Coalition Politics in Estonia and India: A Comparative Study, 1991-2014

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

for the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2018

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled *Coalition Politics in Estonia and India: A Comparative Study, 1991-2014* submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated
To
My Parents

Acknowledgements

The writing of this thesis was not possible without the support, suggestions, guidance and assessment of several individuals and institutions. I owe my gratitude to all those people who have been part of this and also because of them I will cherish forever.

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. K B Usha. I am highly indebted for her excellent guidance, valuable comments, constant supervision and providing necessary information throughout my thesis work. I will be obliged all through my life for her intellectual and moral support which made this work possible.

I would like to convey my greatest appreciation to the entire faculty of the Centre for Russian and Central Asian studies. I am also thankful to all of the staff members of JNU library, Nehru Memorial Museum and library, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) for their academic support.

I am thankful to my friends Jaspertap Singh, Ravi Nagar, Lakshmi Prasad, Alok Ranjan, Gagandeep, Shiv Prakash, Vijay Pratap, Pankaj Singh, Srikant and my home town friends Mohan Kumar and Mohan C. for their supportive role to my life and to my studies. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to my classmates Abdulla, Anoop Kumar and others for their support.

Last but not least, I would like to express my highest and respected gratitude to my beloved parents, Mahendra Raj and Jayanthi and to my dearest sister, Tejashwini for their affection, kind co-operation and encouragement which helped me in the completion of this thesis.

None of the above bears any responsibility of errors and omissions crept into this study. I am solely responsible for any such lapse.

New Delhi   *Arun Kumar M.*
20 July 2018

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List of Abbreviations

AGP	Asom Gana Parishad
AIADMK	All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
AITC	All India Trinamol Congress
APF	Association of Pensioners and Families
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BSP	Bahujan Samaj Party
BLD	Bhartiya Lok Dal
CFD	Congress for Democracy
CMP	Common Minimum Programme
CP	Coalition Party
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPI (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CPSU	Communist Party of Soviet Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DMK	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
EBP	Estonian Blue Party
ECDA	Estonian Christian Democracy Association
ECDP	Estonian Christian Democratic Party
ECDU	Estonian Christian Democratic Union
ECP	Estonian Communist Party
ECPP	Estonian Conservative People's Party
EDJU	Estonian Democratic Justice Union

EEP	Estonian Entrepreneurs Party
EFP	Estonian Future Party
EFU	Estonian Farmers Union
EGM	Estonian Green Movement
EGP	Estonian Green Party
EH	Estonian Home
EHS	Estonian Heritage Society
ELDP	Estonian Liberal Democratic Party
ENIP	Estonian National Independent Party
EPPP	Estonian Progressive Peoples Party
EPU	Estonian Pensioners Union
ERCP	Estonian Rural Centre Party
ERCP	Estonian Republican Coalition Party
ERP	Estonian Reform Party
ESDIP	Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party
ESDLP	Estonian Social Democratic Labor Party
ESDWP	Estonian Social Democratic Workers Party
ESP	Estonian Socialist Party
ESR	Estonian Social Revolutionaries
EU	European Union
EUHS	Estonian Union of Handicapped Societies
EUPP	Estonian United People's Party
FDP	Free Democratic Party
INC	Indian National Congress

IUML	Indian Union Muslim League
JD (S)	Janata Dal (Secular)
LPP	Liberal People's Party
MLA	Member of Legislative Assemblies
MP	Member of Parliament
NEC	National Electoral Committee
NCP	Nationalist Congress Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDU	New Democratic Union
NHS	National Heritage Society
PFE	Popular Front of Estonia
PP	Progressive Party
PPU	Pro Patria Union
RDM	Russian Democratic Movement
RJD	Rashtriya Janata Dal
RPE	Russian Party of Estonia
RPI	Republican Party of India
RSDPE	Russian Social Democratic Party of Estonia
RSDWP	Russian Social Democratic Workers Party
RUP	Russian Unity Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SP	Samajwadi Party
SSP	Samyukta Socialist Party

SSR	Supreme Soviet of the Estonian
TDP	Telugu Desam Party
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
UPP	United People's Party

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Coalition Politics, A Theoretical Framework

The party system and coalition politics are an indispensable aspect of national politics in any country which is a parliamentary representative democracy. Estonia and India are two evolving parliamentary democracies which demonstrate a phenomenon of coalition politics within the framework of parliamentary democratic sovereign republics and multiparty systems. In both Estonia and India Prime Minister is the head of the government and legislative authority rests with parliament. While coalition politics emerged in Estonia from the very beginning of post-independent period, the phenomenon of coalition politics appeared in the case of India after a long period of experiencing the dominance of one party in national politics. It is generally perceived that multi-party system, which is a necessary pre-condition of coalition politics, plays an important role in strengthening social cohesion, integration and legitimacy within the state. Therefore, the study examines the coalition politics in Estonia and India in a comparative perspective.

Estonia was under Soviet occupation for nearly 50 years. India experienced the colonial rule of the mighty British Empire for more than 200 years. After becoming independent the consolidation of a democratic political system and governance, providing constitutional guarantees of freedom, equality, justice, citizens' rights and ensuring well-being of citizens' remain the nation building priorities in both post-Soviet Estonia and post-colonial India. As a result the constitution, political party, party system, and electoral laws, etc. were established. Estonia's democracy has now crossed nearly three decades, but showing various challenges. India has established a politically stable democracy

and survived seven decades of its existence despite many issues and challenges. Hence, comparing these two democracies helps to understand the factors enabling coalition politics in both Estonia and India drawing from theoretical insights and scholarly interpretation from party system studies, political science, political sociology, international politics, etc.

Research Problem

Estonia and India faced several new challenges such as political instability, economic decline and chaotic social situation in the immediate aftermath of independence prior to establish as democratic sovereign states. In order to recover from the various kinds of instability, the democratic system has been adopted in both Estonia and India. As a result Estonia and India have been undergoing multidimensional transition as part of state and nation building processes. Institutional restructuring, cultivating a democratic political culture, political system and market-oriented economic reforms have assumed key roles in this process.

Estonia had a long history of successive invasions, occupations and fragmentation. Sweden's defeat by Russian in the Great Northern War resulted in the capitulation of Estonia and Livonia in 1710, confirmed by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721 and Russian rule was then imposed. The Estophile Enlightenment Period (1750-1840) led to the Estonian national awakening in the middle of the 19th century. In the aftermath of World War I (1914-1918) and the Russian revolutions of 1917, Estonians declared independence in 1918. The Estonian War of Independence (1918-1920) ensued on two fronts: the newly proclaimed state fought against Bolshevist Russia to the east and against the Baltic German forces to the south. The Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 recognized Estonian Independence. In the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939, the Soviet Union occupied

Estonia. In 1941 Germany occupied Estonia later in World War II the Soviet Union re-occupied it. In 1991 Estonia regained independence in the course of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and joined the European Union and NATO in 2004 (Thomson 2007).

From the late 18th century to the mid-19th century, large areas of India were annexed and administered by the British East India Company of the British Empire. The Indian Rebellion of 1857 was an outcome of dissatisfaction towards the Company rule. Later the British provinces of India were directly administered by the British Crown and witnessed a period of rapid development of infrastructure and economic decline. A nationwide struggle for independence was launched during the first half of the 20th century with Indian National Congress (INC) being the leading party and later it was joined by many other organizations. In 1947 after the British provinces were partitioned into the dominions of India and Pakistan, India emerged as an independent nation (Metcalf 2006).

Both Estonia and India have faced foreign aggression and has experienced the struggle for independence. Revolutionary movements and national movement's path were adopted to liberate themselves from foreign occupation. The non-violence method of movement was common in India and Estonia and the influence of Mahatma Gandhi was predominant in the singing revolution. Both practiced socialism, later after the downfall of Soviet Union Estonia became independent and adopted the liberal democracy similar to that of India.

In India democracy has been fully established in the past more than six decades of its existence showing political stability except during national emergency (1975-77). But in Estonia democracy has now just crossed two and half decades,

walking towards political stability. India is a developed democracy and Estonia is an evolving democracy and India sets an example to Estonia. However, in Estonia and India there has been a transition in various levels mainly in terms of restructuring the institutions, democratizing the political system and market driven economic reforms etc.

In Estonia and India coalition politics are necessarily reflected in the coalition government building based on linguistic and ethnic lines. The ethnic and minority groups attempts to forge political coalition in a simple manner to form the governments. The ideology in the form of liberals, socialist, communist, conservative, Christian democrat and universal policy considerations are of relative significance as well. Hence, comparing these two democracies helps to understand the factors enabling coalition politics in both Estonia and India.

In Estonia as well as in India the coalition politics are influenced by various factors like constitution, political party, party system, electoral system and electoral laws, institutional structure, regime stability, stable government and administration, etc. On the other hand recurrent changes in the political system, differences in the political leadership, internal war and government's instability has also led to coalition politics. A multi-party system was developed in Estonia after independence. In India the post-independence period can be classified into single party rule (1952-77) and its transition to multi-party system. Since independence numerous political parties were formed in Estonia and India. They provide stability by participating in government formation. The aspects of coalition politics in Estonia and India are stability as well as instability, competition between political parties, political parties' strong roots in a society, strong and independent party organizations, fragmentation of party system and coalition building etc. In Estonian and Indian political system, political parties

and party system are interrelated among people and government. The coalition politics in Estonia and India is also maintained by strengthening democracy through the electoral system and electoral laws. Estonian and Indian political parties function within the framework of the electoral system and electoral laws. Since 1991 both in Estonia and India coalition governments have come to power. In the case of Estonia fragmentation and lack of institutionalization, public trust deficit are the causes for the emergence of coalition politics. But in Indian case the political institutionalization and public trust in government institutions are high despite having huge diversity in society.

Both Estonia as well as India has been experiencing the importance of coalition politics in their respective national politics. Their transformation towards a multi-party system from a single party dominance system was not linear, but rather phased, with each phase creating a new space to coalition politics. The structure and performance of political parties within the institutional framework of Estonia and India have been viewed as a significant path towards coalition politics. The coalition politics in Estonia and India are strengthening the existing political institutions, vibrant civil society and establishing a new political leadership. In the course of democratic consolidation, the coalition politics in Estonia and India has begun advancing with institutionalization and performing the function of an intermediary between society and government.

The study addressees the research problems in a comparative perspective; the social cleavages factors conducive to the emergence of coalition politics and the representation of the minorities are influencing the coalition government formation in Estonia and India. The coalition politics has a causal effect on governmental stability. The role of coalition politics in maintaining democratic stability in both Estonia and India. Therefore, in order to have a depth

understanding of coalition politics it's necessary to develop a conceptual understanding which is discussed below.

Theoretical Framework

The word coalition has been derived from a *Latin* word *'coalito'* referring to *coalescere* (meaning together or to go together). Henceforth, here coalition represents an act of coalescing, union or alliance. It's a combination of different groups into one whole (Prasad 1963). Coalition denotes an agreement, pact or treaty between groups or individuals were they co-operate for joint action, they join hands together for a similar cause as well as for their own self-interest. This alliance may be temporary or a matter of convince. For a better understanding of the research problem the concept of coalition is defined borrowing from F. A. Ogg, who defines 'coalition' generally represents a mutual agreement in which distinctive groups belonging to different political parties come together to form a government. The term 'coalition' has obtained prominence in a democratic set up out of exigencies of a multi-party system. In this multi-party government numerous minority parties come together to join hands for forming the government and this is unlikely in a democracy formed by the majority party system. The coalition politics also referred as alliance or concord for co-operation among dissimilar political parties on common political agenda, frequently intended for the purpose of contesting an election for forming the government. The political factors responsible for formation, continuation, dissolution, success and failures, etc. of coalition government are broadly referred to as coalition politics. According to socio-cultural and economic conditions of various countries, coalition politics takes diverse form and has a different impact. On the other hand a coalition government is formed when a political alliance comes to power in which several parties work together to govern or when a majority has not been achieved (Ogg 1957).

The concept of coalition politics and its practice can be traced through various literary contributions in the context of national and international politics. According to Kumar (2011), a coalition denotes an act of grouping or uniting into one body or union of persons or alliance, it's a combination of whole. In a political sense coalition is mainly used to describe an alliance for a joint action of various co-workers for a single government of distinct parties or members of distinct parties. Bogdanor (1983) argues, coalition denotes an alliance between political parties and their co-operation which takes place at three different levels that is electoral, parliamentary and governmental. The parliamentary coalitions occur due to no single party gains a majority and on an understanding with the external support they form a minority government. The coalition on electoral basis is formed by two or more parties to contest the elections jointly in opposition to a common foe. This may differ from electoral alliance between parties at the constituency level and at national level.

According to Stevenson, Pearce and Porter (1985), a coalition can be characterized as: firstly, *interacting group*: in this coalition consists of members who communicate with each other regarding the issues related to coalition and impending action about coalition. However, the definition excludes individuals independently seeking to influence events. Secondly, *deliberately constructed*: here coalitions are created by their members for a specific purpose. This can be distinguished from other informal groups by their self-conscious formation and design. Thirdly, *Independent of formal organizations structure:* coalition is not dependent of officially designated groups such as committees, departments or task forces. Fourthly, *lack of formal internal structure*: Formal structure of any organization have no relation with coalition in which it is embedded and also their own formal structure is lacking, this also impacts coalition process. There is

a lack of stability in coalitions; this is an impermanent quality leading to a distinctive characteristic of coalitions.

Fifthly, Boissevain (1974) *common insight of membership*: individual members should have knowledge about member and non-member in the alliance. Members should have knowledge of the alliance even though they may not have communicated directly with each other. Here the support of particular coalition may be uncertain. This denotes membership is indefinite. The structure of coalition involves a set of core members and others whose membership remains in doubt. Sixthly*,* Gamson (1961) *subject oriented*: to advance the purpose of their members coalitions are formed, when the members interact around various issues the coalition may no longer exist. Individually members may perceive similar objectives for the coalition but they might also have different motives for coalition participation.

Seventhly, *exterior focus*: coalitions form because their members exert more influence than individuals. The issues that the coalition addresses must be external; therefore, the coalition influences some external means. Eighthly, *concentrated member action*: coalitions must act as group through group action or members' action or a jointly signed memorandum for dividing tasks and allocating it to individual members (Stevenson, Pearce and Porter 1985: 262). All these defining characteristics represent a group to be considered as coalition.

Warwick (1996) further elaborates that the coalition forming involves political parties contending in national assemblies for a defined goals. Chander (2004) thus indicates that, in a parliamentary democracy majority form the government and minority function as the opposition. The coalition or a multi-party government comes into picture when no single party could secure enough

majorities to form a government. However, the natures of coalition politics are likely to be affected by the composition of cabinet and nature of its working, the character of electoral politics and the party system. According to Veena (2016: 33-34) in a parliamentary system with proportional representation, the coalition government takes place where several political parties co-operates to reduce or to avoid the dominance of a single party within that coalition.

On the other hand Laver and Schofield (1990) states that certain electoral systems favor formation of coalition prior to elections than later, a matter that has a fundamental impact on the politics of coalition. Further Bogdanor (1983) explains, coalition government represent sharing power and it takes place when a single party is unable to get a majority of its own form a coalition to form a majority government. The parties comprising such coalitions need not necessarily come together in an electoral alliance; they may electorally compete with coalition partners. As per Tummala (2009), a coalition may occur due to: like mindedness of coalition partners, to share power and to prevent other parties from coming to power. Bryce (1921) argues that a government formed by a coalition of parties is bound to be weak because of the unstable and conflicting character of the compromise involved. Keohane (1989) states institutions as unrelenting and associated set of rules that lay down behavioural role, confine activities and shape opportunity. The works of Sartori (1994), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Merkel (1996) serve as an important contribution to coalition politics in institutional context. They reason that democratic systems are founded on institutional settings. Among these arrangements the ones linked to the type of executive, legislative assembly, political parties, constitution and electoral system have realized an increasing measure of popularity.

Smith (2001) illustrates, the Estonian constitution has given rise to a functioning set of democratic institutions in the contour of a freely elected Riigikogu, an executive branch with the powers clearly defined and restrained by law and an independent judiciary. According to Pettai (2003) Estonian democracy has firm institutions with rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities. Ganguly et al. (eds.) (2007) describe the success of Indian democracy is through setting up institutions like independent judiciary, freedom to form political parties, free press etc. Apart from these there are several other participants in the process, each of which has its own role, according to which powers and competences are crafted.

The politics of coalition have been approached primarily through two schools of traditions. The *European politics* tradition and the *Game-theoretic* tradition (Kumar 2004: 4) both of these have evolved in different directions quite independent of each other, precisely talking about the same thing by using different approaches. The politics of coalition have generated intense research giving rise to theoretical postulations. The various attempts made so far have been categorized into three different approaches through which the empirical validity of coalition experiments has been put into theoretical framework. Each approach has a range of theories and each theory within an approach shares certain key postulations with other such theories, but none of the theory or approach is sufficient to explain the Estonian and Indian complexity. Therefore, there is a need to derive an understanding and try to empirically validate the Estonian and Indian experience collectively. Barbara Hinckley (1981) has categorized the major approaches to the coalition study in three broad classes: the

social psychological approach, *game theoretic approach* and the *empirical political approach*.[1]

Social Psychological Approach

From a social psychology point of view a useful definition regarding coalition formation has been projected by Thibaut and Kelly (1959). According to them coalition represents two or more parties co-operate with each other to attain desired outcome. Here the parties involved may be individuals, groups or collectivities. Most social psychologists indicate that coalition formation has a mixed motive interaction (Gamson 1964; Shelling 1960). However, in order to obtain an outcome political parties need to co-operate.

To understand coalition formation social psychologists much like political scientists have formulated an approach similar to game theory. In this parties are called players and the manner in which players negotiate in forming a coalition is called a coalition game. Unlike most of the political science literature on coalition formation, social psychologists study these games not by comparing their predicted results with the party composition of governments formed in the past, but by designing experiments in which subjects form coalitions in the laboratory (Beest in (ed.) Andeweg, Winter and Dumont 2011: 25).

The social psychological approach comes from sociology and social psychology. It is both theoretical as well as empirical. It is theoretical because it seeks to identify and explain recurring patterns of coalition behaviour; it is also empirical because it concentrates on how coalition players actually behave in the real world under different conditions. The theory develops with support of evidence from

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[1] However, in this categorization there are ranges of theories and each theory within an approach shares certain basic principle with other such theories, but none of the theory or approach is sufficient enough to explain the complexity. Therefore, there is a need to derive a better understanding and try to empirically validate (Hinckley 1981).

concrete events. On the other hand William Gamson in Berkowitz (ed.) (1964: 86) has categorically reviewed the theories of the social psychological approach.

Firstly, *the minimum resource theory*, Garnson (1961) indicates two assumptions; first and foremost players intend to maximize their share of reward. Secondly, in proportion to resources players allocate the reward. By combining both these assumptions the theory predicts the formation of coalition that minimizes the reward of its members. It also implies that the relative resources of the actors determine the coalition formation. They seek to maximize their share of payoff at least proportionally to their initial resources. This is known as parity norm and parity here means a commensurate gain. This theory further predicts that a coalition are formed in which all the resources are minimal, sufficient to win. This is broadly termed as *minimum winning coalition theory*.

Another important theory is the *minimum power theory*, which is an adaption of game theory. It emphasizes the relative power of the players rather than their initial distribution of resources. Here proportion of times is the essential power of players and the losing coalition can be changed into winning coalition based on the resources. Players expect pay off in relative to their crucial power rather than their initial resources. However, experimental test of this theory has shown discrepancies in it and has given rise to *anti-competitive theory*. This theory believes that attitudes about competition and bargaining, personality differences and other factors may lead the players to form coalitions larger than minimum size. It holds that coalitions will be formed along the lines of least resistance. Lastly, *random choice theory*, it is a reflection of conditions which are not conducive to rational calculation and analysis and thus coalition formation by this theory is the best as an essential random choice process (Ibid: 87).

Game Theoretical Approach

The Game theoretical approach pioneered by J. Von Neuman and O. Morgenstern (1944), this mathematical game-theoretical approach was popularized by William Riker (1962). This approach is not concerned with explaining actual coalition behaviour, but with elaborating the formal logical relationships in a given situation. This theory originated from the presumption that problems in politics can be dealt as if they were games like chess, bridge or poker in which players adopt rational strategies to maximize their returns. They have resources, goals and defined set of rules of the game and they calculate the best way to achieve their goals and move accordingly after considering all factors including the counter moves of other players. This analogy is extended to coalition politics and political parties are treated as players of the game politics (Kumar 2004: 3).

Riker's (1962: 164) notion of game theory indicates that all single and multiparty systems converge to two coalitions of equal size. It assumes that politics is a zero sum game, as would occur that is if all issues involved basically zero sum redistributions of wealth. In such a game, the optimal strategy is to allow the opposing coalition to be as large as possible, while remaining a losing-paying coalition. Under majority rule this implies two coalitions of equal size. Leiserson in Groenning (eds.) (1970: 15) have addressed the important concepts of game theory they are: *notion of dominance* (it implies that an outcome dominates one another), *notion of equilibrium strategy* (it is the selected strategy of a player, not influenced by the new knowledge of the strategies of other players), *notion of value* (it suggests that the worth of the reward that a factor receives for participation in a coalition is proportional to the value added by that actor to the coalition. The value or power of an actor is proportional to how he can turn a coalition from losing into winning by joining it).

The most important contribution of the game theory for studying coalition politics is *size theory or size principle*. Riker says (1962: 32) in n-person, zero sum games, only a minimum winning coalition take place.[2] Here, n-person means that number of persons participating in a game should be more than two. Zero sum condition implies that loss and gains of the participating players are equal. Rationality condition means that all players are rational beings and will therefore try to maximize their gains and minimize losses. Condition of perfect information implies the knowledge regarding the move, counter move, pay offs and bargaining alternatives of the players (Kumar 2004: 4). However, the game theory relies heavily on mathematical tools and it is difficult to follow.

Empirical Political Approach

The empirical political approach seeks to explain a political phenomenon that is how coalition players actually behave in a real world situation and observes the actual situation instead of creating an artificial one for the purpose of experiment (Hinckley 1981: 28). In coalitions cabinet formation is an area, which is considerably explored by the empirical political theorists. Problems of forming and maintaining coalition governments arise from multi-party systems when no single party emerges with majority seats in legislatures.

In relation to this approach Groennings (1970: 449) has advanced specification of variables which constitute the basis of coalitions. These are, *situational variable* (they are concerned with opportunities like strength and position of the parties); *compatibility variables* (it relates to partners like their ideology, social base or leadership); *motivational variables* (these refer to propensities like desire for self identity preservation); *interaction variables* (these deals with methods

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[2] Thus, in the *Theory of Political Coalition* (1962), Riker made the first major application of co-operative n-person game theory to political analysis.

like bargaining strategies). He further advances a model of coalition maintenance with five sets of variables. These are *apparatus variables* refer to leadership and decision making, etc.; *motivational and communications variable* are concerned with rewards and losses, etc.; *situational variables* encompass elections and other pressures, etc.; *compatibility variables* are policy goals, reliability or resources of parties, etc.; and *strategic variables* are related to strategies, size, position on ideological spectrum etc.

Lawrence C. Dodd (1973: 37) has refined the size theory of Riker and applied it to party politics with special emphasis on the durability of the governments. He has further developed minimum winning coalition theory by adding two bargaining condition. Firstly, when there is a generalized priory willingness of parties to bargain. Secondly, when there is a high degree of information certainty. A generalized priory willingness to bargain refers to the readiness of all the parties to enter into coalition and information certainty means perfect information on the prior moves like offers, bargains and counteroffers etc and complete information as to the weight that is the voting strength of the party in the legislature.

All the above discussed approaches based on their strengths and weaknesses are individually insufficient to analyze empirical coalition realities. For instance, although the social psychological approach gives many theories, yet it fails to with stand the experimental test because it is primarily built on the basis of artificial settings. At the best it can be called as silent cue for decision making in a coalition situation, where the cue is some set of information about the players. Similarly, game theories try to quantify human preferences on the basis of parlor games: however, the suggested analogies have little scope for alliance politics of political parties. This is due to the very nature of alliance politics that is a

dynamic process, quite out of reach for a rather static nature of almost all game theoretic ideas. Also, such perfect conditions like the rationality condition and the availability of complete information are difficult to achieve in a real life situation. Similarly, the empirical political studies have their limitation too. They have been applied mainly to the formation of coalition cabinets. They have generated a lot of data on the subject but are not able to explain why two governments differ in their durability under similar situation (Kumar 2004: 6).

Apart from these primary approaches to the phenomenon and politics of coalition; it is necessary to discuss the two widely prevalent theories for understanding the nature of coalitions. In order to have a clear insight on coalition politics the study provides an explanation on various theories on coalition politics and its relevance in the context of Estonia and India. The first set of theories on coalition politics like the power maximization and the policy based theories are concerned with coalition experiments and traces their nature. The second set of theories that is, the electoral systems theory and the social cleavage theory primarily deals with theories of the party system. These two theoretical sets adopt different approaches to coalitions and within each set the two theories present opposing perspectives on coalitions which are discussed below.

Power Maximization and Policy Based Theories

Wolendrop, Keman and Budge (1998) explain that the power maximization theories predict minimum winning coalitions; while the policy based theories predict minimum connected winning coalitions. The basic underlying idea is that in coalitions formed under compulsions of power, each party within the coalition would be indispensable to the formation or survival of the coalition. This is because lesser the number of parties sharing the coalition larger the payoffs

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guaranteed to each member. On the other hand, policy based coalitions celebrate the coming together of like minded political parties which lie adjoining on ideological scale and are not compatible on major issues. This reduces the number of total coalition partners in the government. The basic assumption of these two theories that the rational choice of any actor should support minimum winning coalitions, however on the contrary empirical evidence around the world points to the extensive presence of coalitions that have not been minimum winning (Ibid: 125-64).[3]

Power Theory

The major theorists in this tradition are Riker (1962), Gamson (1964), and Dodd (1976). According to Riker (1962) 'minimum winning coalitions' denotes a coalition were every party is vital to coalition prospect of winning a simple majority. In this coalitions every members share of payoff is maximized this is known as size principle. Size principle theories can have variants because there can be more than one minimum winning in many distributions of seats. Therefore, one can have variants of minimum winning coalitions such as minimum size coalitions were number of legislators of the winning coalition is minimized to a number just enough to win a majority or minimum number of parties coalition in which the number of coalescing parties necessary to win a majority is minimized (Dodd 1976: 44).

Gamson (1961: 376) conceived his version of size principle as "cheapest winning coalition", i. e., the one in which the overall resources are neighboring to the decision point. Apart from the assumptions of rationality and of the existence of

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[3] However, the simplistic assumptions made by these two theories fail to rationalize the extensive presence of minority governments including minority coalitions in hung parliament situations or also another extreme of this size factor, that is, surplus majority coalitions, which have coalition partners redundant for a majority number (Wolendrop, Keman and Budge 1988).

a coalition situation that we also noted in Riker, Gamson makes the following assumptions in his model: firstly, the actors have the same (but not necessarily perfect) in turn about the primary distribution of resources and the payoff to any coalition. Secondly, the actors do not differentiate between the payoffs in the same class, with "payoff class" being defined as a set of payoffs in which the lowest is no more than K percent less than the highest. Thirdly, every actor has a set of non-utilitarian strategy preferences for getting together with other players which he will pursue within any class of payoffs to form a coalition with actors having highest mean rank on his scale of non-utilitarian strategies. Fourthly, every actor expects others to demand from coalition a share of payoff relative to the sum of resources which they contribute to a coalition. This is Gamson's so-called "parity norm". From these assumptions Gamson deduced his hypothesis of "the cheapest winning coalition", which, despite his differences with Riker on some points, is very close to the latter's size principle.

Although both Riker and Gamson assumed "the winner takes all" or the zero-sum condition in their models, the non-zero-sum condition seems more realistic for the development of an empirical theory of political coalitions. That is, in a real world coalition situation (in a multi-party parliamentary coalition government), the government may not be able to exercise full control over policy in various, or at least in some, issue areas. Apart from the formal and informal powers of the institutionalized opposition, the parties outside the governing coalition may control some branch of government (in the separation of powers systems) or some alternate level government (in federal systems). Second, as Hinckley (1972: 199) aptly observes, politics is a series of games not the single game that the deductive and experimental models posit. With servility, as it can be called, winnings in one game may become resources in the next and the size of the winning today may determine entry and subsequent distribution of

resources tomorrow. In sum, the non-zero-sum condition does not seem to apply to the real world coalition situations, a fact that may in part account for limitations in the explanatory power of the minimum winning hypothesis to be noted subsequently. In his later works Riker himself recognized the non-zero-sum condition as empirically more relevant and theoretically more fruitful in the study of governing coalitions (Riker 1967: 643).

An important corollary of size principle theories is that pivotal parties are especially placed to extract rewards disproportionate to their size, particularly those that can threaten to leave and enable the formation of an alternative coalition in which they are also pivotal. Thus, in certain circumstances, very small parties which are pivotal to coalitions can extract disproportionate rewards and hold much larger partner and parties to ransom (Sridharan 1999: 272). Varying from case to case extraneous criteria and considerations may be weighed to form minimum winning coalitions such as seeking parties that have similar agenda and programme perspectives. However, an implicit rule is formation of cabinet cannot last for an indefinite period. Therefore, the longer the bargaining process lasts in coalition the more is the pressure for a cabinet to be formed. In Rikers system, a comprehensive willingness of political parties to bargain pertains to selling of parliamentary systems where every party are willing to consider entering a cabinet coalition with any other party (Riker 1962: 49). Dodd (1976: 44) on the other hand states that the kind of coalition that forms the cabinet will depend on the bargaining conditions. According to him, if the parliamentary conditions were very much constrained in their willingness to bargain among themselves there would be a tendency towards minority cabinets.

Also the availability of a set of parliamentary parties bargain willingly would be a factor crucial to the entire exercise. Thus, this willingness shall determine

whether it will be a coalition of minimum winning or an outsized coalition. Riker adds an important factor of information certainty uncertainty which determines the precise size of coalition. Simply put it means, the more the information uncertainty, the more will be the desire of parties to seek compensation and thus, the greater would be the size and number of parties in the coalition (Riker 1962: 49).

However, Dodd (1976: 50) points out that enhance in information certainty can give way to undersized and oversized coalitions because in such situations where there is an information that undesirable parties can bargain and mutually find maneuverability and acceptance, negotiations and calculations take more time and under constraints, that exist in parliamentary bargaining parties are forced to settle for smaller coalitions than the best one possible. The Riker and Dodd theory is generally applicable to multi-party parliaments because the important constituents of this theory, the conditions of bargaining and cabinet coalition's position can be perceived very evidently. It may also be applied to the parliaments which have dominant one party majority rule, in which case the single party formed cabinet can be considered as essentially a minimum winning cabinet. It has both a low level of bargaining constraints and high information certainty and is also more durable.

Policy based Theories

Policy based theories on the other hand, foresee minimum connected winning coalitions that is coalitions comprising of member parties adjoining on ideological scale and   unable to coexist on most important issues thus, minimizing the coalitions ideological span and within this restrictive condition, the minimum number of parties needed for majority (Sridharan 1992: 273). Similarly, Axelrod (1970) states the minimal connected winning theory predicts

that only minimal winning coalitions connected ideologically along a dimension forms coalitions based on similar policies. A coalition has to be minimal winning because if it loses any of its members it no longer controls a majority of seats in parliament. In the notion of connectedness coalitions that are larger than minimal winning are sometimes included in the theory's prediction. However, on this forecast the minimal connected winning coalition's forms.

Robert Axelrod (1970), Abraham D. Swaan (1973), Michael Leiserson (1970) and Seven Groenning (1970) are some of the theorists belonging to this school of thought. The policy based theorist's postulates that coalition cabinets must agree on a package of proposed government policies. This is so because policy is an intrinsic end value for itself rather than as an instrument used by the politicians to gain office. Thus, through this theory the role of cleavage conflict in coalition formation is highlighted. It is also suggested that parties must look to minimize the policy range among their partners and themselves. A variant of this is the minimal policy range coalition, one that minimizes the policy distance between the coalition extremes (Sridharan 1999: 273).

Indeed, policy based theories of coalitions have been extended to see coalition formation not as an episodic event but as a stage in a continuous cycle of elections, government formation, policy implementation and all such activities in which party competition takes place. Empirical evidence from the comparative literature on coalition politics tends to weigh in favor of policy based theories. Hence, often the stress is on the element of compatibility for coalition formation and even more for coalition. Longevity landed there has been instances of coalition governments in Western Europe, which have contributed to general success of democracies (Mehra in Singh and Saxena (eds.) 1998: 289). According to Sridharan (1996: 54) the other way of looking at power

maximization and policy based theories is the one which divides the motivations of politicians and the political cultures of societies into opportunistic and partisan politics. A society's politics is said to be opportunistic if the pursuit of political office is primarily for the fruits of power of the office for one's own sake. Partisan politics, on the other hand is the one where the pursuit of office is for changing public policy in the direction desired by the contestants party's ideology and social constituency.[4] Likewise, manipulation of policy to serve the purpose of getting re-elected (ultimate aim of political party) is the characteristic feature of opportunistic parties and politicians.

Coalitions and Electoral Systems Theory

The coalitions and electoral systems theory postulates that there are different implications for the likelihood as well as the behavioural characteristics of coalition governments under the proportional representation and plurality rules electoral systems. Accordingly, this is termed as regime level attribute of coalition government. In a proportional representation system parties get seats in proportion to their votes so these systems are more prone to throw up coalition governments. This is because in general, no single party gets half the votes necessary for half the seats. At the same time it highlights a reality absolutely critical to coalition behavior and stability that is any coalition at the best is only second best situation for every major political party. Thus, each party during the coalition's lifetime will seek to position itself to improve its vote and seat share in the next election. As a result, conflict is built into coalition (Sridharan 1999: 279). Thus, in every coalition there are long term electoral gains along with short term maximization of power among its members.

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[4] Thus, about two thirds of the majority coalitions in developed countries have been ideologically connected. However, it is equally important to keep in mind that within these constraints payoff maximization plays a very powerful behavioural role (Sridharan 1996).

The implications of electoral system theory for the plurality rule electoral system are quite different. In these systems coalitions tend to be rare due to seat- vote disproportionality in which plurality suffices for a legislative majority. Therefore, the dynamics prevailing is quite different from the one operative under the proportional systems. Thus, there is the inevitable competition for long term electoral gains (increased vote share) as well as short term power maximization. Among the coalition partners competition and suspicion are likely to be more intense due to minor swing in support can increase or decimate a party in terms of seats either by putting it in power or by removing from government (Ibid: 279).

The electoral systems theory as a result predicts coalitions in plurality rule systems to be steady. This is for the reason that at least partly inevitable bigger vote share in next election the member parties are not under the alarm that due to proportionality rule swing will reduce seat strength and also because there is an improbability of huge swings in this system. For the plurality rule system, the electoral systems theory however has some important implications which are applicable to India as well. Some of those are being mentioned here (Srindharan 1999: 280). Firstly, the instability and short-lived character of coalitions in plurality rule systems like those of India is due to the incentives created by the structural characteristics of such systems. Where politics is substantially about access to state resources (power for power's sake), the possibility of being politically wiped out would matter much more. In such a situation, coalitions and minority governments tend to be unstable, with strong incentives for members or external supporters, who perceive them self to the losing strength to terminate the arrangement or constantly blackmail the government about withdrawing support.

Secondly, as Sridharan (1999: 280) points out that the plurality rule system tends to support minority governments than that of majority coalitions. Mainly due to disproportionality of seat vote, it causes greater electoral volatility in terms of seats. As a result there is a better inducement for major opposition parties either to stay in the opposition or to be external supporters of a minority or a coalition government. By this they hope to remain a convincing substitute in the next election. Thus regime level attribute of the plurality system sharply differentiates coalition formation and behaviour in the Indian case from cases based on PR systems and provides powerful support to the extension of coalition theory to 'party competition as a whole'.

Thirdly, in plurality rule system aggregation imperatives gives incentives to politicians to form indiscriminate, non-programmatic, purely power-oriented, pre-electoral coalitions. These arrangements are criticized for being one-sided and not true coalitions. This occurrence is explained because of an imperative of winning the single leading number of votes under the plurality rule at the constituency level as well as at more aggregated levels. As a result, this leads to indiscriminate pre-electoral coalitions as well as government formation, which are many times *ideologically incoherent and conflict ridden,* hence, unstable coalitions or minority governments. Another moot point is when party identity and organization is weak and client-oriented, there are strong incentives to split parties and engineer defections (Ibid: 281).

The electoral systems theory despite being very elaborate and comprehensive is however not able to explain all the peculiarities. The non-suitability of the Duverger's law can be cited as an example. According to this law, plurality system favors two-party system (Sridharan 1997). To explain the law in short: two factors are suggested in related to the emergence of two-party system viz.,

first, mechanical reason where parties exploit electoral voting system to their advantage and second, a psychological reason where voters don't waste their votes on candidates of those parties which are unlikely to win. This law is however not sufficient to explain the case of economically backward and yet politically highly mobilized regions.

Social Cleavages Theory

A social cleavage is a split or division in society reflecting the diversity of social formation within it. Such cleavages are born out of an unequal distribution of political influence, economic power or social status. To interpret politics in terms of social cleavages is to recognize particular social bonds, they may be economic, racial, religious, cultural or sexual as politically important and to treat the group concerned as a major political actor. However, these cleavages can be interpreted in number of different ways. For some they are fundamental and permanent divisions rooted either in human nature or in the organic structure of society. These divisions can be thought of as healthy and desirable or as evidence of social injustice and oppression (Heywood 2015: 42).

Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) put social cleavages on the map by concluding that voting choices are explained by sociological factors such as race, religion, class and familiar pressures. Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) argued against this purely sociological model in favor of the 'funnel of causality', which envisions voting choices at one end of a funnel and causal factors increasingly removed from the dependent variable further up the funnel. Psychological factors such as party identification are found at the political behavior end and sociological factors at the other. Hence, they advocate explaining voting choices by either sociological or psychological factors depending on the type of explanation desired. In the sub-field of comparative

politics scholars have conducted cross-national surveys and case studies of particular countries along similar lines. Lijphart (1971 and 1979), Rose (1974) and Heath, Jowell and Curtice (1985), work from the sociological end of the funnel of causality to determine the relative influence of various sociological factors on vote choice.

Thus, social cleavages theory implies that the party system reflects the principal cleavages in society that is those in ethno-culturally homogeneous industrialized societies' and that the cleavages between the labour and capital are reflected through parties being positioned on a *Left-Right spectrum*. In brief, this theory predicts a high cognizance relation between political parties and social cleavages in deeply segmented societies. This theory shall be useful in the explanation of the 'social essence of the Indian coalitional reality because it underlines the belief that politics is a mirror reflection of the society. Since the coalition era has come to stay Indian political arena, it is necessary to understand the character of this political development which has deep socio-cultural and economic implications. Having discussed the various approaches and theories of coalition's politics it would be appropriate to look into the relevance of these theories in Estonian and Indian context (Sridharan in Zoya Hasan (ed.) 2002: 476).

The coalition theories explained earlier has influenced the practice of coalition politics and in coalition government formation in both Estonia and India. The coalitions in Estonia as well as in India are viewed as important mechanism through which caste, class, religious cleavages, regional or territorial based identities are put in a cohesive framework even in the presence or absence of shared ideologies. So, apart from the general criteria, the importance of local or the regional factors drew attention in the game of coalitional power. Veena K. (2016: 34) on the other hand states that one of the unique features in Indian political system is the federal system. In which power is separated in-between the

central and the states. In a federal system we come across numerous regional political parties. Due to lots of trust in national parties in fulfilling people's demand or in solving the local issues in the regions there has been a rise of regional parties. After 1967 in states and 1977 at centre, Indian political system had seen remarkable changes from single party dominance to multi-party coalitions. This was mainly due to the emergence and influence of regional political parties. There were both pre-election and post-election coalitions so far in India resulting in stability as well as instability. After 1999 till 2014 all the coalition's governments were stable even though there were differences within coalitions.

Estonian society in the 1990s was more delicate with no outline of political differences. Estonia managed to balance its political base in spite of having an unbalanced party system and volatile voting patterns. Political stage completely took a new turn in 1992 wherein new political parties came up with varied political agenda pitching behind the old political parties. Politically relevant cleavages emerged powerfully in the society. In Estonia during the inter-war period cleavages among the political parties barely existed due to the influence of Soviet regime. The emergence of cleavages integrated various aspects like the historical, contemporary and transitional (Tolvaisis 2011: 57).

India's polity is dominated by multiple crosscutting axes that is left-right, secular-communal, centralist-regional, autonomist and a variety of caste based blocs varying regionally. There is a strong consensus on economic policy and weak reforms (Ahluwalia in Mukherji 2007: 109-111). On the other hand Bartolini and Mair (1990) indicate that both among voters and politicians party identification in India is relatively weak with factional defections and splits and the surfacing of new parties being recurrent occurrences. Parties in India based on cleavages of caste, religion, language and other inscriptive criteria do not

neatly fit the social cleavage theory of party systems each having a well defined support. While several ideological and regional parties do partly fit social cleavages theories, many of the non-congress formations are weakly institutionalized and have a catch-all clientelistic character that is merging or splitting vertically on the basis of the feuds or deals of leaders.

In India, the issues of caste affiliation, regional group, religious groups, linguistic and minority or majority affiliation, matter a great deal in the political arena. These criteria not only intervene and govern the coalition formation, but also their operation as well. In a traditional country like India, coalitions are necessary mechanism to rectify historical wrongs such as caste-class inequalities and discrimination. Thus coalitions apart from offering a representation or manifestation of the usual fractiousness that human associations are associated with to provide a recourse through political modalities such as coalition building for the sake of articulation and also at least as a hope for redressal of grievances. A number of scholars have viewed the result of the 2004 and 2009 Lok Sabha elections in this light (Hindu 2004).

The Indian electoral system is a single-member district, simple-plurality system in which voters cast a single ballot to choose a single representative to Lower House of the Parliament or State legislative assembly. The candidate with a largest number of votes, even if only a plurality, is declared elected to represent the constituency. There are at present 543 constituencies that send a single member each to the Lok Sabha with two members being nominated. This is known as the first past the post (FPTP) system. This system was adopted shortly after independence, following discussions in the Constituent Assembly and the Parliament just prior to the adoption of the 1950 and 1951 Representation of People Act and the first general election of 1952. The multi-member constituencies were abolished in 1961 following which the electoral system has

been the single member FPTP system (Sridharan in Hasan, Sudarshan and Sridharan (eds.) 2002: 340).

The inference of the disproportional electoral system and the plurality rule system in general for coalition politics is that its aggregation of the essence would tend to give incentives to politicians to form pre-electoral coalitions (Golder and Clark 2006; Laver and Schofield 1998) which in India will be inclined to be ideologically arbitrary due to parties of unreliable ideological nature dominating dissimilar states. Such imperatives towards arbitrary aggregation in pre-electoral coalitions are accentuated in a federal system with some overtly or effectively regional parties (Sridharan 2003: 135-152). National parties have to form pre-electoral coalitions with regional parties in order to win enough seats and to stand a fair chance of forming a government at the centre either on their own or in a coalition ignoring ideological differences and also tacitly ceding territory to partners.

This electoral system produced a party system (1952 to 1984) in which the single largest party won majority of seats and plurality of the votes and formed a single-party majority government. In all elections during this phase, the single largest party which formed the majority government was the Congress except in 1977 when Janata Party formed the government supported by almost the entire non-Communist opposition. The single largest party never got a simple majority, the maximum percentage of votes received being 48 per cent by Congress in 1984, but always got a majority even several times a two-thirds or (in 1984) even a 4/5th majority (Ibid: 341). In a coalition era which has come to stay in Indian politics, the polity despite partisan still refutes to be simply characterized by single unilinear left-to-right ideological axis. Instead, today there are multiple-cross cutting axes in Indian politics with varied nature as the secular-communal, centralist-regional autonomy.

Since independence many parties contested elections and coalition government became the custom in Estonian politics. In September 1992, first free parliamentary elections were held in Estonia. Thirty eight political parties participated in this election. The conservative Fatherland alliance became the largest party in the *Riigikogu* by winning 29 seats and Mart Laar, leader of the Fatherland alliance became Prime Minister of a coalition government (Spilling 2010). From 1992 to 2014 in Estonia all governments were coalitions. Often the coalition governments are formed from two parties. In Estonia as of distinguishing between governments the changes are recorded when there is a change in the partisan composition of the government coalition (when the representatives of one or more parties leave the coalition government or join the coalition government) (Kortmann et. al. 2006: 47).

However the party system changed from 1989. The Lok Sabha election results henceforth, were indicative of two interlinked processes viz. the breakdown of one party system in the 1980s and a parallel process of regionalization of politics through a multi party system so much so that today the all India parties and the regional parties compete for power at the centre. As a result, the seven general elections in India of 1989, 1991 1996, 1998 and 1999, 2004 and 2009 have resulted in minority coalition governments. This was because of the decline of the Congress votes. The critical threshold at which a vote plurality translated to a seat majority led to hung Parliaments and coalition politics (Sridharan in Hasan, Sudarshan and Sridharan (eds.) 2002: 347). As a result the coalition governments and their politics have become an unavoidable reality of the Indian political system. It is because of this that the relevance of the study on coalitions and their implications as well as compulsions for the Indian polity has become unavoidable.

The available theories and approaches on coalition politics and their individual relevance shows that it is applicable not only to Estonia and India but to other coalition governments as well. Although theoretically speaking it is possible to find coalitions which confirm to the pluralist view in each of these categories. The actual truth may lie somewhere in the middle (Mehra in Singh and Saxena (eds.) 1998: 289). When there is stress on power maximization in a coalition, some policy arrangements are inevitable and power maximization efforts may take place in policy-based coalitions too. In order to grasp the complex evolution of coalition politics in Estonia and India the study has addressed the nature of Estonian and Indian coalition situation at the centre.

Rationale, Scope and Significance of the Study

The study is an under researched area. In the available body of literature addressing the question of coalition politics in Estonia and India is inadequate. Even though there are seminal literary contributions to coalition politics in national and international politics. There is a substantial lack of academic engagements between coalition politics in the comparative context. This study is contributing to the existing scholarly work in different socio-political aspects of Estonia and India. Empirically the study has national and international implications and can reflect the national discourses in these countries. It further defines the significance of coalition politics within and out of these countries. Through this India and Estonia represent in global discourses, but their political stability is decisive in their relations with the rest of the world at large.

Estonia and India are both experiencing the importance of coalition politics in their respective national politics. Their transition from dominance of one party to a multi-party system was not a linear, but rather phased, with each phase creating a new space to coalition politics. The scope of this study examines the abstract

conception of coalition politics embodied in the institutions of Estonia and India. The institutions developed from struggles have an exemplary significance for contemporary democracy. The emergence of coalition politics and the consolidation of democratic institutions such as a multi-party system, electoral system and government formation along with political stability factors in the post independent Estonia and India draw a significant academic interest. The time period from 1991-2014 is essential as it traces the emergence of coalition politics in Estonia and the consolidation of coalition politics in India. Based on the specified time period a comparative analysis is undertaken between Estonia and India.

Focus of Study

The study focuses on the points as given below on coalition politics in Estonia and India during 1991-2014.

1. The post-independence evolution of coalition politics and the functioning of democratic institution in Estonia and India.
2. The factors contributing to coalition politics in Estonia and India.
3. The relation between nature of party system and coalition politics in the context of Estonia and India.
4. Coalition politics, elections and government formation in a democratic framework
5. Influence of coalition politics on government stability and party system fragmentation in both Estonia and India

Research Questions

The study addresses the fallowing research questions.

1. What are the factors that shape conditions for coalition politics in Estonia?

2. What are the cause for the emergence of coalition politics in India

3. How inclusive the minority representation in democratic politics in Estonia and India?

4. How coalition politics influences government formation in Estonia and India?

5. Whether Estonian coalition politics different from the coalition politics in India?

6. How effective is coalition politics in maintaining stability in Estonia and India?

Hypotheses

The study intends to test following two hypotheses.

1. The social cleavages like ethnic, religion, language, caste and class etc., are the reasons influencing the development of coalition politics in both Estonia and India.

2. The coalition politics which leads to the formation of coalition government is contributing to governmental stability and fragmentation of party system in Estonia and India.

Methodology

The study is historical, analytical, descriptive and comparative in nature. The study uses different theoretical approaches on coalition politics. It draws scholarly insights from the works of Barbara Hinckley (1981), William Gamson and Berkowitz (1964), J. Von Neuman and O. Morgenstern (1944), William Riker (1962), Kumar (2011), Bogdanor (1983), Keohane (1989), Chris Ogden, F. A. Ogg, Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Sartori (1994), Mileshevich and Mair, Mitra and Enskat, Saarts, Atul Kohli, Amrita Dhillon, N. Jose Chander, K. K. Tummala, Kripa Sridharan, Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace, S. P. Ahuja,

Rajarama Tolpady, E. Sridharan, Chibber and Nooruddin, Pardeep Kumar and others were employed.

The study has used various theories, concepts and variables or indicators like social psychological approach, game theoretic approach and the empirical political approach, the minimum resource theory, minimum winning coalition theory, minimum power theory, anti-competitive theory, random choice theory, the electoral systems theory and the social cleavage theory, apparatus variables, motivational and communications variable, situational variables, compatibility variables, strategic variables, power maximization and the policy based theories, ideology, coalition politics, parliamentary coalition, electoral coalition, coalition government, federalism, political stability, election density ratio (EDR), fragmentation, electoral volatility, cleavage structure in order to develop a framework of analysis.

In order to understand coalition politics in a comparative perspective the study has adopted J. S. Mill's Method i.e., direct method of agreement and method of differences. It has also used qualitative and quantitative methods for content and data analysis of the texts, documents and reports etc. The comparative analysis will be done based on the findings from Estonia and India. The study is based on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include government and legal documents, reports, policy documents, speeches, interviews and newspaper reports. Secondary sources include books, periodicals, journals, newspaper articles and internet available in English, Russian and Estonian translation. Interviews and discussion of elected representatives and experts working in the area are necessary in this study.

Structure of the Study

The study is structured in seven chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction to the theoretical framework and the background for discussion of coalition politics in Estonia and India. It draws all the theoretical views and scholarly interpretation related to the coalition politics in order to provide a broader understanding of political coalition. The second chapter discusses the evolution of coalition politics in the context of Estonia and India. This provides a detailed historical insight on the emergence of coalition politics. The third chapter is a discussion on social cleavages and coalition politics in Estonia and India. It brings a comparative understanding of social cleavages and coalition politics between Estonia and India. The fourth chapter examines in detail about the legal and institutional regulations, political parties, party system, electoral system and political parties performance, the relation between parties and voters and the political parties role in government formation in the context of Estonia and India. The fifth chapter provides a detailed insight on coalition governments in Estonia and India. It further examines the influence of coalition government in the decision making process and in maintaining democratic stability. The sixth chapter constitute a comparative analysis of coalition politics in Estonia and India. It examines the factors conducive in Estonia and India for developing a coalition politics. It further examines the level of stability in coalition politics. The seventh chapter states, validity of the hypotheses and list out major findings of the study and suggest further areas for future research.

The study proceeds to the next chapter that explains the evolution of coalition politics in Estonia and India through an historical setting.

Chapter 2

Evolution of Coalition Politics in Estonia and India:
Historical Background

The evolution of coalition politics in Estonia and India can be traced back to history, the emergence of multiparty system, political parties and democratic state/nation building in these countries. The evolution of coalition politics in Estonia and India has historical roots related to each country's socio-political contexts. Estonia was under Soviet occupation for nearly fifty years. Before that this country has the experience of a democratic state for short period in the interwar period, which the currently considered as legal continuity of Estonian democratic state. India experienced the brutal colonial rule of the British Empire for more than 200 years. After becoming independent states through non-violent freedom movements both post-Soviet Estonia and post-colonial India took the consolidation of freedom, establishment of a democratic political system and governance, to provide constitutional guarantees of freedom, equality, justice, rights and ensure well being of citizens as their nation building priorities. As a result the political party, party system, and electoral laws, etc. were established.

Estonia's democracy has now crossed two and half decades, but lacking in content. India has established a full democracy in the past more than six decades of its existence showing political stability. While in Estonia coalition politics emerged from the very beginning of independence, after the disintegration of Soviet Union disintegration in 1990s that created a conducive environment for democratic trasition and political parties to flourish. Coalition politics emerged in the late 1970s after nearly three decades of one party domianance system.

Therefore, historical background of political developments in both countries are necessary for understanding the features of coalition politics in both countries .

Democracy and Party Politics in Estonia during Interwar Period

The idea of nation building process which culminated into the program of transforming Estonia into democracy regime. Eventually, it gave rise to the emergence of political parties. It came into the practice only after the collapse of Soviet Union. Estonia took the short span of democracy as a reference point in the post-Soviet political transformation. It is significant to look into the brief history of various stages of development of the political parties and government formation and decision making in Estonia, to understand the evolution pattern of coalition politics in Estonia. The Estonian history witnessed remarkable changes during post 1905 revolution. With the tottering of tsarist regime in 1905, the Estonians chalked out the possibility for political liberation in a federalized Russia (Raun 2001: 19). In the end of 19th century, Estonian social and political thought had been revived with the reformative stance. The leadership of the intelligentsia had been transferred to a newly educated generation who were more positive about Estonian political growth (Ibid: 22).

After the advent of the publication of newspapers like *Teataja* (The Messenger) in Tallin, at the beginning of the 20th century, there is paradigmatic change in Estonian social and political thought, these changes were recorded by Konstantin pats and *Uudised* (The News) in Tartu, edited by Peeter Speek. There were other journals and magazines like Tonisson and the *postimees* group which never considered registering the voice of the margins. However, *Teataja* and *Uudised* poped up as the first journalistic voices of the marginal classes of the Estonian population and emphasized the need for social and economic change (Jansen 2004: 100). *Uudised* proposed a reform agenda and it called for the creation of a

state parliament which has to follow the principle of universal suffrage as well as enmeshing broad autonomy for the non-Russian areas including Estonia. This kind of activities received rigorous repercussion at the larger level which resulted in arrests of Estonian revolutionaries (Medijainen 2004: 107).

Tallinn was epicenter which acts as strategically operation of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP) in Estland and northern Livland. During August 1905 in Tartu, the Estonian Social Democratic Workers Party (ESDWP) with a federalist agenda was established. During the tsarist period, the revolutionary and reformative activities of various groups kindled the awareness of the population regarding civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and the press. Tonisson's Estonian Progressive Peoples Party (EPPP) was formed in Tartu (Jansen 2004: 101).

During 1905, the political trend of northern livland and Estland broadly classified into following groups: The Baltic Constitutional Party which was supported by the Baltic Germans and the Moderates constitutes of Tonisson's Estonian Progressive Peoples Party (EPPP) whose views were analogous to those of the Constitutional Democrats. It was observed that the Radicals did not organize themselves into a political party and these positions were occupied by pats and *Teataja* intellectuals. Perhaps, the balancing strike was maintained between the positionality of Social Democrats and the Moderates. The revolutionary groups who were organized into two parties: Russian and Estonian Social Democratic Workers Parties. It was accepted claim that RSDWP supported a centralized all Russian movement and the ESDWP following the values of local autonomy and federalism (Raun 2001). However, the event of February Revolution in Petrograd tend to change the political scenario of Estonia. It was observed that Jaan Tonisson immediately called for independence of Estonia and it made Baltic provinces to facilitative the restructuring process of self-government owing to the

pressure of provisional government. In March 1917, the establishment of Estonian Representative Assembly (*Maapaev*) pressurized the Petrograd to agree for the independent existence of Estonia (O'connor 2003).

For the first moment in Estonian history, the political parties emerged on a wide basis in collaboration with the elections of provincial assembly (*Maapaev*) around May 1917. These provincial assemblies constitutes of Bolsheviks, Estonian Social Revolutionaries (ESR), Estonian Social democrats (ESD), Democrats (formerly Estonian Progressive Peoples Party- EPPP), Labor Party, Agrarian League, Radical Democrats, German and Swedish Minorities and as well non-Party Representatives. In the year 1917, the idea of municipal elections were experimented in the form of direct voting which tend to show the symptoms of political strength (Medijainen 2004). This outcome indicated an important segmentation of the political scale which tends to intricate by the prevalence of huge members from non-Estonian soldiers. During this epoch, tiny part of urban areas and Tartu witnessed the subjugation of moderate political forces. However, the left proved to be stronger in the industrial cities of Tallinn and Narva (Raun 2001).

On 15th June 1920, the first enduring constitution of the Republic of Estonia was ratified in the assembly. In the Estonian Constituent Assembly, the document reflected communist principles and it made the centre-left majority as the democratic idealism of Estonia. Moreover, it was the prepositions proposed by the Weimar, Swiss, French and U.S. constitutions as well. It gave rise to the new political system where parliamentary structure was established. On the basis of proportional representation, all men and women who have reached the age of twenty years be eligible to elect their representatives of State Assembly (*Riigikogu*). The durations of every successful regime lasts for three year tenure and consisted of 100 elected representatives (Parrott and Dawisha 1997).

The modality of old constitutions 1920's, operated and functioned at various methods which did not rely upon proportional representation. The members who presiding over the cabinet namely the *Riggivanem* (State Elder) was selected by the State Assembly and acted as a Prime Minister. The State Assembly could be dismissed at any time and it tends to operate arbitrarily. The parliament elected the Supreme Court judges and the constitution provided referendum for popular legislative which was initiated by demand of 25,000 voters. Referendum was required for the approval of Constitutions amendments (O'connor 2003: 90).

During the period of liberal democracy (1920-1934), and the extended era of moderate authoritarianism (1934-1940), this state of affairs witnessed five State Assembly elections. The first State Assembly of 1920's showed a positive turn out of voters in comparison to the Constituent Assembly elections of 1919. However, the graph of individual parties showed wide fluctuations, the various political parties representations remains stable and equal (Raun 2001). The following table shows various political parties participation and their seat sharing across the five state assembly elections.

Table 1

Political Parties Contested in *Riigikogu* Elections

Party	Number of Seats in State Assembly Elections				
Left	1920	1923	1926	1929	1932

Communists	5	10	6	6	5
Independent Socialists (SRs)	11	5	-	-	-
Social Democrats (SDs)	18	15	-	-	-
Socialist Workers	-	-	24	25	22
Center					
Labor Party	22	12	13	10	-
National Party	10	8	8	9	-
Homesteaders	-	4	14	14	-
Other Parties	-	6	-	-	-
National Center	-	-	-	-	23
Right					
Christian National Party					
Farmer's Party	7	8	5	4	-
United Agrarian Party	21	23	23	24	-
Landlords	-	-	-	-	42
National Minorities	1	2	2	3	-
	5	7	5	5	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: (Raun 2001: 114)

In the series of election during 1920 to 1929, the right, center and left each had shared nearly one-third of the parliamentary seats. Out of which, the national minorities won five to seven seats. In the year 1932, the differences among centre and right were indistinct due to the effect of new regrouping of parties. However these figures showed to be very unbalanced (Parrott and Dawisha 1997). In consequences to above mentioned trends, the communist tend to raise questions on the validity of the sovereignty of Estonian republic which denied the life chance of communist regime. On the other hand, the Communists were able to participate in elections by changing their strategy and its alliances to prove its existences. During the time of economic distress, United Front of the working class had proved its existence by winning consecutive elections. It had opened up a new avenue for United Front of working class, Socialist Workers

Party and the non-Communist left (the SDs and the Independent Socialists) came together for contestation in elections (O'connor 2003).

The regime of liberal democracy in Estonia was totally dominated by the forces of right and center, despite the radical beginning during the Constituent Assembly. From 1919 to 1933, approximately it had witnessed the constituent assembly of twenty one cabinets. Out of the twenty one, ten were headed by members of the Farmers or United Agrarian parties and another nine went to the Labour Party, National Party and National Center. When Konstantin Pats (Farmers and United Agrarian Parties) were head of the state then is was considered to be most active assembly. *Riigivanem* was occupied five times by Jaan Teemant (Farmers and United Agrarian Parties) and Jaan Tonisson (National Party and National Center), who were heads of state four. In the similar fashion, *Riigivanem* was controlled by Socialist only once (August Rei in 1928-1929). However, the Socialist Workers Party was prone to be the largest constituent members in parliament from 1926 to 1932 (Medijainen 2004).

The overall picture shows that the National Center and its main apparatus such as Labour and the National Party were occupied sixteen times of cabinets. In contrast, Farmers and its alliances namely United Agrarian Party participated in fourteen times of cabinet. In least, Socialist Workers and SDs took part at minimum chances, to say only six cabinets. Estonia faced the difficulty of multiplicity of political parties like the Weimar Republic. One third of the seats in parliament together were holding by the Communists, Socialists, and National Minorities (Kasekamp 2010). During the inter-war period, one of the most famous radical right parties in Europe was the League of Veterans - Estonian war of independence (*Eesti Vabadussojalaste Liit* popularly known as the vaps movement). In 1934 it was forbidden since the government had a fear that it might win the foresee election (Barak 2009).

Later during the "era of silence" (*vaikivajastu*) that is from 1934-1940. Kaarel Eenpalu was the Prime Minister across this period. Throughout the years, the aspects of martial law and restrictions on civil and political rights were continued and as mandated in the constitution of 1933 and as well the elections for *Riigivanem* and a new State Assembly did not take place as scheduled way (Kasekamp, 2003). In 1934 the existing State Assembly convened a unique session and it attempted to resist the government restrictions. In March 1935, Pats also permanently asking for postponing the session and sought to abolish all political parties. Instantly thereafter the present regime established the Fatherland League (*Isamaaliit*), it was an organization intended to endorsing national coherence and secure state peace (Medijainen 2004).

This was the only political organization during the era of silence, which proposes the agenda to stand over the politics of the lost paradise and signify along with the original interests of the people. Pats also started a sequence of events which promotes corporative institutions in which diverse elements of the population were represented. Seventeen of these organizations became popular during the end of the year 1936 (Parrott and Dawisha 1997). However, the nationalist leaders of Estonia may possibly set up dictatorial leadership and establish liberal democracy from thriving. Eventually it led to constitutional crisis.

Political Changes in Estonia under Soviet Union

It was brought into scholarly attention that Estonia came under Soviet control with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. On 24th August 1940, based on the Stalinist model of 1936, the Estonian Constitution were drafted and proclaimed Estonia. However, the constitution occupied the ultimate power in the pretext of a new legislative organ. The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian (SSR) became independent nation by recognizing the vital role of the Communist Party in socialist development. After June 1940, Communist Party of Soviet Union

(CPSU) had the real locus of political power in Estonia. The Estonian Communist Party tends to occupy minute position (Raun 2001).

The beginning post-war years of the Estonian Soviet Republic were easily noticeable by looking into the trend of intensive Sovietization, Russification and colonization. After the inclusion of Estonia into the USSR, it was assumed that communist loyalists were imported from Russia and implanted in the government since local regimes were distrusted in Moscow. The 'Forest Brethren' a guerilla resistance movement including 15,000 active participants and thousand more supporters was viciously evacuated through forced collectivization in the countryside and the exile of thousands of Estonian farmers to Russia (Bugajski 2002).

From the independence era, the procedure of political Sovietization proceeded along with well-known political figures, including 38 former ministers and eight former heads of the state were detained and made exile in their own territory. Thousands of Estonia's military and law enforcement officials were executed and political and social leaders were imprisoned (Tarand 2004). Following the World War II, Stalin's attempt for forced collectivization of agriculture also led to another round of deportation. The administrative institutions like Soviet judicial, police and security etc. were instituted in Estonia. Under Soviet Rule, there was tendency to have no voice of dissent or political differences were curtailed. The Communist Party of Soviet union (CPSU) was the only party that dominated the entire regime though it considered being coalition regime. Thus, when Estonia came under Soviet Union, the multiparty system also came to an end (Medijainen 2004).

The Sovietization of Estonian society also integrated a full planned attack on planked of independent cultural life of Estonian. The first blow was due to

emigration and it led to the loss of the majority of the pre-war intelligentsia. The Estonians fled the country in the final stages of the World War II, due to the Soviet suppression. They comprise of university lecturers, teachers, engineers, architects, doctors and Estonian clergymen. Those who remained were besieged by the Soviet regime for capture and deportation and undergone severe torture. The history was rewritten in a way that the Baltic region's organic connection to Russia and all newspapers, journals and literatures became closely supervised by Communist Party (Taagepera 1993). It was clear that cultural cleansing might be occurred by denying the independent spheres of public life. Political purge and extreme oppression of Estonian culture and education was intended to thoroughly Russify the population. The significant shades in the country were taken by Russified and Sovietized Estonians who were imported into the country. The periodic purges of the Communist Party were conducted in Estonia to root out any dissenter and to inculcate a state of constant terror (Tarand 2004).

Between 1968- 1980, Brezhnev's regime the country witnessed economic stagnation and bureaucratic failure. The number of dissident organizations also quite active during this condition as well. It includes the Estonian patriots, the Estonian Democratic Movement, and the Estonian National Front. However, their influence remained limited since the condition is highly suppressive (Bugajski 2002). During the period of Soviet occupation, demonstrations or attempts of revolt and resistance were suppressed. In these conditions, the Baltic dissent movements acquired a chance to voice their concerns and demands, when Mikahil Gorbachev introduced the scheme of perestroika and glasnost reforms. The independence movement became more organized and public demonstrations in opposition to Soviet rule took place in proper shape and concrete forms. Political parties such as the Popular Front movement and the Estonian National Independence Party gained importance at the larger front. Hence, the Soviet

authorities found it difficult and inconvenience in handling the concern of popular pressures (Freire 2003). In the late 1980s Estonia's started to drive for separate statehood and democratic rule along with the birth and growth of various independent cultural, ecological and informational, student and political groupings. These were numerous protest movements in critiquing the precise aspects of Soviet policy, such as environmental devastation and censorship or elements of national rebirth in which Estonian history, culture and language were rediscovered (Bugajski 2002).

In the late 1980s Estonia acquired certain freedom which caused the emancipation from Soviet economy and society as their last prospect to regain some access over their own lives. During 1980s, it was noticeable by the formation of new political movements and its activities. At the eve of 48th anniversary (23rd August 1987), the hidden alliance between Hitler and Stalin gave rise to a massive protest in Tallinn which condemning this secret pact and its future. For the last 40 years, the above mentioned protest considered to be major public demonstration against the Soviets (Otfinoski 2004). In the similar way, at the end of 1988's, rallies and public protest had become more common occurrence in these places. The protest agenda and demands not only pitching for mere autonomy within the Soviet Union and claim full scale national independence of Estonia. It was resonated in others spheres; the press and cultural organizations increasingly dis-associate themselves from Soviet censorship. Astonishingly, the Estonian Communist Party (ECP) also began to proclaim for republican sovereignty both in the economic and administrative arenas (Bugajski 2002).

It was suggested by political commentators and scholar's that the first large political organization in the Soviet Union outside the Communist Party was the Estonian National Independent Party (ENIP). It also called as the Popular Front

of Estonia (PFE). These groups were systematically nurtured and supported by Lagle Parek, Tunne Kelam, and other former dissidents; they consciously arouse the people sentiment by raising the issue of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Minahan 2004). It was the first organization which openly opposed the party of Soviet Union, and it led to the boasting that this party constitutes more than 300,000 members. The main agenda of this organization was to restoring complete independence of Estonia from Soviet Union. Later, the Estonian Popular Front orchestrated the claim for self-control, autonomy of government from Moscow. The following year, the Supreme Council of Estonia's leading political body bravely recognized that law would be followed based on its own sovereignty than abiding the protocols of Soviet Union (Otfinoski 2004).

This led to the transformation in the political settings of Estonia. By mid-1990 the Estonian political spectrum had packed out significantly; the most noteworthy parties that they were on the right side of the spectrum were the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP), the Estonian Christian Democratic Party, Estonian Conservative People's Party, the Estonian Entrepreneurial Party, the Estonian Christian Union, and the *Respublica* Association. In the center were the Estonian Democratic Party, the Estonian Liberal Democratic Party and the Estonian Rural-Center Party. On the left wing were the Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party, Estonian Green Party, the Russian Social Democratic Party (in Estonia) and the Estonian Democratic Labour Party (Raun 2001).

In the terrain of political settings, the idea of rebirth in pluralist scope and the emergence of numerous parties was one of the most outstanding consequences of glasnost and perestroika. In 1989 Pro-independence organizations led by the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP), the Estonian Conservative People's (ECPP), the National Heritage Society (NHS), and the Estonian

Christian Democratic Party (ECDP) organized the local citizens committees and the Estonian congress also runs a parallel national parliament which was not allegedly favours any compromises with communism (Bugajski 2002).

A path which led towards the process of democratization, Estonia had gone tendons changes, to name few; it witnessed not only the emergence of a significant number of parties and its alliance. Moreover, it paved the way for conducting freer and fair elections based on more sophisticated voters. Estonian's were the most important place where it acquired positive benefits after the change of political settings. During this course a unique prominence was achieved that it was laid on the legal ramifications of party formations, organization and election of leaders, party membership, party staff and resources, party structures for internal and external governance (Minahan 2004). The Estonians got the opportunity for political freedom only during Mikhail Gorbachev's period. They re-established their independence in 1991 by using the political opportunity through perestroika and glasnost reforms. It eventually gave rise to the process of democratic transition and the formation of multiple political parties and coalition politics in Estonia (Medijainen 2004).

In Estonia party system emerged from the "Popular Front", an umbrella organization of Estonian dissidents, reform communists and nationally oriented movements. As common trends, the popular front coalition was collapsed because of the prevalence of heterogeneity among the contesting groups and this was common tendency for defeating the larger force and it get diffused once the political goal of independence was achieved. As an outcome, achieving independence and claiming nationality also promotes party pluralism. However, Scholars emphasize that "Party pluralism took intense forms and incompletely encouraged through the lack of regulatory mechanisms" (Merkel 1999; Biechelt 2001).

After the attainment of independence, Estonia's political spectrum tends to crystallize. Both the organization such as Estonian congress and PFE (Popular Front of Estonia) were basically considered to be pluralistic formations that consequently drifted their agendas based on the sectarian interest which gave rise to diverse political parties. This allowed the formations of moderate and centrist parties in the PFE. It was observed that more radical nationalist forces tend to strengthen and produce a feasible electoral bloc vis a vis ex-communists and centrist who were associated with former Prime Minister Savisaar (Janusz 2002). Hence, nationally parties became feasible and the figure of parties entering parliament increased. At the event of elections, the vote shares of parties swung significantly (Sikk 2006). Further, Sikk (2006) argued as follows; "Since early 1990s, political commentators commend that the foremost political parties alongside with their direct predecessors had been present in politics. Estonia did not repeat the inter-war pattern of a rapid succession of weak government in spite of frequent changes in governments. It embarked on a long-drawn-out process of democratic institution building and party consolidation. It was laid out that the handful of constant and fairly large parties started to sprout at different level during late 1990s (Tamm 2013). It includes Popular Front (1988) and later it became Centre Party (1991) under the alluring headship of Edgar Savisaar; the rural People's Union (1989); the market liberal Reform Party (1994), the national conservative Pro Patria Union (1995); and the Social Democrats (1990), formerly called the Moderates.

Similar to other East European states parties did not erupt as mass organizations and then emerged as small groupings with a core leadership based on personal as well as political ties and it often analogous with programme based alliance. It was pointed out that the formation of political parties in Estonia took quite a lot of years; to get public assurance, internal stability, and organizational

competence. The Estonian's role of parties has had particularities that can be traced in terms of its growth and their relationship to the state. It does not simply replicate the normal trends of parties in modern democracies (Sikk 2006: 109).

Evolution of Democracy and Party Sstem in India

Since India's struggle for freedom and the history of origin and growth of political parties can be traced by understanding the transition phase of colonial effects. It was observed that the social awareness at larger level eventually crystallized into the framework of party system which might initiated by the twin factor of socio/cultural -religious reforms and political response to colonialism.[5] The idea of colonialism and its assumed by product of nationalist movements tend to strengthen and reinforced the essential spirit of polity which might shed away the imperial traditions. The primary significant and its direct impact of colonialism were resonated in the realm of public administration, law and order, as well as the introduction of some social welfare measures. These patterns gave some room for the creation of political parties. In case of India, there were various groups and factions, participating in local elections which might trace back from 1840's and 1850's. However, it was established fact that India did not have a long tradition of local elections. These traditions emerged from the evolution of local governments, were largely sidelined by the nationalist movement (Pye 1966: 382-384).

During the independence movement, two types of trends took place; *firstly,* Horizontal: large masses joined the movement across the country and *secondly,* Vertical: the process of integration of certain regions had taken place which

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[5]Ajay K. Mehra (2003), Historical Development of Party Systems in India, in Ajay K.. Mehra, D. D. Khanna and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), *Political Parties and Party Systems,* New Delhi: Sage, p.50.

sprouted by the fact of emerging linguistic middle classes in the region, such as Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan- *Hindi* speaking, Madras, Bengal, Tamil and Telugu. These regional identities provided firm room for all-India parties (Pai 1997: 155). The events, reform movements, such as Brahmo Samaj (1829), Arya Samaj (1875), Rama Krishna Mission, Theosophical Society (1875), Aligarh Movement and Singh Sabha Movement (1873) etc., It also demanded representation of various communities in civil services and decision making bodies and helped in developing a protest beside the policies of colonial masters at   diverse stages. These movements were led by influential and committed leaders. However, Scholars commend that the image of dedicated leadership at different stages of the reforms, protests and anti-colonial activities might have played a decisive part in forming the democratic political culture that not only led to the emergence of party system in the country but also to its sustenance and institutionalization in the critical years after decolonization (Mehra 2003: 50).

As a matter of fact, over a period of time, numerous social, economic and political organizations, notably British Indian Associations of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay (1851/52), Landholder Society (1838), Poona Sarvajanik Sabha (1870), Madras Native Association (1862), Aligarh British Indian Association (1866), Western Indian Association (1872), Shankarseth Party, East Indian Association (1866), Indian Association Prajahitavardhak Sabha Surat (1882), Sindh Sabha Karachi (1883) and Mahajan Sabha Madras (1884) etc., tried to generate a political consciousness among the masses, in general and made a platform for the party system, in particular (Mehrotra 1971: 383).

It is repeated argument that the formation of Indian National Congress by Allan Octavian Hume in the last week of December 1885 was the beginning of new life for the evolution of parties and vindication of their growing 'unity' as a nation.

The Congress brought together different points of view, ideologies and processes, functioning as composite party system. Meanwhile, the formation of Swaraj Party in 1992 by C. R. Das and Moti Lal Nehru was very significant from the outlook of evolution of the party system in India. They stuck to their guns and took democratic dissent within the Congress Party to a new pitch. Later on, they returned back to parent party. It reflected the consolidation of the dynamic process which was based on ideologies, splits and convergence of moderates and extremists. The Congress Socialist Party, created by Acharya Narendra Dev in 1934, was nurturing the values of multi-stream and multi-ideology, within the Indian National Congress (INC), which developed the seeds of a national party system in the country. The Congress leadership compelled the members of Socialist Party to leave in 1945. Finally, the Socialist Party emerged out as a significant political force in post-independence period, providing an alternative to the Congress Party (Ibid: 418-419).

In July 1939, Subash Chandra Bose created the All India Forward Bloc. This move was considered as form of protest which unleashed against the undemocratic politics of Congress Party. The INC became the foundation for the appearance of party system in the country. Of course, the formation of Muslim League in 1906 by Syed Ahmed Khan, remained part of the pre-independence Indian party system. It promoted the interests of the Mohammedans and ultimately, made a claim for separate sovereign state of Pakistan for the Muslims. The tussles and stresses between Congress Party and Muslim League over various issues, demonstrated true spirit of the party system, which came to stay in the emerging Indian polity. Despite the partition, the spirit of multi-cultural party politics stayed and was further nurtured through competitive politics (Mehra 2003: 68-81).

The origin of Communist Party of India in 1924, and the foundation of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in 1925, became essential components, contributing to the evolving party system in the country. The appearance of the whole spectrum of political ideologies shaped a definite foundation for the party system in the country, from the right, the Muslim League, and the Hindu Maha Sabha as well as RSS. To the Left, Communist Party of India, and even ultra Left etc., on ideological scale each point was fully represented. Singh (1981) therefore, the development of party system in this phase was characterized as 'movement party system'.

Party System and Political Parties in Independent India

With the promulgation of Indian Constitution on 26th January 1950, the political parties began preparing themselves for the first general elections. By the year 1951, four major group of parties emerged. *First Group*: It included Congress Party, Socialist Party, Kisan Mazdoor Party, and Krishikar Lok Party in Andhra, which accepted democratic values and secular principles. *Second Group*: It contained Communist Party of India (CPI), Bolshevik Party of India and Revolutionary Socialist Party etc. These parties advocated Soviet or Chinese model. *Third Group*: Jan Sangh, Hindu Maha Sabha, Ram Rajya Parishad were in this group, which promoted Indian traditions and culture. *Fourth Group*:It referred to Akali Dal, Schedule Caste Federation, Jharkhand Party and Tamilnad Congress. These were concerned with some provincial and communal interest (Weiner 1962: 16).

One Party Dominant System (1952-67)

The Congress Party maintained its place as a party occupying most of the room in the political system, since there was plurality within the dominant party system which made it more representative and flexible. Similarly, it absorbed

other groups and engagements from outside. Thus, the party prevented other parties from attainment of vigour (Kothari 1964: 1164). Morris Jones stated that Congress Party enjoyed unshared governmental power at the Centre and in most of the states over a period of two decades in three general elections 1952, 1957, 1961 and also 1967. Its legislative majorities were massive as the party won 1096 out of 1477 seats in Lok Sabha, its proportion of the votes, casted, seldom over fifty percentage. While, the opposition parties, had no alternative to Congress in the use of power, nor did they split power in any coalition form. Rajni Kothari and Morris Jones conceptualized it as 'Congress system' and 'one party dominant system', respectively (Jones 1978: 218-220). Kothari states that a party system in which open contest amid parties occurred; Congress Party was a dominant party. However, it was a cut-throat party system in which challenging parties played a quite divergent position. The Congress was 'party of accord,' while, the opposition parties were 'parties of pressure' (Kothari 1964: 1164). In net shell, the party was the dynamic core and centre piece of India's operating institutional system.

Emergence of Regional Political Parties and Coalition Politics (1967-77)

The Indian political system in its evolutionary process passed through the essentially transitional phase of politics of one-party dominance to another phase of politics of polarization, which represent the stage of political coalitions. In a way, the opposition parties entered into a number of pre-poll alliances in different states with a view to dislodging the ruling Congress (Narain 1967: 651-652).The Marxist-Communist in Kerala, DMK in Tamil Nadu, and Swatantra-Jana Congress in Orissa, made alliance pacts, which were cohesive regional forces in the respective states rather than an ad-hoc alliance of various parties. The dissident leaders of Congress Party joined hands to win more seats than the official candidates as elsewhere (Kothari 2003: 184). The Congress-regional

parties' bi-polarization came into existence over the period 1967-89 in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Goa, Assam and Andhra Pradesh.

Sridharan (2008: 484) in Zoya Hasan (ed.) indicates that the Akali Dal, National Conference and Maharashtra Wadi Gomantak Party (MGP) had a very long history in politics. In Tamil Nadu, the process began by eliminating the Congress Party from the top two positions, was started during this period and DMK and AIADMK occupied two top positions. The Jan Sangh/BJP came into existence as second party in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi and Himachal Pradesh because of the consolidation of non-Congress votes in these states. However, the political parties were entering into alliance politics more, as an opportunity than as the responsibility and tried to use this alliance to strengthen their political support base. This led them to take possession of key portfolios in the government by which vast power of resources and patronage could be commanded (Kamal and Meyer 1977: 120-123).

In the words of Morris Jones (1978: 146), the outcome of elections indicated the emergence of 'market polity'. By this, it meant, a system in which large number of decisions are taken by a substantial number of participants, who stand in both positions, being dependent on with each other as well as in conflicts. The decisions in this alliance are reached by a process of bargaining, where no one is strong enough to impose his decisions. There are plenty of competitions and bargaining before 1967, it took place largely within the Congress Party, between groups and in semi-institutionalized forms. In fact, it was this internal competition, which was responsible for the 1967 change. The dissenting Congressmen played an important task in the declining of party at the time of polls and became significant cause for the defeat of Congress Party in all states

except Tamil Nadu. The outcome of this, more open competition and spreading of market power over number of groups. This led to 'monopoly' to competition.

Morris Jones considers coalition governments as 'small markets' and says that all the new non-Congress governments were of this kind except Tamil Nadu. The new tug of war between Congress Party and non-Congress parties established a 'pretty regular' and continuous 'defectors market.' For example, in Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh (non-Congress states), Congress Party formed governments after the elections but were brought down by defections. Thus, the party system was only modified by fresh form of competition, and not replaced (Ibid: 157).

Sridharan (2008: 482) in Zoya Hasan (ed.) states it was the consolidation of non-Congress opposition parties state by state, that took place over a period, led the displacement of the Congress Party. The important feature of this phase was bipolar consolidation and driving force of the division of the national party system. Kothari (2003: 175) points out that, it was wrong to conclude that Congress Party did not hold a monopoly of power even before 1967. There were a large number of parties opposing it, the combined strength of non- Congress parties and candidates were always more than that of the INC. The 1967 elections did represent a major step in the direction of increasingly competitive polity and more differentiated structure of party competition.

The 1967 elections was a watershed in Indian politics, which followed major structural changes in the political system, which led to shift from dominant party system to competitive polity. The overwhelming dominance of Congress at the Centre eroded (Kothari 1970: 940). On the one hand, party lost the majority in eight state assemblies, namely Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Madras/Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Rajasthan, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh out of sixteen states, on the other.

The national proportion of Congress votes declined from 44.7 percentages to 40.8 percentages. The elections gave a staggering blow to Congress dominance (Kamal and Meyer 1977: 110). The party was divided against itself.

A fresh trial of strength took place in four state assemblies' elections in 1969, known as "little elections." The former kind of cohesive regional or coalition emerged as a viable alternate to Congress Party in West Bengal and Punjab, while, the later kind failed to do so in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. In West Bengal, United Front made the most drastic comeback and in Punjab, Akali Dal achieved dominance. After continuous instability for a long time this party system witnessed an increasing polarization between the INC and a coalition of regional parties (Kothari 2003: 184).

The Congress Party was divided into two groups-one faction of Congress (Ruling) headed by Indira Gandhi and another was, Congress (Organization), led by Nijlingappa group. The factionalism did not remain confined to Congress Party alone, but other parties also experienced this particularly Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), Communist Party of India (CPI), Swatantra Party, and Jan Sangh. The minor and regional parties were also faction ridden. The reasons for splits were due to personal ambitions of leaders (Markandan 1990: 746).

Due to factional fight, the central government was not able to pass the Bill for "abolition of privy purses" from Rajya Sabha and it was lost by a margin of only one vote. On the moral grounds, Indira Gandhi advised, the President of India to dissolve Lok Sabha and order a fresh polls. On the eve of general elections in 1971, Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), Jan Sangh, Swatantra Party and Congress (O) forged 'grand alliance' at national level to give a way for an alternative government (Ibid: 749).It had neither a common programme, nor it had a single leader, as a result, alliance faced difficulty in projecting a coherent image. Indira

Gandhi fought elections on two major striking points; *firstly*, nationalization of banks and *secondly*, abolition of privy purses.[6]The posters and the newspapers' advertisement given by Congress Party attracted public attention, which attacked opposition parties by projecting opposition alliance as old guard of Congress,' ten point agenda, which focused on simply '*Indira hatao*' (remove Indira Gandhi from power), but Congress Party had only one point agenda '*garibi hatao*' (get rid of poverty) (Jones 1978: 169-71).

The Congress (R) under the leadership of Indira Gandhi contested 442 seats and got 352 seats in the popular House, with 43.7 percentages of votes, whereas, united Congress fought elections on 544 seats but retained sixty seats only. Congress (O) did perform badly, lost forty five percentages of votes and reduced to 'Gujarat party'. It was the charismatic leadership or personality cult of Indira Gandhi by which Congress (R) won a landslide victory in 1971 parliamentary and the state assemblies elections of Bihar, West Bengal, Tripura, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Mysore, Gujarat, Punjab, Haryana, and Maharashtra. The new trend emerged, party sought to lose its identity in its leader because major thrust of Congress (R) was to project Indira Gandhi as its undisputed leader of the party and cry was 'vote for her,' unlike previous appeal of party vote for lamp-post (Hartmann 1971: 232).

Kochanek (1976) in Henry C. Hart (ed.) states that Indira Gandhi adopted a more argumentative posture equally towards opposition parties at national level and towards non-Congress governments in different states. She created a 'pyramidal type of decision-making structure' in party as well as in government. Markandan

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[6]At time of integration of the princely states into the Indian Union, on the eve of independence, the government of India fixed an annual amount, varying according to size and revenues of each princely state, which was to be paid to each ruler in lieu of his agreeing to integrate his state.

(1990: 752) further states that Indira Gandhi started purging politicians such as Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Assam and Madhya Pradesh. Earlier, all disputes in the party were resolved through the Congress High Command but she started resolving all the conflicts at intra-party level. Jayaprakash Narayan symbolized it as "*Indira is India and India is Indira*". As a result, India was poised towards 'one party dominant system to one-party authoritative rule'.

Emergence of Bi- Party System: Mergers and Splits (1977-79)

The general elections in March 1977 brought an end to thirty years of Congress Party rule, eleven years of government of Indira Gandhi and twenty one months of an emergency that had set the nation on an authoritarian course (Weiner 1978: 1). Obviously, highly centralized rule of Indira Gandhi contributed to the formation of oppositional organization/movement, such as the *Nava Nirman Yuvak Samiti* in Gujarat and *Chhatra Sangharsh Samiti* in Bihar as well as the student bodies that spread rapidly to other states, which further set the pattern of future polity (Pai 2011: 75). Kothari rightly points out this type of situation as "insecurity at the top and unrest at the bottom".

According to Chandra (2011: 481) a new dimension was added, when Jayaprakash Narayan agreed to take over the leadership of the movement, between 1974 and 1975. Jayaprakash Narayan called for 'total revolution' and advised the students to give up their studies for a year to 'save democracy'. The Congress (O), Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), Jan Sangh and Socialist Party extended their full support to the Jayaprakash Narayan. Besides, the Allahabad High Court verdict against Indira Gandhi resulted in clamping emergency on the midnight of 25 June 1975 and detention of all non- Communist opposition leaders. Morarji Desai and Ashoka Mehta from Congress (O), Charan Singh, Piloo Mody and

Biju Patniak of the BLD, Lal Krishnan Advani and Atal Bihari Vajpayee from Jan Sangh/BJP, Surendra Mohan of the Socialist Party, Jayaprakash Narayan and nearly thirty Members of Parliament (MPs) including dissident Congressmen such as Chandra Shekhar and Mohan Dharia were a few leaders of the main opposition parties, arrested during Emergency because of their political differences with Indira Gandhi (Ibid: 493).

The detention of these leaders opened a new chapter on party politics in the country. In these circumstances, discussion on the merger of parties held by leaders in *Tihar Jail* in Delhi and in Bombay, where Jayaprakash Narayan was convalescing. After the announcement of Lok Sabha elections, on 18 January 1977, simultaneously, four parties-Congress (O), Jan Sangh, BLD and Socialist Party decided to fight elections under 'one-flag and one programme' on the banner of Janata Party on 20 January 1977 (Jain and Nair 2000: 275). The issues of democracy versus dictatorship and stability versus chaos were main themes in Lok Sabha elections in 1977 (Weiner 1978: 48). The Janata Party won 298 seats and Congress was reduced to just 153 seats in the Lower House.

Manor (2008: 446) in Zoya Hasan (ed.) states that once again, Congress Party after defeat in elections, faced another split in 1978, which divided the party into two groups, one section known as a Indira Congress or Congress (I) led by Indira Gandhi and other faction led by Swaran Singh, later on, by Dev Raj Urs, group named as Congress (S). At the same time, the heterogeneous composition of the Janata Party and fierce ambitions of its three leading figures-Morarji Desai, Jagjivan Ram and Charan Singh, reflected that government was unable to achieve much cohesion. Ultimately, Janata Party government disintegrated in mid 1979 and many of its components splintered. This phase was noticeable by free opposition between political parties and larger volatility in party system. The plentiful replacement among parties in power at national and state levels led to

constant decay. The division inside parties by inclination towards personalized control of parties or splinters by different interests led to great fluidity within the party system as factions and rumps.

Restoration of Congress Party's Dominance (1980-89)

The outcome of the 7th Lok Sabha elections in 1980 restored, Congress (I)'s dominance with two-thirds (2/3) majority in the Lower House, securing 351 seats. It constituted sixty seven percentage seats in the House of People by polling less than forty three percentage of total valid votes casted in its favour (Roy 1980: 227). The Congress dominance was the product of fractured opposition, (which united in 1967 and 1977 only to displace the Congress government) that opened the doors to Indira Gandhi, return to power (Hardgrave 1984: 405). Thus, it was approximate that Congress (I) won over 100 seats due to the split in shared votes of Janata Party in 1977 general elections. The votes divided among the Janata Party and Lok Dal (Roy 1980: 227). It was clear that the process of the disintegration of Janata Party started in 1978 when differences among the top leaders as Morarji Desai, Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram emerged and secondly, in the first half of 1979. Consequently, the central government and party started breaking into various groups such as BJP, Lok Dal, Janata Dal (S) and so on (Namboodiripada 1980: 12).

The challenges to Congress Party at central level arise out of the 'regionalization of politics.' The weak organizational structure of the INC, and its lack of responsiveness to regional concern as well as the absence of strong national opposition party, contributed to the growth of regional parties and regionalization of national parties (Hardgrave 1984: 413). There were many regional parties formed government, at state level, National Conference in Jammu and Kashmir, CPI (M) in both West Bengal and Tripura, newly emerged Telugu Desam Party

(TDP) in Andhra Pradesh and Janata Dal in Karnataka in 1983.In brief, it was a time that characterized overwhelming victory of Congress (I) in 1980 and 1984 as well as subsequent state assemblies, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv, which strengthened traits of charismatic leadership. The party in this phase was totally dependent on leader as hegemony, on the one side and failure of non-Congress or anti-Congress parties at national level, on the other. Thus, Indira Gandhi had a patrimonial view of Indian politics. She thought that state (Indian political system) inherited from her father (Nehru) should be transmitted to her heirs (sons). That is why; she was reluctant to allow Congress leaders with an independent popular support to emerge in states or in the Centre (Dikshit 1995: 234).

The Congress Party was organizationally weak because, there was gradual erosion of inner-party democracy, due to suspension of party elections, tight control over ticket allocation; finance party machinery and appointment of Chief Ministers etc, all became the prerogative of the Centre. Rajiv Gandhi was unsuccessful to reserve these trends and revive the party structures. There was an entire swing from a mediatory to plebiscitary form in which leader overshadowed the party, thereby declining it. In fact, by the late 1980s, institutional decay was so higher in party organization that one might barely converse of a 'pre-dominant party' (Pai 1997: 171).

The alienation of upper caste from Congress Party, disaffection and factionalism within party in mid 1980s, increasing incidents of violence and riots in various states, further contributed to growth of regional parties as Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), and other national parties like Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The formation of these parties marked the transition from 'traditional class politics to democratic politics.' The immediate electoral victory of the regional parties due to their successful used of alliance strategies and

appeals different from national parties (Ibid: 173). Multiparty system and coalition politics emerged after 1989 .

In the context of Estonia and India the history of political parties and coalition politics has similarities and differences. Both faced foreign occupation and later emerged as an independent nation. Apparently, India became a democratic nation, setting an example to other countries at an early stage. Whereas, Estonia lately became independent but still strongly practicing democracy. The emergence of political parties, party system and coalition politics has been the norm in both the countries witnessing stability and instability in the government. Overall the evolution of coalition politics with the base of political parties and party system has been strongly rooted in Estonia and India.

Emergence of Multi-Party System and Coalition Politics (1989-1991)

Singh (1997: 128-129) in S. Bhatnagar and Pradeep Kumar (eds.) elaborates in the 1989 parliamentary elections the party system made a formal switch over from one party dominant system to multi-party system, in particular. Three successive minority governments, formed by National Front under the headship of V. P. Singh as Premier, then the Samajwadi Janata Dal with Chandra Shekhar as Prime Minister and Congress Party government led by P. V. Narasimha Rao, were the reflection of multi-party system. It was more diversified and differentiated pattern of party domination in Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas, tended to give rise to more federalized structure of power, that is, there was significant shift in the power structure at the top.

According to Chakrabarty (2003: 251) in Mehra, Khanna and Kueck (eds.), a tri-model party system took shape in 9th general elections in 1989. The three national parties emerged, Congress (I), BJP and Janata Dal led National Front (NF). The NF evolved under the leadership of Vishwanath Pratap Singh, Butler,

Lahiri and Roy (1997: 153) in Partha Chatterjee (ed.), former Defence Minister, who played a major role in uniting opposition parties particularly Janata Party, Lok Dal (A) and Lok Dal (B) to merge in National Front. V. P. Singh worked hard to unit anti-Congress forces on single platform. Besides this, Congress (S), DMK, CPI, CPI (M), AGP and other parties retained their identity, but agree to come on a common platform to defeat the Congress. Meanwhile, the NF also made some seats adjustments with BJP in Rajasthan and Gujarat etc. Paul Brass (1994: 85) considers that NF emerged as a 'new Janata coalition' which sought to duplicate unity and victory of Janata Party of 1977. The concern for stability and integrity of the country, an urge for socio economic equality, consciousness of community, caste and ethnic identities and above all, resentment against corruption and scandals (kickback to middlemen in connection with huge defence procurements with the Swedish Bofors company) were major issues in the 1989 elections (Malik and Singh 1992: 318).

As per Pai (1997: 175) in Bhatnagar and Kumar (eds.) states that in 1989 parliamentary elections, no party even came close to 263 seats which was the requisite number for majority in the Lower House. Consequently, the 'hung Parliament' was thrown. The Congress Party lost its majority, however, emerged as the single largest party in the House of People by gaining 197 seats, with 39.5 percentages of votes. Sudha Pai, coined the term the 'federation of parties' (NF) obtained 143 seats, with only 17.8 percentage of votes. The partners of NF did not perform on expectation lines, as TDP got two seats, Congress (S) one, DMK none, the BJP improved its position from two to eighty eight seats in Lok Sabha, third place behind Congress and Janata Dal.

Ghosh (2003: 233) in Mehra, Khanna and Kueck (eds.) indicates that the NF minority government formed by V. P. Singh better known as the 'crutch

government' because the National Front (NF) brought together two diametrically opposite political forces, the BJP, on the one side and the Left parties, on the other, with the aim to keep the Congress at bay by any means. However, V. P. Singh ministry faced internal and external crisis right from the beginning. Consequently, the BJP withdrew its support from Union Ministry and V. P. Singh government lost majority in the Lower House. Then, Chandra Shekhar bolted Janata Dal and made a new Samajwadi Janata Dal, which formed Cabinet under him. The central government was constituted with the help of eleven regional allies and outside support of Congress Party. The central government could barely muster one-tenth of Lok Sabha's strength. As a matter of fact, the INC extended support to Chandra Shekhar ministry because it did not want to face mid-term elections, unlike previous installation of Charan Singh government, as part of well worked out strategy to pull down the Janata Party and to force fresh general elections in 1979 (EPW 1999: 251).

Thereafter, Chandra Shekhar's ministry collapsed, just after four months, because the gulf widening between Congress Party and Council of Ministers on the issues of refuelling of the American warplanes during the Gulf war and budget. In a way, on 6th March 1991, Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar resigned from the office and advised President of India to dissolve the popular House and conduct fresh elections. The shocking assassination of former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi on 21 May 1991 during the parliamentary election campaign in southern part of Tamil Nadu, generated sympathy wave for its slain leader. However, no party or combination of parties could aspire towards a majority (Andersen 1991: 976).

There were various issues raised by the NF, the BJP and Congress in the 1991 mid-term elections. The National Front and its Communist allies made social

justice a central theme, and V. P. Singh proposed quota programme for backward classes, the Congress offered the only ray of hope of stability and peace in the country. The BJP called for construction of Lord Rama temple at controversial site *Babri Masjid* (mosque built by Babar) in Ayodhya. The Congress Party emerged single largest party by winning 226 seats in the Lower House. The National Front reduced to just seventy six seats, a loss of almost half their strength from 1989. The Left parties won fifty five seats. The BJP and Shiv Sena combine took 121 seats and emerged second largest party in Lok Sabha (Ibid: 979).

Sridharan (2008: 486) in Zoya Hasan (ed.) points that in 1991, the Indian National Congress (INC) was able to form a minority government led by consensual leader P. V. Narasimha Rao, with the support of eleven members of AIADMK and some smaller parties. The Congress Party government's viability was dependent on abstention in confidence vote by a section of opponent parties. P. V. Narasimha Rao initiated policy of economic reforms, which included devaluation of rupees, cut in public expenditure, privatization of public sectors and reducing subsidies, better known as liberalization, privatization and globalization (LPG). The new fiscal policy created intra-party and inter-party conflicts (Bijukumar 2004: 172).

The Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao confronted another problem, his ministers Buta Singh, Balram Jakhar, Madhava Rao Scindia, Arjun Singh, K. Natwar Singh and N. D. Tiwari etc. were involved in Hawala scam and JMM bribery case. These cases tarnished the image of Congress Party in public eyes (Roy 1996: 29). Narasimha Rao's *chanakya method* further generated rift in the party. As a result, G. K. Moopanar formed Tamil Manila Congress; N. D. Tiwari and Arjun Singh left the party and organized themselves as Congress Tiwari.

Moreover, after Rajiv Gandhi's death, the INC was weak managerially and electorally than at any time since 1977. The party strength reduced to third place in two largest states of Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (Brass 1994: 85).

By and large after two elections of 1989 and 1991, national party system as reflected in distribution of seats by the parties and in the alliance pattern among parties took the shape of a loose coalition system. In this parties united with regional and other smaller parties in the form of alliances or fronts to develop their position and to direct their policies and action in the Parliament. After the by-election held in November 1991, the Congress Party stood at the centre of the largest such coalition, in which its own representation of 227 was increased to 251 through an alliance with AIADMK and four other minor parties. The BJP alliance with Shiv Sena accounted for another 123 seats. A third coalition, comprised two groupings the Janata Dal led National Front whose combined strength in the House was 140 (Ibid: 77).

In the context of Estonia and India the history of political parties and coalition politics has similarities and differences. Both faced foreign occupation and later emerged as an independent nation. Apparently, India became a democratic nation, setting an example to other countries at an early stage. Estonia lately became independent and still strongly practicing democracy. The emergence of political parties, party system and coalition politics has been the norm in both the countries witnessing stability and instability in the government. Overall the evolution of coalition politics with the base of political parties and party system has been strongly rooted in Estonia and India.

The next chapter provides a detailed understanding of social cleavages and coalition politics in Estonia and India.

Chapter 3

Social Cleavages and Coalition Politics in Estonia and India

This chapter discusses the influence of social cleavages in coalition politics in Estonia and India. This chapter figures out the common factors, similarities and differences by measuring coalition politics in Estonia and India. It also makes an attempt to understand the nature of the problems in coalition politics in which strategies of various parties adopt and their competitive tendency that give rise to social polarization. There were many factors that explain the above mentioned problems. Coalition politics is deeply embedded into the issues of social stratification. The factors help one to identify its own groups in society, may be associated with citizenship, the legal holders of an "ethnic minority", believers of a particular denomination, and residents of a particular region. This assigns normative values to common members of any group; those group members tend to share the similar value orientation. They influence the ways that voters are politically mobilized. They craft the stability of party-voter relationships. They provide the material of political competition for parties and voters alike and influence the formulation of public policies. They are institutionalized as political parties and other associational groups. The social cleavage related issues in coalition politics are well documented regarding party systems in new democracies. However, few studies approached the question of social cleavage through the lens of comparative frames of analysis in understanding the nature of coalition politics. Hence, a comparative understanding of social cleavages and coalition politics between Estonia and India.

Understanding Social Cleavages

"Cleavage" is one of the important aspects for understanding social and political phenomena. In the social and political realm, "cleavage" organizes social and

political phenomena around "sides" and around competition and conflict between sides (Mikkel 2003: 2). According to Stefano Bartolini and Peter Maira; "Cleavage can be classified into three parts at conceptual level: Empirical, Normative and Behavioral. The idea of empirical cleavages expressed in terms of meaning embedded in social structures and it can be verified by analyzing the emotive cogent. Normative means that it is a system of values which assigns meaning to common identity of any social group and Behavioral means that cleavage can be observed through the interactions between political actors. In the general parlance, cleavages also indicate to the political differences among the citizens which might indirectly affect the electoral process. It has led to the surge of political dissimilarity. Scholars observed that Cleavages in politics are something which leaves impact in a long run (Jurkynas 2004: 281-282). In the 1950s the term 'social cleavage' was formulated as part of the behavioural revolution. A social cleavage is defined as inscriptive or objective sociological traits that divide individuals into groups are perceived as one such determinant" (Stoll 2004: 10).

On the other hand Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) insist that cleavage must involve relatively persistent social division. Kriesi (1998: 167) claims that cleavages have a structural basis in a division between opposite social groups. Beglund, Hellen and Aarebrot (1998) pointed out that social cleavages identify the nature of conflict and scope of partisan tendency of any functioning democracy, in a way it also shapes the behavior pattern of voters. Perhaps, the concept of cleavage is important to systematic study of "parties, party systems and regime change". It can be ascertained that they can go beyond the various issues, conflicts and interests which might reduce at the level of economic or social nature. This approach considered being radical since it had been tracing

the problem of difference through cultural idioms; it's embedded the deep-seated socio-structural conflicts with political significance.

The social cleavage in terms of conceptual understanding implies that societal cleavages are the essence of the formation of political party systems. This theory was first enunciated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 112-117). It stated that the concept of social cleavages cannot turn into political oppositions as automatic outcome. These scholars had given the importance to the factors of alliance, coalition, costs and pay –offs of mergers for social cleavage actively expressed in party form in opposition to other organizational structures. However, it was suggested that considerations of organizational and electoral strategy, the weighting of pay-offs alliance against the losses through split-offs structure depend upon the final outcome of translation from social cleavage to oppositional instincts.

The above approaches have had few ambiguous aspects in understanding the social cleavages. This ambiguity was noted out by Sartori (1976: 176). According to him,

> the problem is not only that cleavages do not convert themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course. The problem is also that few cleavages are not translated at all. Furthermore, the importance of the notion of translation lies in the implication that translation calls for translators, thereby paying attention on translation handling and mishandling. The old-style sociology took for granted that cleavages are not produced by the political system itself, but they are reflected in. As an outcome, there is very little that we really know concerning the extent to which conflicts and cleavages may be channeled, deflected, and repressed, or vice versa activated and reinforced precisely by the operations and operators of the political system. But now we are required to wonder whether translation mishandling may contribute to the cleavage to a great extent. In short, at the heart of social cleavage theory lays an important ambiguity: can the formation of mergers, alliances, and coalitions really influence the translation of cleavages into oppositions. While all agree that the process of translation is not

mechanical, there is not yet a theoretical consensus as to whether mergers can influence the final result of this process" (Zielinski 2002: 187).

Lipset and Rokkan's studies focus attention on the socio-economic dynamics through which the European countries had gone through and their feudal regimes had given way to their multi-party democratic systems. The two authors identified four fundamental cleavages in European political systems; the various divisions in society which gave rise to conflicting interest groups and rival political party formations. These cleavages are: firstly, Subject vs. dominant culture; secondly, church vs. government; thirdly, primary vs. secondary economy; lastly, workers vs. employers. As summarised by Dikshit (1994: 262-263), the first two of these cleavages were the product of the national revolution, representing the process whereby the modern nation-state system had emerged.

In the historical process of the rise of the modern nation-state, there were frequent conflicts between rival interest groups seeking to build a new centralized state, on the one side, and local interest groups that were opposed either to the very idea of the state or to its basic principle on the other. The net outcome was conflict between the nation-building elite, on the one side, and various ethnically, linguistically and religiously distinct subject populations the peripheries on the other. The nation builders stood for a centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing nation-state, in direct opposition to the historically settled corporate privileges of the church. Thus, the national revolution had produced two types of cleavages, which, with the passage of time, rose to capture established positions in the structure and conduct of politics within each state (Ibid).

The second group of cleavages was born as a result of the impact of Industrial Revolution, which represented the process whereby industrial capitalism became

the dominant mode of production. The Industrial Revolution gave rise to emergence of vested conflict among two incipient groups. One is the landed interests of feudal lords and second is the new class of industrial entrepreneurs. Among the landed interests themselves there was conflict between land owners and tenants; among the industrial classes there was conflict between primary vs. secondary economy (also referred to as town versus country) and secondly, between employers and employees (generally referred to as class cleavage). This historical cleavage formulation laid the foundation of the political party systems in Europe. However, the impact of these cleavages varied considerably from state to state, depending upon social, political and economic conditions of each country, and the timing of the introduction of universal suffrage (Dowse and Hughes 1975: 323-324).

On the basis of the aforementioned cleavages in the European societies, Lipset and Rokkan (1970: 50) had identified eight basic types of alliance-opposition structures. These represented the outcome of three dichotomous divisions in society. The first had occurred after the reformation (a 16th century movement launched to reform the doctrines and practices of the Roman Church). As a result of this movement, either the national church was under the state control or the state was allied to the Roman Catholic Church. The second occurred after the 'Democratic' revolution by virtue of which, the first two types of party formations were further subdivided according to the strength of the established church in the respective country. The third came after the Industrial Revolution. A further element in alliance-opposition structures was added as a result of the introduction of the system of universal suffrage. According to Lipset and Rokkan (1970) these cleavage patterns were durable formation, so that the party systems would reflect with few but significant exceptions.

Later on the two major approaches or analytical strategies were formulated. Firstly, formal system level analysis, which is focused on the major (rather formal) patterns of party competition and occasionally explores institutional rules and organizational aspects (Blondel, 1969; Mair, 1998; Sartori & Mair, 2005; Siaroff, 2000; Wolinetz, 1988). Secondly, focus on the sociological-historical approach. There is no doubt that two approaches are deeply inter-linked with each other and many scholars employ them in a complementary manner. In order to identify whether the particular countries' patterns of party competition are truly out of the mainstream in comparison with the other countries in the given region, a systematic analysis of both perspectives is needed. However the sociological-historical perspective digs deeper into the foundations of social cleavages and coalition politics

As mentioned earlier that the sociological-historical approach focuses on the social bases of the party support and makes the social cleavages, societal divisions and their implications as central theme in the party system studies (Ware: 1996). The question on cleavages in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has had surprised political commentators and received scholarly attention. In this line of analysis, the broad scholarly domain floats the stage for consensus which says that 'social cleavages are not rooted in post-communist societies to the same extent as in the west and, therefore, cleavage-based party politics is not as surfaced in CEE'. Moreover, concept of class has had acquired larger currency in European academic circle. Kitschelt (1999) sketch the debates on this consensus among scholars as follows; "the consensus among the scholars had arrived to look into the sociological dynamics of cleavage in Western European politics, as well laid out the prepositions that it is not so accentuated in post-communist settings and instead rather value- and identity based cleavages have gained importance among the scholarly debate than only analyzing through the

concept of class. In contrary to this, most of the scholars doubt that the classical Lipset and Rokkan (1967) theory on cleavages is completely applicable to CEE countries.

However, there is no reason to presume that no cleavages and divides had come to play in the party system formation in CEE. Having laid out a different approaches and modalities in understanding the question of cleavages among western academia and as we look into the popular alternative contributions, there have been lots of efforts taken by many scholars to propose an alternative theory or typology of cleavages in CEE. However, the most widely known and accepted contribution proposed as we should call cleavages as 'divides', because the fully constituted cleavages in the western sense were still finding a place in the region" (Kitschelt 1999: 267).

Kitschelt has identified six typology of cleavages in the post-communist societies: It has explained in the following way; Firstly, communist-anti-communist cleavage (value-based cleavages revealed through the assessment on communist rule) also known as political regime divide (supporters of regime change vs. holders of the old communist regime); secondly, socio-economic cleavage also known as economic-distributive divide (economic losers of the transition vs. winners of transition and supporters of market reforms); thirdly, urban vs. rural cleavage and socio-cultural divide (followers of libertarian ideas in politics, society and economy vs. supporters of authoritarian and protectionist ideas), fourthly, clerical vs. anti-clerical cleavage, fifthly, centre-periphery cleavage also known as national-cosmopolitan divide (self-centred nationalism vs. cosmopolitan outlook), lastly, ethnic cleavage (Kitschelt 1999: 167). He concluded that the different regime legacies might lead to distinct cleavage configurations and its impact on party system.

Based on the above conceptual and theoretical anchoring on the question of cleavages; it is obvious that there are possibilities where we merely understand divisions in the electorate that are relatively independent of specific, transient issues and political actors, and create (or at least have the sufficient potential to create) enduring, recurrent differences in the social and attitudinal composition of the electorates of different parties tend to be conceived as cleavages. Heath (2005) poignantly argued that in the context of language of state level within India; a stronger impact of social cleavages on the voting pattern goes together with lower electoral volatility. Bartolini and Mair (1990) stopped short of showing such an effect. It was suggested by scholars that the electoral volatility somewhat decreased after the 1920s, as well the factors like ethno-religious heterogeneity, union density and party membership rate also affected electoral volatility. This suggestion can hardly be called appealing evidence about the impact of cleavage mobilization on the freezing of party alternatives.

We have discussed about the theoretical and conceptual understanding on the question of social cleavage. It is imperative to demonstrate that how social cleavages are structured in Estonia and India and how they are related to coalition politics in both the countries.

Social Cleavage Structure in Estonia

There are two main reasons has had identified by scholars the way in which the Estonian party politics standing apart from the Central and Eastern European mainstream polity. First reason is that the absence of the communist successor parties and second is that the right-wing-inclined ideologically which tend to be considered as unbalanced party competition. Trames (2016) suggested that "all these features seem to be shaped by unique cleavage constellations in which the

ethnic cleavage is aptly merged with the communist-anti-communist cleavage". The study attempts to seek explanation for these exceptional features, while alluding to the theory designed by Herbert Kitschelt. He argued that many types of communist regime and its legacies are linked with cleavage formation and eventually led to the evolution of party systems. However, the analysis shows that Kitschelt's original argument on the Estonian cases considered to be invalid and hence a new type of communist legacy was taken as centre of analysis, it is to say that expressive characteristics of 'ethnic colonial communism'. These prepositions provided a more convincing explanation and as well opens up new research perspectives on the subject.

Tolvaisis (2011) suggested that the factors like the historical, transitional and contemporary trends gave rise to the implicit maneuvering of cleavages. In contrast to the alternative theory on Social cleavage, ethnic cleavages combined with a communist/anti-communist cleavage were main dividing logic behind the party competition in Estonia. There were two groups namely anti-communist and nationalist camp (IRL, Reform Party) and the last but not least, Russian-friendly Centre Party which has also been more silent towards the historical past of communist regime. However, socio-economic cleavage might have played a prominent role and it had been merged with the latter-mentioned dominant cleavages (IRL and the Reform Party have been market-liberals while the Centre Party has a left-wing orientation). We had analyzed the correlation between the party formation in historical settings and its social cleavages. It was well articulated debate on the question of urban-rural cleavage during 1990's but recent years it has lost its ground. Saarts (2011) pointed out that the Clerical/anti-clerical cleavage might have not played a crucial role in Estonia polity since Estonian society was supposedly to be one of the most secular in Europe.

Let us demonstrate the above prepositions by analyzing the various scholars' views on the Estonian Party system. During 1990's, Estonia has managed to balance its political base though it had a loose party system and uncertain voting patterns. This trend has had changed over a period of time. The political phase completely took a new turn wherein new political parties came up with various political agenda pitching behind the old political parties in the year 1992. It is asserted that political relevance in approaching cleavages been floated strongly in this form of society. In the similar fashion, the effect of Soviet regime during the inter-war period showed that Estonia cleavages among the political parties implicitly existed.

Table 2

Cleavages in Estonia

Country	Major cleavages	Cleavages with secondary importance	Cleavages playing a marginal role
Estonia	Ethnic cleavages linked to communist anticommunist cleavage	Socio-economic cleavage, Urban-rural cleavage	Clerical/anti-clerical, Centre-periphery

Source: (Saarts 2011: 97).

In this part, it has to analyses the correlation between the party system and Ethnic Cleavages. As well, how various scholarly views and opinion on these issues differs and converge with each other. It was stated fact that "Ethnic minority's played a major role in the state politics in Estonia". In the process of politicization, cleavages based on ethnic split had contributed enough to this in

terms of evoking the question of minority, language and non- Estonian representations in the political Regime. Scholars like Saarts (2011) commend on Ethnic cleavages as follows "Central peculiarity of the ethno political configuration of post-communist Estonia laid in a striking discrepancy between the share of non-Estonians in the society and their under representation in all branches of power. It had created new social tensions in Estonia; expressed as denying citizenship and disfranchisement of more than 2, 50,000 non-Estonians in early 1990s. However, the subsequent attempted to do de-naturalizing the issue of ethnic cleavage but did not contribute for non-Estonians to achieve a degree of representation in the national Parliament that would be proportional to their share in the society. There were few Ethnic parties in Estonia such as Estonia's Russian parties (United People's Party, ONPE; Russian Party of Estonia, RPE) failed to retain the accommodative space for non-Estonian population both on the national and the local level, as Russian deputies used to be elected through nation-wide parties. This tendency of distrust on Russian electorate towards political leaders and parties had translated itself into disbelief towards the whole party system. It might have given the situation that alienation from political life at every level resonated through fallout in voter turnout" (Saarts 2011: 93; Tolvaisis 2011: 57-58).

The idea of cleavages between the national elites and its counter parts had been constant phenomenon across the political spectrum of Estonia's political regime. These trends exhibit crucial configurations that the majority of the political elite's possibility to access the polity depends upon the structure of political chance available to Estonia's Russian community. It also attributed to the trends that Estonia is a parliamentary republic hence parliamentary elections tend to be one of the determining political course of the country. The idea of underlying principles in defining citizens, language and migrations policies was never been a

bone of contention in the debates of all the major nation-wide parties for the beginning two decades. Raun (2009) endorses the above statement by saying that "based on ethnic primordial foresight of Estonian nation-state, commitment to a tough procedure of naturalization and Estonian language requirements for employees of both public and private sector never been the central theme of attention for major political party".

For last decade, Estonian nation-wide party had not done any substantial or significant policy strategies regarding minority problems. Few scholars suggested that Estonian political parties has classified into three groups based on the political practice of these parties, especially in relation to ethnic issues and tactical problem associated with minority electorate. The first group consists of *right-wing parties* focusing g on their attention on language, citizenship and other ethnic-related issues. It was observed that "many provisions of rigid legislation on citizenship and language were started by the political leadership of these parties, the Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica". The second group namely *the Social Democratic Party,* express its concern towards pragmatic issues; this attitude supports the problem of non-Estonian population in amicable way than rigid ideological lens and finally, *right-wing liberal Reform Party* demonstrated the event of factional politics at times by creating the tension between non-Estonian electorate as Russian members and Estonian members as indigenous group. The Reform Party was the first to float the idea of Russian faction which extended the Program on National Minorities. It also stated that the third classification of parties includes the group that who are safeguarding the rights of minority groups. The Estonian Centre Party was considered as the only nationwide party; it systematically maintains the professional relation with the Russian electorate. Hence the study observed on electoral outcome and voting pattern shows that Russian voters constitute its significant support base for this

party. It might be the allegation of fact that the Estonian Centre Party tend to exploit the "Russian electorate's disapproval of right-wing parties presenting itself as the only alternative" (Minahan 2004: 24; Tolvaišis 2011: 57).

Moreover, the factors like Alliances strategies, voting pattern, and representation are the key tool for any ethnic community to promote themselves at the national level. In Estonia, this has been identified by analyzing the participation of political parties where they establish ethnic community symbol as their scoring point. Further Alatalu (2008) describes about anti-communist cleavage as follows; "After the independence of the Republic of Estonia during 1991, the pro-Moscow Communist Party of Estonia in alliance with the Communist party of Soviet Union had done enormous effort to re-model its political structures. It was stated that the independent Communist Party of Estonia publicly declared the Memorandum in favor of adhering to new constitution and participated in the general elections of 1992, as a constituent member of the electoral alliance. The Alternative left collaboration held the premier positions in the Supreme Council but its list consisting only of 14 candidates. The Alternative Left candidates had gained a total of 7,374 votes or 1.61 percent of all votes. Vaino Valjas, leader of the Communist Party (1988-95) had got a chance to be re-elected but his seat was forcefully taken over by his former assistant Vambola Poder. He pitched for winning in parliament election, keeping the flag of the Royalists, an unpredictable populist electoral alliance made Poder gained 4,153 votes against Valjas 2,670 votes. The total list of Royalist in the parliament election had acquired 32,638 votes and 8 seats and among the winners there was another CPE CC lecture Tonu Korda was elected. The right party's election campaign was more acute and intensive but it considered being propaganda campaign where the slogan of 'Sweep' became a symbol of victory. The election result showed that in the first round of presidential elections Arnold Ruutel that moved away himself

from the CPE in 1989-90, again is victorious with a 42 percent of vote with popular support. Scholars emphasized that it all happened because of their personalities and readiness to act and their manner to conduct (Alatalu 2008: 178).

However, few anti-Communist propaganda might have spread in all forthcoming elections campaigns. They have occupied a weak position before the 1995 common elections as following this; the right wing forces also lost its winning chance. The return of right wing force to power was an effect of numerous specific anti-communist campaigns and propaganda. For example in the month October, 1998 a few members of former Komsomol activists set the stage to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the foundation of this organization but then a group of intellectuals mobilized a public for campaigning against it. Due to this hindrance, the event was conducted behind the closed doors. This might be the last anti-communist party campaign (Alatalu 2008: 179). Meanwhile, the official successor of the CPE had lost his say over other issues, the protagonist who were against communism; changed their focus of attacks against former communists in the Estonian Centre Party. Perhaps, it became popularly known that the incipient post-communist party was not capable to profuse their theoretical stance. Prime Minister *Mart Laar,* keep on igniting the general mood against Communists by declaring that his government was purely a non-Communist or even anti-Communist. It was observed that "the main reason for the disabilities of the EDLP was that a time for such a kind of party was over in Estonia" (Brady and Kaplan 2001: 349).

Rural and Urban Divide

There are many aspects available in dealing with the question of conflict in Estonia; the most prominent approach is that the political conflict among the

urban and rural people. The disparity of rural-urban economy might be a reason behind salient political division in Estonia. It was observed that in the earlier stage of the formations of party system formation, urban rural cleavage was completely nonexistent in Estonia but it has attracted significance in the recent past though the substantial change happening in terms of quality of life in the cities and rural areas. However, most of the budget was allocated to improve the major urban areas (Siaroff 2000: 236; Bennich and Bjorkman 2007: 341-344).

The *Estonian Coalition party* (EK) was ambitious in setting up as a single party before 1999 elections, for uniting the larger Coalition and Rural People's Union (KMU) alliance. It is noteworthy to emphasis that the KMU itself was established for the sake of 1995 elections and garnered the issues for effective campaigning which was related to agricultural subsidies and increased social expenditure on farming. Along with KMU, there were an antecedent Coalition Party; *the Estonian Rural Union (EM)*, and the *Estonian Rural People's Party (EME).* This coalition was materialized by previous managers of small and medium size agencies of state enterprises and therefore accommodated more former members of the Communist Party which was established in the year 1991. The EM also organized its first committee meeting in the year 1989 which consists of many members who were closely tied with the rural wing of the Communist Party. The EPPL addressed the issues of pensioners and invalids in Estonia. The Coalition Party, EM, and EPPL had participated in the 1992 elections under the *Safe Home rubric* (Ibid).

Pickles and Smith argued that the trend of "Estonia's post-independence government that brought neo-liberal free market reforms have continuously and proudly refused to support the agrarian sector with subsidies advocating that this would be inconsistent with their avowed policy of maximizing competition and

minimizing state indulgence in the economy" (Pickles and Smith. et. al. 2001: 295). It is not surprising fact that beneficiaries of economic changes since 1991 more likely to be helpful for the people who stays in urban areas and working in the service sector, specifically in the capital region of Tallin. The voice of support for the reform party came heavily from the urban settings than the rural. Scholars suggested that the class divisions might have surfaced rapidly in urban communities than in the rural areas (Pickles and Smith. et. al. 2001: 296).

It is obvious fact that the divide between urban and rural is widening, due to the complication involved in political, economic and social process. The above analysis shows that the communist and anti-communist variations may effectively merged with the ethnic cleavage and also depict numerous factors such as "the absence or marginality of the communist-successor parties, the weakness of the left-wing parties, which make the party competition to be ideologically unbalanced and strongly inclined to the right". The framework of our analysis has borrowed from sociological approaches which focus on the social base of party support, stress on the cleavages and divides in the given society and as well looking its implication on the party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Ware 1996).

Trames (2016) propounded four major cleavages for Western European countries as follows; "Class cleavage (also known as socio-economic cleavage), church-state cleavage, centre-periphery cleavage and urban-rural cleavage". The following logics emphasis the crucial relation between social cleavage and party system; First, it is logical to assume that if the class cleavage is highly expressed in given analysis, Social Democratic parties are expected to perform its best. Second, if the urban-rural cleavage is quite dominant, agrarian parties would take a lead role in elections, etc. The above preposition offer a clue that the cleavages

constellations has taken into consideration for analysing the outcome such as which types of parties and party families would emerge, what would be the shape of the party system and whether it produces less or more ideologically balanced party competition. The aforementioned considerations make cleavages the central category for our analysis, because we assume that the absence of post-communist parties and the unbalanced party competition would be mainly a by-product of specific cleavage constellations" (Trames 2016: 119). Looking at the cleavage structure in Estonia in the post-independence period, we can clearly see that ethnicity, ideology, the urban-rural division and the religion constituted the emerging political and party preferences.

Influence of Social Cleavages on Coalition Politics in Estonia

As we have discussed earlier about the aspects of Social cleavage both theoretically and substantially in the context of Estonia. In this part, we attempt to detail out the relation of social cleavage and coalition politics in Estonia. The conceived notion of coalition politics is path way to comprehending the nuance aspects of party systems, as well party formations. The aspects of political party might not be given lesser scope in this frame of analysis since it focuses on coalition politics. It is obvious fact that coalition politics and party system are intertwined with each other both conceptually and empirically. For instance, like party systems' nature co-exist with institutional norms and weighed by non-institutional factors such as by the "number, types, and strength of societal cleavages, with institutional parameters play either an insignificant or inconsistent role" (Hassan 2013: 668). In the Estonian context, the impact of social cleavages on coalition politics can be explored by looking into the range of "fragmentation, polarization, citizen party ties, strength of organizational structure, government stability, etc".

In Estonia, social class identities as primary factors which might have not expressed properly in showing positive move towards party loyalties during the initial phases of post-communist transition. Here, socio-cultural identities played a crucial role than the class identities. Moreover, political groups which worked for theoretical benefit of social groups but immediately following the political changes; those articulations disappeared since lacking in institutional support for expressing the same concern. Hence, the category of Class tend be weak indicator of analyzing electoral pattern. The basic factors such as age, education, union membership and in particular, religion, initial stimuli of political competition and creation of party preferences became the bone of contention in translating the cleavage into part. Hence the perennial problem exists as of medium and short range or low politics; these trends dominated the political agenda of the incipient independent state. In this background, social cleavages started to be crucial factors in understanding the development of party preferences (Kulik and Pshizova 2005: 124).

Later period of 1990's, few popular and relatively large parties begin to erupt in Estonia. These consists of *Popular Front* (1988) later became *Centre Party* (1991); the *market liberal Reform Party* (1994), *the national-conservative Pro Patria Union* (1995); *the rural People's Union* (1989); and *the Social Democrats* (1990), later came to be known as *the Moderates* (Tamm 2013: 5). The rise of specific and numerous types of parties could be perceived as the reflection of cleavage constellations as well. For instance, the rigorous position of successor parties might solidify the communist-anti-communist cleavage and vice versa, etc. The obvious evidence for the above preposition is that absence of communist successor parties or their marginal position in Estonian party politics proves it right. The *Estonian Socialist Labour Party* (later called the Leftist Party) put an effort to garner few representations in the parliament, it had acquired only with 2

percent of the seats in 1999 and in the later election they did not get any seats (Toomla 2005).

Moreover, it may be highly illogical to consider these parties as classical successor-parties but they could be considered rather as ethnic parties (*Estonian Leftist Party* joined with many ethnic Russian parties in 2008. The *Estonian Social Democratic Party* has usually obtained only 10 to 15 percent of votes and only recently has gained more popularity (Estonian National Electoral Committee 2015). There are lot of party affiliations has had gone drastic changes. For example, the most popular left-wing party in Estonia, *the Centre Party*, claimed as a social-liberal party. However, as per *The Manifesto Project* (2015) database, the Centre Party labelled as a left-wing party (not as a *classical centrist party)* and it has been identified even more left-wing than the *Estonian Social Democratic Party* (Pettai, Auers, and Ramonaite 2011, Saarts 2011). Both the Social Democrats and the Centre Party have formed their own government at several times, but the major coalitions have been always led by right-wing parties (Pettai, Auers, and Ramonaite 2011).

The political parties which are associated with social cleavages might have yield data for analysis of coalition politics. The parameters like Voter turnout, electoral volatility and party membership are visible indicators to analyses coalition politics. It was observed that, from 1990 to 1996, Estonia witnessed the Changing loyalty to institutional positions which affect behavior of confidence as well. This might have happened due to restoration of the national state and the progress of civil society. It was suggested by scholars that one such pattern would allowed the acceptance of citizen rights and facilitated the platform for the development of new institutions. Hence, the ties between parties and citizens can be called as moderate. Timma and Rammer explained about changing loyalty in

Institutions as follows; "In the year 1990, when Estonia was still a de jure part of the Soviet Union trust in institutions was concentrated largely between the two ethnic communities with regard to the Estonian governmental and soviet institutions. In 1992, when Estonia had become independent, levels of trust in institutions that played an important role in achieving Estonian Independence had reduced while trust in institutions that were neutral in politics such as Church remained stable. Trust in politicized institutions like political parties and parliament was also low in 1996" (Timma and Rammer 2006: 304).

Estonia have gained the idea of institutional setting from Soviet era, it had built in a way that shows its heterogeneous nature of society. Hence, it bound to facilitate a potentially strong basis for the arising conflict of ethnic divisions between parties. In fact, ethnic Russian parties might have experienced extremely difficult situation to cross the 5% election threshold in every election since independence. Even in the 1995 and 1999 elections, when these parties were about to achieve parliamentary representation but their share of vote was miniscule than the size of the Russians peaking electorate.[6] Hence, there were possibilities that the majority of Russian speakers tend to vote often for the mainstream 'Estonian' parties. For this kind of experience about electoral pattern, the Centre Party was the first to get benefit from this kind of situations. Later, it might have followed by the Moderates, the Reform Party, and Res Publica, which have also been vocal in influencing the 'Russian vote'. However, the lacunae of the ethnic Russian parties had a less impact in determining the vote sharing at the larger level of nationalist parties. It was observed that none of them could yield parliamentary representation since Estonia's has had witnessed

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[6] According to the 2000 Population and Housing Census, the share of Russian-speaking citizens was about 15%, while ethnic Russian parties gained 5.9% of votes in 1995, 8.2% in 1999 and only 2.4% in 2003.

free elections in 1992. Mikkel (2003) argued that "the swift resolution of the independence issue and institutional bar on ethnically based party creation during the beginning stages of the transition, combined with the successful strive of the established Estonian parties to broaden their electoral manifestation to Russian voters, created effective hurdles to the birth of strong ethnic parties".

Scholars made a comment that Estonia's fundamental reform policies might have created an ambience of high social inequality and inflict the conditions where many voters might have experience the form of poverty and deprivation. This might have been given scope for left parties to widen their base basis. However, the real scenario might be completely different: the left-wing parties revealed its stakes are very less in Estonia. One of the communist successors as Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party made only a less success rate in parliament since the 1999 elections that too elected in a joint list together with the United People's Party of Estonia. The Moderates who claim to be a modern social democratic, have been facing difficulties in addressing the question of identity, but having aligned with right-wing governments throughout the 1990s and extending their support for all neo-liberal policies. In the indicator of election result as well, it shows poor result in the recent (2002) local elections and very low profile for reaching the required 5 percent threshold for parliamentary representation, so it pressurised the Moderates to alter the gear which clearly shift to the left with their programme and agenda. Hence, the other mainstream parties were able to raise the issues by themselves, leaving the Estonian party spectrum which they consider largely unproductive and taking the electorate in their grip of control that left-wing ideas are not even worth contemplating (Ibid: 2).

It was observed that few social institutions in the initial phase of the transition (*independence, ethnicity, de-communization*) had the potential for determining

party cleavages, since the Estonian political process has been featured as high order of practicality on the domain of mainstream political actors. Perhaps, Sooner or later the opposing parties also have identified some common grounds for cooperation and coalition-building. Though, the critical differences might have erupted between leaders that has contributed significant, often predominant role in post-communist environments. However, this has not caused any surpassing hurdles for such cooperation; the suitable example of being a coalition government of the Centre Party and the Reform Party. Mikkel (1998) observed that "these parties would have expected a viable coalition involving between Centre Party leaders Edgar Savisaar. However, the actual result was a comfortably working government of two parties and party leaders (Savisaar and his Reform Party counterpart Siim Kallas) who were, in many ways, diametrically opposites".

The party system in Estonia has had undergone few considerable changes in terms of consolidation since independence. From 1991 to 2014, the total number of recognized political parties has shown a declining curve because of new electoral reforms. During this period, parties might have attained greater organizational strength and each affiliated with broad political positions. *The Reform party*, *Pro Patria* and *Res Publica* have moved towards the Centre-right pro market lineage and bared government position. While the *Centre party*, *the Social Democratic party* and *the People's Union party* are supposedly more pertinent to the issues of social justice (Richard 2012: 207). Moreover, it was accepted fact that Parties which occupies greater organizational capacity tend to be shown positive sign with the indicators of moderate institutionalization.

The trend of ideological difference and its political formation also played a vital role in the deciding the factors for Coalition politics. Toomla explained as follows.

> Ideological divisions in Estonia have surfaced due to socio-economic dimensions and cultural ethnic framework. Based on the socio-economic dimensions parties were classified into Leftist, Centre-left, Centre right and rightist parties. The difference between the right and the left side is based on the attitude of parties towards a market economy. Those on the right or Centre-right have the programmed ideal of a market economy society. The left wing with its flank had the main goal to resist the negative influences of the market economy on the Estonian society. The difference between the rightist and Centre-right parties is that the Reform party favors the model of a liberal market economy while the Centre-right parties argue a social market economy. The United People's party is erected on the Centre-left based on their own self-identification. Among the Centre- right parties, the Centre party lies on the left wing of the group and Pro patria on the right wing. This order is based on the tax policy structure of the parties. The Centre party strongly inclined towards the establishment of a graduated tax, the Popular Union and the Moderates have opined this view more mildly and the Coalition party and Pro Patria Union was convinced supporters of proportional taxation (Toomla 2001: 142).

The heterogeneous economic structure and the range of socio-economically varied constituencies within Estonian society as broad and complex, these complexities made the political parties to tune with broad ideas. Thus the *Reform party* resonates itself as the liberal, market friendly party, and the *Centre party* is assumed to be as party of social justice. Only the *agrarian People's Union party* openly voice out a single constituency. It was suggested that the fluid socio-economic situation in countries allowed parties to delve deeply into the process of economic transformation, so stable party system takes its own time to crystallize (Richard 2012: 207). The matter of stability slowly tends to appear in Estonian party system.

The previous part, we have discussed about the socio-economic factors and how it influences the party system. In this section, we discuss about Cultural-ethnic aspects and its influence in party system. Cultural-ethnic are significant parameter in which political parties often takes very nuanced positions which might easily paved the way to form opinion about various parties. The three parties; *United People's Party, Russian Unity Party* and *Russian Party* in Estonia have set the stage to deal with the question of culture. These parties attempt to reflect the interests of the Russian speaking population in Estonia as considered to be one of their primary agenda. A major shift has been forced upon voters when reconstitution of party interest expresses in the form of supply, that too contesting in a given election. Hence it tends to creating floating parties than in turn of expecting floating voters. It was suggested by scholars that "the disappearance of parties between elections and the emergence of new political offerings to the electorate account for the shift in voting patterns to a greater extent than volatility among the parties that continue to compete from election to election. This has indeed resulted in the reforming of party system in Estonia" (Munro, et. al. 2001: 427).

Social Cleavage structure in India

India's extraordinary social heterogeneous nature can be easily expressed its difference in regional, linguistic, ethnic, religious, economic and most distinctively caste and its produce and reproduce multiple and cutting edge of cleavages. India's political institutions are quite unique in anthropological sense but it's similar to those of many western democracies through the prism of comparative politics. It is obvious and repeated notions that the country's social diversity strongly effects the development of the party system where political organisational pattern and electoral strategies of political parties, that are starkly varies from other parliamentary federal systems. The diversity and institutional

notions of the polity might have given scope for understanding it as plural in appurtenance but not sharply polarized party system at the national level. It also led to a process of flourishing wide and often complex array of political parties. Scholars commend that "India's pluralism is of moderate variety not one of unmanageable extremes that might take the policy towards disintegration. However, the moderate extreme centrifugal tendencies are forcing parties and groups to compromise" (Sridharan and Varshney 2004). India has been known as the most socially diverse country in the world, with cleavages like religious, linguistic, caste, tribal, rural-urban, and class. Caste and class cleavages are related to each other; upper castes might have represented disproportionately the higher classes while the lower castes likely to represent disproportionately the lowest classes often noted. These understanding of cleavages tend to depict a picture of the larger diversity. India's religious variations are also multitude in nature such as *Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Sikhism, Jainism* and *Zoroastrianism* (Pre-Islamic Persian) of whom Hinduism and Islam have the largest number of followings.

These vast diverse in religions, languages, ethnic and tribal groups, castes of India allows the societal norms to be frictional in functioning which often turn to be grooming plight for inter-group conflict. For instance, religion acted as basis for social tension of the Sikhs in Punjab in the year 1986-87. In Uttar Pradesh, the Hindu claim of their temple site within a mosque had given rise to the cold blood shed of Hindu-Muslim riots. Not only religion is the source of social conflict. For example, in the terrain of language issues, violence erupted over the status of the *Konkani language* in Goa, and Tamilnadu witnessed a re-emergence of anti-Hindi agitation. In the domain of Ethnicity, *Naga* and *Mizo* insurrections occurred and the *Gorkhaland* demand for a separate state. Caste 'wars' are widespread tendency in Bihar, with castes such as the *Bhumihars, Rajputs,*

Kurmis and *Yadavs* organizing *Senas* (groups of armed men) for safeguarding their interest of caste purity and to achieve economic benefit. In western India, farmers demanded better terms of trade through the *Shetkari Sangathan* (Chhibber and Petrocik 1989: 192).

This form of divisions and conflicts might be too easy to exaggerate. However, the uniqueness of India cannot be characterized only based on the extreme form of conflicts. It is obvious that equivalent social differences might have ignited inter-group conflict in most societies but the significant aspects of salient differences lies in; castes within religion, language within class, religion, class within language, class within caste, caste within language, etc. The above mentioned cleavages and their divisiveness as well bridge the relation between social cleavages and party support. Scholars argued that "from the point of view of the social cleavage theory of party systems, the Indian parties, especially the Congress, are anomalous". Moreover, the aspects of religion, language, caste, class and ethnic differences tend to shed away the claims on individuals. However, as a political party-the Congress enjoyed the support of a large number of the electorates in the earlier decades. In the beginning four decades and eight general elections, both in terms of the percentage of the vote sharing and the seats occupied in Parliament; it had continuously out floored its rival parties. In the political history of congress, It had lost control of forming national regime only once, and then only for a short period. It was assumed by political commentators that its opponents have never forged a stable challenge (Ibid: 192).

Most students of politics might have predicted the structural effect and development of parties on other larger democracies. In the context of India's political settings, the dominance of the Congress prevailed for quite long period of time. The idea of social differences might yield bonding as well and gave

scope for political parties who can make use of demographic fault lines; a party's members and supporters might have drawn from a few groups, sometimes associated with single group only. Other societies are less sharply characteristics of social fragmentation exist and it might have given scope for less aligned party systems.[7] Lijphart (1978) argued that "in these systems, the followers of any given party were religiously, ethnically, racially, linguistically and economically heterogeneous; no group, however defined, represented more than a fraction of a party's believers". This relationship between the   social characteristics and partisanship might vary accordingly with the counts of followers, their attitudes and political effect of its cleavages. Hence it is from the context of this relationship that India is anomalous. It was suggested by scholars that the extreme form of social stratification seem to be ineffective in determining party preference (Lipset 1983: 1).

Kothari (1964) offers explanation which highlight the Congress's role as a heterogeneous, catch-all, centrist party, which has established its base in the background of independence movement. In his own words, he expressed as follows; "Congress existing as a coalition of interests; this character of congress cuts across major ethnic, regional and class barriers, not because it was really functional as a heterogeneous, catch-all party, but because of the fame and its leaders struggle in the independence movement allowed it to appeal for retaining voters and groups who were first gather into mass politics remain intact with congress for longer period of time. Finally, Kothari pointed out that the dominance of the party resonates and amplify the status and legitimacy of the formation of state itself, while its opposition, unable to claim such a historic past.

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[7] By 'aligned' party system we are denoting to party systems in which there is a strong correlation between social and demographic variables and party preference. By 'less aligned' we understand to indicate weak correlations.

Hence the opposition parties left to reflect the nuances of dissent and operate as political 'pressure valves' within the broad political consensus which the Congress party framed. The further explanation also comes out from an alternative theory which emphasis that the limitations of the leadership of the opposition parties. For instance, no opposition party leader can favor or articulate the interests of a represented group either because their leaders doesn't possess capacity to become prime minister or because they are prejudiced with personal vested interest. It was clearly evident in the break-up of the Janata coalition in 1979. Hence, it was a repercussion of competing personal ambitions of Janata leadership" (Kothari 1964: 19).

The Chhibber and Petrocik (1989) exhibited that "the social base of the Congress party conforms to the social cleavage theory of party systems". Scholars argued that the congress is conglomeration of state and its local parties which varies profusely among themselves in the groups and interests they tend to reflect. While analysing its followers, the Congress seems to be several parties in its interest, this denotes- it accommodates some section of the members at one region that is at odds with its social foundations in other regions. At the level of national frame, a Congress supporter hails from a mixture of social classes, occupational groups, religions and languages. However, by looking into the local configuration of power structure; one can easily come to conclusion that electoral support of the Congress seems to be quite homogeneous. As authors noted to describe that the Congress considered as a heterogeneous, national party of consensus, representing all groups, is formally accurate but significantly miscalculated. A more apt explanation comes from Sisson (1972), he observed that "the national Congress is organized into mutually exclusive factional coalitions which inclined to nucleate around a dominant leader or faction which has its own regional base of political support". The fragmentations of Indian

society are quite visible only if we take the national level trend as this parameter. For instances, mass political mobilization might take place, whereas, they remain hide at the national level, thus allowed the Congress to emerge (inaccurately) as a heterogeneous centre party of consensus.

It was suggested by scholars that the demographic heterogeneity of Congress party has had another probable explanations. Chhibber and Petrocik illustrated the above explanations in a much more nuanced form. It has follows; "A persistent, concerted Congress party beginning to project the Congress Prime Minister as the only national figure has reinforced the trust that opposition leaders' representatives of sectarian, and perhaps divisive, interests are too limited to provide political leadership to the whole nation. Both explanations have merit. From the point of view of the social cleavage theory, however, their strength is also their weakness: they invoke unique features of Indian political history to explain India's deviation from traditional path. Our grasping, on the other hand, illustrates significant consistency between the structure of party support in India and the social cleavage theory. The key to finding the correspondence is in the level of the political system at which one examines the relation between party preference and social character" (Chhibber and Petrocik 1989: 195).

Influence of Social Cleavages on Coalition Politics in India
Cleavages in Indian society as argued earlier denotes a constructive and enduring form of division in society, which social elements characterise themselves and may facilitate the process of political mobilization. It was assumed that Cleavages based on class and ethnicity tends to bifurcate the society and its functions. The revolving debates around the question of class might cause confusion for the analysis. Firstly, class identifies a specific kind of status group

which carved out by a particular life styles, tastes, and sensibilities. It is expressed by non-economic factors of social cleavage such as caste, religion or ethnicity. Secondly, it is noteworthy to mention that these symptoms are not defined by subjectively significant attributes of a social location, but rather by the association of people towards income generating resources or assets of various kinds. However, the system of inequality produced by their relationship to these resources, and lifestyles in turn may be projected as significant identities. Thirdly, class articulates the nuance of economic cleavages in society that might led to overt conflicts. It is obvious that inequalities in terms of economic opportunities tend to generate antagonisms of interest. Finally, class creates conscious awareness which might fuel the struggles against exploitation and oppressions. This is considered to be much more complex, normatively contentious and dense question. Scholars argues that "By virtue of the nature of the cleavage on which the conflict is based, contain the capacity to change the very nature of the game itself" (Misra, Palai and Das 2006: 4). Some sociologists pressed that if class is withering away then people tend to produce and articulate stable identities in class terms and thus less likely to focus their political approach on the basis of class, while others suggests that class always an ever ending character of contemporary society. It's pointed out that a person's economic prospects around one's own life always rely up on their close connection to economically valuable products of various sorts (Ibid: 5).

Here, let us analyze the substantial focus of our study. India's cleavage structure has observed as crosscutting than dispersed, but a lens of comparison between colonial and postcolonial India depicts that we cannot claim the trends of the emergence of ethnic parties as post-colonial phenomenon. In colonial India, the rift between the *Muslim League,* which represented as Muslims, and the *Indian National Congress,* identified with Hindu majority, was not inconsistent with the

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outcome of the present model. The *Muslim League,* in the earlier period operated intimate to the power center, which had raised more advanced positions regarding the issues of territorial freedom for Muslims. This erupted as violent partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947. After independence, politics has been shaped by concomitant by parties which also smaller in content followed by centrist pattern. Hence, India's cleavage structure was crosscutting in both scenarios. To the extent we can say that India's crosscutting cleavage structure as a constant pattern so it is difficult to explain the difference in outcomes for the longer durations. Scholars argued that "the opinion builds on the insights that cross cutting cleavages are supposed to moderate ethnic outbidding. Indeed, it assumes but it is the institutionalization of such cleavages, rather than the mere fact of their existence, that explains the difference in democratic results in India and elsewhere" (Chandra 2005: 239).

In India, political parties articulate their response not only to safeguard the interests of social cleavages but content of the party also remains the same in a concealed form. Group identities tend to affect the attitudes and interests of the political parties hence group identities do contribute to the changing pattern of voting system in India, but that cleavage structures decides the formation of political parties and count of the same as well. In a way, these ways of unfolding relation between social cleavage and political interests might influence how people cast their vote. Social classes eventually reproduce their attitudes and voting pattern in India. For instance, the parents are cleverer in passing their partisanship attitude to their children. Partisanship should not consider being only an attitude, but also a significant result of crucial political behaviours. Moreover, it can be identified easily that if voters are assumed to be rational actors then their electoral choices also will represent the interests of the groups to whom they are acquainted. For example, if these groups held a concrete political

position i.e., a decent political party reflect their query, then voters would love to vote for them. Hence Vote and attitudes are highly intertwined phenomenon. It is accepted fact that the attitudes are, at least partially, influenced by social group membership. So the entire country need not be attributed as homogenous entity; that even in apparently similar regions there can be differences in group attitudes and voting. Few Scholars expressed their views as follows.

> The sociological explanation of voting behaviour holds very often when there are strong parties representing the interests of the relevant social groups. There is no party representing particular religious interests in any of the part of India. Parties competing for their vote in regions having strong religious cleavages allow us to better test the influence of religiosity on vote. The partisan strength can be conceptualized in many different aspects, including attitudinal stability, support intensity, as well as the following political behaviour that was influenced such as electoral stability (Misra, Palai and Das 2006: 5).

The social cleavage theory has provided the basic model for analysis of electoral behaviour and party systems all over the developed world. However, doubts have been raised in regard to its relevance to societies like India. Chhibber and Petrocik (1989: 194-210) in a major contribution to political party study in India noted that though the Indian society is divided into a series of ethnic and apparently conflicting groups based on language, religion, caste and community, cleavages in the Indian society appear to play marginal role at the national level electoral contests.

The Indian society is moving in the direction of social fragmentation on the basis of identity and sub-identity politics and multiple political parties for the representation of social identity and seminary interests of diverse social groups have been established to participate in politics. It is logical that the ongoing process of fragmentation of the society is accelerating the process of fragmentation and multiplication of parties. It was not without reason that the

BJP-led NDA (1999-2004) had as many as 24 constituent parties and groups with a pure regionalist party and the Lok Sabha elections had been contested by forty five parties and groups. The fragility of such alliances of opportunism becomes clear (Bhambri 2005: 9). When Congress-led UPA coalition government formed at centre, DMK was a major ally of this coalition government. However, for example due to DMK relation with LTTE, after the Jain Commission reports on Rajiv Gandhi's assassination I. K. Gujral lost its government. A pretentious philosophy propounded by the contemporary politician is that there can be no permanent friends or permanent enemies in politics or that is nothing right or wrong in politics (Kaushik and Raman in Chaube and Kaushik (eds.) 1999: 211). In the emergence of coalition politics in India the party system transformation from dominance of one party to a multi-party configuration has at least one desirable consequence. The regionalisation of the party system has articulated the federal features of the Indian political system that had remained rather suppressed during the congress dominance.

In India the roots of coalition politics can be traced back to India's social order with immense social and regional diversities. The coalition governments in India have by and large remained stable under conditions of polarization of parties in a coalition with dominant partners (Saxena 1998: 11-12). India has four types of coalition: right-dominated, left-dominated, centre-dominated and amorphous. In India regional parties in coalition politics and governments become a game of selfish, opportunist, power hungry and unscrupulous politicians who had to look after nothing but their personal interests (Singh 2006: 53). Regarding this opportunism Bhasin opines 'parliamentary government and coalition do not go together' (Srivastava 2005: 14).

The political shops clearly reveals that caste, sub-caste, region, sub-region leaders have emerged to have a share of power in the central government on the basis of spurious clams of representing group identity aspirations (Bhambhari 2005: 9). The party system typically mirrors the complexity of social cleavages along lines of religion, caste, language and region to produce a multi-party system (Mitra and Singh 1999: 134). The multi-party politics has inevitably led to multi cornered contests and it has seriously undermined the popular mass base of the dominant party congress(I), which ruled India, 1952-1989 with majority status, but not with a majority support base (Sastry 2000: 230). This also played a crucial role in erosion of a single dominant party and as a result of multi-party system became competitive since 1990s (Shastri 1997: 7). "India's party system has undergone a transformation and beginning of the 21st century have witnessed it growing fragmentation of society because political class has openly taken recourse to sectarian social mobilization" (Chhibber and Nooruddin in Roy and Wallace (eds.) 1999: 36).

This shift from one-party dominant to a multi-party coalitions from the dominant ideology of nation state and political ideology of national building to the assertion of ethno-religious identities, resurgence of newly empowered social groups and realignment and reconfiguration of castes (Prakash 2001: 29). India is a multi-cultural, multi languages, multi-religious, secular democratic and federal country, where social diversity has been given a legal space to celebrate its existence, as a secular country of the world Indian's political scenario is known for its pluralism and the entire society exhibits various levels of pluralism in different walks of life (Tarkunde 2003: 7).

In the wake of changing political scenario, the multi-party system with the dominance of a single party soon gave way to political plurality. This

development was a natural consequence of the diverse Indian Diasporas. Awakening of aspirations of regional, linguistic and cultural level several political and social diversities come to the force articulating ethnic, caste religious and the like factors. As a logical corollary various new political identities come to thrive mainly on regional consciousness (Stokes in Bhandery (ed.) 2000: 10). The regional consciousness is differing from state to state and coalition system is the one and only system that could comfortably accommodate by regional political parties. Coalition compulsions of power-sharing and political accommodation need to be seen as emergence of a new level of political consciousness and maturity of judgement, on the part of the voters (Majeed 2000: 2).

The emergence of electoral coalitions across Indian states lies in the primacy of social identity in Indian electoral politics. In India caste has played a major role in Indian politics since independence, particularly at the state level. Apart from caste, religion and regional identity have also been key cleavage dimensions in some states. In general, social cleavage plays a prominent role in electoral politics in India through a variety of avenues. For example, identity enters the strategic calculations of political parties in terms of which voters to target. Strategies that target specific social groups have been used frequently and overtly in the national and sub national context in India. Identity has also been a basis for candidate selection by political parties. Social cleavage is also an important determinant of voter attachments in India. A case study through electoral survey data indicates that several states show a high degree of correlation in the vote choice of individual members within particular social groups. Identity has also been one of the dimensions through which patronage has often been distributed in India. Several ethnic parties also exist at the regional level to represent interests of one or more specific castes (Chandra 2004). In short, social cleavages

have been the fundamental axis along which Indian electoral politics has been organized since independence.

Comparison of Estonia and India

Estonia has managed to balance its political base though it had a loose party system and uncertain voting patterns. This trend has had changed over a period of time. The political phase completely took a new turn wherein new political parties came up with various political agenda pitching behind the old political parties. It is asserted that "politically relevance in approaching cleavages been floated strongly in this form of society". The question of cleavages attributes to different aspects like the historical, transitional and contemporary. In Estonia, ethnic cleavage became sharp focus of divide with a communist and anti-communist cleavage and it also reflected in the party competition. The socio-economic cleavage might have played an auxiliary role or has been combined with the latter-mentioned dominant cleavages. It was well articulated debate on the question of urban-rural cleavage during 1990's but recent years it has lost its ground. Saarts (2011) pointed out that the Clerical/anti-clerical cleavage might have not played a crucial role in Estonia polity since Estonian society was supposedly to be one of the most secular in Europe

On the other hand, India's extraordinary social heterogeneous nature can be easily expressed its difference in regional, linguistic, ethnic, religious, economic and most distinctively caste and its produce and reproduce multiple and cutting edge of cleavages. India's political institutions are quite unique in anthropological sense but it's similar to those of many western democracies through the prism of comparative politics. It is obvious and repeated notions that the country's social diversity strongly effects the development of the party system where political organisational pattern and electoral strategies of political

parties, that are starkly varies from other parliamentary federal systems. The diversity and institutional notions of the polity might have given scope for understanding it as plural in appurtenance but not sharply polarized party system at the national level. It also led to a process of flourishing wide and often complex array of political parties. India has been known as the most socially diverse country in the world, with cleavages like religious, linguistic, caste, tribal, rural-urban, and class. These cleavages give a good sense of the larger diversity.

Both in Estonia and India, the post-independence phase saw a significant progress in terms of the democratic institutions like political parties, party system and democratic stability. However, in the Estonian and Indian context the influence of social cleavages on coalition politics can be conceived in understanding the various range of fragmentation, polarization, citizen party ties, strength of organizational structure, government stability, etc. The Estonian and Indian political parties are characterised by strong fragmentation, less ideological polarization, and sense of stability. In Estonia and India, the total number of effective and active parliamentary/electoral parties shows the rate of exponential curve in its progress graph. Hence, the level of institutionalization considering to be moderate and it facilitating the process of consolidation democratic values in Estonia and India.

The next chapter examines in detail about the legal and institutional regulations, political parties, party system, electoral system and output of political parties, the connection between voters and parties and the role of political parties in government formation in the context of Estonia and India.

Chapter 4

Party System, Electoral Process and Government Formation in Estonia and India

In a democracy the party system, electoral process and government formation are an indispensable aspect of coalition politics. The multi-party system consisting of political parties and electoral system is a necessary pre-condition of coalition politics. It plays an important role in strengthening social cohesion, integration and legitimacy within the state. This can be traced in both Estonia and India. Prior to independence Estonia was under Soviet occupation with one dominant political party and later resulted in the emergence of party system with new political parties. India on the other side experienced the colonial rule of the British prior to independence later resulted in the emergence of newly formed political parties. In order to overcome from the various kinds of instability, the democratic system consisting of party system, electoral system and government institutions were established. However, the chapter provides an overview of interpretation related to party system, electoral process and government formation in order to provide a broader understanding of coalition politics. It also provides a necessary insight on the political background of both Estonia and India by elaborating on political institutions and its functions. So that comparative discussion of coalition politics in Estonia and India can be achieved.

Party System in Estonia: Legal Framework and Organizational Structure

In Estonia the origin of moder party system can be traced to the rise of "Popular Front". The Front was an organization that was established by the reform oriented communists, and the Estonian dissidents. All these groups had their origin in the national movement. However the National Front fragmented into

many groups because of the heterogeneity of the participating groups, once it attained independence. Later, pluralism of political party emerged (Merkel 1999; Biechelt 2001). After independence Estonia's political spectrum began to crystallize. The Estonian congress and the PFE both were in essence pluralistic political formations. The Estonian Congress and Popular Front later on as a result split into multiple political parties. This disintegration of Popular Front and Congress gave birth to many moderate as well as centrist political parties and political and cultural formations. (Janusz 2002). From 1992 as the nationally viable parties emerged. Many small groups have have been successful in establishing a national base and many of them have been able to make their presence felt in the Parliament. However there is a also a trend that shows the political volaitility of the region this gets reflected in the fact political parties have a shifting electoral base. The vote share of political parties has swung dramatically. The following table shows the peculiar graph of coalition politics" (Sikk 2006; 109).

Table 3

Political Parties and the Evolution of Coalition Politics in Estonia after Independence

Political Party	Immediate predecessor	Earlier Predecessor	Original predecessor
Centre Party (1991)	Popular Front (1988)		

Pro Patria Union (1995)	Pro Patria (1992)	Christian Democratic Party (1988) Christian Democratic Union (1989) Conservative Popular Party (1990) Party of Republicans (1990)	
	National Independence Party (1988)		
Reform Party (1994)	Liberal Democratic Party (1990)	Popular Front (1988)	
Moderates	Moderates	Social Democratic Party (1990)	Popular Front (1988)
		Rural Centre Party (1990)	Popular Front (1988)
	Popular Party (1998)	Party of Conservatives and Republicans (1994)	Pro Patria (1992)
		Peasants Party (1994)	
Popular Union (2000)	Rural Union (1989) Country People's Party (1994) Party of Families and Pensioners		

	(1994)		
United People's Party (1994)	Russian Democratic Movement (1991)	Popular Front (1988)	
Progressive Party (1996)	Centre Party (1991)		
Social Democratic Labour Party (1997)	Democratic Labour Party (1992)	Communist Party of Estonia	
Independence Party (1999)	Future Party (1993)	Pro Patria (1992)	
Democratic Party (2000)	Blue Party (1994)		

Source: (Pettai and Toomla 2006)

Pettai and Toomla (2006) analyzed as follows; "The Pro Partia Union (1995) was the by product from the two former nationalist groupings; the Pro Patria party and the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP). The ENIP was Estonia's foremost opposition party created from the anti-Soviet dissident movement in 1988. It campaigned in favor of a restorations approach to Estonian Independence and it was also one of the chief forces behind the nationalist congress of Estonia movement (Pettai and Toomla 2006: 4). In 1992 the Pro Patria party was a coalition shaped among four proto-parties they are: Christian Democratic Union (1989), Christian Democratic Party (1988), Party of Republicans (1990) and Conservative Popular Party (1990). In the 1992 elections even though the two groups ran independently and later by becoming allies shaped a governing coalition. During 1994, one of the constituent members of Pro Patria namely the Liberal Democratic Party broke off from it and had an alliance with various other defectors from the Moderates. The new party was

also helped by the decision of the popular chairman of the Bank of Estonia Siim Kallas to become its leader" (Bugajski 2002: 53).

Raun (2001) observed that due course of time, the Moderates held their position at Estonian politics and they had their strong roots in polity around 1992 as an amicable tie among two growing parties that was *the Social Democrats (1990)* and *the Rural Centre Party (1990).* In the year 1995, these parties made an official treaty which promulgated by both groups as well. In 1999, the People's Party gained importance and it was engrossed by Moderates and in the later stage, one of the key member and leader - foreign minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves, joined the People's Party to withstand its treaty. However, this move considered being significant in government parlance in which he negotiated a more influential agenda in the Moderates group and finally he became its chairman (Raun 2001;42). The Coalition Party (CP) held a secondary position in the center and it consisted of Soviet era administrators and professionals. In 1995, the party established its own standard which proved the prepositions that "it was the option for most voters disgruntled with the 1992-1995 rules by the ENIP, Pro Patria and the Moderates". In consequence to this, the party legitimately amplified its tone to be acted as leading party during the year 1995 to 1999 (Bugajski 2002).

A number of small organization and party which was emerged from rural settings and labelled as social niche also extended its own lineage into the People's Union or Popular Union in the year 2000. This form of negotiation between small and fragmented party was most important ally of the Coalition Politics during its 1995-1999 rules. Pettai and Toomla (2006) as argued that; "As part of these larger allies, it constituted the Rural Union (Maaliit) which was formed in 1990 amid with leaders of Estonia's Soviet era collective farms, second; the

Country People's Party (Maarahvaerakond) which was formed in 1994 as one more new party to challenge the 1995 elections and finally the Farmers Assembly (Pollumeeste kogu) which acted as a very marginal agrarian party, established in 1991 and along with these parties, the Pensioners and Families Party (Pensionaride ja perede erakond) also erupted steadily in 1994 as a party alluring to the interests of these two groups. During the 1995 election, these four groups were allied in the name of Country People's Union (Maarahvaühendus) which ran as an associate with the Coalition Party and they tend to work closely. During 1999, the above mentioned three parties functioned as a single unit (under the banner of the Country People's Party). After the 1999 election, these four parties were brought together successfully by the skillful leadership of Villu Reiljan who were a former environment minister and thus People's Union was born" (Pettai and Toomla 2006; 347).

The three diverse parties represented most of Estonia's Russian population. They are the *Russian Party of Estonia (RPE), United People's Party (UPP) and the Russian Unity Party (RUP).* In the year 1994, on the plan of the *Russian Democratic Movement, the United People's Party (UPP)* was come into official participation in elections. After Estonia regained independence it was consider be the first moderate Russian grouping to be shaped instantaneously. Because of Estonia's restorations citizenship policy the leaders were never able to garner much support. In the first parliamentary elections of 1992 no Russian party even contested. In 1993 in local elections the UPP and RPE did well. However, the UPP and the RUP came together in an electoral alliance for achieving the 5 percent parliamentary election threshold to enter the Riigikogu the RPE during 1999 (Pettai and Toomla 2006).

A further modification of electoral law was addressed by the 1999 *Riigikogu* elections; the electoral coalitions were officially barred. Even though non-affiliated independent candidates were still allowed only single parties could field candidate. This alter was destined to promote unification of the party allies. This obligation that carries a message –'party should have minimum 1000 members had also taken effect'. The outcome was that "there were only 12 electoral lists for the March 1999 poll but the total number of parties subsumed under these lists was nearer to 20" (Pettai and Toomla 2006: 14). Among the Moderates, the Pro Patria Union, and the Reform Party, these groups came together to prove the establishment of centre-right based victory in accordance with the leadership of *Mart Laar, Pro Patria Union* was given the premier's post. However, the coalition lasted not for less than 3 years. In 2001 the Reform party determined to make a pact into an alliance with the Centre Party on the height and promoted *Laar* to quit in the year 2002 and later coalition was disintergrated. "This enforced the Reform Party to discuss a national (minority) government along with the Centre Party and Siim Kallas the prominent leader of RP became the Prime Minister" (Ibid: 15).

Estonia has a multi-party system in which coalition governments are the norm. The origins of party system in Estonia lie in the independence movements of late 1980s. The *Eesti Rahvusliku Soltumatuse Partei*, Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP) established in 1988 by leading dissidents was the first opposition party in the entire Soviet Union. Another major political force of the era, *Rahvarinne* the Popular Front, which played an important role in bringing down the communist regime fell apart soon after the restoration of the independence giving rise to a number of new political parties (Ehin 2006: 494).

Since early 1990s the major parties along with their immediate predecessors had been present. Estonia embarked on democratic institution building and party consolidation. The major political parties had been active and present in politics since the early 1990s. By the late 1990s stable and relatively large parties began to emerge (Tamm 2013). They are the rural People's Union (1989), Social Democrats (1990), Centre Party (1991), Reform Party (1994), Pro Patria Union (1995),) and Moderates. However, it was not before several decades that political parties could successfully gain, howsoever partial and incomplete that gain may be, public trust and poltical stability in Estonia (Sikk 2006). There are recurrent differences on primary issues between political parties. In the coalition agreement one may observe the contest between them to forward specific promises. In a multi-party system it is quite common that the political success of one of the coalition partner, lead other parties to restrain the government's common action (Allum 1995).

Overall, the Estonian party system has displayed many features typical of young post-communist democracies; instability, mergers and splintering are common and several elections have seen the success of newly founded parties, high electoral volatility, the prevalence of fuzzily focused parties without a strong social base or civil society roots, the fragmentation of vote and seat distribution, and low levels of popular trust in parties (Rose and Munro 2009). At the same time there is a significant degree of continuity in the Estonian Party system: all major parties are currently represented in the Riigikogu or their direct predecessors have been present in politics since 1992 (Sikk 2006: 343).

The basic legal frameworks for the operation of political parties in Estonia are the Estonian constitution and the Party Act. The Riigikogu Rules of Procedure Act are the basic and foundational rules for the establishment, institution for any

parliamentary poltical party. Section 31 of the above mentioned act dictates that parliamentary party groups should or could be formed by a minimum of five Member of Parliaments. A chairman and deputy chairman are elected by each parliamentary group and at one time a member may belong to one parliamentary party group. A member cannot join other parliamentary party group if he leaves a parliamentary party group. It is the three member executive board of the Riigikogu is comprised of the Speaker and two Deputy Speakers organizes and does committee assignments. They should consider and make compromise of the each parliamentary party group's (Toomla 2006). The public party funding in Estonia is moderately advanced and there is a control over party financing also. Also since 1996 Estonia witnessed a sizeable enhancement in overall state funding for elections. However the state funding for poltical aprties and elections does not encompass an entire electoral-poltical spectrum. It is merely those poltical parties that reach the five percent vote of the national electoral roll that are considered eligible for state/public funding (Sikk 2006).

Estonia has built a large and strong juridical frame for the smooth execution and performance of its political system, the legally registered and recognized poltical parties have the largest role to play in this system. Politcal parties not only ensures the smooth functioning of this poltical system but also make the entire structure representative and participatory.The lagal regulation we must note here is not prohibitory but an enabling factor in the poltical life of Estonia and as it is based on the principles of fairness and rule of law it is inclusive of the entire poltical spectrum of the country. There was no governing majority in the last several months of the first Riigikogu. The situation was similar in 1997 and 1998. The Estonian political parties are new and relatively unstable (Russ 2002: 120).

Electoral System of Estonia: Evolution and Reforms

The electoral system in Tunisia have began to transform as a result of multiple reforms beginning since 1989. The origin of legal-electoral reforms in the country can be traced back to the period of Supreme Soviet. It was an independently elected parliament that came into being in the period of Soviet epoch. The first electoral laws were eneacted and implemented by the Supreme Soviet. Later, the proportional votining rules under Single Transferable Vote System (PRSTV) were introduced. Based on this law the 1990 elections were conducted (Taagepera 2007: 330). In Independent Estonia electoral reforms started through the introduction and espousal of new electoral regulations. There were four major electoral reforms that were introduced. The first major electoral reform was introduced in the year of 1992, then in the year 1994, then again in the year 1998 and lastly in the year of 2002. These electoral reforms intiated siginifican altered and transformed the Estonian electoral system. The Major transformations or changes were the following.

The Electoral Reform of 1992

On 20th April 1992 the *Riigikogu* Election Act was enacted. The act mandated and introduced a open register which was applicable to all parts of the country. This system was proportional electoral system. According to this system the entire national electore were divided into three three tiers. District was one central unti of this electoral system. In order to distribute seats there were three rounds of counting In the first round: 'personal mandate', for each and every electoral district a simple quota was considered. In the level of 'district mandate', it was the number of valid votes received according to which the candidate was ranked in the list. Valid votes casted in favour of each candidate on the similar list were combined and added. By following this method it was those candidates who were on the top of each list that were counted elected; at

the last as per "compensation mandate", at this level mandates were distributed in between different lists and it was those who had received minimum of five per cent casted valid votes at the national level or those who were already included. A adapted d'Hondt method of distribution was adopted for the sharing of 'compensation mandates'. In each list, a mandate be given to candidate who was promoted toward that resulted in them coming top in the lists (National Electoral Committee 2012). Tweleve such districts were created. They were: Polv-Valg-Vor, L-V Jog-Vilij, Parnumaa-Parnu, Hiiu-Laane-Saare, Tallin 2, I-V, Tartumaa-Tartu, Tallin 4, Narva-Jarva, Tallinn 1, Tallin 3, Harju-Rapla (Nunez 2011).

On 18th June 1992 this act was amended. The various outcomes of the laws are: the *Riigikogu* consisted of 101 members and there was no change in the size. Twelve multi-mandate districts were there. seat apportionamnent to these districts were calculated before the election in concordance with the total number of registered voters who were registered. Each voter had one vote in the fully open lists. Electoral alliances were permitted. While submitting the candidate lists, it is noteworthy here that each individual poltical party and also each pre-electoral alliance were allowed to decide the categorize the national lists by themslelves.It was a necesscity for a party to score minimum five percent nationwide party threshold or if they are not successful in that parties ought to have won minimum number of three seats on the basis of simple quota. (European Commission for Democracy through Law 2008).

In relative to the expectations of law the 1992 electoral law had the most striking unforeseen outcomes. These unforeseen consequences were not chiefly in the way of disproportionality or in way of partisan seat-vote outcome. Disproportionality resulted mainly as a result of the five percent national threshold that was imposed. This led to a monoploistic electoral tendency that

was certainly not very encouraging for a new democracy as it firstly checked the expansion of poltical parties. The smaller parties were eradicated as a result of this arbitrary five percent parameter and even when the combined votes of smaller parties amounted to twenty percent of the total votes casted yet these parties could not make their presence felt at the national level (Grofman, et. al. 1999).

The Electoral Reform of 1994

On 11th July 1994 the *Riigikogu* Election Act was amended. It introduced various changes like the Estonian electoral register of citizens was a base for registration of voters. On 1st December of the year preceding the elections those citizens of Estonia who dwell in rural municipality or even city were entered in this register. A polling card was received by every registered person. On the basis of the register the municipality of each rural area or local city government agencies arranged polling list for their respective electorate. It is also interesting to ensure the non-violation or compliance of these new electoral reforms the government ensured certain punitive measures.Thus If any member of subordinate electoral committee did violate any provision of electoral law, the Electoral committees were autorised and had right to suspend and debar that concerned and identifid member (National Electoral Committee 2012).

A not so major change was introduced that resulted in the reduction of the total number of districts that was earlier twelve declined to eleven. On the principle of proportionality mandates were circulated to the electoral districts this was done as per the number of citizens who were legitimate voters. Only political parties could form election coalitions. Thus under the *Riigikogu* elections it was the political parties and pre-election formations of coalitions parties and the autonomous candidate who could legitimately participate in the electionss

(Taagepera 1998: 69). However the electoral rules and nomination rules were made stricter. It was mandatory for every candidate to fill in several electoral related forms, but under the new electoral system that was intiated by *Riigikogu,* it was no more possible to correct the technical errors that were in the documents on the final day of electoral nomination. And if there were any errors still left these candidates were not considered eligible for contesting election and their registretaion stood cancelled. Furthermore this also resulted in exclusion of many other coviv and poltical bodies form electoral participation. Pre-poll election coalitions of citizens and other civic associations forefeited their right to propose and nominate candidates. The procedure for formation of electoral committees was also specified by *Riigikogu*. The *Riigikogu* created the National Electoral Committee consisting of 18 members.

The Electoral Reform of 1998

The year 1998 witnessed a slew of reforms, these reforms were also in continuity and consonance with that of 1994 *Riigikogu* Election Act. Estonia had undergone a large scale poltical changes which had a definite bearing on the ways that elections used to get organized and used to get carried out. It also had bearing on restrictions regarding campaigning and other such electoral practices. The 1998 reforms need to be read as an integral part of the Fourth Amendment that was enacted on 13th November 1998 and that of Fifth Amendment that was introduced on November 17th, 1998 together they introduced numerous changes. The earlier principle of electoral professionalism was replaced and substituted by the principle of territorial representation. The National Electoral Committee itself in turn was formed on a new principle and it was consisted of seven members.

The number of seats between the electoral districts was divided by the fourth amendment. A particular number of mandates was awarded to each electoral

district in accordance with the integer of the number that was obtained as an outcome of this calculation (Nunez 2011). On 17th November 1998 with the introduction of a separate fifth amendment the formation of election coalitions was prohibited. The draft that was initiated by the then Estonian Centre Party faction motivated a lively debate in the *Riigikogu*. The protogonist of the plan under consideration did claim that it would and could make the electoral system not only more transparent but could also result in developing the reach of the political parties' on the landscape of Estonia. Henceforth 'independent' candidates and political parties both could participate in elections (Grofman, et. al. 1999).

The Electoral Reform of 2002

On 18th July 2002 the *Riigikogu* Election Act was enacted. As per the reform, instead of 11, there would now onwards be 12 'multi-member districts' but that does not mean that the apportionment method was also allowed to be amended. Electoral alliances were not permissible. The electronic voting possibility and its procedures were introduced. On 14th July 2006, as per the enacted 7th Amendment (*Muudatus 7*) introduced and added a new possibility that allowed a new feature of reconsideration and also revote. Later on even this got amended and brought some changes they are: during I-voting period a voter has a opportunity to also recast her vote, and even the the last casted vote got counted. During the first and second tiers it was observerd that no alteration in the threshold was applicable or allowed. Mandate allocation rules (Art. 62) were also revised. In the list of political parties in any electoral district the candidate should be ranked as per the number of votes that got casted for each candidates and these candidates has to receive at least 5 per cent of the votes nationally. In an electoral district the total votes casted for each candidate in the list of the candidates of the same political party shall also be totaled. A list should receive

as many mandate as that the number of time and the votes it received in each electoral district exceeding the 'simple quota'. The Mandates that were obtained by surpassing the "simple quota" are also that are deemed to be the mandates of any political party (Estonian National Electoral Committee 2002).

According to Mikkel and Pettai; "The number of mandate that a political party is given gets amplified by one, if the remaining votes correspond to the minimum of 75 per cent of the "simple quota". Those candidates who are at the top of the list and for whom the number of valid votes casted is minimimum ten per cent of the "simple quota" are considered to be elected. The candidate who is promoted towards the top of the national list of candidates shall be elected if atleast two candidates receive an equal number of votes."(Mikkel and Pettai 2004: 332-46). As per the 2002 reform a seat can be awarded from the compensation mandates to only those of the candidates who reach at leat 5 percent of the "Hare quota" at each district level. If the candidateS do not reach the point of support then next candidate on that list will be given the seat (Pettai 2004: 828-34).

Parliamentary Elections and Party Competition in Estonia

In Estonia, a unicameral *Riigikogu* (parliament) exercises the legislative authority and it is the highest legislative body. The parliament decides on the holding of referendums and adopts law. It also elects chairman from its members who can direct the working of the assembly and other functions and procedural activities (Miljan 2004: 190). The council of ministers, it is to be noted, holds the executive power and the council is constituted from the exisiting members of the *Riigikogu.* The Prime Minister and council of ministers, like Indian electoral system, are together part and parcel of council and it is the Prime Minister who forms the 'council'. The members of the council are usually selected and chosen form the members of the ruling party or the ruling coalition. It is the council of

ministers which implements any legislation and also decisions regarding policy matters, the Council also submits the draft of legislations to the *Riigikogu,* it also coordinates in between the the works of the multiple government organs and institutions. It also organizes and shapes the foreign policy and relation with other foreign countries (Spilling 2010).

The general elections for the *Riigikogu* is general, uniform, direct, and free. The election is conducted on the principle of one man one vote. The electoral results are checked and verified on the principle of the proportional representation. The President of the Estonian republic announces the regular *Riigikogu* elections through a resolution on the basis of the clause 78 (3) of the Constitution but he must do so latest by three month prior to the election day. The President of Estonia also have the power by which he nominates the Prime Minister and prime minister in turn is elected by the *Riigikogu* (Taagepera 1995: 329).

The demeanor of the political parties and candidates contesting parliamentary elections are primarily regulated primarily through and by the 1992 Constitution and the *Riigikogu* Election Act. There are many other laws that are applicable and are used to control the electoral conducts; these include the Political Parties Act, Media Services Act, the National Broadcasting Act, the Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act, Code of Misdemeanor Procedure and the Penal Code. It is the "National Electoral Committee" (NEC) that harmonizes and regulates and establishes coordination between all these various laws (OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report 2011: 3). The *Riigikogu* elections are further organized and monitored by the successive electoral committees. The term of National Electoral Committee and its authority lasts for four years. The four year term of the authority is also applicable to county electoral committees, and the same is true for the electoral committees of the

cities of Tartu and Tallinn. The Division committees, are formed previous to 'extraordinary' as well as before the regular *Riigikogu* elections. The authority of the division committee is legitimate and valid untill the new members of the new committee are appointed (*Riigikogu* Election Act 2002).

The 1992 Parliamentary Election

Estonia's parliamentary elections were held during 1992, 1995, and also 1999 (for the 7th, 8th, and 9th *Riigikogu* respectively*)*.The electon turn out witnessed swings between the center-right to the center-left and then back to the center-right. It was during the year 1990 and the year 1991 that a number of small and big political parties were founded in Estonia. It was in the year 1992 with the first forthcoming *Riigikogu* elections that the real party background begun emerge on the political horizon of Estonia. In the year 1992 a new constitution was already in concrete shape and in place beside an electoral system. These new developments encouraged all the political parties and politicians that they could now begin to develop their party and the party system in general in full earnest. These first elections were remarkable as it allowed each political or citizen association for the first time to contest and run for then forthcoming first elections. As a result of this many groups mushroomed the electoral roll and the ballot paper featured the total number of 38 parties or associations. In the table below we describe the results of 1992 elections. According to Pettaiand Toomla;

Table 4

Election Results of 7th Riigikogu (20th September 1992)

Party	Candidates	Votes	percentage	Seats
Pro Patria	101	100,828	22.00	29

Secure Home	73	63,329	13.60	17
Popular Front	103	56,124	12.25	15
Moderates	49	44,577	9.73	12
ENIP	97	40,260	8.79	10
Royalists	30	32,638	7.12	8
Estonian Citizen	26	31,553	6.89	8
Greens	14	12,009	3.71	1
Entrepreneurs	14	10,946	2.39	1
Others	121	66,983	14.60	-

Source: (Pettai and Toomla 2006: 11).

It was Pro Patria that emerged victorious in this election. The Pro Patria emerged and began as a pro-reform party and advocated over the question of national satisfaction and argued this should been given importance over the question of independence. This allowed this party to assume a dominant position in the Estonian parliament. "The Pro Patria was successful in forming government with the support of Moderates and the ENIP in the leadership of Mart Laar. Mr. Laar declared that the chief objective of his administration was to speed up the privatization programme and to re-negotiate the pulling out of all of the Russian troops who were still remaining in Estonia. The opposition was formed by the `Secure Home', and it was the first partnership between the Rural Union, the Coalition Party and the Popular Front coalition which was dominated by the Centre Party. Surprise showings were made by the Royalists and Estonian Citizen. However, these parties soon faded. Due to the strength of their leaders in their individual districts two parties the Greens and the Entrepreneurs Party gained single seats via direct mandates. However, the parties managed to retain their positions but did not top the five percent national threshold" (Pettai 2009: 954).

The 1995 Parliamentary Election

However during the 1995 election failed to retain tis momentum as a result of the harshness of the economic policies introduced by the government based on the doctrine of shock therapy. Mart Laar the leader of the centre-right alliance was forced to resign from the leadership of the council of ministers in support of the interim cabinet that was headed by the Moderate leader Andres Tarand in the late 1994. The new political equation led to the inclusion of the Country People's Party by the Secure Home coalition. The new coalition appeared to the people of Estonia as a respite from the harshness of the economic reforms. The resulting new Coalition Party-"Country People's Union" promised an alternative to the orthodox economic reform regime. The people of Estonia saw CP-CPU as a better alternative, however it would be incorrect to assume that the centre-right coalition was completely rejected as despite their electoral defeat they were successful in garnering a significan percentage of national votes. The Reform Party led an attempt to create an alternative centerist position which did not bypass the market mechanism and retained their focur on the market led reforms. The new party and the coalition also was susscessfull in attracting popular votes who were opposed to preexisting coalition and its economic policies but were unwilling to support a left leaning government (Pettai and Toomla 2006: 12).

Table 5

8th Riigikogu Election Results (5 March 1995)

Party	Candidates	Votes	percentage	Seats
Coalition Party and Country People's Party	161	174,248	32.23	41

Reform Party	103	87,531	16.19	19
Centre Party	114	76,634	14.17	16
Pro Patria and ENIP Union	109	42,493	7.85	8
Moderates	101	32,381	5.99	6
Our Home is Estonia	73	31,763	5 .87	6
Right-wingers	101	27,053	5.00	5
Others	494	68,596	12.69	-

Source: (Pettai and Toomla 2006: 12)

This election also a decline of the new political parties unlike the previous election where we saw the mushrooming of the poltico-electoral formations and associations.Only those political parties which were officially registered parties did field their candidates in this election. However, the pre-poll as well as post-poll electoral coalitions were still being allowed. This provision resulted in, for example, Estonia's Russian parties also to form a considerable strong enough coalition by which they could not only win nearly six percent of the valid vote but also six seats. Right-wingers Party we should remember was a electoral novice. During the year 1994 as a result of internal wrangling about Mart Laar's leadership it broke off from Pro Patria and it was a short-lived formation. Later, the party merged back into Pro Patria and barely squeaked into parliament. Those candidates who were unaffiliated they too received fewer seats as well as votes and interestingly the number of the so called wasted votes too declined. In 1995 pmajority won by then CP-CPU was larger then that of the Pro Patria in the 1992, however, the recent centrist grouping had have a hard time in finding an appropriate collaborator either between that of Centre Party or that of the Reform Party (Solvak and Pettai 2004).

Tiit Vahi was the leader at that time of the CP-CPU and it turned towards the Centre Party and towards Edgar Savisaar when its initial overtures towards the Reform Party did not succeed. However, unfortunately, this coalition could last not more than seven months. Failing this, the Reform Party 'Vahi' intiated to form the new government, however even this government failed to mark a break and barely lasted for one year. Forced to the corner, the Coalition Party decided to resume alliance together with the Centre Party in October 1996. The Reform Party renounced this move and walked away from the coalition. Henceforth, the CP-CPU combination continued as the minority government (Taagepera and Ensch 2006). In the parliamentary elections held on a second occasion in March 1995 Estonia witnesses another shift towards the center-left alliance. The results reflected a general resentment and dissatisfaction amongst the elderly people and the rural voters as it was they who were hardest hit as a result of the pro-market reforms intiated by the previous governments. KMU formed a coalition government with the majority in partnership with the leftist Center Party. This coalition lasted till October 1995 however the centre party left the coalition thus paving way for the rightist and centrist party to reign in the helm (Taagepera 1995: 329).

The 1999 Parliamentary Election

It was held on 7th March 1999 and the largest percentage of votes was won by the Center Party. A center-right majority coalition government was formed with Pro Partia, Reform Party and the Moderates taking 53 seats. Edgar Savisaar the leader of Center Party was effectively forced into the opposition. Seven seats each were won by the centrist party (Coalition Party) and the 'Country People's Party'. The representative of the ethnic Russian people, United People's Party, won six seats. These three parties were successful in securing enough votes to

ensure their entery in the parliament (Karatnycky 2000: 185). The tablee given below describes the parties and their electoral performance.

Table 6

9th Riigikogu Election Results (7 March 1999)

Party	Candidates	Votes	percentage	Seats
Centre Party	242	113,378	23.41	28
Pro Patria Union	178	77,917	16.09	18
Reform Party	212	77,088	15.92	18
Moderates	303	73,630	15.21	17
Coalition Party	216	36,692	7.58	7
Country People's Party	167	35,204	7.27	7
United People's Party	172	29,682	6.13	6
Others	395	40,648	8.40	-

Source: (Pettai and Toomla 2006: 14)

There were other developments that we witnessed in the election of 1999 it brought further review of the electoral laws. Surprisingly one mainstream alliance CP-CPU was officially debarred from the election. However the non-affiliated and independent candidates could still participate and contest election. Further, unlike past, the alliances were not allowed to field the list of candidates and it was only the political parties in particular who were allowed to do so. This move of the state was seen as means to strengthen and consolidate the political party system. The reformed law added a new condition which made it mandatory for any political party to have least 1000 members before it could lay claim as a

political party. As a result of this pre-poll electoral alliances that came in effect in November 1998, the smaller poltical parties could neither merge into a pre-poll coalition or form alliances. This affect the prospect of smaller parties. Many a times the candidates of these smaller parties were merged into the formal lsit of the poltical parties. However it does not mean that there was no inter-party cooperation and despite these the parties continued to remain legally recognized by protecting their poltical and autonomous identity. We witnessed 12 electoral lists, furthermore the sum of the parties mentioned under the lists was no more than twenty in the March 1999 polls (Solvak and Pettai 2004).

The 1999 election led to an accord between the Moderates, the Pro Patria Union, and, the Reform Party. As a result of this accord they returned to the power as an alliance of the center-right government. Mart Laar returned to the power as the leader of this alliance as it was his the Pro Patria Union party that received the largest share of the votes. This coalition stayed in power for a relatively longer duration btu collapsed within 3 years. The government came crushing down in December 2001. A new post poll alliance formed when the Reform Party joined hands with the Centre Party. Mart Laar resigned from the premiership in 2002. The new coalition was a minority government and the Reform Party leader Siim Kallas was chosen as the Prime Minister (Pettai and Toomla 2006: 15). Most of the analysts were taken aback by the alliance between the Reform Part and the Centre Party as they represented opposing streams of the poltical current and had launched a bitter and hostile or vitriloc campaign against eachother in the elections. However the two aprties set their difference including that on taxes and state subsidies aside to remain in power.

The 2003 Parliamentary Election

On 2nd March 2003 Parliamentary elections were held in Estonia. Twenty eight seats were won each by the Centre Party as well as the Res Publica Party won. Res Publica succeeded in gaining requisite support by negotiations in the aftermath of elections and thereby succeeded in forming a coalition government (Baltic Report 2003). Thus even when the Centre Party was successful in winning a majority of the seats yet they in terms of the percentage of the votes shared they were barely having the lead of the 0.8 percent in comparison to the the new Res Publica party (The Independent 2003: 9). As a result both parties won 28 seats. The President of Estonia, Ruutel, invited the premier of the Res Publica party on the 2nd April. Juhan Parts, the leader of the Res Publica, formed a new government. The new Governement resulted from a result of negotitations between Reform Party, Res Publica, the and the People's Union of Estonia (Nohlen and Stover 2010).

The 2007 Parliamentary Election

On 4th March 2007 Parliamentary elections were held in Estonia. The voting method and instruments also saw a transformation in place of the earlier ballot system, the electronic voting mthods and instruments were introduced. The Estonian Reform Party came out as as the single largest party in the Riigikogu with 31 seats to tis credit. the Estonian Centre Party stood second with 29 seats in its perch, where as the Res Publica and Union of Pro Patria had a deduction of 16 seats in comparison to their last performance of the 35 seats in 2003 elections. The Social Democrat party achieve four seats, where as the Greens for the first time entered the Riigikogu with seven seats and lastly the People's Union were reduced to six seats a huge dip from their last best 13 seats (Postimees 2007). It is remarkable that in the year 2007 Estonia successfully first ever experiment of national election where internet was used to cast the popular vote. The voting took place between February 26 and February 28. A significant number of the

national electorate 3.4 per cent used internet voting method (Information Week 2007).

The 2011 Parliamentary Election

A fresh round of parliamentary election was organized in Estonia on March 6, 2011. This election too relied on the method of e-voting. The elections took place between February 24 and March 2, 2011. The hundred and one member of the *Riigikogu* were elected for another four year period. The government also introduced a D'Hondt method according to which the seats were allotted. The entire country was separated in 12 multi mandate "electoral districts". Pre-election polls put Andrus Ansip of Reform Party ahead of its main rival, the opposition Centre Party. The latter is considered populist; slightly to the left on economic matters the former is right of centre. Both parties are members of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party. The election was marked by the highest number of running independents (32) since 1992. Several independent candidates were members of the Estonian Patriotic Movement (Postimees: 2011).

Party Coalitions and Government Formation in Estonia

After its independence from Soviet Russia in 1991 Estonia began to build a new form and pattern for its self-governemnt. The Estonian government has two important functionaries the prime minister and the president. The president is the head of the state while prime minister is rthe head of the government. It is the rules of the legislative assembly (*Riigikogu*) that decides the foration and conduct of the governemtn. Article 89 describes the rules as per which the government is formed. This parliamentary supremacy or legislative supremacy is

one important feature of the parliamentary form of governemtn across the globe (Spilling 2010: 31).

The systems of party lists were used in Estonian parliamentary elections. In 1992 at least nine lists were elected to the 7th legislative assembly that resulted in participation 7 poltical parties in the parliament. A coalition government was formed of three parliamentary party groups representing eight parties (Pettai and Toomla 2006: 19). The second election to the parliament in the aftermath of independence from Russia took place in 1995. Thirty political parties participated int his election making it one of the most representative and participative elections. On March 5th, 1995 the 8th *Riigikogu* was elected. Fourteen parties representing seven lists. Estonian Centre Party gained 16 seats and an alliance of the recently formed Estonian Reform Party won 19 seats. With 41 legislative seats, ten ministerial posts were taken by the Coalition Party led by Prime Minister Tiit Vahi. (Russ 2002: 118).

In the 1999 parliamentary elections, with Mart Laars as Prime Minister the People's Party Moderates formed a coalition (Fleuren 2006: 33). A fragmented distribution of seats in parliament is favored by the proportional election system. In Estonia after elections and between elections the changes of parties in the government formation have been certain.

Party System in India: Types, Legal Framework and Organizational Structure
Political parties perform an important functioning in the parliamentary system. By being the medium of representation they ensure the smooth functioning of democracy. The political parties and party system in India has their roots in anti-colonial struggle. The Indian National Congress was formed in 1885 and though it was nto a poltical party in the contemporary sense but increasingly it

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transformed itself into a poltical party with the claim of representing the entire colonized and subjugated populace. After independence the development of the party system presents a study of transformation to a complex of multi-party configuration from one-party dominant system.

According to Rani, "In India… strong trends of factionalism, fragmentation and regionalism, coupled with the aspiration to form alliances for seeking a share in the power are being increasingly witnessed. However, in India the party system has developed a plurality at regional and national levels. In India political parties and the party system have been significantly influenced by cultural diversity, community and religious pluralism, social, ethnic, caste, traditions of the nationalist movement, clashing ideological perspectives and contrasting style of party leadership. India has a multi-party system and the number of political parties has been exceeding. In India the political parties are recognised by the Election Commission of India on the basis of certain specified criteria. There are two major categories of political parties National and State. At present, there are seven national parties and numerous regional parties recognized as such by the Election Commission of India. The National parties are Indian National Congress (INC), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Communist Party of India (CPI), Communist Party of India (Marxist), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) and All India Trinamol Congress (AITC)" (Rani 2015: 101).

In short, Indian party system has undergone a major transformation and is still in a process of evolution and change. The most dramatic developments have been the end of Congress party dominance, the rise of Hindu nationalist, the proliferation of caste and regional parties, federalization of the party system and a new era of multiparty coalition governments. Personality, ideology, program

and base of support have come to divide and fragment parties and have frustrated attempts to forge a stable national coalition. These changes in the development on Indian political parties have in turn altered the nature of the party system (Hardgrave and Kochanek 2008: 263).

Dynamics and nature of party system in India is distinctive. Right from its inception Indian arty system is dominated by a single party, congress occupying that role for at least 3 decades after independence and later representing the spectacle of a multiparty system. Since 1970s both at the center as well as in the states Indian party system has become highly competitive. "This competitiveness has extensively made the political parties to shift from the phase of variability during the early years to that of a structural consolidation. With unique models of social engineering the puzzling pluralities of political formations and interests have been developed into full-fledged political parties. Since 1989 a prominent characteristic of the electoral outcomes has been the fractured mandate leading to the emergence of hung parliament resulting in multi-party coalitions. Furthermore, India's party system has been distinctive. It has been often described as a dominant one party system and had revolved around the Indian National Congress party. The plurality of parties reflects rather an environment of multi-party situation with the congress, despite the rise and fall in its electoral support, remaining a dominant single party. After attaining independence the dominance of Congress emerged. The first phase (1947-1967) was the period of the Congress system; the second phase (1967-1977) was characterized by the decline and disintegration of the Congress system and the consolidation of power by a small oligarchy; and the third phase (from 1977-1989) witnessed the development of a new system, which because of its domination by Indira Gandhi came to be known as the Indira Congress or Congress (I). Until its rout in 1967, 1977, 1989 and 1996 elections, the Congress Party exercised a domination of

power at the centre and, with a few exceptions, has been in control in most of the states" (Swain 2008: 59).

Rajni Kothari (1970) states the Indian party system as the 'Congress system' or 'one party dominance system'. He asserts that the Congress party was capable to lodge varied interests and factions within its fold based upon a broad consensus. "These factions reached compromises without creating any breakdown of the system. The opposition parties used the factional leaders of the Congress party to manipulate its policy decisions and worked outside the system. These parties acted as pressure groups and commonly created informal alliances with the factional leaders of the ruling party. The congress system showed accommodation and remarkable flexibility in withstanding the pressure from within its own ranks as well as from the opposition groups. The congress system absolved the programmes, policies and even personnel of the opposition parties thus leading to strengthening of the one party system in India" (Fadia 2007: 533).

Since 1967 a multiparty condition had emerged, both in the state and centre. However, the party system in India has evolved from one party dominance to multi-party united fronts, to the possible emergence of bi-nodal coalition system centered on the Congress party and the BJP. The explosion in the number of and electoral support for regional parties in the 1990s has federalized the party system and has begun to rephrase the Indian federalism. Indian political parties continue to pursue a pattern of coalition alliance and united front politics while simultaneously trying to expand their own base supports (Hardgrave and Kochanek 2008: 263).

The constitutional and legal position of political parties varies from country to country. However, in most democratic countries there is neither any legal sanction establishing political parties as a necessary governmental institution nor

any direct constitutional provision regulating the functioning of political parties. For the operation of party system there are some governmental systems which try to prescribe some conditions. In the Constitution of India political parties do not as such find any direct mention. The Tenth Schedule is one provision in the Constitution which is directly relevant to the functioning of political parties. The Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 added Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. It deals with the disqualification of a person for being Article 102 (2) a member of either House of Parliament or Article 191 (2) the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State on ground of defection. The Election Commission, a constitutional body responsible for conduct of elections and it frames and administers the rules and regulations governing political parties in India. It has the power to decide whether or not to register an association or body of individuals as a political party (Rani 2015: 101).

According to the NCRWC; According to the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 Article 29A (1) and (2) it is obligatory for any group or body of individuals calling itself a political party to make an application within thirty days following the date of its formation to the Election Commission for its registration as a political party. Article 29A (5) requires that the application shall be accompanied by a copy of the memorandum or rules and regulations of the association or body, by whatever name called, and such memorandum or rules and regulations shall contain a specific provision that the association or body shall bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India, and to the principles of socialism, secularism and democracy and would uphold the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. And provisional to sub-section (7) of section 29A provides that no association or body shall be registered as a political party under this section unless the memorandum or rules and regulations of such association or body

conform to these provisions, i.e. the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 29A. The commission's decision in this matter is final (National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution" (NCRWC) 2001: 421).

Further according to NCRWC States that: In accordance with the provisions of Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 the recognized political parties are accorded the status of a national or state political party from time to time. The number of national parties has been changing owing to constant review of the status based on the performance of the parties. It may be noted that sometimes political parties in India are also categorized by observers, political analysts and academics on the basis of their territorial or geographical representation, such as: all India parties, regional parties and local parties. This is done by them only as a matter of convenience to argue a particular point, or identify them in a particular way, and does not in any way reflect either any official party classification recognized by the Government or by the Election Commission. Similarly any identification of a party on the basis of its ideological orientation as a party of the left, right, center, socialist, communist, communalist or leader-centred etc., bears no official recognition (Ibid: 401).

Electoral System of India: Evolution and Reforms
The electoral system is a fundamental component of any democracy. Electoral laws convert votes into seats to determine the composition of legislative chambers, and hence, the type of government as well as the quality of governance in a country. Any electoral system should ideally serve multiple objectives. According to Rae (1967) and Norris (2004) First, it has to be representative i.e. the composition of the legislature must reflect accurately the views and opinions of the electorate on important social and economic issues in the country. In a divided society, this objective must also incorporate social

inclusiveness by according representation in the legislature to minorities. Second, it has to produce legislatures which are conducive to the formation of stable governments, which in turn should ensure good governance. Typically, this means that the legislature should not be too fragmented since the presence of a large number of small parties is not conducive to the formation of stable coalitional or single party governments. Third, the electoral system should also provide the electorate with the means to hold its representatives accountable by rewarding good politicians or political parties and punishing the bad ones. It is well recognised that no electoral system can satisfy these objectives since they are often conflicting. For instance, research on comparative electoral systems suggests that the more representative an electoral system, the more likely is it to result in a fragmented legislature (Dutta 2009: 93).

India's electoral system is outlined in its constitution and in the major acts of parliament. Article 326 of the Indian constitution provides that elections to the Lok Sabha (House of the people) and Legislative Assemblies (Vidhan Sabhas) of the States are to be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The system of elections is outlined in part XV of the constitution and the Representation of the Peoples Act (RPA) 1950 and the Representation of the People Act (RPA) 1951 passed by the parliament in pursuance of Article 327 of the constitution. Article 325 stipulates that there shall be a common electoral roll for all Indian citizens irrespective of differences of religion, race, caste or sex. Article 324 of the constitution vests the power of superintendence, direction and control of elections to the parliament, state legislature, to the offices of the president and vice-president in the election commission of India.

According to Singh and Saxena; "Elections are also held for local bodies such as municipalities, municipal corporations and Panchayati raj. Beginning as one

member body, the commission currently has three members including the chief election commissioner. The commission works through the rule of unanimity. Appointed by the union executive, the members of the commission are constitutionally guaranteed the same security of services as the Supreme Court judges. This means that they cannot be removed from office except by an order of the president passed after resolutions in each house of the parliament supports by a majority of total membership and majority of not less than two thirds of the members present and voting." (Singh and Saxena 2011: 248).

The Representation of Peoples Act (RPA) 1950 provides for the allocation of seats in and determination of constituencies for the purpose of elections to the house of the people and legislatures of states, including qualifications of voters and preparation of electoral rolls. The Representation of Peoples Act (RPA) 1951 lays down provisions for the actual conduct of elections, qualifications for members of the parliament and state legislatives, eligibility for membership of these houses, electoral malpractices and offences and decisions of electoral disputes. Under these constitutional and legal arrangements, the Election Commission of India has been guaranteed autonomy from the two orders of government of India (Ibid: 249).

The enhanced role of the Election Commission (EC) has much to do with the rise of alliance politics and coalition rule in India. The emergence of coalitional politics itself is a corollary, to a large extent, of the acquisition of political expressions by marginalised communities. These communities or groups, primarily defined by occupation, are becoming politically assertive. They are organising themselves either as political parties or as influential local groups possessing a decisive edge in electoral politics. This democratisation, happening in quite a random and jumbled way, has segmented the one party dominant

system and led to the emergence of multiparty regimes. This is where the role of institutions like the EC has acquired unprecedented importance. The EC has to ensure that in the rush for attaining power, newly politicised groups do not trample upon democratic norms. However, in doing this the EC also has to see that it does not become a force that clamps down on democratisation (Katju 2006: 1635).

During the last five decades of its working the Election Commission of India has acquired for itself a prestigious position in the constitutional setup of the country. Any grievance against a political party, candidate, minister or official can approach the commission for its redressal. A feeling has grown in the country that the election commission is the only suitable agency for the removal of their electoral grievances and can render the requisite help and guidance in all matters pertaining to elections. The commission has been able to generate a sense of faith that the people repose in its integrity. In fact the Election Commission of India is one of the institutions that have earned the country credit at home and abroad (Fadia 1991: 614).

Electoral Reforms

Both the Law Commission in its 170th Report on "*Reform of the Electoral Laws*" in 1999 and the ECI in its seminal 2004 "*Proposed Electoral Reforms*" report have stated the following. According to the Law Commission of India; "maintaining the purity of the electoral process however, requires a multi-pronged approach, which includes removing the influence of money and criminal elements in politics, expediting the disposal of election petitions, introducing internal democracy and financial transparency in the functioning of the political parties, strengthening the Election Commission of India, and regulating opinion polls and paid news. Unfortunately, these are some of the issues, which have

plagued the Indian electoral system over the decades and have eroded the trust of many people in the country. Consequently, over the years, a number of committees have examined some of the major challenges and issues affecting India's electoral system and have made suggestions accordingly" (Law Commission of India 2015: 1).

Kumar argues that these electoaral and legal reforms continued unabated in recent times. According to Kumar, the other committees and commissions, which have examined these issues, are: the Dinesh Goswami Committee was set up in 1990, the Indrajit Gupta Committee was set up in 1998 with the central issue of election funding and the Law Commission submitted its 170 report in 1999 suggesting wide ranging reforms in the electoral process. In addition, the Election Commission of India has also taken initiative towards suggesting reforms in the election system since the 1980 and in its publication Elections in India- Major Events and New Initiatives 1996-2000 suggested far reaching reforms in the electoral process. But one should take note that the concern for electoral reforms has not become fashionable only during the recent past. It was as early as 1974 that Jayaprakash Narayan set up the Committee on Electoral Reforms under the chairmanship of V M Tarkunde. Popularly known as the Tarkunde Committee, the report on electoral reforms was submitted in the year 1975. Besides these reports, there have been several studies, which suggested various kinds of reforms in the Indian electoral system, but the book by L. P Singh (Electoral Reforms) published in 1986 has been perhaps the best of its kind. In spite of so many committees and reports, the concern on electoral reforms still continues mainly because, except for bringing some procedural changes in the electoral system, most of the suggestions of these committees have not been implemented by the government.

Some of the reforms which have been implemented so far are: the voting age has been lowered from 21 years to 18 years. This has helped increase the number of voters and response confidence in the youth of the country; another landmark change has been the increase in the amount of security deposit by the candidate to prevent many non-serious candidates from contesting elections with a ulterior motive; the photo identity cards have been introduced to eradicate bogus voting or Impersonation; the introduction of Electronic Voting Machine (EVM), the voting capturing, rigging, and bogus voting may not be possible; if a discrepancy is found between the number of votes polled and number of total votes counted, the Returning officer away report the matter forthwith to Election Commission. Election Commission on such report may either declare the poll at the particular polling station as void and give a date for fresh poll or countermand election in that constituency" (Kumar 2002: 3489).

The electoral reforms brought about in the recent past have been reducing the number of campaigning days from three to two weeks time, raising the ceiling limit of election expenditure for contesting the Lok Sabha Elections to Rs 15 lakh and for Vidhan Sabha elections to Rs 6 lakh, raising the security deposit for contesting the Lok Sabha elections to Rs 10,000 and for con- testing the Vidhan Sabha election to Rs 5,000 in case of general candidates. For candidates belonging to the scheduled caste (SC) or the scheduled tribe (ST) category, the security deposit has been fixed for Rs 5,000 for contesting the Lok Sabha election and Rs 2,500 for contesting the Vidhan Sabha election. Under the revised rules, a restriction has been imposed on a candidate on contesting election for not more than two constituencies at one time. Under the new election law, election can be countermanded only on the death of a party candidate and not in case of the death of an independent candidate. As per the modified rules, a person convicted by the trial court attracts disqualification and even those who

are released on bail during the pendency of their appeals against convictions are disqualified for contesting elections. All these reforms have been given effect by enactments of the parliament (Kumar 2002: 3489).

Parliamentary Elections, Party Coalitions and Government Formation in India
The term parliamentary refers specifically to a kind of democratic polity wherein the supreme power vests in the body of people's representatives called parliament. The parliamentary system is one in which parliament enjoys a place of primacy and pre-eminence in the governance of the state (Kashyap 1992: 20). Under the constitution of India the legislature of the union is called parliament, it is the pivot on which the political system of the country revolves. The parliament of the Indian union like most parliaments in federal countries consists of two houses: the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (House of the People). The names of the house fairly reflect the character of their composition. The Rajya Sabha (Council of States) or the upper house is composed mainly of representatives of the states elected by states assemblies. The Lok Sabha (House of the People) or lower house is composed of directly elected representatives on the basis of adult franchise and territorial constituencies. The president is an integral part of the parliament. These two houses and the president together constitute the parliament of India (Basu 1989: 194).

In the Parliamentary form of government party government is the real name for the parliamentary democracy. Political parties are not merely a link between the government and the people; they are the instrumentalities of social change, social resurrection and transformation. Political parties play the most crucial role in the electoral process - in setting up candidates and conducting election campaigns. The first general elections under the new constitution were held during the year 1951-52. First popularly elected parliament of India came into being in April

1952. The Indian National Congress (INC) came to power with 245 seats (Ghosh 2017: 174). So far sixteen general elections have been held for the formation of government since independence. The study is mainly limited from 1991 to 2014.

The Tenth Lok Sabha Elections (1991)

The Tenth Lok Sabha election was a midterm election as the result of the dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha. The ninth Lok Sabha lasted only for 16 monthsThe 9th Lok Sabha election was largely polarising elections as it took place in the background of the struggle over reservation and the Babri mosque agitation by right wing party nationally. The Ayodhya ram temple movement was being used by the BJP as a significant electoral plank to usher into a majoritarian electoral and national tendenciy. Ths election was a three pronged struggle between three national parties. This election did not result in any party emerging victorious on tis own. The result of the election was that no party could get a majority, so under P.V. Narsimha Rao the Congress formed a minority government with the coalition of left parties. The positive outcome of Shri Narsimha rao's maneuvering was that his government lasted full five years (Election Commission of India 1991).

The Eleventh Lok Sabha Elections (1996)

The general elections to the eleventh Lok Sabha were held on 27th April 1996. People gave a fractured mandate and made it very difficult for any party to form the Government. It led to a hung and indecisive parliament and 2 years of instabile national or central governments. In these two years country witnessed three prime ministers. The Rao government opened a new terrain in the Indian poltics by opening the gate of foreign investment alons with the policy of liberalization. Privatixzation and globalization. The role of Rao and his government is formative for the later period of India both electorally and

poltically. However even his gvernemnt remained poltically instable. "In May 1995, senior leaders Arjun Singh and Narayan Dutt Tiwari quit the Congress and formed their own party All India Indira Congress (Tiwari). The BJP emerged as the largest single party with 187 seats, but it was far short of full majority. The Congress was a poor second with 140 seats. The other parties were quite smaller in number. The President invited BJP leader A.B. Vajpayee to form the government, as he was the chief of the single largest party in parliament. Vajpayee took over as Prime Minister on May 16 and tried to get support from regional parties in parliament" (Pai 1996: 1177).

Shri Vajpayee formed the government, later he could not prove his majority, and he tendered his resignation. The lure of power brought a number of 13 parties conclave together who formed the government under the name of 'United Front'. The Congress party offered support from outside. The United Front gave two Prime Ministers namely H. D. Deve Gowda on 1st June 1996 and I.K. Gujral on 21 April 1997 in a short span of nearly one and a half year, and then collapsed. The dramatic release of interim report of Jain Commission alleging the hand of DMK in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi turned the tables. The Congress party withdrew its support. The result was the country was once again pushed into elections for a fresh mandate in 1998 (Hardgrave 1996).

The Twelfth Lok Sabha Elections (1998)
The 12th Lok Sabha was constituted on March 10, 1998, but unfortunately the elections again failed to produce a clear majority. The Congress party at that time was in very bad shape and Congress leadership had virtually lost its credibility for various reasons. The BJP improved its tally to 182 seats, but still it was short of full majority. The BJP formed the government with the help of about 13 parties. The coalition somehow limped on for about 13 months, but after

withdrawal of support by Ms. Jaylalitha, the government fell and the country had to face elections once again (The Hindu 1998). "The results of the 1998 elections gave the message that electorate of India had endorsed a two-party or two national alliances system to dominate the country's political scene. On the basis of the voting pattern, it could be said that the voters in almost every State hinted that they did not want their preferences to be divided only between the two major poles of alliances. They identified the two major contenders and confined their preferences to this either-or option. Both BJP and Congress could do well only in those States where they had struck alliance with some parties. This was an interesting phenomenon which was likely to continue and usher in the country an era of polarization between two parties or alliances. The defeat of the BJP led alliance government by a single vote in the Lok Sabha in May 1999 when the AIADMK suddenly withdrew support paved the way for the next general elections, which were held in August/September 1999" (Dubbudu 2015).

The Thirteenth Lok Sabha Elections (1999)

On April 26, the then President of India K R Narayanan dissolved the Lok Sabha and called for early elections. The BJP continued to rule as an interim administration until the polling, the dates of which were announced on May 4, by the Election Commission. As General Elections had previously been held in 1996 and 1998, those of 1999 were the third in 40 months. Their dates were spread over five weeks to allow for the deployment of security forces around the country's 31 states and Union Territories to stem electoral fraud and violence. Altogether 45 parties (six national, the rest regional) contested the 543 Lok Sabha seats (Oldenburg 1999). During the lengthy election campaign, the BJP and the Congress generally agreed on economic and foreign policy issues, including the handling of the Kashmir border crisis with Pakistan. Their rivalry only boiled down into a personal confrontation between Vajpayee and the

Congress President Sonia Gandhi. The entry of Sonia Gandhi, a relative newcomer having been elected to the party presidency in 1998, was challenged by then Maharashtra Congress leader, Sharad Pawar, on the grounds of her Italian birth. This led to a crisis within the Congress and the BJP effectively used this as an electoral issu. Another issue running in the BJP's favour was the generally positive view of Vajpayee's handling of the Kargil War, which had ended a few months prior to the polls and had affirmed and strengthened the Indian position in Kashmir. Also, in the previous two years, India had posted strong economic growth on the back of economic liberalisation and financial reforms, as well as a low rate of inflation and higher rate of industrial expansion (BBC 1999).

The 1991, 1996, and 1998 elections saw a period of consistent growth for the BJP and its allies, based primarily on political expansions in terms of cultivating stronger and broader alliances with other previously unaffiliated parties and regional expansion which had seen the NDA become competitive and even the largest vote takers in previously Congress dominated areas such as Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Assam. These final factors were to prove decisive in the election outcome of 1999. The outcome which began on October 6 gave the NDA 270 seats, 156 to the Congress and its allies" (Hardgrave 1999).

Unfortunately even the incumbent parliament could not solve the problem of political instability. The elections again reflected the lead of the BJP led National Democratic Alliance. However it did not have a clear majority. But the Government appeared to be handicapped because of lack of a clear mandate. The BJP, though it the largest partner in the NDA, had given up its stand on Article 370, on universal civil code and many other issues. Differences surfaced between the BJP and the RSS. The economic policies followed by the NDA government

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are the same as were followed by the Congress led governments. It began with enormous expectations at the formation of India's first genuine non- Congress Government but concluded with the same sentimental being transferred back. Lok Sabha was dissolve in February 2004 and elections were declared in April 2004 for fourteenth term of Lok Sabha (Wallace and Roy 2003).

The Fourteenth Lok Sabha Election (2004)

The fourteenth Lok Sabha election was a test case for the Congress party as it ran in the background of a formidable coalition led by the BJP. "The BJP under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpei was a formidable electoral force and the BJP led NDA government, headed by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee completed five years of its rule in 2004 and elections followed in four phases between April 20 and May 10, 2004. Most analysts believed the NDA, riding high on the feel good factor and its promotional campaign 'India Shining' would beat anti incumbency and win clear majority. The economy had shown steady growth during the BJP rule and the disinvestment of public sector undertakings (PSUs) had been on track. The Foreign Exchange Reserves of India stood at more than 100 billion (the seventh largest in the world and a record for India) (The Hindu 2004).

The service sector had also generated a lot of jobs. These elections, compared to all the other Lok Sabha elections of the 1990s, saw more of a head to head battle between personalities (Vajpayee and Sonia Gandhi) as there was no viable Third Front alternative. The fight was between the BJP and its allies on the one hand and the Congress and its allies on the other. However, regional differences emerged on the national scene. The BJP fought the elections as part of the NDA, although some of their seats sharing agreements were made with strong regional parties outside of the NDA such as the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh

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and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu. Ahead of the elections there were attempts to form a Congress led national level joint opposition front. In the end, an agreement could not be reached, but on regional level alliances between Congress and regional parties were made in several states. This was the first time that Congress contested with that type of alliances in a parliamentary election. There were slew of other parties for example the Communist Party of India (Marxist) which fought the elections on their own in their local and regional strongholds like Tripura, West Bengal, and Kerala" (Sandeep, Suri and Yadav 2009). There were other multiple parties both regional and national which either contested on their own or in alliance with other parties. Dr. Manmohan Singh was sworn in as the Prime Minister (Election Commission of India 2004).

The Fifteenth Lok Sabha Elections (2009)

The Congress led UPA implemented a lot of its promises including the enactment of Right to Information (RTI) & the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). It also waived off farm loans in 2008. Against this background, it went into the polls in 2009 (Dubbudu 2015: 1). The fifteenth Lok Sabha was held in five phases between 16 April 2009 and 13 May 2009. A total of 8070 candidates contested for 543 Lok Sabha seats. The average election turnout over all 5 phases was around 59.7 percent (Associated Press 2009). The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress was able to put together a comfortable majority with support from 322 members out of 543 members of the House. (CNN-IBN 2009). Dr. Manmohan Singh was sworn in as the Prime Minister for the second time.

The Sixteenth Lok Sabha Elections (2014)

The Indian general election of 2014 was held to constitute the 16th Lok Sabha, running in nine phases from 7 April to 12 May 2014. According to the Election Commission of India (2014), 814.5 million people were eligible to vote, with an increase of 100 million voters since the last general election in 2009, a total of 8,251 candidates contested for the 543 Lok Sabha seats. The average election turnout over all nine phases was around 66.38 percent, the highest ever in the history of Indian general elections. The results were declared on 16 May 2014, fifteen days before the 15th Lok Sabha completed its constitutional mandate on 31 May 2014. The National Democratic Alliance won a sweeping victory, taking 336 seats. The BJP itself won 31.0 percent of all votes and 282 (51.9 percent) of all seats, while NDA's combined vote share was 38.5 percent (The Wall Street Journal 2014). Narendra Modi became the fourteenth Prime Minister of India.

However, the party system, electoral process and government formation in both Estonia and India serves as a base for coalition politics. The multi-party system consisting of numerous political parties and electoral system is necessary for coalition politics to take place. It plays an important role in strengthening political system, social cohesion, integration and legitimacy within the state. This can be seen in both Estonia and India in the functioning of party system and in the electoral process and government formation. In spite of different political and social conditions both Estonia and India has overcome several similar challenges such as political instability and chaotic social situation in order to maintain stability. Overall the study provides an overview of interpretation related to party system, electoral process and government formation between both the countries.

The study further proceeds to the next chapter, Coalition Government, Decision Making Process and Democratic Stability in Estonia and India.

Chapter 5

Coalition Government, Decision Making Process and Democratic Stability in Estonia and India

This chapter examines the relation between coalition politics and democratic stability in Estonia and India in a comparative perspective. Democracy and political stability are an indispensable aspect in both national as well as international politics. The government formation is a necessary pre-condition for democratic stability. The ideas of democracy in Estonia and India date back to the early years when the nationalist successfully appropriated liberal democratic principles from the west and infused them into the political context. Estonia and India faced several challenges before emerging as a democratic sovereign state. In order to recover from the various kinds of instability, the democratic system has been adopted.

As a result Estonia and India have been undergoing multidimensional transition. Institutional restructuring, democratization of political system and market-oriented economic reforms have assumed key roles in this process. The democratic stability in Estonia and India can be traced through various factors like constitution, political party, party system, electoral system and electoral laws, institutional structure, regime stability, stable government and administration, economic development etc. On the other hand there are also important factors that contribute to the political instability and civic unrest in the two countries. The fact that not many governments have been able to completely cover their term has led rise to speculations over the future of the country. Hence, comparing these two democracies help to understand the factors enabling coalition government and democratic stability.

This chapter will provide a detailed insight on coalition governments in Estonia and India. It will further examine the influence of coalition government in the decision making process and in maintaining democratic stability.

Emergence and Structural Basis of Coalition Government in Estonia

As we have noted earlier, the people of the country constituted a constitution for themselves in the aftermath of the decline of the Soviet Russia and its withdrawal from Estonia. It was on June 28th, 1992 that the new Constitution was approved by the popular referendum. Article 1 of the Estonian Constitution pronounces Estonia as a sovereign and independent democratic republic. The people of Estonia are a sovereign people. The most important organs and institutions of the Estonian state power are, i) Riigikogu (Parliament), ii) The Government, iii) The presidency, iv) The court system. The Riigikogu (legislative assembly) consist of hundred and one members. These members stay in power for a period of four years. Prime Minister of Estonia is selected from the members of the Riigikogu and stays in that position for the next four years. Prime Minister is appointed by the president. Both the executive and the legislative power belong to the government. Article 87 of the constitution gives right to the government of the Constitution defines the right of the government and decides its boundary. These include right to make budget which is valid for the entire country, right and power of legislation, foreign relations, declaration of the state of emergency in any one part of the country of for the entire territory of the country (Tallo 1995: 125).

It was in 1992 that election was organized for the first time in Estonia after it became an independent and autonomous country. The first election had itself on an imprint of anti-Soviet Russia rhetoric; a coalition of the Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP), the Moderates (Social Democrats), and the Isamaa

(meaning Fatherland) came to power. Isamaa itself was more of a coalition then a political party. Isamaa was the central and leading component of this ruling coalition. As we have noted earlier the first election was primarily driven by a nationalist sentiment and emphasized upon a clear break from the past.[8] The post-independence government had to major challenges. On the one hand it must ensure and establish a functional democratic state and on the other hand it was faced with the challenge of the building the entire economy afresh (Ibid).

The first Estonian government thus had a herculean task ahead of it. The Isamaa led coalition government has the challenge of firstly ensuring a smooth transition to democracy. This was no small feat, no small achievement. The new government and their functionaries had no prior experience of governance or government that made their task daunting. This is especially so as in the past Estonian government was run with the help of experts. It is still open to debate as to if the primacy of the political class that Estonia tried to build above the bureaucratic class was a desirable path for a new country. The bureaucracy required a professional and non-partisan class of professionals. The Isamaa government faced further difficulty in its road to democratic transition as it decided to dispense with the erstwhile bureaucratic apparatus. Looked from the point of view of the political parties and the political culture 1992 was a watershed moment in the history of Estonia. The foundation of a new political culture was laid during this period that flourished in later phase. The Isamaa success is a reminder of the power of nationalism as a political sentiment and

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[8] "Plats puhtaks" (literally: Clean the Place) It has been argued that Isamaa's main interest was the almost literal "cleaning of the place" of Estonia's most recent history in order to reinterpret and give new meaning to her previous history, especially to that of the time of the national awakening. For lsamaa, to the ideas of these times are added those of minimal-state and free market along the lines of the Chicago school.

also a symbol of the power of the national elites in mobilizing the entire populations of the country (Tallo 1995: 126).

In the first centre-right government which was in office during 1992-94, the Pro Patria Alliance together had 38 percent of the cabinet posts, while the Nationalist Independent Party had about 25 percent and the Moderates 25 percent. Together, these three parties commanded a 54 percent majority of the seats in parliament. This first cabinet ended after two years because of the resignation of the Prime Minister. Immediately after, President Meri appointed the president of the Bank of Estonia, Siim Kallas as the new Prime Minister. However, the members of the Estonian parliament refused to fallow this nomination. Consequently, the president had to appoint a second candidate who has been former minister of environment, a supporter of the Greens but non-party affiliated. The new Prime Minister, Tarand formed the second Estonian coalition government consisting of the Pro Patria Alliance (NEP), the Moderates, the Nationalists (ERSP) as well as smaller centre-right groups. In this second cabinet, the NEP lost ministerial posts. The winners have been independent, non-party affiliated professionals who held a total of 26 percent of the ministerial positions. This cabinet did not last long, since the second national parliamentary elections were scheduled in 1995 (Blondel 2001: 19).

By then several political parties had changed their name and their organization. Thus, the former centre-left wing Popular Front (PEE) became the Centre Party and Rural People's Union (KMU) comprising various agrarian parties and the Pensioner's and Families League. The KMU focused on pro-market reforms, increasing protectionism and social benefits for citizens. Voter turnout at the 1995 election was again low at 69 percent. Four party alliances and three parties won seats in national parliament. The KMU which comprises centre-right and

centre-left parties became the largest parliamentary party with 41 out of 101 seats. It was followed by the newly founded Estonian Reform Party (ER) which obtained 16. Both the Pro Patria Alliance, in electoral union with ERS and the moderates, lost support and obtained only 8 and 6 seats respectively (Rommel 2001: 20).

Immediately after the election the president nominated Tiit Vahi, leader of the KMU to form the government. He entered into negotiations with the centre-left party with which he signed a coalition agreement in which both parties agreed to press for the integration of Estonia in western and European institutions to improve relations with Russia, to balance the budget to exempt smallholders from income tax payments and to reduce credits for agriculture. Thus, Vahi established the smallest possible minimum winning coalition based on two parties only. From 1995 to 1999, the dominant Coalition Party which formed an alliance with the Rural Union, the Pensioners and Families League and the Rural Peoples Party, held 53 percent of the cabinet posts in the first coalition and only 40 percent in the second coalition. In the fourth cabinet the Reform Party (ER) received a significantly high number of seats in cabinet given to their relatively low representation in parliament. In the fifth cabinet the strength of the KMU in cabinet increased again. They held 53 percent of the ministerial posts, while 34 percent had been distributed among independent politicians. The end of the Vahi era was determined by the resignation of the Prime Minister in 1992 (Tallo 1995: 126).

President Meri then appointed the former leader of the KMU parliamentary party, Mart Siiman as new Prime Minister. He too formed a single party near majority government with the 41 seats of the KMU parties in parliament, appointing also four independent ministers. The composition of the Siiman

cabinet was half technical and half political. In the sixth Estonian cabinet, the KMU could increase its cabinet strength to 60 percent. As the KMU held only 40 percent of the seats in parliament, one portfolio was given to the small Progressive Party, the successor of the Centre Party, thereby increasing the parliamentary strength of the coalition government to 56 percent. Although some changes in its composition took place, the government remained in office up to the third general election of 1999 (Blondel 2001: 20).

This election shifted Estonian politics back to the centre-right of the political spectrum. Former Prime Minister Laar formed a coalition with the Reform Party and the Moderates and the parliament constituted the seventh Estonian cabinet. In this new cabinet the posts were equally divided among the governing parties. The more or less equal distribution of seats among the three constituents of the coalition represented the growing power of these parties respectively. There is another interesting aspect to the Estonian government unlike other countries the independents have a better likelihood of being represented in the council of ministry. As Rommel (2001) notes "On an average, independents held 19 percent of the Cabinet posts during the period from 1992 to 1999."

Arnold Ruutel a former official of the Communist Party assumed the role of the President of Estonia in 2001. Siim Kallas who was the chairman of the Reform Party was appointed as the incumbent new Prime Minister by President of Estonia after Mart Laar the then prime minister resigned from his post in January 2002. The new Sim Kallas government also was a coalition government, the main constituents of this new coalition was the Centre party and the Reform party. Taking a both symbolic and substantial leap from its Soviet and communist past, Estonia joined European Union as well as NATOs in the year 2004. This showed the growing presence of American and European powers in

the country. Andrus Ansip, the Reform Party leader was appointed Prime Minister in the fourth month of 2005 by the President. Andrus Ansip government was eighth government within twelve years of the independence of Estonia. This showed a culture of political instability. It is remarkable that in the year 2007 Estonia successfully introduced first ever experiment of national election where internet was used to cast the popular vote. The voting took place between February 26 and February 28. A significant number of the national electorate 3.4 per cent used internet voting method (Information Week 2007).

On 4th March 2007 Parliamentary elections were held in Estonia. The voting method and instruments also saw a transformation in place of the earlier ballot system, the electronic voting methods and instruments were introduced. The Estonian Reform Party came out as the single largest party in the Riigikogu with 31 seats to his credit. The Estonian Centre Party stood second with 29 seats in its perch, whereas the Res Publica and Union of Pro Patria had a deduction of 16 seats in comparison to their last performance of the 35 seats in 2003 elections. The Social Democrat party achieve four seats, whereas the Greens for the first time entered the Riigikogu with seven seats and lastly the People's Union were reduced to six seats a huge dip from their last best 13 seats (Postimees 2007, Spilling 2010: 33).

Andrus Ansip's as Prime Minister and as the leader of the center-right coalition wanted a re-election and went for electoral contest in the March 2011. Though Ansip was convinced about his victory however the popular opinion was far from unanimous. Even opinion polls seemed to back his expectations as they claimed that the Andrus Ansip coalition may get well above 54 percentages of the popular votes. However not everyone was of the same opinion another pre poll survey suggested that at least 44 per cent of the voters were undecided about

their choice even on the evening of the elections. The election results that were announced on March 5th 2011 showed that the ruling coalition had comfortably gained the majority. The Reform Party led by Prime Minister (Andrus Ansip) won 33 seats. Andrus Asnip was set to form the government with the support of Pro Patria and Res Republica Union. The coalition got a convenient majority in the parliament with 56 members to their fold. At least six smaller parties failed to seat a single member of their party in the parliament. The Center Party (main opposition) got 26 seats and another six seats were won by the Social Democrat party. Andrus Ansip was rewarded by the people of Estonia for rescuing his country out of the recession without surrendering to the powerful international organizations or European Union (Vabariik in (ed.) Tom Lansford 2014: 453).

Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves took the oath for his second five-year term in office, after an overwhelming victory in August. Mr. Ilves was sworn in on 9th October 2011 before the 101-seat parliament, where 73 of the lawmakers voted for his re-election. His rival, European Party Deputy Indrek Tarand, received 25 votes, while three votes were discarded. Initially elected in 2006, Mr. Ilves became the first presidential candidate to claim the required two-thirds majority in parliament in the August election. In the past, all presidential elections have been decided by the Electoral College after lawmakers failed to give any candidate the necessary majority (Miljan 2015: 250).

On 4th March 2014, with the situation in Ukraine growing on NATO's borders, Prime Minister Andrus Ansip announced he was stepping down. The resignation is the first step in a leadership reshuffle in the Reform Party. European Union Commissioner and founder of the party Siim Kallas was expected to take his place and lead the party into the 2015 parliamentary elections. Ansip had been tipped to become Estonia's next EU commissioner after Kallas term ended in the

second half of 2014 (Country Studies Estonia 2014: 1). On 17th March 2014, President Toomas Hendrik Ilves picked Taavi Rõivas, the Reform Party's current and second choice for Prime Minister, to form the next government. Sven Mikser, the leader of the Social Dems, and Taavi Rõivas, the Reform Party's number one following the resignation of Andrus Ansip and the exit of Siim Kallas, were called in to meet with Ilves in Kadriorg. These two parties had made the most progress in mutual talks and command a majority of the seats in the 101-member Parliament. The division of ministerial posts or inclusion of other coalition partners had not been decided. On 26 March 2014 Andrus Ansip spent his last day in charge of government of Estonia, thus totaling eight years, 11 months, and two weeks. In the afternoon, Taavi Rõivas took the baton, at Toompea (Miljan 2015: 251).

Coalition Government and Decision Making Process in Estonia

The decision making process in Estonian cabinets has varied over time according to the leadership style of the Prime Minister. Yet, irrespective of this style Prime Minister have all made intensive use of the informal meetings which take place before matters are decided on at the regular meetings of the cabinet. Informal decisions have also been taken in coalition council meetings, where no written records are taken. In addition, consultations with the parliamentary parties are frequent as well as seminars with members of the coalition parties on issues which have to be decided in cabinet. The impact of individual leadership style on cabinet decision making can be assessed by examining the very different mode of behavior of two Prime Ministers, Siimann (1997-99) and Laar (1992-94 and from 1999). After the March 1995 election, the Coalition party (KMU) under Prime Minister Vahi formed a coalition with parties from the centre-left and the right. Because of different scandals in which the Prime Minister was alleged to be involved, as noted earlier, the government fell and a minority cabinet led by

Siimann (KMU) was formed in 1997. The new Prime Minister promised to open the policy process and to consult even opposition parties on policy proposal. As we also noted, he recruited seven of his fifteen ministers among experts without party affiliation. The new consultative policy style opened the decision making process first to civil servants many of whom attended informal cabinet meetings as advisers to politicians or as observers. Siimann allowed general discussions and hard bargains to take place on policy issues (Blondel and Rommel 2001: 26).

As the number of participants increased, the duration of the decision making process also increased at these informal meetings became much longer and the probability that proposals would be ready for the cabinet declined. Unable to deal simultaneously with the extended number of these proposals, the Prime Minister started to delegate decisions on these matters to other institutions and to political actors, for example, to ministerial committees, to individual ministers and to expert groups. In the ministerial committees, civil servants soon began, to play a major part, as much of the discussion dealt with the technical issues which were more within the competence of the civil servants than of the ministers. Indeed, the more technical issues became, the less ministers were competent to discuss proposals at ministerial committee meetings. Thus a greater number of proposals came from the departmental civil servants, who at their own discretion started to elaborate draft policy programmes and ministers often approved these proposals ex post facto (Miljan 2015: 252).

The political power of ministers individually grew markedly during the Siimann cabinet. As only half of the cabinet members belonged to a party, the impact of interest groups on political decision making became large, while ministers belonging to a party tend to inform their irrespective parliamentary party about their ministerial activities once a week when parliament is sitting. However, the

consensual-consultative style introduced by Siimann thus gave considerable responsibility to individual ministers and resulted in a markedly more open form of governmental decision making than that which had characterized previous Estonian cabinets. Mart Laar, on returning to office after the March 1999 election, reduced ministerial autonomy and relocated political decision making in the centre of government. His, leadership style is based on the dominant role of the Prime Minister. Parties became more important; co-ordination of decision making was given to politicians and not to civil servants and the decision making process became more formal. Civil servants were barred from attending informal cabinet meetings (Blondel and Rommel 2001: 27).

The main purpose of these informal meetings is to have the discussion of these matters in an informal environment, as this helps to increase collegiality among the decision makers. These meetings lasted much longer than regular cabinet meetings on average four hours even during the cabinet of Laar with each issue being allocated about twenty minutes. Ministers, parliamentary party leaders, the Prime Minister and his personal advisers, the government advisers and state secretaries participated. The staff from the Bureau of Public Administration Reform and from the Bureau of European Integration attended only once a month. The time devoted to the discussion of particular items at these meetings came to be limited in time and there was concentration on particular rather than on technical issues. If a serious controversy occurred among members at informal cabinet meetings, the matter was sent to an ad hoc working group led by ministers. Votes were taken on proposals. The consensual leadership style was replaced by a more rigid bargaining style. The role of the Prime Minister in cabinet decision making became markedly more pronounced. This new leadership style substantially increased the decision making capacity in a cabinet

which had a rather heterogeneous party composition (Blondel and Rommel 2001: 28).

In sum, cabinet decision making in Estonia has been more consensual and more open than in most countries of East-Central Europe. Critical issues have been discussed in advance either informally or in cabinet committees and they either have been solved by means of discussions or have not appeared on the cabinet agenda at all. Voting in cabinet has been rare. The fact that cabinet agendas have been sent to journalists and cabinet decisions taped underlines the transparency of cabinet decision making in the country.

Emergence and Structural Basis of Coalition Government in India

Coalition governments are quite common in India. It is seen that they arise as a result of the electoral system and are subject to the socio-political conditions prevalent in the country. The coalition governments at the Centre are likely to continue in view of the diversity of our polity and the nature of the electoral system in India (Arora 2000). The first twenty years of the independence period in India passed relatively smoothly as far as the relations between the Centre and the state governments were concerned. This was because of the fact that the Congress party was in power both at the Centre and the states. It was also because of the towering personality of Jawaharlal Nehru who remained the Prime Minister up to 1964. However after 1967, the Congress government lost Assembly elections in some of the states and non-Congress parties formed state governments for the first time in India (Butler, Lahiri and Roy 1995). In 1977, when the Lok Sabha elections were held under the leadership of Indira Gandhi after the Emergency period, the Congress lost power for the first time at the Centre also. The Janta Party was the first party (or more accurately a de facto coalition of parties), which was able to form the first non-Congress government

at the Centre in 1977 (Bhatia and Singh 2000). It was composed of five different parties that hurriedly merged in 1977 but collapsed before completing its full term. In 1989 the V. P. Singh government was swept to power but here also due to internal contradictions, the government was forced to go. The Congress government that followed in 1991 with Narasimha Rao as the Prime Minister was a minority government for half its term but acquired majority status midway through unsavory means. Coalition governments in India are now the order of the day (Bhatia 2001).

The next coalition government was led by H. D. Deve Gowda. The coalition was called the United Front, henceforth the Front. The Front was another experiment in coalition government. There were thirteen constituents' political parties of this coalition. One of the oldest parties of the country, the Congress part supported the coalition front from outside without participating in the government or the council of ministry. The other constituent of this coalition were 'Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam', Communist Party of India, the Samajwadi Party, Tamil Maanila Congress, Telugu Desam Party and Asom Gana Parishad. According to Reddi (1997) "the united front government headed by H. D. Deve Gowda was like a chariot being pulled at times in different direction by 13 horses". However this alliance too had a predictable end, the Congress party withdrew its support to Gowda government. The Front government got 190 votes in the no-confidence motion while those in support of the no-confidence got 338 votes. This ensured the demise of the Gowda government. However the era of post-poll political arithmetic and coalitions was far from over.

Reddi (1997), the next coalition government was headed by I. K. Gujral, the Gujral government too had an untimely demise. However it is interesting that both Gowda and Gujral governments were experiments in the formation of non-

congress, non-BJP government at the centre. Indeed both these governments were harbingers of the regional politics and regional political parties. The regional political parties were not only important constituents of both the government but also decision making factors. This could very well be described as the golden era of regional politics. The regional parties that took birth in the 1950s and 1960s with few exceptions were limited to their regional background and even there they had a strong fight with the Congress party. It was in this period that the regional parties not only came out of their limited identity but were in a position to form, influence and at some times bring down the central government. However it was the golden period of the regional parties that also sowed seeds of its eventual decline. No single regional part was in a position to form the Central government on its own. Secondly, as there was multiplicity of the regional parties they could not form a unanimous national position. Thirdly, most of the times these regional parties lacked a national vision and were often mired in their own local sectarian interests. Fourthly it was seen that the regional parties even when they were at their best could not form a government of their own and inevitably they required they help of one or the other national parties. This led to a growing disenchantment with regional parties as far as the parliament elections were concerned. It was on the plank of political stability that the first BJP government came to the power in the Centre. Keeping in pace with the disgruntled past of the coalition government, the Gujral government too failed to complete its term and was unseated within a year. Gujral resigned from his post in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the Congress support. Burns quote Gujral's resignation letter that that reads: "My government has lost its majority and does not want to continue in office on moral grounds" (Burns 1997).

A new coalition was formed under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The Vajpayee government stayed in power for a little more than one year. The main

constituent's political parties of BJP and Vajpayee led government were BJD, AIADMK, Shiv Sena, TRC and PMK and others. Even the Vajpayee government came crashing down under the force of coalition politics and its compulsions (India Today 1998: 13).

A new coalition government came into being under 13th Lok Sabha once again under the leadership of Vajpayee. This new coalition government completed its five year terms. This new coalition was termed NDA (National Democratic Alliance). NDA was constituted by twenty four political parties under the leadership of BJP. The other important constituent parties were Telgu Desam Party, AIADMK, Trinimool Congress, Shiv Sena, Shiromani Akali Dal, NC, and others.

Another coalition government came into being in 2004 after the electoral defeat of the BJP and NDA. 2004 election results too did not gave clear majority to any one party, but the Congress came as the single largest party. Under the leadership of the Congress a new coalition was formed and was named as the United Progressive Alliance (henceforth UPA). Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister of India in 2004. The UPA was supported by the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), National Conference, Kerala Congress (Mani), Indian Union Muslim League. The UPA government was also supported by the major left parties.

The UPA 1 one was succeeded by UPA 2. Once again Manmohan Singh became prime minister of India. Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister for two consecutive terms, a rare achievement both for the Congress party as well as for the national politics given the fact that nation has gone through an intense phase of coalition politics before it. Fifteenth Lok Sabha polls were held in five phases; 16 April 2009 and 13 May 2009 (Tharoor 2009). UPA 2nd was short of 10 seats

to reach the magical number of 272 as required under rules to form government. UPA 2nd had the outside support of Samajwadi Party with 23 MPs, Bahujan Samaj Party with 21, Rashtrya Janta Dal with 4 MPs, Janta Dal (Secular) with 3 MPs, others with 3 MPs. Given the fact that Manmohan Singh led UPA had 262 members in the parliament; it required ten more Member of Parliament to support his alliance. The support was extended by smaller parties and individual members unconditionally.

Coalition Government and Decision Making Process in India

In a coalition government the decision making process involves consulting keeping in mind the interests of all parties involved. Differences of opinion can lead to breaking up of the government also. A coalition government can remain effective only as long as it is stable to accommodate the difference between the coalition partners (Sharda 2010: 36). This can be assessed based on the policies and decisions taken during coalition government. According to Bhattacharya,

> The adoption of new economic policy in 1991, advent of coalition government at the centre and involvement of regional and smaller parties in the governance at the national level and the move towards taking governance closer to the people through the 73rd and 74th amendments of the constitution which provided for creation of the three tier structure of democratic institutions at the district, block and village level, popularly known as the Panchayati Raj system. The new economic policy of 1991 envisaged greater reliance on market forces for resource allocation. As such, the central government elicited involvement of the private sector through partnerships in implementing the plan schemes including the infrastructure projects. This broad approach forced the centre to provide more space to states to negotiate for foreign direct investment (FDI) alternatives in the development projects (Bhattacharya 2015: 24).

Niloferop writes that, "the emergence of coalition government gave direct representation to regional parties in the decision making process at the centre eased tension between the centre and the states. The regional parties from the mid-1990s realized that they as a group cannot substitute national parties but at

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the same time can carve out political space of their own at the centre through electoral gains in their regions. The national parties also realized that they have to be more receptive to accommodate the regional aspirations. It is the mutual recognition by the national and regional parties that provided stability to coalition politics at the centre" (Niloferop 2009: 758).

In India after 1989 multi-party coalitional model has emerged at the national level. Since then coalitional governments formed in India under the leadership of different parties. Some proved successful and some failed because of the growing importance of regional or state parties in formation of coalition governments. It was the benchmark year when the one party dominance system shattered and the Congress lost power at the centre. It was the year that changed the fate of Indian politics. Multi-party system developed and coalition politics became inevitable for Indian political. Coalition politics and governance has distinct importance in the Indian polity. Emergence of 'coalition' phenomena reflects the federalized tendencies of Indian society (Devi 2016: 52).

Since 1991 to 2014 parliamentary elections coalition governments formed at the centre. In these elections the regional parties also formed government at the centre and national parties provided them out-side support. It also affected the nature of Indian federalism. Stability of the regional parties, vote share and seat share in these elections increases it indicates that the regional parties are supplementary to the national parties. Electoral politics also indicates that the masses accepted the alliance strategy of national and regional parties. In different regions people voted according to the alliance combinations. Developments from 1989-99 provide evidence that coalition governments have an element of vanity built into them. Any hard policy decision is almost ruled out in a coalition government. At best, a coalition can just hang on. This is particularly true of

coalition where the government has to come up with countervailing pressures. Along with it, it has often been observed that the functioning of a coalition becomes a battle of nerves as various constituents scramble for greater say in the decision making and greater share of the national cake (Ibid 53).

Moreover, the phenomenon of coalition governments hampers the process of political polarization, since the national level political parties seek to ride to power by leaning on the support of regional and state level parties and groups, it is not only multiplies the bargaining power of the later but also adds to their over-all electoral strength. The situation has reached a point where anyone and everyone is not only ready to join hands with anyone else but also to split the party merely at the drop of a hat or merely to stay in power. The only exceptions to this emerging pattern are the cadre based parties, the BJP and the communists (Sharma, 2000: 33-34). In the earlier period regional parties bargain only for their personal benefits but after 1999 elections the parties actively participating in the nation building process along bargain for their states welfare, TDP is a big example of this. Now these regional parties tried to do best for the development of their own states.

Coalition dharma demands an ethos of 'give and take' by both the major and minor partners. Just as the major partner is duty bound to accommodate the interest of all partners, the junior partners, on their part should not blackmail the major partner into submitting unjustifiable demands (Niloferop 2009: 758). So the similar situation was faced by the UPA after the formation of the government. Soon after the government was formed, it faced the threat of withdrawal from the DMK for not getting plum posts. UPA government faced all problems which are obvious in a coalition government. In 2008 UPA government faced another problem. The left parties withdrew the support to the UPA

government on 23rd July 2008. Serious differences arose on nuclear agreement with United State of America. Dr. Manmohan Singh played as reasoned politician and saved his government when confidence motion was passed by 275 votes against 256 votes with the support of Samajwadi party (SP) led by Mulayam Singh Yadav and other parties. However, BJP has tried all its best to defeat the motion of confidence moved by Dr. Manmohan Singh, but it was in vain. The UPA government completed its full term with ups and towns. The UPA coalition proved a successful coalition. The NDA (1999) and UPA (2004) both proved that coalition can be stable (Sharda 2010: 37).

Democracy, Coalition Government and Political Stability in Estonia and India

For the better understanding, the concept of democracy and political stability is defined. The concept of democracy is defined borrowing Sartori (1976) and Vanhanen's (1984) definition, as a set of institutions that together result in democratic government (a procedural or descriptive definition) and as the set of ideals or principles that guide the procedures of a given state (a normative or prescriptive definition). The former focuses on empirically observable public institutions and practices, where the later looks more to the spirit or values that guide them. The term political stability is denotes and refers to the fact that whether or not a political regime that is democratically elected is able to complete its mandated period in the office. Political stability has been identified as an important element in the governance of any country. Paldam defines political stability as a stable government, stable political system, internal law and order, and external stability (Feng 1997: 391).

The post independent Estonia and India have undergone multiple transitions in the form of economic, political, cultural and societal. In 1991 Estonia and India transformed from a socialist state to a capitalist state. A major transformation

came about on the economic policy front leading to liberalization, privatization and globalization. On the political front institutional structures such as constitution, president, parliament and political parties which are necessary for stable democracy were established. A multi-party system was developed in Estonia after independence. In India the post-independence period can be divided into the 'one-dominant-party system' period (1952-77 and 1980-1991) and its transformation into a multi-party system (1977-98) (Spilling 2010: 33; Sharma, 2000: 33). Since independence numerous political parties were formed in Estonia and India. They provide stability by participating in government formation. The aspects of political stability in Estonia and India are institutionalized party framework. Both in Estonia and India political parties and party system act as a link between people and government (Miljan 2015: 252; Devi 2016: 52).

The political stability in Estonia and India is also maintained by strengthening democracy through the electoral system and electoral laws. Estonian and Indian political parties function within the framework of the electoral system and electoral laws. The Estonian electoral system is established on the basis of representative democracy. It emphasizes upon proportional representation (proportional representation by means of the single transferable ballot system). The electoral system of India is a single member district, simple plurality system (first past the post system) (Rommel 2001: 20; Sharda 2010: 35). The electoral laws of Estonia and India indicate that the citizen who has attained the eighteen years of age has the right to vote. Since Independence Estonia and India had a regular election. Estonia had six parliamentary elections (1992, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011), five presidential elections (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011) and European Union parliamentary elections (2004, 2009 and 2014). India had sixteen parliamentary elections, fourteen presidential elections and various state assembly elections. Since 1991 both in Estonia and India coalition

governments have come to power. In the case of Estonia fragmentation and lack of institutionalization, public trust deficit contributed to political stability. But in the case of India the political institutionalization and public trust in government institutions are high despite having huge diversity in society (Miljan 2015: 252; Devi 2016: 52)..

The concept of democracy and political stability and its practice in different countries can be traced through various literary contributions in the context of national and international politics. "The western political thought starting from the ancient era to contemporary times has empirical views on democracy and political stability. Plato's aristocracy, Aristotle's best possible state, Thomas Hobbes discussions in Leviathan, Rousseau's egalitarianism, Marx and Engels's analysis of class struggle are concerned about political stability. In the realm of international relations theory prominent schools of thought such as realism, idealism, liberalism, neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism and constructivism have dealt with the stability of the international political system" (Laswell 1950: 238).

Hansen (1989) argues democracy as a set of political institutions in which power, directly or indirectly rests with the whole of the people. Similarly Vanhanen (1984) described democracy as a political system in which power is widely circulated among its members and in which the status of power holders is based on the consent of the people (Vanhanen 1984: 9-11). Ostrom (1997: 49) put forward a question stating democracy cannot be interpreted by referring exclusively to the concept of force. The power as the focus of inquiry is not coherent with the characteristics of democracy, by studying only power relationships one might conclude and afford an unsatisfactory conceptual language in the subject area of popular societies. Laswell (1950) emphasized that a democratic government is merely a necessary but not a sufficient precondition

for democracy. He characterized the democratic scheme of governance by self-responsibility, voluntarization, wide distribution and sharing of authority, impartiality, challenge ability and equilibrating tendencies (Laswell 1950: 238).

Robert Dahl (1971) distinguished two different dimensions of democracy, those of public contestation or competition and of participation or inclusiveness; these are assessed according to eight separate institutional guarantees or indices. Later writers like Bollen (1980, 1991), Gastil (1991), and Hadenius (1992) have developed and consolidated these indices distinguishing in turn between the electoral process, its effectiveness and inclusiveness on the one hand and the protection of civil or political liberties on the other. Beetham (1994) broadens the dimensions beyond those of the electoral procedure and civil rights or liberties to include clear and accountable government and aspects of civil or democratic society. He further suggests, making the indices of political equality more stringent by examining the level of effective rather than merely formal equality of political rights and opportunities (Beetham 1994: 2)

On the stability discourse Sengupta (2004) indicates that the matter of stability has not taken a striking space in the public discussion. Recently there has been an increasing interest in the subject among politicians, media and administrators in large democracies like India and elsewhere (Sengupta 2004: 5101). On stability Hurwitz (1973) argues that all things as various individuals attempt to measure the degree or amount of "political stability" present in their particular universe. According to Hurwitz "political stability as the absence of violence, the governmental longevity/duration, the existence of a legitimate constitutional regime, the absence of structural change, a multifaceted societal attribute" (Hurwitz 1973: 449). Similarly Pirages (1980) indicates that political stability include absence of domestic dispute and violence which can be manipulated by

either consensual (consent application) or autocratic (coercion application) means, that is the "existence of legitimacy of the constitutional order and stability as a multifaceted societal attribute" (Pirages 1980: 433). Sengupta (2004) further argues that political stability viewed in terms of governmental durability in power is one of many conditions of stability in the political arrangement.

Sharma (1989) elaborate that stability of a political system refers to the fact that there is predictability to the patterns of governance, to the fact that in normal circumstances a chosen government is able to complete its term in the office. In a multifaceted societal attribute, it is the absence of several negative indicators like revolution, violence, political movements opposed to the existing system and the presence of several positive indicators like governmental longevity, constitutional continuity, effective decision making and positive systematic acceptance and support (Sharma 1989: 7-21). On the other hand Margolis (2010: 326) argues with a different perspective on political stability. Political stability focuses on the state, though the state is only one example of a political object. Political stability is more than state stability. He states the absence of violence approach is intuitive and simple; it reduces the stability to violence, making the approach less a definition than an analogy. It provides little clarity instead exchanging one complex concept for another.

Democracy, political stability and economic growth are all reciprocally related. Democracy provides a stable political environment which reduces unconstitutional government change; along with regime stability, democracy offers flexibility and the opportunity for major government change within the political system (Feng 1997: 392). Both democracy and political stability are two sides of the same coin, without democracy, it is difficult to maintain political

stability and without political stability, it is difficult for a democratic state to function efficiently.

Evolution of Democracy and Institutional Functionality in Estonia and India
Keohane (1989: 3) defined institutions as persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural role, constrain activities and shape expectations. On the other hand (Safferling 2102: 124) argues institutional functionality refers to the internal layout of the interaction and communication of the democratic institutions. There are several participants in the process, each of which has its own role according to which powers and competences are crafted. On the emergence of democracy Silver and Titma (1996) states, democracy emerged in Estonia when the country was in transition towards independence. The political mobilization in Estonia since the onset of perestroika created a population that had experienced a wide variety of democratic participation (Silver and Titma 1996: 3).

In support of Silvers' argument Dowley and Uuekula (1996) indicates that these mass demonstrations, open meetings and political strikes were far different from the mobilized participation (Dowley and Uuekula 1996: 47). In order to provide an understanding on the emergence of democracy Kavlekar (1987: 81) brings forth the argument, democracy implies rule by the people, their consent being obtained through debates, discussions, elections and majority decisions by representative bodies. India is one of the rare exceptions among developing nations in having fostered and sustained a multi-party democracy since independence. On the other hand Ganguly et al. (eds.) (2007) argue the emergence and persistence of Indian democracy are theoretical and historical anomalies. Early theorists of democracy argued that this form of government not

only required but was generated by certain social and economic requisites- none of which India possessed.

Sartori (1994), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Merkel (1996) works serve as an important contribution to democratic systems and institutional context. They reason that democratic systems are founded on institutional settings. Among these arrangements the ones linked to the type of executive, legislative assembly, political parties, constitution and electoral system have realized an increasing measure of popularity. The combined effects and concomitants of these institutions have influenced the overall performance and stability of democracies worldwide. Ganguly et al. (eds.) (2007) describe Indian democracy has a success through its institutional arrangements. It delivers a vigorous free press, robust political parties, a working judiciary and an apolitical military. Similarly Adams (2011) explains, in the India parliamentary democracy its executive system is based on the system of popular elected government headed by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister at the centre along with the respective council of ministers wields real executive power (Adams 2011: 238).

The Estonian constitution has given rise to a functioning set of democratic institutions in the contour of a freely elected Riigikogu, an executive branch with the powers clearly defined and restrained by law and an independent judiciary (Smith 2001: 66). Similarly Spilling (2010) elaborates that Estonia's current political system dates back from 1992 when a new constitution was adopted following a referendum, which provided for a parliament (*Riigikogu)* and a presidency with limited powers (Spilling 2010: 29). Estonia presents the characteristics of a democracy with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of minorities (Pettai 2003: 75).

Sartori (1976: 39) indicates that a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition. Lewis (2000: 123) further enumerates that party systems can be separated by four main precepts, the ideologies of the parties; the extent to which parties penetrate society; the standard of parties towards the authenticity of the government; and the number of parties in the arrangement. The argument of Spilling (2010) elaborates that since independence Estonia has embraced a multiparty parliamentary style democracy that has relied heavily on coalitions to form governments. From 1991 there have been frequent changes of government and various realignments of the government coalition. Despite this apparent political instability, the government has remained politically and economically consistent (Spilling 2010: 32). Despite numerous changes in governments, Estonian did not repeat the inter-war pattern of a rapid succession of weak government. It embarked on a prolonged process of party consolidation and democratic institution building (Tamm 2013: 5).

According to Cheema (2005) free, fair and regular elections constitute one pillar of democratic governance. Such elections confer and maintain political legitimacy because they reflect popular participation and choice in the political process. They are an important beginning step in crafting government of, by and for the people (Cheema 2005: 25). A new electoral law of 1992 in Estonia introduced an electoral system with three tiers electoral committees: the National Electoral Committee of the Republic of Estonia; territorial committees and the polling division committees. The Riigikogu formed the National Electoral Committee on the proposals of councils of counties and major cities. This law introduced proportional electoral rules under a Single Transferable Vote system (PRSTV) (Nunez 2011: 2; Taagepera 2007: 330). The conduct of elections in India after independence became the duty of the Election Commission. It was in 1950 that the Election Commission of India was set up as a constitutional body

and entrusted with the task of superintendence, direction and control of all national and state level elections (Katju 2006: 1635). The Election Commission of India has considerable autonomy of action as it derives its authority directly from the Constitution (Singh 2004: 10).

Coalition Government and Democratic Stability the Case of Estonia

Estonia is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy that has enjoyed political stability since 1991. It established the kind of institutional and legal conditions that place it within the western political model. It developed a multiparty system in which democratic procedures are respected. Despite frequent changes of coalitions and cabinets, it has maintained underlying political stability while demonstrating that power can be transferred peacefully from one coalition government to another. In order to establish a democratic regime and to hold it first free elections since the 1930s. An Estonian constitutional assembly with a wide popular base and led by the democratic nationalist segment of the independence movement prepared a new constitution. Remembering the autocratic government that emerged in the tumultuous 1930s, the majority rejected the former 1938 constitution with its strong executive and adopted instead a parliamentary rather than presidential system. The new constitution and a law denying automatic citizenship to non-Estonians who had moved to the country after 140 were submitted to a referendum on June 28, 1992, three months before the first parliamentary elections. They were accepted overwhelmingly. The democratic stability in Estonia can be analyzed through its government stability, political system and other various aspects (Thompson 2014: 134).

The political heart is a unicameral 101 seat Riigikogu, elected by proportional representation every four years. The Estonian electoral rules mandates that a political party must win a minimum of the five percent of the popular votes

casted before it gets any representation in Riigikogu. This rule was introduced to check the political instability that has engulfed the Estonian republic. The political party which is can win a national majority or the coalition which is in majority gets the right to form the government. The post of the Prime Minister also is decided by either that party of the coalition. Although formally appointed by the president, he must be approved by and maintain the support of a majority in the Riigikogu in order to remain in office. The Prime Minister's cabinet must also be approved by the legislature made up of numerous political parties (Kasemets 2014). Since no one party ever controls a majority of the seats, government are always coalitions. Only Estonian citizens can vote in national elections, but non-citizens who are legal residents are permitted to vote in local elections. Although only citizens can stand as candidates, non-citizens can have an input into that level of government closest to them. This led to change in the leadership of the Tallinn City Council after a Russian oriented party, the People's Trust, won four seats on the council in 1999. The nationalist oriented parties of the Estonian ruling coalition had wished to oust the Centre Party dominated city government, but it lacked a majority. It got its majority by negotiating a coalition agreement with the People's Trust (Raudla 2010: 280).

Estonian Prime Minister always faces the difficulty of holding shifting party coalitions together. Mart Laar, chairman of the Pro Patria Bloc and Prime Minister in 1992-95, assumed power in 1999. Laar's government, the longest serving in Estonia's post-Soviet history collapsed in 2002. He was replaced by Reform's leader Siim Kallas. He became prime minster in a minority government with the Centre Party. He pursued the major objectives of the previous government, namely to steer Estonia into NATO (successful in April 2004) and the EU (entry in May 2004). In august 2004 he became Estonia's first EU

commissioner (for administrative reforms) and one of the five vice-presidents of the European Commission (OECD 2015: 67).

After the elections of March 2003, the Centre Party got the most votes but it could not form a government. It was done by a newcomer Res Publica, a conservative, business oriented party that campaigned on an anticorruption and anticrime platform. It was led by Juhan Parts, former chief state auditor who became Prime Minister. In April 2005 Parts stepped down after parliament had expressed no confidence in his justice minister over proposed anti-corruption measures. He was replaced by Reform Party leader Andrus Ansip, former manager, banker, mayor of Tartu and economics minister in Part's government. In March 2007, Ansip's Reform Party emerged as the largest party winning 27.8 percent of the votes and 31 seats. This was a rare case of a government being reelected in Central Europe. The Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica (which emerged in 2006) captured 17.9 percent of the votes and 19 seats. In March 2011 elections, Ansip and his Reform Party did it again, emerging as the leading party with 28.6 percent of the votes and 33 seats. Ansip remained in the Prime Ministerial chair until March 2014 when he resigned to improve his Reform Party's chances of winning the general election in 2015 (Vabariik 2016: 299).

Coalition Government and Democratic Stability the Case of India

Unlike many critics we do not see anything inherently wrong with the rise of the coalition politics. The rise of the coalition politics cannot be understood or judged merely from a value loaded perspective. One must take note of the fact that the rise of the coalition politics in India is inextricably linked with the decline of the one-part domination system. It was the failure of the Congress party despite its claim of being the most representative party that first led to rise of regional satraps within as well as outside the congress fold and which went on

to lay seeds for the formation of regional parties across many states of the country. The rise of the regional parties and the decline of the Congress is part of one and the same process and it is this historical factor more than anything else that is behind the rise of coalition politics in India. As the Congress failed to form government on its own earlier in the states and then later on in the Centre has to take support of the regional parties. However Congress right from the beginning was hostile towards the regional parties even when it required these parties for retaining power in the state and the Centre.

In India there was a change in political scenario. The dominance of congress came to an end. For the first time Janata Party came to power during the same period. The 1980's is a time where one can see the history of coalition politics. Coalition politics came to be seen because of growth of many small regional parties. Slowly these regional parties started playing influential role in the national politics. No single party got a full majority to form a government in the parliamentary elections. Depending on the pre poll and post poll agreement between different parties, government were formed. In this coalition politics, the regional parties play a very influential role. They are also influencing the policy making of the government (Sridharan 1997).

A coalition government is a cabinet of a parliamentary government in which several parties cooperate. The usual reason given for this arrangement is that no party on its own can achieve a majority in the parliament. However, a coalition government may also be created in a time of national difficulty or crisis. If a coalition collapses, a confidence vote is held or a motion of no confidence is taken. Since India is a diverse country with different ethnic, linguistic and religious communities, it also has diverse ideologies (Singh 1997). Due to this, the benefit that a coalition has is that it leads to more consensus based politics

and reflects the popular opinion of the electorate. The stability of a coalition government requires a mutual appreciation of difference and an agreement over minimum basic code of conduct that all partners of the coalition must adhere to. In order to ensure the stability of a coalition government, it is important that various political parties reach on a common ground of governance. Only when the political parties are able to overcome their own rigid and narrow outlook and interests they can be part of a successful and functional coalition. However the Indian experience of coalition politics did not and could not do so. It has been the case that either the stronger party dominates the coalition thus undermining the spirit of coalition or the smaller parties try to unduly pressure the larger party. This has led to a mixed experience of coalition politics. Thus even when there has been success in terms of completing the official term of a government yet it has been ridden with acrimony. It makes decision making process slow (Ravi and Singh 2000).

Coalition politics has both merits and demerits. Due to coalition politics, government stability is threatened and elections are held before five years only. But in other way it helps to bring all streams of people in the national politics. National policies will be influenced by regional ideas. The success and failure of the coalition was not merely a matter of alliance arithmetic, but also reflective of a significant change in electoral behaviour. The coalitions involved in the elections relate to far deeper alignment of social and political power than earlier. The loose, pre-electoral alliance formed by the Congress worked well, presumably because it happened to coincide and express a deeper head within the political system, the need to create an alternative to the BJP's social block. Constituted by parties holding views opposed to the NDA, the pre-poll Congress alliance sought to articulate a political vice that tragedy remained peripheral in the erstwhile regime (Chakrabarty 2006: 213). In this sense, the 2004 election is

a watershed. On the one hand, it has brought about radical changes in the party system by redefining its nature primarily in terms of coalition of parties holding comparable political views, on the other, with the crystallization of these two competing coalition, this election also seems to have compartmentalized the contending social blocks with allegiance to either the BJP or the Congress led amalgamation (Ibid: 214).

We must note here that regional parties are here to stay. Even if the recent past has shown a tendency towards centralization, it is important to note that a country like India cannot go back to the system of one-party domination that we saw in the period of the Congress party in the period between 1947 and 1965. The regional parties and their rise is one landmark in the history of not only federalism but also in the larger history of democracy in India. Regional parties have certainly enriched the Indian democracy. However the rise of regional parties only reflected the antagonism of Indian politics an antagonism which regional party formations failed to overcome. The regional parties increasingly became individual centric and could not result in strong organisational politics that was the characteristic of the national party formations. The recent experience as well as the past experience shows the pitfalls and dangers of centralizing tendency in Indian politics.

Many a critics argue that Indian politics requires a new culture of federalism a culture of politics that does not try to subsume the smaller political parties and political formation within itself; but rather a culture that establishes and encourages a healthy political and electoral competition. Despite the inherent tensions of coalition governance, the Indian experiments, especially that of the NDA and UPA, add new theoretical twists to the phenomena. As the regional parties, regardless of their individual numerical strength in the ruling coalition

are crucial, the nature of political administration is likely to undergo dramatic changes in two ways. First, given their importance in the coalition government, the leaders are correspondingly entrusted with responsibilities at the national level. They cannot therefore think only of the region to which they belong rather, they need to take into account the problems and issues which are relevant at the national level (Chakrabarty 2006: 215).

Despite the inherent tensions of coalition governance, the Indian experiments especially that of the NDA and UPA, add new theoretical twists to the phenomena. As the regional parties, regardless of their individual numerical strength in the ruling coalition are crucial, the nature of political administration is likely to undergo dramatic changes in two ways. First, given their importance in the coalition government, the leaders are correspondingly entrusted with responsibilities at the national level. They cannot therefore think only of the region to which they belong rather, they need to take into account the problems and issues which are relevant at the national level. The growing importance of regional parties in the government is therefore a positive development from the point of view of governance as well. With their involvement in the administration, the regional parties gain a national perspective while articulating their responses to issues that may or not have regional underpinnings. Second, the inevitability of coalition governments is also indicative of significant changes in the conceptualization of politics in India. It is now clear that the failure of the pan-Indian parties to deal with regional issues largely contributed to the rise and growing importance of regional and state based parties. The notion that the regions are neglected or bypassed for the national gains remains ground at the root of the formation and the gradual electoral strength for these parties in contemporary Indian politics (Ibid: 216).

Political Stability in Estonia and India: Structural Indicators

Political stability in India and Estonia can be traced out through various factors like the longevity of the regime, election density ratio (EDR), an increase in the number of parties, strength of ruling party, index of democratization, stable political parties, party system, electoral system, government formation etc. Apart from these stability and fragmentation of party system are considered as vital. Saarts (2011: 88) enumerates the various indicators used by different authors (Bakke and Sitter, 2005; Horowitz and Browne, 2005; Lewis, 2006; Meleshevich, 2007; Rose and Munro, 2009; Tavits, 2005, 2007, 2008) that is used to measure the durability of any form of government and party system. These indicators are following number of parties, electoral volatility, rise and fall of new parties, number of parties presented in the parliament, voting percentage of these parties, opposition-government relationship and dynamics, etc.

The ENEP/ENPP index is the measure of the fragmentation of the party system. This system is used to classify the political party system as per the number and strength of the parties. The fragmentation of political parties is a good indicator of the politicization of the party system (Bielasiak 2002). Chibber and Nooruddin (1999: 46) argue party fragmentation too; in India's single member simple plurality (or first past the post) electoral system is not driven by increased turnout but the degree of competition between the top two parties in a constituency.

The question of rootedness of the political parties and the party system in general is a critical element in the analysis of political stability. Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) proposed using ideological voting as a major indicator. Kitschelt (1995), Toka (1998) and Whitefield (2002) argued that social cleavage and conflicts are important elements of a functioning democracy. The primary social cleavage that obtain in Estonia is that of ethnicity and secondly that of liberal verses

communist antecedents. Given the fact that Estonia for long was under the control of Soviet Russia and also given the fact the public opinion on this chapter of Estonian past is divided, it has caused an important thread of political and social mobility in the country. Scholars argue that other differences and marginalities, for example that of socio-economic divisions, either play a secondary role or are often a continuity of these primary cleavages. Estonia had other forms of social cleavage for example urban-rural in the immediate aftermath of its independence from Soviet Russia but these social cleavages has successfully been managed or overcome. Even the religious division does play a marginal role as the Estonian society is considered very secular (Saarts 2011: 96). India's multi-party system also exhibits the effects of multiple cleavages. According to Rose and Munro (2003) Party membership, electoral volatility, and voter turnout, needs to be considered as informative sign of it.

Sottilotta (2013) indicates,

> a broad operational definition of political stability should take concepts and indicators into account such as human development (as measured by the UN Human Development Index); inequality (Gini index); political legitimacy (i.e. the more or less widespread support for the government, be it democratic or non-democratic); constraints on regime responsiveness (i.e. the economic constraints that governments encounter in meeting the requests of their citizens as expressed, for instance, by the total stock of a country's public debt); and regional/international integration (membership in international and regional organizations or the ratio of total foreign trade over GDP) (Sottilotta 2013: 3).

On the other hand Lijphart (1968) believes,
> a stable country is characterized not only by a lack of negative indicators such as violence, revolutions, coups and political movements opposed to the political system as a whole but also by positive indicators in the form of continuity of the constitutional order, government longevity, active social support for the political system and the ability of the political system to make effective decisions which could penetrate the society" (Lijphart 1968: 77).

It is remarkable that Lijphart approaches the question and the challenge of political stability in a different light. He combines multiple approaches and emphasises upon a heterogeneous range of factors.

Against the backdrop of the above discussion, a few theoretical and methodological gaps are found. Theoretically, the existing democratic studies are mainly focused on western experiences and the post-Soviet and post-colonial contexts in countries like Estonia and India have to be taken further. Moreover, the studies on political stability are yet to consider the diverse debate among the democrats within national and international contexts. Methodologically most of the available studies focused on analyzing the democracy and political stability discourse in a given national context, having very limited references to transnational or global comparative aspects. Thus the interaction of democracy and political stability in Estonia and India are overlooked.

The study proceeds to the next chapter that makes a comparative analysis of coalition politics with an Estonian and Indian experience

Chapter 6

Coalition Politics: A Comparison of Estonian and Indian Experience

The phenomenon of the coalition politics is one of the most interesting features of a parliamentary form of government; as a result the study of the phenomenon of coalition politics can throw important insights about the nature, functioning and challenges of parliamentary system. It is furthermore interesting to note that coalition politics in most of the circumstances inevitably emerges in the parliamentary system even when no one desires it. It emerges from the circumstances when no single party is in a situation to form the government in the Lower house, this leads in forming of a coalition between two or more parties to facilitate the formation of the government. The coalition form of the government is very common in a democratic state. The political factors responsible for formation, shape, politics, continuation, dissolution, success and failures etc. of coalition government are broadly referred to as coalition politics.

Coalition politics takes different form and makes different impact on various countries constitution according to their social, cultural and economic conditions. The constitution of a country sets limits within which politics can be practiced but it does not determine the actual nature of politics which is determined by a number of social, economic and cultural factors which is why the same type of constitution gives birth to different types of politics in countries with different socio-cultural milieu. On the contrary the politics of every country has its impact on the course of its constitutional development, directly or indirectly, formally or informally.

Coalition politics in both Estonia and India is based on the same principles. In both the country whenever any single political party is not able to get the requisite number of the seats in the lower house to form the government it leads to a situation of coalition. The study also tries to conceptualize the formation of electoral coalitions both at a conceptual and empirical level in Indian and Estonia. It also attempts to evaluate the implication of the coalition politics on polity in general and on the nature of electoral politics in particular. From 1991 to 2014 Estonia and India had several coalition governments. This shows political landscape was fragmented showing strong roots of coalition politics in both Estonia and India. This chapter tries to examine the comparative experience of coalition politics in Estonia and India during the period from 1991 to 2014.

Estonia's Experience of Coalition Politics

On the face of it and in a superficial reading coalition politics merely appears as an electoral alliance driven purely by electoral, instrumental and political purposes. However these readings are far from complete and barely capture one aspect of the phenomenon of coalition politics. It is important in this regard to note that the phenomenon of coalition politics has itself come to acquire meanings that are much larger than the mere immediate electoral interests. One can see the unfolding of the range of political, social, and cultural meaning in this phenomenon. Many a historical and socio-cultural factors find their contemporary political expression in and through this phenomenon. A merely electoral perspective is unable to comprehend the entirety of this apparently electoral phenomenon. For instance, a merely electoral approach to coalition politics does not tell us anything about the origin of the phenomenon of the coalition. Origin of coalition politics can be understood in the specific historical context and to which it gives one particular political expression.

The role of coalition politics in handling the crisis of parliamentary democracy has very well been highlighted by many commentators. It will not be incorrect suggest that coalition politics is symptomatic of the crisis of parliamentary democracies across the world. It is both the expression of the crisis of parliamentary representative system of democracy and a way out of this crisis. It is often seen that political parties with opposed political positions end up joining hands in forming coalition and that has resulted into popular disenchantment with both coalition and elections in general. However coalition is a political reality and endemic to the parliamentary form of the government. There cannot be any permanent fix for this tendency and this reality of the coalition politics has been recognised as such by even the trenchant critics of the coalition politics. The historical reality of divided society and its legacies has also shaped the political and institutional reality of Estonia.

The Estonian experience shows that the institutional mechanism in the country is strong enough to change and improve itself according to the changed circumstances. It is the prime minister who plays a leading role in maintaining the coalition under one fold. Prime Minister is assisted by finance minister and the chairperson of his parent party. Other participant parties too help in maintaining and protecting the coalition.

Centre of Government (CoG) is an important body with significant powers. It allows smooth function of the government. The CoG also facilitates coordination between and amongst different organs of the government. It s an important institution for inter and intra-institutional communication within the Estonia. Its role is further highlighted in the fact that it facilitates communication and dialogue between various ministries of the government which is very important requirement for the functioning of any government. Every country has developed

their own mechanism beside the regular meetings of the council of ministers to meet their requirements. The CoG also helps and facilitate drafting government documents and for introducing policies changes and continuities. The CoG is also a centre for grooming leadership. It is the declared mission of the CoG to implement and execute the national vision and formulate strategies for its implementation and success.

The OESD (2004) notes that in actual practice the CoG is not a completely autonomous body its effective functioning in reality depends upon the nature of the government and its priorities. Only when the government have a concrete course and plan of action and such a vision the CoG could act as the vehicle of change and improvement. According to Radula; "Estonia display similarities with respect to the types of strategic documents used to present the governing coalition's incoming political commitments and to how these political commitments get translated into a whole of government implementation plan. In Estonia government programme is the political statement of priorities of the governing coalition; it sets the overarching political direction for the government over its four year term. This political statement is then translated into a whole of government strategic plan called the strategic implementation plan of the government programme. Estonia's political commitments are referred to as the coalition agreement; this agreement is translated by the government office strategy unit into a strategic four year action plan for the government called the government programme. The strategy unit works with the other centre of government institutions and line ministries when translating the political commitments of the coalition agreement into a strategic and actionable implementation plan for the government. In addition to the government programme, three key horizontal longer term national strategies have been developed by the Estonian government: the Estonia 2020 national

competitiveness strategy, the national sustainability strategy and the national security concept. They have longer time horizons and are thus intended to influence multiple government programmes" (Raudla 2010: 281).

The Public Governance Review (PGR) in their (2011) report that the trajectory of the public culture in Estonia right from the time it got independence from Soviet Russia was against a culture of centralization and authoritarianism given their experience of Soviet Russia. The popular imagination equated every centralizing tendency or move as a movement towards authoritarianism. Kasemets notes that this led to a democratic political culture which cherished and preferred decentralization over centralization, public opinion over authoritarian or statist diktats. According to Kasemets,

> Estonia opted instead for a system of diffused power in the hands of ministries and local governments. The centre of government was designed to act essentially as an essentially as technical hub. As a result, the centres capacity to lead government strategy setting and co-ordinates strategy implementation government wide was relatively limited. Thus the early 1990s in Estonia could be characterised as a period with no centre of government role in the overarching strategic management of the government's strategic direction; national development was being pursued through uncoordinated and at times incoherent soloed line ministry decision making (Kasemets 2014).

As we have seen Kasemets draws our attention to one unintended consequence of this political culture and political tendency. While the move towards a diffused power setting itself was well intended and its roots in the public memory as well as in the political culture and therefore there was nothing fundamentally wrong in it, however this resulted in a lack of coordination, sector specific development programmes which at time collided and clashed with other programmes or policies run by other ministries or other institution. In absence of a clear decision making body with binding authority and clear coordination there emerged a situation of lack of coordination. This got further entrenched when Estonia

became a member of the European Union. The requirements and the criteria that were set by the EU as a condition based on which Estonia could become a fulltime member of the European Union further intensified this tendency (Ibid).

OECD observes

> The second half of the 1990s was marked by a notable increase in the number of single sector strategies, driven in part by the European Union (EU) accession process which required the country to fulfil certain framework conditions prior to acceding to the EU as a member country. As a result of the government's preparations to adopt the *Acquis communautaire*[9] and to comply with EU directives, a significant number of sector specific strategies were presented by ministries to parliament either to fulfil EU requirements or to align their own political priorities in specific policy fields with EU requirements thus enhancing their own sector's visibility or both. Consequently, the absence of central co-ordination led to a proliferation of disconnected single-sector strategies. By the early 2000s the number of sector-specific national development strategies adopted by the government or parliament had grown to over 120 (OECD 2015: 67).

The terms and conditions set forth by the European Union as part of their requirements over Estonia thus only deepened an already existing political tendency within the Democratic Republic of Estonia. Thus it would be a mistake to solely blame European Union for this segmented development strategies and the developmental plan that augmented this process. EU terms and conditions only intensified these tendencies and also as Estonia and Estonian government was in a rush to join EU it lost the opportunity to reflect and introspect upon their

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[9] The Community acquis or *acquis communautaire* sometimes called the EU acquis and often shortened to acquis, is the accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the body of European Union Law. The term is French: *acquis* meaning "that which has been acquired or obtained", and *communautaire* meaning "of the community" (Rudolf and Berg 2010: 22).

developmental plan. However there is another factor that contributed to this lack of coordination and a culture of sectionalism. And this new factor was the compulsions of coalition politics. Coalition politics, as we have argued and demonstrated earlier is also an obstacle in the path of a unified modality of government and governance. According to Lansford;

> The strategic unit is responsible for translating the coalition agreement into the government programme and actionable commitments for implementation by the government. This unit has now been around long enough to ensure that institutional memory can inform the whole of government exercise of translating the coalition agreement into the government programme. This unit, in fact plays the role of the government offices and hence the governments nerve centre. As it leads the translation exercise of the coalition's political commitment s into action plans. This includes referring policy objectives by sector and sub-sector along with the performance information needed to assess whether departments and ministers eventually achieve the results to which the government commits under its programme. It sustains close working relationship with the Ministry of Finance to ensure that the government programme, national competitiveness strategy and the multi-year budget framework are linked (Lansford 2014: 451).

The strategic unit that Lansford refers to is important unit within all coalitions to ensure the coordination. It creates channels of communication between constituent political parties and ministries that is inevitable requirement for both the sustenance of the government as well as for the smooth functioning of the government furthermore without this strategic unit the coalition itself can come under strain. According to OECD;

> During coalition agreement negotiations, the government office or the Ministry of Finance may also be called on by politicians to advice on current government programmes. However, in principle the political leadership arrives at a coalition agreement with little input from the government office or ministries. Once the coalition has agreed on its political commitments, the strategy unit is tasked with co-ordinating with the ministries to prepare measures to give effect to them. All ministers are involved in this process. Officials in the strategy unit engage with the ministerial advisors or ministries themselves to ensure a clear understanding of the political commitments outlined in the coalition agreement so that they are

translated into concrete commitments outlined in the coalition agreement so that they are translated effectively into concrete commitments to be implemented though the government programme"(OECD 2014: 68).

Lansford (2014) writes that it is the strategic unit that is burdened with the task of aligning single sector specific tasks to the overall programmes of the government. The strategic units look into the fact that there is a minimum of conflict of interest between two or more programmes run by different ministries and their organs. To achieve this end it is mandatory for each sector and corresponding ministry to come out with a concrete plan of action which is presented to the government and the council of ministry within 3 months of the adoption of any new strategy.

In the following discussion we present a history of the government formation and that of the coalition in Estonia in the wake of its independence from Soviet Russia. Day Banks and Muller write that there were many factors that were responsible for continuous change of governments and formation of new governments and coalition in Estonia. The primary reasons in the early years after the independence were the economic condition of Estonia, earlier the Estonian governments depended upon the grants from Moscow that suddenly stopped in the wake of the decline of the Soviet Russia. This led to the food shortage and a disgruntlement against the government. In the elections held on 18 March 1990, a majority of seats had been won by pro-independence groups, notably the Estonian Popular Front. The chairman of the party, Edgar Savisaar became Prime Minister on April 3. Savisaar's appointment had been preceded on March 29 by the reappointment of Arnold Ruutel as legislative chairman (de facto president of the Republic). Savisaar resigned on 23 January 1992 after the government had failed to win enough legislative votes to support a state of emergency that had been sought to cope with post-Soviet food and energy

shortages. The supreme council approved the formation of a new coalition administration on January 30 1990. Tiit Vahi was chosen as caretaker Prime Minister (Vabariik 2016: 299).

In general elections on 20 September 1992, Ruutel won a substantial majority (42.2 percent) of votes cast in presidential balloting, although in the legislative elections his party Secure Home (Kindel Kodu) coalition ran second to a Pro Patria coalition that supported Lennart Meri. Since presidential candidate had secured not a majority, the choice was constitutionally assigned to the legislature. A three party nationalist alignment on 5 October 1992 endorsed Meri by a narrow margin. A coalition government sworn in on 21October 1992 under the Prime Ministership of Mart Laar. The parttty adopted the reinforcements of Estonian statehood, defence to democracy, stabilization of the economy, the creation of environmental and social guarantees necessary for the development of a market economy, the restoration of a civil society and integration to Europe as its goals (Banks, Day and Muller 2016: 300).

Thus the parliamentary elections of the 1992 led to the formation of a three a party coalition. Both the rightist nationalist party and the centrist party joined hands under the leadership of Mart Laar. Mart Laar's party (Fatherland) won the largest thirty seats in the Riigkogu. Moderates won twelve seats. The Estonian Nationalist party won ten seats. Mart Laar is an important figure in the formative years of Estonia. He has both a nationalist legacy but he also championed a pro-economic reforms stand that created further strain over the poor and the elders of Estonia. However despite his unpopularity Mart Laar was successful in retaining power with a thin margin for the two years. However his unpopularity and growing civic unrest resulted in a no-confidence motion and as a result of it Mart Laar was ousted from power within two years. Mart Laar was thus ousted from

power in 1994 within two years of coming into power. There was a caretaker government that ushered into power; the caretaker government was run by the same three parties, until the new election was held in 1995. This new election resulted into a complete reversal of the results of the last election. It was the opposition parties of the last election who came to power with three fourth majorities (Ibid).

Muller (2016) argues,

> Parliamentary elections on March 5th, 1995 gave Estonian voters an opportunity to pass judgement on recent political events. The outcome was humiliating defeat for the Prop Patria alliance, while the moderate alliance endorsed by Prime Minister Tarand also lost ground. The main victor with a plurality of 41 seats was the relatively conservative Coalition and Rural Peoples's Union (KMU) headed by the 1992 caretaker Prime Minister, Tiit Vahi, on April 12 formed a new coalition government which included the Estonian Centre Party (Eke) led by former Prime Minister Savisaar, who was appointed interior minister. The change of government was seen by many foreign observers as part of a trend by East European voters to confer power on parties descended from the former communist regimes and opposed to the free market policies pursued by intervening governments. Prime Minister Vahi took pains to deny that this government was dominated by ex-communists and asserted that it would continue the pro-market reforms of its predecessors (Muller 2016: 300).

However, the political instability that marred Estonia right from the beginning of its government continued unperturbed. Barely within six months of coming to power of the new Prime Minister, Sivar had to face dismissal as there were allegations of political misconduct against him. He was alleged to have secretly taping the conversation during the formation of coalition. The entire council of minister has to resign and a new government was formed from within the same coalition under the leadership of Kallas who was the leader of the Estonian Reform Party.

According to Raudla the allegations that president Meri's sympathies toward Moscow on bilateral issues underscored contentious presidential balloting in the Riigikogu in August 1996. He was nominated for second term by a cross section of deputies although the incumbent was at first opposed as in 1992 only by Arnold Ruutel of the Estonian Rural Peoples's Party (EME). Meri led Arnold Ruutel in three successive ballots of the deputies on August 26, 27 and 28 without obtaining the required two third majority of the full complement of 101 members. As per the provisions of the constitution the speaker transferred the contest to an electoral college of 374 members (the 101 parliamentarians plus 273 local council representatives), where two additional candidates were nominated. They were eliminated in the first Electoral College ballot on 20 September, with Meri prevailing over Ruutel in the second later the same day by 196 votes to 126. The re-elected president pledged to use his further term to press for Estonia's complete integration into European economic and security structures, particularly into the European Union (Raudla 2010: 284).

Only seven seats were won by The Estonian Coalition Party (*Eesti Koonderakond- KE*) in the election that was held on 7th March 1999. The election results showed a contrast of fortunes. Actually it was Centre party that won the highest number of seats, but the government was formed by a coalition Estonian Reform Party, the Fatherland (Mart Laar's party) and the Moderates. The three party joined hands to form the government showing another pitfall of parliamentary democracy as the most popular party was not able to form the government and rather the government was formed by parties which were less popular than it. Thus, Raudala states,

> During the restoration of independence, all the governments except one (Mart Siimann's government, 1997 - 1999) were majority governments. In the first half of the nineteen-nineties the coalitions were broader, encompassing more

parties, and at the same time a party's control over the formation of government and the work of ministers was weaker. In the mid-nineties it was not exceptional for a minister to be without a party and not to have been previously elected to the Riigikogu. With the strengthening of the parties there has been a growth in their control over the government. Since the Riigikogu elections of 1999, parties have played an assured leading role in forming the governments, and as a rule coalition talks have begun even before the election results are made clear. Typically the coalitions have consisted of 2 to 3 parties which have a slight majority in the Riigikogu, and where each party has a roughly comparable number of ministerial posts. Among the governing parties the right wing has dominated, notably the liberal Reform Party (Raudla 2010: 285).

Due to increasing conflict among the government coalition partners, Prime Minister Laar on December 19, 2001 announced his intention to resign. He was succeeded by Siim Kallas, former finance minister and chair of the RE, formed a new Centre Party/RE cabinet on January 28. Municipal elections in October 2002 were most notable for the strong performance by the recently launched Union for the Republic (Res Public- RP). Campaigning on an anti-corruption and anticrime platform, the RP won nearly one-quarter of the votes in the March 2, 2003 legislative balloting. Declining a coalition offer from the Center Party, the RP subsequently agreed to an RP/RE/ERL government on April 10 under the leadership of the RP's Juhan Parts. The RP-led center- right coalition government in 2003 endorsed the previous government's plans for Estonian accession to NATO and the EU. EU membership was formally achieved on May 1, 2004. Prime Minister Parts resigned on March 24, 2005 in response to the Riigikogu's adoption of a no-confidence motion against the administration's justice minister. With the EK replacing the RP in the government coalition, a new three party government was installed on April 13 under the premiership of the RE's Andrus Ansip. Toomas Hendrik Ilves of the Social Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond-SDE) was elected president on September 23, 2006 after three rounds of balloting in the parliament. Ilves defeated incumbent

president Ruutel by a vote of 174-162 in the Electoral College (Banks, Day and Muller 2016: 301).

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The RE led all parties in the 4 March, 2007 legislative balloting with 31 seats fallowed by the EK with 29 and the newly formed Pro Patria and Res Publica

Union (*Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit- IRL*), composed of the RP and the Fatherland Union. Eschewing further co-operation with the EK, which had previously blocked economic reforms, Andrus Ansip formed the RE/IRL/SDE coalition in April. Policy differences over how to manage the budget deficit resulted in the exit of the SDE from government a minority coalition composed of the RE and IRL. A subsequent centre-right coalition led by the Prime Minister Ansip was formed following elections on 6 March, 2011. This coalition resulted in the creation of an entirely RE-IRL led cabinet a marked change from the previous cabinet. The EK nominated independent Indrek Tarand for the August 2011 presidential elections, who advocated increased transparency and a presidential term limi t(Lansford 2014: 453).

Although the EK did not promise to organise a campaign in the legislature on his behalf, it implicitly endorsed his support for a referendum on instituting direct presidential elections. Tarand was defeated by incumbent President Ilves 73 votes to 25. In May 2012 Minister of Defense Mart Laar resigned after suffering a stroke in February and was succeeded by IRL chairman and MP Urmas Reinsalu. As a sign of the growing strength of the RE-IRL coalition, Ansip announced that Reinsalu would serve as acting Prime Minister when Ansip had to be absent (Lansford 2014: 453).

The rise of the party system in Estonia has a history were the primary reason behind this was the 5 per cent national threshold that was retained despite other changes. According to this only those parties which can nationally win 5 per cent of popular mandate was entitled to be represented in the parliament. This led to a decline of the party system. Not many new parties that sprung up could achieve this requisite mandate and therefore these parties withered away in course of time. Many critics in this regard have noted the instability of the party system in

erstwhile Soviet countries. On these measures even the Estonian party system could not be considered to be completely stable. One figure in this regard is illustrating the number of parties that were effectively participating in 1992 was 5.9 that declined to 4.7 in the year 2003 (Liiv 2004).

The prospect of political parties has not changed drastically at the national level. However, the nationally viable parties had changed surprisingly little from 1992 to 2003. The vote shares of parties had swung dramatically at times, but often only to change direction again in following elections. The programmatic profile of some parties has changed, yet the ranks of key politicians remained to a large extent constant through the decade. Only the parliamentary elections of 2003 brought with it a sudden rise of a genuinely new party, Res Publica that seemed to undermine the prior relative persistence of the party system (Biezen 2004: 702).

Busse (2003) also notes this tendency of the Estonian representative system when he argues that there has not been any radical alteration in the fate of the political parties since 1992 at the national level. More or less, however their electoral fortune may change, all the parties that contested the first parliamentary election in 1992 continues to be active players in national politics. All other major parties or their direct predecessors had been present from 1992. That includes the moderately leftist Centre Party under the charismatic leadership of Edgar Savisaar, the market liberal Reform Party participating (and perhaps dominant) in all coalitions since 1999, the national-conservative Pro Patria Union, the rural People's Union (with elements of the once powerful but now defunct Coalition Party), and the Social Democrats, formerly called the Moderates. While the parties are ideologically distinct and differ in social bases of support, this has not been a decisive factor in coalition-making. The

Moderates have participated in right-wing coalitions under Mart Laar (Pro Patria Union) and remarkable differences in economic programs have not impeded the Centre Party and Reform Party from sharing governmental responsibilities. In fact, today there are very few inconceivable coalition combinations in Estonia (Busse 2003: 1124).

The Estonian party system shows features of the party system in general across the world. But there are certain elements that are distinctive to Estonia. These elements have their genealogy in the Soviet past. These features as we have noted earlier can also be visualized in other countries of the former Soviet Union which went through or are rather going through the transition from communism to liberal democracy. The perception of the role of parties and their relationship to the state in Estonia does not simply reflect the status of parties in modern democracies, but has its particularities due to the recent transition from communism and its legacies. Additionally, Estonia poses an interesting question about the status of political parties in a small country. The question of whether parties should be primarily private or public organizations was extensively discussed in parliamentary debates before the Political Parties Act was passed in 1994. The eventual version of the law saw them mostly as private organizations the law is basically an addendum to the Non-profit Associations Act, only setting some additional regulations. In matters not covered by the Political Parties Act, they are subject to the same legal provisions as NGO-s (Non-governmental Organization) (Liiv 2002: 376).

There is also the phenomenon of the regulation of political parties that can be seen in Estonia. The successive governments introduced a range of reforms and regulations. These regulations cover the funding of the political parties and the amount of money that a party or a single candidate can spend over elections.

Interestingly the election funding in Estonia is completely state funded. These regulations also have provision based on which a political parties can be recognised as the political party. For example if a party has less than a thousand cadres or registered members the party may well face liquidation (Biezen and Kopecky 2001: 410).

Many a political observers and critics suggest that part of the problem of political party system in Estonia is due to a very rigid election law and Political Parties Act. The act has been revised so many times over that it is difficult to derive any clear meaning from it. Many a times contradictory provision cohabit the same act. The rigidity of the electoral law has caused a decline of the party system as it requires a large infrastructure and human resources to run the party. At times it has been advised to scrap the Political Parties Act in to and replace by a new act which can ne facilitating for the political participation of larger social group and prospective political parties. However we must recognise that it is the political party alone that has right to represent people in the parliament. The genesis of this idea lies in the fact that non-party formations were considered ineligible to represent people. Furthermore in 1998 the State of Estonia decided to ban pre-poll electoral alliances with the intended of strengthening party system in the country. It was decided in 1999 that only those parties which are registered (remember that the criteria for registration of parties were very restrictive) can contest in the national elections (Ibid).

The origin of the privilege given to the political parties in Estonia to the fact the Estonian state tried to dilute the possibility of arbitrary political formation and for the fact that Estonia emphasized upon institution building as a prerequisite for democratic functioning and as an important factor to stop nepotism. The privileges for parties can partly be explained by a pragmatic wish to exclude

nonpartisan actors from electoral competition, but some more objective reasons have been significant as well. The main reasoning behind the ban on coalitions has been the strengthening of political accountability. Clearly, electoral coalitions are temporary organizations and accountability can dissolve among its constituent parts (Liiv 2002: 378).

On the other hand, Estonia has also seen once powerful parties that simply dissolved after a spell in power. The most remarkable case was that of the Coalition Party, that became the most powerful actor in the 1995 parliament and fielded two Prime Ministers, only to fade from the scene in 1999 and even disband in 2001. This step was hailed as an honourable one by some of the party's members that the party did not stick to power after completing its mission (whatever that was). But the fate of the Coalition Party also somewhat notorious, because its term in power was tainted by numerous corruption scandals. One of them is bringing down Prime Minister Tiit Vähi, who has since become one of the wealthiest entrepreneurs in Estonia. While the present strict membership requirements for parties should in principle enhance the prospects of accountability, even the publication of membership lists has not made them thoroughly trustworthy (Ibid).

Scholars argue that the fact that Estonia has made the registration of political parties mandatory for their public appearance can be traced back to its troubled past. During the earlier period, when Estonia was under Soviet rule, the political parties used to operate underground as they were not allowed to operate. The Estonians believe that there is no need of an unregistered political party as it reminds one of the Soviet era. This is an interesting feature of Estonian republic.

As we have seen the political parties and not the civic and civil society associations are the vectors of Estonian politics. The Political Parties Act clearly defines the political party and its role in the public life of Estonia. Political party is a voluntary body and cannot participate in politics for profit maximization. It is upon the political party to represent the people of Estonia both locally and nationally. However the nature of the party system in Estonia is very restrictive and so far only six political parties have been able to operate at a pan Estonia level. The republic of Estonia is a very new state it came into being only in 1990s. Therefore, even the political parties are of a very recent origin. The political parties have gone through multiple splits in this short span of time. Many leaders have changed their loyalties.

Coalition is another interesting feature of the Estonian party system. In the early years, in the immediate aftermath of independence Estonia was successful in electing majority governments. However this changed in the course of time. The present era, and the larger reality of Estonia is the reality of coalition politics. No single party is able to form governments on their own. This has resulted in coalition era. The present government and the governments before it were the products of coalitions. Politics in Estonia confirms to the larger trend of parliamentary system. This gets reflected in the multi-party system. Hence, from 1991 to 2104 coalition politics has been the norm in Estonia. There has been enormous influence of political parties in government formation and decision making process resulting in both unstable and stable coalition governments.

Indian Experience of Coalition Politics

The history of coalition politics is closely associated with the downfall of the Congress Party in Indian politics. It is stated in the states and at centre both when the Congress was defeated at polls, this resulted in the emergence of many

regional parties leading to the formation of coalition groups and finally resulting in the formation of coalition government.

Coalition governments were first formed in states like Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar etc. after the downfall of the Congress in these states in the election held in 1967. These coalition governments were popularly known as S. V. D. (Samyukta Vidhayak Dal) governments. These coalition governments ended the domination of Congress Party in state politics and provided the opportunities for governance to opposite parties. These S.V. D. Governments were mostly managed by the leaders of opposition parties who had no or little experience of governance. Hence very soon these coalition governments earned bad names for themselves and were equated in popular perception within decision, delay, and indiscipline, misuse of power and even sale and purchase of MLA's (Member of Legislative Assemblies). They became the symbol of political corruption, lust of power, erosion of chief minister's authority, and decline in collective responsibility of cabinet etc (Chander 2004: 30).

Just as in the states, the coalition politics began at the centre with the defeat of Congress Party in the 1977 elections when the first Non-Congress government headed by Majorji Desai was formed in New Delhi. Although technically this government was a one party (Janata Party) government, actually it was a coalition government because the Janata Party was itself a conglomeration of five political parties, i.e. Congress (O), Socialist Party, Bhartiya Lok Dal (BLD), Jana Sangh and the Congress for Democracy, (CFD). Therefore, it functioned, faced problems and died as a coalition government. Chaudhary Charan Singh formed another Non Congress government with the outside support of the Congress in 1979 which fell within a month necessitating mid-term poll in 1980 in which the Congress won and Indira Gandhi returned to power. Again the

Congress returned to power in 1985 election in which her son Rajiv Gandhi got 3/4 majority due to sympathy wave generated due to murder of Indira Gandhi in 1984. V. P. Singh formed another non Congress government in 1989 with outside support of left parties and BJP and Chandra Shekhar formed one more non-congress government in 1990. Both these governments were technically one party minority government formed with the outside support of one or another political party (Chakrabarty 2014: 15).

The real coalition era dawned in 1996 when the general election to the 11th Lok Sabha resulted in a hung parliament in which no party or combination of parties got majority. As no party or combination of parties got majority, the President Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma invited Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the leader of the largest party to form the government and prove his majority on May 31. He was sworn in as Prime Minister on May 16. The motion of confidence moved by him on 27th May was discussed for 10 hours on May 27 and 28. The motion was, however, not put to vote as Vajpayee announced during the debate itself that he was going to resign. He went straight from Parliament house to the Rashtrapati Bhawan and submitted his resignation to the President on May 28 itself (Times of India 1996).

From 29 May to 1 June, 1996 Atal Bihari Vajpayee government worked as caretaker government. After the resignation of Atal Bihari Vajpayee on 28 May, 1996, the president asked P. V. Narsimha Rao the leader of the second largest party to form the government but he declined (Sayeed 2000: 147). Thereafter the President turned to the National Front and the Left front for providing alternative government. The National Front and Left front made hectic efforts to find out a suitable person for Prime Ministership. First they tried to persuade V. P. Singh and Jyoti Basu to lead the combination. When they refused, they agreed only on the name of H. D. Deve Gowda who was not a member of any house at that time.

The Congress also offered its support to Deve Gowda. Many writers have criticized the president for appointing Deve Gowda the leader of the United Front comprising thirteen parties was sworn in as Prime Minister of the coalition government on 1 June, 1996. He proved his majority in the Lok Sabha on 12 June, through a motion of confidence (Times of India 1996). In very dramatic circumstance the Congress withdrew support from the Deve Gowda government. As a result the government fell in a vote of confidence and he resigned on 11 April, 1997. Deve Gowda worked as caretaker Prime Minister from 11th to 21st April, 1997. The Deve Gowda government was the first government at the centre to represent southerners and backward people dominated. It was really a federalist government, however, because of the composition as the council of ministers, much was not expected (Kothari 1996: 17).

Deve Gowda government truly represented the composition of the Lok Sabha because there was dominance of backward classes, Dalits and Muslims in the Lok Sabha and Council of Minister both. However, since the government depended on Congress support from outside, people in general did not hope much from this government (Dival 1997: 1). This proved true when the government fell on April 11. The Congress President Sita Ram Kesari who was annoyed with Deve Gowda for some personal reasons, offered to support United Front government, the front changed the leader. The Congress had nothing against the government or its policies but was against the leader. After this offer of the Congress, United Front once again started the search for another suitable candidate for Prime-Ministership. Again the process of elimination started. Several names such as those of Y. K. Moopnar, Laloo Prasad Yadav, Mulayam Singh Yadav were considered but each of them was opposed by strong groups and persons. Ultimately they all agreed on the name of I. K. Gujaral who was foreign minister in the outgoing ministry of Deve Gowda. Gujaral took oath of

office on 21 April, 1997 and formed the coalition government at the centre with outside support of the Congress (Times of India 1997).

Like constitution of ministers, allotment of portfolios etc. Pritish Nandy says that he was too good a man to be Prime Minister at that time. Ram Bahadur Rai says that he was the first Prime Minister who had no right to constitute his cabinet; Shekhar Gupta has branded him as bonded Prime Minister. According to Bhawani Sen Gupta he was not a politician; Prime-Ministership was thrust upon him. He lacked political courage to take lot of decisions (Sahara 1997: 1). Still he could not satisfy Sita Ram Kesari who withdrew support from the government in November 1997. Gujaral resigned on November 28. No party of coalition was in a position to fill the political vacuum after the resignation of Gujral that prompted the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha on 4 December, 1997 (Times of India).

The President ordered a mid-term poll which was held on February 16, 22, 28 and 7 March, 1998. For fighting the midterm poll three political alliances came into being BJP entered into alliance with Akali Dal, Shiv Sena, Haryana Vikas Party, Lok Shakti, AIADMK, MDMK, Janta Party, Samta Party, Biju Janta Dal etc., the Congress allied with Rashtriya Janta Dal, Kerala Congress, IUML and Republican Party of India (RPI) and the national front consisted of Janta Dal, Tamil Manila Congress, DMK, Telgu Desam (Naidu), CPI, C.P.I. (M), Samajwadi Party, etc. The election to the 12th Lok Sabha again resulted in a hung parliament. No Party or alliance gained majority. However the BJP led alliance emerged with 264 seats, as the largest alliance in which BJP had the largest number of seats (197) (Dival 1997: 2).

After hectic political activities, it became clear that BJP alliance had more support and could form a stable government. Hence the President invited Atal Bihari Vajpayee to form the government, Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister for the second time on 19 March, 1998 (Times of India 1998) to lead the coalition government at the centre. Immediately thereafter, Atal Bihari Vajpayee started feeling the pangs of a coalition government. President too was in a difficult position. Jayalalita started troubling Vajpayee from the day 1 and kept him on his toes on the one pretext or another. The whole year 1998 passed as a period of black-mailing by allies supporting Atal Bihari Vajpayee from inside or outside (Jai 1996: 275).

All parties supporting the government were putting one demand or another everyday forcing Vajpayee for taking unworthy decisions or deferring decisions. However, Jayalalita put three demands that are to sack Defence Minister George Fernandes, reinstatement of sacked Navy Chief Vishnu Bhagwat and setting up a joint parliamentary committee to probe into allegation made by George Fernandes against Bhagwat (Thakur and Sharma 1999). Mr. Vajpayee did not yield and the result was obvious. Jayalalita (the AIADMK) withdrew support from the government in the first week of April. Hence the President asked Atal Bihari Vajpayee to seek fresh vote of confidence. Vajpayee government was defeated by one vote to 17 April, 1999 (269 votes in favour and 270 votes against the motion of confidence) (Times of India 1999). The remark of Church bill that one is enough was proved true in this voting (Harold in Thakur and Sharma 1997: 358).

The Vajpayee government resigned immediately but was asked by the President to continue till the new government was formed. The President tried to find out a leader who could form the next government but he miserably failed in this

attempt. The opposition parties which were able to remove Vajpayee from power, could not form an alternative government because they could not agree on who should lead the new government. Hence the President dissolved the 12th Lok Sabha on April 26, (Times of India 1999) as no government could be formed, Vajpayee continued working as care-taker Prime Minster till the formation of next government in October 1999. After the dissolution of the 12th Lok Sabha, political parties started preparation for the election for the 13th Lok Sabha. There was clear indication since 1996 that the days of the one party dominance in parliament were over and the days of hung Parliament started. Hence two main claimants of to the power, the BJP and the Congress, set their feet on course of coalition politics, the BJP with full vigor and the Congress only half-heartedly (Sayeed 2000: 148).

The BJP formed a grand alliance of political parties as National Democratic Alliance (NDA) on 15 May, 1999. Atal Behari Vajpayee was elected leader of NDA. The main political parties forming the alliance were Janta Dal (United) Samta Party, Lok Shakti Party, Shiromani Akali Dal, Indian National Lok Dal (Haryana), DMK, MDMK, PMK, IMC, TRC, (All Tamil Naidu), Biju Janta Dal (Orissa), Shiv Sena (Maharastra), Himanchal Pradesh Vikas Party (HP) etc. Some other parties Telugu Desam and Trinamool Congress (West Bengal) assured support from outside. The Congress reached electoral understanding with some political parties AIADMK, Rastriya Janta Dal (Bihar), Rastriya Lok Dal (UP), Kerala Congress, Muslim League etc. The third alliance of left parties was already there. Some other parties like Samajwadi Party, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) etc. decided to face the election on their own without any alliance or understanding with other parties (Times of India 1999).

This time the victory of NDA was so convincing that President K. R. Narayanan appointed Atal Bihari Vajpayee Prime Minister on 11 October, 1999 without asking him to see any vote of confidence Atal Bihari Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister for the third time on 13 October, 1999 and formed the fifth coalition government at the centre. Vajpayee completed his stint as Prime Minister as the head of the coalition government successful which was no mean achievement given the experience of earlier coalition governments in the centre. Atal Bihari Vajpayee got the Lok Sabha dissolved on 6 February, 2004 a few months earlier than due (Times of India 2004). Atal Bihari Vajpayee successfully leading a coalition government for a full term performed the rarest of rare feat in the annals of parliamentary government. He proved that coalition government can be stable provided the parties forming the coalition observe coalition culture and work within the limit set by the agenda of coalition government better known as Common Minimum Programme (CMP). This besides several other factors led the Congress to think and feel that coalition politics was the need of the hour (Chakrabarty 2014: 19).

Hence it declared its willingness and readiness to form coalition government. It, in fact, formed a coalition known as United Progressive Alliance (UPA) to fight the 2004 parliamentary poll as an alliance. In the 2004, election, UPA won the majority. Shortly, thereafter Sonia Gandhi was nominated by the 19 Congress allies to be the next Prime Minister. Buts she declined to take the national top post and instead nominated eminent economist, former Union Finance Minister and senior Congress leader, Dr. Man Mohan Singh for the post (Manisha 2005: 424). This was approved by the Congress parliamentary party and UPA partners. Hence he was sworn in as Prime Minister on 22 May, 2004 to lead the coalition government at the centre. Thus coalition politics has been the mainstream of all coalition governments that have been formed till this day.

If we look at the working of coalition governments at the centre we shall not fail to identify certain political developments which have had deep influence on the course of constitutional development and working of constitutional agencies and institutions. Some of the very important among them are: the tradition of outside support to a minority government started with Indira Gandhi who took outside support from CPI, and others when her government became a minority government after the Congress split in 1969. Since then different Prime Minister from Indira Gandhi to Man Mohan Singh who headed minority governments, took outside support from different parties and dealt differently with the parties supporting from outside. Different political parties supporting the minority government dealt with different Prime Minister differently according to the political situations in which they (PM) were placed (Chander 2004: 28).

Indira Gandhi's minority government avidly depended upon the outside support of the CPI, and others, she had to make compromises on many issues of policies and programmes for surviving as Prime Minister. Ultimately, fed up with the pressure exerted by these parties she dissolved the Lok Sabha in 1970 and ordered fresh poll one year earlier in 1971, instead of 1972. Charan Singh, V. P. Singh, Chandra Shekher, Deve Gowda and I. K. Gujral had to resign from the Prime Ministership when the parties supporting from outside withdrew their support from the government, BJP in the case of V. P. Singh and Congress in the case of others. Narsimha Rao converted his minority government in to a majority government by persuading, pressurizing or purchasing some MP's belonging to other parties notably Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. According to Dr. Subhash Kashyap, the term of ninth Lok Sabha (1989-91) in which two minority governments were installed, was the period in which the great institution of Lok

Sabha sank to the lowest depths and rules and regulations of the house were ignored (Kashyap 1992: 223-24).

However the ugly face of the outside support was visible only after 1996 when Prime Ministers were forced to resign or make unhealthy compromises with the parties supporting from outside. Outside support has emerged as an institution in the era of coalition politics. Man Mohan Singh survived as Prime Minister on the outside support of left parties. As an institution, the outside support has proved a bane in Indian politics because it affected the position of Prime Minister and functioning of government. Our experience with outside support has not been very encouraging. In fact the aim of extending outside support to a minority government was never pure. For example the aim behind CPI's extending support to the Indira Gandhi government in 1969 was to strengthen the leftist elements in the Congress led by Indira Gandhi. Similarly Indira Gandhi's aim in giving outside support to Charan Singh was not to enable Charan Singh to run the government but to make way for mid-term poll (Jai 1996: 275). Outside support has not had a good record in our parliamentary history. Venkataraman says that Indira Gandhi's support to Charan Singh and her withdrawal of support within three weeks were ugly precedents in our parliamentary history (Venkataraman 2004: 437).

President Venkataraman was very cautious when Rajiv Gandhi offered outside support to Chandra Shekhar in 1990 in forming a minority government. He agreed to invite Chandra Shekhar to form the government, when Rajiv Gandhi gave an assurance that he would not withdraw support at least for a year. It was only after this assurance that the President became convinced that Chandra Shekhar would form a viable government. Hence, when Rajiv Gandhi withdrew support from the government just after three months, the President was very

sorry for Chandra Shekhar. After the resignation of Chandra Shekhar in 1991 Rajiv Gandhi tried to constitute new government with the outside support but the President declined (Ibid: 488). According to Madhu Limaye Charan Singh's biggest mistake was to accept Indira Gandhi's treacherous support in 1997. Chandra Shekhar committed the same mistake in 1990. History repeated itself when Deve Gowda and I. K. Gujral accepted the outside support of the Congress in 1996 and 1997 respectively and met the same fate (Harold in Thakur and Sharma 1997: 358). However the practice continued through Vajpayee government to Man Mohan Singh government: They accepted outside support from TDP and left parties respectively.

Coalition politics has brought about significant change in the nature of our political parties by forcing national parties like the Congress and the BJP to come close to regional and state parties like the DMK, the Akali Dal, the Telugu Desam, and the AGP etc for the purpose of forming government. This has, on the one hand enabled the national parties to better understand the local aspirations of the people which the regional and smaller parties represent and promote and on the other, offered ample opportunities to smaller parties to participate in decision making at the national level. In this way both regional and national parties have been benefited. Both have become realistic and pragmatic in their approaches. This has led to politics of compromise conciliation and consensus. Coalition politics has been a cause and an effect of hung Lok Sabha. The phenomenon of hung Lok Sabha has influenced the functioning of several of our constitutional institutions and created many administrative problems (Prakash 2005: 6).

For historical reasons, coalition politics was born out of negative approach to politics. Since no political party found itself able to defeat Congress, many parties opposed to the Congress like Congress (O) etc. joined hands on anti-

Congress front and formed the Janta Party, there was nothing common among these parties except that they were opposed to the Congress party and Indira Gandih. So they followed anti-congress formula to the extent to dismissing nine Congress ruled states, dismissing governors and sending Indira Gandhi to jail. Similarly UPA was born out of anti NDA plank the only thing that is keeping UPA united is anti NDA plank. This negative politics has given birth to certain very unhealthy trends in Indian Politics such as political vendetta, witch-hunting, misuse of investigative agencies, opening and closing of criminal cases against political leaders with an eye on political gains, naming and renaming of the schemes and institutions announced and reversing decisions taken by the former government. The list is unending because it goes on increasing with the passage of time. Moreover, the trend has percolated the states and local bodies at a great financial cost to the people (Sayeed 2000: 149).

Coalition governments, as we have discussed above, have also created few problems, which may prove dangerous, even catastrophic in certain situations. In this situation we are left with no choice but to find out ways and means to ensure smooth working of coalition government in future. Various constitutional experts and leaders have come up with a number of suggestions in this regard. A few of them are discussed as fallows; firstly, the Lok Sabha should have a fixed term so that it may not be dissolved before the due date. This would solve many problems political administrative, financial and others which are created by the uncertainty associated with likely dissolution of Lok Sabha. Secondly, smaller regional political parties should be kept out of national politics because they have more than often posed problems for good governance (Times of India 2004). As a factor the regional parties create such individualistic syndrome as Karunanidhi, Jayalalita, Lalu Yadava-Mulayam Singh Yadava, Mayawati and Mulayam Singh Yadava, Bal Thakre etc. who try to protect their individual interests without any

consideration for larger national interests. The regional parties moreover always promote their regional agenda at the cost of national agendas (Chaturvedi 2004).

Thirdly, the President should stop the practice of asking a newly appointed Prime Minister to seek vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha within a stipulated period of time. Experts are of the view that there is no mention of vote of confidence in the Constitution or Law or even in the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of business in the Lok Sabha. It is harmful in that it gives unnecessary authority to the President to meddle in the organization and working of government. Had the President not asked the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to seek vote of confidence in 1999, the fall of government by one vote and all that followed thereafter could have been avoided. Constitutional experts feel that the President's job is to appoint a Prime Minister who in his opinion has majority in the Lok Sabha and is likely to give a stable government, it is not his job to ask him (PM) to prove his majority in the Lok-Sabha and that it is right and duty of the opposition to move a motion of no-confidence against a Prime Minister if it feels that he does not have majority. A former President R. Venkataraman holds that the President should not have asked Vajpayee to seek vote of confidence (Jai 1996: 213).

Fourthly, no-confidence motion should accompany with the name of the new Prime Minister in case the motion is carried. Alarmed at the fall of Vajpayee government by one vote in 1999 and failure of the opposition to be able to form an alternative government, many eminent people have come with such a suggestion, on the lines of such a practice in some of European countries to ensure stability in the epoch of the coalitions. Chopra notes that "The Law Commission in a radical proposal has suggested that if a government falls by no confidence vote; the opposition leader automatically becomes the Prime Minister

and forms the new government" (Chopra 1996: 6). N. M. Ghatate, former chairman of the law Commission, told reporters that the Law commission, based on its recommendation that were based on the experience of "no confidence motion" in Germany, has stated in their 170th report recommending that no confidence motion and a confidence motion stating the choice of the alternative leader should be accompanied together and presented to the house together. By the second motion which is simultaneously introduced with the first the leader of the opposition assumes the role of prime minister without wasting much time and energy of the parliament. This move the law commission believed can also overcome political uncertainties that arise in the wake of the success of the no confidence motion. He said that the system would fit into the spirit of the Constitution as it would not require any change or amendment of the constitution or any laws; it only requires a minor change in Rule No. 198 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha (Times of India 2001).

Fifthly, the practice to extend outside support to minority or coalition government should be discouraged. The cause of untimely death of the governments led by Charan Singh, V. P. Singh, Chandra Shekhar, Deve Gowda and I. K. Gujral was the sudden withdrawal of the outside support by BJP in case of V. P. Singh and by the Congress in all other cases, if the withdrawal of outside support by the Congress was the cause of down fall of the coalition governments of Deve Gowda and Gujral, the continuation of outside support by the left of Man Mohan Singh is disastrous particularly to the economic reforms which are so badly needed to take India forward as a global power. Sixthly, the practice to appoint a jumbo cabinet to accommodate MP's changing parties just for political position and power should be banned by law. Thanks to the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government, this objective has been already achieved by 97th Constitution Amendment Act enacted in 2003 which limited the size of Council of Ministers

and debarred defectors from joining them in ministry. However politicians have found ways and means to overcome the limitations. This should be looked into (Jindal 2005: 7).

Seventhly, since the governors are in very embarrassing position and face cross-firing from state governments and Union government when they belong to different political parties. It has been suggested that clear cut rules should be framed regarding their appointment, tenure etc. so that they do not function under the threats of Union or State government. Governors like Dharm Veer, Romesh Bhandari, Sunder Singh Bhandari, Vinod Kumar Pandey, and Fatima Beewi to just a few, and faced very uncomfortable even humiliating situation during their tenures. We have waited too long for convention. Now it is necessary to frame some rules regarding the appointment and functioning of governors. Eighthly, it has been suggested that Lok Sabha should be involved in the selection of Prime Minister. Justice Seervai has suggested that the Prime Minister should be selected by Lok Sabha by a majority vote. If no candidate gets majority of votes in the first voting, the second voting should be resorted to select one from the top two persons selected in the first voting (Chopra 1996: 6).

Ninthly, the government i.e. the executive must realize that it is only one component of the state and not the state itself. It must not by pass the Legislature by issuing circulars and rules as and when it wants. Some people say that compulsions of coalition politics hamper legislature since the government does not have the numbers in parliament. But this cannot be accepted as an excuse for inaction; it must draft and get passed necessary laws to address the pressing problems of the nation (Jindal 2005: 7). However, none of the suggestions is acceptable to all; a sort of national debate is on these suggestions. This is likely to go on until and unless one, two or many of them are made part of our political

system either through constitutional amendment or judicial verdicts or well established conventions. However, we are sure to find out remedies to the maladies from which our political system is affected at present. It may be advisable to appoint a committee of experts to examine the above suggestions and make its recommendations.

As may be inferred from the comparative analysis, the experiences of coalition government and coalition politics in both Estonia and India has both its strengths and weaknesses. It is both pertinent and desirable that we learn from these experiences and not merely praise or dismiss these experiences. It is important that one is not dismissive about the entirety of the experiences of the coalition politics and also take note of its strengths which are no less significant. The fact that coalition politics has given rise to a less polarized electorate and a sense of cooperation is no less commendable achievement. Coalitions are also a politically enriching experience for pluralistic society. After all coalition politics is one rich evolving political terrain in the experience of representative democracy.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

An attempt to foreground an enquiry on the question of political aspects of coalition formations is always quite complex and dense. It provides a broader understanding and overall view of coalition politics in Estonia and India by providing a detailed insight on political institutions and its functions and as well locating it at the political background of Estonia and India. From the existing literature and body of knowledge on coalition politics in Estonia and India reminds us that these forms of political arrangements and government apparatus constitute its principle based on the linguistic and ethnic lines. To represent the multiple voices and accommodate the difference within the given political structure requires the coalition mode of governing as form of alliance to constitute larger government. The ideology in the form of liberals, socialist, communist, conservative, Christian democrat and universal policy considerations are of relative significance as well. Hence, comparing these two democracies helped us to understand the factors enabling coalition politics in both Estonia and India.

Coalition politics are influenced by various factors in Estonia and India like constitution, political party, party system, electoral system and electoral laws, institutional structure, regime stability, stable government and administration etc. Coalition politics in Estonia and India has also led to stability and instability, competition among political parties, political parties' strong roots in a society, coalition building and fragmentation of party system etc. By strengthening democracy through the electoral system and electoral laws coalition politics has been maintained in Estonia and India. Since 1991 there has been a coalition

government in Estonia and India. In Estonian case fragmentation and lack of institutionalization, public trust deficit has resulted in the emergence of coalition politics but, in Indian case despite having huge social diversity political institutionalization and public trust in government institutions are high.

Estonia and India both has been experiencing the importance of coalition politics in their respective national politics. The significant aspect of coalition politics in Estonia and India has been the structure and performance of political parties within the institutional framework. The existing political institutions, vibrant civil society and establishing a new political leadership have strengthened the coalition politics in Estonia and India. The coalition politics in Estonia and India has begun advancing with institutionalization and performing the function of an intermediary between society and government. The coalitions in Estonia as well as India are viewed as important mechanism through which caste, class, religious cleavages, regional or territorial based identities are put in a cohesive framework even in the presence or absence of shared ideologies. Hence, apart from the general criteria, the importance of local or the regional factors drew attention in the game of coalition power.

It was observed that the Estonian society was more subtle in terms of its political articulation which might have not directly express political differences in prior to 1990's. The political crisis such as unstable party system and unpredictable voting patterns shook the politics base of Estonia. However, it had managed it social base to maintain political stability. At the end of the year 1992, the trend of political articulations completely took a new turn wherein new political parties came up with diverse political agenda. The unobserved political and social cleavages gained prominence and it's reflected in the systems of political party. Factors like the historical, transitional and contemporary complexities might

have feed into the burgeoning phenomenon of political cleavages. In contrast to the settings of Indian polity, Estonia political climate was completely driven by straight jacket ideologies of left, right and center.

In the context of India, the polity never be dominated by single ideologies, but multiple crosscutting axes were quite prevalence that was left-right, secular-communal, centralist-regional, autonomist and a variety of caste based blocs also varying regionally. Primarily, the issues of caste affiliation, regional group, religious groups, linguistic and minority or majority affiliation, have received greater attention in the political trends of India. Hence, these elements contribute to the formation of government in accordance with coalition party. From the Global perspectives, the society of India always considered to be traditional one. Hence coalitions are necessary mechanism to rectify historical wrongs such as caste-class inequalities and discrimination. Thus coalitions apart from offering a representation or manifestation of the usual fractiousness that human associations are associated to provide a recourse through political modalities such as coalition building for the sake of articulation and also at least as a hope for redress of grievances. Hence, coalition politics and its evolution can be seen with an emergence of political parties in a democratic form of government. The formation of coalition became unavoidable in the multi-composite society where no political party gets a majority in the elections of the lower or popular house of legislature. This mode of government has been the norm and common political trends in Estonia and India.

The fall of Soviet Union and its political transition is the primary factors for Estonia to experience the formation of political parties. It was based on the principle of social cleavages or else manifestation of social cleavages enacted in the form of political party. The democratic transition in 1990s opened up an

opportunity for citizens and its members to build the society based on the principles of democracy. In this context, the emergence of political parties and multi-party system became crucial. Moreover, one can trace the existence of the idea of coalition politics even before 1990s; probably it dates back to its first independence period during the interwar period (1918-1940). It was stated fact that Estonia had a democratic political system until 1934. It had given the scope for development of political parties and party systems. However, during the World War II Estonia was captivated into the Soviet Union model in which democratic system and political parties were not due in practice and obviously, communist rule with a single party system was established. It was known fact that the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) was the only legally recognized party in Soviet regime and no other party was qualified to be political party. In spite of the retreat and collapse of various political parties during the Soviet rule, the ideological association and inclinations were very much alive. This led to the re-installation of the Estonian political parties during 1991.

In case of India, since India's struggle for freedom and the history of origin and growth of political parties can be traced by understanding the transition phase of colonial effects. It was observed that the social awareness at larger level eventually crystallized into the framework of party system which might initiated by the twin factor of socio/cultural -religious reforms and political response to colonialism. The idea of colonialism and its assumed by product of nationalist movements tend to strengthen and reinforced the essential spirit of polity which might shed away from the imperial traditions. The primary significant and its direct impact of colonialism were resonated in the realm of public administration, law and order, as well as the introduction of some social welfare measures. These patterns gave some room for the creation of political parties.

After independence India adopted the democratic principles, giving constitutional and legal framework for effective functioning of political parties. It was suggested that the diverse aspects of Indian society never allowed any form of hegemonic practices so then the 'political parties' and the 'party system' in India are highly affected by variation in cultures, caste based community and religious pluralism, clashing ideological perspectives. It was pointed out that there are two important classification of political parties existed in India; one is national at level and other is at state level (regional). As per the constitution of India, Election commission of India has to recognize the political party and duty is to classify them based on specific criteria. In the context of Estonia, *the popular front* coalition was collapsed into bits and pieces due to the prevalence of heterogeneity among the contesting groups and this was common tendency for defeating the larger force and it get diffused once the political goal of independence was achieved. As an outcome, achieving independence and claiming nationality also promotes party pluralism.

The study has also attempted to analyse the various trends of the formation of political parties and its variation in given socio-political and historical context. As well, it has given emphasis on the question of 'agency' in understanding the development of multi-party system, especially the period in which globalisation had been extended its ground as free market economy. Keeping this as background of the study, it attempt to trace the unfolding of party system in Estonia at first and later in India on the basis of chronological encounters along with historical predicaments.

Political parties in Estonia are similar in their structure and internal functioning. Over the years, the party landscape has become clearer: similar parties merge and party ideologies become more apparent, which in turn helps make plain the

commonalities and differences between them. There have also been moves towards greater democracy. To site just a few examples, all five parties included in this study hold internal elections to determine their electoral lists; party members are consulted in the process of policy development; and a mandate from the party Congress is needed before any major changes can be made.

Another matter that poses a problem for party development and effectiveness is the unchanging composition of the party leadership. It is fairly easy to rise up the party ranks to a certain level, but it is difficult for new actors to rise to the national leadership. Although the positions that particular people hold in the party vary, only a small group of people have access to those positions. It is sometimes said that it is easier to found a new party in Estonia than to change the leader group in the old parties. The stability of the party leadership, and the limited access that new and young leaders have to this group, are related to a phenomenon that is evident in all aspects of Estonia's public and business life: after the restoration of independence at the beginning of 1990s, most of the old leaders in public life and business were replaced by new leaders in their twenties and early thirties.

Because of the fact that the new leaders were young when they gained the leadership positions, almost all senior positions are still held by the same people, who even today are relatively young (they are in their forties). Thus access to the leadership in political parties (as well as in business and other domains of public life) is likely to be limited for the next ten to twenty years. The lack of female leaders is not fully recognized as a problem among the parties, but most of them acknowledge the need to bring young people to senior party posts. Hence most of the parties in this study help young leaders to secure important positions, and

they take steps to ensure that young people are placed in 'electable' positions on electoral lists.

The idea of coalition politics is widely accepted concept in Indian context. The conceptual exegesis might have borrowed it for continental theory and as well it has widely practiced in Europe. In the similar mode of operation but with variation in experiences, India too acquainted not much inconsiderable experience in this form of governing arrangement. The earlier experience of coalition party in the context of independent India might be traced back to 1977; when non-congress pitched the strategic alliance under the leadership of Morarji Desai which floated the party called 'Janata' government. The prominent leader, Ram Monhar Lohia had propounded the idea of coalition to form the government against Congressism majority or non Congressism. He was having the opinion that Congress had won elections with a thumping majority since past three general elections. Hence there might be feeling among the common people that the Congress could not be defeated and it had come to stay in power for ever.

This trend of people perception and his political maneuvering triggered Lohia to invite all the opposition parties to fill candidates against Congress so that the non-congress votes might not get scattered and as well common people tend to change their perception regarding congress. This formula of Dr. Lohia had gained momentum in the year 1967 general elections. It proved its success by defeating congress in seven States and *Samyuktha Vidhayak Dal* governments was formed by the effort of opposition parties during those times. Scholars commend that "Lohia's formula sowed the seeds for coalition politics in India". As per political data, the first coalition was established under the leadership of Morarji Desai. He was the oldest man to become Prime Minister of India. Moreover, Janata government remained in power for two years (1977-79), the

equations of power struggle did not allow Desai to continue or form coalition at larger level. It was stated observation that no confidence motion was unleashed against Desai which was discussed in the lower house then he tendered his resignation. The collapse of Janata government gave opportunity for the emergence of new leadership like collapsed like "George Fernandes, H.N. Bahuguna, Biju Patnaik and Mudhu Limaye".

India has made exemplary and perennial entry in the world of coalition politics. The above analysis clearly draw the picture that how hung parliaments tend to be norm in the largest democracy with fragile or enduring impact. It was observed that the crumbling of political parties creates gloomy electoral circumstances in which hung parliaments become rule rather than an exception. Nevertheless, Indian democratic politics so far has been lacking in the aptitude and the culture of coalition forming and maintaining succession of unhinged coalitions or minority governments has made its own contribution to the crisis of the State as the state is inextricably mixed with the webs of coalitions have become an inevitable and indispensable element of the national and regional politics in the present political trends, and coalitions in India primarily owe their existence to a set of determined people, who combine to govern for personal and party ends. That at present scenario regional parties are sharing power at the Centre and helping in the process of consensus might not be true in all sense.

In fact, they do not necessarily collaborate in governance of the country. They tend to stay parochial in their outlook. Moreover, the idea of Populism can be their method and strategy to gain support from others. Thus the regional parties have come to stay in the Indian political system and their relevance is not only confined to their respective states but it also extends to the national scene. The federal approach in governance is the result of the assertion of the regional

parties. Their participation in the coalition government is the reinforcement of the periphery and federal governance at the centre.

The preceding discussion of the internal dynamics of Indian political parties reveals the fact that multi-party system in India has its own limitations. It would not be wrong to say that it is natural for India's plural society to have a multi-party system and coalition government. Hence, the dynamism of Indian party system makes as well as demands a proper space for stable coalition governments. But it is very important to analyze whether these minority coalition governments will be able to meet the challenge of liberalization, privatization and globalization in this postmodern world. The question is, should the parliamentary system be reformed in favor of the presidential system for ensuring political stability and good governance in India. But it has become imperative to develop a 'Coalition Dharma' to be followed by all political parties in letter and spirit. Moreover, there is an urgent need to form ideological coalitions than non-ideological alliances. Opportunistic coalitions, which are totally blind to the grass-root political conditions, cannot work. Ideological coalitions can be stable. To save Indian politics from unprincipled alliances and unparliamentarily mind sets, instead of charismatic and populist leadership, intellectual maturity is the need of the hour.

The various answers to these questions, one could probably conceive, have been seen being experimented during the last decade of Indian politics. But crucially, irrespective of the nature of support (inside or outside) nature of alliance (pre or post-poll), what matters is the question of the basis of alliances and coalitions. In this context two crucial issues that can sustain coalitions and make them effective in terms of governance could be identified. They are (a) ideological convergence; and (b) commonality of interests that the last decade of experience with the

coalition governments has attracted two kinds of responses. While one view has found the coalitions to be undesirable for they have invariably resulted in political uncertainty and governmental instability, especially in view of the emerging reflective of the ground level realities. Another is the rise of the aspirations, what could be noted as the political aspirations through regional parties and they have increasingly become the multiparty coalitions.

As may be inferred from the comparative analysis, the era of coalition government in both Estonia and India has given both positive and negative signs. We should catch hold of positive signs like understanding and cooperation among regional and national political parties, common minimum programme, coordination committee, politics of consensus, culture of coalition politics etc. and try to evolve a unique model of parliamentary government which will be most suited to the multi-cultural, multi-religious polity. Thus the political system is on trial and coalition politics are trying to prove that they are fit for democracy and constitutional government.

The first chapter addresses the research problem and formulates the theoretical framework as a background for discussion of coalition politics in Estonia and India. It has drawn all the theoretical views and scholarly interpretation related to the coalition politics. Hence, it provides a broader understanding of coalition politics. The chapter also highlights rationale, scope and significance of the study, points out focus of study, research questions, and hypothesis and research methodology.

In the second chapter the evolution of coalition politics is traced with an emergence of political parties in a democratic form of government. This chapter has viewed coalition politics and its evolution in the context of Estonia and India.

It has traced a detailed historical insight on the emergence of coalition politics. The study has also looked into the contemporary discourses related to coalition politics in post-Soviet Estonia and the post-colonial India. The chapter has provided a detailed insight on political parties in Estonia during Interwar period, political parties in Estonia under Soviet Union, emergence of coalition politics in Estonia after restoration of independence, evolution of political parties in India, one party dominant system, emergence of multi-party system and coalition politics in India.

The third chapter social cleavages represent the nature of the problems over which parties compete are rightly at the center of analyses of coalition politics. They are rooted in a persistent social stratification, which helps one to identify certain groups in society, members of an ethnic minority, believers of a particular denomination, and residents of a particular region. It also engages some set of values common to members of the group; group members share the similar value orientation. They influence the ways that voters are politically mobilized. They craft the stability of party-voter relationships. They provide the material of political competition for parties and voters alike and influence the formulation of public policies. They are institutionalized as a political party and other associational groups. Several studies have definite attention to the development of social cleavages within party systems in new democracies.

However, there have been some comparative analyses that examine the nature and sources of social cleavages in a coalition politics. This chapter provides a discussion on social cleavages and coalition politics in Estonia and India. It figured out the common factors, similarities and differences by measuring coalition politics in Estonia and India. It further brings a comparative understanding of social cleavages and coalition politics between Estonia and

India. The chapters have given a detailed insight on social cleavage structure in Estonia and India and its influence on coalition politics in a comparative perspective.

The fourth chapter states that in democratic nations the party system, electoral process and government formation are an indispensable aspect of coalition politics. The multi-party system consisting of political parties and electoral system is a necessary pre-condition of coalition politics. It plays an important role in strengthening social cohesion, integration and legitimacy within the state. This can be traced in both Estonia and India. Prior to independence Estonia was under Soviet occupation with one dominant political party and later resulted in the emergence of party system with new political parties. India on the other side experienced the colonial rule of the British prior to independence later resulted in the emergence of newly formed political parties. In order to overcome from the various kinds of instability, the democratic system consisting of party system, electoral system and government institutions were established.

The chapter has examined in detail about the legal and institutional regulations, political parties, party system, electoral system and performance of political parties, the linkage between voters and parties and the role of political parties in government formation in the context of Estonia and India. However, the chapter provides an overview of interpretation related to party system, electoral process and government formation in order to provide a broader understanding of coalition politics. It also provides a necessary insight on the political background of both Estonia and India by elaborating on political institutions and its functions. So that comparative discussion of coalition politics in Estonia and India can be achieved.

In the fifth chapter the study has examined the relation between coalition politics and democratic stability in Estonia and India in a comparative perspective. Democracy and political stability are an indispensable aspect in both national as well as international politics. The government formation is a necessary pre-condition for democratic stability. The ideas of democracy in Estonia and India date back to the early years when the nationalist successfully appropriated liberal democratic principles from the west and infused them into the political context. Estonia and India faced several challenges before emerging as a democratic sovereign state. In order to recover from the various kinds of instability, the democratic system has been adopted. As a result Estonia and India have been undergoing multidimensional transition. Institutional restructuring, democratization of political system and market-oriented economic reforms have assumed key roles in this process.

The democratic stability in Estonia and India can be traced through various factors like constitution, political party, party system, electoral system and electoral laws, institutional structure, regime stability, stable government and administration, economic development etc. On the other hand frequent changes of the political system, the irregular transfer of leadership, internal war, violent political riots and consequent instability of the governments has led to democratic instability. Hence, comparing these two democracies help to understand the factors enabling coalition government and democratic stability. This chapter provides a detailed insight on coalition governments in Estonia and India. It further examined the influence of coalition government in the decision making process and in maintaining democratic stability.

In chapter six the study of coalition politics in a parliamentary form of government is very unique. Wherever no political party gets majority in the

elections to the Lower or popular house of legislature, a number of political parties join hands to form a coalition government. This type of government is very common in a democratic state. The political factors responsible for formation, shape, politics, continuation, dissolution, success and failures etc. of coalition government are broadly referred to as coalition politics. Coalition politics takes different form and makes different impact on various countries constitution according to their social, cultural and economic conditions. The constitution of a country sets limits within which politics can be practiced but it does not determine the actual nature of politics which is determined by a number of social, economic and cultural factors which is why the same type of constitution gives birth to different types of politics in countries with different socio-cultural milieu. On the contrary the politics of every country has its impact on the course of its constitutional development, directly or indirectly, formally or informally.

In India coalition politics is based on a system of governance by a group of political parties or by several political parties. Where several political parties collaborate to form a government and exercise the political power on the basis of a common agrees programme or agenda, in Estonia we have a similar system as coalition politics or coalition government. Where a government is usually organized when no party is in a position to get a majority in the parliament and some parties form a coalition group or an alliance and thus form a government. The study intends to understand the formation of coalition and an evaluation of its implications for society with an Estonian and Indian experience. From 1991 to 2014 Estonia and India had several coalition governments. This shows political landscape was fragmented showing strong roots of coalition politics in both Estonia and India. This chapter has constituted a comparative analysis of coalition politics in Estonia and India. It has examined the factors conducive in

Estonia and India for developing a coalition politics. It has further examined the level of stability in coalition politics.

The last chapter states the validity of the hypotheses and list out major findings of the study and suggests further areas for future research.

1. The study proves that social cleavages like ethnic, religion, language etc in Estonian case and caste, class, religion, language etc., in Indian case are influencing the development of coalition politics in both Estonia and India.

2. The study further proves that coalition politics leading to the formation of coalition government in Estonia and India is contributing to governmental stability and fragmentation of party system in both Estonia and India.

The hypotheses formulated in the beginning on which the study was based has been proved as positive and valid.

Main findings of the Study

The first most important finding of this study is that since 1991 Estonia and India is getting the mass public support for liberal form of democracy. Despite various complaints against the governments due to various, genuine, reasons the people of Estonia and India overwhelmingly participate in the elections and the people are more aware of their democratic status.

The second finding of this study is that there is different phases in the evolution of political parties in Estonia and India that is political parties in Estonia during Interwar period, political parties in Estonia under Soviet Union, emergence of coalition politics in Estonia after restoration of independence, evolution of political parties in India, one party dominant system, emergence of multi-party system and coalition politics in India.

The third finding of this study is that social cleavages like ethnic, religion, language, etc., are strongly rooted in Estonia and in India caste, class, religion, language etc., are strongly rooted. Both in Estonian and Indian case they have been influencing factor for the development of coalition politics.

The fourth finding of this study is that the legal and institutional regulations, political parties, party system, electoral system and performance of political parties, the linkage between voters and parties and the role of political parties in government formation have been the driving force in the context of Estonia and India. However, party system, electoral process and government formation are the contributing aspects of coalition politics.

The fifth finding of this study is that the democratic stability in Estonia and India can be traced through various factors like constitution, political party, party system, electoral system and electoral laws, institutional structure, regime stability, stable government and administration, economic development etc. On the other hand frequent changes of the political system, the irregular transfer of leadership, internal war, violent political riots and consequent instability of the governments has led to democratic instability. Hence, comparing these two democracies helped to understand the factors enabling coalition government and democratic stability. The coalition governments in Estonia and India has been traced and the influence of coalition government in the decision making process and in maintaining democratic stability has also been addressed.

The sixth finding of this study intends to understand the formation of coalition and an evaluation of its implications for society with an Estonian and Indian experience. From 1991 to 2014 Estonia and India had several coalition governments. This shows political landscape was fragmented showing strong

roots of coalition politics in both Estonia and India. This has constituted a comparative analysis of coalition politics in Estonia and India. It has examined the factors conducive in Estonia and India for developing a coalition politics and it has further examined the level of stability and instability in coalition politics.

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