liberal government in the general elections; Andre Ouellet is appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs

November 1, 1993

The Maastricht Treaty is ratified and comes into force; the European Community becomes the European Union.

November 5, 1993

External Affairs and International Trade Canada is renamed as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

January 10, 1994

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization endorses the Partnership for Peace program.

February 22, 1994

Jean Chretien's first budget includes a decrease in official development assistance spending.

April 6, 1994

The plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi is shot down; ethnic violence and civil war erupts in Rwanda; by August, the United Nations estimates the death toll is at 1,000,000.

May 26-28, 1994

The first multiracial elections are held in South Africa; Nelson Mandela is elected as president.

September 19, 1994

After the U.S. invasion embarks for Haiti, the military agrees to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power.

January 1, 1995

The World Trade Organization is inaugurated.

February 7, 1995

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade releases foreign policy document titled "Canada in the World"

March 9, 1995

During the Turbot War, Canada arrests the Spanish fishing vessel *Estai* in international waters for overfishing.

June 26, 1995

Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco.

October 30, 1995

The Quebec referendum on sovereignty is narrowly defeated.

November 21, 1995

The Dayton General Framework Agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is initialled; it is signed at the Peace Implementation Conference in Paris, December 8-9.

Phase II (1996-2000)

January 25, 1996

Lloyd Axworthy is appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Pierre Pettigrew is appointed Minister of State for International Cooperation and Relations with la Francophonie.

May 1, 1997

Tony Blair is elected as the Prime Minister of Britain.

June 2, 1997

The Liberal Party retains its majority in the federal election. The Reform Party of Canada becomes the official opposition.

February 24, 1998

The federal government announces a balanced budget in the House of Commons.

November 14, 1998

Joe Clark is elected the new leader of the Progressive Conservative Party.

June 10, 1999

The Reform Party of Canada votes to become the Canadian Alliance.

August 20, 1999

The Supreme Court of Canada rules that Quebec cannot unilaterally secede from Canada.

October 17, 2000

John Manley becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs.

November 7, 2000

George W. Bush wins the U.S. presidential election.

November 27, 2000

Jean Chretien wins the election and increases his majority in the House of Commons.

June 29, 2001

Kofi Annan is re-elected Secretary General of the United Nations.

Phase III (2001-2003)

September 11, 2001

Terrorists attack the World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington DC.

October 7, 2001

An attack on Afghanistan begins, led by the United States; Canada contributes troops and fighter pilots to the coalition of the willing.

December 5, 2001

The Interim Afghanistan government is formed.

January 16, 2002

Bill Graham is appointed Canada's Foreign Minister.

March 20, 2002

Stephen Harper defeats Stockwell Day to become leader of the Canadian Alliance Party.

August 21, 2002

Jean Chretien announces he will step down as prime minister in February 2004.

September 9, 2002

Jean Chretien meets Gorge W. Bush in Detroit to discuss the requirements for Canadian involvement in Iraq.

December 16, 2002

Canada signs the Kyoto protocol.

March 11, 2003

The International Criminal Court opens at The Hague; the United States is not a signatory.

March 17, 2003

Jean Chretien announces that Canada will not participate in any military enforcement in Iraq.

August 11, 2003

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization takes formal control of a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

December 12, 2003

Paul Martin Jr. is sworn in as the 21st Prime Minister of Canada after Jean Chretien resigns.