ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF FACULTY:
A STUDY OF SELECT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES IN INDIA

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DECLARATION

I, Aishna Sharma, do hereby declare that the thesis entitled *'Accountability and Academic Freedom of Faculty: A Study of Select Public Universities in India'*, submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy is my *bonafide* work and this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of any degree of this university and any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

It is, hereby, recommended that the thesis be placed before the examiner(s) for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIFUCTO	All India Federation of University and College Teachers' Organisation
API	Academic performance indicators
CABE	Central Advisory Board of Education
CAS	Career Advancement Scheme
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DRS	Departmental Research Support
DSA	Department for Special Assistance
FEDCUTA	Federation of College and University Teachers' Association
FIST	Fund for Improvement of Science and Technology in Universities and Higher Education Institutions
FUTA	Federation of University Teachers' Association
GFR	General Financial Rules
GOI	Government of India
HEI	Higher Education Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IQAC	Internal Quality Assessment Cell
JNUTA	Jawaharalal Nehru University Teachers' Association
KFO	Knowledge Formation Organisation
MHRD	Ministry of Human Resource Development
NAAC	National Accreditation Assessment Council
NCHER	National Commission for Higher Education Research
NEP	National Education Policy
NIE	New Institutional Economics
NIRF	National Institutional Ranking Framework
NKC	National Knowledge Commission
NPM	New Public Management
PAT	Principal- Agent Theory

PBAS	Performance Based Assessment System
QS	Quacquarelli Symonds
RUSA	Rashtriya Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan
SAP	Special Assistance Program
THE	Times Higher Education
UGC	University Grant Commission

Chapter 1: Introduction

Their work is their life; their vocation is their avocation (Gerstl, 1961, p. 48)[1]

1.1 Background of the Study

Accountability, of universities or faculty, is a buzz word in the recent higher education policy rhetoric. The expectations from universities to deliver in various areas has not only increased but also become more vocal and diversified in nature. It is particularly true for public universities and their faculty, which are largely funded from the pockets of taxpayers. But, universities, ever since their conception, have been a part of the society. The purpose has historically been to undertake teaching and research, while situated within a particular social milieu. The word 'accountability' might not have been explicitly mentioned then, but it has been an integral part of existence of any university and their faculty since beginning. Accountability of faculty, in simple terms, reflects their responsibility to perform their primordial tasks- teaching, research, and/or extension services. However, it is often contended that this accountability is in conflict with Academic Freedom of faculty.

But to say that accountability through performance monitoring causes a dent on academic freedom would be rather saying it too simply. What is crucial to understand is that such a change has occurred as a result of a larger change, which took years, to materialise and has taken a faster grip in recent times, in the Indian higher education system. The overarching reform or rationale introduced in the Indian higher education policy was a relegation of the role of State and rendering autonomy to the universities; the autonomy gradually was conceptualised as a freedom from the State, particularly State funding. The State funding was considered as bringing about wastage, lack of accountability and an impediment to quality education. An antidote to this was recognised in bringing about markets or market-oriented changes in higher education, to make the system more efficient. As would be seen in Chapter 5, which also traces the history of policy pertaining to accountability, there have been proposals made to bring about performance assessment for quite some time, before

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[1] Adapted from Anderson & Murray (1971)

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the first step towards establishing National Accreditation Assessment Council (NAAC) in 1994, and making it mandatory in 2013, and later Performance Based Assessment System (PBAS) in 2010, took place. The underlying rationale of all was an improvement in quality work or at least maintaining minimum standards of work in universities and colleges.

Whereas earlier there was an implicit understanding that faculty were to be accountable to the stakeholders, like the State, the Students or the public at large, recently since past many decades, there has been a growing emphasis on accountability in policy documents in India. In other words, it appears there has been a constant reminder for faculty to performance and thence become accountable; documenting work is of prime importance. In the Indian scenario, this change primarily came about with the institution of regulation by University Grants Commission (UGC) in 2010 (GOI, 2010; 2013; 2016a, 2016b)[2], which required the faculty to perform in the three broad areas- Category I- Teaching, Learning and Evaluation, Category II- Professional Development, Co-Curricular and Extension Activities and Category III- Research and Academic Contributions. The purpose, as purported in the regulation, is to maintain minimum standard of work in universities and colleges.

Whereas in Category I and II it is the time spent by the faculty which is the basis of assessment, in category III the output measured in terms of number of publications, seminars/ conferences participated in, invited lectures, etc. If a faculty scores a prescribed minimum score in these three categories, they are eligible for the next stage of screening which involves interview. The supposed aim is to ensure that the teachers deliver output in return for the salary they receive from the State and thereby make the HEIs more efficient by reducing shirking of responsibilities at the hands of faculty and enhance quality of institutions.

The Indian higher education system, before the advent of PBAS, had a system of documenting work for the annual report of the universities and also for NAAC visits. Annual report did not mandate faculty to perform every year or every assessment period. Similarly, while NAAC was set up in 1994, it was in 2013, after PBAS that accreditation became mandatory, again having no binding contract on each

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[2] The drafts were amended later, please see Annexure I.

and every faculty to perform. It is PBAS which has put every faculty member under the scanner (of their own gaze) assessing their performance. It would, therefore, require them to strategise in order to up their performance.

There has been less literature discussing about PBAS, barring a few, which have raised certain issues with respect to application of it in Indian context, like implications of it on motivation of faculty (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014; Chattopadhyay, 2015; Sharma, 2018), disregard of language issues, like lack of linguistic skills particularly in English, among social sciences faculty and little weightage given to regional languages (Sujatha, 2015). Further, while the regulation makes certain concessions for disciplinary differences, like a difference in score as per the disciplines, the process that a faculty undergoes in order to register output has a bearing on the discipline they belong to and thus the discrimination yet remains to be overcome completely. The provision of augmenting scores as per the Impact Factor of journals is more in favour of sciences or applied branches of social sciences. Das and Chattopadhyay (2014), in the context of PBAS, have highlighted that API has led to standardisation, because it does not take into note the contextual differences, like different opportunities to publish in different disciplines, difference in mission and culture of the universities, and the individual differences with regard to their inclination towards research. Constraining the activities of a faculty in a time bound framework is inimical to their academic freedom, as there would be less engagement for undertaking path-breaking research (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014, p. 70). In a similar vein Sujatha (2015) presents a critique of the system, arguing that it is insensitive to disciplinary differences, and the culture of institutions. Productivity is found to be a measure of creativity, informing little about quality of work done. Another problem highlighted was possibility of malpractices in the quest of gaining scores (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014; Sharma, 2018). PBAS aims to orient the faculty into competitive and enterprising individuals, who are self-managing (and theoretically free). But such a concept of freedom is rather narrow (Chattopadhyay, 2015). Chandra (2017) condemns the standardised approach to evaluating teaching, as one which assumes that all the universities and requirement of all the faculty are alike. He further suggests that teaching evaluation should be about evaluating the quality of teaching material, providing timely support to students, introducing innovation in

teaching. Similarly, research evaluation entails reading chapters, research papers, and taking a review by experts regarding the impact of the work.

Using Principal Agent Theory (PAT) here (it would be discussed in detail in Chapter 3), the state or assessing authority could be understood as the Principal and the faculty the agent. Another level of PAT operates where the university is the agent and the State a principal. The PBAS aims at extract certain outputs from the faculty, in the area of teaching-learning, research and extension activities. It could be understood as an outcome-based contract, where the faculty are required to produce at the end of an year or assessment period. What is of crucial note is that it is also a behaviour-based contract, because it alters the behaviour of the faculty by channelling them towards their own assessment, which has come up as a measure of their success. However, it is too naive to assume that the faculty would quickly orient themselves to scoring points for assessment. The reason for this argument rests with the very nature of academic work. It entails creative work. As stated earlier, even the teaching in universities should not be disjunctive from research; teaching also is informed by an element of creativity. And for creativity to blossom is required a freedom, of deep engagement. Such framework of constraining the work of the faculty in a prescribed time frame might affect their academic freedom and their motivation. Some faculty might resort to strategising as a result, as to how to maximise their output given their constraints, which has been happening in the Indian higher education system. While some would be doing this willingly, some would not. A major problem concerns the practice of standardisation across the board, with little regard for contextual differences of faculty- their disciplines, their designation (or career paths), or the universities they are a part of. It remains to be seen therefore how quality work could be achieved.

With this backdrop, the chapter is organised as following: Section 1.2 would explicate the meaning of accountability. Section 1.3 would present the evolution of this concept of accountability, historically, until the present scenario. Section 1.4 would bring in the Indian Scenario, highlighting the rationale of accountability. Section 1.5 would present a relationship between accountability, autonomy and academic freedom. Section 1.6 gives a general structure of different locations of

accountability. Section 1.7 mentions the statement of the problem. The last section mentions the chapterisation of the thesis.

1.2. What is Accountability?

The common meaning of accountability is responsibility; someone who is said to be accountable is held to be responsible for a particular act. Mortimer (1972) defines accountability by distinguishing it from evaluation and responsibility. For him evaluation is the internal assessment made by an organisation and accountability involves judgement by external agencies. Responsibility for him means a voluntary obligation, or answerability to one's conscience, whereas accountability is a formal obligation to perform certain duties which a university expected to perform. Berdahl (1990) explains accountability as a demonstration to an external agency of responsibility in action. That the need for accountability is linked with justification for spending public funds is mentioned in the definition thrown by Trow (1996), where they explicate accountability as "obligation to report to others, to explain, to justify, answer questions about how resources have been used, and to what effect" (p. 2).

For Romzek (2000), being accountable is being answerable for one's performance. Much like Trow (1996), Alexander (2000) also understands it as accountability in using public funds, which requires universities to perform. Dunn (2003), in similarity with Mortimer (1972), finds accountability as formal obligation of public officials towards public, and responsibility refers to their accomplishment of their duties as per their discretion. Aviles and Simons (2013) define it as "a particular kind of being held to account" (p.1). Alexander (2000), Dunn (2003) however highlight that accountability is characterised now as performance-based accountability.

Mortimer (1972) clearly understands evaluation as only a self-assessment exercise. However, it could as well be an enforced self-assessment, where a university or a faculty is required to govern their behaviour, albeit adhering to a regulation which expects such a behaviour. While they predicted a shift towards managerialism, the nature of evaluation was not discussed in the light of this shift. A common thread underlying the conception of accountability is answerability for one's performance. This could be to an external evaluating agency, the society or the students. It is

crucial, therefore, to perform and the visibility of such performance is answerability; answerability to one's self-conscience might not be as visible.

Furthermore, in academia, broadly responsibility and accountability mean the same; at a base level faculty and universities are held to be responsible for the tasks they are expected to perform. But it differs from the commonplace meaning as being "held to account" (Aviles & Simons, 2013, p.1), for it refers to an imposition from the outside. Accountability is an integral part of the faculty life; ideally, the faculty are intrinsically responsible for the work they perform and are therefore answerable to their own conscience. Such an approach requires motivation and passion towards one's work. This could be called as 'being accountable' towards their own work, for which trust is reposed in them, and thus differs from the above commonplace meaning of accountability. Because the faculty are in a profession, which may not pay them as much as an alternative one, and yet requires a high level of motivation, calling them to account would rather be detrimental to their work, because that would question their integrity towards their work.

In conclusion, while responsibility includes an element of self-conscience, accountability in the more recent times is directly linked with performance, which makes the latter a more tangible concept than the former.

But, at this juncture, one might ask why accountability has been accorded such a crucial place in the working of universities; why is accountability, as defined above, required at all? The two broadly stated reasons, which accord accountability in higher education system its substance, are: effectiveness and efficiency of public institutions (Mortimer, 1972; Berdahl, 1990; Alexandar, 2000; Huisman & Currie, 2004; Kai, 2009). By effectiveness is meant that the universities achieve the desired goals, and efficiency means that the public institutions reduce wastage of resources and justify expending public money by registering their performance. Efficiency could further be divided into: Allocative Efficiency and Technical Efficiency. Allocative efficiency is when the supply meets the demand in an economy, while technical efficiency is producing a given output by minimizing costs, or given a particular cost or budget, the output is maximised. A third kind of efficiency, called dynamic efficiency, aims at innovation in products and/or processes to ensure adjustment to changing

technologies (Jongbloed, 2004). (The detailed implications of achieving this objective of efficiency and effectiveness would be discussed later in Chapter-5).

1.3. Evolution of Universities and Faculty Accountability: An economic analysis

Before arriving at the context of the study in the Indian scenario, it would be interesting to know the historical trail of this concept. Arriving at the present discussion of accountability as sought in the Indian policy circles needs a presentation of the context which led to its emergence as such; a context which has developed over time, due to certain rationales at different points in time. Trow (1996) and Romzek (2000) raise some common questions, which need to be addressed, while talking of accountability. These are: a) For what should one be accountable? b) To whom to be accountable? c) Through what processes is accountability sought? An additional and vital question posed by Trow (1996) is: "with what consequences?" (Trow, 1996, p.2). The trail would be put into a perspective using these broad questions.

It would draw on the historical record presented by Raines and Leathers (2003) and Stabile (2007), of how universities came into being, and how they evolved starting from the ancient period. While they do not explicitly mention the word 'accountability', the functioning of accountability was inherent to the goals and daily life of the teachers of the universities so mentioned. It would be merged with the questions raised above, to the extent possible, to create an account of history of accountability in higher education system.

1.3.1. The conception of Universities and Faculty work

The roots of higher education system developed in Greece, where the early schools focused on military training. The nature of schooling changed, with the arrival of a group of immigrants called sophists. Sophists believed in charging fees for education they provided. In return, they trained students in subjects that enabled them to secure career in public service and government. The fee-based system led to competition amongst them to attract students, making them accountable to the students. It was a case where competition was sought to achieve excellence in teaching; the more money made by a teacher was a mark of better quality teaching. By contributing to the

students' life, they justified their contribution to the society at large. Contesting such an approach towards education were philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who criticised this creation of market-based approach, and believed in pursuing virtue, that is love for knowledge than wealth. But, it was largely the former view which held the reins of higher education system in Greece at that point. The beginning of middle age saw Churches having a control over what was taught, as they provided with the funds, giving rise to endowments as a mode of funding. The salaries of the teachers were linked majorly with the endowment funds, along with tuition fees (Stabile, 2007).

This debate has been existing in the higher education system ever since, with only a variation in its form. One can say that much of the 'who', that a university is accountable to, depends on the mode of funding[3]. University of Oxford and University of Cambridge were established during the mid-12th century and late 15th century respectively. University of Oxford and University of Cambridge gradually became dependent on endowments, and salaries of the teachers were fixed. The University of Oxford received its reputation because of teaching, but later went into decline (before resurrecting its position) due to neglectful teaching. Adam Smith (1776) later argued that the cause of decline in European Universities at that time lay in endowment model, which made teachers less responsive and less diligent to improve their abilities and impart quality education. As a result, it was contended, the education rendered was not useful to the students (Raines & Leathers, 2003, p. 66; Stabile, 2007, p.39); the endowment, as was argued, reduced their accountability as teachers.

Adam Smith (1776) provided an economic analysis to accountability in university system. For him what would made teachers accountable was competition with other faculty to have students to teach. For him competition would lead to excellence, by making teachers perform. This required that salaries of teachers be dependent upon the tuition fees paid by the students. He says that:

> …exertion of the greater part of those who exercise it is always in proportion to the necessity they are under of making that exertion. This necessity is greatest with those to whom the emoluments of their

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[3] It will be seen sequentially, that two types of regulations can affect accountability: the one which relates with the mode of funding and the one which does not necessarily relate with funding. This would answer the question related to the 'means' through which accountability is sought.

profession are the only source from which they expect their fortune (p. 760)

The endowment model, in contrast, reduces, this necessity to exert (Smith, 1776). In the context of European Universities, he argued that the authority to which the teachers should be subject should be external, like a governor or a minister than university body of which they are also a part, to curb corrupt practices or neglect of their duties. Accountability should be to an external body and to the students. This stance was also supported by James Mill (Raines & Leathers, 2003), but only that Mill did not support teaching of market-oriented subjects, unlike Adam Smith. Mills, however, favoured government regulation to ensure quality work by faculty who were paid their salaries from endowment.

The American Universities witnessed this move towards sophism starting late 19th century; before that there was more emphasis on endowments and influence of church. Largely influenced by Alfred Marshall, it was believed that education was valuable because it created economic gains for society. Veblen criticised the view that competition would help improve quality., by making universities responsive to consumers, and argued that it was endowment which gave faculty freedom (Stabile, 2007).

As can be seen, the debate centres around the mode of funding and thus the ensuing accountability. The fee-based salaries made faculty accountable to the students, whereas endowment model, as argued rendered them freedom to be accountable to the needs of society, giving them a scope to expand the subjects they could teach. The means of ensuring accountability was generally funds. However, it was James Mill, who argued for government regulation to extract quality work from faculty; he contended that faculty whose salaries came from endowment fund should be pushed by the government to achieve. He advocated parents to judge the effectiveness of educational institutions. Mill's recommendation mimics the modern-day performance-based accountability, where assessment of faculty work by an external agency would make them improve their performance. The broader objective of any form of accountability espoused was to achieve excellence or quality; only the standards of measuring that quality differed between Sophists and their opponents.

While the debate still continues, it was the ideology engrained in sophist school, which formed the core of conceptualising accountability. The next section would move further the chronological way depicting a change in the role of higher education, and a concomitant meaning of accountability.

1.3.2. Economic growth and Role of Universities: Implications for accountability

The mid-20th century witnessed a growing role of higher education globally. Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964) popularised the concept of Human Capital, as capital embodied in human being which made them productive. Simultaneously, the economics as a discipline began taking a turn towards the virtues of markets and competition in governing human behaviour, with the prophecies of the economist Milton Friedman in 1960s. Friedman (1962) argued against standard salaries being provided to the teachers at that time, which promoted mediocrity. They rather supported merit-based salaries, which would lead to attracting quality faculty in education system. The mid-1980s witnessed the emergence of endogenous growth theories further highlighted the significance of investing in human capital from the point of view of larger economy (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988); the economies which invest in human capital can experience increasing marginal returns to investment in physical capital and thus faster economic growth. The concept of knowledge economy took grasp of policy circles, where knowledge played a vital role in contributing to the growth of economies. The purpose of universities to contribute to the society and growth of economy became all the more significant globally.

Apart from this change, came two major reforms in European as well as American universities: massification of higher education and cut in the public expenditure (Alexander, 2000). Massification is attributed to the theory of human capital investment, and endogenous growth theories (Alexander, 2000, p.415). There was a global trend to cut expenditure on higher education in favour of school education and other sectors. Johnstone (1998) highlights that while greater massification put burden on public funds, there was a disenchantment worldwide with public funding of higher education institution, for promoting inefficiencies. Further higher education was touted as a private good, and not public These factors provided rationale for giving a way to the private sector participation in higher education, worldwide.

The private sector participation could happen in two ways: exogenous privatisation and endogenous privatisation (Ball & Youdell, 2007). Exogenous refers to private sector providing public education, which could be either through financing or management or both, and endogenous privatisation, which involves applying the practices, ideas and techniques from private sector into a public university like contracting, output monitoring, self-appraisal, etc. The endogenous privatisation could be called as also New Public Management of higher education. The former kind of privatisation mimics the practice of sophists of earlier periods, which would lead to accountability to the students and private funders. In endogenous privatisation, ideally the accountability is still towards the larger society but the means of fulfilling that accountability becomes performance, called as performance-based accountability (Alexander, 2000).

What is interesting to note was in 1970s Mortimer (1972) in their report had predicted a movement towards the New Public Management (without using the term), which is premised on performance-based accountability; judging the performance of faculty against certain pre-defined benchmarks. This is expected to install efficiency and effectiveness in the work of faculty who are employed in public universities, justifying the investment of public funds in these universities. Extracting performance, without necessarily linking the performance to funds was first proposed by Mill.

Thus, the universities and their faculty are expected to perform and deliver output in the wake of increase in demand due to massification, and a push towards privatisation. The word performance invariable appears in the literature talking of accountability of faculty or universities, which is to be judged against certain criteria. Accountability is to the external world. The development of performance indicators swept the discourse of accountability.

We will now look at how India has been placed in this global transformation of universities and how accountability has come to be understood in Indian higher education system.

1.4. The Indian Scene

The earlier policy commissions, Radhakrishnan Commission (1948) and Kothari Commission (GOI, 1966) were not as emphatic on devising performance indicators to extract accountability, as was experienced later, during the post-liberalisation period. This period witnessed an advent of both exogenous and endogenous form of privatisation. The background of this lay in the Structural Adjustment Programme advocated by the World Bank and Stabilisation policy by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), calling for a cut in public expenditure particularly on higher education sector, in developing economies (Chattopadhyay & Sharma, 2018). Carnoy and Dossani (2013) argue that affirmative policies have led to massification of higher education, supported by a burgeoning private sector participation. However, the public sector failed to achieved quality or improvement. The endogenous privatisation, called as New Public Management, which is relevant for public funded universities, came to established first in 1994 with the setting up of National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) and later in 2010, with Performance Based Assessment System (PBAS), assessing the output of faculty. The latter was in particular installed to maintain minimum standards of faculty work in universities and colleges.

But extracting accountability to improve quality of work at universities is not a novel concept in case of Indian higher education; various policy documents have over the years mooted different ways of making higher education institutions and/ or faculty accountable. It has been assumed that producing tangible outputs would address the poor quality of Indian higher education, the problem which has been afflicting the universities for decades now. Over the years the policy has suggested for an increase in financial autonomy of universities[4], coupled with accountability from the faculty to ensure that autonomy is not abused at the hands of faculty or universities and quality does not suffer. Not only this, the location of accountability has also changed.

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[4] Ashby (1966) understands financial autonomy as freedom that a university must have to decide how to allocate the funds it receives from state or private sources, among the different categories of expenditure.

For instance, the Kothari Commission (1965-66) (GOI, 1971) had shown a preference for State funding of HEIs and that accountability should be towards society at large. It was argued that independent thinking can develop only in an institution which is free from regimentation of ideas and short-term needs, which is required for the development of society.

Kumar (1987) noted in mid 1980s that an average Indian teacher has no idea of the freedom that they must enjoy, due to burgeoning bureaucracy. And whatever form autonomy was there amongst teachers was doubted as being abused, calling for accountability in the form of measurable productivity. He further contended that the research output was not only abysmally low but was of poor quality. The policy documents indeed began fervently bringing up the recommendations on having performance-based indicators in universities. Since 1990s however, there was a paradigmatic shift towards developing quantifiables as indicators of quality and restricting the location of accountability to the immediate clients or customers, rather than society at large. Punnayya Committee (GOI, 1993) had recommended developing performance indicators and conducting academic audit, in order to ensure quality (GOI, 1993, p. 71) and that funding should be output based and through student vouchers (GOI, 1993, p.88). In order to assess the performance of universities, the National Accreditation Assessment Council (NAAC) was set up in 1994. NAAC ranking of universities, based on only quantifiable indicators, supposedly acts as a signal of quality. Likewise, the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE) (GOI, 2005) had recommended to set up internal quality assessment cell (i.e. academic audit of teachers and universities) to make their output performance public and ensure quality in education, student feedback mechanism, teachers' self-appraisal to ensure accountability and regulate the misuse of autonomy provided to the universities.

The landmark reform in infusing accountability came up in 2010, with the institution of Performance Based Assessment System (PBAS), which required faculty to perform and register their time devoted, as well as output produced in the activities if teaching, research and administration and extension activities. The rationale that could be provided by its proponents could be an abuse of freedom, as depicted by poor quality work, absenteeism, malpractices, etc. (Chattopadhyay, 2015). Following 2010, when PBAS was introduced, the State made accreditation of all universities

mandatory in 2013 (GOI, 2013). The emphasis on performance was further stressed by RUSA (2013) (GOI, 2013) which proposed funding based on the performance of the state universities. As a result of such changes, the meaning of quality has been attached to something which can be quantified. Such policies have an impact on the behaviour of the very constituents working in the higher education system.

Faculty is involved in a creative endeavour, for which their motivation plays a very crucial role. This has not been taken note of, except in the 12th Five Year Plan. Recognising that faculty motivation is crucial for academic quality, the 12th Five Year Plan (GOI, 2013) sought to enhance faculty motivation by developing healthy work environment, with high-quality minimum facilities and a flexible framework of accountability and performance evaluation.

The rationale behind instilling accountability through performance assessment is that the public universities are funded by the state and therefore, should be held responsible. Because the State provides funds, the faculty work and productivity is particularly scrutinised (Webber, 2011). In the Indian higher education, PBAS is a case in point. PBAS is another attempt by the policy makers to improve the quality of higher education institutions or at least maintain minimum standards, by inducing the faculty to perform. The schemes like career advancement scheme (CAS), or Department for Special Assistance (DSA) are also a part of performance-based funding provided at the departmental level. Nevertheless, the departmental performance is accumulation of faculty performance.

The accountability of universities or the faculty is to the stakeholders in the higher education like the State, the funding agencies, accreditation agencies, the administration, the students, etc. The universities are expected to mandatorily accredit themselves which would act as a signal of quality or excellence (GOI, 2013). Apart from this, there has been an anxiety at the global level for the universities to compete and outperform each other and feature in the rankings. This anxiety to perform better gets translated into expectations from teachers to perform. The accountability, therefore, is not only at a local level but also global.

More recently, the academic freedom of Indian Universities has been plummeted by the ideological war on campuses, spawned by political interference

(Sundar, 2018). The university accountability is sought to be aligned with the goals of nationalism, impacting the very character of teaching-learning and research activities within universities.

The requirements of accountability can, however, interfere with autonomy of the university and academic freedom of the faculty. The next section would discuss about the same.

1.5. Accountability, Autonomy and Academic Freedom

The faculty at a university primarily engages themselves in two major tasks: one, research and scholarship and two, teaching. And these two are not mutually exclusive activities. While many argue that teaching is their prime vocation, but a quality teaching cannot be sustained without a concomitant good quality research. Not only this, the university teaching in itself is very different from teaching at other level of education, in that its purpose lies in preparing the students for research (Veblen, 1971). It could, therefore, be said that while teaching does assume a crucial part of faculty work, the research holds a major and an indispensable space in a university. Research entails inquiry of certain problems or issues, which require a deep and unfettered engagement with them. These activities are those of creativity which cannot happen in a constrained environment. What the faculty need is academic freedom to conduct such work, which forms the very backbone of university life. It is this academic freedom which gives universities a character which makes them unique and different from other institutions. Academic freedom means the freedom enjoyed by a faculty or a scholar to pursue their research and teaching without being fearful of any termination or punishment for offending others (Berdahl, 1990). It means an unfettered inquiry of truth, pursuit of teaching and research without any interference (Tierney, 2001). Sundar (2018) understands Academic Freedom as freedom in creating a space where the standards of discipline and university are followed to make any judgement, rather than the pressure of funding or politics. Academic freedom refers to the freedom of faculty to conduct their roles and responsibilities without any constraints posed on them.

But tagged along this freedom are also the responsibilities which they must fulfil, towards society, the students, and the academia. In other words, academic

freedom comes along with accountability. Bennich-Bjorkman (2007) calls academic freedom as a "norm that imposes a great deal of responsibility on researchers and at the same time expresses confidence that their own energy and their own judgement will guarantee scientific development." (Bennich-Bjorkman, 2007, p.342). Trust in faculty behaviour is the very foundation of rendering academic freedom to faculty. But a faculty truly desirous of having such freedom would also be accountable without any external force. Such faculty would produce output out of their own curiosity and will. Thus, academic freedom and accountability are the two sides of the same coin.

In other words, enjoying academic freedom should be the norm in universities; it should not be something that faculty need to fight for, because it underlies the very nature of their work. But academic freedom is not an unfettered freedom. The academic freedom is a means to achieve the goals which the faculty set for not only themselves, but also for larger society; academic freedom ideally is accompanied by a concomitant requirement of accountability. These concepts of accountability and academic freedom are however subtly present within the university life, constituting the very ingredients to pursuing the ends which a university envisions to fulfil.

While these are ideally ubiquitous concepts defining the very life of university, their exercise and its implications are not ahistorical. The reason is found the changing relationships universities have had with the society. The rise of significance of knowledge economies has made universities a centre place for contributing to the growth of the economy. The universities are closely watched over now than in the immediate post independent era as a potent contributor of research and development in the economy. Another common reason for scrutinising the working of universities, found in Indian higher education system, is their funding through public money, making them answerable to the larger public by expecting them to perform their tasks well. At present, one would refrain away from looking into the nature of society or public, which could as well be utilitarian. Watching over or scrutinising the work of academe might impact their academic freedom and thus motivation to work.

Also, quite often than not, that freedom, which is a crucial ingredient of faculty work might be abused at their hands in universities. When there is a security in

job (tenured job) and salary, the possibility becomes greater. It is when the faculty or universities are not performing their assigned tasks, that accountability from outside is installed, in the form of performance-based accountability, where they are required to document their work. There, thus, arises a struggle between academic freedom and accountability.

Therefore, whereas ideally, accountability and academic freedom, as said before, are two sides of the same coin, in practice these might be at conflict with each other (Berdahl, 1990). The accountability requirements can impinge upon academic freedom of faculty directly, through mechanisms which require faculty to be accountable to the society, and indirectly, where the university's performance is called to account. By latter is meant that the pressure on universities as a whole to perform, as in rankings, which would require effectively each and every faculty member to perform, thus having a possible impact on their academic freedom. It needs to be noted here that even when a faculty is held to account directly, the university (administration) is the one mediating between the state and the faculty; to what extent the regulations mandated by the State have been implemented or amended by the university would affect the freedom of faculty. Thus, the academic freedom of a faculty depends on the level of discretion which a university enjoys vis-à-vis the State. This discretion of the university is referred to as autonomy. Berdahl (1990) defines Autonomy as a power of a university to govern without any external interference, distinguishing it from Academic freedom. He further distinguishes it into two: substantive autonomy and procedural autonomy. Substantive Autonomy is the freedom that a university enjoys to determine its goals and Procedural Autonomy is the power a university has to decide the means by which it would achieve its goals.

The policy measures affect these Substantive and Procedural autonomies of a university, which in turn affect the academic freedom of faculty. Talking first of Procedural autonomy, the means of achieving the goal of excellence might be imposed from the outside, curbing the procedural autonomy of the university. Performance based accountability, which is premised on registering performance indicators in order to maintain minimum standards or quality is a case in point. It can further go on into informing the Substantive Autonomy of the university, defining the 'what' of the academic activity and thus the academic freedom of faculty; the nature

of output or research[5], for example, might get altered in order to adhere with performance assessment exercise. How far these autonomies of the universities and thus academic freedom get altered would depend on the orientation of the university. A University which is more externally oriented would be more responsive to the external environment (Sporn, 1996). Thus, culture of the university has a bearing on the work life of faculty, mediating through the substantive and procedural autonomy of the universities.

The relation between Accountability, Autonomy and Academic Freedom could be explicated with the help of the following diagram (Figure 1.1):

Figure 1.1 Relationship between Accountability, Autonomy and Academic Freedom

Source: *Author's creation*

The requirements of accountability could rather be time consuming and taxing for faculty, affecting their freedom to work. These include an overemphasis on documenting the output that faculty produce, or having faculty produce a minimum amount of their already assigned key responsibilities, teaching and research. The

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[5] For example, basic research which would require more time would get replaced by applied research, which could as well be a reproduction of existing research

undertone of such requirements is often 'lack of trust' in faculty work. The recent times have witnessed a change in the location of accountability, from the inner conscience of faculty to an external assessing agency (which would be discussed in the next section, 1.5). As this happens, the academic freedom, the very foundation of university life, faces the danger of its demise. The result of it could as well be a fall in the motivation of faculty and quality of work.

1.6. Locations of Accountability

As would be seen in Chapter 5 on Policy Analysis, there is a gradual shift in the location of accountability, from one's self-conscience to external performance assessment agencies. With the change in this location is implicated the degree of academic freedom that faculty could enjoy. Trow (1996) has discussed about two aspects of accountability-internal and external. Internal accountability is the accountability of individuals within university to one other regarding their actions to make improvement in their work and accomplishing in mission of their institution. External accountability, on the other hand, as the name would suggest, is accountability of the university to those outside, to their funders, or society at large, to assure them that their mission is being pursued honestly. These aspects could be understood as location of accountability, that is, to whom are the faculty accountable. Also, they discussed two kinds of accountability: a) financial/legal accountability, which means obligation to report about the usage of resources, that is, if the funds have been used for the purported objectives, and b) academic accountability is the obligation to report to the inside and the outside world about what has been done with resource towards the furtherance of the mission, and what has been the result of it. Both these financial accountability and academic accountability could be directed towards an external location or internal or both. The present study is focused on academic accountability and would seek to look at its relationship with academic freedom of faculty. As stated above, the location-external or internal-would determine the degree of academic freedom of faculty. The figure below (Figure 1.1) captures the degree of academic freedom that faculty would enjoy with varying locations of academic accountability.

Figure 1.2 Locations of accountability

Source: *Author's creation*

The above pyramid (Figure 1.2) mentions the broad locations for accountability in higher education, moving from internal at the bottom to gradually to external. The bottom most is self-conscience, where the faculty is accountable to themselves regarding their work or conduct. Here the faculty work, out of their own will to be answerable to themselves and enjoy the maximum academic freedom. Next up the pyramid come the peers, which are again an internal location of accountability. The academic freedom is sustained but only with a slight reduction if the peers act as a constraint than an enabling factor for faculty to work stress free. The first amongst the external location of accountability is the society. While it can be argued that the universities exist to serve the needs of society, but if the society is utilitarian in nature, it may as well circumscribe the academic freedom of faculty. One such example is having more skill-based courses to be taught in universities, which would narrow the scope of learning and also the freedom of a faculty to teach. The next level comes that of the State. The public universities up until now are largely funded by the State, in turn holding the universities accountable. The State, through its various regulations (like time bound framework of assessment or restricting the number of students to be supervised by the faculty), can also impact the academic freedom. It depends upon the nature of the state; in the present times the State has assumed a neo-liberal character. The academic freedom of the faculty would reduce even further if they are academically accountable to the students and have to therefore teach the content as desired by them. This is particularly true, when the salaries of the teachers become dependent on tuition fees. Then comes the requirement of meeting the needs of

market, which happens when there is a growing privatisation in the higher education system through either entry of private universities or through diversification of funding base by public universities to include private sources, or when public universities are required to perform on the lines of private universities, through managerial practices like output monitoring. When such changes happen, the academic freedom of faculty is highly stifled, to meet the needs of market in the name of being efficient, effective and productive. The present times are beset with this kind of accountability. In public universities in particular, there has been an infusion of managerial practices like output monitoring. Thus, there is a move away from self-conscience of faculty as a location of accountability, to performance assessment agencies. Each such location has a different degree of implication on academic freedom of faculty.

1.7. Statement of the problem

Accountability from faculty has been a major concern of the higher education policy and various committees over time have mooted recommendations for assessing their performance. With a shift towards a neo-liberal form of accountability, the nature of governance is that of steering from a distance. By this is meant that individuals are made to govern their conduct on their own through their self-assessment. Such a project could be successful only when every individual behaves as per the neo-liberal discourse; that if they behave like a *homo economicus*, optimally allocating their limited resources (time or ability) in order to perform. The policy, however, does not delve deeper into how that process takes place. And, also if there is any possibility that such a process does not reach fruition at all; that is what could be the possible points of resistance. The supposed objective of UGC behind installing such accountability measures like PBAS is to improve quality of education or maintaining minimum standards of performance, by curtailing any abuse of autonomy at the hands of faculty. However, for faculty what matters for quality performance and creative ideas is academic freedom (Austin, 1990, p. 62). The academic freedom might get affected whenever accountability compliance from the faculty is insisted upon. Thus, there might emerge a conflict between the two. Secondly, whereas accountability norms assume a standard response from every faculty, the differences in their contexts or circumstances is not taken note of, which might lead to differences in their

responses, forming another point of resistance. Not only this, the perception of faculty regarding accountability compliance and academic freedom would also vary as per their respective contexts, like their disciplines, position in career paths, or the university where they are placed. The present study aims to study if there is any tussle between accountability and academic freedom and how the faculty responses differ under different contexts. Another crucial economic analysis of human behaviour is premised on a rational conduct of optimal allocation of resources (here time). But rational conduct may not always produce quality output.

1.8. Chapterisation: Structure of the thesis

Against this backdrop the study tries to understand how accountability compliance particularly under API is affecting the very life of faculty; how faculty have organised their lives around this norm or what conflicts do they undergo in order to form their identities under the neo-liberal discourse. The study is structured as follows: The next two chapters, chapter 2 and 3, will present a review of literature and the research gaps identified there. While Chapter 2 would discuss about the studies pertaining to accountability and academic freedom, Chapter 3 discusses about the theoretical foundations upon which the study is based. Chapter 4 would present the research questions and methodology to address those questions. Chapter 5 would undertake the discourse analysis of neo-liberal governance as presented in the policy documents, overtime. Drawing on this chapter, the next chapter, Chapter 6, would discuss about the case study undertaken in two public universities about the perception and rational behaviour of faculty there. Chapter 7 would present game theoretic expositions to highlight the possibility of low quality work despite rational behaviour of faculty as per the neo-liberal norms. The last chapter, chapter 8, concludes the study and presents its limitations.

Chapter 2: Review of Literature- Accountability, Academic Freedom and Implications

2.1. Introduction

Accountability is the academic, administrative and financial responsibility with defined goals for each constituent namely teachers, students, administrative staff and all others aiming towards providing quality education for the betterment of the society[6] . In simple terms it refers to being answerable for one's performance. Romzek (2000). Accountability from faculty of universities, by this definition, would imply that faculty must be answerable for what they do, in order to justify their salaries, in the pursuit of excellence. Faculty are always accountable, and in the more recent times they are 'held accountable' for their work. In India in particular, concerns have been raised in the past regarding shirking of work by faculty in public universities (See Kumar, 1987). Therefore, whether to improve quality of work, or to reduce shirking by faculty, accountability reforms in policy have always found their rationales. There is no contesting these rationales, but the issue arises with the simplistic understanding or imposition of accountability requirements on the work of faculty, leaving many dynamics of faculty life and their work untouched.

Accountability is not a novel concept. Since the conception of higher education, in the ancient Greece, accountability was linked with the mode of funding; the sophists charged high fees for the courses which rendered employability to the students and were therefore accountable to the students. The endowment was thought to be making faculty complacent (Stabile, 2007, discussed in Chapter-1 in details). It was in the 18th century that Smith (1776) had discussed about teacher accountability, albeit somewhat differently, in order to usher in quality in their teaching/ output. He had argued that in order to acquire their salaries, teachers must exert a certain quantity of work of known value and that the teachers would exert only when this salary is linked to the fees paid by the students. When this happens, a teacher would diligently work; when salaries are appropriated from endowments, the teachers might become

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[6] Report of the Central Advisory Board on Education on Autonomy of Higher Education Institutions (GOI, 2005).

lax (p.588-589). Thus, the output was sought by linking their salaries to the output produced.

The percolation of the same rationales can be witnessed, even in Indian higher education system, when one talks about the accountability of public universities. The Indian higher education policy has been emphatic about accountability of faculty and/or universities by gradually recommending the development of performance indicators. The performance-based accountability took a firm grip of the system with Performance Based Assessment System in 2010. Because their salaries are not directly linked with the fees of the students, there have emerged regulatory ways to hold them accountable, more recently. The faculty are required to perform, document their performance, and thus become accountable. The State often monitors these scientific activities because a growing suspicion about the performance of traditionally public funded organisations (Ferlie, Musselin & Andresani, 2009, p. 4). These measures, while might help curb the problem of shirking away, but it imposes standardisation in the Indian Higher Education System, which is diverse and posing different challenges across the universities like language (Sujatha, 2015), infrastructure, funding, societal problems to be addressed, etc.

As the chapter would unravel, this performance-based accountability is one of the tenets of the New Public Management reform, which is widely witnessed globally in higher education. The New Public Management practices are an arm of the neo-liberal school of thought, whereby the principles of governing a private are applied to govern a public-sector organisation (Deem, 1998; Christen & Legreid, 2002).

The chapter would review the literature pertaining to accountability reforms in universities, their implications for academic freedom of faculty and other practices. It is organised as following: The next section, 2.2, would discuss about models of governance in higher education. Sector 2.3. would extend the discussion of the last section, highlighting more about the New Public Management as a governance tool. The next section, 2.4, would discuss the relationship between Accountability and Academic Freedom of faculty. The problem of standardisation and role of contextual placement of faculty is brought forth in Section 2.5. The other impacts of New Public Management and Performance Based Accountability are mentioned in Section 2.6. Section 2.7. talks about the accountability and academic freedom in the Indian Higher

Education. The role of contexts in Indian higher education is briefly discussed in Section 2.8. That Accountability is a governmentality technique is argued in Section 2.9. Section 2.10 concludes this part of literature review by explaining the role of culture and leadership in structuring faculty response to policy reforms.

2.2. Governance in Higher Education

Governance is understood as any 'strategy, tactic, process, procedure or programme for controlling, regulating, shaping, mastering or exercising authority over others in a nation, organisation or locality (Rose, 1999, p. 15)[7]. It refers to the mechanism of functioning of universities, their decision-making, and how they organize their day-to-day affairs (Austin & Jones, 2016). It is through governance that an order is created and the goals of teaching, research and extension activities are accomplished. Such governance mechanisms occur at three levels: micro level (at basic academic unit of department), micro level (at the level of organisations) and macro-level (at the level of higher education system). At the micro and meso level, governance relates to the day to day functioning of universities and decision making to achieve the desired organisational performance outcomes. At the macro level, the state aims to ensure that its higher education system is achieving the state desired goals (Austin & Jones, 2016, p.3). Thus, sstudying governance, and its nature, is important to know how or how not the universities achieve their goals. The governance structure of a university affects the decision-making by the university managers (Knott & Payne, 2004) and efficiency (Henard & Mitterlie, 2009).

Governance models in higher education have been studied in a myriad of ways. Clark (1983) conceptualised a triangle of coordination, which depicted the relationship between the State, the academic oligarchy and the markets. This model underpins the shift overtime in the authority amongst these three dimensions (and the relative weights thereof), in decision-making and influencing the actions within universities. Trakman (2008) brings give kinds governance models in the higher education system; a) faculty, where faculty provide advice and support to the administrative actors for better governance, b) stakeholder, where different stake holders together make a decision, c) corporate, which is based on managerial practices, d) trustee governance, which based on the trust between trustee boards and

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[7] As cited in Cotoi (2011).

the beneficiaries of the decisions that trustees would take, and e) an amalgamation of all. The faculty and stakeholder model can as well be called as 'shared governance' model. The concept of good governance emerged and introduced in the 1990s by the World Bank. Good governance aims at positioning universities vis-à-vis their external environment, while maintaining the integrity of academic values in the higher education system, with a purpose of making them accountable (Henard & Mitterlie, 2009). Governance of universities seeks address the problem of dysfunctional managerial level and instill efficiency (Trakman, 2008; Henard & Mitterlie, 2009).

Ferlie et al. (2009) identify three broad structures of governance, looking at the external structures. The first one is the normative framework, where the State protects the academics from external influence and provides them with complete academic freedom. The second is the greater control of the State on higher education system in the wake of growing massification and expansion. And the third mode of governance relies on the marker as a means of governing the universities. In the last kind, the State emerges as an Evaluative State (Neave, 1988), with a focus on monitoring the performance of universities. This could also be called as corporate form of governance (Trakman, 2008; Henard & Mitterlie, 2009), which aims at the New Public Management in public sector organisations (Henard & Mitterlie, 2009). Some of the tenets of this New Public Management include output monitoring, audit and accountability, contracting, etc. (Marshall & Peters, 2009; Marginson, 2009).

Austin and Jones (2016) present a structural perspective, where there are internal as well as external structural elements as governing factors in universities. The internal structural elements include governing bodies like senates, governing boards, and different committees. The larger size of such bodies leads to less efficient decision-making (Austin & Jones, 2016). The governing boards supposedly ensure that the universities do not deviate away from their mission. The external structure refers to the macro-environment comprising of the global policymakers, the State and its legislatures, external accrediting bodies, etc. These elements impact the structural changes which occur within the universities.

The governance of universities is derived by the impact of the larger environment within which the universities are operating. The governance model which is prevalent globally is that of corporate kind of governance, which has the

objective of ensuring performance by the universities. This change in external environment requires a revamping of internal structures or development of a new kind of an organization and leadership (Blieklie, 1998; Ferlie, et al., 2009; Whitchurch & Gordon, 2017). The more recent shift towards the NPM or corporate kind of governance globally is to ensure efficiency and answerability in the system in the quest to improve quality. But the impact of governance on quality cannot be ascertained. For instance, Volkwein (1986, 1989) and Volkwein and Malik (1997) found no impact of financial autonomy and academic autonomy on quality of education. Let us look at the New Public Management as a governance tool.

2.3. New Public Management as a governance tool in higher education

The universities exist in a space which is under constant flux due to changes in the external environment. These changes more recently refer to a growing exaltation of neo-liberal practices within higher education policy. The neo-liberal belief system has brought about a change in the role of universities in society and with that follows a change in the governance of universities. The governance of the universities is premised on quasi-market principles and a minimalist state. One such outcome of neo-liberalism is a growing practice of managerialism. One of the key principles on which managerialism rests is performance measurement, which is used as a governance tool. This new managerialism is exalted as a good governance philosophy, which instils efficiency (Austin & Jones, 2016, p.170-171).

The New Public Management is an arm of neo-liberal practice or neo-liberal governance of universities. As mentioned above, the tools or practices of NPM seek to govern a public-sector organisation using the principles applied in a private organisation. The accountability through performance assessment is one of the features of New Public Management. It deserves studying because "it changes the internal composition of academic profession" (Andresani & Ferlie, 2006, p. 416-417)

The New Public Management (NPM) in higher education is marked by a change in the role of the State/ government and a greater orientation towards privatization or private way of managing HEIs. It is assumed that public sector is inefficient in its functioning, producing low or no output. Therefore, the attempts have

been made to establish new ways of functioning of public-funded higher education institutions, which is supposed to render efficiency to the sector as a whole. Some of the key tenets of NPM include use of written contracts and performance agreements, on rewards and sanctions, short term employment contracts, funding-based economic incentives, user-driven production, product formats, the pricing and sale of outputs, the installation of entrepreneurial leadership, output monitoring and measurement, competitive ranking of personnel and institutions, performance of management, pay for performance, contracts and incentives to partner with industry and commercialise research motivations and products, and systems of accountability and audit, including contracts with government (Marshall and Peters, 1999; Marginson, 2008, p. 270 ; Marginson, 2009, p. 110). Andresani & Ferlie (2006) and Ferlie et al. (2009) highlight the key features of the New Public Management as a) entrepreneurial and empowered management than traditionally autonomous and collegial academics, b) planning being replaced with quasi-market forces and, c) performance management, with a growth of audit systems.

Ball (2003) also argues that the key elements of education reform package are embedded in three policy technologies: the market, managerialism[8] and performativity and these new technologies are aligning public sector organizations with the methods of private sector. Performance serves as a measure of productivity or more specifically, a value of an individual within a field of judgment (p. 216). This leads to fabrications; fabrications are the versions of an organization or person which do not exist, which are produced to be accountable. The organizations/ teachers emphasise on the effectiveness of their work and therefore transform themselves into auditable commodity (p. 225). Not only this, the culture of performativity leads to replacement of collegiality and trust which used to be a corner stone of academic activity (Deem, 1998), as accountability under neo-liberalism assumes that teachers are untrustworthy and therefore their performance be measured, to avoid any shirking away by them (Roberts, 2007). There is a great emphasis on extracting accountability from the HEIs which are funded by the public money, to ensure that there are no corrupt practices or shirking away from work. Accountability is supposed to improve

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[8] Managerialism means the adoption by public sector organizations of organizational forms, technologies, management practices and values more commonly found in the private business sector (Deem, 1998).

quality in HEIs, by forcing people to observe their own performances and subjecting them to review from outside (Trow, 1996).

In case of higher education, the reforms of new institutional economics can broadly be categorized as:

1) facilitation and freeing of market forces by adopting competitive mechanisms for the allocation of government support for universities and by reallocation of intellectual property rights.

2) empowering users by mandating the provision of academic quality information to students (through ranking) as well as by increasing utilization of tuition fees for university funding, and

3) specifying contractual relations between government and universities by tying research funding to clearly defined indicators, like publications and citation (Dill, 2014).

The State is choosing alternative approaches of contracting to deliver higher education in order to achieve efficiency (Ferris, 1991). The objectives of entering into contract with HEIs include enhancing accountability of public funds and to encourage institutions to attract funds from other sources and not just state. The NPM accounting advocates allocation of funds on the basis of competition or outputs. In other words, it imposes a financial calculation on every task performed in the university. Research and scholarship are taken as means to the financial ends (Marginson, 2009). It is assumed that the link between resources and outcomes in an institution can be observed and performance can be altered by manipulating resource inputs (Schmidtlein, 1999). Once the state decides the amount of funds provided, the next question to be addressed is how to organize the delivery of those outputs. Apart from the organizational restructuring, the various behavioural incentives of contract also affect the output produced (Ferris, 1991).

Accountability, as sought by the quality assurance mechanisms, is one of the tools of governance under New Public Management, which sought to be achieved by performance management. It could be called self-regulation mechanism, albeit enforced. By enforced self-regulation is meant that the individuals regulate

themselves, but that regulation is promoted by the government. It changes the behaviour of the individuals, in order to affect the market processes or market conduct (Jongbloed, 2004). The government, rather than directly controlling the behaviour of individuals, designs certain rules of the games, which could be formal as well as informal (North, 1990; Jongbloed, 2004). The quality assurance mechanisms instituted by the state seek to instil self-regulation, where the faculty or the universities become directly responsible for constantly monitoring or measuring their performances in order to achieve a prescribed standard.

2.4. Accountability and academic freedom

The present academic reality governed by new public management practices and (hence) the accountability norms have direct implications on the academic freedom of faculty. This is not to say that accountability ceases to exist. But the nature of accountability needs an examination. This refers also the scope of accountability-i.e. who the faculty is accountable to. Before discussing about accountability and implications it has on academic freedom of faculty, it would be useful to look at the academic freedom.

Academic freedom of faculty is their independence to work in the area of research which interests them, to teach without constraint in the area of their expertise, and to express themselves in academic space without worrying about any external controls. Academic freedom is the freedom for individual teacher/ researcher to choose what problems to study and what methods to use and publish results, subject to the ideal norm of quality. It also involves a free dialogue in academic community, including transparency and critical evaluation of what is produced (Hagg, 2009, p. 2). This is what the ideal notion of academic freedom is, as was also pressed upon by Wilhelm von Humboldt in the early 19th century. It was called as *lehrfreiheit*-the freedom of professors to teach in their classrooms and to do research in their direct areas of expertise. In addition to this, in the present times, as argued by Altbach (2009), the definition should be expanded. The faculty should be able to express themselves in public space (Altbach, 2009; Stergiou & Somarakis, 2016). The faculty should do research for its own sake, even on unfashionable issues (Stergiou and Somarakis, 2016).

The current times are beset with a lot of dissonance over what academic freedom is and how it is prioritised in the universities or academic space. The present definition of academic freedom, as argued by Altbach (2009) has expanded as well as contracted at the same time. Now it comes to include all the conditions which sustain a successful university and permits effective teaching and research. That is, enough funds for universities, involvement of faculty in the internal management of the universities, presence of technology and adequate classrooms, etc. At the same time, the faculty is being circumscribed over what they can teach, research, or express. It is coupled with growing number of part time teachers who do not enjoy academic freedom in their work. The knowledge is often owned by the universities or some multinational corporations (Altbach, 2009).

But it does not mean an unbridled freedom; the faculty ought to take responsible action and remain accountable to the society at large. Though universities may demand accountability from the faculty, by measuring their productivity, their academic freedom should not be violated (Altbach, 2009).

The academic freedom of faculty is also determined by the institutional governance (Berdahl, 2010). An institution which recognises the role of faculty in the academic matters would be able to protect the academic freedom of their faculty (Berdahl, 2010). "While no governance system can serve to guarantee that academic freedom will always prevail, an inadequate governance system-one in which the faculty is not accorded primacy in academic matters-compromises the conditions in which academic freedom is likely to thrive." American Association of University Professors (2006)[9]

For a good quality academics/ research in a HEI are required not only quality researchers but also an environment of freedom where academicians can work without constraints or external environment. Also, a teacher should be allowed flexibility with curriculum designing. This is academic freedom is crucial for pursuing aims of the university and for the welfare of those who work within it. It is a condition for work granted because it is considered as essential for teaching and learning of truth because a climate of academic freedom is considered as most efficient for medium of research (Ashby, 1966; Bok, 1982). Academic pursuits are undertaken by

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[9] As cited in Berdahl (2010)

self-driven and motivated faculty and motivation flourishes in the atmosphere of academic freedom (JNUTA, 1997)

An HEI functions under its regulatory structure, which represents an overarching rule of game which governs their behaviour. The regulation of a HEI holds it accountable in terms of producing certain outputs, on the basis of which the they are funded. The underlying argument to ensure accountability from HEIs is to instil more efficiency in them, reduce the corruption and thereby enhance the quality or excellence. However, this compliance with accountability leads to a compromise with the autonomy or academic freedom of the faculty because one, their tasks are programmed according to the needs of governance structure, stifling their creativity in what they do and how they do and two, compliance with accountability often diverts productive time of the faculty to fulfilling formalities. The faculty might resort to producing outputs in terms of only quantity and not quality, because they lack internal motivation to perform their tasks when their creativities are bound to an external actor.

Marginson (2006, 2007) identifies academic freedom as academic self-determination by the academes in the universities. This academic self-determination constitutes of a) agency freedom, that is the researcher possesses an intrinsically active and proactive human will and thus, is a doer and a judge. It determines what all they can do, b) effective freedom, that is the power to have control over one's work and c) freedom as capacity for radical-critical break, that is the capacity for critical reflection/ imagination in order to create something new, it is the ability to undertake undetermined thinking. This freedom to undertake critical thinking depends on the other two constituents of the academic self-determination. That is, it is contingent upon the autonomy of individual who is active and pursues radical-critical thinking because it is satisfying for them and that is what constitutes their identity. Taking Osterloh & Frey's (2000) argument, this could be called as intrinsic motivation of the faculty. Secondly, it depends upon effective freedom, which in turn depends upon relational settings of individuals (or their conditions), i.e. the social, political and economic opportunities available to them. In universities such settings are time, money and other personal capabilities. (Osterloh & Frey, 2000); academic freedom needs certain supporting conditions (Bennich-Bonjmark, 2007). In similar vein, Hagg

(2009) argues that the freedom can get affected by limited time and resources which are allocated to an individual teacher and researcher within a HEI. Constraining that academic freedom through over regulation can be detrimental to the motivation of faculty and hence the quality of work (JNUTA, 1997). To give an empirical stance, in a study by Bennich-Bjorkman (2007) in Sweden Universities, it was found the academic freedom to conduct research was strongly linked to the chances of getting funds for research. But academic freedom and motivation to work flourish only when there is trust placed on faculty for trust and corruption are often negatively correlated (Dasgupta, 2007). In other words, the less faculty are trusted, their motivation work goes down and hence the practices involved in performing work would be affected adversely. Ensuring accountability through performance assessment exercises could lead to an erosion of autonomy of faculty due to pressure to publish more. It not only alters of meaning of teaching and research to them but also their motivation for doing so (Deem, 1998).

The conformity to norms can take away the freedom of faculty to engage in original work and dissuade them from engaging in long-term projects, taking away their intellectual freedom and also motivation to work. Accountability measures lead to standardization and this standardisation leads to path dependency, or compliance because of the risk inherent in innovation or departing from the path (Marginson, 2009). Thus, there would be tendency amongst faculty to fall in line with the system of performance assessment, because deviating would lead to incurring costs. Also, in the absence of research funding, faculty approach external funding agencies, which expect specific objectives to be fulfilled, and also producing the results which could be produced rapidly (discouraging the long-term engagement with a subject to produce new knowledge). It is in this way also that academic freedom gets impacted (Bennich-Bjorkman, 2007). In a similar light Harris (2005) highlights that under neo-liberal governance in universities, it is the applied knowledge which becomes more important. Berg and Seeber (2016) argue that he nature of knowledge being generated under neo-liberal regime is something which is applied, profitable and quantifiable, and not reflexive enquiry. The scholarly activities run the risk of getting restricted to the ones which are rewarded.

The reforms sometimes affect the academic freedom of faculty due to the various contexts within which those faculty are placed. The NPM assumes a deterministic or universal way of faculty responses (Bleiklie, 1998; Lucas, 2014)., but the responses are often dependent on the contexts of faculty (Lucas, 2014). Let us try to factor in the contextual differences in responses.

2.5. Situating accountability compliance in different contexts

Berg and Seeber (2016) discuss about situational intelligence, which means that it is the situation or circumstances where an individual is placed which has an implication on individual cognition. Thus, in the context of performance assessment, one should not expect each and every faculty working individually in accordance with their cognition but a due recognition should be given to the fact that the environment where they are placed has an impact on their behaviour or emotions, which has a direct import on their work. There are at work the negative emotions and positive emotions. The positive emotions at workplace not only reduces the effect of negative emotions, but also broadens the scope for individual cognition and creative thinking (Berg & Seeber, 2016). The performance assessment of faculty assumes that a single yardstick is used to measure the output of faculty like number of hours or number of publications. But every faculty is endowed with different resources, different opportunities due to their designation and disciplines, different culture of the universities to which they belong, etc. therefore, not only do they have different inputs (like funds) but also the way the inputs are transformed into outputs also differs, leading to a difference in the quality of teaching and research. These differences in disciplines, career stages, and the type of institutions they belong to determine how their responses are to any change (Whitchurch & Gordon, 2017). The various emotions, as mentioned above, come into play due to these factors, having a direct effect on the work performed by the faculty.

2.5.1. Problem with standardisation

The relationship of university with society is looked at in global terms; it however ignores the significant internal distinctions (Becher, 1994). The problem with NPM lies in its universal approach (Bleiklie, 1998; Lucas, 2014), without giving due to regard to different contexts (Lucas, 2014). As also argued by Webber (2011), the contexts as well as disciplines are important variables to be considered before making

an evaluation. Quality is devoid of its everyday meaning of having high excellence but is a technical requirement in order to maintain minimum standards. Quality, therefore, here means standardized quality (Engebretsen, Heggen & Eilersten, 2012).

The academic governance and thus the way faculty conduct their work depends upon institutional, individual and disciplinary factors (Lewis, 2013). In other words, every faculty is different in terms of not only their motivation but also their circumstances under which they operate. Another problem is that the development of performance indicators treats universities as manufacturing units and relates the way in which inputs are transformed into outputs. Moreover, inputs are often used to produce more than one output and it is difficult to attribute a specific input to specific outputs (Johnes & Taylor, 1990)[10].

For instance, for publication, the numbers of publications could be taken as common measure to assess research productivity in some universities. However, it would be futile to have a blanket measure for all HEIs (or faculty), in order to ensure accountability. Funding plays a crucial role here. The faculty members who receive grant funding sometimes are able to work with graduate assistants and get relieved from teaching responsibilities and can devote more time to the research, produce more articles or other research productivity measures (Tam, 2001, p. 112).

2.5.2. Disciplinary differences

The academic disciplines that faculty specialise into, affect faculty perspectives, their behaviours, and their identities through their different cultures (Austin, 1990; Becher, 1994; Henkel, 2005; Lewis, 2013). Not only do the different disciplines train the faculty in a particular way of investigating new knowledge, but also socialise them differently through punishing and rewarding certain kind of behaviour, and by producing particular type of research outputs (Lewis, 2013). Talking of punishing/rewarding certain behaviours, debating and discussing informally on an issue in social sciences might not be considered as much a waste of time, as in a science department, where their research takes place only in laboratories. The second component of producing particular types of research outputs has a lot of influence on the behaviour and perception of faculty. For instance, the social science involves the

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[10] As cited in Tam (2001).

academic work consisting of society as its major subject matter, and are therefore continually "on the job", understanding and questioning the world around them. In contrast, for the science faculty, there exists a distance between the life which is going on around them and their work (Anderson & Murray, 1971). The other cultural difference arises due to greater competition, teamwork, better networking with national and international colleagues and faster publication rates in sciences or hard-pure disciplines than social sciences or soft-pure disciplines[11], which are marked by independent work, single authorships, fewer and slower rate of publication (Austin, 1990). The nature of output that they produce and/or the independence in they experience in their work could influence their response to protecting their academic freedom. The faculty which belong to disciplines where they have been trained to work autonomously are not supportive or rather resist to such changes which impairs their academic freedom, like the pressure of publishing more for performance assessment exercises (Henkel & Kogan, 1996)[12]. This could in particular be true for soft discipline or social sciences faculty. Also, since they work more closely with social issues, they might be more vocal against any curb on their academic freedom. However, it is not to say that such a hypothesis would hold true across universities. One needs to look at this in conjunction with the culture of the university where the faculty are placed.

The way in which individual background in terms of ability, resources and motivation are transformed into research productivity will vary across natural sciences and social sciences (Wanner, Lewis & Gregorio, 1981). Research productivity varies across disciplines due to difference in academic attributes of a researcher. This relationship was captured by Wanner et al. (1981). They looked at the impact of individual academic characteristics like holding a Ph.D. degree, the time it took to obtain the degree, post-doctoral fellowship granted, number of grants in the last 12 months, commitment to research (measured by percentage of time an individual spends at teaching and research, number of journal subscription, expressed

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[11] Biglan (1973a) and Becher & Trowler (1989) identify disciplines as either hard or soft, based on their paradigmatic assumptions of the subject, with hard being concerned with universal knowledge and soft with particulars and value-laden knowledge. Within these categories, they introduce two sub-categories of pure and applied, on the basis of immediate application to practical problems. There emerge, therefore, four categories into which subject matter could be categorised: hard-pure, hard-applied, soft-pure and soft-applied.

[12] As cited in Deem (1998)

commitment to research), academic rank, rank of institutions on academic article count and book count across natural scientists, social scientists and humanists. It was found that for science faculty, grants was a significant variable explaining publication of an article, which was not found to have significant impact in case of social sciences. The reason could be that the requirement of funds is greater for a science faculty than social sciences. Academic rank was found to be significant for all science, humanities and social science faculty (Wanner et al., 1981). The output also gets altered as per the nature of research support particularly in natural sciences because the conduct of research in natural sciences gets altered in order to meet the external demand of funders, which is not (as often) found in case of social sciences because of low requirement of funds for conducting research by the latter (Becher, 1994). Moreover, those undertaking research in applied areas are able to earn substantial funds than those working in pure areas of research, providing the former with better contacts with the outside world (Becher, 1994)

When used globally across disciplines, the performance indicators like quantifiable outputs, number of publications, number of consultancies, amount of research grant received, etc. are biased in favour of science than humanities faculty. It further fails to note the deterioration in quality where, for instance, a humanities faculty publishes prolifically throughout the year whereas they usually publish longer works (Moses, 1990). In a study done on universities in Australia and Argentine, Mollis & Marginson (2002) in a similar vein argue that performance assessment in implemented globally, disregarding different approaches of the disciplines towards teaching and learning, and also different cultures of the nations where these are implemented. They suggest a discipline-level assessment.

2.5.3. Rank of Faculty

The rank or designation of a faculty determines the various opportunities they have which can support their research activities like easy (or not) availability of resources, networking with other academics/industry. Austin (1990) argues that Professors in large universities often enjoy autonomy, are well travelled, place value on research, and disciplinary interactions and maintain their time. In contrast, the early-career faculty are faced with multiple responsibilities, leaving them with time crunch. They also feel that due to too much demand of work from them, the quality of their work

begins to suffer (Austin, 2006). It was also found amongst the early career faculty of University of North California that they felt anxiety and competition with respect to the senior faculty, who did little to guide them during their early career (Austin, 2006.). Also it affects the motivation or lack to it to move further up the ladder. For instance, Deem and Brehony (2005) using focus group discussion and semi-structured questionnaire in the UK universities had found that younger academics in the role of management were more in tune with the new managerialism concerned with change in funding and performance measures, for the sake of their future career. This was not found in the case of head of departments who were working for fixed period of time.

In a study conducted by Menzies and Newson (2007)[13] it was found that regardless of disciplines, career stage or gender, majority of respondents indicated that they had less time for reflective and critical thinking in their early stage of career and also literature they read was more narrower and more specialized in nature than they liked it to be. Whitchurch and Gordon (2017) highlight a change in work life emerging in the universities of UK, with an emphasis on recruiting non-tenured faculty; the early career and non-tenured faculty are required to engage more in teaching and management activities, whereas others would collaborate in research and engage in knowledge generation.

2.5.4. Institutional differences

The differences in the institutions in their cultures, their objectives, their funding, etc., would bring about a difference in the responses of faculty. The governance pattern of an institution plays a crucial role in shaping its culture and thus faculty behaviour (Austen, 1990). The faculty within each institutional type often share similar experiences (Austen, 1990).

The culture or ambience of the university structures the practices within a university, have implications for faculty motivation. If the culture is only competitive, the faculty would not cooperate amongst each other, acting in a self-interested manner. What is required for improving the quality in the university is also collegiality/ cooperative environment, which would motivate the faculty. Dill (2014) noted that collegiality is changing from mere peaceful co-existence to 'peer review'

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[13] As cited in Berg and Seeber (2016)

activities. The individual or subject-level review (or individual-level competition) do not see the efficacy of collegial control as quality assurance mechanism (Dill, 2014). Performance assessment assume that an individual only motivated by the competition.

Marginson (2009) posited that if the researchers in different kinds of knowledge formation organization (KFOs) (University or non-University) have different motivations, it would not be possible to get their desired behaviour by altering the environment. Dill (2014) noted that the policy reforms associated with NPM are path-dependent, that is they are shaped by the particular history and institutions of each nation (Dill, 2014, p. 23).

Another factor instigating differences in institutions is their funding. Volkwein (1986) had concluded in his study that faculty quality, measured in terms of their ranking, was found to be highest in the State universities which were generously funded. As already stated above, the science faculty in a university which could get adequate funds from abroad would be able to register outputs better than the science faculty in an underfunded university.

The existing position of a university also matters in attaining funding. The HEIs which exist at the top would be able to get generous funding from various sources, further enabling them to pursue excellence and recruit best of faculty (and hence meet outputs generation under accountability framework) and those at the bottom would continue to suffer due to lack of funds channelized to such institutions leading to a hierarchical nature of competition (Winston, 1999). The faculty in these two kinds of institutions would face different circumstances with respect to meeting accountability norms. It has been argued by Muscio Quaglione, & Vallanti (2013) that the universities which are funded by the government are able to attract external funding options like research contracts and consultancies with industry.

What is to be noted is that amount of funding would also differ as per the needs of disciplines and also the seniority of a faculty might play a crucial role in attracting funds, which may be difficult for a junior faculty.

There also exists difference between a university and a college, in not only their culture but nature of work. The college teachers are generally burdened with teaching as well as remedial assistance load and have an absence of research students

(Austin, 1990), whereas universities mostly cater to the masters level or research students leading to lesser teaching load, and more focus on research.

It is to be noted that institutional differences are reflected by the culture of the place, in which role of leader and the vision/mission of the university has a role to play (It is discussed in detail in an upcoming section).

Let us look at other implications of NPM form of governance or performance based accountability like collegiality, competition, motivation, nature of output, time crunch, the relationship between teaching and research, etc. which might affect the work of faculty in turn.

2.6. Impact of New Public Management or Performance Based Accountability on Faculty Life

The rationale for NPM is often put forth as greater effectiveness in the work environment. As also argued in Chapter 1, the performance-based accountability leads to efficiency, effectiveness and productivity. But these not automatic offshoots of it. There occurs a change in the work life of universities and faculty. If the universities or faculty are to be successful under the corporate governance, they must align their rationality with the larger political rationality, lest they lose. The relationship between teaching and research, the nature of output produced, trust and motivation amongst faculty, collegiality and individualism within departments, networking with an outside world, everything gets impacted. Whether the objective of quality is achieved is not, however, remains to be seen.

Deem (1998) argued that regulation of academic labour leads to replacement of trust and discretion. One of the impacts noted by Powell and Smith (1998) is the conflict of interest between universities and their faculty: the university might be interested in external negotiations rather than those of the researcher whose work is being marketed. The faculty's academic freedom may be seriously curbed under such an arrangement. Another and the major implication of this pursuit of new revenues would be an alteration of the mission of the universities. This would happen when the

merit of the research would depend on its marketability, which will in turn determine the resource allocation to the university (Powell & Smith, 1998).

In the present context, the marketability of research would mean its utility. Production of research output is guided by the 'utility' that output has. Any research is undertaken by the university keeping as its motivation its utility. This 'utility' may mean a different thing to a private and public university. For private university it may mean utility primarily to industry or corporate with which it has liaisons. For public-funded university this should ideally mean utility primarily to society. Furthermore, for a public-funded university, the 'utility' may mean a different thing altogether. However, as argued by Evans (2002) the term 'useful to society' is dynamic and has involved many things over time. In the 12th century beginnings it meant useful to soul and mind. The recent expansion in public funding however is not undertaken on the basis of cultivating young minds for their own sake but on the basis of promoting societal values. The universities are expected to aid economic competitiveness of the nation. It's all about consumerism, where marketable goods as desired by the industry, commerce and technology are produced. The neo-liberal state looks for benefits if the funding can be obtained from other sources like industry. This is altering the very internal life of universities because these external funders are amongst the stakeholders in the university and it is difficult to keep them at a distance. They often want to control every development which they fund, thus hampering the academic autonomy of the researcher. This has led to blurring of universities' sense of their purpose and their boundaries. To quote him:

> Yet this kind of thing potentially affects the autonomy of universities, making it unclear where the university ends and the world of commerce begins, and thus in practice taking away by stealth their right to govern themselves. This is, in essence, potentially an undermining of the identity of a university which may seriously compromise its purpose… A scientist receiving funding from big business may find himself in a complex employment situation, since the university may not be the sole employer and other employer may have his own views on who is primary employer and entitled to make rules (p.67-69)

The more specific the products are (as required by the industry), the more the range of activities and potential pathways for creativity would be restricted. There would be less space for the new and the known when the work is determined by and limited to known categories (Marginson, 2009, p. 115). Also, the boundaries between different types of knowledge formation organizations are essential for them to maintain their identities. Once these boundaries become blurred the creativity in the universities would get inhibited[14] (Marginson, 2009).

Marginson (2010) noted that creating new institutional forms which focus a lot on conformity would be inimical to creativity. This is because quite often than not the creator or the faculty gets to building the prestige or the university gets into self-making in order to gain status in the market. The creator is in the harmony with the research university, by adopting forms of creation where the ultimate goal is the self-making university system, and not work or knowledge. The university is thus shaped by performance culture and human resource management, research is driven by outputs and monetary rewards, researcher focuses on short-term achievement and increases the quantity of apparent outputs. He calls the end of universities in order to confirm to the market as 'simulacrum'.

Marginson (2010) contended that the system of research policy and management are so designed that they harness academic labour for institution-building. Also, the policy ties research to administered status and economic rewards are tied to predictable behaviours. This subjectivisation or governmentality is brought about by the forces of legality and funding. The funding system and behavioural incentives transform science into commercial technologies. Social sciences research are marginal to this, yet patterned by it. In the similar light, Ball (2003) calls this as fabrication or projection to become what market wants the HEIs or faculty to be.

Another kind of impact could be found on the motivation of faculty. The external monitoring crowds out internal motivation (Frey, 1993, 1994). Motivation is a crucial ingredient for pursuing quality academic work. A loss of motivation might

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[14] Boundaries can become blurred by infusing the principles of profit-making non-university research organizations in universities conducting research. This would orient faculty to produce what is marketable or quantified, in order for them to justify the needs of market and also to compete with other non-university Knowledge formation organizations.

result researcher never taking the longer route which is risky, also they would focus on applied research than fundamental/basic research, which is uncertain in terms of output and may take longer.

Ideally teaching and research go hand in hand in a university system. But performance-based accountability might create a rift between the two than complementarity. Marginson (2009) argues that research is the most important activity which renders a university status in the global dimension. The market-oriented governance reforms, like NPM, make the arrangements within a university more flexible by selective use of research-only labour in place of a uniform teaching-research nexus, increasing the range of research practices like patent production.

For faculty, teaching is an inevitable activity assigned by the university, particularly at the initial stages of their career but at the same time, it is the research which earns them prestige. The scholarly activity has been now narrowly conceptualised as only research productivity (Austin, 1990, p. 73). There is ideally a relationship between the two: both inform each other. With the introduction of performance assessment of faculty this nexus also gets altered.

The relationship between research and teaching was first recognized by Humboldt in early 19th century. His central principle was this union of teaching and research in the work of individual scholar and scientist. His assertion was that a university exists to find out the solution to various problems and should therefore be committed to *Wissenschraft* (field of pure scholarly learning). Structured lectures should be a small part of the university. The professor and students must emancipate themselves from the aspect of someone 'being taught' by someone else and rather teaching should be based on the search for truth where students also actively participate with teachers. Humboldt therefore found research as embedded with teaching (Raines and Leathers, 2003; Anderson, 2010).

However, the post-Humboldtian pattern in universities is characterized by a difference in roles, organizations or resources for teaching and research, even though both are expected of academics at a university (Schimank & Winnes, 2000)[15]. That is the context would change the nexus between the two and hence these might be in

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[15] As cited in Leisyte, Enders & Boer. (2009).

conflict when the reward system assigned to both are different might lead these to be in conflicting roles (Leisyte, Enders, & Boer, 2009). One of the major factors is the shortage of public funding, which forces academics to spend time on acquiring external research funding. This exposes academics to the rules of sponsors like forming international consortia as a prerequisite for grant application. Such deviation of time away from teaching and research both calls for a reconsideration of teaching-research nexus (Leisyte et al., 2009. p. 624). At the same time, because research determines the future of a researcher, they may consider teaching loads impeding their career opportunities (Leisyte et al., 2009)

Leisyte et al. (2009) conducted a case study in biotechnology and history departments of both Dutch and English Universities using the interview data of academics. Of three of the four biotechnology departments the increase in teaching load was not welcomed as research was eventually counted for their academic prestige. Similarly, in history departments teaching was found to be taking away time for doing research. Nevertheless, many academics favoured that teaching and research should be tightly coupled.

Because research renders prestige, often the academic autonomy of university faculty might get diminished as academic work is marginalized and professors are to produce only those research outputs that have market value or utility (Evans, 2002). Similarly, Slaughter and Leslie (1997)[16] suggested that as a result of a large commercialisation of higher education undergraduate instruction suffers deterioration in quality as less money and time is being spent on teaching than research.

The rationale behind is that it is research which brings prestige to an institution and a professor increases his value in the job market. And secondly, a university prefers stability when resources are altered (a reduction in public fund), and it responds to by directing its efforts to restore that stability (e.g. getting funds from industry to fund themselves). University research, it is said, is an offshoot of only three things: academics' interest in the money they get, industries' wish to produce new drugs or insecticides and the state's desire to produce new armament[17]. Therefore, Barnett (1990) finds it as leading to distortion in academic life. But there

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[16] As cited in Raines and Leathers (2003).
[17] Barnett (1990).

exists not only the negative impact of research (whether funded by private sources or public) on university teaching. There has been a change in the way fundamental research is being viewed. From conceptualized as "Ideational Science", having social utility in itself, it is viewed as "Instrumental Science", stock of useful and directly applicable knowledge. However, there exists a third view also, that a research scientist performs social functions other than their participation in research and their effectiveness in these other functions is dependent on their participation in research. One such 'other function' is teaching. The value of her/his research resides in the quality of her/ his students with whom she/he shares that knowledge. Thus, there is a direct relationship between teaching and research. The quality of graduate students will depend on whether the researcher-professor is teaching her/him a current or obsolete knowledge. Therefore, engaging in cutting edge research helps a professor also to update himself and improve his teaching contents (Dresch, 1995).

Also, a senior faculty, having reached highest position may not abide by the need of putting in minimum hours for teaching and would rather concentrate only on research. The performance assessment exercise however could lead to a time crunch and hence a substitution between teaching (or quality of it) and research. It is the research which provides the faculty more visibility in the academic world and therefore there could lie a possibility of compromising on teaching in the class room, unless the student evaluation of classroom teaching is objective and has some consequence on performance of faculty. For academic careers, the number of articles published become more important than the quality of teaching; the research contributes to the reputation, increased grant revenue and future earnings for the faculty (Dill and Soo, 2004; Bal, Grassiani and Kirk, 2014). For instance, Clifton and Rubenstein (2002) also discussed about the growing individualism in the behaviour of faculty (which is discussed in a later sub section), highlighting the experience of a faculty at University of Michigan under performance assessment stating their resentment against teaching for it cost them their money and reputation. They would negate their teaching loads for administrative responsibilities and research projects. As also highlighted by Whitchurch and Gordon (2017), there is a movement away from a Humboldtian kind of complementarity between research and teaching; the early career faculty would engage in teaching and those who are up the ladder or tenured faculty would engage in research related activities.

There have been a few studies on the governance of universities. Greenhalgh (2015) undertook a case study of governance failure at London School of Economics. They reviewed the Woolf report on the LSE governance, which came up with the conclusion that the failure of governance could be addressed by making certain structural changes. Greenhalgh (2015) contested their conclusion and added that the failure of governance could be understood by a cultural study of every individual's behaviour. This was done by reviewing the findings of the aforesaid report and understanding social practices (through the language games) that the staff at the LSE played at the time for which the report was done. These social practices result from the competing tensions that one faces in universities, like pressure to maintain an academic standard, satisfy their students, partnership at global level, etc. And to ward off these tensions and ensure a good governance is needed deliberation by the faculty on these issues, rather than focussing on procedures.

The new public management requires faculty to deliver output in a certain frame of time and binds their work in units of time they need to be devoted to their work. Similar is the case with API. This could lead to time crunch for faculty. As also noted by Berg and Seeber (2016) time crunch adversely affects the intellectual work, ability to think creatively and critically (p.17). Under the present neo-liberal regime, there is an expectation placed on faculty to produce research output, leaving them with little or no time in the face of compelling time needs for teaching and administrative activities (p. 86). What quite often happens is that faculty would resort to time management. But, the time management could call for multitasking, which reduced the effectiveness and increases anxiety due to focus on time poverty, bringing in a sense of always lagging behind. Also, the intellectual work cannot be measured against time, for it needs time to think critically and creatively.

Thus, in place of this corporate way of instrumentalising time, to produce creative work there is a need to experience timelessness of time, which is the experience of transcending time and become immersed in the present-moment activity; in other words, long period over which faculty may want to apply themselves in generating research or creative ideas. (Berg & Seeber, 2016). In a similar vein, Roberts (2007) also argues that lack of time under neo-liberal regime, prevents them from undertaking serious reading and reflection, which are crucial for undertaking

quality research. As a result, a lot many devote their unpaid working hours, weekends and vacations to this pursuit, causing higher stress levels (Anderson & Murray, 1971; Roberts, 2007). As they become more mindful of what all activities they need to undertake to register output, the enthusiasm for undertaking research gets lost (Roberts, 2007).

It is interesting to note that an organization undertakes certain strategies to make itself legitimate to the external environment. If the goal of the organization and its environment diverge, the organization loses its legitimacy. And as the circumstances in their previous environment changes, they attempt to enhance their domain of activities to ensure their survival. In other words, they constantly identify their outputs, values and the method of operations to with institutions, values or output which are strongly believed to be legitimate (Pfeffer & Dowling, 1975).

That HEIs are continuously seeking to adjust or undertake various strategies to adjust to their changing governance structure is nothing but an attempt made by them to remain 'legitimate' to their environment. And under this entire exercise, professionals are one of the principal targets. This sub-section will provide a glimpse of kind of strategies HEIs are making under different governance structures or the growing influence of NPM and how it alters/ affects the behaviour of academics.

Galbraith (1967) in 'The New Industrial Estate' has postulated that higher education sector is accommodated to the needs of industrial system. The funding from outside/ governance structure has a strong impact on what goes inside a HEI or to whom are they accountable. To quote Galbraith:

> If individual university disciplines are directly subsidized by the state or the business enterprise and continue to have and expand contractual relationships with these sources of funds, the result is nearly certain. Not only will the subjects so favoured have a distorted growth in response to the needs of the system but those involved will tend to identify themselves increasingly with the goals of contracting agencies and enterprises…they will come more or less fully into the orbit of the industrial system (p.375).

Due to the falling public expenditures or to create more revenue-generating areas, the universities are now restructuring themselves. Ortmann (1997) used the incentive-model discussed by Adam Smith to understand how higher education is

operating in the post-industrial environment. Based on his case study of two universities in the US and literature survey he found that the curricula was more influenced by demand-side considerations, there was a rise in the number of teachers on limited-time, piece-rate contracts, more enrolment in the business, marketing and technology programs and as also in the increasing use of computerized delivery programs. Also ranking had become a major criterion in the decision-making by the universities. However, it was conjectured that in the current trend of customer orientation, not only were the faculty and students becoming marginalized but the skills the students were being provided with were too industry-specific; the human capital needs to become more flexible in the current times of uncertainty. Not only that, most policy decisions were taken by the administrators or professional researchers, leaving little room for faculty involvement.

Leifner (2003) estimated the effect of forms of funding and resource allocation on the universities as well as individuals using case study method and in depth-interviews of the administrators and professors. It was found that it affected the universities at the macro-level and individual behaviour at micro level. He undertook case studies of six universities of high repute in the US and interviewed higher education administrators and professors. It was found that the internal allocation of financial resources reflects the way the funds are obtained from outside. For instance, the university depending on federal funds majorly for the sake of stability in funds projected a stable allocation to departments and the long-term changes were driven not by performance but by the decision taken up by the board. In stark contrast, the university, identifying itself as an entrepreneurial university and emphasizing participation in the industrial activities, received majority of its income from public and private research grants and contracts and tuition. Competition for these funds was a major driving force for this university, as a result of which it allocated all money to the departments that earned the money through teaching, enrolment figures, project proposals or high-quality research. To analyse the effect of introducing the competitive elements on behaviour of individuals within the university, he hypothesised, drawing from the principal-agent theory that 1) agents that have been rather inactive before the introduction of performance-based resource allocation will have to work harder and 2) with performance-based resource allocation agents will tend to avoid projects with a high chance of failure. The majority did not reject the

hypothesis. The continuous publication was found to be essential for gaining funds in the future and therefore many refrained from taking up a research area which had chances of failure. The results were found to be different in the case of university getting fund from government, where the interviewees state that stable budgets every year gives them an opportunity and flexibility to follow new ideas and concentrate on pure research despite the chance of failure (Leifner, 2003).

It is noteworthy that the commercialisation of university research to gain more financial resources is more rampant in the life sciences and other commercial fields of medicine, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (Powell & Smith, 1998). Universities no longer provide basic research but also are creators of intellectual property rights. They utilize research to draw funding from industry. Universities are undertaking applied research for financial returns and this has blurred the difference between industry and academia. The impact of this strategy is found in the organizational responses of the universities. The universities develop institutional arrangements to foster external linkages like industrial liaison program, contract research agreements, research parks, clinical trials programs. Also, they set up offices of sponsored research, technology transfer, patent administration, institutional development, large legal departments etc. to facilitate the external linkages. The political leaders evaluate a university on the basis of commercial research they undertake.

What happens as a result of installing NPM conditions is that forms of heteronomy get installed in the imagination of the researcher. The researchers decide the scope of their work and its subject matter in order to increase their probability of getting funding support. The strategy is made such that the projects proposals (and thus the expected outputs) are designed after understanding the research funding system or the external preferences. In a study of university researchers by Henkel, it was found that the HEIs and their members were subjected to government scrutiny and research funding was more dependent upon whether the research was carried out in the context of application in industry. Thus, the nature of research had to be altered (Marginson, 2009). In NPM accountability, when the funds are linked to the output, this tends to drive greater attention to the output (Marginson, 2009).

One impact of instilling competitive allocation by the government academic rivalry amongst HEIs and hence, growing stratification of higher education system

with funds being concentrated in research-intensive universities. There would be an eagerness to create individual and institutional academic reputations which would instigate all universities to imitate the leading research universities rather than to diversify their missions and profiles. Another way of instilling competition is through intellectual property rights. By incentivizing universities to patent and license their discoveries as a means of raising revenue, there is restriction introduced in using some research tools, which would have otherwise been freely available (Dill, 2014).

Performance based funding encourages universities to adopt strategic actions with respect to improvement in their management of research programs. But there are possibilities of negative impacts also. For instance, the focus on counts of publications may encourage some researchers to become more manipulative in their publication patterns; they might bring out numerous articles from a single research (Dill, 2014). Also, the impact of performance-based funding would be spasmodic, "creating an initial jolt to the overall system, which initially motivates all universities eligible for the funding to increase research productivity, but lessens overtime" (Dill, 2014, p. 30).

In case of PBAS, the minimum to be scored by a teacher gives the teacher a signal to allocate their time in such a way that their scores are maximized subject to capping; in the process they end up become calculating individuals (Chattopadhyay, 2015) rather than focusing on creativity.

What is happening is colonization of mind, which refocuses not only teaching but also research efforts as well as cultural life of the university. With respect to teaching and research, everything that is done must be measurable because only the measurable matters in order to serve the market. The culture changes to that of compliance to externally controlled performance indicators. As an effect, the academics would be dominated by personal career interests (Lynch, 2006). This would have adverse effect on quality higher education. Also, university would be too reliant on industry-funds or would act as profit-making business, aligning its interest with powerful vested interests (Lynch, 2006). The priorities or the work are shaped by the external agents (who want a particular output in return for the funds they provide). The innovation must meet the tests of market utility (Marginson, 2009).

Prusser and Turner (2002) conjectured that the different governance structures and the funding mechanism of for-profit and not-for profit university leads to differences in the response to market forces such as changes in student demand or introduction of new technologies in the education process. However, the market place would slowly make the two kinds of HEIs converge in their missions, source of revenue and outputs. For instance, there has been a tendency also in not-for-profit HEIs look for alternative markets for revenue-generation.

Changes in the funding methods, i.e. shifts in the income sources or in the form of resource allocation will likely have a major impact on the behaviour of universities and their internal process of allocation. The activities of a university are driven by the demand placed on them by the funders (Leifner, 2003). Performance based funding in a HEI would affect the scientific activity taking place in the university. There would be a shift away from pure research to applied research, a drastic increase in publication and transformation of new knowledge into marketable products. The government allocates fund on the basis of previous years' budget to conserve the present structures, giving no incentive to the HEIs to innovate. On the other hand, the funding provided by the private actors in the form of tuition and fees, gifts, grants, or research contracts drives the very activities of universities, faculty and the staff. In order to achieve this funding the universities demonstrate competitiveness, and foster organizational and educational innovation (Leifner, 2003.).

The impact of NPM on the working conditions of academics has been noted by Santiago and Carlvahlo (2008) in their survey of Portuguese higher education institutions, using case study research design. The changes noted were as following: reduction of terms and conditions of employment, adoption of model of economic rationality, product-orientation, measuring of individual productivity based on research output and flexibility resulting in loss of job security. It was found that polytechnics (which were inclined to meet the needs of labour markets) employed part-time faculty with the justification that they could bring the practical knowledge of their parallel career to the institutions but the major reason as stated by the authors was that the part-time faculty was less expensive than the full-time faculty as employed in the universities granting degrees. Non-tenure working environment

causes withdrawal of their legitimacy to exercise control over the curriculum, the admission of students, the awarding of degrees and research interests, insecurity and loss of trust among the part-time faculty.

Another kind of impact noted is on collegiality. The mode of collegiality might also gets altered from mere peaceful co-existence to 'peer review of performance'. The subject-level reviews often fail to see the effectiveness of collegial control for quality assurance mechanism (Dill, 2014). Thus, market-oriented practices of performance are not amenable to the environment of non-market institutions (Dasgupta, 2010b) like HEIs. Volkwein and Parmley (2000) found that teamwork has a positive effect on the satisfaction of administrative staff in the U.S. Thus, the 'I' must be replaced by 'we' in order to ensure quality (Clark, 2001). Hoetch (2006) notes that control-based quality assurance system can reduce the intrinsic motivation of the people who are expected to deliver quality work whereas trust-based quality systems could stimulate their intrinsic motivation. Trust leads to mutual commitment between trustor and the trustee and if manifested in peer relationships it could become a means of control based on individual's desire to not to disappoint their peers or not wanting to face the threat of becoming an outsider to the group (Hoetch, 2006)

With a growing emphasis of having to perform under neo-liberalism, the external rewards would assume more importance than intrinsic motivation (Roberts, 2007). They would be incentivised to advertise themselves as potential speakers or supervisors, or winners of awards, than pursuing research out of curiosity. Thus, increasing the performance in such terms would become a stronger driving force for them to perform than undertaking curiosity driven research (Roberts, 2007).

2.7. Accountability and Academic freedom in Indian Higher Education

In the Indian higher education, the stepping stone of the shift in accountability was laid in 1990s, with the introduction of Structural Adjustment Program, as advocated by the World Bank. The Bank provided loans to the country with a precondition of cutting expenditure on higher education and shifting the resources to school level education (Carnoy, 1995). All this led to the eclipse of Keynesianism in the mid-1970s, and gradually and reluctantly paved the way for the entry of market principles

(Tilak, 2005). The offshoot of this was a decline in the public expenditure in both plan and non-plan expenditure in real terms from 1990-91 to 1995-96, with expenditure on higher education as a percentage of GDP being around 0.4 per cent (on an average) from 1990-91 to 2000-01 (Tilak, 2004). Before 1990s, the reliance on the public funds was not assumed to hinder the autonomy of the HEIS. For instance, Kothari Commission supported state funding of HEIs and held higher education accountable to society at large.

In order to achieve excellence, the Indian higher education policy has also given due importance to extracting accountability over decades. This is done by instilling the principles of New Public Management, whereby the public-funded institutions are expected to perform like a privately funded institutions. And accountability is one such feature of the NPM. The Indian higher education policy, since the early 1990s, has always placed an importance on performance of a university/ accountability of HEIs as well as faculty to ensure quality in higher education, which has been greatly emphasized during recent years. Accountability has been stressed upon because of shrinking State budget for higher education. The State therefore rationalizes by allocating the limited resources to the HEIs which register output. At the same time HEIs are encouraged to explore alternative mode of funding, which makes them accountable also to those other non-State funders.

What is important to note here is the paradigm shift in the governance structure in higher education sector, affecting both the public-funded university and private universities. Ball & Youdell (2007) classified the tendencies of privatization in public education as a) Privatisation in Public Education, called as Endogenous Privatization and b) Privatisation of public education, called as Exogeneous Privatization. Whereas the latter aims at opening up of public education services to private sector participation on a for-profit basis and using the private sector to design, manage or deliver aspects of public education, the former involves importing of ideas, techniques and practices from the private sector in order to make the public sector more like business and more business-like. Such tendencies have been observed in the Indian higher education policy overtime.

The reforms in the higher education could broadly be categorised as:

a) Reforms related to financial autonomy

b) Shift in regulations not related to funding

The reforms which emphasised upon funding of universities found their place in the policy ever since 1990s, which a gradual increase in intensity to look for other modes of funding than the State. It was thought that the State funding led to wastage in the system. Providing the public universities with financial autonomy was thought to make them more accountable (to the funders). The regulatory mechanisms had always alongside such prescriptions relating with financial autonomy, in the form of recommendations which talked about measuring or documenting the work of Universities or faculty. These set of reforms began with setting up National Assessment Accreditation Council (NAAC) in 1994, followed by setting up of Internal Quality Assessment Cells (IQAC) in Universities and colleges. But a great wave to install the mechanism of performance assessment came up with PBAS in 2010. These reforms could be called as endogenous privatisation in public universities and colleges.

The Indian higher education has been suffering from good quality faculty (Thorat, 2016). The post-independence period saw a decline in the standards; faculty wanted parity with the civil servants in terms of promotion, which meant that they should be able to rise in their career without having to face much hindrance (Shah, 2005). And over years the policy has come up with various other kinds of measures like organising orientation programmes in teaching methodologies, establishment of Academic Staff Colleges for strengthening pedagogical and academic capabilities of faculty, providing faculty with better infrastructure, etc. (Mathew, 2016). The need for such control of the activities (albeit from a distance) of universities arises emerges from a mistrust in university governance (Chandra, 2017) and to ensuring quality work or maintenance of minimum standards by faculty. But there arises a serious issue because often these measures or policy recommendations are undertaken at central level, and state governments are required to follow them. Education within a state has to be seen in the larger context defined by

the typology of the state, the resources states have in hand, their priorities of development, etc. (Bhushan, 2015).

Both the kinds of reforms mentioned above have implications for the very governance of public universities. It would require them to reorganise their lives and perform. But there are two points to be noted: a) diversifying the funding base is yet to get a grip of Indian Public universities, to the point where financial autonomy could at the same time make them perform, and b) It is the PBAS, from amongst the reforms, which has had a direct impact on the life of faculty.

The recent neo-liberal agenda in Indian higher education aims at bringing New Public Management (NPM) kind of framework into the governance of HEI. There is an emphasis on performance and delivering output as an accountability measure, which can be seen emerging in the policy documents over time. Hence forth Punnayya Committee (1992) also argued for output-based funding for the universities. CABE (2004-05) also called for making the output performance public in order to increase accountability and that institutions should be encouraged by the apex regulatory and statutory bodies to subject themselves for external accreditation periodically through advocacy and system of incentives and recognition. In the similar light, Yashpal Committee (2009) also provided three performance criteria to assess central universities as: a) socio-cultural aims of higher education, b) academic excellence and c) institutional self-reform. Further, it prescribed incentive in terms of competitive renumeration to attract and retain good people in the universities and student feedback as a monitoring tool. More recently the *Rashtriya Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan (RUSA) (2013)* also emphasized on accountability by prescribing that the funding of State universities be based on their performance and adherence to reforms at the university level. This expected to improve their already deteriorated quality of education. (A detailed account of recommendations of policy documents on accountability is provided in the chapter on policy analysis)

The HEIs, are supposed to respond to such neo-liberal policy prescriptions. Whereas one may find the existence of such measures focusing on output/performance as an accountability measure quite rampant in a private HEI already, in a public-funded HEI in India these measures are also being introduced. For

instance, the HEIs are expected to accredit themselves which would act as a signal of quality/ excellence. The HEIs are supposed to set up an internal quality assessment cell. One more such example is introduction of Academic Performance Indicator (API) in HEIs in India in the year 2010. The performance-based assessment system (PBAS) attempts at a quantitative assessment of teaching-learning activities, research output, academic administration, co-curricular activities, etc. API is supposed to act as a monitoring device to extract performance/output from faculty by incentivizing them. The supposed rationale behind infusing such accountability measures in the faculty work life is to reduce corrupt practices and make them more efficient. By orienting the life of a HEI towards registering outputs, the State can ensure that the institutions is not misappropriating the funds and is committed towards excellence in academics, and also instil self-regulation, whether the performance assessment/ accountability measures actually lead to the desired results remains to be seen.

The following paragraphs would briefly look at the change in the funding mechanism and hence, the change in the nature of accountability of HEIs in Indian higher education policy.

The Punnayya Committee, 1992-93 (GOI, 1993), in the wake of shrinking budget size for education and growing numbers in higher education, contended that negotiated mode of funding was inimical to quality and efficiency of the HEIs. This mode of funding does not support accountability and returns for investment. It asked for justifying support given to all public-funded activities and suggested that development grants be linked to an academic audit system and performance indicators, which were recommended to be developed to make inter-university comparison possible. It also suggested that the central universities must avoid offering conventional courses, except when needed and offer short-term in-demand courses for generating internal sources of revenue, in addition to raising tuition fees.

Talking of financial autonomy and accountability, the CABE committee report 2004-05 (GOI, 2005) is rampant with market-oriented strategies like raising tuition fees, entrepreneurial education, bringing in self-financed courses. In order for HEIs to be accountable it recommended setting up benchmarks for accountability and quality, having a student feedback mechanism to facilitate quality improvement, monitoring of accountability, academic conducting audit to have a goal oriented performance

appraisal system and thereby motivate teachers for improvement in educational standards, setting up of internal quality assessment cell to make the performance public to ensure transparency and accountability, introducing career-oriented courses, etc. Thus, the entire shift was towards exploring alternative sources of funding other than the State and making teachers accountable to produce output and respond to the needs of the market/ funders or customers (students, potential source of revenue). Furthermore, in order to practice accountability it suggested performance appraisal of teachers through self-appraisal based on objective parameters. For this research should be given adequate weightage because teaching is informed by research. Innovation in teaching such as use of new technologies should be factored in. The outcome of appraisal was recommended to be used for merit-based promotions and other incentives. It also asked for developing norms for accountability for institutions along with individuals.

Following this, the National Knowledge Commission 2006-09 (GOI, 2009a) proposed an increase in tuition fees so as to cover at least 20 per cent of the total expenditure of universities, investment in financial instruments by the HEIs, land should be leveraged especially in the form of land grants to attract more private investment to bring in financial autonomy in HEIs. With respect to accountability, it stated that universities must be accountable to the students and not the State, and that the students and parents must assess a university. Providing students with choices would enhance competition between the universities and hence, their accountability. Also, it discussed of providing incentives for performance by creating salary differential between performers and non-performers within a university as also between universities. It was suggested that there should be an effort to attract talented faculty members by combining better working conditions along with incentives for performance.

The Yashpal Committee (GOI, 2009b) also recommended private sector investment in higher education and public feedback on the performance and achievements of HEIs as an accountability measure. It called for setting up National Commission for Higher Education Research (NCHER) which would create norms for ensuring quality and accrediting universities. Setting up of certain performance criteria was thought of as an important tool for infusing accountability. It was thought

that developing performance criteria was useful for institutions which are expected to work in autonomous manner. Even if the university was thought to be autonomous it must have certain performance criteria on the basis of which it can assess itself and be assessed by others.

In order to extract accountability from the teachers, in 2010, the State advocated minimum qualifications for appointment of teachers and other academic staff in universities and colleges by way of Performance Based Appraisal Scheme (PBAS) (GOI, 2010). It has delineated three categories of output as i) teaching learning and evaluation, ii) co-curricular, extension and professional development related activities and iii) research and academic contribution. Supposed aim is to ensure that the teachers deliver output in return for the salary they receive from the State and to make the HEIs more efficient by reducing shirking of responsibilities. There is assumed to be a linear relationship between input (time) and output. The one who fails to perform is excluded from the system. Also, in the process the teachers are supposed to be evaluated by the students, the so-called customers of the service providers. This is again a step to render consumer sovereignty to the students. This also comes across as an initiative to infuse competition amongst teachers/ universities to raise their academic standards.

In 2012 the Narayana Murthy Committee (GOI, 2012) came up with the suggestion of bringing in greater private sector participation in higher education; it suggested a university-corporate link up in order to enhance the relevance of education and as also to explore an alternative mode of funding research in the universities.

Another step to infuse a sense of accountability and hence, competition amongst universities is setting up of National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) (in 1994), and UGC has made it mandatory for universities to get themselves accredited by an accreditation agency to ensure quality education (GOI, 2013). Also, in order to get funding from the UGC under the College with Potential Excellence scheme, the universities must submit an accreditation certificate with a minimum 'B' grade. Such a measure aims at quantitative evaluation of the universities based on quantifiable criteria like curriculum, teaching-learning, physical infrastructure, human resource, publications etc. Acquiring accreditation would also supposedly provide an

international recognition to the Indian universities (GOI, 2013). The funding has been made contingent upon relative performance of the universities.

Performance-based funding of the state universities has also recently been proposed by the *Rashtriya Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan* (RUSA) (2013) (GOI, 2013). The committee suggested that by providing freedom to the state universities, they would enhance their quality. And improving quality was thought to be very vital for its 'demographic dividend' to compete in the global market. Funding based incentives are supposed to enhance the performance of universities. The 12th FYP (2013) also similarly argued that incentivisation by performance appraisal would raise the motivation of teachers in universities and hence their quality.

That the accountability has shifted towards students can easily be seen in the 11th Five Year Plan (GOI, 2008) which talked of raising tuition fees and providing skills to the students by developing national skill development mission. Providing skill-based education was further stressed in the 12th FYP (GOI, 2013).

Thus, the policy reforms aim at making HEIs institutions financially autonomous by encouraging them to explore other sources of funding and in turn, accountable. However, shifting some sources of funds from the State to private sources like industry, funding agencies, or students would alter their strategies because they would have to produce as per the needs of the clients.

As articulated by Prasad (2008), the higher education reforms post-Kothari Commission have focused upon improving the status of higher education in India by shifting towards producing tangible outputs. The shift has made the social forces supporting higher education like the government or communities as one of the stakeholders, along with other private stakeholders. Market criteria have come to gain importance while gauging the performance of HEIs.

There is as a result infusion of private principles of performativity within public funded HEIs, which is also a feature of New Public Management or endogenous privatization (as coined by Ball & Youdell, 2007). The greater attention is placed on the image, enhancement of revenue, contracting, widespread use of audits and accountability measures (Ball & Youdell, 2007).

As an effect, the faculty would undertake collaboration with industry or other agencies for funding, alter their curriculum to more skill-based or collude in other ways to the needs of students in order to improve their student feedback, produce applied knowledge which takes less effort and risk as compared to basic research , as well as shift to patenting etc. Conformity to such accountability norms can be inimical to creativity (Marginson, 2010) because meeting accountability norms impact the academic freedom of the faculty and hence, the intrinsic motivation to work gets affected, the major input required for creativity/ quality in academics. It remains to be seen that how meeting this accountability would impact their academic freedom of faculty.

The present phenomenon of (providing financial autonomy to the HEIs coupled with) enhanced accountability is that of New Public Management, where is principles of private sector, like linking performance to incentives, are sought to be installed in the public sector. PBAS is an example of NPM reform being introduced at HEIs, where a teacher is assumed as a factory worker concerned with his marginal productivity (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014) and would mechanically perform the task. The following sub-section discusses in brief about the tenets of NPM as discussed in the international literature, majorly.

The PBAS requires the faculty to confirm with the norms in order to get promotion or seek entry into the system. What is happening as a result is that it gives enough scope to self-interested faculty to produce minimum work required, focusing on short-term needs (of gaining points) (Deem, 1998), ignoring the long-term interest of society. The faculty often restrict to specializing in narrow fields in order to produce more number of outputs per year than focusing on holistic knowledge which might yield only single output over a year (JNUTA, 1997; Kumar, 2013). Focusing on short-term gains, the faculty is strategising by producing greater number of outputs like journals or conferences which may be of poor quality (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014). The present system therefore transforms a teacher into a calculating individual, who would earn points as prescribed in the gazette of India by strategizing amongst activities and at the same time demotivate them to earn excess points because of provision of capping, thus curtailing their academic freedom (Chattopadhyay, 2015).This happens when accountability is not to oneself but to the institution or

immediate master[18] , which would alter the behaviour of the faculty to meet the needs of their clientele or produce outputs as specified by the state, and comply to the capping requirement as mentioned in the Gazette of India (GOI, 2010, 2013, 2016a, 2016b). The faculty under given scheme are supposed to devote 7-8 hours per working day in the teaching, learning and co-curricular activities, leaving them with no time left for research work (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014), the output which renders maximum prestige to a university or faculty, which is their ideal objective. Thus, the provision of scoring minimum points, with capping in case of many categories, coupled with limited time left for research is inimical to the motivation of faculty and hence, their creativity. And without creativity there could be no quality output produced by them. Hence there would always be tussle between accountability and autonomy.

Under such framework, a university is likened to a firm which simply maximizes an objective (of prestige) subject to demand and production constraints (Raines & Leathers, 2008). However, what this simple exercise, or so to say, the application of microeconomic principles to the university often ignores is the fact that there involves a human element in the work performed in a HEI and that is of creativity. In order to access the impact accountability compliance on faculty, it is crucial to analyse how the actors within an institution are behaving given the rules of the game.

2.8. Factoring contexts in Indian higher education

The accountability in the form of standard documentation reduces the scope for contex specific decision making (Hammersley, 2002; Heggen & Engerbretsen, 2000)[19]. It needs to be mentioned that under API framework quality could become only a quantitative concept. As discussed above the contexts are crucial in terms of disciplines, designation and institutions in order to understand how it is perceived and what kinds of actions are taken up by the faculty in order to comply to this. When looked at the categories of evaluation, as listed in the Gazette of India on performance- based assessment scheme (GOI, 2010, 2013, 2016a, 2016b), there will

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[18]Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-when-accountability-is-not-institutional/article6764600.ece

[19] As cited in Engebresten, Heggen & Eilersten (2012).

be a difference in the strategy making by a science faculty vis-à-vis a social science faculty. Therefore, "'One size fits all' and 'standardisation to achieve standard' is anathema to higher education"[20] .

In a case study undertaken in a central university in India, science faculty faces more challenges in terms of producing output than the social science faculty because of huge requirement of funds, which are often not sufficiently met even in central universities. They therefore had to resort to writing projects for meeting their academic expenditures. Doing projects subjected them to follow the general financial rules (GFR) (GOI, 2005), which emphasizes on least price principle. The faculty said that buying the inputs for laboratory at least price was inimical to quality and this led to conflict between the administration and the faculty. The detailed and time taking paper work involved to ensure accountability to the university and alignment of research topics of their students with those of projects were impeding the academic freedom of the faculty[21].

Given this scenario, the science faculty would have greater chance of applying for projects which have grant amount above 30 lakhs than social science faculty applying for a grant above 5 lakhs. This would lead to science faculty easily scoring 20 points per projects as compared to social science. Also the former would easily produce output in terms of patents at international level than latter, rendering the former better score. With respect to prioritizing the tasks also, the science faculty would give research priority (because the funding for research supports their teaching activities) whereas social science faculty may not make such strategy.

In one of the categories of output pertaining to project outcomes, the science faculty is measured in terms of the patents produced. The production of patents offers private rewards for disclosure of knowledge and this reward structure is not linked with priority of discovery. That is a commercially successful application of already existing knowledge would reward the adaptor (Dasgupta, 2010a). This would not only constrain new knowledge generation but also the nature of output would shift to application based only.

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[20] Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-when-accountability-is-not-institutional/article6764600.ece

[21] Sharma (2015).

When talking of institutional differences, what is happening in the State universities is that on the one hand there is from shortage of funds, on the other hand, they are supposed to meet the PBAS requirements particularly related to research for getting promotion or supplementing their teaching (in case of science departments). This is particularly true for the state universities. RUSA (2013) (GOI, 2013b) had discussed about the sorry state of funds provided to the state universities and as also their poor absorbing capacity due to lack of monitoring of activities. The already resource crunched HEIs cannot produce output or maximize their prestige and thereby attract non-state funders. How such institutions would meet accountability norms, is a very vital question to be addressed. Thus, there would be hierarchy operating between a central university and state university (as argued by Winston, 1999). Thus, assuming a level playing field by proposing a standard PBAS for both central and state universities may not raise the performance of already resource crunched state universities.

Designation plays a significant role in PBAS compliance in India. The assistant professors are required to register minimum points in order to move to the next stage within the same designation, which requires them to undertake projects, consultancies, take invited lectures and paper presentations in different seminars, which is difficult to earn during their formative years. Attending seminars requires funding and at the initial stages of their career there is limited funding support that they get from their institutions (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014).

2.9. Accountability and Governmentality

Under the influence of the New Public Management the institutions' autonomy has been considerably increased, which in turn has pushed for demands for accountability (Engebresten et al., 2012). But in the Indian context, accountability of the public universities has been strengthened to maintain certain minimum standards within universities. Accountability, as a part of NPM involves the emulation of private sector management styles, an emphasis on 'freedom to manage' and promotion of 'self-regulating' individuals and institutions, giving rise to privatization and individualization of risk management (Peters, 2001). The government sets certain goals and output measures and steers from a distance, making the academic agent entirely responsible for their actions (Marginson, 2009). The accountability from

faculty has been sought in Indian higher education by installing certain surveillance/ monitoring mechanisms like Performance Based Appraisal Scheme, in the present context. The nature of the accountability however is not 'controlling' but 'self-regulating', where individuals regulate themselves by undertaking self-appraisal. As argued by Olssen (1996), the present system seeks to create a "manipulatable man" (p. 340) who is 'manipulated' to become self-regulating, less dependent on the State and is thought to have become 'free' or 'autonomous'. This is not to say that there is no governance. The mode of governance has changed from that of control to supervision, also called as 'steering from a distance' (Jongbloed, 2004). In the case of PBAS the faculty are similarly manipulated by internalizing in them the argument of producing outputs (like teaching, research, administrative activities) in order to enhance quality. What happens as a result is heteronomy of imagination (Marginson, 2009). The minds/ imagination of faculty get in-tune with the system.

The process/mechanism behind such phenomenon can be traced by understand the existing discourse in the policy texts; which means what are the 'rules' which led to the existence of present conception of accountability, which focuses on creating self-regulating individuals, in the policy texts. Discourse can be defined as a set of ideas, concepts and beliefs that have become established as knowledge (Doherty, 2007; Powers, 2007). Foucault (1972) argues that a discourse modifies relationship between subjects and society. A discourse modifies the above relations and simultaneously for a discourse to be legitimate the above relations need to be modified accordingly.

The neo-liberal discourse which focuses on autonomy coupled with accountability is nothing but 'governmentality' (Doherty, 2007). Governmentality may be described as the deliberate effort, directed at subjects, to create governable subjects through various techniques developed to control, normalize and shape people's conduct. The operation of government can be found at many sites like the family, the workplace, the profession, etc. (Doherty, 2007; Fimyar, 2008). The technical means or technique is the discourse through which relations are altered and subjectivisation happens and the government rationalizes its own existence. Foucault defines government as "the conduct of conduct" and thus a term which ranges from governing the self to governing others. The practice of government leads to a

multitude of techniques, schemes and ideas deliberately mobilizing in attempting to direct or influence the conduct of others (Doherty, 2007). Here governing the people doesn't mean a way to force people but processes and techniques through which the self is constructed and modified by himself. This power of the state is not exercised against the wish of individuals but it empowers them or *responsibilises* the subjects forcing them to free decision making in fields of action.

Thus, PBAS is a kind of technique which the State has instituted in order to responsibilise the faculty. It is the governmentality which gets internalized by individuals and guides their mentality/thinking (Foucault, 1991)[22]. The governance, using Foucauldian approach, is not something that a ruler performs on the ruled, it is something which influences the actions and self-understanding of others (Engebresten, et al., 2012), and the subjects are created to meet the ends of the government, by fulfilling themselves than being obedient (Rose, O', Malley & Velverde, 2006). Because faculty responds to the system with cooperation, the present system has gained legitimacy. It seeks to alter the relationship between the faculty and the vice-chancellor of the university or faculty or the student etc. then only would the system perpetuate in the desired way. Another way the 'governmentality' is sought to be installed in minds of individuals is through 'standardization of quality'. Every faculty is supposed to produce a standardised 'quality' output in terms of numbers of papers or numbers of hours devoted to their tasks. This setting of standard represents a way of 'governing the faculty' from the distance. As an effect of the subjectivisation of teachers, the collegiality gets reduced, with the teacher focusing on individual 'performativity' and also the relationship between teacher and student gets affected (Ball, 2010).

However, what happens with respect to creativity/ academic freedom of faculty, as a result of this wilful subjectivisation (which supposedly makes the faculty 'free') is seldom discussed in the policy text of Indian higher education. The myriad of relationships which the neo-liberal discourse produces for faculty to be accountable and the discourse to be legitimate might be detrimental to their academic freedom, which remains to be seen.

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[22] As cited in Engebresten, Heggen & Eilersten (2012).

2.9.1. Accountability as policy technology: Understanding the relations at work

The major premise of Foucault's work is to look at how the discourse is formed and also how it has an effect on every day existence or every day practices of the subjects, of which the discourse speaks. The discourse is manifest in policy objects (artefacts like books), architecture, subjectivities and practices (Ball, 2015).

When universities are managed according to market like principles, they are expected to behave premising on a corporate model, which emphasises upon efficiency and productivity in universities. The work of academics becomes more structured (Marginson, 1997) and "members of academic profession, regardless of field, are very broadly engaged in reshaping their relations with external groups, organisations and agencies" (Slaughter, 1993)[23].

The performance assessment at the individual level somewhere alters the behaviour of individual or it can be said to be controlling the behaviour. Cotoi (2011) suggests that behaviour control regimes rationalise the behaviours using truth as a reference point. This truth is the truth (or rules) of the prevailing discourse.

Under new managerialism, a certain kind of language of knowledge economy, grant generation, efficiency, accountability, technology transfer, etc. dominates how the academic work gets shaped within the institutions. It is this language which faculty are internalising and it alters the internal dialogue they have about research as well as their practice (Berg & Seeber, 2016).

The new managerial practices have led to an emphasis on competition between the employees (Deem, 1998; Austin & Jones, 2016), along with an emphasis on individualism (Austin & Jones, 2016); in other words, competitive individualism (Ozga, 1998). In the state of individualism, one's worth is adjudged by their success and in the context of academics, the success is ascertained often by publications and research grants for professionals (Bal, Grassiani & Kirk, 2014). The neo-liberal mode of governance which includes monitoring of individual performances often lead to such behaviour amongst faculty. As a result of managerial practices in universities, collegiality amongst academics working together, based on minimum hierarchy and

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[23] As cited in Marginson (1997)

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maximum trust, is being replaced (Deem, 1998, Austin & Jones, 2016) and there is now a loss of trust amongst academics particularly as result of assessment of their work (Yokoyama, 2006). Bal, Grassiani and Kirk (2014) after studying the experiences of faculty in Dutch Universities conjectured that neo-liberal for of management, due to individual performance measurement had made academic an insecure place to work, causing mental health problems, growing competition amongst faculty at the expense of collegiality and decrease in the quality of work performed; it led to growing individualisation amongst faculty. In a similar vein, Berg and Seeber (2016) highlight how under this new climate of accounting there has set in a sense of isolation in the faculty, because of the reduced interaction amongst peers. The hallways of the university departments are found to be empty, and even talking to each other is found to be a waste of time. It is the individual cognition which is given greater emphasis, leading to individualism in universities. The negative emotions of competition have replaced the positive emotions of collegiality. They further argue that as a result the faculty, if at all, spend time together in a way that could be measured and registered in accounting system. Colleagues are seen as resources, with a goal of mutual support; there has emerged virtual networking where relationships are understood as affiliations. In other words, even relationships are evaluated in terms of their capability to offer. The features of competition requires individuals to be responsible and be more sensitive to the needs of market. Those who do not adjust themselves suffer the penalties of their actions (Neave, 1988, p. 20). The people get governed in the process by and through their own interests. (Cotoi, 2011).

In such an environment academics compete against their colleagues to make a space for themselves (Roberts, 2007). A collegial system in contrast is a place where people help out each other, respect each other, share each other's burden and encourage each other (Roberts, 2007). Research has generated competition between individuals for grants or publications (Shattock, 2017). In more collegial cultures, the faculty experience greater autonomy and are not guided by rules. Collegiality is often defined as cooperation or collaboration amongst faculty members but such a phenomenon is not possible in many departments, where the faculty belong to different disciplines or area of specialisation.

In a study conducted by Yokoyama (2006) to assess the impact of research assessment exercise on collegiality in four English universities, it was found that on an average the research assessment had led to mode managerial culture, away from collegiality.

2.10. The role of culture

Culture of refers to shared values, beliefs, assumptions, rituals and practice, which govern and shape the behaviour of individuals and groups, and also the meanings they attach to events (Kuh & Whitt, 1988). This could be culture of a university, as well as that of a discipline. These cultures determine how faculty take decisions, how they interact with the students and how they organise their work (Austin, 1990). Even though the regulations set by the higher authority, like UGC, affect the faculty behaviour, there is something apart from the external influence which goes into determining the way the faculty would behave. These values or beliefs of the institutions may be such that support any new regulation proposed by the UGC or these may run counter to the external recommendations. In the latter case, there might erupt a possibility of resistance by the faculty or other internal constituents of the university in adhering to the external recommendations. Second, and following out from the possibility of resistance, it is also crucial to understand the culture to know if there is an easy adaptability of the UGC norms or does there exist such leadership which helps adaptability. Ensuring adaptability by the leader of the university or the faculty could be construed as a sign of their subjectivisation, without any real internal conflict in them. Similarly, different disciplines lead to different socialisation and hence behaviour of faculty (This would be discussed in detail in a later sub section).

Without understanding the culture, one cannot understand the behaviour of faculty. What kind of actions and behaviour are acceptable (and not acceptable) determine the quality of work conducted in the university. Secondly, how the faculty would persist towards producing quality work (or would not) would depend on acceptance by university of mediocre- quality work, despite existence of performance assessment. If the leadership is such that they accept poor quality work, then even at the time of the interview, after the output has been quantified in the assessment form, poor/ mediocre quality work would not be filtered out. Looking from the point of view of principal agent theory, this could be a case of collusion between the principal

and the agent, which may thwart the quality of work the very purpose for which accountability has been sought from the faculty.

Thus, studying university culture could go a long way in determining the quality of work performed in the university. There have been a few studies on studying the culture of the university. But either the studies have not talked about inter disciplinary culture or if they have talked of interdisciplinary culture, then the process of subjectivisation and resistance has not been studied at all. Also, in the literature pertaining to performance assessment the culture has not been touched upon in determining the behaviour under the performance assessment regime.

Sporn (1996) looks at culture from two angles: strength of it and its orientation. Strength is understood as the alignment between the goals and the values of faculty of the university. Orientation at the same time refers to the beliefs, vales, attitudes and patterns of behaviour. It could be internally oriented or externally oriented. Internally oriented cultures are inclined towards internal dynamics of universities; the university members focus on internal issues pertaining to strategy and structure of work and these issues have a precedence over external challenges. In contrast the externally oriented culture emphasises upon responding to the environment by addressing the discontinuity between the organisation and its environment. An organisation which is focused externally would find it easier to adapt to the changing environment. The orientation as well as strength of the culture can be reflected in the mission of the universities and their intensions (Sporn, 1966).

It is here that the role of leadership assumes significance. The middle managers play a role in managing the interface between policy and its implementation, by promoting a 'positive psychological contract' (Whitchurch & Gordon, 2017, p. 9). These managers or leaders align the individual motivations and aspirations, with the requirements of structures (Whitchurch & Gordon, 2017). The NPM reforms also alter the role of leadership, which has strengthened as a result as was found in Norway (Bleiklie, 1998) and Australia (Mollis & Marginson, 2002)

There needs to be added a few qualifications in the analysis of Sporn (1996) when understanding the strength of the culture. It needs to be noted here that the perfect alignment between goals of the university and the values of faculty may not

lead to quality work because the attainment of quality work depends on how the goals are defined. The intensions of decision makers are the basis for formulating the goals of the university; these intensions affect the culture of the university and thus their performance. For instance, goals of a university may not be holistic but narrowly defined like focusing on skill development or placements of students than achieving quality teaching-learning. Similarly, the intension of the decision maker might be to feature their universities in some aspect like ranking, at the cost of neglecting other aspect like academic freedom. Secondly, the external orientation in the context of performance assessment could be the quest of the leader of the university to appear in the ranking, or amongst the faculty it could be projecting themselves as productive as envisaged by the scores or more emphasis being given to the external rewards in order to motivate themselves to perform better. Thirdly, the existence of various subcultures is understood as a sign of weakness because of the values and beliefs of each sub culture would vary and would not only not help in achieving the goal of the university but also would have different orientations, which may not help university have easily adaptability (Sporn, 1996). In the context of the API, this subculture may develop due to difference in the designation of the faculty; the values and beliefs of an assistant professor may be very different from that of a professor when it comes to adhering to the performance norms. In accordance with the above definition, this would depict a weak culture. But at the same time, it needs to be noted that the existence of various subcultures may become a starting point for resistance towards the norms. And that would rather make the university culture strong in resisting to comply with the external norms that do not enhance the quality of work always. This has also been noted by Berg and Seeber (2016, p. 84), stating that there could be subcultures of collegiality and togetherness within departments, which may create pockets of resistance towards neo-liberal agenda of infusing competition and individualism. Similarly, such subcultures might develop in case of different disciplines. Thus, there is a need to redefine a strong and a weak culture. A university which has a lot of subcultures and that subculture leads to resistance by many to retain the quality of the institution, it may be rather a strong culture. At the same time, a university which has no subculture and can as well passively accepts the norms imposed by the above authority might rather be called as having a weak culture.

The next chapter, Chapter 3, would continue the review of literature, with an emphasis on reviewing the theories and developing a theoretical framework for seeking answers to the problem posed in the present study.

Chapter 3: Review of Literature-Developing theoretical framework to understand accountability and its effects

3.1 Introduction

The performance assessment of faculty as a measure of university governance assumes a rational behaviour by the faculty, which is that the faculty would self-regulate themselves and score points in order to sustain their jobs or get promotion. It is a monitoring mechanism with an aim of maintaining minimum standards in the universities. It could be understood as a contractual relationship between the faculty and the regulating authority, wherein the recruitment or promotion of faculty is undertaken only after output as stated in the regulation are produced.

It undertakes an economic analysis of the behaviour of the faculty combining and augmenting the theory of Principal-Agent model, Michel Foucault's approach towards neo-liberalism, and augmenting that with the role of social norms. To reiterate, the study tries to understand the implications such monitoring mechanisms would have on the faculty life; the intended effects are to be understood studying the policy documents and the actual effect would be looked at by interviewing the faculty member In particular, the attempt is made to know how the faculty members relate themselves with the policy prescription pertaining to measuring their performance; are they in tune with it or is there any struggle that they face in accomplishing their task in according with this monitoring mechanism. It is crucial to understand the struggle or the conflict, or in general their responses to the policy, because that has a direct impact on their motivation, academic freedom and quality of the work performed.

The performance assessment essentially involves self-assessment by the faculty, which could be understood as a way to self-regulate the individuals and institutions. There is also a subtle contract between the faculty and the authority (the State or the UGC or the administration) to perform as per the norms stated in the UGC regulation.

As also discussed in the chapter on review of literature, it seeks to instil individualism amongst faculty, whereby they are expected to behave more efficiently

and produce output. Under the mainstream economics, Principal Agent model is often used to understand the contractual relations between two or more parties, which entails basically designing an optimum kind of contract, in order to either ensure a particular outcome or a particular kind of behaviour.   One however needs to probe deeper into the formation of these behaviours or outcome, under the self-regulatory regime. Firstly, the neo-liberal rational behaviour suffers on two accounts: a) it does not delve upon values and b) it is global in nature (Simon, 1986). As far as the first one is considered, the behaviour of individuals is not value-free and therefore, can have implications on quality of work. Second critique is that what rationality means is different for people, depending upon the contexts or places where they are situated. Therefore, not every one might behave in a singular manner. Studying the rational behaviour under neo-liberalism would entail invoking the Foucauldian perspective on neo-liberalism and his framework of subject formation under surveillance, where the ideas from his work on *Discipline and* Punish, *The Archelogy of Knowledge,* and *The history of sexuality (Vol.1)* are brought from.   (and the possibility of resistance). What is of a note here is that subjectivisation (or resistance to it) does not happen in isolation but within a university sphere and therefore role of university culture plays a crucial role here. As has also been discussed by Michel Foucault about Institutional discourse, the formation of subjects would be looked at bringing in that factor as well. And in that regard, the theory would gradually move and draw on framework of New Institutional Economics (NIE). The chapter would thus begin with discussing about Principal Agent theory, augmenting it with Foucault's framework of subjectivisation and role of norms in institutions, largely as suggested by Elinor Ostrom. It would sum up the entire discussion with the construction of a neo-liberal academic identity and resistance.

3.2. Principal Agent theory to study contractual relationships

PAT describes the relationship between principal (s) and the agent (s), where both enter into an agreement, with the expectation that agent will as a result produce the output or alter their behaviour, as desired by the Principal (Moe, 1984). A principal often principal seeks out an agent when the former lacks a specialised knowledge that agent has or the task to be accomplished is complex (Moe, 1984; Sappington, 1991). In a university, faculty is the agent and administration or higher authority, their

principal. Universities and the faculty get funds from government, also in the form of salaries, and are therefore said to be accountable to the government.

Apart from funds, a principal may ensure accountability through other governance mechanisms. A case in point is the performance assessment of faculty or universities at large, which in the more recent times is not necessarily linked with funds. Even though in many nations there is a shift away from government spending on higher education, the government continues to exert substantial influence over the policy development, institutional decision making, policy outputs, etc. (Lane & Kivitso, 2008). In case of the neo-liberal State, for instance, the higher education institutions still remain accountable, but only the nature of output, their objectives, and behaviour alters to the needs of different clients, which are rendered some form of legitimacy by the very (neo-liberal) State.

But, the relationship between principal and agent is not as simple. In such a relationship emerge two problems: i) agency problem which arises because there is a) information asymmetry regarding the behaviour of agent and it is often costly for principal to verify the behaviour of the agent) and b) conflict of goals between principal and agent and ii) the problem of risk sharing (an agent may be more risk loving than principal or vice-versa which may lead to differing actions of principal and agent) (Moe, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989). In other words, any individual (agent) would generally seek to maximize his own utility (goal) first. But the principal has to ensure that the interest or the goal of the principal is not thwarted. In order to ensure the above, the principal must have complete information on the actions taken by agent(s). But, quite often than not, it is not possible to have full information on the behaviour of the agent, which would be called the problem of information symmetry; it is difficult for principal to gauge the behaviour of the agent. The agent may shirk away from his responsibilities and devote his time somewhere else. This is called the problem of Moral Hazard or the problem of corruption in higher education. For instance, a faculty may devote his time away from classroom teaching towards pursuing his own research goals. Or the faculty could increase their discretionary time largely at the expense of meeting their institutional responsibilities due to the increased revenue i.e. accepting private assignment like private consulting or speaking engagements. Similarly, at the institutional level also the State can provide the same

resources for undergraduate and graduate activities, but the university may spend more on graduate teaching which would render them more prestige. Similarly, the HEI may devote more resources to the prestige-generating research activities at the cost of teaching assignments. (Lane & Kivitso, 2008).

From the perspective of the State the main problem with shirking is, it reduces effectiveness and productivity of universities. Therefore, the State enters in contract with the faculty or HEIs or both, which is principal's mode of control (Lane & Kivitso, 2008). The State develops a scheme to induce the desired behaviour in the HEI agents and the government may use a contract to exert its influence. For instance, the state may appropriate more funds to the universities which more closely satisfy the state's objectives, leading to competition for funds or may link the funds to the output produced/ performance (Ferris, 1991).

There could be majorly two kinds of contract a) behaviour-based contract and b) outcome-based contract (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the behaviour-based contract, the principal monitors the behaviour (actions) and then rewards or punishes those behaviours. In the outcome-based contract, on the other hand, the principal rewards (or does not reward) the agent for attaining (or not attaining) certain outcomes. These contracts act as not only incentivizing mechanisms but also monitoring mechanisms. The behaviour-based contracts are said to address the problem of information asymmetry and the outcome-based contracts the issue of goal conflict. It is assumed that by entering in either of the contract the faculty can be made accountable to the State; the corrective actions of the principal may be enough of a motivation to prevent or reduce shirking at the end of agent. But this accountability may impede their autonomy, which is a vital input for excellence. This classic dilemma between accountability and autonomy is at the heart of principal-agent framework.

In the case of Indian higher education having installed measures like Academic Performance Indicators or providing performance-based funding as in RUSA (2013) to assess the performance of the faculty is a measure to extract output from the faculty in terms of teaching-learning, research and extracurricular activities by trying to affect faculty behaviour and their actions in their day to day academic life. Such activities however may lead to adversely affecting the academic freedom rather than motivating the faculty, compromising with the objective of excellence by

the HEIs and State at large. The faculty may also resort to corrupt practices in order to remain in the race of performing or producing quantifiable output.

Whereas the Agent, would like to enjoy some autonomy in order to pursue the academic goals, the Principal will be reluctant to render the same because of the threat to the Principal for misuse of that autonomy at the hands of the Agent. The Principal cannot have a complete control or information on the actions taken by the Agent, which may be inclined towards fulfilling the personal goals of the Agent than Principal's. The principal therefore makes the agent accountable by either altering his behaviour by monitoring it or altering his outcome by providing incentives and thereby make sure that the goals of the principal and the agent are aligned together and there are no corrupt practices or shirking by the agents. Many a time, the problem of monitoring is dealt with by the means of structuring of incentives in order to reveal the information partially or completely in the course of performance of job in case of imperfect information (Spence, 1975). This is called as 'the Principal's problem', of manipulating the agent's incentives to minimize shirking (Miller, 2005).

The principal structures certain incentives for the agent to take one amongst the many actions available to the agent. This structuring of incentives is the central focus of the Principal Agent theory (Gailmard, 2014). The decisions which the principal takes in order to induce a 'desirable decision making' by the agent forms very crucial elements of the contracts signed between the Principal and the Agent. The principal assigns the task to the agent because either he/she does not have required expertise to accomplish the task and/or does not have time to perform that task. The reason for the principal to induce agents to take the actions as desired by the Principal is that the principal has some stake in the task performed by the agent. In case of higher education, the principal mostly has a financial stake.

The likelihood of shirking is linked with the motivation and incentives provided. If the motivation is monetary rewards than intrinsic satisfaction, then shirking on quality is problematic. Shirking can be reduced in such cases through incentives such as contract renewal or disincentive such as non-payment. On the other hand, if the motivation is self-satisfaction, the concerns over shirking are less (Ferris, 1991).

Let us look at how the impact of external intervention is taken into the Principal- Agent model (adapted from Frey (1993, 1994)).

Agent

The agent chooses his action by considering the benefits B and the cost C. As the performance increases both B and C increase. At the same time, the higher performance, P, leads to diminishing marginal returns and increasing marginal cost. The B and C are also the function of principal's external intervention, E. The above situation can be written as:

$B=B(P,E); B_p>0, B_{pp}<0$……………………………………………………………… (1)

$C=C(P,E); C_p>0, C_{pp}>0$……………………………………………………………..(2)

Now, an agent would choose an optimal level of performance P* such that the net benefit is maximized (that is B-C is maximized)

The first order condition of maximization gives the following condition

$B_P=C_p$……………………………………………………………………………………… (3)

When the principal exerts an external intervention, this optimal performance of the agent gets affected. So differentiating the condition stated in equation (3) with respect to E gives the below situation:

$B_{PE} + B_{PP} \, dP/dE = C_{PE} + C_{PP} \, dP*/dE$

$dP*/dE = (B_{PE} - C_{PE})/(C_{PP} - B_{PP}) > OR < 0$……………………………………….. (4)

There emerge 3 scenario:

(a) The standard principal-agent theory states that external intervention raises the performance because the cost of shirking increases or so to say the marginal cost of performance reduces i.e. $C_{PE}<0$. It is called the disciplining effect of the intervention. The standard PAT does not account for intrinsic motivation. That is the crowding out effect is neglected which makes the effect of intervention on marginal benefit of performing as null, i.e. $B_{PE}=0$. Using these conditions and as stated in (1) and (2), dP*/dE>0, which is the conjecture of the standard or

orthodox PAT. The same outcome is achieved when external intervention raises intrinsic motivation; the disciplining effect is strengthened by the crowding in effect (i.e. $B_{PE}>0$)

(b) In the second scenario, when external intervention undermines internal motivation, then crowding out effect sets in (i.e. $B_{PE}<0$) and the discipling effect does not work, the stronger external intervention reduces the agent's performance, i.e. $dP^*/dE<0$.

(c) But generally, both come into play as a result of external intervention by the principal and therefore, external intervention has both effects at the same time, the disciplining effect which may lead to more output or crowding out effect which diminishes the internal motivation and reduces the output. Whether intervention leads to increase in performance or not is determined by the relative weight of the two.

Since the crowding out effect always exists, it would be naïve to argue that mechanisms like API or other monitoring/ incentivising or accountability measures would lead to increase in performance by the faculty or the HEI. The present policy framework seems so assume $B_{PE}=0$ (just as in scenario (a))

Whereas it is difficult to capture the intrinsic motivation of the faculty or the various constituents of a HEI (nor is that the purpose of the study), it plays a vital role in academia and must be supported by its environment. If there exists intrinsic motivation but the faculty is not provided with the academic freedom, the quality of output would get affected because the intrinsic motivation would be impeded. The study would however try to look at the academic freedom of the faculty.

3.2.1. Modification to the Frey's model: Incorporating academic freedom and different 'types' of agent

The above model fails to take note of an important link of academic freedom between external intervention and performance. Performance of an agent, faculty, in higher education, depends upon their academic freedom, A , which gets affected by external intervention, E. Thus,

$P=P(A(E))$…………………………………………………………………………(5)

Taking into account equation (5), the following results are obtained after differentiating equation (3) with respect to E,

$$B_{PE} + B_{PP} (dP^*/dA)(dA/dE) = C_{PE} + C_{PP} (dP^*/dA)(dA/dE) \text{ or}$$

$$(dP^*/dA) = (B_{PE} - C_{PE})/\{(C_{PP} - B_{PP})(dA/dE)\}\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots(6)$$

The equation (6) gives the effect of academic freedom on performance of faculty.

(1) The standard assumption under performance assessment of the faculty is that external intervention makes faculty into self-regulating individuals or it does not impact their academic freedom; i.e. $(dA/dE)=0$. Also, $B_{PE}=0$, under the standard model, that is there is no crowding out of motivation. Therefore, when $(dA/dE)=0$, the performance increases astronomically. However, there are required two qualifications. This might be true for individuals for whom the external motivation or rewards matters than the internal motivation. Two, the increase in performance might be only in terms of quantity and not quality.

(2) For the faculty, who are already intrinsically motivated and value their academic freedom, external intervention in terms of performance assessment reduces their academic freedom, i.e. $(dA/dE)<0$. This would happen in the case of faculty who are already intrinsically motivated to perform. The sign of dP^* and hence, (dP^*/dA) would depend upon the relative weights of B_{PE} and C_{PE}. For an already intrinsically motivated faculty, there would be crowding out of motivation because his academic freedom is adversely affected under the culture of performance. Though the disciplining effect would exist always, the crowding out effect would over power the disciplining effect, leading to a fall in the performance. That is $(dP^*/dA)>0$. For this faculty, the increase in academic freedom would lead to increase in performance, and reduction in academic freedom as a result of external intervention would cause a fall in performance.

What is interesting to note here, is that under both scenarios, the conception of academic freedom, which is instrumental in performance and nature of performance, is different for a faculty who is extrinsically motivated and those who are intrinsically motivated. **Academic freedom might mean different things for faculty belonging to different institutions**; it might be in tune with the mandate of the HEIs, where they

work or it might have been imposed upon them due to institutional anxiety to perform vis-à-vis other HEIs. Also, there would be a substantial difference between the qualities of output. This is because the objective of performance would differ. For the faculty who are extrinsically motivated, their objective would be to produce more and more output in order to maximize their rewards. For intrinsically motivated faculty, the increased academic freedom would translate into better quality output because their objective is not to earn rewards only.

3.3. Augmenting PAT: Bringing in the Foucauldian framework of subject formation

The principal agent theory could only provide a partial understanding to capture the mechanism of monitoring measures like PBAS. The model postulates that through altering incentives, the goals of principal and the agent could be aligned, or the behaviour of agent could be modified to reduce the risk of shirking away. But it doesn't throw light on how that could happen; how can behaviour be altered? And how the desired output be ensured? (or otherwise) For this it is important to look at many complexities which undergo, which may not render that simplicity to the PAT; that is incentives or rewards could not as easily translate into output or desired behaviour always. The other set of complexities include the role of social norms or culture, during formation of subject. The underlying mechanism could be explained with the help of Michel Foucault's formation of subject (and resistance). The study has drawn majorly on the work of Michel Foucault, in order to understand the implications of performance based assessment system, which represents a mode of surveillance, on the faculty life. Michel Foucault has used the notion of power, which has been utilized to understand the working of governance under neo-liberalism; much like Foucault's conception of self-regulating subjects, the present neo-liberal reform of performance assessment also aims at creating self-regulating individuals, by steering from a distance.

3.3.1. Performance based assessment system as a 'disciplinary power'

Michel Foucault has described in his work, *'Discipline and Punish'*, how the disciplinary mechanism changed over years, from that using force and repression, to the one of surveillance. The change witnessed a transformation in punishment from inflicting pain on the body, and executing in public vision, to having an impact on soul; on the thoughts, the will and the inclinations. It is the certainty of getting punished for an aberrant behaviour which came to have an impact on the souls (Foucault, 1975). Thus, the notion of power understood here in surveillance is not that of coercion but as one which creates certain behaviour. Surveillance is a way of disciplining individuals and could thus be called disciplinary power. This (disciplinary power) makes individuals responsible for themselves, by training them to behave in a certain way. It creates a knowledge about individuals by placing them on a field of comparison, a place of differentiation. The individuals are differentiated on the basis of an average rule, which is the minimum threshold to be achieved or the constraint of a conformity to be achieved. By measuring in quantitative terms it hierarchises the individuals in terms of their ability or nature. Thus, this power produces knowledge about the individuals; that is who they are, based on where they stand in the hierarchy. The surveillance therefore produces a normalizing judgment. This power of normalisation imposes homogenization but at the same time it individualises based on the gaps, measured levels and specialities (Foucault, 1975, p.183-185). Standardisation also creates the same kind of knowledge; it brings clear distinctions between those who are performing and those who are not (Roberts, 2007). This power is therefore not necessarily repressive but productive as it produces certain behaviour which are amenable to its exercise.

Disciplinary power produces able and willing bodies that support the power relations (Powers, 2007). The power does not exist at some central point but is present at micro-levels- in individuals and institutions. These individuals and institutions become the subjects of power. Therefore, the effect of discourse that the power produces is to create "subjects", (called constitution of "subjects" which in turn reproduce this power. The subjects are produced by modification of the relations between them (Foucault, 1980.). The human subjects produced through elements which correlate power and knowledge (Townley, 1993). Thus, power refers to the

relations that are created by the discourse to get legitimacy. And once these relations are created it renders a knowledge to the individuals and institutions about their identities as subjects.

Studying the notion of power entails a discussion on *Governmentality*. It is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of political rationality underpinning them. For Foucault government means "the conduct of conduct", which ranges from governing one's self to governing others. The practice of government spawns a multitude of techniques, ideas and schemes that attempt to influence the conduct of others (Doherty, 2007). It underlines how the modern sovereign state and modern autonomous individual co-determine each other's emergence. Here governing the people doesn't mean a way to force people but processes and techniques through which the self is constructed and modified by himself. This power of the state is not exercised against the wish of individuals but it empowers them or *responsibilises* the subjects forcing them to free decision making in fields of action. Thus, a specific form of reasoning (a rationality) is formed. Government is the regulation of conduct by the more or less rational application of technical means (Lemke, 2000). Governmentality, (thus), may be described as the deliberate effort, directed at subjects, to create governable subjects through various techniques developed to control, normalize and shape people's conduct. The operation of government can be found at many sites like the family, the workplace, the profession, etc. (Doherty, 2007; Fimyar, 2008). The technical means or technique is the discourse through which power relations are altered and subjectivisation happens and the government rationalizes its own existence. Peters (2004) calls this subjectivisation as playing games of truth, where the human subject constitutes itself by entering into such games (rules) and playing them to the best advantage and therefore, there is willingness to become a subject. (What is the truth is determined according to the current episteme). Thus, governmentality is a subtle form of governance which affects the mentality of individuals. It does not operate through surveillance but through motivation and by making people work for a goal (Engebresten, et al., 2012). The individuals and institutions are moulded into self-interested individuals, who regulate themselves through their own interests.

The individuals or the institutions would act in the most rational manner. It may be in conflict with ethical behaviour. Even a criminal who is committing crime after weighing the costs and benefits of the act, is rational (Becker, 1993). One such possible effect would be fabrication, as argued by Ball (2003). Fabrication is that version of organisation that is produced to become accountable (Ball, 2003). The Indian higher education policy emphasises upon quantifiable outputs. This might lead to, universities or faculty resorting to unethical means in order to deliver quantifiable outcomes. The culture of performativity takes place, where judgement and display of performances would be a means of control of individuals and institutions. These performances or displays are taken as measures of productivity. The individuals are made to think about themselves only (Ball, 2003). Here, what matters is the effectiveness and not necessarily the truthfulness.

The next section would discuss about how the present conception of autonomy and accountability in the higher education policy brings out certain effects, which sustain neo-liberalism is discussed in the section after that.

3.3.2 Principal-agent theory and subjectivisation

The principal agent theory postulates contracting between the principal and the agent as the solution to solving the problem of imperfect information between the principal and the agent, as also discussed above. If the agents' goals are in align with that of the principal's, the objective of contract would be met. When looked at from the point of view of Foucault's theory of subjectivisation, if the agent behaves rationally as per the larger discourse (and also the way the principal expects him to behave) then the discourse gets legitimacy. This could mean an alignment of the goal of the agent and the principal.

The contractual relationship becomes a success through subjectivisation. It is a form of regulation which supposedly provides freedom to the subjects to perform and achieve the desired results. Thus, the contract is not enforced by subjugating the subjects perforce but through self-regulation. Now, what are the various technologies used to subjectivise individuals- accountability and related policy recommendations. These come under the contract arrangement. So, subjectivisation is a way of enforcing

that contract. But this does not mean that subjectivisation, as conceptualized by Foucault, has been forced upon individuals.

However, often this collusion of goals of principal and agent may not meet the supposed objective of quality, even if the faculty is behaving rationally; despite being in tune with the larger discourse the objective of quality may not be attained. The outcome attained would be sub optimal or satisficing[24] (Simon, 1959, Williamson, 2002), which is attained under bounded rationality. There could be possibly two group of reasons for faculty attaining satisficing equilibrium and not optimal equilibrium: a) the type of individuals- they may impute their ability at a lower level, they might not be honest in terms of producing quality work or they may lack motivation, etc., and b) environment-like paucity of time at hand, limited resources provided by the university.

Regarding the first one, there could be an existence of imperfect information between the principal and the agent in the case of performance assessment; though there is complete information in terms of evidence produced against the work done, the information regarding the quality is lacking unless the university is conscious of the quality at the stage of interview. In such a case the objective of quality may not be attained. Second, to understand if subjectivisation is helping attain the larger goal of quality, it is also crucial to understand the role the university culture is playing; whether it is quality conscious or not. The university culture could make the subjectivisation easy or difficult. For instance, if the university is externally oriented, then it becomes easier because their vision would be aligned with the norms of the discourse where they are placed. Therefore, one needs to bring in the role of university where they are placed in understanding the behaviour of agents; how far the problem of imperfect information is addressed at the university level and also what is the mission of the university.

Another point to be noted here, which departs from the standard Principal Agent theory, is that the conflict between the principal and the agent may not always lead to poor quality outcome, in the case of performance assessment. The agent may

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[24] "… economic man is a satisficing animal whose problem solving is based on search activity to meet certain aspiration levels rather than a maximizing animal whose problem solving involves finding the best alternatives in terms of speci-fied criteria" (Simon, 1959:277)

resist or face conflict with respect to the larger discourse in academia, due to an adverse effect on their academic freedom, or a feeling of compulsion. Academic work is an outcome of creativity which thrives best when faculty is provided with the freedom. When that freedom is impinged upon, the faculty may feel demotivated to perform. Whereas it is not to rule out that the resistance could mean shirking away from work by some, but a resistance towards such a performance assessment could actually happen for the quality of work undertaken in universities. Here, one needs to understand the culture of the university; it could be such which supports the resistance because of it being a quality conscious institution.

The study would try to understand the power-knowledge relationship, as postulated by Foucault. Knowledge, as argued by Foucault (1972) refers to the practices possible by an individual within a discourse, the restraints they could have, the positions they could take to undertake an action or the field of coordination of statements (when one is analyzing a text or interview). Thus, it is a field where a subject is situated.

The relationship between power and knowledge could be understood as follows: When they act as per the discourse or speak within that discourse, which is the way power is exercised, they produce a knowledge about their own identity (as subjects of discourse), and when the subjects identify themselves (knowledge through their own practices) with the discourse, they reproduce power. This is how power and knowledge reproduce themselves.

Existence of power-knowledge relationship need not guarantee an improvement in quality, if the subjects compromise with processes which are not visible. Now, how the power-knowledge function or take shape depends in part also on the culture of the university. If the culture is such which strengthens this relationship then subjectivisation would be easier than in a culture where there might be conflicts in abiding by this relationship, within a particular discourse. In this light, Foucault (1978) discussed about the role of the discourse of institution. This could be called as the culture of a place or institution, which requires a deeper engagement to understand its role in formation of subject. Foucault's thesis has been extended using the arguments of Sporn (1996) and Ostrom (1998). Also, existence of this relationship need not guarantee quality work.

3.4. Bringing in the role of norms in subject formation

The chapter 2 has highlighted the neo-liberal nature of growing accountability requirements, as also of PBAS. It requires and assumes a certain rational way of human behaviour for the policy to be effective.

The neoclassical framework looks at individual as atomized being and devoid of any social influence, possible through social relations. However, in a university there are various dynamics which come into play, which refute the neoclassical theory as a way to understand the institutions and individual behaviour in those institutions. The effects of NPM are dependent on the contexts, and thus the way in which individuals respond to it differ (Lucas, 2014). Hodgson (1998) contrasts the neoclassical framework for understanding human behaviour with institutional analysis. The neoclassical economics draws on universal framework of rational choice and behaviour. But human behaviour cannot be understood at an abstract level and demands to be moved to concrete analysis, relying upon psychological, sociological and other research of individual behaviour, which calls for using the lens of institutional economics. The institutionalist approach combines the general ideas regarding human agency and institutions with specific social institutions and conditions concerning norms, valuations, availability of information (Hodgson, 1998) etc. The branch of neoclassical theory which developed in the 1990s, draws on neoclassicism, but with certain assumption which are different from theb latter. The understanding of neo-classical theory of human beings as rational utility maximisers is inadequate. The NIE understands that individuals are bounded-rational and suffer from information asymmetry, and that institutions function also on certain informal norm or culture, which go into shaping the individual behaviour. One branch of NIE which addresses the problem of information asymmetry is the agency theory, where the information gap between the principal and the agent is sought to be addressed by way of drawing contract based on either behaviour or on output. Thus, the key target of achieving efficiency in performance as sought under NPM needs to be looked at through the lens of NIE, particularly through agency theory, as would be discussed in the chapter below.

It is often the non-market social interactions determine the individual and collective behaviour. These non-market social interactions are called as norms and the

social structure (Som, 2014). There is a possibility of cooperative behaviour/ coordinated action amongst the faculty, rather than competition. It needs a mention here that cheating does give higher pay off to players if others cooperate because he obtains surplus without incurring any cost of contribution and also, he does better by cheating when others too are cheating because he saves the cost of contributing to the output. Nevertheless, people also engage in cooperative behaviour when such a behaviour is a norm (Posner, 2010; Som, 2014). Ostrom (2005) calls culture (of a place) as also a norm. What kind of signals do the individuals emanate also depends upon the norms (Posner, 2010). Signals here refer to the information pertaining to themselves that they provide to the other agents. In other words, Posner's and Ostrom's arguments mean that in the context of university means that the actions or the strategies that the faculty would undertake would depend upon the culture of that university; if the culture is conscious towards the quality, the actions would also be concomitant to that and if the university is not conscious of quality, the faculty would not really be motivated to produce good quality work.

Ostrom (1998) argued that reciprocity is often a norm because there is uncertainty regarding the duration of the situation[25] or there are some 'irrational' players who would reciprocate cooperation with cooperation. Therefore, if someone uses reciprocity 'irrationally' then others could 'rationally' choose to cooperate. However, the problem is not as simple as it seems. The contract arrangement does not always lead to mitigating the problem of shirking or moral hazard completely. Also, what is important in higher education, is not just producing output in the form of publications, teaching hours or time spent in co-curricular activities but ensuring quality in these outputs, failing which the output shall only be sub-optimal. As also argued by Ostrom (1998), there would be cooperation but not 100 per cent cooperation. Outcome would therefore be better than the non-cooperative decision making by both the players, but suboptimal. And as argued by Gornitzka et al. (2004)[26], it is not possible to reduce the information asymmetry to zero because the institutions (or faculty in this case) will always know more about their functioning and quality than the state authorities.

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[25] If the player knows that they would not play in the next period then might defect in the present period and increase their pay-offs. But if the player knows that in the next period also they might ne playing the game, then they would tend to cooperate in the present period.
[26] As cited in Lane & Kivitso(2008)

At the same time, one could not rule out that there exist certain individuals who fail to learn reciprocity or may fail to use the same norms[27] in every situation. Some may be unscrupulous and clever enough to lure others into the situation (or game) and then defect on them. Reciprocity might also mean that individual hides his intentions and continues to move forward to gain power. Therefore, in any group which consists only of individuals who follow reciprocity, it would be difficult to detect and punish cheaters (Ostrom, 1998).

Using the analogy of Ostrom (1998), it could be said that API/NAAC are the first-generation models of rational choice because it assumes that individuals are maximisers and maximize their prestige or monetary incentives and that strong competition eliminates players who do not maximize immediate external values. One has to however, understand the implications/ decision-making process under the present governance reform using the second-generation models of rationality. Under the second-generation models, the individuals tend to learn about the heuristics that approach best response strategies. In addition to learning heuristics, the individuals learn to use norms and rules. The meaning of norm is that individual attaches an internal valuation (positive or negative) to taking particular types of actions. These norms are not given but acquired through learning and hence, individuals within a single culture may respond differently to the same situation. Rules means that there exists a shared understanding amongst a group of individuals that certain actions must, must not or may be undertaken and those who do not confirm would be punished. Rules are the artefacts related to particular actions in specific situations. Rules can enhance reciprocity by specifying/ making clear mutual commitments.

While Elinor Ostrom has emphasised on the role of learning and reciprocity, within an organisation, in human response, the analysis of Sporn (1996), as discussed already in Chapter-2, looks at the orientation and strength of the university. The orientation can be depicted by the leadership, mission and vision of the university, and strength (or lack of it0 depends on the strength collective voice in the university. These two strands are crucial to understand the role of culture in subject-formation.

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[27] The meaning of norm is that individual attaches an internal valuation (positive or negative) to taking particular types of actions. These norms are not given, but acquired through learning and hence, individuals withing a single cultue may respond differently to the same situation.

3.5. Accounting for information asymmetry

The standard PAT assumes a rational behaviour from an agent. The rational behaviour speaks nothing of the ethics or abilities of agents. Becker (1993) argued that an unethical activity might as well be rational because the individual weighs the expected costs and expected benefits of the actions (crime) that they undertake. Similarly, the agents taking actions according to their own assessment of their abilities is also rational.

While an agent might produce work as required by the policy, the actions might not produce quality work because their type and thus their objectives were not known.

In other words, while assessing or registering their performance, the agents produce evidence of the work they have done. Yet, there is an information asymmetry regarding the type of agent that one is; Is the agent competent or not? Is the agent honest with their work or not? These various types determine the actions an agent would take to achieve those evidences.

The lack of information regarding the type of agent leads to the problem of moral hazard (Rasmusen, 2000). Moral Hazard is defined as a rational economic behaviour, 'producing loss-producing propensities of the individual assured' (Pauly, 1968, p. 535). In simple terms moral hazard refers to the problem of post-contractual actions, which mat deviate from the actions expected in the contract. It arises because there is not enough information regarding the risk-taking ability of an agent.

The problem of lack of information regarding the type of faculty, and thus their objectives could lead to emergence of corrupt practices in the universities. Corruption in education is not necessarily around money; it also includes certain subtle forms of corruption like deviation from the norms or code of conduct expected from them, which is called as professional misconduct. Professional misconduct is understood as a deviation from the code of conduct of faculty (Braxton & Bayer, 1999[28]; Lyken-Segosebe, Braxton, Hutchens & Harris, 2018). The code of conduct of faculty expects them to follow the formal rules of the university and UGC, and also to

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[28] As cited in Lyken-Segosebe, Braxton, Hutchens & Harris (2018)

strive towards working for excellence, the very objective of any accountability measure. Any deviation from this could be touted as a corrupt practice in education. As discussed earlier under such a situation, the higher education system achieves only satisficing equilibrium. It also gives rise to a culture of Performativity. Performativity refers to the technology of self-regulation, aimed at producing outputs which can be measured (Ball, 2003). It emerges due to a fixation with the measurable output as quality indicators (The implications of this are studied in details in Chapter-7).

The behavioural effects within an organization are difficult to be captured by price-theory. When organizations (or HEIs in the present context) are run as if it were a set of markets, it means that employees there are rewarded according to their marginal productivity and extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivation of the agents is relied upon by the principal, to get the task accomplished. Extrinsically motivated coordination in firms is achieved by linking employees' monetary motives to the goals of the firm. That is pay for performance. It is assumed that opportunism is a strong kind of extrinsic motivation (Osterloh & Frey, 2000).

But this has severe implications on internal motivation of a faculty, which is most crucial for creativity. Motivation is intrinsic if an activity is undertaken for one's immediate need satisfaction and is valued for its own sake (Osterloh & Frey, 2000, p. 539). Although measuring this intrinsic motivation is not the purpose of the study, but it plays a major role in having output produced by the agents who are involved in creative work like painting or like research. Frey (1993, 1994) conjectures that the external intervention by a principal impacts the motivation of the agent(s). It produces two kinds of countervailing effects: a) the incentive or disciplining effect of the reward or the regulation or b) the crowding out effect, crowding out the intrinsic motivation. Whereas the former may lead to greater intensity of activity, the latter reduces the activity in question. Thus, the principal either provides incentives to the agent or punishes them for shirking.

Simon (1978) argues that as one moves away from the price theory, one undertakes a qualitative analysis, which looks at procedural rationality. In other words, how the agent takes the decision. His decision-making is strongly influenced by the environment as they perceive it and the process of learning overtime. And these environmental factors are not only uncertain but how the agent perceives it also

differs. Also, the capabilities of individuals also influence such a decision making (Simon, 1959). The personal attributes, which are linked with personal objectives or aspirations of the individuals are not revealed to the State.

Simon (1978) however, criticizes much of the economic theory at the same time, postulating that there are limits on the ability of the economic actor to decide what behaviour is optimal for them. But under given circumstances, the actor can best decide what is optimal for them. In that way, every actor acts 'rationally'. And hence, one can construct different games, apart from the conventional non-cooperative game to understand various possibility of actions that agents can take under the given governance reforms. One example is game theory, which contrary to what Simon (1978) argues, can be used to understand the procedural rationality of the player because every action that a player takes is affected by the environment as well as learning process (as in the dynamic or sequential games). Having understood that the external intervention by providing rewards or punishment may not always lead to better performance, it would be vital to look at how the faculty would behave given the various monitoring mechanisms (either by rewards or punishment). (It is discussed in details in Chapter-7).

3.6. Construction and deconstruction of neo-liberal academic identity: Formation of self

The mainstream economics identifies every man as *homo economicus*, who are rational and are self-interested. The problem they are faced with is to achieve optimal allocation of resources to alternative ends. Thus, mainstream economics assumes that every economic actor is rational, and competition is a means of survival for such rational being (Simon, 1959). The rational being is considered self-centred who maximises their own utility. The present neo-liberal accountability seeks to transform the academic identity akin to that of a *homo economicus*, who strategises and takes rational action. It changes not only what the academics do, but also what they think of themselves (Harris, 2005; Ball, 2010). Instrumental and economic values are given more significance than the educational values, in defining an academic (Harris, 2005). For instance, in recent times, it is research which defines the academic identity, and thus alters the relationship between teaching and research (Harris, 2005).

Foucault (2008) understands a *homo economicus* man as the subject of neo-liberalism. He argues that *homo economicus* is someone who accepts reality. And rational conduct is the one which is sensitive to the modifications in the environment. These responses to the variables of environment are the object of economic analysis. Thus, it can be said that *homo economicus* is someone who can be governed. At the same time, by the very ideology of neo-liberalism this individual *laisssez-faire*-s, in that they function without any interference from the government; they are let alone. What makes this man a governed individual therefore? The process of governing this neo-liberal *homo economicus* is, therefore, governing them from a distance, through their own will, or interest. If an individual gets in contract with the State, it is not due to force that they will comply with the contract, but because of their own interest that they would remain in that contract; and if the interest disappears then nothing could oblige them to stick to the contract. The *homo economicus* man is, therefore, a subject of interest (p.269-274). Individuals can only be governed from a distance by their own self- interest than coercion (Cannizzo, 2015), "through the love of not neo-liberalism, but through a love of what neo-liberalism puts at risk" (Bansel & Davies, 2010)[29] . Using this analogy for PBAS, it can be seen that those who would become a subject of this neo-liberal discourse would be guided by their own interests, of recruitment or promotion, rather than any obligation. If it was not for their interests, they would have snapped the contract and chosen not to abide by the regulation.

The individuals through their own interest construct themselves. The self-evaluation and self-reflection are the techniques through they develop an idea about themselves (Cannizzo, 2015). These self-evaluation and self-reflection techniques help them create a self-knowledge. They document their achievements, provide an evidence of their work, and generate a knowledge about their own selves (Cannizzo, 2015). These practices focus on performativity of academics, and thus forming a technique of self-formation. The performativity is found to be desirable as well as logical, and it is effective when individuals also want for themselves what is wanted from them (Ball & Olmedo, 2013). In the quest of performativity, they say, that the individuals rethink their relationships with not only themselves but others. Ball & Olmedo (2013) argue that this new kind of individual is formed through the logic of

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[29] As cited in Cannizzo (2015)

competition. The individual, by doing the above, become subject to normalisation (Batters, 2011), which draws a distinction between what is normal and what is not.

In other words, this neo-liberal academic identity is constructed by certain logic of self-interest, self-evaluation, reflection on oneself, self-knowledge. This logic is internalised by the individuals in their own activities and also with others. To bring in the analogy of Foucault, we can say that it requires a certain type of power relations. This being strategises their actions in accordance with the logic of neo-liberalism.

Chiapello & Fairclough (2002) here add an important distinction between what one does and what one is, as a subject of discourse. They argue that any discourse represent imaginaries-that is one could be or should be done. These imaginaries are reflected in social relations. The discourse might be enacted the way it is expected, but when such imaginaries become inculcated are the new identities formed. And it might be possible that a discourse is enacted but not inculcated or owned by the subjects. The subjects may resist becoming what they perform (Davies & Peterson, 2005).

But the individual is not formed as such in isolation. The actions of an individual are often constrained by time, income, calculating capacities, limited resources and also the opportunity available in the economy (Becker, 1993). Both, the individual beliefs as well as institutional culture and positioning have a role to play in constructing a neo-liberal academic identity (Harris, 2005). And this is where understanding the culture, whether it is subjectivising or not, becomes important (The discussion on culture has been done earlier).

3.6.1. Resistance

One might cast doubt as to how the individuals become the subjects of the discourse passively, without exercising their agency. The individuals develop, therefore, undertake 'a critique' of themselves, which is a crucial element in formation of self. This critical attitude is one of the types of counter-conduct (Foucault, 1978)[30]. This critical attitude arises a will "to not be governed like that" (Lorenzi, 2016, p.8), and

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[30] As cited in Lorenzi (2016)

thus arises resistance. When one examines or introspects the obviousness of practices like that, they develop a certain self, and resist (the logic of) performativity (Ball & Olmedo, 2013). The individuals begin to develop an understanding of existence which is different from that which is expected 'as usual' (Ball & Olmedo, 2013).

Lucas (2014) argues that the contexts within which an individual is placed differ, leading to possibility of resistance and challenges to the NPM. The managerial practices might lead to formation of a subject or a 'managed' faculty, however, the resistance to such changes might thwart their effectiveness (Ainley & Bailey, 1997[31]; Trowler, 1998). The resistance occurs simultaneously with the process of subject formation. The relative weight of the two cannot be commented upon for certain, however. In this context, Foucault (1980)[32] says:

> But once power produces this effect, there inevitably emerge responding claims and affirmations, those of one's body against power, of health against economic system, of pleasure against moral norms of sexuality, marriage, decency. Suddenly what had made power strong becomes used to attack it. Power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to the same body, finds itself exposed to the counter attack in the same body…But the impression that power weakens or vacillates here is mistaken. Power can retreat here…and so the battle continues (p.56)

Greenhalgh (2015) argued that the contemporary governance mechanism has placed competing demands on the faculty like student satisfaction, getting business for the school and maintaining academic standard had put them under tensions. Whereas neo-liberal logic expects an individual to channelise their motivation to work towards achieving these ends, these tensions might lead to a conflict inside of them.

One kind of resistance, albeit subtle, to the corporate kind of culture in universities is the infusion of the Slow movement in universities (Berg & Seeber, 2106). It calls for slowing down in the fast-paced academic world, with an emphasis on letting the research take its time to ripen, fostering community relationship while undertaking scholarship in place of competition, accepting that research takes time

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[31] As cited in Deem (1998)
[32] From power/knowledge

and is not a mechanism, thinking about the problem vital from a long term perspective than just focusing on short term accountability compliance, etc. This is not to say that it needs to be understood as a contrast to being fast or speed but to be understood as a phenomenon bringing due attention to one's work and collegiality with peers (Berg & Seeber, 2016). In a study conducted by Huisman and Currie (2004) on the effectiveness of accountability measures, a majority of faculty members across universities reported no effect on quality improvement and suggested an alternative as having a culture where informal procedures could be a part of university culture. There was an opposition to work load quantifiable indicators. Berg and Seeber (2016) conjectured that pockets of resistance (to neoliberalism) could also be found in subcultures of collegiality and togetherness within departments.

Ball & Olmedo (2013) have discussed other kinds of resistances amongst school and higher education teachers. Irresponsibility could also be a form of resistance, where one does not perform or mould themselves as per the need of the market. It can also be resistance to that which works and categorises the individual as successful. Lucas (2014) also undertook a study of resistance towards quality assurance mechanism in higher education in UK. They found resistance due to organised protests or public demonstration against the NPM.

As posited by Kumar (2016), dissent is crucial in a university; it could lead to generation of new socially relevant knowledge. This is particularly true when the State regulations curb the very academic freedom of the faculty and change the very democratic nature of interaction in the universities. Dissent, on the other hand, can support the culture of questioning and thinking, a culture of academic freedom, a democratic decision-making in the universities. And research and learning, which are creative pursuits, cannot flourish without academic freedom.

Another dimension of resistance comes when even when a subject is performing or enacting as per the neo-liberal discourse but they do not inculcate the practices within themselves; there is a difference between what they do and what they are (Chiapello & Fairclough, 2002; Davies & Peterson, 2005). That it happens when the individuals do not take up neoliberalism as their own but as law. They might be practising it, even when they find it undesirable or irrelevant (Davies & Peterson, 2005).

Thus, resistance requires an alteration in one's understanding of self, which requires them to work constantly on themselves (Ball & Olmedo, 2013), through thinking critically. This process is called as self-formation too, albeit the self is different from what is expected.

This resistance is often forestalled when the need for survival is made the objective or the fear of failure is there. In such a scenario competition and individualism, at the cost of collegiality, becomes a means for survival (Davies & Peterson, 2005). When the subjects get enmeshed in the practices of discourse, the resistance often reduces.

3.7. Research gaps

The study is largely premised on PBAS, as mentioned in Chapter-1. The central problem of the study is to understand the way this accountability mechanism takes an effect in the life of faculty. The first step to understanding the policy effect is to understand the policy, its larger beliefs and assumptions. It is from these larger beliefs and assumptions that the expected behaviour from the faculty can be culled out. Therefore, it requires taking a step back to analyse the policy, and its effects.

1. There has been literature which talks of education policy analysis using different approaches-First is the Foucault's Critical Discourse Analysis and subjectivisation- Ball (1993a, 1993b, 2003, 2011, 2015), Peters (2001), Marginson (1997), Mollis & Marginson (2002), Engebresten, et al. (2012), Lingard & Rizvi (2009). Second uses Economic Analysis (Massy (2004), Jongbloed (2004), Dill & Soo (2004), Chattopadhyay (2012), Chattopadhyay (2015) and Chattopadhyay & Sharma (2018)). Third is focused on descriptive analysis of implications of various policy measures, raising certain issues like recommendation of various committees over time, problems associated with PBAS, accountability measures in Indian higher education policy, excellence and mediocrity in education, or autonomy of the state governments with respect to policy formulation ((Shah (2005), Das & Chattopadhyay (2014), Bhushan (2015), Sujatha (2015), Mathew (2016), Thorat (2016), Chandra (2017)). All the three analyses have detached themselves of the other. For instance, the critical discourse analysis does not delve upon the possible strategies or effects through power relation, which go into

formation of subject, that would ensue. As discussed already in the introduction chapter accountability seeks to bring in efficiency, effectiveness and productivity in the higher education system. The descriptive analysis of policy also understands various policy recommendations over time, and the lacunae in their efficacy. The economic analysis of policy-strand analyses policy using these concepts of efficiency and their implications on quality. What is to be noted is that the behaviour of a *homo economicus* would be centred around these kinds of efficient, effective and productive strategies. Combining these two threads can also help to have a better understanding of why and how a policy aiming to attain quality is a success and why it is not, which is often found to be missing in the third strand.

2. Another kind of literature talks about the impact of New Public Management Reform on various aspects of universities/ faculty life, including their academic freedom (Anderson & Murray (1971), Volkwein (1986, 1989), Ball (1993a, 2003, 2005), Marginson (1997a, 1997b, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), Deem (1998), Powell and Smith (1998), Mollis & Marginson (2002), Harris (2005), Hoetch (2006), Bennich-Bjorkman (2007), Roberts (2007), Santiago & Carlvahlo (2008), Dill (2014), Berg & Seeber (2016)),

With respect to studying the implications of policy reforms on academics, even on their academic freedom, there has been no deeper engagement to study the dynamics of those responses by faculty or universities to the reforms. Do the responses occur according to the will of the faculty or university, or is there any resistance to their responses, or is there any difference between their 'doing' and 'becoming' the subject of policy? While Ball & Olmedo (2013) and Lucas (2014) have discussed about resistance amongst school and higher education teachers in UK, they have not talked about questions like motivation or lack of it, or alternative to the present system. The resistance within the power relations needs elaboration.

Marginson (1997) undertook an empirical study looking at power relations in Australian higher education. However, the study was restricted to only looking at impact on university managers and their strategies in the wake of neo-liberal reform. The perception and strategy of faculty, who form the core of the university and are impacted closely by policy needs to considered and thus, their views and struggles or motivation on ground need to be captured. Another study by Mollis & Marginson

(2002) use Foucault's framework to look at the implications of performance assessment on academic independence. They looked at the government-university relation and how it impinged on autonomy. But, as also highlighted by them, the study did not delve deeper into other social relations in the higher education system which might get affected as a result.

Apart from subjectivisation and resistance, the other strand of possibility of unethical practices of subjects has not been touched upon. The policy assumes a standard way of response from everyone, without any due consideration to their differing contexts, their types and objectives. These three dynamics need to be understood together to have a nuanced understanding of the response of faculty and whether the objective of excellence or minimum standards could be achieved.

The present study is contextualised in PBAS, which was instituted in 2010, followed by certain amendments. Since its inception, there has been no empirical study on PBAS. As mentioned above, it also requires taking a step back and understanding the larger discourse of policy. For that purpose, the present study would amalgamate the three methods, and develop a new way of looking at policy, which has not been done either internationally and nationally. The impact of PBAS would be undertaken using all the three concepts of subjectivisation, resistance, corrupt practices together, to understand the formation of self, which has not been done before for understanding policy implication at higher education level.

Chapter 4: Research design: Methodology and Method

4.1 Introduction: Major world views

Preparing a research design involves an amalgamation of philosophical underpinnings of the study, the strategies to make enquiries and the concomitant methods of doing research (Creswell, 2009). The philosophical ideas behind designing a research consist of the world views which suit the objective of the research and the ensuing questions which the researcher seeks to address. It is from these questions that method of research design is implicated, which include the strategies for inquiry. These strategies consist of understanding what kind of data is required, and the sampling method thus suitable, to address the objectives and research questions, the tools that would be thus used to collect that data, and then the mode of data analysis and interpretation. Traditionally, there have been generally two broad worldviews, to look at a particular research problem: positivism and post-positivism[33] (Baronov, 2004; Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007[34]). The positivist view upholds that all knowledge can be derived from universal laws, by looking at the relationships and regularities amongst selected factors. In contrast, post positivism was marked by a deviation from regularities governing the determination of knowledge, in particular when it concerns problems involving human behaviour. This school of thought brings in the role of 'context' (Cohen, et al., 2007), making the truth of the matter under investigation as something 'not absolute', The social context plays a major role in how human beings makes sense of their world. The latter stance was maintained by the pessimists under the post positivist paradigm. But more recently, has emerged a new worldview called 'pragmatism', which aims at using all approaches available, whether those belonging to positivist or anti-positivist paradigm, to understand a problem (Creswell, 2009). It is not committed to any one worldview and thus seeks to combine or mix the methods of both the world views, in order to answer the research

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[33] There are other two worldviews in addition to these: critical theory and constructivist. Under critical theory the knowledge, being a function of ideology, works for social transformation. Constructivists argue that individuals make their own subjective meanings of their experiences (Creswell, 2009). Although these have been distinctly defined, but they can be subsumed under the phase marked by the post-positivism period,

[34] They use the term anti-positivism as an anti-thesis to positivism. This anti-positivism would include only the pessimist post-positivist, the school of thought as explicated in Baronov (2004), which challenged the regularity of positivist by bringing in the role of context in determining knowledge.

questions. This marked an end of dichotomy between positivism and post positivism and sought to look at the continuum which existed between the two.

The worldview or philosophy, chosen from above, would determine how the objectives would be looked at. And, from these world views would emerge different research designs. This chapter would make use of this fundamental ground mentioned above, looking at the rationale of study and determine the research design for the present study.

The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 would provide the rationale of the study. Section 4.3 discusses about the research objectives and research questions. The gaps, as existing in literature, with respect to methodology and method is briefly highlighted in section 4.4. The next section (Section 4.5) would talk about the ensuing methodology, which is mixed methods, followed by method in section 4.6. The last section, 4.7 would talk about reliability and validity of results.

4.2 Rationale of the study

Accountability from the faculty or the university has been used as a tool in the Indian higher education policy, with the supposed objective of ensuring quality output from them or at least maintaining minimum standards of work performed by them. But the meaning and the way of ensuing accountability has altered over time. Whereas the early post-independent period emphasised on accountability to the society, the policy prescriptions during the more recent period, particularly post 2010 understand accountability as requiring measured output from the faculty, in research, teaching or other extra-curricular or administrative activities, putting a greater emphasis on documentation of work. This is not to say that documentation or measurement of work did not exist earlier; the universities, and thus the faculty, have always been expected to produce their annual reports, wherein the output of each faculty has been documented. But more recently, there are two major changes introduced. One, it has become mandatory, which has as a result led to increased intensity of documentation of work. Two, with the performance assessment scheme introduced by the State in 2010 as a self-assessment (self-regulatory) tool, the behaviour of the faculty is more directly/immediately implicated, whereas in the earlier times it may not have had that immediate an impact on the faculty behaviour and also some did not get impacted, by

either producing and (or documenting) less or not producing and (or documenting) at all.

The policy documents over time have showcased the need to make the universities accountable, with PBAS having a direct implication on faculty work, in order to ensure the quality of work performed. This has led to an emphasis on developing performance indicators, instituting quality assurance cells in universities, disbursing funds on the basis of performance of universities. The performance assessment of faculty is one of the tools of new public management, which seeks to alter the very ways in which the faculty in universities work. It could be seen as a contract between the principal, (here, the State) and the agent (here, the faculty), where the former seeks accountability from the latter to avoid any possible shirking. Thus, PBAS could be understood as a tool or technology used by the State in order to extract accountability from faculty, making them responsible towards their work. The performance assessment regime, aims at making faculty self-regulating, who are rendered themselves responsible for their performance. The State is said to be controlling their actions by steering from a distance. (as has already been discussed in chapter 2 on literature review).

However, it is not as straight as it appears on the surface; there are certain dynamics and complexities which need to be studied in order to ascertain if the greater objective of quality or at least maintaining minimum standards would be met.

To begin with, the policy seeks to create individuals and institutions that would behave in a manner legitimating the existing discourse in the policy. A certain kind of behaviour is expected of them; the present neo-liberal discourse seeks to create rational faculty who would all aim at accumulating their scores. However, this rational behaviour may have certain qualifications which need to addressed, if one is to understand its implications on quality. First, every faculty is placed under different contexts: their designation and thus the career graph might differ, different disciplines might place different constraints and demands on faculty or the universities where they are places might have a particular cultural context. These contexts along with demand to comply with performance assessment might have a different impact on the academic freedom on the faculty, which is the most essential ingredient in engaging in quality creative works. These contexts, in addition to other environmental factors, also

inform their autonomy in general and also how PBAS is affecting their academic freedom. A lack of motivation or academic freedom directly affects creative works and thus their quality. Every accountability measure subtly alters the behaviour of faculty as well the university as a whole. It has implications on the very objectives that various institutions, including the State, seek to achieve in the first place. Thus, there emerges an internalisation of various norms in some places, the perception of faculty changes, the strategy of university and the faculty may also change. This is not to say that the changes happen without any resistance. There might be traces of resistance where the academic freedom of the faculty gets compromised. But this is true of only the faculty who do not have short-term objectives of maximising points. Another problem worth considering is that while the performance assessment has been imposed on all the faculty, the disciplinary differences of the ease/difficulty of producing the same output has not been factored in. This how it impacts their academic freedom, etc. their motivation to work, stress and frustration differ, which may lead to a difference in how faculty perceive of the performance assessment exercise, ultimately impacting the quality of their output. In addition to this, due to the pressure to perform, many faculty resort to unethical practices of only producing output in numbers.

Second, and what is often ignored is that an unethical action/ manipulative action may also be called rational, which would have adverse consequences on the quality of output. This could happen due to lack of information asymmetry with the State about the type of faculty and thus ensuing actions undertaken by them (all the information which the State or the authorities have is the output produced by the faculty), which gives rise to possibility of corrupt practices, leading to a possible fall in the quality of output, on an average.

Third, some faculty are aware of their ability or may impute their ability at a lower level due to self-doubt and choose to aspire accordingly. Many faculty could therefore choose to produce a large quantum of moderate quality work. This could also adversely affect the quality, the very purpose for which the performance assessment regime has been installed in the first place.

Fourth, the circumstances or resources at hand are such that the faculty perforce produce not good quality output but adjust for moderate quality output.

Fifth, the performance assessment regime appears to be assuming two broad conjectures. One, that the faculty would work with the fear of being punished, which in the present context is indirect by way of their exclusion from the success ladder. A poorly designed performance assessment might lead to a behaviour amongst faculty where they tend to avoid risks or insufficient incentives to the faculty and that causes them to under-invest in the quality of work that they perform (Dill & Soo, 2004) Two, that the faculty would get extrinsically motivated by the need to score points and thereby perform. The former case also is subsumed under the rational behaviour, as discussed in the previous paragraph. This could lead to various possibilities like producing knowledge which is more applicable in nature, reproducible and easier, needing less time to be invested. In the context of PBAS, this could lead to faculty substituting amongst the research category. They may tend to behave as per their ability, which they might have imputed at a lower level and thus quality might suffer. In case of latter, the question of motivation comes into picture. It needs to be noted that academic work is creative in nature and creativity flourishes only under academic freedom. As discussed in chapter 2 on literature review, for academic freedom to take its roots, there have to be certain enabling conditions like time and resources. The tying up of faculty work under a given time frame might lead to experience of time crunch for some faculty. Similarly, when they do not have enough resources at hand, they might feel constrained to produce output, particularly in research category. When the faculty do not enjoy academic freedom due to such circumstantial constraints, then it directly impacts their motivation to perform and hence quality work.

4.3. Research objectives and research questions

Given the above discussion, the objectives and the ensuing research questions which the study would try to address could be delineated as following:

1. **To critically look at the discourse of accountability in Indian higher education policy**

   1.1. How has accountability been conceptualised in the policy documents over years?

- What is the overarching rule governing the statements in the policy documents? What is the 'truth' which proscribes or delimits individual behaviour?

- How has the scope of accountability been defined?

1.2. What are the effects of policy that could ensue?

1.3. Can there arise resistance to these expected effects?

2) **To look at the implications of neo-liberal performance assessment on the faculty behaviour and their academic freedom**

2.1. How do faculty perceive and experience performance assessment exercise under the present neo-liberal regime?

2.2. How do the faculty negotiate between accountability and academic freedom?

2.3. How do faculty relate with other individuals and institutions in order to perform?

2.4. How do the faculty understand their rational actions and its relationship with ethical practices?

2.5. Does there arise a possibility of resistance?

3) **To understand the implication of neo-liberal rational behaviour on quality work**

3.1. Does performance assessment of faculty translate into quality work?

- How can the performance assessment regime lead the percolation of culture of performativity in faculty life and impact quality of work?

- How does possibility of moral hazard arise in faculty work?

3.2. What role could social norms play in addressing corrupt practices in education?

To elaborate, the study would first try to understand how accountability has been conceptualised in the neo-liberal discourse, and its implications for academic freedom of faculty and quality work. This objective would address the kind of behaviour and relationships expected in the policy to legitimate the present discourse. In ensuring the existence of such relationships by the policy, it remains to be seen if the institutions and the institutions would be able to exercise their academic freedom,

which is a prerequisite for quality work. Having understood the rational behaviour and relationships expected, the second objective is to understand how the faculty are complying in the real life situation with such a regulation and thereby unravelling its impact on their academic freedom, if any. It aims to understand how they are reorganising (or not) their daily lives, and if they are facing any conflict with regard to that. Going further, also an attempt would be made to unravel the rational actions of the faculty, as expected under neo-liberal discourse. This problem emanates from the presence of possible information asymmetry between the State and the faculty regarding the type of faculty, which gives rise to the problem of moral hazard or post-contract adverse selection (will be discussed in a later chapter). Whereas some may choose to resort to mal practices, some deliberately choose to perform a relatively moderate quality work, given their ability. The objective is pursued to understand how the faculty actually perceives the present discourse and how they are behaving in their respective universities. The perception and strategies would help understand if they have indeed been subjectivised, by looking at their thought process and actions and if those are legitimating the discourse. The performance assessment regime does not account for the differences between the disciplines, the university culture, designation differences of the faculty. The contextual differences affect their motivation to perform their tasks and hence quality of work. In addition to that, the possibility of resistance would be captured by looking at if the faculty would want to have an alternative to the present system. Having understood the link between the policy prescriptions and the behaviour of the faculty on ground, particularly in the context of API, the next and the last objective would seek to present hypothetical models, depicting the possible faculty behaviour under different circumstances, also highlighting the possibility of moral hazard. The rationale for this objective also arises due to the gap left in the above objective in terms of assessing moral hazard problem; it might be difficult to comment on the quality work or the shirking away of work by then faculty through interactions with them or also through their documented work. Another and more important point which provides justification for this objective is that the UGC regulation aimed at standardisation of assessment may not be a panacea to maintaining minimum standards of work. Every faculty is different and would take actions commensurate with their 'type'. This could lead to a compromise on quality work as well in some situations. Because it is not possible to gauge the faculty type through interactions, this objective would provide with certain models for different

type of faculty depicting their respective strategies and optimal outcomes. This portion of the study would build hypothetical models depicting the possibility of moral hazard and also, the different strategy of the faculty under their different contexts, like discipline, or position in their career graph. In addition to this, the hypothetical situation of alternative proposed, if any, would be created. Thus, studying accountability of faculty in the context of higher education essentially entails probing deeper into the above discussed dynamics.

4.4. Methodology: Pragmatism

The above discussion seeks to answer the research questions by an in-depth investigation of issue at hand; by bringing in the role of context in understanding not only the policy but also the faculty life. To elaborate, the present study seeks to address the question of accountability and how it is impacting the academic freedom of the faculty. Accountability here is in terms of complying with PBAS. The faculty members are social individuals, situated within a particular social context like the nature of their universities, the disciplines that they teach, the career paths they are at, etc. At the same time, the academic profession is guided by creativity, which thrives majorly on the intrinsic motivation; the level of motivation as well as factors affecting their motivation might differ amongst faculty. Because it is difficult to draw generalizations, a large part of the study would make use of qualitative paradigm of research. But what should be noted here, is that the policy documents or the regulations seeking accountability from the university/ faculty are premised on the principle of standardization, using the same yardstick to measure the performance of these different individuals. The starting point would be therefore to look the policy documents and try to understand the generalizations which are expected in the faculty behaviour. The implications of that on faculty behaviour on the ground would then be assessed. The subsequent part of the study would try address the gaps left out in the qualitative portion, that is the implications of an overall context on the academic freedom or motivation of faculty, while complying with PBAS, as well as highlighting the general possibilities of moral hazard in the wake of information asymmetry, by using the objectivism as paradigm and come up with possibilities/ hypothesis which could be true in general and could be tested later. It could be said that the study uses a pragmatism paradigm to address the problem.

To sum up, it could be said that the study would resort to part qualitative and part quantitative paradigm in order to understand the implications of accountability on academic freedom and motivation. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the study could be said to be opting for a 'Pragmatist' world view. The paradigm is also called as mixed methods research. The section below would throw greater light on how the quantitative and qualitative methods have been integrated here.

4.5 Mixed Methods and analysis- Dimensions and type

Mixed methods research refers to integrating the quantitative as well as qualitative viewpoints in order to address the research questions. It recognizes the significance of both qualitative method, as well as quantitative method to answer questions. It relies on not only the viewpoints of qualitative and quantitative research, but also their methods of data collection, data analysis, and inference techniques (Jonson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). The methods are combined to overcome the shortcomings found in the other method, at any stage, to answer the research questions. There could be three types of mixed methods. One could be qualitative dominant, where one relies primarily on qualitative view of research process and adds the quantitative data and approaches to address the objectives completely. Two could be equal status. And last is quantitative dominant, which is exact opposite of qualitative dominant (Jonson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p.124). In order to understand how the mixed methods are used, there should be identified the timing of mixing and also the stage of mixing. Greene (2008) has identified some different dimensions like:

1. Status: This reflects parity or dominance of one methodology over the other

2. Timing: Timing reflects of the methods are implemented concurrently or sequentially

3. Strands or phases: The methods can be mixed at different phases and consists of various strands which are mixed in a study. For instance, within a qualitative study, a quantitative component could be added to infer the data better.

As mentioned above, the present study is primarily rooted in the qualitative philosophy and uses quantitative method to augment the findings of the qualitative

study. The timing and strands of mixing would be understood after having looked at each objective.

4.6. Tools for analysing objectives

Objective 1

Addressing the first objective would entail analysing the policy documents. The key variables which would be looked into are accountability, autonomy and quality. This would be done using the Foucault's method of Critical Discourse Analysis, as well as Foucault's theoretical framework on Knowledge Power relationship, as detailed upon in the chapter on theoretical framework. It would help understand what governs the present conceptualisation of these terms and how the process of subjectivisation takes place in order to legitimate the present neo-liberal discourse. These are a set of rules/conditions; the prevailing discourse, which seek to create certain relations in the various elements of the society and legitimates its own exercise. It gets imbedded in individuals and institutions, which become the subjects of power and are produced by modification of relationship between them. Whereas the discourse analysis would help unravel the governmentality in the policy texts, which seek a particular kind of rationality from the subjects, this expected rational behaviour might not always lead to better quality. The data sources would include the policy documents issued by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India and the relevant UGC regulations.

Objective 2

The perception and experiences of faculty would be sought with respect to implementation of PBAS in their universities. Open ended questionnaire would be used to interview faculty in this regard. Since the aim is to understand the perception and strategy of faculty working under different circumstances, the study would choose stratified purposive sampling technique to choose the faculty to be interviewed. Under stratified purposive sampling the sample is divided into different strata and from within each strata a small number of cases are chosen such that they satisfy a specific purpose and are then studied intensively. This helps in understanding the characteristics which are similar or different across strata (Teddlie, & Yu, 2007).

Whereas one could argue that speaking to either of the respondents might suffice to capture the status of accountability of the faculty but to have a better validation of the date so collected the method of "triangulation in data" has been adopted which combines data from "different" people or different sources (Flick,2004). This technique helps to explain a particular phenomenon or behaviour from more than one stand point (Cohen et al., 2007). Therefore, open ended questionnaire are also used for the administration of the university and the officials of the UGC, to capture the overall culture or orientation of the university, and also the principal agent conflict or differences in rationality, if any.

4.6.1. The setting

The UGC regulation (GOI, 2010, 2013, 2016) is mandated for the public funded universities and colleges, and it is amongst the public funded institutions only therefore that this study is located[35]. Of the public funded universities, India has at present 370 state universities[36] and 47 central universities[37] . The sampling method used was purposive in nature, at two different levels; one, while selecting the type of university (state or central) and two, also while selecting the faculty to be interviewed (discipline-wise and designation-wise).

4.6.1.1. Sampling for selecting university type

The study is conducted in the state universities in India. The central universities were left out of the consideration for the present study because these universities receive relatively better funded than the state universities (GOI, 2013), providing them with a leverage over the latter in terms of infrastructure and teaching facilities. In contrast, the state universities suffer from shortage of funds, (due to less funds allocated by the state government to the state universities) and other procedural hassles. As a result, the research output, the quality of infrastructure and teaching is often at below acceptable levels (GOI, 2013). Two universities were chosen because often the development priorities and problems of two states are different, and education of a university should be viewed in that context (Bhushan, 2015). When the state

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[35] There are a few private universities/colleges which follow the regulation on discretionary basis and some private universities have devised their own performance assessment mechanisms.

[36] Source: https://www.ugc.ac.in/oldpdf/State%20University/State%20University%20as%20on%2006-10-2017.pdf

[37] Source: https://www.ugc.ac.in/oldpdf/Consolidated%20list%20of%20Central%20Universities%20as%20on%2029.06.2017.pdf

universities are already in such dire need of the basic infrastructure and adequate teaching and research culture, it remains to be seen how the faculty in such universities would be able to comply with the UGC norms of producing output periodically in order to gain promotion or get recruited. Both the universities were NAAC 'A' ranked and the study would see if despite both being A ranked there is any difference between the two with respect to their responses to the PBAS, their internal life and how that reflects in the behaviour of the faculty and hence their attitude towards their work. Also, care has been taken to choose such universities where both the sciences and social sciences departments are actively involved in academics and research.

University A

The state university is amongst the oldest universities in the countries, established in 1857. Within sciences, there are specialized departments each for nano sciences, physics, bio-physics, biotechnology, computer science, chemistry, informational technology, geography, life sciences, mathematics and statistics. Social sciences comprise of applied psychology, economics, history, sociology, African studies, civics and politics and philosophy.

In the last five years, the university has seen an increase in the number of students enrolled. There has been 156 per cent increase in the number of papers published in international journals. There are 12 departments which have been recognized under various programs like SAP/ CAS/ DRS/ DSA/ FIST[38]. In addition to this, in the last five years eighteen national/ international awards have been won by teachers. The faculty has international presence as well, with every year about 20 faculty visiting abroad for academic activities. The university has had also various industrial collaborations and runs professional courses as well[39].

University B

The University is also amongst the old universities of the country, having been founded in 1937. The university runs 16 faculties and 41 departments of teaching and

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[38] These are the additional grants provided by the UGC to universities to strengthen their research and other academic activities. SAP= Special Assistance Programme, CAS= Career Advancement Scheme, DRS= Departmental Research Support, DSA= Department of Special Assistance, FIST= Fund for improvement of S&T Infrastructure.
[39] Retrieved from University Website

research. Much like the university A, this university has over 150 affiliated colleges. The University Grants Commission has identified the University as one of the 26 institutions selected for promotion of India Studies by foreign students.

The university has been graded A by the National Assessment & Accreditation Council (NAAC).

4.6.1.2. Sampling within universities: Purposive sampling and data saturation

The research is primarily qualitative in nature, for which non-probabilistic purposive sampling method was chosen. Whereas in quantitative methodology generally there is a fixed method of determining the size of sample based on the population size, in qualitative research, the non-probabilistic sampling is undertaken, such that the data is rich and thick. By rich is meant the quality of data and thick represents its quantum (Fusch & Ness, 2015). The researcher spent almost a month's time in each university. The above two criteria of richness and thickness were met by ensuring data saturation. Data saturation occurs at a point of data collection when, while collecting the data, the researcher does not get any new data in the themes so identified; when each theme or category for which the data is being collected gets saturated (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). At such a point, any new sample would not render a new data. In each university, it was observed that after interviewing 9-10 faculty members such a saturation was reached. However, for the sake of completion the sample size extended to 18 in each university, and 32 in the other totalling up to 50 faculty members; the study entails interviewing faculty across different career paths and although initially only junior faculty was accessible in both the universities, the senior faculty or faculty from different disciplines, to do away with skewness with respect to designation or the discipline as observed during the initial phase of the data collection, were added to the sample during latter half of sample collection[40].

Sample at a glance

The sample consists of 50 faculty across University A and University B. The faculty from sciences and social sciences discipline, at various stages of their careers, were

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[40] It was found that the senior faculty were keeping busy and not as available for interview as the junior faculty were. Similarly, science faculty were also not as available as social science faculty.

interviewed. This was to capture the struggle associated with science and social sciences research, and also their ranks.

The sample at University A consisted of 32 faculty, with 17 from social sciences discipline and 15 from sciences discipline. Of these, 20 were Assistant Professors, 6 Associate professors and 6 Professors. For the qualitative data analysis the sample was restricted to 17, which can be described as in the table below (Table 4.1)

Table 4.1

Sample size of faculty interviewed in University A

Rank/ Discipline	Assistant Professor	Associate Professor	Professor
Social Sciences	4	3	3
Sciences	5	1	1

At least 3 faculty were picked up from each of the ranks-assistant professor, associate professor and professor, from each discipline. In sciences only one associate professor was interviewed. Although two professors from sciences were interviewed but qualitative analysis the response of only professor was taken into consideration. The other professor did not respond to many questions, leaving the data insufficient for analysis.

The sample size of faculty interviewed in University B was 18, of which 8 faculty belong to sciences and 10 to social sciences. The sample is depicted in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2

Sample size of faculty interviewed in University B

Rank/ Discipline	Assistant Professor	Associate Professor	Professor
Social Sciences	7	2	1
Sciences	2	4	2

A counterfactual sample:

By counterfactual sample is meant the sample which does not primarily contribute to the data analysis. But these cases could help understand the issues under the performance assessment regime faced by other different groups, an insight into the implications of universal application of PBAS, understanding the historic times of the university, and what actions did university take to ensure quality when performance assessment was not instituted in their university, and also the alternative to the present system of performance assessment, if at all, that could be offered by those who were not in the system.

<u>Sample I</u>

In addition to these faculty members, currently working in the university, a retired faculty member from each university was also interviewed to get a picture of performance assessment exercise in their universities even before API came up and the orientation of the university (university culture) in extracting quality work from the faculty. Whereas some of the faculty presently working for very long in the university were also asked about the change overtime, their responses may not truly reflect the true picture about their universities because they are presently employed there and may not reveal true picture. The retired faculty as such did not have direct accountability to the university at the time of interview, making them more amenable to share less subjective status of the university culture overtime.

<u>Sample II</u>

Apart from this, another counterfactual group of faculty were also interviewed. During the pilot survey, it was found that the university faculty raised concern about the issues faced by the college teachers with respect to time crunch owing to teaching load or the nature of work which does not support them conducting research. Also some concerns were raised about people from humanities or languages, who lag behind because the journals in their disciplines seldom have an impact factor. Thus, they in particular, are at a slightly disadvantageous position when it comes to scoring under research category. Therefore, in order to substantiate the findings and have a holistic understanding of faculty behaviour and concerns in the wake of performance assessment, one college teacher teaching in college affiliated to each university was

interviewed. And, one faculty from each university from neither sciences nor social sciences was interviewed. Thus, in this sub- sample there were four faculty members in all.

The questionnaire would try to look at how the faculty understand the accountability and how as a result their relationship with other individuals and institutions are affected. In addition to this the questionnaire would try to look at possibility of resistance towards the present reform. (See Annexure II). This would help unravel the tussle with academic freedom. The process of subject-formation and resistance would throw a light on existing power relations under the performance assessment regime. The questions have been mapped with the research objectives. Because the responses are situated in a context, an additional section on culture of university is added, in order to understand how the university culture is conditioning the responses of the faculty. In addition to that, the data from reports on academic activities, the type of journals where faculty publish, the nature of seminars, etc. would be looked at to have an idea about the university culture. The questionnaire is broadly divided into categories like: general perception of faculty regarding accountability and quantification of work, teaching, research related activities, competition and individualism, culture of their university, citation and discipline related issues, and lastly motivation and academic freedom. The flow of the questionnaire was so maintained to enable as easy administration of the questions. Since the purpose of administering the questionnaire was to understand the subjectivisation in the context of performance assessment, possibility of malpractices, instances of resistance, and impact on academic freedom, the categories would be developed accordingly. For the purpose of analysis, as would be seen in the data analysis chapter, the questions can be categorised under the following heads as following (Table 4.3)

Table 4.3

Categorisation of faculty questionnaire

S. No.	Category	Question No.
1	**Meaning of Accountability and Academic Freedom**	1,2
2	**Formation of self**	
2.1	Subjectivisation and Resistance	
A	General perception of performance-based accountability	4,8,14,15, 16, 17, 18
B	Experience related to PBAS	6,7,11, 13, 23-26
C	Culture	19-22
d.	Organised Resistance	5
2.2	Rational behaviour and Corruption	10
2.3	Informative questions	3
2.4	Impact of PBAS on Academic Freedom, Motivation, Nature of Knowledge Generated, Trust	27

Rationale for the above categories

As already discussed, the larger objective of the study is to understand the implications of the policy prescription on performance assessment on the university life, and faculty in particular. The objective of filed visit was to understand the perception of the faculty in the universities about the performance assessment regime, and API in particular, and also how they are organising their lives and identity around this policy. There could broadly be three possibilities: the faculty are in tune with the larger discourse or they are not, which would reflect in their perceptions and impact it has on their motivation and freedom. Whereas one could argue that these are the two obvious and evident possibilities of their behaviour, the purpose of talking to faculty does not end there but to delve deeper into the implications this could have had on their quality work.

The theoretical framework used for this purpose was that of Foucault's discourse analysis; the responses would be juxtaposed with the larger discourse to know if their behaviour is legitimising the discourse or there are internal struggles or conflict with respect to acting in accordance with the discourse. The extreme possibility of faculty not doing anything at all is not the only instance of resistance

that they could show because everyone has to abide by this UGC regulation if they want to secure promotion or get recruited. Moreover, that is the ot only form of resistance that could exist. Any conflict with respect to this exercise of this API could also be counted as resistance.

Whether a faculty is a subject or not of the larger discourse is not could be revealed through operation of power, which gets manifested in the power relations. Within a university system and in the context of performance assessment, these could be understood by looking at: how the faculty identifies themselves (subject position that they take), the nature of their relationship with their peers, the nature of relationship between their work and society, nature of their relationship with students, etc. These are primarily premised around API; that how these relationships are structured under API; are these oriented towards neo-liberal discourse or not. The possibility of resistance would be unravelled from these very categories. At the same time, to capture resistance there are other direct questions, which are as mentioned above. Another way to understand subjectivisation (and/or resistance) is by looking at what is it that motivates them or does the performance assessment motivates them or not, and how API impacts their academic freedom. Academic freedom, as was found during the pilot survey, was understood as only having the freedom to design curriculum and teach. In order to get a detailed account of areas which go in to ensuring academic freedom, like resources, time, nature of knowledge, etc., and which would be impacted by performance assessment, a structured question was administered, where faculty were asked to rank the options. There are in addition to these questions which capture only about the faculty's perception about performance assessment in general. There include their views on competition or quantification of output as a way to enhancing faculty performance. The responses to these questions also would help understand if their identities are in tune with the neo-liberal performance assessment rationale or not.

However, the subjects take their position (or not) within their unique circumstances, which calls for looking at also their individual contexts like the discipline that they belong to, the stage of their career, and also their respective university circumstances/culture. Firstly, discipline related questions focus on citation practices and issue in publishing in impact factor journals and funding availability for

conducting research. This is asked to understand the bias against certain discipline in scoring API, because UGC regulation has provision to augment scores according to the impact factor of journals where the faculty publish their articles. In addition, the time taken to publish was asked. This is because controlling for quality of journals where faculty publish, the lesser the time taken to publish an article in a particular discipline, the more points the faculty can score. The university culture could either support the process of subject formation or it could do the otherwise. This has been captured by a) posing questions to the faculty related to their experience regarding the university culture and b) understanding the orientation and adaptability of university by i) talking to their leader and ii) through their mission statements. The mission statement would be analysed using discourse analysis.

As stated above, in addition to questionnaire for faculty, one more questionnaire was administered (See Annexure III). This was for the IQAC director, who is amongst the 'leaders' of the university. This would help understand how over the years the university has been conscious about the quality, it's culture and also if there are instances of unethical practices. The purpose is also to understand if university is adaptable to the norms and thus the ease of process of subjectivisation of the leader. Thirdly, the leader's perception about performance assessment could throw light on his role in ensuring (or not) the formation of faculty as subjects.

The responses would be analysed in two steps. Step I involves using content analysis as a method of analysis. It identifies the patterns and themes in the data, by looking at the data (Cohen et al., 2007). After the themes are identified, the number of respondents are enumerated for each theme. (Holsti, 1969). The themes, in the present study, have been identified using the research questions of the study, which is called as direct content analysis (Hseih & Shannon, 2005). (detailed upon in upcoming paragraphs). It might be argued that 'replicability' may not be fulfilled by qualitative content analysis as texts or data do not have a single meaning and thus content analysis may not be a reliable technique[41]. This might appear as a challenge to objectivity of the technique. However, as conjectured by Krippendroff (1980)   in qualitative content analysis there could be no text which would exist without an

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[41] For e research technique to be reliable, the finding of the study, to which it is applied, should be replicable. By replicability is meant that researchers working under different circumstances and different time should get the same result (Krippendroff, 1980)

interpreter or an observer; the meaning of a data are always brought to it by someone. Secondly, if one wants to achieve replicable or common results, then the technique would be restricted to only identifying the manifest data/ manifest aspect of data or the use of technique would be restricted to small recipients of data, who look at the world around them in a similar fashion. But data are read differently depending upon different contexts of data producers, recipients or analysts. The meaning would depend on not only contexts, but also different purposes and discourses. But these differences in interpretations do not mean no possibility of agreement/ common ground within a particular context or discourse (Krippendroff, 1980; p. 22-24). This is how the qualitative content analysis could be rendered objectivity. To ensure this, the second step would situate the responses in a particular discourse. Step II seeks to make as objective sense of the themes as possible. In social sciences, interpretation is done within a particular context. Since the study entails understanding the behaviour of the faculty under the performance assessment regime, it would seek to look at how the power relations existing in the system as a mode of governance. This entails capturing the broader discourse, power relations and how these power relations shape the conduct of individuals as well as any possibility of resistance in their behaviour. The responses would then be analysed keeping the larger discourse in the backdrop and situation the existence (or non existence) of these relations within that discourse. Thus, the second stage would involve using critical discourse analysis. To sum up, this essentially means that the process of 'self-formation', and concomitant resistance, if any, under Foucauldian framework, as provided in the Theoretical Framework (Chapter-3) would be brought forth, through the responses of faculty and administrators. Responses would be categorized according to disciplines, designation and university type. From that various interjections would be derived. For instance, science assistant professors compared to a social sciences assistant professor, science assistant professors versus science professors, etc.

To elaborate, using content analysis to analyse responses requires two broad steps, one is developing codes and two in interpreting the data using those codes. There have been three broad kinds of content analysis methods identified by Hseih and Shannon (2005) namely, conventional content analysis, direct content analysis and summative content analysis. Under the conventional content analysis the researcher develops categories from among the data, instead of using preconceived

theories or categories. The directed content analysis aims at extend or validate the existing theory or theoretical framework. Using the existing theory/ research the researcher develops categories for analysis or use research questions to identify key concepts for categories. The data which cannot be coded are identified and analysed later to determine if they represent a new category or a sub-category of an existing category, depending upon the predetermined category and the objective of research. The theory would guide the research findings. The newly developed categories either refine or enrich the phenomenon being studied or offer a contradictory view. The summative content analysis, which is the third type of content analysis aims at identifying and quantifying certain words in order to understand the contextual meaning of those words. Interpreting the content by understanding the context in which the word has been used is referred to as latent content analysis. The disadvantage of the summative content analysis is the text as read as single word, which may not be able to capture the entire data. Of the remaining two methods, the directed content analysis is more comprehensive in nature because the codes are identified from not only the research question but can be extended using the responses of interviewees. Also, it can help extend or refute an existing theoretical framework. Since under the present study the performance assessment has been understood as Foucault's governmentality framework (process of subjectivisation and possibility of resistance in power relations) the directed content analysis could help understand if the present rationality expected by the present discourse is indeed being fulfilled. The Foucault's research on neo-liberal governmentality takes neo-liberalism as practice (Cotoi, 2011). Using the Foucault's framework the categories have been developed in the questionnaire as well as analysis, which try to capture if faculty have rationalised themselves in accordance with the discourse by understanding their perception about performance assessment and their ensuing relationships around.

The last question of the questionnaire is structured in nature, and to analyse the responses, the method of likert scale analysis was used, to understand the impact of API on Academic freedom and motivation of faculty, and also the nature of output produced, and trust placed on faculty work. These responses and those of qualitative part of the questionnaire, were juxtaposed, wherever required. The qualitative paradigm looks at variance in responses, and vouches for particularity, but "there also exists enough invariance in the social world to make generalisation possible" (Payne

& Williams, 2005, p. 297). Such generalisation is, however, limited in scope in that they do not attempt to produce sweeping statements which would hold true across time or range of cultures, but within a particular context general conclusion can be drawn. Such generalisation is called *Moderatum* (moderate) generalisation (Payne & Williams, 2005), which 'may' hold true in a similar context. The qualitative research seeks understanding and extrapolation to similar situations (Hoepfl, 1997)[42], or case-to-case transfer (making generalisations from one case to another similar case) (Collins, Onwuegbuzie & Jiao, 2007).

<u>Objective 3</u>

This objective emanates from objective 2. The neo-liberal discourse helps understand the rational actions or a deviation from that, in order to perform. There have also been cases where faculty resort to publishing in moderate or poor quality journals in order to secure legitimacy, either because of difference in their ability or because of dishonest means to secure points. Different kind of faculty might behave differently than what is expected in the policy, and this as such challenges the blanket assumption of linear relationship between registering or documenting the output and production of quality work. The objective would unravel the problem of information asymmetry as existing between the State and the faculty regarding the ability of faculty and hence the quality of work. Due to this information asymmetry, there is a possibility of corrupt practices or low quality work happening in the universities by a few faculty. This may push down the quality of work and thwart the very purpose for which performance assessment has been undertaken. In other words, different types of people strategise differently, often leading to a possibility of corruption in the system. The strategy and optimal outcome of different kind of faculty would differ would be understood using game theory. Game theory helps understand the strategic/ rational behaviour of individuals and the resulting optimal outcome. How this would happen would be analysed using the game theoretical models. The models would look the pay-offs of faculty from playing fair versus cheating/ producing low quality output and come up with equilibrium output under the moral hazard games. Sometimes, the assessment of work is undertaken at departmental level as under NAAC, which leads

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[42] As cited in Golafhsani (2003).

to possibility of free riding by a few faculty. That this is detrimental to the quality work would be shown with the help of collective action games. Also, since often in literature it is argued that collegial university culture is more amenable to quality work, the game models would be developed to test this hypothesis. Through these models an attempt would be made to highlight the conflict between ethics and rationality. In the end through a model the role of culture and governance would be highlighted in abetting (or reducing) corrupt practices in universities.

Thus, after looking at the three objectives it could be said that method followed is qualitative dominant. The different strands of mixing could be further summed up in the table as below (Table 4.4)

Table 4.4

Mixed method approach utilised for the study

Objectives/ Strategies of Inquiry	Method	Data Sources	Tools for Analysis and Inference
Objective 1	Qualitative	Texts-Policy Documents and UGC Regulations (Qualitative)	Critical Discourse Analysis (Qualitative)
Objective 2	Qualitative and Quantitative	Open-ended questionnaire and Structured questionnaire (Qualitative and Quantitative)	1. For open-ended questionnaire: A mix of Content Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis 2. For structured questionnaire: Likert Scale analysis using Non-Parametric Tests (Qualitative and Quantitative)
Objective 3	Quantitative	Hypothetical model building (Quantitative)	Game Theory, Algebraic exposition (Quantitative)

4.7. Reliability and Validity of the results

By reliability is meant a) the extent to which results can represent the entire population, and b) reproduction of similar results using similar methodology. And validity measures the truthfulness of research results or does the research measure what it intended to measure. (Joppe, 2000)[43].In other words, reliability means replicability of results and validity means the truthfulness of reality (Golafshani, 2003). Reliability or replicability can be ensured when generalisation of the result could be made, which is understood a tenet primarily of quantitative research. But, as mentioned previously, the qualitative study also aims at generalisation, of moderate

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[43] As cited in Golafshani (2003)

nature. Therefore, such studies are also amenable to the test of reliability, albeit in a restricted sense. Validity, as defined by Creswell and Miller (2000), means the accuracy with which the results depict participants' account of social reality and includes the strategies that researcher makes to make their study credible. They further identify certain method to identify the credibility of the results. The results are made credible by referring to the lens used by researcher. The assumptions or beliefs of the researcher should be elaborated in research design. Also, a thick description of design should be provided. Thick description means clearly explaining the setting where research takes places, and also the themes used to analyse statements. The study has mentioned clearly the theoretical framework (chapter 3) which has been used to not only design the questionnaire but also to analyse the data.

4.8. Ethical considerations undertaken

The study has followed the ethical research practices at various stages. To begin with, the purpose and objective of the study was made clear to the interviewees. Second, some of the questions revolved around issues such as ethical practices in conducting research, university culture, loss of trust in their work by authorities, individualism in their departments, etc. Such issues could prove to be sensitive in nature and thus, the privacy of the universities where the faculty members were interviewed needs to be maintained. For this reason, the name of the universities has been kept anonymous. Three, as Kvale (2007)[44] also argues, interviewing is often a moral inquiry. Due consideration was undertaken while framing and asking the questions, that no sensitive questions which could prove to be stressful for the participants were asked. For instance, when asking about proliferation of poor quality journals, or people publishing in not so good quality journals, their general experience regarding what was happening around them was sought, than asking about their own individual practices. Because of this gap, the issue of ability, ethics and rationality was addressed by constructing generalised models. Fourth, while data analysis, due consideration of meeting validity criteria (and accuracy of results) were undertaken (This would be elaborated in Chapter 6 on Data analysis).

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[44] As cited in Creswell (2009).

Chapter 5: Higher Education Governance: Accountability as a policy technology

5.1. Introduction

Ever since the conception of higher education policy, universities have been accorded a special role in serving the society, directly or indirectly. The discussion of this responsibility, called accountability, has always found a mention in the policy since independence. The supposed objective for making universities and faculty accountable is to improve the quality of work performed by them or at least maintain a minimum standard of work performed by them. Over time, however, its nature has undergone a change. In other words, who the universities and faculty are accountable to, and through what mode, have transformed over time. This would be understood in details, while have a critical look at higher education policy over time.

The objective of this chapter is to analyse the present governance discourse using Foucault's power concept called governmentality. It aims to look at how accountability has been conceptualised overtime, with an emphasis on quality assurance. The Foucault's concept of governmentality helps understand the underlying rationality. By deciphering the underlying rationality, one means unravelling the interwoven power relations which the discourse needs, to legitimate itself. As would be later discussed in the chapter that to analyse a policy is to not just look at the mere sentences but to understand the kind of effect, through these power relations, that it seeks to produce. In order words, the practices situated in that discourses, which are expected of the individuals and the institutions, would be looked at. The chapter would conclude with highlighting two issues which may not lead to performance enhancement as expected by discourse and deterioration of quality even under cases where such rational behaviour is complied with. The first one would look at the potential for deviance through counter-conducts within the existing discourse. In other words, this means going deviant from the rationality of the discourse. The second would look at the possibility of malpractices, or moderate quality work when faculty act as per their assessment of their abilities.

Education Policy is analysed by examining the texts of policy documents or reports and regulations. Ball (1993b) contends that the problem that policy research deals with is conceptualisation of policy. They call policy as text as well as discourse.

There is one strand of research which looks at policy as text, often using the words discourse and text interchangeably. This involves a linguistic analysis of the text or 'discourse', analysing the language of the text. Discourse is defined in such a tradition as text or a dialogue/non-dialogue discourse (Tierney, Raphael & Cohen, 1983). It places importance on the key concepts or the topics which are chosen by the author (Taylor, 1997; Nuzdor, 2013) and making meaning and interpretations of the texts (Tierney, Raphael & Cohen, 1983; Taylor, 1997; Burns, 2011). It is, however, also contended that the text should be read from the point of view of authors' intention to make an objective interpretation of it (Tierney et al., 1983; Burns, 2011). The problem exists when one is analysing policy documents, which are often not written by a single author but many. It is difficult to have an information about their intention. Moreover, the intentions are not formed in a black box; it is crucial to look at the driving force behind those intentions. Another problem exists with the tradition of meaning making. There are different readers of a policy text, leading to different meaning-making.

Policy as discourse reflects the larger beliefs or the bigger picture. A discourse defines what can be said and done within a discourse. It constructs certain possible thoughts (Ball, 2009). Such an understanding of discourse draws on Foucault's concept of discourse analysis. Such analysis goes beyond the texts and looks how policy or discourse governing the policy texts, aims at the construction of new kind of social relations within academia and a new kind of identity of professionals (Olssen, Codd, & O'Neill, 2004) in order to legitimate the working of the present discourse (The method would be detailed in the next section). Amongst others, such an approach has been used by Marginson (1997) in the context of Australian higher education, Peters (2001) where they note the emergence of responsibilised self as a result of neo-liberal policies in the UK using Foucault's perspective and also by Olssen et al. (2004) for New Zealand higher education. The upshot of this approach over considering policy as a text is greater objectivity in analysis; in this approach the

purpose in not to make meaning of the text, but to understand the overarching rules which led to existing of the text as such.

Another method of policy analysis entails application of disciplinary perspectives to policy recommendations. Internationally an economic analysis of higher education policies has been undertaken by Massy (2004), Jongbloed (2004) and Dill and Soo (2004), where they argue how efficiency, the basic premise of competition under market-based reforms, cannot be applied in education sector, and how efficient practices are in conflict with achievement of quality in higher education. provide a critique of efficient market-based reforms in higher education. In the Indian context as well, an economic analysis of higher education policy has been undertaken; higher education policy in analysed using the orientation of economics as a discipline. The analysis is done by critically examining the construction of market in education sector (Tilak, 2005; Chattopadhyay, 2009; Chattopadhyay, 2012), the neo-liberal policies in terms of funding reforms and/ or reforming university governance (Chattopadhyay, 2012; Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014), for instilling efficiency in the system (Chattopadhyay, 2012). It has been argued that construction of rationality of neo-liberalism is inimical to achieving the objectives of equity, excellence and expansion (Chattopadhyay, 2009).

Third, and apart from this, another set literature has done a descriptive analysis of policy, raising certain issues like recommendation of various committees over time, problems associated with PBAS, accountability measures in Indian higher education policy, excellence and mediocrity in education, or autonomy of the state governments with respect to policy formulation ((Shah (2005), Das & Chattopadhyay (2014), Bhushan (2015), Sujatha (2015), Mathew (2016), Thorat (2016), Chandra (2017)).

Before that, one might ask the following question: why should policy be studied in the first place? Policy refers to a course of action for selection of goals, allocation of resources or definition of values. It reflects the political power behind the policy to make it legitimate (Codd, 1988). Dye (1992)[45] defines policy as anything which the State decides to do and not to do. Analysing policy incorporates, a) analysis of policy determinants (inputs and processes which go into policy formulation), and effects of policies on various groups, and b) analysis of policy content, that is values,

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[45] As cited in Lingard & Rizvi (2009)

ideologies and assumptions behind policy (Codd, 1988, p. 235-236). The policy reflects the larger agenda which has been designed by the policy makers and expected to be implemented in the universities or other higher education institutions. If implemented and practised, these policy recommendations would have a role in organising the life of the universities or faculty in there, in a way that would provide a legitimate place to that policy in not just the entire higher education space, but also the minds and souls of the faculty. The studies often are prescribed to understanding the functions or life of universities, with often a neglect to link that with broader policy reforms, of which they are often the effect. Studying these policies would unravel therefore the rationale behind reforms mooted, and also the effects that it might generate (before one could study on field the effects which are actually generated). Thus, analysing a policy text constitutes of first deciphering the overarching beliefs of a text and second, how that belief produces the effects on the individuals and the institutions. To put it summarily, the chapter studies policy by looking at the policy contents, and the ensuing policy effects.

While the study is premised largely on the Performance Based Assessment System (PBAS), which was instituted in 2010 and later amended, it is crucial to know the broader landscape shaping the higher education policy, of which it is a part. Much of the rationale of the PBAS would emerge from understanding the rationale behind the larger policy prescriptions or the trend thereof. Therefore, an archival analysis of policy would be undertaken. The accountability expected from faculty or universities is premised upon certain behaviour, deemed rational, which fits in the larger prevailing discourse of the time.

But, quite often than not, the rational behaviour expected out of faculty may not yield the desired objective of them producing quality work or at least maintaining minimum standards as expected by the UGC. Also, every faculty behaves rationally given their abilities and differing contexts under which they are placed. These factors may affect their performance and therefore need to be factored in when one in trying to understand accountability adherence and the resultant expected quality work. In addition to these, we would try to understand the implications of it on the academic freedom of faculty.

Hence, it is to be noted that accountability is not a standalone concept. It is accompanied by quality and academic freedom. If dig a little deeper, we can see that the way accountability has been discussed globally along with a grant of autonomy to universities, so as to make them efficient to perform, the Indian scenario in the public funded universities has only little to match with this. In India, a large chunk of public institutions (universities as well as colleges) are dependent on public funds, and thus defy the grant of autonomy (from the State funding). Thus, we cannot really say that because they have been rendered an autonomy, should they be accountable. However, there has been an autonomy in the work granted to the faculty in Indian public funded universities; more importantly there has been no check on their performance. The reform process which brought about the greater emphasis on accountability has rather possibly aimed at checking such practices and ensuring that the faculty who are funded by the public money, document their performance and justify their salaries; the State has not yet relinquished the funding of a large number of public universities in India. The move, therefore, intends to curb the wastage in the system, and ensure efficiency in work by the universities or the faculty. To sum up, to have understand the implications of the policy, we would unravel the rationale behind the policy gradually overtime, to be able to situate the PBAS in a larger context.

The chapter is organised as following: Section 5.2 would highlight the rationale of studying higher education policy. The next section, 5.3, method for policy analysis, which is a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis and Economic Analysis of policy. Section 5.4 provides a brief snapshot of policy. The next section, 5.5, gives excerpts from policy documents and Section 5.6 analyses the content and tries to decipher the discourse in policy texts. The next Section, 5.7 does an economic analysis of policy, and uses that to decipher power relations at institutional and individual level in section 5.8. The chapter concludes with Section 5.9 by drawing the implications on academic freedom and society.

5.2 Why study policy at all?

The higher education policy is designed by the government and concerns various direct or indirect stakeholders like the university administration, the faculty, the students and the society. Since it is addressed to diverse groups with differing interests and objectives, the crucial task of policy making is to ensure consent among

these groups. However, this is not to say that there would be no counter-conduct and the policy prescriptions would be accepted unanimously. But the crucial task of policy remains to make the recommendations acceptable by making intelligible certain beliefs or assumptions behind the policy. It can happen by addressing the behaviour of the people involved, in a way that the probability of resistance by them is reduced, so that the policy is rendered legitimate. These beliefs, assumptions are called as discourse by Michel Foucault. Therefore, looking at policy objectively means to understand the existing discourse and what kind of behaviour is expected of individuals to further that discourse.

The higher education policy is a prime point from where the very conceptualisation or categorisation of faculty or faculty's work, their position within the realm of higher education vis-a-vis other actors or institutions is determined. The policy documents provide with an articulation of the role of faculty in the higher education space, which also sometimes contain implicit recommendations with regard to their accountability. This is in addition to the accountability requirements expected from them, as mentioned explicitly often in the policy. Talking of the coverage of the policy, one needs also to look at certain policy recommendations which although pertain to university but have an impact on the very life of faculty. A clear manifestation of larger policy discourse in India is also the regulations made mandatory by the University Grants Commission (UGC) from time to time, making inevitable to study these regulations as well.

Having known this, the policy is much broader than a set of prescriptions or recommendations. For having a grasp over policy and its implications, one needs to capture the overarching rules, which are governing these recommendations, in order to understand the implications these recommendations would have on faculty. It is this broader belief system behind those recommendations which needs attention while studying policy. The upcoming paragraphs would throw a light on this aspect and the implications tis could have on the life of faculty. While one could argue that not all policy recommendations are implemented and those could therefore be rendered redundant for the present purpose, but these policies pertaining to different time periods (if at all), whether implemented or not, could provide fodder for capturing the

larger set of beliefs prevailing in the policy space. For this purpose, the chapter would cover all the policy prescriptions pertaining to accountability.

5.3. Method for policy analysis

The chapter would draw on Foucault's Critical Discourse Analysis, and amalgamate it with the economic analysis of policy, by looking at the implications of accountability (on efficiency and effectiveness, as mentioned in Chapter 1 and productivity) in higher education sector.

5.3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

The objective of the chapter, for analysing policy, is two-folds: one is to look at the policy contents and two is to analyse the policy effects. To address this, the chapter would use the method of Michel Foucault's Critical Discourse Analysis (Foucault, 1972), which entails understanding the rules or discourse behind the existing statements in the policy texts and the social effects of policy on individuals and institutions, which is manifested in their practices on a daily basis.

Governance of an institution is reflected by the decision making and actions/behaviours of individuals within the institutions. But such actions are not undertaken in a vacuum, but often an offshoot of the larger discourse which is prevailing. Foucault's work can help understand the governance by highlighting the rationale behind the actions/behaviour emanating from the rationale of the policy discourse. It helps understand how the institutions and individuals rationalise their behaviour under a given regime. There also comes up the role of culture of that space, which may or may not be consonance with the macro-level prevailing discourse.

The analysis is conducted in the following two steps:

a. Analysis of content: When talking of content, it needs to be clarified first what the content is. The content here refers to not the word or the sentences but the discourse (or the context) within which the policy has come into existence. While in linguistic analysis, discourse comes to mean the text or a conversation. Critical Discourse Analysis renders a different meaning to discourse, it is referred to as a general domain of all statements (Foucault, 1972). By general domain is meant the larger rules of

conditions which led to fruition of certain kinds of statements in a text. In other words, the discourse analysis of texts involves asking the following question: What led to the existence of a particular statement? It refers to the rules that were behind the existence of a statement, or a set of related statements. The intention is not to understand the innate or hidden meaning of those sentences but rather, we look at what conditions were behind their existence (Foucault, 1972).

In Foucault's method of Critical Discourse Analysis, discourse means a set of ideas, and beliefs that are established as knowledge (Doherty, 2007; Powers, 2007). This knowledge reflects the knowledge which individuals and/or institutions develop of their own selves, within those larger schemata of beliefs. It involves an understanding of a wide sphere of social practices between individuals and institutions. Thus, analysing a discourse is always analysing the conditions or rules which legitimate the existence of statements and indicating which of them will never be legitimate. And that legitimacy is rendered by the social practices defined by that discourse, in which the individuals and institutions engage in.

According to Foucault (1980), these rules which govern a statement are nothing but 'power' or disciplinary power (Foucault, 1980). This notion of power is quite different from a repressive power or coercive power. This power is creative, in that it creates certain relations amongst the various elements of the society and legitimates its own exercise; it is not foisted upon the individuals and institutions but it comes to exist through a wilful acceptance. Only such relations, called power relations, can produce a legitimate discourse. This power is permeated in the society by the way of discourse, which creates power relations amongst individuals and institutions; power is made legitimate by discourse (Foucault, 1980). There exists a two-way relationship therefore: discourse defines certain power relations and the exercise of these power relations, as manifested in various social practices, legitimises that discourse. A preoccupation with the contents of a text only means that the analyst will lack a reference point and would not be able to get involved with the discourse (Hook, 2001). This could lead to bias in analysis; analysis text or language would cause different meaning makings by different readers.

To further the method of Critical Discourse Analysis, it needs to be noted that a statement contains certain objects and also the subjects and assigns various positions

to the subjects. The first task is to identify the object within a particular discourse, and analysing the statements containing the object of analysis. It could be thought that an object is something which unites the sentence, like the word 'accountability' in policy documents. But we begin in a different manner. We begin by looking at what the larger discourse is, and what all objects does it form. Thus, when looking at a discourse of accountability, the objective is to look "at the space within which such object (and others) emerge, and could lead to their transformation" (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). In other words, we seek to not pick up sentences mentioning accountability, but we look at the larger belief which has led to defining the word as it is. When that becomes the approach, then the same word could be given a different meaning in different discourse. And in addition to that, we would look at other such objects which have relationship accountability; relationship as found legitimate in that discourse[46]. Thus, the statement does not refer to an object but to the larger discourse which leads to formation of objects. This domain of the objects accords certain positions to the subjects, through power relations. As mentioned above, that domain of the objects reflects the power relations; the relations between institutions, economic and social pattern, the norms of behaviour, etc, under the positive conditions of which the objects exist. These relationships emanating from the discourse are called discursive relations, which are practised by the subjects.

b. Analysis of policy effects: Analysing policy effect is the natural follower of the previous step of analysing contents of policy document. The discourse leads to existence of certain types of objects and the formation of subjects. It is in the formation of subjects or the process of subjectivisation, that the policy effects are found. Discourse represents power, which is not coercive but productive, in the sense that it produces various social processes and relations which make the discourse legitimate. Thus, analysing policy effects boils down to analysing these power relations underlying that discourse, that is the relationship of (and between) individuals and the institutions.

That there is a policy, and the individuals/ institutions are expected to behave in accordance with the policy prescriptions could be seen as a top-down mechanism of power exercise. However, Foucault understands the functioning of power through

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[46] The other objects would be determined by the larger discourse, and would establish power relations. And It is for this reason that statistical softwares have not been used to analyse discourse.

policy prescriptions differently. This 'power' or power relations operate in the everyday lives of individuals and institutions. That is the power relations expected to operate amongst individuals and the institutions. It is this mechanism which creates a knowledge amongst subjects about themselves and further legitimates the existence of the objects of the discourse. Rather than having a top-down approach, there is an inter-connectedness amongst the constituents of society.

Both the steps could be summed up as in the diagram below (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Framework for Critical Discourse Analysis

Source: *Author's construct, created using Foucault's framework of CDA (1972)*

In sum, policy analysis would boil down to analysing the effects of policy, in terms of power relations within a larger discourse, that would ensue. Foucault calls these as strategies, in which the power relations take effect (Foucault, 1978, p. 92-93). The chapter seeks to develop an economic analysis of the policy, and therefore these strategies would be understood as in the discipline. As mentioned in Chapter-1, the accountability brings about efficiency and effectiveness in the system (Mortimer, 1972; Berdahl, 1990; Alexandar, 2000; Huisman & Currie, 2004; Kai, 2009). The possible power relations or strategies would be centred around these strategies which depict an efficient and effective behaviour. In the end implications of these on the academic freedom are looked at. Intrinsic to power relations is the constitution of a subject, as discussed in the theoretical framework.; the formation of a neo-liberal governable subject. The next sections present the snapshot of Indian Higher Education Policy, before applying the afore-said framework to the analysis.

5.4. A history of Indian Higher Education Policy: A brief snapshot

As discussed in chapter 1, the study is broadly situated in the context of performance assessment of individual faculty work, which was formalised in 2010 (GOI, 2010). This could be called as a form through which accountability has been sought out in the policy. The emphasis on accountability has always found a place in Indian higher education policy, ever since the conception of Radhakrishnan Commission Report on Higher Education during mid-1950s. The chapter 1 highlights the very inevitability of accountability in higher education; universities do not exist in isolation and are largely dependent on public funds, which also makes them accountable to the society at large. But the proliferation of ensuring accountability through performance assessment of faculty or universities in the higher education policy could be traced back to the beginning of mid 1990s, when accreditation was introduced in the system, with the setting up of National Accreditation Assessment Council, in 1994. It was however not made mandatory until 2013. Apart from this, many Indian universities were following (and are) the tradition of publishing annual reports for each department/school, having a depiction of faculty output with respect to the books or articles published, the seminars/conferences attended by the faculty, or lectures delivered outside their own universities. Even then, the performance assessment had not held grip of the faculty's daily life, as much as it is doing now, particularly post 2010, with the institution of Performance Based Assessment System (PBAS). Now each and every faculty's performance is measured under three broad categories of teaching and learning, research and co-curricular activities. They are now under a constant gaze of this surveillance mechanism, having to perform and depict their productivity. This has further exacerbated by the infusing the system of ranking the universities in the Indian higher education space; the universities having to perform also puts an indirect responsibility on faculty to perform. But it is majorly PBAS which has an immediate implication on the very life of faculty, which was not found as much earlier. Based on the intensity with which accountability has been emphasised in the policy, and the

The upcoming section would draw the historical trail of accountability, of faculty and universities, and the deliberations on the academic freedom of faculty in Indian higher education policy. At first, the policy prescriptions would be discussed,

and that would be followed by the analysis using the Critical Discourse Analysis, as mentioned above.

5.5. The discourse of accountability in Indian higher education policy

The various higher education policy documents have emphasised on excellence and efficiency in the system and have accorded a great significance to accountability in that regard. Particularly the post 1990 period saw a greater and explicit mention of accountability, through instilling mechanisms of performance assessment in higher education. It seeks to instil accountability in the higher education. Higher education, the public universities to be exact, is funded by the public money and thus, to ensure that there is not wastage, the universities have been expected to deliver output. While analysis the discourse of performance assessment, accountability thus forms one object of analysis. But it is important to note, as mentioned in the method section of this chapter, it is not the unity of accountability that would be analysed, but the unity of discourse which defines the space in which the object like accountability or other objects exist. To give an example, accountability would be mentioned in a policy pertaining to 1940s, as also that belonging to 2000s, but the meaning of the same object may differ if the discourse in 1940s stands to differ from that of 2000s. By unity of discourse is meant the rules and conditions which lead to emergence of accountability the way it exists. It is this discourse which determines the relationship between the one object and the other.

The objective of accountability over years has been linked with ensuring quality or excellence in the system. The objects that are considered for culling out certain excerpts of policy are therefore accountability and quality/excellence, for both universities and faculty. These define what the roles of a faculty ought to be.

Below are selected excerpts from each policy document, first on accountability and then on quality from each policy document.

1. Radhakrishnan Commission (GOI, 1948)

Accountability:

a) University level

Education is an instrument for social change (GOI, 1948, p. 38). On such a scheme we cannot get leaders who with new values would transform the communities. The aim of education should be to break ground for new values and make them possible (GOI, 1948, p.38)

b) Faculty level

The primary responsibility of the teacher is to arouse the interest of the pupil in the field of study for which he is responsible. He has not merely to convey factual information and the principles and generalisations which accrue from them, he has to stimulate the spirit of enquiry and of criticism, so that minds may acquire the habit of exercising independent and unbiased judgement, and learn to discriminate between adequate and inadequate, relevant and irrelevant data, and to avoid the extremes of haste and indecision in arriving at conclusions (GOI, 1948, p.58-59)

Research or quest for new knowledge is not merely an additional casual activity of a University teacher which he may if he so chooses to omit, it is an essential part of his function and may be neglected only at the peril of intellectual stagnation (GOI, 1948, p.59)

Quality:

a) University level

The success of a university is to be judged as much by the type of graduate it turns out as by the amount and quality of research contributed by its teachers and research students. It must be clearly recognized that there is no conflict involved between the twofold function of a university to educate its members and to advance the frontiers of knowledge-the two functions are, in fact, complementary (GOI, 1948, p. 74)

b) Faculty level

University personnel must develop a greater sense of social responsibility for educational and national progress, a preference for quality over quantity. The teachers can do much to raise the tone of the universities. It is in educational institutions that we can train character, build personality, by the discipline of body, intelligence and will (GOI, 1948, p.47).

A right kind of teacher... His success will be measured not in terms of percentage of passes alone, not even by the quantity of original contributions to knowledge-- important as they are, but equally through the quality, of life and character of men and women whom he has taught (GOI, 1948, p.59).

But while some of this work may be capable of yielding immediate and tangible results, the value of much of it cannot be assessed, because the relation of cause and effect cannot be established (GOI, 1948, p.65)

In selecting the personnel, emphasis should be on quality rather than on numbers (GOI, 1948; p. 151).

Unfortunately, there are signs of a steady decline in the quality and quantity of research at our universities. There are several causes, but the most important is that most of the leaders of research in different fields have either left the universities or are on the verge of retirement and the universities have not been able to find suitable successors to continue the research tradition initiated and fostered by these pioneers. Ever since the higher administrative services were thrown open to Indian graduates, the universities have had to compete with the Government, which is the largest employer in India, for recruitment for their teaching staff. The universities could not attract the best men to their staff and during the, last ten years a number of brilliant teachers have left the universities, for government service, as they were offered better salaries and prospects there (GOI, 1948, p. 130).

2. Kothari Commission (GOI, 1966)

Accountability:

University level

..to provide society with competent men and women...who will also be cultivated individuals, imbued with sense of social purpose (GOI, 1966, p. 553).

....Universities are a forum of society sympathetic objective (GOI, 1966, p. 555)

The universities should realise that it is unwise to expect that effective autonomy could descend as a gift from above: it has to be continually earned and deserved. The universities derive their right to autonomy from their dedication to the pursuit and service to truth (GOI, 1966, p.650)

Faculty level

Unless they (university teachers) have the high ambition to make an impact of social thinking and endeavour, they will not be able to help in moulding a new society which will...cherish high values (GOI, 1966, p.555)

Nor it is (university) an ivory tower into which students and teachers can withdraw for a time for teaching or research, accepting no responsibility for improvement of society. As an ultimate goal every university teacher in India should become a

researcher and every university researcher should become a teacher. Publication of quality research apart from good teaching ability, should become one of the basic criteria for advancement of teachers in their university career (GOI, 1966, p. 480)

Quality:

Moreover, we must recognize that pursuit of excellence implies and requires a discriminatory approach; and that to provide equal resources to all irrespective of the quality of their performance and potentiality for growth merely promotes mediocrity (GOI, 1966, p. 563).

Many of the existing institutions lack the physical facilities, adequately trained staff and in particular the atmosphere so essential for quality education. It is very important that a possible lowering of standards consequent on the numerical increase projected above should be scrupulously avoided by adequate advance preparation. For this purpose, urgent steps should be taken to strengthen the provision of staff and other facilities in existing institutions and to carry out the adjustments and changes that expansion necessitates (GOI, 1966, p. 687).

Publication of quality research apart from good teaching ability, should become one of the basic criteria for advancement of teachers in their university career (GOI, 1966, p. 480).

3. National Policy on Education (GOI, 1986)

Teachers' performance will be systematically assessed. All posts will be filled on the basis of merit (GOI, 1986, p.19)

Of all the factors which determine the quality of education and its contribution to national development, the teacher is undoubtedly the most important. It is on his personal qualities and character, his educational qualifications and professional competence that the success of all educational endeavours must ultimately depend. Teachers must, therefore, be accorded an honoured place in society. Their emoluments and other service conditions should be adequate and satisfactory having regard to their qualifications and responsibilities (GOI, 1986, p.39).

The 1990s period saw the policy had discuss more frequently about developing performance indicators in particular, like in the Punnayya Committee (GOI, 1993), to begin with. It also witnessed institution of NAAC in 1994 as quality monitoring agency. But getting accreditation from NAAC was not made mandatory until then. Let us at look at some more policy exerpts.

4. Punnayya Committee (GOI, 1993)

Accountability:

...the need for universities to accept accountability in terms of quality, cost consciousness and cost effectiveness is imperative (GOI, 1993, p.7)

Quality:

...bringing into existence a new pattern of internal management of universities which will support quality, promote cost effectiveness, prevent wastage and duplication and encourage raising of resources... (GOI, 1993, p. 8)

5. Central Advisory Board on Education (GOI, 2005)

Accountability:

Institutions should make their output performance public to ensure accountability (GI, 2005, p. 15)

All universities should adopt the practice of performance appraisal of teachers initiated through self-appraisal based on objective parameters (GOI, 2005, p. 16)

The yardstick of measurement of accountability includes self-regulated or agency-regulated adherence to rules; self-motivated efforts towards accountability and pro-active role in conceiving and implementing innovations (GOI, 2005, p.21)

Quality:

Each higher education institution should set up an Internal Quality Assurance Cell with a view to continuously assessing its performance on objective and predefined parameters. (GOI, 2005, p.15)

The strengths of achieving accountability are:

• Quality sustenance and quality enhancement in higher education

• Student feedback mechanism to facilitate system-oriented quality improvements

• Teachers' self-appraisal to achieve building of confidence and capacity.

• Setting up of benchmarks of accountability and quality.

• Checks and balances for monitoring accountability and quality

• Appraisal to get oriented towards the entire system of higher education. (GOI, 2005, p. 22)

In order to have an unbiased understanding of whether the quality improvement methodologies have successfully percolated down to various constituents of higher education, an Academic Audit System or Internal Quality Assurance System should be implemented. Academic Audit is an educational exercise to asses and improve the performance of teachers/ students/administrative staff and the whole institution in a holistic manner and to have a pragmatic view about what is the present status of academic standards of higher education in a given institution (GOI, 2005, p. 23).

6. National Knowledge Commission (GOI, 2009a)

Accountability:

The higher education system must provide for accountability to society and create accountability within... Evaluation of courses and teachers by students as well as peer evaluation of teachers by teachers should be encouraged (GOI, 2009a, p.64).

An expansion of higher education which provides students with choices and creates competition between institutions is going to be vital in enhancing accountability (GOI, 2009a, p. 64)

It may be necessary to rethink the issue of salary differentials within and between universities along with other means of attracting and retaining talented faculty members (GOI, 2009a, p.65) (between the disciplines within the universities and also across universities)

The essential objective of accountability to society must be to empower students to take decisions rather than simply increase the power of the state. Stipulated performance criteria or inspections are forms of control. We need to create systems that enable students, or their parents, to choose between and assess universities (GOI, 2009a, p. 74).

An expansion of higher education which provides students with choices and creates competition between institutions is going to be vital in enhancing accountability. Such competition between institutions within India is, of course, essential. But the significance of competition from outside India, more qualitative than quantitative, must not be underestimated (GOI, 2009a, p.74)

(In the proposed national universities)..there shall be no career advancement schemes and appointments at every level shall be through open competition. (GOI, 2009a, p. 76).

Quality:

(Under the sub-title: Promote enhanced quality) It is necessary to formulate appropriate policies for the entry of foreign institutions into India and the promotion of Indian institutions abroad, while ensuring a level playing field for foreign and domestic institutions within the country (GOI, 2009a, p. 64-65)

There should be stringent information disclosure norms for all educational institutions such as their financial situation, physical assets, admissions criteria, faculty positions, academic curricula, as also their source and level of accreditation. Evaluation of courses and teachers by students as well as peer evaluation of teachers by teachers should be encouraged. There must be a focus on upgrading infrastructure (GOI, 2009a, p. 64).

It is necessary to provide working conditions in the form of office space and research support combined with housing. But it may not be sufficient. This must be combined with some incentives and rewards for performance (GOI, 2009a, p.68).

The quality of higher education depends on a wide range of factors. But accountability, at every level, is a critical determinant (GOI, 2009a, p. 74)

An expansion of higher education which provides students with choices and creates competition between institutions is going to be vital in enhancing accountability (GOI, 2009a, p.74).

Instead of vesting one institution created by the state with monopoly power, the IRAHE may be empowered to license a number of accreditation agencies, public and private, to do the ratings. In doing so, the regulator would set standards for them. This will need to be accompanied by stringent information disclosure norms for all educational institutions, including the source and level of their accreditation. The rapid growth in higher education, particularly in the private sector, has created a strong need for empowering students and parents with reliable information from a credible accreditation process (GOI, 2009a, p.74).

Almost everywhere, information in the public domain is an important source of accountability. Higher education should be no exception. There should be disclosure norms for universities and institutions imparting higher education. They should be required to place basic information relating to their financial situation, physical assets, accreditation ratings, admissions criteria, faculty positions, academic curricula,

and so on, in the public domain. This would empower students and parents and enable them to make informed choices. Information, along with competition, fostered by increased supply, will close the accountability loop (GOI, 2009a, p.75).

7. Yashpal Committee (GOI, 2009b)

Accountability:

Setting up of certain performance criteria is a common device for infusing accountability in an organisation. Such a device is particularly useful for institutions which are expected to work in an autonomous manner (GOI, 2009b, p.26). (on the basis of three criteria: socio-cultural aims, academic excellence and institutional self-reform)

Student feedback should become a routine, and teachers whose feedback records remain poor ...should be required to face formal procedure (GOI, 2009b, p.44).

Quality:

Irrespective of the checks and balances one may place on a regulatory system, we will have to ultimately depend on the quality of people in our universities to ensure its health over time (GOI, 2009b, p. 43).

Quality of teaching is the best indicator and a key determinant of the overall quality of institutional life (GOI, 2009b, p. 44).

Developing global benchmarks on student performance; university performance (GOI, 2009b, p.70).

8. Rashtriya Uchchattar Shiksha Abhiyan (GOI, 2013b)

Accountability:

All funding under the RUSA would be norm based and future grants would be outcome dependent (GOI, 2013b, p.83)

Setting up an Internal Quality Assurance Cell (IQAC) to continuously assess the performance of the institution on objective and pre-defined parameters and making the output performance data public to ensure transparency and accountability (GOI, 2013b, p.97).

Performance appraisal of teachers with adequate weightage for research work based on quantifiable parameters (GOI, 2013b, p.97).

Quality:

Setting up an Internal Quality Assurance Cell (IQAC) to continuously assess the performance of the institution on objective and pre-defined parameters and making the output performance data public to ensure transparency and accountability (GOI, 2013b, p.97).

9. New Education Policy Draft (GOI, 2016d)

Accountability:

A fundamental weakness is the lack of transparency and accountability in the system, which is exacerbated by the strength of teacher unions, threat of strikes and the affiliations of student bodies 'with different political parties (GOI, 2016d, p. 123)

In short, the new management paradigm should encourage quality by offering total autonomy; should discourage the poor managements with appropriate checks and controls; equally, when an institution is assessed to be below minimal standards, it should be closed down without ado (GOI, 2016d, p.135)

Quality:

...evolve methods to assess quality of teaching and learning, develop instruments to measure teaching effectiveness and create feedback mechanisms for sharing the results of studies on teaching effectiveness (GOI, 2016d, p. 124)

Accreditation is a higher threshold of minimal quality assurance; it validates and provides assurance that the quality of education provided by the institution meets a common standard... Accreditation is important for the institution, the student and for prospective employers (GOI, 2016d, p.126).

Apart from accreditation, ranking of higher educational institutions is another useful indicator of institutional performance. (GOI, 2016d, p. 126).

10. National Institutional Ranking Framework (GOI, 2016c):

Quality:

> New benchmarks of quality need to be defined to help overall system to move up on the quality spectrum. Research assessment and national ranking of Indian educational institutions can play an important role in improving performance and quality of academic institutions (GOI, 2016c, p.1). - Preface NIRF.

5.6. Discussion

As can be seen from above, accountability and quality have found a place in all the phases in higher education policy. But the meaning and implications differ. It has had implications on not only subjectivising the faculty, defining their identity, but also on what can happen to their academic freedom. Let us identify, if there is any difference in discourse over time. Much of the policy in the Indian space is an offshoot of an influence of global level trends. We will look at those trends and the features, and juxtapose the Indian scenario, before commenting upon the nature or a shift in discourse.

5.6.1. Global shift in discourse

The 19th century and early 20th century witnessed a preponderance of liberalism as a discourse, which was much influenced by the ideas of Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall, James Mills. The period espoused *Laissez Faire*-ism, and critical of the idea of a welfare state; the State was stated to be interfering with the freedom of individuals. Social welfare was thought to be an aggregation of individual self-interests. The Great Depression in 1930s set the stage for state intervention in the wake of market failure. The period from 1930s until 1970s was marked by Keynesianism, where the State sought to place restriction on some of the activities of market, which were speculative in nature.

Ward (2012) identities a further shift in the discourse at macro-level and also in the working of public institutions. This was the advent of neo-liberal discourse. The neo-liberalism placed importance to the role of the State, as one facilitating the better working of the markets. The criticism placed by neo-liberals, particularly Hayek, was that managed economies, by controlling production and consumption in society, killed

democracy, freedom of an individual, innovation and motivation. It established a bureaucratic control of the economy. In case of civil services, Ward (2012) posits that the bureaucrats became the "icon of evil" (p. 26), without being accountable for the work they performed, because of guaranteed pensions. Another rationale behind neo-liberalism highlighted was corrupt practices, laziness in attitude, dependence and abuse of position. These problems associated with the State managed organisations pushed for accountability, choice and privatisation, and restructuring the public organisations. But they also realised that markets, although superior to the government, could always fall into dis-equilibrium and that accorded the State a crucial role in ensuring a smooth function of the markets. Some of the features of neo-liberalism highlighted by him are: 1) Advocacy of self-interest which can be nurtured in market-like conditions, 2) Superiority of rationality, efficiency and optimising effects of markets, 3) loosening of market activities by state, 4) reforming public realm and public institutions using market and privatisation measures. The last condition is called as New Public Management, which is an arm of neo-liberalism, beginning in 1980s and 1990s, and which transforms the working conditions in the public organisations shifting towards private sector management practices (Deem, 1998; Ward, 2012), providing autonomy for greater accountability (Ward, 2012).

The main problematic of neo-liberal discourse is this 'autonomy'. The individuals are considered to be free to make decisions for their own benefits and welfare. Self-regulation or self-assessment is understood to making individuals free to monitor their own performance, if they want to succeed in their careers. It responsibilises them to report on their own performance. The performance under NPM is however measured against a set of standards or indicators, or a regulation which seeks to bring about these practices. It could be called as therefore 'enforced self-regulation' (Jongbloed, 2004), with a possibility of leaving a little room for freedom in true sense. Foucault (1991)[47] calls these individuals (or institutions) as the self-governing individuals who are governed by their own practices of self. The self is conceptualised within a particular rationality of a discourse. The conjecture of freedom under neo-liberalism, therefore, needs to be tested.

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[47] As cited in Ward (2012).

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5.6.2. Is there a shift in discourse in Indian Higher Education Policy?

If we begin with Radhakrishnan Commission and Kothari Commission, which (juxtaposing with prevailing discourse at global level) featured before 1970s, one can see a lot of reliance on the State as a major funder and accountability has been rooted in the society and students. Radhakrishnan clearly explicated that it is difficult to measure the work of faculty. Kothari Commission argued that teachers should have high ambition, placing an importance om accountability being nurtured at the level of one's consciousness. But it placed an importance on research publications as a criterion for advancement in one's career. Similarly, later the National Policy on Education (GOI, 1986) argued for assessment of faculty and their recruitment/ promotion on the basis of merit than years spent in service.

But one element of premise success of teachers in jobs presented an advent of a neo-liberal (or NPM) tenet, the which although found dominance in 1970s (near the period when Kothari Commission was conceived) but continued to exist as a subjugated discourse globally in 1950s and 1960s. However, it was largely dominated by Keynesian school of thoughts.

The stage for letting the reins of the state go loose began from 1990s, with the conception of Punnayya Committee recommendations The principles of market or market facilitation conditions have been encouraged in Indian higher education, through the tools of autonomy and the ensuing accountability, which the following paragraphs would briefly discuss upon.

Punnayya Committee (GOI 1993) had vouched for autonomy of universities by diversifying the funding base and in return recommended developing performance indicators and conducting academic audit, in order to ensure quality (GOI, 1993, p.71) and that funding should be output based and through student vouchers (GOI, 1993, p.88). As an offshoot of the ideas presented in the National Policy on Education, to address the issues of quality, National Accreditation Assessment Council (NAAC) was formed in 1994 (Patil & Pillai, 2016). It aimed to make universities accountable to produce output. NAAC accreditation, based on only quantifiable indicators, supposedly acts as a signal of quality. It has been made mandatory for universities to get themselves accredited since 2013.

In 2000 the emphasis on privatisation in higher education was placed more strongly with, the Ambani-Birla report (GOI, 2000) advocating the users pay principle in university funding, coupled with loan schemes and financial grants for the economically and socially backward section of society. It called for a decentralised management of public education and expansion of privatisation. Another step towards relegating the role of state and enhancing autonomy suggested was to leave higher education to the private sector entirely and keeping the economy free from controls to create conditions necessary for market for education. The role of the State was further restricted to only ensuring the financial guarantees for student loans. It asked for providing an unbridled autonomy to the institutions which did not have government as source of funding or where government provided a low level of funding. While there was no direct mention of accountability, but under the given framework, it goes without saying the location of accountability of universities would be confined to the students and other private funders.

In somewhat similar light, the CABE committee (GOI, 2005) had argued that in order to enhance efficiency, the universities become financially autonomous by exploring other sources of funding like introducing self-financing courses, generating internal resources through student fees and undertaking consultancy and sponsored research projects, establish linkages for academic and research collaboration with their counterpart academic and research organizations, industry and professional organisations in India and abroad. At the same time, the universities were recommended to set up internal quality assessment cell (i.e. academic audit of teachers and universities) to make their output performance public and ensure quality in education, student feedback mechanism, teachers' self-appraisal to ensure accountability and regulate the misuse of autonomy provided to the universities. Creating salary differentials between performers and non-performers was suggested in the National Knowledge Commission (NKC) (GOI, 2009a) and also universities must be made accountable to the students, which would enhance competition between the universities. The NKC suggested raising tuition fees and leveraging land, especially in the form of land grants to attract more private investment to bring in financial autonomy in universities. In a similar light, Yashpal Committee (GOI, 2009b) proposed connecting universities with industry to promote innovations. In order to meet the needs of industry, the universities would provide practical subjects and

therefore justify themselves for charging high fees. The committee had recognized that academic autonomy is crucial for quality/ creative thinking and therefore proposed that universities should be made autonomous. This autonomy would be ensured by the National Commission for Higher Education and Research (NCHER), which would at the same time create norms for ensuring quality and accrediting universities. Setting up of certain performance criteria and public feedback on performance were thought of as important tools for infusing accountability.

A strong resentment towards the direct role of the State in the Indian higher education was further clearly presented by the Narayana Murthy Committee in 2012. It had expressed concerns over limited public funds allocated to the higher education and as a solution to this problem suggested bringing in corporate sector for funding, determining curricula, outcomes, collaborating in research etc. Also, it was posited that corporate sector is a direct beneficiary of the higher education, which makes universities accountable to the corporate sector and thus would create potential for changing the nature of knowledge generated. It advocated for financial autonomy by charging fees from students and raising fees from students. With respect to accountability it was conjectured that accountability should be to the accreditation agency and there should be no intervention from the central or state government agencies and that public funding should be linked with performance.

Another step to make faculty accountable and thereby improve excellence of universities, was suggested in the Central Universities Act, 2009 wherein a faculty's job is transferrable across central universities. In 2010 Performance Based Assessment Scheme (PBAS) was introduced, whereby the faculty has been made accountable to produce output in terms of a) research, b) teaching and c) co-curricular activities. This is to justify the salaries that they get from the State. The State made accreditation of all universities mandatory in 2013 (GOI, 2013d), making the funds flow to universities contingent upon their performance. The performance-based funding for the state universities has been mooted in the *Rashtriya Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan* (RUSA) (GOI, 2013b), making them accountable for the funds they would receive from the State. The RUSA has sought to address the problem of low quality education facing the state universities in India by recommending financially and academically autonomy for them.

The student has gained a central position as one of the locations of accountability in the policy. Also, the meaning of quality higher education has now been understood to be something which would provide skills and hence employability to the students for their survival. The 11th FYP had initiated launching of National Skill Development Mission, the objectives of which were further pushed forth by the 12th FYP. The universities in such a framework would be accountable to the students for providing skills/ job and to the job-market for providing employable cohort. The 12th FYP had advocated for the public private partnership in universities and also mentioned about universities to also engage with community and conduct socially relevant research. The two recommendations may run counter to each other. Recently, it has been suggested that every central university must develop 5 villages around them.

More recently, the preliminary suggestions to the New Education Policy clearly mention about the paradigmatic shift from regulation to facilitation, that should come about to promote autonomy of institutions. With respect to funding it says that public funding is inappropriate to deal with expanding higher education and therefore funding base should be diversified including students as a potential source of funding. Further, universities should engage with industry to provide skills to the students, which would make them employable. It encourages public private partnership in the Indian universities.

In the more recent times, there has been a lament in the policy circles over Indian universities not figuring in the world ranking. It has been taken as an indicator of poor quality of universities. As a result, a National Institutional Ranking Framework (NIRF) (GOI, 2016c; GOI, 2017a) has recently emerged, which aims at making universities accountable at home and improving their quality, in order for them to figure in the global rankings. The UGC in 2017 (GOI, 2016e; GOI, 2017b) came up with the regulation of giving the status of institutions of eminence based on their overall performance.

Let us here juxtapose the conditions or features of neo-liberalism offered by Ward (2012), to see if the larger discourse is neo-liberalism.

a) The policy recommendations have been premised on instilling efficiency in the universities by infusion financial autonomy and making them accountable through producing performance indicators.

b) In the public universities, the practices like mandatory accreditation, competing for ranking, or monitoring the performance of faculty, have been introduced. These are the features of New Public Management, aiming to reorganise the universities and the lives of individuals within those.

c) The institutions and individuals (through PBAS) are assessed which requires them to be self-regulating and performing institutions. Individuals are governed through their self-interest in promotion or recruitment, or, for example, outcompeting other universities for a better ranking. The state is not regulating by control but by initiating another measure of accountability where the institutions are required to be globally competitive for they are judged by where they stand in global terms; they have to take account of the global environment where they are operating (Marginson & van der Wende, 2007). Another effort in this regard is the State opening its doors to foreign institutions and also selling its education abroad.

Given the above transformations, one can see a move towards the broader neo-liberal discourse and more specifically the New Public Management. The intensity has sharpened post 2000s in particular. Root of the change could be traced back to the early 1990s, with infusion of structural adjustment programme and stabilisation policy instituted by the World Bank and the IMF in the developing countries ridden with debts. These suggested a cut in public expenditure on higher education and a subsequent privatisation to ensure efficiency. Autonomy from the State funding, thenceforth, found a mention in the policy documents. At the same time an additional dimension of a neo-liberal change in higher education regulation has emerged, which went beyond fund-base diversification to changing the very governance of universities, through injecting managerial practices in public funded institutions. The State steers the individuals from the distance in universities. The principles of New Public Management (NPM) are injected, which is an arm of neo-liberal form of governance, where the principles of private sector are installed in public sector institutions. In addition to this, there is an attempt to change the culture of the

universities, towards that mimicking a private enterprise and making them more competitive; the universities are exposed not only to the external competition but there is also established an internal competition by forming internal markets, focusing on short term success and competitive zeal amongst individuals (Deem, 1998).

Whereas it had a mention of performance assessment to instil accountability in the universities and the year 1994 also saw setting up of NAAC, it is particularly in the last decade that quality assurance has tightened its grip in the universities, as means of ensuring accountability. And this form of accountability, was not in conjunction with granting financial autonomy, as happens in a New Public Management reform. This new governance regime focuses on regulating the universities and its different actors from a distance, through self-regulation. Thus, overtime accountability is being sought by making faculty/ universities document their performances in numbers. However, the most immediate impact on the faculty behaviour, is of the Performance Based Assessment System (PBAS), which was introduced in 2010. Thus, the other objects are also identified during this period, in addition to accountability. Some of the other objects, which are interlinked, include efficiency, quality, standards, output, performance indicators, competition etc. However, the two broad objects which exist with respect to performance assessment are: accountability and quality.

The next section would brief on the Foucauldian framework, which would be used in the section following that to understand how the policy is effecting a rational behaviour of individuals in higher education, using the technologies of accountability and autonomy and legitimating the present discourse, which is neo-liberal. Therefore, the rational behaviour would be looked at by adding to the analysis the tenets of New Public Management, of which efficiency, effectiveness and productivity play a crucial role in being accountable.

5.6.3. Accountability as policy technology

When 'accountability' is situated in a discourse, it comes to be understood as a social concept, having intended real effects in social life, as per the logic of prevalent discourse. When Foucault's framework of discourse analysis is used, which is premised on governmentality, these effects refer to exercising power and power

relations which reinforce neo-liberal discourse. The governmentality is effectuated through the interests of individuals; the people are governed by their own self-interest (Cotoi, 2011).

The notion of accountability as discussed in the policy is that of creating a self-regulating and self-interested individual, who aims at maximising their own utility. It fosters individualism. This is not to say that the policy doesn't talk about accountability and the autonomy is uncontrolled freedom. The accountability remains but to the market needs than the societal interests. This is expected given that markets have been looked at as a potential source of funding than the State, in the name of autonomy.

The neo-liberal discourse and its various elements like accountability, autonomy, quality or minimum standards are the technologies of government, which alter the relationship between citizens of a society in a way that the discourse gains legitimacy in the society. This called as policy effect, brought about through power- that is discourse.

To argue that the above notion of autonomy and accountability are the technologies that the government uses to create subjectivisation and mould the relationship between different constituents of higher education, we need to understand the effects they create to perpetuate the neo-liberal discourse. That is, we need to understand the process through which the myriads of bodies which are constituted as subjects, the network through which power circulates and undertake an ascending analysis of power, i.e. the manner in which the phenomena of power enter at the most basic levels (Foucault, 1980). The essential question which is being addressed here is "how" of the power and not where or in what does this power reside (Foucault, 1980; Townley, 1993). The nodal point of analysis is therefore the "way" in which knowledge is put to work and distributed in the workings of a successful discourse (Hook, 2001). The important level of analysis for power relations is at the level of micro practices, the everyday activities of life (Powers, 2007) and how these practices shape the ways of thought, speech ad conduct of individuals as well as institutions (Hodges, Kuper & Reeves, 2008). Thus, the Foucauldian discourse analysis is at the point of an individual, or at the micro-level (Diaz-Bone et al., 2008). Governing and behaviour control regimes (as neo-liberalism) aim to rationalise the behaviour of

individuals as per the truth (Cotoi, 2011). The truth is the rationality of the discourse (which is neo-liberalism, in the present context). It creates a 'programmable' reality, that is regularity in reality, which comes into effect by commonly accepted facts (Cotoi, 2011, p. 117), the truth of discourse. The rationality of discourse is put into practice by the rational actions of the individuals and institutions.

Given the above framework, the section seeks to answer the following questions: a) How the present discourse is subjectivising different micro-level individuals or institutions? b) How the relationship is being altered amongst various constituents of higher education, (and how the nature of knowledge produced may get altered) as follows:

a) The process of subjectivisation is happening at the level of the State, higher education institutions and the individuals (faculty, students, etc.).

The role of the State as altered, with it creating more space for market like conditions. This kind of regulation is not a reduction in the role of the State but a positive conception of the State, where it provides conditions for markets in higher education to flourish. It is not a trade-off between regulation and competition, but a third best option which is stimulating competition as a function of regulation (Jongbloed, 2004). This approach is called as "state supervision model' rather that "state control model", wherein more room for market type system is provided, emphasizing individual decision making by providers (education institutions) and clients (students). Under this model, control cannot take place anymore through increasing interventions and regulations by government but through designing "clever frameworks for interaction between individual clients and individual providers". This is not to say that the role of government diminishes here. On the contrary, government has to arrange the framework, boundaries, devise policies which support building up high-skills and knowledge-intensive goods and services. The new regulatory paradigm is marked by "Structural Coupling"[48]. The neo-liberalism changed the role of the State as only a steerer from a distance, which acts more as a facilitator of privatisation, by cutting the public expenditure, encouraging private mode of funding

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[48] Structural Coupling occurs when two or more operationally autonomous but otherwise interdependent systems coexist in the same environment and react both to changes in that environment and each others' reactions. (Also, see Jessop, 1993).

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and collaboration of universities with industry to produce knowledge. The direct presence of State is construed more as interference. This has particularly been the tone of policy post-2000.

But a change in the relation of the State with others does not reflect a supreme position accorded to the State. Foucault states that "the analysis must not assume that the sovereignty of the state…or…domination is given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes" (Foucault, 1978, p.92). Thus, the State is but another subject in this node which seeks to bring life to the discourse, by undergoing a particular form of relation with universities. The State is the product of discourse (Ball, 2009).

The present state of policy is creating self-regulating, individualistic, self-interested subjects, who are freed from the direct control of the State. But in the process the State is emerging as an Evaluative State (Neave, 1988).

Another subject of neo-liberal discourse would be the faculty, who are moulded into self-regulating individuals. They are required to register output under PBAS, salaries differentials had been suggested to motivate them, ushering in competition, performance-based pay is understood as a motivating factor, etc. Thus, they are created as competitive subjects, who would maximise their scores. They become subject to numbers and become numbered subjects (Ball, 2015). The setting up of Internal Quality Assessment Cell also requires faculty to regulate themselves. Similarly, the students are subjectivised by providing them autonomy to evaluate the faculty, under PBAS. The students are treated as customers, who are a potential source of revenue. They are required to be self-regulating by paying the fees or securing the loans to fund their education and be responsible for their education.

The universities have been rendered freedom from the State and are suggested to look for alternative sources of funding by collaborating with industry, corporate sector, raising student fees, etc. This makes them competitive vis-a-vis other universities. Also, the universities have become self-regulating by registering outputs to secure performance based funding through accreditation. With the more recent NIRF, the universities would be required to act competitively, focusing more on

industry collaboration, student satisfaction, quantifying the non-quantifiables like teaching-learning process, etc.

b) The relationship has altered as a result between various constituents of higher education which is required for the sustenance of the neo-liberal discourse. For instance, the teachers have been made accountable to not only the State by registering outputs under PBAS but also students who are amongst evaluators of faculty and a potential source of funding. Universities would look forward to students as potential source of revenue and therefore would focus on providing labour market oriented, skill-based courses which would not be all-encompassing in nature. Universities are also now suggested to compete among themselves through the ranking framework. It would entail greater collaboration between academia and industry. This new relationship would proliferate all the more. The nature of knowledge as a result would get changed as a result of growing collaboration with the industry. The research output produced would be applied in nature and would be patented to serve as source of return to investment made by the industry. Roberts (2007) argues that only that knowledge which could be measured and sold would be produced, which would, in turn, drive out the rather complex, time consuming and uneven process of research to triviality and insignificance. The result of this would be researchers carry research only in the area leading to certain outcomes (like applied research) and subduing the areas of research which involve more time, risk and uncertainty (like basic research).

Not only this, the culture of performativity may lead the faculty or universities as a whole to resort to unethical means to deliver output; they may produce more at the cost of quality.

To sum up, it can be observed that the policy documents post 1990s are rampant with neo-liberal ideology which aims at installing market like conditions in higher education, particularly competition between universities to out compete each other in terms of quantifiable outputs and gain performance-based funding, or to serve certain customer interests which would provide them with funds. The individuals and institutions have to become self-interested in order to compete in the market. The accountability under such a framework is towards industry, students, private donors like alumni, international funding agencies etc.

Thus, as neo-liberal subjects, individuals and institutions are incited to invest in themselves, and to improve ourselves, to confirm to the 'truth', the truth of neo-liberalism (Ball, 2015). If they fail to do so they would be forced to not to enjoy the rewards of the system and would be left out.

However, this process of subjectivisation of often coupled with resistance or inner conflict in formation of faculty as neo-liberal subjects. This conflict could hamper the very objective of quality work expected to be performed by them. This is discussed in the next section.

5.7. Analysis of practices and ensuing power relations: Efficiency, effectiveness and productivity

This section initiates the second level of analysis of policy, that is practices rooted in neo-liberal behaviour of a subject. It throws light majorly on the efficiency, effectiveness and productivity with regard to macro level accountability measures, directed at universities as a whole, and micro-level accountability measures (like PBAS) which are directed at individual faculty. The power relations would require a detailed discussion and thus constitute a part of a next major section (Section 5.9).

During the post 1990s, more so post 2000s, the State has been creating conditions to bring in market-like practices in the higher education. This has been done in two ways: directly giving more space to the establishment of private higher education institutions and secondly, by the way of New Public Management. Ball and Youdell (2007) call the former as exogeneous privation and the latter as endogenous privatisation. It is the latter where the interest of this study lies in. In the public universities in India, the techniques and practices of performance assessment, which are found in private sector, have been brought into. It reflects the New Public Management, which is an arm of neo-liberalism. Such a performance assessment can lead to achieving improvement in an institution (Ball & Youdell, 2007).

It is often argued under neo-liberal discourse that these market forces make the universities perform more efficiently (Friedman, 1962; Massy, 2004; Olsen & Peters, 2005; Ball & Youdell, 2007), which furthers quality or improvement in work (Olsen & Peters, 2005; Ball & Youdell, 2007).

We would look at the implications for efficiency, effectiveness and productivity at two levels:

i. Institutional level Accountability measures: The measures for accountability for the entire higher education system

ii. Performance Based Assessment System: The measure installed in 2010 to ensure accountability by the faculty with respect to three categories of their work: Teaching and Evaluation, Co-curricular activities and Research.

But before having an analysis of implications of efficiency, effectiveness and productiveness, let us look at the economic meaning of these terms.

5.7.1. Efficiency, Effectiveness and Productivity

The efficiency that is expected could be of 3 broad types, as mentioned in Jongbloed (2004): dynamic efficiency, technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. By dynamic efficiency is meant that providers would look for new products that are differentiated from existing ones. This differentiation could be horizontal, which means producing other products or it could be vertical, which means an improvement in quality of existing products. It also refers to a long-term investments in innovations. Only when a firm does that can the product be differentiated from the others. Technical efficiency is production requiring few resources or providers looking for better means of production, producing services at a lower cost. The third kind of efficiency, allocative efficiency, is where good or services are produced in accordance with the needs of consumers. It could lead to lowering the price of the good or service, making it more attractive to more consumers. This allocative efficiency, or responsiveness to demand and supply, also enhances the dynamic efficiency of the institution (Massy, 2004). The technical and allocative efficiency reflect internal efficiency of an organisation. Internal efficiency of an educational institution measures how funds could be best allocated; it is obtaining the greatest educational output for any given level of spending (Lockheed & Hanushek, 1994). It is defined as "producing a right bundle of output given the needs and wants of

stakeholders[49], and then minimising production cost for a given bundle[50] (Massy, 2004, p. 13).

A common theme that could be inferred from above, for any university trying to be efficient is that the focus would be on producing output which is concomitant with the demand in the market or needs of consumers, and at the same time on reducing costs. It is pursuit of these efficiencies which would determine the practices and the strategies of universities. Thus, it is broadly the market that would presume a crucial space for universities to make strategies. Since, the purpose is to compete globally, the market-oriented strategies would span the global space as well.

The market forces or market like conditions in higher education institutions also lead to improvement in productivity. Productivity refers output per unit of input. In the wake of market forces governing the institutions, they often evaluate where their comparative advantage lie, and utilise their inputs to their best advantage. Producing high demand output at lower cost would lead the institution to save and thus invest the gain in the less-demanded activity (Massy, 2004). This cross-subsidisation is another kind of productivity improvement.

The third concept of effectiveness means that universities are meeting their goals, or in case of market-based accountability, meeting the goals as desired under that framework.

Now, since all the practices of the universities/faculty would be guided by the larger discourse of neo-liberal accountability and thus efficiency, the practices would be disentangled to see how these efficiencies, effectiveness and productivity improvements operate in each of the practice. After having understood this, the paper would look at the implications this would have on freedom.

This exercise would first be done for the larger policy measures discussing about accountability at institutional level, and then pertaining to PBAS, which is context of the study.

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[49] Allocative efficiency
[50] Technical efficiency

5.7.1.1. Institutional Level Accountability Measures

Much of the focus of the policy has been to infuse accountability for making the system more efficient, effective and productive. For the higher education system as a whole the reforms pertaining to accountability have been of two kinds: financial reforms, and non-financial regulatory reforms. The financial reforms include providing financial autonomy to the universities, by relegation of the State funding in favour of other modes of funding, like exploring industry, student (vouchers), student fees, student loans, etc. The universities have been encouraged to move from input-based funding to output based funding (Jongbloed, 2004). Financial reforms have been introduced to reduce the wastage of resources and make them perform by making them accountable to the source of funding. State funding has been found as not only an interference in the working of universities but also less accountable. The second set of reforms, of New Public Management, have relied on instituting performance- based indicators for the entire system, the advent of which was institution of NAAC in 1994. Performance of universities was given a further push in 2013 with NAAC becoming mandatory and institution of RUSA which introduced performance-based funding to state universities. The more recent regulations of Institution of Eminence, Graded Autonomy provided to universities and National Institutional Ranking framework is a further step in this direction.

Let us look at the implications of these reforms.

Efficiency

Technical efficiency: It would aim at minimizing the costs so as to reduce wastage. With respect to reforms pertaining to financial autonomy, such a practice might not hold true. The universities would not have a dearth of funds, if they explore other private sources. In case of NPM kind of reforms, like ranking the emphasis is not performance which not directly linked with funding. Technically efficient practices would not really take place under neo-liberal accountability. There could, however, be only chance possibilities particularly for universities trying to achieve Institutions of Eminence status or international ranking: Collaboration with the faculty from other universities majorly online, recruiting foreign faculty, albeit those who relatively demand less salary or Focus on applied research than the basic research, because basic

research is costly in terms of money and time and involves risk. A disclaimer deserves a mention here. The universities trying to achieve such a status would generally enjoy abundance of funds. The chances of them minimising costs are, therefore, extremely bleak.

Allocative Efficiency: It would orient the mission and output of the universities as per the needs of the funders. Accountability would be in the form of producing the kind of output desired by them. This would equally be true in case of NPM kind of reforms like ranking, where the nature of research would be as valued for performance. The universities have to feature in the national rankings as well which require the data on mean salary of students as well as their placement records. The UGC regulation on Institution of Eminence renders enough freedom to the universities to recruit faculty from the industry. This would lead to a change in the curriculum, to that oriented more towards the needs of labour market. courses would be oriented towards ensuring employability of the students. The way that universities would differentiate from each other would be by producing cutting –edge research and out-compete each other. This would majorly lead to collaborating with industry and producing the much-in-demand research output. Again, as mentioned in the UGC regulation the focus would be to produce applied research than basic research. This, when coupled with the financial autonomy that these universities are provided with respect to deciding the tuition fees, would call for providing courses which would enhance only the skills needed by the market. The courses pertaining to management or engineering would replace provision of conventional courses. Thus, there would be a shift in the accountability towards meeting the needs of the stakeholders, away from society.

Dynamic efficiency:

It reflects how a university innovates its products and processes so as to adjust to the needs of market in the long run. The adherence to allocative efficiency also enhances the dynamic efficiency of a university. But as can be seen above, it is enhancement of new kind of products (horizontal) than necessarily an improvement in quality (vertical).

Productivity:

Productivity refers to output per unit of input. As mentioned earlier, cross-subsidisation is a kind of productivity improvement. This would reflect the efficient practices as mentioned above, where a university would utilise its inputs (faculty) to produce research, which holds a greater value, than teaching. The rationale for this argument is found in the relative weight given to research in international rankings, where the institutions of eminence are required to feature. In the international rankings, the Times Higher Education World University Rankings devote over 60 per cent weightage to research alone and 30 per cent to teaching, which also has components pertaining to PhD awarded. Reputation surveys on teaching and research explicitly mentioned are given 33 per cent weightage. The QS rankings are largely based on reputation, with academic reputation constituting 40 per cent and employer reputation constituting 10 percent of total score. The academic reputation is calculated by taking experts opinion regarding the teaching and research quality at universities. Citations per faculty constitute another 20 per cent of total score. Thus, research assumes a sizeable weightage in performance assessment under QS rankings. The third international ranking where the Indian World Class Universities aim to feature in is the Shanghai's Academic Ranking of World Universities. This ranking gives 90 per cent weightage to research outcomes.

Another possible step in this direction could be division of labour, where junior faculty or domestic faculty are utilised for teaching and foreign faculty conduct research related activities, networking with faculty abroad. Such strategies provide universities a better edge in featuring in rankings. The QS and THE have components of international outlook or international faculty and students. That the international students would take admission in a university or an international collaboration would take place would in turn depend upon the reputation of the national university.

Effectiveness: The universities, when adhering to practices pertaining to allocative efficiency and productivity improvement exhibit their effectiveness; they are producing as per the goals defined in the larger discourse.

5.7.1.2. Performance Based Assessment System

The PBAS captures output of faculty in three categories:

i. Teaching and Evaluation (Category I): Assessment is made in the area of classroom teaching, exam duties, preparing material/curriculum, tutorials, use of innovative teaching methods, etc, measured in the unit of time spent.

ii. Co-curricular and Extension Activities (Category II): The assessment is made in terms of student related extension activities, professional development and contribution to the corporate life of the university, measured in the unit of time spent.

iii. Research and Academic Contribution (Category III): Faculty performance is assessed in terms of numbers of papers published, conference attended, projects undertaken, consultancy activities, invited lectures, research supervised, etc.

The purported objective is to define minimum eligibility criteria for appointment of faculty and other academic staff in college and universities in India and maintaining minimum standards in higher education. In each category, the faculty are required to score minimum points in order to apply for appointment or promotion. The regulation has undergone amendments (Please see appendix I).

Of the concepts of efficiency, it is allocative efficiency which would be applicable to analyse faculty behaviour, along with productivity. As far as technical efficiency is concerned, it requires minimizing costs to produce a certain output or given costs maximizing output. Faculty behaviour is assessed not in terms of costs. But from amongst these two, it would be latter, that is maximizing output[51] given the time and money costs involved, which would be valid for analysing strategies of faculty, which reflects nothing but productivity of faculty.

Allocative efficiency:

Under performance-based accountability this means that faculty would supply output as per needs of this market-based reform. It would also ensure their effectiveness in

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[51] Output, in case, of PBAS would be maximized only until a particular point. PBAS requires faculty to perform a certain minimum amount of work, beyond which the points gained do not add much value.

the system. It is to be noted here that in teaching category it is the input which is measured, and research has output such as number of papers or conference certificates. What is visible is the research output, controlling for its quality, and not the teaching process. In order to be performing as per the requirement of the regulation, there could be a possibility of reallocation of some time away from teaching to research. Another possible implication of this focus on research could be publishing the nature of work which is easier or faster to research. An example could be applied kind of a research than basic research; the latter is time taking and uncertain often. Thus, faculty would produce the kind of output which would categorise them as 'performing faculty' or accountable.

Productivity (and Technical Efficiency):

Productivity improvement would also have faculty strategizing their time allocation, input, to produce maximum output or at least what is required for getting promotion to the next stage. One way would be cross subsidisation, as discussed under allocative efficiency. Another mechanism of productivity improvement is substitution within the categories. For instance, participation in corporate life of university by becoming a member of academic committees or board of studies would be less time and effort taking than student related co-curricular activities. Similarly, publishing in an edited volume of a book would be less strenuous then publishing in peer previewed international journal. Or writing a text book would fetch more points than publishing a paper in refereed journal.

Thus, the performance-based accountability would make faculty efficient and productive, as per the standard definitions. However, the question of quality is not addressed in the regulation.

Effectiveness: The faculty members, when adhering to practices pertaining to allocative efficiency and productivity improvement exhibit their effectiveness; they are producing or strategising as per the goals defined in the larger discourse.

5.8. A discussion on power relations

For the above strategies to take place, the individuals as well as institutions are required to undertake rational practices as per the larger discourse of neo-liberalism.

There would emerge power relations and process of subjectivisation. First, we would look at the university level accountability. This would happen at two levels, at the level of an individual and at the level of an institution. That is the relationship would alter amongst individuals, between individuals and institutions and thirdly, amongst institutions. After this, the power relations and process of subject formation pertaining to only PBAS would be highlighted.

5.8.1. University level accountability and power relations

There would be a change in the relationship between the institutions (the State and the global space) and the individuals. It is this relationship which would further guide the very practices in the universities.

A. University with the State:

The push for world class university has certainly led to legitimating the significance of ranking. The NIRF ranking is a step in this effect. The ranking is a form of governmentality; that is the technology used by the government to regulate the behaviour of the individuals within the university. This is done through self-regulation, which was discussed earlier in the paper. The university monitors its own performance with respect to the expectations set up globally (because the aim as mentioned in the UGC regulation is to find a place in the global rankings). Another mechanism used by the State is to instil financial autonomy in such universities by rendering them with the freedom to raise resources and expand those resources. Such a regulation would render the knowledge in the subjects that they are amongst the strong contenders for the World class status and they would thus alter their practices inside the universities, which would be discussed in detail in sub-section C.

Such a distancing of the State from funding universities is found to be efficient; neo-liberals often argue State funding leading to inefficiencies through wastage and interference by the State. The next two sub-sections would detail upon what kind of efficient practices are expected to undertake in the given neo-liberal discourse.

B. University within the international realm:

In order to feature in the international rankings and appear world class the universities would undertake collaboration with universities abroad, for projects, and also recruit faculty and students from abroad. Another major practice that the universities would try to emulate would be a greater focus on research, in order to gain better reputation.

The neo-liberal discourse pertaining to world class universities would render knowledge amongst the individuals that they are but a subject of the discourse. By this is meant, they would identify themselves with the rationality of the larger discourse and would mould their behaviour accordingly. The individuals by constantly monitoring their performance in order to feature as a world class university, would become a 'numbered subject' (Ball, 2015). Anything that could be measured would be undertaken at the expense of anything which cannot be directly counted. Their identity getting attached to numbers becomes the truth of the discourse. There would emerge other truths as well; the works within the universities could reorganise, by orienting academic to the larger academic discourse, the students would be treated as customers for being a potential source of raising revenue.

C. Intra-university practices

The practices that the university would undertake could be either internal or international. The international would be networking with faculty from abroad, collaborating with the foreign universities, admitting students from abroad, emulating the outcomes to be achieved in international rankings. The internal could be recruiting industry people in the university as faculty, raise in student fees and student evaluation.

5.8.2. Performance Based Assessment System: Power relations and subject formation

The PBAS, although as the regulation says, is a self-assessment exercise, but a faculty does not perform in vacuum. It was introduced in 2010 and requires a transformation in the way a faculty behaves with respect to their own work, and also others. Power or the rationale of the discourse could affect the individual, the relationship of an individual with others, and also with the institution. Under the various cultural and

economic contexts, the individuals engage in, what Foucault calls as Self-formation of subject. As discussed, earlier in method for policy analysis, the self-formation occurs by forming a knowledge about oneself within a context. It happens as a result of normalising techniques, like performance assessment, which would categorise individuals as per the norms of measurement. Those who deviate from those norms are 'non-performing'. Thus, they act upon themselves within that context of discourse. It has implications for teaching-research relationship, networking with other academicians (for mutual gain), relationship with fellow academics (collegiality and individualism). Some of these possible changes in relationships and individual behaviour have been mentioned in the studies already in Chapter 2 and 3.

1) Relationship with society: The relationship of an efficient and productive faculty with society is expected to undergo change. Chapter 2 discusses about the time crunch that ensues due to performance assessment exercises. The shortage of time would affect the societal extension activity, if any, or the nature of research faculty undertake. The relationship with society is expected to provide students with skills and improving accreditation ranking of universities in order to attract best employers for students. It is also expected that knowledge be produced for economic gains. However, the urgency to produce under API may deviate the output away from what is needed for society. Similarly providing students with skills may not bring about their holistic development for society's welfare.

2) Relationship with students: Students are understood as important stakeholders or clients of higher education. As 'customers' under the neo-liberal framework their evaluation of teachers in universities is given due consideration. Thus, it might alter the relationship between the faculty and the students. This could also lead to conflict in faculty due to possibility of favouritism in evaluation or bias in student evaluation. Rather than motivating the faculty it could demotivate the faculty. Moreover, time crunch might impact the time a faculty would like to spend with the students.

3) Relationship with peers/ competition and individualism: It is expected the faculty should be self-interested, individualistic and competing individuals. They are expected to focus on their own work, due to either time crunch or in order to succeed in their career. Such behaviour is expected at university level by the

NIRF. Self-assessment would make a faculty keep a track of their performance, demanding more focused work, leading to a possibility of individualism. However, it may lead to conduct counter to producing quality work. If the purpose is to only out compete the others in terms of numbers, the objective of quality may not be met. This may lead to setting in of anxiety due to pressure of running ahead of others. The focus on self-improvement might suffer in the process.

4) External rewards to motivate faculty: It is expected that external rewards in terms of promotion or getting external recognition would motivate them to perform better. The corporate kind of governance has an environment where there is less trust, more monitoring and is based on external rewards (Austin & Jones, 2016). With a growing emphasis of having to perform under neo-liberalism, the external rewards would assume more importance than intrinsic motivation (Roberts, 2007). But in case of those faculty who teach or do research for the sheer joy of it, such monitoring may either have no effect or at best crowd out their motivation of they feel a loss of trust placed in their work. The actual rewards of academic life, in contrast are, autonomy, collegiality, intellectual discovery and sharing, which are bound to get threatened under managerialism (Austen, 1990).

5) Networking: There should be a growing academic interaction between academics now, in terms of organising seminars or doing projects together due to mutual benefit of scoring points. Whereas this networking can help disseminate knowledge, quite often than not it could lead to manipulation at the hands of a few faculty and lead to organising such networks just for the sake of scoring points, at the cost of quality. It is difficult to say however whether a network develops out of sheer purpose of knowledge creation and dissemination or mutual interest to score points under PBAS.

6) Role of leadership: These managers or leaders, under NPM reforms, align the individual motivations and aspirations, with the requirements of structures (Whitchurch & Gordon, 2017).It is expected that the leader of the institution under the performance assessment regime should take actions to draw forth the quality work from faculty on the one hand and ensure quick adaptability of the UGC norms. The rational expected behaviour of leader may get hampered by the resistance of teacher's movement in adaptability of those norms. At the other

extreme there may be only a passive adaptability of norms, with less concern for quality, due to lack of enthusiasm in the leader of university or the leader trying to curry favour with both faculty and the UGC.

7) Nature of output: Ideally, the output expected of a university is of quality and meant for contributing towards society. Performance assessment, however, could lead to focusing on research at the cost of quality teaching; it is difficult to track what a faculty does in the classroom but any research output could render them prestige in the academic circles. At the same time, due to urgency to produce output every year/ assessment period the nature of output could get deviated away from what is meant for society or basic kind of research to applied or reproducible research. As also argued by Harris (2005) and Berg and Seeber (2016), under neo-liberal governance in universities, it is the applied knowledge which becomes more important.

8) Contextual differences: For policy to happen, is needed the subjectivity which is concomitant with the larger discourse. However, it is often inflected by personal and institutional interests and context. Other factors which could lead to behaviours inconsistent with performance enhancement are disciplinary differences and designation differences, leading to resistance

a) Disciplinary differences: For instance, a sciences faculty may find it easier to augment their points according to impact factor of journals than social sciences or humanities due to presence of good number of impact factor journals in sciences than in humanities or social sciences.

b) Designation: The younger faculty are generally under tremendous pressure to perform and may resort to rational action of producing output, albeit of poor quality. There might be resistance from the elder faculty to perform or indifferent approach of theirs because they have already scored the points that they required. Some of those not very motivated may choose therefore not to push themselves beyond bare minimum. from the elder faculty, who have already reached their desired levels.

c) University culture: The culture is reflected by common values and norms of the university. The neo-liberal performance assessment regime expects those values to be altered in favour of self-regulation, individualism within universities, gearing

up towards producing quality work etc. However, it is difficult to alter the culture of universities unless a major population is subjectivised. A university which even before API had not focused on quality and the faculty there had organised their lives around producing mediocre work may not bring about a sudden change in that culture. Similarly, a university which had always focused on quality work before API would mostly continue to do despite API. Thus, whether API leads to producing quality work or not depends a lot upon the existing university culture. The role of leader in motivating or taking actions to ensure quality work from faculty also would matter here. Also, the university culture that is externally oriented (Sporn, 1996), would support the process of subjectivisation.

Another area where the role of university features is in the availability of funds. This may be particularly true for sciences faculty. If the faculty do not have sufficient fund, that would put a constraint on them for producing research output. In India, a majority of public funded universities are not able to provide sufficient funds for faculty to undertake quality research. In the wake of this, they have to depend upon writing projects to garner funds. Even in this scenario they face hurdles with respect to getting funds released by their university administration, which is complained of being bureaucratic in nature, in time. This in turn affects their delivery of research output and thus their registering of research output for API.

5.9. In lieu of a conclusion: Implications for Autonomy, Academic Freedom and Society

Under the given political rationality, where accountability is more towards private players, are the various actors of higher education really autonomous? Autonomy should not be understood as an unbridled freedom but is coupled with accountability. It is crucial here to understand: who are the institutions of higher education and faculty accountable to, and does it run counter to the very notion of autonomy that the present discourse seemingly perpetuates? As argued above, it is the private funders or stakeholders who have more demands placed on the universities. The thinking of the individuals within universities has to be in tune with the funders, impeding their autonomy (Kumar, 1987). Similarly, under performance-based accountability, the output is produced within a time frame. The creative endeavour of academics cannot

take place in a constraint environment; if the academic freedom or autonomy of the academicians gets curtailed it would have severe implications on quality of research as well as teaching. The very purpose for which accountability measures have been put in place under the neo-liberal framework (i.e. quality) would not be met with. The efficient and effectiveness might not be in consonance with quality improvement.

Accountability to the market changes not only what they do but who these individuals are. The individuals are made into competitive, individualised and self-interested human beings. This individualism leads to outcompeting one another, instilling insecurities. It alters the nature of their work. The work which would enhance their effectiveness in the market assumes importance over what needs immediate attention in the society. Every democratic society accords freedom to citizens to participate in its decision-making processes and in turn demands accountability from those citizens to be responsible and reasonable in their actions towards the society. The democratic society is premised on social cooperation amongst its citizens and therefore inter-dependency among people and various institutions as a tool for accountability towards others. The present neo-liberal discourse is counter-productive to this kind of accountability for it has narrowed the scope of accountability that university actors, who are the citizens of society, practise.

At this juncture, it is crucial to understand that the kind of autonomy that is required for a democratic society is *weak autonomy*, which the individual not only has the power and resources to choose certain ends, which are approved by the society. What is required for this is that the individual has knowledge of the preferences which are sanctioned by the society as reasonable (Winch, 2002, 2005). Thus, every self-interested individual or institution practises autonomy but at the same time has to be accountable to the society. This is in contrast with *strong autonomy* where individuals can choose from among the actions which are not approved by society (Winch, 2002, 2005) or which defies social accountability.

The kind of individuals and institutions which would emerge as a result of existing practices may not serve the end of a democratic society always and dissolve the process of social cooperation. The neo-liberal discourse aims at 'responsibilising' the individuals by making them free from external surveillance and directing them towards self-control. The focus of present discourse of higher education policy is on

constructing self-regulated institutions and individuals. These self-interested individuals or institutions would become competitive, in order to register output and become accountable in order to secure funding only. As a result, the nature of learning that takes place in the universities or the kind of knowledge that is produced is more commercial in nature, which is limited in the scope. One, the research output is moulded to the needs of private funders, who would overlook the need of society. Two, the kind of self-interested students which emerge from the system may not be prepared to serve larger social interest because their focus remains job market needs. Also because of competition and pursuit of self-interests, the individuals and institutions may seek to resort to unethical means, compromising on quality, taking short cuts to produce outputs. For instance, publishing a good number of papers in poor quality journals or focusing on number of hours faculty has taught in the class than on quality interaction between student and teacher in the class, or university collaborating with industry to focus more on research, which is accorded prestige in the market, than teaching learning activities.

Thus, the connection between university and society, which is an important element of social cooperation gets diminished. And also the citizens who emerge from such education system might be indifferent to the needs of the society. The ends of democratic society are not met and the relationship dynamics which emerge between society and university is inimical to the functioning of democratic society. What needs to be noted here, that the above prescriptions require a change in the nature of subjectivisation and therefore a change in the beliefs, assumptions and values which operate in the policy. These changes would bring about a change in the way accountability and autonomy have been conceptualised in the higher education system and thereby a change in the power relations tilted larger goals of society. Moreover, the standardised measures of performances do not take note of contextual differences if the faculty. These differences would lead faculty respond to this measure differently.

Based on the issues raised above in the context of PBAS, in the last few sections, the next chapter seeks to look at real time experiences of faculty, emphatically at subjectivisation (or otherwise) under performance-based accountability.

Chapter 6 Data Analysis

6. 1. Introduction

The previous chapter (Chapter 5) threw light on the possible strategies as a result of Performance Assessment of Faculty, which could have a potential impact on not only what work that the faculty do, but also who they are or become. As discussed in the previous chapter, the policy seeks to produce certain effects on the behaviour of individuals through power relations. This effect is produced when it enters into the articulation by individuals and their productive (Butler, 1995)[52]. The power gets masked under the guise of words like efficiency, productivity, accountability and competitiveness (Davies & Peterson, 2005). The discourse or power transforms the individuals, and what they are willing to do by linking their survival to such tasks, as a result of which they internalise the notions or rationale of that discourse. It is in the same manner that the technology of accountability impacts individuals and they form a self. There might, however, emerge a voice of resistance if the academic freedom, which is fundamental to faculty work, is challenged in the process. Also, of note, is the fact that there is often a divide between 'doing' and 'becoming', which has already been discussed in Chapter 3. Discourse is found in one's ways of being (Chiapello & Fairclough, 2002), and there a particular way of being of a neo-liberal subject (discussed in Chapter 3), which would be looked at in this chapter.

The academic performance indicator aims to infuse accountability amongst university and college faculty by requiring them to perform (at least a stipulated minimum) in teaching, research and administration related activities. As stated in the regulation title (GOI, 2010), this is (expected) to maintain minimum standards in universities and colleges, through documentation of their work.

Underlying this monitoring mechanism is the concept 'efficiency', where the faculty are required to allocate their time efficiently across category, behaving in a self-interested manner to score points. In other words, it seems to work on the principle of assuming individuals as self-interested beings, who would 'be incited to

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[52] As cited in Davies & Peterson (2005)

invest in themselves, work on themselves and improve themselves, and would increase their numbers and output' (Ball, 2015), with the supposed objective of improving quality or at least maintaining minimum standards. It can be called a neo-liberal way of monitoring individuals. The individuals are made to regulate themselves by re-organising their lives around it. Any deviance from such behaviour would be called 'irrational' under the present regime, because such faculty would lag behind the race, in terms of promotion.

What could happen as a result of this calculation of work output is a change in the way they view themselves and their work and also the way the individuals relate to others. Thus, going deep one needs to note that there are certain variants of this rational behaviour which is expected of faculty and which might ensue, for them to turn into a neo-liberal subject (as also discussed in Chapter 5).

The underlying behaviour needed to be inculcated in oneself is that of individuality, rationality and self-interest (Peters, 2001). The modern (neo-liberal) state aims to construct a structure where a new form of individuality is shaped (Foucault, 1982). These individuals are the self-managing individuals (or academics), who are responsible for investing in themselves (Marginson, 1997; Peters, 2001). It is understood under the neo-liberal discourse that self-management would enhance quality work. What can happen however is that this culture of individualism could lead to an erosion of collegial culture within the departments, as it was found in a study conducted on Australian higher education by Marginson (1997). In a similar light, Berg and Seeber (2016) also highlighted about the time crunch under this scenario, which leaves no time for interaction with peers, infusing a sense of individualism amongst faculty and thus isolation. A sense of competition between the faculty is taking place in place of collegiality. Greenhalgh (2015) argued that the contemporary governance mechanism has placed competing demands on the faculty like student satisfaction, getting business for the school and maintaining academic standard, which had put them under tensions.

Another point worth mentioning is that it is assumed that faculty is extrinsically motivated because they would try to gain greater monetary compensation (i.e. higher salaries associated with promotions). Opportunism is considered to be a strong kind of extrinsic motivation (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Thus, it is assumed that

faculty would be looking outwards, towards salaries or other rewards, and thus, scoring points. The underlying behaviour needed to be inculcated in oneself is individuality, rationality and self-interest (Peters, 2001). However, this kind of external monitoring could crowd out the intrinsic motivation of faculty (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). In the present context of API, the external reward would have a different connotation. It could mean an external goal of, say, moving up the ladder, or the various awards or incentives which have been instituted in some seminar or conferences, or out-competing their colleagues in terms of reputation. In other words, it means looking outward, to motivate oneself to perform. Thus, for some, particularly for a typical neo-liberal subject, these external rewards would enhance their intrinsic motivation to perform.

Furthermore, as stated above, it is in particular kind of relations that neo-liberal discourse is rendered legitimacy. These relations are not restricted to just within a university but extends to forming relations outside too. One such example could be networking with academics outside in order to gain mutual benefit. Berg and Seeber (2016) argue that as a result of this change the faculty, if at all, spend time together in a way that could be measured and registered in accounting system. Colleagues are seen as resources, with a goal of mutual support; there has emerged virtual networking where relationships are understood as affiliations. In other words, even relationships are evaluated in terms of their capability to offer. Another kind of relationship related effect could be seen with the students, where student is understood as a major stakeholder because of their evaluation of teacher performance. As a result of this neo-liberal governance which brings in also possibility of time crunch, the relationship with society would get affected. For instance, rather than producing what is needed for society, the research would be oriented towards areas which are easily marketable or quicker to be registered.

What the API does is to infuse standardisation across universities and colleges. It remains to be seen, if the faculty would comply by these expected behaviours, given their different contexts in India; the faculty in a State university would have different resources (imbedded as well as exogeneous) and might be a different culture than a Central University, a social science faculty will have different struggles in doing research than a science faculty, a senior faculty may choose not to comply with API

and would be less stressful than a young faculty, etc. Thus, individual contexts have to be featured in, to understand how / (how not) and why (why not) they are organising their lives around this performance assessment, and with what effect.

In addition to the faculty, their relationship with the leader as well as culture has a role to play in order to understand how the faculty have been oriented towards producing quality work. If the culture is externally oriented, it would respond to external changes easily and adapt them, as also discussed in Chapter 2 on literature review. The leader has a role to play here. Thus, the leader in such case would not only be a subject of neo-liberalism but would ensure smooth adaptation of such practices to create such faculty-subjects. If the university fails to filter quality, then despite API the alleged objective of it may not be achieved.

The chapter is organised as following: Section 6.2 at the outset discusses about the culture of the two universities, so as to enable one to situate the responses of the faculty within a context. It is extended further by discussing the Internal Discourse of the Institution in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 revisits self-formation, which has been discussed in details in Chapter 3. Section 6.5 provides Data Analysis, providing responses of present faculty, and the counter-factual group. The gap in the in-depth questionnaire with respect to impact of PBAS on different items were addressed by gathering structured responses and conducting non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis) in Section 6.6, along with a supplementary quantification of faculty responses. Section 6.7 develops an analysis of self-formation or subjectivisation and resistance amongst faculty of both universities, looking at first their generation perception about performance-based assessment and then at their experiences with respect to PBAS. Last section, 6.8, gives reliability and validity of the results.

6.2. Orientation of University: Analysing the mission statements and other practices

The mission statement of a university throws light on the core activities of the universities, which are a shared definition of its purpose and function. These statements go into defining the culture of the university and thus their possible strategy space or decision making (Sporn, 1996; Fogazzotto, 2009). As also discussed

earlier, that whether a university is externally oriented or not, (which has an implication on its adaptability), can be depicted by also its mission and vision statements. Analysing a mission statement encompasses not only looking for certain phrases which would inform the researcher about the orientation of university culture (external or internal) and definition of its territory within which faculty could operate, but also looking at what governs such statements, as also discussed in Chapter 5 on Foucauldian analysis of higher education policy. The mission statements expect the university constituents to form a certain kind of identity, which is amenable to achieving the university objective.

In the context of neo-liberal performance assessment regime, the university culture should ideally be external and might depict 'performativity'. (A discussion on performativity has already been undertaken in Chapter 7). The orientation to be accountable to the outside world, would lead to different actors constantly asking themselves if they measure upto the expectations set up in that outside world. The universities are under constant visibility of such stakeholders, which demands them to portray a different kind of identity, of that of being performers or performative (or fabricating) as understood by Stephen Ball. The managerialism has brought about a culture of performativity (Cowen, 1996; Deem, 1998; Ball, 2003) The recent neo-liberal wave expects universities to be performative, or so to say accountable to stakeholders as well as competitive; it has to look effective and thus adaptable to neo-liberal norms. This would mean that for a university and its' constituents to be neo-liberal subject, it should be externally oriented, and performative. There should be a word of caution offered here. Just because a university appears to be externally oriented it would be too early to say that they are performative. Thus, to capture performativity, which is the next step to commenting upon the culture of university as being amenable to the larger discourse, the institutional discourse as depicted in the mission and vision statements, needs to be juxtaposed with the quality of work performed by their faculty. If the quality of work is not of good quality, albeit the university shows its' effectiveness in quantitative performance, one could say that there might be functioning a culture of performativity. Since quality of work cannot be judged through tangible means, for the present purpose the only closest proxy for that would be looking at faculty work in research publication and

seminars/conferences attended, which is a concern of another sub section in this chapter.

Although the above framework does not exactly relate to API, but it would throw light on its propensity to be a subject of neo-liberal reforms, at least in theory.

A brief at Mission and Vision statements of University A and University B

University A

The website of University A did not feature the mission and vision statements. It was only one sub-centre of the University that mentioned about its mission, which was mentioned briefly as to educate students and advance knowledge. That the university did not have a mission statement mentioned reflects a lack of goal-setting and direction in the university at a theoretical level at least. It would be difficult to comment on the orientation of the university therefore.

University B

In stark contrast to the University A website, the University B website had clearly stated its' vision as well as mission.

This is as following[53]:

Vision

- To have institutional autonomy and academic freedom

- To have strong but impartial public governance

- To be campus rooted but internationally oriented

- To be knowledge based and student centred

- To be research driven and learning focused

- To be quality and cost conscious but socially responsible

- To be technologically sophisticated but community dependent

- To be professionally attuned but humanly sensitive and above all

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[53] Website of University B. Last accessed on 03.07.2017

- To be publicly accountable and socially committed

Mission

- To emerge as a centre of academic excellence through holistic education and development of right skills

- To be recognized as the hub of original research and innovative thinking that caters to the needs of the Industry and Policy Makers

- To strengthen the Consultancy services of the University through a full-fledged University- Industry tie-up and thereby tap resources of the Industry for its teaching, research and extension services

- To actively respond to the momentous issues of our society and socio-political environment of the world

- To transform our traditional University into a University of global standard that makes significant contribution at the international level

- To ensure that Departments and centres in the University have autonomy within the frame work of the established system and facilitate the same choice to the affiliated colleges.

- To produce young entrepreneurs who can provide job opportunities rather than be job seekers

- To be known across the globe for the diversity of its teachers and students, and the quality and employability of its graduates, in diverse fields

- To produce internationally known leaders, scholars/scientists and sports persons

Analysis

The University B vision broadly talks about being oriented towards society. The nature of this orientation could be understood by looking at the orientation of its mission statement. There are two broad objectives of the university: One, to cater to the needs of the industry and at the same time tap resources of the industry by forging university-industry tie ups and two, to produce leaders or scholars who get recognition internationally. Theoretically one could say that the University B is oriented towards its' environment by catering to the needs of the industry, and also in

seeking global recognition. The mission statements need to be juxtaposed with the practices on campus space. This is because it is the university campus space, and thus the culture, which makes the mission statements tangible. As was found from the website of the university, the Internal Quality Assessment Cell (IQAC) has taken an initiative to approach the industrial establishments and asked for the areas of research which should be undertaken by the students of the university, which are all compiled together and distributed across departments. With respect to global orientation, the tangible university space practices comprised of a) IQAC having developed a Master Action Plan to Improve Quality, in 2015, for improving quality which was uploaded on the university website, which had amongst its objectives as featuring in the global ranking. It has been stated in the master action plan that the vision it to appear in the THES World Ranking, THES South Asia Ranking and QS ranking for Asian University, in the long term and in Alert to World-Class Parameters in the short term, and b) a workshop conducted by the university teaching the faculty as to how international ranking is computed and therefore how could they orient their work for the university to feature in those. This was revealed by an ex-registrar of the university, who also happened to be a member of IQAC. That whether there is a culture of performativity or not, could be ascertained only after looking at quality of work performed by faculty in the university. This would be done in later sub-section.

It needs to be mentioned here that mission and vision statements may not be updated and belong to some past time and therefore are not reflective of recent neo-liberal reforms. To augment a better understanding of orientation of university culture, other evidences on the websites and other practices, apart from those of faculty have been looked at, which is discussed in the sub section below.

Other evidences on university website and other practices observed during survey

Even though the University A did not have Vision and Mission mentioned on their website, the 'About Us' section of the university website mentions primarily about its' growth and achievements[54]. However, much of the information pertains to only growth in enrolment and in research papers published, approximate number of teachers who visit abroad every year (about 20) and recognition of departments under various national programs of UGC. That a particular number of faculty visits abroad

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[54] Website of the University. Last accessed on 03.07.2017

does not suffice to comment upon the external orientation of university, because this number does not inform about how university is responding to the external environment. The 'About Us' section was analysed for the sake of completion and thus be able to comment on subjectivity, with as less bias as possible.

A comparative look at the website of the two universities shows that the University A had not updated their IQAC link, and also it was not easily accessible. At the same time, the University B had not only the link shown on the front page and could be easily located, but also has an updated link on its website. With respect to quality monitoring, the University B website shows an updated profile of the university website, with respect to latest reports, pertaining to audits and the fact sheet of the state. Not only this, the University, in 2015, charted out a master action plan to improve the quality. As stated in the master action plan[55] designed in the year 2015, the objective is to feature in the World Class University.

The VC of the University A was approached but he could not take out time. Also the VC of University B could not be met. The VC of University A asked the researcher to attend one of the conferences going on in the university at that time on "Indo-Israel collaboration on improving entrepreneurship, media and communication: The role of academia". The researcher attended the conference as one of the non-participant observant[56]. The observation was structured, in that, the purpose of the observation was known in advance (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007), i.e. to understand the culture of the university. In particular, when talking of culture, the aim was to gauge the two broad categories, i.e. the orientation and adaptation by the university. It was done to test the hypothesis that under this culture of performativity, the university is not externally oriented and not adaptable to neo-liberal regime of performativity and regulations. Following were the observations made, as was shared in the conference: a) The university is planning to collaborate with the Tel Aviv University, through a student exchange program, b) The VC in his address shared that i) they were planning to revamp the entire campus infrastructure, ii) they were planning to apply for the world class university status and iii) they wanted freedom

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[55] University B(2015). Master action plan to improve quality. Internal Quality Assessment Cell. University B

[56] The non participant observer is the one who observes the situation/ event/ human behaviour without actually participating in it. Non participant observer stand aloof from the group activities they are investigating (Cohen, Manion &, Morrison, 1997; pp.261)

from in the state in governance so that they can raise their own resources through student fees. It is therefore pretty evident that the University is trying to portray its quality to outside world and autonomy is understood as freedom from the State. The university is very much externally oriented and a subject of performativity culture. This is much at the cost of compromise on the internal issues facing the faculty with respect to quality. In contrast, the faculty at the University B felt motivated by the performance assessment exercise, because of the encouraging role of the leader. The University B also showed an inclination towards external rewards however the role of leader was such that the faculty did not feel demotivated. The leader in a way could be said to be ensuring a smooth subjectivisation.

6.3. Internal discourse of the institution

Foucault (1978) looked at the internal discourse of the institution with respect to practice of sexuality in schools in the eighteenth century. He says:

> But one only has to glance over the architectural layout, the rules of
> discipline, and their whole internal organisation: the question of sex
> was constant preoccupation (p. 27-28).

In order to understand the life of institutions or institutionalisation i.e. the norms or culture of that place, it is crucial to understand the discursive practices of that institution. In other words, it entails capturing the institutional discourse, i.e. construction and practise of the discourse. Discourse, as discussed in the chapter on Foucault, gains its legitimacy by way of practise in the power relations. It entails understanding the relationship between principal and agent; i.e. how power functions in those relationships. In the context of studying universities, this would mean understanding the relationship at two levels: between faculty and administration, and between university and the UGC. How these relationships work could go a long way into defining the discourse of that institution and thus its culture and decision making. Furthermore, it needs to be juxtaposed with the larger discourse and seen if the culture of the place is in consonance with the larger discourse to know if adaptation is easy in the institution. Against this backdrop, the institutional discourse would be sought to be understood in the University A and University B by parsing the artefacts, as

observed during the field visit by the researcher and also the responses of the faculty and the administration.

First, the following points discuss about the artefacts, which could throw light on the culture of the institution:

a) In both the universities there was a punching machine in place, which required them to punch in and out and stay at the department for stipulated period of time throughout the day.

b) In University B there were posters displayed for innovation competition in the university.

c) In University B in every faculty's room there was a monthly newsletter issued by the IQAC found on their table.

d) In both the universities, the administration office was far away placed from the academic departments, which required faculty to travel. The distance was found to be a problem in particular for the University A, which required longer commuting time.

i) University and UGC relationship

- Both universities are the State universities. Whereas the UGC provides only plan funding to these universities, the non-plan fund comes from the state government. Fund crunch was the problem faced by both the universities as shared by the university administration. The UGC mandates the universities to adhere to performance-based assessment system introduced in 2010. With respect to adapting the UGC norms, it was found that both universities adhered to the UGC norm, however University B adopted the norms only in 2013

- A large number of students that both the universities cater to are from within the respective states, speaking regional languages or lacking the requisite educational background. In order to address their academic issues, the faculty would need more time. If the faculty follows strictly the API template, there is little freedom that they get.

- Talking of autonomy of universities vis-a-vis UGC, the universities enjoyed little financial autonomy due to not only limited availability of funds, which

(as also stated by the faculty) directly had an adverse impact on registering output in research category. With respect to adhering to the UGC regulation, 2010, University B had made some alterations in accordance with the requirement of college teachers.

The role of leaders is very crucial to understand how subjectivisation is taking place in the universities. This is to gauge the culture of the place, whether it supports or does not support easy subjectivisation of individuals or the institution as a whole. Also, this could reflect upon the possible conflict between faculty and the leadership, if any. Another purpose to talk to the people holding leadership position is to capture the quality consciousness of the university.

ii) **Leadership and faculty relationship**: The researcher tried to contact the Vice Chancellors of both the universities. But they were unavailable for interaction. The IQAC directors of both the universities were contacted, to understand the orientation and adaptability of universities. Three things were sought to be understood in order to gauge subjectivity:

a. The individual perception of the leader with respect to performance assessment (individual subjectivity)

b. The relationship of leader with the UGC, to understand the adaptability and orientation of the university

c. The relationship between the leader and faculty, to unravel the role of leader in ensuring subjectivisation of the faculty or ensuring such a culture. This could also highlight the conflict between the leader and the faculty, if any.

The leader at University A said that there should be performance assessment exercise but at the same time conjectured that it was only an imperfect measure of performance. He was particularly resentful of the way unscrupulous means were resorted to by the faculty in order to score point and called for scrapping API altogether. He at the same time found that individualism was at least making people do something.

With respect to UGC or the State, while conversing he supported competition between the universities for raising funds and autonomy from the State in governance. On adapting to the norms of UGC His response restricted to providing with whatever data or the number the UGC wants.

With respect to his relationship with the fellow faculty he stated that 90 per cent of faculty in his university were producing sub-standard work. But he was not willing to spoil his relationship with them by holding their promotions as that would have ensued enmity between him and the other faculty, which as he stated, will have continued even in the future when he will serve his tenure as an IQAC coordinator. Though the IQAC was organising certain workshops for faculty to get training in writing research papers, editing, publishing etc., the coordinator shared that faculty do not turn up. Thus, IQAC was said to be not capable of doing much. When asked if they faced any resistance from faculty they shared that teachers' union was ineffective, and if they resist it is never for ensuring quality work in the university system, but other issues. To have a complete understanding of university culture or the role of internal quality assessment cell, this needs to be understood along with experiences of the faculty. All the faculty agreed that IQAC keeps asking for report every year. One faculty said that filling up for such reports gives them a sense of self-reflection. All of them said that at a personal level, IQAC does not motivate them to produce quality work.

The director of IQAC at University B was interviewed to understand his role in ensuring quality work by the faculty as well as adaptation of API. He stated that API has motivated people in his university to meet certain requirements. They know now they have to act in certain fronts to meet these requirements. In order to motivate the faculty, he said that they have started documenting what they were doing and projecting it back to them. This helped some faculty to understand that they were really good innovators when they compared their work with others. Another way to motivate the faculty was to send letters of appreciation to the faculty for publishing in top journal or for patents. Thus, for excellence, as he said, they publicise and let others see what they have done. Under his leadership, the university undertook academic audit for the first time, where the departments were given autonomy to

choose their reviewers and independently hold discussions with them. This was undertaken despite resistance by some.

The IQAC prepared a master plan in 2015, which mentions a list of international rankings where they plan to feature. When asked the director, he said we want to ensure that we want to apply for rankings. But they did not want to do it artificially. They said that they could out-compete many universities in NIRF because they had well documented data in place. They said *that "the sign of times is that they should be ranked"*. And trying to feature in world ranking would help them see where they stood and may be that would make them feel ashamed. [57]

With respect to societal accountability, the university sent letters to industry asking them what areas they should undertake their research in, to have an idea of the issues that society was grappling with and needed research.

All the faculty were all praises for the pro-active role IQAC undertook in the last 2 years. One faculty strongly emphasised that the word to be used for IQAC was *"vibrant".* They even mentioned that IQAC has instituted best paper award and best project award for the faculty.[58]

In University B, the leader was found to be proactive towards extracting performance from the faculty. They had revamped the IQAC website and uploaded not just the annual reports of the university but also the minutes of each IQAC meeting as well as the actions taken. Most of the faculty also conjectured that the IQAC had become proactive in the past couple of years with the coming up of new leadership. It was found during the visit that the IQAC had instituted a competition within the university on innovation. In addition to this there was a best project award and best patent award also instituted within the university. When asked how the university is orienting itself towards world class university, though they explicitly did not state their desire, but the master plan on quality improvement had a mention about a plan on featuring in international ranking. One of the ex-registrar when spoken to mentioned on orienting the faculty towards international ranking in one of the workshops (however, no minute of such workshop was found on the website).

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[57] This was found in the second round of survey done.
[58] This was found in the second round of survey done.

iii) Historical belief and assumptions: Role of the State culture

University A is located in the western part of India, and University B in Southern part. The state where University B is located has always had a culture of resistance and pole are more vocal. This has been sustained by the culture the party which has mostly ruled in the state. In case of the State where University A is located, historically there had been resistance during independence movement for issues like Women Education. But gradually the culture died down, due to growing spawning of corporate culture in the State, and the city in particular that University A belongs to, altered the major issues for the state and the demography of the State to fluid population. not to say that the teachers' union had raised no voice against implementation of API.

Another historical aspect which played a role was the culture of documentation. In University B, documentation of the work had taken a firm grip historically, as was found in the annual reports. It was found in University A, that many annual reports did not have all the data updated on the publication of faculty which was there in the respective bio-data. Therefore, it was easier for this neo-liberal practice of documenting the output of faculty to take place in University B amongst even the older faculty, having a limited resistance against this in the university.

It was found that the conception of academic freedom was limited to designing curriculum or teaching the way they wanted to. To expand the understanding of academic freedom, from the literature, certain variables which determine academic freedom were identified and a structured questionnaire was administered, along with other categories like motivation and trust. The next section would throw light on the analysis of structured questions.

6. 4. Self-formation

The section would try to unravel the process of creation of the amenable subjects as well as to see if there exists any possibility of resistance. For Foucault, these power relations not of repression, in that these are productive, as they cause new behaviours to emerge. In other words, these are manifested in the day to day strategies of the

individual and institutions. Power can, therefore, be called strategy. At the same time, where there is power there is also resistance (Foucault, 1982).

The discourse makes an individual think who they are, that is whether they are 'effective' teachers or 'good teachers', what a good lesson would look like. The teachers, therefore, engage themselves in successful practice. The teachers and students are subject to visibility and are treated as effective or productive subjects (Ball, 2015). In analysing the power effects, using Foucault's framework, one looks at how the policy discourse seeks to subjectivise individuals and institutions, through power relations, and also how the expected subjects of the discourse might resist those power effects.

The indicators which would be looked at, largely, to analyse the process of subject-formation are derived from the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3, which discusses about the neo-liberal academic identity. The neo-liberal discourse or policy prescription seeks to create subjects, which are amenable to it and would legitimise the existence and perpetuation of the discourse. The basic premise of neo-liberalism is to assume that every individual is self-interested and would maximise their respective utilities. The individuals through their own interest construct themselves. The self-evaluation and self-reflection are the techniques through they develop an idea about themselves (Cannizzo, 2015). These self-evaluation and self-reflection techniques help them create a self-knowledge. They document their achievements, provide an evidence of their work, and generate a knowledge about their own selves (Cannizzo, 2015).

The API instituted in the Indian higher education or any performance assessment exercise assumes the same; that is that individual faculty would respond by accumulating scores in order to secure their jobs or get promotions and thereby ensure quality work. Thus, it is assumed that the faculty is extrinsically motivated. An employee is motivated extrinsically if they indirectly benefit through monetary compensation, like pay-for-performance (Osterloh & Frey, 2000) and any other external reward like fame, praise, prestige, etc. In API, apart from scores, the external rewards which seek would include prestige gained as a promotion, or accolades in research circles. However, for a creative work, as in the academic world, what is needed more is intrinsic motivation, whereby the individuals undertake a task for the

sake of one's need satisfaction (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). And often bringing in accountability or monitoring mechanisms like performance assessment can crowd out the intrinsic motivation because it is seen as a sign of distrust (Frey, 1993) by the faculty. Adjusting the intrinsic motivation downwards can have serious ramification for quality of work performed by the faculty. The key premise that performance assessment exercise is centred is to create a competitive environment. The major objective of neoliberal reforms is to install relations of competition in order to increase accountability, productivity and control. This competition is understood to be increasing quality under neoliberalism (Olssen & Peters, 2005). However, in case of API there could be no competition between the faculty created in the true sense because every faculty is on their different trajectories in their career path. For instance, a Professor does not stand to be in a competitive relationship with an Associate professor working in the same department. But the new public management principles seek to infuse opportunism, so that every individual becomes self-regulating, managing their own performances.

The modern (neo-liberal) state aims to construct a structure where a new form of individuality is shaped (Foucault, 1982). These individuals are the self-managing individuals (or academics), who are responsible for investing in themselves (Marginson, 1997; Peters, 2001). To sum up, the neo-liberal technology of performance assessment seeks to create subjects, by infusing a culture of self-regulation and individualism; the subjects are expected to respond to the external rewards by undertaking self-improvement.

The understanding of governmentality involves exploring the ways in which a certain type of truth is formed (that is the truth of larger discourse) and how these truths are put into practice through what conflicts, violences, alliances, subordinations, etc. (Cotoi, 2011). Thus, it looks at the rational programmes and techniques that try to conduct behaviour so that specific results could be obtained (Rose, 1999)[59]. The understanding of subjectivisation tells us that policy manipulates us, or at least expects to, into self-interested, rational, calculating and individualistic. The neo-liberal technology of performance assessment seeks to create subjects, by infusing a culture of self-regulation and individualism; the subjects are expected to

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[59] As cited in Cotoi (2011).

respond to the external rewards by undertaking self-improvement. It seeks to transform individual identities in a way which is amenable to the larger neo-liberal discourse.

However, in the very process of this subjectivisation, the so-called subjects deploy their own creativity as well as reluctance, when the previous displaced discourses and subject positions face a conflict with the present discourse (Ball, 2015). Performance assessment may in some cases adversely affect the academic freedom of faculty, as discussed above, by impacting their motivation. The motivation might get adversely affected due to lack of trust shown in the faculty performance, particularly in case of those faculty who are already intrinsically motivated, time crunch which faculty may experience, the compelling need of producing output every assessment period, etc. In the context of PBAS, this might be true particularly of that faculty who have been a witness to the pre-PBAS era.

6. 5. Data Analysis

As mentioned already in Chapter 4, the questionnaire administered was open-ended in order to get in-depth account of faculty perception. The in-depth responses are analysed by developing themes from the questionnaire; it is using the above discussion on subjectivisation that the questions and themes were developed. The broad themes developed are: conception of accountability, relationship with the society, relationship with students, relationship with peer (competition versus collegiality), networking in academic circles, resistance in API compliance and possibility of rational versus unethical practices. The responses are analysed using a combined method of content analysis by developing themes from the questionnaire; the method is called direct content analysis (Hseih & Shannon, 2005) to arrive at moderatum generalisation (Payne & Williams, 2005). It is combined with Critical Discourse Analysis.

However, the content analysis only talks about the number of times a theme is discussed and aims at drawing a generalisable results, it does not give a clear a picture of context. To substantiate the findings of the content analysis, the responses of the faculty and the larger operating discourse would be juxtaposed, in order to make meaning of the responses. In other words, it would be found out as to whether they are

in-tune with the larger discourse or resisting against the discourse and what are the reasons behind such a behaviour. The reasons would be deciphered by understanding the different contexts of the faculty, that their disciplines, their designation in the university, their number of work life hours, the culture of university (whether the university is quality conscious or not), etc. The extent of subjectivisation and/or resistance would also be discussed here by juxtaposing it with their unique contextual placements.

The analysis is done in two steps: first, the qualitative analysis will be done. In the qualitative analysis, at first using the content analysis a quantitative assessment of responses would be done, where the frequency of responses would be mentioned. It would be followed by a discussion on contextual analyses of responses using critical discourse analysis. Analyses would be done at two level: first at a general level, where perception of faculty related to performance assessment would be captured, and then the responses pertaining particularly to API would be analysed, which would be done during discussing the results. To comment upon subjectivisation, critical discourse analysis would be applied, which would essentially highlight the process of self-formation Resistance is conceptualised as counter-will or counter-conduct (Lorenzini, 2016) amongst the categories of subjectivisation. Second, a quantitative analysis will be done and both the results be juxtaposed, wherever required.

6.5.1. Analysis of the account of present faculty

This section would discuss about the experience of the faculty which are presently teaching in the respective universities. Following this, the experience of counterfactual group would be discussed, in the next sub section. The themes developed are the following, which will be followed by discussion in next section:

a. **Accountability of faculty:** All faculty in both the universities conjectured that a faculty should be accountable to the students. A large number of faculty identified teaching as their primary responsibility, and thus found themselves accountable to the students. But two faculty from University B said that they are accountable to only themselves. The Second most important location of accountability was found to be society because of its major role in funding their salaries. One social science faculty from University B understood accountability

with respect to performance under tenure versus non-tenured job, where she said that under a tenured job faculty might exploit the system because of the job guarantee that they enjoy and thus they were not accountable. The remaining faculty did not reflect much on this question on accountability of faculty, limiting their responses to only faculty being accountable to the students. Another dimension of accountability shared by faculty in both the universities was being accountable in terms of documenting their output, like having student feedback, or producing for API, or their annual reports. Four faculty members from university A and five from university B conceptualised accountability in the afore-mentioned fashion.

It was further asked from all faculty if ensuring accountability through documenting or quantifying their work, as under PBAS, helped improve their performance or quality. In University A, 74 per cent faculty agreed that performance assessment helps improve performance. Of those who disagreed, the number of sciences equalled social sciences, ruling out disciplinary differences in the response. One faculty amongst those who agreed, said that it helped them 'remain on track', one faculty stated that it helps in *'benchmarking and assessing their performance against that benchmark'*, and another stated it helps them become more *'accountable and responsible'*. All the faculty members, except 2 from social sciences, in University B agreed that periodic assessment helps improve performance (numbering to 89 per cent). From amongst those who agreed, one faculty from sciences said that monitoring should be there to stop abuse of academic freedom that faculty are rendered with (the remaining did not provide any rationale to it). Other three faculty (one from sciences and other two from social sciences) added qualification to their responses, saying that it may not really lead to improvement in quality if it is done mechanically; one of the social sciences faculty said that quality is matter of setting internal standard and one's self-concept. The percentage of faculty finding quantification to improve quality was higher in University B than University A. Also, there was no disciplinary difference found.

b. **Academic freedom:** Faculty members were asked how they understood their academic freedom. It was found that most of the faculty answered either in affirmation or negation. In University A, 80 per cent faculty said they enjoyed

academic freedom, and remaining 20 per cent said they did not. Almost 58 per cent faculty could not conceptualise what academic freedom meant for that. The remaining faculty, (one from sciences and six from social sciences) who also said that they enjoyed academic freedom, mentioned about the following variables while conceptualising academic freedom: no interference, freedom to frame syllabus, and freedom to let creative self to come out, freedom to be responsive to the needs of society, and one's own development, freedom to be able to say what they wanted to say in the class, freedom to choose teaching methodology, and freedom to publish in the area of research they found importance. In University B, 2 faculty members said they did not have any academic freedom, of which one stated the administrative hurdles as the reason. The remaining only said that they enjoyed academic freedom[60]. About 67 per cent of the faculty could not say what did they understand by their academic freedom. The remaining faculty talked of the following variables: flexibility to work, freedom to go deep into science, freedom to frame curriculum and assess, freedom to do research and do projects. Thus, a large chunk of faculty in both the universities did not provide with a definition of academic freedom.

c. **Time crunch:** The faculty under PBAS are required to perform a minimum number of hours of teaching and also research, along with extension activities. The faculty were asked, if teaching hours leave them with enough time to do research. In University A, as high as 67 per cent faculty agreed that teaching hours were taking away the time for research. Of those, who did not find any substitutability between teaching and research, 80 per cent belonged to sciences, and 20 percent to social sciences. These sciences faculty shared that there laboratory timings are also included in teaching hours, and not just classroom teaching. The social science faculty who disagreed was an associate professor. During the field visit, two assistant professors shared that the burden of teaching largely rests with junior faculty. One concern raised by every faculty was the amount of time spent in travelling, which took away their crucial hours that they could devote to doing research. In University B, barring one assistant professor, everyone said that teaching load affects their time for doing research. A couple of

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[60] This question pertained to only understanding their conception of academic freedom. The relationship between academic freedom and PBAS was asked later on.

faculty members shared that they try to take out time for research early morning or during wee hours at night. It was raised by some faculty members in both the universities that since it is research which is tangible, and there is a stipulated time to be devoted to teaching, the quality of teaching gets suffered in the process.

Some of the faculty during the interview also shared how there was a growing rush towards research activities after PBAS which adversely affected their teaching. Two faculty, one an assiatnt professor, and another a professor, from Department of Chemistry at University A shared their views, albeit contrasting, regarding this. While the assistant professor said that such a phenomenon was found rampant amongst youngsters, the professor said it was more amongst senior faculty. But assistant professor found it to be a positive thing. To quote them:

> *Among the younger faculty...they do tend to focus entirely on research. As a result the teaching hours are, I would not say neglected, but not given the same emphasis that earlier generations of teachers were able to give. I do not feel this is necessarily a bad thing though. It will teach the students also a little bit of independence. Its not entirely a negative thing that teachers do not put in enough time for teaching. Ultimately, the academics worldwide is more oriented towards research. So it is high time that India also took the same stand.* (Assistant Professor, Department of Chemistry, University A)

> *In classroom teaching there is no tangible output. But there are recognition and rewards if I publish...there is a personal recognition if you publish in journal with high impact factor. So sometimes it happens...some of my colleagues, I have seen, do this. This kind of a thing happens only after a certain stage, when you start to aspire for something else* (Professor, Department of Chemistry, University A).

c. **Relationship with society:** In the University B, the faculty engaged in activities where students were sent to some school to teach, were involved in social extension activities, giving election duties (in case of social sciences) and in case of science discipline, there was no direct involvement of students, but the faculty conjectured that the accountability to the society was through being accountable

to the students. One social sciences faculty said if you are not accountable to the students you are *"taking a bribe and engaging in corrupt practices"* because they were being paid for that. A large number of faculty from social sciences, however, highlighted that due to the present system of API where their work has been structured, they are unable to find out time to take the students for field visit and interact with them. This they stated would hamper the outreach towards society. They also stated that outreach to local community through public lecture might get reduced because they do not get certificates for these activities, whereas API expects them to document every activity. They therefore felt *"bound"*.

d. **Relationship with the students:** The faculty were asked about their take on students evaluating teachers, and if they get enough academic time outside classroom also. All the faculty in both the universities agreed that student feedback helped them improve their teaching quality. Although IQAC in their universities required faculty to get student feedback, but many faculty also take a separate feedback from students for self-evaluation, out of their own accord. All the faculty who had joined post/ during the introduction of API were in favour of students evaluating the faculty and said that this would improve the quality of work by the faculty and personally helped them too. Two faculty from social sciences in the University B, however, expressed their discontentment with feedback only because the university did not take action against the faculty who did not perform well and therefore it failed to serve it's purpose; there was no provision to *"fire"* the faculty and this was the *"fallacy"* of the system. In contrast, one science faculty, who was a part of the university for 25 years, however, argued that students may not really have capabilities to evaluate a faculty, despite having said that student feedback would be important. Whereas the rest of the faculty said that students would not really manipulate the evaluation, this science faculty said that there might be 'conspirational feedback'. But they did not oppose student feedback. To quote some of the phases used by the faculty: "It helps in teacher readjusting", "That is also a pressure when you are being judged by the people you have to deal with. I think this is positive.", "We know where we stand".

They all found it desirable to spend time with students outside the classroom. Two-thirds of faculty in each university said that due to classroom teaching load under API, not only were they not able to find time for research but also were not able to spend time with students outside the classroom. Only roughly 33 percent of the faculty in both the universities said that they are able to make time despite time crunch that they faced.

e. Relationship with peers: Competition and Individualism versus collegiality

As much as 60 percent of the faculty in the University A agreed that competition amongst faculty is good for pushing faculty to work more and produce quality work. As high as 75 per cent agreed that PBAS had instilled individualism in their departments. Two of the faculty (from sciences, one assistant professor and one associate professor), found such individualism good because it instilled accountability and monitored faculty work to focus on their work. One faculty added to this, that in order to enhance competition, the university should provide with necessary resources. Only 33 per cent however said that as a result of these phenomena, collegiality had reduced in their departments. The remaining attributed the sustainability of collegiality to their different research areas. The proportion of faculty agreeing to competition improving quality of work was higher in university B, standing at 83 per cent. One faculty said that those who are against API had a 'fear to perform well'. Only one professor from social sciences and one assistant professor from sciences disagreed with this, saying that competition led to stress. One professor from social sciences said that he was not aware of this. 73 percent of the faculty said that it had led to infusion of individualism. To quote one social science faculty said that they did not experience competition but rather individualism, due to which people were getting "*island-ised and alienated from society*". Rather than competition, it led to infusing individualism in their department, they said. Three faculty members further extended their responses by saying that it helps to focus on the quality work. From amongst those who agreed only one said that as a result of individualism quality work was getting adversely affected. Those who negated attributed it to small size of their departments. In start difference to university B,

with respect to collegiality, 72 per cent said that it had reduced collegiality, in the form of less socialisation, due to time crunch or faculty running after scores.

f. **Relationship with other academic community/ Networking:** The response in this category was also found to be more or less the same in both the universities, among a large number of faculty. All the faculty in University A agreed that the networking which is taking place after API. Of these 50 per cent said that such networking was not letting improve quality work. They used phrases like 'favouritism', 'money making business', 'quantity is rising at the cost of quality', 'helping each other publish', 'tangibility of research gives them points', etc. as the reasons behind organising such conferences and seminars. The remaining conjectured that it would improve quality; while majority did not state the reason, one faculty said it would help better communication, another said it would help get access to better resources if collaboration is done with faculty who can get funds easily, or push those who were earlier not doing anything to do something. In University B, 50 per cent of the faculty agreed that after API there was a growing interaction amongst academicians across universities. The remaining either said that it existed even before API was there or they were not sure. Of those agreed or unsure (only one), more than half found this phenomenon not to be contributing to quality, which numbered 50 percent of the total faculty interviewed. The rest found it contributing to improvement of quality.

g. **External rewards and motivation:** Faculty were asked, what was more important in motivating them, their own intrinsic motivation or external rewards, or if they found a relationship between the two. All faculty, barring one said that external rewards were important to them, made them motivated to work or helped them improve quality. The rewards listed were getting recognition for their work, appreciation for their work or getting awards like best paper or best project. From amongst them, 33 per cent of the faculty in University A said that both were crucial. When asked to comment on the relationship between the two, two faculty members said that external rewards could help sustain intrinsic motivation; one of them said that they would do their work out of internal drive but if their work does not get recognition then they would lose the motivation to perform. In University B, all the faculty found external rewards to be motivating them to

perform. One faculty shared that they got an award and a prize money which made them look forward to doing more in the future. Another faculty said such rewards made them think that they had to do something. One faculty said that since a lot of time is spent on academic activities, and they tended to think what they gained after doing so much, these rewards can help retain the motivation to work. One faculty said that due to the NAAC visit which was pending at her university, she was encouraged by the VC to finish her Ph.D., which motivated her to complete her Ph.D. One of the faculty and the IQAC director also mentioned that they recently got an award from the governor for being the best university in the State. They appreciated that the work is externally getting recognised. As shared by the faculty, their university instituted various awards like best paper award. The IQAC gave best funded project and best project award to their faculty. Even the Teachers' Union of the university had instituted certain awards for faculty performance.

h. **Rational neo-liberal behaviour versus ethics:** It was raised by faculty during the interview that there was proliferation of poor quality journals, or faculty were rushing towards research at the cost of teaching in the classroom. In this context they were asked if the faculty were rational doing this given that they had to register performance or if they impute their ability at lower level. All the faculty members in University A, except two of them, agreed that faculty were rational if they were doing this. Two faculty attributed this to lack of time, two of them to the fault of UGC, one to the lack of exposure, and another one to poor economic background of some faculty. Those who did not find it rational shared that if faculty resort to such practices because they think they were less able, then they should not be in this profession. The response was not dissimilar in University B. Expect for one faculty, all the faculty members found the behaviour rational. Three faculty members found the limited time to be a reason for such behaviour, and two to UGC adding poor quality journals to their list. The one faculty who did not agree said that people which such behaviour did not deserve to be in this profession. Those who agreed further added that under pressure some faculty 'strategise'/ take rational action by publishing in not so good quality journals. Two faculty stated that something was better than nothing. They conjectured that the faculty who have now started publishing, albeit of poor quality, would

gradually get exposed to such culture of academics and produce better work in future.

i. **Possibility of resistance:** The subjectivity does not mean that all the individuals would willingly organise themselves and take the position of a subject of that discourse. There would be instances of resistance. Resistance could be found in faculty rejecting the idea of PBAS, or, as mentioned earlier, they might not inculcate the neo-liberal discourse in their *being*. Some of the areas where resistance was tried to be captured pertained to impact of API on academic freedom, faculty's perception about having an alternative to API, instances of teachers raising voice against API, or resistance due to respective disciplinary struggles. These are discussed as following:

1. **API and Academic Freedom:** It was asked from the respondents if API had any impact on their academic freedom. In University A only 20 per cent of the faculty agreed that API restricted their academic freedom. There faculty stated the reason for this. One assistant professor from social sciences stated that they had become target oriented which reduced their academic freedom. Another assistant professor from social sciences said that fou nd their freedom to undertake long term project rather restricted forcing them to focus on short term projects. An assistant professor from sciences also found the PBAS restricting their academic freedom due to bounds of time. The rest 80 per cent did not find any impact of API on their academic freedom. In university B, all the faculty except 4, said that API did not impact their academic freedom. Three of the remaining faculty were professors (2 faculty from social sciences and 1 from sciences), and one was an assistant professor from social sciences. One professor said it was a "positive change". The other two said that it was due to time crunch or rescheduling their plan that they did not find API impeding their academic freedom.

2. **Alternative to API:** In University A, two faculty called for scrapping PBAS. The remaining were not in favour of having an alternative but suggesting certain amendments to it, like having a working formula to take care of different environment, or factoring in different contextual factor, rather than having a universal standard. In a similar vein, none of the faculty in University B said that there should be an alternative to API, albeit some amendments were suggested.

They were not exactly in favour of the movements which took in DU last year against API. One social science faculty said that those faculty who wanted to scrap API were fearful of performance Two faculty said, that there should be a different performance assessment system for college different from university teacher, as also discipline wise as it was expressed that some disciplines didn't have journals with very high impact factor and may therefore feel *"victimised"*. They were not in favour of de-rooting the API altogether and on the contrary found it good. It was noted that teachers union had opposed the implementation for 3 years and suggested an alternative to PBAS, called

3. **Faculty voice against UGC regulation:** Only a few faculty in both the universities were aware of the teachers' movement which took place in the New Delhi against API. The faculty in University A mentioned about the teachers' organisations in the university, however it was said to be inactive in raising voice. As stated by one faculty it is usually when issues related to salaries arise, do they sometimes raise voice.

There are two major teacher union organisations in the university one of which is an affiliate of All India Federation of University and College Teachers' Organisation. The faculty members from the teachers' union could not be met with during the field survey. The interview of a faculty member who had been a part of the university for long, also as a student was conducted. The faculty had actively participated in the student union movements during his stay on the campus as a student. This faculty was chosen due to his prolonged association with the university, first as a student and then as a teacher. The objective was the same as above. There was said to be limited political interference in the working of these associations. He stated having not remembered any agitation taking place against PBAS. As per the experience of the faculty member, there was no aggression and persistence on the part of teachers. However, it was in the last one year that one of the organisations had become active due to change in the leadership and raised issues related to faculty promotion, allocation of faculty accommodation, and other injustice done to the teachers, with the result that they gained the trust of teachers in the university. Two reasons put forth by the faculty for lack of aggression so far were the presence of lobbies within the university based on various factors, like caste or ideology which

brought division amongst the faculty and thus the consciousness of belonging to one group of teachers was lacking.

In the University B, teachers' unions were active in raising voice. Due to the resistance owing to unawareness and other issues, the university implemented API in only 2013. One of the retired faculty, who started working in the university in 1981, shared that the faculty in the university were more *'militant'* than faculty elsewhere. One of the faculty, who also happened to be involved in the teachers' movement when API was introduced shared that they raised concerns regarding the universal implementation of API across faculty in university who were all not equally equipped. The alternative aimed at performance assessment as per personal circumstances of the faculty. This entailed for instance including mentioning about articles published not in peer reviewed or ISSN journal but also in local journals which have an impact in local community. The state where university is placed has had a vibrant culture of protests, with its inclination towards the left ideology. It has 14 state universities, one central university and two Deemed-to-be universities. Every university and college in the state has their own teachers' organisations and they are consolidated at a common platform called Federation of University Teachers' Association (FUTA). The in-depth interviews of two faculty members were taken who were associated with the teachers' union, in the context of protests which were taking place in the university. The objective was to understand the role of teachers' union vis-a-vis UGC policies and its impact on teachers' agency. One of the faculty was a retired faculty from the University, serving as a dean in one of the departments, and a member of Academic Council of the University. At the time of the interview he was also a member of Executive Council of AIFUCTO, and a member of FUTA, which was affiliated to AIFUCTO. He raised the issue of implementation of Performance Based Assessment System (PBAS) in the state of University B, citing the difficulties faced by the college teachers first. The college teachers are primarily engaged in teaching, having no time to do research and satisfy the category pertaining to research. Also, except the University College (one the colleges affiliated to the University), none of the colleges had research centres[61] where they could guide M.Phil. and Ph.D. students hampering their opportunity to score points. Another issue posed by him was the absence of

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[61] Research centres are the special centres installed within the college, where there is a provision to supervise the research students, in terms of equipments and faculty. The research students are enrolled in these research centres and are allotted supervisors from these centres.

teaching departments in a medical and a technological university, which were oriented towards research; the faculty in these universities faced the problem of scoring points in teaching. The AIFUCTO member was therefore against the standardisation imposed by the Central government. Since they did not receive funds from the centre, they did not feel accountable to them directly. The New Education policy was criticised as well for being exclusionary in nature, affecting students from poor sections. He argued for university autonomy and flexibility, criticising the interference of the central government. Every faculty member should have freedom to have their own beliefs, as said by them. The other faculty member who was a teaching faculty, was a part of political union of the University cited how the teachers agency is being crumbled by the administration by accepting all the guidelines given by the UGC. Despite the resistance by the faculty, who also proposed an alteration to the PBAS, the suggestions have been accepted by the administration. All in all, the culture of resistance to safeguard the identity of teachers was found to be vibrant, with faculty also being aware of the movements against PBAS, which took place in other universities like University of Delhi.

4. **Discipline related struggles-citation and publications:** The UGC regulation has the provision of augmenting the API scores according to the impact factor of the journals. The faculty were asked of their perception with respect to this. The science faculty from University A did not find any bias against social sciences with respect to citation. Even with respect to their disciplines where they worked, the response was in negation. Only one professor from sciences raised the issue of bias against social sciences and natural sciences. At the same time, all the social sciences faculty felt that it was biased against them. One assistant professor from social sciences shared that his research was interdisciplinary in nature and could not publish in journals catering to core areas in his disciplines. As a result of this, the citation and impact factor suffered. It was also shared that in sciences publishing in a journal with an impact factor of 5 is easy, in social sciences publishing in a journal with an impact factor of 5 was not as easy. A similar concern was raised by another assistant professor who shared that not many people work in his area. One social science assistant professor shared that she looked at the journal with high impact factor and published there.

The results were not different for University B, where all the social sciences felt a bias against their disciplines. One social sciences professor shared that

> *...there are many good quality journals which do not have impact factor.*

In sciences, only one assistant professor said that it was biased against social sciences and languages faculty. The rest did not find any bias. One faculty said *"There are many journals with high impact factor in my area"*. One science faculty shared their concerns regarding this provision. He said:

> *Impact factor is a major issue. If you are working in the area of basic field like taxonomy, the area I work in...Throughout the world taxonomy is disappearing. In India only handful of people are working on taxonomy. So the highest impact factor journal may have an impact factor of only 1.At the same time someone working in cancer biology even an ordinary journal for them may give an impact factor of more than 5. Citation is less because there are few people.*

j. **Departmental level assessment versus individual assessment:** From University A, half the faculty preferred individual assessment over departmental level assessment. The reason stated by all of them was this would help curb free riding by the faculty. 3 faculty (2 assistant professors from social sciences and one assistant professor from sciences) said that since individual abilities differ, the assessment should be done at the departmental level. The remaining asked for both the mechanisms to take place; the reason they cited was only departmental level would lead to free riding, and at the same time departmental level would hide the individual performance. One assistant professor from sciences said that even if there would be free riding in departmental level assessment, the faculty would learn over time to perform. In University B, 56 per cent agreed that there should be individual assessment than departmental level assessment. One assistant professor from social sciences said that the previous mechanism did not yield any improvement and thus, individual assessment should be there. 22 per cent faculty said that there should be a departmental level assessment. These

faculty were all professors from social sciences and 3 from the 4 argued that faculty have different capabilities and should not be assessed individually. One, however, said that her department faced shortage of faculty and she being the head of the department was occupied with administrative tasks, making her difficult to devote much time to research.

6.5.2. Analysis of account of counterfactual group

As mentioned already in Chapter 4, the first counterfactual sub-group comprises of retired faculty. The retired faculty's perception was taken in order to understand the experiences in the university historically, and because these are not at present directly accountable to the university, their narratives could give less subjective picture about the university practices with respect to accountability.

The faculty in this sub-group in the University A shared that during the initial years of his joining the department of economics, there were stalwarts who were actively involved in the conception of five-year plans and policy. However, there was very less international collaboration happening, giving the university an autarkic nature. Also the faculty did not aspire to publishing in international journals. The scenario remained the same, pre and the post API period. But after API, as he shared, there began emerging a pressure of an *"unpleasant kind"*, where there is *"desperation among young faculty"* to publish. API had instilled individualism and a *"competitive race to the bottom"*. There was a change of culture where younger colleagues were motivated by external rewards. An alternative to API, as suggested by this faculty, was to peer review performance of faculty after 5 years, a solution which he tried to apply in his department when he served as its director. With respect to his university effort, he stated that IQAC was inactive and became slightly active in only recent years.

The faculty from the University B also raised his concern over deterioration of quality research post API. He stated that after API, an *"unhealthy pressure"* to publish has developed among young faculty. Because there is pressure to document the work, people are attending all kinds of seminars, going only after quantity. There has emerged a race. During his days, he shared, there was a cooperation among younger faculty and senior ones, with the latter tutoring and chiselling the work of the

younger ones. That culture of cooperation had gone down in the recent years, affecting the quality work and academic culture, where collegiality had gone down. Also, he did not face administrative activities load earlier. He mentioned that even before API came up, there was a culture of producing work every year to be sent for the annual report of the university to the senate. Though there was no feedback but there was severe criticism against faculty not working. It was the fear of scrutiny which made faculty work, even though this had no direct connection with their salaries and promotions.

The next sub-group in counterfactuals comprised of faculty not belonging to colleges affiliated to these universities.

The college teacher in government funded college affiliated to the University A was critical of API, in that she said that it led to teachers becoming calculative. She expressed the concern that there was a huge teaching load and the number of students a faculty in college has to cater to is 130-140 every semester. The teachers in university, as she said, were relatively better off in that manner with respect to number of students they had to cater to. Also, she said that in college the primary responsibility was to teach, and then research, and when under API they were required to do research in colleges it was *"injustice"* to them. In light she suggested that one could not have the same API for university teachers and for college teachers, and also across faculty belonging to different disciplines.

In contrast, the college teacher in college affiliated to University B was supportive of API, saying that the some kind of compulsion to perform was needed. He, however, raised two concerns saying that if such norms are to be implemented across the country, then the State government should give additional resources to the State universities. Also, he stated that college environment is different from that of university, because the latter is oriented towards research. Getting consent from the state government for various fellowships was also difficult. Therefore, a modification he suggested was an alteration be made to a unified pattern for assessment. For instance, he suggested there should be options like giving concession with respect to publishing in ISSN/ISBN journals.

6.6. Academic Freedom and Motivation: A comparative analysis of universities

During the survey it was found that faculty from both the universities discussed only about the freedom of designing curriculum or teaching whatever they wanted to teach in the classroom as academic freedom, which did not have much relationship with PBAS. A large number also felt there was no relationship between PBAS and their academic freedom. In addition to this, even though the faculty were talking of motivation, it was felt that there was a need to get a concrete answer on how the PBAS was affecting their motivation. Also, during the pilot survey also, it was found that some of the answers did not receive explicit response from the respondents, particularly on questions relating to academic freedom and motivation. To get concrete responses, and juxtapose the two universities, the question pertaining to this was transformed into a structured questionnaire (please see Annexure II, Question no. 27).

The responses reflect the different degrees of agreement over various issues pertaining to PBAS. Since it is ranked and is qualitative in nature, method developed by Likert (1932) is used to analyse them. The items were categorised into different categories, broadly: academic freedom and motivation. In addition to this, there were certain single item questions related to trust and nature of output produced. These items under each category were identified using the existing literature on factor informing academic freedom and motivation, under the New Public Management, and also from the pilot survey. The faculty were asked to rank the items under each of the category between the rank 1 and 5, where 1 was strongly agree, 2 was agree, 3 neither agree or disagree, 4 was disagree and 5 strongly disagree. A sum of scores was done to derive likert scales for each category[62]. For example, under academic freedom, for each respondent, a total of all ranks was done to come up with their scores. The likert scale under academic freedom therefore ranged between 4 and 20, because it contains 4 items. Similarly, a sum of two items under the category of motivation would give the likert scales ranging from 2 to 10.

The data analysis would be done under several steps, using SPSS:

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[62] Some researchers take an average of score, to make the data continuous and suitable for parametric tests. But it is important to take note of the fact that likert scale by nature is a discrete data. By this is meant the difference between 'strongly agree' and 'agree' is not the same as between 'agree' and 'neither agree nor disagree'. Similarly, an average score of 1.5 does not mean that it's equidistant from 'strongly agree' and 'agree'.

Step 1: Defining the data

The items under each category are as below (with their codes provided in parentheses):

Category: Lack of Academic Freedom

1. PBAS has led to time crunch for you (Api_tc_af)

2. Registering output every year/assessment period takes away your agency to work in the research areas which you find interesting (interestarea_af)

3. Registering output every year/assessment period takes away your agency to work in the research areas which are important for societal welfare (socialwelfare_af)

4. Registering output every year/assessment period takes away your liberty to engage in creative endeavour requiring long time (creative_af)

Category: Lack of Motivation

1. Co-curricular activities reduce motivation for academic activities (cocurri_motiv)

2. Performance assessment reduces your motivation (pbas_motiv)

3. Time crunch reduces your motivation to work (tc_motiv)

Apart from these categories, the remaining items were individually tested.

Step2: Calculating new variables for the total scores for each category, as total_af , for academic freedom, which sums all the 4 items listed above and total_motiv for Motivation, which adds up both the items listed above.

Step 3: Testing for normality

Whereas each likert is non-normally distributed because the data is ordinal in nature (in the present study the responses are discrete numbers like 1,2 3, etc., and do not lie anywhere in between these numbers), the total scores at times represent normal distribution and therefore are required to be tested for normality. The total scores for academic freedom as well as motivation were tested for normality. This was undertaken because the tests to be applied further would depend upon whether the data was normal or not. For the purpose, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was used, to test the hypothesis of normality (with alternative hypothesis as non-

normality) of total score for academic freedom (total_af) and total score for motivation (total_motiv). It was found that the p-value of KS Z statistic for total_af was 0.607 and for total_motiv was 0.047 (See Annexure IV, Table 6.1A and Table 6.2A).

The result was insignificant for both, suggesting a normal distribution. However, what needs to be noted here that with a small sample, often these tests show the data to be normally distributed[63], whereas when the data are in Likert scale they are intuitively non-normal because they are ordinal in nature, discrete than continuous. By this is meant the difference between 'strongly agree' and 'agree' is not the same as between 'agree' and 'neither agree nor disagree'. Similarly, an average score of 1.5 does not mean that it's equidistant from 'strongly agree' and 'agree'. The data were, therefore, subject to distribution free treatment, using non-parametric Mann-Whitney test.

Step 4: Conducting Mann-Whitney Test for non-parametric data

Mann-Whitney test is conducted to find if the two samples originate from same population. In other words, it is used to see if there is any difference between two groups with respect to any testing variable. For more than two groups, Krusal-Willis test is used. The null hypothesis is that the two samples or groups are from the same population. The groups used in the study are: universities, discipline, and designation of faculty. Both the categories would be looked at across these groups. University A has been coded as 1, and University B as 2. Science has been coded as 1 and Social Sciences as 2. For designation, Assistant Professor is coded as 1, Associate Professor as 2, and Professor as 3. Since the grouping variable designation contains more than 2 categories, Kruskal- Wallis H test is used in place of Mann-Whitney U test.

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[63] Please see http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/BS/BS704_Nonparametric/BS704_ Nonparametric2.html

Case 1: Academic freedom as testing variable

Table 6.1

Mann-Whitney U test statistics for Academic freedom as dependent variable and university as grouping variable

Ranks

	University	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
	1	32	28.16	901.00
total_af	2	18	20.78	374.00
	Total	50		

Test Statistics[a]

	total_af
Mann-Whitney U	203.000
Wilcoxon W	374.000
Z	-1.727
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.084

a. Grouping Variable: University

As can be seen from Table 6.1, the p value of Mann-Whitney U test statistic, Z, is 0.084, signifying an insignificant result. Therefore, we would conclude that there is no significant difference in the reduction of academic freedom in two universities.

Table 6.2

Mann-Whitney U test statistics for Academic freedom as dependent variable and discipline as grouping variable

Ranks

	Discipline_code	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
	1	24	25.88	621.00
total_af	2	26	25.15	654.00
	Total	50		

Test Statistics[a]

	total_af
Mann-Whitney U	303.000
Wilcoxon W	654.000
Z	-.176
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.861

a. Grouping Variable: Discipline_code

The Table 6.2 shows that the p value of Z statistic is considerably high at 0.861, and thus the null hypothesis could be rejected, implying no difference is API reducing academic freedom across disciplines.

Table 6.3

Kruskal-Wallis H test for Academic freedom as dependent variable and designation as grouping variable

Ranks

	Designation_Code	N	Mean Rank
total_af	1	29	25.31
	2	12	25.50
	3	9	26.11
	Total	50	

Test Statistics[a,b]

	total_af
Chi-Square	.021
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.990

a. Kruskal Wallis Test

b. Grouping Variable:
Designation_Code

With regard to designation as well, there was no significant difference with respect to reduction in academic freedom.

Case 2: Reduction in Motivation as testing variable

Table 6.4

Mann-Whitney U test statistics for Motivation as dependent variable and university as grouping variable

Ranks

	University	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
	1	32	24.08	770.50
total_motiv	2	18	28.03	504.50
	Total	50		

Test Statistics^a

	total_motiv
Mann-Whitney U	242.500
Wilcoxon W	770.500
Z	-.933
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.351

a. Grouping Variable: University

The p value of Mann-Whitney U test for motivation is 0.351, which makes the results insignificant. Thus, there is no statistical difference across universities in terms of API reducing motivation.

Table 6.5

Mann-Whitney U test statistics for Motivation as dependent variable and discipline as grouping variable

Ranks

	Discipline_code	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
total_motiv	1	24	30.40	729.50
	2	26	20.98	545.50
	Total	50		

Test Statistics[a]

	total_motiv
Mann-Whitney U	194.500
Wilcoxon W	545.500
Z	-2.314
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.021

a. Grouping Variable: Discipline_code

Interestingly, the p value of Z statistic is 0.021, which is less than 0.05 when motivation is tested across disciplines. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the faculty belonging to social sciences and sciences, with respect to PBAS reducing the motivation of faculty. The mean score of science faculty is higher than the mean score of social sciences faculty.

Table 6.6

Kruskal-Wallis H test for Motivation as dependent variable and designation as independent variable.

Ranks

	Designation_Code	N	Mean Rank
total_motiv	1	29	24.24
	2	12	27.21
	3	9	27.28
	Total	50	

Test Statistics[a,b]

	total_motiv
Chi-Square	.530
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.767

a. Kruskal Wallis Test

b. Grouping Variable: Designation_Code

As can be seen from Table 6.6, there is no difference across designation with respect to API reducing their motivation.

It can be seen from the tables above, that across various groups like universities, discipline and designation, the extent of effect of API on Academic Freedom and Motivation remain the same. Only exception was motivation across different levels of designation.

Case 3: Nature of output as dependent variable (applied_natureoutput)

The faculty were asked if API has led to proliferation of more applied kind of research, than basic or fundamental research. As could be seen from table 6.8 to 6.10 below, there was no difference in this response across universities, discipline or designation (with p value for the tests being 0.187, 0.080 and 0.198 respectively)

Table 6.7

Mann-Whitney U test for Nature of output as dependent variable and university as independent variable.

Ranks

	University	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
	1	32	23.53	753.00
applied_natureoutput	2	18	29.00	522.00
	Total	50		

Test Statistics[a]

	applied_natureoutput
Mann-Whitney U	225.000
Wilcoxon W	753.000
Z	-1.320
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.187

a. Grouping Variable: University

Table 6.8

Mann-Whitney U test for Nature of output as dependent variable and discipline as independent variable.

Ranks

	Discipline_code	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
applied_natureoutput	1	24	29.13	699.00
	2	26	22.15	576.00
	Total	50		

Test Statistics[a]

	applied_natureoutput
Mann-Whitney U	225.000
Wilcoxon W	576.000
Z	-1.752
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.080

a. Grouping Variable: Discipline_code

Table 6.9:

Kruskal-Wallis H test for Nature of output as dependent variable and designation as independent variable.

Ranks

	Designation_Code	N	Mean Rank
applied_natureoutput	1	29	22.55
	2	12	28.38
	3	9	31.17
	Total	50	

Test Statistics[a,b]

	applied_natureoutput
Chi-Square	3.240
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.198

a. Kruskal Wallis Test

b. Grouping Variable: Designation_Code

Case 4: UGC is losing trust in faculty work

The p value for all the three tests conducted with university, discipline and designation as independent variables, was found to be greater than 0.05 (See Table 6.10-6.12 below). Thus, the various groups in each category belonged to the same population.

Table 6.10

Mann-Whitney U test for loss of trust as dependent variable and university as independent variable.

Ranks

	University	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
	1	30	22.62	678.50
ugc_trust	2	17	26.44	449.50
	Total	47		

Test Statistics[a]

	ugc_trust
Mann-Whitney U	213.500
Wilcoxon W	678.500
Z	-.948
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.343

a. Grouping Variable: University

Table 6.11

Mann-Whitney U test for loss of trust as dependent variable and discipline as independent variable.

Ranks

	Discipline_code	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
ugc_trust	1	23	24.20	556.50
	2	24	23.81	571.50
	Total	47		

Test Statistics[a]

	ugc_trust
Mann-Whitney U	271.500
Wilcoxon W	571.500
Z	-.099
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.921

a. Grouping Variable: Discipline_code

Table 6.12

Kruskal-Wallis H test for loss of trust as dependent variable and designation as independent variable.

Ranks

	Designation_Code	N	Mean Rank
ugc_trust	1	27	24.48
	2	12	25.67
	3	8	19.88
	Total	47	

Test Statistics[a,b]

	ugc_trust
Chi-Square	.996
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.608

a. Kruskal Wallis Test

b. Grouping Variable: Designation_Code

Case 5: There is no fund shortage

Another item that was asked from the faculty was if there was any fund shortage they were experiencing. This question was asked because for faculty to enjoy academic freedom, finance is a very crucial input. The results for all, i.e. university as dependent variable, discipline as dependent variable and designation as dependent variable were insignificant reflecting that the group in each dependent variable belonged to the same population.

Table 6.13

Mann-Whitney U test for shortage of fund as dependent variable and university as independent variable.

Ranks

	University	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
	1	32	27.14	868.50
fundshort_af	2	18	22.58	406.50
	Total	50		

Test Statistics[a]

	fundshort_af
Mann-Whitney U	235.500
Wilcoxon W	406.500
Z	-1.099
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.272

a. Grouping Variable: University

Table 6.14

Mann-Whitney U test for shortage of funds as dependent variable and discipline as independent variable.

Ranks

	Discipline_code	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
	1	24	22.79	547.00
fundshort_af	2	26	28.00	728.00
	Total	50		

Test Statistics[a]

	fundshort_af
Mann-Whitney U	247.000
Wilcoxon W	547.000
Z	-1.307
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.191

a. Grouping Variable: Discipline_code

Table 6.15

Kruskal-Wallis H test for shortage of funds as dependent variable and designation as independent variable.

Ranks

	Designation_Code	N	Mean Rank
	1	29	25.17
	2	12	25.13
fundshort_af	3	9	27.06
	Total	50	

Test Statistics[a,b]

	fundshort_af
Chi-Square	.134
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.935

a. Kruskal Wallis Test

b. Grouping Variable:
Designation_Code

Discussion on non-parametric tests: As seen above, all the tests were insignificant, except for one on motivation, taking discipline as dependent variable. It could be said that across the two universities there was no significant differences in the responses given by the faculty. Also the discipline and designation also had no role to play in coming up with any difference in responses. Thus, one could say that these contexts do not have as great an impact on the responses. There is however a larger role to be played by the university culture. Here one could argue that there is no statistical difference in the two universities. But capturing culture of the university goes much deeper and requires a nuanced understanding of the orientation of the university and the role of leader in that, which might not be as minutely captured by the statistical calculations. That role of culture has been discussed above.

6.6.1. Academic freedom and motivation: A descriptive analysis

Whereas the non-parametric exercise reported no difference across universities, or disciplines or designation, let us scrutinise the responses given for the individual items by different faculty in each of the universities. For each of the item, the proportion of faculty either strongly agreeing or agreeing (henceforth, in this section the word used for both would be 'agree/agreeing', to simplify) to the items were calculated (Table 6.3A and Table 6.4A, Annexure V). The analysis undertaken at all-university level, and also discipline wise, rank-wise and according to the intersection between discipline and rank, under the various sub-heads, as per the items, is as following:

6.6.1.1. Performance Based Assessment System and Academic freedom

As mentioned in the preceding section, certain factors under PBAS were identified which could have an impact on freedom of faculty. Under this, the items picked up were:

a. API has led to time crunch for you

b. Registering output every year/assessment period takes away the agency to work on research areas which you find interesting

c. Registering output every year/assessment period takes away your agency to work in the areas which are important for societal welfare, and

d. Registering output every year/assessment period takes away your liberty to engage in creative endeavour requiring long time

It was found that in University B 44 per cent agreed that API led to time crunch for them, whereas in University A this proportion was less standing at only 34 per cent. In University B, more than two-thirds of faculty agreed that the regulation puts a constraint on their freedom with respect to deciding output, agency to work in their interest area and engaging in creative endeavours requiring long time, and a large number (72 per cent) agreed that it takes away their agency to work in the areas significant from the point of view of society. In University A, this per centage was less, with 44 per cent faculty agreeing that API takes away their agency to work in areas which they found interesting, and 50 percent and 53 per cent stating that it took away their agency to work in the areas important for societal welfare, and in the areas requiring long time creativity, respectively. With respect to deciding output, they stood almost at par with University B at 59 per cent (in University B this proportion was 61 per cent).

It could be said that in University B, not only a good number of faculty interviewed felt that API was restricting their academic freedom in various areas, the proportion was also considerably more than found in University A.

6.6.1.2. Nature of Knowledge generated

Under this category, two items are considered. One is the agency to work in the areas important for societal welfare (also discussed above, but here would be discussed in the context of nature of knowledge without linking to academic freedom) and second is API has led to producing outputs, which could be registered quickly-like applied research than basic research. In University B it was found that 72 per cent faculty agreed that their freedom to produce output for societal welfare was taken away, whereas this proportion was less, at only 50 per cent in University A. With respect to producing applied research, in University B 50 per cent faculty agreed that API led to producing applied research than basic research, with a higher proportion of 66 percent in University A, agreeing to them same.

Thus, more than half the faculty interviewed in both the universities, agreed that the nature of output produced could be away from that meant for societal welfare, and is more applied in nature, which is quick to be produced, than basic. What needs to be noted here is that quite often than not, it is the applied research which is felt by many to be leading to providing solution of practical problems (Nelson, 1959, p. 301). Going with this line of thought, it would not be surprising to see that if faculty find the research output to be not meant for societal welfare, they would also not find a deviation from basic research to applied research, as a result. But it could still be concluded that 50 per cent and 66 per cent faculty in University B and University A felt that there was no fundamental knowledge was generated, and faculty resorted to producing research which was quicker to be generated.

6.6.1.3. Co-curricular activities reduce motivation for academic activities

Only roughly one-thirds faculty in both the universities agreed that it does reduce their motivation to perform academic activities. This result is concomitant with many faculty sharing, that if they do manage their daily tasks well it was not difficult to score points under PBAS. Also, if looked at the UGC gazette, it could be found that for getting promotion from an assistant professor[64] level to associate professor level, they needed 3 publications in 12 years time span, which was not as difficult.

6.6.1.4. PBAS enhances motivation to perform better

What was found was whereas 50 per cent faculty in University A agreed that PBAS enhanced their motivation to perform better, this proportion was as high as 72 per cent in University B. The reasons stated by faculty in university A were: it gives them a benchmark to perform, they feel motivated for promotion, it helps them reveal their hidden intellect. In university B, three faculty stated that they felt geared up to publish more now, another faculty said that now they wanted to publish more because they would be rewarded for that. The results are concomitant with the role the leadership at both the universities played, as was discussed in qualitative analysis. (Although, this might be in conflict with a large number of faculty agreeing to a loss of agencies

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[64] Only assistant professor is discussed here because some assistant professors shared that most of the administrative burden falls on their shoulder and not the senior faculty in their departments.

under various items discussed above, the conflict would be highlighted and resolved in a subsequent sub-section of this chapter)

6.6.1.5. UGC is losing trust in faculty

It was asked from faculty, if they felt that API was instituted because UGC had lost trust in faculty work. In University B this proportion stood at 39 per cent and in A 50 per cent faculty agreed to this. This result needs to be looked at in conjunction with how API is affecting the motivation of faculty, and also if they would like to gave alternative to API. From the qualitative results it was found that hardly any faculty would like to have an alternative to API; all they had suggested for was amendments to be made within PBAS. Secondly, in University B as high as 72 per cent faculty, and in University A 50 per cent faculty agreed that PBAS has led to enhancing their motivation to perform better. It is not surprising therefore that a less proportion of faculty, particularly in University B, feel that there is any loss of trust in their work.

6.6.1.6. Shortage of fund for doing research

As discussed in Chapter-2, Marginson (2006,2007) and Bennich-Bjorkman (2007) argue that one of the enabling conditions for faculty to enjoy academic freedom are economic opportunities or funds (to do research). In both the universities 22 per cent faculty shared that there was no shortage of fund to conduct research, implying that 78 per cent in both the universities agreed that there was a shortage of fund. A lack of economic opportunities would have a direct implication for not only the agency of faculty, but also for them to score points under PBAS.

Disciplinary differences

a.   **PBAS and academic freedom:** In both the universities the proportion of faculty agreeing to API causing them a time crunch was higher amongst social sciences than sciences. This was also true for producing defined output taking away their freedom. A much of this has to do with the nature of work undertaken in these two types of disciplines. In social sciences, as already discussed in Chapter 2 on literature review, people are engaged with societal problems, leading them to have more perspectives and be more vocal, which is often not the case in sciences. Also sciences faculty are long engaged in their laboratories for research,

for they are required to quickly publish the results of their research due to fierce competition, as in the biological fields, whereas in social sciences publication is slow (Powell, 2016) leaving them with more time at hand. In social sciences, the faculty spend time socialising as well, which also becomes their field of study. Another factor to be taken into consideration is that in sciences due to huge demand of funds for carrying out their academic activities, the faculty have to depend on doing projects (Sharma, 2013, 2015), and already produce patents. Given this backdrop, the performance assessment would bring greater changes for social sciences faculty than sciences. In the remaining items, like taking away the agency to work in the areas they found interesting, areas requiring creative endeavour and longer time, or areas important for society, the proportion of social science was less than sciences. This could be because the problems that a social science faculty is engaged with is already incorporates some needs of society. Also, the fact that less proportion of agreed to their freedom being taken away with respect to doing the work they find interesting or requiring longer duration, is a reflection of less dependency of them on funding agency and thus deviation away from what they would want to produce, and two, of an assessment period being enough of time for them to undertake creative endeavours, which may not be true for sciences, where it might take a longer period of research to make a breakthrough in research.

b. **Nature of knowledge generated:** In University A there was not much difference between science and social faculty response, where 63 per cent science faculty and 69 per cent social science faculty agreed that API has led to producing outputs which are quick to be produced like applied research than basic research, which is but an outcome of expecting output to be produced in a time bound manner under a performance assessment exercise. Amongst University B social science faculty, all agreed to this. What is surprising is the fact that only 25 per cent of University B science faculty agreed to production of applied research than basic.

c. **Co-curricular activities reduce motivation for academic activities:** In University B, the difference between science and social sciences faculty was found to be substantial; Only 13 per cent of science faculty agreeing to co-

curricular activities reducing motivation for academic activities, and 50 per cent of social sciences faculty interviewed agreed that co-curricular activities reduce the motivation of doing activities. In University A, there was not much difference between the sciences and social sciences faculty, at 36 per cent and 31 per cent respectively.

d. **PBAS enhances motivation to perform better:** In both the universities, the proportion of faculty belonging to sciences felt more strongly that PBAS enhanced their motivation to work better, than those from social sciences. The non-parametric tests also reported a statistically significant difference between the two groups.

e. **UGC is losing trust in faculty:** In University A, both sciences and social sciences stood at 50 per cent, which was true of University B social sciences faculty as well. But in University B, only 25 per cent on sciences felt there was a loss of trust. That is why also, faculty from sciences outnumber social sciences in agreeing that PBAS enhances their motivation to perform better, and also as compared to social science faculty, a less number from sciences agreed to any time crunch due to PBAS. Motivation and no loss of trust go hand in hand.

f. **Shortage of fund for doing research:** Whereas the requirement of fund is found to be greater in sciences for conducting their academic activities, as compared to social sciences, what was surprising was in both the universities, a greater number of social sciences agreed that there was a shortage of fund for doing research. This could be because a large number of sciences faculty in both the universities agreed that they write projects in order to get funds.

Designation-wise differences

Designation-wise, there was no coherent pattern found in responses. Responses stood in contrast in both the universities. But in case of impact of academic freedom, it was found, that professors felt more constraint on their agency to work in the areas meant for societal welfare than younger faculty. The younger faculty mostly joined the Universities post 2013. We can say the PBAS was more internalised in their will. Another interesting finding was with respect to impact of PBAS on agency to do research with required longer time. In both the Universities, as compared to younger

faculty, a smaller proportion of professors agreed to this item. This could also be expected, given that a large burden of teaching load lies with the assistant or associate professors, leaving professors with more time to engage in creative endeavours requiring long time. Similarly, proportion of professors who felt that co-curricular activities reduced their motivation was less in both the universities as compared to a younger faculty. It is also but expected because much of the burden of administrative activities falls on assistant professors, as also shared by an Assistant Professor from University A.

Some observations from academic audit of University B

The academic audit was undertaken for the first time in University B. The audit had departments given the autonomy to choose their own peer reviewers. There were certain biases noted in this regard, which are as following:

1. Some of the peer reviewers were either retired from the same University (like in case of Sociology) or some had done their doctoral degree here (for instance, one peer reviewer of economic department)

2. Some departments had college teachers assessing the research performance of faculty. This was ironical because it was understood by the college teachers interviewed and as also many university faculty had argued that primary activity is to teach in colleges.

    The ambiguity over commenting upon quality work would, therefore, always remain. (The next chapter would try to depict various behavioural possibilities under faculty performance assessment, and their implications on quality work, using game theoretic expositions)

6.7. Discussion: Subjectivisation, self-formation and resistance

The analysis of the faculty responses is undertaken at two levels:

i. General perception about performance assessment

ii. Perception and their experiences pertaining to only API

The reason for this analysis lies in the fact that the faculty when sharing their perception about API, would bring in their experiences about the people in the academic world flouting the norms of quality work, as expected by them. This might lead them to not like API. This would make understanding the process of subjectivisation and resistance difficult. Therefore, in order to know if they are also 'potential subjects' of the discourse, one must analyse their perception about neo-liberal performance assessment in general. Another reason for analysing responses at the level of general perception is because API is a recently new phenomenon, particularly, in the University B, having been implemented in 2013. Therefore, its too soon to comment upon the impact on faculty behaviour. Thus, the analysis is as following:

6.7.1. General perception of faculty regarding performance assessment: Construction of Self

Chapter 3 details about the construction of neo-liberal self. It happens through self-interest and self-evaluation. Through this faculty create a knowledge about their own selves. This is called as normalising technique, which are premised on individualism, competition, deriving motivation from external rewards, documentation of work, etc. The faculty were in general asked around these indicators. As mentioned above, the majority faculty in both the universities agreed that quantification of output could make the faculty perform better. They provided with a qualification that it might lead to poor quality. In University B many faculty said that PBAS gave them an opportunity to self-reflect on themselves. With regard to competition also, over three-fourths of faculty supported that competition would help better quality work. When asked them regarding external rewards, again in both the universities they agreed that external rewards would help them being more motivated. Thus, one could say that a large chunk of faculty was willing accepting the practices of new managerialism. It was found to be more in University B, however, than University A.

This process of self-formation, where need of survival is centred around individualism and competition, is also instrumental in forestalling any kind of resistance (Davies & Peterson, 2005). As discussed in an earlier section, the leadership also had a role in orienting the faculty in University B towards such logics. He had indeed played the mediating role, as expected of a leader under NPM reforms.

These managers or leaders align the individual motivations and aspirations, with the requirements of structures (Whitchurch & Gordon, 2017). The IQAC director had developed a 'positive psychological contract' (Whitchurch & Gordon, 2017, p. 9). It could be for this reason, that despite a pocket of faculty (teachers' union) resisting the PBAS, a large chunk of faculty was willingly internalising the norms required by a potential subject. Such phenomena were found missing in University A. Let us now look at experiences of faculty which were specific to the PBAS.

6.7.2. Perception and experiences regarding API

In the University A, barring 20 percent of faculty, the rest were in favour of API. However, their concern revolved around the way it implemented, with loopholes supporting poor quality work. The remaining 20 percent felt that API was curtailing their freedom to do research due to time crunch owing to teaching load. They also felt that they did not have enough resources, which affected their research category in API. It was in general found that the faculty at the University B was in favour of API. The phrases like 'pressure to perform' or 'fear to perform' had a positive connotation for them. None was in favour of scrapping off API but they proposed only slight modification in the regulation, with respect to disciplines or institutions. Most of the faculty favoured also competition as a way to bring in quality of work, and also external reward were found to be motivating them to perform.

It can be said that they were self-regulated particularly in the instances like undertaking feedback on their own and internalised the 'pressure' to perform positively. That there was hardly any resistance against API witnessed among the faculty could be attributed to the fact that of the five faculty interviewed, four had joined the university right when API was being implemented in the university. Whereas it was observed that faculty were praising the efforts undertaken by the IQAC[65], but this pro-activeness of IQAC was witnessed only in the last 3 years.

Another rational behaviour as expected under the neo-liberal discourse could also be seen in their favouring the academic relationship outside university for scores or certificates and stating the something is better than nothing. This was found in both the universities. Students were considered to be the reliable evaluators of their work,

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[65] This was found in the second round of survey done.

which might lead to rendering them an authority over the work of teachers, who become answerable to students. In addition to that, a couple of faculty found API enhancing their academic freedom as it encouraged them to do research.

It could be seen that the faculty in the University B felt motivated by the API scores in general, making them a *"numbered subjects"*[66] of policy. Not only this, the IQAC director also tries to motivate the faculty through external rewards like one for best project, or patents. That their plan to improve quality has the intention to feature in international rankings depicts the need for external positioning of the university. Thus, in all the approach is more outward looking and externally oriented in the university. Without any major conflicts between the leader and faculty, with both exhibiting extrinsic motivation, the adaptation of API would not be difficult[67].

It cannot be said for certain whether API has a role to play in this regard. In other words, if it is API which has moulded their behaviour in this manner cannot be concluded because they joined right when API got implemented in the university. Even if one assumes away API having any such impact, it needs to be noted that they appear to be oriented towards performance assessment exercises, extrinsically motivated by rewards and competition, documenting the work to self-reflect and keep oneself on toes[68] and therefore, API could and would continue to gain ground amongst them. At the same time, it could be seen, that the IQAC director is, to some extent, also instrumental in orienting the university culture towards documentation and thus performance assessment.

Since API is relatively a recent phenomenon in University B (in some departments, it started 6 months back only), one cannot really conclude about its impact on quality work. It may as well be the case that despite being in tune with the larger discourse, the faculty is conscious of producing quality work.[69]

When talking of culture and the role of leadership, it needs to be noted that the leader at University B got the requisite support from the faculty in ensuring quality work at the university level. But as stated by the leader, there was an initial resistance

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[66] The individuals governed by numbers (Ball, 2015)
[67] It cannot be said that it has been easy because it is very recently that API was adopted (2013).
[68] This was shared by some faculty in recent survey.
[69] It can be concluded by looking at the publication/ research activity history of the university.

from the faculty which was overcome by his persistent efforts in ensuring. In case of University A on the other hand, the leader could not garner enough support from the faculty in ensuring the success of IQAC endeavours as well as ensuring quality work by the faculty. That subjectivisation was a smooth sail in University B could be attributed to the support that the leader could garner from the faculty, by demonstrating the results of his efforts despite the initial resistance.

Thus, in both the universities the general perception of faculty was in favour of neo-liberal kind of an assessment, making them amenable noe-liberal subjects. But, what can be seen is that in case of University B there is a greater orientation of faculty towards API than is there in University A. A great part of this is attributed to the role of leadership in the university. University A does not have that proactive and dynamic a leadership in installing the neo-liberal rules of the game, as it is there in University B. Thus, in a nutshell it could be said that power relations as expected under the neo-liberal discourse function more in University B, than A. As said earlier, the subjectivisation does not happen without resistance. In the University B, there was a strong resistance against API, which was not found in the University A. Despite resistance, the faculty are turning into neo-liberal subjects, due to favourable institutional discourse. As has been argued earlier, the neo-liberal rationality could be in conflict with ethical practices in universities. But the fact that University A does not depict instances of formation of strong neo-liberal subjects does not mean that the objective of quality has been met by in University A. At the same time, one could not conclude that the process of subjectivisation in University B renders good quality work. Looking at the faculty research output is only a partial way to understand quality, because a) quality is difficult to measure and b) what is quality work differs in accordance with the larger discourse.

6.8 Reliability and Validity of results

The criteria to test reliability and validity of results have already been explicated in Chapter-4 on Methodology and Methods. The reliability could be tested if the same measure leads to similar results. The objectives were broadly addressed using the measure of Critical discourse analysis, analysing the implications of larger neo-liberal discourse. The themes that would be developed to understand the working of neo-liberalism have been generated using the existing literature on performance

assessment and also features of neo-liberalism. Adhering to this method, would yield the similar results as given in the study. Secondly, as could be seen in the quantitative analysis of the data, there was no statistically significant difference found in both the state universities. The state universities in India suffer from almost similar constraints, like culture, fund crunch, lack of motivation, lack of training, etc. If the study was undertaken in a similar fashion in another state university it might have led to 'replication' of results, providing reliability to the present results.

As regards validity, first off, the data was found to be saturated during the phase of collection after talking to 9-10 faculty in each university. But for the sake of completion some more faculty members were interviewed, albeit with not much contribution to the already collected data. Second, the study has provided a detail of theoretical framework, within which the questionnaire, as well as method of analysis have been situated. When the study is looked at with this lens, it renders credibility to the findings as stated. Also, the results are analysed by bringing in some knowledge about the culture of the setting, and themes of policy effects as well as data analysis being developed using Foucault's framework. These factors provide a rich and thick description to the study, providing it with credibility.

Chapter-7: Performativity, Social norms and Quality: Proposing Game theoretic expositions

7.1 Introduction

The Performance Based Assessment System is a regulatory measure, installed to maintain minimum standard of quality. It is installed to curb the abuse of freedom at least by some, in universities[70]. Kumar (1987) in this light highlighted a call for accountability in the wake of shirking away by the faculty and an abuse of freedom. PBAS, although is a self-assessment exercise but it is regulated by the government[71] and therefore, qualifies to be called as 'enforced self-regulation' (Jongbloed, 2004).

The Performance Based Assessment System assumes a neo-liberal framework of human behaviour, which has been argued in the previous chapters, where the individuals are thought to be self-interested, maximising their own utility in terms of promotion or recruitment. Any performance assessment exercise might seem to be premised on the assumption of an individual being homo-economicus. In the context of universities and faculty behaviour, a rational faculty should be behaving in their own interest (of recruitment or promotion) and register their scores in various activities, as a way to gain promotion or recruitment. It is this self-interest which governs their behaviour.

The performance assessment exercise requires the faculty to register their performance across categories of teaching-learning, research and co-curricular activities The supposed aim of any performance assessment exercise is to improve quality work or at least maintain certain minimum standards of work. This monitoring mechanism would supposedly plug in the lack of information about the faculty productivity, which is measured through the outputs they produce, and reduce shirking at the hands of faculty, and improve the governance of universities.

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[70] But in some Universities which were quality conscious the papers written by the faculty were assessed by the experts before the faculty was made eligible for interview.

[71] The IQAC of a University can filter the self-appraisal forms, before sending them for screening or to UGC.

Let us discuss the problem of information asymmetry. In the case of teaching, there is an information regarding the time faculty devotes in the classroom, that is the input, but whether teaching is taking place in the classroom and of what quality cannot be ascertained[72]. Similarly, in research, the process of publication and the effort put in in doing research work is also unknown, despite an evidence in the form of number of publications or seminars attended. The processes through which outputs are produced are not known. In other words, if the process whereby the labour time of faculty is converted into output is taken into account, the quality of output produced could be put to question in certain cases. This is because despite having information about the output produced, there lies a lack of information on the type of faculty and hence their objectives, and thus, the actions or the methods resorted to, to achieve those outputs, go unaccounted for. First off, the faculty might produce the quality of their output according to their respective abilities. For instance, a faculty may accumulate score under PBAS by producing output at local or national level, than international if they think that they are not able enough. It may also be rational for a faculty to not to spend more time on producing a very high-quality output, and rather produce output such that it takes less time to register their scores, even if quality is compromised slightly in the process. Another very crucial factor determining the motivation of faculty and the quality of their work is the culture of university they are associated with. Second, a faculty may on purpose choose to not give their best in terms of producing quality. This also emanates from the type of faculty that they are. But a significant factor is the culture of the university where the faculty are placed; the culture may or may not support such actions by them, in which case might emerge a conflict. For instance, a university which is not very quality conscious may have more faculty adjusting their motivation downward and producing a lower quality output than under a university where quality of output is important. The present chapter would revolve around these two (or rather three) considerations in understanding the faculty behaviour, and how it could have an impact on the quality work performed by them.

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[72] One way to ward off such lack of information is to rely on the student feedback. The UGC had introduced student feedback in the regulation in 2013 but the faculty were required to only administer a proforma, disregarding the feedback given by the students. In 2016, it was amended further and the feedback of the students was used to provide scores to the students, but it was later removed in the 4th amendment of the regulation the same year.

In other words, the faculty members who are not very motivated to perform might end up producing outputs as required just to satisfy the PBAS requirements, albeit the quality is not ascertained always in the process. Ball (2003) argues that under this practice or culture of performativity[73], some faculty might resort to false projection of their work or fabrication, because there is a problem of information asymmetry regarding the nature of actions taken up by the faculty. These actions are a function of the type of individual that a faculty is. This when coupled with the emphasis of PBAS on measuring the productivity of the faculty using the number of hours devoted into teaching or number of publications/ seminars attended, could give rise to possibility of fabrication. The faculty members might undermine morality while complying with the system and maximising their opportunities (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 142). As was also found during the field visit, a high incidence of corrupt practices was reported by almost all faculty, in terms of not only proliferation of predatory journals but also faculty in their departments/universities publishing in such journals. As discussed in the previous chapter, some faculty members also shared about classroom teaching being ignored due to rush towards writing papers and attending seminars. Much of this is also informed by the competitiveness they feel with their peers.

The faculty members would engage in competitive activities to win the race in terms of registering own quantifiable outputs, which was also reported by many faculty during the field visit. This could lead to the phenomenon of moral hazard, with hidden knowledge (also called post-contractual adverse selection). At the time of contract, the information is symmetric but becomes asymmetric post contract[74](the entire phenomenon will be discussed later in section 7.6), leading to a fall in the average quality of output produced. At the same time, a faculty member who is already highly intrinsically motivated might become less motivated to perform as they did before, because they may feel a lack of trust being placed in them, which would impact their quality or they might feel left behind by the faculty pursuing unethical means to produce output. Also, it must be noted at the outset that this phenomenon

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[73] Performativity is a technology, culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgments, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change-based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic)' (Ball, 2003, p. 216).
[74] Rasmusen (2001)

tends to focus more on individualism, instigating the competition between the fellow faculty members to outperform each other[75].

In the wake of proliferation of poor quality work emerging in the higher education sector, a couple of retired faculty suggested group-based accountability, where faculty in a department could evaluate each others' work[76], and some faculty suggested also assessment of the entire department, than individual. Such measures are also not sacrosanct and are susceptible to crumbling due to individualism or possibility of corruption in the counter-conduct by some faculty, either due to deliberate corruption or downplaying by imputing their ability at lower levels. A large part of this chapter would discuss about the corrupt practices in higher education sector.

The performance assessment of faculty in the Indian public funded universities, by registering outputs in the area of teaching learning activities, research and extension services, represents a contractual relationship between the State/ UGC and the faculty. The salaries of faculty in public universities are funded by the State and they are therefore held accountable for producing output, in the expectation that such a practice would improve the quality of education in universities.

The relationship between the State and the universities/ faculty could be understood using the traditional Principal-Agent theory (PAT) (as also mentioned in Chapter-3). According to PAT, a principal enters into a contract with the agent, because the former lacks knowledge, time or expertise in the concerned area and has therefore assigned the task to the agent. The agent is assumed to be self-interested individual, who would maximise their own utility at the expense of principal's goal. Thus, there exists a possibility of shirking by the agent, particularly by the dishonest type, as the principal can never have complete information about the agent's actions, which instigates principal to enter into contract with the agent aiming to align their objectives. The PBAS could be understood as the same kind of contract where the administration/ UGC remains the principal and the faculty the agent.

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[75] The competition is more pronounced at the time of recruitment than promotion

[76] Only in the departments where all faculty belong to a single discipline or sub-discipline/specialising could this solution be possible. While evaluating this in a later section, we would make an assumption that the department has faculty from same discipline, and there are clusters of faculty working in similar areas.

Against this backdrop, the chapter looks at the emergence of culture of performativity, and as a result, some of the possible unethical professional practices which might be undertaken by some faculty members to meet the performance assessment requirement and how the average quality of output of faculty members could decline as a result. It draws on the analysis performed by Sharma (2018) in the context of PBAS. Using the game theoretic expositions largely, this chapter would look at the optimal strategy that the faculty would make and its implications on quality-at whether the performance assessment exercise would fulfil its supposed objective of quality improvement. The chapter is organised as following: Section 7.2 briefly talks about the Principal Agent Theory as a mechanism to understand the contractual relationship between the State and the faculty. Section 7.3 discusses how the performance assessment can help proliferate a culture of fabrication. The next provides a brief rationale on using game theory to understand institutional behaviour. Section 7.5 defines the game under performance assessment exercise. The Section 7.6 mentions games under complete information and Section 7.7 presents games under information asymmetry. Section 7.8 depicts problem of moral hazard. The alternative in the form of group-based accountability is depicted in Section 7.10 would throw some light on the reciprocity in the context of repeated games and its implications for the culture of university most amenable to producing quality output. The last section, 7.11, concludes the chapter by highlighting some other problems in Indian higher education.

7.2. A re-look at the Principal- Agent Theory: Qualifying for rational behaviour

As discussed already, PAT describes the relationship between two or more parties, where principal enters into a contract with the agent, with an expectation that agent will produce the output as required by the Principal (Moe, 1984). The principal either suffers from a lack of specialized knowledge, which the agent has, or the task for which agreement is undertaken is complex for the principal (Moe, 1984; Sappington, 1991).

However, the relationship is not as simple. In such a relationship emerge two problems: i) agency problem which arises due to a) information asymmetry (it is

costly for principal to verify the behaviour of the agent) and b) goal conflict between principal and agent and ii) the problem of risk sharing (an agent may be more risk loving than principal or vice-versa which may lead to differing actions of principal and agent) (Moe, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989). To explain, any individual (agent) seeks to maximize his own utility (goal) first and principal has to ensure that the interest of principal is not compromised. In the case of PBAS the principal has the interest of ensuring quality work from the agent. The principal, in order to ensure the above, must have complete information on actions taken by the agents. But it is not possible to have full information on the behaviour of the agent. In case of information asymmetry, it is difficult for principal to gauge the behaviour of the agent because every agent is different, and also the nature of teaching and research are different[77]. The agent may shirk away from his responsibilities and devote his time somewhere else. For instance, a faculty may devote his time away from classroom teaching towards pursuing his own research goals. Or the faculty could devote time to activities which cause an increase in revenue at the expense of meeting their institutional responsibilities.

In order to ensure that the information is revealed to the principal to a great extent possible, the principal enters into contract with the agent, either through behaviour-based contract, which moulds their actions/ processes or outcome-based contract, which aligns the goals of the agent with that of the principal. Eisenhardt (1989) describes two kinds of contract a) behaviour-based contract and b) outcome-based contract. Whereas in the former the principal monitors the behaviour (actions) and then rewards or punishes those behaviour, in the latter, the principal rewards the agent for achieving certain outcomes as desired by the principal. These contracts act supposedly as not only incentivizing mechanisms but also monitoring mechanisms. The behaviour-based contracts are said to address the problem of information asymmetry and the outcome-based contracts the issue of goal conflict. It is assumed that by entering in either of the contract the faculty can be made accountable to the State. But the accountability proscribes the autonomy of faculty. This conflict between autonomy and accountability is central to PAT (Eisenhardt, 1989). In spite of such contractual arrangement, a principal can never have a complete information

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[77] In classroom teaching it is difficult to assess the quality of lectures delivered.

about the actions or objectives of agents, because the type of agent is not revealed to the principal.

Using the above analogy, it can be said that the State or the university administration is the principal, and the faculty is the agent. In this light, PBAS can be considered as a mixture of both behaviour-based contract and outcome-based contract to monitor faculty members. It alters the behaviour of faculty members in a way that they produce output in quantitative terms, in terms of number of hours devoted to teaching and administrative activities or the number of publications, conferences attended, etc. This is called contracting in higher education. The contracting between the State and universities takes place, to ensure accountability for using public funds (Ferris, 1991). PBAS is a contract which seeks to make the faculty members accountable and produce outcomes pertaining to teaching, research and co-curricular activities, with the expectation of improving quality or at least maintaining minimum standards. In a nutshell, it aims to align the behaviour of faculty members with the minimum standards expected by the state. It also supposedly reduces the shirking of work by the faculty.

The actions taken by principals via contracting arrangements, therefore, have a direct impact on the benefits gained or costs incurred by the agents and vice-versa. This interdependence could be shown by a game theoretic framework. A game is a formal way of representing a situation which involves strategic interdependence. By strategic interdependence is meant a situation where actions of one player(s) of a game affect the payoff/utility of the other player(s). Thus, interaction between principal and the agent can be represented in the form of a game. Further, using the analogy of game theory the expected equilibrium outcome of different strategies undertaken by the faculty and the State can be inferred. It would be later on seen in the chapter if bringing in the differences in the contexts where faculty is situated can lead to different outcomes, quite different from a uniform outcome as expected under the performance assessment regime.

As understood in Chapter 5, the performance assessment exercise under the neo-liberal discourse expects a certain kind of rationality from the faculty, which would make their existence and thus the discourse legitimate. The rational action expected is that the faculty would subject themselves to performance assessment,

maximize their scores in the expectation that the quality of work would improve. However, the kind of rationality that the state expects from the faculty is the one that would make them perform better and enhance the quality. But what actually is a rational decision is determined by the different circumstances under which a faculty is placed and also how they understand their own ability. Every faculty is different and a standard measure may not serve the purpose. Because there is always a conflict in their goals, as a result of differing understanding of rationality, the objective of quality work may not always be met.

Under the PBAS, it is assumed that all faculty would be of the same type, who would behave rationally and would like to only maximize their scores and thereby enhance the quality of work undertaken in universities. The State has assumed away any fabrication or dishonesty on the part of the faculty as also the differences in their circumstances. It can be said that the State assumes knows that the actions taken by the faculty (which is assumed to be fair). The next sub section would begin with a simple auditing game under no information asymmetry. The following sub section would bring in the element of information asymmetry, where the State does not have information about the type of agent i.e. whether the agent is honest (good) or dishonest (bad) and hence what actions they would take. These games would be moral hazard/ adverse selection/ signaling games.

7.3. Performativity: The culture of fabrication and unethical practices

When standard performance assessment measures are introduced, it causes infusion of a new value context. In this value context, it is the management of impression and image that are more crucial than processes of education (Ball, 1993a). A culture of performativity emerges therefore.

Performativity refers to the technology of self-regulation, aimed at producing outputs which can be measured (Ball, 2003). It emerges due to a fixation with the measurable output as quality indicators. Knowledge, imagination or innovation is accepted only when they are quantified (Codd, 2005). The faculty is compulsively engaged in competitive activities, under the pressure to deliver performance. It can

also change significantly the value system of faculty. There is, thus, a possibility that some faculty produce a large amount of output, albeit, of poor quality.

Performativity gives birth to fabrication of output, by some faculty at least. Ball (2003) states:

> Fabrications are versions of an organization which does not exist – they are not 'outside the truth' but neither do they render simply true or direct accounts –they are produced purposefully in order to be accountable. Truthfulness is not the point, the point is their effectiveness (p.224).

It is possibly that certain faculty members publish a lot of papers and provide evidence of number of hours spent in classroom teaching, without taking due consideration of quality and thereby engage in fabrication. Quality is not a focus in such cases; the faculty members present the quantity. Also, job descriptions, technical competencies, or employment contract do not depict the fundamental values that faculty adhere to (Codd, 2005). Limiting the task of faculty member in a set of numbers carries a potential for encouraging fabrication.

For instance, the faculty members garner reputation from publications which are seen as indicators of one's productivity. It is also needed for promotion. The faculty members may publish in a poor-quality journal, or they might be a guest author[78] or provide ghost authorship[79] (Bennett & Taylor, 2003). In case of guest authorship, the published work is given some credibility because of the reputation of guest author. As far as ghost author is concerned, their motivation might spiral down in the future due to lack of credit given to their work. It is not unknown that researchers cull out and publish many papers from their theses. Some other unethical practices include using false data in research, not giving credit to original source, plagiarism, paying to publish in a poor journal, etc (Elliott, Marquis, & Neal, 2013). These activities require less effort and time of faculty.

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[78] Guest authorship is when a faculty sometimes adds the name of their seniors, who are famous in the academic community in the hope that this would increase their chances of publishing their work or their name is added out of obligation or appeasement.
[79] Under ghost authorship, the name of the original author is excluded and somebody else's name is added as an author

Apart from this, the culture of the HEI also has a role to play. Faculty members sometimes derive rationale of their conduct from the environment in which they are situated (Hallak & Poisson, 2001). The culture also governs the actions taken up by the faculty members. This very culture would determine the value system the faculty members find justifiable. The notion of unethical practices exists, but the culture of the HEI determines the level of tolerance towards these unethical practices. These unethical practices get so internalised in a faculty member's behaviour that no longer do they find it as a corrupt means (Chapman & Lindner, 2014).

However, the actions, whatsoever, taken by a faculty member still fall under the purview of rationality. Becker (1993) argued in his noble lecture on '*The Economic way of looking at Behaviour*' that even the crime performed by an individual can be touted as rational because the action is undertaken after weighing the expected costs and expected benefits. Rationality implies that crime is simply conducted because of the financial and other rewards from crime compared to the punishment, legal work or conviction. Similarly, a dishonest faculty member might resort to unethical practices due to the rewards they would get in terms of scores. Faculty members, therefore, are rationally maximizing their utility (or objective), which might be score maximization for some, prestige maximization for some or maximisation of self-esteem for others, or a combination of these. This happens due to the way incentives have been designed in the system. This utility would differ from one faculty member to the other. The objective of every faculty member in their respective career paths would differ. However, their rationality must not be confused with ethics. Rationality can have a conflict with ethics. And that is why certain 'rational individuals' (but ethical) would not commit crimes despite knowing the benefits of defecting or the profits from taking short cuts (Becker, 1993). Under neo-liberal discourse the criminal is a rational individual, and crime is therefore devoid of any psychological, or anthropological explanations. Thus, there is no difference between a murder and parking offence. The moral quality of subjects is based on the fact that they assess the costs and benefits of a particular act than the alternative acts (Lemke, 2001). The consequence of actions are borne by them, who are 'responsible' subjects of neo-liberalism (Lemke, 2001, p. 201). The shirking faculty members would on the contrary resort to unethical practices and act rationally to maximize their

utility or points. Under such a performance regime, "being ethical may actually mean being inefficient at times." (Berg & Seeber, 2016, p. 60)

The supposed rational action could also lead to engaging in competition and outperforming each other. The means to engaging in and succeeding in the competition, however, may differ across faculty members. It is because there is a large focus only on numbers as indicative of output, which often conceals more than it reveals. The faculty members (some) might take rational but unethical actions to achieve output. The processes that the faculty members undertake to achieve those numbers might go unnoticed and gives them an opportunity to shirk and compromise on quality of output that they produce. That is, there lies an information asymmetry with respect to the actions or behaviour of faculty members, between the higher authorities (like the University Grants Commission, or the administration of the HEI) and the faculty members. This information asymmetry lies at the heart of the problem. Due to lack of information or presence of imperfect information, even the faculty members who produce good quality output remain in the system. This is called as adverse selection, which is the concern of the section 7.6.

Another rational action may pertain to them taking action as per their assessment of their ability. For instance, if some faculty think that they are not able, they might seek to invest their limited time on publishing in a journal where it is feasible for them rather than targeting a top notch or high-quality journal always. Based on the theory discussed above, the next few sections would build up game theoretical models to understand how quality would get impacted in the process.

7.4. Why game theory to understand institutional behaviour?

An institution has its own set of rules, explicit or implicit. These rules of the institution are the subtle norms which pervade that institution/ university. Thus, it can be expected that individual behaviour might as well be influenced by that overarching norm. This would comprise learning from the culture of that institution and responding accordingly over a period of time. Another point worth considering is that there is another overarching rule, that is the rule of prevailing discourse, or a set of beliefs and assumptions, in the larger economy which exists, which also affects the decision making undertaken by those individuals within the institutions. These two

rules could be in conflict with each other or could be in consonance with each other. Apart from this, individuals also behave within an institution in accordance with assessing their own ability/limitations posed against these broad rules. In all the three cases posed above, the individuals do not behave in isolation, they are always interacting with either other individuals, which could be their colleagues or could be the individuals in administration, or other institutions like the State at large or a regulatory body. Thus, there is always a strategic interaction which is taking place within an institution. Under strategic interaction, the utility or the pay-off gained from one's action is not independent of the utility gains or pay off of the other individual or institution. The game theory, as a tool could help capture this strategic interaction between individuals within an institution. Whereas the standard neoclassical economics understands human behaviour as essentially making choice under constrains, there is often a contract always when decision-making takes place. Within this contractual behaviour also comes a possibility of reciprocity, which stands against the assumption of mainstream economics of understanding human beings as only self-interested.

Performance assessment requires individuals to make certain strategic actions in accordance with (or against) the overarching discourse or/and the rule of the institutions. These interactions further happen at two levels: one, with respect to their fellow colleagues in the institution and two, with respect to the monitoring mechanism and their own abilities.

Another point worth noting is that in the PBAS there is a possibility of information asymmetry between the one who monitors and the one who is being monitored, in terms of the type of the latter, which has been discussed above. Because the type is not known, the strategy that they will undertake cannot be ascertained.

The standard performance assessment assumes one-person maximisation, which means that the individuals essentially strategise in isolation. In a typical market like situation all that individuals need to know is the price, and they would undertake the decision which would maximise their utility. In case of performance assessment, it is assumed that all the information that they need is the score they would attain and they could strategise their activities accordingly. However, the question of quality is ignored in the process. Quality of work is determined by the type of individual;

different types of individuals would have different objectives and thus their strategies would also differ. But the individuals are involved in social interaction, which means that the strategy undertaken by one person has a direct implication on the utility of the other person. Thus, rather than attaining a stable equilibrium, the individuals attain satisficing equilibrium, (Simon, 1959; Willimson, 2002), or 'good enough' equilibrium, which may be efficient, the way it is expected under standard market like condition/competition. But the quality is not ascertained always in such a process. Game theory helps build models of such possibilities, the possibilities which could be often ignored when neo-liberal governance principles are applied in institutions.

7.5. Defining a game under performance assessment exercise

A game is depicted by the strategies/ actions that players choose from a given set of feasible actions and their resulting pay-offs to those players (Gibbons, 1992). Player i can choose any action a_i from a given set of feasible actions A_i. This renders a pay-off of $u_i (a_i, a_{-i})$, where the payoff that player 'i' receives depends not only on his strategy/action but also the strategy of other players. The game is therefore represented by, say, $G= (A_i, u_i)$.

The supposed purpose of performance assessment of faculty is to improve the quality of academic and non-academic work undertaken by them in the universities, or at least maintain minimum standards. It is assumed that such accountability mechanism would aim to ensure that the faculty does not shirk away from their primordial responsibilities, which would have been a possibility if there was no monitoring. At the same time because the performance is gauged in terms of quantifiable work, there exists a scope for faculty to shirk and produce poor quality yet measurable output. Also, some faculty, who value reputation, academic freedom and creativity, would not like to be circumscribed by such a regime. Thus, the strategy space for the faculty would be to play fair, that is produce quality output and to not playing fair, that is producing sub-standard quality of work for maximizing scores. The strategy space for the State would constitute a choice between monitoring and not monitoring. The pay-off would refer to the scores that each acquires from registering output, taking into consideration the action other player would take, and the pay-off they would get. The games would evolve gradually in the chapter, with first beginning

with games of complete information[80], and moving on to games of incomplete information.

7.5.1. Defining strategies in universities

In case of a performance assessment exercise, it is the faculty member and the university who are the players. In the Indian Higher Education system, PBAS, has to be implemented by the universities as a regulatory intervention. But the degree of enforcement differs from one university to the other, as has also been seen in the previous chapter on Data Analysis (Chapter 6). As was seen, although both universities had implemented PBAS, but the IQAC in University A was not as quality conscious or was as actively orienting the behaviour of the faculty towards performance enhancement as in University B. In other words, the word 'enforcement' here does not mean implementation. It reflects the orientation of a university towards indeed ensuring minimum standards or quality work by their faculty. Thus, a university could either 'Ensure quality assessment' or 'Weakly Ensure quality assessment'; there are the strategies that a university could undertake. Ensuring would reflect the effort of the university to maintain minimum standards and Weakly Ensuring means a compromise on maintaining even minimum standards or quality or having a lower benchmark than the former. While IQAC of any university would register the scores of faculty members as mentioned in their self-appraisal forms[81], whether the quality of work is emphasised upon or not, happens at the stage of screening by the expert panel. It is at this stage of screening, that one talks of degree of ensuring quality work.'

It needs to be noted here, that quality cannot be concretely defined here and is rather a relative concept. There are different levels of quality, depending upon the standards/ benchmark adopted by different screening committees. While every university would follow the guidelines provided by the UGC for defining the base quality, like the list of journals approved by the faculty, the screening committee has

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[80] It is assumed by ensuring accountability by way of performance assessment, the imperfect information at the hand of principal would reduce.

[81] The IQAC might check for any discrepancy in the scores mentioned by the faculty, by referring back to the UGC proforma. If the faculty meet the requisite scores, the applications are forwarded for screening by expert committee.

the discretion to decide quality of work or not, depending upon their benchmark, which often represents the existing reputation of the university.

Concerning the faculty members, adherence to PBAS is required at two levels: a) Recruitment, and b) Promotion from one stage to the other. During recruitment, the faculty could take risk and choose not to play fair (at least might resort to so doing) because they do not know if the screening committee is quality conscious. By not playing fair is meant the strategy to consciously choose to produce poor quality work (research primarily), either because of taking short cuts in producing output or because faculty are not competent enough or impute their ability at a lower level. Their strategy would comprise the 'how' of achieving those outputs; what means or process did the faculty use to achieve those outputs. For instance, they might devote the stipulated number of hours in the classroom, without engaging themselves in real teaching and learning. At the same time, they might as well spend 2-3 years just to produce one good quality paper. It is important to take into considerations these processes[82] because of their direct implications on the objective of maintaining minimum standards (or even quality) in universities and colleges. Thus, at the stage of recruitment they could either play fair (quality conscious effort) or not to play fair (not quality conscious effort)[83]. In such a scenario, there would be S-efficiency (Glennester, 1991), where those faculty who were not playing fair would get selected in a university which are not quality conscious at the level of screening, and those who are producing a greater quality work would veer towards the reputed universities. But once a faculty is recruited, they get to know about the university culture, and to if they choose to apply for promotion (or recruitment), their next stage pay-offs would be a result of competence or a lack of it[84], given a particular type of a university. Thus, in the next stage their pay-off would be dependent upon their competence or lack of it. Because their strategies at each level have an implication on quality work that they do, the strategies would again be defined as 'quality conscious effort' and 'not quality conscious effort', respectively.

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[82] The chapter discusses only about possible processes in the absence of a concrete measure of these.

[83] The strategies play fair refers to resorting to such means which cause producing quality output and not play fair means the otherwise.

[84] This might appear to be contradictory to the previous argument discussing about S-based efficiency. But, what needs to be noted is that at the stage of selection, the credentials and the interview performance are only a signal of their other attributes like sincerity, honesty, etc., which inform their likely productivity. Even the quality conscious universities recruit faculty who are not as competent as others. Similarly, a not so quality conscious university would have a presence of competent faculty.

Here, it might be highlighted that there might be collusion as well at the time of selection. In some scenarios, the selection committee might have a bias towards or against a certain candidate, based on the criteria different from academics, research or extension activities. Some of them might be known to the selection committee from before, but some might not be known. The strategies of the selection committee would be: Non-academic assessment and Academic assessment. The pay-offs would be determined differently, as would be seen a further section.

7.5.2. Defining pay-offs for the players in a university

A pay-off in a game reflects the net benefits to a player; it is the difference between the benefits that a player gets and the costs that they incur in playing a strategy. These costs and benefits are however not determined in isolation, they are also a result of the strategy/expected strategy of the other player. While estimating the benefits and costs of a player, we would also take into consideration the actions that the other players would take. In case of the performance assessment specific game, it is sequential in nature, in that the regulation by UGC has been either enforced or weakly enforced by universities, already. Given this strategy of the university, the faculty would calculate its pay off[85]. Similarly, the pay-off of the university would depend upon how they expect the faculty to behave.

As mentioned previously in sub-section 7.5.1, the strategies at the hand of faculty are at the time of recruitment are: play fair and not play fair (termed as quality conscious effort, and not quality conscious effort, respectively). If looked at in isolation, when they play fair, they would have to devote greater time, than if they were not playing fair; creative endeavor would require greater effort and time, be it teaching or research, controlling for all other factors. The benefits that the faculty would gain is considered only in terms of the scores that they attain. The faculty who plays fair might have to devote greater time, particularly in research and therefore in terms of number of output, the benefits registered would be less. The classroom teaching is measured in terms of number of hours; how much time and effort the

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[85] Only at the time of recruitment, might the faculty not know about the intensity of enforcement. In case of a very reputed university, or a non-performing university, however, they can approximate the intensity of recruitment at the entry level. Furthermore, in the cases they are not aware of the intensity of enforcement, if recruited, they learn about it eventually, adjusting their behaviour accordingly, if they are applying for a next level promotion.

faculty devoted before that to ensure quality work is not known. In case of classroom teaching, even if one faculty had put in more quality into preparing for class than the other, both would stand to gain same benefits for the number of hours they spend in classroom. Thus, in case of classroom teaching, the only way someone could benefit more than the other is by documenting the number of hours taught without actually teaching in the classroom and/or without taking classes at all. The one who is playing fair would not register this output if the class did not take place[86], while incurring greater costs in terms of preparing for classes. When we consider the strategy of the university, the faculty would incur an additional cost of loss of reputation by playing not fair in universities which are intent on Enforcement. Another cost which those who play fair face, when there is an assessment, there is a feeling of loss of trust on their work or a constraint on their academic freedom, affecting their motivation to work and hence their quality of work. This is counted as a cost pushing down their net benefits

Ensuring quality assessment would cost a university a greater cost due to time spent by the expert panel in ensuring that the work registered is of quality and also the money costs due to inviting external experts at the stage of screening[87], if any. Similarly, when a screening committee 'Weakly ensures quality assessment', the costs would be less. The benefits on the other hand of ensuring would be that the university would be able to ward off the production of poor quality work, and also ensure maintenance of minimum quality work. when a university enforces it weakly, then the benefit would push down. It would not be zero because some faculty, who were earlier not working at all, have been pushed to work.

7.6 Auditing games with complete information

In game theory, information refers to information regarding the actions that players take or their pay-offs. There also exists information regarding the type of players, which is often not explicitly available, at least in one shot game, and which often goes into determining their actions and pay-offs. If we invoke the principal-agent kind of relationship here, where there is an audit of work performed by the principal, as under

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[86] In many colleges of State universities, the classroom teaching does not take place.
[87] If the external expert is of repute in academia, they would be duly compensated for their time and efforts devoted to filtering out quality. It would be opposite if the expert is not as reputed or known in the academic circles.

the PBAS, there is a high possibility of compromising with the process, because often times the type of the agent is not known to the principal and one player derives their utility from the pay-off of other players. Since the type is unknown the principal is oblivious of the quality of actions the agents would undertake (which will be discussed in a subsequent section). The standard performance assessment would assume that the university has complete information because there is information regarding the output that faculty have produced. And thus, in games with complete information the pay offs and strategies of the players is a common knowledge amongst all the players. It is assumed that principal or the university has complete information about the actions that the faculty would take.

The exercise of performance assessment is not without costs. When faculty is audited, the university gains whereas faculty, because they may not like to be audited due to loss of trust being signalled by the university or the State, which could be demotivating for some faculty and also due to time they are required to devote in documenting their work/output, suffer a loss in their pay off. The faculty would therefore like to defect by not cooperating with the auditing authority[88].

In auditing games, each player would like to outguess the other player. The players in the game are university on the one hand, and a faculty on the other. This single faculty as a player is a representative of others of their type. Now, if the faculty is working diligently, the university would not like to incur extra cost of auditing. But if the university weakly ensures quality assessment, the faculty may as well shirk. This can be represented with the help of the following matrix (Figure 7.1).

		University	
		Weakly ensuring quality assessment	Ensuring quality assessment
Faculty	Quality conscious effort	(a, A)	(c, C)
	Not quality conscious effort	(b, B)	(d, D)

Figure 7.1 Auditing game: Recruitment

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[88] It is to be noted here that university does not put any pressure on faculty to perform under PBAS. But, the faculty are asked to inform IQAC and the concerned department, about their latest achievements or output.

In the above matrix (Figure 7.1), the faculty has two strategies, i) Quality conscious effort; emphasis is on producing quality work, without subverting the process and ii) Not quality conscious effort, which means to do the opposite. The University has two strategies, i) Ensuring quality performance assessment and ii) Weakly ensuring quality performance assessment. The difference in their strategies would depend on the culture of university; whether it is quality conscious or not.

Pay-off to the University

If the faculty plays Quality Conscious Effort, it pays the state prefers to Weakly ensure quality performance Assessment than otherwise. Ensuring quality incurs time and money costs. Therefore, we have A>C. If faculty is not putting quality conscious effort, then the University would gain more from warding off any poor-quality work to be produced, as compared to not or Weakly Ensuring Performance Assessment, which leads to D>B. The reason lies in the fact that social cost of poor quality higher education system exceeds the costs that state would incur to inspect. As a result, the net payoff of Ensuring quality would exceed from not doing so.

Pay-off to the faculty

If the university chooses to not ensure quality during assessment, then the pay-off to the faculty from not putting in quality in the efforts would be greater than compliance and producing quality output. This is because faculty would save on time, by quickly producing more in numbers poor quality work. (It is assumed in the standard neo-liberal framework that faculty is self-interested and would always maximise points). Thus, given the same time frame, their output and thus pay-off might exceed than doing the opposite. Therefore, we have b>a. If the University is quality conscious, then playing quality conscious efforts by the faculty gives higher pay-off than the other strategy and getting caught, because the latter strategy would adversely impact the reputation of the faculty and reduce their chance of promotion/recruitment. Therefore, we have d <c.

As can be seen in the game, there is no mutually self-enforcing strategy[89]. If the University is ensuring quality performance assessment, the best strategy that

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[89] A mutually self-enforcing strategy is a stable equilibrium, where there exists no scope of defection by any player. It is called as nash equilibrium.

faculty can choose is to play Quality Conscious Efforts. But if faculty is playing Quality Conscious Efforts, it doesn't pay the University to Ensure Quality Performance Assessment, because that might lead to loss of trust between the two players, and also the university would be unnecessarily incurring additional costs. The quality conscious universities and their IQAC would bear more time costs to filter quality work, and they would incur money costs to invite people of repute in their screening committee.

Another point to be noted is that the strategy of faculty arising due to not playing fair or playing fair at the stage of recruitment is not known to the University or the Screening Committee. The solution to the game would be retrieved using the mixed strategy, where each player assigns a probability over the strategy taken by the other player. The game would be played at two subsequent stages; first is recruitment and second is promotion. Suppose the University assigns a probability that the faculty would play Quality Conscious Effort with probability 'p' and playing Not Quality Conscious Effort with probability, (1-p). The pay-offs in the above matrix (Figure 7.1) are assigned hypothetical numbers in the matrix below (Figure 7.1.1) to come up with a conclusion.

The hypothetical version of figure 7.1 is given as below

University

	Strategies	Weakly ensuring quality assessment	Ensuring quality assessment
Faculty	Quality conscious effort	(1, 1)	(3, 0)
	Not quality conscious effort	(2, -2)	(0,3)

Figure 7.1.1 Stage I Auditing game: Recruitment

Every value of pay-off contains a meaning mentioned in Figure 7.1.1. For instance, when faculty is not being quality conscious and the university is ensuring a quality performance assessment at the screening level, then the faculty would not be recruited, rendering them a pay-off of '0'. At the same time, if the screening committee was not quality conscious, and they recruit such a person, then they would have a negative pay-off of '-2'. While the university might save on the cost but

recruiting faculty who are not putting in quality effort due to not playing fair would lead to furthering poor quality work in that university. But if the screening committee was quality conscious, not only would their pay-off be higher than -2, but also positive as they could ward-off poor quality work from percolating in the university.

When the faculty is playing fair, then the university would gain 1 from not having a quality assessment, but when it engages in quality performance assessment, though it still gains in terms of quality work, but the pay-off would fall by some amount due to cost incurred in ensuring quality performance assessment.

Given the probability of the faculty's moves, expected Pay off to University from Weakly ensuring quality assessment is given by E (UWE), such that

E(UWE)= 1(p) + (-2) (1-p),

$\quad$ = 3p-2 -- (1)

Similarly, expected pay-off to the University from Ensuring Quality Assessment, E(UE), is given by

E(UE) = 0(p)+3(1-p)

$\quad$ = 3-3p ……………………………………………………………….(2)

Let us find out when would the university weakly ensure quality performance assessment. This would happen, if (1)>(2). It implies p>5/6. In other words, when p is very close to 1, the faculty would put in quality conscious effort and the university would be weakly ensuring the performance assessment. Thus, for any given value of p, except when p is close to 1, it would pay the university more, if it ensures quality performance assessment at the stage of screening. When that is the strategy pf the university, the faculty would play fair and put in quality conscious effort. The equilibrium would, therefore, be (Quality Conscious Effort (play fair), Ensure Quality Performance Assessment), for all p<5/6. This is the ideal solution, as also expected by the PBAS. It is assumed that the universities are ensuring Quality Performance Assessment and the faculty would comply by playing fair.

What such a mechanism would ensure is that the universities which are quality conscious would select faculty who would be conscious of producing quality work. And the universities which are relatively less quality conscious would recruit faculty

who would put relatively less effort in producing quality output, leading to adverse selection. After the state of recruitment, the game is then played only on the basis of competence, ideally. This is not to say that in a university all the faculty are of the same type. A university which is conscious of producing quality work may as well have faculty who are not as competent. But, it would always be competence that would be rewarded in such a university.

While the above depicts a theoretically ideal situation, the recruitment or promotion to the next stage career is often a function of nepotism or patronisation (Omotola, 2013). We would now move on to the next stage of promotion. At this stage, the university has learned about the competence of faculty, and the faculty also has a knowledge about the university, as to whether the university is quality conscious or not. However, there lies a possibility of collusion between the principal, that is university, and the agent, that is faculty. This collusion is an informal tie owing to attributes other than merit in faculty (Omotola, 2013). The strategies of the university would therefore be: Non-merit-based selection and Merit-based selection. The faculty here can either choose to put in their best effort or not put in their best effort. The pay-off of the faculty would be determined also by the type of selection. Similarly, the pay-off of the university would depend on whether an insider is recruited or not (Figure 7.1.2).

Here those faculty who are quality conscious are the ones who would compete on the basis of competence and those who are not quality conscious do not have the requisite competence which their profession demands and look for selling other attributes than merit. In some cases the faculty would know the panel of interview. But some may not know, if the panel is biased towards attributes in a candidate. For such faculty, let us assume that they impute a probability 'q' that the interviewing panel gives importance to non-merit attributes in a candidate, and (1-q) that panel will make selection based on merit-based attribute. If the panel selects on the basis of non-merit attributes, then the faculty with competence would stand to loose (getting a pay-off of 0) than the faculty without competence (who would get a higher pay-off of 1) and looking for selection based on their other attributes, because of the latter's higher chance of recruitment. But if the university undertakes a merit-based selection of faculty, the competent faculty would gain (with a pay-off of 2), than the incompetent

faculty, who would get a pay-off of 0, because they would not be selected. Similarly, such university would also gain more in promoting competent faculty, than an incompetent one.

	Non-merit based selection	Merit based selection
Quality conscious effort	(0,0)	(2, 2)
Not quality conscious effort	(1,1)	(0,0)

Figure 7.1.2 Stage II Auditing game: Promotion

Expected pay-off to the competent faculty would be E (QE),

E(QE) = 0q+2(1-q)

$$= 2\text{-}2q \dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots \quad (3)$$

Expected pay-off to the incompetent faculty would be E(NQE),

E(NQE)= 1q+0(1-q)

$$=q \dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots \quad (4)$$

Faculty would choose to compromise on taking effort based on competence, if (4)>(3)

This implies that if q is greater than 2/3, if there is a high probability that the panel would select on the basis of other attributes, then it would also pay the faculty to not play on the basis of competence but other attributes. This could be done by approaching the panel or the University Authority/ Vice Chancellor, beforehand, and/or focusing on those other attributes at the time of interview. Other attributes like affiliation to the same organisation or political party that any member of panel or University authority belongs to/ follow can also be acquired by the candidates.

7.7 Information asymmetry and possibility of corruption: Revisiting Performance Based Assessment System

Information asymmetry arises where one party in the game has better (or private) information than the other (Rasmusen, 2000). These could relate to the pay-off function, the information the various players have about the game or the strategies available to them. In the present context, this could alternatively be called incomplete information[90]. The performance assessment exercise is beset with lack of information on the process of teaching and registering output under research categories. The root of this problem lies with information asymmetry with respect to the type of individual that one is; the type goes into defining the means or processes whereby the faculty would produce their output. Broadly, the faculty could be categorised as: willing to work, not willing to work, having competency and not having competency, not necessarily mutually exclusive. We can develop the following matrix to categorise the type of faculty (Figure 7.2):

Attributes of faculty	Having competence	Not having competence
Willing to work	A	B
Not willing to work	C	D

Figure 7. 2 Matrix depicting type of faculty

It needs a mention here that the faculty who have competence would focus on producing quality work. But they can be willing to work or not willing to work. These are A and B type respectively. Similarly, those who do not have competence would not produce quality work. But these could also be the ones who are willing to work and ones who are not willing to work. These different types of faculty would produce varying quality of work. These different types are not known to the university often, at least at the time of recruitment, and also later, when it concerns the willingness to work by faculty.

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[90] It is not that incomplete information and asymmetric information could be used alternatively in every situation. There could be a situation where the active players do have the similar information but it is complete. Similarly, there could be incomplete but similar information available to the active players regarding the play of the game.

The PBAS does not regard these differences in the types. The PBAS assumes a linear relationship between number of hours devoted to work and the output produced (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014). But it is precisely here that lies a problem of information asymmetry. It is particularly true for categories like teaching and research supervision, where the time devoted to such activities cannot reflect the motivation of faculty and quality of work (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014, p. 70). The faculty may take lectures on paper, without engaging in the teaching learning process or developing critical thinking amongst their students in the classroom. In case of Category 3 for research, the output is visible in the form of papers published, books/ book chapters published, certificates of the papers presented, etc. But the process to produce those outputs is unknown[91]. A faculty member might reproduce an old work with a new title, they may compromise on quality in the wake of time crunch and publish in a mediocre journal, rather than targeting to publish in a good journal, they may attend seminars/conference just to get certificates without making a quality presentation, etc. Thus, while the output is produced, the process is unknown. Such faculty behaviours cannot be captured, because although there is an information about the time they spend in the classroom or the number of publications they have, the process is not known. Whether quality has been devoted in that process depends upon the kind of faculty that one is. For example, those faculty who consider themselves as not able or those who deliberately would not want to put in a lot of effort, might as well compromise with the quality.

7.7.1 Corruption as misconduct by faculty

The information asymmetry leads to a high possibility of corrupt practices in higher education, when it concerns the performance assessment of faculty. Holmes (2015) analyses different definitions of corruption thus far offered in the literature. The

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[91] To assess the quality of work in the research category, the universities may enlist the preferred journals or publishers where faculty should publish. The UGC has also enlisted the preferred journals to filter quality work. However, the definition of quality and thus quality journals differs from one university to the other. And two, one of the methods adopted by the UGC was to consult the universities for the names of journals which would be included in the UGC approved list. While the process is democratic, the universities would often give the name of the journals in which their faculty publish.

The process is majorly unknown in teaching, but in research while there might be an information about journal that one publishes in, but there are other mechanisms through which faculty can strategise to score points. For instance, they might publish some newspaper articles and score points equivalent to one journal article. The faculty not willing to work might as well resort to such strategies. This is however not to say that newspaper articles do not depict quality.

traditional definition is moral impurity, changing later to describing it as any deviation from the norm. The most recent definition is "improper behaviour linked to ones' official position" (Holmes, 2015, p.1). Even in the recent kind of definition, quite often than not corruption is understood in legal terms, as illegal appropriation of money. In education, corruption takes not only monetary forms but also non-monetary forms. These pertain to mostly a misconduct as compared to a certain benchmark mentioning the basic conduct expected of a faculty. A large part of corruption is "professional misconduct" (Heyneman, Anderson, & Nuraliyeva, 2007, p.3). Professional misconduct is understood as a deviation from the formal and informal code of conduct of faculty (Braxton & Bayer, 1999[92]; Lyken-Segosebe, Braxton, Hutchens & Harris, 2018). The informal codes are not in print and yet define the moral boundaries of the profession. Of the many listed by Lyken-Segosebe, Braxton, Hutchens and Harris (2018) are- the failure of faculty members to advise the students, and their poor preparation for classroom teaching. The formal norms required them to carefully plan their courses, conveying the course details to students, courses should reflect advancement of knowledge in the field. The insights from the field survey of the two universities show that PBAS led to a substitution between teaching and research and in some cases a compromise on the dedication of the classroom. If one goes by the above definition it reflects a deviation from the norms or code of conduct expected by the faculty. Another kind of corrupt behaviour refers to having informal ties, for one's personal gains. Such activities pertain to nepotism or patronage, creating two groups of insiders and outsiders, giving more privileges to insiders (Omotola, 2013; Holmes, 2015). Appointments are based on criteria other than merit. These insiders help in having a harmonious work environment, reducing possibility of any kind of conflict. Thus, even when there are formal institutional norms and value, which make an institution free of corruption, these can be circumvented by such practices (Omotola, 2013). It is often the faculty who are not willing to work that would engage in such acts. Such a misconduct by professoriate should not be touted as illegal, as they are not really flouting the law. The faculty is still publishing articles or taking classroom lectures; the process which leads to flouting quality is often not visible but might lead to subverting the code of conduct that they must adhere to. Deviation from expectation is by putting in less effort than desired, which could as

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[92] As cited in Lyken-Segosebe, Braxton, Hutchens & Harris (2018)

well be due to lack of motivation. The level of motivation cannot be captured by the number of hours devoted in classroom teaching.

There are three reasons stated by Cressey (1953)[93] which explain engagement in a corrupt act: motive, opportunity and rationalisation (Fitzimons, 2007). There could be a pressure or an incentive which motivated them to perform such an act. There could be an opportunity, presented by their situation to engage in such act, without having to be accountable for that. And thirdly, they might rationalise their act. Rationalisation is a defence mechanism to justify one's actions. As a result, they morally neutralise the morality or immorality in their acts (Gorta, 1998)[94]. In case of PBAS, those who are not willing to work or those who are incompetent might feel motivated to compromise on the process to register output, or seek favours for their appointment or promotion. That the process is not visible but only the number of hours devoted in the classroom, or number of conferences attended, provides some of the faculty an opportunity. At the same time, these types of faculty rationalise their actions. As was found during the field survey a majority of faculty rationalised the publication of papers in not a good quality journal, by attributing it to a lack of time or resources to engage in research. For them the 'motive' was found in the pressure to perform in the wake of time crunch.

The next would discuss further how information asymmetry leads to adverse selection, having an implication on quality work.

7.8. Moral hazard or Post-contractual adverse selections

Information asymmetry leads to either moral hazard or adverse selection or, rather, both. Adverse Selection happens when there is incomplete information about the type of faculty before they enter into a contract (implicit contract, to be precise). The phenomenon has been explained by Sharma (2018), using Akerlof's (1970) theory which explains adverse selection using the example of automobile market: There exist bad cars and good cars in the market and the quality differences between them is known only to the sellers. Buyer does not have information on quality and therefore both types of cars would sell at the same price. Buyer would have information on

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[93] As cited in Fitzimons (2007).
[94] As cited in Fitzimons (2007).

quality of car, only after having bought it. But both kinds of cars are sold at the same price, it being the average price of both the cars. Under such circumstances, the sellers having good quality cars would not like to sell their cars because the price fetched in market for these cars would be less than their reservation price. Simultaneously, those sellers with bad quality cars would still sell their cars because the price they get for their cars in the market is above the reservation price. Thus, there would be high chances that bad quality cars would be sold in the market. This is the problem of adverse selection. Moral Hazard is defined as a rational economic behaviour, 'producing loss-producing propensities of the individual assured' (Pauly, 1968, p. 535). This refers to a change in the action of agent post-contract. Moral Hazard arises due to hidden action of the agent or hidden information, where agents' actions are observable but not the information on the basis of which actions were taken. Information about the type of individuals is one such information. The individuals make efforts but the principal does not know which effort is appropriate because they do not have information of the type of agents. This represents the problem of adverse selection which happens after contract has taken place, or post-contractual adverse selection (Rasmusen, 2000). In the context of PBAS, it is this post-contractual adverse selection, which holds relevance.

In majority universities, the performance is assessed on the basis of quantification of their work[95]. It is difficult for the State or the university administration to have complete information about the quality of their work because there is a lack of information on the faculty's objectives which differs as per their types. For example, there is hardly any information on the quality of interaction with the students, the quality of time devoted to administrative activities or the quality of research undertaken, [96]. The capability of faculty cannot be measured. Further Stiglitz (2002, p. 463) argues that a worker existing at the bottom of the ability distribution might conceal such information, in order to portray a higher ability to the employer

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[95] UGC has recently come up with a list of approved journals which should be considered before making an assessment of performance of faculty. However, during the filed visit a large number of faculty had pointed out the inclusion of poor quality journals as well.
[96] The information which the State has is regarding the time devoted to classroom teaching, time devoted to research supervision, hours spent in administrative and social extension activities, number of publications and seminar/conferences attended by the faculty members.

that actually it is. Those who do not have competence and they know it, under PBAS, might try to hide their (lack of) competence by producing more in numbers[97].

The output documented acts like a 'signal' or 'screening device' for their likely productivity. After a passage of time after recruitment, the productivity of faculty or their competence is learnt by the university administration. In the recruitment process, some faculty of low competence also get hired by mediocre or a good university. It is because of manipulating the signals (Spence, 1973), which in the present context refer to the credentials of those applying for jobs. These signals or credentials may not necessarily be of good quality. The signalling theory, by Michael Spence, assumes a negative relationship between the cost of obtaining signals and productivity; a more productive person requires less time obtain a signal. But, under PBAS, the cost of acquiring those signals in terms of time may not be negatively correlated with one's productivity. The type P faculty or more productive faculty would invest more time in their activities vis-à-vis the type Q or less productive faculty member, ceteris paribus. Creativity requires time; be it the process of teaching or research. Type Q faculty member might save on time by taking short cuts through unethical practices, investing less time and producing poor quality but greater number of outputs. They would, therefore, appear to be more productive according to the assumption of signalling theory. However, the productivity is not immediately observable by the HEI administration or the State[98] because the credentials of the applicants are only a signal to their other attributes which might reflect their productivity; only with time, after hiring, can it be observed.

Applying the analogy presented by Akerlof (1970), as discussed earlier, suppose there exists broadly two categories of faculty members: a) faculty members who produce quality output (P), through ethical means and devoting their diligent effort. Using the categorisation mentioned in Matrix 7.2, these could be faculty of type A and type B. Although the type B faculty does not have competence, but as long as they are willing to work, they could learn and improve and thereby produce quality

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[97] In case of universities which do not have a high benchmark for quality, this is possible.

[98] This is particularly true for a large number of universities in India which do not focus on quality work, or who have lower benchmarks of quality. Apart from that, the publication in a high impact factor journal is also beset with faults, in that, a faculty might publish an article in a high impact factor journal, but the citation of their own personal work might remain low, depicting a low impact of their work. Thirdly, where the selection committee is biased towards or against a certain applicant, due to varied reasons.

work and b) other not, faculty members (Q), who are not particular and concerned about quality of work done, i.e. faculty members who register their output through rationalising their inadequate actions resorting to either unethical means, or due to their low ability. In matrix 7.2, these could be faculty type C and D, who are not willing to work, despite having competence even. Both type of faculty members produce output in terms of numbers (in universities, it is the quantity which matters[99]). A creative task would need more time than less creative ones. It would also be a more risky endeavour. Thus, the output produced by P per unit of time would be less than that by Q, making entry or promotion easier for Q than P *ceterus paribus*. The higher education system would be proliferated more with Q type of faculty members. This is called as adverse selection in higher education. It will also have a bearing on P type of faculty, as mentioned below:

a) P might adjust their motivation downwards due to proliferation of Q type of faculty and restrict themselves to bare minimum. However, their output would still be positive because of compliance with the regulation. Their quantum of quality output would go down.

b) Amongst P, some would keep producing the same quality output. But since they would take greater time for an equal amount of output, they would fall in race behind Q type of faculty. For instance, it might take only 6 months for Q type to write three papers, along with carrying out teaching and administrative task, while P type might take one year to finish just one paper along with other tasks. write only 1 paper in a year. It is also possible that some P type of faculty members might end up joining Q, compromising upon the quality. This is particularly possible for those faculty who are at the early stages of their career or hold non tenured position.

Considering all the above scenario, in numbers, the sum of low quality output of Q type of faculty would exceed that of P type of faculty. On an average the quality

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[99] There are some universities, however, which emphasise on quality as well by, for instance, declaring the names of the journals where a faculty is expected to have published their work. Even in such universities, after the poor quality work has been sieved out, the performance would be ultimately judged by the quantum of work. This factor would be considered later in another set of games, which take into account universities' ethos and culture.

of output would fall. It does not mean that there would non-existence of quality work, and the system will end up failing. But, it shows that share of good quality work as compared to poor quality work might reduce than before. Not all P type of faculty would join the race. Some of them resist, holding on to their moral values.

The possibility of poor quality work proliferating can be further understood with the help of the following games.

As discussed above, there are different types of faculty in a higher education system. Let us look at the optimal output of type P and type Q faculty The matrices for the P type and Q type can be had as following (Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 respectively):

University

	Weakly ensuring quality assessment	Ensuring quality assessment
Quality conscious effort	(3, 1)	(2, -1)
Not quality conscious effort	(2, -1)	(-1, 1)

Faculty

Figure 7.3 Auditing game for P type faculty

In case of P, even when the university weakly enforces, they would put in quality conscious effort, as they would derive greater satisfaction from their creative endeavours rather than taking short cuts. At the same time, the university weakly enforcing would repose trust in the faculty, render them academic freedom and give boost to their intrinsic motivation to work. Thus, the payoff would be the highest in this scenario. Therefore, playing fair would be a dominant strategy for them, rendering a greater pay off that not playing fair. The stable equilibrium would therefore be (Quality Conscious Effort, Weakly Ensuring Quality Assessment).

	Weakly ensuring quality assessment	Ensuring quality assessment
Quality Conscious Effort	(1, 1)	(2, -1)
Not quality conscious effort	(2, -1)	(3, 1)

Figure 7.4 Auditing game for Q type faculty

If a faculty is of type Q (refer to Figure 7.4), their dominant strategy would be not putting in quality conscious effort unless due to university culture or peer pressure they do otherwise[100]. Thus, even when the State is monitoring, they would not put in quality effort, by producing only the numbered output, albeit of poor or not-so-good quality. This makes their pay off for such type of faculty from playing quality conscious (i.e., 2) less than that from not playing quality conscious (i.e.3). The equilibrium solution of this game is therefore (Not quality conscious effort, Ensuring quality assessment). Ironically, it means that even when the university is inspecting, the faculty is not playing fair. This is possible because of the way incentive structures are designed. The more the faculty produces in terms of numbers, the more they are incentivised or rewarded. The quality goes unmeasured in this case (The faculty not playing fair by producing more at the expense of quality). Not only this, the equilibrium outcome is efficient also because both the players receive highest pay-offs. Thus, there have to be a mechanism to look into not just numbers but quality, which would induce type Q faculty to play quality conscious.

The problem of post-contractual adverse election could be further understood with the help of the following game tree. Suppose there are two types of faculty: type P denoted by T_1 and type Q denoted by T_2 .. The university has to choose amongst these types for promotion/ recruitment based on their PBAS scores. The Q type faculty would have an objective of maximising output in numbers, often at the cost of quality work. The P type faculty would emphasise on quality of output and hence on creativity. Since creativity takes time, more often than not, the output produced by such faculty would be less in number as compared to what is produced by the faculty P. The university however does not know, for certain, the type of faculty, at least at

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[100] This is called as learning behaviour, which also happens over time, and not at one period. The game proposed above is a one-shot game.

the stage of recruitment. Let the probability assigned by the University be 'p' that the faculty is type P and (1-p) that the faculty is type Q. The state has two strategies, given at the nodes, Weakly ensuring quality assessment (O) and Ensuring quality assessment (I). The following figure represents the game tree (Fig. 7.5).

Figure 7.5 Game tree for post-contract adverse selection or moral hazard

Before constructing pay-offs, let us make the following assumptions:

1. Any faculty, whether type P or Q, who focuses on quality would take more time[101] to produce a particular quantum of output than the faculty who would not, but produce high in number, output. This is because the former would undertake creative tasks and creativity needs time to come to fruition. The reason for this lies in the way performance assessment incentives are constructed, valuing quantum more than the quality[102]. This implies

$$w>x \text{ .... (1)}$$

$$z>y \text{ .... (2)}$$

$$t>r \text{ .... (3)}$$

$$u>s \text{ .... (4)}$$

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[101] More time is required also when paper is sent for publication in a good journal a book/book chapter is published under a good publisher. It is therefore the process which is time consuming sometimes, which affect many a faculty who want to apply for promotion.

[102] There is an exception in certain universities which value quality. However, even in such universities, after a certain bad quality work gets excluded from assessment exercise, it is the quantity which is considered for measuring the performance of faculty, be it for recruitment or promotion.

2. The strategy of rationalising to subvert processes, as discussed above, under performance assessment would mean producing only in terms of numbers or reporting number of hours devoted to teaching when actually it did not happen, compromising on quality. The type Q faculty would perform this strategy better than the type P ones, on an average[103]. Therefore,

$$t > w \quad .... \quad (5)$$

$$u > z \quad .... \quad (6)$$

3. A good quality/ fair work by the faculty would render a university a higher pay-off by enhancing its reputation.

    Let us look at the pay offs of the type P or T_1 faculty. When they employ quality conscious effort, then their pay-off from the university that is only weakly ensuring performance assessment would be greater than that under strict ensuring of performance assessment. This is because the latter can signal a lack of trust reposed in the faculty by the State or university which would reduce their motivation to perform. At the same time weakly ensuring would render them with academic freedom, which would motivate them to work better. Suppose if type P or T_1 does not play fair. An honest faculty may sometimes resort to not playing fair if due to performance assessment measures their objective function changes from maximising the quality output to maximising scores (as was discussed above), even at the cost of quality. This might be particularly true in case of younger faculty who want to move up the ladder or in case the university culture is such which forces the faculty to alter their objective function. If the state overlooks, then their pay off from not playing fairing would exceed from inspection; if they are caught while not playing fair (which may not be possible because the performance assessment is often focused more on quantity of output than quality, except if the university culture is such which values quality work more than the quality), the punishment would be imposed in terms of less chances of promotion/less score etc. Therefore, for type P or T_1 faculty, the following conditions hold true:

$$x > y \quad .... \quad (7)$$

$$w > z \quad .... \quad (8)$$

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[103] Though by definition an honest faculty would never not play fair but if the pressure of producing quantity than quality exists if the university culture is such or the peer competition is such, they may change their objective function slightly.

Suppose type Q or T$_2$ faculty plays fair. In rare cases, this might be possible due to peer pressure where the cost from social shame would be much higher to the faculty than benefit from private benefit from maximising scores by not playing fairing. If the university weakly ensures quality performance assessment, it motivates them to produce quality work, than if university was to inspect. Inspecting when a faculty is playing fair would lead to some lack of motivation, causing a fall in the faculty pay off. However, what is to be noted is the overall quality may not be as good as that of type P or T$_1$ faculty, these pay-offs would be less than the corresponding pay offs of type P or T$_1$ faculty. Similarly, when type Q are not putting in quality conscious efforts (the chance of which is high), their pay offs from the University weakly ensuring performance assessment would exceed from the university doing the opposite, because there would be no punishment in case of former and therefore, they can easily maximise their scores.

When a type P faculty puts in quality conscious effort, then the pay-off to the university from only weakly ensuring quality performance would be greater than the pay-off from not being quality conscious because the latter strategy would make the university incur unnecessary cost of inspection when the faculty is already doing what the university wants them to do. Let us assume the pay-off to the university, from weakly ensuring performance assessment to be i and from inspecting to be j. Similarly, when the same faculty change their objective to maximising scores and not playing fair, the university gets higher pay off from assessing their activities than weakly ensuring exercise of performance assessment because the latter would lead to proliferation of poor quality outputs, thwarting the very purpose for which the performance assessment exercise is undertaken.

Therefore,

$$i > j \quad .... \quad (9)$$

$$n > m \quad .... \quad (10)$$

In case of a type Q faculty, the pay-off to the university would be more from ensuring the quality performance assessment than not doing so, when the faculty is not quality conscious, because it would prevent any potential fall in the quality. If the same faculty now performs quality work, then the relative pay off that the university

would get would be higher than what they would have gotten if faculty was not quality conscious, because the quality of work by faculty would be relatively better in this case. But, due to additional costs incurred in monitoring, the pay-off from inspection would be less than weakly ensuring the norms of performance assessment, when faculty is quality conscious.

Therefore,

$$k>l .... (11)$$

$$q>o .... (12)$$

Given the above pay-off, it can be seen that the pay-offs to both the faculty types would be higher when a faculty is not quality conscious or focused on producing more output in terms of quantity. This is because taking the honest way or producing quality work entails creative endeavours which are time consuming. Thus, given the same time availability to both types of faculty, the latter would produce more output per unit of time. And because the incentives or scores are related to output in terms of numbers, not playing quality conscious would render faculty greater pay-offs. This means that a rational faculty would not be playing fair. Now given that not playing fair is a dominant strategy, the university would choose to inspect always because n>m and q>o

Thus, for any value of p, the pay-off from inspecting exceeds that from overlooking. Ironically, the faculty would play 'not quality conscious effort' with the university is ensuring quality performance assessment. This is possible because the faculty is assessed in terms of only the numbers or quantifiable. This causes a fall in the quality of output produced by the faculty.

Whereas performance assessment exercise aims at maintaining minimum standards in the higher education system, when there is a presence of type Q faculty, there is a possibility of average quality of the output suffering. The issue was also raised by the faculty during the field survey, where they raised concern about the quality of work rather depleting after the introduction of PBAS. The faculty were asked of an alternative to PBAS, where only a couple of retired faculty suggested having peer review system rather than API to evaluate the performance of faculty. The upcoming sections would dwell on those possibilities and how there could be a

possibility of free riding in such situations. The section preceding that would propose an antidote to such a possibility.

7.9. Proposing an alternative to Performance Based Assessment System: Group-based accountability

Evaluation of performance of faculty in universities was instituted with the primary objective of maintaining minimum acceptable standards of work. However, as highlighted above, this measure is also rampant with the possibility of producing low quality work. As discussed in chapter 6 on Data Analysis, an alternative suggested by retired faculty at both the universities was having a peer evaluation of work. Such a model is based upon cooperation, rather than individualism amongst faculty. A related model, an alternative to the individual performance assessment, could be the performance assessment at group-level or department-level, where the faculty are rewarded collectively. Clifton and Rubenstein (2002) contended that individual performance assessment leads to growing individualism. When performance of the entire department is assessed, that would infuse cooperation amongst the faculty, including colleagues teaching each other, assisting each other to become better teachers and better scholars. Such an action would emanate from the consequence that they and the entire department would have to bear. Within the department, the work would become more transparent and the social control mechanism in the form of peer pressure, shame, praise and encouragement would get the poor performers to do better (Clifton & Rubenstein, 2002). As also argued by Dill (2014) the subject-level reviews, for quality assurance, where individuals are assessed based on only their individual performance, often negate the effectiveness of collegial control. As also discussed in Chapter 2, in a study conducted by Volkwein and Parmley (2000) on public and private universities in the U.S., there was found a significant positive impact of teamwork on intrinsic satisfaction of the administrative staff.

One could, at the same time, argue that individual performance assessment also brings in transparency and could motivate the faculty to perform better. However, such a model assumes that a) the faculty is indeed producing quality work and b) the faculty is self motivated. These two assumptions become the root cause of problem. One, since faculty is not being watched by the peer, they may focus on producing

quantity of work, at times even at the cost of quality. The factor of social shame for producing poor quality work gets ruled out in such cases. Such faculty are only assessed in front of screening committee. Whether that quality gets filtered out there or not, would depend on that committee, where the culture of university has a role to play. Two, in a department there exist faculty members who are at different career paths. Some of them are younger and some older/senior. The senior faculty often have enough experience, publications, and network in academic circles, whereas younger ones lack such advantages and are often still learning. In such a circumstance, the individualistic or competitive behaviour would be detrimental to the performance of the younger faculty and would be advantageous for the senior faculty who are better equipped to perform. It could also lead to adversely affecting the motivation of the younger faculty and hence their performance.

With respect to assessing the performance at the departmental level, many faculty members raised the concern of it being beset with the problem of free riding, during the field survey in both the universities. That is assessing the performance of the entire department could have instances of shirking away from work by some of the faculty members; they could free ride on the reputation gained by the department owing to the work of other dedicated faculty[104]. For instance, where the output of the faculty was required to be registered for preparing the annual report of the universities, or where they were required to produce for the periodic assessment by NAAC[105], there was no binding on each and every faculty to produce. The advent of PBAS on the contrary required the faculty to perform individually in all the three broad areas as mentioned in the regulation, lest they lose out on promotion or eligibility to get recruited in universities/ colleges. However, there was one sciences assistant professor in University A that even if there was a free riding, the faculty learn overtime to perform. The four faculty members from University B (with 3 being Professors from Social Sciences, said that there should be a departmental level assessment than individual because not all faculty members had enough resources to perform. The coming few sub-sections would weigh and assess both the possibilities, before concluding on how an alternate performance assessment model could be

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[104] Belonging to a department and associating with the faculty having good reputation amongst academia adds to one's reputation, albeit in a limited manner.
[105] NAAC assessment also became mandatory after 2013. Before that it was done voluntarily, leaving the faculty all the more with no compulsions to monitor their individual performances. The pressure to perform individually arises due to PBAS, and not NAAC.

established. It is done using the collective action games, highlighting the possibility of free riding and later understanding as to how the adequate social norms within the universities could help fight such a tendency and ensure an alternative to the individualistic performance assessment exercise.

7.9.1. Collective action game: The problem of free riding

The collective action game is a cooperation game and is used to understand the problem associated with the provision of a public good. There is a dilemma associated with such provision, which is the following: If the good is provided, all the agents would stand to benefit. But because even if one agent provides for the cost of that good, the good would be provided, giving others an incentive to not to contribute to the cost and free ride. The same analogy could be applied when the performance of the entire department is assessed. Some of the faculty would save themselves the cost of time and energy in producing output and would like to 'free ride' on the reputation or the ranking the department gains due to the efforts of others[106].

In the Indian higher education, under some performance assessment exercises the output is assessed at the aggregate level, i.e. at the university or departmental level. This is particularly true of accreditation as a quality assurance mechanism, which has been made mandatory in Indian higher education since 2013. The problem associated with it is that any dishonest or lax individual faculty may choose to not put in the requisite efforts and free-ride on the benefits that the university or the department as a whole would gain after the output has been produced, by the other diligent faculty, which was also argued by many faculty. This represents the problem akin to public goods provision, where a rational player would not like to contribute anything to the provision of the public good, if they received the same benefit without contributing. Under such circumstances, there will be faculty who would not cooperate and not produce output.

It may well be said that a way to reduce opportunism at the hands of individual faculty is to infuse a culture of collegiality by assessment of aggregate

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[106] There is a slight deviation here, in that in a department those who work serve their own needs primarily. Another set of people who work are the ones who own a formal responsibility to work for the department, like administrative position/ head of the department.

output of a department or university. Here comes the importance of social norms, which are implicit in the institutions.

The strategy of the faculty could be to cooperate or not to cooperate. Here cooperation is different from 'opportunistic networking which is done for mutual gain' (Holmes, 2015; Berg & Seeber, 2016). Cooperation here refers to an effort by a faculty to help the other faculty members perform, for the larger gain of the department or university, and for the other faculty to perform without any anxieties associated with competition[107] or individualistic behaviour. This could range from providing academic support to motivating others to perform better. In such an environment a culture of collegiality (It has been discussed in Chapter 2) percolates. It refers to having collegial behaviour within a space. But by collegiality is not meant opportunistic collaboration. Seigel (2004) defines the baseline collegiality as a conduct which does not interfere with others' ability to work or the ability of the institution to fulfil its mission. It not necessarily means fitting in with others.

Suppose there is no binding contract amongst the faculty to cooperate with each other, it makes the game non-cooperative. Suppose the cost of their total contribution is given by A units, which represents the time, energy, effort and opportunity cost of labour (forgone leisure) that they devote to their work. For simplicity, let us assume that there are two faculty only, faculty 1 and faculty 2. The cost should ideally be, therefore, divided equally between the two[108]. The benefit, B units, of producing the output accrues to the entire department or the university. B refers to the reputation gained by the entire department. The faculty have two choices, either to contribute to producing output, that is cooperate or to refrain from contributing, that is defect. If both contribute, then each gets a net benefit of B-(A/2). Here, in the context of faculty behaviour within a department, contribution would mean cooperation with the other faculty, that is co-supervising them or motivation them, rather than behaving individualistically to accumulate one's score under the performance assessment, called as Defect, or refraining from contributing. This

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[107] Competition is amongst equals, that is individuals which belong to same discipline, and often amongst faculty at the same career path. However, in a study by Austin (2006), the early career faculty felt competitive with even their senior faculty, leading to anxiety.
[108] However, in a university the costs are often not shared equally by all. Some faculty work more due to formal responsibility, like administration assigned to them, or out of their own accord. But because the game assumes two faculty as players at a time, to ensure fairness at least, both must share the same cost.

scenario can be represented in the matrix form as (Figure 7.6), adapted from Nurmi (2006):

Faculty 2

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	B- (A/2), B-(A/2)	B-A, B
Defect	B, B-A	0,0

Figure 7.6 Collective action game: the problem of free-riding

If one faculty contributes, he incurs the entire cost. If no one pays then both get 0 as pay off. Suppose faculty 1 chooses to contribute, the best strategy for faculty 2 would be not to contribute, that is not to cooperate rendering him B as their pay off, which is higher than if he was to contribute, i.e. B- (A/2). Similarly, if faculty 2 contributes, faculty 1 would not cooperate and get a higher pay off. The game has therefore two equilibria (Cooperate, Defect) and (Defect, Cooperate) (iff, B-A>0). If the benefit that each faculty receives is worth less than the cost incurred by the faculty, then that faculty would rather choose not to put in any effort. That is, if B-A<0, then the equilibrium outcome of the above game would be (0,0). This outcome is, however, not optimal as the faculty get less pay off that what they would have gotten if they both would have contributed, i.e. (B- (A/2), B-(A/2)). Thus, there has to be a mechanism which should make shirking at the hands of each faculty costly and less lucrative than cooperation. In other words, this means that to ensure cooperation from each faculty, the condition of B-(A/2)>B must be met. This means that A needs to be negative for this. Cost being negative means that there has to be some incentive for them to contribute. One such solution is to instil a culture of collegiality amongst faculty. Collegiality could contribute to providing a more supportive environment within the departments, reducing the stress, anxiety associated with the competitive environment in universities. The social humiliation and shame from not contributing can induce the faculty to contribute towards producing quality work.

Going back to the faculty's argument for having department level assessment owing to unequal distribution of resources amongst faculty to perform individually, one could also argue that assessing the performance of department as a whole could

actually shield the performance of such faculty and make them more complacent. In order to ensure that such faculty also become 'equipped' to be able to perform, there is needed a culture within the department, which rather than hiding their (non) performances, motivate them to perform and produce output. The next section would throw light on such a possibility and the crucial role which university culture has to play, in either supporting proliferation of poor quality work (which was discussed in all the preceding sections) or in bringing about a culture of cooperation.

7.10. Norms of reciprocity and coordination in universities (Repeated games): Role of university culture

Any conduct of faculty does not happen in vacuum. The culture of the university informs their decision making and behaviour also. Culture of an institution refers to beliefs, shared values, rituals, practice and assumptions, which govern and shape the behaviour of individuals and groups, and also the meanings they attach to events (Kuh & Whitt, 1988). These cultures determine how faculty take decisions and how they organise their work (Austin, 1990). It is here that the role of leadership assumes importance. It is often the top level, that is leadership, which dictates what is acceptable at all levels of an organisation (Elliott, Marquis & Neal, 2013). Thus, it is the acceptance of poor quality work by the top level which determines the level of acceptance of not only plagiarism but also poor-quality work or otherwise. Therefore, the way a university is governed informs its culture, and the leader has a significant role of play here.

Not only this, the leader acts a mediator between the university and the larger regulatory space. The regulation, like PBAS, essentially seeks to curb any practices in the university which stands against maintain at least minimum standards. The leader also has a role in bringing (or in not bringing) this into effect.

The faculty interact with each other and also the administration of the university. This interaction amongst faculty in a university is a social interaction where their actions are guided by these prevailing norms and ethos (culture) of the university. These norms of conduct are learnt over time by the faculty. The actions can be explained by the norms prevailing in the university where faculty are placed. In the game shown above, the one-period equilibrium is non-cooperative outcome.

Also, it is possible that a majority faculty choose not to contribute in a university where there is no binding contact or social norm amongst faculty to cooperate or the university where a majority of faculty would like to free ride in the absence of such social contract.

The faculty strategy is, however, not restricted to only one –period. The strategy of faculty is contingent upon their contractual relationship with the other faculty for the rest of their working life. Let the hypothetical pay-offs be as given in the matrix below (Figure 7.7)

Faculty 2

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	3,3	0,5
Defect	5,0	1,1

Figure 7.7 Repeated games within a university

Using the analogy from the collective action game (Defect, Defect) would be the optimal strategy. This is particularly true of individualistic behaviour/ rational behaviour expected under the neo-liberal discourse. If faculty 1 is cooperating by producing output, the other faculty would increase their pay off to 5 by defecting because they save on the time cost to be devoted into producing output. But if the game is extended to subsequent periods then, given that the faculty 1's pay-off was reduced to 0 by the faculty 2 playing defect, in the next period the faculty 1 would play defect and both would get 1 as their pay offs respectively. If the relationship is extended to long periods it would pay both the faculty to co-operate and secure a pay-off of 3 each for the rest of their lives. A cooperative faculty is, therefore, met with the following tit-for-tat rules:

1. Choose Cooperate in the first period, and

2. from period 2, choose whatever strategy that was made by the other faculty in the previous period.

Scenario 1: Suppose faculty 1 chooses cooperate in the first period, and faculty 2 chooses to cooperate. Each gets a pay-off of 3 each. Using the tit-for-tat strategy, in

the next period faculty 1 will choose cooperate. With faculty 2 choosing cooperation in future periods each would get pay off as 3 for the rest of their work period.

Scenario 2: Suppose faculty 1 chooses cooperation in the first period and is met by defect by faculty 2, who wants to get maximum pay off of 5. Learning from the previous period faculty 1 will play defect and both would get a pay-off of 1 for the rest of their interaction.

Now which of the two strategies would be preferred by faculty 2 would depend on the comparison of pay offs from both strategy. Whereas faculty interact with each other for finite period of time, but since the duration of contract long and is not know for certain, the game would appear as an infinite period game[109].

If faculty 1 plays cooperate, then pay off today to faculty 1 from playing cooperate in the subsequent period would be given by a sum of discounted values of pay-off over an infinite period of time. Let the rate of interest be r[110] which is given by

P (Cooperate| cooperate)= $3+(3/(1+r)) +(3/(1+r)^2)$......

Where $1/(1+r)$ is the discounting factor denoted by, say, w

Therefore, P (Cooperate| cooperate) = $3\{1/(1-w)\}$

where, P (Cooperate| Cooperate) is the pay-off to faculty 2 from playing cooperate given that faculty 1 has played cooperate.

P (Defect| Cooperate)= $5+ (1/(1+r))+(1/(1+r)^2)+$.....

$$= 5 +1/(1-w)$$

Faculty 2 would play defect if $5 +1/(1-w) >3\{1/(1-w)\}$

$$\text{If } 5> 2/(1-w),$$
$$\text{If } (5-5w)>2,$$
$$\text{If } 5w<3$$
$$\text{If } w<3/5$$

[109] Infinite period here does not mean that the game will never end but only that the duration of game is long and the players are uncertain as to when the last period is. There is always some chance for game to continue to the next period.
[110] The interpretation of 'r' would be done in the next section

If w>3/5, then the faculty 2 would play cooperate in the first and subsequent periods. In other words, if r is infinitely small (r<2/3), then the present value of cooperation would exceed that of defection.

7.10.1. Interpreting the discounting factor 'r': Role of social norms

A university where there exists a culture of collegiality, r would be infinitely small, due to social control factors such as social shame, motivation, transparency of work, etc. 'r' being small means that long term gains, in terms of reputation earned through hard work, outweigh short-term gains. Such a culture would also reduce instances of moral hazard problem arising out of individualistic behaviour.

It is interesting to note that the value of rate of interest rate and hence the discounting factor can also go into determining the type of faculty. The impatient faculty and those oriented to short-term accumulation of score at the cost of quality, would have r very high, as they would discount the future pay-off less than they would value the immediate short-term gains. The performance assessment of faculty is likely to orient some faculty to short-term gains than long term benefits, at the cost of academic freedom and reputation. For this type of (myopic) faculty, the rate of return from present benefit would be higher, which means they impute less value to their discount factor and hence to the present value of their future pay-offs. They would converge towards maximising scores in the short-term and thus producing less risky innovation. It may also happen that they often compromise on quality work and their future reputation. The faculty which may fall under such behaviour type would generally comprise the young faculty at assistant professor or associate professor designation, wanting to move up the ladder. The science faculty may have to resort to external funding, which would require them to project their work and resort to performativity-practices. The obverse would hold true for the faculty who would not like to take short cuts, regardless of their discipline, would like to devote more time to risky innovations; for them the future would matter more than short term maximising of scores. The type of faculty or faculty behaviour would also be determined by the culture of the university where they are placed. If the culture is such where competitive values assume significance over collegiality, then majority faculty would

run the race to outcompete each other. Under this culture, it would not pay the remaining handful faculty to play cooperate with others[111].

What is to be noted is that even if the myopic faculty shirk, in every period they would score the same one-period pay off and continue to do so in future because of the poor construction of incentive structure, which rewards only the quantifiable at least in those universities where quality is not of concern. The good quality faculty, because they would take more time produce a creative work, would get less pay off not only in the present but also in the future because given the same time they would produce less in terms of quantifiable than the other type of faculty. It may therefore turn out that the discounted value of pay-off of the short-term exceed that discounted value of pay-off in the long term (because the pay-off is captured in terms of quantity and not quality).

This might appear to be an ideal kind of situation, where the faculty are more collegial than individualistic in nature. As has been argued by Ostrom (2005) and, in the repeated interaction if there are a large number of people who are opportunist, the model of collective action would collapse. Therefore, there is a need to institutionalise the social norm of cooperation (Som,2014), so that the tendency of agents to defect gets curbed. This is because there could be a case where the university department has at least one opportunist, who may not be willing to work, which may de-motivate the others to produce quality work. When there is a norm instituted for cooperation and that behaviour is monitored from a distance, the incentive to shirk would reduce.

7.11. Governance and corruption

The chapter thus far has talked about how different faculty having different objectives co-exist in the system and as a result of existence of those type of faculty who focus on producing moderate quality/low quality work as a part of their rational strategies, how the average quality of output in the higher education system might fall. Those who impute their ability at lower level or those not willing to work have a role to play in that.

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[111] This is not to say that honest faculty would not produce quality work, albeit less in number. They may act 'irrationally' and lose out in the race but would not compromise on their ethos/ objectives. Such possibility of resistance would be discussed later in the chapter.

This section would have a further closer look particularly at the behaviour of faculty who are engaged in fabrication and/or those who have settled their preferences according to the culture of the university where they are placed. What is accepted as a corrupt act or not is often determined by the culture of the place (Fitzimons, 2007; Holmes, 2015)[112]. A university culture could be such where there is a great emphasis on quality at the time of interview with the screening committee and that increases the probability of getting caught if a faculty shirks away from producing quality output. Conversely, a university which is not much focused on quality might as well not bother about faculty shirking. Thus, the preference of faculty would differ in each case. The preferences would depend on their risk-taking behaviour which in turn would be a function of the culture of university where they are placed.

There are two universities- one which places a high value on quality output, say A and one which does not, say B. Within each university there are some faculty which are highly able and some who are not. Those who are able would have an objective of producing quality work and those who are not would not be conscious of quality, if one controls for university type. However, what needs to be noted here is that under university A, even the low ability faculty would produce quality work, because they would not take risk and let their reputation get affected. But because they would put in more effort and time, their quality output in quantity would be less. In order to attain a minimum score to be eligible for the interview for promotion, some of them would produce in numbers, albeit of lower quality than their counterparts. However, since university is intent upon having faculty to produce quality output only, they might fall behind the race. This university would also continue to maintain their high-quality status. At the same time, university B, which is not hell bent on quality, even during the screening period, would have more number of faculty which would take the risk of producing lower quality output. These universities would have majority such faculty who would settle at lower level of quality output. This is because of S-efficiency. The universities which are ranked above hire good quality faculty and vice-versa (Glennester, 1991; Winston, 1999). At the same time, it needs to be noted that there are only a few universities which are of good quality. Most the universities are of moderate or poor quality. Thus, on an

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[112] While they talked about culture of the nations, such a logic could as well be applied to a university space.

average, poor quality work would proliferate. This is an example of adverse selection. Another point to be noted is that the process of standardisation, or maintaining minimum standards as per the regulatory framework carries potential for erosion of quality in good universities; if a faculty meets minimum standards and not necessarily the quality work as desired by the university, the university authorities generally cannot deny the recruitment or promotion. In such scenarios, S-efficiency fails to happen.

7.11.1. Corruption in higher education: The role of governance

Corruption of any kind arrests the growth and development of institutions. While policy makers instituted PBAS to maintain minimum standards in higher education institutions, this cannot be achieved unless corrupt practices or under-performance is taken cognizance of and addressed. In this context, it would be interesting to look at particularly faculty who would choose to perform at below average or accepted quality level, either because of their ability or because of choosing to put in less efforts than desired (shirking away from work). But, the present sub-section focuses only on corruption part of it. Corruption is referred to as "abuse of entrusted power for private gain"[113]. However, corruption in higher education in the context of performance assessment would pertain to resorting to unethical practices like producing output compromising on quality. The supposed purpose of performing in higher education is producing quality output or maintaining minimum standards in higher education, anything performed less than what is required, through shirking away or taking short cuts, leading to a compromise on quality could be tantamount to corruption in higher education. It is the lack of information, which leads to corruption in higher education (Orkodashvili, 2009). As mentioned in a section above, this lack of information often pertains to the type of faculty. If this is coupled with poor governance structure, quality is bound to suffer. The reason for corruption is often found in poor governance of institutions; good governance is found to be preventing corruption (Heinrich & Hodess, 2011).

The linkage between corruption and governance would be understood using the model developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) in the context of tax evasion, after adding a variable for Governance into their original model. The governance

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[113] https://www.transparency.org/

structure often determines the culture of the place. Suppose that faculty decides to produce moderate quality/low quality work. They might get caught or may not get caught, depending on the governance and hence the culture of the university where they are placed. If a university is conscious of the quality work at the time of interview, there is a high chance of such a faculty getting caught shirking away from quality work, where the faculty will have to pay penalty in the form of denial of promotion or recruitment. On the other hand, in the university where quality is compromised, the faculty would take a chance and produce low quality work. Suppose a faculty is not sure of whether his lower/moderate quality work would be identified or not. Let probability be 'p' that they are caught and (1-p) that they are not caught.

Let X be the quality of output that they produce, may be by investing less time, than what they could have in order to achieve a high-quality work, say W, which represents the threshold quality. If such faculty were to devote more time on quality work, it would have imposed cost on them in terms of extra effort, time and stress. Thus, while settling at X, they save themselves from stress and yet produce output, albeit of lower quality. Let the cost be δ times the output actually produced. Thus, the difference between W and δX would be their gain, if they are not caught. However, if they get caught then there would be a penalty equivalent at a rate α, imposed on the extent of shirking away from quality work expected by the university. That is penalty would be imposed on (W-X); the greater the extent of shirking the severe the penalty would be, i.e. the difference between W and X would differ from university to university. Under such a situation the faculty would maximise their expected utility from producing a certain quality of output, which is rational for them.

They would choose X such that they maximise their expected utility, given by

$$E(U)= (1-p) U(W-\delta X) +p\ U\ (W-\delta X-\alpha(W-X))\ .... (1)$$

For simplicity, let us write (1) as

$$E(U)= (1-p) U(Y) +p\ U\ (Z)\ .... (2)$$

Where $Y=W-\delta X$

$Z=W-X-\alpha(W-\delta X)$,

The first order condition for maxima:

$E'(U) = -\delta (1-p) U'(Y) - p (\delta-\alpha)U'(Z) = 0$ ....(3)

Where U' (Y) and U' (Z) have positive signs, because with increase in the net benefit to faculty their utility would increase.

The second order condition for maxima is given by

$E''(U) = \delta^2 (1-p) U''(Y) + p (\delta-\alpha)^2 U''(Z)$ .... (4),

where U'' (Y) and U'' (Z) hold negative signs. The negative sign is derived from the initial hypothesis of this section that a better governance would reduce corruption in the institution. This would be true only when faculty are risk averse and have concave utility function; their utility increases initially but after the point it falls because they are wary of taking risks. It needs to be noted that even the faculty who resort to corrupt practices would still be risk averse, because the risk could as well represent losing one's job or not getting promoted if caught.

For maxima E'(U) >0, at X=0, and E'(U) <0, at X=W

That is, $-\delta (1-p) U'(Y) - p (\delta-\alpha)U'(Z) < 0$, at X=W

$-\delta (1-p) U'(W(1-\delta)) < p (\delta-\alpha)U'(W(1-\delta))$,

$-\delta+\delta p < (p\delta-p\alpha)$,

$p\alpha < \delta$ .... (5)

This implies that the faculty would continue producing a low quality output as long as expected penalty is less than the cost they have to incur. The probability has thus far been assumed to be exogenous. However, the value of p is determined by the culture or the governance structure of the university. Let us introduce another variable called G to represent this quality conscious culture or governance of university. Therefore we have p (G) , and p'(G)>0. It means that more the university cares about quality of work, the greater are the chances of faculty getting caught if they produce output of the quality less than what is desired.

The equation (1) should be written as following:

$E(U) = (1-p(G)) U(W-\delta X) + p(G) U (W-\delta X-\alpha(W-X))$ .... (6)

And the First order conditions and second order conditions could be rewritten as:

FOC: $E'(U) = -\delta (1-p(G)) U'(Y) - p(G) (\delta-\alpha)U'(Z) = 0$ ....(7)

The second order condition for maxima is given by

SOC: $E''(U) = \delta^2 (1-p(G)) U''(Y) + p(G) (\delta-\alpha)^2 U''(Z) = T$ .... (8)

We intend to find how does X change when p or G changes. That is, d X/d G

This can be derived as $d X/d G = \{d (E'(U))/d G\}/T$ .... (9)

Now, $d (E'(U))/d G = -\delta p'(G) U'(Y) - p'(G) (\delta-\alpha)U'(Z)$ .... (10)

Dividing (10) by T, we get

$d X/d G = \{-\delta p'(G) U'(Y) - p'(G) (\delta-\alpha)U'(Z)\}/ \{ \delta^2 (1-p(G)) U''(Y) + p(G) (\delta-\alpha)^2 U''(Z)\}$... (11)

The numerator of (11) is negative and the denominators is also negative, rendering a positive sign to d X/d G. This implies that more quality conscious the university culture is or the more governance structure is oriented towards extracting quality work from faculty, the more value of X increases, that is the output would approach W, the better-quality output. It can be seen that governance or the culture of the university can be a potential force to reduce the corrupt practices, if not remove altogether. Only in case of risk lover faculty the relationship will not hold true because they would not bother about their upward mobility or reputation.

7.12. Conclusion: What informs quality in Indian Higher Education?

As discussed through most of the chapter, the root cause of possibility of poor quality output in Indian higher education system is the lack of information about the type of faculty that one is. While there are informal codes of conduct for faculty, there are now formally laid codes of conduct as well through PBAS. If the faculty is not willing to work, it could be touted as a misconduct, that is deviation from norms or code of conduct. The unwillingness to work would reflect as much in not adhering to the informal codes of their work, as much as in not giving their hundred percent, if at all they are still performing their tasks. The foundation of academic work is motivation, which would rather be lacking amongst faculty would are not willing to work.

The Indian Higher Education system is beset with another kind of issue, which concerns favouritism or nepotism in appointments. National Knowledge Commission highlighted this problem of native-son/daughter policies in hiring (GOI, 2009a; Mathew, 2016). Chandra (2017) brings to the fore this problem of recruitments in India, stating that hiring is often based on cultural, social or regional proximity, and also problem of inbreeding in Indian universities. Whereas there are no formal studies on such a behaviour as such, but there are anecdotal evidences where appointment is based on other attributes of a faculty, which are different from their merit. Appointment of Vice Chancellors of Universities or faculty by bribing or due to their inclination towards a particular ideology, caste or creed is a commonplace in India. When the faculty are recruited, without them having to compete or put in their merit-based efforts, it is very unlikely that they would pursue this profession with the rigour and commitment that it demands. Without adequate motivation, the classroom teaching, the research output, the advisory work, etc. get compromised in terms of quality. As mentioned in Chapter-1, that higher education contributes to the growth of a nation through externalities, and that it commands huge resources of public. How accountability to the society be ensured remains questionable in such a scenario. Following the definition explicated earlier in the chapter, such a misconduct be called as corruption because these activities are not "socially unacceptable" (Holmes, 2015, p.15). It could be called as white-collar misconduct (Holmes, 2015).

Therefore, albeit there are certain provisions which provide some kind of faculty an opportunity to mis-conduct, the problem is further exacerbated by another kind of mis-conduct owing to patronisation or nepotism, when it comes to selection at the time of interview.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The policy makers have been emphatic about accountability of faculty and/or university, ever since the conception of higher education policy, with the expectation of meeting the objective of quality or excellence. The period post 1990s, and 2000s in particular, witnessed a growing proclivity for developing performance indicators and measuring the output of faculty. These measures, even when implemented, left some scope for not immediately impacting the life of faculty. It led to eventually implement PBAS in the higher education system, with the expectation of at least maintaining minimum standards of work in the university system, if not quality or excellence. The performance-based accountability introduced in the Indian higher education system, as PBAS 2010, requires faculty to document their performance in the areas of Teaching, Learning and Evaluation, Research and Academic Contribution and Co-curricular and Social Extension. The policy measure did not come about in an instant. The Kothari Commission in mid-1960s did place an emphasis on research publication as a criterion for career advancement of faculty. If we look back to other policy measures, there have been instances in the past where concerns regarding promotion of faculty, simply on the basis of their years of service were raised. The National Policy of Education (GOI, 1986) mentioned explicitly that promotion should be merit-based. While there have been several attempts to measure the productivity of faculty later on, by instituting the National Accreditation Assessment Council (NAAC), Internal Quality Assessment Cells (IQAC) in the universities, expecting the faculty to produce for the Annual Reports of the university, these measures did not have a direct bearing on the very life of faculty. For instance, in NAAC evaluations which were institutional based, not every faculty had to necessarily perform. There was always an option for faculty 'not to perform', unless a university screening committee required a faculty to have a certain minimum research output, which is expected to be a phenomenon of only a few universities in India. The Performance Based Assessment System (PBAS) (GOI, 2010, 2013a, 2016a, 2016b) departed significantly from the previous recommendations and assumed a different shape. Here the interest of the

faculty (their self-interest) in recruitment or promotion is linked with their performance, measured in numbers or units of time. If they choose not to abide by the regulation and produce in the stipulated framework, they deliberately choose to remain out of the race.

The chapter aims at summarising the findings of the study, beginning with the problem addressed, in Section 8.2.

8.2 Central problem of the study

The central question that the study has sought to address is: how such a policy measure takes its effect in the life of faculty? The question, although appears to be a single question, has different strands attached to it.

A mechanism like PBAS requires self-assessment or self-regulation by the faculty; the faculty are expected to keep a track of their performance in different spheres of their academic engagement. But, since it is the government that promotes self-regulation, it can be considered as, what Jongbloed (2004) calls, "enforced self-regulation" (p. 93). Now, what is important to note here is that for such a policy measure to take its effect requires a certain kind of an individual, in tune with the large belief system or assumptions found in the policy texts (called as discourse); neo-liberal or its arm called New Public Management in the present case. The faculty are, therefore, assumed and required to be self-interested rational individuals, which would also shape their strategies. It is possible only when they behave like a *homoeconomicus,* optimally allocating their limited resources, that is time and ability, to optimise or maximise their output as measured in terms of points. To address the above question this study has looked at the formation of neo-liberal subject (individuals, as well as institutions). But there could be scenarios where such a formation is not possible, and the results, therefore, deviate from the expected behaviour. It requires looking at the conditions under which there would arise resistance from the faculty. Another problem to be looked at is, how a rational subject might not always produce quality output, the very objective of instilling accountability in higher education as mentioned in policy over the years. It is too simplistic to say that an individual strategis\es their actions in accordance with policy. Thus, the central issues to be looked at, to analyse the effect of policy on faculty life

is go deeper into understanding the various dynamics entangled in a *homo economicus* behaviour. are: a) what makes a faculty internalise and implement the policy in their lives, b) does a) yield the desired result? Why and why not? and b) is there a possibility of them doing opposite to a), or only implementing the policy but internalising? If yes, what makes that happen? Unless these issues in human behaviour are addressed, one can never say that a particular policy will or will not ensure quality. There could be a deviation in their behaviour, than as expected under policy.

Talking of a deviation in their behaviour further, it could be possible that such a requirement proscribes the academic freedom of faculty and thus the faculty deviate from what is expected from them. But ideally, accountability and academic freedom are two sides of a same coin. Faculty work has an innate accountability requirement, without having to be called out by anyone, and they can work only when they are provided with enough academic freedom. What makes these two at conflict with each other is the way they have been made answerable for their work. That is, through performance-based accountability measures. Such a framework put a dent on the academic freedom of faculty, making them lose their motivation to perform. Constraints on academic freedom could be felt due to growing demand on the time of faculty which could cripple creative engagement with a problem, value attached to a certain kind of output for publications, scarcity of funds to conduct research and depict one's performance, standardisation of outputs paying little attention to the contextual demands on the faculty, like their designation, their discipline, the university they are placed in, etc. Thus, while some might feel motivated about PBAS and internalise the norms, the others might resist due to a constraint on their academic freedom or not being able to internalise PBAS into their will.

But it is to be noted that adherence to regulation and resisting those are not binary concepts; resistance is often present in same body where acceptance of norms is occurring, and it is here that the difference between 'being' and 'doing' scores importance to understand faculty behaviour under a particular discourse. These processes also emanate from the experience of faculty about their academic freedom; those faculty who do not feel a restraint on their academic freedom would be potential subject of this discourse, and those faculty who feel a curb on their academic freedom

might as well not be in tune with the discourse. The relationship between accountability and academic freedom is shaped by the contextual placement of the faculty; their disciplines, their designation and the universities they are a part of.

At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the policy hardly brings out these dynamics in the texts. Therefore, before analysing the implications on faculty life, it is crucial to take a step back and get a grasp of what kind of rational behaviour or strategies are expected under the neo-liberal policy discourse. The policy rationalises the imposition of these measures linking them with efficiency and productivity or at least maintaining minimum standards in the work of faculty. Such rationales conceal this conflict and seek to subdue any possible resistance. It makes interesting to look at this conflict or relationship, and also the process whereby the accountability has been depicted as a political rationality in policy documents.

In sum, the study looks at what have these accountability-linked rationales been, particularly the Performance Based Assessment, and how they been sought to be inculcated in faculty behaviour. The study while analysing the policy looks at it normatively and then tests those expected behaviour on the field, by conducting in two state universities in India.

8.3 Addressing the gaps in the literature

The literature broadly pertains to:

a) Analysis of neo-liberal or NPM related policy measures: The NPM policy measures have been analysed using different approaches. The policy has been analysed using the conceptual foundations of economics by Massy (2004), Jongbloed (2004), Dill & Soo (2004), Chattopadhyay (2012) and Chattopadhyay and Sharma (2018). Apart from this method of discourse analysis, with Foucault's work as foundation has been adopted by Ball (1993a, 1993b, 2003, 2011, 2015), Peters (2001), Marginson (1997), Mollis & Marginson (2002), Engebresten, et al. (2012), Lingard & Rizvi (2009). Third, and apart from this, another set literature has done a descriptive analysis of policy, raising certain issues like recommendation of various committees over time, problems associated with PBAS, accountability measures in Indian higher education policy, excellence and mediocrity in education, or autonomy of the state governments with respect to

policy formulation ((Shah (2005), Das & Chattopadhyay (2014), Bhushan (2015), Sujatha (2015), Mathew (2016), Thorat (2016), Chandra (2017)).

b) The implications of NPM reforms on university or faculty life: Some of the empirical studies have been conducted internationally by Anderson & Murray (1971), Volkwein (1986, 1989), Ball (1993a, 1993b, 2003, 2005), Marginson (1997a, 1997b, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), Deem (1998), Powell and Smith (1998), Mollis & Marginson (2002), Harris (2005), Hoetch (2006), Bennich-Bjorkman (2007), Roberts (2007), Santiago & Carlvahlo (2008), Dill (2014), Berg & Seeber (2016).

What was noted in the literature is that the while studying the policy texts, even the discourse of neo-liberalism, the construction of neo-liberal subject (or a *homo economicus* individual) was not extended to understand the possible strategies they would make in the wake of policy reforms. The study addressed this by combining economic analysis of policy and descriptive analysis discussing the implications of Indian policy on quality, autonomy, etc., with critical discourse analysis using Foucault's work (Foucault, 1972, 1978, 1980, 1991). Accountability is understood to infuse efficiency and effectiveness in public institutions (Mortimer, 1972; Berdahl, 1990; Alexandar, 2000; Huisman & Currie, 2004; Kai, 2009), enhancing their productivity and quality of work. The economic analysis of policy-strand analyses policy using these concepts of efficiency and their implications on quality. What is to be noted is that the behaviour of a *homo economicus* would be centred around these kinds of efficient, effective and productive strategies. Combining these two threads can also help to have a better understanding of why and how a policy aiming to attain quality is a success and why it is not, which is often found to be missing in the third strand.

The power, of the discourse, gets masked under the guise of words like efficiency, productivity, accountability and competitiveness (Davies & Peterson, 2005). It remains to be seen how the discourse is manifested through strategies which are efficient, effective and productive.

Similarly, in the literature pertaining to impact of NPM on various aspects of faculty life, there was no discussion on the process through which such changes were

brought about; it is through the willingness (or not) of the faculty that different impacts are brought to their fruition or otherwise. That is the change takes place in the faculty first, which needs to be studies. While Ball (1993) has undertaken it, but it was in the context of schools. Morris & Marginson (2002) have been close to such an analysis. But the latter restricted their analysis to only manager/ leadership level, and not the faculty who form the backbone of higher education system. Ball & Olmedo (2013) and Lucas (2014) have discussed about resistance amongst school and higher education teachers in UK, they have not talked about questions like motivation or lack of it, or alternative to the present system. The resistance within the power relations needs elaboration.

The study extends the Principal Agent theory, by augmenting it with Foucauldian analysis, and economic analysis of policy actors. The PAT only informs about the optimal contract, but the sustenance or non-sustenance of it depends upon the faculty behaviour. The faculty behaviour has been understood using Foucault's Critical Discourse Analysis, which entailed enquiring the process of self-formation: subjectivisation, which is the process through which wilful bodies are formed or resistance. This is done by understanding power relations between individuals and institutions. Another aspect of rational behaviour is often an unethical behaviour, which could cause a compromise in quality work. The literature on NPM does not throw much light on it, except Ball (2003) who says that the rational actions often lead to spawning of corrupt practices by individuals, which has not been adequately addressed in the literature in the wake of accountability reforms.

Combining these frameworks to look at PBAS, the questionnaire was developed and administered to faculty in two state universities. Such an approach has not been used internationally and nationally in higher education.

In this light, the study addresses the following objectives and respective research questions:

1. To critically look at the discourse of accountability in Indian higher education policy

    1.1. How has accountability been conceptualised in the policy documents over years?

- What is the overarching rule governing the statements in the policy documents? What is the 'truth' which proscribes or delimits individual behaviour?

- How has the scope of accountability been defined?

1.2. What are the effects of policy that could ensue?

1.3. Can there arise resistance to these expected effects?

2. To look at the implications of neo-liberal performance assessment on the faculty behaviour and their academic freedom

   2.1. How do faculty perceive and experience performance assessment exercise under the present neo-liberal regime?

   2.2. How do the faculty negotiate between accountability and academic freedom?

   2.3. How do faculty relate with other individuals and institutions in order to perform?

   2.4. How do the faculty understand their rational actions and its relationship with ethical practices?

   2.5. Does there arise a possibility of resistance?

3. To understand the implication of neo-liberal rational behaviour on quality work

   3.1. Does performance assessment of faculty translate into quality work?

   - How can the performance assessment regime lead the percolation of culture of performativity in faculty life and impact quality of work?

   - How does possibility of moral hazard arise in faculty work?

   3.2. What role could social norms play in addressing corrupt practices in education?

Some of the findings which emanate from the study are the following:

8.4. Normative Analysis of Policy Recommendations

The first step concerns analysing policy, which means analysing its contents and its effects (Codd, 1988). The effects emanate from the contents of the policy, which in turn reflect the larger discourse prevailing, that is the beliefs, assumptions and the rules. Therefore, analysing policy means analysing the discourse and the concomitant effects which would/could come about. The method used is a combination of Foucault's CDA and Economic Analysis of Policy.

The (education) policy recommendations are therefore normative, prescribing certain goals and purpose of education to be fulfilled (Lingard & Rizvi, 2009). The normative nature of the policy derives from the larger discourse which it speaks of, and which has certain ways of achieving the ends. The first question therefore is to understand what that larger discourse is.

The Indian higher education policy and the larger global discourse were juxtaposed. Lingard and Rizvi (2009) and Ward (2012) trace a shift in the policy discourse towards neo-liberalism, particularly post 1980s. As discussed in Chapter-5, the impact of this global shift is also visible in the Indian Higher Education Policy, which premised its recommendations for higher education governance on neo-liberal discourse and New Public Management, to be exact, post 2000s. Accountability from university has been sought at two levels: university and faculty. At the university level this has been done through accreditation, institution of quality assurance cells, developing rankings framework or performance-based funding. For faculty, the State instituted Performance-Based Assessment System, which mandates faculty to perform in the broad areas of teaching, research and co-curricular activities. There has been a shift in the location and nature of accountability. The Radhakrishnan Commission emphasised on being accountable for developing students into citizens of this country, and to the society. The accountability and its scope has gradually become narrowl, by restricting it to being performance-based. The latter kind of accountability might not meet the needs of society and students.

The accountability during the neo-liberal regime has manifested in the form of performance-based accountability, than, or not just, to accountability to one's self-conscience. But there are a whole lot of mechanisms involved in registering performance, ranging from producing a certain self to producing certain relationships. It changes not only what the faculty do, but who do they become, which might be at loggerheads with their academic freedom. These mechanisms are normative, formed within the larger discourse.

8.4.1. Efficient strategies and subjectivisation

The PBAS requires a transformation in the way a faculty behaves with respect to their own work, and also with others. Power or the rationale of the discourse could affect the individual, the relationship of an individual with others, and also with the institution. The self-formation occurs by forming a knowledge about oneself within a context. It happens as a result of normalising techniques, like performance assessment, which would categorise individuals as per the norms of measurement. Those who deviate from those norms are 'non-performing'. Thus, they act upon themselves within that context of discourse. The working of power, which seeks to bring about efficiency and effectiveness, as discussed in Chapter 5, can broadly be found in following areas: relationship with society, relationship with students, relationship with peers, the nature of knowledge generated, relationship with academic world at large, growing individualism, competitiveness amongst peer at same level, motivation from external rewards. Within these areas one can see whether actions are taken willingly (subjectivisation) or they are taken but unwillingly (resistance or counter-conduct) But all these have an influence of the designation of the faculty, discipline of faculty, etc. which provide a further input to determining the working of power on the bodies. What needs to be noted is that these strategies could be in conflict with the academic freedom and also quality work, providing a further impetus to resistance.

Another layer of subject formation is the culture of the university. Foucault (1978) brings in the role of discourse of institution in this context. The culture is reflected by common values and norms of the university. The neo-liberal performance assessment regime expects those values to be altered in favour of self-regulation, individualism within universities, gearing up towards producing quality work etc.

Another area where the role of university features is in the availability of funds. This may be particularly true for sciences faculty. If the faculty do not have sufficient fund, that would put a constraint on them for producing research output.

8.5. Positive Analysis of Policy: Policy Effects

The policy effects are looked at by understanding the behaviour of faculty towards Performance Based Assessment System. The NPM tools or neo-liberal kind of accountability being one, try to effect a rational behaviour in faculty, which might be at variance with their academic freedom and the quality work. In-depth interviews of 35 faculty members in two state universities were undertaken, to have an idea of their general perception about performance assessment, and their experience of PBAS in particular. The two universities, although both of them were State Universities, was chosen to throw some light on the role of culture (and leadership) in faculty behaviour (pertaining to areas like subjectivisation, resistance and corrupt practices). The broad categories chosen to design questionnaire were those as mentioned in Section 8.2. Critical Discourse Analysis, coupled with content analysis were used to comment on the findings to arrive at *moderatum* generalisation (Payne & Williams, 2005).

8.5.1 Conceptualisation of Accountability and Discourse

The neo-liberal discourse understands accountability as performance-based. Amongst faculty, their two top-most location of accountability were society and students. Another dimension of accountability shared by faculty in both the universities was being accountable in terms of documenting their output, like having student feedback, or producing for API, or their annual reports. Four faculty members from university A and five from university B conceptualised accountability in the afore-mentioned fashion. It could be seen that neo-liberal discourse and its concept of accountability was prevalent at least amongst a few faculty in Indian Universities.

8.5.2. PBAS has no impact on Academic Freedom? Lacunae in conception

There emerged an interesting contradiction. When faculty were asked if PBAS had any impact on their academic freedom, a majority of faculty informed that it had no impact on their academic freedom. To get a nuanced response for this, the questions which related academic freedom and PBAS were developed which captured the

impact of PBAS on: agency to undertake creative endeavours requiring long time, agency to undertake research in the area of their interest, time crunch, agency to work in areas pertaining to social welfare. Surprisingly, a major number of faculty in University B found that PBAS reduced their agency in these areas, and it was larger than in University A. These results might appear in contradiction with above findings of subject formation, where they feel motivated by PBAS and also said that it had no impact on their 'academic freedom'. The results resonate very much with the study conducted by Bennich-Bjorkman (2007) in the context of a Sweden University, where they argue that although NPM had an impact on the research work of faculty, they still felt enjoying academic freedom. Whereas, their study attributed this enjoyment of academic freedom to certain resistance tactics they had developed in their university, where in they found ways to create scope to follow their own area of research interest, however, in the present study the reason attributed could be different. One could be the phenomenon of subjectivisation, which was ensured through the role of leadership (in case of University B), which reduced resistance amongst faculty members towards PBAS, and second could be, the narrow conception of the word academic freedom by the faculty. Regarding the conceptualisation of Academic Freedom, more than two-thirds faculty in University B could not conceptualise Academic Freedom, with this proportion being only slightly less in University A.

8.5.3. Self-formation in Universities

Subjectivisation in Universities happens at various levels, at University level, at the level of leadership and at the level of faculty. It was observed in Indian Universities, that there was a certain kind of conception of self by faculty, especially in the University (B) where leadership level had also developed itself as a subject of the discourse. They had created a self-knowledge through documentation, helping them understand where they stood. A large number of faculty felt motivated by PBAS, the proportion of which was less in University A. There are many factors which play a role here.

a. Leadership and Orientation of the University: If the University culture is externally oriented, it is quick to respond to the signals of environment (Sporn, 1996). The leader has also a role to play here. The director of the IQAC cell of University B had developed a master plan with the objective of appearing in

international rankings, and they also organised workshops to train the faculty on paper writing or raising funds from international bodies for doing project. From the account of faculty, it was also revealed that IQAC director made regular attempts to meet faculty and organise paper writing and other competitions for them. In stark contrast, the IQAC of University A, did not take such prompt actions to improve quality work by faculty, despite agreeing to the fact that a large number of their faculty was producing substandard work. Thus, The IQAC director had indeed formed 'positive psychological contract' (Whitchurch & Gordon, 2017, p. 9), and aligned the interests of faculty to the larger interest of the State.

b. The culture of documentation: As in University B, if documentation of individual work for maintaining annual reports is a ritual it would be easier for faculty to internalise the norms of performance assessment. The faculty by documenting their achievements and providing an evidence of their work, generate a knowledge about their own selves (Cannizzo, 2015). This knowledge categorises them as 'performing or normal' or 'not-performing or not normal'.

c. Discourse of the Institution: The discursive practices within a university can help highlight its relationship with the larger world, and also the relationships within. The nature of these relationships could bring to light the extent of ease and facilitation or not of self-formation. University B was found to be more proactive in this regard by instituting competition for faculty, training faculty to raise funds for their work. The mission and vision statements can direct the faculty to orient and prepare for the larger culture of the university. These were found to be well articulated for University B than University A, with a mention also of objective of featuring in the World Rankings.

d. Performativity: The culture of performativity can come forth only when individuals, the leaders and the institutional discourse is so directed. The practices of documenting performance, evaluating one's own self, or self-reflecting on one's own work was found to be prevalent amongst faculty of University B, who had internalised the logic of competition and documentation for performing better. It was no surprise that most of them felt motivated by PBAS, which was not so much found in the other university.

8.5.4. Possibilities of Resistance

As shared by Michel Foucault, the resistance exists along with subjectivisation. The seed for resistance lies in Critique about one's formation of self. The critical attitude makes one question the obviousness of the process. The faculty are not passive recipient of discourse; the contexts where they are placed could cause a difference in their responses, raising resistance and challenge to the discourse (Lucas, 2014). Resistance has been captured by dissonance or negative views (Lucas, 2014), conflict inside or irresponsible attitude (Ball & Olmedo, 2013), a difference between being and doing (Chiapello & Fairclough, 2002; Davies & Peterson, 2005). Following areas show resistance amongst Indian higher education faculty:

a. Contextual differences

The responses did not reflect disciplinary struggles. To capture this, a second round of interview was conducted with faculty, targeting only this issue. The UGC Regulation has the provision of augmenting the API scores according to the impact factor of the journals. All the social sciences faculty in both the universities felt that it was biased against them. Similarly, the opportunities of publications differ between sciences and social sciences (Das & Chattopadhyay, 2014). Designation-wise it was found that professors felt their academic freedom more constrained than younger faculty in the area pertaining to agency to do the work meant for societal welfare. Another interesting finding was with respect to impact of PBAS on agency to do research with required longer time. In both the Universities, as compared to younger faculty, a smaller proportion of professors agreed to this item. This could also be expected, given that a large burden of teaching load lies with the assistant or associate professors, leaving professors with more time to engage in creative endeavours requiring long time. The finding is concomitant with a study conducted by Menzies and Newson (2007)[114] which found that regardless of disciplines, career stage or gender, majority of respondents indicated that they had less time for reflective and critical thinking in their early stage of career. Similarly, proportion of professors who felt that co-curricular activities reduced their motivation was less in both the universities as compared to a younger faculty. It is also because much of the burden of

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[114] As cited in Berg and Seeber (2016)

administrative activities falls on assistant professors, as also shared by an Assistant Professor from University A.

b. Critical Attitude amongst faculty

University type also has a role to play in developing this critical attitude towards self-formation and resistance. But the resistance for developing a different kind of self is often forestalled by the larger university culture. The process of forestalling is greater subjectivisation of them, a process which could be found in University B. The university had certain pockets of faculty, who were a part of teachers' union and resisting towards PBAS. But even after 3 years of resistance, the PBAS was implemented in the University. One can see that the process of forestalling critical attitude had more strength. Also, resistance was only among a handful of faculty who were a part of teachers' union, the rest had wilfully internalised PBAS as a motivating factor for them to perform. The practice of self-introspection or developing a critique of one self was not found in University A, but there were no counter wailing force of instituting logic of neo-liberal too.

c. Corrupt practices

Indian higher education, as shared by them, is suffering from growing corrupt practices in the form of publishing in poor quality journals, and networking for mutual benefits. Such practices as an offshoot of PBAS were found o be deteriorating the quality of work and were condemned strongly.

d. Organised Resistance

Ever since the institution of PBAS, the organised resistance in the form of public demonstrations have taken place against its implementation, with demands for even scrapping it altogether. The movements have been led by Delhi University Teachers' Association (DUTA), pan-India organisations like Federation of College and University Teachers' Association (FEDCUTA) and All India Federation of University College and Teachers' Association (AIFUCTO) and Jawaharlal Nehru University Teachers' Association (JNUTA). The resistance had not led to scrapping PBAS but making amendments to it (See Annexure I). These are central level organisations or organisations of central university and enjoy

positional advantage in negotiating with UGC or MHRD. These political organisations led by teachers often determine the extent of awareness that the faculty in their universities develop for a particular issue.

The state universities may not have the same level of resistance, owing to other pressing concerns or a different culture in their universities. Often the state universities are beset with a greater political interference than a central university. It was found that University A did not have a strong teachers' association. They did not raise voice against PBAS implementation, which was reflected in the awareness amongst faculty; most of the faculty were not aware of the all-India demonstrations which were taking place in Delhi University. University B, in contrast, had a strong teachers' association, who resisted the implementation until 3 years, proposed an alternative to PBAS called PCP (Personal Career Performance) which would assess faculty based on their own indicators, and amended PBAS as per the needs of their college teachers. It was also reflected in the responses of faculty who were mostly aware of protests against PBAS.

8.5.4. Nature of knowledge and Accountability to society

In this entire process of understanding policy effects using Foucault's framework, we must question the accountability of universities to the society, which are the major provider of funds to the public universities. The nature of knowledge, as reported by the faculty, was turning into applied or something which is easily reproducible, than basic or fundamental research, which required more time. It does not give agency to faculty to engage in work which are crucial for the point of view of society. This is particular true for State universities, where faculty would like to work for local development but that work would not be either published in a national or international journal or cited, leaving them with low PBAS score. Faculty's effort to disseminate knowledge to local villagers by writing in their regional/local language magazines is also discouraged. On the one hand the PBAS is making faculty accountable by documenting their work, on the other hand the nature of work produced might not be useful for society always but is produced only to score points.

8.5.5. Problem of information asymmetry and corruption

The study highlights a crucial role which information has to play in understanding the actual behaviour of faculty. There is a need to have better information about the kind of faculty, and also their contexts to understand not only their actions but the import of their actions on quality of work that they do. Whereas it is often argued that better monitoring system in an antidote to lack of information in organisations (Fritzen & Basu, 2011), often in case of country like India, having a varied and unique universities, this solution too has loopholes, as was discussed in chapter 7. The chapter has highlighted the problem of moral hazard, either due to lack of competence of faculty or lack of honesty or both.

The individual performance assessment is beset with the problem of individualism, leading to academic opportunism amongst faculty and hence, poor quality work. This problem arises due to lack of information with the principal on the type of individuals, their objectives and hence quality. They have information, albeit imperfect. The information that is provided is about the number of hours devoted to teaching and co-curricular activities, and about the research output in terms of number of publications, conferences attended, etc. It is during the process of teaching that faculty can compromise with quality because the classroom teaching is not visible to the regulator. Similarly, the time allotted to research guidance gets affected. Also, in case of research output, the faculty might produce certification of paper presentation without actually doing at, or they might substitute across categories within research, and choose the easier one. It is rational for faculty to undertake such practices. Whereas on the surface, there is nothing illegal that faculty do, but such acts could represent misconduct by faculty, because it is 'understood as a deviation from the code of conduct of faculty (Braxton & Bayer, 1999[115]; Lyken-Segosebe, Braxton, Hutchens & Harris, 2018). The code of conduct of faculty expects them to not shirk from their responsibilities and work towards excellence.

8.5.6. Alternative to PBAS: Exploring the possibility of collegiality

In University A, two faculty called for scrapping PBAS. The remaining were not in favour of having an alternative but suggested certain amendments to it, like having a

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[115] As cited in Lyken-Segosebe, Braxton, Hutchens & Harris (2018)

working formula to take care of different environment, or factoring in different contextual factor, rather than having a universal standard. In a similar vein, none of the faculty in University B said that there should be an alternative to API, albeit some amendments were suggested. One retired faculty from each university suggested peer-evaluation. But such a measure is also susceptible to failure due to self-interested behaviour of individuals, unless it is made a formal norm in the universities.

Some faculty suggested conducting evaluation at the departmental level an alternative to individualism as a result of individual performance assessment. But there was a possibility of free riding, as cited by some. One solution to that effect was having peer supervision. In order to and reduce free riding, government policies are needed (Jongbloed, 2004, p. 96) and one way could be to institutionalise collegiality/ cooperation. The policy should be such that incentivises cooperative behaviour amongst faculty (Dill & Soo, 2004). In other words, the otherwise informal (and ideal) norm could be made formal (Som, 2014). As argued by Dill and Soo (2004), for improvement of academic standards is needed an external control, which helps strengthen the internal collegiality. This could help greater communication amongst faculty to improve quality of teaching and research.

Whereas one could argue that collegiality could also happen amongst the faculty of different departments, but it is the department which is the primary means of social control and primary unit for improvement of teaching and research (Braxton, 1990)[116]. Collaborating or helping with faculty of other departments could instil again competition within a department. In contrast, cooperating with faculty within their own department would prove more beneficial in reducing the individualistic behaviour because that is their primary place of work, where their majority of interactions happen. As also argued by Braxton & Bayer (1999)[117] the departmental meetings, departmental work focusing on teaching and research, the informal face-to-face interaction between faculty facilitates finding out of poor quality teaching and research and communicating of informal norms which could lead to improvement in quality work.

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[116] As cited in Dill, & Soo (2004).
[117] As cited in Dill, & Soo (2004)

As argued by Berg & Seeber (2016), the collegiality within the department could become a potent point of resistance to the individualism and competition. However, as was found in both the university, and to a greater extent in University B, the resistance in this respect was rendered weak by growing individualism and the subjects who favoured competition as a way of improving their quality. And a larger role was played by the governance structure of the university guided by their leader.

But the sustenance of it is put to question given the self-interested behaviour of individuals.

8.6. A new discourse and a new self?

It was shared under resistance that there is discontentment amongst faculty with respect to the standard application of PBAS. They also raised concern about malpractices which increased after implementation of PBAS. There has also been organised resistance against it. But, only certain amendments have been made to the regulation so far. The performance assessment had picked up globally in universities since 1980s. India has rather been a late starter. Given that Indian higher education policy has largely been influenced by global neo-liberal discourse, it is unlikely that performance-based accountability could be rolled back altogether. Apart from the global factor, Indian higher education has been suffering from teacher absenteeism and shirking away by many faculty, which seriously has affected the quality of the system and led to institution of PBAS so as to maintain minimum standards. The faculty resisting in even University B concurred they were against PBAS as such but the standard measure of application. It is too early to comment that there will be a shift away from performance-based accountability to some other kind of accountability. In the US there has emerged a Slow Professor movement which focuses on slowing down the work of professor for them to enjoy timelessness of their work (Berg & Seeber, 2016). Such a movement however requires commitment towards one's work and having an honest attitude.

A new kind of self requires developing a critical attitude, that could make one rethink about their own selves and also the relationships around them (Ball & Olmedo, 2013). Having an understanding of oneself as an academic requires first of all having an understanding of one's academic freedom, which is the crucial

ingredient of faculty work. A major faculty in Indian state universities had no conception of academic freedom. When one cannot conceptualise their academic freedom, it is difficult for them to think of themselves, and what they do, critically in the performance assessment regime. The lack of this was found when many even answered that PBAS had no impact on their Academic Freedom, but when different categories of Academic Freedom was presented to them the responses differed. The critical attitude was subdued also by the culture and leader in University B. Another dimension to be looked at in this regard, was the relationship between teaching and research. Most state university faculty found teaching as their primary activity. But it is the research, which also guides the kind of teaching which takes place in a university (Veblen, 1971). A reason for this could be that a large number of them were previously working as college teachers in the colleges affiliated to the same universities.

Developing a new self requires thinking out of the box and self-introspecting what the faculty are doing and why. This resistance or possibility of it was found rather lacking in Indian State Universities. When this lack is coupled with bleak likelihood at the macro-level for a shift in discourse, at least in the near future, one must question the strength of resistance or find a better way of assessing performance of faculty, so as to reduce any possible areas of challenges which could impact their motivation to work.

8.7. In lieu of conclusion: What about quality?

Quality of work cannot be measured, as it is value-laden, where every stakeholder has a different view of the quality and it defined accordingly (Tam, 2001). It is defined according to the fitness of purpose; quality derives its meaning only in relation to the purpose of a service. If it meets the stated purpose, that service is called quality service (Green, 1994; Tam, 2001).

That purpose is defined by the larger discourse of neo-liberalism, when the very accountability is defined as performance-based. Therefore, if the performance can be measured, and meets a certain threshold defined by the university, it can be

termed as a quality work. But this threshold differs from one university to the other, and thus the meaning of what quality is differs.

Despite limitations of not having a sacrosanct definition of quality, and PBAS aiming only to maintaining certain minimum standards in the system, one can still see that quality of work can get impacted due to two reasons, where the second one also partly derives from the first:

a. Possibility of tweaking the UGC regulation

b. Moral Hazard Problem

The UGC regulation can provide faculty with possibilities of choosing the easier of the options, particularly in Category III, i.e. research. Similarly, the number of hours devoted to teaching or administrative activities do not reflect the quality of work. Now, who would do that and who would not would depend upon the type of faculty that one is. PBAS cannot ensure quality because the motivation levels and values differ amongst faculty, owing to their different types (Sharma, 2018).

Those who are not willing to work might subvert the process and those who are willing may not. As discussed in details in Chapter-7, using game theoretic models, this leads to moral hazard problem, affecting of quality of work.

Ideally, those faculty who are not quality conscious would veer towards the universities which are not as quality conscious and those who are quality conscious would veer towards universities which are quality conscious too. This leads to S-efficiency (Glennester, 1991). But PBAS aims at maintaining minimum standards. In that case, the faculty, or atleast some of them, who are earlier doing more than these prescribed minimum requirements in terms of quality, might adjust the quality of work downward. Those who are not willing to work or not competent enough might produce high in numbers but low-quality work. Such phenomenon leaves possibility of deterioration of quality on an average than an improvement of it.

In order for the State to come up with effective regulation, it is crucial to understand what is it that renders inefficiency in the performance; is it the academic opportunism or problem of collective action (Dill & Soo, 2004). Addressing these two could lead to addressing the problem of information asymmetry. One could be peer

supervision, which brings about a reduction in the information asymmetry. The Indian scenario shows that it has been a case of academic opportunism. An alternative proposed by a couple of faculty during field survey that was peer supervision. Unless, such a provision is made a formal norm, in the PBAS format, informal norms of peer supervision would fail due to opportunistic behaviour of individual in the wake of limited resources, that is time and ability.

The assessment of faculty on the basis of standard measures is fraught with a lacuna of not factoring in the mission of a university. A state university in a country like India might have an objective to cater to a large number of students coming from remote backgrounds, and faculty would engage more in the kind of research relevant for local needs, often lacking in registering any impact factor in numbers. As also suggested by Massy (2004) in the long run, it would be useful for universities to document the outcomes and progress reflecting their unique missions. This will facilitate comparison between two universities having a same kind of a mission, than measuring faculty output with a similar yardstick across universities.

Another problem in Indian higher education causing poor quality work is lack of quality consciousness in the Principal. It was stated by al the faculty interviewed that UGC has added even poor quality journals. It is much in consonance with the argument raised by Becker (1993) that the amount of crime does not only depend upon the rationality of the criminal but also the environment created by the policy. The UGC created a list of journals, which would be recognised for calculating the score of faculty for PBAS. Thus, UGC has an equal role in abetting corruption in higher education. Unless policy is amended in a manner that principal or UGC becomes conscious of quality, production of quality work cannot be ascertained in the higher education system.

The Indian higher education system suffers from another problem, which aggravates the quality issues. These relate to corrupt practices or favouritism in appointment of Vice-Chancellor and bureaucratisation which acts as impediment to academic work. State universities also suffer from fund crunch for doing research. Marginson (2006,2007) and Bennich-Bjorkman (2007) also argue that one of the enabling conditions for faculty to enjoy academic freedom are economic opportunities

or funds (to do research). Faculty in both the universities cited a crunch of funds, which affected their conduct of research

Under these circumstances, the optimal outcome meets satisficing equilibrium (Simon, 1959; Willimson, 2002), that is an alternative which is a good enough equilibrium (Williamson, 2002), but not the intended objective of quality, which has been the focus of many policy prescriptions over years. The aspirations (of the faculty) tend to adjust to what is attainable (Simon, 1959). Thus, to ensure quality in Indian higher education, having PBAS might only be a limited solution. The other issues, as mentioned above, need to be addressed holistically.

8.8. Limitations of the study

1. The Vice Chancellors of both the universities were approached but could not be met. Due to this, their perception about faculty behaviour in the wake of API could not be captured. Also the relationship of university with the UGC cannot be ascertained in true sense.

2. The study has only proposed a game theoretic model on moral hazard in university under performance assessment, and its impact on quality. It has not ventured into measuring quality because the meaning of quality faculty work changes as per the context.

3. Although faculty discussed about the corruption in publications after PBAS, and shirking away from teaching by some faculty, the study could not comment on actual extent of corruption. The reason is that the data pertained to not those who were involved, but only others who speculated what was going on, with no fact to support that.

4. The location of policy analyst has a bearing on the analysis conducted. Lingard & Rizvi (2009) highlight the differences in analysis undertaken by a sole researcher in a university space, and the one in a large bureaucratic organisation. While the best attempt has been made to reduce subjective analysis of policy, the location of the research and its bearing on analysis remains.

5. The study did not undertake an assessment of quality work of faculty. The meaning of quality is subjective and is determined by the purpose for which quality is assessed (Tam, 2001)

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Annexures

Annexure I: University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education), Regulations, over years

Table 1.1A

Category I: Teaching, learning and evaluation related activities (for the year 2010)

Brief Explanation: Based on the teacher's self-assessment, API scores are proposed for (a) teaching related activities; (b) domain knowledge; (c) participation in examination and evaluation; (d) contribution to innovative teaching, new courses etc. The minimum API score required by teachers from this category is 75. The self-assessment score should be based on objectively verifiable criteria wherever possible and will be finalized by the screening/selection committee.

Universities will be required to detail the activities and in case institutional specificities require, adjust the weightages, without changing the minimum total API scores required under this category.

S. No.	Nature of Activity	Maximum Score
1	Lectures, seminars, tutorials, practicals, contact hours undertaken taken as percentage of lectures allocated[a]	50
2	Lectures or other teaching duties in excess of the UGC norms	10
3	Preparation and Imparting of knowledge / instruction as per curriculum; syllabus enrichment by providing additional resources to students	20
4	Use of participatory and innovative teaching-learning methodologies; updating of subject content, course improvement etc.	20
5	Examination duties (Invigilation; question paper setting, evaluation/assessment of answer scripts) as per allotment.	25
	Total Score	**125**
	Minimum API Score Required	**75**

Note: [a] Lectures and tutorials allocation to add up to the UGC norm for particular category of teacher. University may prescribe minimum cut-off (net of due leave), say 80 %, for 1 and 5 above, below which no scores may be assigned in these sub-categories.

Table 1.2A

Category II: Co-curricular, extension and professional development related activities (for the year 2010)

Brief Explanation Based on the teacher's self-assessment, category II API scores are proposed for co-curricular and extension activities; and Professional development related contributions. The minimum API required by teachers for eligibility for promotion is 15. A list of items and proposed scores is given below. It will be noticed that all teachers can earn scores from a number of items, whereas some activities will be carried out only be one or a few teachers. The list of activities is broad enough for the minimum API score required (15) in this category to accrue to all teachers. As before, the self-assessment score should be based on objectively verifiable criteria and will be finalized by the screening/selection committee.
The model table below gives groups of activities and API scores. Universities may detail the activities or, in case institutional specificities require, adjust the weightages, without changing the minimum total API scores required under this category.

S. No.	Nature of Activity	Maximum Score
1	Student related co-curricular, extension and field based activities (such as extension work through NSS/NCC and other channels, cultural activities, subject related events, advisement and counseling)	20
2	Contribution to Corporate life and management of the department and institution through participation in academic and administrative committees and responsibilities.	15
3	Professional Development activities (such as participation in seminars, conferences, short term, training courses, talks, lectures, membership of associations, dissemination and general articles, not covered in Category III below)	15
	Minimum API Score Required	**15**

Table 1.3A

Category III: Research and academic contributions (for the year 2010)

Brief Explanation: Based on the teacher's self-assessment, API scores are proposed for research and academic contributions. The minimum API score required by teachers from this category is different for different levels of promotion and between university and colleges. The self-assessment score will be based on verifiable criteria and will be finalized by the screening/selection committee.

S No.	APIs	Engineering/Agriculture/ Veterinary Science/Sciences/Medical Sciences	Faculties of Languages Arts/Humanities/Social Sciences/Library/ Physical education/Management	Max. points for University and college teacher position
III A	Research Papers published in	Refereed Journals *	Refereed Journals*	15 / publication
		Non-refereed but recognized and reputable journals and periodicals, having ISBN/ISSN numbers	Non-refereed but recognized and reputable journals and periodicals, having ISBN/ISSN numbers.	10 / Publication
		Conference proceedings as full papers, etc. (Abstracts not to be included)	Conference proceedings as full papers, etc. (Abstracts not to be included)	10/ publication
III (B)	Research Publications (books, chapters in books, other than refereed journal articles)	Text or Reference Books Published by International Publishers with an established peer review system	Text or Reference Books Published by International Publishers with an established peer review system	50 /sole author; 10 /chapter in an edited book
		Subjects Books by National level publishers/State and Central Govt. Publications with ISBN/ISSN numbers.	Subject Books by / national level publishers/State and Central Govt. Publications with ISBN/ISSN numbers.	25 /sole author, and 5/ chapter in edited books
		Subject Books by Other local publishers with ISBN/ISSN numbers.	Subject Books by Other local publishers with ISBN/ISSN numbers.	15 / sole author, and 3 / chapter in edited books
		Chapters contributed to edited knowledge based volumes published by International Publishers	Chapters contributed to edited knowledge based volumes published by International Publishers	10 /Chapter
		Chapters in knowledge based volumes by Indian/National level publishers with ISBN/ISSN numbers and with numbers of national and international directories	Chapters in knowledge based volumes in Indian/National level publishers with ISBN /ISSN numbers and with numbers of national and international directories	5 / Chapter
III (C)	RESEARCH PROJECTS			
III (C) (i)	Sponsored Projects carried out/ ongoing	(a) Major Projects amount mobilized with grants above 30.0 lakhs	Major Projects amount mobilized with grants above 5.0 lakhs	20 /each Project
		(b) Major Projects amount mobilized with grants above 5.0 lakhs up to 30.00 lakhs	Major Projects Amount mobilized with minimum of Rs. 3.00 lakhs up to Rs. 5.00 lakhs	15 /each Project
		(c) Minor Projects (Amount mobilized with grants above Rs. 50,000 up to Rs. 5 lakh)	Minor Projects (Amount mobilized with grants above Rs. 25,000 up to Rs. 3 lakh)	10/each Project
III (C) (ii)	Consultancy Projects	Amount mobilized with	Amount mobilized with	10 per every

	carried out / ongoing	minimum of Rs.10.00 lakh	minimum of Rs. 2.0 lakhs	Rs.10.0 lakhs and Rs.2.0 lakhs, respectively
III (C) (iii)	Completed projects : Quality Evaluation	Completed project Report (Acceptance from funding agency)	Completed project report (Accepted by funding agency)	20 /each major project and 10 / each minor project
III (C) (iv)	Projects Outcome / Outputs	Patent/Technology transfer/ Product/Process	Major Policy document of Govt. Bodies at Central and State level	30 / each national level output or patent /50 /each for International level,
III (D)	**RESEARCH GUIDANCE**			
III (D) (i)	M.Phil.	Degree awarded only	Degree awarded only	3 /each candidate
III (D) (ii)	Ph.D	Degree awarded	Degree awarded	10 /each candidate
		Thesis submitted	Thesis submitted	7 /each candidate
III(E)	**TRAINING COURSES AND CONFERENCE /SEMINAR/WORKSHOP PAPERS**			
III(E) (i)	Refresher courses, Methodology workshops, Training, Teaching Learning Evaluation Technology Programmes, Soft Skills development Programmes, Faculty Development Programmes (Max: 30 points)	(a) Not less than two weeks duration	(a) Not less than two weeks duration	20/each
		(b) One week duration	(b) One week duration	10/each
III(E) (ii)	Papers in Conferences/ Seminars/ workshops etc.**	Participation and Presentation of research papers (oral/poster) in	Participation and Presentation of research papers (oral/poster) in	
		a) International conference	a) International conference	10 each
		b) National	b) National	7.5 / each
		c) Regional/State level	c) Regional/State level	5 /each
		d) Local –University/College level	d) Local –University/College level	3 / each
III(E) (iv)	Invited lectures or presentations for conferences/ / symposia	(a) International	(a) International	10 /each
		(b) National level	(b) National level	5

*Wherever relevant to any specific discipline, the API score for paper in refereed journal would be augmented as follows: (i) indexed journals – by 5 points; (ii) papers with impact factor between 1 and 2 by 10 points: (iii) papers with impact factor between 2 and 5 by 15 points; (iv) papers with impact factor between 5 and 10 by 25 points.
** If a paper presented in Conference/Seminar is published in the form of Proceedings, the points would accrue for the publication (III (a)) and not under presentation (III (e)(ii)).

Table 1.4A

Category I: Teaching, learning and evaluation related activities (for the year 2013)

Category	Nature of activity	Notes	Unit of assessment	Score
Category I	TEACHING, LEARNING AND EVALUATION RELATED ACTIVITIES			
1A (i)	Classroom teaching (including lectures, seminar)	As per allocation	Hours per academic year	
1A (ii)	Classroom teaching (including lectures, seminar) in excess of UGC norms	As per allocation	Hours per academic year	
1A (iii)	Classroom teaching (including lectures, seminar) preparation time	Same as actual teaching hours as per attendance register	Hours per academic year	
1B	Tutorials and Practicals	Actuals as per attendance register	Hours per academic year	
1C	Outside classroom interaction with students	Max 0.5 of hours in 1A	Hours per academic year	
	Sub-total 1	**Score = hours/10 (max score 100)**		
2	Research Supervision (including Masters thesis)	Max 1 hour per student per working week	Hours per academic year	
	Sub-total 2	Score = hours/10 (Max score = 30)		
3A	Question paper setting, moderation and related work	Actual hours	Hours per academic year	
3B	Invigilation/supervision and related examination duties	Actual hours	Hours per academic year	
3C	Evaluation/assessment of answer scripts and assignments related to internal assessment, external and re evaluation	Max 20 minutes per full script	Hours per academic year	
	Sub-total 3	**Score = hours/10 (Max score = 20)**		

4A	Teaching innovation including preparation of innovative course, use of innovative methodologies for teaching including bilingual/multi-lingual teaching	Evidence to be provided. Scores to be finalized by the screening committee	Outstanding = 10 Very good = 7 Good = 5 Average = 3 Modest = 1	
4B	Preparation of new teaching-learning material including translation, bridge material, study pack or similar additional resource for students	Evidence to be provided. Scores to be finalized by the screening committee	Outstanding – 10 Very good = 7 Good = 5 Average = 3 Modest = 1	
4C	Use of anonymous students' feedback on the quality of classroom teaching and students' interaction	Performa and summary feedback to be attached	2 points per course (max 10 points)	

Table 1.5A

Amended Category II: Co-curricular, extension and professional development related activities (for the year 2013)

S. No.	Nature of Activity	Maximum Score
1	Student related co-curricular, extension and field based activities (such as extension work through NSS/NCC and other channels, cultural activities, subject related events, advisement and counseling)	20
2	Contribution to Corporate life and management of the department and institution through participation in academic and administrative committees and responsibilities.	15
3	Professional Development activities (such as participation in seminars, conferences, short term, training courses, talks, lectures, membership of associations, dissemination and general articles, not covered in Category III below)	15
	Minimum API Score Required	15

Table 1.6A

Category-III: Research And Academic Contributions (for the year 2013)

S No.	APIs	Engineering/Agriculture/ Veterinary Science/Sciences/Medical Sciences	Faculties of Languages Arts/Humanities/Social Sciences/Library/ Physical education/Management	Max. points for University and college teacher position
III A	Research Papers published in:	Refereed Journals *	Refereed Journals*	15 / publication
		Non-refereed but recognized and reputable journals and periodicals, having ISBN/ISSN numbers.	Non-refereed but recognized and reputable journals and periodicals, having ISBN/ISSN numbers.	10 / Publication
		Conference proceedings as full papers, etc. (Abstracts not to be included)	Conference proceedings as full papers, etc. (Abstracts not to be included)	10/ publication
III (B)	Research Publications (books, chapters in books, other than refereed journal articles)	Text or Reference Books Published by International Publishers with an established peer review system	Text or Reference Books Published by International Publishers with an established peer review system	50 /sole author; 10 /chapter in an edited book
		Subjects Books by National level publishers/State and Central Govt. Publications with ISBN/ISSN numbers.	Subject Books by / national level publishers/State and Central Govt. Publications with ISBN/ISSN numbers.	25 /sole author, and 5/ chapter in edited books
		Subject Books by Other local publishers with ISBN/ISSN numbers.	Subject Books by Other local publishers with ISBN/ISSN numbers.	15 / sole author, and 3 / chapter in edited books

		Chapters contributed to edited knowledge based volumes published by International Publishers	Chapters contributed to edited knowledge based volumes published byInternational Publishers	10 /Chapter
		Chapters in knowledge based volumes by Indian/National level publishers with ISBN/ISSN numbers and withnumbers of national and international directories	Chapters in knowledge based volumes in Indian/National level publishers with ISBN /ISSN numbers and withnumbers of national and international directories	5 / Chapter
III (C)	RESEARCH PROJECTS			
III (C) (i)	Sponsored Projects carried out/ ongoing	(a) Major Projects amount mobilized with grants above 30.0 lakhs	Major Projects amount mobilized with grants above 5.0 lakhs	20 /each Project
		(b) Major Projects amount mobilized with grants above 5.0 lakhs up to 30.00 lakhs	Major Projects Amount mobilized with minimum of Rs. 3.00 lakhs up to Rs. 5.00 lakhs	15 /each Project
		(c) Minor Projects (Amount mobilized with grants above Rs. 50,000 up to Rs. 5 lakh)	Minor Projects (Amount mobilized with grants above Rs. 25,000 up to Rs. 3 lakh)	10/each Project
III (C) (ii)	Consultancy Projects carried out / ongoing	Amount mobilized with minimum of Rs.10.00 lakh	Amount mobilized with minimum of Rs.2.0 lakhs	10 per every Rs.10.0 lakhs and Rs.2.0 lakhs, respectively
III (C) (iii)	Completed projects : Quality Evaluation	Completed project Report (Acceptance from funding agency)	Completed project report (Accepted by funding agency)	20 /each major project and 10 / each minor project
III (C) (iv)	Projects Outcome / Outputs	Patent/Technology transfer/ Product/Process	Major Policy document of Govt. Bodies at Central and State level	30 / each national level output or patent /50 /each for International level,
III (D)	RESEARCH GUIDANCE			
III (D) (i)	M.Phil.	Degree awarded only	Degree awarded only	3 /each candidate

III (D) (ii)	Ph.D	Degree awarded	Degree awarded	10 /each candidate
		Thesis submitted	Thesis submitted	7 /each candidate
III(E)	TRAINING COURSES AND CONFERENCE /SEMINAR/WORKSHOP PAPERS			
III(E) (i)	Refresher courses, Methodology workshops, Training, Teaching-Learning-Evaluation Technology Programmes, Soft Skills development Programmes, Faculty Development Programmes (Max: 30 points)	(a) Not less than two weeks duration	(a) Not less than two weeks duration	20/each
		(b) One week duration	(b) One week duration	10/each
III(E) (ii)	Papers in Conferences/ Seminars/ workshops etc.**	Participation and Presentation of research papers (oral/poster) in	Participation and Presentation of research papers (oral/poster) in	
		a) International conference	a) International conference	10 each
		b) National	b) National	7.5 / each
		c) Regional/State level	c) Regional/State level	5 / each
		d) Local – University/College level	d) Local – University/College level	3 / each
III(E) (iv)	Invited lectures or presentations for conferences/ / symposia	(a) International	(a) International	10 /each
		(b) National level	(b) National level	5

*Wherever relevant to any specific discipline, the API score for paper in refereed journal would be augmented as follows: (i) indexed journals – by 5 points; (ii) papers with impact factor between 1 and 2 by 10 points; (iii) papers with impact factor between 2 and 5 by 15 points; (iv) papers with impact factor between 5 and 10 by 25 points.

** If a paper presented in Conference/Seminar is published in the form of Proceedings, the points would accrue for the publication (III (a)) and not under presentation (III (e)(ii)).

Table 1.7A

Category I: Teaching, learning and evaluation related activities (for the year 2016)

Category	Nature of Activity	Assistant Professor		Associate Professor		Professor	
		Max. Score	Actual Score	Max. Score	Actual Score	Max. Score	Actual Score
I	a. Lectures - Classroom Teaching (including Lectures in excess of UGC norms)	60	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷10	50	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷10	45	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷10
	b. Examinations duties (question paper setting, Invigilation, evaluation of answer scripts) as per allotment	20	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷10	15	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷10	10	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷10
	c. Innovative Teaching - learning methodologies, updating of subject contents / courses etc.	10	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷10	15	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷10	15	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷10
	d. Students Feedback (Students who have put in at least 75% attendance per course are eligible to give feed back)	10	Outstanding 10 Very Good 8 Good 6 Average 4 Below Average 0	10	Outstanding 10 Very Good 8 Good 6 Average 4 Below Average 0	10	Outstanding 10 Very Good 8 Good 6 Average 4 Below Average 0

*Note: 1. 18/16/14 hours per week include the Lectures / Practicals / Project Supervision. Two hours of Practicals /project supervision be treated as equivalent to one hour of lecture. Those teachers who supervise the research of five or more Ph.D. students at a time may be allowed a reduction of Two hours per week in direct teaching hours.
2. 6 hours per week include the hours spent on tutorials, remedial classes, seminars, administrative responsibilities, innovation and updating of course contents.

Table 1.8A

Category II: Professional Development, Co-curricular and extension activities (for the year 2016)

Category II	Nature of Activity	Maximum API Score	Actual score
a.	Student related co-curricular, extension and field based activities. (i) Discipline related co-curricular activities (e.g. field work, study visit, student seminar and other events, career counseling etc.) (ii) Other co-curricular activities (Cultural, Sports, NSS, NCC etc.) (iii) Extension and dissemination activities (public /popular lectures/talks/seminars etc.)	15	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷ 10
b.	Contribution to Corporate life and management of the department and institution through participation in academic and administrative committees and responsibilities. (i). Administrative responsibility (including as Dean / Principal/Chairperson/ Convener / Teacher-in-charge/similar other duties that require regular office hrs for its discharge) (ii). Participation in Board of Studies, Academic and Administrative Committees.	15	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷ 10
c.	Professional Development activities (such as participation in seminars, conferences, short term training courses, industrial experience, talks, lectures in refresher / faculty development courses, membership of associations, dissemination and general articles and any other contribution)	15	Actual hours spent per academic year ÷ 10

Table 1.9A

Category-III: Research and academic contributions (for the year 2016)

Category	Activity	Sciences / Engineering / Agriculture / Medical / Veterinary Sciences	Faculties of Languages / Humanities / Arts / Social Sciences / Library / Physical education / Management	Maximum score for University / College teacher*
III (A)	Research Papers published in:	Refereed Journals as notified by the UGC	Refereed Journals as notified by the UGC	15 per Publication
		Other Reputed Journals as notified by the UGC	Other Reputed Journals as notified by the UGC	10 per Publication
III (B)	Publications other than journal articles (books, chapters in books)	Text/Reference Books by International Publishers as notified by the UGC	Text/Reference Books by International Publishers as notified by the UGC	30 per Book for Single Author
		Subject Books by National level publishers as identified by the UGC or State / Central Govt. Publications	Subject Books by National level publishers as identified by the UGC or State / Central Govt. Publications	20 per Book for Single Author
		Subject Books by Other local publishers as identified by the UGC	Subject Books by Other local publishers as identified by the UGC	15 per Book for Single Author
		Chapters in Books published by National and International level publishers as identified by the UGC	Chapters in Books published by National and International level publishers identified by the UGC	International –10 per Chapter National – 5 per Ch
III (C)	RESEARCH PROJECTS			
III (C) (i)	Sponsored Projects	(a) Major Projects with grants above Rs. 30.0 lakhs	Major Projects with grants above Rs. 5.0 lakhs	20 per Project
		(b) Major Projects with grants above Rs. 5.0 lakhs up to Rs. 30.0 lakhs	Major Projects with grants above Rs. 3.0 lakhs up to Rs. 5.0 lakhs	15 per Project
		(c) Minor Projects with grants above Rs. 1.00 lakh up to Rs. 5 lakhs	Minor Projects with grants above Rs. 1.0 lakh up to Rs. 3 lakhs	10 per Project

| III (C) (ii) | Consultancy Projects | Amount mobilized with a minimum of Rs.10.00 lakhs | Amount mobilized with a minimum of Rs. 2.0 lakhs | 10 for every Rs.10.0 lakhs and Rs.2.0 lakhs, respectively |
| III (C) (iii) | Projects Outcome / Outputs | Patent / Technology transfer / Product / Process | Major Policy document of Central / State Govt. Bodies prepared | 30 for each International / 20 for each for national level output or patent or major policy document |

III (D)	RESEARCH GUIDANCE			
III(D)(i)	M.Phil.	Degree awarded	Degree awarded	5 per candidate
III(D) (ii)	Ph.D.	Degree awarded	Degree awarded	15 per candidate
		Thesis submitted	Thesis submitted	10 per candidate
III E	Fellowships, Awards and Invited lectures delivered in conferences / seminars			
III(E) (i)	International Award/Fellowship		International Award / Fellowship	15 per Award / 15 per Fellowship
	National Award/Fellowship		National Award/Fellowship	10 per Award / 10 per Fellowship
	State/University level Award		State/University level Award	5 Per Award
III(E) (ii)	Invited lectures / papers	International	International	7 per lecture / 5 per paper presented
		National level	National level	5 per lecture / 3 per paper presented
		State/University level	State/University level	3 per lecture / 2 per paper presented
	The score under this sub-category shall be restricted to 20% of the minimum fixed for Category III for any assessment period			
III(F)	Development of e-learning delivery process/material			10 per module

Table 1.10A

Category I: Teaching, learning and evaluation related activities (for the year 2016)

Category	Nature of Activity	Assistant Professor		Associate Professor		Professor	
		Max. Score	Actual Score	Max. Score	Actual Score	Max. Score	Actual Score
I	a. Direct Teaching	70	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div 7.5$	60	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div 7.75$	60	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div 7.75$
	b. Examination duties (question paper setting, Invigilation, evaluation of answer scripts) as per allotment	20	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div 10$	20	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div 10$	10	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div 10$
	c. Innovative Teaching - learning methodologies, updating of subject contents/courses, mentoring etc.	10	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div 10$	15	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div 10$	20	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div 10$

Note: Direct Teaching 16/14/14 hours per week include the Lectures/Tutorials/ Practicals/Project Supervision/Field Work. .

Table 1.11A

Category II: Professional development, co-curricular and extension activities (for the year 2016)

Category II	Nature of Activity	Maximum API Score	Actual score
a.	Student related co-curricular, extension and field based activities. (i) Discipline related co-curricular activities (e.g. remedial classes, career counselling, study visit, student seminar and other events.) (ii) Other co-curricular activities (Cultural, Sports, NSS, NCC etc.) (iii) Extension and dissemination activities (public /popular lectures/talks/seminars etc.)	15	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div$ 10
b.	Contribution to corporate life and management of the department and institution through participation in academic and administrative committees and responsibilities. i). Administrative responsibility (including as Dean / Principal / Chairperson / Convener / Teacher-in-charge/similar other duties that require regular office hrs for its discharge) (ii). Participation in Board of Studies, Academic and Administrative Committees	15	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div$ 10
c.	Professional Development activities (such as participation in seminars, conferences, short term training courses, industrial experience, talks, lectures in refresher / faculty development courses, dissemination and general articles and any other contribution)	15	Actual hours spent per academic year $\div$ 10

Table 1.12A

Category-III: Research and academic contributions (for the year 2016)

Category	Activity	Faculty of Sciences / Engineering / Agriculture / Medical / Veterinary Sciences	Faculties of Languages / Humanities / Arts / Social Sciences / Library / Physical education / Management	Maximum score for University / College teacher*
III (A)	Research Papers published in:	Refereed Journals as notified by the UGC#	Refereed Journals as notified by the UGC#	25 per Publication
		Other Reputed Journals as notified by the UGC#	Other Reputed Journals as notified by the UGC #	10 per Publication
III (B)	Publications other than journal articles (books, chapters in books)	Text/Reference, Books published by International Publishers, with ISBN/ISSN number as approved by the University and posted on its website. The List will be intimated to UGC.	Text/Reference Books, published by International Publishers, with ISBN/ISSN number as approved by the University and posted on its website. The List will be intimated to UGC.	30 per Book for Single Author
		Subject Books, published by National level publishers, with ISBN/ISSN number or State / Central Govt. Publications as approved by the University and posted on its website. The List will be intimated to UGC.	Subject Books, published by National level publishers, with ISBN/ISSN number or State / Central Govt. Publications as approved by the University and posted on its website. The List will be intimated to UGC.	20 per Book for Single Author
		Subject Books, published by Other local publishers, with ISBN/ISSN number as approved by the University and posted on its website. The List will be intimated to UGC.	Subject Books, published by Other local publishers, with ISBN/ISSN number as approved by the University and posted on its website. The List will be intimated to UGC.	15 per Book for Single Author
		Chapters in Books, published by National and International level publishers, with ISBN/ISSN number as approved by the University and posted on its website. The List will be intimated to UGC.	Chapters in Books, published by National and International level publishers, with ISBN/ISSN number as approved by the University and posted on its website. The List will be intimated to UGC.	International – 10 per Chapter National – 5 per Chapter
III (C)	RESEARCH PROJECTS			
III (C) (i)	Sponsored Projects	(a) Major Projects with grants above Rs. 30 lakhs	Major Projects with grants above Rs. 5 lakhs	20 per Project
		(b) Major Projects with grants above Rs. 5 lakhs up to Rs. 30 lakhs	Major Projects with grants above Rs. 3 lakhs up to Rs. 5 lakhs	15 per Project
		(c) Minor Projects with grants above Rs. 1 lakh up to Rs. 5 lakhs	Minor Projects with grants above Rs. 1 lakh up to Rs. 3 lakhs	10 per Project
III (C) (ii)	Consultancy Projects	Amount mobilized with a minimum of Rs.10 lakhs	Amount mobilized with a minimum of Rs. 2 lakhs	10 for every Rs.10 lakhs and Rs.2 lakhs,

				respectively
III (C) (iii)	Projects Outcome / Outputs	Patent / Technology transfer / Product / Process	Major Policy document prepared for international bodies like WHO/UNO/UNESCO/UNICEF etc. Central / State Govt./Local Bodies	30 for each International / 20 for each national level output or patent. Major policy document of International bodies - 30 Central Government – 20, State Govt.-10 Local bodies – 5
III (D)	**RESEARCH GUIDANCE**			
III(D)(i)	M.Phil.	Degree awarded	Degree awarded	5 per candidate
III(D) (ii)	Ph.D.	Degree awarded / Thesis submitted	Degree awarded / Thesis submitted	15/10 per candidate
III E	Fellowships, Awards and Invited lectures delivered in conferences / seminars			
III(E) (i)	Fellowships/ Awards	International Award/Fellowship from academic bodies	International Award / Fellowship from academic bodies/associations	15 per Award / 15 per Fellowship
		National Award/Fellowship from academic bodies	National Award/Fellowship from academic bodies/associations	10 per Award / 10 per Fellowship
		State/University level Award from academic bodies	State/University level Award from academic bodies/associations	5 Per Award
III(E) (ii)	Invited lectures / papers	International	International	7 per lecture / 5 per paper presented
		National level	National level	5 per lecture / 3 per paper presented
		State/University level	State/University level	3 per lecture / 2 per paper presented
	The score under this sub-category shall be restricted to 20% of the minimum fixed for Category III for any assessment period			
III(F)	Development of e-learning delivery process/material			10 per module

* Wherever relevant to any specific discipline, the API score for paper in refereed journal would be augmented as follows: (i) paper with impact factor less than 1 - by 5 points; (ii) papers with impact factor between 1 and 2 by 10 points; (iii) papers with impact factor between 2 and 5 by 15 points; (iv) papers with impact factor between 5 and 10 by 20 points: (v) papers with impact factor above 10 by 25 points. The API for joint publications shall be calculated in the following manner: Of the total score for the relevant category of publication by the concerned teacher, the First and Principal / corresponding author /supervisor / mentor would share equally 70% of the total points and the remaining 30% would be shared equally by all other authors.

The University shall identify the journals subject-wise through subject expert committees and forward the recommendations to UGC in the format prescribed by UGC for approval of the UGC Standing Committee. The journals approved from this list, by the UGC Standing Committee, shall be included in the "List of Journals" notified by the UGC. The UGC Standing Committee shall give its recommendations within 60 working days of the receipt of the list from the University. The UGC Standing Committee may also, suo-moto, recommend journals for inclusion in the "List of Journals". The clause 6.0.5 (i) will be strictly followed by the University.

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Table 1.13A

Assessment Criteria and Methodology for University/College Teachers (for the year 2018)

S.No.	Activity	Grading Criteria
1.	Teaching: (Number of classes taught/total classes assigned): 100% (Classes taught includes sessions on tutorials, lab and other teaching related activities)	80% & above------Good Below 80% but 70% & above—Satisfactory Less than 70%----Not satisfactory
2.	Involvement in the University/College students related activities/research activities: (a) Administrative responsibilities such as Head, Chairperson/ Dean/ Director/ Co-ordinator, Warden etc. (b) Examination and evaluation duties assigned by the college / university or attending the examination paper evaluation. (c) Student related co-curricular, extension and field based activities such as student clubs, career counselling, study visits, student seminars and other events, cultural, sports, NCC, NSS and community services. (d) Organising seminars/conferences/workshops, other college/university activities. (e) Evidence of actively involved in guiding Ph.D students. (f) Conducting minor or major research project sponsored by national or international agencies. (g) At least one single or joint	Good—Involved in at least 3 activities Satisfactory—1-2 activities Not-satisfactory-Not involved / undertaken any of the activities **Note:** Number of activities can be within or across the broad categories of activities
		publication in peer reviewed/UGC list of Journals.	

Overall Grading:
Good: Good in teaching and satisfactory or good in activity at Sl.No.2.
Or
Satisfactory: Satisfactory in teaching and good or satisfactory in activity at Sl.No.2.
Not Satisfactory: If neither good nor satisfactory in overall grading

Table 1.14A

Assessment Criteria and Methodology for University Teachers (Academic/Research)
(for the year 2018)

Academic/Research Activity	Faculty of Sciences/Engineering/Agriculture/ Medical /Veterinary Sciences	Faculty of languages/Humanities/Arts/Social Science /Library/Education/Physical Education/Commerce/Management & other related discipline
1.Research Papers Published in Peer Reviewed/UGC listed Journals	08 per paper	10 per paper
2.Books/ e-booksauthored which are published by		
International publishers	10	10
National publishers	08	08
Chapter in Edited Book	05	05
Editor of Book by International Publisher	10	10
Editor of Book by National Publisher	08	08
*e-content (developed in 4 quadrants) per module	05	05
MOOCs (developed) per module/lecture	05	05
3. Research Projects Completed:		
More than 10 lakhs	10	10
Less than 10 lakhs	05	05
Ongoing:		
More than 10 lakhs	05	05
Less than 10 lakhs	02	02
Consultancy:	03	03
4. Patents		
International	10	10

National	07	07
*Policy Document		
International	10	10
National	07	07
State	04	04
5. Research Guidance		
Ph.D.	10/per degree awarded 05/thesis submitted	10/per degree awarded 05/per thesis submitted
M.Phil./PG dissertation	02/degree awarded	02/per degree awarded
6. *Invited lectures / Resource Person /paper presentation		
International (Abroad)	7	7
International (within country)	5	5
National	3	3
State / University	2	2

The Research Score for papers would be augmented as follows:
Peer reviewed /UGC listed journals
i) Paper in referred journals without impact factor - 5 Points
ii) Paper with impact factor less than 1   - 10 Points
iii) Paper with impact factor between 1 and 2   - 15 Points
iv) Paper with impact factor between 2 and 5   - 20 Points
v) Paper with impact factor between 5 and 10   - 25 Points
vi) Paper with impact factor >10   - 30 Points
Joint Publication:
(a) Two authors: 50% of total value of publication for each author
(b) More than two authors: 70% of total value of publication for the First/Principal/Corresponding authorand 30% of total value of publication for each of the joint authors.
Joint Projects: Principal Investigator and Co-investigator would get 50% each.

Notes:
Paper presented if part of edited book or proceeding then it can be claimed only once.
- For joint supervision of research students the formula shall be 70/30. First Supervisor shall get 7 marks and co-supervisor 3 marks.
- In development of e-content in 4 quadrants for a complete course/e-book may be assigned points equivalent to authoring a book at national level, contribution to development of e-content modules in complete course/paper/e-book may be awarded points same as that of contributed chapters in edited book and editor of e-content for complete course/paper/e-book may be awarded points same as that for editor of a book by National Publisher.
- Development of various quadrants of complete MOOCs may be given the weightage similar to authoring a book, contribution to development of modules in a complete MOOCs may be awarded points same as contributed chapters in edited book and coordinator of MOOCs for complete course may be awarded points same as that for editor of a book by National Publisher.
- For the purpose of calculating research score of the person, the combined research score from the categories of **Policy Document** and **Invited lectures / Resource Person /paper presentation** shall have an upper capping of 30% of the total research score of the person.
- The research score shall be from the minimum of 3 categories out of 6 categories.

Table 1.15A

Criteria for Short listing of candidates for Interview for the Post of Assistant Professors in Universities (for the year 2018)

S.No.	Academic Record	Score		
1.	Graduation	80% and above = 15	60%to less than 80% = 13	55% to less than 60% = 10
2.	Post Graduation	80% and above = 28	60%to less than 80% = 25	55% to less than 60% = 20
3.	M.Phil.	60% and above = 07		55% to less than 60% = 05
4.	Ph.D.	30		
5.	NET with JRF NET or equivalent	07 5		
6.	Research Publications (2 marks for each research publications published in Peer Reviewed/UGC listed Journals)	10		
7.	Teaching/Post Doctoral Experience (2 marks for one year each)#	10		

However, if the period of teaching/Post-doctoral experience is less than one year then the marks shall be reduced proportionately.
Note:
(A) (i)M.Phil + Ph.D Maximum – 30 Marks
      (ii) JRF/NET/SET Maximum – 07 Marks
(B) Number of candidates to be called for interview shall be decided by the concerned universities.
(C) Academic Score   - 80
      Research Publications   - 10
      Teaching Experience   - 10
      Total :   -100
(D) SET/SLET score shall be valid for appointment in respective State Universities/Colleges/Institutions only

Annexure II Questionnaire for Faculty

Name of the faculty
University
Discipline
Designation
Courses and programme taught
Date of Joining the present university

A	General perception about faculty responsibility and freedom
1	How do you understand the accountability/ roles and responsibility of a faculty?
2	How do you understand academic freedom of faculty? Do you think it is vital?
3	Has your department implemented API? Since when? Is it actively implementing?
4	Do you think registering quantifiable output can improve faculty performance? Why or why not?
5	Are you aware about the movement in Delhi university? What are your views about that?
B	Teaching
6	The regulation mentions about outside the classroom interaction a) Do you find it desirable given the time constraint you are faced with? B) do you engage yourself in academic interactions with your students outside the classroom?
7	Do you find any kind of burden due to minimum hours of teaching per week? If yes, why? Do you feel any constraint on your research activities?
C	Research
8	Is it wise for faculty to focus more on research than other activities given the former renders greater prestige?
9	Do you feel that API has put pressure on faculty to publish more?
10	There has been a sudden outburst of large number of journals. Don't you feel faculty are rational in publishing these journals in order to have job security?
11	Do you feel the need to score points every year/ assessment period hampers research for societal welfare? (And rather there is more focus on applied research because of urgency to secure points?)
12	Do you think that there is a growing network amongst academics post API? If yes, go to 14a, otherwise to 15)
13	Is this networking amenable to improving quality of work or is it hampering quality due to favourism, if any?
D	Competition, Individualism
14	Do you think instilling competitive environment amongst faculty could lead to better quality output? (Yes/No)
15	Has performance assessment instilled individualism amongst your peers? (Yes/ No/ Somewhat) In case of yes/somewhat go to 16a, otherwise go to 17
15a	Has there been any effect on collegiality in your department?
16	What is more crucial for quality work? Please tick.
i)	Internal motivation
ii)	External rewards

17	Do you see a relationship between the two? If No, why? If yes-
i)	Positive
ii)	Negative
18	What can lead to better performance of faculty- Individual performance assessment or Departmental performance assessment? Why?
E	UNIVERSITY CULTURE
19	Is your university culture (IQAC) focussed on generating quality work? How or how not?
20	Is your university culture amenable to giving academic freedom to the faculty?
21	Should faculty raise voice against regulations? What about your university?
22	Do you get enough funds to support your academic activities?
G	API, motivation and academic freedom
23	Does API motivate you perform more/better? Why/ Why not?
24	Does API somewhere constrain your academic freedom? If yes, in what all areas?
25	Should there be an alternative to API?
26	Do you think that there is any loss of trust being placed in your work? If yes, how do you feel about it?
27	Please rank the following statements, where 1 is strongly agree and 5 strongly disagree
i	API has led to time crunch for you
ii	Co-curricular activities reduce motivation for academic activities
iii	Time crunch reduces your intrinsic (internal) motivation to perform
iv	API has led to producing outputs which are quick to be registered-like applied research
	than basic research (in case of sciences)
v	The UGC is losing trust in faculty and therefore instituted API
vi	Performance assessment has led to enhancing your motivation to work better
vii	There is no fund shortage from university for you to conduct research
viii	Registering output every year/ assessment period takes away the agency to work on research areas which you find interesting
ix	Registering output every year/ assessment period takes away your agency to work in areas which are important for societal welfare
x	Registering output every year/ assessment period takes away your liberty to engage in creative endeavour requiring long time

Annexure III Questionnaire for IQAC director

Name

Department

Number of year served as IQAC director

1	How do you understand the accountability of faculty?
2	Do you think faculty should be given academic autonomy? Why or why not?
3	Do you think quantification of faculty output can make faculty perform better?
4	Has student feedback been instrumental in enhancing teaching quality in your university?
5	Do you think performance assessment can help reduce cases of shirking away from work by faculty (in case, any)?
6	What in your view is more important for quality work- a)internal motivation, b)external rewards, c)both (elaborate the relationship between the two)
7	Do you think instilling competitive environment could help improve quality work by faculty?
8	Has performance assessment brought about individualism in your university? If yes, how has collegiality been affected?
9	What could lead to better performance-individual assessment, departmental level assessment, and university level?
10	Do you think UGC is losing trust in faculty and therefore instituted API? Why or why not?
11	Does the university face any constraint in adapting to the accountability norms by UGC (like API, NIRF)?
12	What all measures does IQAC take to ensure quality output from faculty?
13	Does API motivate faculty in your university to perform better?
14	Do you experience cases where some faculty members publish in moderate/poor quality journals? Do you find this behaviour justified or rational given the time constraint, their abilities and pressure to perform?
15	Do you find a change in the nature of output produced post API-applied than basic? If yes, what could be the possible reason?
16	Have you come across any instances where faculty face problems in registering outputs- (particularly research)? If yes, what were the reasons stated?
17	Does your university undertake training courses in research for faculty? If yes, does that help them conduct research better?
18	Has the UGC accepted the list of journal sent by your university or has there been any rejection? In case of rejection, what reason was stated by the UGC?
19	Do you get adequate support from the faculty and administration in conducting your work in IQAC?
20	Does UGC provide you with enough autonomy and funds to conduct your work smoothly?
21	Has there been any deviation in the API from what is suggested by UGC?
22	Do you feel API is biased towards certain discipline? Have your faculty expressed such concern to you?
23	Do you feel faculty have increased research activity post API? How is teaching affected in the process?
24	Would you like to suggest any alternative to API or any amendments to it? Are there any university specific issues you would like to account for in the assessment?

Annexure IV Statistical Tables

Table 6.1A

Normality test for the scale of Academic Freedom

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test

		total_af
N		50
Normal Parameters[a,b]	Mean	10.2400
	Std. Deviation	3.44970
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.108
	Positive	.108
	Negative	-.095
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		.762
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.607

a. Test distribution is Normal.

b. Calculated from data.

Table 6.2A

Normality test for the scale of Motivation

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test

		total_motiv
N		50
Normal Parameters[a,b]	Mean	8.9000
	Std. Deviation	2.44323
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.194
	Positive	.115
	Negative	-.194
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		1.370
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.047

a. Test distribution is Normal.

b. Calculated from data.

Annexure V Faculty Response for different items

Table 6.3A

Proportion of faculty strongly agreeing or agreeing to different items for University A in per centage

| | Per centage of faculty either strongly agreeing or agreeing | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Designation | | | Discipline | | Intersection of Designation and Discipline | | | | | |
Items	Total	Assistant Professor	Associate Professor	Professor	Science	Social Science	Science Assistant Professor	Science Associate Professor	Science Professor	Social Science Assistant Professor	Social Science Associate Professor	Social Science Professor
API has led to time crunch	34	40	17	33	31	38	33	100	33	50	20	25
There is no fund shortage for you to conduct research	22	25	17	17	25	19	25	0	33	25	20	0
Registering output every year/ assessment period takes away the agency to work on research areas which you find interesting	44	40	67	33	50	38	42	100	67	38	60	0
Registering output every year/ assessment period takes away your agency to work in areas which are important for societal welfare	50	45	67	50	56	44	42	100	100	50	60	0
Registering output every year/ assessment period takes away your liberty to engage in creative endeavour requiring long time	53	60	50	33	63	44	58	100	67	63	40	0
API has led to producing outputs which are quick to be registered-like applied research than basic research	66	65	83	50	63	69	50	100	100	88	80	0
The UGC is losing trust in faculty and therefore instituted PBAS	50	50	33	67	50	50	50	0	67	50	40	50
Cocurricula activities reduce motivation for academic activities	34	45	0	33	38	31	42	0	33	50	0	25
Performance Assessment has led to enhancing your motivation to perform better	50	55	50	33	63	38	67	100	33	38	40	25

Source: Authors' computation

Table 6.4A

Proportion of faculty either strongly agreeing or agreeing to different items for University B (in per centage)

| Items | Per centage of faculty either strongly agreeing or agreeing | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Designation | | | Discipline | | Intersection of Designation and Discipline | | | | | |
	Total	Assistant Professor	Associate Professor	Professor	Science	Social Science	Science Assistant Professor	Science Associate Professor	Science Professor	Social Science Assistant Professor	Social Science Associate Professor	Social Science Professor
API has led to time crunch	44	56	17	67	13	70	0	25	50	71	50	100
There is no fund shortage for you to conduct research	22	33	0	33	38	10	100	25	0	14	0	0
Registering output every year/ assessment period takes away the agency to work on research areas which you find interesting	56	44	50	100	63	50	100	100	50	29	100	100
Registering output every year/ assessment period takes away your agency to work in areas which are important for societal welfare	72	56	83	100	75	70	50	100	50	57	100	100
Registering output every year/ assessment period takes away your liberty to engage in creative endeavour requiring long time	67	89	33	67	25	100	50	75	50	100	100	100
API has led to producing outputs which are quick to be registered-like applied research than basic research (in case of sciences)	50	89	17	0	25	70	100	25	0	86	50	0
The UGC is losing trust in faculty and therefore instituted PBAS	39	44	33	33	25	50	0	75	50	57	50	0
Cocurricula activities reduce motivation for academic activities	33	33	50	0	13	50	0	50	0	43	100	0
Performance Assessment has led to enhancing your motivation to perform better	72	89	50	67	88	60	100	100	50	86	0	0

Source: Author's computation

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